DEFENDING THE FAITH FROM FRANCE:
AN UNDERLYING MOTIVATION OF THE ENGLISH CROWN’S
POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PAPACY, 1509-1522

by

ANTHONY STEVEN BROWN

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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 1

1) DEFENDING THE FAITH FROM FRANCE: HENRY VIII’S PERCEPTION OF HIS POLITICAL ROLE VIS-À-VIS THE PAPACY 38

2) HONORARY PAPAL AWARDS AS INCENTIVES AND REWARDS FOR HENRY VIII’S ‘DEFENCE’ OF ROME FROM FRANCE 130

3) THE ROLE OF PAPAL CENSURES IN ENGLISH ATTEMPTS TO DEFEND THE PAPACY FROM FRANCE 174

4) ENSURING THE “FURTHERANS OF AL HYS AFERYS IN TYME TO KOME”: THE ENGLISH CROWN’S ATTEMPTS TO INFLUENCE CONCLAVES IN ITS OWN INTEREST AND TO PREVENT THE ELECTION OF A ‘FRENCH’ POPE 226

5) INFLUENCING ACCESS TO ‘THE FOUNDATION AND HINGE’ OF THE PAPACY: ENGLISH ATTEMPTS TO AFFECT THE COMPOSITION OF THE SACRED COLLEGE 284

CONCLUSION 342

APPENDIX: NARRATIVE, 1509-1522 358

PHASE I: 1509-1514 359

PHASE II: 1514-1518 458

PHASE III: 1518-1522 645
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AHP</td>
<td>Archivum Historiae Pontificiae.</td>
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<tr>
<td>AHR</td>
<td>American Historical Review.</td>
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<tr>
<td>BIHR</td>
<td>British Institute of Historical Research.</td>
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<tr>
<td>EHR</td>
<td>English Historical Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fiddes</td>
<td>The Life of Cardinal Wolsey, R. Fiddes, (1724).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HJ</td>
<td>The Historical Journal.</td>
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<tr>
<td>JEH</td>
<td>Journal of Ecclesiastical History.</td>
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<tr>
<td>JMH</td>
<td>Journal of Modern History.</td>
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<tr>
<td>JWC</td>
<td>Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes.</td>
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MHP  Miscellanea Historiae Pontificiae.


P&P  Past and Present.


TRHS  Transactions of the Royal Historical Society


Note:

For all other referenced works, I have employed a short-title system throughout. For instance, after the first full citation of W.E. Wilkie, The Cardinal Protectors of England: Rome and the
Tudors Before the Reformation (1974), I refer to this resource as W.E. Wilkie, *Cardinal Protectors*. 
INTRODUCTION

When seeking to analyse Anglo-papal relations in the early sixteenth century, a lack of relevant research becomes quickly apparent. While a wide range of studies refer at times to this subject in terms of the grand narrative of English or papal foreign policy, few consider the relationship of temporal heads of state with the papacy or focus more directly upon elements of contacts between England and Rome during this period.¹ To address this area, a broad assessment of the English crown’s relationship with the Apostolic See for the earlier part of Henry VIII’s reign was planned, a time when England was still undeniably loyal to Rome. Preliminary research made it apparent that the nature of this intercourse was frequently affected by the dynamics of and tensions inherent between the temporal and spiritual roles of the papacy. It was gradually realised, however, that the constraints presented by a study of this kind permitted only one aspect of this relationship to be examined here. As a result, consultation of the published primary sources available, particularly correspondence and documents contained in the likes of the *Letters and Papers*, highlighted a valid opportunity for more focused research, specifically the need for consideration of how the English crown related with the papacy in its role as a territorial prince and an assessment of the extent to which England’s temporal concerns affected aspects of its broader relationship with the Apostolic See.² This opportunity was further emphasised when it was realised that this dual role of the papacy, while long recognised in historiography, has only since the 1960s begun to

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¹ Often, a narrower focus on Anglo-papal relations occurs only from when Henry’s marriage to Catherine of Aragon failed. This will be demonstrated in the brief historiographical survey outlined below; pp.8ff.
² For the sake of this study, the ‘temporal’ role that is being referred to is the princely function fulfilled by the popes by virtue of their contemporary territorial possessions, largely the lands known as the Papal States. This is distinct from earlier papal claims to universal temporal power within Christendom over all other secular princes (even the emperor). For this latter idea, see R.W. Southern, *Western Society and the Church in the Middle Ages* (1970), pp.143-150. While the Anglo-centricity of this thesis may not be to all tastes, it will become apparent in the survey of relevant historical research below that no exclusive study has ever been made to address the English perspective. An attempt is being made, therefore, to begin to fill a gap in academic research; M. Harvey, *England, Rome and the Papacy 1417-1464: the Story of a Relationship* (1993), p.1; pp.8ff.
receive direct attention from writers. Further refinement of this topic was enabled when it became clear that a central preoccupation with France constantly manifested itself in the Anglo-papal political relationship; each party perceiving the other as a potentially valuable ally against this ‘superpower’. Concern with French power also emerged in the English crown’s perception of its own role vis-à-vis Rome; Henry VIII sought to protect the Church from the influence of the Most Christian King(s), whose presence in Italy during this period posed a great threat to papal political ‘independence’, as far as England and its interests were concerned.

The overall intention is, therefore, to establish that the crown recognised the need to relate with Rome throughout this period on a predominantly temporal level concerning France, albeit within the context of this dual framework, when navigating its political course in relation to the ‘barque of St Peter’, with a constant eye on the successful pursuit of its own interests. It will be seen that this resulted in problems and tensions within the Anglo-papal relationship, as popes equally needed to act in their own political interests as temporal princes, as well as within their spiritual role as universal ordinary and were, as the English feared, frequently under strong political pressure from France, which could affect their

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4 This idea will be examined more fully in a subsequent chapter. Suffice it to say for now that the English crown most feared the prospect of a ‘French’ papacy which, on account of the traditional rivalry and xenophobia between England and France, it expected would have negative repercussions on its relationship with Rome in both temporal and spiritual spheres; pp.76ff. Focus could also have been made on the Anglo-papal relationship as affected by Scotland, albeit the dynamic with Rome was somewhat different. While Henry VIII and the papacy had a mutually direct relationship with and concern for France, Scotland’s distance from the Papal States meant that only the English king had a similar interest in this northern state. The papacy simply did not have a concern for Scottish power that would give rise to situations whereby English support would be sought, as was the case in its experiences with Louis XII and Francis I. In turn, this means that Henry VIII never really envisaged a need to ‘defend the faith’ from Scotland in the same way that he did France. Henry, on the other hand, sought papal support for his own political interests with Scotland. This was demonstrated vis-à-vis Rome, for instance, particularly after the Battle of Flodden (9 September 1513) when, trying to enforce English claims to overlordship of Scotland, Henry attempted to gain control of appointments to the Scottish episcopate, although one could tentatively posit that Leo X’s lack of direct interest in the kingdom (and lack of desire to offend Scotland’s powerful ally, France), contributed to the ultimate failure of this move. Due to the necessary limitations of this study, further comment, analysis and justification of Scotland’s role in the Anglo-papal relationship is not feasible, although it will occasionally arise, albeit in the context of the broader anti-French agenda which remains the principal focus of this thesis; pp.450-452.
decisions. Consequently, it will be demonstrated that the English crown made (foreign) policy decisions on subjects concerning Rome which recognised the politicisation of the papacy by virtue of the temporal demands imposed by its ownership of the Papal States. In this context, it will be the contention of this thesis that the English crown under Henry VIII, for all its recognition of the spiritual supremacy of the Vicar of Christ, was able to discriminate whether the pope was acting either wholly or partly in his temporal role (as a territorial prince in an extremely volatile corner of Christendom), and adjusted its approaches and responses accordingly to treat the pontiff in virtue of his motives and English foreign policy interests. Moreover, in this light, it will be found that the English crown’s perception of itself in its political relations with Rome, as well as those links themselves, were affected markedly by the crown’s concern with France, the latter’s ambitions in Italy and how these could affect English interests with regard to the papacy. Henry visualised himself, it will be seen, as the defender or protector of Rome from France.

In determining the chronology of this study, it has already been mentioned that writers concentrating on Anglo-papal relations involving Henry VIII have largely focused on his marriage dispute onwards, through the Reformation and beyond. As the original intention of this study was to research Henry’s formative relations with Rome as a ‘most devoted son’ of the Church, a distinct period was therefore sought during the earlier part of his reign.\(^5\) Once his preoccupation with France and his desire to ‘defend’ the papacy, politically speaking, from the French was identified, a succinct period of study emerged. Beginning at Henry VIII’s accession, this underlying theme can be confidently plotted up to the end of 1521, culminating in Leo X’s recognition of this function when he awarded him the title ‘fidei

\(^5\) Henry tended to end his letters to the pope with this phrase; C.H. Burns, ‘Papal Gifts and Honours for the Earlier Tudors’, *MHP*, 50 (1983), p.185.
"defensor" and followed shortly after by this pontiff’s death. As will be seen in the narrative, this end date also represents Henry VIII’s strategies to ‘defend’ Rome having come full circle; he began his reign in 1509 eager to attack France (at least partly) to this end and ended in 1521 committed to the same course. Finally, the period encapsulates a time before Henry’s marital issues and repercussions from the Lutheran controversy affected the relationship with Rome.

To demonstrate this anti-French focus underlying the English crown’s relationship with Rome, it became increasingly apparent that direct research was required on the political dimension of these contacts and how this affected broader relations between them. To achieve this, a number of stages need to be reached before such a discussion can take place. In the first place, one needs to define the two parties involved: the crown, as the governmental institution that acted on behalf of the kingdom of England, and the papacy, particularly in terms of how the heir of St Peter was perceived from an English perspective. Secondly, the means by which the English crown related with Rome in the political sphere requires some elaboration. The distance between the two powers necessarily impeded their relationship, although this period coincided with the beginnings of permanent resident diplomacy. This outline will provide some necessary context that will contribute to an increased understanding of the relationship as it existed.

The next stage of this study is a detailed narrative that focuses on the crown-papal relationship that was conducted and developed 1509-1522. This provides an integral contextual basis for the analysis of this thesis although, for reasons of space, it will be

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6 While the title was awarded in direct recognition of Henry VIII’s book, Assertio Septem Sacramentorum, the king had pursued this honour in recognition of his actions by the sword for some years; pp.151-173.
incorporated as an appendix. While there are plenty of accounts of Henrician foreign policy, as well as those on the political directions of the papacy and other heads of state, none is sufficiently detailed to test the underlying thesis; that a significant focus of the English modus operandi with Rome was to prevent French dominance of the papacy. Secondly, the lack of any directly Anglo-papal narrative makes it doubly difficult to draw an accurate picture of this relationship. To address these deficiencies, therefore, it has been necessary to reappraise the available sources from which Henry VIII’s foreign policy has been reconstructed; particularly diplomatic and other correspondence. To make this narrative more manageable, the period 1509-1522 was divided into three phases. Each demonstrated the different approaches taken by the English crown in its attempts to shield Rome from French attempts to achieve hegemony in Italy (implicit in which was the crown’s pursuit of its own interests). They also highlight a papacy that largely encouraged Henry VIII to perform this role, although there were times when the weight of French influence on Rome or when the papacy was negotiating with France meant that it could not voice this sentiment publicly. In the first phase, 1509-1514, direct aggression was sought and employed to support a (largely) collusive papacy, which culminated in the English invasion of France in 1513. This was largely successful, although the papacy pressured Henry towards peace in 1514. In the second period, 1514-1518, a flawed Anglo-French peace allowed Francis I to act in Italy and the English crown backed indirect military support for a pontiff whose political independence of action was severely limited by the French king’s victory at the Battle of Marignano (1515). This failed, as did subsequent attempts to galvanise an anti-French coalition ‘in defence of the Church’. This forced Henry VIII to look to an alternative solution (and implicitly recognise French gains in Italy up to that point), which was found by Wolsey’s combining French peace

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7 See pp.358-756.
8 See pp.8ff.
overtures with papal crusading overtures, emerging with a universal peace agreement (Treaty of London, 1518). This diplomatic success intended to restrain France from further interference in Italy by virtue of its offensive focus on the Ottoman threat and by its defensive commitment to the security of all adherents. In the third phase, 1518-1521, one finds Henry VIII and Wolsey attempting to implement this restraining policy, although this became increasingly untenable, as the rivalry between Charles V and Francis I escalated from the Imperial election (1519) onwards. As France and the Holy Roman Empire headed towards full-scale war Henry VIII, by virtue of the universal peace agreement, had the excuse he needed to ‘defend’ the papacy robustly once more and Wolsey formalised this with Charles V at Bruges during 1521. The period ends with Henry committed to war, while the anti-French coalition (minus any English contribution) expelled the French from Milan shortly before Leo X’s death, thereby causing French influence in Italy and, by implication over the papacy, to drop to pre-1515 levels (before the Battle of Marignano).

The reconstructed narrative background has facilitated the principal focus of this study that analyses the political underpinning of aspects of the English crown’s relationship with the papacy. The main crux of the argument will be that Henry and his advisors both sought papal support for their own designs against France and feared for papal security and ‘independence’ in the face of the French threat. This, it will be argued, was central to Henry VIII’s perception of his own political role in relation to Rome. It will become apparent that England portrayed itself and, in many cases, acted as the ‘defender’ of the institution, particularly as a territorial principate. Finally, this study will be drawn together with an analysis of the effects that this perception had on aspects largely peculiar to the Anglo-papal relationship that often incorporated the latter’s spiritual role. The elements to be focused on are papal honorary
awards, papal censures, conclaves and appointments to the Sacred College. Here it will be found that the English crown hoped to gain or influence these processes both in its own political interest, as well as to the detriment of France. It will also be seen that the papacy recognised the political leverage that this gave it over England and employed it to further the anti-French agenda. Finally, some tentative conclusions will be possible concerning this aspect of England’s relationship with Rome. Despite the overall focus being on the crown’s interaction with the temporal role of the papal institution, it must be emphasised that the latter’s wider, universal, spiritual pretensions cannot be detached entirely, as both roles overlapped, so reference to and consideration of spiritual elements of the relationship will be made, but mainly when they were affected profoundly by temporal causes (as far as these can be identified).

The research for this study has been enabled by and derived from a considerable volume of printed primary sources. The most relevant have been the Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic, of Henry VIII, the State Papers, and the Calendars of State Papers relating to Henry VIII, Milan, Spain and Venice. Similar correspondence can also be found in Martene and Durand’s Veterum Scriptorum et Monumentorum, Ellis’ Original Letters and Rymer’s Foedera. Each of these collections adds considerable detail to the general political picture gleaned from modern historiography and contributed to the need felt to plot a new narrative with the main focus on England and Rome. Also, with reference to the papacy,

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9 Focus could also easily be made on appointments to benefices, jurisdiction, taxation and the crusade, aspects of which preliminary research revealed to have a direct impact on England’s political relationship with Rome, vis-à-vis France. Time and space, however, have forced any consideration of these to be deferred for another time.

10 While the temporal relationship is the aspect to be considered for the most part here, the spiritual sphere is taken into account but, as will be demonstrated, political considerations quite often affected spiritual contacts between the two parties, sometimes taking precedence over the pontiff’s ecclesiastical role as leader of the Church. In any case, the likes of Partner and Hay have increasingly demonstrated that such a focus is a justifiable pursuit, M. Harvey, England, Rome and the Papacy, p.1; also see pp.10-11.

11 While most of these have been mined by historians, they have not yet been exhausted as primary sources.
various bishops’ registers occasionally shed light on relations, as well as the latest *Calendars of Papal Registers*. Reliance on diplomatic sources, such as the despatches of Venetian envoys, has been questioned for lulling readers into believing that they provide an insightful portrayal of events within, say, the English Court, while, in fact, providing just a superficial idea of what actually happened. While the accuracy of diplomatic correspondence can often be superseded by seemingly more factual primary sources, such as financial documents, in explaining what actually happened, they inadequately illustrate the opinions and beliefs of contemporaries making the decisions that led to such statistics. Indeed, the pitfalls of such sources notwithstanding, diplomatic evidence can still be reliable and useful, particularly if their contents cross-reference with other sources and correspondence. Often, however, it is the only source for opinions and events, particularly among the English, so appropriate caution must be exercised. Equal care had to be taken given that the format of most printed sources consulted is largely in abstract form. While potentially useful material may still await discovery, the sheer volume of consulted sources that reiterate the main argument of this study validate the approach taken and has facilitated access to sources that may otherwise prove inaccessible.

In terms of the gap in secondary materials that helps to justify and support this study, it again ought to be stressed that little material covers Anglo-papal relations *per se*, let alone their political dimension and the importance attached by the English crown to its consideration of the pope’s temporal role in these contacts. Among the works available, one can identify four relevant types of writing. Firstly, there are those that include Anglo-Roman relations as part of their ‘grand narrative’, particularly works on the activities of the main

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12 For example, *Reg. de Castello; Reg. Mayew; Reg. Wolsey; CPLXIX, XX.*
protagonists (mainly in the political sphere). Among these are biographies of Henry VIII, Thomas Wolsey, Julius II and Leo X which are usually quite generalised and are often driven by narrative. As a result of their principal focus on the ‘great person’ of their titles, there are only occasional references to Anglo-papal relations, as and when their remits dictate.\(^{14}\) One exception to this rule is A.F. Pollard who, in part of his study of Wolsey, developed a paradigm concerning the papacy to explain the direction of Wolsey’s (rather than Henry’s) foreign policy. He envisaged Wolsey as having aligned England politically with the papacy throughout the period of his ascendancy, ostensibly in a bid to secure the papal tiara for himself.\(^{15}\) While this theory, widely held for a number of years, has fallen out of favour, it does see Pollard attempting to focus upon the English crown’s temporal relationship with Rome.\(^{16}\) This text is relevant and useful, therefore, but does not adequately survey crown-papal relations in the sense intended for this study. Rather it tries to fit English foreign policy into the temporal direction taken by the papacy during Wolsey’s ascendancy, not always successfully.

A second type of study that sometimes impinges on this subject is that which aims at a thematic consideration of English foreign policy. While the likes of an essay on foreign policy by Potter and a collection of articles by Doran and Richardson provide valuable context for

\(^{14}\) The chief examples of this genre that have been utilised in this study are Scarisbrick’s biography of Henry VIII, those of Pollard and Gwyn for Wolsey, Shaw’s study of Julius II, Roscoe’s on Leo X, as well as the Creighton and Pastor histories of the papacy; J.J. Scarisbrick, *Henry VIII* (1968); C. Shaw, *Julius II: The Warrior Pope* (1996); W. Roscoe, *The Life and Pontificate of Leo the Tenth*, 2 vols. (1853); A.F. Pollard, *Wolsey* (1929); P.J. Gwyn, *The King’s Cardinal: the Rise and Fall of Thomas Wolsey* (1990); M. Creighton, *A History of the Papacy from the Great Schism to the Sack of Rome*, vols. v-vi (1903); L. Pastor, *The History of the Popes from the Close of the Middle Ages Drawn from the Secret Archives of the Vatican and Other Original Sources*, vols. vi-ix (1908-1923). In the index to Scarisbrick’s study of Henry VIII, for example, there are only 10 references apiece to Julius II and Leo X (if one excludes references to Julius II’s brief and bull relating to Henry VIII’s marriage, all of which are cited during the dispute that came after this period). In Shaw’s biography of Julius II, on the other hand, reference is made to Henry VIII in the index on only 11 occasions. While this is only an extremely rough indication of the discussion of crown-papal relations in these pieces, it does still give an idea of the gap in historical research; J.J. Scarisbrick, *Henry VIII*, pp.555-556; C. Shaw, *Julius II*, p.352.

\(^{15}\) A.F. Pollard, *Wolsey* (1929), pp.16-17, 121-123 and, more generally, pp.99-164.

\(^{16}\) The implications of this theory on the debate as to who controlled English foreign policy during this period will be raised later; pp.15-17.
England’s relationship with its fellow-states in Christendom, they rarely address how this affected political contacts with Rome, implying the need for a more direct study on this subject.\textsuperscript{17} Similarly, there are also several articles that analyse particular moments in ‘Wolsey’s’ foreign policy, such as the Treaty of London of 1518 and his subsequent interactions with the Holy Roman Empire at the conferences of Calais and Bruges during 1521 which, again, are useful more in terms of the context that they provide than in their focus on the Anglo-papal relationship.\textsuperscript{18} Of the few texts that focus on papal foreign policy, notably Chambers’ study on papal involvement in warfare, these demonstrate parallel limitations.\textsuperscript{19}

A third genre of secondary work relevant to this study is that which analyses papal relations with other states or England generally. Of the few texts that consider the former directly, J.A.F. Thomson’s \textit{Popes and Princes} is probably the most prominent. While Thomson covers most of the period under study and sheds an invaluable light on these dynamics from the papal perspective, he leaves a lot of shade concerning relations with England in the early sixteenth century, principally because his remit covers contact with all (Christian) princes.\textsuperscript{20} In terms of its overall theme, perhaps the closest self-contained study to


\textsuperscript{19} D.S. Chambers, \textit{Popes, Cardinals and War: the Military Church in Renaissance and Early Modern Europe} (2006).

\textsuperscript{20} Chronologically, Thomson ends his analysis in 1517. Also, to put the lack of consideration of England into some sort of perspective, Thomson’s index only cites references to Henry VIII on five occasions; J.A.F. Thomson, \textit{Popes and Princes 1417-1517: Politics and Polity in the Late Medieval Church}, 1417-1517 (1980), p.251.
the intended subject of this thesis is that of Harvey, who focuses on England and Rome during the period 1417-1464 but, in addition to the chronological limitation, she places more stress on the spiritual role of the papacy and has placed ‘high politics’ in the background. 21 In Prodi’s text concerning the dual roles of the papacy, there lies a significant section on the papacy’s exercise of foreign policy and relations with other secular states, but this surveys a much longer period than that under study and his brief focus on England only considers the post-Reformation situation. 22 In addition, there are other broad texts that do take some time to consider the English crown’s relationship with Rome specifically, but these focus mainly on an ecclesiastical perspective, according to the remit of their titles. 23

Finally, perhaps the most relevant texts to this study are those that focus on specific elements of the Anglo-papal relationship and incorporate the period 1509-1522. Among these, one can particularly cite the usefulness of works by Chambers, Wilkie, Lunt, Burns and Jensen. Covering subjects such as Wolsey’s alleged desire to be elected pope, the diplomatic and fiscal relationship between England and Rome, these provide invaluable context and detail on single topics on which this study can be based but, again, highlight a lack of material on the political links between two parties and further justify the need for a study in this area. 24

21 M. Harvey, *England, Rome and the Papacy*. In addition, Harvey has more recently published an insightful article concerning perceptions of the papacy in the later Middle Ages but again, while extremely useful, it does not limit itself to England, nor does it focus greatly on the earlier part of Henry VIII’s reign; M. Harvey, ‘Unity and Diversity: Perceptions of the Papacy in the Later Middle Ages’, in R.N. Swanson (ed.), *Unity and Diversity in the Church*, Studies in Church History 32 (1996), pp.145-169.


24 D.S. Chambers has probably published the most relevant work relating to the Anglo-papal relationship, concerning Wolsey’s candidacy for the throne of St Peter. There is also a group of studies that have shed light on the diplomatic relationship between England and Rome (including political contacts); D.S. Chambers, ‘Cardinal Wolsey and the Papal Tiara’, *BIHR*, 38 (1965), pp.20-30. Chambers’ research on Cardinal Bainbridge and his career at Rome, for example, has been particularly enlightening in terms of the business conducted between the English crown and papacy in Rome, albeit for a very limited period (1509-1514). Similarly, Wilkie’s examination of the development of Cardinal Protectors within the framework of Anglo-papal diplomacy has also provided an important background to the diplomatic relationship between the two parties, but in this case
In addition to identifying a gap in historiography concerning the English crown’s political relations with Rome, one also needs to briefly assess the attitude of historians to the object of this study, (the English relationship with) the temporal role of the papacy. Up until the 1960’s-1970’s, this aspect of papal power, as distinct from the spiritual function, received relatively little focus from researchers. While there appears to have been a longstanding consensus about the duality inherent in the nature of the pontifical institution, at least as far back as the early twentieth century, the main problem (for this study) has been that there has rarely been much of an attempt to distinguish between these two roles in the actions of pontiffs (apart from when attributing military actions to purely temporal motives, often in a condemnatory manner), nor much effort to analyse the English crown’s (or any other prince’s) perception/s of this dichotomy in its relations with Rome. No attempt has been made to plot, for example, what actions or policies (particularly in the spiritual domain) were motivated principally by the temporal responsibilities of pontiffs, nor has there been any covered the whole period in question. Another useful article on the diplomatic side of the relationship was that penned by Behrens, attempting to outline the rise of the crown’s resident diplomacy in Rome. In addition, two articles concerning the English Hospice of St Thomas in Rome also sheds light on crown relations with the Holy See and other Englishmen there; B. Behrens, ‘Origins of the Office of English Resident Ambassador’, *EHR*, 49 (1934), pp.640-656; D.S. Chambers, *Cardinal Bainbridge in the Court of Rome 1509 to 1514* (1965); B. Newns, ‘The Hospice of St Thomas and the English Crown 1474-1538’, in *The English Hospice in Rome* (2005), pp.145-192; G.B. Parks, ‘The Reformation and the Hospice 1514-1559’, in *The English Hospice in Rome* (2005), pp.193-217; W.E. Wilkie, *The Cardinal Protectors of England: Rome and the Tudors Before the Reformation* (1974). In the fiscal field, the extensive work of Lunt has provided a fairly comprehensive picture of economic contacts between England and Rome, albeit concentrating on ‘spiritual’ revenues. An article by Jensen on the history of the papal imposition, Peter’s Pence, in England, has also been of use; O. Jensen, ‘The “Denarius Sancti Petri” in England’, *TRHS*, 19 (1905), pp.209-277; W.E. Lunt, *Financial Relations of the Papacy with England 1327-1534*, ii (1962); W.E. Lunt, *Papal Revenues in the Middle Ages*, i-ii (1965). Finally, there are also miscellaneous articles on Anglo-papal links, such as Burns’ short essay on the gifts and honours that were bestowed by popes on the early Tudors, that will provide some background to a section considering how temporal concerns dominated the English crown’s pursuit and receipt of these. Similarly, Mitchell’s work on Rome as a source of artwork for the English crown during the reign of Henry VIII has been of use; C.H. Burns, ‘Papal Gifts and Honours for the Earlier Tudors’, *MHP*, 50, pp.173-197; M. Mitchell, ‘Works of Art from Rome for Henry VIII. A Study of Anglo-Papal Relations as Reflected in Papal Gifts to the English King’, *JWC*, 34 (1971), pp.178-203.

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concerted assessment of the reactions of temporal rulers in light of these. On the whole, whenever any distinction has been made between the two duties, it has usually been in the form of a generalisation that observes the pontiffs of this period (and the Renaissance at large) to be primarily wielding the (often frowned upon) temporal sword rather than concentrating upon its (more virtuous) spiritual role; choosing to act more as a Renaissance prince than as universal ordinary. Indeed, this does reflect the attitude of some contemporaries. Furthermore, much of the writing that has transmitted this view has largely done so by weighting such temporal functions in a distinctly hostile light, particularly in order to demonstrate the contemporary decadence of the institution. Therefore, the traditional view of Popes Julius II and Leo X has portrayed them as being more interested in the temporal aspects of their office rather than the spiritual, thus bringing, implied or otherwise, moral condemnation on both them and their pontificates. Such criticism was frequently shaded with allusion to the Reformation (across Europe), whereby Catholic or Protestant sympathies have long coloured interpretations. In light of this traditional bias against the temporal role...

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27 One of the most high-profile examples from the north of Europe was Erasmus. For his views on this issue, see the difference between his ‘public’ views from *Praise of Folly* (written in England in 1509 and published in Paris during 1511), compared to those that he issued anonymously in the *Julius Exclusus* (written probably in England shortly after Julius II’s death in 1513 and published in print during 1517); L.F. Dean (ed.), *Erasmus, The Praise of Folly* (1946), pp.154-165; P. Pascal (trans.) and J. Kelly (ed.), *The Julius Exclusus of Erasmus* (1968), pp.50-51, 55-56, 57-60, 80-89.

28 Indeed, Prodi attributes the origin of moral condemnation of papal temporal power among historians to the likes of Guicciardini and Machiavelli who, notably, railed against it; P. Prodi, *The Papal Prince*, pp.3-5.

29 In commenting on the papacy wielding both swords, Roscoe opined: ‘when schemes of ambition and aggrandizement were to be pursued, the pope, as a temporal prince, could enter into alliances, raise supplies, and furnish his contingent of troops, so as effectually to carry on an offensive war; but no sooner was he endangered by defeat, and alarmed for the safety of his own dominions, than he resorted for shelter to his pontifical robes, and loudly called upon all Christendom to defend from violation the head of the holy church’; W. Roscoe, *Leo the Tenth*, i (1853), p.6. Pastor, a Catholic, distinctly makes no moral judgements on the exercise of temporal power by Julius II and, instead, defends the papacy’s right to possess and wield it in the context of the period; L. Pastor, *History of the Popes*, vi, pp.216-217, 449-454. However, Creighton, a Church of England bishop in his time, did not adopt a partisan view on this subject and, despite citing contemporary criticism of the papacy’s possession of temporal power, also defended it in the context of the time and suggested that it had no bearing on
(and towards the spiritual role) of the papacy, more recent studies have modified (and moderated) views of these functions, particularly the temporal, not in terms of the former role dominating Renaissance pontificates in a negative sense, but rather that it was a necessary feature of the period and provided the papacy with its best (and possibly only) chance of institutional independence.\(^{30}\) Such a viewpoint resulted from a move away from the Catholic-Protestant axis of thought for or against the papacy, towards a more empirical look at the institution that existed in its contemporary context. Partner, falling into the latter camp, envisages that the temporal power of the papacy should be viewed in a broader context than just a decadent feature of Renaissance pontificates, its having been a fundamental characteristic of the institution since the eighth century.\(^{31}\) This view that the temporal role of the papacy predated the Renaissance (by some centuries) certainly stands up to initial scrutiny and is confirmed as a view held among some contemporaries at least by the writings of Guicciardini, who was in papal service and, in general, a critic of papal temporal power.\(^{32}\)

Another shift in historiography concerning the roles played by the papacy has been the consideration of the temporal component as an almost separate element that warrants individual study. This was pioneered by the likes of Partner, although he was careful not to advocate the complete isolation of the papacy’s temporal function from its spiritual role, rightly believing them to be symbiotic.\(^{33}\) More recently, Chambers has focused on the subsequent Reformation, rather it aided the Apostolic See in the defence of its position; M. Creighton, *History of the Papacy*, v, pp.189-194.\(^{30}\) As will become apparent, this theme was recognised by the English crown during this period and contributed to its perception of and relations with the papacy.\(^{31}\) P. Partner, *The Papal State under Martin V: the Administration and Government of the Temporal Power in the Fifteenth Century* (1958), p.v. Also, see P. Prodi, *The Papal Prince*, pp.3-5.\(^{32}\) S. Alexander (ed.), *The History of Italy by Francesco Guicciardini* (1969), pp.140-151.\(^{33}\) P. Partner, *The Papal State under Martin V*; P. Partner, *The Lands of St Peter* (1972). Also see D. Waley, *The Papal State in the Thirteenth Century* (1961). Almost independently of these trends, some relevant material concerning papal temporal power is contained in the writings on cities and ruling families that came within the sphere of influence of the Papal States, notably Bologna and Florence. While, Florence was never technically a part of the Papal States, it may, to all intents and purposes, be treated as such for the pontificates of Leo X and, later, Clement VII; C.M. Ady, *The Bentivoglio of Bologna: a Study in Despotism* (1937); H.C. Butters, *Governors and Government in Early Sixteenth Century Florence, 1502-1519* (1985); P.J. Jones, *The Vicariate
papacy’s involvement in military affairs.\(^{34}\) Perhaps most significantly, Prodi has devoted a whole text to the study of the temporal role in comparison to the spiritual.\(^{35}\) For the period covered by the early years of Henry VIII’s reign, Shaw’s biography of Julius II is invaluable in this sense, as it elaborates on the temporal and spiritual roles of the papacy as separate (albeit inter-related) functions. Throughout, Shaw emphasises the distinct roles exercised by this pope that shaped his pontificate.\(^{36}\) Overall, these trends have led historians to moderate views on the temporal role of the papacy and adopt a similar stance to the likes of Prodi and Partner, particularly in terms of the move away from a ‘moral’ judgement of this function and assessing it more in its context, as well as in terms of according it individual significance in helping further understanding about the papacy.\(^{37}\)

Existing historical research also highlights a number of relevant historical debates that will demand consideration. Given that the study concentrates on the English perspective, such topics concern the English crown: namely, theories of English foreign policy and disagreement over the relative control of this by Henry VIII and Wolsey. Firstly, a number of great over-arching theories have been ascribed by authors to English foreign policy during Henry VIII’s reign. On initial survey, the preponderance of these paradigms tends to muddy the waters of any examination of Henry VIII’s relations with external powers. Some have


\(^{36}\) P. Prodi, *The Papal Prince*.

claimed that the English crown was driven by the aim to maintain a ‘balance of power’ within Europe in order to prevent any single state achieving hegemony and to ensure that England remained on the stronger side.  

Others have asserted that the English crown tried to imitate papal policy wherever possible, chiefly so that Wolsey could gain favours and rewards from Rome, with the ultimate aim to attain the papal tiara.  

Another view has been postulated that English foreign policy was motivated principally by dynasticism, particularly at the end of the period in this study, when the lack of a son is argued to have preyed seriously on the minds of Henry and his advisors.  

Others again have claimed that the main motivator for the direction of English foreign policy during this period was (Wolsey’s) desire for peace whereby, in a return to the ‘balance of power’ idea, England allied with the strongest of the main powers in order to make war pointless.  

While each of these has been held as the orthodox view for a time (in the aforementioned order) and each can be argued to hold some validity, they all possess enough weaknesses for it to be argued that they do not describe English foreign policy per se, nor that of 1509-1522.  

However, it is enough for now to put these models to

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38 On the eighteenth-century origins of this model suggested by the likes of Rymer and Fiddes, as well as of criticisms of it, see A.F. Pollard, Wolsey, pp.3-4, 118-121. For an example of a later proponent of the theory, see G. Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy (1955), p.155. Belief in the validity of the ‘balance of power’ model for English foreign policy has regained some currency in recent years; for example, D. Potter, ‘Foreign Policy’, in D. MacCulloch (ed.), The Reign of Henry VIII, pp.114-118.  


41 The first proponent of this theory (which alludes the ‘balance of power’ model) was J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp.48-50 and passim. Also, see J. Guy, Tudor England, p.87.  

42 See C.S.L. Davies’ failure to find evidence for the English crown pursuing either a ‘balance of power’ or a peace policy; C.S.L. Davies, Peace, Print and Protestantism 1450-1558 (1976), pp.160-163. Starkey also recognises the search to ascribe a general foreign policy to the English crown in this period, but does not himself attempt to do this, instead generally describing the complex relationship that existed between king and ministers in the formation of such policies (in the context of the rise of Wolsey); D. Starkey, The Reign of Henry VIII.
one side and bear them in mind in the following study. One caveat that needs to be made here is that, by focusing on England and Rome, there is the danger that this study may be accused of returning to the old Pollard paradigm, which has been condemned in some quarters.\textsuperscript{43} It needs to be stressed, however, that the attempt here is to focus on Anglo-papal relations which may re-emphasise elements of his ideas, but is not aiming to bestow prime importance on the papacy in determining English foreign policy. Rome was only one of a number of considerations taken into account when such decisions were made by the crown, as will become apparent.

A second major historical debate that is revealed in research for this study is partially linked to the aforementioned issue. This is the Henry/Wolsey debate where, for generations, the issue of who actually ‘ruled’ England up to 1529 (including in terms of foreign policy) has been disputed. In terms of king and cardinal, the prominence of the latter in the government of England for most of (and beyond) the period in question is without doubt. The debate essentially turns on the personalities of both Henry and Wolsey, and their contributions to government; was Henry a strong king who deliberately allowed his minister to form and implement a great deal policy, or did Wolsey seduce and manipulate his king? This idea occupied and tended to polarise historians for much of the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{44} Currently, most subscribe to the view that Henry was at least a relatively ‘strong’ king who managed his ministers well, often allowing them enough space to pursue their own ends while he indulged in more leisurely pursuits, but always reining them in when he needed to. Although these historians admit that Henry could be weak and indecisive, this was unusual. On the other hand, there still exists a strong belief among some that Henry was not a ‘strong’ king, rather


that he was susceptible to pressure from his ministers, particularly Wolsey in this period, although occasionally he did assert his authority over them.45 Broadly speaking, there seems to be little tangible difference between the two opinions now.46 Moreover, it is even possible to argue that there was little difference in the stances adopted by historians on this subject over the longer-term. On the one hand, most of those consulted agree that Wolsey accumulated an unprecedented degree of power for a minister and held an overriding influence with the king during this period. On the other hand, none dispute that Wolsey was always subject to the king’s authority (who could intervene at a moment’s notice) and needed

45 K. Randell, *Henry VIII and the Government of England*, pp.19-20. Among those who see Henry as the dominant party, Creighton (1888) views Wolsey’s rise as purely down to Henry’s favour (M. Creighton, *Wolsey* [1888], p.30). Pickthorn (1934) admits that Wolsey was extremely powerful, but reasons that his position was entirely dependent on the whim of the king (K. Pickthorn, *Early Tudor Government: Henry VIII* [1934], pp.8-11). Bindoff (1950) sees Wolsey as a general manager of the Crown, in control from 1512, although he always remained dependent on Henry (S.T. Bindoff, *Tudor England* [1950], p.74). Mackie (1963) reasons that, while outsiders viewed Wolsey as in control, Henry was ‘never at any time a mere figure-head’, rather that he was ‘the hidden power which lies behind the bright action’ (J.D. Mackie, *The Earlier Tudors*, pp.286-287) Scarisbrick (1968) argues Henry’s ascendancy on the basis that Wolsey would not hold his prominent position if the king had not wanted him to be his leading servant (J.J. Scarisbrick, *Henry VIII*, pp.43-45). C.S.L. Davies (1977), maintains that Wolsey’s appearance of control was illusory, as ‘the final decision was always the king’s, and Henry was always liable to listen to others’ (C.S.L. Davies, *Peace, Print and Protestantism*, pp.158-159). Guy (1988) views Wolsey as having enjoyed ‘ministerial’ ascendancy, though not on the scale often ascribed to him; rather, he was the controller of policy once it had been decided. He emphasises ease of access to the king’s presence, making him aware of political developments, as well as the daily or twice daily communications with London and Westminster whilst he was absent from Court. The only reason that Wolsey appeared to be *alter rex* was because the king was satisfied with his work (J. Guy, *Tudor England*, pp.82-83. Also, see J. Guy, ‘Wolsey and the Tudor Polity’, in S.J. Gunn and P.G. Lindley (eds.), *Cardinal Wolsey: Church, State and Art* [1991], pp.61-62 and, especially, J. Guy, *Cardinal Wolsey* [1998], pp.6-12). Finally, D. Starkey (1991), similar to Bindoff forty years earlier, views Henry as having established ‘a managerial style’ (D. Starkey, *The Reign of Henry VIII*, p.9). On the Wolsey side of the debate, Robinson (1927) saw the minister as all-powerful and doing all the governmental work (C.E. Robinson, *A History of England: the Tudors and the Stuarts 1485-1688* [1927], pp.12-13). Furthermore, Pollard (1929) described Wolsey as the ‘despotic authority in the state’, but he still admits that the minister’s dependence on the king as ‘absolute’ (K. Randell, *Henry VIII and the Government of England*, p.62; A.F. Pollard, *Wolsey*, pp.99-100). Similarly, Hackett (1946) portrayed the cardinal as almost feigning subservience to his king, while behaving (as far as outsiders were concerned) as if he owned Henry and England (F. Hackett, *Henry the Eighth* [1946], pp.140-141, 172-173). Elton (1955) is less clear-cut in his distinction and, whereas, he argues that it was Wolsey who ‘ruled’, he does concede that Henry ‘never surrendered ultimate control over affairs’ and had the ability to assert his own over his minister (G.R. Elton, *England Under the Tudors* [1962], p.75). Finally, one historian that seems to come down in the middle of this debate, without veering too far from the largely pro-Henry consensus that now exists is Gwyn (1990), who likens Henry to a ‘chairman of the board’ and Wolsey as a ‘managing director’, portraying their relationship as ‘a genuine partnership’ (P. Gwyn, *The King’s Cardinal* [1990], pp.4-5, 208-211). John Guy has since echoed this language of a ‘partnership’ (J. Guy, *Cardinal Wolsey*, p.11).

46 J. Guy, *Cardinal Wolsey*, p.9. Indeed, Pickthorn, as far back as 1934, argued on this basis that it does not really matter whether the period usually ‘called the Wolsey period was Wolsey’s or Henry’s’; K. Pickthorn, *Early Tudor Government*, p.9.
to retain Henry’s confidence if he was to stay in the ascendancy. Indeed, the overall impression emerges of a partnership, that experienced little apparent disagreement (1509-1522, at least). In the context of this study, was English foreign policy and the direction of political relations with the papacy that resulted from this, attributable (more) to Henry or Wolsey? This issue will receive greater consideration later below.

To further set the context for any study of the English crown’s political relationship with the papacy, working definitions of the two principal parties ought to be clarified, as well as their means of communication. In particular, those within the ‘English crown’ who formulated policy concerning Rome should be identified and distinguished from those who implemented it. Again, the Henry-Wolsey debate will receive attention. In terms of the ‘papacy’, the focus will be upon those identified in crown circles as the axis of papal political power; those who could affect or be influenced in matters relevant to England. Finally, the means by which Henry VIII and his ministers conducted diplomacy with Rome will be identified, with emphasis made on the effect that distance had on such communications. To begin with, when looking to establish who was responsible for the English crown’s political relationship with the papacy, one looks naturally to Henry VIII in the first instance, an erudite and able king who actively engaged in foreign policy throughout the period. Indeed, it was

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47 See pp.27-28.
48 In particular, see P. Gwyn, *The King’s Cardinal*, pp.207-211. The other great biographers of Wolsey and Henry VIII, respectively, Pollard and Scarisbrick, agree that Wolsey was the architect of English foreign policy during this period. The former argued that the cardinal, for the purpose of its author’s own ambition, directed England in the same direction as the papacy, while the latter posited that he pursued peace. C.S.L. Davies, on the other hand, attributed English foreign policy more so to Henry; ‘in the general direction of foreign affairs…the king’s prejudices were decisive’; C.S.L. Davies, *Peace, Print and Protestantism*, pp.160-163, esp. p.163; A.F. Pollard, *Wolsey*, pp.111-128; J.J. Scarisbrick, *Henry VIII*, pp.47-50. Indeed, the increasing belief that Henry played a greater role in foreign policy than has hitherto been believed, has contributed to the arguments of those seeking to restore Wolsey’s reputation; J. Guy, *Cardinal Wolsey*, pp.8-10.
49 England was a personal monarchy, whereby the person of the king was supreme, both on account of the perceived spiritual justification of their role, as well as their de facto possession of power within the realm. Elton quotes Sir Thomas Smith, writing in 1565: ‘To be short, the prince is the life, the head and the authority of all
in Henry’s name that correspondence was sent to and equally received from Rome. Foreign ambassadors, including papal nuncios, identified him as a pivotal figure, with whom they

things that be done in the realm of England’; G.R. Elton (ed.), The Tudor Constitution: Documents and Commentary (1960), pp.12,14; D. Loades, Power in Tudor England (1997), pp.8-9. It is widely accepted that Henry had received a good quality education and possessed the intellectual ability to take a lead in government. With relevance to foreign policy, he was multilingual: he was fluent in Latin and French, knew some Spanish and also understood Italian. These skills enabled him to take a direct role in foreign policy, particularly in reading correspondence for himself, sometimes without the aid of translators, and conversing with ambassadors in other languages, as and when he saw fit; LPIii, 402 (calendared end July 1519, relation of Giustianin’s visit to England); LPIi, 1484 (Sp.ii, 72; 19 November 1512, [de Muxica] to Ferdinand, London); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years at the Court of Henry VIII. Despatches of Sebastian Giustinian, i (1854), pp.78-79 (Ven.ii, 624; LPIii, 410; Nicolo Sagudino to Alvise Foscari, 3 May 1515), 86 (LPIii, 395; 30 April 1515, Pet. Pasqualigo to -, London), 100-106 (LPIii, 652; Ven.ii, 633; 3 July 1515, Giustinian and Badoer to the Signory, London), 192-197 (Ven.ii, 699; LPIii, 1653; 11 March 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London); Ven.ii, 655 (16 October 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory, London). Also see J.S. Brewer (ed.), LPi, p.xxiii; D. Loades, Power in Tudor England, pp.107-108; J.D. Mackie, The Earlier Tudors, p.234; A.F. Pollard, Henry VIII, pp.22-24; J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp.5-6; D. Starkey, The Reign of Henry VIII, p.13.

50 It ought to be noted that Henry largely did not write letters himself nor did he often read the full contents of those that he received. A sense of the volume of correspondence that he had to deal with is provided by Richard Pace on 17 November 1521, who acknowledged from Wolsey two of his letters (one in English and one in Latin), along with two missives from Lorenzo Campeggio, an extract of John Clerk’s letters and a copy of a letter written to Rome by Cardinal de’ Medici’s secretary. Of these, Pace remarked that Henry read Wolsey’s letters read ‘w[ord] by w[ord] his self’, but does not comment on the others. Given the volume, it is likely that the other correspondence was verbally presented to the king; LPIii, 1772 (17 November 1521, [Pace to Wolsey], Windsor). Indeed, Henry VIII had three crown secretaries who dealt with his correspondence, whether correspondence that was addressed to him (or his ministers). On 18 April 1518, for instance, Pace notified Wolsey the arrival of correspondence and advised the cardinal that he ‘needs not move the king to read the things that be done in the realm of England’; G.R. Elton (ed.), The Tudor Constitution: Documents and Commentary (1960), pp.12,14; D. Loades, Power in Tudor England (1997), pp.8-9. It is widely accepted that Henry had received a good quality education and possessed the intellectual ability to take a lead in government. With relevance to foreign policy, he was multilingual: he was fluent in Latin and French, knew some Spanish and also understood Italian. These skills enabled him to take a direct role in foreign policy, particularly in reading correspondence for himself, sometimes without the aid of translators, and conversing with ambassadors in other languages, as and when he saw fit; LPIii, 402 (calendared end July 1519, relation of Giustianin’s visit to England); LPIi, 1484 (Sp.ii, 72; 19 November 1512, [de Muxica] to Ferdinand, London); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years at the Court of Henry VIII. Despatches of Sebastian Giustinian, i (1854), pp.78-79 (Ven.ii, 624; LPIii, 410; Nicolo Sagudino to Alvise Foscari, 3 May 1515), 86 (LPIii, 395; 30 April 1515, Pet. Pasqualigo to -, London), 100-106 (LPIii, 652; Ven.ii, 633; 3 July 1515, Giustinian and Badoer to the Signory, London), 192-197 (Ven.ii, 699; LPIii, 1653; 11 March 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London); Ven.ii, 655 (16 October 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory, London). Also see J.S. Brewer (ed.), LPi, p.xxiii; D. Loades, Power in Tudor England, pp.107-108; J.D. Mackie, The Earlier Tudors, p.234; A.F. Pollard, Henry VIII, pp.22-24; J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp.5-6; D. Starkey, The Reign of Henry VIII, p.13.

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sought audience to discuss their affairs. Advising him, particularly in foreign affairs and papal matters, was a small but powerful coterie of advisors within the broader Council, often known as the ‘inner circle’ or something similar. Papal affairs were conducted by an

London; LPIii, 1113 (6 November 1515, de Bapaume to Queen Louise of France, London), 2705 (27 December 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to [Wolsey], Hagenow); LPIii, 1213 (calendared end March 1521, [Wolsey to Henry]); LPIii, 1439 (25 July 1521, Wolsey to Henry, Westminster); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.168-169 (Ven.ii, 682; LPIii, 1421; 21 January 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). There are also various instances of Wolsey forwarding Henry correspondence for him to read and asking him to return it, as well as of the king reading the cardinal’s letters particularly in relation to foreign affairs. There is also an example, during April 1521, of the king sending Wolsey his instructions on the basis of foreign correspondence which he ‘desires Wolsey diligently to ponder’; LPIii, 4058 (4 April 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Abingdon); LPIii, 1213 (calendared end March 1521, [Wolsey to Henry]); LPIii, 1192 (7 March 1521, Wolsey to [Henry], ‘From your house of Hampton Court’), 1220 (Cal. Carew 13; 7 April 1521, Pace to Wolsey, Greenwich), 1426 (20 July 1521, Wolsey to Henry, Westminster), 1429 (21 July 1521, Pace to Wolsey, Windsor), 1439 (25 July 1521, Wolsey to Henry, Westminster), 1536 (2 September 1521, Pace to Wolsey, Guildford), 1594 (20 September 1521, [Pace to Wolsey]).

Another means of presenting correspondence to Henry was verbally, although in March 1516, he may have read ‘a very brief Latin compendium’ compiled by Giustinian, ‘made, that they might prove less tedious to him’; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, p.192 (Ven.ii, 699; LPIii, 1653; 11 March 1516, Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory, London). For verbal summaries of correspondence given to Henry by foreign ambassadors, see Ven.ii, 132. (LPl, 960; 26 November 1511, Signory to Badoer); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, p.301 (Ven.ii, 786; LPIii, 2445; 14 October 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). The inherent problem with the king receiving information in this way was that that presented could quite easily be selective. Indeed, during October 1521, Wolsey accused Pace of ‘reading his letters directed to the king “diminutely”’. Denying this accusation, Pace claimed that ‘I never rehearsed your grace’s letters, diminutely or fully, but by the King’s express commandment, who readeth all your letters with great diligence, and my answers, not by device, but by his instructions’. He further described how Henry dictated to Pace what he wanted written, read the letter several times and marked it for further editing; LPIii, 1713 (29 October 1521, Pace to Wolsey, Windsor).

During 1514, for instance, Henry negotiated with Gianpietro Caraffa concerning Leo X’s desire for an Anglo-French peace. Lodovico Canossa also held talks with the king to the same end while conducting shuttle diplomacy between England and France. Similarly, towards the end of this period, Henry notified the pope that he had spoken with Girolamo Ghinucci ‘upon certain matters of great importance’; LPIii, 2084 (LPl, 5048; 7 May 1514, Henry to Leo, Greenwich); Ven.ii, 453 (26 July 1514, Vetro Lippomano to -, Rome); LPIii, 1137 (21 January 1521, Henry to Leo, Greenwich). For Henry being approached for audiences by ambassadors and giving the impression that he had a good command of foreign affairs, see for instance R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.168-171 (Ven.ii, 682; LPIii, 1495; 6 February 1516, Giustinian to the Council of Ten, London), 192-197 (Ven.ii, 699; LPIii, 1653; 11 March 1516, Giustinian to the Council of Ten, London); ibid., ii, 157-165 (LPIii, 3976; Ven.ii, 1010; 28 February 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, London).

While the Council was traditionally the principal advisory body to English kings, it was not a formal body and its role varied between monarchs. Its remit could include foreign policy, but it has been convincingly suggested that it was limited mostly to ceremonial, legal and administrative business during this period, as it was too large and unwieldy to govern on a day-to-day basis. The only times found when it was consulted as a wider body was when the king wanted to go to war; W.H. Dunham Jr., ‘Wolsey’s Rule of the King’s Whole Council’, American History Review, xlix (1948), p.645; G.R. Elton, The Tudor Revolution in Government (1960), pp.61-62; G.R. Elton, ‘Tudor Government: the Points of Contact’, in, Studies in Tudor and Stuart Politics and Government, III Papers and Reviews 1973-1981 (1983), p.23; J.A. Guy, ‘Wolsey, the Council and the Council Courts’, EHR, 91 (1976), pp.481-484; D. Starkey, The Reign of Henry VIII, p.18. For examples of the Council requiring consultation when the king wanted to go to war with France, 1515-1516, see D. Hay (ed.), The Anglica Historia of Polydore Vergil, Camden Society 3rd series, 74 (1950), p.235; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.262-264 (Ven.ii, 753; LPIii, 2222; 29 July 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 307-309 (LPIii, 2464; Ven.ii, 791; 20 October 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 325-327 (LPIii, 2500; Ven.ii, 801; 1 November 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). For Giustinian’s opinion that the Council could only rubber-stamp Wolsey’s decisions later in the period, however, see R. Brown (trans.), Four Years at the Court of Henry VIII. Despatches
ecclesiastical layer, led by a powerful principal minister who enjoyed the ear of the king and was often cited by Venetian ambassadors to be 'alter rex'.

The chief ministers for this period, Richard Fox and Thomas Wolsey, were both ecclesiastics and were integral to the Anglo-papal relationship as, other than the king himself, they were largely the only officials to correspond directly with the papacy. Fox enjoyed dominance, supported particularly by
Thomas Ruthal, up to the end of 1513.\textsuperscript{55} At this point, Fox began to share power with Wolsey in papal affairs, as correspondence started to be issued jointly in their name and to be addressed to them by both Leo X and English diplomats in Rome.\textsuperscript{56} While Fox did not

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\item \textsuperscript{55} For an indication of Fox and Ruthal’s early seniority, see \textit{Sp.ii}, 44 (\textit{LPl}, 476; 29 May 1510, Luis Caroz to Ferdinand, London); \textit{Ven.ii}, 67 (\textit{LPl}, 463; 18 May 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London). \textit{Ven.ii}, 132 (\textit{LPl}, 960; 26 November 1511, Signory to Badoer). For Ruthal’s secretarial involvement in correspondence to and from Rome, arranging couriers and drawing up diplomatic commissions prior to his becoming Lord Privy Seal in 1516, see for instance \textit{LPl}, 190:33 (\textit{LPl}, 520; 24 September 1509), 354 (\textit{LPl}, 1457; 29 January 1510, Henry to Bainbridge); \textit{LPlI}, 542 (calendared end May 1515, John Baptist Boerius to Ruthal), 1044 (18 October 1515, Dacre and Magnus to Henry, Harbottle); \textit{LPlIi}, p.1453. Ruthal’s involvement in the Anglo-papal relationship as a direct correspondent, however, seems to have been rare. One exception seems to have been Leo X’s missive of 17 December 1514, when the pope urged him (and other English ecclesiastics deemed to be prominent) to convince Henry towards peace with France, although the apparent lack of reply caused the pope not to follow this up. Leo seems to have approached Ruthal (via de Giglis) again during September 1515, concerning his desire for Henry to permit the levy of a clerical tenth. Again, the pope seems to have been using prominent crown ministers to pressure the king (he wrote to Wolsey in the same regard); \textit{EP} 551 (17 December 1514, Leo to Ruthal, Rome); \textit{LPlI}, 887 (7 September 1515, [de Giglis to Wolsey]), 1312 (21 December 1515). Ruthal also seems to have been contacted occasionally by English diplomats in Rome. Bainbridge wrote during the summer of 1513, but this may have been because he was to be the crown ‘contact’ in England, while Fox (and Wolsey) were occupied with the English campaign in France; \textit{LPlI}, 2077 (\textit{LPI}, 4327; 7 July 1513, Bainbridge to Ruthal, Rome). Ruthal also seems to have been in direct contact with the papacy in seeking an indulgence for the restoration of Northam Castle, within his diocese, which had been destroyed by the Scots. He does not seem to have pursued this on his own, however. Rather he availed himself of support from Henry and Wolsey; \textit{LPlI}, 2636 (\textit{LPI}, 4724; 7 February 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome); \textit{LPlIi}, 108 (3 February 1515, [Giulio de’ Medici] to Henry, Rome), 109 (3 February 1515, de Giglis to Henry, Rome), 110 (3 February 1515, de Giglis to [Wolsey], Rome); \textit{EP}, 351 (8 February 1514).\textit{LPIii}
\item \textsuperscript{56} This axis became clear to Leo X and the English ambassador in Rome, Silvester de Giglis, from late 1513. During December, the pope wrote to influential English bishops, Warham, Fox and Ruthal at least, requesting that they lobby Henry towards peace with France. The reply via de Giglis, however, came from Fox and Wolsey and Leo subsequently recognised the overriding influence of these ministers with the king in ‘papal’ matters. This elevation of Wolsey may have been aided by the secrecy surrounding England’s receptiveness to papal peace overtures; \textit{LPlI}, 2513 (\textit{EP}, 251; 17 December 1513, Leo to Warham, Ruthal and Fox), 2611 (\textit{LPI}, 4598; January 1514, [Fox and Wolsey] to de Giglis), 2559 (\textit{EP}, 316; 4 January 1514, Leo to Fox, Rome), 2560 (\textit{EP}, 317; 4 January 1514, Leo to Wolsey, Rome), 2611 (\textit{LPI}, 4598; January 1514, [Fox and Wolsey] to de Giglis), 2639 (\textit{EP}, 350; 8 February 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome), 2658 (\textit{EP}, 364; 19 February 1514, Leo to [Caraffa], Rome), 2659 (\textit{EP}, 363; 19 February 1514, Leo to Fox, Rome), 2660 (\textit{EP}, 362; 19 February 1514, Leo to Wolsey, Rome), 2783 (\textit{LPI}, 4936; 4 April 1514, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 2821 (\textit{EP}, 409; 20 April 1514, Leo to Fox, Rome), 2822 (\textit{EP}, 408 (20 April 1514, Leo to Wolsey, Rome), 2928 (\textit{LPI}, 5353, [de Giglis to Fox and Wolsey], 3019 (\textit{LPI}, 5174; \textit{EP}, 445; 19 June 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome), 3197 (\textit{LPI}, 5354; 26 August 1514, de Giglis to Wolsey and Fox, Rome); 3362 (\textit{LPI}, 5496, de Giglis to Wolsey and Fox, Rome); \textit{EP}, 438 (16 June 1514, Leo to Fox and Wolsey, Rome), 500 (7 September 1514, Leo to Fox and Wolsey, Rome). For the secrecy surrounding Anglo-papal-French peace negotiations, see pp.420-422, 429-432. Wolsey also became a sole correspondent with de Giglis from around April 1513, although he initially seems to have been passing on crown requests in ‘spiritual’ matters, as well as pursuing a plurality dispensation for himself. This may have arisen from Fox’s preoccupation with preparations for the imminent invasion of France. One can also observe Wolsey corresponding with de Giglis in early 1514 on personal issues, particularly concerning the remission of services taxes due on his promotion to Lincoln; \textit{LPlI}, 1857 (\textit{LPI}, 4039; 10 May 1513, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 2644 (\textit{LPI}, 4747; 11 February 1514, [de Giglis] to Wolsey, Rome), 2783 (\textit{LPI}, 4936; 4 April 1514, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome. One can trace the rise of Wolsey back to the summer recess of 1511, when Fox apparently entrusted him to act as his eyes and ears at the Court while he was absent, the importance of which he later stressed in 1516. Wolsey reprised the same role in the summer of 1512. Wolsey’s role in papal affairs at this point was limited. In 1511, he competed with other ministers present to convince the king to support a candidate for a prospective conclave, but recognised that he might have overstepped his remit. In 1512, he forwarded to
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officially retire until May 1516, he retreated from involvement in the Anglo-papal relationship around June 1515, after which Wolsey assumed sole responsibility in this sphere.\textsuperscript{57} During Wolsey’s ascendancy, Ruthal seems to have continued his supporting role and Richard Pace became prominent in the later part of this period, after his return from his Swiss embassy towards the end of 1518.\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{57} For Fox’s continued involvement alongside Wolsey into 1515 and until around June, see for instance \textit{LPI\textsc{iii}}, 109 (3 February 1515, de Giglis to Henry, Rome), 312 (11 April 1515, Ammonius to Wolsey, Westminster), 374 (25 April 1515, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 493 (calendared 22 May 1515, [de Giglis to -]), 574 (12 June 1515, de Giglis to Henry, Rome), 647 (calendared end June 1515, [de Giglis to Wolsey]). While some historians have cited a falling out between Wolsey and Fox, resulting in the latter’s withdrawal from politics and retirement from the office of Lord Privy Seal, sources do not point towards this. Indeed, Wolsey seems to have called upon Fox for advice from time to time; P.S. and H.M. Allen, \textit{Letters of Richard Fox}, pp.52-55 (\textit{LPI\textsc{iii}}, 1814; 23 April 1516, [Fox] to Wolsey), 121-122 (\textit{LPI\textsc{iii}}, 14 August 1519, Fox to Wolsey, ‘Suthwyk’). Furthermore, Fox did not entirely renounce his involvement in papal affairs. At the beginning of December 1516, for instance, (around the time of his brief recall to Court), Fox allegedly intervened in Wolsey’s dispute with the apostolic nuncio Chieregato, whom Wolsey believed to have conspired with the French. While Wolsey was reported to have ‘laid hands on him’ and had him imprisoned and threatened, the nuncio was released only after Fox’s intervention; R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, ii, pp.17-19 (\textit{LPI\textsc{ii}}, 2643; \textit{Ven.\textsc{ii}}, 823; 7 December 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). For Fox giving up the Privy Seal, see C.S.L. Davies, ‘Fox , Richard (1447/8–1528)’, \textit{DNB} (2004).

\textsuperscript{58} For a general comment that English foreign policy was conducted secretly by just two or three individuals during 1518, see \textit{Ven.\textsc{ii}}, 1066 (1 September 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth). Following Fox’s withdrawal from frontline politics, Wolsey was appointed Lord Privy Seal (May 1516) and came to fulfil the same senior but supporting role with Wolsey as he had done with the bishop of Winchester. This drew a skeleton staff of counsel, if any, see N. Samman, ‘The Progresses of Henry VIII, 1509-1529’ in D. MacCulloch (ed.), \textit{The Reign of Henry VIII}, pp.59-73, especially p.62; C. Whibley (ed.), \textit{Henry VIII by Edward Hall}, i (1904), pp.19-20, 147.

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\item \textsuperscript{58} For a general comment that English foreign policy was conducted secretly by just two or three individuals during 1518, see \textit{Ven.\textsc{ii}}, 1066 (1 September 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth). Following Fox’s withdrawal from frontline politics, Wolsey was appointed Lord Privy Seal (May 1516) and came to fulfil the same senior but supporting role with Wolsey as he had done with the bishop of Winchester. This drew an unfettered comments from contemporaries. During a Council meeting in late 1516, for instance, Vergil portrayed Ruthal backing up Wolsey’s arguments ‘lest he should be soundly lashed for doing other wise, because for a long time he had devoted himsel f to Wolsey and therefore depended  entirely on the latter’s pleasure’. For other references to Ruthal’s political seniority (just beneath Wolsey), see for instance \textit{LPI\textsc{ii}}, 1893 (16 May 1516, Sir Richard Sacheverell to the earl of Shrewsbury, London); R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, ii, p.252 (\textit{Ven.\textsc{ii}}, 750; \textit{LPI\textsc{ii}}, 2183; 17 July 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London); \textit{Ven.\textsc{ii}}, 759 (13 August, Giustinian to the Signory, London). For Ruthal’s continued secretarial involvement in correspondence to and from Rome after his appointment as Lord Privy Seal, see R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, ii, pp.88-89 (\textit{Ven.\textsc{ii}}, 891; 26 May 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London); \textit{LPI\textsc{iii}}, 1510 (25 August 1521, [Wolsey to Clerk], Bruges). It is difficult to get a sense of Ruthal’s actual role in papal affairs, other than that he was noted to have direct contact with papal
Given that the aforementioned debate over the relationship between Henry VIII and his principal ministers, particularly Wolsey, this deserves comment in light of the English diplomats, was au fait with papal affairs, albeit he was always aligned with Wolsey; R. Brown (trans.), *Four Years*, i, pp.245-246 (*Ven.ii*, 742; *LPIii*, 2036; 12 June 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, Putney), 274 (*Ven.ii*, 758; *LPIii*, 2264; 11 August 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London); *LPIii*, 1518 (calendared 28-29 August 1521, [Wolsey to Henry]).

Richard Pace was employed as Wolsey’s secretary immediately on his return from Rome around March 1515 Given his curial experience and fluency in Italian, this may well have been envisaged to assist Wolsey in his increasing influence in papal affairs; C. Curtis, ‘Pace, Richard (1483?-1536)’, *DNB*; *LPIii*, 273 (29 March 1515, Richard Wingfield to Wolsey, Paris); *Ven.ii*, 316 (22 September 1513, Brian Tuke to Richard [Pace], Tournai). For Pace’s linguistic skills, see for instance *LPIii*, 2008 (6 June 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Augsburg). Indeed, Pace was instructed to call upon his curial experience by establishing contact with papal representatives while on embassies in the Swiss Cantons (1516-1518) and in Germany (1519) and even with the pope himself in the former; *LPIii*, 1095 (calendared end October 1515, instructions from Wolsey to Pace), 1224 (calendared end November 1515, Pace to Wolsey); *LPIii*, 4068 (10 April 1518, de Giglis to Pace); *LPIii*, 241 (calendared 20 May 1519, Pace’s instructions). On his return from a lengthy Swiss embassy in October 1517, Pace assumed for the first time his office of principal secretary, managing Henry’s correspondence. He was also, from this time, Wolsey’s agent in attendance on the king and acted as his intermediary with Henry for the rest of this period (with brief interruptions in 1519 and from December 1521); see, for example, *LPIii*, 3747 (15 October 1517, Pace to Wolsey, Windsor), 4014 (18 March 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Richmond); *LPIii*, 412 (11 August 1519, Pace to Wolsey, Penshurst); *LPIii*, 1772 (17 November 1521, [Pace to Wolsey]). From the same time, Pace’s prominence in the ‘inner circle’ of English councilors was also recognised by observers, Giustinian, for instance, reported that he occupied ‘the third place in the secret council’ and he now became a figure to be lobbied by foreign diplomats. Giulio de’ Medici also offered his congratulations; *Ven.ii*, 1000 (*LPIii*, 3885; 16 January 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, London); R. Brown (trans.), *Four Years*, ii, pp.146-150 (*Ven.ii*, 1002; *LPIii*, 3896; 24 January 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 259-262 (*Ven.ii*, 1180; *LPIii*, 133; 22 March 1519, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth); *LPIii*, 4020 (20 March 1518, Giulio de’ Medici to Pace). In terms of Pace’s role in the crown’s papal policy, he seems to have been pivotal, positioned between Henry and Wolsey. He had access to all correspondence going to and from Rome and seems to have been involved in discussions between king and cardinal about the appropriate course to take. He was also observed by Giustinian to be au fait with papal affairs. Despite Pace being clearly involved and having experience of Rome, however, his actual contribution to Henry’s and Wolsey’s decisions is uncertain; *LPIii*, 4023 (24 March 1518, Pace to [Wolsey]), 4034 (27 March 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Abingdon), 4053 (calendared end March 1518, Wolsey to Pace), 4082 (14 April 1518, [Pace] to [Wolsey], Abingdon), 4680 (24 December 1518, Pace to [Wolsey], Greenwich); *LPIii*, 412 (11 August 1519, Pace to Wolsey, Penshurst), 1233 (16 April 1521, [Pace] to Wolsey, Greenwich), 1425 (20 July 1521, Pace to [Wolsey], Windsor), 1473 (7 August 1521, Pace to [Wolsey], ‘[Okin]ge’), 1519 (29 August 1521, Pace to [Wolsey], Guildford), 1709 (27 October 1521, Pace to [Wolsey], Windsor), 1739 (4 November 1521, Pace to Wolsey, Windsor), 1759 (13 November 1521, Pace to [Wolsey]), 1772 (17 November 1521, [Pace to Wolsey]); R. Brown (trans.), *Four Years*, ii, pp.146-150 (*Ven.ii*, 1002; *LPIii*, 3896; 24 January 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, London). With respect to Pace’s direct interaction with the papacy, he seems to have been identified shortly after his return to England in late 1517 as a potential contact for the papacy by Giulio de’ Medici. Silvester de Giglis also contacted him during April 1518 in an attempt to resolve papal complaints at communication difficulties with England. Ostensibly, he advised that Wolsey allow Peter Vannes to assume the former; *LPIii*, 1204 (29 March 1521, de Giglis to Pace, Rome), 1275 (12 May 1521, Pace to Leo, London). Finally, Pace seems to have been in contact with the nuncio Ghinucci during June 1521, shortly before Wolsey was due to cross to Calais to mediate between Charles V and Francis I; *LPIii*, 1370 (27 June 1521, Pace to [Jerome Ghinucci], Windsor).
political relationship with Rome that has been researched here. While the impression gained of Henry has been of a king confident in his monarchical authority and foreign policy direction from the outset, particularly against France, his principal ministers (supported by the ‘inner circle’) seem to have been incredibly influential with him albeit, one must stress, not independent. An example of this from the early years of the reign can be seen with Henry VIII’s belligerent desire to go to war against France, while the likes of Fox and Ruthal ‘imposed’ a number of conditions upon him before he could do so. These included the need to build up a network of allies, ideally in a formal coalition, the need to provide an heir if he intended to lead an invasion himself, as well as the allowance of time (at least a year) to prepare. It is unclear how firm these stipulations were but, by 1511, when only some had been met, a compromise seems to have emerged, in the form of two minor military expeditions, not led by Henry, that saw the English sabre-rattling against the French, not attacking them directly. As the military imperative to defend the Church increased following the fall of Bologna to the French, so the conditions slipped (albeit a broad-based coalition was established) and Henry VIII was supported by his councillors in commitments to invade France jointly with the Spanish in 1512 (which failed) and without them in 1513 (with some success). Rather than subscribing to the traditional interpretation of a battle between the ‘peace’ and ‘war’ parties within crown circles during this time, it seems that Henry’s ‘inner circle’, led by Fox, were agreed; they did support the war but, in accordance with their role as advisors, counselled caution at the outset, instead helping Henry to implement his chosen policy when conditions were more suitable.

59 For Henry’s confidence from the outset, see pp.362-364. Wolsey also had access to the king’s correspondence. On 24 March 1517; for instance, he mentions having read de Giglis’ letters both to him and Henry; LPHii, 3945 (24 March 1517, Wolsey to de Giglis, London).
60 See pp.379-381, 385-387. For the king’s ultimate power over his ministers, one only has to look to the beginning of the reign when one of Henry VIII’s first actions was to sacrifice two of his father’s closest, though most unpopular, ministers; Empson and Dudley; C. Whibley (ed.), Henry VIII by Edward Hall, i, p.1. Also, see
When Wolsey became ministerially ascendant, it seems that the dynamic between Henry and the guidance of his ‘inner circle’ might have altered. While Fox may have preferred (or had little choice but) to work with a broader body when advising the king, Wolsey was more clearly the hub of counsel on which Henry relied. Indeed, the nuncio Chieregato wrote in 1517 that Wolsey, ‘by reason of his vast ability, rules everything’. 61 Similarly, Leo X was quoted as saying in 1518 that he had conceded a legatine commission to Wolsey on account of him being practically king. 62 Perhaps the dynamic between Henry and Wolsey is best summarised by Wolsey himself in late August 1521 when he described Henry as putting ‘burden of his affairs on Wolsey’s shoulders’. 63 While this alludes to the *de facto* authority invested in Wolsey, it does not reveal Henry’s role in this process. Indeed, some foreign observers were under the impression that Wolsey led Henry in foreign policy. Giustinian, for instance, believed in 1519 that Henry did not ‘depart in the least from the opinion and counsel of’ Wolsey. His counterpart at the Imperial Court later advised that the cardinal ‘rules the entire kingdom, and may be considered King so far as its administration is concerned’. 64 One must remember, however, that these opinions came from outsiders, who were not privy to the Henry-Wolsey relationship conducted ‘behind closed doors’. Some light is shed on this dynamic by correspondence between Richard Pace and Wolsey, 1518-1521, at

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62 *Ven.ii*, 1031 (12 May 1518, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). Following Fox’s withdrawal, Wolsey was repeatedly assessed by observers, particularly Venetian representatives, as ‘alter rex’ or something similar: *Ven.ii*, 732 (23 May 1516, statement made to the Venetian government on behalf of Richard Pace), 1296 (9 November 1519, Surian to the Signory, London); *Ven.iii*, 1 (calendared January 1520, Surian to the Signory, London), 18 (25 February 1520), 101 (10 July 1520, doge to Wolsey), 278 (3 August 1521, Surian to the Signory, Calais), 302 (19 August 1521, Venetian ambassador at the Imperial Court to the Signory, Bruges); R. Brown (trans.), *Four Years*, ii, pp.294-295 (*LPIII*ii, 397; *Ven.ii*, 1262; 26 July 1519, Giustinian and Surian to the Signory, Lambeth).
63 *LPIII*ii, 1515 (28 August 1521, Wolsey to Henry, Gravelines).
64 R. Brown (trans.), *Four Years*, ii, pp.294-295 (*LPIII*ii, 397; *Ven.ii*, 1262; 26 July 1519, Giustinian and Surian to the Signory, Lambeth); *Ven.iii*, 232 (6 June 1521), 402 (calendared end July 1519). Also see R. Brown (trans.), *Four Years*, i, pp.298-300 (*Ven.ii*, 781; *LPIII*, 2414; 3 October 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London).
a time when sweating sickness and Wolsey’s foreign diplomacy kept king and cardinal apart for long periods. If this stream of communications is representative, it seems that Wolsey diligently kept the king informed, by forwarding him relevant correspondence and seeking signatures and approval. There also seems to have been a genuine sense of deliberation between the two, with the cardinal supplying his advice and although this was usually accepted, Henry ultimately made the decision and Wolsey implemented it. During March 1518, for instance, at a time when England had decided to opt for peace negotiations with France, but was still overtly anti-French as far as the papacy was concerned, one finds Henry approving Wolsey’s advice to deceive Leo X ‘with good words, “non obstante matrimonio contracto cum Gallis”’. He also accepted the cardinal’s recommendation to send de Giglis an extremely limited commission in response to the pope’s crusade proposal.65

65 LPIIIi, 4023 (24 March 1518, Pace to [Wolsey]), 4034 (27 March 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Abingdon), 4053 (calendared end March 1518, Wolsey to Pace), 4082 (14 April 1518, [Pace] to [Wolsey], Abingdon), 4335 (24 July 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Enfield), 4680 (24 December 1518, Pace to [Wolsey], Greenwich); LPIIIi, 412 (11 August 1519, Pace to Wolsey, Penshurst), 1233 (16 April 1521, [Pace] to Wolsey, Greenwich), 1425 (20 July 1521, Pace to [Wolsey], Windsor), 1473 (7 August 1521, Pace to [Wolsey], [“Okinje”]), 1519 (29 August 1521, Pace to [Wolsey], Guildford), 1709 (27 October 1521, Pace to [Wolsey], Windsor), 1739 (4 November 1521, Pace to Wolsey, Windsor), 1759 (13 November 1521, Pace to [Wolsey]), 1772 (17 November 1521, [Pace to Wolsey]). For Henry deciding to resist the papal desire to send a legate a latere to England in 1518, but being talked around by Wolsey, when the cardinal argued that they insist upon legatine powers being limited and that he also be commissioned in such a role, see ibid., 4034 (27 March 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Abingdon), 4073 (11 April 1518, Wolsey to de Giglis, London). For Henry and Wolsey disagreeing over who to promote to the See of St Asaph in 1518 and the king’s choice winning the day, see ibid., 4070 (11 April 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Abingdon), 4074 (12 April 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Abingdon), 4083 (14 April 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Abingdon), 4089 (18 April 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Woodstock). An indication of this dynamic in broader foreign policy can be seen in Henry’s reaction to Francis’ intrigues during the Imperial election in June 1518; he wanted measures taken against Francis’ ambition and left it to Wolsey “to devise”: ibid., 4266 (28 June 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Woodstock). For other indications of Henry VIII’s active input and his deliberation with Wolsey, see LPIIIi, 2631 (calendared 4-5 December 1516, [Henry] to [Wolsey]), LPIIIi, 4014 (18 March 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Richmond), 4058 (4 April 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Abingdon) 4071 (11 April 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Abingdon), 4082 (14 April 1518, [Pace] to [Wolsey], Abingdon), 4085 (16 April 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Abingdon), 4257 (24 June 1518, [Pace] to [Wolsey]); LPIIIi, 302 (13 June 1519, John Clerk to Wolsey, Windsor), 504 (9 November 1519, Pace to Wolsey, Greenwich), 490 (31 October 1519, Pace to Wolsey, Greenwich). For an example of Henry and Wolsey deliberately giving out the same message about foreign policy to the Venetian orator, thereby perhaps giving the impression that the cardinal was leading the king, see R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, 1, pp.160-164 (Veni.ii, 673; LPIIIi, 1386; 5 January 1516, Giustinian to the Council of Ten, London). For an indication of Henry and Wolsey disagreeing and the king pulling rank, see LPIIIi, 1544 (4 September 1521, [Wolsey to Henry], Calais), 1611 (calendared 28-29 September 1521, Wolsey to Henry), 1630 (4 October 1521, Pace to Wolsey, Windsor).
In terms of defining the ‘papacy’ for this study, the emphasis ought to be placed on whom Henry VIII and his principal ministers believed they were dealing with when they communicated with Rome on political matters. For the most part, this was the popes themselves, Julius II and Leo X, as this was with whom they corresponded.\textsuperscript{66} That it was ultimately the pontiffs who were understood to form papal foreign policy was confirmed by the various English diplomats in Rome during this period, who were employed to identify this and influence its direction in the English ‘interest’.\textsuperscript{67} Thus, one finds the likes of Bainbridge and de Giglis seeking and gaining audiences with the popes for this purpose and, likewise, the popes using them as conduits for communicating their opinion back to England.\textsuperscript{68} It is difficult to identify, on the other hand, instances where English diplomats in Rome attempted to influence papal advisors or ministers in a bid to further the crown’s political affairs. That is not to say that this did not occur, rather that this could not have been identified as an effective means to address the popes. Consequently, one finds that Henry and his principal ministers

\textsuperscript{66} For examples of direct correspondence to the pope from the king, of which there are many throughout the period, see for instance \textit{LPIii}, 2310 (\textit{LPI}, 4470; 28 September 1513, Henry to Leo, Tournai), 2674 (\textit{LPI}, 4819; 26 February 1514, Henry to Leo, Westminster), 3140 (\textit{LPI}, 5318; 12 August 1514, Henry to Leo, Greenwich); \textit{LPIii}, 1546 (16 February 1516, Henry to Leo); \textit{LPIiii}, 427 (18 August 1519, Henry to Leo, Greenwich), 432 (calendared 19-22 August 1519, Henry to Leo), 600 (20 January 1520, Henry to Leo, Tower of London), 1137 (21 January 1521, Henry to Leo, Greenwich), 1297 (21 May 1521, Henry to Leo, Greenwich).

\textsuperscript{67} For the role of all ambassadors to identify those holding the reins of powers, see for example \textit{Ven.ii}, 132 (\textit{LPIi}, 960; Signory to Badoer).

\textsuperscript{68} For examples of Bainbridge and de Giglis being instructed to gain audience with and to discuss political matters with the pope, as well as their subsequently doing so, see \textit{Ven.ii}, 169 (\textit{LPIi}, 1182; 6 May 1512, Henry to Bainbridge), 177 (\textit{LPIi}, 1214; 29 May 1512, Henry to Bainbridge), 212 (\textit{LPIi}, 1521; December 1512, Henry to Julius); \textit{LPIi}, 1769 (\textit{LPI}, 3876; \textit{Ven.ii}, 238; 12 April 1513, Henry to Bainbridge, London), 2069 (\textit{LPI}, 4323, calendared July 1513, Spinelly to [Bainbridge]), 2800 (\textit{LPI}, 4955; 10 April 1514, Richard Wingfield and others to the king’s ambassadors at Rome, Mechelin), 2926 (\textit{LPI}, 5106; 20 May 1514, Bainbridge to Henry, Rome); \textit{LPIii}, 2928 (\textit{LPI}, 5353; 20 May 1514, [de Giglis to Fox and Wolsey]); \textit{LPIii}, 1042 (17 October 1515, [de Giglis to Wolsey]), 1201 (27 November 1515, de Giglis to [Ammonius]). For the same orators transmitting papal messages back to England on behalf of both Leo X and Giulio de’ Medici; \textit{LPIii}, 2890 (\textit{LPI}, 5054; 9 May 1514, Giulio de’ Medici to Henry, Rome), 3019 (\textit{LPI}, 5174; 19 June 1514, Leo to Henry), 3241 (\textit{LPI}, 5382; 4 September 1514, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 3496 (\textit{LPI}, 5464; calendared end November 1514, [de Giglis] to [Ammonius]); \textit{LPIi}, 1281 (14 December 1515, [de Giglis] to Ammonius, Bologna), 1450 (28 January 1516, Leo to Wolsey, Florence), 1451 (28 January 1516, Giulio de’ Medici to Henry, Florence), 1452 (28 January 1516, Giulio de’ Medici to Wolsey, Florence), 1667 (13 March 1516, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 3658 (31 August 1517, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 3828 (10 December 1517, [de Giglis] to [Wolsey]).
rarely communicated with anyone other than the pope in Rome, on political matters at least. The notable exception to this rule was Giulio de’ Medici, cousin to Leo X, who was this pope’s principal minister throughout the pontificate. As Guicciardini commented on de’ Medici’s authority, Leo had placed ‘all the important business of the pontificate in his hand….he seemed, indeed to be the Pope’s second self…’ This cousin of the pope forwarded himself to the English as an access point to the pope in September 1513, straight after his elevation to the Sacred College, and subsequently engaged in regular communication with both Henry and Wolsey. It was indicative of de’ Medici’s perceived significance as a papal minister that he was made cardinal protector of English affairs in January 1514, a position that had previously been given to papal ‘favourites’, presumably expecting access to and influence with the pope himself, albeit with limited success.

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69 There were occasional exchanges with particular cardinals, but these were usually on specific matters that were not largely political in nature, for example; LPIi, 101 (8 July 1509, Henry to Cardinal della Rovere, Greenwich), 138 (LPI, 405; 5 August 1509, Cardinal Aldosi to [Henry], Milan), 426 (LPI, 982; 9 April 1510, Cardinal Riario to Henry, Rome); LPIi, 2518 (LPI, 4610; 20 December 1513, Cardinal del Monte to Henry, Rome), 3509 (LPI, 5665, 2 December 1514, Cardinal Riario to Henry, Rome); LPI, 5349, 22 August 1514, Cardinal Remolines to Henry, Rome); LPIii, 971 (calendared end September 1515, Cardinal Colonna to Wolsey), 2362 (14 September 1516, Cardinal [Carvajal] to Henry, Rome). One exception was the approach from the cardinals involved in the Council of Pisa-Milan during 1510-1511, attempting to enlist Henry’s support. While this was a political matter for Henry, it may have been deemed a more spiritual issue for the cardinals involved; LPIi, 625 (LPI, 1353; 25 November 1510, the cardinals at Pavia to Henry), 732 (LPI, 1581; 2 April 1511, the cardinals at Milan to Henry). For the Sacred College’s relative lack of power as an advisory body to the pope, including in the temporal sphere, see G. Fragnito, ‘Cardinals’ Courts in Sixteenth-Century Rome’, The Journal of Modern History, 65 (1993), pp.36-37; K.J.P. Lowe, Church and Politics in Renaissance Italy: the Life and Career of Cardinal Francesco Soderini (1453-1524) (1993), p.47; P. Partner, The Pope’s Men: the Papal Civil Service in the Renaissance (1990), pp.35-37, 211; P. Prodi, The Papal Prince, pp.80-83, 88; C. Shaw, Julius II, pp.179, 180-182.

70 He further suggested that ‘many people think that Leo was ruled by Giulio,’ on account of Leo’s enjoyment of the pleasures of life, which is suspiciously close to allegations that have often been made about Wolsey vis-à-vis Henry. Perhaps this perception was common to principal ministers; S. Alexander (ed.), The History of Italy by Francesco Guicciardini, p.362. For a similar assessment from Stephen Poncher, writing to Wolsey, see LPIii, 912 (13 July 1520, [Poncher] to Wolsey, St Germain). LPIi, 2320 (LPI, 4471; 30 September 1513, [Giulio] de’ Medici to Henry, Rome), 2343 (LPI, 4491; 7 October 1513, Giulio de’ Medici to Henry, Rome).

71 De’ Medici’s prominence was recognised in this way during January 1514; LPIii, 2639 (EP, 350; 8 February 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome), 2640 (EP, 352; 8 February 1514, Leo to Fox, Rome), 2642 (LPI, 4735; 8 February 1514, Giulio de’ Medici to Henry, Rome), 2644 (LPI, 4747; 11 February 1514, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 2653 (LPI, 4786; calendared 18-19 February 1514, Giulio de’ Medici to Henry, Rome), 2659 (EP, 363; 19 February 1514, Leo to Fox, Rome), 2838 (23 April 1514). For de’ Medici’s subsequent prominence in Anglo-papal affairs as cardinal protector, see W.E. Wilkie, Cardinal Protectors, pp.85-103 and passim. Prior to this, the chronology of incumbents in the protectorship are unclear, although two cardinals close to the pope seem to have
To implement crown policy vis-à-vis the papacy, Henry VIII and his principal ministers relied on a burgeoning diplomatic network to communicate and conduct business with the papacy on their behalf. After an initial dearth of representation at the Curia, Henry first used an Englishman as orator from late 1509, Christopher Bainbridge, who was sent to Rome specifically to facilitate the king’s desire to ‘defend’ the papacy from France. Following Bainbridge’s death in 1514, Henry reverted to his father’s tendency to employ Italian curials for most of this period. Silvester de Giglis returned to English service in acted in this role at some point. First was Julius II’s relative, Sisto della Rovere di Franciotti, who was possibly deemed of insufficient calibre to continue and secondly Francesco Alidosi, a favourite whose alleged pro-French sympathies contributed to his death at the hands of the pope’s nephew Francesco Maria della Rovere in 1511. It was probably not difficult for English diplomats in Rome to identify these intimates, as they usually lodged within the Vatican; C. Shaw, *Julius II*, pp. 174-175, 178, 187-188, 277; W.E. Wilkie, *Cardinal Protectors*, pp.36-37, 41. For Alidosi, see *LPI*, 111 (*LPI*, 300; 15 July 1509, Alidosi to [Henry], Milan), 354 (*LPI*, 1457; 29 January 1510, Henry to Bainbridge). The only other papal minister that arises in English correspondence and diplomacy during Leo X’s pontificate was Cardinal Bibbiena. Originally sent as legate to Maximilian’s army that was to expel the French from Italy in early 1516, he was subsequently the English crown’s indirect papal contact in trying to revive this project following its failure during March-April of that year, when Leo X was reluctant to make his anti-French intentions public; *LPI*, 1457 (29 January 1516, Bibbiena to Wolsey, Florence), 1833 (28 April 1516, [Robert Wingfield to Henry], Trent), 1854 (4 May 1516, extracts of intelligence from Italy), 1892 (calendared 15 May 1516, extracts of letters from Galeazzo Visconti), 1924 (21 May 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Trent), 1983 (2 June 1516, [Galeazzo Visconti to [Wolsey]], 1984 (2 June 1516, [Filonardi] to Pace, [Zurich]), 2009 (6 June 1516, Galeazzo Visconti to -, Zurich), 2011 (6 June 1516, Galeazzo Visconti to his son [Anchises], Zurich), 2034 (12 June 1516, Pace to [Wolsey]); L. Pastor, *History of the Popes*, vii, p.154; W. Roscoe, *Leo the Tenth*, ii, p.50, 52. Bibbiena received a red hat at the same time as de’ Medici and was known to de Giglis as an intimate of the pope; *LPI*, 2230 (*LPI*, 4471; 30 September 1513, [Giulio] de’ Medici to Henry, Rome); *LPI*, 71 (29 January 1515, de Giglis to [Ammonius]).

This period coincided with an increasing trend towards permanent resident diplomacy that had been adopted firstly by the Italian powers in the latter half of the fifteenth century, before it began to spread across Europe. England began to follow suit from the reign of Henry VII, but it was only under Henry VIII that this was really adopted. In Rome, the role of English proctor evolved to include diplomatic business during the fifteenth century and a permanent diplomatic presence was maintained from the 1470s. Gradually, the proctorship became subsumed within the broader role of ambassador under Christopher Bainbridge; B. Behrens, ‘Origins of the Office of English Resident Ambassador in Rome’, *EHR*, 49, pp.640-645, 649-650; G. Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, pp.146-153.

The principal English diplomat in Rome 1508-1509 was Christopher Fisher, the ‘King’s solicitor’, but Henry VIII appears to have made little attempt to engage with him, as Fisher was wary about job security as late as September 1509. Girolamo Bonvisi was also ‘solicitor’ around this time, but the only activity of his that has been found is the sending of newsletters to England; *LPI*, 165 (*LPI*, 880; 12 September 1509, [Fisher] to my lord [-], Bacano); D.S. Chambers, *Cardinal Bainbridge*, pp.11-12. For an implied admission that English representation was poor at this time, see *Sp.ii*, 25-26 (*LPI*, 220; 1 November 1509, Ferdinant to Henry). For Bainbridge’s commission, see *LPI*, 175, 190:33 (*LPI*, 520; 24 September 1509); also see pp.48-49.

These Italians already were already au fait with the machinery of papal government, they would have known when, where and how to approach the pope and his ministers, indeed they would have been well-placed to identify the latter. They would have ready-made networks on which to call. Linguistically speaking, they were better equipped than most English diplomats to interact with an increasingly ‘Italian’ papacy. Furthermore, they were well rewarded for their service, de Castello and de Giglis being bishop of Bath and Wells and Worcester, respectively; D.S. Chambers, *Cardinal Bainbridge*, p.7; C.H. Clough, ‘Gigli, Silvestro (1463-1521)’, *DNB*, T.F.
Rome in 1512 and this overlapped with Bainbridge’s work there. While they initially worked together, the two diplomats soon fell out, as Fox and Wolsey secretly commissioned the Italian to start peace negotiations in January 1514, to the exclusion of the English cardinal. 76 De Giglis remained in English service until his death in 1521, although he seems to have lost the confidence of Leo X by May 1520. 77 Another Italian curial of longstanding service to England, Hadrian de Castello, returned to Rome from exile in 1513 (following the death of Julius II). 78 While he was occasionally employed by Wolsey, he too fell out with de Giglis as well as with Bainbridge and never really regained favour in England. 79 In fact, Wolsey was behind attempts to have him sacked from the English collectorship from 1514 on and, eventually, his expulsion from the Sacred College and from his see of Bath and Wells in 1518. 80 De Giglis’ role was taken by John Clerk, who coincidentally arrived in Rome shortly after the Italian’s death and was to stay there until beyond the end of this period. 81 He was supported by Lorenzo Campeggio, who seems to have fulfilled some sort of supporting

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Mayer, ‘Castellesi, Adriano (c.1461-1521), DNB; M. Underwood, ‘The Pope, the Queen and the King’s Mother: or, the Rise and Fall of Adriano Castellesi’, in B. Thompson (ed.), The Reign of Henry VII, Proceedings of the 1993 Harlaxton Symposium (Harlaxton Medieval Studies V; 1995), pp.65-81. For Bonvisi rather hopefully seeking similar reward at the beginning of this period, see LPI, 100 (LPI, 267; 6 July 1509, Julius II to Henry, Rome), 111 (LPI, 300; 15 July 1509, Cardinal [Alidosi] to [Henry], Milan). For the employment of Italian curials as an old-fashioned concept that was increasingly supplanted by resident diplomats from the states that they represented, see P. Partner, Renaissance Rome 1500-1559 (1976), p.52.

76 LPIii, 2611 (LPI, 4598; January 1514, [Fox and Wolsey] to de Giglis), 2926 (LPI, 5106; 20 May 1514, Bainbridge to Henry, Rome); also see p.112.

77 LPIii, 791 (4 May 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 853 (calendared end May 1520; ['de Medici to --]), 1247 (23 April 1521, [Campeggio to Wolsey], Rome).


79 Bainbridge objected to de Castello’s attempts to assert himself as the principal English representative in Rome as early as June 1513; LPIi, 2029 (LPI, 4283; 25 June 1513, Bainbridge to Henry, Rome), 2077 (LPI, 4327; 7 July 1513, Bainbridge to Ruthal, Rome). When de Giglis was accused of murder following Bainbridge’s death in July 1514, the bishop believed that de Castello may have encouraged the allegations and subsequently briefed Wolsey against him. This may not have been the beginning of their enmity, however, as Chambers traces it back to 1505; LPIi, 3203 (LPI, 5356; 28 August 1514, [William Burbank] to Henry, Florence), 3302 (LPI, 5449; [Ammonius] to Wolsey, Westminster); LPIi, 2194 (19 July 1516, de Giglis to Ammonius); D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.9.

80 As a result of his implication in the Petrucci Plot against the pope, Wolsey was able to force the deprivation of de Castello in combination with his denying entry into England of Lorenzo Campeggio as legate a latere; LPIii, 3493 (19 July 1517, de Castello to Wolsey, Venice); T.F. Mayer, ‘Castellesi, Adriano, DNB; W.E. Wilkie, Cardinal Protectors, pp.106-110.

81 Clerk arrived in Rome in July 1521 and remained there until summer 1522; LPIii, 1402 (9 July 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome); D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.147.
diplomatic role after ending his legatine commission in England in August 1519.82 The ‘English’ representatives, particularly de Giglis, seem to have been central to Anglo-papal political communication as not only did they present crown business to the pope, they also referred papal requests back to England.83

Henry VIII also conducted his relationship with the papacy through the latter’s own diplomats sent to England. The most common of these was the nuncio, a title that had come to describe envoys from Rome with commissions for specific business in the areas they were sent to. These commissions were limited in both breadth and duration. Nuncios could not act on their own without papal instructions, although they could convey messages, negotiate and persuade, arrange and conclude accords, but only within the limits set by the pontiff.84 By this period, one can distinguish between two broad types of nuncios at work in England: the nuncius et orator and the nuncius et collector. The former, the nuncio-orator was sent by popes on missions usually of a limited diplomatic nature (in both time and scope), while the latter, as implied by the title, was a permanently resident envoy, whose duties, in addition to their traditional fiscal function (the role of Collector of Peter’s Pence and other dues), had more recently developed to include a diplomatic role, the latter which had come to overshadow the former by this time. It was probably deemed common sense by the papacy to

82 Campeggio was eventually rewarded with the bishopric of Salisbury in 1524; T.F. Mayer, ‘Campeggio, Lorenzo (1471/2-1539)’, DNB; W.E. Wilkie, Cardinal Protectors, p.112. For his working for England with de Giglis as well as in his own capacity from December 1519, see LPIii, 533 (4 December 1519, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome), 557 (19 December 1519, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome), 845 (28 May 1520, Campeggio and de Giglis to [Wolsey], Rome), 1123 (calendared 2-6 January 1521, [Campeggio to Wolsey]), 1767 (15 November 1521, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome), 1879 (17 December 1521, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome). It must also be stressed that temporary ambassadors were still sent to Rome to complement their permanent counterparts, such as Richard Pace in response to Leo X’s death in December 1521; LPIiiii, 1876 (16 December 1521, Charles to de Mesa, Ghent); C. Curtis, ‘Pace, Richard’, DNB. Similarly, Polydore Vergil visited Rome briefly in spring 1514, pushing for the elevation of Wolsey to the Sacred College; LPIi, 2932 (LPI, 5110; 21 May 1514, Polydore Vergil to [Wolsey], [Rome]); W.J. Connell, ‘Vergil, Polydore (c.1470–1555)’, DNB.

83 See above n.68.

84 For an exploration of the status of the nuncio, see G. Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, pp.28-29. For the nuncio in an earlier medieval context and a comment on how, while there were differences in status between nuncios, that between legate and nuncio could be blurred, see R.A. Schmuts, ‘Medieval Papal Representatives: Legates, Nuncios and Judges-Delegate’, Studia Gratiana, 15 (1972), pp.457-460.
employ existing officials with a revenue stream, as it evolved towards the then current tendency to maintain permanent diplomatic representation. While orator-collectors were usually (non-English) curial officials of relatively insignificant socio-political status (holding minor bishoprics or canonries, and so on), it has been observed that there was a tendency to employ candidates of higher rank, as the diplomatic component of their role increased. This can be best seen in Cardinal Hadrian de Castello’s (troubled) tenure of the post from 1489.85

It ought to be noted, however, that while there was always an English collector during the period 1509-1522, they were not always resident in England and, in such cases, they largely exercised their office through deputies or sub-collectors.86 The other type of papal diplomat that visited England was the legatus a latere whose commission elevated a given cardinal to become the ‘alter ego’ of the pope and gave him the corresponding powers to act as a quasi-pope wherever he went, with the ability to override the local ordinary. It also ought to be noted that a legate was always a cardinal commissioned by the pope and his authority was usually limited in purpose and longevity.87 While a stream of nuncios came to England during this period, as well as two legates (one of whom was Wolsey), their role in Anglo-papal

86 While de Castello was the absentee collector up to 1518, his deputies varied between Peter Griphus, Polydore Vergil and Andrew Ammonius. De Castello faced a battle with Andrew Ammonius and de Giglis to retain the office from 1514 on, but managed to hang on to it until his implication in the Petrucci plot in 1517. De Giglis replaced him by the end of August and Silvester Darius was appointed as his deputy; C.H. Clough, ‘Gigli, Silvestro’, DNB; T.F. Mayer, ‘Castellesi, Adriano’, DNB; J.A.F. Thomson, Early Tudor Church and Society, p.31; W.E. Wilkie, Cardinal Protectors, pp.106-107.
87 In terms of appearance, the legate a latere’s ‘papal’ authority was indicated by his attire and insignia, for instance he rode a white horse and wore a red mantle and hat. Also, upon his arrival at a city, for example, he was entitled to be met by the assembled clergy and the people, to be accompanied by them as he entered, possibly while proceeding under a baldachin. He would then go to the main church where a ceremony would be performed, the legate would issue blessings and indulgences. The legate would bring with him a miniature version of the papal administration that existed in Rome, dispensing the same privileges and hearing judicial causes wherever they went; R.A. Schmuts, ‘Medieval Papal Representatives: Legates, Nuncios and Judges-Delegate’, Studia Gratiana, 15, pp.453-455; R.N. Swanson, ‘Legate’, in J.R. Strayer (ed.), Dictionary of the Middle Ages, vol.7 (1986), pp.534-535; F. Wasner, ‘Fifteenth-Century Texts on the Ceremonial of the Papal “Legatus a Latere”’, Traditio, 14 (1958), pp.296-311, 315-321.
political relations is less clear than that of the English network in Rome, not least because little correspondence to and from them can be found.\textsuperscript{88} In terms of the nuncios, that is not to say that they were not active diplomatically. Peter Griphus, for instance, is known to have kept Julius II informed with news during 1511.\textsuperscript{89} Caraffa met with Henry in 1514.\textsuperscript{90} There is record of Chieregato’s involvement in the conclusion of an anti-French treaty in 1516 and his passing on of correspondence to and having audiences with Henry and Wolsey during 1517.\textsuperscript{91} Furthermore, Silvester Darius was sent to England as sub-collector in the same year charged with managing correspondence between there and Rome.\textsuperscript{92} There is no indication, however, that any of these nuncios played a similar role to that fulfilled by the English diplomats in Rome. The one exception to this rule seems to have been Girolamo Ghinucci who, on account of a perceived paucity of communication between England and Rome and a loss of faith on the part of the pope in de Giglis, was proposed as a secret intermediary between Wolsey and Giulio de’ Medici in May 1520. De’ Medici advised that they communicate through him verbally as well as in writing, a proposal that Wolsey accepted.\textsuperscript{93} Subsequently, private political negotiations flowed through this channel to the apparent exclusion of the English network in Rome.\textsuperscript{94} In terms of the legates \textit{a latere}, the fact that one of them was Wolsey helped ensure that the other, Lorenzo Campeggio played a subordinate role. Indeed, it will be

\textsuperscript{88} De Giglis was in England between 1505 and 1512, for instance, but little is known of his activities; D.S. Chambers, \textit{Cardinal Bainbridge}, p.9.
\textsuperscript{89} Ven.\textit{ii}, 127 (\textit{LPI}, 923; 8 November 1511, note from the Venetian secretary at Rome).
\textsuperscript{90} \textit{LPI}\textit{ii}, 2084 (\textit{LPI}, 5048; 7 May 1514, Henry to Leo, Greenwich).
\textsuperscript{91} R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, i, pp.321-325 (Ven.\textit{ii}, 800; \textit{LPI}\textit{ii}, 2499; 1 November 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London); Ven.\textit{ii}, 875 (18 April 1517, Chieregato to the marquis of Mantua, London), 888 (19 May 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 915 (Leo to Henry, 2 July 1517, Rome), 942 (1 August 1517, Chieregato to Francesco II Gonzaga, London). Of all the nuncios who visited England during this period, Chieregato is probably the best documented, although the correspondence found largely relating to a subsidiary role he performed as the representative of Mantua; \textit{ibid.}, 741, 762, 875, 878, 887, 894, 918-919, 945.
\textsuperscript{92} \textit{LPI}\textit{ii}, 3689 (17 September 1517, Leo to Henry, Rome).
\textsuperscript{93} \textit{LPI}\textit{iii}, 853 (calendared end May 1520; [de’ Medici to --]), 897 (2 July 1520, de’ Medici to Wolsey, Florence).
\textsuperscript{94} \textit{LPI}\textit{iii}, 1006. (calendared beginning October 1520, [de’ Medici to Ghinucci]), 1080 (calendared end November 1520, [de’ Medici to Ghinucci]), 1209 (calendared 30-31 March 1521, [de’ Medici to -]), 1210 (calendared end March 1521, [de’ Medici to -]), 1370 (27 June 1521, Pace to [Ghinucci], Windsor), 1410 (12 July 1521, Ghinucci to Wolsey, London), 1411 (12 July 1521, [Ghinucci to Wolsey]), 1916 (30 December 1521, Girolamo [Ghinucci] to Wolsey, Eltham).
found that Campeggio was largely excluded from negotiations in England towards a treaty of universal peace, although he did appear ceremonially.95

Finally, a few words ought to be said about a factor that had a major influence on the political relationship between England and Rome: distance and its effect on the speed of communication. Couriers took one of two routes to travel the roughly 1,200 miles to Rome: either via France or Germany, depending on the prevailing political situation.96 Polydore Vergil considered through France to be ‘the best road’, but at times of Anglo-French hostility, that would have been inadvisable due to the risk of interception.97 Much post between England and Rome was therefore relayed through the Holy Roman Empire during this period. Regardless of the route, the journey was widely deemed to be arduous. Thomas Alen when, complaining to the earl of Shrewsbury in November 1517 about the difficult he was experiencing in getting a reply to the earl’s correspondence from Wolsey, retorted that he would ‘rather be commanded to Rome than deliver letters to him [Wolsey], and wait for an

95 See pp.638-641.
96 G.B. Parks, The English Traveler to Italy, vol.i The Middle Ages (to 1525) (1954), p.497. For de Giglis sending despatches through Lyon during October 1515 when England was formally at peace with France; LPIi, 1042 (17 October 1515, [de Giglis to Wolsey]). For the same ambassador forwarding letters through Germany at a time when the English crown was trying to galvanize a league against the French to expel them from Italy, see ibid., 2241 (2 August 1516, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome). For Bainbridge forwarding correspondence through Germany in 1513, see LPIi, 1594 (LPI, 3678; 26 January 1513, Spinelly to Henry, Mechelin). For John Clerk weighing up the expense involved in both routes, see LPIii, 1431 (21 July 1521, John Clerk to Brian Tuke, Rome). Thomas Spinelly, resident in the Low Countries for much of this period, seems to have been the hub of most crown communication regardless of route. For his forwarding of correspondence from Bainbridge to Henry among other despatches from Rome for instance, see LPIii, 2672 (LPI, 4810; 25 February 1514, Thomas Spinelly, Mechelin), 3015 (16 March 1517, Spinelly to Henry). Also see LPIii, 1317 (21 December 1515, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 1581 (23 February 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 1610 (1 March 1516, Stile to Henry). Spinelly was probably used to engage the services of the Imperial and French postal systems, as the English network only went as far as Calais at this stage; P. Beale, A History of the Post in England from the Romans to the Stuarts (1998), pp.115-117, 130-131, 170; B. Behrens, ‘The Office of the English Resident Ambassador: its Evolution as Illustrated by the Career of Sir Thomas Spinelly, 1509-22’, TRHS, 4th series, 16 (1933), pp.170-172; H. Robinson, Carrying British Mails Overseas (1964), pp.15-16.
97 Ven.ii, 129 (LPIi, 941; 15 November 1511, Vergil to the marquis of Mantua, London). For the danger to English couriers and correspondence when England was on hostile terms with France, see LPIii, 1581 (23 February 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 1600 (27 February 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 1610 (1 March 1516, Stile to Henry). For the risk of interception through Germany as well; ibid., 1794 (20 April 1516, de Giglis to Ammonius, Rome). Equally, the English were not innocent of intercepting French correspondence; ibid., 1855 (5 May 1516, Mountjoy to Henry, Tournai). To ensure security of correspondence, the English took precautionary measures such as encryption; ibid., 2193 (19 July 1516, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 2241 (2 August 1516, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome).
answer'. The distance and dangers, therefore, had an effect on the speed of communication between England and Rome. Even sending a message to Rome via the relatively new, albeit expensive, system of stage posts would take at least 13, if not up to 18 days, which meant a round trip of around four weeks upwards. While it will be found that this had implications for events such as papal conclaves and the creation of cardinals, as it limited Henry VIII’s ability to issue any response, it also affected the degree to which England and Rome could cooperate in foreign policy, particularly when the receipt of other contradictory intelligence was added to the equation. One such occasion occurred in the wake of the French victory against papal and Swiss forces at the Battle of Marignano (13-14 September 1515), which precipitated a period of French dominance in Italy. The varied nature of reports that reached England about this engagement meant that Henry VIII may not have known the true result until late October. At a time when England had committed to supporting the Church against France, the delay meant that Leo X would not hear from his ally for some time which, along with other factors, hastened his submission to the French.

98 *LPiili*, 3807 (25 November 1517, Thomas Alen to the earl of Shrewsbury). Also see *LPIli*, 183 (23 February 1515. Clarendieux to [Somerset], Paris).

99 Around 1500, the carriage of correspondence had undergone a minor revolution, whereby relays were set up to divide journeys into planned stages, which roughly halved postal times. It ought to be borne in mind, however, that travel times could still be affected by the weather and by the risk of interception by hostile powers; P. Beale, *A History of the Post in England*, p.133; G.B. Parks, *The English Traveller to Italy i*, pp.497-498; P. Partner, *Renaissance Rome*, pp.51-52. Brief consultation of contemporary sources does reveal quicker carriage times, although 11 days seems to have been the quickest. News of Henry VII’s death may have arrived in Rome within 11-12 days, de Giglis, writing in 1513, expected a messenger to make the round trip within 22 days and during 1515 claimed to have received a missive from Wolsey in 11 days; *Ven.i*, 942 (*LPi 17; 3-4 April 1509, letters from Rome to the Signory); *LPiili*, 2353 (*LPI, 4500; 11 October 1513, de Giglis to Henry, Rome); *LPiili*, 1111 (6 November 1515, [de Giglis to Wolsey]). It ought to be stressed, however, that the lack of English postal system across Europe meant that crown correspondence was not apparently carried between England and Rome in any standardised way. While a single courier could carry it all the way, it could also be conveyed through multiple messengers through the Imperial network, through another state’s postal system, such as Venice’s, or even by an individual who happened to be going to Rome, such as the physician Boerius; *Ven.ii*, 156 (*LPI, 1179; 4 May 1512, Signory to the Venetian ambassador at the Curia), 168 (*LPI, 1183; 25 May 1512, arrival in Venice of a crown courier), 172 (*LPiili*, 1223; 31 May and 1 June 1512, letters from Friar Angelo, Rome); *LPiili*, 2074 (*LPI, 4326; 6 July 1513, Spinelly to Bainbridge, Brussels); *LPiili*, 542 (calendared end May 1515, John Baptista Boerius to Ruthal).

100 See pp.490-492.
On 11 October 1521, Leo X finally bestowed an honorary title on Henry VIII as king of England; a title that, notionally at least, reflected his fidelity to the Church (or, more specifically, the papacy) and confirmed his place among the principal secular leaders of Christendom. ¹ All three of the contemporary ‘superpowers’ possessed some such title, in addition to a few other states. The Holy Roman Emperor had long been deemed ‘Protector of the Church’. ² Indeed, during May 1512 Henry VIII, explaining to Maximilian why he was going to war with France, hoped for the emperor’s tacit support at least in his role as ‘supreme protector of the Church’.³ The description of French monarchs as ‘Most Christian’ dated back at least to the twelfth century; ¹

¹ LP III ii, 1659 (11 October 1521).
² In its imperial context, this title (and duty) had been bestowed on each emperor upon their coronation by the pope since Charlemagne became head of the reconstituted ‘(Western) Roman Empire’ in 800. Preceding this, however, Pippin III (king of the Franks, 751-768), had become the protector and defender of the Church (particularly of its temporal lands, as specified in the Donation of Constantine), based on his position as ‘patrician of the Romans’, replacing the emperor of the Eastern Roman Empire in this role; E. James, ‘The Northern World in the Dark Ages 400-900’, in G. Holmes (ed.), The Oxford Illustrated History of Medieval Europe (1988), p.99; P. Partner, The Lands of St Peter, pp.18-20; R.W. Southern, Western Society and the Church in the Middle Ages, pp.59-60; W. Ullmann, The Growth of the Papal Government in the Middle Ages: a Study in the Ideological Relation of Clerical to Lay Power, (1962), pp.64-69, 107, 152, 157-160, 197, 214, 260. One must remember, however, that not all ‘emperors’ were crowned by the papacy and thus, technically, remained king of the Romans or ‘emperor elect’. Maximilian I is a case in point, but it does not seem to seem to have affected recognition, including by Henry VIII, that he at least fulfilled this responsibility (see n.3).
³ LP I, 1186 (LPI, 3188; 8 May 1512, Henry to [Maximilian]). A similar letter, apparently written the same month, has Henry begging Maximilian ‘as principal protector of the Holy Roman Church’ to join the holy league against France. Also, in instructions to Cardinal Bainbridge, around 29 May 1512, Henry rehearsed the aforementioned approach to the emperor, ‘it appertaining especially to his office to the defend the Church’. There is also evidence of Charles V referring to himself and Germany as ‘defenders of the Catholic faith’ (against Luther) in April 1521. Finally, the Spanish ambassador in Rome referred to Charles as ‘the natural protector of the Church’ in December 1521; Ven. ii, 177 (LP II, 1214; 29 May or 26 June 1512; Henry to Bainbridge), 178 (LP II, 1215; calendared end May 1512, Henry to Maximilian); LP III i, 1237 (19 April 1521, Charles to the people of Germany); Sp. ii, 368 (11 December 1521, Juan Manuel to Charles).
century. More recently, the king of Spain had become ‘Catholic’, a label gained by Ferdinand (and Isabella) from Alexander VI in 1494, and the Swiss had gained a title, ‘Protectors of the Liberty of the Church’, from Julius II on 6 July 1512 for their role in the expulsion of the French from Lombardy. Even James IV of Scotland may have benefited in this sense, perhaps becoming ‘Protector of the Christian Faith’ in spring 1507. The serious nature of such titles among contemporary heads of state, particularly linked with protection of the papacy, was indicated by James IV during March 1512, when he wrote to Ferdinand of Aragon, recognising how the Spaniard had ‘been summoned by the Pope, under his new title of The Catholic, to protect the Church, and by virtue of that office had entered the league and invited the Scot to do the same’.

In the continental arena, therefore, Henry VIII interacted with other heads of state with honorary

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4 Some (including Guicciardini) consider this title to have been derived from the efforts of Charlemagne and his father (Pippin III) to oust the Lombards from Italy and their bestowal of lands upon the papacy, that marked the beginnings of the Papal States. While Thomson ascribes the title to the twelfth century, it seems that Charles V (1364-1380) or Charles VI (1380-1422) was the first to use it in earnest, although it was not recognised as a de facto description of French monarchs by Rome until Pope Paul II (1464-1471) began to refer to Louis IX (1461-1483) as such when addressing him in correspondence; S. Alexander (ed.), *The History of Italy by Francesco Guicciardini*, p.144; A.D. Hedeman, ‘Pierre Salmon’s Advice for a King’, *Gesta*, 32 (1993), pp.115-116; G. Small, *Late Medieval France* (2009), pp.8-11; J.A.F. Thomson, *Popes and Princes*, p.35.

5 Ferdinand and Isabella were awarded the title of the Catholic Kings by Alexander VI in 1494, in recognition of their expulsion of the Moors from Granada. Charles of Castile was confirmed in this title in 1517 (albeit over greater areas, on account of his inherited lands in the Low Countries and Germany as well); T.J. Dandelet, *Spanish Rome 1500-1700* (2001), pp.28, 35; J.H. Elliot, *Imperial Spain 1469-1716* (1963), p.65; L. Pastor, *History of the Popes*, vii, p.257; C. Pendrill, *Spain 1474-1700: the Triumphs and Tribulations of Empire* (2002), pp.16, 29. For a reference to this title being fairly novel, see *LPl*, 1108 (*LPI*, 3081; 20 March 1512, James IV to Ferdinand, Edinburgh), 1215 (calendared end May 1512 or 26 June 1512; Henry to Maximilian).

6 The Swiss achieved this victory within a few weeks of their active participation in the Holy League. They were also named ‘Protectors of Religious Liberty’ in 22 February 1515; *LPl*, 1312 (*LPI*, 3341), 1344 (*LPI*, 3377; 17 August 1512, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels); *Sp.ii*, 209 (22 February 1515, Leo X to all persons, Rome); M. Creighton, *History of the Papacy*, v, p.236; T.E. Mommsen, ‘The Accession of the Helvetian Federation to the Holy League: An Unpublished Bull of Pope Julius II of March 17, 1512’, *JMH*, 20 (1948), p.130.


8 The Scottish king was imploring Ferdinand to turn his efforts towards peace; *LPl*, 1108 (*LPI*, 3081; 20 March 1512, James IV to Ferdinand, Edinburgh).
titles, including his greatest political rival, Louis XII, as well as his father-in-law Ferdinand. It is unsurprising, therefore, that Henry sought to be recognised by Rome in a similar manner. Indeed, it is possible that the title awarded to the Swiss, combined with failed attempts to secure papal briefs recognising the transfer of the French king’s titles (around 1512-1513) may have inspired the English king’s approaches to the papacy in this respect, particularly given his own commitment to the papacy against France at that time (and later). 9 While the eventual title, fidei defensor, was awarded in response to Henry’s literary attack on Luther, the Assertio Septem Sacramentorum, it was in fact the culmination of at least seven years of lobbying on the part of the English crown to have its wider political role vis-à-vis the papacy recognised. 10 The issue of the book, along with the demand for the title, also coincided with the conclusion of the Treaty of Bruges in August 1521, sealing English commitment to war against France once more, with the declared intention that Henry and Charles act as ‘protectors’ of the papacy. 11 In this light, it will be demonstrated here that Henry VIII and his principal advisors envisaged him as ‘defender’ of papal political, territorial and, consequently, spiritual independence, against the French. While this did not involve direct action by Henry in Italy and it did not entail him acting alone, the aim to counterbalance French interests in Italy in order to achieve this can be identified as a central tenet of English foreign policy for this period at least.

The idea that the papacy needed some sort of protector in practice (from internal and external threats) seems to have been of long standing and, as mentioned, dated back to the reign of Charlemagne and earlier. 12 Many parties had fulfilled this role over the centuries, usually

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9 See below pp.144-151.
10 See below pp.151-172.
11 See below p.741.
12 See n.2.
protecting the pontiff in a military sense in Italy, ranging from emperors and kings of France to
Norman rulers of Sicily. The emperor was still recognised as the principal ‘protector’, although
the Swiss’ recently gained title incorporated this description. It also seems as if Henry VIII
himself sought the word ‘protector’ somewhere in his title, but the eventual label of ‘defender’
was deemed a worthy enough substitute. In the event, it seems that Henry and Wolsey chose
that epithet from a number proposed in Rome around June 1521. Admittedly, Henry had
already styled himself in his book by a more wordy equivalent, ‘very Defender of the Catholic
Faith [of] Christ’s Church, which he has truly deserved of the See Apostolic’, but Wolsey also
sent a list of favoured labels with annotations to John Clerk on 25 August 1521.

The claim of secular rulers to protect the Church was also common in a domestic context,
particularly as a means by which princes asserted their royal authority over the ecclesiastical
community within their states. For Henry VIII, this was justified in theoretical terms as an idea
integral to his coronation. During the ceremony, English kings received the sword (symbolic of
secular power) ‘ordained for the defence of the holy church of God’ and the ring (the emblem of
religious faith) by which he should be ‘a founder and protector of Christianity and the Christian
faith’. While this claim vis-à-vis the ecclesia anglicana is irrelevant here, the broader
interpretation afforded by this notion could easily include the universal Church as a whole and

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14 For an approach to the pope by the English orator in this regard during September 1515, see LIIii, 887 (7 September 1515, [de Giglis to Wolsey]).
15 No real advance in the choice of titles seems to have been made since 1515-1516, as Campeggio reported that ‘Apostolic’ and ‘Protector’ were put forward; LIIIii, 1369 (27 June 1521, [Campeggio to Wolsey], Rome); LIIIii, 1411 (12 July 1521, [Ghinucci to Wolsey]).
16 LIIIii, 1510 (25 August 1521, [Wolsey to Clerk], Bruges).
18 R.N. Swanson, Church and Society, p.96. For a broader comment on this role among kings in general, see W. Ullmann, The Growth of the Papal Government, p.294-295.
makes it more understandable why Henry VIII may have deemed it his duty to act in pursuit of this ideal in his foreign policy. It also links in with the widely accepted idea that the papacy held the spiritual ‘sword’, while secular leaders wielded the temporal.\textsuperscript{19} It has further been claimed that allusions to defending the Church had been made by previous English monarchs, including Richard II, Henry IV and Henry VI. It has also been tied in with contemporary chivalric beliefs, particularly that, during the investiture of knights into the Order of the Garter, an admonition was given to the candidate, that he ‘shed his blood for Christ’s faith and the liberties of the Church’. As head of the order, therefore, the king was the defender of the faith.\textsuperscript{20} Given Henry VIII’s widely accepted commitment to the order, knighthood and chivalry more generally, it is entirely feasible that he took this responsibility seriously.

To test this idea that Henry VIII perceived himself as the papacy’s temporal defender or protector against France, it will first be established that this was the guiding principle of England’s political relations with Rome during this period.\textsuperscript{21} Secondly, the reasons why France was the focus of this ‘defence’ will be identified, exploring the prejudice held against that kingdom and the reasons for this, as well as how these manifested themselves \textit{vis-à-vis} the papacy. Thirdly, other reasons why the king and his advisors believed the papacy needed to be ‘defended’ will be explored; and, finally, the nature of this role will be explored; how it manifested itself 1509-1522.

To begin with, then, it must be established that the guiding principle in the English political relationship with Rome was that the former perceived the need to ‘defend’ the latter

\textsuperscript{21} It ought to be noted that English attempts to defend the papacy may not have been consistent nor successful, but rather a guiding principle to which it constantly returned.
from the might of France. While this is illustrated throughout the narrative, it can most obviously be detected in the various offensive and defensive confederacies of which England was a regular member during this time. In the first phase of anti-French aggression, up to August 1514, all of the alliances that Henry VIII joined had the defence of the Church (or the recovery of its territories) as their overt principal aim. Firstly, he joined the Holy League for the recovery of Bologna and other areas of the Papal States lost to the French, originally concluded on 4 October 1511.22 Henry VIII voiced his adhesion to this on 13 November and promised ‘on the word of a King to observe the [Holy] League and confederacy, and to peril everything for the recovery of Bologna and other towns of the Church, occupied by a tyrant (sic), and for the defence of each of the confederates…’.23 In commissioning his ambassadors to negotiate an alliance with Ferdinand to support this league, on 10 November, Henry specifically cites the purpose as ‘the defence of Holy Church and the recovery of Bologna, and preservation of the Pope’s authority’.24 The subsequent supplementary alliance that resulted on 17 November, similarly stated its purpose was to defend the Church from France.25 Similarly, another offensive alliance concluded with Spain to run alongside the Holy League, ratified by Henry on 9 February 1512, specified that it was ‘for defence of the Church’.26 On 5 April 1513, a renewed Holy League was concluded, this time including Maximilian, although the aim was still to defend the Church against the French; again,

22 Ven.ii, 1345-1346 (Sp.ii, 56; LPl, 889; LPI, 1880-1881; 4 October 1511).
23 This letter was read out at the second session of the Lateran Council in May 1512; ibid., 165-166 (LPl, 1204; 21 May 1512, letters received in Venice from Friar Angelo, Rome). Henry ratified the league on 13 November; Sp.ii, 58 (LPl, 939, 969:40; LPI, 1967; Ven.ii, 128; 13 November 1511).
24 LPl, 969:29 (LPI, 1955, 3513; Sp.ii, 57; 10 November 1511, Henry to Surrey and Shrewsbury, Westminster). Also see Sp.ii, 71 (LPl, 995; LPI, 2033; 20 December 1511).
26 LPl, 1054 (LPI, 2094; Sp.ii, 63-64; 9 February 1511). An additional treaty between the two kingdoms, concluded on 16 March 1512, specified that both kings were obliged to combine ‘in the defence of the Holy Church against France’ in addition to the recovery of Aquitaine for England; Sp.ii, 65 (LPl, 1098; LPI, 3797; 16 March 1512).
Henry confirmed this. Official commitment to this line was further indicated by the appointment of one of the king’s most senior councillors, Thomas Howard earl of Surrey, to be commander-in-chief of the English forces intended ‘for relief of the Holy See’. Once more, a complementary treaty between Henry and Ferdinand, dated 9 May 1513, intended ‘for the recovery of Aquitaine, the defence of the Pope and the Lateran Council’.

Similarly, Henry VIII formulated a league in defence of the Church on 29 October 1516, along with the Empire and Spain. It was hoped that the pope would join and lead the confederacy. Faced with procrastination and defection from its allies, the English crown failed to gain papal adhesion, although this was once again anticipated when the 1516 agreement was renegotiated in July 1517 as a ‘league for defence of the Church’. Finally, on 25 August 1521, a ‘secret’ alliance was concluded between Henry VIII and Charles V at Bruges, the protection of the papacy and the Medici was explicit. This was extended to include Leo X on 24 November 1521.

27 Sp.ii, 97 (LPIi, 1750; LPI, 3649, 3859-3861; 5 April 1513).
28 LPIii 1948:12-13 (LPI, 3997; 4 May 1513).
29 LPIi, 1657 (LPI, 4038; February 1513).
30 LPIii, 2462 (20 October 1516), 2463 (calendared 20 October 1516), 2486 (29 October 1516). This appears to be the same treaty as that said to have been concluded on 15 November 1516 and confirmed by Henry VIII on 5 July 1517; Sp.ii, 253-254 (15 November 1516); LPIii, 3437 (5 July 1517). The pope also joined a league to defend Milan against the French threat in February 1515 but, even though this stipulated an approach to Henry VIII, Anglo-papal communications seem to have been at cross-purposes for some months. It was only from around May 1515 on that Wolsey indicated that the king was prepared to join the league, in return for a cardinal’s hat. As negotiations for this played out, news of the English desire this league did not reach Rome until early September, by which time it was too late, as the Battle of Marignano was only weeks away. The 1516 agreement came in the wake of this; see below pp.475ff.
31 LPIii, 3437 (5 July 1517). This was to be a defensive coalition against France which, in addition to providing for military operations, envisaged the pope wielding spiritual weapons; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.93-95 (Ven.ii, 913; LPIii, 3415; 30 June 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London). Also see below pp.546-547.
32 This was to be achieved by the adherents’ commitment to expel the French from Italy. The pope was not yet a member, although nuncios were privy to the conclusion; LPIii, 1508 (25 August 1521, Bruges). Also see below pp.741-742.
33 LPIii, 1802 (24 November 1521, Calais).
One can also detect attempts by Henry VIII to ‘defend’ the papacy from France in some of its peace treaties with this kingdom. In that of 7 August 1514, for instance, Henry described how the treaty included ‘the Holy See and Bologna by name’. He also tried ‘to have the Duke of Milan included, but could not prevail’. The peace was to be confirmed by the pope and ecclesiastical penalties to be imposed on any transgressors.\(^{34}\) England’s priority, therefore, was the safety of the papacy; that of Milan would have been a strategic bonus, but the crown was unable to procure this.\(^{35}\) In the months following this peace, which was, it should be added, forced by Rome, Leo X urged Wolsey to foster an agreement between Louis XII and the duke of Milan, but to no avail.\(^{36}\) Similarly, the Treaty of London of 2 October 1518 was, it has been argued, intended to act as a straitjacket on French ambitions in Italy. As a treaty of universal peace, it bound all parties to refrain from any aggression towards each other. As the pope was to become its head and ‘the house of the Medici’ and ‘the Florentines’ were specifically comprehended, Francis I was therefore bound not to act militarily against any lands claimed by the papacy and thus not extend his political influence in Italy any further. If he did, he would be open to accusations that he was obstructing a crusade and would incur ecclesiastical censure. It cannot have been any coincidence that the defence and protection of the papacy was mentioned in

\(^{34}\) Maximilian and Charles of Castile were also to be incorporated; \(LP_{ii}, 3139\) (\(LP_{i}, 5319\); \(Ven_{ii}, 487\); 12 August 1514, Henry to Leo, Greenwich). Also see \(Sp_{ii}, 183-185\) (\(LP_{ii}, 3129\); \(LP_{i}, 5305\); 7 August 1514). Henry also included Leo X in the confirmation of this agreement that occurred in April 1515, as a result of Francis I’s accession, but Milan was again notably absent; \(Ven_{ii}, 598\) (5 April 1515).

\(^{35}\) For the strategic importance of Milan to the English ‘defence’ of the Papal States from France, see below pp.460 ff.

\(^{36}\) See below pp.460-462.
the treaty, a concept which had hitherto been included in English treaties that intended aggression against France.\textsuperscript{37}

This agenda was also expressed explicitly by crown sources through its correspondence. Henry VIII asserted this most clearly in connection with the presentation of the \textit{Assertio} in 1521 when he referred to his ‘having already defended the Church with his sword’.\textsuperscript{38} Henry VIII himself apparently first publicly revealed such intentions during April 1512, when he sent Lancaster Herald to the French court to declare to Louis XII that he felt ‘bound to defend the Church’ in a military sense.\textsuperscript{39} He echoed these sentiments in more detail in May, when he justified his aggression against France to Maximilian, on account of Louis XII’s invasion of papal cities, as a result of which, he (and Ferdinand) decided ‘to take up arms in defence of the Church’.\textsuperscript{40} Writing around the same time to Bainbridge in Rome, Henry urged him ‘to inform the pope that he [the king] is ready to risk his goods, life, and kingdom for the maintenance of his Holiness and of the Church’ (against France).\textsuperscript{41} Even in the face of an apparently comprehensive defeat of the Holy League at Ravenna, Henry continued to voice his commitment to this end. Writing to the same ambassador on 31 May 1512, still uncertain of the outcome of this engagement, the king claimed that he had ‘never in the midst of this mishap, and of these contradictory stories, changed his intention of defending the Church and protecting the pope’, before outlining the departure of his troops for the joint Anglo-Spanish enterprise into

\textsuperscript{37} \textit{LPIii}, 4467 (1 October 1518), 4468 (calendared 1-2 October 1518), 4469 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 1083; 2 October 1518), 4470-4471 (2 October 1518), 4473 (3 October 1518), 4475-4477 (4 October 1518); \textit{Ven.ii}, 1088 (9 October 1518); G. Mattingly, ‘An Early Nonaggression Pact’, \textit{JMH}, 10 (1938), pp.7, 12.

\textsuperscript{38} \textit{LPIii}, 1656 (calendared October 1521, John Clerk’s speech in Consistory on presenting the king’s book).

\textsuperscript{39} \textit{LPI}, 1169 (\textit{LPI}, 3986; calendared end April 1512, Lancaster Herald’s mission).

\textsuperscript{40} \textit{LPI}, 1215 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 178; calendared end May 1512, Henry to Maximilian).

\textsuperscript{41} This letter is calendared at 26 June and 29 May 1512, respectively; \textit{Ven.ii}, 177 (\textit{LPIi}, 1214; 29 May 1512, Henry to Bainbridge).
Aquitaine. This commitment even bridged over into the next pontificate. Again writing to the Bainbridge, on 12 April 1513, Henry was glad to hear that Leo X ‘sanctions the league for the defence of the Church, and has joined it’. He also hoped that the pope would support his forthcoming invasion of France, ‘undertaken for the liberation of the Church’. In appointing Queen Catherine regent and governess of England while he was in France, on 6 June, Henry termed the expedition as ‘for the preservation of the Catholic religion, and recovery of his rights’. Catherine herself, writing to Wolsey on 26 July 1513, hoped that the pope would work towards ‘an honourable peace’ for Henry (in light of his loss of Spain as an active ally and Leo X’s inclination towards peace), particularly given ‘that all the business that the King hath was first the cause of the Church’. Finally, in announcing the eventual Anglo-French peace of August 1514, Henry VIII, also referred to the war just ended which ‘he entered for the sake of the papacy’.

Understanding the increasing French threat to Italy in late 1514, Henry tentatively approached the pope perhaps in December with a view to protecting him from a prospective French enterprise. He initially urged Leo to resist the French and to ‘free Italy and extend his own authority’, although this was rejected. Shortly after, de Giglis again approached the pope, this...
time proposing a coalition against France, but this was again dismissed. Eventually, during 1515, Leo X did engage England to join such an anti-Gallic league, in response to which Wolsey advised the pope that Henry was ‘a better friend to the Church than all other Princes’. The context of this certainly suggested that this referred to Henry’s protection of Rome. Furthermore, when Wolsey notified Rome of Henry’s having signed the treaty, he advised that the king was now ‘ready to expose his person and goods to support the honour and safety of the Holy See’. At the same time, he expected Henry to gain an honorary title in recognition of this.

While the English acted too late to prevent Francis I achieving a decisive victory against anti-Gallic forces in September, they envisaged a swift response when they sent Richard Pace to hire the Swiss. In late October, Wolsey advised the pope that this embassy was intended ‘for the Pope’s defence’ and may have sought Leo’s participation. While the resulting Imperial-Swiss expedition failed from March 1516, Henry tried to ensure its continuation, in pursuit of which he approached Leo to agree to the ‘methods of security’ that he had recommended to him, most likely an early reaction to Maximilian’s retreat from Milan. Wolsey reiterated Henry’s commitment to defend the Church in late May 1516, but emphasised that his advisors had insisted that England’s allies be ready first. Consequently, the English failed to secure a firm papal commitment as first Charles and then Maximilian and the Swiss defected to the French.

In spite of this, the Empire and Spain continued to negotiate with England and, when it became

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48 Ibid., 71 (29 January 1515, de Giglis to [Ammonius]).
49 Ibid., 648 (calendared end June 1515, [Wolsey to de Giglis], ‘From my place beside Westminster’). Also see below pp.478-480.
50 LPHI, 894 (10 September 1515, Wolsey to [de Giglis]).
51 This message was conveyed perhaps secretly via Ammonius; ibid., 1105 (1-4 November 1515, [de Giglis to Ammonius]), 1201 (27 November 1515, de Giglis to [Ammonius]).
52 The ‘methods’ cited are unclear; ibid., 1788 (20 April 1516, Henry to Leo, Eltham).
53 Ibid., 1928 (22 May 1516, Wolsey to de Giglis, ‘From my house in London’).
54 See below pp.536-538.
apparent that papal adhesion was not forthcoming, a league ‘for defence of the Church’ was concluded in London anyway on 29 October 1516, with the hope that Leo would join later.\textsuperscript{55} The lack of celebration, however, suggested that this may not have been deemed likely.\textsuperscript{56}

As Henry and Wolsey continued to struggle to gain firm papal backing from Rome for a coalition to protect it from 1517, English declarations of commitment to this course seem to have quietened, as they began to adopt a reconciliation strategy \textit{vis-a-vis} France, with a view to constraining Francis I’s Italian ambitions.\textsuperscript{57} While the provision for the defence of Rome in the consequent Treaty of London has already been cited, there were also indications that the English crown still actively envisaged its defence of the papacy. During the Imperial election of 1519, for instance, Wolsey declared to the pope England’s intention to oppose Francis I’s candidacy on the basis that his victory would ‘endanger the independence of the Holy See’.\textsuperscript{58}

While from 1520 on, the English crown became increasingly receptive to Charles V’s overtures to align against France, particularly with a view to defending the papacy against France, it seems to have been cautious about voicing its desire to fulfil this role, perhaps not being confident of papal (or Imperial) intentions around this time.\textsuperscript{59} Even by May-June 1521, English representatives in Rome voiced this doubt to Leo X himself.\textsuperscript{60} Nevertheless, some sort of secret declaration of intent had already been made as, on 21 May, Henry told the pope that ‘he was ready to defend the Church, not only with his arms, but with the resources of his mind’.\textsuperscript{61} By

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{55} \textit{LPIii,} 2462 (20 October 1516), 2463 (calendared 20 October 1516), 2486 (29 October 1516).
\textsuperscript{56} See below p.539.
\textsuperscript{57} See below pp.596-600.
\textsuperscript{58} \textit{LPIii,} 137 (25 March 1519, Wolsey to de Giglis, London). For the Treaty of London, see above pp.45-46.
\textsuperscript{59} See below pp.678-679, 691, 702-705.
\textsuperscript{60} \textit{LPIii,} 1325 (calendared beginning June 1521, [de’ Medici to -]).
\textsuperscript{61} Giulio de’ Medici acknowledged this around 7-8 June and its secrecy is implied by the cardinal’s replying through a diplomatic back-channel, the nuncio Ghinucci; \textit{ibid,} 432 (calendared 19-22 August 1519, Henry to Leo), 1333 (calendared 7-8 June 1521, [de’ Medici to the bishop of Ascoli]).
\end{footnotesize}
this time, Wolsey intended to ally Henry with Charles against France, under cover of the peace conference of Calais, and planned to use the king’s book against Luther as leverage to gain an honorary title for him. \[62\] Furthermore, on the eve of these talks, Wolsey held a secret meeting with the nuncio Ghinucci ‘concerning his Holiness’ affairs against the Frenchmen’. Given the pope’s later reaction, this probably reiterated England’s desire to protect him. \[63\] Subsequently, following the conclusion of the Treaty of Bruges (25 August 1521), Wolsey instructed John Clerk secretly to notify Leo of the nature of this agreement, in addition to the imminent presentation of the *Assertio*, ‘declaring the King’s resolution to support the Church, and extinguish heresy by the sword and pen’. \[64\]

Henry VIII envisaged this defensive role as an obligation incumbent on him as a king. One can interpret Henry’s comments to the pope of May 1521 in this context. In a letter that effectively requested an honorary title, he emphasised that ‘nothing is more the duty of a Christian Prince than to preserve the Christian religion against its enemies’. \[65\] He may have been convinced quite early on of this by Ferdinand of Aragon during June 1510, who argued, ‘should the King of France really depose the pope, such an insult to the common church of all Christian people and to all princes of Christendom would be even a greater offence to them than an attack on their dominions, and they would be bound to oppose France with all their might’. \[66\] This sense of duty was subsequently reflected in Henry’s commissions to the earls of Surrey and

\[62\] See below pp.688-689.
\[63\] *LPiii*, 1486 (12 August 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome).
\[64\] *Ibid.*, 1510 (25 August 1521, [Wolsey to Clerk], Bruges), 1574 (14 September 1521, Clerk to Wolsey, Rome).
\[65\] While Henry refers directly to Luther as the ‘enemy’ in question, his talk of also using arms to defend the Church implies that he also meant Francis I, against whom he was about to commit in alliance with the emperor; *LPiii*, 432 (calendared 19-22 August 1519, Henry to Leo).
\[66\] *Sp.ii*, 50 (*LPii*, 483). Also, see *ibid.*, 48 (calendared June 1510, Ferdinand to Hieronymo de Vich in Rome).
Shrewsbury in November 1511 to negotiate an alliance with Spain against France, which state that (in the face of French aggression) he was, ‘as a Christian prince, obliged to help the Church in her tribulations, and to obey as his faithful son the orders of the pope, who by letters and memoirs has asked him for aid’.67 This sentiment was repeated in Henry’s instructions to his herald when issuing his declaration of war to Louis XII during April 1512. He intended to attack France because Louis had given the pope (and Ferdinand) ‘occasion to ask Henry’s help for the Church’, which Henry felt duty-bound to give.68

This idea that Henry VIII was or could be a ‘defender’ of the Church was also fostered by the papacy itself, at times when English support was sought against France. Again, this role can also be identified in direct correspondence. If the Venetians are to be believed, Julius II first approached Henry VIII to defend him from France around June-July 1510, having perceived ‘the extreme ill will of the French not only towards all Italy, but chiefly against the Apostolic See’.69 Subsequently, around October 1511, Julius II formally requested that Henry VIII join a league ‘against Louis XII, who had disposed of ecclesiastical preferments on his sole authority, and done other acts in contravention of the Papal authority, especially in besieging Bologna, and refused conditions of reconciliation which the Pope offered…’.70 The pope made a further request to Henry to come to ‘the defence of the Apostolic See’ on 14 March 1512.71 Reference to these approaches by Rome for protection were subsequently repeated in various commissions and the

67 Sp.ii, 57 (LPI, 934; 10 November 1511, Henry to Surrey and Shrewsbury, Westminster).
66 Lancaster Herald visited Louis XII to convey this; LPIi, 1169 (LPI, 3986; calendared end April 1512, Lancaster Herald’s mission).
69 Ven.ii, 71 (LPIi, 529; 15 July 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome).
70 LPIi, 1065 (LPI, 2010; calendared 20 February 1512, Julius to Henry, Rome).
71 Ibid., 1096 (LPI, 3068; 14 March 1512, Julius to Henry).
April 1512 declaration of war against France. Finally, in announcing the August 1514 Anglo-French peace, Henry VIII, claimed that it was mainly the pope who persuaded him to agree to going to war in the first place.

Leo X again invoked Henry VIII’s role as ‘defender’ during July 1515, following the latter’s agreement to join a coalition earlier formed to resist and expel Francis I from Italy, in respect of which Leo wanted ‘the King to be considered its [the Holy See’s] patron and protector’. This was a clear allusion to Henry’s self-perceived role and the title with which he wished this to be recognised. It seems that the king took this bait and began to push for a formal title to recognise his position. Consequently, in early September, de Giglis told Wolsey how he had spoken to Leo X about some title for Henry, ‘as protector of the Holy See’ and this led to failed attempts to secure such an honour that were effectively extinguished by the anti-French league’s defeat at the Battle of Marignano (September 1515). During 1517, Giulio de’ Medici approached Henry to help ‘succour the Church’ financially against its enemies, also mentioning previous occasions when the king had rescued two pontiffs ‘from danger’. While this money was intended for the Urbino conflict, in which Leo was embroiled against the exiled duke Francesco Maria della Rovere, the pope had already stressed his conviction that della Rovere was backed by France (and Venice). Given that Henry, at the time, still laboured for an anti-French league to move against Francis I in Italy, it seems that the papacy was playing on Henry VIII’s

72 Sp.ii, 57 (LPI, 934; 10 November 1511, Henry to Surrey and Shrewsbury, Westminster); LPIi, 1169 (LPI, 3986; calendared end April 1512, Lancaster Herald’s mission); LPIii 1948: 12-13 (LPI, 3997; 4 May 1513).
73 LPIii, 3139 (LPI, 5319; Ven.ii, 487; 12 August 1514, Henry to Leo, Greenwich).
74 LPIii, 700 (EP, 619; 12 July 1515, Leo to Wolsey, Rome).
75 Ibid., 887 (7 September 1515, [de Giglis to Wolsey]). For English attempts 1515-1516 to gain a title in recognition of this role, see pp.153-158.
76 LPIii, 3350 (10 June 1517, Nicholas von Schönberg to Wolsey, Ghent), 3382 (20 June 1517, Leo to Henry, Rome).
self-perceived role as ‘protector’. In 1519, the papacy appealed to England to ‘defend’ it in a different way, by helping it to influence the Imperial election. During March, Leo X declared that, while he opposed the candidacies of both Charles and Francis, he envisaged the latter as ‘the less evil’ and asked Wolsey for his advice. Quite predictably, the English crown objected to the French king first and foremost. Subsequently, when England and Rome failed to cooperate on the ground in Germany and both sides exchanged recriminations, Leo regretted ‘that Henry gave no attention to a project which would have made him a near, instead of a distant neighbour of the papal states’. Leo clearly implied (perhaps insincerely) that, had Henry facilitated his own election, he would be able to defend the papacy more directly, as he would then possess territories (and claims) in Italy, in addition to the traditional Imperial role as supreme ‘protector’ of the Church. Finally, the papacy appealed for English ‘protection’ in 1521 as, allied with Charles, it turned against France. Approaching Wolsey initially via Giulio de’ Medici, Leo was said to have ‘resolved to liberate himself at all hazards from this intolerable slavery, and hopes that Henry will show the same good mind towards the Pope and his confederates that he has always done’. It was to be further emphasised to Wolsey that this policy was not just intended ‘for the liberation of the Holy See, but of Italy, from the fangs of the wolf’. After publicly declaring himself against France in late June 1521, the pope approached England directly to come to his protection. A request through Clerk was made on 9 July and on the 21\textsuperscript{st}, the orator reported that Leo repeatedly urged him to write to England ‘for help and assistance against the

\footnotesize{77} See below pp.578 ff.
\footnotesize{78} LPIIIi, 149 (29 March 1519, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome).
\footnotesize{79} See below p.125.
\footnotesize{80} LPIIIi, 393 (Mart. Amp. iii, 1301-1303; calendared 22-23 July 1519, de Giglis to Wolsey).
\footnotesize{81} LPIIIi, 1209 (calendared 30-31 March 1521, [de’ Medici to -]).}
Frenchmen’. Similarly, around the middle of the month, Ghinucci appeared before Wolsey, along with his Imperial counterpart, to deliver letters from the pope which presumably urged the same course, now that an Imperial-papal axis was in place.

There is also evidence to suggest that other states appealed to Henry VIII’s self-perception as ‘defender’ of the Church to induce English support against France. During December 1511, for instance, Ferdinand of Aragon proposed to Henry VIII (through the Spanish ambassador in England), that some arrangement needed to be made concerning the relative precedence of their representatives at the forthcoming Lateran Council, so that, ‘as defenders of the Church, they should appear united against the King of France, her declared enemy’. Similarly, in January 1512, Ferdinand wrote to his son-in-law of his satisfaction with the current negotiations for an alliance against France: ‘the world shall know that the King of England and he will not permit anyone to trample the Church under foot’. Around the beginning of April 1512, the Venetian orator Badoer received instructions to urge Henry VIII to attack France, ‘a power waging war on the Church’. Also, on 20 November 1513, the duke of Milan replied to Henry, acknowledged the latter’s recent conquest of Thérouanne and Tournai and believed that this would ‘bridle the power of this enemy of the Church; without it he could have found no security in Italy’. Even towards the end of March 1514, the Swiss cardinal Matthew Schiner still referred to the French as ‘enemies of the Church’ in correspondence to Christopher Bainbridge, at a time when he believed that Henry would relaunch his attack on France that

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82 *LPiii*, 1430 (21 July 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome), 1402 (9 July 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome).
84 *Sp.ii*, 61 (LPl, 1006; calendared end December 1511, Ferdinand to Luis Caroz).
85 Ibid., 62 (LPl, 1011; LPl, 3638; 3 January 1512, Ferdinand to Henry, Burgos).
86 *Ven.ii*, 155 (LPl, 1128; 1-7 April 1512, Badoer to the Signory, London).
87 *LPl*, (LPI, 4751; 20 November 1513, Maximilian Sforza to Henry, ‘Ex arce Portae Jovis Mediolani’).
The emperor himself continued to push this line to Henry VIII merely days after England had come to peace with France in August 1514. On the 13th, Sir Robert Wingfield reported to his king that Imperial intelligence understood that an offensive Franco-Spanish alliance had been arranged against the pope and Italy, which they (the Empire and England) ought to resist. The following year, Ferdinand of Aragon attempted to induce English support against Francis I’s descent into Italy by asking Henry ‘to invade France and to succour the Holy Father’. Similarly, after the Battle of Marignano (September 1515), the Swiss Cardinal Schiner pledged himself to further the English plan for a swift reaction ‘against the French, who have dared to rend the unity of the Church’. Finally, an instance of third-party pressure on England to fulfil this role at the end of this period came from Charles V during July 1521 when, lobbying Henry to join the recently published Imperial-papal axis against Francis I. He described him ‘as one who had been a special defender of the Holy Church’.

The most obvious question deriving from the clear policy to ‘defend’ the pope from France is ‘why France?’ Both of the other ‘superpowers’, the Empire and Spain, had active interests in Italy and, indeed, the latter held considerable power in the peninsula with its possession of the kingdom of Naples. Erasmus commented roughly on this apparent contradiction to his friend, the king’s Latin secretary, Andrew Ammonius, on 26 November 1511, shortly after the first anti-French league of this period was concluded: ‘but pray suppose the French are driven out of Italy, and then reflect, please, whether you prefer to have the Spaniards as your masters, or

88 Ibid., 2752 (LPI, 4916; 26 March 1514, Cardinal Schiner to Bainbridge, ‘Ex Viglo’).
89 Ibid., 3150 (LPI, 5323; 13 August 1514, Robert Wingfield to [Henry]).
90 Sp.ii, 217 (14 September 1515, Ferdinand to his ambassador in Rome).
91 LPHii, 1146 (13 November 1515, Cardinal Schiner to Wolsey, Innsbruck).
92 LPHIIIi, 1415 (13 July 1521, Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to Wolsey, Antwerp).
the Venetians, whose rule is intolerable to their own countrymen’. 93 There had to be some powerful reasons, therefore, why Henry VIII and his advisors sought to pursue this course as part of English foreign policy. It will, therefore, be established that there was in England a general antipathy towards foreigners, foremost of which was a prejudice against the French. While it will be seen that this was a general feeling, the king and his principal advisors shared this outlook, to varying extents. This anti-French xenophobia was rooted, partly at least, in the Hundred Years War and continued to fuel this rivalry during the period 1509-1522. Finally, it will be demonstrated that a tangible fear of French political dominance over the papacy therefore shaped the English crown’s relationship with Rome into a ‘defensive’ policy against its neighbour’s influence in Italy. This fear was sometimes voiced by those in crown circles in two distinct lights; that the French king sought to be ‘monarch of the world’ (or some similar label) and that they were the Christian equivalent to the Turkish threat. It was also linked to a fear that France might turn the papacy against England.

Before demonstrating a widespread and deep-seated English xenophobia against the French, it ought to be emphasised that this was underpinned by a broader insular antipathy towards foreigners and outsiders per se. Slightly predating this period, for instance, a Venetian diplomat’s summary of his time in England circa 1500 reported that ‘the English are great lovers of themselves and of everything belonging to them; they think that there are no other men than themselves, and no other world but England…They have an antipathy to foreigners’. 94 The English people’s more general xenophobic feelings could at times be voiced more tangibly, for

example during the ‘Evil May Day’ riots of 1517 in London and possibly Southampton against alien merchants, on account of a conviction that the latter ‘not only deprived them [the English] of their industry, and of the emoluments derivable thence, but disgraced their dwellings, taking their wives and daughters…’. Even after the arrest of the principal perpetrators, it was alleged that this sentiment continued to be voiced ‘by their women, who evince immense hatred to all strangers’.  

That a prejudice against outsiders was felt across Christendom generally is also indicated by the prevalence of negative ‘national’ stereotypes in writings of the period. During June 1515, for instance, Thomas Colman wrote to his patron, Wolsey, from Bologna, opining that all such traits were true. Justifying, for instance, that ‘the Germans are tipplers’, he commented on the behaviour of Maximilian; ‘he tipples up wine and he tipples up all the money he can get’ (from England). On Scottish perfidy, he claimed that they ‘are perfidious to the King of England, to whom they owe obedience, and the Archbishop of York, who is their patriarch’. These demonstrate a degree of insularity among contemporaries. Similarly, this negative identification with outsiders was fuelled by self-perceived generalisations that one’s own people possessed this or that trait. Again, according to Erasmus, the English claimed to have ‘the most handsome women’, to be ‘the most accomplished in the skill of music’ and to keep ‘the best tables’. By way

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96 Colman also considers the Spanish to be ‘thieves’; *LP II*, 606 (22 June 1515, [Thomas Colman] to Wolsey, Bologna).
of comparison, the scholar reported that ‘the French think themselves remarkable for complaisance and good breeding’. 97

While the antagonism towards outsiders may have been a widespread feeling among the people of the kingdom who rarely, if ever, had contact with people from other states, that is not to say that those in governmental circles, who encountered foreign diplomats and merchants, necessarily or completely shared this view. Cordial enough relations were maintained between England and other states (even France at times) throughout the period, indicating that such antipathies could be tempered and did not automatically induce an isolationist foreign policy. Indeed, Venetian and papal sources, in addition to Richard Fox, reported a firm response to the aforementioned May Day riots of 1517 by Henry and Wolsey. 98 A convincing idea that has been put forward is that those at governmental level clearly identified this feeling (and that to be outlined vis-à-vis the French) as a potentially useful tool for encouraging war. 99 This is confirmed by Erasmus in his Querela Pacis (1521), who, after outlining a number of ‘national’ rivalries, alleged that kings cunningly and deliberately manipulated these notions to create a pretext for conflict. 100 As vague and intangible as this notion seems, therefore, particularly in light of the kingdom’s multifarious diplomatic and mercantile connections with other states, not to mention the collective, universal, religious identity shared by western Christendom, the existence of this attitude does provide some context in which the English relationship with France

97 Erasmus goes on to outline other self-perceived ‘national traits; L.F. Dean, Erasmus, The Praise of Folly, pp.91-92.
98 R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.69 (LPIIIi, 3204; 5 May 1517, Giustinian to the doge), 76 (LPIIIi, 3218; 9 May 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, Richmond); LPIIIi, 3259 (19 May 1517, Nich. Sagudino to Alvise Foscari); Ven.ii, 887 (19 May 1517, Chieregato to Vigo da Campo San Pietro); P.S. and H.M. Allen, Letters of Richard Fox, 58 (LP Addendum, 185; 10 May 1517, Fox to Wolsey, ‘St Cross beside Winchester’).
99 Hale identifies the frequency of negative national stereotypes that were voiced during wartime, but these were not exclusive to England; J. Hale, The Civilisation of Europe in the Renaissance (1993), p.57.
100 T. Paynell (ed.), The Complaint of Peace translated from the Querela Pacis (A.D. 1521) of Erasmus (1917), pp.57-58.
was set. While it is difficult to isolate anything more than a general antagonism towards outsiders in England, it provides a broad context from which one can begin to understand the strong prejudice that was more tangibly held against the French. Not only was this widely held among the English people, but also among the higher echelons of society, notably the king himself, in addition to many of his advisors, despite their willingness to accept lucrative French pensions during times of peace.

In the first place, the existence of a ‘national’ rivalry or enmity between the English and French was commonly believed among contemporaries. Again, Erasmus confirmed this in his *Querela Pacis* (1521), when arguing against such ‘nationalistic’ feelings: ‘an Englishman they say, is the natural enemy of a Frenchman, because he is a Frenchman’. Similarly, Polydore Vergil, in his account of the Hundred Years War in his *Anglica Historia*, commented that ‘it cannot be brought to passe by any meane that a Fr enche man borne will much love an Englishe man, or, contrary, that an English will love a Frenche man; such is the hatred that hath spronge of contention for honor and empire’. While this sense of ‘national’ rivalry was believed to have existed throughout the period, it is particularly highlighted in correspondence at times when

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101 Hale also mentions the cross-pollination of scholars, artists and mercenaries as instances where prejudices were not always as straightforward as they initially seemed; J. Hale, *The Civilisation of Europe in the Renaissance*, p.57.
103 For this rivalry predating the period under study, see J.A.F. Thomson, *Popes and Princes*, p.43, n.18.
104 Erasmus is critical of such antagonisms and shortly after goes on to argue that ‘a little gut of sea divides the English from the French; but if the whole Atlantic ocean rolled between them, it could not disjoint them as men united by nature; and, while they mutually retain the christian religion, still more indissolubly cemented by grace’; T. Paynell (ed.), *The Complaint of Peace translated from the Querela Pacis (A.D. 1521) of Erasmus*, pp.57-59. He also mentioned this particular regional hostility in his *Enchiridion Militis Christiani* (1504), while criticising the lack of Christian unity; K. Wilson and J. van der Dussen (eds.), *The History of the Idea of Europe* (1995), p.36. Hale also quotes Erasmus as writing ‘practically every Angle hates the Gaul, and every Gaul the Angle, for no other reason than that he is an Angle’; J.R. Hale, *War and Society in Renaissance Europe 1450-1620* (1985), pp.42-43.
England was either desirous of, committed to or at war with France. During September 1509, for instance, the Venetians tried to induce English support against the French by emphasising the need to ‘humble his [Louis XII’s] present haughtiness’ and referring to the French as ‘his [Henry’s] most natural enemies’. In May 1512, Lorenzo Pasqualigo, Venetian consul in England, commented that ‘foreigners remain here in great fear, and keep their tongue within their teeth, for they dare not speak ill of the [Holy] League [against France]; but if they do give utterance, it is to abuse France, perhaps unwillingly, as were they to do otherwise, their heads would be well broken’. Similarly, around 15 September 1515, Giustinian understood that recent French victories in Italy were not welcomed, ‘owing to the natural feeling existing between the two nations’ and repeated this sentiment on a number of occasions. More directly, Richard Pace in December 1515, seeking to recruit the Swiss to react to Francis’ victories in Italy, described the French as ‘the enemies of his country’, despite England still formally being at peace with France. Even in April 1518, again at a time when England was not at war with France and was negotiating towards a peace agreement, Henry was quoted as referring to the French king as his enemy. It ought to be noted, therefore, that the English understanding that the French were their enemies even extended into ‘peacetime’. This can be further emphasised in the wake of the Treaty of London (October 1518), some of the terms of which were said to be unpalatable to many English, including the restoration of Tournai to France and the plan for

106 *Ven.ii*, 12 (*LPlii*, 169; 14 or 15 September 1509, Signory to Badoer). They reiterated this traditional rivalry in a despatch during December. In a letter to be relayed to Henry VIII, Louis XII was referred to as his ‘capital and natural enemy’; *ibid.*, 24 (*LPlii*, 278; 21 December 1509, Signory to Badoer).


109 *LPlii*, 1258 (8 December 1515, [Pace to Wolsey], Zurich).

110 *LPliii*, 4082 (14 April 1518, [Pace] to [Wolsey], Abingdon).
Henry to meet Francis I.\textsuperscript{111} While reported discontent with these concessions indicates broader English antipathy towards France, the king and cardinal’s involvement does not necessarily indicate the absence of underlying anti-Galic sentiment.\textsuperscript{112} During May 1519, for instance, it was rumoured that Wolsey removed a number of Henry’s courtiers on account of their French sympathies.\textsuperscript{113} Later, in the summer, Richard Pace warned the king that two English ambassadors in Rome ‘undoubtedly were corruptibe bi the Frenche Kyng’.\textsuperscript{114} Finally, by the time England was once again aligned against France, anti-French sentiments became publicly acceptable once again. As the Imperial orator noted in December 1521, news of victories against Francis at Milan and Tournai caused much rejoicing: ‘they sang songs about it in the streets, and in the court, even those who commonly lean to France’. Henry also conveyed his congratulations.\textsuperscript{115}

English prejudices against France could even be so intense that to describe someone as a Frenchman could be a term of abuse. During June 1510, Christopher Fisher, recently replaced as the English representative in Rome by Bainbridge, apparently described his successor as ‘a Frenchman at heart’.\textsuperscript{116} Later, during July 1513, Bainbridge himself, when describing the onetime English orator Hadrian de Castello to Thomas Ruthal, commented that the Italian ‘is as

\textsuperscript{111} R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, i, pp.253-255 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 1173; \textit{LPIIIi}, 117; 10 March 1519, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth); \textit{LPIIIi}, 728 (7 April 1520, de la Sauch to Chièvres, London).
\textsuperscript{112} See below pp.688-692.
\textsuperscript{114} Ellis, p.78 (\textit{LPIIIi}, 412; 11 August 1519, Pace to Wolsey, Penshurst).
\textsuperscript{115} \textit{LPIIIi}, 1858 (12 December 1521, de Mesa to Charles, London).
\textsuperscript{116} \textit{LPii}, 493 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 73; 8 June 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London). As the archbishop cannot really be termed anything other than anti-French, one can only interpret this as perhaps a broader insult by Fisher to his replacement; D.S. Chambers, \textit{Cardinal Bainbridge}, pp. 23 and passim; J.J. Scarisbrick, \textit{Henry VIII}, p.25; W.E. Wilkie, \textit{Cardinal Protectors}, p.42.
parciall a Francheman as I hame a Ynglisman. I pray God geve hymme evyll triste’.\footnote{LPi\textit{ii}, 2077 (\textit{LPi}, 4327; 7 July 1513, Bainbridge to Ruthal, Rome).} It is notable here that both sources had direct contact with the king and his inner circle.

‘Negative’ national stereotypes about the French that contributed to and perpetuated the English prejudice were also widely held.\footnote{J.R. Hale, ‘Sixteenth Century Explanations of War and Violence’, \textit{P&P}, 51 (1971), p.18.} Within personal correspondence that reached the highest governmental levels, it has already been mentioned how, on 22 June 1515, Wolsey’s protégé, Thomas Colman, cited a number of such stereotypes. Concerning the French, he opined to Wolsey that they were ‘unchaste’ and illustrated this by arguing that history bore ‘testimony to the flattery and frauds of the French, of which Francis is a proof in the way he has acted touching the dowry of Mary the French Queen’.\footnote{\textit{LPi\textit{ii}}, 606 (22 June 1515, [Thomas Colman] to Wolsey, Bologna).} Also, during his struggle to enter possession of the disputed see of Tournai during 1515, Wolsey’s vicar-general Sampson hoped that his superior would ‘find the Frenchmen more faithful than people expect’.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, 769 (calendared July 1515, [Sampson] to [Wolsey]).} Similarly, during November 1515, the English orator in Rome, de Giglis in describing French plans for the forthcoming meeting with the pope at Bologna, stated, ‘it is the nature of Frenchmen that they can never hold their tongue upon what they do, say or think’.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, 1105 (calendared 1-4 November 1515, [de Giglis to Ammonius]).} While emanating from an Italian, albeit one who had been in English service for some time, this opinion was intended to be acceptable to its intended governmental audience. Furthermore, Richard Pace, writing during the collapse of the English-funded campaign to expel the French from Italy in April 1516, advised that some of Henry’s money was intended for ‘those who were more Frenchmen than Christians’.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, 1817 (23 April 1516, Pace to Burbank, Bergamo).}
One particular ‘French’ characteristic that was raised repeatedly by the English was an alleged arrogance and pride, particularly in the context of their Italian ambitions, and the English consequently expected to take them down a peg or two. Around March 1514, Henry VIII is reported to have retorted angrily to his father-in-law’s truce with Louis XII, lamenting that ‘such an opportunity had been lost for crippling the pride of France’. 123 Similarly, during October 1515, William Knight, ambassador to Charles of Castile (resident in the Low Countries) recommended an alliance with the Swiss against France, believing that such a league would ‘be a scourge for the pride of France’. 124 Also, around August 1516, Wolsey talked of measures taken by Charles of Castile ‘to counteract the pride of France’, in spite of his recently having allied with him in the Treaty of Noyon. 125 Foreign states also identified this perceived French arrogance and pride as a means to stir up the English. In March 1510, for example, the Venetian envoys in Rome were instructed to go with Bainbridge to the pope to promote a coalition which would have ‘the benefit of indubitably repressing the haughtiness and pride of the French’. 126 Similarly, around June 1510, Ferdinand recommended a broad league by which ‘they will be better enabled to find means for putting down the arrogance and the tyranny of the French’. 127 Furthermore, during November 1511, while trying to induce the final adherence of Henry VIII to the Holy League against France, Venice begged that he ‘humble the intense pride and arrogance of the French’. 128 Finally and most pertinently, Leo X, in appealing to Henry VIII to defend the Church

123 LPIIi, 2707 (LPI, 4864; 8 March 1514, Peter Martyr to Lud. F. Mendoza, Valladolid).
124 LPIIi, 1003 (8 October 1515, Knight to Wolsey, Brussels). Also see Spinelly talking in the same terms a few weeks later; ibid., 1094 (31 October 1515, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels).
125 Ibid., 2329 (calendered end August 1516, [Wolsey] to [Henry]).
126 Ven.ii, 42 (LPI, 384; 1 March 1510, Signory to the ambassadors in Rome).
127 S.p.ii, 50 (LPIi, 483).
128 Ven.ii, 132 (LPIi, 960).
against France in July 1521, stressed ‘that now is high time to punish their [the French] pride and
insolvency’.\textsuperscript{129}

Given the clear existence of a strong English xenophobia towards France, the form that
this took within English foreign policy ought to be considered, particularly that voiced by Henry
VIII and his principal advisors. It will be argued here that, while those in power possessed the
political pragmatism to suppress their anti-French prejudices when it suited English (and/or their
own) interests, such as for the peace of August 1514, the prejudice against France was never far
beneath the surface, particularly given the latter’s ambitions in Italy had the potential to affect
Anglo-papal relations.\textsuperscript{130}

The reign began with Henry VIII’s vocal declarations of enmity towards France and,
indeed, immediately after his coronation, he was said to have pledged that he would attack Louis
XII.\textsuperscript{131} Contemporaries generally agreed with this analysis, Guicciardini writing that, from the
beginning of his reign, Henry was ‘incited by the innate hatred of the kings and people of
England against the French, as well as by his youth and the great sums of money he had inherited
from his father’.\textsuperscript{132} While many historians have pointed towards subsequent tensions between a
‘war party’, consisting particularly of young lay nobles and a ‘peace party’, containing the

\textsuperscript{129} LP IIIii, 1430 (21 July 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome).
\textsuperscript{130} Personal interests were served particularly with the lucrative pensions that accompanied peace treaties with
France (said to be worth £5-10,000 \textit{per annum}, 1475-1550), although it has been questioned whether they actually
induced their recipients to act in the French interests, or indeed whether they were expected to act in such a direction
below pp.379 n.69, 456-457.
\textsuperscript{131} See below p.362.
\textsuperscript{132} When narrating Francis I’s intention to realise his Italian ambitions in 1515, Guicciardini further wrote that ‘with
such goads and pricks it was easy to resuscitate the ancient hatred in Henry’s breast’; S. Alexander (ed.), \textit{The History
of Italy by Francesco Guicciardini}, pp.233, 287.
leading ecclesiastics in his confidence, an alternative interpretation has been found in this study.  

While the existence of such debate in crown circles is not disputed, it has been posited that the ‘inner circle’, who guided Henry in foreign policy, imposed a number of conditions that needed to be fulfilled before they would back the king’s desire to invade France. Among these was the need to break up the League of Cambrai and to form a coalition against Louis XII, to include the pope. Time was also required for preparation.  

While Henry pursued these vis-à-vis Rome through the Bainbridge embassy and approached his father-in-law, Ferdinand, warning of ‘the ambitious designs of certain Christian princes’, that would threaten the Spaniard’s (Italian) possessions, an interim Anglo-French peace was confirmed in March 1510 which contradicted all other anti-French signals up to that point. In spite of initial papal anger at this, the ‘peace’ was merely a renewal of that already existing with France. Moreover, it formed part of a broader policy at the beginning of the reign to reconfirm England’s agreements with other states and also guaranteed Henry VIII’s continued receipt of lucrative French pensions. As a consequence, England only began to move indirectly against France in 1511 and only then in minor expeditions.


134 See below pp.379-380.

135 See below pp.366 ff, 374. For Bainbridge’s embassy on 24 September 1509, see D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.23 and passim. For the approach to Ferdinand, for which, it ought to be stressed, the Spaniard was still officially an ally of France, see Sp.ii, 23-24 (LPl, 220; 1 November 1509, Henry to Ferdinand), 25-26 (LPli, 221; 1 November 1509, Henry to Ferdinand).

136 See, for instance, LPl, 1181 (ibid., 535; LPI, 318; 22 July 1510); also see pp.374 ff. Chambers speculates that Henry’s bellicosity may have been intended to induce the French into buying peace with England. This may well have been the case, but it does not mean that war was not still planned in the longer term; D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.22.
that did little more than sabre-rattle.\textsuperscript{137} Given the general understanding that Henry was ‘an enemy of the French’, he must have been complicit in approving his ministers’ advice to take this cautious course.\textsuperscript{138} If he had wanted to overrule his ministers, he could have done. Also, Henry’s advisors did not seek to prevent him from going to war, they merely sought to create the right conditions for him to do so. Henry’s initial anti-French sentiments expressed in 1509 culminated, therefore, in the direct military action that was attempted in 1512 and 1513.\textsuperscript{139}

Following the modest successes of the 1513 invasion of France, Henry and his ministers began to restrain their anti-French impulses from the close of the campaign. While they remained publicly committed to relaunching the offensive in 1514, they had been forced to undertake the 1513 expedition with little support from their allies and so began to respond to papal peace overtures from late September onwards.\textsuperscript{140} Anti-French rhetoric, while still active in terms of its use as diplomatic leverage, tapered off and ceased by the peace of 7 August 1514.\textsuperscript{141} Following Louis XII’s death in January 1515, the English crown chose to renew this agreement with Francis

\textsuperscript{137} See pp.385-386.
\textsuperscript{138} \textit{Ven.i}, 941 (28 April 1509, the Signory to Badoer).
\textsuperscript{139} See below pp.379-380. Two of those usually cited as members of the ‘peace’ party, Fox and Warham, can be seen to have agreed with Henry’s anti-French policy. Fox reportedly told the Venetian ambassador in May 1510 that, while England would not act against France that year, he could expect this to occur during 1511, reasoning ‘that King Lewis should aggrandize himself is not for our benefit’. Similarly, on 25 March 1511, William Warham, also often cited as an opponent of war with France, wrote to Lord Darcy, then intending to crusade against the Moors of North Africa, lamenting that he and his archers had not been sent to the pope, ‘to strength [sic.] him against the enemies of the Church, which be little better than infidels’; \textit{Ven.ii}, 64 (\textit{LPli}, 430; 15 [April] 1510, Badoer to the Signory); \textit{LPli}, 725 (\textit{LPi}, 5740; 25 March 1511, Warham to Lord Darcy, Canterbury).
\textsuperscript{140} See pp.429-430. For Henry reportedly informing the pope that he had agreed a peace because of his lack of allies against France, see \textit{LPlii}, 3482 (\textit{LPi}, 5642; 27 November 1514, Peter Martyr to Lud. Furtado, Valladolid). Some historians have indicated their scepticism of Henry’s xenophobia on the basis of the 1514 peace agreement. Gunn, for instance, argued that Henry justified his tough stance in negotiations through the anti-French sentiment prevalent in England. Similarly, Wilkie considers that the war rhetoric emanating from Henry in early 1514 may have been intended to add weight to the English diplomatic position during peace talks, as he could not afford another invasion. While both arguments are correct, they do not indicate that Henry was not anti-French, rather that he (and his advisors) recognised when they ought to exercise pragmatism and temper this stance. The lack of allies, the financial burden and the desire of the pope to withdraw justification from the war made peace a sensible option at this stage; S. Gunn, ‘The French Wars of Henry VIII’, in J. Black (ed.) \textit{The Origins of War in Early Modern Europe}, pp.28, 34; W.E. Wilkie, \textit{Cardinal Protectors}, p.45.
\textsuperscript{141} See below pp.456-457.
I, despite its discomfort with the prospect of him descending into Italy.\textsuperscript{142} An indication of the insincerity of this and the underlying anti-French disposition of Henry VIII can be detected at the beginning of March 1515, when he commented to the Venetian ambassador that Francis I ‘was indeed a worthy and honest sovereign, but nevertheless a Frenchman, and not to be trusted’.\textsuperscript{143} Furthermore, in spite of confirming the Anglo-French peace with Francis in April 1515, Henry was already in negotiation with Rome to join an existing league to defend Milan from the French. Before he could formally join, however, Francis won a decisive victory against the coalition at Marignano (in September).\textsuperscript{144} In reaction to this French success, Henry VIII’s anti-French disposition immediately resurfaced as he attempted to organise the defence of Italy against further French successes. This resulted in a failed Imperial-Swiss expedition to Italy and various aborted leagues against France during 1516-1517.\textsuperscript{145} While Henry and Wolsey attempted to keep their anti-French strategy secret until around May-June 1516, after this they freely voiced anti-Gallic rhetoric. Towards the beginning of August 1516, for instance, Giustinian, following an audience with Wolsey and Ruthal, described them ‘abusing the King of France without reserve’.\textsuperscript{146}

The failure of the English crown to galvanise its allies against France led to a change of strategy against France from 1517 on, one of apparent reconciliation which led to the Treaty of London in 1518. From this point, anti-French sentiments were reined in at governmental level, although they were present. This can be seen particularly in Henry VIII’s staunch opposition to

\textsuperscript{142} See below pp.464-465.
\textsuperscript{144} See p.489.
\textsuperscript{145} See below pp.489-593.
\textsuperscript{146} R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, i, pp.265-270 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 757; \textit{LPIII}, 2259; 10 August 1516, Giustinian to the Signory).
Francis I’s candidacy in the Imperial election of 1519, albeit while publicly claiming to back him.\textsuperscript{147} It can also be seen in the great demonstration of Anglo-French ‘amity’ that was the Field of Cloth of Gold in 1520. Henry and Wolsey undertook this meeting in spite of its unpopularity ‘with all the nobility and people of England’. Shortly after this occurred, a conversation was overheard by the Venetian ambassador in which one English noble said to another, ‘If I had a drop of French blood in my body I would cut myself open to get rid of it;’ and the other replied, ‘And so would I’.\textsuperscript{148} While Henry reportedly made a public show of arresting the two, this does not take into account the continued anti-Gallic agenda that underlay the summit and contemporaneous meetings with Charles V.\textsuperscript{149} In addition to using it as a way to divert Francis from Italy, Henry was also beginning to entertain anti-French overtures from Charles V and, to disguise these, went to great lengths to give the illusion that England’s strongest amity was with France.\textsuperscript{150}

Governmental xenophobia directed against France, therefore, may have been a guiding principle, but it was by no means unconditional. There were times when peace was entertained with apparent enthusiasm and cordial relations ensued. These were, on the other hand, times when France was not furthering its ambitions in Italy and, it is argued, when they did, relations between England and France took a turn for the worse. It is unsurprising, therefore, that, despite the pragmatism inherent in the cut and thrust of international politics, ‘national’ stereotypes occasionally arose, betraying the deep-seated feelings of those in and around crown circles.

\textsuperscript{147} See below pp.653-673.
\textsuperscript{148} LP\textit{iii}, 728 (7 April 1520, de la Sauch to Chièvres, London); \textit{Ven.iii}, 108 (18 July 1520, Surian to the Signory, Calais).
\textsuperscript{149} See below pp.688-694.
\textsuperscript{150} That Henry was at this point successful in giving this impression was also noted by Surian, who reported (incorrectly) that no agreement had been made with Charles at their second meeting, as Henry ‘chooses to be French’; \textit{Ven.iii}, 108 (18 July 1520, Surian to the Signory, Calais). Also see below pp.688-689.
As to the motives for this xenophobia that underlay crown attempts to ‘defend’ the papacy from France, the most obvious derive from a combination of geography, history and a commitment to chivalry. The largely fractious relationship that evolved between these states was not assisted by the long-term development of rival claims to territories and titles as a result of conquest and marriages.\(^{151}\) With perhaps the possible exception of Scotland, France had certainly been England’s greatest and most frequent rival on the European stage. This had most recently manifested itself during the Hundred Years War, which still remained relatively fresh in the English memory and added an historic aspect to the Anglo-French rivalry. The principal elements of this dispute (or disputes) that were still prominent included the continued claim of English monarchs to the French throne,\(^{152}\) the reduction of English controlled territory to the enclave in and around Calais,\(^{153}\) and the relatively recent memory of glorious English victories by the likes of Henry V.\(^{154}\) Focus on the latter was particularly fuelled by the king’s commitment to knighthood and chivalry. A particularly significant feature of Henry’s chivalric commitment was his desire to achieve honour on the battlefield, which is often given as an explanation of the king’s bellicosity in this earlier part of his reign, from which this idea of defending the papacy


\(^{152}\) This claim to the French throne was also enshrined in the English monarchs’ formal title that always began ‘Rex Angliae et Franciae’; see, for instance, *LPIII*, 1226 (calendared end November 1515, [English ambassadors] to the Lords of the League of Upper Almain). For the resurfacing of an active claim by Henry VIII to the French crown, see below pp.70 ff.

\(^{153}\) The limited territory held by English kings in France was a matter of fact, a daily reminder to Henry VIII of his unfulfilled claims there.

was probably in part drawn. A chivalric ethos was also strongly held by a significant element of those with whom Henry chose to surround himself, young lay nobles who are often argued to have exacerbated Henry VIII’s warlike temperament in this period.

These factors ensured that the legacy of the Hundred Years War remained an open wound that could contribute to the prejudice felt towards France, particularly within crown circles. Whether contrived or not, it does not take much to envisage, therefore, that combined with a wider anti-Gallic prejudice, Henry VIII would want to imitate the victories of his predecessors by attempting to make good his titular and territorial claims there. Therefore, it becomes increasingly demonstrative of an anti-French prejudice when English claims to French territory and titles are raised during this period, particularly when they coincide with Henry VIII’s drive to defend the papacy from France. A strong indication that this was a genuine feeling came during September 1510, when the English ambassador in Rome, Bainbridge, apparently instructed a papal nuncio in England to urge Henry to take ‘the opportunity he has of increasing his honour and of obtaining great advantages. The right moment has come….for the King of England to

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157 Historians remained divided over whether ‘regaining’ the crown of France was a genuine aim of Henry VIII (and his advisors). For example, while C.S.L. Davies does not believe that this was ever a serious intention, Potter asserts that it was enthusiastically raised when the opportunity arose. While this is a valid consideration, it falls out of the remit of this study, as here it is merely being demonstrated that the implications of the Hundred Years War were indicative of a continued xenophobia towards France; C.S.L. Davies, ‘The English People and War in the Early Sixteenth Century’, in A.C. Duke and C.A. Tamse (ed.), Britan and the Netherlands, p.17; D. Potter, ‘Foreign Policy’, in D. MacCulloch (ed.), The Reign of Henry VIII, pp.108-109.
recover all that belongs to him’. Contemporary chroniclers also identified the existence of this motivation. Polydore Vergil, in his *Anglica Historia* commissioned by the English crown, refers to ‘Normandy, Aquitaine and some other places which by hereditary right belong to the king of England’. He also refers to Henry VIII’s desire in 1513 ‘not merely to equal but indeed to exceed the glorious deeds of his ancestors’. Guicciardini, a papal official during this period, in writing about Henry VIII and his conflicts with France, again alluded to the motivation of the Hundred Years War. In commenting on the build-up to Henry’s invasion of France in 1513, he stated that the English king had ‘a great desire to renew the glory of his ancestors, who, entitling themselves kings of France and at various times having vexed that kingdom with great wars from which they emerged victorious’. Guicciardini also mentioned Henry V by name and his near-conquest of France.

In terms of the formal voicing of this historic rivalry in English alliances of the period, this first appears in the Anglo-Spanish treaty of 17 November 1511, intended to support the broader Holy League. The focus of these two powers was to be on Aquitaine ‘which province belongs by right to the King of England’.

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158 Unfortunately, this intelligence came from his French hosts, who had intercepted this letter and released its contents to the Spanish ambassador there. The Spaniard comments on how curious it was that Bainbridge was communicating through a nuncio, but could not give a reason for this; *Sp.ii*, 52 (10 September 1510, Hieronymo de Cabanillas to Ferdinand, Tours).

159 It ought to be noted that Vergil was resident in England at this time; D. Hay (ed.), *Anglica Historia*, p.195.


161 S. Alexander (ed.), *The History of Italy by Francesco Guicciardini*, pp.233, 287.

162 *Sp.ii*, 59-60 (*LPi*, 945; *LPi*, 1980; 17 November 1511). In the supplementary treaty between the two states, they ‘bind themselves to assist one another in the defence of the Holy Church against France, and to aid the common attempts to be made to recover those provinces which by right belong to the crown of England, but are occupied by the King of France’; *ibid.*, 65 (*LPi*, 1098; *LPi*, 3797; 16 March 1512). The renewed treaty between England and Spain of 9 May 1513 again had the recovery of Aquitaine as its main strategic objective, along with the defence of the Church, as did the next renewal of the alliance on 17 October 1513. For the latter, however, the intention was to invade France from both the north and the south; *LPii*, 1657 (*LPi*, 4038; February 1513); *LPiii*, 2377 (*Sp.ii*, 138-139; *LPi*, 4511; 17 October 1513).
on 6 June was revealing, insomuch that it referred to ‘the King’s absence in his expedition against France, for the preservation of the Catholic religion, and recovery of his rights’.  

Possibly more significant in demonstrating the strength of Henry VIII’s feeling against France in this sense was his formal attempt to wrest the kingdom and its titles from Louis XII via the pope, 1512-1514. It was widely understood that a pope could depose and legitimise the appointment of monarchs. The pope drew up a brief for this on 20 March 1512, promising to invest Henry with Louis XII’s rights as king of France and sanctioning his coronation. While this was to remain secret, Cardinal Bainbridge lobbied hard albeit unsuccessfully in Rome to have this brief published, as the papacy was adamant that this was not to occur until Henry VIII gained de facto control of France. This plan came to naught, even after Julius II’s death, when Bainbridge actually obtained the brief. In terms of the Anglo-French rivalry, Julius II clearly recognised that, by offering the French throne as an inducement to help justify the conflict, this could ensure that the English actually went to war. Henry, for his part, seized the opportunity to realise his historic claim.

During this early period, foreign states also recognised the resonance that the English claim to the French throne could have in lobbying Henry towards war with France. This occurred for the first time in September 1509, when Venice, on the verge of being destroyed by the League of Cambrai, appealed to Henry VIII, to effect a league against France, as a result of which ‘the
King could never have a finer opportunity for conquering France, like King Henry of glorious memory, and revenging himself on his most natural enemies’. 166 Similarly, the Imperial chamberlain de Berghes told the English representative in Burgundy, during summer 1513, that he had been commissioned to persuade Henry VIII to go to Rheims, where Maximilian would meet him for his coronation as king of France. 167

Henry VIII’s claim to the French throne was next raised during 1515, as English adhesion was sought to a league to defend Milan from Francis I. Leo X alluded to this in a conversation with de Giglis during May, commenting that he now agreed with Julius II ‘that the King of England was a young man of great power and would easily conquer France’. 168 Henry himself referred to France as ‘the ancient enemy of England’ in a letter to Knight, his ambassador in the Low Countries, during August of the same year. Knight used the same language a few months later when urging that England respond to the French victory at Marignano. 169 Also from August onwards, Sir Robert Wingfield, resident in Germany, advised and passed on Maximilian’s view

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166 *Ven.* ii, 12 (*LPl*, 169; 14 or 15 September 1509, Signory to Badoer). Venice wrote in a similar vein on 21 December 1509, instructing Andrea Badoer ‘to exhort the King not to neglect so great an opportunity for the conquest of a crown whose title he bears, assuring him that, should he undertake this expedition against his capital and natural enemy the King of France, they will so straiten the latter in Italy, that he [Henry] will find it very easy to obtain what they propose, and gain as much praise and glory as have ever fallen to the lot of any other King of England’; *ibid.*, 24 (*LPl*, 278; 21 December 1509, Signory to Badoer). Among other instances of this, on 12 January 1510, the same Italian state instructed its ambassador, among other things, to urge Henry VIII ‘to conquer France, that he may be the true king and lord of that country, and not merely to bear an empty title’. Similarly, during May 1512, Lorenzo Pasqualigo, Venetian consul in England, implicitly referred to the Hundred Years War when he extolled to his brothers ‘that "with God's assistance the English will make these French dogs cry mercy, as they have done many times of yore”’. Finally, on 6 October 1512, a letter was composed from the doge to Henry VIII, congratulating him on his victories against the French ‘which will recover for him his hereditary right’ (although this does not seem to have been sent); *ibid.*, 33 (*LPl*, 330; 12 January 1510, Signory to Badoer), 174 (*LPl*, 1216; 27-29 May 1512, Lorenzo Pasqualigo to his brothers, London), 196 (6 October 1512, doge to Henry).

167 *LPl*, 2106 (*LPI*, 4355; 19 July 1514, Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels). Also, during September 1513, the emperor advised that Tournai surrender to Henry as king of France and that subsequent oaths should be sworn according to this title; C.S.L. Davies, ‘Tournai and the English Crown, 1513-1519’, *HJ*, 41 (1998), pp.6-7.

168 *LPl*, 493 (calendared 22 May 1515, [de Giglis to -]).

169 *Ibid.*, 798 (12 August 1515, Henry to Knight, ‘From our Monastery of Chertsey’), 1003 (8 October 1515, Knight to Wolsey, Brussels).
that, through English involvement in the current conflict, Henry could become king of France.\textsuperscript{170} The English crown responded positively to this encouragements and, among instructions to Richard Pace in October 1515, commissioned him to form a league with the Swiss both to expel the French from Italy and to recover Henry’s rights in France.\textsuperscript{171} Even after the failure of the Imperial-Swiss expedition in March-April 1516, sustained pressure came from Germany for Henry to realise his ancestors’ claim to France.\textsuperscript{172}

During the English ‘reconciliation strategy’ of 1517-1521, no reference to Henry’s claim to the French throne has been found. To convince Francis I of the veracity of their amity during and after negotiations, this would have been prudent. However, one awkward moment occurred when Henry’s title was read out at the Field of Cloth of Gold in 1520, at which point Henry tried to play it down. The titles, he claimed, were ‘good for nothing’. Francis replied diplomatically, albeit reserving his and his successors’ right to the French throne.\textsuperscript{173} As Henry became receptive to Imperial overtures towards an alliance against France, the English claim to France soon resurfaced as a war aim. Charles V apparently proposed this at his second meeting with Henry at Calais during August 1520. While this was disclosed to Francis, Henry and Wolsey were trying to double bluff the French by demonstrating their commitment to the Anglo-French amity.\textsuperscript{174}

That the English did seek this as a war aim was subsequently indicated in instructions given to

\textsuperscript{170} Ibid., 838 (22 August 1515, Robert Wingfield to Henry), 982 (2 October 1515, Robert Wingfield to [Wolsey], Innsbruck), 1265 (10 December 1515, Robert Wingfield to Wosey, ‘[Fiesyn], in Swave’), 1399 (12 January 1516, Robert Wingfield to [Henry], ‘Aws[burgh]’), 1404 (15 January 1516, Robert Wingfield to Wolsey, Augsburg), 1413 (18 January 1516, Robert Wingfield to Wolsey, Augsburg). Cardinal Schiner reiterated this; ibid., 1483 (calendared 4 February 1516, abstract of Cardinal Schiner’s letters).

\textsuperscript{171} Ibid., 1095 (calendared end October 1515, instructions from Wolsey to Pace). Pace further spoke of ‘England’s right to France’ in December 1515; ibid., 1244 (calendared 3-4 December 1515, Pace to Wolsey).

\textsuperscript{172} Ibid., 1902 (17 May 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to Henry, Trent), 2010 (calendared 6 June 1516, [Galeazzo Visconti] to [Anchises Visconti]).

\textsuperscript{173} Ven.iii, 60 (3-8 June 1520); S. Gunn, ‘The French Wars of Henry VIII’, in J. Black (ed.) \textit{The Origins of War in Early Modern Europe}, p.37.

\textsuperscript{174} LPIIIi, 936 (calendared beginning August 1520, instructions to Sir Richard Wingfield and Jerningham, ambassadors to Francis).
Tunstal, sent to negotiate an alliance with Charles, around January 1521. Furthermore, during July 1521, Henry and Wolsey spoke with Imperial diplomats about the time being right for the recovery of France, which Charles V later encouraged. This active claim to the French throne was indicated right up to the end of this period when, at the dinner to celebrate the receipt of the bull bestowing ‘fidei defensor’ on the king, heralds cried ‘Henricus dei gratia rex Angliae, et Franciae, defensor fidei, et dominus Hiberniae…’. Overall, the underlying xenophobia felt by Henry VIII against France was motivated and exacerbated by the king ‘feeling the hand of history on his shoulder’ vis-à-vis France, particularly his chivalric outlook looking back to the Hundred Years War. This was shared by at least some of his younger advisors, who were similarly committed to the arts of war enshrined in knighthood and chivalry.

Given the anti-French attitudes held in England throughout this period, it becomes increasingly understandable that Henry VIII and his advisors would oppose French political and territorial ambitions in Italy. If they did not, the worst-case scenario would be a peninsula and a papacy influenced heavily by the French crown. While in 1509, this situation was speculative, such a fear was not new to the English crown; it was strongly felt during the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, during the ‘Babylonish captivity’ of the papacy at Avignon and particularly during the Great Schism, when it influenced English support of the ‘Roman’ line of popes. Most notably, these ‘memories’ were contemporaneous with those of the Hundred...
Years War. In this context, therefore, the attraction to Henry VIII of defending the papacy against his neighbour becomes clearer. This is more marked when one considers France’s recent ambitions in Italy and how the English crown interpreted them *vis-à-vis* the papacy. While the Papal States and Italy had long been vulnerable to ultramontane powers competing for hegemony in the peninsula, the most recent trend for French monarchs to expand into Italy and make good their territorial claims only slightly predated Henry VIII’s reign.\(^{179}\) Some of the king’s senior advisors, such as Fox, would have been able to remember Charles VIII’s initial incursion into the peninsula in 1494.\(^{180}\) It has been argued that prior to 1494, wars were broadly of a different character, ‘chiefly a matter of domestic housekeeping’; that the nature of warfare changed after this point, particularly in terms of French expansionism, which had a bearing on English intervention in continental affairs.\(^{181}\) It is to be argued here that Henry VIII and his advisors interpreted French ambitions in Italy principally in terms of the bearing they had on the (temporal and, therefore, wider) independence of the papacy. Given the deep-seated antagonism borne towards France and claim to its throne, Louis XII or Francis I’s domination of the peninsula was unacceptable to English interests. To establish that the English crown did fear the consequences for the papacy of French hegemony in Italy, general indications of its fear for this outcome will

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\(^{179}\) French interests had been pursued in Italy for most of the fifteenth century up to the 1480s; D. Hay, ‘Italy and Barbarian Europe’, in E.F. Jacob (ed.) *Italian Renaissance Studies* (1966), p.52.

\(^{180}\) Also, Thomas Ruthal and Thomas Howard (earl of Surrey), among others; C.S.L. Davies, ‘Fox [Foxe], Richard’, *DNB*; M. Johnson, ‘Ruthall, Thomas’, *ibid.*; D.M. Head, ‘Howard, Thomas, second duke of Norfolk (1443–1524)’, *ibid.*

be explored first, then two distinct lights in which the French monarchs were portrayed, as attempting to become ‘monarchs of the world’ and as the ‘Christian Turk’.

An initial indication that Henry VIII (and his ‘inner circle’) indeed feared the consequences for the papacy of French hegemony in Italy is that the king followed his father’s lead in (tacitly) opposing the League of Cambrai’s attack on Venice. While this coalition included the Empire, Spain, even the papacy itself, the English were only really concerned about the implications that the league’s victories would have for French influence over Julius II. The first tacit indication of this fear for the papacy emerges in a letter to Ferdinand of Aragon, during November 1509, when he approached his father-in-law to cease hostilities against Venice and to turn against France: ‘if Venice were conquered and destroyed,’ he argued, ‘the other states of Italy would be unable to withstand the ambitious designs of certain Christian princes’. In reply, Ferdinand agreed ‘that the destruction of Venice would be unjust as well as very dangerous to the other princes of Christendom’. It does not take much to see that the root cause of Henry’s opposition to the continued attacks on Venice (probably the most powerful, independent Italian state at that time) lay in the potential political threat to the papacy if the republic fell. Following Henry VIII’s initial approaches to Ferdinand, the latter continued to fuel his son-in-law’s idea of the French threat to Italy. On 11 January 1510, the English orator in Spain, John Stile, conveyed the Catholic King’s wish for a league to be concluded quickly, so ‘that the Freynsche kyng schal not nor maye not atayne unto hys cruel purpose for to dysstroye al the

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182 Henry also emphasises Venice’s essential role as ‘a wall against the Turks and other infidels’, but, as will be outlined later, it was the French not the Ottomans at the forefront of Henry’s concerns; Sp.ii, 23-24 (LPIi, 220; 1 November 1509, Henry to Ferdinand). Curiously, a very similar letter from Henry to Ferdinand of the same date has almost identical contents, but neglects any mention of Italy’s potential vulnerability if Venice fell; ibid., 25-26 (LPIi, 221; 1 November 1509, Henry to Ferdinand).

183 Ferdinand replied through his daughter, Catherine of Aragon; ibid., 27 (LPIi, 253; 18 or 28 November 1509, Ferdinand to Catherine).
cuntrays of the Ytaly, and for to subdwe theym’. 184 Also during January 1510, Henry VIII played on this fear in his approaching the emperor to break from the League of Cambrai and join a new anti-French confederacy. Negotiating through Margaret of Savoy, the English king advised that they ought ‘to consider the danger accruing from the aggrandisement of the French if it be not politicly prevented’. 185 Again, the implication that a ‘French’ papacy may result is not difficult to interpret. Notably, the threat to Rome as perceived from England was not cited directly at this point. Was this because Henry had not yet envisaged himself as the defender of the papacy, or was it because the papacy was still technically an ally of France at that point? Probably the latter, as Henry could not realistically present himself in this role against Louis XII when Julius II was, formally at least, still on good terms with the French King. Indeed, it will be seen later that overt claims by England to ‘defend the Church’ dissipated when it could not count upon public papal support against France.

The turning point for Henry VIII’s public, political role vis-à-vis the papacy came, according to Venetian sources, around June-July 1510, when Julius II wrote to Henry VIII, requesting his help in resisting ‘the extreme ill will of the French not only towards all Italy, but chiefly against the Apostolic See’, continuing that it was ‘certain that his Majesty will not allow the Apostolic See to be harassed by the machinations of his natural enemies, but will assist and maintain the papacy’.  186 The pope was clearly hoping to play on existing prejudices held in England towards the French and gave Henry the ‘green light’ to develop his self-perception as defender of the papacy. This was reiterated in May 1511 when a papal envoy in Germany conveyed to Sir Robert Wingfield the pope’s hope that Henry VIII (and Ferdinand) ‘would not

184 LPIi, 329 (LPI, 796; 11 January 1510, John Stile to Henry).
185 Ibid., 355 (LPI, 923; calendared end January 1510, Henry to [Spinelly]).
186 Ven.ii, 71 (LPIi, 529; 15 July 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome).
suffer the French King to oppress him and the Church’.\textsuperscript{187} By 1512, Henry VIII was referring directly to the consequences of French power in Italy \textit{vis-à-vis} the papacy. Writing directly to Maximilian on 8 May 1512, justifying his decision to go to war with France, Henry reflected on the holy league’s recent loss at Ravenna, ‘which threatens to place Naples, Italy, and Sicily at the mercy of their enemies, and indeed the whole of Christendom’\textsuperscript{188} A similar letter from Henry to Maximilian, probably also from the same month, more explicitly answers the emperor’s call for peace and crusade in this sense, on the basis that ‘they who should be the foremost to defend the Church and preserve its unity with all their might,- who moreover, choose to be styled “most Christian”,- then lacerated the seamless garment of our Lord Jesus Christ, snatched St Peter's patrimony, took the cities of the holy Roman Church, and fostered petty tyrants in them, threatening chains, dungeons, and everything most atrocious to the pope himself’. On account of this, he (and Ferdinand) decided ‘to take up arms in defence of the Church’.\textsuperscript{189} Now a full member of the Holy League, Henry wrote along the same lines to Bainbridge, perhaps on 29 May 1512, referring in particular to Louis XII’s plans ‘to take revenge on those who hindered him from obtaining his wish and desire against the Church of God, and from persecuting the pope’, to resist which he as English king was committed.\textsuperscript{190} Similarly in April 1513, following Leo X’s election and admitting an uncertainty about the new pontiff’s intended political direction, Henry appealing for him to ‘follow the example of his predecessor in sanctioning this expedition undertaken for the liberation of the Church’.\textsuperscript{191}

\textsuperscript{187} \textit{LPIi}, 780 (\textit{LPI}, 1697; 30 May 1511, Sir Robert Wingfield to Henry, Innsbruck).
\textsuperscript{188} \textit{Ibid.}, 1186 (\textit{LPI}, 3188; 8 May 1512, Henry to [Maximilian]).
\textsuperscript{189} \textit{Ven.ii}, 178 (\textit{LPIi}, 1215; calendared end May 1512, Henry to Maximilian).
\textsuperscript{190} Henry now wrote as a full member of the Holy League; \textit{LPIi}, 1214 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 177; 29 May 1512, Henry to Bainbridge).
\textsuperscript{191} \textit{Ibid.}, 1769 (\textit{LPI}, 3876; \textit{Ven.ii}, 238; 12 April 1513, Henry to Bainbridge, London).
When the English arranged a peace with France during 1514, this was at least partially due to Leo X’s attempts to withdraw papal justification of the war. During negotiations, Henry and Wolsey attempted to secure Rome against any renewed French threat both by having the papacy and, specifically, Bologna, named in the agreement and by also including the strategically significant city of Milan. While they were successful with the former they failed to achieve the latter. As a consequence of Milan’s exclusion, Louis XII’s and, then, Francis I’s Italian ambitions were revived. During February 1515, Thomas Colman, a scholar in Bologna, reported to Wolsey that the Italians were ‘delighted to hear of the death of Louis XII, but apprehensive of the warlike disposition of Francis I’. In consequence of this, the duke of Milan had reportedly entrusted his duchy to the Swiss, Bologna was astir with plots and Colman expected ‘to hear of great disturbances’. For some months, however, English concerns were unable to manifest themselves, as there was no clear indication that the papacy wanted to be ‘defended’ from the French threat, and England was initially unaware of papal membership of a league to protect Milan. It was perhaps on account of the lack of a clear invitation to join this league that the English crown procrastinated when the pope did make overtures towards the end of May. Subsequently, Wolsey engaged in some brinksmanship, demanding a cardinal’s hat, among other concessions, in return for Henry VIII’s adhesion. Recognising the danger to papal security, Wolsey warned that if he failed to secure England as an ally, Leo would be ‘in greater

192 Ven.ii, 487 (LPIii, 3139; LPI, 5319; 12 August 1514, Henry to Leo); LPIii, 3254 (EP, 503; 8 September 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome).
193 See below pp.460 ff.
194 See below pp.462 ff.
195 LPIi, 168 (16 February 1515, Thomas Colman to Wolsey, Bologna).
196 See below pp.466-478.
197 See below pp.478-487.
danger on this day two year than ever was Pope J[ulius]. Nevertheless, England probably would not have abandoned the papacy and crown circles were noted to be strongly opposed to the imminent French expedition. Indeed, Henry and his ministers voiced their objections to this in early July, as they were ‘dreading the increase of his [Francis’] power’. In spite of this, the king claimed to be able to affect whether this would occur and which side the pope would choose.

While Henry did ultimately agree to join the coalition, it was too late and the French made swift inroads into Italy, culminating in a major victory at Marignano (13-14 September 1515). News of initial French advances caused concern in England ‘owing to the natural feeling existing between the two nations’. Furthermore, there was said to be ‘no want of persons daily exhorting King Henry to violate the [Anglo-French] Treaty’.

The months following the Marignano defeat probably saw Henry VIII’s greatest concern for the prospects of a ‘French’ pope. When firm news of this victory reached a ‘much vexed’ Henry, he voiced his concern for the papacy, particularly if Francis now intended to march through the Papal States to take Naples. Henry also enquired whether the pope had been forced into accepting terms. In addition to resolving on a swift military response, the king may have issued a knee-jerk ultimatum to Francis I demanding that he desist from attacking the pope, perhaps in early to mid-October. That this may not have been sanctioned by Wolsey or Fox is suggested by the French king’s interpretation that the ultimatum, if not observed, would result in

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198 *LPIii*, 763 (calendared 30 July 1515, [Wolsey] to [de Giglis]).
200 See below pp.487-489.
203 *LPIii*, 1113 (6 November 1515, de Bapaume to Queen Louise, London).
an English attack, which Wolsey subsequently denied. Despite papal attempts to allay English fears about negotiations with Francis, claiming they would not be to Henry’s prejudice and that Leo would turn against France when the opportunity arose, Wolsey swiftly warned the pope against coming to terms, stressing the king’s displeasure and how much Leo owed England. In reply, the pope justified the Franco-papal agreement on account of his lack of allies and that it only affected Milan. English concern was further heightened when the crown began hearing of a meeting to be held at Bologna between the pope and French king in December. As a result, the English ambassador in Germany reported the emperor’s despair that they could no longer count on Leo, now that he appeared to favour the French. There were also warnings from de Giglis that Francis would attempt to gain leverage over Leo by means of this summit, although the orator opined that the pontiff would never become ‘French’. Wolsey’s reply in December was relatively reassuring. He reported that Henry was satisfied with Leo’s intentions for the conference, but hoped that the papacy would ‘retain its dignity’. He did, however, fear that Francis I would feel encouraged by Marignano to further destabilise Christendom. Nevertheless, Henry would not oppose any arrangement made between France and the papacy, on condition

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204 The ultimatum resulted in some ministerial backpeddling; in his audience with the French orator on 5 November, accompanied by Fox and Rathal, Wolsey commented on the strangeness of Francis’ ‘misinterpretation’ of the king’s request, that was merely intended as a request for him not to make war on Leo X. De Baupame responded that ‘the King’s words were gracious enough if not misinterpreted, and that Henry had written much more rudely’; in other words, it seems, the English monarch’s tone was deemed aggressive; ibid., 1113 (6 November 1515, de Bapaume to Queen Louise, London). For the Pace mission to organise a military response, see below pp.493-494.
205 Sp.ii, 226 (1 October 1515, Leo to the Spanish ambassador in Rome); LPIII, 1105 (calendared 1-4 November 1515, [de Giglis to Ammonius]).
206 LPIII, 1111 (6 November 1515, [de Giglis to Wolsey]), 1126 (9 November 1515, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 1201 (27 November 1515, de Giglis to [Ammonius]).
207 Ibid., 1201 (27 November 1515, de Giglis to [Ammonius]).
208 Ibid., 1265 (10 December 1515, Robert Wingfield to Wolsey, ‘[Fiesyn], in Swave’).
209 Ibid., 1111 (6 November 1515, [de Giglis to Wolsey]), 1281 (14 December 1515, [de Giglis] to Ammonius, Bologna).
that it was ‘satisfactory’ (whatever that meant).\textsuperscript{210} In essence, the English recognised that Leo X had little choice in this matter, but still stressed their concerns for French dominance.\textsuperscript{211} English concern continued, however, as Leo was forced to meet with Francis at Bologna during December 1515. While the pope attempted to reassure the English about what was transacted and of his intentions, this in itself betrays the reception that he was expecting the meeting to receive in England. Indeed, Henry does seem to have protested about the outcome of the meeting, to which Leo responded that he had acted in the best intentions for Christendom.\textsuperscript{212} At this point, however, it still seems to have been recognised, as Spinelly reported, that ‘the Pope’s words can be no better than they be’ due to the strength of French power in Italy.\textsuperscript{213} At the same time, however, Richard Pace was working with papal representatives in the Swiss Confederacy to raise troops for an offensive to oppose this.\textsuperscript{214}

Following the failure of the English-funded expedition to expel the French from Italy during 1516, Henry VIII did continue to lobby the papacy towards this cause and, while he received broadly positive responses, he found it difficult to gain any commitment, on account of Francis’ influence in the peninsula.\textsuperscript{215} Nevertheless, Henry continued to baulk at Francis having

\textsuperscript{210} Ibid., 1280 (13 December 1515, [Wolsey] to [de Giglis], ‘My house at London’)

\textsuperscript{211} Sir Robert Wingfield, seems to have anticipated this attitude when he asserted on 18 October that, while ‘the Pope through fear has declined a little from the right way’, he would surely not abandon his powerful allies (Maximilian, Ferdinand and the Swiss); \textit{ibid.}, 1043 (18 October 1515, Robert Wingfield to Henry, Innsbruck).

\textsuperscript{212} \textit{Ibid.}, 1449 (28 January 1516, Leo to Henry, Florence). Also see \textit{Ven.ii}, 681 (7-26 January 1516, Venetian ambassador at the Curia to the Signory, Florence).

\textsuperscript{213} \textit{LPii}, 1388 (6 January 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Mechelin).

\textsuperscript{214} \textit{Ibid.}, 1105 (1-4 November 1515, [de Giglis to Ammonius]), 1201 (27 November 1515, de Giglis to [Ammonius]). This mirrors Cardinal Schiner’s reply to Wolsey’s overtures, following the former’s initial meeting with Pace, which attributes the \textit{casus belli} to the French having ‘dared to rend the unity of the Church’, ensuring that a crusade could not take place ‘unless their insolence be repressed’. Similar language was used, about not forsaking the pope or the Church, by de Mesa in conversation with Henry VIII on 4 November. He would only have spoken thus if Henry was similarly disposed; \textit{Ibid.}, 1146 (13 November 1515, Cardinal Schiner to Wolsey, Innsbruck); \textit{Sp.ii}, 239 (5 November 1515, de Mesa to Ferdinand, London).

\textsuperscript{215} \textit{LPIii}, 1928 (22 May 1516, Wolsey to de Giglis, ‘From my house in London’); also see below pp.489-593.
‘Italy and the Pope at his pleasure’. It was becoming clear that Marignano had led to the worst-case scenario for England, a ‘French’ papacy. During the summer of 1516, negotiations towards a ‘holy league’ were conducted, in which papal nuncios were actively involved. Wolsey was so confident of Leo X’s intentions by 9 August that, when challenged whether he believed that Leo wished the French to be chased out of Italy, the cardinal responded, ‘so long as the King of France is in Italy, the Pope considers himself his chaplain’. The likelihood of papal involvement receded, however, when Charles of Castile defected to France by the Treaty of Noyon on 13 August. In light of this, Henry and Wolsey reassured Leo of their continued hostility towards France and to sought to sound out his reaction. In reply (on 4 October), while confident that Noyon would not last, Leo confirmed that he could not do anything until an Anglo-Spanish treaty was concluded. In the meantime, he could not afford to ‘irritate the French’, fearing the loss of various papal territories. The pope claimed that he was caught ‘between the French molars’ until a suitable opportunity arose to resist. As a result, the English delayed no longer and a league ‘for defence of the Church’ was concluded in England on 29 October 1516. Initially, this comprised Henry, Maximilian and Charles and the pope would hopefully become its head. A copy was then sent for Leo to ratify and Cardinal Schiner was secretly despatched to Rome to induce this. An indication of Wolsey’s frustration with the papacy occurred in early December when, having discovered that the Schiner mission had been leaked, he assaulted the

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216 Ibid., 2175 (calendared 15-16 July 1516, [Henry] to [Tunstal and Richard Wingfield]).
218 LPii, 2350 (9 September 1516, [Pace] to Wolsey, [Zurich]). Also see ibid., 2431 (8 October 1516, [Pace] to Wolsey).
219 Ibid., 2420 (4 October 1516, [de Giglis] to [Wolsey], Rome).
220 Ibid., 2462 (20 October 1516), 2463 (calendared 20 October 1516), 2486 (29 October 1516).
221 Ibid., 2528 (calendared 8-9 November 1516), 2698 (23 December 1516, de Giglis to [Wolsey], Rome); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.321-325 (Ven.ii, 800; LPii, 2499; 1 November 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London).
nuncio Chieregato, demanding to know what he had written to the King of France and threatening him with torture. He also searched the nuncio’s correspondence. In spite of this league, the papal reluctance to commit was further cemented by Maximilian’s adhesion to the Treaty of Noyon and the defection of the Swiss in a separate agreement. Henry VIII voiced his concern that the Swiss volte-face would permit Francis to return to Italy, by which ‘the Pope be imperiled’. In response to Wolsey’s warnings of French intrigues among the Cantons, the pope was unsurprised given Francis’ ‘wish to dictate to all Christendom’ and offered his services against the French. The pontiff was also said to be opposed to any subsequent plans for a Franco-Swiss offensive against Naples as, if this succeeded, ‘he would then be no better than their chaplain’. Leo was also reportedly unhappy with the Franco-Imperial arrangement. Finally, vis-à-vis Spain’s continued adhesion to Noyon, the pope advised Wolsey to ignore Charles’ ‘lukewarmness’ and to forge a closer alliance with Spain. The implication, therefore, was that the pope would be more amenable if he was sure of Spanish support. At around the same time, both Leo and Lorenzo de’ Medici were positive towards English overtures apparently linked to the Schiner mission, probably relating to the proposal for the papal nephew’s endowment with territories in central Italy and a marriage alliance.

During February 1517, when the English were still struggling to assemble their coalition against France, in spite of their allies’ defection, Wolsey warned the Venetians, as allies of
France: ‘I pray you do not molest the Church;- touch not the hem of Christ’s garment’. 226 Similarly, the diplomat William Knight, advocating that England abandon its anti-French strategy, reasoned that ‘the Pope is French, and all from Rome to Calais’. 227 Continued English concern at the French threat to papal ‘independence’ would have been further raised by reports that Francesco Maria della Rovere’s attempt to seize back the duchy of Urbino from the pope’s nephew Lorenzo was backed by the Franco-Venetian axis. Indeed, around 8 February 1517, Leo informed the English crown that he was sure of this and that the underlying intention was ‘to bring the Pope to their feet’ and to ‘have him for their vassal’. 228 Therefore, when the pope approached England for financial support against the enemies of the Church in June 1517, he was almost certainly playing on Henry’s fear of the French. 229 Further indication of papal vulnerability to French influence appeared in relation to the anti-Gallic league. Leo advised that, if Maximilian failed to win Charles’ commitment to this, he ‘must fall into the hands of the French, and then he can do nothing for England’. 230 The English gained papal adhesion to the league in defence of the Church during May 1517, as Charles committed and Henry had agreed to a papal loan for the Urbino war. 231 In spite of appearances, however, this does not appear to have represented a solid papal commitment and this continued to be sought from Rome. 232 While Leo did confirm the league during August (perhaps on the 11th), this was withheld from de Giglis for

227 *LPiiii*, 2930 (16 February 1517, Knight to Wolsey, Brussels).
228 Ibid., 2889 (calendared 8 February 1517, de Giglis to [Ammonius]).
229 Ibid., 3350 (10 June 1517, Nicholas von Schönberg to Wolsey, Ghent).
230 Ibid., 2888 (calendared 8 February 1517, de Giglis to [Ammonius]).
231 Ibid., 3232 (12 May 1517, Somerset, Tunstal and Robert Wingfield to [Henry], Brussels).
232 See below pp.581-583.
a week and, even then, it was to remain secret. Further papal procrastination meant that Leo did not release his ratification until November and continued to request that this remain undisclosed. By this time, the English crown seems to have long admitted the failure of the league, as it had been involved in peace negotiations with France for some months.

It was probably because of the difficulty encountered persuading the pope to accept English ‘protection’ against France that Henry and Wolsey chose ‘reconciliation’ as a strategy to restrain the French from Italy, largely to the exclusion of the papacy. The eventual Treaty of London (2 October 1518) was clearly negotiated with this in mind, providing for the defence and protection of Rome, Florence and the Medici. By usurping the papal crusading initiative, Wolsey also avoided the risk that the pope’s truce proposal could be adapted by Francis I as a ruse to conquer Naples and thereby further dominate Italy and Rome. By virtue of the agreement, therefore, one can perhaps interpret Wolsey’s hope that it would ‘promote the peace of Christendom’, as actually referring to Italy. In this regard, England began to divert Francis from Italy and thereby the papacy by the resumption of an old proposal; a personal meeting with Henry. During the interruption provided by the death of the emperor Maximilian in January

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233 *Ven.ii*, 954 (18 August 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 956 (22 August 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 3658 (31 August 1517, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome); *LPIii*, 3617 (24 August 1517, Leo to Wolsey), 3618 (24 August 1517, Leo to the bishop of Exeter), 3619 (24 August 1517, Leo to the bishop of Coventry and Lichfield), 3620 (24 August 1517, Leo to Fox), 3801 (18 November 1517, [de Giglis] to [Wolsey]); L. Pastor, *History of the Popes*, vii, pp.209-210.

234 *LPIii*, 3801 (18 November 1517, [de Giglis] to [Wolsey]).

235 See below pp.596-598.

236 See above pp.45-46.

237 *LPIii*, 4467 (1 October 1518), 4468 (calendared 1-2 October 1518), 4469 (Ven.ii, 1083; 2 October 1518), 4470-4471 (2 October 1518), 4473 (3 October 1518), 4475-4477 (4 October 1518); *Ven.ii*, 1088 (9 October 1518); G. Mattingly, ‘An Early Nonaggression Pact’, *JMH*, 10, pp.7, 12.

238 For this as an English motivation, see pp.627-644.

239 *LPIii*, 24 (calendared 14 January 1519, Wolsey to West and others).

240 *LPIii*, 4483 (8 October 1518); *LPIii*, 111 (5 March 1519, Boleyn to [Wolsey], Paris).
1519, Henry VIII’s fear of French hegemony in the peninsula, particularly its consequences for papal ‘independence’ caused him to re-engage with Leo X to prevent this. While they agreed this strategy in principle and Francis’ candidacy was unsuccessful, they did not ultimately cooperate on the ground in Germany. Indeed, Wolsey seems to have suspected the French were bringing pressure to bear on the pope and asked de Giglis to take care when divulging English thoughts and to observe his reactions.

After Charles V won the ballot, the dynamic of the English policy of ‘defence’ by distraction changed, as the new emperor became increasingly likely to visit Italy to be crowned. This marked the beginning of the Hapsburg-Valois rivalry, in which Henry now assumed a balancing role, albeit secretly biased against France. As mediator between the two, he publicly discouraged both princes from their Italian ambitions and reinforced this by reviving the prospect of a summit with Francis. He also negotiated to meet Charles. Between May and July 1520, Henry met the two monarchs and, while he made a great show of being seen to lean towards Francis, he secretly began to entertain anti-French overtures from Charles. This culminated with an insincere ultimatum given to the emperor at their second meeting at Calais, whereby Henry threatened to side with France if Charles crossed the Alps. Overall, the ruse appears to have worked and Francis was convinced by Henry VIII’s claims to oppose Charles’ going to Italy; at one stage, he was even quoted as saying that his English counterpart ‘had taken upon him the protection of the Italis against such as might intend to [disturb] the peace or quiet

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242 See below pp.653-673.
243 See below pp.673-676.
244 See below pp.675-677.
245 See below pp.690-692.
thereof”. 246 Francis, however, declared his intention to return to Italy almost as soon as the Field of Cloth of Gold ended. 247 The English crown subsequently demonstrated its concern for this through repeated embassies and pleas from Wolsey to Francis that he refrain from this course. 248 Wolsey continued to be concerned about this prospect up to March 1521. 249 Unsure of the papacy’s stance at this time, Wolsey wrote to Leo in a ‘neutral’ capacity in November 1520, asking him to advise Francis I against any Italian enterprise, perhaps emphasising its financial implications. 250

Around the time of the Field of Cloth of Gold, Henry VIII’s fears of French intentions to dominate Rome were confirmed when Francis I approached him to jointly facilitate this. Francis proposed that, between them, they ‘should handle the pope’. By doing this and by ensuring that they always offered him support, ‘as obeisant children of the Church, he would not be of fear inclined to be hasty in acceding to the requests of the King Catholic’ and they would be better placed to prevent Charles V gaining political control over Rome if and when he went there to be crowned. 251

While continuing to publicly advocate a peaceful policy towards France, in order to restrain Francis from Italy, Henry had already begun to lean back secretly towards a belligerent policy to achieve this end. An agreement between Henry and Charles in July 1520 at the Calais-

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246 LIII, 913 (calendared 13-14 July 1520, Richard Wingfield to [Wolsey]). Around the same date, Wolsey was sent credentials for Wingfield to speak on behalf of Francis I; ibid., 911 (13 July 1520, Bonnivet to Wolsey, St Germain). The Venetian ambassador in France also reported the Most Christian King’s conviction (arising from second meeting with Charles) that Henry would side with him if Charles crossed the Alps; Ven.iii, 109 (21 July 1520, Giovanni Badoer to the Signory, Poissy). For other indications (to the French and their Venetian allies) around the time of the second Anglo-Imperial meeting that Henry was pro-French and would side with Francis if Charles went to Italy, see ibid., 108 (18 July 1520, Surian to the Signory, Calais); LIII, 922 (19 July 1520, bishop of Bayeux to Bibbiena, Poissy), 923 (19 July 1520, [Sir Richard Wingfield to Henry], Poissy).

247 LIII, 893 (calendared 1 July 1520, [Richard Wingfield to Henry], Abbeville).

248 See below pp.692-694.

249 LIII, 1191. (calendared 6-7 March 1521, Wolsey to Fizwilliam).

250 Ven.iii, 135 (10 November 1520, Surian to the Signory, London).

251 LIII, 913 (calendared 13-14 July 1520, Richard Wingfield to [Wolsey], Poissy).
Gravelines meetings marked the beginning of negotiations that were to continue into 1521, although they had reached a stalemate by February.\textsuperscript{252} Again, the papacy was not involved and deliberately so. Indeed, in early 1521, Henry revealed his perception of Leo X’s weakness as an ally, when he warned Charles V against conflict with France in the short-term. The pope, he advised was ‘so brittle, and variable, to be led into wars for the sake of one or other’.\textsuperscript{253} As the Hapsburg-Valois rivalry descended into conflict in early 1521, including in Italy, the English crown resolved to protect Rome from the French danger by means of the Calais Conference. While the French were intended to see this as a peace summit, the Imperialists understood that it was to provide cover for the conclusion of an Anglo-Imperial alliance.\textsuperscript{254} This conference may have been partly in response to several papal communications that began to cite the French threat. In late February, Giulio de’ Medici declared that ‘the French had proceeded to their dishonest craft’ and had tried to take the papal city of Reggio, under pretext of arresting the Milanese exiles there, but had failed.\textsuperscript{255} A month later, the cardinal asserted that, as the French could not negotiate an alignment with the pope, they tried to achieve this through intimidation instead; ‘this insolence must be chastised’. De’ Medici further warned against English attempts to arbitrate ‘\textit{inter Caesarem et G[allum]}’, as they will ‘only encourage Francis, who ought to be restrained, as he has often disturbed the peace of Christendom’ and requested Henry’s backing as Leo tried to ‘liberate himself at all hazards from this intolerable slavery’.\textsuperscript{256} In spite of these declarations, the English crown kept the papacy at arms length until the last minute. It only formally informed

\textsuperscript{252} See, for instance, \textit{ibid.}, 969 (1 September 1520), 151 (7 January 1521, Surian to the Signory, London).
\textsuperscript{253} \textit{Ibid.}, 1150 (calendared end January 1521, [Henry to Tunstal]).
\textsuperscript{254} In addition, Wolsey sought a truce, so that England could prepare for war; \textit{LPIIIii}, 1381 (1 July 1521, [de Mesa] to Wolsey, London); also see pp.694-699.
\textsuperscript{255} \textit{LPIIIii}, 1209 (calendared 30-31 March 1521, [de’ Medici to -]).
\textsuperscript{256} \textit{Ibid.}, 1209 (calendared 30-31 March 1521, [de’ Medici to -]).
Leo of the Calais Conference on 20 June and then only to assert its purpose to mediate. The pope’s response was distinctly anti-Gallic: Leo argued that Henry ‘knew little “what presumption and insolency the Frenchmen had us[ed] with his Holiness lately”’. He declared that it was ‘high time to punish the insolence of France, he will spend his blood to drive them out of Italy’. However, it was only when reports reached England of Leo X’s open declaration of his alliance with Charles V that the English crown began to incorporate him into the anti-Gallic agenda of the Calais Conference. Hearing of this papal commitment at the Imperial Court, Spinelly’s reply was said to be ‘very violent’, stating that Henry would react to this within a few days. ‘These Frenchmen want to rule the universe,’ he added. Furthermore, on 19 July, Henry himself was said to have defended the pope’s actions against complaints by a pair of French envoys. They claimed that Leo had made military preparations against Genoa long before Francis moved against Reggio (which was correct). The English king replied that this may well have been the case, but Francis ‘had before that put him [Leo] in such fear and extreme subjection, that he was compelled to do as he had done’. Consequently, Ghunicci had a secret meeting with Wolsey immediately prior to the cardinal’s departure for Calais. Following the conclusion of the Treaty of Bruges (25 August 1521), Wolsey formally revealed the English strategy up to that point: that Henry wished for ‘some sure knot of alliance’ with Charles V and, so, the Calais conference in pursuit of a truce ‘was only a colour to deceive the French King’. While Wolsey also worked towards a truce at Calais, as a means to play for time before England was plunged

257 LIIIi, 1402 (9 July 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome), 1404 (9 July 1521, Campeggio to [Wolsey], Rome).
258 Ibid., 1402 (9 July 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome).
259 See below pp.734-737.
260 Ven.iii, 254 (9 July 1521, Contarini to the Signory, Brussels).
261 Richard Pace reported these exchanges to Wolsey on 20 July; LIIIi, 1425 (20 July 1521, Pace to [Wolsey], Windsor). Also see Ven.ii, 268 (22 July 1521, Surian to the Signory, London).
262 LIIIi, 1486 (12 August 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome).
263 Ibid., 1574 (14 September 1521, Clerk to Wolsey, Rome).
into war, he further betrayed his fear for papal security when he rejected proposals that such a
cessation only apply north of the Alps as ‘he thought this would be worse still, as all the French
forces would be turned against the Pope’. Finally, in late 1521, Henry and Wolsey would have
been concerned that, as a result of the lack of leadership in Rome arising from Leo X’s death, the
recent victories against the French in Italy, particularly the taking of Milan, would be reversed.
English orators in the Low Countries, for instance, warned Wolsey on 18 December that this may
‘force the Pope [sic] to yield to the French’. Similarly, when the non-resident Adrian VI was
elected in January 1522, these concerns would not have been lifted, particularly when Cardinal
de’ Medici stressed the need for the pope to reside in Rome ‘for the conservation of the lands of
the Church’.

The English fear of a French-controlled papacy was also cultivated by those powers
seeking Henry VIII’s support against the Most Christian King. Venice, for instance, wrote to its
ambassador in Rome during July 1510 of its certainty that Henry ‘will not allow the Apostolic
See to be harassed by the machinations of his natural enemies, but will assist and maintain the
papacy’. Even after the initial expulsion of the French in 1512, following the battle of
Ravenna, the Venetians acknowledged the English role in this, doge Loredano affirming that ‘it is
confessedly to his Majesty that she [Venice and Italy] is indebted for being in great measure freed
from French oppression’. Furthermore, if the English king needed any more reason to fear
Louis XII’s influence over Julius II, Ferdinand of Aragon conveyed ‘intelligence’ to be passed on

264 Ibid., 1606 (24 September 1521, Gattinara to Charles, Calais). For Wolsey’s angry reaction to the French making
the same suggestion, see Ven.iii, 342 (28 September 1521, Surian to the Signory, Calais).
265 They feared that papal troops would not be paid, leading to the disbanding of the army, thus allowing the French
to advance and papal rebels, such as Francesco Maria della Rovere, to cause instability within the Papal States; 
LPiili, 1881 (18 December 1521, Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to [Wolsey], Ghent).
266 Ibid., 1881 (23 January 1522, Pace to [Wolsey], Florence).
267 Ven.ii, 71 (LPii, 529; 15 July 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome).
268 Ibid., 187 (26 August 1512, doge to Henry).
to Henry during June 1510, alleging that, by intending to replace the pope, the French king was attempting to become ‘spiritual and temporal lord of Italy’, in which case ‘no resistance to him will be possible in Christendom’.\textsuperscript{269} Ferdinand again tried to invoke Henry VIII’s fear of French hegemony in Italy after the battle of Ravenna. On 20 July 1512, when empowering his ambassador in England to conclude a new league in defence of the Church, Ferdinand alleged that Louis XII threatened ‘to return once more to Italy, and to conquer the states of the Church’.\textsuperscript{270}

Fear of a ‘French’ papacy was also implicitly voiced in the leagues formed and adhered to by England to counter this. In particular, the territorial integrity of the Papal States was cited as, for instance, in the first holy league formed on 4 October 1511, where the preamble stated that ‘as the city of Bologna and other towns, castles, &c, undoubtedly belonging to the Holy Father, are invaded by tyrants and oppressors of the people, it is the object of this league to reconquer those portions of the Papal States which are wrested from the See of St Peter by force and intrigues’.\textsuperscript{271} In England, Henry VIII’s adherence to this confederacy was to be supplemented by a specific Anglo-Spanish accord. In the king’s commission to the earls of Surrey and Shrewbury to negotiate this on his behalf, Henry stated that it was in response to the pope having written to him ‘that certain enemies of the Christian faith have deprived the Church of Christ of the city and territory of Bologna, which from olden times have always belonged to the Apostolic See. These enemies, not satisfied with what they have stolen, intend to pursue their wicked plans, and to divide among them even the "tunic of our Lord"’. In reply to the pope’s requests for aid,

\textsuperscript{269} Sp.\textit{ii}, 50 (\textit{LP}i\textit{ii}, 483; calendared June 1510, Ferdinand to his ambassador in England). Also, see \textit{ibid.}, 48 (calendared June 1510, Ferdinand to his ambassador in Rome).

\textsuperscript{270} \textit{Ibid.}, 66 (20 July 1512, Ferdinand to his ambassador in England).

\textsuperscript{271} Admittedly, the league was concluded at this point without England, but it is stated among the articles that this conclusion was effected ‘with the full knowledge and participation of the King of England’; \textit{ibid.}, 56 (\textit{Ven.\textit{ii}}, 1346; 4 October 1511).
therefore, Henry proposed to join Spain ‘to defend the Church against any further aggression, and to reconquer for her Bologna and its territory’.\textsuperscript{272} This idea is repeated in the preamble to the actual treaty, that refers to Louis XII’s ‘nefarious project of robbing the Church of her property’.\textsuperscript{273} The supplementary treaty between the two states (March 1512) binds them ‘to assist one another in the defence of the Holy Church against France, and to aid the common attempts to be made to recover those provinces which by right belong to the crown of England, but are occupied by the King of France’\textsuperscript{274}.

One can also highlight two other ways in which Henry VIII (and his advisors) voiced their concerns for French ambitions in Italy. The first of these was in terms of Louis XII or Francis I’s desire to ‘rule’ Italy, ‘the world’ or something similar. While this idea has wider implications than merely influence over the papacy, its manifestation in crown sources primarily related to the way in which the English crown envisaged French control of (northern) Italy and, thereby, domination of Rome. While this idea was not exclusive to England, its manifestation in English sources was linked to the fear for English interests if the papacy lost its ‘independence’. In the initial conflict with France, that ended in the peace of August 1514, one can see Henry writing directly to Maximilian on 8 May 1512, justifying his decision to go to war with France, as the recent loss by the holy league at Ravenna, ‘threatens to place Naples, Italy, and Sicily at the mercy of their enemies, and indeed the whole of Christendom’.\textsuperscript{275} More explicitly supportive of the argument that crown circles envisaged this idea in terms of a potential ‘French’ papacy,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{272} Ibid., 57 (\textit{LPIi}, 934, 969:29; \textit{LPI}, 1955, 3513; 10 November 1511, Henry to Surrey and Shrewsbury, Westminster).
\item \textsuperscript{273} Ibid.59-60 (\textit{LPIi}, 945; \textit{LPI}, 1980; 17 November 1511).
\item \textsuperscript{274} Ibid., 65 (\textit{LPIi}, 1098; \textit{LPI}, 3797; 16 March 1512). Also see above pp.42-46.
\item \textsuperscript{275} \textit{LPIi}, 1186 (\textit{LPI}, 3188; 8 May 1512, Henry to [Maximilian]).
\end{itemize}
Henry VIII, writing to Bainbridge on 12 April 1514, but actually addressing the new pope, Leo X (and possibly replying to the latter’s initial approaches for peace), justified the war by stating that ‘France has no other object in view except to trample on the Pope and all the potentates of Europe’.  

Similarly, Henry received pressure in this direction from his representatives abroad. In a wider context, during April 1514, for instance, when Thomas Spinelly reported from the Low Countries on the growing French influence there, he commented that ‘unless the King looks to it all these countries will be ruled by the French’. 

English fear of French influence over the ‘world’ was next voiced most starkly after the battle of Marignano, 13-14 September 1515. In mid-December, Wolsey reported the king being ‘afraid that the French will be too much elated by this victory at Milan, and trouble the whole of Christendom’. Similarly, during April and May 1516, when the English were attempting to rally the anti-French powers after the collapse of the Imperial-Swiss expedition, Wolsey referred to Francis’ aim to achieve ‘the sovereignty of Italy’ and later justified English opposition as preventing Francis ‘from giving law to the universe should he be victorious’. A few months later, the cardinal again mentioned the French king’s ambition to attain ‘the sovereignty of Christendom’. In recognition of English efforts to prevent this, therefore, Pace predicted during September 1516, that the league being created to counter this would ‘bridle the “ambitious

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276 Ibid., 1769 (LPI, 3876; Ven.ii, 238; 12 April 1513, Henry to Bainbridge, London).
277 LPI, 5006 (24 April 1514, Spinelly to Henry, Bruges). This idea was not limited to English sources or others writing to or from England. The Venetian humanist Mocenigo wrote in 1525 on the League of Cambrai, that Louis XII was motivated by a ‘greed for domination’ and that the French coveted ‘the empire of Italy’; L.J. Libby Jr, ‘Venetian History and Political Thought after 1509’, Studies in the Renaissance, 20 (1973), p.33.
278 LPIi, 1280 (13 December 1515, [Wolsey] to [de Giglis], ‘My house at London’).
280 Ibid., pp.276-280 (Ven.ii, 760; LPIii, 2284; 17 August 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London).
appetites of the] French King” and give peace to all Christendom’. During the Imperial election of 1519, this concept was raised again, as Sir Thomas Boleyn relayed Francis’ desire for English support ‘as in the new Emperor there will really be vested the monarchy of Christendom’ Even if this was interpreted more broadly than the hegemony of Italy, the danger was not lost on Henry VIII, who subsequently opposed Francis’ candidacy before all others.

Similarly, this idea was used by other opponents to French expansionism when trying to engage English support. During August 1509, for instance, Andrea Badoer was to notify the English that Louis XII was ‘doing all he can to make himself Lord of Italy, and then - as frequently stated by them - of the universe’. In June 1511, the apostolic nuncio Jerome Bonvisi, spying for the French crown, reported that the Spanish ambassador ‘continually animates this King and Council against you [France] by saying that the King of France wishes to make himself lord of all’. Again, the July 1512 commission for the intended new Venetian ambassador for England instructed him ‘to praise the King for having joined the [Holy] League, and for his operation in its favour, to which were due the release not only of Italy, but of the whole of Christendom’. Most importantly, the idea that the French posed a direct threat to the Papal States was encouraged by the papacy itself, which used evocative terms to describe this. In a bull of excommunication of July 1512 which was sent to England, Julius II referred to Louis XII’s seizure of papal cities and territories. In terms of French support for the Council of Pisa,

281 LPIIi, 2387 (calendared 25-26 September 1516, [Wolsey] to Pace).
282 LPIIIi, 70 (9 February 1519, [Boleyn] to Henry, Paris). Margaret of Savoy seems to have envisaged this description in an Imperial context when writing in December 1515 of the potential result of Ferdinand or Maximilian dying; LPIIIi, 1339 (calendared 24-25 December 1515, [Spinelly to Wolsey]).
283 See below, pp.653-673.
284 Ven.ii, 9 (LPII, 154; 30 August 1509, Signory to Badoer). Again, on 9 September 1510, Venice notified the same orator that, had it not been for the actions of the pope, that ‘the French would by this time be masters of Italy’; ibid. 81 (LPII, 570; 9 September 1510, Signory to Badoer).
286 Ven.ii, 179 (LPIi, 1276; 3 July 1512).
moreover, the pope alleged that the French king was ‘cutting in pieces thereby the tunic of our Lord, and dishonouring his bride, the Roman Catholic Church’.287 Similarly, this fear was reported to have emanated from the pope by Richard Pace on 23 April 1516, then (unsuccessfully) managing an English-subsidised Imperial-Swiss offensive in Italy. He reported Leo X’s dread of ‘the French King becoming monarch of the whole world’.288

The other form of rhetoric employed by Henry VIII and his advisors when alluding to the French threat to Rome (and Christendom) invoked crusading terminology. At worst, the French kings or their subjects could be overtly or implicitly referred to as ‘the Christian Turk’. The Ottoman Turks, at this time, were universally considered to be the principal enemy of Christendom, who perpetrated atrocities and other ‘evils’, in battle and over those within their power (particularly Christians) during peacetime.289 By implication, therefore, the ‘Christian Turk’ would be deemed to share many of these characteristics, threatening the very wellbeing of Christendom and, furthermore, preventing concerted action being taken against the Ottomans. In other words, France was portrayed by the English crown (and others) as a significantly more serious threat to the Church and Christendom than the Turks, traditionally Catholic Europe’s principal enemy. Before exploring the employment of such descriptions by crown sources, a little needs to be said about the ‘crusading’ context of the English defence of the papacy against France. There are a number of indications that Henry VIII and his advisors were eager to draw crusading ideas and rhetoric into their pursuit of this policy. In the first place, the English crown

287 Sp.ii, 67 (LPII, 1305; 21 July 1512, Julius II to all persons).
288 LPII, 1816 (23 April 1516, Pace to [Wolsey], Bergamo).
(in addition to its confederates) portrayed France as obstructing universal peace which, in turn, impeded a crusade being launched against the Turks. In particular, the leagues for the defence of the Church of which England became a member mostly tended to state, as their ultimate intention, an eventual expedition against them. It was a natural extension, therefore, that the state(s) preventing universal peace, the essential precursor to such an expedition, be directly associated with this cause. This provided a ‘just’ casus belli for England, particularly strengthened by support from the Church. One should also remember that, in terms of the king’s commitment to chivalry, enthusiasm for a quasi-crusading character to war with France was consistent with the knightly belief that crusading was the most laudable form of warfare. It is unsurprising then that Henry VIII sought and apparently succeeded in gaining an indulgence for those who fought for this ‘just’ cause in 1512. In addition, the utilisation of crusading ideas also enabled England to resist calls from other powers, often the allies of France (and at times the papacy itself), for universal peace and a subsequent expedition to the East. While such appeals were believed in England to be ploys sponsored by the French crown, Henry VIII could not be seen to reject such proposals out of hand. Having crusading justification for his own cause, however, did enable him to ‘legitimately’ reject such calls and still portray himself as a pious

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290 See, for example, Henry VIII’s letter to Bainbridge of 12 April 1513, acknowledging the new pope’s confirmation of his continued membership of the Holy League against France. Henry refers to an alleged promise made by Julius II for particular military actions, ‘so, by restoration of peace, a general expedition might be made against the Infidels’; LPl, 1769 (LPl, 3876; Ven.ii, 238; 12 April 1513, Henry to Bainbridge, London).

291 See, for instance, the Anglo-Spanish treaty of 17 November 1511, to support the broader holy league against France, in which Henry and Ferdinand alleged that the need for this confederacy had interrupted their preparations for ‘a great expedition against the Infidels’; Sp.ii, 59-60 (LPl, 945; LPl, 1980; 17 November 1511). Also see the Treaty of Bruges of 1521; LPlili, 1508 (25 August 1521, Bruges), 1802 (24 November 1521, Calais).

292 For Leo X’s calls for universal peace from quite early on in his pontificate having serious implications for English aggression based on the crown’s claim to be ‘defending’ of the papacy, see for instance, LPlili, 2288 (LPl, 4458; 20 September 1513, Leo to Henry, Rome), 2310 (LPl, 4470; 28 September 1513, Henry to Leo, Tournai).
supporter of the crusade. In such terms, therefore, it is not surprising that the English fear of French influence over the papacy came to be voiced in powerful rhetoric that invoked the crusade.

In terms of broad English allusions to the ‘Christian Turk’, Wolsey most strongly and directly alluded to this idea around 29 March 1518 when, in response to the Venetian ambassador’s intelligence concerning an Ottoman naval threat, he warned him, ‘guard yourselves more against the Christian Turk than the real Turk’. This was interpreted as clearly referring to Francis I and intended to provoke Giustinian, Venice being an ally of France. The first allusions from the English crown of this idea, however, came in the spring of 1512, when England was committed to a joint invasion of Aquitaine with Spain. Writing to Cardinal Bainbridge in Rome on 31 May 1512, Henry VIII himself referred to the French as ‘Turks, heretics and Infidels’, in response to reports of the recent French ‘victory’ at Ravenna. Similarly, in the same May or June, he also wrote to Maximilian of his commitment to defend the Church against the French as if he ‘actually fought against the Turks or Saracens’. Such evocative language also emanated, during July 1513, from Thomas Spinelly, in the Low Countries, who referred to ‘Henry’s enterprise against the enemies of the Church’. From this description, it is not much of a step to describe them as ‘Christian Turks’. Sir Robert Wingfield

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295 At some point from 1511 on, for instance, Henry was reported to have rejected Scottish universal peace overtures. He also refused a safe conduct to the Scottish bishop Andrew Forman on this mission to foster universal peace, despite James IV’s brandishing a papal brief. James claimed that Henry refused on the basis that Julius II had changed his mind about such a peace and had since joined an anti-French coalition; LPIi, 773 (LPI, 3216; 21 May 1511, James IV to Henry, Edinburgh), 1065 (LPI, 2010; calendared 17-20 February 1512, Julius II to Henry), 1615-1616 (LPI, 3837; 12 February 1513, James IV to Julius II, Edinburgh).

296 R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, p.175 (Ven.ii, 1019; LPIi, 4047; 29 March 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, London). For Wolsey also making the same suggestion a few weeks earlier, see ibid., pp.166-173 (Ven.ii, 1015; LPIi, 4009; 15 March 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, London).

297 Ven.ii, 169 (LPIi, 1182; 6 May 1512, Henry to Bainbridge).

298 Ibid., 178 (LPIi, 1214; 29 May 1512, Henry to Bainbridge).

299 LPI, 2069 (LPI, 4323; 5 July 1513, Spinelly to [Bainbridge]).
similarly referred to the French as ‘the enemies of Christendom’ in January 1516, when England next fostered conflict with France.\textsuperscript{300} This language was further mirrored by foreign sources writing to England. In November 1513, for instance, Maximilian Sforza, writing to Henry, referred to the French as the ‘enemy of the Church’.\textsuperscript{301} Also, on 5 May 1514, Matthew Schiner, in a letter to Henry VIII, referred to the Swiss having ‘been most active in expelling the French and heretics from Italy’.\textsuperscript{302}

By virtue of viewing France as the ‘Christian Turk’, the English crown was also able to justify war against France above and before the need to address the Ottoman threat. This can be seen during 1521 in Wolsey’s reaction to Hungarian overtures for aid while he was at the Conference of Calais. At this time Belgrade was under siege and in serious danger of falling.\textsuperscript{303} Initially, he was able to reject these advances, probably because he had heard from Rome that Leo X had already indicated that he would not divert from his project against France; he might ‘spend his mitre, but he will have them [the French] out of Italy’.\textsuperscript{304} In the same way, Charles V, while not dismissing the worthiness of the Hungarian cause, notified Wolsey on 17 September that he was unable to do anything until the French issue had been dealt with.\textsuperscript{305} Consequently,

\textsuperscript{300} LPI, 1377 (1 January 1516, Robert Wingfield to Wolsey).
\textsuperscript{301} LPI, 4571 (20 November 1513, duke of Milan to Henry, Cremona).
\textsuperscript{302} Ibid., 5040 (5 May 1513, Cardinal Schiner to Henry, ‘Ex Viglo’).
\textsuperscript{303} The English crown would have heard of the strategic significance of Belgrade both directly and indirectly from the Hungarian ambassador. At the beginning of September 1521, Wingfield and Spinelly cited him as saying that ‘if it be lost, all the realm will be lost’. By the 10\textsuperscript{th}, the same diplomats advised Wolsey that Belgrade, ‘the strongest place on that side of Hungary’, had fallen; LPIii, 1532 (calendared start September 1521, [Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to Wolsey]), 1561 (10 September 1521, Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels). For the context of the fall of Belgrade, see J. France, The Crusades and the Expansion of Catholic Christendom 1000-1714 (2005), p.305.
\textsuperscript{304} LPIii, 1477 (8 August 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome).
\textsuperscript{305} The Hungarian gained an audience with Charles at the beginning of September 1521. It seems that a previous overture had been rejected by Charles after consulting the Diet of Worms (January-May 1521), citing the significance of the French threat over that of the Ottomans. While, by the 10\textsuperscript{th}, the English ambassadors in the Low Countries understood that Charles had consented to the Hungarian envoy’s mission to Francis to secure a truce, the emperor elect’s denial of aid was issued by the 17\textsuperscript{th}; ibid., 1532 (calendared start September 1521, [Richard
Wolsey could easily sidestep the Hungarian approach for aid. Addressing Louis II’s orator on the 26th (in the presence of the Imperial chancellor Gattinara at least), Wolsey argued that Henry VIII could provide little aid without the ‘the other chief princes’ doing the same and that these same princes would not act during the current war. The implication was, however, that if Wolsey could achieve the truce that he sought, thoughts could then turn towards the Turks. The problem was, however, that the Turkish threat was very real to Hungary and the fall of Belgrade on 28-29 August sent a stern warning to advocates of the crusading movement. Early indications of this would have reached Wolsey perhaps around 11-12 September, but were not accepted by Henry VIII until mid-October. In reaction, it seems that Henry’s allies, Leo and Charles had a change of heart. Charles V had decided to act by the end of September 1521 and notified Wolsey of this. John Clerk notified Wolsey of papal concern on 10 October, claiming there was much fear for Hungary (as a result of Belgrade) and that if there were to be war in Hungary, Italy and France, ‘the earth will be well satiated with Christian blood’. From this, it could easily be inferred that the papal focus on France may be wavering. At this watershed moment, it appears that Wolsey opportunistically used Belgrade to pursue his own preferred policy, a truce (with a view to a future war against France). Sending two pairs of envoys to lobby Francis and Charles respectively, the English cardinal instructed at least one set to emphasise the need to resist the

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Wingfield and Spinelly to Wolsey]), 1561 (10 September 1521, Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 1586 (17 September 1521, Charles to Wolsey, Brussels).

306 Ibid., 1609 (27 September 1521, Gattinara and others to Charles, Calais).

307 Ibid., 1561 (10 September 1521, Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 1680 (15 October 1521, Pace to [Wolsey], Windsor).

308 Ibid., 1616 (30 September 1521, Charles to his ambassadors at Calais, ‘Bins’), 1620 (calendared end September 1521, Charles to his ambassadors at Calais).

309 Ibid., 1654 (10 October 1521, Clerk to Wolsey, Rome). In addition, the grand master of Rhodes who, describing the ‘great cruelty’ inflicted by the Turks in taking Belgrade, feared an attack on his own island stronghold; ibid., 1741 (4 November 1521, Philippe Villiers de L’Isle-Adam to Wolsey, Rhodes).
Ottoman threat in Hungary.310 By the end of the year, however, when his truce strategy had failed and he had returned to England, Wolsey again rejected the Hungarian appeal for aid, asserting that ‘nothing can be done against the Turks until the French King is subdued’.311

Linked to the English crown idea that France was akin to the ‘Christian Turk’ was its allegation that the French fought worse than the Turks, committing various atrocities, particularly against the Church, women and children.312 Henry VIII himself cited such ‘war crimes’ in his letter to Bainbridge of May 1512. Concerning the battle of Ravenna, the king claimed to have been ‘informed of the great slaughter effected there, including that of the French commanders, about the captives, and also of the other cruelties committed by the French’.313 Around the same time, Henry VIII also responded to Maximilian’s pleas for peace and crusade by claiming that French actions ‘showed a worse than Turkish cruelty, shedding blood, plundering and burning universally, slaughtering aged men women and infants; violating virgins consecrated to God and, what the Gentiles of old and the most barbarous of men were wont most scrupulously to spare, profaning churches and altars with innocent blood…. In short, they omitted no act of cruel impiety and nefarious villainy’.314 Such allusions also emanated from the reports of English diplomats abroad. For instance, Henry VIII’s representative in the Low Countries, Thomas

310 Wolsey certainly instructed those going to Francis to employ this argument (among others). Furthermore, those sent to Charles also recognised the importance of this factor; the Venetian orator at Courtrai acquainted them with Turkish news and noted that they appeared to hold this ‘in great account’ and that they considered that ‘that the discord among Christians was the cause of this misfortune which had befallen Christendom’. Boleyn and Docwra then urged Contarini to send copies of this correspondence to Calais, presumably to further the truce negotiations; ibid., 1694 (calendared 20 October 1521, Wolsey to Charles), 1695 (20 October 1521, [Wolsey] to Francis, Calais), 1696 (calendared 20 October 1521, Wolsey to Francis); Ven.iii, 350 (25 October 1521, Contarini to the Signory, ‘Courtray’).
311 LPIii, 1858 (12 December 1521, de Mesa to Charles, London).
312 For the common, contemporary belief that the Turks committed ‘evil acts’ against Christians in both war and peacetime, see K. De Vries, ‘The Lack of a Western European Military Response to the Ottoman Invasions of Eastern Europe’, The Journal of Military History, 63, pp.550-554.
313 Ven.ii, 169 (LPl, 1182; 6 May 1512, Henry to Bainbridge).
314 Ibid., 178 (LPl, 1215; calendared end May 1512, Henry to Maximilian).
Spinelly, reported such occurrences in March 1512: ‘letters have been received stating that the French in Brescia [had committed great] disorders. There were killed 14,000, and both secular and spiritual persons pillaged; none were spared, and children over 8 yrs old were all made prisoners and put to ransom’.315

This idea that the French were more cruel than the Ottomans in warfare probably originated from those on the receiving end of French aggression, but it is likely that the English readily accepted such claims and adopted them in pursuit of English interests. During September 1509, for instance, while facing a powerful coalition of states intent on its destruction, Venice appealed in these terms to Henry VIII, instructing its ambassador to report that confederacy forces were ‘perpetrating against Christians such cruelties that greater could not be committed by Infidels’.316 Similarly, during August 1511, Venice advised the pope that similar atrocities had recently occurred, including ‘the violation and murder of women on the altars of churches’, hoping that he would write to Henry VIII (along with Ferdinand and Maximilian), ‘so that such unheard of iniquities may no longer be perpetrated in Christendom’.317 Subsequently, on the 26th, the state advised Badoer in England that Franco-Imperial forces had perpetrated ‘rapine, arson, violence and slaughter, even in the churches and at the altar of the Virgin, sparing neither sex nor age, that the like was never heard’.318 Also, there is evidence that such language came from the

315 LPlI, 1101 (LPI, 3077; 17 March 1512, Spinelly to Henry, Mechelin). Polydore Vergil later recorded the sack in similar terms: ‘the savage enemy charged on the wretched citizens and slew the unarmed crowd without respect for age or sex. Entering the churches they perpetrated a massacre there; and so terrible was the slaughter that rivers of blood flowed from these churches through the town’; D. Hay (ed.), Anglica Historia, p.167.
316 Admittedly, the Venetians mention papal and Ferrarese forces in addition to the French, but it would have been known by the authors that the English crown would only respond to French atrocities. Indeed, the author of this letter alleges that Louis XII was the cause of Julius II’s enmity towards Venice; Ven.ii, 12 (LPlI, 169; 14 or 15 September 1509, Signory to Badoer).
317 Ibid., 111 (LPlI, 844; 15 August 1511, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome).
318 Ibid., 117 (LPlI, 851; 26 August 1511, Signory to Badoer). The delay was perhaps intended to give chance for the papal letter to be sent, to ensure the greatest impact by their arrival together or in quick succession.
pope himself. On 2 June 1512, Julius II wrote to Louis XII, protesting that ‘[the battle of] Ravenna has witnessed horrible cruelties perpetrated by French soldiers worse even than the Turks’.³¹⁹ If the pope was addressing his enemy in these terms, it is equally likely that he also wrote in similar terms to his allies, including England.³²⁰ Finally, Cardinal Schiner described the French in this vein when reporting to Wolsey after the Battle of Marignano in 1515. In making overtures to England to hire the Swiss in response, he reported that the Cantons were ‘anxious to take vengeance on the French for their cruelty to the wounded who had taken shelter in the churches at Milan’.³²¹

A final related consideration concerning the English desire to associate the crusade with its defence of the papacy from France was the fear that a ‘French’ papacy would be able to invoke the same notions against England. Indeed, this could be posited to explain why Henry VIII was reluctant to respond to papal overtures towards universal peace after 1515. That Henry was well aware of such ‘spiritual’ backing the papacy could give a conflict was clear at the beginning of his reign. In communication with Julius II during January 1510, he proposed a coalition against France with universal peace and a subsequent crusade as its main aims ‘to which, if other princes refuse to accede, they must be considered as a common enemy’.³²² If the papacy was under French political influence, however, and such sentiments were voiced, it would at the very least preclude Henry from acting against France or, at worst, cause him to be targeted

³¹⁹ It is later stated that ‘they [the French] have treated Ravenna worse than Turks’; *LPl*, 1224 (*LPI*, 3283; 2 June 1512, Julius II to Louis XII, Rome).
³²⁰ Indeed, that copies of this letter survive in English archives suggests that Julius II may have forwarded these to his confederates.
³²¹ *LPl*, 1146 (13 November 1515, Cardinal Schiner to Wolsey, Innsbruck).
as an obstacle to crusade. The first time that this would have been cause for concern for the
English would have been following the Franco-papal settlement after Leo’s defeat at the Battle of
Marignano in late 1515 when reports emanated from Rome that the pope would now pursue
universal peace in combination with Francis I recognised as the principal protector of the
Church.323 In the first instance, this threatened the continued efforts of the anti-French coalition
and, in particular, Henry VIII’s attempts to back an Imperial-Swiss expedition.324 It may have
been in response to this ‘pro-French’ call for universal peace that the English made overtures to
Rome for an ‘anti-French’ equivalent to be enshrined in a coalition, in later December 1515.
Although the pope rejected this, he did give Henry the impression that he tacitly supported his
actions.325 In terms of the ‘French’ crusade, the pope made moves in December to send out
deleagtes to urge the princes in this direction. Notably for England, a nuncio was sent, rather than
a legate a latere, who took four months to reach England. Even then, Chieregato seemed to have
a hidden agenda, linked to tacit papal support of English attempts to resist Francis I in Italy.326 In
response to hearing of a legate addressing Maximilian on this, Henry recommended that the
emperor reject papal ‘incantations’, as Leo ‘is easily misled to believe what he most desires’, but
will be deceived by Francis and will instead join their own (anti-Gallic) league.327 As the English

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323 This was to be part of the Franco-papal peace settlement and was to be discussed at the Bologna meeting in December 1515; LPii, 994 (7 October 1515, de Giglis to [Wolsey], Viterbo), 1042 (17 October 1515, [de Giglis to Wolsey]); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, p.146 (Ven.ii, 665; LPii, 1250; 6 December 1515, Giustinian to the Signory, London).
324 See below pp.499 ff.
326 As England was notoriously reluctant about entertaining legates a latere, Leo X could have forced a rupture. Indeed, a legate was sent to Germany; see below p.511.
327 LPii, 1446 (28 January 1516, Henry to Maximilian, Greenwich).
crown was able to gain confidence from tacit papal support for its anti-French measures, leading up to the Imperial-Swiss incursion into Italy during early 1516, the threat of a French-led universal peace initiative declined.\textsuperscript{328}

While there were a number of subsequent occasions when the English crown sought to avoid papal calls to crusade (via universal peace) because it was sceptical that Leo X could retain control over it, that of 1517-1518 is probably the most notable, on account of Henry’s and Wolsey’s reaction and subsequent developments. It has already been noted that the eventual agreement, the Treaty of London (2 October 1518) was at least partly designed to restrain Francis I from interfering in Italy.\textsuperscript{329} While this was a remarkable enough adaptation of the crusading ideal, the process by which Wolsey hijacked the papacy’s attempt to impose a five year truce was even more so. Immediately before developing this strategy, Wolsey advocated a ‘water-tight’ universal peace to the pope that would not allow the French the opportunity to adapt to their own purposes.\textsuperscript{330} His fears for Francis I’s interference apparently lay in a prospective Franco-papal marriage, involving Lorenzo de’ Medici, which the English crown had been unable to prevent. As Henry was informed, if the agreement occurred, the French king would be able to make his final move to achieve hegemony in Italy by seizing Naples.\textsuperscript{331} Furthermore, Henry and Wolsey were also concerned about potential French attacks on English interests and that the crusade would again be invoked as cover for this. Intelligence from France in December 1517, outlined an enthusiastic French response to the papal call for crusade, although the source warned that the

\textsuperscript{328} See below pp.520-525.
\textsuperscript{329} See above pp.45-46.
\textsuperscript{330} LPLlii, 3812 (calendared end November 1517, [Wolsey] to [de Giglis]).
\textsuperscript{331} By 20 February, however, the marriage had been agreed; ibid., 3874 (7 January 1518, Spinelly to Henry, Valladolid), 4022 (23 March 1518, Spinelly to Henry).
money would be diverted for use against England.\textsuperscript{332} It is unsurprising, therefore, that Wolsey took three months to answer the pope’s crusade appeal of December 1517, at which point he advised that universal peace was a necessary prerequisite, although he added that this would already exist, if it had not been for ‘the immoderate ambition of certain Princes’, which ought to be addressed.\textsuperscript{333} Wolsey emphasised that the English priority was the French before the Turkish threat. Before the cardinal’s proposal could have reached Rome, Leo X moved to force the hands of Christian princes towards the crusade by proclaiming a five year truce across Christendom, in pursuit of which legates were to be despatched, including one to England.\textsuperscript{334} This gave Wolsey the opportunity to seize control of the initiative. On the arrival of the papal proposal, Wolsey gained Henry’s agreement that he become a second legate \textit{a latere} to control events.\textsuperscript{335} The English had already been involved in peace negotiations with France since the previous June and an earlier proposal by the English cardinal for a marriage accord had already been agreed.\textsuperscript{336} By the time Lorenzo Campeggio was allowed entry to England in August 1518, his co-legate, Wolsey, had already reached the final stages of negotiating a universal peace agreement with France.\textsuperscript{337} In subsequent talks, Campeggio played little part, perhaps understanding them to be a separate matter to the five year truce and a matter for the English and French to discuss.\textsuperscript{338} Wolsey further imbued proceedings with his legatine authority by assuming a senior role over

\textsuperscript{332} \textit{Ibid.}, 3818 (1 December 1517, Tours). Also see \textit{ibid.}, 3550 (1 August 1517, news from France).

\textsuperscript{333} Wolsey expanded upon his belief that the French were raising a large army intent on disturbing Christendom, despite Francis’ claiming to be pro-peace; \textit{ibid.}, 3973 (27 February 1518, Wolsey to de Giglis); R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Cariesbrick}, Henry VIII, p.69.


\textsuperscript{335} \textit{LPIII}, 4055 (1 April 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Abingdon).

\textsuperscript{336} See below pp.604-605.

\textsuperscript{337} \textit{LPIII}, 4357 (calendared end July 1518).

\textsuperscript{338} See below pp.637-639.
Campeggio, despite having no apparent authority to do so. Wolsey did not notify the papacy of his true intentions until September, which drew a strong response from Giulio de’ Medici. The cardinal wrote that ‘with great displeasure has His Holiness learned that Wolsey has set aside the proposal of a five years’ truce, because he does not wish to leave the final position of affairs in the hands of the Pope. No Christian – far less a Cardinal – should venture to express himself in that way, and least of all Wolsey, who has received so many honours and favours from the Holy Father. From this we can see what the Holy See and the Pope have to expect from the English Chancellor’. The papacy apparently felt cheated by Wolsey, having finally realised that the English had seized control of the crusading strategy. For Wolsey, however, this marked the successful prevention of a feared French-led universal peace and the beginning of a period when the English could restrain France by more peaceful means.

So far, it has been found that the English crown clearly opposed and feared the general prospect of French hegemony in Italy and of the consequential loss of papal political independence that would result. This fear was gradually realised, 1515-1517, as Henry and Wolsey struggled to gain papal backing for their anti-Gallic agenda and this manifested itself particularly in their concern for a suspected French-led universal peace that they countered by Wolsey’s facilitating of the Treaty of London in 1518. It also ought to be stressed that the English crown’s fear for the implications of a ‘French’ papacy was not limited to the crusade. In such situations, it also expected the French king to be able to lever concessions out of the pontiff, as

339 LPIii, 4179 (20 May 1518, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome).
340 Ven.ii, 1080 (29 September 1518, Venetian ambassador at the Curia to the Signory, Viterbo); LPIii, 4615 (29 November 1518, Spinelly to Wolsey, Zaragoza); L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, p.243.
341 See below pp.125-126.
well as induce him to obstruct English requests from Rome. While it is the aim of subsequent chapters to examine how the English crown related with the papacy in light of some of these issues, particularly in terms of papal honours, censures, conclaves and promotions to the Sacred College, a few examples can be highlighted here. Firstly, following the initial blow to papal ‘independence’ engendered by the Battle of Marignano in September 1515, Wolsey’s request for a legatine commission was almost immediately rejected by Leo ‘from dread of France demanding the same’. 342 Similarly, at the Bologna meeting between Leo and Francis in December of that year, Francis levered one red hat from Leo and, while the pope claimed to have resisted pressure for a further three, the English probably deemed this a worrying omen. 343 While the papacy indicated to England during this time that it was still anti-French at heart, this trend continued and, during September 1516, de Giglis cited ‘the influence of the French’ and ‘the prosperity of France’ as causing difficulties in gaining amended briefs concerning the disputed see of Tournai and a legatine commission for Wolsey. 344 This difficulty evidently continued as, in early February 1517, de Giglis defended the pope’s recent actions in upholding the French claim to Tournai by outlining the political obstacles encountered due to French influence. The orator claimed that ‘divers times I have seen him [Leo] holding up his [hands] towards the heaven, saying those words, “O Almighty God, ut[inam] ille rex Angliae war somewhat nerer to us for to have this f[avor] and succor in our occurrents. Then the Holy Church would be in more….and surety under the protection, umbre and chadow, of the said m[ost] virtuous King”’. Once French

342 LPili, 966 (calendared end September 1515, [de Giglis to Wolsey]), 967 (calendared end September 1515, [de Giglis to Ammonius]).
343 Ibid., 1281 (14 December 1515, Leo to Wolsey, Bologna), 1282 (14 December 1515, Leo to Henry, Bologna), 1283 (14 December 1515, Leo to Wolsey, Bologna), 1284 (14 December 1515, de Castello to Wolsey, Bologna); L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, p.139.
344 LPili, 2394 (27 September 1516, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome).
fortunes changed, he continued, Leo would uphold Wolsey’s claim. Even in June 1517, de Giglis continued to report that his efforts to have Wolsey restored as administrator of Tournai would be unsuccessful until the pope was ‘safe from the French shears’. Finally, during April 1518, while Wolsey was informed that the pope had followed his advice in not elevating a ‘French’ nominee to the Sacred College, Leo had backed down because Francis could ‘kindle a fire’ at any time in the Papal States.

Before exploring how Henry VIII’s role as ‘defender’ of the papacy against France manifested itself during this time, it should be stressed that the king and his advisors envisaged a number of limitations to this role, in a military sense at least. In particular, they did not envisage a direct or unilateral defence of the papacy against France. They were pragmatic enough to recognise their limitations: distance and an inability to confront France alone. In the first place, England was too far from Italy to be directly involved in resisting French ambitions there. Around 25 June 1510, in response to Venetian pleas for assistance following their loss of Vicenza (to the emperor), Henry VIII and his ministers told the republic’s ambassador that they were reluctant to break the peace at this point; ‘we are at a distance; another year something will be done’. Similarly, announcing English adhesion to the Holy League in defence of the Church on 13 November 1511, Henry asserted that he did not bind ‘himself to bring an army into Italy, from

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345 LPIii, 2886 (8 February 1517, de Giglis to Henry, Rome). Also see, ibid., 2889 (calendared 8 February 1517, de Giglis to [Ammonius]), 2890 (calendared 8 February 1517, [extracts from de Giglis’ letters] to Ammonius).
346 Leo also feigned belief that the English were disinterested in this issue, on account of a lack of communication in the last three months; ibid., 3352 (12 June 1517, extracts from de Giglis’ letters, Rome). This sense of French pressure on the papacy would have been reinforced by Leo’s approach to Charles for support in his continued difficulties in Urbino; ibid., 3331 (1 June 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Ghent).
347 The nominee was the archbishop of Mainz, an Imperial elector whose vote Francis was trying to ‘win’; ibid., 4133 (calendared end April 1518, - to - ), 4356 (calendared end July 1518, letter of intelligence).
348 Ven.ii, 74 (LPli, 508; 25 June 1510; Badoer to the Signory).
its distance and by reason of other impediments, but being pledged to wage war in every other quarter where expedient’.349 Again, an article of the Anglo-Spanish treaty of 17 November 1511, to support the broader holy league against France, stated that ‘as it would be difficult for the King of England to send an army to Italy, he promises to succour the Church by making war upon the French from another side’. In this case, he and Ferdinand would harass France from their frontiers, particularly in Aquitaine.350 Secondly, England could not act alone as the Church’s defender against France. Indeed, England could not act alone in a military capacity on the Continent. As will be seen, the Italian wars meant that it could either cause diversions or could subsidise conflicts.351 Richard Fox indicated that England was not powerful enough to act unilaterally during May 1513 when, faced with launching an invasion with little support from England’s allies, he hoped that the French retained a presence in Italy, ‘for soo shall the Frenche poway<re / be devided, and the lesse shall it be vppon vs’.352 Henry VIII indicated a similar sentiment in instructions to Christopher Bainbridge of 29 January 1510. During negotiations to form a league against Louis XII, he stated that he was only prepared to join such a confederacy if the Empire and Spain did the same.353 This may well have been linked with his ministers imposing this condition on Henry before they backed his plan to attack France.354 Even at the end of this period, Henry and Wolsey demanded an alignment with Charles V in 1521, before they

349 This was read aloud to the Lateran Council during May 1512; ibid., 165-166 (LPi, 1204; 21 May 1512, letters received in Venice from Friar Angelo, Rome).
350 Sp.ii, 59-60 (LPII, 945; LPI, 1980; 17 November 1511).
352 P.S. and H.M. Allen, Letters of Richard Fox, 43 (LPII, 1899; LPI, 4094; 19 May 1513, Fox to Wolsey).
353 This was in reply to a papal request that he approach the Catholic King in this regard; LPII, 354 (LPI, 1457). Also see D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, pp.72-73.
would even consider an alliance with Rome.\textsuperscript{355} Equally, it does not seem as if foreign powers, including the papacy, expected England to act alone against France. When the Venetians appealed to Henry to ‘defend’ Christendom in September 1509, they urged him to effect a league with the Empire and them against France. Consequently, Venice envisaged English action in France and Imperial-Venetian manoeuvres in Italy.\textsuperscript{356} Again, in December 1509, Venice recommended that Henry VIII form a multi-state coalition against France, involving the Empire, Venice and Spain.\textsuperscript{357} Another apparent condition of English protection of the papacy was that it needed time to prepare for interventions on the continent. With the exception of his reaction to the Battle of Marignano, Henry VIII did not launch headlong into conflict on receipt of a papal call to arms.\textsuperscript{358} This was probably attributable to his inability to effect any direct moves in Italy, again on account of the distance, therefore necessitating provision for the peninsula in some sort of league. Time also gave the English chances to form such a coalition and to assess the commitment of its allies in following through with their pledges. Again, the apparent conditions placed on Henry VIII’s desire to invade France during 1509-1510 included the need for time to prepare. In response to Venetian pleas for aid, Fox reportedly replied in April 1510, ‘another year something will be done…Let this year glide by’.\textsuperscript{359} During 1518, Richard Fox also suggested that time was needed because of a general lack of forethought given to such actions: ‘Our manner is never to prepare for the war to our enemies be light at our doors’.\textsuperscript{360} Finally, Wolsey insisted that

\textsuperscript{355} LPIII, 1150 (calendared end January 1520, [Henry to Tunstal]), 1162 (calendared 11-12 February 1521, Tunstal to Henry).

\textsuperscript{356} Ven.ii, 12 (LPl, 169; 14 or 15 September 1509, Signory to Badoer).

\textsuperscript{357} Ibid., 24 (LPl, 278; 21 December 1509, Signory to Badoer).

\textsuperscript{358} In reaction to Marignano, the Imperial-Swiss expedition of early 1516 was enabled by the English contribution being solely financial. It did not involve any overt declaration against France and English intrigues were kept as secret as possible; see below pp.492-499.

\textsuperscript{359} Ven.ii, 64 (LPl, 430; 15 [April] 1510, Badoer to the Signory).

\textsuperscript{360} LPIII, 3952 (15 February 1518, Fox to Wolsey, St Cross).
the Treaty of Bruges at the end of this period stipulated that the English crown would not go to war until 1523. John Clerk, when instructed to divulge the conclusion of this agreement to the pope was directed to tell him that this was to gain time to prepare for the conflict.  

In spite of these military limitations, Henry VIII was well aware of his strengths in the military sphere to protect the papacy from France. The most readily available of the king’s options was a direct attack, which could range from a full-scale invasion, to involvement in indirect conflicts on the borders and even to the funding of enterprises against French interests in Italy. These were envisaged to be enough to disrupt the French king’s plans for Italy or even induce him to withdraw troops from the peninsula. To the same end, the English crown was also known to ‘sabre-rattle’. This idea that England could affect the French military presence in Italy was the corner-stone of the English crown’s temporal relations with the papacy for the period under study. That this was perceived as a genuine capability is supported by foreign commentators; generally speaking, a Venetian diplomat, writing around 1500, recorded that the English ‘have a very high reputation in arms; and from the great fear the French entertain of them, one must believe it to be justly acquired’. Furthermore, Henry VIII apparently did believe he had the ability to affect whether a French descent into Italy took place. In early July 1515, for instance, Henry reportedly stated, ‘my belief is, that if I choose, he [Francis] will not cross the Alps, and if I choose he will cross’.  

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361 LPIIIi, 1510 (25 August 1521, [Wolsey to Clerk], Bruges).
362 The writer then goes on to speculate that the actual reputation of the English in battle was not necessarily deserved; C.A. Sneyd (ed.), A Relation of the Island of England, p.23.
363 Wolsey allegedly anticipated these sentiments a few days earlier. Also, during May, Wolsey reportedly told three Venetian diplomats that ‘if England chose, she could thwart [Francis’] his projects [in Italy]’; Ven.ii, 619 (15 May 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the Venetian ambassadors in France, London); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i (1854), pp.100-106 (Ven.ii, 633; LPIIIi, 652; 3 July 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory, London). In this
throughout the period in the English crown’s approach to defending the papacy, there was a time, particularly from around 1517 on, when Henry VIII also developed peaceful means to the same end, namely reconciliation with Francis I with a view to restraining his Italian ambitions.

The most effective way in which the English crown could ‘defend’ the papacy, given its distance from Italy, was by a direct attack on France itself. Henry VIII reportedly declared this to be his intention from the moment of his accession and this strategy was developed in subsequent years up to the failed Anglo-Spanish enterprise into Aquitaine in 1512 and the actual invasion of 1513. In terms of English intentions, these were intended to help the pope recover Bologna and other territories by diversionary actions. While the 1512 invasion was unsuccessful as a military operation, it may well have been instrumental in contributing to the expulsion of the French from Italy following the Battle of Ravenna (11 April 1512). The inability of his forces to recover from their losses at the battle and follow-up what was actually their victory in the battle may have been partly due to Louis XII either diverting troops from Italy or failing to send reinforcements because of the Anglo-Spanish threat to Normandy.

English preparations for the Guienne expedition and the concurrent harrying of the Breton coast seem to have had a tangible effect on French troop numbers in Italy. In March 1512, Venetian sources reported that England had declared war on France and that, on account of the alarm that this had caused, the latter’s (presumably military) movements had been affected.

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365 Ven.ii, 149 (LPl, 1102; 17 March 1512, reports among the French in Lombardy, Verona).
Certainly the pope was reported to expect such a diversion in mid-April.\textsuperscript{366} Again, a Friar Angelo, reporting from Rome during May 1512, forwarded a ‘report that 100 French spears had recrossed the Alps to succour France, as the King of England had attacked her’.\textsuperscript{367} By 22 May 1512, Venice was reporting to its ambassador in Rome that ‘400 spears’ had been recalled from Italy by Louis XII to face the Anglo-Spanish threat.\textsuperscript{368} Furthermore, towards the end of the month, Henry VIII was said to be taking direct credit for the result at Ravenna: ‘had it not been for the apprehension of my power entertained by the King of France, he would at least have sent into Italy the 1,000 spears and 12,000 infantry who he keeps at Asti; and had they taken the field before the march of the Switzers, he would have been victorious.’\textsuperscript{369} This role was recognised by the Venetian doge in late August when, following the expulsion of French forces from the peninsula, he affirmed that ‘it is confessedly to his Majesty that she [Venice and Italy] is indebted for being in great measure freed from French oppression’.\textsuperscript{370} Furthermore, Henry may have gained further satisfaction from intelligence that his feint in northern France had also kept Louis XII in Blois ‘till he knows the determination of the English, whether they will carry the war into Normandy or Guienne’.\textsuperscript{371} In other words, he was not concentrating on Italy. By his actions, therefore, Henry VIII could legitimately claim to be working in defence of the papacy. Henry’s own belief in his ability to affect French troop movements merely by threatening to attack France was demonstrated.

\textsuperscript{366} LPI, 1141 (14 April 1512, Andrea da Borgo to Margaret of Savoy, Blois).
\textsuperscript{367} Ven.\textsuperscript{ii}, 165-166 (LPI, 1204; 21 May 1512, letters received in Venice from Friar Angelo, Rome).
\textsuperscript{368} Ibid., 164 (22 May 1512, Signory to its ambassador at the [papal court]).
\textsuperscript{369} Ibid., 174 (LPI, 1216; 27-29 May 1512, Lorenzo Pasqualigo to his brothers, London). For a definition of a ‘spear’ as a military unit, see P. Partner, \textit{The Papal State under Martin V}, pp.153-154.
\textsuperscript{370} Ven.\textsuperscript{ii}, 187 (26 August 1512, doge to Henry).
\textsuperscript{371} LPI, 1127 (LPI, 3112; 1 April 1512).
In spite of the Holy League having fulfilled its immediate aims in terms of protecting the papacy during 1512, Henry VIII continued to follow through with the full-scale invasion of 1513.372 This was enshrined in the Anglo-Spanish alliance ‘for the recovery of Aquitaine, the defence of the Pope and the Lateran Council’, which specified England’s contribution to be an expedition to northern France.373 While no full-scale engagement occurred between English and French forces during this campaign, it is notable that Louis XII did not attempt to act in Italy during that year. Also, the presence of French troops close to English operations suggests that Henry VIII had successfully diverted his focus north.374

England intended to continue the invasion during 1514, but by this time, Henry VIII could no longer legitimately claim that he was defending the papacy.375 On 17 October 1513, a treaty was concluded between England, the Empire and Spain, against France, which provided for a two-pronged invasion of France in the following year but, notably, the (defence of the) Church is not mentioned.376 Henry was experiencing sustained pressure from Leo X to come to terms with France at this time, thus removing formal justification for his aggression. While the English king was unable to cite the Italian issue as a reason for his continued belligerence, this does not mean that Henry did not envisage that his continued invasion had ceased to be in defence of the papacy, albeit a papacy that was mistakenly calling for peace.377 Furthermore, one could argue that Henry’s declared intention to continue this course kept Louis XII away from Italy during 1514.

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372 See below pp.415-419.
373 LPIi, 1657 (LPI, 4038; February 1513).
375 This was an argument that Ferdinand of Aragon employed, when seeking to gain English adhesion to the Franco-Spanish truce of 1514; Sp.ii, 170 (calendared April 1514, Ferdinand to Caroz).
376 Ibid., 138-139 (LPIii, 2377; LPI, 4511; 17 October 1513).
377 The withdrawal of the justification for Henry’s aggression against France was also reflected in Ferdinand of Aragon’s February 1514 truce with France, its stated purpose being ‘the defence of the Church, and to avoid the effusion of Christian blood’; LPI, 4818 (25 February 1514).
Indeed, this is supported by the fact that rumours of Louis’ intention to cross the Alps increased, particularly after the conclusion of the Anglo-French peace of August 1514 and, indeed, the French king then began to declare this intention to his English counterpart. While the 1513 campaign was the only full-scale invasion conducted by England during this period, others were planned. From 1515, for instance, Henry VIII planned to attack France in combination with other powers following an enterprise that expelled the French from Italy. Later, according to the Treaty of Bruges of 1521, Henry committed himself to invading France alongside Charles V, while Charles and Leo X would expel the French from Italy. Given that this agreement remained a secret (theoretically at least), it cannot be said to have had effect on the French removal from Milan in mid-November and Henry could not take any credit for affecting this.

In addition to full-scale invasions, England could act to defend Rome through smaller-scale expeditions on France’s coast or borders. Henry VIII appears to have recognised the validity of this strategy during June 1510 when, in response to Venetian pleas for assistance following their loss of Vicenza (to the emperor), he stated that he ‘would make a diversion willingly’, but was ‘averse to breaking the peace’ at that point. Two such minor military expeditions were launched by Henry VIII during 1511, as part of the build-up towards a full-scale invasion in support of the Church. Firstly, Lord Darcy led 1,000 archers to Spain during May-June 1511, to help Ferdinand crusade in North Africa. A secret agenda for this English force that would sail to northern Spain seems to have been suspected by the French orator in England and

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378 See below p.462.
379 LPii, 1095 (calendared end October 1515, instructions from Wolsey to Pace).
380 LPiii, 1508 (25 August 1521, Bruges), 1802 (24 November 1521, Calais).
381 Ibid., 1858 (12 December 1521, de Mesa to Charles, London).
382 Ven.ii, 74 (LPii, 508; 25 June 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London).
this may have been correct, as the French crown was later informed that the crusade had been abandoned and Ferdinand had diverted troops to Naples. The English contingent sailed home, however. Secondly Sir Edward Poynings commanded a similar sized force to help the emperor’s grandson in the Low Countries against the French-backed duke of Guelders. While this seems to have been an attempt to induce Maximilian’s support against France, the Venetians certainly interpreted it as a diversionary attack on France, intended to affect Louis XII’s forces in Italy. While the effect of these minor expeditions on the French focus on Italy is uncertain, it is feasible that they did draw some of Louis XII’s resources north, to the benefit of the papal cause.

Another strategy pursued by England to defend the papacy against French aggression in Italy was its funding of anti-French forces to cross the Alps. This was a feature of English foreign policy from 1515 onwards, coinciding with Wolsey’s ascent to sole prominence in Anglo-papal affairs. This option was prompted by approaches from the duke of Milan and the Swiss Cardinal Schiner following the defeat of anti-French forces at Marignano during September of this year and the despatch of Pace to organise this was immediate. English confidence would have been raised when, in advance of his arrival in the Cantons, Pace informed Wolsey of intelligence in October 1515 that Francis I was returning home, fearing a Swiss descent into

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384 LPIi, 727-728 (28 March 1511), 730 (LPI, 5741; calendared end March 1511, instructions to Lord Darcy), 731:12 (LPI, 1531; 8 March 1511), 731:41 (LPI, 1562; 28 March 1511), 734 (8 April 1511, d’Arizolles to Robertet London), 793 (14 June 1511, ‘Abbatis’ [Bonvisi] to Robertet, London); J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, p.28. Also see below pp.385-386.
385 LPIi, 804:35 (LPI, 1740; 22 June 1511), 809 (6 July 1511, Andrea da Borgo to Margaret of Savoy, Valence), 825 (Ven.ii, 116; 26 July 1511, Badoer to the Signory, London), 851 (Ven.ii, 117; 26 August 1511, Signory to Badoer), 872 (Ven.ii, 125; 27 September 1511, Badoer to the Signory). For the sense that this was a political gesture designed to buy Maximilian’s friendship against France, see ibid., 832 (calendared end July 1511, Margaret of Savoy to Maximilian), 884 (calendared end September 1511, Margaret of Savoy to Maximilian), 906 (LPIi, 1902; 17 October 1511, Margaret of Savoy to Henry, ‘Boisledeue’); J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp.27-28. Also see below pp.385-386.
386 See above pp.22-28.
387 LPIIIi, 1065 (calendared 24-25 October 1515, Pace to [Wolsey]). Also see below pp.482-484.
Italy. Furthermore, de Giglis reported from the Bologna meeting between Leo and Francis in December that the Pace mission caused the French to be ‘much in fear of England’, given the complaints that they were making. A few months later, as the Imperial-Swiss invasion was mobilising, the secretary reported that Francis I ‘fears England more than hell, as appears by his promising the pope recompence for “breaking his faith in soliciting the Scotch against us”’. A few days later, he reported hearing that Francis had left Italy on hearing of this expedition and intended to detach from Venice and come to terms with the pope. While Francis is known to have left Milan for France on 8 January 1516, it is not known if the impending invasion affected this. In terms of winning over the papacy, it seems that the expedition nearly persuaded Leo to publicly side with the anti-French powers, but the emperor’s sudden withdrawal from Milan in March effectively ended that prospect. During 1516 and 1517, the English crown continued to envisage papal assistance in the recruitment of the Swiss for the relaunch of the operation to expel the French from Italy and, indeed, their services were envisaged to be central to the ‘league for defence of the Church’ concluded in late October 1516. This coalition never gained the appropriate commitment from any of the other parties for it to have been put into practice and for the Swiss to have been retained. The only other (if immeasurable) effect that these attempts to recruit the Swiss had on England’s bid to protect the pope was financial: from the moment that

388 LPIII, 1067 (25 October 1515, Pace to [Wolsey], Antwerp).
389 Ibid., 1281 (14 December 1515, [de Giglis] to Ammonius, Bologna).
390 Ibid., 1470 (1 February 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Constance).
391 Ibid., 1489 (5 February 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Constance).
393 See below pp.528 ff.
394 LPIII, 2082 (23 June 1516, [Wolsey] to Pace), 2420 (4 October 1516, [de Giglis] to [Wolsey], Rome), 2486 (29 October 1516). For the continued work of Pace with the nuncios in the Swiss Confederation, see below p.211.
395 See below pp.536-542, 561-563. While papal adhesion was given, it did not represent Leo’s full commitment; see pp.552-553, 568-569. Charles’ joining the Treaty of Noyon put paid to this; LPIII, 2350 (9 September 1516, [Pace] to Wolsey, [Zurich]). In spite of such negotiations carrying on, particularly through Pace, up to October 1517, nothing tangible occurred; see below pp.533-534.
Pace reached the Cantons, he reported Francis I laying out great sums of money in counter-offers to retain their services. Whether this affected England’s role vis-à-vis the papacy, however, is unclear.

Given that English attacks on France and French interests were expensive and time consuming, part of England’s ‘defence’ of the papacy also lay in the latent threat to France. This was recognised as a means to stop or prevent French interference in the peninsula. In benefiting papal security, this can be seen from the start of Henry VIII’s reign beginning with his vocal belligerence towards Louis XII. Even though it later becomes apparent that England was unable to act before 1511, the French king’s uncertainty about the Englishman’s intentions apparently caused him to remain out of Italy (and in the north of France), at least until a peace agreement was arranged with England. This would benefit the papacy by reducing the military opposition, if it was at war with France, or by ensuring a weaker French presence in Italy overall, that may enable greater freedom of (political) movement for the pontiff. That the English were understood to be capable of this was indicated in summer 1509, when a Venetian source in Rome wrote of a rumour that an Anglo-Scottish offensive against France had caused Louis XII to return across the Alps. Also, in December of the same year, a Venetian orator reported intelligence from Flanders that, while Louis XII was mustering a force to cross the Alps, he was also ‘sending troops into Normandy from fear of the English’. The implication was that this was benefiting Italy. Furthermore, in January 1510, Venice believed that Louis XII’s contribution to the League

396 See pp.533-534.
397 See below pp.362-363.
398 LPIi, 325 (LPI, 922; calendared February 1510, abstract of Spinelly’s letters); Ven.ii, 52 (LPIi, 365, 385; 14 February 1510, Badoer to the Signory). Also see pp.379-380.
399 LPIi, 147 (22 August 1509, Paulo Capello to Philip Capello, Rome).
400 Ven.ii, 1342 (9 December 1509, Hieronimo Count of ‘Porcil’ to Zuan Badoer, Rome).
of Cambrai could be ended by calling on ‘the King of England to make a demonstration and military preparations in those parts’. Even the French themselves appear to have recognised this English strategic intention. Imperial representatives in France reported to Margaret of Savoy, on 14 January 1510, that Henry ‘makes a show of arming so as to draw off some of the French forces now against the Venetians’.

Similarly, Wolsey apparently employed this strategy in response to news of French (and Venetian) progress in Italy during September 1515. In condemning contemporaneous French actions to stir up Scotland, he complained that, by Henry’s observance of the Anglo-French peace, he was ‘losing so great an opportunity for invading France, whilst the King is in Italy with the princes and military, there remaining in his own realms but women and property; whereas, ships being in readiness, in eight days, he [Henry VIII] could have sent an infinite number of troops across, to conquer and lay waste as far as their march might extend; and he said, “Believe me, sir ambassadors! this most serene King, and the kingdom, will not brook such an outrage”’. Wolsey issued a similar threat a few months later, when the French were worried about the English reaction to the Battle of Marignano (also during September 1515). On 6 November 1515, the French ambassador in England reported that ‘Henry was making a show of warlike preparations to please his subjects, who wished him in reality to make war on Francis in his absence, but that he was desirous of peace’. In a bid to discover England’s real intentions, he then exhibited a missive from Francis, claiming that, if he ‘had not left his frontier well guarded it was because he never thought that Henry would make war on him in his absence, considering the

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401 Ibid., 33 (LPIi, 330; 12 January 1510, Signory to Badoer).
402 LPIi, 333 (14 January 1510, Rogendorf and Andrea da Borgo to Margaret of Savoy).
403 R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, p.131 (Ven.ii, 651; LPIii, 948; 26 September 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory, London).
treaty of peace and friendship between them’. Wolsey swore that ‘neither the King, his Council, nor himself had ever thought of such a thing; and that the ships and the great galley were only built to please his Queen and his sister Mary, and that they and the Council had dined there on Thursday last. They were not built to make war on either France or Scotland, but merely to be in readiness for anything that might happen; still, if the Duke of Albany did not abstain from and make reparation for his injuries to Margaret and her children, Henry would make him do so’. Wolsey was, therefore, extremely politic in his answer; he denied intending to threaten France, but made it clear that such threats could easily materialise. The French orator, moreover, added his own opinion ‘that if Francis had been unfortunate in Italy, Henry would have invaded France’.\(^{404}\) It is unlikely, however, that this threat had any effect on the French threat to the papacy, as the pope had already submitted to Francis and would shortly meet him in Bologna.\(^{405}\)

A final instance of the purported effect of England’s latent threat to France affecting Italy came in June 1516: when the English crown began to publicly declare its opposition to the French presence there, Sir Robert Wingfield reported hearing that news of this had reached Francis I’s army in the peninsula and may have caused its recall.\(^{406}\)

In addition to the belligerent strategies pursued to prevent French dominance of the papacy, the English crown also had more peaceful methods at its disposal, particularly by attempting to tie French kings down in peace agreements that precluded this possibility and by distracting them from any planned enterprise to the peninsula. While these did appear sporadically and to a lesser extent in the first half of this period, they increasingly featured in the

\(^{404}\) L\(\textit{PIIi}\), 1113 (6 November 1515, de Bapaume to Louise of Savoy, London).  
\(^{405}\) See below p.489.  
\(^{406}\) L\(\textit{PIIi}\), 2026 (10 June 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to Henry, [Trent]).
second half, as Henry and Wolsey realised that the papacy was too frightened of France to commit definitively to an anti-Gallic course. This perceived weakness of a ‘French’ papacy caused the English crown to adopt a wholesale ‘reconciliation’ policy with France from 1517 on, largely to the exclusion of Rome, underlying which was a concern for the ‘defence’ of the papacy from French political influence. This ‘reconciliation’ ploy persisted in public from 1520 onwards while, in private, Henry VIII turned back towards belligerent solutions, again without involving the papacy until the last possible moment.

Up to 1515, English attempts to protect Rome via reconciliation with France were only occasional and ultimately unsuccessful. Indeed, Henry and his ministers may not have been aware of their position of strength in this regard during 1509-1510, as uncertainty about Henry VIII’s anti-French rhetoric may have caused Louis XII to abandon any personal intervention in Italy. The subsequent renewal of the Treaty of Etaples in March 1510, however, gave the French king free rein to act (albeit he did not return to Italy in person).\footnote{LPIi, 325 (LPI, 922; calendared February 1510, abstract of Spinelly’s letters), 408; 24 March 1510, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory); Ven.ii, 52 (LPIi, 385; 23 February 1510, Badoer to the Signory); also see pp.65, 374-375. Later in 1510, Louis went to Lyon, where he was rumoured to be preparing to go to Italy, but this did not materialise. He did, however, send a force to support Ferrara against papal and Spanish armies in September 1510 and continued to conduct military operations against these powers subsequently; F.J. Baumgartner, \textit{Louis XII} (1996), pp.211, 213-215.} Similarly, following the Anglo-French peace of August 1514, there were a number of efforts to keep Louis out of Italy and away from the papacy. These included an attempt to ‘distract’ him by proposing an Anglo-French attack on Navarre, as well as a personal meeting with Henry. These were bound for failure, however, on account of an inherent problem with the peace agreement. England’s failure to have the strategic ‘bulwark’ of Milan included in the treaty, despite its best efforts, opened the way for Louis XII to revive his Italian ambitions without fearing an attack from the north and the French
king would not be distracted from this course. The course continued with the accession of Francis I from January 1515. Francis was intent on crossing the Alps and managed to renew the Anglo-French peace, still excluding Milan, in April. In spite of this, Henry VIII still attempted to sideline his French counterpart with the offer of a meeting, but to no avail.

Following Francis I’s decisive success during 1515, particularly his conquest of Milan, the English crown found it difficult to obtain any open papal commitment to the anti-French agenda and was frequently uncertain whether Leo X actually shared this sentiment at all, given various reports of negotiations and agreements with France. Perhaps the final straw for England’s decision to no longer rely on papal support in the protection policy was its failure to gain papal adhesion to the league ‘in defence of the Church’ because of Leo X’s fear of France. The treaty, originally concluded on 29 October 1516 was not fully and publicly confirmed by Rome. Henry VIII eventually levered papal membership in return for a loan to help Leo pay for the Urbino war with Francesco Maria della Rovere. While this was sworn to in London by 5 July 1517, papal adhesion was still left wanting. Leo did ratify in August, but did not release this bull to de Giglis until mid-November and stipulated that it remain private. By this point, however, the English crown had already been engaged in peace negotiations with France for some months and was increasingly resolved in this direction.

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408 See below pp.462-463.
409 See below pp.464-466.
410 See below pp.499-508.
411 LPIii, 2486 (29 October 1516).
412 Ven.ii, 954 (18 August 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory).
413 R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.95-103 (Ven.ii, 920; LPIii, 3455; 10 July 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London).
415 See below pp.596 ff.
The first stage of this reconciliation and distraction policy towards France was the negotiation of a treaty of universal peace on 2 October 1518 which, as already described, both excluded the papacy for the most part (until the last moment) and intended to keep Francis I out of Italy.\(^{416}\) In the months following this, Henry and Wolsey attempted to further this policy by seeking to arrange the personal meeting with Francis that was stipulated in the agreement.\(^{417}\)

The progress of this strategy with little papal involvement was interrupted by the death of Maximilian in 1519, at which point Henry VIII sought to protect the papacy from France by preventing Francis from being elected emperor. While this was consistent with the reconciliation strategy, insomuch that Francis was given the impression that Henry supported his candidacy, the English king tentatively approached the pope to oppose this prospect during March. Wolsey advised that, as Francis ‘is straining every nerve, by art or cunning, to obtain the election and succeed in his unbridled desires, England thinks it expedient that every obstacle should be thrown in his way; for if he were successful he would revive many obsolete pretensions, and endanger the independence of the Holy See’.\(^{418}\) By becoming emperor, Francis would enter into territorial rights and claims in Italy that would make his dominance over the papacy both more likely and potentially more complete. During the election campaign, while English opposition to the French king was paramount, the pope envisaged Francis as the lesser of two evils (compared to Charles) but, at length, they reached a consensus that they would align to back a third party. As the English crown understood, this third party was to be Henry himself, if possible, and Richard Pace

\(^{416}\) See above pp.106-109.  
\(^{417}\) LPIIIi, 4483 (8 October 1518).  
\(^{418}\) While Wolsey further argued that he was not in favour of Charles becoming an ‘overgrown power’, he considered that he would be ‘the less evil’; LPIIIi, 137 (25 March 1519, Wolsey to de Giglis, London).
was despatched to Germany to facilitate this. When there, however, Pace was unable to align with the papal representatives, who worked against Charles’ candidacy and towards Francis’, until they switched to support Charles at the very last moment.

The nature of this reconciliation and distraction policy towards France altered after the Imperial election on account of the vast increase in power of Charles V, as well as his declared intention to be crowned in Italy, both of which Francis I opposed. Henry VIII and Wolsey increasingly became arbiters between the two and this was reflected in how they continued to pursue the underlying anti-French agenda by keeping Francis away from the peninsula. For this purpose, both princes were discouraged from Italian expeditions and personal meetings with them were also fostered. Again, the pope was not party to negotiations and complained about not being informed. This was perhaps emphasised when Leo sought Henry’s approval to send a nuncio to the summits as late as mid-March. On 4 May, Henry and Wolsey replied to papal complaints of the previous month and assured Leo that nothing would be negotiated ‘to the prejudice of the Church’. As the meetings were imminent, however, the pope just had to take their word for it. In the subsequent meetings, the English continued to publicly display their ‘neutrality’, although they began to concur with Charles towards an anti-French alignment, negotiations for which began afterwards. However, Francis I immediately declared his

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419 Ibid., 137 (25 March 1519, Wolsey to de Giglis, London), 149 (29 March 1519, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome). For the pope’s opinions, see ibid., 149 (29 March 1519, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome).
420 See below pp.655-669.
421 This also involved discouraging Charles from making the same journey; see below pp.673-677.
422 See below pp.673-677.
423 LPIII, 614 (1 February 1520, [Campeggio] to [Wolsey], Rome), 648 (3 March 1520, Campeggio to Wolsey), 649 (3 March 1520, Campeggio to [Wolsey]), 680 (14 March 1520, [de Giglis] to Wolsey, Rome); Ven.iii, 26 (12 March 1520, Minio to the Signory, Rome).
424 LPIII, 844 (27 May 1520, Campeggio to Henry, Rome), 845 (28 May 1520, Campeggio and de Giglis to [Wolsey], Rome), 846 (28 May 1520, de Giglis to Henry, Rome), 847 (28 May 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome).
425 See below pp.687-692.
intention to return to Italy, prompting sustained English correspondence and embassies in a bid to prevent this.426

As both Henry VIII and Francis I gradually turned away from their rapprochement, the former attempted to negotiate with Charles towards an anti-French alliance. The English king explicitly demanded that the papacy be excluded at present from the strategy being developed for its own protection. He was adamant that he would not agree to any defensive league with Rome before the Anglo-Imperial axis was in place. The reasons for this seem to be that they were not yet sure of the pope and that, in any case, he was ‘so brittle, and variable’.427 In other words, Henry did not trust Leo X to support them in their bid to defend him. Consequently, the pope remained excluded from the next stage of the English policy purporting to advocate ‘reconciliation’, while really seeking to restrain France: the peace conference at Calais.428 The English only began to disclose their real intentions when reports began arriving of the pontiff’s open publication of his alliance with the emperor.429 Just before the beginning of the conference, at the end of July 1521, Wolsey took Ghinucci into his confidence.430 Wolsey then notified the pope of the Treaty of Bruges on the day of its conclusion (25 August) and swore him to secrecy.

426 For example, L.PIIIi, 893 (calendared 1 July 1520, [Richard Wingfield to Henry], Abbeville).
427 English objections also seem to have been based around the Imperial insistence of a marriage dispensation for the prospective match between Charles and Mary. Henry feared being beholden to the papacy for such a grace, which the French might be able to obstruct; ibid., 1149 (calendared end January 1521, [Henry to Tunstal]), 1150 (calendared end January 1521, [Henry to Tunstal]), 1162 (calendared 11-12 February 1521, Tunstal to Henry), 1214 (calendared end March 1521, Wolsey to Tunstal, Hampton Court).
428 See below pp.731-734.
429 R.J. Knecht, Francis I, p.107; L.Pastor, History of the Popes, viii, pp.35-36, 42-43; L.PIIIi, 1402 (9 July 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome), 1403 (9 July 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome).
430 L.PIIIi, 1486 (12 August 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome). According to Contarini, the Venetian ambassador with Charles, his papal counterpart in Ghent was fully briefed by Ghinucci in England, the latter ‘who takes part in all the present consultations and is acquainted with everything’. Caraccioio also understood that negotiations were afoot for an Anglo-Imperial marriage alliance, although it is unclear whether he received this intelligence from Ghinucci. This nuncio also revealed the papacy’s hope that the peace conference would fail and that Henry would subsequently ally with the papacy; Ven.iii, 274 (29 July 1521, Contarini to the Signory, Ghent).
The price of English support, however, was to be an honorary title, ‘fidei defensor’. Back in Calais, an extended Treaty of Bruges was then negotiated, which was concluded on 24 November, finally marking a return to full engagement with Rome on its security against France.

LPIIIii, 1510 (25 August 1521, [Wolsey to Clerk], Bruges). Also see ibid., 1502 (24 August 1521, Wolsey to [Henry]), 1519 (29 August 1521, Pace to [Wolsey], Guildford). The timing of this was evidently stage-managed by Wolsey, as he had reminded Henry to sign and send him the relevant letters to the pope concerning the book shortly before he crossed for Calais; ibid., 1449 (calendared end July 1521, Wolsey to Henry).

The English also expected Leo X to lay France under interdict and further named Cardinal de’ Medici to be protected under the treaty’s terms. Ghinucci concluded on Leo’s behalf; ibid., 1796 (22 November 1521), 1802 (24 November 1521, Calais); P. Gwyn, ‘Wolsey’s Foreign Policy’, HJ, 24 (1980), p.769. Sicca also believed that this revised treaty provided for Wolsey to be the joint Anglo-Imperial candidate for the next conclave, with de’ Medici to be second choice, although nothing has been found to support this; C.M. Sicca, ‘Consumption and Trade of Art between Italy and England in the First Half of the Sixteenth Century: the London House of the Bardi and Cavalcanti Company’, Renaissance Studies, 16 (2002), p.173.
HONORARY PAPAL AWARDS AS INCENTIVES AND REWARDS FOR HENRY VIII’S ‘DEFENCE’ OF ROME FROM FRANCE

Given that Henry VIII clearly wished to act to protect the papacy’s political ‘independence’ against French interests (albeit to his own ends), it is natural that he sought recognition from Rome of his performing this role. One way to achieve this was by recourse to the ‘armoury’ of honorary awards in the latter’s gift that were invariably bestowed upon princes for political reasons. These could be awarded in recognition for political ‘services’ rendered or in anticipation of that yet to be given. Some were issued without being requested from Rome as a form of recognition of ‘loyalty’ to the Church. Others were actively sought by secular princes, particularly in a bid to gain a public display of papal support in the political sphere. These awards can broadly be divided into three categories. Firstly, there were annual gifts, such as the golden rose and the blessed sword and hat, bestowed on secular leaders, usually as some sort of political gesture from the papacy. While not worth much in material terms, intended principally as spiritual honours, they had a subsidiary benefit insomuch that they bestowed papal favour upon the recipient. Each of these honours was accorded to Henry VIII during this period, both linked to the recognition of his role as a protector of the papacy against France. The English king had good reason to expect to receive them, as he would have at least seen the sword and hat awarded to his

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1 Such awards comprised just one dimension of the concessions that the English crown sought from Rome to ‘buy’ its political backing (against France) and that the papacy offered as inducements to the same end. At a politically opportune moment, the king and his ministers might seek a number of grants from Rome in order to guarantee English support (usually for war). In addition to the papal honours focused on in this section, the crown might also seek other favours and concessions.

father and perhaps witnessed their reception in 1505. Secondly popes, as universal ordinaries, claimed the authority to entitle leaders to and depose them from territorial states. Again, the invocation of such ‘power’ was invariably linked to the papacy’s political interests although, as one might expect, it was rarely invoked given the difficulty of enforcement. Nevertheless, such a papal award featured once in the Anglo-papal relationship during this time and, again, was linked to Henry VIII’s political defence of papal interests against the king of France. Finally, the papacy was also able to bestow honorary titles that recognised rulers’ loyalty and devotion to the Church to the same political ends. These already existed for the Holy Roman Emperor, kings of France, as well as, more recently, kings of Spain and possibly Scotland. The Swiss also gained such a label during this period. It should be unsurprising, therefore, that Henry VIII sought similar papal recognition for most of this period, culminating in his recognition as ‘fidei defensor’ in 1521. While this award was bestowed in response to the English king’s written defence of Rome against Luther’s On the Babylonian Captivity of the Church (1520), it will be seen that Henry had sought this in connection with his physical defence of Rome against the French and this title was also intended, in part, to recognise this.

Firstly, tackling the political significance to the English crown of those ‘spiritual’ honours awarded annually by the papacy, Henry VIII does not appear to have actively sought these, but was an enthusiastic recipient nonetheless, particularly as they either sought or acknowledged his

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3 Henry VII received the sword and hat in 1488, 1496 and 1505. Henry VII was also awarded with blessed candles by Julius II in February 1508 which, given the date, may well have been awarded in connection with the pope’s desire to assemble a coalition against Venice. Among other English kings to receive the sword and hat was Edward IV; C.H. Burns, ‘Papal Gifts and Honours for the Earlier Tudors’, MHP, 50, pp.177-185; J. Wickham Legg, ‘The Gift of the Papal Cap and Sword to Henry VII’, Archaeological Journal, 57 (1900), pp.185-193, 196-197.
4 For the longstanding papal claim to such authority, see W. Ullmann, The Growth of the Papal Government in the Middle Ages, pp.283, 301-303, 450.
political role in defending Rome from the French crown. The papacy, on the other hand, under both Julius II and Leo X, deployed such inducements to ‘persuade’ the English crown to follow its favoured political course vis-à-vis France.

Golden Rose, 1510

The Golden Rose was a gift of papal favour awarded annually on the fourth Sunday of Lent to heads of state, among others, but had not been bestowed on an English king since Henry VI in 1444. In material form, it was ‘a spray of roses made of gold and embellished with diamonds and sapphires’. In Henry VIII’s case, the pope blessed the rose on 24 March 1510, but did not bestow it publicly on the English king through Christopher Bainbridge until 1 April. The political context of this award was blatant. The papacy at this time sought English participation in a notional league against France; Julius II had recently reconciled himself with Venice (the target of the League of Cambrai), under pressure from England, with a view to assuming an anti-Gallic course. While there were various indicators that the English crown still desired an offensive against Louis XII (including the presence of Christopher Bainbridge), the pontiff had been aware, since January 1510, that Henry was entertaining French peace overtures; this caused much uncertainty in Rome. By early March, the increasing likelihood of an Anglo-French accord

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7 Henry VIII received the rose again in 1524, although this falls outside the remit of this study; C.H. Burns, ‘Papal Gifts and Honours for the Earlier Tudors’, MHP, 50, pp.186-187.
8 See below pp.365-380. A number of historians broadly agree that this gift was politically motivated and Mitchell, in particular, links this to papal gifts of wines and cheeses to England in 1511 to the same end, carried on a papal galley. Guicciardini stresses that the visit of a papal ship to England was incredibly unusual; LPIi, 842 (7 August 1511, Venetian ambassador in Rome to Signory); S. Alexander (ed.), The History of Italy by Francesco Guicciardini, p.243; M. Mitchell, ‘Works of Art from Rome for Henry VIII’ JWC, 34, p.179; L. Wooding, Henry VIII (2009), p.68.
caused Julius II and Bainbridge to discuss the forestalling of this agreement and, by the 12th, it was decided that Christopher Fisher (hitherto, English ‘solicitor’ in Rome) be sent to England post-haste to this end, carrying a secret brief which presumably urged Henry VIII to break off the peace talks. The sensitive nature of its contents was later indicated by Bainbridge, who divulged to his Venetian counterpart that he would conceal it in the cover of a book, so that the French would not discover it. The mission seems to have been delayed around 15 March, however, at the pope’s behest, as he had the idea of masking the real intention of the mission by awarding the Golden Rose to Henry VIII at Easter. This plan seems to have been finalised by the 22nd and the gift was blessed two days later. The Golden Rose was then awarded to Bainbridge for Fisher to depart with it (and the brief) on 8 April.

The mission was doomed to failure, however, as an Anglo-French compact was concluded on 23 March 1510. Julius II apparently discovered this within a week of Fisher’s departure by letters from his sub-collector in England, Peter Griphus, as well as from French correspondence. In response to the awkward diplomatic situation, Bainbridge went hunting because, according to the Venetian ambassador, ‘he was ashamed’, although it is more likely that he found it expedient to keep a low profile. When he did finally go in person to the pope to deny any knowledge of the treaty (by 12 April), Julius II angrily replied ‘You are all rascals’. This

9 Ven. ii, 52 (LPlii, 408; 24 March 1510, Donato to the Signory, Rome); LPlii, 413 (30 March 1510, Donato to the Signory, Rome).
10 Ven. ii, 49 (LPli, 402; 17 March 1510, doge and senate to Donato), 52 (LPli, 407; 23 March 1510, doge and senate to Donato), 53 (LPli, 413; Donato to the Signory, 30 March 1510), 54 (LPli, 417, 3 April 1510, Donato to the Signory, Rome); LPli, 418 (LPi, 976; 5 April 1510, Julius to Warham, Rome), 426 (LPi, 982; 9 April 1510, Cardinal Riario to Henry, Rome), 427 (983; 9 April 1510, Cardinal Isvalie to Henry, Rome); C.H. Burns, ‘Papal Gifts and Honours for the Earlier Tudors’, MHP, 50, pp.186-187; D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, pp.29-31.
11 LPli 406 (LPi, 962-963, 974; Sp.ii, 36; 23 March 1510).
12 Ven.ii, 56 (LPli, 432; 8, 10, 11, 12 April 1510, letters from Rome to the Venetian Signory), 58 (LPli, 432; 15 April 1510, Donato to the Signory, Rome).
13 The ambassador received letters from England on 12 April which, he asserted, contained no notification of this event, although it would be surprising if this correspondence had contained such intelligence. Bainbridge may have
anger probably stemmed from the realisation that any Anglo-French treaty ruled out any hostilities between Henry VIII and Louis XII for the present campaigning season, at least until 1511, thus allowing the French monarch to concentrate solely on Italy.\textsuperscript{14} Publicly, Bainbridge did not celebrate the treaty as his French counterparts did. To mark its conclusion, the French are reported to have invited Bainbridge to celebrate a Mass, but the archbishop reportedly refused even to attend. However, perhaps in begrudging recognition of the agreement, the English envoy mirrored his French counterparts by having bonfires burnt in front of his residence and making wine available to passers-by.\textsuperscript{15} In subsequent days and weeks, Julius II became increasingly reassured that, despite the negative implications of the treaty, it amounted to nothing more than a re-confirmation of Henry VII’s 1492 agreement with the French (which was part of a broader renewal of his father’s accords with England’s neighbours) and that Henry VIII remained committed to the anti-French cause in the longer term.\textsuperscript{16}

While the Fisher mission, carrying the golden rose, had become futile in its aim to prevent the Anglo-French agreement, there was no apparent attempt to recall it. The pope probably shared the Venetians’ initial reaction that, in spite of the setback, ‘it cannot be but advantageous, as it will at least serve to give umbrage to the King of France’.\textsuperscript{17} Indeed, in subsequent months, the pope applied further diplomatic pressure to induce an English declaration against the

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had some forewarning of an Anglo-French accord, as on 23 March he intimated to a Venetian representative that there would be no conflict between Henry and Louis that year; \textit{LPi} 354 (\textit{LPi} 1457; 29 January 1510, [Henry to Bainbridge]); \textit{Ven. ii} 56 (\textit{LPi}, 432; 8, 10, 11, 12 April 1510, letters from Rome to Venice); D.S. Chambers, \textit{Cardinal Bainbridge}, pp.72-73. For the Venetian orator writing of the Anglo-French rapprochement, see \textit{Ven.ii}, 59 (\textit{LPi}, 421; 6 April 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London), 61 (\textit{LPi}, 413; 30 March 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London).
\textsuperscript{14} The suggestion that England would be prepared to act against France in 1511 was made, not for the first time, in a report by the Venetian ambassador in late May 1510; \textit{Ven.ii}, 64 (\textit{LPi}, 430; 15 [April] 1510, Badoer to the Signory).
\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Ven.ii}, 57 (\textit{LPi}, 432; 12 April 1510, Hieronimo da Porzil to Zuan Badoer, Rome), 58 (\textit{LPi}, 432; 15 April 1510, Donato to the Signory, Rome).
\textsuperscript{16} See below pp.380-383.
\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Ven.ii}, 60 (\textit{LPi}, 433; 19 April 1510, doge and senate to Donato).
French. Fisher eventually arrived in England and presented the rose to Henry VIII by 8 June. That it took him two months to get there suggests that the originally hasty nature of his commission might have been revoked. It is also curious that there seems to be no record of any celebratory Mass to bestow the gift on the king, in spite of papal instructions to Archbishop Warham to hold such a ceremony. Nor does there appear to be any other record of the formal receipt of this papal gift in England, or evidence that Henry VIII thanked the pope for it. Nevertheless, it is difficult to argue that the pope did not seek to reward the English king with this honour in a bid to induce his ‘defence’ of the papacy against France.

Blessed Sword and Hat, 1513-1514

The cap and sword (also known as the cap and sword of maintenance or the blessed sword and hat) was another honorary gift bestowed annually by the papacy on a favoured prince. They were blessed by the pope in his chapel on Christmas Day and later sent to their recipients. The sword seems to have been intended to recognise actions in defence of the Church, while the cap symbolised obedience, presumably to the Holy See. By Henry VIII’s time, this tradition was

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18 For diplomatic pressure applied through direct letters, through Bainbridge and via an embassy sent to England during June-July 1510, see below pp.384-386.
19 Ven.ii, 73 (8 June 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London).
20 LPi, 418 (LPI, 976; 5 April 1510, Julius to Warham, Rome). Contemporaries such as Hall and Vergil fail to mention the award, despite the former citing Henry’s later gaining the blessed cap and sword; D. Hay (ed.), Anglica Historia; C. Whibley (ed.), Henry VIII by Edward Hall, i, p.121.
21 The ceremony for the 1524 award of the rose by Clement VII is also not mentioned in sources, although this time there is evidence that Henry thanked the pope; C.H. Burns, ‘Papal Gifts and Honours for the Earlier Tudors’, MHP, 50, pp.187, 193-194.
22 J. Wickham Legg, ‘The Gift of the Papal Cap and Sword to Henry VII’, Archaeological Journal, 57, pp.193-195. Wickham Legg traces the sword as a papal gift back to the eighth century, when Paul I (757-767) sent such an award to Pepin III (751-767), while Mitchell demonstrates the origins of the sword as a symbol of protection in Imperial elections and the cap as an indicator of obedience; M. Mitchell, ‘Works of Art from Rome for Henry VIII’, JWC, 34,
well-established and Henry VII had been the beneficiary of such gifts on three occasions, 1488, 1496 and 1505. Stow records the latter to have been recognition that he was a ‘defender of the Church’. Given this regularity, Henry VIII may therefore have been optimistic that he would become a recipient at some point, if he supported Rome in some aspect of foreign policy. Indeed, the fact that James IV received it in 1507 for political reasons, in anticipation of the Scot’s desired support against France (possibly along with an honorary title), may have spurred him further. Again, these were an indication of political favour from the papacy and, in Henry VIII’s case were was intended as a form of inducement to comply with the pontiff’s political wishes.

Henry VIII was the beneficiary of the cap and sword during 1513-1514. The pope blessed them on 24 December 1513 and they were presented to de Giglis on 7 January 1514, in front of cardinals, ambassadors and others. Unusually, it was claimed, the cap and sword were then carried in procession to de Giglis’ house. Leonard Spinelly (brother to the longstanding Florentine diplomat in English service, Thomas) was employed to convey the gifts to England, which he reached during May. Leo X was explicit in explaining the reason for these awards to Henry VIII in a brief of 1 March, which recognised his role as ‘propugnator adversus inimicos fidei’ and in protecting the Church (against France). This would have pushed all the right buttons

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23 See above n.3; J. Stow, Annales (1632), p.484.
24 Julius II sought to detach James IV from his alliance with Louis XII and induce him to support the expulsion of the French from Italy; A.J.S. Brook, ‘Notice of the Sword-Belt of the Sword of State of Scotland’ Proceedings of the Society of Antiquaries of Scotland, 28 (1894), p.280; also see above p.39.
25 The English orator took credit for the honours being awarded to Henry; LPlii, 2527 (Ven.ii, 361; Vetor Lipomano to the Signory, 27 December 1513, Rome), 2530 (LPI, 4621; 31 December 1513, de Giglis to Henry, Rome).
26 The pope did not issue a letter of credence for Spinelly until 20 February and only despatched him on 1 March; ibid., 2644 (20 February 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome); Fiddes, c.11-12 (LPlii, lli 2688; LPI, 4835; 1 March 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome).
in England, given the king’s perception of himself as fulfilling this responsibility up to this point (and beyond). The brief further hoped that Henry would now turn his arms against the Ottomans, for which peace with Louis XII would need to be concluded.\textsuperscript{27} This indicates the papacy’s real reason for its recognition of the English king as a ‘protector’.

Underlying this gift was sustained papal pressure to come to terms with France. Official papal support of the 1513 campaign notwithstanding, Leo X had been seeking to bring about peace with France, albeit unsuccessfully, since his election in March 1513.\textsuperscript{28} The pope’s decision to offer some sort of inducement to Henry to draw him into peace negotiations may have derived from the king’s warning, around 9 November 1513, that Leo ought not to come to terms with Louis XII on the back of English victories, arguing that a premature peace may cause even more war. Apparently in response to this and most contemporaneous to the awarding of the cap and sword to Henry, Leo had replied around mid-December, hoping that the king would now respond to his peace overtures, given that his ‘holy purpose’ (the recovery of papal territories) had been achieved.\textsuperscript{29} This was surely a hint at papal recognition of Henry VIII’s ‘defensive’ role \textit{vis-à-vis} the Church. Furthermore, by recognising Henry VIII as a ‘protector’ of the Church, the pope implied that the king had been supported in his war against France on this basis but, now that the papacy no longer needed to be ‘defended’, the king ought to heed Leo’s peace overtures. Can one also interpret an implicit threat in these honours? The impetus for the cap and sword may have been inspired by Henry VIII himself who, when he wrote from Tournai on 28 September to reiterate his congratulations to Leo on his election, also voiced his support for the pontiff’s

\textsuperscript{27} C. Burns, ‘Papal Gifts and Honours for the Earlier Tudors’, \textit{MHP}, 50, p.189; Fiddes, c.11-12 (\textit{LPlii}, Iii 2688; \textit{LPI}, 4835; 1 March 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome).
\textsuperscript{28} See below pp.412-428.
\textsuperscript{29} See below pp.415-437. For support of the idea that Leo intended these awards as an inducement to English support of his peace initiative, see J.J. Scarisbrick, \textit{Henry VIII}, p.53.
intention to organise a crusade, provided that ‘affairs were [at] once settled in Christendom.’ This gesture was made effectively at the end of that year’s hostilities and, through this, Henry ‘opened the door’ to ongoing papal peace proposals. Indeed, this indication of Henry’s potential compliance with Leo X’s political aims appears to have inspired a determined increase in diplomatic pressure from Rome, of which the cap and sword was only one element. In terms of the universal peace initiative, Leo was struggling to gain admission to England for a legate a latere to negotiate. Perhaps anticipating at least further difficulty in this, Leo X despatched a nuncio to England instead, to perform the same task; Gianpietro Caraffa arrived by early February 1514 and was subsequently involved in Anglo-French peace negotiations. A second nuncio, Balthazar Stuerd, passed through England on his way to Scotland around the same time; his mission, it seems, was to bring both states to terms in the wake of Flodden. Indeed, also around the time of the cap and sword, the pontiff may also have considered offering Henry the governance of Scotland in return for his compliance. The presence of both papal diplomats seems to indicate that Leo believed that England was open to the idea of peace.

A further motivation for the pope to award the cap and sword to Henry VIII was perhaps Leo’s reluctance to honour the 1512 promise of his predecessor to invest the king with France (and its associated titles), particularly given his own peace with the French. While Julius II probably never intended to make good this grant himself and Henry had not met the condition that he gain de facto control over France first, this did not stop Christopher Bainbridge seeking to realise this award in late 1513. While the orator faced obstacles from Cardinal Vigerio, in whose

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30 LPIii, 2310 (LPI, 4470; 28 September 1513, Henry to Leo, Tournai).
31 Ibid., 2517 (LPI, 4608; 19 December 1513, Leo to Henry, Rome).
33 Ven.ii, 366 (5-8 January 1514, Venetian ambassador in Rome [Lippomano?] to the Signory).
hands the brief was placed, he does appear to have gained a pledge from the pope that the investiture would be confirmed, although Leo was probably disingenuous in making this promise. In this light, therefore, the award of the cap and sword around this time was perhaps offered as an alternative.34

While the official reason for not despatching the cap and sword to England immediately was the harsh winter, the delay could have been largely politically motivated, given the underlying hope of Leo X to bring about peace between Henry VIII and Louis XII.35 It is surely no coincidence that, prior to Spinelly’s departure, Silvester de Giglis would have received a commission to treat secretly with the pope and French representatives. This seems to have been an immediate response to the arrival of nuncio Caraffa in England around 7 February.36 Around the same time, it was heard in Rome that the English king rewarded the pope personally by making Giulio de’ Medici (Leo’s cousin and chief advisor) cardinal protector of England and Giuliano de’ Medici (Leo’s brother) became a knight of the Garter.37 It is possible, therefore, that the pope had awaited firm indications of good faith from the English king before he released the promised awards and these arrived in Rome by March 1514.

Spinelly arrived in England with the cap and sword in mid-May; he entered London on the 19th, escorted by bishops from his disembarkation. He was met at Blackheath by the duke of Suffolk and others, before processing to St Paul’s Cathedral. The ceremonial Mass to award the honours to Henry VIII then took place on the 21st and was followed by a banquet. It was also significant in a political sense that these events were observed by the duke of Longueville (a

34 See below, pp.147-150.
35 See above n.26.
36 This commission was kept secret even from Bainbridge and he continued to expound England’s public policy of continued hostility towards France in 1514; see below pp.431-432.
37 See below pp.442-443.
prisoner from the 1513 campaign) and perhaps a French envoy sent to negotiate peace. These attendees would have clearly understood that the papacy was recognising the English role in protecting it from France. Indeed, in Spinelly’s address at the presentation ceremony, the papal delegate outlined how the gifts were traditionally awarded to Christian Kings who defended the Church and went on to praise Henry’s adoption of this role (implicitly against Louis XII). It is also worth noting that, in this oration, Spinelly also reasoned that the cap and sword were also intended to recognise the English king’s zeal for peace. This was doubtless intended by Leo X as a reminder as to the ‘real’ reason for these honours.

That this award was linked to Henry VIII’s receptiveness to papal peace overtures can be further stressed, given the arrival of a third papal nuncio to pursue the initiative, shortly after Spinelly. The pope must have understood negotiations to be quite advanced, albeit still secret, as Lodovico Canossa entered the kingdom ‘in great haste, and incognito’ and it was believed that he would remain indoors until he heard the final agreement of an Anglo-French peace, at which point he would leave. The nuncios were subsequently integral to Anglo-French negotiations which eventually led to an accord on 10 August 1514. While the blessed hat and sword may have been perceived as a means to ‘buy’ English compliance to the papacy’s desire for peace, the crown envisaged additional concessions. Of these, Henry and his ministers were successful in

38 Hall mistakenly claimed that the honours were sent by Julius II; LPIii,2929 (LPI, 5111; 21 May 1514); Ven.ii, 445 (LPIii, 3003; 15 June 1514, Nicolo di Favri to -, London); C. Whibley (ed.), Henry VIII by Edward Hall, i, p.121. Louis d’Orléans had been captured at the Battle of the Spurs (16 August 1513); A.F. Pollard, Henry VIII, p.64; J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII (1968), p.36. Oddly, considering he was a papal representative, Polydore Vergil did not mention this award in his Anglica Historia (nor did he cite the bestowal of the golden rose); D. Hay (ed.), Anglica Historia. Historians have often commented on Nicolo di Favri’s description of Henry having the oversized cap placed on his head, comically covering his face, but this whole ceremony seems to have mirrored that which took place with Henry VII in 1488 (and, one might presume, in 1496 and 1505); Ven.ii, 445 (LPIii, 3003; 15 June 1514, Nicolo di Favri to -, London); J. Wickham Legg, ‘The Gift of the Papal Cap and Sword to Henry VII’, Archaeological Journal, 57, pp.185-191.


40 Lodovico Canossa arrived around 17 June. The other nuncios present were Gianpietro Caraffa and Balthazar Stuerd; see below pp.438-440; J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp.53-54.
gaining an unusual indulgence to help rebuild Norham Castle (which had been destroyed by the Scots) and permission to retain clerical contributions for the aborted 1514 expedition. They also gained papal agreement, at least initially, to the replacement of the apostolic collector, Hadrian de Castello, with the Latin secretary, Andrew Ammonius, although this struggle still had some years to run (until 1517). For Wolsey specifically, a reduction of the consistorial taxes due on his provision to Lincoln was eventually won, although the papacy put up significant resistance, and his promotion to the see of Tournai was agreed. Finally, the possibility of Wolsey’s entry to the Sacred College was also floated at this time, although the pontiff procrastinated until ‘a suitable time’ arose.41

In keeping with the political nature of papal awards, Henry VIII rewarded the courier, Leonard Spinelly, with a benefice reputedly worth 200 ducats per annum: Cottingham in the diocese of York.42 However, Cottingham was already held by a Scottish prelate, Andrew Forman, who had received it from Henry VII in 1498 for his role in arranging an Anglo-Scottish truce.43 The benefice was probably selected in a bid to recover Cottingham from the Scot because of his recent hostile diplomatic activities.44 The opportunity to reclaim Cottingham from Forman

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41 See below pp.446-456.
42 The appointment was described by a Venetian diplomat on the 15th, but Cottingham was not formally bestowed on Spinelly until 29 June; Ven.ii, 445 (LPii, 3003; 15 June 1514, Nicolo di Favri to -, London); LPii, 3049:38 (LPI, 5198).
43 D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.75. For instances of Cottingham included in Forman’s title, see LPii, 114 (19 July 1509), 129 (LPI, 369; 30 July 1509, James IV to Henry, ‘Abbay of Haly Croce beside Edingburgh’). For the relatively insignificant value of the benefice, see Valor Ecclesiasticus Temp. Henry VIII Auctoritate Regia Institutus, v (1825), p.127.
44 J.D. Mackie, A History of Scotland (1964), pp.130-131; C.A. McGladdery, ‘Forman, Andrew (c.1465–1521)’, DNB. Henry was simultaneously trying to perform a similar manoeuvre with the priory of Coldingham; previously a cell subject to the monastery of Durham, but annexed by the Scottish (with papal approval) in 1509. This was a long running dispute that was not solved at this point; LPii, 299 (LPI, 774; calendared 1509, James IV to Julius II), 1077 (calendared end February 1512, James IV to Cardinal Riario, Edinburgh), 2355 (LPI, 4502; 12 October 1513, Henry to Leo, Tournai), 2443 (LPI, 4556; 13 November 1513, Dacre to Henry, Harbottle), 2552 (LPI, 4627; calendared end 1513, James V to Leo); LPii, 3119 (5 August 1514, James to Leo, Perth), 3616 (29 May 1514), 3616 (13 November 1514); LPii, 707 (calendared 14 July 1515, Albany to Leo), 777 (calendared end July 1515, James to Leo and the
had already been identified from July 1513, when he was promoted by Louis XII to the archbishopric of Bourges. To retain his existing livings in commendam, Forman would require new or amended papal dispensations. Bainbridge used this angle in his opposition to both Forman’s appointment to the French see and his ‘Retencon of his late benefice of Cottinghym’, although he admitted defeat in both respects by September 1513. This all coincided with other English actions, vis-à-vis Scotland, in the wake of Flodden: Henry VIII had sought to realise his claim to overlordship over Scotland and, in relation to this, approached the papacy to approve nominations to Scottish bishoprics from him. This eventually failed and Forman was admitted by Leo to the archiepiscopal see of St Andrew’s in November 1514. The regaining of Cottingham may have been intended as a warning to Forman not to oppose the English candidate for the Scottish archbishopric. By bestowing Cottingham on Spinelly, Henry was perhaps trying to force the pope’s hand politically; if Leo wanted his chamberlain to benefit from this rectory, he would at least have to snub Forman’s candidacy for St Andrew’s, if not recognise English authority over the Church in Scotland.

While the benefice was disputed, Leonard Spinelly would find it difficult to benefit from its revenues, particularly as a non-resident. He was stuck in the middle of a political game; he had been rewarded by Henry VIII, but he would have to rely on Leo X to help him realise this. In late

45 LPIii, 2276 (LPI, 4455; 17 September 1513, Bainbridge and de Giglis to Henry, Rome); D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, pp.75-76. Leo X approved the new archbishop to retain his existing benefices, including Cottingham, on 15 July. Forman also held the see of Moray, two monasteries and had access to another religious house; LPIii 3617 (15 July 1513).
46 In addition to seeking to control nominations to the Scottish episcopate, Henry VIII also sought to reduce St Andrew’s from an archbishopric to its earlier status as a suffragan see to York; see below pp.450-452.
47 See below pp.450-452.
November 1514, his brother Thomas, a longstanding diplomat in English service, requested that Henry VIII grant Leonard an alternative English benefice, specifically that of Herman Tulman of Utrecht who had recently died. By this date, Leonard’s prospect of gaining possession of Cottingham had taken a turn for the worse in Rome: Forman, had been provided to St Andrew’s on the 13th, part of a deal to placate a member of the pope’s family, Innocent Cibo, who gained Bourges as a result. Leonard Spinelly’s subsequent hopes for gaining the rectory lay in the possibility that Leo would withhold a dispensation for Forman to hold it in commendam, but the envoy informed Wolsey on 2 January 1515 (having recently arrived in Rome), that the Scot had been permitted to retain Cottingham as part of the deal for Bourges. The records consulted fail to mention any English response to this; it seems that, in spite of Spinelly being the courier of papal honours that recognised Henry VIII’s ‘protection’ of the papacy against France, it was not felt imperative to follow-up and realise the controversial reward bestowed on him as a result. Leo X had not been forthcoming with the various English demands to control the Church in Scotland, so why should Henry VIII follow-up on Cottingham? Correspondence on this subject continued until 1516, with Leonard Spinelly continuing to use the influence of his brother in England and have the pope intercede on his behalf, but the outcome is unclear.

48 LPIi, 3473 (LPI, 5632; 25 November 1514, Thomas Spinelly to Henry).
49 See below p.452.
50 LPIi, 7 (2 January 1515, Leonard Spinelly to Wolsey, Rome).
51 Ibid., 818 (17 August 1515, Thomas Spinelly to Wolsey, Bruges), 880 (5 September 1515, Thomas Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 905 (13 September 1515, Thomas Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 983 (2 October 1515, Leonard Spinelly to Wolsey, Chur), 1417 (19 January 1516, de Giglis to Wolsey), 1496 (7 February 1516, Thomas Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 2081 (23 June 1516, Thomas Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels), 2303 (26 August 1516, Thomas Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 2371 (17 September 1516, Leo to Wolsey, Rome). Thomas Spinelly lobbied the king presumably for preferment on his brother’s behalf back in March 1513. While no indication has been found to suggest that Leonard had performed any specific service for England in Rome, Thomas may have been merely attempting to gain a living for his brother in recognition of his own diplomatic duties for the English crown; LPIi, 1676 (LPI, 3778; 11 March 1513, Spinelly to Henry).
The Kingdom of France (and its Associated Titles), 1512-1514

The second genre of papal ‘honours’ that could be and were bestowed for political reasons was the elevation of an individual to the rule of a state (usually at the expense of another). Such gifts were rare, not least because they were difficult to enforce, but Julius II effectively offered the kingdom of France to Henry VIII, if he was able to conquer his southern neighbour. While Henry, at the Field of Cloth of Gold, dismissed the significance of such labels, in particular that of king of France, it will be seen that he actively sought such recognition when he became aware of the papal award.\(^{52}\) In any case, the Tudors already had a kind of experience of such a ‘gift’, when Innocent VIII effectively legitimised Henry VII’s conquest of England in 1486. Henry VII later had this confirmed by Alexander VI in 1494.\(^{53}\) Henry VIII’s father, therefore, placed great value on the papacy’s ability to lend support to his newly acquired power and, for that matter, anybody else’s.

The award to Henry VIII came on 20 March 1512, when Julius II produced a brief translating Louis XII’s territories and titles to the Englishman and his successors ‘for as long as they shall remain in faith, devotion and obedience to the Holy Roman Church and Apostolic See’. Among the titles to be transferred was the honorary ‘\textit{Rex Christianissimus}’ and the pope himself would crown Henry king of France. Before any of this could be enacted, however, the English king had to defeat his French counterpart. There was perhaps some uncertainty as to the point at

\(^{52}\) Ven.iii, 60 (3-8 June 1520, Gioan Joachino, secretary of the governor of Genoa, resident at the French Court, Ardres).

\(^{53}\) On 2 March 1486, Innocent issued a dispensation for the new king to marry Elizabeth of York (on account of consanguinity), which also pronounced ecclesiastical censures on anyone who opposed his possession of England; R.L. Storey, \textit{The Reign of Henry VII}, pp.184-185.
which the English king would be deemed to have fulfilled this stipulation; in the meantime, the brief was to remain secret and to be held by cardinals.\textsuperscript{54}

Many agree that this (potential) award to Henry VIII was intended as an inducement for English adherence to the Holy League.\textsuperscript{55} In other words, its aim was to ensure that the English king ‘protected’ the papacy. Around this period, the pope wanted to make certain that England actually followed through with membership of the coalition (originally concluded 8 October 1511) and attacked its neighbour. As recently as 14 March, the pope wrote to Henry requesting his support ‘for the defence of the Apostolic See’.\textsuperscript{56} Henry VIII’s mandate to join the coalition had only arrived in Rome in early January 1512 and England’s formal adhesion would not take place until 17 May (during the third session of the Lateran Council). The papacy was counting on England to take some of the brunt of the war away from Italy with a planned Anglo-Spanish offensive and, both towards the end of February and on 6 March, Henry VIII informed Julius II of his determination to launch this in April.\textsuperscript{57} It was in this context that the pope effectively offered the English monarch the kingdom of France; it was a tempting inducement to ensure that the invasion did take place. This gesture may have been unnecessary, however, as Henry had already issued at least one declaration of his imminent intention to attack France, which apparently arrived in Rome before the brief bestowing France was drawn up.\textsuperscript{58} It seems likely

\textsuperscript{54} This ambiguity is further hinted at by historians; whereas the likes of Chambers and Scarisbrick suggest that Henry had to defeat Louis XII (albeit the latter hints at the need for conquest), Wilkie argues that the king was required to gain ‘effective control of France’; C.H. Burns, ‘Papal Gifts and Honours for the Earlier Tudors’, \textit{MHP}, 50, pp.187-188; D.S. Chambers, \textit{Cardinal Bainbridge}, pp.38-39; M. Mitchell, ‘Works of Art from Rome for Henry VIII’, \textit{JWC}, 34, p.179; J.J. Scarisbrick, \textit{Henry VIII}, pp.34-35; W.E. Wilkie, \textit{Cardinal Protectors}, pp.43-44. Henry VIII’s desire for a title such as that of ‘Most Christian’ will be examined later; see below, pp.151 ff.


\textsuperscript{56} \textit{LPHi}, 1096 (\textit{LPI}, 3068; 14 March 1512, Julius to Henry).

\textsuperscript{57} See below pp.395-398.

\textsuperscript{58} The Venetian orator mentions the receipt in Rome of such correspondence from England (dated 6 March) in missives of the 18\textsuperscript{th} and 23\textsuperscript{rd}-27\textsuperscript{th} March 1512. It is unclear, however, whether the diplomat was referring to one or
therefore that the document that transferred France and the title of Most Christian King to Henry was Julius’ reaction to hearing that the offensive was about to begin and a bid to ensure that it took place.

The offer of the kingdom and titles to Henry VIII was also apparently linked to Julius II beginning to fulminate ecclesiastical censures against the French. In May or July 1512, he deprived Louis XII publicly and pledged the transference of his titles and territories to Henry on the ambiguous condition that he defeated the French king. Julius followed this in mid-August by imposing an interdict on France, which was reissued in the third session of the Lateran Council on 3 December. Also, some months prior to September, possibly at the same time as the deprivation of Louis XII, Julius released the Most Christian King’s subjects from their oaths and obligations.

Unlike the previous papal honours, which the English crown did not pursue to any visible degree, this was evidently coveted by Henry VIII and was linked to one aspect motivating his
anti-French agenda: the realisation of the traditional English claim to the French throne. Indeed, for the rest of his time in Rome, Christopher Bainbridge was assiduous in his bid to gain possession of the titular brief. The English cardinal first moved to gain possession of this document in January 1513, but failed on the basis that Henry had not yet conquered France. That he may have come close to obtaining them is implied by the fact that the pope transferred them to Cardinal Vigerio for safe-keeping. It is difficult to account for Bainbridge’s motivation here, as the English were nowhere near conquering France. The Anglo-Spanish offensive in Guienne had been a fiasco, as Ferdinand had used the presence of English forces to assist his own conquest of Navarre. The cardinal asserted to the pope during December 1512 that this failure was attributable to the Spanish. Furthermore, while the English had been conducting naval raids along the Breton coast (of which Bainbridge heard of some successes towards the end of September), a notable setback had occurred in August with the loss of The Regent, the flagship, along with two of Henry’s courtiers, who had been in command. Bainbridge’s approach may well have been motivated by the fact that the immediate objectives of the Holy League had been achieved; Bologna and the other papal territories under French control had been recently recovered, and Louis XII’s presence in Italy had been all but extinguished. There seems to have been a fear in England that Julius II may, as a result, cease his participation in the war, which would have thereby removed the opportunity for Henry VIII to gain papal recognition as king of France. In response to this fear, in the latter months of 1512, the English king proclaimed that he would invade France personally in 1513, continuing to cite his motivation to be the ‘defence of the Church’. It is perhaps in this context that one ought to see Bainbridge’s attempt to get hold of the

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63 See above pp.69 ff.
64 D.S. Chambers, *Cardinal Bainbridge*, p.40.
65 See below pp.402-404.
brief; if the papacy withdrew its support from the Holy League, Henry would have no chance of success. Indeed, the lack of tangible English military success up to that point need not be an obstacle; it could easily be argued that Henry VIII fulfilled his responsibility to the coalition by acting as a diversion to actions in Italy, that consequently weakened the French presence in the peninsula sufficiently for them to crumble after their ‘victory’ at Ravenna (11 April 1512).\(^{66}\)

Bainbridge moved for this investiture for a second time in the wake of tangible English military progress against France during 1513. He apparently approached the pope as soon as unconfirmed news of the Battle of the Spurs (16 August 1513) and of the fall of Thérouanne (23 August) arrived in Rome. He reportedly told Leo X that Henry intended to go to Rheims for his coronation. The ambassador followed this up by trying to gain the brief from Cardinal Vigerio. While Vigerio accepted that the king had fulfilled its conditions, by virtue of the victories, he rejected the request, claiming that he had been instructed by Julius II to await an order from Henry himself in this regard. Vigerio also advised that the the grant be requested ‘in more ample manner’, as a bull. Bainbridge further recommended that Vigerio be rewarded in some manner.\(^{67}\)

Bainbridge returned to Vigerio by 14 October, thereby conveying Henry’s request for the brief (and a promise of a reward for the cardinal). According to the Italian, he complied with Bainbridge’s request, but admitted that Leo X’s confirmation was required, which the English orator was already seeking.\(^{68}\) Henry and Bainbridge had been caught out once again with this

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\(^{66}\) See above pp.114-116.
\(^{67}\) *Ven.ii*, 301 (9 September 1513, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory); *LPIii*, 2258 (*LPI*, 4446; 12 September 1513, Bainbridge to [Henry], Rome); D.S. Chambers, *Cardinal Bainbridge*, p.50.
\(^{68}\) The cardinal also excused himself, on account of illness, from the request to help gain this confirmation; *LPIii*, 2363 (*LPI*, 4506; 14 October 1513, Vigerio to Henry, Rome). Vigerio also seems to have written to Henry on 20 December 1513, claiming that he had still not handed over the ‘*depositum*’ to Bainbridge and was still awaiting the appropriate instructions from the king. Chambers explains this confusion as having arisen from the cardinal having earlier given a copy of the brief to the English orator; *ibid.*, 2518 (*LPI*, 4610; 20 December 1513, Vigerio to Henry, Rome); D.S. Chambers, *Cardinal Bainbridge*, pp.54-55.
obstacle; they had managed to gain possession of the document, but it needed to be approved by the new pontiff. Perhaps recognising the impossibility of this (which will be explained below), Henry VIII and his advisors did not apparently respond to this new hurdle and failed to inform Bainbridge of their decision. At some point, the cardinal seems to have gained agreement from Leo X to confirm the brief ‘super nomine Christianissimi Regis’, but was confused, when writing on 20 May 1514, that he had heard no reply from England. Bainbridge speculated that this may be due to de Giglis’ dislike of the brief.69

While the timing of this second overture from Bainbridge is easily explained, he could not have been naïve enough to believe that it would not need some sort of affirmation by the new pontiff. It was perhaps thought by the English, however, that they had already gained the necessary commitment from Leo to honour his predecessor’s actions in two briefs issued on 25 June 1513.70 Vigerio’s revelation that further approval was required was probably an unwelcome surprise to the English cardinal and Henry VIII. There is also reason to believe that, despite Bainbridge’s confidence in May 1514, the likelihood of the pope confirming this grant was practically non-existent. Leo X had been urging England towards peace with France since his election, made renewed overtures in this direction at the end of the 1513 campaigning season and publicly reconciled with Louis XII on 19 December, implicitly cancelling the king’s deposition.71

It has earlier been posited that the award of the blessed cap and sword to Henry VIII may have been intended as an alternative to the investiture with France. Furthermore, around January 1513,

69 LPiii, 2926 (LPI, 5106; 20 May 1514, Bainbridge to Henry, Rome).
70 Ibid., 2029 (LPI, 4283; 25 June 1513, Bainbridge to Henry, Rome); M. Mitchell, ‘Works of Art from Rome for Henry VIII’, JWC, 34, p.180. For Ferdinand seeking a similar assurance from the new pope in September 1513, vis-à-vis the reissue of the investiture of Naples and the renewed excommunication of the king and queen of Navarre, see Sp.ii, 135 ([September] 1513, Ferdinand to his ambassador in Rome).
Leo X may even have considered offering Henry VIII control of Scotland as a further inducement. 72

Given the probable recognition in England that Leo would not honour this award, it is unsurprising that the subject was dropped. Henry VIII responded positively but secretly to papal peace overtures from around January-February 1514, up until the eventual Anglo-French accord in August of that year. 73 It is on account of this ‘secret’ policy, that one can explain Bainbridge’s consternation in May 1514 that he had not had a reply to his correspondence reporting Leo’s decision to confirm Henry’s investiture of France. He was not made party to the new policy and he suspected his colleague, de Giglis, of treachery, unaware that the latter had been empowered to negotiate with the French. Instead, he was used to perpetuate the crown’s public anti-French rhetoric and Henry’s continued intention to launch a new expedition that year, probably to strengthen the English hand in negotiations. 74

Overall, by making this gesture in 1512, Julius II had little to lose and everything to gain, politically speaking. While it risked angering the French king, he was already at war with him and was in the process of imposing ecclesiastical censures on him. Louis XII, for his part, had renounced obedience to the Holy See and supported a general council hostile to the pope in which Julius’ deposition would be anticipated. 75 In effect, therefore, the pontiff was taking preemptive action against a recalcitrant prince. Militarily, the deposition was a risky manoeuvre with

72 Ven.ii, 366 (5-8 January 1514, Venetian ambassador in Rome [Lippomano?] to the Signory).
74 See below pp.429-432.
75 This belief had been held by Ferdinand for some time and the pope probably agreed. In spite of this, Ullmann argues that there is no evidence to suggest that the cardinals running the Council of Pisa-Milan ever intended to charge Julius II with any misdemeanour, let alone depose him; Sp.ii, 48 (calendared June 1510, Ferdinand to his ambassador in Rome); W. Ullmann, ‘Julius II and the Schismatic Cardinals’, in D. Baker (ed.), Schism, Heresy and Religious Protest, Studies in Church History 9 (1972), pp.182-183.
the potential to rebound on Julius, given the strength of the French in Italy, which may explain the pontiff’s reluctance to hand over the brief to the English. In terms of Henry VIII, the brief could only benefit papal interests. Julius knew that he harboured ambitions for the longstanding English claim to the French throne.\textsuperscript{76} It was an easy trigger to ensure direct English involvement in the conflict. It was also a simple gift with a vital condition that the papacy probably did not expect to be fulfilled. Given the inability of successive English kings to realise their ‘right’ during the Hundred Years’ War, Henry was unlikely to deal a knockout blow to Louis XII during 1512/13. Even if he did, that bridge would be crossed at a later date. From the English perspective, the offer, however unlikely to be realised, would always be seized, given the king’s motivation against France and the rare opportunity for papal recognition of the English claim to this throne. Indeed, there was a recent precedent for this occurring; on 5 July 1510, Julius II proclaimed that he would award Naples to Ferdinand of Aragon, which was also claimed by the French crown.\textsuperscript{77} Admittedly, the Spaniard was already in possession of the kingdom, but the gesture was no different to that of France; Henry had to be in control of the kingdom for this award to be made. Furthermore, the English king was not risking anything in his attempts to get hold of the investiture brief; he had already decided on his belligerent course before Julius II had made this offer.

\textit{‘Fidei Defensor’, 1515-1521}

\textsuperscript{76} See above pp.69 ff.
\textsuperscript{77} The award of this kingdom was slightly different, however, as Naples was a papal fief, but the similarity of the gesture is valid; J.S.C. Bridge, \textit{A History of France from the death of Louis XI}, iv, \textit{Reign of Louis XII 1508-1514} (1929), p.63.
The final genre of awards that could be and were issued by the papacy during this period, usually to political ends, was the honorary title, bestowed upon a prince or state and added to their formal title; Spanish monarchs, for instance, were known as ‘Catholic Kings’. While the heads of the contemporary ‘superpowers’ possessed such a name, Henry VIII did not and sought such recognition for most of this period, largely as a reward for his military role in protecting the papacy from France. While he was eventually recognised for his written defence of the Church against the Lutheran heresy, it will become clear that Henry’s political support of Rome in 1521 and across the whole period generally, was effectively recognised in the reward.

Leo X bestowed the title ‘fidei defensor’ upon Henry VIII on 11 October 1521. This title recognised the king’s loyalty to the papacy and confirmed his place among the principal secular leaders of Christendom. It was the culmination of at least seven years of lobbying on the part of the English crown to have its wider political role vis-à-vis the papacy recognised. It was also the end of a lengthy process to gain an honorary title of any kind. It is probable that the English king was motivated in his quest for an honorary papal title by the 1512 offer of the title ‘Most Christian King’ (in addition to France). This was clearly intended to ensure English military action against Louis XII and would have encouraged Henry to believe that he could gain such a title, if the papacy needed English political support. It is also likely that, when the English realised that the transferrence of Louis’ titles was unlikely, they began to push instead for an honorary title for Henry as king of England; the papacy had already offered such a title once, so it

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78 L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vi, p.321.
80 See above pp.38-40.
was not unprecedented. Henry VIII could also look to recent instances of popes issuing honorary titles for political reasons, particularly the Swiss, Spain and perhaps Scotland. While, cumulatively, these would have encouraged Henry’s hopes of gaining such a title it may well have been a title that had possibly given to James IV that spurred him on; if those who cite this are correct, not only did it recognise the Scot’s role as a ‘protector’ of Rome but, in English eyes, James was also Henry’s subordinate.

The lengthy process by Henry VIII to gain recognition of his political protection of the papacy began in 1515. On 29 January, de Giglis informed Ammonius that he awaited the bull for Henry VIII’s title, presumably that of ‘defender’ or something similar. The timing of this is curious; England, at peace with France since August 1514 (after substantial papal pressure), feared a French descent into Italy as a consequence of this amity. Without any allies, however, Henry VIII was able to do little and, as far as the king was concerned, Leo X’s strategy was to push for ‘universal peace’. The death of Louis XII and the accession of the equally ambitious (vis-à-vis Italy) and more youthful Francis I added an extra factor to the mix. In reaction to the perceived French threat, de Giglis had approached the pope around 19 January with a view, it appears, to forming a coalition to defend Milan (against France). An honorary title, therefore, may have been presented as the English ‘price’ for its breach of the peace. If so, the crown

81 See above pp.144 ff.
83 See above p.39.
84 LPH II, 71 (29 January 1515, de Giglis to [Ammonius]).
85 The papacy was, in fact, pursuing two other distinct policies at this time. On the one hand, Leo opposed the prospect of a French descent; he had been secretly allied with Ferdinand since late 1514 and secretly joined a league against France in February 1515. On the other hand, the pope was simultaneously engaged in negotiations with the French crown towards a marriage agreement that took place in February 1515. Consequently, it seems to have been unclear in England what Leo X really meant when he urged universal peace; see below pp.462-463, 470-472.
miscalculated, as Leo rejected this overture, claiming that he could only advocate a general peace. A bold bishop of Worcester voiced his belief that ‘some Frenchman had been breathing in his [the pope’s] ear’. While de Giglis tried to lobby Leo again in this regard, he was unsuccessful; the orator again reacted quite aggressively, asserting that the papal response ‘was not a fit return for the services England has rendered him’. The exchange was so turbulent that one of Leo’s close advisors, Cardinal Bibbiena, visited de Giglis that night to urge the ambassador to smooth over matters. 86 Given papal adhesion to an anti-Gallic coalition during February 1515, it seems likely that the English ambassador knew about the earlier negotiations and gained some sort of private agreement from Leo X to award Henry VIII an honorary title if England were to join the fray. 87 That this did not occur may have arisen from the pontiff’s vacillation; in securing a French marriage for his brother, Giuliano de’ Medici, in the same month, Leo was clearly trying to cover all bases. Indeed, he kept a foot in both camps until July 1515, when he finally made his membership of the anti-French league public. Until shortly before that point, he does not appear to have contacted the English vis-à-vis this cause. 88 Given the pope was trying to sit on the fence for as long as possible, it may be considered unsurprising, therefore, that he may have offered Henry VIII an honorary title, at a point when he himself was involved in negotiations towards an anti-French league and the English king had recently made overtures to him along these lines. As he was not prepared to make public his wish to resist Francis I, Leo was unlikely to bestow such an indicator of favour on the English king because of its obvious connotations. Indeed, Leo X did

86 *LPill*, 71 (29 January 1515, de Giglis to [Ammonius]).
87 Indeed, the treaty of 12 February stipulated that all parties were expected to induce the entry of other princes, including Henry VIII; see below pp.471-472, 475-476.
88 See below pp.475-481.
not start making tentative approaches to the English concerning anti-French plans until May–June 1515.\textsuperscript{89}

The honorary title was not mentioned again until 7 September 1515, when de Giglis claimed to have spoken to Leo about Henry becoming ‘protector of the Holy See’.\textsuperscript{90} The political timing was far more opportune this time, as the English crown clearly possessed leverage over the pope, who was now actively seeking English membership of the anti-French coalition.\textsuperscript{91} This time, the crown had decided on a new ‘price’ for its alliance; a cardinal’s hat for Wolsey; the archbishop clearly used the pope’s desire for Henry VIII as an ally to lever a red hat out of him and, on two occasions, specified that, if this was not forthcoming, he would not gain English adhesion.\textsuperscript{92} This worked and, by 1 August, Wolsey understood that he would be raised to the Sacred College and, accordingly, issued Henry’s signed agreement to join the league. The new cardinal ramped up his demands by also requesting a legatine commission.\textsuperscript{93} Given this context, it is likely that Wolsey would also have instructed de Giglis to seek an honorary title for the king. Indeed, Leo may have hinted at this opportunity to Wolsey on 12 July: responding positively to the archbishop’s initial demand for promotion and Henry’s declaration of ‘devotion to the Holy See’, he wished the English monarch ‘to be considered its patron and protector’.\textsuperscript{94} It is feasible that Wolsey, reading this, instructed de Giglis to suggest that this notion be formalised when the opportunity next arose. Notably, however, he did not seek to include it as part of his ultimatum to

\textsuperscript{89} See below p.469.
\textsuperscript{90} LP\textsuperscript{III}, 887 (7 September 1515, de Giglis to Wolsey).
\textsuperscript{91} The English had known that Leo X was a member since March 1515, but could not be sure, on account of the secrecy and because the pontiff was also publicly pursuing ‘universal peace’; see below pp.477-478.
\textsuperscript{92} Initially, towards the end of June, Wolsey unsubtly implied that English friendship was dependent on the cardinalate, but by the end of the following month, the archbishop spelt this out clearly to the pope; LP\textsuperscript{III}, 648 (calendared end June 1515, [Wolsey to de Giglis], ‘from my place beside Westminster’), 763 (calendared 30 July 1515, [Wolsey] to [de Giglis]).
\textsuperscript{93} See below pp.482-483, 488-489.
\textsuperscript{94} LP\textsuperscript{III}, 700 (12 July 1515, Leo to Wolsey, Rome).
the papacy that offered English membership of the anti-French league, although this may well have been because he had already issued two missives stipulating that the price was a red hat and felt obliged to honour this condition from 1 August, at which point he understood that he would become a cardinal. The timing of de Giglis raising this issue with Leo X was also significant; not only had the papacy apparently declared itself to be a member of the anti-French league by this time, but it also coincided with the receipt in Rome (by 3 September) of the English commitment to join the coalition, to which Leo asked Henry to honour his agreement to impose half a tenth on the English clergy and finally promoted Wolsey (on the 10th). De Giglis may have felt that this was an opportune moment to lobby for an honorary title, given the pope had submitted to English pressure vis-à-vis the cardinalate and now hoped for English money to fund the war against Francis I. Unaware of de Giglis’ approach to Leo, Wolsey thanked the ambassador for his work towards the cardinalate, declared that the king was now prepared ‘to support the honour and safety of the Holy See’ and further recommended that Leo award Henry ‘some honourable title’ in recognition, particularly as it would not cost the pope anything.

By the end of September 1515, the prospect of an honorary title for Henry VIII had been discussed within papal circles. That of ‘protector’ was objected to as it belonged to the emperor; Leo preferred ‘defender’, but that already belonged to the Swiss; others forwarded ‘King Apostolic’ and ‘Orthodox’, but the pope did not like these. Such were the details that de Giglis relayed back to England. By this time, however, there were indications that Leo X might be reluctant to concede such a title. Wolsey had given up the political highground when Henry joined the alliance against France back in August. Indeed, the pontiff felt confident enough to

95 Ibid., 894 (10 September 1515, Wolsey to [de Giglis], Rome).
96 Ibid., 894 (10 September 1515, Wolsey to [de Giglis], Rome).
97 Ibid., 967 (calendared end September 1515, [de Giglis to Ammonius]).
turn down Wolsey’s follow-up request for a legatine commission (reportedly because he was afraid of Francis making a similar demand). He would also have been discouraged on hearing (around the same time) that the promised clerical (half) tenth would not be forthcoming. Perhaps most importantly, however, the French victory inflicted at Marignano on 13-14 September immediately prompted the papacy to negotiate terms with Francis I. Given Leo’s position (reinforced by the meeting held with Francis at Bologna in December 1515 and its accompanying concordat), prospects for an honorary title for Henry VIII were now bleak. Nevertheless, on 19 January 1516, de Giglis informed Ammonius of his confidence that he would soon get hold of the bulls entitling Henry VIII ‘S. Ro. Ecclesiae Defensor’. Leo X perhaps kept this inducement ‘live’ to retain his amity with England, in case he could shortly turn against France again, as he was already indicating he might.

The prospect of Henry VIII becoming ‘defender’ or something similar effectively ended by 28 January 1516, when Leo X informed Henry of the ‘difficulty’ of his demand. As de Giglis explained the following day, Leo ‘cannot assent at present without great danger’. In other words, French political pressure was too great; the pope could not afford to provoke Francis by

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98 Ibid., 966 (calendared end September 1515, [de Giglis to Wolsey]), 967 (calendared end September 1515, [de Giglis to Ammonius]), 968 (calendared end September 1515, Ammonius to Wolsey).
99 For English fears for the papacy and its political ‘independence’, post-Marignano, see below pp.489-492.
100 LPIII, 1418 (19 January 1516, de Giglis to Ammonius).
101 The aforementioned legatine commission desired by Wolsey still seems to have been thought possible, albeit unlikely, by de Giglis and the pope still sought the promised tax from the English clergy; ibid., 1417 (19 January 1516, de Giglis to Wolsey), 1418 (19 January 1516, de Giglis to Ammonius). For the papacy’s eagerness to ensure that it retained English support, that Henry and Wolsey did not perceive Leo as ‘French’, as well as of England’s belief that it had a ‘secret understanding’ with Rome to continue the war, see below pp.499-509.
102 The English orator, assigned by the pope to expand on his inability to meet English demands, also suggests that Wolsey’s desire for a legatine commission could not be granted for the same reason. Contemporaneous correspondence from Giulio de’ Medici indicates that the cardinal protector had been approached to realise the English crown’s demands, but de’ Medici excused himself on account of his being preoccupied with matters in Bologna up to that point; LPIII, 1449 (28 January 1516, Leo to Henry, Florence), 1450 (28 January 1516, Leo to Wolsey, Florence), 1451 (28 January 1516, Giulio de’ Medici to Henry), 1452 (28 January 1516, Giulio de’ Medici to Wolsey), 1456 (29 January 1516, de Giglis to Wolsey, [Florence]).
recognising England through an honorary title. Nothing emanated from England then until the end of May. On the 22nd, an angry Wolsey wrote to Rome of the king’s displeasure that he had ‘heard nothing of the title Defensor Fidei, as if the pope were afraid of the French’. At this point when Wolsey was trying to revive the anti-French coalition, which was collapsing during April-May 1516 after the emperor’s withdrawal from the Imperial-Swiss attack on French interests in Italy. In a bid to relaunch this offensive and to retain papal support for this (which had been tentative up to then), he also revived the king’s desire for an honorary title to recognise his protection of the papacy from France. In this context, this was either a last-ditch bid to browbeat the pope before the true scale of the enterprise’s failure became apparent or an attempt to induce the pope to declare himself committed to the coalition, as England backed the relaunch of the military offensive. The pope was not convinced; he was not as desperate for English participation in a coalition against Francis I as he had been in 1515, and still felt it too risky to break with the post-Marignano settlement and his overtures to England remained secret and indirect. The failure of the Imperial-Swiss armies at Milan earlier in 1516 could not have inspired Leo to act much differently.

Perhaps due to an underlying perception that the papacy was ‘French’ (or, rather, subject to French political influence) for several years after this point, the prospect of Henry gaining an honorary papal title did not arise again until 1521. Indeed, the failure of any English-financed offensive to expel the French from Italy and, subsequently, the Treaty of London of 1518,

103 LPIi, 1928 (22 May 1516, Wolsey to de Giglis, London).
104 See below pp.528 ff.
105 In the same way, Wolsey seems to have resumed his quest for a legatine commission in the same missive; he lamented that ‘others have more influence with the pope than he has, and have received legateships and distinctions which Wolsey has not’. He would even settle, he argued, for a faculty allowing him to visit exempt monasteries; LPIi, 1928 (22 May 1516, Wolsey to de Giglis, London).
106 See below, pp.549 ff.
precluded this until then, at least if the English king envisaged gaining recognition of his role protecting the papacy from the French. Once Wolsey became sure of Leo X’s commitment against France in 1521, he planned to extract such a concession from the pope as England’s ‘price’ for joining this political cause. While, the cardinal sought recognition of Henry’s role in protecting the papacy against France, it was now to be tied in with the king’s defence of the Church against another contemporary concern of Leo X, Martin Luther.\textsuperscript{107}

The book eventually produced, \textit{Assertio Septem Sacramentorum}, was a response to Luther’s most recent work, \textit{On the Babylonian Captivity} (1520). In particular, the king responded to the friar’s attack on papal primacy and defended this position.\textsuperscript{108} This provided the central tenet for the English argument for an honorary title; that Henry VIII was defending Church and papacy both physically and literally. Writing of this work may have begun shortly before the receipt in England of the Lutheran text to which it responded. Certainly, the king seems to have been busy ‘\textit{in scribendo contra Lutherum}’ towards the start of April 1521 and, by the 16\textsuperscript{th}, had agreed to Wolsey’s advice that the resultant book be sent ‘not only to Rome, but also into France.

\textsuperscript{107} Mitchell agrees that an honorary title was always expected as a reward for the book; M. Mitchell, ‘Works of Art from Rome for Henry VIII’, \textit{JWC}, 34, p.184. For an indication that this was Wolsey’s idea, see \textit{LPIIIii}, 1659 (11 October 1521, Rome). For indications that the Lutheran controversy raised concern among English theologians from 1519 and that the papacy informed the crown of its own concern for this issue around the same time, see \textit{LPIIIi}, 260 (24 May 1519, Erasmus to Warham, Antwerp), 444 (1 September 1519, de Giglis to Wolsey), 476 (17 October 1521, Erasmus to John Fisher, Louvain), 640 (calendared 27 February 1520, More to Lee, Greenwich), 847 (28 May 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 1208 (30 March 1521, Campeggio to Wolsey); \textit{Ven.iii}, 169 (10 March 1521, Surian to the Signory, London).

\textsuperscript{108} T.E. Bridgett, ‘Defender of the Faith’, \textit{Dublin Review}, 96 (1885), p.248. This may not have been the first time that Henry tried to pen a book; the English king appears to have written a text by June 1518, which was praised by ‘great learned men’, as well as by Wolsey, who may have played the role of ‘devil’s advocate’ during the writing process. There is no tangible evidence that this book was taken any further at this stage and Scarisbrick speculates that Henry VIII’s attention may have waned; \textit{LPIIIi}, 4257 (24 June 1518, [Pace] to [Wolsey], Woodstock), 4266 (28 June 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Woodstock); J.J. Scarisbrick, \textit{Henry VIII}, p.110.
and other nations, as shall appear convenient. So that all the church is more bound to this good and virtuous Prince, for the vehement zeal he beareth unto the same’.

The plan was put into practice on the arrival of a papal bull and brief around 16 April, instructing that all Lutheran texts were to be burnt. The king was overjoyed ‘to have these tidings from the Pope’s holiness, at such time as he had taken upon him the defence of Christ’s church with his pen, afore the receipt of the said tidings’. Subsequently, a concerted campaign to gain recognition of Henry VIII as defender of the Church was launched with a magnificent public display against Luther on 12 May 1521 at St Paul’s Cross (outside the cathedral). Before an audience of foreign dignitaries and with the nuncio Ghinucci seated on his right-hand side, Wolsey presided over a Mass at which he published the papal excommunication of Luther (and his followers), had him denounced and his books burnt. One Venetian commentator wrote of

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109 While historians disagree on the question of Henry’s authorship, it is probable that he did contribute to the book, although the lion’s share of the work was probably done by a group of senior ecclesiastics, specifically ‘appointed to examine Luther’s books’. Whereas Wolsey later suggested that the Assertio was prefaced by two verses composed and handwritten by the king, these seem to have been conceived by others and a number were sent to Henry to select and transcribe them. The papacy may have recognised this collective contribution on 7 June, when de’ Medici indicated the pope’s satisfaction that Henry had induced scholars to write against Luther; LPiIII, 1218 (3 April 1521, Warham to Wolsey, Canterbury), 1220 (7 April 1521, Pace to Wolsey, Greenwich), 1233 (16 April 1521, [Pace] to Wolsey (16 April 1521, [Pace] to Wolsey, Greenwich), 1449 (calendared end July 1521, Wolsey to Henry), 1450 (calendared end July 1521, Wolsey to Henry), 1510 (25 August 1521, [Wolsey to Clerk], Bruges), 1333 (calendared 7-8 June 1521, [de’ Medici to the bishop of Ascoli]); LPiIIIi, 1450 (calendared end July 1521, Wolsey to Henry), 1499 (23 August 1521, Erasmus to Warham, Bruges). For the views of historians on this matter, including Wooding, whose argument is similar to this one, see T.E. Bridgett, ‘Defender of the Faith’, Dublin Review 96, pp.255-259; J.M. Brown, ‘Henry VIII’s book, “Assertio Septem Sacramentorum”’, and the Royal Title of “Defender of the Faith”’, TRHS, 8 (1880), pp.250-258; D. MacCulloch, ‘Henry VIII and the Reform of the Church’, in D. MacCulloch (ed.), The Reign of Henry VIII, pp.162-163; V. Murphy: ‘The First Divorce: Literature and Propaganda’, in ibid., p.146; P. Smith, ‘Luther and Henry VIII’, EHR, 25 (1910), p.659; J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, p.112; L. Wooding, Henry VIII, p.108.

110 LPiIII, 1233 (16 April 1521, [Pace] to Wolsey). For the arrival and reaction to these instructions, see Ven.iii, 195 (23 April 1521, Surian to the Signory, London), 208 (11 May 1521, Surian to the Signory, London), 223 (26 May 1521, Contarini to the Signory, Worms). The idea to capitalise on the Lutheran issue may have began with Wolsey’s receipt of papal concerns in December 1520 and a request that Henry and Wolsey, on account of their influence among princes, write to Charles and others ‘to prevent its further diffusion’, although the idea to hold a book-burning event may have been formented some months earlier; LPiIIIi, 810 (15 May 1520, Erasmus to Oecolampadius, Louvain), 1080 (calendared end November 1520, [de’ Medici to Ghinucci]), 1185 (calendared end February 1521), 1208 (30 March 1521, Campeggio to Wolsey), 1210 (calendared 30-31 March 1521, [de’ Medici to -]), 1234 (17 April 1521, Leo to Wolsey, ‘Pali’), 1328 (3 June 1521, [Richard Wingfield] to Wolsey).
Wolsey’s arrival that it was ‘as if the pope in person had arrived’, presumably in recognition of his legatine status. At this Mass, John Fisher (bishop of Rochester), arguably England’s foremost theologian, gave an oration which commended Wolsey’s work against Luther and pledged that Henry would do the same. He further revealed that Wolsey held in his hand the king’s written work against the German friar, although it was yet to be finished:

But touchynge these sacramentes the kynges grace our souerayne lorde in his owne persone hath with his pen so substauncyally foghten agaynst Martyn Luther that I doute not but euery true christen man that shal rede his boke shall se those blessed sacramentes clered and deluyered from the sklaunderous mouthe and cruel tethe that Martyn luther hath set vpon them, wherin al Englond maye take grete conforte and specially al those that loue lernynge.

The papacy was informed of these events on 21 May, when Henry VIII outlined how, as it was the duty of a Christian prince to ‘preserve the Christian religion against its enemies’, he strove to destroy the Lutheran heresy. Due to its proliferation, the king claimed to have adopted a multi-pronged strategy: he commissioned learned men to discuss and denounce Luther and wrote to the emperor and electors to the same end. In addition, Henry ‘thought it right still further to testify his zeal for the faith by his writings, that all might see he was ready to defend the Church,

111 It was speculated that over 30,000 people attended. The ceremony was followed by a great banquet; Ven.iii, 210 (13 May 1521, Surian to the Signory, London), 213 (14-17 May 1521, Lodovico Spinelli, secretary to Surian, to his brother, Gasparo Spinelli, Secretary to Badoer); LPIIIi, 1274 (12 May 1521). Wolsey followed up the book burning by instructing the episcopate to search for and send him all Lutheran texts within 15 days; ibid., 1279 (14 May 1521, Wolsey to Charles Booth, bishop of Hereford, ‘my house at Westminster’).

not only with his arms, but with the resources of his mind’. As a final touch, the king told Leo that he had dedicated ‘the first offsprings of his intellect and his little erudition’ to the Medici pontiff. Given Henry’s allusion to defending the papacy both militarily and intellectually, there is little doubt that he was angling for an honorary title to reflect this. Perhaps because of Leo X’s previous reluctance to make such a grant, Henry offered a supplementary reason to respond positively: on 21 May, he awarded Cardinal de’ Medici the see of Worcester (recently vacant on account of de Giglis’ death). When notifying the pope’s cousin and most intimate confidante of his nomination, Henry implied that further reward may be available, admitting that Worcester ‘is not equal to his merits’. Given that the see had only been vacant since 18 April, and news of this could only have been received in England from early May, this must have been a swift decision by the English crown, particularly as it had promised Cardinal Campeggio an episcopal benefice at the end of his legatine commission in England.

The pope acknowledged notification of the English strategy on 7 June at the same time as the preferment of his cousin to the see of Worcester. He did not explicitly mention the book, however. It transpires, as Cardinal de’ Medici notified Ghinucci via a diplomatic back-channel, that while the pope was pleased that the king would defend the Church ‘with his pen as well as

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113 LPIIIi, 1297 (21 May 1521, Henry to Leo, Greenwich).
114 In Wolsey’s notification of recent English actions against Luther, as well as referring the pope to Ghinucci for a full account, he also specified that Clerk would speak to him about his legateship (presumably concerning further powers) and other matters. Given the nature of Henry’s contemporaneous letter, the book and title were probably to be discussed; ibid., 1299 (21 May 1521, Wolsey to Leo, London).
115 Ibid., 1298 (21 May 1521, Henry to de’ Medici, Greenwich).
116 Ibid., 1247 (23 April 1521, [Campeggio to Wolsey], Rome). For the earmarking of Salisbury for Campeggio, see ibid., 533 (4 December 1519, Campeggio to Wolsey).
his sword’, he did not refer to it in his correspondence, as he understood it was still a secret.\footnote{Leo X was also allegedly impressed that Henry had gathered his scholars to write against Luther. Furthermore, he had written for a second time to Christian princes against Luther, as Wolsey had advised, and forwarded some anti-Lutheran texts for the cardinal to peruse and comment on; \textit{ibid.}, 1332 (7 June 1521, Leo to Wolsey, Rome), 1333 (calendared 7-8 June 1521, [de’ Medici to Ghinucci]). For the papacy and de’ Medici’s enthusiastic acceptance of the see of Worcester (to which the cardinal was provided on 7 June), also see \textit{ibid.}, 1334 (8 June 1521, Giulio de’ Medici, Florence), 1335 (8 June 1521, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome).}

The pope here may have been somewhat over-cautious, as the existence of the king’s work had been disclosed in the Fisher sermon.\footnote{Furthermore, Wolsey had disclosed the king’s writing such a book to the Venetian ambassador around 23 April; \textit{Ven.iii}, 195 (23 April 1521, Surian to the Signory, London).} Nevertheless, it was discussed in Consistory on 7 June, at which, gratitude was again expressed at Henry’s piety for defending the Church ‘with his pen’. Significantly, at this same Consistory, de’ Medici was provided to Worcester and ‘it was resolved to bestow some honourable name or title on the King in return for his piety in resisting the spread of the Lutheran heresy, but the matter is deferred on account of its importance’.\footnote{\textit{LP\textit{III}}, 1335 (8 June 1521, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome), 1336 (9 June 1521, [Campeggio] to Henry, Rome).} It was discussed again on 10 June, when various possibilities were proposed, including ‘\textit{Regem Fidelem}’, ‘\textit{Anglicum}’ ‘\textit{Orthodoxum}’ ‘\textit{Ecclesiasticum}’ and ‘\textit{Protectorem}’. Henry VIII’s previous ‘defence’ of the Church and the award by Julius II of the title ‘Most Christian King’ were cited as justification for the proposed honour, in response to scepticism among some present. Eventually, it was agreed that the pope should propose a selection of titles from which the English king should choose.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, 1335 (8 June 1521, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome); M. Creighton, \textit{History of the Papacy}, vi, app..3, pp.374-375; J.J. Scarisbrick, \textit{Henry VIII}, p.116.} This discussion was not disclosed to Wolsey until 27 June, when Campeggio advised that while the Sacred College had proposed ‘\textit{Apostolicus}’ and ‘\textit{Protector}’, it would be grateful for the Englishman’s opinion.\footnote{\textit{LP\textit{III}}, 1369 (27 June 1521, [Campeggio to Wolsey], Rome).} In Consistory on that same day, Leo X finally made public his alliance to Charles V and, thereby, his intention to fight French interests in Italy, as
It ought to be noted that, when the pope made this offer, he knew of Henry VIII’s negotiations with Charles for an alliance against France. The honorary title therefore was probably envisaged as the perfect inducement to secure English support, given that this had been sought after in the past. On 12 July, Ghinucci conveyed a secret communication from the pope (via de’ Medici) to Wolsey; he reminded the cardinal to ensure that the *Assertio* was completed and sent to Leo before he crossed to Calais. He also asked that he and Henry choose one of the honorary titles proposed by the pope’s cousin. This was followed, just before the 16th, by the same nuncio, presenting letters from Leo X to Wolsey, declaring the pontiff’s intention to join with Charles and, presumably, requesting English support. Wolsey apparently issued an immediate response, perhaps fuelled by the prospect of the title for Henry (reinforcing Leo’s declaration against France), and, although England subsequently appeared more enthusiastic about joining the papal-Imperial cause, Wolsey’s intention to host the Calais Conference, ally with the emperor under cover of this and attempt to delay the conflict until England was ready, did not alter.

To ensure the award of the honorary title, the *Assertio* had to be despatched to Rome; the timing of this was clearly politically motivated. While the book seems to have been ready...
towards the end of July, it was not sent to Rome for another month. 126 On 25 August 1521, Wolsey issued instructions for John Clerk to present the king’s book against Luther, the Assertio. 127 At this ceremony, the orator was to declare ‘the King’s resolution to support the Church, and extinguish heresy by the sword and pen’. Reinforcing this role (and his angling for an honorary title), Clerk was also to deliver an oration and to advise ‘that the King has therein styled himself the very Defender of the Catholic Faith [of] Christ’s Church, which he has truly deserved of the See Apostolic’. Wolsey further stipulated the reward that he expected Henry to receive through ‘a memorial of such titles as will be most agreeable with annotations’, and instructed Clerk to have the relevant bulls drawn up along with a brief of thanks to the king “with certain words to be inserted therein by the Pope’s own hand”, … stating that [he does not] thinks his [grace can be b]etter employed. 128 With the papacy’s enmity towards France, the political implications of these statements were unambiguous. The calculated nature of this is further emphasised when one notes that Wolsey issued these instructions on the same day that he concluded the Treaty of Bruges, binding England to the Empire and committing Henry VIII to war with France in 1523. The concordat bound both parties to act as ‘protectors’ both of the papacy and of the house of Medici. 129 In the same letter, Clerk was instructed to bind Leo to secrecy when he revealed that Henry intended to ally with him and Charles against Francis I, because of the latter’s attacks on the Empire and the Papal States, as well as due to papal and

126 LPIIIii, 1449 (calendared end July 1521, Wolsey to Henry).
127 The previous disclosure via Ghinucci may have been deemed ineffective because it elicited no response from Rome.
128 Wolsey also thanked Clerk for gaining the bulls for his expanded legation, which he also levered out of the papacy at this time; LPIIIii, 1510 (25 August 1521, [Wolsey to Clerk], Bruges). Wolsey sent a copy of this correspondence to Henry on the 24th (which was received on the 28th) and, while this suggests that the cardinal was the policy maker here, one would have expected the king to have assented to this approach; ibid., 1502 (24 August 1521, Wolsey to [Henry], Bruges), 1519 (29 August 1521, Pace to [Wolsey], Guildford).
129 See below p.741.
Imperial requests for support. At this point, Leo was to be informed that, in order to prepare for the conflict, Wolsey had conducted the Calais (and Bruges) peace negotiations and that a marriage alliance had been agreed under cover of these. Leo was also to be asked to send a messenger to Wolsey, who intended to remain at Calais until the start of October, in a bid to extend the peace talks.\footnote{LPIIIii, 1510 (25 August 1521, [Wolsey to Clerk], Bruges).}

John Clerk received the Assertio and Wolsey’s instructions by 14 September. He reported the pope to be enthusiastic about the book and agreed to it being presented in Consistory (and being distributed to other princes); he was also said to like the king’s (self-proposed) title of ‘defender’. On politics, Clerk dutifully bound the pontiff to secrecy. He disclosed the Treaty of Bruges and Henry VIII’s intention to act ‘in defence of the Church’, before explaining how this would not happen immediately and that the Calais Conference would continue to keep up the pretence. While the pope replied positively, he procrastinated about sending a delegate to Wolsey, seemingly because Clerk was unable to show him a copy of the treaty.\footnote{Ibid., 1574 (14 September 1521, Clerk to Wolsey, Rome).} Perhaps because he did not entirely believe that England had made an anti-French pact with the Empire, Leo rejected overtures for the presentation of the Assertio in a public ceremony, instead receiving it in a secret Consistory on 2 October.\footnote{On 25 September, Clerk reported that Leo agreed to the book’s presentation in an ‘open’ Consistory, but had evidently changed his mind by the following week. The pope claimed to reject a public ceremony, to avoid stirring up controversy, ‘as men’s minds as so much infected with Lutheranism’. The pope also later rejected a request from the ambassador for the book to be approved by formal decree in Consistory. Nevertheless, Leo did proclaim an indulgence of ten years for all who read the Assertio; ibid., 1607 (25 September 1521, Clerk to Wolsey, Rome), 1654 (10 October 1521, Clerk to Wolsey, Rome).} By this, Henry would not be openly recognised as a ‘defender’ of the Church, worthy of public papal support and Clerk may have feared that this would put the honorary title in doubt. Yet the ceremony went as well as could have been expected for Clerk. In his oration, he emphasised Wolsey’s work against Luther and drew

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130 LPIIIii, 1510 (25 August 1521, [Wolsey to Clerk], Bruges).
131 Ibid., 1574 (14 September 1521, Clerk to Wolsey, Rome).
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attention to the king’s desired title. In explaining Henry’s motivation for the book, the ambassador reasoned that it should not be seen as strange that such a devoted king, ‘who with his Forces and Reveng’d Sword, has formerly defended the Church of Rome when in greatest dangers and Calamities of Wars, should now for the Glory of God, and Tranquility of the Roman Church, by his Ingenuity and Pen, put a stop to Heresies, which so endanger the Catholick Faith’. In response, Leo X mirrored this language by praising Henry who, in addition to now writing this book, ‘with His Sword has totally subdu’d the Enemies of Christ’s Church, that (like the Heads of the Hydra, often cut off, and forthwith growing up again;) has so often endeavour’d to tear in pieces the Seamless Coat of Christ’. He further gave ‘thanks to our Creator, who has rais’d up such a Prince to defend His Church and this Holy See’. Given such language, it is unsurprising that Clerk was promised that the bulls for the king’s title would be issued in the next Consistory.133 This must have relieved the ambassador somewhat, although it remained to be seen whether the pope would perform this publicly or even issue the bulls.

For present purposes, the most relevant section of the Assertio is the initial ‘Of Indulgences and the Pope’s Authority’. Here Henry sought to portray himself as a multi-faceted ‘protector’ of the Church and papacy; by virtue of this unsubtle emphasis at the beginning of the book, no-one could dispute his performing this role, nor his worthiness of an honorary title.134 The Assertio is avowedly pro-papal and is at pains to stress Henry’s devotion to the Holy See.135

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133 Ibid., 1654 (10 October 1521, Clerk to Wolsey, Rome), 1656 (calendared 10 October 1521); T.W. Gent (ed.), Assertio Septem Sacramentorum (1688), ‘The Oration of Mr. John Clark’ and pp.b2-b3; M. Mitchell, ‘Works of Art from Rome for Henry VIII’, JWC, 34, p.184.

134 Scarisbrick speculates that this section may have been rescued from an earlier, aborted text written by Henry (from 1518); J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII (1968), p.110.

135 John Clerk reinforced this in his oration when presenting the book: ‘I speak somewhat of the Devotion and Veneration of my King towards Your Holiness and this most Holy See’; T.W. Gent (ed.), Assertio Septem Sacramentorum (1688), ‘The Oration of Mr. John Clark’, pp.4-8. The emphasis on papal primacy was reinforced in the secret Consistory at which the Assertio was presented, whereby ‘the Pope’s holiness sat in his majesty upon a
The king, in his dedication of the text to Leo X, states that he wrote the book partly ‘to declare Our great respect towards your Holiness….and Our Obedience to the Service of Almighty God’. The king goes on to support the divine origin of pontifical authority, which Luther rejected. In his preface to the reader, for instance, Henry objects that Luther ‘calls the most Holy See of Rome, Babylon, and the Pope’s Authority Tyranny, and Esteems the most wholesom Decrees of the Universal Church to be Captivity; and turns the Name of the most Holy Bishop of Rome, to that of Antichrist’. In taking this position, the English king was at pains to stress the familiar role which he envisaged himself as playing; that of protector of the ‘faith’. Henry asserts ‘I account it as much my own Duty, as his who is the most Learned, by my utmost endeavours to Defend the Church, and to oppose my self to the Poisonous shafts of the Enemy that fights against her’. To perform this role, the king expounded the need to ‘Arm our selves with a two-fold Armour: the one Caelestial, and the other Terrestrial’, thereby recognising his own employment of both temporal and spiritual powers in his defence of the papacy against Luther.

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136 This contained in the Henry VIII’s dedication of the text to the Pope that precedes the main text, in T.W. Gent (ed.), Assertio Septem Sacramentorum, c.

137 Henry further accuses Luther of inconstancy in his position on this subject and argued ‘that all the Faithful, honour and acknowledge the Sacred Roman See for their Mother and Supream; nor does distance of Place or Dangers in the way hinder Acce’s thereunto… If the Bishop of Rome has got this large Power, neither by command of God, nor the Will of Man, but by main force; I would fain know of Luther, when the Pope rush’d into the Possession of so great Riches?’ Henry went on to argue the legitimacy of papal primacy according to custom and historic writings. Finally, the English king likens denial of papal primacy to the sins of ‘witchcraft’ and ‘idolatry’, and should be punished as such. Overall, Henry issued his full support of the papal claim to the divine origin of his power, resting his argument chiefly on the fact that its supremacy is universally recognised de facto and also that no evidence can be found for the human origin of papal power. Again, this was reinforced by Clerk during the presentation; T.W. Gent (ed.), Assertio Septem Sacramentorum, ‘The Oration of Mr. John Clark’, c.2, pp.4-8. To reinforce his message, Henry may also have sent with the Assertio a chasuble with gold embroidery depicting St Peter’s receipt of the keys from Christ; M. Mitchell, ‘Works of Art from Rome for Henry VIII’, JWC, 34, p.186.

138 Contained in Henry VIII’s address to the reader, prior to the main text in T.W. Gent (ed.), Assertio Septem Sacramentorum, c 2.
Henry VIII then went on to defend papal primacy against the latter’s challenges in the section ‘Of the Pope’s Authority’, although he did not mention his role again explicitly.\textsuperscript{139}

As promised, on 11 October 1521 (at a public consistory), Leo proclaimed that Henry VIII was to become ‘\textit{Fidei Defensor}’; the bull appears to recognise the English king’s longstanding protection of the Church with his ‘Material Sword’, in addition to the written defence against Luther, as the English had repeatedly desired. Notably, however, this document was not sent to England or handed over to Clerk at this stage.\textsuperscript{140} Indeed, the pope apparently delayed thanking Henry for the \textit{Assertio} and notifying him of the honorary title ‘for his services to the holy see’ until 4 November, when he promised that the king would soon receive the appropriate bulls.\textsuperscript{141} This delay was probably linked to events in Calais; Leo was still quite cagey about English intentions and would have been reluctant to commit to this reward without any guarantee of English backing in the war against France. While the pope had responded to Wolsey’s request to commission someone to join the proposed truce (so that England could prepare for war) and had also sent a power to conclude an alliance with Henry and Charles, he does not seem to have received any tangible guarantee that England would honour its promise, according to the Treaty of Bruges, to attack Francis I in 1523.\textsuperscript{142} Being already at war with France, however, it appears that the pontiff acted, albeit cautiously, both by sending commissions that need not ultimately be exercised and by awarding the English king an honorary title, yet

\textsuperscript{139} \textit{Ibid.}, pp.4-8.
\textsuperscript{140} The pope rejected, however, a late proposal (from members of the Sacred College) to add ‘\textit{Orthodoxus, seu Gloriosus, seu Fidelissimus}’ to this label; \textit{LPiii}, 1659 (11 October 1521, Rome); T.W. Gent (ed.), \textit{Assertio Septem Sacramentorum}, ‘The Pope’s Bull’, pp.b3 on; M. Creighton, \textit{History of the Papacy} v, p.375; J.J. Scarisbrick, \textit{Henry VIII}, p.116.
\textsuperscript{141} \textit{LPiii}, 1470 (4 November 1521, Leo to Henry, Rome).
\textsuperscript{142} These papal powers arrived in Calais perhaps around 20 October and were probably sent around the time that Leo had decided to allow the \textit{Assertio} to be presented in a secret Consistory; see below p.747.
withholding the bulls until such time as he was certain that Henry would act. The delay between
the Consistory proclaiming Henry as ‘Fidei Defensor’ and the pope’s notifying him of this in
writing can be attributed, therefore, to this uncertainty. On this basis, it would be surprising if
Leo had released the bulls prior to the English actively joining the war, given the lengthy
opportunity for Henry VIII to renege on this.

Back in England and Calais, news of the Assertio’s reception was eagerly awaited and
received. Notification that the honorary title had been awarded reached Henry by 17
November. He personally read Wolsey’s correspondence which described how the book had
pleased the pope enough ‘to g[ive] unto him the high and most excellent tit[le] of Defensor of the
Faith, to the perpetu[al] renown and glory of him and all his s[uc]cessors’. The king thanked God
and the pope for having ‘given unto him so notable a reward spiritual for his labour, [with] the
whole consent of all the College of Cardinals without contradiction’. Wolsey immediately
instructed Clerk to have the bulls for the title expedited. No sooner were Henry and Wolsey
celebrating news of the honorary title, however, than the pope died (1-2 December 1521).
Probably recalling the obstacles that had arisen in 1513 to withhold Julius II’s promise of the
investiture of France, Clerk immediately turned to gaining possession of the fidei defensor
documents. He noted the uncertainty created by the interregnum and that ‘every one here begins

143 Wolsey apparently heard of the initial receipt of the book in Rome by the pope around either 14 or 22 October,
news of which he forwarded straight to his grateful king, who acknowledged this by the 27th; LP IIIi, 1709 (27
October 1521, Pace to [Wolsey], Windsor), 1739 (4 November 1521, Pace to Wolsey, Windsor).
144 As well as sending Henry two letters of congratulations of his own (one in English, the other in Latin), dated 11
November, Wolsey forwarded an extract of Clerk’s letters, two missives from Campeggio and a copy of a note from
the secretary of de’ Medici. Richard Pace claimed to have read those from the cardinal to the nobles and councillors
present, as per his instructions; ibid., 1771 (17 November 1521, Pace to Wolsey), 1772 (17 November 1521, [Pace to
Wolsey], Windsor). There is also record of an oration given by Wolsey when presenting the title to Henry VIII,
although the fact that it refers to ‘the late Pope, Leo X’, confirms that it dates from outside of the period under
analysis; ibid., 1659 (11 October 1521, Rome).
145 Wolsey also instructed Clerk to have the king’s book distributed around universities; ibid., 1760 (Ellis, 282;
calendar 13-14 November 1521, [Wolsey to Clerk]).
to shift for himself’. While he spoke reassuringly that the title was ‘under lead’ and signed by the Sacred College, he repeatedly failed to obtain it from them; they always promised to send it themselves. Clerk clearly feared this procrastination and with good cause. The *interregnum* dragged out for the rest of the month and Giulio de’ Medici, mentioned the title in a letter to Henry VIII on the 24th (as ‘the greatest proof of the esteem the Pope [Leo] had for him’), in an apparent bid for English support in the forthcoming conclave, although there was no direct mention of the bulls. By the end of December, Clerk advised that the bull was ‘already sped in right good manner’, as Wolsey would see from the copy that he had recently sent him. The originals were held by de’ Medici and the orator told him to keep it safe so that, if he was elected, it would be unnecessary to lobby again. The cardinal protector agreed and added that they would have been sent already, had not Leo X not insisted on ‘divers verses and words’ to be composed in praise of Henry, which were intended to accompany the bulls.

The election of the non-curial Adrian VI on 9 January 1522 scuppered English hopes of easily gaining the bulls without seeking their confirmation. Nevertheless, Clerk pressured de’ Medici’s secretary (Gian Matteo Giberti), who held the documents, to release them. While Giberti admitted that that for the honorary title existed, he revealed that that confirming the king’s book did not. Clerk argued that Leo X had promised that everything was ready and only not to perceive any negligence on his part and relayed de’ Medici’s confidence that Adrian would

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146 Ibid., 1825 (2 December 1521, Clerk to Wolsey, Rome).
147 The Italian also enclosed letters written by Leo before his death, to which, he claimed, the pontiff intended to add a handwritten postscript. These may have mentioned the honorary title; ibid., 1893 (24 December 1521, [de’ Medici] to Henry, Rome).
148 Ibid., 1895 (calendared end December 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey]).
issue confirmations.\textsuperscript{149} Finally, de’ Medici may have attempted a further strategy concerning the bulls as, during January 1522, he told Pace that he was sending the same Giberti to England ‘upon the business that was to have been transacted with the late Pope’. If one takes into account that the secretary visited Charles V first, reportedly to seek the emperor’s backing for the next conclave, it could also be argued that Giberti sought the same outcome from Henry VIII, particularly given that he possessed valuable leverage.\textsuperscript{150} In the event, the bulls were not to be confirmed until de’ Medici himself did so in 1524 as Clement VII.\textsuperscript{151}

Scarisbrick describes the bestowal of the title \textit{fidei defensor} as ‘a reward for persistence as much as virtue’ and, while this was partly true, it can also be viewed as papal recognition of Henry’s role in protecting the Church from France. Although the English king had to apply considerable pressure to gain this title, it was the culmination of a number of inducements that the pope could and did dangle in front of Henry, in return for his political backing, and that Henry clearly coveted.\textsuperscript{152} This process arguably began with the Golden Rose back in 1510 to draw England into a coalition against France, continued with the (potential) investiture of France to ensure that the English did attack the French, the Cap and Sword when Leo X wanted to induce peace with Louis XII (albeit these gifts recognised the king’s recent ‘protection’ of the Church against France), and finally the title ‘\textit{fidei defensor}’, granted officially for Henry’s anti-Lutheran writing but also intended to recognise his practical defence of Rome. The offer and award of

\textsuperscript{149} \textit{Ibid.}, 1960 (13 January 1522, [Clerk to Wolsey]).
\textsuperscript{150} Unfortunately, nothing else seems to have survived concerning this mission; \textit{ibid.}, 1981 (23 January 1522, Pace to [Wolsey], Florence), 1984 (24 January 1522, Pace to Wolsey, Florence), 1985 (24 January 1522, de’ Medici to [Wolsey], Florence), 2004 (30 January 1522, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome); M.A. Tucker, ‘Gian Matteo Giberti, Papal Politician and Catholic Reformer’, \textit{EHR}, 18 (1903), pp.31-32.
\textsuperscript{152} J.J. Scarisbrick, \textit{Henry VIII}, p.117.
papal honours to the English crown during this period clearly demonstrates both that Henry VIII envisaged himself as a protector of the papacy’s political ‘independence’ from French dominance and that the popes recognised and played on this by using such awards to secure English support.
THE ROLE OF PAPAL CENSURES IN ENGLISH ATTEMPTS TO DEFEND THE PAPACY FROM FRANCE

Within its ecclesiastical armoury, the papacy possessed an array of spiritual weapons that it could wield against its enemies, political or otherwise. While the most well-known of these are probably excommunication and interdict, it could also reinforce these by promulgating economic sanctions, relieving populations of their obligations to their leaders, even deposing rulers, thereby justifying an attack (even crusade) against them and their states. It is almost universally accepted that the papacy’s spiritual weapons were (and had been for quite some time) integral to its political role as a temporal principate.¹ A brief look at a bull of 21 July 1512 shows Julius II citing chiefly temporal motives in his publication of censures against the Biscayans and Cantabrians (and others of those regions), as well as those who assisted France against the papacy or its allies in the Holy League, militarily or otherwise. While the former were punished in this manner due to their being convinced by Louis XII ‘to become enemies of the Church’, there is a distinct political motive for the pope’s citing of the latter group; they threatened the territories of the Church.² In the context of this study, it would be useful to define the key censures examined here. Excommunication of individual heads of state, at papal level, meant the act of excluding an individual from all aspects of religious life and, to a large extent, from society. It also referred to the subsequent state in which the individual was deemed to be. Only the pope could absolve the

¹ Trexler envisages an ascending gradation of these spiritual punishments that may or may not be imposed by Rome one after the other, to induce submission; C.L. Stinger, The Renaissance in Rome, pp.137-138; R.C. Trexler, The Spiritual Power, Republican Florence under Interdict, Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought IX (1974), pp.1, 8. For the relieving of subjects of their oaths and their connection with deposition, see E. Vodola, Excommunication in the High Middle Ages (1986), pp.21-23, 67-69.
² Sp.ii, 67 (LPIi, 1305; 13 September 1509, Ferdinand to Catherine of Aragon, Valladolid).
penitent recipient of the censure.\textsuperscript{3} Interdict, on the other hand, was a punishment whereby the ecclesiastical life of a given area or group was to cease. As a papal weapon, this had developed during the Middle Ages to be imposed against entire populations of cities or states and it is in this sense that it must be considered here. As will be seen, it was often employed simultaneously with excommunication against a state and/or population and its leader(s), respectively. Again, only the pope (as instigator of the punishment) could remove the sentence.\textsuperscript{4} Confusingly, ‘excommunication’ has often been employed by contemporaries and historians alike when ‘interdict’ may have been the more appropriate term. This sometimes makes it difficult to correctly identify and understand the particular censure which is being referred to.\textsuperscript{5} Concerning

\textsuperscript{3} It ought to be noted that popes were not the only individuals with the power to impose this censure and that excommunication itself can be subdivided into ‘major’ and ‘minor’ categories. One can further distinguish the ‘full ceremonial excommunication – the anathema’, intended to emphasise the seriousness of the censure or to reiterate it in the face of defiance from the recipient. Here, however, the focus will remain on instances of excommunication issued by the papacy against the leaders of other states, which were invariably cases of the more serious ‘major’ excommunication (which technically excluded recipients from the Church, its sacraments, as well as from contact and support from almost elements of society, the one notable exception being one’s dependents; F. Donald Logan, ‘Excommunication’, in J.R. Strayer (ed.), \textit{Dictionary of the Middle Ages}, vol. iv, pp.536-538; F. Donald Logan, \textit{Excommunication and the Secular Arm in Medieval England} (1968), pp.13-15; R. Hill, ‘The Theory and Practice of Excommunication’, \textit{History}, 42 (1957), p.1; R.N. Swanson, \textit{Church and Society}, pp.179-181; E. Vodola, \textit{Excommunication in the High Middle Ages}, pp. 14-16, 36-37, 45.

\textsuperscript{4} Again, interdicts could be imposed by others, but it is papal instances that are the focus here; E. Vodola, ‘Interdict’, in J.R. Strayer (ed.), \textit{Dictionary of the Middle Ages}, vol. vi, pp.493-497.

\textsuperscript{5} Among contemporaries, Trewler notes the use of ‘excommunication’ for ‘interdict’ among the lower levels of society up to the end of the fifteenth century, but it seems to extend into this period at least and is apparent among individuals who one would have expected to have been able to distinguish between the two. On 30 April 1509, for instance, Jerome Bonvisi (a papal notary and English solicitor) reported the excommunication of the Venetians. Ferdinand of Aragon uses the same term when writing to his daughter on the republic’s predicament in November of the same year. Even Henry VIII may have blurred the distinction between excommunication and interdict; apparently quoting a letter to the pope from the English king, it was recorded in the senate that Henry requested that Julius absolve ‘the Venetians, his friends, from the excommunication’. Even the pope himself pronounced ‘Greater Excommunication’ against the Biscayans, Cantabrians, and their adherents if they did not return to the obedience of the Church within three days, along with all those assisting, supporting or fighting for Louis XII and his allies. Finally, a Florentine diarist in June 1511, noted the pope’s excommunication of Bologna following the city’s throwing off the shackles of papal rule and welcoming the return of the Bentivoglio; R.C. Trewler, \textit{The Spiritual Power, Republican Florence under Interdict}, p.6; \textit{LPI}, 9 (LPI, 11; 30 April 1509, Bonvisi to Henry VII, Rome); \textit{Sp.ii}, 27 (LPI, 253; 18 or 28 November 1509, Ferdinand to Catherine of Aragon); \textit{Ven.ii}, 39 (LPI, 373; 24 February 1510, Paulo Capello to his brother, Rome); \textit{LPI}, 1305 (Sp.ii, 67; 21 July 1512, Julius II to all persons, Rome); A. de Rosen Jervis (trans.), \textit{A Florentine Diary from 1450 to 1516 by Luca Landucci Continued by an Anonymous Writer till 1542 with Notes by Iodoco del Badia} (1927), p.245. Similarly, among historians, on the other hand, Shaw refers to ‘the bull of excommunication against Venice’ of 1509, when the censure that was laid on the republic was an
the other papal censures, the economic sanctions that will be considered here are the right to confiscation of goods of those under excommunication or interdict; ‘a pretext for opportunistic robbery’, as Trexler describes it.\(^6\) The release of subjects from oaths and deposition are self-explanatory concepts that were often inter-related, although they were usually a separate and secondary consequence of excommunication and interdict. They were, nevertheless, generally intended to be temporary, until the head of state or government had repented and was absolved by the pope. While, technically, vassals (and others subordinated by oath) were automatically released from their obligations to their lords when the latter were excommunicated, in practice this had long been a separate (and subsequent) pronouncement from the sentence of excommunication itself. The implicit intention of these acts was to allow the subjects of a deposed leader, whose obligations had been lifted, to rebel against them, not fight on their behalf (particularly against papal interests) and not contribute financially to their lord’s opposition to the papacy.\(^7\) After any or all of such censures were imposed, the papacy and its allies had ‘spiritual’ justification for war which may be presented as a form of crusade or a precursor to crusade (to the East), as the target was impeding universal peace (the necessary precondition to such a crusade).\(^8\)


\(\text{\textsuperscript{7}}\) These censures were apparently separated from that of excommunication by Gregory VII in 1076. Concerning the desired consequences of these punishments, vassals and subjects had long been forbidden from fighting for an excommunicated lord, but deposition and the suspension of oaths reinforced this; W.J. Bouwsma, \textit{Venice and the Defense of Republican Liberty} (1968), pp.7-8; E. Vodola, \textit{Excommunication in the High Middle Ages}, pp.20-23, 67-69.

\(\text{\textsuperscript{8}}\) See above p.98.
In 1509, it would have been well-known within crown circles that Julius II was no stranger to using his spiritual weapons in the political sphere. He had excommunicated the Bentivoglio of Bologna (and their followers) in 1506 and would have been expected to lay Venice and its leaders under interdict as part of the League of Cambrai then formed against the republic. The main reason for Julius’ attacks on both was related to his attempts to secure and extend papal control over lands claimed as part of the Papal States. Similarly, Leo X’s wielding of spiritual weapons against Francesco Maria della Rovere, duke of Urbino, in 1516 was also motivated by temporal concerns. Some contemporaries readily recognised the underlying political motives of these papal weapons. For instance, Erasmus in his *Julius Exclusus* (c.1513-1514), envisaged St Peter ridiculing the deceased Julius II’s use of these ‘thunderbolts’ in this manner and questioning their theological basis. Guicciardini, in a section of his *History of Italy* that was understandably omitted from Italian editions until long after his death, rued the historic tendency of popes increasingly ‘employing the terror of their spiritual weapons for temporal occasions…’. On the other hand those, such as Giles of Viterbo, Paolo Cortesi and Raffaele

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9 The interdict on Venice and excommunication of its senate duly came towards the April of 1509. Julius II also cited a dispute over benefices for the breach, but this was not the root cause of the pope’s vilification of the republic; C.L. Stinger, *The Renaissance in Rome*, pp.138-139. Concerning Bologna, Julius also prepared to fulminate an interdict against the city, but apparently decided to limit his censures to the leading family and their adherents; W.K. Gotwald, *Ecclesiastical Censure at the End of the Fifteenth Century* (1927), p.71; C. Shaw, *Julius II*, p.159.

10 The duke had conspired with France in 1515, prior to the battle of Marignano, withheld his military forces at the battle and afterwards stirred up the French king against the pope. As a result, Leo, citing breach of fealty, excommunicated the duke, deprived him of his lands and titles and placed the territories that continued to support him under interdict. The pope also planned to install his nephew, Lorenzo de’ Medici, in the duchy; W.K. Gotwald, *Ecclesiastical Censure at the End of the Fifteenth Century*, p.81; L. Pastor, *History of the Popes*, vii, pp.147-150.

11 The *Julius Exclusus* was published in 1517; P. Pascal (trans.), *The Julius Exclusus of Erasmus*, p.49. Also see pp.55, 58. It must be noted that such criticism was not a new phenomenon, predating this period by at least 200 years, but contemporaries did perceive that the frequency of such use of papal censures had increased. Also see R.C. Trexler, *The Spiritual Power, Republican Florence under Interdict*, p.3.

12 S. Alexander (ed.), *The History of Italy by Francesco Guicciardini*, pp.140 n., 147. Also see C.L. Stinger, *The Renaissance in Rome*, p.139. Machiavelli also criticised the politically motivated employment of spiritual weapons; he wrote that ‘it will be evident that the popes, first with censures, and then with censures and arms at the same time, mixed with indulgences, excited fear and awe’. He also highlighted the ‘bad use of censures and arms’; W.J. Bouwsma, *Venice and the Defense of Republican Liberty*, pp.36, 38.
Maffei, perhaps did not wholly agree with this practice, but admitted that this was done ostensibly in defence of the Church and, therefore, the papacy.\textsuperscript{13} In essence, they recognised that this was a ‘necessary evil’ to ensure the papacy’s survival. While it is difficult to pinpoint the English crown’s attitude towards this practice, given that its principal figures do not appear to have commented publicly on such issues, one can probably lean them towards the latter camp, if any. It will become clear that Henry VIII did recognise the usefulness of papal censures in his bid to protect the papacy from the French and their allies and lobbied the papacy in this direction, but he was not oblivious to the potentially detrimental consequences, even indirect, that these could have on English interests, and the dangers that these posed when rivals like France attempted to influence the papacy in the same way. It is in these contexts that papal censures in the Anglo-papal relationship demand attention.

In light of the papacy’s preparedness to utilise these unique weapons in a temporal context, it is unsurprising that they were also politicised by the English crown in its relationship with Rome.\textsuperscript{14} The role that papal censures played in the Anglo-papal political relationship was twofold. Firstly, they were an attractive reason for allying with the pontiff against England’s enemies, particularly France. Secondly, they were a reason to avoid the enmity of Rome and, if the English crown disagreed with their implementation (including against states and leaders with which it had no quarrel), they were ignored. There was, therefore, a sense of double-standards in Henry VIII’s treatment of the papacy’s spiritual weapons; this political expediency will become


\textsuperscript{14} Despite some historians’ arguments that the employment of papal censures in a political context somehow lessened their effects, it will be demonstrated here that, even if this was the case, this did not dampen the desire of the English crown to have them imposed on mutual enemies. For an example of the former view, see W.K. Gotwald, \textit{Ecclesiastical Censure at the End of the Fifteenth Century}, p.82; C. Shaw, \textit{Julius II}, pp.222-223.
apparent in the subsequent analysis. Briefly, the reasons for these censures being a significant element of Anglo-papal policy lay in the political, economic and religious consequences they had (or could have) against the cited individuals, groups or lands cited. In a political sense, papal censures could help bestow papal, the Church’s and even God’s justification on a given conflict, discourage support or obedience being given to the recipient, even cause a rival to enter into ‘rightful’ possession of certain lands and titles. In an economic sense, these spiritual weapons enabled the confiscation of the recipient’s or recipients’ goods and property. They were a particularly potent threat to states dependent on a strong mercantile element to their economy, such as Florence, which invariably had a considerable number of merchants and bankers (and assets) abroad who were vulnerable to the effects of these punishments, but they could also affect diplomats as well.15 The censure of deposition of a state’s leader could equally legitimise similar confiscations, in addition to sanctioning invasion and regime change.16 Finally, in a spiritual sense, the original intention of these papal weapons, particularly in cases of excommunication and interdict, was to punish the recipient with their exclusion from the Church and its sacraments. The aim was for the recipient to feel that, without the ecclesiastical ‘insurance’ and protection involved with being a member of the universal Church, they needed to reconcile themselves by seeking absolution, in the cases focused on here, from the papacy.17 Of these consequences of papal censures, it will be the political and economic that will receive primary focus here.

15 This risk to the citizens residing abroad of, say, a state under interdict, had been extant for centuries. Moreover, the proximity to Rome and mercantile basis of the economies of most north Italian city-states made the economic implications of papal censures most serious for these entities; C. Shaw, *Julius II*, pp.6, 222-223.
17 F. Donald Logan describes the intention of excommunication as ‘medicinal’ and one can also ascribe this adjective to other papal censures as well; the papacy’s intention was always for the recipient to seek the removal of the fulminations by submitting to the will of Rome; F. Donald Logan, ‘Excommunication’, in J.R. Strayer (ed.), *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, vol. iv, p.537.
Firstly, the English crown envisaged the papacy’s spiritual weapons as an attractive by-product of having Rome as a political ally; they could be brought to bear against a mutual enemy, particularly France during this period when Henry sought to defend the Church, but also against the latter’s ally, Scotland. The sanctions that Henry VIII sought and/or observed from the pontiff ranged from excommunication and interdict to the deposition of the Most Christian King himself, along with the transfer of France to Henry, all as a prelude to papal-sponsored war against France (and Scotland). One can observe Henry VIII and his principal councillors advocating and actively seeking papal sanctions against England’s enemies during this period. Concerning the English desire to have sentences of excommunication and interdict fulminated against Louis XII (and later Francis I) and France, this was apparent when the papacy’s use of spiritual weapons was stipulated in the anti-French treaties of the period to which Henry VIII was party, as well as in actions, requests and statements reportedly emanating from the crown itself.

Initially, England was intimately involved, through Bainbridge, in the negotiations which led to the Holy League of 4 October 1511. This bound the pope, in one of its articles, to excommunicate any opposition to the confederacy. In the military action that was to take place outside of Italy, the papal contribution was limited to its spiritual armoury. There would have been little doubt that France was the intended target. The English crown’s eagerness to observe such censures is next indicated when French intelligence from April 1512 reported that Henry had refused to give audience to a French ambassador, having ‘learned from the Pope that the

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18 Ven.ii, 1345-1346 (Sp.ii, 56; LPl, 889; LPI, 1880-1881; 4 October 1511). England’s commission to Bainbridge (and the Spanish ambassador in Rome) to ratify the Holy League appears to have been dated 4 December 1511; ibid., 140 (LPl, 1001; arrival in Venice of an English courier carrying letters dated 4 December 1511, London). It ought to be noted that the inclusion of such clauses was normal and in no way exclusive to English involvement.
French are excommunicated, and are no better than dogs’. Similarly, by the end of May, the Venetian consul, Pasqualigo, talked of the English monarch’s resolve to act ‘against those who are excommunicated’, again suggesting the French, given the planned Anglo-Spanish attack via Guienne that summer. Subsequent treaties based on the Holy League against France also displayed a desire to use ecclesiastical sanctions against the mutual enemy. In a wider version of the league comprising the emperor, concluded 19 November 1512, it was provided that the pope excommunicate Louis XII and all Frenchmen. That the English crown was at least partly complicit in demanding these stipulations for the papacy is suggested by similar provisions being included in the more detailed and focused treaties concluded around the same time with two of its confederates, the Empire and Spain. In that with Maximilian (5 April 1513), Julius II was bound to excommunicate enemies of the league, while that with Ferdinand (18 April 1513) obliged them to induce Leo X ‘to excommunicate all the abettors and subjects of the King of France, whenever and as often as he is requested by the contracting parties, or any of them to do so’.

Whether the English crown was involved in instigating the deposition of Louis XII in March 1512 is unclear, although one can clearly perceive a hope that this become permanent when...

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19 LPI, 1127 (LPI, 3112; 1 April 1512). As will be outlined later, no excommunication or interdict seems to have been pronounced against Louis XII or France directly by this point, other than the then secret deposition of the Most Christian King on 20 March, news of which could not have reached England by 1 April, although Henry may have been forewarned about this. One can only otherwise speculate that the French were deemed ‘excommunicate’ on account of their adherence to the Council of Pisa, that first met in November 1511, which, according to the bull convoking Lateran V, thus sentenced all of its supporters; ibid., 932 (5 November 1511); W.K. Gotwald, Ecclesiastical Censure at the End of the Fifteenth Century, p.77; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vi, pp.364-365. That there was some belief in England that France had incurred ecclesiastical censure at this early point is suggested by a similar reference to the French as ‘excommunicated dogs’, at the turn of April-May 1512, by the Venetian ambassador in England Andrea Badoer, this time in the context of English military preparations against France; Ven.ii, 159 (LPI, 1126; 30 April and 1 May 1512, Badoer to the Signory, London).


21 Sp.ii, 73-75 (LPI, 1486; 19 [November] 1512). This confederacy also excluded Venice and Maximilian hoped to gain a papal pledge to level censures against the republic. In the event, Julius did admonish Venice that he would wield his spiritual weapons against it if the republic did not come to terms with Maximilian, but does not appear to have followed this up; C. Shaw, Julius II, pp.310-311.

22 Sp.ii, 84 ([January] 1513). Also see ibid., 97 (LPI, 1750; LPI, 3649, 3859-3860; 5 April 1513).

23 Ibid., 101 (18 April 1513).
Christopher Bainbridge, in Rome, repeatedly sought to gain possession of bulls that invested his king with the kingdom and its titles (in particular that of ‘Most Christian King’), thence to have them made public. It appears, however, that Julius II was behind this offer, despite the unlikelihood that it would be honoured unless Henry conquered France, as a political inducement to ensure English observation of the Holy League. Further and more direct evidence of the English crown actively pursuing such papal censures against France can be seen in the wake of Julius II’s death, when confirmation of the previous fulminations was needed from the new pontiff. On 12 or 30 April 1513, Henry wrote to Bainbridge in response to notification of Leo X’s election; in reply, he was keen to secure the new pontiff’s support for the impending English invasion of France, including Leo’s renewal of the spiritual censures pronounced particularly against Louis XII and France, but also against other enemies of the Church. By 25 June, Bainbridge notified Henry that Leo was sending two briefs confirming Julius II’s grants to him against the enemies of the Church, although the pope could not attack France himself.

Contemporaneous to Henry’s enthusiasm to take advantage of its alliance with the papacy in this way, he also sought similar benefits vis-à-vis the old French ally, Scotland. In this case, all of the running seems to have been done by England. Bainbridge worked to direct papal censures against Scotland as a result of Catherine of Aragon’s notification (18 September 1512) that James

24 See above pp.144-151.
25 This being said, one cannot entirely rule out the idea coming from Bainbridge or from England.
26 One can reasonably surmise that Henry VIII and his advisors were most concerned with Louis XII’s deposition and the promised investiture of Henry with his kingdom and titles. In addition, one can also presume that this request covered the bull releasing the French from their obligations to their king and the interdict placed on the kingdom in August 1512 (and reiterated in the third session of the Lateran Council on 3 December); N.P. Tanner (ed.), Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, i, pp.597-598.
27 Ibid., 1769 (LPI, 3876; Ven.ii, 238; 12 April 1513, Henry to Bainbridge, London).
28 Ibid., 2029 (LPI, 4283; 25 June 1513, Bainbridge to Henry). Ferdinand also sought Leo X’s renewal of the censure of France in September 1513; Sp.ii, 132 ([September] 1513, Ferdinand to Cardinal Remolines).
IV had broken the Anglo-Scottish peace agreement. A monitory brief was granted by 24 November and James IV had received this and a bull of execution by the following March (1513), for both of which the Scot blamed Bainbridge. The problem for England, however, was that a new pope had since been elected, which meant that these censures had to be reconfirmed. While Leo seems to have issued some sort of confirmation of those against Scotland in his first letter to Henry VIII, the king sought further clarification from Rome on these. By 25 June, the pope promised Bainbridge that he had written to James threatening that, if he attacked England, ‘he [Leo] … woll not oonlie granntt unto Your Grace oon odr bull confirmyng the furst granntide by pope Julie butt also grantt oon harder…’. Perhaps satisfied with this, Bainbridge (and de Giglis) only returned to this issue on 15 September 1513, having heard of a Scottish incursion into England, when they sought the promised stronger bull. Despite French opposition, Leo reportedly pledged to send an orator to England with the desired bulls before Michaelmas. In any case, he presumed that the bishops of Durham and Carlisle would already have fulminated the

29 Ven.ii, 203 (LPi, 1391; 18 September 1512, Catherine of Aragon to Bainbridge, London). For the treaty of 19 August 1509, which was a renewal of the peace between James and Henry VII from 1502, see LPi, 153 (LPi, 474-475, 478; 29 August 1509). Both parties swore to observe the treaty under pain of excommunication (and, it seems, interdict); see, for instance, Leonard Lopez’s comments on the treaty to James in April 1512 which, he claimed, had been ‘sanctioned by the strictest pontifical penalties’. Also, see James seeking exemption from his oath to observe the Anglo-Scottish peace, ‘ratified under apostolic censures’, because of Henry’s persistent infringement of the concordat (5 December 1511); ibid., 974 (LPi, 2020; 5 December 1511, James IV to Julius II), 1158 (LPi, 3146; 25 April 1512, Leonard Lopez to James IV, London). Also see J.D. Mackie, ‘Henry VIII and Scotland’, TRHS 19 (1947), p.98.

30 James was reported to be so angry that he would not perform obedience to the new pontiff, if Leo did not listen to his appeal against the censures; LPi, 1735 (LPi, 3838; 1 April 1513, Nicholas West to Henry); D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.40.

31 LPi, 1769 (LPi, 3876; Ven.ii, 238; 12 April 1513, Henry to Bainbridge, London), 1775 (LPi, 3882; 13 April 1513, Nicholas West to Henry).

32 Fiddes, c.5-7 (LPiii, 2029; LPi, 4283; 25 June 1513, Bainbridge to Henry); D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.52. Catherine of Aragon may have been citing the confirmation of papal censures against Scotland when she wrote to Wolsey on 26 July that she was glad to have a brief sent to Henry; LPi, 2120 (LPi, 4365; 26 July 1513, Catherine of Aragon to Wolsey, R[ichmond]).
excommunication originally expedited by Julius II. [33] In comparison with the censures against the French, there is a distinct sense that, concerning Scotland, both Julius and Leo were reluctant to excommunicate James IV under their own authority. This was perhaps because the papacy had no direct quarrel with Scotland as, while that kingdom was an ally of France (and thereby liable to incur spiritual sanctions on account of their being contagious), it was not attacking the papacy directly and had not been party to the French-backed Council of Pisa-Milan. The English crown was, moreover, citing breach of oath as the justification of the sentence, which the pontiff was not really in any position to prove or disprove. It may well have been for this reason that the pope demonstrated his political support of England by devolving power and responsibility for the sentence against James IV to Bainbridge. [34]

A similar impression of English enthusiasm for politically-motivated papal censures is gained from subsequent leagues intended against France, for which the pontiff’s support was hoped, expected or already attained. In negotiations during summer 1515 which led to England committing to join another league to defend the papacy against France, Leo X approached Henry VIII with a view to employing universal peace and a subsequent crusade as cover for this. The English king replied that he recognised the pope’s sense of obstacles caused by ‘the private interests of certain princes’, as a result of which he recommended that ‘such obstinacy should no longer be encountered by prayers, but by the spiritual sword, and [he, Henry] proffers his aid’. [35]

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[33] LPIii, 2276 (LPI, 4455; 17 September 1513, [Bainbridge] and de Giglis to Henry, Rome). A nuncio was commissioned, Balthazar Stuerd, but his instruction to compose a peace between England and Scotland make the enforcement of a stronger bull of excommunication unlikely; see below pp.438-439.
[34] LPIii, 2258 (LPI, 4446; 12 September 1513, Bainbridge to [Henry]).
[35] LPIi, 712 (15 July 1515, Henry to Leo, Greenwich). This is perhaps the request for papal censures against France that Ferdinand of Aragon (in September 1515) understood that Henry had made to Rome and which, in the
At a time when Francis I was increasingly rumoured to be preparing to descend into Italy, the English king clearly intended France as the object of these spiritual (and temporal) weapons. Henry may have been responding to a vague admonition issued by Leo during June, threatening censures against any aggressors to the Papal States, particularly the outpost cities of Parma and Piacenza. ³⁶ This was not pointedly against Francis I at this stage because the pope had yet to make his ratification of that year’s anti-French coalition public.³⁷ If Henry was going to commit to this anti-Gallic alliance, however, an indirect threat was deemed insufficient and he consequently demanded a more public declaration of papal support. Ferdinand of Aragon understood this and encouraged the pontiff to wield the spiritual sword for his son-in-law’s benefit both in the summer and around mid-September 1515.³⁸ In negotiations conducted in Rome towards English membership of the anti-French league, it seems that censures were envisaged, not least because it declared that the parties were bound to fight the ‘schismatics’. In addition a crusade was envisaged as the eventual aim.³⁹ This league was never finalised, however, due to coalition’s loss at the Battle of Marignano (13-14 September). Subsequently, it was observed (probably by the Imperial Cardinal Lang) that, while the pope may have been induced to employ spiritual weapons if English commitment had occurred, his apparent leaning towards France at that point now made this unlikely.⁴⁰

While the English crown struggled to organise an anti-French coalition involving the papacy from April 1516 on, it seems that use of the papacy’s spiritual armoury was always

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³⁶ These territories were nominally held by Giuliano de’ Medici: W. Roscoe, Leo the Tenth, ii, p.12.
³⁷ Public papal adhesion occurred during July 1515; see below pp.471-472.
³⁸ Sp.ii, 212 (calendared summer 1515, Ferdinand to his ambassador in Rome).
³⁹ Ibid., 222 (calendared September 1515).
⁴⁰ LPIIi, 1265 (10 December 1515, Robert Wingfield to Wolsey, ‘[Fiesyn], in Swave’).
envisaged. In the league ‘for defence of the Church’ eventually concluded in London on 29 October 1516, Leo was expected to employ the spiritual arm in its support when he joined; excommunication and interdict were specifically mentioned and he was bound not to absolve anyone without the consent of his allies.\textsuperscript{41} Wolsey had been confident of such a clause shortly prior to this when he threatened the Venetians with such censures if they did not join the league.\textsuperscript{42} Similarly Wolsey, during December, notified Giustinian of his intention to demand that France and Venice cease their attack on the Imperial city of Verona, refusal of which would lead to England waging war on them as if they were ‘infidels’ and requesting the pope to censure both states, ‘so that should you choose to exist, it will behave you go into Turkey’.\textsuperscript{43} Given the lack of celebration surrounding the league, the English crown may not have been that confident of papal adhesion and, therefore, of the prospect of papal censures being fulminated. Indeed, Leo X visibly stepped back from the anti-French agenda following the defection of Charles and Maximilian to France by the Treaty of Noyon (13 August 1516) and, later, the Swiss.\textsuperscript{44} While papal ratification was not forthcoming, Leo continued to send positive noises to England and, as a result of an approach to gain a loan for the Urbino war during March-April 1517, was to offer his membership in exchange for this.\textsuperscript{45} Various papal commitments to the October league and its provisions for excommunication and censure were issued via a nuncio on 11 May and on 5 July, but these do not seem to have represented full adhesion to it. Indeed, Leo confirmed his membership of the league in August, but withheld this from de Giglis until 18 November 1517

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., 2486 (29 October 1516); Sp.ii, 253-254 (15 November 1516).
\textsuperscript{42} Wolsey pledged to lobby Leo X to excommunicate both Venice and France; R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, ii, pp.12-16 (Ven.ii, 791; LPIII, 2464; 20 October 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London).
\textsuperscript{43} R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, ii, p.13 (Ven.ii, 822; LPIII, 2642; 7 December 1516, Giustinian to the Signory London). Francis I dismissed this threat when he heard of it; Ven.ii, 830 (22 December 1516, Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory, Amboise).
\textsuperscript{44} See below pp.557 ff.
\textsuperscript{45} See below pp.606 ff.
and, even then, insisted that it remain secret.\textsuperscript{46} By this time, however, the English do not seem to have had much confidence in the coalition, let alone in the pope’s obligation to wield the spiritual sword.

Finally, the English crown expected Leo X to use ‘the spiritual arm only’ against Francis I and France according to the Treaty of Bruges of 25 August 1521, by which Henry committed England to join the Empire in the conflict against France.\textsuperscript{47} Similarly, its extension to involve the papacy on 24 November also stipulated that France be laid under interdict.\textsuperscript{48} Prior or subsequent English pressure may have been deemed unnecessary, given that the papacy had already declared itself publicly against France and had started on this course already in late June 1521.\textsuperscript{49} At this point, Leo threatened with censure those who had invaded the Papal States, in particular the French commanders. While Charles V called for stronger sanctions, the excommunication of Francis himself, the pope did not respond until 4 September, when he demanded that the French cease hostilities and hand over Parma and Piacenza within 15 days, on pain of Francis and his generals incurring such punishment.\textsuperscript{50}

In addition to Henry VIII’s enthusiasm for the papacy to employ spiritual weapons against the French and their allies when he was acting to protect the Church, the papacy equally recognised these as inducements to ensure English support and commitment against their enemies. The strongest example of this has already been discussed, whereby Julius II drew up

\textsuperscript{46} Giustinian, reported hearing that it provided for the pope to ‘fulminate censures’; R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, ii, p.95 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 913; \textit{LPiIii}, 3415; 30 June 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London). \textit{LPiIii}, 3437 (5 July 1517).
\textsuperscript{47} It was stipulated that he ‘lay the whole of France under interdict, and withdraw all the honours and prerogatives which the French have hitherto held of the Church of Rome’; \textit{LPiIii}, 1508 (25 August 1521, Bruges).
\textsuperscript{48} \textit{Ibid.}, 1796 (22 November 1521), 1802 (24 November 1521, Calais); P. Gwyn, ‘Wolsey’s Foreign Policy’, \textit{HJ}, 24, p.769.
\textsuperscript{49} See below pp.734 ff.
\textsuperscript{50} L. Pastor, \textit{History of the Popes}, viii, pp.46-49.
documents deposing Louis XII and investing the English monarch with the kingdom of France on 20 March 1512 (also sanctioning Henry’s coronation as king). The catch was, however, that they were to be kept secret and the pope refused to publish them until Henry VIII had secured control of France, a position that Julius continued to hold despite sustained pressure from Bainbridge to obtain possession of the documents. ⁵¹ Throughout this episode, one senses the papacy consciously employing its censorial powers (and powers of investiture) to induce positive English involvement in the conflict against France, without any serious intention of fulfilling its pledge. Only if Henry VIII dealt a knockout blow in France would the papacy’s bluff have been called. Conversely, the English crown, whether it believed the papacy or not, grasped at the bait offered, in the hope of realising its claim to France. Perhaps Henry was persuaded that there was a chance, however slight, of gaining at least papal recognition of his claim to the French throne, given that there was a recent precedent for Julius II investing a rival of Louis XII with a territory claimed by France. During July 1510, Julius II awarded the kingdom of Naples to Ferdinand of Aragon. ⁵² If the Holy League’s military aims were achieved, there was a slight chance, therefore, that English ambitions may be achieved. At the very least, the claim to France could be a bargaining chip in a future Anglo-French peace. Another occasion when the papacy used censures as bait for English support occurred in October 1516, when Richard Pace reported from Zurich, a papal offer via a nuncio to censure Francis I, using the latter’s usurpation of Milan as justification. ⁵³ Bearing in mind that Henry was, at that point, close to concluding a new anti-French league with Maximilian and the Swiss, it is entirely feasible that the pope envisaged such means vis-à-vis England to

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⁵¹ See above pp.144-151.
⁵³ *LPIII*, 2473 (22 October 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Zurich).
ensure that this confederacy would align with him and/or his interests.\textsuperscript{54} Finally, papal recognition of the importance attached by England to the use of its censures can be seen in the excommunication of James IV 1512-1513. Despite its apparent reluctance, the papacy still delegated authority for this action to Cardinal Bainbridge, thereby indicating support for England’s defence of the Church against its enemies, even though France had been the main target.\textsuperscript{55}

It was not just the papacy that recognised the value placed on its spiritual censures by England when acting in defence of Rome; other states also identified and used this to encourage Henry VIII towards war with France. As early as September 1510, for instance, the Venetians, understanding that Julius II was considering such weapons against their mutual enemy, encouraged the pope in this direction, believing that such a move would induce English actions against Louis XII.\textsuperscript{56} Again, during October 1512, Venice wrote to its ambassador in Rome concerning the likely abandonment of the Anglo-Spanish invasion of Gascony. The republic asserted that it would write to Henry VIII, not only to urge his continuation of this expedition, but to request that the pope ‘transmit spiritual weapons and censures to aid the war in the duchy of Guipure’.\textsuperscript{57} Similarly, Ferdinand of Aragon in December 1513, seeking a renewed Holy League with England, wrote to his ambassador with Henry that ‘if the Pope has already absolved or is about to absolve the King of France, and if the schism is at an end, the Apostolic censures against the King of France must last until he gives back that of which he has unjustly deprived his

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 2497 (calendared start November 1516); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.321-325 (Ven.ii, 800; LPIli, 2499; 1 November 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London).
\textsuperscript{55} See below pp.422-424.
\textsuperscript{56} Ven.ii, 79 (LPIi, 567; 7 September 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome).
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 198 (LPIi, 1432; 11 October 1512, Signory to the Venetian ambassador at the Curia).
neighbours’. During the summer of 1515, Ferdinand encouraging resistance to Francis I’s expedition to Italy, instructed his orator in Rome, to persuade the pope both to write to Henry VIII and to pronounce Francis I excommunicated, which he claimed that Henry desired very much. By 14 September, Ferdinand reiterated that Leo ought ‘to publish, without delay, the bull of censure against the French which the King of England has asked of him. He is to stigmatise the French as usurpers of the property of their neighbours and disturbers of the peace of Christendom, and as the obstacle to war with the Infidels. Such a bull will have great weight with the King of England. It will animate him and furnish him with a good pretext for declaring war’. Finally, this sentiment can be seen in the Imperial minister, Matthew Lang, during December 1515, when the cardinal reportedly told Robert Wingfield that, if it had been known that Henry was willing to enter the Holy League that year, both pope and emperor could have been urged to ask Henry to start the war and Leo X could have been encouraged to fulminate censures against France.

While these instances demonstrate considerable English enthusiasm for the use of papal censures against France and its allies, and some success in having them employed, particularly when seeking to act in defence of the Church, it should be borne in mind that having the pope as an ally did not automatically mean that he would wield them on demand. Indeed, as the obstacles raised in Bainbridge’s attempts to gain the brief investing Henry with France and the papacy’s reluctance to excommunicate James IV directly both demonstrate, the pontiff was not prepared to concede readily to all of Henry VIII’s requests in this area just because he was acting to protect

58 Concerning England, this could mean just Guienne/Gascony or even the kingdom of France itself; Sp. ii, 146 (6 December 1513, Ferdinand to his ambassador in England). Also see ibid., 147 (6 December 1513, Ferdinand to his ambassador in Germany).
59 Ibid., 212 ([summer] 1515, Ferdinand to his ambassador in Rome).
60 Ibid., 217 (14 September 1515, Ferdinand to his ambassador in Rome).
61 LPIII, 1265 (10 December 1515, Robert Wingfield to Wolsey, ‘[Fiesyn], in Swave’).
him. Historically, the papacy had been fairly reluctant to impose such sanctions against heads of state, if they could be avoided. The perceived gravity of such weapons can be discerned through Julius II’s apparent reservations about leveling them against Louis XII and France, 1510-1512. Initially, around November 1510, the pope excommunicated the French commander-in-chief, de Chaumont, and his captains, along with Milan (a French dependency), when the former appeared with his army before Bologna, where the pontiff was then resident. If one bears in mind that the papacy had been openly in conflict with French interests in Italy since July 1510, why did Julius II limit his censures to the French army within Italy? The most obvious reason is that formal papal censure against the Most Christian King and his kingdom was a major step to take and would cement a breach with a ‘superpower’ that maintained a strong military presence in Italy. Julius was perhaps not ready to do that at this stage, not having formed the necessary coalition to help him resist this. Again the pope skirted around the issue when he excommunicated the adherents of Louis XII on 16 April 1511. Indeed, the French king could have incurred automatic censure on a number of occasions, such as on his intended adherence to

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62 While Julius did depose Louis XII, such an action was theoretically meant to be temporary, until repentance and absolution. By making the investiture of Henry VIII public, the pope would have indicated that the deposition was intended to be permanent and would have instigated a serious political situation in its future relations with France. Concerning the excommunication of James IV, that this was allowed through Bainbridge, suggests that Julius II may have been uncomfortable about censoring a king with whom he had little quarrel, other than the Scot being an ally of Louis XII. While the pontiff did potentially have grounds for excommunicating James, as an ally of the schismatic king of France, the Scot had neither adhered to the Council of Pisa nor attacked England (yet). The only tangible grounds that Julius II could employ were Henry VIII’s rather subjective claims that it was solely James that was in breach of the Anglo-Scottish peace. As an ally of England, the pope met Henry half-way by allowing the excommunication, but not directly through him.

63 Hill argues that the papacy was reluctant to censor the secular power on which it relied for the enforcement of its spiritual punishments (at all levels, from personal to state), as well as for papal authority in general; R Hill, ‘The Theory and Practice of Excommunication’, History, 42, pp.6-7.

64 Ven.ii, 88 (LPli, 613; 16 November 1510, Signory to Badoer). Theoretically, Louis could have incurred excommunication as a result of his continued association with his excommunicated captains in Italy, but the gravity of the sentence against a king probably demanded a separate sentence in practice.

65 Since attacks on Genoa and Ferrara, although one can trace Julius’ sentiment back at least to the absolution of Venice in February 1510; C. Shaw, Julius II, pp.252-263.

the Council of Pisa, as condemned in the bull summoning the Fifth Lateran Council of 18 July 1511. As already stated, actual papal censures against France only began to be issued in March 1512, when Louis XII’s titles and territories were secretly transferred to Henry. The pope went one step further in consistory, either in May or July 1512, depriving Louis XII publicly in front of the cardinals and pledging the transferance of these titles and territories to Henry if he gained control of France. On 13 August, the same pontiff imposed an interdict on France, which was reissued in the third session of the Lateran Council on 3 December. Also, some months prior to September, possibly at the same time as the deprivation of Louis XII, Julius released the Christian King’s subjects from their oaths and obligations. It is uncertain whether Louis XII was personally excommunicated (as James IV was), although this is likely, at least because of his support for the ‘schismatic’ general council, as well as on account of his having been deprived and his subjects released from their oaths.

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67 There had been talk of excommunicating Louis during the summer of 1510, prior to the initial summoning of the Council of Pisa, along with threats of such a sentence against the French cardinals if they took part; W.K. Gotwald, *Ecclesiastical Censure at the End of the Fifteenth Century*, p.77; L. Pastor, *History of the Popes*, vi, pp.332, 364-365. A similar reluctance on the part of the papacy to censure Louis and France can also be interpreted from the interdicts placed, 1511-1512, apparently against Bologna for its contribution to the overthrow of papal authority and definitely against Florence and Pisa, the former for its allowance of the Council of Pisa to meet in the latter. The political object of both censures was to cease their support of France, but their contagious nature does not seem to have been passed on to their French allies, nor had there yet been any specific spiritual punishment of the French king or his kingdom. For the probable interdict against Bologna (although a contemporary diarist states it was excommunication), see C.M. Ady, *The Bentivoglio of Bologna*, p.204; A. de Rosen Jervis (trans.), *A Florentine Diary*, p.245. The likelihood that this censure occurred is indicated by Julius, when announcing the loss of Bologna to the Sacred College, attributing at least some of the blame to treachery by its population; L. Pastor, *History of the Popes*, vi, pp.349-350. For the interdict of Florence, see S. Alexander (ed.), *The History of Italy by Francesco Guicciardini*, pp.234-235; L. Pastor, *History of the Popes*, vi, p.388; A. de Rosen Jervis (trans.), *A Florentine Diary*, pp.247-250; R.C. Trexler, *The Spiritual Power, Republican Florence under Interdict*, pp.180, 183, 185-186.


69 The following authors disagree on the date of this event, the former citing July and the latter May; F.J. Baumgartner, *Louis XII*, p.223; D.S. Chambers, *Cardinal Bainbridge*, pp.38-39.

70 Curiously, the interdict cited the duchy of Brittany to be immune from the interdict, while Lyons and the fairs that it held were specifically mentioned; N.P. Tanner (ed.), *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, i, pp.597-598.  

71 STC 25947.7 (University of Birmingham, Special Collections).

72 For Catherine of Aragon calling Louis ‘that schismatic sovereign’, see *Ven.ii*, 203 (*LPli*, 1391; 18 September 1512, Catherine of Aragon to Bainbridge, London). For other references suggesting that Louis XII was excommunicate by virtue of his support for the schismatic council, see *Sp.ii*, 73-75 (*LPli*, 1486; 19 [November]
The political motivations for such English enthusiasm for the employment of papal censures, particularly against France, require consideration. One reason was Henry VIII’s perception of himself as a defender of the Church. At all levels, papal censures required at least the assistance of, if not enforcement by, the secular arm; to perform this role at an international level was a mere extension of a more day-to-day function. In political terms, therefore, Henry’s claim to fulfil this defensive role, combined with papal approval, provided legitimacy for an attack on a mutual political enemy. If the papacy also fulminated ecclesiastical censures against this enemy, from excommunication up to deprivation, then justification of the casus belli in this context was practically watertight both politically and in the eyes of God. Indeed, this validation was reinforced by the fact that papal censure in defence of Church territories and possessions had long been accepted in canon law. It was entirely reasonable, therefore, for the crown to expect Julius II and Leo X to implement these sanctions when England was acting to protect the Church, as an integral part of the broader military offensive. This bestowal of papal legitimacy on such a conflict could also have important domestic implications; fighting against an
excommunicated king might have great propaganda value among those from whom the crown wished to raise money and recruit troops. Why else would Wolsey, on 22 September 1512, have issued an inspeximus of the bull that released the subjects of Louis XII from their allegiance to him?76

Secondly, by seeking papal censures against mutual enemies, the English crown hoped to ensure its allies’ observance of treaties to attack those opponents. By having a head of state sentenced as excommunicate, for instance, all papal allies became duty-bound to attack this recipient. A similar motivation is visible in the stipulations of confederacies which often bound each adherent to attack a particular power under pain of excommunication. A treaty drawn up around September 1515 which provided for English membership of an anti-French coalition that had been formed with papal involvement earlier in the year and which claimed its aim to be (universal peace and) a crusade against the Turks, accordingly stipulated that Leo excommunicate any member which failed to fulfil its duties.77 Through such clauses, Henry VIII may have hoped that the risk of censures would cause Spain, for instance, to honour its pledge to join with English forces in a joint attack on Guienne in 1512, but it was not that easy. In the event, Ferdinand of Aragon used the presence of English forces as cover for his conquest of Navarre.78 Even if Ferdinand had been judged to have clearly breached his oath in this respect, it is highly unlikely

76 STC 25947.7 (University of Birmingham, Special Collections). Already, in the Parliament of February 1512, a letter from the pope to Henry VIII, requesting aid against France, was read aloud. In a similar fashion, this would have been intended to have both justified the intended war against France and to convince the grant of revenues to pay for it; LPlI, 1065 (LPI, 2010; calendared 20 February 1512, Julius to Henry, Rome).

77 Sp.ii, 222 (calendared September 1515).

78 For Henry’s reported dissatisfaction with Spanish actions, see Ven.ii, 205 (LPli, 1417; 1 October 1512, Badoer to the Signory), 211 (LPli, 1475; 9 November 1512, Badoer to the Signory, London), 220 (LPli, 1586; 20 January 1513, Pasqualigo to his brothers in Venice). While the abstracts of the treaty between England and Spain, 17 November 1511, that arranged for this expedition do not explicitly mention ecclesiastical censures, one can interpret them as being at least implied, as both parties would have sworn oaths to observe it; Sp.ii, 59-60 (LPli, 945; LPI, 1980; 17 November 1511), 65 (LPli, 1098; LPI, 3797; 16 March 1512).
that the pope would have fulminated against him. Ferdinand was too powerful to offend, particularly while Julius II was at war with France and, in any case, it would be nigh on impossible to enforce excommunication without military coercion. Overall, one can thereby perceive that, although it was hoped that the threat of papal censure might ensure the commitment of England’s allies in their defence of Rome, this was impossible to enforce.

Thirdly, Henry probably hoped that the use of papal spiritual weapons against enemies would reduce their military threat. For an excommunicated monarch, while the sentence technically entailed a temporary lifting of their subjects’ oaths to them (legitimising the withholding of revenues, military dues and even permitting rebellion), the contagious nature of the sentence also meant that their troops would incur the same punishment. Papal sentences of deposition and suspension of subjects’ obligations aimed for the same consequences. While these censures were never likely to affect the loyalty of Frenchmen, the papacy evidently believed that it could discourage non-French troops from being recruited or hired. Instead of relying on the unspecified effects of general sentences against, for example, adherents to Louis XII, the papacy issued specific bulls against those that it wished to discourage. On 21 July 1512, for instance, Julius II excommunicated the Biscayans and Cantabrians (complicit in France’s taking of Church lands) and ‘all who assist the King of France against the Apostolic See or its confederates, or who

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79 It was expected that contact with the excommunicate cease completely; E. Vodola, Excommunication in the High Middle Ages, pp.67-69.
80 Even for those who fought for, say Louis XII against England, it must have crossed their minds that death in battle was risky to an excommunicate. This was certainly perceived by the English, as on 27 September 1512, a letter to Bainbridge in Rome reported a naval engagement with the French fleet, whereby a suicidal move of one Frenchman, who allegedly set alight the gunpowder on his ship, caused the writer to comment that he (the Frenchman) ‘preferred to die a heretic’. Obviously, this risk was dependent on the recipient acknowledging his excluded status, which was unlikely, but this caused considerable handwringing by Henry VIII and his ministers in the case of James IV’s death at Flodden, causing Henry to write to the pope, requesting permission to take the body to London to be buried with royal honours; LPI, 1403 (27 September 1512, - to Bainbridge, London), 2355 (LPI, 4502; Sp.ii, 137; 12 October 1513, Henry to Leo, Tournai).
take service in his army, although they may have bound themselves to do so by a solemn oath’. While Henry VIII probably had nothing to do with this sentence, he was sent a copy of the bull which he would have probably welcomed. Similarly during March 1512, Julius II forwarded to Cardinal Schiner, his legate with the Swiss, a bull excommunicating those who went to fight for France. Again, there is no reason to believe that the English crown would have had any part in this, although it would have doubtless welcomed such discouragement of renowned Swiss mercenaries from being employed by Louis XII, potentially against English forces. Of more direct relevance to England, in February 1513, the pope censured German mercenaries serving Louis XII against Henry and Ferdinand, whom he called ‘defenders of the Church’. One can further explain Henry VIII’s reported enthusiasm for the pope to fulminate censures against France during 1515-1516 at least partly as a bid again to discourage the Swiss, particularly when, during 1516, Henry VIII was trying to recruit them himself. While the efficacy of these spiritual weapons is impossible to discern, their issue presumably indicates that the papacy, at least, expected them to achieve at least some success. Pisa, for instance, was one place where interdict apparently caused a withdrawal from pro-French policy; also, to a lesser extent Florence, in 1511-1512. Papal sanctions appear to have affected the ‘hearts and minds’ particularly of the ‘subject’ population of Pisa, which did not agree with the reasons for Julius II’s decision to censure them; its hosting of the schismatic general council, for which it had no choice. On this

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81 Sp.ii, 67 (LPii, 1305; 21 July 1512, Julius II to all persons, Rome). In a similar vein, the Venetians were apparently unable to hire Swiss mercenaries because of their interdicted status, 1509-1510; C. Shaw, Julius II, p.240.
82 C. Shaw, Julius II, p.295.
83 LPii, 1655 (LPI, 4832; calendared February 1513).
84 Sp.ii, 212 (calendared summer 1515, Ferdinand to his ambassador in Rome), 217 (14 September 1515, Ferdinand to his ambassador in Rome). For England’s attempts to recruit the Swiss from late 1515, see pp.493 ff.
85 Florence itself also tried to distance itself from the council; R.C. Trexler, The Spiritual Power, Republican Florence under Interdict, pp.178-186. There are also parallels with the interdict threatened by Julius to Bologna in
basis, it is not inconceivable that the English crown envisaged the interdict against France causing pro-English elements (perhaps in Gascony or other areas that it claimed) to come out in its favour or withhold support for Louis XII. Finally, and most specifically, the English crown may have envisaged that papal censures against France could bring it closer to realising its age-old claim to the French throne. While the papacy may have instigated the idea to invest Henry with the realm and its titles, the offer was firmly grasped and, through Bainbridge, its realisation repeatedly sought.

In spite of the English crown’s eagerness to seek papal censures against France and other enemies for their consequential political implications, it also recognised their advantageous economic effects, particularly the legitimisation of attacks on enemy merchants and their property, albeit with the important caveat that English trade was not to be affected until the last possible moment.\(^{86}\) Intelligence from France around the beginning of April 1512 revealed the French belief that Henry would not observe the papal censures understood to be applicable vis-à-vis French merchants for a period of one to two months, until war commenced but, the author speculated, as the English king was influenced by his father in law, ‘he will not be long in taking his advantage’.\(^{87}\) This intelligence proved correct, as Lancaster Herald’s mission to the French

\(^{1506}\) if it did not expel the Bentivoglio, although the French intervened in support of Rome here; C. Shaw, \textit{Julius II}, pp.159-161.

\(^{86}\) The economic effects of state level excommunications and interdicts were not always explicit in the sentences fulminated although, in practice, political rivals were usually quick to recognise and act upon them, particularly against the merchants of the censured power. In this light, Bouwsma argues that the effect of papal censures had diminished in Florence by 1500, that it was only being assessed in terms of its impact on trade; W.J. Bouwsma, \textit{Venice and the Defense of Republican Liberty}, p.50. Also see F. Donald Logan, ‘Excommunication’, in J.R. Strayer (ed.), \textit{Dictionary of the Middle Ages}, vol. iv, p.536.

\(^{87}\) That this referred to the interdict against France is suggested by the author of this news report suggesting that the French ambassador in England recently had an audience with the king on account of Henry having ‘learned from the Pope that the French are excommunicated, and are no better than dogs’. In this case, the English crown would have logically assumed that economic sanctions against French merchants were now legitimised; \textit{LPIi}, 1127 (\textit{LPI}, 3112; 1
court later in the month to declare Henry VIII’s intention to go to war to support the pope involved an offer ‘that, for two months, French merchants shall not be molested in his dominions, and requests that Louis will allow a like privilege to English merchants’. Louis XII’s reply (around 27 April), however, was quite dismissive, reasoning that, as England and France were not at war, trade ought to continue as per usual. In light of the French disinterest in England’s offer to overlook the economic implications of papal censures, it appears to have become ‘open season’ on French naval vessels. Lorenzo Pasqualigio reported to Venice in May that the English had seized ten Breton barks and four Spanish ships, containing merchandise belonging to Florentine and Genoese traders. In reply to complaints from the merchants, Henry ‘declared the prize to be lawful, as said merchants, holding to France, are excommunicated and accursed on account of their being opposed to the Church’. In relation to these economic sanctions, on 17 December 1512, crown instructions were issued to proclaim the prohibition of the import of Gascon wine into the kingdom. This prohibition was reiterated in a licence given to two Italian merchants, on 6 February 1513, to import all types of merchandise, including Toulouse woad, with the express exception of Gascon wine. Why the wine was banned and the woad permitted

April 1512). That there was some belief in England that France had incurred ecclesiastical censure at this early point is suggested by a similar reference to the French as 'excommunicated dogs', at the turn of April-May 1512, by the Venetian ambassador in England; Ven.ii, 159 (LPl, 1126; 30 April and 1 May 1512, Badoer to the Signory, London) 

88 LPl, 1169 (LPI, 3986; calendared end April 1512, Lancaster Herald’s mission). That this approach was made by the herald is confirmed by an Imperial representative at the French court on 24 April; ibid., 1157 (24 April 1512, Andrea da Borgo to Margaret of Savoy, Blois).

89 Ibid., 1163 (27 April 1512, Andrea da Borgo to Margaret of Savoy, Blois).

90 Ven.ii, 168 (LPl, 1183; 6 May 1512, Lorenzo Pasaqualigio to his brothers in Venice, London). For an apparently separate incident of English seizures that involved Franco-Imperial trade also in May 1512, see LPl, 1228 (6 June 1512, Paul de Laude to Margaret of Savoy, Blois). Furthermore, in the ‘King’s Book of Payments’, sums are awarded in August 1512 to two men, the first for ‘attaching a Breton at Lyme’ and the second ‘for bringing up the same Breton’. The context of this is not clear, but it is entirely feasible that this related to an attack on a Breton merchant vessel; LPliii, p.1457.

91 LPl, 1524:34 (LPI, 3597; 17 December 1512).

92 Ibid. For an English merchant licenced in August 1512 to import Toulouse woad, see ibid., 1365:9 (LPI, 3369; 11 August 1512).
is not stated, but it seems sensible that the former was not deemed vital to the English economy, while the latter was integral to its reliance on the wool trade. Still, this indicates that the crown could pick and choose economic areas in which it would observe papal censures against France. That these were observed is most powerfully demonstrated on 23 January 1513, when a member of the Venetian embassy in London reported that the effects of Henry VIII’s observation of the spiritual punishments leveled on France were biting. He wrote that ‘formerly many rich French merchants had houses in London; some of those who remain have been imprisoned, and their goods seized and sequestrated. Some French tradesmen have also remained, but when the English found them abroad, they maltreated them’.93 These incidents demonstrate a deliberate decision to implement the interdict against France, as an enemy of the Church, adherent to the schismatic council and opponent of the Holy League, although Henry had tried to avoid it for as long as possible before open hostilities broke out. Finally, in December 1516, shortly after the English crown finalised a league to defend the Church which envisioned papal censures, Wolsey demonstrated his enthusiasm for the economic threat implied by such sanctions, when he threatened France and Venice via Giustinian: if those states did not respond to an English demand to cease their attack on Verona, he said, ‘we are disposed to wage as utter war against you as if you were so many infidels; you will be prohibited trading all over the world; and we shall endeavour to get his Holiness to excommunicate both the most Christian King and your Signory’.94

93 Ven.ii, 219 (LPIi, 1591; 23 January 1513; Niccolo di Favri to Francesco Gradenigo, London).
94 R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, p.13 (Ven.ii, 822; LPIi, 2642; 7 December 1516, Giustinian to the Signory London). This was made known in the French court by the Venetian ambassador there, in reply to which Francis I dismissed this threat; Ven.ii, 830 (22 December 1516, Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory, Amboise).
The sources also indicate that, despite his economic aggression, Henry VIII was not fully prepared to impose papal economic sanctions against France, or rather ‘French’ merchants favoured by England, and could circumvent or ignore restrictions. In terms of evading these constraints, the English crown could make favoured merchants denizens. In addition to availing the recipient of fiscal benefits from which, as foreigners, they had previously been excluded, at times of papal censure, this probably also bestowed on them the protection of the crown.\textsuperscript{95}

There was a small flurry of such grants from June 1512; for instance, Martin de Pyn, a merchant from Bayonne, was granted denization on 18 June 1512.\textsuperscript{96} Nor was the benefit of denization limited to merchants; it was also granted to a clerk, a gentleman usher of the Chamber, and others whose occupations are not identified and who were natives of various regions of France, including Brittany, Gascony (and Aquitaine), the Loire, Maine and Normandy.\textsuperscript{97} In addition, it seems that the crown also ignored the papal censures against the French and their allies when it granted licences to individuals to import and export around this time. Four Genoese traders were licenced to do business throughout England on 16 May 1512.\textsuperscript{98} A merchant from Toulouse and


\textsuperscript{96} \textit{LPI}, 1266:15 (\textit{LPI}, 3247; 18 June 1512).

\textsuperscript{97} \textit{Ibid.}, 1221:19 (\textit{LPI}, 3185; 7 May 1512), 1316:5 (\textit{LPI}, 3286; 2 July 1512), 1316:17 (\textit{LPI}, 3300; 9 July 1512), 1316:36 (\textit{LPI}, 3318; 17 July 1512), 1316:37 (\textit{LPI}, 3324; 19 July 1512), 1365:15 (\textit{LPI}, 3379; 17 August 1512), 1365:22 (\textit{LPI}, 3391; 28 August 1512), 1415:22 (\textit{LPI}, 3430; 23 September 1512), 1415:29 (\textit{LPI}, 3444; 30 September 1512), 1462:8 (\textit{LPI}, 3455; 6 October 1512), 1524:7 (\textit{LPI}, 3563; 4 December 1512), 1524:26 (\textit{LPI}, 3587; 14 December 1512), 1602:4 (\textit{LPI}, 3634; 5 January 1513), 1662:38 (\textit{LPI}, 3734; 16 February 1513). Interestingly, no denizations of Frenchmen can be found prior to May 1512, suggesting that they may well have been motivated by the perceived papal censures against France; \textit{ibid.}, \textit{passim}.

\textsuperscript{98} \textit{Ibid.}, 1221:32 (\textit{LPI}, 3199; 16 May 1512). Genoa was a staunch ally of France and it has already been mentioned how merchandise belonging to a native of this state had been seized by crown representatives on account of their being excommunicated; see n.90. Florence was placed under interdict 23 September 1511 to 31 March 1512, a separate censure because it hosted the Council of Pisa in its subject town. While no evidence has been found to suggest that denizations or licences to trade were issued to favoured Florentine merchants or citizens in England during the interdict, there was a flurry of licences issued in subsequent months (from May 1512). Given the significance of Florentine trade and Henry VIII’s earlier treatment of Venice in this regard, it is unlikely that the
one from Bordeaux were granted licences to import Toulouse woad and Gascon wine and export wool, among other goods, on 22 September 1512. 99 Similarly, a licence to trade in England was granted to two Breton merchants on 23 October 1512. 100 As mentioned earlier, a licence to two Italian merchants (from Pisa and Lucca), permitted the import of Toulouse woad, but upheld a ban on Gascon wine. 101 In these cases, while the privileged individuals were doubtless favoured by the English crown, the latter was reluctant to sever ties with them by virtue of papal censures against France. 102 Indeed, the geographical origins of some may betray political motives on the part of Henry VIII and his ministers. Firstly, the Bretons were a special case, as their duchy was excluded from the interdict published first in August 1512. 103 Thus the denization and licences may have, in fact, demonstrated strict English observance of the censure, particularly as those confiscating French goods were not likely to have taken the time to establish the origin of the merchants and whether the interdict applied to them. Other crown grants were made to Gascons, their duchy closely associated with English claims to the French throne and the object of an intended expedition during 1512. 104 If Henry VIII soon hoped to acquire this territory, therefore,
it was prudent to maintain good (mercantile) relations with his potential subjects. The same could be argued for the natives of Normandy who benefited from crown protection around this time.

From this, it is clear that a contradictory position was adopted vis-à-vis these ecclesiastical punishments; on the one hand, a natural desire to disrupt the mercantile revenue streams of its enemy, but on the other, a willingness to make exceptions (not just among merchants), so that the English economy and, presumably, the crown’s involvement in it, was affected as little as possible. Crown protection of merchants from censured states was by no means new and can be traced back in England at least to the Florentine interdict of 1376.105 Indeed, the papacy itself was known to act similarly, as it demonstrated when Julius II shielded Florentine merchants in Rome (curiam romanam sequentes) from the consequences of their state’s interdict, 1511-1512.106 The motives for these juxtaposed positions are not difficult to discern; while the benefits of seizing an enemy’s goods and wealth during wartime are self-explanatory, Henry took a broader view of English trade, undoubtedly envisaging a time when the censures would be lifted, war ended and trading relations returned to normal.107 If Henry ruined French merchants during the war, it would impede existing and future trade. This attitude is perhaps encapsulated in the ban on Gascon wine, compared with the continued allowance of the import of Toulouse woad. Furthermore, Henry VIII clearly appreciated the vulnerability of English merchants in France and elsewhere, when he enforced the economic dimension of excommunications and interdicts; he would expect similar sanctions to be imposed on traders from his own realm and this clearly informed his request to Louis XII in 1512 to allow each

106 Ibid., pp.179-180.
107 Trexler cites an unwillingness by states to permit ‘the dangers such licence [by permitting the confiscations allowed by papal censure] posed to public order, and to the whole merchant community’; ibid., p.101.
other’s merchants to continue unmolested for two months, despite Henry’s declared intention to observe the papal censures against France. The English king may also have hoped that, by naturalising favoured ‘alien’ merchants and excluding certain goods from the censures, his French counterpart may do something similar, thus limiting the inevitable attack on English mercantile interests that would result from Henry’s imposition of papal spiritual weapons.

A significant problem inherent in assessing the economic effects of papal censures during wartime, or even the preliminaries to war, is that mercantile property was usually among the first to be attacked in any conflict. It is, therefore, difficult to ascribe Henry VIII’s actions vis-à-vis French traders wholly to his observance of, say, the interdict of France, when he would probably have targeted them anyway. Nevertheless, it is probable that the English crown did take such actions, in part at least, due to the ecclesiastical justification provided by the papacy’s censures. This idea becomes more convincing considering the opposition that Henry displayed towards such economic consequences on occasions when he opposed the interdict that permitted them, as in his dealings with Venice in 1509-1510.

\[108\] See above pp.197-198.

\[109\] This was apparent in James IV’s complaints to Henry through Lord Dacre, during July 1512, that his merchants had been imprisoned in London and their goods confiscated. James referred to ‘Englishmen “calling yame the Pape’s men”’. If this refers to the English themselves claiming to act on behalf of the papacy, then one can interpret this as an assertion to be acting, perhaps, by virtue of papal censures, as Scotland was an ally of France and, in the eyes of some, would have thereby automatically incurred ecclesiastical punishment. At this point, it ought to be remembered that the Scottish king was not excommunicated, so Scots could not have incurred papal censures by transmission in this manner. The only basis on which it could justify these seizures, vis-à-vis ecclesiastical punishments, is that Scotland was an ally of France and, therefore, its merchants’ goods were liable to confiscation in the same way as those of Florence and Genoa a few months earlier; LPIi, 1297 (LPI, 3320; 18 July 1512, James IV to Lord Dacre, Edinburgh). Also see ibid., 1298 (LPI, 3321; 18 July 1512, James to Dacre, Edinburgh), 1302 (LPI, 3326; 20 July 1512, Dacre to Henry, Carlisle Castle). For James IV’s excommunication, see above pp.182-184. Incidentally, in the bull that eventually excommunicated James IV, the ground on which was condemned was as ‘an adherent of the Schismatics’; D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.53. Another example of the English crown limiting Scottish trade for reasons other than papal censure can be seen in March 1513, when Henry wrote of the possibility that James IV had requested a safe-conduct (on the seas) for Scottish merchandise on the pretence that he was securing passage for his navy (and perhaps victuals); LPI, 3811 (20 March 1513, Henry to the dean of Windsor).

\[110\] See below pp.212-220.
While, for the most part, the English crown was eager to benefit from the justification provided by papal censures, particularly against the French and their allies, it was, on the other hand, quite dismissive of them and their authority when they did not suit English interests, although not defiantly so. Henry was tacitly able to ignore threats of ecclesiastical punishments, claiming immunity from such censures. Henry and his advisors were prepared to overlook the use of ecclesiastical weapons against friendly states, or powers with which they had no quarrel.

The problem with the papacy’s employment of its spiritual weapons for political purposes was that, if the institution was unduly influenced by France for any reason (a situation that was feared by the English throughout this period), these censures could theoretically be turned against England. In practice, however, the English crown had long provided against this risk domestically by not recognising papal censures under common law; the pope could not impose sanctions as he was not an official of that legal system. 111 This was logical, given that English common law was the monarchy’s tool for imposing its authority and governance over its territories and that this authority and governance would be open to challenge if there was an alternative source of power. Alongside this, kings of England had long asserted their immunity from spiritual punishment by the papacy. 112 Yet, while Henry VIII could claim that papal censures did not apply to him, he could not prevent their being issued from Rome. However, he had various strategies available to him to counteract any such threats. He could prevent the relevant brief or bull from entering England, he could stop it from being published and, even if it

112 For crown immunity in a general sense, see R.C. Trexler, The Spiritual Power, Republican Florence under Interdict, p.18. Crown immunity was implied in a thirteenth century conflict between crown and Church, whereby Edward I insisted upon the exemption from excommunication of crown officials. This culminated in Edward instructing the English episcopate in 1281 not ‘to attempt anything to our prejudice, or that of our realm, or against us or our rights’; P. Heath, Church and Realm 1272-1461 (1988), pp.24-28.
had, he had the means to prevent it being enforced (within the kingdom, at least).\footnote{113} Outside England, however, it ought to be noted that the English crown had no such option to control the impact of excommunication or interdict; on a political level, the observation and imposition of such censures by other states was dependent on Henry VIII’s prevailing role in continental affairs and his relationships with individual princes. He probably understood that his allies would turn a blind eye, as he did, it will be seen, with the Venetian interdict of 1509-1510, and that his rivals would observe them, although it would remain to be seen whether acts of war would be actioned through their imposition.\footnote{114} Theoretically, Henry only had tenuous potential forums for appeal against papal censures, to one of which most states on the receiving end of Rome’s spiritual weapons claimed to seek recourse; a future general council or pope, although the papacy naturally rejected these.\footnote{115} In an economic sense, the implicit vulnerability of English merchants overseas to the imposition of papal censures was subject to the same dynamics as in the political sphere although, if the situation were to ever arise, Henry probably envisaged negotiating with other princes to avoid the inevitable confiscations and trade embargos as much as possible, just as he did when he was the ‘aggressor’ imposing papal spiritual sanctions against France circa 1512.\footnote{116}

\footnote{113} The non-recognition of these sanctions went back as far as William the Conqueror. In addition, the Constitutions of Clarendon (1164) precluded any recognition of the excommunication of crown officials, without royal consent; R. Hill, ‘The Theory and Practice of Excommunication’, \textit{History}, 42, p.4; R.C. Trexler, \textit{The Spiritual Power, Republican Florence under Interdict}, pp.17-20; E. Vodola, \textit{Excommunication in the High Middle Ages}, p.189. The crown’s reluctance to admit a legate \textit{a latere} into England (until Wolsey’s appointment as co-legate with Campeggio in 1518) may well have been due in part to a reluctance to risk the presence of such a powerful figure, independent of the crown, who had within his remit the ability to fulminate papal censures himself, as well as to enforce those of the pope; see for instance pp.631-632.

\footnote{114} For Henry VIII ignoring the Venetian interdict of 1509-1510, see pp.212-220.

\footnote{115} See below, pp.206-207 (esp. n.119), 222.

\footnote{116} See above pp.197-198.
While the English crown claimed domestic safeguards against papal punishment (although it had little control over how these would manifest themselves externally), the English crown faced no tangible threat of censure by Rome during this period. While the legitimacy of the papacy’s spiritual armoury in England was not admitted vis-à-vis the crown, it was not prepared to rock the bark of St Peter by open and vocal defiance. Despite a tendency to pick and choose the elements of papal authority that it recognised at any given time (often according to its political interests), the crown did still adhere to papal spiritual supremacy. Despite the crown’s legal rejection of papal authority in this sense, it seems that, in terms of foreign policy, the potential implications of papal censure were at times feared. As the English diplomat Sir Robert Wingfield (then resident in the Empire) revealed to Wolsey in December 1515, he had not forgotten the interdict of England under King John when he outlined the historic enmity between England and France, and how this could be affected by Rome.117 On the other hand, while the crown was prepared to ignore excommunications and interdicts against those with whom it had sympathies, it did not do this in a particularly public manner and the papacy never challenged Henry VIII on this.118 Finally, if one speculates as to what Henry VIII would have done if he was excommunicated, if England was placed under interdict, or if he received a stronger papal sanction, it is difficult to envisage his reaction to be any different to the likes of Venice in 1509. Venice had repeated its actions of 1483; it questioned the validity of the interdict given its political nature, refused to publish it within the state, appealed to a general council and sponsored

117 LPii, 1265 (10 December 1515, Robert Wingfield to Wolsey, ‘[Fiesyn], in Swave’).
118 Hill identifies a reluctancy on the part of the papacy to impose excommunication on monarchs, on whom it relied for the realisation of papal authority within their territories, particularly in England where, despite occasional threats, only John was actually censured in this manner and, only then, permitting loopholes and effectively placing blame on the king’s advisors; R Hill, ‘The Theory and Practice of Excommunication’, History, 42, pp.6-7.
anti-Julian propaganda. Henry himself took precautionary action against expected excommunication in 1533, when he appealed peremptorily to a future general council. This initiative was proclaimed merely weeks before Clement VII threatened the English king with such punishment unless he reconciled with Catherine. In the event, however, the excommunication was never issued.

While the papacy never threatened England directly with censures during this period, the crown risked incurring excommunication and interdict during 1509-1510, as a result of its continued association with Venice, then subject to papal censure. An implied and ultimately empty threat seems to have come from Jerome Bonvisi, one of the English solicitors in Rome, on 30 April 1509, when he informed the crown of the imminent Venetian interdict and enclosed a

119 The Venetian appeal to a council was secretly attached to the doors of St Peter’s in Rome. The republic had challenged the validity of papal censures against it in terms of their political motives as early as 1201, while Florence did so as early as 1376; W.J. Bouwsma, *Venice and the Defense of Republican Liberty*, pp. 49-50, 80-81, 100-101; L. Pastor, *History of the Popes*, vi, pp.312, 320. Concerning the legitimacy of papal censures, Louis XII had the Synod of Tours (that met on 15 September 1510) consider, among other matters, the validity of such actions by the papacy when the recipient had unsuccessfully requested papal arbitration and was defending himself from the papacy itself. The response of the synod was that the pope’s spiritual weapons, in these circumstances, could be considered invalid; J.S.C. Bridge, *A History of France*, iv, pp.93-94; L. Pastor, *History of the Popes*, vi, p.330. More generally speaking, recipients of papal censures also often appealed to the Pope better informed, to a future Pope, to a future General Council; and even to the Holy Spirit and to the whole body of believers. This was in spite of the fact that an appeal to a future General Council was made a reason for excommunication *ipso facto* by Pope Pius II, in 1459. He [the excommunicate] would also deny that the excommunication really existed, since it was unjust...’ Back in the thirteenth century, the decretist Hostiensis admitted that papal censures could be unjust, upon which the pope in question would be punished if this was the case; W.K. Gotwald, *Ecclesiastical Censure at the End of the Fifteenth Century*, pp.82-83; E. Vodola, *Excommunication in the High Middle Ages*, p.51 n.42.

120 Henry was excommunicated in consistory again in 1535, but the death of Catherine of Aragon and execution of Anne Boleyn ensured that this did not come into effect. A similar bull was prepared against Henry in 1538, which provided for his deposition and the suspension of his subjects’ oaths, but again this was not effected; J.J. Scarisbrick, *Henry VIII*, pp.317-320, 335-336, 361.

121 In May 1513, Ferdinand, attempting to avoid war with France and to gain support for his truce with the latter, apparently tried to get the pope to act as a mediator between England and the Empire on one side and France on the other. If Henry or Maximilian were reluctant, he envisaged Leo (and the Lateran Council) wielding his spiritual weapons against them to bring about universal peace; *Sp.ii*, 104 (calendared 21 May 1513, Ferdinand to his envoy to France). Also, hypothetically, if a joint Anglo-French attack on Navarre, mooted by the English crown in 1514, had been serious and had taken place, Henry would have risked incurring excommunication (presumably among other papal censures against him and his kingdom), as on 21 September that year a secret treaty was concluded between Leo X and Ferdinand of Aragon (then ruler and occupier of Navarre), in which the pope promised excommunicate anyone who attacked the Catholic King; *ibid.*, 188 (21 September 1514).
copy of the bull.122 His words have an admonitory tone, possibly forwarding a message from the pope himself.123 While broadly a pro-papal news report on the initial successes of the Cambrai coalition against Venice, Bonvisi also reported that ‘the Pope is angry with three barons of the Ursins [Orsini], who had proposed to succour the Venetians. They have now submitted, and asked the Pope’s forgiveness’. This refers to an incident where the Orsini, for business reasons, chose to ignore the spiritual censures imposed on the republic. It is implied, however, that the Orsini admitted their error and had reconciled with the papacy.124 Shortly after, Bonvisi mentions that ‘the Pope always asks for the King’ and, although this refers to current reports of Henry VII’s poor health, it could also be interpreted as an informal warning to the English king that, the pope’s preoccupation with military matters in Italy notwithstanding, peripheral England still commanded his attention and that any opposition to Cambrai would risk spiritual censure.125 Despite Henry VIII’s subsequent actions that undermined the Venetian interdict, it is significant that no further papal warning or action resulted.

122 LPIi, 9 (LPI, 11; 30 April 1509, Bonvisi to Henry VII, Rome).
123 In addition to his position in English diplomatic service, Bonvisi was also employed by the papal favourite (who was probably also cardinal protector of England), Francesco Alidosi. It is clear from other correspondence from English diplomats in Rome that the pope or his intimates quite routinely instructed crown representatives to convey their views, opinions and requests, and it is quite feasible that, at this stage, the papacy feared England’s intentions considering it had not responded to its overtures to join the League of Cambrai; see above pp.31-32 n.75, 361.
124 Creighton describes the Orsini’s defiance of the bull as being a case of returning money to the Venetian envoy, despite Julius II forbidding them to do so. The Orsini thought it worth risking excommunication for the sustenance of their good reputation. Bridge, on the other hand, outlines a dispute where the pope prevented the Orsini from fighting on Venice’s behalf; J.S.C. Bridge, A History of France, iv, p.20; M. Creighton, History of the Papacy, v, pp.117-118. 125 LPIi, 9 (LPI, 11; 30 April 1509, Bonvisi to Henry VII, Rome). The date that the bull of excommunication was published appears to be under dispute. Shaw cites 26 April 1509, while most other sources cite 27 April; M. Creighton, History of the Papacy, v, pp.117-118; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vi, pp.311-312; C. Shaw, Julius II, p.235. Bonvisi was not entirely accurate when stating that the excommunication came into force on 27 April, as the bull stipulates that it would only be enforced if, within twenty four days, Venice had not returned the lands and revenues from the Romagna claimed by the Church; C. Shaw, Julius II, p.235. Bonvisi presumably believed that the papal terms were too harsh for the Venetians to submit to. It was likely to have been a calculated ultimatum, designed to be too unpalatable to the republic. Bonvisi would also have calculated that, by the time the letter arrived in England, the twenty four days would have elapsed, thus making the excommunication real. According to Pastor, 600 copies of this strongly-termed bull were immediately printed and circulated.
The only other occasion when England seems to have risked spiritual censure from Rome came in October 1516, when Richard Pace wrote to Wolsey of the arrival in Zurich of a papal brief threatening excommunication, it appeared, of all the confederates and their ambassadors, including England. Pace, however, demanded that the pope either write in the allies’ favour or remain neutral. 126 To put this into context, the English had been negotiating towards a league against France in the preceding months, although the pope had recently declared, since Charles of Castile had defected to the French, that he was unable to risk offending Francis I. 127 In this light, such a move by Rome would have been of great concern, indicative of the French influence over Rome. Nevertheless, no reaction has been detected in England, although a treaty to defend the Church was concluded on 29 October 1516 albeit without papal adhesion and with low key celebrations, perhaps in case Leo X turned against it. There seems to have been no further move made in this direction by the papacy, as Leo soon approached England for money to support his war in Urbino, for which he was soon prepared to join the English coalition. 128 Henry VIII had, therefore, ignored this indirect threat of papal censure and had tacitly called the papacy’s bluff.

In addition to the crown’s various domestic safeguards against the papacy’s spiritual weapons, one can also observe Henry VIII deliberately seeking to avoid political situations where censures might be incurred. On occasions when the papacy was perceived to be pro-French, the English crown sought to avoid universal peace initiatives emanating from Rome. While it has already been demonstrated that Henry VIII urged the papacy to pursue a general peace in 1510, so that those who refused to join could be ‘considered as a common enemy’, presumably then

126 LPIII, 2495 (calendared end October, [Pace] to [Wolsey]).
127 See below pp.557-559.
128 See below pp.561 ff.
incurring various spiritual sanctions, he would also have recognised the danger of the tables of such a strategy being turned against England if the papacy was dominated by France. 129 A ‘French’ papacy would be expected, in such cases, to wield ecclesiastical censures against England if it did not comply. An implicit fear of this was declared by de Giglis to the pope after the Bologna meeting between Francis and Leo in December 1515. Faced with the prospect of a pope susceptible to French influence, which had just discussed universal peace and crusade, the orator voiced his suspicion of French intentions for an Anglo-Scottish reconciliation as a part of this, believing that Francis only intended this so that he could attack England when he was ready. The pope, perhaps understanding that the English also suspected that he would use ecclesiastical censures to back such a campaign, replied that he ‘would be the first to draw both swords against him [Francis]’. 130

Subsequently, the English felt the effects of French influence over Rome, as they failed to gain firm commitment from Leo to resist this. Concomitant with this were increasing calls from the pope for universal peace and crusade, at least partly as an attempt to tackle the French threat himself. These culminated in November 1517 with Leo forming a commission of cardinals to draw up a crusading strategy to be distributed to princes for consideration. 131 This proposal envisaged that peace be established in 1518 ‘under pain of papal censure’. 132 While it has already been argued that a lack of English response was motivated by a fear that the crusading mechanism might be adapted by the French to their own ends, it seems that Henry VIII and Wolsey were also concerned about the prospect that papal censures may also be used to further

129 LPI, 354 (LPI, 1457; calendared end January 1510, [Henry to Bainbridge]).
130 LPIii, 1281 (14 December 1515, [de Giglis] to Ammonius, Bologna).
131 LPIii, 3801 (18 November 1517, [de Giglis] to [Wolsey]).
132 Ibid., 3816 (calendared end November 1517).
these ends, potentially at England’s expense. It was Wolsey himself who voiced this concern when he eventually replied to the papal appeal in late February 1518. To launch a crusade, he stressed the need for a general peace, which had been and still was being prevented by Francis I’s Italian ambitions. If this was impossible through diplomacy, Wolsey recommended that spiritual weapons be employed to bring this about. By this approach, therefore, the English crown sought to ensure that the French would be constrained under pain of censure by any papal crusading initiative, rather than be allowed to make a move on Naples under cover of this. If, while bound to such an agreement, Francis then acted in Italy, Henry VIII could lobby Leo to censure him on account of a breach of oath, similar to the justification used against James IV in 1512-1513. In spite of this English approach, the pope had already decided to implement his own strategy, proclaiming a five year truce in early March 1518, for which legates a latere were to be despatched to the princes. When news of this arrived in England, Wolsey reacted by usurping the papal initiative to English ends, again to ensure that it did not allow Francis a free rein in Italy. This marked a success in the English crown’s attempts to restrain and distract the French from gaining further influence from Rome, albeit involving the papacy as little as possible, and culminated in the Treaty of London of 2 October 1518. This universal peace agreement was, as one would expect, bound by the oaths of the kings which, if breached, would open them up to the threat of ecclesiastical censure. Indeed, on 16 October, Henry swore to observe the marriage element of the agreement (of Princess Mary to the dauphin), enjoining

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133 Ibid., 3781 (8 November 1517, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome).
134 Wolsey further outlined his belief that Francis was mobilising an army for Italy; ibid., 3973 (27 February 1518, Wolsey to de Giglis); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.178-181 (Ven.ii, 1022; LPIii, 4076: 12 April 1518).
135 For James IV’s excommunication, see LPIii, 2258 (LPI, 4446; 12 September 1513, Bainbridge to [Henry]); also see above p.184.
136 See below pp.630 ff.
137 See pp.125, 629 ff.
138 See below pp.643-644.
Wolsey to excommunicate him and lay England under interdict if he failed to do this.\textsuperscript{139} This was obviously a ‘loaded’ pledge, however, given that the legate was never likely to carry this out (not least because he eventually brought about a contradictory foreign policy in 1521). Nevertheless, Francis I was also bound by threat of papal censure to observe the agreement. While references have been found to such penalties \textit{vis-à-vis} paying a dowry to England for the marriage and to refrain from fortifying Tournai, it is probable that Francis was so bound to keep the peace.\textsuperscript{140} Notably, Charles V began accusing his French counterpart of breaching this treaty from April 1521, in a bid to invoke England’s obligation to side against the ‘aggressor’ and besought the pope to censure Francis at the end of June.\textsuperscript{141} While the English crown did not attempt to reinforce these overtures, it ought to be noted that Henry and Wolsey were still publicly playing the role of arbiters at this point, their increasing commitment against France remaining secret.\textsuperscript{142} In connection with this, one can cite a final instance when Henry sought to avoid being open to accusations that he was in breach of an oath. In November 1521, he notified Wolsey of his wariness of the truce that the cardinal was trying to facilitate at Calais. He was concerned that, if he swore to be the conservator of this truce, he would either have to break this oath in siding with Charles or breach the Treaty of Bruges, if he sided with France, in the coming conflict.\textsuperscript{143}

Also revealing of the English crown’s attitude towards papal censures \textit{vis-à-vis} its desire to protect Rome from France was its reaction towards the imposition of such weapons against

\textsuperscript{139} LPI\textit{ii}, 4504 (16 October 1518).
\textsuperscript{140} Ibid., 4626 (6 December 1518, Henry to Margaret of Savoy, Greenwich), 4687 (calendared end December 1518, Henry to Knight). Francis was also similarly bound to pay a pension to England; LPI\textit{iii}, 1991 (calendared 26 January 1522, instructions for Cheyne).
\textsuperscript{141} See below pp.694 ff; L. Pastor, \textit{History of the Popes}, vii, pp.46-49.
\textsuperscript{142} See below pp.695 ff.
\textsuperscript{143} LPI\textit{iii}, 1762 (calendared 13-14 November 1521, [Wolsey to Henry]).
states with which England had no quarrel. Essentially, Henry VIII and his advisors could ignore, as much as possible, the spiritual weapons wielded against such states and sought to continue normal relations with them.\footnote{144 It ought to be noted that ignoring papal censures against heads of state and the states themselves was by no means limited to England and predated this period. Venice, for example, ignored excommunications and interdicts imposed both on itself and other states; during the war of the Otto Santi (1375-1378), it even became complicit with the recipient of such an interdict, Florence, by offering to protect its interests in Flanders and Ireland; W.J. Bouwsma, \textit{Venice and the Defense of Republican Liberty}, pp.80-81. Also see the various measures taken by western European heads of state (including England) to circumvent the interdict of 1376 in order to protect the Florentine merchants and bankers resident with them; R.C. Trexler, \textit{The Spiritual Power, Republican Florence under Interdict}, pp.44-108.} A notable and reasonably well-documented example is their reaction to the interdict of Venice, imposed 27 April 1509, to bolster the League of Cambrai’s offensive against the republic. The crown would have expected the papacy to take this action, in a bid to shore up spiritual justification for the Cambrai conflict.\footnote{145 As noted earlier, the papacy would have been expected to commit to fulminate at least excommunication and/or interdict as one of its obligations laid down in any treaty of confederacy, in this case the League of Cambrai.} It implicitly opposed this, however, at least partly because of a fear of the consequences for papal political independence if Venice was to fall.

Having received a copy of this bull to publish, Henry VIII was placed in a difficult position. His immediate political outlook was quickly becoming obvious to all; belligerently anti-French.\footnote{146 See below pp.362-365.} In this light, the destruction of Venice, one of the few strong and independent states in the peninsula that could oppose France and help him defend the papacy, therefore, was definitely not in English interests.\footnote{147 It ought to be borne in mind that, realistically speaking, England was unable to do anything to actively oppose a coalition that comprised the most powerful states of Christendom.} The first indication of tacit defiance by the crown came when letters from Venetian merchants in England arrived in the republic in 10 June 1509, reporting (probably correctly) that Henry had refused to publish the papal bull.\footnote{148 It is unclear who sent these reports from England; \textit{Ven.ii}, 5 (LPfi, 67; 10 June 1509, receipt in Venice of letters from England). No mention of the bull has been made in any of the bishops’ registers that have been checked, nor is there any indication of its publication in the collections of royal proclamations (while the publication of such a bull would not necessarily have been expected \textit{via} royal proclamation, it was not an unprecedented procedure as, for example, Inigo Lopez de Mendoza, bishop of Saragossa, had had his excommunication published \textit{via} papal bull in 1497, and other excommunications were published \textit{via} papal bull in 1504 and 1506 via papal bull; see B. Levy, \textit{The Spiritual Power}, 56-57, 104-106, 152, 241.} Henry proceeded to defy the bull
both politically by continuing to grant audiences to the Venetian ambassador and by acting to subvert it (ultimately despatching an orator to Rome to undermine it), and economically by encouraging the republic to continue trading with England, even lobbying some members of the Cambrai league to permit the unmolested passage of Venetian galleys to England.

Henry and his advisors maintained personal contact with the Venetian ambassador Andrea Badoer throughout the period of the interdict, risking excommunication themselves through the contagious nature of ecclesiastical censures. Conversations between king and ambassador reportedly covered Henry’s sympathy for the plight of the Venetian republic, his own personal hostility against France, and the actions that he took to end the attacks on Venice (notably writing to the Cambrai confederates, mediating on Venice’s behalf with the emperor and writing to the pope to lift his censures against the state). Nor was Badoer’s contact with the English crown limited to the king; it also included Henry’s intimate councillors. He occasionally names Fox,

example, Henry VII published Innocent VIII’s 1485 bull recognising him as the true king of England; Reg. de Castello; Reg. Mayew; R.W. Heinze, The Proclamations of the Tudor Kings (1976), p.66, no.5.

Badoer’s first recorded audience with Henry VIII seems to have been just after the new king’s coronation (24 June) and reportedly took place throughout the period of the interdict, all the way up to the orator’s presentation to Henry of a copy of the bull of absolution, prior to 6 April. The orator gives the impression that he was able to gain audience whenever correspondence from his state arrived. Equally, the Venetian government was rightly under the impression, from very early on, that Badoer would be able to continue normal diplomatic relations with the English crown, as is indicated by its instructions to him throughout the period of the interdict, in which the orator was frequently ordered to seek audience of the king and his intimate advisors. Among the objectives that Badoer was instructed to facilitate were an English attack on France, English mediation between Venice and the Empire, a loan from England and the formation of an anti-French coalition; Ven.ii, 2 (LPli, 53; 30 May 1509, Signory to Badoer), 7 (LPli, 98; 3 July 1509, Badoer to the Signory, London), 8 (LPli, 140; 6 August 1509, Signory to Badoer), 9 (LPli, 154; 30 August 1509, Signory to Badoer), 12 (LPli, 169; 14 or 15 September 1509, Signory to Badoer), 17, (LPli, 240; 15 November 1509, Signory to Badoer) 24 (LPli, 278; 21 December 1509, Signory to Badoer), 25 (LPli, 280; 22 December 1509, Signory to Badoer), 26 (LPli, 238; 14 November 1509, Badoer to the Signory, London), 28 (LPli, 319; 5 January 1510, Signory to Badoer), 29 (LPli, 320; 5 January 1510), 30 (LPli, 322; 5 September 1513, Roberto Acciauolo to Florence, Amiens), 33 (LPli, 330; 12 January 1510, Signory to Badoer), 39 (LPli, 360, 373; 22 February 1510, Venetian ambassadors in Rome to the Signory), 45 (LPli, 383; 2 March 1510, Signory to Badoer), 52 (LPli, 365, 385; 14 February 1510, Badoer to the Signory); LPli, 159 (2 September 1509, Badoer to the Signory, London).
Henry’s principal advisor, as a ‘friend’ of Venice. The republic also counted on the favour of the Latin secretary, Peter Carmeliano. None of this amounted to an observation of the Venetian interdict.

Furthermore, there were a number of actions that the English crown took during this time, appearing to centre around the dispatch of its new ambassador, Bainbridge, to Rome, that further clarify tacit opposition to this papal censure. In the first place, the archbishop was commissioned to go to Rome on 24 September 1509, ostensibly to detach the papacy from the League of Cambrai and to encourage the formation of an anti-French coalition, integral to which was the absolution of Venice. One ought not to underestimate the import of Bainbridge’s appointment as orator; the commission of a metropolitan with considerable Italian experience to these ends was a bold move while the Venetians remained under interdict. The crown must have been confident either in the orator’s abilities and/or in the views of the pontiff. This embassy was part of a broader diplomatic offensive whereby the king wrote to the various Cambrai confederates between September and November 1509, including the pope, to cease their attacks on Venice. That message was possibly presented by Bainbridge and read by Julius II by 1

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150 Ven.ii, 2 (LPli, 53; 30 May 1509, Signory to Badoer), 7 (LPli, 98; 3 July 1509, Badoer to the Signory, London), 45 (LPli, 383; 2 March 1510, Signory to Badoer).
151 Ibid., 12 (LPli, 169; 14 or 15 September 1509, Signory to Badoer), 25 (LPli, 280; 22 December 1509, Signory to Badoer), 30 (LPli, 322; 5 September 1513, Roberto Acciauolo to Florence, Amiens).
152 LPli, 175, 190:33 (LPi, 520; 24 September 1509).
153 Bainbridge had studied in Italy and had been to Rome at least twice; D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge (1965), pp.14-16.
154 The Venetians were certainly hopeful of a successful resolution with the pope as a result of Bainbridge’s arrival; Ven.ii, 19-20 (LPli, 262; 3 December 1509, Signory to their ambassador in Rome), 21 (26 November 1509, Venetian ambassadors in Rome to the Signory). As early as July 1509 (the same time as the pope first received the censured Venetian envoys), Julius II was counting down the time before the campaigning season was over and the French king would leave Italy, so that he could start to counteract his influence in the peninsula. In addition, there was soon to be a dispute between Louis XII and the papacy over the right to dispose of French benefices from October 1509, which further split the two parties; C. Shaw, Julius II, pp.245-251; M. Creighton, History of the Papacy, v, pp.122-123; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vi, p.318.
155 For those to the Empire, France and Spain, see below pp.366-368.
December. It was probably cautious in its nature, reasoning that Venice ought not to be destroyed, on account of its role in resisting the Ottomans, that Christians should not fight Christians, and that, if Venice ceased to exist, Italy would be at the mercy of French ambitions. In other words, it would harm their chances to defend the Church. Most significantly, Henry probably stressed that Venice had conceded all territories claimed by the confederates before they had attacked it, an indirect reference to the ultimatum made in the papal bull threatening the republic with interdict. The English were thus advising that, as a part of the u-turn that they hoped the papacy would perform concerning Venice, the interdict should be lifted. Subsequently, Bainbridge was involved in delicate discussions with the papacy about the republic’s absolution (and reconciliation with the pope) in which he was extremely careful about disclosing English thoughts. Sometime around 4 February, the king, through Fox, wrote again to the pope, this time specifically requesting that he raise the interdict against Venice, particularly as the latter had proffered its obedience. This correspondence reached Rome on 22 February but, while it was presented to the pope two days before the absolution took place, probably did not contribute to a decision that already seems to have been taken. Shortly before this letter was written, on 29

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156 In condemning the shedding of Christian blood, Henry may also have made reference to the pope’s duty to facilitate universal peace (and a crusade to the east); an expedient often employed by contemporary rulers to discourage or call for an end to warfare. The speculated contents of the letter to Julius are taken from the arguments for ending the war against Venice that Henry presented in two similar letters to Ferdinand of Aragon, dated 1 November 1509; Sp.ii, 23-24 (LPlii, 220; 1 November 1509, Henry to Ferdinand), 25-26 (LPlii, 221; 1 November 1509, Henry to Ferdinand). The Venetians were unhappy with a clause in the pope’s letter to the pope, whereby Henry asked the confederates to cease their aggression once Julius and his allies had gained the territories that they claimed from the republic; Ven.ii, 17 (LPlii, 240; 15 November 1509, Signory to Badoer), 22 (9 November 1509, Badoer to the Signory), 24 (LPlii 278; 21 December 1509, Signory to Badoer), 25 (LPlii, 280; 22 December 1509, Signory to Badoer). D.S. Chambers, *Cardinal Bainbridge*, pp.24-26. Also, Ven.ii, 19-20 (LPlii, 262; 3 December 1509, Signory to their ambassador in Rome), 21 (26 November 1509, Venetian ambassadors in Rome to the Signory). Also see M. Creighton, *History of the Papacy*, v, pp.123-124; C. Shaw, *Julius II*, p.237.


158 Ven.ii, 39 (LPlii, 360, 373; 22 February 1510, Venetian ambassadors in Rome to the Signory), 45 (LPlii, 383; 2 March 1510, Signory to Badoer); D.S. Chambers, *Cardinal Bainbridge*, p.29. Concerning the lack of impact that this letter would have had, Venice had already submitted to papal demands as early as 29 December, the pope promised...
January, Henry wrote to Bainbridge, thanking him for his work with the pope. While the context of this suggests that the king is referring to his proposing a league against France and detaching the papacy from Cambrai, it must also imply this business with Venice. Furthermore, the Venetians themselves felt obliged to thank Henry and Bainbridge for their contribution towards this reconciliation with Rome. The English crown, therefore, had acted to secure the absolution of Venice as part of a broader initiative to cease the Cambrai offensive and turn it against France, integral to which was a ‘softly, softly’ approach by Bainbridge to secure this end in Rome. While Henry VIII’s underlying anti-French agenda was no secret, he evidently did not want to force the issue unnecessarily, perhaps due to a latent fear that ecclesiastical censures could still be turned against him. In the event, when the English king did hear of the absolution, circa 6 April, the Venetian ambassador reported how Henry ‘rejoiced thereat’, before consigning the other copy to Ferdinand.

While the crown did ignore the Venetian interdict in England and acted to end it through Bainbridge, it should be noted that the orator publicly recognised the censure when he reached Rome. On his reception (24 November), the ambassador was ceremonially received by all orators (among others), except the Venetians who, due to their censure, could not participate. It seems, however, that Bainbridge may have disobeyed the excommunication later that day, by receiving to lift the excommunication in a consistory of 4 February 1510, while the final details were settled by 15 February 1510; M. Creighton, History of the Papacy, v, pp.125-128; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vi, p.319; C. Shaw, Julius II, p.241. Later, in July 1512, Badoer, writing to his brother, claimed credit for persuading Henry VIII to write to Julius II in pursuit of the absolution; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.67-68 (LPIi, 1307; LPI, 3333; Ven.ii, 191). 159 LPIi, 354 (LPI, 1457; 29 January 1510, Henry to Bainbridge).

160 Ven.ii, 41 (LPIi, 384; 1 March 1510, Signory to the ambassadors in Rome), 43 (LPIi, 382; LPI, 932; 2 March 1510, doge to Henry), 44 (2 March 1510, motion in the Senate for a letter to Badoer), 45 (LPIi, 383; 2 March 1510, Signory to Badoer).

161 Ibid., 59 (LPIi, 421; 6 April 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London).
the ambassadors’ secretary, Andrea Rossi, sent to apologise for their unavoidable absence.\textsuperscript{162} Bainbridge received the ambassadors in person on 26 November, among them Donato.\textsuperscript{163} By doing this, Bainbridge incurred the risk of excommunication as, despite the absolution of Donato (as well as of cardinals Cornaro and Grimani, in order to negotiate with the papacy), the others were still subject to the interdict. While Henry VIII could ignore the bull quite safely from England, the flouting of its terms by his orator in Rome itself appears at first glance to have been a considerable risk. However, that these ambassadors were resident in Rome and able to carry on with their business surely indicates that some sort of pragmatism was adopted by the papacy.\textsuperscript{164} In addition, England’s friendship with Venice must have been obvious to all at this point, as the republic had deliberately lobbied for this to be the case.\textsuperscript{165} Perhaps the contagious implications of the interdict were overlooked by the papacy, as long as Bainbridge did not obviously flout their terms in Rome. In this instance, Julius II’s turning against France would have reinforced this position.

A more open, albeit indirect, display of opposition is suggested by Henry’s positive response to a request apparently from Venice’s orator in his court in July 1509 to mediate on the republic’s behalf with Maximilian.\textsuperscript{166} If the credit for this ought to lie with Badoer, this was a

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\item[162] \textit{Ibid.}, 21 (26 November 1509, Venetian ambassadors in Rome to the Signory). For Rossi being the secretary in question, see D.S. Chambers, \textit{Cardinal Bainbridge}, p.23. Hironimo Donato was the only Venetian ambassador who had been absolved back in July in order to have contact with the pope; M. Creighton, \textit{History of the Papacy}, v, p.120; L. Pastor, \textit{History of the Popes}, vi, p.316; C. Shaw, \textit{Julius II}, p.237. Bainbridge’s meeting with Rossi may not have been contrary to papal censures if the secretary was not a Venetian, but one could easily argue that his association with the ambassadors of the republic would make him automatically excommunicate and, so, this would pass on to Bainbridge on their meeting. Indeed, the doge and senate instructed their ambassadors to breach the censures by visiting Bainbridge; \textit{Ven.ii}, 19-20 (\textit{LPli}, 262; 3 December 1509, Signory to their ambassador in Rome).
\item[164] Regardless of the interdict, the Venetians’ presence in Rome was neither secret nor condemned. As seems to have been accepted tradition, Julius II permitted the entry of the censured Venetian representatives into Rome after nightfall, although he would only speak in person to an absolved member of the embassy; C. Shaw, \textit{Julius II}, p.237.
\item[165] \textit{Ven.ii}, 23 (\textit{LPli}, 267; 8 December 1509, Signory to its ambassadors in Rome).
\item[166] \textit{Ibid.}, 9 (\textit{LPli}, 154; 30 August 1509, Signory to Badoer).
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clever plan that indicated England’s lack of willingness to observe the interdict. As go-between, Henry VIII thereby advertised the fact that he continued to entertain diplomatic contact with this censured state and, indeed, sympathised with its cause.\textsuperscript{167}

Finally, the English crown’s largely dismissive attitude towards papal censures with which it disagreed is demonstrated by its reaction to the economic implications of the interdict.\textsuperscript{168} If Venetian merchants understood that Henry VIII had refused to publish the interdict in England, then they presumably did not fear confiscation of their property there. This was was further indicated by the Venetians on 30 August 1509, when they instructed their ambassador to thank the king ‘for his good treatment of the Venetian merchants’.\textsuperscript{169} In comparison with the French merchants earlier noted as protected by the English crown from the effects of papal censure, only one Venetian apparently benefited in a similar manner during the latter republic’s interdict. On 27 July 1509, Antonio Bavaryno was given protection for one year while at Calais under the authority of its lieutenant, Sir Gilbert Talbot.\textsuperscript{170} More revealing, on the other hand, it seems that in December 1509, all Venetian traders resident in England reportedly benefited from a grant to prorogue the payment of custom duties to the crown for a period of two years, presumably arising from the difficulties caused by the war and the effects that the interdict was having on business

\textsuperscript{167}\textit{Ibid.}, The republic itself was enthusiastic to employ Henry VIII in this manner and it seems that the king did take the role seriously; \textit{ibid.}, 12 (\textit{LPli}, 169; 14 or 15 September 1509, Signory to Badoer), 24 (\textit{LPli}, 278; 21 December 1509, Signory to Badoer), 28 (\textit{LPli}, 319; 5 January 1510, Signory to Badoer), 29 (\textit{LPli}, 320; 5 January 1510), 31-32 (\textit{LPli}, 328, 7 January 1510, Signory to its ambassadors negotiating with the emperor), 33 (\textit{LPli}, 330; 12 January 1510, Signory to Badoer), 35 (\textit{LPli}, 336; 16 January 1510), 36 (\textit{LPli}, 335; 16 January 1510, Signory to its ambassadors negotiating with the emperor), 45 (\textit{LPli}, 383; 2 March 1510, Signory to Badoer) 52 (\textit{LPli}, 365, 385; 14 February 1510, Badoer to the Signory); \textit{LPli}, 323 (8 January 1510, Venetian ambassadors negotiating with the emperor to the Signory).

\textsuperscript{168}Contemporaries fully expected this interdict to have economic repercussions; C. Shaw, \textit{Julius II}, p.233.

\textsuperscript{169}\textit{Ven.ii}, 7 (\textit{LPli}, 98; 3 July 1509, Badoer to the Signory, London).

\textsuperscript{170}\textit{LPli}, 132:95 (\textit{LPli}, 346; 27 July 1509). That is not to say that others were not protected in a similar or other manner, rather that the sources consulted only reveal this single instance.
outside of England.\textsuperscript{171} This suggests that the economic implications of the interdict were biting, probably by the lack of merchandise coming into the kingdom, regardless of crown support.\textsuperscript{172}

In addition to the above concessions, the English crown’s opposition to this political interdict manifested itself in the efforts it made to facilitate the continuation of Anglo-Venetian trade \textit{vis-à-vis} the Flanders galleys. This fleet, which customarily sailed every year to Southampton, imported various luxury goods from the east, such as spices, in addition to wines from the Mediterranean. On their return journey, the galleys exported wool, tin and other products from England. While the voyage of the Flanders galleys was fairly regular during peacetime, it had often, as Henry VIII was doubtless aware, ceased during wartime in his father’s reign, as in 1497. Such was their perceived significance at this time that Henry VII wrote personally to the republic to request they be sent.\textsuperscript{173} That the cancellation of the Flanders galleys worried Henry VIII is indicated by his personal inquiry to the republic, which elicited a response on 6 August. The Venetian government informed Henry that they wanted to send the galleys, but the Cambrai confederacy’s actions, including the threat of confiscation partly engendered by the interdict, made it too dangerous. Instead, they encouraged Henry to intervene in the conflict so

\textsuperscript{171} According to Ferigo Morexini (resident in London), writing to his brother on 5 December, the consul, Lorenzo Pasqualigo, along with other merchants of his state, made this request to the crown; \textit{ibid.}, 264 (6 December 1509, Badoer to the Signory).

\textsuperscript{172} This situation is also implied on 14 February 1510 by Andrea Badoer who, when complaining of a lack of money (having pawned everything of value), mentioned that the state’s merchants in England could not subsidise him. While lack of money was a common issue among diplomats, one can sympathise with Badoer on this occasion, given the effects of the interdict and the war but, more importantly, it is entirely feasible that the republic’s merchants in England would usually have been a source of credit, but could not be this time; \textit{Ven.ii}, 52 (\textit{LPi}, 365; 14 February 1510, Badoer to the Signory).

\textsuperscript{173} The Flanders galleys had been regular visitors to Southampton since the beginning of the fourteenth century. The most recent fleet left England around the end of April 1509; \textit{Ven.i}, pp.lxiv-lxxi, 544, 606, 612, 735, 736, 813, 829, 839, 852; \textit{Ven.ii}, 1; R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, i, pp.xv-xvi; A. Beardwood, \textit{Alien Merchants in England 1350 to 1377} (1931), p.4. For wars impeding voyages in the fourteenth century, see F.C. Lane, \textit{Venice, A Maritime Republic} (1973), pp.126-127.
that voyages could resume. While Venice perhaps envisaged English assistance in a more military sense, Henry VIII’s intervention came as letters written to some of the confederates, requesting them to grant safe conducts to the galleys or to desist from molesting them, in direct contravention to the interdict. Henry reportedly approached Maximilian and Louis XII some time before 23 October 1509. Similarly, in November 1509, Henry requested that Ferdinand of Aragon allow them safe-passage around his territories, and though Ferdinand replied that he could not ignore the censures placed upon the Venetians, he pledged to order that they should pass unmolested. Notably, the papacy does not appear to have been approached in this regard, possibly indicating an English reluctance to publicly indicate opposition to the interdict. This is curious given that Venetian ships would have to pass by the Adriatic coast of the Papal States en route to England. Nevertheless, these approaches to France and Spain represented external and potentially public defiance of the papal interdict, to which Henry VIII presumably did not expect any papal rebuke. Despite these measures to circumvent the interdict, the English failed to induce a voyage by the Flanders galleys; Henry had to wait until May 1518 for this. He failed,
therefore, to forestall the economic effects of the Venetian interdict on Anglo-Venetian trade, and this equally indicates the success of papal censures in this sense. That the threat to the Flanders galleys had still not been adequately addressed, even after the absolution of Venice, is further demonstrated when Henry VIII’s representatives raised the issue of their safety in their negotiations for the Anglo-French peace of March 1510, which culminated in the inclusion of a clause guaranteeing their safe passage. While the English crown’s disregard for the Venetian interdict points towards a defiance of papal authority, it should not been seen in the same way as that displayed by the Venetians themselves. In addition to refusing to allow the interdict’s publication in the republic, Venetian agents pinned an appeal against it to a future general council to the doors of St Peter’s and Castel Sant’ Angelo, during the night of 27 April 1509. It is unlikely that Henry VIII would ever have contemplated supporting such an extreme measure in support of a state with which he was not even formally allied.

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178 The Venetians were unhappy with the protection afforded by this clause, however, and voted not to despatch the Flanders galleys in September 1510, thus continuing their absence from England and perhaps suggesting that, as the interdict had ceased, that what they really feared the general risk of seizure of their merchandise, whether such acts were blessed by papacy or not; Sp.ii, 36 (LPi, 406; LPI, 962; 23 March 1510); Ven.ii, 52 (LPi, 365, 385, 408; 14 February 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London), 61 (LPi, 413; 30 March 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London), 66 (LPi, 450; 30 April 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London), 67 (LPi, 463; 18 May 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London), 80-81 (LPi, 570; 9 September 1510, Signory to Badoer), 88 (613; 16 November 1510, Signory to Badoer).
179 The Venetians even went as far as to approach Cardinal Bakocz of Hungary, who as Patriarch of Constantinople, possessed the theoretical power to convogue a general council, although the cardinal did not respond to this and it is doubtful that there would have been wider support of his authority to take such action; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vi, pp.311-312.
180 It has already been posited that the English crown avoided placing itself at risk of papal censure if possible; see above pp.209-212.
The motives for the English crown ignoring papal censures against Venice in 1509-1510 were both political and economic. Politically, Henry VIII objected, certainly in writing to Ferdinand and probably to Julius II, to the destruction of Venice, partly because the rest of Italy (and Henry would particularly have had the Papal States in mind here) would be ‘unable to withstand the ambitious designs of certain Christian princes’. Indeed, it seems that Henry did not lay the blame for the war itself and, thereby, the interdict, at the door of Julius II; rather, he and his advisors seemingly believed the republic’s assertions that the pope had been coerced into these temporal actions by Louis XII. On 30 August 1509, the signory conveyed how, despite obeying the papal ultimatum to return certain towns to stave off the interdict within the stipulated timeframe and having written to the pontiff and sent ambassadors to Rome to seek absolution, the papacy’s position against the republic had not softened on account of French influence or coercion. This reasoning may well help to explain the broader contradiction in English policy in opposing papal actions, while retaining otherwise cordial relations with the Apostolic See. It also fits in with the whole anti-French agenda being pursued from the accession of Henry VIII, involving belligerent rhetoric, as well as initial attempts to detach the confederates from the League of Cambrai and form an anti-French coalition, of which the Bainbridge mission to Rome was part. English economic motives for ignoring, even attempting to counter the interdict can be easily be attributed to financial self-interest. The measures outlined above indicate a great desire, on the part of Henry VIII, to ensure ‘business as usual’, so that England continued to

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181 Sp.ii, 23-24 (LPl, 220; 1 November 1509, Henry to Ferdinand), 25-26 (LPl, 221; 1 November 1509, Henry to Ferdinand).
182 Ven.ii, 9 (LPl, 154; 30 August 1509, Signory to Badoer). During the period of the interdict, Venice also tried to convince the English crown that the papacy would declare its enmity against France if Henry attacked Louis XII. Also see correspondence of 24 April and 14 September 1509, respectively; Ven.i, 936 (24 April 1509, Signory to Badoer); Ven.ii, 12 (LPl, 169; 14 or 15 September 1509, Signory to Badoer).
183 See below pp.362-363, 368ff.
benefit from its trading links with Venice and that these were in no way jeopardised; although this seems to have been largely unsuccessful, given that a concession concerning customs duties was required in December 1509 by Venetian merchants and the Flanders galleys did not come to England for a number of years. In addition, Henry VIII’s personal interest in and enthusiasm for the Flanders galley, further fuelled the crown’s preparedness to ignore papal sanctions in this instance.\textsuperscript{184} The crown’s failure to ensure the continuation of Anglo-Venetian trade highlights the effectiveness of the economic consequences of papal censures and the inability of the English, however supportive, to affect this outside its own territories.

Overall, it is noteworthy in this Venetian case study that no reaction appears to have emanated from Rome concerning England’s lack of observance of its censures. Given that there was papal diplomatic representation in England at this time, particularly Silvester de Giglis and Polydore Vergil, it is unlikely that the papacy was completely unaware of the crown’s stance. It was Bainbridge’s cagey negotiations with the pope on this issue that highlighted the difference between England and the actions of its representative in Rome. Bainbridge was extremely careful not to contradict the pontiff and tried to bring him around gradually.\textsuperscript{185} Yet, what could the pope do about it? Julius II could have excommunicated Henry and interdicted his kingdom, but what would that have achieved? He needed the secular arm to make a response and Henry was the secular arm. Even if Julius had acted, it would have made an unnecessary enemy of England, with military implications for the League of Cambrai. At the same time, it was not long before

\textsuperscript{184} See n.173.
\textsuperscript{185} See below pp.368-373.
the pope turned against Louis XII and envisaged England as an ally to this end.\textsuperscript{186} However one viewed Henry VIII’s challenge to papal authority in this area, it was politically pragmatic for the papacy to turn a blind eye to it, for now.

The English crown, then, held a somewhat two-faced attitude towards papal censures during this period where the French axis was concerned. On the one hand, Henry VIII envisaged the employment of spiritual weapons when England committed to act in defence of the Church, particularly in order to help justify military action, to ensure that his allies met their obligations in this regard and even to help him realise a longstanding claim to the French crown. In an economic sense, the English king was also prepared to take advantage of the ability to confiscate property facilitated by excommunication and interdict, although he was prepared to delay this for as long as possible and to make exceptions for favoured merchants who happened to be native to the censured state(s). On the other hand, Henry VIII’s perception of the threat of papal censures against England or friendly states was somewhat different. While he rejected the validity of papal censures within England and never really risked incurring the imposition of these during this period, he did pro-actively seek to avoid papal overtures towards universal peace which, he feared, would prevent him under pain of censure from acting against Francis I, if the latter then used the crusade as an excuse to realise his Italian ambitions. Henry was also prepared to ignore excommunications and interdicts against friendly states, in particular Venice, at least partly on account of the republic’s position as a potential ally to defend papal independence.

\textsuperscript{186} For England’s ability to affect specifically French military power in Italy at this point, see above pp.114-116.
ENSURING THE ‘FURTHERANS OF AL HYS [HENRY’S] AFERYS IN Tyme To Kome’: THE ENGLISH CROWN’S ATTEMPTS TO INFLUENCE CONCLAVES IN ITS OWN INTEREST AND TO PREVENT THE ELECTION OF A ‘FRENCH’ POPE

Theoretically, conclaves should not arise in any discussion of the English relationship with Rome, as the crown had no formal role in papal elections. In practice, however, this cannot be avoided, as not only did England have something to gain in a political sense by attempting to influence the outcome, but the cardinals that comprised the electorate were affected by various external pressures and loyalties that ensured that they would never be solely guided by the Holy Spirit in their choice of candidate. One such external loyalty was that owed by many to a secular state and their heads were not oblivious to the opportunities available to them on such occasions.

A cardinal might be obligated to a secular prince in one of two ways. On the one hand, he might be a native of that state, ostensibly owing his ecclesiastical seniority to the patronage of his king or prince. He could be resident in Rome on a permanent basis, thus providing his crown with

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1 P.S and H.M. Allen (ed.), Letters of Richard Fox, pp.52-53 (LPlI, 880; LPl, 3443; 30 September 1511, Wolsey to [Fox]).
2 Francis I reportedly told the English ambassador, Fitzwilliam in early January 1522, ‘that it was just not the fashion at Rome to give their voices as the Holy Ghost puts in their minds’. Similarly, Guicciardini, in reporting the claim of the cardinals who elected Adrian VI in 1522 to have been so spiritually motivated, sceptically stated, ‘as if the Holy Ghost...would not disdain to enter into souls full of ambition and incredible greed, and almost all dedicated to the most refined, not to say most dishonest, pleasures. The Imperial ambassador in Rome, Juan Manuel, writing to Charles V, shortly after Leo X’s death, openly condemned the clearly political intrigues of the cardinals seeking votes for conclave, stating that ‘all is founded on avarice and lies’. Prodi goes as far as saying that, in papal elections, ‘external factors have a decisive influence’ on the Sacred College; LPlIIii, 1947 (calendared 9 January 1522, Fitzwilliam to [Wolsey]); Sp.ii, 368 (11 December 1521, Imperial ambassador in Rome to Charles); S. Alexander (ed.), The History of Italy by Francesco Guicciardini, pp.329-331; L. Nussdorfer, ‘The Vacant See: Ritual and Protest in Early Modern Rome’, The Sixteenth Century Journal, 18 (1987), p.174; P. Prodi, The Papal Prince, pp.40, 89. For some comments on the role played by ‘divine guidance’ on the cardinals’ choice, see C.L. Stinger, The Renaissance in Rome, pp.85, 90-91.
diplomatic service, or he could only attend Rome for conclaves. On the other hand, he might be a foreign (usually Italian) cardinal, employed by the state in some diplomatic context in Rome; the state employing this individual would invariably expect the cardinal to pursue its interests during papal elections. While both types of cardinal might affirm equal loyalty to their secular employer, this might be different in the privacy of conclave, where one would envisage that the singular tie of the native cardinal might prove more steadfast than, say, the multiple loyalties of a curial-based Italian. For England during this period, therefore, Christopher Bainbridge was a rare example of an English-born curial cardinal, also acting as crown orator in Rome, and would have acted above all in Henry VIII’s interests at the 1513 conclave. More common were the Italian cardinals employed by England for general service at the Curia, such as Hadrian de Castello and Lorenzo Campeggio, who attended conclave in 1513 and 1521, respectively. While it would have been hoped or even expected in England that these would have voted in the crown’s interests, indeed both claimed to have done so after the event, Henry VIII would have been well aware that their loyalties were not exclusively to England, thus making their obligation less certain than Bainbridge’s. The English crown also employed Italian cardinals in the higher dignity of cardinal protector. This position was usually accorded to the pope’s most prominent cardinal-minister. For Leo X’s pontificate, this was his cousin, Giulio de’ Medici. By virtue of the power and other loyalties of this cardinal, however, the English crown is likely to have held some, but rather less hope of his service during conclaves. In the conclave of 1521-1522, de’ Medici had Florence to

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3 Naturally, non-curial cardinals who did not attend conclave could not vote for the next pontiff.
4 Bainbridge was the first English cardinal to take part in a conclave since Adam Easton in the second half of the fourteenth century; D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.41.
think about (being scion of the city’s leading family), as well as his own candidacy in the election (he entered as *papabile*).5

On this basis, therefore, secular states could hope that their interests would be pursued when ‘their’ cardinals cast their votes for a new pope, and/or also undertake their instructions to back one or more particular candidates. While most states were neither large nor powerful enough to command or influence more than one or two cardinals, the political ‘superpowers’, such as the Empire, France and Spain were widely perceived to have had control of their own ‘parties’ within the Sacred College, which could conceivably have a bearing on the result of papal elections, particularly given the inherent and endemic rivalries between them.6 England, while not a ‘superpower’ on the scale of the big three, was not an insignificant political entity. It was, as is largely accepted, more of a second-rate power on the international stage and this was reflected by its representation at the Apostolic See.7 As far as its influence in Rome was concerned, it would be overstating the case to claim that an English ‘party’ existed among the College of Cardinals, particularly during papal elections. During the conclaves of this period, the closest that one can come to identifying such a group is in 1513, when both Christopher Bainbridge and the English collector and longtime diplomat, Hadrian de Castello, were present. Even then, however, the latter’s ‘English’ credentials can be called into question, given the apparently minimal diplomatic service that he had given to England since he left Rome to go into

\[\text{De’ Medici was also cardinal protector of France, but the papacy’s concurrent war with Francis I, instigated by Leo X of whose government Giulio was the leading member, ruled out any chance of the latter fulfilling any obligations to France in conclave; W.E. Wilkie, \textit{Cardinal Protectors}, pp.86, 94-95.}\]

\[\text{See, for instance, Lowe’s summary of this idea with reference to the 1523 conclave, as well as how this affected the 1513 and 1521 elections; K.J.P. Lowe, \textit{Church and Politics in Renaissance Italy}, pp.50-51, 72-73, 121-124.}\]

\[\text{For an example of Henry’s reluctance to attack France alone even though he had gone too far to pull-out by April 1513, see \textit{LPI}, 1769 (\textit{LPI}, 3876; \textit{Ven.ii}, 238; 12 April 1513, Henry to Bainbridge, London).}\]
exile in 1507. Furthermore, de Castello only arrived in Rome on the evening after conclave had opened, therefore giving him little time to build up any type of rapport with Bainbridge. While this ought not to have had any effect on their joint pursuit of English interests, the overall impression of this Italian is that his joining with the Cardinal of York in this respect would have been unlikely or, at best, insincere.

To gain an insight into the underlying importance of political considerations in this aspect of the English relationship with Rome and how they linked in with Henry VIII’s perception of himself as a defender of the papacy from France, the occasions when its concern with conclaves arose will first be outlined, followed by the strategies that it adopted in response. Subsequently, the chapter will explore why the crown tried to affect papal elections and what it hoped to achieve, politically speaking. Analysis will also be made on how effective the crown believed it could be in this area and how successful it was in reality.

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8 De Castello spent most of his time, 1507-1513, in and around the Empire, and his loyalty to Maximilian is somewhat betrayed by his cautious initial links with the schismatic cardinals in 1511, the latter backed by the French and Imperialists at that point; ibid., 1007 (LPI, 2039; calendared 1511, [de Castello] to Henry); H. Jedin and D.E. Graf (trans.), A History of the Council of Trent, i (1949), p.107; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vi, pp.353, 361-362; R.J. Schoeck, ‘The Fifth Lateran Council: its Partial Successes and its Larger Failures’, in G.F. Lytle (ed.), Reform and Authority in the Medieval and Reformation Church (1981), pp.100-101. The English crown also recognised de Castello’s links with Maximilian in the winter of 1512-1513, when Henry commissioned the cardinal to induce the emperor to agree a peace with Venice; Ven.ii 214 (LPIi, 1574; 15 January 1513, messenger from de Castello in Venice); M. Underwood, ‘The Pope, the Queen and the King’s Mother’, in B. Thompson (ed.), The Reign of Henry VII, pp.79-80. W.E. Wilkie, Cardinal Protectors, p.34.

9 Neither is there any indication that the cardinals communicated directly before the election; D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.42, 152-165; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, p.19. There also seems to have been no direct contact between Bainbridge and de Castello before this election.

10 Bainbridge and de Castello later had considerable disagreements, as the latter attempted to reassert his diplomatic role with England. The Italian’s relations with Henry and Wolsey also soured, as a protracted attempt to remove him from the apostolic collectorship ensued, only ending when de Castello was deprived by Leo X in 1517 (on account of his tenuous involvement in a conspiracy against the pope’s life); see above p.32 n.79.
Two conclaves occurred in this period, which elected Leo X in 1513 and Adrian VI in 1522. As will be seen, the English crown attempted to influence the outcome of both for principally political motives, a pro-English and anti-French agenda. In addition, from the English perspective, there were occasions when an election was either expected or feared to be imminent. Given the time delay in communications from Rome, the English crown had no choice but to take every rumour of papal illness seriously. Accordingly, Henry VIII and his ministers sometimes developed contingency plans in anticipation of such a report being confirmed.

The first vacancy arose following Julius II’s death on 20 February 1513. After a relatively short *interregnum*, conclave lasted 4-11 March, at which Giovanni de’ Medici was selected. The rapidity of events in Rome did little to facilitate an English reaction. News of Julius II’s death only began to arrive in England, firstly via Germany, through Thomas Spinelly in the Low Countries, in correspondence dated 9 March 1513, when conclave had already been meeting for five days. Spinelly claimed to have received a despatch that day from Bainbridge, reporting Julius’ demise. He wrote again to Henry on the 21st of hearing that the cardinals peacefully entered conclave on the 4th, although he did not know of any result. The following

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11 On the 4th, Julius himself is said to have expected his imminent death when talking to his master of ceremonies, Paris de Grassis; M. Creighton, *History of the Papacy*, v, p.187. Also, see C. Shaw, *Julius II*, p.312.
13 The quickest times between England and Rome achieved by couriers riding post around this time were 13-18 days. On this basis, if one assumes the best estimate of 13 days’ journey each way and an instant response by the English crown, this would mean that instructions could only have reached Rome on 18 March at the earliest. It is, therefore, unlikely that Henry could have received news of the death of Julius and issued his preference(s) in the intervening 19 days, although this would not have necessarily stopped him from trying; D.S. Chambers, *Cardinal Bainbridge*, p.42; G.B. Parks, *The English Traveler to Italy*, i, p.498.
14 The diplomat states his source to be ‘the Cardinal de Jorco’. Spinelly also confirmed that Maximilian and Margaret were in receipt of the same news from their own source; *LPI*, 1670 (*LPI*, 3777; 9 March 1513, Spinelly to Henry, Mechelin). Leo X went on to notify Henry VIII of his election on 19 March, although it is curious that the conclave itself does not seem to have written to inform Henry of Julius II’s death and Leo X’s elevation until 19 July; *ibid.*, 1687 (*LPI*, 3806; 19 March 1513, Leo X to Henry, Rome), 2108 (*LPI*, 4354; 19 July 1513).
15 *Ibid.*, 1697 (*LPI*, 3817; 21 March 1513, Spinelly to [Henry]).
day, Spinelly may have notified the king of Leo X’s election, as he again forwarded correspondence from Bainbridge, although he does not mention its contents. It is unlikely, however, that the post carrying this news would have travelled quicker than all Imperial sources (as otherwise, Spinelly would have mentioned similar reports to Maximilian or Margaret).16 We can only be sure that Henry was aware of this news by Bainbridge’s correspondence by 12 April, as on this date Henry acknowledged receipt.17 That is not to preclude the possibility of intelligence from other sources, particularly from Germany or France.

While the English could not have anticipated a short interregnum, there is no evidence of any reactive crown policy to instruct its representatives in Rome to lobby for a particular candidate (or candidates) in conclave. It is more likely that Bainbridge, along with de Castello and, to a lesser extent the non-cardinalatial de Giglis, were expected to use their discretion in choosing to back the cardinal most sympathetic to English interests and who had a chance of being elected. Bainbridge et al may or may not have received recommendations from England, based on one or more previous occasions when Julius II was thought to be terminally ill.18 In any case, it is clear that Bainbridge intrigued in the subsequent conclave on Henry VIII’s behalf.

Bainbridge apparently pursued the candidacy of Raphael Riario (as recommended in England by Thomas Ruthal and Charles Somerset earlier in 151119) but, quickly discovering that his candidate had no chance of election, effectively spoiled his vote in the first scrutiny (10

16 Ibid., 1699 (LPI, 3821; 22 March 1513, Spinelly to [Henry]).
17 Ibid., 1769 (LPI, 3876; Ven.ii, 238; 12 April 1513, Henry to Bainbridge, London). If Bainbridge was doing his job properly, one would expect him to have written letters of such import immediately on hearing of the relevant event; so, he would have notified Henry of the pope’s death on 20 February 1513 (possibly 21st, as Julius died in the night), and of Leo’s election on 11 March, as soon as he was allowed to leave conclave.
18 See, for instance, the discussions that took place in September 1511, below pp.236-237, 393.
19 See below pp.236-237.
March), by nominating a layman, Fabrizio del Carretto. By doing this, he probably hoped to avoid contributing to the election of another cardinal at this point. After this ballot, he could then enter discussions with his fellow cardinals and ascertain who, in the English interest, had the most realistic chance of selection. Bainbridge’s choice in the second scrutiny is unknown, but his opinions seem to have been academic, as Raphael Riario and Giovanni de’ Medici had already agreed to ensure the latter’s election. Given his diplomatic role and the need to work closely with the future pontiff, it is unlikely that Bainbridge worked against, and he probably voted for, the future Leo X. The inducements that bought Bainbridge’s support may have been, most significantly, an alleged promise by Leo to maintain the papacy’s confederacy with England (against France) and, to a lesser extent, the conferral on the English cardinal of one of de’ Medici’s benefices. The other ‘English’ cardinal, Hadrian de Castello, while a supporter of Riario’s opponent, de’ Medici, voted for Bainbridge in the first scrutiny (along with Cardinal Cornaro). This was probably a politically motivated gesture, attempting to curry favour with the English crown in order to gain lucrative diplomatic employment once more, while probably not expecting the Cardinal of York to achieve sufficient votes to be elected. Furthermore, de

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20 Del Caretto was the brother and conclavist of Cardinal Carlo del Carretto di Finale; D.S. Chambers, *Cardinal Bainbridge*, pp.42-44, 107. Theoretically, anyone could be elected pope, although it was extremely rare for the selection of anyone outside of the Sacred College. Most recently, Amadeus VIII duke of Savoy was elected as Felix V by the Council of Basle in 1439, although he failed to gain recognition of his role outside of his own lands and a few minor states, and was subsequently regarded as an antipope; J.N.D. Kelly, *Oxford Dictionary of the Popes* (1986), pp.243-244.


22 For an Imperial account of the conclave that seems to have reached England via Spinelly, see *LP*ii, 1677 (*LP*ii, 3780; 11 March 1513).

23 D.S. Chambers, *Cardinal Bainbridge*, p.44; *LP*ii, 2029 (*LP*, 4283; 25 June 1513, Bainbridge to Henry). The benefice concerned was the Benedictine monastery of San Stefano, Bologna, awarded on 19 March and worth around 700 ducats *per annum*, less 200 ducats in pensions; D.S. Chambers, *Cardinal Bainbridge*, p.96.

24 Also, as a supporter of de’ Medici, whose candidacy was to remain secret until an appropriate time, he had to vote for somebody else in the first ballot. This argument is made more convincing by the fact that Bainbridge’s other benefactor, Cornaro, was also a member of the de’ Medici faction; D.S. Chambers, *Cardinal Bainbridge*, p.44; L. Pastor, *History of the Popes*, vii, pp.22-23.
Castello appears to have been a fervent opponent of Riario during the election and was quoted as saying, during this time, that ‘Sic hic pontifex creatur, ultra Sauromatas fugere hinc libet’.25

The second vacancy of this period began on 1 December 1521; while Leo X had suffered illnesses since August, his latest malady was only identified as life-threatening on 30 November. Dying within 24 hours, news of this in Rome, therefore, was completely unexpected.26 Conclave was delayed until 27 December, at least partly because of the college’s objections to the detention of Cardinal d’Ivrea en route to Rome, and then lasted until 9 January, thus allowing time, theoretically, for an English response.27 Henry and Wolsey appear to have been notified of the pope’s death by 16 December, in letters from Francis I. Their concern with events in and around Rome that led to their subsequent actions cannot be seen in anything other than an overtly political light. In immediate response, Henry VIII apparently decided that Wolsey’s candidacy should be pursued, thus invoking a promise that Charles V had made to the cardinal at Bruges in August 1521, to make a joint bid for Wolsey’s nomination, should a vacancy arrive. Before discovering the emperor’s apparent willingness to honour his pledge, Richard Pace was immediately despatched to Rome to this end. However, if the Wolsey nomination was unlikely to succeed or if Giulio de’ Medici was already likely to win, the secretary was instructed to back the latter.28 Despite the delays in Rome, Pace was to arrive some weeks after the election of Adrian

25 LPIi, 1677 (LPI, 3780; 11 March 1513); L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, p.23.
26 S. Alexander (ed.), The History of Italy by Francesco Guicciardini, p.327; M. Creighton, History of the Papacy, vi (1903), p.188; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, viii (1908), pp.58-64. Pace only believed the pope’s sickness to be serious on 1 December; LPIii, 1824 (1 December 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome).
28 The Imperialists appear to have first raised the idea with Wolsey of a joint bid for him to become pope back in 1520, but this only seems to have become a more serious offer at Bruges in 1521. For the apparent implementation of Imperial support, see LPIii, 1868 (15 December 1521, Margaret of Savoy to Wolsey, Oudenarde), 1876 (16 December 1521, Charles to de Mesa, Ghent), 1877 (17 December 1521, Charles to Wolsey), 1880 (17 December 1521, Margaret of Savoy to Wolsey, Ghent), 1884 (19 December 1521, de Mesa to Charles, London), 1904 (27 December 1521, Margaret of Savoy to Wolsey, Ghent), 1906 (28 December 1521, Charles to Henry, Ghent), 1907
VI, on 27 January. News of this event again seems to have reached England via Spinelly in Brussels, who wrote at 8 a.m. on 18 January 1522. Margaret of Savoy mentioned the same news on the 20th, although she would not confirm it. Wolsey was said to be disappointed at the emperor’s failure to help his candidacy in the election and it was predicted that England’s cool relations with France would warm as a result.

In the absence of crown instructions, the English ‘party’ in Rome again used its own initiative in pursuing candidates in the English interest. The ‘party’ at this point consisted of the orator John Clerk, Lorenzo Campeggio and, to a lesser extent, Giulio de’ Medici. Clerk and Campeggio seem to have discussed a joint strategy with de’ Medici prior to the opening of conclave, in which the subject of the crown interest would have been integral. Essentially, Clerk and Campeggio intended to back the latter’s candidacy and Clerk’s offer to lobby other members of the Sacred College in this regard was accepted. It must also be noted that, in addition to his English loyalties, Campeggio was also firmly committed to the Medici camp both before and

(calendared 28 December 1521, Charles to Wolsey, Ghent), 1908 (calendared 28 December 1521, Charles to his ambassador in Rome), 1934 (5 January 1522, Margaret of Savoy to Wolsey, Ghent), 1954 (10 January 1522, Margaret of Savoy to Wolsey, Ghent), 3372 (30 September 1523, Wolsey to Henry, ‘At the More’), 3389 (4 October 1523, Wolsey to Clerk, Pace and others). After the election, de’ Medici himself was told that his candidacy was the priority of the Pace mission, with Wolsey’s to have been ‘plan B’; ibid., 1956 (12 January 1522, Giulio de’ Medici to Henry, Rome), 1957 (12 January 1522, Giulio de’ Medici to Wolsey, Rome). Also see J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp.107-110.

29 LPHIII, 1995 (28 January 1522, Pace to Wolsey, Rome). Pace had an audience with Charles V on 22 January and with the emperor’s aunt, Margaret of Savoy, on 23rd; ibid., 1890 (23 December 1521, Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to [Wolsey], Ghent). Pace heard the news shortly before he arrived at Florence and, after this, did not hurry to Rome, instead waiting at the former city to speak with Giulio de’ Medici; ibid., 1966 (16 January 1522, Pace to [Wolsey], Florence).


31 Ibid., 1974 (20 January 1522, Margaret of Savoy to Wolsey, Bruges).

32 The Venetian author also reasoned that this change might come about because Francis had also promised not to interfere in Scotland. The implication is that Francis, recognising the political bias of the new pope, was already taking measures to prevent Henry joining Charles in the current Franco-Imperial conflict. Francis was, however, unaware of the secret alignment already concluded at Bruges in August 1521; Ven.iii, 396 (27 January 1522, Venetian ambassador in England to the Signory). Also see LPHIII, 2024 (5 February 1522, Charles to de Mesa, Brussels).
during the election, thus making this decision to back Giulio unsurprising. Also in pursuit of Henry VIII’s interests, Clerk made enquiries about Campeggio as the second choice of the Medici ‘party’, if Giulio’s attempts were met with opposition, but Campeggio himself proved evasive, being loath for this possibility to be raised unless de’ Medici did so first.33 While the Imperial ambassador, Juan Manuel, came to an agreement with de’ Medici by 24 December, also providing for other suitable candidates if Giulio’s nomination failed, it is unclear whether both English and Imperial camps were working together at this time.34

In conclave, while it was only Campeggio and de’ Medici who held votes to be used potentially in the English interest, the latter entered as *papabile* with considerable backing within the Sacred College. De’ Medici, however, faced too much opposition and his last nomination was registered in the seventh scrutiny on 5 January. That of Campeggio, on the other hand, gained a number of votes in at least two ballots, but his interest effectively ended on Saturday 4th. In the face of the inability of the Medici faction to secure a victory, Clerk reported Giulio’s difficulty in putting trust in any compromise candidate, but he eventually turned to Cardinal Adrian of Tortosa, a firmly Imperial candidate. Concerning the Wolsey nomination, neither Campeggio nor de’ Medici were informed of this before they left conclave, although each later claimed to have worked in some way towards this. There was some validity in these claims, given that de’ Medici was quoted by Clerk as commenting on Wolsey’s worthiness for the papal tiara prior to the

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33 Clerk seems to have believed that he gained Cardinal Colonna’s commitment to support Campeggio if de’ Medici could not secure enough votes; *LP IIIii*, 1895 (calendared end December 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey]), 1932 (4 January 1522, [Clerk to Wolsey]), 1945 (9 January 1522, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome), 1952 (10 January 1522, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome); Ellis, pp.304-3166 (*LP IIIii*, 1960; 13 January 1522 [Clerk to Wolsey]).

opening of conclave. Furthermore, Wolsey did secure votes in at least one ballot, seven in the fifth scrutiny, the sheer number of which were probably the result of (some) support from within the Medici camp. After the election, de’ Medici claimed to have supported Wolsey in every scrutiny and to have induced 17 or 18 of his supporters to do the same. While this was untrue, he may have encouraged some of his party to demonstrate his commitment to England (as its cardinal protector) in the fifth ballot, if it was anticipated that this would be inconclusive, just as his cousin appears to have done back in 1513. In any case, de’ Medici, no longer principal minister to the pope, was seeking to secure English support for the future.

Finally, there were occasions when reports reached England that there was likely to be a change of pontiff, either on account of the pope falling seriously ill or because of a political or military threat to depose him. In such cases, there was sometimes activity within crown circles to prepare a reaction to the possibility that a conclave was imminent. One example occurred from mid-August 1511 when Julius II was widely believed to be mortally ill. In Rome itself, there was

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35 *LP III*, 1895 (calendared end December 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey]), 1945 (9 January 1522, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome), 1952 (10 January 1522, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome), 1981 (23 January 1522, Pace to [Wolsey], Florence), 1990 (26 January 1522, Pace to [Wolsey], Palpa), 1995 (28 January 1522, Pace to Wolsey, Rome); Ellis, pp.304-3166 (*LP III*, 1960; 13 January 1522 [Clerk to Wolsey]). Even the Swiss cardinal Matthew Schiner claimed to have attempted to nominate Wolsey; *LP III*, 1955 (11 January 1522, Cardinal Schiner to [Wolsey], Rome).

36 It is unclear whether Wolsey received votes in any other ballot, as the only breakdown found lists only those cardinals with the greatest number of votes. It is difficult to imagine, however, that, in such a divided conclave, Wolsey, as a figurehead of the English crown, would have gained so many votes from the politically ‘neutral’, let alone from the pro-French ‘party’; *Sp. ii*, 375 (9 January 1522); *LP III*, 1896 (calendared 24 December 1521); L. Pastor, *History of the Popes*, ix, pp.14-25.

37 *LP III*, 1981 (23 January 1522, Pace to [Wolsey], Florence).

38 It must be noted that there was no knee-jerk reaction to news of papal illness, rather reactions only came if the reports deemed it to be life-threatening. See, for instance, reports from mid-July 1516 on of English business being impeded on account of Leo X’s incapacity and the pope’s health being a noteworthy topic for correspondence; *LP III*, 2194 (19 July 1516, de Giglis to Ammonius), 2241 (2 August 1516, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 2243 (4 August 1516, de Giglis to Ammonius, Rome), 2359 (13 September 1516, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels). Also see *ibid.*, 2395 (27 September 1516, Boniface Collis to [Ammonius], Rome). Similarly, in October 1520, Campeggio reported to Wolsey of the pope having left Rome due to ill health, but makes no further comment; *LP III*, 1016 (10 October 1520, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome).
great instability when the pope fell unconscious on 21\textsuperscript{st}, as his apartments were despoiled by his own officials and the Roman noble families, particularly the Colonna, sought to reassert their authority through the Capitoline government. Julius soon recovered and reasserted control, but not before rumours of his demise had circulated throughout Christendom.\textsuperscript{39} Such news reached England in September 1511, via Sir Robert Wingfield in Germany. In what appears to have been an immediate response, several of Henry’s ‘inner circle’, including the rising Wolsey, discussed their favoured successors. A letter from Wolsey to Richard Fox at this time conveys the former’s recommendation to the king that Hadrian de Castello, also Maximilian’s favoured candidate, should be supported, while Thomas Ruthal and Charles Somerset criticised de Castello and preferred Raphael Riario. Wolsey reported that the king was inclined to agree with him, but that Ruthal’s and Somerset’s dissension was preventing any final decision. Consequently, the almoner requested Fox’s return to Court to sort this out.\textsuperscript{40} This forethought given to a potential conclave came to nought, however, as Julius II soon recovered.

Given the various attempts to affect the outcomes of papal elections by and on behalf of the English crown, it is worth clarifying briefly the two broad strategies that were employed. Firstly, the English representatives in Rome identified their own candidate(s) to lobby for and support; this could involve joining with the ‘party’ of an English ally. Secondly, the crown may

\begin{itemize}
\item Maximilian even briefly envisaged himself as Julius’ replacement; \textit{LPli}, 850 (26 August 1511, Andrea da Borgo to Margaret of Savoy, Lyons), 858 (2 September 1511, Andrea da Borgo to Margaret of Savoy, Lyons), 865 (16 September[?]) 1511, Erasmus to Ammonius), 866 (18 September 1511, Maximilian to Margaret of Savoy); M. Creighton, \textit{History of the Papacy}, v, pp.153-156; F. Gregorovius (A. Hamilton, trans.), \textit{History of the City of Rome in the Middle Ages}, vol.viii part i (1902), p.80-85; C. Shaw, \textit{Julius II}, pp.286-290.
\item Wolsey also raises other, non-papal matters, for which Fox’s return was required; P.S and H.M. Allen (ed.), \textit{Letters of Richard Fox}, pp.52-3 (\textit{LPli}, 880; \textit{LPI}, 3443; 30 September 1511, Wolsey to [Fox]). It is as a result of the timing of the arrival of this news that we are fortunate enough to have this evidence. At this point, the king was still on his summer recess. During such recesses, Henry VIII was not surrounded by many councillors and, in 1511, Fox appears to have entrusted Wolsey to watch over matters in his absence; see pp.23-24 n.56.
\end{itemize}
nominate one or more cardinal to their representatives in Rome, which again may involve cooperation with a third-party power. The most significant factor that affected whether strategy ‘two’ could supplant strategy ‘one’ was distance, specifically the time taken for communications to travel between Rome and England. A new pope had usually been elected in the time that it took for the English crown to be notified of the previous pontiff’s death and for any subsequent instructions to return to Rome.  

Considering, firstly, the actions of those in the crown’s diplomatic service in Rome, it seems apparent that they were initially expected to formulate their own response to a papal death. This is obvious from the responses of Clerk and Campeggio in 1521-1522 and it is also likely that their remit was to choose the candidate they believed to be most suitable for English interests and most likely to win, at least until more direct instructions arrived. While Clerk tentatively raised the possibility of Campeggio’s candidacy without success, he and Campeggio eventually agreed to back de’ Medici, once they had consulted with him. Back in 1513, Bainbridge and probably de Giglis initially settled on Raphael Riario. On both occasions, it is notable that the English diplomats selected one of the firm favourites for the papal tiara, which implies that it was

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41 For the implications of distance for the Anglo-papal relationship, see pp.36-37.
42 For Clerk having discussed with Wolsey the possibility of the latter’s candidacy for election prior to leaving for Rome, see Ellis, p.308 (LPIIIii, 1960; 13 January 1522 [Clerk to Wolsey]). Following the 1521-1522 election, Charles V revealed that his own ambassador was empowered to work in his interests during conclaves, until more specific instructions arrived; LPIIIii, 2024 (5 February 1522, Charles to de Mesa, Brussels).
43 Clerk originally raised Campeggio’s candidacy when lobbying Cardinal Colonna, to which the cardinal replied that he would support him if de’ Medici did the same (although he was sceptical about de’ Medici doing so). Clerk then went to Campeggio, but the cardinal cautiously warned him not to mention this to de’ Medici unless the latter did first. In a subsequent conversation with Giulio de’ Medici, Clerk tried to hint at Campeggio becoming their candidate but, perceiving no support, did not mention it directly and let the matter drop; LPIIIii, 1895 (calendared end December 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey]), 1952 (10 January 1522, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome).
44 Bainbridge’s desire to back one of the two strongest candidates (the other being Giovanni de’ Medici) was probably genuine, given that one would surely choose somebody less likely to win if initially attempting to conceal the identity of the nominee that one truly supported. Indeed, this approach was taken by the Medici ‘party’ up to and including the first ballot. Also, it has already been outlined that the other ‘English’ cardinal in this conclave, de Castello, does not seem to have worked with Bainbridge in this election, having supported de’ Medici from the start and strongly opposed Riario. Moreover, de Castello’s vote for Bainbridge in the first scrutiny, as already noted, was not a genuine desire on the Italian’s part for the Englishman to become pope; see above, pp.230-233.
a deliberate policy to play it safe when selecting the ‘English’ candidate, preferably someone who
would enter conclave as *papabile*.\(^{45}\) While this did have its limitations, particularly in terms of
the narrow field from which to choose and the need to assess the political sympathies of these
few candidates, it would make sense for the English representatives to do this, given their
relatively weak position in conclaves and their need to please the king by their actions towards
these. Having chosen the ‘English’ nominee, the diplomats would then visit various cardinals in
an attempt to drum up support. In December 1521, Clerk reported to Wolsey that, as ‘princes’
orators here in the court be now somewhat busy as meet ministers in all these practices *sede
vacante*, I offered myself at all seasons to go and to ride, to do and to sp[eak] in the King’s behalf
and yours, and otherw[ise] that by him should be thought expedient’. The offer was made to de’
Medici and the latter accepted.\(^{46}\) While it is unknown how Bainbridge and de Giglis went about
their lobbying for Riario in 1513, the similarity to their counterparts in 1521-1522 in their
selection of candidates would suggest that they also visited other cardinals to this end. Indeed, it
is known that Bainbridge did have good connections within the Sacred College.\(^{47}\)

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\(^{45}\) Bainbridge seems to have reported to England, via Spinelly in the Low Countries, that Riario was one of the two
favourites (the other being Fieschi). This was borne out by an (Imperial) account of the actual election; *LPI*, 1670
(*LPI*, 3777; 9 March 1513, Spinelly to Henry, Mechelin), 1677 (*LPI*, 3780; 11 March 1513). In 1521, Clerk
perceived de’ Medici as a favourite, towards the end of December, but before conclave opened Richard Wingfield
and Thomas Spinelly reported their understanding of the same from Ghent on 26 December (they also named
Cardinals Siena and Fieschi as likely candidates). Similarly, Pace, en route to Rome, reported on 31 December his
hearing that de’ Medici was one of three likely to be elected (the others being Fieschi and ‘Jacobatius’) and, indeed,
that he was ‘at a great fordeale’, given the number of benefices he held and could, therefore, distribute to supporters;
*LPIIIii*, 1895 (calendared end December 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey]), 1901 (26 December 1521, Richard Wingfield
and Spinelly to Wolsey, Ghent), 1918 (31 December 1521, Pace to Wolsey, Speyer).

\(^{46}\) The date of this correspondence can be speculated on the basis of Clerk’s acknowledging the arrival of Wolsey’s
dated 25 November and that it mentions that conclave will open on 26 December (St Stephen’s Day); *LPIIIii*, 1895
(calendared end December 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey]).

Another element of the English diplomats’ strategy could involve combining their efforts with colleagues from a friendly, third-party state, in order to strengthen their position.\footnote{48} Once again, the 1521-1522 experience points towards this. In the first place, one ought to note that England at this time was politically aligned with the Empire against France, according to the Treaty of Bruges (August 1521), and thus it would have been common sense for both sets of diplomats to work towards an agreed end in Rome. Indeed, on 19 December, the Imperial ambassador in England reported Henry’s intention that Clerk ‘act in concert’ with his Imperial counterpart in Rome, Juan Manuel.\footnote{49} Secondly, that this was expected is suggested on 19 December, by Sirs Richard Wingfield and Thomas Spinelly notifying Wolsey of their anticipation that Manuel and Clerk would hasten the election to occur before the arrival of the French cardinals, believed to be on their way.\footnote{50} The likelihood of an Anglo-Imperial axis is also heightened when one considers the loyalties of Lorenzo Campeggio towards both powers. Campeggio’s close association with the Empire predated his relationship with England, having been sent there as papal nuncio on several diplomatic missions, having benefited from an Imperial bishopric (Feltre, 1512-1520), as well as the cardinal protectorship of Germany from perhaps 1517.\footnote{51} It is unsurprising, therefore, that the Italian was eager to retain his links with this secular patron and that Juan Manuel, on 24 December 1521, listed him among the pro-Imperial cardinals.\footnote{52} This alternative loyalty, however, was not perceived to be at odds with Campeggio’s service to England, as was indicated by Wolsey’s having assisted him to retain the cardinal

\footnote{48} Again, one can ascribe the motive of such action as being the result of a lack of English strength within the College of Cardinals. As will be seen, however, such an alignment was never likely with France.  
\footnote{49} It is entirely feasible that Clerk had already been instructed to do this, in the event of the pope’s death; *LPIIIii*, 1884 (19 December 1521, de Mesa to Charles, London).  
\footnote{50} *Ibid.*, 1885 (19 December 1521, Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to [Wolsey], Ghent).  
\footnote{51} T.F. Mayer, ‘Campeggi, Lorenzo’, *DNB*.  
\footnote{52} *Sp.ii*, 370 (24 December 1521, Imperial ambassador in Rome to Charles, Rome).
protectorship after the accession of Charles V. On this basis, therefore, Campeggio was evidently in contact with both Clerk and Manuel on this subject, before entering conclave. The probability that some sort of cooperation occurred is further increased by the similarity of the actions of Manuel who, by 19 December, was reporting early attempts to gain votes for the Medici ‘party’ and to prevent the pro-French faction from gaining the upper hand. Another coincidence in strategy is that both Clerk and Juan Manuel approached Cardinal Colonna with a view to his voting for de’ Medici. By the 24th, the orator deemed Campeggio to be pro-Imperial, but he, like Clerk, claimed to have come to some arrangement with de’ Medici to be their favoured candidate, although others of Manuel’s designation were to be nominated if this failed. Of the latter, Adrian of Tortosa was to be the Medici-Hapsburg choice if a non-resident was proposed. The involvement of Campeggio and the pursuit of de’ Medici’s nomination, therefore, coincided with the English strategy outlined above. The only difference was that the back-up candidates were reportedly determined by Manuel. While the idea of Anglo-Imperial collusion during this conclave remains circumstantial, it is made even more likely by the more definite observation below that both parties worked towards Wolsey’s candidacy (at least to some extent).

53 In addition, Campeggio approached Wolsey in 1520 to write to Charles, suggesting that he attend the latter’s coronation; *LPIIIi*, 921 (17 July 1520, de la Roche to Wolsey, St Omer), 958 (22 August 1520, Campeggio to [Wolsey], Rome); W.E. Wilkie, *Cardinal Protectors*, p.119.
54 *Sp.ii*, 369 (19 December 1521, Imperial ambassador in Rome to Charles). The Venetian ambassador in the Low Countries believed that Manuel would pursue de’ Medici’s candidacy as early as 17 December; *Ven.iii*, 376 (Venetian ambassador in the Low Countries to the Signory, Ghent). It would have been difficult for Clerk et al to have worked with Juan Manuel prior to 11 December, as on this date he condemned to the emperor the intrigues involved and claimed to have listed 12 nominees for whom cardinals could vote, if/when they enquired of the Imperial candidate. Thus, in his mind, the orator claimed to be devolving himself of all responsibility and preventing any enmities from developing with those who were not chosen by him on Charles’ behalf; *Sp.ii*, 368 (11 December 1521, Imperial ambassador in Rome to Charles).
55 *Sp.ii*, 369 (19 December 1521, Imperial ambassador in Rome to Charles); *LPIIIii*, 1895 (calendared end December 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey]).
56 *Sp.ii*, 370 (24 December 1521, Imperial ambassador in Rome to Charles), 371 (28 December 1521, Imperial ambassador in Rome to Charles).
Before and probably during conclave, English representatives in Rome were also empowered to make promises of money, benefices and so on, in a bid to guarantee the votes of cardinals.\(^{57}\) That Clerk was prepared to make such illegal simoniacal offers, albeit perhaps not explicit sums or named benefices, is suggested by the orator in December 1521, when he told de’ Medici of Wolsey’s desire to support him: ‘I showed him that I was sure your grace [Wolsey] would be contented to suffer largely, both in your goods and also in your body, to see him in the room, [the papacy] and that he might boldly to that intent promise all that your grace was hable [sic.] to make’.\(^{58}\) Clerk was suggesting, therefore, that he could offer inducements for votes. That he may have had considerable free-rein during this process is suggested by Clerk’s later claim that he ‘did not gretely labor bifor their [de’ Medici, Campeggio and Schiner] entre into the Conclaue’ because he did not believe that Wolsey wanted to become pope.\(^{59}\)

Once conclave was underway and the ‘English’ cardinals were physically separated from their non-collegiate colleagues, they still attempted to communicate with each other, particularly as to the favourites for election. This was enabled by the English ambassadors at both elections, de Giglis and Clerk, being appointed to the security of the chapel precisely to prevent such breaches, the latter on the second of three ‘wards’ between the cardinals and the outside. In a summary of his main duties, Clerk outlined that, while the first ward consisted of troops guarding the cardinals from violence, ‘the chief thing wherein consisteth [the orators’ and other prelates’

\(^{57}\) Such actions were not peculiar to England; the Imperial Juan Manuel allegedly offered de’ Medici a pension of 10,000 ducats in addition to a bishopric to secure his support, although after the election he recommended Charles V grant the former, but not the latter; *ibid.*, 376 (11 January 1522, Imperial ambassador in Rome to Charles).

\(^{58}\) *LPIIIii*, 1895 (calendared end December 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey]). Simony was blatantly illegal during papal elections and measures had been taken to prevent it. Julius II’s bull against simony was read at the beginning of the 1513 conclave and the cardinals took an oath undertaking not to engage in such practices in 1521-1522; L Pastor, *History of the Popes*, vii, p.21; *LPIIIii*, 1932 (4 January 1522, [Clerk to Wolsey]). For the extent to which Francis I indicated that he was prepared to go to influence conclave in this manner back in 1520, see L Pastor, *History of the Popes*, ix, pp.10-11.

\(^{59}\) Ellis, p.308 (*LPIIIii*, 1960; 13 January 1522 [Clerk to Wolsey]).
charge in this custody [is] that there be no letters sent out ne into con[clave], nor none other
watchwords to and fro, so that w[e] search their meat, their pots and their platters; and if they
agree not after three days, we may diminish their fare, and at the last keep them at bread and
wine. [Their meat and] their drink was delivered them at a round turning wheel made in the wall,
as I am sure your grace [Wolsey] hath seen the like in religious places…’. 60 Categoric evidence
that the English ‘party’ was involved in such intrigues came in 1513 when, probably as a result of
curial inexperience, Bainbridge was caught red-handed on the fourth day of conclave (8 March).
Florentine diplomats, presumably contributing to the same security duties as de Giglis (and later
Clerk), revealed that the bottom of one of the English cardinal’s plates had been etched with the
names of the two favourites, ‘San Giorgio [Riario] o medici’. 61 It is unlikely that Bainbridge was
the only cardinal to communicate in this way, but it did not bode well that he was caught so early.
Such an attempt to breach security implies that he had something to gain (presumably in the
English interest), by revealing this information to the outside. 62 It is possible that he was
attempting to make de Giglis aware of the election favourites, in case instructions had arrived
from England or, if de Giglis had access to better information externally than he did within the
Sistine Chapel, to seek advice. In either case, the Italian could then recommend which of the
candidates was the more suitable for Bainbridge to support and whether he needed to adjust his
strategy. In 1522, Clerk claims that by the second day of this conclave, ‘watchwords and tokens

60 LPIIIii, 1932 (4 January 1522, [Clerk to Wolsey]). Imperial sources in Rome were also in receipt of intelligence
from inside the Sistine Chapel on 6 and 7 January; Sp.ii, 372 (6 January 1522, Imperial ambassador in Rome to
Charles), 373 (7 January 1522, Hieronymo Severino to Charles, Rome).
61 In a bid to prevent any similar occurrences in the future, the silver plates supplied to the cardinals were substituted
for earthenware, D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.43; L Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, p.25.
62 Bainbridge also had his nephew Roger Bainbridge, as well as his Latin secretary, Richard Pace, as his conclavists;
D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, pp.42-43.
had been given by those within,’ in order to oppose de’ Medici.\textsuperscript{63} He later admitted that he was in receipt of correspondence from Campeggio while the latter was in conclave, on 9 January. The orator notified Wolsey of the election of Adrian VI, news that he had received in a letter from the Italian at 3 p.m., before the conclave had ended.\textsuperscript{64} While ‘security’ may have been more lax once a pope had been elected, one cannot help suspecting that this orator, being involved in the security, was in regular contact with Campeggio and, perhaps, de’ Medici and his supporters.

While the English ‘party’ did evidently enjoy some independence of action \textit{vis-à-vis} conclaves, although loathe to stray from the safest paths, they may well have also expected some kind of guidance from the crown, time allowing.\textsuperscript{65} What is definite for this period is that such instructions were discussed, planned or sent to Rome from crown sources both in 1511 and in 1521-1522. Wolsey’s letter to Fox of September 1511 is extremely useful in revealing disagreement over whom the crown ought to back as a potential pope. Moreover, in terms of the candidates chosen, both occasions suggest a tension between the backing of one of the ‘favourites’ (as the representatives in Rome tended to choose) and the pursuit of a less likely candidate. Given that Riario was to be a favourite in 1513, it is probable that his supporters in England, Ruthal and Somerset, were playing it safe by selecting him whom they understood to be the most likely winner who would be sympathetic to English interests. Wolsey, on the other hand, persuaded Henry to back an outsider, de Castello, who had been exiled from Rome for some

\textsuperscript{63} \textit{LPIIIii}, 1932 (4 January 1522, [Clerk to Wolsey]). For Imperial sources also having inside knowledge of conclave, see above n.60.

\textsuperscript{64} \textit{LPIIIii}, 1944 (9 January 1522, Clerk to Wolsey).

\textsuperscript{65} While the following are not English examples, it is entirely feasible that they also reflected English practice. By 28 December, for instance, the Imperial ambassador wrote to Charles V of his expectation that he ought to have received a reply to his notification of Leo X’s death three or four days prior. Similarly, the Cardinal Sta. Croce asked for instructions when he initially notified the emperor of the same pope’s death, on 1 December; \textit{Sp.ii}, 365 (1 December 1521, Cardinal Carvajal to Charles, Rome), 371 (28 December 1521, Imperial ambassador in Rome to Charles).
time. Nevertheless, the almoner may have envisaged this cardinal as having greater potential benefit to the crown, given his ties to England (as bishop of Bath and Wells and apostolic collector, as well as his past diplomatic service), if he did become pontiff. Alternatively, in 1521, the tension seems to have been between the candidacies of Wolsey and de’ Medici. On the one hand, the king was convinced that his minister had a chance of winning, based on his belief in Imperial support and probably reinforced by those of his intimate ministers who believed this. On the other hand, Wolsey claimed not to be interested in pursuing the papal tiara and, therefore, may have been behind the forwarding of Giulio de’ Medici’s nomination. The outcome was the confusing commission of Pace to secure Wolsey’s election if possible with de’ Medici’s as the ‘fall-back’ choice. However, if Pace arrived and found that Wolsey did not stand a chance, the secretary was to throw his full weight behind de’ Medici; the ‘safe’ candidate.66 Once again, it is not difficult to see the reason for the tension between the two choices; de’ Medici was most likely to be elected and would be expected to plough a similar, if not the same, political furrow to Leo X which, at that point, involved war against France.67 Wolsey, on the other hand, would be an English pontiff, with all the implications that that carried with it.

That the English crown sometimes decided to act in common with one of its political allies for conclaves is certainly confirmed by the arrangements to forward Wolsey’s candidacy in 1521-1522. It has already been outlined how, in August 1521, Charles V had pledged to back Wolsey’s nomination at the next papal election and that Henry VIII had invoked this offer as soon as he heard of Leo X’s death. The subsequent agreement to this by the emperor and his aunt (with Giulio de’ Medici to be their second choice), along with Richard Pace’s audience with them.

66 See above pp.233-236.
67 See below pp.751-752.
both en route to Rome, demonstrate a commitment to an Anglo-Imperial axis in the election (as far as England was concerned).\textsuperscript{68} This alignment even extended to a request from Wolsey that the emperor bring military pressure to bear on the conclave, to ensure a favourable outcome.\textsuperscript{69}

Wolsey appears to have foreshadowed this inclination towards working with the Empire in backing candidates for the papacy back in 1511. He chose de Castello, it appears, not just because of his English connections, but also because of his links with the Empire. As a result of the latter, Wolsey had been informed by Sir Robert Wingfield that the Italian was Maximilian’s favoured nominee for the papal tiara and that he had encouraged Wingfield to go to Rome to lobby in this regard.\textsuperscript{70} Wolsey, therefore, was cognizant at an early stage of England’s limited power to affect the result of conclaves, unless it threw in its lot with another anti-Gallic third party. While Maximilian was not, at that moment, detached from France, it was hoped that he would participate in the planned attack on France.\textsuperscript{71}

As the English representatives at Rome could offer inducements to the cardinals to secure the election of the ‘English’ candidate, so did instructions from England contain similar

\textsuperscript{68} See above n.28.
\textsuperscript{69} \textit{LPiili}, 1892 (24 December 1521, bishop of Badajoz to Charles, London). Charles had pre-empted Wolsey in considering the employment of such leverage, having implied in correspondence dated 23\textsuperscript{rd} that his army in Italy would be used to ensure that Wolsey became pope. While the latter may have agreed privately with such a course in his favour, it is unthinkable that he would have voiced such an opinion publicly, given the effect that this could have, not only on his candidacy, but also on external perceptions of the validity of his election (if this occurred). In reply, Charles V confirmed to Henry and Wolsey that he would fully support the English cardinal’s candidacy by any means possible, including the use of military force; \textit{ibid.}, 1891 (23 December 1521, bishop of Badajoz to Charles, London), 1906 (28 December 1521, Charles to Henry, Ghent), 1907 (calendared 28 December 1521, Charles to Wolsey, Ghent). Also see the commission from Charles to his ambassador in Rome to this end, from which this could be implied; \textit{ibid.}, 1908 (calendared 28 December 1521, Charles to his ambassador in Rome). Indeed, Juan Manuel, did have the power to instruct the Viceroy of Naples in military matters and did instruct him to keep the Neapolitans mobilised on hearing of Leo X’s death. Soon after, he offered the emperor’s services to ‘defend’ the Sacred College, should they need this; \textit{Sp.ii}, 366 (2 December 1521, Imperial ambassador in Rome to Charles), 368 (11 December 1521, Imperial ambassador in Rome to Charles). Also, see, \textit{ibid.}, 369 (19 December 1521, Imperial ambassador in Rome to Charles), 370 (24 December 1521, Imperial ambassador in Rome to Charles, Rome).

\textsuperscript{70} P.S and H.M. Allen (ed.), \textit{Letters of Richard Fox}, pp.52-3 (\textit{LPli}, 880; \textit{LPi}, 3443; 30 September 1511, Wolsey to [Fox]).

\textsuperscript{71} For the English desire for Imperial adhesion to the anti-Gallic agenda, see pp.373-374, 385-386 (esp. n.98), 390-391.
promises.\textsuperscript{72} Richard Pace, it seems, was empowered to offer money and other rewards to ensure Wolsey’s election.\textsuperscript{73} Indeed, the Imperial ambassador in England quoted Wolsey as saying that ‘the election should not be lost for want of 100,000 ducats’.\textsuperscript{74} Such inducements appear to have been expected, as Matthew Schiner, Cardinal of Sion, wrote to Wolsey after the conclave, claiming to have done all he could to forward the Englishman’s nomination, simultaneously requesting a pension from Henry VIII.\textsuperscript{75}

The next questions to ask concerning English interference in conclaves are why attempt to do this and what was the crown hoping to achieve? Addressing, firstly, the reasons for its attempts to influence the outcomes of papal elections, Henry VIII envisaged his contribution as necessary because the character, background and loyalties of the successful candidate would determine the subsequent political direction of the papacy. Being leader of a territorial principality in addition to the Church ensured the pope’s active involvement in the politics of Christendom. As seen, the political stance of the papacy, shaped primarily by these characters, backgrounds and sympathies, was significant in shaping the English crown’s strategy to ‘protect’ the papacy from France. Furthermore, as the ability to influence conclaves was open to all states, the English crown had to take precautions against the election of a candidate sympathetic to its rivals, particularly France, and more hostile to England itself. The result of a papal election would, therefore, have a direct

\textsuperscript{72} Once again, this practice was not peculiar to England. Around 13 January, de’ Medici, in conversation with Pace at Florence, suggested that the French had made him many offers since Leo X’s death; \textit{LPIIIii}, 1981 (23 January 1522, Pace to [Wolsey], Florence).

\textsuperscript{73} So the Venetian ambassador in England, Surian, understood towards the beginning of January 1522; \textit{Ven.iii}, 384 ([6] January 1522, Venetian ambassador in England to the Signory). That the Italian’s perception was correct seems likely given the parallels that one can draw from Pace’s instructions for a similar mission to the Imperial electors in May 1519, this time to secure Henry VIII’s election, if at all feasible; \textit{LPIIIi}, 240 (calendared 20 May 1519, Pace’s instructions).

\textsuperscript{74} \textit{LPIIIii}, 1892 (24 December 1521, bishop of Badajoz to Charles, London).

\textsuperscript{75} \textit{Ibid.}, 1955 (11 January 1522, Cardinal Schiner to [Wolsey], Rome).
bearing on the direction of Anglo-papal relations (in both temporal and spiritual spheres), as well as upon English foreign policy more generally. As already posited, a ‘French’ papacy was feared by Henry VIII and his advisors, a fear that was effectively realised post-Marignano (1515). This had taken a massive military effort on Francis I’s part in Italy and was to see an expensive English response in its financing an Imperial-Swiss enterprise in 1516. However, opposing the election of a ‘French’ pontiff need not be so costly, and could be avoided if precautionary action was taken in conclave. Wolsey summarised crown intentions in a general sense, when he wrote to Fox in September 1511: having heard that Julius II was mortally ill, he consulted ‘with the Kyng in thys matter and shewyd on to hys grace how mych honor and also furtherans of all hys afferys in tyme to kome shuld insue to hym yf that by hys comendacion sume Cardinall myght atteyne to be Pope’. It can be posited that, leaving aside the attempt to increase Henry’s honour, the aim to secure the ‘furtherans of all hys [Henry’s] afferys’ was largely political and selfish in nature, seeking to secure the election of a pontiff who was at least sympathetic towards English temporal interests and, by implication, anti-French, which would in turn also grease the wheels of the Anglo-papal relationship both in spiritual matters and in making the papacy more amenable to the English desire to act in its defence. Similarly, Richard Pace reflected candidates’ political sympathies when he wrote to Wolsey on 31 December 1521, while on his way to Rome. In conveying intelligence he had gathered from a German concerning the favourites, on Cardinal Fieschi he commented, ‘If the said Flisco shall obtain the dignity, it is hard to know what way he

76 See for instance pp.413-414.
77 See above pp.119-120.
78 P.S and H.M. Allen (ed.), Letters of Richard Fox, pp.52-3 (LPLi, 880; LPL, 3443; 30 September 1511, Wolsey to [Fox]).
will take, *quia Genuensis est*. As Genoa was traditionally pro-French, the implication was, therefore, that Fieschi’s candidacy might not be favourable to English interests. Similarly, the broad concern with a candidate’s political views can also be identified post-election, when the crown sought confirmation of these from its own diplomats and other sources. This intelligence was more important than that on potential candidates, as it could indicate the direction of foreign policy to be pursued during the new pontificate, upon which could be based England’s own foreign policy. Henry VIII, for instance, was extremely pleased in April 1513, when Bainbridge informed him of the newly-elected Leo X’s commitment to the Holy League against France, in pursuit of which the king was about to invade his southern neighbour.

The underlying anti-French bias in English attempts to influence conclaves is further highlighted when one explores what the crown was hoping to achieve therein. Firstly, the crown hoped to induce the election of a nominee who was sympathetic to English interests and, secondly, it sought to back someone who opposed (and would continue to oppose) those of its secular enemies particularly, in this period, France. In both conclaves of this period, Henry VIII was committed to going to war with France, so a pro-English pontiff would also need to be anti-French.

The desire to back a candidate who would be sympathetic to English interests could manifest itself in two ways; the support of English-born or pro-English nominees. The backing of English-born candidates by or on behalf of the English crown was relatively unusual, although, at

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79 Of the other three favourites that Pace mentions, he only refers to the political stance of one, ‘Jacobatius’, whom he includes among the pro-French Colonna faction. Perhaps those of the cardinals de’ Medici and Mantua were sufficiently well-known not to require comment; *LpIIIii*, 1918 (31 December 1521, Pace to Wolsey, Speyer).

first glance, it appears to have occurred twice in this period, albeit in different guises.\(^81\) It occurred first in 1513, when Hadrian de Castello apparently voted for Bainbridge in the first ballot of the 1513 conclave. This was probably a less than genuine attempt to secure an English-born pontiff, as the cardinal had only just returned to Rome from exile and was probably seeking to ingratiate himself back into English diplomatic service. In any case, the Italian was a supporter of Giovanni de’ Medici, whose candidacy was intended to remain secret, initially at least.\(^82\) It is extremely unlikely that de Castello had been instructed from England to pursue Bainbridge’s nomination, given his relatively limited contact with the kingdom since 1507.\(^83\) De Castello’s gesture can therefore be dismissed, particularly given the further lack of evidence that Henry VIII and his advisors ever envisaged the Cardinal of York as pope material. It probably was not worth England throwing its weight behind its ‘national’ candidate, if he did not have any chance of being elected.\(^84\) On the second occasion that an Englishman was backed by the crown for the papacy, both the king and Wolsey were actively involved. In 1521-1522, a deliberate attempt was

\(^81\) Naturally, the most favourable outcome of English influence on a papal election would have been the elevation of an English cardinal. It needs to be stressed, however, that the lack of cardinals of English extraction, combined with the largely Italian composition of the Sacred College, meant that this would always remain an incredibly unlikely proposition. Nicholas Breakspear (Adrian IV, 1154-1159) is the only Englishman ever to have been elected pope but, significantly, he was not a creature of the crown; J.N.D. Kelly, Oxford Dictionary of Popes, pp.174-175. One could also argue about the ‘Englishness’ of at least one of the Avignon popes, Clement V (1305-1314) who, despite a reputation for being pro-French was born in English-controlled territory in France and has been found by Menache to be supportive of the English crown; S. Menache, Clement V (1998), pp.247-268.

\(^82\) On account of de Castello’s need to keep the object of his genuine support secret, therefore, he had to vote for somebody else in the first ballot and, perhaps wisely, chose Bainbridge. De Castello was not the only cardinal to back Bainbridge in this initial ballot; Bainbridge’s other benefactor, Cornaro, was also a member of the de’ Medici faction; D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.44; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.22-23.

\(^83\) Indeed, his contact with the principal English representative in Rome must have been minimal, given that de Castello was a fervent opponent of Riario, the candidate chosen for English support by Bainbridge, in conclave itself; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, p.23.

\(^84\) Chambers also believes that Wolsey did not like Bainbridge, particularly later on when the latter made moves to return to England as a legate a latere. If Wolsey’s sentiment was true (and had existed for some time), this would have impeded any forwarding of his candidacy in England; D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, pp.42, 60. One must also remember that there were a number of other factors that checked any Bainbridge candidacy, not least his being a relatively inexperienced cardinal (only being appointed in 1511), his not being particularly old (50-51) and his close political association with a secular prince; these factors will be expanded upon with reference to Wolsey, later.
made to induce Wolsey’s election, although this apparently depended on English faith in Imperial support (and, even then, Wolsey perceived his chances as being slim). If this came to pass, however, as de Mesa quoted Henry as saying, ‘both your majesties [Henry and Charles] might so dispose of the Cardinal’s authority as if the Holy See were your own possession’.\(^{85}\) It did not need to be made explicit that this included temporal authority, as the papacy was then allied with the Empire, with a view also to join with England in a war against France.\(^{86}\) Indeed, Wolsey himself was quoted by the same orator as saying that one of his intentions, should he become pope, was to ‘exalt his own King’.\(^{87}\)

Wolsey’s nomination notwithstanding, it was probably more realistic for Henry VIII, his advisors and his representatives in Rome, to support non-English candidates who had pro-English sympathies. Such a stance could be as a result of the cardinal being (or having been) employed by the English king, or by a sort of proxy, whereby the nominee was also favoured by an ally of England. Both of these features can be seen in the crown discussions of September 1511 concerning a potential successor to Julius II. On the one hand, Wolsey backed de Castello chiefly, it seems, on account that he was ‘the Kyngis bownden subiect’, being the bishop of Bath and Wells and apostolic collector in England, with a number of years’ experience of diplomatic service to the kingdom. De Castello also, moreover, had had close links with the Empire during his exile from Rome and this culminated in his being backed by Maximilian in both 1511 and during the 1513 election.\(^{88}\) While England and the Empire were not technically allies against France at this point, this was the aim of diplomatic negotiations that were eventually to bear fruit

\(^{85}\) In the ambassador’s opinion, however, Wolsey felt that his election was unlikely, although he did not completely dismiss it; \(LPIII\), 1884 (19 December 1521, de Mesa to Charles, London).
\(^{86}\) See below pp.755-756.
\(^{87}\) \(LPIII\), 1892 (24 December 1521, bishop of Badajoz to Charles, London).
in November 1512. Wolsey may therefore have been anticipating that the backing of a pro-
Imperial and pro-English candidate may become beneficial in the near future. Routhal and
Somerset, on the other hand, preferred Riario, who had a longstanding relationship with England
since the reign of Richard III, was currently a friend to the English cardinal, Bainbridge, and was
later (in 1513) to be the ‘official’ candidate backed by the Spanish crown, as well as head of a
powerful faction in his own right. England, at this point, was most closely aligned with Spain in
its foreign policy and was just a few months away from joining the Holy League that was to be
launched against Louis XII (of which the papacy was a leading member). In terms of this
argument, moreover, not only can one see Wolsey opting for a cardinal who had served the
English crown diplomatically, but there was a split among royal councillors about whether to
back a pro-Imperial or pro-Spanish candidate. The latter was probably perceived to be a safer bet
by Routhal and Somerset, given England’s current foreign policy trajectory, while de Castello was
perhaps deemed too uncertain in his loyalty to the kingdom.

One can also see these trends evident in John Clerk’s attempts to raise Lorenzo
Campeggio’s profile before the 1521-1522 election. On paper, he looked the perfect candidate; he
had visited the kingdom as (co-) legate a latere in 1518 and, having made a favourable
impression, returned to Rome to work in conjunction with the English orators there, de Giglis and
then Clerk, in diplomatic service to the crown. Campeggio was also linked to the Empire, as its

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89 See below pp.407-408.
90 In addition, given the dynastic tendencies of the papacy around this time, Riario may also have been an attractive
candidate in England, given that he was the nephew of Sixtus IV (and, thereby, also related to Julius II); D.S.
91 These two were accused by Wolsey of ‘dysspreysyng the Cardinall Adrian’; P.S and H.M. Allen (ed.), *Letters of
Richard Fox*, pp.52-3 (LPI, 880; LPI, 3443; 30 September 1511, Wolsey to [Fox]). For de Castello’s earlier
diplomatic service to England, see M. Underwood, ‘The Pope, the Queen and the King’s Mother’, in B. Thompson
92 See above pp.32-33.
cardinal protector in Rome. This time, however, Anglo-Imperial relations were much closer, both being committed to go to war with France according to the Treaty of Bruges, negotiated in August 1521. Henry VIII and Wolsey must have been pleased, therefore, when early news from Rome after Leo X’s death, revealed that Campeggio was said to be among the frontrunners for election.\textsuperscript{93} That the English crown was motivated by the need for a pro-English pontiff is also reflected by Imperial reactions to the election of Adrian VI, in spite of the ‘official’ joint policy to back Wolsey. Adrian was intimately associated with Charles V, both as his childhood tutor and most recently as his viceroy in Spain.\textsuperscript{94} The emperor himself sought to reassure Henry and Wolsey that Adrian was pro-English, when he notified them of the election on 21 January; next to Wolsey’s election, he argued, Adrian’s was ‘most for the good of Christendom’.\textsuperscript{95} Again, on 5 February, Charles, through his ambassador in England, tried to reassure Wolsey that he ought to ‘rejoice at the advancement of one who can do him more favour than any other member of the College’.\textsuperscript{96} Similarly, de’ Medici, having met with Pace and discovered his mission around 23 January, asserted that, while he failed to secure Wolsey’s election, he instead lobbied for ‘a friend to the King and the Emperor’.\textsuperscript{97} A need was felt, therefore, by England’s allies at this conclave, to reassure Henry VIII and Wolsey that the resultant pontiff, while an unforeseen choice, would be pro-English, not least in the political sphere. By the end of January 1522, Richard Pace, by then in Rome, appears to have been convinced of this; having spoken with the Imperial

\textsuperscript{93} Campeggio’s name is one of four that Richard Wingfield and Thomas Spinelly forward to Wolsey from Ghent on 19 December 1521; \textit{LPIIIii}, 1885 (19 December 1521, Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to [Wolsey], Ghent).


\textsuperscript{95} \textit{LPIIIii}, 1977 (21 January 1522, Charles to de Mesa, Brussels).

\textsuperscript{96} \textit{Ibid.}, 2024 (5 February 1522, Charles to de Mesa, Brussels). Commentators from other states considered the election of Adrian of Utrecht to mark the start of an ‘Imperial’ pontificate, although most would not have known of the positive implications that this would be expected to have for England, given that the Anglo-Imperial alliance of 1521 still remained a secret; \textit{Ven.iii}, 395 (22 January 1522, Gasparo Contarini to Signory, Brussels); \textit{LPIIIii}, 1994 (calendared 26-28 January 1522, [Francis] to la Batie and Poillot).

\textsuperscript{97} \textit{LPIIIii}, 1981 (23 January 1522, Pace to [Wolsey], Florence).
ambassador Manuel, Pace reported Manuel’s recommendation that Adrian visit England, so that
he could speak with Henry and Charles. Subsequently, the emperor-elect ought to accompany the
new pontiff to Italy to ‘settle it [Italy] to the profit of his friends’. 98

The second aim of English interference in papal elections, to secure the elevation of
someone who opposed the interests of the crown’s rivals, was equally as important. As the central
argument of this thesis is that Henry and his inner circle generally sought to ‘defend’ the papacy
(and papal ‘independence’) from French influence; the crown’s aim to secure the election of an
anti-French pontiff is entirely consistent with this. Indeed, this situation did not contradict the
desire for a pro-English pope. As both conclaves of the period coincided with occasions when
England was planning war against France, and the period more generally witnessed frequent
English hostility against France, not to mention the historic enmity between the two states, it was
natural to assume that a pontiff who was broadly anti-French would be sympathetic to English
interests. 99 Implicit in the actions taken vis-à-vis conclave in this regard, was a simultaneous
opposition to pro-French candidates, who could realise the worst-case scenario for Henry VIII
and his advisors: a ‘French’ papacy, in both the temporal and spiritual spheres. 100 Not only would
England have to check its anti-French foreign policy, but it would also expect less favourable
responses concerning requests over internationally disputed benefices, cross-border jurisdiction
and so on. It could mark a return to the supposed ‘Babylonian Captivity’ of Avignon.

98 Charles would also be crowned emperor there; ibid., 1996 (29 January 1522, Pace to Wolsey, Rome).
99 In 1513, preparations were at an advanced stage for an invasion of France under the auspices of the Holy League
to defend the Church. In 1521-1522, an anti-French alliance with the Empire and papacy had been concluded, again
with the protection of the Church as an explicit aim, although it still remained ‘secret’ at this point; see below pp.412
ff., 699 ff.
100 In 1521-1522, this worst-case scenario was shared by the Imperialists, whose ambassador in Rome commented,
on 24 December, that, ‘in consequence of the passions of the Cardinals, the French will gain in Rome as much as
they have lost in Lombardy’; Sp.ii, 370 (24 December 1521, Imperial ambassador in Rome to Charles, Rome).
Concerning the health scare of Julius II in September 1511, it seems that both candidates discussed at this time by those around the king had merits as anti-French candidates. Firstly, Riario’s anti-French credentials may have been interpreted by those in England from his friendship with the xenophobic Cardinal Bainbridge, with whom he approached the pope for the absolution of Venice back in 1509 (as the first stage in the formation of an anti-French coalition). Furthermore, he was related to the anti-French Julius II, having been made a cardinal by his uncle Sixtus IV. Secondly, de Castello, while having no overt anti-French pedigree, was presumably backed by Wolsey on account of his ties to England and the Empire. He would hopefully become an ally against Louis XII, which would translate, if he became pope, into hostility towards France.

On the death of Julius II in February 1513, it was feared in England that the papacy’s staunch support of its anti-French foreign policy could be lost. This concern, as held by Henry himself, was highlighted by the nuncio Polydore Vergil, who reported that ‘the King received this news with great sorrow, being anxious lest the treaty [Holy League] should collapse and the enormous preparations which he had made for the war [against France] should perhaps prove to be in vain; and this he considered would by no means be in the interest of the Roman Church’. When Leo X was elected, however, and notified Henry of his intention to continue supporting England in this direction, the king ‘rejoiced greatly that immediately at the start of his pontificate Leo should attend with such pious shrewdness to the affairs of the church. Therefore at the royal command, throughout the kingdom of England, prayers were said and thanks given to God for the

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101 D.S. Chambers, *Cardinal Bainbridge*, p.107. Nevertheless, Riario’s anti-French credentials cannot be completely assured, as the Venetian ambassador in Rome, Lippomano, on the same papal illness, suggested that this cardinal was seen as part of the ‘French party’; L. Pastor, *History of the Popes*, vi, p.369.
elevation of Leo to the papacy'. In this sense, therefore, the significance of the continued anti-French stance of the papacy is highlighted. In Rome, it is a pretty safe bet that Christopher Bainbridge would not have backed anyone other than an anti-French candidate, so extreme was his francophobia. Riario, his friend, could be expected to have shared Bainbridge’s views on this matter. Conversely, Bainbridge’s initial opposition to the Florentine Giovanni de’ Medici can be viewed as stemming from the latter’s city of birth, which he, as scion of his family, now controlled. Florence, being traditionally pro-French, could mean that Giovanni as pontiff would come under pressure from France.

For the 1521-1522 election, Wolsey’s candidacy would surely be the ultimate anti-French ticket and does not really need further expansion, given the Anglo-Imperial commitment (through the Treaty of Bruges) to wage war on France in the near future. That this equally represented a desire to prevent a ‘French’ candidate from gaining the papal tiara is demonstrated by Wolsey’s request that Charles use military force, if necessary, to ensure this. According to de Mesa on 24 December 1521, Wolsey requested that the emperor move his troops to Rome, so that, if he could not be elected, the cardinals ‘should be prevented by force from electing an adherent of the French party, to the destruction of Naples and Sicily, and consequently of all Christendom’.

Furthermore, the crown’s choice of Giulio de’ Medici as the alternative English (and Imperial)

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105 See below pp.368-373 and passim.
106 For Bainbridge’s reported look of displeasure as he left conclave, see D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.44. For Florence’s traditional links to France and continued loyalties of some in the city during this period, see H.C. Butters, Governors and Government in Early Sixteenth Century Florence, passim.; F. Gilbert, ‘Florentine Political Assumptions in the Period of Savonarola and Soderini’, JWC, 20, p.200.
107 LPIIIii, 1892 (24 December 1521, bishop of Badajoz to Charles, London). While de Mesa considered these comments to be strange, Charles V himself preempted the request, on 23 December, by suggesting that he would employ his forces in support of the English cardinal’s candidacy. On the 28th, the emperor reiterated this commitment, having heard of Wolsey’s request; ibid., 1891 (23 December 1521, bishop of Badajoz to Charles, London), 1906 (28 December 1521, Charles to Henry, Ghent), 1907 (calendared 28 December 1521, Charles to Wolsey, Ghent).
candidate can also be viewed in similar terms of its opposition to France. Other than the pope himself, this Florentine cardinal had been the lynchpin of Leo X’s government and was, therefore, integral to the papacy’s current war against France in Italy. Indeed, de’ Medici’s prominence in this most recent conflict was marked by his appearance on the frontline as legate to the papal army that had been involved in the recent capture of Milan.\textsuperscript{108} On this basis, Henry and his advisors probably did not welcome reports received via France that conclave had already opened on the 20\textsuperscript{th} and that Cardinal Flisco (Fieschi) was the favoured candidate, given that this candidate was from the traditionally pro-Gallic Genoa.\textsuperscript{109}

Similarly, Clerk also shared the same anti-Gallic priorities as Henry and Wolsey. In describing his actions shortly before 26 December 1521, he reported having approached Cardinal Colonna to support de’ Medici’s candidacy. Unbeknown to Clerk, however, it seems that Colonna was gearing up to forward himself for the role of pope and would become the focus of the pro-French interests in the imminent conclave\textsuperscript{110} During Clerk’s meeting with the cardinal, Colonna had tried to convince him that ‘De Medicis was naturally, as all Florentines, for the French part’. In Clerk’s opinion, however, ‘I cannot tell whether he said truth or not; b[ut] God

\textsuperscript{108} This was not the first time that de’ Medici had fulfilled such a role; D.S. Chambers, Popes, Cardinals and War (2006), p.142. It also needs to be stressed that, while a Florentine candidate in 1513 was something of an unknown quantity, as far as political sympathies were concerned, Leo X’s pontificate had demonstrated that the Medici could keep control of Florence and were broadly anti-French (whenever they could be), thereby making them a safer bet for England. Trust in Giulio de’ Medici had been indicated early on (1514), when he was appointed cardinal protector of English interests in Rome; see above p.30; H.C. Butters, Governors and Government in Early Sixteenth Century Florence, pp.187-307.

\textsuperscript{109} LPIIIii, 1892 (24 December 1521, bishop of Badajoz to Charles, London). Pace’s conveyed doubts about this cardinal on this basis have already been mentioned; \textit{ibid.}, 1918 (31 December 1521, Pace to Wolsey, Speyer).\textsuperscript{110} \textit{Ibid.}, 1918 (31 December 1521, Pace to Wolsey, Speyer), 1946 9 January 1522, [Fitzwilliam to Wolsey], St Germain’s), 1967 (calendared 16-17 January 1522, Pace to Wolsey, Florence); \textit{Sp.ii}, 369 (19 December 1521, Imperial ambassador in Rome to Charles), 370 (24 December 1521, Imperial ambassador in Rome to Charles, Rome), 372 (6 January 1522, Imperial ambassador in Rome to Charles).
forbid that everything should be of truth...’. 111 While it Colonna unsuccessfully attempted to trick the Englishman into withdrawing his support from the most powerful anti-French candidate, this exchange serves to highlight the significance that outsiders perceived anti-French motives to have with the English crown both generally and during interregna. The ambassador also focused on the threat from the French ‘party’ in his reports on the papal election. On the fourth day of conclave (30 December), for instance, he relayed that cardinals kept on coming to the door, asking whether any more French cardinals were coming, to solve the impasse between the pro-Imperial and pro-French ‘parties’.112

Finally, it ought to be emphasised that the fear of the election of a pontiff hostile to one’s political interests was not limited to the English crown; it appears to have been felt universally. Ferdinand of Aragon notified England in June 1510 of his fear that Louis XII planned to depose Julius II and have a more ‘amenable’ pontiff elected.113 An Imperial diplomat in Rome reporting the 1513 conclave, claimed to have sent his secretary to the Sistine Chapel ‘to induce them not to elect a Frenchman or Venetian’.114 Similarly, Juan Manuel wrote to the emperor on 24 December 1521, lamenting that ‘in consequence of the passions of the Cardinals, the French will gain in Rome as much as they have lost in Lombardy’.115 On the other hand, Francis I’s opposition to the possibility of a pro-Imperial pope was so strong that Fitzwilliam, England’s ambassador resident at the French court, around the turn of 1521-1522, claimed to have it on good advice that the

111 Clerk also outlined Colonna’s arguments why de’ Medici would become a ‘French’ pope; LPIii, 1895 (calendared end December 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey]).
112 Ibid., 1932 (4 January 1522, [Clerk to Wolsey]).
113 Sp.ii, 50 (LPl, 483; [June] 1510, Ferdinand to his ambassador in England).
114 LPl, 1677 (LPl, 3780; 11 March 1513).
115 Sp.ii, 370 (24 December 1521, Imperial ambassador in Rome to Charles, Rome). Also see ibid., 372 (6 January 1522, Imperial ambassador in Rome to Charles).
French king had threatened to withdraw obedience from Rome if de’ Medici was elected.\textsuperscript{116} That this is not entirely unfeasible can be interpreted from Francis I’s reaction to the subsequent election of Adrian VI. In correspondence to his diplomats in England, Francis stated his belief that a pope had been created ‘entirely at his [Charles’] devotion’. Furthermore, he believed that, if French forces were not in Italy, the first thing that the emperor would do ‘would be to occupy the duchy [of Milan], and consequently the whole of Italy, including even the patrimony of the Church, which the Pope, being his creature, would not deny’.\textsuperscript{117}

Given most recent historians’ scepticism regarding Wolsey’s bids for the papal tiara (by the cardinal himself, anyway), a necessary supplementary question to this analysis of politically-motivated English involvement in the influencing of papal conclaves concerns how far Henry and his advisors expected their actions to be successful, either as a result of their own instructions emanating from England, or through their proxies’ using their own initiatives in Rome.\textsuperscript{118} While the English representatives in Rome and the crown back in England differed slightly in their assessments, they clearly did envisage the possibility of some success through these means, even if factors such as distance, lack of influence in the Sacred College and the limitations of backing an English candidate were likely to impede these attempts. If there was no possibility of affecting papal elections, surely they would not have bothered. It has already been rehearsed sufficiently how the English representatives went about this during the \textit{interregna} and how the cardinals with some sort of ties to the kingdom used their votes in its interest, with apparent support from the

\textsuperscript{116} LP\textit{IIIii}, 1947 (calendared 9 January 1522, Fitzwilliam to [Wolsey]).
\textsuperscript{117} \textit{Ibid.}, 1994 (calendared 26-28 January 1522, [Francis] to la Batie and Poillot).
\textsuperscript{118} A second attempt was made to forward Wolsey’s candidacy in 1523; D.S. Chambers, ‘Cardinal Wolsey and the Papal Tiara’, \textit{BIHR}, 38, pp.27-30.
crown in England. Bainbridge best demonstrates how far English diplomats would go, when he was caught attempting to smuggle intelligence on the candidates out of conclave.  

A successful outcome, therefore, was obviously worth the risk of such underhand methods.

It seems that English representatives in Rome were quite realistic about their ability to affect elections, given that they tended to back one of the favourites. Taking the almost automatic backing of de’ Medici by Clerk and Campeggio, he was not only the richest and most powerful cardinal in Rome at this point, but he had been Leo X’s right-hand man since 1513. Indeed, it is sometimes argued that it was de’ Medici who actually ran the show. On these bases, this Italian cardinal was to enter conclave as papabile. While most now regard this assessment as something of a poisoned chalice, it is doubtful whether contemporaries would have dismissed de’ Medici’s chances on this account. Indeed, Pastor asserts that there was a great groundswell of support for him (and indeed he was successful on the second time of asking, in 1523). It seems, therefore, that the English representatives tended to back cardinals who already had a body of support behind them. While Clerk did put out feelers for Campeggio’s nomination, this was tentative and seems to have been abandoned when Campeggio rejected this without de’ Medici’s support. Essentially, the crown’s diplomatic representatives recognised the implicit tendencies of papal conclaves to choose senior, Italian, curial cardinals, some of whom had relatives who had gained the papacy previously.

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119 See above p.243.
120 See above pp.230-236.
121 See above p.30. For an indication of de’ Medici’s perceived power based on an estimation his income by a Venetian orator, it was said that, at the time of the 1523 conclave, this was around 50,000 ducats per annum, almost double that of the next wealthiest cardinal then in Rome (26,000 reportedly received by Cardinal Cibo); K.J.P. Lowe, *Church and Politics in Renaissance Italy*, p.245.
122 He did have powerful opponents, however; L. Pastor, *History of the Popes*, ix, pp.7-9.
123 *LPIIIii*, 1895 (calendared end December 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey]).
124 See below pp.286-287.
Based principally on the pursuit of Wolsey’s candidacy, it seems on the surface that those in crown circles back in England, may have had a slightly more unrealistic view of their chances to affect conclaves, as there were a number of significant obstacles to this ever being likely. Even before he knew of Charles V’s apparent willingness to support his nomination, Wolsey reportedly believed that, while he had little chance of success, he did retain some hope.\textsuperscript{125} The crown’s attempt to have Wolsey elected pontiff still seems to have been genuine; while it resulted from unusual circumstances (the pledge of Imperial support), it was still reckoned to be feasible, albeit a long shot.

Firstly, the identity of the ambassador entrusted with this task suggests that the mission was taken seriously. Richard Pace, then the king’s principal secretary, was implicitly trusted by both king and cardinal.\textsuperscript{126} Charles V was notified that it was as if Henry ‘had sent his very heart’.\textsuperscript{127} In addition, Pace was both a curial and diplomatic veteran of some standing. He had been resident in Rome up to 1515, most prominently as Christopher Bainbridge’s Latin secretary and was attendant on his master when the latter voted in the conclave of 1513. He was also fluent in Italian, which ensured his continued involvement in papal affairs after returning to England in 1515. In addition to Pace’s skills and experience, he probably also had good connections in Rome. Pace had also been entrusted with several significant diplomatic missions, including those to the Swiss to secure their services against the French. Possibly his most significant mission, in this context, was as Henry’s ambassador to Germany during the Imperial election process of

\textsuperscript{125} \textit{LPiii}, 1884 (19 December 1521, de Mesa to Charles, London). The emperor’s aunt, Margaret of Savoy, appears to have been preparing Wolsey for failure as early as 27 December, when she warned him that, if the cardinal’s elevation did not come to pass, it was not Charles’ fault; \textit{ibid.}, 1904 (27 December 1521, Margaret of Savoy to Wolsey, Ghent).

\textsuperscript{126} One only has to look at his role as go-between in the correspondence to and from king and cardinal, while the latter was at Calais and Bruges during 1521. Pace, then resident with Henry, regularly communicated with Wolsey on behalf of the king; see above pp.24-25, n.58.

\textsuperscript{127} \textit{LPiii}, 1884 (19 December 1521, de Mesa to Charles, London).
1519, when he tested the water *vis-à-vis* Henry VIII’s candidacy. In the event, Henry had no chance of becoming emperor, but Pace’s conduct of this mission, in addition to his being empowered to promise money in return for support, has obvious parallels with that intended for Rome. Finally, while Pace failed to reach Rome in time to fulfil his mission, despite traveling post, he appears to have done his utmost to have his instructions reach Rome in time, by despatching his servant, Thomas Clerk, post to Rome from Speyer around 31 December. In short, Richard Pace’s rank, experience, connections and efforts would have carried considerable weight in his mission and, therefore, provide an indication that Henry and Wolsey did seriously intend to affect the papal election if they could.

Secondly, the whole feasibility of the mission appears to have stemmed from the expectation that Charles V would honour a pledge that he made at Bruges in this respect. While such a potential strategy seems first to have been identified (in this period) back in 1511 by Wolsey when he envisaged that acting with another secular power might increase the chances of English influence, in 1521-1522 they already had promises which both Henry and Wolsey called upon. That Charles V and his aunt Margaret pre-empted the English approach, doubtless fuelled English hopes. Not only did the Empire have greater influence in conclave, but it also had a military presence close by that could potentially affect the election. Pace’s visits to Charles and Margaret, en route to Rome, demonstrate a serious commitment to discovering whether the

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129 Pace was reportedly ‘riding post-horses the whole way for speed’, but does not appear to have reached Florence before confirmed news of Adrian VI’s election reached him; *LPiii*, 1981 (23 January 1522, Pace to [Wolsey], Florence); D. Hay (ed.), *Anglica Historia*, pp.292-293. For Thomas Clerk as Pace’s messenger traveling before him post, see *Ven.iii*, 379 (24 December 1521, Venetian ambassador in the Low Countries to the Signory, Ghent); *LPiii*, 1918 (31 December 1521, Pace to Wolsey, Speyer), 1981 (23 January 1522, Pace to [Wolsey], Florence).
Imperial promises were genuine. That the secretary continued on his journey suggests his belief that they were.

Thirdly, the pledge to Wolsey by Charles was not the first offer of conclaval backing received by the cardinal. By early February 1519, at a time when France was closely tied to England according to the Treaty of London, Francis I promised to throw the weight of the ‘French party’ behind him in the next papal election. This would reportedly consist of 14 cardinals, the Orsini and Marcantonio Colonna. Boleyn opined that, now Henry and Francis were aligned, ‘neither Emperor nor Pope be made but such as pleased them’. This apparently unprompted offer seems to have been linked with the English crown’s claim to be supporting Francis in the Imperial election contest; in other words, a *quid pro quo*. This offer may have been reiterated during 1520, when Francis I was negotiating with Wolsey towards his meeting Henry at the Field of Cloth of Gold. It ought to be stressed that while England and France were at peace during these years, the English crown’s anti-French agenda persisted, motivating this amity and, for instance, the meeting, in a bid to prevent Francis I from realising his Italian ambitions. It is unlikely, therefore, that Henry and Wolsey would have envisaged acting in concert with France in conclave, although some sort of deceit may have been considered. No indication has been found whether this offer was followed up or even taken seriously, but it is


131 During March 1520, Wolsey was informed that Francis was anxious to recognise his service in this and, if there was anything in his kingdom that he wanted, he would give it to him. As the Imperial ambassador in England understood the following month, this seems to have been a promise to make Wolsey pope. Furthermore, in the immediate wake of the Field of Cloth of Gold, Sir Richard Wingfield relayed Francis’ gratitude to Wolsey and ‘promised Wolsey a much greater recompence than any remembrance he had yet made him for the trouble he had taken to effect the amity’; *LP IIIi*, 666 (8 March 1520, Sir Richard Wingfield to [Wolsey], Cognac), 728 (7 April 1520, de la Sauch to Chièvres, London), 894 (1 July 1520, Sir Richard Wingfield to [Wolsey], ‘Abevyle’). For other suggestions of French offers, see *ibid.*, 803 (13 May 1520, Coruna).

132 See above pp.123-129.
probable that Francis was acting on what he believed to be Wolsey’s ambition and it is even possible that this sowed the seeds for Wolsey’s 1521-1522 candidacy.

Among other indicators that the Wolsey candidacy was genuine is the cardinal’s ambitions demonstrated up to this point. While he apparently seemed reluctant to forward himself for pontifical office, he may well have deemed this politically expedient for the current foreign policy interests of England and its ally at that time, the Empire.\textsuperscript{133} This belief is suggested by de Mesa’s report, from 16 December, of Wolsey’s statement to the king (in his presence) that he would not accept the papal dignity unless Henry VIII and Charles V deemed it in their interests.\textsuperscript{134} The English crown was committed, according to the Treaty of Bruges, to aiding the Emperor in his war against France. As the crown felt it necessary to have the pope as an ally during such conflicts, this would be ensured if a strong pro-English character was on the papal throne. Furthermore, until recently, the papacy had been pro-French, as a result of the military disaster at Marignano (1515), which had had significant repercussions for the political relationship between England and Rome.\textsuperscript{135} As far as Henry VIII’s interests were concerned, therefore, the Cardinal of York would be the perfect pontiff. As will be seen, this option would probably never have been considered if Imperial support had not been offered and, even then, it was likely considered an outside bet.

If Wolsey deemed his candidacy politically necessary, his apparent reluctance has perhaps been somewhat overstated. The strongest piece of evidence that suggests the cardinal did not

\textsuperscript{133} There has already been debate over whether Wolsey held an ambition to become pope and a broad consensus has arisen from Chambers’ argument that he did not. Pollard originally forwarded the idea that Wolsey was motivated by his desire for the papal tiara, so much so (he argued) that the cardinal aligned English foreign policy with that of Rome to this end; D.S. Chambers, ‘Cardinal Wolsey and the Papal Tiara’, \textit{BIHR}, 38, pp.20-30; A.F. Pollard, \textit{Wolsey}, pp.25, 121, 164 and passim.

\textsuperscript{134} \textit{LPIIIii}, 1884 (19 December 1521, de Mesa to Charles, London).

\textsuperscript{135} See above pp.125-129.
welcome his nomination came from Clerk, writing after the election, on 13 January 1522. In justifying his failure to lobby for Wolsey, the orator claimed that it was ‘by cause your Grace at my departing shewed me precisely that ye wolde neuer medle therewith. And on my faith ware not the Kyngs persuasions I shulde stande yet in greate doubte whither your Grace wollde accepte it or no if it ware offred you’. One must remember, however, that the discussion between Charles and Wolsey on this subject did not occur until August 1521, when Clerk was already in Rome. Furthermore, the Imperial ambassador’s mention of the cardinal’s reluctance, of 16 December, was made on the same day that news of Leo X’s death first arrived. Wolsey, therefore, was not yet assured that Charles would honour his pledge to support his candidacy. One can reasonably assume, therefore, that Henry and Wolsey had not advertised Clerk of this agreement any earlier because they were not completely confident that Charles would follow through with his promise. When confirmation arrived that the emperor would support Wolsey in the election, moreover, Wolsey ‘was as thankful as if he had already been elected Pope’. From this point, Wolsey appears to have shown far more enthusiasm about his potential elevation; by 27 December, for instance, Wolsey had replied to the archduchess Margaret through Pace, affirming his desire to become pope, expressing himself beholden to the emperor’s aunt and terming her ‘mother’. To the latter, the archduchess replied that ‘I hope one day to be mother of my father, that is to say, of our Holy Father’. Also, Wolsey displayed anger when he heard of the failure of the Imperial ambassador in Rome to support his nomination, so much so that

136 Ellis, pp.304-3166 (LPIIIii, 1960; 13 January 1522 [Clerk to Wolsey]). Indeed, Polydore Vergil, writing after this period, suggests a similar belief. Concerning the election, he wrote that ‘Wolsey began to hope (or rather pretended to hope) that he might acquire the papal dignity’; D. Hay (ed.), Anglica Historia, pp.292-293.
137 LPIIIii, 1884 (19 December 1521, de Mesa to Charles, London).
139 Ibid., 1904 (27 December 1521, Margaret of Savoy to Wolsey, Ghent).
Charles V felt it necessary to reply.\textsuperscript{140} In addition, he was reportedly discontented with the actual result of the papal election, believing that Charles had failed to support him.\textsuperscript{141}

Furthermore, Wolsey’s ecclesiastical career up to this point had indicated both considerable ambition and a desire to exercise ‘papal’ powers in both the temporal and spiritual spheres. His pursuit of promotions and offices was fully in keeping with what Anglo describes as a culture of aggrandizement at the court of Henry VIII.\textsuperscript{142} Wolsey’s ambition had been rapidly promoted from his initial episcopal provision to Lincoln (1514), taking in some unusual promotions. Tournai was extraordinary for having been taken from France; similarly, the brief acquisition of Badajoz was unusual for having been awarded by Charles V, apparently in recognition of Wolsey’s role in facilitating meetings with Henry VIII (to run in parallel to the Field of Cloth of Gold) and also for secret assurances that England remained committed to the anti-French agenda. Also remarkable were Wolsey’s acquisition of a bishopric and (exempt) abbey \textit{in commendam}: Bath and Wells and St Albans.\textsuperscript{143} This was unheard of among English ecclesiastics, but common among curial cardinals. Wolsey was also driven in his pursuit of a red hat from shortly after his elevation to the English episcopate.\textsuperscript{144} Also, his legatine commission was levered out of the papacy in 1518. Once he was a legate \textit{a latere}, there were a number of occasions when Wolsey appears to have acted almost as pope in northern Europe, albeit always

\textsuperscript{140} \textit{Ibid.}, 1968 (17 January 1522, de Mesa to Charles).
\textsuperscript{141} \textit{Ven.iii}, 396 (27 January 1522, Venetian ambassador in England to the Signory).
\textsuperscript{142} Anglo talks in the context of court festivals reflecting a broad, European tradition of magnificence among heads of state; S. Anglo, \textit{Spectacle, Pageantry, and Early Tudor Policy} (1969), p.2.
\textsuperscript{143} For most of these appointments, see S.M. Jack, ‘Wolsey, Thomas (1470/71-1530), DNB. For Badajoz (and the commutation of provision to this see a pension deriving from its revenues), see below pp.370-372, 382-384. Charles V first dangled a bishopric in front of Wolsey at the beginning of 1518, a time when the emperor knew that the English were conducting peace negotiations with France (and that the return of Tournai, before 1513 a French enclave in Burgundy, was on the table). While Charles attempted to scupper these negotiations, he also received secret pledges from England of continued anti-French intentions; \textit{LP.iiii}, 3872 (6 January 1518, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Valladolid), 3935 (9 February 1518, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Valladolid); also see below pp.600-601.
\textsuperscript{144} See below pp.293-294, 295-297.
publicly acting first and foremost under Henry VIII’s authority. Firstly, he hijacked Leo X’s universal peace/crusade initiative to take the lead in (and credit for) the Treaty of London (1518). Secondly, he played a pivotal role in the meetings between Henry and the two greatest princes in Christendom, Charles V (at Canterbury and Calais-Gravelines) and Francis I (at the Field of Cloth of Gold). Thirdly, he acted as mediator between the latter monarchs over their differences, traditionally a role exercised by or expected of the pope (or his agents), at Calais and Bruges in 1521. The papacy also came to be involved in the Calais conference as a partisan party on behalf of whom Wolsey attempted to mediate. To gain an alternative sense of the papal flavour of Wolsey’s roles, one can also examine the legatine ceremonial that occurred on his meeting these monarchs and so on. Such formalities were designed to give the sense that the pope himself was there and being honoured.¹⁴⁵ In light of all this, therefore, it is not difficult to entertain the idea that Wolsey may well have envisaged himself as a future pope, particularly as he had already fulfilled some of the key ‘political’ roles expected of this position. Indeed, the Venetian Giustinian, in his summary of his stay in England, written in 1519, portrays Wolsey’s standing as seven times greater than if he were pope.¹⁴⁶ He was at his peak in terms of the state, as both Chancellor and principal minister of the king; it goes without saying that he could never become king. He was also at the top of the ecclesiastical hierarchy in England, as cardinal-legate and archbishop of York and had asserted his pre-eminence in Europe as a legate a latere. The only possible promotion he could aim for now was the papacy itself.

In arguing that genuine hopes were held for Wolsey’s candidacy, one must consider why the cardinal expressed reluctance to pursue the office of pontiff. In addition to the idea that

¹⁴⁵ See below pp.702-706.
¹⁴⁶ R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, p.314 (Ven.ii 1287; LPIIIi, 402; calendared 10 September and end July 1519, respectively; report of England by Giustinian).
Wolsey’s protestations predated any confidence on the crown’s behalf that Charles V would honour his promise, Gunn suggests the general existence of a tendency to react in this manner to potential promotions and appointments for the sake of one’s honour; ‘and when given the chance they [the appointees] expatiated at the moment of their appointment on their unworthiness to receive such an accolade’. This is also sometimes known as ‘nolo episcopari’. It does not take much to interpret Wolsey’s initial reluctance to being nominated as the Anglo-Imperial candidate for the papacy in this sense, particularly given his protracted attempts to secure the cardinal’s hat where, in contrast, his ambitions were no secret. Indeed, Giulio de’ Medici, who is certainly known to have held papal ambitions, when approached by Clerk with a view to his candidacy, ‘[thought] himself far too unworthy for the room’. Similarly, Adrian VI, in his first letter to Henry VIII, claimed that it was ‘an honour which I not only never solicited, but never wished for. My strength is unequal to it, and I should have refused, but for fear of offending God and the Church’. Nevertheless, Adrian’s and later Giulio’s claims of unworthiness did not preclude their acceptance of the papal office. It must be emphasised, however, that Gunn does not believe that such a reaction demonstrated insincerity, instead that those who issued such statements took their promotions and nominations very seriously and that their reticence was perhaps an indication of this. It is in this context, therefore, that one ought to view Wolsey’s protest to the king (in front of the Imperial ambassador), that he would not accept the dignity unless both Henry

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147 Gunn is talking specifically about appointees to the Order of the Garter during the early Tudor period, although this reaction has been discovered in other contexts, as is being argued concerning Wolsey and the papal tiara; S. Gunn, ‘Chivalry and the Politics of the Early Tudor Court’, in S. Anglo (ed.), Chivalry in the Renaissance, p.109.

148 There are also parallels of ‘nolo episcopari’ to be seen in Silvester de Giglis’ initial reluctance to approach Henry and Wolsey directly concerning his ambition for a red hat, instead he chose to make enquiries through a subordinate; see, for example, LPiiii, 4442 (18 September 1518, Darius to Wolsey, London).

149 LPiiii, 1895 (calendared end December 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey]).

150 Ibid., 2018 (2 February 1522, Adrian VI to Henry, ‘Victoria’).

and Charles deemed it in their interests. Wolsey’s overt reluctance is also unsurprising because any indication to the contrary would certainly scare off any potential support within the Sacred College. Given that all curial cardinals envisaged themselves as potential popes to some degree, they were arguably less likely to forward the likes of Wolsey as a non-curial compromise candidate (as Adrian VI became), if he showed himself desirous of the role. Moreover, on a more personal level, it would not redound to Wolsey’s honour and reputation, both domestically and externally, if he was known to covet the papal office and failed to get it, particularly given the high-profile role that he had carved out for himself in recent years on the European political stage, as legate a latere.

In arguing that Wolsey’s candidacy was genuine, one must also tackle a convincing element of Chambers’ thesis to the contrary, that ultimately he would not have given up his offices in England to live in Rome. Firstly, Wolsey, always having demonstrated his loyalty to the king, could have overcome this reluctance by seeing it in terms of his ‘duty’ to the king; indeed, this is how he portrayed his undesired candidacy. There is no sign of Wolsey’s reluctance in the audience he gave to de Mesa around 17 January, where the cardinal was reportedly extremely angry to hear from Rome that the Imperial ambassador there was lobbying the cardinals in favour of de’ Medici. De Mesa countered that, if this was true, his counterpart in Rome would change his policy on Pace’s arrival. Indeed, Charles V, on hearing of Wolsey’s

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152 LPIIl, 1884 (19 December 1521, de Mesa to Charles, London).
153 Again, one is thinking particularly of Wolsey’s role in the Treaty of London (1518), the meetings of Henry VIII with Francis I and Charles V, as well as the conferences of Calais and Bruges; see below pp.702-709, 732-751.
154 D.S. Chambers, ‘Cardinal Wolsey and the Papal Tiara’, BIHR, 38, pp.26-27. Also, this issue was reportedly one of the objections that cardinals had to Wolsey’s nomination when it was raised in conclave; LPIII, 1990 (26 January 1522, Pace to [Wolsey], Palpa).
155 According to the Imperial ambassador, de Mesa; LPIII, 1884 (19 December 1521, de Mesa to Charles, London), 1892 (24 December 1521, bishop of Badajoz to Charles, London).
156 Ibid., 1968 (17 January 1522, de Mesa to Charles).
ire, felt it necessary to answer him through de Mesa. The emperor assured Wolsey that his orator in Rome had no commission to lobby for anyone other than Wolsey, but at the time in question, had not yet received these instructions. Until this commission arrived, Manuel was empowered to choose and support the most suitable candidate which, on reflection of the result and Pace’s failure to arrive in time, was probably not de’ Medici anyway.\textsuperscript{157} Similarly, the Venetian, Surian, on 27 January reported Wolsey’s discontent with the actual result of the papal election.\textsuperscript{158}

That Wolsey was prepared to leave England can also be argued, to some extent, by the fact that he had already spent a relatively large amount of time across the sea from Henry (in Calais and Bruges during the latter half of 1521), during which time he saw no challenge to his supremacy as principal minister.\textsuperscript{159} Admittedly, this did not involve the relinquishing of crown office that accepting the papal tiara would inevitably involve, but it is still significant. Finally, it is not impossible that Wolsey envisaged that he could exercise his papacy from England. Indeed, Clerk speculated that the new pope, Adrian VI, believed to be elderly and sick, could be induced to travel from Spain to visit the emperor via England where, if he died, Wolsey would be able to hold a conclave ten days later. Towards the end of February, however, Pace confirmed that this scenario would not be permitted, given that Clement V (1305-1314) had decreed that conclaves must take place in Rome, regardless of where the pontiff had died.\textsuperscript{160} That this was an impractical idea is difficult to dispute, but one can argue that it does demonstrate that crown sources were searching for a way to lower the odds stacked against Wolsey’s candidacy in a future election and

\textsuperscript{157} \textit{Ibid.}, 2024 (5 February 1522, Charles to de Mesa, Brussels).
\textsuperscript{158} \textit{Ven.iii}, 396 (27 January 1522, Venetian ambassador in England to the Signory).
\textsuperscript{159} See below pp.739-749.
\textsuperscript{160} Pace negated, however, precedents set by the Avignon conclaves, among others (for instance, Martin V [1417-1431] elected at Constance); \textit{LPIIIi}, 2017 (1 February 1522, Clerk to Wolsey, Rome), 2064 (22 February 1522, Pace to [Wolsey], Rome). Chambers employs the same sources to argue that Wolsey never intended to leave England; D.S. Chambers, ‘Cardinal Wolsey and the Papal Tiara’, \textit{BIHR}, 38, pp.26-27.
for a way for him to retain his influence in England. Clerk’s solution was theoretically perfect, but incredibly unlikely. Overall, it is still difficult to argue that Wolsey would have dropped everything in England to serve his king in Rome, but it cannot be ruled out entirely, given the weight of other evidence that supports the genuine nature of his candidacy in 1521-1522. That a pope failing to reside in Rome was not an entirely ridiculous proposition was voiced by those who feared that the newly-elected Adrian might not leave Spain. On 13 January, Clerk wrote, ‘it is truth that he [Adrian] may kepe the See apostolique elliswher if he will, and as in tymes past it hath been kepte in Avignon and in Fflorenc, and in many other places, so likewise nowe, if the Pope will, he may kepe it in Spayne, or in Almayn…’. 161 Pace reported de’ Medici’s opinion, around 23 January, that it is ‘expedient that the Pope should be at Rome for the conservation of the lands of the Church, and the contentation of all’. 162 The secretary also conveyed on 26th hearing that Adrian intended to pass by England and the possibility of him visiting Henry and Wolsey was suggested. 163

Finally, however outlandish Wolsey’s candidacy sounded, the crown’s belief that there was a slim chance of success is also indicated by parallels with other seemingly impossible missions of the period. Firstly, around 1512-1514, Henry VIII, through Bainbridge, sought to gain papal legitimisation of the English claim to the French throne, particularly the transfer of the title ‘Most Christian King’ to Henry. While success was extremely unlikely, the political situation was favourable enough to England for Julius II to draw up the appropriate brief to this end. 164 A plan that has greater similarities to the Wolsey candidacy is Richard Pace’s mission to the

161 Ellis, p.313 (LPIIIii, 1960; 13 January 1522 [Clerk to Wolsey]).
162 LPIIIii, 1981 (23 January 1522, Pace to [Wolsey], Florence).
163 Ibid., 1990 (26 January 1522, Pace to [Wolsey], Palpa), 1996 (29 January 1522, Pace to Wolsey, Rome).
164 See above pp.144 ff.
Imperial electors in 1519 to forward Henry VIII’s nomination if possible, perhaps as a compromise candidate. Again, it was an incredibly unlikely prospect, but Henry and his advisors tried anyway.\textsuperscript{165}

Given that the English crown and its curial representatives believed that they could affect papal elections at least to some degree, this idea ought to be tempered by a consideration of the principal impediments that limited such expectations. Foremost was the distance between England and Rome and its effect on the speed of communication. A round trip of around four weeks for notification and reply meant that conclave was likely to have opened (during which all communication with the outside was forbidden) before any instructions from England were likely to arrive.\textsuperscript{166} In terms of the conclaves of this period, therefore, Henry and his advisors would have been lucky to have received notification of Julius II’s death before Leo X was elected, let alone send instructions to Bainbridge in Rome, as the \textit{interregnum} only lasted 18 days. The second vacancy of the period of 39 days, on the other hand, would have provided just enough time for Campeggio and Clerk to have been acquainted with the crown’s choices of Wolsey and de’ Medici, but this did not occur.\textsuperscript{167} Even in the latter case, Charles V reckoned himself too far away to successfully affect the election; on initially hearing of Leo X’s death and offering his support to Wolsey (on 16 December), the emperor wished that he was closer to Italy, presumably to have speedier and more direct influence.\textsuperscript{168} On the other hand, these communication

\textsuperscript{165} See below pp.653 ff.
\textsuperscript{166} See above pp.36-37.
\textsuperscript{167} Julius II’s death and Leo’s election occurred on 21 February and 11 March 1513, respectively. Similarly, Leo’s death and Adrian’s election took place on, 1 December 1521 and 9 January 1522. Usually, however, \textit{interregnums} lasted around one to two months; J.N.D. Kelly, \textit{Oxford Dictionary of Popes}, pp.255-256, 258; L. Nussdorfer, ‘The Vacant See’, \textit{The Sixteenth Century Journal}, 18, p.173.
\textsuperscript{168} \textit{LPIIIii}, 1876 (16 December 1521, Charles to de Mesa, Ghent).
difficulties would have been taken for granted by those involved and are not likely to have affected behaviour in any instance. There was always an outside chance that the *interregnum* would be long enough for English instructions to reach Rome and the benefits of success must have been deemed worth the risk. While Pace did not reach Florence before confirmed news of Adrian VI’s election reached him, he did his utmost to have the instructions reach Rome in time, by despatching a messenger ahead of him. As a result of this difficulty, it is entirely unsurprising that the English representatives in Rome were expected to use their own initiative to support a suitable candidate.

Another obstacle to the English crown was lack of influence both at the Holy See in general or within the Sacred College, compared to other states and interests. At conclaves in particular, groups such as the ‘French cardinals’, the pro-Imperialists, pro- and anti-Medicean interests were most evident. England was not a ‘superpower’ on the scale of the Empire, France or Spain and lacked the resources to compete with them on an individual basis, not least in Rome. Furthermore, these powers all held interests in Italy, which they often affected directly and could, therefore, command the loyalty of elements within that peninsula. This power was transferable into the College of Cardinals during conclaves. England never had more than one native cardinal at a time and, Bainbridge notwithstanding, he was not usually resident in Rome.

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169 Ibid., 1966 (16 January 1522, Pace to [Wolsey], Florence), 1918 (31 December 1521, Pace to Wolsey, Speyer), 1981 (23 January 1522, Pace to [Wolsey], Florence).
170 K.J.P. Lowe, *Church and Politics in Renaissance Italy*, pp.50-51, 72-73, 121-124. For a sense of the power of the pro-French/anti-Medici and the pro-Imperial/pro-Medici parties during the 1521-1522 *interregnum*, see for instance, *LPIIIii*, 1933 (4 January 1522, Richard Wingfield and Thomas Spinelly to Wolsey, Ghent); *Sp.ii*, 369 (19 December 1521, Imperial ambassador in Rome to Charles), 370 (24 December 1521, Imperial ambassador in Rome to Charles), 371 (28 December 1521, Imperial ambassador in Rome to Charles). In both elections of this period, there even seems to have been a division between younger and older cardinals, although political sympathies could complicate this; M. Creighton, *History of the Papacy*, v, pp.204-208; *ibid.* vi, pp.214-222.
171 See, for instance, Wolsey’s belief that Charles could affect the outcome of the 1521-1522 election by military pressure from his troops in Italy; *LPIIIii*, 1892 (24 December 1521, bishop of Badajoz to Charles, London).
This made the development of a ‘party’ problematic. The English crown’s tacit recognition of its limited power in both Rome and the Sacred College is indicated by its employment of Italian curials, the likes of de Castello, de Giglis and Campeggio for much of its business in Rome during this period. It was obviously too difficult and/or costly to develop Englishmen to provide this representation, Bainbridge and Pace excepted. Similarly, the earlier demonstration of the crown’s willingness to align with friendly third-parties during conclaves also suggests the English accepted that they were not powerful enough to affect conclaves alone.

It must be stressed that, despite the attempts of secular powers to affect papal elections, conclaves were unpredictable and the English crown would have been well aware of this impediment to their efforts. Papabile rarely emerged as pontiffs. The political interests and loyalties of the cardinals, such as they were, were also affected by other factors, including personal ambition and a desire for material wealth. Indeed Juan Manuel, even after aligning with Giulio de’ Medici, wrote that it depended on the cardinal keeping his word in conclave, ‘a thing which is not usual in Rome’. This unpredictability could be exacerbated by the invariable return of exiled cardinals who had been enemies of the dead pope, for one reason or another. It would also have been affected in the later conclave by Leo X’s elevation of 31 cardinals in 1517. This put a major limitation on the likely efficacy of instructions emanating from England and explains the existence of a ‘plan B’, to back Giulio de’ Medici, when Henry and

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172 See above pp.31-33.
173 See above pp.245-246.
174 Cardinals were frequently offered inducements before and during conclaves to support particular candidates, not least from the collection of benefices that the newly-elected would be obliged to relinquish. A few days after Leo X’s election, Bainbridge was awarded his abbey of S. Stefano in Bologna; D.S. Chambers, *Cardinal Bainbridge*, pp.44, 96.
175 *Sp.ii*, 370 (24 December 1521, Imperial ambassador in Rome to Charles, Rome).
176 K.J.P. Lowe, *Church and Politics in Renaissance Italy*, pp.46-47.
177 See below pp.302-303, 573-574.
Wolsey sent instructions to Rome in respect of the latter’s nomination in 1521-1522 (and again in 1523) to circumvent this.

In addition to these obstacles to English influence in conclaves, there were more particular limitations if the crown wanted to forward the nomination of an Englishman. Despite apparently genuine hopes for Wolsey, these obstacles would have have been as clear in 1521-1522 as they had probably been in 1513, when Bainbridge was not pushed to the fore. Despite Imperial support making the difference in the later election, Wolsey was probably realistic when he told the Imperial ambassador that he was unlikely to become pope, although he did not completely give up hope.

The first characteristic going against Wolsey was that he was both non-curial and non-Italian. As Chambers quotes a mid-fifteenth century cardinal, a non-curial was like ‘a fish out of water’, they did not have the experience or connections to run the papacy, let alone get elected to it. The importance of this for Wolsey, if he was to become pope, was implied by John Clerk, on 1 December, when he notified the cardinal of Leo X’s grave illness. The orator also commented that he wished Wolsey was there, which can only be an allusion to his potential candidacy in a potential conclave. Although de’ Medici, in conversation with Clerk prior to the election, ‘said that your Grace [Wolsey] was more meet for the room [papacy] than any man, and wished that the Holy Ghost would inspire his brethren the Cardinals to lean that ways’, one must remember that the orator was at that point offering the cardinal England’s support, so this can

178 D.S. Chambers, ‘Cardinal Wolsey and the Papal Tiara’, BIHR, 38, p.20. While there was no technical difference between the positions of curial and non-curial cardinals, in practice the curials were able to wield more influence in Rome, particularly in times of Sede Vacante; J.A.F. Thomson, Popes and Princes, pp.64-65.
179 LPIIIi, 1824 (1 December 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome).
probably be dismissed as polite conversation. Furthermore, in the wake of Wolsey’s name having been raised in conclave, the Cardinal of Siena later reported to Richard Pace that one of the reasons for his candidacy being objected to was the expectation that he would not come to Rome. Even when a non-curial was elected, surprise and discontent were among the reactions emanating from Rome. Clerk wrote to Wolsey on 9 January that ‘the world is here marvellously abashed and evil contented. This man here is nother known nor spoken of’. The people of Rome were said to be so incensed that the cardinals were too scared to leave their homes for a number of days. Even by Pace’s arrival in Rome on 27th, the cardinals were still reluctant to appear in public for this reason. In addition to the non-residency issue, the election of a non-Italian had also become extremely unusual. As already mentioned, the composition of the Sacred College was overwhelmingly Italian and this was almost always reflected in the results of the subsequent elections. Once again, Adrian VI proved the exception, although this was unforeseen. Finally, another tendency of conclaves was to elect candidates who were relatives of previous popes. In other words, a dynastic element had entered the electoral process, of which Julius II was a good example and the de’ Medici were soon to emulate. While this did not always

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180 Ibid., 1895 (calendared end December 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey]).
181 Ibid., 1990 (26 January 1522, Pace to [Wolsey], Palpa).
182 Ibid., 1994 (9 January 1522, Clerk to Wolsey).
183 M. Creighton, History of the Papacy, vi, pp.221.
184 LP III, 1995 (28 January 1522, Pace to Wolsey, Rome).
185 At the 1513 conclave, McClung Hallmann demonstrates that 19 of the 25 cardinals were Italian (76%), while in 1522 36 of the 39 (92%) originated from the peninsula. Chambers, on the other hand, states that, 1480-1534, 93 (57%) out of 162 cardinals created were Italian (by way of comparison, only three were English). Partner more or less concurs with Chambers, calculating that, for the period 1471-1527, nearly 60% of college members were from the southern side of the Alps. On this subject, Prodi also stresses the increasing Italianisation of the College of Cardinals, indeed of the papacy itself around this time, although one must remember that the Italian cardinals were a far from homogenous group, possessing diverse political interests, usually based on their city (or city-state) of origin; D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.6; B. McClung Hallman, Italian Cardinals, Reform, and the Church as Property, 1492-1563 (1985), p.4 (table 1.1); P. Partner, The Pope’s Men, p.209; P. Prodi, The Papal Prince, pp.18, 83-85, 171-172. Also see C.L. Stinger, The Renaissance in Rome, pp.93-94, J.A.F. Thomson, Popes and Princes, pp.61-64.
occur (and Adrian VI, among others, were exceptions), again, Wolsey obviously did not fit this
criterion.

Other characteristics which would have been recognised in England as reducing the likely
success of an English candidate included age and health, and state office. Age and health
repeatedly arose as determining factors to papal electors. Probably due to the individual
ambitions of cardinals, all potential aspirants to the papal throne, there seems to have been a
general reluctance to elect a young, fit nominee.\(^{186}\) Thus, as Leo X was an extraordinary 38 when
he was elected, it has been suggested that his election was eased by his fragile health when he
entered conclave, which required the attendance of a medic.\(^{187}\) His broader physical appearance
may have done little to dispel this impression, being corpulent and extremely short-sighted.\(^{188}\)
While Leo perhaps survived longer than some of his electors may have hoped, he did die at the
relatively young age of 46. Adrian VI, on the other hand, seems to have been elected, in part at
least, because of his age and ill health.\(^{189}\) Thus, it is not surprising that Wolsey’s age and
presumed health were cited as obstacles to his candidacy in conclave. Campeggio, for instance,
highlighted this issue to Wolsey as being significant to the failure of his candidacy. The Italian
said he tried to convince his fellow cardinals that Wolsey was over 50, if not close to 60, but was

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\(^{186}\) That age was seen as an issue, see for example Pace’s consideration of a ‘Jacobatius’ that he had heard was one of
the favourites for the papacy, on 31 December 1521; \textit{LPIIIii}, 1918 (31 December 1521, Pace to Wolsey, Speyer).
Also, see \textit{ibid.}, 1895 (calendared end December 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey]).


\(^{188}\) For a comment on this made by a contemporary, shortly after the pope’s death, see L. Pastor, \textit{History of the
Popes}, viii, p.67.

\(^{189}\) Campeggio cites the Imperial cardinal’s age; \textit{LPIIIii}, 1952 (10 January 1522, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome).
Also, Pace reported from Florence to Wolsey, probably on 16 January 1522, that rumours abounded of the pope
being ill and that bets were being placed that he had already died; \textit{ibid.}, 1967 (calendared 16-17 January 1522, Pace
to Wolsey, Florence). Even the emperor himself was not particularly optimistic of these attributes of the new pontiff.
Charles reportedly described Adrian VI as being ‘of great age, of a feeble complexion and sickly’ when he heard of
his election; \textit{ibid.}, 1970 (calendared 18 January 1522, Spinelly to Wolsey). Finally, Clerk, on 1 February, reported to
Wolsey a strong rumour that the pope was dead. If he was not, the orator recommended that Wolsey induce Adrian
to come to England so that, given his age and infirmity, he might die there and Wolsey would thereby be able to hold
the election there and ensure his own victory; \textit{ibid.}, 2017 (1 February 1522, Clerk to Wolsey, Rome).
unsuccessful. Similarly, John Clerk, asserted on 13 January that, among other reasons for opposition to Wolsey’s nomination, ‘your Grace was to yonge’.

A further potential impediment to an Englishman’s nomination was his holding of state office. The cardinals were generally not disposed to choose as pope those who held prominent state office, particularly those associated with the ultramontane powers. Again, Adrian VI was an exception, an intimate minister of the emperor and running Spain on Charles’ behalf when elected. He had also been the emperor’s tutor but, unlike Wolsey, he was never described as ‘alter rex’. Adrian was also less prominent in international politics than Wolsey had been, particularly in recent years. Wolsey’s actions with the Treaty of London did not endear him to Leo X and overall, his conducting himself as a quasi-pope may not have been viewed supportively by his fellow cardinals; indeed, they may already have envisaged him as aspiring to the papal tiara. On 10 January 1522, Campeggio mentions Wolsey’s status as one of the objections of the cardinals; ‘some feared that with Wolsey’s greatness, they would not have enough intercourse with him’. Similarly, the Cardinal of Siena told Richard Pace, on 26 January, that, while he had supported de’ Medici’s forwarding of Wolsey’s nomination, one of the objections was ‘that ye were nimis potens’.

Overall, it does seem that the English crown envisaged its attempts to affect papal conclaves to have a limited chance of success, given the recognised obstacles. The English 

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190 Ibid., 1952 (10 January 1522, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome).
191 Clerk also cited as impediments that the cardinals ‘had certain knowledge that ye were determined to trouth and the execucion of Justice,’ to which a number were opposed and, also, ‘that ye favored not all the best th’emperor’, a charge which de’ Medici, Campeggio and Sion claimed to have attempted to counter; Ellis, pp.304-3166 (LIIII, 1960; 13 January 1522 [Clerk to Wolsey]).
192 For this description as an indication (usually by foreign diplomats) of a principal minister, see above pp.21-22.
193 LIIII, 1952 (10 January 1522, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome).
194 Pace, however, speculated that he could have removed this objection; ibid., 1990 (26 January 1522, Pace to [Wolsey], Palpa).
representatives in Rome fully recognised their powers to affect conclaves, but their choice, usually dictated by the principal English-born diplomat, tended to be for those Italian candidates with established power-bases.

After all this, how far did the English crown actually achieve its political goals in papal elections? While, superficially, the results of the conclaves of 1513 and 1521-1522 represented a failure in English policy, the reality of the outcome may be different. In both cases, the ‘English’ cardinals in conclave all appear to have voted for the successful candidates, eventually. In 1513, Bainbridge, despite his ire, probably backed Giovanni de’ Medici in the final scrutiny, given that he soon after gained a Bolognese abbey previously held by de’ Medici. Similarly, Clerk’s disappointment at Adrian’s election ignores the ‘English’ cardinals’ involvement in it. Definitely de’ Medici and, consequently, Campeggio, forwarded this candidate and voted for him. As the Florentine reportedly later told Pace, ‘he thought it best to obtain the papacy for a friend to the King and the Emperor, as he doubts not the newly elected will be’.

The underlying English political motive for interfering in papal elections was to ensure the success of an anti-French/pro-English nominee, an apparently suitable candidate emerged on both occasions. According to Bainbridge, writing on 25 June 1513, Leo X ‘woll never doo contrary to that he said at his creacon unto me…he woll in deade firmelie kepe the

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195 D.S. Chambers, *Cardinal Bainbridge*, p.44; *LPIIIii*, 1944 (9 January 1522, Clerk to Wolsey); Ellis, pp.304-305 (*LPIIIii*, 1960; 13 January 1522 [Clerk to Wolsey]).
197 Admittedly, de’ Medici’s ‘English’ credentials can be questioned, but Clerk seems to have worked with both him and Campeggio to secure the English interest in this election; pp.234-236.
198 *LPIIIii*, 1981 (23 January 1522, Pace to [Wolsey], Florence). Clerk reported on 13 January that Adrian was nominated by the Medici ‘party’; Ellis, p.308 (*LPIIIii*, 1960; 13 January 1522 [Clerk to Wolsey]). Also, Campeggio implied that he had voted for Adrian when he asserted that ‘the cardinals were influenced by his [Adrian’s] integrity alone, as none but a very few had ever seen him’; *LPIIIii*, 1945 (9 January 1522, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome).
confederacon withe your grace’.\footnote{D.S. Chambers, \textit{Cardinal Bainbridge}, p.44.} It would be surprising if Bainbridge had not gained some kind of commitment from Leo before helping to enable his election. If, indeed, this did occur, then Bainbridge had facilitated the election of a candidate favourable to current English foreign policy. No wonder Henry VIII was ‘very well satisfied with the writer’s [Bainbridge’s] diligence’ in this affair. He particularly ‘rejoiced to find that Leo sanctions the league for the defence of the Church and has joined it’.\footnote{\textit{LPIii}, 1769 (\textit{LPI}, 3876; \textit{Ven.ii}, 238; 12 April 1513, Henry to Bainbridge, London).} In summary, the result of the conclave was extremely positive for the English crown in the short-term. In the longer term, perhaps the degree of ‘success’ could be revised, given Leo X’s practical subjection to France following the battle of Marignano, but crown policy \textit{vis-à-vis} papal elections was not blessed with foresight.

Again, in 1521-1522, the election of Adrian VI was politically positive for England. Intimately connected with Henry’s ally against France, Charles V, this ‘Imperial’ pontiff would be expected to be both pro-English and anti-French. De’ Medici said that he had been nominated for these qualities. Furthermore, Charles V wrote to reassure Wolsey on 21 January reasoning that, besides the Englishman’s own candidacy, Adrian’s was ‘most for the good of Christendom’.\footnote{\textit{LPIii}, 1977 (21 January 1522, Charles to de Mesa, Brussels). Also see \textit{ibid.}, 2024 (5 February 1522, Charles to de Mesa, Brussels).} Similar sentiments were relayed to England by Clerk, on 13 January, that ‘men suppose heer [in Rome] that the Kyngs Highnes shall haue a greate stroke with themperor’.\footnote{Ellis, p.313 (\textit{LPIii}, 1960; 13 January 1522 [Clerk to Wolsey]).} Spinelly, reporting from Brussels, recalled his own meeting with the new pontiff while the latter was in Spain, where ‘I found him well inclined to the King and you’. In his opinion, Adrian would ‘confirm and increase the honours granted to you by his predecessor’. Indeed, the diplomat also relayed Charles’ promise to obtain confirmation of Wolsey’s legatine commission from
Adrian VI. On 29 January, Richard Pace, having spoken with Manuel, reported the latter’s recommendation that Adrian be conveyed to England, so that he could speak with Henry and Charles. Subsequently, the emperor-elect ought to go to Italy with the new pontiff to ‘settle it [Italy] to the profit of his friends’, as well as be crowned emperor. Unfortunately, there is little indication of reaction to Adrian VI’s election within crown circles. Only Surian, the Venetian ambassador in England, mentions this and cited Wolsey’s disappointment at the emperor’s failure, as he understood it, to help facilitate his election. As a result, Surian appears to have envisaged an English withdrawal from continental politics. While Wolsey may well have been disappointed, that does not mean that he was unhappy with the election of the Imperial cardinal. The Venetians at this time were unaware of any Anglo-Imperial alliance (and its commitment to war against France), so would not have appreciated the potential consequences that such a politically biased pope could have for England. The news may have been received positively in England, as the crown continued its preparations to aid the Empire in its war with France, according to the Treaty of Bruges. There was, nevertheless, something of a wait-and-see attitude in England from the moment Henry and Wolsey heard of Leo X’s death. They were not yet prepared to commit publicly to their alliance with Charles V, preferring to continue the façade of amity with France and to promote a truce (so that England could prepare for war). This appears to have persisted following confirmation of Adrian VI’s election being received in England; perhaps the crown was waiting to see how the papacy was going to act, particularly

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203 *LPIIIi*, 1969 (18 January 1522, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels).
205 The implication is that Francis, recognising the political bias of the new pope, was already taking measures to prevent Henry joining Charles in the current Franco-Imperial conflict. Francis was, however, unaware of the secret alignment already concluded at Bruges in August 1521; *Ven.iii*, 396 (27 January 1522, Venetian ambassador in England to the Signory). Also see *LPIIIi*, 2024 (5 February 1522, Charles to de Mesa, Brussels).
206 See, for example, *LPIIIi*, 2012-2014 (calendared end January 1522, preparations for war).
given that Adrian was not yet in Rome and this was, according to the English representatives there, the cause of much instability.\textsuperscript{207}

Finally, confirmation of the intentions of the new pontiff came from Adrian VI himself when, on 2 February, he notified the crown of his election. He praised Henry’s ‘zeal for the peace of Christendom’ and urged him to join with the emperor in pursuit of this goal. Similarly, he urged Wolsey to ‘promote an indissoluble alliance between his King and the Emperor, as the greatest safeguard to the peace of Christendom’.\textsuperscript{208} In the context of the calls for universal peace that were made during this period, Adrian’s sentiment would most probably have been interpreted as an indication of continued papal support for the current war against France, to which England was committed. This indicated, therefore, that a pro-English/anti-French pontiff had been elected.

The problem with the new pontiff in the short-term, was his absence from Rome. \textit{Interregna} were destabilising to the papacy at the best of times, but an absentee pope was even more so.\textsuperscript{209} As the timetable for Adrian’s arrival was unknown, it was even questioned whether he would come, the instability of the \textit{interregnum} continued. Clerk commented on this on several occasions. On 13 January, for instance, he reported that Adrian’s coming to Rome was greatly desired ‘not onely for the mayntenyng of thEmperors affaires heer in Lumbardy and Naples but also for the preseruation of the Lands of the Churche which hourely be invaded’. Concerning the

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{207} See below pp.753-756.
\item \textsuperscript{208} \textit{LP III}, 2018 (2 February 1522, Adrian VI to Henry, ‘Victoria’), 2019 (2 February 1522, Adrian VI to Wolsey, ‘Vittoria’).
\item \textsuperscript{209} Political stability was arguably not aided by the effective shutdown of most aspects of papal government during such times, until the election of a new pontiff; L. Nussdorfer, ‘The Vacant See’, \textit{The Sixteenth Century Journal}, 18, p.173.
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anti-French foreign policy, to which Henry VIII was committed, Clerk further relayed a concern that ‘there can no expedicions be made vntell such tyme as he [Adrian] be crowned’.  

Overall, it can be concluded that the English crown’s representatives in Rome were broadly successful in contributing to the election of pro-English and anti-French candidates, but not those who were initially chosen, nor favoured in England itself. Those looking to the crown’s interests in Rome, in a general sense, were able to adapt successfully to the fluctuating conditions there and the popes eventually elected were the best compromise candidates available. The nominations emerging from England itself, on the other hand, particularly Wolsey’s (although, to a lesser extent, Riario’s), were speculative and, while not deemed completely implausible, unsurprisingly failed.

\[210\] Ellis, pp.312-313 (\textit{LPIIIii}, 1960; 13 January 1522 [Clerk to Wolsey]). Also, see \textit{LPIIIii}, 1961 (13 January 1522 Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome), 2017 (1 February 1522, Clerk to Wolsey, Rome). Also, see similar reports and sentiments from Campeggio and Pace comments; \textit{ibid.}, 1979 (22 January 1522, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome), 1980 (22 January 1522, Pace to [Wolsey], Florence), 1995 (28 January 1522, Pace to Wolsey, Rome), 2037 (10 February 1522, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome).
5

INFLUENCING ACCESS TO ‘THE FOUNDATION AND HINGE’ OF THE PAPACY:
ENGLISH ATTEMPTS TO AFFECT THE COMPOSITION OF THE SACRED COLLEGE

The College of Cardinals occupied an influential yet ambiguous position within the governmental structure of the Church. On the one hand, its members, appointed only by the pope, were the most senior ecclesiastics in the ecclesiastical hierarchy other than the pontiff himself and its principal formal role concerning Church government was to assume control during an interregnum and elect the successor of St Peter. On the other hand, while it had traditionally been the advisory body of popes, this role had diminished considerably during the Renaissance (although it continued to claim this role), as the monarchical character of the papacy increased in connection with its territorial interests, to the extent, as some would argue, that its members had become little more than courtiers. This is not to say that the college’s role was purely ceremonial...

1 During an audience with the Venetian ambassador Giustinian during May 1516, Wolsey was told that, by virtue of being a cardinal, he was ‘the foundation and hinge’ of ‘the apostolic chair’, which he was bound to defend. Doubtless Wolsey agreed with this summary in a sense, but the Venetian was referring to the need to defend the papacy against the Emperor, with whom England was then allied, ostensibly aiming to eject France from Italy (or, at least, to relaunch an expedition that had recently failed); R. Brown (trans.), *Four Years* i, pp.224-228 (LPIII, 1960; 31 May 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, Putney). For the idea of cardinals as hinges in this sense and others, see S. Kuttner, ‘Cardinalis: the History of a Canonical Concept, *Traditio*, 3 (1945), pp.130-131.


3 For the Sacred College’s general lack of actual governmental responsibility around this time, its failure in its attempts to assert a more prominent role for itself for instance through electoral capitulations and the opinion of some that they were largely courtiers, see G. Fragnito, ‘Cardinals’ Courts in Sixteenth-Century Rome’, *JMH*, 65, p.34; K.J.P. Lowe, *Church and Politics in Renaissance Italy*, p.47; P. Prodi, *The Papal Prince*, pp.80-84; P. Prodi, *The Papal Prince*, pp.80-84; J.A.F. Thomson, *Popes and Princes*, pp.66-71. In terms of the college’s advisory function, Consistory had evolved from a consultative forum to an occasion where, most often, provisions to benefices were forwarded by cardinals. Consistories involving the presence of cardinals were also convoked to receive dignitaries, most commonly foreign diplomats but also, on occasion, heads of state, such as Francis I at Bologna in 1515; *LPIII*, 1281 (14 December 3284
by this time; it still played an integral role, for instance, in appointments to consistorial
benefices and could also be asked by the pope to consult on particular matters (as a corporate
body or through a commission of cardinals). Cardinals could also act with quasi-papal powers
around Christendom, on commission from the pontiff, as legates a latere. Broadly speaking,

1515, [de Giglis] to Ammonius, Bologna); G. Fragnito, ‘Cardinals’ Courts in Sixteenth-Century Rome’, JMH, 65, pp.36-37; K.J.P. Lowe, Church and Politics in Renaissance Italy, p.47; P. Partner, The Pope’s Men, pp.35-37, 211; P. Prodi, The Papal Prince, pp.80-83, 88. For cardinals as courtiers, see, for instance, their attendance on the pope when he received gifts of animals, including an elephant, from the king of Portugal in March 1514. Also, cardinals are mentioned as accompanying the pope on a grand hunting expedition in January 1515 (reportedly involving 3,000 horse) and other hunting trips in November 1516, February and March 1519; Ven.ii, 387 (21 March 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome), 570 (17, 21 January 1515, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 814 (16 November 1516, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 1157 (13 February 1519, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). Similar attempts were made in September 1519 to obtain a reduction in the service taxes due on John Veysey’s provision to Exeter, which was successfully resisted by the Sacred College; LPIIIi, 2636 (LPI, 4724; SPV, xi; 7 February 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome), 2644 (LPI, 4747; 11 February 1514, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 3496 (LPI, 5464; calendared end November 1514, [de Giglis] to [Ammonius]); LPIIIii, 443 (1 September 1519, de Giglis to Henry, Rome), 444 (1 September 1519, de Giglis to Henry, Rome); D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.6; P. Partner, The Pope’s Men, p.74; W.E. Lunt, Financial Relations of the Papacy with England 1327-1534, ii (1962), p.169 and passim; W.E. Wilkie, Cardinal Protectors, pp.150-161.

4 While individual cardinals proposed candidates (often at the behest of secular princes), as Bainbridge did for Wolsey’s promotion to York in 1514, work for which they were paid as individuals, the college benefited from a significant proportion of the revenue generated from the taxes associated with these provisions, which was subsequently divided among the cardinals (the rest went to the pope). Given their vested interest in this process, it is entirely understandable that the cardinals (in Rome) were quite proprietorial about this function. Concerning an attempt by Wolsey to gain a remission of the service taxes due on Lincoln in 1514, for instance, Leo X notified Henry that the college had rejected this and this was confirmed by de Giglis. Around September 1514, however, de Giglis notified Ammonius that the college had been persuaded to reduce the amount due by 1,000 ducats, despite considerable opposition from the cardinals. Similarly, an attempt was made in September 1519 to obtain a reduction in the service taxes due on John Veysey’s provision to Exeter, which was successfully resisted by the Sacred College; LPIIIi, 2636 (LPI, 4724; SPV, xi; 7 February 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome), 2644 (LPI, 4747; 11 February 1514, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 3496 (LPI, 5464; calendared end November 1514, [de Giglis] to [Ammonius]); LPIIIii, 443 (1 September 1519, de Giglis to Henry, Rome), 444 (1 September 1519, de Giglis to Henry, Rome); D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.6; P. Partner, The Pope’s Men, p.74; W.E. Lunt, Financial Relations of the Papacy with England 1327-1534, ii (1962), p.169 and passim; W.E. Wilkie, Cardinal Protectors, pp.150-161.

5 Among the instances seen for this period, for example, during 1516-1517, Leo X delegated responsibility for planning a crusade to the east to the cardinals (or at least a committee of them), following the fall of Egypt to the Turks. In pursuit of this, the college wrote to Henry on 8 January, requesting that he send ambassadors to Rome to discuss the matter; LPIIIii, 2759 (8 January 1517, College of Cardinals to Henry, Rome), 3165 (23 April 1517, de Castello to [Wolsey], Rome), 3816 (calendared end November 1517). Similarly, around December 1518 (in anticipation of Maximilian’s death which was shortly expected), the cardinals debated whether the Imperial crown should be sent into Germany at Maximilian’s behest (so that Charles’ ‘election’ could be ensured. One can only envisage this discussion taking place at the pope’s request; Ven.ii, 1124 (15 December 1518, Minio to the Signory, Rome). Also see LPIIIii, 19 (13 January 1519, Pace to Wolsey, Westminster). During 1520-1521, the cardinals were also involved in discussing Luther and were said to have permitted the bull of excommunication against him; Ven.iii, 10-12 (4 February 1520, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 15-16 (11 February 1520, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 28 (16 March 1520, Friar Gabriel to Lorenzo Bragadin, Rome), 171 (15 March 1521, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 180-181 (31 March 1521). Finally, the cardinals deliberated, again almost certainly under papal instruction, the honorary title that Henry VIII ought to receive in recognition of his book against Luther, the Assertio Septem Sacramentorum; LPIIIii, 1335 (8 June 1521, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome), 1369 (27 June 1521, [Campeggio to Wolsey], Rome).

however, while popes still often used cardinals for counsel and to aid them in their oversight of the Church and its territories, this was largely due to the personal links of individuals with the pontiff (particularly as family, friends or servants) rather than solely by virtue of their membership of the Sacred College (the latter often coming as a by-product of the former). In spite of the apparent ambiguity of cardinalatial power in this sense by 1509-1522 (outside of interregna), enthusiasm for elevation to this body had not diminished. While 25 cardinals attended the 1513 conclave, this number had risen by the elevation of 31 candidates in 1517, so that 39 actually attended the 1521-1522 election. The overall trend was towards an increase in membership of the College of Cardinals. As mentioned, popes used promotion to this body as a means to reward family, friends and servants, as well as to bolster support for their policies and to ensure the existence of a powerful party that would elect a suitable successor when the time came. Another longer-term trend was the Italianisation of the Sacred College; a majority of

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9 Despite attempts by general councils to limit the size of the Sacred College and a general reluctance of the cardinals themselves to welcome an increase in membership (partly due to fears that it would reduce individuals’ revenues from service taxes and the like, as well as that it may dilute the dignity of the position), as is reportedly evident in 1513 and 1520, numbers were generally rising; *LPIii*, 2398 (*LPI*, 4525; 25 October 1513, Peter Martyr to Ludovico Furtado, Valladolid); *LPIii*, 993 (26 September 1520, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome); J.F. Broderick, ‘The Sacred College of Cardinals’, *AHP*, 25, pp.13-15, 26-29, 36-40; K.J.P. Lowe, *Church and Politics in Renaissance Italy*, p.46; J.A.F. Thomson, *Popes and Princes*, pp.65-66.
10 While Julius II (not reputed as a great nepotist) promoted four relatives during his pontificate, Leo X raised five, in addition to various supporters of the Medici; *LPIii*, 2320 (30 September 1513, [Giulio] de’ Medici to Henry, Rome); L. Pastor, *History of the Popes*, vii, pp.201-203; J.A.F. Thomson, *Popes and Princes*, pp.60-63. Also see K.J.P. Lowe, *Church and Politics in Renaissance Italy*, p.49. That this trend would have been recognised in England can be interpreted through a letter from de Giglis to the Latin secretary Ammonius during 1516 whereby, following-up the pope’s desire for a relative to be installed in a benefice within the gift of the disputed see of Tournai, the orator reasoned that the candidate, a cousin of Leo X, would become a cardinal in the next creation. De Giglis was therefore indicating both Louis de Rossi’s favoured status by virtue of his prospective membership of the Sacred College and thereby recommending that he benefit from the crown’s broader policy to reward those close to the pope (partly in the hope of political favour); *LPIii*, 2579 (22 November 1516, de Giglis to Ammonius); L. Pastor, *History of the
cardinals had been native to the peninsula since the time of Calixtus III (1455-1458). Of course, it is difficult to draw any conclusions from this, given that Italy was not unified and the Italian cardinals held various loyalties, not just to their states of birth, but often also to one of the ultramontane ‘superpowers’ (the Empire, France or Spain) whose territorial claims and de facto power in the peninsula fluctuated prior to, during and beyond this period. In light of this, it is important to point out that there continued to be a considerable number of non-Italians raised to the cardinalate and that the possibility of this attracted secular rulers for reasons that will become clear. A final observable trend concerning the make-up of the Sacred College during this (and a broader) period, linked to its Italianisation, was its increasing population with members of aristocratic families from the peninsula. This has been posited as a reason why the popes of this time were so concerned with the temporal aspect of their role and one cannot really argue with this, particularly with the tendency towards nepotism. Julius II, for instance, belonged to the della Rovere family (admittedly a minor branch of it) and, among other actions which favoured his kin, he persuaded the duke of Urbino in 1504 to adopt Francesco Maria della Rovere as his heir. Similarly, Leo X as scion of the Medici, brought with him to the papacy control of Florence and

*Popes*, vii, pp.79-84. Such nepotism can be traced back at least to the Avignon period; J.F. Broderick, ‘The Sacred College of Cardinals’, *AHP*, 25, p.21.

11 27 of the 37 cardinals that elected Julius II were Italian, while 18 of the 25 that elevated Giovanni de’ Medici were from the peninsula; P. Prodi, *The Papal Prince*, pp.18, 83, 171; C.L. Stinger, *The Renaissance in Rome*, pp.94-95; J.A.F. Thomson, *Popes and Princes*, pp.61-64. This Italianisation was not limited to the Sacred College but occurred throughout papal government; P. Partner, *The Pope’s Men*, pp.10-13, 17.

12 See p.228.

13 Chambers calculates that roughly 42.5% of those elevated 1480-1534 were certainly not Italian, while Partner cites 40.3% 1471-1527; D.S. Chambers, *Cardinal Bainbridge*, p.6; P. Partner, *The Pope’s Men*, p.209.


15 Links between the della Rovere and Montefeltro had stretched back to a 1474 marriage alliance between the families, a by-product of which was Francesco Maria’s growing up at the duke’s court; C. Shaw, *Julius II*, pp.17-18, 183-184.
an innate concern for its interests. Among other nepotistic actions, he bestowed the same duchy of Urbino on his nephew, Lorenzo de’ Medici, in August 1516, after the latter had seized the territory from Francesco Maria della Rovere.\textsuperscript{16}

Given the position of the Sacred College within the Church, their power (both real and perceived) and exclusivity and proximity to pontifical power (combined with the significance of the papacy’s temporal role), it is unsurprising that popes envisaged granting membership, partly at least, as a means by which they could induce others to align with their own political interests. In particular, popes focused on the recruitment of influential crown ministers in a bid to curry favour with their secular employers. Equally unsurprisingly, secular princes expected red hats as concessions when the papacy was in need of its political assistance.\textsuperscript{17} Monarchs also sought to block the candidates of rivals, or if the opportunity arose, urge the suspension or deprivation of their cardinals. While the number of Englishmen to be raised to the Sacred College was low (four, 1471-1527, and never more than one at any given time),\textsuperscript{18} Richard Fox and Thomas Ruthal incorrectly informed the Spanish ambassador in May 1510 that this was due to Englishmen choosing not to petition the pope for such favours.\textsuperscript{19} Nevertheless, the promotion of English ministers to the Sacred College did occur during this period for political reasons, particularly in relation to the crown’s underlying anti-French agenda and its self-perceived role as defender of the Church from France. The elevation of Christopher Bainbridge (1511) was a bid by the pope to induce Henry VIII to commit to war against Louis XII, while that of Thomas Wolsey (1515) was


\textsuperscript{17} Broderick traces the trend for princes to lobby the papacy to promote candidates in its (political) interests (and in some, but by no means all, cases succeed) back to the thirteenth century. He also finds that this trend continuing in later centuries; J.F. Broderick, ‘The Sacred College of Cardinals’, \textit{AHP}, 25, pp.23-26, 48-54.

\textsuperscript{18} According to Partner’s calculations, this makes up 2.2\% of the cardinals created during this time. Chambers, on the other hand, cites three elevated 1480-1534, which makes up 1.9\% of the membership of the Sacred College during that period; D.S. Chambers, \textit{Cardinal Bainbridge}, p.6; P. Partner, \textit{The Pope’s Men}, p.209.

\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Sp.ii}, 44 (\textit{LPli}, 476; 29 May 1510, Luis Caroz to Ferdinand, London).
blatantly sought in exchange for English commitment against France. A point of comparison is provided by Henry VIII’s failure to have his long-serving orator, Silvester de Giglis, promoted in 1520-1521, partly on account of Henry’s lack of political leverage over Leo X at that point. English attempts to block the candidacies of its rivals are more difficult to identify, but there is one definite indication of this vis-à-vis France in 1518. While Henry VIII had little power to take advantage of opportunities arising in which French or pro-French cardinals could be suspended or deprived, he did act again on one distinct occasion. It will be established, therefore, that there was a distinctly political context underlying the English crown’s relationship with the papacy over membership of the Sacred College and that this was influenced by English concerns to protect Rome from France.

Firstly, considering the papacy’s attempts to curry political favour with Henry VIII vis-à-vis France, the promotion of the king’s orator in Rome, Christopher Bainbridge, was a blatant example. It is difficult to ascertain, however, whether his candidacy was forwarded principally by England or Rome. The fact that two of Henry VIII’s inner circle, Fox and Ruthal, were aware of a rumour as early as May 1510 that the orator might benefit from such papal patronage implies crown support of the proposal (there was certainly no opposition). Also, it seems likely, given the senior status of this resident ambassador as archbishop of York, that Bainbridge was sent to Rome with the aim to gain a red hat; curial Venetians certainly believed that this was part of

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20 The idea of having crown ministers elevated to the cardinalate for political purposes was not exclusive to the papacy. In May 1510, the Spanish ambassador in England, Luis Caroz, dangled the carrot of Spanish support for the candidacies of Fox and Ruthal, in order to facilitate an Anglo-Spanish alliance, although it is questionable how realistic a proposition this really was. It is perhaps revealing that Luis Caroz states his opinion that the negotiations for an Anglo-Spanish treaty, in which context the topic of cardinals was raised, may have taken an extra month, if he had not done so; ibid., 44 (LPI, 476; 29 May 1510, Luis Caroz to Ferdinand, London). Broderick recognises this as a fairly common alternative strategy to gain the admission of a ‘crown cardinal’ to the Sacred College; J.F. Broderick, ‘The Sacred College of Cardinals’, AHP, 25, p.53.
Bainbridge’s mission from his arrival in late 1509.\textsuperscript{21} Similarly, Maximilian opined to his daughter Margaret in January 1511 that cardinalatial status was the motivation for Bainbridge’s close relationship with the Venetians and support of the papacy against Imperial (and French) interests.\textsuperscript{22} Implicit in this is the recognition that Bainbridge would have been operating with crown support to pursue these policies in Rome. There are, on the other hand, reasons to believe that Julius II was the instigator of Bainbridge’s candidacy. The first is the lack of any evidence to suggest that the archbishop was ever proposed by Henry VIII for promotion. Indeed, the French ambassador in England d’Arizolles, writing in January 1511, reported that Bainbridge, while holding an ambition to become cardinal, had been unable to induce his king to write to the pope on his behalf; that what the pope intended to do in this regard was not at Henry’s behest.\textsuperscript{23} Also, the aforementioned statements by Fox and Ruthal of 1510 give reason to suggest that Bainbridge’s creation was at the pope’s instigation; the ministers outlined how this and other elevations would be made in a bid to counter French influence at the curia in the event of his death.\textsuperscript{24} Similarly, it was rumoured (in France) in December 1510 that Julius II intended to create 12 cardinals before Christmas for much the same reason; so that, in the event of Julius’ death, conclave would be packed with supporters, who would ensure the continuation of his anti-French policy.\textsuperscript{25} From this context, therefore, it is more likely that the pope was behind Bainbridge’s candidacy more than Henry.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{21} D.S. Chambers, \textit{Cardinal Bainbridge}, pp.24-25, 27-28, 35.
\item \textsuperscript{22} \textit{LPfi}, 669 (4 January 1511, Maximilian to Margaret of Savoy, Fribourg in Brisco).
\item \textsuperscript{23} \textit{Ibid.}, 674 (10 January 1511, d’Arizolles to Robertet, London).
\item \textsuperscript{24} \textit{Sp.ii}, 44 (\textit{LPfi}, 476; 29 May 1510, Luis Caroz to Ferdinand, London). Bainbridge was again rumoured for promotion in October 1510, but Julius II was discouraged from breaching an agreement to raise the numbers of the Sacred College; D.S. Chambers, \textit{Cardinal Bainbridge}, p.35.
\item \textsuperscript{25} According to an Imperial source, writing to the Archduchess Margaret in the Low Countries. Chambers claims that the college obstructed this attempt as well; \textit{LPfi}, 636; D.S. Chambers, \textit{Cardinal Bainbridge}, p.35. Also see \textit{LPfi}, 669 (4 January 1511, Maximilian to Margaret of Savoy, Fribourg in Brisco).
\end{itemize}
Bainbridge’s actual promotion, on 10 March 1511, demonstrated the overtly political motives of Julius II when granting this honour. The papacy had been seeking English participation in a projected league against France since the previous summer at least and, while it knew of Henry’s sympathies, it also recognised that he had been drawn into a renewal of his father’s peace with France in March 1510. The net result was an anti-French Henry VIII biding his time, as advised by his senior ministers, until conditions were suitable to break with Louis XII and assist, indirectly, with the expulsion of the French from Italy.26 The coincidence of the timing of the elevation, therefore, suggests that Julius II was making a deliberate attempt to curry favour with the English crown, particularly as Bainbridge was renowned for his anti-French views.27 This argument is strengthened when one considers that Bainbridge was appointed prior of the group of seven new cardinals. The papal master of ceremonies, Paris de Grassis, disputed Bainbridge’s suitability for this honour, but the pope insisted on his wish to honour Henry VIII. In addition, Bainbridge performed some very public ceremonial functions as prior. He took precedence when each of the new cardinals was received by Julius II for the first time and he led them in procession to their older colleagues, where he delivered an oration. The political context is difficult to dispute; the pontiff was courting a potential ally.28 This was done in a very public fashion that was probably designed, as far as the English crown was concerned, to pledge papal support for England if and when Henry VIII broke with France. The political nature and anti-French undertone of the promotion is further emphasised by the identity of some of the other candidates elevated at the same time. The Imperial minister, Matthew Lang, with whom the pope

26 See below pp.379-380 and passim.
27 See below pp.368-374, 375 ff.
28 Chambers agrees that Bainbridge’s elevation was politically motivated; D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, pp.36, 103-104.
intended to negotiate to detach Maximilian from France, was promoted *in petto*. The Swiss Matthew Schiner who was instrumental in bringing the Cantons over to the papacy and the Venetian Francesco Argentino, the latter’s state also being a papal ally, were also admitted.\(^{29}\) If all this was not enough, within a week of his elevation, Cardinal Bainbridge was commissioned as legate *a latere* to part of the papal army about to attack the pro-French forces of Ferrara.\(^{30}\) If, as is likely, the pope intended to force England’s hand into coming out against France both by appointing its orator to the Sacred College and by having him lead an army against French interests, it was certainly effective. The French ambassador in England complained to Henry, prompting the king to reply that he was happy to assist the Church and that Louis XII was in the wrong by supporting the rebellious duke of Ferrara against his overlord.\(^{31}\) The elevation of Christopher Bainbridge to the Sacred College, therefore, was a clear attempt to induce the English crown to act against France. Whether this was a success or not is debateable. On the one hand, the belligerent Henry VIII acted indirectly against France during 1511 by contributing towards the Imperial force against the duke of Guelders (backed by Louis XII) and sending Lord Darcy to Spain to join an aborted crusade to North Africa (which could be interpreted as sabre-rattling).\(^{32}\) On the other hand, Henry’s hands were still tied by his intimate councillors, who had insisted that various conditions be fulfilled before they would sanction an invasion of France. While English membership of a holy league against France was on the cards during this year, it took the fall of Bologna on 23 May to inject some urgency into its formation and, even then, it

\(^{29}\) *Ven.ii*, 98 (*LP* 1, 714; 10 March 1511, a private letter received in Venice from Hieronimo Lipomano, Ravenna); *LP* 1, 718 (13 November 1511, Andrea da Borgo to Margaret of Savoy). For Pastor’s view that Schiner was originally elevated in 1508, but the proclamation was delayed until 1511, see L. Pastor, *History of the Popes*, vi, pp.325-326.

\(^{30}\) *Ven.ii*, 99 (*LP* 1, 720; 15 March 1511, Donato to the Signory), 104 (*LP* 1, 765; 8-10 May 1511, Proveditor Capello to the Signory, Dina), D.S. Chambers, *Cardinal Bainbridge*, pp.37, 81-93.

\(^{31}\) *LP* 1, 776 (23 March 1511, Venetian ambassador at the Curia to the Signory, Ravenna).

\(^{32}\) See below pp.385-386.
took until December for Henry VIII to adhere to the coalition that was concluded in Rome on 4 October.\footnote{Among the conditions placed on Henry VIII’s support of the papacy in this sense was the need for allies; see below pp.379-380.}

In the same way that the papacy perceived that offers of a cardinalate might prompt favourable political actions from princes, so princes recognised their position of strength if Rome needed their assistance and, naturally, attempted to use this leverage to seek the admission of servants into the Sacred College.\footnote{The French ambassador, d’Arizolles, comments to this effect in January 1511, when suggesting that Bainbridge may be elevated despite having been unable to get Henry to write to Julius II on his behalf; \textit{LPIi}, 674 (10 January 1511, d’Arizolles to Robertet, London).} Such candidates were usually favoured ministers and that this was the case seems to have been a condition from Rome.\footnote{In the century prior to this reign, English cardinals tended to be archbishops, often of Canterbury and also to be Chancellors; John Kemp (York, 1425-1452, Canterbury 1452-1454, Chancellor 1426-1452, cardinal 1439), Thomas Bourchier (Canterbury 1454-1486, Chancellor 1455-1486, cardinal 1465), John Morton (Canterbury 1486-1500, Chancellor 1487-1500, cardinal 1493). Henry Beaufort (also the king’s uncle, was created cardinal in 1417, although Henry V forbade him to accept, and again in 1426) was the exception, ecclesiastically speaking, being bishop of Winchester, although he did hold the chancellorship on several occasions (1403-1405, 1410-1411, 1413-1417, 1424-1426). Given the preponderance of English cardinals, it is interesting that William Warham (Canterbury 1503-1532, Chancellor 1504-1515) was never apparently considered by the king for a red hat. While this is not the place to explore this, it seems likely that Warham, despite his leading ecclesiastical and state positions that were carried over from Henry VII’s reign, was not particularly prominent within Henry VIII’s ‘inner circle’. Correspondence emerging from \textit{LP} (and other published sources) fails to highlight much of a role for him, particularly in foreign (and Anglo-papal) policy, and one suspects that his falling out with Fox over probate revenues (1512), merely confirmed the archbishop’s outsider status in this sense. From his resignation from the chancellorship in 1515 to Wolsey, Warham retreated further from affairs of state for the rest of this period. Perhaps one can explain Warham’s position as an administratively useful but unfavoured hangover from the previous reign; L. Clark, ‘Bourchier, Thomas (c.1411–1486)’, \textit{DNB}; R. G. Davies, ‘Kemp, John (1380/81–1454)’, \textit{ibid.}; C. Harper-Bill, ‘Morton, John (d. 1500)’, \textit{ibid.}; G. L. Harriss, ‘Beaufort, Henry (1375–1447)’, \textit{ibid.}; J.J. Scarisbrick, ‘Warham, William (1450?-1532)’, \textit{ibid.}.} In the case of Wolsey, for instance, Vergil and de Castello told him in May 1514 that the pope agreed in principle to elevation, ‘if Wolsey had great authority with the King’.\footnote{\textit{LPIii}, 2932 (\textit{LPI}, 5110; Pol[ydore Vergil] to [Wolsey], [Rome]). Also, the Spanish ambassador in England, when offering Spanish support for the elevation of Fox and Ruthal in 1510, targeted those in whose hands ‘all business affairs were’, to gain their goodwill in his quest for an Anglo-Spanish alliance (against France); \textit{Sp.ii}, 44 (\textit{LPIi}, 476; 29 May 1510, Luis Caroz to Ferdinand, London).} Consequently, Henry VIII wrote to the pope on 12 August, formally requesting Wolsey’s promotion (after Bainbridge’s death): ‘his merits are such
that the King esteems him above his dearest friends, and can do nothing of the least importance without him’. 37

While such applications to the papacy were made formally by the king, there are suggestions that, during this period, Henry VIII’s ministers did most of the running. In May 1510, Fox and Ruthall lobbied the Spanish ambassador to have Ferdinand advise Henry to look to their promotion. In addition, one can detect the two bishops’ enthusiasm for this prospect, allegedly having visited the Spanish orator’s house on seven or eight occasions to consult exclusively on the cardinalates. 38 Despite their influence with the king on papal matters, they apparently believed that the matter would not be followed through. In the case of Wolsey, while Henry VIII’s personal contribution is clear, the almoner campaign-managed his own nomination. 39 Around July 1515, for instance, Henry delegated this task to Wolsey, as he asked the pope to acknowledge his almoner in this matter as though he himself were speaking. 40 Wolsey’s acting on the king’s behalf is also apparent from comments to de Giglis in late September 1515; ‘and if by your politic handling the Pope can be induced shortly to make me a cardinal ye shall singularly content and please the King; for I cannot express how desirous the

37 As Henry could only just have heard of Bainbridge’s death (which occurred on 14 July 1514), it is also likely that the king envisaged that this was an appropriate occasion on which the pope could be called upon to create a new English cardinal, particularly as this request also conveyed Henry’s desire that Wolsey hold all of the dead cardinal’s honours, which apparently included the archbishopric of York; LPIii, 3140 (LPI, 5318; 12 August 1514, Henry to Leo, Greenwich). That the creation was largely spurred by the crown is also stated by the Venetian ambassadors in England, on 20 September 1515: Wolsey ‘has been created Cardinal at the suit of this most serene King, who, with might and main, is intent on aggrandizing him’; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, p. 128 (Ven.ii, 650; LPIII, 929; 20 September 1515, Giustinian to the Signory, London).

38 Sp.ii, 44 (LPII, 476; 29 May 1510, Luis Caroz to Ferdinand, London).

39 From around March-April 1514, Wolsey employed Hadrian de Castello, through Polydore Vergil, to approach the pope in this regard, although the latter conveyed (on 21 May) the pope’s message that the almoner’s promotion would be a good idea ‘if Wolsey had great authority with the King’. The implication is that Leo X wanted Henry to lobby him in Wolsey’s favour. Indeed, this is what Henry did in August 1514; LPIii, 2932 (LPI, 5110; Poly[dore Vergil] to [Wolsey], [Rome]), 3140 (LPI, 5318; 12 August 1514, Henry to Leo, Greenwich).

40 ‘Quare ipsam rogamus, ut quae idem dominus Eboracensis vestrae sanctitati significabit, ex ipso ore meo se audivisse velit arbitrari’; Mart. Amp. iii, p. 1296 (LPIII, 12 app.; calendared July 1515, Henry to [Leo]).
King is to have me advanced to the said honour’. Here, Wolsey advised that Henry would not communicate this directly. That the king would not concertedly follow up such requests in person may account for the lack of evidence for the crown’s proposal of Bainbridge, prior to 1511. Perhaps Bainbridge, as an archbishop and councillor, was permitted to manage his own elevation? Similarly, this might explain why the Italian servant of the crown in Rome, Silvester de Giglis, later had to approach the king himself in this regard, at a point when he believed that his long service merited cardinalatial status.

While the political nature of such elevations is immediately apparent through the identity of the candidates and their positions both as state officials and advisors to the king, the timing of the crown application and the leverage employed to ensure success were also political, being closely linked to English foreign policy. More specifically, crown pressure towards Wolsey’s elevation was closely connected with the anti-French agenda during this period and the desire for the papacy to be protected from French influence.

Initial overtures from England in Wolsey’s favour were closely connected with papal pressure for Henry VIII to make peace with Louis XII in 1514. The papacy was already prepared to issue concessions to England in this regard, such as the honorary cap and sword of maintenance, its apparent agreement to replace the apostolic collector (Hadrian de Castello) and

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41 *LPii*, 3497 (*LPI*, 5465; calendared end November 1514, Wolsey to [de Giglis]). In early February 1515, Wolsey wrote to Suffolk, then heading an embassy to France to negotiate the return of Henry’s sister Mary following the death of her husband Louis XII, asking him to recommend his affairs to Francis I. While this certainly would have implied the bishopric of Tournai, one can also surmise that he may have again been seeking French support for a red hat; *LPiii*, 113 (3 February 1515, Wolsey to Suffolk).


43 Broderick highlights the tendency of most governments to employ ‘high-pressure tactics’ in a bid to secure the promotion of their candidates. These tactics could include the persistent nomination of individuals over long periods, denial of aid or support (particularly military) for the papacy, even threats of withdrawal from Roman obedience or even a physical attack on the Church. Some of these will be apparent in the case of Wolsey’s candidacy for the Sacred College; J.F. Broderick, ‘The Sacred College of Cardinals’, *AHP*, 25, p.49.
the reduction of consistorial taxes due on Wolsey’s appointment to the see of Lincoln (on 6 February). If the papacy wanted England’s participation in a peace that much, Wolsey determined to push things one step further. Hence his employment of Hadrian de Castello, via Polydore Vergil, perhaps around March-April 1514, to approach the pope in this regard. The reply from Vergil on 21 May, however, while not a rejection, recommended that the request ought to come from the king and implied that there would be some delay. The English crown was evidently not in a strong enough political position to demand this favour at this point. This may have had something to do with Leo X’s knowledge that Ferdinand had already abandoned Henry as an ally back in February and was pressuring Henry and Maximilian to join him in his truce with France. In addition, the pope would have been aware that Anglo-French negotiations were already under way and may have considered, therefore, that this extra concession was not required to ensure that the desired peace was concluded.

In England, however, it seems to have been understood that Wolsey’s promotion might be conditional on the peace being actually concluded. Why else would Henry VIII’s personal request in this regard concerning Wolsey have been issued on 12 August 1514, the same date as he formally notified the pope of his having agreed peace with France? This understanding turned out to be mistaken: as the peace was now made, Henry VIII no longer had sufficient leverage to secure Wolsey’s promotion. At first, this was not realised in England. Towards the end of September, Wolsey understood that the king’s application had caused Leo X to promise

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44 For these and other concessions sought by England, see below pp.446-456.
45 LPii, 2932 (LPI, 5110; Polydore Vergil) to [Wolsey], [Rome]).
46 See below pp.429 ff.
47 Ven.ii, 487 (LPI, 5319; 12 August 1514, Henry to Leo, Greenwich). By the fact that de Giglis was also working to this end by September, it is likely that he was instructed to do so in letters that accompanied Henry’s August missive; LPii, 3496 (LPI, 5464; calendared end November 1514, [de Giglis] to [Ammonius]).
him a red hat at the next creation. The question was, however, when would the next creation be? These were infrequent events. An actual response from Leo to Henry, dated 24 September, outlined that the promotion would be difficult, although he would comply at an appropriate time (whenever that would be). De Giglis reported on the state of negotiations around the same time, reasoning that the pope was naturally slow and that, while he was not prepared to elevate Wolsey alone, nor with those previously promised, he offered a secret promotion, as long as Wolsey did ‘not carry the insignia publicly’. This offer had clear political undertones; the pope was reluctant to make an overt display of support for Henry VIII at this point.

This subject arose again on 22 March 1515, when the pope thanked Wolsey for his good offices and referred him to de Giglis for what he intended to do for Wolsey’s honour. That this referred to the cardinalate is suggested by Ammonius, who reported how the pope was ‘considering how he can increase his honour with the safety of his oath. Hopes he will be able to do it sooner than Wolsey thinks’. Once again, the political context vis-à-vis France was important, the balance of power having changed since the previous year. The accession of Francis I with vocal ambitions for Milan and for an Italian expedition that year, once again made England an attractive ally for the papacy. Leo X feared the implications of a French descent and had, as recently as 22 February, secretly ratified a treaty with the Empire, Milan, Spain and the Swiss,

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48 *LPlii*, 3497 (*LPI*, 5465; calendared end November 1514, Wolsey to [de Giglis]). This seems to have been linked to Ammonius’ letter to Wolsey of 25 September, whereby the Latin secretary summarised the contents of de Giglis’ correspondence and commented that there was a good chance for the cardinalate; *ibid.*, 3302 (*LPI*, 5449; 25 September 1514, [Andrew Ammonius] to Wolsey, Westminster).

49 *LPlii*, 3300 (*LPI*, 5445; *EP*, 512; 24 September 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome). That is not to say that Leo did not take this seriously, as Richard Pace, on 25 September, notified Wolsey that the pope had been making enquiries about him in this regard; Ellis, lxxi, pp.177-180 (*LPlii*, 3304; *LPI*, 5447; 25 September 1514, Pace to Wolsey, Rome).

50 De Giglis implies that this ought to be rejected, as he recommends that letters be written to Leo and Giulio de’ Medici; *LPlii*, 3496 (*LPI*, 5464; calendared end November 1514, [de Giglis] to [Ammonius]).

51 Leo commanded the orator to write to Wolsey in this regard; *LPlii*, 255 (22 March 1515, Leo to Wolsey, Rome).

that aimed for the defence of the Church and envisaged a crusade to the east, which Henry was to be persuaded to join. Realistically, however, the true object was a defensive alliance against France; English membership was envisaged to help prevent a French descent.\(^{53}\) To this end, therefore, it would have been the right time to resurrect Wolsey’s cardinalatial candidacy.

By this time, however, the crown seems to have believed that Leo X was procrastinating, as on 22 April the latter thanked Wolsey for his good services, but lamented the almoner’s belief that he was reluctant to fulfil his wishes. The pope reasoned that some delay was essential.\(^{54}\) De Giglis, on 25 April, relayed the pope’s apology that he could not promote Wolsey until a certain number of cardinals had been created. He also stated that Leo was under pressure from Maximilian and Francis I to elevate their candidates. So, although he valued the services of Henry VIII, ‘Wolsey’s promotion cannot take place for the present without the greatest scandal’. Leo asserted that he was not deceiving Wolsey and requested that Henry ‘send milder letters’. The pope, it appears, was still trying to keep his options open vis-à-vis his participation in an anti-French coalition. His procrastination over Wolsey’s elevation was quite natural; the almoner’s creation would be both a powerful inducement to win over Henry VIII and a public indication of anti-French intentions at a time when Leo was still negotiating with France. The crown, on the other hand, was perhaps oblivious to Leo’s double-dealing, but was becoming impatient with his empty promises. Perhaps linked to this seems to have been the cancellation of an embassy intended to go to Rome to perform the obedientia ceremony on Henry’s behalf.\(^{55}\)

\(^{53}\) At the same time, Leo was hedging his bets by negotiating with France; see below pp.471-473.

\(^{54}\) *LPii*, 366 (22 April 1515, Leo to Wolsey, Rome). This letter does not explicitly refer to the red hat, but de Giglis’ letter a few days later confirms that this was what was meant; *ibid.*, 374 (25 April 1515, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome).

\(^{55}\) News of this is acknowledged in Rome by de Giglis on 25 April; *ibid.*, 374 (25 April 1515, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome).
Subsequent Anglo-papal exchanges concerning Wolsey’s elevation were similar in nature. On the one hand, the pope promised that he was working in this direction, but still advocated delay. On the other hand, Wolsey and Henry, while pledging their obedience to Rome, began to threaten the papacy. The next surviving letter from de Giglis, dated around the end of June 1515, conveyed the pope’s claim to be investigating how to promote Wolsey alone or otherwise. At the same time, the pope wanted to know the state of relations between England and France.\(^{56}\) That Leo wanted England to break with France by this time is demonstrated by requests on 16 June from both the pope and Giulio de’ Medici for England to assist in the struggle against the Turks.\(^{57}\) Reading between the lines, the papacy was asking Henry to join the league which also provided for the defence of the Church against France. To this end, Wolsey’s red hat had become a more realistic proposition. Probably around the same time though, Wolsey demonstrated to de Giglis that he had lost patience with Leo. While he pledged that ‘for the great love that I bear to his holiness an[d that I] would have the King fast to him [Leo]’, he also threatened the pontiff. Writing ‘by the King’s express commandment’, he continued, Henry ‘has always been a friend to the Pope and his alliance ought not to be lightly thrown away’ and further that he would ‘be greatly displeased if his desires are not regarded, as he is a better friend to the Church than all other Princes’.\(^{58}\) The context of this need not be spelt out. Also, during June, more tempered letters may have been sent to Leo X himself by Henry and Wolsey, as on 12 July, the pope acknowledged their receipt and, with respect to Henry ‘expressing his entire devotion to the Holy

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\(^{56}\) Ibid., 647 (calendared end June 1515, [de Giglis to Wolsey]).

\(^{57}\) Leo X’s invitation is alluded to by de’ Medici; ibid., 590 (16 June 1515, Giulio de’ Medici to Henry, Rome).

\(^{58}\) Ibid., 648 (9-11 September 1515, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). It ought to be noted that such a condition placed on military aid by Wolsey was not unprecedented. Louis XII had gained three French cardinals from such an ultimatum in 1506; J.F. Broderick, ‘The Sacred College of Cardinals’, AHP, 25, p.49.
See’, he wanted ‘the King to be considered its patron and protector’.\(^{59}\) The implication of this in military terms against France would not have been lost on the recipients. Before this arrived, however, Wolsey again applied pressure on the papacy once more, informing de Giglis how ‘the King’s grace marvellieth that the Pope delayeth so long the sending of the red hat to me, seeing how tenderly, instantly, and often his Grace hath written to his holiness for the same’. He further claimed that Henry asked him every day about it and that the pope ought to grant this as soon as possible. Most ominously, Wolsey added, ‘if the King forsake the Pope, he will be in greater “danger on this day two year than ever was Pope J[ulius]”’.\(^{60}\)

By this time, however, the pope had already decided to join the coalition against France and, to induce English support, would promote Wolsey.\(^{61}\) On 1 August, Wolsey wrote to de Giglis, acknowledging that Leo X ‘hath granted to create me Cardinal sole’. With this letter, he also returned a copy of the anti-French treaty sent by the papacy, now signed by Henry VIII. Having gained the red hat, Wolsey now pushed for a legatine commission. The new cardinal further advised, ‘never had [the] Pope a better friend than the King of England, if he comply with his [Henry’s and, implicitly, Wolsey’s] desires’.\(^{62}\) Wolsey effectively admitted, therefore, that the papacy had paid for England’s adhesion to the anti-French alliance by granting him the cardinalate (and may gain further benefits if a legateship was granted). Indeed, on the date of his

\(^{59}\) *LPIii*, 700 (12 July 1515, Leo to Wolsey, Rome). One of the letters in question may be the following, in which Henry again recommends Wolsey for elevation, although in polite terms; *Mart. Amp. iii*, p.1296 (*LPIii*, 12 app.; calendared July 1515, Henry to [Leo]).

\(^{60}\) *LPIii*, 763 (calendared 30 July 1515, [Wolsey] to [de Giglis]).

\(^{61}\) He had been preparing for war since June, but only formally joined the league at the end of July; see below pp.471-473.

\(^{62}\) *LPIii*, 780 (1 August 1515, [Wolsey to de Giglis]). At this point, however, the promotion had not occurred. On 7 September, de Giglis replied to Wolsey, thanking him for letters of 12 August from him and Henry, stating that the pope was glad that Wolsey anticipated his (Leo’s) wishes and will return the draft of the treaty signed. The pope also claimed that he would insist on Wolsey’s promotion in spite of the cardinals. Wolsey further attempted to capitalise on the political leverage that a papacy at war with France gave England by pushing for an honorary title for Henry VIII; *ibid.*, 887 (7 September 1515, [de Giglis to Wolsey]), 895 (calendared 10 September 1515, Wolsey to [de Giglis]).
actual elevation in Rome, 10 September, Wolsey understood that the promotion had already taken place and, as well as conveying his thanks, added that Henry VIII was now ‘ready to expose his person and goods to support the honour and safety of the Holy See’. 63 That Henry’s political support had been bought in this manner to ‘defend the faith’ was subsequently identified by the Venetian ambassador in Rome, who notified his state of the link between Wolsey’s imminent promotion and the pope’s desire that England attack France. 64 Finally, the ‘balance of power’ in this elevation is suggested on 15 September by the cardinal protector, Giulio de’ Medici, writing to Henry that ‘Wolsey’s promotion is proof of the Pope’s anxiety to please the King’. 65 However, the elevation was too late for England to have any effect on France. The disastrous Battle of Marignano took place on 13-14 September, which effectively ended opposition to Francis I in the peninsula in the short-term and initiated a period of French influence over Rome. 66 As a result, England neither had the chance to act militarily in defence of Rome, nor to use the ostentation and display involved in Wolsey’s receipt of the hat in any anti-French propaganda.

To put these ‘political’ nominations and promotions to the Sacred College into context, it would be insightful to examine an instance when Henry VIII approached the papacy to have an ‘English’ candidate raised to the Sacred College without having the necessary political leverage

63 Ibid. 894 (10 September 1515, Wolsey to [de Giglis]). Sir Robert Wingfield also implies the link as, when he mentioned having received letters notifying him of the elevation that also mentioned de Giglis’ having joined the Holy League in Henry VIII’s name; ibid., 909 (14 September 1515, Robert Wingfield to Wolsey, Ins[broke]). For Wolsey’s actual elevation on this date, see ibid., 892 (10 September 1515, Leo to Wolsey, Rome), 893 (10 September 1515, [de Castello] to Wolsey, Rome).
64 Ven.ii, 648 (9-11 September 1515, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory).
65 LPIIi, 910 (15 September 1515, Giulio de’ Medici to Henry, Bologna).
66 See below p.489.
to facilitate success. The nominee was Silvester de Giglis, the Lucchese bishop of Worcester and longtime crown orator in Rome.67

In retrospect, Chambers argues, if de Giglis was going to be promoted, it ought to have been in July 1517, when Leo X elevated an unprecedented 31 cardinals en masse, partly in response to the Petrucci plot and partly in a bid to raise money for war against the duke of Urbino.68 The pope made a deliberate attempt to pack the Sacred College with pro-Medici cardinals. A number of them can easily be described as political appointments, including the French Louis de Bourbon, the Imperial Adrian of Utrecht and the Spanish Raymond de Vich.69

Considering the wider political context, the pope may not have elevated an English candidate because of ongoing Anglo-papal negotiations towards membership of an anti-French league. Henry VIII had been trying to gain Leo X’s commitment to such a coalition since 1516 but this only seemed to be coming to fruition on 5 July 1517, when a ‘league for defence of the Church’ was proclaimed in London with apparent papal approval but not ratification. In exchange for this, Leo had been trying to lever money out of England to help him in the War of Urbino.70 Even on 24 July, however, the pontiff was unsure whether he would actually gain this money.71 Given this understanding, therefore, Leo X had already offered papal membership of the anti-French league

67 De Giglis’ diplomatic service in England for the papacy and in Rome for the English crown stretched back to 1483 and, as he had been the crown’s orator at the Holy See since 1512, this effectively makes him an ‘English’ candidate; C.H. Clough, ‘Gigli, Silvestro’, DNB. It was by no means unusual for princes to lobby for the elevation of Italian nuncios that had visited their courts and who subsequently acted in their interests in Rome; J.F. Broderick, ‘The Sacred College of Cardinals’, AHP, 25, p.48.
69 Also, the Venetian Francesco Pisani and the Portuguese Alfonso de Portugal can easily be isolated as political appointments; C. Eubel, Hierarchica Catholica Medii Aevi, iii, pp.16-19; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.201, 204-205. There is evidence that some who thought they ought to have been promoted were disappointed. Perhaps echoing the private thoughts of de Giglis, Venetian source in Rome reported that Ludovico Canossa, bishop of Tricarico, complained to Leo that he had not been raised. The author suggests that the pope was suspicious of him; Ven.ii, 938 (30 July 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory).
70 See below pp.546-547, 578 ff.
71 Ven.ii, 935 (24 July 1517, Minio to the Signory).
in exchange for monetary aid, and might not have been prepared to make further concessions at this stage. Furthermore, it was the crown that had been chasing papal commitment, not vice versa, giving Leo X the political advantage in negotiations. The sources consulted do not reveal any English reaction to these creations, save Wolsey’s moves to lobby for Hadrian de Castello’s deprivation, on account of his alleged involvement in the plot. Chambers argues that Wolsey’s silence may have had something to do with his belief that de Giglis had been negligent in attempts to realise the cardinal’s claim to Tournai. It may also have had something to do with the dispersal of the king and his ministers when the news reached England, however, as it was the summer recess and an epidemic of sweating sickness was prevalent.

The first move in de Giglis’ favour was apparently made by his deputy in England, Silvester Darius, who wrote to Wolsey in this regard on 18 September 1518, commenting that this promotion would benefit the crown. This may have been a bid on the part of the ambassador to take advantage of English involvement in the universal peace initiative that was shortly to result in the Treaty of London. Nothing more was heard about de Giglis’ request, however, perhaps because Leo soon realised that Wolsey had appropriated the crusading initiative to his own ends. Henry’s first letter in favour of de Giglis appears not to have been issued until 20 January 1520. While the bishop was pleased with the approach, expecting to be

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72 De Giglis notified Ammonius towards the end of June of a stormy Consistory at which this creation was discussed, but this would have arrived in England far too late for any reaction; LPIii, 3406 (calendared 26-27 June 1517, de Giglis to Ammonius). For Wolsey’s preoccupation with the fall-out arising from de Castello’s reported involvement, see for example R. Brown (trans.), *Four Years*, ii, pp.113-116 (*Ven.ii*, 944; LPIii, 3558; 6 August 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London).
73 *LPIii*, 2886 (8 February 1517, de Giglis to Henry, Rome).
75 *LPIii*, 4442 (18 September 1518, Darius to Wolsey, London).
77 *Mart. Amp. iii*, 1304-1306 (LPIii, 600; 20 January 1520, Henry to Leo, Tower of London).
elevated at the next creation, he did accept that this creation had been delayed while Leo was negotiating with the emperor.\footnote{LP\textit{IIIi}, 651 (3 March 1520, [de Giglis] to Wolsey).} If de Giglis had heard this reason through the pope, he had perhaps been duped, as Campeggio reported to Wolsey around the same time that the pope saw no imminent need for cardinals to be elevated.\footnote{Ibid., 647 (calendared end June 1515, [de Giglis to Wolsey]).} In a way, the pope was being truthful to Campeggio. Leo had by that point hedged his bets by, on the one hand opening diplomatic channels with Charles V towards an alliance and, on the other, having secretly concluded a treaty with Francis I in October 1519, which facilitated a papal attack on Ferrara.\footnote{See below pp.679-680.} It was not, therefore, an appropriate time to create cardinals without sending out any political signals. Indeed, it was only two years since he had elevated 31 nominees, including Campeggio himself. In these circumstances, England was not the attractive ally against France that it had once been, particularly when one also considers England’s concurrent policy of reconciliation towards Francis I.\footnote{See below pp.680-681.} There was no need, therefore, to offer any inducements, such as a red hat.

This did not stop de Giglis from continuing his pressure on both crown and papacy. To the former, he wrote on 14 March that the planned creation would involve political promotions for various powers which, the orator argued, would be unacceptable if England did not also benefit.\footnote{In this correspondence of 14 March, de Giglis again requested that the crown urge his promotion; \textit{LP\textit{IIIi}}, 679 (14 March 1520, [de Giglis to Henry, Rome], 680 (14 March 1520, [de Giglis] to Wolsey, Rome).} Henry VIII took the bait and responded by writing again to the pope, as well as to Giulio de’ Medici, on 25 April.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, 762 (\textit{Mart. Amp. iii}, 1306-1307; 25 April 1520, Henry to Leo, Greenwich), 846 (28 May 1520, de Giglis to Henry, Rome), 847 (28 May 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome).} On this basis, de Giglis expected (on 28 May) to be promoted in the next creation.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, 846 (28 May 1520, de Giglis to Henry, Rome), 847 (28 May 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome).} Meanwhile, as with Wolsey, the pope continued to procrastinate. On 4
May, de Giglis told Wolsey that he expected a delay in the creation of cardinals because of the threat to Rhodes for which the pope was requesting aid and because the emperor elect probably would not respond to this until after his coronation at Aachen.\textsuperscript{85} At some point during May, however, the papacy decided to reject de Giglis’ nomination because, de’ Medici asserted, he lacked sufficient calibre. While Leo had hitherto indicated that he was prepared to promote the orator, he might still find it necessary to do so and, hence, de’ Medici warned that Wolsey should not be surprised if papal support of de Giglis’ candidacy continued.\textsuperscript{86}

In spite of de’ Medici’s communication, de Giglis continued to believe that he would be elevated, albeit in a postponed creation. The crown continued to support him in this and, publicly at least, the papacy continued to delay. By 22 June, de Giglis still believed that he would be promoted, albeit aware of some sort of delay.\textsuperscript{87} On 12 July, the orator cited further letters from Henry VIII in his favour, but stated that the pope wanted to ensure that the promotion was truly desired by the king. As a result, Leo had contacted his nuncio in England, presumably as an independent third party, to ascertain this. If Henry confirmed this wish, it would occur in September.\textsuperscript{88} This relieved Leo of up to a few months of pressure from the orator. The ambassador’s spirits must have been lifted by the end of the month, when de Giglis confirmed that his name was on the list of nominees. On 3 August, however, de Giglis hopes were dashed again, when he notified Wolsey that the creation was delayed for yet another reason, until a French envoy, Morette, arrived. As a result, he requested Wolsey write again in his favour.\textsuperscript{89}

\textsuperscript{85} \textit{Ibid.}, 791 (4 May 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome).
\textsuperscript{86} De’ Medici’s correspondent was a nuncio in England; \textit{ibid.}, 853 (calendared end May 1520, [‘de Medici to --]).
\textsuperscript{87} \textit{Ibid.}, 880 (22 June 1520, de Giglis to [Wolsey], Rome).
\textsuperscript{88} De Giglis blamed the Casali for persuading the pope that the letters in his favour had been extorted from the king; \textit{ibid.}, 909 (12 July 1520, de Giglis to Vannes, Rome).
\textsuperscript{89} \textit{Ibid.}, 941 (3 August 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome). Morette’s significance will be outlined below.
When the pope finally proposed three names in Consistory on 18 September, de Giglis was included alongside French and Imperial nominees. A Venetian source reported that only the French candidate was accepted by the cardinals and that alternative English and Imperial candidates were desired. Campeggio advised on the 26th that this Consistory was postponed because of the dissensions. Since then, he claimed, the French and Imperial candidates had been accepted, while de Giglis was unsuccessful. The bishop of Worcester initially attributed his failure to his role in de Castello’s deprivation (in 1518).  This probably did not make him popular within the Sacred College, which was highly protective of its members’ status. Still, the orator did not give up and by 8 October he had spoken to the pope and ‘reminded him of certain circumstances’. Leo, however, tried to fob him off, saying that the only way he could see that de Giglis would be raised was if Henry wrote to the senior cardinals. Presumably, it was this group that the pontiff cited as being behind objections to the nomination. The pope’s reaction here does not apparently reveal his true thoughts on the matter, however. Around November 1520, de’ Medici wrote once again to Ghinucci, relaying that the pope would rather not receive any further letters recommending de Giglis. De’ Medici also mentioned that he was continually approached by the ambassador for promotion and that, if he could not take the hint, Leo would have to tell him to his face. The matter was over by March 1521, when de’ Medici wrote again to thank

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90 Ven.iii, 122 (18 September 1520, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory).  
91 LPIIIi, 993 (26 September 1520, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome). According to Pastor, the French candidate was accepted and the Imperial nominee referred to Francis I for his thoughts. When the French king objected to the fact that the Imperial was even considered for promotion, Leo shelved both elevations; L. Pastor, *History of the Popes*, viii, pp.12-14.  
92 LPIIIi, 994 (26 September 1520, de Giglis to [Wolsey], Rome). Also see *ibid.*, 1015 (8 October 1520, [de Giglis] to Henry, Rome). For de Castello’s deprivation, see T.F. Mayer, ‘Castellesi [da Castello, da Corneto], Adriano’, *DNB*.  
93 LPIIIi, 1015 (8 October 1520, [de Giglis] to Henry, Rome).  
94 *Ibid.*, 1080 (calendared end November 1520, [de’ Medici to Ghinucci]).
Wolsey for his compliance. The pope had decided not to promote de Giglis, he reported. De Giglis died not long after (18 April), but there was a rumour that he had tried to bribe the pope.

The story of de Giglis’ candidacy reveals a curious exchange between England and Rome, whereby the papacy presented its objections to de Giglis’ candidacy as arising chiefly from the personality of the nominee and not specifically from the prospect of an ‘English’ candidate. It should be noted that the papacy went to great lengths to avoid offence by not publicly rejecting the crown nominee. Nevertheless, there was more to de Giglis’ failure than this. In 1520, England simply did not possess the requisite leverage to induce this and may even have incurred papal displeasure over its exclusion from the Field of Cloth of Gold and the meetings with Charles V. It should also be remembered that Bainbridge’s and Wolsey’s success occurred at times when the papacy was desirous of English complicity against France. In 1520, this was not (yet) the case. The year was dominated by threats from both Francis I and Charles V to descend into Italy, both of which were undesired by Leo X. The pope, however, had not decided who, if anybody, he would support in the subsequent conflict. Only once he had decided which ‘superpower’ was likely to win would the pontiff contemplate drawing in England. In this situation, an alliance with England was not yet an attractive enough proposition for the papacy to concede a red hat when Henry requested one. This general political situation was also reflected in the circumstances surrounding this intended creation of cardinals; it revolved around a Franco-Imperial dispute. It is probable that Henry first put forward de Giglis’ candidacy at the beginning of 1520 after hearing of Charles V and Francis I’s desire to press for the elevation of their own candidates, Eberhard de la Mark and Jean d’Orleans, respectively. The nub of the dispute lay in the nomination of de la

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95 Ibid., 1209 (calendared 30-31 March 1521, [de’ Medici to -]).
96 Ibid., 1247 (23 April 1521, [Campeggio to Wolsey], Rome); D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, pp.149-150.
97 See below pp.684-687.
Mark, to whom the French king objected. In light of this and the generally pro-French disposition of the papacy since Marignano in 1515, the planned creations were repeatedly postponed (as de Giglis noted) as Leo X sought a compromise. Ultimately, in Consistory on 17 September, when these candidates and de Giglis were proposed, only d’Orleans received assent, although even his elevation was postponed when Francis disputed the fact that de la Mark had even been nominated in the first place. Furthermore, it is possible to envisage that the whole initiative by the pope to raise these cardinals was an attempt to restore the papacy’s centrality to the peace process, initiative for this having been seized by England. This made the French and Imperial candidates most significant to Leo X, anxious to ingratiate himself with his potential allies. An English nomination, on the other hand, was probably prudent given Henry VIII’s prominent mediating role at the various conferences with Charles and Francis that year, but the actual concession of the red hat was perhaps deemed unnecessary, and the candidacy of de Giglis was relatively insignificant. Charles and Francis were the princes that Leo really needed to keep on-side; they had direct interests in Italy and were threatening to descend into the peninsula. The pope would need to decide which of these he intended to back before he needed to consider the place of England in his plans. Obviously, Leo needed to side with the ‘winner’, but who that would be remained unclear throughout 1520.

Secondly, in a political sense, the papacy was unlikely to concede to this English request as Leo X was, if anything, displeased with Henry VIII’s actions on the European stage, particularly vis-à-vis the meetings with Francis and Charles, about which he complained (to de

98 M. Creighton, History of the Papacy, vi, p.185; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, viii, pp.11-14.  
99 See below pp.684-687.  
100 Even on 23 December, Campeggio believed that Leo would remain neutral, despite Imperial pressure to come out against France; LPIII, 1101 (23 December 1520, [Campeggio] to Wolsey, Rome).
Giglis) that he had been excluded and kept uninformed on more than one occasion March-May 1520.\textsuperscript{101} Even after the Field of Cloth of Gold and the meetings with the emperor had taken place, Leo complained in August of the lack of correspondence from England concerning what had been concluded at them, although by October he seems to have been placated by Wolsey’s promise not to make any arrangement without consulting Leo.\textsuperscript{102} Leo may have also have resented the prestige in which Henry and Wolsey bathed as a result of the summits.\textsuperscript{103} If this was the pope’s attitude, the English crown could hardly expect a political concession such as a red hat. A wariness, even distrust of conferences between princes was to be expected from all parties who would not attend, yet possessed an interest in their outcome.\textsuperscript{104} One only has to look back to the Franco-papal conference at Bologna in 1515 as viewed from the English point of view.\textsuperscript{105} It was probably as a result of his suspicions that Leo sent the trusted Girolamo Ghinucci to represent him at the meetings, described by Campeggio as ‘a friend to the Cardinal de’ Medici’\textsuperscript{106}. Wolsey initially attempted to counter Leo X’s distrust on 4 May 1520, asserting that the meetings aimed for universal peace and that nothing would be agreed to the detriment of the

\textsuperscript{101} \textit{Ibid.}, 680 (14 March 1520, [de Giglis] to Wolsey, Rome), 720 (4 April 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 744 (15 April 1520, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome), 791 (4 May 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome).
\textsuperscript{102} \textit{Ibid.}, 945 (8 August 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey), 1006 (calendared beginning October 1520, [de’ Medici to Ghinucci]).
\textsuperscript{103} Around October 1520, de’ Medici commented on the honour gained by both king and cardinal as a result of the conferences, albeit not in a negative light; \textit{ibid.}, 1006 (calendared beginning October 1520, [de’ Medici to Ghinucci]).
\textsuperscript{104} Charles V and Francis I were also distrusting of each other’s meetings with Henry VIII, even to the extent that they tried to prevent them from occurring; see below pp.675-677.
\textsuperscript{105} See below pp.502-509.
\textsuperscript{106} \textit{LP\textsuperscript{III}}, 780 (2 May 1520, Leo to Henry, ‘In villa [Manliana]’), 781 (2 May 1520, Leo to Wolsey, ‘In villa nostra Manliana’), 784 (2 May 1520, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome). Campeggio was under the impression, towards the end of April 1520, that Leo would despatch a relative of his, the Florentine noble Petrus de Pazzis; \textit{ibid.}, 756 (22 April 1520, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome).
While Campeggio and de Giglis wrote on 28 May that the pope was pleased with this communication, a decision already seems to have been made concerning de Giglis’ candidacy. Giulio de’ Medici’s initial communiqué relating the papal rejection, in the same month, while citing the orator’s lack of calibre, also suggests that it might have arisen from the current state of Anglo-papal communications. The cardinal protector revealed earlier in the letter how he and Leo were confused about England’s foreign policy intentions, particularly as both the Empire (with whom the papacy admitted negotiating) and France claimed to have Henry VIII on-side. De’ Medici advised that no confidence was to be put in de Giglis if Anglo-papal relations were to progress (perhaps against France) and that, to this end, another representative ought to be sent. The papal minister apparently blamed the lack of knowledge of the English meetings with Francis I and Charles V on de Giglis. This notion is reinforced when one considers de’ Medici’s second letter to England to warn against any further lobbying of de Giglis’s candidacy, in November 1520. Once again, the cardinal protector desired Wolsey to send ‘a well informed agent’ to Rome. The crown responded to this in March 1521, when it commissioned John Clerk to go to Rome. By this, Henry and Wolsey implicitly recognised that de Giglis was not in favour, perhaps as a result of their actions, and would not gain a red hat.

Leo X’s displeasure with Henry VIII’s arrangement of these meetings with Francis and Charles also seems to have gone beyond the lack of consultation accorded him from England; he

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107 Letters from Henry to the same effect may have been sent at the same time. They also outlined arrangements for the meetings; *ibid.*, 844 (27 May 1520, Campeggio to Henry, Rome), 845 (28 May 1520, Campeggio and de Giglis to [Wolsey], Rome), 846 (28 May 1520, de Giglis to Henry, Rome), 847 (28 May 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome).
109 De’ Medici’s correspondent was a nuncio in England; *ibid.*, 853 (calendared end May 1520; [‘de Medici to --’]).
110 *Ibid.*, 1080 (calendared end November 1520, [de’ Medici to Ghinucci]).
111 *Ven.iii*, 167 (28 February 1521, Surian to the Signory, London); *LPIIII*, 1189 (5 March 1521, Clerk to Wolsey, Calais).
also appears to have resented the crown’s apparent usurpation of the papacy’s traditional role as mediator between Christian princes. Henry, through Wolsey’s cardinalatial and legatine status (albeit always under the auspices of crown authority) had gradually asserted this role after hijacking Leo X’s universal peace initiative in 1518, which resulted in the Treaty of London.\(^\text{112}\)

Instead of being the centre of such processes to pursue universal peace (and thence a crusade against the Turks), Leo had become peripheral to their arrangement and, given that the venue for these events had shifted to northern Europe, was far less able to influence them. One can observe, during 1520, an attempt by the papacy to wrestle back the initiative for universal peace through its emphasis of the Turkish threat and its proposal of a crusade to counter this threat. From February of this year, news of the danger posed by the Ottomans was conveyed back to England through its representatives in Rome, de Giglis and Campeggio. That this was inspired by the papacy is suggested in de Giglis’ missive of 4 May, when he revealed that the pope had instructed him to inform Henry of the Turkish news as soon as possible.\(^\text{113}\)

This culminated in Leo writing directly to Henry VIII on 3 June requesting that the king now act ‘for the safety of Christendom’.\(^\text{114}\) Indeed, the dispatch of Ghinucci to England as nuncio, officially to be present at the conferences, may also have been intended to achieve this end.\(^\text{115}\)

This can be interpreted as an attempt by the papacy to appropriate control of the mediation process for two reasons. Firstly, there does not seem to have been much of an actual Turkish threat during 1520 to motivate such a

\(^\text{112}\) See below pp.684, 687, 701-702, 706-709.

\(^\text{113}\) *LPIIIi*, 614 (1 February 1520, [Campeggio] to [Wolsey], Rome), 784 (2 May 1520, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome), 791 (4 May 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 847 (28 May 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 857 (4 June 1520, [de Giglis] to Henry, Rome), 858 (4 June 1520, Campeggio [and de Giglis] to Wolsey, Rome), 867 (10 June 1520, [Hieronymus Pothelinus to --]), 880 (22 June 1520, de Giglis to [Wolsey], Rome).


\(^\text{115}\) The Venetian ambassador in England reported around the beginning of April 1520 that the papal nuncio in France told him that his mission was to discuss the Ottoman threat with Francis, although Surian did not believe him; *Ven.iii*, 64 ([4?]) June 1520, Surian to the doge and Signory, Boulogne.)
response. Secondly, news of the danger posed by the Ottomans ceased to feature in the correspondence of the English diplomats based in Rome after the end of June 1520. Suspiciously, this roughly coincides with Henry VIII’s meetings with Francis and Charles and, one suspects, that the stress on the need for a crusade may have ceased because, at this point, the papacy would have guessed that the meetings had taken place and were no longer preventable. In terms of de Giglis’ bid for promotion, the orator was never likely to be successful while the papacy was unhappy with Henry VIII’s current actions on the international stage.

The English response to this papal initiative was quite effective. On the one hand, Henry could not be seen to object to such a ‘noble’ plan to crusade and had to express enthusiasm. Thus, one can observe, for instance, Wolsey telling Surian, the Venetian ambassador, on 18 May that Henry would write to the pope against recent reported Turkish attacks and that the king was ready to act. By the beginning of July, according to Surian, Wolsey had told him that Henry had promised 1,000 soldiers to defend Rhodes. This was quite feasibly a verbal response to the pope’s request for action in early June. In reality, however, the crown was quite sceptical about such timely calls to crusade. Wolsey allegedly stated that whenever the Italians needed anything, they cited the Turkish threat.

116 Certainly, Setton’s study on this pope’s reaction to the Ottoman threat does not cite 1520 as a critical point in relations between the Turks and Christendom. This is not to dispute that the reports from the East were genuine, but Leo X does appear to have been capitalising on them; K.M. Setton, ‘Penrose Memorial Lecture. Pope Leo X and the Turkish Peril’, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 113 (1969), pp.419-421.
117 The next point at which the possibility of a crusade is mentioned (by Campeggio in reporting an audience with the pope) is during January 1521; LPIII, 1123 (calendared 2-6 January 1521, [Campeggio to Wolsey]).
118 Ven.iii, 49 (18 May 1520, Surian to the Signory, London).
119 Ibid., 99 ([6 July?] 1520, Surian to the Signory).
120 Ibid., 86 (16 June 1520, Surian to the Signory, [Guisnes]). Wolsey’s alleged statement is almost word for word what two Venetian ambassadors reported the Imperial minister de Chièvres as responding on receipt of Turkish newsletters (presumably via the orators) around 29 May. One ought to remember that Charles V was in England at this point to meet with Henry prior to the Field of Cloth of Gold; Ven.iii, 55 (29 May 1520, Cornaro and Surian to the Signory, Canterbury).
While the elevation of Englishmen to the Sacred College was used both by the English crown and the papacy in a political context *vis-à-vis* France, what political advantages resulted from the existence of English cardinals? At this point, one ought to distinguish between the two genres of cardinal extant during this time; curial and non-curial, those who went to or remained in Rome and those who resided in their native lands. While the status of each type of cardinal was theoretically equal, the characteristics to which princes such as Henry VIII were attracted differed.121

English curial cardinals were extremely unusual, the last having been Easton in the late fourteenth century.122 This rarity was even recognised by contemporaries when Bainbridge’s candidacy was rumoured around January 1511. Despite his residency in Rome since late 1509, Maximilian predicted that, once promoted to the college, the orator would return to England.123 Nevertheless, Bainbridge did become the first English curial cardinal in over a hundred years and his residency in Rome offered three broad political advantages to the crown, in terms of its foreign policy. It provided England with the ability to vote in conclave, gave it the opportunity to lobby the pope more personally and directly in the English interest, and bestowed honour and dignity on the crown within Christendom.

The first political reason for Henry VIII to welcome the admission of an Englishman to the Sacred College lies in what was (and still is) the greatest element of a cardinal’s authority; the

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121 This equality of status had been stipulated by Eugenius IV (1431-1447); J.A.F. Thomson, *Popes and Princes*, p.64.
123 *LPIi*, 669 (4 January 1511, Maximilian to Margaret of Savoy, Fribourg in Brisco). On the other hand, Richard Pace, having heard in September 1515 that Wolsey could be promoted, assumed that Wolsey would go to Rome, but that was in the wake of Bainbridge’s death and the secretary did opine that Henry VIII ought to maintain one or two curial cardinals; Ellis, lxxi, pp.177-180 (*LPIi*, 3304; *LPI*, 5447; 25 September 1514, Pace to Wolsey, Rome).
ability to vote in conclave. Papal elections were watershed opportunities to affect, potentially, the identity of the next pope and, with it, the future political affiliation of the papacy vis-à-vis England. It is demonstrated elsewhere that the English crown during this period had a strong vested interest in trying to prevent the election of a ‘French’ pope and to secure that of a pro-English candidate (an English pope was incredibly unlikely). Indeed, Richard Pace stressed this to Wolsey, on 25 September 1514, when recommending the need for an English curial cardinal shortly after Bainbridge’s death: ‘for I assure you my Lorde itt is necessary for the Kyngis Grace to have oon or ij. yff need were Cardinals, and resident in the Courte off Rome, …for the creation off Popis; whyche thynge is off greate importance to thoos Princes bi whoos means they be create, as they might be bi our most Christian Kynge aswell as odre Princes yffe he hadde sum Cardinals in thyse Courte as odre have’. It ought to be emphasised that, realistically, an English cardinal had to be resident in the Curia to be able to exercise his vote. England was too far from Rome to enable a non-curial to travel there upon being notified of a pontiff’s death. On the one occasion during this period on which an English cardinal did contribute to a papal election, Bainbridge in 1513, it seems extremely likely that he was both

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124 The College of Cardinals had monopolised this role by the start of the twelfth century; J.F. Broderick, ‘The Sacred College of Cardinals’, AHP, 25, p.10.
125 One can interpret as a warning to the crown in May 1517, Richard Pace’s description of an attempt by Francis I to cause Leo to raise a number of cardinals, in his belief, to cause a Frenchman to be elected pope; LPIii, 3276 (23 May 1517, [Pace] to –, Constance). In the papal elections of this period, however, both expected and actual, the English crown appears to have sought to back a candidate also supported by an ally (particularly the Empire); see above pp.244-245. Another aspect of cardinalatial power during conclaves that could have offered political benefits to the English crown was the college’s insistence on electoral pacts that were customarily forced upon potential electees. While there is the potential that parties could have included political demands, no evidence has been found to suggest that Henry VIII tried to influence these when Bainbridge was involved in 1513. In any case, these pacts were not enforceable and none was ever successfully imposed. Ullmann and others now view them as an attempt by the Sacred College to reassert a formal role for itself in papal government; W. Ullmann, ‘The Legal Validity of the Papal Electoral Pacts’, in W. Ullmann (ed), The Papacy and Political Ideas in the Middle Ages, xv, pp.3-35.
126 Note, that Pace had not heard directly that Wolsey’s elevation was being sought from England, so he naturally appears to have believed that the latter was intended to reside in Rome; Ellis, lxxi (LPIi, 3304; LPI, 5447; 25 September 1514, Pace to Wolsey, Rome).
127 For the implications of distance, see pp.36-37.
expected to back a suitable pro-English and anti-French candidate, as well as adhere to crown instructions (potentially specifying a particular cardinal) if these arrived in time.\(^\text{128}\) This idea is further strengthened by Richard Fox and Thomas Ruthal in May 1510 who spoke of the need for more English (and Spanish) cardinals due to the alleged fear of Julius II that a French pope would be elected if he died; the ‘French party’ was currently too numerous, they argued.\(^\text{129}\) The degree to which English curial cardinals could affect papal elections must not be overstated. Bainbridge was a lone voice working in the English interest and, in spite of being able to influence like-minded members of the college, could not compete against other, more numerous ‘parties’ in conclave, such as the French, Imperial and Spanish. By not lobbying for the creation of more than one curial cardinal, however, Henry VIII implicitly recognised his limited position in this respect and one can conclude that this made it important for Bainbridge to associate in Rome with cardinals associated with those states currently aligned with English foreign policy interests.\(^\text{130}\).

Secondly, Henry VIII benefited from having an English cardinal representing him at the Holy See as curial cardinals, by virtue of their status, were better placed than other crown representatives to lobby the papacy in the interests of English foreign policy. As Richard Pace explained to Wolsey in 1514, in addition to the ability to affect papal elections, England needed curial cardinals ‘for knowliege off all thyngis that schall succeed here’.\(^\text{131}\) Silvester Darius, in an attempt to gain crown support for de Giglis’ candidacy during 1518, suggested that it would

\(^{128}\)While Bainbridge appears to have used his own initiative in this conclave, there is evidence to suggest that he pursued a candidate recommended from England during a papal health scare in 1511; see pp.230-231, 238.  
\(^{129}\) *Sp.ii*, 44 (*LPli*, 476; 29 May 1510, Luis Caroz to Ferdinand, London).  
\(^{130}\) See above pp.228, 240.  
\(^{131}\) Note, that Pace had not heard directly that Wolsey’s elevation was being sought from England, so he naturally appears to have believed that the latter was intended to reside in Rome; Ellis, lxxi (*LPlii*, 3304; *LPI*, 5447; 25 September 1514, Pace to Wolsey, Rome).
‘advance the King’s service’. The implication from both is that a diplomat of lesser status would not be privy to such ‘knowliege’. If nothing else, cardinals had the opportunity to access the pope more regularly, on account of their presence at consistories, as well as various services, ceremonies, celebrations and even in leisure activities (such as hunting). They could also build up relationships with other cardinals, who were now their equals and create a network of connections in a way that English orators may not have been able to achieve. Furthermore, through their seniority within the Church, curial cardinals could be involved in the workings of the papal court and gain an inside knowledge of how to get things done, more so than, say, an orator.

Once ensconced as a curial cardinal, an Englishman could arguably work more effectively in the crown’s interest, particularly against France and its allies, through more direct access to the pope and his advisors. Indeed, this is what Bainbridge did (in continuation of the policy that he had pursued since his arrival in Rome). He induced Julius II to grant a brief that transferred Louis XII’s titles and territories to Henry VIII in 1512, he was instrumental in having Louis’ ally, James IV, threatened with papal censures, the responsibility for enforcing which was later devolved on Bainbridge himself, and he lobbied strongly, publicly, although unsuccessfully, against the restitution of the schismatic cardinals who had renounced the Council of Pisa-Milan in 1513. Also, as a curial cardinal, Bainbridge established a network of contacts within the

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132 LPIII, 4442 (18 September 1518, Darius to Wolsey, London).
133 Bainbridge, for instance, became Chamberlain of the Sacred College in 1514, responsible for the body’s revenues, particularly the consistorial taxes associated with provisions to benefices that took place in Rome; D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.111.
135 Ibid., pp.40, 52-53.
136 The cardinal caused comment by his refusal to attend the Consistory that reinstated his pro-French colleagues in June 1513. One must remember, at this point, that Henry VIII was on the cusp of launching a considerable invasion of France; ibid., pp.46-47.
Sacred College, through whom he could more effectively pursue English political interests. Among the cardinals with whom Bainbridge is known to have had a close working relationship, were Riario, Vigerio and Remolines. 137 Bainbridge’s use of his cardinalial connections to forward Anglo-papal relations gave him a stronger hand when he approached the pontiff, than it had been merely as English orator. Furthermore, it is unlikely that Bainbridge’s curial connections would have been as strong, had he not been of equal ecclesiastical status to other cardinals. Another political advantage that accrued to the English crown from having a cardinal resident at Rome was the knowledge gained of the workings of papal government, if he was appointed to any curial position. The most ‘political’ commission bestowed on Bainbridge was that of legate a latere to a section of the papal army fighting the duke of Ferrara (an ally of France), effectively in a bid to induce an English declaration against the French. 138 Bainbridge was also employed by the papacy on various commissions which, in addition to demonstrating papal favour, perhaps gave greater access to the pontiff to political ends. In particular, he was appointed to examine the duke of Ferrara’s quarrel with the papacy in July 1512. 139 Given Alfonso d’Este’s alliance with France to that point and Bainbridge’s direct involvement in the war against him, one could have expected a partisan approach from the Englishman.

Finally, gaining the creation of and maintaining an English cardinal in Rome had positive political repercussions for the crown in the important sphere of international reputation. It could

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137 LPlii, 2276 (LPI, 4455; 17 September 1513, [Bainbridge] and de Giglis to Henry, Rome). Chambers provides a useful outline of the cardinals with whom Bainbridge associated. The papal master of ceremonies, Paris de Grassis, described these as ‘de factione Anglicana’, although this certainly overstates their collective loyalty to the English crown; D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, pp.106-112.
138 LPlit, 776 (23 March 1511, Venetian ambassador at the Curia to the Signory, Ravenna).
139 C. Shaw, *Julius II*, p.301. Another example of Bainbridge’s involvement in a commission of cardinals came when he was chosen to discuss the reform of the Curia and its employees, via the Lateran Council, in June 1513. While this does not have a direct political dimension, it again shows papal favour and may have facilitated greater access to the pontiff; D.S. Chambers, *Cardinal Bainbridge*, p.95.
bring both prestige and honour to the crown at this diplomatic hub, where other states could not avoid taking notice and the cardinal could be used to publicly display English foreign policy. Initially, the elevation of an English cardinal in itself would have highlighted a degree of papal favour bestowed on Henry VIII and this would have publicly been accorded through the ceremony in which Bainbridge received the dignity.\textsuperscript{140} In addition, as such creations had a political basis, they also served to emphasise political alignment between England and Rome. In this way, Bainbridge’s elevation both brought international recognition to the young Henry VIII early on into his reign and was used by Julius II to flush out the king’s anti-French ambitions.\textsuperscript{141} Even if the anti-French association of Bainbridge’s promotion was not desired at this point by Henry VIII, the pope ensured that this was broadcast across Christendom. Also in this sense, the subcollector Silvester Darius, when first approaching Wolsey on behalf of his master de Giglis with a view to crown support for his bid for a red hat in 1518, reasoned that it would ‘show the world how great is the influence the King has with the Holy See’.\textsuperscript{142}

If such a curial cardinal remained in Rome and came to be recognised by the pope, through titles and benefices, legatine commissions and appointments to committees, then there was political capital to be made in how this cardinal, and thus the crown, was perceived by others. In the first place, Christopher Bainbridge quickly came to be reputed (among other titles) as the ‘Cardinal of England’.\textsuperscript{143} This was a clear identification of his political affiliation; no-one

\textsuperscript{140} Ven.ii, 98 (LPli, 714; 10 March 1511, a private letter received in Venice from Hieronimo Lipomano, Ravenna); D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.36.
\textsuperscript{141} See above pp.288-293.
\textsuperscript{142} LPliii, 4442 (18 September 1518, Darius to Wolsey, London).
\textsuperscript{143} For examples of the use of this title by English, papal (Giulio de’ Medici), Spanish and Venetian sources, see Ven.ii, 104 (LPli, 765; 8-10 May 1511, Proveditor Capello to the Signory, Dinale), 1006 (Sp.ii, 61; calendared end December 1511, Ferdinand to his ambassador in England), 1346 (Sp.ii, 56; 4 October 1511); LPli, 776 (23 March 1511, Venetian ambassador at the Curia to the Signory, Ravenna); LPlii, 2124 (LPi, 4366; 26 July 1513, Sir Robert Wingfield to Henry, Brussels).
could ever have forgotten his association with Henry VIII. Indeed, Bainbridge managed to ingratiate himself with both pontiffs of this period. He was awarded the basilica of S. Prassede (Rome), as his titular church, in December 1511 and made Cardinal Protector of the Cistercians in November 1513.\textsuperscript{144} From Julius II and Leo X, he also received benefices, such as the priory of Sant’ Antonio (Reggio Emilia) from the former and the monastery of San Stefano (Bologna) from the latter.\textsuperscript{145} Such grants would not only have indicated the favour in which Bainbridge was held, but reflected back on the English crown. In a more overtly political sense, Julius awarded Bainbridge Vetralla, a town and castle in the Papal States (near Viterbo) in 1511, reputedly of some strategic significance.\textsuperscript{146} This patronage had a distinctly anti-French subtext, as not only had Bainbridge been given responsibility for the defence of this territory, for which the current threat was France and its Italian allies, but he had just finished his legatine commission. That commission was basically an attempt by Julius II to demonstrate English support against France and to induce Henry VIII to join the planned league against Louis XII.\textsuperscript{147} Contemporaries could not have avoided interpreting the papal award of Vetralla as an indication of favour on England, with a view to having Henry VIII act in support of Julius II’s desire to expel the French from Italy. Similarly, the appointment of Bainbridge to various cardinalatial commissions would also have reflected positively on the English crown’s standing in Rome.\textsuperscript{148} The maintenance of a curial cardinal in Rome could also be used by the English crown as a means by which English foreign policy intentions and achievements could be advertised across Christendom. Bainbridge’s activities and reactions to events would reflect directly upon the English crown and it is

\textsuperscript{144} D.S. Chambers, \textit{Cardinal Bainbridge}, pp.95, 98.
\textsuperscript{145} \textit{Ibid.}, pp.95-97.
\textsuperscript{146} \textit{Ibid.}, pp.93-94.
\textsuperscript{147} See above pp.292-293.
\textsuperscript{148} See above n.139.
reasonable to presume that the orator was aware of this. As he was also a member of the Sacred College, they would also be noted by observers. Thus, in receipt of ‘good’ news of English victories at the Battle of the Spurs and at Flodden in September 1513, Bainbridge ostentatiously had celebratory bonfires lit outside his residence.  

On occasions when there was apparently ‘bad’ news for England, such as Bainbridge’s failure to influence the conclave earlier in 1513, the cardinal’s demeanour was noted; in this case Bainbridge was said to look unhappy with the result, as he left conclave. More of a snub to Leo X, Bainbridge’s failure to attend a consistory that restored two of the schismatic cardinals in June 1513, against which he had argued vociferously (under instruction from England), apparently caused a stir in Rome and publicly demonstrated the crown’s opposition to this papal reconciliation. This was completely understandable, given the current English invasion of France in ‘defence of the faith’ and against the schism last formented by their enemies.

While the creation of English cardinals was relatively rare, non-curials proliferated. From 1471 until the end of this period, there were three English cardinals who remained in England, Thomas Bourchier, John Morton and Thomas Wolsey. On account of their being located in England, these non-curials were, perhaps inevitably, in a different position to their

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149 Ven. ii, 314 (15-16 September 1513, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 325 (30 September-1 October 1513, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory).  
150 D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.44.  
151 LPlii, 2032 (LPi, 4287; 27 June 1513, de Castello to Henry, Rome); D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.47 and n.1; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.56-69.  
152 See below pp.415 ff.  
153 It ought to be noted that, despite the concentration of this study on non-curial cardinals that also occupied positions of state, this was not the case for all cardinals that resided outside of the Holy See. Some, for instance, stayed away from Rome due to their political opposition to the current pontiff. One such example for this period was Hadrian de Castello, who fled Rome in 1507 and did not return until Julius II had died in 1513; K.J.P. Lowe, Church and Politics in Renaissance Italy, p.46; J.A.F. Thomson, Popes and Princes, pp.46-47. For de Castello, in particular, see T.F. Mayer, ‘Castellesi, Adriano’, DNB.  
Rome-based counterparts but, nevertheless, still offered a number of political opportunities to the crown. There was the slight possibility that they could be elected pope, they could potentially influence the papacy as its most senior representative in the kingdom, their position personified papal authority in England and could be used to further the crown’s foreign policy interests, and finally, their status served to enhance the reputation of the crown.

The English non-curial cardinals’ ability to vote in conclaves was largely theoretical, as it was unrealistic to expect them to reach Rome from England before an election took place. While the college could and did delay conclaves for brief periods, as in 1521-1522 for Cardinal d’Ivrea, who was detained by the papal general Prospero Colonna en route, this privilege was not accorded to more far-flung colleagues. That the issue of distance for non-curials was at the front of English minds at such times was demonstrated on 19 December 1521, when Sir Richard Wingfield and Sir Thomas Spinelly (based in the Low Countries) voiced their belief to Wolsey that the non-curial French cardinals would not be able to arrive in time for the election, for two reasons. Firstly, they cited a reform by the Lateran Council that reduced the stipulated length of exequies by six days and, secondly, they presumed that both the English orator, Clerk, and his Imperial counterpart could be relied upon to hasten proceedings and prevent the French from reaching Rome in time. The English ambassador in France, on the other hand, around 9

155 For Richard Pace’s inability to reach Rome in time for the 1521-1522 conclave with crown instructions, see pp.233-234.
156 See, for instance, LIIIi, 1879 (17 December 1521, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome), 1933 (4 January 1522, Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to Wolsey, Ghent), 1941 (Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to [Wolsey], Ghent); Sp.ii, 369 (19 December 1521, Juan Manuel to Charles, Rome); M. Creighton, History of the Papacy, vi, p.216.
157 LIIIi, 1885 (19 December 1521, Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to [Wolsey], Ghent). According to Clerk, various cardinals in conclave were also anxious about the potential arrival of more French cardinals in Rome (that could affect the outcome of the election) on 4 January, on which day they kept on going to the door to enquire on this matter. Indeed, two days later, the Spanish ambassador in Rome reported a rumour he had heard that four French cardinals were on their way; ibid., 1932 (4 January 1522, [Clerk to Wolsey]); Sp.ii, 372 (6 January 1522, Juan Manuel to Charles, Rome).
January 1522, ominously indicated that Francis had told him that the conclave would not begin until his cardinals had arrived, whom he had despatched post. On a more positive note, Fitzwilliam cited a reliable source within the French court as telling him that this was unlikely.\textsuperscript{158}

While non-curials such as Wolsey would probably never attend a conclave, this did not preclude them from being chosen for the tiara, as Adrian VI exemplified in 1522 (then resident in Spain).\textsuperscript{159} Adrian’s election notwithstanding, it was most unlikely that a non-curial would be elected, particularly one perceived as closely tied to a monarch. Up to this point, the increasing Italianisation of the Curia had assisted to ensure that this would remain the case.\textsuperscript{160} The election of a non-Rome-based candidate was also likely to be unpalatable to the populace of a city already unstable during \textit{interregna}. The ‘Babylonian captivity’ of the papacy in Avignon was unforgotten and Clerk implied this shortly after the 1522 election. When the cardinals emerged from the Vatican, ‘every man here [was] right sore abasshed and very evill contented in there mind; in so moche that when the Cardinalls came oute of the Conclave the common people here (saving your honour) wh[is]tlid at them as they came by’.\textsuperscript{161}

In seeking the appointment of non-curial cardinals, the English crown both seems to have believed and wanted it to be understood that such recognition would increase its influence with the papacy, as Wolsey explained to de Giglis, around September 1514, when he was forwarding

\textsuperscript{158} \textit{LPIIIii}, 1947 (calendared 9 January 1522, Fitzwilliam to [Wolsey]).

\textsuperscript{159} Adrian was a political choice, being a minister of Charles V and, at that point, the emperor elect’s viceroy in Spain; J.N.D. Kelly, \textit{Dictionary of Popes}, p.258. It ought to be mentioned that, in conclave, cardinals were not bound to elect one of their number and, indeed, Bainbridge, in the initial scrutiny of 1513, nominated the non-ecclesiastical brother of a cardinal; D.S. Chambers, \textit{Cardinal Bainbridge}, pp.43-44.

\textsuperscript{160} See above pp.276-277.

\textsuperscript{161} Ellis, pp.304-305 (\textit{LPIIIii}, 1960; 13 January 1522, [Clerk to Wolsey]). Similarly, Richard Pace, when he arrived in Rome on 27 January, wrote to Wolsey that the cardinals were scared to go out ‘for fear of the people, which hourly crieth out against them, to their great rebuke and shame, by reason of the said election’; \textit{LPIIIii}, 1995 (28 January 1522, Pace to Wolsey, Rome). The Venetian ambassador in Brussels considered the election of this non-curial ‘a miraculous circumstance’; \textit{Ven.iii}, 395 (22 January 1522, Venetian ambassador in the Empire to the Signory).
his own candidacy, ‘to the intent not only men might thereby perceive how much the Pope favoureth the King and such as he entirely loveth, but also that thereby I shall be the more able to do his grace service’. While a non-curial English cardinal could not establish a personal rapport with the pontiff (or with collegiate colleagues for that matter) through face-to-face contact, he could still address the pope directly in Rome on political matters via correspondence. As such cardinals were also usually principal ministers of the king, they tended to become the channel through which much crown-papal communication was routed. This was certainly the case with Wolsey, although his becoming the hub for Anglo-papal contact (taking over from Richard Fox) did predate his becoming cardinal and was effectively complete by the summer of 1515. Wolsey, as he assumed the lead as the king’s chief minister, became the only regular correspondent with the pope other than Henry himself. His communication could be both direct and indirect, the latter through the king’s Latin secretary as well as through English diplomats in Rome. He lobbied the pope on numerous matters of foreign policy, the first appearing to be his successful insistence on gaining the red hat in a quid pro quo for English membership of an anti-French league. Among other political matters in which Wolsey attempted to influence the pope as a cardinal, in December 1515, he was commissioned by Henry to convey to de Giglis ‘business of the gravest importance to be communicated to the pope’. This, one can reasonably presume, was connected with England’s desire to launch an offensive against France in the following year, particularly as the disastrous Battle of Marignano had effectively caused the papacy to submit to France at the conference of Bologna earlier that month. In 1518, Wolsey

162 LPlii, 3497 (LPI, 5465; calendared end November 1514, Wolsey to [de Giglis]).
164 LPIIi, 1354 (29 December 1515, Henry to Leo, Eltham).
165 See below pp.489 ff.
took responsibility for answering the pope’s request for support in a planned crusade to the east. Similarly, in 1519, the cardinal sent secret letters to the pope, conveying his and Henry’s wishes for the Imperial election. Later in the same year, Wolsey complained for himself and his king about the pope’s conduct in this matter. Finally, in January 1521, Wolsey conveyed ‘matters of great importance’ to Leo X, written on Henry’s orders. These may well have related to the English intention to mediate (through Wolsey) between Charles V and Francis I at Calais later in the year and could feasibly have sought papal support for this. The correspondence may have even sounded out Leo X’s willingness to break with France; at this time, the English crown was secretly and tentatively moving towards an alliance with Charles V against France (eventually effected during August 1521 under cover of the ‘peace’ negotiations held at Calais), while publicly presenting itself as a neutral arbiter and, privately to Francis I, as a friend of France. While one cannot ascribe Wolsey’s contact with the pope on these matters solely to his cardinalial dignity, it probably did contribute.

While English non-curial cardinals were invariably crown ministers first and foremost, the crown also welcomed the air of ‘papal’ authority that this status brought with it. Domestically, it made them the most senior ecclesiastics in England and, as far as Wolsey was concerned, raised him above the archbishop of Canterbury. That the papacy insisted that prospective English cardinals were influential with the king was probably a consequence of this: once elevated, the non-curial cardinal would potentially become the focus for Anglo-papal

\[166 \text{LPIII} \text{, 4132 (30 April 1518, de Giglis to Henry, Rome).} \]
\[167 \text{LPIII} \text{, 277 (calendared end May 1519, de Giglis to [Wolsey]), 444 (1 September 1519, de Giglis to Henry, Rome).} \]
\[168 \text{Ibid., 1137 (21 January 1521, Henry to Leo, Greenwich).} \]
\[169 \text{Also see pp.723-725. For the Calais Conference and the Treaty of Bruges (25 August 1521), see below pp.697-701.} \]
communication, if he had not already assumed this position.\footnote{LPii, 2932 (LPI, 5110; 21 May 1514, Pol[ydore Vergil] to [Wolsey], [Rome]).} If he did not, it would be a snub to his position. From the English perspective, such a pivotal position enabled Wolsey to act somewhat like a computer firewall, in a prime position to decide which papal instructions or requests to allow into England from Rome and which to block or ignore. Being the king’s trusted principal minister, this would have both given the crown firmer control over the domestic Church and facilitated its veto of politically-tinged decrees or requests from the papacy that were not in the English interest.

Wolsey’s employment of an air of papal authority seems to have been deliberate in other spheres, such as in the attention he gave to wearing the appropriate cardinalatial attire, on all public occasions at least. Even before he officially received this, the chronicler Hall wrote that the hat itself was conveyed ‘to London with suche triumphe as though the greatest prince of Christendome had bene come into the realme’.\footnote{C. Whibley, \textit{Henry VIII by Edward Hall}, i, pp.148-149. The subsequent ceremony at which this hat was bestowed upon Wolsey in November 1515 was also ostentatious, would have been attended by foreign diplomats, and was clearly intended to publicly highlight the new cardinal’s dignity; \textit{LPiii}, 1153 (15 November 1515).} As early as 10 September 1515, for instance, he requested that de Giglis supply him with appropriate garments for his appearance in Parliament ‘\textit{in crastino Animarum}’.\footnote{One assumes All Souls’ Day, 2 November; \textit{LPiii}, 894 (10 September 1515, Wolsey to [de Giglis]). There are quite a number of instances outlining Wolsey’s desire to be regularly supplied with appropriate cardinalatial attire by de Giglis in Rome. In one of these, dated March 1517, Wolsey thanked the orator ‘\textit{de duobus pulcherrimis galeris}’ and also asked for two ‘\textit{biretia}’ according to a design he had sent, as the last two were too big; \textit{LPiii}, 3045 (\textit{Mart. Amp. iii}, 1275; 24 March 1517, Wolsey to de Giglis, ‘from my house at London’).} As Wolsey had made the red hat conditional on England’s joining the papacy in the fight against France, the new cardinal’s concern to be suitably attired for what would ostensibly be a ‘war’ Parliament is not difficult to fathom; the will to fight and the financial means to ‘defend the faith’ might be more forthcoming if the pope was visible through his cardinal. Also, Polydore Vergil described how Wolsey ‘soon began to use a golden chair, a
golden cushion, a golden cloth on his table, and, when he was walking, to have the hat, symbol of the rank of cardinal, carried before him by a servant, raised up like some holy idol or other’. 173 This increased when he became a legate a latere in 1518, from which time he ‘was not satisfied with the one cross which he had used in his capacity as archbishop of York, but would have another carried before him by two elegantly proportioned priests riding on horses’. Vergil also noted Wolsey’s tendency to celebrate Mass more often when the king was present, insisting on his right on such occasions, as legate, to be attended by the highest ranks of the secular and ecclesiastical nobility.174 In addition to the way he looked and acted, Wolsey clearly sought to project ‘papal’ authority through his cardinalatial dignity in what he said to foreign diplomats. During an audience with two Venetian ambassadors in January 1516, when questioned on rumours that English money was being transferred to the Low Countries to be used against the French and Venetians in Italy, he allegedly prefaced his denial of this by saying, ‘I will speak to you with all sincerity and truth, and will tell you what becomes a Cardinal on the honour of the cardinalate’.175 In a similar manner, around mid-August 1517, Giustinian quoted Wolsey as swearing that the pope wanted to expel the French from Italy, among other things, ‘per haec sacra et per dignitatem cardinalatus’.176 An indication that such a ‘papal’ perception of Wolsey was either held in Rome or was deemed prudent to employ when talking about him (particularly to English diplomats) comes in 1521. On 27 October, the English ambassadors in the Low

174 The Italian cites dukes and earls, in addition to bishops and abbots; ibid., p.255.
175 R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.155-160 (Ven.ii, 671; LPIIIi, 1380; 2 January 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). The same ambassadors quoted Wolsey as using the same phraseology to deny the same rumour again on 8 March; ibid., pp.184-189 (Ven.ii, 695; LPIIIi, 1638; 8 March 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London).
176 Ven.ii, 763 (19 August 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). Also, around 10 August 1516, at a dinner he gave to the Venetian ambassadors, during a discussion on the malevolence of French power in Italy and urging Venice to detach itself from France, Wolsey was quoted as answering the orators’ cautious, conditional reply; ‘possibly his Majesty the King, and I, who am at least a Cardinal, do not deserve an “if, indeed”’; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.267-268 (Ven.ii, 757; LPIIIi, 2259; 10 August 1516, Giustinian to the Signory).
Countries relayed a discussion with the the papal nuncio, Jeronimo Adorno, on whether he had sufficient power from the pope to join the truce that Wolsey had been lobbying for during the Calais Conference, including a statement by Adorno’s colleague Leo that he ‘held you [Wolsey] in higher honour than any Cardinal of the College, “reputing you in manner as his brother”’.¹⁷⁷

In addition, the crown may have benefited from a trait adopted by Wolsey that was more commonly associated with his curial colleagues; the holding of benefices in commendam. Thus, as the cardinal was provided to the see of Bath and Wells in 1518 and the abbey of St Albans of 1521, this would have emphasised this non-curial cardinal’s authority to observers, both foreign and domestic.¹⁷⁸

Realistically, however, Wolsey’s personification of papal authority was of limited use in international politics, not least because other princes possessed their own cardinals and because, from an external point of view, Wolsey would have been envisaged quite clearly as Henry VIII’s cardinal, whose true priority was the English interest. This dignity merely put Wolsey on the same level as other the cardinal-ministers (not an insignificant thing in itself). The only means by which such a non-curial cardinal could enhance his ecclesiastical status any further while still serving the crown and which would ensure a precedence on the international stage over most other cardinals was by obtaining a commission as a legate a latere, what Vergil terms ‘the loftiest

¹⁷⁷ The ambassadors in question were Thomas Docwra, Thomas Boleyn and Richard Wingfield; LPIIIii, 1714 (29 October 1521, Docwra, Boleyn and Richard Wingfield to [Wolsey], Oudenarde).
¹⁷⁸ Henry and Wolsey successfully lobbied the pope for the deprivation of the previous bishop, Hadrian de Castello, after the latter was implicated in the Petrucci plot against Leo. Wolsey gained the see on 30 July 1518; LPIIIii, 4350 (30 July 1518, Leo to Wolsey, Rome). Henry VIII awarded Wolsey St Albans in recognition of his diplomatic service and expenses at Calais and Bruges earlier that year; LPIIIii, 1760 (calendared 13-14 November 1521, [Wolsey to Clerk]). Admittedly, Wolsey had some form in this, having ‘held’ the right to administer the diocese of Tournai since 1514, although this was never realised; C.G. Cruickshank, The English Occupation of Tournai 1513-1519 (1971), pp.143-187.
rung in the ladder’. A legatine commission bestowed on its recipient quasi-papal status wherever the commission applied. While this did not mean that the legate could override the pope, and the details of his powers varied depending on the commission, it did mean that he outranked all other ecclesiastics with whom he came into contact (the pope himself and, generally speaking, most other legates a latere excepted) and even most laymen. Wolsey obtained this status in May 1518, wrung out of Leo X in return for his allowing the original legate, Lorenzo Campeggio, to cross from Calais to England. It is significant that the English cardinal had sought this status (for which being a cardinal was a pre-condition) since his initial promotion to the Sacred College, as this supports the argument that he wanted to become the English embodiment of ‘papal’ authority. It is perhaps indicative of Wolsey’s extensive ambitions that he was reportedly disappointed with the initial commission that arrived, which was to end on the departure of his co-legate, Campeggio. From this first appointment, Wolsey regularly sought extensions to his powers, both in scope and duration. From his legatine commission, Wolsey’s role in English foreign policy assumed an increasingly ‘papal’ character. In the first instance, he

179 D. Hay (ed.), *Anglica Historia*, p.255.
180 The commission elevated the cardinal to the ‘alter ego’ of the reigning pope and gave him the corresponding powers to act as a quasi-pope wherever he went, with the ability to override the local ordinary. It also ought to be noted that a legate was always a cardinal commissioned by the pope and his authority was usually limited in purpose and longevity; R.A. Schmuts, ‘Medieval Papal Representatives’, *Studia Gratiana*, 15, pp.453-455; R.N. Swanson, ‘Legate’, in J.R. Strayer (ed.), *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, vol.7, pp.534-535; F. Wasner, ‘Fifteenth-Century Texts on the Ceremonial of the Papal “Legatus a Latere”’, *Traditio*, 14, pp.296-311, 315-321.
181 Legatine status was not confined to non-curial cardinals, and Wolsey was neither the first nor the last chief minister of a prince to seek enhanced authority through such a commission; J.A.F. Thomson, *Popes and Princes*, pp.74-75.
182 This was also tied in with the crown’s insistence that Hadrian de Castello be deprived; *LPIIIi*, 4170 (17 May 1518, Leo to Wolsey, Rome).
184 For a flavour of this, see *LPIIIi*, 406 (1 August 1519, [Wolsey to de Giglis], London), 444 (1 September 1519, de Giglis to Henry, Rome), 600 (20 January 1520, Henry to Leo, Tower of London), 647 (calendared end June 1515, [de Giglis to Wolsey]), 853 (calendared end May 1520; [‘de Medici to --’]), 1006 (calendared beginning October 1520, [de’ Medici to Ghinucci]), 1124 (6 January 1521, Leo to Wolsey, Rome); *LPIIIi*, 1510 (25 August 1521, [Wolsey to Clerk], Bruges).
appropriated Leo X’s plan for a five year truce and crusade in 1518 with his own universal peace initiative that culminated in the Treaty of London. Subsequently, in 1520, one can observe Wolsey’s principal role in the meetings and ceremonies involving Henry VIII with Francis I (Field of Cloth of Gold) and Charles V (Canterbury), in which his cardinalalatial and legatine dignity was again prominent. He also continued to forward himself as a mediator, attempting to prevent war between the Hapsburg and Valois monarchs. Subsequently during 1521, Wolsey ‘mediated’ in Henry’s name between France and the Empire at the Conference of Calais and at Bruges, both seeking to conclude an anti-French alliance with Charles V and to arrange a truce so that England could prepare for war. At these events, Wolsey’s ecclesiastical authority was clearly and deliberately visible, as was his assumption of the role of arbitrator. In particular, one can see Wolsey invoking his legatine power in trying to force a truce from the end of August and, at

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185 A sense of the pontifical authority invoked by the English crown can be seen in accounts of the two legates’ reception by Henry VIII from 3 August 1518. Wolsey himself described Campeggio as ‘so honourably received [into London], that had the Pope come in person he could scarcely have been welcomed with more magnificent pomp’. Giustinian, on the other hand, commented on a mass and banquet on 8th at which ‘less respect for the holy chair could scarcely have been shown’, see LPIIIi, 4361 (3 August 1518); Ven.ii, 1062 (20 August 1518, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1355 (calendared August 1518, Wolsey to de Giglis); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii (1854), pp.204-206 (LPIIIi, 4366; Ven.ii, 1053; 5 August 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth), 206-207 (LPIIIi, 4371; Ven.ii, 1057; 11 August 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth); C. Whibley, Henry VIII by Edward Hall, i, pp.166-167. That this legatine authority was to be centralised in Wolsey’s hands was emphasised from the outset, as the English cardinal asserted his ‘seniority’ over his co-legate at every opportunity and largely excluded Campeggio from negotiations; see below pp.636-643.

186 At the Field of Cloth of Gold, one can again observe Wolsey’s invocation of ‘papal’ authority in a number of ways. Overall, he appears to facilitate the actual meeting (which he took the lead in organising). Indeed, Francis appointed him his ‘procurator’ to arrange it; LPIIIi, 645 (2 March 1520), 677 (13 March 1520, Francis to [Wolsey], Angouleme). Wolsey deliberately highlighted his pontifical status through his own attire, even by the way he acted as senior to the French legate present de Boissy and the other French cardinals (de Bourbon, d’Albret, de Lorraine). It also ought to be remembered that the meeting itself was a celebration of the universal peace that he himself had brought about in 1518. One can also recognise the same emphasis of Wolsey’s legatine authority at the Canterbury meeting with Charles during May 1520; Ven.iii, 50 (21 May-14 July 1520), 53 (27 May 1520, Francesco Cornaro and Surian to the Signory, Canterbury); LPIIIi, 740 (11 April 1520), 906 (10 July 1520).

187 For the Calais summit, nominally intended to settle differences between Charles and Francis, Wolsey was given broad negotiating powers by Henry to conclude one of six different alliances with the Empire; LPIIIi, 1443 (29 July 1521). At the Bruges meeting with Charles V, Wolsey was given considerable respect by the emperor elect. They shared a canopy and kneeling desk at a service on 15 August. Furthermore, Charles negotiated directly with Wolsey, rather than delegating this to his subordinates; Ven.iii, 298 (16 August 1521, Contarini to the Signory, Bruges), 302 (19 August 1521, Contarini to the Signory, Bruges).
one stage, he even pledged to act as security for Leo X’s adhesion when the Imperial delegates argued that they could not conclude without consulting Rome.\textsuperscript{188} While the English cardinal was awaiting commissions from Leo to this end, he was not really in a position to offer this assurance, however, not least because the papacy was a partisan power in negotiations.

Finally, the crown was interested in the international esteem gained by the king’s attendance by a non-curial cardinal. In an age when display, ostentation and magnificence were gauges to reflect a prince’s power, honour and reputation, the presence of a cardinal within the kingdom provided the opportunity there to capitalise on his dignity in front of observers, albeit within the context of crown authority. With an increasing general tendency towards resident diplomacy, orators and other foreign representatives in England (including merchants) could thence be counted upon to broadcast this to their respective governments.\textsuperscript{189} Indeed, one would expect that Henry VIII’s and Wolsey’s ideas on this were shaped, or at least encouraged, by observations from English diplomats about the non-curial cardinals that surrounded his fellow princes. An English embassy to Francis I in early February 1515, for instance, cited the presence of ‘a great number of cardinals, archbishops and bishops’.\textsuperscript{190} At this point, England had no cardinals, Bainbridge having died the previous summer, and given Henry VIII’s great rivalry with

\textsuperscript{188} LPIIIii, 1535 (1 September 1521, French ambassadors at Calais to Francis), 1816 (calendared end November 1521; Imperial account of the Calais Conference). Also see Ven.iii, 321 (30 August 1521, Surian to the Signory, Calais).

\textsuperscript{189} See above p.31 n.73. Also, there was doubtless an intention to present this dignity to a domestic audience, but examination of this is not relevant here.

\textsuperscript{190} The delegation, consisting Suffolk, West and Richard Wingfield was sent, ostensibly, to retrieve Henry’s sister, Mary, who had been married to Louis XII in 1514 and to negotiate as much dower as possible; LPIII, 105 (3 February 1515, Suffolk, West and [Richard] Wingfield to [Henry], ‘Saunt Leez’). Similarly, Sir Robert Wingfield reported the presence of two cardinals at the Imperial court at Innsbruck in October 1515 and the earl of Worcester the same number at a St George’s Day service attended by the emperor in Antwerp during April 1517; LPIII, 1006 (9 October 1515, Robert Wingfield to [Henry], [Innsbruck]); LPIIIi, 3174 (26 April 1517, Somerset to [Henry]).
the French king, this could not have been an entirely comfortable situation. Wolsey’s candidacy had been proposed unsuccessfully during the previous year and by March-April, perhaps in light of hearing of the cardinals attendant on the young Francis, the English archbishop had accused Leo X of procrastination. 191 Similarly, in 1520, during de Giglis’ failed campaign for promotion, he reasoned to Wolsey at one point that, as the pope intended to elevate the candidates of other states, that it would be ‘disgraceful’ if England was not included. Receipt of this correspondence prompted Henry VIII to lobby the papacy again in favour of his orator and it may have been this particular argument that strengthened his resolve. 192 The sense of one-upmanship was also emphasised at the Field of Cloth of Gold when Wolsey assumed a senior position as cardinal-legate over the French members of the Sacred College present. 193

Just as the English crown sought the elevation of its own candidates to the Sacred College, it also opposed the strengthening of the presence of its rivals in this body, particularly France, for much the same reasons. Firstly, it feared the increase of French voting power within conclave. In 1510, for instance, Fox and Ruthal alleged that Julius was fearful that, on account of the large number of French cardinals, a French pope would be elected when he died. 194 Similarly, Pace relayed a worrying rumour in March 1517, that Francis I, intending to ensure the victory of Francesco Maria della Rovere against the pope, would subsequently use his advantage to force the creation of a substantial number of French cardinals; enough for Pace to believe that he

191 See above pp.296-298.
193 See below pp.701-704.
194 Sp. ii, 44 (LP II, 476; 29 May 1510, Luis Caroz to Ferdinand, London).
planned to raise a French pope. Secondly, it feared the ability of a stronger ‘French party’ to influence the papacy, contrary to English interests. This is confirmed in September 1521 when Clerk told Wolsey of two candidates interested in ‘buying’ cardinalates from Leo X, which the pope refused because they would be pro-French. Finally, Henry would have objected to the increase in international standing (particularly compared to himself) that the honour and dignity of a French cardinal could bring to his rival; such events would be perceived as detrimental to the recognition of England by the papacy, as perceived by the outside world. The admission to the Sacred College of Francis I’s tutor and advisor, Adrian Gouffier de Boissy on 14 December 1515, for instance, would have demonstrated in England the dominance of France over the papacy in the wake of the Battle of Marignano. Indeed, this clearly political creation, which involved no other elevations, took place at a meeting between king and pope at Bologna, which was intended to symbolise this French victory. To counter any increase in France’s power within the College of Cardinals, the English crown therefore attempted to obstruct French intrigues on at least one identifiable occasion. On others, it seems to have been unhappy with French elevations, but heard about them too late to do anything about them. Finally, Henry VIII sought to deprive cardinals with French loyalties when the opportunity arose.

The clearest indication of obstruction, on the part of the English crown, surfaces in a letter of April 1518, where Wolsey was to be told that ‘the Pope has adhered to his advice against creating a Cardinal at the instigation of France, as England would always interpose in behalf of

195 Whether the secretary thought that Francis wanted to depose Leo or merely pack the Sacred College for the next conclave is unclear; LPIii, 3276 (23 May 1517, [Pace] to –, Constance).
196 It was only as recently as 1506 that Louis XII and Cardinal d’Amboise insisted that Julius II name three Frenchmen to the Sacred College (all relatives of d’Amboise), in return for French aid to recover Bologna and Perugia; J.F. Broderick, ‘The Sacred College of Cardinals’, AHP, 25, p.49.
197 LPIii, 1618 (calendared at 30 September 1521, [Clerk to Wolsey]).
198 See below p.505.
the Holy See, which has the more enraged the French’. The candidate in question was probably a German, Albert of Brandenburg, archbishop and elector of Mainz. As the question of Imperial succession was already being considered, electors such as Brandenburg were to become increasingly significant in terms of their voting power. In May 1518, Spinelly informed Henry from Spain of intelligence from Rome (dated 12 April) that the archbishop was likely to become a cardinal, at Francis I’s instigation. It was believed that the French king planned these promotions so that Brandenburg could then become a legate a latere and sway other Imperial electors in his favour. Contemporaneously, Kite and Bourchier, also in Spain, confirmed the same ploy by Francis, as one way in which he ‘goeth about covertly and layeth many baits to attain to the empire’.

The implication was that the promotion ought to be prevented, if Francis’ Imperial ambitions were to be prevented. Given the fundamental English objection to the French king’s candidacy, therefore, Wolsey’s obstruction to Francis’ attempt to buy votes was entirely understandable. Despite the original message from Rome that Wolsey’s objection had been sustained, English opposition had already failed, as Leo X had actually elevated him on 24 March 1518. This may have remained a secret however until at least October.

While it has been difficult to find other instances of English blocking tactics vis-à-vis other French cardinalial candidates, it ought to be remembered that there was often little notice

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199 Both author and addressee are unknown; LPIii, 4133 (calendared end April 1518, - to -).
200 See below pp.595, 704-705.
201 LPIii, 4146 (4 May 1518, Spinelly to Henry).
202 The two diplomats also outlined how the son of another elector was offered ‘much fat spiritual promotion’; ibid., 4160 (12 May 1518, Kite and Bourchier to [Henry]).
203 See below pp.595, 704-705. For the English crown’s fundamental objection to Francis’ candidacy in 1519, see pp.653-673.
204 C. Eubel, Hierarchica Catholica Medii Aevi, iii, p.19.
205 A Venetian diplomat in Rome refers to him only as an archbishop towards the end of June and, even the usually well-informed Erasmus only mentions Brandenburg’s becoming a cardinal on 24 October; Ven.ii, 1350 (23 June 1518, Minio to the Signory, Rome); LPIii, 4523 (24 October 1518, Erasmus to Warham, Louvain). Indeed, Brandenburg only received his cardinalial title in January 1521, implying that it was politic for some delay in this; C. Eubel, Hierarchica Catholica Medii Aevi, iii, p.19.
given of creations, making pre-emptive action difficult. Furthermore, the distance between England and Rome further contributed to this, making it more problematic for Henry VIII to make an effective or even any response. The first of these candidates, Adrian Gouffier de Boissy, the brother of the Admiral of France (de Bonnivet), was promoted at the Bologna conference between Francis I and Leo X, following the defeat of anti-French forces at Marignano in September 1515. It was to be the first indication that the papacy was under French political influence. While Henry VIII’s reaction to both the defeat and the meeting was anger and suspicion, there was little he could have done to prevent this elevation, as he had no advance warning of it. The pope, recognising that this concession would be unpopular in England, informed de Giglis that, while he had granted one red hat, he had turned down French requests for another three. This news was probably received as an indication of de facto French influence over the papacy as a defeated power. Furthermore, there were other issues arising from the Bologna summit, particularly the discussion of universal peace and crusade, which could potentially scupper England’s moves to forment opposition to France in Germany and the Swiss Cantons. The intended military response to Marignano would have taken priority over opposition to de Boissy’s promotion, given that the expulsion of the French from Italy would enable Leo X to resist such pressure in the future. It is noteworthy, however, that English pledges

206 LPnii, 1281 (14 December 1515, [de Giglis] to Ammonius, Bologna); C. Eubel, Hierarchica Catholica Medii Aevi, iii, p.15; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, p.139.
207 See below pp.499-509.
208 LPnii, 1281(14 December 1515, [de Giglis] to Ammonius, Bologna). Pastor differs slightly, writing of a rumour that Francis had sought three cardinals in total, the other two being the brothers of the dukes of Bourbon and Vendôme; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, p.139. Significantly, the pope did not mention the creation in his own accounts of the conference to Henry and Wolsey, focusing instead on the need for (universal) peace and crusade that he and Francis had discussed. If this omission was deliberate, it is feasible that Leo’s informing the crown instead via its orator (in the perhaps exaggerated manner outlined above), may have been intended to soften a piece of news that was not likely to be received well in England; LPnii, 1282 (14 December 1515, Leo to Henry, Bologna), 1283 (14 December 1515, Leo to Wolsey, Bologna), 1284. (14 December 1515, de Castello to Wolsey, Bologna).
209 See below pp.503-509.
of continued support up to the Bologna conference were not enough for Leo X to avoid making this cardinalatial concession. English concern at French pressure on the papacy to create cardinals was next displayed in May 1517 when Richard Pace, writing from Constance, warned Wolsey of an attempt by Francis to cause Leo to raise a number of cardinals, in his belief, to ensure that the next conclave would elect a Frenchman. Again, it was impossible for Henry and Wolsey to obstruct this, as two promotions had already occurred on 1 April.

It also ought to be noted that there was no need for English avoidance tactics at times when the papacy was aligned against France and committed to the expulsion of French interests from Italy. Julius II, for instance, was never likely to create any French cardinals after his detachment from the League of Cambrai during 1510. This is evident from the composition of his sixth creation of March 1511, of which Bainbridge has been noted to have been raised on an anti-Gallic ‘ticket’. Similarly, Clerk informed Wolsey in September 1521 that, while Leo X planned to create cardinals to raise money, he had turned down two offers because of their pro-French tendencies. The papacy was at war with France at this point.

There is, on the other hand, one instance of the English crown appearing to support a French nomination to the Sacred College, in spite of its underlying anti-Gallic agenda. Certainly, Leo X was approached to further Stephen Poncher’s candidacy around July 1520, as the archbishop of Sens acknowledged receipt of these letters on the 13th and asked Henry and Wolsey

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210 LPIii, 3276 (23 May 1517, [Pace] to –, Constance).
211 C. Eubel, Hierarchica Catholica Medii Aevi, iii, pp.15-16.
213 LPIIIii, 1618 (calendared at 30 September 1521, [Clerk to Wolsey]).
to write further letters to the cardinals, in particular Giulio de’ Medici. While this seems to contradict the English crown’s whole ‘defensive’ strategy vis-à-vis Rome, it was consistent with Henry VIII’s current foreign policy. Having struggled to gain definitive papal support for an aggressive course against France up to 1517, he turned towards reconciliation with Francis I, through which he aimed to restrain the latter from his Italian ambitions, albeit largely excluding Rome from this process. At the time of English ‘support’ for Poncher’s candidacy, this had recently manifested itself in the Field of Cloth of Gold. Indeed, the date of Poncher’s acknowledgement suggests that a request for backing came at the meeting itself. It would have been completely in keeping with the ethos of the event, therefore, if Henry and Wolsey agreed to write to the pope in support of Poncher. It would also have been in keeping, if the letters were not intended as a genuine demonstration of backing, as the English made exaggerated public demonstrations of amity with France and hostility towards Charles’ intention to descend into Italy, while privately entertaining anti-French overtures from the emperor. This was all intended to demonstrate England’s good faith and distract Francis I from Italy. All was not as it seemed, therefore. That Henry and Wolsey never really intended to follow through with their pledge of backing Poncher is suggested by the fact that their missives were conveyed to the archbishop to forward to the pope and, also, by his request that they then write further letters to the cardinals. If

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214 *LPIII*, 912 (13 July 1520, [Poncher] to Wolsey, St Germain). It is unclear from what date Poncher’s candidacy was forwarded by the French crown, but the only other mention of it (in the consulted sources) seems to have been when de Giglis reported Leo X having been lobbied for both Poncher’s and d’Orleans’ elevation, alongside de la Mark’s exclusion, in August 1520. Interestingly, however, Campeggio’s account of the same French diplomat’s audience with the pope only mentions d’Orleans’ nomination; *ibid.*, 945 (8 August 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey), 958 (22 August 1520, Campeggio to [Wolsey], Rome). It was not unusual for princes to ask fellow princes to support their nominations for the Sacred College. In 1517, for instance, Charles may have contacted de Giglis with a view to having Chèvres elevated; *LPIII*, 3682 (14 September 1517, de Giglis to Vannes).


216 See below pp.687-694.

they had wanted to indicate their full backing for Poncher, they would have surely sent their letters directly to Rome and would have also applied pressure to the Sacred College in the first instance. Furthermore, there is no indication that English representatives in Rome were instructed to lobby to this end, despite de Morette’s attempts both to secure the promotion and to work with de Giglis. While de Morette may have been instructed to present Poncher’s letters in conjunction with his English counterpart, de Giglis was reluctant to act with de Morette until he received instructions to do so.\textsuperscript{218} Indeed, de Giglis implied his opposition to this whole episode on 8 August, when he reported that, as Leo ‘has no hope of protection from England, he will be obliged to comply with these and other unlawful requests’.\textsuperscript{219} In other words, despite publicly cordial Anglo-French relations, de Giglis still envisaged the promotion of French cardinals as detrimental to the English interest.

Finally, the English crown could pressure the papacy to limit French influence in the Sacred College by pushing for the suspension or even deprivation of existing cardinals. This was a tricky area and there was only limited opportunity for princes to take advantage of such possibilities.\textsuperscript{220} The only apparent occasion when Henry VIII became involved in such

\textsuperscript{218} As a result of the Field of Cloth of Gold, Francis approached Henry with a view to working bilaterally in Rome. De Morette approached de Giglis soon after in this regard and also seems to have been commissioned to secure a red hat for two French nominees; see below pp.713-714.

\textsuperscript{219} LPIII, 945 (8 August 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey).

\textsuperscript{220} There seems to have been a general reluctance by the papacy to deprive cardinals. In terms of the ‘schismatic’ cardinals linked to the Council of Pisa-Milan, for instance, while they initially convoked their meeting on 28 May 1511, the initial suspension of revenue for only three of the nine initially listed, did not take place until August, while they were not deprived and excommunicated until 24 October. It took the pope five months to react to this open defiance of his authority. Similarly, English pressure to deprive Hadrian de Castello following his implication in the Petrucci Plot in 1517 faced papal reticence and took some time to bear fruit, despite the conspiracy aiming to take the pope’s life. Equally, the English crown probably feared attempts by rivals to deprive its own cardinals. A warning of this possibility came in December 1515, when the Imperial cardinal, Matthew Lang, alleged that Francis I had sought his deprivation, on account of the role he had played in the war against France, at the recent meeting with Leo X at Bologna. From the English point of view, if the French had moved against Lang, then why not Wolsey? \textit{Ibid.}, 1347
negotiations concerned cardinals Carvajal and Sanseverino who had sided with France for the Council of Pisa-Milan.\textsuperscript{221} In his bull \textit{Sacrosanctae Romanae Ecclesiae} (issued 25 July 1511), convoking the Lateran Council, Julius II described the dissidents as ‘sons of darkness’, making sanctions against them inevitable.\textsuperscript{222} English support probably played its part in enabling the pope to facilitate their deprivation, as he only pushed it through Consistory once the Holy League had been concluded (4 October) and the backing of his anti-French allies could be assured.\textsuperscript{223} Admittedly, Bainbridge did not receive the power to adhere on Henry VIII’s behalf until December, but he had been pivotal in the treaty’s negotiations and English commitment was deemed inevitable.\textsuperscript{224} He is also known to have gained the confidence of the pontiff, particularly in terms of his anti-French disposition, and presumably the orator would not have failed to encourage Julius to deprive the breakaway cardinals, not least because this would have suited his...

\textsuperscript{221} While not all of these cardinals were French-born (only two out of the five actual dissidents, Briconnet and de Prie, the others being Carvajal, Consenza and Francesco Borgia), their council was to be supported by the French crown. By virtue of their embodiment of French opposition to Julius II, one can thereby deem the dissidents ‘French’ and, in this way, understand English hostility towards them; C. Shaw, \textit{Julius II}, pp.281-283; W. Ullmann, ‘Julius II and the Schismatic Cardinals’, in D. Baker (ed.), \textit{Schism, Heresy and Religious Protest}, p.181.

\textsuperscript{222} In response to the cardinals’ citation to appear at the Council of Pisa (that the pope was aware of on 28 May), this bull was dated 18 July, but only published on the 25\textsuperscript{th} according to Pastor and Ullmann. The Venetian ambassador in Rome at this time, on the other hand, indicates that it was published sometime between 1-5 August; L. Pastor, \textit{History of the Popes}, vi, pp.352, 364; W. Ullmann, ‘Julius II and the Schismatic Cardinals’, in D. Baker (ed.), \textit{Schism, Heresy and Religious Protest}, p.187; LPI, 816 (18 July 1511), 829 (Ven.ii, 109; 31 July 1511, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). Briçonnet, Borgia and de Prie were excommunicated and deposed in Consistory on 24 October 1511, while Sanseverino and d’Albret were threatened with the same, if they continued to adhere to the Council of Pisa-Milan. The English crown (as far as the Latin secretary Ammonius indicates and de Grassis confirms), on the other hand, was under the impression on 28 November, however, that four of the five had been deprived and four are mentioned as being deprived in a bull of excommunication against adherents of France, dated July 1512. The amount of time between the initial citation by the dissident cardinals, publicised in Rimini on 28 May and the eventual deprivations suggests deliberate delay by Julius, so that he could enact them with the public support of his allies against France; \textit{ibid.}, 964 (LPI, 2002; 28 November 1511, Ammonius to Erasmus, London); D.S. Chambers, \textit{Cardinal Bainbridge}, p.45 n.2; L. Pastor, \textit{History of the Popes}, vi, pp.352, 374.

\textsuperscript{224} L. Pastor, \textit{History of the Popes}, vi, pp.373-374.
crown’s interests at this point. Back in England, however, one can note that Henry did not condemn the dissident cardinals when they approached him via a servant. This seems to have been a ploy to gain information, as the cardinals later complained that someone at the English end had forwarded their correspondence to the pope.

While Julius II was alive and committed to the anti-French project, Bainbridge and the English crown need not fear the absolution of the schismatic cardinals. However, Leo X’s election changed matters as, while he was eager for peace and sought to end the schism by bringing the dissident cardinals back into the fold, England was committed to invade France and acting against the schismatics was a significant *casus belli*. Fear of losing this major element of justification caused Henry VIII to write to Rome, as soon as news of Leo’s election reached England. He expressly instructed Bainbridge to oppose any restoration in April 1513; ‘though it may appear merciful, yet as, after the death of the present Pope, one of the schismatic cards may obtain the Papacy, who would favour the French in all things to the prejudice of all orthodox supporters of the Church, the King thinks it necessary that his Holiness should weigh this matter well, and do nothing without communication with the confederate princes’. Henry invoked the article of the Holy League, whereby no party would make peace with their enemies without consulting his allies and included the cardinals among their enemies. Bainbridge’s objections at the seventh session of the Lateran Council (17 June), at which the submissions of Cardinals Carvajal and Sanseverino were discussed, had little effect, despite support from Cardinal Lang, as

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225 *LPII*, 842 (7 August 1511, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory).
226 *Ibid.*, 625 (*LPI*, 1353; 25 November 1510, the cardinals at Pavia to Henry), 732 (*LPI*, 1581; 2 April 1511, the cardinals at Milan to Henry).
227 *Ibid.*, 1769 (*LPI*, 3876; *Ven. ii*, 238; 12 April 1513, Henry to Bainbridge, London). Henry VIII also seems to have lobbied Maximilian against the restitution of these cardinals, through Sir Robert Wingfield, around June 1513; *ibid.*, 2016 (*LPI*, 4274; Sir Robert Wingfield to Henry).
well from the Imperial and Spanish ambassadors. Bainbridge tried a last-ditch attempt to block this process on the 24th; having heard that Leo had sent for Carvajal and Sanseverino, he went to the pope, accompanied by his Spanish and Imperial counterparts and, according to Henry’s instructions, begged the pontiff not to do this ‘without the consent of all princes crystinyde frendes unto the churche’. Leo claimed that the matter was too far advanced, although he would not do anything about the French interdict without consulting his allies. Bainbridge notified Henry VIII of his failure in this affair the following day, although he argued that he had done his best and suggested that letters of thanks be sent to four cardinals in particular for their cooperation. The absolution and restoration took place on the 27th, although Bainbridge and Lang are alleged to have criticised the pope and did not turn up to the ceremony, arguing that it set a precedent for such behaviour (by the schismatics) and they left Rome as a result. This episode may not have been completely without consolation for England. Leo X was not prepared to withdraw support completely for Henry VIII’s invasion of France, so he confirmed the existing ecclesiastical censures against the enemies of the Church (France, as far as England was concerned) and threatened worse spiritual sanctions. It is a timely coincidence, therefore, that on

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228 L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.54-55. It was understood by Peter Martyr, in Spain on 19 May, that the two cardinals had surrendered to Leo X at Florence and were seeking their restoration; LPIi, 1902 (LPI, 4096; 19 May 1513, Peter Martyr to Ludovico Furtado, Valladolid).

229 Cardinals Riario, Vigerio, del Monte and Lang; LPIi, 2029 (LPI, 4283; 25 June 1513, Bainbridge to Henry).

230 LPI, 4371 (27 July 1513, Peter Martyr to Ludovico Furtado, Valladolid); LPIi, 2032 (LPI, 4287; 27 June 1513, de Castello to Henry, Rome); D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.47 and n.1; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.56-69. On the same day as the ceremony, Leo sent a brief to Henry notifying him of what had happened and enclosing a copy of their absolution and restitution; LPIi, 2030 (LPI, 4288; 27 June 1513, Leo to Henry, Rome). Significantly, it does not seem as if the restoration of these two was entirely complete. In December 1515, Matthew Lang informed the English diplomat Sir Robert Wingfield that Francis I had pressured Leo X, at their meeting at Bologna, to restore Cardinal Carvajal to all dignities that he held before he was deprived. This was of concern to the ‘bishop of Siguenza’ who benefited from Carvajal’s deprivation; while he understood that his see was safe when Carvajal was initially absolved and that, in any case, Ferdinand would not allow his restoration to the diocese in question. As Ferdinand was now dead and the bishop questioned Charles of Castle’s experience, he approached Henry to write letters to Charles and his chief minister in this regard; LPIi, 1347 (27 December 1515, Cardinal Schiner to [Robert Wingfield], ‘Ravespurgh’), 1748 (8 April 1516, bishop of Siguenza to Henry, ‘Majoreti’).
28 June, the pope wrote to James IV, declaring his annoyance at hearing of Scottish war preparations against England, impeding papal efforts towards universal peace and crusade, for which Henry was said to be enthusiastic. Finally, Leo told James that he was in no position to refuse the imposition of ecclesiastical censures against him and Scotland, if the English king asked (which he had). The coincidence in timing of this concession may therefore have been intended to placate Henry VIII’s expected discontent concerning the restored cardinals.

The absolution and restoration of the two French cardinals associated with Pisa-Milan, Briçonnet and de Prie, was delayed until April 1514. This seems to have been because Louis XII did not sign a declaration to renounce the Council of Pisa-Milan and adhere to Lateran V until 26 October 1513, and this was not ratified by the latter until its eighth session of 19 December. While Spinelly notified Henry of Imperial intelligence that Louis XII had offered to abandon the schismatic council as early as 29 June 1513, there is no indication that the other English representatives in Rome either anticipated or attempted to block this second reconciliation. Perhaps they did not expect success. Even if Henry and his ministers had been forewarned of this, they were under increasing pressure from Rome to make peace with France and by the beginning of 1514 were engaged in negotiations to this end. If the pope was so intent on peace, the English had little hope of preventing the absolutions, particularly given that the schismatic council had been renounced.

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231 LPIii, 2036 (28 June 1513, Leo to James IV, Rome).
232 L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, p.73 n.
233 The declaration was drawn up in Rome on 6 October by French diplomats in consultation with the papacy; ibid., pp.66-68, 71-72.
234 LPIi, 2038 (LPI, 4296; 29 June 1513, Spinelly to [Henry]).
235 See below pp.433 ff.
CONCLUSION

By the end of 1521, Henry VIII had finally achieved his aim to be recognised for the political role that he had been performing *vis-à-vis* the papacy since his accession: as its defender against France.\(^1\) While the honorary title bestowed on him, *fidei defensor*, has been traditionally attributed as a reward for the anti-Lutheran book alleged to have been penned by the king, it has been demonstrated that this was more the culmination of a longer-term strategy by the English crown (certainly going back as far as 1515, if not earlier) to gain formal recognition of its temporal policy towards Rome, specifically its attempts to protect the papacy and Papal States from the perceived threat of French hegemony in northern Italy.\(^2\)

The presentation of the *Assertio Septem Sacramentorum* to Leo X itself indicated this motivation, having been carefully orchestrated to coincide with the announcement of the Treaty of Bruges (1521), an Anglo-Imperial alliance committing both parties to war against France that directly addressed this issue (among others). Wolsey’s instructions to present the book were issued on the same day as the conclusion of this compact.\(^3\) This political underpinning of the award of ‘*fidei defensor*’ was stacked with problems for the future, however. Henry’s vociferous assertions of papal primacy as a ‘dutiful son’ of the Church would come back to haunt him in later years, when he sought to assert his own independence from papal authority and, *vis-à-vis* the *Assertio* at least, Henry would subsequently claim that

\(^1\) While Leo’s death prompted a delay of the bulls from being published and it took until 1524 for this to occur, at the end of this period, Henry and Wolsey understood that, to all intents and purposes, the title had been awarded and still hoped to gain possession of the relevant documents.

\(^2\) That is not to say that the 1521 move for a title was not linked to Henry’s anti-Lutheran actions, rather that this was part of Wolsey’s attempt to portray his king as a multi-faceted protector of Rome, given that attempts to gain such recognition by virtue of Henry’s temporal actions in defence of the papacy had been hitherto unsuccessful.

\(^3\) It has been argued that Wolsey identified the arrival in April 1521 of a bull ordering the burning of Lutheran texts as the opportunity to apply pressure for a title, given the crown’s prior failure to secure such an award in return for political actions alone. In addition during the ceremonies surrounding the bestowal of the *Assertio* to the pope, there is reference on both sides to Henry’s previous defence of the Church by ‘sword’ as well as the current format (by ‘pen’), which is subsequently recognised in the bull conveying the honorary title to Henry.
he had been coerced into writing it at the instance of the fallen Wolsey and others of his episcopate.⁴

As a fundamental guiding principal underlying the English crown’s political relationship with Rome during this time, defending the papacy from France was found to be a clear priority that was based on a broader and longstanding enmity with France that permeated English foreign policy throughout the period 1509-1522. Based on a full-scale reconstruction of the diplomatic narrative, albeit with a concentration on an Anglo-papal axis, this assessment has implications when considering its place alongside previous studies of Henrician foreign policy and could perhaps form the basis of a future reconsideration of this area, with a primary focus on how this preoccupation with its traditional enmity with France shaped other or even all external relations.⁵

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⁴ Certainly, given debate over Henry’s authorship and actual contribution to the book, Henry’s later claims are quite convincing, although it is unlikely that he was an unwilling participant, unable to grasp the implications of his actions and not in a position to say ‘no’ at any point. It has been argued here that Henry entered this process with his eyes open; this was a means to a clear end – an honorary title; J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp.111-113; also see pp.108-109, esp. n.109.

⁵ In particular, research into Anglo-papal political relations could be fruitful vis-à-vis England’s other ‘traditional’ enemy and ally of France, Scotland. During this study, Henry VIII’s concern with his northern neighbour has occasionally been highlighted in his contacts with Rome, for instance in his attempts to have ecclesiastical censures imposed on James IV and Scotland, circa 1512-1513. Unlike the mutual concern with France that England and the papacy shared, however, it would be expected that the dynamic would be weighted differently concerning Scotland. Given that Scotland was even more peripheral than England in geographical terms and it bore no direct political interest for Rome, one would probably find that the English crown did all of the running when seeking papal concessions against the Scots and that the papacy would be broadly reluctant to grant these. More generally speaking, this research sits slightly apart from previous studies on Henry VIII’s early foreign policy, albeit without fully contradicting them. It does not agree with Pollard’s overarching assertion, for instance, that Wolsey had England’s foreign policy mirror that of the papacy in his pursuit for the papal tiara, yet it does ascribe importance to papal considerations in shaping English foreign policy during this period. Similarly, this work does not directly disagree with Scarisbrick’s belief that Wolsey fostered a peace policy, not least because Wolsey’s rise coincided with the beginning of a recognition in England that the belligerent policy against France was not working (due to a lack of allies and so on), but goes further by positing that an anti-Gallic sentiment also permeated England’s peaces with France and that, by implication, Henry VIII was only at peace because it was not in his interest to be in conflict with France at that point. Vis-à-vis the more traditional ‘balance of power’ paradigm, this work also recognises some validity, particularly from the election of Charles V as emperor onwards, but again places a stronger stress on an underlying anti-French motivation in shaping this. While Henry and Wolsey went to great efforts to appear ‘neutral’ during these later years, they never fully sat on the fence; their modus operandi was always to oppose the political ascendancy of France, despite being forced to veil this approach through peaceful methods up to 1521. Gwyn, in particular, agrees with this idea. Furthermore, the ‘balance of power’ argument has never traditionally been applied to the early years of Henrician foreign policy and there has been no reason to dispute that here. Up to 1519, there were three ‘superpowers’ (France, the Holy Roman Empire and Spain), one too many for Henry VIII act as a ‘balance’ towards, but Charles of
found that this fear of augmenting French power on the Continent (and particularly in Italy) extended to a concern for how this would affect the papacy as a political entity and, consequently, as a source of spiritual authority. This was reinforced when subsequently considering how this affected the Anglo-papal relationship with regard to papal awards and censures, as well as England’s attempts to influence conclaves and membership of the Sacred College. As a motivation for shaping Anglo-papal political relations, this priority manifested itself as much in ‘offensive’ confederacies intended to physically defend the papacy and its territories from France as it did in peace agreements with the French. In the latter, the papacy (and its associated interests) tended to be named specifically, with the consequential hope that France would not threaten papal ‘independence’ by descending into Italy or moving against the Papal States, for instance. This *credo* was also found to have been expressed directly by crown sources, from April 1512 when Lancaster Herald declared war on Louis XII, pronouncing Henry duty ‘bound to defend the Church’, through to the end of the period when, while angling for an honorary title, this protection of Rome ‘by the sword’ was repeatedly alluded to.

While Henry envisaged it his duty as king to defend the Church generally, his focus against France (as opposed to, say, Spain or the Holy Roman Empire, who also held Italian interests) was rooted in a general antipathy towards ‘outsiders’ that was held by most contemporaries and could be seen, for instance, in widespread negative ‘national’ stereotypes. In England, the most extreme manifestation of this antipathy was a xenophobia reserved for a

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6 By implication, the Papal States were not deemed powerful enough to defend themselves against French incursions.
group widely considered to be the ‘natural enemy’, the French. While this sentiment permeated crown circles (including the king himself) as well as the population at large, it is clear that Henry VIII and his ministers were able to rein back at politically expedient times, for example at the Field of Cloth of Gold (1520), arguably demonstrating that such a stance was a deliberate or cynical policy. Nevertheless, even at such times when England was nominally at peace with France, an undercurrent of anti-Gallic fervour has still been detected and continued to motivate the king in his foreign policy and in his political relationship with Rome.

This overarching anti-French sentiment was shaped partly, it has been argued, by a combination of historical and geographical factors, particularly as the Hundred Years War remained unresolved as far as the English crown was concerned, not least in terms of its claim to the French throne (which crops up again and again when Henry sought conflict with France) and the fact that English continental possessions had long been reduced to the Calais region. If one also takes into account the chivalric commitment of Henry VIII and the young lay nobles around him, a clear context emerges whereby one can understand Henry’s desire to imitate the victories of his recent predecessors (particularly Henry V) in this manner. Consequently, it becomes increasingly understandable why, in Anglo-papal political relations, Henry VIII would focus on protecting the papacy from France, particularly when his chief enemy had actively pursued its claims in Italy since 1494. This raised the fear that the papacy was on the brink of another ‘Babylonish captivity’, as was perceived to have occurred during the late fourteenth- and early fifteenth-centuries, while the papacy was exiled in Avignon. The English crown endeavoured, therefore, to avoid this worst-case scenario by acting to protect the papacy from French political hegemony in northern Italy and, as it understood, the

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7 While these factors were treated in this study as a means to prove Henry VIII’s driving xenophobia against France, there is certainly room for further investigation of each. For Scarisbrick’s argument that Henry VIII sought to continue the Hundred Years War, see J.J. Scarisbrick, *Henry VIII*, esp. pp.21-40.
inevitable shadow that it would cast on the papacy’s temporal and wider independence. This situation was perceived as detrimental to the English political interest for a number of reasons, not least that the Church would subsequently be supportive of French foreign policy and be unable to commit to any anti-Gallic agenda. As the pope could (and post-1515 did) sanction French foreign policy by proclaiming it to be contributing towards the desire for a crusade to the East (usually in some preparatory fashion relating to ‘universal peace’), Henry VIII thus found it difficult to oppose France, particularly when his justification was in defence of a papacy that, publicly at least, did not need defending. The prospect of Louis XII or Francis I becoming what was often styled ‘monarch of the world’ in this way (and to be portrayed as the ‘Christian Turk’) led Henry to oppose French ambitions in Italy with all means at his disposal, albeit with his eye (and those of his advisors) remaining firmly on the English interest.

Clearly, this desire to defend the papacy from France could not have been advanced if it was not condoned by Rome. Indeed, the papacy acutely felt the effects of French power in northern Italy and, for most of the period, sought to avoid becoming partisan as a result, often seeking to solve this predicament by fostering the expulsion of French influence from the peninsula. As this interest was common to both England and Rome, contemporary popes repeatedly appealed to Henry VIII to act in a ‘protective’ capacity and encouraged him to think of himself as performing such a role against France. The earliest instance of this was

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8 While the post-Marignano papacy did still seek to oppose Francis I from late 1515 onwards, the degree of French dominance in Italy meant that it was unable to do so publicly until mid-1521.
9 It should be noted that the papacy was not just concerned with the prospect of French power in Italy; at various times during this period, it did not relish the prospect of being subject to Imperial or Spanish influence either. This was perhaps best demonstrated during the Imperial election process of 1519, when Leo X initially sided with Francis I over Charles of Castile as the lesser potential evil; he believed that Charles, if elected, posed the greater political threat to him in Italy. Later, Leo told Henry VIII that he only backed Francis’ candidacy because he anticipated the impossibility of the Frenchman’s election and hoped that they could combine to back a minor third-party candidate; see pp.653-673.
1510, when Julius II sought protection from the ‘extreme will of the French’.\(^\text{10}\) Equally, England’s other allies against France also played on Henry’s self-perception as *fidei defensor* when appealing for his backing against the Most Christian Kings. If they did not believe it would be successful, surely none of these parties would have played on this factor when pressing England to turn against the French.

From his accession, Henry believed that he could best ‘defend’ the papacy from France in a military sense, ideally a full-scale invasion led in person, but this soon broadened to encompass smaller expeditions that included the support of pre-existing border conflicts (such as that in which Burgundy was involved against the French-backed duke of Guelders) and raids (particularly on France’s northern coast), as well as fostering a latent threat by sabre-rattling. From late 1515 on, this policy widened again, as the English crown also began to explore the possibility of funding third parties (particularly the Swiss) to act against the French in Italy. *Vis-à-vis* the papacy, Henry VIII’s overarching aim in these actions was to safeguard papal ‘independence’ by the intended expulsion of French power from Italy. Through diversionary military actions in the north (both actual and threatened), he believed that he could (and did) contribute to this by causing his French rival to withdraw troops from or to fail to send reinforcements to the peninsula, in order to face the English threat, thus increasing the chances of anti-French forces in Italy (including the papacy) to achieve their ultimate aim.

In seeking to identify and explore the strategies by which the English crown sought to defend Rome from France, it became clear that these were subject to a number of clear limitations that not only shaped their initially belligerent format, but also caused them to diversify to incorporate the more peaceful methods apparent from 1515 on. These constraints

\(^{10}\) *Ven.ii*, 71 (*LPli*, 529; 15 July 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome).
were based largely on the distance from Italy and its perception of English military strength (or lack thereof) relative to that of its neighbouring ‘superpower’. Consequently, the English would not intervene directly in Italy (except through a third party), would not act unilaterally and would always require time to prepare for any military action. During the protracted process 1510-1512, for instance, when Henry VIII eventually adhered to his first coalition against France, he was restrained by his ministers from committing himself against Louis XII until all of these conditions were met.¹¹

While a belligerent approach to protecting the papacy from France persisted as Henry VIII’s preferred strategy throughout the period under study, the aforementioned constraints, combined with a decisive shift in the degree of French power in Italy, would force him to diversify his approach to include alternative means that could at least limit French power in Italy and influence over Rome.¹² The seeds of this policy change can be traced back to the watershed Battle of Marignano of 13-14 September 1515. This decisive defeat of anti-Gallic forces in Italy marked the beginning of a period of French dominance in the north of the peninsula and initially prompted a more concerted attempt by Henry to act there directly (via employed third parties). However, Henry VIII’s inability to act from afar and to intervene without allies soon made itself clear. The defeat of an English-funded, Imperial-Swiss expeditionary force, sent to expel the French from Milan in 1516, combined with the sustained lack of commitment from potential allies (including Rome) in response to subsequent English attempts to revive the offensive and organise coalitions ‘in defence of the

¹¹ In this instance, the conditions placed on Henry VIII (also including the need to produce an heir before he led an invasion in person, although this was later relaxed) was found to be the result of ministerial pressure; see pp.379-380 and passim.

¹² A forewarning of this prospect occurred during the 1513 invasion of France which, despite the caution exercised to amass a committed coalition, saw Henry receive only very limited support from the emperor and nominal backing from the new pope, Leo X; the anti-Gallic impetus in Italy (and Spain) had evaporated, following the expulsion of French forces from the peninsula that resulted from the Battle of Ravenna (1512). Sustained papal pressure towards peace from late 1513 left England with little choice but to negotiate with Louis XII; England could not continue the struggle alone, particularly when the pope that he sought to defend had removed the casus belli.
Church’, caused the English crown to rethink its strategy by 1517. Consequently, Henry and Wolsey envisaged that they would ‘defend’ Rome by more peaceful means; by seeking reconciliation with France, with a view to keeping Francis I from crossing the Alps and, therefore, away from the papacy. This was also pursued largely to the exclusion of the papacy. Through a veneer of friendship, the English crown kept the French king’s focus away from Italy for most of this time, particularly through the Treaty of London, the great set-piece of meetings of 1520, especially that with Francis, and the Calais Conference of 1521. Beneath these, however, the anti-French agenda was never far away and, even during the Field of Cloth of Gold, Henry and Wolsey entertained hostile overtures from Charles V concerning France. The reconciliation strategy was to fail because of the Hapsburg-Valois rivalry that resulted from Charles’ becoming emperor in 1519, which left Christendom dominated by two ‘superpowers’ with conflicting Italian interests: Charles wanted to be crowned in Rome and Francis coveted Naples. It was almost inevitable that political focus would return to Italy and demand that Henry VIII play his part (against France) to protect a vulnerable papacy. Thus, this period ends with Henry’s commitment to the Treaty of Bruges, along with Charles V and Leo X, with a view to another full-scale invasion of France in 1523 but this time as ‘fidei defender’. Incidentally, Henry and Wolsey’s ability to restrain any anti-French sentiments when required and adapt their policy to defend the papacy from France as circumstances

13 It is tempting to link Wolsey’s increasing influence with this diversification in English policy from 1515 on, particularly given that he was the main conduit for Anglo-papal correspondence (other than the king) by June of this year and is widely deemed to have taken a principal role in foreign policy (alongside Henry) from around the same time. In terms of the ‘peace’ methods employed towards France, it has been found that these were not entirely new, such as the Anglo-French peace of March 1510, along with proposals during 1515 for a meeting with Francis I and a joint Anglo-French attack on Navarre. Compared to 1517 on, however, these early instances were both inconsistent and unsuccessful (in terms of restraining the French from Italy). It could be suggested, therefore, that Wolsey helped to develop a more concerted peace strategy with France, in order to prevent any further increase of French power in Italy (and over the papacy). Indeed, the lead taken by Wolsey in negotiating the Treaty of London, along with the role he played in arranging and attending the subsequent meetings and conferences certainly offer a convincing line of argument to follow, although further investigation would be required to verify this.
dictacted, could perhaps indicate a degree of cynicism in their approach, rather than an ideological rigidity that may have seen them constantly seek all-out war against France. It would have been unlikely, however, that neither possessed sufficient political pragmatism to realise when it was or was not in their interest to pursue the anti-Gallic cause.

While it would be expected that the English desire to defend the papacy from France would continue in the same vein for several years after this period and within the limitations outlined, beginning with Surrey’s raids in northern France during 1522, an interesting test would be expected to arise from 1525-1527 onwards, as the Battle of Pavia and the Sack of Rome (along with the ‘capture’ of Clement VII) gave rise to Imperial hegemony in Italy, which may have challenged the English perception of France as the greatest threat to Rome’s political independence. While prior to 1522, the old anti-French xenophobia, including that vis-à-vis Rome, had been an uncomplicated affair, the rise of Charles V as a ‘superpower’ to rival Francis I would certainly test the extent to which Henry’s desire to defend the faith from France was genuine. This would certainly require further reconstruction of the narrative beyond the limits of this study. At a cursory glance, Scarisbrick portrays Henry to be opposed to this new Imperial predominance, particularly following Charles V’s occupation of Rome (the pope effectively a prisoner in Castel S. Angelo), albeit he was reluctant to act against the emperor in accordance with his alliance with Francis I. Indeed, the continued preoccupation with the French ‘threat’ seems to have led to an unrealistic plan whereby Wolsey would oversee a caretaker papal government at Avignon until this situation was resolved.14 Another factor that would be expected to affect English policy in seeking to defend Rome from France would be the rise of Henry VIII’s marital dispute from the later 1520s and his subsequent

attempts to assert himself as a ‘Catholic’ king outside of papal control.15 Again, this would be expected to influence the relatively uncomplicated anti-French xenophobia that had hitherto underlain English foreign policy towards the Holy See and could make a valid contribution to Reformation scholarship.

Having identified and explored the framework for Henry VIII’s attempts to protect the papacy’s political ‘independence’ from France during this period, the nature of this motivation was further tested by focusing on several aspects of the Anglo-papal relationship in which this was found to be highlighted. Vis-à-vis honourary papal awards, in demonstrating that the title fidei defensor was as much the result of the English king’s fulfilling this role against France as it was for engaging in theological argument with Luther, it was found that the English crown had been lobbying directly for such formal recognition since early 1515 and that this move was the cumulative result of earlier exchanges between England and Rome concerning other papal awards, all of which have been linked to recognition of this defensive role. This began with the Golden Rose of 1510, continued with papal lure of a brief translating Louis XII’s territories and titles to Henry in 1512, for which the English strove unsuccessfully to induce publication, and also included the blessed sword and hat of 1513-1514, which may have been intended as a sop instead of the French titles.16 Furthermore, it was demonstrated that the papacy was as complicit in touting such honorary awards in return for English political backing concerning France as Henry VIII was in seeking them.

16 While Burns and Mitchell have connected individual awards with English foreign policy vis-à-vis France, this study has gone a step further to suggest that they all link together to form a timeline that resulted in Henry VIII seeking and gaining that of fidei defensor; C.H. Burns, ‘Papal Gifts and Honours for the Earlier Tudors’, MHP, 50, pp.173-197; M. Mitchell, ‘Works of Art from Rome for Henry VIII’ JWC, 34, pp.178-203.
In terms of papal censures, the English crown fully recognised their politicisation by Rome and expected to benefit from their threat and imposition when supporting the papacy against France. Equally, the papacy (and other anti-French confederates) recognised the utility of spiritual weapons as an inducement to encourage English commitment against France. By virtue of the pope being an ally, such spiritual weapons could add justification to a war, be employed as propaganda among one’s own population, encourage allies to observe the treaties that they had joined, hopefully reduce the military threat posed by the enemy (if opponents chose to avoid, say, the risk of excommunition by association) and help facilitate economic sanctions. In this sphere there was, however, something of a contradictory stance adopted on both the English and papal sides. While Henry VIII was an enthusiastic proponent of papal censures against France (and its allies), he did not fully impose the economic sanctions that these permitted when they affected English interests, particularly concerning certain favoured ‘French’ merchants or products. With regards to the risk of papal censure to himself, Henry both deemed himself immune to all potential spiritual weapons (according to common law) and ignored papal censures imposed on others when it suited his interests, as he did with the Venetian interdict of 1509-1510 (the republic being a powerful potential ally against the French in Italy). Nevertheless, the English king remained wary of the prospect of a ‘French’ papacy employing censures against him and consequently sought to avoid political situations where this prospect could arise. In particular, Henry resisted Leo X’s universal peace overtures from 1517 on, whereby it was envisaged that a crusading initiative could be adapted to Francis I’s interests (enabling him to pursue ambitions in Italy or against England), inducing Leo to employ spiritual weapons in support of these. In terms of the nature of Henry VIII’s defending the papacy from France, one can certainly detect a degree of cynicism in his attitude towards such censures; on the one hand, he was eager for their imposition against
France when acting as a ‘loyal’ son of the Church but, on the other, would be selective in their implementation and, in any case, deemed himself impervious to their effects and did not observe them when they were wielded against friendly states. Henry could easily justify ignoring the latter by considering the pope to have been subject to French coercion when the censures were imposed, but it should be noted that the English crown did not publicly or vocally oppose them. Henry VIII’s contradictory stance may well have been influenced by Rome’s own ambiguous approach towards the employment of spiritual weapons in the political sphere. While it was clear that the papacy induced English support against France through censures, it was traditionally hesitant about wielding them against heads of state generally and reluctant during this period to follow through with them against both the kings of France and Scotland at Henry’s behest; this was demonstrated particularly in the 1512 brief whereby Julius II deposed Louis XII and invested Henry VIII with his territories and titles, which neither Julius nor his successor ever looked likely to publish, despite the best efforts of Cardinal Bainbridge.

While Henry’s attempts to influence the outcome of papal elections reveal a strong anti-French imperative up to 1522, they also highlight his limited ability to actually make a difference during the conclaval process. As confined his efforts to defend the papacy in general against France, he was subject to the same broad limitations in this sphere: distance and relative lack of political influence. This time, distance affected Henry’s ability to react quickly to news of a pope’s death in terms of communications and the lack of an English ‘party’ to rival that of France (and also those of the Empire and Spain) would always be a disadvantage. In spite of these constraints, Henry and his ministers still believed that they ought to act preemptively to prevent the election of a candidate contrary to the English interest and that, to some extent, they could affect the outcome of conclaves. Discussions
concerning the choice of the crown nomination could become heated as was the case in 1511 and, if the timeframe was deemed feasible, instructions were issued from England for crown representatives to lobby for the election of a particular candidate.\(^{17}\) Indeed, contrary to Chambers’ assertions, it has been argued that Wolsey’s nomination during 1521-1522 was intended as a serious tilt at the papal tiara, even if it was always going to be a ‘long shot’.\(^{18}\) Whether in receipt of recent instructions or not, English diplomats in Rome did their utmost to secure the success of an anti-French (and, invariably, a pro-English) nominee, often in combination with other like-minded diplomats.\(^{19}\) They were seemingly empowered to offer money and benefices to potential voters and, if participating in conclave itself, could engage in espionage (as Bainbridge was detected doing in 1513). Crown representatives in Rome tended to be more realistic about their ability to affect papal elections than their superiors in England, insomuch that they tended to back an anti-French cardinal that was also deemed to be *papabile*. As in his attitude towards papal censures, a cynicism can perhaps again be highlighted in Henry VIII’s approach towards influencing papal elections; he was not prepared to allow the ballot to be determined by the ‘Holy Spirit’ and risk an outcome to his political detriment. It must be noted, however, that Henry was not alone in doing this; all parties, including fellow princes and the voting members of the Sacred College were playing the same ‘game’.

Finally, Henry VIII’s attempts to influence the composition of the Sacred College again reiterate a strong correlation with the lengths he went to to be recognised as *fidei defensor* against France. The rigid (and successful) insistence that Wolsey become a cardinal

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\(^{17}\) Or candidates; during 1521-1522, a second-choice was advocated in case the first failed or was deemed to have no chance of success.

\(^{18}\) For Chambers, see D.S. Chambers, ‘Cardinal Wolsey and the Papal Tiara’, *BIHR*, 38, pp.20-30.

\(^{19}\) It seems that there was an impetus within crown circles to back the same candidates as the emperor during this period. Wolsey pushed for Maximilian’s nominee de Castello in 1511, Wolsey himself was to be supported by both Charles and Henry during 1521-1522, while John Clerk, unaware of this agreement in Rome, worked alongside the Imperial orator in lobbying for Giulio de’ Medici.
in 1515 before Henry would join the papal-led coalition against France demonstrated the efficacy of the political leverage held by the English over Rome at this point.\textsuperscript{20} The papal concession of creating an English cardinal at this time sent out a strong political message concerning Rome’s anti-Gallic (and pro-English) credentials. Similarly, Julius II’s elevation of Bainbridge in 1511 was a clear attempt to induce English adhesion to and observance of the incipient Holy League against France. Despite these ‘successes’ in the anti-Gallic context, Henry VIII’s ability to affect membership of the Sacred College was otherwise limited; there was only one English cardinal at any given time which, it was stipulated by Rome, must be the king’s principal minister. Furthermore, the crown was rebuffed by the papacy when it did lobby for the creation of a second ‘English’ cardinal during this period, Henry’s longstanding curial representative Silvester de Giglis between 1518 and 1521.\textsuperscript{21} That this lack of leverage was recognised in England is perhaps suggested by the crown’s failure to build on the foundation stone of permanent diplomatic representation established in Rome by Bainbridge, following the latter’s death in 1514.\textsuperscript{22} Also, despite a desire to block, suspend or deprive French (and pro-French) candidates if the opportunity arose, Henry was further limited in his ability to affect the papacy. In the instances detected, the English had no success. The implication is, therefore, that Henry VIII’s influence of the composition of the College of Cardinals was limited to the occasional elevation of an Englishman and only seemingly when the papacy sought English support against France.

Overall, this focus on aspects of the Anglo-papal relationship both reinforces and goes beyond supporting the broader argument that Henry VIII went to great lengths to act as the papacy’s loyal defender against France in the temporal sphere, albeit within the confines of

\textsuperscript{20} That is in spite of this arguably being a poor decision in hindsight, given the crushing victory of anti-French forces that occurred shortly after at the Battle of Marignano.

\textsuperscript{21} Although de Giglis was Italian, he was widely recognised for his long association with the English crown.

\textsuperscript{22} Henry reverted to his father’s practice of using Italian curials, although English-born diplomats, such as Clerk and Pace, did continue to visit Rome for extended periods.
the English ‘interest’, even to the extent of his attempting pre-emptive actions when the prospect of a conclave arose. They further highlight Henry’s strong desire to be recognised and rewarded for this, as well as his concern that he be actively supported by the papacy while he performed this role. In this sense, he expected the popes to invoke various aspects of papal ‘spiritual’ authority in an overtly politicised way. The study of these contacts has also revealed how the papacy deliberately cultivated and exploited Henry’s self-perception at times when it sought English support in its own dealings with France; sometimes unobtainable concessions were offered and on other occasions these were achievable and actually awarded. Both parties actively played on their mutual concern for France and tried to assert whatever political leverage they believed they held over each other at any given time. While Henry VIII clearly secured concessions and gained formal recognition of his anti-French role from the armoury of papal authority on a number of occasions up to 1522, these rarely came easily and he sometimes struggled to capitalise on his strength as a counterweight to France. England’s political influence vis-à-vis Rome would always be limited by its being a relatively small kingdom located on the outer-reaches of Christendom; it lacked the strength and ability (possessed by France) to coerce the papacy more directly. This juxtaposition was clearly demonstrated in Henry’s efforts to seek the title fidei defensor; the fact that Henry had to branch out into the ‘spiritual’ sphere to be rewarded for his ‘temporal’ actions hints at the longer struggle he had in getting to that point. Even from the death of Leo X, through the subsequent conclave and beyond, Henry laboured to gain publication of the titular bulls, the political imperative having been lost. Nevertheless, recognition and concessions were potentially available and could be achieved if the pope needed English

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23 It would be interesting to compare the English and French experiences of levering concessions from Rome during this period, particularly in terms of how strongly Francis I was able to influence the papacy in the aftermath of the Battle of Marignano (1515).

24 One cannot help but wonder whether Henry envied the Most Christian Kings’ ability to influence the papacy in this manner.
support enough. While there is some suggestion that Henry VIII may have cynically employed his desire to defend the papacy from France, such as his ability to rein in his anti-Gallic sentiments at politically expedient moments, his selective observance of papal censures and in his attempts to affect the outcome of papal elections, it is difficult to assess the extent to which this may or may not have been underpinned by religious commitment.
APPENDIX:

NARRATIVE, 1509-1522
PHASE I
HENRY VIII FULFILS HIS AMBITION TO ATTACK FRANCE IN ‘DEFENCE’ OF THE CHURCH, UNTIL A LACK OF ALLIES AND A WITHDRAWAL OF PAPAL SUPPORT FORCE HIM TO PEACE: 1509-1514

Henry VIII is initially unable to act against France on account of the League of Cambrai (1508) against Venice: 22 April 1509 – September 1509

On 22 April 1509, Henry VIII inherited a kingdom whose government had been hitherto, while perhaps not at odds with the papacy in temporal matters, at least in tacit opposition to its political direction. Julius II had recently ratified the League of Cambrai (on 23 March). This confederacy, also comprising the Empire, France and Spain (the latter then a union of the kingdoms of Aragon and Castile under control of Ferdinand I), was formed ostensibly to regain lands ‘lost’ by each power to the Venetian republic, and was about to embark on a major offensive against the maritime state. Papal membership of the league was driven exclusively by temporal objectives and Julius II, just like his allies, aggressively sought territorial gains and, in fact, achieved considerable initial success. England under Henry VII had rejected papal attempts to gain his adhesion to the League of Cambrai, principally through Julius’ appealing to the notion of the crusade. This was at least partly

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1 The two treaties comprising the league were originally concluded on 10 December 1508. The pope procrastinated over confirming his membership of the league until 23 March (Creighton suggests the 25th), as he was not comfortable with throwing his lot in with France (as will later become apparent). When a pre-emptive Venetian submission sought by Rome was not forthcoming, Julius II dragged his feet over the league’s ratification, holding out for a change of heart by the republic. He also, allegedly feared that Louis XII would betray him and attack the Papal States instead; F.J. Baumgartner, *Louis XII*, pp.191-192; M. Creighton, *History of the Papacy*, v, pp.116-117; L. Pastor, *History of the Popes*, vi, p.310; C. Shaw, *Julius II*, pp.233-234.

2 One of the Cambrai treaties concentrated on solving disputes between Louis XII and Maximilian, while the other pledged a collaborative war against Venice before 1 April 1509; C. Shaw, *Julius II*, pp.229-232; J.J. Scarisbrick, *Henry VIII*, p.24.

3 Papal forces quickly made progress in the Romagna and, in the wake of the Venetian rout at Agnadello on 14 May, the republic ceded Cervia, Faenza, Ravenna and Rimini to Julius II; C Shaw, *Julius II*, pp.232-236.

4 Julius II had invoked his spiritual role to induce English membership of the confederacy through a papal brief that appears to have arrived with Henry VII not long before his death, whereby the English king was invited ‘to
motivated by the English crown’s fear for the repercussions of the republic’s potential destruction; in particular, the advent of a powerful French presence in Italy and its by-product, a ‘French’ papacy. At Henry VIII’s accession, one can perhaps detect a degree of papal suspicion that England’s non-participation in the Cambrai coalition might manifest itself into some sort of active support for Venice. This is reflected in the first correspondence to be received by Henry VIII from Rome, although it was almost certainly written before

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5 Henry VIII, in a letter to Ferdinand (dated 1 November 1509), asserted that his main reasons for objecting to the war were that it was unbecoming of Christian princes to attack a state with such a high reputation and also that Venice provided a wall against the Turks that would be useful in a future crusade; Sp.ii, 25 (LPIi, 221; 1 November 1509, Henry to Ferdinand). This fails to take into account, however, Henry VIII’s early, public, anti-French rhetoric and his belief that the French were the root cause of this league; see n.11. Concerning trade as a partial motivation for the crown’s Venetian sympathies, as Chambers agrees, this can be traced largely to a desire for the the continuing visits of the Flanders galleys. This fleet was a fairly regular visitor to England during peacetime, but it had, as Henry VIII was doubtless aware, ceased during times of war during his father’s reign, such as in 1497. Such was their perceived significance at this time that Henry VII wrote personally to the republic to request they be sent; Ven.i, 735 (28 January 1497, Almoro Pisani, Venetian Consul in London, and Piero Contarini to Venice), 736 (22 March 1497, letters from Henry VII to the Signory). That the prospect of the Flanders galleys not coming in 1509 was of concern to Henry VIII is indicated by his inquiry about this to the Venetians, a reply to which is recorded in a letter from the Doge and Senate of 6 August 1509. In this, they informed Henry that they wanted to send the fleet, but the actions of the Cambrai confederacy made it too dangerous, instead encouraging the English king to intervene in the conflict so that the voyages could resume; ibid. ii, 8 (LPIi, 140; 6 August 1509, doge and Senate to Badoer), 12 (LPIi, 169; 14 or 15 September 1509, doge and Senate to Badoer). This intervention came in the form of letters written to some of the Cambrai confederates, requesting them to grant safe conducts to the galleys or to desist from molesting them. Henry seems to have approached Maximilian and Louis XII some time before 23 October 1509 (LPIi 189; 23 October 1509). Also see Sp.ii, 25-26 (LPIi, 221; 1 November 1509, Henry to Ferdinand), 27 (LPIi, 253; 18 or 28 November 1509, Ferdinand to Catherine of Aragon); Ven.ii, 52 (30 January 1510, Henry to Maximilian), 61 (LPIi, 413; 30 March 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London), 66 (LPIi, 450; 30 April 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London), 67 (LPIi, 463; 18 May 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London), D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.9; see above pp.220-221.
knowledge of his father’s death had reached the Curia. In the course of a pro-papal news report on the confederacy’s initial successes against Venice that predicted the latter’s imminent demise, Girolamo Bonvisi, ‘the King’s beloved solicitor’, probably writing under instruction from Julius II, appears to issue an implicit admonition against any English reaction. He reported the papal censures placed on Venice on 27 April 1509 and enclosed a copy of the relevant bull, exemplifying just before this the submission to the pope of the Orsini who had initially intended to support Venice. In effect, Julius II, in whose interests the bull was sent to England for publication, had indirectly, by virtue of the contagious nature of ecclesiastical weapons, issued a tacit threat of censure against the king of England. While this letter does not definitively demonstrate papal hostility towards England at this time, it is probably fair to say that political relations between crown and papacy were in a sort of limbo when Henry VIII became king. How the relationship would progress in this sphere depended a great deal on the character and contribution of the new monarch and those he chose to be his principal advisors. However, in the short-term, there was little that Henry could do to affect the papacy’s contribution to the League of Cambrai, even if he did oppose it; England was not powerful enough to act alone, it could not engage in direct military action in northern Italy and its diplomatic presence in Rome was negligible.

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6 This seems to have been the first contact between Rome and England, since Henry VII declined the pope’s request to send an ambassador to discuss England’s joining the league; *Ven.i*, 942 (*LPl* 17; 3-4 April 1509, letters from Rome to the Signory).

7 *LPl* 9 (*LPf*, 11; 30 April 1509, Bonvisi to Henry VII, Rome); see above pp.207-208. Bonvisi’s multiple roles and loyalties make it unclear which ‘hat’ he was wearing when writing this letter. He was also employed as a papal notary and was a subordinate of the most likely candidate for English cardinal protector, Francesco Alidosi, the latter himself who was also the favourite and right-hand man of Julius II. It later turned out that both Alidosi and Bonvisi were Francophiles and the latter’s espionage with the French ambassador was detected when Bonvisi visited England in 1511; see pp.30-32 (n.72, 74), 58.

8 Even if Henry hoped to intervene by attacking France, time would be needed to prepare for such a campaign. For the available options open to England vis-à-vis acting in Italy, see pp.113 ff. For the relatively poor standard of diplomatic representation maintained in Rome at this time by England, see D.S. Chambers, *Cardinal Bainbridge*, pp.11-12.
News of Henry VII’s death reached Rome around 3-4 May 1509 and the pope deemed the news significant enough to announce in a special Consistory. It is feasible that the political implications arising from this were discussed in this meeting, not least due to England’s ambiguous position concerning the Venetian war. Perhaps more ominously, the republic’s source in Rome also reported intelligence received about the political disposition of the new king, that he was so hostile towards France that he would undoubtedly invade his neighbour. Such information would have been of concern to Julius II, as it had the potential to threaten, or at least impact upon, the league’s military actions in Italy; an English invasion of France could pull French troops from the peninsula and thus dilute the strength of the league. No immediate reaction appears to have issued from the papacy, however, Julius II perhaps choosing to wait for confirmation of any English military build-up before taking any action.

Initial reports reaching Rome concerning Henry’s belligerent disposition were quickly confirmed and would have indicated that the new king’s vocal enmity against France would preclude any hope that he may have harboured about gaining the new king as a confederate against Venice. Further hostile sentiments may have been stirred with the king and his inner

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9 Ven.i, 942 (LPli 17; 3-4 April 1509, letters from Rome to the Signory). The author reports this intelligence to have come from the Bonvisi bank at Lucca, contained in letters from its London branch. While it is unclear whether Henry VIII’s anti-French sentiments were known by papal sources or not, it is likely that they were, given the public nature of his comments. Also, the letters came through the Bonvisi bank, which may well have been linked to the papal notary with the same name who was employed in English diplomatic service. Secondly, the Venetians in Rome, in receipt of such intelligence that favoured their cause, would doubtless have capitalised on it by informing the pope or his subordinates.

10 See above pp.114-115.

11 Even before his father’s death, Henry VIII was portrayed by the Venetian ambassador, Badoer, in letters to his government, as being an enemy of France and willing to attack his neighbour. Indeed, it was reported by Venetian merchants that Henry, straight after his coronation, swore to attack France; Ven.i, 941 (LPli, 5; 25 April 1509, Badoer to the Venetian Signory, London; 26 April, private letters from merchants, London). Venetian sources in England, principally Badoer, continued export such a view home in subsequent months; see for example; Ven.i 942 (LPli, 17, 3-4 May 1509, letters from Rome to Venice), 943 (26 April 1509, letters from merchants, London), 945 (15 April 1509, Badoer to the Signory, London); Ven. ii, 1 (LPli 7; 26, 28 April 1509, Badoer to the Signory, London). The Venetian conviction was such that, from as early as 28 April 1509 and for the rest of the year, Henry VIII was lobbied by Venice to invade France unilaterally and so pull French forces from Italy. This pressure was stepped up when Venice understood Henry’s anti-French disposition and was sustained at least up to December 1509; Ven.i, 941 (28 April 1509, Signory to Badoer), 944 (16 May 1509, Signory to Badoer); Ven.ii, 2 (LPli, 53; 30 May 1509, Signory to Badoer), 8 (LPli, 140; 6 August 1509, Signory to Badoer), 9-10 (LPli, 154; 30 August 1509, Signory to Badoer), 12 (LPli, 169; 14 or 15 September 1509,
circle when they heard, from Venetian sources, complaints that the pope’s treatment of them in this war was ‘contrary to all equity and justice, and utterly unmerited’. Furthermore, they were told that the papal army was ‘perpetrating against Christians such cruelties that greater could not be committed by Infidels’. While Henry and his advisors probably perceived this to be indicative of the pope’s exercising a temporal policy in the same way as any other prince, they seem to have believed the republic’s assertions that Julius II had been coerced into these actions by Louis XII and, further, that he would declare his enmity to the Most Christian king if England attacked France. This reasoning may well explain the contradiction in English policy that becomes apparent, in opposing papal actions, while retaining cordial relations with the Apostolic See. Indeed, the belief that Julius II was being coerced by the French (or at least was in a position that meant his actions were constrained by

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Signory to Badoer), 24 (LPI, 278; 21 December 1509, Signory to Badoer); LPI, 33 (16 May 1509, motion passed in Venice to write to Henry VIII). One could argue that Venetian sources may have exaggerated the extremity of Henry’s xenophobia, particularly as the isolated state was desperately looking for any signs of potential opposition to the French, whom it perceived as responsible for the League of Cambrai. Nevertheless, one incident involving Henry’s berating a French envoy who had turned up in August 1509, in response to a letter requesting peace, written apparently under crown authority but without Henry’s knowledge, appears to be quite convincing in conveying this view. The likes of Chambers and Scarisbrick also accept this incident at face-value. Furthermore, the summoning of Parliament in October 1509 (to meet the following January) to discuss French affairs, according to Badoer, is another suggestion of Henry’s belligerence. The Venetian also claimed that the king told him shortly after his coronation that he would do this. It is widely accepted that Henry was in no great financial need at this point (having a considerable legacy from his father) and so it would have been natural to interpret the summons in terms of the king’s desire to go to war and raising the extraordinary revenues needed to wage it; Ven.i, 936 (24 April 1509, Signory to Badoer); Ven.ii, 7 (LPI 98; 3 July 1509, Badoer to the Signory, London), 11 (LPI 156; August 1509, Badoer to the Signory, London), 22 (LPI, 230; 9 November 1509, Badoer to the Signory, London); LPI, 205 (17 October 1509), 219 (LPI, 613; 1 November 1509); D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.22; J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp.24-26. It could also be posited that Henry’s belligerent rhetoric was a clever ruse designed to ensure that the French crown continued to pay him the lucrative pension (such as that due in July 1509) that was payable twice a year, an arrangement renewed in the Treaty of Étaples of 1492. It will be seen later, however, that even this was not enough to prevent Henry breaking with France, although it may have contributed to its timing. For the French pension, see for example LPI, 1181 (ibid., 535; LPI, 318; 22 July 1510), 1182 (LPI, 538, 22 July 1510). For the English preparedness to drop the pension when convenient, see pp.387-389. Overall, this idea of Henry VIII as being belligerently anti-French from the moment of his accession, has been widely adopted by historians looking in any depth at English foreign policy during this period. See, for example, J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, p.24; R.B. Wernham, Before the Armada, p.78.

12 Ven.ii, 9 (LPI, 154; 30 August 1509, Signory to Badoer).

13 The ambassador was to communicate this to Henry and ‘all such leading members of the Privy Council as shall seem fit to him’; ibid., 12 (LPI, 169; 15 September 1509, Signory to Badoer). Also see a similar statement in a dispatch to England of April 1509; Ven.i, 936 (24 April 1509, Signory to Badoer).

14 Ven.i, 936 (24 April 1509, doge and Senate to Badoer); Ven.ii, 9 (LPI, 154; 30 August 1509, Signory to Badoer), 12 (LPI, 169; 15 September 1509, Signory to Badoer).
them) may have provided some justification for Henry VIII to ignore the ecclesiastical
censures fulminated against Venice.\textsuperscript{15}

Uncertainty about English intentions and news of Henry VIII’s anti-French stance perhaps induced the pope to despatch a nuncio to England in July 1509. While Girolamo Bonvisi’s remit was to smooth out issues arising from Thomas Ruthal’s provision to the see of Durham, there is no reason why this could not have been done in Rome or through existing nuncios in England.\textsuperscript{16} It seems feasible, therefore, that Bonvisi was sent to England to ascertain the political intentions of the new king. Papal suspicion and/or uncertainty of Henry VIII’s projected foreign policy would not have been helped around the beginning of July 1509, when the Venetian ambassadors seeking peace with Julius II proposed an agreement that included England, thereby implying the latter’s friendship.\textsuperscript{17} Papal ignorance of English foreign policy direction was further demonstrated by rumours circulating Rome around mid-August 1509; that England and Scotland had made a joint attack on France prompting Louis XII’s return across the Alps.\textsuperscript{18} Furthermore, the contents of a letter from the other English solicitor in Rome at this time, Christopher Fisher, around September 1509, suggests that the

\textsuperscript{15} See above pp.212-222.
\textsuperscript{16} Letters of credence were issued by Julius II and Cardinal Alidosi, respectively. Curiously, that from Alidosi does not mention Durham and only states that Bonvisi wished to live in England; \textit{LPl}, 100 (\textit{LPI}, 267; 6 July 1509, Julius to Henry, Rome), 111 (\textit{LPI}, 300; 15 July 1509, Alidosi to [Henry], Milan).
\textsuperscript{17} Spain and Hungary were also to be included in the peace that Venice instructed its orators to put forward on 29 June. It is not known whether Henry VIII approved his inclusion in this plan or was even aware of it, as no mention of it has been found in the English sources, although one would suppose that he would not object to his incorporation in any projected peace; \textit{LPl} 90 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 6; 29 June 1509, Signory to the six Venetian ambassadors in Rome). It is unclear whether the proposal was actually made to the pope, as the ambassadors found it difficult enough to gain access to the pontiff. Even when the envoys did speak with Julius II, he was not ready to negotiate with them; rather he demanded that Venice agree to excessively harsh terms. Nevertheless, it is probable that the Venetians did make some sort of proposal at some point; C. Shaw, \textit{Julius II} (1996), pp.237-239.
\textsuperscript{18} \textit{LPl}, 147 (22 August 1509, Paulo Capello to Philip Capello, Rome). This rumour had probably grown out of the confirmation of the 1502 treaty between England and Scotland on 29 June, as well as the commissioning of a Scottish ambassador in July to go into England to conclude a perpetual peace and settle border disputes. The latter treaty did not come into being until 19 August 1509; \textit{LPl} 88 (\textit{ibid.}, 94:107; \textit{LPI}, 234; 31 October 1509), 114 (\textit{LPI}, 475; 19 July 1509), 129 (\textit{LPI}, 369; 30 July 1509, James IV to Henry, ‘oure Abbay of Haly Croce beside Edingburgh’), 153 (\textit{LPI}, 474-475; 29 August 1509); \textit{LPI}, 478 (29 August 1509). The rumour may also have been exacerbated by the Venetian belief that Louis XII had left Milan to cross the Alps back to France; \textit{Ven.ii}, 8 (\textit{LPl}, 140; 6 August 1509, Signory to Badoer).

364
crown may not have contacted him since Henry VIII had come to the throne; he was unaware whether he would retain his office.\textsuperscript{19} If so, this would have implied English opposition to current papal foreign policy and would have contributed to the lack of papal understanding of its intentions. It may also betray the new English regime’s decision to remain aloof from the current political situation, being in no position to affect it (yet). In the early months of the reign, therefore, Henry VIII’s political relationship with the papacy reflected wider English foreign policy. In spite of the king’s vocal hostility towards France, then an ally of Rome, and apparent opposition to papal intentions against Venice, albeit blamed on French coercion, and particularly manifesting itself in his refusal to allow the publication of ecclesiastical censures against the republic, Henry was unable to act, in the short-term, to prevent Louis XII from gaining control of northern Italy and gaining \textit{de facto} political influence over the papacy.

\textbf{English pressure on Julius II to break with France, September 1509 – February 1510}

English inaction ceased from around September 1509, however, as Henry sought to meet conditions imposed by his senior councillors for going to war. In the first instance, Henry VIII sought to renew existing peace treaties with his neighbours, while seeking a diplomatic resolution to the threat against Venice (thereby attempting to break-up the League of Cambrai) and sounding out relevant powers about an anti-French coalition. Once domestic security had been achieved, the coalition against Venice dissolved and potential commitments for an anti-French confederacy gained, the next stage of the councillors’ plan could begin; the development of an anti-French league.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{19} Fisher seems to have written at least twice to the recipient of this piece, who we know as ‘his Lordship’, and to the king at least once (‘six or seven lines’), but he does not acknowledge receipt of any correspondence as diplomats routinely did; \textit{LPII}, 165 (\textit{LPX}, 880; 2 September 1509, [Fisher] to my lord [-], Bacano).

\textsuperscript{20} In spite of Henry’s early anti-French rhetoric and refusal to observe the interdict against Venice, the crown’s actual response to the League of Cambrai was far more measured. This was probably due to the fact that England understood that unilateral action would have little effect on France (while it was ensconced in a coalition of the
In terms of Julius II, these terms required, firstly, that the pope cease his attack on Venice and thereby be detached from the League of Cambrai, and secondly, that he be instrumental in forming, or at least joining, a new anti-French coalition. To achieve the first aim, the English were ready to engage in direct diplomatic relations with the papacy at some point between September and November 1509, when Henry wrote to Rome in this regard. This may have been a partial response to Ferdinand’s notification to Henry on 13 September that the pope had ‘reconquered all the country of the Church’ and had thereby achieved his territorial aims. Upon receipt of this information, therefore, it may have been decided in England that Julius II would become more receptive to English approaches to cease the attack on Venice. While this correspondence to the papacy has not survived, its contents can be surmised through an examination of similar letters sent by Henry VIII to the pope’s allies, requesting that they cease hostilities against Venice and, in those despatched to Ferdinand and

‘superpowers’) and that, in any case, military preparations would take time. An alternative strategy was patently necessary. It is from this point that one senses the influence of the wise heads advising and restraining the new king in his intended foreign policy, particularly the likes of Fox and Ruthal. The adoption of this policy concurs with the advice given to Henry by his father-in-law from 9 September 1509; while the Catholic King implicitly encouraged him towards war with France, he discouraged him from breaking with Louis XII until a league had been formed, also comprising the emperor; LPIi 162 (LPI, 490; 9 September 1509, John Stile to Henry, Valladolid), 329 (LPI, 796; 11 January 1510, John Stile to Henry); Sp.ii, 27 (LPIi, 253; 18 or 28 November 1509, Ferdinand to Catherine of Aragon), 32 (LPIi, 260; 3 December 1509, Ferdinand to Catherine of Aragon). A further motivation for this ministerial caution was domestic security; one ought to remember that Henry VIII was the first of a new dynasty to acquire the throne by inheritance and the Tudor regime could do without foreign states, particularly France, sponsoring rival claimants to the throne in this settling in period for the new king. For the later threat of English rebels harboured by France, see for instance; LPHii, 1223 (Ven.ii, 172; 31 May and 1 June 1512, letters from Friar Angelo, Rome), 1297 (LPI, 3320; 18 July 1512, James IV to Lord Dacre, Edinburgh). For the confirmation of peace treaties and lobbying of potential allies, see pp.375 n.53, 379-380 n.70.

21 Dating this letter, which does not appear to have survived, is problematic. The Venetian ambassador in England suggests that it existed in letters dated between 10 September and 4 October 1509. Badoer only saw this letter, however, on 9 November, then forwarding a copy home. If one assumes that the missive was to be carried and presented by Bainbridge (as will be posited later), then the date of the letter can probably narrowed down to before 30 September, on which date the archbishop left England; Ven.ii, 17 (LPHii, 240; 15 November 1509, Signory to Badoer), 22 (LPHii, 230; 9 November 1509, Badoer to the Signory, London), 24 (LPHii, 278; 21 December 1509, Signory to Badoer); LPHii, 187 (LPI, 538; 30 September 1509, Christopher [Bainbridge] to [Ruthal], Winchelsea).

22 Sp.ii, 22 (LPHii, 167; 13 September 1509, Ferdinand to Catherine of Aragon, Valladolid).
Maximilian, also sounding them out about turning against France.\textsuperscript{23} The tenor of the letter sent to Ferdinand on 1 November 1509 was that the league should cease its war against the Venetians, which England opposes because: Venice has traditionally formed ‘a wall against the Turks’; that ‘it does not become Christian princes to destroy, to molest, and to annoy the Venetian republic,’ that is to fight another Christian state; that Venice had conceded all lands demanded of them by the confederates before the war began, though the league pressed on with their attack; and, finally (probably the prime motivation for Henry’s writing), that ‘if Venice were conquered and destroyed, the other states of Italy would be unable to withstand the ambitious designs of certain Christian princes,’ – a thinly veiled reference to the king of France.\textsuperscript{24} In tailoring his message to his papal audience, Henry may have appealed to the pope’s ‘duty’ to call for universal peace (as a precursor to a crusade), desiring his condemnation of the shedding of Christian blood and instead his advocating a league, with Venice, against the infidel.\textsuperscript{25} Henry probably also reasoned that, having regained Church territories, there was no further need to fight.\textsuperscript{26} Further light on these letters to the pope is shed by Venice when, after expressing thanks, criticised a passage contained in one of the letters that presumably requested the papacy to lay down its arms against the republic, ““after his Holiness has obtained his places and towns, and after the other confederate powers in like manner shall get possession of well nigh all those places to which they lay claim;”- because

\textsuperscript{23} Henry VIII also directed communications to Louis XII, Ferdinand I and Maximilian I, all to the same end; \textit{ibid.}, 23-24 (\textit{LPli}, 220; 1 November 1509, Henry to Ferdinand), 25-26 (\textit{LPli}, 221; 1 November 1509, Henry to Ferdinand).

\textsuperscript{24} These arguments for ending the war against Venice were taken from two letters sent to Ferdinand of Aragon on 1 November 1509 and which, in essence, stated the same thing though one was more detailed than the other. It ought to be noted that this is the first instance to be found that clearly states Henry VIII’s concern with French hegemony in Italy; \textit{ibid.}, 23-24 (\textit{LPli}, 220; 1 November 1509, Henry to Ferdinand), 25-26 (\textit{LPli}, 221; 1 November 1509, Henry to Ferdinand).

\textsuperscript{25} This was merely an appeal by the English crown to a role traditionally associated with the papacy and which was frequently employed for political purposes; see pp.97-105. Henry VIII would later be subjected to similar pressure towards peace from Leo X (as well as from fellow princes) during this period and was often unenthusiastic; see pp.105-109.

\textsuperscript{26} As had been argued by Ferdinand; \textit{Sp.ii}, 22 (\textit{LPli}, 167; 13 September 1509, Ferdinand to Catherine of Aragon, Valladolid).
this furnishes matter for his Holiness to reply that the Emperor has not obtained that to which he lays claim. 27 This complaint suggests that Henry VIII was cautious in the phrasing used to urge the papacy to end hostilities. Notably, the Venetians did not take issue with the loss of territory that the English condoned here, but with a clause which allowed Julius II to procrastinate over a possible settlement. One can understand the English crown’s logic here, that it was just feeling its way into negotiations, rather than making any major demands. This would concur with Christopher Bainbridge’s later reluctance to present even these apparently mild letters to the pope at such an early stage in this new, more direct Anglo-papal relationship.

In addition to and perhaps to deliver this correspondence, a more decisive gesture was made to the papacy in the despatch to Rome of a new English ambassador, the archbishop of York, Christopher Bainbridge. 28 Commissioned to be the king’s representative in Rome on 24 September 1509, this may have been anticipated there since at least August. 29 The sending of such a high-ranking ambassador to the pope, along with the letters, marked a new intensity in its political relationship with Rome and was made more significant by the fact that similar approaches made to Ferdinand, Louis XII and Maximilian do not appear to have involved any such special envoy. 30 This is perhaps indicative of the significance attached by the English

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27 *Ven.ii*, 25 (*LPi*, 280; 22 December 1509, Signory to Badoer).
28 To replace two low-ranking, ‘solicitors’, Fisher and Bonvisi; see p.31 n.74.
29 According to the commission, Bainbridge was to be ‘Oratorem, Procuratorem, Actorem, Factorem, Negotiorumque Gestorem ac Nuncium specialem’; *LPii*, 175, 190:33 (*LPi*, 520; 24 September 1509). Christopher Fisher may have recommended himself to the archbishop in a letter from Rome of 12 September; *ibid.*, 165 (*LPi*, 880; 12 September 1509, [Fisher] to my lord [-], Bacano).
30 Admittedly, Henry already had representatives resident in the Low Countries (through which he was lobbying the emperor) and in Spain, but the dignity of Spinelly and Stile (respectively) could not compare with that which Bainbridge carried in his embassy. In terms of seniority, the metropolitan was second in the ecclesiastical hierarchy of England (after the archbishop of Canterbury). To send such a senior ecclesiastic could also be deemed risky, given that the papacy claimed the right to provide to benefices vacated (by death or otherwise) *in Curiam Romanam*. Bainbridge also had experience of Rome and had been educated in Italy. This status and experience, therefore, suggests that the mission could not be entrusted to the existing, relatively low level of crown diplomats at the Holy See; G.M. Bell, *A Handlist of British Diplomatic Representatives 1509-1688*, Royal History Society Guides and Handbooks no.16 (1990), pp.159, 170, 252. For the implications of an English (or any ecclesiastic) dying while in Rome, see the following Milanese correspondence commenting on
crown to papal amity in the desired conflict against France; in addition to his military and economic resources, Julius II could also remove spiritual justification for the current offensive against Venice and legitimise that intended against France. That Bainbridge was sent to mediate between the papacy and Venice, and further detach Julius from the League of Cambrai is widely accepted, and the mission may have been deemed more immediate because of the positive signals emanating from Rome by its engaging in negotiations with Venetian ambassadors or on account of the failure of these representations to come to any agreement. In either case, Henry VIII may have spotted an opportunity to mediate in these talks, just as he had between Venice and Maximilian. Indeed, Venice had no other influential allies to lobby on its behalf and, by assuming this role, the English could more effectively urge the pope to break from the League of Cambrai and turn against France. There must have been at least some confidence among Henry VIII and his advisors that the pope’s attitude had softened in order for the embassy and letter to be sent, not least because this approach would imply continued English contact with an interdicted state. Indeed, Julius II had been negotiating with the republic with a view to its absolution since July 1509. Furthermore, Julius II had also begun to turn against his French ally, who had become too dominant in northern Italy for the pope’s comfort. As early as July 1509, Julius II was counting down the days before the

Bainbridge’s death their in July 1514; Mil., 698 (12 July 1514, Milanese ambassador in Rome to the duke) 700 (17 July 1514, Milanese ambassador in Rome to the duke).

31 One will remember that spiritual censures had been promulgated against the republic.

32 See, for example, Ven.ii, 28 (LPI, 319; 5 January 1510, Signory to Badoer).

33 L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vi, pp.316-318. While a number of reasons have been postulated to account for the despatch of the Archbishop of York to Rome, most of which are political in nature, it is generally agreed that, despite the very general nature of his commission, he was sent principally to lobby the pope for the absolution of Venice (from its interdict) and to draw the papacy out of the League of Cambrai to oppose France. Indeed, the Venetian ambassador Badoer, later (in 1512) suggests that this was the case. Among the few that cite different reasons for the commission, Brewer states that Bainbridge was sent to announce Henry VIII’s accession, but provides no evidence to suggest that this was the case; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, p.68 (Ven.ii, 191; LPI, 1307; LPI, 3333; 24 July 1512, Badoer to his brother, London); LPI, p.xiv; D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.22; J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, p.25; W.E. Wilkie, Cardinal Protectors, p.38.

34 These negotiations were not very productive at this stage, but the fact that they were taking place indicated a readiness by the pope to make peace with Venice; Ven.ii, 6 (29 June 1509, Signory to the six Venetian ambassadors in Rome); C. Shaw, Julius II, pp.237-239; M. Creighton, History of the Papacy, v, pp.120-124; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vi, pp.316-318.
campaigning season was over and Louis XII would leave Italy, so that he could start to counteract his influence in the peninsula.\textsuperscript{35} So, when Christopher Bainbridge arrived in Rome on 24 November 1509, the English must have been quietly confident that the pope would be receptive to their approaches.\textsuperscript{36}

From his reception in Rome, Bainbridge was thrown immediately into the stalled negotiations between Venice and the papacy. He had a number of audiences with the pope, in which he trod extremely carefully.\textsuperscript{37} By 1 December, the pope had apparently read the letter from Henry and sent for Bainbridge. In response, Julius II restated the justification of the war against Venice, before proposing a reconsideration of the case by Cardinals Caraffa and Riario, which Bainbridge would be expected to attend.\textsuperscript{38} Officially, therefore, the papacy’s position concerning the war with Venice remained, at that point, intractable, although Julius permitted some review of his position. In Bainbridge’s next interview with Julius, on 3 December 1509, he still refrained from displaying any definite views on the Venetian matter. He kept the pope on-side by sympathising with his point of view in the conflict when pressed for his opinion. Julius II was apparently content with this reaction and encouraged Bainbridge

\textsuperscript{35} To add fuel to the flames, there was also a Franco-papal dispute over the right to dispose of French benefices around October 1509, which further split the two parties; M. Creighton, \textit{History of the Papacy}, v (1903), pp.122-123; L. Pastor, \textit{History of the Popes}, vi, p.318; C. Shaw, \textit{Julius II}, pp.245-251.

\textsuperscript{36} The Venetians were certainly hopeful of a successful resolution with the pope as a result of Bainbridge’s arrival; \textit{Ven.ii}, 19-20 (LPli, 262; 3 December 1509, Signory to their ambassador in Rome), 21 (26 November 1509, Venetian ambassadors in Rome to the Signory).

\textsuperscript{37} The Venetian ambassadors, on 26 November 1509, requested that the archbishop present letters of favour they had received from Henry to the pope. Bainbridge declined, saying that though he would be their ally, they should present the letters themselves and that the pope could then discuss them with him afterwards. Furthermore, Bainbridge disclosed that he had already met the pontiff in a secret audience on the previous day, and did not raise the letters he had brought for fear of upsetting (the famously volatile) Julius II, though he claimed to have hinted to the pope that Henry intended to invade France. Bainbridge was wise to have approached the pontiff with caution, as the Venetian Cardinal Cornaro subsequently tried to present the letter in question and received a cool reception from Julius, who refused to read it in full. Indeed, a despatch to Venice stated that the pope may have become ill on reading this letter; \textit{ibid.}, 19-20 (LPli, 262; 3 December 1509, Signory to their ambassador in Rome), 21 (26 November 1509, Venetian ambassadors in Rome to the Signory); D.S. Chambers, \textit{Cardinal Bainbridge}, pp.24-25.

\textsuperscript{38} Riario and Caraffa were two of those charged by the pope, in late October, to negotiate with the Venetian ambassadors towards a settlement; \textit{Ven.ii}, 19-20 (LPli, 262; 3 December 1509, Signory to their ambassador in Rome), 21 (26 November 1509, Venetian ambassadors in Rome to the Signory); D.S. Chambers, \textit{Cardinal Bainbridge}, p.25; M. Creighton, \textit{History of the Papacy}, v, pp.123-124; C. Shaw, \textit{Julius II}, p.237.
to convey what had occurred to the king.\(^{39}\) Bainbridge met with the pope again on the 11\(^{th}\), to ask what he should report to Henry VIII on the Venetian matter. Julius II asked him what he wanted to write, and Bainbridge replied that he could only tell the king that his letters had been of little use to the republic. When pressed further, Bainbridge remained neutral, responding that it was not his place to comment and that he would convey Julius II’s opinions as his own. Once more, Bainbridge was extremely guarded, but following this exchange, he reminded Julius of the latter’s recent idea to absolve Venice if the two main issues outstanding (concerning towns in the Romagna and navigation in the Gulf of Venice) were settled in Rome’s favour. Bainbridge then tentatively introduced a proposal for a papal league, to include England and Venice, to oppose France, but was swiftly rebuked.\(^{40}\) This reaction reveals the sage reason for the crown’s caution in dealing with Rome so far; despite the occasional positive noises emanating from the Apostolic See that Julius II was prepared to absolve Venice and league against France, he was certainly not ready at this stage. Bainbridge wrote to Henry VIII of this meeting with the pope on 16 December 1509, although he presented the idea of the anti-French confederacy as coming from Julius II, not mentioning the rebuff. The king’s reply of 29 January 1510 gave cautious assent for Bainbridge to explore this plan, even though Anglo-French ‘peace’ negotiations were already in train.\(^{41}\) It is unclear why Bainbridge apparently lied to his king, as the consequences could potentially make his life extremely difficult, but the possibility that Julius II informally implied his desire for such a league with Bainbridge, while remaining overtly and publicly opposed to such an idea, should not be ruled out.

\(^{39}\) Bainbridge’s caution prompted mutterings of discontent from the Venetians in Rome, who saw the Englishman as interested only in gaining promotion to the Sacred College; D.S. Chambers, *Cardinal Bainbridge*, p.25.


\(^{41}\) Although the orator’s letter of 16 December 1509 no longer exists, its contents have been gleaned from the reply dated 29 January 1510; *LPi*, 354 (*LPi*, 1457; 29 January 1510, Henry to Bainbridge). For Anglo-French negotiations, see pp.374-382.
By late January 1510, English pressure on the papacy to absolve Venice and withdraw from the League of Cambrai, with a view to allying against France, had combined with Spanish representations. Bainbridge informed a Venetian secretary on 20 January of such a combined meeting with the pope. As a result, Bainbridge recommended that the Venetians compromise with Julius in order to bring about absolution. This implies that the pope had indicated his readiness to make peace with Venice, due to the intervention of the English and Spanish ambassadors. Thereafter, Venetian envoys consulted with Bainbridge regularly in the days leading up to the lifting of the interdict on 24 February 1510. Doubtless responding to encouraging signals from Rome, Henry again wrote to the pope (this time through Fox) prior to 4 February, requesting that he raise the censures against Venice. He also informed Julius II that he was at peace with Scotland (one of the preconditions for preparing for war against France) and that he would not ally with anyone against Christians or infidels without the inclusion of Venice. This correspondence reached Rome on 22 February and, while it was presented to the pope before the absolution took place, the latter already appears to have been a foregone conclusion. Nevertheless, the Venetians still thanked the English crown for its

42 D.S. Chambers, *Cardinal Bainbridge*, pp.28-29. Bainbridge’s role in the raising of papal censures against Venice ought not to be overstated. Ferdinand of Aragon had been working to this end since hinting to the English crown that he was satisfied with his (and the other confederates’) territorial gains in a letter of 13 September 1509. Furthermore, the Catholic King seems to have had turned down his allies’ wish to destroy Venice and sought instead to ally with England. By 18 November, Ferdinand had confirmed his opposition to the destruction of Venice, and had already entered secret negotiations with the pope. Again relaying to Henry that the Church had obtained its territorial aims, Ferdinand posited that the pope ought to ally with England and Spain and that, while Julius II agreed with him, he was not prepared to make these plans public until there was no danger to himself. Furthermore, the Spaniard believed that the pope would have immediately joined a new league had it already been concluded. Finally, Ferdinand urged Henry to maintain cordial relations with the French for now, until a new league came into being. In this light, therefore, one ought to note that England’s actions vis-à-vis the papacy concerning Venice were made with Spanish support; Sp.ii, 22 (LPIi 167; 13 September 1509, Ferdinand to Catherine of Aragon, Valladolid), 23-24 (LPIi, 220; 1 November 1509, Ferdinand to Henry), 25-26 (LPIi, 220; 1 November 1509, Ferdinand to Henry), 27 (LPIi, 253; 18 or 28 November 1509, Ferdinand to Catherine).


44 *Ven.ii*, 39 (LPIi, 360, 373; 22 February 1510, Venetian ambassadors in Rome to the Signory), 40 (LPIi, 373; 24 February 1510, Paulo Capello to his brother, Rome). The letter was read to the Venetian ambassadors in
assistance in obtaining the absolution. The implication is that Henry VIII’s diplomatic actions were deemed effective in contributing to the state’s pardon and absolution and, thereby, the public detachment of Julius II from the League of Cambrai. If Henry VIII did not hear news of the papal-Venetian reconciliation through his own diplomatic network, he was probably notified of the absolution by Julius II himself in a letter issued the same day (24 February). When the king first saw a copy of the absolution, by 6 April, he reportedly ‘rejoiced thereat’ and forwarded this to his father-in-law and potential ally against France, Ferdinand. The first stage of the English plan to form a coalition against France, therefore, had been achieved quite rapidly, vis-à-vis the papacy at least.

The long road to forming a ‘holy league’ against France: February 1510-May 1512

The second stage of the English plan for war with France was to gain papal adhesion to a confederacy for this purpose. As far as Henry VIII was concerned, the pope had been prepared to join such a league as early as December 1509 and had urged him to lobby Ferdinand and Maximilian, with a view to their membership. In his reply of 29 January, Henry wrote that he would not do this without first knowing their foreign policy intentions.

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Rome on 23 February; D.S. Chambers, *Cardinal Bainbridge*, p.29. As far as the inevitability of the lifting of papal censures against the Venetians was concerned, the latter had submitted to papal demands as early as 29 December 1509, the pope had promised to lift the sentence in a consistory of 4 February 1510, while the final details were settled by 15 February; M. Creighton, *History of the Papacy*, v, pp.125-128; L. Pastor, *History of the Popes*, vi, p.319; C. Shaw, *Julius II*, p.241.

45 *Ven.ii*, 39 (*LPi*, 360, 373; 1 March 1510, meeting of the Venetian Senate.), 41 (*LPi*, 384; 1 March 1510, Signory to the ambassadors in Rome), 43 (*LPi*, 382; *LPI*, 932; 2 March 1510, doge to Henry), 44 (2 March 1510, motion in the Senate for a letter to Badoer), 45 (*LPi*, 383; 2 March 1510, Signory to Badoer).

46 Confederates of this alliance had committed themselves not to make peace with Venice until the (territorial) aims of all had been achieved. Papal actions on 24 February effectively contradicted this and publicised that Julius II had effectively ceased his involvement in the league.

47 That sent to James IV of Scotland has survived; *LPi*, 372 (*LPI*, 908; 24 February 1510, Julius to James IV). The Venetians notified Henry VIII through letters to Henry, as well as to their orator in England, dated 2 March; *Ven.ii*, 43 (*LPi*, 382; *LPI*, 932; 2 March 1510, doge to Henry), 45 (*LPi*, 383; 2 March 1510, Signory to Badoer).

48 Copies of the bulls arrived with Badoer by 30 March, but he was unable to present them to the king while he and his councillors were dispersed during the Easter break. Henry was definitely presented with these by 6 April, however; *Ven.ii*, 59 (*LPi*, 421; 6 April 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London), 61 (*LPi*, 413; 30 March 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London).
He would, however, join a league with them as members, had already written to Ferdinand to this end, and recommended that Julius II lead it. The nature of Henry’s proposal seems to be one of universal peace and subsequent crusade, ‘to which, if other princes refuse to accede, they must be considered as a common enemy’. If this was impossible, Bainbridge was instructed to urge the pope’s promotion of an apparently simple alliance against France, consisting of England, Rome, the Empire and Spain.\textsuperscript{49} As mentioned, Bainbridge may have been untruthful when he reported this original papal proposal, but this does not make sense. However much of a gallophobe Bainbridge was, he surely would not have invented it to stoke up war; it was far too risky. Given that Julius II had, by this time, turned against the French, it is likely that he was given tacit go-ahead to report this, while being publicly rebuked for raising this subject.

In reality, however, the English crown had no intention of going to war in the short-term; Henry’s senior councillors were plotting the opposite course to that pursued in Rome; they were negotiating peace with Louis XII, which was concluded on 23 March 1510. This was effectively a renewal of Henry VII’s Treaty of Étaples (1492).\textsuperscript{50} While it appears to represent a complete \textit{volte-face} by the English crown and, as far as this study is concerned, a direct snub to the pope, who had publicly indicated his rejection of Cambrai largely on account of English (and Spanish) support, this was not the case. Indeed, an indicator of this was the sacking of the pope’s favourite, Francesco Alidosi, as cardinal protector of England.

\textsuperscript{49} \textit{LPIi}, 354 (\textit{LPI}, 1457; calendared end January 1510, [Henry to Bainbridge]); D.S. Chambers, \textit{Cardinal Bainbridge}, pp.26-28. Note that Ferdinand had already advised Henry (in November 1509) that Julius was prepared to join such an alliance when there was demonstrably no danger to himself. By 11 January 1510, the Catholic King recommended that his son-in-law urge the pope to join a league also comprising England, the Empire and Spain (as well as Charles of Castile); \textit{Sp.ii}, 27 (\textit{LPIi}, 253; 18 or 28 November 1509, Ferdinand to Catherine); \textit{LPIi}, 329 (\textit{LPI}, 796; 11 January 1510, John Stile to Henry).

\textsuperscript{50} \textit{LPIi}, 406 (\textit{LPI}, 962-963; \textit{Sp.ii}, 36; 23 March 1510), 416 (3 April 1510), 447:1 (\textit{LPI}, 974; 1 April 1510). For the 1492 accord, see R.L. Storey, \textit{The Reign of Henry VII}, pp.80-81. England ratified the treaty on 20 June, upon which date a copy was sent to the pope for confirmation; \textit{LPIii}, 498-499 (\textit{LPI}, 1106-1108; 20 June 1510), 519:47-48 (\textit{LPI}, 1104-1105; 20 June 1510). Notably, Bainbridge was only commissioned to seek papal confirmation of the treaty in mid-September 1510; \textit{ibid.}, 587:7 (\textit{LPI}, 1227; 14 September 1510).
prior to 6 April, reportedly on account of his pro-French sympathies.\(^\text{51}\) While the king was enthusiastic for a confederacy against France, as outlined earlier, the necessary pre-conditions did not exist for this to be in the English interest yet and England was not prepared to commit itself to war during 1510.\(^\text{52}\) The Anglo-French peace, therefore, was merely a continuation of a broader policy to confirm England’s amicable relations with its neighbours (in the short-term) and, more specifically, a bid to ensure a continued income from the pensions due from France.\(^\text{53}\)

While this strategy was not inconsistent with Henry VIII’s longer-term plan for war against France, this was not communicated to Rome, which could only take Bainbridge’s

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\(^{51}\) This again came from a Badoer despatch of 6 April; *Ven. ii*, 59 (*LPI*, 421; 6 April 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London). Henry VIII had already acknowledged Bainbridge’s concern with Alidosi’s behaviour in late January, with regard to his obstruction of Silvester de Giglis in some unnamed business; *LPI*, 354 (*LPI*, 1457; calendared end January 1510, [Henry to Bainbridge]). For other indicators of Henry’s continued belligerent intentions, see for instance *Ven. ii*, 63 (*LPI*, 434; 20 April 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London).

\(^{52}\) Nevertheless, the Venetians were under the impression, both from their own ambassador in England and from Bambidge, that England’s recent peace with Scotland was or could be connected with preparations for a coalition against France. Indeed, by mid-March 1510, the republic was confident of immediate English (as well as Spanish, Imperial and other) adherence, if the pope formed such a league; *Ven. ii*, 39 (*LPI*, 360, 373; 22 March 1510, Venetian ambassadors in Rome to the Signory), 40 (*LPI*, 373; 24 February 1510, Paulo Capello to the Signory, Rome), 41 (*LPI*, 384; 1 March 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassadors in Rome), 45 (*LPI*, 383; 2 March 1510, Signory to Badoer), 48 (*LPI*, 398; 15 March 1510, Signory to Venetian ambassador in Rome), 52 (*LPI*, 408; 24 March 1510, Donat to the Signory, Rome), 55 (*LPI*, 425; 8 April 1510, Signory to the ambassador in Rome).

\(^{53}\) It was mentioned earlier that, before war against France could be countenanced, Henry VIII’s inner circle first sought domestic security, in the short-term at least, by renewing the kingdom’s existing peace treaties with its neighbours, which it proceeded to do between August 1509 and May 1510 (the 1502 perpetual peace treaty with Scotland was renewed on 29 June 1509); *LPI*, 88 (*LPI*, 234; 29 June 1509), 94:107, 114 (*LPI*, 475; 19 July 1509), 129 (*LPI*, 369; 30 July 1509), 153 (*LPI*, 474-475; 29 August 1509); *LPI*, 478 (29 August 1509). As far as the Empire was concerned, the existing amity with Maximilian I appears to have been confirmed by 7 October 1509, but this is unclear, as around September 1510, an approach was made for the emperor to renew existing mercantile treaties with England; *LPI*, 196 (7 October 1509, Maximilian to Margaret of Savoy, ‘Lymisne’), 576 (27 September 1509, Maximilian to Margaret of Savoy, Constance), 621 (22 November 1509, Maximilian to Margaret of Savoy), 627 (28 November 1509, Maximilian to Margaret of Savoy, Fribourg). Vis-à-vis Spain, the English crown may well have envisaged the renewal of the Treaty of Medina del Campo (1489) through Henry’s marriage to Catherine of Aragon, given that the original pact had provided for the nuptials of Arthur to the Spanish princess. An Anglo-Spanish treaty was only concluded, though, on 24 May 1510 which, while confirming Medina del Campo, amounted to a new alliance; *ibid.*, 21 (11 May 1509, Ferdinand to Henry), 22 (*Sp. ii*, 3; calendared 11 May 1509 Ferdinand to his ambassador in England), 23 (*Sp. ii*, 8; calendared 11 May 1509 Ferdinand to his ambassador in England), 162 (*LPI*, 490; 11 June 1509), 260 (*Sp. ii*, 32; 2 December 1509, Ferdinand to Catherine of Aragon), 321 (*Sp. ii*, 35; *LPI*, 793; 6 January 1510), 461 (*Sp. ii*, 38; *LPI*, 1055; 18 May 1510), 465 (20 May 1510), 468 (*Sp. ii*, 38-41; *LPI*, 1059; 24 May 1510), 485:51 (*LPI*, 1055; 18 May 1510). Henry VIII even continued the renewal of his father’s peace treaties with more minor heads of state, such as that with George duke of Saxony, ratified on 9 June 1511; *ibid.*, 729 (*LPI*, 1565; 29 March 1511), 780, 804:14 (*LPI*, 1717-1718; 9 June 1511), 811 (10 July 1511, Henry to George Duke of Saxony). It is in this context that the Anglo-French accord of March 1510 ought to be viewed.
continued efforts at face value. Rumours of Anglo-French negotiations quickly reached Rome from England, however. The pope was certainly aware of them during an audience with Venetian representatives on 1 January 1510. He allegedly stated that Henry was forced to revert to his father’s peace policy because of the negative response to his letter to cease the war by Louis XII and the majority opinion of his Council. Julius was aware that a French embassy was in England, and the nature of its mission did not require much guesswork. This engendered concern in Rome and, as a result, the concerned parties, in particular the pope and Venice, in collusion with Bainbridge, concocted a plan to forestall the treaty. It was apparently agreed around 12 March that direct steps be taken to urge Henry VIII against this course, both by using Bainbridge and by commissioning Christopher Fisher to go to England to present the king with a papal honour, the Golden Rose. A preparatory brief, presumably explaining the papacy’s desire for Henry to break off the talks with France, preceded him. Curiously, there was no urgency for Fisher to leave Rome, as the rose was not presented to

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54 Up to news of the Anglo-French accord arriving in Rome, Bainbridge continued to encourage the belief that Henry VIII would commit against Louis XII. He certainly appears to have had the Venetians convinced of this; that England’s recent peace with Scotland was or could be connected with preparations for a coalition against France. Furthermore, by mid-March 1510, the republic was confident of immediate English (as well as Spanish, Imperial and other) adherence, if the pope formed such a league; Ven.ii, 39 (LPl, 360, 373; 22 March 1510, Venetian ambassadors in Rome to the Signory), 40 (LPl, 373; 24 February 1510, Paulo Capello to the Signory, Rome), 41 (LPl, 384; 1 March 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassadors in Rome), 45 (LPl, 383; 2 March 1510, Signory to Badoer), 48 (LPl, 398; 15 March 1510, Signory to Venetian ambassador in Rome), 52 (LPl, 408; 24 March 1510, Donato to the Signory, Rome), 55 (LPl, 425; 8 April 1510, Signory to the ambassador in Rome).

55 C. Shaw, Julius II, p.240. As, from 14 February 1510, the Venetian ambassador Badoer communicated home the movements of French ambassadors at the English Court, it is reasonable to assume that the papacy was aware of this intelligence as well (being an ally of the republic and having its own nuncios in England); Ven.ii, 52 (LPl, 365, 385; 14 February 1510, Badoer to the Signory), 56 (LPl, 395; 12 March 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London).

56 Chambers suggests that the mission and briefs were Fisher’s idea. In support of this, the Venetians urged the pope to issue ‘ample promises’, presumably financial given that the French paid pensions, both to Fisher and the king’s principal councilors to secure this end; LPl 418 (LPl, 976; 5 April 1510, Julius to Warham, Rome); Ven.ii, 49 (LPl, 402; 17 March 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome); D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, pp.29-31. The Venetian Signory also urged Badoer in England to keep the crown on course in a despatch of 17 March; Ven.ii, 50 (LPl, 401; 17 March 1510, Signory to Badoer).

57 That the brief urged Henry to break with the French is implied by Bainbridge having hidden it in the cover of a book, in order to avoid its interception by French interests on the road; Ven.ii, 51 (LPl, 407; 23 March 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome), 52 (LPl, 408; 24 March 1510, Donato to the Signory, Rome); D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.30. According to Venetian sources, a second papal brief was to be sent with Fisher himself, Ven.ii, 53 (LPl, 413; 30 March 1510, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory).
Bainbridge until 1 April and, even then, Fisher was not due to leave until the 8th, albeit with haste through France. The plan failed, however, and Julius II was incensed when the news first reached him around 11-12 April 1510. When Bainbridge subsequently visited the pope to deny any prior knowledge of the treaty and to pledge that Henry VIII would still go to war with France, the temperamental Julius II reacted just as one may have expected; ‘You are all rascals!’ he shouted at the ambassador. In fact, Bainbridge may have known what was going on at home, as he intimated to a Venetian diplomat on 23 March; that, ‘between England and France there would be neither peace nor war [that year], both parties holding their own’. In other words, the renewal of the peace treaty would not change anything in practical terms. Given the volatility of the pontiff, however, Bainbridge perhaps deemed it prudent not to push this line of argument. Indeed, while his reported refusal to perform or even attend a mass celebrating the treaty may have betrayed his own opinion on the matter, one can also interpret

58 Ven.ii, 54 (LPli, 417; 3 April 1510, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). The Venetians became quite impatient with Fisher’s not departing and urged its importance through their ambassador in Rome on a number of occasions; ibid., 51 (LPli, 407; 23 March 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome), 55 (LPli, 425; 8 April 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome). Furthermore, letters of commendation issued for Fisher on 9 April suggest that he may not even have left Rome until this date; LPli, 426 (LPl, 982; 9 April 1510, Cardinal Riario to Henry, Rome), 427 (LPl, 983; 9 April 1510, Cardinal Islavies to Henry, Rome). Even after it was known that Fisher’s mission would be unsuccessful, Venice’s doge and senate opined that it would still be worthwhile, as it would at least raise Louis XII’s suspicions; Ven.ii, 60 (LPli, 433; 19 April 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome).

59 Venetian sources cited the pope as receiving news of the league in letters from France, dated 2 April and through letters from Peter Grifhus in England. News of the peace was received in Venice (from Rome) during the night of 17-18 April and the treaty was initially taken at face value as signifying the loss of England as a prospective ally against France. Bainbridge, doubtless hoping to avoid the pope’s initial anger, kept a low profile by going hunting; Ven.ii, 56 (LPli, 432; 8, 11, 12 April 1510, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory; 12 March 1510, Badoer to the Signory); 57 (LPli, 432; 12 April 1510, Hieronimo da Prozil to Zuan Badoer), 58 (LPli, 432; 15 April 1510, Donato to the Signory, Rome); J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, p.27; W.E. Wilkie, Cardinal Protectors, pp.42-43. For accounts of the French celebrations in Rome, see Ven.ii, 56 (LPli, 432, 8, 11, 12 April 1510, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory; 12 March 1510, Badoer to the Signory), 57 (LPli, 432; 12 April 1510, Hieronimo da Prozil to Zuan Badoer), 58 (LPli, 432; 15 April 1510, Donato to the Signory, Rome).

60 The significance of this statement, however, does not seem to have been noted, as the orator, in his letter of 12th, refers to Bainbridge’s denial of any prior knowledge of this league. If the English diplomat did know that England would not go to war during 1510, this would be consistent with the plans of Henry’s senior councillors at this time; Ven.ii, 52 (LPli, 408; 24 March 1510, Donato to the Signory, Rome), 56 (LPli, 432; 8, 11, 12 April 1510, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory).
this as an ‘English’ response. From this episode, it is apparent that Julius II quickly adopted a pragmatic political perspective; he did not object per se to the negotiations being conducted, indeed, he himself was no stranger to such double dealing, but it was the outcome of the negotiations to which he objected and his failure to affect them.

It seems, therefore, that the Anglo-French agreement was a ‘public relations’ disaster for the English crown, forcing Henry and his ministers to move quickly to dispel any fears and to convince its potential allies of its commitment against France. A communication was reportedly sent to the pope from the king on this subject; that it revealed a continued commitment to an anti-French coalition is suggested by its allegedly being formulated as a minute to be sent to Bainbridge, so that the French should not see it. This may have reached Rome by 21-22 April and was to be read aloud to the pope. A copy of the treaty also seems to have been sent for the pope’s perusal. While Fox and Ruthal reportedly understood that Julius II greatly distrusted England after he heard of the peace, the placatory missive from

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61 Bainbridge, however, did allow bonfires to be lit outside his house and wine was available for passers-by; Ven. ii, 57 (LPl i, 432; 12 April 1510, Hieronimo da Porzil to Zian Badoer, Rome), 58 (LPl i, 432; 21 April 1510, Donato to the Signory, Rome).

62 The Spanish ambassador in England claimed to have gained an admission from sources close to the king ‘that the manner was bad in which the alliance [with France] was concluded’. The same orator also conveyed ministerial displeasure when it was heard about ‘how arrogantly the French had behaved’ upon the conclusion of the peace; Luis Caroz, dated 29 May 1510; Sp. ii, 44 (LPl i, 476; 29 May 1510, Luis Caroz to Ferdinand, London), 46 (LPl i, 478; 29 May 1510, Spanish ambassador in England to Miguel Almazan). Similarly, Badoer reported that Henry and many of his ministers had assured him that the peace had been made to the republic’s advantage and quoted Henry as adding ‘I wish thee [Venice] vastly well’. The Venetians may also have been convinced of the ‘true’ nature of the Anglo-French compact once their orator in Rome had opened and read the king’s correspondence to Bainbridge; Ven. ii, 59 (LPl i, 421; 6 April 1510, Badoer to the Signory), 61 (LPl i, 413; 30 March 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London), 66 (LPl i, 450; 30 April 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London), 67 (LPl i, 463; 18 May 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London), 73 (LPl i, 493; 8 June 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London), 74 (LPl i, 508; 25 June 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London); LPl i, 441 (26 April 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome), 531 (17 July 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London).

63 The exact meaning of this communication’s sleight of hand is uncertain, but the intention is clear; the contents were not intended for view by French eyes. In addition, Badoer reported that a brief on the same subject was sent to Maximilian, albeit ‘somewhat modified’. Again, given that the emperor was still an ally of France at this time, it makes sense that the message to Rome was different. This letter may have been intercepted and read by the Venetian ambassador in Rome, who reported home that the English king was still friendly to them; Ven. ii, 59 (LPl i, 421; 6 April 1510, Badoer to the Signory); LPl i, 441 (26 April 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome). The date of arrival can be speculated from the Venetians’ receipt of news of this treaty around 17-18 April; Ven. ii, 60 (LPl i, 433; 19 April 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome).

64 Sp. ii, 44 (LPl i, 476; 29 May 1510, Luis Caroz to Ferdinand, London).
Henry must have predated their receipt of this news. The English rearguard action was successful and it was not long before Julius II recognised that the Anglo-French peace was not an act of treachery on Henry VIII’s part. Indeed, Richard Fox and Thomas Ruthal revealed to the Spanish orator towards the end of May 1510 that the pope ‘had been somewhat comforted’ since seeing the treaty.

In spite of English reassurances, a calculated risk had been taken by virtue of the Anglo-French agreement, as the guarantee given to Louis XII about the security of his northern borders gave him chance to focus on his Italian ambitions, thereby threatening the papacy. Consequently, it was increasingly reported that Louis XII planned to cross the Alps that year. There was, however, nothing that Henry VIII could do in the near future, as he did all the groundwork to prepare for a war, so it was pragmatic that he benefit from the interim peace. English ministers had imposed a number of conditions before any breach with France could occur; by May-June 1510, it had been apparently stipulated that Henry produce an heir, that he acquire allies and that at least a year was needed to prepare. While the king

65 The ministers reportedly told the Spanish ambassador about the pope’s reaction towards the end of May 1510; ibid.
66 The Venetians also realised quite early on (before the end of April) that the arrangement may not spell the end of English involvement in a future anti-French league; Ven. ii, 60 (LPI, 433; 19 April 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome).
67 Sp. ii, 44 (LPI, 476; 29 May 1510, Luis Caroz to Ferdinand, London).
68 Ferdinand was sure, from intelligence emanating from Rome and France, that Louis was marching south, intending, among other things, to replace the pope. He wrote in this vein to Luis Caroz in England, although the orator was not to disclose this information to Henry VIII until after an Anglo-Spanish alliance had been arranged; ibid., 47 (LPI, 481, May 1510, Ferdinand to the Viceroy of Naples), 48 (calendared June 1510, Ferdinand to his ambassador in Rome), 50 (LPI, 483; calendared June 1510, Ferdinand to his ambassador in England). As it was, the French king was still in Blois on 5 July and did not look to be going anywhere, although he did have a considerable force already in Italy under de Chaumont; LPI, 522 (5 July 1510, Louis XII to de Chaumont, Blois).
69 For the lucrative French pensions, see LPI, 399 (LPI, 952; 16 March 1510, Louis XII to the Earl of Shrewsbury, Paris), 444, 449:19 (LPI, 1027; April 1510), 535 (LPI, 1181; 22 July 1510), 538 (LPI, 1182; 22 July 1510); 744, 751:2 (LPI, 1632; 25 April 1511), LPI, 916, 924:34 (LPI, 1919; 27 October 1511), 981 (LPI, 2026; 9 December 1511). On initially hearing of the Anglo-French peace in Rome, there was speculation there that the English would receive an enhanced pension from the French as the result of this deal; Ven. ii, 56-58 (LPI, 432; 8, 11, 12 April 1510, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). For the English crown following Ferdinand of Aragon’s advice to enjoy the benefits of peace until a league could be concluded, see above n.42.
70 The ministerial pressure on Henry VIII’s intended foreign policy already cited, particularly led by Fox and Ruthal, galvanised by May-June 1510 into a number of conditions placed on the king before he went to war, all
attempted to meet these conditions, the momentum for the creation of an anti-French coalition shifted decisively to Rome where the pope, now an open enemy of France, was in need of allies.\textsuperscript{71} The Venetians appear to have recognised this impasse and urged the pope to speed up negotiations with England on several occasions between June and August 1510.\textsuperscript{72} Julius II’s fightback would have begun, partly unintentionally, with the arrival of Christopher Fisher in London (by 8 June) to present the Golden Rose to Henry, with all of the underlying political symbolism that that entailed. The nuncio’s original mission to prevent the Anglo-French peace had probably morphed into one which sought Henry VIII’s adhesion to an anti-French alliance.\textsuperscript{73} In addition, from perhaps late June 1510, with the papacy on the verge of hostilities against Genoa and Ferrara, Julius’ impatience with Henry VIII’s apparent inaction caused him to put further diplomatic pressure on England by a combination of correspondence, working through Bainbridge and the despatch of an embassy. Henry was sent a letter from the pope around the end of June or the start of July, requesting that he help resist of which follow on from the strategy pursued during 1509. Firstly, Henry needed to produce an heir before he led an army in person, secondly, England needed to acquire allies (notably Ferdinand, Maximilian and Julius II) and, finally, time was needed for preparation (Fox was quoted as saying ‘another year something will be done…Let this year glide by’ and, later, unquoted crown sources argued that nothing could be done during 1510 because ‘we are at a distance’). While time and space limits the ability to demonstrate these ‘conditions’ in depth here, it must suffice to merely identify their emergence in three separate diplomatic reports (two Venetian of 15 April and 25 June and one Spanish of 29 May 1510). The former cites a conversation with Fox, whom Badoer describes as ‘alter rex’, while the latter gives accounts of discussions with Henry, Fox, Ruthal and other, unnamed, principal councillors. Concerning their caution, compared to the king, the Spaniard Caroz, on reporting his negotiations for an Anglo-Spanish alliance, described the principal councillors (of whom he named only Fox and Ruthal) as being very different from the king; slow to conclude anything and tending to raise their king’s suspicions; \textit{Sp.ii}, 44 (\textit{LPl\textit{i}}, 476; 29 May 1510, Luis Caroz to Ferdinand, London). For Badoer’s despatches, see \textit{Ven.ii}, 64 (\textit{LP\textit{i}}, 430; 15 [April] 1510, Badoer to the Signory), 74 (\textit{LP\textit{i}}, 508; 25 June 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London).\textsuperscript{73} Julius II began to move against French interests within Italy during 1510 (from August onwards), notably Ferrara and Genoa. Against the former, the pope decided to lead the campaign in person and made his way to Bologna, where in October, he came close to being captured by the French commander, de Chaumont; L. Pastor, \textit{History of the Popes}, vi, pp.327-329, 332-336; C. Shaw, \textit{Julius II}, pp.252-265.\textsuperscript{74} On 27 June 1510, Venice instructed its ambassador to Rome to this end, arguing, perhaps optimistically, that if Julius declared himself against France, England (along with other powers) would follow suit. Two further despatches to the same effect were sent in August; \textit{Ven.ii}, 68 (\textit{LP\textit{i}}, 525; 10 July 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome), 76 (\textit{LP\textit{i}}, 558; 23 July 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome), 77 (\textit{LP\textit{i}}, 558; 2 August 1510; Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome).\textsuperscript{74} \textit{Ibid.}, 73 (\textit{LP\textit{i}}, 493; 8 June 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London). Once the Venetian government had reflected on the Anglo-French peace (by 10 April 1510), it believed that the Fisher mission would still be useful, as it could not fail to offend Louis XII; \textit{Ibid.}, 60 (\textit{LP\textit{i}}, 433; 19 April 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome). Also see above pp.132-135.
the French threat to the Church (and Italy), arguing that Ferdinand and Maximilian were about to adopt this course.\textsuperscript{74} It seems, however, that the courier carrying this missive, along with correspondence from Bainbridge, was intercepted by the French.\textsuperscript{75} On hearing this, the Venetian government predicted that Henry VIII would be extremely angry and that the pope would inflame the situation.\textsuperscript{76} Further correspondence to the same end was despatched by the pope towards the end of July, accompanying a nuncio.\textsuperscript{77} Secondly, the pope seems to have used Bainbridge as a conduit to lobby the English monarch. Notably, the aforementioned intercepted messenger was also carrying correspondence with a similar message from the ambassador, although intended for a nuncio in England. One can speculate, therefore, that the orator was working under instruction from the pope himself here, as otherwise he would surely have addressed this directly to the king or one of his ministers.\textsuperscript{78} In terms of embassies, the pope already had Fisher in England, but he also had the sub-collector Peter Griphus to call upon; both were probably working towards an English breach with France (under instruction

\textsuperscript{74} One gets a sense of the contents of this correspondence through Maximilian in separate letters to his daughter and to Henry; \textit{LPI}, 562 (31 August 1510, Maximilian to Margaret of Savoy, Landeck), 564 (\textit{LPI}, 1221; 2 September 1510, Maximilian to Henry, Visbourg). According to the Venetian government, Henry was not the only prince to whom the pope wrote in this vein. The Venetians also instructed Badoer to assist in this project and to work closely with the resident papal nuncios; \textit{Ven.ii}, 71 (\textit{LPI}, 529; 15 July 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome), 72 (\textit{LPI}, 530; 15 July 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome). The republic again attempted to lobby Henry VIII through their own ambassador in England during September and, implicitly, November; \textit{ibid.}, 81 (\textit{LPI}, 570; 9 September 1510, Signory to Badoer), 87-88 (\textit{LPI}, 613; 16 November 1510, Signory to Badoer).

\textsuperscript{75} News of this interception, which reportedly occurred in France, was known in Rome by 8 August 1510; \textit{LPI}, 553 (8 August 1510, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). Based on the description of contents later summarised by Maximilian, it is reasonable to assume that this was the papal missive sent originally at the turn of June-July; see n.74.

\textsuperscript{76} \textit{Ven.ii}, 77 (\textit{LPI}, 558; 23 July 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome). The gravity of the situation caused by this intercept is also indicated by Sir Thomas Spinelly (based in the Low Countries), in his despatch to the deputy of Calais. Spinelly speculated that intelligence received concerning the sending of a French ambassador to England was linked to Louis XII’s need to excuse his actions; \textit{LPI}, 568 (9 September 1510, Thomas Spinelly to Sir Gilbert Talbot, Brussels).

\textsuperscript{77} See p.382.

\textsuperscript{78} Not only did Bainbridge’s missive accompany that of the pope’s (and was intercepted), but it is reported to have conveyed the same message; Bainbridge apparently instructed the nuncio (perhaps Griphus, but probably Fisher) ‘to speak very boldly’ to Henry, urging him to seize the opportunity ‘to recover all that belongs to him’, alluding to the English claim to the kingdom of France. Indeed, Julius II ordered this nuncio to obey Bainbridge’s instructions. In addition, the Venetians evidently believed that Julius II was employing the English orator in this manner and were eager for this to continue; \textit{Sp.ii}, 52 (10 September 1510, Hieronymo de Cabanillas to Ferdinand, Tours); \textit{Ven.ii}, 79 (\textit{LPI}, 567; 7 September 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome).
In addition, a military setback for the pope at Genoa reportedly caused him to despatch ‘Zuan Englese’, perhaps a nuncio, to the king by 28 July, carrying letters urging him to the same anti-Gallic end. Furthermore, the papacy seems to have considered stronger measures to induce potential confederates, including England. There is an indication that, by the summer of 1510, the pope had attempted to bully England into making a financial contribution towards the anti-French cause through the medium of crusading taxes, but this was reportedly resisted by Henry VIII. Also, by the beginning of September, Julius II seems to have toyed with the idea of employing spiritual weapons against France, perhaps with the hope that his potential allies would publicly display themselves as enemies of the Most Christian King. An interdict was not fulminated against France, however, until 1512.

Meanwhile, Bainbridge continued to work hard in Rome towards the anti-French aim of his commission, lobbying the pope towards a coalition and cooperating with friendly fellow ambassadors towards this end, in spite of the Anglo-French peace. Around 20 May, 79

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79 On 8 June, Badoer reported that Fisher had been working in the Venetian (i.e. anti-French) interest, which coincided with the papacy’s at this time; *Ven.ii*, 73 (*LPl*, 493; 8 June, 15 July 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London). For the pope’s reported displeasure that Griphus and Fisher did not succeed in winning the king over, see *LPl*, 734 (8 April 1511, d’Arizolles to Robertet, London). It was also the republic’s understanding that the nuncios in England would be pursuing this end, so they instructed their orator to assist them; *Ven.ii*, 71 (*LPl*, 529; 15 July 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome).

80 *LPl*, 541 (28 July 1510, from a friend to Peter Bibiena, Rome). That ‘Englese’ was a nuncio is suggested by a Venetian letter, dated around the beginning of July, which supports a papal proposal to send such a delegate to England to seek the latter’s support against France; *Ven.ii*, 70 (*LPl*, 525; 10 July 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome). Overall, the Venetians approved of the various strategies employed by Rome to break the Anglo-French peace, as was indicated, for example, on 23 July; *ibid.*, 75 (*LPl*, 558; 23 July 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome).

81 This threat is reported by the Venetian ambassador in Rome during the summer of 1510 and seems to mark part of the papal response to the Anglo-French peace of March 1510; D. Hay, ’Pietro Griffò, an Italian in England: 1506-1512,’ *Italian Studies*, ii (1938), pp.124-125. Lunt, however, has detected no such papal demand; W.E. Lunt, *Financial Relations of the Papacy with England*, ii, p.160.

82 Indeed, the Venetians entertained this hope and consequently encouraged the pontiff in this course; *Ven.ii*, 79 (*LPl*, 567; 7 September 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome).

83 See p.192.

84 The Venetians in particular continued to cultivate the archbishop’s friendship for this purpose; *Ven.ii*, 62 (*LPl*, 456; 12 May 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome), 65 (*LPl*, 479; 25 May 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome), 69 (*LPl*, 525; 3 July 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome), 72 (*LPl*, 530; 15 July 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome). He must have been
perhaps buoyed by the expectation of an imminent Anglo-Spanish alliance, Bainbridge allegedly told his Venetian counterpart that, if Louis XII attacked the pope, Henry would attack him, as he was not bound by the earlier agreement with France in this respect.\textsuperscript{85} Prior to 9 August 1510, Bainbridge had absented himself from Rome, causing rumours to be spread that he was travelling back to England in haste, presumably on a mission concerning hostility against France. The Venetian ambassador in Rome, however, soon reported that this was not the case and speculated that the story was planted to worry the French.\textsuperscript{86} Bainbridge nailed his colours firmly to the mast in the days following 19 October, when the pope lay ill and besieged within Bologna by French forces; he went (along with his Spanish counterpart) to the commander Chaumont and demanded that he withdraw, under pain of Henry VIII attacking France.\textsuperscript{87} The English ambassador may have received instructions to make direct overtures concerning an anti-French league in the later months of 1510; sometime around 19 November, Bainbridge proposed to the pope and Venetians a tripartite league, pledging that Henry VIII would attack France in the north, although Julius II allegedly declined this on the grounds of expense.\textsuperscript{88} Presumably, the pope’s complaints of the financial burden resulting from such a treaty were based on the lack of Spanish and Imperial involvement to share costs. In reality, the pontiff may have been reluctant to combine formally against France without the adherence of one of these ‘superpowers’. It is unlikely that this proposal originated in

\textsuperscript{85} \textit{LPIi}, 466 (20 May 1510, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). A defensive alliance with Spain, which seems to have been a precursor to the anti-French league, was concluded on 24 May 1510; \textit{Sp.ii}, 42 (\textit{LPIi}, 472), 44 (\textit{LPIi}, 476; 29 May 1510, Luis Caroz to Ferdinand, London), 46 (\textit{LPIi}, 478; 29 May 1510, Spanish ambassador in England to Miguel Almazan), 50 (\textit{LPIi}, 483; June[?] 1510, Ferdinand to Luis Caroz).

\textsuperscript{86} \textit{LPIi}, 554 (9 August 1510, letters that reached Venice from Hieronymo da Porzil, Rome).

\textsuperscript{87} According to the French orator d’Arizolles, Bainbridge took credit for the French not taking Bologna; \textit{LPIi}, 674 (10 January 1511, d’Arizolles to Robertet, London); C. Shaw, \textit{Julius II}, pp.264-265.

\textsuperscript{88} \textit{Ven.ii}, 89 (\textit{LPIi}, 624; 24 November 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome), 90 (\textit{LPIi}, 617; 19 November 1510, Venetian ambassadors in Rome to the Signory), 91 (\textit{LPIi}, 630; 30 November 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassadors in Rome).
England, however, as it claimed that James IV of Scotland would head the Venetian contingent.\textsuperscript{89} On 4 January 1511, Bainbridge, as Maximilian understood, was intriguing with the pope and Venetians against him (to gain a red hat).\textsuperscript{90} The same impression was confirmed by the French ambassador in England on 10 January, although d’Arizolles lay emphasis on the archbishop’s writing back to Henry VIII firmly in the pope’s favour (against the French interest).\textsuperscript{91} It is possible that Bainbridge became frustrated at English inaction against France, as it was reported by the French ambassador in England (April 1511) that the cardinal now only contacted Henry VIII through his groom of the stool, William Compton, as he feared the influence of others as French pensioners.\textsuperscript{92} Indeed, a crown commitment to a continuation of the peace policy towards France was sent to Bainbridge in September, when he was instructed to seek confirmation of the Anglo-French treaty.\textsuperscript{93} Again, though, this must be interpreted in terms of the wider English commitment to ensure peace with its neighbours in the immediate term, while preparing for conflict in the future.

The papacy continued its encouraging approach to England into 1511, when Julius raised Bainbridge to the Sacred College on 10 March.\textsuperscript{94} Julius II’s intentions were even more
blatant when, a week later, he commissioned the new cardinal to be legate a latere to a
division of the papal army fighting against the French and their allies. Bainbridge’s
prominence as English ambassador and within England’s ecclesiastical hierarchy would be
highlighted in this role he played in the war; it would associate Henry VIII with the anti-
French conflict being waged in Italy. If it did not induce Henry to become a participant of his
own accord, then perhaps France would declare war on England on account of Bainbridge’s
involvement. This measure was reported by Venetian sources to have had some success in
England, towards the beginning of May; in reply to the French ambassador’s complaint of
Bainbridge’s military role, Henry had allegedly answered that he was happy to assist the
Church, arguing that Louis XII was at fault for supporting the duke of Ferrara (the object of
Bainbridge’s campaign), given that he was a vassal of the papacy.

Back in England, the crown continued on the same cautious course; Henry’s plan for
war with France, tempered by the various conditions that needed to be met. Nevertheless, Fox
had intimated back in 1510 that the crown would act this year. Indeed, the intention of the
English to participate in two expeditions during 1511, a Spanish crusade against the Moors in
North Africa, and the Imperial conflict with the French-backed duke of Guelders, can be
traced to the beginning of 1511. Both campaigns can easily be interpreted as intended to
with politically sympathetic members who would not be likely to elect a ‘French’ candidate in the event of
Julius’ deposition; Ven.ii, 98 (LPl, 714; 10 March 1511, a private letter received in Venice from Hieronimo
Lipomano, Ravenna); LPl, 718 (13 November 1511, Andrea da Borgo to Margaret of Savoy); C. Shaw, Julius
II, p.272. Also see above, pp.289-293.
95 During May, he was said to have had 2,000 Spanish troops with him; Ven.ii, 99 (LPl, 720; 15 March 1511,
Donato to the Signory); 101 (LPl, 754; 2 May 1511, Signory to the Venetian ambassador at the Curia), 104
(LPl, 765; 8-10 May 1511, Proveditor Capello to the Signory, Dinale). Also see D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, pp.36-37, 81-93.
96 LPl, 776 (23 March 1511, Venetian ambassador at the Curia to the Signory, Ravenna).
97 See above n.70. While an heir had not been produced, Henry had made an alliance with Spain and negotiations
with the emperor were ongoing. The lack of heir to allow Henry VIII’s personal leadership of a campaign against
France may explain the indirect actions taken during 1511. For English efforts with Maximilian, see for instance
Ven.ii, 61 (LPl, 413; 30 March 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London).
worry the French king. The desire to act more directly, however, was indicated by William Warham (traditionally cited as a member of the ‘peace party’ within the Council), writing to Lord Darcy, prior to the latter’s leading the English contingent on crusade in March 1511. The archbishop conveyed his wish ‘that he [Darcy] and his archers, when sent out of England, were to be with the Pope “to strength him against the enemies of the Church, which be little better than infidels”’. In reality, however, the security of an appropriate coalition still did not exist in which Henry VIII could do this; he was waiting for one of the ‘superpowers’ to

98 The presence of English expeditionary forces around the southern and north-eastern borders of France would certainly have been interpreted as a potential threat in France, indeed as sabre-rattling at the very least. Firstly, Lord Darcy’s crusading mission (consisting of 1,000 archers) of May-June 1511 responded to a request from Ferdinand to assist in fighting the Moors of North Africa, but the Spaniard cancelled the expedition shortly prior to the English crusaders’ arrival in Spain, as ‘at present Christendom is vexed with wars, and Mother Church in so great necessity’. Roughly translated, on account of the fall of Bologna, the Spaniard feared the French threat to his kingdom of Naples. That this expedition worried the French is indicated by the French ambassador in England, writing around 8 April that, while Henry was going to send the requested archers to Spain and that both king and council had assured him that they were only to be employed against the Moors, one senses that d’Arizolles suspected an ulterior motive; LPl, 724 (23 March 1511, Maximilian to Margaret of Savoy), 727-728 (28 March 1511), 730 (LPl, 5741; calendared March 1511, instructions to Lord Darcy), 731:12 (LPl, 1531; 8 March 1511), 731:41 (LPl, 1562; 28 March 1511), 734 (8 April 1511, d’Arizolles to Robertet London), 742 (LPl, 1622; 20 April 1511, Ferdinand to Henry, Seville), 787 (6 June 1511, [Lord Darcy] to Ferdinand), 793 (14 June 1511, ‘Abbatis’ [Bonvisi] to Robertet, London), 795 (14 June 1511, [Lord Darcy] to [Ferdinand]), 797 (LPl, 5743, 1726; 16 June 1511, Ferdinand to Lord Darcy, Seville); LPl, 1566 (29 March 1511); J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII (1968), p.28. Sir Edward Poyning, on the other hand, was appointed admiral of an expeditionary force consisting of 1,000-1,500 soldiers to fight against the French-backed duke of Guelders in the Low Countries. His commission cited Henry’s observance of a treaty with Charles of Castile in which he committed himself to support the prince against his enemies. The troops left England around the middle of July, for an initial three months, but were retained a further month on Margaret’s request, returning after achieving some success by around December. On 26 December, Henry promised Margaret more support against the same duke. Certainly, the Venetians interpreted it to be a diversionary attack on France, that would disrupt or even stall French action in Italy, giving the republic chance to reinforce its army; LPl, 804:35 (LPl, 1740; 22 June 1511), 809 (6 July 1511, Andrea da Borgo to Margaret of Savoy, Valence), 825 (Ven.ii, 116; 26 July 1511, Badoer to the Signory, London), 832 (calendared end July 1511, Margaret of Savoy to Maximilian), 851 (Ven.ii, 117; 26 August 1511, Signory to Badoer), 856 (calendared end August 1511, Margaret of Savoy to Maximilian), 872 (Ven.ii, 125; 27 September 1511, Badoer to the Signory), 884 (calendared end September 1511, Margaret of Savoy to Maximilian), 906 (LPl, 1902; 17 October 1511, Margaret of Savoy to Henry, ‘Boisledeu’), 919 (28 October 1511, Margaret of Savoy to Maximilian), 989 (15 December 1511, Henry to Margaret of Savoy, Greenwich), 992 (17 December 1511, Henry to Margaret of Savoy, Greenwich), 999 (26 December 1511, Henry to Margaret of Savoy, Greenwich); S.G. Ellis, ‘Poyning, Sir Edward (1459–1521)’, DNB (2004). For the sense that this was a political gesture designed to buy Maximilian’s friendship against France, see LPl, 832 (calendared end July 1511, Margaret of Savoy to Maximilian), 884 (calendared end September 1511, Margaret of Savoy to Maximilian), 906 (LPl, 1902; 17 October 1511, Margaret of Savoy to Henry, Boisledeu); J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp.27-28. One may be able to trace the origins of this expedition back to January 1510, around which time Margaret of Savoy, Charles’ regent, used this as a condition for her support in talking her father around to joining an anti-French league; LPl, 355 (LPl, 923; calendared end January 1510, Henry to [Spinelly]).

99 LPl, 725 (LPl, 5740; 25 March 1511, Warham to Lord Darcy, Canterbury).
make the first move. The pope was growing impatient with English inaction and, by 8 April, it was understood by the French ambassador in England that Julius wished to deprive Peter Griphus of the sub-collectorship, on account of his lack of success in this respect. Also, Christopher Fisher, was reportedly sent away from the pope, for the same failure. Julius did, however, commission Girolamo Bonvisi as nuncio and collector to England on 19 May, with instructions to rouse Henry against the French.

England, Rome and Spain were shaken from their lack of urgency in forming an anti-French coalition when Julius II lost Bologna on 23 May 1511. This acted as a wake-up call, at least as far as the English crown was concerned. Combined with the almost simultaneous citation from a group of dissident cardinals (supported by Louis XII and Maximilian) convoking a general council, the papacy appeared to be in grave danger. In territorial terms, Bologna’s strategic significance to the security of the Papal States and its symbolic importance as their second city would have been well-known to Henry VIII and his advisors. The proposed general council, if it met during a time of French military

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100 As the Venetian orator, Badoer, revealed towards the beginning of May, Henry was reportedly ready to do 'great things against France should the King of Spain also do the like'. He also wished that Maximilian would ally with them; Ven.ii, 106 (LPl, 759; 5-6 May 1511, Badoer to the Signory). The lack of English desire to act in any direct sense at this point is supported by Henry VIII’s less than hostile reaction towards approaches (from Louis XII and a group of dissident cardinals) for him to support the convocation of a general council against Julius II (November 1510-April 1511). In fact, the English king gave the impression that he was sympathetic to this move; LPl, 625 (LP, 1353; 25 November 1510, the cardinals at Pavia to Henry), 732 (LP, 1581; 2 April 1511, the cardinals at Milan to Henry).

101 Griphus is referred to by d’Arizolles as ‘Andrew Gryst’; LPl, 734 (8 April 1511, d’Arizolles to Robertet, London); also see p.34, n.86.

102 W.E. Wilkie, Cardinal Protectors, p.38; Ven.ii, 109 (LP, 829; 31 July 1511, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). This papal gesture may have been in response to a recent request from Venice to have Henry VIII ‘put in execution the offers made by him in case the King of France should come into Italy’ (supporting the idea that England was expected to act that year); ibid., 103 (LP, 761; 7 May 1511, Signory to the Venetian ambassador at the Curia). Bonvisi may already have been in England, as on 14 June, he received correspondence from Rome dated the 8th, which would have made his journey (as a diplomat) extremely quick; LP, 793 (14 June 1511, Abbatis [Bonvisi] to Robertet, London).

103 Strategically, the city sat at the head of the major artery through the Appenines and was the key to the Romagna. It also offered other tactical advantages vis-à-vis Venice, Florence and Milan Symbolically, Bologna was the second most populous city of the principality and was home to the most important legation of the Papal States (not to mention the substantial revenues that accrued therefrom); D.S. Chambers, Popes, Cardinals and
dominance in Italy, was likely to pronounce the deposition of the pope with the benefit of sufficient coercive power to effect this in practice. Julius II was so alarmed at the loss of Bologna that he wrote immediately to Henry VIII, presumably to request his urgent assistance. Bonvisi may well have received this communication on 6 June 1511, instructing him to urge England’s participation with the papacy and Spain in a league against France.

While the king’s response does not seem to have survived, Henry may have advertised the pope prior to 10 July that he intended to act, particularly on account of the loss of this papal city. The crown’s actions in England must have indicated that definite moves had been made, as the Venetian ambassador there reported, on this date, that he was sure that a league

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104 According to the Venetian ambassador with the pope, similar briefs were also sent to the Empire and Spain; LPI, 776 (23 May 1511, Venetian ambassador at the Curia to the Signory, Ravenna), 829 (Ven.ii, 109; 31 July 1511, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory); L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vi, pp.348-349. The brief was reportedly conveyed through the Spanish ambassador. Bonvisi was instructed to convince Henry to join the league and, while the English king had reportedly been prepared to do this since late May, he awaited Ferdinand gaining a definite answer from the pope on this matter before issuing a commission to conclude. This would not be aided by Bonvisi himself who, indulging in pro-French espionage, claimed that he would drag out negotiations for six months or more; LPI, 793 (14 June 1511, Abbatis [Bonvisi] to Robertet, London), 829 (Ven.ii, 109; 31 July 1511, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). The English crown was also informed of the Bolognese crisis by one of its own diplomats; Sir Robert Wingfield, based with the emperor, reported as it unfolded; ibid., 773 (LPI, 1676; 19 May 1511, Sir Robert Wingfield to Henry, Innsbruck), 777 (LPI, 1681; 24 May 1511, Sir Robert Wingfield to Henry, Innsbruck), 780 (LPI, 1689; 1697; 27 and 30 May 1511, Sir Robert Wingfield to Henry, Innsbruck). At some point around this time, Hadrian de Castello (probably based in Germany) reported hearing of the fall of Bologna and that there was no intelligence as to where the pope was in the aftermath; ibid., 1007 (LPI, 2039; calendared 1511, [de Castello] to Henry).
between England, Rome and Spain had been concluded. Henry VIII may have written again on this subject during July. He appears to have issued instructions to Bainbridge to conclude as soon as possible, as on 26 July he was quoted by Badoer as saying, ‘Ambassador! thou wilt soon hear some good news from Rome; and by this time the Signory must know all’. The English crown’s decision-making could not have been aided during these months by Bonvisi, who was involved in pro-French espionage and pledged to drag out the process of the league’s formation and even brief Henry’s councillors against the pope. He was unsuccessful, however, as his correspondence to France was intercepted and he was arrested by the end of July.

A further inducement to join the anti-French papal cause came on 18-19 July 1511, when Julius II convoked the Lateran Council for 19 April 1512. Its aims were cited as peace among Christians and a crusade. In practical terms, however, the council would have been seen as a papal weapon to beat both the rival Council of Pisa and the French. By effectively forcing the French to become schismatics, Julius II was offering (spiritual) justification for war against them. Henry VIII’s commitment to support the papacy from this point was indicated formally and publicly by his sending an embassy (Young, accompanied by a Spanish ambassador) to Louis XII during August to demand that he join ‘a general peace, therein providing for the rights of the Church and the restoration of Bologna, and leave the

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106 This information was reported by Badoer to Venice in his despatch of this date; *Ven.ii*, 110 (*LPii*, 812; 10 July 1511, Badoer to the Signory, London).
107 Such correspondence was expected from him in Rome by 7 August, according the Venetian orator there; *LPii* 842 (7 August 1511, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory).
110 *LPii*, 816 (18 July 1511). According to a Venetian source in Rome, however, it was not published until around 7 August; *ibid.*, 842 (7 August 1511, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory).
111 Citations for the Council of Pisa were affixed to St Peter’s (and the other basilicas) in Rome on 9 June. The quick reaction of Julius II to this must be considered in this context; *ibid.*, 794 (14 June 1511, letters to Venice from Hieronymo da Porzil, Rome).
holding of the Council to the Pope’. The English, therefore, had drawn a calculated line in the sand, beyond which its French counterpart had already stepped (and was never likely to retreat). On Young’s return, Henry’s Council agreed to war. In addition, England had begun to demonstrate indirectly that it was prepared to act militarily, by the departure of the Poynings expedition to fight in support of Imperial forces against the French-backed duke of Guelders by mid-July 1511.

In Rome, negotiations for the league between England, Rome and Spain continued during July and August 1511. As the Venetians understood, they were to be excluded from the prospective alliance, unless they reached terms with the emperor. In other words, the urgent necessity for a coalition engendered by the loss of Bologna overrode the need to get Maximilian on-side, although the principal parties were not prepared to rule out his involvement entirely, nor were they prepared to make him an enemy (the natural outcome of

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112 Such an embassy seems to have been expected in France since the beginning of the month; ibid., 840 (7 August 1511, Andrea da Borgo to Margaret of Savoy, Valence), 850 (26 August 1511, Andrea da Borgo to Margaret of Savoy, Lyons), 854 (Ven. ii, 119; 25 July – ? August 1511, Badoer to the Signory, London), 860 (7 September 1511, Andrea da Borgo to Margaret of Savoy, ‘La Palize’), 983 (11 December 1511, Jean de Veau to Margaret of Savoy, Blois); D. Hay (ed.), Anglica Historia, p.161. Among the Anglo-Spanish demands, other towns claimed by the Church were also to be ceded by Louis XII; LPl ii, 854 (Ven. ii, 119; 25 July – ? August 1511, Badoer to the Signory, London), 858 (2 September 1511, Andrea da Borgo to Margaret of Savoy, Lyons).

113 Such diplomatic approaches to rival heads of state were quite normal among belligerent parties, superficially as a last-ditch attempt to forestall war but, realistically speaking were expected to face rejection. Henry VIII (and Ferdinand) went on to rehearse the sending of this embassy in the Anglo-Spanish offensive alliance (November 1511), when he sought to justify the intended conflict; Sp. ii, 59-60 (LP lii, 945; LPI, 1980; 17 November 1511). Also see the Holy League itself of 4 October, prior to English adhesion; Ven. ii, 1346 (Sp. ii, 56; 4 October 1511).

114 Vergil portrayed some discord within the meeting, particularly based on those who posited that the pope (as beneficiary of the Holy League) already had powerful allies in Spain and Venice, that England was too far away to act and that, if it did act, they might be left facing France alone, once Louis XII was expelled from Italy. While such opposition to conflict may have existed, it was not necessarily held among Henry’s inner circle, who had thus far facilitated their king’s road to war; D. Hay, Anglica Historia, pp.161-163; J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, p.28.

115 See above pp.385-386. While the background of the Guelders expedition predates the fall of Bologna, it is not unfeasible that it came to represent a response to the papacy’s loss of the city. Indeed, one could argue that this and English participation in the Spanish crusade represented only a partial English commitment against France, pre-Bologna, while following the city’s loss, Henry VIII was prepared to commit to direct warfare (as will be seen).

116 Ven. ii, 108 (LP lii, 838; 15 July 1511, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome). Badoer also mentions this on 10 July, although he explains that Venice and the Empire could join the alliance, once they had settled their differences; ibid., 110 (LP lii, 812; 10 July 1511, Badoer to the Signory, London).
involving Venice in this league). By the end of July, a ‘grand consistory’ had also been held, presumably to discuss this situation. Indeed, correspondence was expected in Rome from England (and Spain), vis-à-vis the league, by 7 August. An agreement seems to have been concluded between the pope, English, Spanish and Venetian diplomats by 10 August. Bainbridge apparently played a pivotal role in these negotiations and was reportedly confident that his king would accept the terms. Indeed, if Henry VIII was expecting ‘good news from Rome’ in this regard around 26 July, then he must have given his ambassador the nod to finalise an anti-French alliance towards the beginning of the month at the latest. Around the end of July, the pope may have written to Henry VIII again, protesting at the loss of Bologna. By then, however, Julius may have understood that England was finally prepared to act. Perhaps in recognition of this, around the beginning of August, Julius sent 100 Parmesan cheeses, along with wines and other gifts to Henry VIII on a papal galley. It is highly likely that these were intended as inducements to an imminent ally of Rome. Indeed, intelligence involving Venice in this league). By the end of July, a ‘grand consistory’ had also been held, presumably to discuss this situation. Indeed, correspondence was expected in Rome from England (and Spain), vis-à-vis the league, by 7 August. An agreement seems to have been concluded between the pope, English, Spanish and Venetian diplomats by 10 August. Bainbridge apparently played a pivotal role in these negotiations and was reportedly confident that his king would accept the terms. Indeed, if Henry VIII was expecting ‘good news from Rome’ in this regard around 26 July, then he must have given his ambassador the nod to finalise an anti-French alliance towards the beginning of the month at the latest. Around the end of July, the pope may have written to Henry VIII again, protesting at the loss of Bologna. By then, however, Julius may have understood that England was finally prepared to act. Perhaps in recognition of this, around the beginning of August, Julius sent 100 Parmesan cheeses, along with wines and other gifts to Henry VIII on a papal galley. It is highly likely that these were intended as inducements to an imminent ally of Rome. Indeed, intelligence

117 See the tone of the Venetian ambassador, writing on 31 July; ibid., 109 (LPl, 829; 31 July 1511, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory).
118 So reported the Venetian ambassador there; LPl 842 (7 August 1511, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory).
119 Ven.ii, 112 (LPl, 844; 15 August 1511, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome). The Venetians appear to have been happy with this and commissioned their ambassador to sign the alliance on their behalf as soon as possible; ibid., 113-114 (15 August 1511), 115 (15 August 1511, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome). The conclusion of this agreement does not seem to have been a surprise, as the Venetian Signory issued an authorisation for its representative conclude this league on 14 August; ibid., 1344 (14 August 1511). On 26 August, the Venetians instructed their ambassador in England to follow their curial representative’s instructions in inducing Henry VIII to join as quickly as possible. To this end, the Signory portrayed the French as committing serious ‘war crimes’; ibid., 117 (LPl, 851; 26 August 1511, Signory to Badoer).
120 See the Venetian Signory’s conveyance of thanks for his work in this matter and its general recognition of this, on 15 August and 20 October, respectively; ibid., 112 (LPl, 844; 15 August 1511, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome), 1347 (20 October 1511). Indeed, the articles of the initial league, concluded on 4 October, which left a place for England, acknowledged Bainbridge’s contribution and, later, the Venetians, when proclaiming England’s adhesion to the league in May 1512, referred to its ‘entire conclusion [on Henry VIII’s behalf] having been negotiated by the Right Reverend Lord Christopher of York, Cardinal of England’; Ven.ii, 163 (LPl, 1198; 18 May 1512), 1346 (Sp.ii, 56; 4 October 1511).
121 Ibid., 116 (LPl, 825; 26 July 1511, Badoer to the Signory, London).
122 Julius is also said to have written in the same vein to Ferdinand and Maximilian by the Venetian orator in Rome on 31 July. As a result of the letter to England not having been found, it is uncertain whether this was an entirely new piece of correspondence or if the Venetian was referring to that sent in the immediate aftermath of the city’s loss; ibid., 109 (LPl, 829; 31 July 1511, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory).
123 Guicciardini emphasises the extraordinary nature of the visit of a ship flying the papal banner; LPl 842 (7 August 1511, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory); S. Alexander, The History of Italy by Francesco Guicciardini, p.243.
emanating from England was all positive, as far as the papacy was concerned. Around 10 October, it was reported that Henry had (recently) written to Rome to say that he would comply with the pope’s wishes. Similarly, letters from Peter Griphus that reached Rome towards the beginning of November reported Henry’s willingness to do all that he could for the pope.

The Holy League ‘for the recovery of Bologna’ (and other occupied papal territories) was finally concluded in Rome between the papacy, Spain and Venice on 4 October 1511, without England’s membership. One of its articles stated, however, that the league had been formed ‘with the participation and knowledge of the King of England’ and that his adhesion was postponed until the receipt of appropriate instructions by Bainbridge. The English delay quickly unsettled at least one of the confederates, as the Venetians lobbied the pope and Bainbridge to ensure that it would occur. Julius II may not have heard of

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124 Ven.ii, 130 (LPii, 896; 10 October 1511, Badoer to the Signory). This letter was probably sent in late September; LPiii, p.1452.
125 Griphus wrote before news of the Holy League had reached England, as reported by Venetian sources in Rome; Ven.ii, 127 (LPii, 923; letters received by Venice from Rome on 8 November 1511).
126 The article cited suggests that Bainbridge’s commission was delayed by postal problems and that the confederates were no longer willing to postpone the league’s conclusion. This implies that the treaty may have been finalised earlier if the power from Henry had arrived; ibid., 1345-1346 (Sp.ii, 56; LPi, 889; LPI, 1880-1881; 4 October 1511). According to the Venetian ambassador there, the details of the treaty had been finalised by all parties to 29 September, but, because Bainbridge was insufficiently empowered, all parties could only hope at that stage that Henry VIII would still join. The league was published on 5 October in S. Maria del Popolo in Rome, at which ceremony it was reported that Henry VIII would join the alliance. Indeed, emblems of Henry VIII were carried in the celebratory procession on 10 October. Surely Bainbridge would not have permitted this if he was unsure of his king’s intentions. In addition, when the Venetian government heard of the league’s conclusion, it readily believed its ambassador’s claims that England would adhere. Similarly, an Imperial official at the French court believed, on 14 October, that England was already comprised in the alliance and that Ferdinand had pledged Henry’s ratification; LPi, 873 (29 September 1511, Hieronymo di Porza to Venice, Rome), 892 (5 October 1511, Hieronymo di Porza to Venice, Rome), 895 (Ven.ii, 123; Signory to the Venetian ambassador at the Curia), 896 (10 October 1511), 902 (14 October 1511, Andrea da Borgo to Margaret of Savoy, Beaufort), 1347 (20 October 1511).
127 As early as 13 October, Venice wrote to its ambassador in Rome, expecting to hear that Bainbridge had received his commission and that, in the meantime, it hoped that Julius II (and Ferdinand) were urging Henry VIII to this end. By the 20th, however, the state understood that the relevant correspondence was still yet to arrive (although it was expected imminently). By 25 October, Venice’s concern was such that it instructed its orator at the Holy See to adopt a conciliatory policy with Henry VIII, not only to have him join the league, but also to demonstrate his enmity towards the French. Even when Doge Loredano ratified the league on 20 November, however, the power for Bainbridge had still not arrived. On 26 November, Venice optimistically informed Badoer that it expected England to have joined the Holy League by the time he received the letter, but still urged Henry ‘to humble the intense pride and arrogance of the French’. In addition, the republic promised to send the
Henry VIII’s intention to commit the league until the end of November at the earliest. In the meantime, Bainbridge claimed that correspondence both to and from him was being intercepted. This may have been an attempt to reassert that he retained influence with the king, although one cannot rule out such postal problems at this time. Indeed, Bainbridge seems to have implied some familiar reasons why English ratification was not forthcoming; namely, Henry’s distrust of Ferdinand and desire for Imperial adhesion to the Holy League. Finally, the delay may have been motivated by a recent bout of serious illness suffered by Julius II; news of this reached England in September 1511, in response to which candidates were considered for the prospective conclave at the end of the month. When the crown was informed of the conclusion of the Holy League soon after, it is likely that caution was deemed expedient until the pontiff’s recovery was confirmed. It would be unwise to commit to this coalition when papal involvement may be withdrawn, if Julius’ successor were to be pro-

Flanders galleys, now that it was allied with Spain, probably as an inducement to this end. Finally, on 10 December, the Venetians instructed their ambassador in Rome to lobby the pope (and Spanish ambassador) to ensure that Henry VIII acted, as ‘the slightest stir made at the present moment by the King of England would bring the affairs of the French to ruin’; Ven. ii, 124 (LPl, 900; 13 October 1511, Signory to the Venetian ambassador at the Curia), 126 (LPl, 914; 25 October 1511, Signory to the Venetian secretary at the Curia), 131 (LPl, 958; 26 November 1511), 132 (LPl, 960; 26 November 1511, Signory to Badoer), 134 (LPl, 982; 10 December 1511, Signory to the Venetian secretary at the Curia), 1347 (20 October 1511), 1348 (20 November 1511).

128 Ibid., 136 (LPl, 965; 28 November 1511, Hieronymo di Porza to Zuan Badoer, Rome).
129 Ibid. Initial distrust of Ferdinand arose from the latter’s rejection of Lord Darcy’s contingent to join in the planned crusade to north Africa only after the English had arrived in Spain. The desire for Maximilian’s membership was one of the outstanding conditions originally imposed on Henry VIII’s going to war, although it soon became clear that the English crown would be prepared to join a coalition without him; see above pp.385-386.
130 P.S. and H.M. Allen, Letters of Richard Fox, 35 (LPl, 880; LPl, 3443; 30 September 1511, Wolsey to [Fox]). The perceived seriousness of Julius’ illness cannot be overstated; at one stage his death was deemed imminent and rumours that it had occurred spread through Christendom. The pope had recovered, however, by the end of the month; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vi, pp.368-373; C. Shaw, Julius II, pp.286-289. Also LPl, 850 (26 August 1511, Andrea da Borgo to Margaret of Savoy, Lyons), 858 (2 September 1511, Andrea da Borgo to Margaret of Savoy, Lyons), 865 (LPl, 1842; 16 September[?] 1511, Erasmus to Ammonius, Cambridge), 866 (18 September 1511, Maximilian to Margaret of Savoy). Finally, see above pp.236-237.

393
French.\textsuperscript{131} The English crown seems to have been aware of the pope’s recovery by late October, but that does not mean that concerns for his health had lifted completely.\textsuperscript{132}

News of the Holy League reached England by 8 November and, while Ammonius reported that ‘England has not yet resolved what to do’, the crown’s commitment to Rome up to that point makes this is unlikely.\textsuperscript{133} Indeed, Henry VIII had apparently viewed the articles of the Holy League by 9 November and reportedly intended to send an envoy to Rome to adhere to it on his behalf.\textsuperscript{134} Ratification was issued on 13 November.\textsuperscript{135} The commission to Bainbridge, however, was not issued until 4 December.\textsuperscript{136} This delay may be explained again partly by continued English concerns for the pope’s health. It was probably also motivated by the crown’s fear of being left isolated; immediately after he heard of the settlement of the Holy League, Henry sought a formal, supplementary agreement of Spanish support in the planned offensive. Bainbridge voiced this concern to a Venetian diplomat, towards the end of November 1511, who quoted him as saying, ‘I am more afraid of Spain than of France, on account of the uncertainty of his [Ferdinand] keeping faith, as seen heretofore, although it is a

\textsuperscript{131} Doubtless in light of such concerns, supplementary articles were added to the Holy League on 8 October, compelling the Sacred College to continue the Church’s commitment to the arrangement until another pontiff was elected; \textit{Ven.\textit{ii}}, 133 (\textit{LPIi}, 959; 26 November 1511).

\textsuperscript{132} \textit{LPIi}, 917 (\textit{LPI}, 1918; 27 October 1511, Ammonius to Erasmus, London). If the Venetians were aware of this by 21 September, it is unlikely that intelligence of such import took more than a month to reach England; \textit{Ven.\textit{ii}}, 121 (\textit{LPii}, 867; 21 September 1511, Signory to the Venetian ambassador at the Curia).

\textsuperscript{133} It is probable that such an important notification would have been carried to England far quicker, even though it would most likely have had to travel through Germany; \textit{LPii}, 933 (\textit{LPI}, 1948; 8 November 1511, Ammonius to Erasmus, London).

\textsuperscript{134} \textit{Ven.\textit{ii}}, 135 (\textit{LPii}, 97; 27 November-7 December 1511, letters from the Venetian secretary Trevisan to Venice, Rome). There are a number of indications that Henry VIII was declaring his readiness to join the league around this time. Intelligence conveying this from a papal agent in England, ‘Piero di Rizo’, reached Rome by around 28 November. Similarly, further letters from England containing this intelligence, dated 9 November, did not reach the Venetian secretary at the Holy See until around late November to early December. Finally, Badoer’s letters of 12 November, indicating similar information, reached Venice only on the 27\textsuperscript{th}; \textit{ibid.}, 135 (\textit{LPii}, 977; 27 November-7 December 1511, letters from the Venetian secretary Trevisan to Venice, Rome), 136 (\textit{LPii}, 965; 28 November 1511, Hieronymo di Porza to Zuan Badoer, Rome), 139 (\textit{LPii}, 937; 12 November 1511, Badoer to the Signory, London).

\textsuperscript{135} \textit{Sp.\textit{ii}}, 58 (\textit{LPii}, 939, 969:40; \textit{LPI}, 1967; \textit{Ven.\textit{ii}}, 128; 13 November 1511).

\textsuperscript{136} Its despatch was probably arranged by Thomas Ruthal; \textit{Ven.\textit{ii}}, 140 (\textit{LPii}, 1001; arrival in Venice of an English courier carrying letters dated 4 December 1511, London); \textit{LPiii}, p.1453.
question of his own interest’. An Anglo-Spanish agreement was swiftly concluded on 17 November, which committed both parties to defend the Church (and help recover Bologna) by launching a joint offensive on Louis XII through Aquitaine. English procrastination may also have been financially motivated; if Henry could drag this out long enough, he could secure the November installment of the French pension. In the event, the mandate did not reach Rome until around 7-11 January 1512. It reportedly empowered both Bainbridge and the Spanish ambassador to join the league on Henry’s behalf, although at a time and in a manner to be chosen by the Spaniard. England’s actual formal adhesion to the league did not occur in Rome until the third session of the Lateran Council (17 May 1512), at which a letter from Henry was read aloud, in which he pledged to observe the alliance ‘and to peril

137 Ven.ii, 136 (LPIi, 965; 28 November 1511, Hieronymo da Porza to Zuan Badoer, Rome). English suspicions about Ferdinand’s commitment were doubtless raised by the the Spaniard’s cancellation of the crusade against the Moors earlier that year, only after Lord Darcy’s force had reached Spain; see above pp.375-376. A further indication that the English were concerned with their potential allies’ commitment was raised in Henry VIII’s 13 November declaration of adherence to the league, in which he stipulated the condition that no party would make peace with France without the consent of all members. Sp.ii 58 (LPli, 969: 40; LPI, 1967; 13 November 1511). This was also a condition of the Anglo-Spanish agreement cited below, lending weight to Banbridge’s reported suspicion of Spain; ibid., 59-60 (LPli, 945; LPI, 1980; 17 November 1511).

138 Surrey and Shrewsbury were commissioned on 10 November to arrange this compact with Spain as soon as news had arrived of the Holy League’s conclusion. Ferdinand did not confirm the treaty, however, until 20 December, while Henry followed suit on 9 February 1512; Sp.ii, 57 (LPli, 934, 969:29; LPI, 1955, 3513; 10 November 1511, Henry to Surrey and Shrewsbury, Westminster), 59-60 (LPli, 945; LPI, 1980; 17 November 1511), 63-64 (LPli, 1054; LPI, 2094; 9 February 1511), 71; LPli, 995 (LPI, 2033; 20 December 1511). For the supplementary treaty of 16 March 1512, increasing the number of troops to be deployed in Aquitaine, see ibid., 65 (LPli, 1098; LPI, 3797; 16 March 1512).

139 Close to 14,000 gold crowns were expected at Calais from 1 November and may only have been received around 9 December. Louis XII was likely to have cancelled this if he received firm intelligence that Henry was about to become his enemy. As at 15 November, according to the Imperial ambassador at the French Court (citing correspondence from the French ambassador in England, d’Arizolles), Louis understood that the Holy League had been concluded without Henry VIII’s knowledge and, furthermore, that the latter remained committed to the amity between their two kingdoms, despite the French king’s rebuffal of the recent English embassy to him calling for peace; LPli, 916, 924:34 (LPI, 1919; 27 October 1511), 942 (15 November 1511, Andrea da Borgo to Margaret of Savoy, Blois), 981 (LPI, 2026; 9 December 1511).

140 The courier passed through Venice around 29 December; Ven.ii, 140 (LPli, 1001; arrival in Venice of an English courier carrying letters dated 4 December 1511, London), 143 (LPli, 1020; 7-11 January 1511, letters from Rome to Venice). The Venetians, presumably in response to Bainbridge finally being empowered, conveyed their thanks for his ‘good disposition’; ibid., 144 (LPli, 1029; 19 January 1512, Signory to the Venetian ambassador at the Curia).
everything for the recovery of Bologna and other towns of the Church’. Subsequently, Bainbridge and the Spanish ambassador signed the league on Henry’s behalf. 141

From the moment that Henry VIII committed himself to the Holy League, he began to ready his kingdom for war. Indeed, the messenger carrying the commission to Bainbridge to adhere reported (in Venice) that extensive preparations were already afoot for the invasion of France in 1512. 142 The formal justification for this continued to be England’s defence of the Church, at the papacy’s behest. Thus, in the commissions given to the earls of Surrey and Shrewsbury in November 1511 to arrange a supplementary offensive alliance with Spain, Henry VIII specified that he was responding to Julius II’s request for aid against France and its allies who, in addition to having taken Bologna, planned ‘to divide among them even the “tunic of our Lord”’ (the Papal States). The king, therefore, empowered the two nobles to conclude a league with Ferdinand to ‘defend the Church against any further aggression, and to reconquer for her Bologna and its territory’. 143 Similarly, the resulting agreement, providing for a joint Anglo-Spanish invasion of France, also stipulated the chief purpose to be the defence of the Church. 144 Furthermore, in the ‘war’ Parliament, on 19 February 1512, the same letter from the pope to Henry VIII as that cited in the Surrey-Shrewsbury commission,

141 The reading of Henry’s letter was followed by that of a similar missive from Ferdinand. England’s (and Spain’s) membership was celebrated with bonfires and other ‘great rejoicings’; ibid., 162 (LPIi, 1191; Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory, received in Venice 18 May 1512), 165 (LPIii, 1204; 21 May 1512, letters received in Venice from Friar Angelo, Rome), 166 (LPIi, 1204; 24 May 1512); D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.39; R.J. Schoeck, ‘The 5th Lateran Council’, in G.F. Lytle (ed.), Reform and Authority in the Medieval and Reformation Church, pp.106-107.
142 Ven.ii, 140 (LPIi, 1001; arrival in Venice of a courier with letters from London, dated 4 December 1511). By 28 November, the Latin secretary Ammonius reported (to Erasmus) that the king’s principal minister Richard Fox was ‘so much occupied he can scarcely attend to any other business than his own’; LPI, 964 (LPI, 2002; 28 November 1511, Ammonius to Erasmus, London). On 19 April, Thomas Ruthal wrote to Lord Darcy (then ambassador to Scotland) of the preparations and their intentions for the invasion through Spain; he implied that this will enable the Holy League to challenge French military strength within Italy; Ibid., 1147 (LPI, 5745; 19 April 1512; Thomas [Ruthall] to Lord Darcy, Greenwich).
143 Sp.ii, 57 (LPIii, 934, 969:29; LPI, 1955; 10 November 1511).
144 Ibid., 59-60 (LPIii, 945; LPI, 1980; 17 November 1511). For how this compact supported the broader Holy League, see above pp.394-395.
requesting aid against France, was apparently read aloud to the assembly when the ‘secret’ reasons for summoning the assembly were announced.\textsuperscript{145} English preparations culminated in the despatch to France of Thomas Wall, Lancaster Herald, to declare war. Reaching the French court on 22 April 1512, he declared that, in response to requests for aid from the pope (and Ferdinand), Henry believed it his duty ‘to defend the Church’, in pursuit of which he would launch an expedition against France.\textsuperscript{146} Subsequently, Henry defended his position in a letter to the emperor, written towards the end of May 1512, in which he justified his decision to fight Louis XII, who had ‘lacerated the seamless garment of our Lord Jesus Christ, snatched St Peter’s patrimony, took the cities of the holy Roman Church, and fostered petty tyrants in them, threatening chains, dungeons, and everything most atrocious to the pope himself’. Henry even went one step further, making allusions to the crusade against the Ottomans, citing ‘war crimes’ committed by the French which ‘showed a worse than Turkish cruelty’ and opining that this conflict will ‘prove as acceptable to the Almighty as if he [Henry] actually fought against the Turks or Saracens’.\textsuperscript{147}

There are indications that the English crown sought to keep the papacy informed of its preparations during the months leading up to and after its formal adhesion to the Holy

\textsuperscript{145} \textit{LPIi}, 1065 (\textit{LPI}, 2010; calendared 20 February 1512, Julius to Henry, Rome); ‘House of Lords Journal Volume 1: Decimo quinto die parliamenti’, \textit{Journal of the House of Lords: volume 1: 1509-1577} (1802), pp. 12-13. It is likely that the disclosure of this letter was planned when Parliament (and Convocation) was initially summoned, back on 28 November, given that the commission to Surrey and Shrewsbury in which it was also cited was virtually contemporaneous; \textit{LPIi}, 962-963, 969:74-76 (\textit{LPI}, 2003-2005; 28 November 1511).

\textsuperscript{146} In reply, however, Louis XII reportedly reasoned that, as he had no quarrel with either the pope or king of Spain, Henry had no reason to act against him. Nevertheless, the Frenchman would send his own herald to England to discover the English king’s true intentions. Lancaster Herald’s response was that the English army was ready and had to land somewhere. The marquis of Mantua understood that Wall tried to declare war through a public proclamation, but was not permitted to do so, on account of the danger that he would put himself in; \textit{LPIi}, 1148 (20 April 1512, Andrea da Borgo to Louis Brangier, Blois), 1157 (24 April 1512, Andrea da Borgo to Margaret of Savoy, Blois), 1163 (27 April 1512, Andrea da Borgo to Margaret of Savoy, Blois), 1169 (\textit{LPI}, 3986; calendared end April 1512, Lancaster Herald’s mission), 1220 (letters from Mantua read in Venice on 24 May 1512); \textit{Ven.ii}, 158 (\textit{LPIi}, 1178; 3 May 1512, Marquis of Mantua to Proveditor Capello at Vicenza, Mantua).

\textsuperscript{147} Henry VIII originally commissioned Sir Robert Wingfield to inform the emperor of his declaration of war against France on 8 May. The king’s later justification of the war is presumably his response to the emperor’s reply; \textit{LPIi}, 1186 (\textit{LPI}, 3188; 8 May 1512, Henry to [Maximilian]), 1215 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 178; calendared end May 1512, Henry to Maximilian).
League (in May). On 6 March, he advertised Julius II of these, as well as of his intention to attack France on 1 April.\(^{148}\) Around 6 May 1512, Henry VIII instructed Bainbridge to tell the pope that he had a considerable fleet at sea (that had already achieved some successes) and that an even bigger force would join with Ferdinand to invade Guienne. In the meantime, he urged the pope to attack France, ‘so that the slaughter of Ravenna [11 April 1512] may be avenged’.\(^{149}\) England’s continued anti-French commitment was received well in Rome. Receipt of Henry’s 6 May correspondence may have encouraged a rumour, circulating Rome by the beginning of June, that England had offered the pope a significant number of troops.\(^{150}\) The papacy was able, therefore, to capitalise both unintentionally and intentionally on Henry VIII’s pledges; firstly through hearsay that circulated about an English military contribution in Italy and secondly through a public display of England’s continued commitment (which perhaps further fuelled the earlier rumours).

In a bid to ensure that Henry did attack France, sustained pressure was applied by the papacy on Henry VIII. Firstly, on 14 March, the pope wrote to Henry requesting his aid ‘for the defence of the Apostolic See’.\(^{151}\) Probably in response to positive news from England, Julius played an extremely astute card by offering potential papal recognition of the historic

\(^{148}\) Ven.ii, 151 (LPl, 1104; 18 March 1512, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 152 (LPl, 1119; 23-27 March 1512, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory).

\(^{149}\) Ibid. 169 (LPl, 1182; 6 May 1512, Henry to Bainbridge). For the significance of the Battle of Ravenna, pp.400-401.

\(^{150}\) Ven.ii, 172 (LPl, 1223; letter that reached Venice from Friar Angelo, dated Rome 31 May and 1 June 1512). The Venetians were so pleased either with this rumour or with the actual contents of Henry’s correspondence that, on 8 June, a letter was approved for Bainbridge (among others), presumably intended to further encourage England and Rome against France; Ven.ii, 173 (LPl, 1232; calendared 8 June 1512, Signory to the Venetian ambassador at the Curia).

\(^{151}\) LPl, 1096 (LPl, 3068; 14 March 1512, Julius to Henry). This and subsequent actions seem to indicate an element of doubt in Rome whether England would actually follow through with its commitments against France, particularly given that Bainbridge’s commission to join the Holy League would already have arrived. This idea is supported by the instructions emanating from Venice to Badoer during April 1512, to urge Henry to attack France. Also, during early May (in response to despatches from Badoer in England), the Venetian government ordered its ambassador in Rome to request that the pope apply pressure on Henry (and Ferdinand) to hasten their invasion; Ven.ii, 155 (LPl, 1128; 1-7 April 1512, Badoer to the Signory, London), 156 (LPl, 1179; 4 May 1512, Signory to the Venetian ambassador at the Curia).
English claim to the French throne. On 20 March 1512, bulls were produced which translated to Henry the titles (and rights) of King of France and Most Christian King, also providing for his coronation. Despite continued pressure by Bainbridge, however, the pope refused to publish them until Henry VIII had secured control of France.\(^{152}\) Julius II took a further step in consistory during May or July 1512, publicly depriving Louis XII in front of the Sacred College and announcing the transfer of his titles and territories to Henry VIII (dependent upon the latter’s conquest of France).\(^{153}\) To reinforce these actions (at some unspecified date before September, but later than 20 March), Julius released Louis XII’s subjects from their oaths and obligations.\(^{154}\) This gesture was an extremely potent sign in England and cost the pope nothing. A second, related incentive to ensure Henry (as well as his allies) attacked France was the employment of the papacy’s spiritual weapons against France and its interests. From March 1512 and in subsequent months, Julius II began to fulminate censures against those who assisted Louis XII.\(^{155}\) Indeed, French intelligence relayed back to England, dated 1 April, reported that the French themselves had been ‘excommunicated’.\(^{156}\) It is reasonable to

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\(^{152}\) D.S. Chambers, *Cardinal Bainbridge*, pp.38-40, 50-51; J.J. Scarisbrick, *Henry VIII*, pp.33-34; W.E. Wilkie, *Cardinal Protectors*, pp.43-44. The issue of these bulls coincides with the receipt of letters from England (by 18 March), outlining preparations and pledging an attack on 1 April. Similar reports, possibly from Venetian sources, arrived in Rome around 23-27 March. Indeed, Venice was so pleased with the latter news that it instructed its ambassador in Rome to have the pope ‘stimulate their Majesties [Henry and Ferdinand] by all such means as shall seem expedient’; *Ven.ii*, 151 (*LPii*, 1104; 18 March 1512, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 152 (*LPii*, 1119; 23-27 March 1512, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 153 (2 April 1512, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome).\(^{153}\) The following authors disagree on the date of this event, the former citing July and the latter May; F.J. Baumgartner, *Louis XII*, p.223; D.S. Chambers, *Cardinal Bainbridge*, pp.38-39.\(^{155}\) During March 1512, Julius II forwarded to Cardinal Schiner, his legate with the Swiss, a bull excommunicating those who went to fight for France. On 21 July 1512, Julius II excommunicated the Biscayans and Cantabrians (complicit in France’s taking of Church lands) and ‘all who assist the King of France against the Apostolic See or its confederates, or who take service in his army, although they may have bound themselves to do so by a solemn oath. While there is no reason to believe that Henry VIII had anything to do with this sentence, he was sent a copy of the bull which, one can speculate, he would have welcomed. In addition, ecclesiastical weapons were wielded by Rome in favour of the English crown in a more specific sense during February 1513; C. Shaw, *Julius II*, p.295; *Sp.ii*, 67 (*LPii*, 1305; 21 July 1512, Julius II to all persons, Rome).\(^{156}\) *LPii*, 1127 (*LPi*, 3112; 1 April 1512). Julius II had already excommunicated the adherents of Louis XII on 16 April 1511 and, while there is no reason to believe that this was intended as a direct incentive for Henry VIII to attack France, it doubtless helped; W.K. Gotwald, *Ecclesiastical Censure at the End of the Fifteenth Century*, p.77; L. Pastor, *History of the Popes*, vi, p.346.
presume, therefore, that Louis XII himself may have been under such a sentence, given that he had been deprived and his subjects released from their obligations (James IV of Scotland was soon to suffer a similar fate).  

157 The papacy’s wielding of its spiritual weapons culminated on 13 August with imposition of an interdict on France, which was reissued in the third session of the Lateran Council (3 December).  

158 A third papal inducement was Julius’ bestowal of a crusading flavour on the coming war by his grant of an indulgence probably during April 1512, which Henry enthusiastically acknowledged on 6 May.  

159 Both of the latter ‘spiritual’ gestures would have been intended to bolster justification for the war, in English eyes at least.

Probably the chief limitation of English foreign policy, *vis-à-vis* Rome, was the distance from which it sought to affect matters there. To prevent French domination of Italy was difficult enough by indirect means alone, but the crown also had to contend with the fluid political situation within the peninsula. Thus, when a major battle took place, in which England was not involved, resulting in an apparently decisive defeat of the papacy, one would have expected big question marks to be raised about current crown intentions in that area. The battle of Ravenna (11 April 1512) raised due concern, when initial reports portrayed a catastrophic defeat for the Holy League’s forces (a papal-Venetian coalition at this point) and caused Julius II to prepare to flee Rome, such was the fear of his vulnerability. Indeed, the Romagna fell within days. It soon became apparent, however, that the French were also badly

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158 N.P. Tanner (ed.), *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, i, pp.597-598.  
159 *LPH*, 1182 (Ven. ii, 169; 6 May 1512, Henry to Bainbridge), 1533 (*LPI*, 3602; calendared 1512). Henry also makes allusion to the indulgence in a crusading context in a letter to Maximilian, towards the end of May 1512; *Ven.ii*, 178 (*LPH*, 1215; calendared end May 1512, Henry to Maximilian).
affected, with Louis XII’s forces unable to follow-up their victory. Furthermore, the pope had finally gained Swiss participation in the Holy League, who sent forces to intervene in the war. All of this tipped the balance in favour of the confederacy in Italy, resulting in the almost complete abandonment by the French of their Italian interests. Due to this, the summer of 1512 was spent by the papacy scrambling, with the other powers in Italy, to control the vacuum. The knock-on effect was to leave the Anglo-Spanish invasion as the only threat to France. Nevertheless, the initial uncertainty caused by the Battle of Ravenna was felt deeply by the English crown and Henry VIII remained unsure of its outcome as late as 8 May. It provoked caution and caused Henry to defer the departure of his ambassadors to the Fifth Lateran Council. Yet, Henry claimed to be determined to continue his belligerent course; writing to Bainbridge on 6 May, he asserted that he had ‘never in the midst of this mishap, and of these contradictory stories, changed his intention of defending the Church and protecting the pope’. The English king reiterated this commitment via his orator around 29 May, that ‘he [Henry] is ready to risk his goods, life, and kingdom for the maintenance of his Holiness and of the Church’, also notifying the pope of his rejection of Maximilian’s universal peace initiative. However, the English crown had already nailed its colours to the mast, having declared war against France (through Lancaster herald) on 22 April. In addition, Sir Edward Howard had already commenced hostilities in the English Channel and

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160 The French both lost their commander, Gaston de Foix, and suffered the withdrawal of Imperial troops; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vi, pp.399-403; C. Shaw, Julius II, pp.294-295.
161 See below p.402.
162 LPI, 1186 (LPI, 3188; 8 May 1512, [Henry] to [Maximilian], Greenwich). Reports that a significant battle had taken place at Ravenna (on 11 April) began to reach England as early as 23 April, although the result was reported to be uncertain. Henry wrote of this to Christopher Bainbridge, probably on 6 May, maintaining that he was still none-the-wiser about the outcome; Ven.ii, 169 (LPI, 1182; 6 May 1512, Henry to Bainbridge). News of the battle also appears to have been received through the access of English diplomats to foreign correspondence; LPI, 1157 (24 April 1512, Andrea da Borgo to Margaret of Savoy, Blois).
163 Ven.ii, 169 (LPI, 1182; 6 May 1512, Henry to Bainbridge).
164 Bainbridge was also instructed to brief the pope against the emperor’s moves towards peace, if these were made. Henry also enclosed a copy of the letter that he had sent to Maximilian, rejecting his offer; Ven.ii, 177 (LPI, 1214; 29 May 1512, Henry to Bainbridge), 178 (LPI, 1215; calendared end May 1512, Henry to Maximilian).
preparations for the joint Anglo-Spanish invasion of Guienne were already at an advanced stage.\textsuperscript{165} Henry VIII was, therefore, beyond the point of no return and could issue nothing less than the defiant pledges of commitment to the anti-French cause that he conveyed to Julius II via Bainbridge.\textsuperscript{166}

Henry VIII goes to war in defence of the Church, but has to face a new pope in favour of peace: May 1512 - September 1513

England’s initial military forays in defence of the Church were far from successful. The joint Anglo-Spanish offensive into Guienne failed to materialise, prompting accusations of blame from both sides.\textsuperscript{167} Also, the English fleet maintained in the Channel to harry French

\textsuperscript{165} Ven.\textit{ii}, 169 (\textit{LP}ii, 1182; 6 May 1512, Henry to Bainbridge); \textit{LP}ii, 1186 (\textit{LP}, 3188; 8 May 1512, Henry to Maximilian, Greenwich).

\textsuperscript{166} Indeed, such a commitment was repeated on 8 May in a letter from Henry to Maximilian, justifying England’s reasons for going to war and requesting the emperor’s support; \textit{LP}ii, 1186 (\textit{LP}, 3188; 8 May 1512, Henry to [Maximilian], Greenwich).

\textsuperscript{167} English forces, commanded by Thomas Grey marquis of Dorset, left Spain by October 1512 without having set foot on French soil and amid accusations from both side. English commanders objected to Ferdinand’s insistence that the kingdom of Navarre needed to be conquered prior to any incursion into France, perceiving, to all intents and purposes, that the Catholic King was using their presence as a diversion to this end. After the army had arrived home (by November), one finds that, on the one hand, the English crown seem to blame Spain for the fiasco and there was tension with Spain even in January 1513 (according to Venetian reports), while on the other, Henry reportedly had the commanders questioned in Parliament and his council ultimately blamed Dorset for the failure (according to a Spanish dispatch). Furthermore, Henry’s ‘official’ explanation of the return of his army to Margaret of Savoy was that, on account of the weather and lack of supplies, both he and Ferdinand agreed to this departure; \textit{LP}i, 1239 (\textit{LP}, 3243; 14 June 1512 William Knight to Wolsey, ‘beside Reinteria’), 1286 (\textit{LP}, 3298; 8 July 1512, Thomas Howard to [Wolsey]), 1319 (\textit{LP}, 3350; 1 August 1512 duke of Alva to [Grey], Pampeluna), 1320 (\textit{LP}, 3352; 2 August 1512, Ferdinand to Grey, Burgos), 1321 (Ven.\textit{ii}, 186; 3 August 1512, Venetian consul Pasqualigo to his brothers, London), 1326 (\textit{LP}, 3355; 5 August 1512, Stile to Henry), 1327 (\textit{LP}, 3356; 5 August 1512, Knight to Wolsey, Fontarabia), 1356 (P.S. and H.M. Allen, \textit{Letters of Richard Fox}, 37; \textit{LP}, 3388; 26 August 1512, Wolsey to [Fox], Farnham), 1359 (27 August 1512, extract of letter possibly from Knight, ‘Longiono in Castilia’), 1417 (Ven.\textit{ii}, 205; 1 October 1512, Badoer to the Signory), 1422 (\textit{LP}, 3451; 4 October 1512, Knight to Wolsey, ‘St Sebastian’s’), 1458 (31 October 1512, Peter Martyr to Marquis Bellecensis, ‘Lucronii’), 1475 (Ven.\textit{ii}, 211; 9 November 1512, Badoer to the Signory, London), 1484 (Sp.\textit{ii}, 72; 19 November 1512, [de Muxica] to Ferdinand, London), 1487 (23 November 1512, Margaret of Savoy to Maximilian, Mechelin), 1492 (\textit{LP}, 3555; calendared ed November 1512, Henry to Poynings and others), 1511 (\textit{LP}, 3593; 16 December 1512, Stile to Henry), 1586 (Ven.\textit{ii}, 220; 20 January 1513, Pasqualigo to his brothers in Venice), 1591 (Ven.\textit{ii}, 219; 20 January 1513, Pasqualigo to his brothers, London); \textit{LP}, 3313 (14 July 1512 Grey to Ferdinand, ‘from the camp’); Ven.\textit{ii}, 298 (10 September 1513, report made on the 5th of a conversation with two English knights of Rhodes, Venice). For the Spanish side of the story (and Ferdinand still complaining about the conduct of the English in January 1513), see Ven.\textit{ii}, 198 (\textit{LP}i, 1432; 11 October 1512, Signory to the Venetian ambassador at the Curia); Sp.\textit{ii}, 68 (\textit{LP}i, 1461; October[?] 1512, Ferdinand to his representatives in England), 70 (\textit{LP}i, 1447; 22 October[?] 1512, Ferdinand to his representatives in Flanders and
(and other) shipping suffered defeat in a naval engagement off Brittany, when the flagship
(The Regent) was lost, along with two of the king’s courtiers, Carew and Knyvet.\textsuperscript{168} A visible
strengthening of Calais was also made which, combined with the raids conducted on the
Breton coastline by Sir Edward Howard, commander of the fleet that transported the
expeditionary force to Spain, gave rise to the expectation by foreign observers, including
Italians in England, that a second front (at least) would be opened up by England in the
north.\textsuperscript{169} In advance of these actions, Henry VIII was keen to publicise them to the papacy.
Thus, towards the end of May, he notified Bainbridge of the sailing of his invasion force to
Spain.\textsuperscript{170} Similarly, on 1 July 1512, an unnamed councillor appears to have written to Rome
to publicise the recent victories of Edward Howard, who had raided Brittany.\textsuperscript{171} Henry wrote
himself on 8 August, outlining ‘what he had done for the benefit of Holy Church against
France’ and what he was continuing to do, also outlining some naval success.\textsuperscript{172} Also, on 18
September, Catherine of Aragon wrote to Bainbridge, apparently on Henry’s behalf, notifying
him of a Scottish attack on Aragon, in response to which the king sent the earl of Surrey (and

\textsuperscript{168} This battle occurred on 9 August 1512. In response, Sir Edward Howard vowed to avenge the loss and an
English fleet continued to be maintained in the English Channel up to November at least (apparently under
Howard’s command); see below pp.404-405.

\textsuperscript{169} Even on 9 June, Badoer, reporting the crossing of troops to Calais, noted that Henry was to sail there himself
by the end of the month with many more soldiers. It would not be surprising if the English crown cultivated such
rumours as a diversionary tactic; \textit{Ven.ii}, 182 (\textit{LPl}, 1233; 9 June 1512, Badoer to the Signory). Also see, \textit{ibid.,}
183 (\textit{LPl}, 1291; 14 July 1512, Pasqualigo to his brothers, London), 185 (\textit{LPl}, 1310; 25-26 July 1512, Badoer to
the Signory, London); \textit{LPl}, 1268 (1 July 1512, letter from an English councillor), 1136:40 (\textit{LPl}, 3332; 22 July
1512), 1136:41 (\textit{LPl}, 3336; 24 July 1512), 1321 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 186; 3 August 1512, Lorenzo Pasqualigo to his brothers,
London), 1344 (\textit{LPl}, 3377; 17 August 1512, Spinelli to Henry, Brussels), 1377 (9 September 1512, letters from
merchants in London; 20 September 1512, letters from merchants in Flanders).

\textsuperscript{170} He also enclosed his rejection to the emperor’s approach for universal peace. The courier also cited troops
numbers; \textit{Ven.ii}, 172 (\textit{LPl}, 1223; letter that reached Venice from Friar Angelo, dated Rome 31 May and 1 June
1512), 176 (\textit{LPl}, 1246; 21 and 26 June 1512; Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). Also see \textit{LPl},
1250 (25 and 26 June, letters to Venice from Rome).

\textsuperscript{171} The letter reached Venice via Rome and, although it is uncertain whether it was originally intended for Julius
II or for Venice, it is likely that the English crown would have advertised the papacy of its military
achievements; \textit{LPl}, 1268 (letter from an English councillor, 1 July 1512).

\textsuperscript{172} This letter appears to be that said to have been sent ‘in great haste’, according to the Venetian consul,
Pasqualigo, who persuaded the courier to take his correspondence as well; \textit{Ven.ii}, 186 (\textit{LPl}, 1321; 3 August
1512, Lorenzo Pasqualigo to his brothers, London), 190 (\textit{LPl}, 1354; 21, 22 and 24 August 1512, Venetian
ambassador in Rome to the Signory).
others) northwards.\textsuperscript{173} Finally, Bainbridge was informed from London in late September of English successes in raiding the country around Bayonne, which did not actually occur.\textsuperscript{174} In spite of the positive spin sent to Rome by the English, intelligence received in Rome and Italy about Henry VIII’s actions was extremely contradictory.\textsuperscript{175} Concerning the failing Guienne campaign, Ferdinand briefed the papacy against England, alleging that its failure was Henry’s fault. Correspondence from the Spanish crown to this end would have reached Rome by mid-October, also reporting the departure of English forces from Spain.\textsuperscript{176} In response, Bainbridge had already voiced his opinion of the Catholic King, as early as 28 August, reportedly telling the pope that, given Henry was contributing half the cost towards Ferdinand’s troops, Ferdinand was making progress (against Navarre) at the expense of the English.\textsuperscript{177} By December, the English orator had assigned blame for, what was by then known to be, the failure of the campaign; he asserted that this was due to the Spanish army’s failure to join with the English contingent.\textsuperscript{178} \textit{Vis-à-vis} the English naval defeat in Breton waters, the papacy was quickly \textit{au fait} with this in spite of Wolsey’s desire to keep this sensitive event a secret.\textsuperscript{179} Bainbridge was apparently notified by a letter dated 27 September.\textsuperscript{180}

\textsuperscript{173} Ibid., 203 (LPl, 1391; 18 September 1512, Catherine of Aragon to Bainbridge, London).
\textsuperscript{174} LPl, 1403 (27 September 1512, - to Bainbridge, London).
\textsuperscript{175} For the untrue intelligence supplied to Bainbridge, see \textit{ibid.}. Among other examples of the misinformation circulating in Italy about this campaign, on the one hand, it was understood at points during July and September that the Anglo-Spanish force was making considerable progress in France. At another stage in September, a Venetian source in Milan perceived that the same forces had broken their siege of Bayonne. All of this information was false, as neither English nor Spanish troops breached the borders of Gascony, let alone challenged the city of Bayonne; \textit{Ven.ii.}, 180 (LPl, 1281; 4 July 1512, receipt of news from Trent by the Spanish ambassador in Venice), 193 (LPl, 1368; 1 September 1512, Venetian secretary at Milan to the Signory), 194 (LPl, 1376; 7 September 1512, statement to the Signory by the Spanish ambassador).
\textsuperscript{176} This correspondence was directed to the Spanish ambassador at Venice and its contents were forwarded by the latter to its orator at Rome. It is probable that Ferdinand also sent letters of a similar tenor to his representative with the pope. John Stile, in Spain, also reported, during December 1512, of Ferdinand complaining to the papal nuncio at his Court, of English military inaction; that Henry kept his army in port for two and a half months; \textit{Ven.ii.}, 198 (LPl, 1432; 11 October 1512, Signory to the Venetian ambassador at the Curia); LPl, 1509 (LPl, 3584; 13 December 1512, John Stile to [Henry]).
\textsuperscript{177} \textit{Ven.ii.}, 192 (LPl, 1361; 28 August 1512, Francesco Foscari (ambassador) to the Signory, Rome).
\textsuperscript{178} P.S. Chambers, \textit{Cardinal Bainbridge}, pp.40, 157-158.
\textsuperscript{179} The event was deemed so sensitive, that Wolsey requested that Fox keep it secret, maintaining that only Henry and themselves were aware of it at that point. Venetian sources in England knew of the battle by 5 September, however, and rumours circulated in Italy about this from around the same time; P.S. and H.M. Allen,
disappointment at English actions may have been engendered by the failure of Henry VIII to open up a second front against France around Brittany. It is unclear, whether Julius II was aware of such hearsay, however. Finally, the pope understood by the end of October that James IV had attacked England. It would not be surprising if this caused the pope to believe that the English might focus their attentions on Scotland.

In spite of the apparent lack of success from the English perspective, these events (or lack thereof) were probably deemed to be relatively insignificant by the papacy, as the immediate objectives of the Holy League had been achieved; Bologna and other papal territories under French control had been recovered and the French had been all but expelled from Italy. If nothing else, Henry VIII (along with Ferdinand) had been successful in his diversionary role, diluting Louis XII’s military capabilities within the peninsula, and was believed by some at least to have facilitated these achievements. To England, on the other hand, the fact that the pope had achieved his immediate war aims was a worry. In a letter sent to Rome ‘in great haste’ on 8 August, Henry VIII recognised that the French had left Italy (‘and would be in so much the greater force against him, though he holds them in no

\*Letters of Richard Fox, 37 (Fiddes, c.10-11; LPl, 1356; LPI, 3388; 26 August 1512, Wolsey to [Fox]); Ven.ii, 193 (LPl, 1368; 1 September 1512, Venetian secretary at Milan to the Signory), 199 (LPl, 1371; 5 September 1512, Antonio Bavarin to Francesco Pesaro, London), 200 (LPl, 1385; 12 October 1510, news reported by Piero Lando); LPl, 1377 (news from Venetian merchants in London and Flanders, 9 September 1512 and 20 September, respectively); J.J. Scarisbrick, \*Henry VIII*, pp.29-30.

\*180 The author of the letter to Bainbridge is unknown, but the missive was seen in Venice by 29 October; LPl, 1403.

\*181 See above pp.403-404.

\*182 Ven.ii, 202 (LPl, 1449; 26 October 1512, Francesco Foscari to the Signory, Rome), 203 (LPl, 1391; 18 September 1512, Catherine of Aragon to Bainbridge, London).

\*183 While some contemporaries attributed Henry with credit for having contributed to the expulsion of the French from Italy, it is not difficult to detect their agendas for doing so. The Venetian orator Badoer conveyed his opinion of this to his brother on 24 July, while boasting of his own contribution in persuading the king to adopt this course. The doge of Venice stated this in his letter to Henry of 26 August 1512, although this could well have been mere courtesy. Finally, an English diplomat in Spain, ascribed this role to the English invasion force there in a letter of the same month; R. Brown (trans.), \*Four Years*, i, pp.70-71 (Ven.ii, 191; LPl, 3333; 24 July 1512, Badoer to his brother, London); Ven.ii, 187 (26 August 1512, doge to Henry); LPl, 1359 (letter seen by Venice from an English envoy in Spain, dated 27 August 1512, ‘Longionio in Castilia’).
account’), but also requested that Julius II send a fleet into Provence. The subtext here is a fear that the pope would no longer prosecute hostilities against Louis XII, leaving Henry VIII isolated to face the French. This idea also emerged in Catherine of Aragon’s missive to Bainbridge of 18 September 1512. While the queen conveyed Henry’s continued commitment to the war, she mentioned that he had ‘said openly to all hearers a few days previously that he firmly believed that neither the pope nor his very dear father [Ferdinand] would ever desert him, though if by any chance they should happen thus to do, yet he would never withdraw from this war until that schismatical sovereign [Louis XII] be made an end of’. Given that one of the conditions imposed on Henry VIII by his councillors for entering the war was that he be supported by a coalition of allies, one can detect an element of bravado in this statement and an implicit plea for Julius to remain committed.

By the end of the campaigning season, the English crown and its confederates were already looking towards the renewal of hostilities in the following year, Henry this time anticipating a personal invasion of France. In pursuit of this, the English crown continued

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184 Ven.ii, 186 (LPI, 1321; 3 August 1512, Lorenzo Pasqualigo to his brothers, London), 190 (LPIi, 1354; 21, 22 and 24 August 1512, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory).
185 Ibid., ii, 202 (LPI, 1449; 26 October 1512, Francesco Foscari to the Signory, Rome), 203 (LPIi, 1391; 18 September 1512, Catherine of Aragon to Bainbridge, London).
186 It will be recalled that such a condition would have been imposed on the king because England was unable, realistically speaking, to fight this ‘superpower’ alone; see below pp.379-380.
187 A document has survived, compiled by Wolsey and calendared at September 1512, entitled ‘Things to be remembered by the King’s grace touching his going in person with one army royal into France’; LPIi, 1412 (LPI, 3884; calendared end September 1512). Also see, for example, ibid., 1382 (LPI, 3414; 13 September 1512), 1394 (LPI, 3425; 22 September 1512, [Poyning and others to Henry], Antwerp), 1529 (LPI, 3615-3616; calendared end December 1512). Sir Richard Jerningham was in Germany (and on his way to Milan), by October, recruiting troops and apparently sourcing armour; ibid., 1440 (LPI, 3471; 17 October 1512, Jerningham to Henry, ‘Newys’), 1568 (LPI, 3658; 13 January 1513, Jerningham to Henry, Milan). On 19 October, Henry wrote to Venice, pledging to continue the war; ibid., 1443 (Ven.ii, 211; 19 October 1512, Henry to the Signory). This rhetoric was further followed-up by deeds in the the continuation of Parliament on 4 November (from when it was prorogued back in February) and various Venetian correspondents stated that it both sanctioned the planned invasion (for the following February-March) and had granted 600,000l. for this purpose. One of latter sources also added that the assembly had granted more money, on account that Henry intended to go in person; ibid., 1471 (LPI, 3502; 4 November 1512), 1512 (18 December 1512, Antonio Bavarin to the Pesari London), 1513 (Ven.ii, 216; 18-19 December 1512, Pasqualigo to his brothers, London), 1578 (Ven.ii, 215; 19 December – 16 January 1512, Pasqualigo to his brothers, London), 1591 (Ven.ii, 219; 23 January 1513, Niccolo di Favri to
to justify its aggression in terms of its protection of Rome; thus, on 13 November 1512, Henry reiterated his commitment to the Holy League ‘for defence of the Church’. Similarly, during May 1513, Thomas lord Howard, was commissioned to become commander-in-chief of the king’s army ‘raised at the request of the late Pope, and of Ferdinand of Arragon, for relief of the Holy See’. Also, on 6 June 1513, Catherine of Aragon was appointed ‘Regent and Governess of England, Wales, and Ireland, during the King’s absence in his expedition against France, for the preservation of the Catholic religion, and recovery of his rights’. Moreover, in terms of the papacy, a quid pro quo was envisaged for this; a military contribution by Julius II. Henry continued to hope that Julius would make an attack around Provence, for which he had urged Ferdinand to lobby the pope during February 1513; ‘as we entered this war for defence of the Church and Pope and the assistance of our father’s army in Italy, it is reasonable the Pope should aid us’, he argued.

In spite of English plans, the sands were shifting. The emperor finally adhered to the Holy League on 19 November 1512. This was positive for England, given its commitment

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Francesco Gradenigo, London). Subsequently, the sources consulted are full of references to preparations, both actual and reported, for the planned attack; LPI and Ven.ii passim.

188 LPI, 1494:27 (LPI, 3523; 13 November 1512). For other similar indications, see ibid., 1507, 1524:25 (LPI, 3586, 13 December 1512), 1514, 1524: 39 (LPI, 3603; Sp.ii, 77; 20 December 1512); Sp.ii, 79 (calendared end December 1512), 84 (calendared January 1513).

189 Leo X had become pope by this time; LPIii 1948:12-13 (LPI, 3997; 4 May 1513).

190 The other declared war aim was the conquest of France, which kings of England claimed by hereditary right; LPIi, 2055:46 (LPI, 4179; calendared 6 June 1513).

191 The English ambassadors in Spain were commissioned to pass this on to Ferdinand. This also became a stipulation in the Anglo-Imperial agreement to supplement the Holy League (and set out that year’s military plans) on 5 April 1513; ibid., 1659 (LPI, 4055; calendared February 1513, draft of a commission from Henry to his ambassadors in Spain), 1750 (LPI, 3859-3860; Sp.ii, 84; 5 April 1513). For the earlier approach to the pope by Henry in this regard, see above pp.395-396. Positive intelligence was received via France (during February 1513), in which it was reported that the pope had supplied galleys for a planned Genoese assault on Provence; LPIi, 1647 (LPI, 3552; February 1513). For a formal indication that the English crown hoped for this papal expedition, see the renewed Holy League concluded between Henry and Maximilian on 5 April 1513. It should also be noted that this treaty demanded that Leo employ his spiritual weapons as well; see below p.408.

192 Sp.ii, 73-75 (LPIi, 1486; 19 [November] 1512), 76 (19 November 1512).
to gaining Maximilian as an ally since 1509.\(^{193}\) This was followed by a reconstituted Holy League at Mechelin on 5 April 1513, produced between the emperor and the English representatives there ‘for defence of the Church’, committing all parties to attack France that year.\(^{194}\) An underlying problem with this, however, was that Maximilian had not solved his differences with the Venetians and, therefore, wanted them excluded from any new alliance. Spotting that this would probably drive the republic into the arms of France and, therefore, into enmity with the Holy League, the English crown sought to resolve this situation through Bainbridge.\(^{195}\) This strategy failed, however; the Venetians found Maximilian’s terms too harsh and Julius II concluded a new Holy League with the emperor, which excluded the republic, on 19 November. In addition, the pope concluded a separate, although complementary, alliance with Maximilian, in which Venice was named as an enemy (to be ‘excommunicated’). While a place was left in the compact for Henry (and Ferdinand), it is notable that Bainbridge again seems to have been central to its conclusion, but did not sign it on England’s behalf. As Venice understood, Julius did try to persuade Bainbridge to sign the league, but the cardinal refused and counseled against it. Nor was the amended league ever

\(^{193}\) It also brought Henry VIII closer to fulfilling one of the conditions for war earlier imposed on him by his councillors, although the intention to invade had already been made without any stipulation that Maximilian be involved; see above pp.379-380.

\(^{194}\) This was confirmed in England on 3 May and Maximilian swore to observe it by 15th. It was intended to include Leo X and Ferdinand. It was hoped that the pope would ratify within two months. It was to be confirmed, however, by neither. Spinelly (based in the Low Countries) notified the pope, through Bainbridge; \(\text{LPli, 1514 (1524:39; LPI, 3603; Sp.ii, 77, 20 December 1512, commissions to English ambassadors, Westminster), 1750 (1814; LPI, 3859-3861; Sp.ii, 84 ([January] 1513), 1792 (LPI, 3915; 19 April 1513, Spinelly to Bainbridge); LPlii, 1884 (LPI, 4069; 15 May 1513, Robert Wingfield to Henry); Sp.ii, 97 (5 April 1513), 101 (18 April 1513), 103 (25 April 1513).}

\(^{195}\) Margaret of Savoy reportedly foresaw this issue back in July 1512 and, believing that an Imperial-Venetian settlement could not be made in Brussels, recommended that Henry use Bainbridge to this end in Rome; \(\text{LPli, 1279 (LPI, 3291; 4 July 1512, [Young, Boleyn and Wingfield to Henry], Brussels). The state conveyed its thanks to the cardinal for his services on both 12 and 26 November; Ven.ii, 206 (LPli, 1483; 17 November 1512, Signory to the Venetian ambassador at the Curia), 207 (LPli, 1490; 26 November 1512, Signory to the Venetian ambassador at the Curia), 208 (LPli, 1489; 26 November 1512, Signory to Badoer). For an Imperial version of events and an account relayed by John Stile from Spain, see LPli, 1491 (28 November 1512, Maximilian to Margaret, ‘Wizembourg en Elsass’), 1519 (LPI, 3614; 29 December 1512, Stile to Henry). It should also be noted that the emperor and Venice did not resolve their differences here.
apparently ratified by Henry (or by Ferdinand of Aragon). 196 Apparently, the pope was not entirely comfortable with the exclusion of Venice and, by 9 December, had apologised to the state for his actions against it, claiming he had been compelled to take this action. The Venetians, in reply, instructed their ambassador in Rome to keep the pope on-side, along with Bainbridge and two other cardinals. 197 Henry VIII may have first found out about the revised Holy League towards the beginning of December 1512. 198 The English crown’s concern with this must have engendered an immediate response, as around 11 January, the pope would have received Henry’s letter urging him to mediate between the Empire and Venice, also requesting that Bainbridge be given audience to speak on this subject. 199 The English cardinal continued working actively to this end and the urgency is suggested by at least one direct approach to Maximilian during January 1513. 200 In England, there was probably little hope in any resolution being achieved, particularly as by 20 January it was widely reported that

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196 This new Holy League was again intended to defend the pope and the Papal States, reconquer lands claimed by the Church and provided for an invasion of France itself; Sp.ii, 73-75 (LPl, 1486; 19 November 1512), 76 (19 November 1512). In spite of Bainbridge’s opposition, he was unable to avoid indicating England’s implicit approval by performing the celebratory Mass on 25 November. The Venetians also reported that the league was concluded without Spanish participation and, later, Ferdinand stated that he would not formally adhere to it Ven.ii, 208 (LPl, 1489; 26 November 1512, Signory to Badoer); Sp.ii, 81 (LPl, 1558; 11 January[?] 1513, Ferdinand to his ambassador in Venice); D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, pp.40-41. Also see L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vi, pp.423-427; C. Shaw, Julius II, pp.309-310.

197 This instruction was repeated on 8 January 1513; Ven.ii, 209 (9 December 1512, Venice to its ambassador at the Curia) 210 (8 January 1513, Venice to its ambassador at the Curia).

198 Maximilian informed Margaret on 28 November and several English ambassadors (Spinelly, at least, being accustomed to forwarding Imperial intelligence) were then resident at her court, attempting to negotiate the emperor’s entry to the Holy League from that angle. Henry VIII would also have been notified of the impending loss of Venice from the Holy League through the exiled Hadrian de Castello’s 23 November despatch. John Stile (based in Spain) later notified Henry, on 29 December, that Julius and Maximilian had allied against Venice, without including England; LPl, 1488 (LPI, 3543; 23 November 1512, [de Castello] to Henry, Terni near Trent), 1491 (28 November 1512, Maximilian to Margaret, ‘Wizembour en Elss’), 1519 (LPI, 3614; 29 December 1512, Stile to Henry).

199 Ven.ii, 212 (LPI, 1521; December 1512, Henry to Julius). Around 20 January, Henry told Badoer either that he had done this, or had written a second letter in this regard; ibid., 220 (LPl, 1586; 20 January 1513, Badoer to the Signory, London), 229 (LPI, 1628; 10, 12 and 15 December 1512, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). The English king had pre-empted Ferdinand’s request, conveyed through John Stile on 13 and 15 January, to write to Julius II (as well as to Maximilian and the Venetians) in this regard, as the Catholic King had already claimed to have done; LPI, 1570 (LPI, 3661; 13 January 1513, Stile to Henry), 1575 (LPI, 3662; 15 January 1513, Stile to Henry).

200 On 26 January, Spinelly reported receipt of a despatch from Bainbridge to the emperor concerning the state of negotiations with Venice; LPI, 1594 (LPI, 3678; 26 January 1513, Spinelly to Henry, Mechelin).
Venice had allied with France.\footnote{Ven.ii, 220 (LPIi, 1586; 20 January 1513, Badoer to the Signory, London).} By 15 February, the Venetian consul relayed that the king and his ministers were unhappy at not being notified of this, particularly given that Bainbridge had done so much for the state.\footnote{Ibid., 229 (LPIi, 1628; 15 February 1513, Lorenzo Pasqualigo to his brother, London).} The actual alliance between France and Venice occurred on 14 or 23 March.\footnote{The Venetian ambassador in England, Badoer, was formally notified of this in correspondence dated 18 April, continued Imperial aggression being cited as the reason for this course. This news was confirmed by Knight from Spain on 12 May; ibid., 234 (18 April 1513, Signory to Badoer); LPIii, 1866 (LPI, 4058; 12 May 1513, Knight to Henry). Pastor is vague about the date of the compact, stating merely March, but citing that it was announced on 25th. L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vi, p.426.} The English Latin secretary, Ammonius, told a Venetian merchant, on 3 June, that this had ‘caused great displeasure to everybody in England’, but speculated that Henry VIII was likely to support the emperor against the Venetians.\footnote{Ven.ii, 254 (LPIii, 1956; 3 June 1513, Andrew Ammonius to Nicolo Chafiri, Venetian merchant, London).} According to Badoer, the king was so unhappy with the defection that he initially refused to give him an audience, eventually doing so, but even then he complained of the compact.\footnote{Writing on 6 June, Badoer also claimed that Thomas Ruthal had intercepted his letters and ordered their decryption in his presence, in relation to this subject. In addition, the Venetian alleged that three of his servants had been injured by the English because of the league and that even he himself was wary about going outside. On the same date, Henry even went as far as to send a formal letter of complaint to Venice on account of this agreement with France ibid., 250 (6 June 1513, Badoer to the Signory, London), 251 (6 June 1513, Henry to the Signory). Ferdinand attempted to rouse Henry against this Franco-Venetian agreement in correspondence around 18 June, in which he instructs his ambassador to tell the king that the compact intended the conquest of Italy; Sp.ii, 118 (calendared 18 June 1513, Ferdinad to his envoy in England).} He also tried again to kickstart attempts to mediate between the republic and the emperor.\footnote{Ven.ii, 250 (6 June 1513, Badoer to the Signory, London), 251 (6 June 1513, Henry to the Signory), 305 (calendared 13-15 September 1513, proposed letter from the doge to Henry). Also see the approach to Margaret of Savoy in this regard; LPIi, 2063 (LPI, 4319; 3 July 1513, Spinelly to Henry). Approaches were also made to Rome, as will be seen later: see pp.425-426.} Again resorting to Rome, Spinelly relayed instructions to Bainbridge around 5 July to lobby the pope (now Leo X) in this direction.\footnote{LPIii, 2068 (LPI, 4322; 5 July 1513, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 2069 (LPI, 4333; 5 July 1513, Spinelly to Bainbridge).} On 13 September, Venice, understanding that the English cardinal was making overtures to the pope on this subject, urged its own ambassador in Rome to ensure that Bainbridge continue this work.\footnote{Ven.ii, 304 (LPIii, 2264; 13 September 1513, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome). On the previous day, Bainbridge reported being urged by the Venetian orator to encourage Henry to mediate in this regard, given that he was with Maximilian (in France); LPIii, 2258 (LPI, 4446; Fiddes, c.12-13; 12 September 1513,}
such an accord as a step towards universal peace (that he was also pursuing in order to end the conflict), Henry and his advisors presumably predicted the return of Venice to the anti-Gallic cause if an agreement was effected.

The de facto composition of the Holy League altered again on 1 April 1513, when Ferdinand concluded a truce with Louis XII.\(^{209}\) Detecting delay during February, Henry instructed Stile and Knight to urge Ferdinand to observe their agreement to attack France, thereby defending the Church.\(^{210}\) Still failing to get anywhere, the English crown tried again shortly after concluding an agreement with the emperor (5 April) and even concluded a treaty with the Spanish ambassador in England on the 18\(^{\text{th}}\), ‘the principle object of which is to defend the Holy Church against her enemies’, although this was never ratified by Ferdinand.\(^{211}\) The Spanish defection raised wider English concerns; firstly, that its allies (especially the pope and potentially the emperor) would believe Ferdinand’s assertions that

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\(^{209}\) Sp.\(\text{ii},\) 91-92 (1 April 1513); L\(\text{Pii,}\) 1736 (L\(\text{PI,}\) 3839;1 April 1513). While Ferdinand’s overtures to his son-in-law to do likewise seemingly came via enciphered correspondence from Knight and Stile, dated 3 March 1513, there had been signs of procrastination in Spain’s willingness to renew their offensive alliance from late 1512. Henry VIII proposed a new treaty with Spain (to attack France) in December 1512, but this was never signed or confirmed by Ferdinand. The latter quibbled over money and troop contributions, among other matters. On 19 March, Stile notified Henry that Ferdinand had been negotiating with the French for this end, hence the Catholic King’s procrastination over a renewed Anglo-Spanish commitment to the invasion of France. In any case, Spain was not prepared for war; L\(\text{Pii,}\) 1447 (Sp.\(\text{ii,}\) 70; 22 October[? ] 1512, Ferdinand to his representatives in Flanders and England), 1461 (Sp.\(\text{ii,}\) 68; October[? ] 1512, Ferdinand to his representatives in England), 1484 (Sp.\(\text{ii,}\) 72; 19 November 1512, [Martin de Muxica] to Ferdinand, London); L\(\text{Pii,}\) 1509 (L\(\text{PI,}\) 3584; 13 December 1512, Stile to [Henry]), 1665 (L\(\text{PI,}\) 3766; 3 March 1513, Knight and Stile to [Henry]); L\(\text{Pii,}\) 1689 (L\(\text{PI,}\) 3807; 19 March 1513, Stile to Henry).

\(^{210}\) They were instructed to negotiate a treaty ‘for defence of Holy Church, the recovery of its Patrimony (Bologna) and defence of the Pope’; L\(\text{Pli,}\) 1507 (1524:25; L\(\text{Pli,}\) 3586; Sp.\(\text{ii,}\) 77; 13 December 1512 commission for Knight and Stile). An English proposal for the treaty was drawn up, providing for separate invasions by England and Spain, and for Henry’s contribution of 150,000 ducats towards the Spanish effort. Stile acknowledged receipt of this on 31 January but, as Ferdinand was unhappy with it, the latter had drawn up a new version to be sent back to England and to be signed as it was. In addition, Ferdinand revealed to his ambassador in England, Caroz, that he had made a separate proposal of universal peace, but it is not clear to whom; Sp.\(\text{ii,}\) 79 (calendared end December 1512), 82 (L\(\text{Pli,}\) calendared 11 January 1513; Ferdinand to the Viceroy of Naples), 86 (L\(\text{Pli,}\) 1656; calendared February 1513, Ferdinand to Caroz), 87 (L\(\text{Pli,}\) 1658; calendared February 1513, Ferdinand to his ambassador in Rome); L\(\text{Pli,}\) 1650 (L\(\text{PI,}\) 3755; 27 February 1513, Stile to Ruthal), 1657 (L\(\text{PI,}\) 4038; February 1513), 1659 (L\(\text{PI,}\) 4055; February 1513, draft commission from Henry to his ambassadors in Spain).

\(^{211}\) Sp.\(\text{ii,}\) 99-100 (12 April 1513, Henry to Surrey), 101 (18 April 1513). The unfortunate orator, Luis Caroz, yet to discover his king’s conclusion of the truce with France, readily swore to observe this treaty on Ferdinand’s behalf; \textit{ibid.}, 103 (26 April 1513, Caroz to all persons).
Henry would adhere to the truce;\textsuperscript{212} and secondly, that other confederates would join the peace, thus leaving England to fight alone. Fox, addressing Wolsey on this subject on 16 May, wrote, ‘I feer that themperor woll daunce the same daunce’.\textsuperscript{213} Three days later, the Lord Privy Seal again voiced his opinion (to Wolsey) that Maximilian would follow suit; ‘I thynk his will be good, but powayre woll faile hym’. As a result of this, Fox summarised, ‘then gette we noo helpe, neyther of the Pape, themperor nor the Kyng of Aragon’, as they were all tied up in Italy.\textsuperscript{214}

Perhaps most significantly, the Holy League and England’s planned contribution towards it was threatened on 20-21 February 1513, when Julius II died.\textsuperscript{215} The English crown received news of the pope’s death from around 9 March.\textsuperscript{216} English political concerns on receiving this news were twofold: the immediate effect of the pontiff’s death on the continuation of the Holy League and the longer term implications of the next pontiff’s attitude towards France. In the short-term, \textit{interregna} could cause instability in the Papal States. If this occurred, it could prompt the papacy to cease hostilities against the French at this crucial juncture, while the new pope put his house in order. At worst, the volatility could offer Louis XII an opportunity to regain a foothold in Italy. Spinelly conveyed news of attacks on the northern Papal States on 22 March and hoped that ‘the creation of a new Pope will put an end to many disorders’.\textsuperscript{217} Meanwhile, the \textit{sede vacante} administration was obliged to continue

\begin{itemize}
  \item Maximilian confirmed to Margaret on 12 May that Wingfield had assured him that Henry would not be party to the truce; \textit{LPIii}, 1867 (\textit{LPI}, 4059; 12 May 1513, Maximilian to Margaret of Savoy).
  \item Fox only seems to have known of the truce for certain from this date; P.S. and H.M. Allen, \textit{Letters of Richard Fox} (1929), 41 (\textit{LPIii}, 1885; \textit{LPI}, 4075; 16 May 1513, Fox to Wolsey).
  \item \textit{Ibid.}, 43 (\textit{LPIii}, 1899; \textit{LPI}, 4094; 19 May 1513, Fox to Wolsey). By 27 May, Ferdinand was under the impression that an Imperial ambassador was on his way to Spain to join the truce; \textit{Sp.ii}, 109 (27 May 1513, Ferdinand to Pedro de Quintana).
  \item C. Shaw, \textit{Julius II}, pp.311-313.
  \item Spinelly, in the Low Countries, forwarded this intelligence immediately. French intelligence of February 1513, later received in England reported that the pope was ill; \textit{LPIi}, 1647 (\textit{LPI}, 3552; February 1513), 1670 (\textit{LPI}, 3777; 9 March 1513, Spinelly to Henry, Mechelin).
  \item The Florentine had the Viceroy of Naples defending Modena and Reggio against the duke of Ferrara, while himself taking Piacenza, and described the Venetians threatening Ravenna and Faenza; \textit{ibid.}, 1699 (3821; 22 March 1513, Spinelly to [Henry]).
\end{itemize}
observing the Holy League according to supplementary articles added to the treaty on 8 October 1511.\textsuperscript{218} Given the distance from England to Rome and the effect that this had on communications, the crown only had an outside chance on being able to react to news of a papal death by attempting to influence the subsequent conclave.\textsuperscript{219} Henry VIII was probably advised to adopt a pragmatic approach, awaiting intelligence on the papal election, before making any decisions on the invasion of France.

The English in Rome were preoccupied with the need to ensure that an anti-French candidate was not elected pope. Bainbridge was active in pursuit of this and ultimately appears to have backed the strength of the Medicean party in conclave.\textsuperscript{220} It is unclear exactly when Henry VIII first knew of the election of Giovanni de’ Medici (9 March 1513), but it was certainly before 5 April. The pope apparently declared his commitment to observing the Holy League.\textsuperscript{221} Perhaps around the same time, Henry would also have seen an Imperial report (by da Carpi) on the disposition of the new pontiff, forwarded by Thomas Spinelly, which offered both good and bad news. It confirmed Leo X’s adhesion to the anti-French confederacy, which he was reported to have expressed publicly. However, the pope had expressed to the Imperial delegate his desire for universal peace, but this could be interpreted in two ways; a desire for war or peace.\textsuperscript{222} That it meant peace is suggested by da Carpi’s further claim that

\textsuperscript{218} Ven.\textit{ii}, 133 (\textit{LPli}, 959; 26 November 1511).
\textsuperscript{219} See pp.237-238.
\textsuperscript{220} See pp.231-233. One can detect the crown’s concern with the identity of Julius’s successor through Spinelly’s speculation, as early as 9 March, as to who the favourites were rumoured to be (and whether the schismatic cardinals of Pisa-Milan would take part); \textit{LPli}, 1670 (\textit{LPli}, 3777; 9 March 1513, Spinelly to Henry, Mechelin).
\textsuperscript{221} Nicholas West, at the Scottish court, received a copy of this via Ruthal on this date. The nature of its contents can also be detected through James IV’s alleged reply to West, that ‘your grace [Henry] was fortunate that ye had such a Pope so favourable to your Highness, and that was entered the League’; \textit{LPli}, 1687 (\textit{LPli}, 3806; 349; 19 March 1513, Leo X to Henry, Rome), 1775 (\textit{LPli}, 3882; 13 April 1513, Nicholas West to Henry). This letter must have been publicised, as on the 9\textsuperscript{th}, the agent of Venetian merchant firm similarly reported that Leo prayed Henry ‘to persevere in the undertaking [invasion of France], which was unnecessary, as the latter is more eager than ever’; Ven.\textit{ii}, 237 (9 April 1513, Antonio Bavarin to the Pesari in Venice, London).
\textsuperscript{222} See pp.98-99.
Leo was not predisposed to war and that he ‘will not neglect the dominions of the Church, but not enter on any war except from compulsion, except, perhaps, against the infidels’. More ominously, the English envoy Jerningham reported from Innsbruck on 15 April that Leo had threatened to attack Maximilian, if the emperor waged war on Louis XII. The Englishman’s opinion, however, was that this was a feint.

The new pope’s political disposition was, therefore, worryingly unclear. English doubts would have been compounded by the fluctuating situation concerning the other anti-French powers, particularly the defection of Venice and Spain, as well as fears for the emperor’s commitment. It is unsurprising, therefore, that on 12 April, Henry lamented to Bainbridge that ‘the whole expense and danger of the war will fall upon England’. While Henry VIII may well have anticipated this, he did seek to bind his father-in-law into a renewed offensive alliance (supplementary to the Holy League) from 12 April, shortly after he had discovered the new pope’s identity; this treaty was concluded on the 18th, ‘the principle object of which is to defend the Holy Church against her enemies’. On a more positive note for the English cause, the new pope’s identity would only have been known for a matter of days when the Anglo-Imperial agreement was finally reached at Mechelin on 5 April, which Leo was expected to join. It is tempting to consider that the timing was no coincidence.

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223 The copy of this account that reached England is in the hand of Spinelly (in the Low Countries); \(LPI\), 1677 (\(LPI\), 3780; 11 March 1513).
224 \(Ibid\), 1781 (\(LPI\), 3897; 15 April 1513, Richard Jerningham to Henry, Innsbruck).
225 See above pp.411-412.
226 \(LPI\), 1769 (\(LPI\), 3876; Ven.\(ii\), 238; 12 April 1513, Henry to Bainbridge, London).
227 Sp.\(ii\), 99-100 (12 April 1513, Henry to Surrey), 101 (18 April 1513). Luis Caroz was yet to discover his king’s conclusion of the truce with France, but swore to observe this treaty on Ferdinand’s behalf; \(Ibid\), 103 (26 April 1513, Caroz to all persons).
228 This appears to have been a reformulated version of the (1511) Holy League. While no papal or Spanish representative were present, the participation of both parties was envisaged, Leo’s at least within two months; \(Ibid\), 97 (\(LPI\), 1750; \(LPI\), 3649, 3859-3861; 5 April 1513).
In subsequent months during 1513, while the English crown sought renewed papal support for the anti-French cause (both notional and tangible), it failed to gain much more than the broadest of commitments and, instead, had to face down Leo’s (universal) peace initiative. Before examining these developments, it is worth outlining how the invasion of France developed within this framework. To begin with, despite the ambiguity of the papal position, there is nothing to suggest that Henry VIII altered his plan to attack his neighbour.229 From the opening of the new pontificate, the English crown notified Rome of its preparations and actions in this regard, beginning with correspondence of 12 April (via Bainbridge), in which Henry notified Leo X that a fleet was already on the sea and that his preparations for a land invasion were almost complete.230 Various newsletters were sent up until the end of the campaign, when Henry notified Rome of his having returned to England by early November.231 The factual, reporting nature in these communiqués of events seems to imply an underlying message that, while active papal support was sought, it was not deemed essential.232 This was perhaps a response to the lack of papal backing. These newsletters also served to counter, albeit tardily, contrary claims reaching Rome (largely from ‘French’

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229 Historians, such as Scarisbrick, have often portrayed Henry VIII’s 1513 campaign as somewhat underwhelming and the strategy as curious, especially given the size of the invasion, that the king had his army besiege two fairly insignificant towns (although Tournai was the seat of a bishopric) and that Henry, at one point, left the field for some days to celebrate his victories (at Thérouanne and the Battle of the Spurs) at Lille. It could be argued, however, that given the English crown’s fears at being left in the lurch by its allies and the papacy’s ambiguous position, this represented a scaling down of the enterprise that was originally intended to gain the French crown. However, this would require deeper investigation that cannot be warranted here. For accounts of the campaign, see C. Cruickshank, *Henry VIII and the Invasion of France*; J.J. Scarisbrick, *Henry VIII*, pp.34-37. For Bainbridge claiming, as late as 7 September, that still Henry intended to be crowned at Rheims, *Ven.ii*, 301 (9 September 1513, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory).

230 *LPI*, 1769 (*LPI*, 3876; *Ven.ii*, 238; 12 April 1513, Henry to Bainbridge, London); *LPlii*, 1846 (*Ven.ii*, 240; 5 May 1513, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory).

231 *Sp.ii*, 141 (*LPlii*, 2436, 9 November 1513, Henry to Leo). On 5 July, for instance, Spinelly informed Bainbridge of Henry’s arrival in Calais on 30 June; *LPlii*, 2068 (*LPI*, 4322; 5 July 1513, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels); 2069 (*LPI*, 4333; 5 July 1513, Spinelly to Bainbridge).

232 Indeed, it is interesting to note that Henry also resisted Spanish pressure to adhere to Ferdinand’s truce with France, based on various Spanish arguments that Leo X no longer supported the anti-French cause; *LPli*, 1665 (*LPI*, 3766; 3 March 1513, Knight and Stile to [Henry]); *Sp.ii*, 89 (calendared end March 1513, Ferdinand to Caroz), 93-94 (calendared April 1513, Ferdinand to Caroz), 111-112 (calendared beginning June 1513, Ferdinand to his ambassadors in England), 118 (calendared 18 June 1513, Ferdinand to his envoy in England).
sources) that Henry VIII was suffering various defeats in France.\textsuperscript{233} Prior to the end of September, it does not seem to have been recognised in England that French misinformation was a problem and could be affecting Leo X’s inclination to support the anti-French agenda more actively, although one can envisage that Bainbridge would have cast doubt on them. Indeed, communications between the crown and Rome during the invasion appear to have lessened; newsletters were channelled through lesser dignitaries, notably Thomas Spinelly and Brian Tuke. That ‘French’ misinformation was becoming a problem was identified by 22 September at least, when Brian Tuke (clerk of the signet) indicated his perception that Bainbridge and his secretary, Pace, were doubtful as to the veracity of reports of the king’s

\textsuperscript{233} The misinformation began as early as mid-May, when French correspondence claiming English naval losses was received in Rome. A papal envoy repeated these claims to the Venetians; *Ven.ii*, 244 (13-14 May 1513, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 245 (20 May 1513, statement made to the Venetian College by the papal envoy), 246 (19-20 May 1513, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). Rumours and reports alleging English defeats by land were circulating Rome from as early as 9-10 July, when Cardinal San Severino had reportedly received news from the French Court, alleging that an English force had been routed at Boulogne and that James IV had invaded England. The pope’s ambassador at Venice, Bibbiena, however, admitted that reports of the defeat at Boulogne were contradictory; *ibid.*, 249 (2 July 1513, letters received from Rome by an English merchant in Venice, dated 18 June 1513), 257 (9-10 July 1513, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 258 (14 July 1513, statement made to the Venetian College by the papal envoy Bibbiena), 259 (14 July 1513, letter received in Venice from Florence, via Rome). Towards the end of July, there were a number of rumours (that would have reached Rome) of an English defeat around Thérouanne, some of which alleged that Henry lost a significant number of soldiers; *ibid.*, 260 (23 July 1513, communication to Venice by Bibbiena of a letter from Florence), 261 (18 July 1513, bishop of Marseilles to Andrea Griti, Florence), 262 (3 July 1513, Florentine ambassador in France to Florence, Paris), 263 (13 June-3 July 1513, Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory, Paris), 264 (13-14 July 1513, Gian Giacomo Triulzi to Andrea Griti, Tours[?]). Similarly, around the same time, it was being circulated that Louis XII intended to attack Henry VIII in person, although one Venetian ambassador (in France) was convinced that the English and French armies would not actually meet; *ibid.*, 265 (30 July 1513, Florence to the papal ambassador at Venice Bibbiena), 266 (26-27 July 1513, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 268 (14-19 July 1513, Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory), 270 (24 July 1513, bishop of Turin to the Signory), 271 (4 August 1513, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 274 (14 July 1513, unsigned letters from France to Rome, Lyons). Reports of another supposed great defeat of the English reached Rome by 11 August (alleging that Henry had come close to capture and was now seeking terms with France); *ibid.*, 272 (9 August 1513, unsigned letter to Count Guido Rangone), 273 (11 August 1513, Veto Lippomano to the Signory, Rome), 275 (18 August 1513, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in France), 281 (14 August 1513, Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory). The papacy also received intelligence of Scottish progress, no doubt hearing around 16 September that James IV had defeated and captured the earl of Surrey, although a Venetian source in Rome asserted that this was untrue and a Florentine diplomat based in France questioned the veracity of the sources; *ibid.*, 276 (24 July 1513, Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory), 279 (8 August 1513, Giuliano de’ Medici to Bartolomeo d’Alviano, Beauvais), 306 (12 September 1513, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 307 (7 September 1513, de Lucon to the French ambassador in Rome, Lyons), 313 (20 September 1513, duke of Ferrara to his secretary in Venice), 314 (15-16 September 1513, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 320 (17 September 1513, Dom. Costanza to the Signory, Lyons), 322 (5 September 1513, Roberto Acciauolo to Florence, Amiens), 323 (14-26 September 1513, Veto Lippomano to –, Rome).
military success and blamed it partly on ‘the mere lies which he [Pace] may have heard from the French and their partisans’ and also on the failure of Henry’s councillors to keep him informed. Similarly, Henry himself outlined the details of the fall of Tournai (23 September) and the Battle of Flodden (9 September) to the pope on 12 October so ‘that he [Leo] may not be deceived by false rumours’. In addition, belief in English reports of their victories would have been aided by communications supporting their claims, which began to arrive in Rome from the beginning of September.

The pope was notified of the English victories at the Battle of the Spurs (16 August) and at Thérouanne (23 August) on 5 September by the Florentine representative based in France. Henry sent his notification of these events to Leo X and Bainbridge on 31 August, which Bainbridge received on 13 September. In response to this good news, the English cardinal (along with the Imperial orator) quickly capitalised by publicly celebrating with

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234 Ibid., 316 (22 September 1513, Brian Tuke to Richard [Pace], Tournai). While Spinelly and Tuke seem to have been appointed to communicate with Rome while the king was in France, this was not normal. While on campaign, formal correspondence from the king to the pope was only issued to publicise England victories. Furthermore, Henry seems to have been under the impression (on 12 October) that ‘numerous letters’ had been sent to Bainbridge and de Giglis concerning Flodden at least, although Tuke (in late September) suggested that the king’s council had failed to keep them informed sufficiently with events; Ven.ii, 316 (22 September 1513, Brian Tuke to Richard [Pace], Tournai); LPIi, 2355 (LPI, 4502; Sp.ii, 137; 12 October 1513, Henry to Leo, Tournai).

235 LPIi, 2355 (LPI, 4502; Sp.ii, 137; 12 October 1513, Henry to Leo, Tournai).

236 Just as Bainbridge et al sought news from the French campaign, so would have other interested parties in Rome; one would expect reports from Venetians in England, therefore, to have reached Rome. Even French reports of the Battle of the Spurs and the fall of Thérouanne eventually reflected what occurred, albeit playing down their significance; Ven.ii, 283 (2-12 August 1513, Antonio Bavarin to the Pesari in Venice, London), 284 (1 September 1513, - to Domenego Contarini), 288 (8 September 1513, Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory), 293 (6 September 1513, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 294 (9 September 1513), 295 (6 September 1513, Vetor Lippomano to his brother, Rome), 297 (29 July-25 August 1513, Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory, Amiens), 299 (7 September 1513, Bartolomeo Contarini to the Signory, Cremona), 300 (12 September 1513, report from the German factory to Venice), 302 (12 September 1513, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in France), 303 (9 September 1513, intelligence sent to Venice from Rome), 308 (16 September 1513, Florence to the papal ambassador in Venice Bibbiena). One must also note that some reports exaggerated the extent of the English progress. Vetor Lippomano, around mid-September, for instance, understood that Henry’s army was marching straight to Paris. On the 6 October, the duke of Ferrara was circulating a rumour (to the Venetians at least) that Henry VIII was to continue the war over the winter; ibid., 323 (14-26 September 1513, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome), 328-329 (6 October 1513, duke of Ferrara to Venice).

237 LPIi, 2258 (LPI, 4446; 12 September 1513, Bainbridge to [Henry]).

238 Ibid., 2276 (LPI, 4455; 17 September 1513, [Bainbridge] and de Giglis to Henry, Rome).
bonfires and a Mass at S. Maria del Popolo on 16 September, but Leo reportedly either refused to accept the veracity of the English claims or reserved judgement on whether they had actually occurred, arguing that, as no reliable source had yet reached Rome on this subject, ‘no trust can be placed either in English or French intelligence’. 239 A flavour of Bainbridge’s triumphalism can be gleaned from his letter to Wolsey of 17th, claiming that ‘the glory of the King for this victory is deemed immortal’. 240 In spite of his actions, Bainbridge may have held some initial, private reservations about the veracity of the news (prior to the arrival of the king’s letters). 241 Before news of Flodden arrived in Rome, the pope believed a widespread rumour that James IV had defeated Surrey’s forces and had captured the earl. 242 Spinelly notified Bainbridge of the victory on 17 September, writing again in more detail three days later. 243 The cardinal had received this news by 30 September-1 October and again had bonfires burnt and a Mass celebrated in public recognition. 244 He immediately passed on his news to the pope on 1 October and the victory was confirmed by independent sources by the 4th. 245 A formal notification to the pope by the king was apparently sent at or around the

239 According to two Venetian sources in Rome; Ven.ii, 314 (15-16 September 1513, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 315 (16 September 1513, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome).

240 LPl.ii, 2277 (LPI, 4454; 17 September 1513, Bainbridge to Wolsey).

241 Brian Tuke interpreted this from letters that reached him on campaign by around 20 September. In his reply, Tuke also suggested that the cardinal’s secretary, Richard Pace, shared these reservations; Ven.ii, 316 (22 September 1513, Brian Tuke to Richard [Pace], Tournai).

242 On 17 September, Bainbridge had the pope believing the French ambassador’s report of this. The Venetian Vetor Lippomano confirmed Leo’s acceptance of this apparent Scottish victory over England; LPl.ii, 2276 (LPI, 4455; 17 September 1513, Bainbridge [and de Giglis to Henry, Rome]; Ven.ii, 315 (16 September 1513, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome).

243 Ellis, 163-164 (LPl.ii, 2286; LPI, 4459; 20 September 1513, [Spinelly] to Bainbridge, Lisle). The emperor’s secretary, Bannisius, notified the Imperial ambassador in Rome, Count da Carpi, of Flodden in two letters of the same dates; Ven.ii, 331 (17 September 1513, James Bannisius to Lord Albert of Carpi, Tournai), 332 (20 September 1513, James Bannisius to Lord Albert of Carpi, Tournai).

244 The Venetian ambassador Foscarì doubted this news, however. Chambers claims that Bainbridge first heard about and celebrated Flodden in mid-October but, as will be seen, he is more likely to be referring to the arrival of intelligence of the fall of Tournai; Ven.ii, 325 (30 September-1 October 1513, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory); see p.419.

245 Foscarì conveyed that Flodden had been corroborated by Maximilian’s secretary, writing from the English camp, as well as by a Florentine merchant based in London; Ven.ii, 327 (4 October 1513, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). Also see ibid., 334 (6-7 October 1513, Venetian ambassadors in Rome to the Signory). Any doubts would have been removed by an imperial report from Tournai, where Maximilian’s secretary reported Henry having shown him a garment that James IV had worn at the battle and that the Scot’s gauntlets
same time as Spinelly’s correspondence. The fall of Tournai was predicted by Spinelly to be imminent in his correspondence to Bainbridge of 17 September, news which was conveyed to the pope by the latter on 1 October. Venetian diplomats in Rome were reporting the actual surrender of the city by 6th-7th October. Once again, Bainbridge may have had bonfires lit in recognition and a celebratory service held at S. Maria del Popolo. Henry formally notified Leo of the conquest (and ‘of the great success which God has continuously vouchsafed to him’) on 12 October. Finally, Henry told the pope of his intention to return to England in the aforementioned, although he pledged to return to France in 1514.

Having established the context in which the English invasion of France was communicated to Rome by the crown (as well as other parties), the role of Leo X in Henry VIII’s plans can now be developed. In a bid to ensure that the invasion took place and was a success, Henry VIII naturally sought the papacy’s continued support as an ally and even its active participation, both in ‘temporal’ and ‘spiritual’ senses, in the war against France.

had also arrived. Even this, however, was countered by intelligence from Lyons that reached Rome by 15 October, claiming that James IV had not been killed, rather a brother who wore his coat. Reports of late October that reached Venice from the French Court also perpetuated the myth that the Scottish king may still be alive; ibid., 332 (20 September 1513, James Bannisius to Lord Albert of Carpi, Tournai), 342 (15 October 1513, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 352 (14 November 1513, French news received in Venice). 246 Henry alludes to this in a later letter; LPlii, 2355 (LPI, 4502; Sp.ii, 137; 12 October 1513, Henry to Leo, Tournai). Its form may have been similar to the king’s notification of this battle to the duke of Milan, dated 16 September; Ven.ii, 309 (16 September 1513, Henry to the duke of Milan, Tournai).

247 Ellis, 163-164 (LPlii, 2286; LPI, 4459; 20 September 1513, [Spinelly] to Bainbridge, Lisle); Ven.ii, 327 (4 October 1513, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory).

248 Citing intelligence from Lyons, dated the 3rd, Ven.ii, 334 (6-7 October 1513, Venetian ambassadors in Rome to the Signory). Also see ibid., 338 (18 October 1513, statement made by the Ferrarese secretary to the Venetian Signory).

249 Chambers cites the English cardinal celebrating in this fashion during the second week of October and claims that this was connected with receipt of news of Flodden, but the timing makes it more likely that this was in recognition of the surrender of Tournai. A Venetian representative, however, has Bainbridge and de Castello lighting celebratory bonfires to celebrate a recent defeat of his state; D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.53; Ven.ii, 339 (12-15 October 1513, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome).

250 LPlii, 2355 (LPI, 4502; Sp.ii, 137; 12 October 1513, Henry to Leo, Tournai). It is curious that Henry did not write immediately on gaining Tournai, as he did to the duke of Milan (on 24 September); Ven.ii, 318 (24 September 1513, Henry to the duke of Milan, Tournai).

251 LPlii, 2355 (LPI, 4502; Sp.ii, 137; 12 October 1513, Henry to Leo, Tournai). Henry confirmed to the pope that he had returned in a subsequent letter of 9 November; Sp.ii, 141 (LPlii, 2436; 9 November 1513, Henry to Leo).
initially at least. He also acted to prevent a papal (universal) peace initiative, in addition to other signals that apparently indicated a move towards Franco-papal rapprochement.

Firstly, Henry VIII sought confirmation that the papacy would continue to support the impending invasion of France. Thus, in a general sense, in his 12 April reply (through Bainbridge) to the pope’s initial contact with him, while Henry would have been delighted that Leo supported the league, he also besought the pontiff to ‘follow the example of his predecessor in sanctioning this expedition undertaken for the liberation of the Church’. In other words, the English crown believed the new pope to have only gone so far in his support of the conflict. This may well have had something to do with the revised Holy League that Henry had just concluded with Maximilian on 5 April, which he intended to send to Leo (via Bainbridge), for the latter to join. This was to have no effect, however, as the Venetian ambassador in Rome observed that the pope remained neutral in spite of this intelligence. Henry may have planned a grand embassy to Rome to seek papal adhesion during June 1513, but its failure to materialise may indicate that Henry was already aware that Leo would not agree to the treaty. Indeed, by 26 July, Henry was informed of the pope’s rejection of the reformulated Holy League; Leo preferred a treaty also involving Spain, Milan and the Swiss, but without naming France. The inference here was that the papacy would not support a new anti-French coalition. There were, moreover, occasions when it may have been perceived that the pope could be induced to openly support the anti-French cause. Bainbridge’s report...

252 LPI, 1769 (LPI, 3876; Ven.ii, 238; 12 April 1513, Henry to Bainbridge, London).
253 Sp.ii, 97 (LPIi, 1750; LPI, 3649, 3859-3861; 5 April 1513). Henry told his diplomats in the Low Countries of his intention to send the treaty to Rome as soon as it was concluded. One such representative, Spinelly, notified Bainbridge of the league as soon as it had been concluded; LPI, 1723 (LPI, 4085; calendared end March 1513, Henry to [Poyning and others]), 1792 (LPI, 3915; 19 April 1513, Spinelly to Bainbridge).
254 Ven.ii, 240 (5 May 1513, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory).
255 On 19 June, Maximilian had reportedly seen a copy of an English letter to the pope, in response to which he offered to send Imperial envoys along with those from England. The contents of this letter are unclear, but the timing suggests that it was connected with the forthcoming invasion of France; LPIi, 2010 (LPI, 4272; 19 June 1513, Sir Robert Wingfield to Henry).
256 This may well have been interpreted as a desire for universal peace; ibid., 2124(LPI, 4366; 26 July 1513, Sir Robert Wingfield to Henry, Brussels).
(10 June) of the pope’s reaction to the Swiss victory at the Battle of Novara (6 June), for instance, would have been cause for celebration in England, as the cardinal claimed Leo had declared himself more against the French as a result, shooting guns from the Castel S. Angelo to indicate this.\textsuperscript{257} Nothing came of this, however, and the English probably held out little hope in subsequent months for further papal demonstrations of support for the anti-French agenda.\textsuperscript{258} Leo was in a difficult situation; however much he desired peace, he was committed (as Julius II’s successor) to support an invasion that was already all but inevitable. While, theoretically, he could have withdrawn his support (particularly given Ferdinand’s truce with France), this would have caused considerable resentment in England and, more significantly and in a direct sense, in Germany. In practice, therefore, the most pragmatic course for Leo was to encourage peace, while offering as little tangible support of the anti-French agenda as he could get away with. If this was the case, it is unsurprising, therefore, that England was in receipt of mixed messages from Rome.

Secondly, in addition to general support of the anti-French offensive, the English sought more tangible backing from Rome, particularly in the employment of the papacy’s spiritual weaponry. Those papal measures which censured England’s enemies were integral to the \textit{casus belli} and, with the accession of a new pope, needed to be renewed. Thus, one can observe the crown’s involvement in the revised Anglo-Imperial version of the Holy League (5 April) and the renewed English alliance with Spain (18 April), which stipulated that Leo X

\textsuperscript{257} \textit{Ibid.}, 1984 (\textit{LPI}, 4196; 10 June 1513, Bainbridge to [Henry]). Also see \textit{ibid.}, 2029 (\textit{LPI}, 4283; 25 June 1513, Bainbridge to Henry). De Castello also reported the battle back to England, but did not comment on the pope’s reaction; \textit{ibid.}, 2032 (\textit{LPI}, 4287; 27 June 1513, de Castello to Henry, Rome). In contradiction to Bainbridge’s claims, Pastor asserts that Leo was careful not to react to this news, nor to openly side with either the French or anti-French parties, but Henry VIII and his advisers were not to have known this, given that they were briefed otherwise; L. Pastor, \textit{History of the Popes}, vii, pp.52-54.

\textsuperscript{258} Henry may have followed Ferdinand’s advice to urge the pope towards active participation, both militarily and through censures, in September 1513, but this cannot be confirmed; \textit{Sp.ii}, 130 (calendared 7 September 1513, Ferdinand to a number of diplomats, including one in England), 131 (calendared 7 September 1513, Ferdinand to a number of diplomats, including one in England).
was to ‘excommunicate’ their enemies.\(^{259}\) Again, in writing to Bainbridge on 12 April, Henry lobbied the pope to confirm all bulls issued to England against the ‘enemies of the Church’, including the interdicts against France and Scotland.\(^{260}\) The censures against France were perhaps confirmed as issued under Julius II in the two briefs forwarded to Henry by Bainbridge on 25 June. He also conveyed Leo’s pledge not to raise the French interdict without the consent of his allies. While this looks to have been a successful request by the English crown, Bainbridge’s missive also reported that Leo was not prepared to attack France at this stage.\(^{261}\) Nevertheless, Henry appears to have been satisfied with this outcome, as no further pressure appears to have been applied in this regard.\(^{262}\)

Unlike with France, where ecclesiastical censures had already been issued, those against Scotland were still being developed when Leo X was elected. Instigated and pursued by the English crown from September 1512, these were initially based on allegations of James IV having breached the Anglo-Scottish peace of 1509. After sustained pressure from Bainbridge, James IV received the bull of excommunication by March 1513. Given Leo X’s election the same month, these immediately needed renewal and confirmation and, while some sort of broad affirmation was issued, Henry VIII still sought clarification during April.\(^{263}\) The reply, via Bainbridge on 25 June, both generally confirmed Julius II’s actions against the papacy’s enemies (including an apparent interdict against Scotland) and claimed that Leo had written to James IV threatening that, if he attacked England, ‘he [Leo] … woll

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\(^{259}\) While the renewed Anglo-Spanish alliance, concluded in England, never came into effect, the inclusion of this clause demonstrates the importance of papal censures to the English war effort; ibid., 97 (LPIi, 1750; LPI, 3649, 3859-3861; 5 April 1513), 101 (18 April 1513).  
\(^{260}\) LPIi, 1769 (LPI, 3876; Ven.ii, 238; 12 April 1513, Henry to Bainbridge, London).  
\(^{261}\) Fiddes, c.5-7 (LPIii, 2029; LPI, 4283; 25 June 1513, Bainbridge to Henry).  
\(^{262}\) During September 1513, Ferdinand urged Henry to lobby the pope to impose ecclesiastical censures, but it is unclear whether the English king (already wary of his father-in-law’s commitment against France) would have followed this advice; Sp.ii, 130 (calendared 7 September 1513, Ferdinand to a number of diplomats, including one in England), 131 (calendared 7 September 1513, Ferdinand to a number of diplomats, including one in England).  
\(^{263}\) See pp.182-184.
not oonlie granntt unto Your Grace oon odr bull confirmyng the furst granntide by pope Julie butt also grannt oon harder…’. 264 This response was hardly a resounding demonstration of papal support for England’s actions in ‘defence of the Church’: while Leo did confirm Julius II’s actions, as requested, he was not yet prepared to go any further. Perhaps satisfied with this answer, or having conceded that they were unable to make any further progress, Bainbridge (and de Giglis) only approached Leo again about this on 15 September 1513 when, having heard of a Scottish incursion into England, he sought a new bull against James IV (probably that promised earlier). In spite of French opposition, Leo reportedly promised to send an orator to England with the desired documents before Michaelmas, although he presumed that the bishops of Durham and Carlisle would already have pronounced Julius II’s excommunication of the Scottish king. 265 The pope issued a letter of credence and safe conduct (with Bainbridge’s blessing) on 20 September to Henry VIII for Balthazar Stuerd; the nuncio was to go to Scotland to negotiate peace with England and to help facilitate a crusade.266 It is unclear whether Stuerd would have issued a new sentence against James IV, as the king was killed at Flodden, but the papacy’s earlier reluctance to follow through with

264 Fiddes, c.5-7 (LPii, 2029; LPI, 4283; 25 June 1513, Bainbridge to Henry); D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.52.

265 LPii, 2226 (LPI, 4455; 17 September 1513, [Bainbridge] and de Giglis to Henry, Rome). According to the Venetian ambassador Foscari, writing at the same time, Leo refused this request from Bainbridge to censure James IV, but may have been just interpreting the pope’s failure to issue anything at this stage (after receiving opposition from French representatives) in these terms. Bainbridge may also have had an audience with the pope on this issue on 7 September; Ven.ii, 301 (9 September 1513, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 314 (15-16 September 1513, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory).

266 LPii, 2288 (LPI, 4458; 20 September 1513, Leo to Henry, Rome). Giuliano de’ Medici issued a similar letter to Henry on behalf of Stuerd on 7 October and Maximilian wrote in the nuncio’s favour to the English king on 26 December, revealing that Stuerd had been instructed to visit both of them en route to James IV; ibid., 2343 (LPI, 4491; 7 October 1513, Giulio de’ Medici to Henry, Rome), 2526 (LPI, 4615; 26 December 1513, Maximilian to Henry, Augsburg). It is unclear whether the bulls were ever brought, given that James IV’s death at Flodden effectively annulled them; Henry himself sought the end to the censures against the Scot, seeking papal permission to give him a royal burial. In reply, Leo X assented, presuming that James had repented just before death. Also, that Stuerd’s mission became one of peace makes it unlikely that these provocative documents were brought; ibid., 2355 (LPI, 4502; Sp.ii, 137; 12 October 1513, Henry to Leo, Tournai), 2469 (LPI, 4582; 29 November 1513, Leo to Henry, Rome). For the Stuerd mission, see below pp.438-439.
this, combined with the underlying pacific nature of the nuncio’s mission, make this unlikely.267

Also seeking to gain papal support against France via its spiritual armoury, Henry VIII still expected Leo X to honour his predecessor’s pledge to transfer the rights and titles of Louis XII to Henry VIII, albeit the brief/bull had been given to Cardinal Vigerio for safe-keeping, until the English king had conquered France. While neither Henry nor Bainbridge initially appear to have pressed for its renewal from the new pontiff, one could assume that they interpreted Leo’s generalised confirmation of his predecessor’s actions against France as including this political bombshell. The Cardinal of York only seems to have renewed efforts to obtain the ‘depositum’ on 6 September, following the arrival of news of Henry’s victories in France (the Battle of the Spurs and Thérouanne). Indeed, Vigerio was extremely cautious, refusing to hand over the document/s until specifically instructed to do so by Henry VIII, while also recommending that the king request it be reissued ‘in more ample manner under lead’.268 Bainbridge also seems to have approached the pope around the same time, notifying him of Henry’s intention to go to Rheims for his coronation, thus implying his desire for Leo’s recognition of Julius’ promise.269 While the Cardinal of York does not seem to have gained any concession out of the pope in this regard, there was further progress in terms of the Vigerio document/s. Henry appears to have responded quickly, as Vigerio acknowledged receipt of the king’s letters, through Bainbridge, on 14 October and claimed to have handed over the depositum to the English cardinal, on condition that he hand it to Henry in person. As far as seeking its confirmation (by Leo, one presumes), the Italian cited illness as preventing

267 For a papal reluctance to excommunicate James IV, see above p.184.
268 LPIii, 2258 (LPI, 4446; 12 September 1513, Bainbridge to [Henry]).
269 The Venetian orator cited Leo showing him statements from Bainbridge to this effect; Ven.ii, 301 (9 September 1513, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory).
him from doing this at present. Curiously, Vigerio wrote again to Henry VIII, towards the end of December 1513, recounting Bainbridge’s approaching him for the documents, post-Thérouanne, and his reply that Henry needed to write to him in person, but claims that the king had not yet addressed him on the subject. While it is likely that there is a dating issue with one of the latter two letters, it is clear that Vigerio was reluctant to release the politically sensitive document/s in his charge and to seek their revalidation by the new pontiff. This issue is raised again on 20 May 1514 by Bainbridge, who wonders why the king had not replied to the pope’s preparedness to send the brief ‘super nomine Christianissimi Regis’. While the cardinal suspected de Giglis’ opposition, the true reason was more likely to have been a desire in England not to rock the boat with such provocative gestures while peace negotiations were underway.

Henry also sought an indication of unambiguous ‘temporal’ support from Rome for his invasion of France by continuing to urge active papal military participation. In his April missive to Bainbridge, the king cited a promise made to him by Julius to invade *Gallia Narbonensis* (Provence) through an army led by the Viceroy of Naples. Pressure was also applied to this end by English attempts to have Leo X join the revised Holy League, negotiated between England and the Empire on 5 April, which provided for this assault. Privately, however, such tangible papal support was considered unlikely, as on 19 May Fox predicted, in a private letter to Wolsey, that Leo (and England’s other allies) would be preoccupied with Italy. This suspicion was confirmed by Bainbridge on 25 June, who relayed that, while Leo intended to keep Julius’ promise (presumably to invade via Provence),

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270 According to Vigerio, Julius II instructed that the *depositum* be personally delivered to Henry by him or Bainbridge; *LPI*, 2363 (*LPI*, 4506; 14 October 1513, [Cardinal Vigerio] to Henry, Rome).  
274 See above p.408.  
he ‘cannot yet openly invade the French King, as he is bound by an oath to promote the peace of Christendom’. 276 The subsequent silence on this issue suggests that, by the time that Henry crossed to Calais (on 30 June), England had, to all intents and purposes, given up on the papacy playing any military role. 277 Finally, the English crown maintained pressure on Rome to remain committed to the anti-French cause by seeking Leo X’s mediation of the differences between Maximilian and Venice, which had earlier pushed the republic into the arms of France. The intention was presumably to draw the Venetians back into the Holy League, although it would have also demonstrated papal support for the coalition. This strategy did not succeed, however. 278

At the same time as the English crown was failing in its efforts to gain anything more than lukewarm support from the papacy for its invasion of France (and the Holy League in general), Henry and his advisors simultaneously sought to counter signals from Rome that Leo X was moving towards a rapprochement with France. These manifested themselves most broadly in papal calls for England to join a general peace that was intended, formally at least, to enable an attack on the Turks. 279 In seeking to reject these overtures, the English crown tackled the call for a general peace, the pope’s intention to send a legate a latere to England to facilitate this and, finally, resisted other indications that the papacy was moving towards an understanding with Louis XII. Despite these indications, Leo X was not pro-French; indeed,

276 LPIii, 2029 (LPI, 4283; 25 June 1513, Bainbridge to Henry); D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, pp.46-48.
277 Henry may have instructed Sir Thomas Cheyney, Bainbridge or de Giglis to pressure the pope in this regard, if he listened to Ferdinand’s advice in early September, but this is unclear; Sp.ii, 130 (calendared 7 September 1513, Ferdinand to a number of diplomats, including one in England), 131 (calendared 7 September 1513, Ferdinand to a number of diplomats, including one in England).
278 See above pp.409-410.
279 Leo received encouragement in this from Ferdinand of Aragon. By early April, the Spaniard, in support of his truce with France, lobbied the pope to seek universal peace (to launch a crusade) and to write to England in this regard. During late May, Ferdinand applied similar pressure on the papacy and also urged Louis XII to persuade the pope to mediate a peace with Henry and Maximilian; Sp.ii, 98 (calendared April 1513, Ferdinand to the Viceroy of Naples), 104 (calendared 21 May 1513, Ferdinand to his envoy to France), 105 (calendared 21 May 1513), 106 (21 May 1513, Ferdinand to his ambassador in Rome). Reportedly, Leo also received similar pressure from James IV of Scotland, exhorting him to mediate peace between England and France, as otherwise, the Scot argued, he would have to attack Henry VIII; Ven.ii, 230 (17 March 1513, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory).
he funded Swiss troops to defend Milan against Louis XII’s forces during this year. Rather, he tended towards neutrality, although this was not necessarily sensed in England. Peace with France became increasingly likely following the latter’s defeat by the Swiss at the Battle of Novara (6 June 1513). Papal overtures for England to agree to a proposed universal peace emanated from Rome from the beginning of the pontificate and continued while Henry was on campaign. Given the English commitment to attack (and thereby protect the papacy from) France during 1513, it is unsurprising that Henry VIII vociferously rejected these approaches from the outset. In reply to Leo X’s initial approach, shortly after his election, the king answered bullishly (through Bainbridge, during April) that universal peace and, thereby, a crusade would be achieved by virtue of this war. In addition, he agreed with an apparent papal assertion that while the French had approached Rome with a view to peace, they were ‘only seeking to carry out designs against the Church’. Henry also cited Julius II changing his mind, following his appeal for peace following the Battle of Ravenna (April 1511), on being convinced that such a course would allow the French to become stronger. Finally, Henry argued that the pontiff was precluded from coming to terms with France without the consent of his allies in the Holy League. The pope’s reply in late June relayed a continued commitment to a general peace and crusade and, through Bainbridge, reasoned that he was bound by oath to work in this direction.

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280 The military setback is said to have induced Louis to consider peace overtures towards Rome; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.46-72.
281 The idea that the peace initiative was a ruse sponsored by the French was relayed to Bainbridge via Spinelly in early July 1513, reportedly citing Imperial intelligence from France; LPi, 2068 (LPI, 4322; 5 July 1513, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 2069 (LPI, 4333; 5 July 1513, Spinelly to Bainbridge).
282 Henry’s fear of the pope’s pacific tendencies were also indicated by his instructing Bainbridge to forestall Scottish pressure on the pope in this direction by having the bishop of Murray intercepted and detained, on his way to Rome, lest he get there and ‘disturb our holy expedition’; LPi, 1769 (LPI, 3876; Ven.ii, 238; 12 April 1513, Henry to Bainbridge, London).
283 LPi, 2029 (LPI, 4283; 25 June 1513, Bainbridge to Henry), 2048 ([June] 1513, Leo to Henry, Rome); D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, pp.46-48.
The English also feared some sort of Franco-p papal deal when, in his first letter to Bainbridge following Leo’s election, Henry feared that Leo was considering the absolution of the schismatic cardinals of Pisa-Milan (who were backed by Louis XII). By bringing them back into the fold, Leo would effectively signal the (beginning of the) end of the schism, central to the English casus belli. Henry urged his cardinal to prevent the pope from taking such a course. By 25 June, however, Bainbridge had failed and reported the restitution of Cardinals Carvajal and San Severino. This early setback, which would have been known to the king not long after his arrival in France, may have helped to shape the crown’s subsequent expectations for papal participation in the anti-Gallic campaign. It would not have been aided by other reports of Franco-p papal negotiations from English diplomats during June 1513, particularly regarding offers made to the Medici family, including a lucrative marriage for Leo X’s brother (Giuliano) to a relative of Louis XII.

As Leo X withdrew the casus belli for the English attack on France, Henry had little choice but to engage in peace negotiations, albeit extorting expensive terms from Rome:

September 1513 – August 1514

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284 LPii, 1769 (LPI, 3876; Ven.ii, 238; 12 April 1513, Henry to Bainbridge, London).
285 LPiii, 2029 (LPI, 4283; 25 June 1513, Bainbridge to Henry), 2030 (27 June 1513, Leo to Henry, Rome), 2032 (LPI, 4287; de Castello to Henry, Rome). A letter from the pope notifying Henry of this event was issued on 27 June; EP, 142 (27 June, Leo to James IV, Margaret of Savoy, the king of Portugal and Henry VIII, Rome). The significance of this event and Bainbridge’s perception of his failure to prevent it is suggested by the cardinal on 12 September, when he felt it necessary to account for de Castello’s pre-empting him in advertising the crown of the absolution; Bainbridge claimed that the bishop of Bath and Wells had bribed a secretary to get early news of this and, in any case, had been active in promoting the reconciliation, rather than in preventing it; LPiii, 2258 (LPI, 4446; 12 September 1513, Bainbridge to [Henry]).
286 In return, it was rumoured, Louis XII would renounce the Council of Pisa-Milan and the Pragmatic Sanction. These reports came from Robert Wingfield (21 June) and Thomas Spinelly (29 June); LPiii, 2016 (LPI, 4274; 21 June 1513, Sir Robert Wingfield to Henry), 2038 (LPI, 4296; 29 June 1513, Spinelly to [Henry]). Ferdinand later relayed these reports to England in September, further suggesting that Giuliano de’ Medici would also gain lands in Italy and France as part of the deal; Sp.ii, 131 (calendared 7 September 1513, Ferdinand to his ambassadors at the English and Imperial Courts). This report was portentous; Giuliano de’ Medici married Filiberta of Savoy, aunt to Francis I, but not until 25 June 1515; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, p.106; G.L. Williams, Papal Genealogy (2004), p.73.
As the campaigning season drew to a close and Henry VIII prepared to return to England, there was a reassessment of English foreign policy, given that the king had borne most of the burden of the conflict that year and that he was receiving increasing pressure from Rome towards peace. This reappraisal appears to have begun towards the end of September (shortly after Henry’s victory at Tournai), when Henry indicated to the pope his enthusiasm for the proposed league against the Turks ‘if affairs were once settled in Christendom’. In other words, the English king had opened the door slightly to the papal peace initiative. Implicit in papal peace overtures was Leo X’s intention to withdraw justification for the original casus belli as stipulated in the Treaty ‘for the recovery of Bologna’ (October 1511) and its offshoots; the papacy no longer wished to be ‘protected’. This concern was indicated when, shortly before Henry returned home, Fox and Sir Thomas Grey concluded a renewed version of the Holy League at Lille, committing Henry, Maximilian and Ferdinand to attacking France in 1514. While the treaty mentions the motive of the previous league (‘the object of which was to defend the Church and to extinguish the schism’), it was now reasoned that the alliance was required because ‘the allied princes have not yet entirely executed their work’. While Leo X and Florence (along with Milan) were to be included in the league and permitted to join (indeed, it was hoped that they would), the implication was that the papacy may not be counted upon as a future ally against France.

287 LPIii, 2310 (LPI, 4470; 28 September 1513, Henry to Leo, Tournai). That this letter indicates a change in attitude is suggested by the fact that it congratulates Leo on his election more than six months after the fact and refers to Henry’s intention to send an embassy to pledge his obedience. That it was issued from Tournai, i.e. at the end of the 1513 campaign, implies a deliberate withholding of obedience to the new pontiff that was linked to the invasion and may well have been motivated by his fear of the loss of the papacy as an ally and the justification for the war that this alliance carried with it. An earlier indication that the English crown may have considered the papacy’s motions towards peace was made by Catherine of Aragon (then regent of England, in Henry’s absence) on 27 July, when she mentioned to Wolsey that she would be glad if the pope could ‘make an honourable peace for the King, or “help on his part, as much as he can, knowing that all the business that the King hath was first the cause of the Church”’. It is unlikely, however, that this would have been acted upon while Henry was militarily active in France; ibid., 2120 (LPI, 4365; 26 July 1513, Catherine of Aragon to Wolsey, R[ichmond]).

288 Sp.ii, 138-139 (LPIii, 2377; LPI, 4511; 17 October 1513). Indeed, Ferdinand did not want Leo to know that he had joined this confederacy; ibid., 143 (calendared November 1513, Ferdinand to Knight Commander
The above treaty hints at the contradictory policies emanating from England in subsequent months. On the one hand, Henry VIII remained committed to relaunching the invasion of France in 1514, regardless of papal support. On the other hand, Henry became cautiously but increasingly receptive to papal peace overtures, particularly as he lost more allies and sought to capitalise on his political leverage by inducing various concessions from the papacy. Firstly outlining England’s continued commitment against France, Henry pledged to the pope on 12 October that he would renew the war in 1514.\(^{289}\) Even after his return to England, he warned the pope against coming to terms with France on the back of his victories and voiced his fear that ‘a premature peace might only be the source of greater wars in the future’. Henry further instructed Bainbridge and de Giglis in this regard and seems to have sent Sir Thomas Cheyney to Rome for this purpose.\(^{290}\) In subsequent months, Henry remained committed, publicly at least, to a renewed attack on Louis XII and observers across Europe noted English preparations.\(^{291}\) Even on 24 April 1514, the new earl of Surrey, Thomas Howard (the younger) was appointed admiral and commander-in-chief of the English troops going ‘in aid of the Holy See, at the request of the Pope and the King of Arragon’.\(^{292}\) In

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\(^{289\text{LPIii}}, 2355 (\text{LPI, 4502}; 12\text{ October 1513, Henry to Leo, Tournai}).\)

\(^{290\text{Sp.ii, 141 (LPIii, 2436; 9 November 1513, Henry to Leo). On the 10th, Henry issued a letter of credence to the pope on behalf of Cheyney, who was to go to Italy. The coincidence of the timing would suggest that this embassy was linked with Leo X’s desire for universal peace (and to send a legate to England); LPIii, 2437 (LPI, 4548; 10 November 1513, Henry to Leo, Windsor).}}\)

\(^{291\text{Sp.ii, 141 (LPIii, 2436; 9 November 1513, Henry to Leo). On the 10th, Henry issued a letter of credence to the pope on behalf of Cheyney, who was to go to Italy. The coincidence of the timing would suggest that this embassy was linked with Leo X’s desire for universal peace (and to send a legate to England); LPIii, 2437 (LPI, 4548; 10 November 1513, Henry to Leo, Windsor). On 16 March, for instance, the Venetian consul, Pasqualigo, reported that the rumours that his state had received from Rome concerning a likely Anglo-French peace were incorrect, as preparations for Henry’s crossing were continuing. Even as late as April and May 1514, intelligence reached Rome conveying this intention; Ven.ii, 344 (25 October 1513, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 362 (6 November-6 December 1513, Antonio Bavarin to the Pesari of London, London), 375 (17-18 February 1514, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 382 (7 February 1514, Badoer to the Signory), 396 (LPIii, 2747; 16 March 1514, Lorenzo Pasqualigo to his brothers, London), 397 (24 March 1514, Lorenzo Pasqualigo to his brothers, London), 403 (LPIii, 2891; 12 May 1514, Vetor Lippomano to the Signory, Rome), 417 (LPIii, 2950; 28 May 1514, Paulo Giovio to Marino Sanuto, Rome); LPIii, 2590 (LPI, 4848; 23 January 1514), 2590 (calendared 23 January 1514) 2591 (LPI, 4849, calendared 23 January 1514), 2684:1-5 (LPI, 4694-4698; 1 February 1514), 4848-4849 (4 March 1514).}}\)

\(^{292\text{LPIi, 2863 (LPI, 5007; 24 April 1514).}}\)
R Bainbridge continued to promote the anti-French cause as late as 20 May 1514, apparently oblivious to his employers’ double-dealing.\(^{293}\) On this date, the cardinal also complained to the king about de Giglis’ apparently treacherous behaviour, citing suspicious meetings with French representatives, including his conspiring with the cardinal protector of France, San Severino, in ‘vynes and garthynges’. He also suspected de Giglis of ‘writing clandestine letters’.\(^{294}\) In further illustration of this, the crown appears to have contacted the cardinal through its representatives in the Low Countries (Thomas Spinelly, Richard Wingfield and William Knight) on 10 April 1514, in answer to the recent Franco-Spanish truce which, formally speaking, it opposed. This missive, the contents of which were to remain secret to all apart from the pope himself, instructed Bainbridge to urge the pope to support the continuation of the war against France.\(^{295}\) The message was sent through these diplomats in a bid, perhaps, to conceal its continued employment of Bainbridge in this manner from the French, with whom the king and his ministers were currently negotiating. It may also have been intended to keep the Cardinal of York in the dark concerning England’s true intentions; anyone seeking indications of Henry VIII’s intentions would naturally have looked to Bainbridge’s actions. Even as late as 19 June, the English crown denied that it was

\(^{293}\) It will be seen later that Fox and Wolsey were already using de Giglis for their pro-peace communications with the papacy (from February); D.S. Chambers, *Cardinal Bainbridge*, pp.57-59; also see below pp.440-442.

\(^{294}\) \(LPI\), 2926 (*LPI*, 5106; 20 May 1514, Bainbridge to Henry, Rome); D.S. Chambers, *Cardinal Bainbridge*, pp.58-59. On 7 June, Lippomano also reported de Giglis having daily meetings with San Severino; *Ven.ii*, 424 (10 June 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome).

\(^{295}\) The message conveyed to Bainbridge is not entirely clear, although it does desire the cardinal to urge the pope to write to Maximilian (in opposition to Ferdinand’s truce initiative), to assert that he had no intention of invading Naples or harming his allies (as the Catholic King must have claimed), and that the pope should mediate an arrangement between the Empire and Venice, as well as encourage the Swiss to continue against France. *Vis-à-vis* England, they argued, ‘the Pope should not grudge the prosperity of the King of England, as he has always been an obedient son to the See Apostolic’. The broad message of England’s continued commitment against France, on the other hand, is quite clear. The use of Spinelly *et al* to convey this message can be explained by the latter still labouring under the impression that England would attack France; as they were resident at the Court of the emperor’s daughter and negotiating their joint attack (as well as Charles of Castile’s marriage to Princess Mary), it is likely that they were as unaware of the peace negotiations as Bainbridge in Rome. Certainly, Spinelly indicates this belief on 3 March (having contacted Bainbridge to urge the pope’s support); \(LPI\), 2694 (*LPI*, 4844; 3 March 1514, Spinelly to Henry), 2800 (*LPI*, 4955; 10 April 1514, Richard Wingfield and others to the king’s ambassadors at Rome, Mechelin).
involved in any peace discussions to the Imperial delegation.\footnote{These denials were issued even though the Imperial diplomats knew that they were not true. England was still formally committed to a joint invasion of France at this point, as well as to the marriage of Princess Mary to Maximilian’s grandson, Charles of Castile; \textit{ibid.}, 3018 (\textit{LPI}, 5173; 19 June 1514, Gerard de Pleine and John Colla to Maximilian, London).} In spite of apparent crown attempts to conceal negotiations with France, these were not particularly successful and Venetian sources in Rome knew that these were afoot as early as 21 March,\footnote{\textit{Ven.ii}, 387 (\textit{LPIii}, 2746; 21 March 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome). Also see \textit{ibid.}, 452 (26 July 1514, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 455-456 (8-12 July 1514, Lorenzo Pasqualigo to his brothers, London).} while those in England were speculating on this from 11 April.\footnote{Badoer believed that the agreement was a \textit{fait accompli} from 21 June; \textit{ibid.}, 401 (\textit{LPIii}, 2801; 11 April 1514, Lorenzo Pasqualigo to his brothers, London), 405 (22 April 1514, Lorenzo Pasqualigo to his brothers, London), 413 (\textit{LPIii}, 2844; 27 April 1514, Badoer to the Signory), 444 (\textit{LPIi}, 3029; 21 June 1514, Badoer to the Signory, London). It was not only the Venetians that heard such rumours; the Swiss cardinal, Matthew Schiner, wrote to Bainbridge of such reports on 26 March; \textit{LPIii}, 2752 (\textit{LPI}, 4916; 26 March 1514, Cardinal Schiner to Bainbridge, ‘Ex Viglo’).} 298

In addition to continued public commitment to war with France, Henry VIII also sought to counter any other perceived moves in Rome towards rapprochement with Louis XII. By 12 October, rumours circulated Rome that French diplomats were on their way to repudiate the Council of Pisa-Milan and to submit to papal guidance to end the war.\footnote{\textit{Ven.ii}, 335 (28 September 1513, Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory, Amiens).} Henry’s answer of 9 November, if in response to these reports, was to urge the pope against making peace, particularly as a result of the English victories, warning him that it may only cause further wars and also requesting him to listen to the English orators, Bainbridge and de Giglis.\footnote{\textit{Sp.ii}, 141 (\textit{LPIii}, 2436; 9 November 1513, Henry to Leo). It is feasible that this missive was a response to Ferdinand imploiring his son-in-law to advise the pope that England had no intention of making peace with France, in order to encourage the papacy to come out against Louis XII; \textit{Sp.ii}, 130 (calendared 7 September 1513, Ferdinand to a number of diplomats, including one in England), 131 (calendared 7 September 1513, Ferdinand to a number of diplomats, including one in England).} The English overtures failed to have any effect, however, as Louis XII’s declaration of adhesion to the Lateran Council and renunciation of Pisa-Milan was read aloud and approved in the eighth session on 19 December 1513.\footnote{This document was drawn up in Rome near the beginning of October and ratified by the French king on 26\textsuperscript{th}. A copy of this document apparently made its way to England; \textit{LPIii}, 2399 (26 October 1513); R.J. Schoeck, ‘The Fifth Lateran Council’, in G.F. Lytle (ed.), \textit{Reform and Authority in the Medieval and Reformation Church}, p.108.} While no record has been found of
Henry’s reaction, it was probably hostile. Indeed, his father-in-law, Ferdinand, while still publicly committed to joining Henry on the coming campaign, was critical of Leo X’s incorporation of the French into Lateran V and requested that Henry (and Maximilian) lobby the pope for overt support in their continued fight against France, in particular the continuation of spiritual censures until the confederates had ‘recovered’ the territories that they claimed (given that their initial casus belli had been removed).  

Following the papacy’s reconciliation with France, the English crown’s intended continuation of the conflict in 1514, ostensibly in defence of the Church, became increasingly untenable. The subsequent defection of Ferdinand and Maximilian in the early months of 1514 probably sealed this fate. The Spanish king double-crossed Henry VIII again by agreeing to another truce with Louis XII on 25 February 1514, itself ‘for the defence of the Church, and to avoid the effusion of Christian blood’, which was enshrined in a treaty that intended universal peace (and England’s participation in it) on 13 March.  

As in 1513, there had been earlier indications that Ferdinand would withdraw and, on 27 February, Henry expressed his fear that this would be the case. Among arguments for English adherence to the truce, Ferdinand suggested that the main aim, the defence of the Church and the ending of

302 Sp.ii, 146 (calendared 6 December 1513, Ferdinand to Caroz), 152 (calendared December 1513, Ferdinand to the Spanish ambassador at the Imperial Court). The Catholic King wrote in a similar vein at the same time to his ambassador in Germany; ibid., 147 (calendared 6 December 1513, Ferdinand to the Spanish ambassador at the Imperial Court). By March, however, Ferdinand was citing the same reconciliation to argue why England should agree to the truce that the Spaniard had concluded with their enemy; R.J. Schoeck, ‘The Fifth Lateran Council’, in G.F. Lytle (ed.), Reform and Authority in the Medieval and Reformation Church, p.108.  

303 The truce was declared on 1 April; LPIii, 1736 (LPI, 3839, 4818; Sp.ii, 91; 25 February and 1 April 1514), 2725 (LPI, 4875; Sp.ii, 164; 14 March 1514); L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.93-94.  

304 LPIii, 2678 (LPI, 4829; 27 February 1514, Henry to [Spinelly], Lambeth). Again, Ferdinand had procrastinated over his agreement to a proposed alliance with England to invade France the following year; for example, Sp.ii, 131 (calendared 7 September 1513, Ferdinand to his ambassadors at the English and Imperial Courts), 138-139 (LPIii, 2377; LPI, 4511; 17 October 1513), 142 (calendared November 1513, Ferdinand to his ambassador at the Imperial Court), 146 (6 December[?] 1513, Ferdinand to Caroz), 147 (6 December[?] 1513, Ferdinand to his ambassador at the Imperial Court), 148 (6 December[?] 1513), 149 (6 December[?] 1513, Ferdinand to Caroz), 150 (6 December[?] 1513, Ferdinand to his ambassador at the Imperial Court), 151 (calendared between 6 and 20 December 1513), 170 (calendared April 1514, Ferdinand to Caroz) and passim.
the schism had actually been achieved, since Louis XII had come to terms with the papacy. Henry was notified about the truce by his ambassador in Spain, John Stile, on 21 March, although he seems to have known about it towards the beginning of the month, having already relayed his fury to Spain. Fox was later quoted as blaming Ferdinand for England’s foreign policy reversal. Maximilian apparently accepted the truce by the turn of May 1514; Henry understood that this was the case by the 5th. Nevertheless, the English crown continued the façade of negotiations for Princess Mary’s marriage to Charles of Castile into June and Wolsey even maintained to an Imperial diplomat that the union would still happen. Henry’s reaction to the emperor’s desertion mirrored that he displayed towards the Spanish; anger. On 19 June, an Imperial ambassador relayed the English Council’s assertion that their king had

305 Sp.ii, 170 (calendared April 1514, Ferdinand to Caroz). For other pressure from Ferdinand on England in this regard, see for instance ibid., 171 (April[?] 1514, Ferdinand to his ambassador at the Imperial Court), 177 (July[?] 1514, Ferdinand to Caroz).
306 Around 5 March, Stile relayed Henry’s anger for Ferdinand having induced him to enter war and having urged the pope to use his influence with the king for that purpose; LPiii, 2707 (LPI, 4864; 8 March 1514, Peter Martyr to Lud. F. Mendoza, Valladolid); Sp.ii, 165 (21 March 1514, Stile to Henry).
307 Richard Fox was reported by the Venetian Badoer to have argued this to be the reason for the lack of invasion preparations around 27 April and his colleague, Pasqualigo, implies this motive later on 12 July; Ven.ii, 413 (LPIii, 2844; 27 April 1514, Badoer to the Signory), 456 (12 July 1514, Lorenzo Pasqualigo to his brothers, London).
308 LPiii, 2877 (LPI, 5041; 5 May 1514, Henry to Maximilian, Eltham), 2894 (LPI, 5059; 10 May 1514, Sir Richard Wingfield, Knight and Spinelly to Henry, Mechelin). Also see ibid, 2925 (LPI, 5105; 20 May 1514, Robert Wingfield to Henry, Vienna). For English suspicions about Imperial commitment in late February, see ibid., 2678 (LPI, 4829; 27 February 1514, Henry to [Spinelly], Lambeth). Maximilian seems to have approached Henry with a view to adhering to the armistice on 18 April; ibid., 2815 (LPI, 4978; 18 April 1514, Wingfield and others to Henry, Mechelin). In addition, from early April at least, there seems to have been growing English uncertainty about the prospective marriage between Mary and Maximilian’s grandson Charles, although the façade of negotiations was still maintained into June; P.S. and H.M. Allen, Letters of Richard Fox, 47 (LPiii, 2811; LPI, 4976; 17 April 1514, [Fox] to [Wolsey]); LPiii, 2779 (LPI, 4932; 3 April 1513, Knight to [Wolsey], Mechelin), 2849 (LPI, 5018; 28 April 1514, Margaret of Savoy to Maximilian, Mechelin), 2868 (LPI, 5029; 2 May 1514, Knight to Wolsey, Mechelin) and passim.
309 LPiii, 2656 (LPI, 5139; calendared end May 1514, instructions for the ambassadors with Margaret of Savoy), 2972 (LPI, 5148; 4 June 1514, Henry to Margaret of Savoy, Eltham), 3041 (LPI, 5203; 30 June 1514, Gerard de Pleine to Margaret of Savoy), 3109 (LPI, 5290; 1 August 1514, Spinelly to [Henry]); also see above n.288. It only seems to have fallen through, officially, when news of the Anglo-French peace and the associated betrothal of Mary to the dauphin Francis became public. See, for instance, LPiii, 3208 (LPI, 5362; 29 August 1514, Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to [Henry], ‘Burghes’), 3210 (LPI, 5368; calendared August 1514, Margaret of Savoy’s instructions to an ambassador sent to England), 3235 (LPI, 5377; 3 September 1514, Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to [Henry]), 3240 (LPI, 5379; 4 September 1514, - to Mons. de Giennes), 3245 (LPI, 5387; 6 September 1514, Spinelly to the Council), 3268 (LPI, 5407; 14 September 1514, Jaques de Caestres to [Margaret of Savoy]).
been treated like a child in this affair. He later reiterated this sentiment to the pope, claiming to have agreed to marry his sister to Louis XII because he was abandoned by his allies. Given the earlier stress placed by Henry’s councillors on the need for allies in order for him to act directly in ‘defence’ of the papacy, the need for England to act in a coalition to achieve this was evidently deemed integral.

A final factor that probably contributed to the English decision to seriously pursue peace negotiations at the turn of 1514 was the opportunity to ‘gain’ the kingdom of France that arose from the death of Queen Anne of France on 9 January. As Louis XII did not have an heir, the progeny of his next wife would inherit the realm. If, as was likely, the heir would be a minor when this happened, there would be a chance for English influence. In other words, the English crown may gain the chance to control France in such an event (in the same manner that it was then trying to influence Scotland), which would represent partial achievement of one of its war aims.

Just as Henry VIII opened the door to peace negotiations to the pope in late September 1513, Leo X promoted the same idea. Around 6-7 October, having just heard confirmed news of Flodden and the fall of Tournai, the pope stated his intention to now mediate a peace between the warring powers. Consequently, on the 11th, Leo congratulated Henry on his

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310 LPIii, 3018 (LPI, 5173; Gerard de Pleine and John Colla to Maximilian, London). Peter Martyr (based in Spain), also asserted Henry’s disgust with his former allies on 23 July; ibid, 3089 (LPI, 5267; 23 July 1514, Peter Martyr to Ludovico Furtado, Valladolid).
311 Ibid., 3482 (LPI, 5642; 27 November 1514, Peter Martyr to Ludovico Furtado, Valladolid).
312 This opportunity was clear to contemporaries, as Sanuto indicated that of three candidates discussed in Venice as potential suitors towards the end of January, two were Henry’s sisters. Similar rumours circulated in Rome around the same time (and, in October 1514, de Giglis cites Leo X as having suggested the match). It is unsurprising, therefore, that by March, intelligence at the Holy See suggested that Louis XII might indeed marry an English princess; F.J. Baumgartner, Louis XII, pp.234-235; Ven.ii, 367 (LPIii, 2596; 23 January 1514, French ambassador in Venice communicating letters from Rome and France to the Signory), 369 (21 January 1514, Vetro Lippomano to -, Rome), 383 (10 March 1514, Vetro Lippomano to -, Rome), LPIii, 3132 (LPI, 5543; calendared 7-8 August 1514, [de Giglis] to [Wolsey]).
313 Ven.ii, 334 (6-7 October 1513, Venetian ambassadors in Rome to the Signory).
military success and further urged the king to peace and a crusade against the Turks.\textsuperscript{314} In December, however, Leo answered Henry’s further reservations about the initiative. Firstly, concerning the king’s wish not to enter negotiations without the consent of his allies, the pope responded that he did not wish Henry to abandon them, rather ‘to sow among them the seeds of peace’; secondly, Leo hoped that the monarch would now respond to these pacific overtures, ‘as the holy purpose for which the King took up arms has been secured’.\textsuperscript{315} To strengthen his approach, Leo also wrote to influential members of the English episcopate, Warham, Ruthal and Fox at least, notifying of this strategy and asking for their support. The pope argued that Louis had requested pardon, that Henry had profited from the war, and that it was his duty as pontiff to stop war among Christians and to promote it against the Ottomans.\textsuperscript{316} On 19 December, Leo appears to have offered a lure to Henry to entertain peace negotiations, suggesting that if he admitted a legate a latere to England in this regard, ‘he [the legate] may communicate to the King the Pope’s secret intentions in the matter of war and peace’.\textsuperscript{317} This may also have been intended as a sop to counter the effective absolution of Louis XII that occurred in the Lateran Council on the same day.\textsuperscript{318} In response to being urged towards peace, Fox and Wolsey replied on behalf of the prelates approached by the pope during January 1514, claiming that they had lobbied the king in this regard and enclosed Henry’s answer; that this was positive (albeit not for the reception of a legate) is suggested by

\textsuperscript{314} EP, 233 (LPIii, 2354; 11 October 1513, Leo to Henry, Rome). For an indication that Leo made similar overtures in his first communication to Henry after being elected, see LPIi, 1769 (LPI, 3876; Ven.ii, 238; 12 April 1513, Leo to Bainbridge, London).
\textsuperscript{315} The ‘holy purpose’ presumably being the recovery of Bologna and other ‘papal’ territories, more generally referred to as the defence of the Church (and not Henry’s claim to France); LPIii, 2512 (LPI, 4605; 17 December 1513, Leo to Henry, Rome).
\textsuperscript{316} Ibid., 2513 (EP, 251; 17 December 1513, Leo to Warham, Ruthal and Fox).
\textsuperscript{317} Ibid., 2517 (LPI, 4608; 19 December 1513, Leo to Henry, Rome). For universal peace initiatives used also as a means to promote war within Christendom, see pp.97-99.
\textsuperscript{318} L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vi, p.67.
their stating that de Giglis would ‘negotiate the business’. Further letters were issued by the pope on 4 January 1514 to Fox and Wolsey, requesting they urge the king towards peace, to Henry himself on 8 February and to Wolsey and Fox on the 19th, the latter approach to Wolsey perhaps attempting to take advantage of any gratitude accruing from his recent promotion to the see of Lincoln (on the 6th).320

Also in response to increasing positive indications from England (and perhaps on account of the resistance to a legate), Leo despatched a stream of nuncios to Henry VIII to facilitate peace, which led to the development of ‘secret’ negotiations from January-February 1514. The arrival of two of them predated the Franco-Spanish armistice, thereby backing the idea that England was already prepared to move in this direction. Gianpietro Caraffa was the first to appear in England, towards the end of January, with a commission focused on peace with France.321 This mission had already received royal sanction, when Fox and Wolsey wrote to de Giglis in January 1514, arguing that Caraffa could be utilised by the pope to mediate peace, instead of a proposed legate a latere.322 There is evidence to suggest that Caraffa did gain access to the king and was believed to have been involved in subsequent

319 This was conditional on Maximilian being in agreement and the desire that an accord between the Empire and Venice be arranged first; LPlii, 2611 (LPI, 4598; dated by Chambers at January 1514, [Fox and Wolsey] to de Giglis); D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.56.
320 While the letter to Wolsey directly cites the pope’s desire for (universal) peace, that to Fox does not, although it does imply this by stating Leo’s confidence in Fox, presumably in influencing Henry to this end. In terms of the pope seeking Wolsey’s gratitude for his recent episcopal provision, one ought to remember that the pope had just turned down the bishop’s request for a reduction in the consistorial taxes due on his appointment. At this point, therefore, it is difficult to see where such gratitude would come from; LPlii, 2559 (EP, 316; 4 January 1514, Leo to Fox, Rome), 2560 (EP, 317; 4 January 1514, Leo to Wolsey, Rome), 2639 (EP, 350; 8 February 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome), 2659 (EP, 363; 19 February 1514, Leo to Fox, Rome), 2660 (EP, 362; 19 February 1514, Leo to Wolsey, Rome).
321 Caraffa (the future Paul IV) was despatched to England in late October or early November 1513, quite feasibly in response to Henry VIII’s encouragement of late September. The pope acknowledged correspondence from the nuncio dated London, 25 January, and instructed Caraffa that Giulio de’ Medici would communicate with him about his mission and that the nuncio ought to focus on Fox and Wolsey; Ven.ii, 372 (21 January 1514, Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory, Blois), 382 (7 February 1514, Badoer to the Signory); LPlii, 2610 (LPI, 4727; calendared end January 1514, Erasmus to William Gonell), 2658 (EP, 364; 19 February 1514, Leo to [Caraffa], Rome). For the nuncio’s journey to England via Germany and the Low Countries, visiting Margaret of Savoy en route probably as part of a broader peace initiative, see; ibid., 2448 (LPI, 4563; 16 November 1513, Robert Wingfield to Henry, [Augsburg]).
322 LPlii, 2611 (LPI, 4598; dated by Chambers at January 1514, [Fox and Wolsey] to de Giglis); D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.56.
peace negotiations. Furthermore, the pope could now combine his diplomatic efforts through direct correspondence with the English crown and via instructions to his nuncio. On 20 April, for instance, he contacted Caraffa to urge peace, although he was concerned about a lack of response from England. On the same date, Leo approached Wolsey and Fox again to the same end, the ministers having apparently assured the papacy of their support. A nuncio, probably Caraffa, was also contacted on the same date. A second nuncio, Balthazar Stuerd, seems to have crossed to England only a matter of days after Caraffa, but may have travelled immediately towards Scotland. Originally empowered on 20 September 1513 to mediate peace between England and Scotland, as a precursor to their participation in a crusade, it seems that he also had a broader remit vis-à-vis Henry VIII and Maximilian’s enmity towards Louis XII. Henry’s implied support of Stuerd’s mission is suggested when he wrote in defence of the nuncio on 7 May; in response to hearing that Stuerd was denied

323 LPIii, 2084 (LPI, 5048; 7 May 1514, Henry to Leo, Greenwich). A Mantuan source has the nuncio active in peace negotiations by 20 March; Ven.ii, 385 (20 March 1514, Giovanni Ratto to the Marquis of Mantua). By April, Ferdinand of Aragon understood that Caraffa was similarly occupied and instructed his own orator in England to lobby the nuncio to induce Henry to adhere to the Franco-Spanish truce as the first stage of universal peace; Sp.ii, 170 (calendared April 1514, Ferdinand to Caroz).

324 The nuncio is not named, but it was probably Caraffa; LPIii, 2820 (EP 410; 20 April 1514, Leo to a nuncio in England, Rome).

325 Ibid., 2821 (EP, 409; 20 April 1514, Leo to Fox, Rome), 2822 (EP, 408; 20 April 1514, Leo to Wolsey, Rome). Henry VIII may also have been contacted directly on this date EP, 384 (calendared 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome).

326 LPIii, 2448 (LPI, 4563; 16 November 1513, Robert Wingfield to Henry, [Augsburg]), 2633 (LPI, 4725; 7 February 1514, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels). Stuerd has not been found to have visited the king, but was certainly around the Scottish borders by 20 March and in Scotland by 9 April; ibid., 2740 (LPI, 4902; 20 March 1514, Lord Darcy to Henry, Templehurst), 2793 (LPI, 4951; 8 April 1514, Dacre to Henry, Carlisle Castle).

327 While Leo issued Stuerd (also known as Stuart or Stewart) credentials for this mission on 20 September and Giulio de’ Medici did the same on 7 October, the nuncio’s mission was apparently delayed, perhaps requiring a refocus following news that Henry VI II was open to peace overtures. Curiously, the pope claimed that this nuncio’s despatch was made with the full support of Bainbridge, despite the cardinal’s apparent lack of knowledge about his employers’ later change of heart on France. The Venetian Lippomano heard on 20 October that the pope intended to send nuncios to England and Scotland to settle their differences. En route to the British Isles, Stuerd visited the emperor elect, who in turn wrote in the nuncio’s favour to Henry on 26 December. One also suspects that Stuerd is the ‘legate’ cited by Sir Robert Wingfield on 15 November as calling for Maximilian to agree to universal peace (and crusade); ibid., 2288 (LPI, 4458; 20 September 1513, Leo to Henry, Rome), 2343 (LPI, 4491; 7 October 1513, Giulio de’ Medici to Henry, Rome), 2448 (LPI, 4563; 16 November 1513, Robert Wingfield to Henry, [Augsburg]), 2526 (LPI, 4615; 26 December 1513, Maximilian to Henry, Augsburg); Ven.ii, 343 (22 October 1513, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome). For another part of Stuerd’s mission, to gain possession of the see of St Andrew’s for a papal cousin, see D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.99.
entry to Scotland, the king offered to attack Scotland ‘to avenge the dignity’ of the pope.\textsuperscript{328} The crown also seems to have responded to a report by the nuncio, presumably linked to Anglo-Scottish negotiations, which reached Rome by 9 May.\textsuperscript{329} Perhaps most significantly, the pope was reported, around early January, as intending to induce Henry VIII to peace by offering him the governance of Scotland.\textsuperscript{330} While it is feasible that the Stuerd mission was intended to explore this possibility, maybe to compensate Henry for the papacy’s failure to grant the brief/s transferring all rights to the kingdom of France, there is no evidence that it was ever a real possibility; while Leo X had no coercive powers over Scotland, he may have envisaged Henry assuming direct control of Scotland, given his decisive victory at Flodden, his affinity with its new, young king James V and his declared intention to the pope during October-November that he was returning to England to seize the opportunity now offered there.\textsuperscript{331} Another diplomat that Leo X was rumoured to be sending to England was the Polish ambassador, doubtless to emphasise the crusading imperative, to seek peace between England and France, but there is no evidence that anything came of this.\textsuperscript{332} A third nuncio was sent to England perhaps around mid-May. Lodovico Canossa was despatched on a secret mission to France and England, certainly to seek a truce between the two and to help with the negotiations.\textsuperscript{333} Canossa arrived in England around 17 June ‘in great haste, and incognito, to

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  \item \textsuperscript{328} \textit{LPIii}, 2084 (\textit{LPI}, 5048; 7 May 1514, Henry to Leo, Greenwich).
  \item \textsuperscript{329} \textit{Ibid.}, 2890 (\textit{LPI}, 5054; 9 May 1514, Giulio de’ Medici to Henry, Rome).
  \item \textsuperscript{330} \textit{Ven.ii}, 366 (\textit{LPIii}, 2568; 5-8 January 1514, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory).
  \item \textsuperscript{331} Henry was uncle to the minor James V and brother to the latter’s mother and current governor of Scotland, Margaret. For the decisive nature of the English victory at Flodden, see \textit{LPIii}, 2246 (\textit{LPI}, 4441, 9 September 1513), 2268 (\textit{LPI}, 4451 16 September 1513, Catherine of Aragon to Henry, Woborne); \textit{Ven.ii}, 309 (\textit{LPIii}, 2270; 16 September 1513, Henry to the duke of Milan, Tournai), 341 (\textit{LPIii}, 2313; 29 September 1513). For Henry’s declared intention to follow-up his victory over the Scots, see \textit{LPIii}, 2355 (\textit{LPI}, 4502; \textit{Sp.ii}, 137; 12 October 1513, Henry to Leo, Tournai), 2436 (\textit{Sp.ii}, 141; 9 November 1513, Henry to Leo).
  \item \textsuperscript{332} \textit{Ven.ii}, 349 (4 November 1513, Vettor Lipomano to -, Rome).
  \item \textsuperscript{333} De Giglis informed the English crown of the former purpose (on 20 May), while the Venetian government believed the latter. It ought to be noted that the mission could not have been that much of a secret if the Venetians knew about it. Certainly, it will be seen later that Canossa’s arrival in England and the nature of his mission seem to have been common knowledge among foreign diplomats; \textit{LPIii}, 2917 (calendared 18 May 1518, Leo to Henry, ’Mallianae’), 2918 (calendared 18 May 1518, Leo to Henry and a similar letter to Fox and Wolsey), 2919 (calendared 18 May 1518, Leo to Louis XII), 2920 (calendared 18 May 1518, Leo to the
favour (it is said) the peace with France’. The Venetian Badoer understood that the nuncio would remain indoors until he knew the final decisions on the peace, upon which he would leave immediately. Badoer speculated that Canossa would depart in a few days with a marriage proposal.\(^{334}\) Despite this nuncio supposedly being incognito, Imperial ambassadors were also aware of his presence and purpose.\(^{335}\) Soon after, Leo X again combined direct written pressure for peace to the king and his advisors with instructions to Canossa.\(^{336}\) As Ferdinand I understood by July 1514, Canossa failed to achieve anything, returned to France empty-handed and was said to be deeply unhappy with his treatment in England.\(^{337}\) The Venetian Lippomano in Rome, however, cited correspondence from the nuncio dated 16 July, claiming that he had gained Henry VIII’s agreement to peace and had returned to Louis XII to gain consent. Further correspondence from Canossa notified Leo X that the negotiations were in good train and that a conclusion was expected by 10 August.\(^{338}\) It then seems that Canossa travelled back to England with Louis’ final conditions, which must have been accepted given that the peace was concluded on 10 August.\(^{339}\)

Henry and his ministers’ increasing amenability towards the papal peace initiative in early 1514 can also be observed from their employment, on 7 February, of Silvester de Giglis dauphin), 2927 (LPI, 5107; 20 May 1514, de Giglis to Henry, Rome); Ven.ii, 421 (LPIii, 2980; 7 June 1514, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome); EP, 430 (May 1514, Leo to Henry, Fox and Wolsey, Rome).\(^{335}\) For Canossa’s commission in May, see EP, 430 (May 1514, Leo to Henry, Fox and Wolsey, Rome). The nuncio was said to have left France on the 8th; LPIii, 3004 (LPI, 5164; 15 June 1514, [-] to Colart, Paris); Ven.iii, 1485 (LPIii, 3009; 17 June 1514, Badoer to the Venetian ambassador at the Curia); Ven.ii, 431 (20 June 1514, Vetor Lippomano to - , Rome). The secrecy surrounding Canossa’s visit to the kingdom is also confirmed by another member of the Venetian embassy; ibid., 505 (LPIii, 3298; 24 September 1514, Nicolo di Favri to Francesco Gradenigo, London).\(^{335}\) Given that, officially, England was still committed to war against France, as far as the Imperials were concerned and the crown denied any negotiations with France, Canossa’s residency ought not to have been known by them; LPIii, 3018 (LPI, 5173; Gerard de Pleine and John Colla to Maximilian, London).\(^{335}\) The nuncio Canossa was also instructed to recognise communications from Giulio de’ Medici; EP, 438 (16 June 1514, Leo to Fox and Wolsey, Rome), 443 (19 June 1514, Leo to Canossa, Rome), 444 (19 June 1514, Leo to Ammonius, Rome); LPIii, 3019 (LPI, 5174; 19 June 1514, Leo to Henry).\(^{336}\) Sp.ii, 176 (calendared July 1514, Ferdinand to Cardinal de Cisneros).\(^{336}\) Lippomano does state, however, the pope’s understanding that the agreement had stalled since Canossa’s writing, later explaining that this was linked to the English possession of Tournai; Ven.ii, 453 (26 July 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome), 454 (30 July 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome).\(^{337}\) Ibid., 465 (16 August 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome).
to negotiate in Rome with the pope and French representatives on their behalf.\textsuperscript{340} The date suggests an almost immediate response to Caraffa’s arrival, and that something was said or offered to make peace an instantly attractive proposition. Subsequently, the bishop of Worcester received a number of communiqués from Fox and Wolsey, and was involved in frequent negotiations with the pope and French representatives about the peace, right up to its conclusion. Furthermore, Leo X appears to have used the orator as the conduit for some of his own communications concerning the peace.\textsuperscript{341} The significance of the bishop of Worcester’s role was such that William Burbank believed, after news of the peace (in August) had reached Rome, that Leo X wished to sweep later allegations of de Giglis’ involvement in the alleged murder of Bainbridge under the carpet, on account of this.\textsuperscript{342} De Giglis himself believed that his work deserved a more lucrative benefice than the see of Worcester that he already held.\textsuperscript{343} It is unclear why the English crown employed de Giglis rather than Bainbridge but, while Chambers’ understanding that he may have been a victim of Wolsey’s enmity may hold some truth, Fox was also involved and both ministers still had to achieve a successful outcome for English interests; surely, personal grievances would not have interfered in this. An alternative

\textsuperscript{340} This task is implicit in the actual letter sent by Fox and Wolsey, but this (and its actual date) becomes clearer in its later citation by de Giglis himself; \textit{LPlii}, 2611 (\textit{LPI}, 4598; dated by Chambers at January 1514, [Fox and Wolsey] to de Giglis); D.S. Chambers, \textit{Cardinal Bainbridge}, p.56; \textit{LPlii}, 2928 (\textit{LPI}, 5353; 20 May 1514, [de Giglis to Fox and Wolsey]).

\textsuperscript{341} Other evidence of de Giglis being instructed and informed by Fox and Wolsey about the peace, as well as the bishop’s responding to the same ministers (up to the conclusion of the peace in August 1514) can be found in \textit{LPlii}, 2783 (\textit{LPI}, 4936; 4 April 1514, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 2927 (\textit{LPI}, 5107; 20 May 1514, de Giglis to Henry, Rome), 3019 (\textit{LPI}, 5174; 19 June 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome), 3197 (\textit{LPI}, 5354; 26 August 1514, de Giglis to Wolsey and Fox, Rome), 3362 (\textit{LPI}, 5496; 13 October 1514, de Giglis to Wolsey and Fox, Rome). Bainbridge’s spotting his colleague’s apparent intrigues in this respect (during May) have already been mentioned; \textit{ibid.}, 2926 (\textit{LPI}, 5106; 20 May 1514, Bainbridge to Henry, Rome). In addition, on 7 June, Lippomano also reported de Giglis having daily meetings with the cardinal protector of France, San Severino; \textit{Ven.ii}, 424 (10 June 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome).

\textsuperscript{342} Burbank was one of Bainbridge’s servants, attempting to implicate de Giglis in the alleged poison of the cardinal, who died on 13-14 July 1514; \textit{LPlii}, 3203 (\textit{LPI}, 5356; 28 August 1514, [William Burbank] to Henry, Florence). For Leo writing to Wolsey and Fox on 29 September, asserting de Giglis’ innocence, see \textit{EP}, 521 (29 September 1514, Leo to Wolsey and Fox, Rome).

\textsuperscript{343} De Giglis requested this through Wolsey on 17 June, albeit claiming that he needed such a promotion because of his debts. The previous day, the pope had interceded with the king on the same subject. Leo implored Henry again to recognise de Giglis’ contribution to the peace on 8 September (on the same date he replied to English notifications of the treaty); \textit{LPlii}, 3011 (\textit{LPI}, 5168; 17 June 1514, de Giglis to [Wolsey], Rome), 3255 (\textit{LPI}, 5392 8 September 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome); \textit{EP}, 437 (16 June 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome).
explanation is that de Giglis was commissioned in an attempt to keep the negotiations secret (in the same way that Canossa’s mission to England was to remain covert); Bainbridge would remain a vocal and convincing anti-French firebrand, who might unwittingly help to ensure that this would remain the case, thus perpetuating the underlying anti-French agenda. As the most high-ranking English representative in Rome, Bainbridge’s actions would be scrutinised for any indication of changes in English foreign policy more so than, perhaps, de Giglis. The cardinal also posed a latent threat to the papacy with the English crown’s demand for concessions in return for its compliance (as will be outlined); that Bainbridge and de Giglis were proponents of different views may have suggested to the pope that Henry VIII was not completely decided on the peace and that there may have been a split within crown circles on the issue. Leo would have been encouraged, therefore, to give in to the crown’s requests, to ensure that the anti-French ‘party’, apparently represented by Bainbridge, did not again become ascendant. Of other English diplomatic representatives in Rome who may have been employed to pursue peace, Polydore Vergil, who was dispatched from England on 26 February, was the most likely to have been involved.\(^\text{344}\) While there is no direct evidence that he did act on this subject, he did write to Wolsey from Rome on 21 May, by which time de Giglis was actively negotiating towards the peace, concerning an approach to Leo for Wolsey to gain a red hat, a concession which must have been linked to the wider political context.\(^\text{345}\) Finally, Sanuto notes on 10 June 1514 that an English bishop was to go to Rome, to finalise the peace, but this does not appear to have occurred.\(^\text{346}\)

Another indication that Henry VIII was manoeuvring closer to the papacy and thus towards Leo’s desire for peace, can be seen through his grants to two papal relatives, probably

\(^{344}\) LPIii, 2674 (LPI, 4819; 26 February 1514, Henry to Leo, Westminster).

\(^{345}\) Vergil reported Leo as saying that Wolsey first needed to have ‘great authority with the king’ and recommended that de Castello be commissioned to facilitate this; ibid., 2932 (LPI, 5110; 21 May 1514, Pol[ydore Vergil] to [Wolsey], [Rome]).

\(^{346}\) Ven.ii, 425 (10 June 1514, news recorded by Marino Sanuto, Rome).
issued during January 1514. The pope’s cousin (and closest confidant), Giulio de’ Medici, was appointed cardinal protector of England, while Leo’s brother, Giuliano, was admitted to the Order of the Garter. While the political benefits for Henry of ingratiating himself with those closest to the pope are easily apparent, it is difficult to explain these actions in terms of the dominant theme of political relations between England and Rome at that point; the latter’s desire to arrange peace with France. It may have been a bid to ensure close relations with the papacy after the peace and/or to work against French influence in Rome. Alternatively, it could have been a gesture to ensure that as many concessions were gained out of the papacy as possible, before the peace became a reality. A final suggestion that Henry VIII was moving towards peace is his positive response to a request from the pope, dated 2 October, to intercede with the emperor in his ever-continuing dispute with Venice. Henry seems to have written to the pope twice on this subject by February 1514. Indeed, Fox and Wolsey, in their January letter to de Giglis, suggested that an Imperial-Venetian peace ought to be concluded first.

347 Leo had seen copies of Henry’s letters awarding these honours on 8 February, but the originals do not seem to have arrived in Rome until the 18th; LPIii, 2639 (EP, 350; 8 February 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome), 2640 (EP, 352; 8 February 1514, Leo to Fox, Rome), 2642 (LPI, 4735; 8 February 1514, Giulio de’ Medici to Henry, Rome), 2644 (LPI, 4747; 11 February 1514, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 2653 (LPI, 4786; calendared 18-19 February 1514, Giulio de’ Medici to Henry, Rome), 2659 (EP, 363; 19 February 1514, Leo to Fox, Rome), 2838 (23 April 1514).

348 The pope, it seems, was lobbied himself to act in this regard by the Venetians and apparently did so in subsequent months; Ven.ii, 362 (6 November-6 December 1513, Antonio Bavarin to the Pesari of London, London); LPIii, 2448 (LPI, 4563; 16 November 1513, Robert Wingfield to Henry, [Augsburg]), 2462 (LPI, 4577; 26 November 1514, Spinelly to Henry, ‘Termonde’).

349 As is claimed in instructions conveyed to Spinelly around this time; ibid., 2609 (LPI, 4831; calendared end January 1514, instructions for [Spinelly]). Also see Ven.ii, 363 (LPIii, 2565; 6 January 1513, letter approved by Signory to send to Badoer), 364 (LPIii, 2566; 7 January 1514, doge to Henry), 365 (LPIii, 2567; 7 January 1514, Signory to Badoer), 371 (LPIii, 2573; 13 January 1514, Badoer to the Signory), 376 (LPIii, 2582; 18 January 1514, Henry to the Signory, London), 378 (LPIii, 2689; 1 March 1514, Signory to Henry).

350 Also, the bishop of ‘Feltre’ was deemed sufficient for the emperor. Concerning the proposed negotiations, the English crown was open to a French embassy coming to England or meeting English and Imperial representatives at Calais or another neutral location; LPIii, 2611 (LPI, 4598, dated by Chambers at January 1514, [Fox and Wolsey] to de Giglis); D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.56.
At odds with the English crown’s increasing receptiveness to papal peace overtures were the lengths to which it went to resist Leo X’s intended despatch of a legate *a latere* to facilitate universal peace. If the pope was already aware of English reluctance to entertain such a legate on English soil, as was likely, then this was an aggressive proposal. Leo seems to have pledged to send such delegates to the Christian princes at some point during the election process (back in February), but it only seems to have become a serious proposition towards the end of June 1513, when the pope notified Henry of his intention to despatch such officials to him and Maximilian.\(^{351}\) Bainbridge, however, in a contemporaneous despatch, recommended that Henry bar any such legate from the kingdom, as the pope ‘doithe it oonlie for ashewe and to be sean to kepe his Oithe’.\(^{352}\) On 7 July, the orator revealed that he had induced Leo to change his mind about the legates and that he would send prelates instead, as nuncios.\(^{353}\) Despite this apparent concession, papal pressure on England to admit a legate appears to have increased towards the end of 1513, as the pope headed towards a formal pledge to despatch such envoys to promote universal peace and reconciliation in the eighth session of the Lateran Council (19 December 1513).\(^ {354}\) It is entirely feasible that this was intended to coincide with the end of the campaigning season, which the pope may have identified as an ideal opportunity to force a peace. That this came at the same time as the absolution of Louis XII would not have filled the English with much hope about the political

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\(^{351}\) *LPl*, 2048 (calendared June 1513, Leo to Henry, Rome).

\(^{352}\) Fiddes, c.5-7 (*LPl*, 2029; *LP*, 4283; 25 June 1513, Bainbridge to Henry). It was understood by the Florentine ambassador in Paris that Leo X was to adopt this strategy (also intending to despatch a legate to the emperor); *Ven.*, 262 (3 July 1513, Florentine ambassador in France to Florence, Paris). For the promise arising in conclave, see *LPl*, 2077 (*LP*, 4327; 7 July 1513, Bainbridge to Ruthal, Rome); L. Pastor, *History of the Popes*, vii, p.45.

\(^{353}\) Bainbridge also suggested that de Castello had forwarded himself to become legate to England (and the Empire); *LPl*, 2077 (*LP*, 4327; 7 July 1513, Bainbridge to Ruthal, Rome).

\(^{354}\) The decree may have been implicitly referring to Henry VIII when it referred to ‘the threatening and very obvious danger from the infidels and the spilling of Christian blood, which even then was being poured out because of our blatant faults’; R.J. Schoeck, ‘The Fifth Lateran Council’, in G.F. Lytle (ed.), *Reform and Authority in the Medieval and Reformation Church*, p.108; N.P. Tanner (ed.), *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, i, pp.606-607.
direction of such a peace. 355 De Giglis notified Henry of the pope’s renewed commitment to sending a legate to him on 11 October, proposing Bainbridge and wanting an answer within 22 days. 356 In response, Henry instructed both Bainbridge and de Giglis to lobby the pope against his proposal. 357 The mission of Sir Thomas Cheyney to Italy in early November may also have been linked to this, perhaps indicating that the ‘threat’ was deemed serious. 358 Just a few days before the general council sat to decree the commissioning of legates, the pope warned Henry that he had no choice, arguing that he had made a promise to the assembly. 359 On the day of the eighth session, Leo wrote again to Henry (answering his objections), reiterating that he could not avoid sending a legate. He again proposed Bainbridge and, in requesting permission for him to enter England, added that the cardinal would be able to reveal his ‘true’ plans for the peace. 360 Leo thereby implied that the apparently pro-French gesture towards peace was not all that it seemed. This correspondence seems to have been accompanied by the aforementioned briefs to urge various members of the English episcopate to urge the king in this direction, although Fox and Wolsey conveyed Henry’s rejection of even Bainbridge’s candidature as a legate, regardless of it having been decreed within the general council. Moreover, the two ministers advocated the employment of two existing nuncios to facilitate the peace and crusade (Caraffa in England), claiming that the Lateran Council did not prohibit this. 361 This statement emphasises that the English opposition to legates a latere should not be overstated as an indication that Henry VIII was unreceptive to

355 See above pp.435-436.
356 LPii, 2353 (LPI, 4500; 11 October 1513, de Giglis to Henry, Rome).
357 Sp.ii, 141 (calendared end October 1513, Henry to Leo).
358 Cheyney seems to have been in Rome by February 1514; see above p.420; D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.57.
359 On 12 or 17 December; LPii, 2507, 2512 (LPI, 4605; 17 December 1513, Leo to Henry, Rome).
360 Ibid., 2517 (SPV, x; LPI, 4608; 19 December 1513, Leo to Henry, Rome).
361 Ibid., 2611 (LPI, 4598; dated by Chambers at January 1514, [Fox and Wolsey] to de Giglis); D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.56.
papal peace overtures *per se*. It was, moreover, the level of authority invested in such diplomats with which he was uncomfortable, as he voiced later in 1518. Viewed in political terms, the visit of a legate *a latere* to England shortly after the pope had reconciled himself with Louis XII at the Lateran Council would have sparked concerns in England for the intended direction of universal peace. If the pope was now pro-French, then such a peace could be adapted to Louis’ interests (particularly in Italy) and preclude any English reaction in defence of the Church. Consequently, if a legate was pursuing this policy in England, he would be wielding a great deal more power to force English compliance than mere nuncios.

In addition to diplomatic pressure from Rome for England to agree a peace with France, Leo X also envisaged some inducements to help sway Henry VIII’s decision. The first of these was his bestowal on 24 December 1513 of the cap and sword of maintenance, an honour awarded annually to favoured heads of state. As Leo later explained, these gifts were in recognition of Henry’s role in defending the Church against France and in a bid for him now to turn his arms against the infidels (the precursor to which would be peace with Louis XII). These were received in all solemnity by Henry in a ceremony on 21 May. While the delay between bestowal and receipt was originally put down to the weather, it is possible that Leo awaited positive indications of England’s political direction before he despatched the cap and sword. The pope was mistaken, however, if he believed that he

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362 This acceptance of nuncios as substitutes is consistent with his earlier signals to Rome that he was prepared to open discussions. The pope’s understanding of this is suggested by the fact that two nuncios were already *en route* to England to begin this process; see above pp.437-440.

363 See below p.632.


365 Fiddes, c.11-12 (*LPIii*, 2688; *LPI*, 4835; 1 March 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome).


367 De Giglis informed Henry that Leonard Spinelly would bring it to him once the weather had become milder, but this did not occur until 1 March 1514; *LPIii*, 2530 (*LPI*, 4621; 31 December 1513, de Giglis to Henry,
could ‘buy’ the king’s adhesion so cheaply, as the English crown proceeded to seek a plethora of other concessions, some connected with the rising Wolsey, as a sign of ‘goodwill’.

Among the more general concessions sought from Rome, the first was an indulgence issued on 7 February, at the request of Thomas Ruthal, to help rebuild Norham Castle, destroyed by James IV in the run-up to Flodden, in spite of its unusual form. Principal secretary Ruthal, as bishop of Durham, was partly responsible for the defence of the Scottish border, towards which some of his temporalities were directed, and this fortification was a manifestation of this role. The papacy had reservations about the diversion of episcopal temporalities to this end, at a bishopric that was usually the preserve of intimate crown ministers, and had most recently investigated this through a nunciature in 1509. This Norham indulgence may seem a relatively insignificant concession from Rome, yet it demonstrated recognition of de facto crown authority in this area and, whereas it may have otherwise objected, its issue at a time when the pope was lobbying England towards peace, suggested that it was intended, at least partly, as a bargaining tool.

An arguably more significant concession sought and gained by the crown around this time was Leo X’s agreement, on 16 August that Henry could accept the clerical contributions made for the now abandoned 1514 expedition. This approach may have been made by Fox (Papal States), 2664 (EP, 365; 20 February 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome), LPIII, 2688 (LPI, 4835; Fiddes, c.11-12; 1 March 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome). Also see above pp.139-141.  

368 LPIII, 2636 (LPI, 4724; SPV, xi; 7 February 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome), 2641 (EP, 351; 8 February 1514, Leo to Ruthal, Rome), 2642 (LPI, 4735; 8 February 1514, Giulio de’ Medici to Henry, Rome). For the destruction of Norham by the Scots and Ruthal’s pledge to spare no expense in rebuilding the castle, see ibid., 2279 (LPI, 4457; 18 September 1514, Ruthal to Wolsey, Durham), 2284 (LPI, 4460; 20 September 1514, Ruthal to Wolsey), 2283 (LPI, 4461-4462; 20 September 1514, Ruthal to Wolsey, Durham), 2381 (LPI, 4497; 19 October 1513, Dacre to Ruthal, Carlisle), 2394 (LPI, 4523; 24 October 1514, Wolsey to Akland); Ven.ii, 316 (22 September 1513, Brian Tuke to Richard [Pace], Tournai).  

369 LPII, 100 (LPI, 267; 6 July 1509, Julius II to Henry, Rome). Bonvisi had previously investigated Durham on behalf of the pope in 1506; D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.12. Also see A.S. Brown, Appointments and Benefices, Jurisdiction, and Taxation; Aspects of Relations Between the English Crown and the Papacy, 1485-1509, (unpublished MPhil thesis, 1999), pp.19-29. Subsequently, on 3 February 1515, another indulgence was issued for the restoration of Norham, in pursuit of which Henry VIII commissioned Cardinal de’ Medici (the cardinal protector) and de Giglis on 9 January; LPIII, 108 (3 February 1515, [Giulio de’ Medici] to Henry, Rome), 109 (3 February 1515, de Giglis to Henry, Rome), 110 (3 February 1515, de Giglis to [Wolsey], Rome).
and Wolsey to de Giglis on 30 July to secure this. While the underlying desire to keep the monies raised was entirely understandable, given the expenses that would have accrued in the war preparations for that year, this request to Rome was curious. Direct taxation of the English clergy, while originally a papal prerogative, had by this time been long controlled by the crown and permission was not granted to the papacy to raise money in this manner during this period. Why did the English crown apply to Rome for confirmation that it could keep the levies, thereby admitting formal papal authority in this area? The answer, or at least a suggestion of it, is perhaps revealed by the Venetian consul in London on 12 July; he, reported a widespread rumour that the Anglo-French peace had already been concluded, but not published, because Henry was trying to collect the monies granted by Parliament; if the peace was published, it was envisaged that objections would be raised to the levies, as they were agreed to for the purpose of war. It was not a question of whether the peace had been concluded and kept secret, but the Italian’s belief that there may be unrest if the tax was still collected and not put towards war. While this refers to the crown’s desire to retain lay taxation, it would be logical that Henry and his ministers would equally have wanted to keep any clerical levies raised. By seeking Leo X’s confirmation, therefore, the English crown would allay or at least deflect any criticism surrounding its retention of clerical taxes originally intended for the war against France.

370 De Giglis claimed that the cardinal protector, de’ Medici, had not assisted in this and it was also made difficult by Bainbridge’s claims that Henry VIII exacted frequent levies from the clergy, which themselves were probably feints to argue against the papacy imposing its own clerical tenths. If Rome believed that the English clergy was so burdened, it would have envisaged opposition to its own levies; LPlili, 3157 (LPl, 5331; 16 August 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome), 3197 (LPl, 5354; 26 August 1514, de Giglis to Wolsey and Fox, Rome). 371 W.E. Lunt, Financial Relations of the Papacy with England, ii, pp.160-168. Interestingly, the underlying friction between England and Rome over control of these fiscal measures can be seen when de Giglis claimed that he had found this concession difficult to wring out of the pope LPlili, 3197 (LPl, 5354; 26 August 1514, de Giglis to Wolsey and Fox, Rome). 372 Pasqualigo is apparently referring to lay taxation here; Ven.ii, 456 (12 July 1514, Lorenzo Pasqualigo to his brothers, London).
A further general concession requested by the crown, in connection with its decision to negotiate peace with France, was the replacement of Hadrian de Castello as apostolic collector with the king’s own nominee and Latin Secretary, Andrew Ammonius. Henry VIII apparently approached the pope in this regard prior to the conclusion of the Anglo-French peace and Leo, replying on 16 August, begged a delay of a few days before he confirmed the king’s nomination.\textsuperscript{373} It may be significant that the pope understood that the Anglo-French peace was certain by this time, as it may suggest that he was manoeuvring to avoid this concession, now that he knew that the English crown had played its hand.\textsuperscript{374} Leo’s ‘few days’ were over on 29 September, when he agreed to Ammonius’ assumption of the office.\textsuperscript{375} This was not the end of the matter, however, as de Castello fought a rear guard action in Rome, causing the pope to vacillate on allegations (from the cardinal) that Henry VIII did not support this action.\textsuperscript{376} Subsequently, Leo X compromised in March 1515, allowing de Castello to remain collector, but appointing Ammonius as his deputy; the Latin secretary did not gain his prize, however, until 1517 when de Castello’s fall was prompted by his implication in a plot against the pope’s life, of which the English crown took full advantage.\textsuperscript{377}

A ‘concession’ made by the papacy to England that was not sought by the crown followed the death of Bainbridge \textit{in curiam Romanam}. When a cleric died at the Curia, it was the pope’s right to provide to benefices thereby vacated. While English kings had \textit{de facto} control over appointments to bishoprics within their kingdom (helped by control over vacancy

\textsuperscript{373} \textit{LP\textls{ii}}, 3158 (\textit{LPI}, 5332; 16 August 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome). De Giglis reported de Castello’s belief that Wolsey was the instigator of his sacking; \textit{ibid.}, 3496 (\textit{LPI}, 5464; calendared end November 1514, [de Giglis] to [Ammonius]).

\textsuperscript{374} \textit{Ven.ii}, 465 (16 August 1514, V ctor Lippomano to -., Rome).

\textsuperscript{375} \textit{LP\textls{ii}}, 3311 (\textit{LPI}, 5457; \textit{EP}, 520; 29 September 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome), 3322 (\textit{LPI}, 5458; 29 September 1514, Giulio de ‘ Medici to Henry, Rome).

\textsuperscript{376} On 31 October, for instance, the pope sought confirmation from both the king and Fox that the replacement was actually desired by Henry, as he had been informed otherwise; \textit{ibid.}, 3401 (\textit{LPI}, 5538; Fiddes, c.17-18; \textit{EP}, 533-534; 31 October 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome), 3402 (31 October 1514, Leo to Fox, Rome).

\textsuperscript{377} See above pp.32-34.
temporalities), the death of a bishop in Rome was different and unusual. Given that the last time such an English vacancy at Rome occurred (in 1493), there seems to have been little risk that the then pope, Alexander VI (1492-1503), would exercise his right of reservation, it was equally unlikely in 1514. 378 Indeed, the Milanese ambassador in Rome commented that the pope, while Bainbridge was in extremis, intended to wait for Henry VIII’s nomination to the imminent vacancy at York. The orator further reported that Leo encouraged Bainbridge to draw up a will, so that his considerable wealth would not be acquired by the papacy. While the Milanese writer seems to have been surprised at Leo’s restraint in exercising his rights vis-à-vis York, he also implies a reason for this; the pope was still awaiting a decision from England in connection with the desired peace with France. 379 In this case, therefore, Leo would never have considered jeopardised the peace negotiations by interfering in English episcopal appointments or even the distribution of Bainbridge’s wealth back to England.

Finally, a broad concession that the English crown failed to lever from the pope in relation to its coming to terms with France related to its claims to overlordship over Scotland. The decisive English victory at Flodden (9 September 1513) offered an unprecedented opportunity for the English crown to make tangible political capital on the situation, particularly given that James IV had been killed and that his successor was both Henry VIII’s nephew and an infant (born in 1512). If Henry acted quickly, therefore, he may have envisaged himself able to realise the longstanding English claims to subordinate Scotland. The papacy could assist in this by supporting subsequent English attempts to assert control over the Scottish episcopate (indeed, the Church in Scotland). This opportunity had arisen on account of the senior metropolitan in the kingdom, the archbishop of St Andrew’s, as well as

379 Mil., 698 (12 July 1514, Milanese ambassador at Rome to the duke of Milan), 700 (17 July 1514, Milanese ambassador at Rome to the duke of Milan).
the bishop of the Isles and two abbots, having been killed at Flodden. This meant that there were multiple episcopal vacancies to be filled, which could affect the political landscape of Scotland. In the subsequent political turmoil, the waters were further muddied by powerful dignitaries backing rival candidates for many of the vacant positions. 380 In his first move on 12 October 1513, Henry VIII asked the pope to reduce St Andrew’s from primatial status back to a suffragan see of the diocese of York, thereby reasserting English jurisdictional control over the Church in Scotland. 381 No response has been found to this. Secondly, Henry sought to assert control of appointments to the Scottish episcopate per se by asking Leo X to approve his nominations. 382 Finally, Henry, in co-operation with his sister, Queen Margaret, attempted to install their own candidates to a number of vacant sees. Of these, the most significant was the archbishopric of St Andrew’s, which led to a number of vying candidates. From October 1513, the Scottish crown, then controlled by Margaret, pushed for William Elphinstone, bishop of Aberdeen and met with papal procrastination up until the prelate’s death on 25 October 1514. At odds with the ‘English party’, Leo X himself also tried to take advantage of the chaos in Scotland (and the lack of clear crown power there over episcopal nominations) by attempting to shoehorn his nephew, Cardinal Cibo, into St Andrew’s on 13 October 1513. Henry VIII would have been aware this by mid-February 1514, when Spinelly

381 St Andrew’s had become an archbishopric in 1472 at the behest of the Scottish crown. The deanery of Galloway was also detached from the province of York at the same time. In 1492, the Scottish crown successfully lobbied for a second archbishopric to be created at Glasgow; LPIii, 2355 (LPI, 4502; 12 October 1513, Henry to Leo, Tournai); N. Macdougall, An Antidote to the English, p.116; D.E.R. Watt, ‘The Papacy and Scotland in the Fifteenth Century’, in R.B. Dobson (ed.), Church, Politics and Patronage (1984), pp.115-127.
382 The problem was that, unlike the modus vivendi in England, the Scottish crown’s candidates were not automatically provided by Rome. While Innocent VIII agreed in 1487 that royal nominees would be appointed, if referred to the papacy within eight months of any given vacancy, neither Alexander VI nor Julius II provided every recommendation emanating from James IV. They did, however, appoint the king’s choice for St Andrew’s on the last two occasions. Macfarlane, on the other hand, does argue that, by the reign of James IV, episcopal posts had become political rewards bestowed by the monarch; LPlit, 2355 (LPI, 4502; 12 October 1513, Henry to Leo, Tournai); L.J. Macfarlane, William Elphinstone and the Kingdom of Scotland, 1431-1514, pp.218, 431-432.
advertised him that a secretary of the papal-nephew (Balthazar Stuerd) carried formidable powers to enforce the provision, namely the ability to lay Scotland under interdict. He was also impressed by the secretary himself; ‘a subtle and quick fellow, who can full well say one thing and think another’. A signal of English failure to gain any concessions in this area would have been indicated by the pope’s response when he realised that Cibo would not be successful. Leo proposed a compromise concerning the candidate supported by the Francophile heir-presumptive to the Scottish throne, the duke of Albany; if Forman resigned his recent acquisition of Bourges to Cibo, the pope would provide him to St Andrew’s (and remove his nephew’s claim to the latter). Spinelly notified Henry VIII of this plan on 1 July 1514, as well as of ominous recent news that the pope was ‘French’. English hopes for influence over the Church in Scotland had failed, therefore, before the end of 1514. Leo X was evidently unwilling to grant concessions in this area in return for English compliance in the peace negotiations. This was perhaps because, given the French interest in this, with Louis XII protecting and backing Albany, the political repercussions could spread far beyond England and maybe come back to haunt him in the future.

In addition to more general papal concessions for the crown, several others were Wolsey-specific, perhaps demonstrating his rapidly ascending trajectory at this point. Henry VIII employed all of the English representatives to seek a reduction in the consistorial taxes

383 While Henry VIII had failed to affect St Andrew’s during 1513-1514, this did not deter him from trying to interfere during the next vacancy from 1521 on; *LPIii*, 2633 (*LPI*, 4725; 7 February 1514, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 3051 (*LPI*, 5208; 1 July 1514, Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels), 3468 (*LPI*, 5614; 23 November 1514, Queen Margaret to Henry, Stirling), 3532 (*LPI*, 5678; 8 December 1514, Leo to Queen Margaret, Rome), 3563 (20 December 1514, Leo to Louis), 3616 (13 October 1513); *LPIii*, 1642 (7 October 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome); J.K. Cameron, ‘Beaton, James (c.1473–1539)’, *DNB*; E.B. Fryde et al (ed.), *Handbook of British Chronology* (1986), p.321; L.J. Macfarlane, ‘Elphinstone, William (1431–1514)’, *DNB*; L.J. Macfarlane, *William Elphinstone and the Kingdom of Scotland, 1431-1514*, p.432-433; C.A. McGladdery, ‘Forman, Andrew’, *DNB*; W.E. Wilkie, *Cardinal Protectors*, pp.81-82, 97-100.
due on Wolsey’s provision to Lincoln. Initially, Leo refused this, however, claiming that the Sacred College had rejected the request ‘as detrimental to the Holy See’. De Giglis, moreover, asserted that the pope also objected to the reduction, although Leo did apparently waive the annates due on the deanery of St Stephen (Westminster), perhaps as a compromise, and further promised to recompense Wolsey and Fox in the future, particularly given the recent rewards given to his relatives. Shortly after, the pope further promised ‘to show him [Wolsey] favour in greater things’. Wolsey was apparently dissatisfied with this rejection, much to de Giglis’ dismay, although the orator further had to admit that he had failed to obtain a ‘faculty for holding benefices of 2,000l’, on account of the expense. With regard to the consistorial taxes, the English crown did not take ‘no’ for an answer and further letters concerning this matter reached de Giglis around 17 June. Again, on 26 August, however, the orator relayed his inability to secure any remission. Yet sustained pressure seems to have borne fruit; in November, the pope waived 1,000 ducats and, by October, the Sacred College had conceded a similar sum. Further waivers were sought from England, as the diocese had been vacant twice in one year. By January 1515, the pope had also released

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384 Bainbridge, de Castello, de Giglis and Giulio de’ Medici were all approached in this regard. For de’ Medici, this seems to have been his first instruction since being appointed cardinal protector of England, although his recent promotion does not seem to have made any difference to his efforts; LPIi, 2642 (LPI, 4735; 8 February 1514, Giulio de’ Medici to Henry, Rome), 2644 (LPI, 4747; 11 February 1514, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 2653 (LPI, 4786; calendared 18-19 February 1514, Giulio de’ Medici to Henry, Rome).

385 Ibid., 2636 (LPI, 4724; SPV, xi; 7 February 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome).

386 Ibid., 2644 (LPI, 4747; 11 February 1514, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome). For these awards to Giulio and Giuliano de’ Medici, see above p.443.

387 Ibid., 2660 (19 February 1514, Leo to Wolsey, Rome).

388 Ibid., 2783 (LPI, 4936; 4 April 1514, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome)

389 Ibid., 3011 (LPI, 5168; 17 June 1514, de Giglis to [Wolsey], Rome).

390 Ibid., 3197 (LPI, 5354; 26 August 1514, de Giglis to Wolsey and Fox, Rome).

391 Ibid., 3496 (LPI, 5464; calendared end November 1514, [de Giglis] to [Ammonius]), 3497 (LPI, 5465; calendared end November 1514, Wolsey to [de Giglis]), 3495 (LPI, 5542; calendared end November 1514, Wolsey to [de Giglis]). The cardinals’ concession was allegedly opposed by de Castello (who claimed to have induced a delay in their payment at some point), on account of his belief that Wolsey was behind the challenge to his continuation in the role of apostolic collector for England; LPIi, 3560 (LPI, 5702; 19 December 1514, de Castello to Wolsey, Rome).

392 Service taxes could not be levied more than once in a year. One presumes that Wolsey, having been translated to York on 15 September, wished to share in this ‘benefit’ with his successor at Lincoln, William Atwater, as well as to negate some of the increased sum that he now owed to Rome, given his elevation to the status of
Wolsey from payment of all sums due to him connected with the service taxes of Lincoln and the minister ultimately paid 1,625 ducats of the original 5,000 due.\textsuperscript{393} While these tax reductions occurred after the Anglo-French peace was concluded, they may still have been papal concessions linked to this, as Leo’s subsequent offer(s) of financial reward for Wolsey’s efforts to have the duchy of Milan included retrospectively in the Anglo-French peace may have been remitted through these service taxes.\textsuperscript{394}

Perhaps the boldest concession sought by the English crown for Wolsey at this time was a red hat, particularly given that he had only just been elevated to the episcopate. Polydore Vergil was sent on a secret mission to Rome in February 1514 to raise this issue tentatively with the pontiff.\textsuperscript{395} This could have been an immediate response to the pope who, when recently rejecting Wolsey’s desire for service taxes to be waived, hinted at greater concessions.\textsuperscript{396} Although Vergil failed in this regard, conveying the pope’s basic recommendation that Wolsey must be the king’s chief minister before this could be considered and, perhaps, also that a peace ought to occur, Henry did take this advice seriously and wrote formally and directly to Leo X on 12 August, asserting that he ‘esteems him metropolitan. Indeed, precedents did exist for a successor to pay the whole or part of the balance due from a predecessor’s failure to pay. Perhaps Wolsey was even hoping to transfer his liability for Lincoln onto Atwater; \textit{ibid.}, 3497 (\textit{LPI}, 5465; calendared end November 1514, Wolsey to [de Giglis]); \textit{LPIii}, 20 (11 January 1515, Giulio de’ Medici to Wolsey, Rome); W.E. Lunt, \textit{Financial Relations of the Papacy with England}, ii, pp.171, 222-226, 229.

\textsuperscript{393} In total, 5,000 florins/ducats were due on the see of Lincoln in the form of consistorial service taxes, but this did not represent the true cost of the promotion; de Giglis indicated by 11 February that he had already spent 6,821 ducats 10 carleni of the 7,000 ducats sent to him for this purpose (and, in any case, implied the total due on service taxes to be merely 3,400) and, on 4 April, acknowledged receipt of a complaint from Wolsey that he had spent 1,000 more than he needed to; \textit{LPIii}, 2783 (\textit{LPI}, 4936; 4 April 1514, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome); \textit{LPIii}, 20 (11 January 1515, Giulio de’ Medici to Wolsey, Rome); W.E. Lunt, \textit{Financial Relations of the Papacy with England}, ii, pp.229, 804-805.

\textsuperscript{394} See below pp.461-462.

\textsuperscript{395} Notably, Vergil’s letter of credence to the pope mentions nothing of the nature of his mission. It is curious why Vergil, whose position as vice-collector was under attack by Wolsey would intercede on his behalf for a red hat. One can only speculate that some sort of ‘deal’ was offered by Wolsey, perhaps involving Vergil’s retention of his position (even de Castello’s of his); \textit{LPIii}, 2674 (\textit{LPI}, 4819; 26 February 1514, Henry to Leo, Westminster).

\textsuperscript{396} \textit{Ibid.}, 2660 (19 February 1514, Leo to Wolsey, Rome).
[Wolsey] above his dearest friends, and can do nothing of the least importance without
him.' 397 Significantly, this letter was issued on the same date that the English king notified the
pope that the Anglo-French peace had been concluded and one can reasonably assume,
therefore, that both pieces of correspondence were connected. 398 While Wolsey understood
during September 1514 that the pope would elevate him at the next creation, Leo politely
refused Henry’s August request on 24 September, promising to fulfil it ‘at a suitable time’. 399
The papacy had managed, therefore, to delay this desired concession until the leverage on
which the English crown was relying, the agreement of peace with France, had disappeared.
While it could be argued that Wolsey was naïve in his dealings with the papacy on this
occasion, he would not be in 1515, when he finally succeeded in gaining a red hat. 400

Finally, Henry VIII appears to have taken advantage of his political leverage to have
Wolsey appointed to the wealthy ‘French’ see of Tournai, the city having been conquered
during 1513. While a bishop elect had been appointed in August 1513, he made his position
untenable, as far as the English were concerned, when he refused to pledge obedience to
Henry VIII. 401 As a result, the English king forwarded Wolsey’s candidacy and, while the
date is unknown, the pope forwarded a brief, presumably a positive reply, through de Giglis
on 17 June 1514. 402 It cannot have been a coincidence that Leo also conveyed to Fox and

397 Ibid., 2932 (LPI, 5110; 21 May 1514, Polydore Vergil to [Wolsey], [Rome]), 3140 (LPI, 5318; 12 August
1514, Henry to Leo, Greenwich).
398 If one considers that, traditionally, England did not rarely enjoyed more than one member of the Sacred
College, then Bainbridge’s death in July 1514 made this moment even more opportune for the forwarding of
Wolsey’s candidacy.
399 LPIii, 3300 (LPI, 5445; EP, 512; 24 September 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome), 3497 (LPI, 5465; calendared end
November 1514, Wolsey to [de Giglis]). De Giglis also reported (via Ammonius) around the same time that Leo
was ‘naturally slow’ and that, while he would not create Wolsey cardinal alone, he offered him promotion in
petto. The orator further urged Wolsey to write to the pope and Giulio de’ Medici; ibid., 3496 (LPI, 5464;
calendared end November 1514, [de Giglis] to [Ammonius]).
400 See above pp.295-301.
401 A French candidate, Louis Guillard, had been nominated to Tournai in June 1513 but, due to his youth, could
only become bishop elect (and was provided by Leo X on 24 August); LPHi, 2197 (24 August 1513); C.G.
Cruickshank, The English Occupation of Tournai 1513-1519, pp.143-144.
402 LPHi, 3011 (LPI, 5168; 17 June 1514, de Giglis to [Wolsey], Rome), 3075 (13 July 1514, Henry to Margaret,
Eltham); C.G. Cruickshank, The English Occupation of Tournai 1513-1519, pp.145-146. He also requested some
Wolsey his desire for Henry’s participation in the Anglo-French (and universal) peace on the
19th; the almoner’s goodwill at least was expected, presumably in return for this
concession. The brief was followed by Leo’s confirmation of Wolsey’s appointment to this
see (or at least to its administration) on 16 September and, probably around the same time, de
giglis confirmed that bulls enabling him to hold the see in commendam with York, had also
been granted. In spite of the pope’s apparent acquiescence in this matter, this was merely
the beginning of Wolsey’s protracted struggle to gain control of the diocese (until 1519),
which involved the pope vacillating on a number of occasions and it ultimately ending in
failure for the Englishman. Nevertheless, the timing, the political sensitivity of the issue
(given that the papacy was already enjoying cordial relations with France) and Leo’s
conceding the see to England all suggest a link for request and reply with the peace
negotiations then in train.

Despite England’s apparent willingness to listen to papal proposals from January
1514, a peace treaty was not concluded until 7 August. During the interim, there seem to have
been a few hiccups that stalled negotiations, including the question of French pensions to
England during May, the English desire for Louis XII to not interfere in Italy, generally, or
Milan, specifically, during June and July, and finally the English possession of Tournai

sort of quid pro quo, writing on the 7th in favour of a cleric who he recommended for the next vacant prebend in
Tournai; LPii, 2978 (7 June 1514, Leo to Henry).
403 LPii, 3019 (LPI, 5174; 19 June 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome).
404 Wolsey had also reportedly gained a promise from Louis XII that the present incumbent of the see, the bishop
elect (on account of his youth), Louis Guillard, would resign; Ibid., 3284 (EP, 507; 16 September 1514, Leo to
Wolsey, Rome), 3496 (LPI, 5464; calendared end November 1514, [de Giglis] to [Ammonius]).
405 For the broader context of this struggle, see C.G. Cruickshank, The English Occupation of Tournai 1513-
1519, pp.143-187.
407 Ibid., 427 (12 June 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome), 448 (16 July 1514, Venetian ambassador in Rome to
the Signory). Confirmation that this was a major sticking point is indicated by Henry on 12 August, when he
notified the pope of the treaty’s conclusion; LPii, 3139 (LPI, 5319; Ven.ii, 487; 12 August 1514, Henry to Leo,
Greenwich). The Venetian, Lippomano, also commented on Henry’s considerable demands during June 1514;
during July.\textsuperscript{408} The nuncio Canossa flitted between England and France, finally returning to Henry VIII with Louis XII’s final proposals on 30 July.\textsuperscript{409} In the peace that was finally concluded, Henry included among his allies ‘Pope Leo X, the Holy See, and all the territories and places belonging to it’. In other words, he was still fulfilling his self-perceived role as defender of the papacy. Notably, however, Milan, one of the keys to maintaining papal ‘independence’ from France, was not included and Henry notified the pope that he had tried, but failed, in this regard.\textsuperscript{410} Thus, by the end of this first phase, political relations between England and Rome had nearly gone full circle; Henry VIII was once again at peace with France, unwillingly but forced by circumstance. As the peace now released the French to concentrate on their Italian ambitions, it may have even been predictable to contemporaries, that English fears of the French threat to papal ‘independence’ would soon resurface, leading to another cycle of military action to prevent this.

\textsuperscript{408} *Ven.ii*, 453 (26 July 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome), 454 (30 July 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome), 465 (16 August 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome).

\textsuperscript{409} Ibid., 453 (26 July 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome), 454 (30 July 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome), 458 (8 August 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome), 465 (16 August 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome).

\textsuperscript{410} Louis XII had agreed to Henry VIII’s financial demands as early as 9 July, but the treaty was only proclaimed in England on 10 August and ratified by Henry on the 20\textsuperscript{th}; *Sp.ii*, 178 (9 July 1514), 183-185 (*LPIii*, 3129; *LPI*, 5305; 7 August 1514); *LPii*, 3130 (*LPI*, 5306; 7 August 1514), 3131 (*LPI*, 5307; 7 August 1514), 3134 (*LPI*, 5311; 8 August 1514), 3136 (*LPI*, 5315; calendared 10 August 1514), 3139 (*LPI*, 5319; *Ven.ii*, 487; 12 August 1514, Henry to Leo, Greenwich), 3226:24 (*LPI*, 5343; 20 August 1514). The significance of Milan in the negotiations was noted by a Venetian observer from Rome, on 12 June, who cited contradictory reports about whether Louis XII would guarantee the safety of the duchy; *Ven.ii*, 427 (12 June 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome).
PHASE II
FROM PEACE TO ‘UNIVERSAL PEACE’. ENGLAND’S ATTEMPTS TO PREVENT THE PAPACY FROM BEING CAUGHT ‘BETWEEN THE FRENCH MOLARS’: 1514-1518

A flawed peace that enabled France to launch a successful expedition into Italy:

August 1514 - September 1515

Henry VIII notified the pope of his arrangement with Louis XII on 12 August and attributed it to ‘the frequent and earnest exhortations of the Pope’. He now urged Leo to facilitate the universal peace (and crusade) that he had been pressing for. Wolsey and Fox pre-empted their king’s letter by sending details of the peace days earlier. Leo X had been expecting news of an agreement since around 15 May, but certainly anticipated a successful resolution from the beginning of August.

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1 De Giglis described the pope’s predicament as such on 4 October 1516, when relaying to Wolsey the pope’s inability to provide support for English moves against France until a treaty be concluded between Henry VIII and Charles of Castile. The pope reportedly feared raising Francis’ hackles, as this would risk the French stirring up various rebels within the Papal States. To put this into some sort of context, Leo X was reacting to the recent blow to the anti-French ‘holy league’ caused by the Catholic King’s ‘defection’ to Francis’ side, enacted by the Treaty of Noyon;

2 LPIii, 3139 (LPI, 5319; Ven.ii, 487; 12 August 1514, Henry to Leo, Greenwich).

3 Ibid., 3362 (LPI, 5496; 13 October 1514, de Giglis to Wolsey and Fox, Rome).

4 Ven.ii, 408 (15 May 1514, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). Most reports from Rome around this date, some at least based on intelligence from England, believed that an Anglo-French rapprochement was going to happen; ibid., 415 (1 June 1514, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 419 (31 May 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome), 424 (7 June 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome), 425 (10 June 1514, news heard and recorded by Sanuto), 426 (13 June 1514, Council of 10 to the Venetian ambassador in Rome), 427 (12 June 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome), 429 (16 June 1514, Council of 10 to the Venetian ambassador in France), 432 (24 June 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome), 439 (1 July 1514, announcement to the Venetian College by the French ambassador), 440 (30 June 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome), 442 (3-4 July 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome), 447 (12 July 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome), 448 (16 July 1514, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 450 (17 July 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome), 451 (23 July 1514, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 452 (26 July 1514, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 453 (26 July 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome), 454 (30 July 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome), 457 (4 August and 27 July 1514, Venetian ambassador in Rome and France to the Signory), 458 (3-4 August 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome).

On the 16th, the pope was overheard saying that he now intended to ‘form a Christian league’ to go on a crusade that he himself would lead in person; ibid., 465 (16 August 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome). By 10 August, De’ Medici’s secretary was saying that it had been made. The news was reportedly in Florence by the same date and in Venice on the 12th. The government of the latter were
notification (accompanied by correspondence from Wolsey) arrived with de Giglis by 31st. In reply, Leo hoped that this amity would mark the basis of universal peace and would help precipitate a crusade.

Ultimately, Henry VIII’s lack of support for the continuation of war meant that he had little choice but to agree to a rapprochement with France, however reluctantly. He even apparently wrote to the pope alleging that the marriage agreement was arranged because he had been forsaken by his allies. With regard to Henry VIII’s underlying concern for the papacy’s political ‘independence’, however, the August 1514 peace with Louis XII had one major flaw; by effectively guaranteeing the security of France’s northern borders, Louis XII was now free to indulge in his Italian ambitions, which were still very much alive. This flaw was not expecting imminent confirmation; ibid., 459 (Presentation to the Signory by the French ambassador of letters from Florence dated 10 August 1514). By 16th, the Venetian ambassador in Rome reported a marriage treaty to have been finalised; ibid., 463 (LPIii, 3178; 16 August 1514, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). The Portuguese orator, on the other hand, reported that celebrations were made without Leo X’s permission and that guns were not fired from the Castel S. Angelo, as would otherwise have been expected; LPIii, 3236 (LPI, 5378; 3 September 1514, John Faria to the king of Portugal, Rome). Also see Ven.ii, 465 (16 August 1514, Vetur Lippomano to -, Rome), 466 (21 August 1514), 467 (22 August 1514, Council of 10 to the Venetian ambassador in France), 468 (22 August 1514, Council of 10 to the Venetian ambassador in Rome), 479 (28 August 1514, Vetur Lippomano to -, Rome). De Giglis received notification from England between 26 and 31 August. A celebratory service was performed on 2 September, attended by de Giglis and de Castello, among others; LPIii, 3197 (LPI, 5354; 26 August 1514, de Giglis to Wolsey and Fox), 3220 (LPI, 5365; 31 August 1514, de Giglis to [Wolsey and Fox], Rome), Ven.ii, 489 (3-4 September 1514, Vetur Lippomano to -, Rome).

5 De Giglis received notification from England between 26 and 31 August. A celebratory service was performed on 2 September, attended by de Giglis and de Castello, among others; LPIii, 3197 (LPI, 5354; 26 August 1514, de Giglis to Wolsey and Fox), 3220 (LPI, 5365; 31 August 1514, de Giglis to [Wolsey and Fox], Rome); Ven.ii, 489 (3-4 September 1514, Vetur Lippomano to -, Rome).

6 The pope replied to English proclamations of the agreement on 8-9 September; LPIii, 3249 (EP, 500; 7 September 1514, Leo to Fox and Wolsey, Rome), 3254 (EP, 501; 8 September 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome); EP, 503 (9 September 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome).

7 It will be argued here that the peace of August 1514 (as with that of March 1510) was hardly a sincere one. The necessary preconditions for war against France (mainly allies, including Rome) were not there and, as a result, England reverted to its traditional foreign policy vis-à-vis that kingdom, a peace made profitable through pensions.

8 This letter is cited by Martyr at the Spanish Court and seems to be confirmed by the Milanese orator in Rome; LPIii, 3482 (LPI, 5642; 27 November 1514, Peter Martyr to Ludovico Furtado, Valladolid). Also see Mll., 711 (17 August 1514, Milanese ambassador in Rome to the duke of Milan).

9 The Venetian government, in December 1514, implied to a papal representative that this peace had freed Louis to pursue his aims for Italy, see Ven.ii, 527 (14 December 1514, Signory to the papal ambassador, Pietro Bembo). For other indications of the increased French threat to Italy as a result of the peace with England, see below, pp.463-466.
new, having last arisen as a result of Henry VIII’s renewal of the Treaty of Étaples (1492) in March 1510 and which consequently led to a French campaign in Italy, during which the papacy lost Bologna. Indeed, there is some suggestion that the English may have attempted to draw out the peace negotiations longer than was necessary, in part at least to discourage Louis from crossing the Alps during 1514.

Recognising this flaw, the English crown tried to provide for the security of Rome by having the papacy and, more specifically Bologna named within the Anglo-French peace, presumably in a bid to secure the Papal States against French ambitions and perhaps to ensure a get-out clause if one was ever needed. However, this was merely sticking plaster over the broader English failure to have Milan comprised in the treaty. The duchy, which fell from French control in 1512, was a principal object of French ambitions in the peninsula. It was both claimed by the French king by right and perceived to be of fundamental strategic importance as a launchpad for further operations into the peninsula. Its security, therefore was of direct significance to English interests in Italy and with regard to the papacy, and it is entirely

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10 One immediate consequence of the 1510 renewal of the Treaty of Étaples was a French campaign in Italy, engendered at least in part by the peace on the northern borders. Similarly, the Venetian government implied to a papal representative in December 1514 that this peace had freed Louis to pursue his aims for Italy, see Ven.ii, 527 (14 December 1514, Signory to the papal ambassador, Pietro Bembo).

11 On 12 July, a Milanese source in Rome claimed that England would not conclude unless France promised to leave Italy alone; Mil., 697 (12 July 1514, Milanese ambassador in Rome to the duke of Milan). Similarly, the Milanese ambassador in Rome suggests procrastination by Henry on 21 July (but to see what the Swiss would do; although he does mention Henry’s insistence on generous terms); ibid., 704 (21 July 1514, Milanese ambassador in Rome to the duke of Milan), 705 (27 July 1514, Milanese ambassador in Rome to the duke of Milan). Also, the marriage element to the peace ensured that Louis could not leave northern France until this was fulfilled. For a Venetian source suggesting that this prevented him from going to Italy during 1514, see Ven.ii, 488 (24 August 1514, Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory, Paris). Also see ibid., 491 (18 September 1514, 1514, Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory, Paris). The marriage did not take place until 9 October 1514, by which point in the campaigning a personal descent by Louis was unlikely; LPlii, 3348 (LPI, 5482-5484, 8-9 October 1514).

12 Henry was at pains to stress this when he notified Leo of the peace. Perhaps in a bid to retain the confidence of the pope, the king also made a show of transparency by sending him a copy of the compact; Ven.ii, 487 (LPlii, 3139; LPI, 5319; 12 August 1514, Henry to Leo); LPlii, 3254 (EP, 503; 8 September 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome).

13 For the French claim to Milan, see Sp.ii, 192 (LPlii, 3477; LPI, 5637; 26 November 1514, Louis XII to the duke of Suffolk, Paris). Knecht argues that Italians envisaged the duchy as a ‘bulwark against foreign invasion’; R.J. Knecht, Francis I, p.36.
understandable why the crown desired some sort of proviso for the duchy in its amity with France. However, Wolsey and Fox seem to have admitted that Milan would not be contained in the peace as early as 26 July, on which date they informed the pope that they had had to concede on this point, on pain of the negotiations failing. They promised, nevertheless, to keep the matter at the fore of ongoing discussions.  

Henry VIII reiterated the extensive, albeit failed, efforts to comprise Milan, when he notified the pope of the peace on 12 August. It may be for this reason that the English king went on to urge the pope to advocate universal peace (which, if achieved, would theoretically secure the duchy).  

By September 1514, Leo X seems to have interpreted the earlier English pledge to persist in representing Milan as an offer to broker a more direct agreement between Louis XII and Duke Maximilian Sforza. During October, Leo urged Wolsey and Fox to persuade Henry to mediate an agreement between Louis and Sforza that would pave the way towards universal peace.  

By November, the pope was hopeful of Wolsey’s success. While Wolsey did apparently reply to de Giglis with regard to the duchy, his subsequent actions are unclear. It is possible that, at one point, he pursued a plan for the duchy to be a

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14 The Milanese source of this information refers neither to Wolsey or Fox by name, only to bishops who controlled the king. However, they are the most likely sources; Mil., 715 (9 September 1514, letters from Rome to the duke of Milan).
15 Ven.ii, 487 (LPiii, 3139; LPI, 5319; 12 August 1514, Henry to Leo). Letters from England that reached the Milanese ambassador in Rome by 17 August confirm that Henry had done his best to have Milan included, but relented when he thought the peace treaty to be in danger of collapsing and because he did not have any allies; Mil., 711 (17 August 1514, Milanese ambassador in Rome to the duke of Milan). In demonstration of how such issues were amplified and distorted, Venetian intelligence from Rome, dated 30 September, claimed that one article of the Anglo-French treaty threatened with exclusion anyone who opposed French moves to reacquire Milan; Ven.ii, 483 (LPiii, 3237; 3 September 1514, Bortolomeo Alviano to the Signory).
16 The pope envisaged Louis XII being bought off by a 50,000 ducats pension; LPiii, 3407 (calendared end October 1514, [de Giglis to Wolsey and Fox]).
17 Leo promised Wolsey a reward of 20,000 crowns, if he achieved this, and also pledged to send 1,000 crowns (through de Giglis and Ammonius), on behalf of Maximilian Sforza; ibid., 3496 (LPI, 5464; calendared end November 1514, [de Giglis] to [Ammonius]). This ‘gift’ was not apparently given, as de Giglis, writing in June 1515, mentioned not having received it and the pope wishing that he had not mentioned it, as Maximilian Sforza had neither passed him the money nor made further mention of it; LPiii, 647 (calendared end June 1515, [de Giglis to Wolsey]).
18 LPiii, 3497 (LPI, 5465; calendared end November 1514, Wolsey to [de Giglis], ‘From my place besides Westminster’).
dower gift for Princess Mary on her marriage to Louis XII; perhaps envisaging that Mary retain Milan (or title thereof) in the likely event that her husband predeceased her. It is uncertain how this would have fitted in with earlier desires to uphold the Sforza claim although, if Milan were ever to fall into English hands, this would provide a valuable toehold in northern Italy, from which Henry VIII could pursue his anti-French agenda.

Bearing in mind this ‘loophole’ in the peace treaty, the omens for keeping the papacy free from French influence did not look good. Even before the agreement was concluded, rumours circulated in Rome and Italy more generally that Louis XII subsequently planned to descend into the peninsula. In late May, for instance, de Giglis warned Wolsey of a supposed French plan to recover Milan. While this prospect was initially rejected by the papacy and others in Italy in subsequent months, rumours persisted and Pace, towards the end of September, heard in Rome that a French army (with 10,000 English archers) was heading towards Lorraine, although he issued strong denials. Any trepidation felt by the English crown would have been

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19 The only evidence for this suggestion comes from a Venetian source in England, writing on 24 September, who cited Henry VIII as being receptive to this plan. Probably, it was either a fanciful rumour or it received short shrift from the French; Ven.ii, 505 (LPIii, 3298; 24 September 1514; Nicolo di Favri to Francesco Gradentigo, London).

20 Louis was to offer Maximilian money and troops to achieve this, while the latter’s grandson, Ferdinand (Charles of Burgundy’s brother) was to marry one of the French king’s daughters and receive the duchy as a dowry; LPIii, 2928 (LPI, 5353; 20 May 1514; [de Giglis to Fox and Wolsey]).

21 Ellis, pp.177-180 (LPIii, 3304; LPI, 5447; 25 September 1514, Pace to Wolsey, Rome). For indications that such rumours were circulating and initially rejected by papal and other sources, see Mil., 702 (20 July 1514, duke of Milan to his governor of Asti, Cremona); Ven.ii, 460 (10 August 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome), 463 (LPIii, 3178; 16 August 1514, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory; 3 August 1514, Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory, Blois), 479 (28 August 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome), 488 (LPIii, 3191, 24 August 1514, Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory, Paris), 491 (LPIii, 3286; 18 September 1514, Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory, Paris). Rumblings about Louis XII’s intention to invade Italy continued to build through to November and December 1514, emanating from (Venetian sources in) France and circulating in England and Rome, as well as Spain (among other places). Increasingly it was believed that the incursion would not take place until the early months of 1515; ibid., 490 (14 September 1514, Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory, Paris), 496 (22 September 1514, Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory, Paris), 507 (15-17 October 1514, Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory, Abbeville), 513 (1 November 1514, ‘A faithful friend’ to the Signory, Paris), 515 (26 November 1514), 553 (22 December 1514, Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory, Paris); LPIii, 3435 (LPI, 5581; 13 November 1514, Peter Martyr to Ludovico Furtado, Valladolid), 3519 (LPI, 5675; 3 December
heightened by news from Italy that its potential allies against France, in particular Milan and Spain, were suffering militarily.22

In response, a lack of allies meant that English aggression against France was impractical, although Henry VIII employed several general strategies in a bid to distract Louis XII from the Italian enterprise, one of which was an apparently bizarre proposal for a joint Anglo-French attack on Spanish-controlled Navarre, combined with an attempt to ‘recover’ parts of Castile that by right belonged to Catherine of Aragon.23 As a ploy to distract Louis from Milan by occupying him around the Pyrenées, however, this failed, as the French king maintained that Milan remained his priority.24 Nevertheless, Henry VIII was careful to appear to the French to be tacitly supportive of their plans for Milan, at least as far as Louis XII was concerned. A flavour of this can be detected around late December when Louis, having heard via a papal nuncio that his English ally was opposed to the expedition, requested Henry write to the pope to dispel this rumour.25 The English crown may also have attempted to distract Louis XII from Italy by making half-hearted offers for a meeting with Henry in late 1514 or early 1515, thereby preventing him from journeying south.26

1514, Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels); Mil., 716 (24 December 1514, summary of letters to Milan from Rome).
22 The Venetian ambassador in England was notified of Venetian victories in the region on 30 September. Similarly, on the 30 October, he was informed of a rout of Spanish forces at Este. On 31st, Richard Wingfield and Thomas Spinelly relayed intelligence that Bergamo (again close to Milan) was close to falling, although the Viceroy of Naples was rushing to relieve the town; Ven.ii, 494-495 (6 October 1514, Signory to Badoer), 504 (30 October 1514), 506 (30 October 1514, Signory to Baoder); LPIii, 3400 (LPI, 5539; 31 October 1514, Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to [Henry]).
23 Sp.ii, 192 (LPIii, 3477; LPI, 5637; 26 November 1514, Louis XII to the duke of Suffolk, Paris); LPIii, 1 (1515, instructions to the French ambassador). Also see Ven.ii, 532 (15 December 1514, Venice to its ambassador in France).
24 It did gain initial approval from France, although Louis remained undiverted from his Italian ambitions. Indeed, Louis seems to have been cautious about English claims to Castile; Sp.ii, 192 (LPIii, 3477; LPI, 5637; 26 November 1514, Louis XII to the duke of Suffolk, Paris); LPIii, 1 (1515, instructions to the French ambassador).
25 LPIii, 1 (calendared beginning of January 1515, instructions to the French ambassador). Louis was so convinced of English sincerity that, on 26 November, he asked for a substantial loan from Henry for its recovery; Sp.ii, 192 (LPIii, 3477; LPI, 5637; 26 November 1514, Louis XII to the duke of Suffolk, Paris).
26 During December, Badoer in England conveyed home the rumour of an imminent meeting between the two kings. The Venetian ambassador in Rome asserted, on 15 December, his belief that this would
While brief respite from the growing French threat to Italy came on 1 January 1515, when Louis XII died, this was no reprieve, as English diplomats soon assessed that his successor, Francis I, intended to continue the same Italian policy, but with the advantage of youth on his side.\(^{27}\) In a move at least partially intended to facilitate this, the new French monarch moved to confirm existing agreements with other states, including England. Despite opposing the implicit outcome of this, a French move against Milan, Henry VIII could do little other than confirm the status quo on 5 April 1515. Notably, Milan was again omitted and Francis was referred to in the treaty, among other titles, as its duke.\(^{28}\) This time, it does not seem as if the English crown occur on the 29\(^{th}\). On 27 December, the republic’s orator in France asserted that Louis was travelling towards Picardy to meet Henry. Around the same time, the French king instructed his orator with Henry to suggest that this conference took place in March. Also, on 15 December, the Venetian government understood that the request for the meeting came from Louis and that Henry had refused this; \(\text{Ven.ii}, 532\) (15 December 1514, Venice to its ambassador in France), \(539\) (\(\text{LPIii}, 3547\); 15 December 1514, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), \(542\) (28 November 1514, Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory, Paris), \(555\) (December [1514], Badoer to the Signory); \(\text{LPIii}, 1\) (1515, instructions to the French ambassador).

\(^{27}\) Henry VIII appears to have heard of Louis’ death on 6 January; \(\text{Ven.ii}, 580\) (6 January 1515, Badoer to the Signory, London). Initial intelligence from Spinelly (in the Low Countries) on 17 January was positive, the diplomat reporting that the Italian expedition had been prorogued for that year, but not cancelled; \(\text{LPIii}, 32\) (17 January 1515, Spinelly to Henry). Sir Robert Wingfield commented on this issue on 29 January and at some point in February from the Imperial Court, but mutilation makes his opinion(s) unclear; \(\text{ibid.}, 69\) (29 January 1515, Robert Wingfield to Henry, Innsbruck), \(205\) (calendared end February 1515, Robert Wingfield to Henry). In Rome, Cardinal Bibbiena, a confidante of Leo X, was quoted around 21 January as saying that Francis I was more committed to the expedition than his predecessor and would bring more troops; \(\text{Ven.ii}, 570\) (17 and 21 January 1515, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). For other reports across Europe that an Italian expedition was likely, see \(\text{Sp.ii}, 207\) (January[?] 1515, Ferdinand to his ambassador in Rome); \(\text{Ven.ii}, 572\) (27 January 1515, communication by Pasqualigo to the College). On the manner in which Francis had Louis XII’s claim to the duchy of Milan transferred to him, see W. Roscoe, \textit{Leo the Tenth}, ii, p.2.

\(^{28}\) For various contemporary reports that Francis’ expedition would not occur until he had made an agreement with England (although the French king did, nevertheless, claim not to fear Henry VIII), see \(\text{Ven.ii}, 583\) (17-21 January, 4 February 1515, Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory), \(589\) (23 March 1515, three Venetian ambassadors in France to the Signory, Paris), \(596\) (30 March 1515, three Venetian ambassadors in France to the Signory, Paris), R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, i, pp.38-40 (\(\text{Ven.ii}, 578\); 3 February 1515, Giustinian to the Signory), \(50-54\) (\(\text{Ven.ii}, 592\); \(\text{LPIii}, 267\); 25 March 1515, three Venetian ambassadors in France to the Signory, Paris), \(55-59\) (\(\text{Ven.ii}, 595\); 30 March 1515, three Venetian ambassadors in France to the Signory).

While the Anglo-French peace did not need to be renewed in the short-term, it was an opportune moment for Francis to do this. In addition to a continued lack of allies upon whom Henry could rely to act, there were other reasons for him to plot the same course with France, including the lucrative pension payments associated with the peace and the need to secure the safety and recovery of Henry’s widowed sister (and her dower) from France. Francis I further encouraged England in this direction by stirring up Scotland and by encouraging rumours of an intended assault on Tournai; \(\text{LPIii}, 300\) (4 April 1515), \(301\) (5 April 1515), \(302\) (5 April 1515); \(\text{Ven.ii}, 598\) (5 April 1515); R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, i, pp.59-60 (\(\text{Ven.ii}, 599\); \(\text{LPIii}, 307\); 7 April 1515, Giustinian and Pasqualigo to the
tried to bargain for the duchy’s inclusion. Despite apparent acquiescence to French overtures, which would facilitate Francis’ intended Italian expedition, there are indications that the English were not entirely comfortable with the situation. Henry VIII’s anti-French prejudice, for instance, was undiminished; in early March, while negotiations towards a renewal of the peace were in full swing, he was quoted as saying that ‘the King of France was indeed a worthy and honest sovereign, but nevertheless a Frenchman, and not to be trusted’. The English carried over to the new reign their attempts to distract the French with the offer of a personal meeting with Henry, but this was unsuccessful. Following the April peace agreement, the prospect of a French assault on northern Italy became practically inevitable. While initial intelligence (in England, Rome and elsewhere) on the likelihood of this was contradictory, an enterprise was deemed increasingly certain from late May onwards,

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29 By way of comparison, Giustinian reported from Paris in late March that, while the renewal of the Anglo-French peace was inevitable, that with Spain was not as Ferdinand insisted on the inclusion of Milan, a concession which the new French king was not prepared to make; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.48-50 (LPIII, 146; 12 February 1515, Suffolk, West and Richard Wingfield to [Wolsey], Paris), 198 (27 February 1515, Spinelly to [Henry], Gaunt), 304 (6 April 1515, Suffolk, West and Richard Wingfield to Wolsey); Ven.ii, 587 (21-22 February 1515, Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory). The English meeting proposal still seems to have been on the table as late as August 1515, although by this date Francis envisaged it taking place after his return from Italy; LPIII, 826 (20 August 1515, Henry to Francis), 827 (calendared 20 August 1515, instructions to Richard Wingfield), 828 (calendared 20 August 1515).


31 Discussions to this end were conducted during February-April 1515; LPIII, 146 (12 February 1515, [Suffolk] to [Henry], Paris), 157 (13 February 1515, Suffolk, West and Richard Wingfield to [Wolsey], Paris), 198 (27 February 1515, Spinelly to [Henry], Gaunt), 304 (6 April 1515, Suffolk, West and Richard Wingfield to Wolsey); Ven.ii, 587 (21-22 February 1515, Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory).
at least in England. Francis I eventually announced his intention to go to Italy on 26
June, leaving for Lyons shortly after, in preparation to cross the mountains.

Given that the English crown had failed to have Milan included in the Anglo-  
French peace of 1514 and was thereafter reluctant (if not unable) to mount any direct  
opposition to the growing French threat to Italy, where did this leave the papacy and  
Henry VIII’s desire for it to remain free from French influence? Despite Leo X’s  
original encouragement of the Anglo-French accord, he was now politically  
vulnerable to any French descent, and he perhaps recognised this from the moment he  
received news of its conclusion. As a result, the pontiff explored all political options  
open to him and tried to provide for all eventualities. Firstly, he looked towards an

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32 For intelligence reaching England from April onwards that a French assault on Milan would be  
launched, see LPIii, 343 (21 April 1515, Nicholas West to Henry, Paris), 399 (calendared end April  
1515, intelligence addressed to Wolsey), 535 (calendared May 1515, Robert Wingfield to -, Augsburg);  
Ven.ii, 619 (15 May 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the Venetian ambassadors in France, London); R.  
Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp. 97-100 (Ven.ii, 628; LPIii, 585; 15 June 1515, Badoer and Giustinian  
to the Signory, London). For reports even as late as 17 June indicating that the expedition had been  
postponed or even cancelled, see LPIii, 431 (9 May 1515, Robert Wingfield to Henry, Augsburg), 479  
(20 May 1515, Robert Wingfield to Henry), 594 (17 June 1515, Sampson to Wolsey, Bruges). Between  
May and July, the Venetian ambassadors in England alluded to a prevailing confusion among English  
ministers on this subject, as well as to denials from the king (on 3 July), about the French intention to  
cross the Alps that year. When considering these Italian accounts, however, one must remember that  
the claims by Henry and his ministers were probably disingenuous, intended to convince the orators  
that Francis I was deceitful and not to be trusted; Ven.ii, 618 (15 May 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to  
the Signory, London), 623 (29 May 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory, London); R. Brown  
(trans.), Four Years, i, pp. 100-106 (Ven.ii, 633; LPIii, 652; 3 July 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to  
the Signory, London), 114-115 (Ven.ii, 636; LPIii, 673; 7 July 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the  
Signory, London), 115-117 (Ven.ii, 637; LPIii, 716; 16 July 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory,  
London). Even if there had been any confusion in crown circles about Francis’ intentions, these would  
have been lifted shortly after 28 May at the latest, at which point Francis I approached Suffolk seeking  
to postpone the latest instalment of the pension, due to the great expense to which he was committed in  
Italy; LPIii, 522 (28 May 1515, Francis I to Suffolk, Lyons). From late June onwards, intelligence  
reaching the English crown had Francis either at or on his way to Lyons and preparations to cross the  
Alps at an advanced stage; ibid., 624 (26 June 1515, Robert Wingfield to Henry, ‘Lynce in  
Lontuerture in Aswstryk’), 665 (6 July 1515, Richard Wingfield to [Wolsey], Calais), 685 (10 July  
1515, Spinelly to Henry, Bruges).
33 R.J. Knecht, Francis I, pp. 41-42.
34 The Portuguese ambassador in Rome, writing on 3 September 1514, reported that celebrations of the  
accord were made without the pope’s permission and that there was a distinct lack of public display to  
this end. In contradiction, however, Ammonius reported (on the 25th) that Leo instructed de Giglis to  
celebrate a Mass in this regard at S. Maria del Popolo; LPIii, 3236 (LPI, 5378; 3 September 1514; John  
Faria to the king of Portugal, Rome), 3302 (LPI, 5449; 25 September 1514, [Ammonius] to Wolsey,  
Westminster).
agreement with France (by which Naples would be conquered for Giuliano de’ Medici), but it does not look as if the English were aware of this initially. A Franco-
apal accord eventually came in the early months of 1515, via the marriage of Leo’s brother Giuliano de’ Medici to Filiberta of Savoy. Subsequently, Francis I envisaged obtaining papal support for his Italian plans and negotiations continued with the pope. Henry and his advisors were certainly aware of the marriage and, in correspondence from de Giglis to Ammonius of 29 January, would have been au fait with the pope’s unwillingness to break his alliance with Francis. Secondly, Leo sought protection from France by building up a counterweight network of allies. This manifested itself most formally in a secret defensive alliance between Rome and Spain on 21 September 1514. Intelligence that the papacy was moving in this latter direction was received by the English crown from its sources in the Low Countries and Germany. Possibly the first indication came via Sir Robert Wingfield in mid-

September, who reported that the pope had sent Maximilian a copy of Henry’s letter notifying him of the Anglo-French peace and, as a result, wanted the emperor to join a


36 This arrangement was first proposed during the time of Louis XII. The Venetian orator in Rome quoted Leo as saying (on 17 January) that he envisaged a closer relationship with France now that he and Francis would be related through this marriage. Giustinian reported from Lucca on 25 January, that Giuliano had left Florence to go and celebrate this marriage; *Ven.ii*, 570 (17 and 21 January 1515, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory); R. Brown (trans.), *Four Years*, i, pp.35-36 (*Ven.ii*, 571; 25 January 1515, Giustinian to the Signory, Lucca); W. Roscoe, *Leo the Tenth*, i, pp.384-385; *ibid*, ii, pp.5-6.


38 *LPHi*, 71 (29 January 1515, de Giglis to [Ammonius]). For indications that the English knew of Giuliano’s marriage and papal associations with France, see *ibid.*, 189 (26 February 1515, Suffolk to Henry, Paris), 291 (2 April 1515, Spinelly to Henry, Gaunt), 1342 (26 December 1515, Robert Wingfield to Wolsey, ‘[Ravesbourge] in Swave’).

39 The purpose of this treaty, the defence of the pope, the Church and its territories, makes it difficult to see this as anything else but a reaction to the Anglo-French peace; *Sp.ii*, 188 (*LPHii*, 3291; 21 September 1514). Also see L. Pastor, *History of the Popes*, vii, pp.103-104. The emperor and the Swiss also seem to have been lobbied to join this alliance and the former may well have done so; *Mil.*, 715 (9 September 1514, letters from Rome to the duke of Milan); *Sp.ii*, 189 (calendared October 1514, Ferdinand to his ambassador in Germany), 190 (calendared October 1514, Ferdinand to his ambassador in the Low Countries); *Ven.ii*, 520 (4 December 1514, Signory to its ambassador in France); S. Alexander (ed.), *The History of Italy by Francesco Guicciardini*, pp.282-283.
league for the defence of Italy, presumably against Louis XII. It does not seem as if Henry VIII was approached directly by the pope to become a member of this league, although, in apparent reaction to the peace, the king was requested in August to maintain his amity with Spain, ‘to bridle the inconstancy of the French’. The Anglo-Spanish relationship was at a low ebb at this point and there is nothing to suggest that the English king took heed of the papal request. Leo also enquired during the same month as to what arrangements had been made with the the emperor (as well as with his grandson Charles of Burgundy and daughter Margaret of Savoy). Later, in October, Leo may have been fishing for reassurance when, through de Giglis, he requested confirmation of a rumour from the Spanish ambassador that a treaty was being negotiated between Henry and Ferdinand.

Probably the most vocal strategy adopted by the papacy in the wake of the Anglo-French accord, as far as England was concerned, was its promotion of universal peace (and crusade), through which Leo hoped that the French descent

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40 Wingfield also cited Ferdinand, the Swiss and a duke (probably of Milan) as the other potential adherents. On 27 October, Wingfield again mentioned negotiations between Leo X, Maximilian, Ferdinand and the Swiss, but added cryptically that ‘now that the way is open betwixt your Grace and France,’ Henry would know what to do. By 31 October, Richard Wingfield and Thomas Spinelly reported from Brussels that Spain, Milan and the Swiss had made an offensive alliance (against the French) and were merely awaiting Leo X’s adhesion before concluding. On 3 December, moreover, Spinelly conveyed hearing that Swiss troops were being raised for the defence of Milan and that Ferdinand and Maximilian were doing everything in their power to win over Leo. Finally, on 19 December, Robert Wingfield further notified Henry that the Swiss had allied with Leo, Florence and Genoa, and were currently negotiating another treaty with the emperor, king of Spain, and duke of Milan; LPIi, 3274 (LPI, 5410; 15 September 1514, Robert Wingfield to Henry, [Innsbruck]), 3392 (LPI, 5532; 27 October 1514, Robert Wingfield to [Henry]), 3400 (LPI, 5539; 31 October 1514, Richard Wingfield and Thomas Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels), 3519 (LPI, 5675; 3 December 1514, Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels), 3556 (LPI, 5430; 19 December 1514, Robert Wingfield to Henry, Innsbruck).

41 The orator also mentions other elements of the Anglo-French peace that the pope wished to be altered; ibid., 3132 (LPI, 5543; calendared 7-8 August 1514, [de Giglis] to [Wolsey]).

42 See above p.463.

43 LPhii, 3362 (LPI, 5496; 13 October 1514, de Giglis to Wolsey and Fox, Rome).

44 Ibid., 3407 (calendared end October 1514, [de Giglis to Wolsey and Fox]).
could be avoided.\(^{45}\) As early as 27 July, the Milanese ambassador in Rome claimed that the pope had changed his mind about the Anglo-French peace and was trying to dissuade Henry; the pope allegedly admitted this, on account of his desire for the peace to be universal and not just between those two states.\(^{46}\) Similarly, Leo was overheard around 16 August opining that he would facilitate a general peace and even lead a crusade himself, now that Anglo-French differences were understood to have been arranged.\(^{47}\) Given subsequent papal actions, it is difficult to avoid interpreting this as a defensive measure intended primarily to secure the papacy against an increasingly likely French descent. It is likely that this subtext was not lost on the English crown as, when Henry VIII notified Leo of the Anglo-French peace on 12 August 1514, he encouraged the pope in this direction, presumably for the same reason.\(^{48}\) The pope responded positively, both praising the peace and exhorting Henry to work now towards these pious aims.\(^{49}\) Through de Giglis, Leo put further pressure on Fox and Wolsey to work towards universal peace and crusade during October, linking this desire with the need to reconcile France and Milan, and Wolsey was further lobbied about the latter during November.\(^{50}\) Wolsey seems to have given some unknown answer to be expanded upon by Ammonius, but Venetian reports in Rome

\(^{45}\) For some background on this, see L. Pastor, *History of the Popes*, vii, pp.104-105. For the belief, by a Milanese source in Rome in early September, that the pope would move in this direction, see *Mil.*, 715 (9 September 1514, letters from Rome to the duke of Milan). Also, that this was to avoid a French descent; *Ven.* ii, 525 (*LPl* ii, 3533; 8 December 1514, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory).

\(^{46}\) *Mil.*, 705 (27 July 1514, Milanese ambassador in Rome to the duke of Milan). That Leo may have genuinely hoped for some sort of *passagium* is suggested by his notifying the Hungarian Cardinal Backocz of the peace on 7 September; *EP*, 499 (7 September 1514, Leo to Cardinal Bakocz, Rome).

\(^{47}\) *Ven.* ii, 465 (16 August 1514, Vettor Lipomano to -, Rome).


\(^{49}\) Leo wrote in these terms to Henry on 8 and 9 September. He also praised Wolsey and Fox’s contribution on the 7th; *LP,l*, 3249 (*EP*, 500; 7 September 1514, Leo to Fox and Wolsey, Rome), 3254 (*EP*, 501; 8 September 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome), 3255 (*LPI*, 5392; 8 September 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome); *EP*, 503 (9 September 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome).

\(^{50}\) *LP,l*, 3407 (calendared end October 1514 [de Giglis to Wolsey and Fox), 3496 (*LPI*, 5464; calendared end November 1514, [de Giglis] to [Ammonius]).
(by 8 December) suggested that Henry VIII had rejected these papal overtures. Leo felt it necessary to write once more on this matter to Henry on 8 December.

Given the apparent lack of a tangible English response to papal calls for universal peace, it is perhaps unsurprising that rumours circulated in Rome that Henry VIII supported Louis XII’s Italian ambitions. It has already been suggested that the Venetian orator in Rome believed, by 8 December 1514, that the English king had rebuffed the pontiff’s request for universal peace and even that, now he understood the French claim to Milan, he had urged Louis to pursue its recovery. Around 15 December, the same ambassador told the pope of a recent threat from Henry to Ferdinand, that he would attack Spain if the latter resisted Louis XII, presumably in Italy. While this was probably an attempt to distract and occupy the French king in Spanish-controlled Navarre, it would not have looked like this to Leo. Another English attempt to distract the French from Italy, the offer of a meeting between the kings, may also have unsettled the pope around this time; again, around 15 December,

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51 Ibid., 3497 (LPI, 5465; calendared end November 1514, Wolsey to [de Giglis], ‘From my place besides Westminster’), 3533 (Ven.ii, 525; 8 December 1514, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory).
52 EP, 551 (8 December 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome). The Venetian ambassador in Rome, writing on 25 November, claimed that the pope had appointed four legates to be despatched in a bid to facilitate universal peace (de Grassis for England), but no further reference to this has been found to verify the action or intention; Ven.ii, 517 (25 November 1514, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). For a contemporaneous papal approach to Venice urging peace during early December (although in a more threatening form), see ibid., 520 (4 December 1514, Signory to its ambassador in France). It may also have been in a bid to woo Henry towards the idea of universal peace that Leo wrote to the king’s young nephew, James V, on 23 November 1514, firstly congratulating him on his accession (which was strange, considering that he was only two years old and had been king since the September 1513) and, secondly and probably more to the point, urging that the king (and, implicitly, those who governed on his behalf) be obedient to his uncle, Henry VIII. The pope claimed to be responding to a letter from James, dated 5 October, notifying him of the Scot’s accession; LPlii, 3470 (LPI, 5613; 23 November 1514, Leo to James V, Rome).
53 He suggested that Henry had promised to assist Louis in this undertaking; LPlii, 3497 (LPI, 5465; calendared end November 1514, Wolsey to [de Giglis], ‘From my place besides Westminster’), 3533 (Ven.ii, 525; 8 December 1514, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). The Venetian government, on 14 December, similarly suggested that England was now supportive of French intentions; Ven.ii, 527 (14 December 1514, Signory to the papal ambassador, Pietro Bembo). Also see rumours circulating Rome in September that Henry VIII had supplied archers for the expedition; see above p.462.
54 Ven.ii, 539 (LPlii, 3547; 15 December 1514, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory).
55 See above p.463.
the Venetian orator, quite feasibly citing intelligence from England, notified Leo X that this would occur on the 29th.\footnote{Ven.ii, 539 (LPiii, 3547; 15 December 1514, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). Also see earlier p.463.} While the pope’s opinion on these rumours is unclear, they surely caused him to question Henry VIII’s anti-French sentiments.\footnote{In spite of this Louis XII probably writing at the end of December 1514, understood from the nuncio in France that the pope was informed of Henry VIII’s opposition to his plans for Milan; LPiii, 1 (calendared start January 1515, instructions to the French ambassador in England).}

In the early months of 1515, the papacy’s universal peace strategy developed more clearly into an anti-French measure to be enshrined in a league. While Leo contacted Wolsey indirectly through Cardinal de’ Medici on 11 January, urging him towards a general peace and offering him a fiscal inducement for his support (the remission of half the service taxes due on his provision to Lincoln), the apparent lack of response suggests that the papacy’s intention to formalise this in such a way may have been unclear.\footnote{Leo was also said to be sending an ambassador to England in pursuit of this. Wolsey had been seeking to have the impositions on Lincoln reduced or cancelled, particularly given that he had been recently promoted to York; \textit{ibid.}, 20 (11 January 1515, Giulio de’ Medici to Wolsey, Rome).} In any case, the pope did not give the English much time to respond, as a league, formally intended to launch a crusade was formed on 12 February. While the Ottoman threat was cited, its articles focused on the French danger and it can be interpreted, moreover, as a coalition to defend Milan. In addition, the confederates were bound to gain the adhesion of other princes, including Henry VIII.\footnote{Sp.ii, 208 (12 February 1515); L. Pastor, \textit{History of the Popes}, vii, p.107. During January 1515, Leo X received renewed pressure from his ally Ferdinand to form such a league against France and, in connection with this, to bring Henry VIII into the fold; Sp.ii, 207 (calendared January 1515, Ferdinand to his ambassador in Rome).} These elements were reiterated in Leo X’s ratification of 22 February, although the pope also asserts that the coalition was intended to defend him and the Papal States. In keeping with Leo’s attempts to deal with both sides at the same time,
it is unsurprising that this confirmation appears to have remained secret. In a letter of defiance of around the same date from representatives of the confederates to Francis I (presumably not including the papacy and perhaps never sent), it was alleged, among other things, that Louis XII had breached his peace with England by supporting the dukes of Guelders and Saxony against Maximilian and Charles of Burgundy, both of whom Henry had named as party to the peace. It is widely recognised that Leo X did not publicly ratify the alliance until July, continuing to negotiate with both sides up to this point. Henry would have been aware that the papacy might be moving to protect itself against France as early as January 1515, when Spinelly informed him that Leo might back off from France, now that Giuliano de’ Medici had acquired Piacenza, Parma, Reggio and Modena as part of his French marriage, and that his nephew (Lorenzo) was to marry into the Spanish royal family. The king seems to have confirmed his knowledge of the anti-French league to the Venetian orator Badoer, around 6 March, and may well have believed that the pope had adhered to it. In both Leo’s pro- and anti-French policies, one can discern the pope seeking to establish his brother as a territorial prince in northern Italy, perhaps intending him to preside over a buffer state that would assume Milan’s de facto

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60 Sp.ii, 209 (22 February 1515, Leo to all persons, Rome). While Pastor argues that the pope did not ratify the league until July, while he continued to negotiate with the French, Creighton is convincing when he suggests that the aforementioned ratification was kept a secret for the time being; M. Creighton, History of the Papacy, v, pp.236-237; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.107-110. For further evidence of the secrecy of the pope’s involvement, keeping it even from his own brother, see W. Roscoe, Leo the Tenth, ii, p.9.

61 The letter also insisted that the Most Christian King concede to Leo’s requests and not attack the Church (or its territories). It also required Francis to renounce his claims to Milan and Genoa; Sp.ii, 210 (calendared 22 February 1515, papal nuncio and ambassadors of Maximilian, Ferdinand, the Swiss and other members of the Holy League, to Francis I).

62 Roscoe argues that French pressure initially stopped Leo X from joining the league to defend Milan; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, p.110; W. Roscoe, Leo the Tenth, ii, pp.5, 12.

63 LPIIi, 85 (calendared end January 1515, Spinelly to Henry).

64 Ven.ii, 594 (6 March 1515, Badoer to the Signory, London). For earlier warnings from English envoys of an impending league against France involving the pope, see LPIIi, 11 (7 January 1515, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 69 (29 January 1515, Robert Wingfield to Henry, Innsbruck), 70 (29 January 1515, Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels), 85 (calendared end January 1515, Spinelly to Henry), 107 (3 February 1515, Robert Wingfield to [Henry], Innsbruck), 124 (6 February 1515, Spinelly to [Henry], Mechelin), 167 (16 February 1515, Robert Wingfield to Henry, [Innsbruck]).
strategically vital role in protecting the Papal States (and Florence). As Henry VIII and his inner circle were cognisant of such intelligence, it is entirely feasible that they also concluded that the pope intended to create a Medici shield for the defence of the Church.\textsuperscript{65}

As both Henry and Leo were simultaneously pursuing amicable relations with France, there is reason to believe that, even when they approached each other with a view to resisting a French descent into Italy, the pope may not have entirely trusted England’s apparent underlying anti-French agenda. Thus, around mid-January, de Giglis urged the pope, on Henry’s behalf, to ‘free Italy and extend his own authority’. While the nature of the conflict desired by England is unclear, the sense of the letter suggests that it wanted Leo X to resist any French descent into Italy.\textsuperscript{66} Furthermore, given that the last papal communication to England in December related to universal peace, it is feasible that the English envisaged turning such an initiative against France.\textsuperscript{67} Apparently missing this point, the pontiff rejected de Giglis’ proposal, claiming that he could ‘only show himself an advocate for universal concord’. To this, the orator suggested ‘that some Frenchman had been breathing in his [Leo’s] ear’ and that the pope was wrong to believe that Francis would not attempt to realise his Italian ambitions, alleging that he ultimately coveted Naples and that, once gained, ‘it was all

\textsuperscript{65} In addition to other territories, Giuliano was also envisaged, at various times, as being installed in the kingdom of Naples, as well as the duchies of Ferrara and Urbino; \textit{LP III}, 85 (calendared end January 1515, Spinelly to Henry), 167 (16 February 1515, Robert Wingfield to Henry, [Innsbruck]); W. Roscoe, \textit{Leo the Tenth}, i (1853), pp.381, 384-385; \textit{ibid.}, ii, pp.5-6. Knowledge of Leo’s familial territorial ambitions seems to have circulated quite widely. According to Giustinian, writing to Venice from Lucca during January 1515, the Lucchese feared that their city was coveted by Leo for his brother; R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, i, pp.35-36 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 571; \textit{Ven.ii}, 571; 25 January 1515, Giustinian to the Signory, Lucca).

\textsuperscript{66} One would speculate that de Giglis’ instructions for his audience around 19 January were sent in late December 1514, before Louis XII’s death; \textit{LP III}, 71 (29 January 1515, de Giglis to [Ammonius]).

\textsuperscript{67} See above pp.468-470.
up with the Pope’. Shortly after this, perhaps having received further orders from England, de Giglis again approached Leo, seeking his mandate to form an alliance with Henry, Maximilian, Ferdinand and the Swiss, seemingly against the French, but the pontiff gave reasons for why he could not rely on any of his potential confederates; concerning Henry VIII, he argued that he did not know how long England could provide him with financial support and also that Henry had not pledged to invade France. That this was indicative of cool relations between England and Rome is suggested not only by the rather combative tone with which de Giglis claimed he had responded to Leo, but also by an alleged visit following the latter exchange to the orator by Cardinal Bibbiena, a close advisor of the pope, who besought him to smooth things over between Henry and Leo, albeit the pontiff’s mind had not changed. This treatment of English overtures is more curious when one considers that concurrent negotiations with Ferdinand, Maximilian and others would shortly result in a ‘crusading’ league against France. Uncertainty about English intentions would certainly explain this and also put into context Giulio de’ Medici’s approach to Wolsey of 11 January, more neutrally advocating universal peace and crusade, rather than its intended direction against Louis XII/Francis I. The lack of anti-French agenda emanating from the papacy in the universal peace initiative would hardly have inspired confidence in England that Leo was prepared to resist a French descent. While Wolsey informed de Giglis, on 1 February, that he had instructed the

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68 LPIIi, 71 (29 January 1515, de Giglis to [Ammonius]). This puts into context the lack of anti-French subtext in de’ Medici’s approach to Wolsey of 11 January, urging universal peace, even though a league to resist a French descent was shortly to be concluded; see above pp.471-472.

69 While he named the king of France as a potential party to this league, the broader context of the letter suggests that this was either a mistake or, as with the February league, was included but was not expected to occur; LPIIi, 71 (29 January 1515, de Giglis to [Ammonius]). Given that Parliament was usually convoked when the crown was seeking fiscal grants, usually for war, it is not unfeasible that that which met briefly on 5 February 1515 anticipated a positive response from Rome to resisting French ambitions in Italy; ibid., 119 (5 February 1515).

70 Ibid., 20 (11 January 1515, Giulio de’ Medici to Wolsey, Rome). Hadrian de Castello echoed this on 16 January, informing Henry that the pope was determined to launch a crusade; ibid., 30 (16 January 1515, de Castello to Henry, Rome).
Latin secretary (Ammonius) to convey ‘divers secret things of great importance to be showed to the Pope’, the timing suggests that these were probably a response to the papal rejection of English overtures against France and to Leo’s exhortations towards a general peace.\(^7\) England and the papacy were not on the same political wavelength at this point, despite the latter’s secret involvement in negotiations towards an anti-Gallic coalition. Indeed, Leo X evidently did not admit England to the broader talks that resulted in the anti-French treaty.

Once the league to defend Milan and go on crusade had been concluded in February 1515, an approach from Rome to gain English adhesion might be expected, not least because this was stipulated within the accord.\(^7\) Increased English activity to join might also be expected, given the increasing prospect of a French descent into Italy; indeed, Wolsey was warned of the vulnerability of both Milan and Bologna on 16 February.\(^7\) While Henry may well have written to Leo X concerning the new alliance around the turn of March, it is unclear what he said, but one would suspect that the English were open to offers to join it.\(^7\) Nevertheless, there was plenty of reason for both sides to be suspicious of each other’s true intentions concerning France; Henry knew that Leo had agreed a French marriage for his brother Giuliano

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\(^7\) Ibid., 91 (1 February 1515, Wolsey to [de Giglis], ‘From my place beside Westminster’).

\(^7\) Sp. ii, 208 (12 February 1515), 209 (22 February 1515, Leo to all persons, Rome), 210 (calendared 22 February 1515, papal nuncio and ambassadors of Maximilian, Ferdinand, the Swiss and other members of the Holy League, to Francis I). Indeed, Spinelly reported on 29 January that Maximilian intended to send an ambassador to England for this purpose, the emperor perhaps anticipating his obligation; LPIII, 70 (29 January 1515, Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels).

\(^7\) LPIII, 168 (16 February 1515, Thomas Colman to Wolsey, Bologna).

\(^7\) Badoer claimed that Henry had told him about this correspondence, although the orator implied that the king may have voiced his displeasure that Venice had not been comprised in it. Nevertheless, in the same correspondence, Henry was said to have questioned the honesty of Francis I, on account of his being a Frenchman. One also ought to bear in mind that Venice was an ally of France at this point; Ven. ii, 594 (6 March 1515, Badoer to the Signory, London). An English opinion of the league is further suggested by instructions from Wolsey to the duke of Suffolk (then in France negotiating with Francis), towards the beginning of March 1515; the archbishop ordered the ambassador to cease any discussion of Tournai, the return of which the French king was insisting upon, because he believed that Francis ‘will have enough to do to take care of his own matters. He is in the greatest danger that ever man was in’; LPIII, 224 (calendared 5-6 March 1515, Wolsey to Suffolk).
and Leo knew that Henry was receptive to Francis’ overtures for a renewal of the Anglo-French amity (which occurred during April).\footnote{See above pp.464-468.}

In spite of the lack of any papal approach for assistance against France, the English were at least aware that an anti-French coalition had been formed and could be quietly confident that the political circumstances that forced Henry to peace with France, a lack of papal and other support, might soon change. That the crown was thinking about the composition of this confederacy was indicated at Giustinian’s first audience with Henry in late April 1515, whereby Henry envisaged Venice’s inclusion in ‘the league for the defence of Christendom’.\footnote{According to Giustinian’s 24 April report of his first audience with the king; LPIII, 371 (25 April 1515, Giustinian to Wolsey).} Also, at some point in May, Henry, in pursuing an alliance with Charles of Burgundy, further envisaged a league between them, Leo X, Maximilian and the Swiss.\footnote{Henry indicated that he had been discussing this in England with the Provost of Cassel (George de Theimseke), a representative of Charles of Burgundy; ibid., 539 (calendared end May 1515, Henry to [Poynings and Tunstal]).} The English crown was also involved in negotiations during these months towards new agreements with Spain and the Empire and, although nothing seems to have concluded, it is likely that they were linked to the anti-French agenda.\footnote{During May and June, Ferdinand seems to have sought a new accord with his son-in-law; Sp.ii, 211 (LPHii, 405-406; 2 May 1515, Ferdinand to de Mesa, Ventosilla); LPHii, 609 (23 June 1515, Poynings and others to [Henry], The Hague). Nothing came of this in the short term, however, but one could forgive Henry if he did not entirely trust his father-in-law. The relationship between England and Spain at this point is uncertain. While it is feasible that some rapprochement was sought between the two states, as Thomas Ruther referred to a reconciliation with Ferdinand in early July, it is not until 8 August that Ferdinand commissioned a representative to conclude an alliance with Henry (and Maximilian) and, while a draft treaty (defensive in nature) was subsequently drawn up, by Wolsey on the part of England, this was not finalised until 19 October. Also, there is record of the Spanish orator, de Mesa, requesting an audience of Wolsey on 14 August, commenting on the long time since they last did business. There may have been, on the other hand, a lingering distrust of the Spanish on the part of the English, Ferdinand having double-crossed Henry on several occasions. Indeed, in an audience with Henry around the same time, the Venetians were asked whether Ferdinand was the friend or enemy of the republic. Concerning the wider league against France, Ferdinand invited Henry to join in September, having discovered that his son-in-law was willing to adhere, see R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, 1, pp.102-103 (Ven.ii, 633; LPHii, 652; 3 July 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory, London), 114-115 (Ven.ii, 636; LPHii, 673; 7 July 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory, London); Sp.ii, 214 (8 August 1515, Ferdinand to his ambassador to Flanders and England, Aranda), 215-216 (calendared August-September 1515), 221 (calendared September 1515, Ferdinand to his...} While the English crown clearly interacted with other
potentially anti-French powers probably to this end, there was no urgency to forestall Francis I’s intended descent into Italy or even to ‘defend’ the papacy. This may well have been motivated by knowledge of the existence of the defensive coalition (which England had not been invited to join), as well as by intelligence that powers were mobilising to meet its obligations.79

The papacy’s apparent failure to trust England in its pointed crusading initiative (against France) presumably compounded Henry VIII’s lack of urgency to come to Rome’s ‘defence’, particularly given that his offer to do this had earlier been rejected. Indeed, it must have been difficult for the English king to understand whether Leo X was actually committed to the coalition against France; he had heard of papal membership of such a league, but this was uncertain.80 There were also indications that the papacy might still align with France.81 Such was the perception of

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79 The (rumoured) commitment of Swiss military expertise was particularly noted in English diplomatic newsletters and it was believed Ferdinand of Aragon would also act. See, for instance, LPIII, 531 (31 May 1515, Robert Wingfield to Henry, Augsburg), 535 (calendared end May 1515, Robert Wingfield to -, Augsburg), 563 (7 June 1515, Robert Wingfield to [Henry], Innsbruck), 594 (17 June 1515, Sampson to Wolsey, Bruges).
80 While Henry seems to have been aware of the league and papal membership thereof back in March, the papacy’s commitment to secrecy meant that he was in receipt of intelligence that questioned Leo X’s membership. For reports that Leo had joined this anti-French league, see LPIII, 537 (calendared end May 1515, Spinelly to [Henry], Bruges), 528 (30 May 1515, Sampson to [Wolsey], Bruges), 624 (26 June 1515, Robert Wingfield to Henry, ‘Lync in Lontuuperence in Aswtryk’), 641 (29 June 1515, Robert Wingfield to Henry). Also see above pp.471-472. For reports that the pope was yet to join, see LPIII, 563 (7 June 1515, Robert Wingfield to [Henry], Innsbruck); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.114-115 (Ven.ii, 636; LPIII, 673; 7 July 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory, London). For a report that Leo, Maximilian and Ferdinand were not working together to oppose the French threat to Genoa; LPIII, 564 (7 June 1515, Spinelly to Henry, Bruges).
81 Towards the beginning of May, Robert Wingfield asserted that the French were marching on Genoa, with the permission of the pope (as well as of the city itself). On 28 May, Spinelly reported hearing from Bruges that Francis I, on hearing that Leo would ally with Maximilian, Ferdinand and others against him, had offered (to resign his claim to) Naples to the pope’s brother, Giuliano de’ Medici. Also, on 7 June, Spinelly wrote that the pope favoured the French concerning Genoa; LPIII, 520 (28 May 1515, Spinelly to Henry, Bruges), 535 (calendared May 1515, Robert Wingfield to -, Augsburg), 564 (7 June 1515, Spinelly to Henry, Bruges).
the papal strategy that Spinelly opined on 13 June that, ‘the Pope is pursuing such a policy as will plunge all Italy into bloodshed’. Furthermore, it is possible that the nunciature of Balthasar Stuerd, at work in Scotland since early 1514, may also have caused concern in crown circles. Originally intended to bring about peace between England and Scotland, with a view to universal peace and crusade, the papal representative may have been suspected of being pro-Scottish, if not pro-French. He was certainly working to the same end as the French ambassador around May-August 1515 and also entered into negotiations to these ends with the French-backed duke of Albany when the latter arrived in Scotland to take control of the government. Given English doubt as to the true intent of the papal peace initiative, it is quite feasible that Stuerd’s work was viewed warily as an attempt to stifle any anti-French intentions.

Thus, in the months following England’s April peace renewal with France, while the papacy began to indicate to England that it was in favour of an anti-French coalition (still shaded with crusading intentions), the crown was cautious in its reception of these overtures and, at the same time, sought to gain at least one major concession from Leo X in return for its eventual alignment. The suggestion that papal

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82 Ibid., 577 (13 June 1515, Spinelly to [Henry], Bruges).
83 In Scotland since February 1514, Stuerd (or Stuart) was originally commissioned to facilitate peace between England and Scotland but, on his arrival there, this commission seems to have broadened, on account of the dissensions within the kingdom. Stuerd was also instrumental in facilitating James V’s (or rather his guardians’) decision to join the Anglo-French peace during May 1514, under instruction from Leo X, who reportedly argued that continued Scottish attacks on the English borders were obstructing a crusade. While the nuncio planned to leave once this was achieved, he soon became involved in Anglo-Scottish negotiations, following the arrival of the pro-French duke of Albany. Stuerd finally reached the English Court around 29 July where he sought to put the Anglo-Scottish peace into writing, although it still seems that he had to argue that Albany was de facto head of state in Scotland. In terms of the nuncio’s loyalties, Spinelly certainly thought him duplicitous and Albany referred to him as his ‘kinsman’. Given, Stuerd’s name, it is entirely feasible that the nuncio was Scottish; LPIii, 2288 (LPI, 4458; 20 September 1513, Leo to Henry, Rome), 2343 (LPI, 4491; 7 October 1513, Giuliano de’ Medici to Henry, Rome), 2633 (LPI, 4725; 7 February 1514, Spinelly to Henry); LPIIIi, 415 (4 May 1515, Balthazar [Stuerdus] to Wolsey, Edinburgh), 421 (7 May 1515, La Batye and Mace de Villebresme to Wolsey, Edinburgh), 464 (15 May 1515, James V to Francis), 543 (calendared end May 1515, Balthazar [Stuart] to Henry), 559 (6 June 1515, Balthazar Stuart to Wolsey), 560 (calendared 6 June 1515, Albany to Leo X), 561 (calendared 6 June 1515, Albany to Cardinal [St Mark]), 784 (R. Brown [trans.], Four Years, i, pp.118-123; Ven.ii, 638; 5 August 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory), 858 (27 August 1515, Poyning and Knight to [Henry], Bruges). For the struggle for control over James V’s minority, between the English Queen Margaret and the ‘French’ duke of Albany up to this time, see C. Bingham, James V King of Scots 1512-1542 (1971), pp.27-37.
foreign policy could turn anti-French came around 22 May when the pope transmitted (through de Giglis) his satisfaction that England had a ‘good understanding’ with the Empire and Spain, as it would deter France. Indeed, he believed that Francis would not cross the Alps unless England was friendly. To this end, Leo requested that England join the league to defend Milan and urged that Fox and Wolsey help persuade the king.\(^8^4\) This was presumably Leo’s fulfilment of his obligation to gain England’s adhesion (although his own confirmation still remained secret). This disposition would have concurred with intelligence from Sir Robert Wingfield, dated 15 May, that Leo X was preparing to resist the French descent.\(^8^5\) Either the same or a subsequent (June) approach by the pope, through de Giglis, sought information on the current state of relations between England and France and the exact terms of the earlier peace, given the current French threat to Milan. At the same time, the pope searched for a way to raise Wolsey to the cardinalate, almost certainly as an inducement for England to join the anti-French cause. It appears that the pope was unsure of English intentions, not least because he believed that Henry was due to meet Francis, and because he requested credentials for an English ambassador in whom he could confide.\(^8^6\) Wolsey’s reply seems to have asserted Henry’s desire for his entry into the Sacred College as a rather threatening *quid pro quo* for English support against France; ‘the King has always been a friend to the Pope and his alliance ought not to be lightly thrown away’. Wolsey further emphasised that ‘the King will be greatly displeased if his desires are not regarded, as he is a better friend to the Church

\(^8^4\) De Giglis had also heard of a conversation between the pope and French ambassador whereby, in reply to the latter requesting support for the intended recovery of Milan, Leo refused and added ‘that the King of England was a young man of great power and would easily conquer France’; *LP III*, 493 (calendared 22 May 1515, [de Giglis to -]).


\(^8^6\) *Ibid.*, 647 (calendared end June 1515, [de Giglis to Wolsey]).
than all other Princes'. In all likelihood, one of these ‘desires’ was the red hat, and other concessions were probably also sought. In political terms, the cardinal’s hat, particularly if Wolsey was promoted alone, would have transmitted a clear message about the papacy’s intentions vis-à-vis France. Contemporaries would have understood that there was only one reason why Leo X would seek to ‘buy’ the English crown just when France was poised to descend into Italy; as an ally against this threat. Wolsey was, therefore, forcing the papacy’s hand; either come out definitively against Francis I, by which he would benefit from ecclesiastical office, or lose Henry VIII’s commitment to defend the papacy (and potentially, albeit this was unlikely, see him support Francis I). The pope’s response to Wolsey, on 12 July, appears to have interpreted the latter’s correspondence quite positively. Agreeing in future to communicate through the archbishop and being appreciative of his role in influencing the king (against France), Leo X claimed to be desirous of Henry’s goodwill and appreciated his expressions of devotion, adding that the king should be considered to be the ‘patron and protector’ of the Holy See. While nothing was mentioned about the red hat, it is feasible that this would have been broached by de Giglis, whom the pontiff had instructed to write more fully.

Also indicative of the papacy’s increasing commitment against France, vis-à-vis England, may well have been Leo’s warning during June 1515 that any aggression against the Papal States, particularly the outpost cities of Parma and Piacenza, would result in papal censures being imposed on the culprits. While this would have been deemed a ‘positive’ measure if or when news of this arrived in England, it was still not a categoric declaration of anti-French intent. Indeed, there are indications, albeit from Ferdinand of Aragon, that Henry VIII had sought such ecclesiastical weapons to

87 Ibid., 648 (calendared end June 1515, [Wolsey to de Giglis], ‘From my place beside Westminster’).
88 The de Giglis letter does not seem to have survived; ibid., 700 (12 July 1515, Leo to Wolsey, Rome).
89 These territories were nominally held by Giuliano de’ Medici; W. Roscoe, Leo the Tenth, ii, p.12.
be invoked against Francis I at least from summer 1515. That Ferdinand urged Leo to excommunicate Francis for Henry’s sake at some point perhaps around May-June and again on 14 September, however, suggests that the general papal monition issued in June was not deemed acceptable to the English crown as sufficient sign of papal intent.90

Concurrent with papal contacts with England proposing an alignment against France, Leo X also continued to issue overtures calling for universal peace and crusade where the underlying agenda was unclear. On 16 June 1515, he and Giulio de’ Medici wrote to Henry VIII, requesting his assistance against the Turks.91 While, no doubt, the English crown would have liked this approach to have been a tacit request for assistance against the French and, indeed, it could have been interpreted as such if it was made in accordance with the papacy’s (then, still secret) membership of the anti-French league, the fact that it was accompanied by a brief to the same effect from the Hungarian bishop of Vesprim, gives cause for doubt. Given Hungary’s more tangible concern for the Turkish threat, this metropolitan was probably little concerned with the political in-fighting within Christendom, which suggests that the call to crusade may have been genuine. However, given the confusion around papal foreign policy, it is entirely feasible that, on receipt of these briefs in England, the

90 Sp. ii, 212 (calendared summer 1515, Ferdinand to his ambassado in Rome), 217 (14 September 1515, Ferdinand to his ambassado in Rome).

91 Leo X’s invitation is alluded to by de’ Medici; LPIIi, 590 (16 June 1515, Giulio de’ Medici to Henry, Rome). That universal peace and crusade continued to be a strategy perhaps independent of the concern for France is also suggested by the despatch, on 13 July, of a nuncio to visit Maximilian, Francis and the Swiss, with a view to these ends. Robert Wingfield reported on 24 July that papal ambassadors were indeed pressuring the emperor to respond positively, but Maximilian did not, arguing that, while he had always desired to go on crusade, four French kings had prevented him from doing so. Wingfield also reported on a meeting, at the same time, between the emperor and the kings of Hungary and Poland. It may well be that the papacy perceived this as an opportune moment to lobby for universal peace and crusade, in spite of the wider political context within Christendom; ibid., 703 (13 July 1515, Leo to Baptista, General of the Order of Carmelites, Rome), 746 (24 July 1515, Robert Wingfield to Henry, Vienna), 764 (30 July 1515, Robert Wingfield to Henry, Vienna).
king did not know what was really meant; did Leo intend to use the crusade as a pretext for war against France (as is suggested by the February league to defend Milan); was it a mechanism to prevent an attack on Francis (as may already have been suspected from the Stuerd nunciature in Scotland), or was it a genuine call to arms in defence of Christendom? Perhaps predictably, Henry VIII’s reply, of 15 July, indicates his understanding that it was the former; he was sympathetic to the pope’s desire for peace, particularly given the obstacles experienced through ‘the private interests of certain princes’. In the face of such ‘obstinacy’ (from France), therefore, the king encouraged Leo to use the ‘spiritual sword’, which he would support, presumably in a military sense. Nevertheless, while he would respond to the papal call to arms against the Turks, Henry insisted that a broad league be concluded first, to impose the universal peace.

While the king’s correspondence was supportive, Wolsey’s continued to be more threatening. At some point, probably during July (and perhaps at the same time as that from Henry), he notified de Giglis how ‘the King’s grace marvelleth that the Pope delayeth so long the sending of the red hat to me’. Furthermore, the archbishop continued, ‘if the King forsake the Pope, he will be in greater “danger on this day two year than ever was Pope J[ulius]”’. The implication of this warning was clear; if the red hat was not forthcoming (and quickly), Henry VIII would not neutralise the French threat to the papacy and Milan. This assessment of the English contribution

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92 In his encouragement of the pope to urge Henry’s involvement against France, on 14 September 1515, Ferdinand advocated the portrayal of the French as ‘usurpers of the property of their neighbours and disturbers of the peace of Christendom, and as the obstacle to war with the Infidels’. It is improbable, therefore, that the papacy failed to understand that its universal peace overtures to England could be and were being misconstrued; *Sp. ii*, 217 (14 September 1515, Ferdinand to his ambassador in Rome). For the reality of the Turkish threat in Hungary and the response around 1514 on, see N. Housley, ‘Indulgences for Crusading, 1417-1517’, in R.N. Swanson (ed.), *Promissory Notes on the Treasury of Merit: Indulgences in Late Medieval Europe* (2006), pp.300-301.

93 *LPIII*, 712 (15 July 1515, Henry to Leo, Greenwich).

also mirrored what Wolsey, Henry and others, told the Venetian ambassadors. If the date of Wolsey’s missive is correct, it would not have reached Rome before 1 August, on which date he discovered that Leo X was going to make him a cardinal and, by implication, intended to resist Francis I, particularly given that he was to be the only candidate for this creation. Consequently, Wolsey wrote, he had been able to take advantage of the king’s positive demeanour to have him agree to the league (which he enclosed, signed by Henry); ‘never had Pope a better friend that the King of England, if he comply with his desires’ continued Wolsey, in relation to his further demand to be commissioned as a legate a latere. The rough date of the concession coincided with Leo’s decision to side with the anti-French coalition. Thus, the English crown finally accepted, probably by virtue of the public bestowal of the red hat, that Leo X intended to resist the French. Indeed, it was fairly trusting of Wolsey to have sent the English power to join the treaty before this had actually occurred.

In spite of Wolsey’s brinksmanship, it does not seem that England would have deserted the papacy in its hour of need. Ferdinand of Aragon understood during the summer of 1515 that Henry was willing to help the pope and the league against France and recommended that Leo ought to write to him in this regard. As far as the

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95 See pp.483-485.
96 LP iii, 780 (1 August 1515, [Wolsey to de Giglis]). Ferdinand of Aragon later (by September) seems to have understood that England and Rome had reached an agreement just between themselves and that Henry VIII’s membership of the anti-French coalition was yet to occur; Sp.ii, 221 (calendared September 1515, Ferdinand to his ambassador in Rome).
97 Preceded in June by a general threat to excommunicate those who threatened the papal principality, by the end of July 1515, the pope admitted to the Venetian ambassador that he had joined the coalition against France, although he still claimed to be waiting for a response from Francis that might change this. By early August, however, there were various signals that the pope intended to resist the French descent, including the proclamation of the league in Rome with papal membership. Robert Wingfield confirmed from Vienna on 6 August that the league against France had been proclaimed throughout Italy and that the papal army was actively participating in its endeavours; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.110-111; W. Roscoe, Leo the Tenth, ii, pp.12, 16; K.M. Setton, ‘Pope Leo X and the Turkish Peril’, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 13 (1969), p.384, n.65; LP iii, 786 (6 August 1515, Robert Wingfield to [Henry], Vienna).
98 Ferdinand also advocated a bull of excommunication, as allegedly requested by Henry, to encourage him in this regard. Ferdinand reiterated these sentiments on 14 September. In the former letter, the Spaniard also sought to rekindle the pontiff’s enthusiasm for the war and encourage him to observe the
Venetian embassy assessed the mood of the English crown towards the beginning of July, it was firmly opposed to the impending French descent into Italy, but denied that it was going to take place and even asserted that it was in a position to allow or prevent it.\(^9\) The king and his advisors also claimed to hold sufficient influence over the papacy to affect Leo’s foreign policy direction. When questioned about his relationship with the pope (on 3 July), Henry allegedly stated: ‘[I] am his good son, and shall always be with his Holiness and with the Church, from which I mean never to depart; and I think I have sufficient power with the Pope to warrant hopes of my making his adhere to whichever side I choose’.\(^10\) While the English crown may well have been confident that its overtures to the pope would be successful, one can also detect doubt from Henry in this audience, probably arising from the continued stipulations of the anti-French league (which included lobbying England to join); \(Sp.ii\), 212 (calendared summer 1515, Ferdinand to his ambassador in Rome), 217 (14 September 1515, Ferdinand to his ambassador in Rome).

\(^9\) At one point, Badoer discovered that Henry was sending an envoy to warn Francis against breaking his agreements with England and, given that the Venetian diplomats perceived that Henry was close to the pope at this point and that there were no signs that England was preparing for war, they believed that this mission was at Leo’s behest. When challenged, English ministers either denied the mission or its motivation. In addition, the Venetians cited Henry and his advisors rejecting the idea that Francis would cross the Alps that year. When questioned why this was the case, the king reportedly replied ‘ego credo quod metu mei, ne aliquam vim inferam ejus regno, non transilibit montes’. He later reiterated this, stating that ‘my belief is, that if I choose he will not cross the Alps, and if I choose he will cross’. This sentiment was echoed separately by some of his principal advisors, among whom, Wolsey made a point of claiming, that while he was the architect of the peace, he was willing to throw his weight behind destroying it, if the king so decided, and that there was plenty of support among Henry’s advisors; R. Brown (trans.), \(Four\ \Years\), i, pp.100-106 (\(Ven.ii\), 633; \(LPI\), 652; 3 July 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory, London), 106-107 (\(Ven.ii\), 634; \(LPI\), 653; 3 July 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory, London), 107-114 (\(Ven.ii\), 635; \(LPI\), 666; 6 July 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory, London). 114-115 (\(Ven.ii\), 636; \(LPI\), 673; 7 July 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory, London), 115-117 (\(Ven.ii\), 637; \(LPI\), 716; 16 July 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory, London).

\(^10\) Wolsey had reportedly given the same sort of answer a few days earlier and is said to have repeated this sentiment on 5 July; ‘be assured that this King’s example will be followed by his Holiness... Should our King espouse the French interests, the Pope will do the like’. Ruthal is also said to have repeated this opinion. In a subsequent interview given to Giustinian and Badoer (around 16 July), Wolsey claimed that, while the pope had yet to make a decision on which side to choose, he ‘would doubtless follow the example of this kingdom’; \(ibid.,\) pp.103 (\(Ven.ii\), 633; \(LPI\), 652; 3 July 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory, London), 113 (\(Ven.ii\), 635; \(LPI\), 666; 6 July 1515, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 115 (\(Ven.ii\), 636; \(LPI\), 673; 7 July 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory, London), 115-117 (\(Ven.ii\), 637; \(LPI\), 716; 16 July 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory, London).
uncertainty surrounding the papal position. Why else would he have asked the Venetian diplomats which side the pope was on?101

While Henry VIII remained formally on good terms with France, the red hat (and its consequent sending of the king’s authority to join the league to defend Italy) marked a tipping point.102 From this point, clearer suggestions of his opposition to Francis I and his crossing of the Alps can be observed. At some point probably during August, Henry allegedly indicated to the Spanish orator his readiness to join the anti-French coalition, provided that he was invited by the pope.103 On 12 August, Henry referred to France as ‘the ancient enemy of England’ in a routine diplomatic letter.104 Around 20 August, Henry also sent Sir Richard Wingfield to Francis (then at Lyons) to raise various issues between them (concerning Albany in Scotland, French piracy, Mary’s dower and so on); while it is unclear whether the ambassador urged Francis directly to cease his expedition, one would expect this to have been implicit in the mission and that Wingfield would also have been expected to gather intelligence.105

101 Badoer and Giustinian replied that they did not know but, if Leo chose to pursue ‘justice’, it would that of France and Venice; ibid., pp.100-106 (Ven.ii, 633; LPIII, 652; 3 July 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory, London).

102 A French ambassador apparently arrived in England on 7 August and announced that Francis had decided to cross the Alps to recover Milan. Henry replied with surprise that his fellow king had not informed him about this this earlier. While the English response was not one of defiance, it fits in with earlier crown behaviour, whereby Henry and his advisors pleaded ignorance, so that they could assert that Francis had breached the peace treaty; ibid., pp.124-126 (Ven.ii, 644; LPIII, 847; 24 August 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory, London).

103 If this was said from August on, then Henry had already made this commitment to Leo X, following the concession of Wolsey’s entry to the Sacred College. In response, Ferdinand urged Leo X to induce English participation and also invited Henry to adhere himself; Sp.ii, 221 (calendared September 1515, Ferdinand to his ambassador in Rome), 222 (calendared September 1515).

104 Henry was writing to William Knight, an English representative in the Low Countries, requesting safeconduct for a merchant; LPIII, 798 (12 August 1515, Henry to Knight, ‘From our Monastery of Chertsey’).

105 Francis’ reply does not suggest that Wingfield urged a cessation, although Francis did mention his hope that the Anglo-French amity would benefit Christendom and the crusade, possibly implying that the latter subjects were raised in this context. Guicciardini suggests that an English diplomat did make such a request around this time. Nevertheless, there is an indication by Wolsey that Wingfield was expected to continue his ‘espial with the French King’, although it is uncertain whether this was to be during his mission to Francis or while he was at Calais; ibid., 826 (20 August 1515, Henry to Francis), 827 (calendared 20 August 1515, instructions to Richard Wingfield), 828 (calendared 20 August 1515); LPIII, 141: addendum 1929 (calendared August-October 1515, [Wolsey] to Richard Wingfield); S. Alexander (ed.), The History of Italy by Francesco Guicciardini, p.287. Henry VIII had already, in late
Indeed, perceiving that a change in foreign policy had occurred, Robert Wingfield opined to Henry, on 22 August, that there would only be universal peace in Christendom ‘if the crown of France be once set on your head’.  

In terms of the papal position, Henry VIII and his advisors would have been further buoyed by news that the pope had finally joined the anti-French coalition and was moving troops in its support. It would also have been interpreted positively when de Giglis’ missive to Wolsey, dated 21 August, arrived in England, claiming that the pope was too busy to write, on account of his being ‘occupied by the impending war’. News of Henry VIII’s commitment to the league in defence of Italy (and, consequently, to attack France) reached Rome, on the other hand, by 3 September. Despite the ominous military situation (as will be seen below), the pope was pleased that he had gained England as an ally and returned a signed draft of the treaty for Henry to countersign. De Giglis dutifully delayed his reply to Wolsey until his promotion to the Sacred College had occurred in consistory. At the same time, the pontiff pushed for the payment of a crusading tax, half a clerical tenth, that Henry had agreed could be levied from the English clergy and de Giglis seems to have taken this opportunity to lobby for Henry’s honorary title, in connection with his joining this league to protect the Church and to reflect this commitment. Wolsey thanked de...
Giglis for his work towards his promotion on 10 September, as a result of which, ‘the King will be ready to expose his person and goods to support the honour and safety of the Holy See’. The cardinal also notified the orator that Henry had signed the treaty (presumably to defend the pope) and, therefore, was deserving of an honorary title, which he hoped for by the next post.110

While Henry and Wolsey probably congratulated themselves on an astute piece of diplomacy, whereby they had successfully sold their service to the papacy in return for a red hat, their commitment to defend Leo X and Italy had come too late, as the French military advance into Italy was rapid and decisive.111 While initial intelligence reaching England on this subject was mixed, a truer picture seems to have gradually filtered through from the likes of Thomas Spinelly and Robert Wingfield.112 By mid-September, confirmation of French progress by Francis’ mother (Louise of Savoy), then in temporary charge of France, was received badly in England, ‘owing to
the natural feeling existing between the two nations’. The pope, for his part, panicked at the French advances and, at one stage, even considered flight to Spanish-controlled Naples. The implications of France’s potential ascendancy in Italy, particularly in terms of a French-controlled papacy and its consequent effect on English interests relating to Rome, would surely have been appreciated in England on receipt of de Giglis’ correspondence of 18 August and 7 September (around the same time). While the communications conveyed the papacy’s commitment against the French, they were written after news had been received of setbacks in northern Italy. In light of this, the orator conveyed bad news about Wolsey’s desire for a legatine commission and the request for Henry to be awarded an honorary title. In fact, Leo’s refusal to concede the legation was based on his ‘dread of France demanding the same’ (as well as Maximilian requesting this for his own minister, Matthew Lang), although a little light was offered by virtue that the refusal was temporary. The title, it was stated, was declined after considerable discussion of various possibilities, although there was no indication that a suitable alternative would be sought. While the context of the letters suggests that Leo X’s intransigence was based on his disappointment that a crusading subsidy, previously agreed by Wolsey, was now in doubt, particularly as the legatine commission was offered if Henry committed himself to go on crusade, it can only be speculated that the English crown suspected the papacy may have made these decisions with one eye on the rapid military

114 Leo’s reaction to these and further reverses seem to have been knee-jerk. One minute he was insisting that the anti-French forces should not give in, the next he was considering sending a secret mission to Francis to open negotiations. In addition, Pastor considers that the anti-French league was not assisted by the failure of papal (and Florentine) troops to advance north of the Po and that, in any case, by September, it was clear that they would not contribute actively. To reassure the pope in the wake of Colonna’s capture, Ferdinand of Aragon, among other things, encouraged Leo to engage Henry VII’s active support; *Sp.ii*, 217 (14 September 1515, Ferdinand to his ambassador in Rome), 221 (calendared September 1515, Ferdinand to his ambassador in Rome); L. Pastor, *History of the Popes*, vii, pp.114-118.
advances of Francis I. Certainly, Leo’s motive for rejecting Wolsey’s legatine commission suggests this. A further worrying prospect for England, vis-à-vis papal intentions against France, was the pope’s continued desire to aid the Hungarians against the Turks, albeit mentioned in the same breath as the English crusading levy. As far as Henry VIII was concerned, however, was Leo keeping a strategy to force peace up his sleeve, just in case Francis made too much progress? This did not matter, however, as Francis I’s Italian enterprise soon culminated in a decisive victory against Swiss and Milanese forces at Marignano, 13-14 September 1515, the net result of which was the collapse of the anti-French league and the return of Milan to French control. This was a watershed moment that marked the failure of the English crown’s strategy to ‘defend’ the papacy from French influence.

Post-Marignano, a swift but unsuccessful English reaction to defend the papacy from French dominance: September 1515 – April 1516

The implications for the the papacy following the Battle of Marignano were grave and the resulting threat to the Papal States and Medicean Florence caused a reversal in foreign policy. After initially panicking at news of the defeat on 17 September 1515, Leo X’s reaction was more tempered a few days later, when he told

115 Concerning Wolsey’s desire to become a legate a latere, he may have claimed, as a motive for doing this, that he wished to conduct visitations of the exempt monasteries in England. According to de Giglis, this aspect was not refused by the pope and Wolsey may have more chance of gaining a specific commission to undertake this. Among these rejections, there was one small grant apparently made to England around this point; the pope awarded Wolsey the titular church of St. Cecilia from which, he asserted, many popes had derived. In the light of the other refusals, however, this was but a small benefit to the English crown, LPIII, 966 (calendared end September 1515), [de Giglis to Wolsey]), 967 (calendared end September 1515, [de Giglis to Ammonius]), 968 (calendared end September 1515, Ammonius to Wolsey).

116 Papal and Florentine troops were not active against the French by this time; R.J. Knecht, Francis I, pp.41-47; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.118-120. The gravity of this defeat ought not to be understated; the Swiss, almost universally considered to be an invincible military force, had been comprehensively defeated. Erasmus wrote a cynical response to the surprise of the Swiss at their defeat, that they were ‘in a boiling rage against the French, because they did not civilly allow themselves to be thrashed as they were by the English,’ rather the French ‘dispersed them with their artillery’; LPIII, 985 (2 October 1515, Erasmus to Ammonius, Basle).
a Venetian audience that ‘we will throw ourselves into the arms of the Most Christian
King, and beg his mercy’. This was probably the most pragmatic approach for the
papacy and really his only option, as he was mostly devoid of allies who could act
following the defeat, the Swiss retreating across the Alps and the Spanish expected to
withdraw back to Naples. If he continued to resist, therefore, Leo X would risk his
temporal power (both of the Church and of Florence), not to mention his position as
pontiff. The pope entered into immediate negotiations towards a rapprochement
with France, which he agreed on 13 October. This was to be sealed by a meeting
with Francis I at Bologna during December.

For the English crown, Marignano signified its failure to ‘defend’ the papacy
from French influence; by holding out for Wolsey’s cardinalatial dignity before
committing to its protection had proved costly, as Leo X now had to submit to French
terms, in the short-term at least. For England’s political relations with Rome, this
was the worst-case scenario and Henry VIII’s reaction would be critical. It did not
take long for news of the Battle of Marignano to reach England, but the problem, once
more, was the variability of the intelligence received. Arriving perhaps from 25
September onwards, just as English ministers were returning to London for the new
legal term, initial reports were contradictory, suggesting both a major victory and
defeat for France. This lack of confirmation is further demonstrated by Henry’s

117 Leo initially heard that the Swiss had won, then that the loss had not been decisive, before the true
result reached him. He particularly feared a follow-up attack by the French on Florence and the Papal
States, and was urged to negotiate with Francis, particularly by the Florentines in his entourage; L.
Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.120-125. Also see R.J. Knecht, Francis I, p.48.
118 Sp.ii, 219 (20 September 1515), 223 (39 September 1515, Leo to Francis); M. Creighton, History of
the Papacy, v, p.245; R.J. Knecht, Francis I, p.48; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.122-127.
119 Francis’ entry to the papacy’s second most important city occurred on 11 December; Ven.ii, 666 (10
December 1515, Venetian ambassador at the papal Court to the Signory, Bologna); R.J. Knecht,
Francis I, pp.48-50.
120 Sir Robert Wingfield described the fallout of Marignano as ‘a great crisis for all Christendom’;
LPIII, 1006 (9 October 1515, Robert Wingfield to [Henry], [Innsbruck]).
121 For mixed intelligence from English diplomats, see ibid., 944 (calendared 23-24 September 1515,
[Spinelly to Henry]), 953 (29 September 1515, Richard Wingfield to Wolsey, Calais), 958 (29
failure to mention it in his letter to the pope on 30 September 1515. In spite of this lack of (reliable) intelligence, the English king may have requested in strong terms that Francis desist from attacking the pope, perhaps in early to mid-October. Indeed, it may have been only on 27 October 1515 (a month after initial news of the battle had arrived) that the outcome at Marignano was formally announced to Henry VIII by the French ambassador. Upon reading Francis I’s letter on this, a ‘much vexed’ Henry quibbled with the orator about the number of Swiss allegedly killed during the battle, among other things, accusing the French delegate (and Francis, whose letter to Henry was being read) of exaggeration. It is important to note, however, that while it was clear to the French ambassador that Henry was unhappy with the French progress in Italy, he was still careful, formally speaking, to say that he was pleased for his ‘ally’ when this was raised by the former, although the king reportedly changed the subject to the need for a crusade against the Turks. In this

September 1515, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels). For a lack of recognition of the gravity of the result, even in early October, see ibid., 981 (2 October 1515, Spinelly to [Wolsey]), 982 (2 October 1515, Robert Wingfield to [Wolsey], Innsbruck). Nevertheless, Wolsey alluded to some kind of French reverse during his audience with the Venetian orators on 25 September. During the following few weeks, however, the same ambassadors implied a lack of knowledge about Marignano among English ministers who, as they were returning to Court (after the summer recess), enquired about the French victory, but were yet to discover whether any strategic advantage would be accrued by either side; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.129-133 (Ven.ii, 651; LPIII, 948; 26 September 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory, London), 133-137 (Ven.ii, 653; LPIII, 1017; 11 October 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory, London); Ven.ii, 652 (27 September 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory, London).

He merely thanked Leo for elevating Wolsey to the College of Cardinals The underlying assumption here is that no other letters from the king accompanied this one; LPIII, 960 (30 September 1515, Henry to Leo, Windsor). Neither was there any mention of the letters from de Giglis in Rome, nor Ammonius’ summary of them, that were sent in the same month; ibid., 966 (calendared end September 1515, [de Giglis to Wolsey]), 967 (calendared end September 1515, [de Giglis to Ammonius]), 968 (calendared end September 1515, Ammonius to Wolsey). The English uncertainty about Marignano is further suggested by Henry VIII’s lack of urgency; he only returned to Greenwich (from his summer progress) on 15 October. Furthermore, at a subsequent audience given to the Venetian ambassadors, he still seems to have been uncertain of the true result of the battle; Ven.ii, 655 (16 October 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory, London).

Wolsey and the French ambassador apparently discussed Francis’ reply to this on 5 November, which the latter had apparently interpreted as an ultimatum which, if not adhered to, would result in a declaration of war by Henry VIII; LPIII, 1113 (6 November 1515, de Bapaume to Queen Louise, London).

In other words, Henry posited ‘universal peace’ as a means to cease French advances. This could perhaps be seen as a precursor to the strategy that he and Wolsey would adopt in 1518; ibid., 1113 (6 November 1515, de Bapaume to Queen Louise, London). For confirmation of the nature of this
meeting, Henry also registered concern for the papacy, particularly the implications for papal security (if Francis intended to march through Church territory on his way to Naples) and Leo X’s continued commitment to the anti-French league. Concerning the former, Henry enquired whether his French counterpart now intended an assault on Naples, which suggestion the ambassador refuted. Henry also enquired whether any Franco-papal arrangement had been concluded; the orator replied positively, but was contradicted by the king. One can observe at this point, therefore, a king apparently embittered by the news of this Swiss defeat in Italy and the danger in which this placed the papacy.

From this point, Henry VIII sought to react swiftly and robustly to Marignano. As the Spaniard de Mesa opined on 5 November, after speaking with him, ‘the exchange and further suggestion that England was still uncertain about the implications of Marignano, see; R. Brown (trans.), *Four Years*, i, pp.137-142 (*Ven.ii*, 659; *LPIii*, 1086; 29 October 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory, London), 143 (*Ven.ii*, 664; *LPIii*, 1154; 14 November 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory, London). The bad feeling in England would have been exacerbated by the continued receipt of news indicating that the French were prevailing in Italy, culminating in early November with de Giglis’ report that Milan and its duke had fallen; *LPIii*, 1097 (calendared end October 1515, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels); *Sp.ii*, 239 (5 November 1515, de Mesa to Ferdinand, London); *Ven.ii*, 657 (26 October 1515, Signory to Badoer and Giustinian). At the same time, there was reason for the English crown to remain positive, as intelligence was simultaneously received about French set-backs in the peninsula; *LPIii*, 1067 (25 October 1515, Pace to [Wolsey], Antwerp), 1096 (calendared end October 1515, Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels).

125 *LPIii*, 1113 (6 November 1515, de Bapaume to Queen Louise, London). Doubts about this would have lingered in England and these would have been fuelled by Robert Wingfield’s despatch, on 7 December, conveying the emperor’s belief that Naples was Francis’ next target; *ibid.*, 1253 (7 December 1515, Robert Wingfield to [Henry], ‘Fiesyn’). Also see *ibid.*, 1352 (28 December 1515, [Cardinal Schiner] to -, ‘Ravenspurc’).

126 *Ibid.*, 1113 (6 November 1515, de Bapaume to Queen Louise, London); *Ven.ii*, 652 (27 September 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory, London). Spinelly predicted that such negotiations were imminent in late September. Indeed, Giustinian cited members of the king’s ‘inner circle’, (on or before 11 October) telling him that they had, as yet, unconfirmed reports of an arrangement, but did not seem to believe it; *ibid.*, 958 (29 September 1515, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels); R. Brown (trans.), *Four Years*, i, pp.133-137 (*Ven.ii*, 653; *LPIii*, 1017; 11 October 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory, London).

127 This fear of French control of the papacy was sometimes couched in more general terms of Francis’ ambition to become ‘monarch of the world’ (or something similar). For instance, Margaret of Savoy voiced to Spinelly in December 1515 a common fear of French ambitions generally, that was shared in England; that Francis hoped to ‘obtain the monarchy of Christendom’. In this context, the archduchess envisaged it to be a potential consequence, post-Marignano, in the event of Ferdinand or Maximilian dying; *LPIii*, 1339 (calendared 24-25 December 1515, [Spinelly to Wolsey]).
English are very desirous to do some injury, whatever it may be, to the French’. 128

Thus, Henry swiftly resolved on an aggressive foreign policy to act on his earlier commitment to ‘defend’ the pope. One tangible response, perhaps during mid- to late October, seems to have been a sharply worded demand that Francis cease his attack on the papacy. This may have been a knee-jerk reaction to confirmation of the defeat at Marignano, possibly not sanctioned by Wolsey or Fox, as Francis reportedly interpreted this as an ultimatum that, if not observed, would result in Henry’s attacking him, which Wolsey subsequently denied. 129 In spite of this refutation, plans were afoot to carry out this threat. Firstly, Wolsey’s secretary, Richard Pace, was despatched to Germany and the Swiss Confederation, to facilitate an expedition to Italy that would defend Milan, expel the French and produce an assault on France itself. 130 While the emperor and the Swiss were Pace’s priority, it will be seen later

128 Sp.ii, 239 (5 November 1515, de Mesa to Ferdinand, London). The English also received news hinting at French vulnerability. In late November, for instance, report came from Charles Somerset that the French had suffered a catastrophic defeat at Bologna, with suggestions that Francis had been killed or taken prisoner; LPIII, 1197 (25 November 1515, Charles Somerset to [Wolsey], Tournai). For similar intelligence reaching England that suggested Franco-Venetian reverses, see ibid., 1135 (12 November 1515, Pace to Wolsey, Innsbruck), 1164 (16 November 1515, Margaret of Savoy to the Spanish ambassador), 1198 (26 November 1515, Robert Wingfield to Henry, ‘Memmingen’), 1215 (29 November 1515, Robert Wingfield to Henry), 1227 (calendared end November 1515, - to Wolsey), 1249 (5 December 1515, Robert Wingfield to [Henry], ‘Fiesyn in Swayne’), 1253 (7 December 1515, Robert Wingfield to [Henry], ‘Fiesyn’), 1339 (calendared 24-25 December 1515, [Spinelly to Wolsey]); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.142-148 (Ven.ii, 664; LPIII, 1154; 15 November 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory, London). Once more, however, contradictory reports were also received by the English crown; Ven.ii, 670 (28 December 1515, Signory to Giustinian). Indeed, around this time, Henry and his ‘inner circle’ may not have been entirely confident in their news sources and, as Giustinian pointed out on 6 December, early news from Venice was appreciated by the England, particularly as that gained via Germany often turned out to be untrue; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, p.145 (Ven.ii, 665; LPIII, 1250; 6 December 1515, Giustinian to the Signory, London).

129 The ultimatum resulted in some ministerial backpedalling; in his audience with the French orator on 5 November, accompanied by Fox and Ruthal, Wolsey commented on the strangeness of Francis’ ‘misinterpretation’ of the king’s request, that was merely intended as a request for him not to make war on Leo X. De Baupame responded that ‘the King’s words were gracious enough if not misinterpreted, and that Henry had written much more rudely’; in other words, it seems, the English monarch’s tone was deemed aggressive; LPIII, 1113 (6 November 1515, de Bapaume to Queen Louise, London).

130 Pace was sent post haste to Italy in late October, to ensure that the league continued to resist France, particularly the Swiss (20,000 of whom he was to hire en route, in combination with Maximilian. This appears to have been a direct response to the arrival of the duke of Milan’s secretary, Michael de Abbatis (or Abbate), who arrived in England earlier in October. He encouraged England to ally with the Swiss and urged Henry to realise his claim to the French throne. Shortly after meeting with Sforza’s secretary (while en route to England), William Knight, resident in Brussels, urged Wolsey to seize the opportunity to attack the ‘ancient enemy’, by leaguing with the Swiss. Subsequently, Wolsey envisaged
that papal support was also sought. 131 Secondly, Henry VIII sought to consolidate the anti-French powers on two levels; generally, through the existing coalition that he had agreed to join following Wolsey’s gaining the red hat, or, if this league had failed, the formation of a new one; and, more specifically, through specific English alliances with individual powers directed against France. 132 At the same time, the English

131 See below for instance pp. 516-520.
132 While Henry VIII had already agreed with the pope to join the 1515 league against France, its status would have been called into question following Marignano. Thus, Henry VIII concluded a treaty of peace and defensive alliance with Spain on 19 October 1515. The timing coincides with news of the French victory reaching England and Catherine of Aragon even suggested it might have been a knee-jerk reaction; she wrote, ‘the time for concluding a treaty between Spain and England could not have been worse chosen. There is no people in the world more influenced by the good or bad fortunes of their enemies than the English. A small success of their enemies prostrates them, and a little adversity of their antagonists makes them overbearing’. Central to Anglo-Spanish negotiations, however, was the English doubt of Ferdinand’s commitment, which had proved lacking on several previous occasions. It was, Henry claimed ‘the very pith of the whole question’; Sp.ii, 228 (LPIII, 1022; 12 October 1515), 229-230 (LPIII, 1046; 19 October 1515), 234-237 (LPIII, 1076; 27 October 1515), 238 (31 October 1515, Catherine to Ferdinand, Greenwich), 239 (5 November 1515, de Mesa to Ferdinand, London), 241 (LPIII, 1268; 11 December 1515), 243 (calendared December 1515); LPIII, 987 (3 October 1515), 1072 (26 October 1515), 1356 (30 December 1515, Ferdinand to Henry, ‘Xarasuel’. Similarly, on 29 October, Henry also concluded a treaty for mutual defence with Maximilian and his grandson, Charles of Castile. This envisaged the pope as the head of the league and provided for the entry of other parties including, specifically, the Swiss. Furthermore, by mid-December, Maximilian had commissioned his daughter, Margaret, to negotiate a treaty with England and Spain, ostensibly against France, that would ultimately launch a crusade against the Turks (on the 8th) and to conclude an alliance with England to defend Brescia and Verona (on the 14th), again from Francis I; LPIII, 987 (3 October 1515), 1087 (29 October 1515), 1097 (calendared end October 1515, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 1261 (8 December 1515).
While it is clear that some sort of broad league against France was actively sought by Henry VIII (as well as Maximilian at least, variously to include themselves, the papacy, Burgundy-Spain, the Swiss and Francesco Maria Sforza), the actual process and progress of negotiations towards this and the reasons why they bore no fruit (particularly when it was more usual for such alliances to precede military action) remain unclear. From the sources consulted, it seems that, around 23 December, the English crown recognised that the existing league formed in 1515 against France was untenable and so lobbied its potential allies towards a new agreement. Despite initially enthusiastic responses from Maximilian (on behalf of himself and Charles of Burgundy) in late January 1516, nothing materialised before the Imperial-Swiss expedition was launched; LPII, 1263 (9 December 1515, Maximilian to Margarete), 1285 (14 December 1515, Maximilian to Margarete, ‘Imbst’), 1388 (6 January 1516, Spinelli to Henry, Mechelin), 1393 (9 January 1516, Spinelli to Henry, Brussels), 1395 (9 January 1516, Brussels), 1396 (10 January 1516, Brussels), 1399 (12 January 1516, Robert Wingfield to [Henry], ‘Aws[burgh]’), 1412 (18 January 1516, [Melchior Langus] to Wolsey, ‘Ex Duvarrio’), 1419 (21 January 1516, Melchior Langus to Wolsey, Brussels), 1466 (31 January 1516, [Pace] to [Wolsey], Constance), 1572 (20 February 1516), 1574 (21 February 1516), 1721 (1 April 1516, [Pace] to [Wolsey], ‘[Lodi?]’), 1838 (calendared 30 April 1516, [Henry] to Poyning and [Tunstal]); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.168-171 (Ven.ii, 682; LPII, 1495; 6 February 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London).

While English negotiations with Charles of Burgundy had been largely conducted under the auspices of the latter’s grandfather, Maximilian, this was to change following the latter’s de facto inheritance of Spain on Ferdinand’s death on 23 January. On the 24th, a treaty was concluded concerning amity and trade, which was reportedly proclaimed in England as a ‘perpetual peace’ on 18 February. However, by virtue of Ferdinand’s death, a further or renegotiated agreement was finalised on 19 April. Part of the original agreement with Ferdinand seems to have been a financial contribution towards the hiring of the Swiss, which Charles was reportedly prepared to meet; LPII, 1427-1428 (Sp.ii, 244; 21 January 1516), 1458 (29 January 1516, Tunstal to Wolsey, Brussels), 1538 (14 February 1516), 1574 (21 February 1516), 1581 (23 February 1516, Spinelli to Wolsey), 1597 (27 February 1516), 1645 (9 March 1516), 1599 (calendared February 1516, Spinelli to [Henry]), 1665 (13 March 1516, Spinelli to [Henry], Brussels), 1666 (13 March 1516, Spinelli to [Wolsey], Brussels), 1668 (14 March 1516 Poyning and Tunstal to [Henry], Brussels), 1679 (17 March 1516 Spinelli to Wolsey, Brussels), 1689 (20 March 1516, John Pecche to Wolsey, Calais), 1697 (23 March 1516, Spinelli to [Wolsey], Brussels), 1706 (25 March 1516, Poyning and Tunstal to Henry, Brussels), 1711 (27 March 1516, Spinelli to Henry, Mechelin), 1712 (27 March 1516, Spinelli to Wolsey, Mechelin), 1755 (10 April 1516, Poyning and Tunstal to Wolsey, Brussels), 1764 (14 April 1516, Poyning and Tunstal to [Henry], Brussels), 1766 (14 April 1516, Spinelli to Wolsey, Brussels), 1772 (16 April 1517), 1782 (18 April 1516, Spinelli to Henry, Brussels), 1784 (19 April 1516), 1818 (23 April 1516); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.179-180 (Ven.ii, 688; LPII, 1558; 18 February 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 189-192 (Ven.ii, 698; LPII, 1646; 10 March 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London); Sp.ii, 245 (calendared February 1516). At the same time, Charles received overtures from Francis and this was deemed ominous in England, not least because Charles’ principal advisors were generally viewed as pro-French. The French king also threatened his neighbour implicitly through the duke of Guelders, the perennial thorn in the side of Burgundy, and the apparent movement of German mercenaries towards the region He also leaned on Charles through his claim to the latter’s kingdom of Naples and by supporting a rival claimant to the realm of Navarre. For French peace overtures towards Charles, see LPII, 1447 (28 January 1516, Robert Wingfield to [Wolsey], Augsburg), 1479 (4 February 1516, Spinelli to [Wolsey], Brussels), 1581 (23 February 1516, Spinelli to Wolsey). For the threat of Guelders, see ibid., 1496 (7 February 1516, Spinelli to Wolsey, Brussels), 1516 (calendared 10 February 1516, Spinelli to Henry), 1541 (14 February 1516, Spinelli to Henry, Brussels), 1599 (calendared February 1516, Spinelli to [Henry]), 1600 (27 February 1516, Spinelli to Henry, Brussels), 1666 (13 March 1516, Spinelli to [Wolsey], Brussels), 1678 (17 March 1516, Spinelli to Wolsey, Brussels), 1706 (25 March 1516, Poyning and Tunstal to Henry, Brussels), 1727 (2 April 1516, Spinelli to Henry, Brussels), 1743 (7 April 1516, Spinelli to Henry, Brussels), 1755 (10 April 1516, Poyning and Tunstal to Wolsey, Brussels), 1764 (14 April 1516, Poyning and Tunstal to [Henry], Brussels), 1765 (14 April 1516, Spinelli to [Henry], Brussels), 1782 (18 April 1516, Spinelli to Henry, Brussels), 1822 (24 April 1516, Spinelli to [Henry], Brussels); Sp.ii, 246 (8 March 1516, Bishop of Badajoz to Cardinal de Cisneros, Brussels). For Francis’ threat to Naples and Navarre, see
issued veiled threats to Francis, probably hoping to affect French operations in Italy.

Wolsey, on his return to London on 25 September 1515, suggested to Giustinian that Henry was so angry with Francis, reportedly concerning the return of the duke of Albany to Scotland, that he was prepared to breach the Anglo-French treaty and invade France within eight days. The Venetian also reported that many around the king were putting pressure on him to do so.133 Nevertheless at this stage, the English

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133 This audience occurred perhaps shortly before the English received news that Marignano was a significant defeat; R. Brown (trans.), *Four Years*, i, p.131 (*Ven.ii*, 651; *LPIII*, 948; 26 September 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory, London). Concerning English 'secrecy' about their true anti-French intentions, even in his tense audience with the French ambassador on 26 October 1515 when he was formally notified of the French victory at Marignano, Henry still presented a veneer of friendship, stating that he was glad to hear of this result; *LPIII*, 1113 (6 November 1515, de Bapaume to Queen Louise, London). Similarly, there were various denials (from the king and his ministers) that there was any foundation to rumours of English naval preparations, that the recent Anglo-Spanish agreement was a threat to France, or that substantial sums were being transferred to Germany to finance anti-French resistance in Italy. On 2 January 1516, Wolsey even swore on the dignity of his cardinalate that the crown had any intention of attacking France. Underlying these rejections, however, the English crown was clearly sabre-rattling; notably, Suffolk did not deny that naval preparations were occurring, rather that Henry, who favoured peace, intended them to placate his belligerent subjects. Wolsey offered a different reason; that they were to please the queen and Henry's sister Mary. One suspects that the lack of a 'party line' was deliberate, intended to sow seeds of doubt in France. If this was intended, it worked, as the French ambassador was convinced that, if things had gone awry for Francis in Italy, then Henry would have invaded France; *ibid.*, 1113 (6 November 1515, de Bapaume to Queen Louise, London); *Sp.ii*, 239 (5 November 1515, de Mesa to Ferdinand, London); R. Brown (trans.), *Four Years*, i, pp.144-148 (*Ven.ii*, 665; *LPIII*, 1250; 6 December 1515, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 148-151 (*Ven.ii*, 667; *LPIII*, 1294; 17 December 1515, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 152-153 (*Ven.ii*, 668; *LPIII*, 1308; 20 December 1515, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 153-155 (*Ven.ii*, 669; *LPIII*, 1336; 24 December 1515, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 155-157 (*Ven.ii*, 671; *LPIII*, 1380; 2 January 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London).


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496
crown was careful not to break formally with France. Indeed, the targets of the offensive, the French and Venetians, while fully aware of the English contribution, were faced with vehement denials from Henry and his advisors. While the root of

April 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London; LPIII, 1598 (27 February 1516, Dacre’s correspondence), 1671 (15 March 1516, Dacre and Magnus to Henry, Morpeth Castle) 1672 (calendared 15 March 1516, complaints against the duke of Albany), 1681 (18 March 1516, Francis to Henry, Lyons), 1710 (27 March 1516), 1720 (1 April 1516, [Dacre] to Albany, Morpeth), 1734 (4 April 1516, Albany to Henry, Edinburgh), 1757 (11 April 1516, Anthony Ughtred to Wolsey, Berwick), 1759 (12 April 1516, Dacre to Henry, Durham), 1779 (18 April 1516, Albany to Dacre, Edinburgh), 1797 (21 April 1516, Dacre to Albany, Whittingham), 1837 (calendared end April 1516, Mountjoy to [Henry], Tournai); Ven.ii, 703 (18 March 1516, Signory to Giustinian), 704 (18 March 1516, Signory to its ambassador in France), 706 (30 March 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 711 (12 April 1516), 713 (8, 9 April 1516, Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory, Lyons), 716 (16 April 1516, Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory, Lyons).

Finally, he had to contend with Francis I’s ongoing sabre-rattling, both in Scotland, and around England’s continental possessions; LPIII, 1434 (25 January 1516, Knight and Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 1478 (4 February 1516, Knight to Wolsey, Brussels), 1479 (4 February 1516, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels), 1496 (7 February 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 1498 (7 February 1516, Richard Jerningham to Wolsey, Tournai), 1509 (9 February 1516, Mountjoy to Henry, Tournai), 1516 (calendared 10 February 1516, Spinelly to Henry), 1541 (14 February 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 1554, 1599 (calendared February 1516, Spinelly to [Henry]), 1621 (5 March 1516, Mountjoy to [Henry], Tournai), 1622 (5 March 1516, Mountjoy to Wolsey, Tournai), 1655 (12 March 1516, Richard Wingfield to Wolsey, Calais), 1664 (13 March 1516, Richard Whetetheyll to Wolsey), 1665 (13 March 1516, Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels), 1669 (14 March 1516, de Boissy and de Bonnivet to the French ambassador in Rome, Lyons), 1678 (17 March 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 1766 (14 April 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 1780 (18 April 1516, Jerningham to [Wolsey], Tournai), 1835 (30 April 1516, news from France). Concerning French threats to act via Scotland; ibid., 1478 (4 February 1516, Knight to Wolsey, Brussels), 1496 (7 February 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 1498 (7 February 1516, Richard Jerningham to Wolsey, Tournai), 1509 (9 February 1516, Mountjoy to Henry, Tournai), 1665 (13 March 1516, Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels), 1837 (calendared end April 1516, Mountjoy to [Henry], Tournai). De la Pole was thought to be involved in these threats and, consequently, was spied upon by English sources; ibid., 1516 (calendared 10 February 1516, Spinelly to Henry), 1665 (13 March 1516, Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels), 1783 (18 April 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 1822 (24 April 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels).

Giustinian, in particular, reported from his audiences with the likes of Henry, Wolsey, Ruthal and Norfolk, on the one hand that they were rhetorically hostile towards France and supportive of Imperial and Swiss plans to descend into Italy but, on the other, that they repeatedly denied that England was funding either of the anti-French parties. Richard Fox may have let the cat out of the bag by admitting that his French counterpart in England was scared to challenge Henry or his ministers on their denials, in case that this would prompt immediate hostilities against France; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i (1854), pp.160-164 (Ven.ii, 673; LPIII, 1386; 5 January 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 164-168 (Ven.ii, 678; LPIII, 1421; 21 January 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 171-176 (Ven.ii, 683; LPIII, 1500; 7 February 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London); Ven.ii, 706 (30 March 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 722 (29 April 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 724 (29 April 1516, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in France). In a bid to circumvent any French suspicions of English actions, Pace was at one point instructed to proclaim that he was not commissioned by the king, rather he was working as Wolsey’s representative; LPIII, 1469 (calendared end January 1516, instructions [of Pace] to -). Realistically speaking, however, there was no way the transfer of large sums of money could be kept secret, given the necessary involvement of third parties. William Knight and Thomas Spinelly separately revealed to Wolsey their hearing such rumours circulating the Low Countries during early January 1516, the former apparently not having had prior
the English response, the Pace embassy, faced teething problems in its mission, it ultimately succeeded, recruiting the emperor and a number of the Swiss Cantons against France, and facilitating their subsequent descent into Italy during March and April 1516 (in spite of the death of Ferdinand of Aragon). Initially, they aimed to expel the French from Italy and follow this up with an invasion of France itself.\(^{135}\)

warning of the king’s intentions to hire the Swiss via Pace; *ibid.*, 1384 (5 January 1516, Knight to Wolsey, Mechelin), 1394 (9 January 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels). For the belief in France and Venice that such rumours were true, see for example, *Ven.ii*, 674 (14 January 1516, Signory to Giustinian), 692 (5 March 1516), 696 (8 March 1516, Signory to its ambassador in France), 697 (8 March 1516, Signory to its ambassador at the Curia), 702 (17 March 1516), 703 (18 March 1516, Signory to Giustinian), 716 (16 April 1516, Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory, Lyons), 723 (29 April 1516, Signory to Giustinian), 724 (29 April 1516, Signory to its ambassador in France); *LPIII*, 1669 (14 March 1516, de Boissy and de Bonniyet to the French ambassador in Rome, Lyons). From these, one can subsequently detect an element of sarcasm in Francis I’s 20 April notification to his representative in England of his troops’ recent forcing of the Swiss back across the Alps, when he speculates that Henry VIII ‘will rejoice at his success’ when shown the letter; *ibid.*, 1793 (20 April 1516, Francis to his ambassadors in England, Colombier).

\(^{135}\) Pace was confident by the end of January that he could engage the services of at least some of the Swiss for the expedition. Similarly, a commitment seems to have been gained from the emperor by 4 February, as a result of which, Pace speculated, ‘the Swyce…[fly] to him like bees’. The English diplomats involved in the negotiations, and their Imperial counterparts (and others), were increasingly confident of the expedition’s success during February and, indeed, recruitment was underway by the middle of the month among the Swiss. The contingent (accompanied by Pace) entered Italy in early March, followed separately by Maximilian; *LPIII*, 1377 (1 January 1516, Robert Wingfield to Wolsey), 1385 (5 January 1516, - to [Wolsey], Constance), 1392 (8 January 1516, Robert Wingfield to Henry), 1398 (10 January 1516, Robert Wingfield to [Wolsey]), 1399 (12 January 1516, Robert Wingfield to [Henry], ‘Aws[burgh]’), 1404 (15 January 1516, Robert Wingfield to Wolsey, Augsburg), 1413 (18 January 1516, Robert Wingfield to Wolsey, Augsburg), 1415 (18 January 1516, de Castello to [Wolsey], Florence), 1446 (28 January 1516, Henry to Maximilian, Greenwich), 1447 (28 January 1516, Robert Wingfield to [Wolsey], Augsburg), 1466 (31 January 1516, [Pace] to [Wolsey], Constance), 1470 (1 February 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Constance), 1479 (4 February 1516, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels), 1480 (4 February 1516, [Pace] to [Wolsey]), 1489 (5 February 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Constance), 1520 (11 February 1516, Galeazzo Visconti to Henry, Zurich), 1521 (calendared 11 February 1516, Galeazzo Visconti to [Henry]), 1522 (11 February 1516, Galeazzo Visconti to Wolsey, [Zurich]), 1542 (14 February 1516, [Maximilian] to [Pace], ‘Ex Potnoy’), 1559 (18 February 1516, [Cardinal Schiner] to Wolsey, ‘Ex Valle Montis’), 1560 (19 February 1516, Cardinal Schiner to [Wolsey], ‘Sandezc’), 1564 (20 February 1516, Pace to Wolsey, ‘Coir’), 1565 (20 February 1516, Pace to Burbank, ‘Coire’), 1567 (calendared 20 February 1516, [Pace] to [Wolsey], ‘ex civitate Curiciensi’), 1566 (20 February 1516, Pace to Burbank, ‘Coire’), 1567 (calendared 20 February 1516, [Pace] to [Burbank]), 1576 (22 February 1516, Sampson to [Wolsey], Tournai), 1592 (26 February 1516, Robert Wingfield to [Henry], ‘Village of Crawne in Malsherhaate’), 1593 (26 February 1516, Pace to Wolsey, ‘Founce’), 1594 (calendared 26 February 1516, [Wolsey] to [Pace], ‘Founce’), 1599 (calendared February 1516, Spinelly to [Henry]), 1603 (29 February 1516, Maximilian to Wolsey, ‘In oppido nostro Marran’), 1609 (calendared end February 1516, [Pace] to [Henry]), 1613 (2 March 1516, Cardinal Schiner to [Wolsey], Trent), 1614 (calendared 2 March 1516, Maximilian to Henry), 1618 (4 March 1516, Pace to [Wolsey], Trent), 1633 (7 March 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to [Henry]), 1634 (7 March 1516, [Pace to Wolsey], ‘Ex Tridenti’), 1644 (9 March 1516, Robert Wingfield to [Henry]); *LPIII*, 149 – addendum 1929 (calendared before 4 March 1516); J.J. Scarisbrick, *Henry VIII*, p.60; J. Wegg, *Richard Pace: a Tudor Diplomatist* (1932), pp.74-88. For English fears after the death of Ferdinand, that the campaign might be abandoned, see *LPIII*, 1541 (14 February 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 1559 (18 February 1516, [Cardinal Schiner] to Wolsey, ‘Ex Valle Montis’), 1581 (23 February 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey), 1594 (calendared 26 February 1516, [Wolsey] to [Pace], ‘Founce’), 1618 (4 March 1516, Pace to [Wolsey], Trent), 1735 (4 April 1516, 498
While the expedition made initial progress, its failure was instigated on 26 March, when Maximilian, suddenly withdrew from the gates of Milan, abandoning the Swiss and effectively ending the enterprise.\footnote{The Swiss continued the offensive, but monetary issues and the threat of facing the enemy alone combined to cause their return across the Alps in late April. For intelligence received in England as the march progressed (including reports of a lack of opposition and misinformed reports about the fall of Milan, prior to its actual conquest, see \textit{LPI}\textit{ii}, 1678 (17 March 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 1684 (18 March 1516, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels), 1696 (23 March 1516, Maximilian to Henry, Caravaggio), 1697 (23 March 1516, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels), 1698 (23 March 1516, Francis de Taxis to Brian Tuke, Brussels), 1711 (27 March 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Mechelin), 1718 (31 March 1516, Pace to [Robert Wingfield]), 1727 (2 April 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 1728 (2 April 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 1735 (4 April 1516, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels), 1773 (16 April 1516, Spinelly to [Henry]), 1837 (calendared end April 1516, Mountjoy to [Henry], Tournai); \textit{Ven.ii}, 703 (18 March 1516, Giustinian to Signory, London), 706 (30 March 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London); R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, i, pp.192-197 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 699; \textit{LPI}\textit{ii}, 1653; 11 March 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 205-210 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 708; \textit{LPI}\textit{ii}, 1730; 2 April 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 210-214 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 712; \textit{LPI}\textit{ii}, 1763; 14 April 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). For French sources that may have been intercepted and (copies) referred to England, see \textit{LPI}\textit{ii}, 1699 (23 March 1516, Francis de Taxis to Brian Tuke, Milan), 1701-1702.}

Concerning the papacy specifically, the fall-out of the Marignano disaster forced England to address two contradictory policies emanating from the pope. While on the one hand Leo was forced to seek terms with Francis I, on the other he privately tried to allay English fears about these and pledged his continued support for the anti-French agenda, including Henry VIII’s planned aggressive response. The real question was, however, which of these did the English believe to be Leo X’s true intention? With regard to the negotiations that were taking place with France in the immediate aftermath, the pope made various efforts to suggest to the English crown that this was not his real policy. It may well have been for this purpose that he may have written to de Giglis on 1 October, declaring his intention to negotiate and to claim that this would not be to England’s prejudice.\footnote{Given pope wrote in this vein to the Spanish ambassador in Rome on this date, it would be feasible that he did the same with the English orator; \textit{Sp.ii}, 226 (1 October 1515, Leo to the Spanish ambassador in Rome).} Nevertheless, such fears would
probably have been perpetuated, when the English orator sent the ‘heads’ (headings) of the accord (yet to be concluded) on 7 October 1515; their arrival in England, perhaps around the end of the month, would have caused some consternation given that this agreement, if confirmed, would recognise Francis as the principal protector of the Church (and of the Medici) and, if a clause from Francis was to be accepted, it would bind the papacy to defend Francis’ claim to and possession of Milan. Ominously, it also committed both parties to pursue universal peace and crusade, which would inevitably seek to undermine the anti-French cause in the first instance.

If any solace could be found in the terms forwarded to England, it would have focused upon the pope’s insistence upon the territorial integrity of the Papal States and that the treaty not be prejudicial to his allies (as the pope reiterated verbally to de Giglis). The king and his advisors may also have been pleased that, by virtue of his access to these ‘heads’, de Giglis was being kept well-informed by the papacy, thus suggesting that future English support against France was still envisaged by Leo.138 In spite of these ‘positives’, it would probably have angered the king and his cardinal that misinformation by Francis about a (false) domestic threat to Henry had reached the pontiff, presumably in a bid to raise doubt with Leo about the English crown’s ability to support him.139

The pope’s confirmation that he had entered negotiations with Francis (and, implicitly, that these were near conclusion) was relayed to England towards the

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138 LPHi, 994 (7 October 1515, de Giglis to [Wolsey], Viterbo), 1042 (17 October 1515, [de Giglis to Wolsey]). For a copy of Louis XII’s initial proposal to Leo and also of the latter’s response (with amendments) of 30 September, both of which seem to have been relayed to Spain, see Sp.ii, 219 (20 September 1515), 223 (39 September 1515, Leo to Francis). Leo did not agree to the treaty until 13 October and so, it is indicative of the papal desire to reassure England that de Giglis had such in-depth advanced warning; M. Creighton, History of the Papacy, v, p.245; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.126-127. That this treaty was enacted was suggested by Venetian intelligence forwarded to England (on 26 October), suggesting that Parma and Piacenza had been ceded by the pope to Francis; Ven.ii, 657 (20 October 1515, Signory to Badoer and Giustinian).

139 According to de Giglis, on 17 October, Francis had notified a papal nuncio who, in turn, informed the pope that Henry faced a rebellion by his nobles against some fiscal levies. De Giglis rejected this allegation in an attempt to reassure the pontiff; LPHi, 1042 (17 October 1515, [de Giglis to Wolsey]).
beginning of November, with his apologies for the rapidity of this action and his justification that France and its allies were now dominant in Italy and the Papal States were directly threatened. Nevertheless, Leo reportedly claimed, the Church would turn against France once again when the opportunity arose. Confusingly, however, by 6 November, de Giglis speculated that the treaty might come to nothing if Francis did not consent to all of the many changes insisted upon by the pope. Initial reports of the peace reached England by the end of October. In a letter of the 26th, Wolsey rapidly conveyed to the pope his (and Henry’s) displeasure with the hasty peace with France and stressed how much the pope owed him, presumably in terms of English actions against France. Interestingly, Henry VIII maintained a public disbelief of such intelligence up to 4 November at least. Also, there is nothing to suggest that it affected the Pace mission. Leo replied directly to Wolsey on 20 November, acknowledging the cardinal’s ‘increasing devotion’ to papal service and, albeit in an indirect communication, he justified his failure to consult with Henry in advance of the peace. As far as he was concerned, his amity with Francis would only affect the duke of Milan, albeit Sforza had already surrendered. De Giglis confirmed that the

140 Leo claimed that Modena and Reggio were threatened by the duke of Ferrara, Bologna by the Bentivoglio and that the duke of Urbino was seeking independence from Church control. In addition, he asserted that Medicean control of Florence was at risk. As far as the pope’s continued intention to break with France, if the chance arose, the English crown would have been encouraged by a report in this missive of the Viceroy of Naples (the Spanish commander in Italy) being berated by Leo X, presumably for his failure in the recent campaign; ibid., 1105 (calendared 1-4 November 1515, [de Giglis to Ammonius]).

141 He also mentioned the pope making a significant financial contribution to the emperor, presumably to support his continued resistance of France; ibid., 1111 (6 November 1515, [de Giglis to Wolsey]). On 26 October, Wingfield confirmed from Germany that Leo X had objected to some of the articles insisted upon by Francis; ibid., 1070 (26 October 1515, Robert Wingfield to Henry, Innsbruck).

142 The contents of this letter are implied later. It seems to have arrived in Rome in 11 days, although de Giglis was unable to present it to the pope until around 9 November; ibid., 1111 (6 November 1515, [de Giglis to Wolsey]), 1126 (9 November 1515, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 1201 (27 November 1515, de Giglis to [Ammonius]).

143 Despite apparently accepting that the Franco-papal peace was a done deal, the Spanish ambassador in England, who had had audience on 4 November, reported Henry VIII to have disbelieved a letter from Francis (dated 17 October) notifying him of its conclusion; Sp.ii, 239 (5 November 1515, de Mesa to Ferdinand, London).

144 See below pp.516-518.
treaty contained nothing prejudicial to the current peace between England and France. Nevertheless, the political implications were clear; publicly at least, Leo was compelled to observe his new amity with France, while Francis I remained dominant in northern Italy, and this would preclude participation in any planned expedition or league, at the very least.

If the Franco-papal peace alone was not ominous enough for the English crown, Leo X’s commitment to meet Francis at Bologna in December would surely have raised further anxiety; theoretically, it would be feared that the French king could force the pontiff to agree to almost anything. It would have been expected, therefore, that Leo X would be forced into various concessions or commitments. Pace, citing Cardinal Schiner, voiced such a fear on 8 December; that the papacy had never been less able to expel the French from Italy than at that point, without the help of England. Similarly on the 10th, Sir Robert Wingfield conveyed the emperor’s alleged loss of hope that they could act with papal support, now that Leo appeared to favour the French. Henry and Wolsey may have received initial intelligence that such a meeting may take place from around 18 November. Confirmation from de Giglis possibly arrived, in a letter dated the 6th of the same month, whereby he envisaged that Francis intended to gain leverage over the pope concerning the treaty

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145 Leo argued that his allies could not be relied upon and the French were fermenting rebellion among ‘vermin’ within Florence and the Papal States (notably the dukes of Ferrara and Urbino, as well as the Bentivoglio of Bologna). Concerning his allies, Leo understood that the Swiss had been bought by the French (and were now committed to the French cause), that Ferdinand had not acted (and his Viceroy was a coward), and that he could not rely upon Maximilian (who had, in any case, urged him to seek peace); LP III, 1201 (27 November 1515, de Giglis to [Ammonius]). Perhaps around the same time, Leo informed Ferdinand that, while he regretted his amity with Francis I, his actions were caused ‘by fear, and not by friendship’; Sp. ii, 245 (calendared February 1516).

146 LP III, 1258 (8 December 1515, [Pace to Wolsey], Zurich). Ferdinand of Aragon also quickly voiced his opposition to this prospect in October 1515 and sought to prevent it from occurring; Sp. ii, 224 (calendared October 1515, Ferdinand to his ambassador in Germany).

147 Wingfield cited the Imperial chancellor, Matthew Lang, as voicing Maximilian’s opinion; LP III, 1265 (10 December 1515, Robert Wingfield to Wosey, [Fiesyn], in Swave’).

148 Spinelly forwarded copied correspondence he had been given by Margaret of Savoy, dated the 16th, which mentioned this rumour; ibid., 1164 (16 November 1515, Margaret of Savoy to the Spanish ambassador).
between them. In spite of the pontiff being receptive to these overtures, de Giglis reassured his English employers that Leo would never become ‘French’.\footnote{This was probably de Giglis’ first notification of the meeting. Later, on 13 December, he suggested that he had told Ammonius of the meeting for the first time (at Bologna) on the 4th: \textit{ibid.}, 1111 (6 November 1515, [de Giglis to Wolsey]), 1281 (14 December 1515, [de Giglis] to Ammonius, Bologna). Only after this date did the meeting become a topic for diplomatic correspondence sent to England; \textit{ibid.}, 1162 (16 November 1515, Pace to Wolsey, Innsbruck). Also, see subsequent correspondence indicated that the Curia was moving towards Bologna; \textit{ibid.}, 1177 (20 November 1515, Leo to Wolsey, Arezzo), 1201 (27 November 1515, de Giglis to [Ammonius]), 1216 (29 November 1515, de Castello to Wolsey, Florence).} The prospect of the summit would have become more menacing to the English crown on 6 December, when Francis I’s correspondence informing Henry of the summit was delivered. This declared that universal peace and crusade were to be discussed, before the Frenchman returned home to prepare for the latter. To these ends, Francis urged Henry’s adhesion.\footnote{R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, i, p.146 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 665; \textit{LPIi}, 1250; 6 December 1515, Giustinian to the Signory, London). Knight, based in Brussels, also confirmed that the crusade was to be discussed in a letter of 3 December; \textit{LPIi}, 1238 (3 December 1515, [Knight] to Wolsey, Brussels).} While the inclusion of these topics was not revolutionary, Henry and his advisors would have been unhappy about them; it suggested that the mechanism of universal peace might be refocused against English interests and would serve to discourage them from acting against France, certainly in defence of Rome. Of further concern would have been Sir Robert Wingfield’s claim of 5 December that Francis had requested the pope to arrange lodgings at Bologna for 12,000 horse, a considerable force for a meeting between two heads of state officially at peace.\footnote{This was allegedly refused by Leo X, Francis allegedly then demanding that the inhabitants of the city be disarmed or that the summit be moved to Modena. Overall, Wingfield hoped that ‘this loving and bidding betwixt them shall breed to a jeffayle’; \textit{LPIi}, 1249 (5 December 1515, Robert Wingfield to [Henry], ‘Fiesyn in Swave’).}

The English response was tempered albeit revealing. On 13 December, Wolsey told de Giglis that the king, while satisfied with Leo’s intentions for the conference, hoped that the papacy would ‘retain its dignity’. He did, however, fear that Francis I would feel encouraged by Marignano to further destabilise Christendom. Furthermore, at the same time as notifying the pontiff of the intentions of the Pace mission, Wolsey further added that Henry would not oppose any
arrangement made between France and the papacy, on condition that it was ‘satisfactory’ (whatever that meant).\textsuperscript{152} The English crown, therefore, recognised that Leo X had little room for manoeuvre, although it may have been quietly confident in its own plans to resist the French in Italy and that these would gain papal support.\textsuperscript{153} On the other hand, there was clear concern implied by Wolsey that Leo would henceforth be ‘French’. To ensure that the orator could maintain himself sufficiently at the summit and afford couriers, 200\textls{f.} was remitted to de Giglis during December.\textsuperscript{154} It was envisaged, therefore, that he be present and supply more intelligence than usual and, from this, it can be speculated that news of the meeting was eagerly awaited in England, not least to give an indication of the degree of French power now prevailing over the papacy. Reports of the summit soon arrived from the pope himself, in addition to those from the two English curial representatives, alluding to the nature of the discussions, although it seems that, generally speaking, both parties involved kept most of this a secret.\textsuperscript{155} The papal notifications were issued as soon as negotiations effectively ended, on 14 December, and had presumably reached England by the end of the month.\textsuperscript{156} Initially, Leo sought to reassure Henry that Francis had been suitably devout and responsive to papal suggestions that action to confront the Turkish threat was needed, provided that other princes rose above their differences and combined to this end; in other words, he agreed to a general peace and

\textsuperscript{152} Ibid., 1280 (13 December 1515, [Wolsey] to [de Giglis], ‘My house at London’).
\textsuperscript{153} Sir Robert Wingfield, seems to have anticipated this attitude when he asserted on 18 October that, while ‘the Pope through fear has declined a little from the right way’, he would surely not abandon his powerful allies (Maximilian, Ferdinand and the Swiss); ibid., 1043 (18 October 1515, Robert Wingfield to Henry, Innsbruck).
\textsuperscript{154} LPIII, p.1469 (December 1515).
\textsuperscript{155} The summit took place between 11-15 December and saw a number of quite lengthy interviews between pope and king. Concerning the subjects raised, it seems that Leo kept most a secret from even his closest advisors, not even having had the talks or any agreements arising therefrom committed to writing; R.J. Knecht, Francis I, pp.49-50; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.134-142.
\textsuperscript{156} This takes Parks’ quickest average journey time as a guide (albeit he calculates to/from Rome, rather than Bologna); see p.37 n.99.
crusade. In pursuit of this, the pope urged Henry to back this plan. De Giglis wrote his own detailed report on the same date. He reported a conversation the previous evening with the pope who disclosed the subjects covered in his meeting with Francis. Firstly, Leo conceded a red hat to a French candidate, although he claimed to have resisted pressure to award three others. Secondly, they agreed to launch a crusade, in relation to which Francis agreed to an 18 month truce and to contribute money. Thirdly, Francis complained of the Pace mission (and English behaviour generally), to which Leo pledged to act as guarantor. Fourthly, Francis raised Scotland as a reason for Henry VIII’s dissatisfaction with him. In response to all of this, Leo promised to broker a peace. In response to the latter, de Giglis vigorously questioned French intentions, asserting that Francis pursued this course only in order to attack England at a more opportune moment. The pope asserted that he would not permit this and that, if Francis did attack, he would respond against France with ‘both swords’. In spite of the negative signals, the pope’s prompt disclosure to de Giglis and his own writing to Henry and Wolsey betrays a concern to keep England on-side and to retain the crown’s confidence that the papacy was not ‘French’ as a result of the meeting. It is probable that this implication was detected in England, although whether it was believed is another matter. Hadrian de Castello sent his own despatch to England on the same date, with a similar assessment of the subjects raised, the universal peace/crusade initiative and the creation of a French cardinal, although he also alluded

157 While Leo claimed to have written more fully to Campeggio, who he then believed to be in England, there is no suggestion that he visited the kingdom as early as 1515; another nuncio was surely meant; LPii, 1282 (14 December 1515, Leo to Henry, Bologna); T. F. Mayer, ‘Campeggi, Lorenzo’, DNB. A copy of the letter to Henry was sent to Wolsey, who was also urged by the pope, in a missive of his own, to persuade the king to adopt this policy; LPii, 1283 (14 December 1515, Leo to Wolsey, Bologna).

158 LPi, 1281 (14 December 1515, [de Giglis] to Ammonius, Bologna), 1297 (17 December 1515, [de Giglis] to Wolsey, Bologna). De Giglis seems to have been better informed than the Spanish ambassador in Rome, who reportedly asserted (on 19 December) that only ‘general matters’, such as a general peace and crusade, were discussed; Sp.ii, 245 (calendared February 1516).
to an agreement concerning the Pragmatic Sanction.\textsuperscript{159} Far more negative intelligence was received from Cardinal Schiner in Switzerland. Among concessions that he alleged were made, the pro-French Cardinal Sanseverino had been restored to dignities of which he had been deprived due to his association with the Council of Pisa-Milan, an attempt had been made to deprive Schiner himself of his cardinalate, and a military leader at the Venetian siege of Brescia (Peter of Navarre) had been absolved from an oath not to fight any Christian princes.\textsuperscript{160} While other matters were raised at the conference, there is no evidence to suggest that news of these reached England at this time.\textsuperscript{161}

Overall, it is difficult to envisage the English being able to interpret news of the summit as positive. In particular, the proposed crusade and 18 month truce had the potential to scupper English attempts to rally the league against France into action. From an English point of view, the papacy could be viewed, to all intents and purposes, as ‘French’. It is perhaps indicative of the opinion of all anti-French powers at this point that England’s ally, Maximilian, as reported by Spinelly (then in Mechelin) on 6 January, ‘hath sharply written’ to the pope about the meeting, reminding him of the service he (and the Church) had received from the Empire and

\textsuperscript{159} LP\textsubscript{IIi}, 1284 (14 December 1515, de Castello to Wolsey, Bologna). For other intelligence received in England, see \textit{ibid.}, 1281 (14 December 1515, [de Giglis] to Ammonius, Bologna), 1342 (26 December 1515, Robert Wingfield to Wolsey, ‘[Ravesbourge] in Swave’), 1346 (27 December 1515, Cardinal Schiner to [Robert Wingfield], ‘Ravenspurgh’), 1347 (27 December 1515, Cardinal Schiner to [Robert Wingfield], ‘Ravenspurgh’), 1348 (calendared 27 December 1515, - to Wolsey); \textit{Ven.ii}, 670 (28 December 1515, Signory to Giustinian).

\textsuperscript{160} LP\textsubscript{IIi}, 1347 (27 December 1515, Cardinal Schiner to [Robert Wingfield], ‘Ravenspurgh’). Subsequently, Schiner seems to have believed that the pope was on the French side; \textit{ibid.}, 1352 (28 December 1515, [Cardinal Schiner] to - , ‘Ravenspurch’).

\textsuperscript{161} On the positive side, as far as England was concerned, Pastor argues that Francis went to Bologna intending to gain the pope as an ally against Spain, although Leo insisted on more time to consider this. He also reports a number of other concessions probably forced on the pontiff at the summit, including the release of an enemy of Cardinal Schiner from Castel S. Angelo, an offer to invest Francis with Naples when Ferdinand died on condition that the Frenchman promised to protect the Medici and not interfere in Florence, as well as permission to levy a ‘crusading’ tax from the French clergy (which was to net him 400,000 \textit{livres} from two levies, in 1516 and 1517). Cardinal de’ Medici further revealed to the English in later 1516 that Francis had lobbied Leo at Bologna to support his planned conquest of Naples; R.J. Knecht, \textit{Francis I}, pp.49-50; L. Pastor, \textit{History of the Popes}, vii, pp.142-145; LP\textsubscript{IIi}, 2393 (Spinelly to Wolsey, 27 September 1516, Brussels).
other allies. Henry and Wolsey would not have been particularly pleased to discover that, in reply, the pope claimed that his only intention was universal peace and that Maximilian ought to conclude with Francis to this end. Spinelly conveyed further pessimistic opinions from the emperor’s secretary Bannisius in the same piece: ‘the Pope’s words can be no better than they be’, implying the political context in which the decision to crusade was made. The Imperial official also added that ‘his [Leo’s] goodwill is altered by the subornations of his brother and nephew, and other being about his holiness, and totally inclined to France. In confirmation whereof, I have of late heard spoken of a merchant of Florence coming from Lyons, that the Frenchmen have used such divers means with the said Pope’s brother and nephew that they think all their prosperity and sure succession to consist only in the French King. Wherefore they study diligently for the advancement of his business, inducing the [Pope unto semblable opinion’. Spinelly appears to have agreed with this assessment, particularly given Giuliano de’ Medici’s earlier French marriage, Giulio’s benefices in France and so on, from which ‘it is not m[arvel] though the French King hath friends about his holiness’. As a result of this, the English representative advised that Henry (as well as Maximilian and Ferdinand) ought not to put his ‘trust in the Pope’s saying’. On the other hand, Spinelly, did not advocate that Henry give in, suggesting that the strength of an Anglo-Imperial-Spanish axis (along with the amity of the ‘crusading’ powers, such as Hungary, Poland and Portugal to Maximilian and Ferdinand), would cause the pope to look towards their perception of universal peace over that of the pro-French party around Leo. On the 9th, Spinelly reiterated how entwined with France Leo X now was, Florence being owed 150,000 gold crowns by Francis, and ‘that great intelligence hath been always between his holiness [through

162 LPIII, 1388 (6 January 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Mechelin).
the pontiff’s brother-in-law, who had a house in Lyons] and the French King, and now greater than ever it was, by reason of the meeting\textsuperscript{163}.

A slightly more positive despatch was sent to Wolsey on 7 January by another Imperial secretary, Louis Maroton. While Maroton opined that he did not believe that much had come of the conference, he believed Francis to have proposed a truce (for 18 months), so that he could establish himself in Milan and raise money, and to have requested the pope to help him engage the services of the Swiss. On the other hand, the pope, Maroton believed, was desirous of universal peace ‘that he may govern the Church without botheration, and enrich his friends. He is neither good nor bad, and, if there were an army in Italy, would turn out the French’. Maroton allocated blame for the pope’s relinquishing possession of Parma and Piacenza to Leo’s favourite(s). Finally, the Imperial secretary asserted that the pope was not obliged to assist France militarily against the latter’s enemies. If anything, Leo would continue to aid the resistance to French power, as he now did with the Empire against Venice, in his maintenance of 120 lanzknechts at Verona, under the command of Marcantonio Colonna.\textsuperscript{164} Perhaps the next notification of the conference came via Sir Robert Wingfield, who forwarded an account by the Imperial ambassador at the Curia, da Carpi, on 8 January, although the contents are unclear.\textsuperscript{165} On the 10th, however, the same English ambassador was being positive; ‘though there seemeth to be a great conjunction of amity betwixt the Pope and the French King’, Leo still retained his nuncio, Filonardi, with the Swiss, attempting to persuade the latter to reject French proposals.\textsuperscript{166} Letters from Francis (and his influential mother) reportedly reached the

\textsuperscript{163} Ibid., 1393 (9 January 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels).
\textsuperscript{164} Ibid., 1389 (7 January 1516, Lewis Maroton to Wolsey, Augsburg).
\textsuperscript{165} The correspondence apparently spoke of Francis’ entry into the city and what he subsequently did there; ibid., 1392 (8 January 1516, Robert Wingfield to Henry).
\textsuperscript{166} Ibid., 1398 (10 January 1516, Robert Wingfield to [Wolsey]). For Filonardi’s relationship with Pace, see pp.520-522.
French ambassador in England on 21 January, notifying Henry of what occurred at Bologna and requesting that he raise a crusading army.\textsuperscript{167} In reaction to papal notification and, perhaps some of the wider news and opinions received, Henry VIII seems to have protested to the pope about outcomes of the meeting, including Francis’ intention to hire the Swiss (on account of his own desire to employ them), possibly towards the beginning of January, to which Leo replied on the 28\textsuperscript{th} (from Florence) that he had acted in the best intentions for Christendom.\textsuperscript{168} He may also have conveyed the same sentiment to the pope’s closest advisor, Giulio de’ Medici, who reiterated on the same date that Leo wanted to facilitate universal peace.\textsuperscript{169}

Broadly speaking, Henry VIII’s greatest fear arising from the Bologna meeting was that the papacy was now ‘French’. Indeed, such assessments continued to reach England in subsequent months from its various diplomatic sources.\textsuperscript{170} For instance, Spinelly reported an Imperial view on 7 February that this had caused Leo to lobby the Swiss Confederacy over to France’s side.\textsuperscript{171} During the same month, Spinelly reiterated his belief that the pope was ‘entirely French’, considering that Naples would be vulnerable if Verona and Brescia were not in Imperial hands and relaying that Francis had contributed troops to the recently begun papal offensive against the duke of Urbino.\textsuperscript{172} Later, on 2 April, Spinelly notified his king of potential


\textsuperscript{168} \textit{LPIii}, 1449 (28 January 1516, Leo to Henry, Florence). Henry’s objection to Francis’ engaging the services of the Cantons (because of his own hope to hire them) is revealed by the Venetian ambassador with the pope, citing a conversation with Cardinal Bibbiena; \textit{Ven.ii}, 681 (7-26 January 1516, Venetian ambassador at the Curia to the Signory, Florence).

\textsuperscript{169} \textit{LPIii}, 1452 (28 January 1516, Giulio de’ Medici to Wolsey, Florence).

\textsuperscript{170} Pastor implies that this was indeed the case, suggesting that the pope was wholly opposed to Maximilian’s planned descent into Italy in response; L. Pastor, \textit{History of the Popes}, vii, p.153.

\textsuperscript{171} \textit{LPIii}, 1496 (7 February 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels). For similar reports from Spinelly already cited, see above pp.507-508.

\textsuperscript{172} Spinelly further mentioned Maximilian’s request that the pope desist this assault on one of his ‘subjects’. On 13 March, he again suggested that the papal enterprise against Francesco Maria della
papal involvement in an imminent French naval attempt on Naples. Wolsey was also warned by Pace of French pressure on Leo to act more directly against England; on 1 February, he wrote that Francis lobbied the pope to encourage Scottish aggression.

Such reports would have heightened English concerns, particularly given that Leo X had begun to voice a pro-French policy, as he was obliged to do by virtue of the Marignano defeat. Calls for an 18 month truce with a view to universal peace and crusade arose from the Bologna summit, which could only be interpreted as an attempt to forestall a renewed anti-French offensive in Italy. Leo forewarned England of this prospect on 27 November, claiming that his underlying motivation for arranging the peace with France was to facilitate the crusade so close to his heart, to which he believed Francis would be receptive given that his kingdom was war weary. The pope, allegedly enthused by requests for aid from Hungary, planned to lead the expedition himself. The immediate implication of a papal call to arms against the Ottomans would be to withdraw any potential justification for war against France and to colour the anti-Gallic powers, including England, as opponents to this ‘holy’ aim if they did not desist. Furthermore, it was almost inevitable that the English political perception of such a call would be that a vulnerable papacy was being forced to aid its new ‘ally’ by attempting to channel military aggression away from Francis I and even

Rovere confirmed that Leo X was ‘in the French interest’; *LP*ii, 1599 (calendared February 1516, Spinelly to [Henry]), 1665 (13 March 1516, Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels). Henry and Wolsey are likely to have received confirmation that Francis contributed troops to the Urbino campaign from Venetian correspondence, perhaps by the end of April 1516; *Ven.ii*, 710 (9 April 1516, Signory to Giustinian).

Spinelley claimed that a relative of Leo, ‘John Jordan Ursin’ was complicit in preparations for this at Genoa; *LP*ii, 1727 (2 April 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels).

Francis had allegedly promised ‘recompense’ for Leo’s doing this; *ibid.*, 1470 (1 February 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Constance).

*ibid.*, 1201 (27 November 1515, de Giglis to [Ammonius]); also see p.187. Ferdinand certainly recognised the pope’s ‘double game’ during November 1515; *Sp.*ii, 240 (calendared November 1515, Ferdinand to his ambassador in Rome).
to turn the crusade against France’s enemies. It may well have been in response to this that the English crown may have made overtures to Rome towards an anti-French general peace, to be enshrined in a coalition, in later December 1515. Although the pope rejected this, he did give Henry the impression that he tacitly supported his actions. Before this answer would have reached England, however, the threat of the pope’s crusading call would also have been made ominous to England by Leo’s despatch during December of delegates to the various princes of Christendom to seek agreement to the preparatory truce, including the nuncio Francesco Chieregato to England. Given the papacy’s ‘true’ feelings however, this gesture perhaps lacked conviction; if Leo X had really wanted to force Henry’s hand, he could have sent a legate (as he did to the Empire). Given the English reluctance to entertain legates a latere, Henry would surely have refused him entry, thereby creating a stand-off exposing England to potential papal censure. Furthermore, Chieregato took four months to reach England, at a time when the pontiff was aware that Pace was formenting war among the Swiss. In response to hearing that the legate Cardinal Canisius had spoken to the emperor on this subject, Henry VIII addressed Maximilian on 28 January 1516; he advised the emperor to reject Leo’s ‘incantations’, as the pope, he argued, ‘is easily misled to believe what he most desires’, but will be deceived by Francis and will instead join their own (anti-Gallic) league. In terms of

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176 This opinion would have been heightened by contemporary indications that Leo remained privately anti-French; see above pp.504, 508.
177 See below pp.518-520. Reflecting the pope’s vague, non-committal to England, Giulio de’ Medici answered the same overture by asserting Leo’s aim for universal peace, although he failed to specify which version; LPIIi, 1451 (28 January 1516, Giulio de’ Medici to Henry, Florence), 1452 (28 January 1516, Giulio de’ Medici to Wolsey, Florence).
178 LPIIi, 1399 (12 January 1516, Robert Wingfield to [Henry], ‘Aws[burgh]’), 1446 (28 January 1516, Henry to Maximilian, Greenwich).
179 By way of comparison, see Campeggio’s experience in 1518; pp.631-634.
180 Chieregato arrived in April 1516 and, even then, seemingly with an alternative agenda; p.515.
181 Henry also urged Maximilian to write to Leo, requesting his adhesion to their confederacy; LPIIi, 1446 (28 January 1516, Henry to Maximilian, Greenwich). The king was reacting to news that Maximilian was apparently sympathetic to the legate’s mission, albeit he wanted to consult with his
the contradictory papal messages received in England, therefore, Henry was not entirely convinced that the pope was on his side, but believed that Leo’s support could be induced politically.

Further English dismissal of the papal peace strategy probably arose in response to Leo’s November notification of this intention, when Wolsey reneged on an earlier promise to allow the levying of a crusading tax within the kingdom. Writing to the pope on 13 December, Wolsey asked to be excused for his inability to realise this pledge. In any case, he argued, his persuading Henry to defend the Church in the war currently being organised was worth more than 100 such levies. Wolsey further questioned the pope’s desire to crusade in aid of Hungary, given that recent correspondence from the Knights of St John failed to mention the frontier state and, in any case, he claimed the Turks were more afraid of the Mamluk sultanate of Egypt and Syria. 182 The implication is that, given the current political agreement between Rome and France, the English crown would certainly not finance any crusading initiative, the need for which, Wolsey now argued, was questionable anyway. The pope’s request for a crusading tenth was duly rejected in convocation on 21 December 1515, which declared that it had already conceded six grants to help ‘defend the allies and also remind the pope of his obligations to the anti-French league. Canisius arrived just a few days after another papal embassy, which pledged Leo’s continued support against France. That this was a deliberate strategy by Leo and that the ‘peace’ mission was intended to represent the public policy of Rome is implied by Wingfield in subsequent correspondence when he wrote on the 18th how Maximilian was too busy to answer the three papal diplomats and by 28th that their sole mission was to urge the truce with France; ibid., 1399 (12 January 1516, Robert Wingfield to [Henry], ‘Augs[burgh]’), 1407 (15 January 1516, Lewis Maroton to Wolsey, Augsburg), 1413 (18 January 1516, Robert Wingfield to Wolsey, Augsburg), 1447 (28 January 1516, Robert Wingfield to [Wolsey], Augsburg). This papal embassy arrived just a few days after another (consisting of two representantives that pledged, as will be seen, to continue its support against France).

182 Ibid., 1280 (13 December 1515, [Wolsey] to [de Giglis], ‘My house at London’). For correspondence along these lines from the Grand Master of Rhodes to Henry VIII (albeit dated 21 December 1515), see ibid., 1319 (21 December 1515, Fabrizio del Carretto to Henry, Rhodes), 1320 (21 December 1515, Fabrizio del Carretto to Henry, Rhodes). For earlier intimations to the papacy that the tax was unlikely, see ibid., 887 (7 September 1515, [de Giglis to Wolsey]), 966 (calendared end September 1515, [de Giglis to Wolsey]), 967 (calendared end September 1515, [de Giglis to Ammonius]), 968 (calendared end September 1515, Ammonius to Wolsey). Also see W.E. Lunt, *Financial Relations of the Papacy with England*, ii, pp.160-163.
patrimony of St Peter’ and that Henry’s victories over the French had dissipated any threats to the papacy. It also claimed to be fearful of setting a precedent of allowing money to be collected for causes that could not be justified. While the danger from France evidently remained, there was no likelihood that convocation would allow any levy once Wolsey rejected Leo X’s application. The pope replied to Wolsey’s December missive on 19 January 1516; he reiterated his fiscal request and dismissed English arguments that no Turkish threat was perceived from Rhodes by stressing that the danger was in fact to Hungary and, in connection with this, had the English orator forward letters from Hungary. Doubts about the veracity of this need would have again been raised, however, when Wolsey received a letter of 18 January from de Castello, who (probably unwittingly) suggested that correspondence received from the same Hungarians indicated that the Ottomans sought a three year peace, the decision on which had been referred to the pope. However, the argument was probably academic; the English crown would never hand over money to a ‘French’ papacy,

183 LPII, 1312 (21 December 1515). Lunt portrays the opposition to this tax as deriving from Convocation, in light of the burden from six other clerical tenths granted by the pope for collection by Henry VIII (two of which were yet to be levied). Equally, however, Lunt links the crown’s initial agreement and the bishops’ later refusal with the campaign for Wolsey’s promotion to the Sacred College and earlier. Overall, it is probable that ultimate responsibility for denying this fiscal levy from Rome lay with the crown, who could surely have instructed the episcopate to make an alternative decision if it so wished; W.E. Lunt, Financial Relations of the Papacy with England, ii, pp.160-163.

184 De Giglis seems to have been convinced by the pope’s argument and recommended that the money be sent by the king up front (and for him to recoup it from the next convocations); LPII, 1416 (19 January 1516, de Giglis to Henry, Florence), 1417 (19 January 1516, de Giglis to Wolsey), 1418 (19 January 1516, de Giglis to Ammonius).

185 Ibid., 1415 (18 January 1516, de Castello to [Wolsey], Florence). The situation in Hungary was complicated. On the one hand, Leo X wanted a crusade, both to resist the increased Turkish threat and to create a platform for his wider crusading project. On the other hand, a papal-inspired expedition, approved in later 1513 and preached in April 1514, was abandoned by May, as it morphed into an uprising within Hungary. The pope, however, focused on the external rather than the domestic threat; while he may not have been fully aware of the failure of the crusade, he seems to have pledged more money for the defence of the kingdom. It is unclear whether the English crown appreciated these developments, although it is worth noting that, at the same time, other contemporary observers were sceptical that about the need for crusade in the region; N. Housley, ‘Crusading as Social Revolt: the Hungarian Peasant Uprising of 1514’, JEH, 49 (1998), esp. pp.1, 7-8, 22, 25; K.M. Setton, ‘Pope Leo X and the Turkish Peril’, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 113, pp.374, 376, 382-383, 388.
potentially for use against English interests, particularly when the Pace expedition was believed to be imminent.186

In spite of of the negative news received from and about Rome post-Marignano, therefore, the English crown continued to have some cause for optimism that the ‘French’ pope still wanted to be defended from Francis I and supported Henry VIII’s efforts to react to this. In spite of the drawn-out process whereby Leo X submitted to Francis I, the pope also sought to reassure the English that he remained committed to the anti-French cause. Even before he received confirmed news of the defeat, for instance, the pope moved quickly to confirm his continued adhesion by despatching a nuncio to England, Francis of Sassello (around 19-20 September).187

While the nature of the mission is unclear, its timing suggests that it perhaps involved a request of urgent aid from Henry VIII.188 This seems to be supported by a despatch

186 This suspicion had at least some potential grounding. Spinelly had indicated to Wolsey in late September rumours that the pope had granted Francis permission to tax the Church in France, on account of his lack of funds; LP III, 952 (calendared 26-27 September 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels). Also see L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, p.145.

187 While Leo X did seek terms early on with the French, he was not entirely cowed and still sought to cultivate the anti-French powers, who continued to lobby him in Rome. By 7-8 October, the anti-French elements around the pope were attempting to reassure him that they would act. The Venetian ambassador at the Curia reported his Imperial and Spanish counterparts telling Leo that the emperor was holding a diet and would come in strength, that the Swiss were acting in the same manner, while the king of England would attack France, they having proposed an ‘agreement’ to him, although no reply had yet been heard. Ferdinand believed that Francis I could still be forced into seeking terms if Henry VIII (as well as the Swiss) invaded France; Ven. ii, 654 (6 and 10 October 1515, Venetian ambassador at the Curia to the Signory, Viterbo); Sp. ii, 224 (calendared October 1515, Ferdinand to his ambassador at the Imperial Court), 225 (calendared October 1515, Ferdinand to his Viceroy of Naples).

188 The only clue as to the purpose of the mission comes from Leo X’s recommendation of him, in which the pope praises Hadrian de Castello, then involved in a protracted struggle with the crown over his position as apostolic collector and in the, perhaps not unrelated, imprisonment of the subcollector, Polidore Vergil; LP III, 926 (19 September 1515, Leo to Henry, Rome); also see above p.34 n.86. While no record has been found of the nuncio’s arrival, which one would have expected from around the end of October, this does not mean that he did not come to England; if Francis of Sassello’s mission did indeed involve a request for support, then it would probably have been sensible for him to remain incognito while Leo himself was also seeking terms with Francis I. Furthermore, Francis’ arrival in England may have been deemed unnoteworthy by foreign diplomats, given that he had been a suffragan bishop in the diocese of St David’s since 1507 and apparently held a benefice in the diocese of Bath and Wells prior to this; CPL XIX, 530-534. It is also perhaps significant that Maximilian received a papal nuncio in the immediate wake of Marignano, albeit reportedly urging universal peace, although the underlying motive for the latter is unclear.
from de Giglis on 17 October, which conveyed the pope’s pledge to continue his current alliance with Ferdinand and Maximilian against France, as well as his wish that England was closer to Italy, in spite of current Franco-papal peace negotiations. The ambassador reiterated continued papal commitment on 6 November, relaying that Leo had sent 10,000 ducats to the emperor. Subsequently, after the Bologna summit, the Chieregato mission, originally intended to leave for England during December 1515 to promote universal peace, may also have been intended to reassure Henry VIII about what was going to happen or what had happened at Bologna; this would have been the opportune time to tell the English king that, whatever happened at Bologna, Leo would remain both opposed to French influence and ambitions in Italy, and supportive of English actions to resist this, even if unable to express this publicly. Further encouragement that the pope still wanted to be ‘protected’ came from Germany where Maximilian received similar diplomatic reassurances. In spite of continuing news of papal submission to France, therefore,

(whether it was intended to urge the anti-French allies on or to stall their project); LPHII, 1006 (9 October 1515, Robert Wingfield to [Henry], [Innsbruck]).

In the same conversation, Leo reportedly mentioned an article that he insisted be inserted into his peace with France, which bound it not to be prejudicial against any of his allies, although the pope had not yet received a reply from Francis on this; LPHII, 1042 (17 October 1515, [de Giglis to Wolsey]).

Concerning the pope’s pledge to stay true to his current alliance with the Empire and Spain, the Spanish orator in England reported that Henry was made aware of this by de Giglis before 4 November and that the king believed this over Francis I’s own claims to have arranged a peace with Leo (and the Swiss); Sp.ii, 239 (5 November 1515, de Mesa to Ferdinand, London).

In his original commission, Chieregato’s stated aim was to secure the release of the imprisoned deputy collector Polydore Vergil. This would have been a convenient smokescreen for sending a nuncio to England, if one was needed. A hidden agenda for his mission may be implied in de Castello’s recommendation of Chieregato (on 15 December), suggesting that he was ‘going to England on the Pope’s affairs’. If the embassy was intended merely to smooth things over for de Castello and Vergil, one may have expected the cardinal to have said so. Chieregato’s mission was apparently delayed, given that he did not arrive in England until April 1516; ibid., 1228 (1 December 1515, Leo to Henry, Florence), 1229 (SPVI, xix; 1 December 1515, Leo to Wolsey, Florence), 1288 (15 December 1515, de Castello to Wolsey, Bologna), 1735 (4 April 1516, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels), 1763 (R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.210-214; Ven.ii, 712; 14 April 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London).

Around the same time as Chieregato’s original commission, Leo also sent Egidio Canisio to Germany to pledge continued papal allegiance to the anti-French league. The English were subsequently informed that, on 7 January, the emperor met secretly with two papal representatives who delivered this message, although when pressed, they could not reconcile this with the truce agreed between Rome and France. Nevertheless, the English crown was further informed that Leo’s
reason for optimism was given to Henry VIII by these signals. Indeed, the king may well have perceived that he had some sort of ‘secret understanding’ with Leo X.\textsuperscript{193} While one cannot rule out the pope’s motivation here to remain on the winning ‘side’, he nonetheless presented himself as a victim of coercion to the anti-French powers.\textsuperscript{194}

Papal support for England’s anti-French strategy was perhaps strongest in relation to Richard Pace’s mission to recruit the Swiss and to maintain or create another anti-Gallic coalition. While the Pace mission was seemingly initiated without any direct interaction with Rome (and without any clear knowledge of papal intentions), papal security appears to have been a fundamental motivation. Wolsey notified Leo of the purpose of the embassy in correspondence of 25/26 October, that it was ‘for the Pope’s defence’ and may have intended to engage the pontiff’s active participation (military or financial), given that de Giglis was sent credentials.\textsuperscript{195} Wolsey had also commissioned Pace to encourage the papacy (among other anti-French powers) to continue in its anti-French endeavours, and even envisaged that

\begin{footnotes}
\item[193] Sir Robert Wingfield referred to this during his negotiations with Imperial ministers around 10 December 1515; \textit{LPHii}, 1265 (10 December 1515, Robert Wingfield to Wosey, ‘[Fiesyn], in Swave’).
\item[194] It ought to be noted that a lack of eventual papal support or involvement did not preclude the argument that the league was acting to defend of the papacy; it could easily be claimed that the pope was prevented from voicing its support due to (the threat of or actual) French coercion. Henry and Wolsey may well have concurred with Ferdinand’s argument to his ambassador in Rome (in late 1515) that, if Leo rejected Spanish ‘assistance’ against Francis I, following his recent peace with France, that Ferdinand would carry on regardless, treating the pope as if he was still anti-French, having been forced into his alliance. Robert Wingfield may also have commented along these lines on 15 January, when he made a recommendation, in case the pope did not sanction an English attack on France (although the sense of this is unclear); \textit{Sp.ii}, 240 (calendared November 1515, Ferdinand to his ambassador in Rome); \textit{LPHii}, 1404 (15 January 1516, Robert Wingfield to Wosey, Augsburg).
\item[195] This message was conveyed perhaps secretly via Ammonius; \textit{LPiii}, 1105 (1-4 November 1515, [de Giglis to Ammonius]); 1201 (27 November 1515, de Giglis to [Ammonius]). This mirrors Cardinal Schiner’s reply to Wolsey’s overtures, following the former’s initial meeting with Pace, which attributes the \textit{casus belli} to the French having ‘dared to rend the unity of the Church’, ensuring that a crusade could not take place ‘unless their insolence be repressed’. Similar language was used, about not forsaking the pope or the Church, by de Mesa in conversation with Henry VIII on 4 November. He would only have spoken thus if Henry was similarly disposed; \textit{ibid.}, 1146 (13 November 1515, Cardinal Schiner to Wolsey, Innsbruck); \textit{Sp.ii}, 239 (5 November 1515, de Mesa to Ferdinand, London).
\end{footnotes}
Pace himself might be sent to Rome to facilitate this.\textsuperscript{196} Pace accordingly notified Leo X of his mission from Innsbruck around 10-12 November.\textsuperscript{197} In response to Pace, at some point during November, Leo appeared cagey, claiming that he would not send a commission to England to this end because of his belief that the Spanish had come to terms with France, but would honour his pledge (whatever that might be) if Francesco Maria Sforza was ‘restored’ to Milan and if Lorenzo de’ Medici was married into the English royal family.\textsuperscript{198} The pope was therefore seeking favourable terms in return for his (continued) adhesion to the anti-French league. Upon hearing news of the Pace mission in Rome, the French immediately complained to the pontiff about it and were still complaining in mid-December, implying that Leo failed to condemn it. In response, Wolsey instructed de Giglis (on 13 December) to argue that Pace was sent on his authority to explore whether Francis intended any aggression towards Leo X and, if so, what arrangements could be made to defend him.\textsuperscript{199} In spite of Wolsey’s argument that this was his and not Henry’s initiative, the pope would almost certainly have understood that this was sanctioned by the king. Through this back channel communication, therefore, the English crown may have felt encouraged that it could gain papal support for this expedition.

Perhaps recognising the significance of this back channel and taking advantage of the secretary’s curial experience and geographical proximity to Rome,

\textsuperscript{196} Pace never went to Rome in this regard, however; \textit{LPIII}, 1095 (calendared end October 1515, instructions from Wolsey to Pace).

\textsuperscript{197} Pace wrote to de Giglis on 10 and 12 November and to Leo once around the same time; \textit{ibid.}, 1201 (27 November 1515, de Giglis to [Ammonius]). Wolsey originally commissioned Pace to contact the pope in this regard upon his arrival in Milan but, given that the duchy had fallen, Pace’s base for negotiations had become Innsbruck (initially) and so the initial communications were sent from here; \textit{ibid.}, 1065 (calendared 24-25 October 1515, Pace to [Wolsey]).

\textsuperscript{198} \textit{Ibid.}, 1224 (calendared end November 1515, Pace to Wolsey).

\textsuperscript{199} In early November, de Giglis predicted that the pope would welcome news of Pace’s departure for the Cantons. The French complained of the embassy at the Bologna summit during December, but Leo refused to recognise its hostile intent; \textit{ibid.}, 1105 (1-4 November 1515, [de Giglis to Ammonius]), 1201 (27 November 1515, [de Giglis to [Ammonius]], 1280 (13 December 1515, [Wolsey] to [de Giglis], ‘My house at London’), 1281 (14 December 1515, [de Giglis] to Ammonius, Bologna).
Pace was also expected to keep the pope apprised of developments and preparations for the expedition and to lobby Leo to contribute.200 After notifying the pope of his mission in early November, Pace kept de Giglis informed of progress, updating him on 30 November.201 On 31 January 1516, Pace promised to write to the pope concerning French attempts to recruit the Swiss and turn the emperor.202 Shortly after, on 5 February 1516, as the expedition became increasingly inevitable, Pace again lobbied Leo for assistance.203 This approach may have involved a loan request that de Giglis actively sought up to late April.204

Pressure on the pope to become involved was also applied directly from England. Initially, this consisted of positive noises made about Pace’s negotiations; Wolsey, for example, conveyed to de Giglis on 13 December that their plans were succeeding and that the Swiss were prepared to renew their participation against the French with a force of 20,000.205 Despite this, there may have been some sort of communication problem, as the pope complained of contradictory rumours about English preparations and suspected that the truth was being kept from him.206 Henry

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200 Ibid., 1095 (calendared end October 1515, instructions from Wolsey to Pace). Pace’s pressure on the papacy may have been envisaged as part of a broader effort that also included lobbying from Germany. The English crown would surely have been pleased, for instance, with the emperor’s pledge to urge the pope (and others) to assist them, as reported by Wingfield on 18 January; ibid., 1413 (18 January 1516, Robert Wingfield to Wolsey, Augsburg).
201 Ibid., 1281 (14 December 1515, [de Giglis] to Ammonius, Bologna).
202 Ibid., 1466 (31 January 1516, [Pace] to [Wolsey], Constance).
203 Ibid., 1489 (5 February 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Constance).
204 On 20 April, de Giglis mentioned his failed attempt, at Pace’s behest, to procure a loan of 40-50,000 florins from ‘[Ev]angelita’, probably Leo X’s secretary Andrea Tarasconio Evangelista; ibid., 1794 (20 April 1516, de Giglis to Ammonius, Rome).
205 There was no mention, however, of the difficulty of gaining a formal Swiss commitment through their diet on account of the problems encountered in transmitting money to the Cantons. Nor was there any indication that Maximilian’s adhesion was hard to come by; ibid., 1201 (27 November 1515, de Giglis to [Ammonius]). Similarly, de Giglis kept the crown appraised of intelligence he received about the Pace mission. On 14 December, he wrote that the secretary’s mere presence among the Swiss had prevented a treaty between the Cantons and the French; ibid., 1281 (14 December 1515, [de Giglis] to Ammonius, Bologna).
206 Leo had heard rumours, during early January, that Henry preparing for war and had funded the Swiss. When letters arrived from England that contradicted this, he expressed surprise and suspicion, and asked de Giglis ‘how the King is inclined to the peace of Christendom’; ibid., 1418 (19 January 1516, de Giglis to Ammonius). For Leo’s knowing that Henry was behind the Swiss threat to the
and Wolsey made a direct overture to Leo X around 23 December 1515 to gain papal involvement in the coming conflict. De Giglis delivered the proposal to Leo around 19 January and, while the pope wanted time to consider his response, he reassured Henry that, if England went to war, Rome would not desert him. The orator explained that Leo’s hesitancy stemmed from his promise to help Francis defend Milan. While the pope had planned to avoid this (and indirectly oppose the French) by sending troops to aid Maximilian’s defence of Verona, he had a number of reservations about the English plan: that they could not rely on Charles of Castile, on account of his Francophile council; that the Swiss might gain Milan upon the expulsion of the French (to which he was opposed); and that the war would render the planned crusade impossible as it would weaken Christendom. De Giglis reassured Leo about Charles and about Milan being intended for the next Sforza claimant. In conclusion, Leo pledged to observe his alliance with England, but would not openly declare himself an enemy of France. Apparently having just heard of the direct crown approach to Rome, Richard Pace recommended such action on 31 January 1516, as such requests would carry more weight than his own and that, whatever policy Henry decided upon, the papacy (and other princes) would follow. Henry VIII wrote again to the pope in response to the death of Ferdinand of Aragon. Perceiving that the pope was in a pretty tight bind up to that point, news of the death of one of their principal (potential) anti-

French, around mid-January, see Ven.ii, 676 (16 January 1519, Venetian ambassador at the Curia to the Signory, Florence), 677 (16 January 1519, Venetian ambassador at the Curia, Florence). Concerning the Sforza claimant to Milan, de Giglis asserted that Henry planned to marry him to one of his relatives; LPIi, 1416 (19 January 1516, de Giglis to Henry, Florence), 1417 (19 January 1516, de Giglis to Wolsey), 1418 (19 January 1516, de Giglis to Ammonius), 1449 (28 January 1516, Leo to Henry, Florence), 1450 (28 January 1516, Leo to Wolsey, Florence). The crown approach to Rome was evidently well-received by others. Robert Wingfield may have been referring to this when, around 18 January, he promised Maximilian that his king would lobby Leo X (and the other powers in Italy) against the French. Similarly, on the 31st, Pace conveyed the emperor’s desire that Henry write to the pope for support, suggesting that other princes would then support them (presumably if Leo X’s backing was gained), as well as his own direct approaches to Rome in this behalf; ibid., 1413 (18 January 1516, Robert Wingfield to Wolsey, Augsburg), 1466 (31 January 1516, [Pace] to [Wolsey], Constance). Robert Wingfield gave similar advice to Henry in late November; ibid., 1215 (29 November 1515, Robert Wingfield to Henry).
French allies was evidently of concern to the English king vis-à-vis papal participation in the Italian expedition. Henry ‘notified’ Leo of this event on 16 February, also commissioning his orator in Rome to transmit his thoughts, presumably seeking to reassure Leo that he remained committed to (funding) the expulsion of Francis I from Italy, despite the potential loss of Spanish support.209

In a bid to have the papacy break with France and support the expedition, the English crown may also have attempted more subtle moves. On 28 January 1516, Henry VIII urged Maximilian to demonstrate his readiness for the expedition, upon which he predicted that Leo X would join them against France. He also asked the emperor to write to the pontiff, requesting that he join their league which, presumably, would involve obligations to participate militarily or financially.210 Thomas Spinelly spotted an opportunity for England to secure papal support after hearing of the death of Leo’s brother, Giuliano, in early April 1516. He recommended that the pope’s nephew, Lorenzo, be prevented from marrying the French widow, Filiberta of Savoy, presumably by offering him an attractive marriage into the English royal family.211

During the negotiation process, some confidence in the papacy’s continued anti-French attitude was doubtless also drawn from the activity of the papal nuncio with the Swiss, Ennius Filonardi bishop of Veroli, in Pace and Wingfield’s efforts to

209 Ibid., 1546 (16 February 1516, Henry to Leo). The communication to de Giglis has not been found; it possibly reassured Leo X that, even if Spain failed to involve itself in the expedition or league, that the current coalition was strong enough to defeat Francis I. A possible reply from the English orator on 13 March, albeit to Wolsey, implies such a message; ibid., 1667 (13 March 1516, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome).

210 It is possible that the English were encouraging the emperor to act on an earlier promise; back in early December, Wingfield notified Henry that Maximilian had pledged to write to the pope to urge him against France. Also in the late January letter, Henry further urged the emperor to ignore papal overtures to adhere to a truce, so that a crusade could be launched. In addition, he urged Maximilian to request Leo’s adhesion to their planned league for this purpose; ibid., 1265 (10 December 1515, Robert Wingfield to Wosey, ‘[Fiesyn], in Swave’), 1446 (28 January 1516, Henry to Maximilian, Greenwich).

211 Giuliano had died on 17 March; ibid., 1727 (2 April 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels). The pope had already enquired with Pace about an English marriage for Lorenzo back in November; ibid., 1224 (calendared end November 1515, Pace to Wolsey).
enable this expedition.\textsuperscript{212} This could only have been interpreted in England as evidence of papal support for the anti-French agenda generally and the Pace mission more specifically, especially once the Franco-papal peace had been concluded, necessitating that Leo be careful of issuing any contra-indications to its observance. After reading the nuncio’s correspondence, on 20 November, Pace conveyed back to England Filonardi’s fear that French hegemony in Italy would be achieved if Henry did not act quickly.\textsuperscript{213} This may well have been interpreted as a suggestion that continued papal resistance depended on English intervention; if Henry did not intervene, Leo would give up on the Swiss and resign himself to the prospect of French control over Italy. Certainly on 10 January 1516, Robert Wingfield interpreted the nuncio’s actions as indicative of the papacy’s desire to work against France, but recommended that his crown display its anti-French intentions more publicly, as this would cause the pope (and other Christian princes) ‘to work more firmly’.\textsuperscript{214}

Similarly, a letter from Filonardi to Henry on 22 January hints that the pope was supportive of English moves to gain the Swiss and that the nuncio himself was loyal

\textsuperscript{212} Pace seems to have recognised Filonardi’s significance from very early on, requesting that Wolsey recommend him to Filonardi from soon after his despatch from England. While he was attempting to recruit the Swiss and the emperor, Pace interacted regularly with the nuncio, who appears to have worked to the same end, and Filonardi wrote to Henry on 3 December of his intention to cooperate with Pace (since the latter had arrived in Zurich). He further claimed to be indebted to Henry VII on account of some unexplained favour he received as a child and pledged to treat Pace as openly as he would a fellow papal representative. Pace confirmed the nuncio’s support around the same time, claiming that Filonardi had instructed that anti-French sermons be preached; \textit{ibid.}, 1065 (calendared 24-25 October 1515, Pace to [Wolsey]), 1178 (20 November 1515, [Pace to Wolsey]), 1198 (26 November 1515, Robert Wingfield to Henry, ‘Memmingen’), 1215 (29 November 1515, Robert Wingfield to Henry), 1240 (3 December 1515, [Filonardi] to Henry, Zurich), 1241 (3 December 1515, Filonardi to Wolsey, Zurich), 1244 (calendared 3-4 December 1515, Pace to Wolsey), 1249 (5 December 1515, Robert Wingfield to [Henry], ‘Fiesyn in Swave’), 1328 (calendared 22-23 December 1515, Cardinal Schiner to Pace), 1341 (25 December 1515, Filonardi to Cardinal Schiner, Zurich), 1346 (27 December 1515, Cardinal Schiner to [Robert Wingfield], ‘Ravenspurgh’), 1352 (28 December 1515, [Cardinal Schiner] to -, ‘Ravenspurgh’), 1377 (1 January 1516, Robert Wingfield to Wolsey), 1422 (22 January 1516, [Filonardi] to Henry, ‘Ex Turegio’). The despatch to England of Melchior Langus by Cardinal Schiner might also have been an indicator of papal intentions, as Pace described him as a onetime chamberlain to Julius II, who was trusted by the late pontiff (although Schiner further reveals that he maintained Langus in Rome during this time). Was the secretary implying that Langus may be acting, perhaps implicitly or indirectly, on behalf of Leo X? \textit{LPHII}, 1327 (22 December 1515, Pace to Wolsey, ‘Uberlinge’), 1329 (23 December 1515, Cardinal Schiner to Henry, ‘Uberlingen’).

\textsuperscript{213} \textit{Ibid.}, 1178 (20 November 1515, [Pace to Wolsey]).

\textsuperscript{214} \textit{Ibid.}, 1398 (10 January 1516, Robert Wingfield to [Wolsey]).
to the English king.\textsuperscript{215} Also Pace reported back to Wolsey on 1 February 1516 that the nuncio was opposed to Leo X’s adhesion to France and had written to the pope advising that he side with England.\textsuperscript{216} It is unclear whether Filonardi’s actions were conducted with the assent of the pope (particularly given the results of Bologna), although it is feasible both that this was the case and that the English crown suspected as much. In spite of these generally positive indications for England, \textit{vis-à-vis} Rome and the Pace mission, the crown was not prepared to gain Leo X’s support at any cost; for instance, Henry and Wolsey discarded Spinelly’s suggestion (in October 1515) that the pope’s assistance would be gained if one of his relatives was promised the duchy of Milan.\textsuperscript{217}

Although it is unclear how far the English crown was aware of it, Pace’s and Henry’s pressure helped to convince the pope of the likely success of the Imperial-Swiss expedition. Shortly after returning to Rome in late February, Leo reportedly told the Venetian ambassador that he expected Franco-Venetian forces to be defeated and that Venice would then have to fight alone, all because of English financial support.\textsuperscript{218} Indeed, until the emperor withdrew from the expedition, Henry and Wolsey would have been able to reflect positively on intelligence received about the papacy and communications from Rome concerning Leo X’s ‘real’ foreign policy intentions. There was plenty from English diplomats to suggest that the pope was, at heart, anti-French (in addition to Filonardi’s involvement in the Swiss negotiations).

\textsuperscript{215} Ibid., 1422 (22 January 1516, [Filonardi] to Henry, ‘Ex Turegio’).
\textsuperscript{216} Ibid., 1470 (1 February 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Constance).
\textsuperscript{217} Ibid., 1096 (calendared end October 1515, Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels). Instead, Henry and Maximilian pursued the candidacy of Francesco Maria Sforza, duke of Bari; see, for instance, pp.495 n.132, 530 n.243.
\textsuperscript{218} This conversation took place around 7 March, although the Venetian orator Marino Giorgio claimed to have had more than one discussion with Leo on these matters; Ven.\textit{ii}, 693 (28 February, 1-2 March 1516, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 694 (7 March 1516, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory).
Robert Wingfield predicted on 15 January that, now that the emperor definitely intended to go to Italy, the pope would ask Henry to attack France. On 23 February, Spinelly, informed Wolsey that the pope continued to contribute financially to ‘the entertainment of Verona and Brescia’. Similarly, on 18 March, Spinelly alerted Wolsey that the expedition having commenced, Leo had offered Maximilian assistance. Also, on 4 April, he reported that the pope wanted Maximilian’s friendship, on account of the current ‘success’ of the expedition, and that the emperor had accepted this, on condition that Leo made a financial contribution (presumably for the offensive). The prospect of economic backing from Rome may have been linked with Pace’s approach to Leo for this in February 1516.

Even while the expedition was underway, Leo X looked to be supporting the anti-French powers. In response to the initial success of the Germans and Swiss, Leo despatched a legate to Maximilian (Bibbiena, an intimate of the pope) and a general (Marcantonio Colonna) with a small force to join the Imperial army at Brescia. One also suspects that Giulio de’ Medici’s legatine commission to Verona was possibly also intended in defence of the city (for the emperor) against the Venetians. Equally, the pope did not observe his end of the papal alliance with France, to contribute troops and to pay for Swiss mercenaries; he said he was unable to do any of this, although he reportedly sent a Florentine contingent which marched extremely

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219 The ambassador also made a comment about the possibility of Leo not doing this, as he was a Florentine, presumably because of the state’s traditional friendship with France, although the sense is unclear; LPIII, 1404 (15 January 1516, Robert Wingfield to Wolsey, Augsburg).

220 One presumes that he meant that Leo was contributing to the Imperial defence of these cities; ibid., 1581 (23 February 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey).

221 Ibid., 1684 (18 March 1516, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels).

222 Ibid., 1735 (4 April 1516, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels).

223 See above pp.517-518.

224 W. Roscoe, *Leo the Tenth*, ii, p.50. For English knowledge of this, see LPIII, 1684 (18 March 1516, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels).

225 A letter to him in this position survives for 18 March 1516; LPIII, 1685 (18 March 1516, - to Giulio de’ Medici, legate in Verona, Lyons).
slowly towards Bologna. On 8 April, Pace notified Wolsey of intercepted French correspondence that complained of the pope’s failure to contribute to the defence of Milan, particularly by financing the Swiss. Indeed, other captured correspondence (dated March 1516), that revealed papal procrastination over its obligation to support the French defence of Italy, also seems to have been referred to England around this time. In addition, further news of the pope’s reluctance to aid Francis I seems to have been received in England via Spinelly in, perhaps, the second week of May. Francis I suspected that the papacy might defect to the Anglo-Imperial-Swiss confederation by the middle of March. By the 17th, despite papal reassurances of his support, Francis was recommending that his ally not take heed of ‘bad advice’, before giving reasons why the anti-French powers (potential and actual, but excepting the Swiss) could not be relied upon; with regard to Henry VIII, Francis claimed that he posed no threat as he was ‘beyond the sea’. That the pope was actively encouraging the expedition was certainly suspected by Venice. In a communication to its

226 W. Roscoe, Leo the Tenth, ii, pp.51-52.
227 The Swiss commander Galeazzo Visconti’s confirmation of this also appears to have reached England: LPII, 1741 (6 April 1516, Galeazzo Visconti to Cardinal [Schiner], Lodi), 1746 (8 April 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Lodi).
228 According to the intercepted correspondence, it seems that Leo’s reluctance was already apparent to the French (reportedly suggesting the supply of Florentines instead of a force from the Papal States and, it seems the pope’s preferred option, recommending the recruitment of the Swiss). Furthermore, the French ambassador with the pope had already tried to reason with his crown that they would gain more from papal support in name rather than from the actual troops he had agreed to send to Milan. In reply, this was agreed, but a financial contribution was still sought towards the hired Swiss mercenaries (4,000 as opposed to the previously agreed 2,000). The French crown also placed great pressure on the papacy by keeping Leo regularly informed of the scale of its military presence in the peninsula; ibid., 1699 (14 March 1516, de Boissy and de Bonnivet to the French ambassador in Rome, Lyons), 1680 (17 March 1516, Francis to his ambassador in Rome, Lyons), 1685 (18 March 1516, to Giulio de’ Medici, legate in Verona, Lyons), 1686 (18 March 1516, de Boissy to Giulio de’ Medici, Lyons), 1699 (23 March 1516, Francis de Taxis to Brian Tuke, Milan), 1700 (calendared 23 March 1516, Francis to his ambassador in Rome, Lyons), 1703 (24 March 1516, Charles [duke of Bourbon] to Cardinal San Severino, Milan). That these communications were intercepted and copies relayed to England is suggested both by their being located in English archives and other references to the capture of such materials; ibid., 1741 (6 April 1516, Galeazzo Visconti to Cardinal [Schiner], Lodi), 1746 (8 April 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Lodi), 1854 (4 May 1516, extracts of intelligence from Italy).
229 Money and soldiers were requested by Francis to help in the defence of Italy. Such Italian intelligence that reached Imperial sources in the Low Countries was usually forwarded on to England by Thomas Spinelly; ibid., 1854 (4 May 1516, extracts of intelligence from Italy).
230 Francis I also cited the previous actions of the emperor and Charles' preoccupation with Spanish affairs; ibid., 1680 (17 March 1516, Francis to his ambassador in Rome, Lyons).
ambassador in France on 8 March, the state warned that, while Leo was publicly supportive of their cause, Maximilian would not have crossed the Alps without some signal from Leo. In addition, it speculated, the pontiff had unleashed the Swiss and persuaded Henry to give his financial backing to the enterprise. On the same date, the Venetian government wrote to its orator in Rome; it praised the pope’s claim to be opposed to the Imperial-Swiss descent, not least because of Maximilian’s ambition to acquire the temporal power of the Church. It also commended Leo for sending briefs to Henry VIII and trying to maintain the Anglo-French peace. However, the Venetian ambassador was instructed to discover the pope’s true intentions, as his commitment was suspect; in particular, Leo was believed, through Wolsey, to have induced the English king to fund the expedition. By the 13th, Venice even sought the pope’s intercession with England to cease sending money.

In addition to lobbying the papacy for its involvement in the anti-French enterprise in Italy, the English crown concurrently sought its membership in a planned ‘holy league’ to formalise the alliance of the anti-French powers. While a formal agreement was not made during these months (between England and other potential allies), overtures were made to Rome, this time more directly from the king, although also involving the back channel established by Pace. It has already been observed that the envisaged agreement would aim for universal peace and a crusade against the

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231 Ven.ii, 696 (8 March 1516, Signory to its ambassador in France). Papal complicity was also suspected by virtue of Filonardi’s activities; ibid., 692 (5 March 1516).
232 Ibid., 697 (8 March 1516, Signory to its ambassador at the Curia).
233 Ibid., 701 (13 March 1516, Signory to its ambassador at the Curia).
234 Papal involvement in this league was deemed integral by Henry VIII; in issuing commissions on 21 February 1516 to conclude such a treaty, the pope’s name always cropped up as an intended participant. Similarly, the emperor’s commission of his own ambassador in England to this end (on 20 February), stated the ‘support of the Church’ as one of its intended aims, a sentiment with which his English counterpart doubtless agreed; LPIII, 1572 (20 February 1516), 1574 (21 February 1516), 1721 (1 April 1516, [Pace] to [Wolsey], [Lodi?]), 1742 (calendared 6–7 April 1516, [Wolsey] to -), 1838 (calendared 30 April 1516, [Henry] to Poynings an[d Tunstal]).
Turks. This carried an anti-Gallic subtext, whereby the French expulsion from Italy would be sought (at least) before any passagium could take place.²³⁵ Such an emphasis becomes understandable, when one considers that Leo X, in accordance with his ‘public’ pro-French policy, was also calling for universal peace, albeit it was intended to forestall the impending conflict against Francis I. Indeed, the English emphasis on (an anti-Gallic) universal peace may be considered to be a reaction to these papal calls. Henry VIII and/or Wolsey wrote to Leo urging him to join the alliance (in addition to the expedition) around 23 December 1515. De Giglis received this proposal and delivered it to Leo around 19 January 1516; the pope wanted time to consider his response, but reassured Henry that, if he went to war, he would not abandon him. In also answering a request to join the forthcoming enterprise against France, Leo had various doubts about the English plan, including that it would weaken Christendom too much for a crusade. As a result, Leo pledged to observe his alliance with Henry, but could not openly declare himself an enemy of France.²³⁶ Interestingly, Giulio de’ Medici’s response (as papal confidante, cardinal protector of England or both), apparently to the same overture, was far more vague; he merely expressed the pope’s desire for universal peace which could have meant anything.²³⁷ Perhaps impatient for a response, on 28 January, Henry urged Maximilian to request

²³⁵ Earlier, on 10 January, Robert Wingfield conveyed the emperor’s opinion that Henry ought to recover the French crown, thereby allaying the threat to Christendom, before any crusade could legitimately take place. Similarly, on the 18th Wingfield stated that the emperor’s commitment to the expedition, his decision to lobby other powers including the pope to participate, and the intended coronation of Henry at Paris, would be ‘a sure foundation for universal peace and an expedition against the Infidels’. Again, in April, Pace alluded to the crusading element envisioned for the coalition when he referred to being ‘commissioned to treat for a universal confederation; ibid., 1398 (10 January 1516, Robert Wingfield to [Wolsey]), 1413 (18 January 1516, Robert Wingfield to Wolsey, Augsburg), 1721 (1 April 1516, [Pace] to [Wolsey], [Lodi?]).


Leo’s adhesion to their league. 238 Ostensibly then, the pope had rejected the English proposal, albeit he tacitly supported Henry’s actions, but this must be set in the broader context of the failure to form the league at all during the early months of 1516. 239 In spite of this lack of papal commitment, the pope apparently encouraged Charles of Castile around this time to join such a league (that would include the pope). Two English representatives in the Low Countries notified Henry of this approach on 3 April, for which the English king, in reply, took credit and presumed that the pope had made an informal approach to the Spanish ambassadors in Rome. As a result, Henry VIII now expected a commission to be sent to England with a view to the papacy joining a coalition against France. 240 This did not materialise and any hope that Leo would agree to the proposal probably dissipated with news of the emperor’s withdrawal from Milan.

In reacting to Francis I’s victory at Marignano, therefore, the English crown had been relatively successful in bringing a cowed Leo X to the brink of actively supporting its enterprise to expel the French from Italy. While the pope had shrunk away from any public commitment, reluctant to adhere to any new league or openly break with France, he gave Henry plenty of reassurance that he did support his actions and made various moves to indicate this, such as through Filonardi’s work with Pace and the Swiss, as well as his actions to actively participate in the conflict. This was a considerable feat, given that Leo had submitted to Francis I, both in October after

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238 Henry alludes to a league recently concluded between England, the Empire, Spain and the Swiss, although no such agreement appears to have taken place. In this same letter to the emperor, Henry also urged him to act or at least demonstrate his readiness to act, so as to encourage papal support, as well as to ignore papal overtures to adhere to a truce (the preliminary to the pro-French ‘universal peace); ibid., 1446 (28 January 1516, Henry to Maximilian, Greenwich).

239 The rejection is also consistent with a report by the Venetian ambassador at the Curia in early February that, in reaction to news that an anti-French league had been proclaimed, Leo had declared his intention to remain committed to France and Venice; Ven.ii, 685 (8-9 February 1516, Venetian ambassador at the Curia to the Signory, Florence).

240 LPIIi, 1838 (calendared 30 April 1516, [Henry] to Poynings an[d Tunstal]).
Marignano and in December at Bologna, and that he had publicly posited a desire for universal peace (in the French interest). In light of this, the collapse of the English-backed Italian enterprise was always likely to cause Leo X to retreat from any support for the anti-French agenda generally, as well as to opt more firmly for the French amity already established.

**England fails to relaunch the Italian enterprise and struggles to form and gain commitment to a league ‘in defence of the Church’**: April 1516 – July 1517

News of the emperor’s withdrawal from Milan was followed in England by a period of uncertainty about what had actually happened and whether Maximilian would return to the battlefield. As the English crown became increasingly aware that reports of ‘successes’ against the French (and Venetians) continued to filter into the kingdom. Towards end of April, letters arrived in England from Francis I claiming that Maximilian had fled, which ‘caused great consternation’. The Imperial ambassador claimed that he successfully convinced Henry and Wolsey that this was untrue and, in any case, letters soon arrived from Maximilian, Pace

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241 News of Maximilian’s retreat apparently reached England by 10 April, but was kept secret for several weeks, indeed it was actively denied. It was perhaps due to this crisis, however, that Wolsey attempted to recall Fox to Court, although the latter refused and, in his reply (dated the 23rd), was under the impression that the campaign still progressed. Wolsey seems only to have admitted the emperor’s withdrawal around 29 April, attributing it to Maximilian’s lack of funds and supplies; *ibid.*, 1721 (1 April 1516, [Pace] to [Wolsey], [Lodi?]), 1727 (2 April 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 1729 (2 April 1516, Pace to Wolsey, ‘Laude’), 1736 (4 April 1516, Robert Wingfield to [Henry], ‘in…village de Costa’), 1746 (8 April 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Lodi), 1752 (10 April 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to [Henry], ‘Idoll [Eddolo] in the Vale Camonico’), 1753 (calendared 10 April 1516, [Henry] to [Pace]), 1754 (10 April 1516, [Pace] to [Wolsey], Laude), 1774 (16 April 1516, Maximilian to Wolsey, Terzilas), 1775 (16 April 1516, Robert Wingfield to Wolsey), 1776 (Jerome Prunne to Robert Wingfield, Augsburg), 1782 (18 April 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 1783 (18 April 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 1792 (20 April 1516, Schiner to Robert Wingfield, Male), 1793 (20 April 1516, Francis to Mons. De la [Fayette], Captain of Boulogne, and Mons. Le President [Bap]ausmes, his ambassador in England, Colombier), 1799 (21 April 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to [Wolsey]), 1813 (22 April 1516, Robert Wingfield to Henry, Trent), 1816 (23 April 1516, Pace to [Wolsey], Bergamo), 1817 (23 April 1516, Pace to Burbank, Bergamo), 1822 (24 April 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 1825 (24 April 1516, - to -, Paris), 1831 (27 April 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 1833 (28 April 1516, [Robert Wingfield to Henry], Trent), 1841 (calendared 30 April 1516); *Ven.ii*, 709 (8 April 1516, Marcantonio Colonna, Captain General of the Imperial army, to Maximilian), 720 (28 April 1516, Bailiff of Crema to the Signory), 722 (29 April 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London); P.S. and H.M. Allen, *Letters of Richard Fox*, pp.52-55 (LIII, 1814; 23 April 1516, [Fox] to Wolsey); R. Brown (trans.), *Four Years*, i, pp.210-214 (*Ven.ii*, 712; LIII, 1763; 14 April 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 214-217 (*Ven.ii*, 714; LIII, 1789; 20 April 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 218-219 (*Ven.ii*, 719; LIII, 827); D. Hay (ed.), *Anglica Historia*, pp.135-137; A.F. Pollard, *Henry VIII* (1925), pp.90-91; W. Roscoe, *Leo the Tenth*, ii, pp.49-51; J.J. Scarisbrick, *Henry VIII*, pp.60-61; J. Wegg, *Richard Pace*, pp.88-94. The English were still unclear about Imperial intentions in early May. They apparently chose to disbelieve rumours that Maximilian had been forced to retreat and that he did not intend to return. Part of the reason for this may have been that reports of 'successes' against the French (and Venetians) continued to filter into the kingdom. Towards end of April, letters arrived in England from Francis I claiming that Maximilian had fled, which ‘caused great consternation’. The Imperial ambassador claimed that he successfully convinced Henry and Wolsey that this was untrue and, in any case, letters soon arrived from Maximilian, Pace
that the emperor intended to abandon the current Italian enterprise (even if he was reportedly enthusiastic to start again), it also learnt around the end of May that the Swiss contribution had also collapsed, money again playing a major role.\textsuperscript{242}

Naturally, the English were unhappy but, once they had confirmation that the expedition had failed, Henry and his advisors had to decide whether to abandon the anti-French strategy or encourage a relaunch of the enterprise.

Despite holding reservations about the emperor, the English crown received pledges of continued commitment from both Maximilian and the Swiss, and so threw its weight behind relaunching the Italian expedition.\textsuperscript{243} The English crown also

\textsuperscript{242} Intelligence that reached England (including from Pace and Wingfield) suggested that, in addition to facing logistical problems to pay the Swiss, sums were seized by German and Spanish troops (at Brescia). Wingfield effectively recognised the end of the expedition in correspondence of 11 May on and immediately suggested that he (and Pace) ‘spin’ this setback so that Henry would not be perceived in a negative light; \textit{LP\textsc{iii}}, 1854 (4 May 1516, extracts of intelligence from Italy), 1871 (11 May 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to Henry), 1872 (11 May 1516, duke of Bari to Henry, Trent), 1873 (11 May 1516, duke of Bari to Wolsey, Trent), 1877 (12 May 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Trent), 1879 (12 May 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Trent), 1880 (12 May 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Trent), 1884 (13 May 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to Henry, Trent), 1885 (calendared 13-14 May 1516, news from Italy), 1998 (4 June 1516, Imperial ambassador in England to Margaret of Savoy, London). The degree of concern within crown circles about the expedition is perhaps stressed by the interception of Venetian correspondence around this time, which led Giustinian to complain Wolsey (on 30 May); R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, i, pp.224-228 (\textit{Ven.\textsc{ii}}, 737; \textit{LP\textsc{iii}}, 1960; 31 May 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, Putney).

\textsuperscript{243} During May, Henry VIII refers to ‘the faint and dishonourable dealing of the Emperor’; \textit{LP\textsc{iii}}, 1966 (calendared end May 1516, Henry to -). For Pace’s allegations against Maximilian, including his citing a description by Julius II that ‘\textit{Imperator est levis et inconstans…}’ and is motivated by his desire for money, that Wolsey later claimed to believe, see \textit{ibid.}, 1875 (11 May 1516, extract of news sent to England, Mechelin), 1877 (12 May 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Trent), 1880 (12 May 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Trent), 1965 (31 May 1516, [Wolsey] to Pace). The emperor issued his commitment to England to restart the campaign from mid-May (in response to Henry and Wolsey’s exhortations of 16 April) and this was reportedly believed by the English, see \textit{ibid.}, 1888 (15 May 1516, Maximilian to Henry, Trent), 1889 (15 May 1516, Maximilian to [Henry], Trent), 1890 (15 May 1516, Maximilian to Wolsey, Trent), 1891 (15 May 1516, Maximilian to [Wolsey], Tre), 1895 (16 May 1516, Spinelly to Henry, ‘Douay, in Artois’), 1902 (17 May 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to Henry, Trent), 1904 (18 May 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Arras), 1909 (19 May 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to Henry, Trent), 1921 (21 May 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to Henry, Trent), 1931 (23 May 1516, [Wolsey] to Wolsey), 1937 (27 May 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to Henry), 1964 (calendared 31 May 1516, [Wolsey] to Wolsey), 1998 (4 June 1516, Imperial ambassador in England to Margaret of Savoy, London). The Swiss captains pledged their continued
reassessed its intentions for the conflict, at least postponing for a year the intended invasion of northern France by Henry VIII in person. This refocus is curious insomuch that Wolsey appears to have induced a request from Germany (via Pace) for such a prorogation. As a consequence of this lack of direct English military action, it was further intended that the Imperial-Swiss expedition no longer pursue the French into France at this point, with the enterprise ending when Milan was taken and the French expelled from Italy.\textsuperscript{244} In addition, Henry and Wolsey lobbied once more for commitment around 12 May, Galeazzo Visconti followed suit on the 20\textsuperscript{th} and the exiled duke of Milan (Francesco Maria Sforza) sent one of his advisors to Henry on the 21\textsuperscript{st}; \textit{ibid.}, 1880 (12 May 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Trent), 1881 (calendared 12 May 1516, [Swiss captains to Henry, Trent], 1914 (20 May 1516, letters of Galeazzo Visconti, Trent), 1922 (21 May 1516, Francesco Maria Sforza to [Henry]), 1932 (23 May 1516, Francesco Maria Sforza to Henry, Trent), 1933 ([Francesco Maria Sforza] to Wolsey).

The English decision was probably swayed by the Franco-Venetian threat to Maximilian’s authority in Brescia and Verona; the loss of these cities could mark the end of ultramontane resistance to French hegemony within northern Italy and the emperor’s reported dedication to their security may have offered further proof of his continued fidelity to the anti-French cause. The fall of Brescia towards the end of May did indeed raise such concerns in England, as Maximilian then shifted his focus to the relief of Verona (as the starting point for driving the French from the peninsula); \textit{ibid.}, 1853 (4 May 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Arras), 1914 (20 May 1516, letters of Galeazzo Visconti, Trent), 1921 (21 May 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to Henry, Trent), 1931 (23 May 1516, [Pace] to Wolsey), 1937 (27 May 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to Henry), 1981 (1 June 1516, Cardinal Schiner to Henry, Verona), 1989 (3 June 1516, [Robert Wingfield to Henry]), 1997 (4 June 1516, John Baptist Spinelli and Marcantonio Colonna to [Cardinal Schiner], Verona), 2014 (7 June 1516, [Robert Wingfield to Henry, Trent]), 2016 (7 June 1516, [Pace] to Wolsey, Augusta), 2019 (8 June 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 2027 (10 June 1516, copy of a letter from the king’s spy, written at Mechelin), 2033 (12 June 1516, Tunstal and Richard Wingfield to [Henry], Louvain), 2052 (calendared 15-16 June 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Louvain), 2079 (23 June 1516, Tunstal and Richard Wingfield to [Henry], Brussels), 2081 (23 June 1516, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels); \textit{Ven.ii}, 735-736 (27 May 1516, Signory to Henry); R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, i, pp.242-246 \textit{(Ven.ii}, 742; \textit{LPIII}, 2036; 12 June 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, Putney), 254-262 \textit{(Ven.ii}, 751; \textit{LPIII}, 2205; 23 July 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London).

The orators charged with arranging the original campaign were recommissioned on 28 May; Richard Pace and (apparently) Robert Wingfield were to liaise with the emperor and the Swiss, as well as with Galeazzo Visconti, Matthew Schiner and Francesco Maria Sforza, to facilitate the renewed engagement; \textit{LPIII}, 1942 (28 May 1516, [Wolsey] to Pace), 1943 (calendared 28 May 1516, [Wolsey] to Pace), 1965 (31 May 1516, [Wolsey] to Pace), 1998 (4 June 1516, Imperial ambassador in England to Margaret of Savoy, London). Also see R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, i, pp.224-228 \textit{(Ven.ii}, 737; \textit{LPIII}, 1960; 31 May 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, Putney).

The postponement is referred to by Wolsey in his instructions to Pace of 28 May; for the relaunched expedition, the cardinal wished the aims to be the taking of Milan and the expulsion of the French. Henry, he reasoned, did not intend to raise an invasion force at that point (indeed, was unable to until at least August, one presumes in 1517), given that he was the sole financial backer of the Italian campaign. Just a few days later (on the 31\textsuperscript{st}), Wolsey happily acknowledged Pace’s notification that there was no chance of the Imperials and the Swiss following-up the expedition into France that year, once the French had been expelled from Milan. Wolsey further recommended that his secretary ensure that this postponement carried with the Swiss until the following year. In explanation of this, Scarisbrick convincingly puts Wolsey’s intrigues down to the cardinal’s opposition to the king’s enthusiasm for the invasion. Indeed, the Imperial orator (Titonius) cited Henry’s personal drive towards
the creation of an anti-French coalition, which would underpin the expedition. Negotiations during May and June, concentrated in England, sought to cement such a ‘holy league’ including Maximilian, Charles, Leo X and the Swiss, although emphasis was placed on joint responsibility to finance the Swiss, presumably so that England did not bear the brunt of the cost again. Perhaps seeking to galvanize the anti-French powers, it is notable that Henry VIII determined to adopt a far more assertive role than he did in the earlier campaign. This time, the cloak of secrecy surrounding England’s earlier contribution was lifted and Henry and Wolsey began to openly voice their anti-Gallic convictions and intentions from late May. On 5 June, Wolsey clarified the king’s desire for the expulsion of the French from Italy, to prevent their hegemony there and, potentially, elsewhere. Later, on 9 August, Wolsey again reportedly voiced his opposition to French hegemony in Italy and referred to the pope considering himself as Francis’ ‘chaplain’. Giustinian also cited

this end on 6 May, fuelled by news of Maximilian’s successes in Italy; LPIII, 1863 (6 May 1516, Imperial ambassador in England to Margaret of Savoy, London), 1943 (calendared 28 May 1516, [Wolsey] to Pace), 1965 (31 May 1516, [Wolsey] to Pace); J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp.62-63. Around 6 May, Henry was apparently attempting to form a league between himself, Maximilian and Charles as the central members, with the pope, the Swiss and others also envisaged as joining. Wolsey informed Pace on the 28th of his belief that an agreement was close; LPIII, 1863 (6 May 1516, Imperial ambassador in England to Margaret of Savoy, London), 1931 (23 May 1516, [Pace] to Wolsey), 1942 (28 May 1516, [Wolsey] to Pace), 1943 (calendared 28 May 1516, [Wolsey] to Pace), 1998 (4 June 1516, Imperial ambassador in England to Margaret of Savoy, London), 2082 (23 June 1516, [Wolsey] to Pace); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.219-221 (Ven.ii, 725; LPIII, 1845; 1 May 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 221-224 (Ven.ii, 730; LPIII, 1864; 8 May 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 242-246 (Ven.ii, 742; LPIII, 2036; 12 June 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, Putney). For approaches made for Venice to join, see ibid., pp.228-232 (Ven.ii, 738; LPIII, 1961; 31 May 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, Putney), 232-239 (Ven.ii, 739; LPIII, 1991; 3 June 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, Putney), 239-242 (Ven.ii, 740; LPIII, 2004; 5 June 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, Putney), 242-246 (Ven.ii, 742; LPIII, 2036; 12 June 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, Putney), 254-262 (Ven.ii, 751; LPIII, 2205; 23 July 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 270-276 (Ven.ii, 758; LPIII, 2264; 11 August 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). Furthermore, Giustinian noted that Henry only admitted to funding the Italian expedition for the first time on 3 June although he stressed, it was intended for the emperor’s defence and not to injure his French ‘ally’; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.228-232 (Ven.ii, 738; LPIII, 1961; 31 May 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, Putney), 232-239 (Ven.ii, 739; LPIII, 1991; 3 June 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, Putney). For further comments by Giustinian on this ‘new’ English openness, see ibid., pp.242-246 (Ven.ii, 742; LPIII, 2036; 12 June 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, Putney), 254-262 (Ven.ii, 751; LPIII, 2205; 23 July 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). For previous English denials of involvement, see for instance ibid., pp.221-224 (Ven.ii, 730; LPIII, 1864; 8 May 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London).
the cardinal and his right-hand man Ruthal ‘abusing the King of France without reserve’.248

While the English crown’s intention to continue ‘defending’ Rome from France was clear, it was hampered in all quarters during subsequent months in its attempts to form a league and to relaunch the Italian enterprise. Despite the lack of trust they had in Maximilian, Henry and Wolsey still envisaged him as part of their plans, giving him the impression that he may still gain access to English money, albeit keeping it on tight reins.249 They were pragmatic enough not to burn their bridges with him partly because of the current threat to the Imperial city of Verona which, Tunstal advised, ‘if it be lost, all the passages of Italy will be in the hands of the

248 Ibid., pp.265-270 (Ven.ii, 757; LPIII, 2259; 10 August 1516, Giustinian to the Signory). Contrary to earlier despatches when Giustinian described Henry, Wolsey and others as denying their support of attempts to expel the French from Italy, the orator subsequently outlined conversations with the same characters, publicly supporting the emperor (and others opposing France) and condemning the French. For similar sentiments expressed by Wolsey and Ruthal, also see Giustinian’s audience on 22 July, ibid., pp.254-262 (Ven.ii, 751; LPIII, 2205; 23 July 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London).

French’. Pace and Visconti once again endeavoured to gain a collective agreement from the Swiss to cross the Alps (as the focus of the anti-French league), but despite financial offers and presentation to diets and faced with French counter-offers, the Cantons remained divided. Similar approaches were also made to Charles of

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250 LPIII, 2270 (13 August 1516, Tunstal to Wolsey). While Henry objected to funding the defence of Verona, he was wholly aware that this was the principal focus of the emperor’s concern now and that there was a very real risk that it may fall to Franco-Venetian forces. Indeed, Wolsey even told Giustinian on 29 July that England intended to defend the city and subsidise the emperor to achieve this; R. Brown (trans.), *Four Years*, i, pp.262-264 (Ven.ii, 753; LPIII, 2222; 29 July 1516, Giustian to the Signory, London). For English concerns for Verona and the danger that it was reportedly in, see LPIII, 2154 (10 July 1516, Robert Wingfield to Henry, ‘Fyesyn’), 2157 (calendared 10 July 1516), 2168 (12 July 1516, extracts of letters from -), 2176 (16 July 1516, [Henry] to [Robert Wingfield]), 2178 (calendared 16 July 1516, [Wolsey] to [Pace]), 2184 (17 July 1516, Maximilian to [Wolsey], ‘In Fac[c]ibus Montium’), 2189 (18 July 1516, Tunstal and Richard Wingfield to [Henry], Brussels), 2244 (4 August 1516, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels), 2275 (14 August 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 2303 (26 August 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 2317 (30 August 1516, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels); R. Brown (trans.), *Four Years*, i, pp.254-262 (Ven.ii, 751; LPIII, 2205; 23 July 1516, Giustian to the Signory, London), 276-280 (Ven.ii, 760; LPIII, 2284; 17 August 1516, Giustian to the Signory, London), 281-284 (Ven.ii, 764; LPIII, 2294; 24 August 1516, Giustian to the Signory, London); Ven.ii, 754 (2 August 1516, Sigiont to Gorv). For Pace still stressing the English need for him in their anti-French ambitions, despite his falling out with and lack of faith in the emperor; LPIII, 2076 (22 June 1516, [Pace] to Wolsey), 2111 (calendared end June 1516, fragment in Pace’s handwriting). Also see ibid., 2010 (calendared 6 June 1516, [Galeazzo Visconti] to [Anchises Visconti]), Leonard Frescobald, the merchant banker charged with transferring the English money to Germany and the Swiss Cantons, even recommended that Henry ought to consider the emperor’s poverty; ibid., 2114 (calendared end June 1516). For the continued entertainment in England of Imperial (and Spanish) overtures for money, see; R. Brown (trans.), *Four Years*, i, pp.250-254 (Ven.ii, 750; LPIII, 2183; 17 July 1516, Giustian to the Signory, London), 262-264 (Ven.ii, 753; LPIII, 2222; 29 July 1516, Giustian to the Signory, London). Also see LPIII, 1998 (4 June 1516, Imperial ambassador in England to Margaret of Savoy, London).

251 LPIII, 2165 (12 July 1516, Tunstal and Richard Wingfield to Henry, Brussels), 2166 (12 July 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 2214 (26 July 1516, ambassadors of the five Cantons at Zurich to Henry), 2206 (23 July 1516, Tunstal and Richard Wingfield to [Henry], Brussels), 2225 (29 July 1516, [Galeazzo Visconti] to Henry and Wolsey), 2226 (29 July 1516, [Galeazzo Visconti] to Henry, Zurich), 2231 (calendared end July 1516, [questions proposed to Wolsey] by Anchises Visconti), 2232 (calendared end July 1516, Galeazzo Visconti to -), 2249 (6 August 1516, extracts of various letters of [Galeazzo Visconti]), 2299 (25 August 1516, Pace to Ammonius, Constance); Ven.ii, 756 (4 August 1516, the captain and provedator at Bergamo to his son), 761 (16 August 1516, letter from Tours addressed to the secretary of the archbishop of Salerno), 766 (26 August 1516, Venetian secretary at Milan to the Signory), 767 (27 August 1516, Venetian secretary at Milan to the Signory). Negotiations among the Swiss and with the emperor were also affected by dissensions between those involved in negotiations. Essentially, there was a split between Pace and Galeazzo Visconti (the Milanese captain paid by England to lead the Cantons), on the one part, and Maximilian, Matthew Schiner (the influential Swiss ecclesiastic who had been integral in winning over some of the Swiss districts to the anti-French cause) and Robert Wingfield on the other. Tensions arose from each side attempting to attribute blame for the failure of the expedition thus far and, as far as the Visconti-Schiner split was concerned, to assume control of the Swiss forces; Henry VIII may have heard about the differences between Visconti and Schiner in correspondence from Spinelly (dated 28 May) and, as a result, urged the former to reconcile with the Swiss cardinal; in reply on 2 June, the Italian captain claimed to have done this, but the cardinal soon began defaming him again; LPIII, 1938 (27 May 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Antwerp), 1939 (27 May 1516, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Antwerp), 1982 (2 June 1516, [Galeazzo Visconti] to Henry, Zurich), 1983 (2 June 1516, [Galeazzo Visconti] to [Wolsey]), 2114 (calendared end June 1516). The net effect of this that, while negotiations continued for the relaunch of the
Castile, who, it was hoped, would help pay to hire the Swiss and honour a pledge to contribute (Neapolitan) troops to the expedition. While Charles made positive noises, he procrastinated in making any commitment to England. He was also known to be receptive to French overtures.252

expedition and to support the Imperial defence of Verona, in effect, two separate initiatives were being pursued, by Pace-Visconti on the one part and Maximilian-Schiner-Wingfield on the other, competing for access to English monies and, therefore, for leadership of the renewed campaign. Henry and Wolsey clearly had faith in Pace, who refused to hand over any more money to Maximilian without express consent from England. As far as the emperor was concerned, Wolsey told Pace on 23 June, the king appreciated the secretary’s opinions of him, but believed they ought to take him ‘as he is’ and use him to their own ends; ibid., 2082 (23 June 1516, Wolsey to Pace), 2083 (calendared 23-24 April 1516, Wolsey to [Pace]), 2084 (24 June 1516, Wolsey to [Pace]). For Pace and Visconti’s efforts to secure the services of the Swiss and work (as well as continued disagreements) with the emperor during June, see ibid., 2003 (5 June 1516, Pace to Ammonius), 2008 (6 June 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Augsburg), 2009 (6 June 1516, Galeazzo Visconti to Anchises, Zurich), 2010 (calendared 6 June 1516, Galeazzo Visconti to Anchises, Zurich), 2011 (6 June 1516, Galeazzo Visconti to his son Anchises, Zurich), 2012 (6 June 1516), 2015 (7 June 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Augusta), 2016 (7 June 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Augusta), 2024 (9 June 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 2030 (11 June 1516, Galeazzo Visconti to Pace, Zurich), 2034 (12 June 1516, Pace to [Wolsey]), 2042 (13 June 1516, Pace to Wolsey, ‘Myddelham’), 2046 (14 June 1516, Pace to Maximilian, ‘Ex Meinningho’), 2047 (14 June 1516, Pace to Wolsey, ‘Ex Meinningho’), 2052 (calendared 15-16 June 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Louvain), 2070 (21 June 1516, Pace to -, 2075 (22 June 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey), 2076 (22 June 1516, Pace to Wolsey), 2077 (22 June 1516, Galeazzo Visconti to [Henry and Wolsey], Zurich), 2078 (22 June 1516, Galeazzo Visconti to Maximilian), 2085 (23 June 1516, Anchises Visconti to Burbank, Constance), 2089 (24 June 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Constance), 2090 (19 June 1516, abstract of letter from Anchises [Visconti], Constance), 2100 (calendared 28 June 1516, [Pace] to Henry, Constance), 2111 (calendared end June 1516, fragment in Pace’s handwriting), 2114 (calendared end June 1516). For the Maximilian-Schiner-Wingfield axis, on the other hand, which continued to criticise Pace and Visconti, while attempting to secure money from the English secretary ostensibly for the defence of Verona, see ibid., 2014 (7 June 1516, Robert Wingfield to Henry, Trent), 2026 (10 June 1516, Robert Wingfield to Henry, Trent), 2035 (12 June 1516, Maximilian to [Pace], Erenberg), 2038 (13 June 1516, Cardinal Schiner to Henry, Trent), 2039 (13 June 1516, Cardinal Schiner to Wolsey, Trent), 2040 (calendared 13 June 1516, [Cardinal Schiner] to Barth. Ticcionus), 2041 (13 June 1516, Robert Wingfield to Henry, Trent), 2043 (13 June 1516, Jacobus [Villenger] to Pace, Augsburg), 2044 (14 June 1516, [Cardinal Schiner] to Henry, Trent), 2045 (14 June 1516, abstract of Cardinal Schiner’s letters, 2053 (16 June 1516, to Cardinal Schiner), 2055 (17 June 1516, [Cardinal Schiner] to Maximilian, Trent), 2056 (17 June 1516, Cardinal Schiner to [Pace, Trent), 2064 (19 June 1516, Cardinal Schiner to Henry, Trent), 2065 (19 June 1516, Cardinal Schiner to Wolsey), 2082 (25 June 1516, Cardinal Schiner to Wolsey, Trent), 2093 (25 June 1516, Andreas Schiner to Cardinal Schiner, Verona), 2095 (26 June 1516, Robert Wingfield to [Henry]), 2104 (29 June 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to Henry, ‘Ove[rlingen]’), 2105 (29 June 1516, Maximilian to Suffolk, ‘Uberlingen’), 2106 (29 June 1516, Pace to Wolsey, ‘Uberlingen’).

While English overtures to Charles of Castile met with a distinct lack of enthusiasm during May, by around 4 June they began to bear fruit, as English representatives at the Burgundian Court began to convey the Catholic King’s pledge to act. This was qualified, however, by a reluctance to send money to the emperor. Also, by 28 June, Charles was only prepared to commit his troops to ‘defensive’ actions (in other words not to actively pursue the expulsion of the French from Italy). It did not take long for reports to reach England that the Viceroy of Naples was moving to support the anti-French forces; LPIII, 1853 (4 May 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 1895 (16 May 1516, Spinelly to Henry, ‘Douay, in Artois’), 1904 (18 May 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Arras), 1978 (1 June 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 1993 (4 June 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 2019 (8 June 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 2033 (12 June 1516, Tunstal and Richard Wingfield to Henry, Louvain), 2052 (calendared 15-16 June 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Louvain), 2079 (23 June 1516, Tunstal and Richard
intended expedition against Naples, see English observations of French pressure applied on Charles via the duke of Guelders and rumours of an intended expedition against Naples, see \textit{LPIII}, 2217 (1 July 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels); R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, 2117 (7 May 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 2206 (23 July 1516, Tunstal and Richard Wingfield to [Henry], Brussels), 2183; 17 July 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). For further indications of Charles’ procrastination, see \textit{ibid.}, 1863 (6 May 1516, Imperial ambassador in England to Margaret of Savoy, London), 2033 (12 June 1516, Tunstal and Richard Wingfield to [Henry], Louvain), 2079 (23 June 1516, Tunstal and Richard Wingfield to [Henry], Brussels). For further indications of Charles’ procrastination, see \textit{ibid.}, 1863 (6 May 1516, Imperial ambassador in England to Margaret of Savoy, London), 2033 (12 June 1516, Tunstal and Richard Wingfield to [Henry], Louvain), 2050 (15 June 1516, Charles to Henry, Louvain), 2079 (23 June 1516, Tunstal and Richard Wingfield to [Henry], Brussels), 2080 (23 June 1516, Tunstal to [Wolsey], Brussels), 2087 (24 June 1516), 2088 (24 June 1516, commission to de Mesa), 2099 (23 June 1516, Tunstal to [Wolsey], Brussels); R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, 2222; 29 July 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). It was recognised in England that Charles’ reluctance to commit was because of concurrent Franco-Burgundian negotiations, through which an agreement seemed increasingly likely, particularly given Charles’ concern to secure the Low Countries before he travelled to Spain at a time when they were threatened by the French-backed duke of Guelders; \textit{LPIII}, 1848 (3 May 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 1853 (4 May 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 1862 (6 May 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 1895 (16 May 1516, Spinelly to Henry, ‘Douay, in Artois’), 1904 (18 May 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Arras), 1913 (20 May 1516, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Arras), 1938 (27 May 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Antwerp), 1939 (27 May 1516, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Antwerp), 1963 (31 May 1516, Jerningham to [Wolsey], Tournai), 1973 (calendared end May 1516, news from France), 1978 (1 June 1516, Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels), 1993 (4 June 1516, Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels), 2006 (6 June 1516, Tunstal and Richard Wingfield to Henry, Brussels), 2027 (10 June 1516, copy of a letter from the king’s spy, written at Mechelin), 2063 (19 June 1516, Tunstal and Richard Wingfield to Wolsey, Brussels), 2075 (22 June 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey), 2079 (23 June 1516, Tunstal and Richard Wingfield to [Henry], Brussels), 2080 (23 June 1516, Tunstal to [Wolsey], Brussels), 2081 (23 June 1516, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels); \textit{Ven.ii}, 759 (13 August, Giustinian to the Signory, London); R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, 2222; 29 July 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 265-270 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 757; \textit{LPIII}, 2259; 10 August 1516, Giustinian to the Signory). The English would have blamed these negotiations on the pro-French sympathies of some of Charles’
In spite of continued negotiations with its potential anti-French confederates, particularly focused in London on the formation of a league, the English initiative was gazumped by Francis I’s various counter-offers to the same powers. This began with the Treaty of Noyon (13 August 1516), agreed with Charles of Castile.253 The defection of Charles was to be followed by that of the Swiss on 24 November and Maximilian on 3 December.254 In light of the Franco-Spanish agreement, the English

principal councilors, in particular Chièvres and de Sauvage. On 6 May, for instance, Wolsey had tried to threaten them with the loss of their English pensions and with a revolution against their authority; LPiii, 1928 (22 May 1516, Wolsey to de Giglis, ‘From my house in London’), 2019 (8 June 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels). Wolsey, on 17 August, predicted that Charles would not go to Spain until a treaty was made with France; Ven.ii, 763 (19 August 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London).

According to Noyon, Charles agreed to restore the kingdom of Navarre to its original king and to marry Francis I’s daughter; LPiii, 2271-2272 (calendared 13-14 August 1516); Ven.ii, 765; K. Brandi, The Emperor Charles V, p.76; R. Lockyer, Habsburg and Bourbon Europe 1470-1720 (1974), p.223. The English crown was notified by various of its diplomats from the 15th onwards; LPiii, 2279 (15 August 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 2303 (26 August 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 2310 (28 August 1516, Robert Wingfield to Henry), 2327 (calendared end August 1516), 2328 (calendared end August 1516, [Wolsey] to [Tunstal and Richard Wingfield). Certainly, there were contemporaries who speculated that this agreement would put paid to any Swiss expedition and English ambitions; Ven.ii, 761 (16 August 1516, letter from Tours to the secretary of the archbishop of Salerno).

For reports of Imperial adhesion to the Treaty of Noyon, see LPiii, 2627 (calendared 1-3 December 1516, - to [Margaret of Savoy]), 2633 (5 December 1516, Tunstal to [Henry], Brussels), 2667 (13 December 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to [Henry], ‘Hagenau’), 2671 (13 December 1516, Tunstal to [Wolsey], Brussels). The English knew from at least early September that Maximilian had also been negotiating with the French to join ‘this foul peace’ and, even while negotiating towards an anti-French league through Cardinal Schiner, the emperor effectively indicated (on 12 October) that he was likely to conclude with Francis; ibid., 2331 (1 September 1516, Tunstal and Richard Wingfield to Wolsey, Brussels), 2335 (1 September 1516, Maraton to Robert Wingfield, ‘Ex arche Eerenberg apud Rate’), 2349 (9 September 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 2357 (12 September 1516, Margaret of Savoy to the Imperial ambassadors in England, Brussels), 2358 (13 September 1516, Tunstal to [Henry], Brussels), 2363 (14 September 1516, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels), 2366 (15 September 1516, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels), 2372 (17 September 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 2373 (20 September 1516, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels), 2374 (20 September 1516, Tunstal to Wolsey, Brussels), 2386 (25 September 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to [Henry], Augsburg), 2392 (27 September 1516, Tunstal to [Wolsey], Brussels), 2393 (Spinelly to Wolsey, 27 September 1516, Brussels), 2431 (8 October 1516, [Pace] to Wolsey), 2441 (12 October 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to [Wolsey], Augsburg), 2442 (12 October 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to [Pace], Augsburg), 2444 (13 October 1516, Da[vid Bastard] d’Emeries to Edward Poynings, Tournai), 2473 (22 October 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Zurich). Of additional concern to the English (vis-à-vis the prospect of a Franco-Imperial rapprochement) were rumours of some sort of convoluted financial arrangement for Maximilian to surrender Verona to the French (via Charles). The city was under siege by Franco-Venetian forces and the emperor at length gained English funds to help defend it, apparently in return for agreeing to the anti-French league. The perceived significance of Verona was such that Tunstal opined to Chièvres that, if the city was to be handed over, ‘the French would have Italy’; ibid., 2310 (28 August 1516, Robert Wingfield to Henry), 2331 (1 September 1516, Tunstal and Richard Wingfield to Wolsey, Brussels), 2374 (20 September 1516, Tunstal to Wolsey, Brussels), 2387 (calendared 25-26 September 1516, [Wolsey] to Pace), 2441 (12 October 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to [Wolsey], Augsburg), 2442 (12 October 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to [Pace], Augsburg), 2450 (16 October 1516, Tunstal to Henry, Brussels), 2495 (calendared end October, [Pace] to [Wolsey]), 2496 (calendared end October 1516, [Pace] to [Wolsey], [Zurich]); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.316-318 (Ven.ii, 795; LPiii,
crown was pragmatic; it recognised that it could do little about it (particularly given the pro-French nature of Charles’ chief councillors) and hoped that Charles’ reassurances that he would still align against France would bear fruit.\footnote{The actual reassurances that he would still align against France would bear fruit.}
failure of Henry and Wolsey’s efforts took some months to sink in, however.

Meanwhile, negotiations continued in London (and elsewhere) and agreement seems to have been close but unsuccessful on a number of occasions during September and October. Some cohesion to discussions was only offered when Maximilian sent Cardinal Schiner to England in late September 1516, in a final bid to break the impasse in negotiations and to agree a league and a renewed offensive. Discussions
resulted in a league ‘for defence of the Church’, concluded in London on 29 October 1516; it incorporated Henry VIII, Maximilian and Charles, while papal membership was anticipated.\textsuperscript{258} The low key nature of the conclusion and celebration of the treaty, as well as the secrecy surrounding its contents, are indication enough of a lack of certainty within England that the agreement would be ratified by its members.\textsuperscript{259} Possibly because of this, the retired principal minister, Fox, returned to Court by 18 November, perhaps to add his experience to English efforts.\textsuperscript{260} In subsequent months, the English sought formal approval of the agreement from Maximilian, Charles and the Swiss, with varying degrees of success.\textsuperscript{261} The emperor committed to the anti-


\textsuperscript{258}Integral to the coalition was the collective retention of the Swiss for the Italian enterprise. Among other clauses are the protection of Verona (with an English loan to Maximilian for this), that the emperor would descend to the Low Countries by Christmas and remove Charles’ pro-French councillors, that Henry would go to meet Maximilian shortly after, that the English king would be lobbied to accept the Imperial crown offered to him. Concerning Milan, there was a clause by which Maximilian would invest his ‘natural heirs’ with the duchy if Henry was ‘willing to undertake the defence of Christendom’ but, if not, he would bestow it on Henry’s nominee, as long as the expulsion of the French from Italy was aided by England. Concerning the expulsion of the French from the peninsula, the cost to England was to be met by Milan and other Italian states; \textit{LPIii}, 2462 (20 October 1516), 2463 (calendared 20 October 1516), 2466 (29 October 1516), 2497 (calendared start November 1516), 2515 (7 November 1516, Cardinal Schiner and Titonius).

\textsuperscript{259} The articles of the league were sworn to by Henry VIII, the Imperial and Spanish ambassadors in a Mass on 1 November 1516, in a small chapel usually used by the king. In addition, Giustinian claimed, the articles were not published. From this, one can imply that the English crown wished to keep the agreement, or at least its details, secret at this stage (perhaps awaiting firm declarations of support from its allies). This would explain why Norfolk (at least partially) misinformed Giustinian around 21 October that Schiner was there to propose universal peace. Also, merchant letters from England of 6 November failed to mention the treaty. In addition, Henry VIII was to receive an instalment of the French pension in November, which he doubtless wanted not to jeopardise; \textit{ibid.}, 2497 (calendared start November 1516), 2510 (5 November 1516); R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, i, pp. 309-312 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 792; \textit{LPIii}, 2470; 21 October 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 321-325 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 800; \textit{LPIii}, 2499; 1 November 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London); \textit{ibid.}, ii, pp.19-20 (\textit{LPIii}, 2665; 13 December 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London); \textit{Ven.ii}, 817 (27 November 1516, letters from Venetian merchants in England), 825 (13 December 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London); \textit{Sp.ii}, 252 (1 November 1516). In spite of English efforts, the league did not remain much of a secret, as Francis I knew of it and of Schiner’s involvement by 25 November; \textit{Ven.ii}, 821 (25 November 1516, Giovanni Badoer to the Signory, Amboise).

\textsuperscript{260} Fox certainly seems to have been \textit{au fait} with the anti-French agreement and foreign affairs more generally; R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, ii, pp.9-12 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 811; \textit{LPIii}, 2559; 18 November 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London).

\textsuperscript{261} Upon conclusion of the treaty, Tunstal and Robert Wingfield were commissioned to receive the oaths of confirmation from Charles and Maximilian, respectively. Around 8-9 November, copies of the treaty were distributed to Pace and Tunstal, for the benefit of the Swiss and Charles, respectively. One would also have expected a copy to be sent to the emperor; \textit{LPIii}, 2497 (calendared start November...
French league on 8 December but, as mentioned, had already pledged himself to Noyon. On receipt of initial reports of the latter, Henry was ‘marvellously anguis[hed] and perplexed’ and believed that, if true, it would not only be ‘to the roome of all Christendom, but also to his [Maximilian’s] perpetual shame’. Nevertheless, the English persisted in observing their financial commitments to the emperor and appear to have been convinced during December that he remained anti-French at heart. Continued discussions were also conducted with Charles although,

1516), 2528 (calendared 8-9 November 1516), 2613 (30 November 1516, Robert Wingfield to [Wolsey], ‘Hagenaw in Nether Elsace’).

262 There seems to have been some procrastination to joining the London treaty on the emperor’s part, probably because of his concurrent negotiations with the French; ibid., 2605 (28 November 1516, Robert Wingfield to [Henry], ‘Hagenaw in Nether Elsace’), 2613 (30 November 1516, Robert Wingfield to [Wolsey], ‘Hagenaw in Nether Elsace’), 2626 (calendared 1-3 December 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to [Henry]), 2627 (calendared 1-3 December 1516, - to [Margaret of Savoy]), 2634 (5 December 1516, Wolsey to Schiner), 2641 (7 December 1516, Robert Wingfield to Henry, ‘Hagenow’), 2645 (7 December 1516, Louis Maroton to Margaret of Savoy, ‘Hagenaw’), 2647 (8 December 1516), 2648 (8 December 1516, Robert Wingfield to [Henry], ‘Hagenow in the Neethir Elsace’), 2661 (11 December 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to Henry, ‘Nether Alsace’), 2662 (11 December 1516, Schiner to Wolsey, Hagenow). The English must have been at least fairly confident of success, as Schiner also agreed a supplementary Anglo-Imperial treaty on 2 November, whereby Maximilian would go to the Low Countries to remove Chièvres and others from Charles’ Council (the journey subsidised by the English), so that Charles could be detached from Noyon, meet Henry at or around Calais and would be sent English money for the relief of Verona. While the English met their end of the bargain (by advancing money to the emperor), the emperor’s ‘descent’ was repeatedly stalled, although Maximilian appeared to be moving towards the Low Countries and continued reassurances emanated from Germany. Indeed, the English seem to have abandoned the meeting at least by early December, although they continued with their financial obligations; ibid., 2501 (2 November 1516), 2536 (11 November 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to Henry, ‘Stayn on the Rhine’), 2573 (21 November 1516, Maximilian to Margaret, Strasbourg), 2585 (calendared 23 November 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 2589 (24 November 1516, Robert Wingfield to Wolsey, ‘Hagenow in Nether Alsatia’), 2596 (25 November 1516, Tunstal to Wolsey, Brussels), 2605 (28 November 1516, Robert Wingfield to [Henry], ‘Hagenaw in Nether Elsace’), 2626 (calendared 1-3 December 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to [Henry]), 2627 (calendared 1-3 December 1516, - to [Margaret of Savoy]), 2631 (calendared 4-5 December 1516, [Henry] to [Wolsey]), 2632 (calendared 4-5 December 1516, Henry to Robert Wingfield), 2634 (5 December 1516, Wolsey to Schiner), 2650 (8 December 1516, Margaret of Savoy to Henry, Brussels), 2651 (8 December 1516, Margaret of Savoy to Wolsey, Brussels), 2652 (8 December 1516, [Margaret of Savoy] to [de Hesdin], Brussels), 2661 (11 December 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to Henry, ‘Nether Alsace’), 2662 (11 December 1516, Schiner to Wolsey, Hagenow).

263 Ibid., 2678 (Wolsey to Sir Robert Wingfield, 16 December 1516).

264 Initially, denials were issued from Imperial sources about the agreement, but when these could no longer hold water, Maximilian admitted that he had had no choice but to enter the Treaty of Noyon. Following the arrival of early reports of the defection, Henry was reportedly mortified and sought confirmation from Germany. If it was not true, Wolsey instructed Wingfield to give way to more of the emperor’s financial demands. Indeed, his adhesion to Noyon notwithstanding, Maximilian indicated that he would continue on an anti-French course if this occurred. The English further continued to push towards an alliance and meeting with the emperor. By 25 December, Wolsey wrote of his belief that Maximilian ‘doth play on both hands’ and that, on this basis, England would retain its faith in him. This opinion was repeated by Ruthal; ibid., 2632 (calendared 4-5 December 1516, Henry to Robert Wingfield), 2640 (6 December 1516, Tunstal to Wolsey, Brussels), 2650 (8 December 1516, Margaret...

The Imperial surrender of Verona during December in a deal with France, however, the defence of which England had been bound to contribute, must have caused great resentment within crown circles (despite Maximilian’s protestations that he had no choice); LPIII, 2501 (2 November 1516), 2536 (11 November 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to Henry, ‘Stayn on the Rhine’), 2565 (19 November 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Zurich), 2573 (21 November 1516, Maximilian to Margaret, Strasbourg), 2589 (24 November 1516, Robert Wingfield to Wolsey, ‘Hagenow in Nether Alsatis’), 2626 (calendared 1-3 December 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to [Henry]), 2662 (11 December 1516, Schiner to Wolsey, Hagenow), 2667 (13 December 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to [Henry], ‘Hagenaw’), 2683 (18 December 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 2702 (26 December 1516, Tunstal to Wolsey), 2707 (calendared 28 December 1516, [Schiner] to [Wolsey]), 2719 (calendared end December 1516, [Henry] to [Somerset and Knight]), 2721 (calendared end December 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.12-16 (Ven.ii, 791; LPIII, 2464; 20 October 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 20-25 (Ven.ii, 828; LPIII, 2710). Another worry for England arising from the Franco-Imperial alignment would have been the reported offer by Francis to split Italy from Noyon) by virtue of his agreed ‘descent’ to the Low Countries. The Swiss visibly backed off from the anti-French league post-Noyon, although Pace indicated that at least some of the Cantons could still be won over, even
after their agreement with Francis I. At the close of 1516, therefore, prospects for
the anti-French league did not look bright, although the English continued to be
convinced that the other parties would not observe their various agreements with
Francis I. It may have been indicative of this that, at the end of December,
Giustinian observed a number of Henry’s ministers advocating universal peace. To
protect the papacy from the French, an aggressive course was increasingly unfeasible;
was this a precursor to the universal peace later advocated in 1518?

The confirmation and enacting of the league ‘to defend the Church’ looked
increasingly unlikely to the English crown in early 1517, as all of its principal allies
aligned with France. In addition, it was rumoured that a meeting would be held
between the three ‘Noyon’ monarchs at Cambrai, although this soon changed into a
conference between their delegates. Maximilian had given up Verona, hitherto the

266 For continued English pressure applied to the Swiss and hopes that they could still be turned against
France, in spite of the French peace, see LPIIIi, 2516 (7 November 1516, [Pace] to Wolsey, Zurich),
2519 (8 November 1516), 2531 (calendared 9 November 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to Henry, Over lynge
on the Lake of Constance), 2586 (23 November 1516, extracts from Pace’s letters, Constance), 2587
(calendared 23 November 1516, [Pace] to [Wolsey]), 2591 (24 November 1516, [Pace] to Maximilian,
Zurich), 2601 (27 November 1516, Filonardi to Henry, Zurich), 2602 (27 November 1516, Filonardi to
Wolsey, Zurich), 2615 (calendared end 1516, [Wolsey] to [Pace]), 2675 (15 December 1516, [Pace] to
[Wolsey], Zurich).

267 On 7 December, for instance, Wolsey declared that, within two months, England and Spain would
send ambassadors to France and Venice to demand that they cease their offensive against Verona and,
by the 13th, it was reported that Knight had been commissioned for this purpose (although Knight went
to the emperor); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.12-16 (Ven.ii, 791; LPIIIi, 2464; 20 October 1516,
Giustinian to the Signory, London), 19-20 (Ven.ii, 825; LPIIIi, 2665; 13 December 1516, Giustinian to
the Signory).

268 Ibid., pp.25-26 (Ven.ii, 829; LPIIIIi, 2712; 30 December 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London).

269 An indicator of the desperation felt in England came in early January, when Wolsey and Ruthal, in
response to reports of an Imperial-Venetian peace, claimed credit for this purpose (although Knight went
to the emperor); R. Brown, Four Years (trans.), ii, pp.27-28 (Ven.ii, 834; LPIIIIi, 2753; 6 January 1517,
Giustinian to the Signory, London), 28-29 (Ven.ii, 837; LPIIIii, 2839; 8 January 1517, Giustinian to the
Signory, London).

270 For rumours of such a meeting from early December 1516, see LPIIIi, 2633 (5 December 1516,
Tunstal to [Henry], Brussels), 2634 (5 December 1516, Wolsey to Schiner), 2672 (14 December 1516,
Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 2683 (18 December 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 2709 (29
December 1516, Erasmus to Ammonius, [Brussels]), 2721 (calendared end December 1516, Spinelly to
Wolsey, Brussels); LPIIIii, 2744 (Richard Wingfield to Wolsey, 1 January 1517, Calais), 2745 (1
object of the anti-French cause in Italy. Nevertheless, Henry continued to plough the anti-French furrow, apparently trusting signals from each of the aforementioned parties that they were committed to the October 1516 league. To this end, it seems that Henry still intended to cross to Calais to meet with Maximilian and Charles. Perhaps the final nail in the coffin of the ‘holy league’ occurred on 14 February, however, when the emperor swore adhesion to Noyon. Tunstal and Somerset, ambassadors at the Court of Charles, subsequently recommended that Henry ‘draw his foot out of the affair gently as if he perceived it not, giving good words for good words’. Vis-à-vis, their failure to gain Charles’ confirmation of the anti-French treaty,
they recommended that Henry and Wolsey make the best of the accord as it stood, to consider it binding to the Catholic King and not to refer anything else to the emperor, Margaret of Savoy or Cardinal Schiner. Similarly, Knight (in Brussels) informed Wolsey that all of his fears had been realised and that, concerning the Cambrai conference, Wolsey ought to ‘be on his guard, as he cannot be sure of anything they [Charles’ pro-French advisors and the French commissioners] will do’. Despite all of this, the English crown remained optimistic, contrary advice from its diplomats notwithstanding. Even around 23 February, it was still hoped in England that the emperor would fulfil his promises, that Charles would adhere to the anti-French treaty and that Charles, Maximilian and Henry would meet.

274 Maximilian took his oath in front of Charles at Brussels. Unconfirmed news of this was sent to England by Spinelly on 15-16 February, although formal notifications by Somerset and Tunstal were forwarded on the 18th. While the Imperial secretary, Maroton, suggested that the emperor would still entertain English overtures, the English diplomats described these as ‘painted words’ designed ‘to suck money from our master’ and further stated that they did not trust him; LPIIIi, 2929 (calendared 15-16 February 1517, [Spinelly] to [Henry]), 2940 (18 February 1517, Somerset and Tunstal to [Wolsey], Mechelin). Also see ibid., 2862 (1 February 1517, Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels), 2891 (8 February 1517, Somerset and Tunstal to [Henry]). Tunstal had warned Wolsey about the ‘dissimulation’ in Brussels on 13 February and advised the cardinal to do the same, to ‘shut the King’s purse’ and make the best of the treaty with Maximilian and Charles, ‘or the King will be left without friends’. Knight wrote to Wolsey along similar lines on the 16th; ibid., 2923 (13 February 1517, Tunstal to Wolsey), 2930 (16 February 1517, Knight to Wolsey, Brussels).

275 Ibid., 2943 (19 February 1517, Knight to [Wolsey]).

276 Around 23 February, Henry VIII acknowledged the warnings of his ambassadors concerning the intentions of England’s ‘allies’. The king claimed to have written to them on hearing of the emperor’s intention to ratify Noyon, ‘to express sharply’ his unhappiness. Despite this, Wolsey was convinced (by Schiner’s assurances) that Maximilian would come good. Henry, therefore, intended ‘to refrain for a time…’Better it is to dissemble for a season till we may see the end, than by such means to provoke his further displeasures,” otherwise all their labours will be lost’; ibid., 2958 (calendared 23 February 1517, [Henry] to [Somerset and others]). Also see ibid., 2963 (24 February 1517, Wolsey to [Henry], Westminster). The English representatives in Brussels felt betrayed by Maximilian that he had ratified without fulfilling his pledge to consult Henry first. They were also sceptical that the emperor would fulfil his promises vis-à-vis Charles. This feeling even spread among other English diplomats and Jerningham and the Council of Tournai even recommended on 1 April that Maximilian and Charles were not to be trusted; ibid., 2765 (11 January 1517, Tunstal to [Henry], Brussels), 2922 (13 February 1517, Spinelly to Wolsey), 2964 (24 February 1517, Tunstal to [Henry], Brussels), 3059 (27 March 1517, Somerset and Tunstal, Mechelin), 3090 (calendared 1 April 1517, [Pace] to Wolsey), 3099 (4 April 1517, Jerningham and the Council of Tournai to [Henry], Tournai). For continued English efforts with Maximilian, who still purported to be committed against France, see ibid., 2909 (12 February 1517, Somerset, Tunstal and Wingfield to [Henry]), 2997 (8 March 1517, Schiner to Wolsey, Brussels). For the continued protracted negotiations between Henry and Charles, albeit with positive indications from the latter that he would eventually agree, see ibid., 2958 (calendared 23 February 1517, [Henry] to [Somerset and others]), 2964 (24 February 1517, Tunstal to [Henry], Brussels), 2968 (26 February 1517, Somerset and Tunstal to [Henry]), 3015 (16 March 1517, Spinelly to Henry), 3033 (20 March 1517, Schiner to Robert Wingfield). For the decreasing likelihood of a meeting between
The English still failed to acknowledge the failure of its anti-French league when, on 11 March 1517, the Peace of Cambrai was concluded between Francis I, Charles and Maximilian. It stipulated mutual defence and an intention to crusade although, of potential concern to England, there were secret clauses that provided for the division of Italy between them (excluding Venice).\(^{277}\) One can understand why Henry and Wolsey did not panic, however, as the agreement did not change the prevailing political status quo.\(^{278}\) Furthermore, the same positive indications still emanated from Maximilian and Charles that they would ultimately declare themselves against Francis I. Wolsey lost his patience with the emperor’s continued financial demands by early April and called his bluff; if Maximilian wanted a ‘rupture’, so be it. He also questioned the emperor’s failure to observe his promises to Henry and asserted that Francis was laughing at the English king for financing Maximilian’s ‘descent’ to the Low Countries. While Tunstal took the decision not to present this missive, he seems to have conveyed the general message that this was the emperor’s final chance.\(^{279}\) Subsequently, Maximilian seemed more amenable to helping Henry

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Henry, Maximilian and Charles, following the emperor’s adhesion to Noyon, see ibid., 2958 (calendared 23 February 1517, [Henry] to [Somerset and others]), 2964 (24 February 1517, Tunstal to [Henry], Brussels).

\(^{277}\) Ibid., 3008 (11 March 1517). Knecht questions whether the articles concerning Italy were ever seriously intended by Francis, given that he was only prepared to follow these up if his amity with Venice ended. Indeed, the Franco-Venetian alliance was renewed in October 1517, making this academic; R.J. Knecht, Francis I, p.68.

\(^{278}\) In advance of the peace, on 24 February, Wolsey opined to Henry that there was nothing to fear, seemingly in relation to Chèvres and Sauvage’s conference with French commissioners, given that Somerset intended to continue ‘in his devices’ in the Low Countries; LPHlii, 2963 (24 February 1517, Wolsey to [Henry], Westminster). Following the concusion of the Treaty of Cambrai, Spinelly, on 16 March, declared that none of the articles that he had seen were prejudicial to England, Schiner notified Wingfield that a place in it had been left for Henry and a copy was sent to England on the 27th. Concerning the clauses about Italy, the English were only informed (again by Schiner) that Venice had been excluded from the agreement; ibid., 3015 (16 March 1517, Spinelly to Henry), 3033 (20 March 1517, Schiner to Robert Wingfield), 3059 (27 March 1517, Somerset and Tunstal, Mechelin).

\(^{279}\) Wolsey was careful to issue his ultimatum indirectly through Cardinal Schiner; ibid., 3106 (7 April 1517, Wolsey to [Schiner]). Henry also wrote to the emperor along these lines, but neither letter was presented by the English ambassadors on account of their ‘severe terms’; ibid., 3109 (9 April 1517, [Henry] to Maximilian), 3126 (15 April, Somerset and Tunstal to [Henry]), 3128 (15 April 1517, Tunstal to Wolsey). Prior to Wolsey making a stand, the crown apparently continued to believe in the emperor’s declarations of support after the Treaty of Cambrai and continued to engage with him; ibid., 3033 (20 March 1517, Schiner to Robert Wingfield), 3074, (30 March 1517, Somerset, Tunstal and
gain Charles’ adhesion to the anti-French league, although he still appeared to
dissimulate and continue to lobby England for money.280 It is only from the end of
May that the emperor seems to indicate his intention to fully commit against France;
this filled the English crown with more optimism.281 This led to negotiations towards
a reformulated ‘league for the defence of the Church’, which was finalised on 5 July
1517.282 In wake of this, however, Maximilian reverted to his demands for English
money.283 Around the same time as Wolsey’s ultimatum to the emperor, English
representatives in the Low Countries were also instructed to gain Charles’
confirmation of the anti-French league, without any further quibbling over its articles.
Again, this seems to have been presented as one last push to win over the Spanish king and, appreciating this, Charles and his ministers were also amenable. Charles declared his willingness to confirm the October treaty around 27 April and, indeed, this was done on 11 May. 284 Furthermore, Charles, at length, sent a grand embassy to England to follow this up (and to seek a loan for his intended voyage to Spain), effectively by swearing to the reformulated holy league on 5 July, at which Imperial and papal representatives also participated. 285

The ‘league for defence of the Church’, between Henry, Maximilian and Charles, stipulated that the Swiss would be retained for 30,000 florins per year (by Henry and Charles), one presumes for action in Italy. The other parties ratified by

284 Ibid., 3126 (15 April, Somerset and Tunstal to [Henry]). The commission to gain Charles’ adhesion was issued on 2 April. A sense of the finality of the English offer can be gained from Henry’s instruction at the end of April to accept Charles’ confirmation or, if this was difficult, gain this via Margaret of Savoy and Maximilian. Failing that, however, the English ambassadors were to retire to Tournai; ibid., 3076 (30 March 1517, Spinelly to [Henry]), 3094 (2 April 1517), 3101 (4 April 1517, Somerset, Tunstal and Robert Wingfield to [Henry], Antwerp), 3102 (4 April 1517, Somerset and Tunstal to Henry, Antwerp), 3107 (7 April 1517, Somerset, Tunstal and Wingfield to [Henry]), 3128 (15 April 1517, Tunstal to Wolsey), 3143 (19 April 1517, Somerset, Tunstal and Wingfield to [Henry]), 3144 (19 April 1517, Somerset to Henry, Brussels), 3174 (26 April 1517, Somerset to [Henry]), 3178 (27 April 1517, Somerset and Tunstal to Henry), 3179 (calendared 27 April 1517, Charles to Henry), 3180 (27 April 1517, Tunstal to Wolsey), 3183 (28 April 1517, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 3191 (calendared end April 1517, [Henry to Somerset and others]), 3200 (3 May 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 3210 (7 May 1517, Somerset and Tunstal to Henry, Louvain), 3212 (7 May 1517, Spinelly to Henry), 3221 (11 May 1517), 3233 (12 May 1517, Somerset and Tunstal to [Henry]), 3222-3225 (11 May 1517), 3231 (12 May 1517, Margaret of Savoy to [Wolsey], Ghent), 3232 (12 May 1517, Somerset, Tunstal and Robert Wingfield to [Henry], Brussels), 3343 (7 June 1517, Tunstal to [Henry], Brussels).

285 It was said by Giustinian that a new oath ceremony was required because of the removal of clauses originally inserted by Cardinal Schiner; ibid., 3260 (19 May 1517, Spinelly to Wolsey), 3270 (22 May 1517, Somerset and Tunstal to [Henry]), 3283 (25 May 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Ghent), 3344 (7 June 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Ghent), 3368-3369 (16 June 1517), 3378 (19 June 1517, Tunstal to [Henry], Ghent), 3398 (25 June 1517, [Cardinal of Aragon] to [Wolsey], Bruges), 3399 (calendared at 25 June 1517, Cardinal of Aragon to Wolsey, Calais), 3417 (calendared end June 1517, Henry to [Tunstal and others]); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.90-93 (Ven.ii, 908; LPiii, 3372; 17 June 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 93-95 (Ven.ii, 913; LPiii, 3415; 30 June 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London). For Charles’ commitment being linked to a substantial loan for his voyage to Spain (as well as for fighting the duke of Guelders), which was granted in July, see LPiii, 3402 (26 June 1517), 3417 (calendared end June 1517, Henry to [Tunstal and others]), 3439 (6 July 1517, Charles to Henry, Middelbourg), 3440 (6 July 1517, Charles to Wolsey, Middelbourg), 3441 (6 July 1517, Charles to his ambassadors in England, Middelbourg), 3442 (6 July 1517, Charles’ instructions to his ambassadors in England), 3513-3514 (25 July 1517, Charles to Wolsey, Middelbourg); Sp.ii, 256 (LPiii, 3491; 18 July 1517, Charles to all persons, Middelbourg) 257 (18 July 1517, Charles to his ambassadors in England, Middelbourg), 258 (18 July 1517), 259 (22 July 1517, Charles to all persons, Middelbourg); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.103-104 (Ven.ii, 930; LPiii, 3492; 19 July 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London). Charles was still not trusted by English diplomats, however; see for example LPiii, 3248 (16 May 1517, Pace to [Burbank], Constance).
proxy and a letter patent was recited from Charles. The clauses were said to be those agreed for the previously agreed league of October 1516, albeit it was a ‘defensive’ rather than a ‘defensive’ and ‘offensive’ coalition. Of England’s two allies, Henry and Wolsey had good reason to be confident that Charles would ultimately follow-through with his anti-French commitments. The Spanish king needed Henry as an ally, particularly as he felt a pressing need to go to Spain, where a revolt had the potential to threaten his authority there. To achieve this, he sought an English loan for the voyage (which seems to have been granted in return for his membership of the anti-Gallic league), as well as assistance against the growing military threat to Burgundy by the (French supported) duke of Guelders, particularly while he was in Spain. For the English, Charles’ need to go to Spain was also a credible reason for the continued Franco-Spanish amity which, it was claimed (repeatedly by Chièvres),

286. LPIII, 3437 (5 July 1517); Ven.ii, 918 (10 July 1517, Chieregato to the Marchioness of Mantua, London), 919 (10 July 1517, Chieregato to Francesco II Gonzaga, London); R. Brown, Four Years, ii (1854), pp.95-103 (Ven.ii, 920; LPIII, 3455; 10 July 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London). It was said to be a defensive alliance against France which, in addition to providing for a military offensive, envisaged Leo X using his spiritual weapons; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.93-95 (Ven.ii, 913; LPIII, 3415; 30 June 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London).

287. The English knew of Charles’ need to visit Spain on account of a revolt that appeared to threaten his authority there, from at least March 1517; LPIII, 3069 (29 March 1517, David Bastard d’Emeries) to Poyning, Tournai), 3076 (30 March 1517, Spinelly to [Henry]), 3088 (1 April 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 3143 (19 April 1517, Somerset, Tunstal and Wingfield to [Henry]), 3200 (3 May 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 3210 (7 May 1517, Somerset and Tunstal to Henry, Louvain), 3212 (7 May 1517, Spinelly to Henry), 3233 (12 May 1517, Somerset and Tunstal to [Henry]), 3246 (15 May 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 3283 (25 May 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Ghent), 3300 (29 May 1517, Spinelly to [Henry], Ghent), 3344 (7 June 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Ghent), 3378 (19 June 1517, Tunstal to [Henry], Ghent); R. Brown, Four Years (trans.), ii, pp.88-90 (Ven.ii, 893; LPIII, 3295; 28 May 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London). Also see H. Kamen, Spain 1469-1714: a Society of Conflict (1983), pp.73-74. Charles eventually departed for Spain (a voyage subsidised by England) in September 1517 and was to stay there until 1520; LPIII, 3692 (19 September 1517, Spinelly to Henry, ‘At sea at the Sell’), 3705 (29 September 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Spain), addendum 200 (15 October 1517, A. de la Laing to Wolsey, Brussels); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.134-135 (Ven.ii, 979; LPIII, 3738; Giustinian to the Signory, London); M.F. Alvarez, Charles V Elected Emperor and Hereditary Ruler (1975), pp.20-21, 36-37.

288. For the loan, see for instance, LPIII, 3344 (7 June 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Ghent), 3378 (19 June 1517, Tunstal to [Henry], Ghent). Towards the end of May, Henry was tentatively approached to become the protector of Flanders. For this, the threat felt by Charles from Guelders and the belief that the duke was being actively backed by Francis I, see ibid., 3300 (29 May 15117, Spinelly to [Henry], Ghent), 3453 (9 July 1517, Tunstal to Henry), 3536 (29 July 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Bruges), 3542 (30 July 1517, Tunstal to [Henry], ‘Myddelborowe’), 3586 (17 August 1517, Spinelly to Henry), 3608 (20 August 1517, Spinelly to Tuke, ‘Middelburg’), 3647 (28 August 1517, Spinelly to Wolsey); Ven.ii, 945 (6 August 1517, Chieregato to Francesco II Gonzaga, London).
would be broken once Charles was secure in his southern territories.\footnote{Spinelly certainly voiced this opinion; \textit{LPIii}, 3344 (7 June 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Ghent), 3378 (19 June 1517, Tunstal to [Henry], Ghent), 3537 (29 July 1517, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels). Further optimism would have been gained from hearing that Charles’ Spanish advisors were opposed to the French amity; \textit{ibid.}, 2930 (16 February 1517, Knight to Wolsey, Brussels). That Charles was increasingly leaning towards England may also have been interpreted by Wolsey who, in June 1517, was granted a pension backdated to July 1516 and, during August, may have had a bishopric tentatively offered to him; \textit{ibid.}, 3345 (7 June 1517, Spinelly to Wolsey, Ghent), 3347 (8 June 1517), 3605 (19 August 1517, Spinelly to Tuke).} Despite this optimism gained from both the emperor and king of Spain, doubts must still have been harboured in England, particularly when one considers that both swore to the Treaty of Cambrai as recently as 14 May.\footnote{On the 17th, Henry’s ambassadors in the Low Countries notified him of this. Charles further issued instructions to receive Francis’ oath of observance in mid-June; \textit{ibid.}, 3246 (15 May 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 3251 (17 May 1517, Somerset, Tunstal and Wingfield to Henry), 3375 (18 June 1517, Charles’ instructions to -). Also see \textit{ibid.}, 3378 (19 June 1517, Tunstal to [Henry], Ghent).}

Returning to the Anglo-papal focus, during the progress of the Pace expedition (March-April 1516), the English had failed to gain definitive backing from the papacy. From its faltering at Milan, moreover, it was observed that Leo X would not support the anti-French cause while it was losing and, also, that he began to meet his obligations to support Francis I (in the ‘defence’ of Italy against the Imperial-Swiss descent). An indication of this came on 4 April, when Wingfield reported that Leo X had made no offer to support the expedition financially.\footnote{Neither, he added, had any other Italian state; \textit{LPIii}, 1736 (4 April 1516, Robert Wingfield to [Henry], ‘in...village de Costa’).} In the context of the emperor’s retreat, which the English ambassador accompanied, the implication was that no such contribution could now be expected. Similarly, around 8 April, Pace forwarded intelligence that Francis had sent all of his troops to Bologna, to defend the pope, while Leo himself had sent an envoy to Francis to place himself in the Frenchman’s hands.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, 1747 (calendared 8 April 1516, Pace to Wolsey).} The suggestion was that the pope was no longer reluctant to observe his alliance with France. On 23 April, as the expedition was clearly collapsing, Pace notified Wolsey that the pope (along with Florence and Genoa)
would not assist them against the French until Milan had fallen. He recommended that negotiations needed to be conducted with the pope, ‘who is afraid of the French King becoming monarch of the whole world’.²⁹³ This was probably too late: as soon as he heard that the French were in the ascendancy, Leo X adjusted his stance. The legate Bibbiena ceased traveling towards Maximilian (pleading sickness) and Leo finally agreed to pay the wages of the Swiss as requested by Francis (at least for one month anyway).²⁹⁴ Furthermore, a letter of uncertain provenance (dated 24 April) that apparently reached England, reported that the pope’s nephew (Lorenzo de’ Medici) had engaged in an expedition with France against Naples.²⁹⁵ On 6 May, Spinelly reported that Leo’s ‘feelings’ towards the emperor had altered, following the latter’s departure from Milan.²⁹⁶ By 12 May, Pace informed Wolsey that a papal representative had proposed peace between the Empire and France, although the emperor’s reaction was somewhat dismissive.²⁹⁷ That the papacy would have understood that the expedition had effectively collapsed would have been interpreted by a letter to Wolsey from de Castello of 11 May.²⁹⁸ Cumulatively, this intelligence about the papacy’s shifting policy towards France surely caused greater uncertainty in

²⁹³ Ibid., 1816 (23 April 1516, Pace to [Wolsey], Bergamo).
²⁹⁴ While Wingfield, on 28 April, reported knowledge of the legate’s arrangement to meet Maximilian at Lake Garda, Italian intelligence referred to England at the start of May stated that Bibbiena refused to continue towards Maximilian until the latter had departed (again) for Milan. It was said, furthermore, by the commander of the Swiss (Galeazzo Visconti), that the papal confidante had no confidence in the emperor (one presumes in continuing the expedition as much as anything else). This is contained in Italian intelligence that reached Imperial sources in the Low Countries and which was usually forwarded on to England by Thomas Spinelly; ibid., 1833 (28 April 1516, [Robert Wingfield to Henry], Trent), 1854 (4 May 1516, extracts of intelligence from Italy); L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, p.154; W. Roscoe, Leo the Tenth, ii, p.52.
²⁹⁵ LPIII, 1825 (24 April 1516, - to -, Paris).
²⁹⁶ Ibid., 1862 (6 May 1516, Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels).
²⁹⁷ Maximilian reportedly rejected the overture not necessarily because he was averse to peace, but rather because he objected to this papal intercession; ibid., 1878 (12 May 1516, [Pace to Wolsey], Trent).
²⁹⁸ In this, de Castello discloses his knowledge of the emperor’s withdrawal and the Swiss’ imminent retreat if they were not paid by the next day; ibid., 1874 (11 May 1516, de Castello to Wolsey, Rome). Thomas Colman, based in Rome, made a similar assessment on the 1st. He considered the pope to be ‘entirely French’ and the Florentines adherents to the same. In also suggesting Maximilian’s laziness and deeming the French defence of Milan to be successful, Wolsey’s protégé was also suggesting a valid reason why the papacy was not likely to break with France; ibid., 1844 (1 May 1516, Thomas Colman to Wolsey, Rome).
crown circles. The maintenance of a spy at Amboise to collect information about
Franco-papal communications in relation to England (among other things), indicates
the degree of English fear.\textsuperscript{299} Apparently reflecting on the emperor’s withdrawal from
Milan and Leo X’s role in the whole episode, Pace asserted (on 2 April) that ‘the Pope
hath played marvelously upon both hands in this enterprise’, promising the emperor
that he would not contribute to the French defence of Milan (as he was bound to do by
treaty), and at the same time telling the Swiss that, as the French were his allies, all
who waged war against Francis were ‘enemies of the Church’.\textsuperscript{300} In this context,
therefore, Henry’s direct approach to Leo on 20 April to agree to the ‘methods of
security’ that he had recommended to him, most likely an early reaction to
Maximilian’s retreat from Milan, probably fell on deaf ears.\textsuperscript{301}

The English quickly understood, therefore, that Leo X had retracted any
support hitherto given to the anti-French agenda and that they would have to start
again with their overtures to Rome. As with the general English strategy towards
other potential allies, this time the crown was to be more publicly vocal and more
limited in its focus on Italy.\textsuperscript{302} Again, the hope was that the pontiff would move
decisively in their favour when he saw that the anti-French powers were ‘winning’.
First, however, both England and Rome had to overcome some trust issues; in late
April, Wolsey received complaints from Leo X about the paucity of communication
from England. Replying on 22 May, a forthright Wolsey suggested that this would
continue unless Leo kept Henry a continuing
further added that, if the pope did want Henry’s advice or support on any issue, that

\textsuperscript{299} \textit{Ibid.}, 1835 (30 April 1516, news from France).
\textsuperscript{300} Pace also reported Leo’s release from prison of a Swiss captain who had since recruited for the
French cause; \textit{Ibid.}, 1729 (2 April 1516, Pace to Wolsey, ‘Lauda’).
\textsuperscript{301} The ‘methods’ are not revealed, as Henry referred the pope to de Giglis for more information and
the relevant communication to the bishop of Worcester appears not to have survived; \textit{LPIII}, 1788 (20
April 1516, Henry to Leo, Eltham).
\textsuperscript{302} See above pp.530-532.
he ought to request it directly.\textsuperscript{303} The implication is that the English crown had found
it difficult to interpret the pontiff’s ‘real’ foreign policy and called for more clarity. In
any case, Wolsey instructed Ammonius to write more frequently to Rome, to keep the
pope informed. He also addressed Leo’s recently relayed concerns about
Maximilian’s retreat from Milan. While Wolsey regretted this event, he stressed that
Henry had fulfilled his end of the bargain by supplying the money (indeed, four
months worth, not the one month that Leo believed), but they had been failed by the
‘knavery’ of the merchant-banking company responsible for transferring the cash.
Significantly, Wolsey avoided blaming the emperor, instead asserting the continued
friendship between Henry and his German counterpart (as well as with the Swiss).\textsuperscript{304}
This suggests an attempt by the English crown to induce papal support for a renewed
expedition against the French, which was probably deemed far more likely if Wolsey
emphasised Anglo-Imperial amity, rather than if he started attributing blame for the
recent failure.\textsuperscript{305}

The motivation for Wolsey’s 22 May communiqué was twofold: firstly, he
sought to reengage the papacy in the planned relaunch of the Italian expedition;
secondly, he wanted papal backing for the planned holy league that would support the
invasion. In terms of the former, Wolsey declared Henry VIII’s (continued)
commitment to attack the French in person, but asserted that his Council had insisted
that he not cross the Channel until his allies were ready.\textsuperscript{306} In spite of this
correspondence, indirect papal overtures were already being made through Richard
Pace, Leo perhaps being fearful of a complete cessation of anti-French actions by

\textsuperscript{303} Wolsey begins by attributing the lack of communication to the distance between England and Rome, but the sense mentioned above soon takes over; \textit{ibid.}, 1928 (22 May 1516, Wolsey to de Giglis, ‘From my house in London’).
\textsuperscript{304} \textit{Ibid.}, 1928 (22 May 1516, Wolsey to de Giglis, ‘From my house in London’).
\textsuperscript{305} For Wolsey’s crediting Pace’s reports placing blame on the emperor, see above n.243.
\textsuperscript{306} \textit{LPIII}, 1928 (22 May 1516, Wolsey to de Giglis, ‘From my house in London’).
England. On 21 May, Pace notified Wolsey that Cardinal Bibbiena had contacted him and Visconti, claiming that the pope supported the aim to expel the French from Italy. Furthermore, the English secretary continued to interact with papal representatives in the region to this end, notably Filonardi, but also from May/June 1516 Jacopo Gambaro (da Gambara). Gambaro was later reported to have been en route to the Swiss to finance them (presumably for the anti-French cause), while the nuncio was quoted as saying that Leo was also determined to act militarily. By 6 June Visconti and his secretary were confident about discussions with Cardinal Bibbiena and recommended that Henry and Wolsey discuss matters with the pope directly. Similarly, Pace, who related with Filonardi, was confident by 12 June that ‘the Pope is very favourably inclined to the King’, as was Bibbiena. In response to these positive papal indications Wolsey, on 23 June, instructed Pace to negotiate with the pope, both directly through correspondence and indirectly through his representatives in the region, as well as to send commissioners. He was also to induce financial assistance from Rome to secure the Swiss and to encourage the pope’s desire for his nephew’s marriage into English royalty, albeit only after the success of the Italian expedition.

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307 Pace also referred to Bibbiena as persistently anti-French; ibid., 1924 (21 May 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Trent). Visconti had already, on the 15th, recommended that the legate ought to be targeted as a correspondent to keep the papacy on-side. He also mentioned that Leo was sending a nuncio to England and that Henry ought to stir up the papacy; ibid., 1892 (calendared 15 May 1516, extracts of letters from Galeazzo Visconti). For Bibbiena’s near involvement in the earlier offensive, see p.550. Pace also forwarded correspondence from de Giglis, relaying the pope’s continued support. This was passed on by Wingfield in early June; LPIII, 1989 (3 June 1516, [Robert Wingfield to Henry]).

308 Pastor argues that Filonardi did little to contribute towards the earlier Italian expedition on the pope’s behalf and that this remained the case until the arrival of Gambaro with the Swiss; LPIII, 1984 (2 June 1516, [Filonardi] to Pace, [Zurich]); L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, p.155 n.


310 Also on 6 June Visconti advised Henry to thank Bibbiena and offer him ‘some good benefice’; LPIII, 1983 (2 June 1516, [Galeazzo Visconti] to [Wolsey]), 2009 (6 June 1516, Galeazzo Visconti to -, Zurich), 2011 (6 June 1516, Galeazzo Visconti to his son [Anchises], Zurich).

311 Ibid., 1984 (2 June 1516, [Filonardi] to Pace, [Zurich]), 2034 (12 June 1516, Pace to [Wolsey]).

312 Ibid., 2082 (23 June 1516, [Wolsey] to Pace). Pace originally recommended that the pope needed to be induced to make some sort of financial obligation, to ensure his commitment to the cause, back in late April; ibid., 1816 (23 April 1516, Pace to [Wolsey], Bergamo).
Inextricably linked with English actions to gain papal support for a second Imperial-Swiss descent into Italy were attempts to draw Leo into some sort of anti-French alliance, both through a broad ‘holy league’ and via a focused alliance between the two of them. While it is difficult enough to distinguish between Anglo-papal interaction about involvement in an anti-French expedition and membership of an alliance, it is tougher still to discriminate between negotiations towards a broad coalition and those intended for an Anglo-Roman accord. Concerning a focused alliance, an indirect approach towards this was made by Cardinal Bibbiena to Pace around 21 May. As well as indicating Leo’s support for the expulsion of the French from Italy, he raised an earlier proposition that was surely related to such an amity, by asking which of Henry’s relatives would be offered in marriage to Lorenzo de’ Medici. Wolsey’s response of 23 June, as mentioned, was quite cagey; Pace was to encourage Visconti (and, therefore, Bibbiena) that this was possible, but only once the Italian enterprise had been completed. At the same time, Bibbiena’s approach to Pace and Visconti also seems to have envisaged a wider coalition against France; Wolsey’s reply was more forthcoming on this, empowering Pace to negotiate with the pope and his representatives in the region.

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313 Ibid., 1924 (21 May 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Trent). While unclear, discussions about a possible marriage seem to have continued. By 10 July, Visconti (acknowledging English correspondence of 21 June) asserted that he had won over Lorenzo, along with Leo and Giulio de’ Medici. Lorenzo’s favour can only have related to encouragement of a marriage; ibid., 2155 (10 July 1516, Galeazzo Visconti to [Wolsey], Zurich). Also see p.549. For negotiations about the renewed expedition between Pace and Visconti, on the one hand, and Bibbiena, on the other, see p.553.

314 LPIIIi, 2082 (23 June 1516, [Wolsey] to Pace).

315 This was probably also a response to Pace’s recommendation in late April that the pope be bound in an alliance to England by financial obligations; ibid., 1816 (23 April 1516, Pace to [Wolsey], Bergamo). 2010 (calendared 6 June 1516, [Galeazzo Visconti] to his son-in-law [Anchises Visconti]), 2082 (23 June 1516, [Wolsey] to Pace). At the end of May, around the same time as Pace and Wingfield were re-commissioned to seek the relaunch of the Italian expedition and a formal league to back this, the former was also instructed by Wolsey to encourage this strategy with the Swiss, which specified the desire for papal involvement in a broad coalition; ibid., 1965 (31 May 1516, [Wolsey] to Pace).
Simultaneously, in England, the crown continued its own overtures to the papacy about a holy league. On 22 May, the cardinal responded to papal reservations about its content and requested that Leo send any further conditions. He also stressed that the pope ‘be candid’ with him (again suggesting English confusion about papal intentions thus far).\textsuperscript{316} Within a fortnight, however, both Henry and Wolsey were apparently convinced that they could count on papal support, both writing and speaking of this in public.\textsuperscript{317} This newly discovered confidence in papal intentions may well have been engendered by the receipt of a commission by Chieregato to negotiate Leo’s membership of a league.\textsuperscript{318} The timing of this again suggests a move by Rome to ensure the continuation of English intrigues, despite the collapse of the Italian enterprise. Subsequently, the nuncio was involved in negotiations.\textsuperscript{319} News of the pope’s apparent preparedness to commit to the anti-French powers may well have contributed to Henry and Wolsey’s decision to go public with their intentions at this

\textsuperscript{316} Presumably, to help persuade Leo, Wolsey also went to great lengths to emphasise the union and strength of the anti-French powers; he enclosed a copy of the recent Anglo-Spanish treaty (which Spinelly had recently reported the papacy was prepared to observe), emphasised Henry’s friendship with both Charles and Maximilian and wrote of his expectation that the Swiss would remain on their side; \textit{ibid.}, 1848 (3 May 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 1928 (\textit{Mart. Amp. iii}, 1278; 22 May 1516, Wolsey to de Giglis, ‘From my house in London’).

\textsuperscript{317} Wolsey opined this, apparently in connection with attempts to form a league against France around the end of May. Similarly, Cuthbert Tunstal and Richard Wingfield were informed of this same confidence in letters from Henry that they delivered to Charles on 4 June; R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, i, pp.228-232 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 738; \textit{LPIi}, 1961; 31 May 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, Putney), 232-239 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 739; \textit{LPIi}, 1991; 3 June 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, Putney); \textit{LPIi}, 2006 (6 June 1516, Tunstal and Richard Wingfield to Henry, Brussels). It even seems that Wolsey was confident that the conclusion of such a league including the pope was so close towards the end of May, that he informed Pace that he was ‘in treaty’ with Leo (and others); \textit{ibid.}, 1942 (28 May 1516, [Wolsey] to Pace).

\textsuperscript{318} For such a commission, apparently sent from Rome on 4 May, probably having reached England by the end of the month, see \textit{LPIi}, 1978 (1 June 1516, Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels), 1989 (3 June 1516, [Robert Wingfield to Henry]), 2033 (12 June 1516, Tunstal and Richard Wingfield to [Henry], Louvain). The (re-)engagement of the papacy seems to have marked a reversal of how the English perceived Leo X’s involvement towards the beginning of May, when an Imperial diplomat observed that Henry was then attempting to form a league between himself, Maximilian and Charles as the central members, with the pope, the Swiss and others also envisaged as joining presumably later; \textit{ibid.}, 1863 (6 May 1516, Imperial ambassador in England to Margaret of Savoy, London).

\textsuperscript{319} On 12 June, Giustinian conveyed a ‘reliable’ report that Wolsey and Ruthal had been involved in discussions with Chieregato, as well as representatives of Maximilian, Charles and the Swiss; R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, i, pp.242-246 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 742; \textit{LPIi}, 2036; 12 June 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, Putney).
time. A setback to the prospect of papal involvement may have been envisaged with the fall of Brescia, as on 14 June Henry urged Maximilian to keep Leo X ‘well entertained’. Still, therefore, it was felt in England that the pope could not be counted upon. In spite of this, negotiations continued with Chieregato. Perhaps a result of both the lack of direct information from Rome and the arrival of a papal reaction to the fall of Brescia, Leo X’s commitment to a league may have again been questioned in England around mid- to late July, although the English crown continued to assert its confidence in him. Wolsey reiterated his certainty about the pope on 9 August; when challenged whether he believed that Leo wished the French to be chased out of Italy, the cardinal responded, ‘so long as the King of France is in Italy, the Pope considers himself his chaplain’. Chieregato was observed to be back in daily negotiation at the English Court by mid-August and Giustinian considered it an ominous sign that the nuncio was not forthcoming when questioned about this.

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320 See above pp.531-532.
321 LPIi, 2095 (26 June 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to [Henry]). Spinelly warned as early as 1 June his fear that the pope would pull back on account of French successes and on the 8th quoted Charles’ chancellor (Sauvage) predicting a Franco-Spanish-papal accord as a result of Maximilian’s setbacks; ibid., 1978 (1 June 1516, Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels), 2019 (8 June 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels). Reference to a letter from Henry to his ambassadors in the Low Countries (Cuthbert Tunstal and Richard Wingfield) of 17 June seems to confirm this worry of the consequences of Brescia’s fall. In addition to the king voicing his fears that Charles would back off from the league as a result of the Imperial city’s surrender, the two orators replied (on the 23rd), seemingly responding to the same concern vis-à-vis the papacy, that Leo was likely to remain an ally to France, despite earlier papal intentions to adhere to the coalition; ibid., 2079 (23 June 1516, Tunstal and Richard Wingfield to [Henry], Brussels).
322 Ibid., 2082 (23 June 1516, [Wolsey] to Pace).
323 By 17 July, Giustinian had heard that the pope no longer intended to join the league. On the 29th, the Venetian asserted that Wolsey’s confidence in Leo’s anti-Gallic intentions exemplified his ‘building castles in the air’, duplicitously trying to induce Venetian adhesion to the coalition. Leo, he also opined, was unlikely to break with France while he was pursuing his own territorial ambitions (implying Urbino), which Chieregato reportedly confirmed; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.250-254 (Ven.ii, 750; LPIi, 2183; 17 July 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 262-264 (Ven.ii, 753; LPIi, 2222; 29 July 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London).
324 Wolsey also implied that he was in a position to apply to Rome to gain a papal absolution that would enable Venice to breach its alliance with France and join the anti-French confederates; ibid., pp.254-262 (Ven.ii, 751; LPIi, 2205; 23 July 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). One ought to note that the cardinal would have been in regular receipt of positive reports of papal intentions vis-à-vis the league, for instance from reported statements by the nuncio Jacopo Gambaro on his way to the Swiss in a missive dated Verona 21 June; LPIi, 2071 (21 June 1516, John Bapt. Spinelli to Cardinal Schiner, Verona).
English hopes for papal backing against France would have taken a further knock following the defection of Charles of Castile by the Treaty of Noyon (13 August 1516); on 9 September 1516, Pace advertised Wolsey of his belief that Leo would not join without Charles. On the other hand, the secretary opined, if the Cantons were won over to their side, Henry would at least have ‘[a b]riddle for all other Christian Princes, [and] by the same means be sure of the [Pope’s] Holiness’. This would have been compounded by intelligence sent by Spinelly on the same date that the pope had promised a red hat in the next creation to a nephew of Charles’ Francophile principal advisor, Chièvres. This implied that the papacy was wholly supportive of Charles’ defection, which Chièvres had worked towards. That Leo X had effectively committed to the French side was suggested in other diplomatic communications. The English would have been informed by Giustinian in late September that, since this Franco-Spanish accord, ‘the pope has renewed and confirmed the peace, and formed a closer alliance with France’; while untrue, it would have raised doubts. Furthermore, on 25 September, Robert Wingfield notified Henry that Swiss negotiations with the French involved an agreement that would involve the pope and the Church (among others). Certainly, the influence of France over the papacy would have been of concern to the English when they received, during October, de Giglis’ notification of the difficulties he had experienced in

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326 LPi:ii, 2350 (9 September 1516, [Pace] to Wolsey, [Zurich]). Also see ibid., 2431 (8 October 1516, [Pace] to Wolsey).
327 Ibid., 2349 (9 September 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels). For the subsequent elevation of Chièvres’ nephew on 1 April 1517, see C. Eubel, Hierarchia Catholica Medii Aevi, iii, p.16. A further dimension perhaps raised by Spinelly around this time concerning the uncertainty of papal commitment came in the form of reports of Leo X’s ill health, although he asserted that the pope was well by mid-September; LPi:ii, 2359 (13 September 1516, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels).
328 Ven.ii, 773 (12 September 1516, Signory to Giustinian).
329 LPi:ii, 2386 (25 September 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to [Henry], Augsburg).
gaining amended briefs concerning Tournai and a legatine commission for Wolsey.330

Pace, patently aware of Leo’s double-dealing, urged Wolsey to have Charles join an anti-French axis quickly, as when Spain’s amity is assured, ‘the Pope’s holiness can no more [v]ary his promises’.331

In light of this threat to papal participation, Henry and Wolsey wrote to the pope concerning the Treaty of Noyon on 4 September, both to reassure him of England’s continued hostile intentions against France and to ascertain his reaction. In reply (on 4 October), Leo opined that the Franco-Spanish agreement would not last, although he could not see it being broken while (Charles’ pro-French minister) Chièvres was still ascendant. Meanwhile, the pope believed that the Swiss could defect. He also complained that Henry had not notified him earlier of articles, presumably for their own treaty, and asked how their defensive league could exist when Charles was not allowed to supply troops to anyone other than the emperor. The pope was glad to hear of the English crown’s commitment to the crusade (probably, it would have been implied, once universal peace was established against France), but reiterated his expectation that they would lose the Swiss. Leo promised aid as soon as the treaty was concluded between Charles and Henry. In the meantime, he asserted, he could not afford to ‘irritate the French’, fearing the loss of various papal territories. The pope claimed that he was caught ‘between the French molars’ until a suitable opportunity arose to resist. In spite of Leo’s suggestion that he was unlikely to act at present, de Giglis further hinted that the pope was still interested in joining the anti-French league (concerning his financial contribution to hiring the Swiss, Leo wanted to know the number of troops proposed) and that he could secure papal support, if Wolsey pledged that England would not invade France unless it was for the benefit of

330 The orator referred directly to ‘the influence of the French’ and ‘the prosperity of France’ as determining his difficulties; *ibid.*, 2394 (27 September 1516, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome).
the papacy and Italy more generally. The pope would be particularly interested if, in
the process, he could recover Parma and Piacenza, as well as have Lorenzo de’
Medici become duke of Milan, supported by England, for which the pope’s nephew
would provide great service (de Giglis claimed to be breaking a faith by revealing
this).332

Back in England, while Henry and Wolsey awaited a response from Rome,
negotiations towards the anti-French coalition continued and papal involvement was
still publicly acknowledged. On 7 September, Giustinian reported a source having
told him that the articles of the concluded league had been signed by the pope.333
Furthermore, the arrival of a nuncio, Julio Latino, was expected to conclude on Leo
X’s behalf.334 By 22 September, Chieregato had told Giustinian that Leo X had
agreed to the league with England and that Latino was (still) expected imminently in
England to adhere.335 Other positive news about the pope’s intention to join came
from Spinelly in the Low Countries, who reported in late September that Raphael de’

332 Leo speculated that, if he offended the French now, he might lose Modena and Reggio to the duke
of Ferrara, Brescia to the Bentivoglio, the Romagna to Venice and Urbino to Francesco Maria della
Rovere. He even feared that he could lose Florence. De Giglis ended his despatch by reporting news
that would not encourage hopes of papal participation; it was said that the French had no plans to move
against Naples (thereby making resistance to this unnecessary) and that the Swiss had agreed to a peace
with France (as the pope feared); ibid., 2420 (4 October 1516, [de Giglis] to [Wolsey], Rome).
333 R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.284-287 (Ven.ii, 769; LPIII, 2346; 7 September 1516,
Giustinian to the Signory, London).
334 On 9 September, Pace notified Wolsey that a nuncio was on his way to England to conclude an
offensive and defensive league. The secretary predicted that Wolsey would already know of this. Pace
described the nuncio as a member of the Colonna family and stated that he was an enemy of France;
LPIII, 2350 (9 September 1516, [Pace] to Wolsey, [Zurich]). The nuncio was named as Julio Latino,
although it seems that there was some sort of mix-up between Pompeo Colonna (who arrived in
Brussels during December 1516) and Latino Benassao (who arrived in France in late November 1516,
and that Colonna was actually meant, as he was part of an embassy intended to gain Charles’ adhesion
to the league in London. In any case, no nuncio reached England; ibid., 2640 (6 December 1516,
Tunstal to Henry, Brussels); L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, p.164; also see below p.564.
335 Chieregato also apologised for earlier stating that the pope intended to remain neutral, but
Giustinian disbelieved all that the nuncio told him, believing that Chieregato was acting under
instruction from the English crown. The Venetian also reported the next day hearing that Latino’s
commission had been revoked, thus suggesting early indications of a papal withdrawal; R. Brown
(trans.), Four Years, i, pp.287-292 (Ven.ii, 775; LPIII, 2377; 22 September 1516, Giustinian to the
Signory, London), 292-298 (Ven.ii, 775; LPIII, 2382; 23 September 1516, Giustinian to the Signory,
London). Maximilian still understood the papacy to be participating in the English discussions on 25
September, as he commissioned Cardinal Schiner to treat with Leo, Henry and Charles; LPIII, 2384 (25
September 1516).
Medici was lobbying Charles to break with France. He also conveyed that Leo X, Lorenzo de’ Medici (duke of Urbino) and Florence were well disposed towards Henry VIII.\textsuperscript{336} As at 3 October, Henry VIII (writing to Tunstal) still publicly proclaimed that Leo X would be a member of the league.\textsuperscript{337} At the same time, the possibility of the pope not joining was anticipated in an article permitting Leo ‘to enter at his pleasure’.\textsuperscript{338} This recognition of a papal withdrawal seems to have been reflected in England by Chieregato’s involvement in negotiations; by late October, he was perhaps not fully involved in discussions, but was certainly \textit{au fait} with them.\textsuperscript{339}

Further papal reticence was conveyed by Pace on 22 October, when he reported Gambaro’s request that Wolsey intercede between Henry and Leo concerning the latter’s desire to recover Parma and Piacenza (presumably a condition of papal membership) and to ensure that the king’s promise that he could enter the league at any time still stood, particularly in the face of parties in England believed to be briefing against Rome.\textsuperscript{340} Shortly after, Pace understood that the papacy was retreating from the planned coalition and recommended that, if Leo had not entered the league before Henry’s intended meeting with Maximilian, all confederates should

\textsuperscript{336} De’ Medici allegedly disclosed that Francis, at the Bologna conference with Leo in 1515, had raised his intention to move against Naples; \textit{LPIii}, 2393 (Spinelly to Wolsey, 27 September 1516, Brussels).

\textsuperscript{337} Admittedly, the king was trying to convince Charles to join the anti-French treaty; \textit{ibid.}, 2415 (calendared 3 October 1516, [Henry] to [Tunstal and other ambassadors]). Wolsey may have recently received a communication from the pope declaring that de Giglis was in his confidence (and expressing surprise that the cardinal was using others to conduct business). By implication, this suggested that Rome was on-side; \textit{ibid.}, 2361 (14 September 1516, Leo to Wolsey, Rome).

\textsuperscript{338} Tunstal refers to a copy of the treaty sent to him by Wolsey on 3 October; \textit{ibid.}, 2450 (16 October 1516, Tunstal to Henry, Brussels).

\textsuperscript{339} The nuncio seems to have been indiscrete in disclosing the aims of the Schiner mission and the nature of the league towards the end of October, although he is not mentioned to be present at the daily meetings. On 1 November, moreover, Chieregato claimed to be under oath not to reveal the articles of the agreement; R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, i, pp.312-316 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 793; \textit{LPIii}, 2472; 22 October 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 316-318 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 795; \textit{LPIii}, 2477; 24 October 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 318-321 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 798; \textit{LPIii}, 2487; 29 October 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 321-325 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 800; \textit{LPIii}, 2499; 1 November 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London); \textit{Ven.ii}, 799 (31 October 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London).

\textsuperscript{340} The nuncio was said to have come to Pace ‘in great haste’ to communicate this. Concerning the recovery of the two cities, Gambaro understood that Schiner (and maybe others) were in England working against this papal aim; \textit{LPIii}, 2473 (22 October 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Zurich).
write to the pope in this regard. The secretary opined that ‘the Pope is naturally very 
fearful’ and would be glad of such missives (and the reassurance that they would 
imply). Indeed, in the same letter, Pace reported the arrival of a bull of 
excommunication from Rome against all confederates of the new league (presumably 
that concluded in London), in response to which Pace went straight to Gambaro and 
Filonardi to ask that Leo either write in favour of the confederates or to remain 
normal. Nevertheless, it was still publicly maintained that papal support would be 
forthcoming. Wolsey was full of bravado in front of the Venetian ambassador, around 
20 October, threatening his state with papal censures if it did not join the league. A 
few days later, Chieregato continued to assert that the pope would certainly join the 
coalition. In the final days of negotiations, however, the nuncio is conspicuous by 
his absence.

Perhaps in light of the papal response to Noyon, it was decided not to wait any 
longer for Leo X to relay his commitment to England and a league ‘for defence of the 
Church’ was concluded in England on 29 October 1516; its initial members were 
Henry, Maximilian and Charles, and it intended the pope to become head of the 
confederacy. Leo X would be expected to contribute according to his means

341 Ibid., 2495 (calendared end October 1516, [Pace] to [Wolsey]). 
342 Wolsey pledged to lobby Leo X to excommunicate both Venice and France; R. Brown, Four Years, 
343 Not entirely believing him, Giustinian intercepted some of the nuncio’s private correspondence, 
which confirmed his statements; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.312-316 (Ven.ii, 793; LPII, 2472; 
22 October 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London).
344 Certainly, Giustinian did not note Chieregato’s presence in talks with Wolsey, Schiner and the 
Imperial representatives; ibid., pp.316-318 (Ven.ii, 795; LPII, 2477; 24 October 1516; Giustinian to the Signory, London).
345 See pp.538-539. For the justification of the treaty in defence of the Church, see LPII, 2462 (20 
October 1516), 2463 (calendared 20 October 1516), 2486 (29 October 1516). It also seems that this 
coalition intended universal peace and crusade among its aims; ibid., 2387 (calendared 25-26 
September 1516, [Wolsey] to Pace), 2420 (4 October 1516, [de Giglis] to [Wolsey], Rome); R. Brown 
(trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.1-6 (Ven.ii, 807; LPII, 2543; 13 November 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, 
London). If the pope had intended to join, Giustinian argued, Henry would have postponed the signing 
until the arrival of Julio Latino, who was still expected imminently. Chieregato only admitted that Leo
(presumably in a financial and military sense), as well as to invoke his spiritual weapons (excommunication and interdict were mentioned specifically). The pontiff was also bound not to absolve anyone from such censures.\textsuperscript{346} Papal membership (indeed, leadership) was, however, deemed essential.\textsuperscript{347} A copy was sent to the pope around 8-9 November, to induce his adhesion.\textsuperscript{348} Later in the month, pressure was also applied on Leo by Pace and the nuncios with the Swiss, probably following receipt of the treaty from Wolsey.\textsuperscript{349}

The English may not have been confident of papal backing, however, as the conclusion and celebration of the treaty were unusually low key, and the agreement itself, or at least its contents, apparently kept secret. While this was probably because of a wider uncertainty about the commitment of the various parties, uncertainty of papal intentions would have also contributed, particularly given that the league claimed to be formed to protect the Church.\textsuperscript{350} Probably in response to unlikelihood

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\item[346] Papal membership (indeed, leadership) was, however, deemed essential.\textsuperscript{347} A copy was sent to the pope around 8-9 November, to induce his adhesion.\textsuperscript{348} Later in the month, pressure was also applied on Leo by Pace and the nuncios with the Swiss, probably following receipt of the treaty from Wolsey.\textsuperscript{349}
\item[347] At the same time that copies were sent for the attention of the Swiss and Charles of Castile; \textit{LPHIII}, 2528 (calendared 8-9 November 1516), 2698 (23 December 1516, de Giglis to [Wolsey], Rome).
\item[348] Pace also wrote to de Giglis in this regard; \textit{ibid.}, 2528 (calendared 8-9 November 1516), 2587 (calendared 23 November 1516, [Pace] to [Wolsey]).
\item[349] The articles of the league were sworn to by Henry VIII, the Imperial and Spanish ambassadors in a Mass on 1 November 1516, in a small chapel usually used by the king. In addition, Giustinian claimed, the articles were not published. From this, one can imply that the English crown wished to keep the agreement, or at least its details, secret at this stage. This is supported by the fact that letters from Venetian merchants in England of 6 November failed to mention the treaty. In addition, Henry VIII was to receive an instalment of the French pension on 5 November, which he doubtless sought not to jeopardise; \textit{LPHIII}, 2497 (calendared start November 1516); R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, i, pp. 309-312 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 792; \textit{LPHIII}, 2470; 21 October 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 321-325 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 800; \textit{LPHIII}, 2499; 1 November 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London); \textit{ibid.}, ii (1854), pp.19-20 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 825; \textit{LPHIII}, 2665; 13 December 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London); \textit{LPHIII}, 2510 (5 November 1516); \textit{Ven.ii}, 817 (27 November 1516, letters from Venetian merchants in England). For the treaty not remaining secret and Francis I being aware of it by the end of November, see \textit{Ven.ii}, 821 (25 November 1516, Giovanni Badoer to the Signory, Amboise). Concerning the allies’ uncertainty
\end{footnotes}
of Leo X’s adhesion, Wolsey, Chieregato and Cardinal Schiner formulated a ‘secret’ plan whereby the latter would travel to Rome to induce this by promising that Lorenzo de’ Medici would become ‘free lord of Florence’ and would also be invested with Urbino, Modena and Reggio. The pope was also to be permitted six months to join the league.  

Wolsey wrote to Rome again on 21 November, seemingly to encourage papal membership; he certainly pledged Henry’s continued commitment to retain the Swiss and to send further ambassadors there. Along with Henry, he may also have proposed the ‘Schiner’ plan, to endow Lorenzo de’ Medici and to marry him into English royalty. Curiously, perhaps towards the end of November, Wolsey notified Pace that the pope had entered the league. This was not yet the case, however, and may have been a ploy to induce Swiss membership (given the context of the missive).

Indeed, the English crown was losing patience with the papacy (and losing control of the anti-French negotiations), as was demonstrated by Wolsey’s actions in the first week of December. Probably having discovered that Francis was au fait with the ‘secret’ plan to send Schiner to Rome, the English cardinal reportedly summoned

about papal involvement, Giustinian speculated (on the basis of information from Chieregato) that the coalition would not act without Leo X’s adherence, although he understood that a defiance would be issued to Francis I without awaiting his membership; R. Brown (trans.), *Four Years*, ii, pp.7-9 (Ven.ii, 809; LPHi, 2547; 15 November 1516, London).

Chieregato claimed (in divulging this to Giustinian) that only he and the two cardinals knew about this plan; R. Brown (trans.), *Four Years*, i, pp.321-325 (Ven.ii, 800; LPHi, 2499; 1 November 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London); ibid., ii (1854), pp.6-7 (Ven.ii, 808; LPHi, 2544; 13 November 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 7-9 (Ven.ii, 809; LPHi, 2547; 15 November 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). On the same date, Giustinian also notified his counterpart in France of the same Schiner mission to induce papal membership. Francis I was reportedly unconcerned, believing that Leo X would arrest the cardinal; Ven.ii, 821 (25 November 1516, Giovanni Badoer to the Signory, Amboise). For a general reference to this mission by Schiner himself, see LPHi, 2662 (11 December 1516, Schiner to Wolsey, Hagenow).

The acknowledgement of this communication makes it feasible that this was part of the correspondence sent on 21 November. Also, the fact that the papal nephew was a correspondent suggests that the contents related to the proposal earlier agreed with Schiner; *ibid.*, [Wolsey] to [Pace]), 2689 (21 December 1516, Lorenzo de’ Medici to Henry, Rome), 2690 (21 December 1516, Lorenzo de’ Medici to Wolsey, Rome), 2698 (23 December 1516, de Giglis to [Wolsey], Rome).

*ibid.*, 2615 (calendared end November 1516; [Wolsey] to [Pace]).
Chieregato ‘into a private chamber, where he laid hands on him’, fiercely demanding to know what he had written to the king of France and threatening him with the rack. Following a heated discussion, Wolsey seized all of the nuncio’s papers and ciphers, but did not find anything incriminating. The cardinal was vindicated later that month by de Giglis, however, who confirmed that Chieregato ‘does all the bad offices he can’ via his correspondence. If the English crown was still hoping for papal involvement, this would have done little to encourage it. Wolsey’s reaction was probably further enflamed by the arrival of news around the same time of the Swiss having come to terms with Francis I, as well as the emperor having done so shortly after. Indeed, English intelligence from the Low Countries asserted that the Franco-Imperial accord had been concluded mainly at the behest of the pope and that a papal representative, Pompeo Colonna, had been involved. Henry VIII was certainly worried about the latter agreement affecting Rome; in instructions to his ambassadors going to Maximilian at the end of 1516, he explained his fear that the peace now allowed Francis to go to Italy, by which ‘the Pope be imperiled’. In retrospect, these probably precluded any possibility that Leo would adhere to the London agreement but, meanwhile, Henry and Wolsey continued to hope that the pope would

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355 Fox stepped in to have Chieregato released and, as a result, the nuncio was to leave the kingdom (once he had received money to do this). Following this, Chieregato reported his experience to the Venetian Giustinian who, in turn encouraged the nuncio to exaggerate the incident to Schiner, as he believed that it would annoy both the Swiss cardinal and the pope; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.17-19 (Ven.ii, 823; LIIi, 2643; 7 December 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). For the nuncio disclosing the plan to Giustinian (who then reported it to France), see n.351.

356 LIIi, 2698 (23 December 1516, de Giglis to [Wolsey], Rome).

357 While the English had known of both parties’ negotiations with France, confirmation that the Cantons had concluded with France on 24 November and that Maximilian had done so on 8 December would have been received badly; see above pp.525-526. Indeed, the papacy apparently contributed to the eventual arrangement with Francis I when, on 19 November, Leo urged the Cantons towards peace; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, p.164.

358 Tunstal cited Charles’ principal minister Chièvres for this information. Colonna’s involvement is unclear, although Tunstal does mention his being told that the bishop was sent by the emperor from Germany to facilitate his involvement in this agreement; LIIi, 2640 (6 December 1516, Tunstal to Henry, Brussels).

359 Ibid., 2713 (calendared 30 December 1516, instructions for Somerset and Knight).
declare himself.\footnote{That the league was not considered dead in the water by December 1516 was bl\break down to Charles’ protestations that he was really anti-French and would break from Noyon once he reached Spain (and secured his inheritance there). Also, Maximilian gave the same impression when he ratified the English league on 8 December; \textit{ibid.}, 2647 (8 December 1516), 2648 (8 December 1516, Robert Wingfield to [Henry], ‘Hagenow in the Neethir Elsace’).} Furthermore, in the broader context of papal intentions, Wolsey’s frustration was not without foundation, as Leo X had been simultaneously conducting negotiations with Francis I, although these had hit various difficulties in late 1516. Indeed, by late November, the French orators in Rome deemed the pope hostile towards France and enthusiastic towards the anti-French coalition.\footnote{Franco-papal negotiations had reached an \textit{impasse} reportedly because Leo intended to make his nephew Lorenzo duke of the Romagna and was negotiating for him to marry an Englishwoman, that Francis would not allow the Church to ‘recover’ Ferrara (and was insisting on the surrender of Modena and Reggio to its duke) and that the French king was insisting upon a loan of 50,000 ducats from Florence on the basis that it was his city; \textit{Ven.ii}, 816 (Andrea Griti, Proveditor in the Venetian Camp at Villafranca, to the Signory, 25 November 1516); L. Pastor, \textit{History of the Popes}, vii, pp.163-164.} News of these Franco-papal discussions and all of their difficulties probably reached England via Germany by late December.\footnote{On the 13th, Robert Wingfield notified Henry of the emperor’s understanding about these negotiations and their current obstacles, including the French desire for a ‘friendly loan’ of 50,000 ducats \textit{per annum} from the pope and 200,000 for four years from Florence, as well as the cessation of papal hostilities against Ferrara. Leo, for his part, was said to desire the withdrawal of French support from the same duchy, for which he was prepared to drop his other objections and join Francis in a league; \textit{LPII}, 2667 (13 December 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to [Henry], ‘Hagenaw’).} To muddy the waters, news from Rome of the pope’s reaction to the anti-French league was broadly positive, but was soon complicated by news of Swiss and Imperial defections. De Giglis received notification of the London league by 16 November and, as the papacy understood, it was intended ‘for the destruction of France’.\footnote{This notification was reportedly dated 2 November and stated that the league (between Henry, Charles and Maximilian) was intended for mutual defence and that the pope was allowed six months to join (the Swiss eight months). This correspondence also reportedly stated that Schiner had gained two months financial support for Verona from England, the money to be sent to the emperor and the Swiss; \textit{Ven.ii}, 814 (16 November 1516, Marino Giorgio to the Signory, Rome).} The English orator had an audience with Leo by the 19th, which appears to have inspired a brief to be issued to Henry VIII on the same date concerning Schiner
and ‘a general agreement among the Christians against the Infidels’.364 Given that this aim officially underpinned the treaty, this would probably have been taken as encouragement.365 On 22 November, de Giglis informed Wolsey that, while the pope was pleased with English actions concerning the treaty, he was surprised to have received no letters on this matter, presumably from the cardinal in person.366 News arrived at the Curia of the Swiss and Imperial accords with France by the second week of December. Vis-à-vis the Swiss, Leo was unsurprised at Wolsey’s warnings of French intrigues among the Cantons, given Francis’ ‘wish to dictate to all Christendom’ and offered his services to this end. The pontiff was also said to be opposed to any subsequent plans for a Franco-Swiss offensive against Naples, as if this succeeded, ‘he would then be no better than their chaplain’. Concerning, the Franco-Imperial arrangement, Leo was reportedly unhappy with this, although de Giglis felt obliged to defend Henry VIII against Maximilian’s accusations that he was to blame for leaving the emperor no choice but to come to terms. Finally, concerning Spain’s continued adhesion to Noyon, the pope advised Wolsey to ignore Charles’ ‘lukewarmness’ and to forge a closer alliance with him.367 The implication, therefore, was that the pope would be more amenable if he was sure of Spanish support. At around the same time, both Leo and Lorenzo de’ Medici were positive towards

364 Ibid., 815 (19 November 1516, Marino Giorgio to the Signory, Rome). Also see ibid., 819 (Marino Giorgio, Venetian ambassador at Rome, to Signory, 22 November 1516). This is consistent with Leo’s general call to arms against the Turks during October 1516; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, p.218.
366 Wolsey’s of 8th-9th could not yet have arrived; LPIIi, 2580 (22 November 1516, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome).
367 De Giglis wrote of the emperor’s defection on 8, 13 and 23 December. Maximilian accused Henry of failing to forward sufficient funds to fight the French and of secretly negotiating with Francis behind his back. The orator asserted to the pope that Henry ‘had spent 600,000 ducats without satisfying their [Imperial and Swiss] greed’ and presumably also disputed the latter accusation. De Giglis’ missive of 13 December represented the pope’s reply to Wolsey’s communication of 21 November; ibid., 2669 (13 December 1516, Silvester de Giglis to -, Rome), 2670 (13 December 1516, [de Giglis] to [Wolsey]). This positive reaction from Rome would have been reinforced by reports from the Low Countries, of 18 December, that the papal representative, Raphael de’ Medici, had remonstrated against the Franco-Imperial accord and claimed that Leo ‘[would] empeach the said peace’; ibid., 2683 (18 December 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels).
English overtures apparently linked to the Schiner mission, probably relating to the proposal of the papal nephew’s endowment of territories in central Italy and a marriage alliance. Initial papal enthusiasm was probably also influenced by positive intelligence from England that Henry intended to act and that the French posed a real threat to Italy. Furthermore, around the end of the year, intelligence reaching Wolsey from the Low Countries reported that the emperor was in receipt of money from the pope (and others). All of this news would have found a receptive audience in England, but confidence in the papacy’s political backing would have wavered in the receipt of contrary news. For instance, Henry and Wolsey would have been aware of the failure of the Schiner mission from late December. The Swiss cardinal apparently forwarded Wolsey a copy of a brief he had received from Leo, purportedly at the behest of the French: ‘his holiness has given him a scorpion in return for bread, as Wolsey is wont to say’. However, the Swiss cardinal evidently did not see this as a closed door to papal membership in the anti-French league, as he also promised to work to induce the pope’s membership and requested that Henry and Wolsey write to Rome on his behalf. Even worse news was yet to arrive, as the

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368 Ibid., 2677 (16 December 1516, Leo to Wolsey, Rome), 2689 (21 December 1516, Lorenzo de’ Medici to Henry, Rome), 2690 (21 December 1516, Lorenzo de’ Medici to Wolsey, Rome), 2698 (23 December 1516, de Giglis to [Wolsey], Rome).
369 By the end of November, news was circulating in Rome about England’s intention to act against France; that Henry had sent substantial sums to both the emperor (for his intention to descend into Italy) and the Swiss (for their pension). Henry had reportedly sent 35,000 and 15,000 ducats, respectively; Ven.ii, 820 (Marino Giorgio, Venetian ambassador at Rome, to Signory, 29 November 1516). There is also evidence to suggest that English diplomats abroad attempted to influence their papal counterparts in this direction. Towards the end of November, for instance, Spinelly in the Low Countries, notified the papal nuncio there of reports that the French had proposed to Maximilian that they divide Italy between them. Henry and Wolsey would doubtless have been satisfied with the diplomat’s action; LPIII, 2585 (calendared 23 November 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels). It is also known that Wingfield worked with the pope’s ambassador in Germany; ibid., 2613 (Robert Wingfield to Wolsey, 30 November 1516, ‘Hagenaw in Nether Elsae’).
370 Admittedly, this could also have suggested papal support for the emperor’s amity with the French at the beginning of the month, but this is unlikely; vis-à-vis the anti-French league, Maximilian had always sought money to support his descent into Italy and it is this which is envisaged here; ibid., 2721 (calendared end December 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels).
371 Ibid., 2662 (11 December 1516, Schiner to Wolsey, Hagenow). This probably related to Leo’s formal withdrawal of support for the Schiner mission in response, as Pastor claims, to French warnings
pope, by 23 December, had recommended that England also join the Treaty of Noyon (and offered his intercession), apparently as a result of recent Imperial adhesion, although he equally predicted that Maximilian’s defection would ‘produce great disturbance in Italy’.  

A similar, albeit still confusing, picture of papal support for England’s anti-French measures played out in the Swiss Confederacy, through Richard Pace’s work with the papal representatives there (Filonardi and Gambaro). Despite the Treaty of Noyon, according to the secretary, both nuncios worked firmly against French interests and repeatedly urged Leo X to commit to hiring the Swiss and to their consequent expedition to Italy, even after news of Noyon had reached them. Filonardi and Gambaro even wrote to Wolsey during late September in defence of the emperor’s accusations that Pace was hindering negotiations. News in early November that the French had tried to poison Pace and the nuncios would have surely confirmed Rome’s anti-Gallic credentials. As far as the English were concerned, this back channel would again have provided some reassurance, compared to the generally positive but non-committal nature of direct communications from Rome.

Similarly, in spite of the realisation in England that the pope would not join their

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372 LPIII, 2669 (13 December 1516, Silvester de Giglis to -, Rome). For Creighton’s agreement that the papacy became much quieter about its support for England’s anti-French agenda after Maximilian’s joining Noyon, see M. Creighton, History of the Papacy, v, p.258.

373 Pace also portrayed them as having paid out large sums there to influence the Swiss. He must have been suspicious of papal intentions, however, as on 15 September, he asked them to gain from Leo ‘an explicit declaration of his mind against the common enemy’; LPII, 2334 (1 September 1516, [Pace] to Wolsey), 2366 (15 September 1516, [Pace] to Wolsey).

374 Ibid., 2385 (25 September 1516, Filonardi and [Gam]baro to [Wolsey?], Zurich). Also, during October, Pace described the nuncios’ assistance in lobbying for the emperor to replace his ambassador in Zurich, on account of his having recommended the Swiss to accept French overtures; ibid., 2473 (22 October 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Zurich), 2495 (calendared end October 1516, [Pace] to [Wolsey]). For a third party’s perspective, on 18 October, Venetian sources in Milan understood that, if the Swiss rejected French overtures, the pope would pay them more than before; Ven.ii, 794 (18 October 1516, Venetian secretary at Milan to the Signory).

375 LPIII, 2516 (7 November 1516, [Pace] to Wolsey, Zurich), 2517 (calendared 7 November 1516).
league ‘for defence of the Church’, continued papal commitments continued to emanate from the Swiss Cantons, at least on behalf of the nuncios.\(^{376}\) Indeed, at some point in late October or early November, Henry and Wolsey wrote personally to the nuncios to praise their work and urge their continued service.\(^{377}\) Probably in response to positive papal actions with the Swiss and in a bid to prompt papal action in this sector Wolsey, writing to the pope on 21 November, committed the English to retaining the Cantons (for which purpose, ambassadors were to be sent there) and, presumably, warned of French intrigues to scupper this. Replying on 13 December, Leo was unsurprised at hearing of Francis’ efforts to hire the Swiss, ‘as they wish to dictate to all Christendom’. The pope also offered his services there and further suggested that Henry maintain an ambassador with the Swiss.\(^{378}\)

At the same time and within the same correspondence, Pace advised that they were losing the support of the papacy, post-Noyon.\(^{379}\) Significant among these was the arrival from Rome, around the end of October, of a bull of excommunication from Rome against all confederates of the league to be concluded in London (as he believed). The secretary went straight to Gambaro and Filonardi to ask that Leo either write in favour of the confederates or that he remain neutral.\(^{380}\) Similarly, on 19 November, Pace revealed that the French delegate in Zurich had been instructed to

\(^{376}\) On 19 November, Pace forwarded letters from the papal ambassadors to Wolsey, pledging the papacy’s continued amity with England. By the 23\(^{rd}\), Pace notified Wolsey that the papal ambassadors had urged Leo X to join the new league and stated that he had written to de Giglis in the same vein. On 15 December, Pace suggested that he was still working with the papal ambassadors to launch the expedition and win over the Swiss; \(LP\text{III}, 2567\) (19 November 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Zurich), 2568 (19 November 1516, Filonardi and Gambaro to Wolsey, Zurich), 2586 (23 November 1516, extracts from Pace’s letters, Constance), 2587 (calendared 23 November 1516, [Pace] to [Wolsey]), 2675 (15 December 1516, [Pace] to [Wolsey], Zurich).

\(^{377}\) These are indicated by Filonardi’s replies; \textit{ibid.}, 2601 (27 November 1516, Filonardi to Henry, Zurich), 2602 (27 November 1516, Filonardi to Wolsey, Zurich).

\(^{378}\) \textit{Ibid.}, 2670 (13 December 1516, [de Giglis] to [Wolsey]).

\(^{379}\) Indeed, Pace’s concerns that the Treaty of Noyon would cause the papacy to not join the English coalition have already been cited; see above pp.560-561.

\(^{380}\) \textit{LP\text{III}, 2495} (calendared end October 1516, [Pace] to [Wolsey]). Pastor dates the pope’s change of tack from September, by which time he claimed that Leo was prepared to recall a nuncio from the Swiss and had instructed both there (Filonardi and Gambaro) to avoid behaving in any way that might offend the Most Christian King; L. Pastor, \textit{History of the Popes}, vii, pp.162-163.
read the Franco-papal concordat of 1515 (Bologna) to the Swiss. In other words, it was being asserted, the pope was still pro-French. Anticipating the negative message that this intelligence would send to England, however, Pace also forwarded letters from the papal ambassadors to Wolsey on the same date, pledging the papacy’s continued alignment with England. A few days later, Pace wrote of provision in the Franco-Swiss agreement for the pope (and emperor) to still be able to recruit from the Cantons. He further notified Wolsey that the papal ambassadors had reacted by urging Leo X to join the new league and that he had written to de Giglis in the same vein. Overall, Pace described the papacy as indirectly supporting the English strategy through its nuncios, although there was plenty of reason to suspect that this was not the only policy being pursued by Rome. It is difficult to understand how the crown interpreted this news, although it must have remained positive, as Pace’s mission continued.

By the turn of 1517, therefore, Henry and Wolsey must have felt that the prospects for papal involvement in their league ‘for defence of the Church’ were receding. They had been outmanoeuvred politically by Francis’ Treaty of Noyon and the apparent defection of their allies (Charles and Maximilian’s continued claims to be committed against France notwithstanding). Leo X had already drawn back from joining the English coalition, although he still indicated his tacit support, if conditions

381 Ibid., 2565 (19 November 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Zurich).
382 Ibid., 2567 (19 November 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Zurich), 2568 (19 November 1516, Filonardi and Gambaro to Wolsey, Zurich).
383 Ibid., 2586 (23 November 1516, extracts from Pace’s letters, Constance), 2587 (calendared 23 November 1516, [Pace] to [Wolsey]). For subsequent indications of Pace continuing to work with Filonardi and Gambaro to the same end, see Ibid., 2601 (27 November 1516, Filonardi to Henry, Zurich), 2602 (27 November 1516, Filonardi to Wolsey, Zurich), 2675 (15 December 1516, [Pace] to [Wolsey], Zurich).
changed. Unwilling to give up on the anti-French agenda, the English crown, therefore, continued to seek commitment from Leo, as well as from the emperor and king of Spain. Events, however, saw the prospect of this decline further, as Verona was handed over to the French in mid-January and negotiations between the Noyon powers at Cambrai resulted in a treaty on 11 March. Contemporary to this, Leo X was (and had been since late 1516) also calling for universal peace and a crusade against the Turks, the underlying political agenda for which was unclear. In addition, one needs to take into account the pope’s domestic concerns that would affect his commitment. Firstly, the resurgent threat of Francesco Maria della Rovere, whom Leo had ousted as duke of Urbino in favour of his nephew, Lorenzo. Secondly, the pope faced an attempt on his life from within the Sacred College; the Petrucci Plot. As will be seen, the overall picture of papal intentions from the English perspective would have been confusing at best.

Dealing firstly with the ‘domestic’ threats that demanded papal insularity, Francesco Maria della Rovere, the ousted duke of Urbino, had marched on his old duchy on 16 January 1517 and this sparked a costly war that dragged on for the next eight months, resulting in Leo’s failure to rid himself of this enemy. The conflict was extremely expensive for Leo X to bear and the pope ultimately failed to defeat his

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384 In the wake of Maximilian’s joining Noyon the pope, in mid-December, recommended that Henry make a close alliance with Charles and, a few weeks later, advised that he join the Treaty of Noyon; see above pp.567-568.
385 See above pp.542-547.
386 Della Rovere’s resurgence seems to have been the indirect result of Maximilian’s adherence to Noyon. As he had surrendered Verona in connection with this, the troops that he had retained to defend the disputed city were in the market for a new employer and della Rovere seized the moment. There were rumours that the French and Venetians had colluded in the Urbino offensive and these were given credence in Rome. The city of Urbino itself fell on 8 February (which was prematurely reported in Rome on the 4th). In its failure to overcome della Rovere, the papacy was mocked for its defeat by ‘un duchetto’; D.S. Chambers, Popes, Cardinals and War, pp.139-140; M. Creighton, History of the Papacy, v, pp.277-278; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.165-169, 210.
News of the papal campaign reaching England over the next few months sent mixed messages, at one point (during March) incorrectly notifying Henry that della Rovere had been captured and at another (early April) that Lorenzo de’ Medici had been killed. Despite this, the net result of such intelligence was recognition that the papacy was sidelined by Italian politics. In terms of the English crown’s perception of itself as defender of the Church, Henry VIII would have been concerned with rumours that della Rovere was backed by the Franco-Venetian axis. Indeed, around 8 February, Leo informed the English crown of this and that the underlying intention was ‘to bring the Pope to their feet’ and to ‘have him for their vassal’. Further alarm would have been engendered from mid-May when it was reported that the pope

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387 Guicciardini estimated that the war cost the pope 800,000 ducats. In the end, Leo had to meet the full cost of the war, including della Rovere’s expenditure. While Lorenzo de’ Medici was restored to Urbino in the final agreement, it had cost Rome dear; D.S. Chambers, *Popes, Cardinals and War*, p.140; M. Creighton, *History of the Papacy*, v, p.278; L. Pastor, *History of the Popes*, vii, pp.209-212. Schiner spoke to two English ambassadors about the pope having spent his legacy from Julius II, 500,000 ducats ‘and being much behindhand’ as early as 8 February 1517, although they would have known little about the della Rovere conflict at this stage; *LPIii*, 2891 (8 February 1517, Somerset and Tunstal to [Henry], Mechelin).

388 In mid-February, there was even an unconfirmed report that the Bentivoglio had recovered Bologna from the papacy; *LPIii*, 2886 (8 February 1517, de Giglis to [Henry], Rome), 2889 (calendared 8 February 1517, de Giglis to [Ammonius]), 2895 (9 February 1517, de Giglis to [Ammonius], Rome), 2921 (13 February 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 2985 (4 March 1517, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 3015 (16 March 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 3040 (21 March 1517, de Castello to Wolsey, Rome), 3072 (29 March 1517, Filonard to Wolsey, Zurich), 3083 (31 March 1517, Ammonius to Wolsey, Wesminster), 3085 (31 March 1517, de Castello to [Henry], Rome), 3089 (1 April 1517, [Pace] to Wolsey), 3092 (1 April 1517, Lancelot Colyns to [Wolsey], Bologna), 3095 (2 April 1517, - to [Wolsey?], Rome), 3108 (8 April, Spinelly to Henry), 3110 (9 April 1517, de Castello to Wolsey), 3116 (11 April 1517, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 3165 (23 April 1517, de Castello to [Wolsey], Rome), 3168 (25 April 1517, [Pace] to [Wolsey]), 3200 (3 May 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 3246 (15 May 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 3277 (23 May 1517, de Castello to Wolsey, Rome), 3283 (25 May 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Ghent), 3344 (7 June 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Ghent). Also, for Wolsey’s direct interest in the affair, see R. Brown (trans.), *Four Years*, ii, pp.42-50 (*Ven.ii*, 859; *LPIii*, 3030; 19 March 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London).

389 *LPIii*, 2889 (calendared 8 February 1517, de Giglis to [Ammonius]). Also see *ibid.*, 2866 (3 February 1517, Robert Wingfield to Henry), 2886 (8 February 1517, de Giglis to Henry, Rome), 2890 (calendared 7 February 1517, [extracts from de Giglis’ letters] to Ammonius), 2921 (13 February 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 3085 (March 1517, de Castello to [Henry], Rome), 3246 (15 May 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 3276 (23 May 1517, [Pace] to --, Constance), 3344 (7 June 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Ghent), 3367 (17 June 1517, report of Richard Wingfield from Calais of news from France). In early March, Henry accused Venice of having agreements with della Rovere, as well as with other papal adversaries (the duke of Ferrara and marquis of Mantua), and itself of having taken ‘papal’ territories (Ravenna, Cervia, Rimini and Faenza), but Giustinian rejected these; R. Brown (trans.), *Four Years*, ii, pp.37-42 (*Ven.ii*, 855; *LPIii*, 3001; 9 March 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London). For Filonardi’s suggestion that the Urbino war was affecting the pope’s commitment against France, see *LPIii*, 3072 (29 March 1517, Filonard to Wolsey, Zurich).
would be forced to do a deal with Francis in order to beat della Rovere; namely the concession of Modena and Reggio to the duke of Ferrara. Leo approached England for support in this campaign during June 1517, when the nuncio von Schönberg appealed directly to Wolsey to urge the king to defend the Church as he had done before ‘by rescuing two Popes from danger’. Specifically, he asked for money to help Leo with his enemies, presumably della Rovere. This request was to provide the English with the political leverage required to gain the papacy’s commitment to the French.

Another domestic issue for the pope during 1517 was the Petrucci plot within the Sacred College (from March onwards). While Cardinal Petrucci apparently planned to kill Leo, motivated by a desire to restore his brother to Siena, this conspiracy was uncovered quite easily and resulted in what appears to have been a deliberate overreaction by the pope. When Petrucci returned to Rome in May to meet with the pope (with a safe conduct), he was arrested and imprisoned. Also, several other cardinals were implicated in the fall-out, some perhaps unfairly, including the Anglophile Hadrian de Castello, at which point the pope imposed large fines on them and took the opportunity to pack the Sacred College with ‘supporters’ on 1 July, when he created 31 cardinals. In the latter actions, it is widely agreed that the pope took advantage of the plot to raise money to pay for the War of Urbino. The English

390 There were also alleged issues concerning the payment of Spanish troops from Naples, who were supporting the pope; LPIii, 3246 (15 May 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 3283 (25 May 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Ghent), 3307 (30 May 1517, letter to von Schönberg from Giulio de’ Medici, dated 20 May, sent to England by Spinelly).

391 Spinelly was to go to England to relay these overtures; ibid., 3350 (10 June 1517, Nicholas von Schönberg to Wolsey, Ghent). A few days earlier, Spinelly had reported hearing that the pope could win this war, if he held out until the Viceroy of Naples arrived. He had also been informed that Charles had asked Henry to aid the pope by engaging the Swiss; ibid., 3344 (7 June 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Ghent).

392 See below pp.579-580.

393 For the Petrucci plot, see L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.170-208.

394 S. Alexander (ed.), The History of Italy by Francesco Guicciardini, pp.294-298; M. Creighton, History of the Papacy, v, pp.279-287; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.170-207. For de
crown was informed of the details from Rome from May onwards. Both of these ‘internal’ issues added to the context in which Leo X’s reaction to English overtures to back the anti-French agenda was framed.

As in late 1516, the English continued to be no clearer about whether they would gain Leo X’s adhesion to its league ‘for defence of the Church’ during the early months of 1517. Contradictory signals continued to emanate from Rome. On the one hand, Leo indicated support for England, both in correspondence and in diplomatic actions. Having recommended a closer Anglo-Spanish relationship, the pope was apparently involved in the intricacies of negotiations between the two powers. In talks with the Swiss, during mid-January 1517, Pace still envisaged papal involvement in hiring the Cantons against France. Later in the month, the pope had also reportedly written to Maximilian of his fears for Naples (presumably from the French threat). Finally, in England, Chieregato remained in place as
nuncio, despite having fallen out with Wolsey in December. On the other hand, there were also signals that Leo X was not dealing plainly with the English. Among these was the mid-January report that the pope was in negotiations with France to arrange a marriage for Lorenzo de’ Medici. Perhaps most damningly, in mid-February, William Knight advised Wolsey that ‘the Pope is French, and all from Rome to Calais’.

De Giglis outlined the papacy’s difficult position in early February 1517. In defending the pope’s recent actions in upholding the French candidate’s claim to Tournai (against Wolsey’s), he outlined the role played by French influence compared to the lack of English leverage. The orator claimed that ‘divers times I have seen him [Leo] holding up his [hands] towards the heaven, saying those words, “O Almighty God, ut[inam] ille rex Angliae war somewhat nerer to us for to have this f[avor] and succor in our occurrents. Then the Holy Church would be in more….and surety under the protection, umbre and shadow, of the said m[ost] virtuous King’”. Once French fortunes changed, he continued, Leo would uphold Wolsey’s claim. The orator further communicated Leo’s feeling of vulnerability in the political sphere. The pope had told him that he still wanted the Anglo-Imperial-Spanish league to come to fruition; he was anxious for Charles’ confirmation of this and believed that this would be achieved if Maximilian was urged to change his grandson’s (pro-French)

399 He had not apparently learnt from his previous indiscretions, however, and continued to divulge information to Giustinian, who described him as ‘the faithful friend’; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.33-34 (Ven.ii, 840; LPHii, 2903; 11 February 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London).
400 The match was to be with the daughter of the (ousted) king of Navarre; LPHii, 2784 (16 January 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels). On 11 January, Spinelly quoted a source in the Low Countries telling him that, if the pope and England would finance the defence of Verona, that the peace with France may still be scuppered, although by the 26th, he cited Raphael de’ Medici as saying that Leo would not contribute to this. By early February, English diplomats observed that the pope had distanced himself from the emperor, due a lack of money; ibid., 2767 (11 January 1517, Spinelly to Henry), 2830 (26 January 1517, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels), 2891 (8 February 1517, Somerset and Tunstal to [Henry], Mechelin).
401 Ibid., 2930 (16 February 1517, Knight to Wolsey, Brussels).
402 Ibid., 2886 (8 February 1517, de Giglis to Henry, Rome). Also see, ibid., 2889 (calendared 8 February 1517, de Giglis to [Ammonius]), 2890 (calendared 8 February 1517, [extracts from de Giglis’ letters] to Ammonius).
councillors. However, de Giglis warned that, if the emperor procrastinated or wavered in his commitment, ‘the Pope must fall into the hands of the French, and then he can do nothing for England’. The orator expanded in further communications made to England around the same time. The pope had heard that Maximilian did not intend to remain tied to France and, consequently, had commissioned a nuncio, von Schönberg, to ensure that a breach occurred. Leo feared, however, that the restoration of Verona to the French would induce the emperor’s continued alliance with France. Yet in contradiction, de Giglis also reported the pope having recent information from the Low Countries that Maximilian would side definitively with the French. As a result of this uncertainty, the pope urged Henry to stay allied to Maximilian (as well as to induce the removal of Charles’ principal councillors). Furthermore, he pledged that, if an Anglo-Imperial-Spanish coalition existed, he would join it. Leo further asked England to disrupt the Cambrai negotiations and, finally, Leo promised not to withdraw Filonardi from the Swiss Cantons, despite being urged to do so by the French.

In England, the crown was clearly worried about the impact that political developments in favour of France were having on the papacy. For instance, concerning the surrender of Verona, Wolsey warned Giustinian in mid-February about any subsequent focus on the Papal States; ‘I pray you do not molest the

403 Ibid., 2886 (8 February 1517, de Giglis to Henry, Rome). Also see, ibid., 2888 (calendared 8 February 1517, de Giglis to [Ammonius]), 2889 (calendared 8 February 1517, de Giglis to [Ammonius]).
404 Ibid., 2888 (calendared 8 February 1517, de Giglis to [Ammonius]).
405 Ibid., 2889 (calendared 8 February 1517, de Giglis to [Ammonius]). Around the same time, Cardinal Schiner put a more optimistic spin on the predicted papal reaction to the handover of Verona; while ‘the Pope’s neutrality leaves him prey to both parties’, he argued that the vulnerability of Naples and threat of Franco-Venetian hegemony in Italy had caused Leo to write to Maximilian for support and the pope would soon, he opined, demand an anti-French league ibid., 2869 (4 February 1517, Schiner to Wolsey).
406 Ibid., 2890 (calendared 8 February 1517, [extracts from de Giglis’ letters] to Ammonius).
407 Ibid., 2889 (calendared 8 February 1517, de Giglis to [Ammonius]).
Church;—touch not the hem of Christ’s garment’. 408 Henry and Wolsey must have felt at least partial reassurance, therefore, at receipt of de Giglis’ February notifications of reserved papal support, not least at the prospect of a nuncio, Nicholas von Schönberg, visiting the Cambrai conference in a bid to scupper it. Leo feared a repeat of the 1508 Cambrai agreement, whereby the parties agreed to divide Italy between them and Wolsey, at least, shared these concerns. 409 Furthermore, the pope again reassured the English crown of his willingness to join the anti-Gallic league in indirect, encrypted communication through Cardinal Schiner in early March. 410 The conclusion of the Treaty of Cambrai between Francis, Charles and Maximilian on 11 March made this unlikely, however; faced with a powerful francophile coalition, Leo could not conceivably remain outside its sphere of influence. As de Giglis predicted on the 9th, when rumours of an agreement were already circulating, if reports were true, then ‘the Pope will be left at their mercy’. 411 As notification of the agreement began to arrive in England, Henry VIII soon became aware that places were left in the treaty for both his own and Leo’s admission. 412 This would have raised further doubts in England, given

408 The Church’s temporal lands were often described as ‘Christ’s garment’ or something similar; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.35-37 (Ven.ii, 844; LPIii, 2925; 14 February 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London). For notification to England of the papacy’s awareness of the city changing hands, see LPIii, 2895 (9 February 1517, de Giglis to [Ammonius], Rome).

409 The papal fear was well-founded, as the eventual Treaty of Cambrai (11 March 1517) secretly provided for the division of Italy, including the takeover of Medicean Florence; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.167, 458. Reports of Wolsey voicing similar beliefs at the beginning of March were feasibly in reaction to his receipt of de Giglis’ correspondence from early February. One discrepancy lies in the cardinal’s suggestion to Giustinian that the nuncio attended as a willing participant in the talks, with a view to splitting Italy between them, but this was probably motivated by a desire to detach Venice from France, given that he argued that the republic would be excluded; R. Brown, Four Years, ii, pp.37-42 (Ven.ii, 855; LPIii, 3001; 9 March 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 42-50 (Ven.ii, 859; LPIii, 3030; 19 March 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 56-62 (Ven.ii, 870; LPIii, 3119; 13 April 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London). For a declaration of continued English commitment made to Rome by Cardinal Schiner in early March, in spite of ‘late untoward events’, see LPIii, 2997 (8 March 1517, Schiner to Wolsey, Brussels).

410 Schiner claimed that Leo was ‘very anxious to join’; LPIii, 2997 (8 March 1517, Schiner to Wolsey, Brussels).

411 Ibid., 2895 (9 February 1517, de Giglis to [Ammonius], Rome). Knecht considers that the peace of Cambrai left the pope ‘subservient’ to France; R.J. Knecht, Francis I , p.68.

412 LPIii, 3033 (20 March 1517, Schiner to Wingfield, ‘Termont’).
the subsequent pressure on Rome that would have been anticipated towards this end.413

Nevertheless, Henry and Wolsey continued to be given hope of Leo’s backing. By the end of March, it was known in England that the pope was outraged by the Treaty of Cambrai and that, understanding that Henry would be invited to join, advised him to remain aloof of it.414 In addition, von Schönberg was sent to England at this time, presumably in reaction to the concordat.415 As far as Giustinian could understand, the nuncio’s mission was a response to a complaint from Henry about the pope not joining the anti-French coalition (as well as his having issued a bull effectively depriving Wolsey of the see of Tournai). As Leo had not been involved in the Cambrai conference, the Venetian continued, he had decided to reconcile himself with England and, thus, von Schönberg had received two commissions to join Rome to an Anglo-Spanish axis then being negotiated.416 This papal overture was probably related to a request to aid Lorenzo de’ Medici’s defence of Urbino against della Rovere.417 Furthermore, Filonardi continued to demonstrate his service (alongside

413 Wolsey was informed at the end of March of Imperial communications with Rome apparently concerning the Treaty of Cambrai. De Giglis had accused Cardinal Lang of being ‘the ringleader of this abominable alliance’ (having given in to various bribes); ibid., 3083 (31 March 1517, Ammonius to Wolsey, Westminster). For an English report in late February, that Imperial pressure was applied to Leo to urge Charles not to confirm any amity with England, see ibid., 2964 (24 February 1517, Somerset and Tunstal to [Henry], Mechelin). The contents of the agreement seem to have remained secret from both England and Rome, initially at least, and the ‘secret’ clauses concerning the division of Italy between the confederates remained so; ibid., 3015 (16 March 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels).
414 Ibid., 3083 (31 March 1517, Ammonius to Wolsey, Westminster).
415 The anti-French Schiner recommended him to Wolsey at this point; ibid., 3079 (30 March 1517, Cardinal Schiner to Wolsey, Antwerp).
416 The nuncio was followed by the arrival of a flurry of couriers from Rome (three within a matter of a few days) and had left by 13 April. In terms of Leo’s discomfort with the Cambrai conference, the Venetian wrote that ‘pontiffs are ever wont to be disquieted by conferences between the great powers, as the first thing they discuss in such interviews is the reformation of the Church, that is to say, of the Pope and Cardinals’. Some confidence ought to be put in Giustinian’s speculation on papal affairs, as he was close to Chiericato; R. Brown (trans.), *Four Years*, ii, pp.56-62 (Ven.ii, 870; LPiii, 3119; 13 April 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London). News of von Schönberg’s mission certainly raised the suspicions of the French ambassador in Rome; Ven.ii, 873 (17 April 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory).
417 Schiner asserts that the nuncio was ‘high in the confidence’ of this member of the Medici family. Also, by 24 March, Wolsey had already sent a letter to de Giglis for Lorenzo de’ Medici; LPiii, 3079
Pace) in Zurich, thereby implying papal support. On 29 March, the nuncio, presumably forwarding the pope’s opinion, wrote that Henry was their only hope against French attacks.\textsuperscript{418}

The von Schönberg mission, therefore, marked the opening of an opportunity for England to secure papal support against France. At its heart lay a loan request from Leo for the fight against della Rovere and, knowing that Henry would demand concessions in return, he declared that he was prepared to join an English coalition. The pope had first asked for 20,000 ducats towards the end of February 1517.\textsuperscript{419} No response could have been issued, as a second request reached England (following the Treaty of Cambrai) by the end of March. Wolsey was to persuade the king to lend 15-20,000 ducats, ‘by which he will not only have obliged but bought the Pope’.\textsuperscript{420} This must have been discussed, therefore, with von Schönberg.

Judging by subsequent developments, it seems that an English loan would only be issued after Leo X’s commitment to the English coalition and that the pope would only declare himself if an Anglo-Spanish axis were to be forged. The Anglo-papal focus turned, therefore, to negotiations with Charles of Castile.\textsuperscript{421} Indeed, it

\textsuperscript{418} Ibid., 3071 (29 March 1517, Filonardi to Henry, Zurich), 3072 (29 March 1517, Filonardi to Wolsey, Zurich).
\textsuperscript{419} While the purpose is not stated, it is likely, as Pastor agrees, that this was needed for the war to defend Urbino against della Rovere. It seems that Henry had already replied positively to a papal request to promote indulgences in England, the declared intention being, perhaps euphemistically, for the building of St Peter’s. Incidentally, de Giglis notified England at the end of April 1517 that the pope was about to send ambassadors to promote the latter (as he had already done for France, Germany and Spain), although the orator objected on Henry’s behalf, recommending that the king’s permission be sought and a proportion of the proceeds be offered to him. Leo’s response was to offer the king 25%, although de Giglis suggested to Wolsey that he might be able to increase this to 33%; \textit{ibid.}, 2890 (calendared 8 February 1517, extracts from de Giglis’ letters to Ammonius); L. Pastor, \textit{History of the Popes}, vii, pp.209-210. Indeed, English king would have known already that Leo was struggling financially; \textit{LPIII}, 2891 (8 February 1517, Somerset and Tunstal to [Henry]), 35 app. (calendared end April 1517, de Giglis to Vannes)).
\textsuperscript{420} This time, the approach was made through de Giglis; \textit{LPIII}, 3083 (31 March 1517, Ammonius to Wolsey, Westminster).
\textsuperscript{421} The prospect of success was by no means clear for the pope and this must have affected his thoughts on whether he would actually follow through with this. While, by the end of March, the prospect of Charles’ commitment looked positive, as Chèvres was said to be increasingly inclined against the
may well have been English faith in papal intentions that gave Henry and Wolsey confidence enough to start delivering ultimatums to Charles and Maximilian to commit to an anti-French league around the end of April.\footnote{422} By this time, a rumour circulated in Rome that Henry intended to declare war on France.\footnote{423} Von Schönberg worked closely with English diplomats in the Low Countries towards the formation of the anti-French league and also corresponded with Wolsey on this.\footnote{424}

The breakthrough came with Charles’ adhesion to the treaty to protect the Church (29 October 1516) on 11 May, albeit it was now a defensive rather than an offensive and defensive coalition.\footnote{425} That same evening, Nicholas von Schönberg produced his bull declaring papal membership of the same.\footnote{426} The following day, however, the nuncio was reportedly unhappy with the English representatives for not having formally announced Henry’s approval that Leo X join the league.\footnote{427} Nevertheless, in English eyes, a major turning-point had been reached. Somehow,
however, the nuncio’s proclamation did not represent definitive papal adhesion to the coalition. Focus now moved back to England where, by the 19th, Chieregato had briefs instructing him to swear an oath to observe the league, as long as Henry lent him 50,000 ducats for six months.428 The English were sufficiently satisfied with the papacy’s commitment to send the agreed sum on the 25th, although probably in a bid to ensure papal adhesion, oaths were also to be sworn by representatives of the confederates in front of Leo X, de Castello to perform this role for England. Presumably, it was also intended that the pope would voice his commitment in this way, thereby tying him openly to an anti-French course.429 This swift reaction by the English and their bid for an insurance policy may have been partly encouraged by intelligence that Francis had made overtures to Leo to support him in the Urbino conflict and that these looked as if they might succeed.430

Meanwhile, the English had to wait to see if its leap of faith, by pledging English money, would succeed. Von Schönberg implied the severity of the situation in Urbino when he did not deny that French approaches were being made to Leo, who was reported to be looking for the means to employ 6,000 Swiss to come to his aid.431 Back in Rome, there was increasing confidence that Charles had sworn to the anti-French league and the pope was sure that this had taken place at least by 26 May.432

428 It was asserted by English ministers that the pope was joining because of the Urbino war and Francis’ support for della Rovere; Ven.ii, 887 (19 May 1517, Chieregato to Vigo da Campo San Pietro), 888 (19 May 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London).
430 Francis wanted Modena and Reggio to be restored to the duke of Ferrara. On account of Leo’s lack of money, it was reported that he was likely to agree; LPIii, 3246 (15 May 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 3283 (25 May 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Ghent).
431 Ibid., 3246 (15 May 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 3283 (25 May 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Ghent).
432 During mid-May, it was claimed that the realisation of the league would win over the Swiss. On the 26th, Leo understood that it was a defensive league that also named him and the Swiss; Ven.ii, 886 (16 May 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 892 (27 May 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome).
This may have caused him to apply pressure to de Castello a few days earlier to ensure that his loan request was now granted. Combined with the papacy’s financial need, it was also the reason that de’ Medici instructed von Schönberg to visit England once again. Accordingly on 10 June, von Schönberg appealed directly to Wolsey, albeit in writing, to urge the king to defend the Church as he had done before, for which purpose he was sending Spinelly to England. Specifically, he asked for money to help Leo against his enemies. By not naming the foes, de’ Medici was perhaps deliberately ambiguous; while della Rovere was meant, Francis I was implied.

While the English were happy enough to issue the money on account of Chieregato’s actions in England, they were still not entirely happy with the pope’s commitment. Consequently, on 27 May, Wolsey summoned von Schönberg to England to join on the pope’s behalf (presumably by swearing an oath). In reply, von Schönberg was reluctant to go to England at that point, arguing that he had already demonstrated sufficient papal commitment on the 11th and advised that Leo would personally ratify the league intended to defend him within three months, although perhaps not in the manner that his English counterparts in the Low Countries wanted. The nuncio further hinted at secret matters underlying this, telling Wolsey that he would explain more when he saw him, at which point the cardinal would agree with

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433 On the 23rd, de Castello notified Wolsey that ‘the Pope is put to great expence in defending the lands of the Church’; LPIIIi, 3277 (23 May 1517, de Castello to Wolsey, Rome).
434 The cardinal claimed to be delegating his message to the nuncio on account of his lacking a cipher; ibid., 3253 (17 May 1517, Giulio [de’ Medici] to Wolsey, Rome), 3265 (20 May 1517, Giulio de’ Medici to Henry, Rome). Given the timing of Cardinal de’ Medici’s instructions indicated in two letters, it is suspected that a similar commission from Leo X to the same nuncio, calendared 20 June, was actually issued the previous month. It is also worth noting that the pope also sought Henry’s aid ‘against the enemies of the Church’; ibid., 3382 (20 June 1517, Leo to Henry, Rome).
435 Ibid., 3350 (10 June 1517, Nicholas von Schönberg to Wolsey, Ghent).
his decision not to go to England earlier. Tunstal reiterated von Schönberg’s answer to Wolsey, agreeing that, instead of the nuncio going to England, it would be worth seeking Leo’s personal adhesion to the league through de Giglis.

Nevertheless, von Schönberg did return to England by the end of June to participate, along with the other confederates, in a new ceremony taking the oaths of the English and Spanish participants and proclaiming the anti-French league. This formal declaration of the ‘league for defence of the Church’, with the pope as its head, took place on 5 July at Westminster and, as Chieregato subsequently wrote, it now ought to be considered ‘most holy’. Von Schönberg was summoned to Henry’s presence (along with the Imperial ambassador) after the English and Spanish oaths were taken and announced the pope’s approval of the league, displaying written confirmation that Leo would join. Notably, however, no oath was sworn on the pope’s behalf, although Giustinian believed that this would take place in Rome. While the agreement had been diluted to a defensive league, it was still clear that France was the target, although this merely meant that provocation was now technically needed for war with Francis, rather than this being an automatic aim. Shortly before the proclamation of the league, it seems that Wolsey already knew what this French ‘provocation’ would be; on 28 June he told the pope how he had challenged a recently-arrived French embassy by accusing Francis of having stirred Francesco

436 Tunstal reached the nuncio at Ghent on 9 June and delivered this message the following day; ibid., 3349 (9 June 1517, Tunstal to Wolsey, Ghent), 3355 (13 June 1517, Nicholas von Schönberg to Wolsey, Ghent).
437 The English ambassador opined that a personal pledge would carry more weight than a bull; ibid., 3373 (17 June 1517, Tunstal to Wolsey, Ghent).
438 As representatives from all participants were expected in England from mid-June, it seems that this was Wolsey’s reason for summoning the nuncio; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.90-93 (Ven.ii, 908; LPIii, 3372; 17 June 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 93-95 (Ven.ii, 913; LPIii, 3415; 30 June 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London). Also see LPIii, 3417 (calendared end June 1517, Henry to [Tunstal and others]).
439 LPIii, 3437 (5 July 1517); Ven.ii, 918 (10 July 1517, Chieregato to Isabella d’Este, London), 919 (10 July 1517, Chieregato to Francesco II Gonzaga, London); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.95-103 (Ven.ii, 920; LPIii, 3455; 10 July 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London).
Maria della Rovere against the Church. The French diplomats reportedly did not deny this, arguing that Leo had brought it upon himself by failing to observe his promises to the duke of Ferrara (to restore Modena and Reggio).\textsuperscript{440} In other words, there were already legitimate grounds to invoke the league about to be proclaimed ‘for defence of the Church’, as its ‘defensive’ provision obliged the confederates to mobilise when one of their allies was attacked.

If there was any English suspicion at the lack of oath from the pope, this would have been well-founded, as in Rome on 13 June, Leo admitted to the French ambassador that a nuncio had signed the league in his name but argued that he would not swear to it: ‘should such be the will of the King of France, we will not join it.’\textsuperscript{441} At the same time, the pope’s actions concerning the see of Tournai indicated to de Giglis that he was still subject to French political influence; on the 12\textsuperscript{th}, the orator reported that his lobbying for Wolsey to be restored as administrator of the see of Tournai would be unsuccessful until the pope was ‘safe from the French shears’.\textsuperscript{442}

While the English crown sought papal backing for its league against France, the papacy caused further uncertainty by its pursuit of another strategy that could be both interpreted as pro- and anti-French. From late 1516, Leo X increasingly envisaged his own safety by focusing on universal peace and crusade as an alternative to backing an anti-Gallic coalition with a declared aim to defend him. While an apparently genuine concern with the Turkish threat underlay the call, it was not

\textsuperscript{440} Ven.ii, 933 (22 July 1517, Marco Minio to the Council of Ten, Rome). Concerning French pressure for Leo to restore these two cities to the duke of Ferrara, see above p.581 n.430.
\textsuperscript{441} Ven.ii, 904 (LPiii, 3356; 13 June 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory).
\textsuperscript{442} Leo also feigned belief that the English were disinterested in this issue, on account of a lack of communication in the last three months; LPiii, 3352 (12 June 1517, extracts from de Giglis’ letters, Rome). This sense of French pressure on the papacy would have been reinforced by Leo’s approach to Charles for support in his continued difficulties in Urbino; ibid., 3331 (1 June 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Ghent).
difficult to see that papal security in Italy would be increased by the distraction of princes with the eastern question.\(^{443}\) This can be traced back to October 1516, when Leo made an appeal to Christian princes to this end: ‘it is time that we woke from sleep lest we be put to the sword unawares’. The Sacred College followed this up in November by proposing a crusade to be led by Francis and Maximilian.\(^{444}\) Vis-à-vis England, an earlier approach may have been made to Henry VIII in this regard.\(^{445}\) The problem for England, however, lay in how to interpret this; should the appeal be taken at face value, was it an indication that it would support anti-French actions or was there reason to suspect that it would be a blind for some French offensive?\(^{446}\) For the most part, however, the king and his ministers rejected the Turkish threat. In early October, for instance, Wolsey disclosed the English motivation for doing this when he

\(^{443}\) For Leo’s concern with Ottoman progress against the Mamluks (having taken Syria the previous August and, by early 1517, Egypt as well), see L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.213-219.


\(^{445}\) This could be implied from the orator’s comment that Leo was pleased to hear that Henry and Wolsey continued to intend a crusade; \(LPIii,\) 2420 (4 October 1516, [de Giglis] to [Wolsey]). Indeed, Cardinal Carvajal notified Wolsey of the increasing danger posed by the Ottomans, as they had defeated the Mamluks; \(ibid.,\) 2362 (14 September 1516, Cardinal [Carvajal] to Henry, Rome).

\(^{446}\) In addition to Leo’s overtures, Henry VIII had been under pressure to be open to universal peace from a number of quarters, albeit with different motivations. Notably, the Venetians lobbied him in this direction from September, urging English adhesion to join the Treaty of Noyon, declaring that Francis would not now try to become ‘lord of Italy’ (by attacking Naples), thereby bringing peace to Christendom and allowing a crusade to occur. Venice, as the ally of Francis I, was thereby attempting to counteract the current anti-French negotiations, but one could easily understand if the English suspected that the subsequent papal appeal was linked to this; \(Ven.ii,\) 773 (12 September 1516, Signory to Giustinian); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.292-298 (\(Ven.ii,\) 775; \(LPIii,\) 2382; 23 September 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). Also see \(ibid.,\) pp.294-298 (\(Ven.ii,\) 780; \(LPIii,\) 2401; 30 September 1516, Giustinian to the Signory), 298-300 (\(Ven.ii,\) 781; \(LPIii,\) 2414; 3 October 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 301-303 (\(LPIii,\) 2445; 14 October 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London); \(ibid.,\) ii (1854), pp.9-12 (\(Ven.ii,\) 811; \(LPIii,\) 2559; 18 November 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 12-16 (\(Ven.ii,\) 791; \(LPIii,\) 2464; 20 October 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 25-26 (\(Ven.ii,\) 829; \(LPIii,\) 2712; 30 December 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 27-28 (\(Ven.ii,\) 834; \(LPIii,\) 2753; 6 January 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 29-32 (\(Ven.ii,\) 839; \(LPIii,\) 2896; 10 February 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 35-37 (\(Ven.ii,\) 844; \(LPIii,\) 2925; 14 February 1517, Giustinian to the Signory), 63-68 (\(Ven.ii,\) 876; \(LPIii,\) 3163; 23 April 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London). The Grand Master of Rhodes made similar calls, although any other motivation is unclear; \(LPIii,\) 2457 (18 October 1516, Fabrizio [del Caretto] to [Henry], Rhodes). In late March 1517, Somerset and Tunstal conveyed Schiner’s message that the Ottomans were threatening Croatia, but they believed this to be untrue. In cipher, they advised that this was either a story created by Francis and Charles’ councillors to induce Maximilian back into Germany, or by the emperor to get more money out of Henry; \(LPIii,\) 3059 (27 March 1517, Somerset and Tunstal, Mechelin).
declared, after being pressed by Giustinian, ‘Domine orator, for the love of God, let us first free ourselves from the peril which threatens us from the King of France…’.  

Something had changed by late October, however, when the duke of Norfolk indicated to the Venetian that current negotiations (with Cardinal Schiner) did aim towards universal peace. In other words, the subsequent league ‘for defence of the Church’ would incorporate an intention to crusade, which it did. 

Given the noted change of emphasis placed on universal peace in England towards the end of October, it is feasible that the papal call to arms may have encouraged lip service. By virtue of this declaration, the English could be seen to be responding positively to Leo’s call, albeit shaping its response within the anti-French terms and, potentially, pre-empting any pro-French hidden agenda that it may have suspected. Despite Henry VIII’s crusading commitment according to the league, however, Giustinian was never fooled that this league would fail to be directed against Francis I.

This was only the beginning of the papacy’s universal peace initiative. A sign of things to come for England came via de Giglis’ notification, of 23 December 1516.

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447 R. Brown (trans.), *Four Years*, i, pp.298-300 (Ven.ii, 781; LPIII, 2414; 3 October 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London); Ven.iii, 1487 (3 October 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). By mid-October, moreover, the Venetian ambassador believed that the English merely did not acknowledge the Turkish threat, as it was too far away and they were not motivated by any religious impulse; R. Brown (trans.), *Four Years*, i, pp.301-303 (LPIII, 2445; 14 October 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). Also see *ibid.*, pp.292-298 (Ven.ii, 775; LPIII, 2382; 23 September 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London).


449 Indeed, the treaty of 29 October did stipulate this as an aim; p.244 n.236. In reply to Giustinian raising the Turkish threat to Christendom in an audience on 13 November, Wolsey replied that Henry VIII had already understood this and provided a ‘remedy’ in the form of this coalition; R. Brown (trans.), *Four Years*, ii, pp.1-6 (Ven.ii, 807; LPIII, 2543; 13 November 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). Also see LPIII, 2564 (‘A List of Original Papal Bulls and Briefs in the Department of Manuscripts, British Museum [Continued], EHR, 36 [1921], p.559; 19 November 1516, Leo to Henry, Rome).

450 In early December, for instance, he visited Henry and Wolsey to press the Ottoman threat and reported that the king took little heed, being preoccupied with Italian and French affairs. Similarly, on 30 December, the orator reported claims by the likes of Norfolk and Ruthal that England sought universal peace, but he disbelieved that such a u-turn had really taken place; R. Brown (trans.), *Four Years*, ii, pp.12-16 (Ven.ii, 791; LPIII, 2464; 20 October 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 25-26 (Ven.ii, 829; LPIII, 2712; 30 December 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London).
that, since the death of the Mamluk sultan, Selim I (1512-1520) had gained control of most Mamluk territories and was now expected to prepare for an assault on Hungary; ‘that done you may bid goodbye to Italy’, he opined. Early in 1517, Leo resolved on launching a passagium incorporating England, although some argue that this was soon to be overshadowed by the pope’s concentration on the re-ignited conflict with Francesco Maria Della Rovere. While the latter may be true in terms of an actual expedition, papal pressure for the crusade as a political initiative remained strong, at least as far as the Anglo-papal relationship was concerned. The pontiff implored Henry to participate on 4 January, requesting that he send a delegate to Rome to participate in discussions. Leo, for his part, had already sent Nicholas von Schönberg to England to lobby for English participation in the passagium. While the nuncio did not visit Henry and Wolsey until the end of March and, then, to support the anti-French agenda, this would not have been known at the time.

451 LPii, 2669 (13 December 1516, Silvester de Giglis to -, Rome).
452 News of the Ottoman threat was relayed regularly through English diplomats in Rome; LPii, 2888 (calendared 8 February 1517, de Giglis to [Ammonius]), 2895 (9 February 1517, de Giglis to [Ammonius], Rome), 310 (9 April 1517, de Castello to Wolsey), 3165 (23 April 1517, de Castello to [Wolsey], Rome), 3241 (calendared 12-13 May 1517, [de Castello] to [Wolsey]), 3277 (23 May 1517, de Castello to Wolsey, Rome); R. Brown, Four Years, ii (1854), pp.88-89 (Ven.ii, 891; LPii, 3287; 26 May 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London). A papal representative was commissioned in late April to visit England with Ottoman news; LPii, 3164 (23 April 1517, Leo to Henry, Rome). England was also kept abreast of news from the Levant by other sources; ibid., 3200 (3 May 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 3246 (15 May 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 3344 (7 June 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Ghent); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.88-89 (Ven.ii, 891; LPii, 3287; 26 May 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London).
453 In a sermon delivered by Giles of Viterbo, it was hoped that Francis, Henry and Charles would attend to the danger in the east; R.J. Knecht, Francis I, p.69; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.219-221.
454 The pope reiterated information from an earlier letter that the Mamluk sultan had died and had been defeated by the Turks. He further outlined the danger of the Ottomans, how previous warnings had been ignored and that, if England did not support the crusade, the maritime states of Christendom would be imperilled. Leo seems to have written to other princes in this regard as well; LPii, 2749 (4 January 1517, [Leo] to [Henry], Rome), 2752 (5 January 1517, Leo to Nicholas von Schönberg, Rome), 2759 (8 January 1517, College of Cardinals to Henry, Rome). For de Giglis only hearing in early February that the nuncio would visit England, see ibid., 2895 (9 February 1517, de Giglis to [Ammonius], Rome). Henry would soon know that Leo had also made overtures to Maximilian towards universal peace; ibid., 2866 (3 February 1517, Robert Wingfield to Henry).
455 The nuncio was sidelined by the Cambrai conference, which he had been instructed to prevent or frustrate and to push the crusading initiative. Following his failure to achieve the former and (sort of) success to have the crusade included as a declared aim of the Treaty of Cambrai, he eventually moved on to England, indicating papal support English efforts to align its anti-French ‘allies’ and seeking
For England, however, increasing indications arrived that the papal initiative would be tied in with the French interest, thereby potentially becoming a mechanism for Francis to achieve his Italian ambitions (with papal support). By the end of January 1517, Henry VIII had received two communications from Leo regarding Maximilian’s entry to the Treaty of Noyon, both urging him not to obstruct the natural result of this peace, a crusade. Concerning von Schönberg’s attendance at the conference, at which the English were initially informed of the intention to promote universal peace, Wolsey argued at one point to Giustinian that the nuncio’s presence indicated papal participation in a plot to divide Italy among the powers present at Venice’s expense. While it is unlikely that the cardinal was really convinced of papal involvement at this point, he would have been opposed to Leo seeking a commitment to crusade from the Noyon powers there. Even as early as 8 January, Wolsey was said by an English spy in France to be ‘wonderfully scandalised’ by his French adversaries on account of this. Similarly, as Wolsey responded to Giustinian around 10 February, when the Venetian voiced his hope for universal peace following the surrender of Verona, he was positive, although it was said that ‘he

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456 One of these was presumably de Giglis’ letter of 23 December. Leo was also said to be concerned that some impediment to peace might still arise through Scotland. Papal fears in this respect were confirmed by James V’s complaints about Henry’s belligerent intentions in late January 1517; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.28-29 (Ven.ii, 837; LPiiii, 2839; 28 January 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London); LPiiii, 2800 (20 January 1517, James V to Leo).

457 By alleging this, Wolsey was trying to win over Venice to the anti-French cause, further asserting that the conference was intended to facilitate hostilities against the republic. As this is suspiciously similar to von Schönberg’s commission for preventing the meeting, it is possible that Wolsey was being disingenuous when alleging his belief in papal involvement; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.37-42 (Ven.ii, 855; LPiiii, 3001; 9 March 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London); LPiiii, 3030; 19 March 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London).

458 LPiiii, 2761 (9 January 1517, [Beaughienville] to [Richard Wingfield]).
spoke coldly, like one who expresses that with his lips to which his heart is a stranger’. Further English concern would have been engendered a week or so later when Henry was informed that the emperor was induced to take part in the negotiations on account of various offers linked to a potential crusade, including papal permission to levy clerical tenths in Germany, which thereby implied Leo’s involvement.

More papal pressure in this direction came in early February, when Leo complained that a promise of half a tenth had not been kept by England. De Giglis implies that the promise came via Tuke, who he earlier calls a ‘scoundrel’. It is unclear why this would ever have been agreed at a time of French political dominance, although Tuke’s involvement may be a clue; it is possible that it was intended as a sop to the original papal overture for a crusade, when Henry VIII had to show willing, but not enough to commit to anything, except via a servant (the clerk of the signet) low enough to be blamed for acting without approval or for misunderstanding instructions.

Leo X made another bid to promote his crusading initiative across Europe during March 1517. He apparently gave Henry prior warning of this on the 5th; having received pledges from Francis, Maximilian and Charles to launch an expedition, as

460 Spinelly also claimed that the emperor was drawn into the negotiations by virtue of the offer that he would lead the passagium, as well as that any expedition would secure Hungary (where his niece was married), as well as his own provinces of Carinthia and Croatia; LPIii, 2921 (13 February 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels). Henry and Wolsey would also have been suspicious of papal crusading overtures on account of similar Venetian pressure to this end; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.29-32 (Ven.ii, 839; LPIii, 2896; 10 February 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London). On the other hand, they must have recognised that a real danger was perceived from the Turks, given that an English knight of St John at Rhodes, Sir Thomas Newport, passed on the same information about Ottoman conquests and also recommended a crusade; LPIii, 2760 (8 January 1517, Thomas Newport to [Wolsey], Rhodes), 2898 (10 February 1517, Thomas Newport to [Wolsey], Rhodes).
461 LPIii, 2895 (9 February 1517, de Giglis to [Ammonius], Rome).
462 Even in the unlikely event that this pledge was genuine, concern for the papacy that arose from the emperor’s recent surrender of Verona would have been sufficient to ensure that it was not confirmed; see above pp.542-543.
well as encouraging letters from Henry and statements from his ambassadors, Leo declared his intention to proclaim a five year truce. He enclosed a crusading proposal from the emperor and stated that he would send a legate to England (as well as to other powers) to promote this. Finally, Leo advised Henry ‘to ponder this matter day and night’. Subsequently and perhaps in a bid to retain control of the crusading process that was to become central to the Treaty of Cambrai (11 March), Leo attempted to assert his authority over this in the final session of the Lateran Council (16 March 1517), having it decree that a crusade should take place, for which it proclaimed a three year clerical tax across Christendom. At around the same time, Leo issued a bull calling for a five year truce. Both actions formalised the papal ‘peace’ initiative.

The inclusion of a provision for universal peace in the Franco-Imperial-Spanish agreement at Cambrai (11 March) also caused concern in England, as through this Henry VIII may have feared the loss of any potential influence over the direction of the papal initiative. The English were clearly uncomfortable with the perceived ‘French’ control of this; Wolsey was said to agree that a general peace was needed, but stipulated that, first, ‘every other passion’ ought to be extinguished. Henry reasoned ‘that he was remote from the danger, but that should he perceive the others

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463 LPIii, 2988 (5 March 1517, Leo to Henry, Rome). For further reports to England that this policy was to be implemented, see ibid., 3080 (30 March 1517, extracts from de Giglis’ letters), 3095 (2 April 1517, - to [Wolsey?], Rome). For the prospect that there would be English resistance to the coming of a legate a latere, see below pp.632-634.

464 No English representative was present at this session of the Lateran Council, however, de Giglis being ill; LPIii, 3040 (21 March 1517, de Castello to Wolsey, Rome), 3085 (31 March 1517, de Castello to [Henry], Rome); L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, p.220; R.J. Schoeck, ‘The Fifth Lateran Council’, in G.F. Lytle (ed.), Reform and Authority in the Medieval and Reformation Church, p.111; N.P. Tanner (ed.), Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, i, pp.650-655. The crusade was one of the founding aims of this general council. The need for Leo to assert control was required on account of universal peace being pronounced as the aims of both the anti-French league in London (October 1516) and the Treaty of Cambrai (March 1517). Both ‘sides’ had attempted to dominate the direction of the crusading aim and Leo X probably felt obliged to regain control, to ensure that this strategy developed in his own interests.

465 Giustinian opined to Wolsey in early March that negotiations might be conducted towards universal peace; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.37-42 (Ven.ii, 855; LPIii, 3001; 9 March 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London).
[princes] to bestir themselves he also would do the like’. In other words, the cardinal believed that all princes’ political ambitions (implicitly, Francis’ in Italy) needed to be renounced before he would support this, while the king, along the same lines, did not intend to commit himself until he saw other kings (implicitly, Francis again) do the same.466 Wolsey subsequently enclosed letters to Leo and the Sacred College containing ‘secret matters’ about the crusade on 24 March 1517.467 In the only reference to the contents of these, the pope told the Venetian ambassador that Henry pledged to go in person.468 While this is likely, given the imperative that the king show willing, it also probable that Henry expressed his reservations about the commitment of other powers (notably France), particularly in the light of English concerns following the Treaty of Cambrai.469 Justification of this fear that the French would subsequently ‘shape’ the universal peace was sent to England shortly after by de Giglis who reported that, while Leo understood that he would have Francis’ full support for whatever crusading proposal he made, the French king had reportedly requested Swiss troops as a ‘pretext’, presumably for acting in Italy.470

Reassurance about papal crusading intentions would have probably been provided by the arrival in England of von Schönberg around the end of March 1517. While part of the nuncio’s original commission had been to promote this initiative in England, the Cambrai agreement seems to have morphed this into a papal offer to

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466 Giustinian further noted that Wolsey ‘never says what he means, but the reverse of what he intends to do’; ibid., pp.50-52 (Ven.ii, 865; LPIii, 3081; 31 March 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London).
467 LPIii, 3045 (Mart. Amp. iii, 1275; 24 March 1517, Wolsey to de Giglis, ‘from my house at London’).
468 Ven.ii, 868 (8 April 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory).
469 When the pope also opined that other princes would declare the same intention as Henry, the Venetian orator noted that he did not seem convinced that Francis would follow suit. This could have been based on English arguments from the same correspondence; ibid., 868 (8 April 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory).
470 LPIii, 3080 (30 March 1517, extracts from de Giglis’ letters). In the same context, the English would also have bristled at the duke of Albany’s willingness, by the start of May, to pursue the crusading intentions of the Treaty of Cambrai by sending ambassadors to England to treat for peace; ibid., 3194 (calendared 1 May 1517, Albany to Leo, Edinburgh).
back the anti-French league in return for English financial aid against Francesco Maria della Rovere.\textsuperscript{471} Given the wider universal peace strategy and its inclusion already in the Treaty of London (October 1516), it is likely that von Schönberg invoked this within an anti-French context, pledging that Leo would back England in effectively by ‘forcing’ France into a general peace.\textsuperscript{472} In such a case, it would have been equally as likely that the English crown would have agreed to back the papal strategy within the confines of a renewed or new anti-French coalition.

As von Schönberg returned to the Low Countries to liaise with English representatives in seeking an Anglo-Spanish accord, to facilitate papal involvement in an anti-French league and thus an English loan for use in the Urbino war, Henry VIII became more belligerent about the anti-French prospects for the papacy’s universal peace initiative. In late April, when reflecting on Turkish news from Rhodes, he opined that ‘from the Turk there was little to fear, but that more might be dreaded from bad Christians’.\textsuperscript{473} The implication was clear. Following Charles’ adhesion to the Treaty of London (1516) and von Schönberg joining on Leo’s behalf, English crusading intentions grew louder. On 19 May 1517, Giustinian predicted the alliance between Charles and Henry might easily be turned into a general league against the Turks.\textsuperscript{474} A few days later, Ruthal was predicting a general peace, that would lead to crusade.\textsuperscript{475} In Rome, on the other hand, the papacy was less confident of such an outcome. As de’ Medici reported to von Schönberg on 20 May, ‘considering how little Christian Princes set by his admonitions [about the Turks], he will be compelled,

\textsuperscript{471} See above pp.579-580.
\textsuperscript{472} Giustinian quoted Henry as telling him that the nuncio was in England to form a league against the Turks. Chieregato was more sceptical, however, opining that ‘our masters here are incessantly plotting confederacies and frauds, but never effect anything’; R. Brown, \textit{Four Years}, ii (1854), pp.56-62 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 870; \textit{LPIii}, 3119; 13 April 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London).
\textsuperscript{473} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 63-68 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 876; \textit{LPIii}, 3163; 23 April 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London).
\textsuperscript{474} \textit{Ven.ii}, 888 (19 May 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London).
if they land in Italy, to abandon the residence of St Peter’s, “with such saint reliques as he might assemble”, and flee to some safe place’. This would have been reinforced by news from Rome. Around this time, a papal representative would have arrived in England, instructed to communicate Ottoman news to the king. Also, Wolsey would have been informed of a commission of cardinals established by Leo to discuss an expedition.

Lacking support from Rome (and elsewhere) to form a league ‘in defence of the Church’, Henry VIII responds to French peace overtures, combining these with a papal crusading initiative, to straitjacket Francis I from making further progress in Italy: July 1517 – October 1518.

While the reformulated treaty ‘for defence of the Church’ had been sworn to by England and Spain at least, its ‘defensive’ nature seems to have ended any realistic hope of attacking France, despite Wolsey’s idea to use Francis’ backing of Francesco Maria della Rovere against the papacy as a pretext. Nevertheless, there continued to be indications that the English crown was pushing in this direction with its confederates, but these were far fewer than previously. One can understand this arising from English doubts generated by the fear that both Charles and Maximilian were still committed to the Treaty of Cambrai, which both swore to on 14 May 1517. Vis-à-vis Charles specifically, it was probably already accepted that, even if he was committed to the English coalition, he would not act in any provocative sense.

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476 LPiii, 3307 (30 May 1517, letter to von Schönberg from Giulio de’ Medici, dated 20 May, sent to England by Spinelly).
477 Alexander Geraldine, bishop of St Dominic was instructed to visit England on his way to visit Charles; ibid., 3164 (23 April 1517, Leo to Henry, Rome).
478 Ibid., 3165 (23 April 1517, de Castello to [Wolsey], Rome).
479 See above pp.583-584.
480 On the 17th, Henry’s ambassadors in the Low Countries notified him of this. Charles further issued instructions to receive Francis’ oath of observance in mid-June; LPiii, 3246 (15 May 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 3251 (17 May 1517, Somerset, Tunstal and Wingfield to Henry), 3375 (18 June 1517, Charles’ instructions to -). Also see ibid., 3378 (19 June 1517, Tunstal to [Henry], Ghent).
prior to his imminent voyage to Spain, to which Henry VIII had contributed in order to buy his alliance. There does, however, seem to have been some scheme whereby the English king pledged to defend the Low Countries in Charles’ absence, specifically against the French-backed duke of Guelders. \textsuperscript{481} Furthermore, it had been hoped that Charles would keep his promise to split with France once he had arrived in Spain and secured his territories there. \textsuperscript{482} If this did not take place, the English anticipated that a resurgent Spanish nobility would oust Charles’ francophile

\textsuperscript{481} Charles’ need to go to Spain to put down a revolt and secure his inheritance there, see pp.534-536 n.252. Ultimately, it was the promise of an English loan to finance his voyage that induced Charles to swear to the league against France in May (and July) 1517. In the following months, Charles focused increasingly on his departure and on getting hold of the promised English money. At length, the loan was delivered in mid-August and the Spanish king left Burgundy in September. He was to remain in Spain until 1520; \textit{ibid.}, 3233 (12 May 1517, Somerset and Tunstal to [Henry]), 3246 (15 May 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 3283 (25 May 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Ghent), 3300 (29 May 15117, Spinelly to [Henry], Ghent), 3344 (7 June 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Ghent), 3378 (19 June 1517, Tunstal to [Henry], Ghent), 3509 (24 July 1517, Tunstal to Wolsey, ‘Mydelborogh’), 3513 (25 July 1517, Charles to Wolsey, Middleburg), 3514 (25 July 1517, Charles to Wolsey, Middleburgh), 3524 (28 July 1517, Tunstal to [Henry], ‘Myddilborowe’), 3537 (29 July 1517, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels), 3539 (29 July 1517, Bernard Stecher to Wolsey, Antwerp), 3540 (calendared 29 July 1517, Bernard Stecher to Robert [Wingfield]), 3542 (30 July 1517, Tunstal to [Henry], ‘Myddelborowe’), 3555 (4 August 1517, de Hesdin to Wolsey, London), 3561 (6 August 1517, Charles to Wolsey, Middleburg), 3574 (10 August 1517, de Mesa to Wolsey, London), 3575 (12 August 1517), 3606 (19 August 1517, Chièvres to Wolsey, ‘Middleborowe’), 3608 (20 August 1517, Spinelly to Tuke, ‘Middelborogh’), 3641 (27 August 1517, Tunstal to Wolsey, ‘Mydelborogh’), 3666 (7 September 1517, Tunstal and Spinelly to Wolsey, Middelburg), 3672 (8 September 1517, Tunstal to Wolsey, Middelburg), 3692 (19 September 1517, Spinelly to Henry, ‘At sea at the Sell’), 3705 (29 September 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Spain), addendum 200 (15 October 1517, A. de la Laing to Wolsey, Brussels); R. Brown, \textit{Four Years}, ii (1854), pp.88-90 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 893; \textit{LPiii}, 3295; 28 May 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 113-116 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 944; \textit{LPiii}, 3558; 6 August 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 117-120 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 951; \textit{LPiii}, 3581; 15 August 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 134-135 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 979; \textit{LPiii}, 3738; 10 October 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London). Also see H. Kamen, \textit{Spain 1469-1714} (1983), pp.73-74. Concerning the Guelders pretext, Henry was tentatively approached to become the protector of Flanders towards the end of May 1517. It was widely believed that the duke was again supported by France and Henry VIII was apparently willing to adopt this role, even sending archers to Charles towards the end of July and pledging that he would fulfill this role in early October; \textit{LPiii}, 3300 (29 May 1517, Spinelly to [Henry], Ghent), 3453 (9 July 1517, Tunstal to Henry), 3508 (24 July 1517, Tunstal to Henry), 3513 (25 July 1517, Charles to Wolsey, Middleburgh), 3536 (29 July 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Bruges), 3542 (30 July 1517, Tunstal to [Henry], ‘Myddelborowe’), 3560 (6 August 1517, Charles to Wolsey, ‘Midelbourogh’), 3561 (6 August 1517, Charles to Wolsey, ‘Mydelbergh’), 3566 (17 August 1517, Spinelly to Henry), 3608 (20 August 1517, Spinelly to Tuke, ‘Middelbourogh’), 3647 (28 August 1517, Spinelly to Wolsey), 3723 (6 October 1517, extracts from de Mesa’s letters); \textit{Ven.ii}, 945 (6 August 1517, Chièrégato to Francesco II Gonzaga, London).

\textsuperscript{482} Spinelly certainly voiced this opinion; \textit{LPiii}, 3344 (7 June 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Ghent), 3378 (19 June 1517, Tunstal to [Henry], Ghent), 3357 (29 July 1517, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels). That Charles was increasingly leaning towards England may also have been interpreted by Wolsey who, in June 1517, was granted a pension backdated to July 1516 and, during August, may have had a bishopric tentatively offered to him; \textit{ibid.}, 3345 (7 June 1517, Spinelly to Wolsey, Ghent), 3347 (8 June 1517), 3605 (19 August 1517, Spinelly to Tuke).
councillors.\(^{483}\) Any such expectations would have been dissipated, however, when Spinelly reported no prospect of either outcome in Spain by late September.\(^{484}\)

Concerning Maximilian, the emperor had proved during 1516 that he could not be relied upon and reverted to demanding money from England. In addition, he had recently suffered a stroke, although it is unclear whether this was known in England or affected the crown’s perception of him.\(^{485}\) The only realistic chance of action was through the raising of the Swiss, a provision of the league, for which Pace had remained in the Cantons and had subsequently resumed his negotiations there.\(^{486}\)

While Pace was pessimistic from the outset, it seems that, again faced with French counter-offers to the Swiss and a reluctance by his crown to hand over money in advance (in contrast to 1515-1516), he increasingly recognised that his prospects for success were slim and appears to have left in early October.\(^{487}\)

\(^{483}\) Wolsey had been informed back in February 1517 that Charles’ Spanish advisors were opposed to the French amity; \textit{ibid.}, 2930 (16 February 1517, Knight to Wolsey, Brussels).

\(^{484}\) \textit{Ibid.}, 3705 (29 September 1517, Spinelly to Henry, St Vincent).

\(^{485}\) Maximilian seems to have suffered a stroke during May from which, one Venetian reporter speculated, those afflicted rarely survived beyond a year; \textit{Ven.ii}, 892 (27 May 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). Towards the end of July, Spinelly (in the Los Countries) searched for ways to make the Treaty of Cambrai ‘less mischievous’, although he admitted that Maximilian was difficult to manage. The English, however, were reluctant to entrust the emperor with any more money, despite further requests for English money (at one point desired to pay for Maximilian’s descent to Flanders, so that he could bestow the Imperial crown on Henry VIII, as he claimed). Indeed, Robert Wingfield’s mission at the Imperial Court must have proved untenable probably on this basis, as he was back in England by mid-August. Similarly, a letter from Pace reportedly suggested that the friendship between England, the Empire and the Swiss was not that close, as the latter two powers sought money and Henry VIII had closed his purse strings; \textit{LPHi}, 3523 (27 July 1517, [Pace] to [Wolsey], Constance), 3536 (29 July 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Bruges), 3537 (29 July 1517, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels), 3578 (14 August 1517, [Pace] to [Wolsey], Constance), 3599 (18 August 1517, Robert Wingfield to Wolsey, Wenham Hall), 3604 (19 August 1517, Robert Wingfield to Wolsey, Wenham Hall), 3685 (15 September 1517, [Schiner] to [Wolsey], Zurich), 3724 (calendared 6 October 1517, [Pace] to -); R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, ii, pp.126-128 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 958; \textit{LPHi}, 3638; 27 August 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London). Also see \textit{LPHi}, 3495 (20 July 1517, [Schiner] to [Robert Wingfield], app.37 (20 July 1517, [Schiner] to [Wolsey]); R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, ii, pp.128-129 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 966; \textit{LPHi}, 3675; 12 September 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London).

\(^{486}\) Pace advocated the need for an ‘offensive’ league; \textit{LPHi}, 3247 (16 May 1517, Pace to Wolsey, Constance), 3358 (14 June 1517, Spinelly to Wolsey). For his continued observation of diplomatic negotiations there, see \textit{ibid.}, 3523 (27 July 1517, [Pace] to [Wolsey], Constance), 3536 (29 July 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Bruges), 3557 (4 August 1517, [Pace] to [Wolsey], Constance).

\(^{487}\) Pace acknowledged his being instructed to resume negotiations with the Swiss in the middle of August, although he did not think the prospects were good; he predicted that the process would be expensive and that it would take a lot of time. Pace worked again with Cardinal Schiner, the latter who was also reportedly subject to French attempts to turn him; \textit{ibid.}, 3578 (14 August 1517, [Pace] to
The lacklustre response of England’s allies to the reconstituted league ‘for
defence of the Church’ was probably the reason why Henry and Wolsey became
receptive to French peace overtures that began in May. Negotiations with Francis I
could only benefit the English interest at this stage; either they would prompt a
positive response from the Empire and Spain to act against France (given that Anglo-
French amities tended to free up French kings to act in Italy) or, at worst, Henry VIII
would benefit from his inability to act against Francis through pensions, as he had in
1514. Francis made indirect peace overtures via Pace, then in Constance, during
mid-May 1517. The reply must have been positive as, by June, a French embassy
arrived in England and English representatives were sent to discuss mercantile
disputes. Observers quickly assessed both sets of discussions as efforts towards an
Anglo-French accord, involving the restitution of Tournai. They seem to have been

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488 These could also begin to recoup monies laid out in 1516-1517 to Maximilian and Charles in a bid
to secure their support. 
489 Anchises Visconti approached the secretary in this regard and, consequently, Pace advised that this
overture be deemed genuine; *LPIii*, 3247 (16 May 1517, Pace to Wolsey, Constance), 3358 (14 June 1517,
Spinelly to Wolsey). 
490 R. Brown (trans.), *Four Years*, ii, pp.93-95 (*Ven.ii*, 913; *LPIii*, 3415; 30 June 1517, Giustinian to the
Signory, London); *Ven.ii*, 919 (10 July 1517, Chieregato to Francesco II Gonzaga, London). For an
agreement reached over mercantile disputes in late July, see *LPIii*, 3520 (26 July 1517), 3521
(calendared 26 July 1517); R. Brown (trans.), *Four Years*, ii, pp.111-113 (*Ven.ii*, 941; *LPIii*, 3544; 31
491 *LPIii*, 3427 (2 July 1517, Banissius to Wingfield, Antwerp), 3666 (7 September 1517, Tunstal and
Spinelly to Wolsey, Middelburg); *Ven.ii*, 972 (17 September 1517, Gian Giacom Caroldo, Venetian
secretary at Milan to the Signory, Milan); R. Brown (trans.), *Four Years*, ii, pp.95-103 (*Ven.ii*, 920;
*LPIii*, 3455; 10 July 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London); *Ven.ii*, 921 (9 July 1517, Gian
correct, as Henry had apparently agreed, in principal, a price for the surrender of the city by mid-July. 492 Further French overtures in August, desired that the agreement be in the form of universal peace, although Wolsey rejected the offer for Tournai as insufficient. 493 By late September 1517, however, Wolsey had indicated to a French representative that he wanted an agreement with France above everything else. 494 This seems to coincide with Pace losing hope of recruiting the Swiss and leaving them within weeks. 495

As for knowledge of the peace negotiations among England’s anti-French allies, it seems that, on the one hand, the details and progress of these seem to have remained a secret, on the other, Henry and Wolsey admitted that such talks were being conducted and alluded to the rejection of French offers. 496 This ambiguity seems to have caused, indeed was perhaps intended to cause, much uncertainty among the Spanish and Imperialists, probably hoping that it would provoke action against

Giacomo Caroldo, Venetian secretary at Milan to the Signory, Milan), 931 (7 July 1517, Giovanni Badoer to the Signory, Abbeville), 942 (1 August 1517, Chieregato to Francesco II Gonzaga, London). 492 Ven.ii, 955 (14 July 1517, Giovanni Badoer to the Signory, France). For further Anglo-French diplomatic developments (in both England and France) from which one can see Wolsey moving towards peace, see LPIii, app.40 (28 September 1517, de la Guiche to Wolsey, Boulogne), app. 50 (16 August 1517, de Neufville to Wolsey, Sandwich), 3739 (11 October 1517, Bonnivet to Wolsey, ‘Argentan’), 3766 (calendared end of October 1517, Richard Wingfield and More to Wolsey and the Council), 3772 (4 November 1517, Richard Wingfield and More to [Wolsey]), 3803 (20 November 1517, Richard Wingfield, Knight and More to the French commissioners at Boulogne, Calais), 3805 (24 November 1517, Brian Tuke to John Bennolt, the king’s secretary at Calais, Hampton Court), 3858 (calendared end December 1517, [Wolsey] to -); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.126-128 (Ven.ii, 958; LPIii, 3638; 27 August 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London); Ven.ii, 977 (19 September 1517, Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory). A French embassy in England during November appears to have negotiated closer to an agreement. R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.135-137 (Ven.ii, 987; LPIii, 3788; 11 November 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 136-139 (Ven.ii, 992; LPIii, 3804; 21 November 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London). 493 LPIii, app.38 (calendared end August 1517, [Wolsey] to [Henry]).

494 Ibid., 3714 (calendared end of September 1517, de la Guiche to [Wolsey]). Also see ibid., 3701 (28 September 1517, Stephen Poncher and – to [Wolsey], Boulogne); Ven.ii, 972 (17 September 1517, Gian Giacomo Caroldo, Venetian secretary at Milan to the Signory, Milan).

495 See below pp.607-608.

496 For the secrecy surrounding the actual negotiations, see LPIii, 3714 (calendared end of September 1517, de la Guiche to [Wolsey]). For the English admitting to French approaches for peace, albeit claiming to have rejected their terms, see ibid., 3666 (7 August 1517, Spinelly to Wolsey, Middelburg), 3666 (7 September 1517, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Middelburg).
France. Charles V actively sought to prevent the peace by requesting that he be allowed to buy Tournai from England, a measure which, if carried out, would be extremely provocative given that both Charles and Francis laid claim to the town. This gesture seems to have been treated with scepticism in England, however; Wolsey’s response mirrored the Spanish king’s political intrigues over the last few years; he suggested that, for a small sum, Henry would retain it, while for a larger amount, he would hand it over to him. Nevertheless, the English were apparently intent on peace with France.498

It ought to be stressed, however, that such an agreement was by no means inevitable and that Henry and Wolsey’s continued fostering of their anti-Gallic allies suggested that they were just as prepared to implement a more belligerent strategy, if Charles and Maximilian showed sufficiently willing or if the pacific intrigues with Francis failed. Indeed, while Anglo-French negotiations continued towards peace during the early months of 1518, nothing tangible seems to have been on the table.499 There was, moreover, a fear in England that Francis I’s overtures were disingenuous and that he actually planned to attack England in some form, probably via Tournai. This apparently brought Anglo-French talks to the brink of collapse by February-March.500 Significantly for this study, Henry and Wolsey were also concerned that

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497 *Ibid.*, 3628 (25 August 1517, Pace to Wolsey, Constance), 3666 (7 September 1517, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Middelburg), 3764 (31 October 1517, Spinelly to [Wolsey], ‘Bezzarryll’). By December, Maximilian claimed to be enthusiastic about hearing that an Anglo-French treaty was close; *ibid.*, 3845 (24 December 1517, [Count Decian] to Wolsey, Linz); 3846 (29 December 1517, Maximilian to Henry, Linz).

498 For the proposal that Charles be given first offer of Tournai apparently emanating via Tunstal in the first instance, see *ibid.*, 3672 (8 September 1517, Tunstal to Wolsey, Middelburg). For Wolsey’s proposal, see *ibid.*, 3723 (6 October 1517, extracts from de Mesa’s letters). For other indications of Charles attempting to forestall a peace (and the handover of Tournai), see *ibid.*, 3764 (31 October 1517, Spinelly to [Wolsey], ‘Bezzarryll’).

499 A French embassy was sent to England to conclude at the start of January; *Ven.ii*, 998 (1 January 1518, Antonio Giustinian to the Signory, Tours); *LPiii*, 3968 (25 February 1518, Richmond [H]erald to [Wolsey], Paris), app.43* (6 February 1518, Francis to Henry); addendum 1929: 209 (calendared between February and May 1518, instructions to Clarendon).

500 There were constant rumours of a French military build-up in northern France, although the English crown was unsure of its intention; whether to make a move into Burgundy and to recover Tournai, to
any Anglo-French agreement might facilitate an attempt by Francis to achieve hegemony in Italy.\footnote{R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, ii, pp.166-173 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 1015; \textit{LPiiii}, 4009; 15 March 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, London); \textit{LPiiii}, 4205 (calendared 1 June 1518, - to [Wolsey]). Also see below pp.619-627.} Even in the weeks leading up to the conclusion of the Treaty of London (2 October 1518), there was some lingering scepticism about Francis’ intentions.\footnote{The French ambassador going to England to conclude the final agreement in September 1518 was assessed in this sense; \textit{LPiiii}, 4432 (14 September 1518, William Sandys to [Wolsey], Calais); R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, ii, pp.215-218 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 1072; \textit{LPiiii}, 4438; 18 September 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth).} It must not be forgotten that, while a peace with France did emerge from this phase, forced upon him by a lack of commitment from his allies, Henry VIII’s
underlying anti-French agenda remained undimmed; he continued to regard France as his ‘enemy’, describing Francis as such in mid-April 1518.\textsuperscript{503}

Insofar as the English crown still sought to cultivate an anti-French policy, this can be observed in various ways, particularly in its attempts to demonstrate to Charles of Castile (and, to a lesser extent, Maximilian) its ongoing anti-Gallic commitment and desire to hire the Swiss for this purpose. To keep this ‘option’ open, Henry VIII played down his negotiations with France to the Spanish, ensuring that Charles was aware of his refusal of Francis’ overtures, at least up to April 1518.\textsuperscript{504} This may have been linked to Henry’s fears that France actually planned to attack English interests. The Spanish tried to play on this perceived threat in a bid to pressure England to break with France, offering their support in case of an attack, and Henry gave Charles hope of this in late March 1518, when he welcomed Spanish overtures to negotiate a ‘stricter alliance’. Charles sent an embassy to England for this purpose, which had ‘many consultations’ with Henry by late May.\textsuperscript{505} The English crown also encouraged Charles to believe that he would participate in intrigues to recruit the Swiss (in accordance with their treaty ‘for defence of the Church’ of 1517), implicitly for use

\textsuperscript{503} LPI\textit{i}, 4082 (14 April 1518, [Pace] to [Wolsey], Abingdon).

\textsuperscript{504} The number of occasions that Charles was familiarised with the English rejection of French offers for Tournai suggests a deliberate strategy on Henry and Wolsey’s part to reassure Spain of their continued commitment against the French; \textit{ibid.}, 3874 (7 January 1518, Spinelly to Henry, Valladolid), 4027 (26 March 1518, Knight to Wolsey, Mechelin), 4135 (calendared April 1518, Henry to Kite and Bourchier).

\textsuperscript{505} Spinelly indicated some scepticism and Henry claimed to disbelieve Spanish claims about the French threat to Tournai around 12 April; \textit{LPI\textit{i}}, 3868 (5 January 1518, Charles to Henry, Valladolid), 3874 (7 January 1518, Spinelly to Henry, Valladolid), 4022 (23 March 1518, Spinelly to Henry), 4056 (2 April 1518, Spinelly to Henry, Aranda de Duero, Spain), 4057 (3 April 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Abingdon), 4074 (12 April 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Abingdon), 4155 (11 May 1518, Chèvres and le Sauvage to Wolsey, Saragossa), 4171 (18 May 1518, Tunstal to Wolsey, Oxford), 4187 (25 May 1518, Henry to Charles, Woodstock); R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years, ii}, pp.185-187 (Ven.\textit{ii}, 1020; LPI\textit{i}, 4157; 12 May 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth). Maximilian recognised the importance of such an arrangement to the continuation of the anti-French agenda when, in late May he urged his grandson to conclude an alliance with England quickly; \textit{LPI\textit{i}}, 4186 (24 May 1518, Maximilian to Charles, Innsbruck). For indications that Charles attempted to stir up hostility in France by issuing ultimatums regarding the perceived threat by Francis to Tournai, see \textit{ibid.}, 4056 (2 April 1518, Spinelly to Henry, Aranda de Duero, Spain), 4164 (calendared 12-13 May 1517, [Kite and Bourchier] to Henry), 4207 (calendared 1 June 1518). Also see Ven.\textit{ii}, 1020 (9 March 1518, Francesco Cornaro to the Signory, Valladolid).
against France. However, while the Spanish king repeatedly urged his English counterpart to send someone to the Alpine confederacy from April 1518 and received English pledges that they would do so, this did not occur. By July, Wolsey had told the Spanish that, if all went well with Anglo-French negotiations, they would have no need to hire the Swiss, although Charles still sought this. Finally, Henry and Wolsey must have given Charles at least some hope that they could comply with his desire for Tournai to be handed over to him instead of Francis, as the Spanish king pursued this end throughout 1518.

506 LPIIii, 4056 (2 April 1518, Spinelly to Henry, Aranda de Duero, Spain), 4074 (12 April 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Abingdon), 4208 (calendared 1 June 1518, Charles’ instructions to his ambassadors in France), 4209 (1 June 1518, de Mesa to Wolsey), 4228 (14 June 1518, Kite and Bourchier to Wolsey, Saragossa), 4246 (21 June 1518, Kite to Wolsey, Saragossa), 4277 (30 June 1518, Spinelly to [Henry], Saragossa), 4282 (2 July 1518, Bourchier to Henry, Saragossa), 4313 (12 July 1518, Kite and Bourchier to Henry), 4336 (24 July 1518, instructions from Charles to de la Sauch, sent to England), 4341 (26 July, 1518, Knight to Wolsey, Bruges). Maximilian also expected English assistance to recruit the Swiss, according to their 1517 agreement. Henry was in receipt of Imperial pressure to send someone there from early April and this pressure was repeated on several occasions. By June, he had despatched a representative of the Sforza claimant to Milan to England to seek a pension; ibid., 4057 (3 April 1518, Pace to Wolsey), 4172 (18 May 1518, Maximilian to Charles, Innsbruck), 4186 (24 May 1518, Maximilian to Charles, Innsbruck), 4236 (18 June 1518, Knight to [Wolsey], Ghent), 4239 (19 June 1518, de la Laing to Wolsey, Ghent), 4277 (30 June 1518, Spinelly to [Henry], Saragossa), 4282 (2 July 1518, Bourchier to Henry, Saragossa), 4344 (27 July 1518, Maximilian to Henry, Augsburg).

507 Charles even offered to ‘mediate’ between Henry and Francis on this issue and, although this was rejected in England, it did not stop him making the same overture to the French king; ibid., 3872 (6 January 1518, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Valladolid), 4074 (12 April 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Abingdon), 4313 (12 July 1518, Kite and Bourchier to Henry), 4336 (24 July 1518, instructions from Charles to de la Sauch, sent to England), 4384 (16 August 1518, Spinelly to Henry, Saragossa), 4385 (16 August 1518, Spinelly to Wolsey, Saragossa), 4390 (15 October 1518, Spinelly to Wolsey, Saragossa). Up to 18 March, it seems that the English crown did plan to send Pace back to the Swiss although, from this date, but Henry wished to postpone this. This seems to have been linked with the arrival of a French herald announcing the birth of Prince Francis, which marked a watershed for Anglo-French peace negotiations becoming more serious (see p.604). Over the next few weeks, Henry and Wolsey seem to have disagreed about how to respond to Imperial and Spanish pressure in this direction, causing the king to change his mind on several occasions about how to approach this. At its heart, Wolsey appears to have favoured Pace’s return, in observance of England’s membership of the 1517 ‘anti-French’ league. Henry, on the other hand, did not want to send anyone, wary of provoking a war with Francis by virtue of such a mission when he was currently engaged in peace negotiations with him and trying to work out whether his French counterpart was genuine in his response. Henry was also wary about making such a gesture, when he was sceptical about Imperial and Spanish intentions to hire the Swiss. By 4 April, Henry had finally agreed to despatch a diplomat to the Swiss, but only when all of his allies against France were agreed and on condition that this would not be at odds with his negotiations with France. By the 14th, Henry had agreed to Pace’s departure, albeit in secret, known only by themselves and Ruthal (but only as long as the Swiss were prepared to accept the 1517 league ‘for defence of the Church’). In spite of this, neither Pace nor any other English representative was sent to the Swiss, as became clear from the repeated requests from Germany and Spain; ibid., 4014 (18 March 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Richmond), 4023 (24 March 1518, Pace to [Wolsey]), 4057 (3 April 1518, Pace to Wolsey), 4058 (April, Pace to Wolsey, Abingdon), 4071 (11 April 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Abingdon), 4082 (14 April 1518, [Pace] to [Wolsey], Abingdon), 4085 (16 April 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Abingdon). For
In spite of the English crown’s various indications to Spain that it still ploughed an anti-French furrow, it seems that Henry VIII did not trust Charles’ pledges to the same end. Indeed, the Spanish king’s ‘pro-French’ councillors, Chièvres and de Sauvage, still retained power despite hopes that they would be replaced when they reached Spain. While reports back to England began to contradict this assessment of Charles’ ministers from mid-May and, shortly after, Henry and Wolsey were notified of de Sauvage’s death, it is difficult to identify any change in attitude from the English crown that it fully trusted Spain’s anti-French rhetoric, at least enough to abandon the peace negotiations. To support its attempt to reassure Spain about the French talks and to encourage Charles that the anti-Galic

Wolsey’s declaration to Giustinian that he hoped to arrange a marriage agreement with France, see R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.173-178 (Ven. ii, 1019; LP iii, 4047; 29 March 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, London). On 8 June, Spinelly reported the French to be angry at hearing that Henry had sent someone to the Swiss. It is probable that Spanish sources told them this, given that Charles understood that an English diplomat would be sent; LP iii, 4218 (8 June 1518, Spinelly to Henry, Saragossa). The English also maintained close relations with Matthew Schiner, the cardinal maintaining a representative in England and, at one stage, Henry proposed that he be commissioned to represent England with the Swiss instead of Pace; ibid., 3880 (13 January 1518, Schiner to Pace, Zurich), 4000 (9 March 1518, Schiner to Henry, Zurich), 4023 (24 March 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Zurich), 4118 (26 April 1518, Schiner to Wolsey, Zurich), 4168 (16 May 1518, Schiner to Henry, Zurich), app.47 (30 May 1518, Matthew Beccaria to Wolsey, Abingdon); Ven. ii, 1037 (30 May 1518, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory).

English diplomats in Spain implied the disappointment at this in their correspondence. In February, for instance, Stile wrote that Charles was governed by francophile Burgundians, to the discontent of the Spanish. Also, Knight notified Wolsey in late March, that the two advisors in question were still ‘omnipotent in Spain’; ibid., 3937 (11 February 1518, John Stile to Henry, Valladolid), 4027 (26 March 1518, Knight to Wolsey, Mechelin).

Kite and Bourchier described finding Chièvres less ‘French’ than they expected around 12-13 May and Kite reiterated this opinion on 21 June, although he claimed the Spanish disagreed with him and admitted that there were no Spaniards in Charles’ confidence; ibid., 4164 (calendared 12-13 May 1517, Kite and Bourchier to Henry), 4246 (21 June 1518, Kite to Wolsey, Saragossa). For de Sauvage’s death and his possible replacement by the dean of Besançon and the archbishop of Palermo, see ibid., 4218 (8 June 1518, Spinelly to Henry, Saragossa), 4219 (8 June 1518, Spinelly to Wolsey, Saragossa), 4228 (14 June 1518, Kite and Bourchier to Wolsey, Saragossa). There were also encouraging reports sent back to England from mid-April about Charles’ deteriorating relations with and increasing hostility towards France. For instance, Bourchier reported by 2 July that the Spanish wanted a breach between Francis and Charles and that he believed this to be feasible; ibid., 4091 (18 April 1518, Spinelly to Henry), Aranda de Duero, Spain), 4164 (calendared 12-13 May 1517, Kite and Bourchier to Henry), 4178 (20 May 1518, Spinelly to Henry, Saragossa), 4218 (8 June 1518, Spinelly to Henry, Saragossa), 4277 (30 June 1518, Spinelly to Henry), 4282 (2 July 1518, Bourchier to Henry, Saragossa), 4342 (26 July 1518, Bourchier to Wolsey), 4383 (Kite to Henry, 16 August 1518, Saragossa).
agenda was still alive, Henry and Wolsey attempted to keep the nature of these discussions a secret. While only a handful of Henry’s councillors were privy to them, however, this did not stop details leaking out. By the end of July an Anglo-French agreement became increasingly likely and, from this point, the English began to disclose their intention to conclude with France. Subsequently, Charles (and Maximilian) became increasingly concerned with its implications. While, during August, Wolsey told Charles not to listen to rumours about the treaty, the Spanish king was sufficiently worried by the 16th to request that Henry ‘keep the alliance strictly’ between them. Charles even asked for a delay in its conclusion and offered money for this. By mid-September Charles was not completely convinced about the imminent Anglo-French agreement, but he was said to be reassured of Henry’s

511 The veil of secrecy is indicated by Giustinian, although he does seem to have been au fait with most of the issues being discussed, particularly the marriage, restoration of Tournai and universal peace. Apart from Wolsey, Ruthal and Pace seem to have been involved, although in mid-September, Thomas More claimed that the cardinal ‘most solely’ conducted negotiations ‘so that the King himself scarcely knows in what state matters are’; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.195-199 (Ven.ii, 1042; LPiii, 4243; 21 June 1518), 200-202 (Ven.ii, 1046; LPiii, 4332; 22 July 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth), 204-206 (Ven.ii, 1053; LPiii, 4336; 5 August 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth), 208-210 (Ven.ii, 1063; LPiii, 4392; 20 August 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth), 210-212 (Ven.ii, 1067; LPiii, 4412; 2 September 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth), 213-215 (Ven.ii, 1071; LPiii, 4424; 10 September 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth), 215-218 (Ven.ii, 1072; LPiii, 4438; 18 September 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth); Ven.ii, 1025 (20 April 1518, Doge and College to Giustinian), 1070 (7 September 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth). For Jerningham’s lack of knowledge about the negotiations, see LPiii, 4364 (4 August 1518, Jerningham to Wolsey, Tournai).

512 Wolsey initially tried to reassure Charles by assuring him that Francis would not consequently launch any enterprise in Italy. The response from Spain and the Low Countries was negative and Knight recommended that Henry and Wolsey write to convey further reassurance; LPiii, 4336 (24 July 1518, instructions from Charles to de la Sauch, sent to England), 4341 (26 July, 1518, Knight to Wolsey, Bruges), 4341 (26 July, 1518, Knight to Wolsey, Bruges).

To reassure Charles about the negotiations with France, the English gave implied support of Charles’ candidacy for the Imperial crown, doubtless intended as a demonstration of faith. Some sort of bond may also have been paid to Spain for the same end. Nevertheless, the Spanish king feared the prospective loss of Naples as a result of any Anglo-French amity; ibid., 4336 (24 July 1518, instructions from Charles to de la Sauch, sent to England), 4369 (10 August 1518, de la Sauche to Wolsey, London), 4407 (calendared end of August 1518, [Wolsey] to [Charles], Hampton Court). In terms of Charles’ fear of any conclusion, the offer to Wolsey of a bishopric was also resumed; ibid., 4384 (16 August 1518, Spinelly to Henry, Saragossa), 4385 (16 August 1518, Spinelly to Wolsey, Saragossa).
good faith, although on 15 October, Spinelly still recommended that Henry needed to placate the Spanish king.\footnote{On the positive side, Charles wanted to be privy to all articles about the treaty, but on the negative, he still feared a possible French move against Naples; \textit{ibid.}, 4436 (17 September 1518, Kite and Bourchier to Henry, Saragossa), 4439 (18 September 1518, Kite to Wolsey, Saragossa), 4440 (18 September 1518, Spinelly to [Henry], Saragossa), 4503 (15 October 1518, Spinelly to Wolsey, Saragossa). Also see \textit{ibid.}, 4505 (16 October 1518, Spinelly to Henry, Saragossa).}

The watershed moment for English foreign policy \textit{vis-à-vis} France came with the arrival of news that an heir was born to Francis I on 28 February 1518. Wolsey had already anticipated this possibility and had proposed a potential marriage alliance, involving Princess Mary, prior to this. The birth of Prince Francis was known in England by 18 March and, a few days later, Giustinian noted that Wolsey no longer abused Francis and declared, ‘if I perceive the King of France to mean well towards his Majesty, and administer justice to our subjects, I will at any rate conclude this union;… The King of France has now got a son, and his Majesty here has a daughter – I will unite them by these means’. French agreement to this proposal was issued on 8 April.\footnote{Wolsey’s initial offer of Princess Mary’s hand in marriage to the \textit{dauphin}, if a son was born to Francis, was apparently made during Stephen Poncher’s last visit to England and seems to have been first acknowledged in France around the middle of March; \textit{ibid.}, 4014 (18 March 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Richmond), 4061 (7 April 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Abingdon), 4063 (8 April 1518, Stephen [Poncher] to [Wolsey], Paris), 4064 (8 April 1518, instructions from Poncher to his secretary), 4166 (14 May 1518, Poncher to [Wolsey], Amboise); \textit{Ven.ii}, 1018 (11 and 13 March 1518, Antonio Giustinian to the Signory, Amboise); R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, ii, pp.173-178 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 1019; \textit{LPiiii}, 4047; 29 March 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, London). For this news causing Henry to postpone an English embassy to the Swiss, see above p.591 n.506. Giustinian was convinced by mid-March that Henry was predisposed to peace rather than war; R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, ii, pp.166-173 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 1015; \textit{LPiiii}, 4009: 15 March 1518).} By 21 June Wolsey, then a legate, proclaimed his hope that the presence of a French secretary and herald would result in universal peace.\footnote{R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, ii, pp.195-199 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 1042; \textit{LPiiii}, 4243; 21 June 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth).} A preliminary treaty providing for the marriage of Mary to Prince Francis and the restitution of Tournai was initially settled on 9 July, following which there was a delay as a high-ranking embassy was awaited to conclude the agreement. This arrived in England by late
August-early September. At this point, Wolsey was confident of success as the final bout of negotiations began, although the cardinal subsequently reported French resistance to the inclusion of the Empire and Spain. A final French embassy travelled to England in mid- to late September, although it seems that there was still some lingering scepticism in advance of its arrival about whether Francis I was still genuine in his intention for peace. The Treaty of London was finally proclaimed on 2 October 1518 amidst great pomp and celebration. At its heart was an Anglo-French amity centred on the marriage of Princess Mary to the dauphin and the restoration of Tournai to Francis I for a price. The other significant dimension to this agreement was its provision for universal peace as a precursor to crusade against the Ottomans.

517 *LP III*, 4254 (23 June 1518, Francis to Wolsey, Angers), 4255 (23 June 1518, Stephen [Poncher] Bishop of Paris to Wolsey, Angers), 4275 (30 June 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Woodstock), 4276 (30 June, 1518, Pace to Wolsey), 4303 (9 July 1518, Westminster), 4304 (10 July 1518, London), 4339 (25 July 1518, Poncher to [Wolsey], Angers), 4351 (31 July 1518), 4352 (31 July 1518), 4353 (31 July 1518), 4357 (calendared end July 1518), 4358 (calendared end July 1518), 4360 (1 August 1518, Budaeus to Pace, Paris), 4401 (28 August 1518, Stephen [Poncher] Bishop of Paris to Wolsey, Sandwich), 4405 (31 August 1518, Francis to Wolsey, Angers), 4421 (8 September 1518, Budaeus to More, Paris), 4422 (8 September 1518, Budaeus to Linacre, Paris); R. Brown (trans.), *Four Years*, ii, pp.200-202 (Ven. ii, 1046; *LP III*, 4332; 22 July 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth), 204-206 (Ven. ii, 1053; *LP III*, 4366; 5 August 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth), 206-208 (Ven. ii, 1057; *LP III*, 4371; 11 August 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth), 208-210 (Ven. ii, 1063; *LP III*, 4392; 20 August 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth), 210-212 (Ven. ii, 1067; *LP III*, 4413; 2 September 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth); Ven. ii, 1047 (18 July 1518, Antonio Giustinian to the Signory, Angers), 1055 (21-25 July 1518, Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory, Angers), 1068 (21 August 1518, Antonio Giustinian to the Signory, Nantes), 1087 (9 August 1518, Antonio Giustinian to the Signory, Nantes).

518 Negotiations also related to money and Wolsey claimed to have gained a higher sum in advance of the marriage and better terms regarding Scotland; *LP III*, app.51 (28 August 1517, Wolsey to Henry), app.52 (calendared after 28 August 1517, Wolsey to Henry). Giustinian understood by 2 September that negotiations were pretty much concluded, although the final ratification would not take place before the end of the month. By the 7th, the Venetian believed that a conclusion was expected in a week or so and prematurely visited Henry on the 18th to congratulate him; R. Brown (trans.), *Four Years*, ii, pp.210-212 (Ven. ii, 1067; *LP III*, 44123; 2 September 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth); Ven. ii, 1070 (7 September 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth), 215-218 (Ven. ii, 1072; *LP III*, 4438; 18 September 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth).

519 The French delegation entered London on 23 September and was formally received by Henry VIII on the 26th. Giustinian believed the agreement to be practically settled, although he still understood that there were some final issues to sort out; *LP III*, 4432 (14 September 1518, William Sandys to [Wolsey], Calais); R. Brown (trans.), *Four Years*, ii, pp.215-218 (Ven. ii, 1072; *LP III*, 4438; 18 September 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth); Ven. ii, 1095 (30 September, 10 October 1518, Nicolò Sagadino to Alvise Foscari, Lambeth). For the Treaty of London and its celebrations, see *LP III*, 4467 (1 October 1518), 4468 (calendared 1-2 October 1518), 4469-4471 (2 October 1518), 4473 (3 October 1518), 4475-4477 (4 October 1518), 4480 (5 October 1518), 4483-4484 (8 October 1518); Ven. ii, 1088 (9 October 1518, anonymous account of the entertainments in England on the conclusion of the treaty), 1095 (30 September, 10 October 1518, Nicolò Sagadino to Alvise Foscari, Lambeth); R. Brown
Returning to the Anglo-papal focus, the English crown had gained papal support for its league ‘in defence of the Church’ through von Schönberg by 5 July 1517, but the nuncio did not swear membership on the pope’s behalf. It was understood that Leo would ratify later in Rome in front of his allies’ ambassadors.\footnote{To buy papal support (and probably explaining the ambiguity of papal adhesion), Henry agreed to supply the pope with 100,000 ducats of the 200,000 requested for the Urbino conflict, on condition that this could at least be subsidised by a clerical tenth in England.\footnote{News of the league’s proclamation reached Rome by the end of July, along with von Schönberg’s report that Henry was enthusiastic about going to war, as long as his allies joined it. The pope was reportedly delighted and, after speaking with the Imperial and Spanish representatives, declared that the league should be ‘etiam ad offensionem’.\footnote{All that remained was for the pontiff to ratify his membership personally and send that back to England. While Leo did confirm the league during August (perhaps on the 11th), this was withheld from de Giglis for some months.\footnote{While Pastor asserts that Leo ratified the treaty on 11 August, de Giglis was still said to be seeking to obtain Leo’s pledge/signature up to the 31st of this month. By the 22nd, for instance, de Giglis was said to be trying to convince Leo on the basis of his losses to della Rovere in the Romagna, whereas his French counterpart was attempting to prevent this. Some indication from Leo must have been issued by the 24th, however, as he appointed Wolsey along with at least three other bishops as collectors of the Sixth.}}\footnote{\text{\textit{Ven. ii}}, 1085 (5 October 1518), 228-235 (\textit{Ven. ii}, 1089; \textit{LPIii}, 4491; 10 October 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth). For the continued focus upon Tournai throughout, see for instance \textit{Ven. ii}, 998 (1 January 1518, Antonio Giustinian to the Signory, Tours), 1025 (20 April 1518, Doge and College to Giustinian); \textit{LPIii}, 4255 (23 June 1518, Stephen [Poncher] Bishop of Paris to Wolsey, Angers), 4275 (30 June 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Woodstock). The duke of Suffolk was accused in early April of having offered to secure Tournai for Francis, in return for a pension, which he denied and was still fighting in July. Wolsey, however, seems to have already made positive noises about this to Stephen Poncher (bishop of Paris); \textit{ibid.}, 4063 (8 April 1518, Stephen [Poncher] Bishop of Paris to [Wolsey], Paris), 4308 (11 July 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Woodstock). For the universal peace aspect, see for instance R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, ii, pp.223-224 (\textit{Ven. ii}, 1081; \textit{LPIii}, 4466: 1 October 1518) and below pp.628-644.}}\footnote{\textit{Ven. ii}, 954 (18 August 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory).}}\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, 937 (28 July 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). Such news had been expected since the 22nd, although rumours circulating Rome were at odds about whether Henry would actually break with France; \textit{Ibid.}, 933 (22 July 1517, Marco Minio to the Council of Ten, Rome), 939 (30 July 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory).}}
Papal procrastination meant that Leo did not release his ratification until 18 November but, even then, he requested that this remain secret.\textsuperscript{524} By this time, however, the anti-French coalition was effectively dead in the water and, although communication channels between England and Rome had and did remain open on this subject, no further progress was apparently made. Indeed, the English crown does not appear to have made any direct attempts to realise papal involvement. While in early August, von Schönberg still remained confident that the coalition would begin to turn against France, having urged Charles to lobby Henry to assist a pope who wanted to be ‘protected from wrong and oppression’, little is known about the nature of the nuncio’s subsequent exchanges with Wolsey.\textsuperscript{525}

As far as Henry and Wolsey were concerned, this papal reluctance to finally commit to the league may not have been surprising, given the wider political context of foreign affairs. The English by this time had little faith in their other allies taking the next ‘step’ to direct the league against France, by recognising a French transgression of the ‘defensive’ coalition that would induce action. Indeed, the English had largely given up making any tangible moves in this direction by September-October 1517, particularly as Pace returned home from the Swiss and there was little indication of Charles honouring his pledge to break with France tenth insisted upon by Henry, if he was to financially assist the pope against della Rovere, ‘the son of iniquity and child of perdition’. One cannot imagine Leo as envisaging crown cooperation in this if he was still not prepared to commit to the league; \textit{ibid.}, 954 (18 August 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 956 (22 August 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory); \textit{LPIII}, 3617 (24 August 1517, Leo to Wolsey), 3618 (24 August 1517, Leo to the bishop of Exeter), 3619 (24 August 1517, Leo to the bishop of Coventry and Lichfield), 3620 (24 August 1517, Leo to Fox), 3658 (31 August 1517, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome); L. Pastor, \textit{History of the Popes}, vii, pp.209-210. The Spanish ambassador in Rome, Hieronymo de Vich, may also have been called upon to help gain the pope’s oath; \textit{ibid.}, 3616 (23 August 1517, Hieronymo de Vich to Henry, Rome).

\textsuperscript{524} \textit{LPIII}, 3801 (18 November 1517, [de Giglis] to [Wolsey]).

\textsuperscript{525} \textit{Ibid.}, 3536 (29 July 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Bruges), 3556 (4 August 1517, Tunstal and Spinelly to [Henry]), 3567 (7 August 1517, Schomberg to Wolsey, Middelburg), 3587 (17 August 1517, Spinelly to Wolsey), 3667 (7 September 1517, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Middelburg).
following his reaching Spain. Of these, it may well have been understood in England that Charles’ declaration was of paramount importance to Rome, as Leo’s initial commitment in July was made conditional on this. Equally the pope believed that Henry VIII’s intention to act was dependent on the direct involvement of his allies, including Charles. In this context, therefore, Leo X’s reluctance to handover his ratification of the anti-French league until he could be confident of the likes of Spain also committing is entirely understandable. Indeed, by 31 August, the pope had advised de Giglis that he would ratify soon, as he had heard that the Spanish king had embarked for Spain. It was eventually on account of the Spanish king’s inaction and continued influence of his ‘pro-French’ councillors that de Giglis attributed Leo’s desire to keep his November ratification secret. Charles’ failure to follow-through

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526 For positive intelligence in Rome that England was acting in the Cantons up until then, see Ven.ii, 964 (10 September 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 968 (13 September 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). For reports from the Curia and elsewhere that the Swiss had joined France, see LPIii, 3682 (14 September 1517, de Giglis to Vannes), 3685 (15 September 1517, [Schiner] to [Wolsey], Zurich), 3693 (19 September 1517, [Pace] to Wolsey, Constance). Around the end of November, de Giglis passed on a request from the pope for Henry to counter French intrigues with the Swiss ‘for the sake of general tranquility’, but this was too late, given Pace had already departed; ibid., 3813 (calendared end November 1517; [de Giglis] to [Wolsey]).

527 See above pp.579-580.

528 At the same time as he notified Leo of his adhesion to the English treaty, von Schönberg reported Henry’s commitment to go to war, as long as his allies also participated; Ven.ii, 939 (30 July 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory).

529 LPIii, 3658 (31 August 1517, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome). To the pope, there was a hope that Henry was still attempting to facilitate this; by 9 September, Leo had received intelligence from France that Henry had supplied Charles with 3,000 troops, presumably for the defence of the Low Countries and 300,000 ducats for his voyage. The following day, Imperial intelligence circulating Rome suggested that Henry VIII would turn against France when Charles arrived in Spain; Ven.ii, 962 (9 September 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 964 (10 September 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 968 (13 September 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). Contemporaneous to this, Leo and Charles concluded a secret league during August 1517 that was based on the pope’s earlier alliance with Ferdinand ‘for the preservation of the Church’. In addition to the Church, Florence and Lorenzo de’ Medici were included and its aim was probably to support the papal effort in Urbino. While Wolsey was informed of its existence, the English crown was neither involved, nor did it even broach the subject with Rome; LPIii, 3495 (20 July 1517, [Schiner] to [Robert Wingfield]), 3591 (calendared at 17 August 1517, [Schiner] to -), 3660 (calendared at the end of August 1517), app.37 (20 July 1517, [Schiner] to [Wolsey]).

530 LPIii, 3801 (18 November 1517, [de Giglis] to [Wolsey]). As early as 14 September, there were suspicions in Rome that a Spanish rupture with France would not materialise; de Giglis conveyed the pope’s unhappiness at hearing of a purported ‘new’ alliance between Charles and Francis, for which he blamed Chièvres. The English orator had heard from Imperial sources, however, that this was false. He also wrote of having been approached by Charles to urge Chièvres’ elevation to the Sacred College; in other words, hopes that this pro-French principal councillor would be removed from power once Charles was in Spain, thus enabling the Spanish king to break with Francis, were unfounded; ibid.,
with his membership of the anti-French coalition, therefore, would have given the English crown little hope of inducing an oath from Leo X.

Secondly, Leo’s campaign against Francesco Maria della Rovere continued to drain papal coffers and divert his focus away from the broader anti-French agenda. Initially, however, Wolsey identified this conflict as a potential *casus belli*, through which the ‘defensive’ league could be activated against France. He tentatively sounded out the papacy on 28 June, claiming to have protested to a recently-arrived French embassy about Francis’ backing of the ex-duke against the Church, asserting that Henry would not tolerate this. This did not apparently elicit a response from Rome and was not pushed any further as a motive to declare war on France. The pope’s concentration on this ‘domestic’ concern overrode any commitment to the English league. Indeed, around 24 July, prior to hearing about the proclamation of the league on the 5th, Leo X’s main concern was whether the condition that he had imposed on his membership had been met by Henry VIII: ‘we are expecting to hear whether the King of England will accommodate us with money, for to this effect have we made a demand of him’, he told the Venetian ambassador. Around mid-August, for instance, it was rumoured in Rome that, despite de Giglis’ pressure for papal ratification of the London treaty, Leo would not do so until he heard the result of

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3682 (14 September 1517, de Giglis to Vannes). For reports in Rome along the same lines, that Chèvres would remain in control, despite Charles reaching Spain, see *Ven.ii*, 969 (16 June 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). For earlier indications that the English hoped for the replacement of Charles’ councillors, see pp.537-538 n.255.


532 The ambassadors reportedly did not deny the accusation, but argued that the pope had brought it upon himself by failing to observe his promises to the duke of Ferrara (to restore Modena and Reggio); *Ven.ii*, 933 (22 July 1517, Marco Minio to the Council of Ten, Rome). For Wolsey previously raising the French-backed della Rovere as a reason for war, see above pp.583-584.

533 Minio replied that he did well to ask Henry for this and that, given the Englishman’s wealth, he would surely grant it. The pope laughed and replied ‘We shall see’. By virtue of his discussing this with an ally of France, Leo effectively indicated that his actions *vis-à-vis* England were deceptive and financially motivated. It was also said that Francis had protested that Leo had written to England alleging that della Rovere was supported by France in his war against the Church; *Ven.ii*, 935 (24 July 1517, Minio to the Signory). Also see *ibid.*, 936 (24 July 1517, Minio to the Council of Ten).
Cardinal Schiner’s negotiations with the Swiss, presumably to support him against della Rovere. The English remained informed about developments in this war and, while these were not entirely negative, rumours about how Francis I’s support for the ex-duke might force or already have forced Leo to take up French offers of ‘assistance’ and how he was finding it difficult to recruit troops from the Swiss must have raised concerns. Among recommendations made to the English crown to support the pope was Pace’s advice of 17 August to have Francis apply pressure on della Rovere to cease hostilities, thereby withdrawing French support. Also, the secretary suggested that Henry write directly to della Rovere. Similarly, Cardinal Schiner, reporting the prospect of Filonardi’s recall from the Swiss Confederation as an indicator of Leo X’s inclination towards the French, advised Pace on the same date to urge his king and cardinal to write to the pope to prevent this. There was even a

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534 Ibid., 954 (18 August 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). Prior to this, by 27 July, Ammonius had heard from de Giglis that there was a very real possibility that Leo would side with the French, unless Henry fostered the Swiss. This would have been linked with the pope’s need for support in the Urbino war; LPIii, 3535 (29 July 1517, Ammonius to Wolsey).

535 On the one hand, there were positive reports that Leo was trying fight della Rovere without resorting to Francis and by using Filonardi to recruit the Swiss. On the other hand, despatches were more emphatic that the pope was ‘in great extremity’ in this conflict, having no money (as Pace reported on 11 July) and would either be forced to resort to French offers or had already done so. Robert Wingfield, in early July, even portrayed the offer of French support as a ‘pretex[t] for Francis’ to get possession of Italy’. From the Swiss Confederacy, Pace sent despatches describing the papacy’s failure to pay the Cantons for troops and the latter’s withholding of those troops for the campaign. Complicating matters was the emperor’s unclear role, where the secretary understood that Maximilian was not allowing Leo to recruit the Swiss, instead trying to take advantage of the pope’s desperation and trying ‘to pluck some money from him’. By mid-August, Cardinal Schiner portrayed the pope as having already sided with Francis, as he had (as the cardinal understood) recalled Filonardi because he was anti-French/pro-English; LPIii, 3427 (2 July 1517, Banissius to Robert Wingfield, Antwerp), 3463 (calendared 11 July 1517, [Pace] to Wolsey), 3523 (27 July 1517, [Pace] to [Wolsey], Constance), 3535 (29 July 1517, Ammonius to Wolsey), 3550 (1 August 1517, news from France), 3557 (4 August 1517, [Pace] to [Wolsey], Constance), 3578 (14 August 1517, [Pace] to [Wolsey], Constance), 3587 (17 August 1517, Spinelly to Wolsey), 3589 (17 August 1517, [Schiner] to Pace, ‘Schuitz’), 3590 (17 August 1517, Schiner to Pace, ‘Schuitz’), 3593 (calendared at 17 August 1517, Matthew Beccaria to [Cardinal -]), 3615 (23 August 1517, Pace to Wolsey, Constance), 3628 (25 August 1517, Pace to Wolsey, Constance), 3658 (31 August 1517, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 3666 (7 September 1517, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Middelburg), 3667 (7 September 1517, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Middelburg), 3685 (15 September 1517, [Schiner] to [Wolsey], Zurich), 3693 (19 September 1517, [Pace] to Wolsey, Constance), 3721 (6 October 1517, Pace to [Wolsey], Constance).

536 If this worked, Pace reasoned, the pope would be obliged to Wolsey. He also described the need to end the Urbino war as ‘an interprise godli’, on account of Wolsey occupying ‘one of the most hygh posts of the Churche’; ibid., 3578 (14 August 1517, [Pace] to [Wolsey], Constance).

537 Ibid., 3590 (17 August 1517, Schiner to Pace, ‘Schuitz’).
report in Constance during late August that peace negotiations between Leo and della Rovere were being conducted in England, although there is no other indication that this was true.\textsuperscript{538} While it is difficult to identify any clear English reaction to the Urbino war’s impact on gaining Leo X’s final oath as an ally, Henry and Wolsey could not have been optimistic.\textsuperscript{539} Even when the conflict ended in September 1517, the lack of outright victory and its sheer expense would not have assuaged their uncertainty.\textsuperscript{540} At the end of November, for instance, de Giglis advised Wolsey of his belief that the French would soon encourage della Rovere to reignite the conflict.\textsuperscript{541}

Thirdly, and inextricably linked to the Urbino war and Leo X’s desire to secure his nephew in the duchy of Urbino, the papacy entered into negotiations with both Francis and Charles to secure a matrimonial match for Lorenzo de’ Medici.\textsuperscript{542} The advantages for the papacy were twofold; it would secure Lorenzo in Urbino and ally him with France or Spain. For the English, however, the latter decision was of most concern, as if Leo opted for France, this would certainly preclude papal ratification of the London coalition. De Giglis began reporting this possibility from

\textsuperscript{538} \textit{Ibid.}, 3628 (25 August 1517, Pace to Wolsey, Constance).

\textsuperscript{539} The financial implications of the war alone would have been sufficient for them to be sceptical; \textit{ibid.}, 3463 (calendared 11 July 1517, [Pace] to Wolsey). It was probably intended that Pace, reactivated by mid-August to recruit the Swiss, work with the nuncios Filonardi and Gambaro to ensure that the papacy hired sufficient mercenaries to overcome della Rovere, but the English secretary was pessimistic about his overall mission from the start and more so, \textit{vis-à-vis} the papacy, when Filonardi was recalled; see above pp.595-596.

\textsuperscript{540} French commissioners negotiating with their English counterparts at Boulogne notified Wolsey on 28 September of the war ending; \textit{LPiii}, 3701 (28 September 1517, Stephen Poncher and – to [Wolsey], Boulogne). For the contribution of Charles (or, as Pace portrayed it, ‘the falseness of the Spanish’), instructing Spanish troops to leave della Rovere, shortly after making an agreement with pope ‘for the preservation of the Church’ see \textit{ibid.}, 3591 (calendared at 17 August 1517, [Schiner] to -), 3667 (7 September 1517, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Middelburg), 3693 (19 September 1517, [Pace] to Wolsey, Constance), 3705 (29 September 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Spain), 3721 (6 October 1517, Pace to [Wolsey]), app.37 (20 July 1517, [Schiner] to [Wolsey]). Nevertheless, Wolsey sought to take at least partial credit for this; R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, ii, pp.132-134 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 978; \textit{LPiii}, 3733; 8 October 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, Westminster). For accounts of the end of the Urbino conflict, see M. Creighton, \textit{History of the Papacy}, v, pp.278-279; W. Roscoe, \textit{Leo the Tenth}, ii, pp.68-69.

\textsuperscript{541} \textit{LPiii}, 3813 (calendared end November 1517; [de Giglis] to [Wolsey]).

\textsuperscript{542} The first suggestion of Franco-papal negotiations came towards the end of July, although a marriage for Lorenzo is not mentioned; \textit{Ven.ii}, 938 (30 July 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). In England, there were rumours around the same time that Francis I intended to move against Naples, possibly with papal approval; \textit{LPiii}, 3523 (27 July 1517, [Pace] to [Wolsey], Constance), 3535 (29 July 1517, Ammonius to Wolsey).
mid-September, although he was not initially worried about it, particularly (by mid-November) as the pope had approached Charles for an alternative match. At some point, Wolsey instructed the orator to lobby in favour of the Spanish option but, by the end of November, Leo was suggesting that he had no choice but to conclude with Francis, as he had received nothing tangible from Charles. The pope reiterated this by 10 December 1517, blaming Chièvres’ French sympathies for this. This again hints at disappointment in Rome that the expected replacement of Charles’ francophile councillors upon their reaching Spain failed to take place and that, consequently, Charles was unlikely to break with France. Given that Leo X had made his commitment conditional on such a Spanish commitment, Henry and Wolsey would probably have despaired of gaining a public declaration by this point.

Finally, the prospect of firm papal commitment to the English coalition could not have been deemed particularly great, given that the crown had already engaged in peace negotiations with France. That Henry and Wolsey began to respond to French overtures even before the ceremony proclaiming the anti-Gallic coalition on 5 July 1517 and that a French delegation was already in England by this stage suggests that Leo X’s support was not thought to be guaranteed. Given the subsequent lack of conviction displayed by the English in lobbying their confederates against Francis I, including Leo X, it may well be that they had already despaired of any plan to

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543 In mid-September, de Giglis reported that no decision had been made about a French marriage for Lorenzo. By 18 November, in spite of heavy French pressure, he wrote that Leo will ‘not throw himself into their hands’; LPiii, 3682 (14 September 1517, de Giglis to Vannes), 3801 (18 November 1517, [de Giglis] to [Wolsey]). Nevertheless, the English were still informed that Leo X continued to fear the realisation of French political ambitions in Italy ibid., 3427 (2 July 1517, Banissius to Robert Wingfield, Antwerp). Also see Ven.ii, 921 (9 July 1517, Gian Giacomo Caroldo, Venetian secretary at Milan to the Signory, Milan).

544 De Giglis also implied that Leo was already ‘French’ because of a legatine commission conceded to Cardinal de Boissy on the pretext of the crusade; LPiii, 3813 (calendared end November 1517; [de Giglis] to [Wolsey]).

545 Ibid., 3828 (10 December 1517, [de Giglis] to [Wolsey]).

546 See above pp.596-597.
develop the anti-French agenda through this league. If this was at least partially the

case, then the English would have been relatively unconcerned by the effect that

subsequent rumours of these discussions were having on the pontiff and his handing

over to de Giglis of his final ratification of its league. Leo X knew from early July that

Henry had entered into negotiations with Francis and, by the end of the month,

understood that an agreement was under discussion.\textsuperscript{547} Even when Leo was said to be

‘delighted’ about von Schönberg joining the league on his behalf, this was tempered

with suspicions about Wolsey’s regular and secret meetings with French envoys

which, it was speculated, must concern some sort of arrangement.\textsuperscript{548} This explains

why rumours circulating Rome around this time were at odds about whether Henry

would actually break with France.\textsuperscript{549} Further news of Anglo-French negotiations were

relayed to Rome on 1 August, when Chieregato wrote that all disputes between Henry

and Francis had been settled and that perpetual peace was rumoured.\textsuperscript{550} At this point,

the nuncio had identified an agreement on mercantile differences from late July, but

he had assessed the preliminary peace discussions correctly.\textsuperscript{551} Given that Henry’s

positive response to French overtures was an apparent reaction to his losing faith in

his anti-Gallic allies, one could also argue that the lack of firm papal commitment

hitherto also contributed to this. The English crown appears neither to have involved

the papacy in its intrigues with France or have even informed Rome of these. It was

only around mid-October that Wolsey even implied to the pope that an Anglo-French

arrangement was on the cards, when he promised that nothing would be negotiated to

\textsuperscript{547} Ven.ii, 916 (Leo to Henry, 4 July 1517, Rome). By the 9\textsuperscript{th}, a Venetian source in Milan reported the

pope having ‘thrown himself into the arms of King Francis’; \textit{ibid.}, 921 (9 July 1517, Gian Giacomo

Caroldo, Venetian secretary at Milan to the Signory, Milan). Also see \textit{ibid.}, 929 (17 July 1517, Minio

to the Signory, Rome).

\textsuperscript{548} \textit{Ibid.}, 937 (28 July 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 939 (30 July 1517,

Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory).

\textsuperscript{549} \textit{Ibid.}, 933 (22 July 1517, Marco Minio to the Council of Ten, Rome).

\textsuperscript{550} \textit{Ibid.}, 942 (1 August 1517, Chieregato to Francesco II Gonzaga, London).

\textsuperscript{551} See above pp.596-597.
Leo’s prejudice. While the pope was said to be happy with this, Wolsey made no further effort to keep the pope informed and, by 10 December, Leo was still on tenterhooks about the French embassy in England; de Giglis reported that the pope had been waiting for letters on this subject and was afraid of a rapprochement. He had heard various rumours that this was close, including that a figure had been agreed for Tournai. De Giglis had tried to reassure the pontiff about Wolsey’s lack of communication, again blaming the sweating sickness then prevalent. The pope even seems to have hinted that the negotiations would force him to come to his own arrangement with Francis I, vis-à-vis a match for Lorenzo de’ Medici. By the end of December, while rumours in Rome circulated that the French embassy had left England empty-handed, it was still believed that an arrangement was possible. The English crown, therefore, had contributed towards papal reticence to confirm membership of the anti-French coalition by virtue of these negotiations; it had encouraged a self-fulfilling prophecy by sending confusing messages to Rome about its intentions vis-à-vis France.

In addition to probable English scepticism about the papacy’s commitment to the anti-French agenda, the crown also had to contend with Leo X’s ‘other’ (ongoing) strategy for dealing with the threat of Francis; universal peace. On 2 July, Leo forwarded Henry a letter from the Grand Master of Rhodes with intelligence of Turkish successes in Egypt. As a result, the pope urged the king ‘to hasten the Turkish

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552 In this letter, Wolsey apologised for not writing very often, blaming this on the sweating sickness then sweeping England. The cardinal implied that negotiations towards an Anglo-French agreement were afoot when he notified Leo of the arrival of a French embassy, for which the pope was grateful; LPIII, 3781 (8 November 1517, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome). Earlier, on 14 September, de Giglis told Vannes that he had received a secret message from a nuncio in France that Wolsey was negotiating a treaty; ibid., 3682 (14 September 1517, de Giglis to Vannes).
553 Ibid., 3828 (10 December 1517, [de Giglis] to [Wolsey]).
554 Henry had reportedly rejected the French offer to buy Tournai from them, yet may have been prepared to give the city to Charles, so that Charles could hand it over to them; Ven.ii, 997 (31 December 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory).
expedition’ and had Chierega apply further pressure. On the 12th, de Giglis forwarded news of the Ottoman threat, along with Leo’s concerns about this and a request that an English envoy be sent to Rome to advise on the matter. Around 23 July, a nuncio charged with promoting the crusade (perhaps instead of the legate promised in March) arrived in England. Wolsey, however, was reported to have held Alexander Fitzgerald in little regard, despite claiming to be in favour of peace. Indeed, Giustinian observed a few days earlier, despite understanding that Anglo-French negotiations were under way, that little was said in England about the crusade. English reticence was understandable, given the underlying anti-French agenda; existing French political influence over Rome could still force such an initiative to work against the English ‘interest’. By the end of July, Wolsey received intelligence that the French were pretending to prepare for the crusade, yet were actually intending to expel the Spanish from Naples. By supporting the papal strategy, therefore, Henry VIII would have been in danger of helping to cement French hegemony in Italy and Francis’ political influence over Rome. This fear of the papacy being too weak to control the political direction of any universal peace probably explains why the English crown was reluctant to encourage this papal

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555 Ibid., 915 (Leo to Henry, 2 July 1517, Rome).
556 LPIII, 3469 (12 July 1517, de Giglis to Henry, Rome), 3470 (12 July 1517, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome). Henry was also lobbied in this direction by the Grand Master of Rhodes; ibid., 3607 (19 August 1517, Fabrizio [del Carretto] to Henry, Rhodes), 3695 (23 September 1517, Fabrizio [del Carretto] to Henry, Rhodes). The Venetians were also eager to transmit eastern news to England, albeit probably motivated by the desire to encourage Henry’s peace negotiations with their ally France; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.128-129 (Ven.ii, 959; LPIII, 3655; 31 August 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 135-137 (Ven.ii, 987; LPIII, 3788; 11 November 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London); Ven.ii, 973 (21 September 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 982 (24 October 1517, Signory to Giustinian), 990 (16 November 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London).
556 The nuncio was instructed to communicate Ottoman news to the king, en route to visiting Charles; LPIII, 3164 (23 April 1517, Leo to Henry, Rome); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.104-111 (Ven.ii, 934; LPIII, 3594; 23 July 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London). For the papacy’s original intention to send a legate a latere, see pp.589-590.
558 LPIII, 3548 (calendared end July 1517, - to Wolsey). Other intelligence from France, at the start of August, even opined that the English were ‘the Turks they will attack’ and advised the crown to be alert around Tournai and the Scottish borders; ibid., 3550 (1 August 1517, news from France).
policy, yet simultaneously albeit cautiously receptive to similar overtures from Francis I himself. With direct involvement in any agreement, Henry and Wolsey may have felt more able to affect this outcome.\textsuperscript{560} In early October 1517, for instance, Wolsey was observed to receive news from Constantinople ‘with a troubled countenance’. Furthermore, on speaking of his and Francis’ contribution to the pope’s ‘victory’ over della Rovere, the cardinal spoke of his hope that a general peace might now be achievable.\textsuperscript{561}

In response to earlier papal pressure, Wolsey told de Giglis around the end of November 1517 that he and Henry were now convinced of the need for universal peace. Henry was willing to comply with this, ‘notwithstanding the insults he has received from France’. Consequently, de Giglis was instructed to induce the pope to demand peace between England and France. To avoid any war in Italy that might result from this, a defensive and offensive peace was also to be urged, including England, the papacy, France, Venice and the Swiss. This proposal was evidently tentative, as the orator was not to mention them to the pope until he had got him to raise the subject and bound him to silence. De Giglis was further advised that the matter be ‘managed with great dexterity, for reasons Wolsey cannot write’ and that no-one else knew about this.\textsuperscript{562} This was clearly an early indicator that the English crown viewed the possibility of peace with France seriously and, to avoid the usual consequence of such agreements, the reactivation of French ambitions in Italy, spotted

\textsuperscript{560} If so, this was the precursor to such an approach that later led to the Treaty of London (October 1518). For French overtures from August that any arrangement be in the form of universal peace, see p.597.

\textsuperscript{561} R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, ii, pp.132-134 (Ven.ii, 978; LPIii, 3733; 8 October 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, Westminster).

\textsuperscript{562} Wolsey suggested that he was responding to de Giglis’ notification of Turkish successes. The French ‘insults’ to which Wolsey alluded related particularly to Francis’ interference in Scotland; \textit{LPIii}, 3812 (calendared end November 1517, [Wolsey] to [de Giglis]). The possibility of universal peace as an outcome could not have been much of a secret, however, as Giustinian reported on 10 December that peace with France was talked of in England and that he hoped to see ‘this confederacy between all the Princes of Christendom’; R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, ii, p.139 (Ven.ii, 994; \textit{LPIii}, 3827; 10 December 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, London).
an opportunity to provide for this; the papal crusading initiative. If the call was to come from the pope, Francis would be unable to resist the sentiment at least. Also, an offensive and defensive peace could be more aggressively imposed than if it was merely defensive. It is unclear whether de Giglis ever made this approach, as the pope was in the process of formalising the call to arms against the Turks.

Perhaps sensing that he could lose control of the universal peace initiative more generally, Leo X took further decisive steps towards a crusade in the later months of 1517. On 4 November, a congregation of cardinals was appointed to discuss a response to the Turks, to which ambassadors were allowed entry. By the 12th, this group had produced a memorandum which, among other things, called for universal peace among the princes of Christendom, so that a crusade could be launched forthwith. Leo subsequently distributed copies of this to Henry and his fellow princes.\textsuperscript{563} He further lobbied Henry to ratify the preparatory five year truce on 18 November.\textsuperscript{564} De Giglis gave Wolsey some forewarning of this decision on the 8th; he further lamented that he was the only orator that lacked a commission to negotiate such an agreement and that he told the pope that this was due to the effect that the sweating sickness then sweeping England. Presumably, he meant that the king’s attempts to avoid the epidemic was hampering the speed of business conducted. De Giglis did, however, voice his suspicion of French enthusiasm for this course, stating to his Gallic counterpart that ‘it was important that it [the crusade] should be sincere

\textsuperscript{563} As far as an English contribution was envisaged, it was specified that Henry contribute towards shipping, although one presumes that troops were also expected; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.223-227. Also see *LP*III, 3801 (18 November 1517, [de Giglis] to [Wolsey]), 3815 (calendared end November 1517), 3816 (calendared end November 1517), 3817 (calendared end November 1517).
\textsuperscript{564} *LP*III, 3801 (18 November 1517, [de Giglis] to [Wolsey]).
and unfeigned, and not a pretext for injury'. Despite Wolsey’s November proposal, the English reluctance to commit to the papal appeal continued and there was no urgency to reply to Leo X’s renewed call.

By the turn of 1518, despite an apparent Anglo-papal alignment against France, the papacy having issued its ‘secret’ ratification of the English league ‘for defence of the Church’, following two declarations of commitment by Nicholas von Schönberg earlier in the year, both Henry and Leo were far from allied to each other against France. To confuse matters, neither party seemed to know in which political direction it was heading, sending out mixed signals to each other about their attitudes towards France. The English crown was still expounding anti-French sentiments, yet had been involved in peace negotiations with Francis I for some months, as it could not rely upon its allies to act against France. As will be seen, the papacy still voiced its anti-French sympathies to the English, yet was moving towards its own agreement with Francis. At the same time, Leo X was increasingly vocal about his crusading intentions, for which some sort of general peace would be required. Juggling two contradictory policies Henry and Wolsey continued to pursue as strong an anti-Gallic agenda as they could vis-à-vis the papacy. Firstly, they sought to steer Leo X away from any agreement with France. Secondly, they tried to give the impression that peace talks were stalling, that they still envisaged Francis attacking them and would, if necessary, make a robust response. Thirdly, they remained reluctant to subscribe to the papal crusading initiative, fearing the implications that this may have if, as was expected, Francis used it as a blind to pursue his ambitions in Italy. English

565 Ibid., 3781 (8 November 1517, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome). It seems that the Venetians instructed Giustinian to back the papal proposal; Ven.ii, 989 (13 November 1517, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome). For the pope requesting in July that Henry send someone to Rome to advise on the crusade, presumably in this forum, see p.615.
566 See above pp.598-604.
enthusiasm for this course changed only when Wolsey identified an opportunity to hijack the initiative, by forcing Leo to commission him as one of the legates *a latere* sent out to promote the call to arms.

In spite of its own negotiations with France, the English crown sought to prevent any Franco-papal arrangement, in particular via the increasingly likely marriage for Lorenzo de’ Medici, which had been under negotiation for some months. It was feared that French threats may cause the pope to buckle and choose this option and that, subsequently, Francis would be able to make his planned move against Naples and have the papacy politically under his control. In light of Leo’s December notification that he might be forced to agree to this, as tangible Spanish counter-offers were not forthcoming, the English sent an envoy to the duke of Urbino (‘*Johannes Anglicus*’) during mid-January, presumably to urge him against the French and towards the Spanish marriage. By 20 February, however, de Giglis had written from Rome that the marriage had been agreed and that the failure to prevent it was down to a lack of communication from England, which the pope had interpreted as indifference. If Henry or Wolsey had written earlier or if they had sent an embassy to Spain earlier, the orator believed, this would have prevented the French success. Implicit is papal uncertainty about England’s intentions *vis-à-vis* France. Giulio de’ Medici attempted to reassure Henry on the same date that he ought not to worry about

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567 In one despatch that reached England, Henry VIII was informed that, if the wedding took place, the Spanish feared that ‘the French will have entire sway in Italy’ and, in another, that it ought to be stopped in order ‘to prevent the increase of the French feathers’. If they did prevent it, Spinelly conveyed in January 1518, the pope would join the Anglo-Spanish alliance and ‘the peace of Christendom will be secured’; *LPiii*, 3874 (7 January 1518, Spinelly to Henry, Valladolid), 4022 (23 March 1518, Spinelly to Henry).

568 *Ibid.*, 3882 (15 January 1518, Henry to Lorenzo de’ Medici, Greenwich). Also, a ‘Dominus Hadrianus’ seems to have resided with de’ Medici until mid-May. It is unclear, however, whether this was the same or a second English envoy to the duke; *ibid.*, 4177 (19 May 1518, Lorenzo de’ Medici to Henry, Amboise).
the agreement; it was just an attempt to increase the power of the Church. Ignorant of this *fait accompli*, Wolsey, writing on the 27th, urged de Giglis to promote the Spanish option and also informed him that ambassadors had recently been sent to Spain to urge Charles’ compliance. While Henry, he claimed, had heard rumour that the Gallic match had already been agreed, he had sufficient faith in the pope to disbelieve it (indeed, he did deny reports to Giustinian around the 28th). Further confirmation of the pope optings for the French match came from Rome on 10 April, by which time de Giglis presumed that Pace had already heard of the duke’s departure for France and reassuringly commented that no-one approved of it. In spite of the apparent (or rumoured) failure to prevent a Franco-papal marriage agreement, Henry VIII continued to press Charles to further his counter-offer. On the positive side, he emphasised that a successful outcome could only strengthen their league against France. On the other hand, he warned that, if the French match occurred, ‘the Pope will lean entirely on France, which will thus have Milan, Genoa, Venice, Ferrara, and all Italy at her beck’. Furthermore, it would effectively withdraw Rome from their defensive league and place Naples in danger. This pressure came too late, however, as the English ambassadors reported Charles’ principal councillors conceding defeat on this matter by 12 May. Indeed, English intrigues to prevent a Franco-papal

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570 *Ibid.*, 3973 (*Mart. Amp. iii*, 1277; 27 February 1518, Wolsey to de Giglis); R. Brown (trans.), *Four Years*, ii, pp.157-165 (*Ven.ii*, 1010; *LPHii*, 3976; 28 February 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, London). The English crown would also have been confident of Charles’ support in this; *LPHii*, 3874 (7 January 1518, Spinelly to Henry, Valladolid). For intelligence reaching England that the French marriage had been agreed, see *ibid.*, 3923 (4 February 1518, intelligence from Flanders).
571 *Ibid.*, 4068 (10 April 1518, de Giglis to Pace). For other intelligence reaching England that the pope had chosen the French match, see *ibid.*, 3992 (calendared 5 March 1518, Erasmus to Colet, Louvain), 4022 (23 March 1518, Spinelly to Henry), 4056 (2 April 1518, Spinelly to Henry, Aranda de Duero, Spain), 4091 (18 April 1518, Spinelly to [Henry], Aranda de Duero, Spain).
572 At the same time, the English crown was reacting to the papacy’s call for a five year truce and beginning to implement a strategy to usurp it, at least partly on account of this fear; *ibid.*, 4135-4136 (calendared end April 1518, Henry to Kite and Bourchier). Also see below pp.635-636.
573 The orators only managed to see Charles towards the end of April. By this time, Chièvres and le Sauvage reportedly admitted ‘their sloth and negligence’ in the matter. They also asserted that Leo now
agreement had failed and Lorenzo’s marriage to Madeleine de la Tour took place at Amboise on 28 April 1518.\textsuperscript{574} Wolsey must have made some sort of indication that he accepted the agreement, as on 1 May, the pope conveyed that he was pleased to hear this.\textsuperscript{575} Finally, de Giglis only seems to have replied to Wolsey’s letters to oppose the marriage around the beginning of June, at which point he advised that such a message would have hindered the Franco-papal agreement if it had arrived before its conclusion (especially if he had caused Charles to make counter-offers). In fact, the orator explained, Leo X would have preferred a Spanish match, but various factors caused him to accept Francis’ offer, the weight of French pressure being one. Despite this, the pope pledged not to allow the marriage to affect his membership of the anti-French treaty nor to affect the English crown. Nevertheless, de Giglis warned, due to the weight of French pressure, there was ‘danger of his [Leo’s] falling into many errors through French practices’. In particular, the orator claimed to have warned the pope against making any ruling in favour of the French claimant to Wolsey’s disputed see of Tournai. Finally, de Giglis recommended that Henry and Charles ‘keep their eyes open, and not trust too much to his [Leo’s] words’. Also urging them to retain the Swiss as a matter of urgency, the ambassador believed that this was the only way that Francis could be stopped from moving against Naples.\textsuperscript{576} In spite of papal

\textsuperscript{575} \textit{LPIii}, 4139 (1 May 1518, de Giglis to [Vannes], Rome).
\textsuperscript{576} \textit{Ibid.}, 4206 (calendared 1 June 1518, [de Giglis] to [Wolsey]). Guicciardini was another who believed that the marriage indicated a papacy that would be politically amenable to France; when Lorenzo de’ Medici went to France for his wedding, the Florentine historian described how the duke took a brief with him that allowed Francis to appropriate the clerical crusading levy until such time as it was required for use against the Turks (at which point Francis was to repay it). In addition, 50,000 scudi of this was ring-fenced for Lorenzo; S. Alexander (ed.), \textit{The History of Italy by Francesco Guicciardini}, p.302.
pledges to the contrary, Franco-papal marriage cemented English fears that Rome was now politically dominated by Francis I.\textsuperscript{577}

By virtue of the Franco-papal marriage, the English crown understood that its interests would be or were being threatened on a number of fronts. At its broadest level, this lay in its perception of the French intention to move against Naples, thereby establishing hegemony in Italy and making permanent its existing political influence over the papacy. The ‘French’ papacy that the marriage was expected to engender would also be expected to be amenable to Francis’ requests and make concessions in his interests. While Henry VIII would have baulked at his counterpart having such influence over Rome \textit{per se}, this would have been deemed particularly abhorrent in terms of matters directly affecting England, as de Giglis’ warning to Leo about ruling against Wolsey concerning the see of Tournai has already demonstrated.\textsuperscript{578} Also, the orator had already warned about French counter-pressure against the English campaign to deprive Hadrian de Castello back in mid-April. At this point however, de Giglis did not perceive this to be ‘dangerous’, as it had ‘incensed’ the pope.\textsuperscript{579} In the broader field of European politics, the English crown moved to oppose Francis’ use of the papacy to further his early intrigues to influence the expected Imperial election.\textsuperscript{580}

Indeed, a letter of French intelligence sent to England around the end of July stated

\begin{itemize}
\item[577] This view would have been further reinforced by third party intelligence reaching England. On 26 April, Knight reported from the Low Countries hearing that the papacy (through Lorenzo de’ Medici) may be involved in an assault on Naples currently being planned by Francis I. The diplomat also implied his belief that Leo X had used the Turkish threat as a means to raise money through an indulgence to this end. Furthermore, on 8 June, Spinelly reported Lorenzo de’ Medici to have pledged to \textit{‘be friend to friend, and enemy to enemy with the French King’}, which had prompted Charles to write a letter of complaint to the pope but, on the positive side, the pope had allegedly refused his nephew permission to conclude a closer alliance with France; \textit{LPIii}, 4117 (26 April 1518, Knight to [Wolsey], Mechelin), 4218 (8 June 1518, Spinelly to Henry, Saragossa).
\item[578] See above p.621.
\item[579] He reported that the French ambassador had been instructed to act in this matter; \textit{LPIii}, 4084 (15 April 1518, de Giglis to Pace, Rome). The English crown sought to deprive de Castello from both Bath and Wells and from his cardinalatial dignity as a result of his role in the Petrucci Plot against the pope, although the roots of English attempts to destroy his career can be traced back to 1514; W.E. Wilkie, \textit{Cardinal Protectors}, pp.105-110.
\item[580] It was no secret around this time that Maximilian’s health was failing and, as a result, both Charles and Francis were seeking to sway the inevitable election in their direction. See above p.595.
\end{itemize}
that Francis did indeed hope to gain the Imperial crown with the assistance of Leo X. In a bid to win over one elector, Francis applied pressure on the pope to elevate the archbishop of Mainz to the Sacred College. While, during April 1518, Wolsey was informed that Leo had followed his counsel against this, the pope had in fact already conceded the promotion. The reason for the pope ultimately backing down was hinted at in the same missive; Francis could ‘kindle a fire’ at any time in the Papal States.

While the elevation seems to have remained secret for some months, English diplomats in Spain were confident that French pressure would succeed and that Francis would thereby be one step closer to the Imperial crown. Finally, the English crown would have held politically-motivated reservations about the marriage on account of the Scottish connections of the bride; Madeleine de la Tour’s brother-in-law was the French-backed duke of Albany, who had been a thorn in England’s side in its attempts to control Scotland since the accession of James V (1513). With particular relevance to the papacy, following his victory at Flodden, Henry VIII had tried to assume control of nominations to the Scottish episcopate, albeit with little success. Albany, who had himself gained control of this process, following his becoming governor of Scotland in 1515, inevitably resisted this. Even if the English still harboured any hopes in this area, they would have been disappointed that Albany could potentially benefit from a familial connection with Leo X (however distant). This fear, if it existed, would have been well-founded, as there is evidence to

581 LP IIIi, 4356 (calendared end July 1518, letter of intelligence concerning France).
582 The archbishop was elevated on 24 March 1518; ibid., 4133 (calendared end April 1518, - to ); C. Eubel, Hierarchica Catholica Medii Aevi, iii, p.19.
583 See above p.333.
584 For Albany’s taking the lead of the Scottish government from July 1515 and the battle with England for control over episcopal (and other) benefices in the kingdom, see for example LP IIIi, 560 (calendared 6 June 1515, Albany to Leo), 604 (21 June 1515, Albany to Leo, Edinburgh), 654 (3 July 1515, James V to Leo and the College of Cardinals, Edinburgh), 707 (calendared 14 July 1515, Albany to Leo, Kirkoswald). For the background to this, see C. Bingham, James V, pp.32-39.
suggest that the duke (through Francis) sought papal recognition of his right to exercise the privileges of the kingdom by virtue of their kinship even before the marriage was agreed. Furthermore, if Albany could benefit from his links to the Medici in the ecclesiastical sphere, it was conceivable that he could also call upon this in the continuing political struggle with England. These are just instances of how the implications of the Franco-papal marriage agreement began to affect English interests. As will be seen, these were to affect the Anglo-papal political relationship more directly, particularly in terms of Henry and Wolsey’s attitude towards Leo X’s crusading initiative.

At the same time as it attempted (and failed) to influence Leo X away from an agreement with France, the English sought to reassure the papacy about their own peace talks with Francis I. As they were still not confident that this would be the eventual strategy adopted, given they still did not trust the French king and anticipated his attacking English territory particularly around February-March 1518 on, Henry and Wolsey continued to foster the pope (among others) as an ally against France. Towards the end of February, for instance, Wolsey played down negotiations when he told Leo that Henry had refused Francis’ overture for Tournai, which had reportedly angered the French king. He also wanted de Giglis to enquire discretely whether the pope believed the French intended peace or war, Henry being ready to respond to either scenario. By the end of March, the pope reportedly understood that Henry

585 *LPIii*, 3889 (18 January 1518, Leo to Albany, Rome), 3996 (5 March 1519, Leo to Francis, Rome). For references to de la Tour as Albany’s sister-in-law, see for example *ibid.*, 3923 (4 February 1518, intelligence from Flanders); R. Brown (trans.), *Four Years*, ii, pp.157-165 (*Ven.ii*, 1010; *LPIii*, 3976; 28 February 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, London).
586 See pp.627 ff.
587 See above, pp.598-601.
588 *LPIii*, 3973 (27 February 1518, Wolsey to de Giglis).
was ill-disposed towards France and had raised several thousand troops against the perceived French threat.589

Just as Henry VIII continued to demonstrate his ongoing commitment to the anti-French league to Charles of Castile, albeit to a far lesser extent than previously, he also sent the same message to Rome.590 Gaining firm papal commitment still seems to have been dependent upon Charles making a public declaration of his support for this course. The pope may have heard of early Anglo-Spanish discussions towards ‘a stricter alliance’, as he was said to be awaiting articles for a new agreement between England Spain and Rome on 1 and 19 March. Having not received them, Leo surmised that Charles had not committed himself, nor was he likely to do so while Chièvres remained influential.591 Even at the beginning of May, there was speculation in Rome about an Anglo-Spanish agreement and de Giglis was quoted as saying that the English king was ready for both peace and war with France.592 Leo X gave a curious indication that he was prepared to support the anti-French league on 15 February, when he issued (another) ratification of the July 1517 treaty to Henry VIII.593 While the context of this declaration is unclear, it may have been intended either as reassurance to England, in spite of the Lorenzo de’ Medici marriage that had been agreed with Francis, or as a sop to induce Henry’s backing for the five year truce that Leo was shortly to proclaim.594 Whatever the intention, Henry VIII exhibited this ratification to Charles when he sought the latter’s complicity in seizing control of the

589 Ven.ii, 1021 (29 March 1518, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory).
590 See above pp.598-601.
591 LPiii, 4015 (19 March 1518, de Giglis to [Vannes]). For Anglo-Spanish discussions in this direction, as well as the hope that Charles’ foreign policy would become anti-French once he reached Spain and Chièvres and de Sauvage would be replaced, see above pp.598-601.
592 Ven.ii, 1027 (1 May 1518, Minio to the Signory, Rome).
593 It is unclear from the abstract which league the pope had joined and whether he was joining at that point or referring to an earlier adhesion. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to surmise from the language used that Leo was referring to the 1517 coalition and was joining then (because, as he said, of Henry’s ‘zeal for the Holy Church’); LPiii, 3953 (15 February 1518, Leo to Henry).
594 See below p.630.
papal crusading initiative during April 1518. The English crown also seems to have built up the impression that it remained committed to the anti-French league with signals given to Rome that it was still interested in retaining the Swiss and was taking action to ensure this. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that the king envisaged a papal contribution to retain the Swiss (then being proposed), which was incumbent on papal membership of the coalition, apparently based on his reading of the February papal communiqué. It is completely understandable, therefore, why Leo X, around

595 Also apparently by way of ‘apology’ for the French marriage of Lorenzo de’ Medici, the pope reportedly sent a blank form of amity to the Spanish, to be expanded as Charles saw fit and with Henry’s agreement. \textit{LPLii}, 4160 (12 May 1518, Kite and Berners to [Henry]).

596 Intelligence circulating Rome had Pace still in the Cantons lobbying the Swiss during January 1518. While Pace was already back in England by this stage, Henry VIII intended to send him back to the Alps during the early months of 1518. Perhaps in a bid to encourage the king in this direction, during mid-March, the pope showed de Giglis correspondence that the Swiss still might be bought and a few weeks later had the orator urge that an English embassy be sent to them (to oppose French intrigues). During April, at a time when the English crown remained undecided over whether to send anyone to the Swiss and the Anglo-French peace negotiations became more serious, there were internal discussions in England about whether Henry would be obliged (by the terms of the 1517 treaty) to despatch an embassy to the Cantons if Leo did the same. In response, however, Wolsey recommended that Leo intercede with the Swiss to prevent them from making any agreement with the French; the pope agreed and would also comply with the request to keep this a secret. Reportedly, the pope responded flatteringly that he placed his faith more in Henry than in other princes. Leo also used an alternative, secret route to transmit this information; while the correspondent is unknown, it is stated that it would be sent via the papal ambassador with Maximilian and Raphael de’ Medici. In subsequent months, there were various reports that Leo had indeed sent a representative to the Swiss and even, around the end of May, that he had offered a pension to the exiled duke of Milan, Francesco Maria Sforza and, by late June, that he had sent money to the Swiss. Even during September, intelligence reached England that Leo X was lobbying against French interests with the Swiss. In spite of papal and wider pressure to send someone to the Swiss Confederacy, however, no-one was despatched from England. Nevertheless, the pope continued to labour under the impression that the English crown would act with the Swiss and send an ambassador to them all the way up to the Treaty of London in October. By 30 May, for instance, it was rumoured in Rome (through Schiner) that Wolsey had promised an English subsidy for their retention, which probably caused de Giglis to recommend an Anglo-Spanish alignment with the Swiss on 1 June (to prevent a French assault on Naples); \textit{Ven.ii}, 999 (12 January 1518, Minio to the Council of Ten, Rome), 1001 (17 January 1518, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1033 (19 May 1518, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 1037 (30 May 1518, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 1040 (8 June 1518, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 1044 (5 July 1518, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 1061 (19 August 1518, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 1069 (4 September 1518, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory); \textit{LPLii}, 4015 (19 March 1518, de Giglis to [Vannes]), 4040 (28 March 1517, de Giglis to [Vannes], Rome), 4058 (4 April 1518, Pace to Wolsey), 4133 (calendared end April 1518, - to - ), 4160 (12 May 1518, Kite and Bourchier to [Henry]), 4182 (22 May 1518, Maximilian to Henry, Innsbruck), 4206 (calendared 1 June 1518, [de Giglis] to [Wolsey]), 4218 (8 June 1518, Spinelly to Henry, Saragossa), 4244 (21 June 1518, Spinelly to Henry, Saragossa), 4336 (24 July 1518, instructions for Spanish ambassador sent to England, Bruges), 4440 (18 September 1518, Spinelly to [Henry], Saragossa).

597 \textit{LPLii}, 4057 (3 April 1518, Pace to Wolsey).
10 April, was anxious to know why a French herald had gone to England.\footnote{At the same time, de Giglis conveyed the pope’s complaints about the lack of English correspondence reaching Rome (demanding a reason for this on ten occasions over two days); \textit{ibid.}, 4068 (10 April 1518, de Giglis to Pace). For the reiteration of papal concerns about the lack of crown communications, see \textit{ibid.}, 4084 (15 April 1518, de Giglis to Pace, Rome).} It contradicted the current understanding of the English position \textit{vis-à-vis} France, although the pope continued to understand that Henry VIII would honour his obligation to retain the services of the Swiss.

Also consistent with the English crown’s continued anti-French agenda was its treatment of the papal crusading initiative. Up to 1518, Henry VIII had been visibly reluctant to commit to this, in spite of increasing pressure from Rome. While it seemed a viable option to Leo X for ‘defending’ himself against Francis I’s Italian ambitions, the English did not agree. Indeed, Wolsey’s unsubmitted or unanswered proposal of November 1517 to ensure that any universal peace be ‘watertight’ revealed a fear that the French would use the crusade as a blind to gain Naples and, thereby, hegemony in Italy. He implied, moreover, his belief that the papacy was too weak politically to retain control of this initiative.\footnote{See above pp.616-618. Wolsey was not alone in this fear; Erasmus voiced his scepticism about the declared crusading intentions generally, when writing to various contacts in England. To William Warham, he described it as ‘a mere blind’, before outlining Lorenzo de Medici’s attempts to occupy Campagna, while to Colet he outlined how the crusade really intended to oust Charles from Naples; \textit{LPIii}, 3987 (5 March 1518, Erasmus to Warham, Louvain), 3989 (calendared 5 March 1518, Erasmus to Fisher, Louvain), 3991 (5 March 1518, Erasmus to More, Louvain), 3992 (calendared 5 March 1518, Erasmus to Colet, Louvain). For a comment on Wolsey’s belief that the strategy, if it remained in the pope’s hands, may have caused a crusading army to move against Naples, as a result of French political influence over Rome, see G. Mattingly, ‘An Early Nonaggression Pact’, \textit{JMH}, 10, p.12.} Neither was the papacy strong enough militarily to defend itself against French ambitions; it was not long since Leo X (through Lorenzo de’ Medici) had struggled to oust Francesco Maria della Rovere from the duchy of Urbino in a costly war.\footnote{While Wolsey had heard reassuring news that Urbino was quiet and that the peace with della Rovere was holding in late January 1518, this would remain a potential faultline. That this was clear to contemporaries is suggested by Spinelly’s conveying intelligence during June 1518 (from France via Spain), that della Rovere intended to serve the French in Italy and had offered to besiege Ferrara, although the Florentine diplomat guessed that this was untrue; R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, ii, 627}
prospect of a French attack on English interests in some other quarter and that the crusade would again be invoked as cover for this. News from France dated 1 December, for instance, described Francis’ enthusiastic response to the papal call for crusade, with preaching and money being raised all over the kingdom. The source warned, however, that the money would not be used against the Turks, but against England.

Given this context, the English crown continued to remain aloof of the papal initiative, procrastinating in its reply to official proposals from Rome issued in November. Meanwhile, Leo X received answers from Francis, Maximilian and Charles towards the end of December 1517. That from the emperor, Henry was later said to have laughed at; Maximilian suggested that he lead an enterprise paid for by others, which the English king believed would ‘be only an expedition of money’. Leo perhaps recognised Henry’s reservations about the initiative on 15 February, when he appealed for Henry’s support in the crusading initiative, also confirming his membership of the anti-French coalition of 1517 because of Henry’s ‘zeal for the Holy Church’. The pope also indicated that he would comply with the king’s request to deprive Hadrian de Castello, but only in a manner appropriate to ‘the honour of the Holy See’. This may have been offered as an additional quid pro quo to induce England to support the crusading initiative. At length, Wolsey replied on

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pp.146-150 (Ven.ii, 1002; LPIii, 3896; 24 January 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, London; LPIii, 4244 (21 June 1518, Spinelly to Henry).

601 Consequently, they recommended that Henry VIII attack France. It was also asserted that Francis would blame Henry if he did not attack the Turks; LPIii, 3818 (1 December 1517, Tours).

602 See pp.616-618.

603 While Francis, when pushed, agreed in principle, he wished to retain control of the taxation raised for the expedition. Maximilian outlined an elaborate three year plan, while Charles proposed a focus on the defence of Italy’s extremities; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.228-230; LPIii, 3823 (6 December 1517, ‘summary of [the answer] of the [French king] to the legate [Cardinal Sta. Maria in Porticu] at Paris on 6 December 1517’), 3830 (14 December 1517). For the emperor notifying the English crown that he was enthusiastic about the pope’s recent call to arms, see ibid., 3845 (24 December 1517, [Count Decian] to Wolsey, Linz); 3846 (29 December 1517, Maximilian to Henry, Linz).

604 LPIii, 4023 (24 March 1518, Pace to [Wolsey], Reading).

605 Ibid., 3953 (15 February 1518, Leo to Henry).
Henry’s behalf towards the end of February 1518, justifying delay by the king’s need to seek advice from his councillors and also to speak to Charles of Castile. If the crusade was Leo’s genuine intention, Wolsey advised, he must first procure universal peace which, he argued, would already be in existence if it was not for ‘the immoderate ambition of certain Princes’. Francis I’s ‘ambition’ must be curbed by such an agreement which, if unobtainable by diplomacy, ought to be enforced by ecclesiastical censure.606 In other words, Henry VIII was willing to back the papal crusading initiative but only as long as the preparatory peace was strictly imposed, so that France would be unable to adapt it to his own interests, particularly in light of rumours of the Franco-papal marriage agreement.607 In effect, Wolsey had reiterated his November overture. The English crown’s prioritisation of the threat of France over that of the Turks was confirmed by Giustinian shortly after. Laughing at the Venetian’s protestations about the danger posed by the Ottomans, Henry opined that they would not act against Christendom during 1518. Venice, moreover, ought to be concerned with ‘one who devises worse things against Christendom’, Francis. Henry predicted that his French counterpart was raising troops using the crusade as a pretext, but would use them to ‘subjugate Italy, whereupon the Pope, and yourselves [Venice],

606 Wolsey expanded upon his belief that the French were raising a large army intent on disturbing Christendom, despite Francis’ claiming to be pro-peace. He talked in similar terms to the Venetian ambassador on 11 April, alleging that Francis had designs on Italy and, in keeping ‘all the potentates of the world in great anxiety’, threatened the pope with ‘various devices’; *ibid.*, 3973 (27 February 1518, Wolsey to de Giglis); R. Brown (trans.), *Four Years*, ii, pp.178-181 (*Ven.ii*, 1022; *LPIIIi*, 4076: 12 April 1518). He further gave the impression of English support for this initiative through the despatch of an embassy of Spain apparently to urge Charles’ compliance. There may have been an earlier, tentative English response, as Charles had reportedly heard by early January that Henry had offered to go in person as ‘captain of the sea’. If true, it was unlikely that this was a formal reply, as the pope was reportedly unhappy, by 19 January, that he had still received no word from England about his appeal; *LPIIIi*, 3874 (7 January 1518, Spinelly to Henry, Valladolid), 3891 (19 January 1518, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome); L. Pastor, *History of the Popes*, vii, p.239. For an indication that Henry was considering ‘certain articles for the Christian expedition’ towards the end of January 1518, see R. Brown (trans.), *Four Years*, ii, pp.146-150 (*Ven.ii*, 1002; *LPIIIi*, 3896; 24 January 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, London).

607 See above pp.619-622.
will be compelled to what you cannot resist’.\textsuperscript{608} Given this motivation, Wolsey’s response to the papal appeal marked the beginning of what would become the English hijacking of the papal crusading initiative that would culminate in the Treaty of London (2 October 1518).

Without waiting for the English response to his November proposition, the pope had already acted \textit{vis-à-vis} the crusade. On 6 March 1518, he took the next formal step by proclaiming a preparatory five year truce. To preach this, four legates \textit{a latere} were to be despatched to the principal powers of Christendom.\textsuperscript{609} One of these representatives was planned for England, which made this a provocative move by the papacy; not only was the truce to be promoted by someone in whom papal authority was invested, but Leo X would have known of a traditional reluctance by the English crown to entertain the presence of legates \textit{a latere} on English soil.\textsuperscript{610} It was shortly after this that the pontiff received Wolsey’s conditional support and warning about French intentions; the only record found of this suggests that it was well received by the pope.\textsuperscript{611}

The potential implications of this crusading initiative \textit{vis-a-vis} the papacy and France, as well as the likelihood that a successful response would sideline Henry


\textsuperscript{609} Leo X’s five year truce was proclaimed on 10 March. Briefs to this effect were sent out to all princes on or around 6 March; L. Pastor, \textit{History of the Popes}, vii, pp.232-235; J.J. Scarisbrick, \textit{Henry VIII}, p.69. De Giglis did not attend the ceremony due to illness; \textit{Ven.ii}, 1016 (15 March 1518, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 1017 (15 March 1518, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory).

\textsuperscript{610} For the English crown’s discomfort with the presence of such ‘papal’ authority to rival its own, see for instance \textit{LPIIIi}, 4055 (1 April 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Abingdon), 4073 (11 April 1518, Wolsey to de Giglis, London).

\textsuperscript{611} De Giglis also cautiously informed the Venetian orator that Henry would be fully supportive ‘should the Christian expedition be effected’; \textit{ibid.}, 4040 (28 March 1517, de Giglis to [Vannes], Rome); \textit{Ven.ii}, 1017 (15 March 1518, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory).
VIII’s involvement in European politics, demanded that it be taken seriously.\textsuperscript{612} It was also Henry’s duty as a king, as a loyal son of the Church, to be positive in his response, now that the call to arms had been formally issued.\textsuperscript{613} Procrastination, therefore, was no longer an option; English foreign policy now had to be shaped within the context of saying ‘yes’. Given that the English crown was not yet clear which of its strategies concerning France would bear fruit, the anti-Gallic league or the peace negotiations with Francis, support for the crusading ideal was incorporated into both.\textsuperscript{614}

The arrival in England of news of the papal five year truce coincided with that of the birth of an heir to Francis I. Wolsey had earlier proposed to French representatives that, if a son was born, that a marriage agreement should then be negotiated for Princess Mary and they had also discussed the prospect of this becoming a universal peace agreement.\textsuperscript{615} As the Anglo-French peace policy became increasingly convincing from this point, Wolsey had to gain control of the papal crusading initiative to ensure that any eventual universal peace (or truce) would suit

\textsuperscript{612} A positive response (as already suggested by Francis, Charles and Maximilian) could shift the focus of European politics to Rome. Up to this point, Henry and Wolsey had tried to keep it in England (or at least northern Europe), with the anti-French league and their negotiations with Francis. The adhesion of the other powers to Leo’s five year truce and concentration then on a crusade would consequently reduce Henry’s political centrality hitherto achieved concerning the French threat to Italy.\textsuperscript{613} Shortly prior to this, Wolsey indicated the king’s recognition of his obligation to the crusade. Henry, he declared, just wanted ‘to live peaceably and tranquilly with all Christians’, so that ‘he may expend it against the infidels, as is the duty of every Christian potentate’; R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, ii, pp.157-165 (Ven.ii, 1010; LPIii, 3976; 28 February 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, London). It is unlikely that this was wholly rhetoric, as it tied in with Henry VIII’s chivalric commitment, which stressed the crusade to be the most laudable form of warfare in which he, as a knight, could participate. Indeed, Gunn refers to Henry making this assertion at some point, while Tyerman stresses the broad chivalric enthusiasm for crusade at his Court; S. Gunn, ‘The French Wars of Henry VIII’, in J. Black (ed.) \textit{The Origins of War in Early Modern Europe}, p.36; C. Tyerman, \textit{England and the Crusades 1095-1588} (1996), pp.346-347. For another historian who implies his belief in this idea, see R. Schwoebel, \textit{The Shadow of the Crescent: the Renaissance Image of the Turk} (1967), pp.82-83.\textsuperscript{614} Charles and (to a lesser extent given the state of his health) Maximilian still gave the impression that they were prepared to go to war against France, but recent experiences gave the English cause to pause for thought. Despite the peace negotiations with France, Henry and Wolsey continued to be sceptical whether Francis could be trusted and had indicated to the pope in late February that England was prepared for both war and peace; LPIii, 3973 (Mart. Amp. .iii, 1277; 27 February 1518, Wolsey to de Giglis); also see above pp.593-601.\textsuperscript{615} See above pp.604-606.
the English interest and could not be adapted by the French to achieve their Italian or other ambitions. The means to do so were provided by the pope himself, in commissioning legates a latere to facilitate this strategy; if Wolsey could become a legate, he could thereby ensure that the talks he planned be focused in London and control their direction. When news arrived in England on 26 March that a legate would be sent to England, therefore, Henry’s first reaction was to make his entry conditional on the limitation of his commission to treating against the Turks.\footnote{LPIII, 4034 (27 March 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Abingdon).} This was a demonstration of the English reticence to allow such officials, invested with such a degree of papal authority, to enter the kingdom. Within days, however, Wolsey had put his own proposal to the king, that they insist he be commissioned as a second legate. Henry approved this on 1 April, happy that the visiting Italian cardinal ‘will not then be able to attempt anything against the King’s laws’\footnote{Ibid., 4055 (1 April 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Abingdon).}. That this coincided with Wolsey revealing to Giustinian that he hoped to negotiate a marriage alliance between England and France suggests that his intention to appropriate the papal truce strategy to English ends was already formulated.\footnote{R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, ii, pp.173-178 (Ven.ii, 1019; LPIII, 4047; 29 March 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, London).} Thus, on 11 April, Wolsey approached the papacy in this regard; while it was not normal for foreign legates to enter England, Henry was prepared to make an exception, he argued, as long as Campeggio’s legal faculties were withheld and that Wolsey was appointed co-legate. Otherwise, the king would refuse the Italian legate admission.\footnote{LPIII, 4073 (11 April 1518, Wolsey to de Giglis, London).} This was an astute move by the English crown, as Leo had little choice but to concede if he wanted his crusading initiative to be successful. The pope initially tried to fob Wolsey off, asking that he delay this request, as he did not want to offend Francis I, for whom he had
(reportedly) refused a similar demand. Polydore Vergil, however, states that Wolsey was eventually successful partly because of the support of the French king. The pope seems to have changed his mind by 12 May, possibly because the emperor had made a similar demand for Matthew Lang, and the pope was quoted as saying ‘these two Cardinals are themselves the Kings, so that we must content them’. Accordingly, the pope commissioned Wolsey to be co-legate to Lorenzo Campeggio in Consistory on 17 May, ‘considering Wolsey’s influence with the King.’ Leo, therefore, did not wait for Henry’s reply to his refusal, but made clear the political grounds on which he made the concession. Wolsey knew of his commission by 7 June and reportedly gave the courier a generous gift. By the 21st, however, it was said that the cardinal was unhappy with the temporary nature of the appointment. His victory in forcing this concession from the pope was evidently limited. Despite this, Wolsey was ready to put his universal peace plan into action; as he reportedly told Giustinian, ‘he would prove to the world what it may be in his power to effect for the furtherance of this holy alliance’. While Campeggio reached Calais by the end of April 1518, Leo claimed to have had a brief composed for Wolsey a credentials for the unknown author/recipient of this letter, but the former was said to be delayed as the pope had left Rome; ibid., 4133 (calendared end April 1518, - to -).

620 To prove that he would have granted such a commission, if he was not in such a difficult position, Leo claimed to have had a brief composed for Wolsey a credentials for the unknown author/recipient of this letter, but the former was said to be delayed as the pope had left Rome; ibid., 4133 (calendared end April 1518, - to -).
621 Vergil states that the cardinal became a legate partly because of Francis and ‘partly as a result of Henry’s persistent demands and requests’; D. Hay (ed.), *Anglica Historia*, pp.253-257.
622 *Ven.ii*, 1031 (12 May 1518, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory).
623 *LPIii*, 4170 (17 May 1518, Leo to Wolsey, Rome). Commissions for both Wolsey and the Imperial advisor Matthew Lang were subsequently discussed in consistory and, on the 20th, de Giglis confirmed to the former that he had been successful in gaining the commission. Significantly, he notified his English employer, Francis and Maximilian were unable to gain the same concession for Cardinals de Boissy and Lang, respectively; *Ven.ii*, 1033 (19 May 1518, Minio to the Signory, Rome); *LPIii*, 4179 (20 May 1518, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome). For Campeggio’s notification to Wolsey of the same, see ibid., 4193 (28 May 1518, [Campeggio] to [Henry], ‘ex Palizia’), 4194 (28 May 1518, [Campeggio] to [Wolsey], ‘La Palice’).
625 Giustinian reported Wolsey to be visibly disappointed with his legatine commission and ‘seems to hold [it] in small account’, as it would expire on Campeggio’s departure; ibid., pp.195-199 (*Ven.ii*, 1042; *LPIii*, 4243; 21 June 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth). In response, perhaps on 21 July, Wolsey apparently demanded that the post be granted ‘in perpetuo’ (in addition to the deprivation of de Castello and conferral of his English see to him), in return for Leo being given full credit for the Anglo-French treaty that was then deemed close to conclusion. Leo refused, however, instead offering,
June, he was not permitted to cross the Channel until the following month. Wolsey had again taken advantage of the situation by leveraging other concessions from Rome; the deprivation of de Castello and, associated with this, provision to Bath and Wells.\(^\text{626}\) Once confirmation of the former was received, Campeggio was granted access to the kingdom and was received magnificently in London on 29 July and (alongside his co-legate Wolsey) by the king on 3 August.\(^\text{627}\)

In addition to gaining control of the peace initiative via Wolsey’s legatine commission, the English crown also needed to engage the complicity of the other ‘superpowers’ that would be involved in any universal peace, namely Spain and the Empire. Henry and Wolsey continued to cultivate them as ‘anti-French’ allies during 1518, albeit less so than in previous years, due to the unlikelihood that they would

by way of compromise, to re-confirm his legatine status on a rolling basis on a rolling basis. This was to mark the beginning of Wolsey’s attempts to lever a permanent legatine commission out of Rome; Ven.\textit{ii}, 1054 (5 August 1518, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). For the possible dating of Wolsey’s request to 21 July, see \textit{LPI\textit{iii}}, 4399 (27 August 1518, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome).

\(^\text{626}\) De Giglis recommended that Wolsey should take this course when he originally notified the cardinal of his commission in late May. Campeggio had apparently reached Calais by 21 June and was expected in England any day soon. Henry questioned Wolsey about this on the 24\textsuperscript{th}. On 29 June, Campeggio wrote to Wolsey from Calais, understanding that the king would not let him into England until de Castello’s deprivation was confirmed. The Italian argued, however, that as he had written to Leo on this matter three times and that the pope would surely agree to this, this delaying tactic was unnecessary. Writing on 3 July, however, Giustinian wrote of Campeggio’s still being detained at the port and that this would continue for some time. By the middle of the month, however, confirmation of the deprivation had been received in England and that the Italian cardinal crossed the Channel on the 14\textsuperscript{th} (escorted by a knight of the Garter). On the 24\textsuperscript{th}, Pace requested that Wolsey bring an original bull with him, feasibly confirming the deprivation, as Henry had been asking about it; \textit{LPI\textit{iii}}, 4179 (20 May 1518, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 4257 (24 June 1518, [Pace] to [Wolsey], Woodstock), 4271 (29 June 1518, Campeggio to Wolsey, Calais), 4335 (24 July 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Enfield), 4348 (29 July 1518, Wolsey to de Giglis); R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, ii, pp. 195-199 (Ven.\textit{ii}, 1042; \textit{LPI\textit{iii}}, 4243; 21 June 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth), 199-200 (Ven.\textit{ii}, 1043; \textit{LPI\textit{iii}}, 4284; 3 July 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth), 200-202 (Ven.\textit{ii}, 1046; \textit{LPI\textit{iii}}, 4332; 22 July 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth); D. Hay (ed.), \textit{Anglica Historia}, p.253; J.J. Scarisbrick, \textit{Henry VIII}, p.69.

\(^\text{627}\) J.J. Scarisbrick, \textit{Henry VIII}, p.70. For various descriptions of the receptions of Campeggio on his journey from Sandwich to London, thence to Greenwich, see \textit{LPI\textit{iii}}, 4333 (23 July 1518), 4348 (29 July 1518, Wolsey to de Giglis), 4361 (3 August 1518); R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, ii, pp.202-204 (Ven.\textit{ii}, 1052; \textit{LPI\textit{iii}}, 4361: 2 August 1518), 204-206 (Ven.\textit{ii}, 1053; \textit{LPI\textit{iii}}, 4366; 5 August 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth). Wolsey wrote to the pope, either on 21 July or 5 August, according to de Giglis, ‘remitting himself wholly to his holiness’s pleasure’. Given the timing, it is likely that this related to the cardinal receiving news of the deprivation and thus being prepared to act as legate alongside Campeggio to foster the crusade; \textit{LPI\textit{iii}}, 4399 (27 August 1518, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome).
commit to breaking with France. Nevertheless, Charles and Maximilian initially gave the English the chance to wrest the crusading initiative from Rome. When the papal truce was proclaimed in March, both Charles and Maximilian initially chose not to answer Leo until they had consulted Henry, intending then to reply in unison. Perhaps not taking the emperor that seriously, the English crown concentrated on Spain, commissioning Kite and Bourchier to go to Charles to respond to his request. Specifically, they were to urge the Spanish king to send or empower a representative to join a treaty of universal peace to be concluded in England and to urge that he not reply to the papal truce proposal via the legate in Spain until this had been finalised. The implication from their instructions was that the English were fostering a universal peace that would be directed against France. Furthermore, presumably to convince Charles that they had papal backing, the orators were to exhibit a bull by which Leo

628 See above pp.593-601.
629 On 2 April, Charles sent word to Henry that he would not answer the pope’s request to ratify the five year truce until he knew his and Maximilian’s opinions; if agreed, the Catholic King wanted to answer the pope together and, if they accepted the truce, it would contain ‘such clausis that may repress the ambition and tyranny of the Frenchmen’. Later, on 24 April, Maximilian asked Henry VIII to send an envoy to him to disclose the answer he intended to send the pope, as well as with sufficient power to debate the expedition at a forthcoming diet; LPIii, 4056 (2 April 1518, Spinelly to Henry, Aranda de Duero, Spain), 4112 (24 April 1518, Maximilian to [Henry]), 4135-4136 (calendared end April 1518, Henry to Kite and Bourchier).
630 The orators were commanded to discuss the pope’s crusade proposal, to which Henry objected in the first instance because England and Spain’s contribution had barely been considered. The commission and a list of minutes compiled by Ruthal that also seem to be directed to the same pair appear to advocate a general peace hostile to France. It was suggested that Anglo-French negotiations had collapsed, that Francis was preparing to recover Tournai by force, and that England sought Spanish support, if necessary. The Anglo-Spanish alliance itself was portrayed as intending to to protect Christendom. According to Giustinian, the envoys were sent to Spain by 28 February 1518, while the commission and Ruthal’s minutes are calendared at the end of April 1518; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.157-165 (Ven.ii, 1010; LPIii, 3976: 28 February 1518); LPIii, 4135-4137 (calendared April 1518), 4160 (12 May 1518, Kite and Berners to [Henry]). In terms of the English crown perhaps dismissing Maximilian’s commitment, it was only in late March that Henry was said to have laughed at his crusading proposal and it was only in late February that the emperor had urged England towards such an enterprise, have already pledged his own commitment to Rome. In any case, Maximilian barely waited for a reply to his overtures to England for a joint response to the papal initiative, as on 18 May he told Charles that he had issued instructions to conclude a treaty with the pope for five years. This was to exclude Venice but, in order to expedite the crusade, had agreed with Francis I to form a truce with the republic for five years, if possible; ibid., 3964 (21 February 1518, Titonius to Wolsey, ‘Ex Augusta Vindelicha’), 4023 (24 March 1518, Pace to [Wolsey], Reading), 4172 (18 May 1518, Maximilian to Charles, Innsbruck).
adhered to the 1517 league between England, Spain and Germany.\textsuperscript{631} This approach was successful and Charles’ response, on receiving the embassy around 12 May, was positive; he was happy to go along with whatever Henry wished, including his answer to Leo about the crusading articles, and would aid England if France attacked.\textsuperscript{632} In effect, the Spanish king, convinced of the underlying anti-French intentions of Henry VIII, indicated his complicity in the English plan to usurp the papal crusading initiative and helped Wolsey to facilitate this. That this began with an approach to Charles during April 1518 clearly indicates that Wolsey had formulated a plan to do this and to focus it around an Anglo-French agreement at the same time as he received news of the papal truce initiative and at a point when the birth of an heir to Francis I raised the likelihood of a peace with France.\textsuperscript{633}

By virtue of his becoming a legate \textit{a latere} and having the support of Francis and Charles, Wolsey was now well-placed to begin his usurpation of the papal peace initiative. The only potential obstacle was that Leo X still held the reins, at least partially, through Cardinal Campeggio. The English had already circumvented this, however. De Giglis offered a solution when he originally notified Wolsey of his commission, claiming that the Englishman was described as the senior of the two

\textsuperscript{631} Another, perhaps more attractive, inducement offered to Charles was Henry’s implied support of his candidacy for the Imperial crown (Charles and Francis at that point manoeuvring to influence the election that was soon expected, as Maximilian’s health was failing); \textit{LPIii}, 4135-4137 (calendared April 1518), 4160 (12 May 1518, Kite and Berners to [Henry]).

\textsuperscript{632} \textit{Ibid.}, 4160 (12 May 1518, Kite and Berners to [Henry]). In late June, Spinelly reported that Henry’s reaction to the pope’s request of the truce was received well by the Spanish Court. He also added that Charles would take Henry’s advice concerning the pope and had spoken to his ambassadors about concluding an alliance with ‘you four’ (England, Spain, the Empire and the papacy) and the Swiss. It is unclear whether Spinelly was referring to a subsequent approach by Henry VIII or the initial April communication. In any case, it further indicates that the English crown was successful in gaining Spanish complicity for its hijacking the papal peace initiative. Charles of Castile’s continued support of the English usurpation of the peace plan was again indicated on 11 July, when the Spanish king conveyed his wish that they adopt a common strategy with the legates resident in their kingdom. Charles was also said to have been unhappy with the pope’s five year truce, perceiving it to be motivated by ‘mischief’; \textit{ibid.}, 4244, (21 June 1518, Spinelly to Henry, Saragossa), 4313 (12 July 1518, Kite and Bourchier to Henry, Saragossa).

\textsuperscript{633}See above pp.602-606.
legates and that Campeggio was not to act without him.634 This advice was rigorously followed and no opportunity was lost to demonstrate Wolsey’s seniority; from the legates’ official reception by Henry VIII on 3 August, when the Englishman had a bigger chair than his counterpart, to the mass celebrating the Treaty of London on 3 October, where Wolsey’s chair was raised six steps and Campeggio’s only three, the Cardinal of York always took the lead, while his colleague seems to have been little more than a reinforcing presence.635 These were significant actions in an age of visual symbolism, particularly in ceremonies and the like. They also help to contextualise the English cardinal’s sidelining of his co-legate in negotiations, as he seized the papal peace strategy.

In subsequent negotiations, centred around Anglo-French discussions, Wolsey was the guiding force, while Campeggio had little practical involvement. There does not seem as if there was a lot for the Italian to do, as the Anglo-French agreement, to which the universal peace was to be anchored, was already in the final stages of negotiation.636 Indeed, on or shortly after his arrival in England, Campeggio seems to have notified his French counterpart, Bibbiena, about the form of the treaty and some

634 De Giglis asserts that Wolsey was stipulated to be ‘prae omnibus aliis legatis’; LPIii, 4179 (20 May 1518, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome).
635 Also at the initial audience, Wolsey delivered the first oration, while Campeggio’s brother gave the second; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.204-206 (Ven.ii, 1053; LPIii, 4366; 5 August 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth); Ven.ii, 1088 (9 October 1518). If one rises above the critical tone, Polydore Vergil agrees with this assessment, describing how the Cardinal of York appropriated all ceremonies and used every opportunity to pull rank as legate, although admittedly he was referring to Wolsey’s general behaviour and not to the treaty negotiations per se; D. Hay (ed.), Anglica Historia of, p.255.
636 For Anglo-French negotiations being at quite an advanced stage see, for instance, what are apparently English plans for a league (‘pax universalis’) which would include the pope, the articles of which were to be drawn up by Wolsey; LPIii, 4357 (calendared end July 1518). From the French end, on 31 July, the Most Christian King had commissioned a high-ranking embassy to go to England to negotiate with the pope, Henry and other princes towards a league of mutual defence. The fundamental Anglo-French elements that were to appear in the eventual treaty (Mary’s marriage to the dauphin, the restoration of Tournai and a meeting between Henry and Francis) were all cited. Also, Wolsey was awarded an annual pension 12,000 livres Tournois as compensation for the see of Tournai, which one can only interpret as a reward for his actions thusfar; ibid., 4351 (31 July 1518), 4352 (31 July 1518), 4353 (31 July 1518), 4354 (31 July 1518). Also see R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.204-206 (Ven.ii, 1053; LPIii, 4366; 5 August 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth). For Wilkie’s agreement concerning Campeggio’s lack of involvement, see W.E. Wilkie, Cardinal Protectors, p.111.
of its terms.\footnote{Campeggio himself reportedly advertised his French counterpart, Bibbiena, of the form of the league and some of its terms (some of which he said were still under discussion) during early August; \textit{Ven.ii}, 1087 (9 August 1518, Antonio Giustinian to the Signory, Nantes). Also see \textit{LPIii}, 4384 (16 August 1518, Spinelly to Henry, Saragossa).} It ought to be emphasised that the Italian legate was not entirely shut-out by Wolsey, as it seems that he was \textit{au fait} with most of the terms of the eventual Treaty of London and the progress of negotiations in the final months.\footnote{\textit{Ven.ii}, 1066 (1 September 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth), 1087 (9 August 1518, Antonio Giustinian to the Signory, Nantes), 1095 (30 September, 10 October 1518, Nicolo Sagudino to Alvise Foscari, Lambeth); R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, ii, pp. 210-212 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 1067; \textit{LPIii}, 4413; 2 September 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth), 213-215 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 1071; \textit{LPIii}, 4424; 10 September 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth).} He also seems to have been kept entertained by Wolsey, as befitted his status.\footnote{Giustinian commented on the magnificence of a mass and banquet, shortly after Campeggio’s arrival, but equally commented on the lack of deference shown to the papacy: ‘I will not now write how far the decorum of the Apostolic chair was preserved on this occasion…, it may suffice for me to say, that less respect for the holy chair could scarcely have been shown’; R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, ii, pp.206-208 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 1057; \textit{LPIii}, 4371; 11 August 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth). Also see \textit{Ven.ii}, 1066 (1 September 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth). Campeggio was also notably present at various ceremonial occasions, for instance at the arrival of the final French embassy, as well as at the public proclamation of the Treaty of London (albeit visibly subordinate to Wolsey); R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, ii, pp.221-222 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 1075; \textit{LPIii}, 4457; 26 September 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth); \textit{Ven.ii}, 1088 (9 October 1518, anonymous account of the conclusion of the Treaty of London), 1095 (30 September, 10 October 1518, Nicolo Sagudino to Alvise Foscari, Lambeth). Also see W.E. Wilkie, \textit{Cardinal Protectors}, pp.111-112.} Nevertheless, it seems that the English cardinal deliberately kept Campeggio out of the talks, perhaps to disguise the true intention of universal peace for as long as possible.\footnote{Around 10 September, for instance, Giustinian, reporting his inability to gain access to Wolsey, also commented that Campeggio was finding the same difficulty. There was also a definite attempt by the English to keep the details of the negotiations a secret; R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, ii, pp.204-206 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 1053; \textit{LPIii}, 4366; 5 August 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth), 210-212 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 1067; \textit{LPIii}, 4413; 2 September 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth), 213-215 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 1071; \textit{LPIii}, 4424; 10 September 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth), 221-222 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 1075; \textit{LPIii}, 4457; 26 September 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth). There is some evidence to suggest that Lorenzo Campeggio may have been aware of Wolsey’s hijacking of the papal truce initiative with his own universal peace, but it is unclear whether he understood this or if he reported this back to Rome; \textit{ibid.}, pp.208-210 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 1063; \textit{LPIii}, 4392; 20 August 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth); \textit{Ven.ii}, 1087 (9 August 1518, Antonio Giustinian to the Signory, Nantes).} Nevertheless, it seems that the English cardinal deliberately kept Campeggio out of the talks, perhaps to disguise the true intention of universal peace for as long as possible.\footnote{\textit{LPIii}, 4462 (30 September 1518, Maximilian to Wolsey, Kaufbeuren), 4463 (30 September 1518, Maximilian to de Mesa, Kaufbeuren).} Certainly, it was Wolsey alone who, declaring ‘his desire to compose the dissensions of Christendom’, asked the emperor to send someone to England negotiate on 18 August.\footnote{641 Furthermore, various rounds of talks are reported between the English
crown and French delegations without the presence of Campeggio. 642 In the days leading up to the conclusion of the Treaty of London, the Italian’s peripheral role in proceedings was further emphasised. When Henry VIII received a final French embassy on 25 September, the ceremony recognised Campeggio, as he and Wolsey were sat at the king’s right hand. At the end of this, however, the king, Wolsey and the French delegation retired to a private chamber (where, Giustinian believed, they discussed the articles of the agreement), but Campeggio was noted to have remained outside with the other ambassadors. Similarly, after the conclusion of the Treaty of London and, specifically the espousals on 5 October, Henry, Wolsey and the French ambassadors again, reportedly, retired to a private room (after dinner), to conclude some matters yet to be settled; notably, again, Campeggio did not join them. 643 This experience seems to have been indicative of Lorenzo Campeggio’s contribution to the Treaty of London.

It is unclear at which point, if any, the pope approved Wolsey’s plan for universal peace instead of his own five year truce. Given the attempted secrecy imposed by the English upon the Anglo-French negotiations, in addition to Campeggio’s lack of tangible involvement, it is possible that Leo X never fully understood the implications of what Wolsey was trying to do until it was too late; the pope may have envisaged that the Anglo-French amity would be a preliminary to a separate agreement to subscribe to his five year truce, that would be negotiated with full papal involvement (via the legates). As late as 20 May, the pope apparently believed that the five year truce remained a going concern, as on this date he

642 R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.210-212 (Ven.ii, 1067; LPIii, 4413; 2 September 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth).
643 Ibid., pp.221-222 (Ven.ii, 1075; LPIii, 4457; 26 September 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth), 224-228 (Ven.ii, 1085; LPIii, 4481; 5 October 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth); Ven.ii, 1095 (30 September, 10 October 1518, Nicolo Sagudino to Alvise Foscari, Lambeth).
conveyed his desire for Henry to ratify it jointly with Charles.\textsuperscript{644} Certainly by the end of July, Leo was becoming aware that Anglo-French negotiations were likely to succeed.\textsuperscript{645} By late August, he knew both that Campeggio had been received in England and that Henry and Wolsey were enthusiastic for the crusade, as well as that an Anglo-French amity was being arranged, although no indication is made that they were to be associated.\textsuperscript{646} Indeed, on 27 August, the pope believed himself to be fully involved, as he reportedly declared that he had helped draw up the\textit{exordium} for the expected treaty, although it is unclear what this contained.\textsuperscript{647}

Perhaps in response to hearing that an Anglo-French agreement was close and that the English were also enthusiastic for a\textit{passagium} to the east, Leo X effectively condoned the English assumption of the initiative from mid-August, although probably unintentionally. While on the 13\textsuperscript{th}, he urged the English cardinal to organise a league against the Turks, he formalised this a week later, when he commissioned Wolsey and Campeggio to treat with the principal powers for such a confederacy. Significantly, the pope wanted this to be offensive as well as defensive, thereby

\textsuperscript{644} The pope was reportedly pleased at the good reception of an English embassy in Spain although, unbeknownst to him, it had been instructed to lobby Charles to support Wolsey’s usurpation of his crusading strategy; \textit{LPIii}, 4179 (20 May 1518, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome). Also, the pope may have applied pressure on Henry VIII towards the truce and crusade via John Grygge during June 1518, as this Englishman in Rome claimed to send treaties between the pope and other Christian princes towards the crusade. The nature of this approach is uncertain, however, as he does not seem to have been a part of the crown diplomatic setup in Rome\textit{per se}, rather a servant of William Warham, whom de Giglis seems neither to have liked nor trusted; \textit{ibid.}, 2895 (9 February 1517, de Giglis to [Ammonius], Rome), 4229 (15 June 1518, John Grygge to Henry, Rome).

\textsuperscript{645} The pope knew about the prospect of the restoration of Tournai and the matrimonial element of negotiations by the end of July 1518, although he was apparently hesitant to reveal these to the Venetian ambassador when challenged. Leo was reportedly pleased about the agreement. Correspondence about this arrived in Rome from Wolsey around this point, coinciding with similar disclosures to Charles and Maximilian; \textit{Ven.ii}, 1048 (30 March 1518, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 1054 (5 August 1518, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). Also see \textit{ibid.}, 1056 (7 August 1518, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory); \textit{LPIii}, 4384 (16 August 1518, Spinelly to Henry, Saragossa).

\textsuperscript{646} \textit{Ven.ii}, 1062 (20 August 1518, Minio to the Signory, Rome). By 4 September, the pope had heard from England that the peace would be confirmed by both Henry and Francis, but again there is no reason to believe that he understood that this may undermine his five year truce; \textit{ibid.}, 1069 (4 September 1518, Minio to the Signory, Rome).

\textsuperscript{647} Leo again stated that Henry and Francis were intent on crusade; \textit{ibid.}, 1065 (27 August 1518, Minio to the Signory, Rome).
envisaging his own protection in Italy against any French incursion.648 While these communications do not refer to universal peace or the papal truce, it seems probable that Leo envisaged a league against the Turks arising from the Anglo-French concordat which subscribed to his own initiative, while in reality, the commission unintentionally empowered Wolsey to pursue his own agenda. The critical moment where Wolsey’s plan could no longer be concealed apparently came some time in September, when the cardinal sent ‘urgent’ letters to the pope about his hope that a general peace would occur. Reaching Rome by 29 September, Leo was sceptical (at least to his Venetian audience) that Francis would agree, particularly given his insistence that Charles should restore Navarre to its French-backed claimant. Despite this, the pope was optimistic about an Anglo-French agreement, even if it was to be universal peace.649

By this time in England, however, the conclusion and proclamation of the treaty as one of universal peace was all but inevitable; one can only envisage, therefore, that Wolsey was notifying the pope of a fait accompli and inviting his involvement.650 Leo X responded on 2 October by commissioning Wolsey and

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648 The coalition was to be negotiated between Germany, England, France and Spain. Around the same time, Leo put further pressure on Wolsey to pursue the crusade by relaying news of the Turkish threat through de Giglis; LPIii, 4375 (13 August 1518, de Giglis to Wolsey), 4393 (20 August 1518, Leo to Wolsey and Campeggio), 4399 (27 August 1518, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome); Ven.ii, 1062 (20 August 1518, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). That the pope had decided not to oppose Wolsey’s moves to control the peace process was also suggested by de Giglis around the same time, when he suggested that little was going to happen in Rome over the next few months; the pope was to spend part of September and October away from Rome, as a result of the heat. While this was not unusual, de Giglis’ request that he visit his hometown of Lucca during this time implies that there was little going on, diplomatically speaking; LPIii, 4375 (13 August 1518, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome).

649 Ven.ii, 1080 (29 September 1518, Venetian ambassador at the Curia to the Signory, Viterbo). Curiously, Giustinian claims that Wolsey spoke openly about his insistence on universal peace as part of the Anglo-French agreement on 20 August; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.208-210 (Ven.ii, 1063; LPIii, 4392; 20 August 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth). Furthermore, Pastor states that Leo X remonstrated with the English crown at some point that a crusade would be more likely if the peace was limited like his, rather than permanent like Wolsey’s, but the date of this approach is not stated; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, p.242.

650 One important piece of contradictory evidence, dated towards the end of August, cites the pope, when discovering that Catherine of Aragon was pregnant, hoping that it would be a prince who could be ‘the prop of the universal peace of Christendom’; LPIii, 4398 (27 August 1518, de Giglis to Henry, Rome).
Campeggio again, this time to make arrangements on his behalf with the various parties for the crusade itself.\textsuperscript{651} By implication, it seems that the pope, while not expecting universal peace, still anticipated his five year truce to succeed as a result of the Anglo-French accord. In this context, therefore, one can understand the pope’s later anger at Wolsey’s actions when he heard about the Treaty of London as a universal peace agreement, which negated his own truce initiative.\textsuperscript{652}

Even if the pope did not really grasp what Wolsey was doing, it is still curious that Campeggio did not apparently voice any objection to his exclusion from negotiations in England.\textsuperscript{653} The legate was compliant perhaps because the Anglo-French accord did not come within his remit; this was a matter for these two states, upon which Leo’s five year truce (or universal peace) could be added. In the final stages of negotiations, Campeggio seems to have been present for the public elements and ceremonies, but was at no point integral.\textsuperscript{654} The same was true at the final proclamation of the treaty (as alluded to earlier); at the celebratory mass of 3 October and at the espousals of Princess Mary (to the dauphin of France) on the 5\textsuperscript{th}, Campeggio was in attendance and participated at times, but Wolsey was clearly the principal celebrant.\textsuperscript{655} One gets the impression that, despite Wolsey being commissioned as legate \textit{a latere} for these negotiations, he acted principally as Henry VIII’s minister. This idea is reinforced when one considers that, despite his ‘papal’ power at this point, he did not have the authority to ratify on behalf of Leo X (nor would one have expected him to possess this). Giustinian congratulated Wolsey on his

\textsuperscript{651} Ibid., 4472 (2 October 1518, Leo to Wolsey and Campeggio).
\textsuperscript{652} See below pp.645-649.
\textsuperscript{653} Wilkie does have Campeggio complaining about the lack of provision for crusade in the treaties although the source for this is not clear and nor is whether this came before or after the conclusion of the Treaty of London; W.E. Wilkie, \textit{Cardinal Protectors}, p.111.
\textsuperscript{654} See above pp.637-639.
\textsuperscript{655} Again, after a dinner on the 5\textsuperscript{th}, both legates were sat alongside the king but, at the end, Henry, Wolsey and the French envoys retired to a different room to finalise some matters. Again, this did not include Campeggio; R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, ii, pp.224-228 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 1085; \textit{LPIii}, 4481; 5 October 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth).
diplomatic achievement on 23 September; ‘for that the Pope had laboured to effect a quinquennial truce, whilst his lordship made perpetual peace; and that whereas such a union of the Christian powers, when joined by the Pope, was usually...concluded at Rome, this confederacy had been settled in England, his Holiness, nevertheless, being its head’. In reply, the English cardinal produced a papal bull from his desk, authorising him to conclude the league there.656

The Treaty of London was finally concluded on 2 October 1518. The Anglo-French focus stipulated the marriage of Princess Mary to the dauphin Francis, the restoration of Tournai to France and an agreement for Henry and Francis to meet.657 Magnificent celebrations were subsequently held and, when it was proclaimed at St Paul’s Cathedral on the 3rd, Wolsey celebrated the mass ‘with so many pontifical ceremonies, and of such unusual splendour, as to defy exaggeration’.658 At the same time, accounts of the celebrations emphasise crown over papal authority; in the mass of 3 October for instance, the choir was decorated with gold brocade that was emblazoned with the king’s arms.659 The treaty provided for universal peace and the intention to crusade. The preliminary oration referred to the Turkish threat originally highlighted by the pope and Leo was recognised as the instigator of the peace and was to be its head. More significantly, however, Wolsey had succeeded in ensuring that this agreement was fully in the English interest, in particular that it would constrain Francis I’s Italian ambitions and, thus, relieve the French political pressure hitherto

656 Ibid., pp.218-221 (Ven.ii, 1074; LPiii, 4453; 24 September 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth).
657 The meeting was to be held before the end of May initially, then by the end of July 1519 (from 8 October). According to the French ambassadors, the English failed to have any provision for France to withdraw its support for Scotland and to keep Albany in France; LPiii, 4479 (4 October, French ambassadors in England to [Francis], London), 4480 (5 October 1518), 4483 (8 October 1518). 4484 (8 October 1518).
658 R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.224-228 (Ven.ii, 1085; LPiii, 4481; 5 October 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth).
659 Ven.ii, 1088 (9 October 1518, anonymous account of the conclusion of the Treaty of London).
felt by Rome. It cannot have been any coincidence that the defence and protection of the papacy was mentioned in the agreement, a concept which had hitherto been included in English treaties against France. Furthermore, the English had Lorenzo de’ Medici (as duke of Urbino), the house of Medici and Florence incorporated into the peace, which effectively signalled their protection under this umbrella. Wolsey had, therefore, avoided the risk of a papal-led five year truce which he feared would be adapted by Francis I as a ruse to conquer Naples and thereby dominate Italy and Rome, instead fostering a peace that would straitjacket France and avoid this. Given that England’s ‘allies’ against France had shown no sign of acting on this commitment, this was the best possible scenario for Henry VIII vis-à-vis defending the papacy. The only nod towards compromise, however, was the inclusion of Ferrara within the treaty, thereby precluding the papacy from making any moves against this duchy.

660 Despite the treaty already having been, to all intents and purposes, agreed, Norfolk, Ruthal and Somerset were commissioned on 1 October to treat for peace with Leo, Francis and any other willing prince. The pope was expected to confirm his membership within four months. Concerning the bestowal of credit for the treaty upon Leo X, a comedy performed after a celebratory supper (for the marriage) also recognised the pope as ‘the commencement of this peace’; LPIII, 4467 (1 October 1518), 4468 (calendared 1-2 October 1518), 4469 (Ven.ii, 1083; 2 October 1518), 4470-4471 (2 October 1518), 4473 (3 October 1518), 4475-4477 (4 October 1518); Ven.ii, 1088 (9 October 1518); G. Mattingly, ‘An Early Nonaggression Pact’, JMH, 10, pp.7, 12.
PHASE III

THE HAPSBURG-VALOIS RIVALRY GIVES RISE TO THE OPPORTUNITY FOR HENRY VIII TO RESUME HIS ACTIVE ‘DEFENCE’ OF ROME FROM FRANCE:

1518-1522

Early English attempts to enforce the Treaty of London and gain papal backing, to prevent a French descent into Italy: October 1518 – January 1519

If the Treaty of London was intended to restrain Francis I from turning to his Italian ambitions, Henry VIII needed to follow this up by ensuring that this straitjacket could be enforced.1 In general terms, this saw the English crown seek ratification of the universal peace by all of the principal parties, thereby binding Francis to non-aggression within Christendom and providing an implicit threat against this through the commitment of the pope and other princes to act against him if he did.2 Francis I’s confirmation came quickly, by mid-December 1518.3 Maximilian, on the other hand, was initially unhappy with the surrender of Tournai and still apparently hoped for English cooperation to hire the Swiss. Following some

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1 Historians have disagreed on Wolsey’s underlying intention for the Treaty of London; was it a true attempt to secure peace within Christendom, a blind for the new Anglo-French alliance, an attempt to assume a prominent position in European politics, a means by which he could scupper the crusade, or something else? The intention here is not to challenge these views directly, rather to envisage how the agreement was seen in terms of England’s relationship with the papacy. Given that previous attempts at war and peace had failed, the hijacking of the papal peace initiative provided a rare opportunity to restrict French political ambitions, potentially without costly recourse to a military solution; G. Mattingly, ‘An Early Nonaggression Pact’, JMH, 10, p.10.
2 Mattingly highlights a weakness of the agreement to be the inability of parties to determine and react (with any speed) to any perceived breach in the agreement, for example if Francis did decide to cross the Alps, but this was pretty much the case for most treaties; blame was subjective and communications difficult. The clauses of mutual defence were probably envisaged as sufficient deterrent to the Most Christian King to risk the wrath of Christendom in the first place; ibid., pp.13-14.
3 A grand English embassy was sent to France during November for this purpose and to tie up a number of loose ends with the agreement; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii (1854), pp.235-238 (Ven.ii, 1093; LPiIIi, 4529; 25 October 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth), 238-239 (Ven.ii, 1102; LPiIIi, 4563; 9 November 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth); LPiIII, 4564 (9 November 1518), 4649 (14 December 1518), 4652 (15 December 1518, Somerset, West, Docwra and Vaux to Wolsey), 4653 (15 December 1518, Somerset, West, Docwra and Vaux to Wolsey), 4655 (16 December 1518), 4675 (23 December 1518, Antonio Giustinian to –, Paris). Also see Ven.ii, 1129 (17 December 1518, Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory), 1130 (17 December 1518, secretary to the Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory), 1132 (23 December 1518, Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory), 1133 (9 January 1519), 1134 (23 December 1518).
confusion over whether the emperor would adhere, an English envoy was sent to Germany during December but, when he arrived, Knight found Maximilian ‘diseased’ and unable to talk at length. The emperor died shortly after. Charles of Castile was also suspected to be unhappy with the league and needed repeated reassurance that it did not oppose his interests.

While positive noises emanated from Charles about his intention to join, he procrastinated until giving way on 20 March 1519.

Henry and Wolsey also began making moves to keep Francis physically away from Italy by the prospect of an Anglo-French conference in the Calais border region, as agreed in the Treaty of London, and active negotiations towards this began by the end of July 1519.

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5 Initially, it appears that Charles had sent a commission to join the league that arrived in England two days after its conclusion. On receipt, the Spanish orator never used it, asserting that it was because he was not privy to negotiations. Other reasons for this offered from Spain were that the Spanish ambassador did not have enough authority and that he was commissioned not to join after its conclusion; LPIii, 4553 (4 November 1518, Henry to Kite), 4588 (18 November 1518, Spinelly to Henry, Zaragoza), 4658 (17 December 1518, Kite, Berners and Spinelly to Henry, Zaragoza), 4669 (21 December 1518). For Charles’ dissatisfaction with the agreement, see R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii (1854), pp.238-239 (Ven.ii, 1102; LPIii, 4563; 9 November 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth). While it was repeatedly stated that Charles intended to send (someone with) his power to England, the Spanish king also sought and received reassurance on a number of matters, including English goodwill generally, the handover of Tournai, the defence of Charles’ territories in case of attack from France and the wording of clauses. The three English diplomats in Spain (Kite, Bourchier and Spinelly) seem to have worked hard in this respect. The Catholic King also seems to sought confirmation that the emperor and the pope would join as well: LPIii, 4492 (10 October 1518, Knight to Wolsey), 4553 (4 November 1518, Henry to Kite), 4588 (18 November 1518, Spinelly to Henry, Zaragoza), 4590 (20 November 1518, Kite and Bourchier to Henry, Zaragoza), 4615 (29 November 1518, Spinelly to Wolsey, Zaragoza), 4626 (6 December 1518, Henry to Margaret, Greenwich), 4629 (6 December 1518, Kite to Wolsey, Zaragoza), 4656 (16 December 1518, Charles to Henry, Zaragoza), 4658 (17 December 1518, Kite, Berners and Spinelly to Henry, Zaragoza), 4660 (17 December 1518, Kite to [Wolsey], Zaragoza), 4678 (23 December 1518, Philibert Naturelli, Provost of Utrecht, to Charles), 4683 (27 December 1518, Margaret of Savoy to Wolsey, Mechelin). Also see Ven.ii, 1121 (11 December 1518, Francesco Comaro to the Signory, 13 November 1518). For the Spanish embassy sent to England in late February to ratify and the subsequent ceremony on 19 March, see LPIii, 90 (22 February 1519, Margaret of Savoy to Wolsey, Mechelin), 97 (25 February 1519, de Berghes to Wolsey, Mechelin), 128 (19 March 1519, London); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.253-255 (Ven.ii, 1168; LPIii, 117; 26 February 1519, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth), 259-262 (Ven.ii, 1180; LPIii, 133; 22 March 1519, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth). Incidentally, Venice also adhered to the Treaty of London on 15 April 1519; Ven.ii, 1196 (LPIii, 186; 15 April 1519), 1197 (15 April 1519), 1201 (18 April 1519).

6 The meeting was to be held initially before the end of May, but this date was repeatedly delayed; LPIii, 4483 (8 October 1518); LPIii, 111 (5 March 1519, Boleyn to [Wolsey], Paris), 118 (11 March 1519, Boleyn to Wolsey, Paris), 121 (14 March 1519, Boleyn to [Henry]), 122 (14 March 1519, Boleyn to Wolsey); Ven.ii, 1142 (8 January 1519, Antonio Giustinian to the Signory, Paris), 1168 (26 February 1519, Giustinian to the Signory,
Indeed, the English embassy sent to France to gain Francis’ ratification of the universal peace in November 1518 was commissioned to treat on this matter. The papacy may have been informed that the meeting was also intended to make arrangements for the crusade. In these senses, therefore, Wolsey was genuine when he spoke of his hope that ‘this alliance will promote the peace of Christendom’, while writing to the English ambassadors in France during January 1519.

The English envisaged Leo X integral both as beneficiary of and contributor to the Treaty of London’s restraint of France. Henry VIII’s consideration for papal security can be seen in the agreement itself; not only did he nominate the papacy, Florence, Urbino and the house of Medici by name for inclusion, but Leo was also to head the league and there was direct reference to the defence and protection of the Church. If the universal peace was to be observed and Francis I was to become subject to sanctions if deemed to be threatening the Papal States, therefore, Leo X’s adhesion was needed. That the pontiff fully understood the underlying English position vis-à-vis France is indicated in a discussion he had with the Venetian ambassador on 22 January 1519; Leo commented that he did not believe that Francis

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7 LPIII, 4564 (9 November 1518). For mutual enthusiasm about the conference, see for instance ibid., 4580 (13 November 1518, Stephen [Poncher] to [Wolsey], ‘Carnoti’), 4664 (18 December 1518, [West] to [Wolsey], Paris).
8 Campeggio spoke to Giustinian of his understanding that this was the purpose of the conference on 12 November 1518; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.243-246 (Ven.ii, 1106; LPIII, 4577; 12 November 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth).
9 LPIII, 24 (calendared 14 January 1519, Wolsey to West and others).
10 LPIII, 4469 (2 October 1518); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.228-235 (Ven.ii, 1089; LPIII, 4491; 10 October 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth); G. Mattingly, ‘An Early Nonaggression Pact’, JMH, 10, p.12.
would attack Naples partly because Henry would not permit him ‘to become greater than he was’.

The papal power to join the Treaty of London may have been expected by Henry and Wolsey shortly after its conclusion, but this appears to have been a false report. News of the agreement’s conclusion, however, reached the pope quickly (by 19 October 1518), although he reportedly sneered at the requirement that he ‘request and pray’ for admission. By this, it seems that the pope objected to the stipulation that he had to apply for membership of an initiative that he had instigated. Indeed, there soon arrived in England several indications that the papacy was unhappy with the concluded treaty. Initially, Giulio de’ Medici writing to Campeggio on 6 October, conveyed ‘with great displeasure has His Holiness learned that Wolsey has set aside the proposal of a five years’ truce, because he does not wish to leave the final position of affairs in the hands of the Pope. No Christian – far less a Cardinal – should venture to express himself in that way, and least of all Wolsey, who has received so many honours and favours from the Holy Father. From this we can see what the Holy See and the Pope have to expect from the English Chancellor’. These were strong words from the pope’s principal advisor. This complaint was confirmed by Spinelly (from Spain) on 29 November, who reported that Leo thought himself ‘slighted’ by the method used to bring

11 *Ven.ii*, 1143 (22 January 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome). For rumours in England of French interference in the peninsula, specifically Francis’ backing of an uprising in Genoa and Charles’ movement of troops to Naples, officially to defend against the Turkish threat but believed to be intended to forestall a French descent into the peninsula, see R. Brown (trans.), *Four Years*, ii, pp.246-248 (*Ven.ii*, 1117; *LPIii*, 4621; 3 December 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth).

12 Intelligence gained from the nuncio in Spain suggested that such a commission had been sent; *LPIii*, 4440 (18 September 1518, Spinelly to [Henry], Zaragoza).

13 *Ven.ii*, 1092 (19 October 1518, Marco Minio to Signory, Corneto). Talking to Giustinian around 10 October, Campeggio also understood that papal ratification was sought within four months although, if Leo did not adhere, he would be included as an adherent rather than as a principal. This meant that, if attacked, the papacy would be defended by the allies at his own rather than at common expense; R. Brown (trans.), *Four Years*, ii, pp.228-235 (*Ven.ii*, 1089; *LPIii*, 4491; 10 October 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth); *Ven.ii*, 1090 (12 October 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth).

about the treaty.¹⁵ This can only refer to Wolsey’s hijacking of his five year truce under cover of the Anglo-French amity.

Perhaps recognising that England had overstepped the mark and potentially that papal support of the Treaty of London may not be forthcoming, Henry VIII duly issued his ratification of the pope’s five year truce by the end of December 1518, thereby implying deference to the original papal initiative, Leo X’s role as arbitrator and the ‘pressing’ need for a crusade.¹⁶ It ought not to be forgotten that Wolsey’s Treaty of London had evolved from the pontiff’s five year truce and that the aim for an enterprise against the Turks underscored both initiatives. Indeed, the English crown gave every impression that it was committed to a passagium as the eventual outcome of the Treaty of London. As far as Campeggio understood on 12 November, the preamble of the league referred to such an expedition, he believed that Henry intended to go on crusade and that an interview with Francis (stipulated in the agreement) would arrange this.¹⁷ Also, Henry pushed this aspect of the universal peace when trying to convince the emperor to join the Treaty of London; he expounded upon an expedition to the east as being his duty and wanted Maximilian’s opinion on how this ought to be launched.¹⁸ On the other hand, indications emanated from England that the crown was not as fervent about this cause as it claimed. In the days after the conclusion of the universal peace agreement, Campeggio allegedly remonstrated against the lack of a clause for the

¹⁵ Nevertheless, the pope was said to be happy with the contents of the agreement. Concerning Leo’s dissatisfaction, Spinelly advised that nothing be said; LPIii, 4615 (29 November 1518, Spinelly to Wolsey, Zaragoza).
¹⁶ On 24 December, Henry was happy with the form of the commission made out for this purpose, on condition that a clause was inserted ‘salvis aliis omnibus’, albeit this was already acknowledged to be the case. The king was concerned, therefore, that this truce really did mean peace and protected all parties against aggression, probably from France: ibid., 4003 (calendared 10 March 1518), 4680 (24 December 1518, Pace to [Wolsey]), 4688 (calendared end December 1518). The English adhesion may also have been prompted by Francis’ approach to Henry to do this jointly. Indeed, by 6 January 1519, Leo X was under the impression that Anglo-French membership was imminent; ibid., 4596 (23 November 1518, Francis to Henry); Ven.ii, 1131 (6 January 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome).
¹⁸ LPIii, 4687 (December 1518, Henry to Knight).
defence of the Mediterranean against the Turks, to which Wolsey replied that Ottoman affairs would be discussed at another time.\textsuperscript{19} Also, the Venetian ambassador reported on 20 November that Wolsey, on receipt of news from the Levant, was concerned but warned, if no moves were ‘made by England to avoid the common peril, the reason was that it did not much affect her’.\textsuperscript{20} Nevertheless, the papacy still sought to push the crusading agenda. This can be first interpreted from the aforementioned complaint from de’ Medici to Campeggio about Wolsey’s having undermined the five year truce (6 October).\textsuperscript{21} Further papal pressure was applied via Silvester de Giglis on 9 November. Stress was laid on the need to prevent an agreement between Hungary and the Ottomans, and Leo requested 70-80,000 ducats to help finance an expedition (to which Charles and Francis, he claimed, were already committed).\textsuperscript{22} Thus, when Henry VIII ratified the five year truce at the end of 1518, he effectively gave a positive response to the pope’s request for English participation in the crusade (albeit without mentioning the financial request).\textsuperscript{23} By 22 January 1519, the pope was expecting England and France to join his truce.\textsuperscript{24}

Despite Henry VIII’s apparent olive branch that was probably intended to placate the papacy and induce Leo to ratify the Treaty of London, English confirmation of the five year truce

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\item \textsuperscript{19} Ven.ii, 1090 (12 October 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth).
\item \textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 1111 (20 November 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth).
\item \textsuperscript{21} L. Pastor, \textit{History of the Popes}, vii, p.243.
\item \textsuperscript{22} From the two relevant letters, one presumes that the 70-80,000 ducats to be raised by England was part of the 12 million said to be required for the two year project; LPIii, 4565 (9 November 1518, de Giglis to Wolsey), 4566 (calendared 9 November 1518, [de Giglis] to Henry). Similarly, around 15 December, the pope voiced to the Venetian ambassador his hope that Henry (and Francis) would now move against the Ottomans; Ven.ii, 1124 (15 December 1518, Minio to the Signory, Rome). There was also implicit pressure in this direction from Venice and Spain, the former who continued to furnish the English with news from the east and the latter who notified Charles’ intention to send troops to Naples to defend against the Turkish threat. For Venetian communications, see R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, ii, pp.238-239 (Ven.ii, 1102; LPIii, 4563; 9 November 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth), 240-243 (Ven.ii, 1105; LPIii, 4574; 11 November 1518); Ven.ii, 1111 (20 November 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth). For Charles’ actions, LPIii, 4590 (20 November 1518, Kite and Bourchier to Henry, Zaragoza).
\item \textsuperscript{23} LPIii, 4688 (calendared end December 1518). If Campeggio is to be believed, he and probably Wolsey had also coordinated a pledge by Francis and Charles to supply troops in case the Turks invaded Italy; the Italian legate disclosed this to Giustinian over dinner during January 1519; R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, ii, pp.248-250 (Ven.ii, 1136, LPIii, 20; 13 January 1519, Lambeth).
\item \textsuperscript{24} Ven.ii, 1143 (22 January 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome).
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25 The situation apparently did not change, as on 18 May the pope was still expecting Henry to ratify his truce.26 By this point, however, it would not be surprising if English enthusiasm in making this concession had waned; as will be seen, continental politics was now dominated by the Imperial election process and the Treaty of London was on the backburner.

If one takes, therefore, Henry VIII’s intention to join the papal truce as a gesture to induce papal ratification of the Treaty of London, was it successful? Despite the pontiff’s displeasure, as details of the Treaty of London filtered to him, Leo X seems to have been cautiously prepared to join at around the same time.27 Perhaps fearful of joining what could

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25 Francis approached Henry in this regard in late November 1518. De Giglis also claimed to have written to Wolsey on this subject on the 19th. In slight contradiction to what de Giglis said, however, the pope understood around 3 March that Francis had sent a commission to his representative in Rome to confirm the five year truce, but had instructed its delay in order to scare Charles into giving up Navarre; LPIIIi, 4596 (23 November 1518, Francis to Henry); LPIIIi, 149 (29 March 1519, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome); Ven.ii, 1170 (3 March 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome).
26 Ven.ii, 1221 (18 May 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome).
27 A copy of the league had been sent to Rome and, although it was noted that this had not been received by 14 November, it seems to have reached the Holy See by 1 December. While the Venetian orator in Rome suspected that not all of the clauses had been sent, the pope disagreed, although he admitted that secret promises may have been made between England and France. Giustinian later (in March 1519) confirms that that sent to Rome was the full version, when he compared it with other copies; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.243-246 (Ven.ii, 1106; LPIIIi, 4577; 12 November 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth), 253-255 (Ven.ii, 1168; LPIIIi, 117; 10 March 1519, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth); Ven.ii, 1108 (14 November 1518, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1115 (1 December 1518, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1118 (3 December 1518, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1120 (5 December 1518, Minio to the Signory, Rome). Also, details about the nature and contents of the league (both true and false) gradually permeated through to Rome. Around 14 November, for instance, it was believed that nothing had been settled at that point about universal peace, as other princes had not yet sent their powers to join. Also, by the 24th, it was rumoured that the English and French had agreed in their amity to destroy the Swiss; Ven.ii, 1108 (14 November 1518, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1112 (24 November 1518, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1114 (27 November 1518, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1115 (1 December 1518,
develop into a partisan axis (which could drag him into war with one or more of the ‘superpowers’), the pope’s power to Campeggio to join the league on his behalf was reportedly conditional on the emperor and king of Spain also adhering. The English crown appears to have been confident that this would occur, however, at least by December. The pope issued his ratification of the Treaty of London on 31 December 1518. It is not known, however, when it left Rome, as there is no indication of its arrival prior to mid-March; around 17th of this month, on account of their receipt of this commission, Wolsey and Campeggio were ceremonially received by the king as if they had just arrived from Rome. In reply to the oration given on behalf of the two cardinals, Pace praised the pope for having sent the power of ratification to England. A Venetian commentator present observed that the English crown was in control of the Treaty of London and that Henry could be described as head of the league rather than Leo, such were the expressions of honour bestowed on him by the pope ‘to the disparagement and degradation, perhaps, of the Apostolic chair’. Subsequently,
Campeggio and Wolsey confirmed papal membership of the Treaty of London in a ceremony on 20 March 1519, at the same time as Charles.\(^{32}\) It is a coincidence that papal and Spanish adherence occurred simultaneously, given the concern of both that each other join. Curiously, however, when Wolsey notified the pope of Spanish adhesion to the universal peace on 25 March, he suggested that he still awaited papal confirmation. It seems that the commission that they had received included a number of amendments, upon which the legates then advised Leo X and were yet to receive a reply. Nevertheless, Wolsey asserted that both he and his co-legate participated in this ceremony in order to lend the treaty more authority.\(^{33}\) While interpretation of this is difficult, it seems that the impression given, intentionally or not, was that the papacy joined the universal peace on 20 March; French, Spanish and Venetian diplomats were united in reporting this to their governments after attending the ceremony. It is unlikely that all three misinterpreted the situation. A feasible explanation is that Wolsey and Campeggio, as legates \textit{a latere}, joined on the pope’s behalf without having sufficient power to do so; as already mentioned, they had been sent a commission but, while this required amendment, these corrections were perhaps deemed minimal and the pontiff’s commitment considered inevitable enough to go-ahead anyway. Furthermore, the ruse may have been required to ensure Charles I’s adherence, as he had previously indicated that he was not prepared to do so without Leo X doing the same.

**Henry VIII attempts to prevent Francis I’s victory in the Imperial election and tries unsuccessfully to work with Rome to achieve this: January 1519 – June 1519**

\(^{32}\) R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, ii, pp.259-262 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 1180; \textit{LPIIIi}, 133; 22 March 1519, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth); \textit{LPIIIi}, 145 (28 March 1519, [Boleyn] to [Wolsey], Poissy), 184 (13 April 1519, Spinelly to Wolsey, Barcelona). Leo X’s insistence that papal ratification was conditional upon Charles and Maximilian doing the same probably explains the delay of nearly three months between the pontiff sending his commission and the aforementioned ceremony. One also ought to note that Maximilian was, by this time, dead.

\(^{33}\) \textit{LPIIIi}, 137 (25 March 1519, Wolsey to de Giglis).
The English strategy to restrain Francis I from Italy by the Treaty of London was unavoidably interrupted by the death of Maximilian I on 12 January 1519. This had been anticipated for some time and intrigues had been under way to secure the subsequent Imperial election by Maximilian and Charles (for the latter’s ‘succession’) on the one part and Francis (for himself) on the other; these efforts were well-known in both England and Rome. At an early stage (during 1518), Henry VIII offered his backing to the Spanish king, while Leo X grumbled about the prospect of the Catholic King succeeding. Towards the close of 1518, Maximilian tried to bring things to a head by seeking the selection of Charles at a specially convened diet. To this end, Maximilian had requested the Imperial crown to be sent from Rome, but the pope, at length, refused, claiming this to be harmful to the papal dignity and a dangerous precedent. In response, while the emperor reportedly threatened to descend into Italy to retrieve the crown and Charles complained vociferously about it being withheld, Leo, speaking after the emperor’s death, considered that ‘Italy had been spared some great catastrophe’.

To understand Henry’s and Leo’s responses at this watershed moment, they ought to be envisaged as implementing ‘public’ and ‘private’ policies in a bid to secure their interests in the Imperial election. On the one hand, Henry VIII ‘publicly’ responded positively to the approaches of Charles and Francis, indicating (individually) his backing to both candidates.

34 *Ven.ii*, 1108 (14 November 1518, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1120 (5 December 1518, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1124 (15 December 1518, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1131 (6 January 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1135 (11 January 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1143 (22 January 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome). For Maximilian’s health being a concern since May 1517, around which time he journeyed anyway, see *ibid.*, 1137 (15 January 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome).

35 *Ven.ii*, 1148 (29 January 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome). For another indication of Leo’s belief that an Imperial descent into Italy would cause Francis I to follow and his doubt that Maximilian would make the journey anyway, see *ibid.*, 1137 (15 January 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome).

36 For indications to the pro-Charles camp that it had England’s backing, see *LPIIIi*, 84 (20 February 1519, Spinelly to Wolsey), 252 (24 May 1519, Margaret of Savoy to Henry, Brussels); *Ven.ii*, 1228 (7 May 1519, Francesco Cornaro to the Signory, Barcelona), 1236 (16 June 1519); G. Mattingly, ‘An Early Nonaggression Pact’, *JMH*, 10, pp.15-16. For signals sent to Francis that Henry supported his candidacy; *Ven.ii*, 1163 (8 February 1519, Antonio Giustinian to the Signory, Paris), 1172 (26 February 1519, Antonio Giustinian to the
As rumours of this circulated, both candidates suspected English intentions at various times. Privately, on the other hand, the English pursued a more complex strategy; first and foremost they firmly opposed the elevation of Francis I (although this was never to become public knowledge to their ‘ally’); secondly, they were against the selection of Charles, if possible, with the preference of a third party, possibly Henry himself. These strategies culminated in the Pace mission to Germany from May onwards, where the secretary was to walk a diplomatic tightrope, taking all of these contradictions into account.
In terms of Leo X’s strategies for securing his interests at the Imperial election, publicly he initially leaned towards a third party, while simultaneously in negotiation with both Francis and Charles. From the turn of February/March 1519, however, the pontiff increasingly leaned towards the French king and this, combined with active opposition to Charles, was apparent during the election process. Privately, however, the pope adopted a three pronged strategy; firstly, to prevent the election of Charles at all costs, secondly, he would have preferred that Francis was not successful, but envisaged him as the lesser of two
evils if one of the two was unavoidable, and thirdly, his favoured choice was to induce the selection of a third party if possible. In achieving the latter, the pontiff even envisaged adapting his public backing for the French king; once Francis realised that he could not win, they could both throw their weight behind an alternative candidate. Ultimately, the English strategy had mixed results; while it contributed to the prevention of Francis’ elevation, it was unsuccessful in facilitating the selection of any third party (and did not come close to doing so). Nevertheless, Henry VIII came out of the election process ‘smelling of roses’, as the Spanish were convinced that he had contributed to their victory which, to all intents and purposes, he had supported. The papal policies, on the other hand, were unsuccessful; not only did Leo fail to advance a third party or Francis with any effect, but he also failed to obstruct his worst-case scenario, Charles. In fact, anticipating his failure in this matter from around the end of May, the pontiff came to an eleventh hour agreement to support the Catholic King’s candidacy, thereby ensuring that the papacy was on the ‘winning’ side.

44 The pontiff voiced his opinion that Francis would be the ‘lesser evil’ to the Catholic King as early as 13 February; Ven. ii, 1157 (13 February 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome). For other indications of this belief and of suggestions that he would, at heart, prefer Francis not to be elected at all, see ibid., 1157 (13 February 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1165 (24 February 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1170 (3 March 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1179 (21 March 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome). For Leo envisaging his support for the French king as a means to block Charles and would rather not see him elected, see ibid., 1169 (29 February 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1170 (3 March 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1175 (13 March 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1179 (21 March 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1219 (13 May 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome).

45 For indications that the pope also continued to favour a third party, see ibid., 1194 (12 April 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1204 (25 April 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1231 (5 June 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome). There are also a number of suggestions that Leo claimed to back Francis because he hoped that, when the Frenchman realised the impossibility of his candidacy, they could combine in support of a third party. These culminated on 29 May, when the pope, on receipt of intelligence that Francis did indeed have no chance of success, complained that Francis had let matters reach this stage and had not realised earlier the advantages of backing another anti-Charles candidate. In the end Francis I withdrew his candidacy on 26 June and threw his weight behind two German princes (one of whom did not want to be considered, the other of whom had no chance). This was far too late to benefit Leo X, however; LP III, 195 (22 April 1519, Spinelly to Henry, Barcelona); Ven. ii, 1219 (13 May 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1227 (29 May 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome); R.J. Knecht, Francis I, p.76. In terms of historians’ opinions of the papal election strategy, Knecht and Pastor broadly agree with this assessment, while Pollard agrees that Leo would have preferred a third party. Scarisbrick, on the other hand, believes the pontiff rather ‘wobbled from one policy to another’; R.J. Knecht, Francis I, p.74, 76; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.273-278, 280-281; A.F. Pollard, Henry VIII, p.101; J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, p.99.

The implications for England of the death of the emperor had direct relevance to Henry VIII’s underlying motivation to prevent French political control of the papacy and go a long way to accounting for the English crown’s ‘private’ strategy for the election campaign. At the heart of the latter was the king’s fervent opposition to his rival’s attainment of what was essentially the ‘monarchy of Christendom’. With such potential power, access to resources and even more Italian interests (than Milan and Genoa that he already possessed), there would be nothing to stop Francis achieving his Italian ambitions (particularly Naples) and thereby dominating the papacy. In a similar way, the papacy shared the English crown’s fears for the potential influence that the prospective emperor would exercise over Rome if Charles or Francis were to succeed although, without the blinkers of the inherent anti-French

47 Henry VIII’s commitment to the Treaty of London, particularly as a means to straitjacket France, and desire that it be ratified and observed, limited his actions in the public sphere and accounts for why he sought to reassure both principal candidates of his support for them. For Charles’ ratification in March, see above p.646.
48 The English crown’s inherent opposition to Francis’ candidacy can be traced back to 1518. On 4 May, Thomas Spinelly summed up English fears when he opined in May 1518 that ‘all Christendom will suffer if the French King is elected’. Henry’s own hostility towards this prospect was cited by Pace during June of the same year when he informed Wolsey of the king’s belief that ‘this… must be “growndly looked [to] and as great remedies used against it”’. He repeated this sentiment in another letter and delegated Wolsey to respond to this threat; LPIii, 4146 (4 May 1518, Spinelly to Henry), 4257 (24 June 1518, [Pace] to [Wolsey]), 4266 (28 June 1518, Pace to Wolsey). Furthermore, Charles of Castile was doubtless applying pressure to what he already knew was a raw nerve when he urged Henry in April 1519 to ‘beware of allowing the most Christian King to obtain a dignity which would render him irresistible’, a sentiment that he had already conveyed to the English king during July 1518; LPIii, 4313 (12 July 1518, Kite and Berners to Henry); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.264-265 (29 April 1519; Ven.ii, 1211; LPIii, 203; Giustinian to the Signory). Concerning Henry VIII’s understanding that the ‘monarchy of Christendom’ rested on this election, see the king’s comment on this when giving Francis his support during early February 1519; LPIii, 70 (9 February 1519, [Boleyn] to Henry, Paris). Incidentally, Mattingly detected the English nobility’s prejudice against France as a motivation for the crown’s opposition to Francis’ candidacy (and ultimately siding with Charles); G. Mattingly, ‘An Early Nonaggression Pact’, JMH, 10, pp.14-15.
49 Attainment of the Imperial crown would provide both principal candidates with the opportunity to establish de facto hegemony in Italy; G. Mattingly, ‘An Early Nonaggression Pact’, JMH, 10, p.14. It must be stressed that the English crown also opposed, although to a far lesser extent, the nomination of Charles I (hence its preference of a third party), doubtless because of the massive expanse of territories that he would control if he were to be elected, which would add Imperial fiefs in Italy (or the claim thereto) to his existing rule over the kingdom of Naples and, similarly gift a Hapsburg emperor with untold influence over Rome. This explains Henry VIII’s actual preference for the election of a third party and his preparedness to accept the Catholic King as the ‘lesser evil’, if the former was impossible. While this is not the place to compare Henry VIII’s fear of the papacy becoming politically subordinate to France with its being subject to Hapsburg influence, it has been argued elsewhere that the English view of the French as the ‘ancient enemy’, with all the historical baggage that that carried, was deeply entrenched in the English or rather, for the sake of this study, the king’s psyche; see above pp.64 ff.
prejudice, the pope was more alarmed at the thought of the former than the latter. Accounting for his opposition to the prospect of a Spanish victory in mid-March 1519, Leo X exclaimed to the Venetian ambassador, ‘do you know how many miles hence the borders of his [Charles’] territory are? 40 miles!’, referring to Naples.\(^{50}\) Despite this, the papacy also dreaded similar consequences in the event of a French victory.\(^{51}\) However, Leo may have believed that a French descent into Italy was more unlikely, as Henry VIII would not tolerate this.\(^{52}\) Furthermore, the prevailing French influence in the peninsula (that had affected the papacy since the Battle of Marignano in 1515) may have contributed to Leo’s ‘public’ backing of Francis; it was most expedient for him to be seen to be supporting the French king as, if he was elected, the pontiff had backed the winning horse but, if he was not and there were to be any subsequent political fall-out, the papacy remained close to the dominant power in Italy.\(^{53}\) Finally, Leo may have adopted a publicly pro-French course without the guiding

\(^{50}\) Also, on 12 April, the pontiff told the same diplomat that he opposed Charles first and foremost ‘from fear lest such vicinity should cause much and serious disturbance to the Papal States’; *Ven.ii*, 1175 (13 March 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1194 (12 April 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome). Part of the formal argument that Leo X employed to justify his opposition to Charles’ candidacy was that the latter was precluded from the election in the first place, due to the oath that he swore on being invested with Naples not to pursue the Imperial crown. Knecht frames this objection in the context of a wider policy pursued by the papacy since the thirteenth century, to ensure that the Holy Roman Empire and Naples remained in the hands of separate rulers. Charles was aware of this technicality prior to the death of Maximilian and sought dispensation from this oath when he asked to be invested again without the relevant clause in November 1518; *ibid.*, 1108 (14 November 1518, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1194 (12 April 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome); R.J. Knecht, *Francis I*, p.74.

\(^{51}\) That the papacy feared the political implications of both contenders becoming emperor is indicated towards the end of February, when the election was said to have been the most talked about issue in Rome for years and that there was universal disapproval of the prospect of either Charles or Francis winning, ‘on account of the great danger which would thus threaten the Apostolic See and all Italy’. Leo’s right-hand man, Cardinal de’ Medici, made a similar observation at the end of March that, if either won, ‘all other powers must yield to him’. There was also said to be a general feeling in Rome towards the beginning of March that, if Francis won the ballot, nobody would be able to oppose him in Italy; *Ven.ii*, 1169 (29 February 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1170 (3 March 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1185 (30 March 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome). Also see *ibid.*, 1170 (3 March 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1187 (2 April 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome).

\(^{52}\) *Ibid.*, 1227 (29 May 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome).

\(^{53}\) Papal uncertainty can be observed on 12 March, when the pope voiced his fear that a Franco-Spanish agreement would be concluded to secure Charles' elevation, which would leave him, the pope, high and dry. Leo X is also recorded to have made several comments of his hope that Francis, if elected, would demonstrate his gratitude for papal support and, even if he did not, would acknowledge proof of the pontiff’s good will; *ibid.*, 1175 (13 March 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1179 (21 March 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1194 (12 April 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome). Also, Pastor argues that nepotistic links between Leo X and Francis I may have contributed to the papacy’s publicly pro-French attitude in the election; L. Pastor, *History of the Popes*, vii, pp.277-278.
hand of his principal minister Giulio de’ Medici, who was in Florence when his cousin declared his hand.54

In terms of the English crown’s relationship with Rome during the election process, it can be agreed therefore that both shared, to a large extent, a broad desire for neither Francis nor Charles to become emperor and, thereby, potentially dominate Rome. They disagreed, however, on who was the lesser of the evils, if their private preference of a third party proved impossible. In practice, the attempt by Henry and Wolsey to reach some sort of alignment with Leo X on this matter proved difficult (if not impossible), on account of intriguing by both England and Rome. For the English crown, a large part of the difficulty lay in understanding what the pope really intended. It was doubtless reassured in the months leading up to Maximilian’s death that the pope was unlikely to support Francis in the planned election.55 Alternatively, Henry and Wolsey would have been wary of Leo’s intentions from March 1519 onwards, given their receipt of intelligence that he was leaning towards Francis, their worst-case scenario.56 Equally, it will be seen that the English king and his cardinal also confused the papacy by its implementation of their own ‘public’ and ‘private’ strategies. If the crown and papacy did want to work together on this, they first had to assess if they could trust each other and, second, one party had to make a leap of faith in disclosing their ‘true’ intentions.

54 Certainly the Venetian orator Minio interpreted de’ Medici’s reaction to the pope’s Gallic commitment in this way, when the cardinal returned to Rome by the end of March. The Venetian ambassador made a similar comment on de’ Medici’s attitude in late April; *Ven. ii*, 1185 (30 March 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1210 (28 April 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome).

55 *LP iii*, 4465 (calendared end September 1518).

56 Spinelly (based in Spain) notified the English crown of this (and the anti-Charles) bias from 9 March and of the mission of Robert Orsini to Germany in pursuit of this from 4 April. Prior to this, the English diplomat advertised Wolsey of Leo’s intended neutrality; *LP iii*, 130 (20 March 1519, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Barcelona), 158 (4 April 1519, Spinelly to Wolsey, Barcelona), 192 (20 April 1519, Charles to Henry, Barcelona), 195 (22 April 1519, Spinelly to Henry, Barcelona), 195 (22 April 1519, Spinelly to Henry, Barcelona). De Giglis probably conveyed similar intelligence to England, given that he certainly knew of the aforementioned nunciature and of Charles’ complaint about it; *Ven. ii*, 1187 (2 April 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome).
In the first instance, Henry and Wolsey had little choice but to be (at least partially) duplicitous towards Leo X by lobbying him to support Charles’ candidacy, in response to the latter’s specific request to do this.\textsuperscript{57} Wolsey agreed by 4 February 1519, soon after hearing of Maximilian’s death, that this overture be made secretly via Campeggio.\textsuperscript{58} This English declaration (which reached Rome by 19 February) may not have been overly convincing, however, as while Leo was said to have rejected it by 3 March (as one would have expected), it was also said that Campeggio had only written the king’s intention and how Wolsey had ‘cast the stone and led the arm’. By inference, the Spanish were unhappy that the approach was said to be induced by Wolsey, rather than being the king’s own initiative, thus suggesting that Henry’s ‘true’ mind may still be unknown and that the papal rejection was made with knowledge of this.\textsuperscript{59} Perhaps shortly after the half-hearted English communiqué of support for

\textsuperscript{57} Charles first seems to have asked Henry to write to the pope for his favour in the election on 20 January. At some point, probably during the same month, the English king encouraged his Spanish counterpart to write to Leo for the same reason, which Charles did; \textit{LPIII}, 36 (20 January 1519, Spinelly to Henry, Zaragoza), 50 (calendared 28 January 1519, Spinelly to Wolsey).

\textsuperscript{58} The English cardinal claimed to have persuaded Henry to delay from interceding on behalf of Francis to support Charles instead. This approach to the papacy (to consist of letters from Wolsey and Campeggio) was to seek Leo’s support for Charles and to propose that Cardinal Schiner act on the latter’s behalf in Germany (which the pontiff also rejected). The date of Wolsey’s correspondence to Spinelly is cited in this reply; \textit{ibid.}, 84 (20 February 1519, Spinelly to Wolsey). For other references to this (anticipated) action, see \textit{ibid.}, 87 (22 February 1519, Charles to Henry, Barcelona), 88 (22 February 1519, Charles to Wolsey, Barcelona), 89 (22 February 1519, Charles to Margaret of Savoy and Council, Barcelona), 108 (4 March 1519, Margaret of Savoy to Maximilian de Zevemberghes, Mechelen), 180 (12 April 1519, Margaret of Savoy to Charles, Mechelen). This communication was probably made by Campeggio in his despatches of 31 January-2 February 1519, which consisted of three letters to Cardinal de’ Medici and one to Leo himself; Guasti, ‘I Manoscritti Torrigiani Donati al R. Archivio Centrale di Stato di Firenze’, \textit{Archivio Storico Italiano}, 3\textsuperscript{rd} series, xxvi (1878), p.199. As the Spanish understood, however, this correspondence had not reached Rome by 26 February, so they anxiously asked that Wolsey write again. By 13 April, Charles’ advisors were apparently unhappy with the English overture via Campeggio (the English claiming that the Treaty of London prevented any more direct support), claiming that a letter in Henry’s hand would have clinched it with the pope. Nevertheless, Charles seems to have been informed from England by mid-April that the pope had indicated his intention to support his candidacy (despite being in receipt of intelligence from Germany to the contrary). The Catholic King must also have understood that the English did, eventually, act on his behalf in Rome, as on 18 May he thanked de Giglis for promoting his candidacy (as he understood from Spinelly); \textit{LPIII}, 116 (9 March 1519, Spinelly to Wolsey, Barcelona), 184 (13 April 1519, Spinelly to Wolsey, Barcelona), 188 (16 April 1519, Charles to his deputies in Germany, Barcelona), 192 (20 April 1519, Charles to Henry, Barcelona), 236 (18 May 1519, Charles to de Giglis, Barcelona). For de Giglis’ knowledge of the Campeggio approach by 19 February 1519, see \textit{ibid.}, 137 (25 March 1519, Wolsey to de Giglis, London).

\textsuperscript{59} \textit{LPIII}, 130 (20 March 1519, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Barcelona). That Leo X may have understood that the English crown may oppose the two main candidacies is suggested by the Venetian ambassador in Rome on 12
Charles, the English crown seems to have taken a leap of faith to secure papal support for the Imperial election by disclosing at least one element of Henry’s ‘private’ strategy. Communicating again through Campeggio, perhaps during February, Henry recommended that Francis I be opposed and that Leo send Nicholas von Schönberg to the Swiss in pursuit of this. It probably also recommended joint pursuit of a third party. As Wolsey would later explain to a disgruntled de Giglis (on account of his being undermined as ambassador), he and Henry were unable (or rather unwilling) to put their opinions in writing until they knew the pope’s intentions, as the election was so important and England was officially allied with France. If they had disclosed their ‘real’ views and Leo had then leaned towards Francis, English views could then have reached the French and this risked their recent efforts to straitjacket the French through the Treaty of London.

A positive reply from Rome to this overture was received in England by 22 March. Leo X seems to have concurred that a third party would be in both their interests, Campeggio even hinting that the pope may support Henry in this role, and agreed to conduct secret negotiations to this end. Wolsey, responding through de Giglis on the 25th (whom he now wished to involve in the negotiations), outlined his and Henry’s ‘private’ thoughts on the

March, who cited the pope as believing that Henry not approve of a rumoured Franco-Spanish conference to decide the election; *Ven.ii*, 1175 (13 March 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome).

Acknowledging its arrival, de Giglis refers to this despatch as having arrived very late. Given Wolsey’s later admission to double-dealing in his claim to support candidates and his encouragement of the pope to do the same, it is likely that this letter was intended as a follow-up to the pope to divulge more genuine intentions; *LPIIIi*, 137 (25 March 1519, Wolsey to de Giglis, London), 149 (29 March 1519, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome).

Ibid., 137 (25 March 1519, Wolsey to de Giglis, London). De Giglis’ subsequent involvement was to reflect the wider double-dealing of the English crown on this matter. While, on the one hand, he performed the go-between role in secret negotiations between Wolsey and Leo to join forces in pursuit of a third party, on the other, publicly, he gave the impression to the French and Imperial parties that England was either neutral or supported their candidate; *Ven.ii*, 1187 (2 April 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome); *LPIIIi*, 236 (18 May 1519, Charles to de Giglis, Barcelona).

This is apparently indicated by Giustinian’s discovery by this date that Campeggio and his entourage supported the election of a third party which, it will be demonstrated below, Leo X had disclosed was the ‘genuine’ papal position. While the legate himself was quoted as cagily telling the Venetian orator that the election was ‘a very momentous event, considering the power of the candidates’, one of his relatives went a step further and revealed their support of the king of Poland, as Charles and Francis were far too powerful; R. Brown (trans.), *Four Years*, ii, pp.259-262 (*Ven.ii*, 1180; *LPIIIi*, 133; 22 March 1519, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth); J.J. Scarisbrick, *Henry VIII*, p.99.
principal contenders. The cardinal understood that Francis was trying to win election by any means possible ‘and succeed in his unbridled desires’, in response to which he believed that they should try everything to prevent this, ‘for if he were successful he would revive many obsolete pretensions, and endanger the independence of the Holy See’. Wolsey claimed that Henry also deemed Charles’ election to be dangerous and would result in his ‘overgrown power’, although he was considered to be ‘the less evil’. As to a third candidate, the English monarch claimed to be prepared to back a Franco-papal nominee (a proposal by Leo), if Francis withdrew from the hustings. Wolsey also referred to Campeggio’s insinuation that Henry might forward his own candidacy (as a means to obstruct Francis and Charles). In response, de Giglis was to sound out the pope but, given that Henry had already turned down the offer once and may give the same answer, Leo should write to Wolsey to influence the king in this direction. The cardinal also disclosed how the English intended to pursue their ‘private’ strategy while still being seen to issue ‘public’ support to both Charles and Francis, and recommended that the pontiff do the same. As it was expected that the pope would receive requests for written support from both the French and Spanish candidates (as England had done), Henry advised that Leo ‘use dissimulation’ and issue such pledges, albeit also sending secret messengers, presumably to Henry, to contradict this correspondence, ‘ne hujusmodi litteris fides ulla habeatur’. The English king promised to do the same for Leo. Finally, when presenting Henry and Wolsey’s opinions and thoughts to Leo X, de Giglis was instructed to observe the pope’s reactions closely and to seek to find out ‘his secret thoughts’. The English crown, at this point, appears to have really opened up to the papacy concerning its ‘true’ intentions for the Imperial election and Wolsey must have been largely

63 LPHII, 137 (25 March 1519, Wolsey to de Giglis, London).
convinced that the pope did intend to collude with England; yet, to have enlisted de Giglis’ observational skills, he could not have been completely sure.

Wolsey’s doubt was well-founded, as before his message had a chance to reach Rome, the bishop of Worcester notified him on 29 March of the shifting political sands in Rome concerning the election. Firstly, French pressure was arriving in regular waves and Francis had even claimed English support (including a promise of money and Henry turning down the opportunity for election himself). The English orator claimed that Leo favoured the Frenchman at this stage, as he could not decide who ‘would be the less evil’. De Giglis also claimed that there were problems with the idea of backing a third party, as the electors were reportedly divided on who to choose. In sum, Leo X wanted Wolsey’s opinion about the danger of either Francis or Charles being elected. In reply to the late arrival of Henry’s letter urging that Francis’ election be opposed and that von Schönberg ought to be sent to Germany, Leo told de Giglis that he was not prepared to interfere on account of the danger, instead advising Henry to lobby for one of the electors. Nevertheless since saying that, the pontiff’s stance had reportedly softened and von Schönberg was now to go to Germany to obstruct Charles and Francis, although his mission was to be disguised by his travelling via Hungary.64 Notably, Henry VIII’s candidacy was not mentioned.

A further communication from Leo X (via de Giglis) may have reached Wolsey by around 11 May 1519, again reiterating his apparently true aims for the Imperial election. If the English interpretation of this can be believed, the pope desired that Francis and Charles be opposed and that Henry be elected or, failing that, one of the electors themselves. This correspondence seems to have encouraged, if not prompted, Richard Pace’s despatch to

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64 The summary cites the request that the Franciscan ought to be sent to the Swiss, but this makes no sense and, in any case, von Schönberg was later sent to Germany; ibid., 149 (29 March 1519, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome).
Germany to these ends. That the papal communiqué was perhaps not as encouraging of the English king’s candidacy as claimed can be interpreted from another secret approach made by Wolsey to Leo X (via de Giglis) in early May. Here the cardinal requested papal support for the English plan, which was doubtless that mentioned above. In response, by the end of May, de Giglis conveyed an account of a conversation with Leo; that, prior to Maximilian’s death, the pope envisaged Charles as the lesser of two evils but, since the emperor’s demise, he had repeatedly asked whether Henry and Wolsey would favour Francis (given the Treaty of London), which de Giglis denied. As at that moment, Leo reiterated that he did not wish Charles to be victorious and recommended one of the electors. However, news from France, that Francis may have pulled out, gave Leo cause for optimism; that, if he, Henry and Francis now united, they could secure the election of a third party. Nevertheless, since Leo hears that Henry and Wolsey favour Charles as the lesser evil, the pope claimed that he would follow this course. This was not a particularly clear declaration of papal intent; at the very least, the English would have recognised that further negotiations were required before an Anglo-papal alignment for the Imperial election could be finalised.

65 Scarisbrick believes that it is impossible to decide whether this reference to refers to a new papal missive (now lost) or the 29 March communication; ibid., 241 (calendared 20 May 1519, instructions to Pace); J.J. Scarisbrick, *Henry VIII*, p.99. This decision may also have been encouraged by the receipt of intelligence from Spinelly (in Spain), confirming that the pope’s hidden agenda in backing Francis; that he really sought the French king’s favour for a third party. It was also claimed that Leo was motivated by a desire ‘to increase the dominion of the Duke of Urbin and his’; *LP III*, 195 (22 April 1519, Spinelly to Henry, Barcelona). The perceived need in England for an alignment with Rome, particularly to prevent Francis being successful, may also have been underscored by receipt of intelligence from France that the choice of emperor would default to the pope, if the electors failed to select someone by 6 June. Indeed, there may have been some basis of truth in this, as it seems that the pope had been encouraged (by an unknown source) to wield papal authority during the Imperial *interregnum* (as apparently accorded by the bull ‘extravagans’ issued by John XXII [1316-1334]), although Leo rejected this suggestion. Nevertheless, a brief of 4 May sent to the legate in Germany appears to tell another story; Cajetan was empowered to ‘approve’ the election if three electors were unanimous; ibid., 170 (9 April 1519, Boleyn to Wolsey, Poissy); *Ven. ii*, 1169 (29 February 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome); L. Pastor, *History of the Popes*, vii, p.280.

66 *LP III*, 277 (calendared end May 1519, de Giglis to Wolsey).
Therefore, without being sure of papal support, Pace was sent to the Empire to facilitate a favourable outcome to the election.\footnote{Indeed, if Campeggio’s statement to Giustinian is to be believed, as at 18 May, the legate had neither been informed about the Pace mission nor its purpose; R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, ii, pp.269-273 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 1220; \textit{LPiili}, 235; 18 May 1519, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth).} According to his commission, Pace was to cite Leo X as having urged Henry to send someone to Germany to lobby the electors to think about preserving the peace of Christendom.\footnote{\textit{LPiili}, 239 (20 May 1519, Pace’s commission, London).} When in Germany, part of Pace’s ‘secret’ mission was to consult the papal ambassador and, if he took him to be ‘substantial and sure’, he may discuss his mission and also the pope’s recent letters (via de Giglis to Wolsey), copies of which he was to take with him; that they were to jointly prevent the election of Francis and Charles and to find a way to direct electors towards Henry or to choose a German.\footnote{In addition to Cajetan, there were two other papal representatives in Germany at this time: Caracciolo and Orsini; \textit{ibid.}, 241 (calendared 20 May 1519, Pace’s instructions).} When he arrived, however, Pace found it difficult to pursue this policy.\footnote{Having spoken with Cardinal Cajetan by 10 June, the secretary, despite purporting to like the cardinal personally, reported that the legate had not been notified of his coming and, therefore, had no knowledge of his mission. The implication is that Pace did not disclose his mission to Cajetan as a result. Indeed, he commented that the legate and papal ambassador (possibly Caracciolo) were held ‘in great odium’ as a result of their anti-Spanish practices. Also, it is suggested that an English request for the pope to urge a delay in the election had not materialised; in fact, Pace claimed, Leo had encouraged the process to be speeded up.\footnote{Cajetan told Pace of an incident whereby a number of notable German supporters of Charles entered his house and threatened to drive him out of the country if he did not desist from these intrigues; \textit{ibid.}, 297 (10 June 1519, [Pace] to [Wolsey], ‘on the Rhine within two miles of “Magunce”). While there were three papal representatives in Germany at this time: Caracciolo and Orsini; \textit{ibid.}, 241 (calendared 20 May 1519, Pace’s instructions).}} Having spoken with Cardinal Cajetan by 10 June, the secretary, despite purporting to like the cardinal personally, reported that the legate had not been notified of his coming and, therefore, had no knowledge of his mission. The implication is that Pace did not disclose his mission to Cajetan as a result. Indeed, he commented that the legate and papal ambassador (possibly Caracciolo) were held ‘in great odium’ as a result of their anti-Spanish practices. Also, it is suggested that an English request for the pope to urge a delay in the election had not materialised; in fact, Pace claimed, Leo had encouraged the process to be speeded up.\footnote{It took a few weeks for Pace to get a handle on what the papal representatives were actually doing. Initially (around 21-22 May), he was informed by Margaret of Savoy and others that the nuncio Orsini was praising Francis and ‘depraving’ Charles, but had also been told by another source that the pope had changed his mind recently from Francis to Charles. By the end of the month, the English secretary understood that everyone was unhappy with the conduct of the papal representatives in Germany, lobbying for Francis (referring to the legate Cajetan and an ambassador, either Orsini or Caracciolo). A few days later (3 June), Pace conveyed that Cardinal Cajetan had addressed four electors at a meeting to promote the Most Christian King, an appeal which three allegedly rejected; \textit{ibid.}, 255 (calendared 21-22 May 1519, Pace to [Wolsey]), 274 (30 May 1519, [Pace] to Wolsey), 283 (3 June 1519, [Pace] to [Wolsey], Cologne).} Pace further reported on the night of the
10th that the nuncio Orsini had fled because of his pro-French and anti-Spanish intrigues, the
secretary believing this to have been the best course to avoid ‘his destruction’. Pace also
added that Cajetan would like to have followed suit, but was bound to stay until the election,
according to his commission.72 This intelligence would have been of great concern in
England that the papacy was perhaps being duplicitous and may not align with the crown in
pursuit of the notional third party or, alternatively, was being prevented from doing so. In
addition, the ‘secrecy’ of the embassy’s aim to secure such a favourable election, at least from
Charles, seems to have been compromised from the start; the Catholic King was reportedly
mortified to hear of an Anglo-papal back-up plan to favour a third party. Hearing rumours of
Henry’s inclination towards Francis (which they disbelieved) and of English money being
sent to Frankfurt, the Spanish warned that, under cover of claiming to support someone else,
the French would ‘beguile’ England and Rome and thereby secure the election for
themselves.73 Nevertheless, in Germany, the English ambassador continued to seek a joint
strategy with papal delegates; on 14 June, he spoke with Caracciolo, who had still received no
communication from Leo and believed his correspondence to have been intercepted by
Charles’ supporters. He did, however, consider the nuncio to be ‘a very honest man’ and privy
to part of Leo’s understanding with Henry over the election.74 Finally, over the following few
days, Cajetan and Caracciolo did receive orders that they were to assist Pace, presumably in
pursuit of a third party (although it is unclear whether this was to be Henry). Confirmation of
this also came from de Giglis, but this had come too late, however, and the diplomats no
longer had access to the electors. Nevertheless, Pace said he would try. There were also other indications that the pope was hedging his bets. The secretary implied that Leo was still working against Charles when he conveyed that one elector had promised Cajetan that he would raise the invalidity of the Spanish king’s nomination by virtue of the oath he took on his investiture with Naples. Pace also referred to secret intelligence that the pontiff, fearing that Charles would still be elected, was seeking to come to terms with him.\textsuperscript{75} The Englishman further confirmed his suspicion that the papacy was being deceitful on 20 June, when he claimed that neither Cajetan nor Caracciolo responded to his overtures to work together, in spite of the legate’s commission.\textsuperscript{76} Two days later, Pace reported a possible reason for this, that Cajetan had a bull to publish Francis’ election as soon as he heard that the latter had three votes, motivated by the pope’s fear of the French king (and in spite of Leo’s promises to Henry).\textsuperscript{77} The following day (the 23\textsuperscript{rd}), however, the papal position had changed yet again; both papal delegates had received instructions to proceed no further against Charles.\textsuperscript{78} On the 27\textsuperscript{th}, Pace advertised Wolsey that the pope had made an arrangement with Charles in this respect that would finally draw together the electors.\textsuperscript{79} This news would have taken some days to reach England as, up to 25 June, Henry and Wolsey were telling Campeggio that matters in Germany were proceeding well (since Pace’s arrival) and that, according to the English cardinal, ‘everything will tend to the weal of Christendom’. The Italian legate’s agreement implies a belief in Anglo-papal cooperation on this.\textsuperscript{80} Even on the 28\textsuperscript{th}, Wolsey remained optimistic that this alignment would bear fruit; he wrote to Pace announcing that the

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., 308 (calendared 14-16 June 1519, [Pace] to Wolsey, Mainz).
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., 318 (20 June 1519, [Pace] to Wolsey, Mainz).
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., 323 (22 June 1519, Pace to Wolsey).
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., 326 (24 June 1519, [Pace] to Wolsey).
\textsuperscript{79} According to the secretary, the agreement concerned Leo’s absolving Charles from an oath. This was doubtless linked to his investiture with Naples, which precluded him from obtaining the empire; ibid., 339 (28 June 1519, Pace to [Wolsey], Mainz).
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., 331 (25 June 1519, Campeggio to Wolsey, Windsor).
pope had instructed his legate and nuncio to induce a prorogation of the election. Little did he know, however, that Charles had already been selected. Ultimately then, despite Pace’s overtures, the papal representatives in Germany did not align with the English in pursuing the election of a third party. While they apparently received instructions to do so (quite late in the day), one can only presume that they were overridden by alternative orders to continue Leo’s anti-Spanish/pro-French strategy. Finally, the last shift of the papal representatives to back Charles (contrary to the course agreed with England) took place the day before the Catholic King was elected and was surely too late for them to have had much effect.

It ought to be noted that English concern with and commitment to the papal crusading initiative subsided somewhat during the Imperial election, as all parties looked inwards towards their own interests in the short-term. As mentioned earlier, Henry VIII’s earlier decision to join Leo’s five year truce was not enacted in Rome, for which an expedition to the East was the implicit intention. On the other hand, a passagium remained the eventual aim for the Treaty of London. When Henry VIII received legates Wolsey and Campeggio on 17 March 1519, apparently upon their receipt of a commission to join the concordat on Leo X’s behalf, the king was praised in their oration for his enthusiasm for the crusade and urged to

81 Ibid., 353 (4 July 1519, Pace to Wolsey, Mainz). Wolsey may well have been reacting to intelligence relayed by the secretary on 22 June that, according to the Spanish orators, the electors had decided to postpone for 10-12 days. By 24th, however, Pace reported contradictory information, that the election would be held on the 27th. Ibid., 323 (22 June 1519, Pace to Wolsey), 326 (24 June 1519, [Pace] to Wolsey).

82 The exception seems to have been Francis I, who pledged this as his intention as part of his election ‘manifesto’. When questioned about this by Boleyn in late February, the orator claimed that the French king ‘took me hard by the wrist with the one hand, and laid his other hand upon his breast, and swear to me on his faith, if he attain to be Emperor, that within three years after he [would] be in Constantinople, or he would die by the way’. He intended to begin by invading Greece and would leave his son in France, entrusting Henry not to attack France in his absence. Francis expressed a similar sentiment to the same ambassador a few weeks later; Ibid., 100 (28 February 1519, Boleyn to Wolsey, Paris), 118 (11 March 1519, Boleyn to Wolsey, Paris).

83 See earlier, pp.650-651.
realise this ambition. There is no indication during these months, however, that the English crown intended to pursue this policy; in fact, on 11 April, Giustinian commented that the king and his ministers did not care about news from the Levant. This may well have been based on a perception that the Turkish threat was, at that point, receding. Nevertheless, the English still appear to have employed the notion of crusade for their own political purposes during the election process. Pace, was instructed to raise the spectre of the Ottomans when trying to influence the electors from late May on; he was to warn them that the peace of Christendom was in danger (from the Turks) as a result of Maximilian’s death and that his embassy intended to preserve union within Christendom and to prevent any discord arising as a result of the election. It is likely, however, that this crusading rhetoric was just talk; an argument employed to further English objectives.

The English crown would have received notification of Charles’ election (28 June) by the end of June or the start of July 1519. While not necessarily a perfect outcome for English interests vis-à-vis Rome, it was preferable to a French victory. Notification of the

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84 The papal representatives had just received a new commission from Rome which was deemed to require that they be formally received by the king (again) as they had just arrived; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.256-259 (Ven.ii, 1178; LPIII, 125; 17 March 1519, Giustinian to the Signory).
85 Ven.ii, 1193 (11 April 1519, Giustinian to the Signory, London).
86 On 13 January 1519, Henry was pleased to hear (from Giustinian) that the Turks were expected to approach Hungary for a peace, as it proved that the Sultan was not planning to attack Christendom; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.248-250 (Ven.ii, 1136, LPIII, 20; 13 January 1519, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth). Also see LPIII, 274 (30 May 1519, [Pace] to Wolsey).
87 LPIII, 239 (20 May 1519, Pace’s commission, London).
88 The electors notified Pace on the 28th and Pace reported immediately back to Wolsey, the latter, who it will be seen, complained immediately to the pope on 1 July. Henry confirmed intelligence of this from the Spanish ambassador by the 6 July. That the king believed the latter is suggested by his instruction that Wolsey draw up letters of congratulation. Boleyn also notified this news from France on the 4th; ibid., 338 (28 June 1519, Matthew Cardinal of Salzburg, Frederic Count Palatine, Casimir Marquis of Brandenburg, Erard Bishop of Liege, B. Bishop of Trent, H. Count of Nassau, and the Cardinal of Mainz to Pace, Hoest), 339 (28 June 1519, Pace to [Wolsey]), 352 (4 July 1519, Boleyn to [HVIII], Poissy), 357 (6 July 1519, More to Wolsey, Oking), 393 (calendared 22-23 July 1519, de Giglis to Wolsey); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.283-286 (Ven.ii, 1249, LPIII, 371; 9 July 1519, Giustinian and Surian to the Signory, London). Charles himself notified the English crown of his success on 7 July; LPIII, 359 (7 July 1519, Charles to Wolsey, Barcelona), 360 (calendared 7 July 1519, Charles to Henry, Barcelona).
89 Vergil noted Henry’s rejoicing at the news (although he indicated no anti-French subtext); D. Hay (ed.), Anglica Historia, p.261. The papal diplomats present earlier reported that, in the event, the electors and people would not have allowed Francis I to have been elected; Ven.ii, 1227 (29 May 1519, Minio to the Signory).
same news began to reach Rome from 29-30 June and, although the pope initially did not believe it, he was increasingly convinced over subsequent days and began to make arrangements with the Spanish. As was demanded by the mores of the time, however, when the news was confirmed, it was celebrated in both England and Rome, although there were signals that neither crown nor papacy were entirely pleased with the result. Subsequently, England and Rome blamed each other for the failure of their joint policy. Henry and Wolsey seem to have been convinced of this by reports from Pace in Germany. On 3 July, the secretary attributed the rapidity of the election to the pope’s absolution of Charles from his

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90 News of Charles’ election reached Rome at 2 p.m on 30 June and was taken as confirmed by the Spanish. The French ambassador had rejected a similar report that reached the Holy See the previous afternoon. Papal scepticism was understandable, given that rumour of the Catholic King’s success had swept Rome on 18 May, causing the Spanish ambassadors to go to the pope with news; Ven.ii, 1222 (19 May 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1245 (1 July 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1246 (4 July 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome). The English would have been aware that, circa 15 July, the new King of the Romans had acknowledged that he had received papal support in the election and that Leo had revoked an earlier instruction to the electors in Germany that forbade their selection of Charles; LPIII, 385 (15 July 1519, [Spinelly] to Wolsey, Barcelona).

91 In England, the crown acted quickly to smooth over a diplomatic ‘incident’ around 8 July, when Spanish celebrations were stopped by the London authorities due to fears that a riot may erupt (along the lines of the May Day riot of 1517, Wolsey claimed). Wolsey took steps to prevent this from escalating, including a blockade of correspondence at the ports, to stop Charles’ aunt, Archduchess Margaret, from finding out. Some sort of apology was professed by the council, who also denied that Henry or Wolsey had any knowledge or involvement in the affair. Also, the cardinal proposed an official celebration at St Paul’s for the following Sunday. In response, Henry approved the measures taken and the Spanish ambassador appears to have forgiven the insult soon after; LPIII, 364 (calendared 8 July 1519, Wolsey to Henry), 368 (9 July 1519, More to Wolsey, Oking), 369 (calendared 9-10 July 1519, de Hesdin to Wolsey), 377 (12 July 1519, de Hesdin to Wolsey, London), 403 (cald end July 1519, instructions of Thomas William [Wall?], Norroy King of Arms, to show to Margaret of Savoy); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.283-286 (Ven.ii, 1249; LPIII, 371; 9 July 1519, Giustinian and Surian to the Signory, London). In terms of the ‘private’ reaction of Henry and Wolsey, the king did not attend the celebratory mass performed by his cardinal and Wolsey was noted by the Venetian ambassador to have appeared displeased with the result (although their presumption that this was because he had favoured the French was wide of the mark). It was also noted by Minio in Rome that de Giglis did not attend the mass to mark the election, nor did he make any other display of celebration; ibid., pp.283-286 (Ven.ii, 1249; LPIII, 371; 9 July 1519, Giustinian and Surian to the Signory, London), 286-287 (Ven.ii, 1252; LPIII, 383; 15 July 1519, Giustinian and Surian to the Signory, London); Ven.ii, 1260 (23 July 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome). In Rome, Leo X finally accepted news of Charles election on 5 July, but could not hide his disappointment from the Venetian Minio; if Francis had acted according to his advice, he lamented, a third party would have been elected. At the same time, there were great celebrations by the Spanish in Rome, while the French and their adherents were despondent. In contrast to the reaction in England, it was noted that the pope deliberately chose not to act against the Spanish celebrations there (even though there were substantial processions in battle array), just in case he was interpreted to be unhappy with the election result, as some Spanish were already saying. It was further reported by the Venetian ambassador on the 9th that there had been no sign of papal celebrations either at the Vatican or at Castel S. Angelo but, by the 19th, Leo had received formal notification from Charles himself with a demand for the customary ceremonies. Subsequently, papal celebrations were held over two nights (including at the two locations cited) and a mass on the 20th; Ven.ii, 1247 (5 July 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1250 (9 July 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1251 (9 July 1519, Minio to the Council of Ten, Rome), 1260 (23 July 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome); L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.287-289.
oath from the investiture of Naples (which, it had been argued, prevented him from standing). By the 4th, the secretary reported that, despite Wolsey’s last minute despatch of the 28th, telling him that the pope had promised to have his representatives lobby for the prorogation of the election, they had in fact done the opposite and, instead, wrote in favour of Charles (in their correspondence of the 25th). In Pace’s opinion, such ‘double practices like these are not laudable’. This was the culmination of a broadly negative experience for the English in trying to align themselves with the papacy in the election. Probably based on an earlier report from Pace, Wolsey conveyed his displeasure with the pope’s role immediately on hearing of Charles’ success, on 1 July, alleging that the pontiff’s conduct was ‘misrepresented to the King’. When faced with this hostility, Leo claimed to be astonished that his integrity was being questioned; he asserted that he had never been anything other than open about his opposition to Charles’ candidacy. The pontiff also regretted ‘that Henry gave no attention to a project which would have made him a near, instead of a distant neighbour of the papal states’. He further explained his support of Francis in terms of the French king being the only real alternative to Charles and that he hoped, by so doing, that a third party would be selected. Leo then accused the English of not communicating with him about how they could work together, not from Pace nor anybody else. Finally, the pope accounted for his last

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92 LPIIIi, 351 (3 July 1519, [Pace] to Wolsey, Frankfurt).
93 Ibid., 353 (4 July 1519, Pace to Wolsey, Mainz). The English were not the only ones to blame the pope for Charles’ success; by 18 July, the French embassy in Rome threw Leo into a rage because of such an accusation. It seems that the pontiff felt a little misunderstood in his actions; speaking to the Venetian orator, Leo explained that he had instructed Cajetan (in Germany) to cease his opposition to Charles if he thought the election was inclining towards Spain, ‘as it was no use knocking one’s head against the wall’. He also admitted that the legate may have exceeded his commission a little. However, he wholly rejected French accusations and asserted that he had done all that he could to support Francis; Ven.ii, 1257 (18 July 1519, Minio to the Council of Ten, Rome). In Spain, by contrast, the papacy’s role in Charles’ success seems to have been recognised; the resident nuncio apparently celebrated and praised the result so much that it was noted and praised by many, including by the emperor elect himself; ibid., 1265 (6 July 1519, Francesco Cornaro to the Signory, Barcelona).
94 LPIIIi, 393 (calendared 22-23 July 1519, de Giglis to Wolsey). Wolsey probably felt vindicated when he later received confirmation from Spain of the pope’s role in the election and Charles’ recognition of this; ibid., 385 (15 July 1519, [Spinelly] to Wolsey, Barcelona).
minute volte-face to support Charles, because of intelligence that the latter was certain to be elected, with or without papal support.\footnote{Ibid., 393 (calendared 22-23 July 1519, de Giglis to Wolsey).}

**Henry and Wolsey resume attempts to restrain Francis I from descending into Italy via the Treaty of London, to the exclusion of Rome: June 1519 – May 1520**

The Imperial election resolved, the English crown could now resume its attempts to constrain France through the Treaty of London. The ‘balance’ of European politics had changed as a result, however. There were now two distinct, rival ‘superpowers’; France and the Hapsburg territories, the latter comprising the Holy Roman Empire, Spain, Burgundy and Naples. With the addition of Germany to his portfolio, Charles appeared to rise out of the geographical constraints that had been placed on him by his possession of the disparate Hispano-Burgundian territories and from the consequent leverage that Francis had previously wielded over him.\footnote{For the Treaty of Noyon, see above pp.536-537. For the death of Charles’ francophile advisors, de Sauvage (1518) and Chèvres (1521), and the new ‘expansion’ policy advocated by Gattinara, see M. Rady, *The Emperor Charles V* (1988), p.39.} Francis I now felt threatened by his neighbour. One of the main Franco-Imperial flashpoints that now existed arose from Charles’ aim to be crowned by the pope in Rome.\footnote{In the tradition of Charlemagne, the coronation of an emperor necessitated a visit to Rome for this to be performed in person by the pope. Charles, therefore, was looking to cross the Alps in pursuit of this from the moment he was elected (although, admittedly, he needed to be crowned king of the Romans at Aachen first). Despite this being an apparently genuine intention, however, it ought to be noted that Charles V was not crowned until 1530, by Clement VII at Bologna; M.F. Alvarez, *Charles V* (1975), pp.86-88. For Francis’ broader unhappiness with the result of the Imperial election and the instability in Germany in its wake that was, at times, blamed on French interference, see for example *LP*III, 352 (4 July 1519, Boleyn to [HVIII], Poissy), 363 (8 July 1519, [Pace] to Wolsey, Cologne), 392 (22 July 1519, Pace to Wolsey, Antwerp).} The prospect of an Italian descent by the emperor-elect caused insecurity in France, particularly concerning Francis’ Italian possessions (Milan and Genoa) and claims (Naples) and would prompt a military response.\footnote{R.J. Knecht, *Francis I*, p.77.} It also threatened the prevailing political influence that the French had held over the papacy since the Battle of Marignano in 1515. While there
may have been initial confidence in England that the new emperor had too many immediate issues to deal with before he could make any such expedition, including the need to be crowned king of the Romans at Aachen, it was understood that Charles did intend to cross the Alps. It was also perceived in England during subsequent months that Francis I did fear Imperial actions in this area and was prepared to take measures to oppose them. Indeed, worrying intelligence that a Franco-Imperial war was about to be sparked emanated from de Giglis during November 1519, when he claimed that Charles had diverted his forces from North Africa to Sicily for the winter, since Francis had raised a small fleet in the peninsula. The pope for his part also feared the prospect of Franco-Imperial interference in Italy, although he focused particularly on Charles. Commenting a few days after hearing of the election, Leo exclaimed ‘What shall I do if the Hapsburg comes to Italy now? All Germany

99 During July, Campeggio certainly argued that an Italian enterprise by Charles was unlikely given that the pro-French Chièvres was in power, that Charles was low on funds following the election, that he was not yet established in Spain and that one of the clauses imposed by the electors was that he could not undertake an expedition without their consent. Campeggio also claimed that Charles would get no aid from England for any Italian expedition, as they were committed to the amity with France. Pace apparently reiterated this electoral stipulation by mid-August; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, 287-290 (Ven.ii, 1253; LPiii, 384; 15 July 1519, Giustinian and Surian to the Signory, London). Also see LPiii, 498 (6 November 1519, [Tunstal] to Wolsey, [Cologne]); Ven.ii, 1270 (17 August 1519, Sebastian Giustinian and Antonio Giustinian to the Signory, Melun), 1279 (16, 17, 28 August 1519, Surian to the Signory, London), 1290 (15 September 1519, Surian to the Signory, London). Charles’ presence in Italy would also serve to strengthen his hold over Naples and stifle Francis’ ambition to ‘recover’ the kingdom. It ought to be emphasised that the ‘threat’ to Italy was not imminent, as Charles needed to return to the Low Countries for his coronation as king of the Romans at Aachen first. This did not occur until 23 October 1520. Reports of this were relayed to England and Henry announced it on All Saints’ Day (1 November); LPiii, 964 (29 August 1520, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels), 978 (15 September 1520, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 1018 (12 October 1520, Tunstal to [Henry], ‘Luke’), 1028 (19 October 1520, [Spinelly] to Wolsey), 1029 (20 October 1520, Spinelly to Wolsey, ‘Mastricke’), 1044 (7 November 1520, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Cologne); Ven.iii, 134 (9 November 1520, Surian to the Signory, London); M.F. Alvarez, Charles V, p.38.

100 Towards the beginning of September, Francis’ concern was reported to be such that he intended to spend the winter at Lyons, near Charles, the Swiss, the pope, Venice and Milan; LPiii, 446 (6 September 1519, Boleyn to Wolsey, Blois). Also see ibid., 530 (calendared beginning December 1519, Boleyn to Wolsey).

101 Campeggio updated this information on 28 November, stating that the Spanish(-Imperial) fleet was actually going to Naples; ibid., 516 (17 November 1519, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 533 (4 December 1519, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome). Rumours of a French fleet being equipped at Genoa had been sent to England back in March 1519; ibid., 149 (29 March 1519, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome).
will back him up!’ and went on to deem English backing as vital in resisting this.\textsuperscript{102} Equally, however, he did not want the French in Italy.\textsuperscript{103}

In light of this refocused French threat to Italy the papacy, the English identified the opportunity to forestall this within the context of the Treaty of London. Henry and Wolsey encouraged continued commitment to the universal peace accord by assuming a mediating role between these two powers. By this means, England would become the ‘balance’ between Charles and Francis and, thereby, be in a position to affect any Italian enterprise intended by either power.\textsuperscript{104} In the short-term, they envisaged this through the resumption and expansion of one of the articles of the Treaty of London, the personal interview. Negotiations resumed towards a meeting between Henry and Francis.\textsuperscript{105} In recognition of the new dynamic

\textsuperscript{102} L. Pastor, \textit{History of the Popes}, vii, pp.289-290; \textit{Ven.ii}, 1250 (9 July 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome). Similarly, when asked by the Venetian ambassador about whether Charles had mentioned anything about coming to Italy to be crowned or whether Francis had said anything about sending or refusing to send the Imperial crown to Germany, Leo replied that it had not been raised and added, ‘I will tell you the truth; at this present we would beseech him to have it sent, to prevent his coming into Italy in person’; \textit{ibid.}, 1260 (23 July 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome). Intelligence of the pope’s opposition to an Imperial descent reached England via its ambassador in France during September 1519; \textit{LPiii}, 446 (6 September 1519, Boleyn to Wolsey, Blois).

\textsuperscript{103} Minio claimed on 9 July that the Spanish ambassadors were attempting everything they could to ‘captive’ the pope by forging letters if needed, as well as by intimidation and promises. Leo reportedly admitted that such overtures were occurring, but failed to comment on them. The Venetian reiterated this danger on the 18th, predicting ‘the ruin of all Italy’ if it did occur and if Francis did not approach the pope differently; \textit{Ven.ii}, 1251 (9 July 1519, Minio to the Council of Ten, Rome), 1257 (18 July 1519, Minio to the Council of Ten, Rome). The Venetians took this prospect seriously and urged Francis to ensure that the pope remained on their side; \textit{ibid.}, 1255 (16 July 1519, Doge and Senate to Antonio Giustinian), 1256 (18 July 1519, Doge and Senate to Antonio Giustinian).

\textsuperscript{104} While Henry VIII previously just intended to block Francis I from interfering in the peninsula, the rise of Charles with his own Italian agenda demanded that the English assume some sort of mediating position between France and Germany, if Henry was to retain any influence on whether the French crossed the Alps. It was imperative that Charles and Francis did not settle their differences without them (particularly as this could mean Franco-Imperial hegemony over Italy, to the exclusion of England) and it was also in the English interest that these issues were not entirely addressed, as this would prolong their importance in continental politics. Spinelly gave an indication of his understanding of this on 28 June 1520, when he warned Wolsey ‘that the concord between the Emperor and the French remains firm; though this be not advantageous for England remaining arbiter between them both’; \textit{LPiii}, 884 (28 June 1520, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels). This mediating role becomes increasing clear from Henry’s interviews with Charles and Francis onwards; see below pp.687 ff.

\textsuperscript{105} Negotiations for the Anglo-French summit agreed in the Treaty of London ceased during the election campaign. They resumed, however, immediately after and, while Francis sought an August meeting, Wolsey believed this to be too soon to be arranged, instead proposing the following May (or before the end of summer at the latest); R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, ii, pp.294-295 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 1262; \textit{LPiii}, 397; 26 July 1519, Giustinian and Surian to the Signory, London); \textit{LPiii}, 415 (calendared 14 August 1519, [Wolsey] to [Boleyn]), 416 (14 August 1519, Boleyn to [Wolsey], Melun), 514 (16 November 1519, Boleyn to Wolsey, Blois), 629 (calendared 21 February 1520, instructions to Sir Richard Wingfield); \textit{Ven.ii}, 1269 (14, 15 August 1519, Antonio Giustinian to the Signory, Melun), 1273 (29 July 1519, Surian to the Signory). Negotiations continued for the rest of the year,
involving Charles V, the English crown now also encouraged an interview with Charles as well, particularly given the likelihood of him returning to the Low Countries to be crowned at Aachen prior to any Italian enterprise.\textsuperscript{106} Given Franco-Imperial tensions, a tripartite conference was further fostered, in which Henry and Wolsey could physically assume a central role as mediators.\textsuperscript{107} In addition to keeping the English crown central to the Italian ambitions of both powers and enabling it to discourage these, the meetings would have the further benefit of physically keeping both competing monarchs away from Italy. As long as

\textsuperscript{106} For negotiations towards a meeting between Henry and Charles, which seems certain by 12 November, see \textit{LPIIIi}, 385 (15 July 1519, [Spinelly] to Wolsey, Barcelona), 419 (16 August 1519, instructions of Charles for his ambassadors in England, Barcelona), 548 (11 December 1519, Spinelly to Wolsey, ‘Moleyn de Rey’), 551 (12 December 1519, Charles’ instructions to his ambassadors to England, ‘Molín del Rey’), 560 (23 December 1519, Spinelly to Wolsey, ‘La Tore de Galdes’); \textit{Ven.ii}, 1277 (19 August 1519, Francesco Cornaro to the Signory, Barcelona), 1279 (16, 17, 28 August 1519, Surian to the Signory, London), 1290 (15 September 1519, Surian to the Signory, London), 1298 (12 November 1519, Surian to the Signory, London). By the turn of 1520, an Anglo-Imperial summit seems to have been certain, although there was sustained French pressure on Henry to cancel and Imperial attempts to delay this (in a bid scupper the meeting with Francis) right up to the last minute; \textit{Ven.iii}, 2 (3 January 1520, Surian to the Signory, London), 32 (8 April 1520), 34 (11 April 1520), 38 (23 April 1520, Francesco Cornaro to the Signory, Corunna), 43 (7 May 1520, Surian to the Signory, London); \textit{LPIIIi}, 621 (16 February 1520, Charles to Wolsey, Natzarra), 635 (25 February 1520), 636 (calendared 25 February 1520, Charles to Wolsey, Burgos), 637 (26 February 1520, Charles to his ambassadors, Burgos), 667 (3 March 1520, Charles to Henry, Valladolid), 671 (10 March 1520, Margaret of Savoy to Henry, Mechelin), 672 (11 March 1520, Margaret of Savoy’s instructions to Jehan de la Sauch, Mechelin), 688 (19 March 1520, Spinelly to Wolsey, Pontferrat), 696 (24 March 1520, Margaret of Savoy’s instructions Charles’ ambassadors to England, Mechelin), 728 (7 April 1520, de la Sauch to Chièvres, London), 729 (7 April 1520, Imperial ambassadors to Margaret of Savoy, London), 732 (8 April 1520), 734 (9 April 1520, Sir Richard Wingfield to [Wolsey], Blois), 735 (calendared 9-10 April 1520, Wolsey to Sir Richard Wingfield), 740 (11 April 1520), 741 (11 April 1520), 742 (14 April 1520, instructions of the Imperial ambassadors in England to de la Sauch sent to the emperor, London), 757 (23 April 1520, Charles to Wolsey), 764 (26 April 1520, [Somerset] to Henry, Calais), 765 (26 April 1520, Somerset to Wolsey), 770 (28 April 1520, Charles to Wolsey, Corunna), 771 (28 April 1520), 773 (29 April 1520, Charles to Henry, Corunna), 774 (29 April 1520, Charles’ instructions to Jehan de la Sauch, Corunna), 775 (29 April 1520, Chièvres to Wolsey, Corunna), 777 (30 April 1520, Charles to Catherine of Aragon, Corunna), 787 (3 May 1520, Spinelly to [Wolsey], ‘At Le Cronynys’), 788 (4 May 1520, Charles to Henry), 789 (4 May 1520, Charles to Wolsey), 798 (8 May 1520), 802 (12 May 1520, Margaret of Savoy to Henry, ‘Gand’), 803 (13 May 1520, Corunna), 804 (calendared 13 May 1520), 814 (16 May 1520, Margaret of Savoy to Henry, Ghent), 815 (16 May 1520, Margaret of Savoy to Wolsey).

\textsuperscript{107} \textit{Ven.ii}, 1279 (16, 17, 28 August 1519, Surian to the Signory, London). Henry and Wolsey apparently proposed such a meeting to Charles around January-February 1520, to which Charles replied that he would discuss this issue at his interview with Henry; \textit{LPIIIi}, 635 (25 February 1520), 636 (calendared 25 February 1520, Charles to Wolsey, Burgos).
there was a prospect of a meeting between Henry VIII and one of the parties, the political
focus would remain on the north of Europe and the uninvolved party was likely to remain in
the region (just in case anything was concluded to its detriment).\footnote{Vindication of the English crown’s attempts, through the arrangement of these meetings, to prevent the return of Francis to Italy would have been felt when a despatch from Boleyn, dated 16 November, was received which quoted the French king, who ‘laid his hand on his breast, and said, “By the fai\[th\] of a gentleman, that, but for the very trust he had of the said meetin[g and] entrevieu, he would have been at this day at Myllan’”; \textit{LPIIIi}, 514 (16 November 1519, Boleyn to Wolsey, Blois).} It should also be noted
that the English deliberately led Charles and Francis to understand that, underlying their
mediation was a pro-Imperial and pro-French policy, respectively.\footnote{The king of the Romans was kept on-side with various indications from England that his amity was closer
than that of Francis. In the run-up to the interviews, Wolsey seems to have responded positively to Imperial
desires for a closer amity by allowing the renegotiation of existing treaties (although not, it seems, in military
terms), which culminated in a mercantile agreement that seems to have renewed agreements from 1496, 1506
and so on; \textit{ibid.}, 635 (25 February 1520), 636 (calendared 25 February 1520, Charles to Wolsey, Burgos), 696
(24 March 1520, Margaret of Savoy’s instructions Charles’ ambassadors to England, Mechelin), 708 (29 March
1520, Charles to Wolsey, Compostella), 728 (7 April 1520, de la Sauch to Chièvres, London), 731 (8 April 1520),
739 (11 April 1520), 742 (14 April 1520, instructions of the Imperial ambassadors in England to de la
Sauch sent to the emperor, London), 772 (28 April 1520), 798 (8 May 1520). Among other gestures, Henry sent
gifts to Francis, in a bid to convince him of his overriding amity with him; \textit{ibid.}, 685 (16 March 1520, [Sir
Richard Wingfield] to [Henry]), 698 (26 March 1520, Sir Richard Wingfield to Henry, ‘Chastelharault’), 749 (18
April 1520, [Sir Richard Wingfield] to [Wolsey], Blois).} Nevertheless, it must
not be forgotten that the underlying anti-French agenda still persisted in English crown
circles.\footnote{For an indication of the underlying anti-French attitude held by the king (and his ‘inner circle’), one can note
Henry’s reaction to Richard Pace telling him around 11 August 1519 that two of his orators in Rome
‘undoubtedly were corruptide bi the Frenche Kyng… Whereunto his Grace sayde thies wurdis formally
interragitive, “Bi the masse!”’; Ellis, p.78 (\textit{LPIIIi}, 412; 11 August 1519, Pace to Wolsey, Penshurst). The
English crown’s anti-Gallic intentions were also perceived by the French ambassador in England in the early part
of July 1519; fearing an attack by Charles through the Low Countries, to which he believed Henry would
contribute financially, the diplomat emphasised the need to maintain the English friendship with France, so that
Francis need not worry if Charles descended into Italy to retrieve the Imperial crown. If England was not on their
side, however, this would be a worry, given what the English would do in the north. The French orator was
unsure of Henry both ‘because of the national character of the English, who are hostile to the French’ and on
account of the queen being Spanish; R. Brown (trans.), \textit{Four Years}, ii, pp.283-286 (\textit{Ven.ii}, 1249; \textit{LPIIIi}, 371; 9
July 1519, Giustinian and Surian to the Signory, London). Also see \textit{Ven.ii}, 1278 (24 August 1519, Francesco
Cornoaro to the Signory, Barcelona). The anti-French agenda can be further identified in the English crown
condoning Charles’ moves to pre-empt Francis in Italy (around August 1519); \textit{LPIIIi}, 419 (16 August 1519,
instructions of Charles for his ambassadors in England, Barcelona).} 

Given English attempts to re-establish a central political role in order to prevent a
French descent into Italy by virtue of personal interviews with Charles and Francis, how did
Henry and Wolsey relate with the papacy on this? The apparent answer is hardly at all; in
spite of their concern with the effect that a French incursion would have on papal political ‘independence’, there seems to have been no attempt to engage Leo X in what was essentially a papal role, mediation. In one sense, this might have been expected, given Henry and Wolsey’s dominance of the Treaty of London from the outset of negotiations. Furthermore, the English feeling of betrayal following the papacy’s failure to keep its promises during the Imperial election campaign would not have encouraged efforts to involve Leo. On the other hand, the growing Hapsburg-Valois tension and the increasing likelihood of an Italian enterprise by either party, probably caused the English to worry about which side of the fence Leo would ultimately fall.

Central to the apparent English inaction in this direction may have been an uncertainty about papal intentions, as Leo entertained overtures from both Francis and Charles. In fact, de Giglis conveyed such news to England around the end of July; while Charles sought the investiture of Naples in return for a tribute and offered a marriage alliance, Francis claimed to understand why Leo switched his support to the Charles, but now warned against his ‘overgrown power’ and advised that he take ‘measures’ to deal with this, along with himself and Henry. Francis further advised Leo to employ to the Swiss, presumably for his defence. In terms of intelligence that the papacy was turning towards France, Boleyn relayed on 14 August, for example, that Francis was confident of papal support if his relationship with Charles deteriorated. By 6 September, the same orator suggested that the legate in France, Bibbiena, was engaged in regular communications with the French king, perhaps because of

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111 See later pp.674-676. For continued English concern with French intentions for Italy, see LPIII, 392 (22 July 1519, Pace to Wolsey, Antwerp).
112 See above pp.661-662.
113 See above pp.612 ff.
114 LPIII, 401 (calendared end July 1519, [de Giglis] to [Wolsey]).
115 Ibid., 416 (14 August 1519, Boleyn to [Wolsey], Melun).
the belief that Charles intended to go to Rome.\textsuperscript{116} Further confirmation that Leo was leaning towards France would have been received from de’ Giglis’ September account of the pope’s response to the kidnapping of a Spaniard from Rome at the behest of Charles’ ambassador; Leo threatened to behead the latter. Furthermore, de Giglis warned that this was just the tip of the iceberg in terms of the ‘evils’ that would arise as a result of the election.\textsuperscript{117} Boleyn’s concerns from France were warranted, given that Leo concluded a secret alliance with Francis I during October 1519, although neither Boleyn nor his crown seem have been aware of this.\textsuperscript{118} Further ominous intelligence was relayed to England from the French Court during early December, however, reporting that Francis was to send Cardinal du Prat ‘to manage the Pope’.\textsuperscript{119}

At the same time as they received reports of Leo’s pro-French bias, Henry and Wolsey also heard of papal negotiations with the emperor elect. By 22 July, for instance, Pace had news from Spain that Leo had made some sort of agreement with Charles ‘utterly to forsake all French practices’, which was deemed credible given that he had won the election.\textsuperscript{120}

\textsuperscript{116} \textit{Ibid.}, 446 (6 September 1519, Boleyn to Wolsey, Blois). Also, it was suspected (by the Venetians) that Francis was using his close amity with Henry as leverage to secure papal adhesion to himself; \textit{Ven.ii}, 1269 (14, 15 August 1519, Antonio Giustinian to the Signory, Melun). The pontiff certainly gave the Venetian ambassador in Rome the impression that he would ‘choose’ France, even that he planned a league and pre-emptive attack against Charles. Such a league was already talked about by Francis; \textit{ibid.}, 1261 (23 July 1519, Minio to the Council of Ten, Rome), 1263 (4 August 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1264 (8 August 1519, Antonio Giustinian to the Signory, Poissy); \textit{LPiii}, 401 (calendared end July 1519, [de Giglis] to [Wolsey]).

\textsuperscript{117} \textit{LPiii}, 444 (1 September 1519, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 445 (1 September 1519, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome).

\textsuperscript{118} Leo agreed to defend French interests in Italy, as well as withhold from Charles the Imperial crown and the investiture of Naples; M. Creighton, \textit{History of the Papacy}, vi, p.120; L. Pastor, \textit{History of the Popes}, viii, p.3.

\textsuperscript{119} Du Prat (Cardinal of Bourges) was to intimidate Leo through the Pragmatic Sanction, as the French agreement to drop it (made in the concordat arising from Bologna, 1515) was proving unpopular; \textit{LPiii}, 541 (9 December 1519, - to -, Amboise).

\textsuperscript{120} \textit{Ibid.}, 392 (22 July 1519, Pace to Wolsey, Antwerp). Also, the English crown knew that Charles was working towards securing papal backing. On 16 August, for instance, Charles instructed his ambassadors going to England to tell Henry and Wolsey that he had granted all of the pope’s demands and that, as a result, Leo cannot justify allying against him; \textit{ibid.}, 419 (16 August 1519, instructions of Charles for his ambassadors in England, Barcelona). This may have had something to do with the investiture of Naples, negotiations for which were still not concluded by mid-November; \textit{ibid.}, 516 (17 November 1519, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome). Furthermore, Henry and Wolsey received reports from Rome about French and Imperial intentions to meddle in Italy; in early December, for instance, Wolsey was informed that a Spanish fleet, originally thought to be going to Sicily, was
Furthermore, on 12 December 1519, Charles sent Henry a copy of a brief demonstrating Leo’s enthusiasm for his election, asserting that he was in accord with Leo on other matters. Indeed, despite Leo’s October agreement with Francis, his negotiations with Charles continued and this remained the case as far as England was concerned. The English continued to be informed of the progress of Imperial-papal discussions from February 1520 on, when Charles’ envoy Don Juan Manuel arrived in Rome to facilitate an agreement, although the likelihood of any accord may have cooled by early May. As a result of these contradictory indications, the English crown was probably unable to interpret papal intentions in the months after the Imperial election. It could only be sure that Leo feared the prospect of either power crossing the Alps, particularly given that he was taking measures to protect himself. Indeed, news reached England at the end of 1519 that the pope had taken measures to forestall or minimise this danger; Spinelly informed Wolsey on 23 December that Leo had proposed either to send the Imperial crown to Germany or for Charles to go to Rome with a small retinue. In other words, Leo did not envisage preventing the king of the Romans from being crowned emperor, but was trying to avoid a descent en masse, thereby provoking a French response.

The mixed messages emanating from Rome to England were mirrored in the papal misunderstanding of Henry VIII’s political stance immediately after the Imperial election. In fact sailing to Naples. Such intelligence would have doubtless further shaded English thoughts about papal political intentions; ibid., 533 (4 December 1519, Campeggio to Wolsey).

121 Ibid., 551 (12 December 1519, Charles’ instructions to his ambassadors to England, ‘Molin del Rey’).
122 On 19 December, Campeggio informed Wolsey that an Imperial-papal agreement was close; ibid., 557 (19 December 1519, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome). The English crown was also informed by Spinelly of Imperial overtures to the pope (and of an answer from Rome still being awaited); ibid., 548 (11 December 1519, Thomas Spinelly to Wolsey, ‘Moleyn de Rey’).
123 LPIii, 3913 (1 February 1520, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome); LPIii, 614 (1 February 1520, [Campeggio] to [Wolsey], Rome), 649 (3 March 1520, Campeggio to [Wolsey]), 680 (14 March 1520, [de Giglis] to Wolsey, Rome), 688 (19 March 1520, Spinelly to Wolsey, Pontferrat), 720 (4 April 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 743 (calendared 11-15 April 1520, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome), 791 (4 May 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome).
124 LPIii, 560 (23 December 1519, Spinelly to Wolsey, ‘La Tore de Galdes’).
early July, for instance, Leo understood the Anglo-French amity (the Treaty of London) to be worthless and in need of reconfirmation, due to Francis’ pursuit of his own candidacy to become emperor. In other words, Leo did not think that the agreement would hold and, if anything, new negotiations were needed. In addition, towards the end of July 1519, the pontiff also envisaged England as part of an offensive league against Charles and had warned Henry to beware of the new emperor’s power. By mid-August, it seems that the pope had presumed that Henry VIII was unhappy with Charles’ election; Leo interpreted this from the manner in which the English king proferred his congratulations; not by a personal letter, but by an indirect missive to his ambassador in Spain which did not refer to Charles as ‘king of the Romans’. On the other hand, Campeggio reportedly understood in mid- to late August that, in case of French aggression, Henry had offered Charles a sizeable military contingent to contribute towards his defence; one would have expected the legate to have conveyed this intelligence back to Rome. Further papal confusion about English foreign policy may have been caused by the French portrayal in Rome of the English as their staunch allies. Indeed, the Venetians suspected as early as August 1519 that Francis I was using his close amity with Henry as leverage to secure an alliance with Leo. Even in mid-March 1520, de Giglis reported that the French publicly praised Henry and Wolsey at the Curia (arrangements for the Field of Cloth of Gold having then been confirmed).

In spite of these probable mutual misunderstandings between England and Rome following Charles’ election, Henry VIII took the first steps to re-engage with the papacy

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125 *Ven.ii*, 1250 (9 July 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome).
126 Leo was quoted as saying that ‘we ought to attack him [Charles] now, and not allow him to draw breath’, in Flanders, Navarre and Austria, ‘and reduce him to such a plight that he would not know what to do’; *ibid.*, 1261 (23 July 1519, Minio to the Council of Ten, Rome), 1263 (4 August 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome).
130 *LPIII*, 680 (14 March 1520, [de Giglis] to Wolsey, Rome).
politically (vis-à-vis France) during August 1519, apparently in a bid to pre-empt any papal agreement, presumably with France, that was rumoured to be under negotiation. On the 18th, Henry informed the pope that Campeggio (recently recalled) would join Leo’s five year truce on condition that the pope issued a brief pledging not to enter any league that was contrary to the former agreement. Around the same time, Henry pledged himself to a crusade and promised to lead it in person, if an heir was born before the expedition. He offered 20,000 troops and 70 ships, accompanied by the nobility and financed by a tenth from the clergy and fifteenth from the laity. The motivation for these ‘concessions’ can be seen in the brief requested; England feared Leo X taking sides, particularly France. This motivation becomes more likely when one considers that de Giglis had recently revealed Francis’ overtures to Rome for joint action (along with England, the French king asserted) against Charles. It is entirely reasonable to suppose, therefore, that these placatory moves by England represented a prompt and direct response based on the underlying anti-French agenda, currently represented by Henry’s and Wolsey’s attempts to restrain Francis via the Treaty of London. News of this approach reached Rome by 1 September 1519, as de Giglis informed the pope of it and awaited Campeggio’s arrival. Incidentally, on his way back to Rome, Campeggio visited the French Court and delivered a letter to Francis on Henry’s behalf (around 21 September). While its contents are uncertain, the Italian cardinal subsequently conveyed to Wolsey...
Francis’ friendship and desire for a close amity.\textsuperscript{135} From this, one could infer that Campeggio (thence to be employed as an English diplomat in Rome) was intended to demonstrate continued English amity with France when he joined the five year truce on Henry’s behalf; this would be consistent with the English crown’s continued public adhesion to the Treaty of London. It also suggests that the English did not trust the pope sufficiently to make any overtures hostile to France. The Italian cardinal arrived back in Rome on 28 November, at which point he relayed Henry’s friendship to the Holy See, as well as his ‘desire for the peace of Christendom’. He also presented letters relating to the ‘treaty’, presumably that of London, and offered the pope the truce, of which he had sent him previously a copy, and explained his commission (alongside de Giglis) to ratify the five year truce.\textsuperscript{136} In spite of this, there still seem to have been some matters to settle, as it was not until 8 December that Henry finally consented to joining the truce. He explained that his principal objection had been that it ought to have been agreed through a universal league, otherwise it would appear to diminish, one interprets, the Treaty of London. Henry continued that he had been persuaded to ratify by Wolsey and Campeggio, and that he had also persuaded Francis to do the same.\textsuperscript{137} Unknown to the English, this emphasis on Anglo-French amity would have reinforced the pope’s still secret commitment to Francis I. In belated response to correspondence from Henry, the pope communicated through Campeggio, on 1 February, that he was pleased with the king’s desire for universal peace and recommended that the Englishman side neither with Charles nor Francis, but instead remain neutral. In this positive response and in outlining the Turkish threat, Leo seems to have taken Henry VIII’s earlier overture (his apparent commitment to the

\textsuperscript{135} Ibid., 452 (21 September 1519, Campeggio to Wolsey, Blois), 454 (24 September 1519, Boleyn to Wolsey, Blois).
\textsuperscript{136} Ibid., 533 (4 December 1519, Campeggio to Wolsey).
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid., 537 (8 December 1519, Henry to Leo, Greenwich).
Treaty of London and pledges to contribute towards the crusade) at face value. Notably, however, the pontiff does not seem to have responded to the English request for a brief promising not to conclude any alliance contrary to the Treaty of London and nor would he be expected to, given his secret amity with France.

In addition to English demonstrations of support for the ongoing papal crusading strategy, albeit to prevent Leo allying with Francis, it is possible that Henry and Wolsey may also have issued instructions to Campeggio and de Giglis to cooperate with ongoing Spanish attempts to win over Leo X (against France). Certainly, Wolsey wrote to Campeggio on 23 January 1520 and, on the same date, Charles instructed the bishop of Worcester to co-operate with the newly-commissioned Imperial representative (Juan Manuel) when he arrived. The emperor elect would surely not have issued this instruction if he was not confident of such an understanding with Henry VIII. Indeed, it is perhaps revealing that around 9 February 1520, the pope reportedly saw through Henry VIII’s purported neutrality and believed that, despite his ‘fair promises’, the Englishman leaned towards Charles and would side with him in the event of any breach. Moreover, both Campeggio and de Giglis were keen observers of Imperial-papal negotiations and of the prospective arrival of Manuel during these months, which may suggest instructions from England to keep close tabs or even involve themselves in these intrigues.

138 LPIII, 3913 (1 February 1520, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome); LPIII, 614 (1 February 1520, [Campeggio] to [Wolsey], Rome). Charles V also seems to have been taken in by Henry VIII’s commitment to crusade around this time. In his commission to his ambassadors to arrange his landing in England, the king of the Romans instructed them to discover whether Henry wanted to make a new alliance against the Turks, in which case he would send the form of the treaty desired; ibid., 637 (26 February 1520, Charles to his ambassadors, Burgos).
139 The contents of the Campeggio missive are unknown and there is no direct evidence of Wolsey instructing either his old co-legate or de Giglis in this way; ibid., 603 (23 January 1520, Charles to de Giglis, ‘In Molendino Regio’), 649 (3 March 1520, Campeggio to [Wolsey]).
140 Ven.iii, 14 (9 February 1520, Minio to the Signory, Rome).
141 See above pp.679-680.
At the same time as the English tried to convince Leo X not to side with France, they excluded him from their attempts to revive the Treaty of London as a means to restrain France, this time through mediation and personal interviews. On 1 February 1520, for instance, Campeggio asked for confirmation about the rumour that an Anglo-French meeting would occur in the spring, ‘to quiet men’s minds’. Even in early March, it seems that Campeggio (and, therefore, Leo) were relying on third parties for news of Anglo-French negotiations for an interview; on the 3rd of this month, the pope first seems to have hinted that he was ill-informed about such matters when he conveyed his desire for regular communication from Wolsey. In the event, Leo X seems to have been told by French sources on 12 March that an Anglo-French meeting would take place and that Charles sought an interview with Henry prior to this. Confirming this, de Giglis relayed the pope’s displeasure that he had not been consulted and Leo also sought Henry’s approval to send a nuncio to the meeting, which itself demonstrated a lack of papal involvement up to that point. Towards the beginning of April 1520, the English ambassador repeated papal complaints about not having been informed about the interview and about having received just one piece of correspondence since August 1519, although Leo claimed to be happy that

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142 This may have been motivated partly by the need to convince Charles and Francis to accept English arbitration. In addition to negotiating meetings with them, Henry and Wolsey sent each prince private signals that they actually favoured them over their rival. If this pretence was to be sustained, at least as far as the Anglo-French amity was concerned, the English would naturally have been reluctant to disclose this to the pope; see above pp.675-676. It ought to be stressed, on the other hand, that the pope was aware of negotiations towards the interviews from other sources. Campeggio, for instance, understood around the time of his departure from England (August 1519) that a meeting between Henry and Charles was on the cards. Also, Leo was certainly aware that an Anglo-French summit was under discussion by mid-December 1519; *Ven.ii*, 1279 (16, 17, 28 August 1519, Surian to the Signory, London), 1299 (15 December 1519, Minio to the Signory).
143 *LPiiii*, 3913 (1 February 1520, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome); *LPiiii*, 614 (1 February 1520, [Campeggio] to [Wolsey], Rome).
144 *LPiiii*, 648 (3 March 1520, Campeggio to Wolsey), 649 (3 March 1520, Campeggio to [Wolsey]). Papal concern with events can also be interpreted by Leo’s desire for de Giglis to accompany him on a planned trip to Florence; *ibid.*, 651 (3 March 1520, [de Giglis] to Wolsey).
145 *Ven.iii*, 26 (12 March 1520, Minio to the Signory, Rome).
146 *LPiiii*, 680 (14 March 1520, [de Giglis] to Wolsey, Rome).
nothing prejudicial was intended against the papacy. In reply, Wolsey cited illness as an excuse for the lack of communication, but this was unconvincing given the alleged lack of correspondence since the previous summer. Letters from Henry to Campeggio, which apparently arrived in Rome around the same time, were read in consistory around 4 May. Given Leo X’s apparent satisfaction at the promises contained therein and his previous concern with the lack of communication about the forthcoming meetings, it would be reasonable that the king sought to reassure the pontiff about his intentions for the meetings and that they would not be to the detriment of Rome. Also on 4 May, Henry and Wolsey wrote to Campeggio in what would have apparently been a swift response to recent papal complaints; it must have been carried post, as it arrived in Rome by the 15th. Henry indicated his ‘filial respect’, a desire for continued universal peace and the spread of Christianity (presumably via crusade). Leo was presumably reassured that nothing would be negotiated ‘to the prejudice of the Church’. This probably went one step further than the previous communication that was despatched in this regard. The sense from this correspondence is that the English crown repeated its strategy of 1518 when it did not inform Leo about the true intentions for the Treaty of London until the last possible moment. This left the pope thereby unable to oppose the hijacking of his crusading initiative and, again in 1520, unable to stop Henry and Wolsey becoming the arbitrators of (universal) peace.

Perhaps further demonstrating the lack of alignment between England and Rome around this point, the pope also prepared to send nuncios to the conferences but did not

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147 Ibid., 720 (4 April 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome). Campeggio reiterated the lack of communication from England, particularly concerning the French interview, as well as both his and the pope’s desire for more frequent correspondence. De Giglis also reminded Wolsey that neither he nor the pope had received any letters; ibid., 743 (calendared 11-15 April 1520, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome), 745 (15 April 1520, [de Giglis] to [Wolsey], Rome).

148 Ibid., 811 (15 May 1520, [Campeggio] to [Wolsey], Rome).

149 The pope thanked Henry for his promises; ibid., 790 (4 May 1520, de Giglis to Henry).

150 Ibid., 844 (27 May 1520, Campeggio to Henry, Rome), 845 (28 May 1520, Campeggio and de Giglis to [Wolsey], Rome), 846 (28 May 1520, de Giglis to Henry, Rome), 847 (28 May 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome).
apparently consult the English embassy in Rome. On 22 April, Campeggio claimed that his knowledge of the pope’s intention to send a nuncio was second-hand and that, as Leo did not bring it up, he did not mention it; he had heard, however, that the nuncio would be Petrus de Pazzis, a Florentine noble who was related to the pope. Leo X notified Henry of his decision to send a nuncio to attend the interviews on 2 May, actually Jerome Ghinucci (bishop of Ascoli). He was to be one of three intended to be present, the others to accompany Francis and Charles.

Behind a cloak of mediation, Henry VIII becomes more receptive to anti-French overtures and forms a league to defend the Church: May 1520 - January 1522

After lengthy negotiations, Henry VIII did hold separate interviews with Francis and Charles from May 1520, that with the French king, the Field of Cloth of Gold, marked as one of the most magnificent diplomatic set-pieces of the era. These occasions were officially intended to promote ‘peace’ (and the perpetuation of the Treaty of London).

151 At the same time, Campeggio declared that he would send his own envoy to be present at the meetings, as he could not attend himself; his secretary Florian(-us) left Rome on the 23rd. It is unclear why the cardinal would feel it necessary to despatch his own envoy. Perhaps he felt that this befitted his recent legatine status that he exercised in England, or alternatively, given the complaints about the lack of communication from England, that this would go some way towards solving the problem; ibid., 756 (22 April 1520, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome), 784 (2 May 1520, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome), 811 (15 May 1520, [Campeggio] to [Wolsey], Rome).

Ghinucci left Rome on 30 April. John Roelaius was to go to Francis and Marinus Caraciolus (Caracciolo) to Charles; ibid., 780 (2 May 1520, Leo to Henry, ‘In villa [Manliana]’), 781 (2 May 1520, Leo to Wolsey, ‘In villa nostra Manliana’), 784 (2 May 1520, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome), 791 (4 May 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 792 (5 May 1520, de’ Medici to Wolsey, Rome). For Ghinucci’s journey, ibid., 811 (15 May 1520, [Campeggio] to [Wolsey], Rome), 833 (24 May 1520, Richard Wingfield to Wolsey, Montreuil).

152 The Field of Cloth of Gold was held between Ardres and Guisnes, 7-24 June 1520; D. Hay (ed.), Anglica Historia, pp.263, 269-271; A.F. Pollard, Henry VIII, p.140-142; C. Whibley (ed.), Henry VIII by Edward Hall, i, pp.189-218. The two interviews between Henry and Charles bookended the French summit. The first took place in England 26-29 May and the second at Gravelines and Calais, 10-14 July; LIPIII, 824 (calendared 20-21 May 1520), 828 (23 May 1520, John Herforde, Customer of Plymouth, to Henry), 838 (26 May 1520, More to Erasmus); Ven.iii, 50 (21 May-14 July 1520), 53 (27 May 1520, Francesco Cornaro and Surian to the Signory, Canterbury), 54 (28 May 1520, Cornaro and Surian to the doge and Signory, Canterbury), 61 (3 June 1520, Surian to the doge and Signory, Calais), 63 (4 June 1520, Surian to the Signory, Calais), 64 ([?]) June 1520, Surian to the doge and Signory, Boulogne); D. Hay (ed.), Anglica Historia, p.267-269; A.F. Pollard, Henry VIII, p.139-140, 143; C. Whibley (ed.), Henry VIII by Edward Hall, i, pp.187-189.

153 As the regency council back in England understood, the Field of Cloth of Gold aimed ‘for the quiet of Christendom’ (among other things); LIPIII, 896 (calendared 2 July 1520, [Lords of the Council to Henry]).
summits, Henry and Wolsey continued in their mediating role, pressing for a tripartite peace conference and also tried to compose the differences between these powers. In spite of great demonstrations of friendship with Francis I, however, the underlying anti-French agenda was not far from the surface. Indeed, it is from this point that one can detect Henry VIII increasingly entertaining overtures from Charles V to combine against France. Until he was ready to enact this, however, Henry continued to forward himself as arbitrator and, thereby, made great demonstrations of his amity towards Francis and opposed both French and Imperial plans for Italy.

At both Canterbury and Calais (May and July, respectively), Charles may have proposed a closer alliance with England to be directed against Francis I, that would involve his marriage to Princess Mary (then betrothed to the dauphin of France) and all indications point towards a receptive Henry and Wolsey, although they were not ready to formally align with Charles at that point (and break with Francis). Nevertheless, a secret treaty arose from

155 For English moves to invite Charles to the Field of Cloth of Gold and arrange a tripartite meeting shortly after, see Ven.iii, 71 (8 June 1520, Surian to the Signory), 73 (8 June 1520, Soardino, Mantuan Ambassador at the Court of France, to the Marquis of Mantua, Linck?), 75 (10 June 1520, Cornaro to the Signory, Ghent). For indications that a tripartite conference was proposed at the second meeting with Charles at least, see LPIIIi, 903 (6 July 1520, Spinelly to Wolsey, ‘Odenborg’), 914 (14 July 1520). For English attempts to mediate between France and the Empire, one Venetian despatch claimed that Henry and Wolsey proposed that France have Burgundy, while Charles received Milan. If true, this would have been consistent with the underlying English aim to have Italy (and the papacy) free from French influence; Ven.iii, 62 (4 June 1520, Antonio Giustinian to the Signory, Linck), 71 (8 June 1520, Surian to the Signory), 75 (10 June 1520, Cornaro to the Signory, Ghent), 84 (14 June 1520, letter from the Court of France to the Magnifico Pietro Montemerlo, Royal Senator), 87 (16–17 June 1520, Giovanni Badoer and Antonio Giustinian to the Signory, Linck?), 98 (28 June 1520, Surian to the Signory, Calais).

156 Imperial ambassadors, for instance, reported the continued English hatred of the French and their dislike of the French interview; LPIIIi, 742 (14 April 1520, instructions of the Imperial ambassadors in England to de la Sauch sent to the emperor, London). Also see ibid., 728 (7 April 1520, de la Sauch to Chièvres, London).

157 Wolsey seems to have held talks with Charles’ principal advisor, Chièvres, in the days leading up to the first interview. At the meeting itself, Henry and Wolsey were involved in lengthy discussions with Charles and, although the subject-matter was said to be secret and was not speculated upon, it is likely that this alliance was broached and that the English were receptive. This idea can be interpreted from Charles’ understanding, in advance of the second meeting, that its purpose was to increase the Anglo-Imperial amity and Henry’s apparent reply that he would ‘always retain his fraternal mind to Charles’. Furthermore, Charles seems to have later understood (during June 1521) that, according to the treaties sworn at Canterbury, Henry VIII pledged to declare himself against France, presumably once a closer amity was formed, formalised by a marriage agreement; LPIIIi, 824 (calendared 20–21 May 1520), 863 (7 June 1520, Charles to Henry, Ghent), 887 (calendared end June 1520, Charles to Wolsey), 892 (calendared 1 July 1520, [Wolsey] to Lord –, Calais), 1371 (27 June 1521, instructions to the Imperial ambassadors in England); Ven.ii, 50 (21 May-14 July 1520), 106 (12 July 1520, Lodovico
the second interview (14 July 1520), which pointed in this direction; notably that the English pursue Princess Mary’s marriage to the dauphin no further.158 This implies that plans for an Anglo-Imperial marriage alliance already existed by this time. Indeed, the July agreement marked the beginning of negotiations that were to continue into 1521, although they reached a stalemate by February.159

In spite of England beginning to explore an anti-French alliance with Charles V, Henry and Wolsey continued their policy of arbitration. By virtue of the Treaty of London, they publicly attempted to mediate between France and the Empire and opposed the Italian ambitions of both powers. As will become apparent, Henry and Wolsey did oppose the

Spinelli, secretary of Surian, to his brother Gasparo Spinelli, secretary to Badoer, Calais). Henry later revealed to Francis that Charles had proposed such an alliance, but only in the second interview; LPIII, 936 (calendared beginning August 1520, instructions to Sir Richard Wingfield and Jerningham, ambassadors to Francis), 1149 (calendared end January 1520, [Henry to Tunstal]), 1150 (calendared end January 1520, [Henry to Tunstal]), 1213 (calendared end March 1521, [Wolsey to Henry]). In addition, Wolsey continued to negotiate with Imperial representatives (particularly de la Roche) from Calais, after the formal summit had ended and Henry had crossed back to England; ibid., 918 (15 July 1520, Charles to Wolsey, Gravelines), 921 (17 July 1520, de la Roche, to Wolsey, St Omer); Ven.iii, 108 (18 July 1520, Surian to the Signory, Calais). Given Charles’ previous track record of commitment to alliances with England, it is likely that Henry and Wolsey may have reserved judgement at this stage; see for instance pp.536, 542-549.

158 It was also agreed that deputies from both sides would meet at Calais to arrange disputes and that an ambassador would reside in both kingdoms to ensure that lines of communication remained open; LPIII, 914 (14 July 1520). Also see M.F. Alvarez, Charles V, p.37. Concerning the secrecy of the agreement, the Venetian ambassador at the English Court reported that no arrangement resulted from this second meeting on account of Henry being pro-French; Ven.iii, 108 (18 July 1520, Surian to the Signory, Calais).

159 In September, Tunstal was sent to Charles in accordance with the agreement but, as far as the Venetians were concerned, he was intended to maintain peace between the Imperialists, French and Venetians. Negotiations in subsequent months seem to have revolved around a renewal of the 1516 league between Henry VIII and Maximilian, to which the English raised objections. From September, Charles tried to apply pressure on Henry to declare himself against France, also requesting money and troops to support the resistance against French moves in Italy, which the English king refused at this stage. Negotiations between December 1520 and January 1521 became problematic as they focused on the prospective marriage between Mary and Charles. In early 1521, Henry was angry that Charles’ advisors had changed their mind about this until they had gained a papal dispensation from the pope and the English king had agreed to other matters first, including the formation of a defensive league with the pope, hiring the Swiss, aid against the Spanish rebels and agreement to another meeting. Henry was wary of Imperial commitment and insisted on the marriage alliance before agreeing to anything else. While Charles continued to push for another meeting with Henry, negotiations had reached an impasse; LPIII, 969 (1 September 1520), 984 (20 September 1520, Spinelli to Wolsey, Antwerp), 988 (23 September 1520, Spinelli to [Wolsey], Antwerp), 992 (26 September 1520, Spinelli to Wolsey, Antwerp), 1098 (17 December 1520, [Tunstal] to Wolsey, Worms), 1149 (calendared end January 1521, [Henry to Tunstal]), 1150 (calendared end January 1521, [Henry to Tunstal]), 1162 (calendared 11-12 February 1521, Tunstal to Henry), 1181 (26 February 1521, Chièvres to Wolsey, Bruges), 1226 (12 April 1521, Spinelli to Tuke, Worms); Ven.iii, 118 (7 September 1520, Surian to the Signory), 135 (10 November 1520, Surian to the Signory, London), 136 (10 November 1520, Surian to the Signory, London), 143 (3 December 1520, Surian to the Signory, London), 151 (7 January 1521, Surian to the Signory, London).
emperor elect’s intention to cross the Alps, but more in terms of how this was provocative towards France, rather than due to any principled objection. Indeed, they privately entertained the possibility of supporting such action if an Anglo-Imperial axis was formed and encouraged Charles’ understanding of this.\(^{160}\) In addition, the English crown had a tacit agreement with Charles that it would publicly oppose this prospect, in a bid to convince Francis that it truly intended to arbitrate Franco-Imperial differences or even leaned towards him.

This opposition to Charles V’s Italian ambitions was demonstrated, for example, at a banquet thrown by Wolsey during the Field of Cloth of Gold. The cardinal, while lauding the Anglo-French amity, publicly declared that ‘the Emperor must not aspire to greater power in Italy’.\(^{161}\) More revealingly, intelligence reached France in early July 1520 that Henry, when he heard from his queen that Charles intended to cross the Alps, reportedly replied that if he allowed his councillors to convince him ‘to pass by force to his said coronation, that he might cause to repent him, for he should not fail in so doing to constrain his highness to do all the aid that the King his good brother would desire of him, for the resisting of his said passage by

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\(^{160}\) The prospect of forming a defensive league with the pope and hiring the Swiss were discussed at the Calais interview and were subsequently part of Anglo-Imperial negotiations; *LPIIIi*, 1098 (17 December 1520, [Tunstal] to Wolsey, Worms), 1150 (calendared end January 1521, [Henry to Tunstal]); also see above pp.688-689. The extent to which Henry and Wolsey believed that Charles was in a position to launch such an expedition, however, is unclear. On the one hand, Henry and Wolsey were informed and, at times, apparently believed that the emperor elect had to overcome various obstacles before he could think about being crowned in Rome. Spinelly, for instance, reported on 29 August that a lack of money, the current Spanish revolt and a financial dependency on the German princes meant that Charles would be unable to cross the Alps until the latter part of summer 1521; *LPIIIi*, 964 (29 August 1520, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels), 1141 (25 January 1521, Bourchier to Wolsey, Calais); *Ven.iii*, 132 (21 October 1520, Surian to the Signory, London), 134 (9 November 1520, Surian to the Signory, London), 137 (18 November 1520, Surian to the Signory, London), 141 (28 November 1520, Surian to the Signory, London). There were, on the other hand, increasing reports from the end of 1520 that parties around Charles (particularly German nobles, Italian exiles and Cardinal Schiner) were winning the argument for him go to Italy, although Henry and Wolsey still uttered contradictory opinions about whether this would actually take place; *LPIIIi*, 988 (23 September 1520, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Antwerp), 1044 (7 November 1520, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Cologne), 1098 (17 December 1520, [Tunstal] to Wolsey, Worms), 1106, (calendared end December 1520, Tunstal’s letters), 1155 (2 February 1521, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Worms); *Ven.iii*, 167 (28 February 1521, Surian to the Signory, London), 169 (10 March 1521, Surian to the Signory, London), 177 (24 March 1521, Surian to the Signory), 184 (1 April 1521, Surian to the Signory), 195 (23 April 1521, Surian to the Signory, London).

\(^{161}\) He also stated that Charles should not harm France or Venice; *Ven.iii*, 92 (20 June 1520, Surian to the Signory).
force’. 162 This attempt to convince France that England opposed an Imperial expedition to Italy culminated in Henry and Wolsey’s secret, detailed report to Francis of their second conference with Charles, which reiterated the illusion.163 Overall, the ruse appears to have worked and Francis was convinced by English claims to oppose Charles’ going to Italy; at one stage, he was even quoted as saying that his English counterpart ‘had taken upon him the protection of the Ital[si]c against such as might intend to [disturb] the peace or quiet thereof’.164 That Henry VIII’s apparent ‘drawing a line in the sand’ with Charles did not actually occur in any real sense is readily apparent (even without taking into account the Anglo-Imperial agreement). Although Henry and Wolsey were probably genuine in their desire to discourage Charles’ expedition as a measure to prevent any provocation of the French, it seems that the emperor elect may have been complicit in this attempt to deceive Francis I. Shortly after the Calais-Gravelines meeting, one of Charles’ advisors acknowledged Wolsey having advised against such an Italian expedition on the basis that it would cause war and perhaps result in a loss of money and honour. While the alternative offered by Wolsey is unclear, de la Roche agreed with it, suggesting that it could not have been particularly defiant.

162 The French reportedly rejoiced at this; LPIIIi, 905 (9 July 1520, Richard Wingfield to Wolsey, ‘Chantilly’).
163 In terms of attempting to keep the peace, the information that Wingfield and Jerningham were instructed to impart could have caused this to backfire. Henry and Wolsey alleged that the king of the Romans requested aid for war with Francis, including support for Charles’ intention to descend into Italy in force. These allegations could have caused Francis to retaliate or take pre-emptive action. The king and cardinal went on, however, to emphasise their rejection of these overtures, asserting their binding amity with France and their commitment to help Francis against invasion if, for example, Charles marched through Milan with an army. It is possible, therefore, that the English crown had overegged the pudding somewhat in its bid to convince its French counterpart that it opposed the king of the Romans and his planned coronation in Rome; ibid., 936 (calendared beginning August 1520, instructions to Sir Richard Wingfield and Jerningham, ambassadors to Francis). For other indications that this story was believed, see ibid., 922 (19 July 1520, bishop of Bayeux to Bibbiena, Poissy); Ven.iii, 107 (14-18 July 1520, Surian to the Signory, Calais), 111 (22 July 1520, inaccurate report made to Piero Trono, Bailiff of Brescia, by Jacomo da Cazago, who claimed to have received the intelligence from a page of Peter Carmeliano).
164 LPIIIi, 913 (calendared 13-14 July 1520, Richard Wingfield to [Wolsey]). Around the same date, Wolsey was sent credentials for Wingfield to speak on behalf of Francis I; ibid., 911 (13 July 1520, Bonnivet to Wolsey, St Germain). The Venetian ambassador in France also reported the Most Christian King’s conviction (arising from the second meeting with Charles) that Henry would side with him if Charles crossed the Alps; Ven.iii, 109 (21 July 1520, Giovanni Badoer to the Signory, Poissy). For other indications (to the French and their Venetian allies) around the time of the second Anglo-Imperial meeting that Henry was pro-French and would side with Francis if Charles went to Italy, see ibid., 108 (18 July 1520, Surian to the Signory, Calais); LPIIIi, 922 (19 July 1520, bishop of Bayeux to Bibbiena, Poissy), 923 (19 July 1520, [Sir Richard Wingfield to Henry], Poissy).
Given that the sense of the letter suggests that Charles was intent on going to Italy, it is probable that Wolsey had lobbied sympathetic Imperial councillors to this end, but with little success other than agreeing with Charles to portray Henry as opposing this plan. Furthermore, Spinelly’s first report to Wolsey after the second meeting indicated nothing but goodwill from Charles, before the English diplomat outlined the king of the Romans’ itinerary for going to Rome. Charles’ reported temperament was not that of someone who had been presented with an English ultimatum vis-à-vis Italy; neither does Spinelly seem to have been at all concerned about the intended expedition. The English continued to pedal the illusion that they were opposed to an Imperial expedition to Italy and would side with France for the rest of the period.

The English bid to convince the French that Henry was genuinely trying to arbitrate or was even pro-French is further encapsulated by the English king’s exaggerated demonstrations at his second meeting with Charles. Here he was reported by pro-French observers to be riding a horse and wearing ‘abillements’ given to him by Francis and his ‘visage and countenance…appeared not “to be so replenysshyd with joye”’, as it had been at the Field of Cloth of Gold. If genuine, these gestures would have been a snub to Charles V, but it has already been noted that the English and Imperialists conspired to send positive messages back to Francis that Henry was neutral, if not pro-French. Such signals continued to be sent to France in subsequent months.

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165 *LP* III, 921 (17 July 1520, de la Roche, to Wolsey, St Omer). For Margaret of Savoy’s probable complicity, see ibid., 922 (19 July 1520, bishop of Bayeux to Bibbiena, Poissy).
166 Ibid., 925 (27 July 1520, Spinelly to Wolsey).
167 Ibid., 1212 (calendared end March 1521, Henry to Fitzwilliam).
169 See above pp.690-692.
170 *Ven.iii*, 108 (18 July 1520, Surian to the Signory, Calais), 119 (7 September 1520, Surian to the Signory), 123 (19 September 1520, Surian to the Signory); *LP* III, 1152 (calendared beginning February 1521, instructions to Fitzwilliam, ambassador to France), 1183 27 February 1521, Fitzwilliam to Henry, Armorantyne), 1184 (28 February 1521, Fitzwilliam to Wolsey, ‘Armorantyne’), 1191 (calendared 6-7 March 1521, Wolsey to St Omer).
The English crown’s preoccupation with preventing a French descent into Italy was also demonstrated by its opposition to Francis’ declarations in this direction following the Field of Cloth of Gold. Firstly, Wolsey seems to have reacted to reports by late August 1520 that the French king did plan to go by both recommending (through the Venetian orator in England at least) that he did not and by instructing the Bailly of Caen to apply pressure in this regard in September. Further embassies were sent to Francis in subsequent months with the same mission, in combination with Wolsey’s own exhortations. During early November, for instance, the cardinal argued that Francis ought to refrain from going to Italy, as it would be expensive and was unnecessary (presumably given his efforts to also dissuade Charles). As
Francis would not be swayed from going to Italy, Fitzwilliam was sent back to France in January 1521 to sustain English pressure. This time, however, Francis indicated that he was in no hurry to go to Italy and intended to eventually move to Lyons, where he would await developments. The English ambassadors, Fitzwilliam and Jerningham interpreted this as an unwillingness on the French king’s part to cross the Alps unless absolutely necessary, but were not yet convinced that the enterprise had been cancelled. Accordingly, Wolsey was still wary of an imminent French descent in early February 1521 and even believed this was possible the following month.

By the end of March 1521, the degree of Franco-Imperial hostility appears to have reached some sort of tipping point, whereby the English crown altered its strategy more decisively, albeit still secretly, against France. On the one hand, Henry VIII continued to

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Footnotes:

173 It has been posited that Francis I may have changed his plans for Italy as early as late December 1520, due to the illness of his mother Louisa, who would have been regent in his absence. It has also been suggested that a serious riding accident in early 1521 may also have affected his decision, but Fitzwilliam still believed on 11 February that Francis would head towards Lyons (via Burgundy) once had had recovered; \[LPIIIi, 1100 (20 December 1520, Jerningham to Wolsey, Pa ris), 1157 (6 February 1521, Fitzwilliam and Jerningham to Wolsey, ‘Amorantyne’), 1161 (11 February 1521, Fitzwilliam to Wolsey, ‘Amorantyne’), 1176 (22 February 1521, Fitzwilliam to Wolsey, ‘Amorantyne’), 1202 (21 March 1521, Fitzwilliam to Wolsey, ‘Nansee’); \[Ven.iii, 160 (2 February 1521, Giovanni Badoer to the Signory, ‘Celles’); R.J. Knecht, Francis I, p.105.

174 \[Ven.iii, 162 (calendared 8-9 February 1521, Surian to the Signory, London); \[LPIIIi, 1191 (calendared 6-7 March 1521, Wolsey to Fitzwilliam).

175 Around this time, reports reached England that Francis was behind a number of hostile acts against Charles’ territories. He was said to be behind unrest in Spain; \[LPIIIi, 991 (25 September 1520, Tunstal to [Wolsey, Antwerp), 1043 (6 November 1520, Tunstal to [Wolsey]), 1184 (28 February 1521, Fitzwilliam to Wolsey, ‘Armoyntyne’), 1198 (calendared 16-17 March 1521, [Fitzwilliam to Wolsey]). He was said to back an attempt by the king of Navarre to regain his kingdom (which succeeded briefly in May); \[ibid., 988 (23 September 1520, Spinelly to [Wolsey, Antwerp), 1168 (18 February 1521, Fitzwilliam to Wolsey, ‘Armoyntyne’), 1176 (22 February 1521, Fitzwilliam to Wolsey, ‘Armoyntyne’), 1183 (27 February 1521, Fitzwilliam to Henry, Armoyntyne), 1226 (12 April 1521, Spinelly to Tuke, Worms), 1304 (24 May 1521, Fitzwilliam and Jerningham to [Wolsey, Dijon), 1385 (24 May 1521, [Fitzwilliam and Jerningham to Henry], Dijon); \[Ven.iii, 179 (30 March 1521, Surian to the Signory). Francis was also understood to be aiding Robert de la March’s attack on Luxembourg from February 1521 on; \[Ven.iii, 179 (30 March 1521, Surian to the Signory); \[LPIIIi, 1168 (18 February 1521, Fitzwilliam to Wolsey, ‘Armoyntyne’), 1176 (22 February 1521, Fitzwilliam to Wolsey, ‘Armoyntyne’), 1183 27 February 1521, Fitzwilliam to Henry, Armoyntyne), 1223 (11 April 1521, Spinelly to [Wolsey, Worms), 1226 (12 April 1521, Spinelly to Tuke, Worms), 1254 (28 April 1521), 1268 (7 May 1521,
publicly condemn Charles V’s transgressions and threatened that he would be forced to side with Francis (in accordance with the Treaty of London). French hostility in a number of quarters, on the other hand, had reached such a level that the English king was even suggesting, albeit in couched terms, that he would have to act on the part of the emperor elect.

Given that nothing had been settled with Charles V, however, Henry and Wolsey also continued to encourage their role as mediators between France and the Empire, and subsequently sought recognition from both princes as arbitrators of their differences. Once achieved, it was intended that Wolsey travel to Calais and mediate on the king’s behalf. As

Fitzwilliam to Wolsey, ‘Mychean Levake’). This escalation has often been cited as the beginning of concerted approaches to Henry from Charles and Francis to take their side; M.F. Alvarez, Charles V, pp.45-46; R.J. Knecht, Francis I, pp.105-106.

This again fits in with the idea that the English crown was trying to dupe France into believing its neutral or even ‘pro-French’ position. While the English notified France that these threats were strongly worded, that which was issued in early May was far milder than was claimed and was, moreover, a plea to Charles to submit to Henry’s mediation until an Anglo-Imperial amity could be formed; LPIII, 1245 (22 April 1521, Fitzwilliam to [Wolsey], ‘Mounte Armyne’), 1246 (23 April 1521, Fitzwilliam to [Wolsey], Troyes), 1257 (calendared end April 1521), [Henry to Fitzwilliam], 1258 (calendared end April 1521), - to [Francis]), 1270 (calendared 7-11 May 1521, instructions to Sir Richard Wingfield, ambassador to the Emperor), 1303 (24 May 1521, Fitzwilliam and Jerningham to [Wolsey, Dijon]), 1310 (calendared 25-27 May 1521, instructions to de la Batye, French ambassador to England).

At the end of March 1521, Fitzwilliam was instructed to discourage Francis I from attacking Charles in any quarter, so that the French king may avoid “the inconvenients that may ensue of mutual succours”. Surian reported soon after that this ‘complaint’ was made at the behest of Charles, around 6 April 1521; LPIII, 1212 (calendared end March 1521, Henry to Fitzwilliam); Ven.iii, 185 (6 April 1521, Surian to the Signory). Also see ibid., 189 (19 April 1521, Surian to the Signory), 195 (23 April 1521, Surian to the Signory, London); LPIII, 1223 (11 April 1521, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Worms), 1226 (12 April 1521, Spinelly to Tuke, Worms), 1257 (calendared end April 1521, [Henry to Fitzwilliam]), 1258 (calendared end April 1521), - to [Francis]); Ven.iii, 204 (1 May 1521, Surian to the Signory, London).

The English proposal of a conference at Calais is first referred to as having been put to Francis during May; LPIII, 1311 (calendared 25-27 May 1521, instructions to Fitzwilliam, ambassador to France). Also see ibid., 1337 (9 June 1521, Jerningham to Wolsey, Dijon), 1338 (calendared 9-10 June 1521), 1339 (calendared 9-10 June 1521), 1340. (calendared 9-10 June 1521, instructions to Richard Wingfield, ambassador to the Empire); Ven.iii, 234 (8 June 1521, Giovanni Badoer to the Signory, Dijon). The seeds for this conference may have come from Charles’ pressure on Henry for another meeting. Indeed, Wolsey had told Henry during March 1521 that he wished to avoid an Anglo-Imperial interview because it would raise French suspicions; LPIII, 1212 (calendared end March 1521, [Wolsey to Henry]). An offer to arbitrate was made to the French by 19 April and was possibly made to the Imperialists around the same time; Ven.iii, 185 (6 April 1521, Surian to the Signory), 189 (19 April 1521, Surian to the Signory); LPIII, 1212 (calendared end March 1521, Henry to Fitzwilliam), 1254 (28 April 1521, protest by Charles against the actions of Francis). For comments that Henry and Wolsey intended to mediate, see for instance Ven.iii, 205 (6 May 1521, Giovanni Badoer to the Signory, ‘Musi’), 219 (21 May 1521, Surian to the Signory), 220 (22 May 1521, Contarini to the Signory, Worms), 228 (3 June 1521, Contarini to the Signory, Mainz). The English crown was already mediating between the rival powers prior to this, as accusatory articles and defences were despatched between Francis, Charles and Henry from late April 1521 on. The idea to
far as the French were concerned, they had to be convinced that this was a genuine attempt to
arrange universal peace and Francis’ scepticism is perhaps betrayed by his initial reluctance to
agree to it. In terms of the emperor elect, on the other hand, it was presented as a ‘blind’
behind which a closer amity would be arranged with England against the French. Given that
an Anglo-Imperial understanding already existed, Charles quickly signed up to English
arbitration. In spite of their anti-French inclination, Henry and Wolsey appear not to have
hold a conference at Calais may well have arisen from this de facto role already fulfilled by England. The
correspondence cited below gives the impression of Charles and Francis bickering as to who was to blame for
the hostilities and seeking Henry to come down on their side. As Henry and Wolsey were unable to affect or
control this form of mediation, a more formal forum was a logical idea (regardless of whether the English really
intended to compose the differences); see, for instance, LPIII, 1245 (22 April 1521, Fitzwilliam to [Wolsey],
‘Mounte Armyné’, 1257 (calendared end April 1521, [Henry to Fitzwilliam]), 1258 (calendared end April 1521,
- to [Francis]), 1271 (calendared 7-11 May 1521, memorial of Jerningham to [Francis]), 1278 (14 May 1521,
Fitzwilliam to Wolsey, Chatillon), 1283 (calendared 15 May 1521, instructions to Fitzwilliam and Jerningham
to be declared to Francis), 1303 (24 May 1521, Fitzwilliam and Jerningham to [Wolsey], Dijon), 1304 (24 May
1521, Fitzwilliam and Jerningham to [Wolsey], Dijon), 1310 (calendared 25-27 May 1521, Francis’ instructions
to de la Batye), 1311 (calendared 25-27 May 1521, instructions to Fitzwilliam to declare to Francis), 1315 (29
May 1521, Fitzwilliam and Jerningham to [Wolsey], Dijon), 1322 (calendared end May 1521, Francis to
[Wolsey]), 1323 (calendared end May 1521), 1327 (calendared 1-3 June 1521); Ven.iii, 204 (1 May 1521, Surian
to the Signory, London).

Francis resisted until mid-June; Ven.iii, 189 (19 April 1521, Surian to the Signory), 215 (17 May 1521,
Giovanni Badoer to the Signory, Dijon), 233 (16 June 1521, Surian to the Signory, London), 234 (8 June 1521,
Giovanni Badoer to the Signory, Dijon), 236 (13 June 1521, Surian to the Signory, London), 237 (14 June 1521,
Giovanni Badoer to the Signory), 238 (18 June 1521, Surian to the Signory, London), 243 (29 June 1521,
Giovanni Badoer to the Signory); LPIII, 1293 (20 May 1521, Wolsey to Jerningham and [Fitzwilliam],Westminster), 1303 (24 May 1521, Fitzwilliam and Jerningham to [Wolsey, Dijon]), 1310 (calendared 25-27 May 1521, instructions to de la Batye, French ambassador to England), 1315 (29 May 1521,
Fitzwilliam and Jerningham to [Wolsey], Dijon), 1318 (29 May 1521, Wingfield to [Fitzwilliam and
Jerningham], Worms), 1328 (3 June 1521, [Richard Wingfield] to Wolsey, Mainz), 1329 (calendared 3-4 June
1521, [Wolsey to Richard Wingfield and Spinelly]), 1331 (6 June 1521, [Fitzwilliam and Jerningham to
Wolsey]), 1337 (9 June 1521, Jerningham to Wolsey, Dijon), 1338 (calendared 9-10 June 1521), 1339
(calendared 9-10 June 1521), 1347 (13 June 1521, [Wolsey to Richard] Wingfield), 1350 (15 June 1521, Richard
Wingfield to [Jerningham], Brussels). Knecht links Francis’ change of heart with de la Marck’s expulsion from

Wolsey knew of Charles’ commitment to the English plan by 20 May. The emperor elect’s agreement was
probably eased by Sir Richard Wingfield, who was instructed in early June to tell him that Wolsey intended to
cross to Calais ‘under colour of this mediation’, so that a ‘stricter amity’ could be concluded between them;
Charles was to be assured that Henry would be ‘a fast friend’. In the meantime, however, Charles V was asked to
fully support the peace conference under the auspices of English arbitration; LPIII, 1293 (20 May 1521, Wolsey
to Jerningham and [Fitzwilliam], Westminster), 1317 (29 May 1521, Charles to Henry, Worms), 1318 (29 May
1521, Wingfield to [Fitzwilliam and Jerningham], Worms), 1329 (calendared 3-4 June 1521, [Wolsey to
Richard Wingfield and Spinelly]), 1340. (calendared 9-10 June 1521, instructions to Richard Wingfield,
ambassador to the Empire); Ven.iii, 221 (22 May 1521, Giovanni Badoer to the Signory, Dijon), 239 (19 June
1521, Contarini to the Signory, Brussels). Once Francis had also agreed to English arbitration, Henry and
Wolsey sought a truce and the discharge of armies during negotiations, to which Charles was reluctant to sign
up. News of the French-sponsored attack upon and loss of Navarre had made him increasingly hesitant to play
along with the English ruse and issued demands that England declare itself, perhaps doubting that Henry and
Wolsey would ultimately ally with him and break with ‘their common enemy’. At the same time, however, he
entirely trusted Charles and so sought some assurances before they committed. This English intention to join the Empire against France was also supposed to remain secret in the short-term. Nevertheless, rumours of Anglo-Imperial intrigues circulated, possibly leaked deliberately by Imperial sources, forcing the English crown to issue denials between the latter part of April and the end of May 1521.

While Henry’s and Wolsey’s intentions for the Calais Conference may not have been set in stone, the contention here is that, having identified that the universal peace policy was unlikely to restrain Francis from Italy much longer, they were looking to resume an aggressive strategy to this same end, although they were yet to be convinced that the emperor-elect’s anti-Gallic overtures were genuine. Given this uncertainty, the favoured outcome would be an alliance with Charles and some sort of truce between France and the Empire, so

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181 They did not want to raise French suspicions, particularly as this would affect the French pensions; LPIII, 1370 (calendared 7-11 May 1521, instructions to Sir Richard Wingfield, ambassador to the Emperor), 1340 (calendared 9-10 June 1521, instructions to Richard Wingfield, ambassador to the Emperor). Also see ibid., 1371 (27 June 1521, Charles’ instructions to Philip Haneton and the Bishop of Badajoz and Elna, ambassadors to England, Brussels). For Spinelly’s reassurances to Charles that Henry was anti-French, see Ven.iii, 220 (22 May 1521, Contarini to the Signory, Worms).

182 Towards the end of April 1521, Henry rejected reports reaching Francis that he intended to side with Charles, conclude a marriage alliance and hold a new interview with him. The English believed that these leaked from the emperor elect and the English king even considered reproaching the king of the Romans on his indiscretion, recommending that he get his house in order, particularly as these matters were yet to be concluded. In the event, a decision seems to have been made to refrain from such an accusation and the relevant paragraph omitted. Nevertheless, such an indiscretion was repeated around mid-June 1521, when Gattinara revealed to the Venetian orator that his master was likely to meet with Wolsey. The English crown may also have sought to avoid raising French suspicions about Charles’ intention to reside near Calais during the summit by approaching Francis to do the same; ibid., 1257 (calendared end April 1521, [Henry to Fitzwilliam]), 1258 (calendared end April 1521), - to [Francis]), 1270 (calendared 7-11 May 1521, instructions to Sir Richard Wingfield, ambassador to the Emperor), 1283 (calendared 15 May 1521, instructions to Fitzwilliam and Jerningham to be declared to Francis), 1303 (24 May 1521, Fitzwilliam and Jerningham to [Wolsey, Dijon]), Ven.iii, 215 (17 May 1521, Giovanni Badoer to the Signory, Dijon), 239 (19 June 1521, Contarini to the Signory, Brussels), 240 (23 June 1521, Surian to the Signory, London). Also see ibid., 241 (24 June 1521, Contarini to the Signory, Brussels). For Venetian suspicions about English intentions, see ibid., 195 (23 April 1521, Surian to the Signory, London), 222 (24 May 1521, Contarini to the Signory, Worms), 224 (28 May 1521, Contarini to the Signory, Worms).
that the Anglo-Imperial axis could prepare for war. A closer amity with Francis I was not ruled out, however, if negotiations with Charles failed. From early July, therefore, Henry and Wolsey increasingly indicated to Charles V that they were prepared to agree a ‘a straighter conjunction’, so that they could go to war with France. The Calais Conference was to be employed as a ruse to facilitate this. In addition, Wolsey reportedly envisaged a broad coalition against France before any attack took place. At the same time, there is evidence

183 The lack of clarity can be best demonstrated by the wide range of commissions issued to Wolsey for his visits to Calais and Bruges. The cardinal-legate was commissioned variously to settle Imperial-French differences, to treat for closer amity with France, to treat for an Anglo-papal-Franco-Imperial confederacy and to arrange the marriage of Mary to Charles. Perhaps more revealing is the range of six commissions for possible treaties to be concluded with the Empire that Gwyn convincingly argues were issued to Wolsey around the time of the conference. The tamest of these provided for universal peace and a defensive alliance against France, while the most aggressive sought the recovery of Milan. If Charles V would not agree, Wolsey was to seek a closer relationship with France which, among other things, provided for the defence of Milan (against the Empire); LPIIIi, 1443 (29 July 1521), 2333 (19 June 1522); P. Gwyn, ‘Wolsey’s Foreign Policy’, HJ, 24, p.764. The interpretation of Wolsey’s intentions at the Calais conference are subject to historical debate and a flavour of this can be gained from Scarisbrick’s argument (supported by Wooding) that Wolsey sought peace throughout England’s foreign policy and this meeting in particular, while Gwyn, on the other hand, challenges this, believing that the cardinal set out in 1521 to align England with the Empire (against France); P. Gwyn, ‘Wolsey’s Foreign Policy’, HJ, 24, p.755; J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp.49, 87; L. Wooding, Henry VIII, pp.112-113.

184 In reply to an Imperial embassy that arrived at the beginning of July, demanding military aid against France, Wolsey was consistent with the earlier impasse reached in Anglo-Imperial negotiations when he insisted that no aid would be forthcoming until a closer alliance was agreed. He intended to conclude such an agreement within three months of his arrival at Calais. Henry argued that he could not declare yet against France because he was not prepared for war, but agreed that Wolsey should go to Calais ‘under colour of hearing the grievances of both parties’, only to ally with the emperor elect when he conveniently could not settle them. Around the same time, Henry also pledged to assist Charles V once a ‘straighter conjunction’ had been made although, in the meantime, he asked that the emperor keep this a secret; LPIIIi, 1381 (1 July 1521, [de Mesa] to Wolsey, London), 1383 (calendared beginning of July 1521, Wolsey to Henry, Westminster), 1395 (6 July 1521, de Mesa and Haneton to Charles), 1432 (22 July 1521, Richard Wingfield to Wolsey, Ghent), 1440 (28 July 1521, Pace to Wolsey, Windsor), 1448 (calendared end July 1521, [Wolsey to Henry]), 1453 (1 August 1521, Wolsey to Henry, Dover), 1455 (1 August 1521, Pace to Wolsey, Windsor). Another indication of the veracity of the English intention to join with Charles against Francis can be seen in the positive response to the emperor elect’s request in mid-July for several thousand archers to support him in current hostilities. While Henry was willing to send them, he initially admitted that he could not comply until the conference had ended. By 28 July, however, he agreed with Wolsey’s advice that a contingent be readied for when the cardinal had concluded with Charles; ibid., 1414 (13 July 1521, Richard Wingfield to [Wolsey], Antwerp), 1417 (14 July 1521, Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to Wolsey, Antwerp), 1419 (16 July 1521, Sir Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to Wolsey, Antwerp), 1421 (19 July 1521, Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to Wolsey, Ghent), 1429 (21 July 1521, Pace to Wolsey, Windsor), 1433 (22 July 1521, Richard Wingfield to Wolsey, Ghent), 1440 (28 July 1521, Pace to Wolsey, Windsor), 1448 (calendared end July 1521, [Wolsey to Henry]), 1453 (1 August 1521, Wolsey to Henry, Dover), 1454 (calendared 1 August 1521, Pace to Wolsey, Windsor), 1459 (3 August 1521, Pace to [Wolsey], Windsor), 1462 (calendared 3-4 August 1521, [Wolsey to Henry]), 1473 (7 August 1521, Pace to [Wolsey], ‘[Okin]gc’), 1474 (calendared 7 August 1521, [Wolsey to Henry]), and passim. For Scarisbrick’s belief that this was a dispute between Henry and Wolsey, see J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp.86-87. Finally, Henry VIII, around 28 July, proposed a pre-emptive strike against the French navy, once the closer alliance with the emperor had been concluded. While Wolsey was cautiously enthusiastic, he advised that this initiative should not proceed until
that Wolsey also wanted to facilitate a truce or peace, presumably to give any anti-French league time to prepare for hostilities. The cardinal indicated both of these aims when writing to Henry on 20 July; he stated his continued intention to travel to Calais, both to arrange the differences between the Empire and France, as well as to conclude ‘a straight conjunction with the Emperor’. To this end, it was also important to keep Francis convinced of England’s neutrality, although the French king was increasingly suspicious of reports of Henry’s pro-Imperial intentions.

Reaching Calais on 2 August, Wolsey immediately opened negotiations with the Imperialists towards a closer alliance with Charles, while still claiming to be in pursuit of peace to the French and their confederates. By 14 August, Wolsey had postponed ‘peace’ negotiations to visit Charles in Bruges, negotiating over the next week or so. He had told the French ambassadors, however, that he had gone to urge the emperor elect towards peace. The Treaty of Bruges, concluded on 25 August, committed both Henry and Charles

after the Anglo-Imperial alliance had been concluded; LPIIIii, 1440 (28 July 1521, Pace to Wolsey, Windsor), 1448 (calendared end July 1521, [Wolsey to Henry]), 1454 (calendared 1 August 1521, Pace to Wolsey, Windsor); J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, p.87.

LPIIIii, 1426 (20 July 1521, Wolsey to Henry, Westminster). For Gwyn’s agreement that a truce was intended by England so that preparations could be made for war, see P. Gwyn, ‘Wolsey’s Foreign Policy’, HJ, 24, pp.766-769. A possible reason for England’s wish for delay was money; Henry did not have the reserves to call upon that he did up to 1513. In any case, breaking with France at this stage would cause Francis to cease paying the French pensions earlier than necessary; Ven.iii, 278 (3 August 1521, Surian to the Signory, Calais); LPIIIii, 1507 (calendared 24-25 August 1521).

LPIIIii, 1456 (2 August 1521, Fitzwilliam to [Wolsey], ‘A le Ch[ateau] de Vyleneff’), 1457 (2 August 1521, Fitzwilliam to [Henry], ‘Vyleneff’). For contradictory rumours about English intentions as noted by the Venetian ambassador in the Low Countries, see Ven.iii, 274 (29 July 1521, Contarini to the Signory, Ghent).

Among the terms being hammered out, according to Wolsey, was a marriage agreement between Charles and Princess Mary, as well as the emperor’s paying Henry the French pension that he would inevitably lose when England came out against France. Wolsey also began discussing a date for England’s entry into the war; LPIIIii, 1462 (calendared 3-4 August 1521, [Wolsey to Henry]), 1473 (7 August 1521, Pace to [Wolsey], ‘[Okinlge’), 1479 (calendared 8-9 August 1521, [Wolsey to Henry]); P. Gwyn, ‘Wolsey’s Foreign Policy’, HJ, 24, p.765.

LPIIIii 1491 (16 August 1521), 1493 (calendared 18-19 August 1521, Wolsey to [Henry]), 1495 (calendared 18-19 August 1521). For Wolsey’s entry to Bruges, see Ven.iii, 298 (16 August 1521, Contarini to the Signory, Bruges).

By 5 August, Wolsey had already suggested to the French delegation that he may need to go to Bruges. He reportedly told them that ‘he would visit in person Francis and the King Catholic, and even go on foot to Rome, if necessary,’ to achieve his desire of peace. The ambassadors, however, were not fooled and that this may be just an excuse to go to Charles; LPIIIii, 1467 (5 August 1521, French ambassadors at Calais to Francis). Wolsey deliberately deceived the French embassy, around 8-9 August, about the reasons for his intention to go to Bruges and also rejected rumours that an Anglo-Imperial marriage agreement was imminent, see LPIIIii, 1479
to a marriage alliance and war with France in 1523, the latter including the expulsion of French interests from Italy.¹⁹⁰ The agreement was supposed to remain secret, apart from to ‘the secret councillors of the contracting parties’, but rumours of it escaped.¹⁹¹ Despite this, Wolsey felt triumphant; the anti-French agenda looked to be succeeding. Writing in his own hand to Henry, he recommended that he rejoice that he is ‘not only the ruler of this your realm, which is an angle of the world, but also, by your wisdom and counsel, Spain, Italy, Almayne and these Low Countries, which is the greatest part of Christendom, shall be ruled and governed. France will not now dare to resist him’.¹⁹² Following the treaty’s conclusion, Wolsey returned to Calais (by the end of August) and revived his efforts towards a Franco-Imperial truce. By this means, England would have time to prepare for the envisaged war. The fluctuating progress of the conflicts between France and the Empire, however, meant that Wolsey’s efforts were unsuccessful and he eventually left Calais on 27 November. The cardinal’s overtures to this end continued up to and beyond the end of this period.¹⁹³ Just
before he crossed the Channel, however, Wolsey confirmed an extended version of the Treaty of Bruges that now included Leo X.¹⁹⁴

Given that the English crown’s inclination towards an aggressive anti-French strategy grew from around the time of Henry’s meetings with Charles and Francis during 1520, how did this develop in relation to the papacy that it envisaged defending? It has already been suggested that Henry and Wolsey largely excluded Leo X from negotiations leading up to these summits, particularly as they assumed the ‘mediating’ role in this process and did not really know where the pope stood politically.¹⁹⁵

That this papal exclusion continued on account of the English adoption of what was traditionally (although not exclusively) a papal role, arbitration, can be implied by the clear invocation of ‘papal’ authority in the meetings. Wolsey clearly asserted this in proceedings, as was his right accorded by his status. By virtue of his being a legate a latere, in addition to his office as the king’s principal minister, chancellor and archbishop of York, his role in the meetings was imbued with pontifical authority which, it will be seen, Henry and himself did not fail to capitalise upon.¹⁹⁶ Wolsey’s deliberate precedence can be seen clearly during the planning stages; for the Field of Cloth of Gold for example, the cardinal’s prominence was indicated by his having been appointed proctor to arrange the conference by both Henry and

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¹⁹⁴ LIII, 1691 (20 October 1521, Pace to Wolsey, Windsor), 1709 (27 October 1521, Pace to [Wolsey], Windsor), 1748 (8 November 1521, Imperial ambassadors at Calais to Charles), 1751 (calendared 10-11 November 1521, [Wolsey to Docwra, Boleyn and others, Tournai], 1752 (calendared 10-11 November 1521, [Wolsey to Richard Wingfield]), 1760 (calendared 13-14 November 1521, [Wolsey to Clerk]), 1770 (16 November 1521, Charles’ instructions to his delegation in Calais, Oudenarde). For Wolsey’s intention to continue truce talks in England, see for instance ibid., 1776 (18 November 1521, Somerset, West and Fitzwilliam to Wolsey, Amiens), 1777 (18 November 1521, Richard Wingfield to [Wolsey], Oudenarde).

¹⁹⁵ See above pp.684-687.

¹⁹⁶ It is unlikely that Wolsey would have emphasised his legatine authority to the degree that he did without the full support of Henry.

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Francis.\textsuperscript{197} Also, it was agreed in advance that Wolsey was to be the most senior official at the meeting (on the English side at least), other than the kings themselves; while the legate was to be accompanied by 300 servants, the next largest retinues were to be taken by the archbishop of Canterbury (Warham) and the dukes of Norfolk and Suffolk, who were to be escorted by 70 attendants apiece.\textsuperscript{198} In addition, the intention that Wolsey’s function had a ‘papal’ flavour can be identified in the rewards that he was offered by Francis and Charles, in recognition of his service in arranging the meetings. Both appealed to his perceived ecclesiastical ambition; Francis may have offered the cardinal his support in the next conclave,\textsuperscript{199} while the emperor elect bestowed upon him the see of Badajoz.\textsuperscript{200}

The English crown’s employment of ‘papal’ dignity embodied in Wolsey can be seen even more clearly at the meetings themselves, where Wolsey’s precedence and legatine authority is explicit throughout. It can be seen vividly, for instance, in Wolsey’s visit to the French King at Ardres on 1 June 1520, both to announce Henry’s arrival at Calais and to make final arrangements for the meeting of the two kings. Firstly, the cardinal’s legatine and, therefore, papal status was emphasised by the magnificence of the procession which took him to Francis; Wolsey (‘humbly’ riding a mule) was accompanied by a substantial retinue, largely clad in crimson velvet and gold chains that was clearly intended to emphasise this ecclesiastical dignity. Preceding Wolsey was his crossbearer (‘in a scarlet robe, and a crimson velvet hood…’), who carried two crosses, that of York and that denoting his legatine status, the former of which was left when he passed outside English territory; he therefore entered France primarily as legate \textit{a latere}\.\textsuperscript{201} This ‘quasi-papal’ authority was subsequently

\textsuperscript{197} \textit{LPHIII}, 592 (10 January 1520, ‘Leseignaix’), 633 (23 February 1520, Cognac), 645 (2 March 1520).
\textsuperscript{198} \textit{Ibid.}, 702 (26 March 1520).
\textsuperscript{199} \textit{Ibid.}, 666 (8 March 1520, Sir Richard Wingfield to [Wolsey], Cognac), 728 (7 April 1520, de la Sauch to Chièvres, London), 894 (1 July 1520, Sir Richard Wingfield to [Wolsey], ‘Abevyle’).
\textsuperscript{200} \textit{Ibid.}, 709 (29 March 1520).
\textsuperscript{201} To further reinforce this spectacle, Wolsey was followed by five or six bishops, the grand prior of the Knights
recognised by the French when Wolsey reached Ardres; in broad accordance with protocols governing meetings with legates, Francis sent a retinue to receive Wolsey outside of Ardres; he met the legate himself outside the gates of the town (on a mule, like Wolsey) and they then went in procession to the king’s lodgings; once there, Wolsey dismounted and Francis, bareheaded, embraced him, before leading him inside to conduct discussions.202

The English stress on Wolsey’s legatine status can also be seen clearly at the celebratory mass of 23 June 1520 that signified the culmination of the Field of Cloth of Gold. Held in a specially built chapel, Wolsey officiated, assisted by the French legate. Their legatine status was indicated by the provision of raised chairs for them (beneath a canopy), although Wolsey’s was positioned slightly above that of his counterpart. Furthermore, the other three French cardinals were seated one step below that and the bishops (of whom 21 were present) lower still. During the service, Wolsey was dressed by English bishops and offered water for his hands by English nobles. Finally, following an oration made by Richard

of St John (Thomas Docwra) and a number of protonotaries also wearing crimson (and black) velvet and gold chains; ibid., 870 (calendared June 1520). For the symbolic importance of a legate a latere’s dress (including the colour), as well as of that of his retinue, visualising ‘papal’ power, see N. Vincent (ed.), The Letters and Charters of Cardinal Guala Bicchieri, Papal Legate in England 1216-1218, Canterbury and York Society (1996), p.xlvi; F. Wasner, ‘Fifteenth Century Texts on the Ceremonial of the Papal ‘Legatus a Latere’, Traditio, 14, pp.300-302, 315-316. Also see Ven.iii, 53 (27 May 1520, Francesco Cornaro and Surian to the Signory, Canterbury). Similarly, at the Calais meeting with Charles, Wolsey’s escort was also notable compared to other English dignitaries; he was accompanied by 50 horsemen and 50 foot, while the next in precedence, the archbishop of Canterbury (Warham) was attended by 10 of each and the dukes of Buckingham and Suffolk by just 10 horse; LPIIIi, 906 (10 July 1520). It was noted by observers, however, that there was less magnificence involved in this interview; Ven.iii, 106 (12 July 1520, Lodovico Spinelli, secretary of Surian, to his brother Gasparo Spinelli, secretary to Badoer, Calais).

202 LPIIIi, 869 (11 June 1520), 870 (calendared June 1520); Ven.iii, 58 (1 June 1520, Antonio Giustinian to the Signory, ‘Linx’); C. Whibley (ed.), Henry VIII by Edward Hall, i, pp.194-195. For the protocol surrounding a legate’s meeting a king, including how the former ought to be treated like a brother by the latter, see again F. Wasner, ‘Fifteenth Century Texts on the Ceremonial of the Papal ‘Legatus a Latere’, Traditio, 14, pp.311-314. For the indication of subservience (towards a representative of the papacy) suggested by Francis’ uncovering his head, see once more M. Scott, Medieval Clothing and Costumes: Displaying Wealth and Class in Medieval Times (2004), p.37. Wolsey also went to meet Charles slightly off-shore in accordance apparently with legatine protocols (where the legate was to go in person to meet the emperor, rather than send a retinue to do so), although adjustments may have been made given that Charles had neither been crowned king of the Romans at Aachen nor emperor at Rome. The emperor elect embraced Wolsey when they greeted on-shore; Ven.iii, 50 (21 May-14 July 1520), 53 (27 May 1520, Francesco Cornaro and Surian to the Signory, Canterbury), 56 (30 May 1520, a letter from --, at the Court of France, to his brother, Monteruill). For protocols governing legates meeting emperors, see again F. Wasner, ‘Fifteenth Century Texts on the Ceremonial of the Papal ‘Legatus a Latere’, Traditio, 14, pp.311-314.
Pace, Wolsey gave a benediction and a plenary indulgence to those present, ‘a privilege granted by the pope to the English legate whenever he celebrated mass in pontificalibus’.\(^{203}\)

The Mantuan orator based at the French Court commented that Wolsey ‘observed all such ceremonies as could possibly have been used with the Pope’.\(^{204}\) Following the service, Wolsey enhanced his precedence further by hosting a banquet for bishops, abbots and foreign ambassadors, the latter including papal representatives.\(^{205}\)

One must not overstress Wolsey’s ‘papal’ authority at the interviews, however; he did not try to act instead of the pope and did not have the authority to do so. As will be seen, Leo X maintained his own representatives there. There is moreover little doubt that the English legate would have been seen by participants and observers alike as Henry’s principal minister, first and foremost.\(^{206}\) The most likely explanation for this emphasis of legatine power seems to be the English claim to the mediating role in continental politics that Wolsey had usurped from Rome back in 1518. Indeed, the English cardinal had originally managed to achieve this

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\(^{203}\) *LP*\(^{III}\), 870 (calendared June 1520). For other accounts of Wolsey’s role in this mass, see *Ven.*\(^{iii}\), 50 (21 May-14 July 1520), 69 (7-24 June 1520), 78 (10-25 June 1520, Donato to Z.F. Griti), 79 (10-26 June 1520, Venetian ambassadors in France to the Signory), 91 (21 June 1520, Giovanni Badoer and Antonio Giustinian to the Signory, France), 93; R.J. Knecht, *Francis I*, p.81; C. Whibley (ed.), *Henry VIII by Edward Hall*, i, pp.214-215. Wolsey participated in a similar mass at Canterbury held on 27 May 1520 to celebrate the visit of Charles. He led both king and emperor elect into the cathedral but, while the service was performed by William Warham (presumably as metropolitan), he concluded the service with the benediction and plenary indulgence; *Ven.*\(^{ii}\), 50 (21 May-14 July 1520), 53 (27 May 1520, Francesco Cornaro and Surian to the Signory, Canterbury), 56 (30 May 1520, a letter from --, at the Court of France, to his brother, Monteruil). For the ceremonial role expected by a legate when in the presence of the emperor and a king, see F. Wasner, ‘Fifteenth Century Texts on the Ceremonial of the Papal ‘Legatus a Latere’, *Traditio*, 14, pp.311-314.

\(^{204}\) *Ven.*\(^{iii}\), 93 (25 June 1520, Soardino, Mantuan Ambassador at the Court of France, to Marquis of Mantua, Ardres).

\(^{205}\) *Ven.*\(^{iii}\), 50 (21 May-14 July 1520), 91 (21 June 1520, Giovanni Badoer and Antonio Giustinian to the Signory, Linck?), 92 (20 June 1520, Surian to the Signory). The organisation of such a banquet may have been deemed by some to be ‘contrary to the dignity of the legate a latere’, although it was not as if popes and cardinals in Rome were strangers to hosting such events; F. Wasner, ‘Fifteenth Century Texts on the Ceremonial of the Papal ‘Legatus a Latere’, *Traditio*, 14, p.322.

\(^{206}\) Apart from the aforementioned preliminary meeting with the French king and the celebratory mass, Wolsey’s legatine status does not seem to have remained to the fore during the Field of Cloth of Gold. At the initial meeting between Henry and Francis on 7 June 1520, the focus was clearly on the coming together of the two kings and, although Wolsey preceded both into the pavillion where they met, possibly alongside the Admiral of France and remained present while Henry and Francis talked privately, one gets the sense that observers envisaged him as Henry’s minister at this event. Subsequently, the focus shifted more towards the sporting arena and other festivities; *LP*\(^{III}\), 869 (11 June 1520), 870 (calendared June 1520); *Ven.*\(^{iii}\), 50 (21 May-14 July 1520), 70 (8 June 1520, Giovanni Badoer and Antonio Giustinian to the Signory).
by forcing his commission as a legate *a latere.* Since the universal peace accord had been concluded, with Leo X’s begrudging approval, Wolsey had remained central to encouraging its Anglo-French axis, England had gained the opportunity to become the ‘balance’ between Charles and Francis following the Imperial election and, in light of both of these developments, the cardinal played a pivotal role in encouraging and arranging the interviews of 1520. This centrality continued during the meetings themselves; he went to greet each monarch in advance of their meeting with Henry, finalising arrangements if necessary, he also fostered the idea of a tripartite conference during the meetings, at least formally reinforcing the Treaty of London. One must also remember what the English crown was trying to do around this time; through public and private measures, keep Francis I out of Italy and, as far as this study is concerned, away from the papacy. This concern is hinted at on a few occasions during the Field of Cloth of Gold. Firstly, during the oration, delivered at the celebratory mass of 23 June, Richard Pace bade those present to maintain the Anglo-French amity, which would benefit both the Christian faith and ‘the stability of the holy Apostolic See’.

Secondly, at the subsequent banquet hosted by Wolsey, the cardinal, speaking of the love between their two kings, opined that Charles ‘must not aspire to greater power in Italy’. In the context of English foreign policy, the crown’s intentions *vis-à-vis* the papacy can be seen; a continuation of the universal peace (Treaty of London) whereby France would not act in Italy on account of this and the intention to crusade. In any case, the English suggested that there was no need for Francis I to cross the Alps, given that they were opposed

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207 See above pp.631-636.
208 Immediately before the Field of Cloth of Gold, he conducted long negotiations with Francis and his most intimate advisors *Ven.iii*, 73 (8 June 1520, Soardino, Mantuan Ambassador at the Court of France, to the Marquis of Mantua, Linck?).
209 See above p.687.
210 *Ven.iii*, 93 (25 June 1520, Soardino, Mantuan Ambassador at the Court of France, to Marquis of Mantua, Ardres).
211 Ibid., 92 (20 June 1520, Surian to the Signory).
to Charles making a similar move. In that case, was the emphasis on Wolsey’s legatine status a bid by the English crown to assert the veracity of their pacific intentions towards their traditional enemy? Given the chivalric code of the day, Henry VIII’s invocation of the spiritual sphere in the meeting would have demanded that his friendship be taken at face value.

With such obvious prominence given to a papal legate at these meetings, what did Leo X think of this and did he (attempt to) play any role in the interviews? If Leo X was unimpressed with Wolsey usurping both his truce initiative and his role as arbitrator back in 1518, then he was likely to be similarly unhappy with him reprising this role in the 1520 interviews (particularly when he remained uninformed by the English). He would certainly have known of the Imperial recognition given for Wolsey’s services; the bishopric of Badajoz and a pension of 2,000 ducats from the see of Palencia. He probably did not know, however, about the possible offer from Francis to back Wolsey in the next conclave.

Formally speaking, however, positive noises emanated from Rome on this issue; he was a legate and was encouraging a peace that could not really be opposed. De Giglis, writing on 26 June 1520 when he would have known that the Anglo-French interview was under way, relayed how there was a hope in Rome for peace and that Wolsey was much admired in what he was doing. Later, Giulio de’ Medici conveyed the pope’s praise with Wolsey’s work ‘for the good of Christendom’. He lauded the cardinal’s ‘dexterity in bringing about a

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212 See above, pp.690-692.
213 For which Wolsey sought remission from service taxes; LPIII, 880 (22 June 1520, de Giglis to [Wolsey], Rome). Also see ibid., 958 (22 August 1520, Campeggio to [Wolsey], Rome).
214 See above p.702.
215 A common reason for the despatch of legates a latere had always been to foster peace. Indeed, Wolsey was originally commissioned to be co-legate with Campeggio to help facilitate Leo X’s five year truce initiative, so that a crusade could be launched against the Ottomans; see above p.314. For an earlier example of a legate being sent to England to bring about peace (this time because of civil war), see N. Vincent (ed.), The Letters and Charters of Cardinal Guala Bicchieri, Papal Legate in England 1216-1218, p.xlix.
216 LPIII, 880 (22 June 1520, de Giglis to [Wolsey], Rome).
conference between so many princes of influence. This is a thing so rare that it is reputed almost impossible, as it would have been, but for Wolsey’. The pope’s principal minister closed by citing the honour that this brought to both Henry VIII and Leo X.  

In spite of Wolsey’s legatine status, Leo X despatched his own representative to attend the meetings, Girolamo Ghinucci, who left on 1 May. Leo had apparently delayed the nuncio’s departure for a month already, probably waiting for the royal permission he had earlier requested for this. The bishop of Ascoli was not the only papal representative to attend the meetings, however; other nuncios seem to have been present, those resident at the French and Imperial Courts attended the meetings involving Francis and Charles, respectively. Finally, on account of his own inability to attend, Campeggio sent his secretary, Florian(-us) to be his proxy at the interviews. It is unclear, however, whether the secretary had any agenda other than to keep his master informed, such as providing another set of eyes and ears for the papacy. In terms of the role played by the papal representatives at the interviews, it seems that they were treated by the English as little more than window dressing for the spectacles; to be conspicuously present at the various set-piece events. At the Field of Cloth of Gold, for instance, Ghinucci and probably Stafleio attended the first public meeting between Henry and Francis on 7 June 1520; indeed, the former apparently rode in

217 Ibid., 1006. (calendared beginning October 1520, [de’ Medici to Ghinucci]).
218 Ibid., 791 (4 May 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome). Ghinucci must have travelled post haste to England, as he seems to have been present at Charles’ visit to England; Ven.ii, 50 (21 May-14 July 1520).
219 Campeggio earlier advised Wolsey that Leo intended Marino Caracciolo to attend when Charles met Henry and John Roelatus when Francis did the same; LPIII, 784 (2 May 1520, Campeggio to Wolsey). Also, an ‘agent of the Cardinal de’ Medici’ resident in France reportedly attended the initial meeting between Henry and Francis; Ven.iii, 80 (11 June 1520, letter from the French Court sent to the College by the Signory’s Governor Triulzi, Linck’). A (Giovanni) Stafleio, resident at the French Court, attended the mass held on 23 June as one of the two nuncios present. Both also attended the subsequent banquet; Ven.iii, 50 (21 May-14 July 1520), 92 (20 June 1520, Surian to the Signory).
220 LPIII, 958 (22 August 1520, Campeggio to [Wolsey], Rome). Florian returned to Rome by 11 November 1520; ibid. 1054 (11 November 1520, [Campeggio] to Wolsey, Rome), 1055 (11 November 1520, [Campeggio to Henry], Rome).
221 If Florian was sent just on Campeggio’s whim, then this was an expensive practice for the cardinal, who would have had to maintain him over the following five months.
procession alongside Archbishop Warham. Ghinucci (and, again, his French counterpart) also attended Wolsey’s great set-piece mass and banquet on 23 June. For the meetings with Charles, the bishop of Ascoli was both present at the first and numbered among the English king’s retinue for the second on 10 July. It is worth noting again that these were occasions when Wolsey’s legatine status was prominent.

From the conferences, it seems that Ghinucci (and his counterparts) kept tabs on and reported what was occurring, and the papacy was apparently happy with this. Florian also kept Campeggio abreast of events. Indeed, accounts of the Field of Cloth of Gold at least were eagerly awaited in Rome. Despite their presence, however, the nuncios do not seem to have been kept in Henry or Wolsey’s confidence and were not privy to any negotiations conducted at the interviews. Ghinucci, it seems, did not gain an interview with Wolsey until the Field of Cloth of Gold was well underway (although de’ Medici claimed to be happy with the nuncio’s warm welcome). This lack of access bred suspicion in Rome; thus, Leo was reported to have speculated that Henry, at the Calais meeting with Charles, would negotiate a new alliance. In this, he was at least partially correct. On the other hand, there is suggestion of a secret papal overture that took place also at Guisnes (during the

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222 LPIIIi, 870 (calendared June 1520); Ven.iii, 71 (8 June 1520, Surian to the Signory), 80 (11 June 1520, letter from the French Court sent to the College by the Signory’s Governor Triulzi, Linck?); J.G. Russell, The Field of Cloth of Gold (1969), p.98.
223 Ibid., 92 (20 June 1520, Surian to the Signory).
224 Ibid., 50 (21 May-14 July 1520), 61 (3 June 1520, Surian to the doge and Signory, Calais), 106 (12 July 1520, Lodovico Spinelli, secretary of Surian, to his brother Gasparo Spinelli, secretary to Badoer, Calais).
225 Leo X’s principal minister, Giulio de’ Medici, was pleased with Ghinucci’s communication of 13 June from Guisnes; LPIIIi, 897 (2 July 1520, Giulio de’ Medici to Wolsey, Florence).
226 Ibid., 958 (22 August 1520, Campeggio to [Wolsey], Rome).
227 Ibid.
228 According to the Venetian Surian, the discussions at the first Anglo-Imperial meeting remained secret, despite his having recently crossed the Channel with Ghinucci; by implication, therefore, the nuncio probably did not know what had been discussed either; Ven.iii, 61 (3 June 1520, Surian to the doge and Signory, Calais), 63 (4 June 1520, Surian to the Signory, Calais).
229 Cardinal de’ Medici’s response implies that Ghinucci only met with Wolsey around 13 June. The latter’s reported demeanour was enough for the pope’s cousin to then allow the nuncio to disclose his commission; LPIIIi, 897 (2 July 1520, Giulio de’ Medici to Wolsey, Florence).
230 Ibid., 922 (19 July 1520, bishop of Bayeux to Bibbiena, Poissy).
231 An interim agreement was settled, with a view to further negotiations towards an alignment against France; see above pp.688-689.
Anglo-French conference); a nephew of the pope apparently spoke with Wolsey and, following the second meeting between Henry and Charles, went to the Imperial Court, where he was reportedly well received; as a result, Spinelly advised Wolsey that ‘everything must be kept secret’. It is uncertain to whom the English diplomat is referring, although earlier in the missive he writes about a disagreement he had had with Raphael de’ Medici; the latter had complained about Wolsey’s questioning Ghinucci about Giulio de’ Medici’s negotiations with Charles via Raphael. One suspects, however, that these secret discussions, if they took place, achieved little. By 8 August, a worried de Giglis notified Wolsey that he had not received any correspondence from England since he last wrote on 15 July. The pope, he wrote, expected to be kept informed of what happened at the interviews (or at least that with Charles) and, now that Wolsey had returned to London, he hoped at least for a reply to what he wrote on Leo’s behalf, lest the pontiff be angry.

In the months following the various interviews, the English crown could only send mixed messages to Rome about its foreign policy. Its position was based upon its continued concentration on the Treaty of London as a means to restrain France and its intertwined attempts to keep both Francis and Charles out of Italy. On the one hand, it was essential to keep Francis I convinced of English ‘neutrality’ at least vis-à-vis Charles, as was pushed throughout the Field of Cloth of Gold, and on the other, to suggest to the emperor elect that Henry was really pro-Imperial. If they were ever to divulge their true political intentions to Leo X (via Ghinucci or otherwise), the English needed to be extremely sure of the papacy.
As will be seen, however, papal foreign policy was just as confusing to the English, as the English strategy was to Rome.

In terms of confusing the papacy, therefore, the English crown was called upon by both Charles and Francis, individually, to indicate their amities to the papacy in some form or another, as the rival monarchs sought to secure papal support. In the wake of the Field of Cloth of Gold, Francis, for instance, apparently convinced that Henry was committed to ‘the protection of the Italis [sic]’ from Charles, recommended to Henry and Wolsey that, between them, they ‘should handle the Pope’. His idea was that, if they ‘proferred him assistance at all times, as obeisant children of the Church’, he would not, by fear, agree to all of Charles’s requests. Francis also believed that it would be far ‘more honourable’ if, in the event that Charles was crowned in Rome, the papacy was in their pocket. To achieve this, the French king wanted instructions along these lines to be sent to the English orators in Rome and that, henceforward, that the latter should work closely with their French counterparts (so that their amity could be observed publicly).

On the other hand, Charles may well have outlined to Henry his intention for an alliance with the pope at one of the two interviews. This was probably raised in connection with Charles’ proposal to form an amity with England and, given later indications, it is relied upon in this way, although it was eagerly sought as an ally in any coalition garnered for this reason; see above pp.111-113.

235 The Imperialists believed that a close arrangement with England was necessary to win over the pope. The French felt a similar way when, around July 1520, they were apprehensive of a rumour that the English and Imperialists were negotiating a league at Calais, as they regarded the pope’s friendship as ‘more valued than ever’. In other words, the French too envisaged English support as integral to their winning over the papacy; LIII, 742 (14 April 1520, instructions of the Imperial ambassadors in England to de la Sauch sent to the emperor, London), 922 (19 July 1520, bishop of Bayeux to Bibbiena, Poissy).

236 Ibid., 913 (calendared 13-14 July 1520, Richard Wingfield to [Wolsey]). Around the same date, Wolsey was sent credentials for Wingfield to speak on behalf of Francis I; ibid., 911 (13 July 1520, Bonnivet to Wolsey, St Germain).

237 This was intended at least; ibid., 803 (13 May 1520, Coruna).
entirely feasible that Henry VIII’s involvement in a papal accord was sought.²³⁸ Certainly, at the Calais/Gravelines meeting, Wolsey and the emperor elect apparently agreed to write to their respective ambassadors in Rome to disclose their discussions and ‘to gain the pope’s favour for their realms’.²³⁹ There is nothing to suggest, however, that Wolsey (or Henry) did so. In response to the French proposal at least, however, Henry assumed his ‘neutral’ role as arbiter of the universal peace; he claimed that, while he had no objections, he had also had a similar request from the king of the Romans. The Englishman suggested, therefore, that the representatives of all three states appear together, while English and French delegates cooperated secretly, so that the pope could appreciate their ‘mutual love’.²⁴⁰ At this stage, it is entirely feasible that the same response was given to the Imperial approach.

Prior to 8 August 1520, de Giglis reported having been visited by the French ambassador, the latter citing instructions to act in concert with him. The English ambassador, apparently knowing no better, replied in kind and reciprocated by visiting the Frenchman. Another French representative de Morette, who had only just arrived in Rome, may well have made the same overtures to de Giglis.²⁴¹ In the same letter, the bishop of Worcester reported the pope having been informed of Francis I’s intention to descend into Italy (with Swiss support) but, since Leo did not know Henry and Wolsey’s intentions, he did not know what to do.²⁴² In other words, the papacy was implying its susceptibility to French pressure because

²³⁸ See below pp.728 ff.
²³⁹ De la Roche informed Wolsey that Charles would follow through with this; LPIII, 921 (17 July 1520, de la Roche, to Wolsey, St Omer).
²⁴⁰ In addition to showing how the English crown continued to demonstrate its commitment to the Treaty of London in public, it also exemplifies another dimension to the English strategy to maintain its pivotal status; by privately indicating to Francis I that he would secretly side with him, in this case in Rome to win over the pope; ibid., 936 (calendared beginning August 1520, instructions to Sir Richard Wingfield and Jerningham, ambassadors to Francis).
²⁴¹ Ibid., 945 (8 August 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey).
²⁴² According to the abstract of de Giglis’ letter dated 8 August, de Morette arrived on the 14th; that this is incorrect is indicated by the fact that he was yet to arrive on 3 August and the Frenchman wrote himself to Wolsey on the 9th; ibid., 941 (3 August 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 945 (8 August 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey), 947 (9 August 1520, de Morette to Wolsey, Rome).
of the mixed messages coming from England. Also revealingly, on 23 December 1520, Campeggio reported secret discussions between himself, two French diplomats, Leo X and Cardinal de’ Medici. The Italian cardinal also revealed that the pope was under great pressure from Manuel to side with Charles, but it was believed that the pope would try to keep the peace and remain neutral.243

Equally, the confusing messages sent to England from Rome were based on Henry and Wolsey’s corresponding uncertainty of papal intentions. Indeed, in the July correspondence where Francis proposed a joint Anglo-French approach to ‘handle the Pope’, there is an indication of what was probably a shared uncertainty of papal political objectives. The Frenchman advised this policy given that they knew Leo ‘to be at some other season the fearfullest creature of the world, and at some other to be as brave’.244 Henry and Wolsey clearly understood that the pontiff was in negotiation with both sides; both Charles and Francis advertised the English that they had the better chance of aligning with Leo. By June 1520, for instance, the English would have been informed of Imperial negotiations with Rome; the emperor instructed his ambassadors in England to advertise Henry of these, in a bid to win him over prior to the interviews.245 Wolsey seems to have questioned Ghinucci and an unnamed nephew of the pope about these discussions apparently while at Guisnes (also during June 1520). Given that this caused Raphael de’ Medici to later complain to Spinelly about disclosing his role to, it seems that the English legate had tried to discover what Leo X intended politically, but had met with resistance, as he was not supposed to know about these

243 Ibid., 1101 (23 December 1520, [Campeggio] to Wolsey, Rome).
244 Ibid., 913 (calendared 13-14 July 1520, Sir Richard Wingfield to [Wolsey], Poissy).
245 Charles seems to have been eager to demonstrate the lengths he was going to to secure papal support. The Imperial ambassadors in England were instructed in mid-May to show how their master intended to relate with the pope (as well as with the Venetians and Swiss); ibid., 803 (13 May 1520, Coruna).
intrigues. Spinelly further painted a confusing picture of papal foreign policy on 27 July 1520; despite Leo’s positive noises towards France, he also ‘gives fair words and promises to the Emperor’. Spinelly suggested that the pope was leaning towards Charles, despite indications to the contrary, on account of Raphael de’ Medici, resident there, being the ‘conduytte of the Cardinal de Medicis’ and the arrival of Caracciolo as resident nuncio. As a result, the English representative advised that Leo X’s intentions were not as clear as he claimed. He considered that the pontiff may have been prevaricating until he felt confident to side with the stronger party but, even if he did, his support would amount to little, as Leo had no money. In a separate missive of the same date, Spinelly claimed that he cited Raphael de’ Medici’s role, so that Wolsey understood that he could negotiate with him rather than Ghinucci. In spite of this apparent confusion, the English continued to be informed of Imperial-papal negotiations.

In terms of being _au fait_ with French pressure on the papacy, Francis’ approach to Henry and Wolsey concerning a bilateral approach towards Leo has already been mentioned. The French king followed this up in the wake of the interviews by sending de Morette to Rome to secure his alliance with the papacy, to emphasise his amity with England

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246 Ibid., 926 (27 July 1520, Spinelly to [Wolsey]).
247 Ibid., 925 (27 July 1520, Spinelly to Wolsey), 926 (27 July 1520, Spinelly to [Wolsey]). The English crown also received later indications that the papacy was sympathetic to the emperor elect, such as from Spinelly again during October 1520; ibid., 1028 (19 October 1520, [Spinelly] to Wolsey). Furthermore, Henry VIII was not the only monarch to find difficulty in interpreting the papacy’s political intentions. During April 1520, the Imperial orator in England, de la Sauch, suggested that Charles was similarly confused and that they risked losing Leo’s potential friendship if the interview/s with Henry was/were not conducted appropriately. The Imperial ambassador also believed that, if they had arranged the meeting some months earlier (thus preventing the French interview), ‘the pope would have been more tractable’; ibid., 728 (7 April 1520, de la Sauch to Chièvres, London).
248 Raphael de’ Medici complained to Spinelly about his description of him as the intermediary with Giulio de’ Medici. In addition to the English diplomat’s aforementioned reason for this, he also claimed that it was to demonstrate Raphael’s influence with his relatives; ibid., 926 (27 July 1520, Spinelly to [Wolsey]).
249 Ibid., 1028 (19 October 1520, [Spinelly] to Wolsey), 1045 (calendared 7 November 1520).
250 See above pp.710-712.
(which would assist with the former aim) and to urge a red hat for one or two Frenchmen. De Morette arrived in Rome perhaps on 4 August and praised Henry and Wolsey (and their role in the meeting and alliance) to the pope. He may also have approached de Giglis about working together. In the same letter, the English ambassador reported the pope having been informed of Francis I’s intention to descend into Italy (with Swiss support) but, since Leo did not know Henry and Wolsey’s intentions, he did not know what to do. The papacy was indicating its vulnerability to French pressure on account of the mixed messages from England. It must be noted, however, that given the public image displayed by the English crown, it would have been risky for the king or his cardinal to contradict French assertions of their amity to Leo. While no answer to the papal approach apparently emanated from England, Henry and Wolsey continued to be aware of French negotiations in Rome.

Following papal complaints about not being notified about the conferences in early May, Cardinal de’ Medici may have attempted to tackle the lack of communication towards the end of the month, perhaps in response to recent English reassurances about the forthcoming meetings with Charles and Francis and possibly in reply to an offer from Wolsey. Contacting Wolsey through a third party, he explained that the pope was confused about England’s true foreign policy intentions both on account of the correspondent’s

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251 Morette was originally to be sent after the Field of Cloth of Gold, but his departure was delayed until the end of the second Anglo-Imperial interview on account, it seems, that the French suspected an alliance was being negotiated; LPIII, 922 (19 July 1520, bishop of Bayeux to Bibbiena, Poissy), 945 (8 August 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey), 958 (22 August 1520, Campeggio to [Wolsey], Rome).

252 According to the abstract of de Giglis’ letter dated 8 August, de Morette arrived on the 14th, that this is incorrect is indicated by the fact that he was yet to arrive on 3 August and the Frenchman wrote himself to Wolsey on the 9th; ibid., 941 (3 August 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 945 (8 August 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey), 947 (9 August 1520, de Morette to Wolsey, Rome).

253 Another piece of correspondence, dated August 1520, that seems to have reached English ears indicated a continual to’ing and fro’ing of communications between France and Rome. Campeggio also reported the arrival of a new French messenger in early December; ibid., 966 (calendared end August 1520, Hector de Vicquemare to –), 1089 (6 December 1520, Campeggio to Wolsey). On 26 September, de Giglis wrote of the French rejoicing in Rome seemingly as a result of the rebellion against Charles in Spain; ibid., 994 (26 September 1520, de Giglis to [Wolsey], Rome).
contradictory actions with respect to Imperial-papal negotiations and because both Charles and Francis claimed to have England on their side. Leo was, therefore, eager to know the ‘real’ English course and emphasised the need for a new ambassador (as the pope had lost confidence in de Giglis) and, given de’ Medici’s previous ‘secret intelligence’ with the English cardinal, that they establish a new line of communication with each other through the recipient of this letter. De’ Medici further recommended that communication be made not merely in writing, but also ‘viva voce’, presumably through messengers. As something of a lure to Wolsey, de’ Medici suggested that the intermediary would be able to discuss matters of his legatine commission in this manner.254 It is likely that this go-between was Girolamo Ghinucci, given his recent despatch to England and his subsequent correspondence to de’ Medici on Wolsey’s behalf.255 When de’ Medici discovered that Wolsey would employ Ghinucci in this manner, he instructed the latter, on 2 July, to disclose his commission.256 It could have been in response to this that Wolsey later requested a ‘mandate and instruction’ to act on the pope’s behalf and protect his interests. In reply at the beginning of October, de’ Medici suggested that he was unclear what the English cardinal meant. If Wolsey was seeking just a general commission to secure papal support against France, the Italian argued that he (and Henry) already had sufficient power ‘in these conventions’ to achieve this. If, on the other hand, Wolsey sought papal backing ‘for extraordinary matters’, Leo claimed to already be on amicable terms with Charles and there was no reason to conclude any treaty, ‘unless anything should arise to require it’. Moreover, Ghinucci was to reassure Wolsey that the pope held him in the greatest confidence and that he would not make an agreement with any prince

254 Ibid., 791 (4 May 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 853 (calendared end May 1520; [‘de Medici to --]).
255 Ibid., 897 (2 July 1520, de’ Medici to Wolsey, Florence).
256 Ibid. An indication that Wolsey grasped the opportunity to communicate with de’ Medici through the nuncio is suggested through his continued hosting of Ghinucci. That the latter was treated well is suggested by the nuncio’s report back to the pope’s cousin, perhaps at the beginning of September 1520 about his ‘munificent entertainment’ in England; ibid., 994 26 September 1520, de Giglis to [Wolsey], Rome).
without consulting him first. 257 This was effectively a papal snub to Wolsey’s tentative gambit to see whether Leo would be prepared to turn against the French. Furthermore, de’ Medici may not have believed that Anglo-papal communications had improved by this time, as at the end of November, he repeated his request for Wolsey to send a new ambassador. 258

A further hint that the English crown may have tentatively approached the papacy with a view to turning against France came from Thomas Spinelly, based at the Imperial Court, in his letter of 27 July. His reference to Raphael de’ Medici as the ‘conduytte of the Cardinal de Medicis’ was perhaps made to highlight his authority with the papacy and to advise Wolsey to negotiate with him rather than Ghinucci in England. 259 The implication is, therefore, that Wolsey was looking for an opening to begin discussions with Rome (against France) and that, while Ghinucci was thought to be a possible intermediary for this, he was evidently instructed not to disclose his commission until told to do so by de’ Medici. 260 In light of this, therefore, Spinelly’s identification of Raphael de’ Medici as the best line of communication was quite natural.

The English also took more direct measures to discourage Francis from his declared intention to launch an Italian expedition and to meet with the pope at Bologna. Several embassies and repeated correspondence were sent to discourage Francis against this course. By all accounts, Ghinucci in England was unaware of at least one diplomatic mission, thus suggesting that Wolsey had not involved the papacy. 261 Another (also sent to persuade the French king from going to Italy), Carew also questioned Francis about his intention to meet with Leo X around the beginning of 1521, to which the king replied that he would perhaps do

257 Ibid., 1006 (calendared beginning October 1520, [de’ Medici to Ghinucci]).
258 Ibid., 1080 (calendared end November 1520, [de’ Medici to Ghinucci]).
259 Ibid., 925 (27 July 1520, Spinelly to Wolsey), 926 (27 July 1520, Spinelly to [Wolsey]).
260 See above pp.714-716.
261 Ven.iii, 117 (6 September 1520, Surian to the Signory); see above pp.693-694.
so at Bologna. It is not known whether the English lobbied Rome against this prospect as well, but it was probably deemed unlikely that Leo would have welcomed another interview and that, if it did take place, it would be both an indication of existing French leverage over the papacy and (as with the previous interview of 1515) of future dominance over the Holy See.

Beyond the uncertainty on both sides of the other’s ‘real’ foreign policy intentions, the only meaningful interaction between the English crown and papacy around this time resulted from Henry VIII’s earlier declared intention to support the papal crusading initiative. Concerning this, the crown and papacy may have still been talking at cross-purposes, as Leo X’s real intention may have been to use it as a means to prevent expeditions to Italy by Francis or Charles. Prior to the conferences, in early May, the pope requested aid from England to resist a perceived Turkish threat against Rhodes. Perhaps reacting to this, Wolsey, in conversation with the Venetian ambassador (circa 18 May), claimed that Henry would write to Leo to urge the Christian powers to resist the danger, the English king being ready to act, and the king would raise this at his meeting with Francis I. By the 28th, however, de Giglis dutifully declared that the Turkish fleet (cited by the papacy) was intended neither against Rhodes nor Italy. Nevertheless, papal requests for aid against the Turks in the Balkans were subsequently forwarded to England. It is possible that Ghinucci’s commission partly intended to broach this issue (‘the common welfare of Christendom’), although he may not have been permitted to disclose it until de’ Medici instructed him to do.

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262 *Ven.iii*, 150 (3 January 1521, Giovanni Badoer to the Signory, Blois).
263 *LPIII*, 784 (2 May 1520, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome), 785 (calendared 2 May 1520, Campeggio to Wolsey), 790 (4 May 1520, de Giglis to Henry), 791 (4 May 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome).
265 *LPIII*, 847 (28 May 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome).
266 The bishop of ‘Vesprim’ (presumably Veszprém, Hungary) had been killed in battle with the Ottomans; *ibid.*, 850 (30 May 1520; [Hieronymus Pothelinus] to [Leo], Seguia), 867 (10 June 1520, [Hieronymus Pothelinus to --]).
so on 2 July, having been notified of Wolsey’s positive demeanour. On 3 June, Leo made
another direct appeal to Henry to act against the Turkish threat to Rhodes. Campeggio and
de Giglis reiterated this, apparently at the pope’s request, the following day. In a separate
letter (also dated the 4th), the bishop of Worcester shed doubt on papal claims, however; he
referred Henry VIII to his previous missive on Turkish affairs that suggested the Ottomans
intended no offensive against Christendom and that it was only when they had given up any
fear of Turkish action that year, that ‘the old rumour suddenly springs up of great preparations
being made by the Turks’. De Giglis also stressed that he requested assistance from England
only in accordance with promises made by Campeggio. The clear implication is, therefore,
that the English ambassador was sceptical of the Ottoman threat and warned his English
employers of this. De Giglis’ scepticism perhaps reached England by 16 June 1520, on which
date Wolsey seemed to indicate his response to the papal crusade appeal; in reply to Turkish
news presented by the Venetian ambassador (while at the Field of Cloth of Gold), he
answered that, whenever Venice wanted something, it produced intelligence about the
Ottoman threat. Nevertheless, in early July, the king’s apparent response to the pope was
positive; Henry had reportedly agreed to supply 1,000 infantry to support Rhodes for six

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267 Cardinal de’ Medici’s response suggests that the pope was interested in the universal peace and that this, or
moreover the crusading element, may have been what Ghinucci was now permitted to lobby the English crown; ibid., 897 (2 July 1520, Giulio de’ Medici to Wolsey, Florence). That Ghinucci was intended to discuss the Turkish threat is also suggested by the Venetian Surian, who understood that a papal representative in France (probably there to attend the Field of Cloth of Gold) had claimed that this was part of his remit; Ven.iii, 64 ([4?] June 1520, Surian to the doge and Signory, Boulogne).
268 According to the pope, he had already advertised Henry that the Turks had crossed the Bosphorus and was
now notifying him that they had gathered a fleet near Rhodes; LPIIIi, 856 (3 June 1520, Leo to Henry, Rome).
269 Ibid., 858 (4 June 1520, Campeggio [and de Giglis] to Wolsey, Rome).
270 The request that de Giglis was obliged to relay to England was for 1,000 troops and payment for their
transport; ibid., 857 (4 June 1520, [de Giglis] to Henry, Rome). The orator conveyed similar intelligence from
Rome on 22 June that, according to notices from Constantinople, the Turkish fleet had not yet sailed; ibid., 880
(22 June 1520, de Giglis to [Wolsey], Rome).
271 Ven.iii, 86 (16 June 1520, Surian to the Signory, Guisnes?). Here, Wolsey seems to have been echoing a
sentiment issued by his Imperial counterpart, Chievres, at the Canterbury meeting between Henry and Charles,
when the Venetian orators received some Turkish news from home. Notably, however, Charles’ advisor tarred
all from the peninsula with the same brush, not just those from the maritime republic; ‘whenever the Italians
wanted anything they mentioned the Turk’, he reportedly opined; ibid., 55 (29 May 1520, Cornaro and Surian to
the Signory, Canterbury).
months.\textsuperscript{272} There is nothing to suggest, however, that the pledge was actually fulfilled and one ought to note the timing of the statement. Around 6 July, Henry VIII had just concluded the Field of Cloth of Gold with Francis and was about to meet Charles at Calais. Diplomatically, the spotlight was on him as the ‘balance’ between two fractious monarchs, still advocating universal peace (publicly at least). He could not be seen, therefore, to reject a papal request for aid against the Ottomans; if he did, he would be effectively pulling the rug of justification from beneath himself. The perceived ‘need’ for a crusade changed by 11 November, as Campeggio advertised the English crown that Selim I had died, to be succeeded by Soliman.\textsuperscript{273} By the end of the month, Wolsey knew of this and was concerned about the accession of the new sultan who, he believed, would behave as his father had done.\textsuperscript{274} Campeggio notified Wolsey of further Turkish news on 19 January and of how the pope had sent troops in apprehension of a fleet which attacked ‘Zerbe’.\textsuperscript{275}

As rumours of Francis’ decision to go to Italy intensified towards the end of 1520, so would have Henry VIII’s fear for the implications of Franco-papal negotiations. He would have dreaded both the prospect of an alignment between the two powers and the possibility that Leo would back Francis against Charles, if the former crossed the Alps. These two fears were inter-related; if the pontiff did support the French king in Italy, then an alliance between them was confirmed. The first indication that one of these fears was manifesting itself came around October-November 1520, when intelligence began to be received about Leo X recruiting troops among the Swiss for actions in Italy. Indeed, the cardinal reportedly defended the pope’s hiring 6,000 in the face of an Imperial complaint around mid- to late

\textsuperscript{272} \textit{Ibid.}, 99 ([6 July?] 1520, Surian to the Signory).
\textsuperscript{273} \textit{LPIII}, 1054 (11 November 1520, [Campeggio] to Wolsey, Rome).
\textsuperscript{274} \textit{Ven.iii}, 141 (28 November 1520, Surian to the Signory, London).
\textsuperscript{275} \textit{LPIII}, 1132 (19 January 1521, [Campeggio] to Wolsey, Rome).
October.\textsuperscript{276} It is unlikely, however, that Wolsey would have been entirely confident of the pope’s intentions for these troops. Indeed, he was notified of such uncertainty by Tunstal, then based at the Imperial Court, in a despatch of 6 November. However, the English diplomat reported a claim by the papal ambassador that the pope had made a pre-emptive move to retain the mercenaries, as Leo expected a French descent to begin within a month. This was his last chance, therefore, to hire them ‘for the maintenance [of his] estate’. Charles’ Council, on the other hand (Tunstal continued), did not know whether Leo really sought the troops because of a fear for the duke of Urbino, the ‘Peruse’ faction, or France, or even to support France; in any case, they did not fear a winter expedition by the French, as Charles was not travelling any further into Germany. They speculated that the Swiss troops would cost Leo a lot and that when they passed through the Milanese, the pope’s intention would become clear; if allowed free passage, he had an understanding with Francis; if they were impeded, he did not. The general thinking, according to Tunstal, was that Leo X was more afraid than he needed to be.\textsuperscript{277} Alarm bells would have started ringing when a contemporaneous communication from Francis was received, outlining how the pope was mobilising to resist a contingent of disgruntled Spanish believed to be marching towards the Papal States; Francis notified Henry and Wolsey that he had lent the pope 500 men (under the command of Lautrec) to assist.\textsuperscript{278} Further ominous news would have been received from Campeggio around the end of November that French troops had been ordered to muster at Milan.\textsuperscript{279} Around the same time, Wolsey claimed to understand that the pope’s Swiss

\textsuperscript{276} Ibid., 1080 (calendared end November 1520, [de’ Medici to Ghinucci]), Wolsey would already have heard from Rome of French intentions to use the Swiss in Italy, towards the end of August 1520, but it is unknown whether he connected this intelligence; \textit{ibid.}, 945 (8 August 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey).

\textsuperscript{277} Ibid., 1043 (6 November 1520, Tunstal to [Wolsey], Cologne).

\textsuperscript{278} This could easily have been seen as a pretext for war (although one must bear in mind that there was an uprising in Spain at this time); \textit{ibid.}, 1045 (calendared 7 November 1520).

\textsuperscript{279} Ibid., 1054 (11 November 1520, [Campeggio] to Wolsey, Rome).
mercenaries were intended for an assault on Ferrara. While he may have believed this (Leo
being known to covet the duchy), the English cardinal may have only been telling part of the
story; the information that he was receiving pointed towards a Franco-papal alignment that
was heading towards war with the emperor elect.

As far as the English crown was concerned, this confusing deterioration of the
political situation in Italy continued. During December 1520, Wolsey would have been
informed of de’ Medici’s claim that the Swiss contingent was a direct response to the Imperial
troops amassed on the borders of the Papal States. In the context of English opposition to a
French descent into Italy, the crown also had reason to oppose the prospect of an Imperial
enterprise in the peninsula, as such a move would provoke war. Charles’ movement of
Spanish troops into southern Italy, therefore, would have been greeted warily in England,
despite of the Imperial ambassador earlier claiming that were intended to defend the
papacy. While one would generally have expected Henry and Wolsey to welcome such
action, they knew that Leo and Charles were not yet aligned. They were probably alarmed to
hear during February 1521, therefore, of Spanish troops marching from Naples (and Calabria)
northwards and of the pope’s intention to move his own forces to face them. Leo
apparently complained to Henry about the Spanish contingent perhaps in January or February,
in response to which the king questioned Charles about them; the emperor reiterated that they

280 Wolsey can also be seen voicing the same belief to the same Venetian on 10 March 1521; Ven.iii, 141 (28
November 1520, Surian to the Signory, London), 169 (10 March 1521, Surian to the Signory, London). Francis
reportedly told the Venetian ambassador that he could only think that the pope was raising the Swiss to stop him
descending into Italy, but that this would not stop him. This was surely disingenuous, given that Francis had
confirmed his agreement with the pope in October; Ven.iii, 144 (8 December 1520, Giovanni Badoer to the
Signory, Blois). That Wolsey apparently raised the subject of Ferrara with the nuncio in England is suggested on
8 January 1521, when Francis seems to have registered his displeasure that a letter that he had handwritten to the
cardinal concerning the duke of Ferrara had made public The French king realised this when he received a
missive from Rome containing the same words used in the aforementioned communication, which demonstrates
that Wolsey had been indiscrete with the papal ambassador; LPIIIi, 1126 (8 January 1521, Jerningham and
Carew to Wolsey, ‘Arromatyn’).

281 Ibid. 1080 (calendared end November 1520, [de’ Medici to Ghinucci]).

282 Ibid.

283 In essence, Venice was asking for England to intervene and prevent a war; Ven.iii, 155 (26 January 1521,
Council of Ten and Junta to Surian).
were intended for the pope’s benefit. Wolsey questioned, therefore, Leo X’s bringing of the Swiss to Italy. Furthermore, towards the end of March 1521, the English crown was informed that these Swiss were partly subsidised by the French, prompting the belief that it was intended for the recovery of Naples (for Francis I), as well as of Ferrara. Henry, assuming his role as arbiter of the universal peace, reportedly disapproved of this ‘discord among the Christian powers’. ‘Bad’ news continued to reach England, however; by 4 March 1521, Campeggio notified Wolsey of the Spanish troops having crossed into the Papal States, although they failed in their attack on the town of Ripae and had retreated. By 15 April 1521, the English had been notified of Francis’ justifications for allowing the Swiss safe passage through his territories; he had done it for the security of the pope. Indications of which side of the fence the papacy intended to fall were not particularly promising for the English

In terms of the prospect of a Franco-papal amity, while the secret alliance of late 1519 apparently went unnoticed in England, that of 1521 did not. Rumour of such an agreement circulated in England towards the beginning of 1521 although, as the Venetian orator understood, the English were supposedly included (given that Henry was still publicly the ‘friend’ of Francis, one presumes). Surian speculated that a Mass, celebrated unusually by Wolsey and attended by the nuncio Ghinucci (among others) gave credence to this. The Italian also reported that such a league had been concluded between Francis, Leo and

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284 Ibid., 177 (24 March 1521, Surian to the Signory).
285 Ibid., 176 (24 March 1521, Surian to the Signory), 177 (24 March 1521, Surian to the Signory). The king and cardinal’s opinion may have been shaped by a despatch from the English ambassador in France, Fitzwilliam, sent in mid-March, reporting intelligence that the pope was assembling 10,000 Swiss for an attack on Ferrara and that Francis did not intend to defend the latter. The resident papal ambassador claimed no knowledge of this, however; LPHIii, 1198 (calendared 16-17 March 1521, [Fitzwilliam to Wolsey]).
286 LPHIii, 1187 (4 March 1521, [Campeggio] to Wolsey, Rome).
287 Ven.iii, 187 (15 April 1521, Surian to the Signory, London).
Venice. It would not have taken much to raise English suspicions around this time, particularly given that Fitzwilliam, their ambassador in France, found it noteworthy to comment that Francis never spoke to him about the pope. The French orator in England, Marigny, notified Henry and Wolsey of this agreement by 24 March 1521, as well as of joint Franco-papal funding of the Swiss, the latter being interpreted as confirmation of the intended seizure of Naples and Ferrara by Francis and Leo, respectively (although it was denied).

In consequence of the increasing prospect of a French descent into Italy, the English crown engaged with Leo X from November 1520. At this point, Wolsey approached Leo X directly, to forestall what was believed to be an imminent French expedition. He apparently asked the pontiff to urge Francis against this course, perhaps emphasising its potential cost. Here, the cardinal was probably revealing his fear that this threat might force a vulnerable pope to conclude with Francis. In doing this, however, one ought to note that Wolsey did

288 Ibid., 151 (7 January 1521, Surian to the Signory, London). Such a ‘secret’ agreement had been made, which allowed French forces to pass unhindered through the Papal States in return for a small portion of Naples once it was subsequently conquered; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, viii, pp.15-16. There is no reason to believe, however, that the mass had anything to do with the Franco-papal agreement and certainly did not relate to English membership thereof; indeed, Francis I complained about the treatment of his ambassadors at the event compared with those of Charles; LPIIIi, 1157 (6 February 1521, Fitzwilliam and Jerningham to Wolsey, ‘Amorantyne’).

289 LPIIIi, 1176 (22 February 1521, Fitzwilliam to Wolsey, ‘Amorantyne’). Indeed, a few days before this, Fitzwilliam revealingly notified Wolsey that ‘Sayne Marshawe’ had returned from the pope and all was said to be well (possibly concerning a dispute over a legatine commission). Furthermore, he advised, the pope had agreed not to bestow a red hat on a candidate to whom Francis I objected. Revealingly, Fitzwilliam noted that he had heard nothing on these matters from the Most Christian King himself or his influential mother Louisa; ibid., 1168 (18 February 1521, Fitzwilliam to Wolsey, ‘Amorantyne’).

290 Ven.iii, 176 (24 March 1521, Surian to the Signory). The Venetian orator in France reported home, around mid-April 1521, Francis’ claim that he had gained papal agreement to join a league (against Charles) and had Leo’s power for its conclusion; ibid., 188 (18 April 1521, Giovanni Badoer to the Signory, Dijon).

291 The date of this request is unclear, as the Venetian ambassador claimed to have been told this by his French counterpart circa 10 November. It is unknown, however, whether Wolsey had just disclosed that he had written to Leo or whether the French diplomat had just heard of the result of this request via Rome and France; Ven.iii, 135 (10 November 1520, Surian to the Signory, London). Alternatively, Wolsey could have been reacting to Spinelly’s news (of 23 September) that French troops were already active in Italy, although the English diplomat was sceptical about this; LPIIIi, 988 (23 September 1520, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Antwerp).

292 On 10 October, for instance, Campeggio, reported increasingly frequent news that Francis intends to spend Christmas in Italy. He also reiterated information that he had originally conveyed to England on 26 September, that two French candidates had been elevated to the Sacred College and that the pope was likely to block a third red hat on account of Francis I’s opposition to the candidate. This intelligence would have been of great concern
not beseech Leo to act aggressively; indeed, it could be argued that he was being consistent with England’s role in the Treaty of London, safeguarding universal peace. In other words, even if Wolsey did envisage an Anglo-Imperial alignment against France at this stage, this was merely a preliminary overture, as he was still unclear as to papal intentions. At this time, the cardinal was aware of the pontiff having engaged the services of Swiss troops for an, as yet, unknown purpose.293

From Wolsey’s approach or by other information, the papacy may have been suspicious about English foreign policy, hitherto publicly committed to the Treaty of London, around the turn of 1521. In early January, Campeggio conveyed to Wolsey the pope’s desire that Henry continue his promotion of peace between the two parties and side with neither Charles nor Francis; he recommended that the English king ‘make himself an arbiter between them, whose counsel his Holiness will follow’. Campeggio and de Giglis assured both Leo and Giulio de’ Medici that this was indeed the English intention and, as a result, the pope was reportedly confident that, given time, ‘the holy expedition will take effect, of which the King’s piety first raised his hopes’.294 Here, Leo was clearly citing the English king’s earlier commitment to the crusade, as manifested in his support of the universal peace accord ensconced in the Treaty of London, since which the pontiff had actively courted Henry’s support.295 Towards the end of January, perhaps in immediate response to this, Henry notified Leo that he had spoken with Ghinucci ‘upon certain matters of great importance’ conveyed by

in England, as it smacked of a ‘French’ papacy; \textit{LPIIIi}, 1016 (10 October 1520, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome). This concern is also suggested by Nicholas Carew who, on 8 January 1521, while on a mission to France to discourage the Most Christian King from Italy, claimed that Henry VIII had persuaded the pope (and others) to maintain their amity with France, so that Francis had no need to go to the peninsula. Prior to this, Carew had also questioned the Most Christian King about his intention to meet with Leo X at Bologna, which would similarly indicate French dominance over the papacy; \textit{ibid.}, 1126 (8 January 1521, Jerningham and Carew to Wolsey, ‘Arromatyn’); \textit{Ven.iii}, 150 (3 January 1521, Giovanni Badoer to the Signory, Blois).

293 See above pp.719-723.

294 De Giglis was reportedly instructed to pass on the same message; \textit{LPIIIi}, 1123 (calendared 2-6 January 1521, [Campeggio to Wolsey]).

295 See above p.606.
de Giglis on the pope’s behalf. Wolsey would reply in detail via his orator. In response to Ghinucci’s subsequent report, Leo X thanked Wolsey ‘for his attachment to the Holy See’ and begged his credence for the nuncio on further unknown matters.

By the end of February 1521, some sort of watershed had been reached with the papacy, as far as the English crown was concerned when a new ambassador, John Clerk was commissioned for Rome. Henry and Wolsey had finally responded to Giulio de’ Medici’s repeated requests for de Giglis to be replaced. Given that Leo’s chief advisor had been pressing for this since May 1520, one would surmise that the timing was politically significant. Firstly, the English apparently put great store by the papal recommendation that Henry act as ‘arbiter’ of the Franco-Imperial dissensions; indeed, they communicated through Ghinucci on perhaps 25 February, that Henry was attempting to settle these grievances amicably. Secondly, the English were concurrently negotiating with Charles V towards an alliance against France and Clerk may have been intended to broach this.

The mood of the papacy was changing, however, and de’ Medici indicated this to the English in a despatch, perhaps dated 27 February, asserting that ‘the French had proceeded to their dishonest craft’ and had tried to take the papal city of Reggio, under pretext of arresting

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296 *LPiii*, 1137 (21 January 1521, Henry to Leo, Greenwich). The ‘matters’ to which Henry referred are not specified but, given that de Giglis had hitherto been out of favour as a diplomatic conduit between England and Rome, and that Campeggio had recently referred to both himself and the bishop of Worcester as present when the pope lobbied them to urge Henry to become ‘arbiter’ of Franco-Imperial differences, this is what was probably meant. Indeed, this subject was significant enough to be described ‘of great importance’ and would have warranted the swift reply that is implied. On the other hand, Campeggio’s acknowledgement of his receipt of correspondence from Wolsey, dated 21 January, does not suggest anything along these lines, merely ‘lesser’ matters, such as de Giglis’ desire to gain a red hat and Wolsey being provided to the Spanish see of Badajoz. That is not to say, however, that the corresponding missive to de Giglis did not contain anything about the papal proposal for English arbitration; *ibid.*, 1187 (4 March 1521, [Campeggio] to Wolsey, Rome).


298 Clerk was to leave for Rome on 1 March 1521; *Ven.iii*, 167 (28 February 1521, Surian to the Signory, London).

299 At the end of November 1520, de’ Medici asked for a second time for a new (‘well-informed’) English orator to be sent to Rome; *LPiii*, 1080 (calendared end November 1520, [de’ Medici to Ghinucci]).

300 *Ibid.*, 1209 (calendared 30-31 March 1521, [de’ Medici to -]).

301 See below pp.728-732.
Milanese exiles there, but had failed. 302 This may have been intended by the Italian as a tentative approach to gauge Henry’s willingness to turn against France. Writing more strongly at the end of March, the papal nipote stated that, as the French could not negotiate an alignment with the pope, they tried to achieve this through intimidation instead; ‘this insolence must be chastised’, he opined. Also, de’ Medici conveyed the pope’s warning about Henry’s attempts to mediate ‘inter Caesarem et G[allum]’, as they will ‘only encourage Francis, who ought to be restrained, as he has often disturbed the peace of Christendom’. The Italian further claimed that he had tried to speak with Leo on this matter but, as they could not find a suitable place, he has not said a word. De’ Medici then explicitly outlined papal intentions; Leo ‘has resolved to liberate himself at all hazards from this intolerable slavery’ and hoped for Henry’s support, as the latter had done on previous occasions, as well as of Wolsey’s. Furthermore, Ghinucci was instructed to inform Wolsey that this new foreign policy was intended ‘not merely for the liberation of the Holy See, but of Italy, from the fangs of the wolf’.303 This back channel overture could not be a clearer appeal for Henry to step in and ‘defend the faith’

Clerk, unaware of the direct papal approach, arrived with de’ Medici at Florence by 15 April 1521 and apparently discussed his mission freely. He delivered a handwritten letter to the cardinal protector after which, the latter claimed, it was ‘as if he had been speaking to Wolsey himself’. De’ Medici replied that he ‘entirely surrenders his wishes and thoughts to Wolsey’ and wanted this known to Leo and Henry.304 Given the gushing response from the pope’s chief advisor, one presumes that the English representative arrived with the ‘right’ message; the desire to turn against France. Clerk reached Rome by 20 April and was received

302 LPIIIi, 1209 (calendared 30-31 March 1521, [de’ Medici to -]).
303 Ibid.
304 Ibid., 1228 (15 April 1521, [Giulio de’ Medici to Wolsey], Florence). He passed through the French Court during mid-March; ibid., 1198 (calendared 16-17 March 1521, [Fitzwilliam to Wolsey]).
by the retinues of Campeggio and de’ Medici.\textsuperscript{305} It seems that Clerk did not make a beeline to Campeggio, only delivering the Italian letters from Henry and Wolsey by 3 May; these instructed the cardinal to fully support the new orator, which Campeggio agreed to do (doubtless motivated by his hope of gaining the vacant see of Worcester). Coincidentally, Leo concluded a secret alliance with Charles V shortly after (at the end of May). This may well have been encouraged by Clerk’s reassurances of English support.\textsuperscript{306} The Spanish ambassador in Rome had certainly been circulating rumours that this was the case.\textsuperscript{307}

Wolsey, doubtless having received de’ Medici’s overture to combine against France, assured the pope on 21 May that he was regularly conferring with Ghinucci and also referred him to Clerk.\textsuperscript{308} At the turn of May-June, Clerk and Campeggio apparently met with Leo and de’ Medici, and voiced their doubt whether the pope would persist in his anti-French sentiments. The pontiff replied that he would be offended if this opinion had emanated from Henry or Wolsey. Writing to Ghinucci, the cardinal protector stated categorically that ‘none are so offensive to him [Leo] as the French, and he can never trust them more, or ever become their friend’. The nuncio was instructed to discover whether this opinion did come from the king or his cardinal, so that they could counter it. Wolsey was to be further assured of de’ Medici’s friendship.\textsuperscript{309} Around 7-8 June, de’ Medici, conveying the pope’s satisfaction with the English response to the Lutheran heresy, also rejoiced at hearing that Henry would defend Christendom ‘with his pen as well as with his sword’.\textsuperscript{310} The implication is again, therefore,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item The issue of Clerk’s replacing de Giglis was easily solved, given that the bishop of Worcester had died on the 18\textsuperscript{th}, \textit{ibid.}, 1247 (23 April 1521, [Campeggio to Wolsey], Rome).
\item L. Pastor, \textit{History of the Popes}, viii, p.35.
\item De Giglis refuted these to the pope: \textit{LPIII}, 1278 (14 May 1521, Fitzwilliam to Wolsey, Chatillion), 1303 (24 May 1521, Fitzwilliam and Jerningham to [Wolsey], Dijon), 1310 (calendared 25-27 May 1521, instructions to de la Batye, French ambassador to England).
\item \textit{Ibid.}, 1299 (21 May 1521, Wolsey to Leo, London).
\item \textit{Ibid.}, 1325 (calendared beginning June 1521, [de’ Medici to -]).
\item \textit{Ibid.}, 1333 (calendared 7-8 June 1521, [de’ Medici to the bishop of Ascoli]).
\end{enumerate}
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that the papacy had already received an assurance from the king that he would support Rome against France.

The impression during early 1521, therefore, is of the English crown wanting to believe the pope’s anti-French overtures, but not entirely trusting that he would follow through with his commitment. This sentiment also featured prominently during negotiations towards an Anglo-Imperial alignment against France, particularly through Tunstal, December 1520-June 1521. The first indication of this occurred towards the end of January, when Henry acknowledged his ambassador’s reservations concerning the oath that Charles would give to him upon ratifying such an agreement; that it would not have any force if mention were not made of a papal dispensation for his marriage to Princess Mary due to their consanguinity. Having consulted his Council, Henry decided that, while this was important, ‘to have the oath made dependent on the Pope’s arbitrement…might lead hereafter to influence being used with the Pope by the Emperor, the French King, or others, to refuse the dispensation altogether’. It would, therefore, be ‘inexpedient’ to mention this in the oath ‘before they were sure of the Pope’. If, on the other hand, Tunstal could not avoid any mention of such a dispensation, Henry instructed that a bull or brief be gained immediately from the pope, for them ‘to contract matrimony, whsensoever they should mind and determine so to do, the said impediment notwithstanding’.

Around the same time, Henry conveyed to Tunstal his anger that Charles’ Council had moved the goalposts about forming an Anglo-Imperial alliance. He objected to their new conditions, which included the precursory conclusion of a defensive league with Rome, and refused to meet these before establishing a closer amity with Charles. Concerning the need for

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311 *Ibid.*, 1149 (calendared end January 1521, [Henry to Tunstal]).
a papal dispensation to validate the marriage and seal the alliance, the king insisted upon this being issued secretly ‘under lead’ and that, in their alliance, there would be an article binding both parties not to conclude a defensive union with the papacy until this had been granted. Henry speculated that Leo would not then object to the demand, as if he did he would not be offered the protection of such a league. Henry further explained his firm stance about not concluding a league with the pope before an alliance with the emperor in terms of his not having any need to do so; if he did concede to Charles’ demands, he argued, the Imperialists ‘might demand unreasonable things of us, which would lead us into war and intolerable charges, bring us into suspicion with the other confederates, and help them to play their game, leaving us alone’. If, on the other hand, an Anglo-Imperial axis existed, Henry claimed that they would both be forced to act in good faith towards each other. Henry also advised Charles against war in the short-term because of the instability in Spain, his ministers’ motivation by personal advantage and because the pope was ‘so brittle, and variable, to be led into wars for the sake of one or other’.312

In reply, circa 11-12 February 1521, Charles’ advisors continued to insist on the formation of a league with the pope (and retaining Swiss) arguing that, if they had not instructed the Viceroy of Naples to raise 4,000 foot to aid the pope, he would have joined the French already. Concerning their stipulation for a marriage dispensation, it was said that the emperor could not negotiate ‘with his honour’ unless this was gained. Indeed, the papal ambassador in Germany, it was claimed, possessed such a grant, but was commanded not to deliver it unless Charles first met the papacy’s demands. It was presented to Henry, in other

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312 The other conditions now insisted upon by Charles’ Council prior to any conclusion of an Anglo-Imperial alliance were the hiring of the Swiss, the provision of aid against the Spanish rebels and agreement to a new interview between Henry and Charles. Concerning Henry’s desire to establish a concrete alliance with Charles before committing to anything else and his suspicions about being left high and dry if he did not insist on this, his previous experience with Charles bore witness to the validity of his caution; *ibid.*, 1150 (calendared end January 1521, [Henry to Tunstal]).
words, as a catch-22 situation. Furthermore, Tunstal advised, the Imperialists ‘stakke moche’
to the need for papal favour, particularly concerning their possession of Naples, a papal fief;
they must, therefore, ‘entertain him [for the] good that he may do unto them’. Tunstal also
stated that he had passed on Henry’s insistence on an article for the alliance that no defensive
league be made until the aforementioned dispensation be gained; it was promised that this
would be referred to Charles. The English ambassador also reported his being questioned
about Henry’s failure to reveal the aid he intended for the pope and to hire the Swiss, to which
he replied that his king would do so when he knew what support was required. Tunstal was
then told that Leo wanted a garrison around him immediately and expected England and the
Empire to contribute pro rata. With regard to the Swiss, Henry was expected to convey
20,000 ducats at least, given that the pope and emperor were to contribute 30,000 apiece. In
response, Tunstal commented that it was a large amount of money, given that Henry would
not gain much from its purpose; nevertheless, he told the Imperialists that it might be
negociated once the Anglo-Imperial alliance had been settled. Finally, the Chancellor told
Tunstal that they had already applied to Leo X for a commission to conclude a defensive
league, although this had not yet arrived. At the end of March 1521, Wolsey instructed
Tunstal to reiterate the English position to the Imperial Council; that Henry has expressly
ordered that no discussion of a defensive league with the pope would be held until the Anglo-
Imperial marriage alliance was settled. As will be seen, however, this was partly untrue; the
English crown was exploring negotiations with Rome, unbeknown to the emperor. As to the
marital dispensation, Wolsey described this to Henry as a ‘new invention’, a matter which the

313 Ibid., 1162 (calendared 11-12 February 1521, Tunstal to Henry).
314 Nor were Tunstal and Spinelly to broach the retaining of the Swiss, the provision of aid against the Spanish
rebellion or another interview with Charles; ibid., 1214 (calendared end March 1521, Wolsey to Tunstal,
Hampton Court).
Imperialists insisted upon neither during the negotiations at Canterbury nor Calais. By April/May 1521, the English continued to insist that they would not ally with Rome until the amity with the emperor had been settled. In early May, Henry wrote that the delay emanated from Charles and that, had their alliance been agreed, he ‘might have declared himself more frankly’ concerning the coalition with the pope.

Regardless of England’s reluctance to join with the papacy against France yet, Charles V pursued his own agenda in Rome, to induce papal support for his planned coalition. By April 1521, his ambassador in Rome was claiming that Henry VIII would side with him, causing Henry to warn Charles to ‘look to the close keeping of his secrets’. These rumours seriously undermined England’s continued claim to be arbitrating Franco-Imperial differences; Juan Manuel was claiming that Henry would join an offensive league (also comprising the pope) to expel the French from Milan (and, presumably, Italy). Possibly without instruction from England, de Giglis took steps to reassure Leo X that no such project existed and this news made its way back to France. At the end of June 1521, Charles V re-engaged the English crown on the subject of a league with the papacy (albeit an Imperial-papal alignment had already been concluded, unbeknown to Henry and Wolsey). The emperor-elect was prepared to concede that an Anglo-Imperial alliance be settled first; if Henry and Wolsey showed themselves prepared to conclude under cover of a Calais

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315 Ibid., 1213 (calendared end March 1521, [Wolsey to Henry]).
316 The league was also to include the Swiss Confederacy and Spain; ibid., 1270 (calendared 7-11 May 1521, instructions to Sir Richard Wingfield, ambassador to the emperor).
317 This rebuttal may not have reached Charles V, as in the copy of the instructions found, the paragraph in which this was contained had been crossed out; ibid., 1270 (calendared 7-11 May 1521, instructions to Sir Richard Wingfield, ambassador to the emperor), 1278 (14 May 1521, Fitzwilliam to Wolsey, Chatillion), 1303 (24 May 1521, Fitzwilliam and Jerningham to [Wolsey], Dijon), 1310 (calendared 25-27 May 1521, instructions to de la Batye, French ambassador to England).
318 As Francis understood, the emperor elect planned an initially defensive league with the pope, to gain the investiture of Naples, followed by an offensive arrangement whereby the French would be ousted from Milan and Leo X would gain Parma and Piacenza. The pontiff had been told that Charles would marry Mary on his return to Flanders, at which point England would join the offensive alliance; ibid., 1310 (calendared 25-27 May 1521, instructions to de la Batye, French ambassador to England).
conference, he instructed his ambassadors going to England to demonstrate his commitment to securing papal support and to promise that Henry would be notified of this quickly. If the king and cardinal were unimpressed with this, the orators were to consult each other about how much more they could disclose about the Imperial-papal relationship and to assure the English that, once united, they could easily attract the Swiss.319

The English crown also moved to take control of the broader anti-French initiative from April-May 1521 by offering to arbitrate Franco-Imperial differences at a summit to be held at Calais. It was apparently hoped that Wolsey would be able to use it as cover to compose an Anglo-Imperial alliance, in addition to arranging a truce so that England could prepare for war, although this policy was not yet concrete.320 That this move came shortly after Henry and Wolsey learnt of a Franco-papal agreement suggests that they may have felt it necessary, once again, to pre-empt Leo X offering himself as ‘arbitrator’ and potentially mediating any peace with a pro-French bias.321 Just as in 1518 and 1520, however, the papacy was excluded from this process until the last moment. Wolsey only instructed Clerk to disclose this ‘peace’ initiative to Leo on 20 June 1521. At that point, he claimed to have Francis on-side, but not yet Charles, although he envisaged winning over the latter. Henry and Wolsey desired papal representation at the conference, perhaps even a legate a latere.322 His

319 Charles also wanted his diplomat to declare that an offensive to oust the French from Milan would more surely be achieved with papal backing (although he was careful to emphasise that he would be able to do it without Leo); ibid., 1371 (27 June 1521, Charles’ instructions two ambassadors going to England).
320 See above pp.697-700.
321 See above pp.722-723.
322 This information is rehearsed in Clerk’s reply to Wolsey. The desire for a(-nother) legate to attend is not explicit; while, Clerk mentions ‘some notable person’ being desired by the English, he implies later in the letter that the preferred choice of the English was Cardinal de’ Medici; LPIIIii, 1402 (9 July 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome), 1404 (9 July 1521, Campeggio to [Wolsey], Rome). When Francis agreed to Wolsey presiding over the Calais conference (around 9 June 1521), he claimed that, as he was bound not to make any agreements without Leo X’s consent, he wanted permission for the pope to send envoys to oversee their interests. Henry accepted this proposal; ibid., 1337 (9 June 1521, Jerningham to Wolsey, Dijon), 1338 (calendared 9-10 June 1521), 1339 (calendared 9-10 June 1521).
further sought to consult the pontiff on ‘the ways of arbitrament’ and may also have requested broader legatine powers to enhance his status at this summit. Just as in 1518 and 1520, therefore, Henry and Wolsey intended to invest the occasion with ‘quasi-papal’ authority. The presence of a legate sent from Rome would lend direct papal support to Wolsey’s actions and one imagines that the English cardinal envisaged himself as the senior of the two. In reply, Leo argued as someone who had recently allied (secretly) against France; Henry, he argued, ‘knew little “what presumption and insolency the Frenchmen had us[ed] with his Holiness lately”’ and disclosed that, recently, Francis requested a brief from him, promising not to engage in any arbitration with the emperor-elect. The pope condemned Francis’ inability to observe treaties as a reason why he would not consent to the negotiations. Leo’s political intentions were explicit: ‘it is high time to punish the insolence of France, he will spend his blood to drive them out of Italy’, and he further sought English assistance in restraining Francis. In reply to the request for a delegate to attend the conference, Leo initially refused but, when he heard that Henry VIII awaited papal as well as Imperial and French approval to act as arbitrator, appeared to soften on this; the pontiff said that he would send a cardinal, if he had time, but was unable to release de’ Medici from his current role, governing Florence. Clerk subsequently doubted that Leo would despatch anyone although, if he did, it would be Campeggio. By 21 July, the papacy’s position, vis-à-vis the Calais Conference became

323 Bulls facilitating this were sent on the same date as Clerk’s reply to Wolsey’s desire for a papal representative to be present. The new commission contained powers, ‘the like of which have not been seen in England for many years’, believed by the Venetian ambassador in London to include the ability to confer English benefices and to receive annates (other than those of bishoprics), although he later confirmed that they excluded the latter power. LPIIIi, 1403 (9 July 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome); Ven.iii, 263, 272 (25 July 1521, Surian to the Signory).
324 Just as he had done when Campeggio was his co-legate in 1518; see above pp.637-643.
325 LPIIIi, 1402 (9 July 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome). Clerk later acknowledged receipt of Wolsey’s 25 June missive on 8 July; ibid., 1477 (8 August 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome). Campeggio, listening to rumours in Rome, assumed that he would be the legate sent and asked for Clerk to be instructed to urge that he be commissioned; ibid., 1404 (9 July 1521, Campeggio to [Wolsey]). The pope also resisted French pressure to send a new delegate to the conference, arguing that he already had nuncios in England and France, one of whom would suffice. The French interpreted this to mean that Leo had sided with Charles; ibid., 1366 (25 June 1521, Count de Carpi to Francis, Rome).
clearer. Despite repeated English approaches to have a papal representative despatched, Clerk reported Leo to be indifferent. Such was his enmity against France that Leo dismissed the conference, believing that the matters in dispute would be solved imminently ‘by dint of sword’. Indeed, Clerk reiterated the pope’s friendship with the emperor-elect, his enmity of the French and desire to expel the latter from Italy; he also outlined the papacy’s military movements (and preparations). To emphasise his belief that this was a firm papal policy, Clerk stressed that ‘his Hol[iness is] set, nor it availeth not to reason with his Holiness to the contrary’. The Englishman also reported sustained papal pressure for him to request English aid against Francis I, but he had discouraged the pontiff, claiming that Henry would not agree to such a war at present. Leo disagreed, however, and told the orator ‘that I [Clerk] could not tell what mind the King’s highness and your Grace would be of, where he should see the likelihood and possibility that should be against the Frenchmen’.326

The pope began to publicly express his enmity against France from the end of June and at a consistory, perhaps on the 27th, revealed his alliance with Charles, including to England.327 Around the same time, Campeggio advised that a Franco-Imperial conflict in Italy was deemed inevitable.328 On the other hand, the papacy may not have divulged this

326 *Ibid.*, 1430 (21 July 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome). It seems that the papacy was also subject to Imperial pressure to be uncooperative with the English peace initiative. In mid-July, the Venetian orator at the Imperial Court claimed to have seen correspondence from Caracciolo to Rome, conveying Charles’ assurance that Henry VIII did not have enough power to secure a peace or truce (at Calais) and that, were the English monarch forced to choose sides, he would turn against France; *Ven.iii*, 262 (16 July 1521, Contarini to the Council of Ten, Antwerp).

327 While Pastor claims that the alliance was effectively revealed in Consistory on the 27th, Knecht suggests that it was the 29th, R.J. Knecht, *Francis I*, p.107; L.Pastor, *History of the Popes*, viii, pp.35-36, 42-43. The French ambassador in Rome sensed a *volte-face* by the papacy by 20 June 1521 (which France had hitherto considered an ally, albeit a secret one); Count Carpi reported the imminent (and, as far as he was concerned, ominous) arrival of the *condottiero* Prospero Colonna, as well as a lack of alarm from the pope about the presence of Spanish troops on the border of the Papal States. Overall, the orator opined, the recent death of the emperor elect’s principal minister, the francophile Chièvres, marked a change in policy which would see Charles draw closer to Rome; *LPIIIi*, 1366 (25 June 1521, Count de Carpi to Francis, Rome).

328 Campeggio notified Wolsey that the Spanish, then at the River Tronto, intended to launch an assault on Milan at the first possible opportunity; *Ibid.*, 1369 (27 June 1521, [Campeggio to Wolsey], Rome).
information to the English just yet; as at 9 July, while the English ambassador Clerk understood that Leo had allied with Charles (due to Francis’ attack on Reggio) and wished to expel the French from Italy, the pope was still denying the former, but admitting the latter.  

Despite earlier secrecy surrounding this agreement, Wolsey seems to have been confident that the pope would adhere to any anti-French actions decided upon by England and the Empire as early as 6 July. He had perhaps heard of Leo X’s attacks on French interests up to this point. The first official news of the papacy’s new anti-French alignment appears to have reached England after 8 July. Spinelly was then present at an audience given by the emperor to the papal nuncio in the Low Countries on the 9th. Here, the nuncio formally requested the emperor’s aid against France and declared his intention to communicate this to other princes, in particular Henry ‘who had ever been most closely linked with the Church’. Charles agreed to support the pontiff and then asked Spinelly to relay this request to Henry, so that he could declare himself in favour of Rome. Spinelly’s reply was said to be ‘very violent’, stating that Henry would react to this within a few days. ‘These Frenchmen want to rule the universe,’ he added. Leo X appears, therefore, to have been attempting to induce

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329 To indicate Leo being pro-Charles, Clerk observed that Charles have been given the investiture of Naples and, on last St Peter’s Day, the pope had received the annual homage gift of a white horse. As a result, Clerk believed he would act in tandem with the emperor elect; LPIIIii, 1402 (9 July 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome), 1403 (9 July 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome).

330 Reporting their audience with Henry and Wolsey, at which the latter were reportedly enthusiastic to align with Charles V against Francis, the Imperial diplomats further conveyed the cardinal’s wish to, apparently, form a broader league against France, including the pope, of whose mind Wolsey claimed to be sure; ibid., 1395 (6 July 1521, bishop of Elna and Haneton to Charles).

331 On this date, Spinelly reported hearing that Leo X had declared in favour of the emperor and that he had approached the Swiss with a view to attacking the French at Milan; ibid., 1398 (calendared 6-8 July 1521, Spinelly to Wolsey). According to a Venetian source at the French court, Henry VIII may have heard about the papacy’s actions even earlier, as prior to 6 July, Francis I reportedly wrote to the English king about a ‘stir made against him by the Pope’. Leo, it was claimed, had bestowed Charles V with the investiture of Naples, in return for troops, galleys, an annual financial tribute, as well as a number of cities. Francis claimed that the pope had done this because he had not gained Ferrara. In addition, the French king had promised to restore to Leo Modena and Reggio ‘and this was not enough for him’; Ven.iii, 253 (6 July 1521, Giovanni Badoer to the Signory, ‘Argilly’).

332 The pope approached Charles, allegedly on account of a French offensive on Reggio, on 23 June. In respect of Spinelly’s comments, the Venetian author of this letter conveyed that they could be largely dismissed, as the English diplomat did not carry much weight in crown circles; Ven.iii, 254 (9 July 1521, Contarini to the Signory.
Henry VIII into resuming his role of ‘defending the faith’, by following Charles V’s lead. The emperor repeated his pledge to aid the pope and his request for Henry VIII to do the same, to Richard Wingfield and Thomas Spinelly during an audience around 13 July, in which Charles described Henry ‘as one who had been a special defender of the Holy Church’. These envoys also forwarded news of the consistory in which the pope publicly declared himself against France at this point, along with the pope’s request before all ambassadors in Rome that their princes support him. The emperor, impatient for a reply concerning the pope’s request for aid, instructed Wingfield and Spinelly to write to England again in this regard on the 14th.

Wingfield, perhaps trying to toe the ‘party line’ (his commission being to secure the emperor’s support for the Calais conference), tried to reason with Charles that the offence committed against the pope ‘was rather in demonstration than in deeds’, but to little avail.

In England, before 16 July, Ghinucci and the Imperial ambassador presented letters to Wolsey from their masters, the nuncio declaring Leo’s intention to join with Charles against France and, presumably, requesting England’s participation. Wolsey was said to be still committed to going to Calais, however. Henry and Wolsey must have given their reply to the papal proposal promptly, as the emperor acknowledged it on 20th. The response appears to have been positive, expressing goodwill to both pope and emperor, Charles expecting Wolsey to repair from Calais to his presence, ‘to bring the matter [presumably an anti-French alliance] to a speedy conclusion’.

Furthermore, it cannot have been a coincidence that at this stage, as Richard Wingfield revealed on 22 July, Henry promised to assist Charles once this
‘straighter conjunction’ had been made. He also told the emperor to keep it secret for now. Intelligence from the Low Countries also arrived around this time; Wingfield and Spinelly reported having seen intercepted letters that revealed a planned Franco-papal expedition against Naples and Francis’ promise of Ferrara to the pope. When the latter was slow to materialise, they reported, the pope went over to Charles, ‘thus Wolsey will see his Holiness’ devotion to peace’. 338

English enthusiasm for an anti-French alliance with the emperor increased somewhat following news of the pope’s public emergence from the shadow of France. 339 On 19 July, Henry was said to have defended the pope’s behaviour against complaints by a pair of French envoys who came to protest against papal actions. They claimed that Leo had made military preparations against Genoa long before Francis moved against Reggio (which was correct). The English king replied that this may well have been the case, but Francis had previously put the pope ‘in such fear and extreme subjection, that he was compelled to do as he had done’. In reply to their assertion that Francis no longer intended sending delegates to Calais, Henry replied that Francis ‘might lose much reputation, especially in Italy, for it would appear to all men that the Pope, the Emperor, and England would join against him’. 340 The following day, Wolsey praised the king’s statements and claimed to have independently told the Frenchmen the same things. He also displayed his continued intention to go to Calais, arrange Franco-Imperial differences and to conclude ‘a straight conjunction with the

337 Ibid., 1432 (22 July 1521, Richard Wingfield to Wolsey, Ghent).
338 Ibid., 1419 (16 July 1521, Sir Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to Wolsey, Antwerp).
339 Ibid., 1432 (22 July 1521, Richard Wingfield to Wolsey, Ghent), 1466 (5 August 1521, Wolsey to Charles, Calais). Also, on 25 July, the Venetian ambassador in England reported separate audiences with Henry and Wolsey, at which each threatened the republic that, as it had acted with France at Reggio, England would be bound to attack Venice (in accordance with the Treaty of London). While Suriano claimed to have placated both king and minister, this provides an indication of England’s anti-French and pro-papal credentials merely days before Wolsey was supposed to arbitrate at Calais; Ven.iii, 272 (25 July 1521, Surian to the Signory), 273 (27 July 1521, Surian to the Signory, London).
340 Richard Pace reported these exchanges to Wolsey on 20 July; LPIIIii, 1425 (20 July 1521, Pace to [Wolsey], Windsor). Also see Ven.iii, 268 (22 July 1521, Surian to the Signory, London).
Emperor’. Wolsey was observed to have been aware of some sort of ‘capitulations’ between the pope and emperor, ‘which as yet be kept to theym selfes secrete’, on 25 July.

England’s representatives in Rome, on the other hand, were slow to react to this news, taking a few weeks to even include this in their despatches. Campeggio wrote of the pope’s open favour of the emperor on 8 July. Clerk reported the same on the 9th and claimed to have protested at the lack of consultation with England as promised by Leo, to which the latter replied, ‘What will you that we should do, these Frenchmen be so proud? They be of such power, and we be so nigh their danger…. Wherefore high necessity compelleth us now to fall in with these Spaniards, and to grant unto them many things’. Clerk further denied rumours of an imminent Anglo-Imperial accord. While Clerk maintained England’s public policy of non-partisan arbitration, he was revealing in his assessment of papal intentions. He believed that Leo X would not remain neutral; ‘as the Emperor and the King’s highness do, he will be ready always to do the same’. This again supports the idea that Clerk may have known of England’s ‘secret’ anti-French strategy. By 21 July, Clerk conveyed the pope’s repeated requests to aid him against the French. While the orator advised Leo that he didn’t think that Henry would agree (officially, keeping to the ‘party line’), the pontiff dismissed this.

341 LPHIII, 1426 (20 July 1521, Wolsey to Henry, Westminster).
342 The Imperial embassy in England had been instructed only to disclose the alliance, if Henry and Wolsey would not agree to a closer alliance. As this had already been indicated to them, it seems that this information was not revealed; ibid., 1439 (25 July 1521, Wolsey to Henry, Westminster); P. Gwyn, ‘Wolsey’s Foreign Policy’, HJ, 24, p.770, n.78. For the Venetian ambassador embedded with the English crown talking of ‘some secret understanding between the Pope and the Emperor’ on 3 August, see Ven.iii, 278.
343 LPIIIii, 1400 (8 July 1521, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome).
344 Ibid., 1403 (9 July 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome). Also see ibid., 1402 (9 July 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome). Clerk repeated this news on 21 July, also asserting at this point that French support of Ferrara and ‘other rebels of the Church’ also contributed to Leo X’s change in foreign policy; ibid., 1430 (21 July 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome).
345 Ibid., 1430 (21 July 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome).
In spite of ‘positive’ papal signals for the anti-French agenda, Wolsey still determined to follow-through with the Calais Conference. England was not yet allied with either Charles or Leo and experience would have told him that it was far too early to count on their commitment.\footnote{346 See above pp.536-549.} By this ‘arbitration’, therefore, Wolsey could secretly ally England to the Empire, thereby taking the first step towards the breach with France. That he demanded that this be a precursor to alliance with Rome has already been mentioned. He also did not wish to provoke France until England was ready for war, hence his complementary desire for a truce in the meantime, to prepare for conflict.\footnote{347 See above pp 28-732.}

By 5 August, Campeggio spoke of the ‘great expectation’ felt in Rome about Wolsey crossing to Calais, apparently on account of the underlying anti-French plans. In consequence of papal military preparations and the progress of Imperial forces, he advised that ‘all now rests with England to augment these victories, or demand peace from the French on any condition’.\footnote{348 Given that Wolsey only crossed the Channel on 2 August, it is unlikely that Campeggio would have received accurate news of this yet. The former’s trip had been delayed, however, on several occasions; \textit{LPIIIii}, 1468 (5 August 1521, [Campeggio to Wolsey], Rome). In a similar way, Clerk reported news having reached Rome of Wolsey’s arrival in Calais on the 8th; \textit{Ibid.}, 1477 (8 August 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome).} Meanwhile, in England, towards the end of July, the crown still anticipated papal compliance to its request to send a delegate to Calais.\footnote{349 The Venetian ambassador in England, Surian, understood that the pope would send someone for the congress; \textit{Ven.iii}, 273 (27 July 1521, Surian to the Signory, London). Also, on 30 July, Charles’ chancellor (and one of the emperor elect’s delegates for the meeting), de Gattinara, reported that lodgings had been arranged for a ‘papal legate’ at Calais. While this could refer to Wolsey’s imminent residence there, this could, arguably, have been taken for granted, given that he would arrive on 2 August, and therefore would not be worthy of note. For this particular observation, it is feasible that the Imperial councillor anticipated the arrival of another legate, to represent Rome at the negotiations; \textit{LPIIIii}, 1446 (30 July 1521, Gattinara to Charles, Dunkirk).} Despite the lack of arrival of any special papal representative before the beginning of the conference, Wolsey sought to involve the English-based Ghinucci at least. He held a secret meeting with the nuncio around the end of July, ‘concerning his Holiness’ affairs against the Frenchmen’. One can only surmise that the cardinal admitted the nuncio to his confidence, perhaps revealing his real

\footnote{348 Given that Wolsey only crossed the Channel on 2 August, it is unlikely that Campeggio would have received accurate news of this yet. The former’s trip had been delayed, however, on several occasions; \textit{LPIIIii}, 1468 (5 August 1521, [Campeggio to Wolsey], Rome). In a similar way, Clerk reported news having reached Rome of Wolsey’s arrival in Calais on the 8th; \textit{Ibid.}, 1477 (8 August 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome).}
intention for Calais, as Leo later took ‘comfort’ from this news ‘and instantly desireth your grace to continue in that good manner and purpose’. Ghinucci subsequently attended a meeting at Calais on 5 August (possibly the first of the conference), along with the French and Imperial delegates; the nuncio lauded the congress but stated that he had no commission from Leo X to represent him, although he was confident of gaining such power and wrote to Rome for this. By this, papal involvement in the truce negotiations was effectively suspended until notification from Rome.

Initially, at Calais, Wolsey seems not to have involved the papal representatives in his ‘secret’ negotiations with the Imperialists towards an anti-French alliance. During discussions at Bruges on 19 August, it was reported that the nuncios present, Ghinucci and Caracciolo, were finding it difficult to gain audience with Wolsey (even being turned away from his residence). Nevertheless, the cardinal apparently held a lengthy discussion with them that same afternoon. It seems likely that the cardinal-legate at least hinted at his intentions

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350 LIIIii, 1486 (12 August 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome). According to Contarini, the Venetian ambassador with Charles, his papal counterpart in Ghent was fully briefed by Ghinucci in England, the latter ‘who takes part in all the present consultations and is acquainted with everything’. Caracciolo also understood that negotiations were afoot for an Anglo-Imperial marriage alliance, although it is unclear whether he received this intelligence from Ghinucci. This nuncio also revealed the papal hope that the peace conference fail and that Henry subsequently ally with the papacy; Ven.iii, 274 (29 July 1521, Contarini to the Signory, Ghent).

351 The Venetian diplomat resident at the Imperial Court refers to more than one papal ambassador present at a similar meeting on the 6th, while the French delegates reported negotiations on the 7th, at which a nuncio (presumably Ghinucci) made a speech. Finally, Peter Martyr wrote on the 13th of Ghinucci attending the conference on behalf of Leo X; Ven.iii, 280 (5 August 1521, Surian to the Signory, Calais), 285 (8 August 1521, Contarini to the Signory, Bruges); LIIIii, 1478 (8 August 1521, French ambassadors at Calais to Francis, Calais), 1487 (13 August 1521, Peter Martyr to Marq, A.M., Valladolid).

352 While the nuncio at the Imperial Court, Caracciolo, seems to have been aware of a rumour at least that an Anglo-Imperial marriage alliance was in the offing from at least mid-August 1521, there was no indication that he was involved in discussions at this stage. In conversation with the Venetian ambassador Contarini, the nuncio reportedly opined on the 17th that Wolsey would not be successful in arranging a Franco-Imperial peace. By the 19th, Caracciolo commented that ‘these Imperialists have assuredly concluded the business’, and asked Contarini, ‘did I not tell you at Ghent that an agreement and marriage were in course of negotiation between the King of England and the Emperor?’ Finally, the nuncio added, ‘I am of opinion that the treaty is now ratified, and thus…the French will find themselves without a leg to stand on’; Ven.iii, 299 (17 August 1521, Contarini to the Signory, Bruges), 302 (19 August 1521, Contarini to the Signory, Bruges). For a comment on the secrecy surrounding these negotiations, see ibid., 312 (24 August 1521, Contarini to the Signory, Bruges).

353 Contarini was informed on the morning of the 19th that his own appointment with Wolsey had been ‘bumped’ because of the meeting with the nuncios. Simultaneously, Ghinucci and Caracciolo also began to gain access to
at this point. Indeed, around the 22nd, Caracciolo reportedly suggested to his Venetian counterpart that Henry VIII would eventually declare himself on the emperor’s side. Furthermore, by the 24th, Contarini conveyed intelligence that, over several days, the nature of the negotiations had been communicated to the two papal representatives and for the previous two days, they had actually been present at them. The Venetian was sure that the nuncios had copies of the articles of agreement and would send them straight to Rome.

The Treaty of Bruges, concluded by Wolsey with the emperor-elect on 25 August 1521, effectively committed England to join the Empire in the conflict against France. The papacy was central to the alliance and, most significantly, both Henry and Charles undertook to be ‘protectors’ both of the papacy and of the Medici. In addition, papal representatives would be expected to attend a planned meeting between Henry and Charles in the spring. Furthermore, when they launched a joint offensive in 1523, Leo was expected to use ‘the spiritual arm only’. Finally, the treaty would be approved by the king and emperor elect only once the pope had ratified its articles. On the same day, Wolsey issued instructions to John Clerk to inform the pontiff of the ‘real’ English foreign policy and combined this with the presentation of the king’s book against Luther, the Assertio Septem Sacramentorum. The orator was instructed to bestow the latter on Leo X, ‘declaring the King’s resolution to support the Church, and extinguish heresy by the sword and pen’. Reinforcing this role (and angling for an honorary title), Wolsey also directed him, when given the chance to present an

\[ \text{Charles V; ibid., 302 (19 August 1521, Contarini to the Signory, Bruges), 310 (22 August 1521, Contarini to the Signory, Bruges).} \]

\[ \text{ibid., 310 (22 August 1521, Contarini to the Signory, Bruges).} \]

\[ \text{Caracciolo had told the Venetian that Charles had rejected Wolsey’s truce initiative on account of the pope doing the same; ibid., 312 (24 August 1521, Contarini to the Signory, Bruges).} \]

\[ \text{In terms of Leo’s wielding of ecclesiastical censures, it was stipulated that he ‘lay the whole of France under interdict, and withdraw all the honours and prerogatives which the French have hitherto held of the Church of Rome’; LPIIIii, 1508 (25 August 1521, Bruges). Wolsey also implied to Henry that he could ‘defend’ the papacy by controlling the balance of power in a letter of 28 August, suggesting that England was now ‘an angle of the world’ and could rule and govern most of Christendom, including Italy; ibid., 1515 (28 August 1521, Wolsey to Henry, Gravelines).} \]
oration during the presentation ceremony, to advise ‘that the King has therein styled himself the very Defender of the Catholic Faith [of] Christ’s Church, which he has truly deserved of the See Apostolic’. In the context of the papacy’s contemporary enmity with France, the political implications of these statements were unambiguous. Furthermore, Clerk was to reveal to the pontiff in private, first binding him to secrecy, that Henry had decided to ally with him and Charles against Francis because of the latter’s attacks on the Empire and the Papal States, as well as due to the papal and Imperial requests for support. At this point, Leo was to be informed that, to gain time to prepare for the conflict, Henry had ordered Wolsey to conduct the Calais peace negotiations and that a marriage alliance had been agreed under cover of these. Leo was to be asked to send a messenger to Wolsey, who intended to remain at Calais until the start of October (in a bid to protract the talks). By the end of August 1521, therefore, Wolsey clearly indicated the English crown’s anti-French plans and the ‘price’ that he expected from the papacy as a result; an honorary title, recognising Henry’s ‘defence’ of the papacy.

The secrecy surrounding the anti-French agenda was entirely understandable, not least because the Treaty of Bruges provided for no-one to know about it apart from ‘the secret councillors of the contracting parties’. As papal ratification of treaty and participation in the planned offensive was expected, and the papal nuncios at Bruges already seem to have been informed of the agreement, Leo X was perhaps far more knowledgeable about this than Clerk and Campeggio. While the pope was apparently informed of England’s anti-French actions by 12 August, via the diplomatic back-channel provided by Ghinucci, the English

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357 Ibid., 1510 (25 August 1521, [Wolsey to Clerk], Bruges). Also see ibid., 1502 (24 August 1521, Wolsey to [Henry]), 1519 (29 August 1521, Pace to [Wolsey], Guildford). The timing of this was evidently stage-managed by Wolsey, as he had reminded Henry to sign and send him the relevant letters to the pope concerning the book shortly before he crossed for Calais; ibid., 1449 (calendared end July 1521, Wolsey to Henry).
358 See above pp.164-167.
359 LPIMIII, 1508 (25 August 1521, Bruges).
representatives in Rome remained in the dark.\textsuperscript{360} Campeggio, hearing of Wolsey’s arrival in Bruges, wrote to the cardinal on 30 August, expecting ‘to hear of some glorious deed as the result of this journey,’ also reporting that ‘many say it was undertaken to reconcile the Kings and to provide for peace; others, to assist Charles in avenging a broken treaty’.\textsuperscript{361} Similarly, Clerk was no better informed; on 3 September, he acknowledged a letter from Tuke, dated 8 August, apparently describing Wolsey’s arrival at Calais and the accompanying ceremonies. In the same post, moreover, Clerk was aware of the arrival of an encrypted letter presumably from Ghinucci. While Clerk probed Leo X on this correspondence, the pontiff was reluctant to disclose its contents, stating merely that ‘\textit{Nos speramus quod D. Cardinalis Eboracensis om[nia] tractabit bene}'. As far as the orator was concerned, it was widely anticipated that Wolsey was going to ‘secure peace among all Christians’.\textsuperscript{362} It can be reasonably surmised that the Ghinucci letter revealed to the pope Wolsey’s good intentions towards him, indicated to the nuncio shortly before their departure for Calais, if not his speculation of what was expected to pass at Bruges in the near future.\textsuperscript{363} Clerk only became \textit{au fait} with the Treaty of Bruges (and the details of the anti-French strategy) by Wolsey’s notification which reached him by 14 September. Binding the pope to secrecy, he revealed that Henry VIII had decided to join the pope and emperor ‘in defence of the Church’. In spite of this, Henry and his council had identified some short-term difficulties in pursuing this policy: firstly, they did not have enough time to raise the troops needed; secondly, the campaigning season would be over before English forces could be transported; thirdly, the expense involved. As a result, Clerk continued, Henry’s Council determined that he should act as arbitrator between the Empire

\textsuperscript{360} Ibid., 1486 (12 August 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome).
\textsuperscript{361} Ibid., 1522 (30 August 1521, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome).
\textsuperscript{362} Ibid., 1540 (3 September 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome). Clerk still had no idea of what was going on at Calais and Bruges on 5 September; ibid., 1545 (5 September 1521, [Clerk to Wolsey], Rome). For Clerk’s probable understanding that an anti-French strategy was planned, although he may have been unaware of its details, see p.738.
\textsuperscript{363} See above pp.739-740.
and Rome, on the one part, and France on the other, to enable a sufficient English invasion to be launched at a suitable time. Furthermore, Henry wished for ‘some sure knot of alliance’ with Charles V and, so, the Calais conference in pursuit of a truce ‘was only a colour to deceive the French King’. Leo thanked Henry and Wolsey ‘for attending to the interests of the Church’.364

When Wolsey returned to Calais to resume ‘peace’ talks in late August, he concentrated on his desire for an interim truce, while England could ready itself for war. Ghinucci represented Leo X at these talks.365 Even with papal involvement, however, a cessation of hostilities (even temporary) looked practically impossible. One must remember that the papacy’s presence was as a partisan power, allied with the emperor against France, and that its involvement raised political obstacles for the progress of the conference towards its public aims. Firstly, the nuncio was not empowered to treat on Leo X’s behalf and such power did not arrive until at least 5 October, when papal agreement to a truce was apparently conditional on the inclusion of Florence, the marquis of Mantua and Milanese exiles.366

364 LPIIIii, 1574 (14 September 1521, Clerk to Wolsey, Rome). Also see Sp.ii, 359 (26 September 1521, Juan Manuel to Charles, Rome).
365 ‘The nuncio is always with us,’ reported Gattinara on 12 September. One or more papal attendees were reported on 30 and 31 August, as well as 1, 6, 7, 12 September, 2 October, 22 November. Ghinucci was reportedly ill for the eighth session on 29 September; Ven.iii, 321 (30 August 1521, Surian to the Signory, Calais); LPIIIii, 1525 (31 August 1521, Imperial ambassadors at Calais to Charles), 1534 (1 September 1521, Imperial ambassadors at Calais to Charles), 1535 (1 September 1521, French ambassadors at Calais to Francis), 1549 (6 September 1521, Gattinara to Charles, Calais), 1553 (7 September 1521, Imperial ambassadors at Calais to Charles), 1568 (12 September 1521, Gattinara to Charles, Calais), 1626 (2 October 1521), 1816 (calendared end November 1521; Imperial account of the Calais Conference). For the belief among observers that Leo X opposed a truce; Ven.iii, 325 (5 September 1521, Surian to the Signory, Calais), 330 (9 September 1521, Surian to the Signory, Calais).
366 On 1 September, when the French diplomats reportedly asserted that they were not empowered to negotiate with their papal counterpart(s), Ghinucci agreed that it would not become the pope for him to enter into such discussions with the French when the latter lacked such authority. Wolsey told French delegates on 5 October that he had received letters from Rome indicating that the pope was prepared to treat with France; LPIIIii, 1534 (1 September 1521, Imperial ambassadors at Calais to Charles), 1568 (12 September 1521, Gattinara to Charles, Calais), 1638 (6 October 1521, French ambassadors in Calais to Francis), 1816 (calendared end November 1521; Imperial account of the Calais Conference).
Wolsey had instructed Clerk to have the pope issue such a commission on the same date that he notified him of the Treaty of Bruges. The cardinal stressed the need for speed, but Clerk encountered procrastination around 14 September. The orator does seem to have succeeded shortly after, however.\footnote{LPIIIii, 1574 (14 September 1521, Clerk to Wolsey, Rome), 1618 (calendared at 30 September 1521, [Clerk to Wolsey]).} The delay may have arisen from papal suspicions about Wolsey’s motives; towards the end of September, Leo voiced his fears to the Imperial orator that the English cardinal might be deceiving them and advised that someone ought to warn Henry about him.\footnote{Sp.ii, 359 (26 September 1521, Juan Manuel to Charles, Rome).} This lack of papal commission encouraged Imperial obstruction, as Charles’ delegates insisted that, by virtue of the Anglo-Imperial alliance, they could not come to any type of agreement without papal consent and, as Ghinucci was not appropriately commissioned, the Empire could not, therefore, adhere to any peace or truce. In the first meeting of 30 August, Wolsey said that the difficulties that he experienced in Bruges (in gaining Charles’ agreement to peace) were caused by an oath that the emperor had made to Leo that he would not negotiate any agreement with Francis. Despite this, Wolsey tried to invoke his quasi-papal legatine authority by claiming, in the name of the pope, that all parties would ratify some agreement.\footnote{Ven.iii, 321 (30 August 1521, Surian to the Signory, Calais). Also see LPIIIii, 1535 (1 September 1521, French ambassadors at Calais to Francis), 1816 (calendared end November 1521; Imperial account of the Calais Conference).} In subsequent days, Wolsey tried to challenge Imperial intransigence on the basis that the need to seek papal agreement was not in the delegates’ commission. Gattinara dismissed this and also revealed that he had to continue with such delaying tactics to avoid raising French suspicions, with which he claimed Wolsey was happy.\footnote{LPIIIii, 1549 (6 September 1521, Gattinara to Charles, Calais). For another letter reporting Wolsey’s approval of the same powers given to the Imperial delegates, see ibid., 1553 (7 September 1521, Imperial ambassadors at Calais to Charles).} The English cardinal continued to lobby Gattinara in this regard, however. Towards the end of September, Wolsey may have been confident of papal agreement on account of
papal financial difficulties and proposed that they arrange a truce that the pope could agree to afterwards. The Imperial chancellor believed that this would offend the pope and instead suggested that the truce apply only to ultramontane areas, but Wolsey feared that this would encourage Francis to focus his forces against Leo X. The lack of papal power was still a concern for Wolsey and, despite assuring the French that it was on its way on 29 September, within days he was visibly worried, questioning Surian whether Venice had intercepted it. The Imperial objection was removed by 5 October when Wolsey claimed that Ghinucci’s power to treat had arrived. Around the same time, Charles understood that its arrival was imminent and stepped in to support Wolsey’s proposal for a general truce, although still on condition that he gained papal approval (or act as security for Leo’s agreement). In terms of bringing the French to a truce, Francis’ delegates argued on a similar basis to their Imperial counterparts that they were not sufficiently empowered to conclude. They argued that they could not negotiate with papal representatives, as they were only expecting to treat with Imperial delegates. Just as Gattinara had proposed an ultramontane truce in late September, Wolsey came under similar pressure from the French. Wolsey replied angrily that Francis was not prepared to cease the war in Italy. The actual papal commission to join the truce arrived at the Imperial court at Valenciennes on 14 October, in the hands of Jeronimo Adorno, who had travelled post from

371 Ibid., 1595 (20 September 1521, Imperial ambassadors at Calais to Charles), 1606 (24 September 1521, Gattinara to Charles, Calais), 1612 (29 September 1521, Imperial ambassadors at Calais to Charles), 1624 (1 October 1521, Gattinara to Charles, Calais).
372 Ibid., 1816 (calendared end November 1521; Imperial account of the Calais Conference); Ven.iii, 351 (28 October 1521, doge and senate to Surian).
373 LPIIIii, 1638 (6 October 1521, French ambassadors in Calais to Francis). Gattinara was reined in by Charles, dismissing this idea and insisting that Wolsey gain papal consent to his original truce proposal; ibid., 1615 (30 September 1521, Charles to Gattinara, ‘Bins’), 1616 (30 September 1521, Charles to his ambassadors at Calais, ‘Bins’), 1636 (5 October 1521, Gattinara to Charles, Calais), 1640 (7 October 1521, Charles to -), 1641 (calendared 7 October 1521, Charles to Gattinara).
374 They did say, however, that they would apply to Francis for this power; ibid., 1534 (1 September 1521, Imperial ambassadors at Calais to Charles), 1535 (1 September 1521, French ambassadors at Calais to Francis).
375 Ven.iii, 342 (28 September 1521, Surian to the Signory, Calais).
Rome. He was said to outrank Ghinnuci and had reportedly been instructed to wait for the result of current operations in Italy before acting; either pressing for an advantageous truce if this was favourable, or to have Wolsey force a truce if it was not.\(^{376}\) The commission itself provided for a number of demands from the pope, including those already known by Wolsey concerning the inclusion of Florence, Siena, Mantua and other papal confederates.\(^{377}\) It may also have demanded the exclusion of papal ‘rebels’, such as Francesco Maria della Rovere.\(^{378}\) This commission was not forwarded to Calais.\(^{379}\)

Negotiations subsequently slowed on Leo X’s conditions. On 9 October, for instance, Francis admitted that he was happy to incorporate the pope and Florence, but not the marquis of Mantua and Milanese rebels.\(^{380}\) To his delegates in Calais, on the other hand, Francis wrote on 12 October, that he was not prepared to include the same parties, but would admit Florence if this was insisted upon.\(^{381}\) On the 16th, the French delegates attempted to negotiate these conditions (and their own) with Wolsey, but the cardinal insisted on the inclusion of all those stipulated by Leo. The legate further challenged the French to show him what Francis had written, as he claimed to know that they had ‘double letters’ that permitted the inclusion of Florence and the marquis of Mantua. Wolsey then proceeded to threaten them, suggesting that if Francis did not listen to him, all Christendom would turn against him. Concerning the

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\(^{376}\) *LPIIIii*, 1676 (14 October 1521, Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to Wolsey, Valenciennes); *Ven.iii*, 348 (15 October 1521, Contarini to the Signory, Valenciennes). Also see *LPIIIii*, 1666 (calendared 11 October 1521, Charles to Gattinara).

\(^{377}\) *LPIIIii*, 1678 (calendared 14-15 October 1521, extract of letters). When the nuncios Ghinucci and Caracciolo were brought into Anglo-Imperial negotiations around 22 August, they explained to Wolsey the pope’s rejection of the truce initiative on account of Leo’s reluctance to desert anti-French elements in Milan; *Ven.iii*, 312 (24 August 1521, Contarini to the Signory, Bruges).

\(^{378}\) *LPIIIii*, 1640 (7 October 1521, Charles to -). This particular condition was summarised in the eventual Imperial summary of the conference as the insistence on the parties becoming ‘friends of friends, and enemies of enemies’; *ibid.*, 1816 (calendared end November 1521; Imperial account of the Calais Conference).

\(^{379}\) See pp.748-749.

\(^{380}\) *Ibid.*, 1651 (9 October 1521, Fitzwilliam to [Wolsey], Mortaigne).

\(^{381}\) *Ibid.*, 1670 (12 October 1521, Francis’ instructions to his ambassadors at Calais).
Milanese exiles, however, Wolsey reportedly conceded that their status should remain as it was before the start of the war between France and Rome.  

Shortly after the arrival of the papal commission/s, Wolsey moved to force a truce by despatching embassies to both Charles and Francis. In his message to Charles, he urged the emperor-elect ‘not to r[egard] matters of Italy and the Pope so greatly as to damage the rest of his dominions for their advancement’. In other words, the emperor ought not to reject the truce on account of difficulties in obtaining papal agreement. A problem arose, however, when Docwra and Boleyn arrived at the Imperial court to discover that the papal commission was apparently limited. They further reported that the pope’s ambassadors there had offered to remain in prison until sufficient powers arrived. The English diplomats did admit, however, that they had not yet spoken to Adorno about his commission to treat for a truce. They did visit Adorno on the 27th and, according to Wolsey’s instructions, confronted him on this issue. The papal envoy replied that he had ‘a universal commission to consent to all that the King and Wolsey thought good for the Pope’s honour’. In response, Adorno was urged to send this power straight to Wolsey, so that there would be no delay, but Adorno’s ‘colleague’ ventured that they ought to see the articles of the truce before they consented to it on the pope’s behalf. At this point, a number of papal conditions were raised for Wolsey to include. The English ambassadors interpreted this to mean that their papal equivalents did have sufficient commission, but pretended to wait for it. In addition, they reported Adorno’s belief that the truce would not occur, on account of the French.

382 Ibid., 1683 (16 October 1521, French ambassadors at Calais to Francis).
383 Ibid., 1694 (calendared 20 October 1521, Wolsey to Charles). Wolsey’s instructions for the earl of Worcester and bishop of Ely, sent to Francis I, on the other hand, do not mention the pope, but do emphasise the need for the truce on account of, among other reasons, ‘the victory of the Turk’ and ‘the peril of Hungary’; ibid., 1696 (calendared 20 October 1521, Wolsey to Francis).
384 Ibid., 1706 (26 October 1521, Docwra, Boleyn and Richard Wingfield to [Wolsey], ‘Curtraye’).
385 Ibid., 1714 (29 October 1521, Docwra, Boleyn and Richard Wingfield to [Wolsey], Oudenarde). Francis was also becoming impatient that his own orators had not seen the papal commission; ibid., 1720 (calendared end October 1521, memorandum from Francis).
Despite the arrival (albeit non-disclosure) of the papal commission and Wolsey’s more forward approach in pursuit of a truce, success was no closer. Indeed, Henry VIII had summoned his cardinal home on 27 October and Wolsey tried to wrap things up soon after. Charles’ stance was much the same as it had been at the beginning; he still sought papal agreement, the incorporation of Florence and any other place/person stipulated by Leo. The French position, on the other hand, was shifting, but not sufficiently for the other parties. Francis I instructed his negotiators on 2 November to concede the pope’s demands that the Milanese exiles be included, but only as long as papal ‘rebels’, such as Francesco Maria della Rovere were similarly comprised. Wolsey rejected this on the pope’s behalf, however. In subsequent days, there was some retrenchment by the French, as the offer to comprise the Milanese exiles was withdrawn and another condition added that Cardinal Schiner was not to join the pope’s army. By around 12-13 November, however, Francis had heeded Wolsey’s final ultimatum, then proposing a truce to Charles that provided for the inclusion of any parties on either side, except the Milanese exiles. This was too late, however, as the emperor-elect was unwilling to agree and Wolsey had conceded defeat, returning to England shortly after.

As to the unlikelihood of papal involvement, Wolsey admitted to Henry that Leo (and Charles) would be unwise to cease hostilities while the conflict in Italy looked as if it would expel the French from Milan, particularly as this would increase papal and Imperial power in the region. Furthermore, he believed that the pope would never consent to such a truce until this had occurred. While the nuncio with Charles possessed power to agree a truce, Wolsey

386 See n.193.
387 LPIIIi, 1729 (1 November 1521, [Imperial propositions for a truce]).
388 Ibid., 1746 (6 November 1521, French ambassadors at Calais to Francis).
389 Ibid., 1742 (5 November 1521, Somerset, West and Fitzwilliam to Wolsey, ‘Dourlens”).
390 Ibid., 1758 (calendared 12-13 November 1521, Francis to Charles).
391 For Wolsey’s opinion that Charles would not agree to a truce, see ibid., 1760 (calendared 13-14 November 1521, [Wolsey to Clerk]). Also see above pp.699-701.
believed that Adorno was instructions not to act until the aforementioned events had occurred. As Spinelly reiterated a few days later, ‘the Pope’s power “to entend to the true” [sic.] was sent thither, I think only for show, coming out of season’. 393

Contemporary to Wolsey’s attempts to negotiate a Franco-Imperial-papal truce, he also sought papal membership of the Treaty of Bruges. Wolsey asked Clerk to gain commissions ‘ad tractandum et concludendum’ in late August, when he notified Leo of the Anglo-Imperial alliance, but the ambassador encountered delay initially. 394 The appropriate power for this seems to have arrived at the Imperial Court at the same time as that commissioning Ghinucci and Adorno to discuss the truce. 395 On this understanding, Charles instructed Gattinara to show Ghinucci the articles of the proposed league and to agree to the minor alterations insisted upon by the pope. 396 While Wolsey had heard of its arrival by around the 20th, he appears to have recognised the need for direct papal consent and

392 LPIIIii, 1762 (calendared 13-14 November 1521, [Wolsey to Henry]). Wolsey’s belief is confirmed by Contarini, who on 19 November wrote of his hearing from Imperial insiders that Charles was reluctant to conclude a truce while he believed Milan would be won from the French and that the papal nuncios at the Imperial court encouraged him in this; Ven.iii, 365 (19 November 1521, Contarini to the Signory, Oudenarde). Charles’ understanding, around the same time, was that while Adorno had this power, he was instructed not to send it to Calais without being sure that the truce conditions were agreeable to the pope and, at present, they were not; ibid., 1765 (calendared 14-15 November 1521, Charles to his ambassadors at Calais).

393 LPIIIii, 1787 (20 November 1521, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Oudenarde).

394 Ibid., 1574 (14 September 1521, Clerk to Wolsey, Rome).

395 Ibid., 1666 (calendared 11 October 1521, Charles to Gattinara). This second commission probably arrived at the Imperial court along with Jeronimo Adorno on 14 October, although news of it preceded him; ibid., 1676 (14 October 1521, Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to Wolsey, Valenciennes), 1694 (calendared 20 October 1521, Wolsey to Charles); Ven.iii, 348 (15 October 1521, Contarini to the Signory, Valenciennes). If Leo X’s reported reaction to the Treaty of Bruges was true, then territorial concerns dictated his desire to join the Anglo-Imperial axis. The pope reportedly desired both parties to ‘show some liberality towards the Church out of their acquisitions from the French’ and, further, ‘that in the conclusion of the truce made at Bruges they should show some gratitude to God, by some increase of his patrimony’. As the pope felt it inappropriate to request this himself, ‘he thought it best to leave it to the inspiration of God and their own consciences’, although correspondence to Charles, Henry and Wolsey was planned; LPIIIii. 1723 (calendared end October 1521, extract from letters).

recommended this to Charles. Presumably having received a supportive reply, Wolsey contacted Clerk in mid-November to seek Leo X’s ratification of the coalition. Despite this, an extension to the Treaty of Bruges, including papal membership, was concluded at Calais on 24 November 1521. Again it envisaged the defence of the Church, providing for the restoration of lands recovered from the French to papal jurisdiction and war to be made on all enemies of the Christian faith. In short, it was similar to all previous agreements concluded whereby England pledged to protect Rome against France. Shortly before this Wolsey revealed why he had been so insistent on an Anglo-Imperial axis before incorporating Rome. As Gattinara reported, ‘he does not think his master and Charles ought to be led by the Pope; they ought rather to lead him to their own advantage’.

Throughout the Calais Conference, Franco-Imperial forces were at war (both directly and by proxy) in Italy. Part of the reason for procrastination by both sides concerning Wolsey’s truce proposal was that they awaited a decisive moment in the peninsula before agreeing to this. Indeed, Wolsey kept Henry informed with Italian news and the king does not seem have shared his cardinal’s desire for a truce. In mid-October, for instance, Pace reported that ‘the King expects great tidings’ if Schiner joins the papal army. The most significant news, as far as the anti-French agenda and papal ‘independence’ was concerned,

397 LPIii, 1694 (calendared 20 October 1521, Wolsey to Charles).
398 Ibid., 1760 (Ellis, pp.282-284; calendared 13-14 November 1521, [Wolsey to Clerk]). For rumours of this reaching Venetian ears, see Ven.iii, 364 (17 November 1521, Contarini to the Signory, Oudenaarde).
399 It also expected Leo X to lay France under interdict and named Cardinal de’ Medici to be protected under the treaty’s terms. Ghinucci concluded on Leo’s behalf; LPIii, 1796 (22 November 1521), 1802 (24 November 1521, Calais); P. Gwyn, ‘Wolsey’s Foreign Policy’, HI, 24, p.769. Sicca also believed that this revised treaty provided for Wolsey to be the joint Anglo-Imperial candidate for the next conclave, with de’ Medici to be second choice, although nothing has been found to support this; C.M. Sicca, ‘Consumption and Trade of Art between Italy and England in the First Half of the Sixteenth Century’, Renaissance Studies, 16, p.173.
400 LPIii, 1789 (20 November 1521, Imperial ambassadors at Calais to Charles).
401 See, for instance, ibid., 1632 (4 October 1521, Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to [Wolsey], ‘Mons, in Hennego’).
402 Ibid., 1680 (15 October 1521, Pace to [Wolsey], Windsor).
was the fall of Milan to papal-Imperial forces on 19 November.\footnote{L. Pastor, *History of the Popes*, viii, pp.54-55.} English diplomats in Rome quickly notified the crown of this.\footnote{Campeggio notified Wolsey of this on the 26th. He also conveyed news of the surrender of Cremona and of all other places, bar Parma. Clerk waited until he was convinced of its veracity, on the 28th; *LPIIIii*, 1809 (26 November 1521, [Campeggio to Wolsey], Rome), 1824 (1 December 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome).} News of this began to filter into England by the beginning of December.\footnote{Spinelly and Wingfield reported it on the 1st, immediately sending Lancaster herald, at midnight, to convey the news. They forwarded an apparently firsthand Imperial account of the event on the 3rd. Charles V notified Henry, Katherine and Wolsey of this event on 2nd, while Francis I apparently despatched two envoys on the 3rd to inform the English crown of the same; *ibid.*, 1819 (1 December 1521, Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to [Wolsey], Oudenarde), 1827 (2 December 1521, Charles to [Henry], Oudenarde), 1828 (2 December 1521, Charles to Catherine of Aragon, Oudenarde), 1829 (2 December 1521, Charles to Wolsey, Oudenarde), 1831 (3 December 1521, Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to Wolsey, Oudenarde); *Ven.iii*, 373 (3 December 1521, Francis to his ambassador in England, ‘Compiegne’).} By the 12th, Imperial sources reported much rejoicing of this news in England, including the singing of songs in the streets and at court. Henry promised to write to Charles but, in the meantime instructed the bishop to convey his congratulations.\footnote{An Imperial victory at Tournai was also being celebrated; *LPIIIii*, 1858 (12 December 1521, de Mesa to Charles, London).}

The celebrations were genuine, as it looked as if the French would be expelled from Italy and the papacy would be ‘defended’, without any tangible English actions. The political sands shifted quickly, however, as Leo X died on the night of 1-2 December. While John Clerk immediately notified the crown,\footnote{Clerk first announced that Leo X was gravely ill and unlikely to survive on 1 December. He confirmed that the pope had died on the 2nd, explaining that the latter fell ill while celebrating the fall of Milan on a hunt; *LPIIIii*, 1824 (1 December 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome); Ellis, pp.278-281 (*LPIIIii*, 1825; 2 December 1521, Clerk to Wolsey, Rome).} the first news of this seems to have arrived in England by 16 December, in letters from Francis I. Their reaction was probably politically focused. Worryingly, this French correspondence also claimed that the papal and Imperial armies had disbanded as a result and that the French were gaining ground again in Italy.\footnote{*LPIIIii*, 1891 (23 December 1521, bishop of Badajoz to Charles, London).}

The king and cardinal spoke with de Mesa, outlining their (and hopefully Charles’) reaction. In the first place, Wolsey recommended that Charles maintain his army in Italy, overtly to defend Naples, but really, one would venture, to ‘secure’ the papacy. Secondly, Henry reportedly wanted Wolsey or, failing that, de’ Medici, to become pope, the former particularly
so ‘that both your majesties [Henry and Charles] might so dispose of the Cardinal’s authority as if the Holy See were your own possession’. Charles’ support was sought and Richard Pace was to be despatched to Rome to facilitate this. In the event, the Imperialists pre-empted this request, Margaret of Savoy apparently offering to speak to her nephew on Wolsey’s behalf on the 15th and Charles pledging to honour his promise to Wolsey in communications to the Imperial ambassador and the cardinal himself, on 16 and 17 December, respectively. Henry VIII was also quick to confirm his anti-French commitment to Charles in light of the pope’s death. On 19 December, the king replied to the emperor, pledging his continued commitment against France. The English message, therefore, was ‘business as usual’, in the short-term at least.

The wisdom of Henry and Wolsey’s actions would have been confirmed in the following days and weeks, as news of the prevailing political situation in Italy filtered back to England, mainly through their ambassadors at the Imperial court. On 18 December, Richard Wingfield and Thomas Spinelly notified Wolsey of worrying reports, in particular fears for the future of the anti-French forces in Italy, as they had been financed by the pope, and the likely consequences for a number of cities in the Papal States and beyond; ‘this might force the Pope to yield to the French. The only safety is to provide supplies with all celerity’. By 23 December, Wingfield and Spinelly reported the positive actions of two leading cardinals accompanying the coalition forces, de’ Medici and Schiner, having assembled the various captains and assured them of continued Imperial support, making provision for the defence of

409 In the ambassador’s opinion, however, Wolsey felt that his election was unlikely, although he did not completely dismiss it; ibid., 1884 (19 December 1521, de Mesa to Charles, London). The Venetian ambassador in England, Surian, commented on the breadth of Pace’s commission on 6 January 1522; Ven.iii, 384 ([6] January 1522, Venetian ambassador in England to the Signory).

410 Margaret of Savoy notified Wolsey on the 15th. Charles V instructed his ambassador in England on this subject on the 16th and wrote directly to Wolsey on the 17th; LPIIIii, 1868 (15 December 1521, Margaret of Savoy to Wolsey, Oudenarde), 1876 (16 December 1521, Charles to de Mesa, Ghent), 1877. Also see ibid., 1891 (23 December 1521, bishop of Badajoz to Charles, London).

411 Ibid., 1882 (19 December 1521, Henry to Charles, Richmond).

412 Ibid., 1881 (18 December 1521, Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to [Wolsey], Ghent).
Milan before they left to attend conclave. Furthermore, Charles V himself, conveyed Italian news through one of his representatives in England, in particular refuting earlier French reports that the Imperial-papal army had disbanded on account of the pope’s death and assuring the English that it would continue its anti-French offensive. In correspondence of the 26th, Henry and Wolsey would have been reassured to hear that the Sacred College had confirmed the Church’s membership of the league against France, which ensured a continuation of ‘papal’ policy, at least during the interregnum. Despite this, worrying intelligence continued to be received about the movements of French troops in Italy.

While the English crown, in the short-term, had no apparent intention of altering its foreign policy course, probably adopting a ‘wait and see’ attitude, Charles V, on the other hand, envisaged adjustments to his position by 20 December. Firstly, he wished to drop Wolsey’s truce idea and, secondly, sought an English contribution to the maintenance of his Italian forces, the pope’s death having put the whole financial burden onto him. By the 23rd, Charles sought English assistance to gain the Swiss as allies, through a substantial loan to him and by sending a representative to the Swiss diet. He also implied that his army in Italy would be used to ensure that Wolsey became pope. Wolsey, it seems, had already envisaged the latter; according to de Mesa, the cardinal wanted Charles to move his troops to Rome, so that, if he could not be elected, that the cardinals ‘should be prevented by force

413 Ibid., 1890 (23 December 1521, Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to [Wolsey], Ghent).
414 Ibid., 1891 (23 December 1521, de Mesa to Charles, London).
415 It was further confirmed that the cardinals had sent money to Milan towards the army’s expenses; ibid., 1901 (26 December 1521, Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to Wolsey, Ghent). For further positive news of continued papal commitment, see ibid., 1918 (31 December 1521, Pace to Wolsey, Speyer).
417 Charles issued these instructions to his ambassador in England, the bishop of Badajoz, on 20 December; ibid., 1887 (20 December 1521, Charles to de Mesa, Ghent).
418 Ibid., 1891 (23 December 1521, de Mesa to Charles, London). Also see ibid. 1905 (27 December 1521).
from electing an adherent of the French party, to the destruction of Naples and Sicily, and consequently of all Christendom'.

According to the same Imperial source, writing on 24th, Wolsey was reportedly grateful to discover the emperor’s continued commitment to his candidacy and believed that it was feasible. He also outlined Pace’s broad commission, to obtain this by whatever means possible. Wolsey’s manifesto, if one can call it that, was to crown Charles emperor, ‘exalt his own King’, and organise an expedition to be launched against France and then the Ottomans, which he would lead personally (along with Henry and Charles).

Despite Charles’ demands, the English were in no rush to act. Once Pace had left for Rome, it appears that Henry and Wolsey would wait until they knew who would be elected pontiff or, rather, what their political sympathies were. While they had some hope for Wolsey’s candidacy, they were probably quite realistic about his chances. Third party news of the conclave began arriving in England in late December and, despite being politically shaded, would have led Henry and Wolsey to speculate about both the potential success of the Pace mission and the chances of the ‘French’ party. They probably placed most faith, however, in despatches from English diplomats in Rome. These were not much help, however. Clerk, writing immediately on hearing of the pope’s death, was unable to venture a

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420 *Ibid.*.
421 By 27 December, Charles was under the impression that Pace, having just met him, would go to the Swiss on his way back from Rome, which the emperor thought was too late; *LPIIIii*, 1905. For further English procrastination, particularly the continued intention to allow the French to believe that a truce was still intended, see *ibid.*, 1913 (29 December).
422 See above pp.260, 275-279.
424 For notification about the postponement of conclave; *ibid.*, 1869 (15 December 1521, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome), 1879 (17 December 1521, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome).
guess as to the outcome of the conclave; ‘heer is hard choise’ he reported.\footnote{Ellis, p.281 (LPIIIii, 1825; 2 December 1521, Clerk to Wolsey, Rome).} Campeggio reiterated this on 15 December, given the number of candidates and voters.\footnote{Ibid., 1869 (15 December 1521, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome).} Towards the end of December, Clerk, had been diligent in visiting many of the cardinals, but reported great dissension among them. At length, he chose to back Giulio de’ Medici on behalf of England, having failed to induce Campeggio’s candidacy. In pledging his support to de’ Medici, his motive was clearly political. Clerk advised the cardinal that Henry VIII was in a politically difficult position. He was committed to a league to defend the Church, for which reason he joined the Treaty of Bruges, but this was now ‘in evil case’, unless ‘God should provide us of a new Pope of like mind and affection [as Leo X]; wherefore I exhorted him to look substantially thereunto’.\footnote{Ibid., 1895 (calendared end December 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey]).} News of an election was thought imminent by mid-January.\footnote{Ibid., 1964 (15 January 1522, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Ghent).}

Wolsey’s frustration was displayed on the 17th, when he reportedly berated the Imperial ambassador, having heard that the Pace mission would fail because Juan Manuel was lobbying for de’ Medici. De Mesa replied that, if true, his counterpart in Rome would change his policy on Pace’s arrival.\footnote{Ibid., 1968 (17 January 1522, de Mesa to Charles).} Pace did not reach Rome in time, however, and the uncertainty was lifted from around 20-21 January 1522 on when news arrived in England of Adrian VI’s election.\footnote{Ibid., 2024 (5 February 1522, Charles to de Mesa, Brussels).} Initial reactions from the English representatives indicated surprise and implied discontent. Campeggio claimed that the cardinals had elected the Imperial minister on the basis of his ‘integrity’, while Clerk reported those in Rome to be ‘marvellously abashed and
evil contented’. 431 This may have been shaded, however, by Campeggio’s receipt of Wolsey’s instructions to forward his candidacy.432 While Wolsey’s nomination had failed, the identity of the new pope was probably received positively, in a political sense; as the ex-tutor and now minister of Charles V, a distinctly Imperial candidate had been selected, which augured well for the anti-French agenda.433

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431 LPIIIii, 1944 (9 January 1522, Clerk to Wolsey), 1945 (9 January 1522, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome).
432 Campeggio only seems to have acknowledged Wolsey’s correspondence on 10 January (the day after conclave ended). He probably knew of the Englishman’s instructions on the 9th, however, as he claimed on both this and the following day that he had regularly backed Wolsey; LPIIIii, 1945 (9 January 1522, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome), 1952 (10 January 1522, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome).
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