EPINICIAN PRECEPTS:

A STUDY OF CHIRON AND THE WISE ADVISER IN
PINDAR

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ABSTRACT

This thesis offers a fresh appraisal of the wise adviser in Pindar's epinician poetry. By focusing on the prominent figure of Chiron, it shows how Pindar engages with the paraenetic tradition in a way that reveals the distinctive character of the epinician poet.

The first part of the study explores the function of Chiron as an interactive model for Pindar as poet-teacher. Chapter 1 examines how the mythical pedagogue enhances the status of the poet as wise adviser by illuminating the moral character of his advice. It shows how the relationship between teacher and pupil in the myth provides a model for that of poet and addressee and enables the poet to present his advice indirectly.

In two separate case studies, I explore how Chiron's paradigmatic associations interact with the poet as adviser. In Chapter 2 (*Nemean* 3), I argue that the poet dramatises the instruction of a pupil as part of a collaborative and interactive form of learning. In Chapter 3 (*Pythian* 3), I argue that Pindar reconfigures preceptual instruction in a 'dialogue' between two speakers who enact the pedagogic relationship of Chiron and Asclepius. This strategy allows the poet to present his teaching tactfully and authoritatively.

I conclude that Chiron is a figure for the poet as tactful and authoritative adviser and contributes to the poet's creation of a 'paraenetic encomium'. Secondly, this study of the reception and remodelling of the paraenetic tradition in Pindar illuminates the distinctive character of his advice and its central importance in Pindar's construction of poetic and moral authority.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS

ABV = J.D.Beazley, *Attic Black-figure Vase Painters* (Oxford, 1956).
ARV = J.D.Beazley, *Red-figure Vase Painters*, 2nd edition (Oxford, 1963).
CVA = *Corpus Vasorum Antiquorum* (1925).
DK= H.Diels and W.Kranz, *Die Fragmente Der Vorsokratiker,* 6th edition (Berlin, 1952).
Drach. = Drachmann A.B. (ed.) *Scholia Vetera in Pindari carmina*, 3 vols., (Leipzig, 1903-27).
I = Isthmian.
KA = Kassel-Austin *PCG*: R.Kassel and C.Austin, *Poetae Comici Graeci*, vol.1 (1983), 2 (1991), Berlin.
LIMC = Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae classicae (1981-)
L-P = E.Lobel and D.L. Page, *Poetarum Lesbiorum Fragmenta* (Oxford, 1955)
LSJ = H.G.Liddell and R.Scott, *Greek-English Lexicon*, 9th edn., rev. H.Stuart Jones and R.McKenzie (1925-40); Suppl. By E.A. Barber and others (1968); Revised Suppl. by P.G.W. Glare (Oxford, 1996).
M-W = R.Merkelbach and M.L. West, *Fragmenta Hesiodea* (Oxford, 1967).
N = Nemean.
O = Olympian.
OCD[3] = *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, 3rd edition (eds. S. Hornblower and A.Spawforth, Oxford, 1996).
OCT = Oxford Classical Text (ed. C.M.Bowra, *Pindari Carmina Cum Fragmentis*, 1947).
P = Pythian.
PMG=Poetae Melici Graeci (ed. D.L. Page, Oxford 1962).
RE = A.Pauly, G.Wissowa and W.Kroll, *Real-Encyclopädie der Klassischen Altertumswissenschaft* (Stuttgart, 1893-1980).
schol. = scholiast or scholion.
S-M = B.Snell and H.Maehler, *Pindari Carmina Cum Fragmentis* (Leipzig, 1984)
Roscher = W.H.Roscher, *Ausführliches Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie* (1884-).
TrGF = B.Snell R.Kannicht, S.Radt (eds.), *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*, 5 vols. (1971-2004).
W or IE[2] = M.L. West, *Iambi et Elegi Graeci*, 2nd edition (Oxford,1989-92).

Abbreviations of ancient authors and modern periodicals and journals (in the Bibliography) follow the customary form in the *OCD* and *L'Année philologique.* Translations of Pindar are by Race (1997) and translations of Homer's *Iliad* are by Lattimore (1951) unless otherwise stated.

Figure 1: *The Marriage of Chiron and Chariklo* (cf. Pindar, *Pythian* 4.103). Reproduction courtesy of B.Sparkes (2005), 11, fig.5. Red-figure bell-krater attributed to the Eupolis Painter, dated ca. 440-430 BC. From a private collection in Princeton Art Museum, published in M.J. Padgett, *The Centaur's Smile: The Human Animal in Early Greek Art* (Princeton, 2003), no. 38.

Introduction: The Wise Adviser in the Paraenetic Tradition

1. *Approaches to Pindar's Odes*

The prevailing issue of Pindaric scholarship in recent times has been the relationship of the text to its historical context.[1] Hornblower writes that 'scholars have made great strides since the pre-Bundyan era when scholars like Burton and Bowra still believed that Pindar's development could be traced through his entire output of forty-six victory odes, from *Pythian* 10 of 498 to *Pythian* 8 of 446'.[2] It is appropriate therefore that we should begin with the "historical Bundy", whose influence is still felt in most discussions of Pindar's Odes.[3]

In his *Studia Pindarica,* Bundy focused on the encomiastic nature of Pindar's victory odes and the corresponding hostility he saw on the part of the audience to anything not relevant to praise of the victor.[4] According to Kurke, Bundy was an uncompromising formalist 'who insisted that all the elements of the epinikion be understood as conventional *topoi* that contribute to the poem's primary function

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[1] Cf. Nicholson (2007), 209, who notes that 'the formal operations of the text are not permitted to eclipse the relation between text and context'.

[2] Burton (1962); Bowra (1964). Cf. the historico-biographical approach (following the scholia) of the great German scholar Wilamowitz (1922), who in giving up hope of artistic unity in the odes, used his formidable philology to search after the man, Pindar of Thebes. Cf. Lefkowitz (1991), 53 and (1980) on the influential fictions of the scholia.

[3] I borrow this expression from Lee (1978), who, in defence of Bundy, argued that 'his critical method should not be understood as averse to historical allusion in the poems. Bundy only stipulates that historical and topical references in the poems must not violate the eulogistic content'.

[4] Bundy (1962). His revolutionary reform of the "analytic" critique was anticipated by Schadewaldt's formalist model of the victory ode (1928).

of praising the victor'.[5] Rose thinks Bundy's great achievement was to restore a basis for elucidating one formal level of unity inadequately recognised by previous scholarship, namely strategies of praise for the victor. That basis was the 'fulfillment of a single purpose through a complex orchestration of motives and themes that conduce to one end: the glorification, within the considerations of ethical, religious, social and literary propriety, of [the] victor'.[6]

One of the shortcomings of Bundy's thesis is that although the implied negative proposition ('and it had no other purpose') has polemical force in that it discourages us from milking the poems for over-definite historical or biographical allusions, it does not get us very far.[7] Other scholars have complained that he depersonalised Pindar by refusing to admit any topical or historical allusions in his odes, and that he emphasised form and convention to the exclusion of everything else.[8] In his defence, Slater pointed out that Bundy never denied the presence of historical allusion in the poems. Pindar's poems are essentially encomiastic arguments and the critics must first understand the argument. Then one may speculate about associations in the listener's mind, based on the *topoi* of the genre.[9]

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[5] Kurke (1991), 9. In explicitly following the methods and advances of Bundy and his followers, Kurke proposes that 'a sociological poetics must be thoroughly grounded in the formal analysis of Pindar's odes' (p.10).

[6] P.W.Rose (1992), 155, citing Bundy (1962), 91.

[7] Hornblower (2004), 28. Cf. Most (1985), 11-41, who asserts the dangers of reductionism inherent in the application of such a formalist model.

[8] Cf. Gerber (1988), 252 and Cole in Gentili (1988), xvi on the 'depersonalized *laudandus*'.

[9] Slater (1977), 193. As he rightly notes, critics of Bundy such as Lloyd-Jones (1973) did not try to deny the existence of such allusions in the poems.

Bundy's great achievement, as Hornblower recognises, was to replace the biographical approach by rigorous attention to features the odes had in common, which resulted in a more sophisticated understanding of Pindar's literary and narrative technique.[10] Segal, however, warns against an excessive concern with the formalistic features of an ode, arguing that an approach which emphasises rigidity in the movement of an ode tends to ignore the uniqueness of the individual poem; he doubts whether 'typical features' should receive more importance than unique features in the reader's mind.[11] Certainly, I take the view that meaning is to be found in the dynamic interrelationship of different parts of the ode put together for a unique occasion, usually the celebration of an athletic victory. Bundy's work provides the foundation for the exploration of how an audience's expectations are controlled and directed through the poet's rhetoric and underpins some of the discussions in this thesis. Moreover, the framework for this investigation is the interrelationship of advice and praise, to which Bundy's work provides a starting point.[12]

In this thesis, I use the standard formalist terms such as *laudator* (praise poet) and *laudandus* (object of praise) and 'foil' (contrast). For the sake of convenience, I usually call the man whose success Pindar celebrates the *laudandus*, although I refer to him rather more loosely as the 'victor' in the odes

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[10] Hornblower (2004), 38. For recent commentaries on individual odes, cf. Braswell (1998) and Pfeijffer (1999a).
[11] Segal (1967), contra Schadewaldt (1972), who searched for a formal 'Programm' and 'Hauptgedanke' (= a flight of associated ideas brought to a head).
[12] Cf. Goldhill (1991), 128-9.

for aristocrats (e.g. *P*.6, *P*.9, *N*.3).[13] Whilst appreciating that 'patron' is not a fully satisfactory term, since it suggests something more than a one-off commission, I do not wish to disregard the relationship of patronage outside the text that the term 'patron' implies.[14]

It is a matter of great controversy how far the identity of the historical Pindar imposes itself on the odes. Whether referring to Pindar or the poet, I usually mean his professional persona (which may shift in the course of the ode) and not the historical person Pindar.[15] As Bremer has pointed out, the first-person statements do not throw much light on the human being Pindar.[16] It is important to understand that the 'personal voice' in Pindar is projected by a first-person 'speaker' (*ego*), who is a literary creation.[17] This person's ethical views can be close to that of Pindar, or quite divergent, in which case the term 'speaker' is preferable to 'poet'. In *Pythian* 3, for example, the first person assumes contrasting viewpoints that are projections of the controlling poet Pindar.[18]

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[13] Currie (2005), 1 n.1, notes that the term 'laudator' is a convenient alternative to 'poet' and implies both a relationship within the text and a duty to praise: 'although Hieron is the laudandus of *P*.1, *P*.2, and *P*.3, he is not praised in those odes in the first instance as an athletic victor'.

[14] Pindar establishes a close rapport with Hieron over a number of odes, including *O*.1, *P*.1, *P*.2, *P*.3, the last of which appears to reflect a longstanding relationship.

[15] On the *persona loquens*, cf. D'Alessio (1994), 125, who argues that the poet's voice and the voice of chorus are often difficult to separate; cf. Carey (1999) on Bacchylides.

[16] Bremer (1990), 50, contra Wilamowitz (1922). Pindar's references to Thebes (e.g. *I*.1.1, *I*.4.61-3, *I*.7.1-15 and *P*.4.299, fr.198a) are perhaps the only exceptions to this rule. Cf. Fearn (2007), 8.

[17] Cf. Hutchinson (2001), x, who employs the term 'narrator' to emphasise this fact. Cf. Morrison (2007b), 32, who uses the term 'narrator' to describe the 'closely connected persona of the poet'. On the distinction between 'narrator' and 'author', cf. De Jong (1987b), 29-30. Cf. Carey (2000), on the manipulations of the Pindaric narrator. On the narrator's 'voice' more generally, cf. Goldhill (1986).

[18] Cf. Chapter 3.

In referring to Pindar the poet as the *laudator*, I do not wish to overlook his role as adviser, which I argue is central to his poetic endeavour. As Lardinois observes, 'the 'I' person in Pindar's poems does more than praise the victor: he also tells myths and…advises him'.[19] Thus, I seek a broader definition than the narrow (but convenient) term *laudator* allows and one that will do justice to the scope of Pindar's poetic programme, or what I call, his 'paraenetic encomium'.[20]

2. *The Paraenetic Tradition*

The principal aim of this Introduction is to establish the typical and distinctive features of Pindar's advice relative to composers of didactic-epic poetry, including Homer and Hesiod. The use of the word paraenetic (advisory) to characterise this tradition is particularly appropriate in a thesis about Pindar's Chiron, since the word *parainesis* is actually attested in Pindar *P*.6.23 (Chiron's advice to Achilles) and *I*.6.68 (a father's advice to his sons). Nagy points out that 'the compound *par-ainéō* 'advise', 'instruct' applies to the edifying instructions given by the Centaur, Cheiron, to the youthful Achilles and also by the poet himself to his young patron' (*P*.6.23).[21] Both of these passages are discussed later, although it is worth making the (admittedly obvious) point that Pindar's use of the word reflects a sense of continuity between past and present in the currency of the word *parainesis*, or 'instruction'.

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[19] Lardinois (1995), 256 n.8, who prefers the term narrator to laudator. Cf. Hutchinson (2001), 12-13, who notes that the poet occupies a number of roles, the handling of which is 'appropriately complex'.
[20] The term is used by R.F.Collins (1999), 488 in a discussion of St Paul's first letter to the Corinthians.
[21] Nagy (1979), 238 comparing *I*.6.68.

Scholars have recognised that the style, content and language of the didactic genre are deeply embedded in Pindar's epinician poetry.[22] Carey, for example, perceives Pindar's 'marked tendency to stretch the genre and to hybridize'.[23] Currie has recently stressed the 'generic indeterminacy' and overlap between Pindaric epinician and didactic-gnomic poetry.[24] Commenting on the interface between the paraenetic tradition and Pindar's epinician poetry, Nagy notes that 'the occasionality of Pindar's medium is reflected in [the word] *ainos* or *ep-ainos*, which may be translated primarily as 'praise' in view of Elroy Bundy's observation that Pindar's epinician poetic tradition has one overarching purpose, that of praise'.[25]

For Carey, Nagy's thesis that the genre of Homer's epic and the genre of Pindar's praise poetry are differentiated by the absence and presence respectively of self-definition in terms of *ainos* is too reductive.[26] It is probably a reflection of the pervasive influence of Bundy's formalist approach to Pindar, which, as mentioned above, is too rigid.[27] It has led to the positing of a (false) dichotomy between the two generic markers of Pindar's discourse, namely *parainesis*, 'instruction' and

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[22] Kurke (1991), 155-6, commenting on *P*.9.94-6, remarks that Pindar 'enhances the quality of his gift, or poem, by incorporating into it the wisdom of past authorities, both mythical and poetic'.
[23] Carey (1995), 97 n.21.
[24] Currie (2005), 24.
[25] Nagy (1990), 147. According to Bundy (1962), 3, the one master principle of epinikion is that 'there is no passage in Pindar and Bakkhulides that is not in its primary intent encomiastic - that is, designed to enhance the glory of a particular patron'. Cf. Simonides 542.27 *PMG* and Bacch.5.188 for the diction.
[26] Carey (1992), 283-4: 'Nagy's characterisation is based on a number of passages taken out of context and no real attempt is made to demonstrate the applicability of the *ainos* model to the odes as a whole.' For the meaning of *ainos* as 'praise' in Homer, cf. *Od*.21.110 and *Il*.23.652.
[27] Cf. Lloyd-Jones's (1990), 122-3 scepticism in applying Bundy's methods too strictly. Fearn (2007), 339, 'goes beyond the limitations of a Bundyist analysis according to which epinician poetry can be reduced to its praise-function'.

ainos, 'praise'.[28] The former, a derivative of *ainos*, 'conveys the moralizing tone so characteristic of epinician poetry' and applies to the didactic function of the Hesiodic tradition in general.[29] Whilst *ainos* in Pindar often designates 'praise' (*epainos*), it is more inclusive than this, as Nagy himself recognises.[30] At any rate, I would wish to see *parainesis* and *ainos* as complementary forms of the epinician discourse and to define Pindaric *epainos* as broadly as possible. This study of Chiron as a figure for the poet as wise adviser develops Nagy's claim that 'epic is represented as extending into the epinician *ainos* of Pindar', by arguing for a similar development in relation to the didactic tradition.[31] I hope to show that Pindar uses Chiron in a way that strengthens the paraenetic aspect of his encomium and also reveals the distinctive character of his advice.

3.*The Gnome and its Rhetorical Function*

A key component of the wise adviser's armoury is the rich array of gnomes. It will be worthwhile exploring this briefly in relation to Pindar and the scholarly tradition. First, gnomic statements occur in every type of song, including choral

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[28] Nagy (1990), 150, who defines the ainos as a mode of discourse, not as a genre, 'since it can assume a variety of poetic forms'.

[29] Nagy (1978), 238, ad *P*.6.23. Carey notes in his article on Pindar, *OCD*³, pp.1183-4 that the effect of Pindar's moralising is to give the ode a pronounced didactic as well as celebratory quality; cf. Bischoff (1932).

[30] Nagy (1990), 149. 'As a double-edged mode of discourse, the ainos can admonish or blame as well as praise and can assume a variety of poetic forms' (cf. Pindar fr.181 S-M and Archilochus fr.174 W; also *h.Hermes* 457, where ἐπαίνει (+dat.) in this didactic relationship implies agreement or obedience.

[31] Nagy (1990), 214.

song.[32] Stenger's recent study of gnomes in Bacchylides redresses the formalist approach to Pindar and Bacchylides.[33] As Currie explains, '*Gnomai* in Pindar have often been seen as having a rhetorical function: effecting a transition between formally distinct parts of an ode, contributing to the creation of the laudator's character (*ethopoeia*), and putting the *laudandus'* achievements in a wider ethical context'.[34] The formalist approach championed by Bundy, as Scodel puts it, 'has sometimes taken an extreme and reductive form, in which general reflections appear to be merely a way to move from one segment to the next and their *content* [my emphasis] is almost irrelevant. For Stenger, on the other hand, gnomai are important guides to the audience in how to understand the songs'.[35] The gnome is an especially useful means of introducing or of summarising and ending a paragraph or a thought process. It elucidates the thought-processes contained within the epinician in a way that makes it easier for the public to understand.[36] Certainly, the ethical content of a gnome is important in Pindar as well as the diction in which it is articulated.[37] One of the functions of gnomes in

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[32] Lefkowitz (1991), 5; e.g. Alcman 1.36 *PMG* and Pind.*Pae.*2.50-2 ('that which relies upon good counsel and respect always flourishes in gentle tranquillity'). See *RE* Suppl.VI: 74-87, s.v. 'Gnome, Gnomendichtung, Gnomologien'. For Larrington (1993), 5, a gnome is a proposition ostensibly expressing some general truth rooted in experience.

[33] Stenger (2005); cf. Bundy (1962), who explored how an audience's expectations were controlled and directed through the poet's rhetoric in what P.W.Rose (1992), 154 describes as 'the all-explaining *laudator-laudandus* relationship in each poem'.

[34] Currie (2005), 79 with n.30: 'It cannot be overlooked that the wisdom embodied in Pindar's *gnomai* is often traditional'. Cf. Kirkwood (1982), 23. For their transitional function, see Dornseiff (1921), 131. On *ethopoeia*, see Carey (1995), 96-8, Carey (1999), passim (cf.Arist.*Rhet.*1395b12-17). On the wider ethical context, see Kirkwood (1982), 23 and Carey (1995), 86.

[35] Scodel (2005), 1.

[36] Stenger (2005), 52-3, who cites Aristotle's view (2.21, *Rhet.*1395b1-11) that you have to include 'some elements of public opinion' if you want to find acceptance. Cf. Lee (1978), 66, on the twofold purpose in gnomic statements, which serve either a general paideutic function or a more narrow one of propounding aristocratic values (cf. Pericles' Funeral Oration, Thuc.2.34-46).

[37] Cf. Currie (2005), 412, on the indirectness of verbal echoes, which point up 'the crucial analogy between the laudandus and the hero', just as in similes, they reinforce the link between vehicle and tenor; cf. Carey

epic, lyric and epinician narratives is to link the mythic stories to the present situation.[38] In *Pythian* 3, for example, the myth of Peleus and Cadmus is framed by a single gnome at 85-86 and a gnomic cluster about the inconstant winds (*P*.3.104-5) and man's fortune (105-6) within a direct address to Hieron. The poet subsequently applies this learning to the present through his own personal example at *P*.3.107f.

Stenger claims that both individual gnomes and gnomic clusters are an integral part of each song, and that each ode is constructed as an argument that locates the immediate occasion in an ethical context through which the poem transcends its occasion.[39] He goes as far as to say that Bacchylides' epinician argument is held together by gnomic clusters (e.g. Bacch.1.159-84, which is almost entirely gnomic after the initial first person statement).[40] The gnomes are like the joints in the poem's train of thought, which proceeds basically from maxim to maxim. With the exception of the final triad of *Pythian* 1, however, which is discussed below, the Pindaric argument rarely becomes a loose string of precepts. One reason for this is that the first person otherwise is more prominent in Pindar and *gnomai* placed in the mouth of the speaker are rarer in Bacchylides.[41] The conclusion of

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[38] Lardinois (1995), 260, citing *O*.1.47 (myth), 53 (gnome), which is applied to the present situation at 52 (personal statement).

[39] Stenger (2005), 54-5.

[40] D.L.Cairns (1997), 41 n.28 notes that 'gnomic clusters and reflections on the poet's task are typical elements in the conclusions to Bacchylides' myth-odes'; cf. Hamilton (1974), 81-3. By my reckoning just over a quarter of Pindar's epinician odes contain a gnome in their final verse, whereas nearly three-quarters include a praise motif. This provides some evidence to support the characterisation of Pindar's epinician discourse as a paraenetic encomium, in which the celebration of victory is the poet's main obligation.

[41] Cf. Carey (1999), 19 and 24, with Bacch.3.49-52.

a Pindaric myth is often evaluated by the first person in his moral guise.[42]

Stenger's discussion of the connection between gnomes to other forms of poetic authority reiterates the importance of the gnome's rhetorical function for the poet's argument.[43] Of particular import is his claim that gnomic speech is one of the ways in which epinician poets establish the authority or credibility that is so much a part of Greek poetic style.

Notwithstanding its vital rhetorical function, the gnome is only one element in the epinician argument. Moreover, it has a limited perspective. Currie points out that 'because *gnomai* do not provide unproblematic access to the poet's point of view, they need to be set in the context of the ode as a whole'.[44] Certainly, they carry less authority than statements by the poetic *ego*. As Hubbard notes, 'Gnomes offer partial and often one-sided interpretations of reality which must be qualified by other gnomes and the broader antithetical tensions set up by the text as a whole.'[45] But whilst it is true that they are subject to modification by the poet's voice, Pindar's gnomes do not directly contradict each other and they give the impression of a fairly consistent world-view.[46] Nonetheless, as Hornblower warns, 'in the post-Bundy era, it will not do simply to anthologize gnomic remarks in the odes'.[47] Finally, Pindar's manipulation of traditional gnomes is symptomatic

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[42] Cf. e.g. *O*.1.52, *O*.13.91, *N*.5.14, 16. See further my discussion of the first person below.
[43] Stenger (2005), 52. The first section of his book includes a discussion of *gnomai* in other genres and in rhetorical theory.
[44] Currie (2005), 79. Bowra (1964), 291 notes that 'Pindar inserts general propositions in the course of a narrative and does not mind breaking it with a didactic comment' (e.g. *P*.3.20, 60).
[45] Hubbard (1985), 41, with *N*.3.40-2. Cf. Currie (2005), 80-1 ad *P*.3, noting that they are 'no more authoritative than the generalizing statements made by the chorus or *koruphaios* in tragedy'.
[46] Cf. Gould (1989), 81-2 on Herodotus' use of *gnomai*.
[47] Hornblower (2004), 59.

of his artful transformation of a fossilised didactic tradition into a living epinician form. As Lardinois well notes, 'Greek gnomai were, at least until the fourth century B.C.E., part of a living tradition in which every performance was re-creation, very much like epic verse. They are, like epic verses, "coined" with the help of traditional formulae and themes'.[48] Certainly, it would be wrong to underestimate Pindar's inventiveness in his use of gnome and its effect on the listener.[49]

The oral-improvised character of gnomic sayings may help to explain their attractiveness to Pindar, who adapts them to suit the occasion. A recurring element in gnomai is χρή + infinitive.[50] 'Such patterns help the speaker to create a saying on the spot and, at the same time, the listener to identify a statement as gnomic.'[51] Gnomes are usefully incorporated within a quintessentially Pindaric aspect of his rhetoric, namely the 'fiction of spontaneity', which has been well documented by scholars.[52] Currie, for example, proposes that gnomes be treated 'analogously to other statements from the laudator, such as his proclaimed reasons for directing the narrative in a particular way'.[53] In her review of Stenger, whom she criticises for mentioning Carey's 'oral subterfuge' only once (at p.142),

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[48] Lardinois (1997), 215.

[49] Cf. Lang (1984), 67, who argues that in contrast to Pindar, Thucydides 'seems to be not so much a user of traditional maxims as an inventor of sophistic *gnomai* which he gives to his speakers to characterize them and their purposes in the very same way in which Herodotus gives his speakers bits of folk wisdom'.

[50] Lardinois (1997), 215 with n.18 (e.g. *Il*.2.24, Phocylides fr.5 Diehl). See my discussion of *P*.3.59-60 in Chapter 3. For the use of χρή in a gnome, cf. *P*.2.88, *P*.3.103, *P*.4.271; it is used esp. of poetic obligation at *O*.8.74, *O*.13.94, *P*.4.1 and Bacch.5.187 (also a gnome). Also *P*.9.50 (Chiron).

[51] Lardinois (1997), 216.

[52] Cf. A.M.Miller (1993b), 1 on the role of the 'extemporizing speaker whose unfolding discourse is characterized by the unself-conscious spontaneity, the impulsiveness, the digressiveness, the false starts and self-corrections of ordinary unpremeditated speech'. I draw a distinction between the encomiastic and paraenetic persona of the 'I' in *Pythian* 3 (Chapter 3).

[53] Currie (2005), 79.

Scodel writes that in understanding victory songs as arguments, 'it is very helpful to appreciate that the poetic voice presents its song as thinking, and it seeks to convince its hearers by allowing them to follow the process. This is especially useful to remember in reading gnomic clusters'.[54]

I shall argue that the speaker's correction of a particular attitude by dramatising the moral judgement is an important part of Pindar's self-representation as a wise adviser in *Nemean* 3 and *Pythian* 3.[55] In both cases, the paradigmatic associations of Chiron's pedagogy are assimilated to the actions of the speaker, who applies the particular lesson to the task ahead. This is tied to the 'illusion of spontaneity' in which rhetorical redirection is motivated by the speaker's 'supposed state of mind and feeling'.[56] The audience fully recognise that the poet's diversion is a mirage, since the poem has been meticulously constructed in advance of the performance; this illusion is facilitated by the separation of author and speaker.[57] The likelihood that the audience would perceive such a strategy as a moment of poetic virtuosity is a way of encouraging them to participate in the ongoing construction of the ode. This conceit helps the poet to characterise his relationship with his audience as an interactive one and to present his paraenetic encomium both tactfully and authoritatively. Such a strategy is particularly effective in *Nemean* 3, where the time between

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[54] Scodel (2005), 2. Cf. Carey (1995), 85-103, on the 'oral subterfuge' and A.M.Miller (1993b), 21-54.

[55] See Chapters 2 and 3.

[56] Miller (1993), 21 n.1, who makes a more emphatic distinction between poet and speaker than Carey (1981, 16 n.37).

[57] Cf. Morrison (2007b), 68, who notes that Pindar's epinicia contain the fullest evidence for 'pseudo-spontaneity' in archaic lyric. Cf. *P*.11.38-40. Many of the examples in Pindar concern the choice of subject-matter and the nature of praise.

composition and performance is virtually effaced and it is the poet-composer himself who appears to intervene in presenting a lesson.

4 (a) *The Context of Wise Sayings*

Lardinois has convincingly shown that gnomes are used in much the same way throughout archaic poetry and share the same features. He defines a gnomic expression as a 'generalizing statement about a particular action'.[58] In his important contribution, Lardinois cautions that 'the study of the use of gnomic statements has to be situated within the confines of modern paroemiological research, which places particular emphasis on the context in which proverbial expressions are used'.[59]

Analysis of the 'communication-situation' has provided a useful critical method for analysing gnomes in both the epinician and didactic traditions. Lardinois has adopted Seitel's method of distinguishing between first, second and third person sayings, depending on their external referent. According to this model, a gnome that applies to the speaker is a first person saying, one that applies to an addressee is a second person saying, and a gnome that applies to neither speaker nor addressee is a third person saying.[60] Lardinois notes that 'The

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[58] Lardinois (1995), 276. He argues (p.12) that it is possible to extend Aristotle's definition of the rhetorical gnome (*Rhet.*1394a19-95b19) to its use by the archaic Greek poets.
[59] Lardinois (1995), 273. Cf. Lardinois (1997), 214: Ethno- and sociolinguistic studies stress the importance of context in understanding wisdom sayings and reveal that gnomic expressions take many different forms. Cf. Goldhill (1994), 57.
[60] Seitel (1977), 75-99. Cf. Martin (1984), 33 n.9, who applies the same principle to the genre of prince-instruction.

relationship between the speaker and the addressee determines, at least in part, the particular form gnomai take, and they in turn can illuminate these relationships.'[61]

Pindar's use of gnomes is complex and there are relatively few direct second-person gnomes, most of which are used to compliment the victor.[62] Lardinois has coined the term 'indirect second person gnomai with subsitute addressee' to describe Pindar's preferred form of gnome, since he 'often addresses a god, his lyre, or another member in the audience when speaking about the victor.'[63] In this way, 'gnomes that apply to the victor technically become third person sayings, but since the victor is present in the audience and hears these words too, they are really masked second person sayings or "second person sayings with a substitute addressee"'.[64] It is argued later that Pindar's address to his *thymos* and *psyche* belongs to this same category of advice, which is characteristically indirect and tactful. At the same time, the presentation of advice in this way allows him to enact his instruction more dramatically and hence to increase his authority as a wise adviser.[65]

4 (b) *Ownership and Circumstances of the Saying*

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[61] Lardinois (1997) 221, citing *Il*.20.196-8 and 9.256 ('friendliness is better').
[62] Cf. Lardinois (1995), 268.
[63] Lardinois (1997), 229 with n.77, comparing *O*.8.10-11 (Olympia), *P*.1.59 (Muse), *P*.10.21-2 (Apollo). Cf. Antilochus' use of an indirect second-person gnome with substitute addressee at *Il*.23.787-8.
[64] Lardinois (1995), 267. The victor is addressed directly in only 24 of the 44 epinician odes and usually only in selected passages, often at the very end of the ode. Cf. Athanassaki (2004), 320, who notes that the use of third-person *deixis* at the start of *Olympian* 1 'establishes an initial distance between speaker and addressee', yet the speaker envisages Hieron as being present.
[65] Cf. Chapters 2 and 3.

Let us examine the identity of the owner of the proverb and its relevance to the discourse context. Lardinois' study of gnomes in archaic Greek poetry draws upon New Mexican Spanish proverb performances, in which phrases identifying the so-called owner of the proverb 'are obligatory because they provide a saying with its necessary legitimacy. In the *Iliad*, by contrast, the use of introductory sentences identifying the original owner of a gnomic expression is extremely rare'.[66] The Homeric speaker often simply takes it for granted that the identity of his source is well known to his audience.[67] Lardinois suggests that the Homeric speaker can either 'emphasize the originality of the saying or its traditionality, depending on the situation in which he finds himself, but in most cases this is left in the middle'.[68] Given that when he does recall the original context of the saying, he does so 'in order to give it more weight', it is somewhat surprising that there is only one clear example of this.[69] It tends to suggest that the latter is relatively unimportant as a means of claiming authority.

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[66] Lardinois (1997), 220. Cf. Briggs (1988), 101-35, who identifies eight possible elements in the discourse surrounding the performance of proverbs.

[67] Lardinois (1995), 63, n.108: 'The fact that in most cases we find no identification of the owner is not to be taken as evidence that these gnomai were not considered to be "traditional" as well as newly created: Achilles can tell Priam the story of Niobe without explicitly saying that it is old (*Il*.24.602f.).'

[68] Lardinois (1997), 220. E.g. μοῖραν δ’ οὔ τινά φημι πεφυγμένον ἔμμεναι ἀνδρῶν, οὐ κακὸν οὐδὲ μὲν ἐσθλόν, ἐπὴν τὰ πρῶτα γένηται. (I declare that no man has ever escaped his doom, be he a coward or noble, once he has been born, *Il*.6.488-9).

[69] Lardinois (1995), 65, citing *Il*.9.252, where Odysseus reminds Achilles how *Peleus* instructed him (ἐπιτέλλετο) that 'gentle-mindedness is better' (9.256).

The evidence suggests that epinician poets, on the other hand, like to name the authority for a gnome.[70] In Simonides *PMG* 542.11-16, for instance, the 'explicit reference to a source [the saying of Pittacus], and characterization of that source, appears highly characteristic of Simonides'.[71] Whilst Pindar's use of his sources can be quite oblique, the attribution of a proverbial saying or piece of wisdom to a particular individual is not unusual. Pindar's failure to acknowledge the identity of the particular speaker or source (e.g. *N*.3.52-3) may be due to the fact that the anonymous saying is simply the product of the oral tradition. In the case of *P*.4.277, the naming of Homer as the author of a saying can probably be explained as Pindar wanting the listener to understand a particular point about *his* version of the saying. Moreover, when Pindar attributes a mythological "fact" to the oral tradition, he is not necessarily thinking of a particular text, but merely validating his version.[72]

In hiding the identity of a particular source and paraphrasing or manipulating his words, Pindar gives himself more scope for innovation and for building his authority as a wise poet. In *P*.3.80-2, for example, Pindar alludes to *Il*.24.527-33, which is the last gnome in the poem and spoken by Achilles, although his reference to the 'men of the past' encompasses both the source of the words (probably Homer) and the speaker (Achilles):

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[70] E.g. *Bacch*.5.191-4 (Hesiod, cf. fr.344 M-W), *O*.9.1 (Archilochus' song), *P*.2.55 (Archilochus), *P*.4.277-8, *N*.7.21-4 (Homer), *I*.6.66-68 (Hesiod).
[71] Hutchinson (2001), 296-7: 'the effect is forcefully intellectual, and marks a link to the later fifth century'; cf. fr.19W (= *Il*.6.146): 'The man from Chios said one thing best: "As is the generation of leaves, so is the generation of men." Few men hearing this take it to heart. For in each man there is hope which grows in the heart of the young.'
[72] Scodel (2001), 124.

εἰ δὲ λόγων συνέμεν κορυφάν, Ἱέρων,
    ὀρθὰν ἐπίστα, μανθάνων οἶσθα προτέρων
ἓν παρ᾽ ἐσλὸν πήματα σύνδυο δαίονται βροτοῖς
ἀθάνατοι.

  But, Hieron, if you can understand the true point of sayings, you know the lesson of men of the past: the immortals apportion to humans a pair of evils for every good.

In *P*.3.80, Pindar's reference to the *proteroi* deliberately elides the identity of his source.[73] Nagy notes that 'the genitive in this phrase seems to carry with it both an objective and a subjective function. The glories are being told simultaneously about and by the men of the past'.[74] Here, then, the *proteroi* may include the hero-singers themselves, although there is nothing to show that this is what Pindar primarily intended. Some members of the audience may have simply thought that Pindar was paraphrasing Homer. At any rate, the original context of Achilles' famous speech to Priam, in which he speaks of one jar of goods, one of evils, resonates in the present circumstances.[75] Pindar states that for every good the immortals apportion, there is a pair of evils, thus specifying a ratio that Achilles did not make explicit.[76] Pindar thus changes the original expression to suit the current context and to emphasise the weight of suffering in relation to

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[73] Contra Currie (2005), 392, who rejects the supposed allusion to Homer altogether (cf. Gildersleeve, 1890, 276).

[74] Nagy (1990), 200, translating *P*.3.80 as, 'you know, learning from men of the past'. Cf. *N*.3.52, where the transmission of the *epos* could include the hero-singer Achilles, who is the subject of the myth; cf. Heslin (2005), 88-9 on Statius *Achilleid* 1.95-241.

[75] Cf. *Od*.4.236-7, 6.188-90 for a similar insight. For this common sentiment, cf. Aesch. *Ag*. 553-4: 'And who, except the gods, can live time through forever without pain?'

[76] Σ *P*.3.141ab (ii 81-3 Drachm.) with Race (1997), 253, n.3, argued that Pindar interpreted Homer to mean that Zeus doled out fortune from three jars, i.e. two urns of evil gifts and one of good. As Alden (2000), 33 n.60 shows, however, Pindar is talking of two jars alone and Zeus doles out different mixtures from two jars.

good fortune.[77] David Fearn has recently argued that 'Pindar has amplified the consolatory rhetoric for his own encomiastic purposes, in order to suggest that Zeus doles out a proportion of 2:1 in favour of bad from his two jars'.[78]

I suggest that in recalling the original circumstances of Achilles' advice to Priam, Pindar increases the effectiveness of his consolation to Hieron. The same reservations that Achilles expresses in his gnomes about heroic death and that we sense throughout the poem are echoed by Pindar for his audience in Syracuse.[79] Griffin argues that knowledge of Achilles' death is essential 'for the conversation between Achilles and Priam in Book 24, which without that background would produce an entirely different and far less tragic effect.'[80] Similarly, the correspondence between the mythical characters and the present underpins Pindar's own paraenetic stance towards Hieron. Moreover, by identifying his own thoughts with Achilles, Pindar associates Hieron (and even himself) with the heroes of bygone days. I surmise that Pindar's authority is increased not simply by incorporating a traditional saying within his ode but by assimilating it to the particular occasion of the ode and endowing it with fresh meaning.[81]

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[77] Cf. Pedrick (1983), 60 on Homer's use of hortatory *paradeigmata*, which 'show signs of alteration or addition to the usual myth that enhance the connection between the example and the listener's situation'; also Willcock (1964) and Ø.Anderson (1987).

[78] Fearn (2007), 73 n.142. Lardinois (1997), 215 observes that considering the large body of gnomic material in the *Iliad*, 'one is struck by the fact that so few of these sayings are repeated verbatim in later Greek poetry, including other hexameter or elegiac poetry'.

[79] Mann (1994), 322-3, for example, argues that 'Priam's particular grief is that he lived too long', which is the point of the paradigm.

[80] Griffin (2001), 371.

[81] Nagy (1990), 150 points out that 'occasionality is the essence of *ainos*'.

4 (c) *Distancing and Authority*

We should pay attention to the way in which a saying is introduced, which, together with the reshaping of the saying, reflects the level of authority Pindar wishes to claim for himself. The phrase, 'they say', may include epic poets, who are responsible for transmitting traditional wisdom.[82] In Pindar *P*.3.88, *P*.4.287 and *P*.6.21 this formula refers to anonymous authorities that constitute the collective wisdom of the community.[83] Russo notes that the speaker 'momentarily ceases to use a personal voice in the here and now and instead uses the voice of the shared cultural tradition'.[84] Moreover, the purpose of a gnome is 'to persuade the listener and move him to correct action by utterance of familiar, unassailable wisdom'.[85] This has the effect of broadening the appeal of Pindar's advice, which may be a means of negotiating competing interests within the community.[86] This strategy should be contrasted with the poet's technique of restricting knowledge of the saying to Hieron in *P*.3.80, which makes it more exclusive.

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[82] Cf. *I*.8.47-8, where the identity of the *sophoi* appears to be differentiated from that of other anonymous authorities. For Bowra (1964), 283, 'the sources of Pindar's myths are a matter of much uncertainty and speculation'.

[83] Other examples of anonymous sources in Pindar include *O*.2.28, *O*.6.29, *O*.7.54-5, *O*.9.49, *P*.3.88, *N*.7.84, *N*.9.39 (introduce myth); *P*.2.21 (introducing a myth that includes a wise saying). At *P*.7.19, 'they say' introduces a gnomic saying. Cf. Bacchylides 5.57, 155, 287. Lefkowitz (1969), 84 says that φασίν (Bacch.5.155) is 'consciously bardic' and compares λέγουσιν at v.57; cf. *Od*.6.42, 'implying no personal knowledge on the writer's part' (Stanford, 1947. ad loc.).

[84] Russo (1997), 53, who notes that 'a framing device such as 'they say' marks the start of the proverb. The speaker invokes the 'authority of cultural norms as embodied in inherited verbal formulas that were invented by no one but are known to everyone'.

[85] Russo (1997), 57. Cf. Boeke (2007), 13 on the authority of gnomes as derived from the realities of life.

[86] Cf. Stenger (2005), 291-7 on the use of gnomai in Bacchylides 13 as part of the poet's task to reintegrate the victor Pytheas into his community whilst affirming the political status quo.

Lardinois argues that the Pindaric speaker 'distances himself from the saying by laying the responsibility for the thought with the "elders of bygone days" and the addressee himself'.[87] Speaking a gnome indirectly to an addressee, pretending to quote someone else, can be a sign of deference and politeness towards the addressee: an acknowledgement that in reality he is of a higher social status, as is the case here. Moreover, the speaker masks his 'presumption of being able to give advice to a superior by indicating that what he says is nothing new'.[88] In fact, from the point of view that he has *reshaped* an existing saying, Pindar does not absolve himself of all responsibility for the thought. He merely *pretends* to attribute it to the men of the past. Thus, we should modify Lardinois' observation by surmising that the speaker shifts *exclusive* responsibility for the content of the saying away from himself. Furthermore, in encouraging the audience to participate in his authoritative use of the saying, Pindar elevates the value of his own wisdom.

The phenomenon of 'distancing', then, does not detract from Pindar's authoritative use of the saying at all, nor does the appeal to a familiar corpus of knowledge mean that he is disclaiming ownership of the saying, which is reformulated in the process. It might be true to say that it has a distancing effect vis-à-vis the *wider* audience, since the shaping of the expression makes this

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[87] Lardinois (1995), 269.
[88] Lardinois (1995), 63. Like a polite Homeric speaker, Pindar 'combines personal authorship with an acknowledgement that what is said is well known' (p.62), citing *Il*.23.787-8, where Antilochus praises Odysseus after the foot-race by speaking a gnome about him to the assembled Greeks: εἰδόσιν ὔμμ' ἐρέω πᾶσιν φίλοι, ὡς ἔτι καὶ νῦν/ἀϑάνατοι τιμῶσι παλαιοτέρους ἀνϑρώπους. ('Friends, you all know well what I tell you, that still the immortals continue to favour the elder men'.); cf. Antilochus' words at *Il*.23.589, where he uses this device in an attempt to appease an angry Menelaus. Cf. *P*.4.142 (εἰδότι τοι ἐρέω·) and Soph.*OC* 1539.

nugget of *sophia* the exclusive property of poet and patron and hence strengthens their relationship. As Currie observes, 'By being implicated in the construction of meaning, the listener is made complicit in that meaning; he is not so much confronted with the adulation of an encomiast as left to intuit a profound truth for himself'.[89] Nonetheless, I detect an element of conceit here, since Pindar gives the *impression* of intellectual equality but by inviting the *laudandus* to make his own assessment of the 'true point of sayings', actually demonstrates his superiority over the listener. It is the poet who, by virtue of adapting the saying, controls the utterance and its correct interpretation.[90] So the advice to Hieron reflects the self-interest of the poet rather than the expectation that the listener will do anything different.[91]

5 (a) *Wise Figures*

The context for the poet's strategy of using a wise figure to 'authorise' a particular saying can be discerned in the Hesiodic and Homeric epics, where Lardinois notes

> the actual poet/performer creates a distance between himself and the audience by hiding behind the mask of a legendary wise man (Homer, Hesiod, or Cheiron), who in turn may appeal to the power of the Muses…These personae usually apply their gnomes and other wisdom expressions, such as similes or paradigmatic tales, first to characters in the poem, either by speaking to them (in the paraenetic poems) or by speaking about them (in the narrative poems), before allowing the external audience to measure them against their own situation.[92]

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[89] Currie (2005), 405; Cf. Pindar's injunction to know the wisdom of Oedipus at *P*.4.263.

[90] Cf. Stuligrosz (2000), 161, who notes that the 'task of an audience is to discover an allusion contained in a gnome and to interpret it in the context of the heroic past as well as in the context of historical events and a specific occasion'. Cf. the similar function of the *ainos* (below, section 10).

[91] Cf. Hubbard (1985), 133-45.

[92] Lardinois (1995), 230. Cf. the epic poem *Beowolf*, where gnomes are uttered by the narrator or by characters within the epic for the benefit of an external audience. Cf. Chapter 2.

Similarly, in epinician poetry, the sources to whom gnomic statements are attributed are not always historical persons. Hutchinson notes that 'Pindar and Bacchylides several times refer to utterances by or to figures of myth which have a bearing on the present (*Pyth*.4.9-11, 6.19-23, 8.38-42, *P*.9.94, cf.fr.2.2-3, fr.43; Bacch.3.76-7).[93] These mythical quotations resemble the citations in these authors and Simonides of remarks by poets and Wise Men and have an almost learned appearance. But some of them may formally conceal a poetic quotation or reference too'.[94]

What, then, is distinctive about Pindar's use of Chiron as a voice of authority? First, Chiron occupies a unique position as the only educator of heroes in Pindar and this differentiates him from other wise figures in Pindar.[95] As I argue in Chapter 1, it is chiefly by strengthening the parallel between hero and *laudandus* from a pedagogic perspective that Chiron implicitly reinforces the poet's self-representation as a wise adviser. Secondly, Chiron features prominently in Pindaric myth as an educator in his own right rather than as a direct source for a particular saying. The single exception to this is *Pythian* 6.21f, where Chiron's instructions to Achilles are introduced as a report from anonymous authorities. The precept itself is applied gnomically (vv.23-27), whilst the figure of Chiron

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[93] In *P*.8.38-42, the victor Aristomenes 'bears the word' (λόγον φέρεις) which Amphiaraus once spoke over the Epigonoi, just as Thrasyboulos 'upholds the precept' (ἄγεις ἐφημοσύναν, *P*.6.20). The implication seems to be that following the advice culminates in winning a prize.

[94] Hutchinson (2001), 381, noting that *Isth*.2.9-11 might actually be derived from Alc.360 (=schol.Pind.*I*.2.17, iii 215-16 Drachmann): for they say that Aristodemus once expressed it shrewdly at Sparta: 'Money is the man, and no poor man is good or honourable.' The saying itself is actually hidden in Pindar; cf. Woodbury (1968), 533 and *I*.6.66, which conceals a quotation from Hesiod.

[95] Boeke (2007), 11 suggests that Chiron occupies a special place in Greek thought as an educator; cf. Jaeger (1939), 217 and Burr (1975), 89.

legitimises the poet's praise of the victor.[96] This compensates for the absence of

the first person in this ode through which Pindar often presents a moral attitude.

In *P*.3.80-1 (Homer/Achilles), *P*.4.262 (Oedipus), *P*.4.277 (Homer), *P*.9.94 (Old

Man) and *I*.6.67 (Hesiod), sayings attributed to mythological and poetic figures

support the poet's advice to the addressee(s) more explicitly. In these cases,

Pindar names an external authority in order to strengthen a particular stance.

Oedipus, for example, is one such paradigmatic figure who reinforces the poet's

direct command to Hieron in *P*.4.263 (γνῶθι νῦν τὰν Οἰδιπόδα σοφίαν).[97] Likewise,

in the reference to Homer at *Pythian* 4.277-8 (τῶν δ' Ὁμήρου καὶ τόδε συνθέμενος /

ῥῆμα πόρσυν'), Pindar adopts a similarly candid tone in his command (as in the

previous verse), rather than tactfully attributing knowledge of the saying to

Arcesilas, unlike at *P*.3.80. In the original context, Iris began with the more polite

οἶσθ' (*Il*.15.206).[98] In both *P*.3 and *P*.4, then, the poet's direct appeal to an

authoritative figure should be differentiated from Chiron's appearance in myth,

which corresponds more obliquely to the historical situation. This justifies our

examination of Chiron as a figure for the poet as tactful adviser.

5 (b) *Mythical Characters*

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[96] Cf. Lardinois (1995), 228 and Stehle (1997), 207. Jason mentions Chiron's teaching at *P*.4.102 not as the source of a saying but to bolster his moral credentials.

[97] Cf. Braswell (1988), 362: 'The implication is that Arcesilas [if he considers the riddle] will thereby become acquainted with the kind of wisdom characteristic of Oedipus.'

[98] Cf. the diction in Chiron's deferential speech to Apollo at *P*.9.45 with Janko (1984b), who compares the close thematic parallel in Hesiod fr.162: Χ[ε]ίρων οἶσθα καὶ αὐτὸς ὁμῶς μα[κ]άρεσσι θεοῖ[σιν: 'Chiron, you yourself know, just as the blessed gods do'.

In Pindar's epinician poetry, the poet speaks to his audience through the voice of a mythical character, which is an indirect form of advice. Lardinois well observes the similarity between mythological *paradeigmata* and gnomes, both of which work at the level of poet and audience as well as on the level of the characters.[99] Moreover, the poet's words and those of the mythical character may be complementary and serve to reinforce his message to the addressee.[100] Although, as Lardinois notes, 'it is very difficult to determine where the voice of the poet or the narrator intrudes in the speeches of the gods and heroes' in Homer, there is little reason to doubt that a gnome spoken by a character is applicable at the level of the audience in epinician poetry.[101] In Bacchylides 3, Apollo's advice to Admetus is clearly applicable to Hieron's situation and is intended for his intelligent understanding.[102] The gnome, 'this is the highest of gains' (3.83-4), concludes the god's speech and is a transparent example of the poet speaking through his characters.[103]

The phenomenon of characterisation through gnome can be extended to adviser figures who speak gnomes, such as Pindar's Chiron:

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[99] Lardinois (1997), 233. Gnomai are 'uniquely qualified to fulfil this double function because they transcend by definition the particular situation to which they are applied'.

[100] Cf. my discussion of *P*.4 in Chapter 1, where Jason and Pindar employ similar diction and themes.

[101] Lardinois (1997), 233. 'One must distinguish two levels in the use of gnomai in character speeches. The first level pertains to the characters themselves and usually can be determined from the narrative context. The other level, between poet and audience, is always a matter of speculation, as it must have been for the original audience as well.' Cf. Lardinois (1995), 163.

[102] The poetic source may be preserved in scolion 897 (Campbell), the *logos* of Admetus, with which Hieron may have been familiar. Cf. Maehler (1982), 54-5, who speculates that Bacchylides here cites Epicharmus (fr.267 Kaibel) or a collection of Ἀδμήτου λόγοι, which would also have served as Epicharmus' source. Σ Ar.*Wasps* 1238a, Ar. fr.444 K.-A, Praxill.749, Cratin.fr.254 K.-A.

[103] Hutchinson (2001), 350-1: 'The narrator takes into his discourse the complex and paradoxical wisdom of the god, which enhances his own authority'. Cf. my discussion of this phenomenon in Herodotus below (section 11).

"κρυπταὶ κλαΐδες ἐντὶ σοφᾶς
Πειθοῦς ἱερᾶν φιλοτάτων,
Φοῖβε, καὶ ἔν τε θεοῖς τοῦτο κἀνθρώποις ὁμῶς
αἰδέοντ᾽, ἀμφανδὸν ἀδείας τυχεῖν τὸ πρῶτον εὐνᾶς.

καὶ γὰρ σέ, τὸν οὐ θεμιτὸν ψεύδει θιγεῖν,
ἔτραπε μείλιχος ὀργὰ παρφάμεν τοῦτον λόγον."

"Hidden are the keys to sacred lovemaking that belong to wise Persuasion, Phoibus, and both gods and men alike shy from engaging openly for the first time in sweet love.
And so your amorous impulse prompted you, for whom it is not right to touch upon a lie, to make that misleading speech." (*P*.9.38-43)

At 40-1, Chiron utters an ethical gnomic statement about *aidōs* affecting 'men and gods alike' (40) in a way that 'relates Apollo's experience to the general rule' (καὶ γὰρ σέ, 43).[104] Furthermore, although the comments surrounding the proverb text explain the saying in the present context, the gnome's point of reference is not restricted and works on the level of the poet and his audience too.[105] In the myth of *P*.9.38f, Chiron's speech in *Pythian* 9 is obviously aimed extra-textually at the audience because Apollo already knew the outcome of his action. Chiron's advice to Apollo allows the wider audience to measure the mythical situation against that of the present.[106] The link between Apollo and the victor and the corresponding one between Chiron and Pindar is based around the exhortation of the addressee to see the consequences of his immediate actions in a broader perspective. In both cases, the advice concerns the future of the city Cyrene.[107]

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[104] Carey (1981), 78. 'It is fitting that a phrase which often introduces exempla (see Fraenkel on *Ag*.1040) should be used here to introduce the supreme example, Apollo himself' (p.79).
[105] Cf. Lardinois (1997), 232 (cf. 1995, 161) on the double application of Homeric paradeigmata. Cf. Ø.Anderson (1987), 1-13 on the paradigm of Meleager.
[106] Cf. Felson (2004), 371, who argues that 'the god's *ainos* [*P*.9.30f.] calls attention to the epinician poet's laudatory skills'. See further Chapters 2 and 3.
[107] Cf. the corresponding theme of welcome articulated in v.55 and v.73.

Secondly, Chiron's gnomic speech in *Pythian* 9 mirrors the poet's paraenetic relationship with his audience. Felson argues that 'as a speaker, Chiron resembles *ego* and functions as his surrogate narrator. Like *ego*, the facilitator of athletes, the centaur implements the desires of the young and "inexperienced" god and, like *ego*, uses a variety of genres of discourse'.[108] Notwithstanding Chiron's attention to tact in his advice to Apollo, his speech has a strong personal edge, which is a hallmark of the poet's words too. The first-person future ἐρέω ('I shall say', 51), which is very common in speech situations in the *Iliad*, echoes the poet's ἐθέλω... ἀγγέλλων (1-2).[109] Thus, their similar styles of speech support the view put forward in this thesis that Chiron is a figure for the poet as tactful adviser. Douglas Cairns has argued persuasively that 'the use of the exemplary style is one of the ways in which the epic steers the response of its audience, and it is no accident that it is most strikingly deployed at crucial points in the narrative by figures of accepted authority and status'.[110] These comments are germane to Chiron's function in *Pythian* 9 and *Nemean* 3, who plays a similar role to Nestor in guiding the response of Pindar's audience with respect to heroic deeds. I would wish to emphasise too the importance of the first person as a feature of the exemplary style, which I will discuss separately below.

Lastly, it is important to distinguish between the oblique character of Chiron's advice in relation to the *laudandus* and the more explicit use of the Old Man to

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[108] Felson (2004), 376. She notes the remarkable correspondences in diction (esp. adverbs) that pair the first ten lines of Chiron's prophecy in strophe g with ego's ensuing 'prophecy' about the victor's return and the effects of his victory on his homeland in epode g (71-6).
[109] Cf. *Il.*1.76 (Calchas), 9.103 (Nestor), 23.787 (Antilochus) etc.
[110] D.L.Cairns (2001), 23.

frame the poet's instruction. In *P*.9.38, Chiron's speech is not directly linked to Pindar's *qua* adviser. This is what Segal calls, 'the indirect method of paradigmatic myth and symbolic association'.[111] In the utterance at *P*.9.95-6, however, which is attributed to the Old Man of the Sea, an indirect command introduced by ἔννεπεν reinforces the poet's instruction:[112]

οὕνεκεν, εἰ φίλος ἀστῶν, εἴ τις ἀντά-
  εις, τό γ᾽ ἐν ξυνῷ πεπονα μένον εὖ
μὴ λόγον βλάπτων ἁλίοιο γέροντος κρυπτέτω·
κεῖνος αἰνεῖν καὶ τὸν ἐχθρόν
παντὶ θυμῷ σύν τε δίκᾳ καλὰ ῥέζοντ᾽ ἔννεπεν.

 Therefore let no citizen, whether friendly or hostile, keep hidden a labour born nobly on behalf of all, thereby violating the command of the Old Man of the Sea, who said to praise even one's enemy wholeheartedly when he performs noble deeds. (*P*.9.93-6)

As we have seen, the introduction of a wise saying in Pindar is typically expressed as reported speech.[113] The poet's command to the citizens of Cyrene is underpinned by the authority of the Old Man, though the precise wording is not attested elsewhere. The injunction to praise 'justly' (σύν τε δίκᾳ) evokes the Hesiod's description of Nereus in *Theogony* 233.[114] Pindar's manipulation of an 'ideal type' is typical of his use of wise sayings.[115] Commenting on *P*.9.94, Mullen

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[111] Segal (1998), 16.

[112] Cf. Pelliccia (1995), 344-5 ad *P*.9.93-6: 'the use of ἔννεπεν for a command is conditioned by the previous context'; 'its lack of object reflects the direct-form imperative with the subject otherwise unspecified, equivalent to statements of universal obligation introduced by χρή or δεῖ.' For the verb ἐνέπει, cf. *N*.3.75 (*epos*, v.53), *I*.8.45a; originally in Homer it meant 'tell a tale' i.e. *logos*, *Il*.1.1, like *eipein*; *Il*.2.761 (of Muses); Hes.*Op*.192 ('to speak'). Also *Od*.1.1, Hes.*Op*.1, *Th*.23-5; cf. Martin (1989), 238 on the semantics of this verb.

[113] Cf. *P*.4.277-8, *P*.6.20-7. Currie (2005), 391 n.264 notes that 'Pindaric citations are commonly signalled by accusative and infinitive, explicitly introduced by a verb of saying (or equivalent)'.

[114] Cf. Detienne (1996), 53. Cf. Carey (1981), 97, who thinks the attribution of the gnome to Nereus is fitting because he is ἀψευδής at *Th*.233. Cf. *P*.3.92 for 'wise-counselling Nereus' (Νηρέος εὐβούλου).

[115] Cf. Lardinois (1997), 216 n.22, who notes that 'the nuclear theme, underlying all expressions of this thought, is only an "ideal type" that is always varied in some shape or form'.

well argues that 'it is not by originality of sentiment that the elders will judge his *sophia*, his wisdom and his poetic skill, but rather by the way he makes the saws new through restatement in fresh and memorable language'.[116] I suspect the theme of hiding praise prompts the poet to recall the Old Man as the source of this saying, since he is associated with concealment in *Od*.4.561-4.[117] Indeed, both the gnomic form and theme of the utterance correspond to Chiron's prophecy in the myth and his allusion to the obscure utterances of the Delphic oracle (vv.46-9).[118] Thus, in his insistence on open disclosure where praise is concerned, Pindar usurps Chiron's oracular authority and appropriates it for the epinician genre. The *topos* of hidden praise is expressed more anonymously in *N*.9.6f: ἔστι δέ τις λόγος ἀνθρώπων, τετελσεμένον ἐσλόν /μὴ χαμαὶ σιγᾷ καλύψαι ('there is a saying among men: 'Hide not in grounded silence a noble thing fulfilled').[119] Similarly neutral sayings in Bacchylides 5.193-4 (ὃν ⟨ἂν⟩ ἀθάνατοι τι[μῶσι, τούτωι καὶ βροτῶν φήμαν ἔπ[εσθαι) and Theognis 169 (ὃν δὲ θεοὶ τιμῶσιν, ὁ καὶ μωμεύμενος αἰνεῖ· point to a common source, perhaps the *Precepts of Chiron*. We should note in particular the equivalence of εὖ πράσσοι (Bacch.5.190) and καλὰ ῥέξοντ᾽ (*P*.9.96), which illustrate how the occasion of the ode or status of the *laudandus* determines the particular adaptation of a wise saying.[120]

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[116] Cf. Mullen (1982), 117-8.
[117] Cf. the allusion to Hesiod's *Works and Days* in *I*.6.67 in the context of hard work.
[118] For a similar combination of the terse and obscure gnomic/oracular style, cf. Heraclitus fr.93 (apud Plut.*de Pyth.orac*.21 404E): ὁ ἄναξ οὗ τὸ μαντεῖόν ἐστι τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς οὔτε λεγεί οὔτε κρύπτει ἀλλὰ σημαίνει.
[119] Glossed in Σ 13a and 13b with οὐ δεῖ, without personal object, + infin.
[120] For Carey (1981), 97, the Pindaric phrase 'hints especially at athletic victory' (cf. *O*.1.101, *O*.10.95). Cf. *N*.3.19 on this reference to the victor's youth.

To conclude, the two paradigmatic figures have a complementary function of legitimising the poet's authority, since the Old Man bolsters a direct command and Chiron interacts with the poetic *ego* more obliquely. Thus, our study of Chiron helps to elucidate Pindar's penchant for indirectness.[121]

5 (c) *The Authoritative Adviser*

In an earlier discussion, we observed that the use of a familiar saying can, in the case of *P*.3.80, serve as a compliment to the *laudandus* and increase the poet's authority too. In this way, attributing wisdom to authoritative voices from the past encourages the audience to participate in the poet's project of self-aggrandisement. As Hesiod is the only poet quoted by name by both Pindar and Bacchylides, it will be worth exploring the claim of poetic authority, which has the same effect as the appeal to Chiron's mythical authority, namely to aggrandise the poet.[122]

   Λάμπων δὲ μελέταν
ἔργοις ὀπάζων Ἡσιόδου μάλα τιμᾷ τοῦτ᾽ ἔπος,
υἱοῖσί τε φράζων παραινεῖ,

   In devoting industry to his deeds, Lampon holds in particular honour that saying of Hesiod, which he quotes and recommends to his sons (*I*.6.66-8)

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[121] Cf. Currie (2005), 405 and 412-14.

[122] D'Alessio (2005), 230. 'As often happens in such cases, he is quoted as the authority for a *gnome*, rather than as the source of a story'; cf. *P*.4.277.

The signifier ἔργοις refers to Lampon's work educating his sons in a particularly Hesiodic manner, both in advice and personal example.[123] Lampon now declares (φράζων) himself an example to his sons, a living embodiment of Hesiod's dictum. As Nicholson observes, 'Training is here not a process of transmitting skills but of inculcating moral behaviour. It is the father's morals and moral advice that dominate his teaching, not athletic techniques'.[124] Pindar's comment seems to imply that Lampon's son is accomplished as a result of being indoctrinated by a morally conscientious Hesiodic father. D'Alessio notes that Pindar represents 'Lampon in the act of impersonating through this quotation, Hesiod's parainetic stance: Lampon himself παραινεῖ'.[125] Its effect is to increase the stature of the *laudandus*. Another didactic context for instructions given from father to son can be found in *Iliad* 6.207-210 (Hippolochus-Glaucus), 9.252-59 (Peleus-Achilles), and 11.783-90 (Menoitius-Patroclus), which may be the first evidence in Greek literature of independently formulated wisdom teachings.[126] In these cases, the son refers to his knowledge of precepts in a way that increases both his father's reputation and his own authority as a speaker. Similarly, Pindar employs the *topos* of paternal instruction as a means of mutual glorification for *laudandus* and

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[123] Cf. Kurke (1990), 89 n.18, who points out that it can also refer to the Hesiodic *Erga*. 'By this play on ἔργοις, Pindar signals the source of his allusion'. With this quotation from Hesiod, cf. *P*.8.13-14: 'Gain is most precious if one takes it from the home of a willing giver', which is more succinct than *Op*.356-60.

[124] Cf. Nicholson (2005), 171. 'Lampon is primarily represented as directing the general conduct of his sons, and it is only within this context that the idea of training is introduced'. Cf. Pindar's treatment of Chiron's nurture of Achilles in *N*.3 and Nicholson (2005), 195-6.

[125] D'Alessio (2005), 231. 'Pindar is not simply quoting a sentence: he is making his patron quote it'. Cf. Nicholson (2005), 172 on παραινεῖ as a marker of the specific genre of advice poetry that included the Theognidea and the *Precepts of Chiron*. Lampon is 'a Theognis or a Chiron within his own family'.

[126] Bielohlawek (1940), 5-6. Cf. e.g. *Il*.6.206-8: Ἱππόλοχος δέ μ᾽ ἔτικτε, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ φημι γενέσθαι· / πέμπε δέ μ᾽ ἐς Τροίην, καί μοι μάλα πόλλ᾽ ἐπέτελλεν / αἰὲν ἀριστεύειν καὶ ὑπείροχον ἔμμεναι ἄλλων.

laudandus. As such, we can characterise his discourse as a 'paraenetic encomium'.

The function of advice as a means of poetic aggrandisement can be seen in his adaptation of the saying, as noted above with regard to *P*.3.80. Commentators have pointed out that τοῦτ᾽ ἔπος signals a direct quotation, the Hesiodic maxim, μελέτη δὲ τοι ἔργον ὀφέλλει·.[127] Thummer notes the oddity of the signalling device in this context, where the poet is not actually quoting the exact words.[128] But it is not uncommon for the poet to allude to an *epos* and, in adapting it to his requirements, to claim ownership either directly (e.g. *N*.3.52-3) or indirectly (e.g. *P*.3.80). In this case, the phrase points backwards to μελέταν ἔργοις ὀπάζων, Pindar's formulation. So although Hesiod is explicitly represented as being given honour (τιμᾷ) by Lampon, Pindar's compliment to Lampon for 'devoting industry to his deeds' deflects honour on the poet himself, since it is his variation of the original maxim that is placed in Lampon's mouth. By modifying the Hesiodic advice in the context of moral instruction given to an athlete, Pindar elevates the value of his own wisdom along with that of the *laudandus*. Thus, he secures his own patronage as well as his patron's fame.[129]

Lampon's prominence in *I*.6 can be explained by the fact that he is a vehicle for aggrandising the *laudandus*, which provides a solution to the question of why

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[127] Kurke (1990), 89; cf. Nagy (1979), 238 on the allusion to *Op*.412 ('add preparedness to action!').
[128] Thummer (1968-9 II), 110 and Pelliccia (1987), 45 n.14, on τοῦϑ᾽...ἔπος (*P*.3.1-2), which refers to the common wish for someone who is dead to be alive again (v.3), in this case, Chiron; cf. *P*.4.277-8 (Homeric saying), *P*.6.29 (Chiron's precept), Theog.15-18.
[129] Cf. Fearn (2007), 88 on the panhellenic poet's strategy in Bacchylides 13.

Lampon appears to take on the role of trainer in Phylakidas' second victory and not in his first.[130] But as I have argued, this provides an opportunity for the poet to present himself as appropriating these ethical values for epinician. In *Pythian* 6, the corresponding relationship between father and son is articulated within the same kind of moral framework, namely Chiron's instruction of Achilles, which Pindar transmits to the present. In that case, however, praise of the young Thrasyboulos ostensibly serves as a vehicle for paternal glorification. But as I argue in Chapter One, the assumption of Chiron's authority as a teacher contributes to his own exaltation.

6 (a) *Nestor: The Wise Adviser of Kings*

In order to contextualise the ways in which Pindar advises kings such as Hieron and Arcesilas, it will be useful to examine the different forms of authority employed by Nestor when advising the Greek leaders at Troy. Firstly, how should we characterise his speech? In comparing Nestor with the perfect praise-poet, Martin notes that proportion works in the rhythm and structure of each verse (i.e. at the poetic level). Nestor apportions praise and blame equally (i.e. at the rhetorical level).[131] Nestor's voice 'flows from his tongue sweeter than honey' (*Il*.1.249), suggesting the mellifluous language of the poet himself. Alden suggests that it is Nestor's 'role as praise-poet – therefore, as one who practices the craft of the epic itself – that gains Nestor the most explicitly favourable

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[130] Cf. Nicholson (2005), 171.
[131] Martin (1989), 101f., noting in particular Nestor's speech to Patroclus in Book 11.

depiction of any speaker in the poem'.[132] Lardinois adds that 'it is particularly in

his story telling, where Nestor is most subtle, that he resembles an epic poet'.[133]

His ability to charm the listener through the power of language is a powerful tool

in attempting to resolve the quarrel between Agamemnon and Achilles.

Nestor's admixture of praise and advice is pertinent to Pindar's discourse,

particularly in the 'tyrant' odes. Martin observes that 'In his function as repository

of Achaean traditions, the old man specifically reports the duties of kings, and

does so in terms of speech'.[134] The fundamental kinship between praise and

blame styles in early Greek discourse is evident in Pindar's epinician and

Nestor's use of tact suggests an affinity with our poet.[135] This type of discourse

can be seen at *Il*.9.53-4, where Nestor's praise accompanies his mild corrections

of Diomedes, 'best in counsel among his peers' ($\beta o\upsilon\lambda\tilde{\eta}$ $\mu\epsilon\tau\grave{\alpha}$ $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha\varsigma$ $\acute{o}\mu\acute{\eta}\lambda\iota\varkappa\alpha\varsigma$ $\check{\epsilon}\pi\lambda\epsilon\upsilon$

$\check{\alpha}\varrho\iota\sigma\tau o\varsigma$).[136] Nestor's rebuke to Menelaus, directed through Agamemenon, is also

suggestive:

 $\grave{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\grave{\alpha}$ $\varphi\acute{\iota}\lambda o\nu$ $\pi\epsilon\varrho$ $\acute{\epsilon}\acute{o}\nu\tau\alpha$ $\varkappa\alpha\grave{\iota}$ $\alpha\grave{\iota}\delta o\tilde{\iota}o\nu$ $M\epsilon\nu\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\alpha o\nu$
$\nu\epsilon\iota\varkappa\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\omega$, $\epsilon\check{\iota}$ $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\varrho$ $\mu o\iota$ $\nu\epsilon\mu\epsilon\sigma\acute{\eta}\sigma\epsilon\alpha\iota$, $o\grave{\upsilon}\delta$' $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\iota\varkappa\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\omega$
$\acute{\omega}\varsigma$ $\epsilon\check{\upsilon}\delta\epsilon\iota$, $\sigma o\grave{\iota}$ δ' $o\check{\iota}\omega$ $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\acute{\epsilon}\tau\varrho\epsilon\psi\epsilon\nu$ $\pi o\nu\acute{\epsilon}\epsilon\sigma\vartheta\alpha\iota$.

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[132] Alden (2000), 110. She notes (p.108) that Nestor 'is continually "memorializing" his audience, in a manner akin to the poet's.' Nestor's speech in *Il*.23.315-25 contains the longest block of gnomic utterances in any speech in *Iliad*.

[133] Lardinois (1995), 145. Cf. Thalmann (1984), 139-43.

[134] Martin (1989), 105. He enacts equal distribution (1.254-84), *kata moiran*, in his command to Agamemnon and Achilles. Cf. the Muse-inspired oratory that enables the Hesiodic king to settle disputes (*Th*.87). Not surprisingly, Nestor is chosen by Nicarchus ($\gamma\lambda\acute{\omega}\sigma\sigma\eta\varsigma$ $\underline{\acute{\eta}\delta\upsilon\lambda\acute{o}\gamma o\upsilon}$ $\sigma o\varphi\acute{\iota}\eta$) to represent oratory, as Combellack (1948), 124 points out.

[135] Cf. Detienne (1973), 18-27 and *P*.9.93f; Nagy (1979), 222-75; Martin (1989), 75, 110. Also Martin (1984), 31.

[136] Cf. Alden (2000), 108-9, who notes that Nestor's praise after an exploit (e.g.10.550: words to Odysseus after the Doloneia) 'resembles a poetic eulogy of a heroic deed from the past'. This is suggestive of Pindar's strategy in, for example, the myth of *P*.6.

But beloved as he is and respected, I will still blame Menelaos, even though you be angry, and I will not hide it, for the way he sleeps and has given to you alone all the hard work. (*Il.*10.114-16)

Martin notes that 'both the indirect nature of this rebuke (which Agamemenon assures him is not needed) and the hesitant phrasing show Nestor's reluctance to practice this genre of discourse. Only a regard for fairness and proportionate speech impels him to mention the subject.'[137] As Alden puts it, Nestor 'conveys disapproval in an elegant way, avoiding open and direct reproach'; he indicates displeasure by telling stories which feature the action of which he is complaining.[138] Correspondingly, negative paradigms from the past convey Pindar's message indirectly, as for example Phalaris (*P.*1), Coronis and Asclepius (*P.*3) and Pelias (*P.*4). This rhetorical feature can be found in his Boeotian compatriot Hesiod too. Griffith, for example, has noted Hesiod's exceptional use of Perses' father as a negative paradigm for his son.[139] Clay observes that Hesiod similarly employs both 'straight talk – commands, threats, and exhortations – as well as honeyed eloquence in the form of myths, fables, parables, and promises in resolving the quarrel between himself and his brother Perses'.[140] These features of speech can be observed across generic boundaries. Pindar deploys a similar array of rhetorical techniques, although his

[137] Martin (1989), 107-8. The verb 'I will not conceal', οὐδ' ἐπικεύσω 10.115, is used in other formulas to introduce full disclosures. Cf. Pindar's instruction not to 'conceal a labour borne on behalf of all' in *P.*9.93-4.

[138] Alden (2000), 81; cf. Martin (1989), 70. E.g. *Od.*21.295-6: οἶνος καὶ Κένταυρον, ἀγακλυτὸν Εὐρυτίωνα, ἄασ' ἐνὶ μεγάρῳ μεγαθύμου Πειριθόοιο.

[139] Cf. Griffith (1983), 63; cf. *W&D* 632. Cf. Nagy (1990), 312, on the fable of the hawk in Hesiod's *Works and Days* 202f., which is an *exemplum* of the ways of *hubris* as opposed to the ways of *dike*' in the moral framework of the poem.

[140] Clay (1993), 23. Cf. M.L.West *OCD*[3], s.v. 'Hesiod' p.700, on the *W&D* as the 'Wisdom of Hesiod'.

preference for myths and proverbial maxims and his avoidance of direct threats suggests a more diplomatic approach to his task.

Lardinois suggests that 'Persons in a position of authority over the addressee, such as Nestor, do have the choice of either exercising authority, by speaking direct second-person gnomai, or of resorting to indirect statements instead, in order to express themselves more subtly'.[141] Like the Homeric speaker, Pindar's advice to kings is characteristically forthright, although it is rarely presented as a direct address and then, in the form of exhortation rather than rebuke (e.g. *P*.3.80f.). Certainly, Pindar's overall approach is characterised by its indirectness, which is born of the fact that, like Nestor, he tries to persuade the listener without causing offence. In his advice speeches, Nestor's gnomes 'are for the most part second-person sayings which apply to the addressee and are therefore authoritative speech.'[142] This is untypical of Pindar's style in the epinicia generally and is the main distinction between their styles of speech. Judged on the basis of gnomic speech alone, Pindar's indirect style is closer to that of Odysseus.[143] In recognising that the relative social positions of speaker and addressee are important in dictating the type of address used in the *Iliad*, Lardinois notes that 'most second person gnomai are spoken by persons with authority over the

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[141] Lardinois (2000), 651, citing *Iliad* 4.320. 'Nestor can be very subtle both in his use of gnomai and in his use of paradigmatic tales.'
[142] Lardinois (2000), 649-50. No fewer than ten of the thirteen gnomai spoken by Nestor are direct second-person statements (1.274, 278-9, 8.143-4, 9-63-4, 11.793, 23.315, 316-7, 318, 319-21 and 322-5).
[143] Cf. Lardinois (1995), 277. 'He has the uncanny ability to present a saying as being applicable to one person, but at the same time have it refer to another person as well.' (p.145) Cf. Martin (1989), 104 on Agamemnon's more 'directive strategies'.

addressee (elder men, kings, parents, gods, teachers)'.[144] Given this picture, one would perhaps expect Pindar to address a second-person gnome directly to someone of lower status, but he in fact reserves them for kings, who enjoyed the most powerful position in the Greek world.[145] I interpret this as a sign of his need to claim authority *qua* teacher. Often, there are special circumstances that explain their use. As Lardinois has shown, half of these sayings are used to compliment the addressee, since the friendly content of saying precludes the addressee from taking offence.[146] I conclude that Pindar's style of speech is closest to that of Nestor when addressing advice to a king. This is a reflection of his desire to claim the position of a worthy adviser and the need to be, or to seem to be, superior in experience or wisdom. On the whole, though, his counsel is more oblique than Nestor's.[147]

6 (b) *Discourse Features of the Wise Adviser*

In order to contextualise some aspects of Pindar's advice, I have selected Nestor's speech to Agamemnon during his quarrel with Achilles. Its discourse

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[144] Lardinois (1997), 229. 'When the gnome is meant as a compliment, greater liberty is allowed'.
[145] Lardinois (1995), 268, with references (*O*.5.23b-24; 10.91-93a; *P*.1.85, 99-100; 2.56, 63b-64a, 72-73a; 3.81-3, 85-6, 114b-15; 4.263b-69, 271, 273 and 274; 5.1-4, 12-13, 43-44; 7.19b-21; 8.88-92a, 92b-97; *I*.3./4.49-53a).
[146] Lardinois (1997), 227, n.71; and e.g. *Il*.17.251.
[147] Cf. Instone (1993), 235, who observes that Cole (1992) distinguishes between the strategies used by Pindar for different audiences, comprising: a) aristocracies (e.g. on Aigina) and b) monarchies (e.g. Sicily). 'Pindar is diplomatically ambiguous and allusive for the former where different members of the audience may have had different interests, blunter for the latter where he is serving a single authority.' Cf. F.Cairns (1989), 11: 'encomium and paraenesis addressed to both classes may encompass topics which later became specifically kingship topics.'

context bears close resemblance to Pindar's advice to Arcesilas in *Pythian* 4,

where the poet intercedes in the king's dispute with an exiled citizen, as

discussed later. It is the rhetorical features of Nestor's speech, however, that I

will focus on here.

«Ὦ πόποι, ἦ μέγα πένθος Ἀχαιΐδα γαῖαν ἱκάνει·
ἦ κεν γηθήσαι Πρίαμος Πριάμοιό τε παῖδες   255
ἄλλοι τε Τρῶες μέγα κεν κεχαροίατο θυμῷ,
εἰ σφῶϊν τάδε πάντα πυθοίατο μαρναμένοιϊν,
οἳ περὶ μὲν βουλὴν Δαναῶν, περὶ δ᾽ ἐστὲ μάχεσθαι.
ἀλλὰ πίθεσθ᾽· ἄμφω δὲ νεωτέρω ἐστὸν ἐμεῖο·
ἤδη γάρ ποτ᾽ ἐγὼ καὶ ἀρείοσιν ἠέ περ ὑμῖν   260
ἀνδράσιν ὡμίλησα, καὶ οὔ ποτέ μ᾽ οἵ γ᾽ ἀθέριζον.
οὐ γάρ πω τοίους ἴδον ἀνέρας οὐδὲ ἴδωμαι,
οἷον Πειρίθοόν τε Δρύαντά τε ποιμένα λαῶν
Καινέα τ᾽ Ἐξάδιόν τε καὶ ἀντίθεον Πολύφημον
Θησέα τ᾽ Αἰγεΐδην, ἐπιείκελον ἀθανάτοισιν·   265
κάρτιστοι δὴ κεῖνοι ἐπιχθονίων τράφεν ἀνδρῶν·
κάρτιστοι μὲν ἔσαν καὶ καρτίστοις ἐμάχοντο
φηρσὶν ὀρεσκῴοισι καὶ ἐκπάγλως ἀπόλεσσαν.
καὶ μὲν τοῖσιν ἐγὼ μεθομίλεον ἐκ Πύλου ἐλθὼν
τηλόθεν ἐξ ἀπίης γαίης· καλέσαντο γὰρ αὐτοί·   270
καὶ μαχόμην κατ᾽ ἔμ᾽ αὐτὸν ἐγώ· κείνοισι δ᾽ ἂν οὔ τις
τῶν οἳ νῦν βροτοί εἰσιν ἐπιχθόνιοι μαχέοιτο·
καὶ μὲν μευ βουλέων ξύνιεν πείθοντό τε μύθῳ·
ἀλλὰ πίθεσθε καὶ ὔμμες, ἐπεὶ πείθεσθαι ἄμεινον·
μήτε σὺ τόνδ᾽ ἀγαθός περ ἐὼν ἀποαίρεο κούρην,   275
ἀλλ᾽ ἔα ὥς οἱ πρῶτα δόσαν γέρας υἷες Ἀχαιῶν·
μήτε σὺ Πηλεΐδη ἔθελ᾽ ἐριζέμεναι βασιλῆϊ
ἀντιβίην, ἐπεὶ οὔ ποθ᾽ ὁμοίης ἔμμορε τιμῆς
σκηπτοῦχος βασιλεύς, ᾧ τε Ζεὺς κῦδος ἔδωκεν.
εἰ δὲ σὺ καρτερός ἐσσι, θεὰ δέ σε γείνατο μήτηρ,   280
ἀλλ᾽ ὅ γε φέρτερός ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ πλεόνεσσιν ἀνάσσει.
Ἀτρεΐδη σὺ δὲ παῦε τεὸν μένος· αὐτὰρ ἔγωγε
λίσσομ᾽ Ἀχιλλῆϊ μεθέμεν χόλον, ὃς μέγα πᾶσιν
ἕρκος Ἀχαιοῖσιν πέλεται πολέμοιο κακοῖο.»

  "Oh, for shame. Great sorrow comes on the land of Achaia.
Now might Priam and the sons of Priam in truth be happy,
and all the rest of the Trojans be visited in their hearts with gladness,
were they to hear all this wherein you two are quarrelling,
you, who surpass all Danaans in council, in fighting.
Yet be persuaded. Both of you are younger than I am.
Yes, and in my time I have dealt with better men than

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you are, and never once did they disregard me. Never
yet have I seen nor shall see again such men as these were,
men like Perithoös, and Dryas, shepherd of the people,
Kaineus, and Exadios, godlike Polyphemos,
or Theseus, Aigeus' son, in the likeness of the immortals.
These were the strongest generation of earth-born mortals,
the strongest, and they fought against the strongest, the beast men,
living within the mountains, and terribly they destroyed them.
I was of the company of these men, coming from Pylos,
a long way from a distant land, since they had summoned me.
And I fought single-handed, yet against such men no one
of the mortals now alive upon the earth could do battle. And also
these listened to the counsels I gave and heeded my bidding.
Do you also obey, since to be persuaded is better.
You, great man that you are, yet do not take the girl away
but let her be, a prize as the sons of the Achaians gave her
first. Nor, son of Peleus, think to match your strength with
the king, since never equal with the rest is the portion of honour
of the sceptred king to whom Zeus gives magnificence. Even
though you are the stronger man, and the mother who bore you was immortal,
yet this man is greater who is lord over more than you rule.
Son of Atreus, give up your anger; even I entreat you
to give over your bitterness against Achilleus, he who
stands as a great bulwark of battle over all the Achaeans." (*Il*.1.254-84)[148]

The main features of Nestor's speech are his use of gnome, exhortation and
personal recollection as forms of authority. There are obvious similarities too with
the direct personal address, exhortations to listen to wisdom and persuasive
rhetoric found in Phoenix's speech to Achilles in *Iliad* 9.434f.[149] The rhetorical
features noted above are often found in dialogue and are readily assimilated to
epinician, which I shall argue is conceived as a type of conversation between the

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[148] Transl. Lattimore.
[149] Cf. Martin (1992), 16, who discerns a close parallel between the speech of Phoenix to Achilles and the forms of authority found in Hesiod. Cf. Jaeger (1939), 66 on Hesiod's *Works & Days* as a 'huge admonitory speech', which uses myths (e.g. Prometheus and Pandora) as Homeric speeches do (e.g. Meleager/Ages of Man in Phoenix's speech) to illustrate the truth of the lesson.

poet and an external addressee. Let us examine these forms of authority more closely.

Nestor opens his speech, a rebuke of Agamemnon's behaviour, by referring to the joy the Trojans must feel when they hear about the strife between Achilles and Agamemnon (1.254f.). Nestor ends this part of his speech firmly, yet politely, with an imperative and a gnome in line 274: 'Do you obey/be persuaded too, *for to obey is better*' (ἀλλὰ πίθεσθε καὶ ὕμμες, ἐπεὶ πείθεσθαι ἄμεινον·).[150] The gnome closes the topic of this speech and recapitulates the initial exhortation (259). Lardinois has found that Homeric gnomes generally *follow* the explanation, as is the case here.[151] 'Gnomes that open speeches, by contrast, invite discussion because no definite claim has been made yet about their applicability. They are invariably part of friendly, apologetic or respectful addresses.'[152]

Nestor's exhortation ἀλλὰ πίθεσθ'· ἄμφω δὲ νεωτέρω ἐστὸν ἐμεῖο· (259) 'yet be persuaded; both of you are younger than I am' (cf. 10.176) is accompanied by a personal reminiscence to justify his status as a wise adviser. He illustrates his point that Agamemnon would be better off listening to him by relating how he used to counsel other heroes (259f.).[153] His exemplary status as an adviser is affirmed through his association with heroes greater than those of the present,

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[150] Cf. Martin (1989), 104 and e.g. *Il*.9.256, which softens the previous command directed by Odysseus at Achilles to restrain his great-spirited temper.

[151] Lardinois (1995), 68, who notes that 'letting the gnome precede its explanation makes the statement more friendly and less authoritative'.

[152] Lardinois (1995), 72. Cf. Chiron's tactful speech at *P*.9.38f, which opens with a gnome that is followed by an explanation directed at Apollo in v.42.

[153] Cf. Alden (2000), 79, who notes that Nestor's part 'corresponds exactly to his perception of his role – to manage the Greeks with advice and stories' (e.g. *Il*.4.320: βουλῇ καὶ μύθοισι·).

namely the Lapiths.[154] The pattern of his exhortation is as follows: 'you must do this, because X, who was in more or less the same situation as you, and a more significant person, did it'.[155] Robbins argues that the '*exemplum* of the centaurs is subtle and has a double reference, for Achilles, if violent, will likewise be behaving in the manner of the reprehensible centaurs, not that of his teacher Chiron, the δικαιότατος Κενταύρων' (11.832).[156] Nestor's clever use of *exempla* in a way that applies to different audiences is also significant.[157] The application of this coded message to more than one person is germane to the discourse situation of *Pythian* 4, where the message is intended to be heard by both parties to the dispute, Arcesilas and Damophilos. Similarly, in the myth, Jason's words are initially addressed to his political rival Pelias, though he turns to the assembled throng of citizens in Iolkos for support (*P*.4.117).

In the sense that Nestor's tales of heroes from the past provide instruction tailored to the present situation, they are comparable to Pindar's innovative treatment of myth.[158] In contrast to Pindar, who invests in a poetic legacy of wisdom from the past (e.g. *P*.3.113, *N*.3.52-3 etc.), Nestor's authority as a wise adviser is derived from his own practical experience as a fighter and his

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[154] Cf. Willcock (1964), 14; cf. Oehler (1925), 24 on Nestor's advice to the Lapiths, which sets his own exploits against Achilles' inactivity.

[155] Willcock (1964), 142. Davies (2006), 586 remarks that some paradigmatic tales may end with a call to action: 'consolation becomes exhortation'.

[156] Robbins (1993), 11. Cf. Kirk (1970), 160 on the distinction between Chiron and the other Centaurs. On the duality of the Centaur in the mythical imagination, cf. Buxton (2004), 110, who suggests that a creature with this form symbolically combines the two poles of uncivilised and civilised; cf. *P*.3.4-5, *P*.4.119, and Braswell (1979), 189 on the adjective ζαμενής (*P*.9.38): 'In spite of his philanthropy, Chiron remains generically a Centaur, the very embodiment of violence.'

[157] Cf. the fable of the hawk and nightingale at Hes.*Op*.202 (discussed below, section 10b).

[158] Cf. March (1987), esp. pp.119-54 for Pindar's innovative handling of the Oedipus myth in *P*.4.263.

association with illustrious heroes from the past: 'In my time I have kept company with greater men even than you' (261-2). In doing battle in the company of heroes like Theseus against the 'beast men of the mountains' (φηρσὶν ὀρεσκῴοισι, 268), Nestor implies that he is superior to men of the present.[159] For 'against such men no one of the mortals alive upon earth today could do battle' (*Il.*1.271-2). As Alden notes, Nestor's four 'major exploits function as paradigms and help to justify his claim to offer advice in the present, now that his youth and strength have gone, and he can be only a speaker of words.'[160] Indeed, Nestor's victory over 'godlike' Ereuthalion (e.g. *Il.*4.319, 7.136) represents a direct challenge to men of the current generation to emulate his deeds. Nestor's penchant for self-praise is evident at 11.761, where he reminisces about his role in the battle between the Pylian and the Eleans and says: 'all [the Pylians] prayed to Zeus among the gods and to Nestor among men'. This is more explicit than any such remark in Pindar.

It is noticeable that Nestor demands the respect of Agamemnon and Achilles by claiming superiority over the men of the present (260-1). His emphasis on the gulf between heroes of the past and men of the present (*Il.*23.643-5) is comparable to the function of the mythical hero in Pindar, who serves both as a model and metaphor for the *laudandus*. In *P.*6.44-5 (τῶν νῦν δὲ καὶ Θρασύβουλος / πατρῴαν μάλιστα πρὸς στάθμαν ἔβα), Pindar suggests that Thrasyboulos is a

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[159] Cf. Achilles' claim at 9.105; also *Il.*5.302-4 and 20.285-7 on the gulf between past and present in terms of heroic strength and Most (2003), 131 on Homer's idealisation of the heroic world.
[160] Alden (2000), 75.

paradigm for the current generation.[161] Like Nestor, Pindar dwells on the past (28, 40, 43) in a way that implies the present-day achievements are inferior.[162] Through the somewhat excessive comparison with Antilochus' self-sacrifice, Pindar invites his audience to ponder to what extent Thrasyboulos' deeds really match those of the past.[163] As Goldhill rightly warns, 'The example's narrative form always threatens to produce an excess of signification beyond the controlling lines of the case it is designed to illustrate'.[164] The fact that the *exemplum* invariably overtakes the *comparandum* provokes a response from the audience and may serve as a warning to the victor about his own limitations. In addition, it has an effect on Pindar's rhetoric, namely to give the impression of authority. This is analogous to the impact that stories of heroes and monsters can have on a child's imagination and the resulting sense of wonder that increases respect and admiration for the raconteur.

There is another sense in which Nestor's use of *exempla* is like what we find in Pindar. Willcock notes that Nestor has the 'old man's tendency to digress and

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[161] Cf. Athanassaki (2004), 320, who notes that the main effect of a 'third-person reference to someone whose presence is stated or implied …in a laudatory context…is to make that individual stand out'. Cf. the address to Lampon in the third person (*I*.6.66), which suggests that he is being held up as a paragon of sporting and preceptual excellence.
[162] Cf. Lowrie (1992), 424: 'An important feature of the paradeigma is that the exemplum customarily provides a more noble or extreme instance of the action the speaker tries to persuade the addressee'. See also Willcock (1964), 141-2 on the extreme exemplum provided by Niobe in Achilles' speech to Priam at *Il*.24.602-17 and Goldhill (1994), Ø.Anderson (1987) on the *paradeigma*.
[163] Cf. Gildersleeve (1895), 316 and the similar comparison between Herakles' deeds and those of the victor in *N*.3.20-23, which contain an implicit warning for the victor. Cf. Young (1971), 43. Also Currie (2005): 409 on the nature of similes, which 'throw up differences which may be as pertinent as the similarities between the objects compared'; also Feeney (1992), 35-7.
[164] Goldhill (1994), 70. 'Constant recontextualization and realignment of the example…involves an intertextual dynamic, as the exemplary narrative is construed within a tradition of exemplification'.

reminisce about the past, but there is always some point to it'.[165] Pindar's myths were dismissed in the scholia as illogical 'digressions' ($\pi\alpha\varrho\epsilon\varkappa\beta\acute{\alpha}\sigma\epsilon\iota\varsigma$), since they often lead away from the main point.[166] Indeed, scholars even since have been preoccupied with trying to understand the meaning and function of myth in the poem's argument. Suffice it to say here that the myth rarely has a single function or yields to a monolithic interpretation but contributes to the unity of the ode.[167] Homer's use of para-narrative in the *Iliad* to direct an 'audience to a particular interpretation of the main narrative by means of the comparisons he invites them to make' is pertinent to Pindar's use of myth, which puts the victor's achievement in a different light and encourages the audience to interpret it as they will.[168] Like Nestor's four digressions, which 'establish the legitimacy of his position in the Greek hierarchy as the wisest counsellor', Pindar's myth has a quasi-apologetic function.[169] Moreover, it is a means of increasing his authority.

6 (c) *The Tactful Adviser*

As the perfect spokesman and mediator, Nestor has a duty of fairness to both parties. In this regard, he has an affinity with that of Pindar. This two-fronted appeal is applicable to the epilogue of *Pythian* 4.263f, where Pindar attempts to

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[165] Willcock (1976), 132.
[166] Schol.40a on *P*.2, schol.46a on *P*.10, schol. 45c on *N*.3.
[167] Cf. Young (1971). Cf. Köhnken (1971), 18, who tries to find uniformity in Pindar's myths and tends to neglect other parts of the ode. cf. Currie (2005), 292, who observes that the myth can have more than one point of relevance to the narrative. See further Chapter 1.
[168] Alden (2000), 18.
[169] Austin (1966), 301. The digressions are *Il*.1.260-73; 7.124-60; 11.670-90; 23.629-43. The hortatory paradigms include the story of Meleager (9.529f.) and the Prayers (9.502-12), which Austin calls a mythic conceit.

reconcile Arcesilas to his political rival Damophilos.[170] This shows the importance of a persuasive speaker such as Nestor in resolving a quarrel between near-equals. In fact, both the nature of this dispute and its general form bears a striking resemblance to the *Iliadic* theme of a wronged man. Pindar's advocacy is intended to be heard by both men and combines a robust defence of Damophilos' character with praise of the king. Unlike Nestor, however, he does not address both men directly and refers to Damophilos in the third person (281).

The poet appeals to the shared interests of the community as he implores the king to devote all his zeal to the cause of blessed Cyrene (276). Nestor, on the other hand, complains that the quarrel brings shame on Achaia. Nestor increases the persuasiveness of his plea by reminding Agamemnon of his obligations as a noble man (μήτε σὺ τόνδ᾽ ἀγαθός περ ἐὼν, 275), which also serves as a reminder to Achilles about his responsibility to the Greek leader. The characterisation of Damophilos as one who would not do violence against the *agathoi* (285) may be intended to prompt Arcesilas to re-evaluate his attitude. Similarly, at v.274, Pindar reminds Damophilos of the king's quasi-divine status in a way that recalls Nestor's warning to Achilles to recognise the Zeus-given office of the sceptred king Agamemnon (278-9).[171] This reflects the archaic belief that political rulers were appointed by Zeus and enjoyed a privileged relationship with him, as

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[170] Cf. Mitchell (1966), 109, Carey (1981), 7, Braswell (1988), 360, Hornblower (2004), 40 and my discussion of the political situation in Chapter 1.
[171] For the same metaphor, cf. *P*.5.122, which is quite common in its political sense, e.g. *P*.10.72, *P*.1.91, *O*.12.3; it is used of the trainer 'steering' the athlete at *I*.4.71.

revealed in the statement that Arcesilas' family had divine honours (*P*.4.260) conferred upon them when they settled in Libya.

The main elements of Nestor's speech, then, are an exhortation, an exemplary reminiscence, a repeated exhortation (the explanation at v.274), and a gnome followed by praise. All of these are found in Pindar. Let us consider, for example, his address to Arcesilas of Cyrene in *P*.4.270-6:

ἐσσὶ δ᾽ ἰατὴρ ἐπικαιρότατος, Παιάντέ σοι τιμᾷ φάος.
χρὴ μαλακὰν χέρα προσβάλλοντα τρώμαν ἕλκεος ἀμφιπολεῖν.
ῥᾴδιον μὲν γὰρ πόλιν σεῖσαι καὶ ἀφαυροτέροις·
ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ χώρας αὖτις ἔσσαι δυσπαλὲς δὴ γίνεται, ἐξαπίνας
εἰ μὴ θεὸς ἁγεμόνεσσι κυβερνατὴρ γένηται.
τὶν δὲ τούτων ἐξυφαίνονται χάριτες.
τλᾶθι τᾶς εὐδαίμονος ἀμφὶ Κυράνας θέμεν σπουδὰν ἅπασαν.

But you are a most fitting healer, and Paian honours your saving light. One must apply a gentle hand to tend a sore wound. For easily can even weaklings shake a city; but to set it back in place again is a difficult struggle indeed, unless suddenly a god becomes a helmsman for the leaders. But for you the blessings of such things are unfolding. Dare to devote all your serious effort to the cause of blessed Cyrene. (*P*.4.270-6)

Lardinois explains the striking use of a direct second-person saying by arguing that 'given the positive image in the previous line…this gentle approach is to be expected from the king and therefore that the gnome [v.271] contributes to his praise'.[172] There is, however, an implicit expectation that Arcesilas must continue to prove himself a political healer. In making a tactful plea, Pindar simultaneously demonstrates his own importance as an adviser. Two statements of approbation

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[172] Lardinois (1995), 271. Cf. F.Cairns (1977), 303 with notes 21 and 23 (citing *P*.1.86f, *P*.11.52f and *N*.11.13f.): 'Pindar's praise is partly expressed in the form of advice, which is consciously in harmony with the known intentions of the person praised'.

(270, 275) form a ring around two gnomes at 271 and 272-4. After the second of these, Pindar uses an imperative (275) whose rhetorical force is greater as result of the preceding gnomes. Likewise, Nestor's gnome, 'to obey is better' (274) and subsequent request is accompanied by praise of Agamemnon for his kingship ('great man that you are', 275), which leads into an affirming statement about the privileges of a sceptre-bearing king (278).[173] This last appeal is calculated both to encourage Achilles to acknowledge Agamemnon's authority in the face of the threat posed by Achilles and to convince the king (through flattery) about the speaker's solution to the crisis, which is to procure the return of the slave-girl to Achilles.[174] This attempt at reconciliation shows the subtlety of Nestor's rhetoric and his desire to conciliate both parties by affirming their respective merits.

7 (a) *The Ego of the Adviser*

We have seen that the use of the exemplary style is a trademark of the wise adviser, Nestor, who gives weight to his pronouncements through a strong personal voice. A distinctive feature of Pindaric advice is the use of gnomic first-person statements, which present his own attitude as a model for the audience (e.g. *P*.3.107f.).[175] This is the most authoritative form of utterance. As Morrison

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[173] Cf. Lloyd-Jones (1975), with *Il*.1.278, 2.197, 2.204-05 and *Th*.96 on Zeus as the traditional source of authority for kings. Cf. Hesiod's famous remark that it is 'through Zeus that there are kings'. (*Th*.94-6) and the role of Zeus at *P*.1.67f, *P*.3.85-6 etc.

[174] Lardinois (1995), 278 includes this gnome in his appendix A, which is an addition to the primary collection of Ahrens (1937), 12-38.

[175] Cf. D'Alessio (1994), 118-27 on the 'exemplary' first person and e.g. *N*.4.41-3.

observes, 'moral pronouncements receive extra validity' from the speaker's attempt to portray poetry as a moral activity in which he excels.[176] The effect in *Pythian* 3 is not merely to establish the sincerity of his praise but also to establish his credibility as an adviser.[177] This personal involvement with his patron's affairs has a crucial self-reflexive function that can be traced back to Nestor's use of himself as an example to men of the current generation. To some extent, Pindar's use of the first person must reflect the influence of the paraenetic tradition, in which the speaker typically presents himself as an archetype for his audience.[178]

Scholars have observed the rarity of first-person statements in Bacchylides' epinicia in contradistinction to Pindar.[179] This has a corresponding effect on the type of persona he projects. Maehler observes that 'In his self-presentation…Bacchylides appears much less self-assured than Pindar' (e.g. *O*.1.115-16).[180] Whilst Pindar rarely refers to himself in the third-person, Bacchylides portrays himself as a Cean nightingale (3.96-7).[181] This signature suggests a different artistic emphasis. It has a parallel in Pindar's more oblique

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[176] Morrison (2007b), 98-9.

[177] See Chapter 3.

[178] Cf. Hes.*Op*.174-6, Theognis 26-31; cf. Fearn (2007), 40, on the speaker in the Theognidean corpus as the paragon of correct, moderate, conduct; cf. Solon fr.4W.

[179] Fearn (2007), 40; see Carey (1999), esp.18 and 22. Also Hutchinson (2001), 327: 'the presence of Bacchylides' narrator is less emphatic and obtrusive than that of Pindar's.'

[180] Maehler (2004), 100: Also Carey (1995), 95, contrasting the stronger first person in Pindar with the more detached third person of Bacch.5.11 and noting that 'the first person carries with it a stronger sense of the poet's commitment to the relationship'.

[181] Cf. Hutchinson (2001), 327, with the third-person reference at Bacch.9.3 to the 'god-inspired spokesman of Muses' (= poet) and at 10.10 to the 'clear-voiced island bee'. Also Bacch.19.11, where the 'renowned Kean mind' is part of the poet's self-address. Cf. Hutchinson (2001), 358 and Hes.*Op*.202-12, where the nightingale stands for the poet. The third person is unattested in Pindar, according to D'Alessio (1994), 117 with n.1.

use of the eagle image (e.g. *N*.3.80, *N*.5.21, *O*.2.86f), which might be understood as a metaphorical reference to the poet or his song - a sort of *nom de plume*. As Barker well recognises, 'Pindar is an extremely self-conscious writer, and like others in a choral tradition stretching back to Alcman and beyond, he often refers to his own music and verse'.[182] It is important to recognise that although the Pindaric epinician is unusual in the kind of information which the poet provides about his art, first-person statements reveal little about the historical poet, except that he is a superlative poet.[183]

Fearn contrasts the technique of Bacchylides and Simonides with the extraordinary 'strength and scope of the projected persona [in Pindar], which generally maintains an explicit and well-developed ethical or religious stance which white-washes over other forms of authority embedded within the text'.[184] However, it is the combination of first person statements and gnomai that strengthens the *parainesis*. As Carey notes, 'The effect of the first person moralizing is enhanced further by the high density of gnomai, which reinforce the moral weight of the poetic persona, and by Pindar's lapidary style, which increases the air of certainty conveyed by his moral pronouncements, and therefore the tone of his authority'.[185] Moreover, it is important to differentiate between gnomes that personalise the 'moral judgement', and other first-person

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[182] Barker (1984), 54.
[183] Carey (1995), 93.
[184] Fearn (2007), 20. Cf. Lefkowitz (1981), 57, who notes that Pindar 'does not play the detached role of the wise adviser, because he portrays himself in his first-person statements as grappling with the same dangers as his patrons'. Simonides, on the other hand, separates himself from ordinary men' (e.g., 'I will never look for the impossible and throw my life away in empty hope', *PMG* 542.21-3).
[185] Carey (1995), 97.

statements. Lefkowitz remarks that in *Nemean* 9, 'every first-person statement serves as an introduction or transition to a new subject, or a conclusion to a new theme'. At vv.33-4, Pindar concludes his comments abruptly with a gnomic statement, recalling his own presence as a bard, whose duty it is to utter moral truths.[186] Certainly, first-person gnomes *appear* to be highly personal statements and in projecting an exemplary attitude, are an important feature of his rhetoric.[187]

7 (b) *Modes of Instruction*

The final triad of *Pythian* 1 provides a convenient opportunity to examine the complementary modes of address used by Pindar. West notes that it includes a string of admonitions and that Pindar may be following a traditional model with this lapidary style.[188] The lack of a first-person verb affects the *parainesis* insofar as Pindar is not explicitly presenting his attitude as a paragon for his audience. In fact, the opening is almost apologetic. I have marked the different forms of authority in bold below:

καιρὸν εἰ φθέγξαιο, πολλῶν πείρατα συντανύσαις
ἐν βραχεῖ, μείων ἕπεται μῶμος ἀνθρώπων· ἀπὸ γὰρ κόρος ἀμβλύνει
αἰανὴς ταχείας ἐλπίδας,
ἀστῶν δ᾽ ἀκοὰ κρύφιον θυμὸν βαρύνει μάλιστ᾽ ἐσλοῖσιν ἐπ᾽ ἀλλοτρίοις.

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[186] Lefkowitz (1991), 5 with n.4; cf.*Il*.2.484-93; Hes.*Th*.22-34. 'The first-person verb and the gnome call the listener's attention away from the general praise of the citizens of Aetna to praise of one particular citizen, the victor Chromius.'

[187] This view is shared by Armand D'Angour, who reminds me that we do not have as much of Bacchylides and Simonides as we do of Pindar. Bremer (1990), 44 has estimated that in the 45 victory odes by Pindar, 'there are about 220 textual elements in which an "I" directs attention to its own person and its activities'.

[188] M.L.West (1978), 24. This ode contains a higher-than-average number of gnomes (13-14, 33-35, 41-42, 59, 81-82, 82-83, 84, 85, 92-94, 99-100).

ἀλλ' ὅμως, κρέσσον γὰρ οἰκτιρμοῦ φθόνος,
μὴ παρίει καλά. νώμα δικαίῳ
   πηδαλίῳ στρατόν· ἀψευδεῖ
   δὲ δὲ πρὸς ἄκμονι χάλκευε γλῶσσαν.

εἰ τι καὶ φλαῦρον παραιθύσσει, μέγα τοι φέρεται
πὰρ σέθεν. πολλῶν ταμίας ἐσσί· πολλοὶ μάρτυρες ἀμφοτέροις πιστοί.

εὐανθεῖ δ' ἐ ὀργᾷ παρμένων,
εἴπερ τι φιλεῖς ἀκοὰν ἀδεῖαν αἰεὶ κλύειν, μὴ κάμνε λίαν δαπάναις·
ἐξίει δ' ὥσπερ κυβερνάτας ἀνήρ
ἱστίον ἀνεμόεν. μὴ δολωθῇς, ὦ φίλε, κέρδεσιν ἐντραπέλοις· ὀπιθόμβροτον αὔχημα δόξας

οἷον ἀποιχομένων ἀνδρῶν δίαιταν μανύει
καὶ λογίοις καὶ ἀοιδοῖς.

 If you should speak to the point by combining the strands of many things in brief, less criticism follows from men, for cloying excess dulls eager expectations [**gnome**], and townsmen are grieved in their secret hearts especially when they hear of others' success [**gnome**]. But still, since envy is better than pity [**gnome**], do not pass by noble things [**gnomic injunction**]. Guide your people with a rudder of justice; on an anvil of truth forge your tongue. [**second-person commands**] Even some slight thing you know, becomes important if it flies out from you. You are the steward of many things [**second person praise**]; many are the sure witnesses of deeds of both kinds. [**gnome**]. Abide in flourishing high spirits [**second-person command**], and if indeed you love always to hear pleasant things said about you, do not grow too tired of spending, but let out the sail, like a helmsman, to the wind [**second-person commands**]. Do not be deceived, my friend, by shameful gains [**second-person command**], for the posthumous acclaim of fame

alone reveals the life of men who are dead and gone to both chroniclers and poets. (*P*.1.81-94)

Prior to this, Pindar had addressed king Hieron only in the third person (e.g. v.69). The use of the conditional with the second person (εἰ φθέγξαιο) is more remote and less authoritative than a first-person future, as in the clipped phrase at *P*.5.108 (λεγόμενον ἐρέω).[189] The cluster of four gnomes at vv.81-5 enables the audience to follow the argument of the ode. Commenting on the archaic form of the gnomic progression, Slater observes that 'every sentiment is related only to

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[189] Cf. *Il*.2.493 for the use of this verb in relation to the poet.

the one after it and the one before, so that the reader proceeds as it were on a series of mental stepping stones'.[190] The gnomic train of thought is arrested by imperatives rather than the first person and the particular application of the injunction 'not to pass over noble things' (86) is left unexpressed.[191] The previous maxim, 'but still envy is better than pity' (v.85), provides the justification for the poet's attitude and echoes Periander's plea to his son, 'it is better to be envied than pitied' (Hdt.3.52.5).[192] It is interesting that in both Herodotus and Aeschylus (*Ag*. 939), the person who utters this saying is hardly someone to be admired and trusted; neither Periander nor Clytemnestra is a healthy role-model. Pindar seems to be alone in giving this saying an honourable slant.

In the absence of the first person, Pindar uses second-person commands, which are, of course, commonly found in instruction poetry. With the imperative νώμα (86), Pindar exhorts Hieron to guide his people 'with a rudder of justice'. This is the first of four direct second-person commands, two of which are prohibitions (χάλκευε, 86, μὴ κάμνε, 90, μὴ δολωθῇς, 92). Typically, didactic poems include commands introduced by vocatives, which is a 'traditional element in Greek poetic *paraenesis* from Homer on'.[193] It is typical of this tactful style that advice clearly intended for the *laudandus* is not addressed directly to him and Pindar's differentiation from the tradition confirms the sense that he is presenting advice

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[190] Slater (1979a), 66.
[191] Cf. the gnomic injunction at *P*.3.61, on the other hand, is addressed to the *psyche*; cf. Chapter 3.
[192] Race (1997), ad loc. notes that it is a euphemism for good and evil deeds. Cf. D.L.Cairns (2003), 250 with Thales 17 DK, Epicharmus 285 Kaibel/B 34DK.
[193] Martin (1984), 31, noting that 'generic affiliation might be marked out by diction or syntax'; cf. e.g. Hes.*Op*.274-5.

to Hieron obliquely.[194] The indefinite character of this instruction does not obscure its specific application to the addressee, as suggested by the word σέθεν (88). Pindar implicates Hieron's personal prosperity with that of his people as part of an exhortation at v.86f and the injunctions are tempered by a flattering reference to Hieron's responsibility as king (πολλῶν ταμίας ἐσσί·, 88).[195] The lapidary nature of πολλοὶ μάρτυρες ἀμφοτέροις πιστοί (88) is strikingly gnomic, though it is not included by Lardinois in his Appendix A.[196] The final prohibition 'not to be deceived by shameful gains' at v.92 is presented by Pindar in his guise of 'friendly preceptor'.[197] The explanation (92-4), like the mythical exempla of Sarpedon and Nestor that accompany the gnome at *P*.3.114-15, is that of the enduring legacy afforded by song, which is a feature of Pindar's exemplary style noted earlier. This brief analysis illustrates the typical features of the paraenetic genre embedded in Pindar's 'paraenetic encomium'.

8 (a) *The 'wise-minded' kings*

It was noted above that the quarrel between Agamemnon and Achilles overseen by Nestor bears a likeness to the situation in *Pythian* 4. Another traditional context for Pindar's mediation of the clash between Arcesilas and Damophilos is

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[194] Cf. Griffith (1983), 55 n.71, who observes that Theognis' advice is presented through 'a generalized gnome…in bare conjunction with the vocative Κύρνε'. See also Chapters 2 and 3.

[195] See below on the *topos* of the good king (8b). Cf. Segal (1998), 16, who notes that 'the programmatic alignment of Hieron with Croesus [at *P*.1.94] is also Pindar's way of instructing the ruler in the proper exercise of power'.

[196] Lardinois (1995), 342.

[197] Cf. *N*.3.76 and my discussion in Chapter 2.

that of Hesiod's 'wise-minded' kings (βασιλῆες ἐχέφρονες, *Theogony*, 88), who easily restore assemblies when they fall into error, 'persuading the people with soft words':

Ὅν τινα τιμήσωσι Διὸς κοῦραι μεγάλοιο
γεινόμενόν τε ἴδωσι διοτρεφέων βασιλήων,
τῷ μὲν ἐπὶ γλώσσῃ γλυκερὴν χείουσιν ἐέρσην,
τοῦ δ' ἔπε' ἐκ στόματος ῥεῖ μείλιχα· οἱ δέ τε λαοὶ
πάντες ἐς αὐτὸν ὁρῶσι διακρίνοντα θέμιστας   85
ἰθείῃσι δίκῃσιν· ὃ δ' ἀσφαλέως ἀγορεύων
αἶψά κε καὶ μέγα νεῖκος ἐπισταμένως κατέπαυσεν·
τοὔνεκα γὰρ βασιλῆες ἐχέφρονες, οὕνεκα λαοῖς
βλαπτομένοις ἀγορῆφι μετάτροπα ἔργα τελεῦσι
ῥηιδίως, μαλακοῖσι παραιφάμενοι ἐπέεσσιν.   90
Ἐρχόμενον δ' ἀν' ἀγῶνα θεὸν ὣς ἱλάσκονται
αἰδοῖ μειλιχίῃ, μετὰ δὲ πρέπει ἀγρομένοισιν·
τοίη Μουσάων ἱερὴ δόσις ἀνθρώποισιν.
Ἐκ γάρ τοι Μουσέων καὶ ἑκηβόλου Ἀπόλλωνος
ἄνδρες ἀοιδοὶ ἔασιν ἐπὶ χθόνα καὶ κιθαρισταί,   95
ἐκ δὲ Διὸς βασιλῆες· ὃ δ' ὄλβιος, ὅν τινα Μοῦσαι
φίλωνται· γλυκερή οἱ ἀπὸ στόματος ῥέει αὐδή.

Whomever among Zeus-nourished kings the daughters of great Zeus honour and behold when he is born, they pour sweet dew upon his tongue, and his words flow soothingly from his mouth. All the populace look to him as he decides disputes with straight judgements; and speaking publicly without erring, he quickly ends a great quarrel by his skill. For this is why kings are wise,[198] because when the populace is being harmed in the assembly they easily manage to turn the deeds around, effecting persuasion with mild words; and as he goes up to the gathering they seek his favour like a god with soothing reverence, and he is conspicuous to the assembled people. Such is the holy gift of the Muses to human beings. For it is from the Muses and far-shooting Apollo that men are poets upon the earth and lyre-players, but it is from Zeus that they are kings; and that man is blessed, whomever the Muses love, for the speech flows from his mouth. (*Theogony* 81-97)

This passage gives us an opportunity to contextualise the role of Pindar's Muses in his odes for kings. Murray notes that 'this is the only time we hear of the Muses

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[198] Most (2006), 9 n.6 (whose recent translation I have used) well notes that 'the phrase is ambiguous; alternative renderings would be "This is why there are wise kings" or "This is why wise men are (set up as) kings".'

bestowing their gifts on a recipient who is not a poet'.[199] Moreover, it is not the gift of poetry that they bestow on princes, but speech. In *Theogony* 97, the 'sweet speech' that flows from the mouths of kings points to their original function as advisers, to their love of the Muses and to their appreciation of the poet as servant of the Muses.[200] Homer's description of eloquence as a gift from the gods (and not the Muses) in *Od*.8.170-3 and other similarities with this passage suggests that both poets are drawing independently on the same traditional material.[201]

People look to the good king to settle disputes with true judgements using the power of persuasion bestowed upon him by the Muses. He would soon resolve a *mega neikos* skilfully (87) and this 'conflict-resolving capacity of a judge' recalls our earlier discussion of Nestor, king of Pylos. The honeyed eloquence and 'gentle words' (ἔπε᾽...μείλιχα, *Th*.84) that flow from the mouth of Hesiod's kings are mirrored in Pindar's conception of his song.[202] This attribution of qualities associated with the poet to a good king seems to reflect a threefold nexus between king, speaker and poet. It is hardly surprising, then, that kings welcomed good advisers, given that they themselves traditionally performed the same function. The underlying assumption of Pindar's poetry seems to be that

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[199] P.Murray (2004), 369. Cf. Stehle (1997), 206, who compares the gifts of the Muses to singers and kings (vv.80-103) but differentiates "Hesiod" from the singers (v.55), 'for with the speaker's staff, he has affinities with the kings also'.

[200] Cf. P.Murray (2004), 370 on the same terminology used by Hesiod for the persuasive utterance of the singer/poet (97), prince (84) and Muses (39-40), noting that 'Hesiod expands the traditional sphere of the Muses to include rulers as well as poets amongst the recipients of their gifts'.

[201] Rosen (1997), 469.

[202] Cf. *P*.1.98, *P*.5.99, *P*.8.31, *O*.2.90, *N*.4.4, *N*.9.49 etc. cf. *P*.3.64, *N*.3.4 etc. and his recommendation that king Arcesilas should apply a 'gentle hand' at *P*.4.271 (cf. *P*.4.137 of Jason's 'soothing voice').

the king will be naturally receptive to good advice and indeed requires the poet to fulfil this important duty.[203]

It seems possible that the whole tradition of poets as advisers to potentates is rooted in this passage of Hesiod's *Theogony*, although I cannot explore the idea at great length here. I would like to take up Richard Martin's suggestion that *Odyssey* 8 'offers a dramatic version of the abstract king-ideal of the *Theogony*' by suggesting that the same context is embedded in Pindar's treatment of the same theme in *Pythian* 4.[204] It might be helpful to think of Pindar's ode as a kind of enactment of the process whereby the Hesiodic Muses dispense sweet speech to kings, thereby enabling them to resolve disputes. There is an important distinction to note, however, since Pindar draws attention to his own role as an intermediary conferring mutual benefit on the Muse and the parties to the dispute:

τῶν δ᾽ Ὁμήρου καὶ τόδε συνθέμενος
ῥῆμα πόρσυν᾽· ἄγγελον ἐσλὸν ἔφα τιμὰν μεγίσταν πράγματι παντὶ φέρειν·
αὔξεται καὶ Μοῖσα δι᾽ ἀγγελίας ὀρθᾶς.

Among the sayings of Homer, take this one to heart and heed it: he said that a good messenger brings the greatest honour to every deed [that he reports]. And the Muse, too, gains distinction through true reporting. (*Pythian* 4.277-9)

To paraphrase Pindar, the excellence of the messenger brings honour to the affair he describes (278) and the truth or moral uprightness of his message

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[203] Cf. Stoddard (2003), 8 on the connection between this passage and the poet's responsibility to <u>instruct</u>, as well as delight, his audience in Hesiod's *Theogony*.
[204] Martin (1984), 45. Cf. *O*.1.113-14, which may be an echo of the Hesiodic passage on the persuasiveness of kings. Cf. Clay (1993), 23, who argues that Hesiod usurps the function of the kings and appropriates their rhetoric in *Works and Days*.

enhances the status of the Muse *qua* poetic vehicle of the message (279). Nagy observes that the word ϰαί 'makes clear that not only the poetry but also the subject of the song is meant', thereby implying too that the Muse is a metonomy for song.[205] But Pindar conceives of his Muse as a sort of independent force and abstract personification. This facilitates his claim that his mediation in the political dispute benefits the Muse herself. Hesiod, on the other hand, makes nothing of the effect the kings' speech might have on the Muses. To conclude, Pindar's variation on a traditional *topos* enables him to position himself at the centre of the relationship between king and Muses and to show his pivotal importance.[206] In this case, he does not appeal to the Muses as a source of poetic inspiration or in relation to the choice subject matter (e.g. *P*.4.3, 67) but as an authoritative figure. I will examine this dual function of the Muse in Chapter 2.

8 (b) *The Good King in Homer*

One way in which Pindar highlights his own importance to the *laudandus* is by appealing to the notion of the good king's ability to resolve a quarrel, as mentioned above in relation to Nestor.[207] Pindar facilitates the king's enactment of this traditional function, as portrayed in Odysseus' warning to other kings in the *Iliad* 2.204-6. Like Nestor (*Il*.1.278-9), he upholds the archaic belief that Zeus

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[205] Nagy (1990), 203, n.20, comparing *I*.6.66. Cf. Instone (2000), 1, who over-simplifies the function of the Muse as a metonym for song in *N*.3.1.

[206] See Chapter 1 for the similar rhetorical function of the *sphragis* in this ode.

[207] See O.Murray (1965) and F.Cairns (1989), 10, who notes that 'the fragments of Philodemus' "On the Good King according to Homer" show that 'Homeric comment on kings and kingship was felt to involve a large number of passages, many of which in fact only contain implicit reflections on the subject'. There are four examples of gnomic verse in the *Iliad* which mention the role of the *basileus* (cf. Ahrens, 1937, 12ff for the collection of speeches: *Il*.2.196, 2.204ff, 19.182f, and Calchas at *Il*.1.80).

gives kings the authority to dispense judgements in the first place, as discussed

above. This is evident too in Nestor's speech to Agamemnon in *Iliad* 9, in which

the marked emphasis on 'I' and 'you' helps to demarcate their individual merits:

> τώ σε χϱὴ πεϱὶ μὲν φάσϑαι ἔπος ἠδ᾽ ἐπακοῦσαι,   100
> κϱηῆναι δὲ καὶ ἄλλῳ, ὅτ᾽ ἄν τινα ϑυμὸς ἀνώγῃ
> εἰπεῖν εἰς ἀγαϑόν· σέο δ᾽ ἕξεται ὅττί κεν ἄϱχῃ.
> αὐτὰϱ ἐγὼν ἐϱέω ὥς μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἄϱιστα.
> οὐ γάϱ τις νόον ἄλλος ἀμείνονα τοῦδε νοήσει
> οἷον ἐγὼ νοέω ἠμὲν πάλαι ἠδ᾽ ἔτι καὶ νῦν   105

It is yours therefore to speak a word, yours also to listen, and grant the right to another also, when his spirit stirs him to speak for our good. All shall be yours when you lead the way. But I will speak in the way it seems best to my mind, and no one shall have in his mind any thought that is better than this one that I have in my mind either now or long before (*Il.*9.100-5)

Nestor assigns responsibility and obligations to the king in a way that

aggrandises his own role as an intelligent adviser. Moreover, he does this by

explicitly comparing himself favourably with other counsellors (104-5). This is

comparable to Pindar's desire to be 'foremost in *sophia*' at *O.*1.115-16. Nestor's

juxtaposition of the personal pronoun ἐγών and first-person future ἐϱέω (103)

coming after the adversative αὐτὰϱ emphasises the speaker's full responsibility

for his words.[208] The same lexical combination can be found in the strong first-

person statement at *P.*3.77. Nestor shows appropriate deference to the king's

authority as a speaker whilst simultaneously proclaiming the integrity of his own

speech. In doing so, he appeals to a special relationship (e.g. 1.266-74), whilst

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[208] Lardinois (1997), 220. Cf. *Od.*9.5-12: 'For I say that (ἐγώ γέ τί φημι) there is not fulfilment' and *Il.*1.76 (Calchas); Pindar *N.*3.28, *P.*4.142 and *P.*5.108.

maintaining a respectful distance from Agamemnon.[209] This is highly suggestive of the rhetoric Pindar uses towards Arcesilas and Hieron, where his advice is both authoritative and tactful. Nonetheless, there is an even greater emphasis on the speaker in Nestor's speeches than in Pindar.

The traditional context for Pindar's description of Hieron in *P*.3.71 as 'gentle to townsmen, not begrudging to good men and to guests, a wondrous father' (πραῢς ἀστοῖς οὐ φθονέων ἀγαθοῖς, ξείνοις δὲ θαυμαστὸς πατήρ) is the description of Odysseus as ἤπιος ('gentle'), which is a characteristic of a good king who looks after people.[210] The reference to the king as a father-figure may be a device by which Pindar portrays his own role as quasi-paternal adviser and a means of showing his parity with the king.[211] In alluding to the rights and reponsibilities of a king at *P*.3.84-6 (τὶν δὲ μοῖρ᾿ εὐδαιμονίας ἔπεται. λαγέταν γάρ τοι τύραννον δέρκεται, εἴ τιν᾿ ἀνθρώπων, ὁ μέγας πότμος.), Pindar refers to the king as a 'people-guiding ruler', which has personal as well as political ramifications for Hieron in this ode.[212] This 'complimentary' direct second-person gnome supports the consolatory remark that Hieron, by virtue of his divinely-blessed status, has a

[209] Griffith (1983), 55 compares Phoenix's speech to Achilles at *Il*.9.432-605: 'the autobiographical features are most intimate (485-95) at the point where Phoenix confesses mutual dependency between the two of them'. See *Chapter* 2.
[210] Scodel (2001), 119. In *Od*.2.234, Odysseus is remembered by Mentor as a 'gentle father'; cf. *Od*.2.47, 5.12 for the use of ἤπιος in relation to Odysseus. Also *Il*.24.770 and *Il*.22.184 for its use as an epithet of Zeus in his relations with Athena.
[211] Cf. Gransden (1990), 88, who compares the didactic role of the father-figure (e.g. Anchises and Evander) with that of the poet in Virgil's *Aeneid*. Also Martin (2004), 354 on the resemblance between the paternal bond and the relationship of *laudator* and *laudandus*.
[212] Cf. *P*.4.262f, where Pindar's praise of Arcesilas is interwoven with an exhortation to behave as a good king. See also my discussion of Chiron as an exemplum for the good king (e.g. *P*.3.70-1), in Chapter 3. There are only two other instances of the epithet 'people-guiding' in Pindar, *P*.10.31 (Perseus) and *O*.2.89 (Pelops' sons), although *P*.1.88 probably alludes to this traditional function of the good king.

share of happiness. The diction itself has a long history, as Hornblower recognises:

> Pindar's 'people-guiding ruler' (λαγέτας τύραννος, v.85) looks not only forward to the hellenistic conceptions of the good ruler but back to Homer, who as Aristotle noted (*Nic.Eth.*1161a 15f.) called Agamemnon 'shepherd of the people', ποιμένα λαῶν, because the good king promotes the welfare of his people as a shepherd studies the welfare of his sheep.[213]

Homer describes Nestor himself as a 'shepherd of the people' at *Il.*2.85.[214] Pindar, however, develops this *topos* in a way that strengthens his special relationship with the *laudandus* by allowing him to use the appropriate (authoritative) speech of an adviser.[215] Pindar's allusion to the *topos* of the 'good king', like that of *xenia*, helps to create an illusion of equality and provides an ideal platform for the poet's self-aggrandisement as the chosen adviser.[216]

9. *Wisdom Poets and the Precepts of Chiron*

Having considered the parallel between Pindar and Nestor as authoritative speakers, it is important to contextualise the poet's relationship between the poet and his audience from the perspective of didactic poetry. Hence, by exploring the interface between the paraenetic and epinician genres, we will be able to

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[213] Hornblower (2004), 64, with Aesch.*Ag*.844-50. Haubold (2000), 154 observes elements of epic usage in Pindar. People need to be saved, and the lyric voice sympathises with this wish by asking a god to act as a good shepherd (*O*.13.24-8; cf. *P*.8.41-56).

[214] Cf. *Il*.2.244 (Agamemnon) and Nestor's description of Perithoös and Dryas at *Il*.1.263.

[215] Haubold (2000), 22 notes that the obligation inherent in the metaphor of the shepherd is the task of looking after and saving his group. He cites *P*.3.85 and Simon.ep.36.4 (Page) for appropriations of the word *laos* by and for tyrants.

[216] Stoneman (1984), 48 comments that 'because Pindar is worthy of Hieron, Hieron is worthy of Pindar'; cf. *P*.2.83, 'Let me befriend a friend' (φίλον εἴη φιλεῖν), with Stoneman (1997), 112. Also Willcock (1995), 11: 'Pindar's relations with these often very powerful men are represented by him as personal, and on a level of equality'. For references to the motif of *xenia*, cf. *I*.2.48, *O*.1.103, *P*.3.69 etc. and Slater (1969a).

characterise Pindar's discourse more easily. David Konstan notes that 'four personae inhabit the space of didactic poetry: the poet-teacher; the authority standing behind the teacher, who guarantees the values of the precepts; the personal addressee, and the wider audience that peers over the shoulder of the addressee.'[217] A similar configuration of relationships informs Pindar's use of Chiron as an authority in *P*.6.20. The main difference in epinician is that the personal addressee is not a generic figure, even if his learning is applicable to the wider audience as well. Didactic poems, by contrast, 'are normally addressed to a particular individual who is seen as the primary object of instruction and acts as a model for the reader'.[218]

We can contextualise Pindar's reference to the teachings of Chiron (cf. *P*.4.102) and his use of proverbial wisdom generally by considering the Hesiodic *Precepts*.

τὰς δὲ Χείρωνος ὑποθήκας Ἡσιόδῳ ἀνατιθέασιν ὧν ἡ ἀρχή·
  Εὖ νῦν μοι τάδ' ἕκαστα μετὰ φρεσὶ πευκαλίμῃσι
  φράζεσθαι· πρῶτον μέν ὅτ' ἂν δόμον εἰσαφίκηαι
  ἔρδειν ἱερὰ καλὰ θεοῖς αἰειγενέτῃσιν.

The beginning of the *hypothekai* attributed to Hesiod is as follows: "Now consider for me all of these things in your shrewd mind, first, when you step into your house, to make fair sacrifices to the eternal gods." (schol.*P*.6.22, ii 197 Drachmann)[219]

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[217] Konstan (1993), 12.
[218] *OCD*[3], s.v. 'didactic poetry', p.465. Cf. Welcker (1826), 1xvvii on the relationship between Theognis and Cyrnus: 'non magis nomine vero, quam persona'. Cf. Martin (1992), 14-15. Also Lardinois (1995), 228, who compares the use of Achilles as a foil for the audience of didactic poetry with that of Perses in *W&D*. See now Lowrie (1997) on Chiron in Horace.
[219] M-W (1967), no.283.

Until Aristarchus denied its authenticity, a poem under this title was attributed in antiquity to Hesiod, but the *Precepts of Chiron* was originally an independent poetic tradition.[220] Nonetheless, it shared formal patterns with Hesiod *Op*.336 ('according to your means, make holy sacrifice to the immortal gods').[221]

In *Pythian* 6, Pindar appeals to the mythical ideal of Chiron's pedagogy, a form of authority that reflects his own didactic position within the aristocratic community:

σύ τοι σχεδών νιν ἐπὶ δεξιὰ χειρός, ὀρθὰν
ἄγεις ἐφημοσύναν,
τά ποτ᾽ ἐν οὔρεσι φαντὶ μεγαλοσθενεῖ
Φιλύρας υἱὸν ὀρφανιζομένῳ
Πηλεΐδα παραινεῖν· μάλιστα μὲν Κρονίδαν,
βαρυόπαν στεροπᾶν κεραυνῶν τε πρύτανιν,
θεῶν σέβεσθαι·
ταύτας δὲ μή ποτε τιμᾶς
ἀμείρειν γονέων βίον πεπρωμένον.

 Truly, by keeping him at your right hand, you uphold the precept, whose words of advice they say Philyra's son once gave to the mighty son of Peleus in the mountains, when he was away from his parents: above all gods to revere Kronos' son Zeus, loud-voiced lord of lightning and thunder, and never to deprive of like honour one's parents during their allotted lifetime. (*P*.6.19-27)

As noted at the start of this Introduction, Chiron's instruction applies to the youthful Achilles and the victor.[222] According to Kurke, 'this signals to its

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[220] Lardinois (1995), 228, with Paus.9.31.5. Cf. Most (2006), lxii, on Aristarchus' declaration of its inauthenticity (Testimonium 69): 'No doubt it was the admonitions and precepts in Hesiod's *Works and Days* that suggested to some ancient readers that this poem too was his'.
[221] Nagy (1982), 61f. Cf. Theognis 99-100, 1145, 1147-8 and M.L.West (1978), 240 on Socrates' *parainesis*: In treatment of friends and strangers, 'offer your utmost to the immortal gods' (Xen.*Mem*.1.3.3), quoting *Op*.336. 'Honour thy father and thy mother' is one of the basic commandments after respect for the gods (e.g. Aesch.*Supp*.707).
[222] Nagy (1979), 238 citing *I*.6.68 and (n.17) Phoenix's words of advice for Achilles in *Iliad* 9, which 'qualify for designation by the word *parainesis*'. Homer in fact uses the verb ἐπετέλλετο at *Il*.9.252 (cf. 11.839 of Nestor), where Phoenix behaves as an adviser *in loco parentis*. Cf. Pindar *P*.1.69-70: 'with your

audience the introduction of *hypothêkai* into Pindar's poem'.[223] Contrary to what

the scholia suggest, Pindar was almost certainly not quoting the first lines of the

Precepts, which would probably have opened with an address to the son of

Peleus.[224] Notwithstanding the difficulty of identifying the source precisely, Pindar

is unequivocal about the identity of the teacher at *P*.6.22 and the periphrastic

Φιλύρας υἱὸν ('son of Philyra') links Chiron to the *Precepts*. What about the form of

this poem? It is possible that it had a narrative frame, perhaps with a dialogue,

followed by a catalogue of *hypothekai*.[225] West, however, thinks that the poem

'began at once with maxims (fr.283) and Achilles was enjoined to give due

honour to the gods'.[226] Pindar adds 'honour your parents' to the fragment's

'honour the gods'.[227] He illustrates these in the myth and the encomium

respectively.[228] In short, Pindar reworks the content of the instruction to suit the

occasion of the ode. In a situation where praise is offered by one young man to

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help a man who is a ruler and instructs his son (υἱῷ τ' ἐπιτελλόμενος) can in honouring his people turn them to harmonious peace').

[223] Kurke (1990), 91. Cf. Slater (1979b), 80. The group of mythological *hypothekai* to which the *Precepts of Chiron* belong includes the *agraphoi nomoi*, *patrioi nomoi*, sayings of wise men and the Delphic precepts. The poetry of Theognis (e.g. 27-8) also includes admonitions to abide by aristocratic ideals and precepts regarding social behaviour. A third century BC inscription from a shrine of the Muses on Mt Helicon in Boeotia refers to Hesiod's *W&D* as *hypothekai* (Paus. 9.31.4). See also Lucian *Dial.ad Hes*. 8.

[224] As Hutchinson (2001), 381 notes, the Hesiodic Χείρωνος Ὑποθῆκαι might well be the source for *Pyth*.6.19-27, but Σ 22 (ii 197 Drachm.) does not cite a parallel to the specific remark. Cf. Beazley (1948), 337.

[225] Cf. Schwartz (1960), 244, who thinks the poem included a dialogue between Philyra, Chiron and Achilles; cf. Friedländer (1913), 571-2, 577-8, 600-3. who considered it a monologue. Cf. *P*.9.40-51, where the dialogue between Chiron and Apollo is presented in the 'I' to 'you' style of discourse suited to one-to-one instruction and identifiable with a didactic style typical of the *Precepts of Chiron*.

[226] M.L.West (1978), 23. There may also have been advice relating to practical tasks and 'the statement in the Cyclic *Titanomachy* (fr.6) that Chiron first taught men oaths, sacrifices, and the σχήματ' Ὀλύμπου (constellations?) is perhaps a reference to the *Precepts* or some other similar poem'. Cf. fr.284 and Pherecr. fr.232 (*Fragmenta Hesiodea*, p.144).

[227] Lowrie (1997), 420 n.21 thinks it likely that 'honour your parents' followed 'honour the gods' in the Hesiodic fragment, where δὲ would have followed the fragment's πρῶτον μέν.

[228] Burr (1975), 50, notes that he omits the first precept (respect for strangers), 'the second and third he elaborates gnomically, but he chooses only the third for mythical embodiment'.

another, the poet's assumption of Chiron's mantle contributes to his 'slightly tutorial tone', as Bowra puts it.[229]

How should we characterise the preceptual style of instruction? Lardinois notes that from the adjective πευκαλίμῃσι, 'it appears that this was a friendly address, more like Nestor's wise speech to his wise son Antilochus in Book 23 of the *Iliad* than Hesiod's rebuke of *mega nēpios* Perseus'.[230] Unlike the source, which contained a list of injunctions (cf. φράζεσθαι, ἔρδειν), the only command in the passage above is an indirect one (Chiron to Achilles) introduced by φαντί.[231] If the *parainesis* had been expressed as a direct command to the victor (e.g. 'know the teaching of Chiron!') rather than enclosed in a report, it would have been more explicitly didactic. Moreover, the initial σὺ τοι in *P.*6.19 suggests that Pindar is addressing Thrasyboulos politely, since the particle τοι is an acknowledgement that the *laudandus* is familiar with the object of instruction. At the same time, it 'forces the general truth upon the consciousness of the individual addressed'.[232] As with the final triad of *Pythian* 1, the cluster of gnomes at vv.23-27 gives the ode a didactic framework, although the complete absence of the first person in

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[229] Bowra (1964), 107. The poet would have been 28 at the time of the ode's composition in 490 BC. See further Chapter 1.

[230] Lardinois (1995), 227. The fraternal relationship between speaker and audience in the *Works and Days* is quite different, since the basis for Hesiod's moral authority is his excellence as a speaker in contrast to the transgressive Perses; cf. Clay (1993), 27, n.3.

[231] Cf. the similarly layered speech in Bacchylides 27: a report in the poet's voice from a third party about Chiron prophesying Achilles' future, which may also draw on the dialogue in the *Precepts*.

[232] Denniston (1954), 537. Slater (1969a), s.v. τοι notes that it is 'often hard to differentiate [τοι] from the pronoun'; cf. *P.*2.72, *P.*3.85, *O.*8.59 etc. (in proverb), *P.*1.87, *P.*3.65 (in apodosis). Cf. Lardinois (1995), 270 with n.59, ad *P.*2.72; also Hubbard (1985), 76-7. The use of the ethic dative μοί in some gnomes identifies the speaker as the owner of the saying.

Pythian 6 indicates a lack of genuine authority.[233] So whilst the moralising voice of the poet-teacher is muted, he compensates for this by claiming the authority of the prototypical pedagogue, which is bolstered by the collective wisdom of the community he invokes with 'they say'.

Finally, whilst Pindar appropriates the content of the *Precepts of Chiron*, there is a marked difference in the function of this epinician ode. As Kurke puts it, 'The poet's "teaching" is not a prescription for future actions so much as a commemoration of Thrasyboulos' past noble deeds. This is what transforms it from precept to praise'.[234] This indicates another important generic difference. In contrast to Cyrnus or Perses, whose role does not depend on what they have done, the Pindaric victor deserves particular praise and even emulation. At the same time, Pindar sets the victor's achievement within the ethical context of the world around him. We should therefore characterise Pindar's style here as that of the 'friendly preceptor'. Such a style is characteristic of didactic poems in which there is an existing, somewhat long and affectionate relationship between the speaker and the addressee.[235] This is not, of course, the case in Pindar's epinician, where we are dealing more often with a one-off commission. As I argue later in Chapter 2, however, Pindar adopts a similar posture towards the aristocratic victor in *Nemean* 3, where the didactic character of the poet is graded

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[233] Cf. Carey (1995), 97, n.21 on the 'marked emphasis on the person of the speaker and weighty moralizing, with pronounced use of gnomai' in Pindar.

[234] Kurke (1990), 98. Cf. Kelly (2006).

[235] Cf. Lardinois (1995), 198-9 on Phoenix's characterisation of his relationship with Achilles in *Il*.9.481-2; cf. the father/son relationship between Nestor/Antilochus (e.g. *Iliad* 23.313) and Theognis 1049-50.

to the status of the *laudandus*. Let us turn our attention now to the generic marker of Pindar's discourse.

10 (a) *Coded Speech: Ainos, Riddles and Fables*

The concept of the *ainos* has been extensively explored by Nagy, who notes that, like a riddle, it is 'both difficult in its form and enigmatic in its content'.[236] It is important to realise, however, that *ainos* is not always marked as such and assumes numerous forms.[237] As Lardinois notes, 'Homer and the other archaic Greek poets refer to some proverb-like expressions with the words ἔπος, λόγος, or αἶνος.'[238] We have noted already that Pindar's use of *ainos* is subtle and allusive. The story of Zeus' jars in *P*.3.80f, for example, is a *logos* with a veiled meaning that both conveys a hint about Hieron's destiny and carries with it implicit praise of the king. Similarly, *Pythian* 4.263 refers to the proverbial 'wisdom of Oedipus' and alludes to his redoubtable talent in solving riddles without marking the subsequent parable as an *ainos*.[239] In common with many *ainoi*, this contains a cryptic message that invites careful interpretation. As such, the *ainos* acts as a

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[236] Nagy (1990), 148 (cf. p.31), who defines it as a 'marked speech-act made by and for a marked social group'. Cf. Nagy (1979), 240-1 on *ainigma* 'riddle' as a derivative of *ainos* and the verb *ainissomai* at *P*.8.40). Also Theognis 681-2: 'Let these be my riddling words with hidden meaning for the noble'. Note that 'riddle' is too narrow a translation for *ainigma* and its cognates, which is a form of advice too.

[237] Cf. Adrados (1999), 6, who observes that ainos 'has an impressive function to advise, eulogize (and, of course, criticize)'. Remarking on the image of the lion cub in Aesch.*Ag*.717-36, Nagy (1990), 312 notes that 'the ainos, true to its moral purpose, instructs as it implicitly warns'. Pucci (1977), 76, concurs with Koller (1972) that '*ainos* designates a discourse that aims at praising and honouring someone or something or at being ingratiating towards a person'.

[238] Lardinois (1997), 214. Words for proverbial expressions include *ainos* (*Il*.23.795); *logos* (Alcaeus fr.360 (=schol.Pind.*Isthm*.2.17, iii 215-16, Drachm., *O*.2.22: ἔπεται δὲ λόγος and *P*.3.80: a saying attributed to former poets, and *N*.7.21-2 on Odysseus' proverbial suffering; *epos* (*I*.6.66, *Il*.15.206, Theog.16).

[239] Observing the correspondence between riddles and gnomes, Lardinois (1995), 26-7 notes that every gnome 'requires the listener to apply the general terms in the gnome to a concrete situation'. Cf. Arist.*Rhet*.1394b34 on the use of 'riddling expressions' as gnomai.

means of glorifying the *laudandus*, provided he can understand its meaning. More importantly, however, the *ainos* reinforces the poet's status as a wise adviser by virtue of the fact he has devised the riddle.

Taking issue with Nagy's exclusive definition of *ainos* as 'authoritative speech', Lardinois argues that 'what all speech genres that are referred to as αἶνοι have in common is that they refer in some indirect way to a particular situation, and it is generally left to the listener to figure out how exactly they relate'.[240] We can illustrate this feature by looking at two examples from the *Iliad*. Nestor's account of his own exploits in *Iliad* 23.652 is characterised as an *ainos* (ᾤχετ᾽, ἐπεὶ πάντ᾽ αἶνον ἐπέκλυε Νηλεΐδαο); a few verses earlier (643-45), he had presented himself as a model for men of the current generation.[241] The implicit expectation is that the younger members of his audience will recognise their own responsibility and be inspired to action. This aspect of his authority as a speaker was discussed earlier. Whilst Nestor's account of his exploits commends Achilles for his generosity in giving him a prize in the games for Patroclus, it is instructive too.[242] This overlapping of praise and instruction is highly significant as far as our study of Pindar as a tactful adviser is concerned. Lardinois is perhaps unnecessarily sceptical of the extent to which Nestor's *ainos* is a vehicle of self-praise.[243] I suggest there are at least two specific instances in Pindar where the use of the

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[240] Lardinois (1995), 28, citing Nagy (1990), 31, 148.

[241] Cf. Nestor's speech to Patroclus (*Il*.11.668f.), where he takes the opportunity to inform his audience that there was once was strength in his limbs.

[242] Lardinois (1995), 145 n.106 thinks, however, that *ainos* should not be translated as praise, since Nestor is praising neither the Greek commanders nor Achilles.

[243] Lardinois (1995), 145 n.106, contra N.J.Richardson (1993), ad loc. The bT scholiast on 23.652 explains *ainos* as 'a story with a hidden message' (τὸν ἀπόκρυφον καὶ ἐσχηματισμένον λόγον =Erbse, 1969-88: v.467), 652b. Cf. Theog.681-2.

verb αἰνεῖν or its cognates could be interpreted as having the potential for self-referentiality.[244] As we noted above with regard to *P*.6.23 and *I*.6.68, the poet's *parainesis* can be viewed less as a means of assisting the *laudandus* to cope with his circumstances than as a means of mutual glorification. Again, Nestor's speech to the assembled Greeks at the funeral games for Patroclus in *Iliad* 23.795 is germane.[245] The way in which Achilles reacts to Antilochus' praise, as in the earlier situation at *Il*.23.652, suggests that he understood a point to have been made by both Nestor and Antilochus. The result, I think, is that Nestor's *ainos*, whose ostensible purpose is to thank Achilles, increases the power of the speaker himself. This, then, is the hidden potential of an *ainos*, which may be suggestive as far as Pindar is concerned, although we can only guess the listener's reaction.

Following West's definition of *ainos* as a 'tale or fable containing a hidden lesson for the addressee', we might regard Pindar's myth as an *ainos*, even though it is unmarked.[246] Its cryptic nature certainly fits the definition of *ainos*. Rather like the riddle, Pindaric myth may not have a clear or unanimous interpretation.[247] Like a paradigm, its interpretation depends on the particular perspective from which it is viewed. For example, the speech of Chiron in the myth of *Pythian* 9.46-8, with its reference to the proverbial grains of sand, is a quasi-oracular utterance that

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[244] Lardinois (1995), 27 notes that 'instruction through gnomai and didactic poetry is often referred to by the verbs αἰνεῖν, αἰνίσσεσθαι or παραινεῖν'.

[245] Ἀντίλοχ᾽ οὐ μέν τοι μέλεος εἰρήσεται αἶνος ('Antilochus, your good word for me shall not have been spoken in vain.')

[246] M.L.West, *OCD*³, s.v. 'riddles', p.1317. He cites the famous examples in Homer *Od*.14.508 (Odysseus to Eumaeus) and Hes.*Op*.202 (the hawk and the nightingale). Cf. Archil.174.1, 185.1.

[247] Cf. e.g. the riddling words of Amphiaraos at *P*.8.40, which take the form of an *ainos* (αἰνίξατο) with a hidden application to the present.

might be considered an *ainos* not only for Apollo but also for the wider audience listening to the ode.[248] It is worth reflecting that stories of seers' contests of skills, like this one, belong to the same tradition as the riddle of the Sphinx.[249] The theme of disaster befalling the seer (e.g. Laocöon) may lie behind *Iliad* 1.76-83, where Calchas seeks protection from Agamemnon. Calchas' 'apology' for his explanation of Apollo's anger contains a qualification: will Achilles defend him? The same fear of punishment or reprisal may lie beneath Chiron's tactful challenge (under duress) to Apollo at *P*.9.50-1 (εἰ δὲ χρὴ καὶ πὰρ σοφὸν ἀντιφερίξαι / ἐρέω·). Chiron politely points out that he will be guilty of a verbal affront to the god's omniscience if forced to speak and his use of the conditional εἰ enables him to escape censure. The diction and subject-matter here recall Hesiod *Op*.210 (ἄφρων δ', ὅς κ' ἐθέλῃ πρὸς κρείσσονας ἀντιφερίζειν·), where the hawk's message to the nightingale is that only a fool tries to compete with the stronger. This is perhaps the most impressive and unusual *ainos*.

10 (b) *Hesiod's Fable: Ainos in Didactic Poetry*

In an important study of Hesiod, Clay has shown that he uses one form of address for his brother Perses (second person, v.27, 107, 213, 274, 286); a more

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[248] Cf. Dougherty (1993), 148, who compares the oblique use of metaphor and abstraction in Chiron's speech at vv.44-9 with the famous oracle delivered to Croesus at Hdt.1.47.

[249] Cf. Hes.fr.278 M-W (death of Calchas) and Pindar's reference to the death of Amphiaraos at *O*.6.13. For oracles as a kind of riddle that the recipient had to solve in order to escape ruin, cf. Hdt.1.6.7. Rather like Oedipus, Arcesilas is required to solve a riddle (*P*.4.262f.) in order to safeguard his future. Cf. Forster (1945).

indirect form of address is reserved for the kings, as they have the capacity to figure out the *ainos* on their own.[250] In Pindar, advice is normally addressed to one individual, although it may have more than one intended recipient, as was noted above in relation to the epilogue of *Pythian* 4. In contrast to Hesiod, however, Pindar's direct forms of *parainesis* tend to be reserved for those of the highest status, with whom he would like to claim equality. Whilst the fable of the hawk and nightingale is intended for Hesiod's whole audience, its message is formally addressed to Perses in a summary statement appended as a coda (213-4):[251]

   Νῦν δ' αἶνον βασιλεῦσιν ἐρέω φρονέουσι καὶ αὐτοῖς·
ὧδ' ἴρηξ προσέειπεν ἀηδόνα ποικιλόδειρον
ὕψι μάλ' ἐν νεφέεσσι φέρων ὀνύχεσσι μεμαρπώς·
ἣ δ' ἐλεόν, γναμπτοῖσι πεπαρμένη ἀμφ' ὀνύχεσσι,
μύρετο· τὴν ὅγ' ἐπικρατέως πρὸς μῦθον ἔειπεν·

"Δαιμονίη, τί λέληκας; ἔχει νύ σε πολλὸν ἀρείων·
τῇ δ' εἶς, ᾗ σ' ἂν ἐγώ περ ἄγω καὶ ἀοιδὸν ἐοῦσαν·
δεῖπνον δ', αἴ κ' ἐθέλω, ποιήσομαι ἠὲ μεθήσω.
ἄφρων δ', ὅς κ' ἐθέλῃ πρὸς κρείσσονας ἀντιφερίζειν·
νίκης τε στέρεται πρός τ' αἴσχεσιν ἄλγεα πάσχει."
Ὥς ἔφατ' ὠκυπέτης ἴρηξ, τανυσίπτερος ὄρνις.

   Ὦ Πέρση, σὺ δ' ἄκουε δίκης, μηδ' ὕβριν ὄφελλε·
ὕβρις γάρ τε κακὴ δειλῷ βροτῷ·

And now I will tell a fable for princes who themselves understand. Thus said the hawk to the nightingale with speckled neck, while he carried her high up among the clouds, gripped fast in his talons, and she, pierced by his crooked talons, cried pitifully. To her he spoke disdainfully: "Miserable thing, why do you cry out? One far stronger than you now

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[250] Clay (1993). Cf. the second-person form of address found in the *Precepts of Chiron* (above).
[251] Clay (1993), 27.

holds you fast, and you must go wherever I take you, songstress as you are. And if I please, I will make my meal of you, or let you go. He is a fool who tries to withstand the stronger, for he does not get the mastery and suffers pain besides his shame." So said the swiftly flying hawk, the long-winged bird.

But you, Perses, listen to right and do not foster violence; for violence is bad for a poor man. (*Works and Days*, 202-214)[252]

Commenting on this passage, West observes that *ainos* is 'a fable or other story with an implied message in it for the listener'.[253] The same type of contrast between 'foolish' Perses (e.g. *Op*.286, 397) and the wise kings (v.202) can be discerned in *Pythian* 3.[254]   Hieron's lot as a 'people-guiding *tyrannos*' (v.85) is implicitly compared with that of Peleus and Cadmus and set against that of anonymous 'fools' (*nēpioi,* v.82).[255] The inability of the latter to endure their (mis)fortune gracefully is in stark contrast to Hieron, who by virtue of his status as a king, ought to be able 'to put up with what the blessed gods allot him' (χρὴ πρὸς μακάρων τυγχάνοντ᾽ εὖ πασχέμεν,103-4). Thus, the *ainos* is an oblique form of instruction and praise. Mordine points out that Hesiod's *ainos* 'signals his reworking of that (perhaps) traditional fable as an enigmatic discourse within the context of his own narrative'.[256] Hesiod's fable is a very unusual case, in which the most obviously implied message is that "might is right" (as famously

[252] Transl. Most (2006).
[253] M.L.West (1979), 127 with n.23. Only at *Od*.21.110 does *ainos* not mean a 'story with a point', but is equivalent to *epainos*, 'praise'.
[254] Lardinois (1995), 216-17 notes that 'the νήπιος in the sense of "fool" is the prototypical bad example in didactic poetry because he learns by suffering and not from the advice given to him by experts like Hesiod'; cf. *Il*.17.32 and Edmunds (1990), 60-97.
[255] Cf. Detienne (1996), 60 on the contrast between the *nēputios* (e.g. Thersites) and the king in the *Iliad* from the perspective of speech. In Hesiod, the silent addressee is particularly pointed, since Perses is *nēpios*, and because his major transgressions are forms of speech (oaths etc.).
[256] Mordine (2006), 365, citing Nagy (1979), 239, for whom the code of this *ainos* has a message for kings, but only if they are 'aware' (*phroneontes*); cf. Bacch.3.85, Pindar *O*.2.85 and *P*.5.107. He regards this as analogous to the 'built-in ideology of exclusiveness' in epinician.

propounded by Callicles in Plato's *Gorgias* 484B and the Athenian 'hawks' in Thucydides' Melian Dialogue, 3.84). The kings, however, are not supposed to agree with the hawk. It 'enables Hesiod skilfully to perform the fundamentally problematic didactic task of criticising, without offending, the powerful'.[257] I am not aware of any other example of this peculiar strategy in Pindar.

Race's observation that 'Poets and heroes may resort to an *ainos* when a sufficient difference exists between their status and that of the person being addressed' seems apposite to the context of the odes for kings.[258] Like Hesiod's fable of the hawk and nightingale, Pindar's parable of the woodcutter and the oak tree in *P*.4.263-69 enables the poet to warn the king without offending him, since the *ainos* veils the identities of the participants in the political dispute, Arcesilas and Damophilos.[259] In this case, the point of the 'riddle of Oedipus' is to elicit compassion for the exiled Damophilos.[260] Rather as the kings are supposed to be sensitive to the moral position which Hesiod presses on Perses at the end, Pindar's *ainos* is subtle. To the extent that it is coded and requires intelligent insight, it is respectful like Hesiod's hawk. Notwithstanding this, the poet treads a

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[257] Mordine (2006), 367. 'The kings are obliquely prodded to sympathise with Hesiod qua nightingale despite their natural identification with the hawk, the figure of power.' On the epinician poet's fondness for animal metaphors, cf. Bacch.3.96-7, where the poet identifies with the (Kean) nightingale, and Martin (1997), 157.

[258] Race (1991), 49, citing Odysseus' use of an *ainos* towards Eumaeus (*Od*.14.508), when in the position of a suppliant.

[259] Cf. e.g. Hes.*Op*.524f. and the octopus at 742f.

[260] Cf. schol. ad loc: 'the *ainigma* speaks on behalf of Damophilos' (Drachm.2.163). Cf. Braswell (1988), 361 on the main points of comparison between the oak tree and Damophilos.

tightrope between causing offence to Arcesilas and conveying his message truthfully.[261]

How, then, should we differentiate Pindar's self-representation as a wise poet from that of Hesiod? Griffith notes that the wisdom-poet will 'constantly put himself forward as the expert, in relation to a less experienced, or morally inferior audience which requires his advice or correction'.[262] Whilst Pindar adopts a similar stance, he avoids giving the impression that the addressee is intellectually inferior and typically offers advice indirectly. Mordine has argued recently that 'By according an equality of status to the addressees, the poet [Pindar] thus reconfigures the typical asymmetric intellectual relationship presupposed for didactic poetry in which the poet plays the role of instructor in a superior position to the addressee who is pedagogically inferior'.[263] Whilst I would not disagree with Mordine's basic position, it is debatable whether Pindar actually accords the addressee total intellectual equality, as we noted with regard to *P*.3.80. In *O*.1.115-17, for example, his desire to be 'foremost in *sophia*' (wisdom/poetic skill) is equivalent to Hieron's ambition for fame.[264] This might be taken to imply that the poet is excluding Hieron from his personal aspiration to be without equal in wisdom. Hornblower paraphrases Rose's argument that 'by the very act of conferring such highly-crafted praise on rulers and elites, a literary and linguistic

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[261] Cf. Gildersleeve (1895), 302: 'Pindar acquits himself of a delicate task delicately [through the parable of Oedipus], and then, for fear of making the correspondence too close, breaks off'.

[262] Griffith (1983), 55, contrasting this with the roles of the epic or hymnic poet, 'who is mostly occupied in narrative and devotes a relatively small amount of time and space to his relationship with the addressee'.

[263] Mordine (2006), 365-6.

[264] Cf. the *sphragis* of *P*.3.111-15, on the other hand, where the fame of the *laudandus* is specifically linked with that of the *laudator*, a notion that goes back to Ibycus, *PMG* 282.47-8, where the poet promises Polycrates fame parallel to that of past heroes, with whom he is likened in beauty.

feat quite beyond the intellectual range of his patrons, the poet asserts his own superiority to those patrons'.[265] This assessment can be elaborated somewhat, since it is in advising that Pindar shows off his intellectual superiority. But to reiterate, Pindar demonstrates his superior wisdom over the listener through the *ainos,* whether in the form of myth, gnome or allusion. For example, Chiron's pedagogic relation in the myth reinforces the impression of mutual interests between *laudator* and *laudandus* but also contributes to the mirage of equality in the odes insofar as the poet identifies himself exclusively with the Centaur's authority.[266]

Whenever Pindar adopts the privileged position of special adviser to the king, he appeals to the listener's intelligent understanding. In a remarkable example of asyndetic sophistry, Pindar urges Hieron to 'become such as you are, having learned what that is' (*P*.2.72f.). Pindar's special code is designed to distinguish Hieron's superior intelligence from that of ordinary mortals but not to the extent that it quite matches his own. Nagy argues that 'the *ainos* restricts and is restricted by its audience, who belong to the *sophoi*, the *agathoi* and the *philoi*. He defines the *agathoi* as 'those who are 'intrinsically 'noble' by virtue of having been raised on proper ethical standards, which are the message encoded in the poetry'.[267] I submit that by building up his personal claim to a special kind of wisdom, a privilege only afforded to him by the gods, Pindar in fact shows himself

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[265] Hornblower (2004), 84-5, noting too that 'Bacchylides has less advice to offer Hiero than Pindar has for his tyrannical patrons'; cf. P.W.Rose (1982), 63 and (1992), 176: 'there is menace in the fact that Pindar is capable of conferring or withholding this skill as he wishes'.
[266] Cf. Chapter 3.
[267] Nagy (1990), 148, citing *P*.2.81-8; cf. *P*.4.285 etc.

to be the superior of his patron. As we have seen, Pindar controls the utterance and the elevation of the addressee is conditional upon his correct interpretation of the poet's meaning or import.[268] Consequently, the poet's appeal to an exclusive relationship does not quite amount to implying an 'equality of interpretative ability', as Mordine would have it.[269] It is merely a rhetorical ploy that enables him to convince the listener of the validity of his words and to assume a loftier stance. *Olympian* 2.85-6, for example, suggests that even those who understand need interpreters to expound the whole matter. The explanatory gnome, 'Wise is he who knows many things by nature' perhaps separates Pindar from those who benefit from his wisdom. In conclusion, I would qualify Mordine's argument that Pindar accords an equality of status to his addressee by arguing that *ainos* is a vehicle for the poet's self-aggrandisement.[270] By employing an authoritative, coded and even ambivalent speech, Pindar reinforces his status as a wise adviser.

11. *The Wise Adviser in Herodotus*

I turn now to examine the figure of the wise adviser in Herodotus in order to illuminate the distinctive character of the poet-adviser in *Pythian* 3 (Chapter 3). I will pay special attention to the form of discourse in which it is given and to the figure of the adviser himself.

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[268] Cf. *N*.3.84, where the poet gives the impression that the willingness of the Muse (treated here as a quasi-independent arbiter) will not be ensured unless the addressee follows the advice contained in the ode.
[269] Mordine (2006), 365.
[270] Mordine (2006), 365-6.

Solon's pronouncement to Croesus that no mortal should consider himself happy until he is dead (1.32.7, 1.86.3) stands squarely in the tradition of the meeting of the wise man and the tyrant, as recorded by the writer of Plato's second letter to Dionysius II.[271] Accounts of such meetings are given in conversational form (often in the form of a Socratic dialogue) and the subject they discuss is the same: the relative happiness of tyrant and private individual.[272] The form reveals the sophisticated ways in which the genre developed after Herodotus. What about the character of the advice? The tyrant consulted the wise man expecting to receive a positive endorsement of his good fortune. Solon's shrewd reply was that a man may be called happy (εὐτυχής) in life but only ὄλβιος *after* a life exempt from a reversal in that fortune.[273] Without such a dialogue, it is more difficult for Pindar explicitly to reveal Hieron's state of mind; we must deduce this from internal evidence such as the wish for Chiron, which elicits Hieron's attitude to mortality. In contrast to Hesiod's Perses, we do not hear how his mind shifts in the course of the ode. In Chapter 3, I argue that the use of the first person in this ode helps to give a sense of linear progression as well as attempting to influence the thoughts of the addressee. At any rate, the character of Solon's advice is more pessimistic (much to Croesus' annoyance) than Pindar's advice to Hieron in

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[271] Gray (1986), 121, noting that Xenophon's *Hiero*, in which the wise poet Simonides meets the tyrant Hiero, was written in the fourth century BC but set in the fifth. According to Winsor Sage (1985), 218, 'a significant difference in the two passages lies in the state of mind and response of the characters'. Hiero listens to the wise poet and demonstrates increased persuasion as the dialogue progresses (10.1).

[272] Gray (1986), 120. Cf. *OCD*[3], s.v. Xenophon, p.1631: 'Hiero refutes Simonides' claim that it is pleasant to be a tyrant, while Simonides supplies suggestions for improving the situation, not least by manipulation of public opinion'. The latter tactic is employed most clearly by Pindar in *Pythian* 3.71 (cf. *P*.4.270).

[273] The proverb, 'call no man happy before his death', first appears in Greek literature as a gnome at Aesch. *Ag*.928 (cf. the final verses of Soph.*OT*. 1528-30). Cf. Theog.425-28 for the proverbially pessimistic outlook about mortality, which is echoed in Bacch.5.160-4.

P.3, which exploits the theme of a tyrant's felicity relative to other men in order to hearten the *laudandus*. Whilst acknowledging the inevitability of human suffering (e.g. v.105), Pindar is at pains to stress Hieron's *olbos*; to this extent, he focuses on his own ability to provide a cause for cheer now and in the future.[274] Like Simonides, he expresses sympathy for Hieron's unhappiness and tailors his advice specifically to his concerns. Solon, on the other hand, refuses to flatter Croesus.

The context in which the Herodotean adviser Artabanus (7.46.3-4) gives his advice is also pertinent, since the addressee Xerxes, like Pindar's Hieron, is suffering from mortal afflictions. Gray has observed that two of the central features of didactic poetry are, a) a situation in which a wise man instructs the less wise, and b) an emphasis on helpfulness as the central characteristic of the wise.[275] It is crucial to Pindar's strategy that he avoid the suggestion that his addressee is less wise, even though this may be one consequence of his assuming an authoritative stance. The divergence in intellect is rather more pronounced in Herodotus, I suspect. One feature of the warner in Herodotus and Thucydides is that he gives powerful warnings that seem bound to fail, in contrast to Pindar's more enlightened and helpful adviser.[276] The emphasis in Pindar is firmly on the giver rather than the receiver of the advice, which is in part due to generic differences. In the sense that we are not told about the effect of the

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[274] Cf. Bacch.5.50-5 with Lefkowitz (1969), 63 on this traditional theme.
[275] Gray (1998), noting that these are two of the features shared by the didactic tradition with Xenophon's *Memorabilia*.
[276] Cf. Marinatos (1980) on the wise adviser and tragic warner in Thucydides.

poet's sage advice on the listener, *Pythian* 3 is closer to Xenophon's *Hiero*.[277] At any rate, Pindar offers a more balanced outlook on mortal existence, which includes an insight into the life of the immortals glimpsed through the Muses' song (*P*.3.90). Pelling has shown that both Herodotus and Thucydides emphasise the limitations of human wisdom.[278] In Pindar, advice given by characters in the myth may not always lead, ultimately, to the desired outcome. Chiron's instruction of Asclepius in *P*.3, for example, inadvertently affords his pupil an irresistible belief in his own powers of healing, which ultimately brings about his own downfall. Notwithstanding this, the overall sense in Pindar seems to be that advice, if properly adhered to, will be beneficial.

A key aspect of Pindar's self-representation as a wise adviser explored in this thesis is his attempt to convince the listener by enabling him to become a virtual participant in the acquisition of learning.[279] It seems to me that the figure of the wise adviser in Herodotus, who 'serve[s] in the narrative to dramatize the important choices before individuals, to give advice to those who lack a larger perspective, and to suggest a proper way to behave' is pertinent to Pindar's self-representation as an adviser in *Pythian* 3 and *Nemean* 3.[280] Here, the poet dramatises alternatives by using commands and appeals. Lang thinks that the shift from a Homeric hero's internal debate to dramatic dialogue may owe

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[277] Winsor Sage (1985), 218 observes that the dialogue ends abruptly 'with no indication as to whether Hiero acted on Simonides' advice or how he ended up'.

[278] In comparing Thucydides' Archidamus (i.80-5) with Herodotus' Artabanus (Hdt.7.49.5), Pelling (1991), 120, notes that the problematic quality of *euboulia* is familiar since Homer (e.g. the advice of Polydamas at *Il*.12.195-250). Cf. Schofield (1986).

[279] Cf. my study of *Pythian* 3 and *Nemean* 3 in Chapters 2 and 3.

[280] Marincola (1996), xxii. Bischoff (1932), 31-77 deals exclusively with the tragic warner, tracing its course through the careers of the great kings.

something to other sources, such as the *Precepts of Chiron*.[281] I shall explore this phenomenon in Pindar, where a conversation between a teacher and pupil is enacted with interesting didactic effects. Moreover, this aspect of the poet's role as an exemplary speaker enables him to steer the audience's response tactfully.[282]

In another sense, the function of the Herodotean adviser resembles that of Pindar's Chiron (cf. Priam and Achilles, *P*.3.80), who reflects different aspects of the paraenetic 'dialogue' with the external addressee.[283] I noted earlier that a gnome spoken by a character is applicable at the level of the poet and his audience in epinician poetry, even if it is a matter of some conjecture.[284] This is suggestive as far as Pindar's strategy in *Pythian* 9 is concerned, where Chiron's advice to Apollo helps to illuminate the poet's moral perspective. The link between the epic poet and the heroes who are represented as performing his song is worth commenting on in relation to both Herodotus and Pindar.[285] This is a device by which the poet can convey an ethical view of the world to his audience. Vasileios Liotsakis seems to have something of this in mind when identifying three cases in Herodotus where the words of a speaker are not those

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[281] Lang (1984), 54. Cf. Odysseus' speech to his κραδίη at *Od*.20.18-21 with Pelliccia (1995), 296 and my discussion of *Nemean* 3 in Chapter 2.

[282] Cf. D.L.Cairns on Nestor's function in Homer's *Iliad* (above).

[283] Cf. Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*, where advice about how to rule is given in conversations and speeches. See also Winsor Sage (1985), 228 on the Solon-Croesus *logos* in Xenophon, which appears in the form of giver and receiver of advice.

[284] Lardinois (1997), 233.

[285] Cf. Martin (1989), xiv, on the 'voice' of the poet, which becomes traditionally identified with the 'voices' of the heroes quoted by the poetic performance. See esp. his Chapter 3.

actually said but rather reflect the political views of Herodotus himself.[286] It is evident that the speaker not only enhances his own reputation for sagacity but that of his 'creator' too. This provides a good parallel to my claim about the self-referential function of advice in Pindar and the use of *ainos* as a vehicle of self-praise. As I shall argue later, the appropriation of Chiron's paradigmatic associations by the poetic 'I' reinforces the poet's status as a wise adviser.[287]

12. *Conclusions: Pindar's Epinician Precepts*

I have argued that advice frequently serves to aggrandise the speaker, a phenomenon that can be traced back to Homer's Nestor. This aspect of the tradition is particularly relevant to the odes for kings, where the poet adopts a more authoritative stance vis-à-vis the *laudandus* through the use of a more prominent *ego*. It was observed that the different forms of speech employed by Nestor contribute to the speaker's authority and confirm his status as wise adviser. Martin sums up the main points of interest for us as follows: 'Nestor's commands are supported by gnomic utterance and the authority of recollection; rebukes are backed up by his status as keeper of traditions and overseer of poetic memory.'[288] The latter observation strikes me as germane to Pindar, who often appeals to the Muses in their capacity as the poet's 'mind' and as a form of

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[286] In a paper given at the Classical Association Conference (2007), mentioning Herodotus-Croesus in 1.130, 155.3, Herodotus-Demaratus in 7.104.4 and Herodotus-Otanes in 3.80.5-6
[287] See Chapters 2 and 3,
[288] Martin (1989), 108. 'The power to guarantee fame in the tradition would seem to put Nestor on a level with such divine speakers as the Muses, with whom the epithet *heduepēs*, "sweet-voiced," has already associated him'. (p.105); cf. *Il.*1.248 (Nestor introduced), *h.Hymn* 32.2, Hes.*Th.*965, 1021 (Muses). Cf. Theog.714 for Nestor's ability as a speaker. Also Scodel (2001), 110.

authority, albeit in a way that stresses his own independence.[289] As we have seen, Pindar often cites tradition (e.g. 'they say') in order to reinforce his authority. Of particular relevance to Pindar is Nestor's use of heroes from the past as paradigms for the present and his pointed use of the first person.[290] In both cases too, past exploits are evoked to teach the listener about his proper place in society.[291] However, whereas Nestor uses personal reminiscence to reinforce his authority, Pindar relies more on traditional sayings and myth, which he adapts to the present situation. As Lloyd-Jones put it, 'In the view of the ancients, a poet's originality was not diminished by his use of old material, but rather displayed in his ingenious adaptation of that material to his own purposes'.[292] As is the case in Hesiod, myths are manipulated to persuade their addressees. As we shall see in the next chapter, the particular treatment of a myth makes the *parainesis* more convincing as far as the listener is concerned and affects the type of persona Pindar can adopt.

An obvious dissimilarity between Nestor and Pindar is their respective age and corresponding experience. As Douglas Cairns observes on the use of mythical exempla in the *Iliad*, 'the story itself is, by virtue of its presentation as a paradigm, endowed with authority, an authority which is often reinforced by the inherent

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[289] Cf. Morrison (2007b), 84-90 for a good survey of the Muse in Pindar. Outside the epinician, Pindar indicates his role as prophet of the Muses (*Paean* 6.6, fr.150).

[290] Cf. *N*.3.52, where the use of the first person enables Pindar to lay claim to a familiar tale about Achilles. The speaker, rather than the Muses, rejects myths, as at *O*.1.52, *O*.13.91; cf. Scodel (2001), 123-5. For references to himself rather than the Muses in transitional passages, cf. *P*.4.247-8, *N*.4.33, *N*.8.19 etc.

[291] Cf. Griffiths (1999), 178, who observes that Pindar's myths are back-projected behind the victory celebrations, just as Nestor's anecdotes reach beyond the immediate context of war. Mann (1994), 336 suggests that the function of myth is to provide a distinctive and distinguishing ornament on the monument to his patron's achievement and thus to mark that achievement.

[292] Lloyd-Jones (1971), 44-5. Cf. Braswell (1971), 23.

status of the speaker'.[293] One example of the importance of age to the Homeric speaker is particularly telling. In *Il*.19.216-20, Odysseus "pulls rank" on Achilles by explicitly contrasting their special abilities in strength and thought, before referring to his greater age as way of clinching his demand for obedience.[294] Overall, Pindar presents his counsel more tactfully than the Homeric speakers Nestor or Odysseus, who can speak in this way by virtue of their age and status as kings.[295] So whilst the basis for a speaker's authority is his age and experience, Pindar must construct authority through other means.[296] He does this through his privileged access to Muse-inspired knowledge, as I argue in Chapter 2. I propose that in terms of his self-presentation as a wise teacher, the link with Chiron enables him to claim the authority of a senior statesman.

It has been observed that the character of the advice is affected by the communication-situation and the type of person with whom one constructs the relationship. Unlike Hesiod, whose authority is derived from his being the *panaristos* (*W&D*, 293), the epinician relationship is characterised by ethical equality and it is not Pindar's place to upbraid the *laudandus*.[297] The pedagogic relationship in Hesiod is rooted in a sense of injustice and inequality, which gives him an opportunity to vaunt his intellect, as in his use of the moralising first person at *Op*.270-1. Clearly the epinician relationship is closer to that of Nestor

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[293] D.L.Cairns (2001), 49, mentioning Nestor, Phoenix and Achilles in Book 24.
[294] ὦ Ἀχιλεῦ Πηλῆος υἱὲ μέγα φέρτατ' Ἀχαιῶν, κρείσσων εἰς ἐμέθεν καὶ φέρτερος οὐκ ὀλίγον περ ἔγχει, ἐγὼ δέ κε σεῖο νοήματί γε προβαλοίμην πολλόν, ἐπεὶ πρότερος γενόμην καὶ πλείονα οἶδα. Cf. Martin (1989), 97 and *Il*.9.105.
[295] Cf. Lardinois (2000), 656, who notes that Odysseus relies upon trickery and indirect gnomic address.
[296] Cf. Gray (1998), 160 n.4, who observes that 'the status of the author of the instruction or his dramatised equivalent is clearly an issue for the genre' [of wisdom instruction].
[297] Cf. Carey (1995), 97.

and Agamemnon in the sense that it is based on mutual respect of individual excellences. Nonetheless, like Hesiod in *Works and Days*, Pindar displays a remarkable variety of rhetorical strategies in tailoring his advice to his addressees. Throughout the epinicia, he demonstrates an awareness of the need to speak differently to different people.

I contextualised the use of Chiron as an authority figure by arguing that his prominence in myth distinguishes him from other such figures that serve to legitimise Pindar's status as a wise adviser more explicitly and do not present an independent moral perspective conveyed through the myth. To put this into perspective, I compared the function of Chiron in *Pythian* 9 with that of other wise figures in both poetry and prose, including that of the Herodotean adviser. Whilst enlarging the audience's view of the world, Chiron enables Pindar to communicate different aspects of his advice obliquely. It was noted that the poet's penchant for dramatising ethical choices through the actions of his mythical characters is paralleled in Herodotus; this observation is taken up in Chapters 2 and 3. Finally, it is worth reflecting that Chiron's nuanced roles as a mythical exemplum (*P*.3, *N*.3), speaking character (*P*.9) and authority figure (*P*.6) affect the way in which the poet constructs authority. In each case, however, Chiron's basic function as an *exemplum* should be understood in terms of the overall unity of the ode.[298]

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[298] Cf. Young (1968), who insists on considering Pindar's words in the order and context in which he wrote them.

The Paraenetic Encomium

In this Introduction, I have explored the interface between the paraenetic tradition and Pindar's epinician poetry from the perspective of authoritative speech. I began by asserting the need to understand praise and advice as complementary forms of discourse interwoven in the epinician. A reductive approach to genre here is unhelpful and potentially misleading; two further examples show that *parainesis* is embedded in the epinician obligation 'to praise', which is expressed gnomically. At *N*.3.29, Pindar quotes the unattributed saying, 'praise the good' (ἕπεται δὲ λόγῳ δίκας ἄωτος, "ἐσλον αἰνεῖν"). Likewise, the gnomic exhortation in *Pythian* 9.93-6 seems to be an *ad hoc* invention that demonstrates how Pindar appropriates a *parainesis* in a way that not only strengthens his *ainos* but also his authority as an epinician poet. I therefore propose to define Pindaric *epainos* as broadly as possible by applying the term 'paraenetic encomium' to characterise Pindar's discourse. In Chapters 2 and 3, I consider another aspect of the interface between the paraenetic poetry and epinician as regards the form and content of the ode.

In my survey of the gnomic tradition, I have adopted the system of classification successfully deployed by Lardinois to archaic poetry, which provides an important insight into the oblique forms of address used by the epinician speaker. What, then, is the essence of Pindar's *parainesis*? We have seen that both myth and gnome can be characterised as indirect forms of *ainos* and are interwoven

with more explicitly didactic commands, injunctions and moralising first-person statements.[299] These forms of authority should not be understood in isolation but as part of a cumulative argument and symphonic structure. Rather like Hesiod's *protreptic*, the epinician ode incorporates a dynamic progression of thought. I propose that the felicitous combination of different forms of authority characterises the poet's paraenetic encomium as a tactful and authoritative form of utterance. Moreover, the subordination of gnomes to the poetic *ego* in Pindar may be differentiated somewhat from Bacchylides, who employs them as a central driving force in the ode's argument.[300] Indeed, I shall argue that the 'I' interacts with the mythical exemplum and appropriates Chiron's associations in a way that reinforces the poet's advice.[301] But before we can attempt this, it is necessary to examine Pindar's distinctive treatment of Chiron as a teacher of heroes and to substantiate his interactive function as a model for the role of Pindar as poet-teacher.

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[299] Cf. Stenger (2005), 54, who argues that the gnomic is a direct instrument to interpret the victory and to formulate it explicitly in contrast to the myth, which mentions the victory only indirectly.
[300] Cf. Morrison (2007b), 99, who notes the use of exclamations and emotional language to portray a narratorial reaction to a myth (e.g. Bacch. 3.10, 9.15) compared with the use of the first person in Pindar.
[301] Cf. my discussions of *Nemean* 3 and *Pythian* 3 in Chapters 2 and 3.

CHAPTER ONE: PINDAR'S CHIRON AND THE ACADEMY OF HEROES

Preliminaries

This chapter explores Pindar's presentation of Chiron as a tutor of the heroes Achilles, Jason and Asclepius.[1] Discovering the character of his teaching is an essential preliminary to the subsequent enquiry, which examines how Chiron's teaching underpins the poet's self-representation as an adviser in *Pythian* 3 and *Nemean* 3. This brings us to the question of the status of the addressee. It is important to recognise the individuality of the epinicia in which Chiron is presented as an educator of heroes, two of which were written for *tyrannoi* (*P*.3 and *P*.4) and two of which were written for aristocrats (*P*.6 and *N*.3). The attention given to the education of Achilles in the myths of *Nemean* 3 and *Pythian* 6 lends support to the view that both Thrasyboulos and Aristokleidas were young victors.[2]

It is important to realise that Chiron has a distinguished mythological history in poetry before Pindar but that the poet frequently manipulates this tradition for his

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[1] Cf. J.Escher, *RE* 111 2 (1899), 2302-2308, s.v. 'Chiron'. On the alternative spelling of Chiron's name, he writes, 'In der litterarischen überlieferung vorwiegend Χείρων auf attischen Vasen durchweg Χίρων'. According to West (1966), 431, the antiquity of the spelling Χείρων (besides Χίρων) is proved by Lesbian Χέρρων (*Alcaeus* 10.9 L-P).

[2] Aristokleidas' age, in particular, has been a matter of scholarly dispute. Burnett (2005), 142 makes a strong case for the victor's youth, although she over-interprets Pindar in referring to the 'son of Aristophanes' (v.21) as a boy; cf. Nicholson (2007), 213.

own purposes. In his detailed examination of the iconographic tradition surrounding the education of Greek youths, Beck remarks that 'Chiron's field of expertise covered the survival arts of hunting and healing, the social accomplishment of music and the rules of moral conduct as codified through gnomic wisdom'.[3] All of these aspects are reflected in the iconography of the period.[4] The overall impression I have of Chiron is one of overwhelmingly civilised and aristocratic traits, which might go some way to explaining his prominence in Pindar, whose poetry consistently portrays the same kind of ethical values. Certainly, Pindar's poetry shows the diversity of Chiron's talents, which help the poet to articulate the shared values of *laudator* and *laudandus*.[5]

This study arises from Elizabeth Burr's dissertation on the seven 'Chiron' odes, whose scope is wide-ranging.[6] In Chapter 3, Burr explains Pindar's treatment of Chiron as depending upon the meaning of a number of figures either related or analogous to Chiron. These include the other Centaurs, the athletic trainer, the gods (especially Zeus, Apollo), the Aiakid heroes, and the poet himself.[7] This indicates that Chiron is not linked exclusively with the poet, although it is on Chiron's figurative association with the poet *qua* teacher that this thesis concentrates.

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[3] Beck (1975), 10: Formal schooling in its infancy found its mythic symbol in Chiron. One branch of the vase tradition (commencing c.520BC), for example, represents Achilles as a typical Athenian schoolboy being introduced by his parents to his new teacher.

[4] The best account of the iconography of the Chiron-Achilles myth is Friis Johansen (1939), 181-205.

[5] Cf. Padgett (2003), who argues against the prevailing notion that all centaurs stand for is brute violence.

[6] Burr (1975), an unpublished MA dissertation (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill). See now Burr (1994) for Chiron's influence in her subsequent publication within the field of Greek and Roman Mythology.

[7] Burr (1975), 67.

In the Introduction, I contextualised the use of Chiron as a form of authority in Pindar's epinician poetry in relation to other wise adviser figures. In this Chapter, I shall explore Pindar's distinctive treatment of Chiron in myth as a tutor of heroes. Pindar's principal innovation can be seen in the addition of Chiron to the familiar set of parallels between poet, hero and *laudandus*. It must be said at the outset that I see no conflict between the encomiastic function of the victory ode and its didactic element. Indeed they complement each other.[8] Indeed, Chiron himself is emblematic of the didactic function of the ode, whilst indirectly adding to the glorification of the *laudandus* (through the familiar parallelism between hero and victor) as a promoter of heroic excellence. In this Chapter, I shall argue that Chiron's tutoring of heroes provides an interactive model for Pindar's paraenetic relationship with his patrons, which has important effects as far as his authority is concerned. Thus, I will expand upon Jaeger's claim that 'In Chiron, the wise centaur who teaches the young heroes, Pindar finds the mythical pattern for his own educational mission.'[9] Without further ado, let us turn to the education of Achilles, Chiron's most illustrious pupil.

1. Achilles

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[8] Cf. Carey (1981), 11, who notes that Pindar's epinicia reflect archaic poetry's strong didactic tendency. 'Myth is being exploited to praise the victor; but simultaneously the poet is exploiting the victor as a source for lessons about human aspirations, achievements and limitations'.

[9] Jaeger (1939), 217.

The quintessentially Pindaric treatment of Chiron appears in *N*.3, where Pindar departs from Homer's presentation of the Centaur as a teacher of Achilles in medicine:

 ἐπὶ δ᾽ ἤπια φάρμακα πάσσε
ἐσθλά, τά σε προτί φασιν Ἀχιλλῆος δεδιδάχθαι,
ὃν Χείρων ἐδίδαξε δικαιότατος Κενταύρων.

 He applied kind medicines on it, good ones which they say you have been taught about by Achilleus, whom Cheiron, most righteous of the Centaurs, instructed. (*Il*.11.830-2)[10]

We are introduced to Achilles as a hunter in *Nemean* 3, a choice determined by the paradigmatic function of the epinician myth, namely to exemplify a salient feature of the victory, in this case in the pancratium:[11]

 ξανθὸς δ᾽ Ἀχιλεὺς τὰ μὲν μένων Φιλύρας ἐν δόμοις,
παῖς ἐὼν ἄθυρε μέγαλα ἔργα· χερσὶ θαμινά
βραχυσίδαρον ἄκοντα πάλλων ἴσα τ᾽ ἀνέμοις,
μάχᾳ λεόντεσσιν ἀγροτέροις ἔπρασσεν φόνον,
κάπρους τ᾽ ἔναιρε· σώματα δὲ παρὰ Κρονίδαν
Κένταυρον ἀσθμαίνοντα κόμιζεν,
ἐξέτης τὸ πρῶτον, ὅλον δ᾽ ἔπειτ᾽ ἂν χρόνον·
τὸν ἐθάμβεον Ἄρτεμις τε καὶ θρασεῖ᾽ Ἀθάνα,

κτείνοντ᾽ ἐλάφους ἄνευ κυνῶν δολίων θ᾽ ἑρκέων·
ποσσὶ γὰρ κράτεσκε.

 But fair-haired Achilles, while living in Philyra's home, even as a child at play would delight in great deeds; often did he brandish in his hands his short-tipped javelin and swiftly as the winds, deal death in battle to wild lions and kill boars. He would bring their gasping bodies to the Centaur, Kronos' son, beginning at age six and for all time

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[10] A kylix from Vulci (c.500BC) shows Achilles applying this knowledge of medicine by curing Patroclus' wounds. Cf. *LIMC* 1, s.v. 'Achilleus', no. 468.

[11] The character of Achilles' feats may be intended as a metaphor for the victor's insofar as he hunts down his prey and finishes them off without dogs or nets, relying only on his physical strength (cf. *N*.4.62-4, of Peleus wrestling with Thetis).

thereafter. Artemis and bold Athena marvelled to see him slaying deer without dogs or deceitful nets, for he overtook them on foot. (*N*.3.43-52)[12]

Pindar deftly alludes to Chiron's hunting lesson with the comment that Achilles dragged the bodies of his prey back to the Centaur.[13] This conjures up the image of a cat dropping a dead mouse at the feet of his master, who stands quietly in the background. Our first encounter with Chiron, somewhat unexpectedly, is not as a trainer of his precocious young charge. Both Wilamowitz and Schadewaldt believed that the portrait of Achilles' childhood with Chiron (*N*.3.43-53) is largely a Pindaric invention.[14] It is probably influenced by the *Cycle*.[15] At any rate, it offers a rather different picture from the one found in Homer, who 'eschews tales of a prodigious child brought up in the wilds by a divine creature of half-human, half-bestial appearance'.[16] Griffin notes that 'as far as possible the tutorship of Achilles by Chiron the centaur is suppressed in favour of the man Phoenix' in Homer.[17] Significantly, Pindar's portrait differs from the iconographic tradition that depicts Chiron teaching Achilles how to hunt.[18] Achilles hunts 'without dogs or deceitful nets' (51), relying instead on his natural speed (52). His untutored hands

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[12] I have adapted Race's translation (1997).

[13] Burnett (2005), 149 n.36 notes that 'the idea that Chiron taught more than hunting was becoming popular at this time'.

[14] Wilamowitz (1922), 280 and Schadewaldt (1928), 287 n.2. Erbse (1969), 285 also agrees. D'Alessio (2005), 232 thinks these verses allude to the 'advice of Cheiron' ($\pi\alpha\rho\alpha\iota\nu\acute{\varepsilon}\sigma\varepsilon\iota\varsigma$ X$\varepsilon\acute{\iota}\rho\omega\nu\sigma\varsigma$).

[15] Cf. D.S.Robertson (1940), 180, who claims that Pindar adapts a source from the *Cypria*, with schol.ad Homer *Il*.16.37, Statius *Achilleid* 2.99ff, Apollod.3.13.6.

[16] D.L.Cairns (2001), 40. At p.39, he observes that the *Iliad* 'may include details which overlap with, but also diverge from the Cycle in such a way as to define itself as production of a different order, with distinct norms of decorum and propriety'.

[17] Griffin in D.L.Cairns (ed., 2001), 368. Nagy (1979), 326 n.7 observes Homeric echoes in this rare survival from poetic traditions that told about such boyhood deeds and reminds the audience of the 'lion-hearted hero' (*Il*.7.228).

[18] Burr (1975), 46 thinks that the presence of Artemis and Athena may be the indicator of a suppressed hunting lesson. An archaic vase painting in Baur (1912), 245 shows Chiron teaching Achilles to hunt by means of the lance but Pindar omits such details.

similarly direct his javelin in the slaying of lions and boars (44-5). What we witness is no hunting lesson but the spontaneous demonstration of natural ability.[19] This illustrates the gnome at *N*.3.40-2, which shows that mere learning without innate ability is doomed to failure. The uncertain step (οὔ ποτ᾽ ἀτρεκεῖ κατέβα ποδί) of the 'shadowy man' is implicitly contrasted with Achilles' 'fleet foot' (52) in the subsequent myth and with the victor's sure step at v.20.[20] In short, Pindar's treatment is idiosyncratic.

In throwing emphasis on Achilles' natural ability, Pindar introduces Chiron as a privileged member of a divine audience rather than as a trainer. The epithet, 'son of Kronos', indicates Chiron's divine lineage (as Zeus' half-brother) and underlines this fact. But as Osborne has shown, Chiron usually interacts with a variety of heroes and not directly with the gods.[21] The three epithets, Φιλύρας (43), Κρονίδαν (47) and Κένταυρον (48) illustrate the uniquely diverse nature of Chiron. The first reflects his humane aspect as a foster father, the second his divinity, and the third his hybrid nature of part-man, part-horse.[22] At any rate, Pindar uses Chiron to engender a universal reaction amongst his own audience

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[19] Barringer (2001), 226 n.48 observes that the 'returning hunter' motif was grafted onto Chiron iconography but that Achilles, rather than Jason (cf. *P*.4.78), is represented in such scenes (cf. Philostr.*Imag.*2.2).

[20] Kurke (1991), 25 n.31 notes that 'the ψεφεννὸς ἀνήρ functions as a negative foil not only for the Herakles paradigm that precedes but also for the Achilles myth that follows'.

[21] Osborne (1994), 54.

[22] Méautis (1962), 168 argues that Pindar insists on the genealogy of the centaur Chiron because he does not want to confuse him with the bestial Centaurs of *Pythian* 2. Cf. *P*.9.38, where Chiron is an ambivalent creature with human and bestial characteristics. The word Κένταυρον also describes Chiron at *P*.3.45 (where his parents are again Kronos and Philyra) and again at *P*.4.103. His association with Kronos is stressed at *P*.4.115 and he enjoins Achilles to revere Kronos' son (i.e. Zeus) at *P*.6.23. See also *P*.3.4 (below), where his divinity is compromised by the fact that he is 'departed son of Kronos'. Morrison (2007a), 82 wonders how an audience would have taken the description of Chiron as the 'Magnesian Centaur' (*P*.3.45), if they had already heard about the genesis of Kentauros in *P*.2.45.

towards deeds of valour.[23] Chiron's witness is like that of a spectator at the games and increases the sense of wonder surrounding this prodigious six-year old, who could even elicit the divine admiration of Artemis and Athena. This has a parallel in the poet's approval of the victor's physical form and manliness of his deeds at vv.19-20 (ἐὼν καλὸς ἔρδων τ᾽ ἐοικότα μορφᾷ/ ἀνορέαις ὑπερτάταις ἐπέβα). As Douglas Cairns puts it, 'reference to the victor's beauty is at least a typical marker of competition in one of the lower age-classes'.[24] Although this is not incontrovertible evidence of his youth, the particular emphasis on Achilles' childhood deeds certainly supports it.[25] Moreover, in representing himself, like Chiron, as a spectator at the games, Pindar implies that he is witnessing feats comparable to those of Achilles. In any case, by steering the audience's response towards the hero, Chiron's contributes both to the encomiastic aspect of the parallel between hero and victor and its paraenetic aspect too.[26]

Achilles' Education: 'The child is father of the man[27]

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[23] On Chiron's admiration of heroes, cf. *P*.9.30-1, where he is urged to come out of cave and admire Cyrene. Pindar's desire to influence his audience's support for the athlete can be seen in his acclamation of Aristokleidas at *N*.3.67f; cf. *P*.9.1, *N*.4.74 etc. for Pindar's presentation of himself as a spectator at the games.

[24] Cf. D.L.Cairns (2005), 47 n.88; cf. *O*.8.19, *O*.9.94, *O*.10.103, *O*.14.7, *N*.3.19 etc. Cf. Burnett (2005), 144, contra Pfeijffer (1998), 21-38, who is followed by Nicholson (2007), 213.

[25] Sinos (1980), 20 argues that 'the story of the youthful Achilles is out of kilter with the general technique of epic selection which would rather deal with stories of a hero's prime'. We should note, however, the recurrent descriptions of a hero's youthful exploits in ancient biography and myth; cf. Golden (1990), 1.

[26] Cf. D.L.Cairns (2001), 23 on Nestor's function in the *Iliad*, cited in the Introduction (5b).

[27] From Wordsworth's poem, 'My heart leaps up when I behold'.

In order to understand what kind of lesson Pindar offers his Aeginetan audience,

we need to consider how Chiron contributes to the hero's development:

λεγόμενον δὲ τοῦτο προτέρων
ἔπος ἔχω· βαθυμῆτα Χείρων τράφε λιθίνῳ
Ἰάσον᾽ ἔνδον τέγει καὶ ἔπειτεν Ἀσκλαπιόν,
τὸν φαρμάκων δίδαξε μαλακόχειρα νόμον·
νύμφευσε δ᾽ αὖτις ἀγλαόκολπον
Νηρέος θύγατρα, γόνον τέ οἱ φέρτατον
ἀτίταλλεν [ἐν]²⁸ ἁρμένοισι πᾶσι θυμὸν αὔξων,

ὄφρα θαλασσίαις ἀνέμων ῥιπαῖσι πεμφθείς
ὑπὸ Τροΐαν δορίκτυπον ἀλαλὰν Λυκίων τε προσμένοι καὶ Φρυγῶν
Δαρδάνων τε, καὶ ἐγχεσφόροις ἐπιμείξαις
Αἰθιόπεσσι χεῖρας ἐν φρασὶ πάξαιθ᾽, ὅπως σφίσι μὴ κοίρανος ὀπίσω
πάλιν οἴκαδ᾽ ἀνεψιὸς ζαμενὴς Ἑλένοιο Μέμνων μόλοι.

The story I have to tell was told by former poets: Deep-devising Cheiron raised Jason in his rocky dwelling and then Asclepius whom he taught the gentle-handed province of medicines. Then too he betrothed the splendid-breasted daughter of Nereus and fostered her [Thetis'] matchless offspring [Achilles], making his spirit great in all things fitting, so that, when sent by the blasts of the winds at sea to the foot of Troy, he would withstand the spear-clashing battle cry of the Lykians and Phrygians and Dardanians, and when grappling hand-to-hand against the spearmen of Ethiopia, he would fix it in his mind how their leader Memnon, Helenos' fierce cousin, would not go back home again. (*N*.3.52-63)

It is noticeable that Chiron himself is not actually named until v.53 - ten verses

after the initial reference to his mother Philyra (Φιλύρας ἐν δόμοις). The mention of

Chiron's mother Philyra (v.43) hints at Achilles' need for a surrogate mother,

since he has been separated from his own. This reference emphasises the

discrepancy between Achilles' tender age and his great feats undertaken whilst

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²⁸ Schmid's suppletion of ἐν restores the metre and Mingarelli's correction πᾶσι for πάντα is confirmed by the paraphrase of Σ (101a iii, 56 Dr.). Cf. Theogn.695, Hes.*Th*.639, *Sc*.84 for this phrase.

still a child in need of maternal care.[29] Achilles' pursuit of wild animals is, paradoxically, a child's game that consists of great deeds.[30]

When Chiron is eventually named, it is in the context of raising the heroes Jason and Asclepius. Their inclusion highlights Chiron's versatility as a teacher and the idiosyncratic character of Achilles' education.[31] Carey comments that the 'two heroes mentioned in 54f [Jason and Asclepius] form a priamel-like introduction to the continuation of the Achilles-myth, sketching in the glorious paideutic tradition which lies behind the specific training of Achilles'.[32] The hapax $\beta\alpha\vartheta\upsilon\mu\tilde{\eta}\tau\alpha$ (53) indicates the eclectic character of Chiron's pedagogy in relation to Jason's nurture, Asclepius' learning and Achilles' all-round education. There is a sense in which this intelligent counsel allows the Centaur to understand the innate ability of each hero and to endow him with the necessary training to achieve his purpose.[33] Chiron's name and gentle character resonate with the first part of the phrase $\mu\alpha\lambda\alpha\kappa\acute{o}\chi\varepsilon\iota\rho\alpha$ $\nu\acute{o}\mu\sigma\nu$, used of Asclepius' education only.[34] Thus, Pindar

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[29] Cf. Pfeijffer (1999a), 337 and Burnett (2005), 148. Athletes, like heroes, require both nurture and education, but ultimately have to leave behind their mother in order to prove themselves in contests of strength. Cf. West (1966) ad Hes.*Th*.347: 'only Pindar brings Achilles and Philyra together; not only is Philyra sister to Thetis, but as an Okeanid, she is a proper protector of pre-pubescent males.'

[30] Pfeijffer (1999a), 211 compares this 'oxymoron' with Bacch.18.56-9: 'he is a youth in his earliest manhood and his thoughts are of the pastimes ($\alpha\vartheta\upsilon\rho\mu\acute{\alpha}\tau\omega\nu$) of Ares, war and the clashing bronze of battle.'

[31] Cf. Froidefond (1989), 9, who questions the relevance of Asclepius and Jason to an Aeginetan victor.

[32] Carey (1980), 213.

[33] Cf. the parallel with the poet's self-characterisation through *mētis* (v.9), which is discussed in the next chapter.

[34] The civilised values of this Centaur, symbolised in the hands that do good works, are in stark contrast to the violent hands of his fellow creatures in fr.166.3-4 S-M: $\dot{\varepsilon}\sigma\sigma\upsilon\mu\acute{\varepsilon}\nu\omega\varsigma$ $\dot{\alpha}\pi\grave{o}$ $\mu\grave{\varepsilon}\nu$ $\lambda\varepsilon\upsilon\kappa\grave{o}\nu$ $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\lambda\alpha$ $\underline{\chi\varepsilon\rho\sigma\grave{\iota}}$ $\tau\rho\alpha\pi\varepsilon\zeta\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ $\ddot{\omega}\vartheta\varepsilon\sigma\nu.$

alerts us to the popular etymological association between Chiron's name and the healing arts.[35]

The first three verbs refer to the progressive cycle of nurture, teaching, and marriage over which Chiron presides: his role as foster father of Jason is articulated by the verb τράφε (53), which encompasses moral instruction (cf. *P*.4.103). The verb δίδαξε is reserved for Asclepius because it incorporates teaching in a branch of knowledge that requires skills, namely medicine. Asclepius acquired his skills through some sort of formal teaching, perhaps through observation.[36] νύμφευσε (56) occurs only here in relation to the marriage of Peleus and Thetis as conducted by Chiron, a version that is peculiar to Pindar. The divine intermediary dignifies a union that was previously presented as rape, for Peleus captured the sea nymph with 'great force' (vv.35-6).[37] This climactic progression concludes with the fourth verb ἀτίταλλεν (58). Race observes that Pindar reserves the rarer term for last place and that it connotes more warmth ('cherish') than the others.[38] Chiron assumes the twin role of foster father and educator for Achilles in this ode and although this is the case with Asclepius and

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[35] For this technique, cf. *P*.4.119, where the delayed revelation of Jason's name at the climax of his speech strengthens his affinity with Chiron, who named him.

[36] For Homeric usage, cf. *Il*.5.51, 9.442, 11.831, 832 (Achilles' knowledge of medicine), 16.811, 23.307, 308; *Od*.1.384, 8.481, 488, 22.422. The references are to archery, oratory, medicine and oral poetry. Cf. Pl.*Protag*.325d2, 326a7 etc.

[37] Cf. *I*.8.44-5, where Themis chooses Chiron to oversee a more dignified marriage for Thetis.

[38] Race (1989), 62. Cf. *Il*.16.191, *Od*.19.354, where it complements *trephō*. Also Hes. *W&D* 130-1 (ἀτάλλων), for the use of this verb with children and Theoc.17.58, where the sense 'cherish' is apposite. Also Hes. *Th*.989 and West (1966), 427 on the connection between ἀταλὰ and ἀτιτάλλω. Pindar. fr.214 (S-M) states that 'Hope is the heart-fostering (ἀτάλλοισα) nurse of old age'. The verb ἀτίταλλω is used for the rearing of animals (*Il*.5.271) as well as for the nurture of children (*Od*.18.323).

Jason in *P*.3 and *P*.4, the emphasis on nurture is particular strong here.[39] The verb ἀτίταλλεν is emphatically placed at the beginning of the line and introduces the phrase that constitutes the definitive Pindaric articulation of Achilles' education (ἀρμένοισι πᾶσι θυμὸν αὔξων, 53). The wise Centaur does not simply teach his pupils specialist skills, but adopts a balanced approach that even today might be a model for early formation: nurture allows the child to flourish by shaping moral character.

Achilles as heroic paradigm

As we have seen, Pindar does not present Chiron teaching the boy how to hunt and it is important to differentiate between the two phases of Achilles' upbringing, since natural ability is the essential prerequisite without which the true value of education is negated. Burnett writes that 'strophe depicts a pupil as nature made him; antistrophe sketches a cave-dwelling teacher who strengthens the pupil's temper, and epode promises a moment when instruction and innate potential will combine to produce a superb action'.[40] The wise Centaur merely observes Achilles' natural talent and subsequently nurtures it within the framework of the hero's future requirements at Troy.[41] In Achilles, the victor is given the greatest

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[39] In *P*.4.104f, whilst there is a certain division of responsibility between Chiron and the nymphs as far as his education and nurture are concerned, the impression is that both are indispensable.

[40] Burnett (2005), 147.

[41] Pfeijffer (1999a), 219. He notes (p.338) the odd use of the participle μένων in v.43, which indicates that Achilles' residency in Philyra's home is spent waiting for the time when he can 'fulfil his destiny and sail to Troy'. I note a possible parallel usage at *P*.4.186 (μένειν), which refers to the period spent with a mother, i.e. the nurturing phase of a hero's upbringing.

example of Aegina's inborn excellence and shown the advantages of training

allied to natural ability, which elaborates the truth of the gnome at vv.40-1.[42]

At *N*.3.59f, Pindar links Achilles' later career with his upbringing on Pelion. The

final clause, introduced by the word ὄφρα, attributes Achilles' success at Troy to

Chiron's formation of mind and body.[43] He meets the 'spear-clashing' battle cry of

the Lykians (60) and the 'spear-bearing' Ethiopians through a mixture of physical

and mental strength.[44] The striking phrase χεῖρας ἐν φρασὶ πάξαιθ' suggests that

Achilles' physical might is harnessed to an indomitable strength of purpose. The

verb πήγνυμι is often used of a spear being fixed into an object but here describes

a mental quality.[45] Thus the mature Achilles is seen not merely in light of his

physical training on Pelion but through his acquisition of mental strength. Burr

notes that the climactic slaying of Memnon in the third epode (v.63) is

emblematic of the type of actions toward which Chiron has directed Achilles.[46]

The effort Achilles must make at Troy is at once physical and mental, which is

reflected in his education. In Pindaric usage, φρονεῖν refers to willed mental action

that shapes physical action (cf. *N*.4.95). This single-minded determination is

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[42] Schadewaldt (1928), 287 n.2 thinks that the myth of Achilles makes *physis* and *didache* the only legitimate base for great exploits. In supporting this view, Froidefond (1989), 9 suggests that with time, the great heroic accomplishments mentioned in the ode are increasingly owed to the role of teaching.
[43] Cf. Statius *Achilleid* 2.123-8, where Chiron's education is designed to prepare him for his short life of fighting. Pindar's account is slightly more nuanced.
[44] Pindar mentions Achilles' *aretē* at *I*.8.48 and v.54 (cf. *N*.3.64), presenting the slaying of Memnon **as** a defining moment of his heroic career.
[45] Pindar refers to the mind in conjunction with heroic endeavour at 26 (Herakles), 42 (gnome about shadowy man) and 62 (Achilles).
[46] Burr (1975), 47: 'Chiron's *didache* will be revealed as an essentially *spiritual* adjustment to the heroic protocol of Achilles' inherited and inalienable *phue*.' Burgess (2004), 43 mentions an Attic stand that links Achilles' boyhood with his later success at Troy (cf. *N*.3.59) by juxtaposing the hunter image with the *psychostasia* and duel scenes.

echoed in the poet's injunction to the victor at v.75 (φρονεῖν δ' ἐνέπει τὸ παρκείμενον).[47] The paradigmatic aspect of the myth has further resonances in the poet's self-representation through the metaphor of the eagle-as-hunter at *N.*3.80f. This is obviously to be linked with Pindar's expression of his poetic superiority and reminds us of the untaught aspect of Achilles' youth, namely as a hunter. Of course, the poetic figure need not be compared solely to Chiron in any mythological narrative.

Commentators have alerted us to the fact that it is the cultivation of Achilles' *thymos* that distinguishes him from the other heroes; it is certainly an important factor in Achilles' prowess at Troy.[48] But how should it be defined? Slater categorises *thymos* alongside *I.*8.26 ('the Aiakidai were wise and prudent at heart' (*thymos*)) and suggests that it means wisdom.[49] But the phrase indicates that the *thymos* is the part of us in which wisdom and prudence reside. In fact, it is the seat of a wide range of emotions and faculties. The *thymos* encompasses the mental, physical and emotional faculty of the whole person. In any case, the emphasis on the need to cultivate the *thymos* shows the necessity of some

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[47] Burnett (2005), 149. She observes that Achilles 'is to be equipped with a single, almost artisanal skill – the ability to hammer a developed purpose into his own active will (62) – and this he is to use on the field of Troy against his fated opponent'.

[48] Cf. Burnett (2005), 148-9, who observes that 'Chiron is presented as a generalized teacher – he could train an Asklepios as well as a Jason – and with Achilles he simply "increases the spirit" of his pupil (58), so that wild elements are not extinguished but exploited'. Also Sullivan (1995b), 66. For *thymos* as courage, cf. *P.*9.30 (a mark of Cyrene's heroism).

[49] Slater (1969a), s.v. θυμός. For the increase of the *thymos* as the seat of the emotions, especially 'anger', cf. Hes.fr.317 M-W and Homer *Od.*2.315 (καὶ δή μοι ἀέξεται ἔνδοθι θυμός: 'the spirit is increasing inside me'). For *thymos* as denoting bravery, cf. *P.*9.30 (a mark of Cyrene's heroism). In modern psychiatry, 'euthymic' indicates a balanced temperament.

instruction even for so great a hero as Achilles and not withstanding his innate gifts.[50] Thus, the myth is a form of implicit instruction for Aristokleidas.

The striking use of the participle in the phrase ἀρμένοισι πᾶσι (58), for which there is no other parallel, suggests that Achilles is equipped with all the mutually beneficial skills required by a hero.[51] What does the phrase actually mean? Nisetich suggests 'raising his mind in all things noble' (v.58) and Fennell, 'developing all his character by fitting lore', or 'improving his courage in all respects by fitting exercises'.[52] Burnett translates this phrase as 'nurtured his temper in all fit ways'.[53] If there is a consensus here at all, it is a very broad one. It is worth considering a fresh interpretation, since this is the key to the analogy between Chiron and Pindar as teacher.

The literal sense of this quintessential expression of Chiron's *didache* is something like 'developing his spirit in all harmoniously-fitted-together things', although it is difficult to find an apt poetic expression.[54] The root meaning of ἀρμένος ('fitted together', of separate units) is relevant to this notion of different aspects being joined in a single 'harmonious' whole, hence the secondary

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[50] Froidefond (1989), 9-10. Pindar does not use the noun *didache*, only the verb (*N*.3.55; cf. *N*.3.41)

[51] Nagy (1979), 300. The root *ar 'traditionally denotes the activity of a poet as well as that of a carpenter, and the semantic bivalence corresponds neatly with the Indo-European tradition of comparing music/poetry with carpentry, by way of the root *tek (s)-.'

[52] Nisetich (1980), 243 and Fennell (1893a), 34.

[53] Burnett (2005), 139. The difficulty with the translation 'fit', or 'fitting' is that suggest merely 'suitable', when the real significance of the word is something like 'harmonious'.

[54] I am grateful to Professor Barker for this suggestion, who admits it is none too euphonious.

metaphorical sense, 'agreeable', 'proper' or 'fitting'.[55] Interestingly, the related verb ἁρμόζω is used by Plato to describe the process of fitting the strings to the correct tuning.[56] By analogy, the effect of tuning Achilles' *thymos* is the harmonising of all its separate elements into a unified whole. I shall examine the implicit parallel with the poet's instruction of the victor through the medium of song in the next chapter.

The Pindaric Achilles and music – mere child's play

Chiron's fine-tuning of Achilles' *thymos* at v.58 encourages us to re-examine an inter-text with the Homeric Achilles from the perspective of his musical education with Chiron. I suggest that in his choice of diction, Pindar may be alluding to the famous Homeric description of Achilles as a singer at the start of the Embassy Scene:

τὸν δ᾽ εὗρον φρένα τερπόμενον φόρμιγγι λιγείη
καλῇ δαιδαλέῃ, ἐπὶ δ᾽ ἀργύρεον ζυγὸν ἦεν,
τὴν ἄρετ᾽ ἐξ ἐνάρων πόλιν Ἠετίωνος ὀλέσσας·
τῇ ὅ γε θυμὸν ἔτερπεν, ἄειδε δ᾽ ἄρα κλέα ἀνδρῶν.
Πάτροκλος δέ οἱ οἶος ἐναντίος ἧστο σιωπῇ,   190
δέγμενος Αἰακίδην ὁπότε λήξειεν ἀείδων,

and they found Achilleus delighting his heart in a lyre, clear-sounding, splendid and carefully wrought, with a bridge of silver upon it, which he won out of the spoils when he ruined Eetion's city. With this he was pleasuring his heart, and singing of men's fame, as

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[55] LSJ, s.v. ἀραρίσκω, suggest 'agreeable', 'welcome' for this usage and compare *O*.8.72-3; cf. fr.140b10-11: a paean 'agreeable' to Apollo. Pfeijffer (1999a), ad loc. translates 'making his soul grow with respect to all proper things' and mentions the occurrence of ἄρμενα πάντα at Theognis 275, where it refers to a father providing his son with everything he needs.
[56] Cf. Pl.*Philebus* 56a. Barker (1984), 164 notes that what is created by tuning is a 'fitting together' of notes, a structure of relations that can be used to form the basis of melodies.

Patroklos was sitting over against him, alone, in silence, watching Aiakides and the time he would leave off singing. (*Il.*9.187-91)[57]

The lyre was the means by which he gave pleasure (*terpsis*) to his *thymos*, the seat of the emotions.[58] In saying that Chiron fostered Achilles in '*all* forms of activity governed by the *thymos*, it could be argued that Pindar is elaborating Homer's picture of Achilles as a singer by attributing his musical development to Chiron. This might, then, be an interesting case of Pindar manipulating the tradition of Achilles' education for his own epinician purposes.[59] Whilst Phoenix makes Achilles 'a speaker of words and a doer of deeds' (μύθων τε ῥητῆρ᾽ ἔμεναι πρηκτῆρά τε ἔργων, *Il.*9.443) in Homer, Pindar has Chiron teaching him music.[60]

The claim that *N*.3.58 contains a subtle allusion to the Homeric presentation of Achilles as an accomplished musician can be developed by considering the hero's activity more closely. Homer depicts Achilles singing the *klea andrōn*, the famous deeds of heroes.[61] It is noticeable, however, that we are told nothing specific about the content of the song; nor are we told how Achilles learned to play the lyre in the first place. A clue can be found in Pindar's description of Achilles 'delighting in great deeds as a child' (παῖς ἐὼν ἄθυρε μέγαλα ἔργα,

[57] Transl. Lattimore.
[58] Cf. D.L. Cairns (2003b), 21, who notes that '*thymos* in the *Iliad* is never anger as such, but always the general psychic force under whose head anger… belongs'.
[59] Gray (1998), 160 n.2 notes that it is in the nature of generic composition to assume knowledge of the tradition and to achieve effects by varying the model by means of omission, inclusion, and adaptation.
[60] Heslin (2005), 172 notes that in Statius, 'Chiron becomes far more to Achilles than the simple teacher of medicine that he was for Homer and more the important figure he was for Pindar (*Nem*.3.40-64). He is not simply a teacher, as Thetis chooses to call him (*magistri*, 1.39), but a surrogate father, as Achilles himself calls him (*ille pater*, 2.102).'
[61] Hainsworth (1993), 88 notes that he has deprived himself of the opportunity to perform heroic deeds. Cf. Heslin (2005), 86-88, who remarks that Statius explores the subject matter of Achilles' verse in much more detail than Homer does in *Iliad* 9.189. Of course, heroic deeds and singing are, in a sense, united in the choral performance of the victory ode.

N.3.44).[62] By evoking the content of Achilles' song in the *Iliad*, it supports the view offered above that Pindar is alluding to Achilles' musical education at v.58.[63] Can this be substantiated?

The primary emphasis of the verb ἄθυρε in this context lies in enjoyment of deeds and Willcock observes the verb's association with children as well as with musicians.[64] Pfeijffer concurs that the verb may be used to refer to 'playing' both as a typical children's activity and as a musical activity. In common with other European languages, Greek writers use the same verb of an activity common to both children and musicians.[65] In Pindar and Bacchylides, the *athurma* or *athursis* is always the activity in which one takes delight; this may but need not be music, musicianship, or the instrument itself.[66] The diction suggests a correlation between musical and sporting delight and supports the case for the inter-text with *Iliad* 9, which refers to the hero's musical delight (*terpsis*). Pindar's use of the verb ἄθυρε therefore elaborates the Homeric picture of Achilles singing

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[62] Slater (1969a), s.v. ἀθύρω, suggests 'take delight in'.

[63] Cf. Robbins (1993), 19 n.43: 'Did Achilles learn his lyre playing, another use of his hands, from Chiron?' The image has a long tradition ahead of it. Cf. Philostr.*Imag*.2.2: 'Cheiron knows that [music] soothes children and nurtures them better than milk. This is the scene at the entrance of the cave; and the boy out on the plain, the one who is sporting (ἀθύρων) on the back of a centaur as if he were a horse, is still the same boy.' Cf. Pliny *NH* 36.29 on the sculpture group in Saepta Julia, which may have been a model for the painting from the Basilica at Herculaneum, which depicts Chiron teaching Achilles to play the lyre (*LIMC* s.v. 'Achilleus' [Kossatz-Deismann], nos.50 and 51).

[64] Willcock (1995), 80 notes that ἀθύρειν is used of poetic composition at *P*.5.23 (᾿Απολλώνιον ἄθυρμα) and at Bacch.9.87: Μουσ[ᾶν βαθυζώνων ἄθ]υρμα ('a most fine plaything of the (slim-waisted?) Muses is left behind even when one dies'); cf. *Ep*.1.3 (*Anth.Pal*.6.313): πολέας δ᾽ ἐν ἀθύρμασι Μουσᾶν Κηίῳ ἀμφιτίθει Βακχυλίδῃ στεφάνους ('And in the pastimes of the Muses crown Bacchylides of Ceos with many garlands'). At *O*.1.14-17, the verb παίζω points to the practical expression of youth in music at the symposium.

[65] Pfeijffer (1999a), 339 includes an impressive conspectus of archaic usage (cf. French 'jouer' of musical/child's play, 'giocare', 'spielen' etc.); cf. *h.Pan* 19.15 and *Anacreontea* 43.10 (Campbell) and 42.7. The close association between musical delight and child's play is beautifully articulated in the activities of the young Hermes in the *Homeric Hymn to Hermes* 32, 39-40; cf. 52-3 and 485. The word *athurma* or *athurein* actually appears in all these passages.

[66] I am grateful to Professor Douglas Cairns for this point.

the 'famous deeds of men' by intimating that what he sang was an account of his own childhood deeds.

The only other occurrence of the verb in Pindar, in *Isthmian* 4.37-9, tends to support the view that *N*.3.44 may allude to musical delight.

ἀλλ᾿ Ὅμηρός τοι τετίμακεν δι᾿ ἀνθρώπων, ὃς αὐτοῦ
πᾶσαν ὀρθώσαις ἀρετὰν κατὰ ῥάβδον ἔφρασεν
θεσπεσίων ἐπέων λοιποῖς ἀθύρειν.

but Homer to be sure has made him honoured among mankind, who set straight his entire achievement and declared it with his staff of divine verses for future men to delight in. (*I*.4.37-9)

The staff was the emblem of the rhapsodic poets, the sons of Homer, who performed epic poetry.[67] Currie points out that Homer seems to be pictured as a prototype of the rhapsodes who recited the bard's songs after his death.[68] At any rate, Homer gave pleasure to 'future generations' of performers and audiences alike.[69] In Pindar's day, however, rhapsodes did not sing Homer's poems but rather recited them, using the staff rather than the lyre.[70] If ἀθύρειν suggests music in *Isthmian* 4, it is interesting that Pindar contrasts Homer's own *spoken* performances κατὰ ῥάβδον with the performances of later *musicians*, such as

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[67] Cf. *N*.2.1-3, where Pindar alludes to the etymology of ῥάβδος 'staff', from ῥάπτειν 'to stitch'. According to West (*OCD*[3], s.v. 'Homeridae', p.720), ordinary rhapsodes looked up to these 'sons of Homer' as authorities and arbiters. For the staff of the epic poet, cf. Hes.*Th*.30.

[68] Contra Currie (2004), 65, ἀθύρειν is not a verb of performance, meaning 'to play', or 'perform'. Cf. Burkert (1987), 49 and schol.*I*.4.63c-h.

[69] λοιποῖς can refer both to future audiences and the weavers of tales themselves; cf. Graziosi (2002), 30.

[70] Nagy (1990), 24. See Pl. *Laws* 810bc. For testimonia about reciting rhapsodes holding a staff instead of a lyre, see West (1966), 163-4 and the iconographic evidence of vase paintings. Also Loscalzo (2003), 35-43 for an interpretation of the image of the eagle (=Pindar) and ravens (=rhapsodes) at *O*.2.83-8.

himself, using the lyre.[71] There was a pre-Pindaric tradition of setting excerpts from Homer to music and singing them.[72] Pindar ostensibly engages with Homer's characterisation of the hero Ajax for the enjoyment of his audience but there is a distinct sense of playful polemic with different styles of performance within the song tradition itself. I suspect that Pindar is engaging in a similar way with the poetic tradition in *Nemean* 3. By echoing the language of a famous passage in Homer and elucidating what was hidden in the earlier version, Pindar both claims the mythographical authority of Homeric poetry and overtakes his predecessor. Like the 'new' Antilochus of *Pythian* 6, Achilles is 'shaped to the nature and circumstance of the laudandus', with regard to Chiron's influence in particular, which is generally suppressed by Homer.[73] Moreover, by showing Chiron's prominence in Achilles' early life, he raises his own profile as poet-educator in the process.[74]

In *Nemean* 3, then, Pindar offers a fresh perspective on the hero Achilles through his unique vision of Chiron's 'Academy'. The picture that emerges of Chiron's *didaskalia* in Pindar is one of a balanced education that receives its quintessential expression as the increase of Achilles' *thymos* 'in all things

[71] I am grateful to Professor Barker for this point. Cf. Nagy (1990), 197 n.218, who notes that 'there is no attempt in praise poetry, however, to describe itself explicitly by way of features that characterize the current performance of epic poetry'. For example, when heroes are said to be getting *kleos* from praise poetry in *I*.5.24-8, it is specified that there is musical accompaniment by both lyre and reed.
[72] Cf. ps.-Plutarch *De mus*. 1132c (attributing the practice to Terpander, on the authority of Heraclides); cf. 1133c.
[73] Cf. Kelly (2006), 22.
[74] Braswell (1971) argues that the substitution of Chiron with Phoenix is an *ad hoc* invention of Homer for the purposes of *Iliad* 9; certainly, Homer knew the tradition of Achilles' education by Chiron; cf. Robbins (1993).

blended to perfection'.[75] I suggest that music is the most natural medium through which all the different elements of Achilles' education might have been 'well-integrated'. In Chapter 2, I shall explore the paradigmatic significance of Chiron's development of Achilles' *thymos* in terms of the poet's self-representation as a teacher, particularly in his apostrophising of the *thymos* at *N*.3.26f.

Pythian 6

This ode is formally addressed to Xenokrates of Akragas (Ἀκράγαντι καὶ μὰν Ξενοκράτει v.6) for his victory at Delphi in 490 BC.[76] The prominence of Thrasyboulos in the ode may be explained by the likelihood that he commissioned and paid for the ode as a tribute to his clan.[77] Pindar would have been about 28 years old at the time of this composition and roughly the same age as Thrasyboulos.[78] As I intimated in the Introduction (9), the choice of addressee furnishes the poet with an opportunity, despite his own youth, to affect a pedagogic posture as a 'friendly preceptor' and, ultimately, to increase his authority as a paraenetic encomiast. This suits Pindar's own purpose very well, as Nicholson has shown, since 'by changing his poetic task from an epinician to

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[75] The verb αὔξω here is an organic metaphor derived from the nourishment and growth of creatures (cf. my discussion of *P*.4.279) and is first attested at Hes.*Th*.492, where rapid growth is characteristic of the divine child. Cf. Pl.*Rep*.4101d-3 on training in *mousikē*, which can make a man graceful, since rhythm and *harmonia* penetrate most deeply into the recesses of the soul.

[76] Campbell (1991, *Greek Lyric* iii, 380-1 quotes the schol. ad *I*.2 argum. (iii 212 Drachmann): 'This Xenocrates was victorious with his horses not only at the Isthmian games but also at the Pythian games in the 24th Pythiad [490 BC], as Aristotle records [fr.617 Rose]; and Simonides when singing his praises lists both his victories'.

[77] Race (1997), 312 well notes that 'a tradition going back to the scholia claims that Thrasyboulos drove the chariot, but this is probably fabricated to explain his prominence in the ode'; cf. schol. ad *P*.6.15 (Drach. ii.196.15-18); Gentili et al. (1995), 194 have recently taken up this view; also Steiner, (1993), 170, n.41. Schol. ad *P*.6.13e thought that Thrasyboulos managed the team.

[78] Cf. Burton (1962), 15.

an adult to a piece of instructional poetry to a youth, Pindar is able to characterize himself as a Chiron figure'.[79] I am less convinced, however, by Nicholson's interpretation of Chiron as a pederast teacher and its putative parallel in the present, the poet's supposed erotic relationship with Thrasyboulos. Certainly, our interpretation of this ode should not be driven by the need to reconstruct a personal relationship between poet and patron.[80] The biographical approach has drawn strength from Fragment 124a S-M, which is addressed to the same Thrasyboulos. Its preservation is a remarkable and lucky chance, though it belongs to an entirely different genre.[81] The mention of Thrasyboulos' drinking companions at *P*.6.53 is a general characterisation of the young man as the poet's 'friend', the symposium appearing as an intimate setting in which he can display his sweetness. In this ode, the praise is graded to the youth and personality of the *laudandus*. How, then, does the poet use Chiron to underpin this relationship?

Pindar pays particular attention to the underlying moral foundation of victory in *Pythian* 6:[82]

 σύ τοι σχεδών νιν ἐπὶ δεξιὰ χειρός, ὀρθὰν
ἄγεις ἐφημοσύναν,

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[79] Nicholson (2000a), 245. Cf. Schein (1987), 237-8 for another explanation of why Pindar addresses son rather than father.

[80] Contra Bowra (1964), 107. Amongst those who have proposed alternatives to the biographical explanation (e.g. Wilamowitz (1922), 136-9, Vetta (1979), 87-90) of the erotic elements in this ode, is Lasserre (1974), who has extended generic theory to 'erotic ornaments' – erotic elements embedded in other genres for the purpose of public praise and not private longing.

[81] Burton (1962), 23 notes that the phrase συμπόταισιν ὁμιλεῖν *(P*.6.53) echoes συμπόταισίν (3) in the fragment. Cf. Strauss Clay (1999), 30.

[82] Cf. Nicholson (2000a), 242-6.

τά ποτ’ ἐν οὔρεσι φαντὶ μεγαλοσθενεῖ
Φιλύρας υἱὸν ὀρφανιζομένῳ
Πηλεΐδᾳ παραινεῖν· μάλιστα μὲν Κρονίδαν,
βαρυόπαν στεροπᾶν κεραυνῶν τε πρύτανιν,
θεῶν σέβεσθαι·
ταύτας δὲ μή ποτε τιμᾶς
ἀμείρειν γονέων βίον πεπρωμένον.

Truly, by keeping him at your right hand, you uphold the precept, whose words of advice they say Philyra's son once gave to the mighty son of Peleus in the mountains, when he was away from his parents: above all gods to revere Kronos' son Zeus, loud-voiced lord of lightning and thunder, and never deprive of like honour one's parents during their allotted lifetime. (*P*.6.19-27)

The passage at *P*.6.19-20 has troubled commentators. In the phrase σχεθών νιν ἐπὶ δεξιὰ χειρός (v.19), it is not clear whether νιν refers retrospectively to the victor's father, to victory, or prospectively to the precept.[83] This ambiguity, possibly deliberate, shows the close correlation between the father's teaching of the precepts and his son's success. At any rate, Pindar makes the didactic relation of father and son the object of his praise by drawing attention to the moral foundation for the victory, which he then elaborates mythically in the story of Antilochus. This passage, then, does not controvert the view that Thrasyboulos is chosen as a vehicle of his father's praise.

Whereas Pindar focuses on Chiron's inculcation of a heroic spirit in *N*.3, he places more weight on the formal content of the teaching in *P*.6, which has a strong ethical dimension. Chiron's lesson about respecting one's parents is

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[83] Race (1997), 317 translates ‘him’ (i.e. Thrasyboulos' father, πατρὶ τεῷ, 15) but the schol. ad *P*.6.19c reads *it* (i.e. the precept). Proponents of a reference to precept include Gildersleeve (1890), 318, Carey (1975), 290, Nicholson (2005), 57-8. Advocates of a reference to victory include Lattimore (1947), 78, Kurke (1990), 157 and Bell (1995), who thinks that the metaphor relates to the victor's gesture of raising the right hand to the head in order to hold or adjust the victory wreath (*tainia*), as shown on a couple of Attic red-figure vases from c.470 B.C.

exemplified by the victor. In winning at the Pythian Games, Thrasyboulos has come closest to the standard of ancestral devotion (πατρῴαν μάλιστα πρὸς στάθμαν ἔβα, v.45), which echoes the poet's earlier declaration that his victory was shared with his father and family (πατρὶ τεῷ, Θρασύβουλε, κοινάν τε γενεᾷ, v.15). Secondly, the ethical aspect of the precepts has a more general parallel in Pindar's praise of the victor's character, specifically in his intelligent attitude towards wealth and his avoidance of insolence and injustice (νόῳ δὲ πλοῦτον ἄγει, ἄδικον οὔθ᾽ ὑπέροπλον ἥβαν δρέπων, vv.47-8).[84]

In celebrating Thrasyboulos' success, the poet assumes the posture of a surrogate parent and of one who promotes Chironian values.[85] By identifying himself with the persona of Chiron, Pindar legitimises his authority and uses Achilles as a model for Thrasyboulos.[86] I would therefore wish to qualify Bowra's assertion that Pindar 'treats him [Thrasyboulos] on terms of perfect equality'.[87] Moreover, in praising Xenokrates implicitly as a teacher of youth, Pindar equates his own role with that of the victor's teacher (v.6) and uses the mythical analogue of Chiron to underpin their mutual glorification. I submit that Pindar takes on an exemplary and paraenetic function vis-à-vis Thrasyboulos, a relationship that has its mythical analogue in Chiron's instruction of Achilles.[88]

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[84] Cf. *P*.4.104-5, where Jason comments on his own excellent behaviour in 'word and deed' towards Chiron's family is probably a reflection of the same moral learning.
[85] Cf. Kurke (1990), 101, who notes that 'poet and patron stand in a relation of reciprocal obligation analogous to that between parents and children'.
[86] Cf. Lardinois (1995), 228.
[87] Bowra (1964), 107.
[88] For a parallel reading, cf. Kelly (2006), 20.

Chiron's surrogacy

The reading I have offered above is supported by the presentation of Chiron as a surrogate father. Indeed, the occasional nature of epinician can be discerned in the way that Pindar's treatment differs from previous versions of Achilles' adoption. The myth preserved in the Hesiodic *Aegimius* (fr.300 M-W), records that Thetis was prevented by Peleus from immersing Achilles in boiling water (cf. AR 4.867-79). This conflict led to Thetis' desertion of Peleus and their son Achilles, thus necessitating a foster home for Achilles.[89] This version, dating from around the middle of the seventh century and preserved in Apollodorus (3.13.6), depicts Thetis abandoning Peleus soon after the birth of Achilles.[90] Pindar retains the same general pattern whilst omitting the detail. His primary motivation in this narrative is to introduce the model of Chiron's surrogacy and his exemplary teaching.

Significantly, his version is very unlike the *Iliadic* picture, which involves neither adoption nor desertion, even if, as seems likely, the separation of Peleus and Thetis was known to Homer.[91] In general, Pindar follows older, traditional

[89] Beck (1975), 9 notes that the first representation of this story (which is implied in Hesiod's *Aigimios* and presupposed in Pindar), is found on fragments of an Attic black-figured neck-amphora painted about the middle of the seventh century (Berlin 31573 A9).

[90] See Kurke (1990), 92 and Friis Johansen (1939), 181-205 on the emergence of two distinct traditions of representation in vase paintings. The later one depicts Achilles as young *ephebe*, sometimes bearing the paraphernalia of a young man in the *palaestra*. Kurke surmises that a poem entirely devoted to the theme of Achilles' education by Chiron would have inspired these new representations.

[91] Cf. *Il*.18.429f., *O*d.24.50; see Griffin (2001) and Burgess (2004).

versions of myths, which Homer has altered for purposes of his own.[92] Homer (e.g. *Il*.18.54f), for example, depicts Thetis as having taken responsibility for the nurture of her son and bemoaning the fact that she sent him away to fight in Troy. Thetis' victimisation in Homer clearly has a narratological purpose in increasing our pity for Achilles and the general sense of helplessness caused by the mortal condition.[93] Overall, Homer portrays her as a pretty devoted mother. In the so-called 'Themis variant' that Pindar follows in *I*.8.31f, the gods avert disaster by giving Thetis to Peleus (on Themis' advice) as a reward for his virtue.[94]   Pindar's Thetis is compelled to take a mortal husband and the implication is that she abandons her mortal progeny afterwards**.**[95]   The long tradition of the reluctant marriage forced on Thetis by Zeus is generally suppressed in Pindar. Whilst Pindar's Thetis still has little choice in her marriage to a mere mortal and is subject to the will of the gods (cf. *I*.8.38), Pindar does not present her as a victim: the 'august' (*N*.5.25) and 'immortal' Thetis (*P*.3.100) emerges with credit as a result of her contribution both to divine politics and to Aeginetan glory.[96] For political reasons, he aggrandises Peleus too.[97]

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[92] Stoneman (1981b). Cf. Nagy (1990), 71 and (1979), 8. This is true of the myth in *Nemean* 3.43-53, which is influenced by the *Cycle*.

[93] Thetis' speeches in the *Iliad* (she never speaks in Pindar), are an important part of the epic narrative (cf. *Il*.16.222, 574, 18.57f, 89f, 331 and 19.422 on her early life with Peleus and on sending Achilles off to war).

[94] Slatkin (1991), 77 n.26 notes that 'it seems reasonable to suppose that Pindar in *Isthmian* 8 draws on mythology present in the *Iliad* in some form, and recoverable from it – even if deeply embedded and only allusively evident to us'; Burr (1975), 49 observes that the motif of desertion fits most convincingly into the so-called 'Themis variant' (cf. Alcaeus *Frag* 42.9-10.).

[95] Cf. *Il*.1.414f, 18.438. Graziosi & Haubold (2005), 100 observe that the *Iliad* makes much of the humiliation inflicted upon Thetis caused by the gods' decision to marry her off to a mortal (e.g. *Il*.18.82-5, where she is driven against her will to marry Peleus). Cf. Stoneman (1981) and Bremmer (1983a).

[96] Cf. e.g. the allusion to Peleus and Thetis (by name) in *N*.3.32-6, which comes very shortly before the Achilles passage, and must be a reminder of his parentage. Also *Ol*. 9.76 etc.

[97] Burr (1975), 50. This scenario is corroborated in the iconographic tradition, which depicts Peleus as well as Thetis leading Achilles to Chiron. Cf. *LIMC* 1, s.v. 'Achilleus', nos.29, 35.

In *Pythian* 6, then, Pindar gives us an Achilles deprived of his parents. This differentiation from the epic tradition elevates Chiron's surrogacy, which is marked by the reference to Philyra (*P*.6.22).[98] This can be explained by Pindar's desire to claim authority by assuming Chiron's role with respect to the victor. Schroeder notes the paradox of ὀρφανιζόμενος (22) in view of the fact that Achilles is taught to honour his parents.[99] Certainly, the instruction not to deprive (ἀμείρειν) his parents of honour (*time*) during their lifetime seems rather poignant considering Achilles' reflections on his choice in the *Iliad*.[100] In contrast to Homer, however, Pindar does not dramatise a conflict between the central hero's pursuit of everlasting *kleos* and filial duty.[101] Indeed, the victor's achievements are presented as the ultimate accolade to his father.

I conclude that Pindar's particular treatment of Achilles' education is determined by the fact that his endorsement of the victor turns on the notion of parental absence. While I concur with Kurke's thesis that 'the poet's "teaching" is not a prescription for future actions so much as a commemoration of Thrasyboulos' past noble deeds', this overlooks the fact that the giving of advice confers

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[98] Pindar implicitly rejects the tales of Philyra's disappearance from Chiron's world, including her transformations into a lime tree and a mare after being raped by Cronos in the guise of a horse (cf. schol. ad Ap.Rhod.i.554).

[99] Schroeder (1922), 62. For the meaning of bereavement, cf. Eur. *Alc*.276, Soph.*Tr*.942 and Pin. *P*.4.283 in the general sense of 'deprive'.

[100] Cf. *Il*.24.534-42 for Achilles' sorrowful reflection on the implications that his heroic choice of a short life with everlasting glory (*Il*.9.410-16) have on his father Peleus.

[101] Graziosi & Haubold (2005), 58 note that Achilles is called 'the son of Peleus' already in the first line of the poem, which shows 'his mortal legacy is of crucial importance for the development of his character in the course of the *Iliad*'.

benefits on the adviser, as discussed in the Introduction.[102] Like Chiron, Pindar's role is to afford the victor a richer understanding of his place in the world. Since there is no obvious expectation that the addressee should apply the knowledge in a particular way, its main purpose seems to be to aggrandise Pindar's role in the relationship. Accordingly, Pindar uses the surrogate relationship of Chiron and Achilles to increase his status as paraenetic encomiast.

The Pindaric Achilles

In conclusion, the two versions of Achilles' upbringing in *N*.3 and *P*.6 bear several marks of Pindaric creativity regarding his sources. There is ample evidence to suggest that Pindar manipulates the existing tradition of Achilles' upbringing in a way that fits the particular circumstances of the ode. In *Nemean* 3, Pindar's treatment of Chiron embellishes the principle that excellence in any sphere cannot be attained without the requisite innate ability.[103] But in his choice of mythical paradigm, he qualifies the gnome. As Kurke puts it, 'In contrast to the one who has only the things he has been taught, Achilles possesses both inherited excellence and a noble education'.[104] Moreover, the presentation of a natural talent enhanced by Chiron's formation of the 'spiritual' dimension is instructive as far as the poet's conception of his own 'teaching' is concerned, as I

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[102] Kurke (1990), 98.
[103] Cf. Willcock (1995), 15, citing *O*.9.100 ('What comes by nature is altogether best'); cf. *O*.2.86: 'wise is he who knows things by nature' in a reference to poetic skill.
[104] Cf. Kurke (1991), 25 fn.31.

argue later. The brief account of Achilles' upbringing in *P*.6 links Chiron with the precepts, whose relevance to the present occasion is elaborated in the myth. Pindar's differentiation from the poetic tradition and emphasis on the Centaur's surrogacy can be explained by his desire to place himself at the forefront of the pedagogic relationship between father and son by acclaiming excellence achieved in the absence of one's parents. Moreover, the analogy between Pindar and Chiron is productive with regard to the twin aspect of the epinician discourse, advice and praise. Let us turn our attention now to the relationship between Chiron and his pupil Asclepius.

2. Asclepius

I noted earlier how Pindar de-emphasises the bequest of medicinal skills to Achilles in favour of a broader educational approach. The only beneficiary of Chiron's knowledge in the arts of medicine is Asclepius:

> βαθυμῆτα Χείρων τράφε λιθίνῳ
> Ἰάσον’ ἔνδον τέγει, καὶ ἔπειτεν Ἀσκλαπιόν
> τὸν φαρμάκων <u>δίδαξε</u> μαλακόχειρα νόμον·

Deep-devising Cheiron raised Jason in his rocky dwelling and then Asclepius whom he taught the gentle-handed province of medicines (*N*.3.53-5)

There is a clear distinction in the semantic range of the verbs used. Chiron 'nurtured' (τράφε) Jason, whilst he 'taught' (δίδαξε) Asclepius. We are not told here at what stage in his life Asclepius arrived on Pelion. In *Pythian* 3, however, Pindar relates how Chiron took responsibility for bringing up Asclepius after

Apollo had snatched his son from his mother's burning body (v.43f.). The same verb of teaching is used:

καί ῥά νιν Μάγνητι φέρων πόρε Κενταύρῳ <u>διδάξαι</u>
πολυπήμονας ἀνθρώποισιν ἰᾶσθαι νόσους

He [Apollo] took him and gave him [Asclepius] to the Magnesian Centaur for instruction in healing the diseases that plague men (*P*.3.45-6)

The verb διδάσκω is used in this context (cf. *N*.3.55) in the sense of specialist teaching in a particular branch of knowledge, namely medicine. As noted above, it is the normal term for ordinary childhood instruction. In the opening of the ode, however, the poet addresses a wish for Chiron to be as he was when he reared Asclepius. The verb θρέψεν (v. 5) denotes the kind of upbringing that precedes the specialist education described at v.45.[105] This often applies to 'looking after' a child in a more general way, as, for example, a baby's nurse. Like the English word 'nurture', the Greek verb *trephein* comprises moral guidance, which is especially relevant to the analogy between Chiron and Pindar. But in choosing not to address a wish to Chiron directly as a healer, Pindar distances the teacher as far as possible from the negative aspects of healing in this ode, whilst linking him with the beneficial activities of his pupil. At any rate, the formative teacher-pupil relation evoked by the wish helps to characterise the poet's didactic relationship with the *laudandus*, which I shall examine in Chapter 3.

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[105] The sense of the verb τρέφω is 'to bestow a parent's or a nurse's care upon', 'bring up', 'rear', 'nurture' (cf. *N*.3.53-4, where both Jason and Asclepius are raised by Chiron from a very young age and *P*.4.103, 115 of Jason's nurture). For the use of *trephō* as nurture, cf. *Od*.11.250, 18.323.

Pindar spends the entire third strophe celebrating the great contribution made by Asclepius in the cause of humanity thanks to some highly sophisticated medical procedures.[106] In their service of mankind, Chiron and Asclepius are inseparable as master and pupil. It is as though Chiron has moulded someone in his own image (ἥμερον, v.6 amplifies φίλον, v.5). Pindar transfers the Homeric description of *pharmaka* as 'gentle' (a reference to their soothing effect on the patient) to the healer himself.[107] Indeed, Asclepius' benevolence seems to be an inherited trait from his master, since Pindar alludes to Chiron's philanthropy in the phrase ν⟨όο⟩ν ἔχοντ' ἀνδρῶν φίλον (*P*.3.5) and thus preserves this characteristic from Homer's description of 'friendly' Chiron (φίλα φρονέων).[108] Thus, Asclepius' use of medicine for the benefit of mankind (ἀνθρώποισιν, v.46) is both an inheritance from his father Apollo and a product of Chiron's benign influence, yet crucially, he oversteps the acceptable limits of his profession.[109] Thus, his positive traits draw even greater attention to his fatal flaw. In addition, whilst the former are presented as an extension of Chiron's personality, his faults are entirely of his own doing. His spectacular fall from grace, coming so soon after Pindar had enumerated his many successes, is marked by the terse gnome ἀλλά κέρδει καὶ

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[106] Cf. Faraone (1991), 109. Hornblower (2004), 67, notes that only cauterization is missing from this list.

[107] Cf. *Il*.11.514-15: ἰητρὸς γὰρ ἀνὴρ πολλῶν ἀντάξιος ἄλλων/ ἰούς τ' ἐκτάμνειν ἐπί τ' ἤπια φάρμακα πάσσειν. (A healer is worth many men in his knowledge of cutting out arrows and putting kindly medicines on wounds).

[108] *Il*.4.218-19: αἷμ' ἐκμυζήσας ἐπ' ἄρ' ἤπια φάρμακα εἰδὼς / πάσσε, τά οἵ ποτε πατρὶ φίλα φρονέων πόρε Χείρων. ([Machaon] sucked the blood and in skill laid healing medicines on it that Cheiron in friendship long ago had given his father.) Robbins (1993), 12 n.20 thinks this contains a rudimentary *schema etymologicum*, with ἤπια alluding to the name of Ascl*epius*.

[109] Cf. Young (1968), 42ff.

σοφία δέδεται (54).[110] Asclepius' excessive demonstration of greed in the face of the gods exemplifies the human tendency to strive for immortality, which the poet says should be resisted (vv.59-62).

Whilst it might be inferred from Asclepius' moral lapse that Chiron's education over-emphasised specialist knowledge at the expense of ethical instruction, it is important to recognise that Pindar does not apportion blame to the master, whose *sophrosynē* (v.63) is implicitly contrasted with his rash pupil. Asclepius died because he attempted something beyond that which is acceptable. In bringing a man back from the dead, he effectively challenged Zeus' authority over the living and the dead, a symptom of his desire to compete with Zeus.[111] The reversal is dramatic, as Chiron's most skilled pupil becomes at once his most infamous. Chiron, on the other hand, *chose* to die, a point that I will address later. At any rate, Asclepius' ruin was entirely his own fault and his lack of self-knowledge a perfect contrast to that of his master. Thus, Asclepius is a negative paradigm of morality for the *laudandus*. I propose that the interactive function of the myth lies in Pindar's efforts to furnish Hieron with the correct ethical understanding that was either deficient in Asclepius' education, or else, that he failed to apply.

Asclepius and the poet's song

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[110] Cf. Robbins (1993), 13, who notes that 'Asclepius perverts the *χειρουργία* of his teacher Chiron by gold that appears instead of *φάρμακα* in his hands'. I concur with Hubbard (1985), 23, that medical *technē* is in itself good. The fault lies in the pursuit of gold, which when taken too far, can become greed (52).

[111] For Guthrie (1950), 243-4, Asclepius furnished an excellent example of a mortal who forgot himself and was punished for competing with the gods. Cf. *I*.5.14-16: 'Do not seek to become Zeus; you have all there is, if a share of those blessings should come to you. Mortal things befit mortals.'

The attention given to Asclepius in this ode can explained by the occasion of the ode. The composition of *Pythian* 3 seems to have been prompted by the failing health of the addressee, Hieron, and his apparent request for a cure.[112] As Steiner notes, '*Pythian* 3 is built around the opposing poles of the doctor's temporary powers of healing, and the eternal powers of song'.[113] It is important to recognise that Asclepius' fault lay not in his skills as such but his improper use of medicine in seeking to bring back a man from the dead. This can be seen in the tension between Pindar's evident admiration for this expert practitioner and his implicit condemnation of his ethical motivation.

The evidence that supports the claim that the poet uses Asclepius' arts of healing as a foil for the potential of song to be the source of everlasting fame is to be found in the poem's *sphragis*:[114]

Νέστορα καὶ Λύκιον Σαρπηδόν᾽ ἀνθρώπων φάτις
ἐξ ἐπέων κελαδεννῶν τέκτονες οἷα σοφοί
ἅρμοσαν γιγνώσκομεν· ἁ δ᾽ ἀρετὰ κλειναῖς ἀοιδαῖς
χρονία τελέθει παύροις δὲ πράξασθ᾽ εὐμαρές

We know of Nestor and Lykian Sarpedon, still the talk of men, from such echoing verses as wise craftsmen constructed. Excellence endures in songs for a long time. But few can win them easily (*P*.3.112-15)

At v.113 (τέκτονες...σοφοί), Pindar represents his own craft through the metaphor of the wise craftsman.[115] Both doctors and poets are craftsmen.[116] This echo of

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[112] Currie (2005), 345 believes that the main stimulus for the ode may have been Hieron's failing health, rather than the Pythian victory that some think he may have failed to win (e.g. Cingano, 1991, 101). See also Hornblower (2004), 67 for the former view.

[113] Steiner (1986), 131. Hornblower (2004), 68, quoting Young (1968), 68, notes that 'Pindar was realistically aware that medicine had crucially limited capabilities, which contrast with the immortality conferred by praise poetry'.

[114] Cf. Most (1985), 31, who notes that for Bundy, the essence of the Pindaric epinician is praise of the victory and everything else is 'foil'.

the 'gentle craftsman' (τέκτονα... ἥμερον, 6) signals the substitution of Asclepius' arts with those of the poet, that of immortality in song. But Asclepius' function is not simply to underline the limited capacity of healing, since the allusion to the wounded healer at the start of the ode could have served this purpose equally well.[117] In fact, there is another aspect of the paradigm that is equally productive, albeit implicit. Asclepius' misplaced desires mirror Hieron's wish for immortality, while for his part, Chiron's shrewd choice to die exemplifies the poet's advice to Hieron. So Asclepius' moral lapse both implicitly reflects the desires of the *laudandus* and serves to highlight the efficacy of the poet's song in comparison with medical powers.

As was the case with *N*.3 and *P*.6, the choice of Asclepius as an *exemplum* is determined by the circumstances of the addressee. But it is different from the point of view that the poet uses Asclepius as a foil to Chiron by contrasting the moral characteristics of master and pupil. This creates a more striking interactive paradigm for the relationship between Pindar and Hieron. As I argue in Chapter 3, by aligning his own ethical attitude with that of Chiron, Pindar manoeuvres himself into a position of intellectual superiority over the *laudandus*.

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[115] Cf. Pindar's presentation of his chorus as craftsmen of song in *N*.3.4. Also Gentili (1988), 50 with fr.194 (S-M).
[116] Race (1986), 61f and 140 n.33. Hornblower (2004), 67 calls both Pindar and Thucydides 'amateurs of medicine' and questions whether they were medically alert and well informed to an exceptional degree amongst ancient poets (cf. *P*.4.271-2 and Th.6.14).
[117] Cf. Apollod.2.5.4. Cf. Reinhart (1989), 71, on the image perpetuated in contemporary astronomy: 'Chiron could not heal his own wounds in spite of being able to heal others'. Cf. Lloyd-Jones (1969) for the figure of the wounded centaur in art.

In sum, Chiron's ancient reputation as a teacher of medicine is exclusively associated with Asclepius in Pindar. With the exception of *Pythian* 3, this branch of Chiron's knowledge is not especially prominent. Asclepius' example shows that the integrity of a hero's character in relation to the gods and his fellow men is more important than his knowledge or application of healing, even with its great potential for human good. Moreover, the passages on 'nature versus learning' suggest that this is a special case of a more general attitude, namely that moral nature is more important than acquired skills of any sort. It is the misuse of such a precious skill through an immoral act that makes Pindar's ethical position all the more resonant. Let us turn now to consider Chiron's last pupil, Jason, where the moral nature of this formation is most evident.

3. Jason

Let us begin by considering the character of Jason's education before examining its relevance in the present-day situation. As I remarked earlier, Pindar says at *N*.3.53 that Chiron 'raised' (τράφε) Jason, without telling us what he taught him. Pindar uses the same verb at *P*.4.103 (θρέψαν) and preserves two strands of the Hesiodic tradition concerning Chiron's nurture of Jason:

Αἴσων ὃς τέκεθ' υἱὸν Ἰήσονα ποιμένα λαῶν,
ὃν Χείρων ἔθρεψ' ἐνὶ Πηλίωνι ὑλήεντι

Aison, who bore a son Jason, shepherd of the people, whom Cheiron raised in wooded Pelion (Hes.*Eoiae* 40 M-W)[118]

The choice of diction (ἔθρεψ') confirms the primacy of Chiron's role as a nurturer, which is reflected in Pindar's attempt to portray him as a prototypical foster father.[119] Hesiod's description of Jason as 'shepherd of the people' (ποιμένα λαῶν) is, perhaps, obliquely reflected in Pindar's characterisation of Jason reconciling intra-familial division and in his compliment to Arcesilas for acting as the healer of his city at v.270f.[120] Furthermore, Pindar de-emphasises Jason's association with healing in *P*.4 because this aspect of Chiron's teaching is not fundamental to the hero's identity. The development of Jason's moral outlook is more important than specialist knowledge.

The innovative treatment of Jason's education can be explained, in part, by Pindar's concern to illuminate the moral aspects of the political situation in Cyrene, as seen in the attention given to Chiron's family:

τὸν δὲ θαρσήσαις ἀγανοῖσι λόγοις
ὧδ' ἀμείφθη· "Φαμὶ διδασκαλίαν Χείρωνος οἴσειν. ἀντρόθε γὰρ νέομαι
πὰρ Χαρικλοῦς καὶ Φιλύρας, ἵνα Κενταύρου με κοῦραι θρέψαν ἁγναί.
εἴκοσι δ' ἐκτελέσαις ἐνιαυτοὺς οὔτε ἔργον
οὔτ' ἔπος ἐκτράπελον κείνοισιν εἰπὼν ἱκόμαν
οἴκαδ', ἀρχαίαν κομίζων πατρὸς ἐμοῦ, βασιλευομέναν

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[118] Cf. schol.*Nem*.iii.92 (iii.55-24-56.2 Drachmann).

[119] Cf. Hes.*Th*.1001-2, where Chiron is the surrogate father of the hero Medeus: τὸν οὔρεσιν ἔτρεφε Χείρων Φιλυρίδης. See also Plato *Crito* 54A for the distinction between nurture and education.

[120] Cf. Hes.*Th*.1000, which states that Medea was subject to Jason, 'shepherd of the people'. For the king's role in resolving quarrel through gentle speech, cf. Hes.*Th*.84-90 and my discussion of the motif of the 'good king' in the Introduction (8b).

οὐ κατ᾽ αἶσαν, τάν ποτε Ζεὺς ὤπασεν λαγέτᾳ
Αἰόλῳ καὶ παισὶ τιμάν.

 Steeling himself, he answered with gentle words in this way: 'I claim that I shall manifest the teachings of Cheiron, for I come from the side of Chariklo and Philyra and from the cave where the Centaur's holy daughters raised me. After completing twenty years <u>without doing or saying anything untoward to them</u>, I have come home to reclaim my father's ancient honour of kingship, now being wielded unjustly, which long ago Zeus granted to Aiolos, leader of the people, and to his sons. (*P*.4.101-8)

The marriage of Chiron to the 'Naiad nymph' Chariklo is the first indication in Pindar that Chiron had a wife and family of his own.[121] This innovation could be viewed as a reflection of the "family values" espoused in the teachings of Chiron. It gives the hero's education a more rounded perspective. Pindar clearly demarcates education and nurture by mentioning them in different clauses, which separate *διδασκαλίαν* (102) from *θρέψαν* (103).[122] Likewise, the references to the nurture and teaching of Asclepius in *Pythian* 3 point to Chiron's twin responsibility as foster father and educator; all three of his heroic charges were raised from an early age.

Pindar depicts an environment that is conducive to the development of Jason's moral virtues and Chiron's teaching influences the manner in which he attains his goal. The poet embellishes the picture of Chiron's domestic establishment in *N*.3 by emphasising the female presence of Chiron's wife Chariklo and daughters in

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[121] The scholium to *P*.4.182 reports that Chariklo is the wife of Chiron but that ps.-Hesiod says Naïs (fr.42 M-W). Cf. Janko (1984b), 299, who thinks it more likely that she is simply a Naiad, and D'Alessio (2005), 258, n.73. For full details of Chariklo's genealogy and associations, see J.Escher, *RE* 111 2 (1899), 2140-2141, s.v. 'Chariklo'.
[122] Contra Burr (1975), 52-3, who thinks that Jason assigns his education both to Chiron *and* the nymphs.

the cave.[123] This is paradigmatic of the civilised values that Pindar will impress upon Arcesilas in the contemporary situation. Braswell states that although the epithet ἀγναί describing the Centaur's daughters is conventional, it serves here to stress Jason's claim to the highest moral credentials.[124] Burton makes the point that the precepts were all-embracing. Chiron's daughters are holy and Jason is prepared to undertake tasks of a religious order such as the one Pelias will impose.[125] I conclude that Pindar transfers Chiron's Hesiodic role as the nurturer of heroes to his family and restores the teachings to the Centaur himself. The manner of the upbringing doubtless complements the formal content of the education itself.

The Pindaric Jason

In contrast to *Pythian* 6.25-7, the teachings of Chiron are not explicitly stated, although we can infer the content of Jason's learning from his upright behaviour towards his real family in Iolkos. Like Thrasyboulos, Jason conspicuously displays filial piety (in restoring Aison), as well as a proper respect for the gods by carrying out the will of Zeus.[126] Burr assumes a reference to the *hypothekai* and sees this as an elaboration of the enigmatic statement at *N*.3.58 that Chiron

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[123] See the charming depiction of the Centaur and his newly-wedded wife on a red-figure bell-krater attributed to the Eupolis Painter (c.430 BC); cf. *LIMC* 7 (1994), 387, no. 3, pl. 327, s.v. 'Philyra'. Sparkes (2005), 11, observes that 'the painter has fashioned a solicitous bridegroom leading along his modest bride with tenderness and restraint – an embodiment of culture in contrast to the wild temper of the others of his clan'.

[124] Braswell (1988), 194-5; cf. Sappho 53 L-P of the Charites. The word ἀγναί, 'chaste', 'undefiled', also points to the semi-divine status of his daughters; cf. *P*.9.64 of 'holy Apollo', an allusion to Aristaios' divine father. Chiron himself is described by Jason as divine at v.119.

[125] Burton (1963), ad loc. Cf. Gildersleeve (1895), 291.

[126] Braswell (1988), 193.

increased Achilles' *thymos* 'in all things fitting'.[127] Jason's claim, 'I return from the cave' (ἀντρόθε γὰρ νέομαι, 102), echoes the words of another Hesiodic fragment (ἐγὼ δ' ἐξ ἀγρόθεν ἥκω) that West attributes to an account of Jason's history. Schwartz sees a reference here to the Χείρωνος Ὑποθῆκαι, which would bolster Jason's claim to the highest moral credentials.[128] It is difficult to know just how specific an allusion to the *Precepts* the first audience would take this to be. As with Achilles in *N*.3, Chiron's schooling contributes to the development of the hero's whole person: physical, spiritual and, in terms of his destiny, practical. One essential distinction is that Jason's education is less concerned with developing martial spirit than it is with magnanimity, skills of diplomacy and tact.

The keynote of Jason's speech is his avowal that he has done no harm to his surrogate family either in word or in deed (οὔτε ἔργον οὔτ' ἔπος, vv.104-5).[129] Rather like the Pindaric Achilles, his father's absence accounts for his learning in the first place and provides the stimulus for his future actions.[130] Jason's attitude towards friend and foe alike is consistent with his treatment of his surrogate family. It is characterised by boldness of action (θαρσήσαις) and gentleness of

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[127] According to Burr (1975), 53, these verses attest the classically heroic aspect of Jason's training as epitomised by Phoenix's speech to Achilles in *Il*.9.442-3, but with the 'refinement of fittingness'.

[128] Schol. ad *P*.4.182 (ii 123/4 Drach.), cited in M-W (1967), 26 no.41, who mentions Schwartz (1960), 242. D'Alessio (2005), 232 omits this passage from his recent conspectus of passages in Pindar and Bacchylides that allude to this poem. The Hesiodic expression recalls that used in tragic prologues (e.g. Eur.*Hec*.1), which is parodied by Centaurs rising from Hades in Cratinos' *Cheirones*: 'we have come so as to give maxims' (fr. 254 K-A). Cf. Noussia (2003) on this play.

[129] Cf. *Od*.4.162 (ὄφρα οἱ ἤ τι ἔπος ὑποθήσεαι ἠέ τι ἔργον), where the collocation of word and deed, synonymous with the heroic character, appear in the context of a father's absence. Like Jason, Telemachus requires the help of a wise intermediary (Athena-Mentes, e.g. *Od*.1.155-305) to enable him to avenge the wrong done against their father.

[130] Achilles feels a burden of responsibility for his father, whom he has left behind to grow old in Phthia (*Il*.24.540-2) and is destined never to see again, on account of his choice to have a short life with everlasting fame.

speech (ἀγανοῖσι) at v.101.[131] Jason is motivated by a family cause and ultimately there is no conflict between the satisfaction of this honour and his treatment of his enemy, Pelias. The hero's moral dilemma is to uphold the preceptual obligation of honouring Zeus and his father (106-8) without committing bloodshed within his own family (145) in order to achieve his goals. The lesson of this encounter seems to be that personal ambition should not be compromised by violence against one's relatives.

To conclude, Jason's education makes him capable of adapting to different circumstances, both adversarial and friendly. Both the ethical character and content of Chiron's teachings (i.e. filial piety, duty to the gods) underlying his cause are revealed in Jason's behaviour in Iolkos (v.120f.).

Mythical paradigms

Commentators have often noted the resemblance between the myth of the Argonauts in *Pythian* 4 and the historical situation, focusing in particular on the theme of *nostos*.[132] As has been restated recently, the political topicality of *Pythian* 4 cannot really be denied.[133] More than half of the narrative of the Golden Fleece is devoted to the confrontation between Jason and Pelias, whose potential relevance to the contemporary situation is obvious. It dramatises a

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[131] Gildersleeve (1895), ad loc.
[132] Cf. Gildersleeve (1895), 281. More recent proponents of *nostos* as a *Leitmotif* include Crotty (1982), 111f and Goldhill (1991), 136-7.
[133] Hornblower (2004), 40, who endorses Carey's view (1981), 7 that at the end of *P*.4, 'a reference to contemporary Cyrenean politics is inescapable'.

power struggle in Cyrene between the king and a citizen seeking to return home from exile. As Gildersleeve puts it, the 'poem was a grand peace-offering, and the reconciliation had doubtless been quietly arranged in advance'.[134] The addressee, Arcesilas of Cyrene, is invited, through the myth, to reflect on the significance of restoring the exile. Braswell dismisses the 'futility of attempts to seek a more or less direct correspondence between figures of myth and those of the historical situation'.[135] Notwithstanding this, the characters of Arcesilas' ancestors are drawn in such a way as to be instructive. One essential difference between the myth and the historical figures is that Arcesilas is the reigning king whilst Jason is the aspirant.[136] At any rate, the possibility that Arcesilas is the equivalent of Pelias is 'monstrous', as Gildersleeve put it.[137] Crucially, Pelias serves as the anti-type of what Arcesilas, through his wise magnanimity, is not. This illustrates the persuasive function of paradigms.[138] I submit that the poet's deliberate avoidance of precise correspondence between mythical and historical characters is part of his rhetoric of tact, which we observed in his treatment of Asclepius. For example, Pindar could not risk offending Arcesilas with the implication that his treatment of the exile strongly resembled Pelias' opposition to

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[134] Gildersleeve (1895), 278. Cf. Braswell (1988), 360. Mitchell (1966), 109 sees genuine urgency in the appeal to Arcesilas.

[135] Braswell (1988), 371. Cf. Norwood (1945), 213 n.7. Instone (1990b), rightly criticises Braswell's neglect of the myth's moral thrust in view of the advice, 'Now come to know the wisdom of Oedipus' (v.263ff). In other matters too, Braswell stubbornly refuses to accept any hypothesis for which there is no textual basis.

[136] Cf. Carey (1980a), 152, who challenged Finley's view (1955), 86 that Jason is a model for Arcesilas and possibly parallel to Damophilos.

[137] Gildersleeve (1895), 302, commenting on the parable of Oedipus at v.268; cf. Fennell (1893b), 185.

[138] Cf. Carey (1980a), 152: 'If a man like Pelias could be softened by the nobility and restraint of Jason, it is inevitable that a man like Arcesilas will deal mercifully with a man like Damophilos'. Cf. the use of Asclepius as a negative paradigm for Hieron in *P*.3 and the antitypes of Typhos and Phalaris in *Pythian* 1.

Jason, even if, like other negative paradigms, it is a bold choice of exemplum that puts Pindar precariously balanced on a diplomatic tightrope.

Certainly Jason is not in a position to configure clearly the behaviour of someone in Arcesilas' situation. But the resonances between the king's virtues and the Chironian precepts and some similarities between Arcesilas and Jason suggest that Pindar wishes the king to take the poet's teaching to heart. As we have seen before, the nature of Pindar's interactive paradigms is that they are inclusive rather than monolithic. As Carey well observes, 'the relevance of the myth is not static but fluid'.[139] Moreover, a particular paradigm may have several associations and more than one application. There is no rule in Pindar that dictates mythical and 'real' figures must be correlated one-to-one. For example, Jason's situation as a returning exile is parallel to that of Damophilos but his behaviour could be conceived as a model and metaphor for the characters of the two political rivals in Cyrene.

Naming and Identity

Whilst Pindar specifies Chiron's nurture and teaching at *P*.4.103 (θρέψαν), he does not say that he taught Jason healing.[140] At the end of his first speech,

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[139] Carey (1980a), 152. Jason is the 'forbearing victim of unjust aggression, performer of superhuman feats with divine aid matched by Arcesilas, the ill-treated but forbearing man who has the painful task of setting his troubled city aright, relying on the gods who have so far aided his family'.

[140] Likewise, at *N*.3.53, Pindar reports that Chiron 'raised' (τράφε) Jason, without telling us *what* he taught him.

Jason informs us that Chiron named him and in the process reveals his dual allegiance:

"Αἴσονος γὰρ παῖς ἐπιχώριος οὐ ξείναν ἱκάνω γαῖαν ἄλλων.
φὴρ δέ με θεῖος Ἰάσονα κικλήσκων προσαύδα."

"I come here as the son of Aison, a native, to no strangers' land. The divine creature called me by the name Jason."
(*P.*4.118-19)

The absence of medicine from Chiron's curriculum is particularly surprising in Jason's case, considering that his name was associated with healing in folk etymology.[141] Indeed, Pindar would have been aware of the Homeric tradition (*Il.*11.831 and 4.219) that Chiron taught his pupils the art of healing. Kirk observes that Ἰάσων 'Healer' suggests an originally rather different role for Jason, to which Pindar may allude at v.119 without making anything of it.[142]

The phrase μαλακὰν χέρα (271), which plays on the association between Chiron's name and the healing arts, has been taken to reflect Chiron's teaching of Jason in healing.[143] Certainly this branch of Chiron's arts has no direct relevance to Jason's exemplification of Chiron's *didaskalia*. The supposition that Jason is a

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[141] Hunter (*OCD*[3]), s.v. Jason, p.793, notes that Ἰάσων was sometimes etymologised in antiquity as 'the healer'. This association was no doubt encouraged by the reputation of Chiron <u>outside Pindar</u> as Jason's teacher in medicine (cf. schol.Hes.*Th*.933a, which reports that Pelias entrusted Jason to Chiron to be taught medicine, and schol.*AR* 1.554).

[142] Kirk (1974), 163, noting that the diversity of Jason's nature 'is typical of the difficulty in distinguishing older and younger traits in the subjects of heavily elaborated myth complexes'. He resists classification as either an 'older type' hero or a 'younger type' (such as Achilles).

[143] Bury (1890), 56 discerns an allusion to Chiron's name in μαλακόχειρα at *N*.3.55, which Robbins (1975), 210-12 thinks may have been a *nom parlant* for the poet too, though this (medical) association can only be of a metaphorical kind; cf. Hornblower (2004), 64f. Cf. *RE*, s.v. 'Chiron', p.2302: 'der name ist ein Hypokoristikon [i.e. shortened form] von Χειρίσοφος oder einem andern mit χείρ zusammengesetzten Wort.' Also Dabasis (1970), who notes the pseudo-etymological link between Chiron's name and χείρ, 'hand'. Most of his skills involve the use of hands (i.e. healing, archery, lyre-playing).

healer has led other commentators to maintain that in calling Arcesilas a ἰατήρ (270), Pindar is asking him to become a second Jason.[144] Segal remarks that, 'In this healing function too, he [Jason] proves his education from Chiron (102), famous for his healing arts (cf. *P*.3.1f). Thus he can serve as a heroic model for King Arcesilas, enjoined to tend the festering wound by applying a soft hand (χρὴ μαλακὰν χέρα προσβάλλοντα τρώμαν ἕλκεος ἀμφιπολεῖν, 271)'.[145] Segal's argument, however, is based on the false premise that Jason has learned the healing arts from Chiron. In *Pythian* 4, it is Medea who shows Jason how to use medicines (221) to protect his skin from the fire-breathing oxen and instructs him (ἐκδιδάσκησεν, 217) in the skilful use of prayers and charms. I suggest that Pindar de-emphasises Jason's association with healing not for fear of implicating Jason in the dangerous arts of black magic, but because this aspect of Chiron's teaching is not fundamental to his primary cause of restoring his father's honour.[146] Braswell doubts how strong the association between Jason's name and healing is in *Pythian* 4: 'It is not inconceivable that ἰατὴρ could be used in a name-etymology of Jason…but there can hardly be one here for the simple reason that Jason is nowhere mentioned or even remotely implied'. He dismisses the possibility that the phrase μαλακὰν χέρα recalls the Centaur's healing arts (cf. *N*.3.55); Chiron has not been mentioned for nearly 170 lines and even then, not

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[144] E.g. Burr (1975), 87, who suggests that Chiron gave his pupil the name Jason in order to make him a healer of internal political strife; he [Pindar] would make Arcesilas similarly a mender of *stasis*. Cf. Finley (1955), 85 on Arcesilas as a second Jason and Wilhelm (1973), 91.

[145] Segal (1986), 19. He compares the diction at 270 with v.137, Jason's 'soothing speech'. I suspect that Segal overemphasises the ode's power of healing to fit his view of Jason as an archetypal healer. Cf. R.Rutherford (1987), 214 for a judicious critique of Segal's study.

[146] Cf. C.J.Mackie (2001), 14 who argues that 'Jason is transformed through time to conform to the demands of a society with firm views on the dangers of drugs and the healing practices associated with them'.

in relation to healing.[147] He counters the suggestion that Jason's conduct is a model for Arcesilas, though he admits it may well be exemplary.[148]

There are, of course, reasons why commentators have tried to stress the importance of Jason's name. As we have seen, it assists the 'reading' of the proposed analogy between Jason and Arcesilas. Robbins suggests that Arcesilas is 'being invited to show, in the application of a healing hand, the διδασκαλία of Chiron of which Jason, the central figure of the poem, boasts (102)'.[149] No doubt there is a latent sense in which Jason is a magnanimous statesman-physician or shepherd of the people, but if the literal Jason-healer connection is rejected, we cannot exploit the 'healing' references in relation to Arcesilas. It seems unlikely, then, that the practice of healing has any functional relevance to Jason's fulfilment of his mission in this ode. On the other hand, Jason's name *is* significant to the extent that it contains all the letters of his father's name Aison.[150] This cryptic clue indicates that whilst the relationship with his real father justifies his claim to be the rightful ruler of Iolkos, his surrogate father has given him the wherewithal to fulfil this mission. The preservation of his father's memory in this way attests to the teleological function of Chiron's education in enabling Jason to restore Aison's kingdom. Moreover, this can be

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[147] Braswell (1988), 370, adding that ἰατήρ would suggest Ἰάσων to no one except perhaps a critic of an allegorical cast of mind determined to find correspondences at all costs'. Schol.211a connects Ἰασων with ἴασις 'healing' [cf. Soph.*OT* 68] but Braswell notes the respective quantities of the first vowel are different.

[148] Braswell (1988), 371. Cf. Burton (1963), 168, who notes that in Jason, 'Arcesilas may see the qualities of courtesy, restraint, and respect for family ties together with a spirit of compromise and non-violence in dealing with Pelias which would supply a pattern of behaviour in settling his own quarrel with his kinsman Damophilus'.

[149] Robbins (1975), 210-12.

[150] I am grateful to Professor Barker for this astute observation of Pindar's word game.

discerned in the emphasis placed on his association with Chiron in the pivotal positions at the start and end of his speech (102, 119).

Myth and Reality

Developing the earlier observation about Pindar's treatment of Jason's upbringing, I suggest that the correspondence between the myth and the historical situation centres on Jason's treatment of his surrogate family. Jason's application of the precepts can be discerned in his attempt to conciliate his enemy and uncle Pelias through 'soothing' (v.128) and 'soft' (v.136) words rather than through open hostility (135). His deportment is thus presented as a product of his moral education with Chiron. Jason displays the courage and tolerance of his mentor Chiron, who is said to combine a human quality of gentleness with his innate fierceness at *P*.9.38-9. Jason's treatment of his surrogate family is also replicated in his magnanimous behaviour towards his real family (127f). The paradigm has a hortatory function with regard to Arcesilas' treatment of the exile Damophilos, who longs to see his home (οἶκον ἰδεῖν, 294) and experience the joys of the symposium once more. Arcesilas apparently faced a similar moral dilemma to Jason, who favoured political expediency over the satisfaction of his personal honour through violence. Jason's re-integration into his household provides a compelling case for the contemporary exile's restoration to the king's court.[151] This can be seen in the way Pindar draws on the characters and associations of the mythical characters.

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[151] Contra Crotty (1982), 119-20, who would see the parallel in terms of the victor's return to his city.

It seems to me that an audience would identity Jason's self-presentation with the poet's defence of Damophilos' character. Jason's exemplification of the type of ethical values associated with Chiron is embodied in the man who has learnt to hate the *hybristic* person (ἔμαθε δ' ὑβρίζοντα μισεῖν, 284) and would do no violence against the noble (οὐκ ἐρίζων ἀντία τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, 285).[152] *Hybris* was a quality attributed to Pelias at v.112, the antithesis of Jason, whose piety was nurtured by the Centaur's family. West notes that *P*.4.112-13 (ὑπερφιάλου /ἀγεμόνος δείσαντες ὕβριν) echoes a passage in Hesiod's *Theogony* 995-6.[153] Unlike his nephew Jason, Pelias was a 'lawless' man (ἄθεμιν, 109) who forcibly usurped the throne from 'just ruling parents' (ἀμετέρων ἀποσυλᾶσαι βιαίως ἀρχεδικᾶν τοκέων·, 110). This parallels the 'just mind of Damophilos' (δικαιᾶν/ Δαμοφίλου πραπίδων, 280-1). Although Damophilos is merely 'a youth among boys' (281), he is mature beyond his years in his ability to devise plans, or βουλαί (282), which echoes the 'inflexible counsels' (βουλαῖς ἀκνάμπτοις, 72) that characterise Jason and his family.[154]

By appealing to Jason's example, Pindar also suggests to Arcesilas a way of earning the favour of his fellow citizens, dealing with his enemies diplomatically, treating outsiders with respect, and discerning the will of Zeus in his actions. Thus, by reminding Arcesilas about the good qualities of a ruler, Pindar promotes the same moral values associated with Chiron's 'Academy' and acts as a

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[152] Burton (1962), 171 observes that the term *agathoi* includes the king and his party; cf. Nagy (1990), 148.
[153] West (1966), 429. The story is told in Mimn.11, which refers to the 'arrogant Pelias' (cf. Paus.4.2.5). The (Homeric) epithet ὑπερφιάλου is an important addition to the Hesiodic source and the contrast between Jason and Pelias; cf. Braswell (1988), ad v.111.
[154] Cf. the description of Arcesilas' 'upright counsel' (ὀρθόβουλον, 262).

mediator. I would reiterate the point made earlier that I am treating the myth as having a flexible application. Jason can, in one way or another, reflect the characters and situations of each of the protagonists.

Chiron and Pindar

In what sense, then, is Chiron a figure for the poet? Pindar's indirect method of association inevitably makes it difficult to establish a clear link between the teachings of Chiron and those of the poet. The type of 'inductive' reasoning we have to apply must contend with the characteristically implicit nature of Pindar's poetry.[155] As Silk observes, the 'interest in a given image often derives from the unlikeness as much as the unlikeness; and indeed, without a sufficient unlikeness, all 'point' in the true sense, tends to disappear'.[156] The main criterion is relevance, namely that the *exemplum* should support the point the speaker is making.[157] As we found with other mythical paradigms, the parallel between Chiron and Pindar is rather imprecise. As Burr observes, 'Two aspects of the role Pindar assumes in *Pythian* 4 link him with Chiron: his certification or recommendation of Damophilos, to which Jason's presentation of himself as Chiron's student is obliquely parallel, and his paraenetic relationship to Arcesilas, to which again there is a partial analogue in the past relationship of Chiron and Jason'.[158] Notwithstanding this obliqueness, there is sufficient evidence to

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[155] Cf. Lloyd (1966), 385 on the related 'argument from analogy', with discussion of *Il*.14.264ff.
[156] Silk (1974), 5.
[157] Lowrie (1997), 47. Cf. Goldhill (1994), 70.
[158] Burr (1975), 86.

suggest that the ethical values of Chiron's Academy strengthen Pindar's advocacy of Damophilos and counselling of Arcesilas.[159] Structurally speaking, the poet's mediation of the dispute, which is sealed in the *sphragis*, evokes Chiron's protection and formation of Jason.[160] The main distinction is that Pindar uses the medium of epinician poetry to enact the process of reconciliation between two disputants.[161] There is a sense in which his advocacy of the principal actors in this drama is instantiated in the choral performance of this ode. Goldhill well notes that that by the end of the ode, the 'crisis of nostos' has become a celebratory procession.[162] The poet's appeal to guest-friendship in the very last word of the ode echoes Jason's celebration of his homecoming, in which he received his relatives with 'soothing words' (128) and provided them with fitting hospitality (ξείνι᾽ ἁρμόζοντα τεύχων, 129). As such, it provides a fitting paradigm for the present needs, in which Pindar attempts to re-establish a friendly alliance between two rivals by presenting his own hospitality at Thebes as the supreme moral paradigm.[163] This, incidentally, is a rare form of self-reference and ultimately, a form of self-aggrandisement. It seems to be an

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[159] Cf. Hubbard (1985), 96f, who argues that Chiron's teaching provides a model of behaviour that Arcesilas is encouraged to adopt in his role as a political statesman.

[160] Chiron's role as an intermediary is most obvious in *N*.4.60, where he intervenes in the rescue of Peleus. Cf. also *I*.8.41 and *P*.9.38f. The notion of Chiron as a divine intermediary is found in the cyclic poem *Titanomachia*; cf. Lebedev (1998), 7 and fr.11b (Bernabé): 'Chiron the Centaur brought the race of mortals to righteousness by teaching them oaths, sacrifices, joyous sounds and dances of Olympus'.

[161] Cf. Introduction (8a), where I suggested that Pindar's ode is a kind of enactment of the process whereby the Hesiodic Muses dispense sweet speech to kings, thereby enabling them to resolve disputes.

[162] Goldhill (1991), 136-7. 'The ring composition – opening and closing with the depiction of a group celebration – shows how the circle of *philoi* is formed as an ideal, and how the *epinikion* maps a dynamic of separation and reintegration.'

[163] Goldhill (1991), 131 notes that Pindar 'seeks to create an (aristocratic) ideal of *philia*, for which the affiliations and obligations of *xenia* provide a crucial and recurrent rhetoric'. Also Gianotti (1975), 14: 'Pindaro, insomma, sente ancora, il suo rapporto con un vincitori e i commitenti sotto la protezione di Zeus Xenios, secondo il modello della società aristocratica classica'. Cf. Finley (1977), 99.

example too of Pindar using his poetic persona to exploit facts about his biography.[164]

Conclusions

The overall impression we have of Chiron in the myths of Jason and Achilles is of one who seeks to enhance the prospects of his pupil by nurturing the potential of his whole being. There is good reason to suppose that the innovative treatment of Chiron in these myths is determined by the requirements of the historical situation. Crucially, the twin emphasis on nurture and instruction (if not of a specialised kind) takes on a powerful resonance in terms of the poet's paraenetic relationship with the *laudandus*. Let me summarise the findings of this chapter.

In *Nemean* 3, the education of Achilles forms the centrepiece of a myth in which Pindar highlights the importance of Chiron's development of mind and body. First, the particular emphasis on spirit, both innate and tutored, that unifies the two parts of the myth is underscored partly through inter-textual references to Homer's *Iliad*.[165] Through Chiron's activities, Pindar's carefully nuanced myth qualifies the gnome that 'one with inborn glory carries great weight' (v.40) by suggesting that teaching can develop the potential of one blessed with innate gifts.

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[164] Cf. Morrison (2007b), 34; cf. *P*.3.77-9.

[165] Pindar's variation on the Homeric epithet 'swift-footed', ποσσὶ γὰρ κράτεσκε (52), is used of Achilles chasing animals rather than Hector; the phrase φόνον... λεόντεσσιν may evoke φόνον ...ἡρώεσσιν (*Il*.16.144).

In *Pythian* 6, the clear sense of continuity between mythical past and historical present encourages us to consider the relationship between Pindar and Chiron in terms of their endorsement respectively of athlete and hero.[166] The particular emphasis on the formal content of Chiron's teaching differentiates this ode somewhat from *N*.3. Achilles' learning of filial piety provides a powerful paradigm for the present victory, in which Thrasyboulos' observance of the precept is evidence of his devotion to his father. In showing that his father subscribes to the same ethical values as the poet, it provides an opportunity for mutual glorification. The poet's divergence from the Homeric tradition highlights the absence of Achilles' parents, which necessitates the inclusion of Chiron as a surrogate father to raise the hero. Chiron's function serves to underpin the poet's paraenetic stance vis-à-vis the victor.

In *Pythian* 3, Pindar refers to the departed Chiron as the nurturer of Asclepius in the context of advising Hieron. Asclepius is the only pupil for whom specialist knowledge is emphasised over spiritual development. His negative paradigm serves as a warning against the patron's longing for a cure. Set against this example of the failure to understand one's proper station is the prudent and benevolent Chiron, whose own experience of mortality is both a source of consolation and an implicit warning.

In *Pythian* 4, Jason's conciliatory behaviour distinguishes him from Achilles, although both are defined by their education with Chiron. There is good reason to

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[166] Cf. Kurke (1991), 157.

suppose that Jason's restoration of his father's kingdom, made possible by his education with Chiron, is a political model for Arcesilas, who must devote his efforts to the cause of Cyrene (v.276). But in resisting a monolithic interpretation of mythical paradigms in Pindar, I suggested that Jason's behaviour resonates in Pindar's defence of the character of the exile Damophilos.

The picture of Chiron's pedagogy in terms of its character and content is like this. In Achilles' education, there is a twin emphasis on nurture of his *thymos* (*N*.3.58) and ethical precepts (*P*.6.19f.)*.* Asclepius' education, on the other hand, focuses on practical training in the arts of healing (*N*.3.55, *P*.3.45-6)*,* although nurture is not disregarded altogether (*P*.3.5)*.* The treatment of Jason's education is even more nuanced, since his nurture is assigned to nymphs, the daughters of Chiron and Chariklo at *P*.4.103, whilst the Centaur takes care of his formal *didaskalia* (*P*.4.102, presumably Precepts etc.). *P*.4.115 and *N*.3.53 show that Jason's nurture is Chiron's domain too. It seems, then, that Pindar presents Achilles and Jason as benefiting from a more balanced education than Asclepius. Pindar's use of the matronymic Phillyridas (*P*.3.1, *P*.9.30; cf. Bacch.27.34) and references to Chiron's mother Philyra (*P*.4.103, *P*.6.22, *N*.3.43) reflect Chiron's surrogate function as the nurturer of heroes. Pindar's designation of Chiron by the matronymic and naming of his wife Chariklo in *Pythian* 4.103 may reflect the prominent roles of Chiron's wife and mother in the preceptual tradition too.

Overall, Pindar's treatment Chiron's *paideia* indicates that the teaching of skills is less important than 'nurture', which includes moral guidance. This particular emphasis probably reflects the fact that in athletics, the training of mind and body was regarded as paramount to success; more important, in many cases, than specialist knowledge or skills. In terms of the proposed analogy, it indicates that Pindar aimed to offer the victor a proper understanding of his place in the world and a broader appreciation of his achievement in this context. Hence Chiron's teaching reflects the conventionally moral nature of Pindar's advice.

Robbins argues that the tradition of Chiron as a teacher is a secondary development to his original role as a healer. 'Pindar, whose poetry is full of the aphorisms of received wisdom, would doubtless have drawn on this paraenetic tradition as he certainly did on the Homeric epics'.[167] Whilst we should be cautious in assuming that Pindar is deriving an image or structure of Chiron mainly from one poem, Pindar's poetry certainly reflects the development of Chiron as a teacher of moral values. The overall picture of Chiron in Pindar, then, is one of diverse associations and civilised and aristocratic traits. This might help to explain why he is such a prominent figure in Pindar, whose poetry promotes the same ethical values. There is sufficient evidence, then, to view Chiron's purpose as strengthening Pindar's authority as a paraenetic encomiast. The questions we should tackle henceforth are these; first, to what effect does Pindar appropriate the wisdom of his mythical counterpart within the arguments of his odes? Secondly, what does the use of the mythical pedagogue tell us

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[167] Robbins (1993), 15.

about the kind of image that Pindar wishes to project of his relationship with the

laudandus?

CHAPTER TWO: *NEMEAN* 3

Part 1: Muse and Pindar

The friendly adviser

I want to begin by explaining briefly what I mean by Pindar's 'paraenetic encomium'. As I pointed out in the Introduction (9), the notion of 'friendly precepts' is derived from poems in which there is an existing, somewhat long and rather close relationship between the poetic 'I' and the addressee. This is not the case here (or in *Pythian* 3), where we are dealing with a one-off commission. Nonetheless, the 'character' of the poet is directly influenced by (and in turn has an influence on) the nature of the relationship he can construct with the *laudandus* (whether through subtle means or simply statements of debt and *philia*), and is therefore one of the poet's prime concerns.[1] I shall argue that the appropriation of a preceptual dialogue in *Nemean* 3 is a device by which he can present his instruction authoritatively and tactfully, by avoiding some of the conventions of didactic poetry, such as the consistent use of second-person imperatives.

It will be worth contextualising briefly the discourse of *philia* in which Pindar's wisdom is articulated by considering Phoenix's speech to Achilles in the Embassy scene in *Iliad* 9. Griffith notes that Phoenix gives quite extensive

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[1] Thanks to Adrian Kelly for this insight.

personal reminiscences at *Il.*9.432-605, as he reminds Achilles of his special, almost paternal relationship to him, before giving the rather Hesiodic advice (Litai) and instructive paradigm of Meleager.[2] Phoenix concludes his speech with a direct appeal to Achilles as 'friend':

ἀλλὰ σὺ μή μοι ταῦτα νόει φρεσί, μὴ δέ σε δαίμων
ἐνταῦθα τρέψειε φίλος·

Listen, then; do not have such a thought in your mind; let not the spirit within you turn you that way, dear friend. (*Il.*9.600-601)

The second-person injunction (reinforced by the second-person pronoun) is typical of an older man addressing a younger one, yet by appealing to a relationship based on equality Phoenix softens his exhortation based on the protreptic paradigm of Meleager.[3] As Goldhill remarks, Phoenix 'adopts and manipulates the obligations of *philotēs* in his arguments. He calls Achilles φίλον τέκος, 'dear child' (437, 444) and *philos*, 'dear' (601), and he tells two stories that revolve around the claims of *philotēs*.[4] Since Phoenix was old enough to have nursed Achilles as a baby, the address at 601 might be viewed as an attempt to reposition their relationship as one based on reciprocal benefits. Pindar constructs the same kind of relationship between himself and the *laudandus*,

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[2] Griffith (1983), 56 n.73. Lardinois (1995), 198-9 notes that Phoenix presents himself as Achilles' teacher (442-3), father-figure (494; cf. 437, 444, φίλον τέκος) loved like a father loves his only son (481-82). Phoenix's surrogacy is acknowledged by Achilles at v.607 in his use of the word ἄττα ('papa'). For advice presented within a genuine father-son relationship, cf. Nestor's words to Antilochus: ἀλλ᾽ ἄγε δὴ σὺ φίλος μῆτιν ἐμβάλλεο θυμῷ (*Il.*23.313).
[3] Cf. Oehler (1925), 41f. on the use of ring-composition in this type of *paradeigma*.
[4] Goldhill (1994), 82. Cf. Lynn-George (1988), 136, who argues that 'the decisive process in Phoenix's discourse will be the transformation of that central term "father"'.

since *philia* is a much more appealing way of conceiving the exchange than commerce.[5] The poet characterises his repayment as καλλίνικον (*N*.3.18), a word that also denotes the victory itself.

In the final verses, a kind of epilogue, Pindar addresses Aristokleidas in a way that supports this conception of a relationship based on reciprocity:[6]

χαῖρε φίλος· ἐγὼ τόδε τοι
πέμπω μεμιγμένον μέλι λευκῷ
σὺν γάλακτι, κιρναμένα δ' ἔερσ' ἀμφέπει,
πόμ' ἀοίδιμον αἰολαῖσιν[7] ἐν πνοαῖσιν αὐλῶν,

ὀψέ περ. ἔστι δ' αἰετὸς ὠκὺς ἐν ποτανοῖς,
ὃς ἔλαβεν αἶψα, τηλόθε μεταμαιόμενος, δαφοινὸν ἄγραν ποσίν·
κραγέται δὲ κολοιοὶ ταπεινὰ νέμονται.
τίν γε μέν, εὐθρόνου Κλεοῦς ἐθελοίσας, ἀεθλοφόρου λήματος ἕνεκεν
Νεμέας Ἐπιδαυρόθεν τ' ἄπο καὶ Μεγάρων δέδορκεν φάος.

Farewell, friend. I send you this mixture of honey with white milk, which the stirred foam crowns, a drink of song accompanied by the shimmering breaths of pipes, late though it be. Swift is the eagle among birds, which suddenly seizes, as it searches from afar, the bloodied prey in its talons, while the cawing jackdaws range below. But for you, with fair-throned Kleio willing and because of your determination for victory, from Nemea, Epidauros, and Megara has shone the light of glory. (*N*.3.76-84)

The lengthy eagle-as-hunter metaphor at *N*.3.80f., which is obviously to be linked with Pindar's expression of his poetic superiority, is part of the same equation

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[5] Cf. Kurke (1991), 146.
[6] Lardinois (1995), includes this among a small number of passages, in only 24 of the 44 epinician odes, in which the victor is directly addressed, usually at the end of the ode (e.g. *P*.1.81-end, *P*.3.80-end, *P*.4.249-end, *P*.4.249-end, *P*.9.97-end, etc.).
[7] S-M read Αἰολίσσιν; cf. Race (1997), 'Aeolian'.

between poet and *laudandus*.[8] It may be helpful to think of Pindar's style of address as a kind of gentle exhortation to consider the content of his 'paraenetic encomium'. Similarly, Phoenix characterised Achilles as a friend at the climax of his speech in order to make his advice more persuasive.[9] As this is the first time the poet addresses the victor directly, χαῖρε serves both as a personal greeting and a farewell.[10] This convention drawn from hymnic poetry makes it seem as though the poet is addressing the finished product of his creation.[11] Moreover, Pindar is inviting the victor to consider the content of his song. It recalls the imperative ἄρχε (10) used in the invocation to the Muse at v.9, which I will consider in a moment. Indeed, there is a strong sense in which the *sphragis* looks back to the opening of the ode and articulates the mutual dependency of poet and victor.[12]

How, then, does the style of address support my view of Pindar as a friendly preceptor? The particle τοι originally represented the ethic dative of σύ/τύ.[13] It is a

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[8] Cf. Lefkowitz (1969), 56 n.14 on the dual function of the image as a reference to both *laudator* and *laudandus*. Also Pfeijffer (1994), 305. The image of the eagle reminds us of the hunting exploits of the young Achilles earlier in the poem, which is also a model and metaphor for the deeds of the victor in the pancratium; cf. Burnett (2005), 152.

[9] According to Goldhill (1994), 57 'Who says what to whom' is a defining aspect of an utterance; contextualization will make a difference to meaning and understanding (p.58).

[10] Cf. Pfeijffer (1999a), 397 on this general formula of greeting, which has been interpreted as a formula of goodbye, closing off the epinician. Cf. Σ *N*.3.132a (Drachmann iii, 60) with Instone (1996), 168, on this toasting formula for the symposium. On χαῖρε as a toast like 'cheers', cf. *O*.4.60, 18.122 for the use of the expression at meals. The final eight verses have consequently been regarded as a kind of epilogue (cf. Christ, 1896, ad loc).

[11] Cf. Most (1985), 96ff. with, e.g. *h.Hermes* 579-80: 'Farewell, son of Zeus and Maia; but I will remember you and another song also.'

[12] The participle μεταμαιόμενος (v.81) recalls and intensifies μαιόμενοι (5), thereby satisfying the general thirst for song articulated in the gnomic priamel at vv.6-8. For the function of the *sphragis*, cf. *P*.3.114-15 and *P*.4.298-99.

[13] Lardinois (1995), 270 with n.59; cf. Denniston (1954), 537.

common feature of preceptual discourse. Although he does not include *N*.3.76 in his conspectus of usage, Slater notes that it is 'often hard to differentiate [τοι] from the pronoun: it implies that the point of a statement should be familiar to the listener.'[14] It is a form of polite encouragement to the victor to accept the lessons offered in this ode. One feature of Pindar's 'friendly preceptor' is the prominence of the *ego*, which is not so evident in Phoenix's address to Achilles (above) but is in Theognis' address to his younger friend Cyrnus:

σοὶ δ᾽ ἐγὼ οἷά τε παιδὶ πατὴρ ὑποθήσομαι αὐτὸς
ἐσθλά· σὺ δ᾽ ἐν θυμῷ καὶ φρεσὶ ταῦτα βάλευ.

 I shall personally give you good advice, as a father to a son. Put this in your heart and mind. (Theognis 1049-50)

The prominent 'you' and 'I' forms σοὶ δ᾽ ἐγὼ, with the former repeated in a direct second-person instruction introduced by σὺ, indicates a close relationship. Pindar, of course, does not present himself explicitly as a father-figure. Thus, any resemblance between the paternal bond and the relationship of *laudator* and *laudandus* must be bound up with the way in which, like Theognis, he constructs authority.[15] In Hesiod *Op*.106-7 (Εἰ δ᾽ ἐθέλεις, ἕτερόν τοι ἐγὼ λόγον ἐκκορυφώσω, εὖ καὶ ἐπισταμένως, σὺ δ᾽ ἐνὶ φρεσὶ βάλλεο σῇσιν), on the other hand, there is more of a distance between the first and second person and it is very much the

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[14] Slater (1969a), s.v. τοι. For its rhetorical function, cf. e.g. *P*.6.19 (in myth), *P*.2.72, *P*.3.85, *O*.8.59 etc. (in proverb), *P*.1.87, *P*.3.65 (in apodosis).

[15] Cf. Martin (2004), 354. Cf. my remarks in the Introduction (9) on Pindar's use of Chiron in *Pythian* 6 as a means of creating a senior persona . The theme of paternalism is seen in the description of Hieron as a 'father to strangers/guests' (*P*.3.71); cf. Introduction (8b).

authoritative teacher instructing an ignorant pupil.[16] Nagy sums up the generic difference in his assertion that the 'bond of communication' in the case of praise poetry is one of 'friendship' (e.g. *N*.3.72), φιλότης, not of *intelligence*, as is the case in didactic poetry.[17] This is somewhat reductive, however, since Pindar often appeals to the intelligent understanding of his audience, both explicitly and implicitly. Moreover, we have seen that Phoenix uses a similar rhetoric of friendship.

To reiterate, I would not assume any personal relationship between the victor and Pindar here, any more than I would think of a 'real' relationship (outside the text) between Pindar and Hieron in *P*.3.70-1 (cf. *P*.1.92). Thus, the strategy of presenting himself as a *philos* and adapting the conventional posture of didactic poetry to epinician serves to articulate a sense of equality and collaboration in their relationship. This stance is typical of the 'friendly preceptor', who usually eschews direct second-person forms of address when giving instruction except within the context of praise.[18] In giving advice, then, he avoids the impression of inequality that is a typical feature of the preceptual relationship.

Collaborative learning

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[16] Lardinois (1997), 221 n.71. Cf. Nestor's use of the first and second person pronouns to indicate a relationship with Agamemnon based on mutual respect (e.g. *Il*.9.100-5 and cf. Introduction, 8b).
[17] Nagy (1979), 241.
[18] Cf. *P*.6.19 and Introduction (9) for the concept of the 'friendly preceptor'.

In the Introduction (6), I drew a comparison between Nestor's use of personal reminiscence and Pindar's reliance upon myth and other forms of traditional authority to increase his status as 'paraenetic encomiast'. I suggested that Pindar's Muse has a similar function to that of wise voices from the past in guaranteeing the credibility of the poet's words (cf. *P*.4.279), although Pindar never cites the Muses 'as an authority for his versions of a story'.[19] Unlike Nestor, Pindar is spatially removed from the stories he relates and the recollection of the past is a substitute for personal memory, which is made possible by the Muse's assistance.

Let us begin by examining the invocation to the Muse, whose participation in the construction of the paraenetic dialogue is crucial to its form and presentation. First, the Muse's inspiration provides the poet with an abundance of subject-matter, which enables him to assert his authority as a teacher and to exemplify the precepts to 'praise the good' (29) and 'to heed what is at hand' (75). Secondly, Pindar articulates his relationship with the Muse as a form of collaborative learning. This is indicative of the way in which instruction is presented in a paraenetic dialogue, which I shall look at later.

Ὦ πότνια Μοῖσα, μᾶτερ ἁμετέρα, λίσσομαι,
τὰν πολυξέναν ἐν ἱερομηνίᾳ Νεμεάδι
ἵκεο Δωρίδα νᾶσον Αἴγιναν· ὕδατι γὰρ
μένοντ᾽ ἐπ᾽ Ἀσωπίῳ μελιγαρύων τέκτονες
κώμων νεανίαι, σέθεν ὄπα μαιόμενοι.
διψῇ δὲ πρᾶγος ἄλλο μὲν ἄλλου,
ἀεθλονικία δὲ μάλιστ᾽ ἀοιδὰν φιλεῖ,

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[19] Scodel (2001), 123, arguing that 'Pindar calls on them to confirm not the truth of his claims, but his tact and sense of due measure', which is germane to *N*.3.28.

στεφάνων ἀρετᾶν τε δεξιωτάταν ὀπαδόν·

τᾶς ἀφθονίαν ὄπαζε μήτιος ἁμᾶς ἄπο·
ἄρχε δ᾽ οὐρανοῦ πολυνεφέλα κρέοντι, θύγατερ,   10
δόκιμον ὕμνον· ἐγὼ δὲ κείνων τέ νιν ὀάροις
λύρᾳ τε κοινάσομαι. χαρίεντα δ᾽ ἕξει πόνον
χώρας ἄγαλμα, Μυρμιδόνες ἵνα πρότεροι
ᾤκησαν, ὧν παλαίφατον ἀγοράν
οὐκ ἐλεγχέεσσιν Ἀριστοκλείδας τεάν
ἐμίανε κατ᾽ αἶσαν ἐν περισθενεῖ μαλαχθείς

παγκρατίου στόλῳ·

 O lady Muse, my mother, I entreat you, come to this Dorian island of Aegina, visited by many strangers, in the Nemean sacred month.
For at the water of Asopos are waiting craftsmen of honey-sounding revels, young men, yearning for your voice. One venture thirsts for this, and one for that, but victory in contests especially loves songs, the most suitable accompaniment of crowned excellences.
Grant from my ingenuity an abundance of song but begin, daughter of the ruler of the cloud-covered sky, an approved hymn, and I shall impart it to their voices and the lyre. The glorification of this land will be a delightful task, where the Myrmidons of old dwelled, whose long-famed assembly place Aristokleidas did not stain with dishonour, according to his destiny, by weakening in the mighty course of the pancratium. (*N*.3.1-17)[20]

In *Nemean* 3, Pindar initially addresses his companion with the reverential epithet πότνια (1), which is balanced by the more intimate description of the Muse as 'my mother' (μᾶτερ ἁμετέρα).[21] The pronoun σέθεν (v.5) denotes a request from one person to another, a personal touch that is retained in the second invocation to the Muse as 'daughter'.[22] I suggest the poet conceives of his relationship with his Muse as a form of nurture and collaboration. This companionship is a model

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[20] I reject Race's translation (1997), 23 of the speaker's address to the Muse: 'begin for the ruler of the cloud-covered sky, daughter' on grounds of sense (and despite the strain this places on the dative κρέοντι, v.10), since the speaker has just called her 'mother'.
[21] Race (1982), 34 observes the close 'I-Thou relationship'. The cultic λίσσομαι is used in invocations at *O*.12.1 (to Tyche) and *P*.1.71 (to Zeus). *Potnia* is an august title used of divinities, e.g. *P*.9.55 (Libya), *O*.1.4.3 (Aglaia), *N*.8.1 (Hora).
[22] Scott (1905), 32-3 notes that Pindar is the first Greek poet to use ὦ of the Muses, which indicates familiarity.

for the reciprocal relation of poet and *laudandus* based on mutual respect and equality.

The gnomic priamel explains why the Muse is needed on Aegina by both the chorus and the victor: 'Crowned achievements thirst for the poet's song, just as exhausted athletes long for water.'[23] In searching for a suitable example of *aretē*, the poet will satisfy the requirements of the gnome to find a 'most appropriate accompaniment for crowns' (δεξιωτάταν, v.8).[24] It seems to me that whilst the poet seeks the Muse's help with the provision of subject matter, he retains ultimate control over its utterance, which is the product of his *mētis*.[25] The imperative ἄρχε (10) evokes the image of the Muse as a kind of assistant or meta-poetic supernumerary.[26] The second imperative ὄπαζε (v.9) implies that the song that accompanies (ὀπαδόν, v.8) the victor's success is made possible by the companionship of Muse and poet.[27] It recalls ὄπα (v.5, the voice desired by the chorus) and suggests that the Muse will 'give generous voice' to the poet's song.

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[23] Bundy (1962), 5 explains priamel as 'a focusing device, in which one or more terms serve as foil for the point of particular interest'. It often appears in gnomic or summary form as a list; cf. Race (1982).

[24] Pfeijffer (1999a), 254 believes the metaphorical sense 'favourable' is appropriate here, since birds flying on the right were regarded as a favourable omen (e.g. *Il*.24.319-21 and cf. *P*.6.19).

[25] Pfeijffer (1999a), 255, compares the presentation of song as both a gift of the Muses *and* a product of the poet's mind (γλυκὺν καρπὸν φρενός) at *O*.7.8. Cf. *O*.1.8-9, where the song comes to the *mētis* of wise poets from Olympia; in *N*.3.9, on the other hand, the Muse provides song from the original source of the poet's *mētis*.

[26] Scodel (2001), 124 ad *O*.6.19-21, argues that the Muses are the 'meta-rules, the power that tells the poet when unconventionality is the better course'.

[27] LSJ, s.v. ὀπάζω relate this verb with ὀπαδός but suggest that the forms ὀπ-άων, ὀπ-έων seem to show that δ or ζ is no part of the root, which is probably another form of ἑπόμαι (the aspirate being lost); cf. Abel (1943), 100 on ὀπαών as 'follower', 'attendant'. Cf. Hes.*Th*.80 and *P*.4.287. According to Slater (1969a), s.v. ὀπάζω, the verb always means 'bestow' (usually of a divinity, e.g. *I*.8.39).

What, then, is the effect of Pindar's collaborative relationship with the Muse? Thibodeau notes that in Horace *Ode* 1.24f ('praecipe lugubres cantus, Melpomene'), 'while Horace remains the speaker, his voice alters, becoming in effect Melpomene's. As her voice subsumes the poet's, there occurs a change in tone and…distancing effect'.[28] A similar phenomenon occurs in *Nemean* 3, where the poet appeals for inspiration in the first verse (1) before his voice appears to merge with that of the Muse as he utters the command (10) in the antistrophe.[29] It is crucial to realise, however, that Pindar's personal voice does not subordinate itself to the Muse. This is very unlike Hesiod *Theogony* 100, where for the first time in what was to prove a very long series, the poet styles himself as 'servant of the Muses'.[30] In Pindar, paradoxically, this distancing effect serves to highlight the responsibility of the *ego* (11) in communicating the song to voices and lyre. Nonetheless, as is the case in Horace, the goddess' voice permits the poet 'an added degree of frankness and freedom'.[31] Similarly, Pindar's relationship with the Muse allows him greater licence to demonstrate his control over the course of the ode, whose extraordinary mode of presentation I will examine in a moment. Whilst I am reluctant to accept Instone's over-

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[28] Thibodeau (2003), 245. Like Pindar, Horace chooses a female adviser in this instructional poem.

[29] Cf. Williams (1980), 42, who argues that Horace 'distances his own personality by a retreat into an appeal to the Muse for a particular type of inspiration'. For the Muse(s) as inspiration, cf. Bacchylides 1.1, 3.3, 9.3, 16.3, 19.4.

[30] D'Alessio (2005), 230; cf. Theognis 769, where the poet outlines his special responsibility as 'servant and messenger of the Muses' (Μουσῶν θεράποντα καὶ ἄγγελον). Cf. Bacch.5.13-14, 191-2, where Hesiod is described as 'servant' (πρόπολος) of the Muses.

[31] Thibodeau (2003), 253, noting that the goddess is a fiction.

simplification that the Muse is a metonym for the ode, I surmise that the Muse is a figurative device for enhancing the poet's authority.[32]

Pindar's command to the Muse at *N*.3.9-11 reflects the need to claim authority at the start of a poem, which Hesiod in the *Works and Days* resolves 'by turning the Muses into a link between Zeus and himself'.[33] Pindar summons the Muse as offspring of the union between Zeus and Mnemosyne and guardian of poetic memory.[34] Thus, the way in which Pindar integrates the Muses into the order of Zeus (cf. *P*.1.13-14, *Th*.829-33) by commanding the 'daughter of the ruler of cloud-covered sky' to begin a proper hymn (*N*.3.10-11) suggests she is intimately connected with the poet's choice of mythical subjects. In *Theogony* 36-7, on the other hand, Hesiod uses the Muses to authorise his song. As the initial subject of his song, they sing *for* 'father Zeus'.[35] Pindar preserves the tripartite relation but with a different emphasis, as my translation reflects. For Pindar, Zeus' association with *mētis* and memory ensures that the poet's Muse-inspired song will be 'authentic' (δόκιμον v.11), or one, we might say, that is fit-for-purpose.[36] But

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[32] Instone (2000), 1. For Muse, he reads Pindar's poetry, but cf. my discussion of *Pythian* 4.278 in the Introduction (8a).

[33] Stehle (1997), 202. The singer addresses Zeus directly at v.9 and 'equates his knowledge of truth with Zeus' dispensation' (p.208).

[34] Cf. Hes.*Th*.53-5 and Solon fr.13 (West), which begins with an invocation to the Muses as 'bright daughters of Olympian Zeus and Memory'. For the significance of Zeus in relation to *mētis*, compare his association with personified *Mētis* in the myth preserved at Hes. *Th*.886-900. Zeus is also μητιέτα in Homer (e.g. *Il*.1.175, 508).

[35] Cf. Stehle (1997), 199-212 on the way in which the performer in bardic poetry establishes the Muses within the patriarchal order and defines his song as a reflection of that order. Cf. Lardinois (1995), 201, who notes that 'like Homer [e.g. *Il*.1.1], Hesiod identifies his voice with that of the Muses so that he can claim their authority'.

[36] Pfeijffer (1999a), ad loc. suggests that Pindar is entreating the Muse to start with a hymn that is 'approved', 'that passes the test' and is of the required 'quality'.

as the song progresses, this will require revision to bring it up to the standard established at the outset.

Another formal reason for mentioning Zeus is his link with the island of Aegina (v.3), where the ode was performed in honour of the victor. The deferential periphrasis (v.10) is recapitulated later in a more direct address to Zeus (Ζεῦ τεὸν γὰρ αἷμα σέο δ᾽ ἀγών τὸν ὕμνος ἔβαλεν, v.65) as progenitor of the Aiakidai, patron of the games at Nemea and hence author of the present victory.[37] Thus, the poet's address to his Muse serves not only as a means of authorising his song but also as a way of indicating his shared inheritance with the victor (via the Muse) from Zeus.

Hubbard makes the point that 'Pindar's invocations to the Muse always ask for her assistance to the poet, and, at least in the epinicia, are closely associated with the bestowing of praise upon the victor or other *laudandi*'.[38] In this ode, each subsequent invocation of the Muse directly relates to the celebration of the victor or his ancestors (v.28f, v.83). Indeed, the theme of the Muse's generous intervention on the poet's behalf is reiterated in the last two verses of the ode. I suggest that Kleio (83) is to be identified with the Muse invoked by Pindar at the start of this ode and at v.28.[39] The delayed naming of the Muse is part of the

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[37] Both the Aiakidai (cf. *N*.8.6-8 for the birth of Zeus' son Aiakos by Aigina) and the Aeginetan victor are descended from Zeus. Cf. Privitera (1988), 69 and Fearn (2007), 103 with n.63 on the performance of the ode in the Aeginetan *agora* (v.14).

[38] Hubbard (1987a), 9, citing *N*.9.1-3, *O*.10.3-6, *P*.1.58-59, *P*.11.41-45, *N*.6.28-29; cf. *P*.4.1-2, where the Muse is asked to stand beside Arcesilas.

[39] For this ring-composition, cf. the request addressed to Kleio in *Bacch*.3.3 as 'giver of sweetness', which is echoed by the statement at the end that the Muse 'nourishes' (v.92) the fame of victory through the poet's

poet's rhetoric of cumulative learning, which begins with the longing of athlete and chorus (v.5) and culminates in the offering of song at vv.77-80.[40]   The victor's desire for everlasting fame (*kleos*) is dependent upon the Muse's favour, just as the poet required her to inspire his song. It seems to me that the phrase εὐθρόνου Κλεοῦς ἐθελοίσας is ambiguous and that the Muse will judge whether or not the victor's deeds merit *kleos*.[41] Ultimately, his future glorification may depend too on whether he heeds the advice provided by her son, the poet. It would be wrong, then, to overlook the fact that instances of heroic *kleos* provided by the Muse constitute standards the victor should try to attain if he is to achieve glorious renown. Thus, the Muse is inextricably linked to the paraenetic function of the ode, whose particular character I shall examine in a moment. For now, we should consider how the poet's relationship with the Muse helps the poet to dramatise the production of his composition.

The 'oral subterfuge' as cumulative and spontaneous learning

Let us consider how the presentation of the ode contributes to an effect of cumulative learning for the audience. The speaker begins by pretending that the performance has not begun; without the Muse, the chorus are powerless to

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song. Cf. Maehler (2004), 83-4, who notes that the conceptual and verbal correspondences frame the ode. Cf. also Bacch.13, where the naming of Kleio towards the start and end of this ode (13.9, 13.227, 'flowering Kleio') seems less subtle than *N*.3.

[40] Pfeijffer (1999a), 223 is unnecessarily sceptical about this point but rightly observes that if there is an association, the hearer realises it only here.

[41] Pfeijffer (1999a), 223, notes that 'the willingness of Clio is not the cause of Aristocleidas' victories but the condition of his fame'.

perform.[42] By a familiar fiction, the composition and performance *appear* to be taking place simultaneously.[43] The futures κοινάσομαι (12) and ἕξει (12) create the illusion that the ode has not started yet. Commentators have tried to explain why the speaker expresses the product of his relationship with the Muse from a future perspective. According to Bundy, the conventional use of the future indicative in the first person ('encomiastic future') is a programmatic statement that directly proclaims the present act of celebration.[44] Pfeijffer, however, argues that

> there is no such thing as an encomiastic future. There is no future in Pindar that merely expresses a present intention or that is performative to the extent that its promise is fulfilled by the mere pronunciation of the word. The reference to a future moment is relevant in every single instance of a future verb in Pindar. In no case can one convert the future into a present without any loss of meaning.[45]

Pfeijffer's analysis, however, is too dogmatic and largely ignores the problem of a temporal *origo* before the performance of the ode.[46] The use of the future tense, however, is one of the ways in which the text can represent itself simultaneously from the perspective of composition and performance. In one sense, the future is part of the fiction that the victory song begins at a point immediately *before* its composition and therefore refers to this song as it unfolds in performance.[47] Given the fiction, it is a perfectly understandable application of the future tense, though not typically 'performative' in the sense of referring to the present act of

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[42] Carey (1980), 152. Cf. Burnett (2005), 140-1: 'the performers depict an imaginary instant in which inspiration, composition, musical scoring, and hours of rehearsing combine to become today's unique celebration'.
[43] Pfeijffer (1999a), 564, noting that this fiction takes the audience back vividly to the place of victory.
[44] Cf. Bundy (1962), 21-2.
[45] Pfeijffer (1999b), 67, who argues that 'encomiastic futures' are unnecessary even on the choral hypothesis. Cf. the review in Gerber (2000), 1.
[46] D'Alessio (2004), 279. Cf. Pfeijffer (1999b), 34 on the use of so-called 'fictional futures' (e.g. *N*.3.12, *N*.9.1), whose purpose is 'to create the illusion that his odes take shape at the very spot, fictionally representing the process of composition rather than offering the ready products of that process'.
[47] Contra Heath & Lefkowitz (1991), 186-8, the future cannot refer to the performance of some other aspect of the victory celebration; nor can it refer to a future performance of this ode.

celebration.[48] Thus, the song that 'I' shall impart to the youthful male singers and their lyre is this one. However, *Nemean* 3 is an unusually complex ode. In between the idea of a deferred performance waiting for the arrival of the song (1-13) and the idea that the song is being 'sent' (v.67f.), there are verses that seem to present the song actually having attained fully-fledged enactment in an on-going performance.[49] Clearly, there are several different temporal points in play simultaneously.[50]

In attempting to refine Carey's model of 'oral subterfuge', D'Alessio has argued that the mirage of *extempore* composition does not cover the complex situation in which the very gap between composition and performance is dramatised. He thinks this practice 'is incompatible with the notion that the text represents itself as either an impromptu composition or impromptu performance'.[51] D'Alessio's study suggests that futures in such mediated communications partake of necessary fictionality, making such labels as 'performative' and 'encomiastic' less than useful. The distinction between the deictic moments of composition and performance is virtually effaced in *Nemean* 3, where the chorus refer to their own

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[48] Cf. Slater (1969b), 86-94, to which D'Alessio's article (2004), 272-5 provides important qualifications. *Pythian* 3.77, if it is a genuine future, is a better example of a 'performative' type of future that belongs to a distinct poetic category.

[49] The parallel constructions of ἐγώ...πέμπω (76-7) and ἐγὼ δὲ...κοινάσομαι (11-12), reveal the active participation of the poet in his composition; cf. Hubbard (1987a), 6.

[50] Cf. D'Alessio (2004), 291: 'the time-reference shifts from the moment of production – seen as coincident with the transmission of the song by the Muse through the poet to the singers – to the moment of performance'.

[51] D'Alessio (2004), 279, citing Carey (1981), 5. He suggests the result of this process 'is to stress the *distance* implied in a complex communication process'.

performance as though it is in the process of being composed.[52] In other words, 'the reference to a future moment' expresses both a future intention from the perspective of the composition and in terms of the ode's performance as it unfolds. In this way, the future helps to efface the temporal lapse between composition and performance.

In the Introduction, I observed Scodel's remark that 'the poetic voice presents its song as thinking, and it seeks to convince its hearers by allowing them to follow the process'.[53] The poet's ability to displace what he is doing, by talking about it as an unrealised intention, is a powerful way to accentuate the feeling that what the audience is hearing is a "work-in-progress". The most important effect of the 'oral subterfuge', that is to say composition-in-performance, like that of the Homeric bard, is that it enables the poet to establish a strong personal link with the patron, where 'I' addresses 'you' as if 'we' are having a conversation. In *Nemean* 3, this has interesting didactic effects too, since it is possible for the poet to provide an insight into his methods *and* appear to correct his mistakes within the ode's performance. In this way, he can play the parts of teacher and pupil. In particular, the fact that the content of his teaching is conceived within this spontaenous mode of delivery makes this cumulative learning more persuasive as far as the listener is concerned. By dramatising a gap between text and performance, the poet makes his instruction appear as though it is adapted to the concerns of the present performance.

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[52] D'Alessio (2004), 279. The poet 'exploits the separation between text and performance while apparently effacing it'. The result of this is 'deictic simultaneity'.
[53] Scodel (2005), 2. Cf. Carey (1995), 85-103, on the 'oral subterfuge' and A.M.Miller (1993b), 21-54.

Instruction in a paraenetic dialogue

Let me elaborate the earlier suggestion that the relationship between poet and Muse is a model for that of poet and victor by examining the way in which the poet articulates the product of his collaboration with the Muse. In trying to understand Pindar's self-representation as an adviser in this ode, it is helpful to think of 'I' (poet) addressing 'you' (Muse) as if 'we' are having a conversation about a third person. *Nemean* 3 contains a relatively high number of gnomai for a fairly short ode, all of the third-person type.[54] The fact they are inclusive in reference is symptomatic of the indirectness of Pindar's instruction.

As explained in the Introduction (1b), analysis of the 'communication-situation' has provided a useful critical method for analysing gnomes in archaic poetry. Seitel distinguishes between first, second and third person sayings, depending on their external referent.[55] According to the model expounded by Lardinois, a gnome that applies to the speaker is a first-person saying, one that applies to an addressee is a second-person saying, and a gnome that applies to neither speaker nor addressee is a third-person saying.[56] Pindar's forms of address, however, are more oblique that what we find in didactic-epic. Lardinois observes that the most common way in which the narrator speaks a gnome about the

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[54] *N*.3.6, 7-8, 29, 30, 40, 41-2, 70-74, 74-5, cited in the appendix of Lardinois (1995), 347.
[55] Seitel (1977), 75-99.
[56] Lardinois (1995), 36.

victor is through a substitute addressee.[57] 'This type of gnome is also the preferred form in epinicians by Pindar, who often addresses a god, his lyre, or another member in the audience when speaking about the victor'.[58] The first gnomic priamel in *N*.3.6-8 is an example of an 'indirect second person saying with substitute addressee', since it is addressed to the Muse but applicable to the victor. The pattern of indirect address in *Nemean* 3 is similar to that of *Olympian* 1.4f., in which the narrator initially addresses his own heart. This is part of a lengthy indirect address of the *laudandus* that is eventually followed by a short direct address (to Hieron) at v.107, as at *N*.3.76.[59] However, the address to the heart should be differentiated from the apostrophe to the *thymos* at *N*.3.26 insofar as the poet is not dramatising a form of learning at the start of *O*.1. Anyhow, the Muse has a similar function *qua* substitute addressee to that of the poet's *thymos*, since both enable Pindar to speak in an indirect way about the victor. As noted earlier, Pindar does not formally address the victor until he is ready to seal his 'paraenetic encomium'. Crucially, the poet's collaboration with the Muse in this joint enterprise enables the poet to dramatise his instruction effectively in a way that is applicable to all parties in the discourse.

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[57] Lardinois (1995), 267.
[58] Cf. Lardinois (1997), 229 with n.77, citing *O*.8.10-11 (Olympia), *P*.1.59 (Muse), *P*.10.21-2 (Apollo); cf. *Il*.23.787-88, where Antilochus praises Odysseus after foot-race by speaking a gnome about him to the assembled Greeks.
[59] Lardinois (1995), 263 with references in n.37. The gnomic priamel (cf. Bundy, 1962, 4-6) in *Olympian* 1 corresponds to *N*.3.6-8, which explains that this particular song is motivated by athletic victories, since τὰς picks up ἀοιδάν (v.7).

In the Introduction, it was observed that one of the ways in which the poet presents his ode as a thinking is through gnomic clusters.[60] The poet imparts his instruction by referring to the paradigm of Herakles:

εἰ δ' ἐὼν καλὸς ἔρδων τ' ἐοικότα μορφᾷ
ἀνορέαις ὑπερτάταις ἐπέβα
  παῖς Ἀριστοφάνεος, οὐκέτι πρόσω
ἀβάταν ἅλα κιόνων ὕπερ Ἡρακλέος περᾶν εὐμαρές,

ἥρως θεὸς ἃς ἔθηκε ναυτιλίας ἐσχάτας
μάρτυρας κλυτάς· δάμασε δὲ θῆρας ἐν πελάγεϊ
ὑπερόχους, ἰδίᾳ τ' ἐρεύνασε τεναγέων
ῥοάς, ὁπᾷ πόμπιμον κατέβαινε νόστου τέλος,
καὶ γᾶν φράδασε.

If being fair and performing deeds to match his form, the son of Aristophanes has embarked on utmost deeds of manhood, it is no easy task to go yet further across the untracked sea beyond the pillars of Herakles, which that hero-god established as famed witnesses of his furthermost voyage. He subdued monstrous beasts in the sea and on his own explored the streams of the shallows, where he reached the limit that sent him back home, and he made known the land. (*N.*3.19-26)

Herakles provides an inimitable example of heroic excellence and a supreme standard by which the victor's achievement can be measured; the blurring of the traditional distinction between hero and god implies that Herakles cannot be emulated.[61] For a mere mortal to be compared with Herakles in the first place is flattering enough; but whilst his exploration of the limits of human endeavour sits favourably against the exploits of the victor, it also serves as a warning against excessive ambition. Whilst Pindar does not go so far as to say that the victor 'has reached the limit' of his athletic career, as Pfeijffer suggests, the image of the

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[60] Scodel (2005), 2.
[61] Cf. Shapiro (1983), 17: 'Surely Pindar enjoyed this ambiguity when he coined the bold phrase *herōs theos* (*Nemean* 3.22)'.

Pillars of Herakles reinforces the gnome that it is not easy for someone who has reached very great heights to go further.[62] The $εi$ in the protasis quite often implies 'if, as is indeed the case' and is typically followed by an apodosis containing an expression of warning.[63] The *parainesis* is couched within praise of the victor's 'utmost deeds of manhood' (20) that match his (physical) form. The interweaving of advice and praise in this way is tactful, as is the nature of the address. In this third-person gnome, 'it is not easy to go beyond the pillars of Herakles' (vv.20-21), it is not quite clear who the internal addressee is, although the Muse was the last person to be invoked directly.[64] As with the similar sentiment at *O*.3.44-5, where the victor is mentioned in the previous verse (cf. *N*.3.20), the gnome is clearly applicable to the victor. It should be classified as a third-person saying with substitute addressee, used by a speaker among friends and in polite addresses.[65] Lardinois notes that 'gnomes that apply to the victor technically become third person sayings, but since the victor is present in the audience and hears these words too they are really masked second person sayings or 'second person sayings with a substitute addressee'. This type of gnome can be recognized either through the preceding address of another person or because the victor is spoken of in the third person.' It is the most

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[62] Instone (2000), 1, contra Pfeijffer (1999a), 226. Burnett (2005), 14, argues that 'this is the epinician way of saying that Aristokleidas' success is as full as any mortal success can be'. It is certainly not 'a warning issued to an ageing or ailing patron'.

[63] Pfeijffer (1999a), 282-3 observes that $εi$ clauses are frequently used to introduce ideas that are not necessarily conditions in a logical sense. See *N*.9.45-7, *I*.6.10-13 and *I*.5.12-16.

[64] Lardinois (1995), 261, who does not include this gnome, which he defines as 'a generalizing statement about a particular action' (p.12) in his appendix on Pindaric gnomai.

[65] Lardinois (1995), 267. Cf. *P*.1.59f, *O*.11.19f. for other examples of odes in which the victor is spoken of in the third person following a direct address to the Muse.

common way in which the narrator speaks a gnome about the victor.[66] This is the case at *N*.3.19-21. In contrast to *O*.3.43-5, where the similar expression of advice overlaid with praise is presented from the perspective of the exemplary poetic 'I', the latter is delayed until *N*.3.28. So Pindar dramatises his instruction first before applying the gnome to his own task. This engages the audience fully with the decision-making process and renders the subsequent personal example a more effective form of *parainesis*.

As commentators have pointed out, the gnome at vv.20-1 has a transitional function in the narrative.[67] More importantly, however, the gnome conveys a particular attitude about ambition, whether heroic, athletic or poetic.[68] It is as though the poet uses the gnome to think about an ethical issue before taking up its import personally. The poet reinforces his *paraenetic* stance by commenting tactfully on the implications of the victor's achievement at the same time as adopting an exemplary approach to his own art. Thus, another function of the gnome is to illuminate the shared goals of *laudator* and *laudandus*. The inclusive character of the gnome and the fact that it is contained within an indirect address to the victor enables Pindar to advise tactfully. The implicit warning contained in this gnome is subsequently applied by the speaker to his *thymos* in the form of an apostrophe (v.26). Even as Herakles had to turn back his own ship from the limits of his journey, so Pindar must end his brief association with Herakles'

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[66] Lardinois (1995), 267.
[67] Kurke (1993), 49-50, suggests that 'the topos of the pillars of Herakles functions structurally in the poem as a pivot, a turning point from praise of the victor (14-21) to the central mythic narrative of the Aiakidai (31-64)'.
[68] Cf. Currie (2005), 79.

career and move on to a more 'fitting adornment' (ποτίφορον 31) of the victor and his homeland. I will examine the address to the *thymos* more fully later.

Part 2: Chiron and Pindar

As a preliminary to analysing the centrepiece of Pindar's paraenetic dialogue, it is necessary to consider his choice of myth and its particular resonances with his self-representation as a teacher. When Pindar implores his Muse to grant from his *mētis* an 'abundant' (ἀφθονία) means of celebrating the victor, he suggests an affinity between his activity and that of Chiron in the myth.[69] In Chapter 1, I noted that Chiron's combined educational excellences reveal an inner resource of intelligence encapsulated in the hapax βαθυμῆτα (53), 'deep-devising'.[70]

  βαθυμῆτα Χείρων τράφε λιθίνῳ
Ἰάσον᾽ ἔνδον τέγει, καὶ ἔπειτεν Ἀσκλαπιόν,
τὸν φαρμάκων δίδαξε μαλακόχειρα νόμον·
νύμφευσε δ᾽ αὖτις ἀγλαόκολπον
Νηρέος θύγατρα, γόνον τέ οἱ φέρτατον
ἀτίταλλεν [ἐν] ἀρμένοισι πᾶσι θυμὸν αὔξων,

Deep-devising Cheiron raised Jason in his rocky dwelling and then Asclepius whom he taught the gentle-handed province of medicines. Then too he betrothed the splendid-breasted daughter of Nereus and fostered her [Thetis'] matchless offspring [Achilles], making his spirit great in all things fitting. (*N*.3.53-8)

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[69] Cf. *O*.11.7-8: 'Without stint (ἀφθόνητος) is that praise dedicated to Olympic victors' and *Od*.8.346-7, where Telemachus rebukes Penelope: 'Why do you begrudge (φθονέεις) the trusty singer the right to give delight in whatever way his mind urges him?' Cf. *Il*.2.484-92.
[70] Contra Nicholson (2005), 260 n.9, the context gives no hint that βαθυμῆτα refers to Chiron's 'use and transmission of technical knowledge'.

Fennell admits that 'tautometric responsion' of single words may be without significance and may sometimes be due to chance. But when a verbal repetition is obviously significant it is generally heterometric, unless more than one word is recalled.[71] I suspect, therefore, that the repetition of *mētis* (9, 53) and *thymos* (26, 58) at different positions in the metrical scheme is not coincidental. Indeed, Pindar highlights the inter-relation of different aspects of this ode with repeated imagery.[72] Carey makes the important point that verbal echoes are more noticeable in oral delivery than reading and can be used to reinforce a particular argument.[73] In particular, the organic nature of Pindar's argument in this ode is expressed through a complex nexus of poetic images. I suggest that the reference to Chiron's *mētis* complements Pindar's earlier self-characterisation concerning the production of his song. The question though, is in what sense?

Pfeijffer doubts whether the analogy between Chiron and Pindar is productive because the point about Chiron (vv.58-9) is that he takes care of the right mental disposition of his pupil *before* Achilles exposes himself to the perils of battle: 'Whilst Chiron enables Achilles to gain *kleos* in the first place, Pindar helps to

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[71] Fennell (1893a), xviii, borrowing this term from Mezger's echo-theory (1880), which regarded words that occurred in the same metrical position as significant catch-words, marking transitions and also indicating connection of thought.

[72] Bury (1890) ad v.80 notes that Achilles' fleetness of foot (ποσσί v.52), his trademark Homeric epithet, applies equally to the eagle (ποσίν 81). Cf. the repetition of the verb of sending, πεμφθείς (59) and πέμπω (77).

[73] Carey (1981), 12. Cf. Carey (1981), 11: an 'echo of sound alone without a connection of thought and content is without value'.

preserve the hero's fame afterwards'.[74] One problem with Pfeijffer's interpretation of the analogy is that it ignores the fact that Pindar's primary responsibility as an epinician poet is to the *victor*. In addition, it overlooks the possibility that this is a device by which Pindar can reinforce the paraenetic dimension of the ode. Moreover, in reaching this conclusion, Pfeijffer focuses on the teleological function of Chiron's education, which is to 'fix in [Achilles'] mind' (ἐν φρασὶ πάξαιθ᾽, 62-3) that Memnon would not fulfil his desired homecoming from Troy; he compares this with Pindar's fixing of the Aiakids' fame in the medium of song (τηλαυγὲς ἄραρε φέγγος Αἰακιδᾶν αὐτόθεν· 64), where the notion of fixity is expressed through a different verb.[75]

Clearly our interpretation of an analogy (like a mythical *exemplum*) depends upon the angle from which it is considered and there is nothing to say that the analogy must be viewed in one way. At any rate, my approach takes into account the peculiar expression about the character of Chiron's teaching. As I noted in Chapter 1, the use of the verb ἀραρίσκω at v.64 has more to do with fixing something in place than with accommodating a thing's parts to one another (cf. ἀρμένοισι, 58). This, I argued, is an allusion to the fitting-together of the different elements that ensure that Achilles' *thymos* is properly equipped to fulfil its potential at Troy. This image, whether or not my conjecture of an allusion to musical instruction is accepted, seems to me a useful analogy for the fitting-

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[74] Pfeijffer (1999a), 229 n.71, who cites Hubbard (1985), 42 with n.89 and Gianotti (1975a, *not* 1955), 55-6.

[75] Cf. the lengthy eagle as hunter metaphor at *N*.3.80f., which recalls the hunting exploits of the young Achilles earlier in the poem, though not in relation to the same image of fixity; cf. *N*.5.44 for an expression of fixity.

together of different parts of a poem, with the particular emphasis here being on subject-matter.

Let me substantiate the claim that Pindar identifies his control over the poetic programme with Chiron's nurture of Achilles. Chiron's profound mind can be discerned in his ability to educate heroes in a number of different ways, depending upon their natural ability and particular requirements. The striking collocation ἁρμένοισι πᾶσι (58) implies that Achilles is equipped with all the mutually beneficial skills required by a hero. The main point of the analogy is the ability to attune the *thymos* to its specific requirements, which for Pindar means selecting the correct subject-matter and for Chiron involves directing Achilles' *thymos* towards the pursuit of excellence through a balanced education.

Content and Character of teaching

In considering the parallel between Chiron and Pindar, we should not ignore the other participants in this poetic enterprise, namely the Muse and victor. Hubbard views Chiron's significance in terms of the poet's self-conception as a teacher: 'Whereas Pindar's role is to supply his chorus and ultimately the victor with Muse-inspired wisdom, Chiron provides the training that a hero requires for success in combat.'[76] But we should refine Hubbard's formulation by considering the object of this 'Muse-inspired wisdom'. It is important to recognise that whilst the members of the youthful male chorus are the immediate recipients of this

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[76] Hubbard (1985), 42.

wisdom, Aristokleidas, to whom the poet refers in the third person at v.15, is the subject of the song and hence the ultimate beneficiary of this wisdom.[77] Moreover, he is the corollary of Chiron's pupil.

Contrary to what other scholars have suggested, the image of Chiron as trainer is not especially productive in this ode. From the point of view that Pindar does not portray Chiron teaching Achilles the art of hunting (cf. Chapter 1), he cannot correspond to the athletic trainer, as Pfeijffer suggests.[78] And since Pindar does not teach the victor the skills of the pancratium either, this aspect of the analogy does not seem helpful. Certainly, the equation between hero and victor indicates that the content of Pindar's teaching is significant. In Achilles, the victor is given the greatest example of Aegina's inborn excellence and shown the advantages of training allied to natural ability (cf. 40-2).[79] Secondly, the three distinct phases in Achilles' life: as a child on Pelion, as a young man tutored by Chiron and as a mature hero at Troy, prefigure the gnomic reflection on the three stages of life, since he excels at every point.[80]

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[77] Cf. Mullen (1982), 26 on the creation of 'tension' between Pindar and his chorus at the start of the ode, which is 'destined to be harmoniously resolved'. Cf. Lardinois (1995), 272, who argues that the chorus, in representing the community, has a 'certain legitimacy in addressing important issues through myths and gnomai'.

[78] Pfeijffer (1999a), 230. For Hubbard (1985), 42, 'Cheiron's primordial wisdom is the civilizing principle without which natural talent is raw and unformed. As such, Cheiron evokes the figures both of the athletic trainer and the poet.'

[79] Schadewaldt (1928), 287 n.2 thinks that the myth of Achilles makes *physis* and *didache* the only legitimate base for great exploits. Cf. Froidefond (1989), 9.

[80] Froidefond (1989), 3 believes that the third stage of life mentioned in the gnome, ἐν παλαιτέροισι, shows that Pindar loses sight for a moment of the age categories to athletic contests. But Pindar could simply be looking ahead to Aristokleidas' future or man's common destiny. In the context of the Games the 'elders' could include trainers or judges.

ἐν δὲ πείρᾳ τέλος
διαφαίνεται, ὧν τις ἐξοχώτερος γένηται,

ἐν παισὶ νέοισι παῖς, ἐν ἀνδράσιν ἀνήρ, τρίτον
ἐν παλαιτέροισι, μέρος ἕκαστον οἷον ἔχομεν
βρότεον ἔθνος· ἐλᾷ δὲ καὶ τέσσαρας ἀρετάς
⟨ὁ⟩ θνατὸς αἰών, φρονεῖν δ' ἐνέπει τὸ παρκείμενον.
τῶν οὐκ ἄπεσσι·

  But in the test the result shines clear, in what way someone proves superior, as a child among children, man among men, and thirdly among elders, such is the stage that our human race attains. Then too, our mortal life drives a team of four virtues, and it bids us heed what is at hand. Of these you have no lack. (*N*.3.70-76)

Here, the emphasis lies not on the different qualities associated with the three

stages of life, which is the point of Hesiod fr.321: ἔργα νέων, βουλαὶ δὲ μέσων, εὐχαὶ

δὲ γερόντων, but that in whatever way someone proves to be outstanding holds

true through all stages of life, as exemplified by Achilles.[81] As Pfeijffer remarks,

'the qualities eminent in the boy [Achilles] are presented as identical to the ones

the man possesses and thus qualities in general are considered to be a constant

factor, unvarying with a man's age'.[82]

It seems to me that *Nemean* 3 is exceptional in drawing such explicit attention to

the role of the Muse (in her capacity as the poet's 'mother'). And we have

observed her influence in the production of wisdom. Significantly, Pindar places

some weight on Chiron's *nurturing* (as opposed to purely educative) powers in

the definitive phrase ἀτίταλλεν [ἐν] ἀρμένοισι πᾶσι θυμὸν αὔξων (v.58). The parallel

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[81] Stoneman (1997), 219 concurs with Farnell that the three ages should not be matched somehow with the four virtues (vv.74-5) because all virtues are necessary in each age. For four virtues as a commonplace of Greek thought, cf. Aesch. *Sept*.610 and Simon. *PMG* 542.
[82] Pfeijffer (1999a), 213, contra Froidefond (1989), 9.

between Chiron's mother (Philyra) and Pindar's mother Muse in terms of nurture

helps to define the particular roles of poet and Chiron with respect to the hero

and victor.[83] Chantraine suggests that βαϑυ- has 'l'idée de puissance,

d'abondance'.[84] This is obliquely reflected in Pindar's poetic resources.[85] Verses

20-32 suggest very strongly that the Muse's rules apply equally to Aristokleidas

and through this relation the poet becomes the victor's instructor as well as the

vehicle of his praise. Whereas Chiron's 'intelligent resourcefulness' manifests

itself in the choice of a well-proportioned education for Achilles, the poet's shrewd

choice of subject-matter provides an example that supports the gnomic advice 'to

heed what is at hand' (*N*.3.75). To conclude, the addition of the Muse reinforces

the impression that the didactic aspect of the parallel between Chiron and Pindar

lies in the *character* of the teaching, which comprises the manner in which it is

presented.

In conclusion, we have explored the dual influence of the Muse and Chiron on

Pindar's self-representation as a teacher. I shall consider next the possibility that

Chiron's paradigmatic ability to direct Achilles' *thymos* towards the correct end is

appropriated by the poet in his address to the *thymos*. The latter is conceived as

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[83] Cf. Hubbard (1985), 42, with n.89: 'The figure of the mother, both in the case of Pindar and Cheiron [v.43], emphasizes the natural genetic basis out of which their art must emerge, and which art must take as its starting point.'

[84] Chantraine (1968), p.155-6, s.v. βαϑυ- . Cf. the use of the prefix at *I*.6.74-5 (βαϑύζωνοι κόραι) to describe the Muses as the source of the poet's inspiration in a way that perhaps alludes to their nurturing powers. Cf. *P*.1.12, where the poet refers to the 'deep-breasted' (βαϑυκόλπων) Muses and Bacch.9.87, Μουσ[ᾶν βαϑυζώνων ἄϑ]υρμα, a corrupt text. Cf. the collocation φρενὸς... βαϑείας at *N*.4.8, which describes the source of Pindar's song in the depths of his mind.

[85] Like Homer (e.g. *Il*.23.313-22), Pindar uses *mētis* to refer to mental capacities or their manifestations; cf. Pfeijffer (1999a), 258. Cf. Detienne & Vernant (1972), 15. The *OCD*[3] (p.969) describes Mētis as 'intelligence personified'.

the seat of the emotions in which all the elements, like Achilles' *thymos*, must be carefully harmonised. In addition, I shall argue that the poet's address to *thymos* is an echo of the Muse's nurture, which facilitates the rhetorical strategy whereby the poet presents his own example to the *laudandus*.

Training the thymos

I have suggested that Pindar's address to Aristokleidas is typical of the tradition of friendly instruction characterised in Phoenix's address to Achilles. I want to consider now the way in which traditional forms of instruction are appropriated in the passage at vv.26-32.[86] In particular, I shall contend that Pindar's teaching is underpinned by the paradigmatic relation of Chiron and Achilles in the myth of *Nemean* 3. I should make it clear at the outset that I do not wish to claim that the appropriation of the epic formula at *N*.3.26 is intended to allude to the *Precepts of Chiron* itself (or even to a particular episode within the poem) but that it is symptomatic of the way in which Pindar reconfigures traditional didactic elements in his epinician discourse:

θυμέ, τίνα πρὸς ἀλλοδαπάν
ἄκραν ἐμὸν πλόον παραμείβεαι;
Αἰακῷ σε φαμὶ γένει τε Μοῖσαν φέρειν.
ἕπεται δὲ λόγῳ δίκας ἄωτος, "ἐσλὸν αἰνεῖν,"

οὐδ᾽ ἀλλοτρίων ἔρωτες ἀνδρὶ φέρειν κρέσσονες·
οἴκοθεν μάτευε. ποτίφορον δὲ κόσμον ἔλαχες

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[86] D'Alessio (2005), 232 has suggested that *Nemean* 3.43-53 alludes to the 'advice of Cheiron' (παραινέσεις Χείρωνος), although the emphasis lies more on the formation of Achilles' heroic temperament than on the enumeration of formal precepts.

γλυκύ τι γαρυέμεν. παλαιαῖσι δ' ἐν ἀρεταῖς
γέγαϑε Πηλεὺς ἄναξ, ὑπέραλλον αἰχμὰν ταμών·

  My heart, to what alien headland are you turning aside my ship's course? To Aiakos and his race I bid you bring the Muse. The essence of justice attends the precept "praise the good" but longings for foreign themes are not better for a man to bear. Search at home, for you have been granted fitting adornment to laud in sweet song. In achievements of long ago Peleus took delight, after cutting his matchless spear; (*N*.3.26-33)

The two forms of authority that underpin Pindar's self-representation as a teacher intersect in the poet's address to his *thymos.* The pattern of thought in this ode suggests that this is both an echo of the Muse's nurture and analogous to Chiron's nurture of Achilles. Pindar exhorts his *thymos* to prevent his ship of song from running adrift on an alien headland. Pindar uses the idea of limitation inherent in the Herakles myth as a model for his own poetics, although in changing subject-matter, paradoxically, he has gone beyond the pillars of Herakles.[87]

Whilst the poet requested an abundance of song from the Muse in order to complete his task, he quickly lost his way. That is not to say that the Muse failed in her task, but that the poet's *thymos* selected an inappropriate theme from her abundant resources (v.9). But in finding a suitable example of *aretē*, the poet will satisfy the requirements of the gnome at v.8. Nonetheless, the practical outcome of this manoeuvre (a transition to the second mythical subject at v.28f.) only partly explains its motivation, since the result of the poet *deliberately* leading his poetic ship astray in the first place is to enhance his authority as an adviser.

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[87] Cf. Barker (1994), 178.

Indeed, by subsequently exemplifying a correct approach to his subject-matter, Pindar enacts the disciplining of an errant pupil by a strict schoolmaster.

I want to expand on my claim in Chapter 1 that Chiron is an interactive model for Pindar as poet-educator by arguing that the paraenetic 'I' (v.28), appropriates Chiron's paradigmatic associations in order to provide a tactful and authoritative form of instruction for the victor.[88] The interaction between the paraenetic 'I' (28) and the mythical paradigm gives the impression that Pindar is to Aristokleidas what Chiron is to Achilles (cf. *P*.6), master and protégé respectively.

Didactic Authority

In the Introduction (12), I mentioned Lardinois' observation about Odysseus' use of indirect address; his 'uncanny ability to present a saying as being applicable to one person, but at the same time have it refer to another person as well' is pertinent to this ode.[89] At v.26, Pindar recalls the epic convention in which a hero addresses himself in a moment of crisis:

ἀλλὰ τί ἤ μοι ταῦτα φίλος διελέξατο θυμός;
οἶδα γὰρ ὅττι κακοὶ μὲν ἀποίχονται πολέμοιο,
ὃς δέ κ᾽ ἀριστεύῃσι μάχῃ ἔνι τὸν δὲ μάλα χρεὼ
ἑστάμεναι κρατερῶς, ἤ τ᾽ ἔβλητ᾽ ἤ τ᾽ ἔβαλ᾽ ἄλλον.

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[88] For Hubbard (1985), 42, 'Cheiron's primordial wisdom is the civilizing principle without which natural talent is raw and unformed. As such, Cheiron evokes the figures both of the athletic trainer and the poet.'
[89] Lardinois (1995), 145; cf. Lardinois (2000), 656.

"Yet still, why does the heart within me debate on these things? Since I know that it is the cowards who walk out of the fighting, but if one is to win honour in battle, he must by all means stand his ground strongly, whether he be struck or strike down another." (*Il*.11.407-10)[90]

Lardinois points out that 'the two gnomes that he makes here apply both to himself and to his addressee, which in this case is his own *thumos*'.[91] Likewise, the corresponding gnomes at *Nemean* 3.29-30 are addressed to the poet's *thymos*, since they are framed by the φαμί command to it in 28 and second-person verbs μάτευε and ἔλαχες, for which no other subject is available in 31. The fact that they could apply to the speaker and audience too gives the impression of collaborative learning in this crisis of decision-making. As was mentioned earlier, gnomic thought helps the poet to dramatise his decision-making by presenting his ode as "thinking". The formula itself is a vehicle for a gnomic thought, in which asyndeton is commonly used.[92] In this case, the poet's resolve to chart the exploits of the Aiakids (32f.) results from a sense of obedience to the thought of the preceding gnomic cluster (29-30). The indefinite third-person gnome οὐδ' ἀλλοτρίων ἔρωτες ἀνδρὶ φέρειν κρέσσονες (30) specifies that the advice is applicable to any man (ἀνδρί), including Aristokleidas.[93] As a willing adherent to the Muse's rules, which govern the choice of subject-matter, the poet presents the universal human inclination towards the absent (30) as something that must be similarly resisted by the external addressee. The motif of longing for foreign themes (30) is indicative of an attitude Pindar wishes to instil in the *laudandus*

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[90] Transl. Lattimore.
[91] Lardinois (1995), 146. Cf. Lardinois (2000), 653.
[92] Cf. Hornblower (2004), 361, who compares the use of asyndeton in the break-off formula at v.76.
[93] Lardinois (2000), 648, notes the wide applicability of this gnome; cf. Lefkowitz (1991), 115.

and contributes to the creation of the laudator's character (*ethopoeia*).[94] The command at v.31 to the *thymos* to 'search at home' is the familiar thought 'stick to the near and don't try for what is distant'.[95] This theme is related to, but not identical with, the idea of 'not seeking beyond human limitations'.[96] The word οἴκοθεν has been interpreted as a reference to innate excellence but is a fairly clear reference to the poet's choice of Aeginetan myth.[97] Even so, the yearning for things beyond one's proper sphere is a common human foible that affects both poet and athlete alike, as Pindar has already hinted in his reference to the pillars of Herakles.[98] The word λόγῳ (29) in the injunction 'to praise the good' is picked up in λεγόμενον δὲ τοῦτο προτέρων/ἔπος ἔχω· (52-3), which introduces the myth of Achilles. Thus, in linking the gnome with the first person, he exemplifies the precept. In Pindar's rhetorical strategy, then, example based on precept is more effective than precept alone.

Let us consider Pindar's self-characterisation as a pedagogue. Pindar appropriates an epic formula in a way that emphasises the authority of the speaker. Odysseus uses the verb οἶδα in the first person to emphasise the strength of his moral conviction in contrast to his uncertain *thymos*. Lardinois argues that the use of the phrase 'I say' or 'I know'…gives the speaker full

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[94] On *ethopoeia*, see Carey (1995), 96-8.

[95] Hornblower (2004), 361.

[96] The word ἀλλοτρίων (30) picks up ἀλλοδαπάν (26). Hornblower (2004), 73 n.65; cf. Young (1968), 118-20 on the near and the far, Pfeijffer (1999a), 311 and the fault of Coronis, who 'was in love with (ἤρατο) things remote' (*P.*3.20). Also Hubbard (1985), 11-27.

[97] Contra Woodbury (1979), 113. This idea originates in the scholiast's phrase referring to 'one's own resources', διὰ τῶν οἰκείων ἀρετῶν (Drach. iii, 126).

[98] Hornblower (2004), 335 notes that the word ἔρωτες (30) has an interesting parallel in Nikias' criticism of the Athenians' Sicilian ambitions as 'doomed lovers of things remote' (δυσέρωτας τῶν ἀπόντων, Thuc.6.1.3.2); cf. also Eur.*Hipp.* 184-5, 193-7 for a very close parallel.

responsibility for what he says and is used by superiors speaking to inferiors (or by those who want to claim such superiority).'[99] I suggest the juxtaposition of the first-person verb φαμί (*N*.3.28) with the second-person pronoun σε reflects the hierarchical relationship of teacher and pupil.[100] Comparison with the Homeric speaker suggests that the *parainesis* is more authoritative. Pelliccia notes that φαμί in *N*.3 introduces a command: 'the infinitive after a verb meaning 'say'…represent[s] the imperative of direct speech' (Dover on Thuc.6.29.3). 'So, e.g., in *N*.3, instead of θυμέ, φέρε Αἰακῷ γένει τε Μοῖσαν we get Αἰακῷ σε γένει τε Μοῖσαν φέρειν (the subject of the direct imperative is supplied in the accusative probably because the order extends only to the speaker's θυμός.) The indirect form seems more emphatic.'[101] Certainly, the 'I command' preliminary seems to me to underline the injunction rather than to weaken it.

Although the *parainesis* is more emphatic than the Homeric speaker's, the relationship is one of collaboration in a poetic enterprise. Pelliccia argues that *O*.9.35-42 and *N*.3.26-32 'resemble the Iliadic speeches in which the speaker imputes now rejected thoughts or utterances to his θυμός, but are more explicit, in that the offending organ is addressed and rebuked in the second person; thus they also resemble Odysseus' speech to his κραδίη at *Od*.20.18-21.'[102] Pelliccia overplays the sense in which there is a *conflict* between the two participants in

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[99] Lardinois (1995), 63, citing *Il*.23.787-88, where Antilochus 'combines personal authorship with an acknowledgement that what is said is well known'.

[100] Cf. *N*.6.27-9, where he urges the (singular) Muse to direct to the Aeginetan victor's house a glorious wind of verses.

[101] Pelliccia (1995), 346 n.130. Cf. *N*.6.27-9, where Pindar uses a direct command to urge the Muse to direct to the Aeginetan victor's house a glorious wind of verses.

[102] Pelliccia (1995), 296. He compares the identification of the organ, used as a scapegoat for the waywardness of composition, with the 'bad Muse' in Callimachus fr.75.1-9.

this poetic enterprise in *Nemean* 3, which is not introduced in the form of a rebuke.[103] In the more overtly polemical *O*.9.35f., Pindar addresses a direct command (rather than an apostrophe) to his mouth at 36 and 40. By contrast, the only second-person command directed at the *thymos* is μάτευε (*N*.3.31), which like the address to the *thymos*, is introduced in asyndeton, a feature of didactic poetry. Hornblower has pointed out that asyndeton is used where a sentence is a vehicle for a short gnomic utterance or injunction (e.g. *I*.5.14-16, *N*.3.31, *P*.2.72, *P*.3.61 *P*.4.263). 'The ultimate literary model or influence here may be the staccato manner of the epigraphically-preserved "Delphic Precepts".'[104]

I propose that Pindar's use of the apostrophe is a dramatic means of projecting an internal dialogue, which engages the external audience in the thought-processes of his composition. In the latter respect, it resembles the address to the Muse, although in this case the chosen mythical subjects are emblematic of a particular ethical attitude he wishes to instil in the victor. Two aspects of Odysseus' address to his *thymos* can illuminate the rhetorical function of Pindar's apostrophe, which is a question that remains unanswered and therefore invites reflection on the part of the audience. At vv.26-7, Pindar attributes responsibility to his *thymos* for misdirecting the course of his ode. In the archaic poets, *psyche* and *thymos* alike tend to act as independent agents.[105] Pindar portrays an inner

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[103] Cf. Hes.*Th*.35f, where there is a greater distance between the speaker and the object of his question.
[104] Hornblower (2004), 361. Cf. Hummel (1993), 471 on the frequent introduction of *gnomai* in asyndeton.
[105] Cf. Darcus (1979), 172-3 with Archilochus (fr.128.1-4 W).

dialogue between self and spirit that is peculiar to the inspired poet or prophet.[106] Like Odysseus, Pindar disclaims personal responsibility for his actions. He does this by attributing the digression on the subject of Herakles to the creative instincts of his poetic self, although Pelliccia perhaps goes too far in claiming that Pindar's rational side *chastises* his impulsive side.[107] At any rate, this rhetorical conceit enables the *ego* to reassert control whilst winning credit for being enthusiastic in his praise of the victor.[108]

Second, the poetic *ego* delegates responsibility to the *thymos* for choosing a new mythical subject. The only other example of a self-apostrophe to the *thymos* in relation to the choice of subject-matter in Pindar is *O.2.89f.*, although this does not have an echo of thought elsewhere in the ode. Observing Pindar's fondness for this formula, Morrison notes that none of the other self-apostrophes in archaic poetry comes 'in the context of the selection or control of material for a poem or narrative, but of advising the θυμός or 'heart' (in a manner somewhat reminiscent of Homeric characters such as Odysseus)'.[109] I surmise that Pindar has taken an epic formula and applied it in a unique way to his epinician discourse.

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[106] Clarke (1999), 314. Cf. *Paean* 6 (fr.52f.12-15, S-M), where the poet is guided by his heart in the same way as he might be guided by the deity of song: ἤτορι δὲ φίλῳ παῖς ἅτε ματέρι κεδνᾷ πειθόμενος κατέβαν ('In obeying my own heart, as a child obeys his dear mother, I have come.').

[107] Pelliccia (1995), 305. On the *thymos* as the seat of emotions in Pindar, cf. *P.3.64*, which implies that Chiron's *thymos* is susceptible to emotion (cf. *P.4.295*, of enjoyment experienced by the *thymos*). At *N.6.55-7*, the poet says that every man's *thymos* 'is disturbed by a wave that rolls in the path of a ship'.

[108] Cf. Pelliccia (1995), 306, who observes the twin effect of this rhetorical *trope*: 'The poet wins credit: for generosity of spirit, sincerity, etc., if he yields to his impulses, or for self-control, responsibility, dutifulness etc. if he suppresses them. When he follows the pattern of the Iliadic rebukes to the *thymos* [as in *N*.3] he wins credit for both: he is both exuberant and yet, in the end, conscientious, prudent and restrained.'

[109] Cf. Morrison (2007b), 151; cf. e.g. *Od*.5.298-312 and Theognis 213-14, 695-6, 877-8, 1029-36, Ibycus *PMGF* 317 (b), Simon.fr.21.3W.

Sharples makes the point that after pondering such things in his *thymos*, the Homeric hero sometimes ascribes his actions to forces outside himself.[110] It is as though the character is deferring to an *alter ego*. Since the speaker's concern in *Nemean* 3 is about the particular content of his ode (28), the 'external' force, though not stated explicitly, must be the Muse, as she provided him an abundance of song at the outset. It is not stretching it too far, I think, to see the poet's address to the *thymos* as an echo of the Muse's nurture.[111] By implicitly attributing some responsibility for his actions to the Muse (with the benefit of hindsight), he increases his authority.

A paraenetic dialogue

Pelliccia has shown that direct addresses to the *thymos* are 'fairly transparent examples of using the apostrophizing of an organ as a means of dramatically formulating "rules for living" in Direct Speech commands to oneself'.[112] In formulating a 'rule for living' in his apostrophe, it is not that Pindar is appropriating any particular moral instruction from the *Precepts*, as is the case in *Pythians* 4 and 6, but that he is integrating his own thought with the unique features of this song.[113] So whether or not this didactic-epic formula was recognisable as an

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[110] Sharples (1983), 3. 'With hindsight, a character finds it difficult to regard certain actions as his own - either because he would not normally be capable of them, or because they now seem foolish'.

[111] Cf. Frontisi-Ducroux (1986), 17-27 for the closeness of Homeric narrative apostrophe to Muse invocations. For the Muse as nurturer of the poet's inspiration, cf. *O*.1.112: 'For me [the poet], the Muse nourishes (*trephei*) the strongest weapon'.

[112] Pelliccia (1995), 291 n.18, citing Theognis 1029-1036 and 213f., like Archil.128 (and also *P*.3.63).

[113] Cf. *P*.4.102, *P*.6.23-7.

allusion to the *Precepts* or not, the choice of address to the *thymos* and the nature of the advice itself evoke Chiron's teaching in the myth.

I propose that the conversation between *ego* and *thymos* reconfigures a paraenetic dialogue for epinician in a way that is both tactful, since it is not part of a direct address to the victor, and authoritative, since the 'I' likens himself to a pedagogue and takes on Chiron's paradigmatic associations. In this case, Pindar's *thymos* symbolises a 'pupil', a substitute for the external addressee, who requires instruction from his 'master', the poetic *ego*. Moreover, these roles correspond to the paradigmatic relationship of Chiron and Achilles, which is a foil for that of the poet teacher and addressee. This is analogous to the way in which didactic poems such as the *Precepts of Chiron* include an 'advice speech put in the mouth of a legendary figure who speaks to one or more internal addressees and, through them, to the external audience'.[114] Such a model is readily applied to *Pythian* 9, as I argued in the Introduction. Nonetheless, the dramatisation of instruction through an internal substitute addressee is another manifestation of the same phenomenon. The difference is that it is incorporated within a more dynamic and interactive form of *parainesis* than is the case in *Pythian* 9. As far as the audience is concerned, the 'conversation' between *ego* and *thymos* at vv.26-8 draws on the paradigmatic instruction of Achilles. As an indirect form of *parainesis*, it complements the 'friendly' address to the victor in the epilogue.

Conclusions

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[114] Lardinois (1995), 229. Cf. Nagy (1990b), 71.

In conclusion, the apostrophe of the *thymos* (26f.) takes the form of a miniature 'paraenetic dialogue' in which the poet enacts a form of instruction through a critique of his own professional practice. In the Introduction, I suggested that the way in which Herodotus dramatises alternatives in wise adviser speeches, particularly in commands, appeals, or proposals in order to reflect his own views, might illuminate Pindar's strategy in this ode, where his appeal to the *thymos* provides an insight into the choice of subject-matter. Following Lang's remark that the use of the wise adviser in Herodotus reflects an intermediate stage in the shift from internal debate in Homer to tragic dialogue, I suggest that Pindar's conversation with his *thymos* represents a parallel development, whereby Pindar appropriates a preceptual discourse for epinician. It is likely that this reflects the influence of *Precepts of Chiron* in particular.[115] Of course, this sort of quasi-dramatisation in Pindar is not a step in a *temporal* process of transition, since tragedy was already flourishing by this time. In this case, the poet provides insights into his own *modus operandi* that provide a form of implicit instruction for the external addressee. This compensates for the lack of genuine dialogue in epinician between the poet and recipient of his advice. By drawing on the associations of Chiron, the 'I' increases his authority in a way that is comparable to that of the poet speaking through his characters. But it can be differentiated from *Pythian* 9 in the sense that the mythical characters are substituted in a dialogue between *ego* and *thymos* that derives force from the mythical paradigm.

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[115] Lang (1984), 54. Athanassaki (2004), 326, noting further that in dramatised narratives, the epinician speaker adopts a role analogous to that of a tragic messenger.

I conclude that the way in which Pindar appropriates Chiron's instruction for the benefit of an external addressee effectively reconfigures preceptual instruction for the epinician genre. In this paraenetic 'dialogue', Pindar appropriates the style of instruction in which 'I' instructs 'you' as though we are having a friendly conversation. Of course, the roles of teacher and pupil enacted in this dramatic dialogue are in fact two sides of the same Pindaric persona, which is adept at manipulating the response of the audience in this way. Indeed, this is how Pindar can pose as both teacher and pupil. In *Pythian* 3, a similar drama is played out over the course of the ode rather than in a vignette. This is the subject of the next chapter.

Part One: A Paraenetic Dialogue

Genre and Occasion

Wilamowitz thought that the ode was a consolation for Hieron's failure to win a Pythian victory (in 474 BC) as well as for ill-health, since the impossibility of bringing health and a Pythian crown are referred to together in verse 73 (εἰ κατέβαν ὑγίειαν ἄγων χρυσέαν/ κῶμόν τ᾽ ἀέθλων Πυθίων αἴγλαν στεφάνοις).[1] In his classic study of the ode, Young comments that 'despite the so far insoluble problem of date and occasion, *Pythian* 3 is quite intelligible as it stands and we hardly need such [biographical] information'.[2] Nonetheless, as Hornblower explains, 'the idea of an 'ailing Hieron' has survived into the sophisticated modern phase of Pindaric criticism, which is usually cautious about inferring such biographical data from the text'.[3] This evidence, fuelled by a comment in the scholia, has led to a great deal of interpretative conjecture since.[4] The fact that Pindar did not bring a victory-*komos* (v.73) has convinced many that the ode is not an epinician in the strictest sense of the word.[5] Robbins conjectures that beneath the mention of a former victory is the reality of a present disappointment

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[1] Wilamowitz (1922), 280; cf. also Gildersleeve (1895), 268, Mullen (1982), 168, Gentili (1988), 145.

[2] Young (1968), 27 n.2.

[3] Hornblower (2004), 67, remarking that the phrase 'golden health' (v.73) is personally appropriate as well as beautiful.

[4] For Hieron's illness, cf. *P*.1.50-1, Σ *P*.1.89ab, Σ *P*.3.117; also Lefkowitz (1991), 53.

[5] Nagy (1990), 142 notes that 'epinikion' literally means something like 'that which is in compensation for victory'.

passed over in silence and that this is 'a poem not only of consolation in illness but also in defeat'.[6]

Nothwithstanding the uncertainty about its genre and conception, *Pythian* 3 possesses all the formal elements of an epinician ode.[7] It has been observed that the admonitory content in *P*.2 and *P*.3 is as high as anywhere in the epinicia.[8] Given the unusually high level of advice in this ode, then, the sobriquet 'paraenetic encomium' may be a fitting one.

Structure and Argument

Slater notes that the most important advance in our understanding of the ode was Young's observation that the first 76 lines act as a *recusatio* for the remainder of the poem and that the two parts are formally inseparable.[9] I view line 80 as the climax of the first part and the beginning of the second, where Hieron is directly addressed for the first time.[10] The prayer to the Mother at the start of the fourth antistophe is transitional (v.77).

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[6] Robbins (1990), 311, following Wilamowitz (above n.1) and Bowra (1969), 99. Robbins thinks that a former victory (74) is mentioned because it contributes to an important theme of the poem, namely 'longing for the absent': 'The *komos* that Pindar might have brought would have been for an old victory and this puts it in a class with other things he has abjured, such as the dead Cheiron and Asclepius.'
[7] For Willcock (1995), 12, the three basic ingredients of the epinician are factual details about the victor, myth and moralising (i.e. gnome), all of which this ode has, including the striking opening. Cf. Hornblower (2004), 18 on the problem of classification and Currie (2005), 344.
[8] Cole (1992), 130.
[9] Slater (1988), 53, citing Eur. *Her*.655ff as exhibiting a parallel rhetorical structure of utopian wish used as a foil for a realistic hope (cf. v.111); cf. Aristoph.*Frogs* 866f and *Eccl*.151f, for parody of this rhetorical device.
[10] Robbins (1990), 313, following Pelliccia (1987), 39-64.

From a triple sequence of impossible conditionals (2f, 63f, 73f) in the first part of the ode, the poet switches to simple conditionals (vv.80, 85-6 &103), which are much more realistic and optimistic in their import. The subsequent emphasis is placed on understanding one's mortal lot rather than on striving for the unattainable. Young accepts the *consolatio* interpretation of the poem and concludes that Pindar consoles Hieron with nothing less than poetic immortality.[11] I do not wish to dispute this interpretation of Pindar's message to Hieron and the subsequent consensus.[12] Currie's objections to Young are part of his bold attempt to challenge the traditional interpretation of the poet's message in the ode and do not convince me entirely.[13] The poet's solution for Hieron is based on the substitution of an unrealistic and ethically inappropriate desire for literal immortality with the opposite: a realistic and ethically legitimate aspiration for immortality in song:[14]

εἰ δέ μοι πλοῦτον θεὸς ἁβρὸν ὀρέξαι,
ἐλπίδ᾽ ἔχω κλέος εὑρέσθαι κεν ὑψηλὸν πρόσω.
Νέστορα καὶ Λύκιον Σαρπηδόν᾽, ἀνθρώπων φάτις,
ἐξ ἐπέων κελαδεννῶν, τέκτονες οἷα σοφοί
ἅρμοσαν, γιγνώσκομεν· ἁ δ᾽ ἀρετὰ κλειναῖς ἀοιδαῖς
χρονία τελέθει· παύροις δὲ πράξασθ᾽ εὐμαρές.

And if a god should grant me luxurious wealth, I hope that I may win lofty fame hereafter. We know of Nestor and Lykian Sarpedon, still the talk of men, from such

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[11] Young (1968), 68, contra Farnell (1932), II 97. Young rightly rejected Finley's argument (1955), 91 that 'Pindar would be a healer like Asklepios, or the centaur Cheiron who reared him, but his healing would be the courage which poetry gives'.

[12] The consensual view that the poet rejects literal immortality for Hieron in order to insist on the sole possibility of immortality in song is represented, *inter alia*, by Burton (1962), 90 and Race (1986), 61-2 and Robbins (1990), 316.

[13] Currie (2005), 350-2. He is probably right to see the main stimulus for the ode as Hieron's failing health, rather than the Pythian victory, which Hieron may have failed to win (cf. Cingano, 1991: 101, Robbins, 1990: 312).

[14] Cf. Fennell (1893b), 172: 'the main result of the poet's reflections is that the immortality of song which poets can confer is a higher blessing than longevity which no one can secure for a mortal'.

echoing verses as wise craftsmen constructed. Excellence endures in glorious songs for a long time. But few can win them easily. (*P*.3.110-15)[15]

Robbins well notes the supreme paradox of the poet's promise in the final verses: 'Immortality, which has consistently been presented throughout the ode as future and distant, is given in the present in the form of the ode itself: Immortality is ἐοικοτα and πὰϱ ποδός (59-60) after all.'[16] The point of course, is that the metaphorical form of immortality that Pindar offers Hieron *is* attainable, as the *sphragis* intimates.[17] This militates against Currie's reading, which he admits is not an exclusive one, that Pindar seeks to confer *literal* immortality on his patron.

The effectiveness of Pindar's paraenetic encomium, I propose, turns on the fact that it is advice instantiated in the performance of the song, as much as the promise of immortality in song *per se*, that is the solution to Hieron's particular situation. Rather like Horace, who 'combines the role of wise adviser with that of the poet who confers immortality, and who gains it for himself in the process', so Pindar, in the process of offering his patron a form of poetic immortality, enhances his own status through the giving of advice.[18]

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[15] Transl. Race (1997).

[16] Robbins (1990), 317 noting that the word πϱόσω (111) seems to contradict the earlier rejection of τα πόϱσω (22), which referred to the fool's longing for things distant and unattainable, as exemplified by Asclepius and Coronis. The echo is sealed by the repetition and contrast between unrealistic and morally hazardous hopes (ἐλπίσιν, 23) for things far away and the realistic hope (ἐλπίδ', 111) based on what the poet offers to Hieron.

[17] Robbins (1990), 308, contra Hubbard (1985), 23, who thinks the final stanza cancels the idea of 'the near' as a favoured term. Cf. Hornblower (2004), 335 on the opposition between the 'near and the far' and Pelliccia (1987), 56.

[18] Winsor Sage (1994), 572, noting that Horace *Odes* 4.9 draws his concluding exemplum from the Greek gnomic and historical tradition. Pindar, Simonides and Bacchylides were known 'for lyrics which contain admonition as well as praise'. (p.573)

Outline of argument

In my study of Pindar's self-representation as a friendly adviser in *Nemean* 3, I argued that Pindar's appropriation of Chiron's instruction for the benefit of an external addressee effectively reconfigures preceptual instruction for the epinician genre. Whilst we cannot, of course, be sure about the nature and shape of the *Precepts*, there is little reason to doubt that it included dialogue and probably opened with an address to the son of Peleus.[19] Let me offer an outline of how Pindar reconfigures this form of discourse in *Pythian* 3. I shall argue that the advice to Hieron dramatises the form of a dialogue between the giver and the receiver of advice by transferring the dialectical relationship to two "speakers".[20] It seems to me that the argument of the ode is framed as an exchange of ideas between two "speakers" who assume the paradigmatic associations of Chiron and Asclepius. By manipulating the poetic persona in a way that elucidates the moral dilemma Hieron faced, Pindar presents his paraenetic dialogue both tactfully and authoritatively. Thus, we can substantiate Clay's enigmatic remark that after Hesiod, when the silent presence of the addressee becomes a convention of didactic poetry, 'one could easily imagine an effective form of didactic which might incorporate dialogue'.[21]

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[19] Schwartz (1960), 244 thinks the *Precepts* included a dialogue between Philyra, Chiron and Achilles. Cf. Bacchylides 27.34-38, which may derive from the Hesiodic *hypothekai* (cf. M-W, p.143 and Kurke, 1990, 94). Here, a report about Chiron's speech to Achilles, which is used to support the words of another speaker (possibly Thetis) may offer an insight into the original conception of the *Precepts* as a dialogue.
[20] Cf. Winsor Sage (1985), 228.
[21] Cf. Clay (1993), 23-4.

Secondly, I consider the rhetorical effect of recasting a (hypothetical) preceptual dialogue between Chiron and his pupil, to which the external addressee Hieron is expected to listen and learn (like the audience of Hesiod's *Works and Days*). I propose that the presentation of teaching in this form of discourse aggrandises the poet-teacher. In particular, the internal 'dialogue' between two speakers embodying the characteristics of Chiron and Asclepius helps the poet to manage his audience's expectations during the course of the ode. In this regard too, another Hesiodic context of advice is helpful. The representation of teacher and pupil through two "speakers" helps to give the ode a sense of linear development, since the "first speaker" enacts a mistake on behalf of the *laudandus* only to have it contradicted by the views of a "second speaker". The progression of thought creates an implicit expectation that Hieron will shift his attitude as he absorbs Pindar's teaching. This 'protreptic' (or perhaps 'apotreptic') education is intended to reform Hieron, rather as Perses' position shifts within the poem from that of an erring brother to a budding farmer and finally to a hopeful sea-farer.[22] From an apparently desperate situation in which he is susceptible to misplaced thinking, Hieron moves to a position of confidence in his present and future glory thanks to Pindar's advice. The figure of the Herodotean wise adviser, who dramatises the important choices before individuals, perhaps by giving advice to those who lack a larger perspective, or by advocating a proper way to behave, is germane to Pindar's construction of this paraenetic dialogue. As noted

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[22] Gray (1998), 161. In noting the dynamic linear development of *W&D*, Clay (1993), 25 remarks that Perses is expected to change in the course of the poem as he absorbs Hesiod's teaching.

in the Introduction (11), however, Pindar's advice is more enlightened and constructive than that of the "wise adviser" in Herodotus.[23] For example, Pindar offers Hieron a solution in the second part of the ode to the *aporia* that results from two futile requests for Chiron in the first part and his exhortation strikes a more resolute note.

Of course, this view of Hieron's transformation from a position of misguided ignorance to one of reasoned confidence about his fate is based on an impression gleaned from the internal evidence of the ode; whether or not this corresponds to an external reality is, to some extent, conjectural. Moreover, the fact that the poet tells us less than Hesiod about whether the addressee actually needs to change in the first place perhaps reveals a basic difference between Hesiod and our poet's representation as a tactful adviser. And of course we have no idea of how Hieron actually responded to Pindar's advice. While Pindar's response cannot be explained entirely as poetic artifice or rhetorical conceit, since there must be some truth behind the apparent request for healing, it provides the wise poet with a convenient opportunity for self-aggrandisement.

First-person struggles

In this ode, it is possible to differentiate between two broad categories of first-person statements, whose function cannot be reduced simply to praise and

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[23] Cf. Lattimore (1939), 24: 'The wise adviser is the sage elder who tries to halt headstrong action in a chief; he is in general pessimistic, negative, unheeded, and right'. Cf. Marincola (1996), xxii.

advice, or even to consolation and instruction.[24] These statements carry different levels of authority and represent different ethical perspectives.[25] At the same time, they help the poet to fulfil his obligations to the *laudandus*, which in this case are offered in the form of a paraenetic encomium. On *three* occasions, the first person is used to express a wish for Chiron as part of a hypothetical condition (1, 63, 65). In this way, the speaker impersonates the misplaced desires of the external addressee and provides him with a subtle lesson at the same time. The four occurrences of the first person at 65, 68, 73 and 75 voice the unfulfilled desires of this "first speaker" pertaining to the hypothetical scenario of providing Hieron with a healer. These lines are consistent with his coming to Syracuse, but without bringing healing and a victory-*komos*. At *P*.3.75, the first-person declaration φαμί is consistent with that of the initial wish for Chiron. By intimating what he *would* have done for Hieron, the speaker demonstrates his continuing commitment to the *laudandus*.

Currie observes that the 'laudator's persona in 68, 73, and 76 is inconsistent with members of a Syracusan chorus, but consistent with the Theban Pindar'.[26] These verses show what course Pindar would have taken were Chiron still alive, as opposed to what *ought* to happen in the current circumstances, which he

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[24] Cf. my comments in the Introduction (2) on the overlapping of praise (*ainos*) and instruction (*parainesis*), which demands that we characterise Pindar's *epainos* as broadly as possible and do not reduce it, simply, to 'praise'.

[25] For the distinction between an 'indefinite personal statement' (which annunciates a general principle) and an 'encomiastic' first personal statement (which announces a poetic intention), cf. A.M.Miller (1983), 208 n.25.

[26] Currie (2005), 387, concluding that 'the persona of the first person in 77-8 is, substantially, that of the historical Pindar' (p.388; cf. p.397). According to Schachter (1981), I.166, n.1, the idea that Pindar is speaking *in propria voce* here is based on a Hellenistic invention.

expresses – in the voice of a "second speaker" - by stating what he now desires. This corroborates my view that the ethical identity of the 'I' shifts in the course of the ode.

The speaker of the prayer to the Mother at v.77 signals the new start by ring-composition: ἐθέλω...ἐπεύξασθαι (= ἐπεύξομαι) recalls ἤθελον κε (1) and εὔξασθαι (ἔπος, v.2).[27] This change in mood signals a shift from the morally ambivalent request for an absent healer to a more realistic prayer, albeit one that does not satisfy the poet's project to give Hieron immortality in song. One important nuance is that Pindar offers a vow of devotion rather than requesting a specific favour. Certainly, we are told nothing about the content of the prayer.[28] It is difficult not to be drawn into a historicist reading of vv.77-9, encouraged by the idea of a personal relationship between Pindar and the object of his devotion propagated by a scholion on *P*.3.78, which mentions a hymn to Pan referring to the god as 'companion of the Great Mother' (Ματρὸς μεγάλας ὀπαδέ, fr.95.3 S-M).[29]

Whether or not the prayer reflects a biographical reality, Pindar is capable of portraying an exemplary stance through the 'I' that is independent of his own

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[27] Cf. Currie (2005), 387, adding that the prayer is one of the interpretative cruces of the ode.
[28] Pelliccia (1987), 56.
[29] Bowra (1964), 49-51, suggests that Pindar was busy with a new commission for the festival of the Great Mother (the composition of fr.95 S-M), which prevented him from travelling to Syracuse; cf. Paus. 9.25.3, Σ *P*.3.137b.

personal attitude.[30] Consequently, I am wary of identifying any particular passage with the thoughts of the 'historical' Pindar; it is a matter of great controversy as to how far the identity of the historical Pindar imposes itself on the odes. I suggest that the nature of the request to the Mother is deliberately left unclear, since it is not intended to provide a solution to Hieron's preoccupation with healing and immortality, but to be indicative of a particular attitude.[31] The speaker at v.77 adopts the role of the wise preceptor by suggesting a more realistic alternative to Hieron's misplaced desires. For this speaker, moderation is the key to resolving Hieron's concerns. The emphatic ἐγών coupled with the adversative ἀλλ' reveals this as the strongest form of *parainesis* and most like Nestor's style of speech (e.g. *Il*.9.103).[32] The prayer to the Mother, as I see it, is an imperfect solution to the quest for a healer. But it is a key part of the transition; through it, Pindar sets the right moral basis for an alternative solution, which is consistent with the gnomic injunction to be satisfied with one's present lot (103-4).

I contend that by enacting divergent moral attitudes through the shifting persona of the 'I', Pindar presents his lesson as a form of dynamic interaction between poet and audience. The "first speaker" represents Hieron's purported desires in Syracuse and the "second speaker" the attitude of the wise adviser in Thebes. Thus, by assuming different personae, the poet is able to present his teaching

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[30] Cf. Currie (2005), 80: the '[laudator's] proclaimed understanding of what he is about may fall far short of [the poet's understanding], which is never explicitly revealed to us.' Cf. Morrison (2007b), 32, who notes that the 'criterion for such statements is not truth but plausibility'.

[31] Contra Currie (2005), 353-4, 388; cf. Race (1997), 242. Young (1968), 47-9 makes the plausible suggestion that the poet appeals to the Mother because she is at hand. Thus, he finds an alternative for those who seek things that are far off (20) and strive for the unattainable goal of immortality (61).

[32] Cf. Introduction (8b). For Bundy (1962), 36-9, the conjunction frequently marks a transition to the laudator's professed 'real business' in an ode. As Currie points out (2005), 352, the transition to a new topic does not necessarily mean that what went before is dismissed as foil.

more effectively. These viewpoints counterbalance each other right up to the final epode, whereupon the *ego* finally makes a realistic wish on behalf of the *laudandus* (v.111), and appears to confer praise on him in the process.

The wish for Chiron

Let us examine how Pindar dramatises Hieron's longing for immortality in the opening soliloquy. I shall focus on the rhetorical function of the speaker, the character of his speech and the object of his wish:

 ἤθελον Χείρωνά κε Φιλλυρίδαν

εἰ χρεὼν τοῦθ᾽ ἀμετέρας ἀπὸ γλώσσας κοινὸν εὔξασθαι ἔπος,

ζώειν τὸν ἀποιχόμενον,

Οὐρανίδα γόνον εὐρυμέδοντα Κρόνου,

   βάσσαισί τ᾽ ἄρχειν Παλίου φῆρ᾽ ἀγρότερον

νόον ἔχοντ᾽ ἀνδρῶν φίλον· οἷος ἐὼν θρέψεν ποτέ

τέκτονα νωδυνίας ἥμερον γυιαρκέος Ἀσκλαπιόν,

ἥροα παντοδαπᾶν ἀλκτῆρα νούσων.

   I would wish that Cheiron, son of Philyra wide-ruling offspring of Ouranos' son Kronos – if it is right to utter that common saying from my tongue – now deceased were alive and still reigned in Pelion's glades, that wild creature who had a mind friendly to men; even as he was when, once upon a time, he reared the gentle craftsman of body-strengthening remedy from pain, Asclepius, the hero and protector from diseases of all sorts. (*P*.3.1-7)[33]

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[33] I have adapted Race's translation (1997).

The arresting opening of *Pythian* 3 is characterised by its indirectness, since Pindar does not formally invoke Chiron in the same way that he would gods or abstract personifications.[34] This is neither a formal invocation nor a prayer, but a 'wish-fantasy' for Chiron to be alive.[35] Moreover, the fact that Pindar does not formally address the content of the ode to Hieron until verse 80 tends to suggest that he wants to avoid directly attributing such a wish to him.[36] From the lack of formal addressee, I infer that that the speaker himself is a vehicle for Pindar's instruction of the victor.[37] Certainly, the lack of formal addressee does not prevent the speaker from simultaneously empathising with Hieron and giving him a lesson.

The technique of expressing a typical sentiment *viva voce* through the first-person plural of the personal pronoun [viz. ἀμετέρας ἀπὸ γλώσσας, v.2] is a way of implicating the addressee in the speaker's utterance.[38] This is recalled in ἀμέτεροι at v.65, where Pindar recapitulates the same futile wish in relation to his 'honey-sounding hymns'.[39] The reference to the tongue as an instrument of speech is a way of disowning exclusive responsibility for the utterance, if not the actual thought.[40] This is an effective means of sharing a particular thought-process and

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[34] Cf. e.g. *N*.3.1-3 (Muse), *I*.1.1 (Thebes), *I*.5.1 (Theia), *O*.8.1 (Olympia), *O*.12.1 (Tyche).
[35] Cf. Currie (2005), 348 for the use of this term.
[36] Passages in which the poet speaks directly to the victor towards the end of the ode include *P*.1.81f., 2.18f., 4.249f., 9.97f. and *N*.3.76f. Cf. Race (1992) on the opening of odes.
[37] Cf. my remarks in the last chapter about the address to the Muse in *N*.3, who functions as a substitute addressee and a vehicle for Pindar's instruction of the victor.
[38] Cf. Currie (2005), 360. For the idea of the tongue as a separate organ from the mental faculties, cf. *I*.6.72.
[39] Lefkowitz (1991), 52. Cf. the reflection on *our* destiny (v.60), in which there is a shift from the third person singular to the more inclusive first person plural; the syntax indicates a conceptual link between the wish for Chiron and the thought of the gnome, namely the need to understand our destiny.
[40] Cf. the reference to the *psyche* at v.61, which serves the same function of enabling the speaker to evade some responsibility for his thoughts.

drawing the audience into a progressive argument or debate. The speaker hints at the impropriety (εἰ χρεών, v.2) of this common wish without rejecting it outright.[41] The sentiment is something like 'I wish the dead were living', although this εἰ clause conveys a sense of hesitation and moral uncertainty. It is a variation on the typical way in which a gnome might be expressed with χρή + infinitive, as is the case at v.59, with which it is logically linked.[42]

On the subject of moral authority, the speaker's identification of this common *epos* with the *vox populi* is unlike many first-person statements, which tend to emphasise the speaker's separation from inferior men; it gives away the fact that he is not advocating this for the *laudandus*.[43] That the wish is scarcely authoritative in a moral sense is confirmed by the mood of ἤθελον...κε, in contrast to the use of the same verb in the indicative at v.77.[44] Whilst it is true that ethical statements are often 'couched in the form of first person assertions of practice or desire' these statements carry different levels of authority, as I shall explain later.[45] This kind of sentiment does not reflect that of the moralising poet-teacher, who tacitly acknowledges the misplaced character of the wish in the parenthetical interjection in verse 2. Gildersleeve notes that Pindar 'sets an example of the

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[41] In the terminology of pragmatics, this is a 'speech-act condition' (cf. Hummel, 1993, 437) or a 'parenthetical comment' (Pelliccia, 1987, 42-6).

[42] Martin (1989), 42 notes that 'discourses of *epos* centre around a gnomic one- or two- line utterance' and cites *P*.4.277. Cf. *I*.6.67, where Pindar does not quote the content of the saying directly. At *P*.3.80, the content of the *epos* is in the form of a gnome, whilst in *N*.3.52, it is in the extended form of a myth.

[43] Cf. Lefkowitz (1991), 114-15. Also Arist.*Rhet*.1395b1-11 on the gnome's function.

[44] For a more assertive wish in relation to praise, cf. *O*.7.20; also *P*.9.1, which is the only other ode by Pindar that starts with a wish.

[45] Cf. Carey (1995), 96. Cf. the contrasting expression of ethical practice in the more authoritative first-person gnome at vv.107-8.

impatient yearning he condemns'.[46] I suggest, however, that it is the speaker rather than the poet Pindar who is complicit in the mistake. Moreover, we should separate the identity of this speaker from that of Pindar in his guise as the authoritative adviser and attribute it instead to another side of his professional persona, to whom I refer as the "first speaker". The reason why the wish is inappropriate, though, only becomes apparent as the poem unfolds. The point is that by enacting such a *faux pas* deliberately, Pindar can demonstrate his ethical understanding through the example of a "second speaker" (the paraenetic *ego*) and increase his authority as an adviser.

Desire for Immortality

The introductory appeal to Chiron, reprised at v.65, is a formula by which Pindar can present his advice to Hieron tactfully. This corroborates Segal's view about Pindar's 'indirect method of paradigmatic myth and symbolic association' in contrast to the direct gnomic injunctions of Homer and Hesiod on princely behaviour.[47] The poet identifies with the external addressee by dramatising his supposed wish for a healer. There is a sense too in which the appeal to the absent Chiron is symptomatic of the futility of longing for the unattainable, which is an important *Leitmotiv* of the ode.[48] By showing the impropriety of a wish to bring back Chiron from the dead, Pindar hints at the misplaced nature of his

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[46] Gildersleeve (1895), 268.
[47] Segal (1998), 16. Cf. the mythical exempla in *P*.3, which include Priam, Cadmus, Peleus, Nestor, and Sarpedon.
[48] Pelliccia (1987), 61 observes a parallel in diction between the yearning of the "first speaker" for τὸν ἀποιχόμενον (v.3) and Coronis' yearning for τῶν ἀπεόντων, (v.22).

patron's desires.[49] How, then, should we interpret Chiron's paradigmatic associations, as evoked by the speaker?

In Chapter 1, I argued that Pindar draws attention to the moral aspects of Chiron's nurture and instruction of Asclepius in the arts of healing. Correspondingly, I suggest that the *didactic* aspect of Chiron's associations as far as Hieron is concerned is his ethical attitude, in this case towards mortality. This will be treated separately from Chiron's function as a metaphor for the character of the *laudandus*, which I will examine at the end of the chapter. In the opening of this ode (vv.1-4), Pindar evokes some of Chiron's associations independently of the pedagogic relation with Asclepius, to which he subsequently alludes at v.5. In contrast to *N*.3 and *P*.9, where Chiron's advice to Apollo in the myth mirrors the external relation between poet and audience, Pindar does not initially draw on the paradigmatic relation in order to advise Hieron. In the Introduction (9a), I suggested that the silent presence of the addressee in Pindar can be replaced by a mythical counterpart (e.g. Apollo in *P*.9) who receives a piece of advice that reflects the paraenetic aspect of the epinician relationship. The strategy of presenting advice through the voices of different speakers is analogous to that of speaking through characters in the myth. By voicing the thoughts of the external addressee, the speaker elicits Chiron's paradigmatic associations with the rejection of immortality, which act as a foil to the desires of the speaker and provide an additional lesson.

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[49] Young (1968), 31.

The contemplation of Chiron's death imbues the opening with an aura of poignant resignation. The single participle ἀποιχόμενον (3) contains the sense both of physical departure and of departure from life ('dead and gone').[50] It would bring to mind for Pindar's audience the primary tradition of Chiron's death more or less as told by Apollodorus (2.5.4).[51] In the climax to this tale, we learn Chiron's wound was incurable. The tragic irony is that he was poisoned by an arrow wound that even his legendary skills could not overcome.[52] The logic of this seems to be that if the great patron of healers could not find a cure for his suffering except in death, then Hieron can hardly expect to find one either. Chiron's position at the intersection of the mortal and immortal world discloses the tantalising possibility of attaining physical immortality while at the same time showing it to be problematic.[53] His very proximity to the divine paradoxically emphasises his distance from it, but exemplifies the tendency of someone with quasi-divine status, such as Hieron, to desire immortality.[54]

Pindar draws attention to the wise Centaur's distinguished genealogy and his venerable position at the head of his clan is a metaphor for that of Hieron as *basileus* (70) and *tyrannos* (85). At *P*.3.4, Chiron is said to reign over all the other

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[50] Aston (2006), 351, noting (p.361), that by the time of Pindar, Chiron's 'departure was seen as something that took place in the distant age of the heroes – a regrettable fait accompli.'

[51] Despite his medical expertise, the wound was incurable, but death was equally unattainable since he was immortal (ἐπείπερ ἀθάνατος ἦν). Cf. Aesch.*Prom*.1026-9, Soph.*Trach*.714-16 and Arist. *E.E.* 1229b30 for other interpretations of Chiron's immortality.

[52] Schol. ad *P*.3.102 refers to a late version of myth about Chiron being healed by the hero Asclepius and unable to heal himself. This may owe a debt to the *Iliadic* tradition surrounding Asclepius' son, Machaon. After being wounded by Paris whilst fighting for the Greek cause, Machaon requires the services of another 'blameless healer', ἀμύμονος ἰητῆρος (*Il*.11.834).

[53] Cf. the ambivalent status of Herakles as 'hero-god' as a paradigm for the victor in *N*.3.22.

[54] For a reference to death as a source of consolation (and exhortation), cf. *Il*.18.117-26, where Achilles reflects on the fact that even Herakles had to die. Achilles' death is also used a source of consolation for Hieron at *P*.3.100f.

inhabitants of Mt Pelion (ἄρχειν) and his epithet 'wide-ruling' likens his power to that of Poseidon.[55] The fact that Chiron's status corresponds in some measure to that of Hieron makes his attitude compelling as a model for Hieron. Burr argues that 'Cheiron is an unfinished god. He dies because he falls short of divinity, and his death is therefore all the more regrettable. It is his mortality especially that endears him to Pindar.'[56] In this respect, he provides an extreme *exemplum* for the quasi-divine Hieron that even someone with a greater claim to divinity than himself was still subject to suffering. The fact that immortality prevented Chiron from reaching fulfilment in death is reassuring for Hieron, who is not immortal and therefore will not endure such intolerable suffering. As Davies has recently shown, the distinction between consolation and exhortation is often quite blurred.[57] Chiron is an immortal who chooses death rather than eternal pain, thus underpinning the overall message of the ode, that, given the inevitability of pain for human beings, death is in fact less of an evil than physical immortality.[58]

There is another way in which Pindar appropriates Chiron's acceptance of his fate and rejection of physical immortality as a model for the *laudandus* that reinforces the oblique lesson provided by the "first speaker". In the course of the ode, then, Pindar elicits the traits of Chiron and Asclepius in a way that tactfully contrasts the attitudes of poet and addressee. I shall argue that the use of these

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[55] Cf. *O.*8.31. Κρόνου emphasises his divinity as half-brother of Zeus, a distinguished genealogy that is marked by Οὐρανίδα, 'son of Ouranos' (and of Gaia); this rare epithet evokes the Hesiodic primordial Golden Age and the battle between the gods and giants described in *Theogony* 486 and 502.

[56] Burr (1975), 59. The futility of the wish is shown by the fact that Chiron is a non-existent provider of non-existent immortality, yet the emotional investment Pindar places in him is undeniable. Pelliccia (1987), 60 n.53, notes the irony of Pindar's wish for the resurrection of an immortal who is dead. Cf. the description of Chiron's cave as 'immortal' (*I.*8.41) serves only to point up Chiron's mortality.

[57] Davies (2006), 587.

[58] I am grateful to Douglas Cairns for this summary.

intersecting paradigms provides a more dynamic and authoritative form of teaching.

Asclepius and Chiron: interactive models for the poet as teacher

The stated object of the wish, as opposed to what it symbolises, is for Chiron to be as he was (οἶος ἐὼν, v.5) when he reared Asclepius. This transition into the myth of Asclepius brings into focus the paradigmatic aspect of Chiron's nurture of his pupil. In viewing Chiron as an interactive model for the role of Pindar as poet-educator, we cannot ignore Asclepius. In *Chapter* 1, I observed that the Chiron-pupil relation appears to configure that of Pindar and a young aristocratic victor more closely than it does Pindar and a tyrant.[59] In *Pythian* 3, Pindar's choice of Asclepius as a negative exemplum for Hieron is governed by the ethical character of the advice to Hieron rather than by his age. In contrast to Achilles' positive example in *N*.3, Asclepius' misuse of Chiron's education serves as a warning to Hieron to interpret Pindar's teaching in the right way. In particular, Pindar polarises the respective dispositions of teacher and pupil as paradigms of morality by using Asclepius as a foil to his teacher. Chiron's patient attitude and shrewd choice implicitly underpin the import of the ethical stance as articulated by the "second speaker". We should therefore examine how the paradigmatic associations of Chiron and Asclepius are integrated with the thoughts of the "second speaker" in a way that configures the paraenetic relationship of Pindar

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[59] Cf. my discussion in Chapter 1 of the various ways in which the teacher-pupil analogy illuminates different aspects of the historical relationship.

and Hieron. Following that, I shall examine how the bearing of this speaker strengthens the *parainesis*, whilst not diminishing the level of tact.

The affinity between Pindar and Chiron is revealed in the attitude espoused by what might be termed the "first-person preceptor" at vv.107-8, who is ultimately a model for the external addressee:

εἰ δὲ νόῳ τις ἔχει θνατῶν ἀλαθείας ὁδόν, χρὴ πρὸς μακάρων
τυγχάνοντ᾽ εὖ πασχέμεν. ἄλλοτε δ᾽ ἀλλοῖαι πνοαί
ὑψιπετᾶν ἀνέμων. ὄλβος οὐκ ἐς μακρὸν ἀνδρῶν ἔρχεται
σάος, πολὺς εὖτ᾽ ἂν ἐπιβρίσαις ἕπηται.

σμικρὸς ἐν σμικροῖς, μέγας ἐν μεγάλοις
ἔσσομαι, τὸν δ᾽ ἀμφέποντ᾽ αἰεὶ φρασίν
δαίμον᾽ ἀσκήσω κατ᾽ ἐμὰν θεραπεύων μαχανάν.
εἰ δέ μοι πλοῦτον θεὸς ἁβρὸν ὀρέξαι,
ἐλπίδ᾽ ἔχω κλέος εὑρέσθαι κεν ὑψηλὸν πρόσω.

If any mortal understands the way of truth, he must be happy with what good the blessed gods allot him. Now here, now there, blow the gusts of the high-flying winds. Men's happiness does not come for long unimpaired, when it accompanies them, descending with full weight.
I shall be small in small circumstances, great in great. I shall honour with my mind whatever fortune attends me, by serving it with the means at my disposal. And if a god should grant me luxurious wealth, I hope that I may win lofty fame hereafter. (*P*.3.107-11)

Pindar's personal example at v.107 is more effective because of the way it interacts with the contrasting models of master and pupil in order to instil in Hieron the correct attitude towards fate and the gods. By advising Hieron to be content with what the blessed gods allot him (108-9) and to adapt himself to a given situation at any time (107), rather than to hasten after immortal life, Pindar manifests Chiron's sober rationality and supplies the moral example that was

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either disregarded by Asclepius or not sufficiently emphasised in his education.[60]

Chiron was earlier depicted as σώφρων ('prudent', v.63), since, in spite of his immortality, he 'accepted what is at hand' and chose to die.[61] *Sophrosynē* is, above all, the ability to foresee the consequences of one's actions or of others and is an essential attribute of a teacher.[62] Moderation in aspirations and intelligent foresight are certainly qualities attributable to Chiron, who ended his suffering by preferring mortality to immortality.

It is the way in which the master's associations are played off against those of his pupil that makes the personal example so compelling.[63] Chiron's virtues are antithetical to Asclepius' misuse of his wisdom (*sophia*) for profit (54) and lack of self-knowledge (60). Pindar draws a strong contrast between the 'wisdom' of Chiron in subjecting himself to his fate and his pupil's desire to achieve the impossible and ignore the limits of mortality.[64] If the allusion to Chiron's death shows immortality to be intrinsically undesirable, then the detailed description of Asclepius' fate offers a more explicit sign that such a wish is also ill-conceived (χερσὶ δ' ἄρα Κρονίων / ῥίψαις δι' ἀμφοῖν ἀμπνοὰν στέρνων κάθελεν / ὠκέως, αἴθων δὲ κεραυνὸς ἐνέσκιμψεν μόρον, 57-8). Although both of these aspects are typified in the gnomic passage at vv.59-62, the speaker himself exemplifies Chiron's attitude in

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[60] Cf. the sober advice at *I*.7.40-3 and the commonplace warning about going too far at *P*.10.27.

[61] Slater (1969a), s.v. σώφρων suggests 'sagacious'. Race's translation apparently follows North (1948), 307 n.8, who argues that the epithet means 'wise', 'sage' here rather than 'moderate'. Cf. Pearson (1962), 85 ad Theognis 1135-46 with D.L.Cairns (1993), 177 n.109, on *sophrosynē* as not a purely intellectual kind of 'good sense'.

[62] Sullivan (1995b), 38 compares the description of Chiron as *bathymētis* (deep-thinking, *N*.3.53).

[63] Cf. the paired antithetical paradigms of Croesus/Phalaris (*P*.1.94-6) and Jason/Pelias in *P*.4.94f.

[64] Rademaker (2005), 95.

his own outlook. This is implicitly contrasted with Asclepius' failure to practise the art of healing according to the will of the gods.

It was observed that Chiron's attitude towards mortality serves as a foil to the desires of the "first speaker" and strengthens the *parainesis*. I suggest that Asclepius' attitude has the same function with regard to the rational desires of the "second speaker". Thus, the intersecting paradigms of teacher and pupil strengthen the poet's paraenetic relationship with Hieron. Several aspects of the Asclepius paradigm are linked gnomically to the advice given by the paraenetic *ego* at 107f.[65] The diction of the gnome at v.59 (φρασίν) is echoed in the personal instruction at v.108 (φρασίν) and reveals the underlying cause of human error to be a mental lapse, a point exemplified by Asclepius.[66] As far as the "second speaker" is concerned, the mind (φρασίν, 108) is the key to honouring one's 'fortune' (*daimōn*) and hence of understanding (εἰ δὲ νόῳ,103) the way of truth. The injunction at v.59, to 'seek what is proper from the gods (*daimonōn*)' and to use his resources to the correct end is reinforced by the speaker's exemplary relationship with his fortune.[67] Hieron, of course, already has his share of *eudaimonia* (84), so is included in this special relationship.[68]

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[65] Lardinois (1995), 260 notes that in both epic and lyric narratives, 'gnomai are used to link the mythic stories to the present situation'. Cf. *O*.1.47 (myth), 53 (gnome), which is applied to the present situation at 52 (personal statement).

[66] Cf. the failure of the mental faculties in relation to Coronis, Asclepius' mother, at v.13.

[67] Cf. the verbal echo of *machana* in *P*.3.62/109 and Kurke (1990), 101, on *eumachania* (*I*.4.2) as 'poetic resources'. The opposite is *amachania*, 'poetic resourcelessness'; cf. A.M.Miller (1981), 140 ad *P*.9.92, *P*.2.54.

[68] Cf. Burkert (1985), 180 on *daimōn* as the 'veiled countenance of divine authority'. West (1978), 182 ad Hes.*W&D* 122 notes that in poetry it refers to 'the divine agent responsible for a man's good or ill fortune at any given time'. For Pindaric usage, cf. *P*.5.122-3, where 'Zeus steers the fortune (δαίμον') of men who are dear to him'. Also *N*.1.9, *O*.6.8-9, *O*.9.110 for the use of the adjective δαιμόνιος to describe the *laudandus*.

To conclude, the poet's argument is strengthened by the thematic and verbal interaction beween the poetic *ego*, the paradigm and its 'explanation' in the gnomic injunction. The participle ἀμφέπων (v.51), which refers to the (good) physician's dispensation of his craft in accordance with Zeus' will, corresponds to ἀμφέποντ᾽ (108), denoting the speaker's understanding of his destiny. Pindar emphasises the need to practise his craft in accordance with divine will, which is underpinned by the verbal jingle on Asclepius' name in ἀσκήσω.[69] The verbal echoes as a whole suggest that Asclepius' reversal in fortune is to be linked with Pindar's teaching of Hieron.[70] Unlike Asclepius, whose judgement was impaired by the pursuit of gain, Hieron should use any future wealth he is granted (v.110) to ensure that his dream of 'lofty fame' becomes a reality.[71]

I conclude that by impressing upon Hieron the need to 'exhaust the practical means at his disposal' (v.62) and to reject the desire for immortality (61) illustrated in the Asclepius myth, the "second speaker" appropriates Chiron's defining characteristics of wisdom and moderation and contrasts these with Asclepius' failure to understand his own destiny (60). By underpinning the poet's counsel to accommodate oneself to the circumstances and the times, Chiron's *sophrosynē* is both a metaphor for the poet's advice and a model for Hieron's

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[69] Cf. Eustathius 463, 33 (*ad Il*.4.194), who derives the name of Asclepius from ἀσκέω + ἤπια (with an otiose λ). Also Robbins (1993), 12 n.20, who thinks that *Il*.4.218 contains a rudimentary *schema etymologicum*, with ἤπια alluding to the name of Ascl*epius*. Cf. Slater (1969a), s.v. ἀσκεω: 'honour a divinity' (*O*.8.22, *N*.11.8). In Attic comedy and prose, it usually means 'practise', 'exercise', 'train', as Nagy (1990), 282 reflects in his translation: 'I shall practise my craft on the *daimon* that occupies my mind, tending it in accordance with my abilities' (109).

[70] Cf. Currie (2005), 412, on the indirectness of verbal echoes, which point up 'the crucial analogy between the laudandus and the hero', just as in similes, they reinforce the link between vehicle and tenor; cf. Carey (1981), 11-12.

[71] Robbins (1990), 317 suggests that the tyrant's legendary wealth can help him to acquire a permanent form of prosperity despite the winds of change (104-6), for it enables him to engage a poet.

acceptance of it. By following his example as someone who tackles 'what is at hand' (59), Pindar can legitimately give Hieron what the wish for the absent Chiron (and/or Asclepius or any other healer) could not and should not.

Pindar the Preceptor

Let us consider now how the bearing of the "second speaker" strengthens the *parainesis* at 107f. First, the first-person gnome in Pindar is the most overtly didactic aspect of his style. Bremer notes that 'Pindar uses the first person singular to state a γνώμη, a piece of wisdom and also to give an exhortation, a παραίνεσις'. He explains this differentiation from didactic poetry, which would normally employ imperatives, as an instance of Pindar being 'egotistically eloquent and explicit in his παραινέσεις'.[72] The speaker is not issuing a second-person command like that used in didactic poetry and his statement is a more oblique form of instruction. Nonetheless, the presence of the 'I' makes it more authoritative than the gnomic injunction at *P*.3.61 (where the 'I' is hidden).[73] This is analogous to the use of the phrase 'I say' or 'I know', 'which gives the speaker full responsibility for what he says' and is indicative of one who wishes to claim superiority.[74]

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[72] Bremer (1990), 47 with n.16. His 'I shall' is equivalent to the didactic 'you ought to'. This mode is comparable to the way in which Pindar is egotistical about his poetical craft and should be differentiated from the numerous passages where wisdom is conveyed in a more generalised, 'gnomic' fashion.

[73] Cf. the more emphatic command introduced by 'I say' at *N*.3.28, which I discussed in Chapter 2.

[74] Lardinois (1995), 63 (=1997), 220, noting its frequent occurrence in speech situations in the *Iliad* (e.g. *Il*.1.76, *Il*.6.488, 11.408). Cf. Nestor's use of authoritative first person in *Il*.9.103 and Pindar *N*.3.52 in relation to *epos*; also *P*.9.91 for the 'encomiastic first person'.

Second, the first person future ἔσσομαι (108) shows the audience what the speaker perceives to be the right approach for both parties. The generic future admits the possibility of the poet's example being realised in the performance of this song.[75] According to Lefkowitz, the first-person statements are intended both as indirect advice to the victor and professional statements about and by the poet.[76] So the effect of presenting an exemplary ethical attitude is that Pindar champions his own role as chosen poet. As Young puts it, 'with the first-person indefinite, the poet, by stating what he will do or hopes to do, suggests what intelligent people in general, often the *laudandus* in particular, do or ought to do'.[77] Whilst not entirely excluding ordinary members of the audience, it has the effect of claiming a privileged relationship between the two principal characters. However, the use of the first person singular should be differentiated from the first person plural γιγνώσκομεν, which introduces the second person gnome at vv.114-15; here, the addressee is invited to share the poet's recognition that Nestor and Sarpedon are part of a continuous tradition of commemoration in song to which Hieron can also belong.[78] Thus, Pindar attributes knowledge of the mythological exempla found in verses of wise craftsmen to both speaker and

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[75] Cf. Pfeijffer (1999b), 67, who argues that Pindar projects 'a certain approach to an action, conduct or attitude into any moment to come'.

[76] Lefkowitz (1991), 114-15 (cf. p.55) notes that some first-person statements emphasise his separation from inferior men, his special wisdom and his concern for the community. 'By closely involving his own professional goals with the standards of behaviour that he advocates for the victor, the poet implies that he practises what he preaches.'

[77] Young (1968), 58, citing *P*.11.50-8. Lardinois (1995), 265 with references, notes that the speaker 'serves as comparandum for the addressee'. For Hubbard (1985) 144, this use of the first person is 'evidence of Pindar's attempt to present his own persona, whether qua poet or qua private citizen, as paradigmatic for his *laudandi* and the virtuous behaviour to which he exhorts them'.

[78] Cf. the use of the first person plural pronoun in the wish for Chiron (2) and the first person plural gnome (60), which show the close affinity between *laudator* and *laudandus*.

addressee.[79] So whilst epinician instruction is less overtly didactic than, say Hesiod, the prominent 'I' lends a sense of distancing of the exemplar from the object of his instruction and raises the stature of the giver of the advice.

Conclusions

To conclude, by crossing the boundary between mortal and immortal in different ways, Chiron and Asclepius provide contrasting mythical paradigms that underpin the poet's warning against desiring immortality. Chiron's rejection of immortality (and with it, suffering) raises questions about the rational basis for such a desire, whilst the consequences of Asclepius' ambitions to raise the dead show this to be ethically wrong.[80] One way in which Pindar can present this extreme example of excessive behaviour as a model for Hieron whilst being sensitive to his patron's feelings is to elicit his views through the thoughts of a speaker. The wish is not as forceful as the exemplary first person but attempts instead to win over the addressee through compassionate understanding. In this case, the "first speaker" enacts an error on the part of the 'silent' [external] addressee and in so doing steers the response of his audience.[81] As a foil both to Hieron's acceptable desires and to Pindar's provision of song as an alternative medicine, Asclepius' attitude helps to shape the attitude of the *laudandus*.

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[79] Cf. Scodel (1998), 174 on Phoenix's use of ἐπευθόμεθα (*Il*.9.524), where the speaker shares his authority in order to make his point more persuasive. Cf. Hdt.1.8.4 on the similar attribution of knowledge to the 'elders of byegone days', with Lardinois (1995), 62.

[80] Cf. Currie (2005), 352: 'the negative examples of Asclepius and Koronis are supposed to teach the laudator not to persist in his wish that the 'departed' Cheiron were alive'.

[81] Cf. D.L.Cairns (2001), 23 on Nestor and the Introduction (6).

I submit that the unique treatment of Chiron as a paradigmatic figure in this ode lies in the fact that he is fully integrated with the thoughts of the poet-teacher, which are projected *both* through the negative example of the "first speaker's" wish *and* through the positive example of the "second speaker". Chiron's attitude towards mortality serves as a foil to that of the "first speaker" (and Hieron), whilst reinforcing the moderation of the "second speaker" (and Pindar). Crucially, his paradigmatic associations shape the ethical argument of the ode.

Part 2: Dramatising the Precepts

In the second part, I shall consider how the structural opposition between Chiron and Asclepius is central to the dynamic of the subsequent discourse, in which Pindar dramatises the desire for immortality as a conflict between the "first speaker" and his *psychē*.[82] This is finally resolved by the first-person preceptor towards the end of the ode. I will argue that Pindar's engagement with the moral values associated with Chiron and Asclepius enacts a mental struggle that points up the faults of the *laudandus* in a tactful way. I conclude that the interface between the pedagogic relation and the paraenetic *ego* plays a crucial role in enabling Pindar to present a consistently moral and authoritative persona.

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[82] Cf. Pfeijffer (1999b), 8 on the dynamic hearing of the ode, in which the audience is invited into the text.

The Rhetorical function of the wish

Commentators have recognised the rhetorical function of the wish for Chiron.
Pindar says that if Chiron were alive, he would have brought health and a *komos*
(v.73), but if he had been sincere about restoring his patron's health, he would
presumably not have invoked a deceased healer in the first place.[83] The
obstruction of the wish-fulfilment enables the poet to provide an alternative
solution to healing. In fact, the performance of this song, presumably in
Syracuse, is emblematic of the proper desire for 'what lies at our feet' (v.60) and
is in tune with the ethical advice of the ode.[84]

In the Introduction (3), I noted that the poet often exhorts himself in order to
correct a poetic strategy in an extemporising way that resembles unpremeditated
speech.[85] This apparently spontaneous deliberation is intended to encourage the
audience to engage with the poet's debating of a particular ethical issue, whose
import is relevant to both parties. This gives his didacticism an immediacy which
is at once powerful and persuasive. The wish for Chiron and the subsequent
thought-processes belong to the same strategy. Pelliccia observes that Pindar
often begins with something he will eventually renounce.[86] Arguing against

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[83] Cf. Floyd (1968), 190, who queries why Pindar could not wish for Asclepius rather than for Asclepius'
teacher. In endorsing the Bundyian view of Pindar, Slater (1977), 95 declares that encomiastic poetry is
'basically rhetoric'.
[84] Cf. Young (1968), 33, who argues that the poet uses miracle cures and the raising of the dead as a 'foil'
for his own endeavour to preserve the *laudandus'* fame in song; cf. Bundy (1962), 40 and n.16 and Currie
(2005), 352: 'What is labelled as 'foil' in Pindar frequently lays the foundation upon which the rest of the
poem is to build'.
[85] Cf. A.M.Miller (1993b), 1.
[86] Pelliccia (1987), 47 coins the none-too-euphonious 'false-start recusatio' to describe the poet's technique
of appropriating a second account to correct the first; cf. *O*.1.25-53, *O*.9.27-4 (inappropriate version of
myth/*exemplum*) and the variation in *P*.10.4, 11.38-40 (chastisement for impropriety/digression).

Young's interpretation of the syntax, he noted that the wish was made, not just contemplated and insisted that it is in the nature of an 'unattainable wish' to be 'dismissed' by the speaker as he turns from fantasy to reality.[87] As Pelliccia puts it, 'There is no reason why Pindar should not begin with an expressed wish which he later supersedes' [at v.77].[88]

It seems to me that separating the identities of the two speakers enables us to refine this approach and to see that the wish is indeed made and not dismissed, at least, not by the "first speaker". The restatement of the wish for Chiron at 63f. reflects a continuing struggle enacted in this ode between the moderate *ego* and the impossible desires of the "first speaker" in longing for immortal life.[89] We should therefore distinguish carefully between the moral attitudes of the two "speakers". I have advocated that we identify the wish of the "first speaker" with the type of Asclepian desires that need to be resisted and those of the "second speaker" with the poet's superlative example, underpinned by Chiron's *sophrosynē* (v.63). Accordingly, Pindar presents an alternative solution through the "second speaker" and the gnomic injunction comes closest to expressing the view of the professional poet insofar as it establishes the ethical basis for their contrasting views.[90]

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[87] Pelliccia (1987), 53 contends that the argument of the ode's first part follows a typical Homeric pattern (cf. *Od*.1.253-71): unattainable wish followed by 'the expansion of the wish with a narrative, at the completion of which the wish is recapitulated, and finally dismissed'.

[88] Pelliccia (1987), 47, denying that consistency is obligatory. 'For Young it is crucial that Pindar not actually make the wish about Chiron - for if he does, then how can he later claim to decline it? [v.77]'

[89] Cf. Lefkowitz (1976), 149: 'The impossible wish…is restated'. Cf. Currie (2005), 352: 'The examples of Koronis and Asklepios seem to have problematized the laudator's wish-fantasy, but not to have silenced or quashed it'.

[90] Contra Pelliccia, Currie (2005), 352 argues that *P*.3 contains 'no explicit dismissal of the negative *exemplum* for the laudator. The poem simply moves on'.

At any rate, the idea that 'Pindar arranges the poem so as to make himself appear to discover [as the poem progresses]…the arguments for spurning the wish and facing up to the *hic et nunc*' is quite an attractive one in terms of my thesis.[91] I suggest that this organic process of acquiring knowledge is an important aspect of the poet's didactic representation of his relationship with the external addressee. The presentation of one speaker who enacts a certain attitude and another who provides a corrective is a more dynamic way of presenting the poet's instruction in this 'paraenetic dialogue'. It makes the accumulated learning more compelling as far as Hieron is concerned. In *Pythian* 3, the poet presents the evaluation of different ethical attitudes through his different guises as both pupil (Asclepius) and teacher (Chiron). Consequently, he presents his advice as the result of ethical choices contemplated within the ode and conceived in the unfolding of the performance rather than as a premeditated set of views.

So what makes the choice of Chiron as the object of a wish so pertinent in this ode is how it is interwoven with the poet's 'dialogue' with the tyrant, which draws upon the didactic relation in the myth. This wish can be identified with Asclepius' quest for immortality, as seen in his act of bringing a man back from death (56). Thus, the "first speaker" impersonates an errant pupil whose improper desires require correction. In this way, the poet illustrates the consequences of adopting

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[91] Pelliccia (1987), 61. Cf. Thummer (1968-9), 83-4, 151-2, who coined the term *Hindernismotiv* to describe the poet's necessity to stop because of obstacles. In *N*.5.14-18 (the 'hush' passage) and *O*.13.91, Pindar does not renounce what he says but simply breaks off the account.

the wrong ethical attitude before presenting an alternative view. Ultimately, Pindar supplies the kind of ethical instruction that Asclepius would have been well advised to heed when attempting to bring a man back from the dead (vv.56-7). At any rate, the wish for Chiron functions as part of a rhetorical strategy that serves as a means of aggrandising the poet as teacher. It is the cumulative way in which the dialogue is articulated that makes the instruction so effective.

Tactful instruction: First-person plural gnomes

As explained in the Introduction (3), analysis of the 'communication-situation' has provided a useful critical method for analysing gnomes in archaic poetry. Lardinois has shown that a gnome that applies to both speaker and addressee, or 'first-person plural gnome' is the characteristic form of address used for social equals and friends in the *Iliad*.[92] These are really 'indirect second-person gnomes', since they recommend a particular action for the speaker and his addressee.[93] Lardinois thinks that the Pindaric narrator does not use any 'first person plural/indirect second person' sayings.[94] There is one example in this ode, however:

χρὴ τὰ ἐοικότα πὰρ δαιμόνων μαστευέμεν θναταῖς φρασίν
γνόντα τὸ πὰρ ποδός, οἵας εἰμὲν αἴσας.

μή, φίλα ψυχά, βίον ἀθάνατον

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[92] Cf. Lardinois (2000), 647 with n.24, citing *Il*.24.524 and 525-26. Unsurprisingly, it is used by the sympotic poets when addressing their friends: Archil. fr. 13.5-7a, Mimn. fr. 2.5 V., Theognis 227 f. (= Solon fr. 13.71 f.), 315, (= Solon fr. 15.1), 985-88, 1048, Alc. fr. 335.1.
[93] Lardinois (1995), 89.
[94] Lardinois (1995), 268. Cf. the use of a first-person plural statement at *N*.9.1 to include the audience, with Kurke (1991), 139 n.7. Also Braswell (1998), 46 on *P*.6.3f.

σπεῦδε, τὰν δ' ἔμπρακτον ἄντλει μαχανάν.

It is necessary to seek what is proper from the gods with our mortal minds, by knowing what lies at our feet and what kind of destiny is ours. Do not strive, dear soul, for the life of the immortals, but exhaust the practical means at your disposal. (*P*.3.59-62)

In the gnome that follows the myth of Asclepius, Pindar emphasises the importance of seeking what is proper from the gods, which is the key to understanding man's common destiny. We have seen that the use of the first person plural is a tactful device for implicating the *laudandus* in the misplaced desires of the "first speaker". This syntactical link between the wish for Chiron and the thought of the gnome indicates the failure on the part of the "first speaker" to understand his destiny. This type of gnome applies the ethical attitude both to the speaker and external addressee, although in this case not within a direct address (cf. v.2).

The thought of the gnome, to seek 'what is fitting' (τὰ ἐοικότα), answers the hypothetical εἰ χρεών (2) and makes the listener realise, with the benefit of hindsight, that the wish for Chiron was wrong.[95] All three requirements (to seek what is proper, to know what lies at our feet and to know our destiny) are governed by χρή and intended for Hieron's ears, but the shift from the third person singular in γνόντα to the first person plural εἶμεν makes the lesson more inclusive and tactful.[96] The content of this gnome is perhaps intended to reflect the poet's sense of equality with his 'Aitnaian host' (v.69) in terms of their

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[95] It reinforces the gnome at v.21-3 (ἔστι δὲ φῦλον ἐν ἀνθρώποισι ματαιότατον, ὅστις αἰσχύνων ἐπιχώρια παπταίνει τὰ πόρσω, μεταμώνια θηρεύων ἀκράντοις ἐλπίσιν.).
[96] Cf. Fennell (1893b), ad loc., who compares Soph. *OC* 143, 144 and Eur.*Hel*.1253.

common humanity. Certainly, it substantiates my view that the thoughts of the "first speaker" configure those of Hieron.

The gnome is pivotal in the sense that it links the thoughts of the two speakers and conveys an ethical stance consistent with that subsequently portrayed by the "second speaker". Whilst it carries more moral authority than the wish for Chiron and is identifiable with the view of the poet, it is subject to revision and qualification by the "first speaker" at v.63.[97] Certainly, it is less authoritative than the direct second-person gnome at vv.81-2, which is contained within a direct address to the *laudandus*.

Gnomic Injunction: dramatising an ethical attitude

We can pursue the idea of the wise adviser in Herodotus dramatising alternatives by comparing the poet's questioning of his *thymos* in *Nemean* 3.26 and the "first speaker's" exhortation to *psyche* in *Pythian* 3.61f.[98] I suggest that these forms of address can be differentiated from many other types of break-off, which occur at various points of an ode but do not always contain an address, in that the choice of diction specifically draws on the mythical paradigm.[99] Pindar's use of self-address is a dramatic means of engaging his audience tactfully with the ethical

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[97] Cf. Hubbard (1985), 41. 'All gnomes in Pindar are at best provisional, and therefore subject to self-criticism and "erasure" by the text.'

[98] Cf. Introduction (11) and Chapter 2.

[99] For other examples of rhetorical redirection, many of which do not contain a self-address, cf., e.g. *N*.4.69f. with Willcock (1995), 106, who mentions the comparable passages at *N*.4.33-4, *P*.4.247-8, *N*.3.26-7. Cf. also Bundy (1962), 6, n. 21, with references.

debate. It is helpful to think of the poet's sudden interruption of his narrative as the critical moment that encapsulates the main point of the instruction for the listener.

In the Introduction, I explored the phenomenon of the archaic poet speaking to his audience through the voices of characters in the poem.[100] In *Pythian* 9, for example, the poet puts wisdom into the mouths of his mythical characters in order to advise his audience. In *Pythian* 3, I propose that the ethical attitudes of the mythical counterparts are articulated by two speakers that represent different sides of the poetic persona. But the debate that takes place over the course of the ode is enacted here and distilled in a dramatic moment of disclosure to Hieron. Pindar's articulation of Asclepius' desires at the start of this ode is crystallised in the rebuke addressed to *psyche* at v.61 (cf. the address to the heart at *O*.1.4), which challenges the moral justification behind the original wish for Chiron.

In the last chapter, I observed that the poet's address to his irrational *thymos* in *N*.3.26 voices an internal debate. Moreover, by rebuking himself for allowing his song to run off course and by urging his *thymos* to 'bring the Muse to Aiakos and his race' (*N*.3.28), Pindar strengthens his own example to the *laudandus* by drawing on the paradigmatic aspects of Chiron's pedagogy. In other words, the effect of the poet's interaction with the traits of his mythical characters is to make his *parainesis* more authoritative. A similar approach can be adopted in *Pythian*

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[100] Cf. Martin (1984), 46 n.37. Also Rood (2006), on this phenomenon in Xenophon.

3, where the speaker's rebuke of *psyche* corresponds to the paradigmatic relationship of Chiron and Asclepius, which Pindar draws upon to instruct the external addressee indirectly. In the previous chapter, I examined the epic convention whereby a hero addresses himself in a moment of crisis or deliberation, noting that Pindar's use of the apostrophe is a more persuasive means of engaging his audience with the decision-making process than the prohibition. I suggest that the gnomic injunction at *P*.3.61 is more overtly didactic, like Odysseus' speech to his κραδίη at *Od*.20.18-21.[101] Like *N*.3.26, however, the *parainesis* is oblique as far as the external addressee is concerned, although in both cases, asyndeton signals the introduction of a *parainesis*. The poet displays his 'ethical aversion by interjecting (in asyndeton) a gnomic imperative (χρή), which turns abruptly from the negative exemplum toward the positive consolation of the ode'.[102]

I suggest that Pindar's address to *psyche* functions in the same way as an 'indirect second person gnome with a substitute addressee', which is the term coined by Lardinois to describe Pindar's preferred form of gnome.[103] This is a characteristically oblique and tactful form of Pindaric address. By avoiding applying the injunction directly to Hieron, Pindar avoids causing offence, whilst still offering him a lesson. Nonetheless, in prefiguring the later remarks made by

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[101] Cf. Pelliccia (1995), 296.
[102] Race (1989), 192.
[103] Cf. Chapter 2 for discussion of the address to the *thymos*, with Lardinois (1997), 229 and n.77.

the paraenetic *ego* and showing the poet to be in control of the moral argument, the injunction is authoritative.[104]

Lefkowitz thinks that vv.61f. are clearly addressed to the poet himself, 'since there is no break between these lines and the preceding first-person statement οἵας εἰμὲν αἴσας'.[105] But it is not entirely clear to whom the *psyche* belongs and therefore to whom the gnomic injunction is addressed; this opaqueness is quite deliberate.[106] The distancing effect of the third-person reference in v.69f. is tactful and avoids implicating Hieron directly in the projected desires of the speaker.[107] I suggest it is the "first speaker" who rebukes his *psyche* for making the wish for Chiron. The speaker plays out the instruction by substituting the intended external recipient of the command (Hieron) with an internal addressee (*psyche*). The injunction serves as a warning against his own desires and, by analogy, those of Hieron. Discussing *P*.3.61 (cf. fr.127.3f), Pelliccia argues that 'the speaker is not speaking *qua* poet of his professional conduct, but as a person, commenting on universal ethical norms: these are not "programmatic" passages concerned with the progress of the poem'.[108] In contrast to *N*.3.26, the speaker is not talking about the choice of subject-matter, but he *is* remarking on the ethical basis that underpins the progress of the ode. Indeed, the exercising of a

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[104] Cf. Lowrie (2007), 92.

[105] Lefkowitz (1991), 55. Cf. Σ 109 (Drachm.) πρὸς ἑαυτόν, with Gildersleeve (1895) 274, who thinks that Pindar may be 'taking a lesson to himself', but this also applies to Hieron.

[106] Cf. Lardinois (1995), 260 ad *O*.1.64. In the gnomic priamel addressed to the narrator's own heart in *Olympian* 1, Hieron is spoken about in the third person (v.11). Cf. the reference to the victor in the third person at *N*.3.15 and 20.

[107] Cf. Gentili (1995), 416.

[108] Pelliccia (1995), 297, noting that in *P*.3.61f. (cf. *N*.1.47), the assumption is that the *psyche* is 'naturally attracted to the course rejected'.

particular skill as a means of understanding one's destiny is exemplified in the attitude shown by the "second speaker" and underpinned by the verbal echo of *machana* in *P*.3.62 and 109. Thus, the gnomic injunction is crucial in setting off the ethical attitudes of the two speakers as contrasting models for the audience whilst engaging the external adddressee in the conflict.

I suggested that by addressing *thymos* in *N*.3, the poet-composer effectively disclaims personal responsibility for running his ode off course. Similarly, it could be argued that the result of the "first speaker" uttering a rebuke to his *psyche* is that he absolves himself of some of the responsibility for the initial wish. Does it follow, then, that the "first speaker" is rejecting the initial wish for Chiron and winning credit by doing so?[109] The answer to this can scarcely be in the affirmative, since the speaker does not obey the precept. He apparently ignores the advice by recapitulating the futile wish for Chiron at v.63 in an extended display of 'disobedience' (εἰ δὲ σώφρων ἄντρον ἔναι᾽ ἔτι Χείρων, καί τί οἱ / φίλτρον ⟨ἐν⟩ θυμῷ μελιγάρυες ὕμνοι / ἁμέτεροι τίθεν, vv.63-5). Whereas in *N*.3.28 the speaker adopts the proper approach to his task immediately, it is not until *P*.3.107 that the "second speaker" presents himself as a paradigm for the listener. This tends to suggest that the dramatisation of the errant pupil striving for the unattainable and disobeying his master is particularly vivid in this ode, a point that is underpinned by the structure of this passage, which drives home the *parainesis*: the sequence is injunction (61-2); 'now if it were the case that…, I would…' (63ff); 'but as things are I wish…' (77ff), leading on to the direct address

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[109] Cf. Pelliccia (1995), 306.

to Hieron (80ff); that address seems to pick up and reinforce by direct application the initial injunction. As far as the poet is concerned, this prolonged conflict between two speakers provides a more compelling enactment of the teacher-pupil relation than is the case in *Nemean* 3 and elevates his status as a wise adviser.

Enacting Mythical Paradigms

In order to understand how the paradigm of Asclepius shapes the particular content of this gnomic injunction and ultimately Pindar's instruction, it will be helpful to compare *Nemean* 3 from the perspective of diction. It is worth remarking that the choice of diction does not seem relevant to the addressee in other passages that contain a form of self-address.[110] In particular, the theme of *P*.3.59-60 (χρὴ τὰ ἐοικότα πὰρ δαιμόνων μαστευέμεν θναταῖς φρασίν / γνόντα τὸ πὰρ ποδός οἵας εἰμὲν αἴσας) is comparable to Pindar's rebuke against the tendency to look beyond one's proper station at *N*.3.26, which is expressed in the poetic apostrophe θυμέ τίνα πρὸς ἀλλοδαπάν ἄκραν ἐμὸν πλόον παραμείβεαι· ('My heart, to what alien headland are you turning aside my ship's course?'). The diction and theme of the subsequent advice to 'heed what is at hand' (φρονεῖν δ' ἐνέπει τὸ παρκείμενον, *N*.3.75) is very similar to the instruction 'to know what lies at our feet' (*P*.3.60), with the emphasis on the responsibility of the *phrēn* to make the correct

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[110] Cf. the address to the heart *O*.1.4 in a gnomic priamel (cf. Bundy, 1962, 4-6). See also *O*.9.36 (to his mouth) and *Pae*.4.50 (to his *phrēn*). In *O*.2.89, Pindar exhorts his *thymos* to direct praise at the victor but this is not conceived as a form of instruction for the victor.

judgement.[111] Burnett believes the real sense of φρονεῖν δ' ἐνέπει τὸ παρκείμενον (*N*.3.75) is 'the present opportunity' (or *kairos*) rather than 'our mortal condition' (*P*.3.60), which echoes the diction used to describe Achilles' mental determination at *N*.3.62 (ἐν φρασὶ πάξαιϑ').[112] The gnome at *Nemean* 3.75 reinforces the presentation of mental determination as the prerequisite for attaining heroic success, as applied to to Herakles (26), Telamon (39) and Achilles (62). In particular, the example of Achilles illustrates the truth of the gnome (70f.) that success at any stage of life is achieved by sticking to the task at hand.[113] The danger for Hieron, it seems, is his desire to extend the natural course of his life, whereas for the Aeginetan victor, it is probably the temptation to overreach himself. In both cases, however, the specific advice is not stated.

The diction, I suggest, is determined by the particular content of the advice and the choice of mythical paradigm.[114] In *Pythian* 3, Pindar dramatises the implicit desires of the *laudandus* by referring to the rational part of a man's being that provides him with the capacity to strive for immortality, as exemplified by Asclepius. Although the sense of *psyche* as a survivor in Hades does not impinge in this context, Pindar does not exclude from the reach of the *psyche* a different kind of life that succeeds death, namely immortality in song.[115] The

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[111] The poet's censure of the person who 'longs for foreign themes' (*N*.3.30) mirrors the one who 'loves things remote' (*P*.3.20).

[112] Burnett (2005), 150. In Pindaric usage, φρονεῖν refers to willed mental action that shapes physical action, as at *N*.4.95.

[113] Pfeijffer (1999a), 213.

[114] Cf. Clarke (1999), 312, who thinks that in the context of reflective thought, *psychē* tends to be inseparable from the *thymos* family and is at the core of man; cf. Simon. fr.21.3W. Also Caswell (1990), 8. Cf. Braswell (1992), ad *N*.1.47, who notes that ψυχή is no more than a stylistic variant for ϑυμός'.

[115] Contra Sullivan (1995b), 98. In *O*.2.68-70, however, there is a sense in which the condition of a *psyche* in this life has repercussions on its fate in the afterlife.

injunction therefore supports the view that Pindar attempts to find a solution to the inevitability of human mortality in song rather than literal immortality.[116]

To conclude, the ethical conflict played out in the ode is encapsulated in the gnomic sequence at vv.59-62. Returning to the point I made earlier about the poet speaking through his characters, I put forward the possibility that Pindar's presentation of an inner conflict at *P*.3.61 between the "first speaker" and his *psychē* enacts a form of instruction between Chiron and Asclepius. This evokes the strategy in didactic poetry whereby advice is addressed directly to a mythical character such as Achilles, who serves as a foil for the external addressee. In recalling Asclepius' mental flaw, *psychē* provides a negative paradigm for Hieron.[117] If this hypothesis is accepted, what we have is an miniature variation on the *Precepts of Chiron* tailored to the particular form of this epinician ode, in which an epigrammatic saying is put in the mouth of a legendary figure as a lesson for the audience.[118]

The tactful adviser and a humane Centaur

At the start of this chapter, I briefly examined the function of Pindar's paraenetic dialogue in creating a tactful and authoritative form of instruction. The tone that Pindar takes to the good king in this ode should be differentiated somewhat from

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[116] Contra Currie (2005), 404,

[117] In *N*.3.26, on the other hand, the address to the *thymos* evokes Chiron's influence over Achilles as a positive model for the direction of the poet's song.

[118] Cf. Lardinois (1995), 229, who observes the same phenomenon in relation to Hesiod's *Works and Days*.

that of the 'friendly adviser' in *Nemean* 3, where 'I' instructs 'you' as though we are having a conversation. Whilst a similar style of collaborative learning can be discerned throughout *Pythian* 3, the forms of address are perhaps more varied (cf. *P*.3.80). Crucially, the paraenetic *ego* is more prominent in this ode than it is in *Nemean* 3, which gives a sense of distancing from the object of his advice. It is important to recognise that the social position of the tyrant was such that only a properly authoritative person could speak to him. It seems to me that the tone which Pindar takes to Hieron and the authority he seeks for himself are two sides of the same coin. In other words, Pindar must adopt a more lofty tone because of the higher status of the individual with whom he is constructing the paraenetic dialogue. We have seen that the character of the poetic personae projected in the text affects the type of relationship Pindar constructs with the addressee, which is quite complex in this ode. I suggest that Chiron's associations are central to the creation of a paraenetic encomium in which Pindar simultaneously shows his high regard for the *laudandus* whilst giving him a lesson. This combination is the key to the epinician project, since it is the means by which the poet conveys a strong sense of self-esteem.

I want to pick up the point made earlier that Chiron is chosen as the object of a wish because his associations with mortality and kingship lend themselves to the twin dimension of this paraenetic encomium. Chiron's most distinctive virtue in Pindar is his concern for mortal affairs, which I mentioned briefly in Chapter 1, but which is closely tied here to the notion of the good king.[119] Pindar reminds us

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[119] Cf. Introduction 8b.

that this wild creature had a 'mind friendly to men' (νόον ἔχοντ᾽ ἀνδρῶν φίλον, *P.*3.5)

and expands later on this quintessential philanthropy by calling him the provider

of instruction in 'healing the diseases that plague men' (πολυπήμονας ἀνθρώποισιν

ἰᾶσθαι νόσους, v.46). This is a metaphor for the tyrant's magnanimity both towards

outsiders such as the poet and his fellow citizens, since Pindar later celebrates

his patron's benevolence by calling him πραΰς ἀστοῖς οὐ φθονέων ἀγαθοῖς, ξείνοις δὲ

θαυμαστὸς πατήρ ('gentle to townsmen, not begrudging to good men and to

guests, a wondrous father', v.71). This conventional expression of gratitude for

the commission transcends the relation of economic exchange between poet and

patron. The eulogy expands upon the claim to legitimate kingship entailed by

basileus in 70 – unlike the stock tyrant, Hieron is not harsh and despotic, feels no

phthonos towards prominent citizens, and is as hospitable as a father.[120] Hieron

behaves like a πατήρ (71) even to strangers and the hyperbolic θαυμαστὸς (71)

points to the lavish hospitality and care enjoyed by Pindar as a guest-friend of

Hieron in the past.[121] The expression of guest-friendship towards Pindar's

'Aitnaian host' (Αἰτναῖον ξένον, v.69), epitomises the poet's claim to equality with

Hieron. As Kurke puts it, 'the bond of *xenia* authenticates the poet's encomium,

but it also participates in a precise social context'.[122]

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[120] I am indebted to Douglas Cairns for this point. See Introduction (8b).

[121] *O.*1.9-13 refers to the arrival of wise singers at the 'rich and blessed hearth of Hieron', who wields the rightful sceptre in flock-rich Sicily. It seems likely that there must have been some kind of reality behind such a statement.

[122] Kurke (1991), 136, arguing that the notion of reciprocal exchange in the *xenia* relationship was more important than the reality of the poet's visits to his patron, since the contract was almost certainly older than the personal connection; cf. e.g. *O.*1.103-5, *N.*7.61. At the end of *P.*4, the poet depicts himself as the host in the *xenia* relationship and the 'ode itself is the poet's gift to Damophilos, a gift that pleads his case to the king' (p.146). The expression of *philia* in *N.*3.76 has a similar function in validating the poet's gift.

It seems to me that Pindar affects a close relationship with the person advised in order to make his *parainesis* more persuasive and authoritative. Compared with Bacchylides, there is a greater insistence on the poet's personal bond with his patron, evidence of the poet's penchant for self-promotion.[123] Pindar's allusion to the *topos* of the 'good king' through Chiron, and again at v.84 ('your share of happiness attends you') is part of the poet's appeal to a special relationship with the *laudandus*. Like references to *xenia* or *philia*, it helps to create an illusion of equality and provides an ideal platform for the poet's self-aggrandisement as the chosen adviser.[124]

The "first speaker" introduces the moral dilemma that is the basis of the subsequent dialectical enquiry. By recalling Chiron's paradigmatic associations with kingship, mortality and philanthropy as a metaphor for Hieron's status and situation, this speaker evokes the poet's admiration and sympathy for the addressee. This is a tactful means of communication, but not an especially commanding one. The "second speaker", on the other hand, uses the example of Chiron to underpin the poet's didactic authority, which suggests that he is a vehicle of the poet's desire to be 'foremost in wisdom' (*O*.1.115). The exceptional prominence of Chiron in this ode might be explained by the fact that he underwrites *both* the tactful presentation of the poet's advice *and* his more

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[123] Cf. Hutchinson (2001), 329. In Bacch.3.49-52, the bond of *xenia* is not articulated by the first person. Cf. *Pythian* 2.96, where Pindar declares his support for his patron in the phrase, 'May it be mine to find favour with the *agathoi* and keep their company'.

[124] Stoneman (1984), 48 comments that 'because Pindar is worthy of Hieron, Hieron is worthy of Pindar; cf. *P*.2.83, 'Let me befriend a friend' (φίλον εἴη φιλεῖν), with Stoneman (1997), 112. Also Willcock (1995), 11: 'Pindar's relations with these often very powerful men are represented by him as personal, and on a level of equality'.

authoritative utterances. By spanning the two dimensions of the poetic discourse, he is a symbol for the paraenetic encomiast.

Conclusions

In *Pythian* 3, Pindar reconfigures a preceptual dialogue by enacting the pedagogic relationship of Chiron and Asclepius in an exchange of will between two speakers. This dialogue, like the interaction between teacher and pupil in the *Precepts*, is a foil for the relationship between Pindar and Hieron, who is not formally addressed before v.80. Hence, the instruction is doubly indirect in comparison with didactic poetry. The two speakers put forward contrasting attitudes, one of Chiron, the other of Asclepius, which represent the ethical standpoints of Pindar and Hieron as teacher and pupil. In uttering a wish to bring back Chiron from the dead, the "first speaker" intimates the private desires of the addressee for immortality, to which Asclepius provides a parallel in bringing back a man from the dead. This paradigm is reinforced by the gnomic instruction uttered by the "first speaker" to his *psychē* not to strive for the immortal life (vv.61-2), which is a quasi-dramatisation of Pindar's advice to Hieron. The "second speaker" subsequently provides a corrective form of advice and adopts the outlook of wise Chiron, to which Asclepius' attitude is antithetical. In this way, Pindar controls the paraenetic discourse by speaking through extensions of his own poetic persona. The overall lesson can be seen as the correction of Asclepius' failure to observe the ethical dimension of Chiron's instruction. In

contrast to *Pythian* 9, a lesson emerges not from any words spoken by Chiron but in the course of the poet's unfolding discourse. In a paradigmatic sense, Pindar eclipses Chiron's role as a healer by providing Hieron with the necessary ethical instruction in the form of this song.

Pindar's self-representation as a tactful adviser can be discerned in the oblique presentation of advice by means of a dialogue between two speakers, one of whom configures the attitude of the external addressee. This can be briefly summarised. As the object of the "first speaker's" wish, Chiron provides a covert warning against his desire for immortality and strengthens the poet's instruction. Secondly, the most explicitly didactic form of *parainesis*, the gnomic injunction, which articulates the central tenet of his teaching, is addressed to *psyche* rather than Hieron. Thirdly, the "second speaker" uses first-person gnomes to present his own attitude as a model for the external addressee rather than directly addressing him with second-person imperatives.

CONCLUSIONS

1 (a) *The Paraenetic Tradition and its Interface*

I began this thesis by noting how scholars have observed the overlap in style, content and language of the didactic and epinician genres. For obvious reasons, most attention has been given to the allusion to the *Precepts of Chiron* in *Pythian* 6.20f., where Pindar presents himself as a 'friendly preceptor'.[1] By examining how different aspects of this tradition are reworked in other 'Chiron' odes, I hope to have contributed to scholarly debate in this field. Certainly, it seems that Chiron's exceptional prominence in Pindar can be explained in some measure by the intertextual references to the *Precepts*. Let us remind ourselves of the formal features of this preceptual genre before drawing together some thoughts about its reception in Pindar.

Kurke suggests that 'the genre of *hypothekai* would be characterised by a proem, an address to a specific addressee, sometimes by mythological material, but mainly by a collection of injunctions and traditional wisdom, loosely strung together with gnomic material'.[2] Whilst the formal features of this genre are found, albeit with a different emphasis, in epinician, the overall discourse is radically altered by the essential difference in context. By adopting the same critical methods used throughout this thesis and the model used by Martin in his

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[1] Cf. e.g. Nagy (1979), 238; Kurke (1990), 90. Also Introduction (9).
[2] Kurke (1990), 90, following Friedländer (1913), 571-2, 577-8, 600-3.

study of the embedded context of advice in Homer's *Odyssey*, I will attempt to draw together the different ways in which Pindar engages with the paraenetic tradition. In arguing that the Phaeacian episode represents a dramatised version of the 'Instruction of Princes', Martin notes that 'the marking of a discourse as appropriate for a particular genre can occur even though the discourse is embedded within a composition of an entirely different genre…Nestor and Phoenix, for instance, are not just advisers: they become conduits for the genre of paraenetic poetry'.[3] Similarly, I propose that Chiron is a figurehead for the assimilation of the preceptual tradition to epinician poetry. By focusing on the prominent figure of Chiron, this study has demonstrated how Pindar engages with the didactic tradition in a way that reveals the distinctive character of the poet as a paraenetic encomiast.

1 (b) *The communication-situation*

In the Introduction (4a), I observed the importance of understanding the relationship between the speaker and the addressee. Goldhill has insisted that to understand a linguistic utterance, it must be viewed within a context and as a performance: meaning is constituted through 'the total situation in which an utterance is issued'.[4] Crucially, the communication-situation in epinician is

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[3] Martin (1984), 31. Cf. Introduction 8a on *Odyssey* 8 as a 'dramatic version of the abstract king-ideal of the *Theogony*'. The figure of Chiron has a long tradition ahead of it and features prominently in the Renaissance. Both Machiavelli and Ronsard (cf. Silver, 1971) drew upon the ideal of Chiron as the embodiment of Greek education and, in particular, as an instructor of princes.

[4] Goldhill (1994), 57. 'Who says what to whom' is a defining aspect of an utterance; contextualization will make a difference to meaning and understanding (p.58).

different from that of preceptual instruction, in which an older man advises a younger one, 'usually at a point of crisis or initiation'.[5]

This study has shown that the character of the advice is determined by the unique occasion of the Pindaric ode. In particular, the personal circumstances of the addressee in every case affect how the poet constructs his relationship with him, as well as influencing the particular content of the advice. In our detailed examination in Chapters 2 and 3 of two very different 'classes' of epinician, we have seen that the construction of the poet's identity depends on several factors, such as the nature of the victory, the status and age of the *laudandus*. This reaffirms the objections voiced by scholars against reductionist critiques of Pindar.[6]

It is important to recognise that the social and ethical position of the king was such that only a properly authoritative person could speak to him. Consequently, Pindar has to take a firmer paraenetic tone towards the *laudandus* because of the higher status of the individual with whom he is constructing the paraenetic dialogue. Indeed, the tone which the speaker takes to the king and the authority he seeks for himself are two sides of the same coin. Although the effect of creating such an authoritative persona is to aggrandise the poet adviser, it might appear to put him into a precarious position when confronting the response of some of the most powerful men in the Greek world, upon whose continuing

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[5] Cf. Martin (1984), 33 n.9.
[6] Cf. e.g. Hornblower (2004), 29 and Introduction (1).

patronage he depended. Nonetheless, wise advisers must appear to be superior in experience or wisdom in order to compensate for their subordinate status to that of the king or leader. Indeed, Pindar plays up to the traditional expectation that wise advisers merit an attentive audience by developing the literary *topos* of the 'good king' in Homer in a way that highlights his own importance as a poet.[7] Clay's view that Hesiod arrogates to himself the power and rhetoric of the 'kings' in *Works and Days* may be apposite to Pindar and an interesting area for future research into the reception of Hesiod in epinician.[8] Clearly Pindar has a different relationship from the one between Hesiod and the *basileis* (whose role in the poem is closer to that of arbiters or judges) but his rhetoric simultaneously appeals to his audience's susceptibility to persuasive speech whilst facilitating his claim to moral supremacy. I suggest that the giving of advice has a crucial role to play in increasing Pindar's standing as an epinician poet.

1 (c) *A Preceptual Dialogue*

Let us turn to the form in which the advice is given in epinician, which is the touchstone of my interpretation. As far as we can see, the *Precepts* were a monologue in Chiron's mouth, addressed to Achilles, which may have included some dialogue. In my studies of *Nemean* 3 and *Pythian* 3, I examined the poet's self-representation as an adviser within the framework of a dialogue between

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[7] Cf. Introduction 10b.

[8] Cf. Zoe Stamatopoulou, who begins her abstract to her PhD thesis [University of Virginia, 2007] by stating that 'although there is significant evidence that Hesiodic poetry enjoyed Panhellenic diffusion by the end of the 6th c. BCE, its reception in the late archaic and early classical literature has been largely underestimated and understudied'.

poet and audience. In this scenario, advice is presented indirectly, often through a substitute addressee. I drew on Lardinois' study of gnomes in archaic poetry to support my analysis of the indirect nature of advice in the odes and my characterisation of Pindar as the tactful adviser.[9]

In recognising that the audience of Pindar's odes does not respond to his advice, it is worth recalling Clay's remarks concerning the education of Perses, that 'after Hesiod, the silent presence of the addressee becomes a convention of didactic poetry - although one could easily imagine an effective form of didactic which might incorporate dialogue'.[10] In Chapter 3, I developed Clay's intriguing observation by arguing that Pindar's advice to Hieron manipulates the form of a dialogue between the giver and the receiver of advice by transferring the dialectical relationship to two "speakers".

Commenting on the *Precepts of Chiron*, Griffith regrets the fact that 'we do not know how far the dramatic possibilities of the setting were developed, nor how far the personalities of Chiron and his young ward were brought out in the poem'.[11] It seems unlikely that it would make much difference to our understanding of the interface between didactic poetry and epinician if Achilles responded to Chiron and it is unlikely that he disagreed with his teacher. Similarly, in epinician, the

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[9] Cf. Lardinois (1997) 221 and Introduction 4a, applied to the study of gnomes in Chapters 2 and 3.
[10] Clay (1993), 23-4. In recent correspondence, she tells me she was thinking of the pre-Socratics. Cf. M.L.West (1978), 3-25 on a few non-Greek examples that have a dialogic form. The *Educational Instruction of Ani* covers marriage, respect for parents, reticence and religious observance, and develops a dialogue with the pupil, who resists the instruction.
[11] Griffith (1983), 55-6; cf. Bacch.27.

emphasis is firmly on the giver of the advice. In both traditions, the speaker controls the discourse, although in epinician, he expresses it more tactfully (e.g. <u>εἰ</u> δὲ χρὴ καὶ πὰρ σοφὸν ἀντιφερίξαι / ἐρέω·, *P*.9.50-1) and prefaces it with praise.[12] Moreover, the fact that Apollo does not respond to Chiron's advice in *Pythian* 9 tends to suggest that the reaction of the recipient is relatively unimportant. Although we never hear the views of Pindar's audience, the model of Chiron's pedagogy is one way in which he can bring out their shared concerns. Moreover, the implicit nature of the *exemplum* ensures that Pindar retains a sense of tact and propriety towards the patron whilst not diminishing his own interests. In the case of *Pythian* 3, I put forward that the figure of Chiron occupies a position of strategic importance in helping to establish the moral status of the adviser whilst providing a tactful form of advice to Hieron.

Fortunately, the validity of this thesis does not depend on establishing the form of the *Precepts* or making claims on the basis of a lost poem. I am not arguing that Pindar intended a precise allusion to this poem in *Pythian* 3 but that he recycles typical elements of the genre of instruction in epinician. Indeed, the form of *Pythian* 3, with its arresting opening soliloquy, shares similar rhetorical features to the dramatic monologue of the *Works and Days*, to which the audience listens as silent observers.[13] Both poems include a dynamic and linear progression of thought as a means of providing instruction.

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[12] Cf. e.g. τὶν δὲ τούτων ἐξυφαίνονται χάριτες. / τλᾶθι τᾶς εὐδαίμονος ἀμφὶ Κυράνας θέμεν σπουδὰν ἅπασαν (*P*.4.275-6).
[13] Cf. Introduction 6a.

I noted the idiosyncratic qualities of *P*.3 as a 'non-epinician poem' and its association with the genre of advice, though for obvious reasons of tact, the framework is fairly well disguised.[14] Another example of didactic precept literature is the so-called *Trojan Dialogue* (*Hippias Major* 286a-b), which brings the typical elements of the genre into focus. According to Gray, its originality lay in the dramatised setting, form and choice of characters from the heroic past.[15] This contains some of the same themes that I have sketched out in my interpretation of *Pythian* 3. It is a dramatised conversation in which Nestor instructed Neoptolemus on how to live a good life (cf. *P*.3.103f.). As one would expect, Nestor did most of the talking! Pindar, of course, does not use a fully dramatised setting, although his use of mythical characters to portray the attitude of the *laudandus* suggests a similar need to find authority in the heroic. In the best example of the transformation of the paraenetic genre to epinician, Pindar compensates for the lack of dialogue by presenting a lesson to the silent addressee through the projected thoughts of the two "speakers", who correspond to the mythical pair of Chiron and Asclepius.

This thesis has evaluated the reception of Chiron in Pindar in relation to the nature and function of advice in epinician poetry. In the Introduction, I noted Nagy's comment on the use of heroic models in *Pythian* 6 that 'epic is

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[14] Note, however, the clear reference to Chiron's instruction of Asclepius at *P*.3.45 and the possible allusion to the *Precepts*.
[15] Gray (1998), 165.

represented as extending into the epinician *ainos* of Pindar'.[16] My study provides a basis for seeing a parallel development in the assimilation of the didactic tradition to Pindar's epinician through the figure of Chiron. Whether Pindar's treatment of the "Chiron tradition" according to the requirements of the genre amounts to presenting his poetry as the 'ultimate authority of tradition', depends on the persuasiveness of this thesis rather than on any explicit claim made by Pindar.[17] Pindar, of course, is inexplicit about his aims and does not leave us with a rhetorical handbook.[18] The extent of his ambition to be a second Hesiod, his Boeotian compatriot, for the epinician genre, is not quite clear. At any rate, he is not explicitly 'projecting his own role as a praise poet on to the authority of his predecessor' (cf. *I*.6.67), but doing so in a more sophisticated way may or may not have been recognised by his audience.[19] Of course, it is difficult to prove the extent to which Pindar's treatment of this genre is self-consciously innovative. Nonetheless, he seems to draw on the preceptual tradition, whereby dialogue probably played some part in the communication of advice to an external audience and fashions it within an epinician mould.

In setting the figure of the wise adviser in the context of the paraenetic tradition, I have brought to light the self-reflexive function of advice in Pindar by elucidating the poet's role as adviser. The limitations of this claim can be seen in the difficulty

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[16] Nagy (1990), 214. Cf. Kelly (2006), 22, who uses different evidence to support his claim that 'Pindar presents himself and his tale with the mythographical authority of Homeric poetry'.

[17] Nagy (1990), ibid.

[18] Cf. Boeke (2007), 24-5, who thinks it 'probable that some account of rhetorical techniques applicable to poetry, including the use of wisdom sayings, existed in Pindar's time'.

[19] D'Alessio (2005), 231 on Bacchylides 5.191-2. Cf. Lefkowitz (1969), 90-1, who notes Bacchylides' striking departure from Hesiod in his translation of the traditional 'servant' (of Urania) into 'priest of the Muses'.

of providing an independent assessment of the overall effect of the advice, owing to the fact that epinician, unlike the conversation between Solon and Croesus in Herodotus, is not constructed formally as a dialogue. We cannot ask the original audience either how it felt about Pindar.

2. *Paradigmatic Interaction*

This thesis demonstrates that Pindar reconfigures aspects of the preceptual instruction for epinician by drawing on the pedagogic relation in the myth in order to instruct his audience.

In my treatment of *Pythian* 3, I argued that the mythical relationship between teacher and pupil is dramatised at length by two "speakers" whose ethical views are crystallised in the address to *psychē*. In a more self-contained way, the poetic *ego* in *N*.3.26-8 similarly derives the content of his teaching from Chiron's paradigmatic instruction. Here, though, the nature of the interaction between 'I' and 'you' in the apostrophe of the *thymos* reveals how the instruction is modified according to the requirements of the ode, which in this case is a form of collaboration between poet and addressee. Moreover, the diction of the address is linked to Chiron's paradigmatic instruction of Achilles' *thymos* and this verbal echo reinforces the equation of poet and Chiron. In both *Pythian* 3 and *Nemean* 3, the structural opposition between two ethical attitudes provides the stimulus for the ode's progress, although in the latter, the clash between rational and

irrational desires is presented from the perspective of the ode's composition-in-performance.

I submit that Pindar uses mythical paradigms in an integrated way that is linked to his construction of authority through cumulative learning. One effect of the interaction between speaker and mythical paradigm is that it enables the poet to give the illusion of formulating his instruction within the course of the ode. This makes the learning more dynamic as far as the listener is concerned and strengthens the *parainesis*. This study has applied Carey's notion of 'oral subterfuge', that is the fiction of *extempore* composition in Pindar, to the idea of the poet teaching the audience through interactive learning.[20] This is one of the ways in which the poet presents his teaching authoritatively, since the presentation of the ode as "thinking" furnishes him with an opportunity to demonstrate his control. In Chapter 2, I argued that this collaborative learning is part of his self-representation as a friendly adviser.

Pindar's penchant for so-called 'pseudo-spontaneity' contrasts with the lack of such oral features in Homer.[21] It is a favourite device of Pindar, though attested elsewhere in lyric and epinician poetry.[22] This thesis provides support for the view held by scholars that there is greater concentration on the figure of the 'poet'

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[20] Cf. Chapter 2.
[21] Cf. Morrison (2007b), 72.
[22] Cf. Bacch.5.176-8, Simon.fr.10W. Self-apostrophe does not feature in the *Works and Days*, but compare *Th*.35-6 for the break-off (reference to the narrator) in the form of a question followed by self-apostrophe ('you, let us begin with Muses'); cf. Morrison (2007b), 74.

in Pindar than in Homer.[23] Morrison has observed that the expression of a moral judgement is a forceful sign of 'narrator-prominence' and generally eschewed by unobtrusive narrators of *Iliad* and *Odyssey*.[24] Moreover, 'self-effacement extends to presenting a character's thoughts in the form of a conversation with his θυμός ("heart") to avoid drawing attention to the mediating presence of the narrator, and his implied privileged knowledge'.[25] The picture I have drawn of Pindar is very different, since the poet uses the apostrophe and gnomic injunction to draw attention to an ethical attitude. It seems to be a case of the poet intervening to point out a particular lesson whilst disclaiming responsibility for the original error.[26] In contrast to Homer, it indicates the poet's personal involvement with his audience.

I have interpreted Pindar's use of the mythical paradigm by arguing that this didactic moment is characteristic of a preceptual "dialogue", albeit in miniature form. The most controversial claim in my thesis, perhaps, is that Pindar's conversation with his *thymos* constitutes the appropriation of a preceptual discourse for epinician.[27] In this, I am elaborating Lang's remark that the way in which Herodotus dramatises alternatives in wise adviser speeches reflects an

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[23] Cf. Morrison (2007b), 55-6, who espouses the view that the difference between the deployment of the poetic voice in Homer and Pindar is not connected so much with the emergence of individual self-consciousness (cf. Snell, 1953, 44) as with generic differences.

[24] Morrison (2007b), 91.

[25] Morrison (2007b), 56 n.66; cf. S.Richardson (1990), 131-2.

[26] This is in contrast to the narrator in Xenophon, 'who rarely intervenes to point out specific lessons': Rood (2007), 50.

[27] Cf. Chapter 2.

intermediate stage in the shift from internal debate in Homer to tragic dialogue.[28]

Whether or not the quasi-dramatisation of instruction reflects the influence of the *Precepts of Chiron*, Herodotus' use of characters to reflect his own views illuminates Pindar's strategy. Pindar's use of narrative interjections allows the poet to interact more closely with the mythical characters in a way that also engages more cogently with his audience's ethical outlook.

I should reiterate what I said in Chapter 2 that I am not claiming that the 'epic' formula at *N*.3.26 is intended to allude to a particular episode from the *Precepts of Chiron*. It is difficult to say for certain whether such 'speaking to the *thymos*' formulae in 'didactic' epic would be recognisable as a reference to the *Precepts*. Of course, it is likely that, given the presence of Chiron in the myth, the original audience would have been reminded of this particular poem anyway.[29] Nonetheless, it is symptomatic of the way in which Pindar reconfigures traditional didactic elements in a unique way for epinician, namely as a form of oblique instruction. I conclude that this particular interface illuminates Pindar's self-representation as a tactful adviser.

This thesis has shown that narrative intrusion is a device by which the poet appropriates Chiron's paradigmatic associations in order to present himself as a teacher. Whilst this is different from the Homeric narrator's technique of apostrophising his characters, since it is a self-address projected by a speaker

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[28] Lang (1984), 54. Athanassaki (2004), 326, noting further that in dramatised narratives, the epinician speaker adopts a role analogous to that of a tragic messenger.
[29] Cf. D'Alessio (2005), 232, on *N*.3.43f. as an allusion to the 'advice of Cheiron' (παραινέσεις Χείρωνος).

from within the narrative, it 'enables the audience to cross to the narrative level of the characters'.[30] In Pindar, this has the effect not only of strengthening the parallel between the mythical character and the addressee, but also the external paraenetic relationship, since Pindar has the speaker interrupting the narrative in order to convey an ethical stance for the benefit of his audience. In *Pythian* 3, Pindar exploits the dramatic potential of the distance between author and text by presenting advice to Hieron through two "speakers", who impersonate the moral stance of Chiron and Asclepius. This sophisticated demonstration of the interaction between the poetic 'I' and the mythical characters is both discreet and authoritative.

3. *Chiron and Pindar: A figure for the poet as adviser*

In Chapter One, I argued that the evidence of the odes reflects the broader development in the archaic period of Chiron as a teacher of moral values, though we should be cautious in assuming that Pindar is deriving an image or structure of Chiron solely from the *Precepts*.[31] At any rate, the prominence of the wise centaur Chiron is due to the fact that his educational concerns, especially with the formation of moral character, often seem to mirror those of the poet himself. The character of the poet's advice is revealed in the way he provides an ethical view of the world through exhortations and injunctions that accords with the

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[30] Cf. Morrison (2007b), 92, with the narrator's address of Patroclus at *Il*.16.812-13 for pathetic effect; cf. S.Richardson (1990), 92.
[31] Cf. Robbins (1993), 15, suggesting his original role was as a healer; this primary aspect of his teaching is reflected in the *Iliad* but not in Pindar.

received wisdom and values of the community, as epitomised by the archetypal pedagogue himself. Pindar's advice rarely rises above the conventionally gnomic, although the particular form of the maxims is manipulated in numerous ways.[32]

This thesis demonstrates that Chiron is a useful figure to think with when exploring Pindar's self-representation as a poet-teacher both in terms of the content and the presentation of Pindaric advice. First, the emphasis on nurture rather than specialist skills in Chiron's education corresponds to Pindar's offer of moral advice rather than athletic skills.[33] Second, the communication of the advice can be seen in the way Pindar draws upon the teacher-pupil relation in the myth in order to present advice indirectly.

Let us briefly summarise our findings. The model of Chiron's instruction of Achilles, Asclepius and Jason suggests that the character of an education is more important than its content. Pindar pays scant attention to the precise detail of Achilles' learning at *N*.3.58, but points instead to the holistic character of Chiron's training and the effect it has on mind and body. Similarly, the gnomic advice to the victor at v.75 gives little away in terms of specific advice and some interpretations have been rather forced.[34] What are we to infer from this particular emphasis on the character of training? Pindar, I suggest, implies that any person, given the necessary moral formation and provided he has the innate ability to

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[32] Gray (1998), 167 notes that originality of belief was not part of the programme of wisdom literature.
[33] This does not, of course, prevent him from appreciating in all manner of ways, the athlete's skill; cf. e.g. *N*.4.93-6, *I*.5.59 in relation to *ainos*. Also *I*.4.72, where the word *gnome* applies to the trainer's 'judgement'.
[34] Cf. Pfeijffer (1999a), 227, who thinks that the injunction is to be understood as an incitement not to mourn over lost capacities.

match (*N*.3.40-2), will be successful. The example of Asclepius (cf. *P*.3.54) suggests that taught skills are only of benefit to mankind in the longer term if they are used for the correct purpose. I deduced that Pindar corrects the deficiency in Asclepius' ethical understanding through his advice to Hieron. In this case, the *comparandum* overtakes the *exemplum*, as Pindar supersedes Chiron in terms of his moral contribution to Hieron's future happiness.[35] The way in which this myth is drawn confirms Pindar's emphasis on the importance of the character rather than the content of the teaching. Similarly, at *P*.4.102, Jason refers to the teachings of Chiron without specifying its their content and subsequently exemplifies them in his behaviour towards Pelias; indeed, he does not fulfil the requirement of the precept to "honour thy parents", at least in its fullest sense of restoring his father's kingdom.[36] In *Pythian* 6, the same precept to "honour thy parents" is elaborated mythically. The specific point of comparison here between Antilochus' demonstration of supreme *aretē* (42) and the victor's virtues is brought out in the verbal echo of the hero's sound 'thinking'.[37] The emphasis again is on moral qualities, although the line between the intellectual and the moral is quite porous here. Interestingly, Pindar reverses the normal hierarchy of man honouring god (upheld in Chiron's instruction of Achilles) by noting Poseidon's favour for the young Thrasyboulos' sound mind (νόῳ, 51), which is

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[35] Cf. Goldhill (1994), 70. Also Currie (2005): 409 on the nature of similes, which 'throw up differences which may be as pertinent as the similarities between the objects compared'; cf. Feeney (1992), 35-7.
[36] See Chapter 1 for the double application of the moral paradigm to both Arcesilas and Damophilos in this ode.
[37] Cf. Nagy (1990), 212-14, who observes the correlation between Antilochus, who dutifully bore 'in mind' νόημα (v.29) Chiron's precept and the victor, who treats material wealth with good sense (νόῳ, v.47); cf. the 'unaccomplished purpose' (ἀτελεῖ νόῳ, 42) of the shadowy man and Bakker (2002), 78-9, who argues that 'an act of νοῆσαι is more than a thought or a perception, however profound; it is at the same time the realization, the accomplishment, of its cognitive content'.

conceived as a formal exchange for success in horse-racing (50). Lastly, the fact that Chiron is chosen to answer Apollo's question "Is it right to lay my famous hand upon her and indeed to reap the honey-sweet flower from the bed of love?" (*P*.9.36-7) suggests that Chiron was thought of as an arbiter of morality.[38] Furthermore, Pindar brings out Chiron's human personality more than any of his literary forebears.[39] In every case, then, the presence of Chiron coincides with an emphasis on the moral dimension of the ode in its most universal aspect. In sum, Chiron himself is a quintessentially Pindaric figure.

4. *The function of Pindaric advice*

Our study of Chiron as a mythical paradigm has elucidated the function of Pindaric advice, which usually serves not to correct but to inform, exhort and console. This is typical of the use of *paradigmata* in archaic poetry, as seen in the *consolatio* to Hieron in *Pythian* 3.[40] Chiron himself is uniquely integrated with the activity of the poet in his paraenetic and consolatory aspects. In addition, the way in which his projected persona appropriates Chiron's paradigmatic associations affects his construction and presentation of personal authority, as was argued in Chapter 3. Moreover, the paradigms of Peleus and Cadmus can be differentiated from those of Chiron and Asclepius insofar as they do not provide a model for the poet's pedagogic relationship with Hieron.

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[38] Cf. *I*.8.42; *Il*.11.832.
[39] Cf. *P*.3.5 and *P*.9.38-9: τὸν δὲ Κένταυρος ζαμενής, ἀγανᾷ χλοαρὸν γελάσσαις ὀφρύϊ, μῆτιν ἑάν / εὐθὺς ἀμείβετο·
[40] Cf. D.L.Cairns (2001), 49, cited in the Introduction (12).

It was noted that one parallel between Pindar and Chiron in *Nemean* 3 is the ability to steer innate ability towards perfection through the right blend of education and nurture.[41] The heroes Jason and Asclepius also receive an education tailored to a specific goal. Whilst Chiron's education has a clear purpose in relation to the hero, however, this is not its only aspect. In *Pythian* 9, the 'advice' does not affect the actions of the figure exhorted and is *useful* only to the extent that it gives the *audience* greater understanding of the place of Apollo's action in their community.[42] Clearly, Pindar does not instruct in the formal sense of a didactic poet and the advice he does offer is aligned to the particular context of his epinician discourse.[43] For example, Chiron helps the audience to evaluate a correct moral response in relation to heroic deeds (*P*.9.30-1; cf. *N*.3.48), which are a model and metaphor for the achievement of the athlete. In an important sense, he symbolises the interconnectedness of advice and praise in the epinician discourse and the need to resist a reductive interpretation of Pindar's *ainos*.[44] As noted in Chapter 1, his admiration of heroic skill corresponds to the poet's presentation of himself as a spectator at the games and points up the crucial analogy between hero and *laudandus*.[45] This

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[41] The verbal play on *telos* at *N*.3.25, 42, 70. Cf. *N*.4.60-1, where Chiron intervened to prevent Peleus' untimely death. Nicholson (2001), 52, observes that 'both Chiron and the poet are presented as the servants and promoters of fate: πεπρωμένον (61) clearly echoes πεπρωμέναν (43)'; cf. *P*.6.27 for the same diction in relation to the goal of Chiron's teaching.

[42] Cf. Nicholson (2001), 52: 'As a teacher from outside the community, Chiron evokes the poet'.

[43] Cf. Lowrie (1992), 420, who argues that Horace's Chiron (*Epode* 13) 'engages in *parainesis*. Horace, however, realigns the advice according to the sympotic context of his own poem'.

[44] Cf. Introduction (2).

[45] Cf. Currie (2005), 412, on the indirectness of verbal echoes, which have a similar function.

supports our thesis that Chiron is a figure for the poet as tactful and authoritative adviser.

The impression that advice is largely superfluous, at least in terms of altering the character's behaviour, is confirmed upon close inspection of Pindar's advice. In *Pythian* 9, there is a delicious irony in the picture of a god pausing to question the morality of his proposed action. Chiron acknowledges that Apollo knows the 'appointed end (*telos*) of all things' (44-5) and much of the humour in this episode is based on Chiron's knowledge of the fact that he is predicting the future to the god who presides over the oracle at Delphi.[46] The fact that Pindar's advice is offered after the victory suggests it has little part to play in the achievement of athletic success *per se*. My argument that advice serves as an agent of the poet's self-glorification can be developed a little further with regard to Chiron.

In *Pythian* 6, Pindar does not explicitly teach Thrasyboulos the precepts of Chiron and his 'advice' is largely affirmative because Thrasyboulos has already won his victory. The nature of Pindaric advice can be discerned in the way the myth draws upon Nestor's advice to Antilochus before the chariot race in *Iliad* 23. Nestor implies that his advice is largely superfluous (τὼ καί σε διδασκέμεν οὔ τι μάλα χρεώ·, v.308), a comment that is designed to flatter his son. Antilochus has both the required knowledge and skill (*mētis*) to win and is smart enough to heed his father's advice. Nestor gives advice, which he does whilst purporting to be merely commending Antilochus' skills. Kelly has argued that 'Pindar's own advice

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[46] Cf. Carey (1981), 80.

is more authoritative, in that the specifics of the father's instruction to his son play very little role in the somewhat unwise way in which Antilokhos actually runs his race'.[47] Nestor's advice is utterly useless, because what wins Antilochus his prize, or allows him to keep that prize, is the type of understanding about his place within the (heroic) world which (*mutatis mutandis*) is the typical object of Pindaric *parainesis*. Nestor's advice in the *Iliad* is, in fact, entirely *practical* in nature - and irrelevant to the real issue at hand. In this sense, Pindar claims his superiority to Nestor. In *Pythian* 6, the strategy is probably the other way round: Pindar records Chiron's advice as such, but implicitly uses it as a way of lauding Thrasyboulos and his father. I would conclude therefore that the mythical analogue of Chiron and his pupil serves to aggrandise both parties in the *laudator-laudandus* relationship and that the function of advice is one of mutual glorification.

5. *Speaking gnomes*

In Chapter 2, I argued that the representation of the *thymos* as a 'pupil' requiring instruction from his 'master', the poetic *ego*, dramatises the external relationship between poet and victor. This effectively reconfigures preceptual instruction for epinician; the main effect of what was described as paradigmatic interaction with the thoughts of the poet is to create a more authoritative form of *parainesis* allied to a respectful discourse. The assumption of Chiron's paradigmatic associations

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[47] Kelly (2006), 20, contra Nagy (1990), 208f. and Gagarin (1983). In recent correspondence, Adrian Kelly tells me he would say 'potentially (OR "ideally") more authoritative'.

by the poet in *Nemean* 3 should be differentiated from the technique of putting *gnomai* in the mouth of a character, as in *Pythian* 9.38-41. The latter is analogous to the way in which didactic poems such as the *Precepts of Chiron* include 'a lengthy advice speech put in the mouth of a legendary figure who speaks to one or more internal addressees and, through them, to the external audience'.[48] The fact that the speaker in this case is Chiron is particularly appropriate.

If I am right in my supposition that the speakers in *Pythian* 3 take on the paradigmatic associations of Chiron and Asclepius in order to instruct the external audience, then Pindar has devised a highly sophisticated and personal way of communicating advice diplomatically to his audience. This idiosyncracy is consistent with Pindar's fondness for speaking gnomes in the first person in order to create a more personal link with the *laudandus*. In *P*.3.80-2, Pindar addresses a second-person gnome to Hieron and ascribes knowledge of the saying to him, although the authority for the saying is the men of the past. The allusion to *Il*.24.527-8 suggests that the paraenetic relationship between Achilles and Priam corresponds to that of Pindar and Hieron, which empowers the adviser, as I argued in the Introduction (4b). The effect of not quoting the original source of the gnome directly is significant. First, it gives shared ownership of the saying to poet and speaker, although Pindar claims additional authority by virtue of the fact that he has adapted Achilles' words to suit the particular context of this ode.[49]

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[48] Lardinois (1995), 229. Cf. Nagy (1990b), 71.
[49] Cf. *I*.6.67, where he does mention Hesiod as the source of the gnome and claims his poetic authority.

Second, it foreshadows the expression of a similar sentiment by the paraenetic *ego* at *P*.3.107-9 at the climax of the ode, thereby highlighting the moralising voice of the poet. Bacchylides, on the other hand, prefers to place the gnome in the mouth of his character, as when Meleager tells Herakles that 'it is hard for those on the earth to turn aside the will of the gods' (Bacch.5.94-6). In the same ode, Bacchylides communicates his message gnomically through the words of Herakles (vv.160-4) and the relationship between Herakles and Meleager mirrors that of Bacchylides and Hieron.[50] This distinction could be interpreted as evidence that Pindar engages more confidently with his audience.

6. *The paraenetic encomium*

In the Introduction, I expressed my preference for a broader characterisation of Pindar's role than that of praise-poet or *laudator*, which derives from Bundy's monolithic intepretation of the odes and his claim that their exclusive function is to praise the victor.[51] In the relatively small group of 'Chiron' odes studied in this thesis, the term 'paraenetic encomiast' has proven to be a useful working definition for the poet's *métier*. I submit that the fulfilment of the epinician contract is undertaken through the blending of different kinds of speech that amounts to a paraenetic encomium.

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[50] Cf. Lefkowitz (1969), 73. Gnomai on the human condition are rare in the mouth of the Homeric narrator (cf. e.g. *Il*.16.688-90).
[51] Bundy (1962), 91.

By elucidating the poet's role as teacher, I hope to have redressed Bundy's position further by denying that Pindar's exclusive aim is the glorification of the *laudandus*. Indeed, one of the functions of advice is to provide a moral framework in which praise can be measured and properly understood.[52] As Stenger has argued in relation to gnomes, the giving of advice is one of the ways in which the poem can transcend its occasion.[53] Moreover, it enables the poet to write himself into the aftermath of victory as perpetuated in song. The fact that Pindar can influence his audience's moral outlook gives the impression that the victor needs him in a way that exceeds the straightforward obligation to praise. Indeed, it seems likely that the expectations of the patron included advice. Pindar's manifesto at *O*.1.115-16 (εἴη σέ τε τοῦτον ὑψοῦ χρόνον πατεῖν, ἐμέ τε τοσσάδε νικαφόροις / ὁμιλεῖν πρόφαντον σοφίᾳ καθ᾽ Ἑλλανας ἐόντα παντᾷ.) does not restrict the basis for the poet's claim to excellence to his *praise* of famous men.[54] I have advocated that Pindar achieves this in various ways by drawing attention to the role of the poet as a moral force, not least through his association with Chiron. Like the other rhetorical strategies examined in this thesis, which ultimately determine the poet's construction of moral authority, the giving of advice strengthens the relationship between poet and audience. Consequently, Bundy's focus on the construction of the *laudator-laudandus* relation continues to provide a catalyst for fruitful discussion about the paraenetic aspect of the poet. Whilst observing the problematic connection between the historical Pindar and

[52] Cf. Winsor Sage (1994), 284, who notes that Horace's narrative position 'has been constructed to admonish and exhort rather than either to offer unqualified praise or to condemn'.
[53] Stenger (2005), 54-5 and Introduction (2).
[54] Cf. the poet's assertion of control over the theme of his song at *P*.4.248: 'I lead the way in wisdom (*sophia*) for many others'.

his text in the course of this study, I have focused on how the rhetorical strategies in the odes help the poet's construction of moral authority. As such, this thesis reaffirms the primacy of the text as the means of understanding Pindar.[55]

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[55] This is a principle that those with an interest in Pindar's reception in later antiquity will do well to acknowledge.

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