

**SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN 14TH AND 15TH CENTURY
THESSALONIKE: A NEW APPROACH**

by

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ABSTRACT

The thesis deals with the socio-economic conditions prevailing in the city of Thessalonikê in the 14th and 15th centuries. One of the main aims is to address certain methodological issues linked to the period of transition from the Byzantine to the Ottoman Empire. In this effort, we have employed as an analytical tool the economic theory of *New Institutional Economics*, which lays significant importance in the study of the institutional framework of societies.

The main strands of the thesis are two: firstly, the exploration of the ideological concerns, internal conflicts and response of the Thessalonian society to the changing political environment until the final subjection of the city to the Ottoman Turks in 1430. Secondly, the behaviour of the Thessalonian elite in terms of social and economic practice through an examination of its relationship with the Athonite monasteries and the Late Byzantine state. Our ultimate goal is to shed light on the way provincial elite of Thessalonikê adapted to the political and economic conditions that prevailed in the Late Byzantine period.

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
In general, I have employed a Greek transliteration of Byzantine proper names and technical terms, with the exception of some well-known place names, e.g. Constantinople, or emperors' names, e.g. Manuel II, which appear in their English form. Author's names and work titles appear in the form they were published, apart from those in Greek publications which I have transliterated.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<i>AlexBat</i>	Vatopaidinos, Al. 'Ek tou archeiou tês hieras kai sebastês monês tou Vatopaidiou' <i>Palamas</i> 4 (1920), 631-635; <i>Palamas</i> 6 (1922)
<i>ArkAn</i>	Vatopaidinos, Ar. 'Agioreitika Analekta' <i>Palamas</i> 2 (1918), 449-452; <i>Palamas</i> 3 (1919)
<i>Bat I</i>	Regel, W. <i>Chrysovoulla kai grammata tês monês tou Vatopediou</i> , (Petersburg, 1898)
<i>Bat II</i>	Goudas, M. 'Vyzantiaka engrapha tês en Athô hieras monês tou Vatopediou', <i>EEBS</i> (1926/1927), 113-134, 211-248.
<i>Bat III</i>	Theocharidês, G. <i>Mia diathêkê kai mia dikê vyzantinê. Anekdotia Vatopedina engrapha</i> (Thessalonica, 1962).
<i>BF</i>	Byzantinische Forschungen
<i>BMGS</i>	Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies
<i>BSl</i>	Byzantinoslavica
<i>BZ</i>	Byzantinische Zeitschrift
<i>Chil I</i>	Actes de Chilandar I (1998 edition)
<i>ChilP I</i>	Actes de Chilandar I (edition by L. Petit)
<i>Dion</i>	Actes de Dionysiou
<i>DKMS</i>	Deltio Kentrou Mikrasiatikôn Spoudôn
<i>Doch</i>	Actes de Docheiariou
<i>DOP</i>	Dumbarton Oaks Papers
<i>DöDipl</i>	Dölger, F. <i>Byzantinische Diplomatie</i> (Ettal, 1961)
<i>DöReg</i>	Dölger, F., <i>Des Regesten der Kaiserurkunden des oströmischen Reiches IV-V/ III</i> (Munich, 1960-65/ 1977)
<i>DöSch</i>	Dölger, F. <i>Aus den Schatzkammern der heiligen Berges</i> (Munich, 1948)
<i>EEBS</i>	Epetêris Etaireias Byzantinôn Spoudôn
<i>EHB</i>	The Economic History of Byzantium

<i>Esph</i>	Actes d'Esphigménou
<i>FM</i>	Fontes Minores
<i>GuillNouv</i>	Guilland, A. 'Nouvelles recherches au Mont Athos' <i>BCH</i> 82 (1958), 172-192.
<i>JÖB</i>	Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinistik
<i>Iv III</i>	Actes d' Iviron III
<i>Iv IV</i>	Actes d' Iviron IV
<i>KtenKeim</i>	Ktenas, Ch. 'Ta keimelia tês monês Docheiarion' <i>EEBS</i> 7 (1930), 104-132.
<i>KugNot</i>	Kugeas, S. Notizbuch eines Beamten der Metropolis in Thessalonike auf dem Anfang des XV. Jahrhundert', <i>BZ</i> 23 (1914-1919), 143-163.
<i>Kut II²</i>	Actes de Kutlumus (second edition)
<i>Lavra II</i>	Actes de Lavra II
<i>Lavra III</i>	Actes de Lavra III
<i>LemKar</i>	Lemerle, P. 'Un praktikon inédit des archives de Karakala (Janvier 1342) et la situation en Macédoine orientale au moment de l'usurpation de Cantacuzène', in <i>Charistêrion eis Anastasion Orlandon</i> , vol.I, (Athens, 1965), 278-98
<i>MM</i>	Miklosich, F., Müller, J. <i>Acta et diplomata graeca medii aevi sacra et profana</i> , 5 vols. (Vienna, 1968)
<i>MošinAkti</i>	Mošin, V. <i>Akti izsvetogorskin archiva</i> (Belgrad, 1939)
<i>OikDatSeal</i>	Oikonomides, N. <i>A Collection of dated Byzantine Seals</i> (Washington D.C., 1986)
<i>Pant</i>	Actes de Pantokrator
<i>PhilK</i>	Kravari V 1987. 'Nouveaux documents du Monastère de Philothéou', <i>TM</i> 10 : 261-356.
<i>PI</i>	Dölger, F. 'Sechs byzantinischen Praktika des 14. Jhs. für das Athos Kloster Iberon', <i>Abh. d. Bayer. Akad. d. Wiss., phil-hist. Kl. N.F.</i> 28 (Munich, 1948)

<i>PG</i>	Patrologia Graeca
<i>PRK</i>	Hunger, H., Kresten, O. <i>Das Register des Patriarchats von Konstantinopel. Edition und Übersetzung der Urkunden aus den Jahren 1315-1331</i> , vol.I (Vienna, 1981).
<i>Prod</i>	Guillou, A. <i>Les Archives de Saint –Jean –Prodrome sur le Mont Ménécée</i> (Paris, 1955).
<i>REB</i>	Revue des Etudes Byzantines
<i>SchreinFin</i>	Schreiner, P. <i>Texte zur spätbyzantinischen Finanz- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte in Handschriften der Biblioteca Vaticana</i> (Vatican City, 1991).
<i>TheochEng</i>	Theocharidès, G. ‘Dyo nea engrapha aphorônta eis tèn Nean Monên Thessalonikês’ <i>Makedonika</i> 4 (1955-1960),315-351
<i>TheochVerm</i>	Theocharides, G. I. ‘Eine Vermächtnisurkunde des Grossstratopedarchen Demetrios TzAMPLAKON‘ in <i>Polychronion, Festschrift F. Dölger</i> (Heidelberg, 1966), 486-495.
<i>SolovMošin</i>	Solovjev, A., Mošin, V. <i>Grčke povelje Srpskih vladara. Diplomata graeca regum et imperatorum Serviae</i> (London, 1974)
<i>Vat I</i>	Actes de Vatopédi I
<i>Vat II</i>	Actes de Vatopédi II
<i>Xen</i>	Actes de Xénophon
<i>Xer</i>	Actes de Xèropotamou
<i>ZRVI</i>	Zbornik Radova Vizantološkog Instituta
<i>Zog</i>	Actes de Zographou




1 Map of central Macedonia (author; drawing by S. Sylaiou, courtesy of the Ephoreia of Byzantine Antiquities of Thessalonike)

LATE BYZANTINE
THESSALONIKE



Late Byzantine Thessalonike (author; drawing by S. Sabanopoulou and S. Sylaiou, courtesy of the Ephorceia of Byzantine Antiquities of Thessalonike)



Lefort J 1982. Villages de Macédoine I.
 La Chalcidique occidentale (Paris)
 Carte 1. - La Macédoine orientale.
 Limites de la région étudiée.

I. GENERAL PREOCCUPATIONS AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN
THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION (c.1350-c.1480)

II/a. Introduction

The present thesis was born out of an interest in societies and periods in history that have been ascribed the quality of ‘transitional’. By evoking the notion of ‘transition’, we understand transformations occurring in the political and economic setting of a society. These changes can refer to alterations of the political order or economic institutions and structures, as well as adaptations in the political ideology. Regardless of where scholars wish to focus each time, it cannot be doubted that there is strong interrelation between political and economic developments. Therefore, changes occurring, for instance, in the political field have implications for the nature and function of the others.

Our study concerns an era which bears the aforementioned characteristics, namely the Late Byzantine period and the passage of the Byzantine state to the hands of the Ottomans, which covers, broadly speaking, the period between c.1350 to c.1480. This period poses various challenges mainly because different parts of the empire experienced the advance of the Turks in different ways and at different times, since the Byzantine empire was heavily fragmented and there was a divergence of political and socio-economic conditions. Therefore, we have opted not to pursue a study of the prevailing conditions in the empire as a whole, but to concentrate on a local society and explore its response to the new political and economic circumstances. Despite the general dearth of sources for the later years, the city of Thessalonikê, provides sufficient documentation which renders it a fruitful case-study.

The turn of historical studies to the examination of local societies is consonant with existing trends in modern economic theories which advocate the use of micro-level studies. Our thesis has a strong theoretical orientation, as we believe that certain socio-economic phenomena that arose in the later years of the empire, although considerably studied, can now be seen through a different prism and be placed within a theoretical framework. So far, the only attempts to link Byzantine studies with a theory have been those of scholars influenced by the theories of historical materialism. In this work, we will introduce a theory developed in the last twenty years, which we believe is more appropriate to shed light on such a complex period like the Late Byzantine one. The theory in question is known as the *New Institutional Economics* and, in our view, is balanced enough to be utilised in this study, as it provides useful tools to discuss the various facets of socio-economic conditions of our case-study. This is due to the fact that instead of explaining change as a clash between social classes, it puts emphasis on the institutional framework of a society, without neglecting the issue and importance of its ideological concerns. We need to stress here that we do not consider the theory as a given, but we only wish to test its applicability to our study.

Regarding the structure of this thesis, there are three different layers. The general framework of the theory which is normally exposed at the beginning of each section. On a secondary level, there is an overview of the most recent developments in scholarship regarding the questions we raise each time. Finally, the examination of sources and data and the degree to which they verify or not the various theoretical and scholarly patterns suggested.

Looking more closely on the different sections of the thesis, in the first chapter we discuss scholarly approaches on the transitional period. Even though this thesis concentrates on material related to the Byzantine field of studies, it has been considered necessary to

refer to the way both Byzantinists and Ottomanists have treated this period and all the questions posed so far regarding the period *c.* 1350-*c.*1480. These will be followed by a discussion of the methodological issues and limitations of our sources, as well as of the notion of the ‘city’ and its nature in Late Byzantium, which constitutes the core concept of our case-study.

Chapter two discusses the attitudes and conflicts of the citizens of Thessalonikê in the years from the advance the Ottomans in the area, during the alternations of political authority in the city until its final conquest by the Ottomans in 1430. This is followed by an examination of the way traditional ideology was treated in discourses addressed to the Thessalonians by representatives of the political and ideological authorities, attempting to show that the failings and inconsistencies could provoke social discontent.

In chapter three, we explore the economic transactions that took place between the Athonite monasteries and the local ‘elite’ of Thessalonikê. The choice to focus on the upper layers of society lies in the fact that studies on political and economic transformations frequently rely on this segment of society to demonstrate the degree to which a society adapts to new political and economic conditions.

In chapter four, elites will be seen within the framework of ‘family’ and the administration of their properties, as an attempt to discern ‘individualistic’ or ‘collectivist’ features in the Late Byzantine society, as having implications for the character of this stratum and its willingness to adopt new economic practices.

Finally, in the concluding chapter we will bring together all the threads permeating this work and make an assessment of the period on two levels; firstly, on the level of social and economic practices developed in Thessalonikê, by defining the function of the ‘city’ in the later years; secondly, with regards to the theory of *New Institutional Economics* and its usefulness to our work and the degree to which our findings agree with its main theses. Our

hope is to contribute to a better understanding of the operation of local societies and offer a new approach to the field of Byzantine studies.

II/b. Scholarly preoccupations about the period of transition

The last century of life of the Byzantine Empire and the formative years of the Ottoman state and its crystallization as a political and economic structure (c.1350-c.1480) can be seen as a transitional era that generated certain economic phenomena, which were clearly products of their time and indicative of the two antithetical ideas of ‘centralization’ and ‘decentralization’. These two conceptual frameworks have been frequently employed by scholars who deal with this period, and have dominated their writings primarily as causal elements for the initiation and facilitation of the transference of power from the Byzantine polity to the Ottoman one. The analysis and understanding of the era in question may vary according to the discipline and subject that one has opted to discuss, but on the whole the common denominator in works dealing with the particular historical stage is the attempt to interpret and integrate it within the framework of dispersal and concentration of power as interrelated or successive forms of human, and by extension, state action.

The manner that issues pertaining to this period are approached by the two standard works on the economic history of the Byzantine and the Ottoman empire, the three-volume *Economic History of Byzantium* and the *Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire* respectively,¹ is quite cursory. Even though this can partly be justified by the very character of these projects, which is a general evaluation of the economy of these two states

¹ A. E. Laiou (ed.) *The Economic History of Byzantium, from the Seventh through the Fifteenth Century*: vols. III (Washington D.C., 2002); H. İnalcık H and D. Quataert D (eds.) *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600* (Cambridge, 1997).

over a long span of time, one gets the impression that there is a disinclination from both sides to wholly integrate this period to their discussion as an indispensable part for the economic developments of each polity. This is quite understandable when one considers the rapid and radical transformation that eastern Mediterranean underwent during the late 14th and early 15th centuries, which renders historical and socio-economic matters perplexing, and often blurs the margins of what might be called late Byzantine and early Ottoman era.

In the *Economic History of Byzantium* the common thread that runs through the discussion of the late Byzantine era is that of the disarticulation that permeated the entire structure of the Byzantine society, and had severe repercussions on the economy of the already impoverished state, whose role was heavily marginalized. Starting from the editor's overview and conclusions, it is characteristic that the opening sentences of the part concerning the period from the 1340s to the mid-15th century reads: '[...] there is little left to say about the last hundred years of the existence of the Byzantine state. In the 1340s, a conjunction of factors had catastrophic effects on the population, the agriculture, and the economy of exchange'.² The disturbance of the equilibrium and the shift of power to individuals, who profited from the difficult circumstances of their time and accumulated a great deal of wealth, is particularly stressed in contrast to the weakness of the state to secure sufficient resources in order to survive and prolong its existence. The loss of revenue has been attributed for the most part to the granting of privileges and tax exemptions combined with the privatization of the *pronoia* system, which for centuries constituted the backbone of the Byzantine economic structure.³

² These factors were '...the endemic wars, the previous expansion into marginal lands, the impoverishment of the peasantry, the plague that struck all of Europe, the Ottoman expansion, and the subsequent long restructuring of the trade of the eastern Mediterranean...'. A. E. Laiou, 'The Byzantine Economy: An Overview', *EHB* 2 (2002), 1160.

³ N. Oikonomides, 'The Role of the Byzantine State in the Economy', *EHB* 3 (2002), 1026- 1029, 1033-1039, 1048, 1055-1058.

In the sector of the market and trade Laiou discerns two separate trends. Firstly, the predominance of the Western maritime forces in the interregional trade, where the Byzantine merchant had a role as a minor participant, as a result of the fact that Byzantine manufacture had declined; and secondly, the strong presence of the Byzantine merchant in local trade conducted in the countryside and the towns of the empire.⁴ That means there was a co-existence of auto-consumption and surplus production that was channeled to markets, a phenomenon that is labeled as ‘polyculture and polyactivity’.⁵

Regarding the economy of exchange after the middle of the 14th century, Matschke’s contributions seem to be more pervasive and illuminating. He detects a multiplicity in the kinds of exchange, originating in the early Palaeologan period (1261 to mid-14th century), when the income of the imperial aristocracy was detached from the state sources.⁶ He also underlines the importance of the urban centres for the idiosyncratic character that commerce and trade took in the later period, like, for instance, the fact that after the 1340s rural fairs gradually disappear contrary to the urban ones, whose life extended to the 15th century.⁷ Experimentation and mobility were an integral part of the picture of the late Byzantine regional trade,⁸ while Byzantines’ participation in the long-distance trade should not be, as well, overlooked or diminished.⁹ Particularly after 1350, with the end of *Pax Mongolica* and the shift of commercial focus from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, new favourable conditions started to form and Byzantine merchants adapted to them quickly and successfully.¹⁰ Finally, a very small discussion is reserved to the matter of the Byzantine coinage in the later Palaeologan period, since that was the time of continuous debasements

⁴ A. E. Laiou, ‘The Byzantine Economy: An Overview’, *EHB* 3(2002), 1159.

⁵ *idem*, ‘The Agrarian Economy. Thirteenth –Fifteenth Centuries’, *EHB* 1 (2002), 319.

⁶ K.-P. Matschke, ‘Commerce, Trade, Markets, and Money: Thirteenth- Fifteenth Centuries’, *EHB* 2 (2002) 773.

⁷ *Ibid*, 781.

⁸ *Ibid*, 788.

⁹ *Ibid*, 789-99.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, 791; and 800-805 for the types of late Byzantine merchants.

and when *hyperpyron*, the basic gold monetary unit ceased to be struck. What is emphasized is the well-known penetration of foreign coinage, which combined with the scarcity of site finds and hoards points to the low degree of monetization, with the exception of the transit areas of Thessalonikê and Constantinople.¹¹

On the other hand, in the *Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, the same period, that is the years of the Ottoman expansion, is treated as one experiencing an all the more growing trend for the concentration of power into the hands of a central administrative apparatus that followed the military organization.¹² Particular importance is paid to the issue of the frontier forces, which under the command of the *uç-beys* were of vital importance for the historical affairs during the years from 1360-1453, and especially for the Turkish immigration to these areas. In addition, the attitude the first Ottoman sultans demonstrated towards the pre-existing population is treated within the framework of the policy of reconciliation (*istimalet*).¹³ This was an essential stage in the process of conquest that facilitated the integration and assimilation of the new subjects into the new administrative organization, the *timar* system. This reconciliatory approach was motivated by the economic interests of the conqueror, who was particularly concerned with the ensuring of adequate supplies and resources while setting up the state structures.¹⁴ Therefore, some degree of social mobility and utilization of human resources was respectively permitted and promoted. In particular, İnalcık devotes a part of his discussion on the extensive employment of Greeks and Jews in the Ottoman tax-farming system, trade and banking that took place from the very first years of the Ottomans' occupation, as indicative of their realistic aims and

¹¹ C. Morriison, 'Byzantine Money: Its Production and Circulation', *EHB* 2 (2002), 961-962.

¹² İnalcık, *Economic and Social History*, 13-14.

¹³ *Ibid*, 18.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, 50.

pragmatism.¹⁵ The same expediency dictated the acquiring of material resources and exploitation of regions rich in minerals, necessary sources of state revenue.¹⁶

On the whole, İnalçık delineates the general socio-economic framework during the formation of the Ottoman state, particularly when this took its shape in the 15th and 16th centuries. Very few references are made in the period previous to Mehmed II's reign and only to the extent that they illuminate the central idea of 'reconciliation'. However, throughout this work there is a clear inclination to accept the embracement and continuation of Byzantine institutions and forms of life from the Ottoman state as part of a conscious policy dictated by the political circumstances and aims, as these were shaped in the first years of its existence.

The relations, borrowings and interaction between the Byzantine and Islamic world is certainly not a new issue. Throughout its history the Byzantine Empire co-existed with people of the East, and there were more than a few times that they confronted each other. There were alternate periods of peaceful symbiosis and of violent tension, the latter of which took the form of an ultimate confrontation and submission of the Byzantine state to the Ottomans in a period when it was at its last gasp. The successor state would find itself in front of a scenery of impoverishment and dissolution, but at the same time it would face a set of institutions and administrative structures, which held a long tradition. In order to establish and cement their presence in the newly conquered areas, Ottomans' major challenge would be to utilize the human and material resources, which they came across during their advance, in the best possible way.

Thus, the main implication of the Ottomans' advance was that they had to found their state upon a pre-existing socio-economic structure. That in practice meant that they had to demonstrate a certain degree of flexibility in their politics of establishment. In older Balkan

¹⁵ *Ibid*, 209-216.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, 58-64.

historiography the Ottoman penetration into the Balkans was conceived as a radical phenomenon with disastrous results for the population of the area and its economic life.¹⁷ From the Ottomanists' point of view, on the other hand, it was supposed to have brought an end to older forms of institutions and constituted the celebration of the Asiatic mode of production.¹⁸ Any form, thus, of continuity and interaction between the two worlds was rejected. As research has progressed through the years these politically charged attitudes have faded and been abandoned and have given way to a growing interest in the relations and borrowings of the two neighbouring cultures, as already mentioned above. For our discussion two characteristic features of the Ottoman society are of significance. Firstly, the emphasis that was put by the Ottoman regime on the development of the cities through the utilization of the local population, and secondly, the nascent state's possession of a centralized and greatly sophisticated administrative and fiscal machinery.

The interest in issues relevant to the transition from the Byzantine to the Ottoman era has steadily increased within the last thirty years reflecting, thus, a shift in scholarly attitude towards the discipline of history, as well as the necessity for a comparative approach on issues, which in the past have been treated within a confined 'nationalistic' framework. One of the pioneering projects regarding the period in question was the project undertaken in 1978 by the Centre for Byzantine Studies at the University of Birmingham in collaboration with Harvard University at Dumbarton Oaks.¹⁹ From that point onwards a number of other projects and discussions have come to the fore, although not coming anywhere near the size and the conclusions that the previous project reached.

¹⁷ D. Angelov, 'Certains aspects de la conquête des peuples balkaniques par les Turcs', *BSI* 17 (1956), 220-275.

¹⁸ For an overview of the Turkish historiography of the last century and its political overtones, see Faroqui's introduction in the *Journal of Peasant Studies* 18 (1991), 3-16.

¹⁹ A.A. Bryer and H. Lowry (eds.), *Continuity and Change in Late Byzantine and Early Ottoman Society: Papers given at a Symposium at Dumbarton Oaks in May 1982*, (Birmingham-Washington D.C., 1986).

In August 1991 at the 18th International Byzantinist Congress held in Moscow entitled ‘Byzantium and the Muslim world’, and in the same year a symposium organized by the Institute for Mediterranean Studies in Crete dealt with the Ottoman Emirate between 1300 and 1389.²⁰ The following year a conference held at Princeton University was on trade and the behaviour of merchants around 1453,²¹ whereas the position and role of the monasteries of Mount Athos during the first centuries of the Ottoman occupation was the topic of discussion at a conference in Athens in 1995.²² Finally, a recent conference that took place in Prato in May 2006 focused on the economic relations between the Christian and Muslim world from the 13th to the 18th century with the main aim of demonstrating the imperative of studying socio-economic phenomena within a broader framework that always takes into account the interaction of neighbouring societies and cultures.²³

Turning back to the project that was pursued by Birmingham University and Dumbarton Oaks, one has to underscore its value in the field of comparative studies. The principal aim of this task was the comparative evaluation of the accounts of late Byzantine documents (*praktika*) from Mount Athos and early Ottoman registers (*tahrir defters*), in combination with other documentary material, aspiring to discuss how compatible these types of material are. The nature of these sources, as records of revenues to be derived from people and land in the first case, and surveys of the sources of the Ottoman empire in the second, determined to a large extent the orientation of the task, which for the most part constituted a survey on demography, but included fiscal, administrative and military institutions as well.²⁴

²⁰ E. Zachariadou (ed.), *The Ottoman Emirate (1300-1389), A Symposium Held in Rethymnon 11-13 January 1991* (Rethymnon, 1993).

²¹ ‘*The Business of Change: Merchants and the Fall of Constantinople*, Princeton, November 11-12, 1994.

²² *International Symposium Mount Athos in the 14th-16th Centuries, 17 October 1995* (Athens, 1997).

²³ *Relazioni economiche tra Europa e mondo islamico. Secc. XIII-XVIII*, Prato, 1-5 maggio 2006. (Prato, 2007).

²⁴ An analogous project that focused principally on issues of demography, is K. Moustakas, *The Transition from Late Byzantine to Early Ottoman Southeastern Macedonia (14th-15th centuries). A Socioeconomic and Demographic Study* (Unpublished PhD thesis, The University of Birmingham, 2001).

In an article published in 2002 Klaus-Peter Matschke summarized neatly the main problematic aspects on the downfall, transition and new beginning in the period in question which according to his view require the collaboration of Byzantinists, Slavists and Ottomanists and the synthesis of different disciplines if one wishes to gain a more profound knowledge of historical developments. Based to a large extent on the results reached by the abovementioned venture,²⁵ he unraveled the main prevailing concerns with reference to the shift of power in Anatolia and the Balkans from approximately the 14th to 16th centuries. These for the most part relate to i) the population development between Byzantine and Ottoman rule and how this is manifested on the one hand, in villages and rural regions and on the other, in towns and urban regions; ii) the share of the autochthonous population in the military expansion and defense of the Ottoman state; iii) as well as the Orthodox Patriarchate and the major Christian Monasteries in the period of social change. Turning to subject matters that relate more directly to economic performance he underlines the need for a number of further topics to be studied, that is iv) the continuity of fairs in the period of transition, v) the Byzantine-Greek entrepreneurship and its role in the economic development of the early Ottoman state, and, last but not least, vi) the monetary policies and practices through an investigation of the Byzantine silver refineries and their early Ottoman counterparts.

Matschke's fifth proposition will be discussed in this thesis not as such, but we will explore the reasons that led the Late Byzantine aristocracy, which was traditionally involved in land-based activities, to turn to different kinds of economic activities within the new conditions that were created in the eastern Mediterranean. What is meant by the term 'new conditions' is the passage from the decentralized state of affairs that prevailed in the late

²⁵ K.-P.Matschke, 'Research Problems concerning the Transition to *Tourkokratia*: The Byzantinist Standpoint', in *The Ottomans and the Balkans. A discussion of historiography*, ed. F. Adanir and S. Faroqhi (Leiden- Boston- Cologne, 2002), 79-113.

Byzantine era, both in the political and economic sector, to the new political and economic regime with its apparently centralized structures and policies.

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It is a common knowledge that socio-economic phenomena are dependent on the structure of the state itself and are largely determined by the policies it follows. In our case, various interpretations have been given to the developments of the 14th and 15th centuries under the light of different theories and explanatory frameworks. A fundamental way of perceiving pre-capitalist societies and construing their function is by following the Marxist theoretical line, which explicates the organizational form of politics on the basis of the nature of the surplus wealth, its distribution and consumption. The relation among these three elements is a crucially determining factor for the manner in which a state evolves and for its dialectic relation with its institutions. If this particular theoretical path is followed, then the decline of the Byzantine state should be seen as a product of the shift of power from the state to the hands of an élite class, who managed to appropriate the surplus and gain control over resources.²⁶ By the same token then, the success that the Ottoman state enjoyed in the first centuries of its existence should be attributed to the competence it displayed in minimizing the power of its own apparatus.²⁷

Indeed, regarding the latter case, this presumption may hold true for the period the Ottoman state had established concrete and coherent forms of social and economic practice,

²⁶ J. Haldon, *The State and the Tributary Mode of Production* (London-New York, 1993), 194-202; E. Werner, 'Gesellschaft und Kultur im XIV. Jahrhundert: sozial-ökonomische Fragen', *Actes du XIV^e congrès international des études Byzantines* (Bucarest, 6-12 Septembre 1971) (Bucharest, 1974), 93-110.

²⁷ On the issue of the intricate relationship between the Ottoman state and the ruling class, see, Haldon, *State and Tributary Mode*, 158-188; *idem*, 'The Ottoman State and the Question of State Autonomy: Comparative Perspectives' *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 18 (1991), 18- 108; regarding the matter of 'feudalism' in the Ottoman Empire, see C. Wickham, 'The Uniqueness of the East', *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 12 (1985), 166-196; H. Berktaş, 'The Feudalism Debate: The Turkish End- Is 'Tax-vs.-Rent' Necessarily the Product and Sign of a Modal Difference?' *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 14 (1987), 291-333; *idem*, 'The Search for the Peasant in Western and Turkish History/Historiography' *Journal of Peasant Studies* 18 (1991), 109-184;

but one should be cautious to apply it all through the period of its formative years. There are a number of parameters that must be regarded, two of which are the personality of the ruler and his capability to impose his will,²⁸ and also local conditions and specificities that could determine politics and state actions. It is difficult to imagine that within a period of political and economic fluidity rigid policies were drawn and applied without exception or without any sign of flexibility. Moreover, bearing in mind the complex beginning and evolution of the Ottoman state, it would not be really constructive to pose definitional questions, but, rather, to seek the scopes and stages of the Ottoman advance that for years has constituted a topic of academic debate. The intentions of the Ottomans and their capacity to accomplish their objectives have been linked firstly, with the very origins of the early Ottoman state, and on a secondary level, with the role and position that the non-Muslim element occupied in society.²⁹ The former issue has been the topic of discussion in a considerable number of scholarly writings, whose main consideration is the following: what were the factors and the driving force behind the Ottoman advance and growth.

The prevailing view that has haunted Ottoman studies for years was the one voiced by Paul Wittek in the early twentieth century, which was based on his ‘*gaza*’ or ‘Holy War’ thesis.³⁰ In essence, he put the emphasis on the warlike character of the Ottomans. What accounted, though, for this attitude of theirs was not the existence of base motives, such as those of booty and making profit, but their wish to spread the religion of Islam. Subsequent scholars have objected to this theory to a lesser or greater degree each, but until today it constitutes a point of reference for everyone wishing to deal with the issue of the birth of the Ottoman state.³¹ In most recent years, there has been an endeavour to reformulate the

²⁸ Haldon, *State and Tributary Mode*, 167.

²⁹ For the methodological issues arising from the study of the role of non-Muslims in Islamic societies, see R. S. Humphreys, *Islamic History. A Framework for Inquiry* (New Jersey, 1991), 255-283.

³⁰ P. Wittek, *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire* (London, 1938).

³¹ A good summary of this debate as developed throughout the years is provided in, H. Lowry, *The Nature of the Early Ottoman State* (New York, 2003), 5-13.

problem on a wider basis by shifting the point of gravity to issues of cultural interaction and syncretism, mainly by Cemal Kafadar and Heath Lowry.

In his work, Kafadar advanced a reconstruction of the social and political environment of late medieval Anatolia, within which he searched for the roots of the Ottoman state.³² He made a clear distinction between the Anatolian hinterland and the frontier zones, suggesting that the latter witnessed a high degree of co-existence, which permitted physical mobility and fluidity, and consequently mutual cultural influence. What really distinguished, in his view, the Ottomans from the other Turkish tribes in this process was ‘the fact that they harnessed that mobility to their own ends, while shaping it and taming it to conform to their stability seeking, centralizing vision’.³³ This led them to pursue a policy of ‘inclusivism’ by maintaining a general reluctance towards the pre-existing aristocracy and by accepting particular institutions when ‘it made sense’.³⁴

An even more systematized revision of Wittek’s views, which moved a stage further, was lately pursued by Lowry. His study deserves particular discussion, since it relates in many ways with the scope of this thesis. More specifically, various ‘fallacies’ of well-established conceptions about the early Ottoman period were spotted and reexamined through a new angle. As he states in his introduction, he based his investigation on two case studies: a) an analysis of Christian peasant life in the fifteenth century; and b) an examination of the manner in which members of the preexisting Byzantine and Balkan nobilities were subsumed into the Ottoman administrative apparatus.³⁵ His main thesis is encapsulated in the idea of *istimalet* or policy of ‘accommodation’. Through this concept he argues that the early Ottoman society should not be characterized solely as ‘Turkish’ or

³² C. Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State* (Los Angeles, 1995).

³³ *Ibid*, 140.

³⁴ *Ibid*, 141-142.

³⁵ Lowry, *The Nature of the Ottoman State*, 3.

‘Islamic.’³⁶ Rather, it should be regarded as multifaceted, flexible, tolerant of people of different religion and offering economic incentives, thus opportunities for upward social mobility. But the most radical idea that he introduces in this work relates to the issue of ‘centralization’ itself. ‘Centre’ should be perceived as defined by local society and practice, and not as it has been traditionally interpreted, that is to say as linked to a centralized and bureaucratic apparatus.³⁷ In terms of geographical boundaries, he focuses his examination on the area of the Balkans underlining its significance as the field where the Ottomans’ principal goals were determined and their policies were shaped. If one should search for the origins of the Ottoman state as an institutional structure, then one should turn to the preexisting late-Roman, Byzantine Christian milieu of the Balkans and investigate its influence on the conqueror’s practices.³⁸

His first case study is mainly based upon the tax registers of the island of Lemnos, where he detected a number of practices that, according to him, were dictated by the historical circumstances and ‘need’. In suggesting so, he keeps a clear distance from views that point to a conscious and intentional course of action which, according to him, fail to comprehend that the flexible attitude shown by the Ottomans was dictated by the exigency of exploiting local human resources in order to fill the gap created by the inevitable loss of manpower during war operations.³⁹ Some of the conclusions he reached in favour of the flexibility element in Ottoman practice were the following: the local indigenous Christian peasant population was responsible for the defense of the island; as taxpayers, they had the

³⁶ *Ibid*, 95.

³⁷ *Ibid*, 101.

³⁸ *Ibid*, 96.

³⁹ *Ibid*, 102. In particular he opposes such arguments made by John Fine in, J. Fine Jr., *The Late Medieval Balkans: A Critical Survey from the Late Twelfth to the Ottoman Conquest* (Michigan, 1987), 607-611; and, H. İnalcık, ‘Ottoman Methods of Conquest’, *Studia Islamica* II (Paris, 1954), 104-129. Both these works provide a scheme of the policy that the Ottomans followed during the years of their expansion insisting on its gradualness that was of a deliberate character, and as such they fail to take into consideration potential deviations from it associated with the local factor, an important point for consideration in this thesis.

right to appeal; and there were definitely intermarriages between the Janissaries (*askeri* class) and the local Christian (*reaya*).

The final part of Lowry's study is devoted to the fate of the former Balkan ruling elites, and the degree to which these were absorbed into the Ottoman society. Deriving information mainly from historiographical sources, he drew up a list of the 25 Grand Vezirs who serviced the state from 1453 to 1517. The vast majority drew their origins from the former Balkan nobility, while only three of them seem to have been Muslim Turks by birth. Concluding his chapter, he suggests that the results of his study function as indices for the great extent of the religious and cultural incorporation that occurred in the period in question. The implication is that a reconsideration of the 'negative' perception of conversion, which has predominated a substantial part of literature, needs to be undertaken under the light of the possibility of a *Realpolitik*.⁴⁰

The first scholar, however, who initiated the discussion about the fate of Christian element in the first century of Ottoman occupation, was Halil İnalçık with his article on the *timariots* of Christian origin in the region of Albania, which was followed by his work on the *timariots* of the Balkans.⁴¹ The willingness of the Ottoman state to utilize the pre-existing local element to its best interest is illuminated by the survival of the Christian aristocracy, which took the form of absorption of the local gentry in the Ottoman ruling class. He stressed the fact that one of the Ottomans' main policies, which was put into practice consistently up to Mehmed II's years, was that of conciliation towards preexisting classes and institutions,⁴² and what this conciliatory attitude effected was a profound change

⁴⁰ *Ibid*, 129-130.

⁴¹ H. İnalçık, 'Timariotes chrétiens en Albanie au XVe siècle d'après un registre de timats ottoman. *Mitteilungen des Österreichisches Staatsarchivs* 4 (1951), 118-138; *idem*, Stefan Duşan' dan Osmanlı İmparatoruğuna XV. asırda Rumeli'de Hıristiyan şipahiler ve menşeleri, *Fuad Köprülü Armağani* (İstanbul, 1953).

⁴² H. İnalçık and D. Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600* (Cambridge, 1997), 7, 13.

on a political, social and cultural level.⁴³ Characteristic is the case of the Greek tax farmers who were recruited in the Ottoman fiscal apparatus.⁴⁴

According to an innovative article by Togan, in which a comparison between the Mongol and the Ottoman Empire was pursued, the dynamics and the flexibility of the Ottoman politics are to be sought in the notions of ‘redistribution of resources and power sharing’, and of ‘accumulation of resources and monopoly of power’.⁴⁵ This process is clearly demonstrated by the steps that the Ottomans followed in their advance. Firstly, they practiced an inclusive policy towards people of different backgrounds, and then they dominated a geographical area which was distinct in three zones: i) the ‘core’ zone that was mainly agricultural (Balkans beyond Edirne), ii) the ‘strategic’ one, intermediary between the agricultural and the tribal areas, and iii) the areas close to trade routes, usually colonized by tribal populations.⁴⁶ In terms of chronological development, a three-part division is also sustained. The period from 1290 to 1360 signifies the formation of the political centre that was characterized by horizontal relationships (pastoralism and predatory warfare). The latter transformed to vertical ones (tributary system) in the years from 1360 to 1453 when political ideas were still fluid, and which were crystallized in the period after 1453. From that point onwards, an intensive institutionalization and centralization would follow with particular emphasis on the accumulation of wealth mainly through the fiscal sector.⁴⁷

Without a doubt, apart from utilizing existing manpower, the Ottoman state had as its principal aim the acquisition of material resources. In order for a state to set up a centralized administrative apparatus, a substantial stock and supply of resources is essential. From a

⁴³ Meaning mainly the islamization process, İnalcık, ‘Timariotes chrétiens’, 137-8; and *idem*, *The Classical Age*, 103-129.

⁴⁴ H. İnalcık, ‘Greeks in the Ottoman Economy and Finances 1453-1500’, in *To Hellenikon, Studies in Honor of Speros Vryonis Jr.*, Bd. 2 (New Rochelle-New York, 1993); *idem*, ‘Ottoman Methods of Conquest’, *Studia Islamica* II (Paris, 1954), 120.

⁴⁵ I. Togan, ‘Ottoman History by Inner Asian Norms’ *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 18 (1991), 186-210.

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, 190-191.

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, 196-200.

very early stage of the Ottomans' advance into the Balkans, efforts were made for the acquisition and control of the salt mines and the metal mining areas. Bosnia and Serbia with their rich silver and gold mines were the target of Murad I, who persisted in gaining their control of them,⁴⁸ a policy that was continued by Mehmed II during the first years of his reign.⁴⁹ The importance that the Ottoman state placed on the exploitation of these resources is clearly illustrated by the fact that these were under the immediate control of the sultan, as they constituted –along large cities and ports- part of his *hass* holdings (large fiscal domains).⁵⁰

Moreover, workers operating in salt and metal mines appear to have enjoyed a special status.⁵¹ They were not considered as *reayas*, at least in the early Ottoman legislation, and they were provided with certain privileges. This was in accord with the policy of the Ottomans to grant special privileges, mostly in the form of tax exemption, in order to secure the faithfulness of the locals, and the group of mining workers falls into this category.⁵² Most of them were Christians or former ones as their names reveal.⁵³ Their special status had to do with the dispensation from the institution of *devşirme*, the payment of the poll tax (*cizye*) wholly or partly, and in addition they could receive in exchange for their work a certain amount of money or some kind of natural produce. Their advantaged status was reinforced by the fact the aforementioned privileges could be inherited by their sons, and consequently the potential for them to accumulate capital was increased.⁵⁴ The main objective of the conqueror was after all the acquisition of capital and resources and in this

⁴⁸ İnalcık, *The Classical Age*, 58-59.

⁴⁹ F. Babinger, *Mehmed the Conqueror and his time* (New Jersey, 1978), 16-20, 164-65, 434.

⁵⁰ N. Todorov, *The Balkan City* (Seattle-London, 1983), 81.

⁵¹ E. Grozdanova, 'Bergleute (Madenci), Salzgewinner (Tuzcu) und Celeps als Bevölkerungsgruppen mit Sonderpflichten und Sonderstatus im Osmanischen Reich. Versuch einer vergleichenden Analyse', *SOF* 56 (1997), 105-274.

⁵² İnalcık, 'Ottoman Methods', 107-108.

⁵³ Grozdanova, 'Bergleute', 113-114.

⁵⁴ *Ibid*, 115.

process the choice that was made was to ensure the continuity of life to the possible maximum.⁵⁵

That brings us to the question of what the prevailing economic conditions in the late Byzantine state were. The trend that had prevailed in its policies in the sector of the administration and management of the few remaining resources was that of privatization. For instance, the system of lease holding must have been a quite common practice in the last years of the Byzantine Empire and there were definitely individuals making profit from the exploitation of gold and silver mines.⁵⁶ These were called *chrysepilektai* and came from the upper strata of the society. Several of them were of Thessalonian origin and a number of them managed to extend their mining related activities to other areas of the Balkans.⁵⁷ Indicative of the weakness of the Byzantine state to control its resources in this later period is the fact that even monasteries were in the position to involve themselves in mining activities.⁵⁸

Privatization must have prevailed also in the field of minting coins. The practice of leasing mints was spread in Serbia during the fourteenth century,⁵⁹ and its establishment in the areas of the Byzantine Empire should probably be sought in the middle of the same century.⁶⁰ Unfortunately, the information we get from the sources is scanty and it does not always come from Byzantine ones. It is absolutely certain, however, that this period was one of decadence for the Byzantine coinage, while the Ottoman one started to make its appearance around the end of the century.

⁵⁵ Babinger, *Mehmed*, 434.

⁵⁶ K.-P. Matschke, 'Zum Anteil der Byzantiner an der Bergbauentwicklung und an den Bergbauertragern Südosteuropas im 14. und 15. Jahrhundert', *BZ* 84/85 (1991/2), 57ff.

⁵⁷ Matschke, 'Mining', 120.

⁵⁸ V. Hrochová, 'Zur wirtschaftliche Rolle der Byzantinischen Kloster im 13.-15. Jahrhundert', *JÖB* 32/2 (1982), 85-93.

⁵⁹ B. Saria, 'Die Entwicklung des altserbischen Münzwesens', *SOF* 13 (1954), 22-61.

⁶⁰ K.-P. Matschke 1997. 'Münzstätten, Münzen und Münzprägung im späten Byzanz', *Revue Numismatique* 152 (1997), 200-201.

The picture that one forms at a first glance is that of a contrasting scheme. In the case of the Byzantine Empire, the stagnation of the central machinery and the rise of the individual, and as regards the Ottomans, the concentration of power through the utilization of resources. The study of the transition from one reality to the other requires the determination of a specific focus that will facilitate and validate the results of such an endeavour. Consequently, the current thesis will concentrate on the examination of the city of Thessalonikê and the place this occupied within this process.

The central concept of the present work is to suggest that the study of occurrences in transition can be productive and indicative of the tendencies, mentalities and behaviours adopted, as well as for the choices made either individually, or collectively, that best suited the conditions of the time. One of the key issues is whether the formal rules existing in periods of stability were modified or completely overturned by other ones in transitional historical periods. The question has been explicitly posed by Douglass North, one of the main representatives of the theory of *New Institutional Economics*, which constitutes the theoretical framework of our work.⁶¹ This theory ascribes a decisive role to a society's institutional framework in helping us define 'transition', and the specific forms that it takes. Is it always a visible procedure, or a conventional notion, which permits the interpretation of an evolutionary process? And more importantly, are there recognizable criteria of the initiation of a transitional process?

Changing conditions are a constant in human history. Individuals and groups are regularly invited to adjust to new conditions. The degree and intensity of the shift to new realities varies, but apparently it becomes more discernible in periods of cultural, political and/or economic 'decline'. The word in itself is charged with a negative connotation suggesting the bankruptcy and failure of a society or a polity to preserve the elements and

⁶¹ D. C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance: Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions* (Cambridge, 1995), 83-91.

components that at a certain point in time constituted the bases of its prosperity. To us, however, the ‘decay’ of a society bears the seeds and *is* the prerequisite for the creation of new structures or the transformation of the pre-existing ones to new forms and patterns of action, and does not necessarily signify a mere collapse of structures. Rather it forms the decisive moment at which adaptation to novel historical conditions and circumstances is permitted. And it holds true that in periods of war, revolution and conquest, which are considered as major sources of discontinuous institutional change, the restructuring of a society can be particularly revealing.⁶²

The endeavour to explore the reasons for choices made towards new forms of action can be a tricky business. All the more difficult can be the attempt to define the degree to which these choices were made consciously or were dictated by exogenous factors, that is political, economic or cultural. To be more specific, the main question is whether there is space for initiative – and to what extent-, or conversely if certain actions are imposed by the new state of affairs that comes to prevail in the theatre of historical events, that is if they are dictated by compulsion. Another issue that arises is what the role of custom and tradition is within an evolutionary process and to which degree the choices of historical actors are determined by them or are their concomitants. We need, thus, to select carefully and prioritize the variables, which we will employ in our work in order to study comprehensively ‘transitional’ phenomena. In this work, these variables have been broadly divided into two major organizing concepts, political ideology and economic practice. Individual parts of North’s theory pertaining to these issues will be analysed more thoroughly in the appropriate sections. It must be mentioned that, although the work of other theorists is at times delineated, only aspects of North theory will be applicable to this study.

⁶² D. C. North, *Understanding the Process of Economic Change* (Princeton-Oxford), 89, 101-103.

I/c. Methodological tools and relevant material

The reasons behind the choice of the city of Thessalonikê case-studies vary. The principal one is the relative abundance of written sources, which can elucidate the historical issues and economic phenomena of the time. Secondly, Thessalonikê constitutes a characteristic example for the succession of the political and economic dispersal, and concentration of power. Chronologically, the initiation point varies due to restrictions imposed by the material. Therefore, the political attitudes and ideological issues cover the period between 1372, when Manuel II Palaiologos assumed the governorship of the city, to 1430, when it was subjected to the Ottomans.

Unfortunately, all narratives referring to the advance of Ottomans come from the fifteenth century and their main shortcoming is their chronological distance from the events they deal with. Thus, narration frequently suffers from a lack of precise sequence of events, a fact that reflects the confusion in which the authors found themselves. In terms of the periods they cover in their works, Doukas begins his narration from the year 1341, but becomes more meticulous in his treatment of events from the year 1389 onwards. Geôrgios Sphrantzês in his *Chronicon Minus* focuses on the period 1401-1477, and Laonikos Chalkokondylês is mainly interested in describing the expansion of the Ottomans from the time of their emergence in Anatolia until 1463. The main weakness of his history is that it was compiled with no chronological arrangement.

Fundamental in this research will be the analysis of certain literary sources, since these are more useful in mirroring the values and ideology of the society to which they belonged and provide us with an overall picture of how contemporaries viewed and perceived their historical reality. The mentality and self-awareness of the social strata, especially of the upper one, are not infrequently expressed in the writings of the time. For the most part they constitute the reflection of current intellectual thought and in many cases are intertwined

with the author's political views and own personal perception of the historical events of his age. Even when these concern theological controversies, in reality they constitute a form of the writer's self-assertion, the justification of social demands and safeguarding of his economic well-being. In extension, we can identify their attitudes, interpret the motivations behind individual and group actions, and therefore elucidate the path of social and historical change.

The Byzantine literary sources of the 14th and 15th century on Thessalonikê are not very extensive in number. A classification of these would result in two major categories, the epistolographic and the theological. The first type of sources is the correspondence exchanged between Manuel II Palaiologos, governor of Thessalonikê and leader in the war against the Ottoman Turks, and his friend, Dêmêtrios Kydônês, a Thessalonian in origin. The letters were exchanged in the period from 1371 to 1387 and give us an insight into the attitude of the citizens towards him. The second type of source is the work of theological nature by men of the Orthodox church, and more specifically the three archbishops of Thessalonikê in the period from 1383 to 1430, Isidôros Glavas, Gavriêl and Symeôn. Sensing the pulse of their times their work reflects the social reality and crisis that their region was experiencing. The significance of these sources lies in the fact that apart from their moralistic nature, they also depict their authors' ideas and can provide the researcher with more specific information on the role of the local *archontes* and the tensions between them and the common people from the contemporary observer's point of view. Isidôros Glavas's homilies and letters from the late fourteenth century, for instance, are especially revealing for the communal institutions of the city and how they adapted to the conditions of the Turkish occupation. The sermons of the next archbishop Gavriêl also offer clues for the economic condition of the city and the fiscal measures taken, whereas in Symeôn's discourse one can detect his strong opposition towards the separatist attitudes of the local

aristocrats towards the central authority and their craving to augment their wealth to the detriment of the non-privileged people. Lastly, of great value is the account of Iôannês Anagnôstês on the Ottoman conquest in 1430.

The section on the economic behavior of the Thessalonian elite will be based on an analysis of the economic actions and the fate of the local aristocracy residing in this urban centre all through the period in question. In this attempt, we will utilize the published documents of the monasteries of Mount Athos, which impose two limitations. Being monastic documents, they can only reveal certain economic transactions performed by laymen which do not go any further than their dealings with monasteries. On the other hand, though, they give a quite clear picture about the fate of landed property in the Late Byzantine period. The second restriction is a chronological one, as most documents regarding Thessalonikê comes from the 14th century, whilst those of the 15th are very few.⁶³ We have also utilised the standard work on the prosopography of the Palaiologan period, the *Prosopographisches Lexikon der Palaiologenzeit*, and have produced a systematic recording and tabulation of the Thessalonian elite and their family names, depicting also their economic transactions in the 14th and 15th centuries.

Relevant scholarly works regarding the prosopography of the Late Byzantine elite are those of Angeliki Laiou and Nevra Necipoğlu. Laiou, in her article on the city of Serres,⁶⁴ restricts her overview of the social stratification of the city on the 14th century, she identifies three distinct social strata: the landed aristocracy with roots to the Constantinopolitan families, the local nobility possessing urban and rural properties whose power and wealth started to grow from the middle of the century onwards, and lastly the middle class, which included the merchants and the wealthiest part of the artisans. She lays particular importance

⁶³ It was unfortunate that this thesis was completed before the publication the third volume of documents of the Vatopedi document, which copries material on the 15th century.

⁶⁴ A. Laiou, 'Koinônikes dynameis stis Serres sto 14o aiôna' in *Oi Serres kai hê periochê tou apo ten archaia stên metavyzantinê koinônia: Proceedings of the International Conference (29 September-3 October 1993)* (Serres, 1998), 203-219.

on the role of the current political circumstances as an incentive for the redistribution of wealth and suggests that there was a definite continuity of the 14th century of economic life without dramatic effects in the first century of the Ottoman occupation.⁶⁵

In an article that came out in 2003, Necipoğlu focuses her review of the late Byzantine aristocracy in Thessalonikê in the late 14th and early 15th centuries on the middle and lower strata of this group, which formed part of the local population, excluding the imperial governors whose presence in the city was temporary.⁶⁶ In an attempt to elucidate information coming from narrative sources for the attitudes of the local authorities, she has gathered the names and titles of approximately fifty individuals drawing attention to their economic profile and some of their sources of wealth by highlighting their involvement in trade and banking. This work is a compact evaluation of the nature and role of this particular segment of society with no claims of reconstructing the portrait of the late Byzantine *archon*, as she does not cover the issue of landed property, which is the object of our thesis.

I/d. Framing the notion of the city as a point of social and economic interaction: the paradigm of the Late Byzantine city

A focal point of economic activity, equally in pre-capitalist and capitalist societies, constitutes the ‘city’ or ‘town’. The employment of either the former or the latter term engages the user with a set of cultural presuppositions mainly with reference to the social relations existing in these agglomerations. Therefore, within an academic work it has to be

⁶⁵ *Ibid*, 214-219.

⁶⁶ N. Necipoğlu, ‘The Aristocracy in Late Byzantine Thessalonikê: A case Study of the City’s Archontes (Late 14th and Early 15th Centuries)’, *Symposium on Late Byzantine Thessalonikê*, *DOP* 57, (2003), 133-151. This work is based on her PhD thesis, which has now been published. N. Necipoğlu, *Byzantium between the Ottomans and the Latins: Politics and Society in the Late Empire* (Cambridge, 2009).

stated in advance in what fashion these terms are to be utilized. Since, as a general rule, 'city' refers to larger, more socially structured urban centres with a multiplicity of functions, such as administrative, religious and judicial, and 'town' to smaller agglomerations of habitation with a simpler social stratification.

It needs also to be mentioned that within the scope of this present study our aim is not to discuss the nature and the speculation that surrounds the concept of the 'city' as a topic of academic debate exhaustively, but only to the extent that this will facilitate our discourse and provide us with complementary avenues of enquiry as regards our central preoccupations. The idea is to highlight some of the main general issues regarding the character of the 'city', its employment as a mental construct, and finally its value in cross-cultural studies especially with reference to economic history. The selection of a small number of theorists to be discussed or cited was made purely on the basis of the impact that their work had on later scholarly production with reference to the nature of the urban centre and its intertwining with human relations and activities. Preponderance thus has been given to those thinkers whose written work has been used as a point of reference by subsequent scholars that devoted themselves to the espousing or deconstructing of previous theories in order to shape their own line of argumentation. Finally, the brief examination of the late Byzantine and early Ottoman city, which will follow, will focus on their character with reference to the concepts of 'centralization' and 'decentralization', and how these are reflected in the trends that prevailed in the stratification patterns during the period in question.

For many years, and probably for the sake of research, the city was conceptually separated from the country.⁶⁷ It was perceived and treated as an independent social entity

⁶⁷ For a concise but illuminating discussion and critique on the literature about the nature of the city as seen from various scholars, see P. Abrams, 'Towns and Economic Growth: Some Theories and Problems', in *Towns in Societies, Essays in Economic History and Historical Sociology*, ed. P. Abrams and E. A. Wrigley (Cambridge, 1978), 9-33.

obeying to its own internal rules, being practically isolated from its external environment.⁶⁸ Three of the scholars, whose work on urban studies has been quite influential and has provided a frame of reference for numerous other works, are Max Weber, Gedeon Sjoberg, and Fernand Braudel.⁶⁹ All three of them attempted to establish a typology of the city, which was formed and elaborated on different grounds in each case, but apparently it was unavoidably influenced by these scholars' western cultural background. As will be shown below, in many cases there was a conscious or unconscious effort to create universal models and impose concepts, which were initially created for the study of western European civilization, on the examination of cultures and polities belonging to the eastern world. Even though to a large extent these intellectuals' theories did not escape the pitfall of overgeneralization, on the whole they managed to draw attention to several fundamental issues concerning the social and economic role of the city, which are intended to be dealt with extensively in the course of this thesis.

To begin with, Max Weber dealt at length with the notion of the city departing from the elaboration of the concept itself and following a categorization, which was based on economic grounds.⁷⁰ In his approach preponderance was given to the conception of the city as the embodiment of certain modes of power, to be exact the non-legitimate domination and the rational economic action. Understandably, he envisaged the city as a concentration of social activity where power plays the central role. It could be imposed either by force or it could be a 'peaceful exercise of an actor's control over resources which requires instrumental rationality and deliberate planning'.⁷¹ In both cases the ulterior aim was profit.

⁶⁸ See, for instance, Braudel's suggestion of perceiving the 'town in itself, outside the economy or civilization containing it', in F. Braudel, *Capitalism and Material Life: 1400-1800* (London, 1973), 373.

⁶⁹ M. Weber, *The City*, (Illinois, 1958); *idem*, *Economy and Society* (New York, 1968); Braudel, *Capitalism*, and *idem*, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, 2 vols. (London, 1972, 1973); G. Sjoberg, *The Pre-Industrial City, Past and Present* (London, 1960).

⁷⁰ For his distinction of the city in three types (the 'consumer', the 'producer' and the 'merchant' city), see Weber, *Economy and Society*, vol. III, 1215-1217.

⁷¹ *Ibid*, vol I, 63.

The city was thus the vehicle for Weber to elaborate on his socio-economic theory and it was not treated *per se*, namely as a social entity, but somewhat as the meeting point of socio-economic forces; and as Abrams colourfully puts it, towns were seen ‘as battles rather than as monuments’.⁷²

Although he focused empirically on towns of medieval Europe, the main contribution of his approach was the understanding of the town as a vibrant organism with the potential to induce change, a definition that can be of use to our work on the examination of the late Byzantine and early Ottoman city. It should also be noted, however, that Weber’s theory of the city was grounded on a biased perception which involved the existence of a dividing line between the city of the West/Europe, as typical for the idea of citizenship or ‘commune’, and that of the East/Asia (or Orient), which supposedly lacked this fundamental feature.⁷³ In his view, the explanation was to be found on the very socio-political structure of eastern cities, which constituted the ultimate form of patriarchalism-patrimonialism, where the relationship between ruler and subject was one of absolute control that negated any form of autonomy.⁷⁴ ‘An extreme case of patrimonialism’ was considered to be that of the Ottoman state expressed in the form of ‘hierocratic organization’. The ruler was decisively determining social and economic relations by controlling the formation of social strata through taxation and special land rights.⁷⁵

Proceeding now to another attitude towards the notion of the ‘city’, we find Sjoberg’s categorization of towns in two distinct types, the pre-industrial and industrial. This scheme

⁷² Abrams, ‘Towns’, 31.

⁷³ Weber, *Economy and Society*, vol III, 1226-1234. Weber includes within the framework of Oriental city the Byzantine one. For Weber’s analysis of Islam, see B.S. Turner, *Weber and Islam: A Critical Study* (London, 1974) and M. Talje, ‘Weber’s Sociology of Islam’ *McGill Journal of Middle East Studies* 5 (1997), 61-80.

⁷⁴ For an elaboration of the terms, see Weber, *Economy and Society*, vol. I, 231-232; vol. III chapter XII.

⁷⁵ See discussion in, H. İnalcık, ‘Comments on ‘Sultanism’: Max Weber’s Typification of the Ottoman Polity’, *Princeton Papers in Near Eastern Studies* 1 (1992), 49-72, who challenges the views of the Ottoman state being unstructured and completely dependent on the ruler’s will. He recognizes a number of social groups (for instance the guilds of a city), possessing a substantial degree of freedom of actions in terms of their internal affairs.

leaves little room for any kind of intermediate or transitional types, differing thus conceptually from the previous one. As the employed terminology implies, the main variant he employs in his theory is technology,⁷⁶ and on a second level, the social and particularly political power. The author associates straightforwardly the existence of pre-industrial cities with the elite- the European one- providing a number of reasons for this close link. Preponderance is given to the choices made by the elite, all of which have to do with the security and well-being of this upper stratum.⁷⁷ Yet, the profit gained goes both ways, since, as he argues, ‘the more services and luxury goods the elite commands, the larger and more specialized can be the urban population that supports the upper class, and the more likely is the privileged stratum in a particular city to expand its membership, either by absorbing some of the city’s lower class or by attracting upper-class persons from other portions of the realm’. Although the pre-industrial city is by its nature rigid, discouraging and restricting social mobility, in actual fact this type is not completely precluded.⁷⁸ In many cases mobility is the result of the rupture of the upper class, which contributes to the lowering or raising of the status of some of its members particularly in periods of crisis or military defeat.

Braudel, finally, has put a strong emphasis on the city as a generic construct, which is exemplified in his own argument that the progress of the western economy was a result of the function of the towns.⁷⁹ Conversely, after examining several cities in time, he concluded that society, economy and politics play a crucial role in the definition of the nature of the city.⁸⁰ This inconsistency becomes particularly evident while he elaborates his views on the medieval city, which he regards as a town closed in on itself, that is to say a self-sufficient

⁷⁶ According to Abrams, however, technology cannot be regarded as a determinant but just as a resource. Abrams, ‘Towns’, 27.

⁷⁷ For instance, it is suggested that urban centres are seen by the elite as *loci* of defense, of enhanced communication between its members and of easier fulfillment of their needs. Sjoberg, *The Pre-Industrial City*, 110-116.

⁷⁸ *Ibid*, 137-142.

⁷⁹ Braudel, *The Mediterranean World*, 411; Abrams, ‘Towns’, 23.

⁸⁰ For the contradictions between his intentions and his final conclusions, see Abrams, ‘Towns’, 23-25.

unit.⁸¹ At the same time though, he suggests that it constituted the embodiment of institutional forces and power. The primary role on decision-making about every facet of life was played by the authorities and the entrepreneurial merchants within the city as opposed to the countryside dwellers.⁸²

Despite his persistence in deriving information from the examples of western cities, his major contribution pertaining to our discussion is his introduction of the broader area of the Mediterranean as an integrating element for the development of the cities that belonged to it.⁸³ By setting geographical boundaries for the discussion of the city, he provided a viable scheme within which the similarities, dissimilarities or parallel developments met among the urban centres of this area could be examined. Although he focused his study on the 16th century, when the structure of the Ottoman state had crystallized, and not on its formative period that interests us, he underlined the influence that *pax turcica* exercised in terms of demographic and economic change, offering an insight on issues of continuity and transition.⁸⁴

No matter how diverse or parallel the theoretical standpoints of these three scholars are, each one of them set certain boundaries for the discussion of the ‘city’ and stressed its significance as a meeting point of social and economic forces and the embodiment of human interaction. These socio-economic features will be discussed and underscored in the analysis of the late Byzantine city that will follow, for, in all their intricacy, they are considered to be fundamental for the shaping of the urban centres in general.

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⁸¹Braudel, *The Mediterranean World*, 402.

⁸²*Ibid*, 404.

⁸³*Ibid*, esp. 661-669.

⁸⁴For Braudel’s influence in Turkish socio-economic history, see K. Hayashi, ‘Turkey’, in M. Haneda and T. Miura (eds.) *Islamic Urban Studies. Historical Review and Perspectives* (London –New York, 1994), 203 ff.

The predecessor of the Ottoman city, as it started to evolve in the 14th and 15th centuries, in that part of eastern Mediterranean which was dominated by Christian population and had long before put its cultural seal, was the Byzantine one and in particular that of the later Byzantine period. The reason that this is stressed is because the character of the late Byzantine city is quite diverse from that of its ancestors', since it was shaped under the particular conditions that prevailed in this period. The Fourth Crusade and the capture of Constantinople by the Latins in 1204 was the beginning of important changes in the political and economic landscape of the Eastern Mediterranean, and consequently of the Byzantine Empire. The structure of the latter was irreparably shattered, and new forces - political but mainly economic - emerged, altering the landscape in the Balkans, and generally in the broader area. The enterprise of the Crusaders led to the fragmentation of the Byzantine Empire and to the establishment of certain Latin and Byzantine peripheral states. The tendency for decentralization was prolonged – if not intensified- even after the restoration of Constantinople in 1261 as its capital.

A typology of the late Byzantine city is not an easy task to achieve. Each city presents its own peculiarities determined by the historical and political circumstances in which it found itself and evolved. What has been contended recently is that the difficulty of clarifying qualitative- but not quantitative- differences in urban types is due to the uniformity that existed in late Byzantine urban economy.⁸⁵ In his evaluation of the appearance and way of life of the city in Byzantium through the centuries, Kirsten admits scholars' failure to establish a typology in terms of arrangements and construction of the urban centres of the period except for the great urban centres of Mistra and Thessalonikê.⁸⁶ The absence of consistent information on the character of the Byzantine cities is also marked, though

⁸⁵ K.-P.Matschke, 'The Late Byzantine Urban Economy, Thirteenth-Fifteenth Centuries', *EHB* 2 (2002) 470.

⁸⁶ E. Kirsten, 'Die byzantinische Stadt', *Berichte zum XI Internationalen-Byzantinisten Kongress*, (Munich, 1958), 35. See also, P. Charanis, 'Internal Strife in Byzantium during the Fourteenth Century', *Byzantion* 15 (1941), 208-230; E. Francès, 'La féodalité et les villes byzantines au XIIIe et au XIVE siècle', *BSI* 16 (1955), 76-96.

overemphasized, by Bouras.⁸⁷ When dealing with the features of the late Byzantine city he reaches the conclusion that there was no conscious planning, resulting thus in physical disorder.⁸⁸ This ‘dispersed nature’ of the late Byzantine city has also been examined by Bryer, though from a different angle.⁸⁹ He actually shifted the focus on the social implications of this phenomenon, and argued that the deterioration of the empire and the dispersal of power had an impact on the physical formation of the cities, which were now composed of a number of smaller hubs (*dioikismos*), by no means haphazard, and bequeathed later to the Ottoman city.⁹⁰ In addition, late Byzantine cities had a strong sense of municipality that was not, however, destined to survive after the change of the political regime.⁹¹

In the search for common features for all late Byzantine urban centres one could claim, in a generalized fashion, that the principal one was the fact that they constituted loci of concentration of material resources and consumption of surplus wealth. If one were, however, to determine more specifically the nature of the late Byzantine city, this would be crystallized in the notions of decentralization and individualism. These were to a large degree the result of the changes that took place in the provincial administration in Byzantium after the restoration of 1261. The new state of affairs that came to the fore and the decisions made were dictated by the politics of exigency and survival that the dynasty of the Palaiologi followed. Survival practically meant the concession of freedom of actions to the individual, - or to institutions such as that of the church, and the reliance of the state upon them, concessions which in extension took the form of immunities, whether fiscal or

⁸⁷ C. Bouras, ‘Aspects of the Byzantine City: Eighth-Fifteenth centuries’ *EHB* 2 (2002), 528.

⁸⁸ *Ibid*, 509-511.

⁸⁹ A. Bryer, ‘The Structure of the Late Byzantine Town: *Dioikismos* and the *Mesoi*’, in *Continuity and Change in Late Byzantine and Early Ottoman Society: Papers given at a Symposium at Dumbarton Oaks in May 1982*, ed. A.A.Bryer and H. Lowry (Birmingham-Washington D.C., 1986), 263-279.

⁹⁰ *Ibid*, 273-274.

⁹¹ *Ibid*, 278-9.

judicial, that in their turn generated an enhancement of individual power.⁹² This process had its origins to the 10th and the first half of the 11th century with the granting of lands and tax immunities to great landowners,⁹³ a fact that led the emperors of the 11th century to try to prevent the rise of the rich landowners of the provinces, who constituted a political threat to the central administration.⁹⁴

Yet, during the Palaiologan period (1261-1453) this development was completed,⁹⁵ and gradually led to the privatization of land tenure. In effect, privileged private citizens started to acquire this period hereditary rights on property, a phenomenon that became widespread during the course of the fourteenth century.⁹⁶ In the contemporary Byzantine *praktika*, there are numerous references to plots of land belonging to the *pronoia* system, and which, in contrast to previous periods, could be allotted to the *pronoiar*'s descendants by way of heredity (*kata logon klêronomias kai gonikotêtos*).⁹⁷

What is more, the fiscal and administrative apparatus was now led by such individuals, who were appropriating the main bulk of revenue. The chief administrative unit of this era was no longer the *thema*, although the term still existed, but rather as a shadow of its middle Byzantine predecessors. What is more, it was not any longer conceived as an administrative but as a fiscal division.⁹⁸ Its heir in the administrative organizational form of late Byzantium

⁹² L. Maksimović, *The Byzantine Provincial Administration under the Palaiologi*, (Amsterdam, 1988), 16-25; J.W. Barker, 'The Problem of Appanages in Byzantium during the Palaeologan Period', *Vyzantina* 3 (1971), 105-122.

⁹³ D. Zakythinos, 'Processus de féodalisation', *L'Hellénisme Contemporaine*, Nov.-Dec. (Athens, 1948), 499-514; G. Ostrogorskij, *Pour l'histoire de la féodalité byzantine* (Brussels, 1954). M. Angold, 'The Shaping of the Medieval Byzantine City' *BF* 10 (1985), 1-37. Angold argues that the autonomy of the towns and the cities grew in the 10th and 11th centuries when everyday life started being regulated by the local *Archontes*, on an informal basis.

⁹⁴ A. Harvey, *Economic Expansion in the Byzantine Empire, 900-1200* (Cambridge, 1989), 41.

⁹⁵ P. Charanis, 'On the Social Structure and Economic Organisation of the Byzantine Empire in the Thirteenth Century and later', *BSI*. 12 (1951), 94-153.

⁹⁶ N. Oikonomides, 'The Role of the State in the Byzantine Economy' *EHB* 3 (2002), 1056.

⁹⁷ Ostrogorskij, *Pour l'histoire*, 132-135. For the issue of hereditary rights, see section IV/c.

⁹⁸ The fiscal administration from 1204 to 1453 is discussed in its main lines in M. Hendy, *Studies in the Byzantine Monetary Economy c. 300-1450* (Cambridge, 1985), 439- 447; Oikonomides, 'The Role of the State', 1026-1028. The picture given by Oikonomides is that the fiscal system was far less complex than the sophisticated one prevailing in the previous centuries. The existence of a weak central power unable to effectively control its officials entailed the simplification of the administrative structures.

and the most prevalent independent district was the *katepanikion*⁹⁹. Towards the end of the 14th century as a result of the political upheavals the references to it become all the more rare.¹⁰⁰ During the same century the term that came to designate the provincial governor was that of the *kephalê*.¹⁰¹ *Kephalai*, as a rule derived from the great magnate class and their independence of actions came to be so extensive that in the 15th century they seem to have performed their duties on a solely private basis.¹⁰² The office of the *kephalê* provided them with broad economic opportunities, from the collection of taxes, such as the *monopolion*, *kommerkion*, *skaliatikon*, *poriatikon* and *diabatikon*, to a quite direct participation in trade.¹⁰³ A central role in the boost of their economic activities played the *mitaton*, and was essentially their main source of income. The *kephalai* had the right to purchase grain and other local products at reduced symbolic prices and to channel them again to the local or even distant markets in increased prices becoming in this way direct participants in commerce.¹⁰⁴

Byzantine society, thus, appeared to have experienced a shift, or to put it more correctly, a culmination of a process with regards to the formation of its social stratification and dynamics in the last two centuries of its existence. A vivid expression of this development was the Zealot revolt that focused its activities in Thessalonikê in the middle of the 14th century (1341-1349), but had also followers in other urban centres such as Serres and

⁹⁹ For the whole discussion of its creation and development, see Maksimović, *Provincial Administration*, 70-82.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid*, 80-82.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid*, 117-166; K.-P. Matschke, 'Notes on the economic establishment and social order of the late Byzantine Kephalaï', *BF* 19 (1993), 139-143.

¹⁰² Maksimović, *Provincial Administration*, 162.

¹⁰³ Matschke, 'Byzantine Kephalaï', 138-143; *idem*, *Fortschritt und Reaktion in Byzanz im 14. Jahrhundert* (Berlin, 1971), 85-88; N. Oikonomidès, *Hommes d'affaires grecs et latins à Constantinople (XIIIe-XVe siècles)*, (Montreal-Paris, 1979), 120-21 where a list of the most important aristocratic families of the 14th and 15th centuries is provided, whose members possessed the office of the *kephalê* and were involved at the same time in trading activities.

¹⁰⁴ Maksimović, *Provincial Administration*, 159.

Adrianople.¹⁰⁵ Scholars are still not in the position to provide definite answers about the specific reasons that lay behind this historical occurrence. It has been contended that the revolt was provoked by the economic strain that was put onto the population by usurers and tax collectors and that it constituted a manifestation of democratic tendencies inspired by the Italian communes.¹⁰⁶ It has been generally accepted that the Zealot movement, was the reflection of a profound social discontent,¹⁰⁷ which was ignited by the civil wars in the middle of the fourteenth century and brought to the surface the economic antagonism between two social formations or classes: the feudal aristocracy, namely the great landowners, and that part of the population found mainly in large provincial cities, whose economic activities involved trade, banking and generally private enterprise.¹⁰⁸ This view considers that conditions by that time appeared to have been ripe for the adaptation to new economic practices. The rise of individuals and their faith in their capacity for creating capital paved the way for requisition of power. And like every radical change and development in history, their demands took the form of a profound social upheaval.

In his thorough assessment of the second civil war (1341-54) Matschke adopted a tripartite classification of the population residing in urban centres,¹⁰⁹ which he still follows

¹⁰⁵ The bibliography on this issue is quite substantial, therefore I provide here the titles of the most fundamental works: O. Tafrafi, *Thessalonique au quatorzième siècle* (Paris, 1913), 225-272 ; Charanis, 'Internal Strife', 208-230; I. Ševčenko, '“Nicolas Kabasilas” “Anti-Zealot Discourse”: A Reinterpretation' *DOP* 11 (1957), 91-171; *idem*, 'The Zealot Revolution and the Supposed Genoese Colony in Thessalonica', *Prospora eis St. Kyriakidên, Hellenika, suppl. 4* (1953), 602-617; Matschke, *Fortschritt und Reaktion, passim*; D. Papadatou, 'Political Associations in the Late Byzantine Period: the Zealots and Sailors of Thessalonica', *Balkan Studies* 28 (1987), 3-23; V. Hrochová, 'La révolte des Zélotes à Salonique et les communes italiennes', *Byzantinoslavica* 22/1 (1961), 1-15; C. Kyrris, 'Gouvernés et gouvernants pendant la révolution des Zélotes (1341-1350)', *Recueils de la société Jean Bodin*, 23 (Brussels, 1968), 271-330 ; K.-P. Matschke, 'Thessalonikê und die Zeloten. Bemerkungen zu einem Schlüsselereignis der spätbyzantinischen Stadt- und Reichsgeschichte', *BSI* 55 (1994), 19-43.

¹⁰⁶ Tafrafi, *Thessalonique*, 255-272; G. O. Bratiaňu, *Privilèges et franchises municipales dans l'empire byzantin* (Paris, 1936), 119, cited by Charanis, 'Internal Strife', 219 n.35.

¹⁰⁷ Charanis, 'Internal Strife', 229.

¹⁰⁸ Matschke, *Fortschritt und Reaktion*, 247-248. For another view, see *infra*, 56, n.60.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid*, 38-62.

thirty years later in his general overview of the structure of the late Byzantine society.¹¹⁰ He has distinguished two layers within the nobility class, that is the upper echelon and lower aristocrats, the *mesoi*, a term signifying most probably a kind of middle stratum, and finally the lower class, the underprivileged. Yet, to speak in definite terms for the social stratification of the period is not possible. The narrative and rhetorical sources, though providing valuable information, are in most cases not explicit enough or simply mirror their authors' personal socio-political views. This applies particularly to the definition of the class of the *mesoi*, which has been considered as quite problematic.¹¹¹ The term is found in the Byzantine sources already in the sixth century, reappearing in the twelfth, and again in the first half of the fourteenth century as *mesotês* and *mesê moira*.¹¹² Oikonomides has interpreted the notion of the *mesoi* as corresponding *grosso modo* to the western bourgeoisie, a class standing between the aristocrats and the poor, residing in the larger urban centres of Constantinople, Adrianople and Thessalonikê,¹¹³ whose activities extended from shipping to crafting, trading and money lending. The more recent view, though, regarding the nature of this social formation is that it must have had political extensions apart from the economic ones, and that it was a reflection of the polarization and redistribution of power of the Byzantine society in the middle of the fourteenth century. After that time point the term is not to be found in the sources anymore as the boundaries between the *mesoi* and that portion of the nobility that was involved in similar financial activities appears to have become blurred.¹¹⁴

¹¹⁰ K.-P. Matschke and F. Tinnefeld, *Die Gesellschaft im späten Byzanz: Gruppen, Strukturen und Lebensformen* (Cologne-Weimar-Vienna, 2001).

¹¹¹ L. Maksimovic, 'Charakter der Sozial-Wirtschaftlichen Struktur der Spätbyzantinischen Stadt (13.-15.Jh.)', *JÖB* 31.1 (1981), 184-86.

¹¹² Oikonomidès, *Hommes d'affaires*, 115-116.

¹¹³ *Ibid*, 116, 118.

¹¹⁴ For a comprehensive discussion of the *mesoi* in this period, see Matschke-Tinnefeld, *Die Gesellschaft*, 99-157.

The fact remains that in late Byzantine society there definitely were individuals that had realized the great prospects for making profit through private ventures. And although there has always been an awkwardness on the part of the scholars to speak of a 'capitalistic' or at least of a 'pre-capitalistic' element in late Byzantine society,¹¹⁵ there was definitely a segment of it, which fulfilled to a non-negligible extent the requirements of relevant entrepreneurial activity. Their continuously growing number has been put forward by Laiou, who based on the examination of account books, estimated that during the years between 1311 and 1352 18 per cent of the merchants, a considerable number to her view, belonged to the aristocracy, while in the following years from 1353 to 1402, the proportion of aristocrats increases dramatically to 85 known cases of traders.¹¹⁶ This increase has been interpreted by Oikonomides in terms of the political circumstances of the mid-fourteenth century, the advance of the Turks and the loss of territory, which inevitably led the aristocrats to new forms of acquisition of wealth.¹¹⁷

In addition, to the question whether the strengthening of the merchants' class was related to or constituted a parallel to the economic developments in the West, answers once again cannot be clear-cut. There have been attempts to suggest that a link between western and eastern financial enterprises is to be found, but the conclusions reached are lame for mainly two reasons; the different nature of the political circumstances prevailing on either side and the dearth of relevant documentation in the case of Byzantium. Upon the latter grounds Kazhdan bases his optimistic analysis of the late Byzantine urban centre, and argues that the drastic difference in the source of material, does not permit a comparison and therefore we cannot exclude the existence of parallels. He also points out that the main issue is not a

¹¹⁵ For the scholars' reluctance to attribute a more important role on the part of late Byzantine entrepreneur, see A. E. Laiou, 'The Byzantine Economy in the Mediterranean Trade System, Thirteenth-Fifteenth Centuries', *Gender, Society and Economic Life in Byzantium* (Hampshire, 1992), 172-9; and Matschke 'Zum Anteil', 71.

¹¹⁶ A. Laiou, 'The Greek Merchant of the Palaeologan Period: A Collective Portrait', *The Proceedings of the Academy of Athens* (Athens, 1982), 105.

¹¹⁷ Oikonomides *Hommes d'affaires*, 120-122.

terminological one, whether, that is, it is possible to define the notion of pre-capitalism, but ‘whether this obvious contrast between Byzantium and Italy should be interpreted as the sign of typological diversity or as no more than variegations within one and the same typological pattern’.¹¹⁸ On the other hand, the thesis adopted in the most recent and standard work on the economic history of Byzantium regarding this issue, is that there was indeed a part of the late Byzantine society possessing characteristics that might attribute to some individuals the title of the early capitalist, but in reality this was not the case. What those individuals lacked in their development as entrepreneurs was the commercial and financial competence of their western colleagues as well as a solid industrial basis, which could provide them with the potential of expanding their activities.¹¹⁹

The attempt to integrate and interpret the late Byzantine entrepreneurial activity within the framework of capitalism and comparison to the West seems to be false. Given the circumstances that prevailed in the specific period and part of the world, we should rather examine this phenomenon as a response to its social and historical reality. The key point is to explore the efficiency of the historical actor to perceive and realize opportunities, particularly in periods of change. And assuredly on the eve of the Turkish conquest the preconditions had been created for the individual to perform unrestricted by the state machinery, and to be in the position to accumulate capital and direct it to various ventures. In this period apart from the participation of lay aristocracy in commerce, two other forms of economic activities have been detected, loans and transactions of property.¹²⁰ The late Byzantine individual’s economic mind was efficient enough to create opportunities, for instance by leasing houses and exploiting pieces of land like gardens and vineyards, which

¹¹⁸ A. Kazhdan, ‘The Italian and Late Byzantine’ *Symposium on Byzantium and the Italians, 13th-15th Centuries*, *DOP* 49, (1995), 2-3.

¹¹⁹ Matschke, ‘Commerce, Trade’, 805.

¹²⁰ A. Kazhdan, ‘The Italian and Late Byzantine City’, 9-20.

were found either within or outside the city's walls. Transactions were taking place all through this period and property was exploited whether it was of an urban or rural character.

Herein, it has to be stressed that the notion of the 'city' cannot be perceived without the area surrounding it, and this of course applies both to the East and the West. In general, the town of the Middle Ages could not exist without its surrounding area. A network of interrelations was apparent in every aspect of economic life, such as commodity production, home market and foreign trade. In most cases, the initiatives and means used to come from the town since it was there that the capital was accumulated. The importance of the role of the village might differ according to which specific society we refer to, but undoubtedly it formed an integral part of the medieval economic practice. The manner that conditions developed in the city affected also the countryside. The city in most cases stimulated the productivity of the countryside, and conversely productivity in the countryside implied an intensification of the transactions in the urban centre.¹²¹

In the case of the late Byzantine world there was no confrontation or antagonism between the city and the village. In Byzantium town and village had co-existed in a complementary way since at least the 12th century.¹²² It has been convincingly argued that the growth of the agricultural sector, which earmarked the 11th and 12th centuries, bolstered the development of urban centres, especially the coastal towns in the area of the Balkans, and promoted the establishment of market conditions.¹²³ Local aristocrats, who owned land and at the same time held administrative offices, played likewise a salient role in this process, as they started to gain fiscal privileges and hence economic control.¹²⁴ Although

¹²¹ J. Levitsky, 'Problems on the Methodology of Medieval Town History Analyzed on the base of the history of West-European town', in *La ville balkanique XVe-XIXe ss. Studia Balcanica*, ed. N. Todorov (Sofia, 1970), 7-16; I.T. Sanders, 'Some aspects of the linkage between the city and the countryside', in *Structure sociale et développement culturel des villes sud-est européennes et Adriatiques aux XVIIe-XVIIIe siècles* (Bucharest, 1975), 279-80.

¹²² Kirsten, 'Die byzantinische Stadt', 26f.

¹²³ For the interaction between town and country in the middle Byzantine period, see Harvey, *Economic Expansion*, 198-243.

¹²⁴ *Ibid*, 207, 224-228; Angold, 'Archons and Dynasts', 236-253.

these particular individuals resided in the urban centres,¹²⁵ the sphere of their economic activities included also the countryside. Naturally, their residence in the urban centre provided them with the advantage in the political sector, which was reinforced with the granting of privileges in towns that also went back to at least the 12th century.¹²⁶

In general, the urban centres constituted the core of a broader geographical region consisting of villages and the hinterland, which secured their food supply. In terms of their hierarchy, the main parameter that determined their importance was their connection with the administrative division in which they belonged.¹²⁷ But apart from the economic and administrative ties between cities and countryside, these two components of the Byzantine society were linked also on a legal level as there had not been a real development of the urban civic rights, and furthermore there were always regarded as an administrative unit.¹²⁸ As a result, the interaction between city and countryside, especially in the economic field, was strong and constituted the precondition of their survival,¹²⁹ and the individual in this process in the later Byzantine period was very much present.

What has been characterized as perhaps the most original phenomenon of this period was the emergence of the entrepreneurs with an aristocratic background.¹³⁰ They were the products of the erosion of the Byzantine landed aristocracy and the dismantling of the upper class, who had channeled their economic activities to commerce and money transactions. Their appearance is first traceable in the 1350s, but as time progressed the names of noble entrepreneurs become all the more frequent in the sources. A substantial part of them was closely linked to the administrative system and consequently they were based on the larger

¹²⁵ Maksimović, *Provincial Administration*, 174; Kirsten, 'Die Byzantinische Stadt', 27; G. Ostrogorsky, 'The Byzantine Aristocracy' *DOP* 25 (1971), 29; Bouras, 'Byzantine City', 523.

¹²⁶ Maksimović, *Provincial Administration*, 248-267.

¹²⁷ Harvey, *Economic Expansion*, 200.

¹²⁸ For the importance of the urban hinterland for the economy of the late Byzantine city, see Matschke, 'Urban Economy', 478-481.

¹²⁹ See for instance, A. Laiou, 'Thessalonikê, its hinterland and its economic area in the years of the Palaeologi' *Diethnes Symposio Vyzantinê Makedonia 324-1430, Thessalonikê 29-31 October 1992* (Thessalonica, 1995), 183-194.

¹³⁰ Matschke, 'Commerce, Trade', 805.

urban centres. The majority of them were local aristocrats whose economic activities were chiefly a concomitant of their personal and family interests rather than of a specific consideration for the common welfare.¹³¹ They could still possess large parcels of land, but the surplus of the production was often passed onto the markets in favour of cash profits. Next to the activities linked to land a number of others were undertaken by this group, such as commerce, banking and money changing, which was the decisive feature that differentiated their economic role from that of earlier eras.

The uniqueness of this phenomenon is justified not by the fact that in the previous centuries there were not aristocrats whose activities involved market or enterprise thinking, but rather by the intensification and the substantial extent that these actions took in the later period combined with the nullification of the role of the state and its control mechanisms. In order to become established in this new economic field and expand their range of activities, aristocrats reinforced the ties with the nobility of the Latin colonies, but had also no reluctance to establish relations with the Ottomans. This collaboration has already been highlighted by Nevra Necipoğlu in an article that has provided valuable information on the presence and activities of Ottoman merchants in Constantinople and suggests that the relations between Byzantine and Ottoman merchants goes back to the first half of the fifteenth century.¹³² Thus, the actions of the merchant of this period were characterized by flexibility and resilience, and he was given an ampler space to perform than was previously open to him as a consequence of his contemporary socio-economic and historical developments, that is the tendency for decentralization and dissolution of structures.

¹³¹ Angold, 'Archons' 240.

¹³² N. Necipoğlu, 'Ottoman Merchants and the Fall of Constantinople During the First Half of the Fifteenth Century', *BMGS* 16 (1992), 158-69.

II. THE ROLE OF IDEAS AND THEIR COMMUNICATION IN THE POLITICS OF TRANSITION: THE CASE OF THE THESSALONIAN DISCOURSE (1382-1430).

II/a. The theoretical model

Any endeavour to appraise an historical period and its developments should be carried out on the condition that the researcher will not project or impose modern history, or his very own conceptions of reality and history on his subject matter. In addition, it is essential that he considers the historical issues he is dealing with as product of their times, and further inextricably linked with their contemporary belief system. For it is this structure of dominant beliefs that directs choices and defines behavioural patterns, helping us comprehend and assess individual and group actions.

Given the axiomatic truth that life and its different branches, one of which is economy, is too complex to be explained solely in terms of self-interest and exploitation, which is the essence of the theory of *New Institutional Economics* that we wish to test, one main task is to probe the applicability of one of this theory's major aspects to our study: the role of ideas and mentalities in the process of economic change and transition that occurred in the Late Byzantine period. By implication, this means that apart from attributing a major role for certain economic developments to the existing material conditions, we should also turn our attention to the function of the polity. According to North's theoretical framework, in order to achieve a holistic approach to economic history and avoid the danger that usually lurks to supplant, or diminish the role of ideas and their involvement in the way a society operates in times of strong *uncertainty*,¹ it is essential to explore the performance of the polity, or to use

¹ The idea of *uncertainty* is central to North's theory for it is considered as the motive force for alterations in the institutional framework of a society, and by extension for economic change. For the types of *uncertainty*, see North, *Understanding the Process*, 17, 22.

a different term employed in his writings, the *political market*.² As he puts it, '[...] in order to understand decision making under such conditions of uncertainty we must understand the relationships of the mental models that individuals construct to make sense out of the world around them, the ideologies that evolve from such constructions, and the institutions that develop in a society to order interpersonal relationships'.³

The *political market* differs from the economic one in the sense that it presents a higher degree of complexity and a lower one of efficiency,⁴ as it hinges upon the matrix of social norms and ideological values, which reflect the way individuals perceive their environment.⁵ This perception determines the degree of their consciousness, as well as their response to societal change. In addition, it accounts for the existence of variability in behaviours in a society, which is vital for the course of decision-making. Thus, the economic theory under discussion is inevitably elaborated to a considerable extent around the role of the polity, which is treated as the primary source of economic performance, by defining and enforcing the formal economic rules, namely the institutions that support its economic structure. The main undertaking of the *political entrepreneurs*⁶ is to reduce the *uncertainty* that humans constantly face, by ordering life and setting up institutions (*formal constraints*) according to the *belief system* they represent, which is held up as determinant for the choices they make. For, what is understood under the label of belief system, is the theory humans have about the consequences of their actions.⁷ The edifice of a belief system is socially and culturally derived, that is to say shaped by the norms and conventions of a

² *Ibid*, 56.

³ A.T. Denzau and D.C. North, 'Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions' *Kyklos* 47 (1) (1994), 3-31.

⁴ The use of the term 'efficiency' is considered by North as somewhat problematic when referring to the performance of the polity. Though in economic markets the term signifies the improvement of material well-being (the more technical usage is the minimization of transaction costs), its application in the field of politics is less straightforward. North, *Understanding the Process*, 15, note 3, 66-68; *idem*, *Institutional Change*, 61-69.

⁵ North, *Understanding the Process*, 56.

⁶ *Ibid*, 126.

⁷ Beliefs are defined as the theories humans have for the consequences of their actions. *Ibid*, viii, 23-37.

society, the *informal constraints*, such as codes of conduct, conventions and customs, which are more durable and persist even in cases of a long-run societal change, unlike the formal ones that are thought to be more susceptible to change.⁸ It is also a product of human *learning*, the accumulation of contemporary and historical experiences of an individual, or collective level acquired through *time*.⁹ Learning can also be defined as ‘local’, that is a product of a certain physical and intellectual setting. When this setting experiences change, an imprint of this transformation will be left in the socio-cultural linguistic inheritance. Language, therefore, and its nuances bear the cumulative experience of a society,¹⁰ and, as will be discussed later, constitutes the vehicle for the substantiation of the belief system.

In a society’s political vocabulary, the range of beliefs that prevail is translated into organised ideologies, and on a wider social scale, organised religions.¹¹ It is practically at this point that the complexity of life, to which we referred earlier, becomes more evident, namely when social norms and ideas interfere in some way or another with the political and economic exchanges. The existence of these mental models is essential for the organisation of life and the achievement of *conformity* that facilitates *order*, one of the chief preoccupations of the polity. Following North’s definition ‘ideologies are the shared framework of mental models that groups of individuals possess that provide both an interpretation of the environment and a prescription as to how the environment should be structured’.¹² The concept of ideas is central to North’s theory, as their evolution and communication is thought to provide the path to the performance of a society both synchronically and diachronically, guiding choices at an individual and collective level.

⁸ North, *Institutional Change*, 36-45, 46-53.

⁹ Apart from experiences, there are two more sources of learning: genetic and cultural heritage. North, *Understanding the Process*, viii, 68-71.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, 34, 51.

¹¹ *Ibid*, 44.

¹² Denzau and North, ‘Shared Mental Models’, 4.

Thus, within the boundaries of a given society there is a natural tendency for ideas to converge due to the existence of a common cultural heritage that promotes the transmission of shared perceptions from one generation to the other. Especially in the case of pre-modern societies, cultural learning facilitated internal communication and gave way to the creation of religions, myths and dogmas.¹³ What is needed in order for mental models to be shared is their communication among society's members. The more efficiently the communication channel operates, the more coherent the ideological system will be, and vice versa. A set of widely identifiable concepts are, therefore, usually mobilized by the sender through language, in order for him to convey his message. Certainly, its reception by the listener is influenced by his own system of mental models that affect the interpretation of it.¹⁴ This convergence of ideas is, as has already been mentioned, a major requirement for maintaining order. It goes without saying that in the long-run persistence in ideological conformity acts as a brake on change and produces stagnation and decay, considering the constant novel challenges that humans and their society confront.¹⁵

To come back to the polity and its function, there is the fundamental issue of political order and disorder that affects political results decisively, and by extension economic life. For, order is considered as an essential condition (though not always sufficient) for long-term economic growth by reducing uncertainty. Broadly speaking, there are two types of political order, the *authoritarian* and the *consensual* one.¹⁶ Taking as a point of departure that they can rarely be found in their purest form, it is concluded that most of the time there are no clear boundaries, but some kind of compromise is usually achieved between coercion and social norms. 'On the other hand, disorder occurs when the system of shared mental

¹³ *Ibid*, 15.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, 18-20.

¹⁵ North, *Understanding the Process*, 42.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, 104 for their exact definition.

models collapses due to the disintegration of norms.¹⁷ The change in mental models does not happen overnight, but is gradual and continual,¹⁸ and there can be occasions of individuals who will resist it. Those who are most likely to oppose any of the climate of opinion and the formation of new concepts are normally ideological purists, like religious fundamentalists, generating in this way some form of crisis. Within the frame of our theory, two more major causes for disorder are also identified; the *lack of logical consistency* in the articulation of an ideology,¹⁹ and on a more practical level the *limitation of economic resources*, or their unequal distribution.²⁰ The result in each case is the same: *lack of social consensus*. That brings the discussion to the role the *leading individuals* of a society play in the aggravation or abatement of such a condition.

It has been suggested that in order to ascribe meaning to actions that occur within a certain social and political landscape, one must always take into account the personal inner attributes and values of the individual that shapes a policy. The main issue, however, is not to examine them in isolation, but to observe them in their *interaction* with those of other political actors. The *expectations* that the actors have about each others' acts and responses is the key word for a thorough interpretation of a political phenomenon.²¹ This is the route to follow for anyone wishing to identify the role of ideas in the political and economic life, and to put them into perspective.

The interaction among individuals is a complicated process. A wide range of factors might interfere in the course of the communication between two parties, which lead to success or collapse. Emotions, social norms, personal propensities, motivations, (ir)rational beliefs, and (in)consistency in argumentation are some of the major categories of these

¹⁷ *Ibid*, 105-106.

¹⁸ The process is described as 'punctuated equilibrium', namely 'long periods of slow, gradual change punctuated by relatively short periods of dramatic changes'. Denzau and North, 'Shared Mental Models', 23.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, 25.

²⁰ North, *Understanding the Process*, 106.

²¹ R.B.Bates, R.J.P.de Figueiredo and B.R.Weingast, 'The Politics of Interpretation: Rationality, Culture, and Transition' *Politics and Society* 26 (4) (1998), 628.

visceral or rational factors that are bound to determine the interface of humans. In politics, these parameters are frequently mobilized to achieve one's ends, and there are times that some of them gain precedence, or act to the detriment of the others. Thus, one main task is to attempt to identify which of these traits in human relations actually determine choices that are made within a certain political situation.²²

Two chief instruments that an individual will employ in order to affect or manipulate a decision are *symbols* and the *collective identity* of his audience. Political rhetoric is largely about inducing emotions and trying to shape beliefs.²³ The strategy to accomplish this aim may vary, but one of the commonest manners is to *shame* or try to cultivate *guilt*,²⁴ and the vehicle for this policy is usually provided by the *social norms* and their invocation.²⁵ But at the same time his arguments need to gain validity through the consistency of his own words and actions, which at some point he may have to justify also to *himself*.²⁶ Whether the individual will succeed in his intentions rests on the plausibility of his arguments in conjunction with the feedback that his audience receives from actual events.²⁷

The success or failure, thus, of the political actors to influence opinion and to accomplish their goals is not entirely contingent upon their rhetorical capacity. For a belief system to be restructured there must be two principal conditions to be fulfilled: first, a degree of novelty in the situation confronted by a society,²⁸ and second, the degree of risk that this entails.²⁹ The first is linked to the responsiveness of a society as a whole towards new phenomena, which is determined by its cultural heritage, namely how open it is to

²² Methodologically, this can be achieved in the following way: 'start with observed data (behavior including documents and letters, practices, institutions), and reconstruct actors and their inner attributes (meanings, beliefs, values) in such a way that the data are as fully explained or accounted for as possible.' J. A. Ferejohn 'Rationality and Interpretation: Parliamentary Elections in Early Stuart England' in *The Economic Approach to Politics*, ed. K. R. Monroe (New York, 1991), 281, cited in Bates, 'Politics of Interpretation', 628, note 70.

²³ J. Elster, 'Emotions and Economic Theory', *Journal of Economic Literature* 36 (1) (1998), 56.

²⁴ *Ibid*, 57; J. Elster, 'Rationality and the Emotions', *The Economic Journal* 106 (1996), 1390.

²⁵ *Idem*, 'Social Norms and Economic Theory', *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 3(4) (1989), 100.

²⁶ *Ibid*, 104.

²⁷ Bates, 'Politics of Interpretation', 630-1.

²⁸ North, *Understanding the Process*, 18.

²⁹ Bates, 'Politics of Interpretation', 632.

change. In the second case, the most opportune moment for the alteration of beliefs held in a society over a long period of time can occur in times of great threat, or sharp reversal of the older order.

The foregoing discussion pinpoints the central issues that will preoccupy us in this section of our thesis. On a primary level, the internal dynamics and the broad tendencies that prevailed in Late Byzantine society in terms of political attitudes and system(s) of beliefs, and on a secondary one, the response of a local society, namely that of Thessalonikê, within a period of strong uncertainty, social disorder and political transition. Three main spheres of enquiry will be of consideration: how the period of transition is depicted in terms of the formulation of ideas and beliefs; the degree of their internal consistency, and their relation with external events; and finally, the social responses in the face of the prospects that the older and the new political order offered.

II/b. An account of the years 1372-1430 through the eyes of the contemporaries: commotion and social unrest

After the first establishment of the Ottomans in the Balkan Peninsula in the 1350s with the conquest of the fortress of Tzypê in 1352 and their settlement in Kallipolis in 1354, the time limit and the crucial event that paved the way for their advance on European soil was their victory over the Serbs at Černomen, on the Mariča River, on 26 September 1371. Following this defeat the remaining territories and urban centres of the Byzantine Empire became easy to conquer targets, and one by one passed into the hands of the enemy. After 1371 the city of Thessalonikê started to experience an intense external threat, which involved attacks and raids upon its surrounding areas by the Ottomans, and several blockades that eventually led to its absolute subjection to Turkish rule.

In close proximity to Thessalonikê, the city of Serres was in some ways tied to the political developments of the former after 1371. The fate of Serres is closely tied to the defeat of the Serbs, as for almost 25 years it was under their authority. Stephen Dušan had entered the city on 24 September 1345 and soon afterwards proclaimed himself emperor, exploiting to his best advantage the civil conflicts of the Byzantines and the deep dislike of the Serrean population towards Iôannês Kantakouzênos, who at the time was a pretender to the throne.³⁰ In the years to come, Serres rose as one of the greatest centres of the provinces of the Serbian Empire, until in 1355, with Dušan's death and the fragmentation of his vast territories into smaller political entities, it became the capital of a separate state that was ruled by the late emperor's widow, Helena. In the autumn of 1365 John Uglješa, an influential nobleman assumed and exercised power till the battle of Mariča (1371), in which he was killed and the Serbian rule over Serres was brought to an end.³¹ In November of the same year the city was retrieved by the Byzantines, more specifically by Manuel II Palaeologos who had been the *Despot* of Thessalonikê since 1369,³² and it remained in their possession up to its conquest by the Ottomans on 19 September 1383,³³ which must have had a great impact on the political conscience of the Thessalonians. The previously held

³⁰ G.C.Soulis, *The Serbs and Byzantium during the reign of Tsar Stephen Dušan (1331-1355) and his successors* (Athens, 1995), 69-71, 277-280.

³¹ Fundamental works for this period are, G. Ostrogorski, *Serska Oblast posle Dušanove Smtri* (Belgrade, 1965) (a summary of this work in, H. Miakotine, 'Analyse de l'ouvrage de G. Ostrogorski sur la principauté serbe de Serres' *TM* 2 (1967), 569- 573; B. Ferjančić, *Vizantijski i Srpski Ser u XIV stoleću* (Belgrade, 1994).

³² P. Lemerle, *Philippe et la Macédoine orientale à l'époque chrétienne et Byzantine: Recherches d'histoire et d'archéologie* (Paris, 1945), 214 and note 5; G. T. Dennis, *The Reign of Manuel II in Thessalonica, 1382-1387*, 13 note 38, 27; J. W. Barker, *Manuel II Palaiologos (1391-1425): A Study in late Byzantine Statesmanship* (New Brunswick-New Jersey, 1969), 9, A23; F. Tinnefeld, *Demetrius Kydonas Briefe IV* (Stuttgart, 2003), 433, suggests that Manuel held the title of *Despot* before 1369 addressing to attention one of Kydônês's letters to be discussed below, observing that Barker and Dennis failed to take it into account. However, to set the record straight Dennis does state that Manuel might have been assigned the governorship in 1369 'if not earlier'.

³³ S. Lampros, 'Isidôrou archiepiskopou oktô anekdotoi', *Neos Hellênômnêmon* 9 (1912), 343, 403; P. Schreiner, *Die byzantinische Kleinchroniken*, vol. II (Vienna, 1977), 326-27.

contention that there was another Turkish capture in 1372,³⁴ has proved to be unsubstantiated and the date of 1383 has been firmly established.³⁵

Thessalonikê, on the other hand, outlived Serres regarding its final conquest by the Turks, and its own history of events seems to be a bit more complex, with several issues still being debated and others unresolved. To begin with, the city of Thessalonikê was one of the few urban centres of Macedonia to avoid Serbian occupation and to retain its Byzantine authority during the years of their expansion to the south. The first Turkish appearance before the city occurred on 11 April 1372, when raids of Turks menaced the city walls,³⁶ following their success in the battle of Mariča, which had no other result but the devastation of the surrounding area. More serious was the assault of 1383, which developed into a four year siege and the surrender of the city in April 1387.³⁷ Problematic is the assumption of the second capture of the city in the 1390s. While some scholars simply reject this possibility and accept as second conquest of Thessalonikê the final one in 1430,³⁸ others favour the prospect of an intermediary one and have put forward two possible dates, 1391 and 1394.³⁹ In 1402 another crucial battle, that of Ankara, where the Timurids crushed Bayezid's forces, affected the destiny of the city. In 1403 it was handed over to the Byzantines and remained

³⁴ Lemerle, *Philippes*, 217-218 with notes for older bibliography on this issue. The suggestion of the year 1372 was based on the existence of a Firman issued by Murad I in favour of the monks of the Monastery of Saint Prodomos situated on Mount Menoikion near Serres, and was considered as proof for the Ottoman administration in the area. Lemerle also inclined to accept this date, but adopted a more modest approach by suggesting that although the Ottomans did capture Serres, they probably used it as a military base and did not set up a proper administrative structure.

³⁵ See argumentation, in Dennis, *The Reign of Manuel*, 66-67; G. Ostrogorsky, 'La prise de Serrès par les Turcs' *Byzantion* 35/1 (1965) 302-319; I. Beldiceanu –Steinherr, 'La prise de Serrès et le firman de 1372 en faveur du monastère de Saint Jean Prodomos', *Acta Historica* 4, (Munich, 1965), 15-24; Barker, *Manuel II*, 46-48; A. E. Zachariadou, 'Early Ottoman Documents of the Prodomos Monastery (Serres)' *SOF* 28 (1969), 1-12.

³⁶ Schreiner, *Kleinchroniken*, vol I, 49, 6 (1372), 351; Tinnefeld, *Kydones Briefe* I,2, 517-8; R. J. Loenertz (ed.), *Démétrius Cydonès correspondance*, vol. I (Vatican, 1956), 110.9 ff; Dennis, *The Reign of Manuel*, 55-56.

³⁷ For the short chronicle confirming this date, see Dennis, *The Reign of Manuel*, 8, note 20 with relevant bibliography, and document B in the Appendix of the same work.

³⁸ P. Charanis, 'An Important Short Chronicle of the Fourteenth Century' *Byzantion* 13 (1938), 35; G.T. Dennis, 'The Second Turkish Capture of Thessalonica 1391, 1394 or 1430?' *BZ* 57 (1964), 53-61.

³⁹ A. E. Vakalopoulos, 'Zur Frage der zweiten Einnahme Thessalonikis durch die Türken, 1391-92' *BZ* 61 (1968), 285-290; *idem*, 'Provlêmata tês istorias tês Thessalonikês kata ta telê tou 14ou kai arches tou 15ou aiôna', in *Ê Thessalonikê metaxy Anatolês kai Dyseôs, Praktika Symposiou Etaireias Makedonikôn Spoudôn, 30 Okt-1 Noemv. 1980* (Thessalonica, 1982), 31-41.

under their authority until 1423, when Venice assumed control and governorship of the city.⁴⁰ In the interim, the raids and attacks by the Ottomans continued. Two of them occurred in 1412 and 1416 putting great pressure on the Venetian regime,⁴¹ which was brought to an end in 1430 with the subjection of the city to the Ottomans.

One of the troubling facts regarding the study of this period is the dearth of contemporary historical accounts, as narration of events pauses around the 1360s with the works of Grêgoras and Kantakouzênos. The bulk, then, of the information we acquire for the period afterwards comes from a variety of contemporary material, such as the personal correspondence of Dêmêtrios Kydonês's and Manuel II Palaeologos, literary works coming from the three archbishops of Thessalonikê, Isidôros Glavas, Gavriêl and Symeôn, and finally Venetian sources. Understandably, the extraction of data from such sources, which are often obscure and offer nothing more than hints about current events, is not a straightforward task. As a result, a reconstruction of history based solely on these types of source would prove unreliable. To these sources we should add a chronicle by Iôannês Anagnôstês that pertains to the period and area of our concern, that of the 1430 fall of Thessalonikê.

Allusions to issues that emerged in late fourteenth and early fifteenth Thessalonikê and Serres are often met in the abovementioned contemporary sources, primarily taking the form of disillusionment and grief over the precarious conditions of the time. What is under investigation at this point is to explore the behaviour of the local society towards the shifting and uncertain circumstances it was experiencing, deriving information from the available material. The following discussion, therefore, does not claim to be an exhaustive account of the events of the period that concerns us, as this has been examined in other scholarly

⁴⁰ G. Tsaras, 'Ê Thessalonikê apo tous Vyzantinous stous Venetsianous' (1423-1430)', *Makedonika* 17 (1977), 85-122; A. E. Vakalopoulos, 'Symvolê stên historia tês Thessalonikês epi Venetokratias (1423-1430)', *Pagkarpia Makedonikês Gês* (1980), 31-51.

⁴¹ A.E. Vakalopoulos, *History of Macedonia, 1354-1833* (Thessalonica, 1973), 77.

works.⁴² Rather, we will attempt to record the events or references to instances of social and political disagreement and disorder, and the restoration of order that follows with main aim being to explore the ideas and the situations that guided the choices of the society under discussion within this period of strong uncertainty. This will serve as an introduction to the adaptation of certain ideological tenets presented in the following section, both as a cause and symptom of people's displeasure for the policies its authorities, which were followed by internal conflicts and division. Times of insecurity and poverty fuel the emergence of opposing views and discord, and at a time such as the end of the fourteenth and early fifteenth century the Thessalonians were no exception to this rule. Anarchy and commotion were the main ingredients of the political and social scenery that reached their climax with the abrupt change of political authority.

We will focus on the contemporary works and writings of certain individuals, who can be grouped in three categories: Two of them were intellectuals, both active in politics and with a broader view of the political landscape of their time (Manuel II and Dêmêtrios Kydonês); the following three belonged to the clergy (Isidôros Glavas, Gavriêl and Symeôn); and last but not least, one native of the city who experienced firsthand the change of political power in his city and survived to also witness the organization of life under the Ottomans (Iôannês Anagnôstês).

*

The predominant figure in the political life of Thessalonikê was Manuel II, one of the four sons of the emperor John V Palaiologos. A chrysobull issued in 1371 granted him the governorship of the city, and also rendered him responsible for the recovery of Macedonian lands from the Serbs, with the further objective of protecting them from the incoming threat

⁴²To the secondary literature we have already mentioned we also need to add the most recent work on this period by Necipoğlu, *Byzantium between the Ottomans and the Latins*, 41-115.

of the Turks.⁴³ As mentioned before, in November of the same year he took possession of Serres, and remained in Thessalonikê until 6 April 1372. Four days later, Turks attacked the city without, however, succeeding in entering it.⁴⁴ He was then involved in the internal conflicts of the imperial family that weakened even more the already unstable Byzantine state.⁴⁵ In autumn 1382 he returned to Thessalonikê to assume power,⁴⁶ and played a leading part in the city's life by implementing a policy of resistance and enforcing various measures in an attempt to retain it as a Byzantine domain. Despite his efforts, Thessalonikê surrendered to the Ottomans in 1387. For a second time Manuel left the city a few days prior to the surrender.⁴⁷

As regards the ecclesiastical authorities of Thessalonikê in the period from 1380 up to 1430, the archbishopric was held by three individuals who played a central role in the life of the city. Isidôros Glavas (1380-1396), Gavriêl (1397-1416/7) and Symeôn (1416/7-1430) were the last archbishops of the Macedonian city before its conquest by the Ottomans, three quite distinct personalities who also held diverse attitudes towards the political developments of their time. Isidôros experienced firsthand the defensive struggle of Manuel II Palaiologos, with whom he cooperated for this cause, without this meaning, however, that their relations always ran smoothly. Both Isidôros and his successor, Gavriêl, experienced the first Ottoman occupation of Thessalonikê, during which they acted as mediators between the Thessalonians and the Turkish authorities. Particularly Gavriêl was renowned for his mild character, which seems to have helped considerably in the amelioration of the conditions in the city. Lastly, Symeôn, a man of firm anti-Turkish and to a lesser extent anti-Latin sentiments, was a central figure in the political life of the city, provoking in many

⁴³ F. Tinnefeld, 'Vier Prooimien zu Kaiserurkunden verfasst von Dêmêtrios Kydônês. Edition, Textparaphrase und Kommentar', *BSI* 44 (1983), 13-30, 178-195.

⁴⁴ Loenertz, *Cydonès correspondance*, vol. I, 175.

⁴⁵ P. Charanis, 'The Strife among the Palaeologi and the Ottoman Turks, 1370-1402' *Byzantion* 16 (1942-43), 286-314, esp. 293-330 for the years 1373-1382; Dennis, *The Reign of Manuel*, 26-51.

⁴⁶ Dennis, *The Reign of Manuel*, 57-61.

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, 155.

cases the discontent of both the political authorities and the people. What was common in the actions of the three archbishops was the fact that all of them left the city in periods when the Ottoman siege was putting great pressure on the city, an act that at least Isidôros and Symeôn attempted to justify in their personal correspondence and writings.

During the whole period that Manuel was involved in the political and military developments in Macedonia, one of his chief goals was to ensure the unity of the inhabitants in order to create a solid front against the Turks. Being a man of great perception, he was aware that social harmony is one of the main ingredients for successful political outcomes. In his letters, especially those exchanged with his dear friend Dêmêtrios Kydônês with whom he shared common views on matters of policy, we encounter his distress at the existence of splinter groups among the citizens, a contributing factor – alongside with economic deprivation- to the whole disintegration process of those years.⁴⁸ Kydonês, on the other hand, although he had left his hometown during the troubled period of the Zealot movement, kept a close eye on what was taking place there, by maintaining contacts with some of his fellow citizens. In his correspondence there is a vivid manifestation of the worrying fact that concord was too difficult to maintain, accelerating, thus, the political deterioration that was affecting Byzantium in that period.

In the summer of 1371, Kydônês sent a letter to Manuel who at the time was in Venice with the task of providing his father with the financial means to return to Constantinople.⁴⁹ John V, in his effort to acquire the help of the West against Turks, had accepted the catholic faith in 1369. Sadly, he could not afford to return to Constantinople and after failing to get help from his other son residing in the capital, Andronikos IV, he turned to Manuel who

⁴⁸ A very small number of their letters are very briefly discussed by A. Karpozilos, 'Macedonia as reflected in the epistolography of the fourteenth century', in *Byzantine Macedonia. Identity, Image and History*, ed. J. Burke and R. Scott (Melbourne, 2000), 84-88.

⁴⁹ Loenertz, letter 21=Tinnefeld, letter 76 (summer 1371). (Kydônês's letters will be cited under the editor's name. I follow Tinnefeld's dating of the letters).

raised a sum of money and sailed to Venice in the winter of 1370-1371.⁵⁰ The letter constitutes a plea to him to return, as matters in Thessalonikê had become pressing due to the presence of the Turks.⁵¹ In another letter of the same year, addressed to the *Grand Domestikos* Dêmêtrios Palaeologos,⁵² he advises him on how to deal with the citizens.⁵³ He is confident in the ability of his friend, whose intention is to encourage the citizens and urge them to be disciplined according to the example of the cities of the West that prosper due to justice and the ordered way of life they promote. He alerts him, though, to guard himself from the narrow-mindedness of some Thessalonians, those ‘*slaves born and bred in the house*’ (*oikotrivas*).⁵⁴ He apparently refers to that part of the population, probably the lower class, with basic convictions and unable to perceive current events realistically, at least to his view. It is well known that the adoption of alternative policies such as the Union of the Churches, which Kydônês himself favoured, was rejected by a large segment of the population. This correspondence is of great value for an insight into the internal situation from around the same period.

Hence, writing to the *Grand Primmikêrios* Phakrasês, Kydônês laments the hardships his city is going through. It is again within the spirit of exhortation that he alerts his friend to follow a policy that will not displease the citizens. For the city, apart from the external danger, also suffered from internal disputes that in the past consituted its ‘*illness*’ and had cost so much to its citizens.⁵⁵ As pointed out by Tinnefeld, this is a clear reference to the

⁵⁰ Dennis, *The Reign of Manuel*, 13; Barker, *Manuel II*, 11-13.

⁵¹ The threat of the ‘barbarians’ in 1371 is mentioned in another letter of his to a friend, where there is also a reference – the only known of this period- to an epidemic of plague. Loenertz, l. 107=Tinnefeld, l. 79 (summer /autumn 1371).

⁵² Dêmêtrios had escorted John V to his trip to the West. After Manuel’s departure from the city in 1372 and until 1376, he served occasionally as its governor. Other governors of this period were Iôannês Palaiologos and Dêmêtrios Phakrasês. Tinnefeld, *Kydones Briefe*, 426-432; S.A. Dagiouklas, ‘Dioikêtikê prosôpographia tês vyzantinês Thessalonikês apo to 1343 eôs tèn alôsê tês polês apo tous Tourkous to 1387’, *Byzantina* 23 (2002-2003), 177.

⁵³ Loenertz, l. 106= Tinnefeld, l. 84 (autumn 1371).

⁵⁴ Loenertz, l. 106⁴¹⁻⁴⁴= Tinnefeld, l. 84⁴¹⁻⁴⁶, and note 11a.

⁵⁵ Loenertz, l. 77-Tinnefeld, l. 95 (after 10/4/1372);

summer of 1345, during which the so-called Zealot factionalists, executed about a hundred magnates. The events of that summer are sketched by Kydônês in his work *‘Monody on the Fallen in Thessalonikê’*,⁵⁶ in which there is a much quoted sentence, speaking of the fact that *‘servant was pushing master, the slave his purchaser, the peasant the general, and the farmer the soldier’*,⁵⁷ has been taken literally as depicting the confrontation between the peasantry and the landowners. It seems, however, that this is just a literary convention which must not be taken at face value.⁵⁸

Traditionally, it has been held that during the civil war between John V Palaiologos and John VI Kantakouzenos, this Zealot movement was essentially an expression of opposition against the latter, whom they saw as a representative of the great landowners.⁵⁹ Most recently, this revolt has been interpreted not on the grounds of a class struggle, but rather as having political objectives, namely the city’s political loyalty to John V Palaiologos. In addition, the period of Zealots’ regime of the city has been seen as the result of the efforts of the navy, who actually ruled the city at the time, to retain their status quo and their independence from the throne which was held since 1347 by John VI Kantakouzenos.⁶⁰ The

⁵⁶ Kydônês, Dêmêtrios, *‘Demetrii Cydonii monodia occisorum Thessalonicae’* ed. J.P. Migne, PG 109 (1863), cols. 639-652. For English translation and commentary, see J.W. Barker, ‘The “Monody” of Demetrios Kydônês on the Zealot Rising of 1345 in Thessaloniki,’ in *Essays in Memory of Basil Laourdas* (Thessalonica, 1975), 285-300.

⁵⁷ *‘doulos men ton despotên ôthei; ton de priamenon, to andrapodon; ton de stratêgon o agroikos; kai ton stratiotên o geôrgos’*; Kydônês, *‘Monodia’*, 648.

⁵⁸ Barker, ‘“Monody”’, 297, n.14; D. Kyritses, *The Byzantine Aristocracy in the Thirteenth and early Fourteenth Centuries* (Unpublished PhD thesis, Harvard University, 1997), 381, n.270, who rejects this contention, supporting that most soldiers sided with the Zealots.

⁵⁹ See *supra*, 35.

⁶⁰ Kyritses, *Byzantine Aristocracy*, 378-387; This view accepts Matschke’s suggestion that the revolt was the result of the reconstruction of social and economic relations of the city, but distances itself from his suggestion of a clash between the landowners and the urban elite. Matschke also speaks of growing tendencies of independence and autonomy from the centre, but he sees these as a first step to the creation of a ‘city-state’ according to the example of the West, not through western influences but internal processes. Matschke, ‘Thessalonike und die Zeloten’, 19-43. That the Zealot revolution had no influences from similar movements in the West has been proved by, Ševčenko, ‘The Zealot Revolution’, 602-617, and Hrochová, ‘La révolte des Zélotes’, 1-15.

issue of detachment from the imperial centre is also addressed by Kydônês through a different prism and with a statement that is revealing of the shift of attitudes towards the house of the Palaiologi and the imperial centre. He presents, thus, the people of Thessalonikê as indifferent to the emperor's liberation from his imprisonment in 1379.⁶¹ John V and his two sons, Manuel and Theodore, were put in prison by his other son Andronikos who assumed the throne in 1376.⁶² For this indifference, Kydônês demanded an apology.

To come back to the letter to Phakrasês, there is unfortunately no specific reference to what was actually taking place in the city, what form the disputes took, and between which parties. Bearing in mind, though, Kydônês's social status and his negative inclination towards the lower strata,⁶³ one must assume that the population's displeasure came mainly from citizens most affected by current difficulties and poverty.⁶⁴ For this reason, what is recommended to Phakrasês is to persuade the privileged citizens, whom he served, not to provoke the *lower classes*. What was needed in those difficult times was a moderation of their differences with as ultimate goal the rescue of the city.

The rough living conditions seem to have exacerbated moral depravity, as in August of 1376, when Thessalonikê was again overrun by plague, Kydônês criticized the sad phenomenon of influential members of the Thessalonian society acting opportunistically. What prevailed was avarice, along with private interest and thirst for power, which

⁶¹ Loenertz, l. 206=Tinnefeld, l. 197(1397/80). The addressee is probably again Tarchaneîôtês. The same letter is of interest, as there is an allusion to an attack upon the city by the Serbs in the same year, not referred to in any other sources.

⁶² Charanis, 'The Strife', 296-299.

⁶³ His hostile sentiments to the populace of Thessalonikê had its origins in the Zealot period and the fact that he had to abandon the city. His pejorative stance towards the common people and the way they were influenced by their leaders is evident throughout his monody. See, e.g., '*Hoi de emainonto, kai vasileas prosekynoun, ouden tôn dêmosia tyrannountôn ameinous*'. Kydônês, 'Monody', 641, par.5.

⁶⁴ Poverty did not strike only lower classes in this period. Kydônês in a letter of 1375 or 1376 discusses the difficult financial position of the son of Dêmêtrios Palaiologos found himself in. Loenertz, l. 188 = Tinnefeld, l. 161(autumn 1385/spring 1376).

overshadowed principles and laws.⁶⁵ Of similar nature are the comments made by Isidôros Glavas, who acquired the metropolitan throne of Thessalonikê in 25 May 1380. His inaugural speech is a fervent castigation of the centrifugal tendencies met in the ecclesiastical circles and the broader society of Thessalonikê. In addition, we have one of the first references to intermarriages with the infidels, a phenomenon repudiated fiercely by the archbishop.⁶⁶ This issue is brought up again in another sermon delivered later that year, where he speaks more specifically of the marriages taking place between Christian women and infidels, which he considers to be the reason for their subjection to them.⁶⁷

A new era for Thessalonikê begins with the secret return of Manuel in November 1382 and his self-proclamation as an independent ruler, and concludes in 1387 with its surrender to the Ottomans. Right from the beginning, Manuel followed a militant policy, much to his father's displeasure, marking some encouraging outcomes in the autumn and early winter of 1382.⁶⁸ A considerable number of letters exchanged between him and Kydonês illuminates aspects of Manuel's course of action and the city's internal affairs. His arrival there almost a year before the fall of Serres to the Turks, raises Kydonês's optimism and hope for future successful outcomes in the military field.⁶⁹

Regarding Thessalonians's attitudes during Manuel's presence in the city, they seem to follow the two distinct phases, following the course that warlike activities took; the period of his victories, and that of the reversal of fortune. Thus, in the autumn of 1382, the first encouraging news about Manuel's struggle against Turks reached Constatinople.⁷⁰ He is praised for his success in reversing the situation in favour of the citizens, who after a long siege had managed to open their city's gates, rush out of it and capture many of the

⁶⁵The letter is addressed to Tarchaneiôtês. Loenertz, l.174= Tinnefeld, l. 171(August 1376).

⁶⁶V. Christophoridês, *Isidôrou Glava peristasiakes homilies* (Thessalonica, 1981), 24-25.

⁶⁷*Ibid*, 26-28.

⁶⁸Dennis, *The Reign of Manuel*, 57 ff.

⁶⁹Loenertz, l. 203=Tinnefeld, l. 233 (November 1382).

⁷⁰Loenertz, l. 144=Tinnefeld, l. 235 (late autumn 1382).

attackers. The grim atmosphere that had prevailed gave place to hopefulness and acts of bravery.⁷¹ In the early part of the year 1383, Manuel's just and equal treatment of the Thessalonians is thought to prevent the outbreak of disputes, as they rallied round him committing themselves to the common cause of protecting their territory. On top of that, some of the better-off citizens offered their financial support to him and his followers, who were now in a position to send cloths and gold to their relatives in Constantinople.⁷² In the same period, however, an unexpected attack forced many of the inhabitants to flee to the mountains, or to more distant areas. Some of them drowned in their attempts to cross rivers, and there was a prevailing atmosphere of confusion and feelings of helplessness.⁷³ Manuel, writing to Kydônês, admits that the situation was still fluid, and expressed his displeasure about having to defend his friend's hometown on his own, while Kydônês spent his time at ease.⁷⁴ Within the same spirit of criticism, he also wrote to Nikolaos Kavasilas sometime within the years 1383-1387, using harsh language and accusing him of showing complacency, as he confines himself to a mere observation of the events, though he could provide his help '*both by words and by certain actions*'.⁷⁵ Nevertheless, Manuel's operations were still crowned with some success during the spring and summer of 1383, as Kydônês's enthusiastic overtone permits us to infer.⁷⁶

The situation was very soon overturned, when later in the summer the city was again threatened.⁷⁷ What followed was a period of growing opposition to Manuel's policies.

⁷¹ Loenertz, l. 247=Tinnefeld, l. 236 (winter 1382/3);

⁷² Worthy of note is the more than sufficient economic condition of Thessalonikê, as described in this letter, which took an upward route after the end of the Zealot regime in 1350. Tinnefeld 1999: 28-29.

⁷³ Loenertz, l. 249=Tinnefeld, l. 237(winter 1382/3).

⁷⁴ G.T. Dennis, *The Letters of Manuel Palaeologus*, (Washington D. C., 1977), l. 3₃₁₋₃₅ (winter of 1382-1383).

⁷⁵ *Ibid*, l. 6₂₄₋₃₄.

⁷⁶ Loenertz, l. 254, 312=Tinnefeld, l. 254, 255 (spring/summer 1383).

⁷⁷ Loenertz, l. 248= Tinnefeld, l. 259 (late summer 1383). The letter is addressed to the Thessalonian Rhadênos. For his correspondence with Kydônês, see F. Tinnefeld, 'Freundschaft und PAIDEIA. Die Korrespondenz des Dêmêtrios Kydônês mit Rhadênos (1375-1387/9)', *Byzantion* 55 (1985), 210-244, especially 220-24 for Kydônês's attempts to convince his friend to leave Thessalonikê and join him in Constantinople.

Manuel admitted that it was impossible for him to rule the Thessalonians if they did not change their minds, that is, to wish to defend the city.⁷⁸ These difficult conditions for Manuel were exacerbated when in autumn of 1383,⁷⁹ an ultimatum is presented to the population of the city by the leader of the Turkish troops, Hayreddin Paşa, who had already taken Serres. From a letter of support and consolation written by Isidôros to Matthaios Phakrasês, the Serrean Metropolitan, we hear that the latter had been imprisoned by the Ottomans soon after the conquest of Serres.⁸⁰ The content of the ultimatum reserved the same fate for Thessalonikê, in case the inhabitants declined the option to surrender and pay tribute.

Under these circumstances, Manuel composed and delivered an advisory speech, where he exposed his firm belief in rejecting the Ottomans' proposal, and encouraged the Thessalonians to resist mightily, employing every possible means, whether military or diplomatic, in order to retain their freedom.⁸¹ Isidôros, in his panegyric sermon of 26 October 1383, offered his unreserved support to Manuel's policies.⁸² Towards the end of his speech he sings Manuel's praise,⁸³ after having rebuked once again the avarice of the citizens and their lapse from virtue, which he considers to be the reason for their downfall. It was not Manuel's own convictions that had led to degradation, but the rough course of circumstances, and he urged them to stand by him in all his efforts.

⁷⁸ 'Instead we need either the wealth of Croesus or an eloquence above average to be able to persuade them to bear poverty in good repute than to desire a blameworthy wealth. They have to be convinced, however that it is nobler and much less shameful to suffer willingly the lot of slaves for the sake of their own freedom than, after having become slaves in heart, to try to gain the rights of free men.' Manuel, *The Letters*, l. 4¹⁵⁻²¹ (spring-summer 1383). (translation by Dennis).

⁷⁹ Dennis, *The Reign of Manuel*, 78-79, places it between 19 September and 26 October 1383, when Isidôros delivered a speech in which he explicitly refers to the Ottomans proposition, part of which he translates.

⁸⁰ Phakrasês remained in a state of captivity for four years. There is no exact dating of the letter, but the editor sets it sometime before 1385. Isidôros, *Oktô anekdotoi*, 401, 406-407.

⁸¹ Manuel II Palaiologos, 'O symvouleutikos pros tous Thessalonikeis tou Manouêl Palaiologou', ed. V. Laourdas *Makedonika* 3 (1953-55), 290-307. The main points of the discourse are summarized in, Dennis, *The Reign of Manuel*, 81-84. The text is examined in section II/d.

⁸² Isidôros Glavas, 'Isidôrou archiepiskopou homiliai eis tas eortas tou Hagiou Dêmêtriou' *Hellenika* [suppl. 5], ed. V. Laourdas (1954), 19-32.

⁸³ *Ibid*, 31-32.

Somewhat different seems to be his stance toward Manuel later that autumn. Isidôros, once again, criticizes severely his fellow-citizens for their ethical decadence.⁸⁴ The infidels already seize their land, property, and even their women and children. However, they should not accuse the invaders for these practices, since it is also they themselves that commit thefts of property. This is one of the first instances in which we can attest a clash between the political and ecclesiastical authorities. Apparently, this criticism had been ignited by Manuel's decision to alienate votive offerings, which is evidently insinuated all through the sermon. The archbishop makes sure, of course, to dissociate private property from the ecclesiastical one. Appropriation of the latter was a sin to be punished by God.⁸⁵ Moreover, this sermon is of interest for a further reason, namely the request he presents to his flock to give him its permission to retire from his metropolitan throne,⁸⁶ an idea he must have been toying with from the first years of his office, which he finally acted out in spring of 1384, when he left Thessalonikê and sailed to Constantinople. In September of the same year, he was deposed by the Patriarch and restored sometime later (at least by March 1386), but it was only in 1389 that he returned to the Macedonian city. The real motive behind his departure remains uncertain, but three possible reasons have been proposed: i) fear for his own safety, ii) the conflict over the ecclesiastical property, or disagreement over the emperor's negotiations with the pope, and iii) a secret mission from Manuel in order to come to terms with his father John V.⁸⁷

⁸⁴ Isidôros Glavas, *Isidôrou Glava Thessalonikês homilies*, ed. V. Christophoridês (Thessalonica, 1996), 33-49.9

⁸⁵ *Ibid*, 48-49. This is not the only sermon in which the appropriation of ecclesiastical property comes up. References to this issue can be found dispersed in various of his sermons. He is cautious enough, though, not to target directly Manuel by scolding his unworthy advisors. Isidôros Glavas, *Isidôrou Glava archiepiskopou Thessalonikes omilies*, vol I, ed. V. Christophoridês (Thessalonica, 1992), Homily 30, and *Oktô anekdotoi*, 350-1.

⁸⁶ *Ibid*, 9.

⁸⁷ See Dennis, *The Reign of Manuel*, 89-95, and *idem* 'The Late Byzantine Metropolitans of Thessalonikê', *Late Byzantine Thessalonikê, Dumbarton Oaks Symposium May 4-6, 2001, DOP 57* (2003), 257-259.

Meanwhile, Kydônês continued to send letters during autumn 1383, which all reflect the precarious position in which the city found itself in.⁸⁸ The conquest of Chortiatou, a village outside Thessalonikê, becomes the pretext for the despair and lamentation of Kydônês on the critical situation of his fatherland, which is about to follow the fate of Serres that, as we hear from him, was looted by the Turks. These incidents could be nothing else but a warning of what was about to happen in Thessalonikê as well. The imminent danger created two phenomena. Towards the beginning of the following year, that is 1384, Kydônês mentions that the harsh reality people experienced has given place to a growing opinion held even by the most serious of persons that they should hand over their cities to the enemy.⁸⁹ On the other hand, the endangered position of the city reached its peak in autumn/winter of 1384, when important personages opted to flee. However, it seems that certain people remained loyal to Manuel and consistently refused to abandon the city. Kydônês 's friend, Rhadênos, was one of them despite the former's repeated pleas to leave Thessalonikê.⁹⁰

By contrast, other members of the clergy, such as Isidôros Glavas and his successor Gavriêl -at the time still a monk- had abandoned the city in 1384, taking refuge in Constantinople. In the summer of 1384, the situation was still critical and no hope seemed to be left for a rescue of the city from the greed of the Turks.⁹¹ Land communication was hindered, and the only way for a letter to reach Thessalonikê was by sea. Manuel seems to have been left alone in his effort to defend the city, having to deal with the malice of his subjects and their inclination to accept '*the deceitful words and lies of the enemy*'.⁹² This is

⁸⁸Loenertz, ls. 285, 282,270, 283= Tinnefeld, ls. 267,268,269,271.

⁸⁹Loenertz, l. 320=Tinnefeld, l. 274 (winter 1383-spring 1384?).

⁹⁰Loenertz, l. 289=Tinnefeld, l. 272 (late autumn 1383); Loenertz, l. 324= Tinnefeld, l. 275; Dennis, *The Reign of Manuel*, 97f. It was only in 1385 that the decision of his friend Rhadênos to remain in his hometown and defend it was received with understanding by Kydônês. Loenertz, l. 305=Tinnefeld, l. 305 (May/ June 1385).

⁹¹Loenertz, l. 273=Tinnefeld, l. 284 (after 6/8/1384).

⁹²Loenertz, l. 277= Tinnefeld, l. 285 (after 6/8/1384).

a leitmotif of the enemy's quality, as in the view of Kydônês, also shared by other of his contemporaries, as we shall later see.

Passing to 1385, the picture still remains bleak. According to Kydônês, one would expect that common threat would encourage concord, in cases where the people are not able to decide on how to treat the enemy. In Kydônês's view, Christians must not only venerate God, but also hold the statesman responsible for the community.⁹³ The straitened economic conditions forced Manuel to adopt a new policy. He wrote to Kavasilas and admitted that he would employ any possible means in order to avoid poverty. Having been disconfirmed in his hopes to trust '*those who prefer to speak falsehood rather than the truth*' he would turn to a different policy.⁹⁴ It is the year that Manuel decides to send an embassy to the Pope to request his help. Previously, Manuel after first approaching his brother Theodore, Despot of Morea, and Nero Acciajuoli, Lord of Corinth, an alliance that was not particularly fruitful, turned to Venice only to receive words of sympathy.⁹⁵ The Pope was thus the last resort for aid. The discussions with the papal delegate who arrived in Thessalonikê, must have involved the issue of union of the churches.⁹⁶ Manuel's efforts were applauded and supported by Kydônês, who was a fervent unionist and had always tried to promote this diplomatic policy, which he believed was the only solution to the reversal of the situation.⁹⁷ It is highly unlikely, though, that the majority of the people of Thessalonikê would have agreed with such a policy, considering their traditional anti-Latin sentiments influenced by the Hesychastic movement.⁹⁸

On the other hand, the people of Thessalonikê lived also the reality of having been abandoned by their religious leader. In the late Byzantine period, vacant metropolitan and

⁹³ Loenertz, I. 299=Tinnefeld, I. 289 (winter 1384/85-spring 1385?).

⁹⁴ Manuel, *The Letters*, I. 8 (spring 1385).

⁹⁵ Dennis, *The Reign of Manuel*, 119-123.

⁹⁶ Barker, *Manuel II*, 54-6; for the course of negotiations, see Dennis, *The Reign of Manuel*, 136-150.

⁹⁷ Loenertz, I. 302-306.

⁹⁸ See *infra*, 85.

archbishopric seats was a common phenomenon. With the advance of the Turks, cities were deprived of their prelates who were not infrequently enslaved or taken as hostages.⁹⁹ This would have a huge negative impact on the psychology of the populace, as the church had by some means substituted the state, assuming a more energetic role in cities' by substituting the latter in many of its functions.¹⁰⁰ In Thessalonikê, although the political authorities were present, the sense of abandonment must have been even greater because of the archbishop's choice to flee. However, from Constantinople, Isidôros sent a letter to his flock, dated 1385, where he stated that he would be back shortly, avoiding tactfully any mentions to the reasons for his departure. He only stated that even though he was away, it saddened him greatly to hear of his compatriots' torments. The only way for them to escape enslavement is to offer their support to their leader and follow his will, namely pursue active resistance, as we are informed about a growing segment of the population that did not consider anymore defense as an option. In an outburst against this view, Kydonês breathed fire towards those, *'philistines, flatterers, venal and slaves' who 'impose themselves on fine, sensible and free-spirited individuals, and give them orders as if they were vassals, ruin the common fortune of the city unscrupulously, as if this were their private property; with violence, idiocy and recklessness they have brought everything in a state of disorder, and finally, they plunge the whole city in dreadful slavery, like a ship that sinks due to the inexperience and incompetence of the seamen.'*¹⁰¹

A few months before its surrender, Thessalonikê was in a state of bewilderment, and Manuel was surrounded by many worries, trying to find ways to protect himself and the population of the city.¹⁰² Kydonês, deeply concerned for the situation, admits that in such

⁹⁹ Ostrogorsky 'La prise de Serrès', 302-319.

¹⁰⁰ Sp. Vryonis Jr., *The decline of medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor: and the process of Islamization from the eleventh through the fifteenth century* (Berkeley, 1971) chapter IV.

¹⁰¹ Loenertz, l. 309=Tinnefeld, l. 308(June 1385).

¹⁰² Loenertz, l.329=Tinnefeld, l. 326 (winter 1386).

conditions it is very difficult for someone to be master of himself, and finds it unbearable to see his homeland having become a slave to the barbarians with its citizens being at odds with each other.¹⁰³ On the other hand, there is the case of his friend Tarchaneiôtês, to whom this letter is addressed, who due to the circumstances, is now prepared to take up endeavours (apparently participation in military affairs) he detests, having to fight against and force himself to carry them out.

Despite such efforts, the majority of the citizens had obviously decided to submit to the Turks. For one final time, Kydônês will prompt Rhadenos to flee from the city and avoid a shameful slavery. In the same letter, realizing that there was no hope for an alternative conclusion of the affair, he will also give his own interpretation to the events of that period by delineating its phases, and will also reserve a few words of understanding for his fellow-citizens.¹⁰⁴ The city has gone over to the godless, or rather, has been forced to do so. Initially the inhabitants of Thessalonikê had become allies of their governor, namely Manuel, and during the fight against the enemy they had shown their convictions through their actions. They had become allies of their leader, listening to him with no covetousness or ambition, and with their concord and discipline had built a wall, to which they looked, as they would do for themselves. Later, though, destitution and shortage in foodstuffs led to people's deprivation, which was the decisive factor in their consensual submission. Therefore, these people should not be rebuked and their attitude should not be regarded as failure. Those individuals and cities that accept slavery and are accustomed themselves to a miserable life should be forgiven, since due to their deficient education they could not foresee their undoing. From the same letter we understand that Manuel has already decided to leave the city, with his destination still remaining unknown.

¹⁰³ Loenertz, l. 362=Tinnefeld, l. 325 (winter 1386/7- April 1387).

¹⁰⁴ Loenertz, l. 332=Tinnefeld, l. 328 (February-April 1387).

To be sure, the harsh and constant sufferings of the population during the siege were the main reason for a mounting opposition to Manuel's policy of defense. On this issue, one of Kydônês's letters from the period 1383-1386 addressed to Mouzalôn is worth mentioning.¹⁰⁵ The latter was an official probably charged with the task of finding financial means.¹⁰⁶ Kydônês, in his letter, gives Mouzalôn suggestions for the financial policy he should follow. He warns him that when one implements a policy strictly orientated to the gathering of money, then he will not escape the rage of the people, who may act as avengers of his greed, causing, in this way, extensive social unrest. Indeed, this seems to have been the case during that period, forcing Manuel to depart from Thessalonikê and find refuge in the island of Lesbos. From there, during the summer of 1387, he wrote to Kavasilas describing the hardships he was currently experiencing.¹⁰⁷ He emphasizes that there was no other option but to leave the city due to the adverse feelings of the inhabitants, disappointed for the fact that the citizens were neither grateful to him for the fact that he endangered his life for them, nor did they tried to follow his example. Rather, they demonstrated a hostile behaviour, assisting the enemy's plans either by thinking nothing noble or sound, or by plotting against him, accusing him of '*tyrannising*' them.¹⁰⁸

After the flight of Manuel from the city, Kydônês's letters follow the former's personal story and further information on Thessalonikê cannot really be derived from them. Instead, some light on the subsequent period is shed by the writings of its three archbishops. Symeôn, archbishop of the city from 1416/7 to 1429, composed a historical discourse, probably in 1427 or 1428, describing the years from 1387 up to 1427. Writing

¹⁰⁵Loenertz, l. 323= Tinnefeld, l. 280.

¹⁰⁶Loenertz, l. 142=Tinnefeld, l. 152.

¹⁰⁷Manuel, 'Manuel Paléologue, épître à Cabasilas', ed. R.J. Loenertz *Makedonika* 4 (1955-1960), 35₂₁-36₂₈.

¹⁰⁸*Ibid*, 38-39 ₂₀₋₂₈. Dennis, *The Reign of Manuel*, 85-88, 151.

retrospectively, thus, for the period from 1387 to 1402/3,¹⁰⁹ he brings forth as main reasons for the city's subjection to the enemy violence and necessity, as the 'cowardly counsel of some who rejected hope and faith in God'.¹¹⁰ Symeôn's anti-Turkish sentiments were very well known, and caused many internal problems in the already unstable condition of late Byzantine Thessalonikê, though in this passage he admits that Turks showed leniency to the citizens, as at the time their aim was to conquer Constantinople.¹¹¹

For the late fourteenth century, we have some more information from archbishop Isidôros Glavas, who was contemporary to its events. Returning from Constantinople, probably in 1389, he resumed his duties in the Macedonian city and became involved himself actively in the restoration and improvement of the city's life. But before he returned, he sent a letter to the Thessalonian people, dated in all probability after spring 1387, when the city was already under occupation. There, among other things, he will refer to the period of its siege, during which the citizens were subjected to numerous *temptations*.¹¹² This is a common characterization in ecclesiastical sermons of the phenomenon so frequent in those years of people to acquiesce in the new establishment. In 1393, he will deliver a speech in Thessalonikê, addressed to the city's dignitaries, which is an admonition on how to deal with the Ottoman authorities, but particularly with the inhabitants of the city. As can be surmised from the last part of the sermon, the reason for its composition was the discontent of the population over some kind of levy imposed on them by or through the city's dignitaries.¹¹³ In an imaginary dialogue between dignitaries and the archbishop, the former

¹⁰⁹ Symeôn of Thessalonikê, *Politico-historical Works of Symeon Archbishop of Thessalonica (1416/17 to 1429), Critical Greek Text with Introduction and Commentary*, ed. D. Balfour (Vienna, 1979), 42₆ - 43₂₂, and 113-114.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 42₁₇₋₁₈. (translation by Balfour). Symeôn always consistently uses the word '*mikropsychoi*' (pusillanimous) to denote those who were willing to cooperate in any way with the new regime.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 43₁₄₋₁₆.

¹¹² Isidôros, *Oktô anekdotoi*, 388₂₂. For the change of style in the sermons delivered in Thessalonikê starting in the years of Isidôros Glavas, see V. Laourdas, 'Egkômia eis ton Hagion Dêmêtrion kata ton dekatan tetarton aiôna' *EEBS* 24 (1954), 275-290.

¹¹³ Isidôros, *Homiliai eis tas eortas*, 64₁₁₋₃₆.

will wonder: ‘*when it is necessary that they [i.e. the population] provide a small amount of money for their own sake, who can bear their uproar?*’. In various parts of the speech the dignitaries complain about the treatment they receive from the Thessalonians. They suggest that ‘[...] *they grumble and revile us,¹¹⁴ whom they should consider as benefactors and to whom they [should] know that they are indebted*’.¹¹⁵ Once again, we are not in a position to relate these references to a particular event, but the content of the sermon is telling of the fact that internal conflicts were continuing in this period.

The next source, from which we can furnish some indirect evidence for the first Turkish occupation, comes from Gavriël, Thessalonikê’s archbishop from 1396 to 1416/7. Gavriël was renowned for his mild character and his mediatory role during this occupation.¹¹⁶ Unfortunately, only seven of his sermons have been published, of which only one can be of some historical value. In 1402 the defeat of the Ottomans in Ankara marked a new phase in the history of the Macedonian city, as according to the 1403 treaty between the Ottomans and the Byzantines, the latter were ceded the city of Thessalonikê along with other areas.¹¹⁷ Gavriël delivered a sermon on the issue of the defeat, in which there are a few interesting points.¹¹⁸ Although this sermon should be a celebration of the fortunate reversal of circumstances for the city, one can discern a hint of Gavriël’s concern on attitudes met during the occupation of which he apparently disapproved, but which is disguised in the form of moralistic teaching. Worthy of note is his remark that, even though people were beseeching God’s help to liberate them, they never ceased to sin, but they became even

¹¹⁴ My emphasis.

¹¹⁵ Isidôros, *Homiliai eis tas eortas*, 63₉₋₁₁.

¹¹⁶ We glean this information from a fifteenth century encomium written to commemorate Gavriël. See L. Laourda-Syndika ‘Egkômio eis ton archiepiskopo Thessalonikês Gavriël’ *Makedonika* 4 (1955-1960), 352-370.

¹¹⁷ In the area of Macedonia, the Byzantines were given back Thessalonikê, Kalamaria, Chalkidike and the littoral of the Thermaic Gulf. See G.T. Dennis, ‘The Byzantine- Turkish Treaty of 1403’, *OCP* 33 (1967), 72-87. [repr. in *idem, Byzantium and the Franks, 1350-1420* (London, 1982), no.VI.].

¹¹⁸ Gavriël of Thessalonikê, ‘Gavriël Thessalonikês homiliai’, ed. V. Laourdas, *Athêna* 57 (1953), 164-168 (Homily 6).

worse,¹¹⁹ or, as he later states, ‘incurrigible’.¹²⁰ He is clearly targeting the authorities, when stressing that God will eventually forgive those officials who are unworthy to govern for their incompetence.¹²¹ He also refers to the various and numerous *temptations* from which St. Dêmétrios had saved the Thessalonians, alluding, in all probability, to the inclination of a segment of the population to consent to or perhaps more actively in the new state of affairs.¹²² This is corroborated by Symeon’s retrospective account of the Ottoman siege of the city in 1411, in which he speaks of a part of the inhabitants surrendering themselves to the infidels.¹²³

From this point on and until the years before the final fall of Thessalonikê to the Ottomans, the internal conditions of the city are illuminated by the writings of Symeôn, who served the metropolitan throne from 1416/7 to 1429. What he has to say is interesting for two reasons. Firstly, he unravels many instances of civil conflicts that occurred during this period; and secondly, because of his one political stance, which was characterized by rigid and monolithic views regarding the politics of his years, heightening with his attitude the conflicts within the city.

Starting with the year 1403, where we left off, the transfer of political power in the city was not accepted without opposition. According to Symeôn, Dêmétrios Laskaris Leontarês was sent to assume control of the city, but the remaining Turks refused to collaborate and gathered in the area of the acropolis, while the citizens blockaded the streets with wooden barriers and prepared to defend themselves.¹²⁴ Balfour, the editor of the text, believes that behind this incident must have been the representatives of the pro-Turkish party showing

¹¹⁹ *Ibid*, 165₅₁₋₅₃.

¹²⁰ *Ibid*, 167₁₂₂.

¹²¹ *Ibid*, 165₆₁–166₆₂₋₆₃.

¹²² *Ibid*, 168₁₂₇₋₁₂₉.

¹²³ Symeôn, *Politico-historical Works*, 59₁₃₋₁₄

¹²⁴ *Ibid*, 44₂₄₋₃₄.

their anti-imperial feelings in deeds.¹²⁵ Symeôn continues his narration describing the period following the restoration of the Byzantine regime as one of immorality and decadence that was the result of people's ingratitude to God and their patron, St. Dêmêtrios, turning against both the archons and the subjects. The former '*spend lavishly, accumulate riches, exalt themselves above their subjects, committing promiscuously any kind of offence, not only offering nothing to God, but stealing as well what belongs to God*'.¹²⁶ '*The poor, on the other hand, emulating those in power arm themselves against each other, and live rapaciously and voraciously, as far as they can*'.¹²⁷ All these attitudes raise God's wrath and what follows is a time of troubles and hardships. '*But the majority do not comprehend that, and accuse only their archons, despising them, turning against them, desiring to expel them and wanting to withdraw themselves from them*',¹²⁸ more specifically '*the rulers of the same faith and race as theirs*'.¹²⁹

Finally, the governorship of the city passes to the hands of John VII Palaiologos, Manuel's nephew, until his death in 1408. Emperor Manuel II will appoint as despot of Thessalonikê his juvenile son, Andronikos, and will escort him there himself. Apparently, this decision of his to impose another member of the imperial family on the Thessalonians provoked some kind of commotion, which he broke up reconstituting finally order, as Symeôn informs us.¹³⁰ In the subsequent period, the city finds itself within the whirlpool of the events connected to the problems of the Ottoman dynastic succession. In 1411, Musa, one of the pretenders of the Ottoman throne, laid siege to Thessalonikê. Some of the pusillanimous citizens sent an envoy to the enemy to betray the city, and the situation, as he

¹²⁵ *Ibid*, 115, note 59.

¹²⁶ *Ibid*, 47₉₋₁₁.

¹²⁷ *Ibid*, 47₁₃₋₁₄.

¹²⁸ *Ibid*, 47₂₆₋₂₈.

¹²⁹ *Ibid*, 47₃₀.

¹³⁰ *Ibid*, 48₁₆₋₁₈, and 122.

says, was extremely uncertain until the danger was averted through Saint Dêmêtrios's intervention.¹³¹

Coming down to the year 1422 in Symeôn's narration, we are entering the last chapter of the Byzantine's city's life, when the internal divisions reached their climax. At the beginning of the year the condition within the city is one of dissension and dissolution. 'Our people here', Symeôn writes, '*became suspects in each other's eyes; they attacked each other and wove dire plots; the community magnates were against the palace courtiers and the latter in turn were against the citizens*'.¹³² The archbishop defines the role he played within these circumstances, by suggesting that he had to repress agitations and preposterous actions, a task that affected severely his health,¹³³ and, as we shall see, would aggravate the negative disposition towards him. Despite this fact, he will leave the city with the intention to meet Manuel II in an attempt to find a solution to these problems. More specifically, the issue that had been posed was that of the handing-over of the city to the Venetians to which he was evidently opposed.¹³⁴ Due to the presence of the Turkish army in the area and their attack upon Thessalonikê, which according to Symeôn took place on 14 June,¹³⁵ he failed to act out his plan reaching only Mount Athos. His departure must surely have been seen by some of the Thessalonians as an abandonment of his flock, and he was soon recalled to his post.¹³⁶ The story behind this can only be a matter speculation, but it might be, as Balfour suggests, that Symeôn had disagreed with the policies of Andronikos who was becoming a toy in the hands of an ever-increasing pro-Venetian attitude. It is for this reason that the archbishop must have wanted to seek Manuel's intervention. Coming back to the city, he

¹³¹ *Ibid*, 49⁷⁻¹⁰. For this period and the events, see D. J. Kastritsis. *The Sons of Bayezid: Empire Building and Representation in the Ottoman Civil War of 1402-1413* (Leiden-Boston, 2007).

¹³² Symeôn, *Politico-historical Works*, 53²⁹⁻³¹ (translation by Balfour).

¹³³ *Ibid*, 53³⁴⁻⁵⁴.

¹³⁴ This is inferred in combination with what he writes in his 'Apologia', where he justifies more clearly his reasons for intending to reach Constantinople. *Ibid*, 70-76, 153, 193-199.

¹³⁵ On 13 June according to Kugeas, cited in 153, note 143.

¹³⁶ *Ibid*, 154, note 144.

was confined in his house, practically just watching the developments and being unable to participate in any way. This will not prevent a large segment of the population from leveling severe accusations and threats against him.

In fact, this period must have been one of absolute confusion. Through his narration we discern the following patterns of response of Thessalonian society to its reality. The majority of the inhabitants, namely the underprivileged, accuse the political and ecclesiastical authorities of not serving their interests, and clearly declare their intention to surrender to the Turks.¹³⁷ To make matters worse, some of them join the Turkish side. At the same time, a part of the dominant class range themselves with this view of surrender, which in Symeôn's opinion comes from their desire for material goods.¹³⁸ The actions of the masses were without doubt instigated by certain individuals, '*turbulent men and incapable of sound thought and speech*'.¹³⁹

On the other hand, at the level of official politics, the authorities seem to be crippled, unable even to negotiate with the enemy, who having realized the state of internal disintegration are not willing to engage in any kind of bargaining.¹⁴⁰ In meetings everyone falls silent, and lack of communication results in an envoy being sent to the enemy without the approval of Despot Andronikos, whose own diplomatic plans fall through.¹⁴¹ The intervention of the imperial centre in the matters of Thessalonikê, which comes through the dispatch of a certain general, will deepen further the disagreements on the line of policy to be followed. His proposal that the members of the urban senate should contribute financially

¹³⁷ *Ibid*, 55₃₄₋₃₆–56₁ and 16-19.

¹³⁸ *Ibid*, 56₃₋₁₅.

¹³⁹ 56₁₉₋₂₀. (translation by Balfour).

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid*, 56₂₀₋₂₃.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid*, 57₁₋₁₀.

to a common fund raises great disturbance and mutual mistrust among them. The result of this chaotic situation is the concession of the city to the Venetians.¹⁴²

Modern studies of this era all point to the harsh treatment of the Venetian regime towards the locals, regardless of their social and economic background.¹⁴³ The same picture is drawn by Symeôn as well. On 6 March 1426 a Turkish attack took place. Those who ruled are depicted as negligent and in discord, and those whom they had assigned to safeguard the city have escaped to the infidels, a practice followed by many other inhabitants who could no longer suffer food shortage.¹⁴⁴ The answer to all these hardships and the precarious situation of the city at these moments was obvious to the archbishop. It is simply the result of the choice of some individuals to detach themselves from their compatriots and to oppose the rulers with whom they share the same race and faith.¹⁴⁵ Symeôn's narrative ends in year 1427, while he himself passed away in 1429, six months before the Turkish conquest of the city. From what he has described and discussed, it is more than apparent that the fragmentation of public opinion had largely contributed to the irreversible turn of the history of the city, namely its subjection to the Ottomans. '*The opinions of the public are many and diverse about everything*' he will write in his 'Apology', where he justifies the reasons that forced him to leave Thessalonikê.¹⁴⁶

The role of archbishop Symeôn on the internal affairs of Thessalonikê will preoccupy a little later the writer of the 'Monody' on the capture of the city, Iôannês Anagnôstês. Being

¹⁴² *Ibid*, 57₁₁₋₃₀. G. Tsaras, 'La fin d'Andronic Paléologue dernier despote de Thessalonique', *Revue des Études Sud-Est Européenne* 3 (1965), 419-432; *idem*. 'E Thessalonikê apo tous Vyzantinous stous Venetsianous' (1423-1430)', *Makedonika* 17 (1977), 85-122, suggests that the city was actually sold to the Venetians. Also, Balfour, *Politico-historical Works*, 165, note 169.

¹⁴³ P. Lemerle 'La domination Vénitienne à Thessalonique', *Miscellanea Giovanni Galbiati* III (Milan, 1951), 219-225; A. E. Vakalopoulos, 'Symvolê stên historia tês Thessalonikês epi Venetokratias (1423-1430)', *Pagkarpia Makedonikês Gês* (1980), 31-51; D. Jacoby, 'Thessalonique de la domination de Byzance à celle de Venise. Continuité, adaptation ou rupture?', *TM* 14 (2002), 303-318. The argument of the last work is that the Venetian Senate was interested only in the continuity of the city's economic life, while the political role of the locals was intentionally reduced through an aggressive policy. A suspected movement of Thessalonians to surrender the city to the Ottomans was dealt with by the Venetians with their deportation to other colonies. See Necipoğlu, *Between the Ottomans and the Latins*, 49-50.

¹⁴⁴ Symeôn, *Politico-historical Works*, 60₆₋₁₃.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid*, 63₁₋₂₈.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid*, 74₃.

himself a native of the city, he reveals in his work many interesting details on the immediate periods before and after its fall. For now what interests us is what really preceded the conquest seen through the eyes of a person, the only Byzantine eyewitness to write on this event, who did not belong to the upper stratum either of the political, or the ecclesiastical establishment.¹⁴⁷

His account starts off with a short description – no more than a few lines- of the Venetian occupation, which is strikingly similar to that of Symeôn. The city was suffering during the period Venetians were ruling it, and the inhabitants exchanged thoughts on how to pull through from this situation, but with no result. The Venetians on their part, were willing to come to terms with the Ottomans sending them envoys, which achieved absolutely nothing. As a consequence, the few remaining citizens lost their unity and diverse opinions were expressed.¹⁴⁸ The whole situation became worse when their spiritual leader, Symeôn, passed away. Herein, the picture that Anagnôstês draws of him is interesting, since he presents him as a unifying force for the people of Thessalonikê, a quite different reality from what the archbishop himself had portrayed. Anagnôstês, however, will offer a glimpse of what a part of the population believed about him, when in another part of this work he defends him against those who held a quite negative view of him. In a digression from his narration, he refers to the issue of rendering responsibilities for the event of the fall, which undoubtedly arose immediately after it.¹⁴⁹ The accusation was that Symeôn prevented the

¹⁴⁷ In the edition of the text by Tsaras in 1958 (not available to me), it was argued that this work consists of two parts and that only the first has been written by Anagnôstês, while the second by a redactor, doubting in this way its value as a contemporary source. However, Vryonis has convincingly shown that both parts were written by an eyewitness, but in his re-edition of the text in 1985 Tsaras seems to insist in his view. See S. Vryonis, 'The Ottoman Conquest of Thessalonikê in 1430' in *Continuity and Change in Late Byzantine and Early Ottoman Society: Papers given at a Symposium at Dumbarton Oaks in May 1982*, ed. A.A. Bryer and H. Lowry (Birmingham-Washington D.C., 1986), 281-321; G. Tsaras, *Hê teleutaia alôse tês Thessalonikês (1430)* (Thessalonica, 1985). The text can also be found in French translation, in P. Odorico, *Thessalonique. Chroniques d'une ville prise* (Toulouse, 2005).

¹⁴⁸ Iôannês Anagnôstês, *Joannes Anagnostes De extremo Thessalonicensi excidio narratio*, ed. I Bekker (Bonn, 1838), 487, 100a.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 497, 108b.

solution of capitulation that Murad II had proposed to the citizens more than once. The answer of Anagnôstês to this is categorical. The archbishop was not alive for the last six months before the conquest, so there was plenty of time for the citizens to take this decision for themselves. He adds that the role of the late archbishop was not to interfere in military affairs, but to guide his flock. That is what he actually did, when admonishing them not to rise against their rulers, but to put up with them, since they were sent by God. He refers here to the Venetians. Although Symeôn had opposed the handover of the city to them, he might have started collaborating with them, at least to some degree, when the danger of the Turks, whom he despised, was imminent. It is at this point that Anagnôstês lays blame on the attitude the citizens themselves have shaped. He says '*Thus, it has happened that some have adopted an opinion that inclines to everything that changes, and alters according to the circumstances and the occurrences*'.¹⁵⁰

However, in order to be fair to the citizens and realise their position during the siege, we must look more closely at their relation with the Venetian authority at this time. It is explicitly stated by Anagnôstês himself that it was not possible for the Thessalonians to do what they had in mind out of fear for the Latins, and even more for the bandits that they had employed to watch them.¹⁵¹ In addition, the Venetians had warned that those thinking of betrayal would die.¹⁵² As the military operations are unraveled in this text, one gets the impression of an absolute lack of communication. The main reason that determined, according to Anagnôstês, the result of the siege was that very disunity that its people showed, and which facilitated the efforts of the enemy. The city was taken on 29 March 1430, and the great impact this event had, gave way to a post-Byzantine belief that attributed the fall to a conspiracy, which was plotted from within the walls. Typical of this is

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid*, 498, 109a.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid*, 498, 109b.

¹⁵² *Ibid*, 495, 107a.

Chalkokondyles's comment that the act of opening trenches during the siege was the result of the inhabitants' wish to surrender the city to the Ottomans.¹⁵³

Thus, the overall picture we assume from this brief survey of contemporary sources is that of a society in turmoil where opposing political attitudes created splinter groups. The discontent of the inhabitants with the political choices and policies of their authorities was understandably aggravated in periods of warlike activities and economic pressure, whilst in intermittent periods of relevant peace the clash with the authorities would not cease. In the next section, we will add one more dimension to the issue of social unrest in Thessalonikê, by trying to interpret in conjunction to the public discourses addressed at various points and the mixed messages these transmitted at times.

II/c. The issue of the role of ideology in Late Byzantine discourse: diversity and redefinition.

It has been maintained that in studying Byzantium using a 'dynamic concept of culture', one should bear in mind that political ideology should be seen only as one facet of the cultural setting, and that disruption of its continuity does not entail the same fate for culture as a whole.¹⁵⁴ According to another approach, to seek 'internal logic' in Byzantium's ideology and to charge it with inconsistency is essentially a slip, since such an approach fails to take into account the composite and latently contradictory character of the political

¹⁵³ Laonikos Chalkokondylês, *Historiae Demonstrationes*, 2 vols., ed. E. Darkó (Budapest, 1922-27), vol. I, 14,4-5. Anagnôstês, on the other hand, writes that they were opened by the Ottomans: '*De extremo Thessalonicensi excidio*', 498-499.

¹⁵⁴ Sp. Vryonis Jr., 'Recent Scholarship on Continuity and Discontinuity of Culture: Classical Greeks, Byzantines and Modern Greeks' in Sp. Vryonis Jr., *The 'Past' in Medieval and Modern Greek Culture* (Malibu, 1978), 244.

ideology as a construct.¹⁵⁵ Both these views make their meaning clear: that the system of ideas prevailing in a society is a delicate topic, which should be treated cautiously, and always within predefined boundaries. This issue has already been addressed and conceived as resting upon two separate grounds, namely whether the Byzantines themselves viewed the elaboration of political ideas as a concrete theoretical entity with a life of its own, and further, whether modern scholarship can discern in the formulated ideas a strand of political thought that would validate their qualification as such.¹⁵⁶

Throughout its historical trajectory the Byzantine Empire leaned on certain ideological specifics. But even if in our sense of the word it constituted a traditionalist society, there was always room for deviation from, or redefinition of formulaic ideas. Perhaps this can be attributed to Byzantium's very own character, which has been described as possessing features of 'chronological diversity and structural ambivalence'.¹⁵⁷ Of the two terms the latter signifies the fact that Byzantine state presented in every single sector of its life an oscillation between two poles. This scheme suggests that there were always two facets in the political, social and economic phenomena taking place during the life of the empire, rendering its edifice much more complex than conventionally thought.

The most prominent feature of the Byzantine political ideology was without a doubt the concept of *imperial power*. Even though in the late Byzantine period the traditional self-image and values remained embodied in the concept of the Roman Empire and its representative, the emperor, his prestige suffered increasingly from the second half of the fourteenth century onward.¹⁵⁸ The roots of this attitude should be sought in both internal and external factors, that is to say in the nature of the institution of imperial authority as it was conceived on a theoretical level, and secondarily, in the way the policies drawn and

¹⁵⁵ P. Magdalino, 'Hellenism and Nationalism in Byzantium', *Tradition and Transformation in Medieval Byzantium* (London, 1991), no. XIV, 12.

¹⁵⁶ D. Angelov, *Imperial Ideology and Political Thought in Byzantium, 1204-1330* (Cambridge, 2007), 8.

¹⁵⁷ A. Kazhdan and G. Constable, *People and Power in Byzantium* (Washington, 1982), 140ff.

¹⁵⁸ I. Ševčenko, 'The Decline of Byzantium Seen through the Eyes of its Intellectuals' *DOP* 15 (1961), 81.

implemented were received, and whether they corresponded to the prescribed context of the institution. If we follow the view, therefore, that defines the character of the Byzantine Empire within a framework of contradiction, then the emperor should be seen as operating within two contrasting trends, omnipotence on a theoretical level, versus instability of individual imperial power on a practical one.¹⁵⁹

In analyzing the development of political ideas in the later Paleologan era with particular reference to the role of the emperor, a retrospect of the preceding period is essential. This issue has been exhaustively dealt with by Dimiter Angelov who has argued for a mixed picture of continuity and change in the concept of imperial authority. He has shown how ideology was gradually transformed and adjusted to the political and economic realities of the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, and has discussed them for the most part as a contrast between the ideology of the Nicean Empire (1204-1261) and that of the first two Palaeologoi (1261-1330). What interests us here is to relate his conclusions to the aforementioned theoretical scheme that supports the gradual modification of mental constructs in a society.¹⁶⁰ Some of the main issues that need to be addressed are the following: the emphasis that the Niceans put on the *military virtue* of the emperor continued in the following era, but was less emphasized in favour of *diplomacy* as a different means of policy.¹⁶¹ The concept of the emperor's world domination (*oikoumenê*) also persisted in the early Palaeologan period, though it was now embodied not in his person, but in the city of Constantinople, the *New Rome*. As a result, an added importance was laid on the notion of homeland (*patris*), which signified the emperor's *native city*,¹⁶² coexisting with an emphasis on the image of aristocratic rulership.¹⁶³ On the whole, however, after 1204 an all the more growing argumentation for the absolute rights of the imperial office to administer and

¹⁵⁹ Kazhdan and Constable, *People and Power*, 144-150.

¹⁶⁰ *Supra*, II/a.

¹⁶¹ Angelov, *Imperial Ideology*, 98-101.

¹⁶² *Ibid*, 102-103.

¹⁶³ *Ibid*, 115.

redistribute taxable wealth evolved to defend the economic practices employed,¹⁶⁴ following a growing criticism and contestation of the leader's traditional image as a philosopher-ruler.¹⁶⁵ Hence, new concepts of rulership were introduced, while at the same time independent political thinking did not fall short of voicing its criticism.¹⁶⁶ And finally, the same period saw the balance of power between the political authority and the ecclesiastical one being disturbed in favour of the latter, a condition that was bequeathed to the second half of the fourteenth century, when it became even more manifest and a permanent feature of the political life.

In addition, the continual territorial shrinkage of the Byzantine Empire and its fragmentation had a direct impact on the perception the population had of itself. After 1204 the pattern of territorial division was followed by a distinct and growing feeling of localism, which had implications for the manner in which the late Byzantines designated themselves. Three major foci can be actually discerned as embodying the collective perceptions and identities in this period; family,¹⁶⁷ culture, and lastly, the most salient of all, that of place.¹⁶⁸ The place of birth, or origin represented one of the few stable points of reference in the uncertain world of late Byzantium, and to associate oneself with that rather than the Roman Empire depicts a novel reality, namely a redefinition of traditional values, and an evolution of the ideological system. In times of impending threat, '*patriotism*' came to signify the defense of the *city* that would become a symbol of its own, frequently employed at precarious times as a means of influencing public opinion both by the representatives of the political and ecclesiastical authority.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid*, 286-309.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid*, 195, 253-285.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid*, 253-285.

¹⁶⁷ To be discussed in chapter IV.

¹⁶⁸ A. Bryer, 'The Late Byzantine Identity. An Abstract', *Byzantium: Identity, Image, Influence. XIX International Congress of Byzantine Studies 18-24 August 1996*. (Copenhagen, 1996), 49-50.

¹⁶⁹ T. Kioussopoulou, 'È ennoia tês patridas kata ton 15o aiôna', in *1453. È alôshê tês Konstantinoupolês kai ê metavasê apo tous mesaiônîkous stous neôterous chronous*, ed. T. Kioussopoulou (Herakleion, 2005), 153, 156.

The picture we have for the notion of homeland (*patris*) and its connotations for the late Byzantine period is far from uniform, for its employment by the contemporaries could differ as a result of personal preferences, perceptions, or political intentions. One thing is certain, that the long-standing concept of *imperial ecumenism* could no longer – particularly in the fifteenth century- substantiate a political ideology that was in accord with the political reality. Instead, areas geographically defined provided the medium utilized by the political actors consciously, or not to recreate political entities based on an ideology that promoted the common cultural traits of the Byzantines, those of language and religion.¹⁷⁰ This is the most recent of scholarly views that has been tested on the case of Constantinople. In her work Kioussopoulou, expanding her previous argumentation, considers the capital of the empire in the later Byzantine period as politically transformed, having acquired a city-statelike character.¹⁷¹ The idea of homeland is presented as broadened after the thirteenth century, denoting not only the place of birth, but addressing now issues of continuity with the past, and expressing the emotionally charged atmosphere of the time. There was, that is, a political function of the term that was bound to reinforce the collective identity – the term used by Kioussopoulou is ‘nationalization’ (*ethnikopoiésê*), which would potentially create a united front against the external threat.

The problem of collective identity in Byzantium within the framework of ‘nationalism’ is principally one of semantics, and has preoccupied several academic works. The point of convergence is that by no means should the Late Byzantine state be understood as a nation-

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid*, 155-156. This view somehow underestimates the value attached by Late Byzantine and other Balkan rulers in Serbia, Thessaly and Epiros to a version of political ecumenism in the later 14th and 15th centuries, and their attempts to appropriate this concept. Characteristic is the case of the Serbian ruler, Stephan Dušan, who issued chrysobulls, in which he signed as ‘*vasileus Servias kai Rhômanias*’, as well as frequently recalling the ‘*Rhomaïôn archên*’. There is also a case in which he states that the emperor should be commemorated by the monks of the Vatopedi monastery before him. See, e.g., *Doch*, no.25₂₃; *Vat* II, nos.92₁₅, 93_{20,36}.

¹⁷¹ T. Kioussopoulou, *Vasileus ê Oikonomos. Politikê exousia kai ideologia prin tên alôsé* (Athens, 2007), particularly 201-234; Part of her discussion is based on the conclusions drawn in A. Kônstantakopoulou, *Vyzantinê Thessalonikê. Chôros kai ideologia* (Ioannina, 1996), which will be discussed in the following section of the thesis.

state in the modern sense of the word, which is itself problematic as, apart from being a construct of a different period, it also lacks a proper definition.¹⁷² The term ‘nationalism’ has been used to describe phenomena of earlier centuries in the sense of a movement that was intended to unite the people of various ethnic and social backgrounds residing within the Byzantine Empire against the threat from the east, the Arabs.¹⁷³ Moving on to later centuries and before the Fourth Crusade, ‘nationalism’ tends to acquire a more confined meaning in scholarly writings, as it is associated with the idea of *Hellenism*, and the gradual development of a more concrete identity around this notion.¹⁷⁴ A critical point in this process seems to be the twelfth century, when a plethora of texts verifies the systematic connection that the Byzantine intellectuals made with their Hellenic past. Masked, or implicit in the conventional forms of the rhetorical style that was imitating ancient works was an intrinsic dialogue about the issue of self-definition.¹⁷⁵ After the capture of Constantinople by the Latins in 1204, during the years of the Nicean Empire, the orientation towards the articulation of a theory of a national identity becomes more explicit. The ruling dynasty started to cultivate an awareness of the linkage with the Hellenic tradition in order to give some kind of theoretical credence to the continuity of their office within the new conditions of its displacement to Asia Minor.¹⁷⁶ This appears to be reflected in the increasing frequency of usage of the terms *Hellene* and *Greek*, co-existing side by side, or even displacing that of *Roman*.¹⁷⁷ That was naturally a general trend, and a rule for the more specific usage of the terms cannot be established, as the selection of words by the authors follow their personal likings and concepts of culture.

¹⁷² H.-G. Beck, ‘Reichsidee und nationale Politik im spätbyzantinischen Staat’ *BZ* 53 (1960) 92; Magdalino, ‘Hellenism’, 4; Kioussopoulou, *Vasileus é oikonomos*, 20.

¹⁷³ H. Ahrweiler, *L'idéologie politique de l'empire byzantin* (Paris, 1975), 25-36.

¹⁷⁴ J. Koder, ‘Griechische Identitäten im Mittelalter. Aspekte einer Entwicklung’ in *Byzantium: State and Society. In Memory of Nikolas Oikonomides*, ed. A. Avramea, A. Laiou and E. Chrysos E (Athens, 2003), 297-309 for the development of a Greek identity up to 1204.

¹⁷⁵ Magdalino, ‘Hellenism’, 7-16.

¹⁷⁶ M. Angold, ‘Byzantine Nationalism and the Nicean Empire’ *BMGS* 1 (1975), 49-70; Ahrweiler, *L'idéologie politique*, 107-114.

¹⁷⁷ Ahrweiler, *L'idéologie politique*, 113; Koder, ‘Griechische Identitäten’, 310-313.

In the Paleologan era (1261-1453) and in the years immediately after the prevalence of the Ottomans, things become more perplexing. Although the early Palaeologan propaganda insisted on recreating the myth of 'New Rome' and ecumenism, in the late Palaeologan period, particularly after the middle of the fourteenth century, such a contention was in sharp contrast with the reality. This situation was directly reflected in the vocabulary of collective identity. With the restoration of Constantinople to the Byzantines in 1261 the term 'Roman' did return in the writings of the time as a point of cultural reference, whilst that of *Hellene* with its ethnic connotations receded for a time, and in the second half of the fourteenth century gave space to an intellectually constructed and idiosyncratic meaning, that of the educated individual.¹⁷⁸ In the fifteenth century, the characteristics of the already desultory picture of Byzantine self-awareness is a diversity of terms and nuances, and a lack of consistency in their employment by the authors, a fact that mirrors the confusion, the complexities, and strong uncertainty of the period.¹⁷⁹ The rehabilitation of the term *Hellene* in the fifteenth century has been described by Beck as having a practical function. It was more like a device for rallying the population through the invocation of the common past by deriving from that examples of similar struggles against external enemies. However, strong reservations are expressed as to whether Late Byzantine emperors had envisaged the creation of a 'national' state through the employment of this term.¹⁸⁰ The imperial idea was too ingrained in the Byzantine consciousness to be abolished. It was this idea that was

¹⁷⁸ Koder, 'Griechische Identitäten', 313-314 referring to this use of the term by Dêmétrios Kydônês.

¹⁷⁹ Sp. Vryonis Jr, 'Byzantine Cultural Self-Consciousness in the Fifteenth Century', in *The Twilight of Byzantium. Aspects of Cultural and Religious History in the Late Byzantine Empire*, ed. S. Curčić and D. Mouriki (Princeton, 1991), 5-14.

¹⁸⁰ Beck, 'Reichsidee', 86-94, particularly 92-92; Kioussopoulou, *Vasileus ê oikonomos*, 212-213 insinuates that Manuel II Palaiologos might have conceived the creation of a 'nation-state' in the model of western states of the period, but admits the hindrance that the lack of evidence constitutes and does not push her argument further.

stimulating the intellectual thought, promoting in this way a dialectical relationship between the 'national' and Roman sentiment.¹⁸¹

Probably the most viable model to describe collective identity is one based on the contrast of 'us' and 'them', bearing in mind that the criterion for 'otherness' could be either ethnic, or religious.¹⁸² Religion, thus, is the second factor we need to consider. Christian faith was an element that could hardly be renounced from people's consciousness. Moreover, in the last centuries of the Byzantine Empire it steadily strengthened its presence in the political arena. The tensions between political and ecclesiastical authority were a constant phenomenon, with the latter taking precedence, or at least attempting to shape policies. Four major disputes are attested in the Palaeologan period; the Arsenite schism, the conflict between the reformist Patriarch Athanasios and emperor Andronikos II, the Hesychast controversy, and the debate on the issue of the Union with the Roman Church.¹⁸³ Of all these phenomena it is the last two that pertain more to our discussion for the late Palaeologan period. It is instructive, however, to make a brief mention of the first two cases, as they constituted the departure point for modifications in the conception of the relationship between the emperor and the patriarch. The early Palaeologan period saw the elaboration of a theocratic theory developed by the Patriarchs Arsenios and Athanasios, both of monastic background, who, contesting the primacy of the emperor in the pyramid of power, steadfastly challenged his authority by developing and promoting a novel scheme of political theory which attributed to the spiritual authority a superior role.¹⁸⁴ Their polemics

¹⁸¹ Magdalino, 'Hellenism', 17-18 holds similar views on this issue, suggesting that the consciousness of the Roman past was actually a precondition for the shaping of collective identity. For the coupling of the Hellenic and Roman identity and the preservation of the tradition in late Byzantine ideology, see also J.-L. van Dieten, 'Politische Ideologie und Niedergang im Byzanz der Palaiologen' *Zeitschrift für historische Forschung* 6 (1976), 3-6, 15-17.

¹⁸² Magdalino, 'Hellenism', 4-5.

¹⁸³ M. D. Nicol, *Church and Society in the Last Centuries of Byzantium* (Cambridge, 1979).

¹⁸⁴ Angelov, *Imperial Ideology*, 351ff discusses the process of this ideological change in detail.

gave way to an intense antagonism between these two poles of power that would be transplanted and maintained in the later years of the Palaeologan state in various forms.

The crisis of the relationship between the state and the Church had its roots in the contrasting dimensions of their authority, featured mainly in the course of the fourteenth century. The territorial shrinkage of the empire entailed the enfeeblement of the state machinery, while, on the other hand, the Church started to enjoy a privileged position by assuming a more active role in the sector of administration. The most striking example of the increasing administrative role of the Church is that of the decree of 1312 issued by Andronikos II, according to which Mount Athos was passed on to the jurisdiction of the patriarchate.¹⁸⁵ The involvement of the Church as a regulator of monastic affairs at a local level had further implications, especially in the case of Macedonia and the city of Thessalonikê. The fact that churchmen exercised judicial duties settling civic matters, bolstered their status considerably.¹⁸⁶ Progressively, in the eyes of the subjects the Church would develop into an institution with a sounder and a more credible structure to rely on. In addition, it represented not only the inhabitants of the Byzantine Empire, but also the entire world of Orthodox faith.

Key element in this whole development was the emergence of *Hesychasm* in the middle of the fourteenth century during the troubled period of the second civil war, in which its followers were involved. It was essentially an Athonite monastic movement advocating the primacy of spirituality within religious practices, which very soon spread all over the Orthodox world, mainly in the Balkans, and reinstated its inner bonds.¹⁸⁷ Moreover, it found its way into the circles of the Patriarchate, as after 1347 the office of the Patriarch was held

¹⁸⁵ See J. Meyendorff, 'Society and Culture in the Fourteenth Century Religious Problems', *XIV Congrès international des études Byzantines, Rapports I, Bucharest 6-12 Septembre 1971* (Bucharest, 1971), 51.

¹⁸⁶ M. Rautman, 'Aspects of Monastic Patronage in Paleologan Macedonia' in *The Twilight of Byzantium. Aspects of Cultural and Religious History in the Late Byzantine Empire*, ed. S. Ćurčić and D. Mouriki (Princeton, 1991), 71.

¹⁸⁷ Meyendorff, 'Society and Culture' 61-62; Nicol, *Church and Society*, 40, 88.

by former hesychast monks.¹⁸⁸ The reason that Hesychasm had a profound effect in the political life of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries has three aspects. First, on a theoretical level, its theological discourse was a continuation of the tendency cultivated in the previous period that suggested the submission of the imperial authority to the ecclesiastical one. By extending this kind of argument, it cemented the conditions for the reshuffle of the late Byzantine ideology around a strictly religious core. More specifically, it offered the ideological vehicle in order to adapt one of the fundamentals of the political belief system, that of *order (taxis)*. The term represented the traditional Byzantine view of the world, which was believed to be constructed upon a vertical hierarchy of power, at the top of which was the institution of the emperor.¹⁸⁹ As a result of the radicalization of the ecclesiastical ideas, the patriarchs were gradually presented to be protectors of order.¹⁹⁰ Second, in the field of politics, the movement of Hesychasm offered the ideological pretext for the confrontation between the secular and ecclesiastical authority by playing a vital role in the division of opinion regarding the issue of the Union of the Churches. Even though there was no actual disagreement on the idea of reconciliation, the main concern was the manner in which this could be achieved without betraying traditional theological principles.¹⁹¹ Third, coming back to the issue of collective identity, the rigid stance of Hesychastic thought widened the gap between its representatives and the secular authority, and leading to an even greater polarization of views between the two existing political factions, the unionists and the anti-unionists. What has been discerned in this dispute is the emergence of two separate ‘Byzantine nationalisms’ that were particularly manifest in the capital.¹⁹² This is actually the only clear distinction that can be made in terms of self-definition for the period

¹⁸⁸ Meyendorff, ‘Society and Culture’, 51.

¹⁸⁹ Arhweiler, *L'idéologie politique*, 129-147.

¹⁹⁰ Nicol, *Church and Society*, 28.

¹⁹¹ Meyendorff, ‘Society and Culture’, 59.

¹⁹² Magdalino, ‘Hellenism’, 17; T. Kioussopoulou, ‘È koinônîkê diastasê tês sygkrousês anamesa stous enôtîkous kai anthenôtîkous ton 15o aiôna’ *Mnêmon* 23 (2001), 25-35.

of the fifteenth century, when looseness of structures and opportunistic attitudes, which were instigated by the insecurity of the times, render any other specification fairly difficult.¹⁹³

The last issue to be addressed here is the ideology of the population, and its attitude towards the one that was put forth by the authorities, state or church. The traditional scholarly view that proposed the anti-Latin sentiment on a purely ideological level as the determining factor of the proclivity of the population to prefer the submission to the Turks has been revised.¹⁹⁴ The main objection is that it is actually quite precarious to discuss people's political ideology when we lack the evidence for such an attempt. Whatever information has come to us for the attitude of the Byzantine population is through the writings of the intellectuals, so to a large extent filtered.¹⁹⁵ Indeed, trying to explain the behaviour of the population in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries within the framework of one particular ideology is a mishap. We really need to seriously consider the local factor, namely the different circumstances that each local society was facing that determined its reactions to the political events. It would be more constructive to relate the reaction of the people not with the existence of a certain ideology held by them, but rather as a response to the inconsistency of the official ideology, or at least what they perceived as its discrepancies.

¹⁹³ Kioussopoulou, *Vasileus é oikonomos*, 14-15, 65. The lack of a uniform policy is also attested within the circles of the Patriarchate. See also, P. Gounaridês, 'Politikes diastaseis tês synodou Ferraras-Flôrentias' *Thésaurismata* 31 (2001), 107-129.

¹⁹⁴ This opinion was supported by Ahrweiler, *L'idéologie politique*, 123 and F. Dölger, 'Politische und geistige Stromungen im sterbenden Byzanz' *JÖB* 3 (1954) 13ff.

¹⁹⁵ Dieten, 'Politische Ideologie', 19ff.

II/d. The ideas projected in the discourses of leading individuals in Thessalonikê (1382-1430): traditional ideology, modifications and inconsistencies.

In the years between 1382 and 1430 the representatives of the political and ecclesiastical authorities attempted to propagate or impose certain ideas at a broader social level through formal public addresses. The bulk of these addresses are actually orations delivered to the people of Thessalonikê by the aforementioned archbishops on various occasions, a considerable number of them being in the form of encomia to the patron of the city, Saint Dêmêtrios. Two limitations of this type of source must be taken into account. First, their theological and moralistic nature makes their messages seem quite abstract, sometimes with no specific target. Secondly, even if they do make allusions to more specific circumstances, such as malpractices of the political authorities, the fact that many of them are not dated, renders the extrapolation of safe conclusions as to whom they exactly refer (the Byzantines or the Ottomans), fairly difficult. However, these texts do comment on important political and social issues that preoccupied the society of Thessalonikê. Furthermore, they are quite revealing as to what kind of means were employed by their composers in an attempt to direct and shape public opinion, particularly at moments of fluid or precarious political conditions. Indicative for the growing concern of the ecclesiastics about social and political issues is the change of the style of the encomia, which, as has been noted, started with those composed by Isidôros Glavas. More specifically, after his enthronement in 1380 the encomia cease to be merely praises of the virtues and miraculous intervention of the patron saint, but their thematic is broadened by the inclusion of admonitions and rebukes.

Regarding political speeches, the only text that has survived is the advisory discourse that Manuel II Palaeologos delivered to the people of Thessalonikê in 1383. Between 19 September and 26 October of that year the Ottomans sent an ultimatum to the inhabitants,

who faced the dilemma of either paying tribute, or being attacked.¹⁹⁶ Manuel was definitely against any form of unconditional surrender and summoned an assembly wishing to secure the support of the inhabitants for his policy of resistance.¹⁹⁷ For this reason he delivered a speech, a fine example of *patriotic* fervour, which comprises all the central ideas that a political figure of his time would employ in order to influence the opinion of his people. Some of them were in accordance with their traditional usage, but others were tactfully modified in order to best suit the needs of the time, transmitting thus in many cases mixed messages that would further arouse the mistrust of the addressees. Using this text as a starting point we will focus on the specific ideas it projected, address his rhetorical failings and broaden the discussion on the way the same concepts were treated by the other individuals who were historically linked to the city. The organizing concepts that will be explored are the following: i) the policy of defense, ii) the relation between fatherland and city, iii) collective identity, and iv) the relationship between the political and ecclesiastical authorities.

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i) The policy of defense

The communication of ideas in Byzantium did not correspond very closely to those of the modern world, which has created extremely efficient mechanisms for influencing the opinion of the public. However, the art of politics has essentially remained the same

¹⁹⁶ Dennis, *The Reign of Manuel*, 78-85.

¹⁹⁷ The editor of the speech supported that it was delivered in front of the senate of the city, see 'Hosymvouleutikos', 303-304. However, Dennis and Maksimović have suggested that it was addressed to all the citizens, making it, thus, even more pertinent to our discussion, namely the interaction between the political actor and his audience. See respectively Dennis, *The Reign of Manuel*, 80 and Maksimović, *Provincial Administration*, 255, n. 22.

throughout time, differing only in one aspect: the means and media employed by the political actors to convey their messages. In the Byzantine era, the propagation of ideas was achieved indirectly through material culture and written texts, and more directly through public orations. One of the commonest devices employed was the stereotyped wording, which could be properly adapted to political circumstances, mirroring the particular policy that a Byzantine ruler pursued, as well as the social cast of mind.¹⁹⁸

Typical of the way Byzantine rulers adapted ideas according to political reality was the justification of war activities. Military operations, being always present in the life of Byzantium, sustained imperial propagandistic efforts steadfastly, and any deviations in their justification depict vividly this plasticity of the Byzantine political jargon. One of the main difficulties that the Byzantine ideology confronted was to try to reconcile the idea of peace, a fundamental principle of the Christian tradition, with that of war. In this effort, the Byzantines proved to be quite flexible in the elaboration of theories that justified the act of war. These were conveniently adapted to the political exigencies, and were also sophisticated enough not to deviate from the essence of Christian teachings, or damage the image of the state and its representative, the emperor. If anything, they tended to buttress the symbolism surrounding his authority by presenting him as the defender of peace and an ordered way of living.

In earlier and more glorious periods of the Byzantine Empire, the justification of war could take various forms. As Laiou has noticed, in the twelfth century Byzantium, when military activities were of great extent, the reasoning was founded on five ideological principles: i) self-defense, ii) the recovery of things lost, iii) breach of agreement, iv) averting a greater evil and v) the pursuit of peace.¹⁹⁹ As a general trend, in the early

¹⁹⁸ A. Kazhdan. 'Certain Traits of Imperial Propaganda in the Byzantine Empire from the Eighth to the Fifteenth Centuries' in *Prédication et propagande au Moyen Age: Byzance, Occident* (Paris, 1983), 13-25.

¹⁹⁹ A.E. Laiou, 'On Just war in Byzantium' in *TO HELLENIKON, Studies in Honor of Speros Vryonis, Jr* (New York, 1993) vol. I, 153-177.

Palaiologan period the reasons for warfare were narrowed down to the ‘defense of the imperial land and the fighting against superior forces’.²⁰⁰ In the later Palaeologan era, the reality of the extremely shaky political conditions and the shrinkage of the empire could afford no other explanation for the military affairs of the time, other than that of self-defense that would eventually signify the defense of the *city*.

Self-defense, therefore, is the central idea of Manuel’s advisory discourse, which is elaborated around the triptych of *slavery-freedom-death during struggle*, the three options that the inhabitants of Thessalonikê confronted in 1383, when the Ottoman ultimatum was presented to them. In the exordium, Manuel addressed the reason for summoning the assembly, namely to convince the inhabitants to avoid servitude (*douleia*) to the barbarians and not betray the freedom (*eleutheria*), which, according to him, they had opted for all through their lives.²⁰¹ What would be most instructive here is to examine the meanings that he ascribed to servitude and freedom. Both concepts are actually associated with the tribute that the Ottomans demanded in order not to attack the city, in other words, with the obligation of the Thessalonians to pay taxes. In Byzantine society the concept of freedom had strong fiscal implications, a fact that was reflected in the vocabulary of tenure.²⁰² The most striking example for the association of the term with fiscal duties by virtue of being landless was that of the so-called *free* peasants (*eleutheroi*) a term that is met in late Byzantine charters and signifies a distinct group of poor peasants that were exempt from tax.²⁰³ On the other hand, the term slavery was conceived within the boundaries of the

²⁰⁰ S. Kyriakides, *Late Byzantine Warfare* (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Birmingham, 2007), 262.

²⁰¹ Manuel, *O symvouleutikos*, 295₃; 296₂₀.

²⁰² A. Kazhdan, ‘The Concepts of Freedom (*eleutheria*) and slavery (*douleia*) in Byzantium’ in *La notion de liberté au Moyen Age: Islam, Byzance, Occident* (Paris, 1985), 215-226, for a concise discussion of the terms.

²⁰³ *Ibid*, 216-218; A. Laiou-Thômadakê, *Êagrotikê koinônia stên hysterê vyzantinê epochê* (2nd edition) (Athens, 2001), 216.

relationship between the ruler and the subject, in the sense of the honourable service offered to the lord.²⁰⁴

Manuel skillfully combined both these connotations in his discourse. Firstly, he referred to the political dimension of servitude, by suggesting that there were numerous and different types of servitude. He, therefore, emphatically stated that: '*It is one thing to avow servitude to those that rule lawfully, who owe to secure the ancestral order of those they rule, and another thing [to avow servitude] to the tyrants, whose authority derives not from anywhere else, but from the fact that they humiliate daily those who are under their rule*'.²⁰⁵ It is not exactly clear in which context he evoked in this passage the 'lawful ruler', that is whether he meant the emperor or himself. However, a clue may be provided by the fact that at a later point of his speech he exhorted the inhabitants to take defensive action without expecting any human aid.²⁰⁶ It is worth mentioning that the reason he projected for the success of the enemy's advance and the conquest of cities was their failure to be alert and form a united front, the indifference towards the fate of their neighbouring areas and the lack of safety measures taken for themselves,²⁰⁷ providing us with a quite clear picture for the fragmentation which Late Byzantine society had undergone.

We have also to consider at this point that in this period Manuel acted as an independent ruler of Thessalonikê. The creation of *appanages* had already started in the first half of the fourteenth century, when members of the imperial family were assigned the title of *Despot*.²⁰⁸ Certain territories were given to them to rule, most of the time having as

²⁰⁴ Kazhdan, 'The Concepts of Freedom', 219-222.

²⁰⁵ Manuel, *O symvouleitikos*, 296³⁴⁻³⁸. The distinction between the ruler and the tyrant depended upon their different attitudes towards law: '*The ruler (basileus), by living according to the law and leading lawfully those under him, is utterly opposed to those that wish to tyrannize, who have as standing law their own pleasures*'. Manuel, *Manuelis Palaeologi praecepta educationis regiae*, ed. J.-P. Migne, PG 156 (1866), 373, par.85.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid*, 297³⁶⁻³⁷.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid*, 297¹⁵⁻¹⁸.

²⁰⁸ The history of this title is a long and complex one. In the fourteenth century it was used extensively and was given to the sons of the emperor, particularly the younger ones, who would not become emperors. The

governing centre the city of Thessalonikê. According to Barker, this system was not founded on a basis of proprietary and hereditary right, namely partitioned territories were not transmissible, and it reflected the deterioration of the political organization, which could no longer rely on the institution of a solid bureaucratic apparatus. More specifically, the parcelling of lands was primarily a means of maintaining and prolonging the life of areas that still remained under Byzantine authority.²⁰⁹

As we have seen, Manuel had been officially assigned by his father, John V, the nominal governorship of the city in 1371. In the preamble of the relative chrysobull it was clearly stated that Manuel was to become the governor of the cities of Macedonia and Thessaly with the right to receive their revenues,²¹⁰ but when he reassumed power in 1382 the circumstances were different, as he had apparently no imperial approval for this action.²¹¹ Moreover, his father, John V Palaiologos, who was practically a vassal to the Ottomans after the battle of Mariča (1371), was trying to pursue a safe policy of co-existence with the Ottomans and did not approve of his son's military actions against them since it put the city of Thessalonikê at great risk. Hence, what is probably reflected in the aforementioned statement, is this breach of relationships between the capital and the provincial city.²¹² In this way, in the eyes of the Thessalonians, the traditional role of the central authority was blatantly questioned, if not undermined, by a member of the imperial dynasty. But also

title could not be passed on to the sons of the Despot, namely it was not hereditary, and there also seems to have been a distinction between the honorary title and the Despot himself, who could administer an area. R. Guiland, 'Études sur l'histoire administrative de l'Empire byzantin: Le Despot, DESPOTÈS' *REB* 17 (1959), 52-89, particularly 61ff.

²⁰⁹ For the whole discussion and the differences with the equivalent western policy, see Barker, 'Appanages', 105-122.

²¹⁰ Kydônês, *Vier Prooimien*, 182²⁰⁵⁻²¹⁶, and commentary, 186-187. Laiou has characterized the phenomenon of regional authorities as 'particularism', applying it also to the economic sector. A. E. Laiou, 'The Byzantine Aristocracy in the Palaeologan Period: A Story of Arrested Development' *Viator* 4 (1973), 150. For the preambles as media of the imperial propaganda, see H. Hunger, *Prooimion. Elemente der byzantinischen Kaiserideen in den Arengen der Urkunden* (Vienna, 1964).

²¹¹ This contention is based on the fact that Manuel had secretly left the capital for Thessalonica, where he was apparently not expected. See Dennis, *The Reign of Manuel*, 60-61. Barker, on the other hand, has reservations as to how conclusive this evidence can be for the real status of Manuel in this period: Barker, *Manuel II*, 42-43, and note 119.

²¹² Dennis, *The Reign of Manuel*, 112; Barker, *Manuel II*, 50-51.

people's own attitude towards the central authority seems to have started experiencing a shift around this period. Kydônês's valuable comment about the emperor's annoyance over the fact that the people of Thessalonikê had shown little concern for his liberation from his state of captivity, reinforces our impression about an increasing indifference of the provincial population to maintaining its ties with the capital.²¹³

Let us now examine the economic nuance of servitude as projected in the discourse. The concept of slavery is not actually developed as such, but the main arguments against it are largely elaborated in juxtaposition to the pre-existing privileges previously granted to the city. In his effort to get the message of resistance across to his audience, Manuel urged the Thessalonians to consider the freedom they had enjoyed. He maintained that freedom was something familiar to the people of Thessalonikê, as they were exempt from the tributes, which all the free Romans had to pay to their emperors.²¹⁴ Although Manuel himself is vague in his wording making mention of the 'various donations' (*poikilais dôraies*) with which the Thessalonians had been honoured,²¹⁵ it is more than clear that this is a reference to the practice that was followed in the late Byzantine period by the emperors to issue chrysobulls for certain cities with which their economic status was defined. In the case of Thessalonikê, we do not possess any original text of the first chrysobull, but we can glean

²¹³ Loenertz, l. 206₁₂₋₃₁ = Tinnefeld, l. 197.

²¹⁴ Manuel, *O symvouleutikos*, 297₄₋₈. The issue of privileges, which were also granted to other cities (Ioannina, Kroia, Monemvasia, Verroia, Corfu, Phanarion, Melenikon), has preoccupied several scholarly works regarding whether they were only economic, or municipal as well. Maksimović, *Provincial Administration*, 248-267; E. Zachariadou, 'Ephêmeres apo peires gia autodioikêsê stis Hellênikes poleis kata ton ID' kai IE' aiôna', *Ariadnê* 5 (1989), 345-5; E. Patlagean, 'L'immunité des Thessaloniens', in *EUPSYCHIA. Mélanges offerts à Helene Ahrweiler*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1998), 591-601. Z. Pljakov, 'Le statut de la ville Byzantine balkanique aux XIIIe-XIVe siècles' *Études Balkaniques* 3 (1985), 73-96. The exact character of these privileges is not clear. Although the discussion has not been closed yet, it is certain that the privileges took the form of tax exemption. According to Maksimović, *Provincial Administration*, 248, the difficulty in forming a general picture about these privileges lies in the fact that they were not identical for every town and were not granted at the same time, another point that asserts the particular role the local factor played in Late Byzantine society. See also, D. Kyritses, 'The "Common Chrysobulls" of Cities and the Notion of Property in Late Byzantium', *Symmeikta* 13 (1999), 229-243.

²¹⁵ Manuel, *O symvouleutikos*, 297₁₁.

information through references in various documentary sources.²¹⁶ Even though the employment of the term freedom and its derivatives is differentiated in each single case, as has been noticed, in our case it is more than likely to denote the release of the Thessalonians from fiscal commitments and the free disposal of property.²¹⁷

In the context of our Manuel's discourse delivered to the Thessalonians, his relevant statement has an obvious implication. The growing tendency towards the localization of the Late Byzantine society seems to have been seriously acknowledged by the contemporaries and openly propagated. Also, it is well known that during his rulership of the city, Manuel applied his own economic policies, by issuing *chrysobulls* and enforcing various financial measures,²¹⁸ making the detachment from the imperial centre even more pronounced. Furthermore, being aware of the fact that economic independence could weigh considerably towards a rejection of the Turkish proposal, Manuel made a conscious effort to use the linkage between taxation and servitude as a deterrent against negotiations with the Turks. To him, the tribute the Turks demanded was not a simple affair. Their real intention was to enslave the city, as they had done previously with other cities. He suggested, therefore, that a possible consent on the part of the Thessalonians to pay the tribute out of necessity would not simply put the city in a state of vassalage, but would eventually result in its enslavement.²¹⁹

²¹⁶ Kyritses, 'Common Chrysobulls', 229, note 1 for references to documents.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 232-235, 240. It is characteristic that in the only surviving Greek text of a *chrysobull* granting the most extensive privileges of all, that of the one granted to the city of Ioannina by Andronikos II in February 1319, freedom is explicitly evoked and associated with economic privileges, particularly linked to the conduct of commerce: 'τί ἵνα αὐτή ἡ πόλις τῶν Ἰωαννίνων συντηρῆται εἰς πᾶσαν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ ἐξκουσσεῖαν κατὰ τὴν προτέραν αὐτῶν συνθήειαν καὶ οἱ ἔποικοι αὐτῆς πάντες διάγωσιν ἀκομμέρκευτοι τελείως τὰς δοκούσας αὐτοῖς πάσας ποιούμενοι πραγματείας ακωλύτως πάντη καὶ ἀνεμποδίτως ἐν αὐτῇ τε τῇ πόλει αὐτῶν καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀπάσαις χώραις καὶ τοῖς κάστροις τῆς βασιλείας μου, καὶ οὐδὲν εὐρίσκωσιν εἰς τοῦτο ἐμποδισμόν ἢ ἐναντιότητα παρά τινος τῶν ἀπάντων μέχρι καὶ τῆς θεοδοζάστου, θεομεγαλόντου καὶ θεοφλάκτου Κωνσταντινουπόλεως.' *MM V*, 81.

²¹⁸ Dennis, *The Reign of Manuel*, 99-102; Barker, *Manuel II*, 46.

²¹⁹ Manuel, *O symvouleutikos*, 298₁₅₋₂₆.

This is exactly the same argument used a few years previously by Dêmêtrios Kydônês in his composition about the similar situation that the city of Kallipolis had to face.²²⁰ He had warned that if for the fear of a short-term material damage, namely the destruction of the fields, the inhabitants agreed to pay the tribute to the Ottomans, then the latter would demand more concessions driven by their greed. His main concern was that if the Ottomans subdued the land of Serbians, as they had already done with the Bulgarians, they would return to Kallipolis to demand not taxes, but its own freedom by becoming its masters.²²¹ Elsewhere in the same speech, Kydônês explicitly suggests that the objective of the citizens should not only be the recovery of freedom, but also the restoration of the previous political order.²²² Understandably, for Manuel and Kydônês slavery had also a political extension, signifying the dislodgement of the older and traditional political authority and the subjection to a new one. Slavery or freedom, thus, was equally the economic and political dilemma that Manuel expressed and stressed in the closing sentences of his speech, exhorting the Thessalonians to take armed action and endure ‘*anything*’ for the sake of liberty.²²³

We have seen so far that the act of war was validated at the political and economic level, but its ethical justification deserves also a few comments. In Manuel’s speech the concept of peace is not really promoted. Theoretically, the pursuit of peace was within the obligations of the Byzantine ruler. In his work concerning the virtues of the ideal ruler, Manuel clearly states that there is ‘*nothing more pleasant than peace*’,²²⁴ while in the funeral oration that

²²⁰ Kallipolis was recaptured by Amadeo of Savoy in 1366, but ceded back to the Turks in 1377. Kydônês’s speech must have been delivered in Constantinople early in 1377. See Charanis, ‘The Strife’, 297. This dating is also accepted by Barker, *Manuel II*, 16, 460, and Tinnefeld, *Demetrios Kydones Briefe*, vol I,1, 26-27.

²²¹ Dêmêtrios Kydônês, *Oratio de non reddenda Callipoli potente Amurate*, ed. J.-P. Migne, *PG* 156 (1866), 1020B-1024C, particularly 1024C.

²²² *Ibid.*, 1005C.

²²³ Manuel, *O symvouleutikos*, 302₂₀₋₂₃. Compare Kydônês’s ‘*De non reddenda*’, 1032 B. ‘[...] *we must fight and not consider either pain, danger or expense, from which we shall prosper*’.

²²⁴ Manuel, *Praecepta educationis*, 353, par.56.

Manuel composed in honour of his brother, Theodore Palaiologos, Despot of Morea,²²⁵ he describes it as ‘*better than wealth*’.²²⁶ Referring to a truce that his brother concluded with Bayezid in 1400, he praised this decision that brought the war to an end and promoted good living conditions.²²⁷ Apparently, the scope of this oration was very different from that of his speech in 1383. At various points of the oration, Manuel had occasionally to whitewash his brother’s acts, but it is also apparent that standing now in the position of the emperor based in Constantinople the aggressive policy was not a wise option for him anymore. It appears that at the time the speech was delivered to the Thessalonians his political role and position were at stake, and the maintenance of peace could not be in his agenda, at least not one based on the enemy’s terms. For this reason, his reference to peace was only made within the scope of an unconditional truce that would not be the pretext for an imminent enslavement.²²⁸ Diplomacy, thus, was not utterly rejected, but its aims had to comply with Manuel’s personal vision for his territory, or else armed combat had to be the next alternative. It has to be mentioned that the act of war was regarded by the Byzantines as a necessary evil, a point which Kydônês discussed lengthily in his own discourse, contrasting it to a dishonourable life in slavery.²²⁹

A recent analysis of the Late Byzantine *Mirrors of Princes* concentrated on the ethics of the ruler as depicted in these works and virtually disregards the references to his military prowess that were accentuated by the military activities of this period.²³⁰ Manuel’s own work on ideal rulership conforms to the rule of exalting the moral qualities of the ruler, as

²²⁵ The oration was composed around 1412 and delivered after 1414. See Ch. G. Patrinelês and D. Z. Sophianos, *Manouêl Chrysolôra Logos pros ton autokratora Manouêl B Palaiologo* (Athens, 2001).

²²⁶ Manuel Palaiologos, *Manuel II Palaeologus Funeral Oration on his brother Theodore*, ed. J. Chrysostomides (Thessalonica, 1985), 117.

²²⁷ *Ibid*, 207.

²²⁸ Manuel, *O symvouleutikos*, 300₃₂₋₃₈ and 301₁₋₁₀.

²²⁹ Kydônês, *De non reddenda*, 1029C- 1032A.

²³⁰ K. Paidas, *Ta vyzantina “Katoptra Hêgemonos” tês hysterês periodou* (Athens, 2006). For a concise but illuminating approach, see J. A. Munitiz, ‘War and Peace Reflected in Some Byzantine *Mirrors of Princes*’, in *Peace and War in Byzantium. Essays in Honor of George T. Dennis*, ed. T. S. Miller and J. Nesbitt (Washington, 1995), 51-61.

these had been prescribed throughout the centuries by the Hellenic and Christian tradition. The preservation of peace and not waging war against Christians or even a barbarian nation with which a truce had been concluded was admittedly among the ruler's obligations.²³¹ Nevertheless, that fact that Manuel ensured that he devoted a part of this work to the right conduct of war, a brief *taktikon*, in order to theoretically validate the idea of armed force as another type of policy,²³² is indicative of his pragmatism towards the values of rulership and its complexities.²³³

Turning back to the notions of freedom and slavery, we notice that these were also used by the archbishops of Thessalonikê with a political sense. Especially in the period of the first Ottoman occupation from 1387 until 1402, the reality of being subjected to a new authority had an impact on the way these concepts were further discussed. At a first level, Isidôros associated slavery with the proper sense of physical captivity, or enforced service to the opponent. Writing to his friend, Matthaïos Phakrasês, the archbishop of Serres who had been captured by the Turks in 1383 and remained imprisoned for a period of roughly four years, he lamented his painful slavery/incarceration.²³⁴ The change in the state of a citizen who was born and bred in conditions of freedom to that of a slave seems to have been a common phrase in Isidôros's vocabulary, and appears not only in this letter, but also in his well-known speech about the child-tribute of 1395, where he grieves over the fact that 'a

²³¹ Manuel, *Praecepta educationis*, 353-356, par. 56. For praises of Manuel's own military virtues by his contemporaries, see J. Gouillard, 'Le synodikon de l'orthodoxie, édition et commentaire' *TM* 2 (1967), 101; Kydônês, *Vier Prooimien*, 180₈₁₋₈₆, 182_{205ff}; Ch. Dendrinou, 'An unpublished Funeral Oration on Manuel II Palaeologus (†1425)' in *Porphyrogenita. Essays on the History of Byzantium and the Latin East in Honour of Julian Chrysostomides* (Ashgate, 2003): *passim*. Specifically for the period 1382-7, laudatory comments for his skills in warfare are plentiful in Kydônês's correspondence with him. See for instance Loenertz, l. 312₁₅₋₂₈=Tinnefeld, l. 255.

²³² Manuel, *Praecepta educationis*, 377, par. 89.

²³³ For the multiple tasks (administrative, diplomatic and defensive) that he had to undertake this period, see his own comments in Manuel, *The Letters*, letters, 6, 7 and 8.

²³⁴ Isidôros, *Oktô anekdotoi*, 353.

*free-born child becomes a slave.*²³⁵ In this last case, however, it seems that he also insinuated the fear of losing one's faith when in the hands of the infidels.

Thus, as the Ottomans' presence in the area was being established in the second part of the fourteenth century, freedom and slavery could no longer be evoked solely in political sense. The main concern of the church's representatives was the freedom of the subjects to retain their religion. The notional framework of their usage was that based on the contrast between the Christian and heathen faith.²³⁶ Isidôros in one of the letters he sent to his flock from Constantinople, where he had fled in 1384, stressed that slavery could not harm the Thessalonians, so long as they preserved the '*true and patrimonial order*'.²³⁷ The freedom from '*temptation*', a stereotypical allusion to the inclination of a part of the population to renounce their traditional faith, is another element in the writings of the archbishops and reflects their strong anxiety about this issue.²³⁸ The moral overtones permeating the ecclesiastical discourses aimed to boost the traditional values of the audience, most of the times through the tactic of inflicting shame. For instance, Symeôn in an admonitory letter addressed to churches of other regions ascribed to freedom a meaning emanating directly from Christian thought, which referred at the same time to the contemporary political circumstances. He says: '*We voluntarily rejected the freedom of our soul which we were granted, and offered to the mischievous enemy the right to tyrannize us*'.²³⁹

A correlation between freedom and religion is also detected in Manuel's speech to the Thessalonians for reasons of ethical justification of armed resistance. Although as a general rule he conceived and treated the notion of freedom with reference to the salvation of the city as a political entity, he also made sure to induce the religious sentiment through the

²³⁵ *Ibid*, 354; *idem*, *Peristasiakes homilies*, 62₂₇; Kazhdan, 'The Concepts of Freedom', 219.

²³⁶ Kazhdan, 'The Concepts of Freedom', 218-219.

²³⁷ Isidôros, *Oktô anekdotoi*, 389.

²³⁸ Symeon, *Politico-historical Works*, 88; Gavriêl, *Gavriêl Thessalonikês*. 141-178 *passim*.

²³⁹ Symeôn, *Hagiou Symeôn archiepiskopou Thessalonikês (1416/7-1429) erga theologika*, ed. D. Balfour (Thessalonica, 1981), 94.

concept of *death* in the battle, the third major idea broadly developed in this discourse. Fighting and even dying ‘*for glory*’ had to be the ultimate purpose of the people of Thessalonikê.²⁴⁰ Glory here is associated with dying for the sake of Christ and the vigorous resistance to the strong pressure that barbarians exercised through their blasphemous words and deeds in order to impose their impious way of life.²⁴¹ In this way, Manuel implicitly ascribed to the cause of defence the sense of martyrdom and added ethical credence to the use of violence.²⁴² The idea of voluntarily losing one’s life in order to avoid servitude covers a quite substantial part of his speech. The idea of ‘death’ is present throughout the text and this word is mentioned at least sixteen times, without including other words or phrasings of similar context. One wonders, however, to what extent the prospect of death could be appealing to his audience, even if he tried to attribute religious and ethical value to it. Apparently, realising this, Manuel proceeded to a partial reformulation of this argument. After presenting death as preferable to slavery, he shifted the accent to the utmost value of life in freedom. Still, he did not abandon the motif of dying in battle and referred to it ardently in the closing sentences of his speech where it was the most likely to have a stronger impact on the audience.

The reference to death instead of submission is also met in Manuel’s funeral oration for Theodore. Theodore was prepared to defend his land and die for a just cause, namely against the transgressions of the enemy, having faith in God’s help, his parents’ prayers and *his own* abilities.²⁴³ Death for the defence of family, sacred things and fatherland is also praised by Kydônês in contradistinction with the love of a quiet life (*apragmosynê*). Death, in his view,

²⁴⁰ Manuel, *O symvouleitikos*, 298₃₆₋₃₈, 299₁₋₅. The ethical reward of those who lose their life in the battle is also developed in Manuel, *Praecepta educationis*, 376, par. 87.

²⁴¹ Manuel, *O symvouleitikos*, 299₅₋₃₉, 300.

²⁴² Manuel’s ideas for the glorification of those dying in the battlefield are also exposed in his text on the ideal rulers in Manuel, *Praecepta educationis*, 376, par.87.

²⁴³ Manuel, *Funeral Oration*, 117₃₀₋₃₁, 119₁.

is inevitable even if one refrains from a troublesome life, therefore a ‘*glorious end*’ is preferable.²⁴⁴

As expected, the archbishops spoke within the same spirit, associating defence with the protection of the Christian faith. Isidôros, in one of his sermons from apparently the same period as the Thessalonian discourse, underscored the significance of armed resistance and self-defence as follows: ‘*if the struggles and dangers were imposed in order for the trial of the faith in Christ to be revealed, then those who live not anymore for their own sake but for that of Christ will consider this as the highest bliss, [namely] to die for Him...*’.²⁴⁵ It was for this ‘*glory of Christ*’ that Symeôn encouraged and begged his flock some years later to fight until death in two hortatory proclamations of his.²⁴⁶ He even overtly claimed that those who would resist, would receive the same rewards as the ‘*martyrs*’.²⁴⁷

Interestingly, in the fourteenth century hagiographic texts there is no allusion to active resistance against the Turks, nor did the Orthodox Church accept as martyrs those who lost their lives in the battle against the infidels.²⁴⁸ On the contrary, Western Europe had started to develop the concept of martyrdom already from the eleventh century. The act of self-sacrifice was also linked to the concept of *patria* that re-emerged in the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries as a result of a combination of humanism and Christian faith, with the latter, however, being the most important. Whereas humanism reinstated the concept of fatherland as embodied in the city, religion attributed ethical value to it.²⁴⁹ Manuel employed both of these means in his discourse driven by the urgency of the situation,

²⁴⁴ Kydônês, *De non reddenda*, 1025C-D and 1032 C. It is also worthy of note that Kydônês, had composed a whole philosophical essay on the issue of death Kydônês, Dêmétrios, *De contemnenda morte*, ed. J.P.Migne, *PG* 154 (1866), cols. 1169-1212.

²⁴⁵ Isidôros, *Homiliai eis tas eortas*, 52.

²⁴⁶ Symeon, *Politico-historical Works*, 83-90.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid*, 88.

²⁴⁸ E. Zachariadou, ‘The Neomartyr’s Message’ *DKMS* 8 (1990-1991), 55, 58.

²⁴⁹ For the evolution of these ideas, see E. Kantorowicz, ‘*Pro Patria mori* in Medieval Political Thought’ *American Historical Review* 56/3 (1951), 472-492.

though we may also surmise that he might have been influenced to some extent by these developments in Western thought.²⁵⁰

ii) *The relation between fatherland and city*

The discussion above leads us to pose the question of the way the concept of *fatherland* (*patris*) itself was depicted in the texts that were delivered publicly during the period of the immediate Ottoman threat against the city of Thessalonikê. These were the prominent aspects to the usage of *fatherland*: i) the cultural, including history and religion with the various kinds of symbolism these entailed, and ii) the geopolitical.

Starting from the cultural aspect, it is worthy of note that Manuel made sure to invoke both historical and religious symbols in the opening sentences of his speech, namely king Philip of Macedonia and Saint Dêmêtrios, the patron of the city. In the very first sentence he addressed the Thessalonians as dwelling in ‘*the land of Philip*’,²⁵¹ while a few lines later he referred to Saint Dêmêtrios as defender of the city during its past and future.²⁵² The first layer in the meaning of fatherland, as it is manifested in Manuel’s wording, has to do with the glorious historical past of Thessalonikê. The historical significance of the city is a common trait in all our writings irrespective of lay or ecclesiastic background. In this period, the names of *Alexander* and *Philip* were frequently drawn from history both in public discourses and in more private discussions. The recollection of these two personalities in our text has again a very particular aim: to bolster the morale of the people and prompt them to struggle against the external threat. The fatherland of the Thessalonians

²⁵⁰ The discourse was also sent to Kydônês, as we are informed by their correspondence, in order to get his approval. Manuel, *The Letters*, l. 11; and Loenertz, l. 262, where Manuel is praised for his rhetorical skills and his effort to boost the morale of the population through defending freedom with his words and actions. In another letter of his to Manuel Kydônês will stress that not only is military success honourable, but so is death during the battle; see Loenertz, l. 284₄₅₋₄₆=Tinnefeld, l. 266.

²⁵¹ Manuel, *O symvouleutikos*, 295₁.

²⁵² *Ibid*, 295₉₋₁₁.

is that of those two men, who defeated powerful nations, in comparison to which the Turks were just outcasts.²⁵³ References to the ancient past and historical examples seem to have been a favourite rhetorical device of Manuel, as we can also attest in his funerary oration for the Despot of the Morea.²⁵⁴ This general trend to recall the past through prominent figures has been seen as the beginning of the development of historical memory, with the city and collective memory acquiring respectively historical and political content.²⁵⁵

The cultural significance of Thessalonikê as fatherland was further reinforced in our discourses through the employment of symbols other than those of the Hellenic past. The next target was the Christian faith of the audience. For this reason, one of the commonest features in all the examined speeches is the regular mention of the patron saint of the city, *Saint Dêmêtrios*, as its defender. It would be of little avail to record all the references made to the Saint Dêmêtrios, particularly in the ecclesiastical writings, as they are innumerable. Suffice it to say that his figure constituted one of the main means to emphasize the long Christian history of the city, reinforcing our impression of a growing feeling of localism, or ‘civic loyalty’ in the Palaiologan era.²⁵⁶ In addition, there was a conscious effort by the contemporaries to link the patron saint with their present, stressing his recent miracles. The most characteristic case is that of Symeôn, who composed a discourse, where historical events were always presented as linked with the miraculous intervention of Saint Dêmêtrios.²⁵⁷ His case is quite characteristic of a person deeply attached to tradition, unwilling, for that matter, to bargain with the culture and political independence of the city. His strong feelings for the preservation of his fatherland is reflected in the manner he

²⁵³ *Ibid*, 297₂₁₋₃₄.

²⁵⁴ Manuel, *Funeral Oration*, *passim*.

²⁵⁵ Kônstantakopoulou, *Vyzantinê Thessalonikê*, 161-173.

²⁵⁶ A.M.Talbot, ‘Old Wine in New Bottles: The Rewriting of Saints’ Lives in the Palaeologan Period’ in *The Twilight of Byzantium. Aspects of Cultural and Religious History in the Late Byzantine Empire*, ed. S. Čurčić S and D. Mouriki (Princeton, 1991), 23.

²⁵⁷ The editor of the text has counted twenty-five such cases, including two miracles attributed to Theotokos. Symeôn, *Politico-historical Works*, 104.

utilizes Saint Dêmêtrios as a symbol of the city by not hesitating to equate him with the Apostles.²⁵⁸

With regard to the emphasis put upon the Christian past of the city, there is one new element that seems to increasingly recur in our texts. The references to *Saint Paul* within encomia of Saint Dêmêtrios become all the more frequent in the Late Byzantine period as a sign of a retreat to the Christian tradition triggered by the precarious conditions the Byzantine lands confronted.²⁵⁹ Therefore, it is not strange to meet references to Saint Paul also by Manuel, who evokes him in two separate points of his speech relating him to certain ideas that he wished to project. The first one is what follows his exhortation to fight defying death. After presenting death for freedom as preferable to slavery, he then maintained that liberty itself was even better than losing one's life. So, he urged the Thessalonians to undertake any activities needed, for, '*according to Paul, man possesses the ability to will and action*',²⁶⁰ emphasizing herein his reliance on personal determination and mobilization of local power, as we can also infer from his similar comment on his brother's activities in the Morea.²⁶¹ In the second case, while the purpose of recalling Paul's words remains the same, that is the encouragement of the inhabitants, the path he followed was quite different. Cultivating a sense of guilt, he presented the difficulties of the past as retribution from God to whom, as Paul had said, '*man owed his creation and life, and only the restoration of this relationship will bring the current unpleasant situation to an end*'.²⁶² Clearly, both allusions to Saint Paul were nothing more than an attempt of Manuel to dress his arguments with the garment of piety and make them more effective. In general, the fatherland-city was either explicitly, or implicitly associated with Christian figures, acquiring a sacredness, which is

²⁵⁸ Symeôn, *Erga theologika*, 190₁₃₅₋₁₄₁. Some years earlier, a suggestion of Nikolaos Kavasilas in an encomium of his that Saint Dêmêtrios was superior to John the Baptist had provoked the indignation of the Thessalonian intellectuals. See Laourdas, 'Egkômia eis ton Hagion Dêmêtrion', 280.

²⁵⁹ Kônstantakopoulou, *Vyzantinê Thessalonikê*, 155-161.

²⁶⁰ Manuel, *O symvouleutikos*, 300₃₋₄.

²⁶¹ See *supra*, 95.

²⁶² Manuel, *O symvouleutikos*, 301₁₂₋₂₁.

embodied in Kydonês's words when he advises the citizens of Kallipolis to hold their city and consider it more valuable than anything they own,²⁶³ or even better when he writes: '*I consider fatherland to be the most valuable and holy good of all the others, at any rate after God*',²⁶⁴ although here fatherland should be conceived in a broader sense.

Apart from the obvious invocations to the past of the city that Manuel made by referring to the Thessalonians as dwellers of '*Phillip's land*', inherent in this wording also the association of fatherland with the place of birth, and therefore rendering it a social and geopolitical context. In the anonymous encomium for archbishop Gavriêl it is exactly this nuance that is projected when it is stated that his fatherland was that '*of Phillip*'.²⁶⁵ It is also not uncommon to meet characterizations of the city as that of '*common mother and nurturer*' whenever one wished to underline their strong bond with the city.²⁶⁶ The connotation of birthplace is often stressed in the letters exchanged between Manuel and Kydônês, particularly when the former criticizes his friend for having abandoned his fatherland in that critical period and for residing in the comfort of Constantinople.²⁶⁷ On the other hand, there was a conscious effort to link the city of Thessalonikê with the area of Macedonia and stress the importance the periphery played in the Late Byzantine period. It is characteristic that Kydônês addresses his friend as '*governor of the Macedonians*'.²⁶⁸ Although this could be merely an expression of the particular literary style that prevailed in the Late Byzantine period,²⁶⁹ we cannot disregard the fact that the fragmentation of the

²⁶³ Kydônês, *De non reddenda*, 1012B.

²⁶⁴ Kydônês, 'Apologia della propria fede: I. Ai Graeci Ortodossi', in *Notizie di Procoro e Demetrio Cidone, Manuele Calace e Teodoro Meliteniota ed altri appunti per la storia della teologia e della letteratura bizantine del secolo XIV*, ed. G. Mercati (Vatican, 1931) 400.

²⁶⁵ Laourda-Syndika, 'Egkômio', 354.

²⁶⁶ Isidôros, *Homiliai eis tas eortas*, 21₂₀.

²⁶⁷ Manuel, *The Letters*, I. 3 18-21.

²⁶⁸ Tinnefeld, I. 76.

²⁶⁹ The Late Byzantine texts are characterized by an elitist quality that is particularly evident in the adopted language and stylistic forms, which in the main are obsolete, reproducing ancient concepts and literary devices. See H. Hunger, 'Klassizistische Tendenzen in der byzantinischen Literatur des 14. Jh.' *Actes du XIVe Congrès international des Etudes byzantines*, Bucarest, 1971, vol. I (Bucharest, 1974), 146-151, and

empire had an impact in the perception of space by the contemporaries. This is also depicted in the vocabulary of the archbishops who define fatherland as the ‘*land of Thessaly*’,²⁷⁰ or stress the salient position of Thessalonikê as the ‘*the one presiding over the Thessalians*’.²⁷¹

At the same time, though, both Manuel II and Kydônês treat the concept variously in numerous other cases. For instance, Manuel comments on the fact that Kydônês has preferred a foreign land to his own, referring to a trip of his to Venice from Constantinople, implying apparently the whole empire, or what had remained of it.²⁷² Moreover, in his funeral oration for Theodore, he once again associated ‘fatherland’ with the city, this time with that of Constantinople, which was Theodore’s place of origin.²⁷³ Yet again, in the same text he also referred to his brother’s defense of the fatherland linking it this time not with a particular city but with the broader area of the Peloponnese.²⁷⁴ Kydônês used the strict sense of *patris* as the native city interchangeably with the wider one of the empire. Commenting in his letters on the political conditions of Thessalonikê he normally referred to it as his fatherland,²⁷⁵ but in other cases he associated the term with the empire and its deplorable situation.²⁷⁶ It becomes quite clear that these two individuals adapted the notion of fatherland according to the particular circumstances they wished to discuss. It is also understandable that in the period when Manuel was an emperor and his area of authority broadened, at least typically, his usage of the term would reflect this reality. On the other hand, during the period of his governorship in Thessalonikê, the employment of *patris* was inevitably restricted to this city. This is also the case for most of the times that the

for the same issue in the personal correspondence, see I. Ševčenko, *Nicolas Cabasilas’ Correspondence and the Treatment of Late Byzantine Literary Texts* BZ 47 (1954), 49-59.

²⁷⁰ Isidôros, *Oktô anekdotoi*, 19₁₄.

²⁷¹ Symeôn, *Erga theologika*, 189₈₈.

²⁷² *Ibid*, 1.62₁₇₋₁₉.

²⁷³ Manuel, *Funeral Oration*, 80-83.

²⁷⁴ *Ibid*, 113-115. See also Kioussopoulou, ‘Ê ennoia tês patridas’, 150-151.

²⁷⁵ Loenertz, ls. 94, 168, 285 =Tinnefeld, ls. 61, 146, 267.

²⁷⁶ Loenertz, l. 184 =Tinnefeld: l. 148.

archbishops employ the term, with the only exception that of Symeôn, who also used it whenever he referred to his own place of birth, Constantinople.²⁷⁷

In the public discourses of the period the fatherland-city frequently also acquires the property of bulwark of liberty and culture. The geopolitical role of cities, and therefore Thessalonikê, as strongholds securing the inhabitants' from external threat is emphasized from the very beginning of Manuel's speech, where he instructs people to perceive cities as an '*admirable trench and impregnable wall*'.²⁷⁸ In the same vein, Kydônês ascribes a significant role to the way the city of Kallipolis could function as a defending post for its surrounding area and the imperial city itself. To his view, people should not underestimate it as a small provincial centre and focus their defensive efforts upon Constantinople. He considered as foolish judging things according to their magnitude, underlining immediately afterwards the strategic point of Kallipolis as a stronghold for the other cities of Thrace, as well as a grain provider of the capital.²⁷⁹ Once again, his arguments are revealing of the importance he laid on the periphery as guarding of the life of the empire, making clearer at the same time the divergent attitude of Manuel on this issue in 1383. For reasons we analysed above, the ruler of Thessalonikê could not share at the time Kydonês's broader view of policy. It is characteristic that not once in his discourse does he refer to the imperial centre in connection with his battle for freedom. Besides, he was not totally opposed to negotiations with the Turks and to a political result that, as we can infer, would not endanger his own political position.²⁸⁰ Regarding, finally, the treatment of the city by the archbishops, we are not surprised to see that it generally occurs in their writings in a formulaic manner, namely, as longstanding centre of the orthodox faith. However, they also recognise and refer

²⁷⁷ Symeôn, *Politico-historical Works*, 72₂₆₋₂₈. Symeôn was the only one of the three clergymen not to originate from the Macedonian city. However, apart from the passages clarifying this he generally complies with the practice to designate Thessalonikê as fatherland.

²⁷⁸ Manuel, *O symvouleutikos*, 295₁₁₋₁₃.

²⁷⁹ Kydônês, '*De non reddenda*', 1024C, 1028A-1029B

²⁸⁰ Manuel, *O symvouleutikos*, 300₃₆₋₃₇₋₃₀₁₁.

to the city's geopolitical aspect. For Isidôros, Thessalonikê was the hearth (*hestia*) of the cities of the west, which was Constantinople's role for the east,²⁸¹ while Symeôn also addressed its importance for other areas of the empire, and most importantly for the imperial centre. He specifically saw Thessalonikê as protector of the Christians of its area, those of the West and of the islands, and as an aid to the imperial city, as well as Orthodoxy.²⁸² His own firm views on the value of Byzantine tradition are embodied in the very role he attributes to this city: '*The city has from the beginning been a capital of Orthodoxy, second only to the first, the imperial city. It protects the Christians of this area; it protects those in the West, for it is because of this that they enjoy some measure of ease; it protects those on the islands; it helps the imperial city, and is a hand of Orthodoxy and a useful helpmate*'.²⁸³

iii) Collective identity

The issue of space as a defining criterion for self-appellation and cultural consciousness has been partly touched upon by Browning in an article of his, where he provides a general outline of the epithets employed during Antiquity and the Byzantine era, arguing that in terms of self-designation people, apart from differentiating themselves from the 'others', tend to identify with their community. To put it differently, people's sense of belonging to a city, a particular region or a broader political entity has an impact on the way they perceive and name themselves.²⁸⁴ Consonant with this suggestion are Manuel's references to identity of the Thessalonians. He was careful enough to combine the well established throughout the centuries Roman quality of the subjects with the area of Macedonia. '*You have to remember*', he says, '*that we are Romans, that we belong to the homeland of Philip and*

²⁸¹ Isidôros, *Homiliai eis tas eortas*, 43-44.

²⁸² Symeôn, *Politico-historical Works*, 89₃₂₋₃₅-90₁ (translation by Balfour), and also 63₂₉₋₃₂.

²⁸³ *Ibid*, 89₃₂₋₃₅-90₁. (translation by Balfour)

²⁸⁴ R. Browning, 'Greeks and Others from Antiquity to the Renaissance' in R. Browning, *History, Language and Literacy in the Byzantine World* (Northampton, 1989), no.II.

Alexander [...]’, evoking in this way two cultural traditions, the Christian-Roman and the Hellenic one, and demarcating at the same time the geographical area that had to be defended.

As we have seen, the reference to the specific historical figures seems to be essentially a rhetorical device, which aimed to set a historical precedent for the fight against the eastern adversaries, and it seems quite unlikely that it was used with the intention to shape any sort of ‘ethnic’ identity in the modern sense of the word, at least not consciously. Indicative of this fact is that Manuel’s only distinguishing name for the Thessalonians is the epithet ‘Roman’,²⁸⁵ whilst ‘Hellene’ is not met in this text at all. The Byzantine state was still in existence even as a shadow of its older self and could not at this stage be disowned as a political institution, not even by a person who promoted his political independence. But not even for the case of the rest of the Balkan states can we speak of the existence of a crystallized ‘ethnic’ identity in this period, and the frictions that occurred among them should be mainly seen within their political context detached from issues of national consciousness.²⁸⁶ It has also been noted that the separatist tendencies that prevailed in the Late Byzantine period did not automatically or necessarily entail a break of the bond with the centre. Oikonomides has discerned a ‘substrat idéologique’ that attached periphery to the centre, mainly due to the religious affiliation and the amplified role of the Church in the period, which although divided most of the times by opportunistic attitudes in matters of policy, was spiritually and dogmatically united.²⁸⁷ Therefore, the occurrence of any form of the notion of ‘Hellenism’ specifically in our fourteenth century texts, as opposed to a differentiated and broader use in the fifteenth century, functions as a historical paradigm,

²⁸⁵ Manuel, *O symvouleutikos*, 297⁷ and 21, 299³².

²⁸⁶ J. W. Barker. ‘The Question of Ethnic Antagonisms among Balkan States of the Fourteenth Century’ in *Peace and War in Byzantium. Essays in Honor of George T. Dennis*, ed. T.S. Miller and J. Nesbitt (Washington, 1995), 165-177.

²⁸⁷ N. Oikonomides, ‘Pour une typologie des villes “séparées” sous les Paléologues’, in *Geschichte und Kultur der Palaiologenzeit*, ed. W. Seibt (Vienna, 1996), 169-175 based his conclusions on the cases of Ióannina, Kavalla and Philadelphieia.

and it seems to be a cultural trait rather than a concrete concept of identity in itself. Manuel remains consistent in the usage of the term ‘Roman’ in all of his writings, and his predilection for this is still noticeable in his fifteenth century oration, where he associates it this time with the notion of ‘race’ (*genos*).²⁸⁸

The linguistic choices made by the clergymen regarding self-designation befit their leading role as guardians of the Christian faith and their intellectual conservatism. Not surprisingly, ‘Christian’ is the appellation *par excellence* that surfaces in their texts. The epithet ‘Roman’ is used by Symeôn in connection with ‘race’ (*phylon*) and not ‘nation’ (*ethnos*), which normally signifies in his writings the non-Christians and is often used side by side with the terms of ‘unbeliever’ (*atheos*) and ‘ungodly’ (*asevês*).²⁸⁹ That is not to say, of course, that ‘nation’ had always a negative connotation. When properly qualified it could acquire a positive meaning as in the following example. Writing to the Christians of Caesarea and Ankara, Symeôn praises them as ‘*a holy nation living in the midst of the most ungodly nations*’.²⁹⁰ Once again, the term should be interpreted in a religious and not in a political context. Of interest is also the utterance of ‘*ethnarch*’ (*ethnarchês*), which is met twice in Symeôn’s texts, the first time pertaining to the leader of the Timurids, Timur, and the second one to the ruler of Wallachia, Mircea. Irrespective of their different faiths they were both leaders of nations, a term that could not be applied to the Roman emperor who until the fall of the empire was consistently addressed as ‘*basileus*’. In similar fashion, Isidôros applied to *ethnos* and its derivatives the trait of the non-Christian world, whilst his

²⁸⁸ Referring to the people joining the enemy he says: ‘*I do not know what you would call them: Romans and Christians on account of their race and baptism, or the opposite because of their choice and actions?*’ Manuel, *Funeral Oration*, 160-161₂₂₋₂₄ (her translation). ‘Genos’ could also signify the family and therefore was frequently used to address issues of lineage. See Magdalino, ‘Hellenism’, 8.

²⁸⁹ Symeôn, *Politico-historical Works*, 47₂₅, 84₃₀, 74₃₂.

²⁹⁰ Symeôn, *Erga theologika*, 111₁₅₋₁₆.

very sparse references to ‘Hellenism’ are made in the conventional sense of pre-Christian paganism.²⁹¹

Overall, the archbishops of Thessalonikê were quite frugal in the usage of self-designating terms or cultural attributes other than those denoting their faith. Common descent appears sometimes in the form of ‘*homophyletês*’ or ‘*homophylos*’ (of the same race),²⁹² nowhere to be combined with the ancient past. On the contrary, the distinguished prelates of the thirteenth century, Dêmêtrios Chômatianos (Thessalonikê) and Iôannês Apokaukos (Naupaktos), did not hesitate to touch upon the issue of the association between language and identity, classifying as Roman citizen the person having Greek as his mother language and utilizing terms such as ‘Graeci’. Apokaukos went even further to overtly equate ‘Roman’ with ‘Hellene’.²⁹³ Remarkable is also the case of Geôrgios Scholarios, whose terminological diversity has been seen as a sign of the redefinition of the Orthodox identity that was in process during the fifteenth century, and the usage of ‘Hellene’ in his works as an attribute of the members of the Palaeologan dynasty should be seen within this context.²⁹⁴ On the contrary, in Thessalonikê of the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, the representatives of the Church, either out of pure traditionalism or due to reasons imposed by the fluid political conditions, did not extend the discussion of identity beyond the boundaries of religion. Faith constituted to them a more stable point of reference and potentially a more effective device in their rhetoric. It was actually more imperative to them to differentiate themselves from those that in reality threatened their spiritual and physical territory, rather than to rely on fabricated and baffling terms of identity.

²⁹¹ Isidôros Glavas, *Isidôrou Glava Thessalonikês homilies*, ed. V. Christophoridês (Thessalonica, 1996), 116, 345.

²⁹² Symeôn, *Politico-historical Works*, 47₃₆, 84₃₄.

²⁹³ A. B. Dêmou, ‘Ethnologika stoicheia sta erga tou Dêmêtriou Chômatianou’, in *Praktika Diethnous Symposiou gia to Despotato tês Epeirou*, ed. E. Chrysos (Arta, 1992), 282-4.

²⁹⁴ See discussion in A.D. Angelou, ‘“Who am I?” Scholarios’ answers and the Hellenic identity’ in *PHILELLEN. Studies in Honour of Robert Browning*, ed. C.N. Constantinides, N. M. Panagiotakes and E. Jeffreys (Venice, 1996), 1-19; and Vryonis, ‘Byzantine Self-Consciousness’, 9-10.

Another element in our discourses and a constant feature recurring in the Byzantine texts is a snobbish attitude towards the ‘others’, which is reflected in the adoption of a highly derogatory vocabulary. The Byzantine mind had all the imagination to produce terms of a pejorative nature in order to intensify the antithesis between the Byzantine self-image and any foreign element, particularly those who were perceived, justifiably or not, to constitute a political and spiritual threat. One of the commonest designations encountered is that of the ‘*barbarian*’, to which three features were commonly ascribed: a) heathenism, b) non-belonging to the Roman Empire and c) ignorance of the Hellenic language and culture.²⁹⁵ The references to the Turks in our period took frequently this archaic form of designation. In both Manuel’s and Kydonês’s speeches, this is the only term employed to refer to the attackers of Thessalonikê and Kallipolis respectively, whilst there are no other utterances denotative of their ethnicity.

One the other hand, while the archbishops also used the same description occasionally, they seem to have been particularly keen on appellations of a different type. In the majority of cases they refer to the Ottomans with religious phraseology and almost never with ethnic terms.²⁹⁶ The tendency to confuse the religious and ethnic quality, even by the intellectuals, was quite widespread in late Byzantine texts. As a result, the labelling of the Turks would end up being quite artificial.²⁹⁷ In the case of the archbishops, there is no proof to suggest that they were unaware of the ethnic origins of the enemy, but their typical liking for linguistic forms originating in theological concepts led to the adoption of a wide array of adjectives connoting the impious character of the enemy, such as impious (*aseveis*), godless

²⁹⁵ H. Ditten, ‘Varvaroi, Hellènes und Rhômaioi bei den letzten Byzantinischen Geschichtsschreibern’ *Actes du XIIIe Congrès International d’études byzantines, Ochride 10-16 Septembre*, vol. II (Belgrade, 1964), 282-283.

²⁹⁶ Only twice have I met the designation ‘*Turks*’ in the archbishops’ writings. The first time as part of the title of the sermon delivered by Gabriel after the defeat of the Ottomans by the Mongols who are referred to as ‘*Scythians*’, Gavriêl, *Homiliai*, 164. The other reference is found in one of Isidôros’s letters where he speaks of the ‘*Turks’ greediness*’, Isidôros, *Oktô anekdotoi*, 395₂₃.

²⁹⁷ S. Vryonis, ‘Byzantine Attitudes toward Islam during the Late Middle Ages’, *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 12 (1971), 281-285.

(*atheoi*), faithless (*apistoi*), god-hating (*theomiseis*) antichrist (*antichristoi*), and profane (*miaroi*), just to mention a few. On occasion, the unfavourable comments against the infidels took the form of a straightforward religious polemic. Symeôn, well known for his uncompromising political stance and his harsh language, would turn against the Islamic faith with expressions such as ‘*the profane and totally deceptive religion*’, or ‘*the adjutants of mischievous Mohamed*’.²⁹⁸ The only positive remark he made about the Turks was within the bounds of reprimand to his flock, noting that though they were deceived and working lawless deeds, at least they were devout.²⁹⁹

The hostile viewpoint towards the Turks had an impact on the way their inner qualities and political behaviour were further depicted in our discourses. In terms of the Ottomans’ political integrity, two were the most common characteristics consistently projected in public addresses: untrustworthiness and avarice. In order to emphasize the deceitful and cunning character of the Ottomans and their proposals, Manuel compared them to fishermen who by using a small bait can catch a large prey.³⁰⁰ What was for Manuel a warning about the real intentions of the enemy towards the population, would be presented by Symeôn as a certainty and a grim reality. ‘*Let us see,*’ he says to his Thessalonian flock, ‘*all the cities of the east, which have been destroyed and most of them uninhabited by the Christians; and wherever there are a few Christians, they are being ridiculed, despised each day and becoming fewer. And we also see the cities of the west being destroyed in a short period of time. For, there is persecution, and this impious nation is really the forerunner of the Antichrist and it resembles that snake which deluded Adam*’.³⁰¹ It appears that in Symeôn’s view the treatment of the population by the Turks was without a doubt one of total oppression. The destructive character of their advance was also brought up by Isidôros. In

²⁹⁸ Symeôn, *Politico-historical Works*, 48₂₉₋₃₀, 50₃₈.

²⁹⁹ Symeôn, *Erga theologika*, 96₄₀₃₋₄₀₇.

³⁰⁰ Manuel, *O symvouleutikos*, 301₁₋₃.

³⁰¹ Symeôn, *Politico-historical Works*, 89₂₄₋₂₉.

1383 he lamented the fact that the fields, houses, horses, children and women of the Thessalonians were ravished by the enemy. But that was in a period when the siege was actually taking place and military activities could be viewed in no other way.

Quite different was the impression of Gregory Palamas, the known Hesychast and archbishop of Thessalonikê, when in 1354 he spent some time in comfortable captivity in Asia Minor, where the settlement of the Turks had long before taken place. He witnessed there the peaceful coexistence of Christians and Muslims and a lack of restrictions regarding the practice of the Christian faith, which he described in two of his letters to his church and a description of an argument he had on theological issues.³⁰² Essentially, his attitude towards Turkish conquest was much more realistic than the inflexible standpoint of Symeôn who also had close ties with the Hesychastic movement. The main issue for Palamas was the preservation of the Christian faith of the occupied population. Therefore he was not opposed to contacts with the opposite side, a position apparently adopted by many other Hesychasts and the lower classes in the fourteenth century.³⁰³ This conciliatory attitude can also be attested in Isidôros's writings. In one of his surviving letters from the period of the first occupation of Thessalonikê, most probably written in 1387, there is a passage, where he advises the inhabitants to abide by the new rulers' wishes, saying the following: *'The submission to the particular masters to whom we are subjected and all that power to do service to them has been conferred in the commands for this life; this has been declared long since by the blessed men [...].'*³⁰⁴ This recommendation was made by Isidôros in the period when he had fled the city and resided in the capital, and could not be positively received by his fellow citizens, since we are aware of their deep bitterness about this

³⁰² G. G. Arnakis, 'Gregory Palamas Among the Turks and Documents of his Captivity as Historical Sources' *Speculum* 26 (1951), 104-118; A. Philippidis-Braat, 'La captivité de Palamas chez les Turcs: Dossier et commentaire', *TM* 7 (1979), 204-206.

³⁰³ J. Meyendorff, *A Study of Gregory Palamas* (London, 1974), 102-109, 113.

³⁰⁴ Isidôros, *Oktô anekdotoi*, 389₂₀₋₂₃.

absence.³⁰⁵ But the fact remains that the growing involvement of the church's representatives in the political affairs of the areas under their jurisdiction, particularly in the periods after the conquest had already taken place, meant that their views concerning the 'others' had to be appropriately modified. Paradoxically, this modest and almost submissive attitude that Isidôros in this instance demonstrated towards the Ottoman authorities does not typify his views and reactions in the years of Manuel's reign. It is well known that he overtly disagreed with him in matters of economic policy, without hesitating to spell out his own positions and to oppose him publicly.

iv) The relationship between the political and ecclesiastical authorities

The most decisive question in relation to the messages that were communicated to the people of Thessalonikê in this period is whether there were any inherent ambiguities or inconsistencies. The sometimes subtle political nuances that the lay and church representatives adopted and articulated within the rhetorical conventions may have passed unnoticed by a large part of the population. What was striking, however, were the ongoing problems between the secular and the ecclesiastical authorities. The issue of their conflicting interests and antagonism is well reflected in the public discourses and could be quite easily spotted by the audience, cultivating further their insecurity about their living conditions and the mistrust towards their leaders.

In their discourses, neither Kydônês nor Manuel make mention of the church as an institution and a component of the political life of the city. The decision to surrender or not rested with the inhabitants as a whole and the initiative for their assembly had been taken by the lay authority. It was, so to speak, self-evident to them that the role of the church in

³⁰⁵ We glean this information from two letters that he sent to his city, where he apologises and explains the reasons that kept him away. *Ibid*, letters. 7 and 8.

political matters could be only marginal. Nonetheless, Manuel himself enjoyed the support of Isidôros in his struggle against the Turks to a certain extent. In one of the sermons Isidôros delivered during the first year of the siege (26 October 1383) he exerted himself to bolster up Manuel's defensive policy, painting his image in the most fervent manner. He was the king (*vasileus*) sent by God to help the city in those critical moments, possessing the four cardinal virtues of the ideal ruler: purpose (*phronêsê*), prudence (*sôphrosynê*), fortitude (*andreia*) and justice (*dikaiosynê*). It was not he who was to blame for the rough situation the city faced, but the turbulent conditions of the time. Isidôros also likened him to a golden head of a body, whose members were in poor health, and urged his people to let him navigate the ship in those times of trouble,³⁰⁶ a very common allegory in many Late Byzantine texts.

Isidôros's support for Manuel did not, however, extend to his financial policies. The ruler of Thessalonikê had sequestered ecclesiastical property twice for the purposes of defense. The first time was during the years 1369-1373 when Manuel acted as a Despot, and the second was during his independent rulership. This movement caused the resentment of Isidôros, who, as we have already seen, did not hesitate to disapprove of this policy before his congregations. In the autumn of 1383, he delivered two sermons where he tenaciously criticized the confiscation of ecclesiastical revenues. In the first one, in which Manuel must have been present, Isidôros criticized severely his fellow-citizens for their ethical decadence, presenting the depredations made by the infidels as a result of their own malpractices, namely the thefts of property. To those who would attempt to justify such actions on the grounds of the pressing situation, he adduced piety as a deterrent from what necessity imposed. For, according to him, '*the private effects are not equal to the sacred*

³⁰⁶ Isidôros, *Homiliai eis tas eortas*, 31-32.

ones.’³⁰⁷ In his next sermon, he stood by his views, but he opted not to turn directly against Manuel, presenting him as a victim of his own officials in a quite tactful phrasing: ‘*I am compelled to say these things for those who urge this most righteous king to remove the sacred [objects]*’.³⁰⁸

The problems between church and state were far more complex than the aforesaid allows us to gather. Around the same period (1380-82) John V and patriarch Neilos concluded on a series of rights that were ceded to the emperor and allowed him to interfere in church matters. The motive behind this agreement is thought to be Neilos’s intention to demonstrate, in a rather paradoxical fashion, that the power of the emperor emanated from the patriarch himself.³⁰⁹ Informative of Isidôros’s views on the issue of the relationship between the two spheres of authority is once again a sermon of his that he addressed to the monks. It is essentially a poignant criticism of the phenomenon of the growing interference of monks in secular issues and likewise of the secular representatives in monastic life. Originating himself in the Hesychastic circles he gave precedence to spiritual life, a conviction that he articulated as follows: ‘*Man, it has been legislated that the worldly ruler is blessed and assisted by you, and that in order for him to achieve power he uses you, and that it is right to render you the respect of piety, for you pray for him*’.³¹⁰ A bit further, he will reason the submission to the infidels as a consequence of the fact that ‘*the common order of the Christians has been altered*’.³¹¹

It does not seem likely that Isidôros contested or rejected by any means the secular authority with such statements. Rather, what he wished to do was to draw a borderline between the actions of the secular and the ecclesiastical authority. Sufficient basis for this is

³⁰⁷ Isidôros, *Isidôrou homilies*, vol I, 49, lines, 459-460.

³⁰⁸ *Ibid*, 83₈₁₋₈₃. Parts of this sermon were published by Lampros, see Isidôros, *Oktô anekdotoi*, 349-351. It is also discussed and partly translated by Dennis, *The Reign of Manuel*, 89-90.

³⁰⁹V. Laurent, ‘Les droits de l’empereur en matière ecclésiastique’ *REB* 13 (1955) 5-20.

³¹⁰ Isidôros, *Homiliai eis tas eortas*, 39₁₉₋₂₂.

³¹¹ *Ibid*, 39₂₉.

provided by his description of the feast of Saint Dêmêtrios and the order that was followed by the participants in order to pay respect to him. Unquestionably, first would be the lay representative followed by his dignitaries, then the prelate, the monks and finally the rest of the congregation.³¹² Moreover, no matter what his differences were with the political authorities of the city, he never attempted to supersede them and he frequently made recommendations to both his flock and the officials as to how to overcome their differences.

Especially illuminating for the issue of the growing power of the church in Late Byzantine society and its direct involvement in the political affairs is the case of Symeôn. Late Byzantine churchmen had often to undertake multiple tasks in the life of their diocese, ranging from diplomatic contacts with the Turks to the direction of the defense against them.³¹³ Symeôn was a controversial figure and such was also his relationship with the political power. The main contradiction that emerges in his addresses to the Thessalonians relates to his political ideas, which are a curious amalgam of traditionalism and radicalism.

Outwardly, Symeôn's position towards the members of the imperial family was more than favourable.³¹⁴ He extolled Manuel II for his trip to the West (1399-1402) and his efforts to seek help for the Romans, stressing his piety and rendering him the characterization of '*the apex of the best*'.³¹⁵ For John VII, Manuel's nephew, who was left in charge in the capital, he spoke in the same tune.³¹⁶ A subtle change of accent occurs, when he refers to Manuel's son, Andronikos, Despot of the city from 1408 to 1423. He is quite critical of his financial policies that led the city to impoverishment, saying the following: '*To tell the truth, he himself was to some extent the cause of this penury: he had allowed himself to be*

³¹² *Ibid*, 44₁₅₋₃₄.

³¹³ For a characteristic example, see A. Constantinides Hero, 'Theoleptos of Philadelphia (ca. 1250-1322): From Solitary to Activist' in *The Twilight of Byzantium. Aspects of Cultural and Religious History in the Late Byzantine Empire*, ed. S. Čurčić and D. Mouriki (Princeton, 1991), 27-38.

³¹⁴ This is confirmed by comment of Anagnôstes, according to which the archbishop always instructed his flock to not to oppose their leaders, as they were sent by God. Anagnôstes, '*De extremo Thessalonicensi excidio*, 497.

³¹⁵ Symeon, *Politico-historical Works*, 45.

³¹⁶ *Ibid*, 46₁₆₋₂₀.

over-influenced by feelings of generosity and several times, during outbreaks of pestilence, he had exhausted public stocks beyond what was proper'.³¹⁷ This attitude can be easily explained, when one thinks that it was the straitened conditions of the time that led to the city's handover to the Venetians, of which Symeôn deeply disapproved.

Besides, there was the issue of the competition between the two poles of authority, which was founded on an ideological shift that had taken place in the Late Byzantine era. Symeôn was representing a part of the clergy that professed that the emperor served the church and not the reverse. In Symeôn's years the relationship between the two sides had become quite strained, a situation triggered by the fact that emperor Manuel II had proceeded in 1416 to the confirmation of his privileges over ecclesiastical matters.³¹⁸ As a reaction, Symeôn composed a work on ordination, where he unraveled all his thoughts about the status of the political authority towards the ecclesiastical one. He unequivocally stated that the emperor was in the service of the synod and that he should honour the Church and not control it.³¹⁹ In the Thessalonian discourse, this conviction of his would be translated into an overemphasized role that he attributed to himself and other ecclesiastical representatives in the political affairs of their dioceses.

More specifically, commenting on the period of the Venetian occupation of the city, when he was practically a detainee because of his opposition to the regime and those Thessalonians that supported it, he made a reply to those who suggested that the absence of a high priest would bring peace for the population, which is characteristic of the significance he ascribed to this institution. He considered that people should be under the guidance of their shepherd and follow the rules of piety, otherwise it would be better for him to die.³²⁰

³¹⁷ *Ibid*, 56₃₁₋₃₃. (translation by Balfour's).

³¹⁸ V. K. Stephanidês, 'O akraios stathmos tês exelixeôs tôn scheseôn ekklêsias kai politeias tou Vyzantiou kai ta amesa apotelesmata autou (1416-1439)' *EEBS* 23 (1953), 27-30.

³¹⁹ Symeôn, *De sacris ordinationibus*, ed. J.P. Migne, *PG* 155 (1866), 432, par.219, 434, par.221,440, par. 227.

³²⁰ *idem*, *Politico-historical Works*, 58.

Corroborating this standpoint is a letter he addressed to the other dioceses of the Theme of Thessalonikê, a lengthy exhortation to the people to obey the church's representatives. In his own words, '*Obedience is the accomplishment of God's will*'.³²¹

To sum up, in this period, to demand from people compliance to their authorities was one thing, but to actually convince them to do so was a different issue. Political as well as economic factors had to be considered in their choice to follow the policies that were proposed to them. As far as ideas are concerned, these had to be plausible enough and clear, causing no doubts in the minds of the people in order to be accepted. As a general remark, even if the ideas that the leading individuals projected to the Thessalonians were founded on fundamental principles of the Byzantine worldview, they could also contain mixed messages. But also in the case that they were consistent with tradition, they might not comply with the reality. Most characteristically, in his speech Manuel made sure to employ every possible concept and symbol in order to substantiate an elevated image of the city of Thessalonikê as fatherland and strengthen the people's sense of localism. On the other hand, he could not turn a blind eye to the fact that local societies were practically unable to protect themselves when left alone to rely on their own forces. If we also consider his open admittance that Thessalonikê had been left helpless, it becomes pretty clear that he was actually asking his people to fight a lost battle. It was, thus, highly unlikely that he could persuade them to put faith into their own abilities when he himself could not actually support his own argument. We cannot be certain as to how the audience actually received their leaders' messages since the only written evidence we possess comes from intellectuals. The only indicator can be the information we can glean from their texts which, as already discussed, reveal a deep and widespread social unrest.

³²¹ *idem, Erga theologika*, 163₁₁₇₋₁₁₈.

III. ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN THE THESSALONIAN ELITE AND THE ATHONITE MONASTERIES (14TH -15TH CENTURIES): CO-OPERATION OR ANTAGONISM?

III/a. The analytical framework for the role of institutions and organisations: definition, development and interaction.

At the centre of North's theory stands the conceptual separation between *institutions* and *organisations*. Although the literature on the nature and definition of institutions is vast and not yet conclusive, the theoretical scheme this particular scholar has created is very frequently followed in the field of institutional studies and particularly in institutional economics. The most likely explanation for that seems to be its methodological expediency, which permits the researchers to analyse various facets of an institutional structure separately and then synthesise them into their argumentation as a single but also internally dynamic unit.

The reason for the existence of institutions and organisations is their ability to offer a structure to everyday life and human interaction by defining, coordinating and limiting the choices of the individuals.¹ The objective of both of them is the reduction of *uncertainty* that permeates life.² A broad and illustrative manner of further defining these two notions and a constant feature in North's writings is the following: institutions are the rules of the game and organisations are the players. This typification serves the purpose of demonstrating their diverse nature, but at the same time their continuous interface.

¹ North, *Institutional Change*, 3-4.

² *Idem*, *Understanding the Process*, 17.

Analytically, *institutions* are seen as the *informal* and *formal constraints* that order life. It has been stated elsewhere in this thesis (section II/a) that informal constraints should be perceived as the entirety of codes of conduct, norms of behaviour and conventions which rule life in manners, which are not always straightforward. Formal constraints are more concrete concepts and are visible in the process of exchange, as they order directly the way this is conducted. The representation of this type of constraint with regards to economic activity and practice, or to put it differently the formal economic rules, is embodied in the notion of *property rights*, which define ownership, exploitation, rights to income, and alienability of resources and assets as expressed in laws and regulations,³ in other words, the appropriation by individuals of labour, services, assets and commodities, which can be either direct or indirect. This type of right with a strong economic connotation must be differentiated from another set of (property) rights, the legal ones. The role of the latter is complementary to the function of the economic ones, as they formalize the application of the latter and are more straightforward and more explicit than formal economic rules such as property rights, as influenced from historical practice. Legal rules, that is, provide the structure and the framework within which a certain exchange may materialise.⁴ In general terms, any change occurring in the broader economic landscape has an immediate impact on the property rights system, which depends on the society's political structure, and any alterations in the latter affects the manner economic transactions are carried out, a revealing fact of the intense dialectical relationship of the political and economic spheres.

In order to better illuminate this interaction, let us just refer to the way North has approached this issue based on history. Attempting to link his theory with historical

³ North, *Understanding the Process*, 57.

⁴ Y. Barzel, *Economic Analysis of Property Rights* (Cambridge, 1997), 3.

paradigms, North has provided an overview of economic evolution spanning/extending from the First Economic Revolution (Neolithic Revolution) to the American economy of the early twentieth century, focusing on the way the structure of the state affects economy and the property rights system.⁵ Although he admits the shortcomings of such a generalised discussion in testing his model, he places at the centre of his analysis the relationship between political and economic organisations. For instance, he perceives the body of property rights codified in the Roman Law as emanating from the development of the political structure. In his view, the transformation of Roman administration from a city-state to a centralised bureaucracy brought up the need for stricter tax controls which led to codifications on exclusive individual property rights in factor and product markets.⁶

Coming to the issue of *organisations*, these are considered as the external representation of the institutional framework and are conceived as groups or bodies of social, political or economic nature, formed to accomplish certain goals. They are born of the institutional setting itself, which also defines their course of evolution. Conversely, organisations' role and agency within institutional change is of major importance, since in their effort to achieve their ends they become conducive of alterations in the existing set of constraints.⁷ Thereby, interaction between institutions and organisations is a prerequisite for the existence of both, and at the same time the manner in which this occurs defines the path of institutional change.

Before proceeding to a further analysis of the interplay between institutions and organisations, it would be informative to define, and further elaborate on, the nature and the process of institutional change. North has created a broad pattern for the course of institutional change based on the five major suggestions that follow.

⁵ D. C. North, *Structure and Change in Economic History* (New York, 1981), 71-198

⁶ *Ibid.*, 107-109.

⁷ North, *Institutional Change*, 5

1. *The continuous interaction between institutions and organizations occurs in the economic setting of scarcity; and hence competition is the key to institutional change.*
2. *Competition forces organizations to continually invest in skills and knowledge to survive. The kinds of skills and knowledge individuals and their organizations acquire will shape evolving perceptions about opportunities and hence choices that will incrementally alter institutions.*
3. *The institutional framework provides the incentives that dictate the kinds of skills and knowledge perceived to have the maximum pay-off.*
4. *Perceptions are derived from the mental constructs of the players.*
5. *The economies of scope, complementarities, and network externalities of an institutional matrix make institutional change overwhelmingly incremental and path-dependent.*⁸

It becomes quite clear that these propositions concentrate considerably on the role of organisations and the way these can shape the conditions that can lead to alterations of the institutional structure in a smaller or greater scale. The principal aim of organisations is primarily to further the opportunities which can generate profit, by promoting the institutions that will ensure their survival, at least theoretically, and resisting any alterations which can threaten them.⁹ In this way, the issue of endurance of organisations becomes the motive force behind their continuous effort to invest in *knowledge and skills*. Knowledge is defined by North as ‘*the accumulation of regularities and patterns in the physical and human environment that result in organized explanations of aspects of those environments*’, noting as well that ‘*there is no implication that such knowledge is ‘true’*’.¹⁰ This last issue raised is related to the

⁸ D. North, ‘Five Propositions about Institutional Change’ in *The Twilight of Byzantium. Aspects of Cultural and Religious History in the Late Byzantine Empire*, ed. J. Knight and I. Sened (Ann Arbor, 1995), 15-26.

⁹ *Idem*, *Understanding the Process*, 51.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, 17, note 5.

imperfect character of human perception, an enduring feature in most of his writings as a factor acting synergistically with a host of other parameters towards the failure of a society to achieve successful outcomes in the economic sector.

Acquiring knowledge involves its transmission from one person to the other (*communicable knowledge*) in its simplest form, or can be the result of a combination of communication and practice (*tacit knowledge*). The latter type can be a particularly multifaceted process in the sense that knowledge and by extension the skills one will obtain and develop are to a large extent determined by the incentives the institutional complex of a society provides.¹¹ The fact, though, that human knowledge is taken as incomplete has a number of implications regarding its utilization by organisations, as well as its impact on their function.¹² One of the issues that surface as a result of the fallibility of human knowledge is the way individuals perceive their economic environment and which affect, thereafter, the process of solving problems. Attempts to categorise knowledge stress the difference between ‘knowing that’, which signifies the acquisition of information, and ‘knowing how’, the capacity, that is, to recognise certain issues and to tackle them appropriately, having previously developed the relevant skills.¹³ Another parameter to be considered is the way knowledge is shaped and enriched. The process of learning and making choices is not always consciously derived, but presents itself as a product of individuals’ cultural heritage, their daily effort to resolve situations, which are defined as ‘local’, as well as problems of a more general nature (non-local).¹⁴ Although individuals when seen in isolation have different degrees

¹¹ North, *Institutional Change*, 74. The example utilised here is that the skills and knowledge of fifteenth century wool exporters were quite diverse from those of a modern export firm due to differences in the institutional framework of those societies.

¹² The impediments human knowledge encounters in order to be complete have been summarised as ‘the insufficiency of induction, complexity, the limits of human cognition, exogenous change, the interdependence of individual initiatives, and conflicting ideas and purposes’. B. Loasby, *Knowledge, Institutions and Evolution in Economics* (London-New York, 2002), 1-7.

¹³ For the applicability of this model in the economic sector, see *ibid*, 51-57.

¹⁴ North, ‘Five Propositions’, 16.

in their capacity to learn, in the environment of a community their learning will be influenced by the set of rules this particular setting is conditioned. Therefore, their choices are largely determined by the institutional complex, which inevitably places certain limitations on them.

The dimension of *time* as well as the *rate* at which the process of learning takes place is vitally linked to North's central postulation (fifth proposition) that institutional change is an incremental and path dependent process. The accretion of knowledge that is achieved throughout time is specific to each culture, being a function of the manner in which a belief system interprets experiences and the various situations experienced by individuals and societies at different moments in time.¹⁵ As regards the issue of rate, this will reflect the so-called 'pay-offs', or to put it differently, the set of opportunities leading to a maximisation of wealth, which motivate the individuals and the organisations to which they belong to devote resources in order to induce change. At this point, the interaction between institutions and organisations has to be stated more concisely: it is the institutional framework that gives rise to certain pay-offs and sequentially, it is the opportunity set which structures organisations internally, dictating their course of action and development.

This brings the discussion to a more specific analysis of the purpose and the function conditioning an organisation. It has already been stated that the main purpose of an organisation is to provide a structure to life. This is achieved by guiding the behaviour of its members in order to reduce opportunistic attitudes and also by promoting *coordination* and *cooperation* among them.¹⁶ Taking the thread from where we left off, namely the centrality of knowledge for the operation of organisations, we also attest in the literature of economic theory the great emphasis that is put on this notion for the

¹⁵ *Idem*, *Understanding the Process*, 47.

¹⁶ T. Eggertsson, *Economic behavior and institutions* (Cambridge, 1990), 52.

issue of coordination. Knowledge is essentially identified as the awareness of each others' preferences and expected conduct. Particularly in the case of communities this knowledge is based on social norms and is communicated through them.¹⁷ Whether individuals or groups cooperate is not only a matter of knowledge and information. As has been argued, the cooperation issue necessitates assumptions founded also on individual tastes and ideology, a field not fully developed yet, as North admits.¹⁸

On the other side of the spectrum stands the issue of *competition*. Inasmuch as cooperation is central for the reservation of a structured organisational system, so is competitive behaviour instrumental for the process of institutional change, a change that does not, however, necessarily lead to economic growth. The interpretative system that North provides with reference to the response of organisations to novel situations and hence the instigation of competition, is actually an elaboration of his second proposition. The issue is initially treated on the basis of the nature of the set of opportunity, which is seen as arising after changes, either exogenous or endogenous to organisations, have taken place. When the organisations and their members perceive these opportunities, they will proceed to the investment of knowledge and skills in order to survive and meliorate their performance against other rival organisations. The rate and the degree of institutional change in this case are largely determined by the intensity of competition. The more forceful this is, the more rapid change will be, while what is described as 'muted' competition seems to work inversely, by not releasing the necessary forces for an alteration of the institutional framework.¹⁹

While organisations are the agents of cooperation and competition, the common denominator that provides the incentives for their implementation is the nexus of

¹⁷ N. Schofield, 'Anarchy, Altruism and Cooperation', *Social Choice and Welfare* 2 (1985), 12-13, cited also in North, *Institutional Change*, 14-15.

¹⁸ Eggertsson, *Economic Behavior*, 299; North, *Institutional Change*, 76.

¹⁹ North, 'Five Propositions', 2.

institutions of a society. In order to illuminate better the following discussion, it has to be mentioned herein that the theoretical approach under discussion constitutes a branch of the broader field of institutional economics and is characterised by this particular focus on the usage of adjustment techniques of organisations to the institutional scaffold.²⁰ The main issue that immediately arises is related to the formation of institutions and the process whereby this occurs. As in the case of organisations, institutions are thought to be by North the product of human attempts to reduce uncertainty. The path normally followed by individuals in order to deal with uncertain situations involves the adoption of certain patterns of behaviour, or else conventions, already established by others with main implication that human interaction is to a certain extent thereby predetermined. At this juncture, two issues should also be further specified: first, how institutions emerge and which of them are likely to be adopted under specific circumstances; and second, why individuals persist in practices that may not generate satisfactory results. The explanatory basis for both is provided again by the limited nature of human knowledge. Institutions, on the one hand, help to solve co-ordination problems by offering paradigms and facilitating the process of predicting the behaviour of others. On the other hand, they can become an impediment to innovation when this is perceived to be incompatible with them.²¹

Another contiguous approach to the nature and development of institutions that attributes a crucial role to their internal dynamic has been put forward by Avner Greif. Greif does not negate North's model as such, but he attempts to give an insight into institutions by concentrating on their internal functionality rather than examine them as distinct from organisations, which he sees as institutional elements along with norms,

²⁰ For a synopsis of the major methodological trends in the field, see T. Eggertsson, 'A Note on the Economics of Institutions' in *Empirical Studies in Institutional Change*, ed. G. L. Alston, T. Eggertsson and D.C. North (Cambridge, 1998), 6-24; A. Greif, 'Historical and Comparative Institutional Analysis', *The American Economic Review* 88 (2) (1998), 80-84.

²¹ Loasby, *Knowledge*, 46.

beliefs and rules.²² Although, as a rule, we will follow the Northian model, it would be also informative to provide a delineation of this particular perspective, as North has incorporated elements of it in his last major work, *Understanding the Process of Economic Change*, where he shifts the emphasis to the psychological and cognitive parameters that affect change, emphasizing the contribution of micro-level historical studies and attempting to enrich further his previous more ‘technical’ approach.²³

Posing three fundamental questions, those of emergence, perpetuation and change, Greif bases his analysis on the quality of institutions and their impact on a range of social, political and economic phenomena. He conceptualises them as outcomes evolving endogenously and utilises consistently the term ‘*competition*’ in his writings to denote that institutions generate certain regularities of behaviour, inducing and directing individuals to follow them.²⁴ In this manner, he partly disassociates the creation and operation of institutions from external enforcement. To put it simply, he differentiates himself from the commonly held position that institutions are necessarily products of the combination of state enforcement and ‘informal’ rules, but ascribes to them a strong internal dynamic, which, according to him, accounts for the different forms of organisations and contractual arrangements existing in different societies.

On the issue of institutional change there are a number of points in his approach that are worth mentioning. First and foremost, let us start with his definition of institutional

²² Greif’s analysis falls into the methodology of *Historical Institutional Analysis*. For an outline of its scopes and its subdivisions, see A. Greif, ‘Historical and Comparative Institutional Analysis’ *American Economic Review* 88 (2) (1998), 80-84, and for a comparison with the neoclassical theory and the *New Institutional Economics*, see *idem*, ‘Micro Theory and Recent Developments in the Study of Economic Institutions through Economic History’ in *Advances in Economic Theory*, ed. M. D. Kreps and F. K. Wallis. (Cambridge, 1995), 79-113.

²³ The orientation of this work is theoretical, and in the last part North examines the rise of the Western world as well as the rise and fall of the Soviet Union in a rather generalised fashion. However, it is evident that he has based his general analysis and conclusions in various other micro-level studies. See for instance, T. Eggertsson, ‘Sources of Risk, Institutions for Survival, and a Game against Nature in Premodern Iceland’. *Explorations in Economic History* 35 (1) (1998), 1-30.

²⁴ A. Greif and D.D. Laitin, ‘A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change’ *American Political Science Review* 98 (4)(2004),7.

change, which he perceives as ‘*a change in beliefs, and it occurs when the associated behavior is no longer self-enforcing, leading individuals to act in a manner that does not reproduce the associated beliefs*’.²⁵ As he argues, institutions may change due to exogenous or endogenous factors, or even as a consequence of both, but he himself has extensively elaborated on the issue of the process of change from within. The emergence of an institution can be either spontaneous or intentional, but always a product of the historical and socio-economic environment to which it belongs. In the same vein, its modification can be founded on the presence or not of human intentionality, this meaning also that change can be generated intentionally or unconsciously. In the latter case, the factors that lead to change may be unobservable and uncertain and will take the form of risk and experiment, or the emergence of individuals that have better awareness of a situation.²⁶

As regards the more specific mechanism of endogenous change, he places at the heart of his analysis the question (of) whether an institution *re-enforces* or *undermines* itself. In the case of self-re-enforcement, an institution perpetuates the behaviours it has generated in the first place, this being a precondition for its survival,²⁷ while the opposite applies for a self-undermining one. Either way, however, the rate and direction of institutional change is affected. Greif is generally in agreement with North’s argument that the limitations of human cognition and the weakness of individuals to realise all the aspects of a situation influence the rate of institutional change.²⁸ Because the process of acquiring knowledge is slow, change usually acquires the same character. Broadly speaking, according to him there are three paths to institutional change. First,

²⁵ *Ibid*,17.

²⁶ *Ibid*,18.

²⁷ A. Greif, ‘How do Self-enforcing Institutions change? Institutional Re-enforcement and Quasi-parameters’ forthcoming in *Historical Institutional Analysis* [online] (CUP). Available from <http://scholar.google.co.uk/schhp?hl=en&lr=> [accessed 17 June 2008]

²⁸ *Idem*, ‘Micro Theory’, 105.

change will occur when an institution ceases to be self-re-enforced; second, when a self-undermining process will reach a critical point; and third, indirectly and rather circularly, namely when the institution affects the scale of what is described as ‘exogenous shocks’, which in their turn will influence the institutional framework.²⁹ As regards organisations, their function is considered as bilateral. In the first place, they are presented as causal elements for the emergence of self-enforcing beliefs and norms, while at the same time they are thought to constitute products of institutional selection. In general, Greif’s contribution lies in the fact that the model he proposes is destined to render a service to the study of institutional development where the state authority is non-existent or meagre and cannot be considered as a major source of enforcement.

Regardless of this type of situation, the state does remain the initiating force and principal agent in the *enforcement of property rights and contracts*. The relationship between the political and property rights structure is complex and inextricably related by North to the concept of efficiency. However, before discussing efficiency as such and illuminating the path course that takes, let us first expand on the issue of the nature and function of property rights on the level of the polity and that of the individual. As used in this theory, the concept of property rights is a broad one, representing the set of rights over assets. The formation of rights results from the need to protect and regulate exchanges. Theoretically, economic rights pre-exist legal ones, while the latter emerge in order to validate self-enforced exchange agreements.³⁰ In this process, the objective of the state is to specify and enforce the rules that will potentially maximise profit through monitoring and measurement.³¹ In essence, the property rights system of a

²⁹ *Idem*, ‘Endogenous Change’, 17

³⁰ For a model on the emergence of property rights, see Barzel, *Economic Analysis*, 86-89.

³¹ North, *Structure and Change*, 26.

society is a reflection of its distribution of power.³² In its most simplified form, a polity will consist of a ruler and its constituents. The former will rely on a considerable number of agents in order to carry out the monitoring, measurement and collection of revenue. Due, though, to the fact that their own interests do not correspond with those of the ruler, dissipation of power normally occurs.³³ In other words, there is an innate instability of the state, which is constrained in its operation by internal competition and transaction costs. The concept of transaction costs is one of the fundamentals of this theory, but will not be dealt in this thesis for the reason that it is a particularly technical issue, the study of which is beyond the scope of this work. It will suffice to say that transactions costs are defined as '*the costs of measuring the valuable attributes of what is being exchanged and the costs of protecting rights and policing and enforcing agreements*'.³⁴ In the context of property rights, their full protection and transfer are considered to be extremely costly, and therefore their delineation will never be perfect. In addition, only a small percentage of them can be defined through legal rules.³⁵ By implication, enforcement can never be perfect. Particularly in the case of state enforcement this imperfection must be sought in the dual function of the state itself. Although, that is, as a general rule the state secures ownership rights, it can also undermine and alter them as a result of its agents' effort to maximise their own profit at the expense of other members of the society.³⁶

Another factor that has been put forward in order to explain this faulty situation is the legal framework and informal constraints, the main means to implement enforcement. Because these are not perfectly understood, enforcement cannot be

³² T. Eggertsson, 'A Note on the Economics of Institutions' in *Empirical Studies in Institutional Change*, ed. L.G.Alston, T. Eggertsson and D.C.North (Cambridge, 1998), 14-17 .

³³ See North, *Structure and Change*, in particular Chapter 3: 'A Neoclassical Theory of the State'.

³⁴ *Idem*, *Institutional Change*, 27.

³⁵ Barzel, *Economic Analysis*, 91.

³⁶ North *Institutional Change*, 54, 58-9.

effective.³⁷ But the limitations of state enforcement do not end there. The state does not bear the exclusivity of rights in the enforcement of rules. While the legal infrastructure can typically exist, the absence of the state at times as a regulator and enforcer paves the way for the emergence of private enforcement. Consequently, in such cases, individuals in their effort to secure their rights against anyone who covets them (who, we may add, could be a competing organisation or the state itself) will create networks of mutual support or reliance on a power that can oppose this threat.³⁸ Understandably, the path to institutional change is affected by changes in enforcement, as these will lead organisations to a quest for new ways of enhancing their position in terms of maximisation of wealth and, therefore, to an appropriate adjustment of the institutional framework.³⁹

In practice, property rights are validated and secured through contractual arrangements. *Contracts* define or change property rights and are products of the bargaining that takes place among individuals who may act either on their own behalf or within the boundaries of an organisation. Roughly speaking, contracting can take place, between individuals, an individual and an organisation or a pair of organisations.⁴⁰ The way they are structured is influenced by three major factors: i) the institutional setting or else the combination of legal rules and social norms. The more detailed the stipulation of a law and the more prevalent the customs that promote social order in a society, the less precise are written contracts;⁴¹ ii) by internal rules imposed by the contracting parties;⁴² iii) and by transactions costs. When, that is, it becomes costly to transact, the arrangements that will be chosen by contracting parties will aim at the lowering of

³⁷ *Ibid*, 35.

³⁸ Eggertsson, *Economic Behavior*, 59-60.

³⁹ North *Institutional Change*, 88.

⁴⁰ Barzel, *Economic Analysis*, 9

⁴¹ Eggertsson, *Economic Behavior*, 46.

⁴² *Idem*, 'A Note on the Economics', 9.

costs.⁴³ The role of the state in this process is crucial, as it can facilitate this type of exchange and lower the transactions costs this entails through the supply and enforcement of an explicit and secure system of property rights.⁴⁴ The presence of self-enforcing contracts is also observable at the level of non-advanced societies or small communities, where the lowering of transaction costs is achieved through repeated exchanges that increase knowledge about the other party and the prevalence of social norms of behaviour.⁴⁵ The selection and prevalence of a certain type of contractual arrangement over another is founded on competition among them. In turn, this will be affected and determined by time and precedent. Experimentation may be restricted or delayed by the long-standing informal and formal rules governing the contracts of property rights. If at a certain point in time new economic conditions emerge, legal precedents will define the degree to which a modification of the contract system can occur.⁴⁶ Societies more open and accustomed to adjusting property rights are more willing to experiment and raise expectations that can induce institutional change. Quite the opposite is met in the case of a society that is constrained by a long-term persistence in a particular property rights status quo, limiting in this way the prospects for change.⁴⁷

Implicit in the foregoing discussion has been the issue of *efficiency*, which has implications for every single concept we have referred to, namely institutions, organisations, property rights, enforcement and contracts, as it creates a network of interrelations among them and accounts for the success or the failure of a society to produce economic growth. North attempts to shed light on certain facets of the interaction of organisations and institutions by relying on the notion of ‘adaptive

⁴³ *Idem*, *Economic Behavior*, 27.

⁴⁴ D.G. Lidecap, *Contracting for property rights* (Cambridge, 1990), 11.

⁴⁵ North, *Institutional Change*, 55.

⁴⁶ Private contracting is considered as complementary to law and judicial decisions and affects them indirectly, as law tends to absorb elements recurring in contracts of a private nature. Barzel, *Economic Analysis*, 98-99.

⁴⁷ Lidecap, *Contracting*, 6-7; Eggertsson, *Economic Behavior*, 53-55.

efficiency', which aims to create an explanatory framework for the rules that positively affect the development of an economy and the readiness of a society to invest in knowledge and skills, to innovate and experiment in order to overcome setbacks. What he considers to play the key role in providing the incentives for adaptive efficiency is the entirety of institutions in a society.⁴⁸

At this point, let us put together the aforementioned concepts within the context of (in)efficiency and abridge arguments that have been already exposed or hinted at. To begin with, there is nothing to suggest that the institutions, mainly the formal rules, of a society are efficient for the simple reason that they are destined to serve the interests of those with the bargaining power to set up new rules. In addition, the imperfect perception of individuals is likely to lead to inherent weaknesses of the institutional structure.⁴⁹ The situation becomes even more perplexing considering that institutions are also moulded through path-dependence, being under the constant influence of past decisions and institutions and making the process of change particularly incremental.⁵⁰ Moreover, people may persist in following inefficient norms, a fact that attributes to culture and ideology a share in the efficiency or inefficiency of the institutional matrix.⁵¹ In the context of transactions costs, efficiency is achievable as long as these are lowered. Normally, however, high costs of transacting exist and account for inefficient property rights.⁵² The inefficiency of the latter is caused by their imperfect delineation, which might be due to various reasons, such as insufficient enforcement caused by its agents

⁴⁸ North, *Institutional Change*, 80-81.

⁴⁹ *Ibid*, 16.

⁵⁰ North, 'Five Propositions', 18.

⁵¹ *Idem*, *Understanding the Process*, 58.

⁵² *Idem*, *Institutional Change*, 8; Eggertsson, *Economic Behavior*, 20-25.

own interests,⁵³ or an unclear definition of rights in a contract that can lead to disputes and litigations.⁵⁴

One last methodological concern is what the point of departure will be in the subsequent sections, where we will attempt to empirically test the model as exposed above. As North postulates, the '*theory must begin with the individual*', since it is largely developed around individual choices and their interaction with the institutional framework. The concentration on the individual does not entail that this should be examined detached from his immediate environment. Methodological individualism is about individuals acting within the boundaries of a decision-making unit, that may be a government, a community or a household.⁵⁵

When individualism or individualistic behaviour is evoked in works of economic history, it is often associated with economic growth as constituting one of its prerequisites.⁵⁶ The characterization is not restricted to individuals, but is extended to the level of society. Societies are described as collectivist or individualist according to the way they are organised. In the first case, collectivism is associated with 'segregation', prevailing feature of which is the interaction among individuals which is shaped under the influence culture, religion and family relations. In the case of collective societies the enforcement of contracts relies largely on informal constraints. Individualism, on the other hand, promotes 'integration', meaning that individuals are not restricted in their behaviour by any group loyalty and, thus, are more open in the

⁵³ North, *Institutional Change*, 54.

⁵⁴ Barzel, *Economic Analysis*, 96-98.

⁵⁵ Eggertsson, 'A Note on the Economics' 17; R. Boudon, 'Individualism and Holism in Social Sciences' in *Individualism, Theories and Methods*, ed. P. Birnbaum and J. Leca (Oxford, 1990), 34; see also 'Introduction', 1-14.

⁵⁶ A. Macfarlane, *The Origins of English Individualism. The Family, Property and Social Transition* (Oxford, 1978). For an analysis of the various kinds of individualism, see S. Lukes, *Individualism* (Oxford, 1973).

conduct of their transactions.⁵⁷ This dichotomy might be useful up to a certain extent, in the sense that it draws attention to cultural parameters, which can either endorse or discourage certain economic behaviours. Indeed, certain behavioural patterns present greater frequency in either type of society. For instance, collectivism can be characterised by conformity or low levels of competition, but this does not preclude the persistence of the same qualities in individualist societies as well. In psychology, societies are considered multidimensional constructs and it has been empirically verified that cultures comprise both individualist and collectivist elements.⁵⁸ In the field of sociology, the same preoccupations have given rise to discussions on the establishment of criteria for a typology of smaller social units such as the community and the family. Individualistic tendencies are observable also in these constructs putting in doubt descriptions of them that insist on the fact that their members are bound by common determination and action. In recent years, there is a growing tendency to promote an exegesis founded on the interrelations of culture and historical reality through a comparative analysis, which is considered more appropriate for the study of community dynamics.⁵⁹

The above analytical framework will be utilised in both chapters III and IV. In chapter III we will address the issue of competition or co-operation between two social units of the Byzantine society, the Athonite monasteries and the Thessalonian elite, through their economic dealings and certain types of transaction that were developed in the later period. For the sake of testing this theory, both groups will be considered as *organisations* with main aim to explore whether their relationship was co-operative or

⁵⁷ A. Greif, 'Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies', *The Journal of Political Economy* 102 (5)(1994), 912-950.

⁵⁸ C. H. Triandis, R. Bontempo, J. M. Villareal, 'Individualism and Collectivism: Cross-Cultural Perspectives on Self-Ingroup Relationships', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 54 (2)(1988), 323-338.

⁵⁹ B. Badie, 'Community, Individualism and Culture', in *Individualism, Theories and Methods*, ed. P. Birnbaum and J. Leca (Oxford, 1990), 95-115.

antagonistic. In chapter IV we will be focusing on the Late Byzantine aristocracy of Thessalonikê seen not as a social class, a problematic concept in itself for this period, but within the framework of *family* as an economic organisation. By examining patterns of administrating family property, we will see whether we can describe late Byzantine society as a collective or individualistic one, whilst the study of the development of certain institutions will highlight the process of the ‘adjustment’ of property rights in transitional periods.

III/b. Donations.

Donating property to monasteries was a well-established practice by the late Byzantine period when it became one of the most prominent features of real estate transactions between laymen and church and would prove to be particularly beneficial to the augmentation of church property. In previous centuries, the state had attempted to set some limitations to donations by stipulating laws regulating this kind of transaction in order to prevent the economic strengthening of the church and possible encroachments of private property on its part. Characteristic is the example of emperor Nikêphoros Phôkas who issued a novel in 964 according to which grants of landed property to the monasteries were forbidden.⁶⁰ Such measures, however, were not destined to change the growing importance of monastic estates that reached its peak in the period before the Ottoman conquest.

One of the methods whereby monasteries acquired land and other kind of assets was through donations. In Byzantine law the concept of donation (*dôrea*) was distinguished into two separate acts, the pure donation (*kathara dôrea*) and the conditional one (*dôrea hypo hairesin*). In the first case, there were no obligations burdening the parties, whilst in the case of

⁶⁰ P. Charanis, ‘The Monastic Properties and the State in the Byzantine Empire’, *DOP* 4 (1948), 55-61.

the conditional one, it is evident that certain conditions were attached to this deed.⁶¹ By implication, the act of donation had a contractual character and by law this agreement had to be validated through a written contract or a confirmation by three witnesses.⁶² In terms of definition, donation was considered to be the opposite of sale, although there were cases where the boundaries between the two types of transaction were not clear-cut.⁶³ But even if an amount of money was not involved, the fact that certain conditions could be applied to the act of donation confers to it the quality of exchange and makes it particularly pertinent to our discussion.

The reasons behind a donation varied and, as we shall see, could have both spiritual and financial extensions. One of the reasons for an individual to offer his property or part of it to a monastery was their need or expectation for the salvation of their soul (*dia psychikon*). In this instance, the donor expected the monastery to commemorate him or/and other members of his family in exchange for his offerings. It was not unusual that the manner in which this commemoration was performed corresponded to the status of the donor. The commemoration of aristocrats, for instance, could entail the distribution of money or bread to the poor, a special mass or meal in the monastery. However, the most common form of commemoration was to record the donor's name in the *vrevion* of the monastery, namely the list of persons to be commemorated.⁶⁴

Turning to another aspect of this exchange which had also financial motivations, one must make mention of the *adelphaton*, the dispensation of an annuity to the donor by a monastery. More specifically, an *adelphaton* was the obligation that a monastery undertook towards the

⁶¹ H. Glykatzi-Ahrweiler, 'La concession des droits incorporels. Donations conditionnelles', *Actes du XII^e Congrès International des Etudes byzantines*, II. (Belgrade, 1964), 103.

⁶² According to the Justinianic Code the presence of a witness was necessary for sums above 500 *nomismata*. See Kōnstantinos Harmenopoulos, *Procheiron nomōn ē Hexavivlos*, ed. K. Pitsakis, (Athens, 1971), 158, note 1.

⁶³ *ODB*, 'Donation'.

⁶⁴ K. Smyrlis, *La fortune des grands monastères byzantins (fin du Xe-milieu du XIV^e siècle)* (Paris, 2006), 133-135 ; A.-M. Talbot, 'The Byzantine Family and the Monastery' *DOP* 44 (1990), 124.

donor to dispense an allowance.⁶⁵ It was actually an institution which could lead to mutual profit through the exchange of assets between laymen and monasteries, as it was pivoted on the following principle: a certain individual would donate property or liquid assets to a monastery and the latter had the obligation to provide in return a lifetime pension which could be either in the form of an agreed sum of money or of kind, for instance the provision of foodstuffs as a means to sustain the donor. In terms of duration, the provision of an *adelphaton* normally lasted while the beneficiary was in life and the payment ceased after his death. There were cases, however, in which the contract stipulated otherwise and the pension could be assigned to another person, most commonly another family member of the beneficiary. Although this settlement was based upon certain existing patterns, the specific terms were unique to each contract; therefore the amount and the duration of the pension were not strictly fixed and could fluctuate from one case to the other. Also, of financial nature was a specific type of donation, that of granting private monasteries to larger ones. The donors' aim in such cases was to ensure the continuation of their foundation's operation by handing it over to an economically stronger organisation.⁶⁶

In our documents, which cover the 14th and part of the 15th century, donations of land or other types of property appear quite frequently. Most of our documents concern laymen of a higher social status, either bearing a title or related to well-known Thessalonian families. When dealing with the documents about donations of landed property, one notices that most of the individuals come from the great families of Thessalonikê, such as those of Kavasilas, TzAMPLAKÔN and Devlitzênos, who were also *pronoia* holders, as their titles and property origins reveal. The same does not apply to donations of urban properties where the great majority of individuals are hardly known from other sources. This, of course, may be coincidental and does not preclude the fact that also some of them could belong to the upper

⁶⁵ *ODB*, 'Adelphaton'.

⁶⁶ Smyrlis, *La fortune*, 135.

classes. However, it can also reflect the Byzantine aristocracy's long tradition of ownership and exploitation of land, which constituted for centuries their main source of income. Understandably, this land would be the main object in the transactions carried out by this particular social group.

The limitations of our own material, which concerns property transactions that took place within the broader area of Thessalonikê and focuses primarily on the 'upper' social strata, does not permit any kind of reliable quantitative analysis. Therefore, rather than attempting to draw general conclusions in terms of statistics, it will be more instructive to study the institution itself and explore its nature and internal dynamic within the period in question, integrating it in this way into our broader theme of institutional change. Wishing to explore the real reasons behind a donation, the discussion will focus on the types of property that were donated: i) 'abandoned' land/*paroikoi*'s holdings, ii) properties of commercial interest, iii) mills, and iv) urban properties.

*

i) 'Abandoned' land/paroikoi's holdings

In various cases the land given away to monasteries by laymen was abandoned. This type of land was known as *exaleimma* or *exaleimmatikê (hypo)stasis*. Small differentiations in the usage of these terms have been attested,⁶⁷ but it is generally accepted that for the most part they were employed in order to designate properties whose owners –usually *paroikoi*– had abandoned them or had died heirless.⁶⁸ A more expanded definition specifies the reasons for this abandonment as the decease, flight, disappearance and failure of the *paroikos* to meet his obligations towards his lord. Another element to be noted is that of the assignment of the

⁶⁷ The most important work on this institution is M. Bartusis, 'Exaleimma: Escheat in Byzantium', *DOP* 40 (1986), 55-81

⁶⁸ A. Laiou-Thômadakê, *Ê agrotikê koinônia stên hystêrê vyzantinê epochê*. (2nd edition) (Athens, 2001), 80.

property to the *paroikos*'s lord, who could be either a private landowner -whether monasteries or individuals- or the state.⁶⁹ Even though in previous centuries *exaleimmata* mostly reverted to the state, in the 13th century quite frequently to monasteries, whilst by the early 14th century the prevailing tendency was the appropriation of these lands by lay landowners.⁷⁰ An *exaleimma* could be directly exploited or leased by its owner and even be transferred to another party. The dominant transaction was that of donation to monasteries, while sales were quite rare.

In our material we meet the case of donation of abandoned land in three different documents. The first two come from the early 14th century and concern three *pronoians* whose names are unknown.⁷¹ In both documents the term used to describe the donated property is *exaleimmatika chôraphiaia topia*. This can be translated as fields, although the word *topia* can refer to grazing lands, and therefore there is an ambiguity as to the exact nature of land. In the first document, there is no other land bequeathed to the monastery, but in the second one this property is only half of the donation which also includes a vineyard. If we base our observations upon these two documents where abandoned land is the predominant feature, then the most likely conclusion is that *exaleimmata* were dispensed as being non-exploitable and therefore not profitable, at least on a short-term basis. In another approach, Bartusis has demonstrated that this was not necessarily the case and the characterization 'deserted' can be at times misleading, as these kind of fields, although outwardly desolate, could also be the subject of transaction without its cultivation being interrupted.⁷²

Moreover, the fact that abandoned land could be only a part of a donation that included other potentially profitable properties, can lead to the assumption that *exaleimmata* could at times be productive. The vineyard in our document might point in that direction. Based on tax calculations, it has been estimated that vineyards belonged in this period to the most privileged

⁶⁹ Bartusis, 'Exaleimma', 77.

⁷⁰ *Ibid*, 61.

⁷¹ *Doch*, nos.13 and 14.

⁷² Bartusis, 'Exaleimma', 65. He refers here to the example rather like an exception confirming the general rule.

pieces of land in terms of productivity, being valued more than the best-quality arable land.⁷³ An example illustrating their profitability is that of Kônstantinos Kyprianos who in 1318 ceded one cultivated vineyard of 1,5 *vassilikoï modioi* to the monastery of Timiopetritissa for an uncultivated one of 13 *modioi*, a ratio that reveals the substantial productive capacity of this type of land.⁷⁴ However, in the absence of other indications in our text as to the value of the particular vineyard such a contention is precarious.

The reasons that the state would assign deserted land to a pronoiar are quite clear. As ownerless land, it belonged by law to the state, so it was to the latter's interest to distribute it to pronoiars, in order to bring it back to cultivation in exchange for services to the crown.⁷⁵ In a document of the year 1303, which involves a lease and not a donation, we find a long list of *exaleimmatika stasia* (a paroikos's holding) possessed by Dêmêtrios Harmenopoulos, a military pronoiar.⁷⁶ Oikonomides, commenting on this phenomenon, suggests that the frequent mentions of *exaleimmata* particularly in the early 14th century indicate 'there was more land available than there were hands to work it'.⁷⁷ The donations of these to the monasteries for exploitation suggests then that the donors lacked the means to exploit such properties and for this reason passed them on to the monasteries.

This can be verified in the donation of *meqas papias* Arsenios TzAMPLAKÔN. Arsenios belonged to the well-known family of TzAMPLAKÔNES and was the son of Alexios, who also bore the same title. His properties were located in Thessalonikê, Verroia, Zichna and Chrysoupolis. He led an eventful life, losing his possessions in 1342 as a partisan of John Kantakouzênos and being incarcerated for five years by the opposite party of Alexios Apokaukos. In 1355, he entered monastic life and made a large donation to the monastery of

⁷³ A.E. Laiou, 'The Agrarian Economy', 360.

⁷⁴ *Vat* I, no. 50.

⁷⁵ See section IV/c.

⁷⁶ *Xen*, no.6.

⁷⁷ Oikonomides, 'The Role of the State', 1046.

Vatopedi for the sake of his beloved ones, as emphasised in the document.⁷⁸ This donation involved diverse properties, a number of which probably generated some revenue, while others, such as uncultivated vineyards and land, did not. Among these properties there was an unknown number of *exaleimmatikai hypostaseis*. Arsenios also owned *paroikoi* whom he conceded to the monastery and does make mention of the fact that they were those *that had remained* from those ‘times of trouble’. It is almost certain then that those *exaleimmatikai hypostaseis* belonged to some of his *paroikoi* that had fled. As abandoned lands used to revert to the landowner, it would be to his benefit to reassign them to other *paroikoi* of his in order not to lose income. There are no indications to suggest that the land they had left behind was by some means exploited. Moreover, a number of other parameters such as the nature of the rest of the properties in combination with the timing of his decision to proceed to this donation allow us to surmise that he was actually dispensing possessions that could not be exploited any longer to his own profit.

A landowner could also donate his dependent peasants and their holdings. In 1381, Manouël Devlitzênos donated a mixture of landed properties consisting of land, fruit trees, one leased vineyard (*ampelopakton*), and work force, namely Manouël’s *paroikoi* and *proskathêmenoi*. The relationship between landlords and their dependent peasants in Byzantium is a problematic issue, as there are no safe conclusions as to the exact nature and the degree of dependency. This is mainly because this has not been studied based on the legal conditions whereby tenants held a plot, in other words their property rights. Rather, Scholarly works tend to focus on the study of rent and the price of land.⁷⁹ Another reason was that their status was to a certain degree fashioned by customary law.⁸⁰ In donation documents, the phenomenon of donating one’s *paroikoi* or their belongings is frequent and presented as a

⁷⁸ *Vat* II, no. 15.

⁷⁹ A. Kazhdan, ‘State, Feudal, and Private Property in Byzantium’ *DOP* 47 (1993), 91.

⁸⁰ G. Weiss, ‘Die Entscheidung des Kosmas Magistros über das Parökenrecht’, *Byzantion* 48 (1978), 477-500.

common practice, adding little to this particular issue. They can be more instructive though about the circumstances in which such donations took place.

In some of our acts, *paroikoi* are donated along with their possessions. Such is the case of a donation from the early 14th century.⁸¹ Therein, Maria Angelina, the widow of Doukas Michaël Angelos and daughter of Dêmêtrios Spartênos, who held the title of *pansevastos sevastos*, donated to Lavra monastery a privileged piece of land (*chrysovoullon zeugêlateion*), a characterization also applied to the two *paroikoi* (*chrysovoullatoî*) that were included in the donation. These are referred to with their names, Misouras and Pitzaraphas's wife and son, and what follows is an enumeration of the properties they held, three residences, one barn, one stable, one cellar and two gardens. Although not explicitly stated as in other documents, we are apparently here confronted by a donation of a *stasis*.

A *stasis* was the entirety of holdings of the dependent peasant which could include fields, vineyards, buildings, cattle and flock, that is the whole household of a *paroikos*. Theoretically, a *paroikos* had full ownership rights on his belongings and could transfer them to heirs. His only obligation was to pay a tax which formed part of the *telos*, the rent received by the landowner.⁸² Therefore, the main distinction between a *stasis* and the land a *paroikos* cultivated for the landlord was based on the different property rights attached to these possessions. However, we notice that the donation of *staseis* by the landlord to monasteries *was* possible. It is reasonable to assume then that the donation involved not actually the physical aspect of these possessions but most probably the right to their revenues. This could be corroborated by the clauses that concerned the rights of the monastery after the transfer of property, according to which Lavra acquired the right to all revenues (*pasan kai pantoian prosodon*).

Donations of *paroikoi*'s holdings are also met in three other of our documents, those referring to Dêmêtrios and Geôrgios Kavasilas and Dêmêtrios Devlitzênos. All three

⁸¹ *Lavra II*, no.98.

⁸² Laiou, *É agrotiké koinônia*, 215-216.

individuals belonged to well-known and privileged Thessalonian families. Their properties were situated in Hermêleia and were granted to them by the emperor as a *pronoia* (*apo eleêmosynês vasileôs*), which meant that they were not full masters of the land but could only appropriate its revenues. In 1331 they all decided to make donations to the monastery of Vatopedi. Dêmêtrios Kavasilas donated two *stasia*, those of Tripanis and Kekeris, along with their area they exploited (*meta tês nomês kai periochês*) for the salvation of his soul and his commemoration. As clearly stated, the land was affected by Ottoman attacks and therefore yielded no profit. In the case of Geôrgios Kavasilas, the *stasion* belonged to Panômîtês and had been allocated to him as a *pronoia*.⁸³ It was when Panomitês died that Geôrgios decided to donate it. There is no reference to whether Panomitês had left any heirs, but his death combined with the term *stasion* leads to the conclusion that this was probably an *exaleimma*.

The *stasion*, a variation of the word *stasis*, employed here deserves some elaboration. At times, its use seems slightly different from that of the *stasis*. Even though both of them refer to the *paroikos* household, the *stasion* in plenty of cases seems to characterize possessions that the peasant had deserted and therefore is connected to the *exaleimma*. Indeed, in other documents the two terms are combined (*exaleimmatika stasia*)⁸⁴. Dêmêtrios and Geôrgios Kavasilas must have come to the decision to donate these *stasia*, since there were no *paroikoi* anymore to pay the tax attached to these belongings. In our third document, however, where Dêmêtrios Devlitzênos also employs the term *stasion*, the picture we form regarding whether the land had been abandoned is different.⁸⁵ The donation of *gê*, which signifies arable land,⁸⁶ in combination with the absence of any other direct textual proof excluded the equation of *stasion*

⁸³ *Vat II*, nos. 73 and 74.

⁸⁴ *Vat II*, no. 72; *Doch*, no. 22.

⁸⁵ *Vat II*, no. 75.

⁸⁶ The term is interesting here not so much in terms of its content but its occurrence. As a rule *gê* was not recorded in Byzantine *praktika* among the possessions of the *paroikoi*, so this is an affirmation that they could indeed own this type of property.

with an *exaleimma* in this instance. Therefore, *stasion* cannot *per se* be taken as an indication of deserted holdings.

Beyond any terminological similarities, these three documents share another common feature, their chronology. It cannot be a coincidence that three different individuals donated in 1331 land they possessed in the area of Hermêleia.⁸⁷ In addition, there is one more donation of the very same year this time by a priest called Vladôn who bequeathed to Vatopedi one field of 10 *modioi* again in the same area. Thus, we gain the impression that donations did not only occur sporadically and according to strictly personal motivations but at times could also take an ‘*en masse*’ character, reflecting, in all likelihood, some kind of urgency.

ii) Properties of commercial interest

If we cannot always be sure about the productive capacity of the abandoned land and the holdings of paroikoi donated to the monasteries, the same does not apply to another type of donation emerging from our documents; it relates to the social group of pronoiars and their tenures of landed properties near coastal areas or rivers. On this issue, a document from 1350/1 comes to our assistance. In that year, a certain Kalavaris, who has been identified with *megas hetairiarchês* Michaël Kavalaris, made a donation to Lavra which involved the river Ploumiska, near Rhentina, on the route from Mount Athos to Thessalonikê.⁸⁸ The information we have about Kalavaris is that he was one of the Greek officials of the Serbian occupation who managed to retain his property after the lands were re-captured by the Byzantines. In this particular act, the river Ploumiska and the surrounding area pass to the hands of Lavra. Worthy of note is Kalavaris’s guarantee that the property would be immune from certain impositions and exactions. Among those were the *mitaton*, the right of provincial administrators to

⁸⁷ *Vat* II, no.76

⁸⁸ *Lavra* III, no. 130.

purchase grain at reduced prices, the *kommerkion*, the well-known 10 per cent tax on merchandises which in the text appears in the corrupted form of *koumerki*, and the *psounos*, a term possibly originating from the Serbian *psunj*, a supplementary tax for the transport and sale of merchandise.⁸⁹

All the aforementioned terms testify to the fact that rivers played a vital role in the context of merchandise traffic. This important role has been established by other disciplines, such as the archaeological studies on the Strymôn delta, which have proved the longevity of the area as a locus of transportation of goods throughout the Byzantine and Ottoman period.⁹⁰ In addition, as we shall see, Arsenios TzAMPLAKÔN, who came of a family of pronoiars, owned coastal land and saltmarshes in Galikos river and was almost certainly involved in trade activities. There are more examples of individuals possessing properties in the same area, such as the Devlitzênos family and Dêmêtrios Tzyriggês, who as well donated his piece of land to an Athonite monastery.⁹¹ Can all these be an indication then that these physically privileged areas were reserved for *pronoia* holders and therefore socially distinguished individuals and could favour their opening to a variety of economic activities?⁹² If that is the case, then renouncing such properties is a clear manifestation of the deterioration of this social group in the second half of the 14th century and gives us a gloomy picture for the countryside in that time.

Arsenios's donation is particularly interesting not only for the fact that it is a record of the scale such a transaction could take, but also because it can help us profile the traits of the

⁸⁹ See commentary in *Lavra III*, no. 130. The term seems to resemble also the Byzantine *opsonion*, 'a payment in cash or kind to monasteries or the salaries of civil officials' (*ODB*, 'Opsonion'). However, this definition seems to rule out the inclusion of the term in the text as a tax imposition, unless its history is complicated enough to justify a transformation of its meaning.

⁹⁰ A. Dunn, 'Byzantine and Ottoman Maritime Traffic in the Estuary of the Strymôn: Between, Environment, State and Market', in *Medieval and Post-Medieval Greece. The Corfu Papers*, (*BAR International Series* 2023) ed. J. Bintliff J and H. Stöger (2009), 15-31; *idem*, *The Interaction of Secular Public Institutions and Provincial Communities in the Political and Economic Spheres in Late Antique Aegean Macedonia* (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Birmingham, 2006), 76-77.

⁹¹ *Lavra III*, no. 153. Another example of a *pronoiar* with land in the same area is that of a certain Adrianos (*Iv III*, nos. 70, 75 and 80).

⁹² Another example of a *pronoiar* possessing land by the river Ploumiska in early 14th century is that of *paidopoulos* Petros Doukopoulos. See *ChilP I*, nos. 114, 116.

economic activity of individuals of some social standing in Late Byzantine Thessalonikê. On this issue, two properties are the most striking features in the entirety of the possessions he donated, a tower and a fair. While enumerating his donations, Arsenios makes particular mention of a small fortress (*kastellion*) called Slanesion that he built himself on his own land. In recent years, this fortress has been identified by Nikos Zêkos with the so-called tower of Apollônia which in Byzantine years belonged to the theme of Serres and Strymôn.⁹³ Zêkos suggests that the tower was built between 1333, when Arsenios inherited the estate from his parents, and 1355, the date of our document, and argues that this structure was not related to any military or fortification needs but served a quite different purpose. It seems that it was primarily the place where the production of Arsenios's estates was gathered and redistributed. At the same time, it was used for the protection of those who were in charge of merchandising these products as well as collecting the taxes for Arsenios. These fortresses were widely spread in the area of Chalkidikê and the lower part of the Strymôn valley,⁹⁴ belonging mostly to the Athonite monasteries but also to great landowners.

Another suggestion put forward by Zêkos is that perhaps the Slanesion tower, which he translates literally as 'salted' and by extension saltern, was linked to another productive activity carried out by Arsenios, namely the exploitation of saltmarshes, as according to our textual evidence he was the owner of one near river Galikos.⁹⁵ The extraction of salt in the late Byzantine period could be a lucrative business. In other areas of the empire salt extraction had attracted the interest of the Westerners who became actively involved in its exploitation and trade. For instance, salt was the second most important export after grain in the State of Epiros and salt pans were scattered all over its coasts. Venetians, trying to monopolize the production

⁹³ N. Zêkos, 'O legomenos pyrgos tês Apollônias kai o ktêtôr tou' in *Dôron, Timêtikos Tomos ston kathêgêtê Niko Nikonano*, ed. G. Karadedos et alii (Thessalonica, 2006), 57-67.

⁹⁴ A. Dunn, 'The Survey of Krysoupolis and Byzantine Fortifications in the lower Strymôn Valley,' *JÖB* 32/2 (1982), 607.

⁹⁵ This information is drawn from a second document of 1356 where Arsenios makes a supplementary donation to Vatopedi. See *Vat* II, no.107.

and export of salt,⁹⁶ found themselves not infrequently in controversy with other claimants in the area.⁹⁷ Also, there is a wealth of information regarding Frankish Peloponnese and the extraction of and taxation on salt by the Venetians as well as the location of saltpans. The majority of those were near lagoons, which were appropriate also for fish farming,⁹⁸ or by coastal areas where the terrain formation favoured this activity. Also, quite common was the existence of a nearby port for the facilitation of salt traffic and a fortification for the protection of this product.⁹⁹ Arsenios's case seem to fit this picture and thus to the suggestion that his tower was indeed linked to salt-production gains ground. The production and sale of salt had been a traditional imperial monopoly. However, the rules were practically relaxed in the course of time, as we can infer from the fact that the state would grant salines to monasteries.¹⁰⁰ There were also individuals, such as Alexios Apokaukos, who, as state managers of the salterns, accumulated great wealth.¹⁰¹

That salt extraction was important also in Thessalonikê is well-known and corroborated by a 15th century document that informs us about the existence of a 'company' of salt workers in the city.¹⁰² With this document we are confronted with a distinctive type of donation, a collective one. In 1415, a group of individuals involved in salt exploitation (*alykarioi*) along with their chief (*protalykarios*) decided to dispense part of their income and provide an annual pension of 100 *aspra* to the priest of the church of Saint Paul. This commitment would be kept

⁹⁶ For the trade of salt by Venice, see A. Tenenti, 'Il sale nella Storia di Venezia', *Studi Veneziani* 4 (1980), 15-26.

⁹⁷ E. A. Zachariadou, 'Paragôgê kai emporio sto Despotato tês Epeirou', *Praktika tou Diethnous Symposiou gia to Despotato tês Epeirou* (Arta, 1992), 91.

⁹⁸ For fish farming in the Strymon area, see Dunn, *The Interaction*, 68-73.

⁹⁹ A. Panopoulou, 'Paragôgê kai emporio alatiou stên Peloponnêsô (13os- 16os aiônas)', in *Money and Markets in the Palaeologan Era*, ed. N.G. Moschonas (Athens, 2003), 157- 179.

¹⁰⁰ *Xen*, no.1₁₄₆. For the efforts of the first Palaiologan efforts to re-assert their rights on that product and regulate its trade, see *ODB*, 'Salt'.

¹⁰¹ K.-P. Matschke, 'Bemerkungen zum spätbyzantinischen Salzmonopol' in *Studia Byzantina II. Beiträge der byzantinischen Forschung der Deutschen demokratischen Republik zum XIV. Internationalen Byzantinistenkongress, Bukarest 1971*, ed. J. Irmscher (Bucharest, 1973), 37.

¹⁰² *Dion*, no.14. Salt-related activities in Thessalonikê were known from the early Byzantine period and can also be attested in the period of the Venetian occupation. Matschke, 'Salzmonopol', 38. For the extraction of salt in Macedonia in the Ottoman period, see Dunn, *Interaction*, 74.

indefinitely also by their successors in order for the church to be always in operation and available for them to be commemorated in it.

If we should draw any analogies between this particular donation and that of Arsenios, then the key point must be the ownership and exploitation conditions under which all these individuals held the salterns as well as the motivation behind these bequests. The saltmarshes in the Galikos were part of the personal property of Arsenios, which he inherited from his grandfather,¹⁰³ and of a private network of exploitation, the scale of which is not known. Therefore, his donation concerned the physical aspect of the possession, whilst his decision to donate was instigated by the need to 'secure' his property and by extension himself, considering the fluid environment of that period.¹⁰⁴ On the contrary, the impression we gain about the Thessalonian *alykarioi* is that they were not the owners of the saltern,¹⁰⁵ which is deduced from the fact that they received revenues from it on an annual basis (*roga*). Moreover, their donation, which concerned liquid assets, had solely a charitable character and served those individuals' spiritual aspirations in contrast with that of Arsenios which had distinct financial extensions.

It is unfortunate that the issue of the inner structure and organization of this group remains insufficiently resolved in order to establish the exact social and economic status of its members and the conditions of the saltern's exploitation, but it is highly likely that this was in the form of a lease, thus securing a reliable income but without the risk that ownership of a resource entailed through the need of finding the means to exploit it.¹⁰⁶ This combined with the fact that, some of the signatures at the end of the document, such as those of Sgouros, Komnênos, Argyros, Philommatês and Vryennios, whose names are associated with upper-class families, is

¹⁰³ Whether Arsenios's saline might have originated in a state grant cannot be certified from the text.

¹⁰⁴ For the motives behind a donation, see *infra*, 158-160.

¹⁰⁵ We must note here that it is implied by the wording of the text (*oi tèn alikên dienergountes*) that this saltern was the only one operating in Thessalonikê at the time. *Dion*, no. 14, 1. For salterns in Macedonia, see Dunn, *Interaction*, 73-74.

¹⁰⁶ On this issue, see Matschke, 'Salzmonopol', 37-60 and *idem*, *Die Schlacht bei Ankara und das Schicksal von Byzanz* (Weimar, 1981), 144-159.

a hint of certain socio-economic changes that started to take place from the second half of the 14th century and the detachment of members of the upper social strata from land ownership.¹⁰⁷

Despite all their differences, the two cases of donation we examine are actually both sides of the same coin, depicting a shift in social structures through changes in property rights and an adaptation of the modes of exploitation to the realities of the time. So, on the one hand, we have individuals who relinquish their proprietorship due to the crisis of the mid-14th century. On the other hand, we see individuals of the 15th century who appear to have no full ownership rights over certain resources but are activated in alternative ways of acquiring income and decide to join forces and create guild-like formations in order to, in all probability, secure their individual interests. Moreover, the clause implying the continuity of their profession displays a certain degree of certainty about their future as opposed to the underlying sense of insecurity permeating Arsenios's text, which reveals the difficulties an individual confronted in order to sustain his private property.

Let us now turn to the second interesting point in Arsenios's donation, the Vela fair that was organised in honour of Saint Symeôn, and constitutes an atypical kind of donation. In the Late Byzantine period fairs (*panêgyreis*) were held annually and their origins must be searched in the years previous to the late Byzantine period.¹⁰⁸ These fairs used to take place around churches in certain urban centres such as Thessalonikê or in their vicinity, but most commonly in smaller towns and villages, for instance, those of Katô Volvos and Pinsôn in the area of Chalkidikê.¹⁰⁹ They were part of the festivities for the commemoration of saints and as such they were organised by and operated under their auspices of the church and monasteries which

¹⁰⁷ This is also noted by Matschke, *Die Schlacht*, 154. The involment of Greek – Christians in this activity of Thessalonikê in the 15th century Ottoman Thessalonikê is quite well known. See Grozdanova, 'Bergleute', 113 and *supra*, 17-18.

¹⁰⁸ S. Vryonis, 'The Panegyris of the Byzantine Saint: A Study in the Nature of a Medieval Institution, Its Origin and Fate', in *The Byzantine Saint*, ed. S. Hackel (London, 1981), 196-227; Ph Koukoules . *Vyzantinôn Vios kai Politismos* (Athens, 1947), 270-83; C. Asdracha, 'Les foires en Epire médiévale: La fonction justificative de la mémoire historique,' *JÖB* 32.2 (1982), 437-46; Matschke, 'Commerce, Trade', 779-782.

¹⁰⁹ J. Lefort, *Villages de Macédoine 1. La Chalcidique occidentale* (Paris, 1982), 45, 125.

profited considerably from the commercial activities conducted there. Peasants would participate actively in the exchange of commodities, contributing in this way to the economic development of their region. The importance that was laid by the Byzantines on this institution was significant and it is reflected on the fact that fairs were protected by law.¹¹⁰ It has been noticed that whilst urban fairs survived longer, the importance of rural fairs started to decline around the middle of the 14th century following the decline of agricultural production.¹¹¹

Apparently, the Vela fair was among those still operating around the middle of the fourteenth century. Although it cannot be safely concluded that it was in a disintegrating state, we can infer that it followed the fate of its other counterparts. Another intriguing element is that it seems to have been under the authority of a layman. Arsenios appears to have had rights to the revenues of the Vela fair and treated it as a possession of his own by transferring it to the hands of another party. Usually, the general impression is that church institutions were in charge of the fairs and appropriated their revenues due to their religious character. Still, we are informed that according to the 10th century law compilation of *Peira* the right to found an annual fair belonged to the emperor and the *dynatoi*, namely not only to the church but also to military and civil officials as well as the urban and rural communities.¹¹² As a small parenthesis, it is also known that in the Ottoman period the revenues from the fairs could be vested both in monasteries and *timariots*.¹¹³ Our example is a proof that the Middle Byzantine practice of secular individuals drawing profit from the fairs continued in the later period and was perhaps also adopted by the Ottomans, or at least coincided with their own policies. As will be shown below, Arsenios's decision to assign it to a monastery must be seen within the

¹¹⁰ I. Zepos and P. Zepos, *Jus Graecomanorum* I (Athens, 1931, repr. Aalen 1962), 271-272, cited in A.I. Lampropoulou. 'Oï panêgyreis stên Peloponnêso kata tên mesaionikê epochê' *Ê kathêmerinê zôê sto Vyzantio* (Athens, 1989), 292.

¹¹¹ Matschke, 'Commerce, Trade', 781.

¹¹² *JGR* IV, *Peira*, 57; A.E. Laiou, 'Händler un Kaufleute auf dem Jahrmarkt', in *Fest und Alltag in Byzanz*, ed. G. Prinzing and D. Simon (Munich, 1990), 64; V. Papoulia, 'Die Jahrmärkte in Byzanz als Ausdruck der Autarkie des byzantinischen Stadtwesens' *Etudes Balkaniques* 3-4 (1997), 134.

¹¹³ P. Nasturel and N., Beldiceanu 'Les églises Byzantines et la situation économique de Drama, Serrès et Zichna aux XIVe et XVe siècles', *JÖB* 27 (1978), 282-283, note 72.

general scope of Arsenios's wish to 'dispose of' assets disadvantageous to him as a means to secure his own future through the acquisition of a pension.

The donations of Arsenios TzAMPLAKÔN, a member of the Thessalonian elite, inform us that he possessed a variety of properties, most of them located outside the city of Thessalonikê. As every pre-modern city, Thessalonikê had a close relationship with the countryside. The elite of the city consisted of landowners with most of their properties situated in the area of Chalkidikê, whilst some families had also properties close to other Macedonian urban centres, such as Verroia and Serres.¹¹⁴ However, in the course of the 14th century, the adverse conditions prevailing in the countryside accounted for the contraction of landed wealth. Individuals would still exploit land, but, as we shall see, in smaller plots, such as gardens, around or inside the urban centre. They would also turn to activities, such as the trade of metals or grain.

It is worthy of note that from the 1340's we have a number of references to a member of the TzAMPLAKÔN (Çamblacus) family who appears to have had an important role in channelling grain outside the city of Thessalonikê, to the city of Ragusa. In 1344, Ragusans sent him a gift of 60 *hyperpyra* in order to retain their good relations and secure the continuation of the *daily* sale of grain by him, whilst in 1346 Ragusans sent representatives to TzAMPLAKÔN in order to convince him to sell them 5,000 *staia* of grain.¹¹⁵ The procedure of grain sale in that period can be deduced through other paradigms, such as that of Crete where the course followed was the purchase of production by traders who then resold or exported it.¹¹⁶ It is not unlikely that this is what was happening with the TzAMPLAKÔN family and their tower of Apollônia which might not be used only for the gathering of salt production, as suggested elsewhere, but had a multiple

¹¹⁴ See, e.g., the families Kôkkalas and TzAMPLAKÔN in table III.

¹¹⁵ B. Krekić, *Dubrovnik (Raguse) et le Levant au Moyen Age* (Paris, 1961), nos. 212, 213.

¹¹⁶ A. Laiou, 'Thessalonikê, its hinterland and its economic area in the years of the Palaeologi' *Diethnes Symposio Vyzantinê Makedonia 324-1430, Thessalonikê 29-31 October 1992* (Thessalonica, 1995), 188.

purpose.¹¹⁷ Moreover, in terms of chronology the identification of the TzAMPLAKÔN in the Ragusan documents with Arsenios TzAMPLAKÔN who owned the tower is not impossible, though not unproblematic.¹¹⁸ In any case, the information about the trading activities of the upper layers of the Thessalonian society is what really matters here.

There are more documentary references to other Thessalonians from around the middle of the 14th century such as Dêmêtrios Trikanas and Tzykandêles who in the years 1356-7 were merchandising grain and barley.¹¹⁹ The information is gleaned from a notebook belonging to a certain Kassandrênos who records his financial dealings with other individuals in Thessalonikê and as it seems it concerns transactions conducted at a local level. It seems, therefore, that the sector of grain production and export in the middle of the 14th century could be profitable for certain individuals. This is underpinned by the frequency of Venetian sources referring to grain trade between the two cities. In their majority, they are concentrated in the first half of the 14th century, whilst there is paucity for the following period following the general trend of economic contraction.¹²⁰ The main point here is all these names can be linked to the elite of the city,¹²¹ which points to the direction the economic activities of the former great landowners took in the course of the 14th and 15th centuries.

iii) Mills

Another type of property donated to monasteries was mills. In 1311 Doukopoulos donated a water-mill situated in Kaprinikaia, near Hermêleia, to the monastery of Docheiariou.¹²² Its story of proprietorship is quite informative of the complex character that property rights could

¹¹⁷ *Supra*, 148-149.

¹¹⁸ Laiou, 'Hinterland', 187, n. 25.

¹¹⁹ P. Schreiner, *Texte zur spätbyzantinischen Finanz- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte in Handschriften der Biblioteca Vaticana* (Vatican, 1991), 3/3, 34, 42, 51, 121 and 3/26, 45, 50, 100, 125, 136 respectively.

¹²⁰ F. Thiriet, *Délibérations des assemblées vénitiennes concernant la Roumanie* (Paris, 1966), nos. 272, 327, 376, 346, 351, 418, 434, 440, 447, 453, 456; *idem*, *Régestes des délibérations du Sénat de Venise concernant la Roumanie* (Paris, 1958-1961), nos. 156, 347.

¹²¹ See table III for Trikanas, Kassandrênos and Tzykandêlêles and also Mertzios's list of Thessalonian *archons* in the Venetian period.

¹²² *Doch*, no. 11.

take and the implications that these could have for the act of donation itself. The story has been reconstructed as follows: the water-mill was built by a *paroikos* of Doukopoulos, Aretos, who kept half of it with full hereditary rights, whilst the other half was given to the monastery of Lavra. When Aretos died, his part of the mill was inherited by his three sons and divided into three equal parts. One of the sons, however, died childless and for this reason his part of the property became an *exaleimma*, an ownerless property. As such, it should have reverted to the state, but, as we have already seen, in the 14th century this right was unofficially reserved for the lord of the paroikos. Therefore, Doukopoulos became the master of one-third of the paroikoi's half, namely one-sixth of the whole mill. In actual fact, there was a co-ownership not only of the construction but also the revenues which were ceded through this act to Docheiariou. With this document Doukopoulos confirms the donation of the two brothers to the monastery and further bequeaths his own part.

Two points must be made here. Firstly, it appears that the lord was in the position to validate the actions of his paroikoi, even though they had the ownership of a property. Laiou, based on one more document,¹²³ adds two dimensions to the lord's validation, supporting that firstly, the land was an *exaleimma*; and secondly, it was consequent to the fact that co-ownership of the mill was established from the *very beginning*.¹²⁴ On a second level, there is the issue of legal validity of the act. In order to secure this transaction Doukopoulos religiously condemned anyone who might object and contest this whether his family members or his paroikoi, which means that such a possibility was existent. However, he did not find it necessary to refer to any kind of legal framework, apparently because this process of acquiring property was not legally valid but customary.¹²⁵ Evoking, though, the fact that the land was abandoned seemed to be enough for Doukopoulos to justify his act of donation.

¹²³ She refers to *Doch*, no. 40 which is discussed in section III/d.

¹²⁴ Laiou, *Ê agrotikê koinônia*, 196-197.

¹²⁵ *Ibid*, 118.

In other words, Doukopoulos essentially sidestepped the law, even though his act was customarily accepted, since he appropriated a possession that was clearly deserted and of no use (*kateirêpomenon*) and whose full ownership rights belonged to his *paroikoi*, and donated it to a monastery on the only condition that they commemorate his parents. Spiritual considerations must have definitely weighed upon his decision to proceed to this action, as in all this process there is nothing to suggest that he himself had any financial gains from this transaction. On the other hand, we must also consider that to retain one-sixth of a mill in ruins could not yield to him any significant profit, not to mention the fact that he ensured his parents' commemoration without having to give up any of his own actual possessions.

Finally, a further question that comes to mind when reading this document is the reason Doukopoulos opted to make this donation to Docheiariou and not to Lavra monastery which already possessed part of the mill and would have benefited from possessing it intact. One reasonable explanation might be that perhaps he had stronger relations with Docheiariou. Unfortunately, we have no definite answers for the fate of the mill apart from a vague reference of a *palaiomylos* in Hermêleia in 1321.¹²⁶ In any case, we cannot know whether Docheiariou managed to exploit it profitably or not, therefore it is not conclusive who- if anyone- benefited from this transaction in the end.

Mills were an important investment, as according to taxation rates one mill was equivalent to 100 *modioi* of top-quality arable land.¹²⁷ As shown earlier, a mill could be directly owned by the landlord and/or his *paroikoi*. In the latter case, it yielded profit firstly to the *paroikos* and further to the landowner through the tax or rent he extracted from its use. Moreover, keeping a mill in operation was advantageous to the community, particularly in the

¹²⁶ *Lavra* II, no.108.

¹²⁷ Laiou, 'The Agrarian Economy', 360.

case of water-mills which were used for irrigation, increasing in this way the fertility and productive capacity of land.¹²⁸

A water-mill was included in Manouël Devlitzênos's donation to Lavra.¹²⁹ Here there are no references to the type of ownership of this property but only to the fact that the mill was in use and in operation (*energês*). Since this particular water-mill was operating, we can assume that its donation would be to the profit of the monastery, while Manouël would lose a part of his income. Therefore it was unilateral profit. However, relinquishing the mill along with a number of other possessions was done on the condition that the donor would receive three lifetime pensions (*adelphata*) and thus this act must be considered as an exchange from which both sides would benefit.

Donations of co-owned mills in exchange for *adelphata* are met elsewhere. Let us refer here parenthetically to Thomais Palaiologina's donation of 1471. Thomais donated two water-mills which she owned together with two other individuals, whose social status is not known, in return for half an *adelphaton* amounting to 50 *hyperpyra*. Her share in the first mill was worth 12 *hyperpyra* and in the second 8 *hyperpyra*, whilst the rest of the total sum would be covered by other liquid assets.¹³⁰ Once again, this document serves as a proof of the fact that co-ownership could not stand in the way of an individual's wish to donate, apparently as long as this act did not disturb the operation of the mill, but also for a further reason; it informs us about the cost of an *adelphaton* in the second half of the fifteenth century, apparently 100 *hyperpyra*, an amount which seems to have been fixed since the middle of the previous century.¹³¹

¹²⁸ The *Farmer's Law*, the middle- Byzantine treatise, makes mention of the communal interest in the operation of mills; J. Lefort, 'Rural Economy, Seventh-Twelfth Centuries' *EHB* 1 (2002), 280.

¹²⁹ *Ibid*, no. 48.

¹³⁰ *Lavra* III, no. 173 (1381).

¹³¹ N. Oikonomides, 'The Properties of the Deblitzenoi in the Fourteenth and the Fifteenth Centuries', in *Charanis Studies*, ed. A. Laiou (New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1980), 184.

iv) *Urban properties*

The majority of donations of prominent individuals concerned assets in the countryside and to a much lesser extent properties with an urban setting. As a general remark, we may say that lesser known Thessalonians donated houses, gardens and vineyards either within the city of Thessalonikê or in close proximity to it,¹³² but regarding donations of higher standing individuals churches and monasteries are the most prevalent in the texts. In 1392, Dêmêtrios Tzyriggês donated a small monastery (*monydrion*), that of Iôannês Theologos, to the Thessalonian monastery of Nea Monê.¹³³ The *monydrion* did not always belong to him but was initially owned by another unnamed individual. Tzyriggês possessed a workshop (*ergastêrion*) in the yard of this small church and when a fire destroyed the property he bought it by means of his pre-emption right, reconstructed it and became its *ktêtor*, namely a lay patron. After forty years in his possession, he decided to donate both the *monydrion* and the workshop along with three pieces of land.

As has been suggested, this is one of the few cases of aristocratic patronage in Late Byzantine Thessalonikê as opposed to the growing activation in this sector of individuals of a religious background.¹³⁴ This together with the fact that in the end the *monydrion* changed proprietor mirrors once again the failure of laymen to sustain their properties. It is worth mentioning that Tzyriggês is an isolated example of a Thessalonian layman of the upper class donating a workshop to a religious foundation. This displays some interest, as it comes in contrast with the information we have about the possessions of high standing individuals in the city of Serres. There, they appear to own and donate various types of urban properties, such as workshops and bakeries,¹³⁵ but we are not in a position to securely explain this discrepancy.¹³⁶

¹³² *Xen*, nos. 10 and 28; *ChilP* I, no.85; *Vat* II, nos.85 and 146; *Doch*, no. 47.

¹³³ *Lavra* III, no. 153.

¹³⁴ Rautman, 'Aspects of Monastic Patronage', 53-74.

¹³⁵ Laiou, 'Koinônikes dynameis', 211, note 38.

Tzyriggês was not the only individual to donate a *monydrion* to Nea Monê,¹³⁷ neither did this monastery receive donations only from the inhabitants of Thessalonikê. In 1389, the *kaisar* of Thessaly, Alexios Angelos Philanthropênos, donated to this well-known institution the monastery of Hagia Phôtis.¹³⁸ Just a few years before, in 1384, he had also ceded the Kolydros *kastron*.¹³⁹ The 1389 document is important for the information it provides about the status of Alexios's property. The text reads that the *monydrion* and other landed properties were donated after arrangements with the Turks and 'in full freedom' (*eis pasan eleutherian*). Freedom here has apparently a fiscal connotation and refers to the immunity from taxes. Since Alexios had come to an agreement with the other party and his property was essentially privileged, we cannot suggest that the motives behind this donation were related to the protection of these assets by the Thessalonian monastery. Rather, it should be interpreted as an example of patronage, so his reference to the property's status aimed to emphasize that Nea Monê would also enjoy the same privileges. Since Alexios belonged to the highest levels of society, he does not fall into the category of local aristocracy that we study, but his example illustrates vividly the constant strengthening of Thessalonian religious institutions in that period. Although, in this case the donor did not require a pension as an exchange, we can assume that, apart from the social class of donors, another parameter for donating was age related. In other words, age and physical disability influenced their decision to donate, in order to secure sustenance in old age.

Certain other church donations must be seen exactly within this frame, as consequences of to the deterioration of the economic situation of the Thessalonian society and its weakness to

¹³⁶ Kazhdan wonders whether there is the possibility that monasteries were for some reason more 'active' in Serres and other smaller urban centres than that of Thessalonikê. See Kazhdan, 'Byzantine City', 15.

¹³⁷ The latter was a metochion of the monastery of Lavra, which was built probably around 1360 and survived most definitely until 1433. See G. Theocharidês, 'Dyo nea engrapha aphorônta eis tên Nean Monên Thessalonikês' *Makedonika* 4 (1955-1960), 315-351.

¹³⁸ *Lavra* III, no.151.

¹³⁹ *Ibid*, no. 150. For both documents, see also Dennis, *The Reign of Manuel*, 99-101.

cope with the expenses of their maintenance. On this issue, Arsenios's case provides us once again with material. Part of his donation concerned some residences in ruins in the district of Kataphygê, which also included the church of Kamariôtissa along with its surrounding area, apparently an orchard.¹⁴⁰ Even if studied in isolation from the rest of his donation, there is no doubt that the reason for this particular one was the non-exploitable state of the property.

From the fifteenth century, we possess a document where the reasons of the donation are explicitly stated and vividly reflect the conditions under which certain individuals had to give up their property. In 1420 a certain Maria Hagioreitissa assigned the *kellydrion* (small monastery) of Forty Martyrs to the monastery of Dionysiou.¹⁴¹ It is not possible to identify her and connect her to any of the known families of Thessalonikê, but she herself is clear about the fact that once she used to be well-off. However, her current state of extreme impoverishment and her inability to manage her hereditary property due to the straightened conditions of the time (*kairikês stenôseôs*), forced her to release the deserted *kellydrion* and one building she had bought in the past, both situated in the Omphalos quarter, in the centre of the city. It is characteristic that although she presents herself in a state of destitution, the only conditions she poses to Dionysiou is the inclusion of her and her parents in the *vrevion*, the reconstruction of the building and the church but not any other kind of financial commitment such as the provision of an *adelphaton*. An obvious explanation for that would be that the acquisition of the property by the monastery was not favourable in financial terms. The cession of possessions that could not produce considerable profit seemed to constitute a realistic impediment for the two parties in order to proceed with such an arrangement.

Returning to the case of Arsenios TzAMPLAKÔN, it is in this light that we should explain his donation to Vatopedi which took place in two consecutive years, 1355 and 1356, and with two different deeds. In the first one, he overtly states his intention to enter monastic life and that his

¹⁴⁰ *Vat* II, 107.

¹⁴¹ *Dion*, no. 19.

only aspiration is the salvation of his soul and not the acquisition of *any other adelphata*.¹⁴² In the following year he makes a supplementary endowment. This time he is more specific regarding his material expectations, which take the form of four pensions (*diakoniai*) that were to be reserved for his servants after his death, if these remained there as monks.¹⁴³ What presumably happened is that Arsenios had some preliminary discussions with the monastery during which he made known his wish to receive the pensions. In the first document, he must have taken it for granted that the oral agreement sufficed and he did not include any further details on this issue. However, in the second deed he is much more precise, which leads us to assume that further negotiations had taken place and perhaps Vatopedi demanded more assets in order to satisfy his wish and balance out the burden of the annuities.

Composing complementary documents for a dispensation of *adelphata* was not an uncommon practice. In 1369, the monks of Vatopedi confirmed that *mezas domestikos* Alexios Atouemês Metochitês,¹⁴⁴ uncle of emperor John V and son of Theodôros Metochitês, ceded his land in Styliarion –of approximately 13,000 *modioi*- and 200 ounces of ducats in order to be commemorated and 200, secure a *kellion* in the monastery as well as two *adelphata*. A month later Alexios required two more *adelphata* with a new document for the same amount of money.¹⁴⁵

Finally, the case of the family of the Devlitzênoi is well known and studied and it constitutes one of the main points of reference regarding the issue of *adelphata*. Based on this case, Oikonomides has shown that the agreement on the revenue was not always favourable to the lay recipient. The development of the story could be to his detriment and the party which normally profited was the monastery. He adds, however, the following dimension: that political circumstances and their impact on the productivity of land could affect the agreement and the

¹⁴² *Vat* II, no. 105 9.

¹⁴³ *Ibid*, no. 107 31-32.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid*, no. 129.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid*, no. 130.

value and the fortune of *adelphata* over a prolonged time span and hence this would prove to be a more complex affair to the detriment of the initial intentions of any of the two parties.¹⁴⁶

In order to assess the role and impact of donations in the society of the 14th and 15th centuries, we need to clearly identify the different motives which led individuals to release their possessions. The types of property conferred upon monasteries by laymen of a higher standing from Thessalonikê were for the most part lands or possessions, such as mills, located in the countryside. Within this group we also meet properties of a commercial character. Finally, donated urban properties were restricted to churches and monasteries but still their occurrence is not that frequent.

Herein, we need to distinguish between the properties donated in the first and in the second half of the 14th century. What surfaces from our documentation is that in the early fourteenth century most of the donations were made on the basis of the inability of individuals to effectively manage or exploit their properties mainly due to the lack of manpower. Therefore, ceding these to a monastery had as a primary goal to reverse the productive state of those properties. As most of these belonged to pronoiars who were essentially freed from fiscal obligations,¹⁴⁷ we cannot claim that these donations were directly linked to the wish of evading tax.

The same cannot always be claimed for donations made later in the 14th century. It is true that overall properties dispensed as an endowment would not yield substantial profit or could not be administered by their owner, as is revealed by the abandoned plot Arsenios TzAMPLAKÔN donated. It is also true, though, that areas that were once or probably still considered privileged in terms of natural resources and trade routes were also assigned to monasteries. The range of economic activities and sources of revenue of the donors other than land-associated give an

¹⁴⁶ Oikonomides, 'Deblitzenoi', 177-198.

¹⁴⁷ See section IV/c.

insight into the changing patterns that prevailed particularly around the middle of the 14th century and points into another direction regarding the motives of such endowments.

From 1350 onwards Mount Athos and its monasteries seem to have become a safer place to reside.¹⁴⁸ This in combination with the fact of the favourable attitude of Turks towards the monasteries in terms of taxation suggests that the Holy Mountain offered the chance to laymen to secure their lives and their properties, a situation which has been colourfully described as the ‘Switzerland syndrome’.¹⁴⁹ Although, therefore, individual motives for donating assets could vary, the principal impression is that of a disintegrating state of the local aristocracy who strove to secure its survival. Oikonomides’s ascertainment that from the second half of the 14th century the number of donations and the correlative sale of *adephata* increased as a response to the growing insecurity of the times, since they represented a means of insurance, is in full agreement with our material.¹⁵⁰ All of our cases of *adelphata* recipients come indeed from that period.

In sum, donations cannot be seen merely as a type of contract drawn up between two parties with no other socio-economic extensions. Donation was an institution that was moulded under certain external circumstances but at the same time it defined the path certain economic developments would take. That is to say, it was both a symptom and a cause of the weakening of certain social groups. The tendency of individuals to cede indefinite rights of ownership irrespective of any personal motivations and to formally secure these had a cumulative effect on the balance of economic power. So, while local aristocrats contributed unconsciously to their own undermining, monasteries, showing a high degree of pragmatism, became the real protagonists in the economic life of the period.

¹⁴⁸ E. Zachariadou E, ‘Some Remarks about Dedications to Monasteries in the Late 14th Century’ in *Mount Athos in the 14th-16th Centuries* (Athens, 1997), 27.

¹⁴⁹ Oikonomides, ‘Patronage in Palaiologan Mt Athos’ in *Mount Athos and Byzantine Monasticism. Papers form the Twenty-eighth Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies, Birmingham March 1994*, ed. A. Bryer, M. Cunningham (Birmingham, 1996), 100.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid*, 100.

III/ c. Asserting rights over donations.

i) Securing proprietorship

The monasteries seemed to be the party that actually benefited from donations, if one considers that in most cases they acquired full and irrevocable ownership rights. Regardless of any individual conditions attached to each donation, in the vast majority of our documents the donors specify that full property rights are vested in the monasteries. The terms employed are fixed and most clauses describe ownership with the terms *despoteia*, *katochê*, *nomê* and their variations. Interesting for its uniqueness is a term employed by Dêmêtrios Kavasilas that refers to the monks as absolute proprietors, that of *oikokyrioi*.¹⁵¹ In addition, the right to revenues (*prosodos*), whenever the donated property did or could potentially generate income, was again clearly stated. As a small note, it is perhaps not coincidental that in a text produced by another member of the Kavasilas family in order to oppose the policy of the state to confiscate church property, donations feature as a strong argument against such actions. It is supported that donations should be viewed like any other transaction of private nature such as that of sale, and therefore the recipient becomes full master (*kyrios*) of the bequest.¹⁵² This indirectly reinforces the argument that this type of transaction constituted a way of securing one's possessions.

Another point that must be made is whether there were any time restrictions to donations. In general, we notice that properties were dispensed in perpetuity (*eis dienekeis chronous*), the only exception being that of the *pronoiai*. In the donations of the unnamed *pronoians* of the first half of the 14th century that we discussed earlier, there are clauses on the temporary nature of this transaction. *Pronoiai* were initially granted on a short-term basis, a reality that is reflected here, as the monastery of Docheiariou was ceded the exploitation of the

¹⁵¹ *Vat* II, no 72 7.

¹⁵² I. Ševčenko, 'Nicolai' 'Anti-Zealot Discourse': A Reinterpretation', *DOP* 11 (1957), paragraphs 10-16.

property as long as these individuals hold their *pronoia*.¹⁵³ Marked is the contrast with the *pronoiai* that were donated in the second half of the 14th century, when the character of this institution was altered, as it became a family privilege and therefore permanent. The donations of the family members of the Devlitzênoi, Kavasilas and TzAMPLAKÔN are indicative of this change. When one reads the clauses reserved for this issue, it becomes apparent that they speak for donations that were not burdened with any kind of time limitations or were free (*eleuthera*) from any tax obligations.¹⁵⁴

In all our examples monasteries become full proprietors, with the right to exploit the property as they wished and with no hindrance from the donor or his family members. This was generally expressed in fixed wording, but in some instances there were more specific references to particular individuals who could contest the deed in a way designed to defend the agreement more effectively. When donating his piece of land near Galikos, Dêmêtrios TzAMPLAKÔN made sure to guarantee that his wife, Eudokia Palaiologina TzAMPLAKÔNissa, would not lay any claims to that property by invoking her legal right to retain her dowry as alienated by her husband.¹⁵⁵ In this way, all possibilities were covered and the rights of the monasteries fully protected.

One of the most detailed documents in the clauses safeguarding the status of the property following the donation is that of Kalavaris. The conditions under which the monastery would keep the property are well specified: none of Kalavaris's side, his children, a *kephalê* of *kastron*, a *sevastos* or other local authority could impose any kind of taxes or impositions on the monastery. What follows is an enumeration of impositions linked to the *kastron* of Rhentina, such as those of the Byzantine *parthenophthoria*, *phonikon*, *kastroktisia* and

¹⁵³ *Doch*, no. 13 9; no 14 6.

¹⁵⁴ *Vat* II, no 105, 22-23.

¹⁵⁵ *Vat* II, no. 118, 29-32.

others,¹⁵⁶ as well as a list of taxes of a Serbian origin. It is well known that during the Serbian occupation and the reign of Stephan Dušan, Athonite monasteries enjoyed a period of extensive grants, which strengthened their economic position. The few Byzantine officials who participated in Dušan's regime followed this policy and gave away a considerable part of their possessions, whilst those Byzantine aristocrats who opposed him were forced by circumstances to the same action.¹⁵⁷ According to a different view, Kalavaris was one of those *pronoïars* who were damaged by this change of political authority.¹⁵⁸ Yet, whether he belonged to the first or second category does not detract from the fact that this detailed enumeration of privileges sealed the agreement in the most advantageous way for the monastery.

As regards urban properties, the picture we form is quite similar. The conditions under which monasteries could hold the property highlight their advantageous position and the constant opportunities they had to augment their assets through endowments. There is only one document from 1324 which presents some interest in the sense that it reveals the fact that retention of usufruct after the donation was possible. Monk Lavrentios Kladôn proceeded to a donation of various types of property such as a small monastery, buildings, one vineyard and a piece of uncultivated land, retaining for himself the right to the revenues during his life.¹⁵⁹ Yet, Kladôn was not a member of the elite of the city but of a rather humble origin. This has been linked to the importance these small monasteries had for such founders, as they constituted their main source of revenue, essential for the survival of those and their families.¹⁶⁰ In none of our examples concerning upper class individuals do we meet this kind of arrangement and it appears that in general monasteries would draw profit as soon as they received the assets.

¹⁵⁶ For these taxes, see P. Charanis, 'The Phonikon and other Byzantine Taxes' *Speculum* 20 (3)(1945), 331-333; Sp. Troianos, 'Einige Bemerkungen über die finanziellen Grundlagen des Festungsbaues im byzantinischen Reich' *Vyzantina* 1(1969), 39-57.

¹⁵⁷ T. Maniatê-Kokkinê, 'Pronomiakes parachôrêseis tou servou autokratora Stephanou Dušan (1344-1355)', in *Byzantium and Serbia in the 14th century* (Athens, 1996), 326-327.

¹⁵⁸ *Lavra IV*, 120, note 404.

¹⁵⁹ *Xen*, no. 20.

¹⁶⁰ K. Smyrlis, 'Small Family Foundations in Byzantium from the Eleventh to the Fourteenth Century' in *Founders and Refounders*, ed. M. Mullett (Belfast, 2007), 114.

In order to protect the contract and its validity, there were certain formulations employed towards the end of each document that were supposed to function as a safety valve to any attempt to dispute the donor's decision on the part of his relatives. On the whole, these clauses had no legal foundation but solely a moralistic content, taking the form of cursing or religious rebuke. It seems that they sufficed to seal the agreement, if we take into account that these are found in the majority of our documents. More concrete legal formulas and means were not precluded, though are not met in donation acts as frequently as in those of sales and leases. One such example is that of Maria Angelina who found it necessary to include apart from maledictions a penal clause by stating that in case of infringement she would pay 100 *nomismata* to the monastery and the consequent fine to the fisc according to the law.¹⁶¹ It is worth wondering why she decided to make this commitment and not rely only on the most common practice of malediction, which was generally considered as a secure means of ratifying a document.¹⁶² One hypothesis is that she wished to give additional validity to the donation due to the complex nature of the property she offered. Her donation involved the estate of her late husband, Doukas Michaël Angelos, in Hagia Maria. One sixth of the property originated from the dowry of Doukas's first wife, which he received after her death in compliance with the legal stipulation according to which the surviving husband would acquire one third of his late spouse's dowry. Maria handed in the relevant document to Lavra but also considered it useful to provide further assurances to the monastery that the family of the first wife would not raise any claims to the property and nothing would jeopardize the transaction. The fact that Maria was a woman and according to the legal framework of the time not trustworthy does not seem to be a motive for the insertion of these penal clauses,¹⁶³ since in

¹⁶¹ *Lavra* II, no. 98, 37-38. (1304).

¹⁶² H. Saradi, 'Cursing in the Byzantine Notarial Acts: A Form of Warranty' *Vyzantina* 17(1994), 440-533.

¹⁶³ For legal restrictions imposed on legal actions of women, see H. Saradi-Medelovici, 'A contribution to the study of the Byzantine notarial formulas: the *infirmitas sexus* of women and the *sc. Velleianum*', *BZ* 83 (1990), 72-90.

other women's donations this element is not present. Therefore, our initial justification based on the parameter of future complications makes a stronger case.

For the sake of comparison and in order to reinforce our previous thesis, we should refer to a parallel document, chronologically earlier and concerning a family donation, that of the Spartênoi in 1265. In this affair, three brothers confirm the donation made to Chilandar by their late father, *pansevastos sevastos* Dêmêtrios Spartênos, and cede themselves further properties. Their financial warranty to the monastery and the state involved 1 *litra* of *hyperpyra* in case of infringement of contract.¹⁶⁴ We should note here that documents drawn up for affairs of the higher social strata were quite consistent in terms of language, and formularies followed certain patterns. Notarial clauses were frequently included by way of custom, so to a certain extent this could be a mechanical repetition, having not always a strict relation to the affair itself.¹⁶⁵ On the other hand, the cases of the Spartênoi brothers and Maria Angelina share common features which might indicate a necessity for the inclusion of such clauses. The properties of both were initially imperial grants and were transmitted to them as an inheritance. We have already seen the existent complexities in Angelina's case. The Spartênoi affair was more straightforward but involved three different individuals. It seems then that the penal clauses here were destined to prevent any future claims of any of the siblings. We are after all aware of cases from this period in which such kind of 'complexities' reversed a donation.¹⁶⁶

Finally, of interest is Tzyriggês's case on the issue of the validation of a donation and the likelihood of complications occurring. Tzyriggês states that the document was drawn up in retrospect to the act itself and presents the whole affair. In the past, he had made two separate donations to Nea Monê, those of his *monydrion* and his land in river Galikos. He claimed that at the time he did not draw any written agreement for either of them, considering that it was not

¹⁶⁴ *Chil* I, no. 7²⁵.

¹⁶⁵ V. Kravari, 'Les actes privés des Monastères de l'Athos et l'unité du patrimoine familiale' in *Eherecht und Familiengut in Antike und Mittelalter*, ed. D. Simon (Munich, 1992), 77-78.

¹⁶⁶ One such case is that of Philippa Asanina and other family members achieved to claim part of a donated property which will be discussed elsewhere. *Xer*, no. 26.

necessary due to his close relations to the monks, who considered him as one of them and hence there was no suspicion against him. For unstated reasons, he explains that a written confirmation was now necessary, adding that he had also confessed his good intentions in front of the patriarch. It is not conclusive whether a specific problem occurred, or the monks for reasons of their own decided to demand a proper written deed as security measures from possible future claims. One thing is certain though, that this case was important enough to reach the patriarchal synod for a settlement. The whole affair reveals that at times an oral agreement between the donor and the monastery was considered sufficient to validate this transaction but apparently only temporarily. In the end, a formal agreement was required in order to add credence to the donation.

ii) Complications in donation acts.

Despite the inclusion of warranty clauses in donation deeds, it is not uncommon to meet cases where the agreement between the donor and the monastery could be disputed by other family members, in most cases the heirs of the donor. In general, in the second half of the 14th century an increase in the number of disputes and settlement acts in all types of property transactions between the monasteries and laymen can be detected. Disputations over complications arising from certain donations can also be included into this rising trend, although similar cases are also encountered in the first half of the 14th century. The key characteristic of claims over donated property can be distinguished into two major categories: i) claims arising from particular political or economic circumstances and ii) claims arising from the assertion of familial property rights. They both feature as the main instrument used to invalidate a donation and reclaim part or all of the ceded property. The key point here is to appreciate the nature of these efforts initiated by the donor's relatives, the means employed and

whether they were clear-cut and solid enough to lead to the reversal of the donation. We will also examine the role of the monasteries in this process.

Our discussion commences with an examination of two documents in parallel that uncover several interesting points. A first observation is that any efforts directed at the annulment of a donation contract could be undertaken more than once and be based on different grounds each time as revealed in a document dated in 1328.¹⁶⁷ In this particular act, Maria Dikranê comes to an agreement with Chilandar monastery over some possessions that her first husband, *doulos* of the emperor, Iôannês Dragoumanos, had donated fourteen years previously in order to receive one *adelphaton* and secure the commemoration of the couple and their parents. The donation in question involved an *eukterion* with *kellia*, one vineyard and other land, which were Maria's patrimonial property. For two and a half years the agreement was honoured and the monastery proceeded to invest in improvements, but at that point the couple decided to sell off the property to the monastery due to financial difficulties they were facing. A compromise was achieved and on receiving seventy *hyperpyra*, the couple relinquished the provision of the pension and contented themselves with only their commemoration.

Maria's first husband died and she got married for a second time. For a period of ten years she raised no claims to the property, but later she came to the decision to assert her right to the whole property on the basis that she had been forced to proceed to this donation in the first place. The monastery resisted strongly and in the end after painstaking negotiations through mediators, a settlement was reached according to which Maria would receive 150 *hyperpyra* on the condition that ownership would be conferred on the monastery indefinitely and would never again be challenged. In order to seal the agreement more firmly, there was a warranty of 200 *hyperpyra* to be paid by Maria in case of violation of contract.

¹⁶⁷ *ChilP* I, no.117.

A dispute of similar nature was initiated by Philippa Asanina in 1349, who challenged the validity of her father's donation, claiming that the property ceded to Xeropotamou was her mother's dowry, raising therefore inheritance claims.¹⁶⁸ The document in question is an act of sale in which the whole affair is described. In more detail, Philippa's late father, Dêmétrios Asanês, had previously donated a plot of land with *paroikoi* and fruit trees to the same monastery in exchange for two *adelphata*, his funeral expenses and commemoration. However, his daughters, Philippa and Thomais, along with their maternal grandmother decided to claim the property as being their mother's dowry. At the time of the claim Philippa was a minor and therefore the whole process had to be carried out through the help of her relatives and a guardian, Petros Doukas Adrianos, who was designated by the well-known Thessalonian judge, Kônstantinos Harmenopoulos. A settlement was reached after Philippa's relatives concluded that the monastery should keep half of the property for the expenditures which had already been incurred for the commemoration of her father, whilst the other half would remain to the claimants. In contrast to the previous act, this one is not sealed with a financial warranty. This act was followed by the guardian's written statement verifying the validity of the process together with his personal assurances that the girl would not raise any claims to the land in the future.

What these two stories demonstrate is, first and foremost, the force and fundamental role of family property law in economic arrangements following property questions. Our claimants invoked rights emanating from the origin of the property which was in both cases patrimonial. The legal grounds on which Philippa founded her case were related to inheritance rights she laid on her mother's dowry. To be more specific, she utilised the lawful right according to which the ownership of a woman's dowry could only be passed on to her legitimate children.¹⁶⁹ On the other hand, Maria Dikranê claimed patrimonial property which she herself had brought

¹⁶⁸ *Xer*, no. 26.

¹⁶⁹ Harmenopoulos, *Hexavivlos*, 4.10.51.

to the marriage. The terms employed here to describe her possessions is *gonikothern* and *despotikôs*, meaning that her possessions were patrimonial and that she was vested with proprietary rights. From a terminological point of view, the wording cannot be safely taken as signifying a dowry as the genuine term for this is *proika*. However, if we combine the fact that both *proika* and *gonikothern* were used in the previous document interchangeably with the held opinion that the borders in their usage were not clear-cut in the Palaeologan period,¹⁷⁰ then the idea that we are dealing with dowry goods seems valid.

But how strong these women's arguments were and whether they were vindicated in the end remains an open question. At a first glance, and although we are not aware of the specific legal details, Philippa seems to have made a quite strong case by basing her demands on the argument of maladministration of her mother's dowry (*proika*). Women's dowries were traditionally protected by Byzantine law, as indicated both by its codification as well as surviving court decisions. Law decreed that a dowry was offered as a precondition for the economic security of the marriage and would be administered by the male spouse to that end,¹⁷¹ namely he held the usufruct and could exploit the assets in a way that would be profitable to the family. For that reason, in case of maladministration and damage to the value of the dowry the wife was normally vindicated in legal battles. This is the picture formed by civil and patriarchal courts' decisions from the Palaeologan period where the defence of women's ownership is a prominent feature, especially in cases where dowries were the object of sale transactions and borrowing activities initiated on the husband's part.¹⁷²

By donating the property, Philippa's father had not used his wife's dowry for any economic ventures but according to her he had actually spent it unprofitably. Turning to Maria

¹⁷⁰ A. Laiou, 'The Role of Women in Byzantine Society', *JÖB* 31/1(1981), 239.

¹⁷¹ Harmenopoulos, *Hexavivlos*, 4. 10. 26, 27, 50. For a general discussion of dowries in the Byzantine and post-Byzantine world, see E. Papayannê, *Ê nomologia tôn ekklesiastikôn dikastêrion tês vyzantinês kai metavyzantinês periodou se themata perioussiakou dikaiou*. (Athens-Komotini, 1997), 47-79.

¹⁷² R. Macrides, 'Dowry and Inheritance in the Late Period: some cases from Patriarchal Court' in *Eherecht und Familiengut in Antike und Mittelalter*, ed. Simon D. (Munich, 1992), 94; According to Laiou, 'The Role of Women', 237, the same applies to children and their inheritance rights.

Dikranê, we notice that in the document she presented herself quite assured that the reasons she projected were strong enough to lead to the repossession of the property and cause the discomfort of the other party. Still, no matter what was the legal strength of their cases, neither of the two women had their demands fully satisfied. Philippa had to compromise and receive half of her mother's dowry and Maria to content herself with a financial consideration.

Another point to be considered is the timing of these litigations and the question as to why the legitimacy of these donations was not challenged in the first place but only after the decease of the donor, two explanations suggest themselves. The first obvious reason lies in the fact that the administration of family property by male spouses was bound to the legal framework and had a long tradition in Byzantine society. Although these two cases cannot be considered conclusive as an indication of a new trend, still the fact that both our examples involve women cannot be coincidental and might reveal a shift in the attitudes towards property rights. Indeed, Laiou has shown that women's cases presented in front of ecclesiastical courts in the fourteenth century concerned in their majority disputes and issues linked to their property rights. At the same time, there was a tendency towards a relaxation of formal rules and a simplification of the manner in which the dowries were alienated, which could be corollary of the turbulent circumstances of the later period.¹⁷³ In other words, the changing political and social conditions induced frequent changes in ownership and accounted for the transformation of a long-standing institution and practice.

Our two examples tend to partially reinforce this finding, demonstrating that claims were made whenever a stringent financial situation called for this. As explicitly stated, the first time Maria Dikranê had to withdraw her donation was due this reason. In her subsequent and more confrontational attempt, the fact that she waited for a considerable amount of time after her second marriage before initiating a process against the monastery must imply that she did so

¹⁷³ Laiou, 'The Role of Women', 235, 238, 239 and 240. Laiou suggests that these developments led to the growing role of women in economic transactions which, when not performed as a result of financial pressure, could be taken as a sign of economic initiative.

when at a certain point she and her second husband confronted some kind of financial hardship. We cannot know whether Philippa claimed her mother's dowry driven by the same motives. We do know however that when her sister and grandmother died, Philippa decided to sell this half to Xeropotamou for a sum of 60 *hyperpyra*, in order to pay off her father's debts and because the invasion of the Serbs had rendered the land non-exploitable. Thus, even if a property was successfully restored to its previous owner, there was always the possibility it could return to monasteries through a different type of transaction, as a result of a person's deteriorating economic situation.

It can be seen from such cases that changing political and socio-economic conditions played therefore a pivotal role in the re-asserting of one's rights over previously donated property. Illuminating on this point is an agreement made between Theodôra, daughter of Devlitzênos, and the monastery of Docheiariou in 1419.¹⁷⁴ This case is also interesting for the additional reason that it provides evidence for the transmuted character that certain institutions had assumed by the Late Byzantine period. Theodôra's father had given away land in the area of Hermêleia, where the family held land in the form of a *pronoia*, and received 3 *adelphata* that later on passed on to his widow *according* to the law, as their daughter herself admits. What Theodôra objected to was the retaining of the land by the monastery after her mother's death. She held that she was the legitimate heir of the property since this was an imperial grant and therefore inheritable. The case was referred to the metropolitan of Thessalonikê, Symeôn, who after examining the long and complex history of those properties came to the conclusion that the monastery had acted lawfully and questioned the fact that Theodora, as an adult, did not claim the land during the period in which her mother was receiving the *adelphata*. However, he promoted an arrangement and decreed that the monastery should pay the *adelphata* to Theodôra for the current year as well as a sum of 12 *hyperpyra* in order to

¹⁷⁴ *Doch*, no. 57.

confront her financial difficulties and she, on the other hand, ceded ownership rights permanently.

So far, we have seen cases in which certain individuals raised claims on properties that had been donated by a member of their family that were legally concrete and fully justified. Completely different is the picture that emerges from a document drawn up in 1322, whereby we follow a complex story of subsequent invalidations of a donation contract on the part of the donor himself which ended to the detriment of the monastery. The act in question refers to the monk Iovanês (Iôannês) Karavas, the son of a well-off Thessalonian, Theodôros Karavas, who in 1314 drew up his testament bequeathing his substantial fortune to his family, certain priests and the monastery of Perivleptos.¹⁷⁵ Iovanês possessed an unknown number of houses in the district of Hagios Mênas and five vineyards in Thessalonikê (three in the area of Rhavdas, one in Piasmata and one in Agkônes) as patrimonial property. At a certain point he donated these to Chilandar monastery along with moveable possessions for the soul of his father and as a precondition for his entering monastic life.¹⁷⁶ Later on, however, we are told that he revised his decision to stay in the monastery, so he took back the possession of the residences and sold them in order to settle some financial differences with his stepmother and pay off certain debts. All vineyards, apart from that in Agkônes, would stay in his possession until his death, whereupon they would pass to the monastery's ownership. Apart from this information, there is no other hint either regarding the means he employed in order to achieve this repossession, or as to whether this had been a straightforward process. It appears, though, that a compromise had been reached, since the vineyards, potentially more profitable than the residences, would eventually return to Chilandar.

¹⁷⁵ *Chil* I, no. 30.

¹⁷⁶ From two *chrysobulls* - the first signed by Emperor Andronkos II Palaiologos and the second by the *basileus* Andronikos III - both issued in 1317 which confirm the monastery's possessions we extract the information that Iovanês had donated along with his 'fraternity' paternal property that was free of dues. *Chil* I, no.34₁₆₇₋₁₆₈, no.35₅₆₋₅₈.

Tension in Iovanês's relationship with the monastery was caused when he unilaterally chose to sell the vineyards and spent the cash he received for them. Chilandar opposed this sale claiming three of the vineyards which they eventually regained for an undisclosed price. Iovanês came back to the monastery to claim not all the vineyards, but just the one vineyard in Agkônes as well as all the movable assets he had donated, but after the mediation of a third party he decided to forego all these demands. However, this came with a price for the monastery as they had to pay 90 *hyperpyra* to Iovanês, apparently in order to prevent future suits from him.

Iovanês, thus, behaved in a rather fraudulent manner and his initial donation turned out to be in a way a financial burden to the Chilandar monastery. This particular individual seems to have had a long history of untidy transactions. In his father's testament, it is mentioned that Ioannês had received maternal property which he then sold to another individual. His father repurchased the property making use of the right of *eknikêsis*, namely the removal of the property from the buyer on the basis that this was sold by a person with no ownership rights.¹⁷⁷ Unfortunately, the details of the affair are not known but it is indicative of Iovanês's practices. This might be an isolated case but it shows that at times monasteries could find themselves in a disadvantageous position. That is not to reverse the general thesis that a chief way for monastic institutions to augment their property was donations and that they were the actual beneficiaries of such transactions but that there was always the possibility monasteries could become entangled in cases in which they had to defend even their lawful rights and interests against laymen's demands.

A final aspect to be addressed here concerning donations is that settlements of differences could also take the opposite course, namely a dispute over a piece of land could be resolved

¹⁷⁷ *Chil* I, no. 30₃₅.

through a donation-like arrangement, as in the case of Geôrgios Anatavlav.¹⁷⁸ This particular example offers information about the transition to the first period of the Ottoman regime in Macedonia and Thessalonikê in 1383-1403, and the way landed property was treated in those years. Anatavlav used to own an estate in Portaraia enclosed within land that belonged to the monastery of Esphigmenou. With the arrival of the Ottomans, the land was seized and conferred on a Muslim. The monastery after negotiations with the sultan and a certain Ali Pasha achieved the assignment of the land to its own possessions and Anatavlav's portion was appropriated by the monastery.

This is one of the documentary evidences used by Oikonomides in order to substantiate his argument, which has become a generally held opinion, that in this particular period the Athonite monasteries enjoyed a privileged status through agreements with the new ruler. He does so by presenting this act as an exception to the general rule that suggests the monasteries managed to retain and extend their properties.¹⁷⁹ Recently, this contention has been partly revised by other scholars, not by negating the very fact of the collaboration between the monasteries and the Ottomans, but questioning the extent to which this occurred. In other words, it is suggested that for the monasteries the transition to the new regime was not free of impediments, as according to fiscal and imperial acts coming from after 1403, when the area was restored to the Byzantines, it is deduced that during the first Ottoman occupation monasteries had actually suffered the loss of land and certain *metochia*, namely dependencies.¹⁸⁰ Regardless of these contrasting views, what is of importance to us is not actually the relationship between monasteries and the Ottoman regime, but to illuminate the fate of individuals in this situation, and their position in between these two poles which

¹⁷⁸ *Esph*, no.29.

¹⁷⁹ N. Oikonomides, 'Monastères et moines lors de la conquête ottomane', *SOF* 35 (1976), 1-6.

¹⁸⁰ K. Smyrlis 'The State, the Land, and Private Property. Confiscating Monastic and Church Properties in the Palaeologan Period' in *Church and Society in late Byzantium*, ed. D. Angelov (Kalamazoo, 2009), 72-73.

induced their gradual detachment from landed property and relinquishing their livelihoods and their incomes that derived from the land.

To continue with the affair, in 1388 and after a long contention with Esphigmenou, Anatavlas relinquished his part by agreeing to be awarded two *diakonai/adelphata* for Anatavlas and his son, Theodôros, on the condition that the former would enter monastic life. The annuities which were in the form of foodstuffs would cease at the beneficiaries' passing. Considering that even if the cost of the provision reached the standard rate of 100 *hyperpyra*, namely 200 *hyperpyra* for both individuals, the agreement would still be to the benefit of the monastery, as the estate was probably worth more.¹⁸¹ Consequently, Anatavlas agreed to a solution that would at least guarantee his own livelihood and that of his son.

Finally, quite striking are the closing sentences of the agreement where it is stated that Anatavlas would not contest the ownership rights of Esphigmenou on the estate even if the area reverted to Byzantine authority. This clause has been used as evidence to demonstrate that even though in general there was a continuity of Byzantine legal practices during the first period of Ottoman occupation, there were also instances which testify to an occasional disruption of these. It is assumed thus that Anatavlas was essentially forced into a situation which could not be resolved by referring to the authorities or through a judicial decision and that this was the reason the monastery proceeded to this kind of settlement.¹⁸² It is undeniable that at the time the monastery was in an advantageous position, whilst Anatavlas's hands were tied. Seen from a slightly different angle though, this clause is revealing of the uncertainty that the monasteries themselves were also experiencing. The fourteenth century saw repeated reversals of the

¹⁸¹ A. Laiou, 'Economic Activities of Vatopedi in the Fourteenth Century' in *Hiera Monê Vatopediou. Historia kai Technê*, ed. P. Gounarides (Athens, 1999), 67. By drawing a parallel with other cases, such as that of Devlitzênos, Laiou suggests that the value of an *adelphaton* corresponded to that of the donated property and therefore varied from one contract to another. Non-economic factors are considered as playing also a role in this variation, like those of political pressure and personal links to the monastery.

¹⁸² K. Smyrlis, 'The First Ottoman Occupation of Macedonia (ca. 1383-ca. 1403). Some Remarks on Land Ownership, Property Transactions and Justice', in *Diplomatics in the Eastern Mediterranean 1000-1500. Aspects of Cross-cultural Communication* A.D. Beihammer, M.G. Parani and Ch. D. Schabel (Leiden, 2008), 340.

political situation which accounted for the phenomenon of land constantly changing hands. In the area of Chalkidike particularly, where great landowners and monasteries held properties, there was the precedent of the Serbian occupation which had inflicted a blow against the standing property rights system.¹⁸³ This clause therefore was nothing else but an effort of the monastery to safeguard its interests in the event of a return to the Byzantine rule whose laws were expected to dictate the restitution of ownership rights. That was what actually had occurred in Constantinople after the Ottoman siege of the city between 1394 and 1402, the end of which saw a considerable number of cases brought to the patriarchal court by individuals seeking vindication of their property rights of which they had been deprived due to the ‘anomaly of the time’.¹⁸⁴

In order to draw some conclusions regarding the discussed documents, let us comment on some of their aspects concerning the way disagreements on donation acts were settled. Firstly, we should note that whether efforts to claim donated properties were successful in achieving their goal can only be evaluated if one attempts to discern the factual scope and motivations of the litigants by establishing patterns emerging from our documents. The common features that these disputes share are two: firstly, eventually a compromise was reached with the claimants either settling for a pecuniary compensation or a division of the property; and secondly, the settlement usually took place without the involvement of an official authority, with the exception of Theodôra Devlitzênê’s claim which was resolved by the metropolitan Symeon.

Starting with the latter, it is worth wondering why laymen who disputed donations did not carry the matters further, that is to a court, but rather opted for bilateral negotiations and reconciliations with the monasteries. Was this due to their awareness of possible inherent

¹⁸³ Chalkidike was occupied by the Stephan Dušan in 1345/6, recovered by the Byzantines in 1350 and in 1355 or 1356 came back to Serbian hands until 1371. See N. Oikonomides. ‘Oi dyo servikes kataktêseis tês Chalkidikês ton IDo aiôna’, *Diptycha* 2 (1992), 294-299.

¹⁸⁴ Macrides, ‘Dowry and Inheritance’, 90-91.

weaknesses in their claims? Was it a conscious course of action which aimed at temporary gain, or simply a sign of a partiality in the application of Byzantine law in favour of the monasteries? It would be interesting to be informed of the grounds on which Symeon based his decision to favour the monastery.

Without diminishing the role of the different facets and parameters associated with each case, the most likely explanation lies in the fact that claimants realised that land could be of no substantial profit to them, considering the difficulties in its exploitation imposed by the constant external threats and also their own lack of means due to the disadvantaged financial position to which they had been reduced. Therefore, it seems that ‘compensations’ in cash were very much sought after as a preferable and realistic solution to confront urgent financial needs or ensure a steady income even on a short-term basis. It is not even unlikely to assume that to a certain extent individuals demonstrated an opportunistic behaviour by trying out their chances in litigation. This is certainly apparent in the cases of Iovanês and Maria Dikranê who seem to have acted with some degree of calculation in order to force situations to their own advantage. In our two other examples, on the other hand, the fact that Philippa and Theodôra followed a different avenue in the sense that their argumentation possessed greater reliability and legality does not preclude the possibility that to a certain extent they acted in a similar fashion to the previous individuals. Regarding monasteries, on the other hand, we gain the impression that it was their fixed policy to promote an accommodating solution by accepting to release a certain amount of cash in order to secure in the long run their main source of income, namely landed properties.

Overall, what emerges from our documentation is an unbalanced situation in transactions between individuals and monasteries, with the latter being in the stronger position.¹⁸⁵ It cannot

¹⁸⁵ The advantageous position of monasteries in such disputes was maintained and reinforced during the Ottoman period. A case from 1491 regarding similar claims of Maria –Helena, daughter of the last Serbian despot Lazar, and granddaughter of the Despot of Morea, Theodoros Palaiologos, was examined by the

be denied that there were definitely individual motives and aims behind each dispute, but when studied collectively it is evident that they had a cumulative effect in the shaping of certain economic attitudes and practices whose main feature was the gradual disengagement of Thessalonian landowners from their properties. All these transactions are a peculiar amalgam of collaboration which served temporary needs but which at the same time cultivated an underlying antagonism between the monasteries and the Thessalonian upper class.

III/d. Acts of sale and lease.

Thus far, we have examined donations as a type of transaction, attempting to delineate its main facets and the motivational forces behind these deeds. Alongside donations, which constituted an idiosyncratic type of arrangement between laymen and monasteries in terms of character and scope, there were other more straightforward forms of property transactions such as sales and lease agreements. The frequency with which these occur in our material as detailed documented transactions and not simply in referential form - always regarding the local aristocracy of Thessalonikê- is strikingly less than that of donations. This has been marked as a prevailing trend in monastic archives in the post-1204 era with two main exceptions, the chartularies of Chilandar and Lemvos. This documentary predominance of donations over sales in particular has been partly explained on the basis of the importance of the properties that were acquired by the monasteries through this kind of transaction.¹⁸⁶ The picture is different, though, as regards disputes and settlement acts linked to sales and leases, which occur increasingly in monastic archives from the second half of the 14th century.

Ottoman *kadi* of Thessalonikê who in the end vindicated the monastery. E. Zachariadou, 'A Safe and Holy Mountain' in *Mount Athos. Byzantine Monasticism. Papers from the Twenty-eighth Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies, Birmingham, -March 1994*, ed. A. Bryer and M. Cunningham (London, 1996), 131-132.

¹⁸⁶ Smyrlis, *La fortune*, 150-151

In this part, we will discuss the range of economic exchanges between laymen and monasteries, as well as between lay individuals, that have been recorded and concern both landed and urban properties. One of the chief issues to be addressed regarding these economic exchanges is the conflicts these could generate at times between the two parties. This is unravelled by documents that concern various settlements of differences about land encroachments or complicated transaction cases. A second layer in the discussion will be to pinpoint the sectors of the economy in which individuals took part both in the city and countryside and as well to what extent these can mirror the orientation of the Thessalonian local aristocracy towards certain economic activities.

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Our few documents regarding sales of landed property derive for the most part from the second half of the 14th century and present their own specificities. Selling and leasing property is nothing new in our documentation but had a long history in the economic relations between monasteries and laymen and serves as a sign of their interdependency. But in Athonite archives there are also recorded instances, though much restricted in number, of transactions between laymen themselves.

One such case comes from the year 1368. It is about an act of sale drawn up and signed in Thessalonikê.¹⁸⁷ The object of sale was 11 *stremmata* of land near the *kastron* of Chrysoupolis by Maria Laskarina to *megas stratopedarchês*, Alexios. In contrast to local aristocrats whose connection to land was in general adversely affected in the later Byzantine period, as will be shown below, the highest layer of aristocracy was still in the position to accumulate wealth

¹⁸⁷ *Pant*, no.7.

from less privileged individuals. The most characteristic example is that of Theodôra Angelina Kantakouzêne, mother of John VI Kantakouzênos, who became the recipient of numerous parcels of land through mass sales, donations and property exchanges in the area of Serres and Zichna between 1337 and 1338.¹⁸⁸ For the most part, the sellers or donors were small landowners who released small parcels of land which collectively reached a total of 1,400 *modioi*. In both instances, the presence of these deeds in monastic archives can only mean that all these properties were later ceded to the monasteries.

The motivations behind a sale are not always stated in the documents. In some cases, however, it becomes clear that fluid political conditions played the principal role in influencing an individual's decision to sell his or her property. One of the political changes which had an adverse effect on landed properties was certainly the Serbian occupation. Due to its impact, it is mentioned in some documents as a justification for selling one's property. Interestingly, some of these are linked with the act of donation in some way or another. Previously, we saw Philippa Asanina claiming back her maternal property from Xeropotamou which had been donated by her father and sometime later selling it back to the same monastery on the grounds of the need to pay off her father's debts as well as the deplorable state into which her property had fallen into, generating no profit as a result of the invasion of the Serbs.

A similar reason was given by Anna Kantakouzênê Palaiologina, wife of *mezas domestikos* Dêmêtrios Palaiologos in 1373, for the sale to Docheiariou of her dotal land for the sum of 600 *hyperpyra*.¹⁸⁹ The piece of land, called Amariana, was situated in the area of Kalamaria and, according to Anna, remained intact while the area was under Byzantine authority. During the Serbian occupation however, Anna lost possession of the land apparently like many other great landowners such as the family of Devlitzênos.¹⁹⁰ When this was

¹⁸⁸ *Vat* II, no. 80. See also L. Mavrommatis, 'Notes sur la grande propriété en Macédoine 1337/1338' *Byzantion* 57 (1987), 74-92.

¹⁸⁹ *Doch*, no.42.

¹⁹⁰ Oikonomides, 'Deblitzenoi', 176-198.

reassigned to her, its state had been negatively affected, as it had been stripped of its labour force and thus generated no profit. In addition, she was not in a position to restore the land to its previous state. According to the contract, the two sides would come to an agreement for the price of the land, whilst the difference, which is not mentioned, between the agreed sum and the real value would remain with the monastery in order to perform the commemoration of Anna and her parents.

Here, we have a singular type of transaction in which sale and donation are combined, revealing the strategies followed in the Late Byzantine era to create protection barriers in sale transactions against any possible challenges. This argument has been put forward by Laiou who sees this phenomenon as an effort on behalf of the contracting parties to evade legislation against *excessive damage* (*hyperogkos vlavê, laesio enormis*), which was put in effect in the 10th century, regulating transactions and safeguarding the vendor's interests. More specifically, Byzantine law decreed that in case land was sold at a price lower than the just/fixed one, then there were two options: either the buyer could pay the whole price and retain the property, or the seller could return it by receiving the sum he had offered in the first place.¹⁹¹

By studying Anna's case, we can see how the fact that her sale was disguised as a donation worked as a preventive measure against disputations. Two years after the sale, the monastery of Akapniou put in doubt the validity of the whole transaction, raising demands on the property as the sale entailed aspects of pre-emption rights and took Dêmêtrios Palaiologos to the patriarchal court. The decision reached by patriarch Philotheos and the synod, which is preserved in the archives of Docheiariou, was in favour of Dêmêtrios Palaiologos and was based upon three juridical pivots: firstly, Dêmêtrios had announced the sale of the property but at the time no one had come forth to purchase it for its real value of 2,000 *hyperpyra*; secondly,

¹⁹¹ For a discussion of the document, see N.P. Matses, 'Zêtêmata ek tou thesmou tês protimêseôs en tô vyzantinô dikaiô' *EEBS* 36 (1968), 51-52; A. Laiou, 'Ê diamorfosê tês timês tês gês sto Vyzantio' in *Vyzantio: Kratos kai Koinônia. Mnêmê Nikou Oikonomidê*, ed. A. Laiou, A. Avramea and E. Chrysos (Athens, 2003), 342- 348, particularly 436-347.

he had actually donated the property to Docheiariou with the prospect of entering monastic life and by receiving 600 *hyperpyra*, a sum considerably lower than the estimated price; and finally, Akapniou was not entitled to claim the property recalling its pre-emption rights, since this should have been done within a period of six months and not two years.¹⁹²

Clearly, the patriarchal decision was partial and favoured Dêmétrios Palaiologos. First and foremost, it turned a blind eye to the fact that the act drawn between him and Docheiariou was titled a sale (*prasis, diaprasis*) and that the terminology used throughout the text was consistent with that (e.g. *diapipraskomen*), which leaves no doubt as to the nature of the transaction. Furthermore, the issue of excessive damage was not brought up at all but was concealed and sidestepped by sanctioning the transaction as a donation. The issue of surpassing the time limit to evoke one's pre-emption rights, on the other hand, seems to be the only one based on solid legal grounds and must have weighed heavily upon the patriarch's declaration against Akapniou's assertions.

The phenomenon of this mixed type of exchange is also met in urban properties which came to the monasteries' possession under favourable conditions, namely with reduced price. The earliest of our examples comes from 1315, when Nikêphoros Kladôn and his wife sold two houses and one yard to Xenophon monastery. Only half of the property though was actually sold for 36 *hyperpyra*, as the other half was donated for the soul of archbishop Theodosios, who used to be Kladon's protector.¹⁹³ A similar case is that of *hieromonachos* Ignatios (Chortatzês) who in the year 1375 donated to Vatopedi one quarter of his property which consisted of seven houses. The total value was estimated by Thessalonian archons to be 200 *hyperpyra*. Half of the remaining property was sold for 75 *hyperpyra*, while Ignatios also kept in his possession the other half.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹² *Doch*, no.43.

¹⁹³ *Xen*,no.10.

¹⁹⁴ *Vat II*, no.146.

That the ploy of selling property and presenting it as donation was a common practice in the 14th century, although with roots in the 10th century, becomes apparent from a judicial decision of the year 1391 coming from Thessalonikê.¹⁹⁵ Therein, the rights of a person to buy neighbouring property is protected by plainly setting the rules for distinguishing the two types of transaction. It is decreed, therefore, that when both sale and donation are met in an act, then a person is entitled to seek its invalidation by evoking his right of *protimêsis*. An act can be considered a donation only if there is absolutely no mention of a sale, rendering in this way void any attempt to challenge it.

As becomes apparent from Anna Palaiologina's case, the interpretation and application of law could diverge from case to case. But leaving aside any legalistic aspects, our example is important for the additional reason that it shows that prices were negotiated and therefore these cannot be safely used as indices for the price conditions in the real estate market. It is more than possible that in the majority of cases monasteries acquired properties at reduced price in this way. It also needs to be stressed that certain legal constraints, such as that of excessive damage, which had been created in the Middle Byzantine period to set a frame and protect fixed prices in the property system, were transformed in the later period, fulfilling the opposite role, that of giving a gloss of legality to transactions that were not consonant with the applied price system and leading to a disengagement from strict state control and greater freedom on an individual level.¹⁹⁶

The same line of development was followed in the case of pre-emption right (*protimêsis*). The legislation on neighbour's rights was established through the Novels of emperor Rômanos I Lekapênos in 922 and 934, although it pre-existed them. These were destined to protect the free peasants and soldiers, namely small landholders who constituted the backbone of the Middle Byzantine land tenure system and were the main source of tax income for the state, by

¹⁹⁵ M.T. Fögen, 'Zeugnisse byzantinischer Rechtspraxis in 14. Jh.' *FM* 5 (1982), 232-236.

¹⁹⁶ Laiou, *Hê diamorfosê tês timês*, 347.

limiting the rapacious accumulation of landed wealth by ‘the powerful’ (*dynatoi*). In substance, therefore, it served the fiscal and military policies of the Macedonian dynasty without this meaning that in the end it proved to be efficient and successful.¹⁹⁷ The basic principle on which *protimêsis* was based was that peasant holdings should by priority pass to other peasants. Thus, individuals who had the intention to sell their property were obliged by law to make this known firstly to their neighbours (*anakoinôsis*) and only in case of refusal they could consider to proceed to a transaction with another party. Initially, pre-emption right was applied to the transactions of sale, *emphyteusis* and lease,¹⁹⁸ but in the course of time it underwent various changes, and by the Late Byzantine period certain aspects of its nature and application had been transformed.¹⁹⁹ This is partly reflected in legislation, as according to the *Hexavivlos* in the later period *protimêsis* was only applied to sales although, as we shall see below, this was not always the case in practice.²⁰⁰

In Athonite documents, pre-emption right features quite frequently and it is evident that in the later period this had acquired a broader character in its application as it could be evoked not only by peasants but other social and economic groups too, such as monasteries, which by the later period had become perfectly entitled to exercise this right as great landowners. Further, it is met mainly in connection with disputations or security clauses and warranties intended to prevent future contestations. In the case of Anna Palaeologina, we have already seen that the neighbour’s right was used by Akapniou in order to lay claims on her property. In her sale-donation act the same institution is evoked as a safety measure against claims that Vatopedi too could potentially lay claim on the land on account of a mill it owned there. For this reason,

¹⁹⁷ For a discussion of the institution with examples, see G. Ostrogorsky, ‘The Peasant’s Pre-emption Right. An Abortive Reform of Macedonian Emperors’ *JRS* 37 (1947), 117-126; E. Papagianni, ‘*Protimesis* (Preemption) in Byzantium’ *EHB* 3 (2002), 1071-1082; also for a theoretical approach, see A. Kazhdan, ‘Do we need a New History of Byzantine Law?’ *JÖB* 39 (1989), 15-17.

¹⁹⁸ In the early Byzantine period *emphyteusis* referred to a kind of transaction possessing the qualities of both sale and lease, while the variation of *emphyteuma* in the 13th-15th centuries must be considered as ‘house rent’. *ODB*, ‘Emphytesis’.

¹⁹⁹ H. Saradi, ‘The Neighbors’ Pre-emption Right. Notes on the Byzantine Documents of Transactions’ *Diptycha* 6 (1994-1995), 267-289.

²⁰⁰ Harmenopoulos, *Hexavivlos*, 3,3,112, cited in, Matsês, ‘Zêtêmata’, 45, note 3.

Anna assured Docheiariou that she would step forward to preserve its rights in case of future complications originating in adjacency rights. This statement on its own is a further proof that the transaction was indeed a sale and would suffice to vindicate Akapniou's position, but judicial authorities, for reasons of their own, opted to overlook this fact.²⁰¹

As pointed out earlier, in the 14th century *protimêsis* was supposed by law to be related to sales but it also features in other types of transactions such as leases. This is the case of *vassilikos stratiôtês* Dêmêtrios Harmenopoulos, a pronoiar who in 1303 leased a number of 'abandoned' lands, mainly vineyards, to Xenophon monastery. The interesting point is that he was forced to annul a previous lease contract with Lavra after Xenophon invoked its pre-emption rights and the two monasteries came into conflict.²⁰² Therefore, an institution that was initially created to protect more vulnerable social groups in the later centuries was used variably, and laymen could be involved in conflicts with the monasteries over certain properties, or be called to intervene in order to protect monastic rights. Once again, this highlights the transformation of an institution which gave way to a subtle weakening of individuals' interests and turned the balance towards the expansion of monastic power.

It was not only the transformed character of institutions which operated at the expense of lay property but also disturbances in the property rights system from external factors. A unique case of dispute which concerns a lease and a subsequent settlement ratified by emperor John V Palaiologos, brings to light another type of financial operation in which laymen and monasteries used to take action and which could become the cause of a conflict. In 1350/51 a problem arose between Xeropotamou and the *oikeios* of the emperor, *skouterios* Indanês, when the former claimed that it was not in a position to honour their agreement about the mines in

²⁰¹ According to the commentary of the document the reason was to restrict the rapaciousness exhibited by Akapniou. *Doch*, 242.

²⁰² *Xen*, no.6.

Kontokrikou.²⁰³ Before 1346, these particular mines were possessed or operated by certain individuals who are not named and the revenues would be directed to the fisc, but after that year they passed to a new owner until the Serbs granted them to Xeropotamou.²⁰⁴ Up to that point, the monastery ought to give 20 *hyperpyra* per annum to Indanês. After the Serbian occupation, Indanês, with the support of the emperor, pressed charges against Xeropotamou claiming that the latter had broken the agreement and owed him money. In their defence, the monks argued that this had occurred due to the unrest caused by the Serbs. In the end, both sides proceeded to a compromise with the monastery paying 37 *hyperpyra* to Indanês retrospectively and receiving full ownership rights (*teleian despoteian*) of the mines. In addition, the monks appealed to the emperor in order to ratify this agreement and guarantee their property rights.²⁰⁵

To comment on this last point of imperial endorsement of private acts, we should note that imperial orders (*prostagmata*) ratifying acts was not an uncommon phenomenon, and in Athonite archives there is a frequent occurrence of imperial orders regulating monasteries' transactions as the ultimate entrenchment of one's proprietary rights. It must also be said that in the Late Byzantine period we have a new development regarding the way agreements were sealed. In the years after 1204, there was a new tendency in the compilation of notarial acts that departed from the norms of Roman tradition according to which the signatures of the notary and the witnesses sufficed for the validation of a document. Now, it was the signature of civil and ecclesiastical authorities that added further credibility and weight to a document. That of the emperor was reserved for cases of individuals of higher standing and the imperial circle.

²⁰³ *Xer*, no. 27.

²⁰⁴ *Xer*, no. 25.

²⁰⁵ The failure of a monastery to honour a transaction is met elsewhere. See for instance the dispute between Docheiariou and Doukas Glavas syr Mourinos over a piece of land that the former had bought from him but did not live up to the financial agreement. The case was finally settled by Patriarch Kallistos. *Doch*, 32.

What actually engendered this change in legal practice were the shifting political conditions, one of which was the falsification of documents.²⁰⁶

A typical example of this document fabrication practice was found in the period of Serbian occupation, which was often employed by potential property claimants as an expedient to assert rights or encroach on properties. One such case is that of a document supposedly signed by king Stephan Dušan according to which Vatopedi monastery was assigned various properties in Chalkidike.²⁰⁷ Quite a different method was adopted by Xeropotamou in its difference with Indanês. As already mentioned, the monks had suggested that the ending of payment to Indanês was due to the Serbian presence, an allegation that was far from true as the monastery had actually been granted the full possession of the mines by Dušan, a fact that was concealed during the proceedings. Hence, Xeropotamou practically won the case as it secured unshakeable property rights over the mines, this time through the validation of the Byzantine emperor.

Coming now to the question of the exploitation of the mines, this was a sector of economic activation for the state, the monasteries and laymen. In the early Byzantine period, the state exacted close control over this activity through a sophisticated system of extracting taxes from landowners and revenues from those who operated the mines. Throughout the centuries, mining changed character and acquired a simpler organisational form, whilst in the last centuries the fragmentation of the empire had a negative impact in mining activity and references to mines are restricted to certain areas such as that of Trebizond and Chalkidikê.²⁰⁸

²⁰⁶H. Saradi-Medelovici, 'La ratification des actes privés byzantins par une autorité civile ou ecclésiastique' *REB* 46 (1988), 167-180. Saradi considers that this development can be seen to a certain extent as an influence of Latin practices. For a more general discussion, see N. Oikonomides, 'Les temps des faux', in *Mount Athos in the 14th-16th Centuries* (Athens, 1997), 69-74.

²⁰⁷*Vat* II, 438-44.

²⁰⁸Matschke, 'Mining', 115-120; Sp.Vryonis Jr., 'The Question of Byzantine Mines' *Speculum* 37 (1962), 1-17; A. A. Bryer, 'The Question of Byzantine Mines in the Pontos: Chalybrian Iron, Chaldian Silver, Koloneian Alum and the Mummy of Cheriana', *Anatolian Studies* 32 (1982), 133-150. For the Ottoman period, see Murphey, R. 'Silver Production in Rumelia according to an Official Ottoman Report', *SOF* 39, 75-104.

Uncertainty also prevails as to the degree to which the exploitation of mining resources was exercised by the Late Byzantine state and the real contribution of the revenues to the fisc.²⁰⁹

Our documentary evidence points to a mixed type of exploitation of these resources, in the sense that the state preserved its control and apparently the right to a portion of the revenues by allocating them to monasteries or individuals in the shape of a grant (*pronoia*). Interestingly, this information is gleaned from two *chrysobulls* of Stephan Dušan in which the Serbian emperor makes donations and establishes the status of certain monastic possessions, among which were certain areas of mining production. Parenthetically, as to the reason Serbian authorities proceeded to the granting of such resources, we can hypothesise that this was within their broader policy of acquiring the support of monastic institutions which was considered vital, even if this meant the cession of profitable activities to them. Furthermore, in the fourteenth century Serbia had become an important centre in the sector of metallurgy with operating mines such as those of Kopaonik and Novo Brdo yielding considerable revenues and thus they could probably afford to dispense certain newly acquired mines in Chalkidike.²¹⁰ On the issue of the growing economic power of monasteries, it is quite striking that certain Athonite monasteries had also a share in the revenues of the Serbian mines. Such is the case of Vatopedi which in 1417 was granted by Serbian Despot Stephan an annual revenue of 60 *litrai* from Novo Brdo as well as the nearby village of Koprivnitsa. This was exempted from any taxes and impositions necessary for expeditions against the Turks.²¹¹

But to come back to the exploitation status of the late Byzantine mines, in 1347 the monastery of Lavra was confirmed by Dušan the previous possession of a part of certain mines near Serres and was also granted the other half. These mines are characterised in the document

²⁰⁹ Matschke, 'Zum Anteil', 49.

²¹⁰ Vryonis, 'The Question', 3, 13, 15.

²¹¹ A. Solovjev and V. Mošin, *Grčke povelje Srpskih vladara. Diplomata graeca regum et imperatorum Serviae* (London, 1974), 298-305.

as *dêmosiaka* and *pronoïastika*, namely imperial grants with fiscal liability.²¹² It is also mentioned that Lavra would receive 600 *mazia* of iron per annum from the mines of Trilision and Vronteôs,²¹³ therefore there was an agreement which divided the production and revenues of these resources between the state and the holders.

In a similar fashion, the Kontokrikou mines mentioned in Xeropotamou's archives were initially exploited by laymen who were answerable to the fisc. With the emperor's *prostagma* and the settlement in favour of Xeropotamou it is clear that the tax was received by Indanês and it is reasonable to infer that he did so as a *pronoïar*. This is another case in our series of examples which exposes the detrimental effect of the Serbian invasion, particularly upon the class of the *pronoïars*. Once again, it is characteristic that Indanês did not challenge the ownership of the mines nor did he request a return to the previous status quo of the mines. One may wonder about the reasons Indanês chose to compromise with a financial compensation and did not insist on the return to the previous status, since it is known that mining activities could be considerably profitable. A characteristic example is that of Iôannês Laskaris Kalopheros who belonged to the Constantinopolitan elite and was active in mining enterprises all over the Balkans and probably Chalkidikê from 1360 onwards.²¹⁴

With regard to Thessalonikê, all references to laymen involved in mining come from the first half of the 14th century and are linked to those holding the title of *chrysepilektai*.²¹⁵ For the second half of that century we lack any relevant information, whilst the next occurrences in documents are met in the period of the Venetian domination of Thessalonikê and pertain to Thessalonians making enterprises not in their city or its broader area, but in Ragusa. Thus, we are informed about a certain Theodore Catharo and Johannes Caloianni Russota involved in a

²¹² *Lavra* III, no. 128 27-29.

²¹³ *Ibid*, line 33.

²¹⁴ Matschke, 'Zum Anteil', 51ff.

²¹⁵ Thessalonian *chrysepilektai*: 1) Spastrikos Geôrgios (1314), *PLP* no.26510; 2) Rhammatas Geôrgios, *megalodoxôtatos* (1326), *PLP* no. 24078; 3) Kavakês Athanassios, *megalyperochos* (1327), *PLP* no. 11015; 4) Veaskos Michaêl (1327) not in *PLP*; 5) Veaskos Simôn (1339), not in *PLP*.

dispute with a Ragusan, who were both most probably related to activities linked to the trade of metals.²¹⁶ Manifestly, this gap in information in the years around and after 1350 sketches the vulnerable position of laymen and the ground the monasteries were steadily gaining at their expense.

Up to this point, we have examined conflicts between laymen and monasteries which manifest the latter's aspirations over private property and the methods they employed to acquire it. However, friction between these two parties could also be caused by machinations that were, or at least alleged to be, initiated, from the opposite direction. One such instance concerns a piece of land in Hermêleia which became the object of contention that took on considerable dimensions, as higher authorities were called in to settle the issue. The case was brought by Docheiariou monastery in 1355,²¹⁷ which claimed that its rights over the land, previously sold to it by the *epi tou stratou syr* Mourinos, had been infringed by *mezas hetaireiarchês* Tarchaneîôtes. According to the monastery's allegations, Tarchaneîôtes had trespassed against the property in question, alleging that *syr* Mourinos had revised his initial decision and ceded it to him. In order to ascertain the truth of the matter *syr* Mourinos was called in by the patriarch himself and attested that he had never considered entrusting the land to Tarchaneîôtes. Additionally, he wrote a letter to the trespasser clarifying his position that he had never encouraged him to disturb the monastery.

Of similar nature, or at least presented likewise by Docheiariou, is the affair which concerned property unlawfully appropriated by laymen. The property in question concerned the belongings of the monk Isvês who became a member of the monastic community of Docheiariou around 1355 and at a certain point was transferred to a dependency (*metochion*) in Thessalonikê. After his death, probably in 1360/61, certain issues arose between Docheiariou

²¹⁶ B. Krekic, *Dubrovnik (Raguse) et le Levant au Moyen Âge* (Paris, 1961), nos. 686, 688, 690, 691, 695, 697, 699, 702, 708, 709, 718, 721, 808, 810. See also Matschke 1991/2: 58-62.

²¹⁷ *Doch*, no. 31.

and the *kavallarios* Dêmétrios Trikanas as well as his son-in-law, Kaloêthês. The two cases were examined separately and by a different authority, but are interrelated and characteristic of the efficiency of monasteries in protecting their interests regardless of how well-founded or not their claims were.

On a closer look, in 1361 Docheiariou took action against Trikanas who, according to its claims, had appropriated part of the property of the late monk Isvês which consisted of one vineyard and 157 *hyperpyra*.²¹⁸ The monastery accused Trikanas of having had no right to distribute this sum to his son, his son-in-law, Kaloêthês, and certain other individuals for charity upon the decease of the monk. The case was examined in the palace of Thessalonikê by a committee composed by six *higoumenoi*, as experts in monastic affairs, and empress Anna of Savoy who presided during the hearings. To defend his action, Trikanas contended that he was entitled to dispense Isvês's cash as the latter was not a monk, but had been dismissed by the monastery. The monks of Docheiariou countered his argument by suggesting that Isves was just transferred to their *metochion* in Thessalonikê and was their *megas oikonomos*. Moreover, there was no testament or witnesses testifying for Trikanas's position and therefore the decision issued was in favour of Docheiariou.

However, whether the right was on Docheiariou's side is questionable. Very often, individuals wishing to enter monastic life made a donation of their possessions, called *apotagê*, to the monastery they had selected normally after their tonsure.²¹⁹ The fate of their possessions after their decease was clearly defined by law. The monks could draw up a testament even after their tonsure leaving their possessions to their heirs and keeping a part for themselves which would eventually pass to the monastery. In the case of no existing testament, the heirs would receive a certain part of the monk's belongings and the rest would remain with the monastery,

²¹⁸ *Doch*, nos. 34 and 35.

²¹⁹ R. Morris, *Monks and laymen in Byzantium, 843-1118* (Cambridge, 1995), 192, 197; Smyrlis, *La fortune*, 136-138.

whilst if he died heirless, the monastery kept rights to the whole property.²²⁰ This last stipulation offered the basis on which the decision in favour of Docheiariou was founded.

Still, there are a couple of shady points and contradictions in this case. Firstly, the *metochion* seems to have set no obstacles to Trikanas acquiring the 157 *hyperpyra* most probably because it recognised it as his lawful right. Secondly, there is strong doubt as to whether Isvês died heirless since in the decision there is the mention that among the people to whom Trikanas distributed the money were also the monk's heirs. Thus, there is enough evidence to suggest that the decision was not impartial, but favoured and supported Docheiariou's interests.

The second case over which the monastery was vindicated by empress Anna and a committee of *archons* concerns a dispute they had with Kaloêthes. This case has several aspects and is unravelled in three separate documents. The first mention of the affair is in the 1361 *horismos* of Anna of Savoy, to whom Trikanas and Kaloêthês claimed that they had bought a vineyard from Isvês for 50 *hyperpyra*.²²¹ Following his death, the monastery claimed the land and succeeded in acquiring it. Although Kaloêthês supported that an act of sale had been drawn up, this was considered invalid as the compiler of the document, *prôtonotarios* Sotêriôtes, and other witnesses, suggested that no payment had taken place in their presence, and therefore the transaction was invalid. For that reason, it was decreed that the vineyard should pass to the possession of the monastery.

A few months later, Kaloêthês restored the vineyard to the monastery and received a sum of 55 *hyperpyra* which covered the sale price as well as the expenses for the improvements he had undertaken in the meantime.²²² Finally, in 1366 after the death of Anna of Savoy Kaloêthês incited by his father-in-law attempted to reopen the case and claim the 50 *hyperpyra* that he

²²⁰ Harmenopoulos, *Hexavivlos*: 5. 4. 5-6.

²²¹ *Doch*: no. 35.

²²² *Ibid*, no. 36.

had given to Isvês.²²³ The committee of archons to whom he presented his demands discouraged him from proceeding and only *hieromonachos* Grêgorios declared that he was prepared to consider dispensing the sum to Kaloêthês as long as the latter could provide sufficient evidence for the transaction. The affair ended with Kaloêthês presenting himself penitent and withdrawing from any future claims.

The issue that arises here is why Kaloêthês returned in 1366 to claim the price paid for the vineyard for a second time since he was compensated for that in 1361 and with an added amount of money. There is the suggestion that this was actually a manoeuvre employed by Docheiariou in order to avoid the loss of the property in case the sales act was found. Thus, the monastery forced Kaloêthes to make a false declaration about him receiving the contended sum so as to shield its interests.²²⁴ Kaloêthês, on the other hand, probably realising the vainness of the whole affair decided to end it with an admission that he had been misled by other individuals and a subsequent statement of apology.

Leaving aside disputes about immovable assets, there were also those concerning strictly liquid assets. Such is the case of Alexios Komnênos Masgidas who in 1374 initiated a process against Lavra monastery contesting his uncle's will.²²⁵ Alexios's uncle, Kônstantinos Masgidas, had sold to the monastery grain for which he received 400 *hyperpyra*. After his death Alexios raised demands on this sum proclaiming hereditary rights. This led to a friction between the two sides and the affair was about to be examined in court. At that point, Alexios decided to withdraw, for as he states, he was afraid of the uncertain outcome of a court battle, and opted to settle the difference by receiving 1/10 of the amount, that is 40 *hyperpyra*, providing certainly all the necessary assurances that he and his family would not disturb the monastery in the future. Worthy of note is the reason he offered about deciding to compromise: an anticipation for a negative result at court. This might mean that he was either aware that his

²²³ *Ibid*, no.38.

²²⁴ *Ibid*, 220.

²²⁵ *Lavra* III, no.145.

claim was groundless, in which case the general impression we have about individuals displaying at times opportunistic attitudes in order to access cash is reinforced, or perhaps that there was the possibility the monastery would enjoy a favourable treatment by the tribunal as in our previous example.

The picture about sales and leases of urban properties in terms of the frequency of their appearance in the archives is quite different from those taking place in the countryside, as we notice a larger concentration of these in the first half of the 14th century compared with the second. Also, the documents that describe disputes are isolated. Most of the properties sold to monasteries were buildings and residencies, but some of them concerned vineyards, gardens and wine-presses, or other types of land, such as fallow fields.²²⁶ With very few exceptions, most of the individuals we meet cannot be safely linked to the local aristocracy of Thessalonikê. Still, all these cases are indicative for the economic life of the city and the exploitation of its assets by monasteries and their *metochia*.

In terms of productive capacity, the type of urban property featuring quite often in our deeds is gardens and particularly vineyards within the city or located in close proximity. These were donated to monasteries,²²⁷ exchanged with other properties,²²⁸ or sold.²²⁹ In addition, there were other types of land which were leased in order to cultivate vines.²³⁰ These transactions did not necessarily take place between monasteries and Thessalonians,²³¹ but were also carried out between laymen.

For some individuals, exploiting ‘urban’ land as a consequence of the devastation of the countryside could turn out to be a lucrative economic activity but could also become the object

²²⁶ See *Chil* I, no. 16; *Iv* III, no.84; *ChilP* I, no.125; *Vat* II, no. 121.

²²⁷ *ChilP* I, no.85; *Vat* II, no.85; *Xen*, no. 28; *Doch*, no. 47.

²²⁸ *Vat* I, no. 50; *ChilP* I, no.97.

²²⁹ *Vat* II, 121.

²³⁰ *Vat* I, nos. 32, 44 and 59; *Vat* II, no. 86.

²³¹ M. Kaplan, ‘Quelques remarques sur les contrats de bail pour les vignes du monastère Vatopedi’ in *Vyzantio: Kratos kai Koinônia. Mnêmê Nikou Oikonomidê*, ed. A. Laiou, A. Avramea and E. Chrysos (Athens, 2003), 283-295.

of contention. A much quoted example is that of the Argyropoulos family and their dispute with Iviron monastery over a complex of gardens (*kêperivolia*) situated outside the Golden Gate of the city.²³² The family leased the property in 1404 from the monastery for 30 *hyperpyra*, one year after the restoration of the city to the Byzantines. They then divided the property in parcels which they sublet to five other individuals. From them they received payment in rent and in kind, namely part of the vegetable production which presumably was channelled to the market. The initial rent of 86 *hyperpyra* – considerably higher than the amount the Argyropouloi had to pay to the monastery gradually rose to 115. In 1416-17, the family engaged in several improvement works, mainly in relation to the irrigation of the gardens by preserving or opening new water channels. In 1421, Iviron decided to annul the lease through the intervention of the archbishop and put forward a series of arguments against the family. First, the monks maintained that the lease contract was not valid. An earlier attempt, after 1408, to invalidate the contract was successful but the Argyropouloi managed to retain the property. The second allegation was that they had started to treat the property as their own, whilst the profit made by the exploitation should revert to the monastery. The Argyropouloi consistently avoided a confrontation at court but managed to make known some of their contentions, such as that they had spent the outrageous sum of 17,000 *aspra*, approximately 1,214 *hyperpyra*, which after a hearing from the builders proved to be only 59,5 *hyperpyra*. Despite the family's machinations and various delays in the legal process, Iviron managed to win the case.

It is justifiable to suggest that when leasing the property to the Argyropouloi, the monastery aimed at its preservation and moderate revenues perhaps on a temporary basis, if we consider that the gardens were situated outside the walls and there was always the risk of a blockade and a consequent devastation. But when their exploitation became a viable business Iviron could

²³² Matschke, 'Die Schlacht', 159-175; A. Harvey, 'Economic Conditions in Thessaloniki between the two Ottoman Occupations', in *Mediterranean Urban Culture 1400-1700*, ed.A. Cowan (Exeter, 2000), 119-120.

not content itself with just the payment of the rent while having no share in the profit. Similar activities must have been undertaken by other citizens but this is the only tangible example.

To sum up, through the examination of acts of sale and lease we attempted to delineate the course that the relations of Thessalonian upper classes with their land took in the fourteenth century. Their property ended up in the hands of the monasteries either through direct exchanges or in a circular manner through individuals of the highest class or aristocratic background who could acquire properties and then pass them on to monastic institutions. There were also certain types of arrangements which had as an aim to conceal the real sum involved in sales in order to eliminate the consequences of law, whilst the transformation of the institutional framework contributed also to the strengthening of monasteries at the expense of laymen. Finally, by particularly focussing on examples of disputed properties and problematic agreements between lay individuals and monasteries, it became clear that in the vast majority of cases the latter managed, justifiably or not, to acquire from the authorities decisions favourable to their own interests and damaging to the other party.

IV. THE THESSALONIAN FAMILY AS A SOCIO-ECONOMIC ORGANISATION.

IV/a. The nature of Byzantine family

One of the constituting elements and social units of Byzantine society, performing also an economic role, was the family. In the 6th century, its structure was crystallised in the form of the nuclear family, demonstrating a noticeable stability as opposed to its Western counterpart, which was modelled upon clan and extended kinship ties.¹ Nevertheless, this initial tight/closed system did not remain static but underwent several modifications throughout the centuries. The nuclear organisation of the Byzantine family persisted until certain socio-economic conditions imposed a restructuring and opening of familial ties and ascribed to it western-like characteristics mirrored in the introduction of a patronymic system to the Byzantine aristocracy. This development is placed by certain scholars in the 11th century,² whilst others have suggested that its roots can be found even earlier, in the 9th to 10th centuries, probably extending back to the 8th century.³ The key difference, however, with the West was that in Byzantium this system did not obey a strict linear pattern according to which only the paternal name was inherited. On the contrary, it was looser in its application as the maternal side also played a role in the shaping of familial structures, leaving space for opportunities in the ascension of the social ladder and consequently facilitating social mobility.

Distinct also was the economic dimension of the Byzantine family revealed by its interrelationship with the state. From the 8th century onwards, the household was recognised as a fiscal unit, and during the 9th and 10th centuries military households became a main

¹ A. Kazhdan, 'Small Social Groupings (Microstructures) in Byzantine Society', *JÖB* 32/2 (1982), 3-4.

² *Ibid.*, 4.

³ E. Patlagean, 'Les débuts d'une aristocratie byzantine et le témoignage de l'historiographie: système de noms et liens de parenté aux IXe-Xe siècles' in *The Byzantine aristocracy, IX to XIII centuries*, (*BAR International Series 221*) ed. M. Angold (Oxford, 1984), 23-43.

source of revenue for the imperial fisc. This fiscal system that placed family households in the centre of its practice was sustained also in the later centuries. There is abundant material for the peasant society of Macedonia in the 14th and partly 15th century furnishing information about its structure and internal dynamic. In tax registers (*praktika*), tax-payers were counted on the basis of households with each member being recorded. The head of the family, normally a man, was responsible for the fulfilment of fiscal obligations, but women could also perform the same role in case of widowhood. In terms of structure of these fiscal units, it has been noticed that the least privileged households were nuclear families, whilst different and more extended patterns existed for the wealthier ones.⁴ Nevertheless, regardless of any variations the nuclear formation remained the most prevalent element of this social stratum.

In the Late Byzantine period, the family retained the characteristics of an economic unit, becoming involved in various types of economic activity. This can be detected in several contemporary texts and documents, which unfortunately offer hints rather than a complete understanding of the function of family in activities other than land-based ones. Relying on circumstantial references, Matschke has argued for signs of instability in the family relations of craftsmen and professionals based in urban centres as opposed to the countryside and the individuals attached to the soil. He observed that there is a mixed picture of the way craftsmanship operated in conjunction with the continuity of the profession from father to son. Thus, on the one hand, we meet instances in which family members collaborated in practical issues of everyday life, e.g. sons working together with their father in the family workshop and at times following his profession. On the other hand, a break in that tradition along with an existing weakness in the transference of material

⁴ See whole discussion in Laiou, 'The Role of Women', 101-149.

wealth are detectable. The co-existence of these two trends attributes a quite volatile character to this social group.⁵

Regarding the upper layers of society, the aristocratic household (*oikos*) also constituted an economic cell present throughout the Byzantine period, but the most informative texts about the structure and possessions of those households are testaments and *typika* in monastic archives. These provide hardly any concrete evidence about the internal structure and evolution of the *oikos* in the course of the centuries which on the contrary is available for other social and economic organisations.⁶ It is worth mentioning that in Byzantium the practices followed in the transference of property never distanced themselves from the norms and fundamental operation of the Mediterranean family, whereby one of the major characteristics was the inheritance patterns, which obeyed the rule of the division of patrimonial property among all children. Primogeniture was never favoured and whenever attested in sources it must be regarded as symptomatic and definitely not suggestive of a generalised trend or an established system. A fuller reconstruction of this system can be achieved through a careful examination of recorded transactions between members of the elite and monastic institutions, offering an insight into several issues relating to the administration and division of family property.

In the discussion that follows, we explore two general themes. Firstly, the administration and division of property belonging to the Thessalonian elite seen not as a social class, a problematic concept in itself for this period, but within the framework of *family* as an economic organisation. This will allow us to define the way this social group operated and whether it possessed those structures and mechanisms which would lead to a greater autonomy in the management of family wealth and give an impetus to its economic

⁵ K.-P. Matschke, 'Bemerkungen zu den Mikro- und Makrostrukturen der spatbyzantinischen Gesellschaft' in *Acts of the XVIIIth International Congress of Byzantine Studies, Moscow 1991*, ed. I. Ševčenko and G. G. Litavrin (Shepherdstown, 1996), 397-403.

⁶ P. Magdalino, 'The Byzantine aristocratic *Oikos*', in *The Byzantine aristocracy, IX to XIII centuries*, (*BAR International Series 221*) ed. M. Angold (Oxford, 1984), 92-111.

activities. Further, we will study the institution of *pronoia*, referring briefly to the way it emerged and was perpetuated, but mainly insisting on the way it developed in the Late Byzantine Period. Our purpose will be to re-examine the hereditary character that has been attributed to it.

IV/b. Division and administration of family property

In order to appraise the role of the Thessalonian elite family within the system of social and economic relations prevailing in the Late Byzantine society and integrate it into our broader theoretical framework, we must turn our attention to the quality of this social structure by attempting to assign to it characteristics which pertain to two central concepts, *individualism* and *collectivism*. The specificities and the complex character of these two notions have been pinpointed earlier,⁷ but as a reminder we need to mention that traditional views of these constructs suggest that individualism generally releases creative forces in the form of personal interest and by extension economic growth, while collectivism typifies behaviours of conformity which become an impediment to development. Yet, this approach is now considered quite misleading and has been revised to a more flexible and realistic model which considers that societies and communities can combine both features.

Studying kinship and patterns of division and administration of family property is central to a better understanding of the aforementioned issues, as they can provide indices for the interrelation between culture and the direction that an economy follows. A study that discusses the family structure and operation in England from the 13th to the 18th centuries, has argued that the relaxation of family ties and dispersion of family property shaped new socio-economic conditions and accounted for the phenomenon of individualism which gave

⁷ *Supra*, 135-136.

an impetus to the economic development of the country.⁸ In the case of Byzantium, the issue of individualism is more perplexing and appears to be consonant with theories which reject the concept of one-dimensional societies. Byzantine individualism, thus, is considered to be quite distinct from the modern one which is founded on self-belief, self-interest and individual action. On the contrary, its foundations must be searched in the lack of ‘substantial social links’ which essentially left individuals feeling unassisted and forced them to shield themselves behind family structures.⁹

It is then due to this particular structure that the family demonstrated a remarkable degree of solidarity and stability, and remained a prominent feature in the Byzantine world as corollary of the combination of social conditions and a strong safety net created and enforced by Byzantine legislation. What needs to be seen is the information that surfaces from our documentation regarding the administration and transference of family property in the fluid environment of the later Byzantine period. The main aim will be i) to attest whether and to what extent family property rights conform to the idea of collectivism or individualism, ii) whether we can notice a transformation in the structure and function of the family due to internal and external factors or a combination of both.

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The value of notarial acts of Mount Athos’s archives for the study of late Byzantine society is undeniable, although it is questionable whether they depict a case in all its details and aspects, a fact that depends largely on the ability and the intentions of the compiler.¹⁰ Nevertheless, regardless of any shortcomings, the documents that concern the upper layers of Thessalonian society are more sound than those drawn for peasants and contribute to our

⁸ Macfarlane, *English Individualism*.

⁹ Kazhdan, ‘Small Social Groupings’, 6-7.

¹⁰ Kravari, ‘Les actes privés’, 77-78.

understanding of the manner they treated their property in terms of its administration and transmission.

Broadly speaking, the inheritance system consisted of two main types of transmission, dowries and testaments. As regards dowries, we have already seen that these constituted one of the fundamentals of family property law, which was very often recalled in cases of disputed properties. According to the Byzantine legislation and custom, both parts of the couple should bring property into the newly founded household. The wife brought her dowry (*proix*) and the male spouse the *theorêtron* and the *hypovolôn*, which functioned as a guarantee against any possible loss of the wifely property.¹¹ Men could also receive a dowry, as we can see in the example of Alexis Laskaris Atouemês Metochitês whose father bequeathed him land described as *proikôan*.¹² During marriage, it was the male spouse who bore the responsibility for the administration of the common property. The aim of these financial endowments was to provide the couple with an economic basis on which to set up their conjugal life. This initial transference of wealth from the paternal to the conjugal household could be well followed by further redistribution of wealth following changes of familial relations.

Hence, three issues that immediately arise are what the property that was brought into the marriage through dowries consisted of, whether this could generate profit, and what its fate could be. Although a dowry could involve both movable and immovable assets, landed property is the most frequently recorded due to its importance in terms of value and the type of our sources which involve mainly land transactions between individuals and monasteries. In the majority of cases, therefore, dowries involve parcels of land and at times are combined with various types of buildings. For instance, our already familiar Maria Dikranê

¹¹ J. Beaucamp, 'Proikohypovolôn-hypovolôn-hypovallô' in *Aphierôma ston Niko Svorôno* (Rethymno, 1986), 153-161. For dowry and other financial arrangements in a marriage, see also Harmenopoulos, *Hexavivlos*, 4. 10-14.

¹² *Vat II*, nos. 129, 130.

had brought to her marriage not only land, one vineyard and arable land, but also buildings.¹³ We have no proof that these buildings brought profit to the family in any way, but there is also nothing to suggest the opposite. In the city of Thessalonikê, buildings were probably leased, but most commonly in our sources they were the object of donation or sale by the owner, whether a layman or a monastery, in order to be exploited by the other party.¹⁴ Thus, we cannot determine with confidence the extent to which this type of property would contribute to the economic benefit of the couple, but it seems natural to suggest that landed property was actually the most important asset and the easiest to exploit profitably.

A case from 1304 reinforces this contention and demonstrates the way couples exploited dowries in order to extract a steady income from them. In that year, Dêmétrios Philanthropênos decided to relinquish an inherited piece of land to Michael Proeleusis.¹⁵ The plot, which included a stream and was situated in Halmyros, was his mother's dowry (*gonikoproikimaian*) and during their marriage she and her husband leased the land to Michael for an annual rent of 15 *hyperpyrika kokkia*. Lease was a permissible kind of transaction for a dowry, whilst donation and sale were forbidden by law, as they were essentially against the primary objective of nuptial gifts, that of financial security. It was only in the extreme case of poverty that the sale of a dowry, but only of movable assets, was permitted.¹⁶ Yet, reality suggests otherwise and, as is often the case, social practice did not always conform to formal rules. Again, in his will, drawn up in 1314, Theodôros Karavas mentions that he had sold one vineyard which formed part of his second wife's dowry.¹⁷ As revealed from the content of his will, Karavas was a wealthy individual, possessing an extensive property consisting of 14 houses, various types of land as well as liquid assets, which in no case can justify this sale on the grounds of financial exigency. In actual fact, he

¹³ *ChilP* I, no.18.

¹⁴ *Vat* II, nos. 110, 115, 139.

¹⁵ *Chil* I, no. 22.

¹⁶ Harmenopoulos, *Hexavivlos*: 4.10.35.

¹⁷ *Chil* I, no. 30.

had liquidated the dowry, but in his testament he made sure to compensate his wife by offering part of his own property to her. Finally, we have already seen that dowry assets were also donated, an act that could cause conflicts and at times the annulment of this type of transaction.¹⁸

The number of surviving marriage contracts is very limited, none coming from our period and area of study. In this absence of material, perhaps one of the most illuminating documents featuring in detail the types of assets brought into a marriage through dowries, their importance for the economic livelihood of the couple as well as their fate after the decease of the male spouse is that referring to Maria Devlitzênê, widow of Manouêl.¹⁹ Maria was Manouêl's second wife who stemmed from the prominent family of the Angeloi and brought a quite substantial fortune to her marriage. We are aware of the specific content of her dowry due to an act that was drawn up in 1384. In that year, Manouêl lost his life fighting the Turks in the battle of Chortaitês, and soon after the event Maria hurried to cement her rights over her dowry assets by arranging a census of the couple's belongings.

On entering married life, the value of Maria's dowry was 1,584 *hyperpyra*, consisting of houses, one vineyard, clothing and jewellery. To this sum, an extra amount of 528 *hyperpyra* was added, that is one third of the previous sum, reaching a total of 2,112 *hyperpyra*. For her compensation, the committee subtracted the value of the current household property and added 138 *hyperpyra* that were missing from her additional dowry (*epanôproikon*), her grandfather's inheritance which was received during her marriage, her mourning expenses and her alimentation for the current year. Yet, the amount of compensation was still short by 780 *hyperpyra*. The solution advanced was to assign to her the landed properties of her husband which, however, could not be evaluated due to the prevailing turbulent circumstances. Maria would retain the rights to the profits of the land

¹⁸ See section III/c on complication in donations acts.

¹⁹ *Doch*, no. 49.

and when circumstances permitted, namely with the cessation of warlike activities, another evaluation would take place in order to reimburse the amount owed to her.

This issue of the evaluation (*diatimêsis*) of the dowry at the moment of its cession to the couple was central to the decision of the committee to guarantee a second estimation in order to fully compensate Maria. Byzantine law made a clear distinction between evaluated and non-evaluated dowry which affected its fate after the decease of one of the spouses. In broad terms, a woman had increased rights when the value of her property had been clearly established from the beginning of the marriage, so if her assets were damaged in any way, her husband had the obligation to make a refund of their initial value through his *hypovolon*. In the opposite case, the wife was entitled to a return of the remaining property.²⁰

Naturally, as is usually the case, there were deviations from the formal constraints and different interpretations of the law, which had an impact on the way this was applied. For instance, a 14th century stipulation by an anonymous author departs from the legal norms through an attempt to lift some weight from the shoulders of the husband and limit his financial obligations towards his spouse.²¹ Herein, we have a novel approach to the issue of compensation utilising the assets of the *hypovolon*. On the whole, the spirit of the text does not depart considerably from the established practice which dictated that the husband's counter-gift (here the term *triton* instead of *hypovolon* is used) ought to be utilised for reimbursement only in the case of the *evaluated* dowry.²² It does provide, though, that this should involve not the case of damaged dowry but only the property which had remained intact. In this way, the husband would reimburse only part of the assets. Regardless of such kind of developments and deviations from the norm, the fact remains that in the main dowry

²⁰ Harmenopoulos, *Hexavivlos*, 4.10.1.

²¹ Fögen, 'Zeugnisse', 262-266. The author of this legal text is considered to have worked outside the two urban centres of Constantinople and Thessalonikê.

²² *Triton* refers to the value of the *hypovolon* which in Late Byzantine period equalled 1/3 of that of the dowry.

assets had a particularly privileged treatment in the legal sphere as well as in common practice.

In our census, consideration was also taken for Manuel's children through one of the final clauses which stipulated that they could receive their father's property *on the condition* that some part of it would remain after a future evaluation. To place a wife's rights before those of descendants was not uncommon. *Megas stratopedarchês* Dêmêtrios TzAMPLAKÔN emphatically declared in his testament that the first to be financially satisfied through his assets would be his wife and subsequently his offspring.²³ It is interesting to note here that this strong defence of dowry assets could potentially turn out to be to the detriment of the lawful rights of the deceased husband's offspring. The clause about Manuel's children has been interpreted as an effort to safeguard the rights of his biological heirs in case Maria had more children from a possible future marriage.²⁴ This reading, though absolutely correct, fails to reveal the other side of the coin; that if Maria did acquire more children, then she could bequeath her dowry to them which, being restored with a part of Manuel's assets, would comprise part of his lawful heirs' property. We notice, therefore, an undermining of inheritance rights by the rights relating to dowries and a clear tension between them, concomitant of the social reality and the restructuring of kinship ties and households, but also supported by the legal framework. To put it differently, Byzantine law in its effort to create a safety net for dowered women could undermine other processes and even facilitate the channelling of property to households other than those that were initially intended for. This fact ascribes to dowries an idiosyncratically dynamic character.

As far as we are aware, Maria Devlitzênê did not marry again and therefore the conjugal property would remain with the children she had with Manouêl. However, second marriages were a quite common phenomenon, resulting in the redirection of the first wife's

²³ G.I. Theocharides, 'Eine Vermächtnisurkunde des Grossstratopedarchen Demetrios TzAMPLAKON' in *Polychronion, Festschrift F. Dölger* (Heidelberg, 1966), 490.

²⁴ Oikonomides, 'Deblitzenoi', 197, n. 59

dowry, or better a part of it, to new households. Such as is the case of Maria Angelina who received through her husband, one-third of his previous spouse's dowry that ended up in the monastery of Lavra as a donation.²⁵ This probably occurred because the first marriage produced no descendants who would have rights over the property. On the contrary, Theodôros Karavas also retained part of his first wife's property (1 vineyard and 5 *modioi* of land), but because there were children he passed it on to them. Of course, there might have been a transitional period in which the holdings remained in his possession. During that time, he would have the chance to exploit them profitably, augmenting the rest of his property and contributing to the finances of his second household.

The complexity and changeability of human relations inevitably resulted in an assortment of patterns in the division and distribution of dowry assets. This is depicted in a remarkably intricate case which describes the path a certain dowry followed, changing hands and ending up being the subject of a court hearing. In 1315, the patriarchal court examined the dispute between the families of Grêgorios Moschopoulos and Kouroulakês.²⁶ The latter married off his daughter with Magantênos, giving her a dowry of 16 *hyperpyra*. The marriage produced one daughter, but shortly Magantênos died and his wife proceeded to a second union with Patrikios. This time, her father's bequest was 4 *hyperpyra*. From the total amount of 20 *hyperpyra*, 5 were handed over to Patrikios. The couple acquired two children and the marriage ended with the wife's death.²⁷ The fate of her dowry was the following: her daughter from the first marriage received 7 *hyperpyra* and the other two siblings the remaining sum (13 *hyperpyra*). However, the children died, leaving no testament behind. Patrikios then remarried to the daughter of Moschopoulos, receiving from

²⁵ *Supra*, 167-168.

²⁶ H. Hunger and O. Kresten, *Das Register des Patriarchats von Konstantinopel. Edition und Übersetzung der Urkunden aus den Jahren 1315-1331*, vol.I (Vienna, 1981), no. 22.

²⁷ Normally, what would happen after the wife's death was that her dowry would remain with the husband who ought to pass it on to the children, unless the marriage contract dictated another kind of arrangements. See D. Simon, 'Das Ehegütterrecht der Pira. Ein systematischer Versuch' *FM VII* (1986), 213-214.

him 27 *hyperpyra*. He died after a period of time, leaving no heirs from this union. His wife's family, therefore, claimed the dowry as well as the counter-gift. The former was restored *in toto*, but this was not the case for the latter due to lack of capital. So, Moschopoulos decided to claim the inheritance of Patrikios's deceased children, that is to say Kouroulakês's grandchildren. Kouroulakês's side argued that the grandmother of the children who had outlived them used their share to dower her surviving granddaughter. In the end, the court accepted these claims, declaring that the girl's dowry should remain untouched. It also pronounced that the inheritance of the deceased children ought to be reconstituted through Patrikios's 5 *hyperpyra* and anything that had remained from their mother's property and then divided into three parts. The first would satisfy Moschopoulos's demand, the second would remain with the grandmother and the last one was to be distributed by the church for the commemoration of Kouroulakês's daughter and her children. When reading this story, it becomes evident that the entrenched character of dowries could bring about successive restructurings of family properties which could be perpetuated over a long period of time.

At times, judicial decisions concerning family property rights would be based on the existence or absence of testamentary evidence. When a certain Gudelês remarried and fathered children, the first wife's brother decided to defend his only niece's interests and claim her mother's dowry.²⁸ This consisted of vineyards which had however been bequeathed to Gudelês by his in-laws through a marriage contract, and the affair had been verified in their testaments. A pre-nuptial contract was a private act which was considered valid only if no other legal impediments existed, such as a testament which contradicted its content. The court, taking into consideration the existence of the testaments, issued a favourable decision for Gudelês who managed to secure his rights to the property.

²⁸ D. Simon, 'Erbvertrag und Testament', *ZRVI* 24-2 (1986), 303-304. This document comes from the 13th century court records of the archbishop of Ochrid, Dêmêtrios Chômatianos.

On the contrary, the absence of a testament had a negative result for a Devlitzênos, who was accused of unrightfully retaining his wife's dowry.²⁹ The story is as follows: Anna Sarantênê Indanina got married twice. In her first marriage, she gave birth to three children and at some point she was widowed. She then got married to Devlitzênos with whom she produced no children. When she died, he appropriated her dowry and additional assets brought to the marriage (*exôproika*). This raised a protest by her sister who in 1348 brought the case to the patriarchal court, claiming the property on behalf of her nephews and niece. Due to the fact that there was no testament to support Devlitzênos's actions, it was stipulated that part of the property should return to Anna's children.

These are only a few illustrative examples about the complications in the transmission of marital property emerging with remarriages, as well as the strong position of dowry rights in this process. But they also bring to light a broader theoretical question with obvious extensions in the application of law and its influence on the character of a society: that of certain types of contracts superseding others. The tension mentioned earlier between dowry and inheritance rights seems to be linked with our theme of 'individualism' versus 'collectivism'. In Byzantine legal theory, there was actually a permanent conflict between private contracts and testamentary ones, which related to the tradition that each legislator or legal theorist followed. The ascription of greater validity to private contracts stems from the Hellenistic mentality, which laid particular emphasis on the rights of the individual, whilst testaments were perceived as being closer to group interests by means of protection of lineage.³⁰

²⁹ H. Hunger, *Das Register des Patriarchats von Konstantinopel. Edition und Übersetzung der Urkunden aus den Jahren 1337-1350*, vol. II (Vienna, 1995), no. 152. That this particular Devlitzênos can be safely identified with Manuel has been argued by Oikonomides, 'Deblitzenoi', 194, n.25.

³⁰ Simon, 'Erbvertrag', 305-306 for a comparison of Eustathios Rhômaios and Dêmêtrios Chômatianos, two representatives of these two different tendencies and also, *idem*, 'Vertägliche Weitergabe des Familienvermögens in Byzanz', in *Hommes et richesses dans l'Empire byzantin, VIIIe-XVe siècle*, ed. V. Kravari, J. Lefort and C. Morisson, vol.II, (Paris, 1991), 185-195.

This issue is not irrelevant to another kind of oscillation between ‘individualism’ and ‘collectivism’. These concepts can find a schematization in proprietary rights as these are expressed in certain patterns of administration and transmission of property within a marriage. The notional division of rights into collective and individualistic ones can be examined through a proposed scheme which differentiates ‘family property’, from ‘maternal/ paternal’ ones (*mêtrôa/patrôa*).³¹ At the level of conjugal property, collectivism can be typified in the administration of the assets by the male spouse in agreement with his wife, and the rest of the legislative norms regulating dowry goods, as these have been described so far. This system, though complex, was supposed to inscribe the main principles of the function of the family unit via a quasi-cooperation between the couple, at least on a theoretical level. The category of patrimonial property differentiated itself from this idea to the degree that it entailed greater freedom in the disposal of possessions and was not bound by mutual agreement. In simplified terms, spouses had the absolute ownership of their paternal or maternal possessions and disposed them according to their wish. This bipartite scheme can be tested in various examples of couples transacting their property. It remains to see then i) whether the decision about the fate of conjugal property was taken conjointly and ii) in cases of a person disposing patrimonial property, whether the other spouse had absolutely no role in the decision.

Based on our documentary evidence, two general premises should be tested regarding a couple’s common decision on the fate of conjugal property. Firstly, that such decisions were expressed through the usage of the plural. In 1309, Iôannês Andrônas and his wife, Anna, sold to Chilandar three houses without referring to the provenance of the property.³² It is evident that they acted together, as they speak in the plural (*pipraskomen*). Theoretically then, we are dealing with family property. This is contradicted, however, by another

³¹ Simon, ‘Verträgliche Weitergabe’, 193-195. For the purposes of my analysis, I will employ the terms ‘conjugal’ for the former and ‘patrimonial’ for the latter.

³² *Chil* I, no.25.

document. Euphrosynê and her husband also used the plural when composing the act, but here it is clearly stated that the property belonged to her, as it was her uncle's bequest.³³ Secondly, that conjugal agreement is linked to the usage of terms with the sense of consent (*synainô*, *synainetês*) on behalf of the husband. A certain Theodotê, for instance, was dowered with a house (*gonikoprokimaion*) which she sold to Vatopedi with her husband consenting to the deed.³⁴ However, the husband's consent is also met in the case of Evdokia who donated land which was clearly a patrimonial holding.³⁵ To answer, therefore, the questions posed above proves trickier than expected, as a distance between theory and praxis can be attested and the line between absolute and common administration of conjugal and patrimonial property respectively seems at times blurred.

Leaving aside conjugal households, let us now turn our attention to paternal ones and the manner patrimony was transmitted to descendants, as this had an impact on the way it was administered in the Late Byzantine period. The privileged position that dowries occupied in horizontal relations has its parallel in vertical ties in the form of offspring's rights to patrimonial property. Byzantine law was remarkably protective towards inheritance rights, prescribing that all descendants were entitled to a share of the patrimony. The size of this share depended of course on various parameters, such the existence of already dowered children, informal arrangements as well as personal inclinations of the parents.³⁶ In general, however, legislation promoted an equal treatment of the heirs which found its best expression in the stipulation that concerns the eventuality of parents dying intestate, in which case all heirs would receive the same size or amount of wealth.

³³ *Vat* I, no. 28.

³⁴ *Vat* I, no. 65.

³⁵ *Xen*, no.30. For a discussion of further examples, see Kravari 'Les actes privés', 77-88, particularly 78-85.

³⁶ R. Macrides, 'The Transmission of Property in the Patriarchal Register' in *La transmission du patrimoine: Byzance et l'aire méditerranéenne*, ed. J. Beaucamp, G. Dagron (Paris, 1998), 179-188.

The concern about the allocation of wealth to all descendants had a negative effect on the integrity of the patrimony. In order to combat this problem, families devised the system of joint ownership that was applied either on a formal or an informal basis.³⁷ The core idea was that patrimonial property, divided or not, would be exploited as a single unit. Exploitation did not necessarily entail ownership. Otherwise stated, members of a family could own a certain portion of the patrimony, but they would cooperate in matters of administration, purchase, sale or even donation and have a say about their relatives' property. A few examples will follow in order to lay this system bare and highlight a few of its aspects.

In an act of 1335, confirming the possessions of Xenophon monastery, we find a reference about the donation of the monk Ignatios Sarantênos and his brother Diomêdês, which was made with the consent of their two other brothers.³⁸ This leaves little doubt as to the status of the property and the fact that it was administered jointly, but there were times when the general responsibility of the administration was assumed by one member of the family. In 1265, three brothers, Iôannês, Kônstantinos and Michaêl Spartênos, donated to the monastery of Chilandar land and other possessions.³⁹ Although the adopted wording gives the impression of a joint decision, the fact that the document was signed only by Iôannês allows us to assume that he probably had a leading role in the administration of the holdings.⁴⁰

Quite intriguing is case of the patrimony of Arsenios TzAMPLAKÔN and his siblings. As we have seen, Arsenios made a large donation to Vatopedi. Among the assets, there was

³⁷ A. Laiou, 'Marriage Prohibitions, Marriage Strategies and the Dowry in thirteenth-century Byzantium' in *La transmission du patrimoine: Byzance et l'aire méditerranéenne*, ed. J. Beaucamp and G. Dagron (Paris, 1998), 149-150.

³⁸ *Xen*, no.23.

³⁹ *Chil I*, no.7.

⁴⁰ A similar observation has also been made by Kyritses, *The Byzantine Aristocracy*, 186.

paternal land near the Galikos.⁴¹ Half of the piece was owned by Arsenios and the other one by his brothers. Arsenios seems to have acted independently, making no reference to an approval by his brothers or an agreement with them. We also know that later his brothers donated their part jointly.⁴² It appears then that for some reason only half of the patrimony enjoyed the status of joint administration. In the same plot, there was also the Slanesion tower which was built and initially exploited solely by Arsenios. He later decided to let his brothers have a share, ceding one half of it to them. This makes even clearer the picture we have about the different kind of exploitation in place. It is also noticeable that when relinquishing part of the tower Arsenios made sure to retain the pre-emption rights over it. In the later period, this institution underwent a transformation; in Byzantine conscience and custom, this right had come to be exercised primarily by virtue of affinity, constituting another device to avert the flow of property out of the family.⁴³ Apparently, Arsenios wanted to keep his options open for a future purchase of the remaining property by making use of this very right.

One last issue to be addressed is the prevalence of male kin in our examples which, in all likelihood, is not coincidental. By receiving dowries, women caused the diffusion of the patrimony, removing a portion of it from the control of their natal family. So, the rest of the patrimony and its administration would remain in the hands of the male members. Such is the case of the Tzamlakôn family. The plot by the Galikos was halved between the brothers after their sister, Tornikina, had received part of it for her dowry and, as it seems, she had no involvement in the administration by any means.⁴⁴ It has been argued, on the other hand, that on certain occasions dowries not only did not discourage but, on the contrary, promoted the adoption of this kind of arrangement. Thus, if a daughter left the area in which the

⁴¹ *Vat II*, no. 107.

⁴² *Vat II*, no.135.

⁴³ E. Papagianni, 'Vorkaufsrecht und Verwandtschaft' in *Eherecht und Familiengut in Antike und Mittelalter*, ed. D.Simon (Munich, 1992), 147-160.

⁴⁴ *Vat II*, no.107.

patrimony and their dowry was located, then this would constitute a hurdle to the exploitation of the assets by her and her new family. Unless an exchange of lands took place, the other option would be to proceed to joint administration.⁴⁵ The possibility of a more extended cooperation in the exploitation such as between the natal family and the daughter's household or among more distant relatives was also existent. The administration of an estate (*zeugêlateion*) in Hagia Mari(n)a was shared between two brothers-in-law, whilst a piece of land in the city of Thessalonikê was exploited by a certain Xenia, her son, her niece and her husband.⁴⁶ Nevertheless, despite all these efforts, joint administration arrangements were destined to breakdown. The lack of a transmission system that favoured primogeniture meant that joint exploitation of resources was often short-lived, lasting for one or two generations at the most, and failing thus to keep the patrimony intact in the long run.

To summarise, to ascribe an individualistic or a collective character to certain societal phenomena would overlook the fact that both tendencies could very well co-exist. It would be more instructive to define the extent to which both these notions permeated society, its groups and institutions. In Byzantine society, the construct of family was clearly protected by legislation, procuring its economic viability through certain arrangements and institutions. These institutions could demonstrate a dual function. To accentuate this last point, dowry, had a distinctly ambivalent character; it was undoubtedly one of the most stable types of proprietorship in terms of time endurance and legal protection, destined to create a viable family unit. At the same time, a non-static attribute was embedded in it, in the sense that it could lead to the reallocation of wealth, a reality imposed by the very same legal constraints.

⁴⁵ Laiou, 'Marriage Prohibitions', 149-150.

⁴⁶ *Lavra* III, app. XII and *ChilP* I, no.125.

It is not coincidental that in the fluid landscape of the later centuries, dowries became a flexible asset which could be liquidated and invested in trade.⁴⁷ In the field of law application, we also saw that the prescriptions of law could be subjected to different interpretations according to the individual backgrounds and perceptions of legal experts and, therefore, shift the balance between the protection of ‘individual’ and ‘collective’ rights. At the level of social practice, the administration of conjugal property presents a mixed picture. It seems that the legal right of spouses to decide on the fate of their patrimonial assets was indeed exercised to a considerable extent, but at the same time there were instances in which this cannot be verified with certainty. Finally, in the case of patrimonial property, the persistence in a division of property among all descendants caused the diffusion of patrimony and gave way to a rather unsuccessful system of administration based on kin cooperation.

In the light of these observations, if we should make a qualitative appreciation of the structure and function of the Byzantine family, we may say that the general picture is that of a subordination of personal interest to the common one. ‘Individualistic’ elements did exist as well but could not very often break the barrier of the family. Nevertheless, when they did they could give an impetus to personal economic ventures. To emphasise this, I will refer to the example of Arsenios TzAMPLAKÔN and make a linkage between the separation of his interests from those of his siblings noted above and his successful involvement in trade as will be demonstrated in the concluding chapter of this thesis.

⁴⁷ Laiou, ‘The Role of Women’, 239.

IV/c. The issue of 'pronoia' as a hereditary privilege.

In order to assess the role of the Thessalonian elite family in socio-economic terms and integrate it into a broader economic context, it is essential to turn our attention away from the distribution of wealth within its boundaries as a social unit, and point to another direction: that of its relation to the Byzantine state and the place it occupied within the property rights system of the 14th and 15th centuries. The most efficient avenue is to focus on *pronoia*, one of the most studied topics in the field of Byzantine institutional studies, which typified the Byzantine proprietary system for almost five centuries during which it underwent various alterations in its nature and application, having an impact on private property rights.⁴⁸

A concise but at the same time broad definition of the institution of *pronoia* would suggest that it was the allocation of a holding to an individual by the state on conditional terms and occasionally in exchange for services. In my discussion, I will refrain from an exhaustive analysis of the history of this institution, which is not my purpose, but I will refer briefly to its emergence and certain methodological issues affecting its understanding and implementation. Finally, I will concentrate on profiling the characteristics it acquired in the Late Byzantine period. As an economic institution which was directly associated with ownership, exploitation and rights to income, it is worth exploring the means employed to ensure its survival by the two parties (or *organisations* in the vocabulary of the theory under study) which were directly involved in the shaping of this particular property rights structure, the state and its beneficiaries.

⁴⁸ For a synopsis of the studies and scholarly approaches on this issue, see A. Kazhdan, 'Pronoia: The History of a Scholarly Discussion' *Mediterranean Historical Review* 10 (1995), 133-163.

The issue of ownership is crucial in order to integrate this discussion into our theoretical framework. And that is because if in the history of the institution of *pronoia* a critical point was reached in which absolute ownership was granted formally or was even practised informally and therefore gained the characteristics of private property, then this fact would nullify any cooperation between the state and the beneficiaries and create an independent organisation, or phrased differently, a strong elite in a position to compete for power. The direct implication for the economic sector would be that the full ownership and exploitation of resources would give way to the privatization of the revenues under state control which would cut off the economic ties between the state and the pronoiars. This is what we will attempt to follow and establish in the Athonite charters relating to the Thessalonian elite and their families, relying for our analysis partially on the terminology met in the documents. My intention is not to recast the problem, as this would necessitate an examination of this institution diachronically, rather, I will place it in a broader theoretical framework and relate it to the context of the Thessalonian society. Hereby, I hope to reflect on recent scholarly developments and identify the steps demonstrate the most recent scholarly concerns and steps taken in the direction of clarifying the nature of the late Byzantine property rights system.

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The institution of *pronoia* is generally considered by scholars to have originated in the 11th century,⁴⁹ namely the period of the Komnenoi dynasty, when the Byzantine army was reformed and a policy of extensive state grants was applied. According to a description of this institution, these grants were distinguished into military and civil ones. In the first case,

⁴⁹ The first recorded example is that of Leôn Kephalas in 1084. *Lavra* I, no.56; Oikonomides, 'The Role of the State', 1043.

the grant initially involved the extraction of rent from a particular piece of land in exchange for military service, normally defined with the term *douleia* (literally slavery), and on a temporary basis, though in the course of time this would become wholly or partly hereditary; in the second case, large urban or rural domains with the attribute of hereditary tenure (*pronoiai gonikai*) were assigned to this system of endowments applied to a broader spectrum of beneficiaries, such as the monasteries. These would enjoy tax immunity and possessed the character of ‘*appanages*’.⁵⁰ Despite its usefulness, this scheme is perhaps too broad to apply to the prolonged period of existence of the institution of *pronoia*, as the pattern of property rights, particularly in the later years, was not always straightforward.

Broadly speaking, as regards modern interpretations of *pronoia*, scholarly debate has two main branches and has been stated as follows: the first generation of scholars has considered that *pronoia* had a strong physical aspect concerning land, and that hereditary ownership rights were bestowed on its bearers in the Palaiologan period. To this, other scholars have offered the suggestion that pronoiers were actually entitled to a fixed income (*posotês*) generated from a certain piece of land or peasants. The change that took place in the later years had to do with an increase in the degree of dependency of peasants with respect to the *pronoia* holders and their, i.e. the pronoiers’, consolidation of limited ownership rights over land.⁵¹ This latter view with some variations has been broadly adopted in recent years.

By its nature, *pronoia* (care, solicitude, providence) was conditioned by strong economic links between the Byzantine state and the recipient of this privilege, which was based on and promoted a type of cooperation between them. Another term employed synonymously to *pronoia* was that of *oikonomia* (management, stewardship, dispensation).⁵²

⁵⁰ H. Glykatzi-Ahrweiler, ‘La concession’, 110-114. For the use of the term as donations to imperial relatives or relatives by marriage who were granted all sources of revenue within the area, see *supra*, 90-91.

⁵¹ Kazhdan ‘Pronoia’, 162.

⁵² For a concise interpretation of both *oikonomia* and *pronoia*, see *ODB*, 1516-7 and 1733-4.

In both cases, the message conveyed by the meaning was that of the emperor's discretion and ultimate right to dispense the resources of the empire. This is particularly emphasised in another formulation of the institution encountered quite frequently in our documents, that of *apo eleêmosynês vasileôs* (by/from the emperor's mercy). Things become more perplexing when *pronoia* is linked to the quality of *gonikon* (patrimonial, hereditary) or its variations and derivatives (e.g. *gonikothen*, *gonikevô*, *apo gonikotêtos*, *kata logon gonikotêtos*). It was essentially the usage of this term which led to suggestions that by the end of the empire *pronoiai* had become a hereditary privilege, losing their conditional or limited character and essentially becoming detached from state control. The semantic distance between these terms, but also their 'side by side' usage which did not negate each other, is of fundamental importance in order to trace the course of transformation of the institution on a practical level, but also in terms of the Byzantine attitude toward property rights.

The right to concede a *pronoia* to an individual was reserved for the emperor, the only person who could dispense the resources of the state. The stages of the assignment of a *pronoia* to a person were the following: Firstly, a *prostagma* or *horismos*, namely an imperial order, was issued, the content of which concerned the amount of revenue (*poson* or *posotês*, literally quantity or value) and the area that would be conceded. In the second phase, the fiscal officials would issue a conferral document (*praktikon*, *paradosis*), which would ratify in detail the possessions allocated to the pronoiar, the total amount of fiscal income to be extracted from them called the *oikoumenon*, that is the taxes collected by the *paroikoi* residing in the granted land, as well as the exact types of revenues in the form of rent or the obligations that specified dependent peasants bore towards him. Finally, there was a statement about the fiscal immunity of the *pronoiar*, namely the tax (*telos*) payable by all other landowners. The document of *paradosis*, therefore, constituted the actual dispensation of the *pronoia*, the importance of which is revealed in cases of disputed

possessions when its existence or absence would define which of the conflicting parties would assert rights over a property.⁵³

Quite commonly, in the initial clauses of the *praktika* there would be a general reference to the various categories of land-holding. Thus, we are informed about the existence of parcels of land (*ktēmata*) with the following attributions: *ekklēsiastika*, (ecclesiastical), *monastēriaka* (monastic), *archontika* (belonging to prominent individuals), *prosōpika* (personal) and *stratiôtika* (military).⁵⁴ In most cases, there is little doubt as to the nature of these holdings. Some ambiguity is raised regarding the precise terms of tenure of the *archontika* and *prosōpika*. These have been interpreted on the basis of the holders' offer of service to the crown. Thus, both terms are considered to refer to members of the upper classes, but *archontika* presupposed service to the emperor, whilst the personal ones denote the exemption from any kind of obligations to him.⁵⁵

This is revealed by certain clauses of a *chrysobull* issued in 1280/1281 by Michael VIII in favour of *pansevastos sevastos* and *protovestiaritēs* Dêmêtrios Mourinos.⁵⁶ The document is a confirmation of Mourinos's hereditary rights over certain properties in Paphlagonia and Thessalonikê, and there is a clear distinction between properties which were burdened with certain fiscal obligations and others that were not. More explicitly, Mourinos was firstly confirmed possessions that would be exempted from taxes (*exô pasês kai pantoias dêmosiakês epêreias*) apart from the obligations of *katergoktisia* and *kastroktêsia*,⁵⁷ and

⁵³ See *infra*, 232-233.

⁵⁴ See for instance *Zog*, nos.17, 53; *Xen*, no.15, 16; *Lavra* II, nos. 104, 105.

⁵⁵ *Doch*, 106-107.

⁵⁶ *Doch* no. 9.

⁵⁷ *Katergoktisia* was a corvée linked to the construction of ships firstly introduced in the 11th century. *Kastroktêsia* was also a type of corvée which in the 13th c. was transformed into an extraordinary tax and then into a regular one. See N. Oikonomidès, *Fiscalité et exemption à Byzance (IXe-XIe s.)* (Athens, 1996), 110-1; M. Bartusis, 'State Demands for Building and Repairing Fortifications in Late Byzantium and Medieval Serbia' *BSI* 49 (1988), 205-212; A. Kontogiannopoulou, 'La fiscalité à Byzance sous les Paléologues (13e-15e siècles). Les impôts directs et indirects', *REB* 67(2009), 19-20.

secondly of his *prosôpika ktêmata* which he could dispose according to his wish and with no restrictions imposed by the state.

The nature of private and state property in Byzantium and whether full ownership existed is a thorny one and has frequently provoked scholarly debate. The first line of argument contemplates that property rights followed the broader complexity of the Byzantine society and that in general there were no clear-cut boundaries between the three major types of property, state, private and ‘quasi-feudal’ (in which the *pronoia* system belonged), but an interrelation and complementarity among them rather than a conflict. This view also takes the supremacy of state ownership rights (*dominium directum*) over private ones for granted, most clearly expressed in the right of the state to confiscate private properties unilaterally.⁵⁸ Particularly for Late Byzantium and the re-conquest of the European territories by the Byzantines, when extensive concessions of land took place, the state kept its prerogative to distribute land on its own terms, restricting the rights of transmission and therefore full ownership.⁵⁹ Opposing views concentrate mainly on the issue of arbitrary confiscations, suggesting that those took place under extraordinary circumstances and as such they cannot be considered as affecting the property rights system of a society. This interpretation concerns strictly private property and is careful enough not to include *pronoiai*, the status of which was inextricably linked to the structure and economic efficiency of the Byzantine state.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ Kazhdan, ‘State’, 83-100.

⁵⁹ Kyritses, ‘Chrysobulls’, 229-243. For similar views, see E. Patlagean, ‘GONIKON. Notes sur la propriété allodiale à Byzance’ in *Vyzantio: Kratos kai Koinônia. Mnêmê Nikou Oikonomidê*, ed. A. Laiou, A. Avramea, E. Chrysos, (Athens, 2003), 423-434.

⁶⁰ The most systematic critique of Kazhdan’s thesis which is considered as a misinterpretation of terms and sources can be found in, G.C. Maniatis, ‘On the Validity of the Theory of Supreme State Ownership of all Land in Byzantium’, *Byzantion* 77 (2007), 566-634. For the latter’s views on ‘pronoia’, see *infra*, 240. For an earlier polemic of Kazhdan’s views, see G. Litavrin, ‘Le problème de la propriété d’État en Byzance aux Xe-XIe siècles’, *Vyzantiaka* 9 (1989), 9-46; Oikonomidès, *Fiscalité*, 46-47.

For the period and area that concerns us, the most recent critique has been voiced by Kostis Smyrlis who has dealt with the monastic lands.⁶¹ One of the arguments against the emperor's supreme right over private property is founded on Manuel II's *prostagma* of 1408 providing certain guarantees and exemptions to the Athonite monasteries. Therein, Manuel declared his will to restore the properties to their owners, alleging that he intended to do so from the very beginning. However, we need to look closer at the reasons that Manuel included such a clause. The growing power of the monasteries was undoubted and Manuel could not afford to lose their support by demonstrating a rigid stance regarding the return of their land, especially after they had enjoyed a privileged status and exemptions during the Serbian occupation. Moreover, there was always the precedent of the monks of the monastery of Prodromos in Serres who already from 1372/73 had proceeded to negotiations and agreements with the Ottomans, acquiring guarantees of existing tax-exemptions.⁶² Thus, attempts to explain the Byzantine property rights system in the fluid environment of the later period through imperial statements need to be approached with caution, particularly with regards to monastic land holdings.⁶³

The issue of the protection of private property from appropriations by the state had also preoccupied the contemporaries. Characteristic is the case of a Thessalonian intellectual, Nikolaos Kavasilas,⁶⁴ who composed a discourse, widely known as the 'Anti-Zealot discourse', in which he castigated the policy of the Byzantine state of confiscating monastic

⁶¹ See his works, Smyrlis, 'The State, the Land', 58-87 and *idem*, 'Private Property' and State Finances. The Emperor's Right to donate his Subjects' Land in the Comnenian Period', *BMGS* 33/2 (2009), 115-132.

⁶² E.A. Zachariadou, 'Early Ottoman Documents of the Prodromos Monastery (Serres)' *SOF* 28 (1969), 1-12.

⁶³ The problematic nature of such documents in terms discerning the cession of property rights is also touched upon *infra*, 238-240.

⁶⁴ Nikolaos Kavasilas Chamaetos (1322/3- 1391 or 1397) was a scion of a landowning aristocratic family of the city, an ardent supporter of the monastic movement of Hesychasm and the usurper and later Emperor Iōannēs Kantakouzēnos, by whom he was employed on various missions and embassies. See A. Angelopoulos, *Nikolaos Kavasilas Chamaetos, Ê zoê kai to ergon autou* (Thessalonica, 1970); *idem*, 'To genealogikon dendron tês oikogeneias tôn Kavasilôn', *Makedonika* 17 (1977), 367-395.

property for military purposes, developing certain ideas about private property.⁶⁵ In this treatise he makes two major points: firstly, that the authorities had no right to dispose of private property (*ou tôn idiôtikôn*), but only of the communal (*alla tôn koinôn*). If an owner proceeded to the destruction of his belongings, he had no obligation to give an account to anyone, not even to the emperor. Also, since there was no law justifying the confiscation of private property, such an act was considered unlawful.⁶⁶ Secondly, he makes a strong association between freedom (*eleutheria*), private property and building up one's wealth.⁶⁷ If a state does not provide conditions of freedom to its subjects by not inflicting fear of the loss of private possessions, then he questions how it is possible for them to invest in economic activities and for the state to extract taxes.⁶⁸ His reasoning is of course conjectural but it unravels existing perceptions about private and state property rights, as well as a necessary tension between them, particularly in the course of the fourteenth century. The fact that he discusses monastic property is not irrelevant to the discussion of the *pronoia*, as what interests us is to follow the process in which the privileges assigned to the grantees transformed their property into private holdings.

As implied earlier, *pronoia* constituted an intermediate type of ownership between private and state property, since a pronoiar held only usufructuary rights over a mixture of resources and also because it was a temporary arrangement. The *pronoiar* was assigned land belonging by right to the state in order to extract a fixed income from it. This income was, however, theoretical, as the grantee could make a further and non-taxable profit by exploiting private property that he could also own through direct exploitation or leasing it

⁶⁵ Ševčenko, 'Anti-Zealot Discourse', 91-171. The discourse is titled 'Discourse concerning illegal acts of officials daringly committed against things sacred.'

⁶⁶ *Ibid*, par.10.

⁶⁷ In a very brief discussion of this paragraph, Laiou deconstructs Kavasilas's over-generalised argument, considering this as partially liberal and stressing the necessity for the existence of an institutional framework that protects production and economy. See A. Laiou, 'Economic Concerns and Attitudes of the Intellectuals of Thessalonikê', *Symposium on Late Byzantine Thessalonikê*, *DOP* 57(2003), 207-208.

⁶⁸ Ševčenko, 'Anti-Zealot Discourse', par.26.

out to others. In other words, there was a nominal and a real income drawn from a pronoiar's possessions.

The types of income as well as the temporary proprietary status of *pronoiai* are most clearly depicted in cases of military men becoming the beneficiaries of the state, for whom for that matter, this institution was created.⁶⁹ Two characteristic cases are those of Michaël Saventzês and Nikolaos Maroulês, who belonged to the cavalry (*mega allagion*) of Thessalonikê and to whom an *oikonomia* was ceded in 1321.⁷⁰ Unequivocally, the grant did not concern the possession of land as such, but the extraction of revenues from certain parcels of land in the form of a series of taxes and the labour of the *paroikoi*. The total amount of revenues (*poson*) reached 70 and 72 *hyperpyra* respectively. The actual value, however, must have been considerably higher, since both individuals possessed land which could be exploited directly or rented out to others (the mode of exploitation is not stated in the text), offering extra revenues. It has actually been estimated that in terms of economic value the official fixed sum could be in reality double or triple.⁷¹ A *praktikon* drawn up for a non-military man, the monk Kallinikos, who was granted a *pronoia* in 1323, makes specific mention of the existence of private property, both directly exploited and leased (*hypomortos gê*).⁷² This case has been examined by Kyritses who has estimated that in a total figure of 3,911 *modioi*, 46.3% belonged to the peasants and the rest to Kallinikos, only to reach the conclusion that these proportions cannot provide a general picture for the land-holding in that period.⁷³ In any case, the main point is that pronoiars *could* own private property, and the combination of resources could yield a considerable profit to them.

⁶⁹ I refer here to higher status soldiers who were granted a fiscal revenue and tax immunity and not to soldier-farmers who were assigned a small plot of land in exchange for military services. For the latter, see M. Bartusis, 'On the Problem of Smallholding Soldiers in Late Byzantium', *DOP* 44 (1990), 1-26.

⁷⁰ *Xen*, nos.15 and 16 accordingly.

⁷¹ M. Bartusis, *The Late Byzantine Army. Arms and Society, 1204-145* (Philadelphia, 1992), 172-173. This estimation has been criticized as quite optimistic by Oikonomides, 'The Role of the State', 1046, note 208.

⁷² *ChilP* I, no. 92.

⁷³ Kyritses, 'The Byzantine Aristocracy', 145-147.

In terms of the conditions of holding a *pronoia*, a feature that all three documents share is the terms of holding the property. The beneficiaries would ‘possess’ (*katechein*) and exploit (*nemesthai*) the properties, and acquire all their income (*pantoian prosodon*). The additional feature in Kallinikos’s case is the existence of the terms *anenchleitôs* and *adiaseistôs*, which typically denoted tax-exemption and referred to his private property. Since he was not expected to offer his services to the state, he was assigned full ownership and therefore that is the meaning of *katechein* in this instance.

That the term could also have the nuance of temporary possession and exploitation becomes clear from an act in which Dêmêtrios Harmenopoulos, a *vasilikos stratiôtes*, leased his granted land to the monastery of Xenophon for 3 *hyperpyra* annually, stressing that the arrangement would be valid for as long as he held (*katechôn*) the *pronoia*, whilst the same term is used also for the monastery.⁷⁴ The transaction was treated as one between private parties, following the regulations applied to private property, as it included the clause that in case of breach of contract Harmenopoulos would be obliged to pay a fine to the fisc.⁷⁵ Bartusis has interpreted the rent payable to Harmenopoulos as an *epiteleia*, essentially a fiscal charge which in the case of sale or donation was assumed by the recipient of the property, and had to be validated by the emperor through fiscal reassessments that were conducted periodically. It is, however, questionable how he arrives to this conclusion, since neither is this term or any of its variations encountered in the document, nor is the act one of sale or donation. It is actually explicitly stated that the 3 *hyperpyra* would be paid as rent (*mortê*). Here, therefore, the terms of use/exploitation refer to a kind of a rental arrangement rather than transfer of ownership.

The right of the *pronoiar* to manage his property and income as long as his acts did not contravene the principles of temporary ownership is vividly illustrated in the donation of

⁷⁴ *Xen*, no.6.

⁷⁵ Such formulas are most often met in private transactions of urban properties. See table II.

Petros Doukopoulos, a well-known pronoiar from various acts.⁷⁶ In 1292, he donated and ceded the right of exploitation to Iviron monastery over a water-mill and a garden which he had built on his pronoia, the village of Daphnê. The mill was burdened with a tax of two *hyperpyra*, which Doukopoulos decided not to demand from the monastery. He made clear, though, that this would be an arrangement which could be overturned with the allocation of the pronoia to another individual.

The transferability of fiscal obligations was correlative of the right of the state to alienate taxes and assign them to others. Philommatês and two other unnamed pronoiars (*stratiôtikoi archontes*, military officials) had donated 600 *modioi* of land to Docheiariou. After a fiscal assessment, 350 *modioi* were assigned to Komnênoutzikos. Yet, he was not granted the land but *only* the right to receive the *epiteleia* (*epi telei kephalaiô*) from the monks.⁷⁷ In this case, the state in order to create revenue for a pronoiar imposed taxes on a property that enjoyed immunity. We are aware of this because in the end the monks acquired after their request an imperial *chrysobull* by which they were restored the property in its initial status (*anaphaireton*).

Very frequently, we come across the re-allocation or transfer of an *oikonomia* from one grantee to another in a wording alluding to it as a physical entity. In the *praktikon* of Saventzês, for instance, it is mentioned that certain properties were previously in the hands of the *pronoians* Tzykandêlês and Kêroulas.⁷⁸ The circumstances that could lead to the re-allocation of an *oikonomia* could range from the soldiers' death to reasons of misconduct.⁷⁹ Of course, particularly during the civil wars the shifting of one's pronoia to another was also a quite common phenomenon.⁸⁰

⁷⁶ *Iv* III, 66. See also *ChilP* I, nos. 114 and 116.

⁷⁷ *Doch*, no.22 (1344).

⁷⁸ Another example is that of Theodotos Kalothetos. *Vat* I, no.66 (1328).

⁷⁹ M. Bartusis, 'A Note on Michael VIII's 1271 Prostagma for his Son Andronikos', *BZ* 81 (1988), 268-271.

⁸⁰ Such was the case of Iôannês Margaritês, *oikeios* of John V Palaiologos, who was granted Arsenios Tzamplakon's pronoia, a partisan of John Kantakouzenos. P. Lemerle, 'Un praktikon inédit des archives de

Another way that land-holdings were reshuffled was through confiscations. In times of financial exigency and external threat, the Byzantine state seized properties, mainly from the monasteries, and handed it to the pronoiars. In some cases, these properties were regained by the monasteries. In 1355, Docheiariou was given back the village of Atouvlan, which had become the *pronoia* of *dysikos archontopoulos*, Michael Pitzikopoulos, and 1,000 *modioi* of land in Rhosaion, previously granted to Theodôros Mouzalôn who had lost his life fighting the Turks.⁸¹ The monastery was restored all its previous rights and was given assurances against any future disturbances and requisitions (*dienochlêsin kai epêreia*). The term ‘*epêreia*’ generally indicated state demands or special taxes.⁸² It is interesting that in literal sense it means ‘abuse’. This brings to light the issue of polysemy of Byzantine terms which could very easily become the vehicle for manipulation and propaganda. In this clause, it not safe to suggest that the term renders the exact economic status assigned to a property. If the nuance used here is that of abuse, one may assume that this negates the supposition that private property did not actually exist in Byzantium, in the sense that state confiscations, though justified by the circumstances, were actually against private property rights. However, the most plausible interpretation would be that because the land of Docheiariou had been seized by John Kantakouzênos, when it was restored by Anna of Savoy, the mother of his opponent John V, she wished to stress her opposition to him and his *pronoia* allocation tactics through the inclusion of this term.

The conditions of holding in the documents discussed so far applied strictly to the particular individuals for whom they were drawn up. No reference was made to the fate of the grant after their deaths. However, the system of an *oikonomia* passing on to the

Karakala (Janvier 1342) et la situation en Macédoine orientale au moment de l’usurpation de Cantacuzène’, in *Charistêrion eis Anastasion Orlandon*, vol.I, (Athens, 1965), 278-98.

⁸¹ *Doch*, no.29.

⁸² *ODB*, ‘Epereia’.

pronoiar's heirs had been in practice since the reign of Michael VIII Palaiologos, who after 1261 stipulated that the children of soldiers who lost their lives in the battle would acquire hereditary rights on their *pronoia* (*pronoias* [...] *gonikas egkathêstan tois paisin*), without, however, this being at the time exercised on a large scale.⁸³ Any rights granted by the state would cease with the death of the son. We have previously seen cases of pronoiers from the years 1313-1314 donating land to monasteries for the limited period that they and their children possessed the grant.⁸⁴ They specifically refer to the right of the monastery to the exploitation (*nemesthai*) and revenues (*pantoian prosodon*) of the land and *not* to its ownership.

In addition, in none of the aforementioned examples do we have any kind of reference to the term *gonikon* or similar phrases implying the existence of hereditary rights. In our documentation, one of the first encounters of the term *gonikon* regarding military *pronoiai* relates to the sons of Alexandros Evripiôtês who served in the *mega allagion* of Thessalonikê.⁸⁵ Their grandfather had been granted the *palaiochorion* (abandoned village) of Pougion by Michael IX and Andronikos II Palaiologos. Here we have a quite unique case in which the *pronoia* was granted through an 'exchange' (*antallagôgês charin*) of properties. The despot Iôannês Palaiologos, son of Andronikos II.⁸⁶ ceded the *palaiochôrion* to Evripiôtês and received from him buildings in the city of Thessalonikê.⁸⁷ As already mentioned, the only person who could grant land was the emperor. Sometimes higher officials or members of the imperial family would do the same, but it was imperative that a chrysobull by the emperor would follow in order to validate the affair. Indeed, the grant was

⁸³ Pachymeres I, 92, 1.9-12; G. Ostrogorskij. *Pour l'histoire de la féodalité byzantine* (Brussels, 1954), 93-98.

⁸⁴ *Doch*, nos.13 and 14.

⁸⁵ *ChilP* I, no.67 (1321).

⁸⁶ See *PLP*, no.21475.

⁸⁷ The term *palaiochôrion* is most frequently met in sources around the middle of the 14th century; see Laiou, 'The Agrarian Economy', 316. It is worthy of note that Iôannês later donated these buildings, a fact pointing once again to the importance of donations in order to secure one's property. That was the period of the civil war between Andronikos II and his grandson Andronikos III (1321-1328), during which possessions of wealthy supporters of the former had been confiscated.

confirmed by Andronikos II and his son, followed by a census (*apographikê apokatastasis*). After a second assessment, a new censor decided that the *palaiochôrion* should pass to *panhypersevastos* Iôannês Palaiologos,⁸⁸ cousin of the Emperor Andronikos III. With this act (1321), the descendants who had requested for restitution of their *gonikon palaiochorion* from Andronikos III, were confirmed in its possession. Thus, the rights over granted property started to extend beyond the sons of a pronoiar, involving consecutive generations and creating a family tradition. In this manner, individuals could gradually build up considerable wealth and become established landowners, like the Macedonian provincial families of Devlitzênos, TzAMPLAKÔN and Kavasilas.

Claiming land on account of one's hereditary rights over a military *pronoia* was not uncommon, although at times it could be blocked by other parameters and processes in place. In 1373, Iôannês Kataras made a petition to be handed over land of 2,400 *modioi*, yielding a *posotês* of 48 *hyperpyra*, which was at the time withheld by Docheiariou.⁸⁹ This had been granted to his father, *meGas adnoumiastês* Geôrgios Kataras, with the right to bequeath it to his sons who were also supposed to offer their services (*ekdouleousi*) to the crown.⁹⁰ According to the claims of Docheiariou, the plot initially belonged to them, then it was assigned to the Varvarênoi soldiers,⁹¹ to whom Kataras belonged, and finally it was returned to the monastery through a *paradosis*. The case was examined by the officials who decided that the land was to remain with Docheiariou on the basis that the latter had in its possession both the *chrysobull* and the *apographikê paradosis* confirming its ownership. By contrast, Kataras could only provide the *chrysobull* and not the document of conferral to his father. The main issue was that it could not be proven that Geôrgios Kataras was

⁸⁸ For *panhypersevastos* Iôannês Palaiologos, see *PLP*, no. 21497.

⁸⁹ *Doch*, no.41.

⁹⁰ The *chrysobull* in question survives in *Doch*, no.27.

⁹¹ For the Varvarênoi, see Ostrogorskij, *La féodalité*, 157-158; N. Oikonomidès, 'A propos des armées des premiers Paléologues et de compagnies des soldats' *TM* 8(1981), 360-364; Bartusis, *Late Byzantine Army*, 174-175.

granted the *pronoia* individually and not as a member of the Varvarênoi company,⁹² since the act of the *paradosis* had not survived.

This affair is quite intriguing in various aspects. First of all, it is surprising that the imperial *chrysobull* was not considered as sufficient evidence for Katzaras's claims. A *chrysobull* was not a necessary stage in the process of granting a *pronoia*, but it was issued after the request of a grantee in order to secure his rights more firmly. On the whole, it was a general affirmation of the *paradosis* which was in technical terms a much more detailed document. This fact on its own does not explain why John V issued his decree only for one individual and not for the whole group. When another company of soldiers, that of Klazomenitai of Serres, asked for a confirmation of their *posotês* and requested the right to transmit it to their sons, this was done collectively.⁹³ The status of those groups of soldiers is uncertain; namely it is debatable whether they were mercenaries paid through the *pronoia* scheme or proper *pronoia* holders who formed a group of soldiers. Moreover, these groups are generally treated as soldiers of a low economic status. Understandably, this perplexes somehow the issue of the nature of their property rights. According to Byzantine legislation, there were two categories of 'communal' property rights. On the one hand, there were the groups whose property was indivisible for whom every kind of transaction relating to common property, needed the seal of all members of the group. In addition, a possible loss of property burdened the whole company. On the other hand, there could also be associations whose members had an individual title over a property and therefore could dispose it accordingly.⁹⁴ Seemingly, the case of Katzaras falls into the second category. It is peculiar, however, since all our previous references to the Varvarênoi treat them collectively, that in their case it was deemed necessary for a *chrysobull* to be issued for one

⁹² *Doch*, nos. 18 (1337), 21(1343), 23 (1344), 27(1351).

⁹³ *Kut*, no.20 (1342).

⁹⁴ Harmenopoulos, *Hexavivlos*: 3.10. The association with the legal proprietary rights of these companies has been made by Oikonomides, 'A propos des armées', 363, n. 65, but without elaborating further.

of them, unless that was the procedure that applied for all members. This unfortunately cannot be confirmed.

Perhaps a solution can be provided by the titles of our actors. The father bore the title of *megas adnoumiastês*, which after 1290 meant the administrator of land donations.⁹⁵ It is interesting that from the 14th century we have several examples of individuals holding this title that all belonged to well-established families of Thessalonikê and Serres, such as Iôannês Angelos, two members of the Hyaleas family and Geôrgios Kôkalas.⁹⁶ Moreover, Geôrgios and Iôannês Kazaras both had held the title of *oikeios* (slave/familiar) of the emperor or a member of his family, which from the 12th century designated aristocratic households, whilst in the later period emperors used it to apply it to dignitaries who could become court officials.⁹⁷ It may be suggested, albeit with some caution, that the group of these soldiers consisted of actual pronoiars with individualized property rights and that the confirmation of Kazaras's rights followed a practice which was intensified around the middle of the 14th c. for individuals to secure their *pronoiai* and their privileges, but also extend them, one of the means by which this could be achieved was the transmission to their heirs through an imperial charter.

Indeed, in this period the number of pronoiars asking for confirmation of their privileges seems to rise and does not always involve individuals serving in the army. The crisis of the 1340's, with the confrontation between John V Palaiologos and John Kantakouzenos and the Zealot regime in Thessalonikê, brought about mutual confiscations by partisan supporters of both groups and reallocation to new grantees. One of the most characteristic examples is that of Iôannês Margaritês, which as has been suggested constituted a grant to a layman.⁹⁸ In a *praktikon* of 1342, Margaritês was ceded an

⁹⁵ *ODB*, 'Megas adnoumiastes'; Maksimović, *Provincial Administration*, 191f.

⁹⁶ See table III. There is also a Michaël Neokaisaritês from Serres.

⁹⁷ J. Verpeaux, 'Les oikeioi. Notes d'histoire institutionnelle et sociale' *REB* 23(1965), 89-92.

⁹⁸ Bartusis makes this remark. For the document, see Lemerle, 'Un praktikon inédit', 278-98.

oikonomia which previously belonged to Arsenios TzAMPLAKÔN, partisan of Kantakouzênos, the *zeugêlateion* of the latter, and land belonging to the late Masgidas. The status of Margaritês's holding was the following: he would possess and exploit (*katechê kai nemêtai*) the revenue (*posotês*) which was free of any financial or any service obligations (*eleutheran pantê kai akatadoulôton/ anôteran telous kai varous pantos*), and could be bequeathed to his legitimate offspring and heirs.⁹⁹ Finally, he had the right to improvement (*synistan kai veltioi*).

There is a series of other examples which point to the unstable conditions of the mid-14th century and the ways it affected property rights. *Megas papias* Dêmêtrios Kavasilas, *oikeios* Dêmêtrios Kôkalas, and *oikeios* Dêmêtrios Devlitzenos belonged to well-to-do Thessalonian families whose *pronoiai* originated with their involvement in the army and all of them requested the emperor's affirmation as a security measure. This is most explicitly stated in the *prostagma* which John V Palaiologos issued in favour of Kôkalas in which he mentions that the latter, although he had acquired his *oikonomia* through a *paradosis*, had also asked for a direct order from the emperor for greater surety (*pleionos asphaleias eneken*).¹⁰⁰ That this was probably a military grant, at least initially, can be inferred by his family name, as we know of a Geôrgios Kôkalas, who was *megas adnoumiastês* in 1337-1338 in Thessalonikê.¹⁰¹ For the other two we have clear references within the documents of their activities in war for which they were rewarded with certain privileges. These do not actually differ from those assigned to Margaritês, as they also acquired rights to melioration and transmission.

Both rights were crucial for the accumulation of wealth and the augmentation of family property. Starting with land improvement, it must not seem peculiar that this bore two

⁹⁹ This suggests that theoretically the grant was temporary, but according to the prevailing practice of renewing grants through chrysobulls his heirs would most probably retain the same rights.

¹⁰⁰ *Lavra* III, no. 129.

¹⁰¹ See table III.

qualities, that of precondition for the granting of an *oikonomia*, but at the same time being considered as a ‘privilege’. The *pronoia* system was a machination of the state, at least as initially conceived and institutionalised, in order to enhance the productivity of the granted land and all the more turn the state of unproductive land around with a further aim to support the income of the grantees. Escheat land, for instance, was very often assigned to pronoians -and other grantees, such as the monasteries, in order to increase its productive capacity transform it into a viable fiscal unit from which to draw their income.¹⁰² Let us recall here the *palaiochôrion* assigned to Evripiôtês. As an abandoned village, he was supposed to restore its labour power, namely paroikoi, who would proceed to cultivation and meliorations. Specific references to the terms for granting abandoned land are provided by a 1408 *chrysobull* in favour of the monks of Dionysiou who were also ceded a *palaiochôrion* called Mariskin.¹⁰³ The monastery assumed the obligation to improve 2 *zevgaria* of land within three years’ time during which it would be provided with grain. After that period, Dionysiou would acquire full ownership rights (*kata teleian despoteia kai kyriotêtan*). In addition, from a later *prostagma* we are informed that the monks were also supposed to build a tower where labourers would be installed.¹⁰⁴

Improvement (*veltiôsis*), therefore, could refer to any activity that would increase the income of a property and was not only restricted to land cultivation.¹⁰⁵ For instance, the erection and operation of mills could be a lucrative activity from which both the landlord and the paroikos could profit. There were actually cases in which a mill was co-owned a fact

¹⁰² Bartusis, ‘Exaleimma’, *passim*. For earlier periods, see also D. M. Górecki, ‘Fiscal Control of Unproductive Land in Tenth Century Byzantium: Policies and Politics’ *FM X* (1998), 239-260, particularly 257- 260 for military lands.

¹⁰³ *Dion*, no. 10.

¹⁰⁴ *Dion*, no. 13 (1414). This act actually satisfied the monks’ request for a tax-exemption of their labourers mentioned here under the term *xenoi*, denoting poor, not settled peasants and unregistered in the *praktika*. Other rather synonymous terms were those of *proskathêmenoi*, *mistharnoi* and *eleutheroi*. Ostrogorskji, *La feodalité*, 330f; Laiou, *Ê agrotikê koinônia*, 320-321.

¹⁰⁵ For investments in general see, Laiou, ‘Agrarian Economy’, 352-364.

that entailed the partaking of revenues.¹⁰⁶ On other occasions, the ownership belonged to the landlord who, apart from the basic tax (*telos*) extracted from the paroikos, could appropriate the surplus production.¹⁰⁷

Apart from increasing one's income, however, there was another dimension to the right to invest in a property. Improvements created or provoked the assertion of proprietary rights and it is not coincidental that frequently *veltiôseis* would become the main object of disputations over landed as well as urban properties. A certain Dadas has leased 3 houses and five workshops from Xenophon which he joined in order to create a wine shop which yielded 30 *hyperpyra*.¹⁰⁸ From this sum, he gave only 3 *hyperpyra* to the monastery, whilst he treated the property as owned privately (*prosopikôs*). Moreover, after his death his wife gave the buildings to her daughter as a dowry, meaning that the family considered them as private property. The compromise solution offered by the judge to the descendants of Dadas and the monastery was that either the former should keep the property during their lifetime paying a annual rent of 4,5 *hyperpyra*, or the monastery should give the family the amount their father had spent for the improvements in order to retrieve the properties. Thus, either way the rights of the Dadas family, though not legitimised, gained some kind of recognition.

To come back to the rest of the privileges ceded by the state, it needs to be said that it was not only the right to improvement that created an advantaged status for the pronoiars but also the fact that it was combined with fiscal immunity, entailing that they could retain the increased revenues. In terms of terminology this was expressed in fixed wording (*anaphairetôs, anospastôs, ektos varous tinos*), denoting that there were no obligations towards the fisc. However, occasionally grants of pronoiar included the term of *anepauxêtôs*, literally meaning that the grantee had no right to augment the fiscal revenue

¹⁰⁶ See, for instance, the case of Doukopoulos and his paroikos has already been discussed in section III/b.; Laiou, 'Agrarian Economy', 362.

¹⁰⁷ *Doch*, nos. 39 (1370), 40 (1370/1); Lemerle, 'Un praktikon inédit', 285, 287-88.

¹⁰⁸ *Xen*, no.23 (1419). The legal battle between the Argyropoulos family and the monastery of Iviron over the gardens in Thessalonikê concerned exactly the same issue. See III/d.

assigned to him through a future census.¹⁰⁹ This is frequently encountered in clauses referring to the privileges of relatives or descendants of the pronoiar. The sons of Georgios Katzaras as well as the widow of Alexios Soultanos Palaiologos, Xenê, were confirmed their *oikonomiai* on that term, which might be considered as perhaps the most restricting and revealing of the state's will to retain the right to define the income of the pronoiars.

The matter is more complicated though. In order to appreciate the *degree* to which the state was prepared to release property rights, we need to look each time at the whole set of privileges granted. Katzaras's heirs acquired hereditary rights but on the condition of service to the emperor (*douleia*). By contrast, Xenê actually acquired full ownership rights which were expressed in the right to dispose of the property according to her wish, namely she would be able to transmit it to her offspring, give it as a dowry, sell it, exchange it and donate it, and ameliorate it.¹¹⁰ Actually, her example has been considered as a unique case but also characteristic in depicting the transformation of the institution from a conditional one to a kind of permanent pension.¹¹¹ Initially, a *posotês* of 380 *hyperpyra* was bequeathed from her husband to her son, but the terms of conferral are not known. In 1344, Xenê claimed from this amount 100 *hyperpyra* on the conditions mentioned above, which, as stated, was the status of the hereditary land (*gonika ktêmata*) of the Thessalonians. This last clause reflects the practice of issuing or confirming *chrysobulls* collectively for whole cities after the reconquest of Constantinople.¹¹² Despite the scarcity of sources and the lack of homogeneity in the application of privileges, a broad pattern has been established mainly through indirect documentary references. Collective privileges are thought to have stemmed from the Palaiologan policy of confiscating and redistributing the European lands. Within

¹⁰⁹The term could refer not only to income but to the augmentation of the size of land. The monastery of Vatopedi, for example, was confirmed the donation of land by Theodôros Sarantênos on similar condition (*anepauxêton apo tês apographês*). *Vat I*, no. 62 (1324).

¹¹⁰Margaritês seems to have been one of the most privileged individuals, since he was given unlimited rights including that of increasing his income (*prochôrêshê auxêsin*).

¹¹¹Ostrogorkji, *La féodalité*, 130-131.

¹¹²Patlagean 'L'immunité des Thessaloniciens', 591-601; Kyritses, 'Common Chrysobulls', 229-243.

this process, the state retained its control over land and full ownership rights became a dubious legal concept. In practice, however, it still existed in the form of *eleutheria* (freedom), at times equated with the notion of parental inheritance (*gonikon*), and designated fiscal immunity as well as the elevation of the obligation of service to the crown. The fact, though, that this was assigned through an imperial document is considered to have added more legal weight to this prerogative and have worked as guarantee more than any other abstract formulation of private property.¹¹³

That *gonikon* and its synonymous terms must not be automatically and indiscreetly associated with unlimited rights of property transmission, as they had acquired a fiscal sense in the later period, which has been adequately proved.¹¹⁴ This is illustrated in examples of pronoistic land held on an impermanent basis in which the usage of the term does not seem to contradict the temporary nature of tenure. Katzaras's case is quite characteristic. In the chrysobull ceding him the right to pass his *oikonomia* to his children with the obligation of service, one of the conditions of holding was that of *kata logon gonikotêtos*, indicating apparently fiscal immunity. Moreover, the clauses concerning the prerogatives of the beneficiary are not to be overlooked. Despite their formulaic character, it is not perhaps coincidental that the above phrase is placed among terms and conditions with a definite economic sense such as those of *anapospastôs*, *anaphairetôs*, typically denoting fiscal immunity, and those of *synistan* and *veltioun*, referring to investments and ameliorations. The right to transmission of the *pronoia* to the heirs is referred to separately, specifying who these should be (*ex osphyos paidas kai klêronomoi*).¹¹⁵ In cases of unconditional grants, the wording was almost identical and *gonikotês* used in the same manner.¹¹⁶

¹¹³ Kyritses 'Common Chrysobulls', 241-243.

¹¹⁴ Patlagean, 'GONIKON', 431-432.

¹¹⁵ See, e.g., *Dion*, no. 2 (1347); *Doch*, no. 26 (1349).

¹¹⁶ See, e.g., the *chrysobull* granting to Theodotos Kalothetos full ownership (*poiein osa tois despotais exestin poiein*) of 900 *modioi* of land. *Vat I*, no. 66 (1328).

The transformation of the meaning of *gonikon* is inextricably linked to the issue of property rights in Late Byzantium. Its significance lies in the fact that by acquiring an economic connotation it ceased to refer strictly to private rights and took a public character.¹¹⁷ This brings the discussion back to whether Kazhdan's suppositions of the existence of *dominium directum* throughout the Byzantine period hold water. Regarding pronoia, Maniates has recently criticised Kazhdan's thesis according to which property rights linked to this institution constituted a mixture of imperial sovereignty and 'absolute' ownership of the individual, a situation in which neither of them obtained the full mastery.¹¹⁸ He considers this contention as contradictory on the basis that if pronoia was temporary and conditional, then very clearly the state retained the ownership and the grantee only the usufruct.

I think part of the problem regarding this disagreement is that both views treat the institution of pronoia in a generalised manner, as having remained intact throughout the long period of its application and lacking any internal dynamic. As we have seen, the conditions of holding a pronoia, although they typically followed a certain pattern, could also vary from one case to another. As a marking point, which probably contributed to differentiations in the application of the institution, can be considered the period after the reconquest of the European territories of the empire by the Byzantines in 1260. In that period, the state redistributed the lands of the empire to members of the aristocracy, functionaries and the army, which resulted in a relaxation of these individuals' obligations towards the state and by extension a transformation of the notion of ownership.¹¹⁹ Consequently, the whole concept of pronoia was adulterated. On the one hand, one needed an imperial confirmation of their property rights in order for them to gain legal validity. On the other hand, the state

¹¹⁷ Patlagean, 'GONIKON', 430.

¹¹⁸ Maniates, 'Supreme State Ownership', 616-617; Kazhdan, 'State', 90-91.

¹¹⁹ Kyritses, 'Common Chrysobulls', 229-245.

itself was actually 'forced' by the reality of the unstable political circumstances to cede and confirm further rights.

Within this framework, Kazhdan's theory about the *dominum directum* and the 'absolute' ownership of the individual, can be in a way accepted for the late Byzantine period, in the sense that the state theoretically was still in the position to distribute its lands on its own terms and recall its grants. In reality, there was an indiosyncratic kind of 'collaboration' between the state and the grantees. Repeated confirmations of grants as well as individual terms and conditions, such as the right to investment, would gradually cement the grantees' proprietary rights. However, due to the lack of evidence from the 15th century, the extent to which pronoiasic land acquired the qualities of full ownership is hard to establish unless new material can elucidate this issue.

V. CONCLUSIONS:

AN ASSESSEMENT OF THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION IN THE CITY OF THESSALONIKË THROUGH THEORY

Having examined the Thessalonian society in the 14th and 15th centuries, in terms of political attitudes, as well as its economic and social practice in a period of great uncertainty and fluidity, we can now proceed to a general assessment with the aid of North's theoretical scheme. Regarding this theory, the principal avenues of enquiry upon which we founded our study were: the rôle of ideology in the way a society responds to an uncertain reality, different organisations and traits of competition or co-operation among these, individualistic or collectivist characteristics in the economic behaviour of certain social units, and finally the transformation of institutions relating to the property rights system. Herein, we will attempt to abridge the conclusions produced by the study of the literary sources and documents and appraise them through the light of the theory of *New Institutional Economics*, as expressed by Douglass North. The aim is to demonstrate which parts of his theory apply to our subject of research and the degree to which these are consonant with our material and help us elucidate the period and society under examination.

*

In the opening chapters of the thesis, we referred to the fact that the only theoretical approach to the field of Byzantine studies was that of the Marxist theory or derivative theoretical approaches, expressing our scepticism about their application to Byzantine society and the attempt to explicate its structures and nature through a comparison with Western societies, or within the framework of social classes and their competition. In

recent years, Byzantinists have conducted studies, which without necessarily negating external influences, seem to point to the unique character of the structures and institutions of Byzantine society. It seemed, therefore, appropriate to search for a theory that could interpret this society, respecting its uniqueness and idiosyncrasies. By employing the Northian theoretical scheme, we attempted to address certain issues raised at various times by scholars and integrate them into a single framework.

To begin with, throughout the 14th and 15th centuries Thessalonian society found itself within the turmoil of war activities and constant changes in the city's authority and leaders. The social tensions and discontent which were witnessed in Thessalonikê in that period were provoked by external factors, that is the Ottoman pressure and the ensuing economic hardships, which were particularly exacerbated during periods of siege of the city. However, they were also intertwined with the rhetoric of the period and the communication of certain ideological constructs to Thessalonian society. One of these constructs, a recurrent theme in most discourses of the time, was the elevation of the idea of the 'city' to that of 'fatherland'. The employment of such a concept in public discourses had two facets: although the intention was to rally the inhabitants by instilling in them a sense of localism, in reality it would aggravate the feeling of isolation and detachment of the periphery from the imperial centre, particularly when this was followed by the different policies towards the Ottomans which were exercised by the political authorities of Constantinople and Thessalonikê. The latter issue surfaced in discourses through the transmission of mixed messages and the lack of consistency in their argumentation. To make matters worse, the growing polarisation between the two spheres of authority, the political and the ecclesiastical, became evident through the frequent criticism voiced by the religious leaders about certain political and economic policies. Regardless of whether their objections were masked under the veil of ethical exhortations

or were more straightforward, they surely had a negative impact on the already uncertain reality that the people of the city were experiencing. In their discourses, the political and ecclesiastical authorities employed all instruments of shaping public opinion, namely the evocation of symbols and collective identity, and the cultivation of guilt. Their effectiveness was undermined by the internal coherence of the arguments, whilst their plausibility was at times shaken by the leaders' individual actions, such as the abandonment of the city in critical periods.

But why study the ideological system of a society in a work of social and economic history? In the frame of North's theory, ideology is crucial for the study of economic and institutional history for the reason that there is a strong interplay between ideas and institutions. This is best expressed in his own interpretation of these two notions: ideology and institutions are respectively the internal and the external representation of the environment.¹²⁰ Therefore, when ideology changes, it generates a change of the institutional framework of a society, whether in the political or economic sector. However, this is a gradual and evolutionary progress. In practical terms, it finds expression in the linguistic environment with changes in the meanings of terms and concepts.¹²¹

The question that arises here is whether in our paradigm we can detect and speak safely of a radical change in the mental attitudes and ideology of the later period. We argued that a change in the linguistic preferences of the time is certainly traceable. Apart from the already mentioned issue of fatherland and the propagation of a city's self-reliance, another characteristic example is the notion of freedom (*eleutheria*), which was by that time propagated in the sense of economic freedom, implying the granting or renewal of privileges by the state. This, in conjunction with the references we have for the

¹²⁰ North, 'Shared Mental Models', 4.

¹²¹ *Ibid*, 25

divergence of opinion in the Thessalonian society in the face of the city's conquest by the Ottomans and the growing lack of resources, suggests that the emergence of new or, more accurately, modified belief systems was under way. In this part, the Northian theory is in agreement with our findings with its postulate that societies restructure their belief system in periods in which novel situations arise and there is a scarcity of sources. Our theory, however, also advocates the increased complexity of a society's system of ideas and values. Longstanding ideas that were embedded in Byzantine culture could hardly be abolished,¹²² particularly by the representatives of the ecclesiastical authorities. This is visible in the examined discourses the argumentation of which evolved around traditional ideological tenets, which would surely appeal to a segment of society. Any deviations of the Thessalonian discourse from the Byzantine ideology never took the form of a radical break with tradition. Instead, tradition was utilised and manipulated in such a way so as to shape public opinion. However, a borderline must be drawn here regarding the ideas projected in public discourses and the system of ideas shared by other strata of society. Unfortunately, due to the lack of relevant sources on this issue, we can never draw a complete picture about the ideological system of this period in its entirety and we must restrict ourselves to the description of tendencies rather than realities.

The choice to study the economic behaviour of the provincial elite was made on the basis that its economic behaviour is easier to trace and delineate, and for the additional reason that this group is more likely to compete for power in order to establish and protect its economic interests and thus instigate changes in the institutional framework of a society. In examining its economic dealings with the Athonite monasteries and seeing these two units as *organisations*, the question that was posed was whether a point was

¹²² This has also application in the part of social and economic practice.

reached in the relationship of these two parties, characterised by intense *competition*, which is considered to be a key element for changes in the institutional framework of a society.¹²³ To render the provincial elite, which was mainly treated within the framework of family, and the monastic establishments as an *organisation*, might seem peculiar to historians and Byzantinists who prefer to describe these with the more traditional term of ‘institution’. However, for methodological purposes we followed North’s abovementioned division, whilst in our work institutions referred to the constraints that regulate social and economic practice.

It was in that manner that we treated donations and certain practices emerging from our documentation on acts of sale and lease. Starting with donations, we noticed that they present a mixed picture regarding the issue of competition. Regarding our period of study, it seems that donations fall into two separate periods, the first part of the 14th century and the period from around the middle of the century onwards. In the first case, individuals donated land apparently for the reason that they lacked the means to exploit it. This practice continued in the second half of the century, but then we notice another motive which drove individuals to donate their possessions; for some donations served as a means for securing one’s property from external threat. This is partly reinforced by the types of donated properties. In the first period, we have a lot of references to abandoned land (*exaleimmata*), which was not necessarily unproductive, but, in most cases, at the time of the donation it was not exploitable. As time progressed, however, we also meet particularly fertile areas or possessions linked to commercial activities. Also, from the middle of the 14th century, when economic prosperity and living conditions started to deteriorate, donations in exchange for lifetime pecuniary pensions (*adelphata*) steadily increased. Securing one’s livelihood was one side of the coin. It is also probable that the

¹²³ See section III/a.

donors also aspired to a future reclaiming of their properties, when conditions would allow for, although this would not prove that simple. This is ascertained by the course such demands took. In most cases, donations were disputed by family members of the donor, but they would hardly ever be vindicated, at least according to our records. Instead, very often certain kinds of settlement were promoted, involving pecuniary compensations to the claimants which led us to assume that this was the real motive and ultimate goal behind these disputes.

Despite such attempts, in the case of donations we cannot detect clear competitive characteristics in the behaviour and the relationship of the two parties, but rather arrangements which promoted the interests of both sides. When disputes arose from the infringement of contracts of sale and lease, the lay claimants' vindication could be undermined by previous arrangements with the monasteries, which had this quasi-cooperative character via the transmutation of longstanding Byzantine institutions. The two most characteristic examples are the donation-sales and the pre-emption right (*protimêsis*). In the first case, masking a sale as a donation would function as a preventative measure against disputations, whilst it would also offer space for arranging prices privately by sidestepping legal constraints. Thus, we notice here that informal constraints could interfere and affect the application of the formal ones. On the other hand, the fact that the right of pre-emption could be evoked and exercised by practically anyone, and not only the lower strata for whose protection it had been initially created, would turn it into an effective instrument for protecting one's interests and accumulate wealth, in our case the monasteries, to the disadvantage of the laymen.

These findings help us comment and see whether they confirm two main aspects of the theory: i) the issue of competition and co-operation between organisations and ii) the very character of institutional change. Starting with the nature of the relationship between

the monasteries and the local elite of Thessalonikê, in none of our examples did we ascertain explicit competitive characteristics between the two parties. This is not to suggest that there were no conflicting interests and antagonistic tendencies and that one of them did not profit to the expense of the other, but apparently this situation never produced a forceful contest between the different groups. By extension, since there was not intense competition, an investment in skills and knowledge could not be generated. As elaborated in the theory, knowledge of organisations and individuals about creating opportunities for the maximization of their wealth is a precondition for institutional change. In a pre-modern society, such as the Byzantine one, this process was inevitably slow and changes in the institutional framework likewise. Yet, an additional reason for the slow rate was the attested lack of intense competition between social and economic organisations.¹²⁴

Describing, therefore, the relationship between the Thessalonian elite and the Athonite monasteries is not a straightforward task. It can be said that this was of an idiosyncratic cooperative character,¹²⁵ as they both depended on each other's survival, creating in this manner a complex structure of economic relations. It might be said that their dealings were of a cooperative nature, but with underlying competitive traits. In the Northian language, this phenomenon can be perhaps best described by the notion of 'muted' competition, namely the situation in which competitive forces are not actually activated and by implication do not lead to profound institutional change.¹²⁶

If, however, there was no radical change in institutions, this does not entail that small modifications in the institutional structure did not take place. In the bleak economic atmosphere of the later Byzantine period, there were steps towards the restructuring of

¹²⁴ *Supra*, 126.

¹²⁵ Let us remind here North's definition of cooperation: 'We usually observe cooperative behaviour when individuals repeatedly interact, when they have a great deal of information about each other, and when small numbers characterize the group'. North, *Institutional Change*, 12.

¹²⁶ *Supra*, 126.

certain institutions. In North's words, 'Periods of strong uncertainty, [...] allow for the pursuit of various trial methods of undertaking activities'.¹²⁷ In our case study, this is illustrated in the so-called donation-sales. In this case, not only did the institution of donation assume an altered character, but the assumption that it could lead to negotiability of prices, which essentially invalidated the legal rules (*hyperogkos vlavê*), ascribes to it an important dynamic. It has been claimed that in the long run such small changes in the interconnections between formal and informal constraints account for fundamental institutional change.¹²⁸ On the other hand, the paradigm of the institution of pre-emption right with its long history and the fact that its application was altered in the later period, in order to serve the interests of those in a stronger economic position, might suggest that either this change occurred because of those with sufficient bargaining strength, or as a result of a change in state enforcement.¹²⁹ In any case, both our examples come to agree and corroborate North's fundamental statement that runs through his work, namely that institutional change is a complicated, gradual and incremental process, which is produced by changes in rules, informal constraints and in kinds and effectiveness of enforcement,¹³⁰ also influenced by the rate of this whole process.¹³¹

By studying the local aristocracy of Thessalonikê in the context of family and its property division and administration, we attempted to establish its character by employing the two antithetical concepts of *individualism* and *collectivism*. In general, family property was protected through two main avenues: i) the dowry which safeguarded the

¹²⁷ North, *Institutional Change*, 99.

¹²⁸ *Ibid*, 89. The example used here is the great number of small alterations in agreements between the lords and serfs which led to institutional change and therefore the demise of feudalism and manorial in Western Europe.

¹²⁹ A definite answer on this issue would necessitate a study of the institution diachronically, which was not our purpose in this work.

¹³⁰ North, *Institutional Change*, 6.

¹³¹ *Supra*, 125.

wife's and heirs' rights and by extension lineage, and ii) the institution of joint ownership, the main purpose of which was to retain the patrimony intact. However, both institutions possessed inherent individualistic traits in the sense that eventually they would cause the division of property. Thus, we have concluded that there can be no clear boundaries between the two notions under discussion, as in our examples they could very well co-exist. It is actually the *degree* to which individualism or collectivism was manifested that defines the character of a social and economic unit. In the late Byzantine period, individualistic tendencies seem to exist and perhaps they increased, but apparently they never became the rule and therefore Byzantium did not experience an economic development in the form it took in Western Europe.

Herein, a few further remarks regarding the aforementioned issues of family property are in order. First, it has been suggested that in the Late Byzantine period women seem to acquire a new, more dynamic role in the management of their property, instigated by the prevailing political and socio-economic conditions, namely loss and requisition of territories, and frequent changes in ownership. It must be stressed that, although this assumption might hold true, it cannot be safely verified. We are not actually in a position to speak about a divergent role of women, since our findings might be a result of an accident of sources. If, however, that is not the case, then the suggested factors which must have contributed to this alteration in the status of women can be characterised as 'external', rather than a change in the system of values and family structure.

This persistence of the Byzantines in the traditional form of kinship ties is quite characteristic and attestable in the patterns of division of property amongst their children. The rejection of primogeniture in favour of equal division of patrimony undermined the accumulation of wealth, a vital element for economic growth. It is exactly at this point that North's contribution is significant. Throughout his work, he stresses the importance

of informal constraints, which refer to the entirety of norms of behaviour and conventions of a society. These can interfere with the formal ones and at times can be held responsible for the persistence of inefficient institutions. The persistence and longevity of informal constraints can account for the failure of societies to adapt into new realities or opt for more efficient institutions. The pattern of division and administration of property illustrates this vividly. By traditionally rejecting primogeniture and dividing patrimony equally to all offspring, the unity of the property was undermined. The institution of joint property was introduced as an attempt to mitigate the faulty situation of dispersal of property, but it was only a half measure, as it was short-lived and in the end patrimony was again divided. Thus, tradition and cultural preferences determined society's economic behaviour and in our example they became an impediment to the accumulation of wealth.

In the last section, we discussed the issue of property rights through the institution of *pronoia* and posed the question of whether beneficiaries ever acquired full ownership of their granted properties, in which case the state would lose its control over imperial properties. The institution of *pronoia* emerged from a need to serve certain economic and military policies of the Byzantine state in the 11th century. It was a type of contract between the state and the pronoiar made on a short-term basis which presupposed services, mainly military ones, to the crown. Therefore, in the initial stages of application of this institution, property rights were defined on the following principle: proprietorship belonged to the state and exploitation rights to the beneficiary.

Though of temporary nature, *pronoia* offered opportunities for the accumulation of private wealth through the favourable conditions of holding attached to the 'contract', such as tax-exemption. In this way it was a desirable arrangement from which both

parties drew profit. During the last centuries of the life of the Byzantine Empire, steps were made towards the direction of the transformation of temporary exploitation rights to permanent full ownership rights over granted land. This occurred as a result of the weakening of the Byzantine state machinery and by extension a change in the enforcement of property rights. In other words, there was a relaxation of the rules applying to the *pronoia* which allowed for alterations in its nature, in some cases to such a degree that it can be regarded as an unconditional and permanent grant.¹³² The extent to which grants of this nature were ceded is hard to establish, as we are only aware of occasional cases and we cannot proceed to a quantification. Nevertheless, in most cases unconditional grants, namely not burdened with some kind of obligation towards the state, had time limitations which extended to two generations of grantees, and after that period grantees had to obtain a new validation of their rights. In this way, the state retained its right to distribute its lands and the beneficiary never became a full master of his property, in the sense of perpetuity. The practice of validating one's grant was done through imperial *chrysobulls* and was frequently applied in the mid-14th century, reflecting the unstable conditions of the time and the constant reallocation of wealth. This unclear situation regarding property rights is also reflected in the imprecise meaning of the terminology used to define them, particularly the term *gonikon* which could refer both to property transmission and fiscal immunity.

In order to interpret this institution and the way it was transformed in the Late Byzantine period in theoretical terms, we need to raise the question of what exactly caused the modification of the character of the institution of *pronoia*. It seems the evolution of *pronoia*, as described above, is in agreement with North's assertion that institutional change is -among other things- the product of alterations in state

¹³² See, e.g., the case of Xenê Soultanina, *supra*, 236.

enforcement. In our example, in the later years with the loss of lands to the enemy and the insufficiency of the Byzantine state to control its resources a continuing cession of rights of semi-permanent or permanent character to the elite ensued. The inability of the state to efficiently enforce property rights is ascribed by North to the fact that, on the one hand, it secures ownership rights, but, on the other hand, it modifies them when its agents attempt to maximise their own profit.¹³³ When the state as an enforcing power is absent, then private enforcement mechanisms emerge. Despite the fact that the Byzantine state was extremely weakened in the later period, private enforcement never materialised in the case of *pronoia*. The state was always present in this process and its validation of ownership was a prerequisite for securing one's property rights. Therefore, although there might have been pressure on behalf of the elite to secure or transform their property rights into private ownership, this never took the form of visible and sharp competition between them and the state.

Yet, there were other destabilising factors inherent in the application of *pronoia*, which in the long run might challenge the state and its power. For a contract to fulfil its role it must delineate the terms of ownership firmly and in detail. According to theorists, however, this delineation can rarely be perfect. In the case of *pronoia*, in the absence of a solid legal framework delineating firmly the property rights of the grantees, practice defined to a certain extent the course this system took. That found its expression in the vagueness of terminology which dictated a practice of minor differentiations in the application of property rights. Whether this would have a cumulative effect in the transformation of the institution of *pronoia*, had the Byzantine state not been subjected to the Ottomans, is hard to establish.

¹³³ See whole discussion about property rights and the related issues of enforcement, contracts and efficiency, *supra*, 130-134.

In general, if we should make an evaluation of North's theory, we can suggest that it proved to be a constructive analytical tool. To the degree that we utilised this theory in our work in order to explain certain socio-economic phenomena of the Late Byzantine period, we cannot identify major divergence of our findings from its core concepts. His five propositions about institutional change, according to which the issue of competition between organisations is of chief importance, as a major parameter of institutional change,¹³⁴ seem to be validated somewhat in the opposite direction. Intense competition between certain socio-economic units or between the state and its constituents is not really attestable in our material, therefore Byzantine society did not experience a radical transformation of institutions. Rather, we were able to trace a signs of transformation in the belief system and a greater tendency for alteration of certain social and economic practices. Certain Byzantine institutions experienced partial adjustment, which in certain cases occurred over a considerable length of time. To a certain extent, these modifications were induced and accelerated by historical and political conditions and the uncertain environment of the later period. For instance, the turn of the landed aristocracy to activities such as trade, was a consequence of the negative impact warlike activities had on the countryside, which forced individuals to search for other avenues of making profit. Other changes, such as the modified application of the pre-emption right or the institution of donation-sales, suggest that certain developments in the economic landscape were definitely under way. We cannot know, therefore, whether this development would take place within a different setting, or to put it differently, whether this would happen at this particular point in time, but under different political and socio-economic circumstances. What we can really argue is that 'gradual institutional change was occurring through continuous marginal adjustments'.¹³⁵

¹³⁴ *Supra*, 123.

¹³⁵ North, *Institutional Change*, 101.

Perhaps North's major contribution to our work is the importance he ascribes to culture and its informal constraints for shaping the institutional framework. We have seen that certain mentalities and codes of conduct accounted for the persistence in certain practices. Attempts to overcome defective economic situations could stumble upon these cultural preferences. In the sphere of Byzantine studies, this idiosyncratic character of the Byzantine society might best be described in what Alexander Kazhdan has long before described as 'ambivalence'. In North's words, 'informal constraints matter'.¹³⁶ This is verifiable in the fact that 'discontinuous changes' provoked by revolution or conquest can never be completely discontinuous and informal constraints persist.¹³⁷ This could be the starting point and explanatory framework for a future study of the transformation or adoption of Byzantine institutions into the Ottoman period, a field that, as pointed out in the opening chapters of this thesis, is of crucial importance for a better understanding of periods and societies in transition.

The present study by drawing a picture of the Thessalonian society in the 14th and part of the 15th century has contributed to synthesising the ideology of the period, as expressed in texts and sources related to the city, with references to issues of social and economic practice as they affected a particular social group. It has also addressed theoretical issues with the aim to achieve a better understanding of the operation of societies in transitional periods and to offer a new approach to the field of Byzantine studies, integrating these into a broader framework which could elucidate the particular character of Byzantine institutions and society.

¹³⁶ North, *Institutional Change*, 140.

¹³⁷ *Ibid*, 101.

Table I: Landed property transactions (14th and 15th centuries)

Document/ date	Name of owners/ individuals mentioned in the document	Title	Location of property	Type, size and value of property	Origin/Type of ownership	Type of transaction/ affair	Type of ownership/ conditions of holding as defined by the document
<i>Esph</i> no.10 (1301)	Alexis Amnôn	<i>doulos</i>	Hierissos	Land of 6 <i>modioi</i>		Donation	
<i>Xen</i> no. 6 (1303)	Dêmêtrios Harmenopoulos	<i>vassilikos stratiotês, doulos</i>	-Tripotamon (<i>katepanikion</i> of Aprou or Apros)	<u><i>Exaleimmatika stasia:</i></u> 1)1 <i>stasis voidatikê</i> and vineyard of 1 <i>modios</i> . 2) Land of 42 <i>modioi</i> . -Vineyard of 3,5 <i>modioi</i> . 3)1 <i>stasis voidatikê</i> and vineyard of 2 <i>modioi</i> . 4)Vineyard of 1 <i>modios</i> 1 <i>stasis voidatikê</i> and vineyard of ¼ <i>modios</i> . 5)1 <i>aktêmonitikê stasis</i> and vineyard of ¼ <i>modios</i> . 6)Vineyard of half <i>modios</i> 7)Half a <i>stasis hypampelos</i> . 8)Two more <i>hypampeloi</i>	Imperial grant (<i>eleêmosynê tou vasileôs</i>)	Leased (<i>ekdotêrion engrafon</i>) to Xenophôn monastery for 3 <i>hyperpyra</i> per year	3 <i>hyperpyra</i> per year to be paid by the monastery as long as he holds the <i>pronoia</i> 36 <i>hyperpyra</i> fine to be paid to the fisc in case of breach of contract

<i>Chil</i> I no. 22 (1304)	Dêmêtrios Philanthropênos		Halmyros	Plot (<i>kathedra</i>) with a stream and uncultivated land	His mother's dowry (Athanasia Tzainisa Tzitapina)	Land relinquished to painter Michaël Proeleusis. Previously, leased out to him be his parents for 15 <i>hyperpyrika kokkia</i> annually.	Obligation to construct church dedicated to Virgin Mary. Free from charges. Right to revenues and alienation (<i>charizein, proikizein, legatevein, pôlein</i>)
<i>Lavra</i> II no. 98 (1304)	Maria Angelina, widow (second wife) of Doukas Michaël Angelos, daughter of Dêmêtrios Spartênos (<i>sevastos pansevastos</i>). Angelos's first wife was the daughter of Pharmakês		-Drymosyrta -Kochliaropotamos -Gaimeri -Pallirota -Patrikôna -Rhôsaiou -Hagia Marina (all in the <i>katepanikion</i> of Kalamaria)	land (<i>chrysovoullaton zevgêlateion</i>) with <i>chrysovoullatoi paroikoi</i> their possessions and <i>proskathêmenoi</i> , three buildings	1/6 of Pharmakês's land (part of the 1/3 of the dowry that Angelos received after his first wife's death)	Donation of 1 sixth of previous wife's dowry to certain monks of the monastery (<i>aphierôseôs enypographon engraphon</i>)	Full ownership (<i>kata teleian despoteian</i>) with the right to all income (<i>apasan prosodon</i>) and exploitation (<i>panta poiein kai prattein</i>) 100 <i>nomismata</i> to be paid to the monastery and the fisc in case of infringement
<i>Doch</i> no. 11 (1311)	Doukopoulos (Geôrgios?)	<i>doulos</i>	Kaprinikaia (<i>katepanikion</i> of Kalamaria)	-Water mill in Kaprinikaia -2 of Doukopoulos's <i>paroikoi</i> possess 2/6 and him 1/6. Half of the mill belongs to Lavra monastery	<i>Paroikoi</i> from inheritance. Doukopoulos's part of the mill came from a brother of his <i>paroikoi</i> who died childless	Confirmation of donation of the <i>paroikoi</i> and further donation by Doukopoulos	Full and permanent rights of ownership (<i>despotikôs, eis hapantas diênekeis chronous</i>) to the monastery as well as right to all of its income

<i>Doch</i> no.13 (1313)	–	<i>stratiotês</i>	Hermêleia (<i>katepanikion</i> of Hermêleia)	Abandoned land (<i>exaleimmatika</i> <i>chôraphiaia topia</i>) and 1 vineyard	<i>Pronoia</i> (<i>eleêmosynê</i> <i>vasileôs</i>)	Donation to Docheiariou monastery	Exemption from fiscal obligations (<i>anenchleitôs</i> , <i>anempodeistôs</i>) and right to all income (<i>pantoian prosodon</i>) to the monastery for two generations
<i>Chil</i> I no.30 (1314)	Theodôros Karavas	–	1) City of Thessalonikê 2) Broader region of Thessalonikê: -Lôrôton -Palaiampela -Ravda -Vareai (all in the <i>katepanikion</i> of Kalamaria) -Kastriou -Drimyglava all (in Langadas basin). -Piasmata - Vakai -Gavrovinikeia - Kanopos (all of unknown location)	1) 12 houses in Thessalonikê 2) 61 <i>modioi</i> of vineyard and 2 houses in its region 3) movable property	8 houses probably parents' inheritance 1 house purchased Dowry from first wife: unknown value but included 1 vineyard of 5 <i>modioi</i> in Gavrovinikeia) Dowry from second wife: houses and one vineyard which he sold.	Testament (<i>epiteleution</i> <i>enraphon</i>)	Whole of maternal inheritance (<i>eis klêron</i> <i>mêtrikon</i>) and part of paternal inheritance (<i>eis patrikon klêron</i>) to Iôannês and his sister Full rights of ownership to the Perivleptos Monastery (<i>ôs despotis teleia</i>) Full ownership to wife
<i>Doch</i> no.14 (1314)	Two unnamed <i>pronoïars</i>	–	Hermêleia (<i>katepanikion</i> of Hermêleia)	Abandoned land (<i>exaleimmatika</i> <i>chôraphiaia topia</i>)	<i>Pronoia</i> (<i>pronoïastikôs</i>)	Donation to Docheiariou monastery	Ownership and exploitation (<i>katechein</i> <i>kai nemesthai</i>) with right to all income

							(<i>pantoian prosodon</i>) for the period they hold the <i>pronoia</i>
<i>ChiP</i> I no. 67 (1321)	Sons of Alexandros Evripiôtês	<i>apo tou Thessalonika iou megalou allagiou (Alexandros)</i>	Pouggion (near Thessalonikê)	<i>palaiochorion</i>	From their grandfather (<i>gonikon</i>).	Imperial confirmation of their absolute possession of the village	Free from fiscal obligations (<i>anaphairêtôs, anenochlêtôs kai adiaseistôs</i>)
<i>Xen</i> no.15 (1321)	Michaël Saventzês		-Village Psalis and Phournia (<i>katepanikion</i> of Akros) -Village Ourliakos -Apostolitai (<i>katepanikion</i> of Kalamaria) -Region of Tzykandêlês (unknown location)	<i>Oikonomia</i> (nominal value) of 70 <i>hyperpyra</i>	Some of the properties mentioned belonged previously to other pronoiars (Tzykandelês, Kêroulas)	Granting of a <i>pronoia (praktikon)</i>	
<i>Xen</i> no.16 (1321)	Nikolaos Maroulês		-Village Psalis and Phournia (<i>katepanikion</i> of Akros) -Land in Tylimê (unknown location)	<i>Oikonomia</i> (nominal value) of 72 <i>hyperpyra</i>		Granting of a <i>pronoia (praktikon)</i>	
<i>ChiP</i> I no. 84 (1322)	Sarantênos		Kritziana	1 vineyard	The land was an imperial grant to Chilandar (<i>dia chrysovoullou</i>)	Imperial order to settle the issue of the vineyard appropriation in favour of the monastery	

<i>ChilP</i> I nos. 114 and 116 (1327)	Petros Doukopoulos	<i>paidopoulos</i>	Lozikion	Land of 300 <i>modioi</i> and 1 water-mill	The land was initially an imperial grant to Doukopoulos	Imperial grant to monk Matthaïos	Free from fiscal obligations (<i>anaphairêtôs, anenochlêtôs kai adiaiseistôs</i>)
<i>ChilP</i> I no. 117 (1328)	Manouêl Prokopios and his wife, Maria Dikranê	<i>doulos , megas myrtaitês</i>	Hagios Helias in Rhopalaia	Buildings, 1 vineyard and cultivable land	Maria's inheritance (<i>gonikothen</i>). She and her first husband, Iôannês Dragoumanos, had donated the property in exchange for 1 <i>adelphaton</i> .	Settlement of difference regarding this property. Maria receives 150 <i>hyperpyra</i> in ounces of ducats	Warranty: double the amount of 150 <i>hyperpyra</i> and an additional fine of 200 <i>hyperpyra</i> to be paid by Maria in case of violation of contract
<i>Vat</i> I no. 66 (1328)	Theodotos Kalothetos	<i>oikeios</i>	Tzagkaroiôannou (unknown location)	Land of 900 <i>modioi</i>	Previously belonging to Pentavenos Chadenos	Granting of land (<i>chrysovoullon</i>)	Transmissible (<i>kata logon gonikotêtos</i>), not tax-burdened (<i>ektos telous kai varous pantos</i>) Full ownership and exploitation
<i>Vat</i> II no.72 (1331)	Dêmêtrios Kavasilas	<i>doulos</i>	Hermêleia (<i>katepanikion</i> of Hermêleia)	Land (2 <i>stasia</i>)	<i>Pronoia</i> (<i>apo eleêmosynês</i>)	Donation to Vatopedi	Full ownership (<i>ôs oikokyrioi</i>) exploitation (<i>kratôsin , nemontai</i>) and right to income(<i>pantoian apopherontai eisodon</i>)
<i>Vat</i> II no. 73 (1331) (fragment)	Geôrgios Kavasilas	<i>doulos</i>	Hermêleia (<i>katepanikion</i> of Hermêleia)			Donation to Vatopedi (fragment)	
<i>Vat</i> II no.74 (1331)	Geôrgios Kavasilas	<i>doulos</i>	Hermêleia (<i>katepanikion</i> of Hermêleia)	Land (1 <i>stasis</i>)		Donation to Vatopedi	

<i>Vat</i> II no.75 (1331)	Dêmêtrios Devlitzênos	<i>doulos</i>	Hermêleia (<i>katepanikion</i> of Hermêleia)	Land of 8 <i>modioi</i>	<i>Pronoia</i> (<i>apo</i> <i>eleêmosynês</i>)	Donation to Vatopedi	Full ownership, exploitation (<i>teleian</i> <i>despoteian kai</i> <i>anaphaireton kyriotêta</i>) in perpetuity (<i>diênekeis</i> <i>chronous</i>)
<i>Xen</i> no.23 (1335)	Sarantênoi brothers: -Ignatios -Diomêdes -Nikolaos Doukas -Alexandros Doukas	<i>sevastos</i>	Zavernikeia (<i>katepanikion</i> of Rhentina)	Church of Saint- George with its land divided into two plots of 700 <i>modioi</i> , 1 water-mill, 1 orchard, 1 garden and 3 parcels of vineyards of 15 <i>modioi</i> .	Initially <i>pronoia</i> of Sarantênoi (<i>dia theiou kai</i> <i>septou</i> <i>chrysovoullou</i> <i>oikononias</i>), later donated to the monastery and finally confiscated by the state.	Land ceded to the monastery	Full ownership (<i>anaphairetos</i> , <i>anapospastos, teleian</i> <i>despoteian kai</i> <i>anaphaireton kyriotêta</i> ,
<i>Lavra</i> III appendix XII (1341)	Angelina Sphratzaina (nun Agapê)		Hagia Maria (<i>katepanikion</i> of Kalamaria)	<i>Hypergon zeugêlateion</i> of 2,440 <i>modioi</i>		Sale to brother, Theodôros Doukas Spartênos and brother-in-law, Manouêl Phaxênos	Full ownership
<i>Doch</i> no. 22 (1344)	1)-Philommatês and other unnamed individuals 2)Komnênoutzikos 3) Glavas syr Mourinos	1) <i>stratiotikoi</i> <i>archôntes</i>	-Hermêleia (<i>katepanikion</i> of Hermêleia) -Kassandreia (<i>katepanikion</i> of Kassandreia)	1) Abandoned land (<i>exaleimmatika</i> <i>staseia</i>) of 600 <i>modioi</i> given to the monastery with <i>paroikoi</i> and <i>proskathêmenoi</i> 2)village of Hermêleia and pasturage of Sigrê	1) From Philommatês and the others 6 <i>staseis</i> 2) sold to the monastery by syr Mourinos [from his inheritance (<i>mêtrothen</i>)]	Confirmation of the possessions of Docheiariou monastery coming from donations (<i>dôreastikôs</i>) and sale	Free from fiscal obligations (<i>anaphaireton</i> , <i>anapospaston</i> , <i>adiaseiston</i>) hereditary rights (<i>kata logon</i> <i>gonikotêtos</i>)

<i>Lavra</i> III no. 124 (1345)	Andreas Palaiologos	<i>oikeios, eparchos</i>	Kravvata (<i>katepanikion</i> of Kalamaria)	Land of 1000 <i>modioi</i> in the village of Kravvata 2 <i>paroikoi</i> with coupling (<i>zeugaria</i>)	From <i>prostagmata, praktika</i> and valid rights (<i>euloga dikaiômata</i>)	Affirmation of the emperor (<i>chrysovoullos logos</i>) for right to transmit it	Free from fiscal obligations (<i>adiaseistôs, anapospastôs, anaphairetôs, anenochlêtôs</i>)
<i>Dion</i> no.2 (1347)	Dêmêtrios Kavasilas	<i>oikeios, megas papias</i>	Theme of Thessalonikê - <i>Katakalê</i> (<i>katepanikion</i> of Kalamaria) - <i>Plagêna</i> and <i>Therma</i> (unknown location)	<i>Pronoia</i> of a <i>posotês</i> of 250 <i>hyperpyra</i> : 1) village of <i>Katakalê</i> 2) <i>oikonomia</i> of late Gavras 3) land and vineyard farming (<i>ampelopakton</i>) of the villages of <i>Plagêna</i> and <i>Therma</i> previously belonging to the fisc (<i>dêmosiaka</i>) and then to Geôrgios Pharmakês.	<i>Pronoia</i> granted to Kavasilas by John VI Kantakouzênos	<i>Pronoia</i> is made hereditary by John VI Kantakouzênos (<i>chrysovoullos logos</i>) after Kavasilas's request	<i>anenochleitôs, adiasseistôs, anaphairetôs, anapospastôs</i>) and transmission to children and heirs (<i>kata logon gonikotêtos</i>). His children retain the same rights
<i>Doch</i> no. 26 (1349)	Dêmêtrios Devlitzênos	<i>oikeios</i>	Hermêleia (<i>katepanikion</i> of Hermêleia)	Village of Hermêleia of a <i>posotês</i> of 100 <i>hyperpyra</i> from his 400 <i>hyperpyra</i> of his <i>oikonomia</i>	<i>Pronoia</i>	Confirmation of fiscal exemption (<i>chrysovoullos logos</i>)	Full ownership, right to melioration, transmittable <i>posotêta (kata logon gonikotêtos)</i>
<i>Xer</i> no. 26 (1349)	Philippa Asanina, daughter of late Dêmêtrios Asanês and wife of klêrikos, Michaêl Kontopetrês	-	Hermêleia (<i>katepanikion</i> of Hermêleia*) *in the document it is mistakenly ascribed to the region of Kalamaria	Land of unknown size in Hermêleia, with <i>paroikoi</i> and fruit trees.	From inheritance (<i>apo gonikotêtos</i>).	Sale of land for 60 <i>nomismata hyperpyra</i> [<i>dia doukatôn venetikôn ouggias histôntôn ζ</i>] and confirmation (<i>kouratorikon</i>)	Full ownership (<i>kata teleian exousian kai despoteian</i>), right to exploitation (<i>pôlein, dôreisthai, antallatein, veltioun, synistan</i>) and transmission (<i>klêronomois kai diadochois ean</i>). Guarantee (<i>asphaleia</i>) by

						<i>dekretikon sêmeiôma)</i>	the <i>kouratôr</i> that the land will not be contested in the future. Fine: 20 <i>nomismata</i> .
<i>Lavra</i> III no. 129 (1350?)	Dêmêtrios Kôkalas		-Rhentina (<i>katepanikion</i> Rhentina) -Langadas (<i>katepanikion</i> of Langadas) -Karkara (<i>katepanikion</i> of Kalamaria) 4.Hagios Mamas (<i>katepanikion</i> of Kalamaria)	<i>Oikonomia:</i> 1. <i>agridion</i> called Sykean in Rhentina 2. land of late Eudokia Philanthropênê with its rights in Laggadas 3. <i>paroikoi</i> in the village of Karkara 4. Half of the land belonging to the Hypomimnêskontos, half of the land belonging to Rhôsôn monastery. Finally two gypsies in addition to the ones he already had in his possession.	<i>Paroikoi</i> previously belonged to Michaêl Philanthropênos (<i>meGas stratopedarchês</i> and cousin of the emperor)	Confirmation of his possessions by the emperor (<i>asphaleias eneken</i>)	Free from fiscal obligations (<i>anenchleitôs, adiasestôs</i>) Right to income (<i>prosodos</i>)
<i>Lavra</i> III no.130 (1350/1)	Kalavaris (<i>meGas hetairiarchês</i> Michaêl Kavalaris?)	–	River Ploumiska (<i>katepanikion</i> of Rhentina)	River Ploumiska with the whole area and the <i>anadromê</i> of the river		Donation for <i>psychikon</i>	Guarantee that no taxes (<i>mitaton, skelomagkos, kastroktisia, phonikon, parthenophthoria</i>) will be imposed by him, his son, the <i>kephalê</i> of <i>kastron, sevastos</i> or any other local authority
<i>Doch</i> no.27 (1351)	Geôrgios Kazaras	<i>oikeios, sevastos, adnoumia-</i>	Land called of Patrikôna (<i>katepanikion</i> of	Land of Patrikôna with a house of 2,400 <i>modioi</i> of 48	<i>Pronoia</i>	Imperial grant (<i>chrysovoullos logos</i>)	Free from fiscal obligations (<i>adiaseistôs, anaphairetôs, anapospastôs</i>) with the

		<i>stês</i>	Kalamaria)	<i>hyperpyra</i> value (part of his <i>oikonomia</i>)	(<i>di' apographikôn paradoseôn</i>)	converting the land to hereditary	right to meliorate it (<i>synistan, veltioun</i>), and transmit to heirs (<i>kata logon gonikotêtos</i>). Heirs will retain the same rights
<i>Xer</i> no. 27 (1351)	Andreas Indanês	<i>oikeios, skouterios</i>	Kontokrikou	Foundries of Kontokrikou	Property of Indanês. Initially they belonged to the fisc	Settlement of difference by the emperor (<i>prostagma</i>) over the unpaid sum of the monastery to Indanês.	The monastery must pay 20 <i>hyperpyra</i> according to the initial agreement and acquires full ownership(?) (<i>elavon teleiôs tèn despoteian</i>)
<i>Doch</i> no. 29 (1355)	1.Michaël Pintzikopoulos 2.Theodôros Mouzalôn	1. <i>dysikos archôntopou los</i> 2. <i>kavallarios ?</i>	1.Atouvlan near Revenikeia (<i>katepanikion Akros/Hierissos/Aravenikeia</i>) 2.Rhôsaion (<i>katepanikion</i> of Kalamaria)	1.Village of Atouvlan (<i>Pintzikopoulos's pronoia</i>) 2. Land of 1000 <i>modioi</i> in Rôsaion (<i>Mouzalôn's pronoia</i>)	Initially properties of Docheiariou. Confiscated granted as <i>pronoia</i> by John VI Kantakouzênos	Restitution (<i>paradidômi</i>) of property to the monastery	Full ownership and exploitation (<i>katechein, nemesthai anenochlêtôs kai adiaiseistôs</i>)
<i>Doch</i> no. 31 (1355)	1.Tarchaneiotês 2. syr Mourinos	1. <i>me gas hetairiarchês</i> 2. <i>epi tou stratou</i>	Hermêleia (<i>katepanikion</i> of Hermêleia)	Land of unknown size	Sold to the monastery by syr Mourinos (unknown origin)	Settlement of difference with Tarchaneiotês who trespassed the property. Decision in favour of the monastery	
<i>Doch</i> no. 32 (1355)	Doukas Glavas syr Mourinos	<i>oikeios</i>	Hermêleia (<i>katepanikion</i> of Hermêleia)	Land of unknown size 1 water mill (mill rented by	From inheritance (<i>gonikothen</i>) Initially an	Confirmation of sale of both the land and the mill to the monastery	Full ownership and exploitation (<i>adiaiseistôs</i>) of land and mill in

				Xêropotamou monastery)	imperial grant	by syr Mourinos	perpetuity (<i>eis diênêkê chronon</i>)
<i>Vat II no. 105</i> (1355)	Arsenios TzAMPLAKÔN		-Prinarion -Vela -Thermopotamos (<i>katepanikion</i> of Strymôn)	Estate (<i>ktêma</i>) with all its area and rights, the <i>paroikoi</i> , abandoned land (<i>hypostaseis exaleimmatikas</i>), vineyards in cultivation or not, arable land, mills, uncultivated land and pasture, the part he possessed in Vela and winter pasture in Thermopotamos, annual fair of Hagios Symeôn in Vela, the fortification (<i>kastellion</i>) called Slanesion	1. <i>Pronoia</i> of his grandfather TzAMPLAKÔN, <i>domestikos tôn schôlôn</i> (<i>dia chrysovoullou</i>) Transmissible (<i>gonikon</i>), tax-exempted (<i>anenochlêton kai eleutheron</i>) 2. Fortification constructed in his own expenses	Donation to Vatopedi	Tax exempted (<i>eleuthera</i>) and full ownership (<i>ek gonikothen</i>)
<i>Vat II no. 107</i> (1356)	Arsenios TzAMPLAKÔN	<i>doulos</i>	-Prinarion -Vela -Vlagôstis -Thessalonikê -Galikos (<i>katepanikion</i> of Vardariou/ Paravardaron)	Previous possessions. In addition : 1. winter pasturage in Vlagôstis 2. In Thessalonikê residences in the area of Kataphygê, church of Theotokos Kamariôtissa and its surrounding area (orchard) 3. Half of the estate called <i>tou megalou</i>	3. Transmissible (<i>gonikon</i>). Within this domain he possessed land of 2 <i>zevgaria</i> to exploit to his	Confirmation of previous donations and further ones	Full ownership (<i>kata teleian despoteian kai anaphaireton kyriotêta.</i>) and exploitation in perpetuity (<i>eis apantas kai diênêkeis chronous</i>)

				<i>pappiou</i> near Galikos with salt marsh, coastal land and tower (<i>pyrgos</i>)	wish and a tower (half of it)		
<i>Doch</i> no. 34 (1361)	1. Dêmêtrios Trikanas 2. son 3. Kaloêthês (gamvros) 4. Kammytzês	1. <i>kavallarios</i>		At least 147 <i>hyperpyra</i>	Belonged to late monk Isvês	Settlement of difference between Trikanas and the monastery on the issue of the inheritance in favour of the latter	
<i>Doch</i> no. 35 (1361)	1. Dêmêtrios Trikanas 2. Kaloêthês (gamvros)			Vineyard	Property of late Isvês	Decision in favour of the monastery	Full ownership and exploitation (<i>kata teleian despoteian kai kyriotêta epi tê nomê kai katochê</i>)
<i>Doch</i> no. 36 (1361)	Iôannês Kaloêthês		Mega Plagion?	Vineyard	Bought by late Isvês	Restitution of the vineyard to the monastery by Kaloêthês	(<i>anenchleitôs, adiasistôs</i>) Compensation of 55 <i>ouggiai doukatôn</i>
<i>Vat</i> II no. 118 (1362)	Dêmêtrios TzAMPLAKÔN. Wife: Evdokia Palaiologina TzAMPLAKÔNissa	<i>megalê stratopedarchissa</i>	Galikos (<i>katepanikion</i> of Vardariou/Paravardaron)	Fourth part of the estate in Galikos	Inherited	Dêmêtrios donates his part to Vatopedi	Full ownership and exploitation (<i>kyriôs kai despotikôs, anaphairêtôs kai anapospastôs</i>) Right to the profit of the land (<i>prosodon</i>) Guarantee that his wife will not contest the agreement on the grounds of her alienated dowry

<i>Xen</i> no. 30 (1364)	Evdokia, daughter of Komnênoutzikos, wife of Dêmêtrios Kalligopoulos		Psalis	Land of 150 <i>modioi</i>	Paternal	Donation	Full ownership (<i>despotikôs, anaphairetôs</i>)
<i>ChiP</i> I no. 151 (1366)	Isarês	<i>meGas primmikêrios</i>	Serres? (the document was signed in Serres)	Unknown number of <i>hyperpyra</i> and other property of unknown nature	Bequeathed to Chilandar by Stanesês	Decision in favour of Chilandar regarding Isarês's claims over Stanesês's property as being his own dowry	
<i>Doch</i> no.38 (1366)	Iôannês Kaloêthês					Kaloêthês confirms the monastery's rights over the vineyard of Isvês	
<i>TheochVerm</i> (1366/67)	Dêmêtrios Tzaplakôn	<i>Megas stratopedarchês</i>	Serres, Christopolis	Houses, land, vineyards, churches and personal assets	Bequeathed to his wife and children	Testament	
<i>Pant</i> no. 7 (1368)	Maria Laskarina	-	Mesampelia, (<i>katepanikion</i> of Christopolis, theme of Serres)	11 <i>stremmata</i> of cultivable land (<i>chôraphiaia</i>)	From inheritance (<i>gonikothen</i>) free of charges (<i>eleutheran kai akatadoulôton</i>)	Sold to <i>meGas stratopedarchês</i> Alexios (<i>sympetheros</i> of the emperor) for 130 <i>hyperpyra</i> = 130 <i>ouggiai doukatôn</i>	Full ownership (<i>despotikôs, exousiodôs, kyriôs, anaphairetôs</i>) and rights of transmission and exploitation (<i>pôlein, dôreisthai, antallattein, proikodotein, veltioun</i>)
<i>Vat</i> II nos.	Alexis Laskaris/	<i>meGas</i>	Stylarion, near the		Bought by Alexis's father,	Donation to Vatopedi in exchange for	The monastery acquires the right to ownership and

129 and 130 (1369)	Atouemês Metochitês	<i>domestikos</i>	tower of Hagios Mamas (<i>katepanikion</i> of Kalamaria)	Land of approximately 13,000 <i>modioi</i>	Theodôros. Later ceded to Alexis as dowry (<i>proikôan</i>)	2 <i>adelphata</i> . He also gives 200 ounces of ducats for two additional <i>adelphata</i>	exploitation of land (<i>katechein kai nemesthai</i>)
<i>ChilP</i> I no. 154(1374)	-Xenê Isarina, -Michaêl Angelos Isarês -Theodôros Komnênos Isarês	<i>-megalê kontostavli-ssa -doulos -doulos</i>				Guarantee on behalf of the family that it will lay no claims to Stanesês's bequest to the monastery	
<i>Vat</i> II no. 142 (between 1369 and 1375)	Chrysos	<i>Prôtostratôr</i>	Stylarion, near the tower of Hagios Mamas (<i>katepanikion</i> of Kalamaria)			Imperial order. The part of the land taken away by late Chrysos must be returned to the monastery.	
<i>Vat</i> II no. 135 (1370)	Kavallarios Michaêl TzAMPLAKÔN	<i>doulos</i>	Prinarion (Serres)	Land and winter pasturage	Transmitted (<i>apo gonikotêtos</i>). Co-owner: his late brother, Alexis Kavallarios	Donation to Vatopedi	Full ownership to the monastery(<i>eis teleian exousian kata anaphaireton pantê kai anapospaston kyriotêta</i>) in perpetuity on the condition that this will secure a <i>kellion</i> and pension (<i>adelphaton</i>) to Michaêl
<i>Doch</i> no. 39	Markos syr Mourinos	<i>epi tou</i>	Hermêleia		Belonged	Settlement of difference between	Full ownership

(1370)		<i>stratou</i>	(<i>katepanikion</i> of Hermêleia)	mill	formerly to syr Mourinos	Docheiariou and Xêropotamou over mill in favour of Docheiariou	(<i>anenchleitôs</i>)
<i>Doch</i> no. 40 (1370/71)	Doukas Glavas Markos syr Mourinos	–	Hermêleia (<i>katepanikion</i> of Hermêleia)	Land (unknown size) with water mill	From maternal inheritance (<i>apogonikotêtos/mêtrothen</i>) Initially an imperial grant	Confirmation of mill possession to Docheiariou	Full ownership (<i>anenchleitôs, adiasestôs, anaphairetôs, anapospastôs/lôs teleioi despotai kai kyrioi</i>)
<i>Doch</i> no. 41 (1373)	Iôannês Kataras	<i>oikeios</i>	Patrikôna (<i>katepanikion</i> of Kalamaria)	Land of Patrikôna of 2400 <i>modioi Posotês</i> of 48 <i>hyperpyra</i>	From inheritance (father <i>meGas adnoumiastês</i>) Initially <i>pronoia (dia chrysovoullou)</i>	Settlement of difference between Kataras and monastery in favour of the latter	Full ownership (<i>anenchleitôs</i>) in perpetuity(<i>eis ton diênêkê chronon</i>)
<i>Doch</i> no. 42 (1373)	Anna Kantakouzênê Palaiologina, wife of meGas domestikos Dêmêtrios Palaiologos	<i>megalê domestikissa</i>	Mariana (<i>katepanikion</i> of Kalamaria)	Land called Mariana (unknown size) with water, <i>paroikoi, proskathêmenoï</i> land, trees, vineyards, watermills, pasture One of the mills leased to Vatopedi monastery	Dowry (<i>eis proikan dothen kai apoklêrothen</i>)	Sold to the monastery for 600 <i>hyperpyra</i> in Venetian ducats (<i>prattomena</i>)= 600 <i>ouggiai</i>	Full ownership (<i>kata teleian despoteian kai anaphaireton kyriotêta</i>) She secures the rights over the mill which may be contended by Vatopedi on the grounds of pre-emption right or other. Fine of 200 <i>hyperpyra</i> and the appropriate percentage according to the law to the fisc in case of breach of agreement

<i>Lavra</i> III no. 145 (1374)	Alexios Komnênos Masgidas	<i>doulos</i>		400 <i>hyperpyra</i> from the sale of grain to the monastery	Inherited from Kônstantinos Masgidas (uncle) by testament	Difference settlement. Masgidas withdraws his demand on this sum of money and accepts 40 <i>hyperpyra</i>	
<i>Doch</i> no. 43 (1375)	Dêmêtrios Palaiologos	<i>me gas domestikos</i>	Amariana (<i>katepanikion</i> of Kalamaria)	Land of a value of at least 2,000 <i>hyperpyra</i>	Dêmêtrios Palaiologos had donated the land to Docheiariou for a sum of 600 <i>hyperpyra</i>	Settlement of difference between the monasteries of Akapniou and Docheiariou. Possession to Docheiariou is confirmed with a <i>prostagma</i> of the same year	Full ownership (<i>anenochleitôs kai adiasestôs /kata anaphaireton despoteian kai kyriotêta</i>)
<i>Vat</i> II no. 149 (1376)	Alexios Kavallarios	<i>doulos, oikeios, sygklêtikos, owner of garden and house</i>	City of Verroia	Garden	Inherited by his father, Michaël Kavallarios, and grandfather, Arsenios TzAMPLAKÔN. Then passed to the monastery	Agreement for the exploitation (rental) of the garden	Monastery had the full ownership (<i>teleian despoteian kai anaphaireton kyriotêta</i>). Alexios would rent it and have the right to melioration until the end of his life for 6 <i>ouggias doukatôn prattomenôn apsogôn</i> . His children have no right to claim it.

<i>Lavra</i> III no. 149 (1378)	Manouël Tarchaneiôtês	<i>oikeios</i>	Lôrôton	Village of Lôrôton with its <i>pyrgos</i>	Previously belonging to Geôrgios TzAMPLAKÔN (<i>oikeios</i>) and his brother N TzAMPLAKÔN. The part of the latter had passed to Manouël Rhaoul Koustogiannis (<i>oikeios</i>)	Imperial grant (<i>chrysovoullon</i>)	Free form fiscal obligations (<i>anenochleitôs, adiaiseistôs, anaphairetôs, anapospastôs</i>) during his life with the obligation of <i>douleia</i> . With the right to transmit it only to his son, Ioannês under the same conditions.
<i>Doch</i> no. 48 (1381)	Manouël Devlitzênos	<i>doulos</i>	Hermêleia (<i>katepanikion</i> of Hermêleia)	Land of unknown size with watermill, <i>ampelopakton</i> , fruit trees, <i>paroikoi</i> , <i>proskathêmenoi</i>	Transmissible (<i>gonikon</i>) Confirmed with two documents:	Donation to Docheiariou monastery: land in exchange of three <i>adelphata</i> during his life and to a person of his choice after his death	The three <i>adelphata</i> to be paid to him equal 24 <i>tagaria adelphatarika</i> , that is 3 <i>chartai</i> , 4 <i>tagaria</i> of legumes, 16 <i>tagaria</i> of wheat instead of wine, 2 <i>tetartia</i> of oil and 50 <i>litrai</i> of cheese.
<i>Doch</i> no. 49	Maria Devlitzênê	<i>kyra</i>	-Kontorryakion (<i>katepanikion</i> of Kalamaria) -District of Hagios Dêmêtrios -Galikos (<i>katepanikion</i> of	1) – houses in Hagios Dêmêtrios district worth of 10 <i>litrai</i> = 720 <i>hyperpyra</i> - vineyard in Kontorryakion of 14 <i>modioi</i> worth of 2 <i>litrai</i>	1) dowry initially worth of 22 <i>hyperpyrikai litrai</i> =1584 <i>hyperpyra</i> but now reduced	Evaluation of property after her husband's death and	

(1384)	(widow of Manouël)		Vardariou/ Paravardaron) -Kolytaina -Omprastos Hermêleia (<i>katepanikion</i> of Hermêleia)	- garments worth of 53 <i>hyperpyra</i> - jewellery worth of 154 <i>hyperpyra</i> 2) 500 <i>modioi</i> in <i>Galikos</i> 3) 1000 <i>modioi</i> in <i>Kolytaina</i> 4) 2000 <i>modioi</i> in Omprastos 5) her husband's whole property in Hermêleia (unknown size or value)	2), 3), 4) and 5) (husband's possessions and first wife's dowry) received as compensation	compensation for her reduced dowry	
<i>Esph</i> no. 29 (1388)	Geôrgios Anatavlas		Portarea	Land of unknown size	Initially belonged to Anatavlas Later it was seized by the Ottomans and given to a Turk. After intervention by the monastery acquired it.	Settlement of difference. The land is given to the monastery in exchange for two <i>diakoniai</i>	One <i>diakonia</i> for his son Theodôros (i.e. 12 sacks of wheat, 24 mesures of wine, 6 mesures of oil, 2 sacks of legumes and 30 <i>litrai</i> of cheese per year). Geôrgios will enter monastic life
<i>Doch</i> no. 50 (1389)	Maria Devlitzênê (widow of Manouël)			3 <i>adelphata</i>	From late husband	Confirmation that after her death the monastery will cease to pay the <i>adelphata</i>	
<i>Lavra</i> III no. 150 (1389)	Alexios Angelos Philanthropênos	<i>kaisar</i>	Kolydros	<i>kastron</i>	From <i>chrysovoullon</i>	Donation	Full ownership (<i>kata teleian despoteian</i>)

<i>Lavra</i> III no. 153 (1392)	Dêmétrios Tzyriggês		-Thessalonikê -Galikos (<i>katepanikion</i> of Vardariou/ Paravardaron) - Episkopou	1. Church (<i>monydrion</i>) of Hagios Iôannês Theologos in Thessalonikê 2. one piece of land called 'tou Zaventzê' in Galikos 3. two pieces of land in Episkopou (one triangular and the other called Monodendrion)	1 bought by using his pre-emption right 2 and 3 inherited from his late son-in-law, Adrianos	Donation to Lavra	Full ownership (<i>kata teleian despoteian kai kyriotêta anenochleitôs, adiasestôs, anaphairetôs</i>) in perpetuity (<i>eis aiôna ton apanta</i>)
<i>Doch</i> no. 51 (1404)	Maria Devlitzênê					The court decision that the <i>adelphata</i> should be paid to Maria	
<i>Dion</i> no. 11 (1409)	Manouêl Kavasilas	—	-Katakalê (<i>katepanikion</i> of Kalamaria) -Aloupochôrion (<i>katepanikion</i> of Kassandreia)	1) Palaiochôrion of Katakalê with its fishery 2) Half of the village of Aloupochôrion	From inheritance (<i>gonikothern</i>)	Confirmation of Kavasilas's possession (<i>paradotikon gramma</i>)	Free from fiscal obligations (<i>anenochleitôs, adiasestôs</i>) with hereditary rights (<i>ôs gonika</i>)
<i>Doch</i> no. 57 (1419)	Theodôra, wife of archôn Komês and daughter of Maria		Hermêleia (<i>katepanikion</i> of Hermêleia)	Land with no <i>paroikoi</i>	Initially an imperial grant (<i>vasilikê dôrea</i>)	Settlement of difference. Land remains to the monastery as long as it pays 12 <i>hyperpyra</i> , grain and <i>adelphata</i> of one	Full rights to the monastery (<i>ta dikaiômata panta</i>)

						year to Theodora.	
<i>Iv</i> IV no. 97 (1421)	Argyropouloi		Thessalonikê	Gardens (<i>kêpopervolia</i>)	Leased by the Argyropouloi for the fixed sum of 30 <i>hyperpyra</i> per year (<i>kat'etos</i> <i>paktikôs</i>) not including the charges in kind.	Settlement (<i>sekretikon</i> <i>gramma</i>) of difference in favour of the monastery of Ivirôn	Restoration of the gardens to the monastery
<i>Lavra</i> III no. 173 (1471)	Thomaïs Palaiologina			Two water mill co- owned with Kalamiôtês and Mitylinaïos and other assets of 50 <i>hyperpyra</i> in total (=half <i>adelphaton</i>)	From parents and husband	Donation	Full ownership (<i>kyrios kai despotês</i>)

Urban property transactions

(14th-15th centuries)

Document/ date	Name	Location	Type of transaction	Sums/conditions involved
<i>Chilandar I</i> no. 16(1296)	Manouël Vivlodontês	Thessalonikê	Sale of a vineyard (3 <i>sporeai</i>) and fallow land (4 <i>modioi</i>), on land belonging to <i>aktouarios</i> Kavasilas, to Theodôros Karavas and his heirs	8 <i>hyperpyra eustathma prattomena apsoga</i> and 3 ducats
<i>Vatopedi I</i> no.28 (1299)	Euphrosynê and her husband	Kalokairidês area, near Thessalonikê	Concession of 1 vineyard and land in two parcels (6 <i>modioi</i>) to Dêmêtrios Kyprianos	Concession of full ownership. Fine of 12 <i>hyperpyra</i> in case of violation of contract
<i>Vatopedi I</i> no.32 (1301)	Sotêrichos, son of Dêmêtrês	Kalokairidês area, near Thessalonikê	Leasing land of 3 <i>vassilikoï modioi</i> to Kônstantinos Marmara to cultivate vines	Rent fixed to 6 <i>kokkia hyperpyrika</i> annually starting from the third year
<i>Xenophôn</i> no. 7 (1306)	Anna Doukopoulina Mesopotamitissa		Leasing part of land belonging to the monastery of Hagioi Anargyroi (inherited) to Leôn Pavlos and his heirs	2 <i>hyperpyrika kokkia</i> and 4 additional, according to the leasing act, for a period of 25 years.
<i>Xenophôn</i> no. 8 (1309)	Michaël Kapitonaitês and his wife, Xenê	Asômatôn district	Sale of one house to Xenos Krênitês on land belonging to the Asômatôn church	13 <i>nomismata (prattômena and eustathma hyperpyra)</i> . 1/10 of the payment to the clergy of the church who signed the document. Annual fee (3 <i>kokkia</i>) to be paid to this church
<i>Chilandar I</i> no. 25 (1309)	Iôannes Andrônas and his family	Hagios Paramonos district	Sale of 3 houses and a yard, common with that of the church of Ierousalêm, to the monastery of Theomêtoros	54 <i>nomismata hyperpyra</i> . Property is burdened with an annual fee (<i>telos</i>) of 6 <i>kokkia</i> to be paid to the metropolis of Thessalonikê
<i>Xenophôn</i> no. 9 (1310)	Theodôra Gorgaina	Asômatôn district	Sale of one house to Iôannês Papadopoulos	7 <i>nomismata</i> of good weight (<i>eustathma kai prattômena</i>). 1/10 (<i>dekatêmorion</i>) of the sum is given to the clerics who sign. Annual fee of t 2 <i>kokkia</i> to be paid to the church.
<i>Vatopedi I</i> no. 44 (1310)	Iôannês Mamênos	Aetopholea, near Thessalonikê	Leasing of land (3 <i>modioi</i>) from Vatopedi in order to cultivate vines	Rent is fixed on the basis of 1 <i>hyperpyron</i> per 12 <i>vassilikoï modioi</i> , starting in the third year. Renewal of contract after 25 years (first year double the amount, then the usual one).

				Guarantee: 24 <i>hyperpyra</i> in case of violation of contact on the part of the monastery.
<i>Iv</i> III no. 73 (1314)	Kônstantinos Marmaras	Acheiropoiêtos district	Sale of 3 buildings and 3 wine-presses to Ivirôn.	70 <i>hyperpyra</i> for the sale and 40 <i>hyperpyra</i> for his meliorations.
<i>Xenophôn</i> no. 10 (1315)	Nikêphoros Kladôn and his wife, Maria	Asômâtôn district	Owners of 2 houses with yard on land belonging to the metropolitan church of Theotokos Palladia, paying an annual fee of 4 <i>kokkia</i> . Donation of half property and sale of the other half to Xenophôn.	36 <i>nomismata hyperpyra prattômena kai apsoga</i> . 1/10 to the clerics who sign the document. Guarantee: double the amount of 34 <i>hyperpyra</i> with an additional fine of 24 <i>hyperpyra</i>
<i>Vatopedi</i> I no.50 (1318)	Kônstantinos Kyprianos	Neochôrion, near Thessalonikê	Exchange of property with the monastery of Timiopetritissa. Kyprianos cedes 1 vineyard (cultivated) of 1,5 <i>vassilikoï modioi</i> to Vatopedi and acquires another one of 13 (uncultivated)	
<i>Iv</i> III no. 78 (1320)	Anna Paxamadô and brother, Dêmêtrios Karsêrês	Megalê Panagia district	Sale of 3 houses to Ivirôn	60 <i>hyperpyra</i> in venetian ducats
<i>Vatopedi</i> I no.54 (1321)	Nikêtas Varagios	Thinos, near Thessalonikê	Renounces his pre-emption right in favour of the monastery of Timiopetritissa	Guarantee: fine of 12 <i>hyperpyra</i>
<i>ChilP</i> I no. 84 (1322)	Alexandros Doukas Sarantênos (<i>doulos</i>) and his wife, Kalê	Hagios Paramonos district	Sale of three houses	90 ounces of venetian ducats Guarantee: double the amount of 90 <i>hyperpyra</i> with an additional fine of 50 <i>hyperpyra</i>
<i>ChilP</i> I no. 85 (1322)	Monk Iôvanês Karavas	Hagios Mênas district, Rhavdas, Piasmata, Agkônes	Donation of houses and 5 vineyards, according to his father's wish, to Chilandar, which he later dismissed by selling his property. With this act he comes to a settlement with the monastery and cedes it back to Chilandar	Karavas receives from the monastery 90 <i>hyperpyra</i> in 90 ounces of venetian ducats.
<i>Vatopedi</i> I	Kônstantinos	Neochôrion, near	Leasing of land (3 <i>modioi</i>) belonging to the	Rent is fixed on the basis of 1 <i>hyperpyron</i> per 12 <i>vasilikoï modioi</i> . The renewal of the contract possible

no.59 (1323)	Klôvas	Thessalonikê	monastery of Timiopetritissa , in order to grow vines	after the period of 25 years, by paying one double rent and afterwards the usual amount.
ChilP I no. 97 (1324)	Manouël Kollourakês	Hagios Mênas district, area of Xylorygion	Termination of contract between Kollourakês and late Chalkeopoulos which involved the exchange of 1 house belonging to the latter with 1 vineyard of Kollourakês	
<i>Xenophôn</i> no. 20 (1324)	Lavrentios Kladôn	Hippodrome district, Mikra Karya	Donation of his <i>monydrion</i> of Theomêtôr, near the Rome gate, buildings on land belonging Dêmêtrios Doukopoulos (<i>oikeios</i>), one vineyard of 8 modioi and uncultivated land.	
<i>Iv</i> III no. 84 (1326)	Geôrgios Voutzinos	Hippodrome district	Sale of 4 houses, 1 garden , 1 press	100 <i>nomismata hyperpyra prattômena</i> in 100 ounces of venetian ducats. 1/10 to the monks. Guarantee: fine of 50 <i>hyperpyra</i>
<i>ChilP</i> I no. 106 (1326)	Anyssia Platyskalitissa	Hagios Paramonos district	Sale of 2 houses to Chilandar	40 <i>hyperpyra</i> in ounces of venetian ducats Guarantee: double the amount of 40 <i>hyperpyra</i> with an additional fine of 12 <i>hyperpyra</i>
<i>ChilP</i> I no. 112 (1327)	Dêmêtrios Doukas Petzikopoulos, doulos, and his family	Hagios Paramonos district	Sale of 3 houses and fallow field to Chilandar	140 <i>hyperpyra</i> : 50 <i>hyperpyra</i> borrowed initially the monastery. With this act Chilandar gives the remaining 90 <i>hyperpyra</i> and buys the property Guarantee: double the amount of 140 <i>hyperpyra</i> with an additional fine of 100 <i>hyperpyra</i>
<i>Vatopedi</i> I no.65 (1327)	Theodotê , wife of Iôannês Phalkôn	Hippodrome district	Sale of one house to Iôannês Pezos, monk of Vatopedi	Price: 26 <i>hyperpyra</i>
<i>ChilP</i> I no. 125 (1336)	Xenia and her relatives	Hagios Paramonos district	Sale of land to Chilandar	10 <i>hyperpyra</i> in ounces of ducats Guarantee: double the amount of 10 <i>hyperpyra</i> with an additional fine of 4 <i>hyperpyra</i>
<i>Xenophôn</i> no. 24 (1336)	Eirênê, wife of Leôn Pavlês, and her children	Hippodrome district	Sale of 3 buildings to Ignatios Syrriarês (<i>hieromonachos</i>)	58 <i>nomismata hyperpyra</i> in ounces of venetian ducats
<i>Vatopedi</i> II no.85	Alexios Paxamadas and wife, Chrysê	Thessalonikê	Donation of vineyard of 5 <i>vassilikoï modioi</i> to the monastery of Timiopetritissa	

<i>Vatopedi</i> II no.84 (1339)	Dêmêtrios Palatês	Kalokairidês area	Leasing fallow land (6 <i>vassilikoi modioi</i>) from the monastery near the city in order to cultivate vineyards . Initially, it was bought from the <i>chrysepilektês</i> Simôn Veaskos,	Right to the income of the land for 25 years and in the third year payment to the monastery of an annual <i>telos</i> of 12 <i>kokkia hyperpyrika prattômena</i> , not <i>protimômena</i> (12/24 <i>hyperpyra</i>). The renewal of the contract possible after the period of 25 years, by paying one double rent once and then the normal amount.
<i>Vatopedi</i> II no.85 (1340)	Dionysios Kalamitzênos <i>hieromonachos</i>)	Hagios Mênas district	Agreement with the monastery about four houses Kalamitzênos's father had donated and which Dionysios claimed later. They are finally returned to Vatopedi	
<i>Vatopedi</i> II no.86 (1341)	Germanos (monk)	Kalokairidês area (near the monastery of Pantovassilissa)	Leasing land (2 <i>vasilikoi modioi</i>) to Iôannês Archontitzês for 2 years in order to grow vineyards	<i>Telos</i> defined to 2 <i>megala doukata</i> . Similar conditions with Palatês's contract.
<i>Vatopedi</i> II no.87 (1341)	Nikêphoros Litos	Kalokairidês area.	Leasing land (3 <i>vasilikoi modioi</i>)	Same conditions with the previous one. <i>Telos</i> on the basis of 1 <i>hyperpyron</i> per 12 <i>vasilikoi modioi</i> .
<i>Vatopedi</i> II no.90 (1344)	Theodôros Rhepanas	Kalokairidês area	Leasing land (3 <i>vasilikoi modioi</i>)	Exactly the same conditions with previous one
<i>Xenophôn</i> no.28 (1348)	Hierakina, daughter of late Magidiôtes	Monodendri (land of the Chortaitou monastery), in Tameôs area	Donation of cultivable vineyard of approximately 5 <i>modioi</i> with its annual harvest and the nearby <i>synypotelês</i> land, cleared but not cultivated	The monastery acquires full ownership of the property
<i>Vatopedi</i> II no.106 (1356)	Kônstantinos Agallianos	Kataphygê district	Leasing land from Vatopedi in order to built houses	Annual rent (<i>etêsion anakamptikon telos</i>) of 2,5 <i>megala doukata</i> (=30 silver <i>kokkia</i>) for 25 years. Conditions for the renewal of the contract are similar to <i>Vatopedi</i> nos.86, 87, 90.
<i>Vatopedi</i> II no.110 (1358)	Geôrgios Tzymiskês, his wife and son	Kataphygê district	Agreement for repair of houses and taking possession of them during lifetime	36 <i>hyperpyra</i> in ounces (<i>ouggiai</i>) and 4 <i>litrai</i> of olive oil to be given annually.
<i>Vatopedi</i> II no.115 (1359/60)		Kataphygê district		Expenses for the repair of the houses in <i>Vat</i> no. 110

<i>Vatopedi II</i> no.119 (1364)	Manassês Tarchaneiôtês (<i>prôtostratôr</i>)		Imperial guarantee to Tarchaneiôtês for possession and patronage (<i>ephoreia</i>) of the monastery of Theos Sôtêr (tou Kyrkyrou) with all its land and permission to be transmitted to Vatopedi after his death	
<i>Vatopedi II</i> no.121 (1365)	Nun Zênovia Vranaina sales to Manouêl Chronaios	Kalokairidês area	Sale of a vineyard of approximately 3 <i>modioi</i> to Manouêl Chronaios	12 ounces of venetian ducats
<i>Vatopedi II</i> no.139 (1373)	Michaêl and Kônstantinos Kyprianos (<i>endoxôtatoi</i>)	Thessalonikê	Buy of house in ruins, a church and 3 <i>kellia</i> from Vatopedi [Vatopedi had inherited the property from Arsenios TzAMPLAKÔN through testament with the obligation to pay for his debt]	100 <i>hyperpyra</i>
<i>Vatopedi II</i> no.140 (1374)	Iôannês Rhammatas	Hagia Pelagia district	Sale of 2 houses to Vatopedi	170 <i>hyperpyra</i> in ounces.
<i>Vatopedi II</i> no.146 (1375)	Ignatios Chortatzês (<i>hieromonachos</i>)	Hagios Dêmêtrios district	Chortatzês owns property (yard and buildings) worth of 200 ounces of ducats. Donates to Vatopedi one quarter of it and sales half of the remaining part	1 quarter of property is worth of 50 <i>hyperpyra</i> . The other part is sold for 75 ounces of ducats.
<i>Vatopedi II</i> no.150 (1376)	Kônstantinos Kyprianos	Kataphygê district	Leasing one yard with a church from Vatopedi in order to make meliorations and restorations	Right to exploitation during lifetime. Right to pass it on to a successor of his choice for an annual rent of 48 <i>grand ducats</i> . After the death of both, the property returns to the monastery
<i>Docheiariou</i> no.47 (1381)	Monk Simôn	Hippodrome and Hagios Phantinos district	Donation of one house and one vineyard in order to acquire the right to enter the monastery	
<i>Lavra III</i> no. 151 (1389)	Alexios Angelos Philanthropênos		Donation of monydrion of Nea Photis to the monastery of Nea Monê	
<i>Xenophôn</i> no. 32	Dadas family	Asômatôn district	Judicial decision in favour of the monastery over property that had been rented to the Dadas family.	

(1419)			5 grocer's shops, 3 large houses with one bramble and yard converted to wine shop by Dadas	
<i>Dionysiou</i> no.19 (1420)	Maria Hagioreitissa	Thessalonikê, Omphalos quarter	Donation of church (<i>kellydrion</i>) of the Forty Martyrs and house in ruins	Condition of donation: melioration of the church
Lavra III no.168 (1432)	Kônstantinos Magklavitês	Hagios Mênas district	Leasing of a workshop (extraction of linseed oil) from Nea Monê, previously leased by a Turk	8 <i>nomismata politeuomena</i> and one jar of linseed oil annually

Table III*
Title-holders and family names (14th -15th centuries)

Family name/date/ PLP no.	Profession/ title	Location	Document/date	Comments	Family relations
Adrianos					
-(before 1301) No. 93031	<i>pronoia</i> holder	Galikos /Thessalonikê	<i>Iv</i> III: nos. 70(1301) 75 (1318)80,(1324)	mention	
-(before 1301) No. 309	landowner	Chalkidikê			
Manouêl Doukas (1311) Not in PLP	<i>doulos</i>	Hêrmêleia	<i>Doch</i> : no. 11*	signature	
-(1319)	house and land owner	Aphetos Chalkidikê	<i>ChilP</i> I : no.40 (around 1318)	mention of his house and vineyard	
- (before 1321) Not in PLP		Hêrmêleia	<i>Lavra</i> II : no.109	He sells land of 2 <i>modioi</i> to Vatopedi	
Petros Doukas (1349) No. 315	<i>Kouratôr, oikeios</i>		<i>Xer</i> : no. 26*		
-(d. before 1392) No. 310			<i>Lavra</i> II : no. 153*		Son-in-law of Dêmêtrios Tzyriggês
Angelos					
Theodôros (1295) No. 194		Thessalonikê			Brother of Geôrgios
Doukas Michaêl Angelos (1304) Not in PLP			<i>Lavra</i> II: no.98*		Husband of Maria Angelina

Iôannês (before 1317) No. 202	<i>mezas adnoumiastês</i>	Apidea	<i>Chil</i> I: nos. 34 , 35	Donates land of 200 modioi	
Evdokia Komnênê Doukaina (before 1321) No. 151			<i>Bat</i> III: 18, 21, 24		Married to Theodôros Sarantênos. Mother-in-law of Michaêl Doukas Arianitês
Markos (1348) No. 217	<i>oikeios</i> of Stefanos Dušan	Zichna	<i>SolovMošin</i> : no. 28	Had donated houses, land churches and land to Vatopedi	
Manouêl (1352-1370) No. 214	<i>katholikos kritês, epi tou kanikleiou</i>	From Thessalonikê	<i>MM</i> I: 345		Brother of Dêmêtrios
Geôrgios (1381) No. 184	<i>archôn</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Doch</i> : no.47	signature	
Alexios (1409?) No.181		Serres	<i>Esph</i> : no. 31	signature	
Allelouias					
Geôrgios (1327) No. 676	<i>megalyperochos</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Zog</i> :55f		
– (1343) No.672		Verrhoia			
– (1348) No.673	great landowner, <i>stratiôtes</i>	Zavlantia	<i>SolovMošin</i> : no.21	His paroikoi are ceded to the monasteries of Zavlantia	
Manouêl (1356) No. 687	<i>doulos, tatas tês aulês</i>		<i>Vat</i> II: no.107	signature	
- (beginning of 15th c.) No. 674	house owner	Thessalonikê	<i>KugNot</i> : 153 (paragraph 86)	He sold his wife's dowry, a house, to monk	Son-in-law of Metriôtes. Brother-in-law of Philantropênos,

				Harmenopoulos	Alexios
Alousianos					
-(1425-26) No. 695		Thessalonikê	<i>KugNot</i> : 148-9 (paragraphs 53, 58)	Witness to a transaction between the compiler and Paxamada. He also gives 450 <i>aspra palaia</i> to the compiler	
Alyatês					
- (1300-before 1321) No. 91138	<i>kastrophylax</i> , landowner	Sarantarea Linovrocheion in Diavolokampos	<i>Lavra</i> II: nos. 90 (1300) and 108 (1321)	mention	
- (before 1319) [according to the acts though the document is of 1318] No. 710	<i>sevastos</i>	Chalkidikê	<i>ChilP</i> : no. 40 (1318)	Mention	
- (1319) [according to the acts though the document is of 1318] No.707	landowner	Chalkidikê	<i>ChilP</i> :no. 40 (1318)	mention	
-(1320) No. 93061	landowner	Palaiokastron near Strumica	<i>Iv</i> III: no.77	mention	
Geôrgios (1327) No. 713	<i>pansevastos sevastos</i>	Thessalonikê			
Michaël (1338)		Thessalonikê	<i>Vat</i> II: no.38	Witness	

Not in PLP					
-(1356/7) No. 93060		Thessalonikê	<i>SchreinFin</i> 3/62: 74f		
Amasianos					
Michaël (1356) No.762	<i>prokathêmenos</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Vat</i> II: no. 107	signature	
Amnôn					
Alexios (1279-1301) No. 793	<i>apographeus, doulos, holder of pronoia</i>	Thessalonikê Hierissos	<i>Esph</i> : nos. 7 (1283-84 or 1298-99), 10* (1301) <i>ChilP</i> I: nos. 66 and 72 (1321) <i>Zog</i> : 115, 119f; <i>DoReg</i> : 2095 ; <i>MošinAkti</i> :176; <i>DoSch</i> : 108	He donates land of 6 <i>modioi</i> Signature His <i>oikonomia</i> and <i>paroikoi</i> in Hierissos are confirmed to Chilandar	Husband of Amnissa
Isaakios(1290) No.794	holder of pronouia	Hierissos	<i>Esph</i> : no.10* ; <i>MošinAkti</i> : 176		
Konstantinos (1290) No. 795	holder of pronouia	Hierissos	<i>Esph</i> : no.10* ; <i>MosinAkti</i> : 176		
-(1338) Not in PLP	<i>Hetairiarchês</i> landowner	Hêrmêleia	<i>Vat</i> II : no. 81	mention	
-(1356/7) No. 93075		Thessalonikê	<i>SchreinFin</i> : 3/124		
Ampertos					
Manouël (1474)	<i>archôn</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Dion</i> : no.32	signature	

Not in PLP					
Anatavlas					
Geôrgios (1322) No. 872	<i>sevastos</i> , landowner	Portarea	<i>ChilP</i> I: no. 84*	signature witness	
-(1327) No.868	landowner	Lozikion	<i>ChilP</i> I : no. 116 *	mention	
-(1341/2?) No. 869	landowner	Portarea	<i>Esph</i> : no. 23 (1347)	A part of land of Esphigmenou had been ceded to Anatavlas, but in 1347 was restored to the monastery by Dušan	Son? of <i>sevastos</i> Geôrgios Anatavlas. Father ? of Geôrgios Anatavlas landowner?
- (before 1342) No. 870	<i>hetairiarhês</i> , landowner	Neon Chorion/Thessalonikê	<i>LemKar</i> : 285	mention	
-(1350/1?)	landowner	Ploumiska river	<i>Lavra</i> III: no.130	mention	
Geôrgios (1388) No. 871		Portarea	<i>Esph</i> : no.29*		Son? of Anatavlas, landowner. Father of Theodôros
Theodôros (1388) Not in PLP	<i>hetairiarchês</i> , landowner	Kalamaria	<i>Esph</i> : nos. 22, 29*		Son of Geôrgios
Apelmene					
Dêmêtrios(1300[1299?]- 1320/23) No. 1155	<i>apographeus</i> , <i>pansevastos</i> <i>sevastos</i> , <i>oikeios</i> , <i>doulos</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Xen</i> : nos. 3,4 and 5(1300), 12 (1318); <i>Vat</i> I: no. 30 (1301); <i>Lavra</i> II : nos. 90(1300 or 1315), 93 (1302), 97(1304), app. IX; <i>Chil</i> I: no. 21 (1300); <i>ChilP</i> I: nos. 88 (1323), 130 (1339); <i>Iv</i> III :no.70 (1300);	signature	

			<i>Zog: 37</i>		
Iôannês (1324) No. 1157	<i>doux</i>	Volerôn amd Monysopolis theme	<i>Zog : 38</i>		
-(1339-1342) No. 1153	landowner	Serres	<i>Prod: no. 35</i>	His land of 4 <i>modioi</i> had passed to Prodromou	
Aprênos					
-(ca. 1266) No. 1207	<i>prôtostratôr</i>				Brother-in-law of Tarchaneiôtes Nikêphoros. Grandfather of Nostongonissa
Iôannês (1409?) No.1209	official	Thessalonikê	<i>Esph: no. 31</i>	signature	
Argyropoulos					
Argyropouloi (1421) Not in PLP		Thessalonikê	<i>Iv IV : no. 97*</i>		
Dêmêtrios (1421-1425) No. 1261	leaseholder	Thessalonikê	<i>DoSch : 266</i>		
-(14th c.) No. 93115		Thessalonikê	<i>SchreinFin : 54/1</i>		
Asan(ês)					
Dêmêtrios (1349) No. 1491	landowner	Hermêleia	<i>Xer: no.26</i>		Father of Philippa Asanina and Thomaïs.
Philippa Asanina (1349) No. 1535	landowner	Hermêleia	<i>Xer: no.26</i>		Daughter of Dêmêtrios, aunt of Panaretina, wife of Michaël Kontopetrês

Alexios (1365-75) No. 1473	<i>oikeios</i> of Helena , <i>tsarina</i> of Serbs , <i>doulos</i> of Iôannês Palaiologos	Serres	<i>Esph</i> : no. 67 (1365) <i>Kut</i> II ² : no. 33 (1375)	signature	
Geôrgios Synadênos (1354- 1366) No. 1598	<i>megas stratopedarchês, katholikos kritês</i>	Thrace, Lêmnos, Thessalonikê Constantinople	<i>VatG</i> : nos. 16, 18 <i>MMII</i> : 322/III :126 <i>Dion</i> : no. 3(1366); <i>Kutl</i> II ² : nos. 29 and 30 (1370)	Had built tower on land of 1,200 <i>modioi</i> which he donated to Vatopedi Donations in Lêmnos	
Kantakouzênê (before 1358) Not in PLP	First <i>ktêtorissa</i> of the Timiopetritissa monastery	Thessalonikê	<i>Vat</i> II: no. 110	Had donated houses and a bakery to Vatopedi	
-(before 1365) Not in PLP		Melenikon	<i>Vat</i> II : no.120 (1365)	Donated land to Spelaiôtissa monastery	
-(1366/67) No. 1479			<i>TheochVerm</i> : 489*, par 14	Had given deposit to Dêmêtrios TzAMPLAKÔN, <i>megas stratopedarchês</i>	
Anna Konstostephanina Asanina(1374) No. 1525		Chrysoupolis	<i>Pant</i> : no. 9	She and her husband donate one vineyard	Wife of Iôannês Palaiologos, <i>megas primikêrios, exadelphê</i> of empress Helena Palaiologina

Chagerês					
Manouël (1344-1369) No. 30344	<i>oikeios, apographeus, orphanotophos</i>	Chalkidikê	<i>Doch</i> : nos. 23(1344), 28(1354 or 1369); <i>Lavra III</i> : no. 129* (1350?); <i>Zog</i> :102, 104; <i>SolovMošin</i> :no. 36 (1369)	mention	
Chalazas					
Theodôros (1314-1326) No. 30363	<i>depotatos, myrepsos, archôn</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Iv III</i> : nos. 73(1314), 78(1320), 81(1324), 84**(1326)	witness signature	
- (1383) (probably the same with Andronikos) No. 30359		Thessalonikê			
Andronikos (1389)		Thessalonikê	<i>Doch</i> :no. 50*	witness signature	
- (end of 14th c.) No. 30361	<i>katallaktês</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>KugNot</i> : 154 (par.86)		Married a sister of Platyskalitês
- (1415) No. 30360	doctor	Thessalonikê			
Demos, Andreas, Konstas (1474) Not in PLP	<i>gerontes</i>	Portarea	<i>Dion</i> : no.32	witnesses	
Chamaidrakôn					
-(1310-1322) No. 30542	house owner	Thessalonikê	<i>Xen</i> : nos. 9 (1310), 17 (1322)	mention	
Michaël (1322)	<i>doulos, apo tou</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>ChilP I</i> : no. 84*	witness	

No. 30543	<i>megalou allagiou</i>			signature	
-(1356/7) No. 30541		Thessalonikê?	<i>SchreinFin</i> : 3/ 109		
Choniâtês					
- (1356) No. 31228	landowner	Kataphygê district/Thessalonikê	<i>TheochEng</i> : 339	mention	
- (1356-7) No.31224		(?)in Thessalonikê	<i>ScreinFin</i> : 3/5		
Symeôn (1361-6) No.31244	<i>archôn</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Doch</i> : nos. 36, 38	witness	
- (before 1384-08) No. 31225			<i>Doch</i> :no.49*	Maria Devlitzênê had inherited from him 80 <i>hyperpyra</i>	grandfather of Angelos Iôannês and of Devlitzênê Maria
- (1420) No.31226		Thessalonikê	<i>KugNot</i> : 146, par. 25	witness	Gamvros of the compiler
Chrysaphês					
Theodôros Vranas(1300- 1321) No. 31077	great landowner, holder of <i>pronoia</i>	Karveos, Henorachê, Linovrocheion in Diavolokampos	<i>Lavra</i> II: nos. 90 (1300),108 (1321) 192, 195, IV 207, 387		
- (before 1326) No. 31073	landowner	Zichna	<i>Phil</i> :19		
Chrysolôras					
Thômas (1421) No.31158	<i>archôn tês synklêtou, oikeios</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Iv</i> IV: no. 97*	witness	
Chrysos					
-(1320) No. 31184	landowner	Strumitza	<i>Iv</i> III : no. 77		

-(1321) No. 31179		Selas	<i>Lavra</i> II no. 109		
-(1341) No 31182		Rhadolivos/Serres	<i>PI</i> :109		
-(1345) No. 31185	<i>logothetês</i> of Stefan IV Dušan		<i>SolovMosin</i> : no. 30	mention	
-(1375/76) No. 31183		Thessalonikê			
-(ca.1376-d. before 1391 or 1380?) No. 31190	<i>protostratôr</i>	Stylarion	<i>DoDipl</i> : 326		
Chrysovergês					
Leôn (1322) No. 31120	<i>megalodoxôtatos,</i> <i>doulos</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>ChilP</i> I: no. 85*	witness signature	
-(1325) No. 31094		Verroia	<i>Bat</i> III: 25	inherited a horse by Theodôros Sarantênos	
-(before 1341) No.31105	<i>apographeus?</i>	Hagia Maria	<i>Lavra</i> III : app. XII*	mention	
Dermokaitês or Dromokaitês					
- (1318) No. 5201	landowner	Vrasta	<i>Esph</i> :no. 14	owner of vineyard	
- (before 1356) No. 5202	landowner	Dragobutzista near Serres	<i>Vat</i> II :no. 108	He donated land to Vatopedi	
Theophylaktos (1362-67) No. 91760	<i>katholikos kritês,</i> <i>oikeios,</i> <i>parakoimômenos</i>		<i>Vat</i> II :no. 128	signature	
- (1426)		Thessalonikê	<i>KugNot</i> : 150. paragraph 65	He lends 7	

No. 5200				<i>hyperpyra</i> to Kounoupios who gave them to the compiler of the book.	
Devlitzênos					
Philippos (1296-1311) No. 5175	<i>oikeios</i>		<i>Zog</i> : 53		
Manouêl (1301-1324) No. 5174	<i>pansevastos, sevastos(?), tzaousios tou megalou allagiou, landowner</i>	Hierissos Thessalonikê	<i>Iv</i> III: nos.70 (1301),75 (1318),79 (1324); <i>Zog</i> : 62f;	Half a mill is given to Iviron with the obligation to pay 1 <i>hyperpyron</i> to him as <i>epiteleia</i>	
Lykopoulos (14thc.)	landowner	Near Thessalonikê	<i>SchreinerPrakt</i> : 34 (1328-1430)	mention	
- (1321) No.5172	landowner	Hermêleia	<i>Lavra</i> II : no.108	no other reference to his property	
Dêmêtrios (1331-1349) No. 5169	<i>oikeios, landowner</i>	Hermêleia	<i>Vat</i> II : no.75* (1331), <i>Doch</i> : no. 26*(1349)		
Theodôros (1339) No.5170	<i>pansevastos, sevastos, oikeios</i>		<i>ChilP</i> I :no. 130	mention	
Kônstantinos (1341) No.5171		Thessalonikê	<i>Lavra</i> III :app.XII*	witness	
- (1348) No.5166		Thessalonikê	<i>MMI</i> :283f		Husband of Anna Sarantênê Indanina
Dêmêtrios (1381-4) No. 91757	<i>doulos, oikeios</i>	Thessalonikê Stylarion	<i>Doch</i> :nos. 47 and 48*(1381), 49*(1384) <i>Vat</i> II: no.147 (1375)	Signature donation the monastery Mentioned as	

				landowner	
Manouêl (1382-1409) No. 5173	<i>archôn</i> , landowner	Hermêleia	<i>DoSch</i> : 175, <i>KtenasKeim</i> : 107, 110, 112		Husband of Maria, father of Theodôra and father –in-law of Vartholomaïos Komês
Maria (1384-d.1419) No.5165			<i>Doch</i> : nos. 48*(1384),50*(1389), 51* (1404), 57* and 58 (1419)		Wife of Manouêl Devlitzênos
Dêmétrios (1405) No. 5168	landowner	Chalkidikê	<i>Bat I</i> :37		
Doukas					
Iôannês (1344) No. 91819	<i>prôtovestiaritês</i> , <i>doulos</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Doch</i> : no.23	signature	
Geôrgios (1375) Not in PLP	<i>oikeios</i>	Verroia	<i>Vat II</i> :no. 145	witness	
-(1376) No.5682	<i>archôn</i> , <i>doulos</i>		<i>GudasAphier</i> : 17		
- (1384-1386) No. 91815		Thasos	<i>Pant</i> :no. 11		<i>paidion</i> of Iôannês Palaiologos, <i>meGas</i> <i>primmikêrios</i> . Brother of Palaiogopoulos
Manouêl (1388) No.5696	<i>eugenestatos</i>	Serres?	<i>ChilP I</i> :no. 158	witness	
Iôannês (end of 14th c.) No. 5694	<i>meGas dioikêtês</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>KtenasKeim</i> : 110		
Doukopoulos					
Petros (1292-1327) No. 5707	<i>doulos</i> , great landowner	Lozikion	<i>ChilP I</i> : nos. 100 and 102 (1324), 110 (1326) , 114* and 116*(1327),118(1329), 130(1339), 138(1351)	mentioned as landowner	

		Sarantarea.	<i>Iv</i> III :no. 66 (1292) <i>Lavra</i> II: no.109 (1321) Zog: 80	land of two <i>modioi</i> in Sarantareaand 2 nomismata and 1 <i>paroikos</i> with his family (wife and two children)	
Dêmêtrios (after 1300) No. 5706	<i>kastrophylax</i> , landowner	Psalis	<i>Xen</i> : nos. 4, 5 (after 1300)	Land (called Neakitou) of approximately 300 <i>modioi</i> (7 <i>modioi</i> of vineyard in diverse places), donated to the monastery	
- (1304-1324) No. 5704	landowner	Longos, Hermêleia,	<i>Lavra</i> II : nos. 97 (1304), 108(1321), 114 (1324),	Mentioned just as landowner (stasika chôraphia)	
Anna Mesopotamitissa Doukopoulina(1306) No. 91816	<i>ktêtorissa</i> of the monastery of Hagioi Anargyroi tes Parathyrou	Thessalonikê	<i>Xen</i> : no. 7**		
Geôrgios ? (1311) No. 91817	<i>doulos, myrtaitês</i> , great landowner	Thessalonikê Hêrmêleia	<i>Doch</i> : no. 11* (1311) <i>Lavra</i> II ; no. 98* (1304), 108 (1321), 114 (1324) <i>Xen</i> : nos. 19 (1322/23), 21(1325)	mention	Son of monk Gerasimos and nun Evgenia. Cousin of Petros Doukopoulos. Husband of Maria and father of Geôrgios
- (1322/3-1325)[the same with Petros?]	landowner	Hermêleia	<i>Xen</i> : nos. 19 (1322/3) , 21 (1325)	Mentioned as landowner	

Dêmêtrios (1324) No. 91818	<i>oikeios</i>	Thessalonikê (Hippodrome quarter)	<i>Xen</i> : no. 20**		
-(1356/7) No. 93460	trader	Thessalonikê?	<i>SchreinFin</i> : 3/4	Partner of Theodôros? Kassandrênos	
Edessênos					
-(1344) No. 91847	<i>orphanotrophos, apographeus</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Doch</i> : no.22*	signature	
Eskammatismenos					
Manouêl (1394- 1414) No. 91872	<i>kephalê, doulos</i>	Thessalonikê Lemnos	<i>Lavra III</i> : no.161 (1409); <i>Doch</i> : nos 54 and 55 (1414); <i>MM</i> : 267		
Evripiôtes					
-(1295-d. before 1321) No. 6321	great landowner	Poungion/ Thessalonikê	<i>ChilP I</i> :no. 67* (1321)		Father of Alexandros Evripiôtes
-(before 1318) No. 6322	landowner	Eunouchou/Strymôn	<i>ChilP I</i> : no. 38 (1318)	mention	
Alexandros (before 1321) No. 6324	<i>apo tou megalou allagiou</i> great landowner	Poungion /Thessalonikê	<i>ChilP I</i> : no. 67* (1321)		Son of Evripiotes, landowner
Gavras					
Dêmêtrios No. 3351	landowner	Lykovikeia (Strymôn)	<i>Zog</i> : 44		
- (before 1347) No. 3332	<i>pronoia</i> holder	Kalamaria	<i>Dion</i> : no. 2*		
Iôannês (1348) No. 3358	<i>hetairiarchês</i>	Serres	<i>Kutl</i> : no.21	signature	
Gazês					
- (1286-1309) No. 3444	<i>apo tou megalou allagiou</i> , landowner	Lozikion	<i>Zog</i> :27f		

Pavlos (1406-1419) No. 3452	<i>apographeus, doulos, cleric</i>	Thessalonikê Lêmnos	<i>Dion</i> : no. 11*(1409); <i>Xer</i> : no.29 (1407); <i>Doch</i> : no. 53 (1409); <i>Lavra III</i> : no.161(1409), 164 (1415); <i>KugNot</i> : 144, par. 3	signature He gives to the the compiler of the notebook 25 aspra	
-(1344) No 91580	<i>protallagator</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Doch</i> : no. 23	witness	
Glavas					
Geôrgios (1301) No. 4220	<i>megalyperochos</i>	Serres	<i>Esph</i> : no. 9	witness	
Glavaina(1308) No. 4201	landowner	Sellarion/Macedonia	<i>ArkadAn</i> : 439		
– (1300-1321) No. 4213	<i>pronoia</i> holder	Lôrôton	<i>Lavra II</i> : nos. 90 (1300), 108 (1321)	mention as pronoiar	
Glavaina Doukaina (before 1321) No. 4204	landowner	Hermêleia	<i>Lavra II</i> : no. 108	the metochion of Hagios Vasileios in Hêrmêleia possessed land coming from her	
Glavaina (1322/3) probably the same with the previous No. 91681	landowner	Hermêleia	<i>Xen</i> :no. 19	mentioned as landowner	
– (1330-1344) No. 91682	<i>logothetês tôn oikeiakôn megas dioikêtês, katholikos kritês tôn Rhomaiôn</i>	Thessalonikê , Constantinople Praitorion/Kassandra	<i>Doch</i> :no. 22 *(1344) ; <i>Esph</i> : no. 19 (1334); <i>Zog</i> : 68 <i>Kut II</i> ² :no. 33(1375)	signature mention	
Dêmêtrios (1366) No. 91685	<i>megas droungarios tês viglês, oikeios,</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Doch</i> : no. 38	signature	

	<i>doulos</i>				
Michaël (1377) No. 91687	<i>epi tôn gonatôn, priest</i>	Serres			
Kônstantinos (1379) No. 91686	<i>prôtonotarios</i>	Serres			
Glykys					
Matthaios (1338) Not in PLP	<i>megalodoxôtatos, landowner</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Vat II: no. 83</i>	mention	
Iôannês (1431) No.93356	house owner	Thessalonikê			
Goryanitês					
-(1356/7) No. 93364	middleman	Thessalonikê	<i>SchreinFin : 3/68, 71</i>		
-(1358) Not in PLP	<i>domestikos ton scholôn, landowner</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Vat II :no.110</i>	mention	
Harmenopoulos					
Dêmêtrios (1303) No. 91340	<i>vassilikos stratiôtes, doulos, great lanowner</i>	Tripotamon (katepanikion of Apros or Apros)	<i>Xen :no. 6*</i>		
– (1326) No. 1340	landowner	Verroia	<i>Bat III: 21</i>		
Kônstantinos (1345-59) No. 1347	<i>nomophylax, sevastos, pansevastos, kritês tou vasilikou sekretou, katholikos kritês of Thessalonikê</i>		<i>Xen: no. 27 (1344)</i>		He had one brother
-(beginning of 15th c.) No. 1341	monk, house owner	Thessalonikê	<i>KugNot :153(paragraph86)</i>	His houses belonged earlier to Metriôtês	

Hidrômenos					
Dêmêtrios (1421) No. 8077	<i>apographeus,</i> <i>oikeios</i>	Mariskin/Chalkidikê Thessalonikê	<i>Dion:</i> no. 20	signature	
Hyaleas					
–(before 1310) No. 29467	<i>megas</i> <i>adnoumiastês,</i> <i>pansevastos sevastos</i>	Zichna	<i>Iv III:</i> no. 72		
– (1315/16) No. 29465	<i>kephalê,</i> <i>pansevastos,</i> <i>logothetês tou</i> <i>stratiôtikou</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Vat I :</i> no.48	acting as official	
Alexios (1333-1336) No. 29470	<i>megas</i> <i>adnoumiastês,</i> <i>eparchos, oikeios</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>ChilP I:</i> no. 123 (1333)	signature	
- (1337-1338) Not in PLP	landowner	Serres	<i>Vat II :</i> no.80	signature	
–(1341) No. 29469	weaver, paroikos	Rhadolivos Serres	<i>PI:</i> 113		
Alexios Laskaris (1368) No. 29472	<i>doulos</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Pant:</i> no. 7*		
-Kônstantinos (1430) No.29477	<i>grapheus</i>	Thessalonikê			
Iagoupês					
- (1300-21) No.7816	landowner	Sarantarea	<i>Lavra II:</i> nos. 90 (1300), 108 (1321)	mentioned as landowner	
Kônstantinos (1335) No. 7824		Chalkidikê	<i>ChilP I :</i> no. 125	witness	

Geôrgios (1406-7) No. 7821	<i>apographeus</i>		<i>Rus</i> : 188, 189		
Theodôros (1421) No. 7822	<i>archôn tês synklêtou, oikeios</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Iv IV</i> : no.97*	witness	
Indanês					
- (1320-1338) No. 8206	landowner	Hierissos	<i>Xen</i> : nos. 14 (1320), 25 (1338)	owner of land of 5 modioi , later in the possession of Xenophôn	
- (1321) No.8207	<i>pronoia</i> holder	Lôrôton	Lavra II: no. 108	Mentioned as holder of a <i>pronoia</i>	
Andreas (1351) No.8208	<i>oikeios</i>	Kontokrikou	<i>Xer</i> : no.27*		
Isarês					
Geôrgios (1344-d. before 1377) No. 92111	<i>meGas kontostavlos, eparchos, meGas primikêrios, meGas drouggarios oikeios great landowner</i>	Thessalonikê Hêrmêleia	<i>ChilP I</i> :nos. 151* (1366), 154* (1374) <i>Lavra III</i> : 41 <i>MM I</i> : 298 <i>Doch</i> : nos. 23(1344), 45 (1377) <i>Vat II</i> : no. 97 (1348) and app. VI	His claims over the property of his son-in-law, Geôrgios Stanesês, are refused by the tribunal of Serres Signature and mention as landowner in Hêrmêleia Mentioned as having had paroikoi that later passed on to	Married to Xenê Isarina, <i>megalê kontostavlissa</i> . Father of Michaêl Angelos Isaris and Theodôros Komnênos Isaris. Father-in-law of Geôrgios Stanesês

			<i>SolovMošin: no.142</i>	Vatopedi	
Michaêl Angelos (1374) No.8286		Thessalonikê?	<i>ChilP I : no. 154*</i>	commitment that he will not claim Geôrgios Staneses's inheritance signature	Son of Geôrgios
Theodôros Komnênos (1374) No.8285		Thessalonikê?	<i>ChilP I : no. 154*</i>	commitment that he will not claim Geôrgios Staneses's inheritance signature	Son of Geôrgios
Xênê Isarina (1374) No. 8282		Thessalonikê?	<i>ChilP I : no. 154*</i>	commitment that he will not claim Geôrgios Staneses's inheritance signature	
Ivankos					
Kônstantinos (1402-1420) No.7973	judge, <i>doulos</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Doch: no.51*</i>		
Kaloêthês					
Iôannês (1361) No. 10583	landowner	Thessalonikê	<i>OikDoch: 205, 236f Doch: nos. 34*, 35* and 36* (1361), 38* (1366)</i>		Son-in-law of Demetrios Trikanas
Andronikos (1503)		Thessalonikê	<i>Dion: no.41</i>	witness signature	

Dêmêtrios (1503/4)	<i>archôn</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Dion</i> : no.44	witness	
Kalognômos					
Leôn (1317-1322) No. 10529	<i>apographeus, doulos prokathêmenos of Drama</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Xen</i> :no.12 (1318)		
Kalothetos					
Loukas (before 1315/6) No. 92281	landowner	Hagios Helias/Hêrmêleia	<i>Doch</i> : no.15	He owned land of 3 <i>modioi</i> that he either sold or donated to Docheiariou	
Theodotos Komnenos (1323) [same with Theodotos of 1328?] Not in PLP	<i>doulos</i>	Serres	<i>Vat I</i> : no.61	signature	
-(1315-1324) No.10598	landowner	Hêrmêleia	<i>Lavra II</i> : no. 114 (1324) <i>Doch</i> : no. 15 (1315-16)		
Theodôros/Theodotos (1328-1356) No. 10609	landowner	Tzagkaroiôannou (unknown location)	<i>Vat I</i> : no. 66* <i>Vat II</i> : no. 108 (1356)	mentioned as donor of that land	
Stephanos (1366) No.10622	<i>panhypersevastos, oikeios</i>		<i>Vat II</i> : no.124	He claims 300 <i>hyperpyra</i> from Vatopedi	Father of Angelos. Sympetheros of Alexios Rhaoul, <i>meGas domestikos</i> of Serbia
Theodôros (before 1395) No.10608		Thessalonikê	<i>MM II</i> : 238f		
Kyriakos (1421) No.10616	gardener	Thessalonikê	<i>DoSch</i> : 266f		
Kampanaropoulos					
Manouêl (1314-1324) No. 10825	-	Thessalonikê	<i>Iv III</i> : nos. 73(1314), 78(1320), 81 (1324)	witness signature	

Kantakouzênos					
Theodôros Komnênos	<i>mezas droungarios</i>	Melenikon	<i>Vat I</i> : nos. 20 and 21 (end of 13 th -beginning of 14 th c.)	His wife, nun Anysia, donates 1 mill and 1 vineyard to Spelaiôtissa monastery	Son of Michaêl Elaiodôritês Spanopoulos, <i>sevastos</i> , <i>doulos</i> and <i>stratopedarchês tôn allagiôn</i> (<i>Vat I</i> no.21)
- (1304-1321) No. 10950	great landowner	Longos	<i>Lavra II</i> nos. 98 *(1304), 108 (1321)	Had <i>paroikoi</i>	
Theodôra Angelina (1337-1368) No. 10942	great landowner	Serres	<i>Kut II</i> ² : no.18(1338) <i>Vat I</i> : no.68 (1329) <i>Vat II</i> : nos.80 (1337-1338), 128 (1368)	Donates various properties to Kutlumus Mention of her donation of the Hagios Dêmôtrios metochion to Vatopedi Mention in private acts (buying properties in Serres). She had bought land in Lêmnos from the children of a Chrysovergês	Mother of Iôannês VI
- (1345) No.10951	landowner	Melenikon	<i>Prod</i> : 130		
Iôannês (1358) No. 10971		Zavaltia	<i>Pant</i> : no. 5	He and his siblings consent to his mother	Son of Dêmêtrios Tornikios, pinkernês, and Anna Tornikina,

				donation of half her dowry to the monastery	<i>pinkernissa</i> . Brother of Andronikos, Maria and Eirênê.
Eudokia (1373) No.10937			<i>Doch: 42*</i> (1373)		Daughter of Dêmêtrios Palaiologos , <i>meGas domestikos</i> , and Anna Kantakouzênê Paliologina , <i>megalê domestikissa</i> . Sister of Iôannês Palaiologos, <i>meGas primikêrios</i>
Theodôros[=Theognostos?] (1376) No.10965	<i>doulos, archôn</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>GudasAphier :17; Dion : no. 4</i> (1374)		
Iôannês (1414) No.92474		Thessalonikê	<i>Doch: no. 54</i>	signature	
Kantakouzênê (d. before 1415)	<i>vasilissa</i>		<i>Lavra III: no. 163</i> (1415)	Had asked her nephew, Manuel II, to donate an aule to Hagioi Anargyroi in Thessalonikê	Aunt of Manuel II Palaiologos
Kassandrênos					

- (1300) No. 11312	landowner	Pissôn	<i>Lavra II</i> : no. 90		
- (1301-20) No. 11313	<i>logariastês tês aulês, pansevastos, sevastos, oikeios,</i> great landowner	Xylorygion near Thessalonikê Apidea, Eunouchos (Strymôn)	<i>Iv III</i> : no. 70 (1301) <i>Chil I</i> : nos. 42, 43 44 (1319) <i>ChilP I</i> : no. 126 (1335) <i>Zog</i> :71; <i>MM I</i> :100	mentioned as landowner His land in Strymôn later passed on to Chilandar	
Dêmêtrios (1341-1360) No.11315	<i>oiketês</i>	from Thessalonikê			Father of Kassandrênê, Maria Kanavina. Father-in-law of Kanavês, Nikêphoros Angelos. Fathered other children
Alexios (ca. 1355) No. 11314		Thessalonikê			
Theodôros (1356/7) No. 93783	trader	Thessalonikê	<i>SchreinFin</i> : 3/ 4, 139	partner of Loukopoulos	
Manouêl (1381) No.11316	<i>archôn</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Doch</i> : no. 47	signature	
Karavas					
Theodôros (1296-1314) No.11075	great landowner	Chalkidikê	<i>Chil I</i> : nos. 16** (1296), 30*(1314)	He bought vineyard in Thessalonikê.	Father of Iôannês
Iovannês (1314-1322) No.11077	great landowner house owner	Chalkidikê Thessalonikê	<i>Chil I</i> : nos. 30*, 34, 35	He and his 'fraternity' (spititual brothers) donates all paternal	Son of Theodôros

			<i>ChilP I</i> : no. 85*	property	
Katzaras					
Geôrgios (1351-1373) No. 11490	<i>megas adnoumiastês, oikeios, landowner</i>	Kalamaria	<i>Doch</i> : nos.27* (1351), 41* (before 1373)		Father of Iôannês
Iôannês (1373) No.11491	<i>oikeios</i>	Kalamaria	<i>Doch</i> : no. 41* (before 1373)		Son of Geôrgios
Kavakês					
Athanassios (1327) No.11015	<i>megalyperochos, chrysepilektês</i>		<i>Zog</i> : 25, 28		
Kavallarês					
- (d. before 1323) No. 10024	landowner	Melenikon	<i>Vat I</i> : no. 60		
Michaêl (before 1375) No.10026	<i>megas hetaireiarchês</i>	Atzista/Strymôn	<i>Pant</i> : no. 15*		Father of Alexis Palaiologos
Kavallarios					
Michaêl (1277?) No. 10044	<i>megas kontostavlos</i>	Thessalonikê			
Alexios (1321?) No.10035	<i>oikeios</i>	Serres	<i>Lavra II</i> : no.112	In dispute with the monks of Lavra	
-(1321) No. 10032	landowner	Hierissos	<i>Lavra II</i> : no. 109	mention	
-(1323-26) No. 10033	landowner	Serres	<i>Chil</i> : 224		
-(1324) No. 10031	landowner	Hêrmêleia	<i>Lavra II</i> : no.114	mention	
-(1348) No.10029		Serres	<i>Kut</i> : no.93	signature	

-(1425 or earlier) No. 10030			<i>KugNot</i> :149(par. 59)		Father of TzAMPLAKÔN, <i>archôn</i> in Constantinople
Kavasilas					
- (1282-1296) No. 10067	<i>pansevastos, sevastos, aktouarios, landowner</i>	near Thessalonikê	<i>Chil</i> I: no. 16 **(1296)	mentioned as landowner	
Geôrgios (1295) No. 10077	<i>megas oikonomos</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>DoSch</i> :166		
Theodôros (1316-1333) No.10090	<i>logothetês tou stratiôtikou, megas dioikêtês, pansevastos sevastos</i>		<i>Vat</i> I : no. 57 (1322)	acting as a functionary	
- (1322) No. 10071	landowner	Thessalonikê	<i>Xen</i> : no. 17	The monastery had bought an <i>avlê</i> , called ‘of Kavasilas’	
Dêmêtrios (1327) No. 10081	landowner	near Thessalonikê	<i>Zog</i> : 54-56		Brother-in-law of Dêmêtrios Kalamanos
Geôrgios (1331) Not in PLP	<i>doulos</i>	Hermêleia	<i>Vat</i> II: nos. 73*, 74*	He donates one <i>stasis</i>	Appatently father of Dêmêtrios (1331)
Dêmêtrios (1331) [Probably the same with the one of 1327]	<i>doulos</i>	Hermêleia	<i>Vat</i> II : no. 72*	He donates one <i>stasis</i>	
Geôrgios (1341) No. 10078	<i>oikeios</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Lavra</i> III : appendix XII*	witness	Son of Geôrgios
Dêmêtrios (1341) No. 10083	<i>oikeios</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Lavra</i> III: appendix XII*	witness	
Iôannês (1341)	<i>oikeios</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Lavra</i> III: appendix XII*	witness	
Dêmêtrios Doukas (1347- 1369) No. 92224	<i>megas papias, megas archôn, landowner</i>	Katakâlê, Plagêna and Therma	<i>Dion</i> : no 2* <i>Pant</i> : no. 7* (1368) <i>Lavra</i> III: no. 148 (1377) 111,	witness signature	Husband of Anna Laskarina, <i>megalê papiaina</i> . Father of –

			app.XII* <i>Xer:</i> no. 27* (1351) <i>Zog:</i> 102, 104		Kavasilas, <i>me-gas archôn</i> . Fathered several sons.
- (1348-1356) [apparently Nikolaos] No. 30539	great landowner	Siderokauseia	<i>Vat II</i> : nos. 97(1348), 108 (1356), app. VI	he had donated paroikoi and land in Siderokauseia to the metochion of Spêlaiôtissa	
- (1377) No. 10072	<i>me-gas archôn</i>	Serres	<i>Lavra III:</i> no. 148		Son of Dêmêtrios Doukas, <i>me-gas papias</i> . <i>Gamvros</i> of Kônstantinos Laskaris , Thomais Laskarina and Anna Laskarina, <i>me-galê papiaina</i>
Dêmêtrios (1386-87) No 10080		Thessalonikê			
Iôannês (15 th c.) No. 10092	<i>domestikos, prôtonotarios</i>	Serres	<i>Prod:</i> app. VIII	mention	
Manouêl (before 1409) No. 10099	landowner	Katakalê, Aloupochôrion	<i>Dion:</i> no.11*		Son of Dêmêtrios, landowner
- (1419-1422) No. 10066		Thessalonikê	<i>KugNot</i> : 144, 148, (paragraphs 7, 47, 51)	He gave 2 <i>hypepryra</i> in to the compiler on three separate occasions	
Kephalas					
Nikolaos (before 1324) No.11680	houseowner	Thessalonikê	<i>MM1</i> : 100f		
Michaêl (1355) No. 11678		Near Zicha	<i>Chil I:</i> no.303		
Laskaris (1373)	<i>doulos</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Doch:</i> nos.41*	signature	

No. 11677					
Kerameas/Kerameus					
Michaël (1270-1283/84) No. 11646	<i>apographeus, sevastos</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Xer: no.9 (1270-1274)</i>		
Nikolaos (1284) No. 11641	<i>domestikos tôn dysikôn thematôn, pansevastos sevastos</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Lavra II: no.75 Doch: no. 9 (1280/1)[this one is not in PLP]</i>	witness	Brother of Theodôros Kerameas
Theodôros (1284) No. 11637		Thessalonikê	<i>Lavra II: no.75</i>	testament	Brother of Nikolaos
- (before 1315) No. 11642			<i>Doch : 310</i>		
Theodôros (1317) -(1323) No. 11643	<i>megalyperochos pronoia holder</i>	Rhentina	<i>Vat I: no. 49 SchreinPrakt: 38 (1368)</i>	witness mention	
Kêroulas					
-(before 1321) Not in PLP	<i>pronoia holder</i>	Apostolitai (Kalamaria)	<i>Xen: no. 15*</i>	Mentioned as pronoiar	
-Michaël (1321) No.11700	<i>pronoia holder</i>	Lôrôton	<i>Lavra II : no.108</i>	mention	
Kô(k)kalas					
Kônstantinos (ca.1320)	<i>fiscal official, oikeios</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Iv III: no. 76</i>	witness	
Geôrgios (1336-1345) No.92485	<i>oikeios, megas adnoumiastês, archôn</i>	Thessalonikê			Brother-in-law of Pharmakês Geôrgios
Dêmêtrios (1350?-1?) No. 14090	great landowner	Rhentina, Hagios Mammas	<i>Lavra III: no. 129* (1350?)</i>		
Komês					

Dêmêtrios (1324) No.92401		Serres	<i>Iv</i> III: no. 81	witness signature	
Dêmêtrios (1344) No. 92402	<i>prothierakarios,</i> <i>doulos</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Doch</i> : no. 23	signature	
Geôrgios (1404) No. 92400	<i>doulos</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Doch</i> : no. 51*	signature	
Vartholomaios (1404-1419) No. 92399	<i>archôn</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Doch</i> : nos. 51,*(1404) 57* and 58* (1419)		Son-in-law of Devlitzênos Manouêl. Husband of Theodôra.
Komnênos					
Theodôros (1415)	saltworker	Thessalonikê	<i>Dion</i> : no.14	signature	
Komnênoutzikos					
-(d. before 1337) Not in PLP	<i>pronoia</i> holder	Hêrmêleia	<i>Doch</i> : nos. 18(1337), 20(1341), 21(1343), 22*(1344)		
-(1318-1338) No. 12125 the same with previous?	great landowner	Vardarion Thessalonikê	<i>Chil</i> I: no. 36 (1318) <i>DoSch</i> : 172	mention	
-(before 1364) No. 92406	great landowner	Psalidophourna, Psalis	<i>Xen</i> : no. 30*	His daughter,Evdokia, donates her <i>oikonomia</i> to Xen.	Father-in-law of Dêmêtrios Kaligopoulos
Kontenos					
Dêmêtrios (1317-before 1321) No. 13048	<i>apographeus,</i> <i>pansevastos</i> <i>sevastos, sevastos,</i> <i>doulos</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Chil</i> I: nos. 34, 35 and 36 (1317), 38(1318), 42(1319) <i>ChilP</i> I : no. 67*(1321) <i>Xer</i> : nos.18c(1317/1318) and 19(1319); <i>Esph</i> : no. 14 (1318); <i>Xen</i> : no.12 (1318) <i>Iv</i> III: no.75 (1318) ; <i>Doch</i> :	signature mention as apographeus	

			nos.22 * and 23 (1344); <i>MosinAkti</i> : 185?		
Koteanitzês					
Leôn(1293) Not in PLP	<i>oikeios</i>	Preasnitzá (Strumica)	<i>Chil</i> I: no. 12	He is granted land by the emperor	
(Theodôros?) (1342-1346) No. 92427	<i>megas tzaousios</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Doch</i> : no. 23(1344)	witness	
Ko(u)llourakês					
Manouêl Same with the following?	doctor	Thessalonikê	<i>ChilP</i> I: no. 97** (1324)		
Manouêl (1356-1366) No.92439	<i>doulos, oikeios</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Doch</i> : nos. 36,* 38*; <i>Vat</i> II: nos. 106 and 107(1356)	signature	
Kounalês					
Theodôros (1300-1321) No. 13476	great landowner, <i>pronoia</i> holder	Elaia, near Genna Drymosita, Panagia, Krya Pegadia	<i>Lavra</i> II nos. 90 (1300), 108 and 109(1321)	mentioned as land owner and as interceder in order to remove the <i>epiteleia</i> from a mill owner and be assigned to Lavra	
Kônstantinos (1317-1321) No. 13477	<i>apographeus,</i> <i>pansevastos</i> <i>sevastos, oikeios,</i> <i>doulos</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Chil</i> I: nos. 34, 35 and 36 (1317), 38(1318), 42(1319) ; <i>ChilP</i> I: no. 67*(1321) ; <i>Xen</i> : no.12 (1318) ; <i>Xer</i> : nos.18c (131/1318), 19 (1319) ; <i>Iv</i> III: no.75 (1318); <i>Esph</i> : nos. 14 (1318), 22?(1347)	signature mention	
-(before 1346) [same with Kônstantinos?]	landowner	Kassandreia	<i>Esph</i> : no. 22(1347)	Cedes land of 300 <i>modioi</i>	

No. 13473				(<i>oikonomia</i>)	
-(first quarter of 15 th c.) No.13472		Thessalonikê	<i>KugNot</i> : 153 (par.86)		Married to a daughter of Chalazas (<i>katallaktês</i>)
Koustogiannis					
Manouêl Rhaoul (1378) No. 13611	<i>oikeios</i> , landowner	Lôrôton	<i>Lavra</i> III: no. 149*		
Kryviziôtês					
Michaêl Palaiologos (1421) No. 13840	<i>archôn tês synklêtou, oikeios</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Iv</i> IV: no.97*	witness	
Kyprianos					
Dêmêtrios (1299) Not in PLP	<i>megalodoxôtatos</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Vat</i> I: no.28**		
Dêmêtrios (1317) Not in PLP	<i>pansevastos sevastos, prokathêmenos</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Vat</i> I: no.49	witness	
Kônstantinos (1318) Not in PLP	landowner	Thessalonikê	<i>Vat</i> I : no.50**		
Geôrgios (1361) No.92473	<i>archôn</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Xen</i> : no.28, <i>Doch</i> : nos.36,* 38*	witness, signature	
Kônstantinos (1373-76) No. 13941	<i>endoxôtatos</i>		<i>AlexBat</i> : 631, <i>ArkadAn</i> : 221	He obtained from Vatopedi crumbling house and property, as well as Kamariôtissa monastery in Thessalonikê to restore	
Michaêl (1373)	<i>endoxôtatos</i>		<i>AlexBat</i> : 631	He obtained from Vatopedi	

No. 13942				crumbling house and property, as well as Kamariôtissa monastery in Thessalonikê to restore	
Kyprianos Theodôros Doukas (1414) No.92474		Thessalonikê	<i>Doch</i> : no.54	signature	
Lampênos					
(1301) No. 14421	landowner	Kraneia /Strymôn	<i>PI</i> : 45		
Geôrgios (1317, 1318) Not in PLP	<i>sevastos</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Vat</i> I: nos 49, 50*	witness signature	
-(before 1320) No. 14422	landowner	Zedeleanitza	<i>Xen</i> : app II	mention	
Theodôros (1321) No. 14427	<i>pronoia</i> holder	Drymosita	<i>Lavra</i> II: no. 108	mention	
Tarchaneiôtês (ca. 1335?) No. 14432		Thessalonikê			
Laskaris					
Michaêl Tzamantouros (1259-1269) No. 14554	<i>megas doux</i> , landowner	Hierissos	<i>DoParasp</i> : 437		
Kônstantinos Komnênos (1294) No. 14542	<i>oikeios</i> , landowner	Dekallistê/Strymôn	<i>DöSch</i> :112		
Manouêl Doukas Komnênos (1320)	<i>domestikos tôn dysikôn</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>ChilP</i> I : no.54 (1320)	signature	

No. 14549	<i>scholôn,kephalê, oikeios</i>				
Laskaris? (before 1321) No. 14502		Hermêleia	<i>Lavra</i> II: 282		
- (1339-1345) No. 14512	great landowner	Serres	<i>Prod.</i> nos.35(1339), 39 (1345)		Had one brother
- (before 1348) No. 14513	<i>epi tês trapezês, landowner</i>	Chrysoupolis /Strymôn	<i>Vat</i> II: no. 97	mentioned as landowner	
Two individuals with the name Laskaris (1366/67) No. 92513	both bore the title of <i>pinkernês</i>	Christoupolis (Kavala)	<i>TheochVermacht</i> : 490	mention	Brother of Dêmêtrios TzAMPLAKÔN, <i>meGas stratopedarchês</i>
Nikêphoros (1366/67) No. 14555		Christoupolis (Kavala)	<i>TheochVermacht</i> : 490	mention	Married to the daughter of Dêmêtrios TzAMPLAKÔN, <i>meGas stratopedarchês</i> .
Maria (1368) No. 14497	landowner	Christoupolis (Kavala)			
-(1372) No. 14505		From Thessalonikê			
Makarios Koteanitzês No. 14545	monk, landowner	Macedonia	<i>ChilP</i> I: no. 153	He had unjustly ceded land that belonged to Chilandar to Rhosson monastery	
Geôrgios (1374) No. 14527	<i>doulos</i> , landowner		<i>ChilP</i> I : no. 155	signature	Brother of Kônstantinos Palaiologos Laskaris and Leôn Koteanitzês Laskaris
Kônstantinos Palaiologos (1364-1374)	<i>doulos</i> , landowner	Strumitza	<i>ChilP</i> I: no. 155	He donated the village of	Brother of Leôn Koteanitzês Laskaris

No. 14543				Mpresnitza to Saint-Paneleemon	and Geôrgios Laskaris
Leôn Koteanitzes (1374)	<i>doulos</i> , landowner	Strumitza	<i>ChilP</i> I : no. 155		
Kônstantinos (1377) No. 14539	<i>doulos</i> , great landowner	Serres	<i>Lavra</i> III: no.148	He and his sisters take action against the monastery about their paternal property that their mother had ceded to it.	Brother of Anna Laskarina and Thomais Laskarina
Anna Laskarina (1377) No. 14494	landowner	Serres	<i>Lavra</i> III :no.148	see previous	Sister of Konstantinos and Thomais
Thomais No. 14496	landowner	Serres	<i>Lavra</i> III: no.148	see previous	Sister of Konstantinos and Anna
Dêmétrios Vryennios (1388-1393) No. 14529	<i>archôn, pronoia holder, endoxôtatos great landowner</i>	Achinos/ Strymôn, Serres	<i>Esph</i> : no. 30 <i>ChilP</i> : I no. 158 (1388), 160 (1392)	His claims over half the village of Achinos are rejected Witness Had sold land to Kutlumus	Related to Makarios Vryennios
- (1405) No. 14509	landowner	Kalamaria			Son of Sampias Rhadosthlavos. Brother of Doukas
Alexandres (1409) No.14523	<i>defensôr, oikeios</i>		<i>Lavra</i> III: no. 161	signature	
Manouêl (1503)		Thessalonikê	<i>Dion</i> : no.41	Witness Signature	

Lykopoulos					
- (1317) Not in PLP	landowner	Near Vardar	<i>Chil</i> I: no. 36		
Theodôros (1328) No. 15212	<i>tzaousios tou megalou allagiou, pronoia holder</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Chil</i> I: no.117		
-(1341) No. 92589	landowner	Perigardikeia	<i>Doch</i> : no.20	mention	
Machêtarês					
Alexios (1404-1407?) No. 17532	<i>doulos, notarios</i>	Thessalonikê, Constantinople	<i>Lavra</i> III: no.156	drawing up of document	
Magklavitês					
Geôrgios (1317) No. 16069	landowner	Apidea	<i>Chil</i> I: nos. 34 and 35	Donates land of 100 to Chilandar	
- (1320-1338) No. 92596	landowner	Phournia	<i>Xen</i> : app. II		
-(1338) No. 16068	landowner	Verroia	<i>Bat</i> III: 31		
Dêmêtrios (1415) No. 16070	saltworker	Thessalonikê	<i>Dion</i> : no.14	signature	
Konstantinos (1432) No. 16074		Thessalonikê	<i>Lavra</i> III: no. 168**		
Makrênos					
- (before 1312) No. 16356	landowner	Lêtherê	<i>Xer</i> : no.16 (1312)	Owned vineyard of one modios	
Geôrgios (1312-1325) No. 16360	landowner	Psalis	<i>Xer</i> : no.16 (1312)	Sells land of 3 stremmata	Father of Dêmêtrios Makrenos
Dêmêtrios (1312-1325) No. 16362	landowner	Psalis	<i>Xer</i> : no.16 (1312)	witness	Son of Geôrgios

Dêmêtrios (1312) No. 16364	priest	Thessalonikê	<i>Chil</i> I: no. 30*	Theodôros Karavas left him one hyperpyron	
Kônstantinos (1333-1373) No. 16365	<i>Logothetês tôn agelôn, domestikos tôn thematôn, doulos, apographeus, pansevastos sevastos</i>	Macedonia Thessalonikê	<i>Prod</i> : nos. 27 (1333-1338) and 28 (1333) <i>ChilP</i> I: nos. 46 and 47 (1319), 123(1333), 130 (1339) <i>Esph</i> : no. 19(1334) <i>Xen</i> : nos. 23* (1335), 25 (1338) <i>Doch</i> : nos. 18 (1337), 20 (1341), 23 (1344) <i>Vat</i> II: nos. 79 (1335-1338), 81 and (1338)	Compilation of documents signature	
Mamalês					
-(1301-1320) No. 94044	landowner	Katô Volvos	<i>Iv</i> III : nos. 70 (1301), 75 (1318), 79 (1320)	mention	
Manikaitês					
-(1337) Not in PLP	landowner	Serres	<i>Vat</i> II: no. 80	mention	
Dêmêtrios Doukopoulos (1368) No. 16636	<i>oikeios, doulos</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Pant</i> : no. 7*	witness signature	
Dêmêtrios Angelos (1375) No. 16635	<i>katholikos kritês, doulos</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Kutl</i> II ² : no. 34 (1375) <i>Vat</i> II: nos 144 (1374), 149* (1376)	signature	
Marmaras					
Geôrgios (1309) No. 17100 [same with protomaistor?]		Thessalonikê	<i>Chil</i> I: no. 25	witness	
Konstantinos	house owner	Thessalonikê	<i>Iv</i> III: no. 73** (1314)		

No. 94087					
Konstantinos [same with previous one?]		Thessalonikê	<i>Vat I: no.32** (1301)</i>		
Geôrgios (1322-1327) No. 17102	<i>prôtomaistôr ton oikodomôn</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Iv III: no. 84** (1326); ChilP: I nos. 84** and 85**(1322); Zog: 54</i>	witness	
Manouêl (1365) not in PLP	Landowner	Kalokairidês area (Thessaloniki)	<i>Vat II: no. 121</i>	mention	
Michaêl (1415) No. 17111	saltworker	Thessalonikê	<i>Dion: no.14</i>		
Dêmêtrios (1420) No.17105		Thessalonikê	<i>Dion : no. 19*</i>	witness signature	
Maroulês					
Nikolaos (1321) No. 17156	pronoia holder	<i>mega allagion of</i> Thessalonikê	<i>Xen: no. 16*</i>	granted an <i>oikonomia</i>	
Dêmêtrios (1322) No. 17149	doctor	Thessalonikê	<i>ChilP I: no. 85**</i>	witness	
Iôannês (1379-1384) No. 17153	<i>archôn, apographeus</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>AlexBat :283 Doch: no. 49* (1384)</i>		
– (1384) No. 17143 Identical with archôn Iôannês of the same document?	house owner	Thessalonikê	<i>Doch: no. 49*</i>	mention of a house of his house in Thessalonikê	
Masgidas					
Theodôros (before 1310) No. 17221	landowner	Zichna	<i>Iv III: no. 72</i>	mentioned as landowner	
– (1321) No. 17217	landowner	Linovrocheion	<i>Lavra II: no. 108</i>	mentioned as landowner	

– (before 1324) No. 17218	landowner	Neochôrion	<i>LemKar</i> : 285	mention	
Iôannês Doukas (1324-ca. 1346?) No. 17222	great landowner, <i>doulos</i>	Serres	<i>SolovMosin</i> : no. 17a (1346-1347) ; <i>Pant</i> : no.11(1353) <i>Iv</i> III : no. 81(1324)	His <i>gonikon</i> village of Dragosta was ceded to Panteleêmon He and his wife donate land of 300 modioi in Kotzakion (Zavaltia)to Iviron	Son of Kallistratos (monk) and Martha (nun). Brother of Athanassios . Married to Eirênê Doukaina Masgidaina
-(1356/7) No. 94096		Thessalonikê	<i>SchreiFin</i> : 3/56		
Kônstantinos (before 1374) No. 17223			<i>Lavra</i> III: no.145*		Father of Eirênê Sphratzaina and Iôannês Sphrantzês . Uncle of Alexios Komnênos Masgidas
Alexios Komnênos (1374) No. 17220	<i>doulos</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Lavra</i> III: no. 145*		Nephew of Kônstantinos Masgidas
Matarangos					
Nikolaos (1329-1341) No. 17260	<i>katholikos kritês</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Esph</i> :no. 19 (1334); <i>Kut</i> II ² : nos. 19(1341), 32 and 34 (1375) ; <i>MM</i> I :195	Signature mention	
Mela(n)chrênos/-chrinos/					
Leôn (1295-before 1316) No. 17633	landowner	Thessalonikê	<i>DoSch</i> : 41, 167; <i>Chil</i> I : nos. 33(1316), 34 and 35 (1317)	His wife sold land of 1 modios within the city to the monastery	

Melachrênos (1323) No. 17652		Chalkidikê	<i>SchreinPrakt</i> : 35 (1380-1430)	mention	
Andronikos (1324) No. 17630			<i>PRK I</i> : no.418		Marries off his adopted daughter to Matthaios Thalassênos
-Melachrênê (1326) No. 17647	house owner	Serres	<i>ChilP I</i> : no. 108	mention	
-(before 1335) No. 17627	house owner	Thessalonikê	<i>ChilP I</i> : no. 125*		
-(1339) No. 17626		Ploumiska near Rhentina	<i>ChilP I</i> : no. 130	mention	
Melanchrênnoi (1344) No. 17625	<i>prôtallagatores</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Doch</i> : no.23	Along with other dignitaries they confirm possession of land to the monastery	
Melachrinê (1345) No. 17661	landowner	Livadion	<i>Prod</i> : no. 39	land of 400 <i>modioi</i> sold to Prodromou	
Melachrênos - (1384)	landowner	Thasos	<i>Pant</i> : no. 12	mention	
Iôannês Douk(a)s (1416) No. 17665	<i>doulos</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Dion</i> : no. 15	signature	
Melitas					
Dêmêtrios (1267) No. 17835		Hierissos	<i>Zog</i> :20		
– (1301) No. 17834	landowner	Zurumba near Proaulax/Chalk.	<i>PI</i> : 43		
Iôannês (1308?) No. 17836		Strymôn	<i>Chil I</i> : no.24	witness	
Michaêl (1309)			<i>Vat I</i> : no. 43	witness	

Not in PLP					
- (before 1312) No. 17832	landowner	Chalkidikê	<i>Xer:</i> no.16 (1312)	He owned <i>exaleimmatike gê</i>	
- (1317) No.17833	landowner	Tympanaris/Chalk.	<i>MošinAkti:</i> 182.184		
-(before 1320 and before 1338) No. 92664	landowner	Karytza and Longos near Hierissos,	<i>Xen:</i> nos. 14 (1320), 25 (1325), app. II	mention	
Melitiniôtês					
-(ca. between 1315-1330) No.17847					Relative of Geôrgios Oinaiôtês
Manouêl (1322) No.17858	<i>oikeios</i>		<i>Vat I:</i> nos. 55, 56	representative of the emperor	Relative of Geôrgios Oinaiôtês
Demetrios (1370) No. 17850	<i>oikeios, doulos</i>		<i>Vat II:</i> no. 135*	witness	
Mesopotamitês					
Mesopotamitissa, Anna Doukopoulina (1306) No. 17953		Thessalonikê	<i>Xen:</i> no.7*		related to the family of Doukopouloi? (<i>Xen.</i> nos. 5, 19, 20)
-- (1342) No. 17954	<i>sevastos</i> , landowner	Zichna	<i>LemKar:</i> 282	Had a garden of 2 <i>modioi</i> which he exchanged with other property	
Manouêl (1343) No. 17955	great landowner	Drachova	<i>Chil I:</i> no. 132	He was granted a <i>posotês</i> of 20 <i>hyperpyra</i>	
Andronikos (1344-before 1347) No. 94156	<i>archontopoulos</i>	Zichna	<i>Phil:</i> 301		

Metochitês					
Dêmêtrios Angelos (1326-1355) No. 17980	<i>megas stratopedarchês, kephalê</i> of Serres (since 1328/9), <i>oikeios</i>		<i>Prod</i> : no. 23(1328-1331)	mention	Son of Theodôros Metochitês. Brother of Alexios Laskaris, Metochitês, Nikêphoros Laskaris , Michaêl Laskaris and Eirênê Kaisarissa
Metochitissa Doukaina (1338) No. 94157	landowner	Votitza/Serres	<i>Vat</i> II: no. 80	He sells land of 700 <i>modioi</i> to Kantakouzênê Angelina, aunt of the emperor	Sons, Manouêl , Andreas, Michaêl
Alexios (Atouemes) Laskaris Palaiologos(?) (1355-1369) No.17977	<i>megas domestikos</i> , governor of Thessalonikê (1349-50) landowner	Thessalonikê, Chalkidikê until 1369	<i>Vat</i> II : nos. 129* and 130* (1369)		
Laskaris (1373-76) No. 17983	<i>megas chartoularios, doulos, apographeus</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Vat</i> II: nos. 147 (1375), 148 (1376); <i>Dochl</i> : nos.41*and 42* (1373)	signature	
Andronikos (1421) No.17978	<i>archôn tês synklêtou, oikeios</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Iv</i> IV: no.97*		
Monomachos					
Iôannês (1307) No. 19302	<i>army commander</i>	Thessalonikê			
Michaêl Senachereim (1317-1342/3) No. 19306	<i>megas kontostavlos, eparchos, kephalê</i> of Thessalonikê, <i>pansevastos, oikeios</i> , great landowner	Thessalonikê Thessalia, Chantax and Nesion/ Strymôn	<i>Zog</i> : 68, 71, 73; <i>ChilP</i> I: nos. 152 (1366), 157 (1378) <i>Vat</i> I: no. 49(1317)	mention	
-(1342)	landowner	Zichna	<i>LemKar</i> : 282	mention	

No. 19293					
Iôannês (1359) Not in PLP		Drama	<i>Vat II: no. 113</i>	signature	
Theodora Soultanina Monomachina (1376) Not in PLP	landowner	Verroia	<i>Vat II: no. 152</i>	He donates land to Vatopedi	Wife of Manouêl Monomachos, <i>doulos</i>
Manouêl (1376) Not in PLP	<i>doulos</i> , landowner	Verroia	<i>Vat II: no. 152</i>	He donates land to Vatopedi	Husband of Theodôra Soultanina
Geôrgios (1421) No. 19296	builder	Thessalonikê	<i>DöSch: 267</i>		
Moschopoulos					
Gregorios (1315-1317) No. 19371	<i>sevastos</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>PRK I :nos. 226, 228 Vat I: no. 49</i>	signature	
Iôannês (1333-d. before 1358) No. 92682	representative of the <i>eparchos</i> Michaêl Senachereim Monomachos	Chantax/Strymôn	<i>ChilP I: 157 (1378); DöSch: 118</i>	He claimed a mill belonging to Chilandar	
- (before 1358) No. 19368		Marmarion/Strymôn	<i>DöSch: 118</i>	He had built a mill	
Moschos					
-(1321) No. 19383	landowner	Longos	<i>Lavra II: no. 108</i>	mention	
-(1322/3-1325) No. 92685	landowner	Hêrmêleia	<i>Xen: nos. 19 (1322/23), 22 (1333)</i>	mention	
-(before 1341) No. 19385	<i>apographeus</i>	Hagia Maria	<i>Lavra III: app. XII*</i>	mention	

Moschonas					
-(1321) No. 19404	landowner	Gomatou	<i>Lavra</i> II: no. 109	mention	
Michaël (1322) No. 19406 (Manouël according to PLP)	<i>megalodoxôtatos</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>ChilP</i> I: no. 85**	witness signature	
-(1341) No. 19403		Rhadolivos	<i>PI</i> :117		
Mourinos					
Dêmêtrios (1279-before 1320) No. 19512	<i>prôtovestiarios,</i> <i>pansevastos</i> <i>sevastos</i> , great landowner	Chalkidikê	<i>Doch</i> : no.9* (1280/1)		
Markos Doukas Glavas (1355-1370) No. 19513	<i>epi tou stratou</i> , great landowner	Hermêleia	<i>Doch</i> : nos. 22,* 31,* 32,* 39,* 40*		Son ? of Glavaina Doukaina Uncle ? of Dêmêtrios Mourinos ?
Mouzalôn					
- (1270-1274) No. 19434	landowner	Thrachalê	<i>Xer</i> : no. 9		
Kônstantinos (1321-1324) No. 19442	<i>sevastos</i> , owner of houses	Thessalonikê	<i>ChilP</i> I: no. 68 (1321)	mention	
Theodôros (before 1355) No. 19438	pronoia holder, <i>stratiôtes</i>	Rhôssaion	<i>Doch</i> : no. 29*		
-(1383-1386) No. 19432		Thessalonikê			
Vartholomaïos (1419-1422) No. 19435	owner of <i>myrepsika</i> <i>ergastêria</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>KugNot</i> : 145 (par. 13), 146 (pars.24, 25), 148 (par. 46 and 48)	Sums given to the compiler of the notebook for renting the <i>ergastêria</i>	

				(workshops): -6 nomismata -22 stavrata and 6 aspra palaia - 17 stavrata - 50 nomismata - 15 nomismata	
Neokaisaritês					
Michaël(1309-1324) No.20095	<i>doulos, megas adnoumiastês</i>	Serres	<i>Iv</i> III: no. 82 (1325); <i>Chil</i> I: nos. 39, 40, 41(1318); <i>ChilP</i> I: nos. 103 and 104 (1324)	signature	
-(before 1385) No. 20090	saltwoker	Thessalonikê			
Neokastritês					
-(1321) No. 20097	<i>Stratiôtes</i> pronoia holder	Linovrocheion Rhosaïou Diavolokampos	<i>Lavra</i> II: no. 108 <i>Doch</i> : nos. 18(1337) 21(1343), 23(1344)	mention He owned land of 600 <i>modioi</i> in Rhôsaïou	
Oinaiôtês					
Iôannês (1321?) No. 21027	<i>apographeus,</i> <i>doulos, sevastos</i>	Theme of Serres	<i>Lavra</i> II: no. 112	signature	
Geôrgios (1407) No.21025	<i>katholikos kritês,</i> <i>doulos</i>		<i>Lavra</i> III: no.161	signature	
Kônstantinos Palaiologos (1418-1421) No. 21028	<i>apographeus, doulos</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Doch</i> : no. 56 (1418) <i>Lavra</i> III: no. 166 (1428 or 1443?) <i>Dion</i> : no. 20 (1421)	signature	
Palaiologos					
Kônstantinos Doukas	<i>despot, governor,</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>MM</i> II: 382f, 557-559		

Komnênos (1278- 1379) No.21499	monk				
Iôannês (1295-1307) No. 21475 Same with No. 21479?	<i>despot</i> , governor	Thessalonikê	<i>ChilP</i> I: no. 67* (1321)	He had granted the village of Pougion to Alexandros Evripiôtês, pronoiar	
- (1304-1321) No. 21412	landowner	Longos, Sartês, Sarantarea	<i>Lavra</i> II :nos. 97 (1304), 108 (1321), 109 (1321)	mentioned as owner of land and <i>paroikos</i> (1 <i>stasis</i> of 1, 5 <i>modioi</i>) in Sarantarea	
Iôannês (1305-1325/6) No. 21479	<i>kaisar</i> , <i>panhypersevastos</i> , governor	Thessalonikê	<i>ChilP</i> I: no. 67* (1321)		Son of Kônstantinos Palaiologos, army commander, and Rhaoulaina Eirênê Palaiologina
Dêmêtrios Angelos Doukas (1306-1343) No. 21456	<i>despot</i> , governor	Thessalonikê	<i>ChilP</i> I: no.87 (1322), 95(1323); <i>MM</i> III 111; <i>DöSch</i> 80, 84,		Son of Andronikos II and Eirênê Palaiologina. Father of Eirênê. Fathered one more child
Kônstantinos (1307- 1338) No. 21493	<i>mezas papias</i> , great landowner	Hermêleia Vourvourôn	<i>Doch</i> : no. 10 (1307); <i>Xen</i> : nos. 14 (1320), 25 (1338), app. I, II (between 1320-1338) ; <i>Xer</i> : no.22 (1317-1334); <i>MM</i> III : 104 <i>Vat</i> I: nos. 48 and 49 (1317)	Possessed land in Hermêleia He had donated land (Hagia Triada in Vourvourôn) mention Acting as governor regulating transactions	

Geôrgios (1312) No. 21446	landowner	Psalis	<i>Xer.</i> no. 16	He sells land of 2 <i>stremmata</i>	Brother of Iôannês Palaiologos
Iôannês (1312) No. 21477	landowner	Psalis	<i>Xer</i> :no.16	He sells land of 2 <i>stremmata</i>	Brother of Geôrgios
Kônstantinos (1317) No. 21496	governor, <i>meGas chartoularios</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Vat</i> I: no. 49	signature	
Michaêl Komnênos Vranas (before 1321) No. 21530	great landowner	Sdravikion/ Serres	<i>ChilP</i> I : nos. 60, 61, 70 and 71(1321)	mention	Son of Kônstantinos Doukas Angelos Komnênos Palaiologos and Eirênê Komnênê Laskarina Kantakouzênê Palaiologina . Cousin of Andronikos II
-(1321) No.21413		Sarantarea	<i>Lavra</i> II: no. 109	Received revenue from land	
Theodôros (1325-1326) No. 21462	<i>kephalê, oikeios</i>	Volon, Monysopolis, Christoupolis	<i>Prod</i> : nos. 16 (1325), 19 (1326)		
Alexios (1333) No. 21424	landowner	Zichna	<i>Prod</i> : no. 28	Land of 200 <i>modioi</i> belonging to Alexios were given to monk Iakôvos	
Palaiologina, Agapê Angelina Sphratzaina (1341) No. 21341	landowner, nun	Hagia Maria	<i>Lavra</i> III: app.XII*		Sister of Theodôros Doukas Spartênos. Sister-in-law of Manouêl Phaxênos.
Anna of Savoy Palaiologina	<i>despoina</i>		<i>Lavra</i> III: no. 163 (1415)	Had granted the aulê of Syrges to the monastery of	Grandmother of Manuel II Palaeologus

				Hagioi Anargyroi	
Kônstantinos (1342-1345) No. 21495	governor, landowner	Serres	<i>TheochVermacht</i> :490, par 18	He had given as dowry to his son-in-law, Dêmêtrios TzAMPLAKÔN, <i>megas stratopedarchês</i> .	Son of Dêmêtrios (Michaêl) Komnênos Koutroulês and Anna Komnênê Palaiologina. Father of Andronikos Palaiologos, <i>prôtostratôr</i> , and Eudokia Palaiologina TzAMPLAKÔNISSA. Father-in-law of Dêmêtrios TzAMPLAKÔN, <i>megas stratopedarchês</i> . Uncle of Andronikos III.
Athanassios Soultanos (d. before 1324)					Father-in-law of Theodôros Sarantênos
Alexios Soultanos (before 1344) No. 26338		Verroia	<i>Vat</i> II: no. 89 (1344)	His <i>oikonomia</i> of 100 <i>hyperpyra</i> passed on to his daughter	Father of Xênê Soultanina and perhaps of Dêmêtrios Soultanos Palaiologos
Andreas (1345) No.21425	<i>oikeios, eparchos</i>		<i>Lavra</i> III: no. 124*		
Michaêl (until 1345) No. 21527	<i>synarchôn</i> , leader of Zealots				
Doukas -(1350/51?) No. 21413	landowner	Rhentina	<i>Lavra</i> III: no.130*		
Eirênê (d. before 1365)	<i>despoina, augousta</i>	Serres	<i>Lavra</i> III: nos. 143(1365), 159 (1407)	He had granted land of 200 <i>modioi</i> to Iôannês and Manouêl Disypatos	Wife of Iôannês VII Palaiologos

Dêmêtrios	<i>mezas domestikos</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Doch</i> : nos. 43 and 44(1375)	mention	
Iôannês (1373-1377) No.21484	<i>prôtostratôr, mezas primmikêrios</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Doch</i> : nos 42*(1373), 45 (1377)		Son of Dêmêtrios Palaiologos, <i>mezas domestikos</i> , and Anna Palaiologina Kantakouzênê. Brother of Eudokia Kantakouzênê, cousin of Andronikos IV
Andronikos Angelos (d. before 1375)	<i>protovestiaritês</i>	Vodena	<i>Lavra</i> III: no. 146 (1375)	mention of his land that was inherited to Maria Angelina Doukaina Palaiologina	Grandfather of Maria Angelina Doukaina Palaiologina.
Maria Angelina Doukaina Palaiologina (1375)		Vodena	<i>Lavra</i> III: no. 146 (1375)	He donates church of Gavaliôtissa to Lavra	Wife of of Thomas Prealympos
Andronikos Asanês No. 1489	<i>kephalatikevôn tês dyseôs</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Vat</i> II: no. 144 (1375)	mention	
Manouêl (1375)	<i>oikeios</i>	Verroia	<i>Vat</i> II : no. 145 (1375)	witness	
Dêmêtrios Soultanos (before 1376) Not in PLP		Verroia	<i>Vat</i> II: no. 152 (1376)		Father of Theodora Soultanina Monomachina. Perhaps son of Alexis Soultanos Palaiologos
Alexios (before 1376) No. 21423	landowner	Mpertzitzikon /Serres Zichna, Thessalonikê	<i>Phil</i> : 321-323		Great-nephew of Andronikos III Palaiologos. Nephew of Theodôra Philanthropênê

					Palaiologina. Fathered children
-(1377)	<i>prôtostratôr</i>		<i>Doch:</i> no. 45 (1377)	mention	
....tos Palaiologos (ca. 1381) No. 21410	<i>doulos</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Doch:</i> no.48*	signature	
Theodôros	<i>despot</i>		<i>Lavra</i> III: nos. 150(1384), 151**(1389)	mention of his grants to Nea Monê	
Palaiologopoulos (1384-1386) No. 1399			<i>Pant:</i> no. 11		<i>paidion</i> of Iôannês, <i>mezas primmikêrios</i>
Geôrgios (1388) No. 21444		Chalikidikê	<i>Esph:</i> no. 29	signature	
-(1393) No. 21403		Serres	<i>Esph:</i> no. 31		
Andronikos (1408-1423) No. 21427	<i>despot, monk</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>DoSch:</i> 87; <i>Dion:</i> nos. 20 (1421), 33 (1477) ; <i>ArkadAn:</i> 334; <i>AlexBat:</i> 86	mention	Son of Manuel II Palaiologos. Fathered children
Michaêl (d. before 1415)	<i>porphyrogenêtos</i>		<i>Lavra</i> III: no. 163 (1415)	The <i>aulê</i> of Syrgês was dedicated to Hagioi Anargyroi in memory of Michaêl .	Uncle of Manuel II Palailogos
Iôannês (1416) No. 21476	landowner	Lozikion	<i>ChilP</i> I :71		
Petros (1419) No. 21533	great landowner	Lozikion	<i>ChilP</i> I : 71		
-(before 1471) No. 21406			<i>Lavra</i> III: no. 173*		Husband of Thomaïs

Panaretos					
Iôannês (ca. 1300-1305?) No.26641	<i>apographeus</i>	Serres	<i>Chil</i> I: no. 23	mention	
-(before 1321) No.21634	<i>sevastos</i> , landowner	Ptelea	<i>Lavra</i> II: no.108	land of 4 <i>modioi</i> given to the monastery	
-(1321) No.21632	landowner	Hêrmêleia	<i>Lavra</i> II : no.108	land of 4 <i>modioi</i>	
Leôn (1330) Not in PLP	<i>sevastos, doulos</i>	Chalkidikê	<i>Vat</i> II: no. 71	compilation of document, signature	
-(1356/7) No . 94384		Myriophyton /Olynthos	<i>SchreinFin</i> : 3/82		Brother-in-law of. Geôrgios Agapêtos , landowner
Dêmêtrios (1415) No.21637	<i>protalykarios</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Dion</i> : no. 14		
Pepagômenos					
Theodôros (1415) No.22362	saltworker	Thessalonikê	<i>Dion</i> : no. 14		
Pergamênos					
Kônstantinos No. 22420	<i>doulos, sevastos, apographeus</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Iv</i> III: no. 79 (1320); <i>Xen</i> : nos. 13 and 14 (1320), 15* and 16 *(1321), 17(1322); <i>Lavra</i> II: nos. 107(1319), 108, 109, 110 and 111 (1321)	signature	
Pezos					
Theophylaktos (1284)		Thessalonikê.	<i>Lavra</i> II: no. 75	witness	
- (1321)	mill owner	Gaurianê	<i>Lavra</i> II: no.108	Reference to his mill	
Iôannês (1379)	<i>archôn</i>	Thessalonikê.	<i>Alex Bat</i> :283		

No.22245					
Phakrasês					
- (1299-1300) No. 29570	<i>logothetês tôn agelôn</i> , henchman of the emperor in Thessalonikê				Father of Phakrasês Iôannês, <i>parakoimômenos</i>
- (1326) No.29569	house owner	Thessalonikê	<i>Iv</i> III: no. 84**	mention as owner of property within the city	
- (1347-1368) No. 29565		Thessalonikê			
Manouêl Kantakouzenos (1370-1409) No. 29586	<i>oikeios</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Vat</i> II: no. 135	witness signature	
Dêmêtrios (1362?- 1377) No.29576	<i>megas primmikêrios, doulos</i>	Serres Thessalonikê	<i>Lavra</i> III: no.148 (1377) ; <i>Doch</i> : no.38* (1366)	witness signature	Uncle of Kônstantinos Laskaris
-(1380-1382?) No. 29566					
- (end of the14th beginning of 15 th c.) No. 29567					
- (1422) No. 29568	<i>defensôr</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>KugNot</i> : 148 (par.48)	He gives money to the author of the notebook on behalf of Mouzalôn	
Dêmêtrios (1496) Not in PLP		Valona ?	<i>Lavra</i> III: no. 174	witness	

Pharisaïos					
Geôrgios (1319-1325) No. 29636	<i>doulos, apographeus</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Iv</i> III; no. 79 (1320); <i>Xen</i> : nos. 13 and 14 (1320), 15* and 16* (1321), 17(1322); <i>Esph</i> : nos. 16 (1321), 19(1334) ; <i>Lavra</i> II : nos. 107(1319),108 a 109 and 111 (1321) ,114 (1324) ; <i>Kut</i> II ² : no. 11 (1322); <i>Doch</i> :no.16 (between 1325-1332) ; <i>ChilP</i> I: nos. 55(1320). 68 (1321); <i>SolovMosin</i> : no. 36 (1369); <i>SchreinPrak</i> : 39 (1380-1430); <i>Xer</i> : no.20 (1320-1321); <i>Zog</i> : 39, 41f, 48, 102f; <i>DoReg</i> : 2449	signature	
Pharmakês					
- (before 1304) No. 29643	<i>pansevastos sevastos</i> , landowner	Hagia Maria	<i>Lavra</i> II: no. 98*		Father-in-law of Doukas Michaël Angelos
- (1327) No. 29642	landowner	Lozikion	<i>ChilP</i> I: no. 116*	mention	
Dêmêtrios (1321-1342-11) No. 29645	great landowner <i>megalodoxôtatos</i>	Epanô Antigonía Thessalonikê	<i>Phil</i> :297 <i>Vat</i> I no.54 (1321)	witness	
- (d. 1345) No.29640		Thessalonikê			Brother-in-law of the wife of Geôrgios Kôkalas
Geôrgios (before 1347) No.29644	great landowner, pronoia holder	Plagêna and Therma	<i>Dion</i> : no. 2	mention	
-(until 1347) No. 29641	great landowner	Krousovon/ Strymôn	<i>Esph</i> : no. 24 (1353-1356?)	mention of his grant	
Phaxênos					
Manouêl (1341)	<i>oikeios, archôn</i> ,	Hagia Maria	<i>Lavra</i> III : no. 153*, app.XII*		Brother-in-law of

No. 26609	landowner				Ágapê Angelina Sphratzaina Palaiologina and Theodôros Doukas Spartênos. First husband of the mother of Skampaulês Dêmêtrios and of Thalassênê Kalê.
Philantropênos					
Geôrgios (1304) No. 29757	great landowner, <i>authentês</i>	Halmyros/Chalk.	<i>Chil I</i> : no. 22*		Married to Tzitapina, Athanassia Tzainissa
Dêmêtrios (1304) No. 29762	great landowner	Halmyros/Chalk	<i>Chil I</i> : no. 22*		Son of Geôrgios Philantropênos and Tzitapina, Athanassia Tzainissa
Michaêl (1350? or earlier) No. 29774	<i>meGas</i> <i>stratopedarchês</i> , great landowner	Karkara	<i>Lavra III</i> : no.129 *	His land and paroikoi is ceded to Dêmêtrios Kôkalas	Cousin of John V Palaiologos
Philantropênê Eudokia (before 1350?) No. 29742	great landowner	Langadas	<i>Lavra III</i> : no. 129*	After her death her land is granted to Dêmêtrios Kôkalas	
Michaêl Angelos (1375) No. 29776	<i>doulos</i>	Serres	<i>Kut II</i> ² : no. 33	signature	
Alexios Angelos	<i>kaisar</i>	Thesalonike	<i>Lavra III</i> : no.151** (1389)		Husband of <i>kaissarissa</i>

(1378/9-1389) No. 29750					Rhathoslava Angelina
Geôrgios (1393) No.29756		Serres	<i>Esph</i> : no. 30	signature	
Iôannês Angelos (1421) no.29767	<i>archôn tês synklêtou, oikeios</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Iv IV</i> : no.97*		
Philommatês					
Euthymios (1300-d.before 1321) No. 29928	<i>stratiôtês</i> , great landowner	Loroton, Hagios Elias, Ptelea/ Hêrmêleia	<i>Lavra II</i> : nos.90(1300), 108 (1321) Doch : nos. 15 (1315-1316), 22 (1344)	Mention Had one paroikos 4 <i>exaleimmatikai staseis</i> and 6 more <i>staseis</i> given to Docheiariou	
Akindynos (1308-1309) No. 29921	house owner	Serres	<i>Lavra II</i> : no.102	He buys a houses in Serres	
-(1317) No. 29914		Doxompous	<i>Lavra II</i> : no. 104		
Andronikos (1318) No.29923	landowner	Vrasta	<i>Esph</i> : no.14	owner of vineyard	
-(1327/28) No. 29916		Thessalonikê Zichna	<i>Kut II</i> ² : no.13	witness	
Andronikos (1328) No. 29922	<i>doulos</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>ChilP I</i> : no. 117*	signature	
-(1338) Not in PLP	<i>primmikêrios</i>	Serres	<i>Vat II</i> : no. 80	Sells land of 6 <i>modioi</i> toTheodôra Kantakouzênê	
Geôrgios (after 1371-1380)		Stylarion	<i>Vat II</i> : no.142*		

No. 29924					
-(1415) No. 29920	saltworker	Thessalonikê	<i>Dion: no. 14</i>		
Phoverês					
– (1321) No. 29997	landowner	Lôrôton	<i>Lavra II: no.109</i>	mention as owner of land	
Dêmêtrios (1379-1384) No. 29998	<i>archôn, apographeus</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>AlexBat: 283</i> <i>Doch: no. 49* (1384)</i>		
Phrangopoulos					
Nikolaos (ca. 1290) No. 30104		Thessalonikê			Husband of Anna, landowner. Stepson of Kônstantinos Marmaras
-(1290-1300) No. 30089	<i>ktêtor</i> of the Geôrgios Paryakos monastery	Tachinos/ Strymôn	<i>Esph: no. 28(1387)</i>	He left the monastery to Eshigmenou	
-(before 1280/1) No. 30094	<i>apographeus</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Doch: no.9(1307)</i>	mention	
-(1322/23-1325) No.30087	landowner	Hêrmêleia	<i>Xen: nos. 19 (1322/23), 21 (1325)</i>	mention	
-(1356/7) No. 30083		Thessalonikê	<i>SchreinFin: 3/37</i>		
Geôrgios (1404-1421) No.30097	leaseholder	Thessalonikê	<i>DoSch: 266f</i>		
- (before 1409) No. 30092	landowner , monk	Karvaioi	<i>Lavra III: nos. 161(1409),166 (1428 Or 1443?)</i>	He donated one vineyard to Lavra	
Dêmêtrios (1415) No. 30098	saltworker	Thessalonikê	<i>Dion: no. 14</i>		

Petzikopoulos					
-(before 1322) No.22528	great landowner	Kritziana	<i>ChilP</i> I: nos. 84**and 81(1322) ; <i>DoSch</i> : 84		Husband of Maria Doukaina
Maria Doukaina Pentzikopoulina(1322) No. 22527	house owner	Thessalonikê	<i>ChilP</i> I: no. 84**	signature and mention as houseowner	Wife of Petzikopoulos, mother of Kalê, SchwM of Alexandros Doukas Sarantênos, doulos
-(before 1325) No. 22529	<i>stratopedarchês</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>ChilP</i> I: no. 112**		Husband of nun Melanê. Father of of nun Evlogia, Iôannês Senachereim Pentzikopoulos and Kônstantinos Pentzikopoulos
Demetrios Doukas (1327) No. 22531	<i>doulos</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>ChilP</i> I: no. 112**		Son of late Pentzikopoulos, <i>stratopedarchês</i> , and Melanê(later nun Martha). Brother of nun Evlogia, Iôannês Senachereim Pentzikopoulos and Kônstantinos.
Pitzikopoulos					
-(before 1355) No. 23275	<i>dysikos archontopoulos, great landowner</i>	Rhavenikeia Thessalonike	<i>Doch</i> : no. 29*	mention	

Platyskalitês					
– (1369) No. 23347		Makrogenous near Hierissos	<i>Zog</i> : 102		
– (end of 14th c.) No. 23348	money-changer	Thessalonikê	<i>KugNot</i> : 153 (par.86)		stepson of Metriôtes
Platyskalitissa Anyssia (1326) No. 23350	nun, houseowner	Thessalonikê	<i>ChilP</i> I no. 106**		
Pothos					
–(1297) No. 23437	landowner	Hierissos	<i>MosinAkti</i> :179; <i>Zog</i> : 116		
–(before 1317) No. 23435	landowner	Doxompous/Serres	<i>Lavra</i> II: no. 104	mention	
–(before 1321) No. 23436	landowner	Hêrmêleia	<i>Lavra</i> II: no.108		
Iôannês (1327) No. 23448	<i>paidopoulos</i>	Chantax/ Strymôn Thessalonikê	<i>ChilP</i> I: no. 115	mention	Along with Rhammatas had destroyed a water mill of Chilandar
Manouêl (1377) No. 23451	<i>oikeios</i>	Serres	<i>Lavra</i> III: no. 148	witness	
–(1419) No. 23434		Thessalonikê	<i>KugNot</i> : 145, par. 14		
Prevezianos					
Iôannês (1313) No. 23697	<i>megalodoxôtatos</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Doch</i> : no.13*	witness	
Geôrgios (1348) No. 23696		Thessalonikê	<i>Xen</i> : no. 29	witness	

Manôles (1356/7) No. 23698	trader of fabric	Thessalonikê	<i>SchreinFin: 3/53</i>		Brother of Nikolaos , trader
Nikolaos (1356/7) No. 23702	trader of fabric	Thessalonikê	<i>SchreinFin: 3/61.63</i>		
Nikolaos (1366), possibly the same as the previous one No.23700		Thessalonikê	<i>Doch: no.38*</i>	signature	
Petros (1366-77) No.23703		Thessalonikê	<i>Doch: no.38* Vat II: no. 150</i>	signature	
-(1366) Not certain exactly which one he is		Thessalonikê	<i>Vat II: no. 126</i>	witness	
Manouêl (1374-1376) No. 23699	<i>archôn</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Vat II: nos.140** (1374), 150** (1376)</i>	Witness signature	
Nikolaos (1414-1421) No. 23701	<i>megas chartophylax, diakôn</i>		<i>Doch: nos.49* (1384), 51* (1404), 54 (1414), 57* (1419); Xen: no. 33 (1452); DoSch:269</i>	signature	
Prinki(ê)ps					
Konstantinos, o tou Pringipos (before 1394) No. 23738		Thessalonikê	<i>MM :221</i>		Father of Geôrgios. Also had one daughter
Geôrgios (1394) No. 23741	landowner	from Thessalonikê	<i>MM II :221-223</i>	Heritage problem to solve at the Patriarchal court	Son of Kônstantinos. Had one sister
Geôrgios (1407-09) No.23746	<i>apographeus, doulos</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Xer: no. 29 (1407); Dion: no. 11* (1409); Lavra III: no.161 (1409); Doch: no.53 (1409)</i>	Composition of document and signature	

Dêmêtrios Palaiologos (1421) No.23747	<i>archôn tês synklêtou, oikeios</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Iv IV: no.97*</i>	witness	
Prokopios					
Geôrgios (1328) No. 23823	<i>doulos, megas myrtaitês</i>	Rhopalaia	<i>ChiP I :no. 117*</i>	signature	Husband of Maria Dikranê
Provatas					
-(1283) No. 94448	landowner	Kotzakion/Strymôn	<i>Iv III: no. 62</i>	mention	
-(1321) No.23785	landowner	Ourliakos/Strymôn	<i>Xen: no. 15*</i>	His land of 600 <i>modioi</i> was removed (surplus) and given to Xenophon	
-(1322/23-1325) No. 23784	landowner	Hêrmêleia	<i>Lavra II : no. 114 (1324) Xen : nos. 19 (1322/23), 22 (1333)</i>	mention	
Doukas (1356/7) No. 23786	trader	Thessalonikê	<i>SchreinFin: 3/66, 69-71, 139</i>		Partner of Tornikês, Doullourakês and Gorianitês
Rhadênos					
- (1300-21) No.23987	great landowner, <i>pronoia</i> holder	Genna, Elaia,Karvaioi Hierissos/Thess.	<i>Lavra II: nos. 90 (1300), 108 and 109 (1321) ChilP I: nos .66 and 72 (1321)</i>	mention as owner of landin Elaia, Genna and Karvaioi land belonging to him and Amnôn (<i>oikonomia</i>) is given to Chilandar	

			<i>Xen</i> : no.25 (1338) app.II	within the property of Xenophôn in 1338 1 vineyard of 3 <i>modioi</i> previously belonging to him	
- (1312-24). Probably identical with previous	great landowner, <i>vassilikos stratiôtes</i>	Chalkidikê, Thessalonikê	<i>ChilP</i> I : no.97* *(1324) <i>Xer</i> : no. (1312)	witness He sells land of of 6 <i>stremmata</i>	
-(1350-1387) No.23986		Thessalonikê			
Iôannês (1415-1421) No.23991	<i>apographeus, doulos</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Doch</i> : no.56 (1418); <i>Lavra</i> III: no.166 (1420); <i>Dion</i> : no.20; <i>Arkad An</i> :336	signature	
Stephanos Doukas (1415-21) No. 23999	<i>apographeus , kephalê</i>	Kassandreia	<i>Doch</i> : no.56 (1418); <i>Pant</i> : no. 18 (1419); <i>Dion</i> : no.20; <i>ArkadAn</i> : 335f, <i>AlexBat</i> : 87	signature	
Rhadênê- (1423) No. 23980		Thessalonikê	<i>KugNot</i> :144 (par.9)	She gives to the compiler 5 <i>nomismata</i> and a golden cross and charm as guarantee	
Rham(m)atas					
Nikêphoros (1287) No. 24080		Serres	<i>Kut</i> II ² : no. 4	witness	

Iôannês No. 94462	<i>doulos, sevastos</i>	Serres	<i>Iv</i> III : no. 81 (1324)	signature	
Geôrgios (1326) No. 24078	<i>megalodoxôtatos, chrysepilektês</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>ChilP</i> I: nos 84** (1322), 106 (1326), 112** and 115 (1327), 126(1335); <i>Zog</i> : 68	witness signature	
Sevastê Rhammatinê (1337) Not in PLP		Serres	<i>Vat</i> II: no. 80	He sells land of 8 modioi to Kantakouzênê	Has one son, Iôannês
Iôannês (1374) Not in PLP		Thessalonikê	<i>Vat</i> II: no.140**	He sells one house to Vatopedi signature	
Rhaoul					
Iôannês Palaiologos (1342-1344)	<i>prôtosevastos, megas logothetês</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Doch</i> : no.21 ; <i>Kut</i> II ² : no. 20 (1342); <i>ChilP</i> I: no. 132 (1343); <i>Phil</i> :23; <i>Zog</i> : 88	signature	
Rhaoulêdes (before 1366/67)	<i>magistroi, landowners</i>	Pteloudion, Christoupolis	<i>TheochVermacht</i> : 489, par. 16	Dêmêtrios TzAMPLAKÔN, <i>megas stratopedarchês</i> , had bought land from them	
Sarantênos					
Indanes (1300) No. 24908 (identical with Indanes pronoiarios?)	<i>prôtokynêgos, pronoia holder</i>	Lôrôton	<i>Lavra</i> II: no. 90	mention	
Diomêdês (until 1315) No. 24904	landowner	Zavernikeia/ Thessalonikê	<i>Xen</i> : no.23 (1335)*	donor	Brother of monk Ignatios Sarantênos, Nikolaos Doukas Sarantênos, <i>sevastos</i> , and Alexandros Doukas

					Sarantênos
Ignatios (1315) No. 24907	<i>pronoia</i> holder, monk, landowner	Zavernikeia/ Thessalonikê	<i>Xen</i> no.23 (1335)*	donor	Brother of Diomêdês Sarantênos, Nikolaos Doukas Sarantenos, <i>sevastos</i> , and Alexandros Doukas Sarantênos
-(before 1321) No. 24886		Selas	<i>Lavra</i> II: no. 109	He had one <i>paroikos</i>	
Alexandros Doukas (1315- 1322) No. 24899	<i>doulos</i> , landowner, house owner	Zavernikeia/ Thessalonikê	<i>ChilP</i> I: no. 84** <i>Xen</i> : no.23* (1335)	He and his wife Kalê sell 3 houses to Chilandar donor	Son-in-law of Maria Doukaina Pentzikopoulina. Brother of monk Ignatios Sarantênos, Diomêdês Sarantênos and Nikolaos Doukas Sarantênos, <i>sevastos</i>
- (1322) No. 24893		Kritziana	<i>ChilP</i> I: no. 95*		
Kônstantinos (1323-1326) No. 24911	landowner	Serres	<i>ChilP</i> I: no 109		
Theodôros (1324-d. 1330) No. 24906	<i>pansevastos</i> <i>sevastos</i> , <i>skouterios</i>	Verroia	<i>Vat</i> I: nos.62 (1324), 64 (1325), 68 (1329)	donations to the monastery of Prodromos or Petra, testament	
Iôannês (d. before 1324) No. 24910	<i>stratiôtês</i> , <i>sygktêtor</i> of the Prodromos monastery	Verroia	<i>Vat</i> I: no. 64 (1325)	mention in Theodôros Sarantênos's will	Brother of Theodôros Sarantênos, <i>skouterios</i> , and Gerasimos Sarantênos
Gerasimos(1325) No. 24900	monk		<i>Vat</i> I: no. 64	mention in Theodôros Sarantênos's will	Brother of <i>skouterios</i> Theodôros Sarantênos
	<i>pansevastos</i> , <i>meGas</i>		<i>Vat</i> I: no. 64 (1325)	mention in	Nephew of <i>skouterios</i>

Geôrgios (1325) No. 24901	<i>hetaireiarchês, oikeios, doulos</i>			Theodôros Sarantênos's will signature	Theodôros
Theodôros No. 24905			<i>ChilP I : no. 123 Zog: 68</i>	mention in Theodôros Sarantênos's will	Grandson of skouterios Theodôros
Louvros (1325-1328) No. 24912			<i>Vat I: no. 64 (1325)</i>	mention in Theodôros Sarantênos's will	Nephew of <i>skouterios</i> Theodorios, son of Gerasimos
Sophrôsynê (1330) No. 24881	daughter of a <i>prôtokynêgos</i> , landowner	Pelorygion/Strymôn	<i>Zog: 64f</i>		Sister of nun Xenê Indanina and Anna , sister-in-law of Manouêl Diplovatzês
Xenê Indanina Sarantênê (1330) No. 24881	daughter of a <i>prôtokynêgos</i> , landowner	Pelorygion/Strymôn	<i>Zog: 64f</i>		Sister of nun Sophrosynê and Anna , sister-in-law of Manouêl Diplovatzês
Geôrgios(1333)	<i>doulos</i>	Zichna	<i>Chil P: I no. 123</i>	signature	
Nikolaos Doukas (1315- 1335) No. 24915	<i>Sevastos</i> , landowner	Zavernikeia /Thessalonikê	<i>Xen: no. 23* (1335)</i>	He had donated land to Xenophon	Brother of Ignatios Sarantênos, monk, Diomêdês Sarantênos and Alexandros Doukas Sarantênos
Anna Indanina Sarantênê(d. before 1348) No. 24878	<i>doukaina</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>MMI: 283f</i>		Sister of Eleodôra Tzympinissa Sarantênê. Two marriages. Second wife io Devlitzênos .
Eleodôra Tzympinissa Sarantênê (1348)	nun	Thessalonikê	<i>MMI 283f</i>		

No. 24879					
Saventzês					
Stephanos (1312) No. 24659	great landowner		<i>Xer</i> : no. 16(1312)	He sells <i>exaleimmatikê gê</i> of 15 <i>modioia</i> and donates field of unknown size	Father of Michaël Saventzês
Michaël (1312-1325) No. 24658	<i>apo tou megalou allagiou, sevastos, doulos</i>	Psalis Phournia (Akros)	<i>Xer</i> : no.16 (1312) <i>Xen</i> : no.15* (1321)	He sells <i>exaleimmatikê gê</i> of 15 <i>modioi</i> , donates field of unknown size. Also donates field of 15 <i>modioi</i> Granted <i>oikonomia</i>	Son of Stephanos Saventzês
Senachereim					
Angelos (1305-1329) No. 25146	<i>megas stratopedarchês, pinkernês</i> , house and landowner	Vodena	<i>Vat</i> I: no.68(1329)	He owned 1 guest house, 4 water-mills 1 vineyard and garden and within the city (<i>kastron</i>) 1 rented house. He sold them to Vatopedi	
- (1319) No.25139	great landowner	Vardar	<i>Xer</i> :no.19	mention	
Manouël (1321-1333)	<i>prôtallagatôr, doulos</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>ChilP</i> I: no. 123	signature	

No. 25152					
Iôannês (1327) No.25149			<i>ChilP I: no. 112**</i>		Son of Pentzikopoulos, <i>stratopedarchês</i> and Melanê. Brother of Eulogia, Dêmêtrios Doukas and Kônstantinos Pentzikopoulos
-(1336) No. 25140	<i>kritês tou fossatou</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>MMI: 177</i>		
Nikephoros (1344) No.25145	<i>skouterios</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Doch: no.23</i>	signature	
-(1351) No.25143	<i>oikeios</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Xer : no. 27</i>	mention as functionary	
Sgouropoulos					
Nikolaos (1314) No. 25033	priest	Hagios Mênas Thessalonikê	<i>Chil I: no.30*</i>	He received 1 <i>hyperpyron</i> from Karavas	
- (1317) Not in PLP	<i>pansevastos sevastos, kastrophylax</i>		<i>Vat I: no. 49</i>	signature	
-(1318-1320) No. 25002	landowner	Psalis	<i>Xen: nos. 12(1318), 14 (1320), app. I</i>	mention	
- (before 1338) No. 25007	<i>sevastos</i> great landowner	Phouskoulou/ Kalamaria	<i>Xen: no. 25</i>	He and his wife sold land (<i>gonikê</i> and of 3, 550 <i>modioi</i>) to Xenophon.	
Dêmêtrios (1415) No. 25016	saltern worker	Thessalonikê	<i>Dion: no. 14*</i>	signature	

Sgouros					
Nikolaos (1322) No. 25058	<i>megalodoxôtatos</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>ChilP</i> I: no. 85**	witness signature	
Dêmêtrios (1327) No. 25051	<i>megalyperochos</i>		<i>Zog</i> : no. 25		
– (1362 or 1377 or earlier) No. 25041	<i>kritês tou fôssatou</i>	Rafaliou/Chalkidikê .	<i>DöReg</i> : 3084	He has to return land to Vatopedi.	
– (1419) No. 25038	<i>chartoularios</i> of Saint Dêmêtrios		<i>KugNot</i> : 144 (par. 6)	He gave two <i>hyperpyra</i>	
Skouterios					
-(1321) No. 26221	<i>pansevastos,</i> <i>pronoia</i> holder	Pinson	<i>Lavra</i> II no. 108	mention	
Sôtêriôtês					
-(1321) No. 27339	landowner	Neochôrion near Avramitai	<i>Lavra</i> II 237		
Nikêtas (1349-1375) No. 27441	<i>prôtonotarios,</i> <i>oikeios, tavoullarios,</i> <i>katholikos kritês</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Doch</i> : nos.35 and 36* (1361), 42* (1373); <i>Lavra</i> III: no. 145*; <i>Chil</i> I: no.154; <i>Kutl</i> : nos.33 and 34 (1375); <i>Vat</i> II : nos. 140**(1374), 144(1375), 149* (1376); <i>Xer</i> : no. 26 (1349)	signature mention	
Manouêl (ca. 1400) No. 27340			<i>SchreinFin</i> : 83	He had borrowed money from Dêmêtrios Trikanas	

Spartênos					
Dêmêtrios (1262-before 1265) No. 26495	<i>pansevastos, sevastos, apographeus, great landowner, monk</i>	Lozikion	<i>Chil I: no. 7</i>	He donates land to Chilandar	Father of Iôannês, Michaêl and Konstantinos
Iôannês (1265) No. 26499	<i>doulos</i>		<i>Chil I: no. 7</i>		Son of Demetrios, brother of Konstantinos and Michaêl
Kônstantinos (1265) No. 26503			<i>Chil I: no. 7</i>		Son of Demetrios, brother of Iôannês and Michaêl
Michaêl (1265)			<i>Chil I: no. 7</i>		Son of Demetrios, brother of Iôannês and Konstantinos
Iôannês (1284-1295) No. 26502	<i>prokathêmenos, pansevastos, sevastos</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Lavra II : no. 76 (1285) Iv III no. 65 (1290), 67 (1295)</i>	mentioned as father of Dêmêtrios	Brother of Andronikos (1295) and father of Dêmêtrios (1304)
Andronikos (1295) No. 26494	<i>pansevastos, sevastos</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Lavra II: no.98* (1304)</i>		Brother of Spartênos Iôannês, <i>prokathêmenos</i>
Petros (1295) No.26504	<i>primikêrios tôn tavoulariôn</i>	Thessalonikê			
Kônstantinos (1295-05) No. 26503	landowner	Chalkidikê	<i>Xer : no. 12 (1295)</i>	He sells vineyard of 6 <i>modioi</i> for 91 <i>hyperpyra</i>	
Dêmêtrios (1304) No. 26496	<i>pansevastos, sevastos, oikeios</i>		<i>Lavra II: no.98*(1304) OikDatSeals: 138; DöSch 331</i>		Son of Spartênos Iôannês, <i>prokathêmenos</i> , father of Maria, landowner in Hagia Marina , father-

					in-law of Angelos Michaël Doukas
Iôannês (1321) No. 26500		Sarantarea	<i>Lavra II: no. 109</i>	Had revenues from land	
Iôannês (1330) No. 26501	<i>megas tzaousios</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Zog: 68</i>		
Theodôros Doukas (1341) No.26498	<i>oikeios</i> , landowner	Thessalonikê, Hagia Maria	<i>Lavra III: appendix XII* (1341)</i>		Brother of Palaiologina Agape Angelina Sphratzaina, brother-in- law of Phaxênos
-(1356/7) No. 26491		Thessalonikê	<i>SchreinFin: 3/17</i>		
Spastrikos					
-(1301) No. 26508	landowner	Thessalonikê	PI: 53		
Geôrgios (1314) No. 26510	<i>chrysepilektês</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Chil I: no.30*</i>	Theodôros Karavas owed him 15 <i>exagia hyperpyrika</i> of gold and 7 <i>hyperpyra</i> in <i>ducats</i>	
Theodôros (before 1320) No. 26513	great landowner		<i>ChilP I no. 95(ca. 1318)</i>	mention	
Sphrantzês					
Palaiologos(1334-d. 1339) No. 27282	<i>megas stratopedarchês</i>		<i>Esph: no. 20(1334)</i>	signature	
Eirênê Sphratzaina (1375) No. 27284		Thessalonikê	<i>Lavra: III no.145*</i>		Daughter of Kônstantinos Masgidas Related to Iôannês Sphrantzês

Iôannês (1375) No. 27285			<i>Lavra III: no.145*</i>		Son? of Kônstantinos Masgidas
Spiggês					
- (1342)	<i>epi tôn anamneseôn</i>	Neon Chôrion/Thessalonikê	<i>LemKar</i> : 285	mention	
Stanesês					
Geôrgios Not in PLP	<i>kephalê</i>	Hierissos	<i>ChilP</i> I: nos. 151* (1366), 154* (1374)		Brother of <i>kavallarios</i> Stanesês. Son-in-law of <i>mezas primikêrios</i> Isaris
Stavrakios					
- (1301) No. 26703	landowner	Near Hierissos	<i>PI</i> : 42		
- (1316) No. 26706	leaseholder	Near Dovrovikeia near Serres	<i>PI</i> : 106		
Michaêl (ca. 1320) No.26710	<i>oikeios</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Iv</i> III : no. 76	witness	
- (1321 or earlier) No. 26702	landowner, <i>paroikos?</i>	Hermêleia	<i>Lavra</i> II: no. 108	Land of 8 <i>modioi</i>	
- (1421) No. 26701		Thessalonikê	<i>KugNot</i> : 147 (par.43)	He paid 14 <i>aspra</i> for the church of Hodêgêtria	
Synadênos					
- (before 1321) No. 27104	landowner	Hêrmêleia	<i>Lavra</i> II : no. 108	Mentioned as landowner	
Theodôros (before 1321) No.27118	landowner	Longos	<i>Lavra</i> II: no.108	Owner of land of 10 <i>modioi</i>	
-(1321-ca. 1340) No. 27105	owner of land and mill	Serres	<i>Prod</i> : nos. 9 and 10 (1321),35 (1339-1342)	mention	
-(1324)	landowner	Hêrmêleia	<i>Lavra</i> II: no.114	mention	

No. 27103					
Theodôros Doukas Palaiologos (ca.1280-d ca. 1345) No. 27120	<i>prôtostratôr, doulos</i> landowner	Zichna Ezova	<i>Xen:</i> no. 25 <i>ChilP</i> I: no. 123 (1333) <i>Kut</i> II ² : no. 14 (between 1328 and 1343)	He sells one mill and land of 50 <i>modioi</i> in Zichna to monk Gervasios , monk of Chilandar Donates one paroikos and land of 800 <i>modioi</i> in Ezova to Alypiou monastery	Uncle of the emperor
-(between 1347-9) No. 27108	<i>ostiarios</i>	Thessalonikê			
Dêmêtrios (1420) No. 27115		Thessalonikê	<i>Dion:</i> no. 19*	witness	
Talapas					
Dêmêtrios (ca. 1381) No.27416	<i>kastrophylax, doulos</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Doch:</i> no.48*	signature	
Tarchaneiôtês					
Geôrgios (1311) No. 27477		Melenikon	<i>PRK</i> I: no. 176		
Iôannês (1321) No.27492	holder of <i>pronoia</i>	Drymosita Krya Pegadia	<i>Lavra</i> II: no.108		
Iôannês (1322-1326) No. 27486	<i>domestikos tôn dysikôn thematôn, oikeios, apographeus</i>	Thrace-Macedonia Volerôn Serres	<i>Prod</i> :no. 17 (1325), 19 (1326)		
Manouêl (1366-78) No. 27499	<i>oikeios, doulos pronoia</i> holder	Thessalonikê Lôrôton	<i>Doch:</i> no.38, <i>Zog:</i> no.44, <i>Lavra</i> III: no. 149*	signature	

- (1344) No. 27472	<i>megas stratopedarchês</i>	Thessalonikê Stomion	<i>Xen: no. 27</i>	witness	
-(1355-1358) No. 27469	<i>megas hetairiarchês, oikeios, house and land owner</i>	Hêrmêleia Thessalonikê	<i>Doch: no. 31* Vat II: no. 110 (1358)</i>	witness , mentioned as houseowner	
Manassês (1364) No. 27498	<i>prôtostratôr, ephoros of Sôter Monastery, monk</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Vat II: no. 119**</i>		
Doukas (1375) No. 27480		Serres	<i>Kutl II² :no.32</i>		Brother of Manouêl Doukas Tarchaneiotês.
Manouêl Doukas (1375) No. 27502	<i>kephalê, oikeios, doulos</i>	Serres	<i>Kutl II² : nos.32, 33, 34</i>	signature	Brother of Manouêl Tarchaneiotês.
Andronikos Ap...as (1376) No. 27476	<i>archôn, doulos</i>		<i>PhilK: 323</i>		
Iôannês (1378) No. 27490	<i>oikeios, pronoia holder</i>	Lôrôton	<i>Lavra III: no. 149*</i>		
Manouêl (1378) No. 27501	<i>oikeios, pronoia holder</i>	Lôrôton			Father of Iôannês
Dêmêtrios (ca. 1381) _ (1403/4) No. 27466	<i>kastrophylox, oikeios kapnias</i>	follower of John VII from Lemnos toThessalonikê	<i>Doch: no.48*</i>	signature	
- (1404) No. 27464		Athos	<i>Ark An :451</i>		
Iakôvos Koutachês Philanthropênos(1405- 1420) No. 27482	<i>oikeios, landowner</i>	Langadas Thessalonikê	<i>ArkAn: 337, 339</i>		

-(1425) No. 27465	<i>archôn</i>	Constantinople	<i>KugNot</i> :149 (par.59)		
Tornikês					
Konstantinos (1327) No.29131	<i>meGas drouggarios tês viglês, doulos</i>	Verroia	<i>Vat</i> : no. 65	signature	
- (1348) Not in PLP	notable (<i>gerôn</i>)	Semalton	<i>Vat</i> II: no. 101	signature	
Tornikina (before 1356) No. 29134	<i>parakoimômenê,</i> landowner	Thessalonikê	<i>Vat</i> II : no. 107* (1356)		
-(1356/7) No. 29117		Thessalonikê	<i>ScreinFin</i> : 3/28. 66, 97		Partner of Doukas Provatas
Dêmêtrios (1358) No.29123	<i>pinkernês</i>	Zavaltia/ Serres	<i>Pant</i> : no. 12 <i>ChilP</i> I: no. 157(1378)	donation of one half of land (dowry) to Pant.	Husband of Anna. Children: Maria, Eirênê, Andronikos Tornikês and Iôannês Kantakouzênos
Anna Tornikina (1358) No. 29135	<i>pinkernissa</i>	Zavaltia/Serres	<i>Pant</i> : no.12	Donation of one half of land (dowry)	Wife of Dêmêtrios
Triakontaphyllos					
Michaêl (1315-16) No. 29274	landowner	Hagios Elias/ Chalk	<i>Doch</i> : no. 15	owner of a <i>stasis</i> : uncultivated vineyard (2,5 <i>modioi</i>), one bramble, <i>esôthyron</i> (1 <i>modios</i>), other land (36 <i>modioi</i>)	
Kônstantinos (1317) Not in PLP	<i>megalyperochos</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Vat</i> I: no. 49	signature	
-(1318-1320)	landowner	Eziva/ Strymôn	<i>Iv</i> III : nos. 75 (1318), 79	2 vineyards (1	

No. 29264			(1320) PI : 82	and 1,5 <i>modioi</i> respectively) and land (200 <i>modioi</i>) taken by the monastery	
Kônstantinos (1345) No. 29271	<i>oikeios</i> of Stephan Dušan	Serres	<i>ChilP</i> I :no. 134	signature	
Trikanas					
Dêmêtrios(1356/57) No.29307	Grain trader	Thessalonikê?	<i>SchreinFin</i> : 3/3, 34, 42, 51, 121		
Dêmêtrios (1361-1366) No. 29308	<i>kavallarios,oikeios</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Doch</i> : nos. 34* and 35* (1361), 38* (1366)		
Trixas					
Manouêl (ca.1290) Not in PLP	<i>megalyperochos, doux</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Vat</i> I: no. 26	signature	
Trypommitês or Trypomytês					
Kavallarios Tripommatês(1338) Not in PLP		Serres	<i>Vat</i> II : no. 80	He donates land of 3 <i>modioi</i> to Theodôra Kantakouzênê	
Michaêl Angelos (1421) No. 29382	<i>archôn tês synklêtou, oikeios</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Iv</i> IV: no.97*	witness	
Tzamantouros/-es					
-(1262) No. 94585		Kamena	<i>Iv</i> III: no. 59		
TzAMPLAKÔN					
-(1272) No. 27747	<i>tatas tês aulês</i>	Christoupolis (Kavala)			
- (13th c)	<i>domestikos tôn</i>		<i>Vat</i> II: no.105* (1355)		Grandfather of Arsenios

	<i>scholôn</i>				
TzAMPLAKÔNISSA (1321?) No. 27762	<i>landowner, megalê hetaireiarchissa</i>	Voblianê, southeast of Serres			<i>Sympethera</i> of the emperor
Alexios (1317-1332) No. 27748	<i>meGas papias, doulos, kephalê, oikeios, meGas tzaousios, great landowner.</i>	Serres and Popolia, Zichna, Thessalonikê	<i>Vat I: no. 19 (1317) Vat II: no.105* (1355) Vat II: no. 107* (1356) EspH: no. 19 (1334) Prod: nos. 19,20</i>	Judgement	Father of Arsenios
Arsenios (1333-d. before 1362) No. 27752	<i>meGas papias,doulos, monk</i>	Chrysoupolis Prinarion, Thessalonikê , Verroia	<i>Vat II nos. 97 (1348), 102 (1349), 105* (1355), 107*(1356) , 108 *(1356), 139**(1373), 149*(1376), 150**(1376) , app. VI</i> <i>ChilP I: no. 123</i>	He owned land within the kastron of Chrysoupolis, later given to Vatopedi. Mentioned as carrying out a census. References to his property signature	<i>sympetheros</i> of John VI
Dêmêtrios (1345-1366/7) No. 27755	<i>meGas stratopedarchês, great landowner, house owner</i>	Galikos	<i>Vat II: no. 107* (1356) Vat II: no. 118* (1362)</i>		Son of Alexios . Brother of Asômatianos, Dêmêtrios and Tornikina . Husband of Eudokia Palaiologina TzAMPLAKÔNISS.(no.

					27763). He had children. Father-in-law of Nikêphoros Laskaris
Eudokia Palaiologina (1345-1366/7)	<i>megalê stratopedarchissa</i>				Daughter of Kônstantinos Palaiologos (kephalê of Serres). Wife of Dêmêtrios TzAMPLAKÔN.
Asômatianos (1348-d. before 1356) No. 27753	<i>megas doux</i> , great landowner	Prinarion Galikos	<i>Vat</i> II no. 107* (1356)	He owned part of estate near river Galikos Both he and his brother, Arsenios, donated land in Galikos to Vatopedi	Son of Alexios TzAMPLAKÔN. Brother of Arsenios, Dêmêtrios and Tornikina
- (ca. 1350-2) No. 27743		From Drama, Adrianople			
- (ca. 1350-2). Possibly identical with Asômatianos No. 27746	monk	In (near?) Adrianople			
Alexios Kavallarios (before 1370) No. 27748	landowner	Prinarion southeast of Serres	<i>Vat</i> II: no. 135*	He had donated his share to Vat. before Michaël	Son of Arsenios, Brother of Michaël Kavallarios
TzAMPLAKÔNAIOI (before 1370) No. 27761		Prinarion	<i>Vat</i> II: no. 118* (1362) <i>Vat</i> II: no. 135*	They had donated their share to Vatopedi before Michaël	Anepsioi of Michaël Kavallarios TzAMPLAKÔN
Iôannês Kavallarios (1370) No. 27757	<i>doulos</i>		<i>Vat</i> II: no. 135*	signature	

Michaël Kavallarios (1370)	<i>doulos, oikeios,</i> landowner	Prinarion/Serres	<i>Vat II: no. 135*</i> <i>Vat II: no. 136*</i>		Son of Arsenios. Brother of Alexios Kavallarios. Father of Iôannês Kavallarios and Alexios Kavallarios
Alexios Kavallarios (1370-1376)	<i>doulos, oikeios,</i> <i>synklêtikos,</i> owner of garden and house	Prinarion, Constantinople, Verroia	<i>Vat II: no.135* (1370)</i> <i>Vat II: no.149* (1376)</i>	Signature Rents a garden(previously belonging to his family) from Vatopedi	Son of Michaël Kavallarios TzAMPLAKÔN, Brother of Iôannês Kavallarios TzAMPLAKÔN
– (before 1378) No. 27745	landowner	Lôrôton	<i>Lavra III: no.149*</i>		Brother of Geôrgios TzAMPLAKÔN
Geôrgios Asômatianos (?) Komnênos Aspietês (before 1378-1382) No. 27754	<i>oikeios</i> great landowner	Lôrôton Thessalonikê	<i>Lavra III: no. 149*</i>		Brother of TzAMPLAKÔN, great landowner
Michaël (1415) No. 27759	<i>doulos</i>		<i>ArkAn: 336</i>		
- (1425) No. 27744	<i>archôn,</i> tax official	Constantinople	<i>KugNot :149 (par.59)</i>	Along with other officials he gives the <i>koukkometron</i> to the compiler	Son of Kavallarios
TzAMPLAKONES (until 1463/64) No. 27741	<i>archontes</i>	Lêmnos			
Tzimpeas					
Kônstantinos (1279-d. before 1283)	<i>apographeus</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Zog: 119.</i> <i>Xen: no. 5 (1300)</i> <i>DoSch: 108</i>	mention	

No. 27968					
Theodôros (1304) No. 27967	<i>doulos</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Lavra II: no. 97, app. IX</i>	signature	
Tziskos					
Geôrgios (1341) No. 27989	<i>oikeios</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Lavra III: app. XII*</i>	witness	
Tzi(e)tapes					
Athanassia Tzitapina Tzainissa (before 1304) No. 27933			<i>Chil I: no.22*</i>		Mother of Dêmêtrios Philanthropênos
Geôrgios (1313 –d. before 1314) No. 94589	Owner of 3 wine- presses and 3 houses	Thessalonikê	<i>Iv III : no. 73** (1314)</i>	He and his wife sold them to Marmaras	
Tzykandêlês					
-(before 1321) Not in PLP	pronoiar	unknown area in Chalkidikê	<i>Xen: no. 15*</i>	mentioned as pronoiar	
– (1356) No. 28124	trader of grain	Thessalonikê	<i>SchreinFin: 3/26, 45, 50, 100, 125, 136</i>		
Manouêl (1358-1374) No. 28129	writer, secretary of Iôannês Kant in Adrianople.	Thessalonikê, Epivatai, Selymbria, Mistra			
Andronikos (ca. 1381) No. 28125	<i>doulos</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Doch: nos.41*(1373),48*(1381)</i>	signature	
Geôrgios Doukas (1371- 1383) No. 28126	<i>doulos, judge</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Doch: nos.41*(1373) 48*(1381); Vat II: no. 144(1375)</i>	signature	

Tzi (y)misk(ch)ês					
Iôannês (1322) No. 27952	<i>pansevastos sevastos</i>		<i>ChilP I</i> : no. 76 (1321)	mention	
Manouêl (1327) No.27955	<i>oikeios, pansevastos sevastos</i>	Thessalonikê Verroia	<i>ChilP I</i> : no. 116* (1327) <i>Vat I</i> no. 62 (1324)	mention as functionary in both documents	
-(1384) No. 27957	House owner	Thessalonikê	<i>Doch</i> : no. 49*	mention	
Tzyrakês					
Nikolaos (ca. 1320)	<i>doulos</i>		<i>ChilP I</i> : no. 40 (ca. 1318)	signature	
Tzyriggês					
– (1300- 1321) No.28162	landowner	Pinssôn and Rhopalaia/Chalk.	<i>Lavra II</i> : nos. 90 (1300), 108 (1321) <i>Chil I</i> : nos. 33 (1316), 34 and 35(1317) <i>Iv III</i> : nos.70 (1301), 75 (1318), 79 (1320)	Mention of his vineyard in Rhopalaia He sold a vineyard (1 <i>modios</i>) and land (10 <i>modioi</i>) to Chilandar	
Iosêph (before 1314) No. 28166	<i>pansevastos(?)</i> ,	Rhopalaia/ Thessalonikê	<i>Chil I</i> : no 31		Father of Theodôros
Kônstantinos (1314) No. 28167		Thessalonikê	<i>Chil I</i> : nos. 31 and 32	signature witness	His relation to Theodôros is not known.
Theodôros (1314-1317) No. 28165	landowner	Rhopalaia	<i>Chil I</i> : nos. 31 (1314), 34 and 35 (1317) <i>DöSch</i> : 41	Dêmêtrios Pyrros sells to Chil. two vineyards, one of	

				which is on Tzyriggês's land. The monastery has to pay to Tzyriggês 5 <i>doukata</i> annually. Theodôros and Iôannêshad sold to Chil. free land of 3 <i>modioi</i> . He had also sold to Chil. three free plots of 27, 5 <i>modioi</i> and vineyard of 2,5 <i>modioi</i> .	
Iôannês (before 1317) No. 28168	landowner		<i>DöSch</i> : 41 <i>Chil</i> I: nos. 34 and 35 (1317)		
Tzyriggês Dêmêtrios (1352-1392) No. 28163	donor of Iôannês Theologos Monydrion, workshop owner, landowner	Zaventzi, Galikos, Episkopou	<i>Lavra</i> III: no.153*	Three pieces of land, one in Zaventzi in Galikos, and two in Episkopou	
Theodôros (before 1404) No. 28164			<i>Lavra</i> III: no.156*		First husband of Thalassêne Kalê
Valsamôn					
- (1301) No. 2107	landowner		<i>PI</i> : 51		
Nikephoros (1327)	<i>oikeios</i> ,	Thessalonikê	<i>ChilP</i> I : no. 116*	functionary	

No. 2124					
-(1335-1340) No. 2112		Thessalonikê			
Iôannês Doukas (1355) No. 91427	<i>megas dioikêtês, sevastos, doulos</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Doch: no.29*</i>	signature	
Vassilikos					
-(1353) No. 2450	landowner	Zichna	<i>ChilP I: no. 141</i>	mention	
Vatatzês					
-(1323) No. 2514	landowner	Mamitzona	<i>ChilP I: no. 82 (1322)</i>		
Iôannês (1333-1345) No. 2518	<i>katholikos apographeus, prôtokynêgos, megas droungarios tes viglês, doulos</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Doch: nos.20(1341), 23(1344) ; Zog: 71; PI: 92, 119; DoSch: 205; Prod: no. 36 (1342); GuillNouv: 556; KtenasKeim:109</i>	signature	
Veaskos					
Michaêl (1327) Not in PLP	<i>chrysepilektês</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Vat I: no.65</i>	witness	
Simon (1339) Not in PLP	<i>chrysepilektês, landowner</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Vat II: no. 84*</i>	mention	
Vlattês					
Dêmêtrios (1311-1313) No. 91521	<i>megalodoxôtatos</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>Doch: nos. 11*(1311) and 13* (1313)</i>	witness signature	
Vlachernitês					
Manouêl (1328) No. 2829	<i>doulos, hetairiarchês</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>ChilP I: no. 117*</i>		
-(1419-1420) No. 2828		Thessalonikê	<i>KugNot: 144, 145(par. 2, 22)</i>	witness and also gives to the	

				compiler 4 <i>hyperpyra</i> for the church of Hagia Sophia	
Voullôtês					
-(1319) No. 3081	landowner		<i>ChilP</i> I: no. 40		
Andronikos (1322) No. 3083	<i>megalodoxôtatos</i>	Thessalonikê	<i>ChilP</i> I: no. 85**	witness signature	
-(1342) No. 3082	landowner	Gostompous /Zichna	<i>LemKar</i> : 284	mention	
Vrachnos					
Kyriakos (1421) No. 3206	gardener	Thessalonikê	<i>DoSch</i> : 266		
Vryennios					
Michaël (1415) No. 3261	saltern worker		<i>Dion</i> : no.14	signature	

* In table III I include lay Thessalonians bearing a title and their ‘family’ names in the 14th and 15th centuries, and occasionally the late 13th c. I only provide the documentary sources in which we meet these individuals and not literary or narrative ones. Documents marked with (*) are also presented in table I and those marked with (**) in table II.

*"Nobles" and "small nobles" of
Thessalonike (1425)*

(From Venetian document of July 7, 1425 reproduced in Mertzios, *Μνημεία*, following p. 48: pl. 2^α-3^α)

Name	Monthly salary (in <i>aspra</i>)
(1) Thomas Alousianos	300
(2) George Hyaleas (<i>Jalca</i>)	300
(3) John Rhadenos	300
(4) Thomas Chrysoloras (<i>Grusulora</i> <i>Chrussulora</i>)	300
(5) Michael <i>Democrati</i> (Dermokaites?)	300
(6) Michael <i>Caromaffi</i>	200
(7) Theodore <i>Calatola</i>	150
(8) John <i>Falca</i> (= <i>Jalca</i> ?, i.e. Hyaleas)	100
(9) Manuel Hyaleas (<i>Jalca</i>)	40
(10) Demetrios <i>Vaironi</i> (Vryonis?)	80
(11) John Rhamatas	80
(12) George <i>Aramando</i> (Amarantos?)	50
(13) Andronikos Amarantos	raised from 80 to 120
(14) John Aliates	same
(15) Doukas <i>Milca</i> (= <i>Jalca</i> ?, i.e. Hyaleas)	same
(16) Michael Hyaleas (<i>Jalca</i>)	same
(17) George <i>Gassi</i> (<i>Caacs</i> ?)	same
(18) Manuel Meliras	same
(19) <i>Inavissil Inamissi</i> (?), brother-in-law of Aliates	same
(20) Simon, son of <i>chier</i> Simon	raised from 70 to 100
(21) Manuel <i>Calanca</i>	same
(22) George Laskaris <i>Defala</i>	same
(23) Demetrios Melachrinos (<i>Melachino</i>)	same
(24) Argyropoulos <i>Mamoli</i> (Mamales?)	same
(25) Paschales Laskaris	same
(26) Michael <i>Plomina</i>	same
(27) Manuel <i>Mamoli</i> (Mamales?)	same
(28) Demetrios <i>Caroleo</i>	same
(29) Demetrios Laskaris	same
(30) John Melachrinos, son of George Argyropoulos	same
(31) Constantine Argyropoulos	same
(32) Doukas Melachrinos	same
(33) George Melachrinos	same
(34) Michael Amarantos	raised by 20 <i>aspra</i>
(35) George Makrenos	same
(36) Alexios Melachrinos	same
(37) George Tzamantouras (<i>Camandora</i>)	same
(38) Digenes <i>Senex</i> (Presbytes?)	same
(39) Loukas <i>Arimati</i>	same
(40) Rhalle <i>Enbirisi</i>	same
(41) Pachy Masgidas	same
(42) Michael Tarchaneiotes	same
(43) <i>Braichus</i> Masgidas	same
(44) Andronikos Digenes	same
(45) Doukas Kabasilas (<i>Cavassilla</i>)	same
(46) Alexios Digenes	same
(47) Angelos Theodoros	same
(48) John Grammatikos	same
(49) Basos <i>Conazi</i> (?)	same
(50) John Digenes	same
(51) Angelos <i>Miropuno</i> (?)	same
(52) Andronikos Machtetares	same
(53) Nicholas Chrysaphes (<i>Crussaifi</i>)	same
(54) Demetrios Platyskalites (<i>Placichaliti</i>)	same
(55) Doukas <i>Cotiasi</i>	same
(56) John <i>Peso</i> (Pezos?)	same
(57) John Basilikos (<i>Vassilico</i>)	same
(58) Demetrios Argyropoulos	same
(59) George Rhadenos	raised by 40 <i>aspra</i>

GLOSSARY

adaptive efficiency: the willingness of a society to acquire knowledge and learning, to induce innovation, to undertake risk in order to resolve problems

adiaseistôs: lit. unshakeably, undisturbed/term used to signify secure ownership rights

adelphaton: a living allowance provided to an individual by a monastery

alykarioi: salt-workers

ampelopakton: leased vineyard

anakoinôsis: term related to the preemption right. It was the obligation of a person to announce their intention to sell their property firstly to their neighbours.

anenchleitôs: lit. undisturbed/term used to secure ownership rights

apographikê apokatastasis: land survey for fiscal purposes

apotagê: donation/offer to a monastery by an individual entering monastic life

archôn: any official who possessed power

askeri: the military and religious elite in the Ottoman Empire which enjoyed full tax-exemption

asper (aspron): 14th and 15th century noncave silver coin

chrysepilektai: individuals extracting revenue from the operation of silver and gold mines.

chrysobull: imperial document bearing the gold bulla

cizye: capital tax demanded from non-Muslims

competition: key concept in North's theory considered to induce institutional change

contract: a legal agreement describing and defining property rights

cooperation: the collaboration among members of the same group, or between groups to achieve certain goals

dêmosiaka: <dêmosios/ term designating the state treasury

devşirme: levy of boys from Christian rural population

diabatikon: lit. passage/ kind of due

diakonia: synonymous with *adelphaton*

diatimêsis: estimation, valuation

dôrea: donation

douleia: lit. slavery/ obligation to offer services to the emperor

dynatos: legal term designating prominent office or title holder

efficiency: condition where the existing set of constraints (formal and informal) produce growth.

eknikêsis: legal term referring to the confiscation of the property from the purchaser on the grounds that the vendor had no ownership rights over it in order to sell it

eleutheria: lit. freedom/ also designating exemption from taxes and service to the emperor

emphyteusis: perpetual leases of property, possessing qualities of both sale and lease.

emphyteuma: in the 14th century house lease

epanôproikon: supplementary dowry

epêreia: state requisitions

epiteleia: fiscal term designating cash payments or taxes due to the fisc

ergastêrion: workshop

eukterion: place for praying

exaleimma: escheated property

exôproika: a married woman's personal property exclusive of her dowry

formal constraints: formal rules, e.g. legislation, regulating political and economic practice

gonikon: term designating paternal inheritance, hereditary rights but also fiscal immunity.

gonikoproikimaios: bequeathed by means of dowry

hass: a big fiscal Ottoman domain, allocated to the sultan, a vizier or a provincial governor

hêgoumenos: abbot

Hesychasm: i) 14th and 15th century political social and religious, ii) contemplative monasticism

hieromonachos: monk ordained as priest

horismos: imperial decree

hyperogkos vlavê: legal term referring to the protection of vendor's interests.

hyperpyron: from mid-14th c. a money of account.

hypomortos gê: leased land

hypovolon: wedding gift of a man to his wife

informal constraints: codes of conduct, norms of behaviour, and conventions which are culturally derived.

institutions: rules that structure political, economic and social life.

istimalet: policy of reconciliation

katepanikion: small administrative division

katergoktisia: a corvée concerning the construction of ships

katochê: possession

kastellion: small fortress

kastruktisia: initially a corvée and later an extraordinary charge

kastron: fortress

kavallarios: cavalry man

kellion: monastic cell

kephalê: highest functionary of provincial administration

kêpopervolia: garden for cultivating vegetables

kommerkion: tax on merchandise

ktêma: estate

ktêtor: founder/patron of an ecclesiastical institution

litra: unit of weight

mazia: unit of weight

mega allagion: a military detachment. 13th and 14th century designation for a garrison

meas adnoumiastês: initially a military official. From 1290 onwards, an administrator of land donations.

meas domestikos: high-ranking official

meas hetairiarchês: military official

megas oikonomos: cleric responsible for managing the property and income of a religious foundation

megas papias: honorific title conferred on noble families

megas stratopedarchês: military commander

mesoi mesotês, mesê moira: middle stratum orientated towards trade, banking and crafting. After the middle of the 14th century the term is not documented

metochion: monastic dependency

mêtrôa/patrôa: maternal/paternal

mitaton: kind of *epêreia*

modios: unit of measure of varying quantities

monopôlion: the exclusive privilege of trading specific goods

monydrion: small monastery

mortê: type of rent paid by a peasant on agricultural land belonging to the state or a private landowner

nomisma: standard gold coin of 24 *keratia*

oikeios: lit. familiar/ appellation stating relationship to the emperor

oikokyrios: householder, landlord, owner

oikos: household

oikoumenê: inhabited or civilised world

oikoumenon: fiscal term synonymous with *telos*

oikonomia: synonymous with *pronoia*

organisation: political, economic, social and educational bodies

palaiochorion: abandoned village

palaiomylos: abandoned mill

pansevastos sevastos: honorary title

panêgyris: fair

panhypersevastos: one of the highest Byzantine titles

paradosis: document conferring the fiscal income to be received by a pronoiar

parthenophthoria: a judicial fine/fiscal charge, one of the three *dêmosiaka kephalaia* (*phonikon* and *heuresis thesaurou*)

paroikos: dependent peasant

phonikon: a fiscal charge, one of the three *dêmosiaka kephalaia* (*parthenophthoria* and *heuresis thesaurou*)

political market: polity

poriatikon: fee for crossing a river, brook.

posotês: fixed income assigned to a military grantee in return for service to the emperor

praktikon: inventory listing taxes and land

proix: dowry

pronoia: a prebend acquired through imperial order consisting of a fixed revenue in return for military service

property rights: individuals' appropriation over their own labour, goods and services they possess.

proskathêmenos: settler peasant/ various categories of peasants

prostagma: administrative order

prosodos: income

protimêsis: right of preemption

prôtonotarios: civil or patriarchal official

prôtovestiaritês: chief of the *vestiaritai*/ second class bodyguard

psunj: term of possibly Slavic origin designating a tax on traffic and merchandise

reaya: Muslim and non-Muslim groups not belonging to the *askeri* class, with the obligation to pay taxes

roga: cash salary paid to the members of the armed forces

skaliatikon: harbouring due

skouterios: title bestowed on both generals and fiscal officials

(hypo)stasis/stasion: a dependent peasant's taxable holdings

tahrir defter: Ottoman survey registers recording land, population and revenue

taxis: order, the Byzantine concept of hierarchy

telos: net tax payable to the fisc by all landowners

thema: military division and territorial unit

theorêtron: a wedding gift of a man to his wife that supplemented the *hypovolon*

timar: a military property supporting a cavalry man and a number of soldiers

triton: term designating the value of the *hypovolon* in the Late Byzantine period (= 1/3 of the dowry)

typikon: set of regulations prescribing the administrative organisation and rules of a monastery

uç-bey: frontier lord

vassilikoï modioi: unit of measurement for both land and grain.

vassilikos stratiôtes: soldier of higher standing who might also be titled the emperor's *doulos*.

veltiôsis: improvement

vrevion: inventory of list of persons, precious objects.

zeugêlateion: large estate

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