SCOTLAND AND THE BRITISH ARMY c.1700-c.1750

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The historiography of Scotland and the British army in the eighteenth century largely concerns the suppression of the Jacobite risings – especially that of 1745-6 – and the growing assimilation of Highland soldiers into its ranks during and after the Seven Years War. However, this excludes the other roles and purposes of the British army, the contribution of Lowlanders to the British army and the military involvement of Scots of all origin in the British army prior to the dramatic increase in Scottish recruitment in the 1750s. This thesis redresses this imbalance towards Jacobite suppression by examining the place of Scotland and the role of Highland and Lowland Scots in the British army during the first half of the eighteenth century, at a time of change fuelled by the Union of 1707 and the Jacobite rebellions of the period. It does this by examining a number of connected themes and individuals. The thesis begins with an analysis of the transition of Scottish soldiers from mercenaries in foreign service to soldiers of the British army. It then appraises the career patterns of prominent Scottish soldiers and evaluates their impact upon – and significance for – the British army as a whole. Issues of identity, motivation and nationality are also explored. This is followed by an investigation of the wider policing duties of the British army in Scotland, of the legal constraints under which it operated, and the recruitment patterns that were arguably peculiar to the Scots. Scotland’s traditional military organisations and its distinct forms of military service are examined, as is how these related to the direction, functions and administration of the British army in this period. Finally, an analysis is also made of Scotland’s fortifications, barracks and military roads, their development and their significance in terms of the defence of Scotland and of the wider United Kingdom of Great Britain. The thesis concludes by arguing that, in addition to Colley’s suggestion of a common threat from France in the creation of ‘Britishness’, Jacobitism also provided unity for Scots within the British state, manifested in military service. Therefore, Scotland and the Scots were already firmly embedded in the military organisation and infrastructure of the United Kingdom well before William Pitt the Elder made his famous boast in 1762 of having harnessed the volatile military resources of the Highlands.
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DEDICATION

To my parents, for allowing me to take the gamble of studying history just because I loved it, for funding my unexpectedly long education and, most importantly, for providing the help and encouragement without which doing a PhD would have been impossible.

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ABBREVIATIONS

Source abbreviations

BL – British Library
FCA – Fife Council Archives
NAM – National Army Museum
NAS – National Archives of Scotland
NLS – National Library of Scotland
NWMS – National War Museum of Scotland
ODNB – Oxford Dictionary of National Biography
PA – Parliamentary Archives
TNA – The National Archives

Abbreviations in the text

ADC – Aide-de-camp
CO – Commanding Officer
COIN – Counterinsurgency
GOC – General Officer Commanding
JP – Justice of the Peace
MP – Member of Parliament
NCO – Non-Commissioned Officer
ODNB – Oxford Dictionary of National Biography
SNP – Scottish National Party
INTRODUCTION

Literature review

Any study of the British army in Scotland during the first half of the eighteenth century will feature the Jacobite threat. While the many wars of the century were all continentally and inter-continentially based, the only domestic threat faced by Britain originated from the Jacobites. As a consequence of attempts to reinstate the Stuart dynasty, Britain experienced a series of plots, invasions and rebellions, often with foreign backing, many of which were focused on Scotland. It was in countering these events that the British army experienced its principal military action on home soil. However, most of the literature concerning the rebellions is focused on the Jacobite’s side of the conflicts. ¹ Many are notable for their thoroughness. Beyond the broad-brush approach,² Reid, Petrie and McLynn provide valuable detail on the military aspects of the movement³ and Duffy’s The ’45 (2003) provides an operational viewpoint.⁴ Szechi stands out for his political and diplomatic contextualisation of the Jacobite movement and Zimmerman takes a refreshingly longer viewpoint past the ’45.⁵ Pittock has provided a range of studies that bring compelling conclusions for the longevity of the Stuart myth

¹ For example, B. Lenman, The Jacobite clans of the Great Glen 1650-1784 (Aberdeen, 1995) and S. Reid, Highland Clansman 1689-1746 (Oxford, 1997).
² M. Pittock, Jacobitism (Basingstoke, 1998); F. McLynn, The Jacobites (London and Boston, 1985) and B. Lenman, Jacobite risings in Britain, 1689-1788 (London, 1980).
and legacy\(^6\) and Alasdair and Henrietta Tayler specialised in editing little known or unknown letters and biographies of Jacobite individuals, families or communities.\(^7\)

What is noticeable is the perennial popularity of Jacobitism for researchers. Fiction and music both feed the continuing interest in the Jacobites, as each generation finds something to relate to in the movement. These range from the early nineteenth-century sympathy for the ‘noble savage’ to the twentieth-century affinity with minorities and the ‘under-dog’.\(^8\) Novels span the generations since Culloden and address the movement to each new generation. The 1814 publication of *Waverley* by Walter Scott (as well as his subsequent sixteen novels that had backgrounds set in Scotland’s past) began an trend followed, notably, by Stevenson’s *Kidnapped* (1886) and *The Master of Ballantrae* (1889) and Broster’s *Jacobite Trilogy* published in 1925, 1927 and 1929.\(^9\)


Similarly, the interest in Jacobite music far exceeds any interest in the contemporary music of the British army.  

However, in terms of historical accuracy, this general interest in the Jacobite movement is based on a false perception created in the early nineteenth century by Walter Scott. Reacting to a time of uncertainty as industrialisation changed society and the ‘purity’ of the Highland clans was viewed with envy, Scott stage-managed George IV’s visit to Edinburgh in 1822 drawing heavily on Highland culture. This coincided with the replacement of the image of the Highlander as a potential Jacobite rebel with that of the ‘defender of the empire’, where all things ‘Highland’ were glamorised. Jacobites have been, erroneously, remembered as synonymous with the Highlands because of their practice of wearing tartan regardless of origin, the frequency of rebellions in Scotland and the dramatic fate of the defeated Jacobite army and clans in the aftermath of Culloden. The rise of the Scottish National Party (SNP) in the 1970s and its desire for independence has led to another reinvention of the Jacobites with their symbols being used to remind London of the last Scottish group to defy the Union. More recent literature, therefore, 

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11 Clyde, *Rebel to Hero*, p.150.


13 Reid, *The Scottish Jacobite Army*, p.58.
has focused on the Jacobites as Scots oppressed by England and emphasised the distinctiveness of Scotland.\textsuperscript{14}

The influence of the rise of Scottish Nationalism and of the SNP in the Scottish Parliament has also influenced the historical studies currently being conducted in Scottish universities and thus the study of Scottish history as a whole.\textsuperscript{15} This has two main focuses. Firstly, an interest in the socio-political changes brought by the Union in Scotland, and secondly, the question of identity and nationality, especially for the Highlander. For the former, Phillipson and Mitchison’s collection of essays in \textit{Scotland in the Age of Improvement} (1970)\textsuperscript{16} has influenced many later studies,\textsuperscript{17} this thesis included, examining the early life of ‘North Britain’ as part of Great Britain and the Scottish elites’ efforts to function within it. Of these essays, Simpson’s ‘Who Steered the Gravy Train, 1707-1766?’\textsuperscript{18} and Cregeen’s ‘The Changing Role of the House of Argyll in the Scottish Highlands’\textsuperscript{19} in particular, provide valuable explanations of the complex nature of power sharing, the implementation of policy at a distance via government officials and the problems that arise when these servants are not entirely trusted. The

\footnotesize

\textsuperscript{15} All the authors mentioned in this paragraph were or are staff at universities in Scotland.


\textsuperscript{17} For example, B. Harris, \textit{Politics and the Nation. Britain in the Mid-Eighteenth Century} (Oxford, 2002).


complex nature of the political structure inside and between London and Edinburgh is further discussed in Murdoch’s ‘The People Above’. *Politics and Administration in Mid-Eighteenth Century Scotland* (1980)\(^{20}\) and is in no way less valuable for its focus on the post-’45 period. Murdoch espouses the unusually British-orientated opinion that Scottish politicians wanted to be part of Great Britain. He examines the lengths they went to in order to remain part of the governing process in Edinburgh, by ingratiating themselves into the new British political process in London. Harris’ *Politics and the Nation* (2002)\(^{21}\) makes the significant connection that service in the British army, especially during the ’45, was an attempt by Scots to overcome the stigma of disloyalty, and that this meant the desire to retain the Union was apparent at all levels of society by the mid-eighteenth century.

The influence of Scottish Nationalism has made historians focus on events that can be interpreted as nationalistic, such as the Malt Tax riots of 1725 and the Porteous Riots of 1736. Some historians also examine Scotland in isolation, as if avoiding both Scotland’s desire to be part of the British state, and Scotland’s ‘British’ institutions, can erase that inconvenient history; “Some more daring historians have tried to overcome the difficulties posed by the union by ignoring it as far as possible.”\(^{22}\) This thesis will correct this tendency to avoid the Union by specifically addressing the changes caused by it, not


\(^{21}\) Harris, *Politics and the Nation*.

just in economic and political terms, as examined elsewhere, but through the resulting administrative changes which are revealed by studying the British army as an institution.

In addition to an interest in the socio-political changes caused by the Union, the second consequence of the rise of Scottish Nationalism is an interest in identity and nationality, especially amongst Highlanders. This reflects the influence of Scott and his romanticisation of the Highlander, whose reinvented image and history provided the Scottish Nationalists with a unique identity. Responsibility for this is shared by Stewart of Garth. In 1825, he published *Sketches of the Character, Institutions, and Customs of the Highlanders of Scotland.* As this was the first history of the 43rd Highland Regiment (later becoming the 42nd but known by the epithet, The Black Watch) he therefore took the opportunity to relate a wider history of Highland culture. As such, his view has influenced every history of the regiment written since. However, this is a view affected by his romanticised vision of the Highlander; for example, he modified the recruitment warrant for the 43rd from “in any County or Part of Our Kingdom of Great Britain” to “and the remainder of the non-commissioned officers and private men… to be raised in the Highlands…the men to be natives of that country, and none other to be

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23 Stewart of Garth, *Sketches of the Character.*
The romanticised view of the Highlander and Highland culture further affected common perceptions when Stewart aided Walter Scot in creating a Highland festival for George IV’s visit to Edinburgh in 1822, “executed with such admirable art, that, like the historical plays of Shakespeare, they superseded history.” It is this common perception that resonates still with Scottish Nationalists, creating an interest amongst historians in the themes of identity and nationality of the Highlander.

The influence of Stewart and Scott and of the rise of Scottish Nationalism has been to create an image of the Highlander as the tragic victim of the Jacobite period and a concomitant disdain of their oppressors, the British army – and the Duke of Cumberland in particular – for their brutal conduct after Culloden. Significantly, the majority of books written about the British army in Scotland during the first half of the eighteenth century are focused on its actions against the Jacobites. Reid’s contribution to the literature concerning the British army during the ‘45 is remarkably detailed concerning the structure, make up, weapons and uniforms of those involved. However, except in 1745: a military history (2001), his works are unreferenced, which limits their use for

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27 Macpherson McCulloch, Sons of the Mountains, I, p.xv.
30 S. Reid, British Redcoat (Oxford, 1996) and S. Reid, Cumberland’s Army: the British Army at Culloden (Leigh-on-sea, 2006).
31 S. Reid, 1745: a military history of the last Jacobite rising (Staplehurst, 2001).
further investigation. Duffy’s *The ’45* (2003),\(^{32}\) however, is an excellent and thorough examination of the British army during the ’45 as is Black’s *Culloden and the ’45* (1990)\(^{33}\) and Szechi’s *1715* (2006)\(^{34}\) for the 1715 Rebellion. Both Black and Szechi provide a good mixture of military, political and European history. Still, studies of the British army in the eighteenth century are often dominated by the continental and inter-continental conflicts of the century. *The Oxford History of the British Army* (2003) edited by Chandler and Beckett\(^{35}\) is one example. For the 1702 to 1714 period, Chandler’s chapter is entirely devoted to the Duke of Marlborough during the War of the Spanish Succession and makes no mention of the Jacobites or Scotland, while Guy’s chapter on the period 1714 to 1783 makes only brief mention of the military response to the ’15 and ’45.\(^{36}\)

In studies of the British army as an institution, its deployment in Scotland is largely ignored. Guy’s *Regimental Agency* (1980)\(^{37}\) refers to the ’45 rebellion once in a footnote, focusing on the 1740s, despite a start date of 1715, and only mentions Ireland as an exception to the English norm, making no specific reference to Scotland. Manning’s *An Apprenticeship in Arms* (2006)\(^{38}\) contains only a handful of examples from Scotland. Fortescue’s thirteen volume *A History of the British Army* (1899-1930)\(^{39}\) provides,

\(^{32}\) Duffy, *The ’45*.
\(^{34}\) Szechi, *1715*.
\(^{39}\) Fortescue, *A History of the British Army*, I and II.
amongst a peerlessly wide coverage of continental campaigns and wars, a narrative of the events of the Jacobite rebellions and addresses the government’s strength in Scotland, as does his *Military History* (1923)\(^{40}\) though to a lesser extent. A more recent example that does not ignore the army’s role in Scotland is Black’s *Britain as a military power* (1999), which both approaches the British army as an institution and includes its involvement in Scotland during the period of Jacobite activity.\(^ {41}\)

Significantly, the recent historians of the British army of the early eighteenth century also tend to be connected with the British army. Beckett, Chandler, Duffy and Holmes were lecturers at Sandhurst, while Holmes was a former officer in the Territorial Army.\(^ {42}\) Hogg\(^ {43}\) was also a retired Brigadier and former Assistant Master-General of the Ordnance at the War Office and Director of Technical and Military Administration at the Ministry of Supply, and Guy was the curator of the National Army Museum. This has influenced the recent focus of military history towards the concerns of a post-Second World War British army engaged in counterinsurgency (COIN) in Malaya, Cyprus and Northern Ireland. Consequently, recent military history commonly examines historical events through the issues of COIN. Relations with civilians and native inhabitants and issues of brutality are, therefore, brought to the fore. These combine to create an interest in the reputation of the British army and the conduct of its soldiers, who are viewed as representatives of the British army and thus the British state. This change in focus has


\(^{41}\) J. Black, *Britain as a military power, 1688-1815* (London, 1999).


also brought a desire for a more realistic view of the Jacobites. The British army’s presence in Scotland and its dealings with the Jacobite rebels between the Union and Culloden present an ideal topic for a combination of this interest in COIN and the recent revisionist reaction to the romanticisation of the Jacobite. Both Speck in *The Butcher* (1981)\(^44\) and Oates in *Sweet William or The Butcher?* (2008)\(^45\) re-examine the role of Cumberland in the aftermath of the ’45. Oates in particular attributes Cumberland’s poor reputation less to butchery after Culloden and more at the hands of his political enemies in later life, as well as re-addressing the behaviour of the army in Scotland during the ’45 in the context of similar contemporary events.

Studies that focus on Scotland are frequently limited to the Highlands, as the influence of Scottish Nationalism is to emphasise anything which is unique to Scotland. Clyde, Murdoch and Mackillop lead the field here and contribute much-needed detailed primary research to an understudied area, though this is done to the exclusion of the many Lowland regiments and soldiers that Scotland produced.\(^46\) In many cases, this focus on the Highlander becomes even more narrowed by the use of ‘Gael’ as a designator, that is, those that were Gaelic speakers. Clyde’s *From Rebel to Hero* (1995),\(^47\) Murdoch and Mackillop’s *Fighting for Identity* (2002)\(^48\) and Mackillop’s ‘More Fruitful Than The Soil’ (2000)\(^49\) are very Gael orientated, frequently using Gaelic terminology and phrases.

Mackillop, however, does address the wider social, economic and political context of

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\(^{46}\) S. Murdoch, *Scotland and the Thirty Years War 1618-1648* (Leiden and Boston, 2001); Clyde, *Rebel to Hero*; A. Mackillop, ‘More Fruitful Than The Soil’. *Army, Empire and the Scottish Highlands, 1715-1815* (East Linton, 2000) and Murdoch and Mackillop, *Fighting for Identity*.
\(^{47}\) Clyde, *Rebel to Hero*.
\(^{48}\) Murdoch and Mackillop, *Fighting for Identity*.
\(^{49}\) Mackillop, ‘More Fruitful Than The Soil’. 
Scottish soldiers of the eighteenth century, although only one chapter is devoted to the period 1715 to 1746.

Scottish Nationalism has also tended to brand the study of Scotland as part of the British state as imperial history and therefore old fashioned. Examination of the Scottish element of the British army as an institution of that state is left to military historians. However, the received military history of the British army in Scotland has, as already explained, many limitations. Narrower regimental histories generally lack a wider context and provide little more than details of postings and events. These studies are also less objective, as they are often written with the aid of the regiment in question or their authors are connected to the army or the regiment. Several are introduced, revised or written by former British army officers or colonels of those regiments. Very few contain footnotes, references or bibliographies, and newer regimental histories often closely follow older versions in structure, content and even wording. Brander’s *Famous Regiments* (1976) and Kirkwood’s *The Regiments of Scotland* (1949) echo Simpson’s *Three Hundred Years* (1938), while Royal’s *The Royal Scots* (2006) is an abbreviation of Paterson’s *Pontius Pilate’s Bodyguard* (2001). Non-regimental elements when discussed, are often generalised in detail and chronology. Lenman’s

52 Brander, *Famous Regiments*.
53 Kirkwood, *The Regiments of Scotland*.
54 Simpson, *Three Hundred Years*.
55 Royle, *The Royal Scots*.
chapter ‘Militia, fencible men, and home defence, 1660-1797’\textsuperscript{57}, within MacDougall’s \textit{Scotland and War} (1991)\textsuperscript{58}, contains only three pages dedicated to the 1707 to 1745 period. This is despite Lenman’s remark that it is “odd” that Robertson’s \textit{The Scottish Enlightenment and the Militia Issue} (1985)\textsuperscript{59} “is silent about the practical role of the militia”\textsuperscript{60} and concentrates on the militia issue debate, a subject Lenman then addresses for four pages.

It is clear from the preceding literature review that the historiography of the British army in Scotland in the first half of the eighteenth century is often examined as separate topics: military events, the structure of the army, and the development of the army. Their focus is often limited to either Scotland or England. Often a study of Britain has an implicit focus on England, in which Ireland and Scotland only feature when different, and studies of Scotland focus on Highlanders to the exclusion of other Scots.

The aim of this thesis is to provide a unified study of the disparate factors shaping the Scottish element of the British army, from both a Scottish and British perspective. The British army as an institution is examined to reveal structures, powers and responsibilities – and the Scottish soldiers themselves. This detail builds a broad picture of an army at time of change driven both by the Union and subsequent Jacobite rebellions.

\textsuperscript{57} Lenman, \textit{Militia, fencible men}.
\textsuperscript{58} N. MacDougall (ed), \textit{Scotland and War AD 79-1918} (Edinburgh, 1991).
\textsuperscript{59} J. Robertson, \textit{The Scottish Enlightenment and the Militia Issue} (Edinburgh, 1985).
\textsuperscript{60} Lenman, \textit{Militia, fencible men}, p.187-8.
Research questions

In 1707, the Act of Union between England and Scotland created the United Kingdom of Great Britain and transformed Scotland into ‘North Britain’.61 While Scotland’s legal system and church remained separate, its parliament was transferred to London.62 By contrast, the army was virtually ignored by the Union Treaty beyond transferring its financial and administrative affairs from the Scottish Establishment to the new British Establishment. This raises questions about the impact the Union had on the army: was it the Union or other events, such as the Union of Crowns, Restoration or the Glorious Revolution, that had the greatest influence, or was it simply that more time was needed by the army to adjust to these changes? This thesis, therefore, addresses the British army at the start of the eighteenth century, both as an institutional body and its soldiers. The reduction, at the Union, of the number of Scottish MPs to forty-five and the number of Scottish peers from 160 to sixteen (becoming known as Representative Peers)63 severely curbed the opportunities for Scots to contribute to the establishment and development of the new Great Britain. For many Scots, from the lowest to highest orders, the army became the best way to gain a state position and continue to contribute to the future of their country. This appears in contrast to the anti-Union riots across Scotland that greeted the Union and the anti-Union rhetoric of the Jacobites.64 In this thesis a closer examination of the Scots who supported the state will create a more balanced picture when taken in conjunction with the existing literature.

61 Act ratifying and approving treaty of the two Kingdoms of Scotland and England, 1707, Article III.
63 Royle, The Royal Scots, p.51; Act ratifying and approving treaty of the two Kingdoms of Scotland and England, 1707, Article XXII and Ferguson, Scotland’s Relations with England, p.265.
A further key research question relates to Colley’s work on the creation of nationality and a sense of ‘Britishness’.65 Her premise states that ‘Britishness’ spread as a result of the common threat from France over the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This thesis will examine the impact of the threat presented by the Jacobites and the earlier sense of unity it engendered within the newly formed Great Britain. The experience of Scots serving in the British army provides a microcosm of Scotland’s relationship with the newly formed Great Britain. How did issues of their nationality affect them as soldiers? When set in a backdrop of Jacobite unrest that predominantly occurred in Scotland, how did this affect the perceptions of the government and public towards the loyalty of Scottish soldiers? In answer to Colley’s comment that she had “concentrated on civilian responses [to the growing idea of a British nationality], rather than attitudes in the armed forces, which desperately need separate and detailed attention”66 this thesis addresses the emerging theme of nationality amongst the Scots of the British army.

Chapter summaries

Answers to the preceding questions are developed in the five chapters of this thesis, as aspects of an examination of the various ways the British army was involved in Scotland and of the experience of Scottish officers and other ranks within the British army.

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Chapter One: ‘Scotland’s Professional Soldiers’, gives a broad perspective of the experience of Scots as soldiers in the service of foreign powers and traces their integration into the British army. To understand contemporary attitudes towards the Scots in the years between the Union and Culloden, it is necessary to appreciate how they gained their military reputation. Contemporaries judged the Scottish soldiers of the British army from their past behaviour. The chapter opens with an examination of the Scot as a mercenary, whether Highlander, Lowlander, gentleman or from the lower orders, and considers the many variants this service could take. The extent of the Scottish contribution to foreign armies is analysed, along with the factors that drove army expansion through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Britain’s case is reviewed to establish the reasons why its experience of growth was slightly different from its peers. Additionally, the Scottish proportion of these armies is explored to provide evidence for why Scots were recruited in such great numbers. The change from foreign to home service is then analysed through a sample of Scottish regiments and individuals, examining when and why Scots were attracted to or were sought out for service within the British army. Scottish soldiers in the service of the Covenanting armies of the Civil War are included, establishing their long history of providing military service to powers other than Scotland.

Chapter Two: ‘The Scottish Soldier’s Experience’, examines the recruitment, training and billeting of Scottish soldiers, as well as the duties they were given, in order to ascertain whether Scots were dealt with as ordinary British soldiers or as a cohort that required special treatment. In cases of the latter, the reasons for differentiation are
investigated to discover who instigated such policies and why they were deemed necessary. To what extent were Scottish soldiers hampered by their nationality and what was required of them to overcome such stereotypes? The role of Scottish soldiers within Scotland is focused upon, rather than their continental use in conventional warfare. From this the level of trust with which London viewed them can be determined. Military duties in aid of civil authority placed soldiers in conflict with civilians and this is examined to discover the impact this had on the reputation of soldiers and on civil-military relationships. The impact of their use against civilians is also relevant to establish the extent to which the British army of the eighteenth century was a continuation of the government’s use of the army to implement unpopular measures by force, as experienced under Charles I, Cromwell, Charles II and James II. Conversely was the use of Scottish soldiers within Scotland a form of self-governance? Cases of the use of the military against civilians are included to discover the degree of military power used and the position of the law in controlling this. As the Union brought changes to the lives of Scotland’s soldiers, identity and loyalty are traced to reveal how regiments behaved in an internecine environment during the period of Jacobite activity in Scotland.

The theme of identity and loyalty is continued in Chapter Three: ‘Scottish Soldiers and the British State’, but with a greater focus on the individual and the officer. Methods of securing a military position, as well as motivations for doing so, are examined through a sample of Scotland’s elite. How individuals sought advancement and the reasons for the success and failure of their careers are discussed. Particular attention is given to the relevance of nationality. To what extent did country of birth,
family history and connections aid or hinder promotion? The complexities of loyalty faced by Scots when family, regiment and nation were important but not necessarily mutually compatible are considered, and placed in the context of London’s ‘rebel’ or ‘loyal’ view-point. The problems this created, as well as how individuals overcame this conflict, are surveyed. Additionally, this chapter follows the example of Brown in MacDougall’s *Scotland and War* (1991)\(^{67}\) using the careers of the 2\(^{nd}\) Duke of Argyll and the 2\(^{nd}\) Earl of Stair to demonstrate how Scots were increasingly successful under William III. However, unlike Brown, this chapter will also use the diplomatic, political and military aspects of several individuals’ careers to explain how the many facets of a Scot’s life influenced each other, and specifically, his military career.\(^{68}\)

The inclusion of Chapter Four: ‘Scotland’s Auxiliary Forces’, remedies the lack of recent research into the military formations that were outside those listed on the Establishment but which aided the British army in Scotland. Improving on Lenman’s chapter in MacDougall’s *Scotland and War* (1991),\(^{69}\) this chapter draws on a wide range of primary sources not previously utilised to discover the use and legitimacy of the various forms of auxiliary forces deployed in Scotland in the eighteenth century. Though the context of the militia debate is included, being relevant to the way Scots and London viewed these forces, the main focus is on their structure, role and make up, which is under-researched. Although Holmes, amongst others, claimed that: “There was no militia in Scotland until 1797, not least because of the risk of distributing weapons to a society

\(^{67}\) Brown, *From Scottish Lords to British Officers*.
\(^{68}\) Ibid, p.149.
\(^{69}\) B. Lenman, *Militia, fencible men*. 
that had only recently been disarmed”70, there were more forms of militia in Scotland than in England; militias, fencible regiments, voluntary regiments, corporation regiments and city guards. This chapter examines these different forms, broadening the typical definition of the ‘army’. It includes a wider range of the Scottish population than are normally characterised as soldiers, thus demonstrating how the number of Scots that desired to serve the British state was greater than the army Establishment allowed by Parliament. The formation, use and differences between these formations are explained, attempting in particular to examine the fencibles. Pre-dating and different from the Fencible Regiments raised in the 1750s and 1790s, their precise definition remains elusive but is considered from different angles. The legal status of the Scottish militia dating back to the seventeenth century and the effects of the legal ambiguity which surrounded it are explored especially in relation to the Scottish response to the Jacobite rebellions. A particularly careful re-appraisal of the known sources, including the seventeenth century acts referring to the Scottish militia, was undertaken.

The final chapter, Chapter Five: ‘Scotland’s Military Installations’, provides a study of the military structures and infrastructure built for the British army between the Union and the aftermath of the ’45, ranging earlier when necessary for clarity. Beyond discussing how and where they were built, the significance of the location, design and age of these forts, castles and garrisons are examined to reveal how they reflected the

fluctuating levels of interest and involvement London had in Scotland. The role and positioning of these fortifications, and the roads that linked them, are explored to ascertain whether they were solely a means of military repression. This chapter also takes advantage of the Ordnance Office maps, plans and designs of Scotland’s fortifications, as well as personal visits to the sites and archaeological reports of their remains. Studies of the fortifications of Scotland have rarely been examined in the context of the Ordnance Office and government that ordered their construction. Architectural historians and historians of the evolution of the Ordnance Office have come close, but are often heavily focused on construction or the Royal Arsenal or the period between Restoration and turn of the eighteenth century or end with the Hanoverian succession. Many historians also exclude Scotland and Ireland as administratively separate until the unions of 1707 and 1801.

Methodology

Taking a broader time-frame than the usual study of one event, such as a particular rebellion, this thesis covers the first half of the eighteenth century to allow assessment of the impact of the Union in 1707 on the creation of a ‘British’ army. Where appropriate, references are also made to events after the Union of Crowns, Restoration

71 GUARD (Glasgow University Archaeological Research Division), Fort William and Inverlochy Archaeological Project (Historic Conflict in the Highlands), data structure report. Project 2348 (Glasgow, 2007) and A.G. and M.H. Beattie (eds), ‘Pre-1855 Gravestone Inscriptions in Lochaber and Skye’, Scottish Genealogy Society (Edinburgh, 1990).
and the Glorious Revolution, in order to establish to what extent an unofficial ‘British’ army existed prior to the 1707 Union. The thesis ends with the aftermath of the last Jacobite rebellion in 1746, though occurrences during the rest of the eighteenth century will be referenced as longer-term consequences when relevant. The Jacobites, their plots and rebellions, will feature heavily, as the army’s largest domestic threat, though their role here is as antagonists and catalysts to change: the events during and after the rebellions have been adequately covered elsewhere. This thesis takes a more widely encompassing view of the Scottish soldier than the traditional focus on Lowlander, Highlander or Gael.

Certain topics are examined only as far as they relate to this study. The Board of Ordnance is mentioned in relation to the building of fortifications in Scotland, but it is beyond the scope in this thesis to study the department, structure and staff of the Board. Similarly, this is not a history of the Jacobite movement, which has been adequately covered, in its military aspects, by Reid, and from the political and diplomatic perspectives by Szechi.

Sources

To achieve the aims of the methodology, a broad range of sources are used. Official documentation is a vital part of a study, especially when of a state institution and of its attitudes and decisions. However, the British army expanded later than its continental contemporaries, as is discussed in Chapter One: Scotland’s Professional

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74 Szechi, 1715; Duffy, The ’45; Speck, The Butcher and Oates, Sweet William.
75 Reid, Highland Clansman; Reid, The Scottish Jacobite Army 1745-46 and S. Reid, Culloden Moor 1746; D. Szechi, 1715; D. Szechi, The Jacobites and D. Szechi, Jacobitism and Tory Politics.
Soldiers. Therefore, though administrative development was needed to manage the earlier small ‘guards and garrison’ force of Charles II and James II, it was not until the mid- to late-eighteenth century that the increasingly ‘standing’ nature of the British army and the reforming desire of the Hanoverian kings were able to improve and standardise the administration behind the army. Consequently, earlier records were only sporadically made and kept. The Army List, for example, only began to be published from 1754, though fortunately Dalton has compiled pre-1727 lists of commissioned officers.\footnote{C. Dalton, \textit{English Army Lists and Commission Registers, 1661-1714} (London, 1898), 6 vols and C. Dalton, \textit{George the First’s Army 1714-1727} (London, 1910), 2 vols.} Discharge papers, muster rolls and pay lists only began in 1760. This limits a systematic, quantitative study.\footnote{NAM Information sheet 2; Soldiers records 1660-1913.} However, an adequate and representative study can be made using sample data. Moreover, documents from the State Papers at The National Archives provide valuable information concerning the government. Family papers of the key individuals involved in the army and militia held, for example, in The National Archives of Scotland and the National Library of Scotland, provide valuable detail of those responsible for implementing policy and orders from London. These family papers also provide more background on the practical administration, planning and policy discussion of the military and government elite in Scotland than are contained in the records of government in London.

Another valuable resource is the published diaries, memoirs, pamphlets, ballads and broadsheets of those in and affected by the British army. Unlike government records, they give qualitative evidence for opinions and beliefs, and how these changed over time. However, it must be remembered that publication, especially at a time of mass printing
and no copyright, gives no indication of the extent of sales and readership. If print runs are known – a study in itself and beyond this thesis – then circulation gives some measure of interest and agreement within the population. Diaries and memoirs have their own limitations, particularly if pseudonyms were used. The subject of *Memoirs of the life and gallant exploits of the old Highlander, Sergeant Donald MacLeod* (1791)\(^{78}\) was most likely a pseudonym for William Thomson (1746-1817), a former Presbyterian minister, in the same manner that Mother Ross was believed to be a pseudonym of Daniel Defoe’s.\(^{79}\) The authenticity of Donald McBane, author of *The Expert Sword-Man’s Companion Or the True Art of Self-defence* (1728)\(^{80}\) remains unverified. However, McBane’s existence appears more likely than Macleod’s, as his memoir is only a brief accompaniment to McBane’s sword-fighting manual. Had McBane been fictitious, the ‘real’ author would have been more likely to follow the example of other fictitious stories where adventure, and not a training manual, was the focus. Unfortunately for this thesis, whether genuine memoirs or impostures, the desire to attract an audience places scandalous events as the centre of attention. McBane’s fights, women and private businesses and Macleod’s long life and military adventures overshadow and limit references to McBane’s time in Scotland as a soldier and invalid gunner and Macleod’s service as a sergeant of Lovat’s Independent Highland Company. Similarly, the publication of McBane’s memoir in Glasgow ensures that the focus lies with exotic

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\(^{78}\) W. Thomson, *Memoirs of the life and gallant exploits of the old Highlander, Sergeant Donald MacLeod, who, having returned, wounded, with the Corpse of General Wolfe, from Quebec, was admitted an out-pensioner of Chelsea Hospital, in 1759; and is now in the CIII.d year of his age* (London, 1791).


Ireland and the continent rather than Scotland. An additional flaw of diaries and memoirs, as illustrated through the diary of Colonel John Blackader (1664-1729), a career officer in the Cameronians, is that despite “how altogether rare spiritual autobiography was until well into the early modern period,” the focus on salvation rhetoric leaves Blackader’s references to the army tantalisingly brief. Despite their weaknesses, the diary of Blackader and the memoirs of Macleod and McBane, provide too valuable an insight into army life to be excluded.

It is also an aim of this thesis to provide a social, as well as military and political, analysis of the Scottish soldier in the British army. Therefore, Chapter Two: The Scottish Soldier’s Experience and Chapter Three: The Scottish Soldier and the British State, in particular, draw on a wide range of sources to investigate the Scottish soldier’s experience within the army. As well as the traditional sources, physical remains, such as gravestone inscriptions, and the under-used memoirs of McBane and Macleod will be used. The broad range of individuals studied in Chapter Three: The Scottish Soldier and the British State is practicable thanks to the comprehensiveness of the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography.

The breadth of this thesis has required a rather large range of sources to be used. This has included private correspondence, state papers, family papers, songs, poetry and literature. Primary source accounts such as diaries and memoirs, trial transcripts, laws

82 D.B. Hindmarsh, “‘My chains fell off, my heart was free’: Early Methodist Conversion Narrative in England”, *Church History*, 68:4, December 1999, p.913.
and order books will all be used. Additionally, the use of Ordnance Office design plans as well as visits to the sites of barracks, forts, roads and graveyards, redresses gaps in existing studies, which often imply that “because of the paucity of archival material on the day-to-day activities of the army in Scotland we shall have to deal with that country rather quickly.”

Terminology

To avoid confusion between the various contemporary spellings of locations and names, this thesis follows the convention of Szechi and use current spellings. However, within the descriptions of primary source material in footnote references, and in quotes, the original spelling and abbreviations are retained without the addition of ‘sic’. When clarification is needed or to preserve grammar, square brackets are used. Throughout the thesis, Islay is used for the 3rd Duke of Argyll, even after he succeeded his brother, the 2nd Duke, who is referred to throughout as Argyll, so that both brothers can be referred to simultaneously without confusion. To avoid misunderstanding between contested titles, Jacobite titles are not honoured. Therefore, the Jacobite Duke of Atholl is referred to as the Marquess of Tullibardine. The title James II is retained after the Glorious Revolution, but James Edward and Charles Edward Stuart are referred to by name to avoid the use of more biased terms such as James III or Old Pretender. The terms ‘rebel’ and ‘rebellion’, as well as ‘Gaelic’ and ‘Erse’ are used to avoid monotonous repetition but reflect no personal bias. Unless otherwise specified, the New Calendar is used. Similarly, reference to currency is made after each monetary amount and remains unconverted to current value.

The terms ‘Scotland’, ‘England’, ‘Britain’ and ‘North Britain’ have been used to a specific end in this thesis that does not necessarily reflect conventional use. Therefore, when ‘Scotland’ or ‘England’ is specified, the countries as they are understood today are being referred to. ‘North Britain’ will only be used in a geographical context to highlight the altered border that newly encompassed Carlisle, Berwick and Hull, or when referring to the concept of North Britain as it was understood after the Union as an intellectual attempt to create a British identity.85 ‘Great Britain’ denotes England, Ireland, Scotland and Wales after the Union, but ‘Britain’ refers to the largest island of Great Britain, specifically England, Scotland and Wales, even when referring to it before the Union of 1707. This will allow a distinction to be made that excludes Ireland because of that country’s separate Establishment, and its unique and different history that falls outside of the scope of this thesis. Despite the validity in using the ‘War of the Three Kingdoms’, the brevity of ‘the Civil War’ ensures its use here. Lastly, the distinction of ‘Establishment’ and ‘establishment’ is taken from Guy and used here. The former denotes, prior to the Union, the three Establishments of England, Ireland and Scotland, and after the Union, the two Establishments of Britain and Ireland. However, ‘establishment’ refers to the paper strength of a unit.86 For convenience, maps displaying the pertinent towns and battles of North Britain, the location of fortifications discussed in this thesis and depicting the ‘Highland line’ are included as appendices.87

87 Appendix No.1: Map depicting the ‘Highland line’ including major towns and the fortifications discussed in this thesis and Appendix No.2: Map of ‘North Britain’ including battlefields.
CHAPTER ONE: SCOTLAND’S PROFESSIONAL SOLDIERS

Introduction

It has been said that, for the Scottish, warfare was “not a way of life but…a part of life.”¹ The particular nature of Scotland’s geography, weather and isolation, especially in the Highlands, promoted an independent and self-sufficient society.² From this a culture of honour, duty and orientation around the family and extended community was formed - especially among the Highland gentry.³ The strength of clan and family ties, especially with the lack of control from Edinburgh and later London, led to greater independence of power than elsewhere in Britain. Therefore, Highland feuding and Lowland reiving were common.⁴ Such customary habits had their origins in the middle-ages. Scottish nobility and freeholders were obliged by ‘Free Service’ or ‘Knight Service’ to provide military service for the crown, while ‘Scottish Service’ was the feudal levy that applied to every common man in Scotland aged between sixteen and sixty to serve the crown for up to forty days each year. It was this style of force that provided the armies for William Wallace and Robert the Bruce.⁵ This obligation of military service continued past the decline of feudalism elsewhere in Britain and fostered a strong sense of military duty and a precedent for following a chief, or his representative, into battle.⁶ However, a clan could only support a limited number of warriors and it is not surprising that, as an alternative, military service abroad was common. There the Scottish martial spirit was an

asset not a liability to domestic peace.\textsuperscript{7} From the fourteenth to the eighteenth century, ‘Scottish Service’ was adapted to take advantage of the practise of issuing commissions on the basis of an ability to raise men, encouraging gentlemen of both the Highlands and Lowlands to form regiments from among their clans and tenants for service outside Scotland.

This persistence of the military culture was unique to Scotland amongst the nations of Great Britain. The continuation of Highland clan feuding and raiding and Lowland border reiving into the seventeenth century ensured that whilst the society of England, Wales and Ireland were increasingly pacified in every-day life, Scottish society retained a military ethos.\textsuperscript{8} Scottish men of all social levels commonly wore arms while the English court did not display military identity until late in the eighteenth century, though military men were more likely than civilians to wear swords at social functions.\textsuperscript{9} Consequently, during the Bishops’ Wars and Civil War, Scotland was able to field remarkably large armies. Alexander Leslie, 1\textsuperscript{st} Earl of Leven (1580-1661), introduced the Swedish model of recruitment to the Covenanter army. Therefore, by 1620, the Covenanterers could raise one in ten men for twenty years service. This meant that by 1640 the Covenanter army was 24,000 strong, increasing to 30,000 only four years

\textsuperscript{7} Stewart of Garth, \textit{Sketches of the character},(1885) p.26, 42, 72.
later.\textsuperscript{10} This led to the recognition of Scotland as a considerable military power, as demonstrated by their “crucial” presence at Marston Moor in 1644\textsuperscript{11} and the decision by both Charles I and II to seek Scottish help in 1648 and 1650.\textsuperscript{12}

As the feudal levy armies described above were raised by a form of conscription, they are not the focus here. This chapter concentrates on Scots as professional mercenaries abroad and their transition to professional career soldiers within the British army. In order to place the Scottish soldiers of the British army in the context of the first half of the eighteenth century, a broader chronology than the rest of the thesis is taken here. This chapter begins with an examination of the factors that altered armies from feudal levies to standing armies. The impacts of these changes on Scots’ military service are then investigated. Through the examples of several individuals, regiments and countries the different uses of, and behaviour towards, Scottish soldiers are examined to discover the reasons and consequences for these attitudes. The motivations of Scots abroad are also analysed to establish why service abroad was sought at certain times and service at home sought at others, as well as establishing what other push and pull factors caused this change. A study of the numbers of Scots in service with various states, including Britain, reveals when and why Scottish soldiers ceased service abroad and turned to employment in the British army. As case studies of Scottish regiments on the Scottish, and then British, Establishment, the final section examines and analyses the history, role and make up of four regiments. These are the Royal Scots, a foot regiment;

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\textsuperscript{11} P. Young, \textit{Marston Moor 1644: The Campaign and the Battle} (Kineton, 1970), p.103-6 and Furgol, \textit{The Civil Wars in Scotland}, p.54.
\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Ibid}, p.63, 65.
\end{flushright}
the Scots Fusiliers, a fusilier regiment; the Scots Greys, a dragoon regiment; and the
Independent Highland Companies, which became the 43rd (Highland) Regiment of Foot.
This illustrates the experiences of a broad range of Scottish regiments from the
Restoration to the end of the ’45. To establish the extent of the impact of nationality,
particular attention is given to the ways in which mercenary regiments and the four
sample regiments behaved during peace and war, and the ways in which they were treated
differently, whether in deployment, uniform or composition. In order to avoid confusion,
the term ‘Independent Highland Companies’ is used until their embodiment in 1739,
when they became ‘the 43rd’. Despite the practice of naming regiments for their colonels
and the name and numbering changes that occurred at times of re-structuring, the terms
‘the Royal Scots’, ‘the Scots Fusiliers’ and ‘the Scots Greys’ are used for the sake of
clarity. Similarly, the term ‘Dutch Brigade’ is used here to avoid confusion with the
many other regiments whose names include ‘Scot’ or derivatives, though it was and is
variously referred to by the name of its commander or as the Dutch Brigade, Scotch,
Scottish or Scots Brigade or Scots-Dutch Brigade.

The changing nature of armies

The first half of the eighteenth century was a crucial time in the history of the
British army. The Act of Union in 1707 created the British army and provided the
centralisation of administration which gave the opportunity for increased central control.
Without that control, standardisation and development could not have been implemented,
and the British army could not have developed into a military force capable of
commanding respect amongst its continental contemporaries and of controlling an empire
that would cover a third of the world’s surface. It is the earlier period of trial and change which is the focus of this thesis.

The conduct of warfare in the early eighteenth century was a product of the changes that had been gradually occurring from the fifteenth century. It is disputed whether this process should be described as a ‘military revolution’ or a ‘military evolution’. The immediate impact of technological improvements such as the creation of the bayonet that allowed pike-men to be replaced by increasing numbers of musket-armed infantry argues for the former definition, however, the presence of the many small alterations that allowed a process of trial and error that led to such developments suggests an evolutionary development.\(^\text{13}\) The end result either way was still technological change that demanded new drill, and tactics such as volley firing, and called for developments in state administration to take advantage of them. This coincided with and encouraged stronger central royal courts that allowed for the growth of an administrative system that could aid a ruler and focus the resources of a state towards funding and controlling a new and larger army.\(^\text{14}\)

Britain, however, was atypical in its adoption of these changes when compared to the continent. It adjusted to the technological and tactical developments along with its neighbours, and had a central power base suitable for administering the army; but the army in peacetime seventeenth and eighteenth century England and Scotland remained


smaller than elsewhere in Europe.\textsuperscript{15} While continental powers in the seventeenth century were reliant on their armies to protect their borders, the British state could rely on the Royal Navy and the island nature of Britain to repel aggression. Home forces were limited to protection of the Royal Household and to a small force of ‘guards and garrisons’ liberally spread around England and Scotland,\textsuperscript{16} for reasons traceable to the continuing effects of the Civil War and Interregnum. Charles I and Cromwell, especially, had used soldiers against civilians to impose their will. At the Restoration, both public and politicians were reluctant to allow similar opportunities to recur. In Scotland, the situation was further exacerbated by the use of soldiers against civilians in the reigns of Charles II and James II to suppress religious dissent.\textsuperscript{17}

The end of the seventeenth century and the start of the eighteenth was also a time of change that altered political opinion towards a standing army. The earlier reliance on the Royal Navy had been largely espoused by the Tories. As mainly landowning gentry, they objected to the added taxation needed to fund armies and preferred a ‘blue water’ policy. The Glorious Revolution in 1688 and Hanoverian Succession in 1714 brought the Whigs to dominance. Their commercial background was combined with their support for William III, George I and George II, all of whom had personal interests in the military and their responsibilities to the United Provinces and Hanover meant greater involvement

\textsuperscript{15} Black, \textit{A Military Revolution}? p.6-7, 20.
\textsuperscript{16} Manning, \textit{An Apprenticeship in Arms}, p.263.
in wars concerning the continental balance of power.\textsuperscript{18} The Glorious Revolution, the Nine Years War, the War of the Spanish Succession, the War of Jenkins’ Ear and the War of the Austrian Succession created a need for a larger British standing army, which translated into a steady increase in army size during war over the first half of the eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{19}

Accurate data on this increasing size of the British army, particularly in relation to the population and in comparison to its contemporaries, is hampered by the lack of systematic record keeping. It was not until the latter half of the eighteenth century that organisational improvements remedied this. Despite the attempts of the Duke of Cumberland (1721-1765) at reform between 1748 and 1755, the army needed the loss of the Americas and the threat of Revolutionary France to allow the Hanoverian desire for control and regulation to overcome the endemic ‘custom of the army’.\textsuperscript{20} Therefore, for the first fifty years of its existence, the British army was dominated by the belief that greater royal control would risk a repeat of the oppression of Charles I and the Interregnum, while continuing the ‘customs’ of the army, whereby colonels had greater control over their regiments than the government or the crown, was the best way to prevent tyranny. Indeed, Cumberland’s attempts at reform triggered the old fear of standing armies and pamphlets that compared Cumberland to Cromwell.\textsuperscript{21} Early systematic collection of data focused only on the accuracy of musters to combat endemic corruption. Therefore, returns of the number of other ranks and half-pay officers

\textsuperscript{18} Brewer, \textit{The Sinews of Power}, p.59-60, 168, 170.
\textsuperscript{19} Black, \textit{A Military Revolution?} p.28-9.
\textsuperscript{20} A.J. Guy, \textit{Oeconomy and Discipline. Officership and administration in the British army, 1714-63} (Manchester, 1985), p.29, 149, 162.
\textsuperscript{21} ODNB William Augustus, Duke of Cumberland, by W.A. Speck.
A comparison of army size to the wider population is made difficult by a lack of population censuses until 1801. Even then, the use of this first census is limited because its purpose was to provide data to ascertain the accuracy of the Reverend Thomas Malthus’s *Essay on the Principle of Population*, published in 1798. The London Statistical Society was not founded until 1825, the first of its kind in Britain, marking a new era in which such matters were considered vital. However, Alexander Webster’s *Account of the Number of People in Scotland in the Year 1755*, an unofficial census but “thoroughly done, and done by a man of ability” places Scotland’s population around 1750 at 1,265,000, compared to a possible population of 6,935,000 in England and Wales.

The Civil War was a turning point for army size in Britain. Before its start, the pre-standing army force of ‘guards and garrison’ numbered around 1,000. Within one year of fighting, 100,000 men were in arms on both sides. After the Restoration this number was dramatically reduced but was still higher at the end of the Nine Years War in 1697, at around 7,000 men, than during Charles I’s reign. From a peak of over 75,000 men in 1711 during the War of the Spanish Succession, the British army was reduced to only 23,000 after the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713.

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27 Guy, *Oeconomy and Discipline*, p.4, 5.
translate to twenty-eight regiments at the start of the War of the Spanish Succession, to seventy-nine regiments (or seventy-two, depending on sources) at its peak, to a peacetime strength of fifty-three regiments in 1714.\(^{30}\)

Temporary increases in strength also occurred as military responses to Jacobite rebellions in Scotland. At the start of the ’15, twenty-nine regiments were added to the British Establishment, consisting of fourteen regiments of dragoons and nine regiments of foot, re-raised from regiments disbanded after Utrecht, and six newly raised regiments of foot.\(^{31}\) In 1716, the number of British army soldiers in Scotland stood at 12,000.\(^{32}\) Of these, six regiments of dragoons and five regiments of foot were disbanded in 1718.\(^ {33}\) The start of the War of Jenkins’ Ear in 1739 triggered army expansion. Two regiments of horse, ten regiments of marines and twenty-three regiments of foot were added to the British Establishment.\(^ {34}\) In response to the ’45, thirteen regiments were raised specifically to counter the threat.\(^ {35}\) By the end of the rebellion, 13,000 government soldiers were present in Scotland.\(^ {36}\) These extra regiments were reduced in 1748 leaving the British army with seventy-six regiments.\(^ {37}\)

By continental standards, the British army was unusually small, especially in the earlier period from the Restoration to Anne’s accession. At just less than 35,000,

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\(^{32}\) *Ibid*, p.43.


\(^{34}\) *Ibid*, p.10.

\(^{35}\) *Ibid*, p.10.

\(^{36}\) *Ibid*, p.43.

\(^{37}\) *Ibid*, p.11.
Sardinia, for example, had a standing force similar to Britain, despite the latter’s greater responsibilities at home, on the continent and in its colonies. \textsuperscript{38} At the Glorious Revolution, the people and government of Britain had most recently experienced the army as the method of implementation by force of the policies of Cromwell, Charles II and James II. Consequently, the Revolution Settlement in 1688 stipulated that certain powers be removed from the crown to parliamentary control. \textsuperscript{39} Therefore, despite the desires of William III, George I and George II, the decision to expand the standing army was the prerogative of parliament, which was dependent on a change in attitude towards soldiers and standing armies. The connection of William III to the United Provinces and the Hanoverians to Hanover, and therefore to the Holy Roman Emperor, drew the British army more frequently into wars over continental power-balance from the Glorious Revolution onwards. This increased the need for soldiers as the army’s responsibilities grew and gave those soldiers a chance to demonstrate their improved discipline and professionalism through military victories. Therefore, though the standing army was always reduced on the return to peace by political and public desire, larger standing armies during war were increasingly tolerated. This change in attitude amongst the people and politicians coincided with a series of other factors favouring expansion of the army. In 1694 and 1695 respectively, the Bank of England and Bank of Scotland were established, allowing speculation on new stocks and shares that was part of the increased financial organisation that developed into a fiscal-military state. \textsuperscript{40} The rapid population growth of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries permitted larger scale

\textsuperscript{38} Houlding, \textit{Fit for Service}, p.9.

\textsuperscript{39} Black, \textit{European Warfare}, p.106-7.

\textsuperscript{40} \textit{Ibid}, p.109-10, 129, 130-1. Britain’s fiscal-military state was not truly effective, however, until the War of Austrian Succession (1740-48).
recruitment without endangering agriculture or industry. Consequently, the size of the army during the Nine Years War (1688-97), when the government and public were wary of standing armies, stood at 76,404, compared to the 92,708 men during the War of Spanish Succession (1701-1714).42

Scots in service abroad

For Scots, developing attitudes to armies, their numbers and deployments, also transformed mercenaries from ‘swords for hire’, levied or recruited by a mercenary captain for temporary service, to full-time, professional soldiers recruited or enlisted in regiments raised by treaty and sent abroad by the authority of others. It is this later group that is the focus of this chapter. Though the speed of this change was different for Highlanders and Lowlanders, and for officers and other ranks, the end result for all was the decline of mercenaries in favour of increasing opportunities as professional soldiers in armies of their own nations.

Contemporary use of mercenaries was controversial, as the public and politicians worried that their use removed the need for militias drawn from the domestic population, a process which encouraged the population to contribute to the security and stability of the nation they lived in. The commercial nature of mercenaries created a prejudice that they only had loyalty to money and this was the only factor maintaining their discipline. It was this belief that is evident in the 1650 Alien Act in England. Those awarded leave

41 Black, European Warfare, p.92-3.
to remain in the country were those with a trade, apprenticeship or contract as a servant and were therefore deemed productive. Mercenaries were specifically excluded from this group along with delinquents and the disaffected, thus branding them as men without use or ties to the country. As this belief resonates with modern perceptions that nationhood and patriotic duty are the true guarantors of loyalty, it persists to today. However, these concepts were alien to sixteenth and seventeenth century soldiers who would regard loyalty to a paymaster as normal, especially in a period when regiments and companies belonged to their commanding officers.

The reasons for the prejudice against mercenaries, both their greater loyalty to money than the state and the role they denied to militias, were obsolete even in the sixteenth century, as the ‘military revolution’ brought organisation and structure. In fact, using mercenaries often proved wise, especially for smaller countries that needed to balance their need for soldiers against their need for labourers. An army relied on the stability of industry and food production to allow a fiscal-military state to exist, and it was the labourers for this that were taken for armies made up of home nationals. A contemporary French general commented that every foreign soldier was worth three Frenchmen because it freed one Frenchman to work and pay tax at home, one to fight for France and removed one that could fight against France.

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44 BL 669.f.15(49) (Microfiche), ‘Instructions to Commissioners of the Militia for the County of [blank space] concerning giving licence to some of the Scottish Nation to remain in England. August 21st 1650’.
In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Scottish mercenaries in service abroad were the traditional ‘free-booters’. Scottish gentlemen and their sons, for whom military service abroad provided money and prestige, would raise men from their estates and offer their services to different rulers, changing allegiance as pay and peace dictated. However, such mercenaries were a greater problem to civil peace when unemployed. Other contemporary mercenary groups were more anchored, such as the Scottish regiment led by John Stewart of Darnley, in French service during the Hundred Years War, and the Scots who followed Joan of Arc in 1429.46 As the ‘military revolution’ progressed, military service was increasingly regarded as an essential part of a gentleman’s education and so the passage of time increasingly brought a desire for improvement and discipline.47 Scotland had a long history of service with France dating back to 1295 when a shared desire to counter English hostility created the ‘Auld Alliance’.48 Four companies of Scots were quickly formed, becoming the Gardes du Corps and, later, the Garde Écossaise as royal bodyguards.49

The practise of mutual loaning of troops between France and Scotland continued when the ‘Auld Alliance’ was renewed in November 1512 by James IV of Scotland triggered by the alliance between England, the Holy Roman Empire and the Vatican against France. Scotland’s traditional friendship with France made an invasion from

47 Manning, An Apprenticeship in Arms, p.413.
Scotland likely.\textsuperscript{50} As a consequence of the renewal of the ‘Auld Alliance’, Scots fought for France during the Italian Wars of 1495-1544.\textsuperscript{51} In return, France sent men to reinforce Scottish troops during the ‘rough wooing’ of 1523 to 1546 and at the siege of Haddington from July 1548 to September 1549 when 12,000 Frenchmen joined the Scottish army to re-take the castle whose capture in February 1548 gave England control over the Tweed valley.\textsuperscript{52} Nearly a century later, French soldiers also assisted the Scots during the Bishop’s Wars of 1639-40.\textsuperscript{53} After Charles I’s execution many Royalist Scots sought service in France as a continuation of their Royalist service, aided by the French Dowager Queen.\textsuperscript{54}

Another example of Scottish mercenary service as a loan of professional soldiers was the Dutch Brigade. The Brigade’s first incarnation was as the ‘Anglo-Dutch Brigade’ in 1572\textsuperscript{55} which contained three English and three Scottish regiments. The United Provinces sought independence from their Habsburg masters in order to gain religious freedom. The common Protestant background of England and Scotland created a desire to aid a Protestant state. At this early stage the Brigade was formed of a series of semi-independent companies similar to the Independent Highland Companies discussed later. These companies were more closely affiliated to themselves and each other than their Dutch masters, a position reinforced by the role of their officers in recruiting,

\textsuperscript{51} \textit{Ibid}, p.52-4.
\textsuperscript{53} Glozier, \textit{Scots in the French and Dutch Armies}, p.117.
\textsuperscript{54} \textit{Ibid}, p.117.
arming, clothing, training, feeding and caring for the men and their families.\textsuperscript{56} From 1628, developments in the structure and control of the Dutch army meant that three Scottish regiments had emerged which became the backbone of the Dutch Brigade – a structure that would remain the same for nearly 200 years.\textsuperscript{57} It was these regiments, commanded by Mackay, Balfour and Ramsey, along with three English regiments that joined William III’s invasion fleet in 1688. After serving in Scotland under General Mackay during the 1689-1690 Jacobite rebellion, the three Scottish regiments were returned to Dutch service in 1697, now under Murray, Lauder and Walter Philip Colyear. Three new Scottish regiments, under Strathnaver, Hamilton and Sir David Colyear, were also sent to the United Provinces to replace the English regiments of the Brigade that had been absorbed into the English Establishment after the Glorious Revolution. These additional three regiments remained in Dutch service until they were disbanded in 1714.\textsuperscript{58}

Until its eventual final disbandment in 1783, the Brigade remained three regiments strong, with the addition of an extra regiment, commanded by the Earl of Drumlanrig, from 1747 to 1751.\textsuperscript{59} The size of these regiments within the Brigade varied, as all regiments did, with war and peace. The 1742 Terms of Service stipulated that a company contained ninety men, though in reality the number varied from thirty-four men in 1714, to seventy-seven men three years after the start of the War of Austrian Succession in 1742.\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{56} J. Ferguson (ed), \textit{Papers Illustrating the History of The Scots Brigade in the Service of the United Netherlands 1572-1782} (Edinburgh, 1899), 3 vols, II, p.239.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid, I, p.xi-xii; Glozier, \textit{Scots in the French and Dutch Armies}, p.117 and Parker, \textit{Black Watch}, p.5-6.
\textsuperscript{58} Ferguson, \textit{Papers Illustrating}, II, p.x.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid, II, p.x.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid, II, p.238, 241.
During the Thirty Years War, Donald Mackay, Lord Reay, (1591-1649) recruited 3,600 Scots for service under Christian IV of Denmark and 10,000 for service under Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden. This opened a new path for ‘free-lance’ officers gaining commissions in foreign service and then forming their own regiments, with responsibility for the recruitment, training and fate of the Scottish soldiers within them.\textsuperscript{61} Mercenary companies such as these straddled the change from feudally raised companies of the middle ages and the regimented and integrated examples of the Dutch Brigade and Garde Écossaise. As such they appear as the older ‘free-lance’ groups but in reality had more in common with the Scottish regiments on the French Establishment. By 1631 Gustavus Adolphus had organised and regimented the Scottish mercenary companies into a Scots Brigade. This consisted of four regiments one of which was made up of Highlanders, another of musketeers and the final two of Scottish foot.\textsuperscript{62} They quickly gained a reputation for bravery and stood firm at the storming of Frankfurt-an-der-Oder on 3\textsuperscript{rd} April 1631 and were publicly thanked by Gustavus.\textsuperscript{63}

The second peak in Scottish service abroad occurred between the Glorious Revolution and the end of the ‘45, when the two to three generations of Scots, exiled by direct and indirect Jacobite activities, sought military service abroad.\textsuperscript{64} France was a popular choice, especially as Louis XV created two regiments specifically for exiled Scottish Jacobites after the ‘45. The first was effectively formed from the survivors of

\begin{footnotes}
\item[61] ODNB, Donald Mackay, 1\textsuperscript{st} Lord Reay, by A.N.L. Grosjean; Linklater, \textit{The Black Watch}, p.15 and Parker, \textit{Black Watch}, p.5-6.
\item[63] \textit{Ibid}, p.47-8 and ODNB, Donald Mackay, 1\textsuperscript{st} Lord Reay, by A.N.L. Grosjean.
\end{footnotes}
the regiments raised by Lord David Ogilvy (1725-1803) during the '45, and known by the French name ‘le regiment de’Ogilvie’. The second regiment, ‘le regiment d’Albanie’, was given to Cameron of Lochiel to compensate for the loss of his estates whilst in Jacobite service. However, by 1763, Scots amongst the rank and file of both regiments were so rare that Louis XV amalgamated them with the Irish regiments, arguing that his original promise to keep the regiments embodied to provide employment for exiled Scottish Jacobites was invalid as only the commissioned grades were still Scottish.

Service with the Prussians was also common. This was especially true in the 1740s when Field Marshal Keith (1696-1758) used his influence with Frederick the Great to ensure that officers and privates were found from the exiled Scottish community and recruited from Scotland. Keith himself was a typical example of a Scottish gentleman exiled for joining the '15 rebellion. After failing to gain a commission from Russia, he took by necessity one in Spain. Despite nearly a decade’s service, he found his Protestant faith, though Episcopalian, a bar and so transferred his services to Russia in 1728. Nearly twenty years later he entered Prussian service after the Russian court, already suspicious of foreigners, became jealous of his success. In Prussian service, from 1747 to his death in 1758 at the Battle of Hochkirch, Keith rose to the rank of Field Marshal and gained the friendship of Frederick the Great.

65 McCorry, ‘Rats, Lice’, p.31-3.
68 ODNB, James Francis Edward Keith, by Paul Dukes.
This diverse and complex involvement of Scottish soldiers abroad demonstrates how much more they were than simple ‘swords for hire’. Mercenaries could be nobles, younger sons of gentlemen and men from the lower orders looking for the same outcomes: career, adventure and independent means.\(^{69}\) Though military service abroad, like any other profession, was primarily to gain wealth and position, Scotland’s gentry knew that these were not guaranteed. Sir Donald Mackay of Strathnaver, Lord Reay, had to sell land in 1626 to fund recruitment for his regiment in Swedish service. Such expenditure was rarely, if ever, reimbursed.\(^{70}\) Many also had to negotiate to receive their pay in arrears.\(^{71}\) Military service abroad from an early date also provided, and later reinforced, Scotland’s imperial image. In the second half of the sixteenth century, John Knox argued that Scotland must seek a greater identity than simple independence from England, therefore military service gave Scotland an ‘imperial’ impact. As this period coincided with the growth of Presbyterianism in Scotland, service abroad, most often in the United Provinces and Sweden with their shared Protestantism, was a way for Scots to contribute to the development of Scotland’s international standing.\(^{72}\) Religion was held so highly that, in 1574, during the Livonian War (1558-83), violence followed the attempt of 1,500 Lowland Scottish mercenaries in Swedish service to convert the inhabitants of Reval, now in Estonia but then a conquest of Sweden, to Presbyterianism.\(^{73}\) For Protestant Scots, service with Gustavus Adolphus during the early years of the Thirty

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\(^{70}\) Sinclair, ‘Scotsman Serving the Swede’, p.42, 43 and ODNB, Donald Mackay, 1\(^{st}\) Lord Reay, by A.N.J. Grosjean.


\(^{72}\) Robertson, *The Scottish Enlightenment*, p.4.

Years War provided a way to defend Protestantism in the face of Catholic Imperial aggression. 74

Colley’s argument that national loyalty was formed by a common fear of France ignores the earlier evidence of mercenaries who, despite spending their adult lives in service abroad, demonstrated an acute and active interest in the religious and constitutional issues of their home. 75 The act of leaving their country did not remove the connection they had with it, and their desire to remain involved in moulding the outcome of change is clear in the numbers that returned to Scotland to fight at the outbreak of the Bishops’ Wars. For example, twenty-six colonels and officers asked permission to leave the service of Sweden in September 1640 during the Thirty Years War. 76 Similarly, the political nature of who Scots chose to serve is also a demonstration of the Scots’ desire to affect the development of Scotland. At home, the political decision of Jacobite Scots to participate in rebellions represents an obvious attempt to change and mould Scotland despite the risk to titles, lands, safety and security. When these attempts failed, the number of Scottish gentlemen who chose to continue opposing the British government and the Glorious Revolution is demonstrated by the peak in Scottish exiles in foreign service after each rebellion.

For many Scots in the other ranks, service abroad rather than within English or Scottish regiments was partly due to the lower number of regiments in the pre-Civil War and Restoration armies, and partly because of the attraction of service under France and

the Dutch. The former offered a fixed period of service rather than the effective life long duty expected in Britain and both paid foreign troops more than their native troops. France held particular attraction for its less severe methods of punishment compared to German service. Officers, however, more commonly spent a lifetime abroad, serving in a regiment made up of family members and settling in that country on retirement.

James Keith, Marshal Keith, (1696-1758) for example, served in Prussia with his older brother, George, the 10th Earl Marischal (1692/3-1778) from 1747 to their deaths, though George’s role was diplomatic. Lieutenant-General Hugh Mackay, Colonel of the Dutch Brigade, owed his entrance to military service to the cultural memory and family stories of Scots fighting abroad with Gustavus Adolphus and the Protestant Princes of Germany.

The presence of family links bred their own loyalty and stability. Families frequently settled in the countries they served and this encouraged later generations to continue the service. The officers and men of the Dutch Brigade were often drawn from men of Scottish descent whose ancestors had settled in the United Provinces at the end of their own military careers abroad. The Calvinist Scots of the Dutch Brigade had a greater tendency to integrate, even among privates on short term service contracts, because both their religion and superiors encouraged chastity or marriage, resulting in

78 Glozier, Scots in the French and Dutch Armies, p.133 and Miggelbrink, The end of the Scots-Dutch Brigade, p.87, 97.
79 ODNB, James Francis Edward Keith by Paul Dukes and ODNB, George Keith, 10th Earl Marischal, by Edward M. Furgol.
81 Miggelbrink, The end of the Scots-Dutch Brigade, p.87, 97.
high proportion of marriages with Dutch women. George Benedict Ogilvie is an example of a second generation Scot who followed his family’s example and made his career serving Peter the Great of Russia (1672-1725) from the 1660s onwards. Ogilvie was the son of General George Ogilvie, a former mercenary in the Thirty Years War under the Swedes who remained as the commander of the fortress at Spielberg. Peter the Great was renowned for collecting a ‘court’ of mainly Scottish mercenaries: Patrick Gordon (1635-1699), William Drummond (1617-1688), Alexander Crawford and Sir Alexander Leslie of Auchintoul (not 1st Earl of Leven, who served in Sweden).

It was the longevity and stability of the Dutch Brigade, and of Scottish soldiers’ service in it, which allowed the Brigade to change from ‘free-lance’ mercenaries to professional soldiers in foreign service. This change was from an itinerant group, contractually bound to a series of employers, to a specialist unit in foreign service, officially raised, recruited, armed, clothed and paid. The status of the Brigade as regiments of the line, with a longstanding and therefore well established reputation, and its Scottish identity, made service with the Dutch Brigade an accessible military apprenticeship for the son’s of gentlemen: “Long were the armies of the princes of Orange esteemed the best military schools in Europe.” The United Provinces’ position as a new state under near-constant aggression from more powerful neighbours encouraged its army to develop and improve, becoming a leader in the ‘military

82 Glozier, _Scots in the French and Dutch Armies_, p.133, 136.
83 Urban, _Bayonets for Hire_, p.181.
85 Cuninghame, _Strictures_, p.15.
revolution’ during the period of the Brigade’s existence. Many successful British officers of the eighteenth century began their military careers in the Dutch Brigade, benefiting from this environment. These included Brigadier James Ferguson, who in 1704 was one of the four Scots on Marlborough’s staff, Colonel Graham, secretary to Queen Anne, and General James Murray, Governor of Quebec after Wolfe’s death. Military apprenticeships were also gained in the service of Sweden – another leader in the developments of the ‘military revolution’ in the seventeenth century. Scottish soldiers such as Colonel Alexander Leslie, 1st Earl of Leven (1583-1661) and Colonel Alexander Hamilton (half-brother to the 1st Earl of Haddington), were able to use a lifetime in Dutch and Swedish service to Scotland’s benefit when they returned at the outbreak of the Bishops’ Wars and Civil War. Hamilton was responsible for bringing artillery expertise, and Leslie the skills and experience needed to organise otherwise amateur armies, which were essential for a country that Parker claimed was “untouched” by the developments of the ‘military revolution’. 

The high calibre experience gained by Scottish mercenaries in such continental service was correspondingly beneficial to their next employer. For example, during Colonel Alexander Hamilton’s service with Gustavus Adolphus, he developed a 4-pounder cannon that could be drawn by two horses and thus gave Gustavus superior artillery mobility compared to his contemporaries such as Louis XIII whose army still

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87 Ferguson, Papers Illustrating, I, p.xxvi-xxvii.
used 24-pounders that needed thirty-two horses.\textsuperscript{90} The employment of Scottish officers was especially prized for the recruitment potential they opened up to their foreign masters. Sir Donald Mackay of Strathnaver, Lord Reay (1591-1649), was known as the ‘recruiting sergeant for Gustavus in Scotland’ and did the same for Christian IV of Denmark. He raised and paid for a regiment of 3,600 men in 1626 for service in Denmark during the Thirty Years War, another 2,000 in the winter of 1627-8 and a further 2,000 in early 1630 for Swedish service. In 1643, he raised a new regiment of 1,000 men for service in Denmark. A mark of the esteem in which Scottish mercenaries were held by foreign leaders is shown by the medals struck by Gustavus Adolphus for Colonel Alexander Leslie to commemorate his defence of Stralsund in 1628. Also indicative of this is the personal intervention of Christian IV in gaining the release of Lord Reay when he was captured attempting to bring arms to the Scottish Royalists in 1644.\textsuperscript{91} Similarly, Peter the Great was unusual amongst his Russian contemporaries for his desire to learn from the combined experience and knowledge of the mercenaries in his service. Mercenaries were treated warily in late seventeenth and early eighteenth century Moscow, where all foreigners were obliged to live in the ‘German Quarter’ to prevent the ‘westernisation’ of Russian clothing or commerce.\textsuperscript{92}

Rather than the threatening image of the barely controllable ‘sword for hire’, by the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries mercenaries closely resembled regular regiments

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\item \textsuperscript{90} Sinclair, ‘Scotsman Serving the Swede’, p.50.
\item \textsuperscript{91} R. Trench, \textit{Gustavus Adolphus: Social aspects of the Thirty Years War. Two lectures} (London and Cambridge, 1865), p.22; Sinclair, ‘Scotsman Serving the Swede’, p.38, 39 and ODNB, Donald Mackay, 1\textsuperscript{st} Lord Reay, by A.N.J. Grosjean.
\item \textsuperscript{92} Urban, \textit{Bayonets for Hire}, p.179-80; Dukes, \textit{The First Scottish Soldiers in Russia}, p.49, 50; ODNB, Patrick Gordon, by W.R. Morfill, revised by Paul Dukes and ODNB, William Drummond, 1\textsuperscript{st} Viscount of Strathallan, by David Stevenson.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotes}
of the line. Their only distinguishing features were the ‘foreignness’ of their officers and
men and their outward appearance. The Dutch Brigade, for example, had several
outward symbols of both their difference and their Scottish origins. This was indulged by
the Dutch policy of keeping foreign regiments separate from their own regiments.
Consequently, the Brigade played *The Scots March* during battles, wore the red coats of
the British army, and carried their own regimental colours and the Union flag but nothing
representing the United Provinces.93 Its Union flag also had a Scottish thistle in the
centre while the Brigade’s colours were green with a thistle and a scroll bearing the motto
‘Nemo me impune lasserit’94 surrounded by a wreath, and a further scroll bearing
‘Scottish Brigade’ below that.95 The Brigade was also permitted chaplains and ministers
of their own religion, a move in keeping with the religious sympathies of the Dutch and
of concessions made to their contemporaries, the Cameronians, in the British army.96

The Highland regiment of the Scots Brigade in Swedish service during the Thirty
Years War had the distinction of kilted uniforms, and this, along with the green clothing
and standards of its other regiments, gave them the epithet of the ‘Green Brigade’.97
Similarly, the two French regiments created by Louis XV for Scottish Jacobite exiles
after ’45 were permitted pipers.98 Some soldiers of the Dutch Brigade are known to have
worn kilts as early as the Battle of Reminant in 1578. However, it is interesting that the

94 No-one will attack me with impunity.
distinctiveness of the Brigade was as much due to the British nature of their uniform and regimental insignia as to the Scottish or Highland elements within it.99

The use of these symbols of separatism were actively defended, such as in 1719, 1720 and 1750 when the Dutch Brigade protested the use of their own regimental pall at funerals rather than the ones supplied by the local churches.100 Such identifiers enhanced loyalty to the Brigade, demonstrated by the effort made in protecting the colours in the retreat from Bergen-op-Zoom in 1747101 and emphasised their elite status and reputation. The Brigade was so well known for being trustworthy and courageous that its reputation spread to other Scots outside the Brigade. Frederick Henry called them the ‘Bulwark of the Republic’ in 1629 and the Dutch General Baron d’Ayla always treated the regiment to “the most distinguished favour [that it]…disobliged not only the Germans and the Swiss, but his own countrymen.”102

The extent of the concept of nationality and identity among Scottish soldiers during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is hotly debated.103 The Dutch Brigade, for example, used a plethora of symbols to promote their individuality and distinctiveness. However, what they saw as their identity is less clear. Their red coats

99 Ferguson, Papers Illustrating, I, p.xviii.
101 Miggelbrink, The end of the Scots-Dutch Brigade, p.86.
and Union flag showcased their British identity, while the use of *The Scots March* and thistles on flags showed Scottish affiliations. However, the use of tartan, kilts and pipes are indicative of a Highland identity that did not represent all their backgrounds. Mackillop provides a tantalising explanation in his theory of cyclical identity. Scots had a series of concentric identities and loyalties that could co-exist without conflict and could encompass affiliation to family, clan, community, regiment, Scotland and Britain. However, without evidence regarding the origin of the decision to use such symbols, it is impossible to know whose idea of ‘Scottishness’ was being represented by the appearance of the Dutch Brigade.

It is clear that a simple classification of nationality would not realize the complex ideas of identity present in the eighteenth century where the application of nationality was used and abandoned as the need suited. When the two Scottish regiments in the French army were amalgamated in 1763, only the officers and men born in or of the first generation from England, Ireland and Scotland were transferred. The remaining nationalities were disbanded. Yet when one of these regiments had been raised in 1747, petty corruption had occurred when nationalities on the muster rolls were tampered with to overstate the ‘Scottishness’ of many other ranks to take advantage of Louis XV’s promise of thirty livres extra for each man brought over from Scotland. Similarly, despite the attempts of the Dutch Brigade to maintain its separatism, the longevity of the Dutch Brigade and the soldiers’ existence in the United Provinces led to increased

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integration. Originally, Scottish officers and men were always in the majority, although other nationalities were permitted to serve within it, just as Scots served in other Dutch regiments. However, intermarriage with local people and the daughters of Scottish soldiers, who were one, two or even three generations removed from Scotland, changed the make up of the Brigade over time. In the seventeenth century, Scottish officers preferred Scottish witnesses at the baptisms of their children, but by the beginning of the eighteenth century, Dutch names as witnesses were increasingly common.\textsuperscript{108} Anne’s support for the preservation of the Scottish nature of the Dutch Brigade,\textsuperscript{109} extended to ordering Marlborough to warn the Dutch of her disapproval of their appointment of a non-Scottish major ahead of several other Scottish applicants.\textsuperscript{110} By contrast, the Brigade itself had a less nationalistic approach to its Scottish identity. The practical terms of service from 1742 stated that Irishmen were not permitted to serve in the Dutch Brigade unless they were born in Scotland of Irish families or resident in Scotland for a year and a day.\textsuperscript{111} This suggests an uncomfortable battle between a desire to remain a Scottish regiment and a need to find recruits.

The different recruitment processes for regiments in service abroad is indicative of the changing nature of mercenaries. The ‘Auld Alliance’ between France and Scotland meant that from a very early date regiments were raised and lent between the allies. This provided the precedent for the lending of regiments to other nations in the seventeenth century. Despite the length of its existence, the Dutch Brigade was officially on loan

\textsuperscript{108} Miggelbrink, \textit{The end of the Scots-Dutch Brigade}, p.85, 87.
\textsuperscript{109} Murdoch and Mackillop, \textit{Military Identity and Multiple Identities}, p.xli-xlii.
\textsuperscript{110} Marlborough’s secretary to Brigadier Lauder, Calmpthout, 26\textsuperscript{th} July 1703, quoted in Miggelbrink, \textit{The end of the Scots-Dutch Brigade}, p.86.
\textsuperscript{111} Ferguson, \textit{Papers Illustrating}, II, p.299.
from Britain.\textsuperscript{112} The authorities in Edinburgh, and later in London, displayed mixed feelings regarding the use of Scotland as a recruiting ground for foreign powers. The Union of Crowns gave greater central control so that recruitment for Danish and Dutch service had to receive prior approval from the Scottish Privy Council. This practice continued after the Restoration and Union of 1707 and applied to all recruiting in Scotland.\textsuperscript{113} The exceptions to this were the illegal recruiting of Scots for service in Prussia discovered in 1743 when Britain and Prussia were opponents during the War of the Austrian Succession, and the illegal recruiting for Jacobite forces prior to rebellions or for service in France after the ’45.\textsuperscript{114}

It was competition for manpower that made the Duke of Marlborough suggest an end to Dutch recruitment in Scotland in 1703.\textsuperscript{115} Initially Anne refused and championed the continuance of the Dutch Brigade.\textsuperscript{116} However, the order “for bringing her national regiments up to their full number to all the parishes of Scotland” in March 1709 created an untenable level of competition in a country “already greatly depopulated.”\textsuperscript{117} Presumably a short ban on Dutch recruiting followed, as occurred in 1713 when Anne barred Dutch recruitment for a year after the government and social elite of Edinburgh worried about the dramatic loss of manpower.\textsuperscript{118} A further infringement on the Dutch ability to recruit in Scotland occurred in the aftermath of the ’45. Fearing that former rebels could escape justice by enlisting with the Brigade, the government decreed that

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{112} Miggelbrink, \textit{The end of the Scots-Dutch Brigade}, p.88.
\textsuperscript{113} ODNB, Donald Mackay, 1st Lord Reay, by A.N.J. Grosjean.
\textsuperscript{114} Chartrand, \textit{Louis XV’s Army}, p.8-9 and Bulloch, ‘Scots Soldiers under the Prussian Flag’, p.109-10.
\textsuperscript{115} Ferguson, \textit{Papers Illustrating}, II, p.7.
\textsuperscript{116} Murdoch and Mackillop, \textit{Military Identity and Multiple Identities}, p.xli-xlili.
\textsuperscript{117} Ferguson, \textit{Papers Illustrating}, II, p.92-3.
\textsuperscript{118} TNA SP54/4/85, [Lord Provost of Edinburgh] to Earl of Dartmouth, Edinburgh, 2nd December 1712.
\end{footnotesize}
every recruit had to be presented to a local magistrate and then to an especially deputised officer, created by the Commander-in-Chief in Scotland, who would collect a certificate from the magistrate and a local minister to prove their well-affected status. In the long-term, after the rebellion, the government seemed happy to have potentially troublesome Scots removed to the United Provinces, as the allowances permitted to the Dutch Brigade were increased in 1747. The Dutch continued to recruit in Scotland for another decade, offering reliable pay and a shorter service than the British army. However, this proved too much competition for recruits for the Scottish regiments on the British Establishment. Therefore, in February 1757, the Brigade’s right to recruit in Scotland was abolished by William Pitt the Elder.

In Britain, the wars under William, Anne and George I and II saw the impact of the changes caused by the ‘military revolution’, as standing armies were increasingly tolerated during war and they gradually increased in size. Consequently, the desire for mercenaries declined and professional soldiers were sought. Additionally, the balance of power on the continent was changing so that nations such as Sweden, which in the seventeenth century had been a major employer of Protestant Scottish mercenaries, ceased to be a major European power by 1721. This removed a large avenue of employment. The expansion of warfare to the Americas and the East Indies brought a different scale and conduct of warfare, which coincided with a growing acceptance of

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standing armies amongst the British public and government. This allowed a new commitment to trans-Atlantic war and an embryonic empire that meant competition was stronger than ever for British soldiers to serve in the British army. Scotland’s elite offered regiments drawn from their tenants and clans in order to gain commissions. This was either to rehabilitate themselves for past disloyalty or to contribute to the future of the British state through the most accessible state institution, the army. In many ways, the motivations for serving in the British army was a continuation of the motivations for service abroad; careers and financial independence, and the defence of religion, politics and state.124 The need for men, exemplified by Pitt the Elder’s speech in 1762: “I sought for merit wherever it could be found. It is my boast that I was the first minister of the Crown who looked for it and found it in the mountains of the North”125 meant that the earlier suggestions to raise regiments of the line from Highlanders made in 1738 by Duncan Forbes, Lord President, could be implemented.126 At a stage when Highlanders were gradually proving their loyalty and dependability, their use overseas was viewed by the British elite as the perfect balance of utilising their military culture while keeping them at a safe distance. This mixed compliment towards Highlanders’ military abilities also made them disposable, as Wolfe’s quote in 1751 reveals: “they are hardy, intrepid, accustomed to a rough country, and no great mischief if they fall.”127

124 Mackillop, For King, Country and Regiment?, p.189.
127 Macpherson McCulloch, Sons of the Mountains, I, p.21.
The significantly increased British demand for Scottish soldiers had a dramatic effect on nations still looking to Scotland for recruits. In 1763, Louis XV disbanded the regiments raised to accommodate Scottish Jacobites citing the declining number of Scottish privates. Even the Dutch Brigade had struggled to maintain its contingent of Scottish-born soldiers, and was increasingly officered and manned by men of Scottish descent. Relations between Britain and the United Provinces had been deteriorating, as the Dutch refused to release the Brigade for service in the Americans in 1755 and 1780, and in September 1780 Britain learned that the United Provinces had been aiding the American rebels since 1777. The Dutch, who had struggled for constitutional freedom from Spain 200 years before, found their affiliation with the Americans’ desire for independence was stronger than a fading alliance with Britain. By December 1780 Britain had declared war, creating the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War, forcing the Dutch to demand that Scottish officers swear an oath of allegiance and that the regiments be subsumed into the Dutch Establishment. The uniforms, music and regimental colours that marked their difference were removed. Fifty-three officers remained sufficiently British (or Scottish) to resign their commissions in protest. In 1782, the Dutch Brigade was disbanded, although the Dutch retention of recruiting rights in Scotland up to this point attests to the continuing desirability of the Scots as soldiers.

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However, the Jacobite cause provided another stimulus to Scots serving abroad. The reintroduction of the 1641 Penal Laws in 1695, the Oath of Allegiance in 1689 and the Oath of Abjuration in 1701 sent Catholics, Episcopalians and Non-Jurors into exile. Many fled acts of attainder and the consequent forfeiture of their lands and civil liberties for rebelling or sought sympathetic nations that supported their belief that renunciation of the Stuart right to the throne was incompatible with the divine, hereditary and indefeasible rights of kings. As these oaths and laws effectively barred public service, private professions and land ownership in England, Scotland and Ireland, many looked to France and Spain for a career.133 Consequently, in addition to the existing Scottish regiments already on the French Establishment, the Garde Écossaise mentioned above, in 1747 France created two further regiments, ‘le regiment de’Ogilvie’ and ‘le regiment d’Albanie’, specifically for Scottish Jacobite exiles as “a haven…[for] most of the refugees from the [Jacobite] army…seeking further military service.”134 At its embodiment in 1747, ‘le regiment de’Ogilvie’ had all but one Scottish Jacobite officer and just under half the other ranks were Scottish Jacobites.135 ‘Le regiment d’Albanie’ was raised second and therefore fewer exiles were available. In one company, for example, of the sixty-one men only three were Scottish. Of the regiment as a whole, only forty-seven of the 620 men were Scottish, six Irish and three Englishmen. The rest were French, Swiss or German.136 A year later, the nationality of the Scottish regiments on the French Establishment was still less Scottish. In one company of Ogilvie’s Regiment,

136 Ibid, p.31-3.
eighty-six privates were French, Dutch and German compared to the fifty-one British privates. Of these, one was English, eleven were Irish and thirty-nine were Scottish. Though the Scots dominated the British portion of the regiments, the nominally Scottish character of the regiments was not represented by its soldiers.\footnote{McCorry, ‘Rats and Lice’, p.14-5.}

The Dutch Brigade, with its almost 200 year history, runs in parallel with many of the regiments mentioned above. However, it represents a different type of mercenary tradition. Its official status on indefinite loan to the Dutch gave it a stability that fostered a high level of professionalism and a reputation as an elite amongst its contemporaries, and allowed the creation of a dynasty of soldiers who were Scottish by descent who could mix with ease with both their Dutch neighbours and the Scottish-born fellow soldiers and officers. This absorption, however, had the effect of diluting the Scottish make up of the Brigade, a process accelerated by the eighteenth-century competition for Scottish recruits and the 1782 amalgamation into the Dutch Establishment. In the place of records of nationality, the ability to speak Scots or Gaelic can provide an indicator of country of origin. In 1726, this linguistic ability was so commonplace that the commanding officer of Willemstad had simply to ask for some ‘Scottish officers’ to be sent to communicate with Scots soldiers.\footnote{Ferguson, \textit{Papers Illustrating}, II, p.198-9.} Similarly, in 1747 orders to the other ranks had to be given in English and then Gaelic so they could all understand.\footnote{Miggelbrink, \textit{The end of the Scots-Dutch Brigade}, p.85.} However, by 1784 only two captains in one regiment of the Brigade spoke Scots-Gaelic. Significantly, the only other

\footnote{\textsuperscript{137} McCorry, ‘Rats and Lice’, p.14-5.}
speakers were three lieutenants listed as retired. This suggests that ability with the language was slowly dying out the longer the Brigade was on the Dutch Establishment.\textsuperscript{140}

**Scots in British service**

The original quota of other ranks for the Royal Scots at its embodiment in 1633 was drawn from men who had served under its colonel in Swedish and French service or were recruited from Scotland. The officers were drawn from among those Scottish officers in French service.\textsuperscript{141} As the eighteenth century progressed, this nominally Scottish regiment became increasingly integrated as a British regiment. By 1757, the Royal Scots was made up of 1,124 men of whom 462 were Scottish, the equivalent of forty-one per cent, 444 were Irish – thirty-nine per cent – and the remaining 218 were of unknown origin, but presumably a large proportion were English.\textsuperscript{142} Highlanders became a target for recruitment to regiments of the line after 1739 when the first exclusively Highland regiment, the 43\textsuperscript{rd}, was raised. This marked a watershed, as although Highlanders had long been raised for service, as the presence of kilts in Swedish and Dutch regiments attests, the 43\textsuperscript{rd} became a precedent for an increasing number of Highland regiments.\textsuperscript{143} Though the next specifically Highland regiment, Loudoun’s Highlanders, was not raised until 1745, between 1739, the establishment of the first Highland Regiment, and 1799, when the last regiment, the 93\textsuperscript{rd} Sutherland Highlanders,

\textsuperscript{140} Miggelbrink, *The end of the Scots-Dutch Brigade*, p.95-7.
\textsuperscript{141} Simpson, *Three Hundred Years*, p.5-6.
\textsuperscript{142} Murdock and Mackillop, *Military Identity and Multiple Identities*, p.xxxvi.
was raised, fifty-nine Highland regiments (most of short duration) were raised by the British army, representing around 70,000 men.\textsuperscript{144}

The creation of so many Highland Regiments speaks of the change that had occurred in public and political opinions regarding the Scottish soldier by the mid- to end of the eighteenth century. Britain’s fear of standing armies inherited by the religious and political turmoil and violence of the seventeenth century had faded. This, with increasing involvement in continental and colonial wars, meant Britain needed a larger army, in turn providing greater opportunities for officers and privates. The effective end of the Jacobite movement and the need to use the Scots as a source of manpower in this expanding army meant that Scots were more tolerated in the other ranks and commissioned grades of regiments. These changes coincided with changes in the European balance of power. The power of Austria, Sweden, Spain and France was transferring to Britain, Prussia and Russia, which changed the demand for mercenaries in European conflicts.\textsuperscript{145} It was therefore natural that Scots seeking military service would change from continental to British masters.

Raised in 1633, the Royal Scots were intended for service in France. Charles I’s royal warrant to Sir John Hepburn, its first colonel, took advantage of his military experience.\textsuperscript{146} Between 1634 and 1678 Hepburn’s served with the French and Swedes,

\textsuperscript{144} ODNB, John Campbell, 4\textsuperscript{th} Earl of Loudoun, by Stephen Brumwell; Royle, \textit{The Royal Scots}, p.51 and Mackillop, \textit{For King, Country and Regiment?}, p.199.
\textsuperscript{145} Urban, \textit{Bayonets for Hire}, p.282.
\textsuperscript{146} Simpson, \textit{Three Hundred Years}, p.5-6.
absorbing other Scottish regiments in Swedish service.\textsuperscript{147} At the Restoration the regiment was given the distinction of maintaining a Second Battalion even in peace.\textsuperscript{148} Recalled to face the Covenanter threat in 1678, they were deployed to Flanders for the Nine Years War and the War of the Spanish Succession, where they were present at all major battles.\textsuperscript{149} Service in Ireland and the West Indies followed.\textsuperscript{150} In August 1745, two supernumerary companies, raised the previous summer, were ambushed and captured at Highbridge while marching to reinforce Fort William. This was the first engagement of the ’45 and triggered the recall of the Second Battalion from Ireland.\textsuperscript{151} After fighting at Falkirk on 17\textsuperscript{th} January 1746, the Royal Scots joined Cumberland’s army marching north and fought at Culloden.\textsuperscript{152} By June 1746, they were encamped at Perth and remained in Scotland until 1749 when they were deployed to Ireland.\textsuperscript{153}

The Scots Fusiliers was raised in 1677 or 1678 (depending on the source) by the 5\textsuperscript{th} Earl Mar for domestic security. When ordered south to defend James II’s hold on England in 1688, they declared for William III.\textsuperscript{154} They served in Flanders from early

\textsuperscript{148} Scouller, \textit{The Armies of Queen Anne}, p.97.
\textsuperscript{152} BL Hardwicke Papers Add. MS 36257 f.1, 76, Orderly Book of Joseph Yorke and Duffy, \textit{The ’45}, p.578.
\textsuperscript{153} BL Hardwicke Papers Add. MS 36257 f.124, Orderly Book of Joseph Yorke and Brander, \textit{Famous Regiments}, p.17.
\textsuperscript{154} Mileham, \textit{The Scottish Regiments}, p.88.
1689 to 1697 and from 1702 or 1708 – sources disagree – to 1714.¹⁵⁵ During the ’15, the Scots Fusiliers fought at Sheriffmuir¹⁵⁶ and remained in Britain until 1742.¹⁵⁷ After three years fighting in the continent, the Scots Fusiliers returned with the majority of the British army under Cumberland to assist in the suppression of the ’45.¹⁵⁸ They formed part of the force that re-took Carlisle, fought at Culloden and provided a garrison for Blair Castle.¹⁵⁹ After a year of service on the continent in 1747, they returned to Britain for garrison duty for the next three years.¹⁶⁰

By royal warrant of 25th November 1681, two troops of dragoons created in 1678 with the addition of an extra troop were raised onto the establishment as the Royal Regiment of Scots Dragoons, here known as the Scots Greys.¹⁶¹ Its commander until his death in 1685 was Lieutenant-General Thomas Dalyell (also spelt Dalzell) of The Binns.¹⁶² They had an early history of facing rebellions, first against Argyll’s Rebellion in Scotland in 1685, demonstrating that, pre-Union at least, there was no difficulty feared in sending Scots to fight Scots.¹⁶³ They also deployed to England to prevent the invasion of 1688, but joined William III and were sent to Scotland to face the 1689 Jacobite Rebellion under Viscount Dundee and saw action at Cromdale in April 1690.¹⁶⁴ From 1694 to 1697, 1702 to 1713, and 1742 to 1749, the Scots Greys formed part of the army

¹⁵⁶ Mileham, *The Scottish Regiments*, p.89.
¹⁵⁷ *Ibid*, p.89.
¹⁵⁹ Mileham, *The Scottish Regiments*, p.89.
¹⁶⁰ *Ibid*, p.89.
on the continent in the Nine Years War, the War of the Spanish Succession and the War of the Austrian Succession.  

During peace they were recalled to Britain and were part of the domestic force that faced the Jacobites in skirmishes at Kinross and Dunfermline, and fought at Sheriffmuir in 1715, and again at Glenshiel in 1719.

The 1609 Statutes of Icolmkill made chiefs responsible for the actions of their clans and encouraged them to take control of policing and punishing lawlessness. This was reiterated in the royal warrant of 1667 that charged the 1st Marquess of Atholl to create the first companies to keep “a watch upon the braes.” The Independent Highland Company that fought the Jacobites at Killiecrankie in 1689 so impressed the Commander-in-Chief of the forces in Scotland, General Mackay that he caused five companies to be added to the Scottish Establishment. Between 1690 and 1717, the number of companies fluctuated as more were added at times of unrest, such as in 1701 after poor harvests and rumours of invasion, or removed, as in 1690 as an economising measure. The three companies extant during the ’15 were not involved in the Battle of Sheriffmuir, but assisted escorting arms for the militias and were responsible for persuading clans not to join the rebellion and tracked fleeing rebels in its aftermath.

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170 Simpson, *The Independent Highland Companies*, p.84, 86, 96, 100.
Though recognised as useful for their hardiness, by 1717 the level of petty corruption and suspicions regarding many chiefs’ loyalties meant that the Independent Highland Companies were disbanded.\textsuperscript{172} The creation of six new companies was one of General Wade’s many proposals for increasing the security of Scotland in his 1725 report.\textsuperscript{173} In 1739, these companies and ten new ones were raised onto the British Establishment as the 43\textsuperscript{rd} Regiment of Foot or Crawford’s Regiment named for its first colonel.\textsuperscript{174} After the necessary training at Aberfeldy in May 1740 and three years home service, the 43\textsuperscript{rd} was ordered to march south for deployment abroad. Suspecting deployment to the diseased West Indies, insulted at the lack of a royal review and believing that they had been raised for home service only, 120 men deserted to return to Scotland.\textsuperscript{175} After being re-captured and tried, three were chosen by drawn straws to be shot and the rest transported to regiments in Gibraltar, Minorca, the Leeward Isles and Georgia. The remainder of the regiment was deployed to Flanders.\textsuperscript{176} In 1745 the ‘43\textsuperscript{rd} returned to Britain under Cumberland when the rebellion began but did not join the army in Scotland. Three supernumerary companies were recruiting in Scotland but were only partly assembled when two were captured at the fall of Fort George on 20\textsuperscript{th} February 1746.\textsuperscript{177} After Culloden, the 43\textsuperscript{rd} returned to Flanders and then saw service in America and Ireland, and did not return to Scotland for another thirty years. The Regiment became the 42\textsuperscript{nd} in

\textsuperscript{172} Simpson, \textit{The Independent Highland Companies}, p.87-8 and Ross, \textit{The Historic Succession of the Black Watch}, p.48.
\textsuperscript{173} Ross, \textit{The Historic Succession of the Black Watch}, p.49-50.
\textsuperscript{174} Parker, \textit{Black Watch}, p.14.
\textsuperscript{176} Brander, \textit{The Scottish Highlanders}, p.76 and Parker, \textit{Black Watch}, p.22.
1749 and added ‘Royal’ to its title marking its bravery at Ticonderoga in 1758. It did not gain the official epithet ‘The Black Watch’ until 1861.\(^{178}\)

The Scots Greys, Scots Fusiliers and Royal Scots were regular regiments of the line, and were used as such in continental warfare. Similarly, the use of the Scots Fusiliers and Scots Greys during the ’15, at Sheriffrimuir\(^{179}\), and the Royal Scots during the ’45, was a simple extension of their role as field regiments. The Scots Greys’ presence as part of the standing army garrisoned in Scotland between 1715 and 1742 was typical of other regular regiments of the line, and enabled them to be part of the force sent against the joint Spanish-Jacobite force that invaded in 1719 and participate in the government victory at Glenshiel on 10\(^{th}\) June 1719.\(^{180}\) However, regiments in Scotland were expected to fulfil other duties away from set-piece battles. In 1678, the Royal Scots were recalled from service abroad, and the Scots Fusiliers and the Scots Greys were raised specifically to counter the Covenanter threat.\(^{181}\) The Scots Greys were quartered as small detachments, first in the capacity to find and stop conventicles, and later, between 1681 and 1685, to ensure that the oath for the Test Act was administered, which had to be sworn by every office-holder by 1\(^{st}\) January 1682.\(^{182}\) This is different from the attitude towards Independent Highland Companies. While they were used in much the same way as the three case study regiments mentioned, stationed in small detachments in

\(^{179}\) Mileham, *The Scottish Regiments*, p.24, 89.
\(^{182}\) ODNB, Archibald Campbell, 9\(^{th}\) Earl of Argyll, by David Stevenson and Mileham, *The Scottish Regiments*, p.22.
Jacobite areas to suppress plotting and rebellious activity, they were rarely judged experienced enough to take part in battles, and were limited to auxiliary roles.

The growing power of parliament since the Glorious Revolution, and the military interest of William III, George I and George II, led to an increasingly centralised administration, which sought greater organisation and standardisation of the British army. The developments in tactics and technology during the ‘military revolution’ made maintaining control in close-order formations, which gave effective volley fire and operational mobility on the battlefield, a priority for the army. Consequently, as the eighteenth century progressed, the need for soldiers who could act independently was decreasing. When Jacobite plotting and rebellions in Scotland called for men with the requisite skills and ability to act in independent detachments this capacity had, therefore, been largely removed from Scottish foot regiments like the Royal Scots and Scots Fusiliers, despite their original role. This is clear from their lack of knowledge about Scotland. Whilst the Independent Companies were disbanded between 1717 and 1724, four informal ‘companies’ of Highlanders had to be kept at each fortified barrack to act as guides for regular regiments. 183 By April 1746, along with two other English regiments, the Royal Scots, despite being a Scottish regiment, had to be allocated a civilian guide. 184 Any native knowledge had been lost by their long service abroad and their domestic service in the Lowlands. It was the Independent Highland Companies and other auxiliary forces that the army turned to. 185 During the ’15, the Independent Highland Companies were used as auxiliary forces working with the regular regiments in Scotland. They

184 BL Hardwicke Papers Add. MS 36257 f.53, Orderly Book of Joseph Yorke.
185 These auxiliary forces, along with the various forms of militia, are discussed further in Chapter Four.
guarded baggage, acted as guides and tracked rebels after Sheriffmuir. Their presence persuaded clans and individuals, such as Duncan Campbell of Lochness and the Stewarts of Appin, not to join the rebels, forced the surrender of the Mackenzies and escorted munitions from Glasgow and Inveraray.\textsuperscript{186}

An advantage of the Independent Highland Companies was their similarity to their Jacobite opponents. The British army, during the ’45 for example, used the marching column formation of a ten file wide platoon or a twenty-four file wide division as set out by Major General Humphrey Bland in his \textit{Treatise of Military Discipline}, often in one or two columns.\textsuperscript{187} The Independent Highland Companies, as Highlanders, marched with a width of only three files.\textsuperscript{188} Independent Highland Companies, therefore, could be deployed to troublesome areas more quickly than regular troops. Though Cumberland reorganised the British army’s marching formations during the 1745 campaign so that they were able to form up to engage the enemy twice on the march to Drummossie Muir, Independent Highland Companies were still relied upon to search the Highlands in the months after Culloden.\textsuperscript{189}

Furthermore, the Independent Highland Companies had superior knowledge of clan politics, local culture and topography of the Highlands, and were more skilled at manoeuvre through, and survival in, the Highlands than standard regiments of the line.

\textsuperscript{186} Simpson, \textit{The Independent Highland Companies}, p.97, 99.
\textsuperscript{187} H. Bland, \textit{A treatise of military discipline; in which is laid down and explained the duty of the officer and soldier, Thro’ the several Branches of the Service. By Humphrey Bland, Esq; Adjutant-General; and Colonel of one of His Majesty’s Regiments of Dragoons} (Dublin, 1743), p.116-131, especially p.116-7 and NMS M.1975.5, Marching Orders, 31\textsuperscript{st} January 1746.
This made them more successful at patrolling the Highlands. Indeed it was MacDonald’s and Macleod’s Companies that got closest to capturing Charles Edward as he fled Culloden to the Isle of Skye in June 1746. The British army displayed awareness of the value of their Highland soldiers’ unique skills through the rare concessions made to their uniform. The sanction of kilts, at twelve yards of fabric, provided the men of the Independent Highland Companies with enough material for use as camouflage and blankets. Therefore, while regular regiments required two rest-days a week during marching, as well as an addition one or two weeks on long marches, and their routes across the country were determined by terrain, season and the availability of inns as billets, the soldiers of the Companies had greater manoeuvrability because of their ability to sleep in their plaids. Consequently, although when on the move regular regiments covered around thirteen miles per day, overall they covered less because of the rest-days, achieving an average speed of seven or eight miles per day. Highlanders, by comparison, were able to cover twelve miles a day. Even if this contained the same rest days, as they were also part of the British Establishment, the Highlanders would still march fifty per cent faster than regular soldiers.

As with any military unit in Scotland, a major part of a Scottish regiment’s role was to ensure domestic peace. The use of the Royal Scots, Scots Fusiliers and Scots

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191 Parker, Black Watch, p.13.
192 Linklater, The Black Watch, p.16; Houlding, Fit for Service, p.41; NAS GD112/47/1/3 and GD112/47/1/4, Route Marches between inns, written or corrected by the 3rd Earl of Breadalbane; and NAS GD170/1213/7/1, James Erskine to unknown, Edinburgh, 22nd November 1748, relates ways to avoid ban on plaid so that kilts can still be used for the “conviences” of “walking or climbing the hills.”
193 Without the two rest-days a week, and additional breaks, the British army could have covered fifty-six miles per week. Houlding, Fit for Service, p.41-2 and Duffy, The ’45, p.109.
194 I am grateful to my father, Dr James Henshaw, for his assistance with this, and other examples of maths.
Greys against Covenanters in the 1670s and the use of garrisons of Royal Scots in Ireland between 1715 and 1737 to counter Catholic and Jacobite disaffection set a precedent for regiments being positioned to discourage Jacobite activity.\textsuperscript{195} In Scotland, the Independent Highland Companies had particular value because their unconventional tactics and small-scale detachments made them ideal for patrolling the Highlands. During the ’45, eighteen Independent Highland Companies were positioned in disaffected areas in order to restrict the Jacobites’ freedom of movement, revenue collection and recruitment.\textsuperscript{196} Their deployment across the Highlands made them ideally suited to enforce the Disarming Acts of 1715, 1726 and 1746 co-ordinated from Fort William and Blair Atholl.\textsuperscript{197}

The importance of status and patronage in clan society meant that the promise of a commission to lead an Independent Highland Company was, in itself, a great draw for chiefs. Being allocated a Company also gave power to award further commissions – another attractive incentive. At the outbreak of rebellion in 1745, Duncan Forbes of Culloden, Lord President of the Court of Session, was charged with distributing twenty new commissions; a delicate diplomatic task that was a mixed success.\textsuperscript{198} Traditionally loyal clans were rewarded, including two commissions to the 17\textsuperscript{th} Earl of Sutherland, while traditionally Jacobite clans, such as the MacDonalds of Sleat and the Mackenzies under the Earl of Seaforth, were enticed by two and three respectively in return for

\textsuperscript{196} Mackay Scobie, ‘The Highland Independent Companies’, p.6.
\textsuperscript{197} Simpson, \textit{The Independent Highland Companies}, p.100.
\textsuperscript{198} Mackay Scobie, ‘The Highland Independent Companies’, p.6.
service to the Government. The disadvantages of using Independent Highland Companies as an enticement for prevaricators and former Jacobites, was that some traditionally loyal chiefs, such as the Grant of Grant, were insulted when they received only one commission. Consequently, Grant of Grant, though definitely not a Jacobite, did the minimum required of a Hanoverian. On the pretence of protecting his home, he rarely let his men leave to engage the Jacobite parties moving near or on his estates.

The Union of Crowns in 1603 brought the control of the Highlands to London for the first time. James I and IV passed the Statues of Icolmkill in 1609 which gave the Highland chiefs a self-regulatory responsibility for their clans and lands. This succeeded, except that the increase in power turned larger clans into mini-kingdoms, while their companies became corrupt and riddled with bribery. After the Restoration, Charles II continued his father’s policy and gave the Duke of Atholl a warrant to raise a company from his clan to “watch upon the braes [and] to be a constant guard for securing the peace in the Highlands” on 3rd August 1667. The suspicion that reiving, clan-feuding and petty lawlessness had links to Jacobitism meant that the Independent Companies stationed at the four fortified barracks against Jacobite activity were also there to act as aids to civil peace. The role continued to be one of importance as in 1731 Major Scipio Duroure, whose role it was to inspect the Independent Highland Companies and the detachments on road building duty, drew up standing orders for

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201 Simpson, The Independent Highland Companies, p.3-4.
203 Brander, The Scottish Highlanders, p.17 & Parker, Black Watch, p.5.
204 Ross, The Historic Succession of the Black Watch, p.33-4, 46.
Companies on policing duty.\textsuperscript{205} As the Jacobite threat lessened, attention shifted to smuggling and illegal whisky distilleries. Between 1715 and 1742, the Scots Greys were stationed throughout Britain to help prevent smuggling; however, they made little impact. Despite the presence of Independent Highland Companies at Drumden for the seven previous years, smuggling was still flourishing in 1736.\textsuperscript{206}

The army’s presence in Scotland, where the containment of Jacobite disaffection and the domestic peace needed to be actively maintained, ensured that the garrisoning of soldiers had more in common with the occupation of enemy territory than merely billeting on home soil. From the Statues of Icolmkill to the Highland Host, the use of a military presence to subdue and control the population was a common strategy in Scotland. The Scots Fusiliers spent the first decade of their existence garrisoned across the Lowlands to suppress conventicles – the illegal field preaching of Presbyterians after the Episcopalian Church was restored by Charles II in 1660 – while the Independent Highland Companies were focused on the Highlands.\textsuperscript{207} Following Killiecrankie, Captain Robert Menzies and his company garrisoned Castles Menzies and Meggernie in the 1690s while Grant’s Company formed part of the garrison at Fort William along with Hill’s Regiment, which included the recently amalgamated men from Weem’s Company.\textsuperscript{208} Following the Union, their role remained the same; a company was based at Inverlochy in 1707 to ensure control over that isolated area and in 1708 Colonel

\textsuperscript{206} M. MacIntoch, \textit{A History of Inverness. Being a narrative of the historical events, mainly military, concerning the town and round about, from the earliest times until the early Victorian period} (Inverness, 1939), p.119-20 and Mileham, \textit{The Scottish Regiments}, p.24.
\textsuperscript{207} Mileham, \textit{The Scottish Regiments}, p.88.
\textsuperscript{208} Simpson, \textit{The Independent Highland Companies}, p.80, 84.
Grant’s Company was stationed on the north-east coastline to guard against invasion.\textsuperscript{209} During the ’15, a company garrisoned Seaforth’s home at Brahan Castle near Inverness.\textsuperscript{210} The six Independent Highland Companies created by Wade in 1725 were garrisoned in detachments across Scotland in Fort Augustus, Inverness-shire, Ross-shire, Sutherland-shire, Strathspey, Badenoch, Atholl, Breadalbane, Lochaber and Appin. They were all co-ordinated by the Governor of Fort William.\textsuperscript{211} In this respect, the Independent Highland Companies were employed in just the same way as regiments of the line, as the Scots Fusiliers spent 1748 to 1751 on garrison duty within Britain.\textsuperscript{212}

A comparison of the nationality of the colonels of the case study regiments demonstrates to what extent nominally Scottish regiments were Scottish in composition, and when this changed. The Royal Scots had five Scottish colonels from 1633 to 1688. Its first non-Scottish colonel was the 1\textsuperscript{st} Duke of Schomberg, a native of the Palatinate, friend of William III and Huguenot exile from his adopted French home. He, however, proved unpopular and was soon replaced by the Scottish Sir Robert Douglas of Glenbervie.\textsuperscript{213} Two further Scottish colonels followed to the end of this study’s chronology.\textsuperscript{214} During the ’45, the Second Battalion of the Royal Scots was led in Scotland by its Lieutenant-Colonel, John Ramsey. Its colonel, from 1737 to his death in

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\textsuperscript{209} Simpson, \textit{The Independent Highland Companies}, p.96 and Ross, \textit{The Historic Succession of the Black Watch}, p.46.
\textsuperscript{210} Simpson, \textit{The Independent Highland Companies}, p.97.
\textsuperscript{211} Linklater, \textit{The Black Watch}, p.16 and McAulay, \textit{The First Battalion of the Black Watch}, p.55.
\textsuperscript{212} Mileham, \textit{The Scottish Regiments}, p.89.
\end{flushright}
1762, was James St. Clair, Lord Sinclair.\textsuperscript{215} The Scots Fusiliers had three Scottish colonels until 1704, when the death of Brigadier-General Archibald Rowe at Blenheim saw Viscount Mordaunt, eldest son of the Northamptonshire 3\textsuperscript{rd} Earl of Peterborough, inherit command.\textsuperscript{216} After an interim of two years under the command of a Huguenot, Mordaunt returned until his death in 1710.\textsuperscript{217} It is interesting to note that the two Huguenot colonels of the Scots Fusiliers had only brief colonelcies of the regiment, suggesting that though they shared a common religion with their Scottish officers and other ranks, nationality had some importance. From 1710 to mid-century, the Scots Fusilier’s colonels’ origins varied from English, Scottish and Irish, to Irish and European with Scottish antecedents.\textsuperscript{218} After 1704, only one colonel was Scottish, though many had a link to the country. The Scots Greys had Scottish colonels from their establishment in 1678 to 1688, when the colonelcy was awarded to Sir Thomas Livingstone, 1\textsuperscript{st} Viscount Teviot.\textsuperscript{219} Teviot was of Scottish descent but was born and brought up in the United Provinces, and had served his entire career, along with his father, in the Dutch Brigade.\textsuperscript{220} In 1704 the colonelcy was bought by a Scot and remained in Scottish hands until 1714 when it was bought by Sir David Colyear, 1\textsuperscript{st} Earl of Portmore, who was Dutch of Scottish descent.\textsuperscript{221} In 1717, the colonelcy returned to Scottish ownership and


\textsuperscript{216} Mileham, \textit{The Scottish Regiments}, p.88 and Johnson, ‘The Scots Army in the Reign of Anne’, p.5-6.


\textsuperscript{218} ODNB, Charles Boyle, 4\textsuperscript{th} Earl of Orrery, by Lawrence B. Smith; Johnson, ‘The Scots Army in the Reign of Anne’, p.6; Leslie, ‘The Succession of Colonels’, p.63; ODNB, George Macartney by V.G. Kiernan and ODNB, William Maule, 1\textsuperscript{st} Earl of Panmure of Forth, by Hew Blair-Imrie.

\textsuperscript{219} Mileham, \textit{The Scottish Regiments}, p.22; Leslie, ‘The Succession of Colonels’, p.16 and ODNB, Charles Murray, 1\textsuperscript{st} Earl of Dunmore, by Paul Hopkins.

\textsuperscript{220} ODNB, Charles Murray, 1\textsuperscript{st} Earl of Dunmore, by Paul Hopkins; Mileham, \textit{The Scottish Regiments}, p.22; Cochrane, \textit{Scottish Military Dress}, p.22, 23 and ODNB, Thomas Dalyell of Binns, by David Stevenson.

\textsuperscript{221} Leslie, ‘The Succession of Colonels’, p.16; ODNB, John Dalrymple, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Earl of Stair by H.M. Stephens, revised by W.C. Lowe; ODNB, David Colyear, 1\textsuperscript{st} Earl of Portmore, by T.F. Henderson, revised by
remained so under various individuals to the end of the chronology of this study.\textsuperscript{222} The Independent Highland Companies were enlarged and raised onto the Establishment in 1739 under Lieutenant-General John Lindsay, 20\textsuperscript{th} Earl of Crawford. As a Lowland Scot, he was trusted to remain impartial to the rivalries of the clans. In 1741, Hew Sempill, 12\textsuperscript{th} Lord Sempill, bought the colonelcy and sold it to Lord John Murray in April 1745. Murray kept it until his death in May 1787.\textsuperscript{223} Consequently, the 43\textsuperscript{rd} Regiment was, therefore, conspicuous for its consistently Scottish colonels.

The nationality of the rank and file is harder to establish. Records of recruits were limited to incidental comments or numbers in returns of regimental strengths. Soldiers’ origins were not recorded until the 1790s. Records from the Seven Years War go furthest, occasionally recording a man’s place of origin.\textsuperscript{224} It is difficult to establish, therefore, how ‘Scottish’ the other ranks of Scottish regiments were. The pre-Union existence of the Royal Scots, Scots Fusiliers and Scots Greys probably ensured that before 1707 they were exclusively or at least largely Scottish. The Royal Scots, for example, were originally made up of 600 veterans of Hepburn’s Company that had served with him in Bohemia, Holland and Sweden and, at Hepburn’s insistence, from recruitment in Scotland to be commanded by Scottish officers presently in French
service.\textsuperscript{225} The Independent Highland Companies, prior to their embodiment in 1739, would also have been exclusively Highland in make up. The company captains gained their commissions because of their clan’s loyalty, and were expected to recruit from their clans. After their embodiment, men could be recruited “in any County or Part of Our Kingdome of Great Britain.”\textsuperscript{226} This is contrary to Stewart of Garth’s efforts at romanticisation, editing the 43\textsuperscript{rd}’s recruitment orders to “the men to be natives of that country and none other taken.”\textsuperscript{227} It is doubtful, however, that non-Gaelic speaking, non-tartan wearing men would have actively sought enlistment with them. No official policy existed to maintain Scottish exclusivity in Scottish regiments. However, it was considered advantageous to target Scotland for its manpower, and later Highlanders, for their supposedly natural war-like abilities.\textsuperscript{228} Therefore, the main recruitment area continued to be Perthshire, Braemar, Atholl and Breadalbane.\textsuperscript{229} The Independent Highland Companies created at the start of the ’45 were drawn from the lower orders of their officers’ clans, as the commissions were not awarded until the company strength was complete. This encouraged officers then, as earlier, to take advantage of the old custom of ‘Scottish Service’ to gain rapid recruitment.\textsuperscript{230} Such links were undoubtedly used and abused in the other Scottish and Highland regiments of the mid- and late-eighteenth century, to maximise recruitment.\textsuperscript{231} The only example of particularity to

\textsuperscript{225} Cochrane, \textit{Scottish Military Dress}, p.18 and Simpson, \textit{Three Hundred Years}, p.5-6.
\textsuperscript{226} Macpherson McCulloch, \textit{Sons of the Mountains}, I, p.xvi.
\textsuperscript{227} Stewart of Garth, \textit{Sketches of the Character}, (1825), I, p.252.
\textsuperscript{228} Parker, \textit{Black Watch}, p.33.
\textsuperscript{230} Mackay Scobie, ‘The Highland Independent Companies’, p.16; “Inverness, 12 May 1746. I hereby certify that, pursuant to the trust reposed in me by His Majesty. Commissions were by me delivered to the Officers of the Independent Companies mentioned above; and that these commissions were not delivered until their respective Companies were complete. (signed) Dun. Forbes.”
\textsuperscript{231} Mackillop, \textit{For King, Country and Regiment?}, p.200-1.
Scots in Scottish regiments was shown by Cumberland during the ’45, when recruits raised by the Scots Fusiliers in England were transferred to two English Regiments, and the Scots Fusiliers ordered to recruit replacements from Glasgow as the only ones who could identify loyal Scots from disloyal.232

Regimental strength varied considerably, depending on the generosity of the treasury for that year, the state’s position in war or peace and the political and military situation of the time. Independent Highland Companies, such as Grant’s Company, could vary from the sixty men in 1701 to eighty in 1710.233 By 1739, when the 43rd was raised onto the Establishment, it numbered 850 officers and other ranks.234 The addition of four new companies of 100 men each in 1745 gave the 43rd a total paper strength of 1,215. Only 400 of these were in Scotland during the ’45, a tally closer to the numbers of privates of the Second Battalion of the Royal Scots and the Scots Fusiliers at Culloden. They numbered 401 and 358 rank and file respectively.235 The internal structure of an Independent Highland Company was a scaled-down version of a regiment of the line. The former contained only a captain, a lieutenant and an ensign, supported by four sergeants, four corporals, a drummer and a piper.236 The number of private men varied with the Jacobite threat, from thirty and sixty in the companies raised by Wade in 1725,

232 BL Hardwick Papers Add.MS.36257 f.11, Orderly Book of Joseph Yorke.
235 Reid, Culloden Moor, p.27 and S. Reid, Cumberland’s Army. The British Army at Culloden (Leigh-on-sea, 2006), p.39.
to 100 in each of the eighteen companies raised by Forbes in 1745.\textsuperscript{237} This can be compared to a return of the Scots Fusiliers from 1727 which contained a colonel, one lieutenant-colonel, one major, ten captains, twelve first lieutenants, eleven second lieutenants, an adjutant, a quartermaster, a chaplain, a “chirurgeon”\textsuperscript{238} and his mate. Each of the twelve companies contained three sergeants, three corporals, two drummers and sixty private men.\textsuperscript{239}

The most notable differentiation received by the Independent Highland Companies, and the 43\textsuperscript{rd} after them, was the right to wear tartan and bear traditional arms. Such matters were increasingly important to Scots after tartan, bagpipes and bearing arms were forbidden by the Disarming Acts of 1715, 1726 and 1746.\textsuperscript{240} It is more likely that the British army’s aim was that such concessions would attract recruits rather than a wish to preserve or respect national distinctiveness. Indeed, once kilts proved unsuitable to campaigns in North America in 1762 they were quickly replaced with breeches.\textsuperscript{241} Until the regulations of the 1740 Clothing book and the Clothing Warrant of 1768, uniforms were similar through convention rather than through central control.\textsuperscript{242} As in regular regiments, commanders were responsible for providing clothing and consequently variations occurred because of poor supplies, inconsistency of command, petty corruption and a lack of a regiment’s continuity of existence.

\textsuperscript{238} One of many versions of ‘surgeon’ in eighteenth century spelling. See Glossary.
\textsuperscript{239} FCA A/AAF/40/30/5/1, The Return of the Strength of the Royal Regiment of North British Fuziliers, 1727.
\textsuperscript{240} Simpson, \textit{The Independent Highland Companies}, p.32-3.
\textsuperscript{241} Macpherson McCulloch, \textit{Sons of the Mountains}, I, p.55.
\textsuperscript{242} NWMS A.02.1950-58, A Representation of the Clothing of His Majesty’s Household and of all the Forces upon the Establishment of Great Britain and Ireland, 1742; Guy, \textit{Oeconomy and Discipline}, p.149 and Cochrane, \textit{Scottish Military Dress}, p.27.
The men of the 43rd were meant to wear green, blue or black coats combined with the traditional plaid and blue bonnets. Their officers wore scarlet coats with yellow or buff facings. In reality, though, they often wore their own clothing, as they had as Independent Companies or when a company was raised quickly. This was not unusual; the Scots Fusiliers were raised so quickly in 1678 that no time was available to order uniforms. Consequently, they were clothed in locally produced cloth and gained the nickname ‘Mar’s grey-breeks’. The use of tartan by both loyal and Jacobite Highlanders caused problems distinguishing between them during the ’45. After Falkirk, soldiers had to be reminded that loyal clansmen wore a black cockade to differentiate them from the white-cockade wearing Jacobites.

Concessions made to Scottish regiments of the line demonstrate both an awareness of nationality and the irrelevance of nationality to the British army. Most obviously, recognition of their Scottish background was given in their names; each of the regiments used here included Scots (or North British) in their names. Similarly, the Scots Fusiliers were permitted to wear a badge depicting a green thistle on a red background enclosed by a yellow border, rather than the usual white horse of Hanover; an obvious statement of their Scottish origins. However, the Royal Scots was also the 1st Regiment of Foot, an important position of seniority that demonstrated the importance of

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244 Mackay Scobie, ‘The Highland Independent Companies’, p.15.
247 Reid, *Cumberland’s Army*, p.38.
age and experience regardless of nationality, which granted them alone the privilege of a permanent second battalion.\textsuperscript{248} Similarly, the Scottish origins of regiments made no difference to the rules regarding uniform and appearance. The Scots Fusiliers wore grenadier caps in line with other fusilier regiments and the Royal Scots were awarded the same uniform designator of blue linings to their coats when awarded ‘Royal’ status in 1684.\textsuperscript{249}

The role and positioning of a regiment during a campaign or a battle is revealing of the level of trust the British army and its commanders placed in it. The complexity of Scotland’s relationship with England meant that, with Scottish regiments, such decisions took into account issues of loyalty, the nationality of the opposition and the geographical location of the campaign and battle. The Royal Scots, Scots Fusiliers, Scots Greys and 43rd were trusted in conventional wars on the continent. However, when facing Jacobite rebels in Scotland the British army was more wary as Scottish regiments were not without evidence of Jacobite sympathies. Twenty officers and 540 men of the Royal Scots had mutinied at Ipswich on 8\textsuperscript{th} March 1689, declared for James II and marched back to Scotland.\textsuperscript{250} A retired soldier, known as Finlay, of the Royal Scots became the leader of anti-Union riots in Glasgow in 1706 and Lord George Murray, later a Jacobite general during the ’45, held a commission with the Royal Scots from 1710 to 1715 when he first joined the rebels.\textsuperscript{251} In September or October 1715, Lieutenant-Colonel William Paul of the Royal Scots was discovered with a commission from James III. He was

\begin{footnotes}\textsuperscript{248} Scouller, \textit{The Armies of Queen Anne}, p.97. \\
\textsuperscript{249} Cochrane, \textit{Scottish Military Dress}, p.18, 112 and Reid, \textit{Cumberland’s Army}, p.38. \\
\textsuperscript{250} Ellestad, ‘The Mutinies of 1689’, p.9-11, 16, 17, 19. \\
arrested but cleared by the testimony of others.\textsuperscript{252} In October 1745, a soldier of the Royal Scots quartered at Pontefract “had a thousand stripes given him…for drinking the Pretender’s health, and for saying that half the regiment would run away and join him, if they were sent to engage; he was almost cut to pieces, none showing him any mercy.”\textsuperscript{253}

Despite all these examples of the mixed loyalties of the officers and men of the Royal Scots, they were trusted to fight. Their Second Battalion were the only Scottish regiment of foot at Falkirk in January 1746, positioned in the first line of infantry behind a line of dragoons.\textsuperscript{254} Their position on the right wing at Culloden was a traditional mark of honour; its seniority in the regimental hierarchy and proven history of standing under fire perhaps outweighing any doubts about its loyalty.\textsuperscript{255} The Scots Fusiliers fought at Sheriffmuir in 1715 despite the Earl of Mar, the son of their founder, commanding the opposing Jacobite army\textsuperscript{256} and were part of the force that re-took Carlisle and fought at Culloden in 1746\textsuperscript{257} despite the conflict of interest when two of its captains, James and John Chisholm, faced the charge of Clan Chattan at Culloden led by their younger brother Roderick Og Chisholm.\textsuperscript{258} The Scots Greys were also present in Scotland during the ’15, fighting in skirmishes at Kinross and Dunfermline and at Sheriffmuir, and in the Battle of

\textsuperscript{253} Duffy, The ’45, p.128.
\textsuperscript{255} Duffy, The ’45, p.578.
\textsuperscript{256} Mileham, The Scottish Regiments, p.89.
\textsuperscript{257} Ibid, p.89 and Duffy, The ’45, p.578.
\textsuperscript{258} Reid, Cumberland’s Army, p.39 and 60. James and John are mistakenly recorded as members of the Royal Scots in Prebble’s Culloden and Royle’s The Royal Scots. J.Prebble, Culloden (Harmondsworth, 1972), p.94-5 and Royle, The Royal Scots, p.48-9.
From 1726 to 1729, Lieutenant John Roy Stewart had served in the Scots Greys but had joined the Jacobites, eventually raising the Edinburgh Regiment during the ’45, when he failed to get a commission to the newly raised 43rd. This would have had no bearing on the decision to keep the regiment in Flanders during the ’45 but was more likely due to the greater use dragoons had there than in the mountainous terrain of the Highlands.

The deployment of the Independent Highland Companies and later 43rd reflects the level of trust the British army, and thus the government, held in them as Highlanders. In 1689, they formed part of the force that met the Jacobites at Killiecrankie, and were used as garrison forces to subdue disaffected activity in the Highlands. They were trusted with the difficult task of guarding the rear of several retreats in Flanders during 1747 and 1748 but were mistrusted when placed near to their fellow countrymen. Therefore, though the 43rd was recalled to Britain in August 1745 it was posted along the Kent coastline to guard against invasion. Despite the lengthy list of Jacobite-related incidents in the Royal Scots’ history, and examples of disloyalty during rebellions, their positioning during the ’15 and ’45 was unmatched by any other Scottish regiment. Similarly, the placement of the 43rd at the furthest end of the country indicates that although regiments of the line were trusted, the newly raised and inexperienced 43rd was

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262 Macpherson McCulloch, *Sons of the Mountains*, I, p.3.
not. The British army, therefore, clearly regarded evidence of service and ability as more important than nationality.

**Conclusion**

From the fourteenth to the eighteenth century, a series of changes in power within and between western nation states, the impact of the ‘military revolution’ on army sizes and the changing attitude towards Scottish soldiers fundamentally altered the Scottish mercenary tradition. The position of Scotland as a vulnerable border nation and its enmity with England encouraged early military co-operation with France. Both led to the exchange of troops. This began the practise of Scots serving in Scottish regiments on permanent loan to foreign Establishments. Scotland’s weak government, its isolation and difficult terrain, and its history of internal warfare, led to a highly militarised society. These factors were especially prominent in the Highlands, with the added factors of a clan system that evolved to protect a community through a strong sense of filial loyalty. Subsistence agriculture and little industry meant many men, at all levels of society, looked to military service for their livelihood. Very few beyond the Scottish crown could maintain large bodies of troops, therefore many Scots looked for employment abroad. The culture of filial and hierarchical loyalty in clan society lent itself to bands of soldiers led by clan gentry. The frequent wars on the continent provided ample opportunity for these ‘free-lance’ regiments of mercenaries to find employment. In turn, foreign rulers gained ready-formed regiments. Scottish regiments were particularly prized for their martial culture and, after the Reformation, their religious and moral standards.
The technological developments of the ‘military revolution’ changed tactics and made disciplined troops a requirement. Such troops were moulded and perfected in repeated wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The militarily inclined leaders of Sweden, Russia and the United Provinces, and the position of Denmark, Prussia and France at the centre of those wars caused particular progress towards increasingly professional armies. The religious nature of the seventeenth century conflicts and the shared Protestantism of Scotland, Sweden and the United Provinces created an environment where Scots were well placed to benefit from the developments being made in the art of war. This added to their reputation and made them more attractive as ‘free-lance’ regiments in search of employers.

The European responsibilities of William III and the Hanoverians in the frequent continental wars of the period ensured that England and Scotland, acting as one since the Union of Crowns, became increasingly involved in continental power struggles after the Glorious Revolution. This new need for the army and the improvements in discipline demanded by the ‘military revolution’ eventually overcame Britain’s unusual anathema towards standing armies. From the War of the Spanish Succession, the British army was expanding, despite reductions in peacetime, and men were needed to fill the new regiments and replace casualties. The reputation Scots had gained amongst continental nations now began to attract British politicians. However, the frequent Jacobite rebellions in Scotland and the Jacobite use of tartan that belied the international make up of the Jacobite movement prevented the government and crown from trusting Highlanders as source of recruitment. By the 1750s, however, the decreasingly active
Jacobites and the demands for soldiers to serve in the trans-Atlantic Seven Years War overcame public and political mistrust. For the first time since the 1739 embodiment of the Independent Highland Companies, the government began systematically targeting Scots, and Highlanders in particular, for military service in the British army. This change coincided with the growing strength of nation states on the continent, which could now raise and maintain armies of their own nationals. Consequently, those Scots who, for the same motives of religion, politics and nation-building as their forbears sought military service as a profession could now find opportunities within the British army. The obvious exception to this was the Scots who had chosen service abroad because of voluntary or involuntary exile. Many continued to serve abroad under sympathetic governments, though some used the British government’s need for troops in the 1750s to their advantage and gained commissions in order to rehabilitate themselves or their families for past disloyalty through government service.
CHAPTER TWO: THE SCOTTISH SOLDIER’S EXPERIENCE

Introduction

This chapter addresses the lives of Scottish soldiers of the rank and file in the British army between the Union and the end of the ’45. Where appropriate, to provide a wider context, this interval is extended, with the particular intention to show how the Union changed army life. Though officers are also considered where their experiences differ from that of their men, specific focus on their lives and careers is reserved for Chapter Three ‘Scottish Soldiers and the British State.’ The present chapter surveys the soldier’s life within the British army, from recruitment, training and billeting to his function throughout his career. The first section examines recruitment of the rank and file, the methods used to attract volunteers, the laws that allowed impressment, the requirements for enlisting and the reasons for enlistment. This leads to investigation of what soldiers could expect upon enlistment, including pay, the provision of equipment and uniforms and the opportunity to maintain a wife and family ‘on the strength’. The methods of obtaining a commission by officers are examined and compared: patronage, purchase and meritocracy. The reasons for choosing military service are explored. Discipline is investigated to discover why it was needed and how it was enforced. The roles and responsibilities of soldiers are explored to establish their duties with particular emphasis on the impact these duties had on the civil-military relationship. A section on billeting examines soldiers’ accommodation and the extent to which it affect their relationships with the communities they lived amongst. Particular attention is given to how this changed over the period of interest, including the impact of evolving laws.
Joining the colours

The official method of recruitment was temporarily to empower an officer or sergeant to form a recruitment party. Accompanied by a drummer, or piper in Scotland, they moved around a particular area, attracting possible recruits with their music and speeches.¹ These promoted the success, glory and long history of the regiment, and suggested promises of prize money, adventure and secure employment: “The martial sights and sound of this little band, felt his heart beat time to the trumpet and drum.”² However, recruiting parties had a bad reputation for dishonesty and trickery to achieve their quota. Many claimed they were drunk when they had been recruited. Colonel Blackader’s diary provides unwitting evidence of the typical style of recruitment, when he complained on 15th February 1705 “Soberiety itself is here a bar to success.”³

In order to combat these criticisms, recruits were obliged to sign or make their marks and hear the Articles of War before they were considered enlisted. The Articles contained all the rules and regulations of the army by which the soldier had to live, and the punishments for failing to do so. Additionally, magistrates and JPs, to whom recruits could volunteer if recruiting parties were absent, had their authority extended so that enlistment was only considered legitimate once an oath was sworn before them.⁴ The British army preferred volunteers rather than impressed men, unlike seventeenth-century

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² W. Thomson, Memoirs of the life and gallant exploits of the old Highlander, Serjeant Donald Macleod, who, having returned, wounded, with the corpse of General Wolfe, from Quebec, was admitted an out-pensioner of Chelsea Hospital, in 1759; and is now in the CIII.d year of his age (London, 1791), p.29.
⁴ Houlding, Fit for Service, p.117 and H.C. McCorry, “Besides, he was very drunk at the time..”: Desertion and Discipline, North Britain, 1751-1753’, Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, 70:283, Autumn 1992, p.190, 191, 192, 194, 196.
Sweden and Denmark, where conscription, termed ‘indelningsverk’, was used.\textsuperscript{5} Impressment and conscription brought public outrage and disorderliness, as well as having a negative effect on the labouring poor, disrupting agricultural production and demographics. Volunteer recruits with skills or trade backgrounds, however, were in demand by a self-sufficient army.\textsuperscript{6} Though the Royal Navy had long used impressment, the army usually secured sufficient volunteers and rarely needed impressment or conscription. Its unusually small size by continental standards\textsuperscript{7} meant it was easier to fill the other ranks through voluntary means. However, occasionally this system needed reinforcement. In unusual circumstances, such as when recruitment numbers dipped or during rebellions, contracts for the duration, for three or four years, or for service only within Britain, were offered. Rebellions, especially when they occurred during a war, caused a double drain on skilled artisans and labourers, leading to problems in agricultural productivity and declining birth rates as recruits for both home defence and service abroad were sought. In the ’15, the army had recently been reduced after the Treaty of Utrecht, while in the ’45 it had already been recruiting for six years for the War of the Austrian Succession. Therefore, during the ’15, the army offered service that would end three months after the threat had passed, while during the ’45 the army offered

three year contracts. Volunteers were enticed with a reward of two guineas and a crown on enlistment, while those bringing ‘volunteers’ to serve would also receive one crown.

The usual duration of service was for life, a practice that did not end until 1795. This had the potential effect of draining the male population, especially in times of war. In reality service was often shorter. The legacy of public and political distrust of standing armies, and the dislike of spending money to retain them, meant that regiments were frequently raised and disbanded as budgets were enlarged or reduced with war and peace. Even if a regiment was retained, it was nearly always reduced in size on the coming of peace, so the rank and file rarely spent more than a few years in the army. Chelsea Hospital documents from 1755 record service lengths of between two and forty-five years, with a mean average of nineteen years. However, those who wished to make a career of military service could choose to re-join other regiments, as Macleod and McBane did, four and six times respectively.

Famous, long-established regiments, with seniority in the hierarchy, could promise security of employment, and attracted reliable recruits who would consider a long-term commitment to army service. Newer regiments could turn their probably brief existence to their advantage by effectively offering a term of service for the duration. The frequency with which Chelsea Pensioners cited “Old

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10 Houlding, Fit for Service, p.118.  
12 NWMS M.1975.5, Examination Book of the Chelsea Board held at Perth and Aberdeen. Figures based on records of nine Scottish soldiers examined between 10th and 25th November 1755.  
Age” as a reason for admittance\textsuperscript{14} suggests that though men enlisted with the knowledge that they would probably serve only for the duration, many chose re-enlistment to remain in the army for life.

Recruitment took place in the winter when campaigning was not possible, and officers could be encouraged to recruitment duty by the prospect of visiting home and family. It also allowed out of work agricultural labourers to be targeted without affecting agricultural productivity.\textsuperscript{15} Rebellions, however, did not fit the timetables of conventional warfare, so when the ’15 began in September the army struggled to find temporary recruits as the harvest occupied labourers.\textsuperscript{16} By October, the harvest was finished and enlistment increased.\textsuperscript{17}

In order to comply with the requirements for recruitment to the regular army, a potential soldier needed to be Protestant, not lame or prone to fits, with full use of both arms and legs, not in an apprenticeship or the militia, and be over five foot six inches tall. This last requirement was waived during times of acute need for manpower.\textsuperscript{18} Those that entered the army as criminals had to be over seventeen and under forty-five, over four foot, four inches tall and Protestant.\textsuperscript{19} The ‘Orders & Instructions to the Recruiting Parties’ as recorded by Cumberland’s ADC on 19\textsuperscript{th} May 1746, specified that recruits had to be between the ages of seventeen and thirty, over five foot five inches, unless they

\textsuperscript{14} NWMS M.1975.5, Examination Book of the Chelsea Board held at Perth and Aberdeen, 12\textsuperscript{th} November 1755.
\textsuperscript{15} Houlding, \textit{Fit for Service}, p.117.
\textsuperscript{16} TNA SP54/8/106, James Cockburne to Mr Pringle, Camp at Stirling, 26\textsuperscript{th} September 1715.
\textsuperscript{17} TNA SP54/9/90, Printed proclamation issued by Argyll, Stirling, 27\textsuperscript{th} October 1715.
\textsuperscript{18} Houlding, \textit{Fit for Service}, p.117.
were young enough to still be growing, in which case half an inch grace was allowed.\textsuperscript{20} The peacetime stipulation of five foot six inches in height compared to the mid-rebellion recruitment condition of five foot five or even only five foot reveals which criteria the army considered vital and those on which they were prepared to compromise. Officers were instructed to carefully examine recruits for “sores or Ruptures” – a stipulation important enough that if any arrived at the regiment with sores, the charge for enlisting that man and his subsistence pay would be taken from the officer responsible for recruiting him.\textsuperscript{21}

Once enlisted, a recruit received up to four pounds (Sterling) bounty money. Though a good incentive, it also encouraged a culture of ‘bounty-jumpers’ who made a living enlisting, deserting and re-enlisting. Less scrupulous recruiting officers turned a blind eye to this, as the enlistment still fulfilled their quota.\textsuperscript{22} Each recruit entering as a private was entitled to wages of 8d per day.\textsuperscript{23} However, from this, stoppages were made; 2d for clothing and expenses and further amounts for the regimental agent, regimental surgeon and surgeon’s mate.\textsuperscript{24} In 1708, the Board of General Officers took on the role of inspecting uniforms to ensure they were the standardised, approved version, in an attempt to reduce corruption, as colonels commonly bought cheaper fabric than they claimed for from the government and kept the difference. Though the 1708 changes reduced variations in uniforms, it remained the regiment’s duty to provide them, so both

\textsuperscript{20} BL Hardwick Papers Add. MS.36257 f.104-105, Orderly Book of Joseph Yorke.  
\textsuperscript{21} BL Hardwick Papers Add. MS.36257 f.104-105, Orderly Book of Joseph Yorke.  
\textsuperscript{24} Rogers, \textit{The British Army}, p.309.
irregularities and petty corruption continued.\textsuperscript{25} Standardisation of uniforms and equipment was not achieved until the 1750s.\textsuperscript{26} Expenses for accommodation and food, typically bread, vegetables and cheese, were taken from subsistence pay.\textsuperscript{27} All other products and requirements were paid from the remainder of pay, minus stoppages, which was usually issued every two months, though a contemporary account recalled payday on Wednesdays and Saturdays – further evidence of ‘the custom of the army’ creating a lack of standard practise.\textsuperscript{28} In reality, privates rarely got a minimum amount of 1d per day until 1847.\textsuperscript{29}

Uniforms and some equipment were provided by regiments from the money allocated to them by parliament and distributed by the Quartermaster-General.\textsuperscript{30} The only obligation on colonels was to provide swords to officers. Muskets were supplied by the Ordnance Office, which began stockpiling separate parts after the 1715 ‘Ordnance System of Manufacture’. However, these were only assembled when needed and the Ordnance Office took on average three years to replace worn out weapons. Each man was issued with sixty to 120 charges every year during peace, but training took place using ‘squibs’ as charges were expensive. The lack of standardisation in weapons and the lack of opportunity to train with live ammunition meant proficiency was dependent on the interest levels and ability of each regiments’ colonel and officers, and could

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{25} Rogers, \textit{The British Army}, p.46.
\textsuperscript{26} \textit{Ibid}, p.65.
\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Ibid}, p.83-4.
\textsuperscript{29} Holmes, \textit{Redcoat}, p.309.
\textsuperscript{30} Rogers, \textit{The British Army}, p.45-6, 48
\end{footnotesize}
deteriorate alarmingly during peacetime.\textsuperscript{31} Cavalry deductions also included stoppages for extra equipment, and so were given extra funds for ‘grass money’. To compensate for the money lost to the extra equipment, horses were put out to graze rather than being given cut grass, straw or hay; another example of small-scale but endemic corruption.\textsuperscript{32}

Another entitlement of the rank and file was that some could be accompanied by their wives and families. This number was strictly regulated as they were financially kept by the regiment.\textsuperscript{33} Therefore, four to twelve per cent of wives were kept ‘on the strength’. They alone amongst the camp followers were entitled to follow the army abroad and to earn extra money by acting as laundresses, cooks and nurses.\textsuperscript{34} Early smaller barracks in Scotland had no space allocated for wives, but they were permitted to live in the villages nearby. Once larger barracks were built within the new forts wives ‘on the strength’ could sleep with their husbands within the barracks. Unofficial camp followers, including families, still marched with the army, but without any privileges, the toleration of their presence depending on the situation and commander. Cumberland, for example, tolerated them but included them under the same rules and punishments as the soldiers.\textsuperscript{35} Before the battle of Culloden, Cumberland’s order book reveals he issued orders to the women just as he ordered his soldiers, commanding “The…Women, to

\textsuperscript{31} Houlding, \textit{Fit for Service}, p.138, 140-1, 143, 145, 150.
\textsuperscript{32} Rogers, \textit{The British Army}, p.47.
\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Ibid}, p.98-9.
\textsuperscript{35} BL Hardwick Papers Add. MS.36257 f.52, Orderly Book of Joseph Yorke.
march & continue wth their Regiments.”36 On 23rd April and 8th July Cumberland ordered that any woman or soldier found stealing forage or selling on meal would be whipped.37

Men sought service in the army for many reasons. A large incentive was to escape problems in the civilian world. Unemployment, debts, poor family life or apprenticeships were common reasons that pushed men into the army.38 The memoir of McBane includes using deployment to Flanders as a way to escape the vengeance of the brothers of a woman he had tricked into a false marriage.39 The standard start of most military memoirs is entering the army to escape bad masters in apprenticeships.40 This stereotype was widespread in eighteenth century culture despite the army’s strict rules excluding apprentices from recruitment and its policy of returning them to their masters in order to protect skilled trades.41

A major factor that attracted men to military service was the inducement of regular food, pay and clothing, items not easily found in the precarious civilian life of the common man. This promise was, however, stronger than the reality. Pay was rarely regular, brief delays being caused by transportation of money when on campaign, to decades of procrastination, the fault of a reluctant parliaments and a parsimonious treasury.42 However, for the volunteer aged over thirty with a wife and probably family

36 BL Hardwick Papers Add. MS.36257 f.52 and Add. MS.36257 f.57, Orderly Book of Joseph Yorke.
37 BL Hardwick Papers Add. MS.36257 f.70 and Add.MS. 36457 f.139, Orderly Book of Joseph Yorke.
42 Holmes, Redcoat, p.310.
to support,\textsuperscript{43} civilian life offered little job security or opportunity for improvement. The army’s awareness of money as a motivator to recruitment is clear from the emphasis placed on bounty and prize money by recruiting parties. They neglected, however, to remind potential recruits that, once prize money was shared within a regiment, a soldier’s share was minimal.\textsuperscript{44} British army pay was lower than the average civilian wage, but, unlike seasonal work or fluctuating pay depending on economic circumstance in the civilian world, army pay was at least, promised to be consistent.\textsuperscript{45}

The army also offered men a career and comrades, evidenced by the frequent re-enlistment of men returned to civilian life once regiments were disbanded; McBane and Macleod, though both Highlanders, found support when unemployed not from family or clan but from the army.\textsuperscript{46} For many Scots, military service in the British army was a continuation of the old Scottish custom of military service to their chief. Highland chiefs and tacksmen – the Highland gentry – were aware of this and took advantage of the traditional culture of obedience and deference to the clan elite, and loyalties to clan, family and community to maximise recruits. After the embodiment of the first Highland regiment, the 43\textsuperscript{rd}, in 1739, the Highlands were especially targeted. Here, filial allegiances were stronger and more persistent than the mere historical legacy for Lowlanders. Sir James Campbell of Lawers (1680-1745) was specifically chosen as recruitment officer for the Scots Fusiliers during the War of the Spanish Succession.

\textsuperscript{43} Gilbert, ‘An analysis’, p.41.
\textsuperscript{45} Holmes, \textit{Redcoat}, p.309.
\textsuperscript{46} McBane, \textit{The Expert Sword-Man’s Companion}, p.25, 28, 29, 45 and Thomson, \textit{Memoirs of the life}, p.29, 43, 75, 76.
because he could attract his own tenants.\textsuperscript{47} The Independent Highland Companies, prior to their embodiment, employed the same tactic; commissions for companies were given to the gentlemen of loyal clans who could then recruit from that clan. This reassured the government – always suspicious that all Scots, especially Highlanders, were potential rebels – of the loyalty of both gentlemen and the rank and file. It also ensured recruitment was targeted on a group of Scots not generally sought for regular regiments.\textsuperscript{48}

Even when the clan structure was declining, Scottish officers continued to promote the notion of clan loyalties to London in order to get colonelcies and commissions.\textsuperscript{49} Some had a real sense of responsibility for soldiers under their command who they had recruited. In 1783, Norman Macleod of Macleod objected to his superiors when he was told to transfer the Highlanders he had recruited from his own clan to other regiments. He feared he would “never again visit my faithful people” because his word as a gentleman would be ruined after he had used the remnants of the old powers of patronage and protection of clan gentleman over clansmen to recruit them in return for promises of protection.\textsuperscript{50} By contrast, General Fraser showed no obvious reaction to a placement in Portugal instead of deploying with his regiment in 1762 to Cuba where death from disease was a probability.\textsuperscript{51}

\textsuperscript{50} \textit{Ibid}, p.200-1.
The army also exploited the attraction of a regiment’s history, reputation and the promise of adventure when recruiting. These were symbolised by the flags and uniforms of the recruiting party – a significant fact in a largely illiterate world. Each company had its own colours, providing a focus for morale and identity, as well as the Union flag and regimental colours, which became standardised in 1751. Posters were used, suggesting better literacy than widely assumed. Plays and songs were also common methods of attracting attention, though they might have had less of an impact on Presbyterian Scotland. More influential was the involvement of ministers and local gentry making speeches and issuing proclamations to encourage volunteers, for example at the start of the ‘15. The army, and therefore the government, was aware of the power of visual identifiers in recruitment. Some Scottish regiments from the Restoration, the Independent Highland Companies, and later Highland regiments were permitted specific privileges including the use of kilts, traditional arms and bagpipers. The memoir of Macleod clearly shows how “the highland dress and music, and…the society of his countrymen” helped him to enlist in 1720. These privileges gained extra potency when kilts, bagpipes and bearing arms were banned elsewhere by the Disarming Act of 1746, which sought to break the independence of the clans to prevent future Jacobite

53 Rogers, The British Army, p.43.
55 Thomson, Memoirs of the life, p.43.
uprisings.\textsuperscript{56} Once these were illegal in civilian life, the only way to continue personal use of such traditions was by enlisting in a Highland regiment.

Though a sense of ‘Scottishness’ – loyalty to clan gentry and the wearing of traditional clothing – were effective incentives to recruitment, British national identity and patriotism were weaker concepts during the first half of the eighteenth century. Colley and Bowen argue that the common threat of the French was enough to create a sense of ‘Britishness’ that inspired men to enlist.\textsuperscript{57} However, this threat of republican revolution and anarchy was not present until end of the eighteenth century, so it was the need to defend homes, families and livelihoods from the Jacobites that encouraged men to enlist from the end of the seventeenth century. This was reinforced by the additional threat of French invasion: in only half a century a Franco-Jacobite invasion or threat had occurred in 1708, 1715, 1722, 1733, 1744, 1745 and 1759.

A much more effective motivator than patriotism was religion and politics. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it was impossible to think of one without the other as religious principles gave legitimacy to political authority. These beliefs were so strongly held that many were prepared to fight for them. The Cameronian regiment was formed in 1689 specifically to allow the followers of Presbyterian preacher Richard Cameron in a ‘Protestant crusade’ to defend the Covenanting values of strong Presbyterian religion and civil liberties. These principles, embodied in the Glorious

\textsuperscript{56} A first offence was punishable by six months in prison while the second offence meant transportation for seven years. P. Cochrane, \textit{Scottish Military Dress} (London, New York and Sydney, 1987), p.35.
Revolution, were under threat from Jacobite and therefore Catholic and Episcopalian rebels. The government clearly recognised the value of such motivated soldiers because they made a rare concession that the Cameronians could retain Ministers and Elders of their church, a concession not allowed to any other regiment. The persistent doubts felt by Blackader about the conflict between his faith and military service demonstrate how important these concessions were for the Cameronians to validate their military activities. Many joined the army, both on short contracts and in normal service, to defend principles and beliefs. The return of a Stuart dynasty was objected to because of the loss of constitutional changes it would entail, changes gained at the Glorious Revolution that tamed the power of the crown and created a stronger, protected parliament. It brought the risk of a return to Catholicism and the oppressive foreign ‘yoke of Rome’. The Union of 1707 would also be under threat of reversal. Many Scots, who had gained from trade and tax concessions, decided to fight to defend it, and so 700 men travelled from Glasgow to Stirling in September 1715 to enlist against the threat of Jacobite rebellion. Many then served under Blackader, defending Stirling during the Battle of Sheriffmuir.

Officers were drawn from the landed gentry class, lesser gentry, educated but landless gentlemen, and from those promoted from the other ranks. Though officers

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61 TNA SP54/8/82, [James Cockburne] to unknown, Edinburgh, 22nd September 1715 and Houston, *Scottish Literacy*, p.16.
were expected to be gentlemen, with their natural disposition towards organising and ordering and reflecting the strong social hierarchy of society, a surprising number of sergeants were promoted to become officers. Many of these were created to staff the newer regiments raised to fulfil increasing colonial commitments in the Americas and India. Between 1739 and 1748, 200 sergeants were commissioned from the other ranks for this purpose.\footnote{Houlding, \textit{Fit for Service}, p.105.}

The recruitment of officers was approached differently from that of the other ranks. Officers required commissions to join a particular regiment, which were purchased. Until the purchase system was finally abolished in 1872, two-thirds of officers gained their commissions through purchase using the influences of patronage, nepotism, wealth and personal merit.\footnote{R. Cowley and G. Parker (eds), \textit{The Reader's Companion to Military History} (New York, 1996) p.345 and Houlding, \textit{Fit for Service}, p.100.}

The rejection of social rank within the New Model Army began the belief that the purchase system encouraged corruption, though this was ignored by Charles II and James II who both recognised it as a way to reduce government and crown expenditure.\footnote{A. Bruce, \textit{The Purchase System in the British Army, 1660-1871} (London, 1980), p.7, 11, 16 and J. Black, \textit{European Warfare, 1660-1815} (London, 1994), p.88.}

It was briefly declared illegal in 1684, though even James II continued to approve bought commissions. William tried to control it through the 1695 Mutiny Act but the relevant clause had to be removed in 1701.\footnote{Bruce, \textit{The Purchase System}, p.17-8.}

Not until 1717 did the Board of General Officers agree that the system would be phased out, though this too failed as officers protested it would undercut the value of existing commissions and many were forced to sell for less than they had originally invested as new officers did not know if their purchases would have value at their own retirement.\footnote{Ibid, p.23-4.}
William III, Anne, George I and George II were against the use of purchase for commissions. They saw an inefficient system that promoted wealth rather than professionalism. Petty corruption of the system also existed as was demonstrated in 1705 when Anne had to ban the purchase of commissions for children and youths. Though they were bought as investment for the boys’ later military education, such practices created a shortage of posts for the current generation.\(^{69}\) Many, however, believed the purchase system encouraged a professional attitude towards soldiering. Men who bought and traded on commissions were focused on long-term military careers not the short-term service for plunder associated with mercenaries. Placing a monetary value on commissions also allowed officers to invest in their advancement, almost as a form of speculation similar to buying shares.\(^{70}\) The tiered scale of value also aided the impoverished but ambitious gentleman who could enter the army as the lowest commissioned grade and work his way up to titles, posts, wealth and respect, as Field-Marshal Ligonier had.\(^{71}\) Indeed, the purchase system and the hierarchy of regiments provided a way for officers to monitor their own and others’ improvement. Marlborough believed private purchase between individuals prevented government and crown interference. He also saw from personal experience that the sale of a dead officer’s commission went to aid his family, to paying outstanding debts which would otherwise fall to the regiment and that private purchase was a quicker transaction than if it had to go through government and crown approval process.\(^{72}\) The flamboyant style of cavalry regiments and the hierarchy of regiments that affected their permanence on the

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\(^{69}\) Bruce, *The Purchase System*, p.20.  
\(^{72}\) Bruce, *The Purchase System*, p.21.
Establishment meant that the cavalry and senior regiments had a plentiful supply of applicants.\textsuperscript{73} This left opportunities open for poorer or younger men to gain commissions in less glamorous and therefore cheaper regiments.

As commissions and promotions were dependent on the approval of a regiment’s colonel or commander, a major part of buying a commission was petitioning regimental agents, colonels or commanders of regiments. This was usually done through third parties, such as family or friends or by gaining the support of an influential patron who would look to your interests.\textsuperscript{74} Within this, personal merit was recognised, as some colonels’ desired promotion from within their own regiment only. When Blackader tried to sell the colonelcy of the Cameronians in 1711, he attempted to find the right man to replace him who possessed the qualities of character needed to continue the religious duty of the Cameronians. However, this attempt at promotion through meritocracy failed because the chosen candidate lacked the funds to buy it.\textsuperscript{75} Personal merit could be promoted in other ways, especially in the field. The hierarchy of commissions ensured that, on the death of senior officers in battle, promotions in the field would promote juniors or those who had shown ability.\textsuperscript{76} Sir Robert Munro of Fowlis and the 1st Earl of Orkney were rewarded with their own regiments after demonstrating leadership at

\textsuperscript{73} Houlding, \textit{Fit for Service}, p.126.
\textsuperscript{74} Holmes, \textit{Redcoat}, p.109; NWMS M.1992.279.2, George Brown to William Brown, Brussels, 14\textsuperscript{th} December 1743; FCA A/AAF/40/30/6/1, Earl of Rothes to Duke of Cumberland, Leslie, 2\textsuperscript{nd} January 1748; Earl of Rothes to Ligonier, London, 14\textsuperscript{th} June 1748; Ligonier to Earl of Rothes, Cyndhaven, 23\textsuperscript{rd} July 1748 and Earl of Rothes to Duke of Cumberland, Leslie, 17\textsuperscript{th} August 1748.
\textsuperscript{75} Crichton, \textit{The Life and Diary}, p.428-33.
\textsuperscript{76} Houlding, \textit{Fit for Service}, p.107.
Fontenoy (1745) and Steenkerke (1692), respectively. Though both George I and George II, in keeping with their desire to replace the British ‘custom of the army’ with regulations, tried to abolish purchase, the amount of money already invested in the system made it impossible to end. Consequently, they attempted to control it with regulations and promoted the use of meritocracy to encourage increased professionalism. This only had long term impact through their descendants. Both the Duke of Cumberland (1721-1765) son of George II, and Prince Frederick, Duke of York (1763-1827) son of George III, promoted meritocracy and oversaw dramatic developments in army structure that aimed to reduce corruption and inefficiency. However, during the first half of the eighteenth century, the fate of George Brown was more typical:

I am pretty well assured if it had depended on him (Mr Douglas of Covers) I would have been provided [with a commission]. but how can I reasonably expect to be preferred for nothing, when people of highest rank & best interests, are every day glad to have preferment [promotion] for money.”

Gentlemen had long viewed service in the army as an acceptable career; the belief that the army was filled with the dregs of society applied to the other ranks only. Military service had even greater appeal for younger sons, who would not inherit, and immigrants such as exiled Huguenots. The army provided the opportunity to create their own careers, reputations and fortunes. Ligonier, for example, left France as a young man and

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78 Houlding, Fit for Service, p.100, 107.
worked his way up through the ranks until he became Field Marshal and died an English earl. It was widely known that those with a professional attitude towards soldiering would be welcomed in the British army. Military service was also acceptable as part of a gentleman’s education. The Earl of Islay, though he later pursued a very successful legal career, spent time in Flanders between 1701 and 1705 and was consequently able to fight during the ’15. The educative role of military service is demonstrated in the number of commissions bought for infants and boys as investments; both Argyll and Islay were awarded commissions at fourteen and nineteen, and in 1764, seven of the cadets registered as attending the Royal Artillery College were still in the nursery.

For Scots, military service fulfilled several other requirements. In both the Highlands and Lowlands, martial culture had a long history. Though the Lowlands were increasingly de-militarised as reiving and border-conflicts ended in the mid-seventeenth century, both had a cultural history of ‘Free Service’, the gentry’ equivalent of ‘Scottish Service’. This gave legitimacy to military service as an honourable profession for gentlemen. Additionally, after a half-century of Jacobite activity, military service in the British army also provided an ideal way for Scots to seek rehabilitation with the establishment. Two notable examples were Major-General Simon Fraser, son of the

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80 Whitworth, Field Marshal Lord Ligonier, p.2-5, 392.
84 This was discussed in the introduction of Chapter One: Scotland’s Professional Soldiers.
beheaded 11th Lord Lovat, and Lieutenant-Colonel James Murray, a son and brother of active Jacobites. Fraser quickly offered a regiment to the government in 1757 at the start of the Seven Years War and spent seventeen years of military service in America and Portugal repairing the damage done by his father’s treason before the government returned the family’s estates in 1774. Murray spent fifty-three years serving in the army and retired a respected member of the establishment. Both these men, and many like them, had success in the military by promoting their links of clan and family that would ease recruitment of troops from their lands. Indeed Fraser’s first regiment, Fraser’s 63rd Highland Regiment, was largely recruited from Inverness-shire, the area of his family’s traditional estates. As the eighteenth century progressed, the influence of clan and family ties were based on increasingly tenuous links to old traditions. This contrasts against the experience of his father, Lord Lovat, who in 1688 raised Fraser men for the brother-in-law of his cousin, and therefore his clan chief, the future 1st Duke of Atholl, despite his personal dislike of the man and his politics.

Drill, discipline and punishment

Discipline was vital for any soldier, especially in the British army because of the circumstances that had set public and political attitudes against it. The cultural memory of the army as the oppressive arm of government during the Civil War and Interregnum, and as the enforcer of religious conformity in Scotland in the last decades of the seventeenth century, meant the army at the turn of the eighteenth century needed to

86 This was 63rd or 2nd Highland battalion that, in 1759, became the 78th.
87 ODNB Simon Fraser, Master of Lovat by Stuart Reid.
88 McCulloch, Sons of the Mountains, I, p.190-1 and ODNB James Murray by James Dreaper.
restore a tarnished reputation. The country’s preference for ‘blue water policy’ and a reluctance to pay the taxes to fund a bigger army meant that during the first half of the eighteenth century the army had a pressing need to win over public and politicians alike. In this respect, discipline – that is control – of soldiers both on and off the battlefield was necessary to improve civil-military relations.

Discipline on the battlefield was clearly essential. Developments in technology during the period Roberts termed the ‘military revolution’ had led to new strategies that required controlled coordination of firepower and manoeuvre.\textsuperscript{90} Such control and coordination was instilled through drill, therefore contemporary terminology regarded training as synonymous with discipline. To aid this, officers relied on drill books, and these were viewed as so vital that their regulation was one of the responsibilities of the Commander-in-Chief.\textsuperscript{91} Though drill books were issued by the army administration from the 1670s onwards, no new works were written between 1690 and 1727, and the Regulations issued in 1728 were then simply re-published until 1743.\textsuperscript{92} This stagnation had little detrimental effect however, as warfare advanced little over the early eighteenth century and the plethora of re-printed older works were invaluable to officers. Additionally, as officers were responsible for training, there was flexibility for them to adapt the manual to suit their experience and the peculiarities of their regiments.

\textsuperscript{91} Houlding, \textit{Fit for Service}, p.155.
\textsuperscript{92} \textit{Ibid}, p.173-5, 180.
Drill designed for training in conventional warfare against conventional foes was ineffectual in Scotland. The Highland tactics met during the Jacobite rebellions always initially wrong-footed the British army. The reliance on volley fire from a distance meant even those who might have been prepared, such as McBane who was raised in the Highlands, were shocked by the ferocity of the Highland Charge at Killiecrankie. The effect of the charge at Prestonpans was enough to force the majority of the British army out of Scotland. Though General Cope was criticised for this, a repeat at the left wing of the British lines at Falkirk showed that preparing solely for conventional fighting was a liability when faced with the unconventional tactics used by the Jacobites.

Discipline, both on and off the battlefield, was also vital to reduce desertion rates. Two of the few extant weekly returns of the period, both from October 1715, demonstrate that desertion was common-place. On the 1st October, of nine regiments, three had deserters, giving a total of nine deserters out of 2,053 troops that week. The return of 29th October reveals fifteen deserters of a total 1,511 troops for the nine (different) regiments listed. Dealing with desertion could also distract attention from soldier’s genuine duties; it took 600 men from the 3rd Foot Guards, fifty from the Horse Grenadiers and nineteen locally quartered troops of dragoons four days to intercept and return the 200 deserters of the 43rd Highland Regiment after they attempted to return to Scotland in

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95 TNA SP54/9/2E, ‘Weekly return off the Dragoons and Foot, Octor 1st 1715.’
96 TNA SP54/9/92, ‘A Weekly Return of the Foot and Dragoons, 29th Octor 1715.’ Though the total number of deserters is listed as thirteen, the figures for each regiment reveal the true total should be twelve.
1743. Once soldiers were able to be barracked together later in the century, supervision could be more easily maintained. However, the boredom of garrison duty often led to indiscipline. This had particular implications for Scotland, as the vast majority of early barracks and garrisons were concentrated there. The army addressed this by employing soldiers on extra duties such as road making or as labourers building the barracks themselves. General Hawley wrote in 1726 that to prevent “sloth and idleness,” road building “‘twould keep them in good discipline.” However, road building duty began to break down the barriers of normal army routine and in 1751 an order had to be issued specifically addressing road building parties to remind soldiers to salute their officers while working. This order was followed by wider standing orders in 1754, again specially addressing road building parties. Both orders suggest that a high standard of respect was expected to be maintained and that in normal army life this was achieved.

The army was also aware of the potential harm indiscipline could cause to civil-military relations while soldiers were in billets or barracks. One legacy of the fear of standing armies was that few barracks existed in Britain until at least the mid-eighteenth century. Those that did exist were small and largely focused on coastal or border areas. Consequently, when moving across country, men were billeted in towns and villages, but were often widely dispersed and separated from their officers. The consequence of this dispersal and consequent absence of authority was reduced control leading to increased

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drunkenness, fighting and lechery. While this behaviour would not have improved the public’s perception of soldiers it does suggest that soldiers were better behaved in the presence of their officers. Restored public opinion was needed to correct the impression that soldiers were mere mercenaries or recruited from the scum of society. From 1697, debate in Scotland began to question whether standing armies were the best option for defence. Enlightened thinking, based on Renaissance theory and propagated by Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun in a series of pamphlets, held that if a nation’s defence relied on militias drawn from that nation’s subjects, it would aid society. It was argued that participation in maintaining the peace and authority of the state through militia duty encouraged ‘civic virtù’ in ordinary men who, therefore, were invested in the stability of their own society. Standing armies, by contrast, were filled by mercenaries who had no connection to the society they fought for, no investment in its continuity and security beyond their payment. By the eighteenth century, this opinion was out of touch with reality, but was still believed because the rank and file were recruited from varied backgrounds that contained trouble-makers, adventurers and wild cards. As a few bad experiences and characters are more memorable than a conforming majority, it was these stories that spread to sustain the stereotype.

The poor reputation of soldiers in the British army was not entirely undeserved. Cases of murder were common. Sergeant Anthony Fitzpatrick was tried and found guilty

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100 McCorrey, “‘Besides, he was very drunk at the time..’”, 70:282, Summer 1992, p.114, 70:283, Autumn 1992, p.190, 196-7 and McBane, The Expert Sword-Man’s Companion, p.29-30.
101 Robertson, The Scottish Enlightenment, p.8-10, 13-6, 22-4, 31-2.
in November 1711 of killing his wife in Glasgow in the summer of 1710.\textsuperscript{103} It was violence between soldier and civilian, however, that confirmed the public’s worst fears and stereotypes, such as the two, almost simultaneous but separate, murders of civilians by soldiers in 1712 that caused “Turmult and Mob” in Scotland.\textsuperscript{104} One is discussed in relation to the Riot Act of 1715 later in this chapter, the second concerns Corporal John Brown of Sir Charles Hotham’s Regiment. In May 1712, he killed John Bennet in Perth and then fled. Brown returned two weeks later claiming the death was an accident but had feared the law. His fate is unknown, but the Lord Advocate of Scotland, James Stewart believed Brown had suffered “insufferable provocations” and that the case should be tried elsewhere to ensure fairness, demonstrating sympathy with the difficult role soldiers policing civilians faced. Many soldiers were given reprieves, perhaps because trained men were hard to replace, especially during war.\textsuperscript{105}

For Scottish soldiers and regiments, the need to improve reputations was particularly urgent, as they laboured under both the general slurs against soldiers, as well as the endemic suspicion of their loyalty. The army had recently turned against Charles I, and had abandoned James II for William III, with Scottish regiments and soldiers prominent amongst them. To this was added the fear that since the Stuarts’ repeated attempts to regain the throne that focused on Scotland, all Scots were secretly Jacobite rebels. The distance between London and Scotland, the many motivations that created

\textsuperscript{103} TNA SP54/4/88, Captain Brooks of Major-General Wightman’s Regiment to unknown, Glasgow, 22\textsuperscript{nd} August 1711; SP54/3/38, A.S. Wedderburn, John Montgomery, David Ross and G. Wessham to unknown, 30\textsuperscript{th} November 1708 and SP54/4/37, Sir James Stewart to unknown, 10\textsuperscript{th} November 1711.

\textsuperscript{104} TNA SP54/4/68, Sir James Stewart to unknown, 20\textsuperscript{th} May 1712.

\textsuperscript{105} TNA, SP54/4/69, Sir James Stewart to unknown, 29\textsuperscript{th} May 1712 and SP54/4/72, Sir James Stewart to unknown, 11\textsuperscript{th} June 1712 for the other.
seemingly random divisions between areas, communities and families and the convoluted nature of clan and family allegiances meant that few had the knowledge to distinguish between loyal and disloyal Scots. In the army, these suspicions affected the positioning of Scottish regiments. During the '15 and '45 rebellions, Scottish regiments that pre-dated the Union and who had shown adequate evidence of loyalty were trusted in the battle lines.106 Others, such as the 43rd Highlanders, were positioned with the baggage at Falkirk and Culloden, or kept on the south coast in Kent.107 Again, besides those that were genuinely Jacobite, the behaviour of the few indulging in the ‘cultural’ aspects of Jacobitism helped give credence to the myth. Soldiers were often accused of drinking the Pretender’s health while drunk, while members of the public made denunciations of a regiment’s behaviour.108 The institutional suspicion of Scots reached paranoia under Walpole who followed a strongly anti-Jacobite policy.109

In general, stereotypes have a basis in truth, but for the British army between the Union and the end of the '45, the suspicion that soldiers were disloyal, ill disciplined and a danger to society was slowly becoming increasingly false and out-dated. The army was entirely conscious of the need to improve the reputation of soldiers. Regiments traditionally performed a public parade on the eve of embarkation. The review of the 43rd Regiment at Finchley Common on 14th May 1743, for example, attracted large crowds

108 McCorrey, “'Besides, he was very drunk at the time..’”, 70:282, Summer 1992, p.142-5 and TNA, SP54/8/112C, Copy of denunciation of Elizabeth Kindnmouth, wife of William Kutherfoord of Edinburgh to unknown, 20th September 1715.
eager to see Highlanders in their kilts. The event was important enough for a painting of the parade to be commissioned that now hangs at the entrance of the officers’ mess of The Black Watch, 3rd Battalion, Royal Regiment of Scotland (3 Scots) in Fort George at Ardersier. To emphasise and increase the improvement in the reputation of the British army, it focused on improving its control over troops, and so improving the discipline and reliability of troops. The British army approached this through five methods: the issuing of orders and punishment to enforce them, the acceptance of duelling, the positive association of rewards both during and after service, and through legislation.

The Commander-in-Chief held the most effective position to influence discipline, firstly though drill but also through his commands and regulations. Marlborough, for example, issued two orders in Flanders on 11th June 1708 to protect the local civilians and their goods in order to end plundering. Depending on the severity of the infringement of this order, soldiers would either pay back the value of the goods taken or be sentenced to death. During the ’45, Cumberland issued frequent orders against plundering. In the week after Culloden, for example, five notices were issued and a court martial held to punish those who had transgressed them. Another part of Marlborough’s 1708 orders stated soldiers could not leave camp without permission, though McBane’s frequent adventures away from camp at all hours suggests such an order was difficult to enforce. Even in Scotland in 1746, when the conflict’s status as

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111 Houlding, Fit for Service, p.155.
112 NAM 1963-09-9-10, Two orders concerning discipline, Forbanck, 11th June 1708.
113 BL Hardwick Papers Add. MS.36257 f.60, 62, 64, 68, 71, Orderly Book of Joseph Yorke.
114 McBane, The Expert Sword-Man’s Companion, p.30, 33, 37, 43.
a rebellion allowed the relaxation of normal rules of engagement, the importance of maintaining discipline to protect access of food supplies is still clear. After the order of 17th April 1746 that the King’s Mills were “not to be damaged” had failed to deter plunderers, a guard had to be assigned to them on 18th April to “prevent further disorders.” Consequently, when on 21st April, Cumberland ordered that Lovat’s fisheries were out of bounds, the wording and potential punishment was uncompromising; the first man “who dares” to enter the fishery or take salmon or anyone who fails to stop the entry of salmon into camp would be hanged.

Punishment was designed to provide not just chastisement to offenders but an example to other soldiers. For example, of the 115 soldiers of the 43rd Highland Regiment found guilty of mutiny and desertion in 1743, only three were executed as representatives of all those found guilty. The remaining Highlanders were sent to serve in regiments in Gibraltar, Minorca, Georgia and the Leeward Isles, except the two who died in prison before transportation. Such deployment, the fear of which was one of the reasons the soldiers had deserted, was regarded as equivalent to the death penalty. The regiment in the Leeward Isles remained there for the next thirty-three years, while the regiment in Georgia were reduced by disease from 5,000 to 500 before being relocated. Therefore humiliation as well as pain was meted out. The public nature of punishments, conducted in front of the regiment, with the choice and severity of punishment at the regimental level court martial’s discretion, ensured that one soldier’s
crime affected all and so let down the whole regiment. In this way punishment was feared to the extent that one of the main excuses given for desertion at courts martial between 1751 and 1753 was the fear of punishment due.\textsuperscript{120} Punishments themselves depended on the severity of the crime, varying from corporal to capital. In an ascending scale, punishments included the ‘bastinade’, when the soles of the feet were beaten, floggings, being drummed out of the regiment with your crime written on a sign around the neck, to the death sentence carried out by hanging or being shot. Cases with possible capital punishment were decided by General Courts Martial and the sentence had to be approved by the Commander-in-Chief.\textsuperscript{121} Rather than extreme, such punishments were regarded as fair, and were therefore respected, because they mirrored civil punishments. Between 1688 and 1800 offences with a potential death penalty in civilian law had dramatically increased to 200, in what became known as the ‘Bloody Code’.\textsuperscript{122}

Another, somewhat surprising, method of discipline was the tacit acceptance of duelling. This involved both officers and other ranks from Colonel Gardiner, Lord George Murray and Colonel Blackader to Sergeants McBane and Macleod.\textsuperscript{123} Duelling was illegal in the eyes of both civil and military courts. Article XIX of the 1718 Articles of War stated that “Nor shall any Officer or Soldier presume to send a Challenge to any other Officer or Soldier, to fight a Duel, upon pain of being Cashier’d, if he be an Officer, or suffering the severest Corporal Punishment, if a Non-Commission Officer, or Private

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However, the culture of duelling had been brought to the army from civilian life (and interestingly survived in the army long after it declined from civilian life) and was not easily ignored, especially when the necessity of fulfilling ‘behaviour befitting a gentleman and an officer’ made duelling so common that even the pious Blackader was court-martialled for duelling in December 1691. The experiences of McBane and Macleod and the Article’s inclusion of soldiers suggests that duelling amongst the other ranks was so widespread that London was aware of it. Tacit acceptance could stray into active support. As a new soldier in 1690, McBane’s officer informed him “if any difference fell out betwixt two soldiers, they were obliged to decide it with their swords.” Even twenty-one years later, in 1711, when conscious efforts were underway to improve the discipline and order of the army, McBane’s officer sent him temporarily to another garrison to protect him from his vengeful business competitors. Recent, unpublished research has confirmed that duels among the other ranks functioned as an unofficial method of justice. This method was clearly consciously chosen by officers to settle small disputes and relieve tensions without resorting to higher regimental controls such as courts martial. The continuation of duelling in the British army long after it was proscribed by civil and military law, and its role as a form of justice sanctioned by

124 Article XIX of the 1718 Articles of War. *Rules and Articles for the Better Government of our Horse and Foot Guards, and all other ours land-forces in our kingdom of Great-Britain and Ireland, and dominions beyond the seas* (London and Dublin, 1718).
130 Ibid, p.44.
131 C. Marshall, *Fighting, Fornication, and Gentlemanly Instruction? The treatise of Sergeant Donald McBane*. I am grateful to Cai Marshall for allowing me access to this unpublished material.
officers but external of the army structure, reveals the weakness of central power in the army of the early eighteenth century. However, it provided strength at lower levels of the army that ensured an efficient, inexpensive method of relieving tensions and solving disputes that, unfortunately, left few records.

The British army in the early eighteenth century also sought to improve discipline through positive association. The knowledge that long service in the other ranks could be rewarded with a place in an invalid company or as a Chelsea Pensioner, kept soldiers and their families loyal to their regiment and the regime, and financially invested in the future. The Chelsea Hospital (founded in 1684) cared for wounded soldiers both as in- and out-patients. Of a sample of twenty-seven Scottish former soldiers examined in 1755 who had first been admitted to the Hospital between 1715 and 1754, the mean average length of time soldiers received a pension was ten years. The longest length was forty years and the shortest was one year. Of the sample, seven were wounded during the '45 and one during the '15, though admissions for consumption (tuberculosis), old age and Gravell (kidney stones) were also considered sufficient to gain the army's financial support.

For officers, the purchase system gave individuals a personal investment in their careers and long-term service, as the sale of their final rank provided their pension.

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134 NWMS M.1975.5, Examination Book of the Chelsea Board held at Perth and Aberdeen, 10th – 25th November 1755.
Financial gain became increasingly linked to career advancement rather than the short-term gain of looting, leading to an increasingly professional army. The rank and file could aspire to this, as promotion from the ranks was a common reward for good service. Sergeant Terence Molloy of Lee’s (55th) Regiment was promoted to lieutenant in the winter of 1745-6 after defending Ruthven from a Jacobite attack in August 1745 with only one corporal and twelve men. In order to improve ability, meritocracy and self-advancement, officers were encouraged to improve the soldiers under their command in a manner very similar to the nineteenth century introduction of education and moral welfare under the Duke of York and Edward Cardwell. In the eighteenth century races, competitions for the fastest or most accurate shot, and other games were used to encourage personal pride in themselves, their skills, and their regiment. It also reduced boredom that could lead to indiscipline, such as in the months after Culloden around Fort Augustus. The more formal education given to artillery officers and engineers at the Royal Military Academy at the Royal Arsenal at Woolwich from 1721 aimed to create not only a “complete officer”, competent in arithmetic, mechanics, gunnery, magazine and artillery technology, bridge building, surveying, land levelling and drainage, and French, but also a more mentally disciplined officer class that were invested in their career.

135 Bruce, *The Purchase System*, p.8, 21.
Spiritual guidance also provided a private form of discipline that could also provide another method of control exercised by the army. As already noted in Chapter One, Scots were well-known for their strong morals, and Scots continued to show evidence of strength of principle when serving in the British army.\(^{140}\) Blackader even continued to act for the Cameronians after his retirement, defending their right to their own mode of service at the General Assembly in 1714, when it was threatened to bring the Presbyterian service inline with the English manner of service.\(^{141}\) The governor of Fort William even went to some trouble to find a Gaelic speaking chaplain for Fort William in 1715.\(^{142}\) Cumberland ordered a “Divine Service of Thanksgiving” for the 20\(^{th}\) April 1746, the first Sunday after Culloden, with compulsory attendance, as was weekly attendance for all officers and soldiers as stipulated by the 1718 Articles of War.\(^{143}\) The extent of religion’s aid to the discipline of the majority of soldiers is debatable however, as Blackader’s frequent lamentations about the immorality of the soldiers of the British army attests.\(^{144}\)

Victory in battle also provided a way for the army to reward good behaviour and discipline on the battlefield. Those wounded were usually rewarded with ‘smart money’,\(^{145}\) a tradition adapted by the Earl of Findlater who donated twelve guineas to buy broth for each soldier injured at Culloden. The City of London also used financial


\(^{142}\) NAS GD220/5/472/22, J. Stirling to unknown, Fort William, 23\(^{rd}\) June 1715.


rewards by raising £4,000 (Sterling) for the men, NCOs and Argyllshire Militia who had fought or guarded the train during the battle.146 Cumberland personally paid sixteen guineas to those who captured colours and standards, half a crown for each musket or broadsword captured and a guinea to each man who, when captured by the Jacobites, refused to join them.147 Gestures such as this signalled an official mark of appreciation and acted as a replacement for plundering. Similarly, the completion of a military road between 1725 and 1760s was traditionally celebrated with a hog roast, occasionally attended by General Wade, as a sign of achievement and appreciation.148 Such actions were largely at the discretion of the individual officer as the emphasis on the regiment the military system meant that central power to provide guidelines was weak. Such examples do not, therefore, pre-suppose similar behaviour in all regiments. However, they do demonstrate that there was a clear desire to reward good behaviour as well as punish poor behaviour in the British army in the first half of the eighteenth century.149

The final way the establishment sought to improve discipline in the army was by addressing weaknesses in related laws, the first of which was the 1689 Mutiny Act. William III, disturbed by the failure of soldiers to re-assemble after the army was dissolved immediately after the Glorious Revolution, suspected many were indifferent to him or secretly hostile.150 His suspicions were confirmed in early March 1689, when 800 men and most of the officers of the Royal Scots deserted from Ipswich. Almost

146 BL Hardwick Papers Add. MS.36257 f.61 and 128, Orderly Book of Joseph Yorke.
147 BL Hardwick Papers Add. MS.36257 f.59, 61, Orderly Book of Joseph Yorke.
149 Rogers, The British Army, p.58, 63.
simultaneously, but separately, the Scots Horse, Prince George’s Regiment and around 200 men from various other regiments deserted and began to return to Scotland.\textsuperscript{151}

William III therefore sought ways to increase control over the army and brought a bill to extend the Articles of War to times of peace. Submitted to parliament on 13\textsuperscript{th} March 1689, the Mutiny Act extended military trials and punishments applicable under the Articles of War to peacetime, replacing the previous system that left peacetime crimes to civil law tried as a felony. The 1689 Mutiny Act was intended to be temporary but was annually re-enacted and permanently changed the nature of crime and punishment in the army.\textsuperscript{152}

Between the Glorious Revolution and the first quarter of the eighteenth century, the army was increasingly constrained by new laws that fundamentally altered the army’s legal position when serving within Britain. However, though the introduction of the Mutiny Act and Riot Act represented a difference from the late seventeenth century perception that the army operated outside of the law, it took longer for the public to appreciate this. The Mutiny Act, first enacted in 1689, and the 1715 Riot Act ensured that when soldiers were tried for civil or military crimes, they were often found guilty, despite the sympathy shown by members of the Scottish establishment such as Sir James Stewart, Lord Advocate and their officers.\textsuperscript{153} That many were then reprieved is not unusual considering the number of reprieves awarded in civilian courts.\textsuperscript{154} The changed legal framework did indeed ensure that trials took place and that guilty soldiers were

\textsuperscript{153} Corporal John Brown, Sergeant Anthony Fitzpatrick, Sergeant Davies and the representative seven soldiers from Dumbarton’s Regiment, discussed later in the chapter, are several examples of this.
punished. Even officers were publicly bound by the law. The governors of Forts George and Augustus were both court-martialled after the loss of their forts during the '45. Although General Courts Martial had been in place for years, they were not a formality. Major Grant, former Governor of Fort George, was found guilty in June 1746 for “a Breach of the 7th Article of War in shamefully abandoning his Post, and delivering Fort George to the Rebels” and was “Cashier’d…and render’d incapable of ever serving His Majesty in any military Employment.”

Despite the measures put in place to improve discipline and control, success was neither quick nor without lapses. Continuing problems with desertion, mutiny, murder and petty crime perpetuated the poor reputation of standing armies and caused the social and political elites to continue to question their reliability. In 1705, the 1st Duke of Atholl disliked having unknown, undisciplined Independent Highland Companies on his lands and requested they be deployed to Flanders, complaining: “they are filled with all the most notorious rogues and thieves in the Highlands.” Despite Atholl’s prejudice against Highlanders, formed by a life-time of feuding with Lord Lovat, the archetypal Highland chief, it is still true that Highlanders were less disciplined than regular soldiers. However, this is due to the different set of conventions in Highland society that created different norms. The traditional form of Highland feuding involved brief raids and the custom of ‘Scottish Service’ was limited to only forty days service a year, so that

remaining in the field for prolonged periods was an unfamiliar concept.\textsuperscript{158} A rare individual who did see their value was General MacKay, Commander-in-Chief of Scotland (1689-91). This was despite his Lowland background which viewed Highlanders with as much, if not more, distrust than Englishmen. After witnessing 100 men from Menzies Company in his army at Killiecrankie in 1689, he obtained commissions for them and later recommended the creation of ten companies of Highlanders to police the Highlands, believing they could do it more effectively than regulars.\textsuperscript{159}

The mutiny of the 43\textsuperscript{rd} Highland Regiment in May 1743 is often held as an example of Highland unreliability. However, many reasons have since been given to explain their actions. In an era of irregular rotation, the prospect of deployment to the West Indies was viewed as a death sentence, a fear exacerbated by a recent meeting with the Royal Scots, much depleted since their yellow-fever ridden deployment to the West Indies.\textsuperscript{160} The large number of gentlemen volunteers resented their treatment as ordinary soldiers, especially after two gentlemen-volunteers were not recognised as such when they were summoned to London to be displayed to George II and his court.\textsuperscript{161} The rank and file believed they had entered into an agreement for home service only, in the mould of their traditional ‘Scottish Service’ to their chiefs and as an extension of their duties as

\textsuperscript{159} Simpson, \textit{The Independent Highland Companies}, p.79-80.  \\
\textsuperscript{160} Houlding, \textit{Fit for Service}, p.19, 29 and Parker, \textit{Black Watch}, p.16-8.  \\
Independent Companies.\textsuperscript{162} Additionally, Highlanders had a strong sense of honour and many felt slighted by the lack of royalty at their review.\textsuperscript{163} These reasons appear clichéd in the aftermath of Victorian romantic reinvention. However, similar reasons given in Macleod, published in 1791, suggest that there is truth to these explanations.\textsuperscript{164} English and Lowland Scottish soldiers had an understanding that enlistment removed individualism, making way for the discipline, order and obedience needed for formal drill. Highland behaviour, in contrast, appeared wild, unreliable and entirely unsuitable for conventional continental warfare. In many ways, this contrast is clearer in the Jacobite army. During the ’45, highlanders demonstrated poor discipline at sieges and during periods of inaction, when they reverted to traditions of sixteenth and seventeenth century inter-clan skirmishes and returned home on the promise of returning when fighting recommenced. However, they also achieved a good level of co-ordination and logistical ability both when marching and fighting.\textsuperscript{165}

**Duties of a soldier**

The key role of soldiers in Scotland was as a police force. The unique presence of ‘broken-men’,\textsuperscript{166} border reiving and inter-clan feuds in the Highlands meant a police force was needed earlier than elsewhere in Britain. From 1603, Scots were used to help police themselves. Independent Highland Companies, composed of loyal clans, raised


\textsuperscript{165} Duffy, *The ’45*, p.123, 427, 429-30.

\textsuperscript{166} ‘Broken-men’ were men without clan affiliations who often relied on reiving for survival. See Glossary.
and disbanded as needed, had more success in accessing and patrolling the hostile environment of the Highlands than regular regiments. Cattle reiving surged with the failed harvests of the 1690s and continued, to a lesser extent, into the eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{167} Macleod relates that, from 1720, he spent twenty years “hunting after incorrigible robbers” in Lovat’s Independent Highland Company.\textsuperscript{168} He relates a world in which the return of cattle and horses stolen is preferable to the arrest and hanging of the reiver – a solution which left the reiver’s family destitute and a burden to the parish. Consequently, rather than arrests, deals were struck to return goods because “As the British laws, made since the Union, had not yet free course in the Highlands, and depended, for their execution, on military aid, a great discretionary power in all cases of this kind, was assumed and exercised by military officers of all ranks.”\textsuperscript{169}

After the 1689 rebellion, the responsibility to monitor reiving was joined by the duty to monitor and suppress disaffected behaviour. Regular regiments were also increasingly augmenting the Independent Companies, as continuing Jacobite activity confirmed further the poor opinion London officials had of Highland reliability. Independent Highland Companies, however, were still heavily relied upon to assist with the implementation of the Disarming Acts in 1716, 1726 and 1746, confiscating weapons and arresting those wearing kilts.\textsuperscript{170} In this last task, soldiers were rarely successful, partly because of a lack of support from Scottish magistrates and judges. The letters of James Erskine, Lord Grange, the younger brother of the 6\textsuperscript{th} Earl of Mar, attained in 1716

\textsuperscript{168} Thomson, \textit{Memoirs of the life}, p.50.
\textsuperscript{169} Thomson, \textit{Memoirs of the life}, p.50-62.
\textsuperscript{170} Simpson, \textit{The Independent Highland Companies}, p.100.
for leading the '15, reveal how soldiers were undermined by Scotland’s officials. Of the “act of parliament discharging use of plaid & phillibeg”, Grange, a former Judge and suspected Jacobite, wrote in 1748, advising his acquaintances in legal and civil authorities to give ordinary Scots plenty of warning of the ban, preferably by leaving notices on church doors written in Erse, should the government strictly enforce it. However, Grange went further to advise them how they might re-interpret the law:

You make take all the opportunities you can of letting it be known that tartan may still be worn in cloaks westcoats, breeches or trew⁸, but that if they use loose plaid they may [be] of tartan but either all of one colour, or strip’d with other colours than those formally used, and if they have a mind to use their old plaids, I don’t see but they may make them into the shape of a cloak and so wear them in that way, which tho’ button’d or tied about the neck, if long enough, may be taken up at one side and thrown over the other shoulder by which it will answer most of the purposes of the loose plaid. And if they could come in to the way of wearing wide trousers like the sailors’ breeches it would answer all the conveniences of the kilt and phillibeg for walking or climbing the hills.¹⁷³

Either Grange was very persuasive or his sentiments were echoed by others, because the outcome seems to have been in favour of allowing the loophole. “Duncan M'grigor, Donald M'grigor, John Cameron, Alex’ Robinson and John Cameron” arrested near Rannoch for “wearing Highland Clothes contrary to Act of Parliament”, ten men “some

¹⁷¹ ODNB James Erskine, Lord Grange, by Richard Scott.
¹⁷² NAS GD170/1213/7/1, James Erskine to unknown, Edinburgh, 22nd November 1748.
¹⁷³ NAS GD170/1213/7/1, James Erskine to unknown, Edinburgh, 22nd November 1748.
of them dress’d in Tartan Trowzers & Petticoats, short Coats & shoulder straps, & one man completely dress’d in Tartan Clothes & Trowze” were brought before “Mr Campbell the Sheriff deputy of that place dismissed them all.”\textsuperscript{174} Additionally, two further men who were brought before Campbell were dismissed because their kilts were “closed” – that is, sewn up the middle as trousers – despite the testimony of several soldiers that the kilts had been open when they were arrested. The unrecorded author of this report ends with the frustrated: “I must be oblig’d to send my prisoners for the future to Perth, as that Gentleman seems Resolv’d not to commit any of them.”\textsuperscript{175}

As the eighteenth century progressed, countering smuggling became an increasing part of the army’s policing role. The Revenue Service, established in 1683, was still in its infancy. Faced with the scale of smuggling across Britain, which was endemic in Scotland thanks to its vast coastline and lax attitude to unpopular laws, the Revenue Service lacked the numbers and authority to be effective alone. Consequently, the army formed the third line of defence in the strategy of catching smugglers. Should smugglers get past the Royal Navy patrolling the sea, and the Revenue patrols on the beaches, which soldiers were seconded to assist, then army patrols within Scotland were designed to search and apprehend smugglers and their illicit goods.\textsuperscript{176} Prevention of smuggling was taken very seriously by the government and army because of the threat that Jacobite agents, money and arms could be brought in as well as brandy. This fear was reinforced by Sussex smugglers convicted of swearing oaths of loyalty to the Stuarts in 1740s.

\textsuperscript{174} NAS GD170/1213/8/1, James Erskine to John Campbell, Edinburgh, 7\textsuperscript{th} February 1749 and GD170/1213/16/2, Unknown to unknown, undated.
\textsuperscript{175} NAS GD170/1213/16/2, Unknown to unknown, undated.
\textsuperscript{176} Houlding, \textit{Fit for Service}, p.75-81.
though this was clearly a case of using the obvious opposition to anger the establishment. This link was extended to Scotland by the belief that “in Scotland, smuggling and Jacobitism seems to have gone hand in hand.” However, it was an unpopular duty with the soldiers and resented by the public. In 1735, a soldier was killed in Fraserburgh supporting Customs and Excise officials searching for smuggled goods and a year later, providing assistance to Customs and Excise officials in Dundee proved a “Duty…so hard his Soldiers are not able to bear it” forcing their CO to beg to be re-assigned.

The contrasting public behaviour towards two apprehended smugglers, Andrew Wilson and George Robertson, and the City Guards who guarded them in the days leading up to the Porteous Riot in Edinburgh in 1736 clearly show the effects of using the military in a civilian context. As was common, the smugglers had instant public appeal. After failing to break them out of the Tolbooth on the 9th April, the sympathetic public then failed to stop Robertson when he escaped during their final church service on 11th April, during which Wilson’s popularity increased when he fought and detained all four City Guards, allowing Robertson to escape. By contrast, the City Guards at the church and guarding the scaffold were viewed as villains and received no public support or sympathy. Indeed, the crowds gathered to watch Wilson’s hanging on 14th April stoned the City Guards, triggering a retaliation of musket fire that killed six, eight or nine


people, depending on sources, for which their captain, Porteous, was held accountable by
the public, and was later lynched.\textsuperscript{179}

In the increasingly politically aware but unenfranchised society of the eighteenth
century, an important mode of expressing views or protest was through public
demonstration.\textsuperscript{180} As these frequently ended in rioting, the government and elite
regarded them as disruptive to domestic peace. In addition to the many Stuart
anniversaries the Jacobites used to show dissent, rioters for unrelated issues often used
their conspicuous iconography, such as tartan, to highlight their disapproval of the
government.\textsuperscript{181} The government, especially under Walpole, took the view that any
protest that criticised the government or crown was dangerous. The connection to
Jacobitism cemented the view that riots were tantamount to treason. It was the change
from Stuart to Hanoverian rule, and the potential for Jacobite unrest in retaliation, that
triggered the introduction of the 1715 Riot Act. Once magistrates had read the Riot Act
to a mob, they had one hour to disperse peacefully. Continuing to form a mob past that
hour would constitute a felony and magistrates could call in the army or militia to break
up a mob by force. Prior to its introduction, those gathered in a mob were committing a
misdemeanour under common law. The authorities had only limited powers to stop
misdemeanours allowing mobs time to expand and fester, so their escalation to a riot was
almost inevitable. Rioters were unprotected by common law, because once a mob used

\textsuperscript{179} H.T. Dickenson and K.J. Logne, ‘The Porteous riot, 1736: Events in a Scottish protest against the Act of
\textsuperscript{180} Whyte, \textit{Scotland’s Society and Economy in Transition}, p.91-2.
violence and became a riot, their crime automatically changed from a misdemeanour to a felony. This permitted both private individuals and the authorities to respond with force with immunity from punishment if any rioters were killed or injured.\textsuperscript{182}

What was less understood by contemporaries was that if violence was committed within the hour force could still be used under common law, thereby giving indemnity to civilians and soldiers for action taken before or after that hour.\textsuperscript{183} This ignorance applied to the public, army, magistrates and politicians alike. Guides published for the magistrates who would face the issue of when to call in military assistance were vague and impracticable.\textsuperscript{184} Consequently, magistrates used the army with more caution than was necessary. During the 1725 Malt Tax riots in Glasgow, magistrates delayed calling in Lord Deloraine’s regiment so allowing the rioters to take such control of the town that the soldiers were forced to conduct a fighting retreat.\textsuperscript{185} Political understanding was also poor. A member of the Commons commented in the aftermath of the Porteous Riot in 1736, that “I doubt much if a magistrate would be indemnified, even by this law [if] by ordering his assistants [ie the army] to fire among them [ie the mob] and should thereby kill any person who had committed no overt act of resistance.”\textsuperscript{186}

The power of decision to deploy soldiers was transferred from the army to the magistrates, so making the intervention a civil not military matter. Commanding

\textsuperscript{182} Randall, \textit{Riotous Assemblies}, p.24-5.
\textsuperscript{184} Hayter, \textit{The army and the crowd}, p.16-7.
\textsuperscript{186} Hayter, \textit{The army and the crowd}, p.11.
officers’ failure to understand, or have explained to them, their powers under the Riot Act, and the indemnity they enjoyed through the provision of common law and the Act, left them overcautious. This, and the change in command structures, especially involving government officials, whose diligence and ability varied, frequently hampered the army’s response. It delayed the decision process and produced confused command structures that encouraged mistakes.\textsuperscript{187} During the Porteous Riot in Edinburgh in 1736, the presence of the garrison in the Castle, and of troops quartered just outside the city walls, had no effect on the rioters as both bodies refused to act without the written authorisation of Edinburgh’s magistrates. The mob separated the magistrates from the Castle, while the local MP sent to summon the troops outside the city walls had only his word of honour that the magistrates required them. General Moyle, their commander, refused, citing General Wade’s orders not to use regular troops in civil disturbances unless presented with a magistrates’ warrant and with a magistrate present to command and advise him.\textsuperscript{188}

The new indemnity, however, did not give soldiers permanent immunity from the law. Sergeant Davies was inspecting his troops in Glasgow during the night in early May 1712, when Robert Park and some friends argued with him, resulting in Davies killing Park. After Park’s funeral the crowd “gathered in the streets and offered indignities to the Guards”\textsuperscript{189} and, to placate them, Davies was taken into custody. Despite the testimony of other soldiers as witnesses, the opinion of the Lord Advocate, Sir James Stewart, that the mob were “some idle fellows, servants & women” and that it was “an

\textsuperscript{187} Houlding, \textit{Fit for Service}, p.61.
\textsuperscript{188} Dickenson and Logue, ‘The Porteous Riot. A Study’, p.27.
\textsuperscript{189} TNA SP54/4/68, Sir James Stewart to unknown, 20\textsuperscript{th} May 1712.
accidental scuffle,” Davies was found guilty in January 1713 and sentenced to hang on 27th May.190 The key factor in his guilt was because the Riot Act had not been read when Park was killed.191 Similarly, in September 1737, Private Thomas McAdams and Corporal James Long were found guilty and sentenced to be hanged for the murder of Hugh Fraser of Bellnain. On 4th June 1735 Fraser had been killed during a struggle when nine soldiers including McAdam and Long had attempted to board the suspected smuggler’s boat. The soldier’s warrant, which had been issued by their commanding officer, Lieutenant Cawfield, Fort-Major and CO of Inverness-shire, not the local magistrate, was pronounced invalid and the killing, therefore, was murder.192

The policing duties of the army also included involvement in maintaining the civil peace. In 1724, six regiments of dragoons were used to prevent dispossessed tenants from damaging cattle and dykes in protest in the first Levellers’ Revolts in Dumfriesshire and Galloway.193 The use of soldiers could also be abused, such as in the 1722 elections in Cupar in Fife. When protesters objected to the political monopoly of the local Leslie family, the army was called to force their dispersal on the grounds that the protest must have been Jacobite influenced as the Leslie family were Whig.194

190 TNA SP54/4/68, Sir James Stewart to unknown, 20th May 1712; SP54/4/92, Sir James Stewart to unknown, Edinburgh, 14th June 1712 and SP54/5/44, Sir James Stewart to unknown, Edinburgh, 31st January 1713.
191 TNA SP54/5/68, James Stewart, Lord Advocate of Edinburgh, to unknown, 20 May 1712; SP/54/5/92, Stewart to unknown, 14 June 1712 and SP54/5/44, Stewart to unknown, 31 January 1713.
192 NAS GD50/216/37, ‘Extract of the Proceedings before James Graham of Airth Esq Judge of the High Court of Admiralty in Scotland, in the Action at the insistence of Duncan Forbes Esq His Majesty’s Advocate and Mr Hugh Forbes Advocate Procurator Fiscal of the said High Court, Against Thomas McAdam soldier and James Long Corporal in the Regiment of Foot commanded by Colonel Hamilton Laid before the House pursuant to their Lordship’s Order April 18 1737’.
194 Whatley, Scottish Society, p.152.
From the first Jacobite rebellion in 1689-90 until the last decades of the eighteenth century, a major part of the British army’s role was domestic security, specifically countering Jacobite activity. This involved both the suppression of internal discontent and preventing invasions from outside. When not combating a rebellion, the army’s role was to prevent disaffection and future rebellion. The steady increase in the size and number of barracks during the eighteenth century reflected the growth in military strength in Scotland and also the decision to place permanent barracks there, despite their unpopularity. These provided secure bases for patrols and served as administrative centres for security purposes. Networks of roads were built to link these and allow faster movement across the country. Both barracks and roads were designed to end the autonomy of chiefs inclined to pro-Jacobite activity. Soldiers were involved not just in a policing and security roles, but also as the builders of barracks and roads, making military activity in Scotland in the first half of the eighteenth century a clear statement of intent to end disaffection.

Initiatives such as road and fort building to occupy soldiers in periods of inactivity have been mentioned in the context of discipline.\textsuperscript{195} In Scotland, providing labour for road and fort-building and their maintenance between 1725 and the 1760s provided extra pay, as well as diversion.\textsuperscript{196} It was hoped this “‘twould keep them [the men] in good discipline” rather than sitting in billets where “sloth and idleness” would spread.\textsuperscript{197} This plan was not infallible however, as the mutiny at Fort William in the

\textsuperscript{195} Houlding, \textit{Fit for Service}, p.14-5, 29.
\textsuperscript{196} Lamont Brown, ‘General George Wade’, p.151.
\textsuperscript{197} This is the opinion of the then Colonel Hawley in 1726, who would go on to be Commander-in-Chief of the Forces in North Britain during the ‘45. Houlding, \textit{Fit for Service}, p.193.
winter of 1690 was partially due to overwork from building the new fort. The Independent Highland Companies were encouraged to act as guides and translators, continuing in that role even in the periods when the Companies were disbanded.

The consequence of using the army as a police force and suppressor of disaffection in Scotland was that it made those soldiers the face of the army and de facto representatives of the government in London. For civilians who did not support the Union or were Jacobite, the army remained the oppressive arm of a distant government and, as such, echoed the army of occupation of the Interregnum. The army’s position enforcing the Riot Act also put soldiers in direct confrontation with ordinary people, undermining many of the army’s attempts to improve the reputation of soldiers and the army in general, and to cultivate a better civil-military relationship. This was especially difficult when soldiers were sent to end protests that were genuine demonstrations of a legitimate grievance. The riot that ended in the lynching of Captain Porteous was a protest against London overturning local justice. Queen Caroline, acting as regent, had suspended the sentence decided by the court in Edinburgh, representing interference from London. Similarly, the Malt Tax Riots in 1725 and the accompanying protest by Edinburgh’s brewing industry were expressions of opposition to taxes imposed by London.

201 Whatley, *How tame were the Scottish Lowlanders*, p.8; Burton, *Lives of Simon Lord Lovat*, p.315-7 and ODNB Duncan Forbes by John S. Shaw.
The above examination of the role of soldiers in Scotland reinforces the picture revealed by the case studies of the Royal Scots, Scots Fusiliers, Scots Greys and the Independent Highland Companies. By the time the Union of 1707 created the British army, Scottish and English regiments had been working closely together for forty years. In 1660, the presence of George Monck in both the army of the Interregnum and Charles II ensured the structural developments created in the New Model Army survived the Restoration.\textsuperscript{202} Although the Union of Crowns in 1603 brought both Scottish and English Establishments under the same royal control, it was at the Restoration that, for the first time, a standing army existed and was controlled by one crown. During the Seven Years War and early years of the War of the Spanish Succession, English and Scottish regiments were deployed in an identical manner, for serve together. Change, therefore, had happened as part of the natural evolution in the years since the Restoration, rather than with the artificial watershed of the political Union. Even the establishment of the Revenue Service in 1683 pre-dated the Union and its expansion to deal with the boom in smuggling between 1700 and the 1730s ensured that soldiers assisted against smuggling even before the Union.\textsuperscript{203} The few changes in the Scottish soldier’s role that occurred after the Union were because of later changes in the law, such as the Riot Act in 1715, but this was not influenced by the Union itself.

**Billeting and barracks**

Billeting soldiers in Scotland in the eighteenth century was a delicate and complex matter after the violence of the previous century. As the century progressed,

\textsuperscript{202} ODNB George Monck, 1\textsuperscript{st} Duke of Albemarle, by Ronald Hutton.
\textsuperscript{203} Houlding, *Fit for Service*, p.76.
Britain’s new obligations to the United Provinces and Hanover, and the changes brought by the ‘military revolution’ led to larger armies as the ‘no standing armies’ debate and the legacy of the army as the oppressive arm of the government during the Civil War and Interregnum faded slowly from memory. Additionally, the creation of the Jacobite movement by the Glorious Revolution and its focus on Scotland, where support could be found in the gentry excluded from power and position by religious and constitutional factors, called for an expansion in the establishment of Scotland. This required billets. However, building purpose-built fortifications was unacceptable to those who remembered the standing armies of the Interregnum. Barracks were not only expensive but represented the acceptance of the permanence of a standing army.

The housing of soldiers depended on location and the context of other events. Soldiers were billeted depending on local geography, local population, the wider economic situation and the level of social unrest. Accessibility both by road and by sea was also a factor. In Scotland, this last factor was especially significant given the Jacobite threat and had a considerable impact on where and when barracks were built, or whether they were built at all. Earlier in the century the absence of permanent barracks in Britain was justified because there were few regiments and these were abroad during war and disbanded at peace. This meant that billeting was commonly conducted on a temporary basis, usually as soldiers were on the march. By common agreement, in the seventeenth century, soldiers were only billeted in private homes with the owner’s permission and payment. This arrangement gained more authority from a royal

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204 Houlding, *Fit for Service*, p.23.
proclamation in 1689 although it was not made law until the 1715 Mutiny Act. However, as the proclamation pre-dated the Union, Scotland’s position remained confused. Scots clearly felt the law should apply to them. When Alexander MacDonald of Glengarry complained about unpaid expenses from soldiers billeted on him in 1704, he added “which in time of Peace is directly contrary to the Law of Scotland.” However, after queries were made, the Lord Advocate advised that billeting was permitted if the threat from the Pretender constituted a state of war, which only the Scottish Parliament could decide. Another point of contention was the definition of what constituted a ‘private’ dwelling. The government decreed that as “Tower castles or fortalices” were held communally, owners become hereditary keepers in times of war. Therefore they were ordered to be kept stocked with food and artillery in anticipation of their use on pain of having the property seized. Some protested that they owned the building, making it private, and worried about the cost incurred. Similarly, whilst permission had to be obtained in order to billet on private homes, the power of the government to extort billets either as a show of loyalty or as punishment for past disloyalty undermined the significance of permission given. This was a particular issue in Scotland, where loyalty often had to be proved. William Duff of Bracco, for example, offered Balverie Castle in 1715 as “ideally placed” between the Highlands and Lowlands. Soldiers could also be billeted upon the property of landowners who were in arrears to the government.

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206 TNA SP54/6/41, Alexander MacDonald of Glengarry to unknown, [between 1704 and 1714].
207 GD26/9/120, ‘Answers by their Majesties Advocat and Sollier…1689’.
208 NAS GD220/5/627/1, Lord Leven to unknown, Edinburgh, 24th January 1716 and GD26/9/120, ‘Answers by their Majesties Advocat and Sollier…1689’.
210 TNA SP54/7/41B, William Duff of Bracco to unknown, 13th August 1715.
Billeting on civilians, therefore, was a further strain on an already fraught civil-military relationship. The expense, the poor reputation of soldiers and the violence and disease that were associated with an army made soldiers unwelcome in private homes not just in Scotland but across Europe. McBane’s behaviour when billeted on a farm in Ireland is a case in point. He tricked the farmer’s daughter into a false marriage, lived as her husband for two weeks before using his embarkation to Flanders to abandon her.\(^{212}\)

A further example was the impact of Louis XIV’s ‘grandes dragonnades’ on Protestant communities between 1681 and 1685, forcibly converting them before the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685.\(^{213}\) Consequently, the use of inns was preferred and was authorised in the 1699 Mutiny Act.\(^{214}\) Inns in England were also conveniently located along roads and so could be chosen to fit with marching routes.\(^{215}\) In order to maintain discipline through contact, the army attempted to billet men together in the same town or village. Using inns rather than barracks also kept a military presence temporary. This reduced the burden on communities in an era that lacked a regular system of regimental rotation and prevented soldiers from ‘going native’, becoming attached to people or places and therefore difficult to move on.\(^{216}\)


\(^{215}\) NAS, GD112/47/1/3 Marching routes showing miles between stops, with inns noted for billeting, compiled by John, 3rd Earl of Breadalbane and GD112/47/1/4, Marching routes between inns, with possible billets and miles between each stop, compiled by John, 3rd Earl of Breadalbane.

When billeting on the public or in inns was not possible because of geography, the political situation or on campaign, the army used temporary accommodation such as tents and huts. In Scotland tents were frequently used when extra troops were sent north to deal with a rebellion and the existing accommodation was filled. Tents allowed flexibility of location and mobility, providing the faster reaction time needed during conflicts. They were also vital when travelling into the Highlands as there were few inns north of the larger towns of the Lowlands and Border areas. Consequently, the extra soldiers sent to Stirling Castle during the ’15 were billeted in tents outside the walls even though their fighting ability may have “suffered for spending so much time in tents.”

A description from July 1746 describes an army tent as follows: “outward ornamentation of tents to be alike in each regiment and according to colour of facings; tent poles to be 5 feet in length, 8 feet high, then full length of tent 14 feet, breadth 10 feet, height of half wall 4 feet with door at end as usual.”

Tents or temporary huts were used to accommodate soldiers in road-building parties between 1725 and the late 1760s as the path of roads, by design, often passed through uninhabited and inaccessible areas. Some of these huts became the first inns in the Highlands and eventually made travel and tourism easier. They inadvertently finished what the road access began for the military, allowing more English and Lowland visitors. In this way cultural isolation was reduced and the integration of the independent, isolated Highlands into Great Britain was furthered.

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217 TNA SP54/10/30, 2nd Duke of Argyll to Townsend, Camp at Stirling, 8th November 1715.
Barracks were built in Scotland only when the government decided that too many rebellions were occurring and the first purpose-built, self-contained barracks to be built in Britain were four fortified barracks, commissioned in 1717. As the century progressed and Jacobite activity and rebellions continued, existing castles were improved and new forts were built, increasing in size, expense and capacity until Fort George at Ardersier was begun in 1753.\textsuperscript{220} There had to be a specific requirement to justify such building work, however. Berwick, for example, was the key embarkation point between London and Scotland whilst the four fortified barracks were necessary for policing the Highlands. The three forts of the Great Glen and the old castles of Stirling and Edinburgh provided the administrative and accommodation requirements for a force needed to counter the Jacobite threat. Their architecture and presence also provided a visual statement of intent that the Protestant Succession was permanent. Updating existing castles provided a compromise between the need for accommodation and the undesirability and expense of building barracks. Corgarff Castle in Aberdeen and Braemar Castle were both forfeited by the Earl of Mar after the ’15 and bought by the government in 1748 for accommodating soldiers. Those quartered in the former applied the Disarming Act. Those in the latter operated as an outpost until 1779, when it was used against smuggling until 1832.\textsuperscript{221} It was easier for the public in the south and government to accept permanent barracks in Scotland as a volatile area and susceptible to invasion. That it was popularly held to be a wild, ungovernable area made it easier to make it an exception to the belief that civilised places should not have permanent barracks imposed upon them.

\textsuperscript{220} Tabraham and Grove, \textit{Fortress Scotland}, p.61, 98.
The billeting of soldiers within or near a community was often an inevitable opportunity for ordinary people to re-assess or confirm their old prejudices both of soldiers and other nationalities. The religious violence of the late seventeenth century and the past behaviour of the army during the Civil War and Interregnum, made barracks and the presence of soldiers the largest area of contention between the civil and military worlds.\(^{222}\) Scotland felt this tension more acutely as garrisons had previously been limited to the Lowlands by sheer necessity. The only attempt to build forts in the Highlands had been Cromwell’s four citadels, which were torn down, only partly completed, on the Restoration.\(^{223}\) By contrast, parts of England, particularly on the south and south-east coast were familiar with a military presence.\(^{224}\) The main difference lay in the intention behind the garrison; those in England were mainly intended to protect against foreign invasion, while Scotland’s garrisons were provided to police and suppress Jacobitism. It was this seemingly aggressive intent that placed soldiers in direct confrontation with civilians and caused resentment of the need to billet soldiers, no matter where it was. As the eighteenth century progressed, and the Jacobite threat diminished, standing armies were gradually accepted. Barracks and garrisons became less a burden and instead an asset to the local economy and were seen as part of the community. The financial burden represented by the permanent use of Berwick as a transit port, in which billeting on the public or inns was not replaced by barracks until 1705, gave way to a sense of integration into the community. Fort William, for example, founded Maryburgh to house the families of the soldiers and the army sutlers who

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\(^{222}\) These and the other fortifications and roads mentioned here are discussed further in Chapter Five: Scotland’s Military Installations. Schwoerer, “No Standing Armies!”, p.188 and Donet, British Barracks, p.xiii.


\(^{224}\) Bowen, War and British Society, p.41.
provided its provisions. Even the garrison’s graveyard at Craig’s Cemetery (on today’s A82) suggests a close community, with stones dedicated to soldiers’ wives and their friends.\footnote{Beattie, ‘Pre-1855 Gravestone Inscriptions’, p.32-5.}

However, despite this progress, the army’s attitude towards Scotland is revealed in the prioritisation of military requirements during rebellion above any gains made in the civil-military relationship in peacetime. In a precedent that, with local variations, was applied to Scotland, Marlborough commanded in 1708 that civilian goods be protected in allied countries, but enemy land would be subjected to ‘scorched earth’ for strategic purposes, such as on his approach to Bavaria in 1704.\footnote{NAM 1963-09-9-10, Two orders from Marlborough concerning discipline, Forbanck, 11th June 1708; C. Spencer, \textit{Blenheim. Battle for Europe} (London, 2004), p.212-3 and H. Strachan, \textit{European Armies and the Conduct of War} (London, 1983), p.14-5.} During the ’45, although General Campbell of Mamore established food and equipment stores for the British army across Argyllshire and the west of Scotland in order to leave the land of well-affected clans untouched, Cumberland ordered the systematic collection of cattle in the months after Culloden to deprive the Jacobites of subsistence in case of an ongoing guerrilla-style war with the full knowledge of the effect it was having on civilians.\footnote{J. Fergusson Kilkerren, \textit{Argyll in the Forty-Five} (London, 1951), p.75, 87-8 and BL Hardwick Papers Add. MS.36257 f.64, 109, 111, 113, 118, 119, 126133, 135, 137, Orderly Book of Joseph Yorke. At f.139 Cumberland orders the following on 8th July 1746 to discourage the crowds of now homeless and hungry civilians trying to live off the army’s scraps; “If any Soldier, Soldier’s Wife, or any other Person belonging to the army is known t sell or give any Meal to any Highlander or any person of the Country; they shall be first whipt severely for disobedience of this order & then put in the provost’s for a fortnight, upon Meal and Water.”} Therefore, Cumberland acted as if the army were in an area of hostility, while Mamore as a Scot was attempting a less intensive approach to clearing Scotland of Jacobites.
The nationality of billeted forces provoked still unresolved tensions between north and south. In September 1715, Islay’s request for more troops to counter the ’15 came with the stipulation that “If there is any assistance to be had from the Elbe, it is certain, that foreign or German Troops…would be more popular here [in Scotland] by far than the English themselves.” Conversely, it was not until 1766 that the presence of the Scots Greys on anti-smuggling duty in Sussex was viewed as “typical.” A greater factor than billeting in the integration of national groups and the creation of an overarching ‘British’ nationality was unity through a threat from a common enemy. Colley argues that: “They [the English and Scottish] came to define themselves as a single people not because of any political or cultural consensus at home, but rather in reaction to the ‘other’ beyond their shores.” For Colley, this threat is the French. However, this overlooks the common threat the Jacobites had provided since 1689. It was through military service against the Jacobites that the Scots could show their loyalty to the government and therefore to the survival of Great Britain. The issue is also more complex than the acceptance of Scots into Great Britain and the evolution of a British identity, as there was little integration between Highland and Lowland Scots. The experience of Lowland Scots in the Highlands, such as the all-Scottish battle at Killiecrankie, and the fervour with which Lowlanders behaved in the months after Culloden demonstrates the disunity and natural conflict between Highlanders and Lowlanders. It was, in fact, differences of religion and politics that separated and united

228 TNA SP54/8/112A, Islay to unknown, Edinburgh, 28th September 1715.
229 Houlding, *Fit for Service*, p.83.
Scots, not nationality. The experiences of English, Irish, Lowland or Highland soldiers barracked in Jacobite country reveal the true ‘other’ that united Great Britain. The road-building parties between 1724 and the 1760s were more likely to find billets in private homes in the Lowlands but had to rely on tents in the Highlands.\textsuperscript{234} The engineers of the Ordnance Office also enjoyed far greater cooperation from locals in the loyal Lowlands, than in the crypto-Jacobite Highlands between 1747 and 1752.\textsuperscript{235} These experiences demonstrate that the tension between English and Scots was less due to nationality than to attitudes created by the legacy of the ‘no standing army’ debate, the cultural memory of soldiers’ behaviour during the seventeenth century, and the political tensions of split allegiances between Jacobites and non-Jacobites.

Conclusion

In conclusion, an examination of the experiences of ordinary soldiers reveals much regarding their behaviour and their influence in changing attitudes towards standing armies. The increasing presence of soldiers in Scottish civilian communities, as barracks became more common, spurred the army to work actively towards improving the behaviour and discipline of its soldiers. Officers were encouraged to take responsibility for the care and betterment of soldiers under their command, using rewards as well as punishments. As the century progressed this led to an increase in army control that benefited not only the army’s performance on the battlefield but their behaviour and reputation in times of peace. This was especially marked in Scotland, where the law

\textsuperscript{234} Taylor, \textit{The Military Roads}, p.33.
regarding billeting on private homes was left unclear at the Union and the army presence was larger and more obvious than elsewhere in Britain.

This improving trend benefited from the progressive rise of professionalism amongst army officers. The purchase system encouraged them to view their careers as long-term investments and fostered a desire to improve and advance. A growing recognition of personal merit, under the influence of William III, Anne, George I, George II and Cumberland, furthered the rise in professionalism in officers both on and off the battlefield. Change was slow, however, as small-scale corruption remained endemic in army life. Similarly, lax central control hampered standardisation and facilitated petty corruption. Such weaknesses demonstrated that further reforms were needed but, under Cumberland in the 1750s, were impossible in the face of the strong ‘custom of the army’. Only the growing urgency towards the end of the eighteenth century permitted the Duke of York’s reforms of the 1790s.

An examination of soldiers’ lives in military service is also revealing of similarly slow progress in civil-military relations. The unpopularity of uncontrolled recruitment was addressed by bringing civil powers into the process. The involvement of JPs and magistrates was an attempt by the government to ensure recruitment was kept in check by civil rather than military hands. Similar attention was given by the government to reduce the army’s poor position as the direct controller of public demonstrations. The soldiers’ role as police in preventing smuggling and rioting perpetuated their poor reputation with their civilian neighbours, exemplified by the violence of the Malt Tax Riots in 1725 and
the Porteous Riot of 1736. The army and government attempted to improve this with the introduction of the Mutiny Act in 1689 and the Riot Act of 1715. As the trials of McAdam, Long and Davies attest, this not only made soldiers accountable for their actions but also placed civil authority above military authority. The strengthened role of magistrates was a clear attempt to reduce the feeling that the army was the oppressive force used to implement control from London. This had occurred during the Interregnum and during the religious violence experienced by the Lowlands in the late seventeenth century. However, the effectiveness of the new laws was limited, which delayed their ability to reduce tension since they were often misunderstood and misapplied by magistrates and military commanders. They failed to prevent civil disturbance and Jacobite success in Glasgow in 1725 and Edinburgh in 1745. This is evidence of the lack of clear leadership and control from either London or a central army command. Laws to regulate billeting on civilians were a positive move to improve the reputation of the British army in Scotland and to benefit the civil-military relationship. This advanced further as the need for soldiers was accepted and overcame the old prejudices against standing armies. Barracks were increasingly used in Scotland and by the mid-eighteenth century, their use – rather than billeting on civilians – combined with new laws, had begun the process of integrating soldiers into the community.

Lastly, Chapter Two reinforces the lack of changes that occurred in the British army because of the Union of 1707. Instead the Restoration marks greater co-ordination between the Scottish and English Establishments. The start of an effective standing army and the continuation of the authority of the Union of Crowns meant that Charles II and
James II used the regiments of each Establishment as one force, as an unofficial ‘British’ army forty years prior to the creation of Great Britain and the British army. Such a unity was solidified by the use of this force under William III in continental conflicts.

Disparate regiments and establishments were unified by a common enemy, both France and her allies, and the Jacobite threat, and by the common experiences of war long before the Union created an administrative amalgamation.
CHAPTER THREE: THE SCOTTISH SOLDIER AND THE BRITISH STATE

Introduction

In this chapter, the lives and careers of Scottish officers of all ranks are examined to establish the relationships Scots had with the British state. This contrasts with the focus on other ranks in Chapter Two. A range of individuals is examined to show how Scotland’s senior soldiers joined the army, how their careers progressed and how they were regarded by their superiors and the political elite in London. Using a range of sources a comparison of individuals’ principles, influences and motivations is made, to reveal why and how they functioned within the British system – socially, militarily and politically. Contrasting factors are also examined to discover how this determined loyalties and influenced career decisions. Specifically, the impact of the continuous Jacobite threat, as well as rebellions and invasions, is investigated to ascertain the effect the movement had on perceptions of Scottish loyalty and any subsequent effects this had on careers. This also reveals the extent that nationality was a factor in defining identity and loyalty, and its impact on Scottish military careers. Common themes such as family backgrounds, career expectations and social norms, and differences such as personal motivation and religion, are examined. This reveals the divergent lives that would otherwise have coexisted without the impact of the Jacobite movement.

To facilitate this investigation, a broader time span is employed than elsewhere in this thesis. This is necessary to explore the lives of a number of men which extend outside 1700-1750. Examples include Simon Fraser, 11th Lord Lovat, John Dalrymple, 2nd Earl of Stair, John Campbell, 2nd Duke of Argyll, Archibald Campbell, 3rd Duke of
Argyll, Duncan Forbes of Culloden and the Munro brothers, whose life-spans spread from the 1660s, 1670s and 1680s to the 1740s and 1760s. They are typical of a cohort that witnessed dramatic changes in constitution, monarchy and politics, which put them in unique situations requiring decisions with serious consequences. The proliferation of studies focused around events, specifically Jacobite rebellions, means that individuals are usually portrayed in their set roles of ‘loyal’ or ‘rebel’ when they have already made the decision of who to support, presenting a ‘ex post facto’ view. ¹ Whilst valuable studies in themselves, a broader investigation that takes in individuals’ earlier lives and careers will provide a deeper understanding of how decisions of loyalty were made and why they chose military service to demonstrate it. Similarly, by taking a thematic approach, this determinist attitude towards loyalty will be replaced by an examination of similarities as well as differences, a departure from many sources traditionally used to investigate these individuals. The simple transcript form of the diary of Blackader provides useful primary evidence but its narrative nature emphasises the inevitability of their decisions and eventual loyalties. Doddridge had a Protestant Christian message that detracts from the accurate portrayal of Gardiner and the Munro brothers whom he sought to commemorate. ² Lastly, the continuing existence today of Scotland’s elite families impacts on historians’ objectivity; Tomasson’s obligation to the estate of the dukes of Atholl for access to the papers of Lord George Murray comes at the cost of objectivity in the ongoing debate of whether he or O’Sullivan was to blame for the final Jacobite defeat, while Fergusson’s family link to the Campbells impacts on his sympathetic stance

² P. Doddridge, The Life of the Hon. Colonel Gardiner, who was slain at the Battle of Prestonpans. With an appendix, relating to the ancient family of the Munro’s of Fowlis (London, 1813).
towards General Campbell of Mamore and against the scheming of the 4th Earl of Loudoun. To avoid the traditional labels of ‘Jacobite’ and ‘government’, different terminology will be used, with political leanings in mind, to highlight both the complexity of loyalty and the large grey area of allegiance that is rarely acknowledged in studies of this topic. The individuals studied will still be split into groups, but the recurring themes between groups will highlight the similarities between individuals regarded as enemies.

**Stalwarts**

The careers of Scots who served in the British army are a microcosm of the experiences of Scots who worked with the British Government. Many mentioned in this chapter lived and served before and after the Union and were forced to make difficult decisions about their loyalties in the frequent domestic conflicts caused by the Jacobite movement. Such scenarios both demonstrated the loyalty of Scots to the Union and the Protestant Succession, and provided the paranoid Government in London with examples of why even Whig Scots were untrustworthy. This first section deals with those individuals who were clear Whigs, loyal to the Protestant Succession and Glorious Revolution and all the changes that occurred because of them. Though party loyalty was a loose tie, as parliament often broke off into different factions to achieve particular purposes, these individuals were loyal to the state in its post-Revolution form.

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Regardless of how it was interpreted by London, their example shows how service in the British army was one of the few ways in which many Scottish gentlemen could demonstrate their loyalty and contribute to the formation of the new British state. Greater competition for posts existed in the political sphere, where the Union had reduced the number of Scottish MPs to forty-five and the number of Representative Peers from 160 to sixteen, so military service allowed greater opportunities.\(^4\) It also allowed Protestants to continue the Covenanting tradition, as they viewed military service for the state as, “an ordained duty, sanctioned by God and thus to be conducted in a religious manner and with religious objectives.”\(^5\) The seventeenth century struggle for dominance between the Presbyterian and Episcopalian churches gave the cohort of men active in the first half of the eighteenth century a background of sacrifice in the defence of religious principles. Fighting to defend the Protestant Succession, therefore, became an extension of fighting during the Covenanting wars and during what Wodrow termed the Killing Times. Robert Wodrow’s *The History of Sufferings of the Church of Scotland from the Restoration to the Revolution*, published in 1721-22, has fuelled this legacy both amongst modern perceptions and amongst the cohort of men studied here.\(^6\) Therefore, military service provided a way to defend and further the political structure, religion and dynasty in which individuals believed. The memoirs, diaries, letters and biographies written both by and for these men, combined with a detailed contextual investigation, reveal the reasons for their choice of military service and demonstrates how nationality, family

\(^6\) R. Wodrow, *The History of Sufferings of the Church of Scotland from the Restoration to the Revolution* (Glasgow, 1836), 4 vols. This is also discussed in subsection ‘Billeting and barracks’ of Chapter Two: The Scottish Soldier’s Experience.
background, connections and ability affected their career paths. Given the tempestuous relationship between England and Scotland, inflamed by the Jacobite threat, their successes and failures as soldiers become a case study for the success or otherwise of the Union, Scotland’s ability to integrate into Great Britain, and Britain’s willingness to receive them.

For most Scottish Whig gentlemen, early entry to the army was a time-honoured and respectable avenue to status, advancement and independence. John Blackader (1664-1729) first joined the Cameronians aged twenty-five, influenced by a family background of strong Calvinist beliefs.7 John Campbell, later 4th Earl Loudoun (1705-1782), was twenty-two when he entered the army as a cornet in the Scots Greys in 1727 and within ten years had risen to the army rank of Lieutenant-Colonel in the 3rd Foot Guards.8 James Gardiner (1686/8-1745) followed his family’s military lead as a cadet in Dutch service at fourteen.9 For Gardiner, slow but steady promotion followed in a series of regiments, including a post as Stair’s ADC in 1714-1720.10 Sir Robert Munro of Fowlis (1684-1746) joined the Royal Scots as a gentleman volunteer at eighteen, quickly gaining promotions to a captaincy in 1714.11 His younger brother George (1685-1746) also joined the army as a young man and took part in the suppression of the ’15, actively pacifying the Highlands in his brother’s Independent Company.12

8 ODNB John Campbell, 4th Earl of Loudoun by Stephen Brumwell.
2nd Earl of Stair (1673-1747), began his military career at fourteen with service under the Prince of Orange in the United Provinces.\(^{13}\)

Both Blackader and Robert Munro entered the army as gentlemen volunteers, as young men in their early twenties, a path they shared with Loudoun, George Munro and Stair.\(^{14}\) Such entry, without the necessity of purchasing a commission, was a popular way to gain early military experience on the understanding of promotion to the lowest vacated rank.\(^{15}\) Gardiner, Stair and Loudoun had commissions, that of Gardiner and Stair in Dutch service. As shown in Chapter One: Scotland’s Professional Soldiers, foreign service was a long-established option for generations of Scots of all ranks who found greater opportunity for employment abroad during the seventeenth-century, until the growing conflicts on the continent and the appreciation for a standing army felt by William III and the Hanoverian kings allowed for a larger British army that could employ them in greater numbers. In this regard Loudoun’s superior background probably assisted in gaining a commission in a prestigious regiment such as the Scots Greys in 1705. Purchase of a commission was a sign of status, as suggested by the colonelcies awarded to John and Archibald Campbell (later 2nd and 3rd dukes of Argyll) when aged fourteen and nineteen (1680-1743 and 1682-1761).\(^{16}\) Entry as gentleman volunteers was still a respectable avenue, however, as skill at arms was regarded as part of a gentleman’s education. Military service often ran in families; Gardiner’s father, maternal uncle and


\(^{15}\) As discussed in sub-section ‘Joining the colours’ in Chapter Two: The Scottish Soldier’s Experience.

\(^{16}\) Both John and Archibald’s commissions were awarded as a sign of royal favour to their father. ODNB John Campbell, 2nd Duke of Argyll by Alexander Murdoch and ODNB Archibald Campbell, 3rd Duke of Argyll by Alexander Murdoch.
brother were all in the army, and the deaths of the latter two, at Steenkerke in 1692 and Namur in 1695, did not deter him from enlisting.\textsuperscript{17}

Scottish gentlemen, such as Robert and George Munro, and the politically ambiguous Simon Fraser, 11\textsuperscript{th} Lord Lovat (1687/8 – 9\textsuperscript{th} April 1747),\textsuperscript{18} frequently sought military careers for advancement, as more openings existed for Scots in the army than in politics.\textsuperscript{19} Opportunities blossomed during times of conflict, allowing the Munro brothers to gain positions and promotions; probable unrest in Scotland in 1714 brought Robert an appointment as Lieutenant-Colonel and a Captaincy of an Independent Company, while his appointment as Lieutenant-Colonel of the newly embodied 43\textsuperscript{rd} in 1739 was precipitated by the War of Jenkins’ Ear.\textsuperscript{20} After serving on the continent, George too found favour in the military during the ’15 and the ’19,\textsuperscript{21} and was rewarded with his own Independent Company during the ‘45.\textsuperscript{22} Similarly, Stair’s promotions and colonelcies came after various battles\textsuperscript{23} and his valour at Oudenarde won him the honour

\textsuperscript{17} Gardiner’s father was to die of his wounds after the battle of Blenheim in 1704 two years into his son’s career. Doddridge, \textit{The Life of the Hon. Colonel Gardiner}, p.26-7.
\textsuperscript{18} Lovat belongs in the ‘Trimmer’ sub-section below.
\textsuperscript{20} ODNB Sir Robert Munro by Stuart Handley and Doddridge, \textit{The Life of the Hon. Colonel Gardiner}, p.246.
\textsuperscript{21} At Glenshiel “…they [the Munro clansmen] distinguished themselves by the gallantry of their behaviour, driving the enemy before them in a sharp action, in which many of them were killed and more wounded; and amongst the rest the Captain [George Munro] himself in a very dangerous manner”. Doddridge, \textit{The Life of the Hon. Colonel Gardiner}, p.246-7.
\textsuperscript{22} Doddridge, \textit{The Life of the Hon. Colonel Gardiner}, p.248.
\textsuperscript{23} For example, his success leading a brigade of infantry at the battle of Ramillies (23 May 1706) led to his appointment as Brigadier-General on the English establishment on 1\textsuperscript{st} June 1706. ODNB John Dalrymple, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Earl of Stair by H.M. Stevens rev. William C. Lowe.
of presenting the dispatches at court. Such successes raised his profile, aiding his advancement in the military, at court and in parliament.

Military service, as well as providing a career for gentlemen’s sons, also allowed them to fulfil a moral duty inherited from a background of religious obligations and divisions during the seventeenth century. The religious background to the turmoil of the Civil Wars, when Covenanters used military service to defend their religion, and the continuance of religious violence in late seventeenth century Scotland, as Charles II used the army to control the Presbyterians, linked military service with the defence of religious principle for many Scots. It inspired the followers of Richard Cameron to form their own regiment, the Cameronians, which, on the return of the Presbyterian Church to dominance, then joined the Scottish Establishment. For the Cameronians and many Protestant Scots, service with the British army was a continuation of the role of the Covenanters. The cohort of Scottish officers who joined the army in the early eighteenth century was also influenced by the Scottish Enlightenment. The relative merits of the militia and standing armies were a frequent and contentious topic but most agreed that it was the duty of all Christian gentlemen, as well as every citizen, to participate in the defence and policing of their country in order to ensure the stability and peace of its society. Consequently, many saw military service as a moral duty not just a

27 Robertson, The Scottish Enlightenment, p.5.
28 Lenman, Militia, Fencible Men, p.176-7, 187-9 and Robertson, The Scottish Enlightenment, p.22-32. An example of Fletcher of Saltoun’s work is A. Fletcher, A discourse concerning Militias and Standing
career. Blackader is perhaps most illustrative of this, as his diary focuses so strongly on the religious aspects of his life.

For Blackader, the role of Colonel-proprietor was a moral duty. These ranged from choosing the regiment’s chaplain in July 1702\textsuperscript{29} to mixing training with moral improvement during the winter of 1706-7.\textsuperscript{30} He especially disliked swearing\textsuperscript{31} which he frequently complained of: “[the soldiers] speak just such language as devils would do.”\textsuperscript{32} Even after retirement, Blackader still represented his old regiment at the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland; in May 1714, he spoke against the plans to bring the Cameronians’ church services in line with the English pattern.\textsuperscript{33} While this level of engagement was unusual for British army officers, the Covenanting background of the Cameronian regiment, and its ongoing spiritual concerns, made such a duty clear to its officers. It is significant however, that such tolerance for Presbyterian religious ideals existed at a time when the state was deeply concerned with unity and regarded Catholic beliefs as threatening because of the control the Pope could wield over a faithful population. The concessions made to the Cameronians’ religious beliefs demonstrate the appreciation felt by the Government for the contribution of the regiment. It has been seen how in 1739, this was echoed when the 43\textsuperscript{rd} was allowed kilts and bagpipes, rather than

\textsuperscript{29} Crichton, \textit{The Life and Diary}, p.178.
\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Ibid}, p.292-4.
\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Ibid}, p.238, 252, 281, 293, 312, 342-3, 380-1, 507, 536, 556-7, 22\textsuperscript{nd} April 1705, 12\textsuperscript{th} July 1705, 19\textsuperscript{th} May 1706, winter 1706-7, 1\textsuperscript{st} May 1708, 8\textsuperscript{th} July 1709, 27\textsuperscript{th} April 1710, 8\textsuperscript{th} January 1720, 26\textsuperscript{th} September 1724.
\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Ibid}, p.197, 18\textsuperscript{th} June 1703.
\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Ibid}, p.447.
the usual uniform. Blackader’s religious zeal continued in his later life. Care for both the garrison of Stirling Castle as Deputy-Governor and the wider community as a JP not only fulfilled his personal sense of duty but reflected the dual nature of his official responsibilities over the garrison and local civilians.

Indeed, the Christian element of military service was so interlinked that Doddridge dedicated his Life of the Hon. Colonel Gardiner to junior officers who should use Gardiner’s example as a moral guide in the vice-filled army. However, Doddridge, an Independent minister in England, had a clear agenda in highlighting Gardiner’s spiritual journey rather than his military career. Additionally, the importance of Gardiner’s social and military rank and the connotations of shame surrounding his fatal wounding at Prestonpans ensured Gardiner’s death was solemnised. Charles Edward’s visit to his sick bed and rumours that Charles had taken Gardiner’s horse and rode it during the retreat from Derby turned this attention to posthumous celebrity.

Doddridge’s inclusion of the three Munro brothers, who with Gardiner all died in

35 Crichton, The Life and Diary, p.496, 514, 518, 531.
36 Specifically named was David Gardiner, Gardiner’s son, a cornet in Sir John Cope’s Dragoons in 1747, who had been tutored as a youth by Doddridge. Doddridge, The Life of the Hon. Colonel Gardiner, p.17-9, 25.
37 Gardiner experiences two spiritual conversions; one when left for dead on the field of Ramillies and the second when in Paris with Stair in 1718. Doddridge, The Life of the Hon. Colonel Gardiner, p.31-2, 50-60.
39 Gardiner was reported to have told the Chevalier that he was searching for a temporal crown, while he, Gardiner, was going to get a Crown of Glory. NLS Gardiner papers MS.3648 f.46(b), Gardiner to Doddridge, Ghent, 24th May 1743.
government service in Scotland combating the ‘45, was an open attempt to glorify their
sacrifice in the defence of the Protestant Succession.41

Despite being neighbours, it was the strength of Gardiner’s fame that caused his
inclusion in the Reverend Carlyle’s Autobiography, whose “extensive range of
connections, coupled with his prodigious memory and acute observations, account for the
enduring reputation of his Autobiography as one of the most important first-hand
accounts of cultural activity in eighteenth-century Scotland.”42 Carlyle’s recollections
are heavily influenced by Gardiner’s fate and quasi-beatification, so that their
conversations before the battle have a fatalistic edge. Therefore, Carlyle’s recollection of
his last meeting with Gardiner on the 18th September linked his demeanour to the ensuing
battle: “He looked tired and dejected…I began to ask him if he was not now
quite…confident that they [the British army] would give account of the rebels. He
answered dejectedly that he hoped it might be so, but – and then made a long
pause…[and said] I’ll tell you in confidence that I have not above ten men in my
regiment whom I am certain will follow me. But we must give them battle now, and
God’s will be done!”43 However, his appearance could have been partly due to illness, as
Gardiner’s correspondence in June, July and August 1745 makes more reference to his
health than to military matters.44

41 Colonel Sir Robert Munro was killed at Falkirk, 17th January 1746, along side his brother Dr Duncan
Munro who was serving as regimental surgeon, and Captain George Munro was killed in an ambush in a
42 ODNB Alexander Carlyle by Richard B. Sher.
43 A. Carlyle, Autobiography of the Rev. Dr Alexander Carlyle Minister of Inveresk Containing Memorials
44 NLS, Transcripts of Gardiner correspondence Acc.11647(b) Lady Gardiner to Gardiner, Bankton, 6th
July 1744; Acc.11647(c) John Mitchell to Lady Gardiner, London, 20th June 1745 and Acc.11647(d)
Gardiner to Lady Gardiner, Thirsk, 3rd August 1745.
Gardiner, the Munro brothers and Blackader, following the lead of the Covenanters, believing it was the duty of every Presbyterian to defend, by force of arms if necessary, the Presbytery and their religious freedom. Consequently, both Doddridge and Carlyle saw their deaths defending the Protestant Succession as a worthy sacrifice and this coloured their publications. This in turn influenced their subsequent portrayal; later paintings dramatically depict Gardiner’s fatal wounding,\(^{45}\) while a history published six years later erroneously recorded: “Sir Robert Munro was wounded and…taken prisoner, together with his Brother [Duncan]…both of which…the Rebels murdered in cold Blood.”\(^{46}\) Several monuments exist commemorating both Gardiner and Munro at their burial sites and the battlefields where they fell, in stark contrast to the focus on Jacobite commemoration at other Jacobite related sites, especially Culloden.

Any subsequent reference to Gardiner, the Munro brothers, and to a lesser extent Blackader, has to bear in mind an ulterior motive - to decry the Jacobites’ barbaric behaviour and highlight the tragic deaths of the government’s loyal servants. Doddridge’s emphasis on religion,\(^{47}\) though illustrative of their personal motivations, similarly detracts from the military reasons for certain events. For example, his attribution of Gardiner’s promotions to “his exemplary diligence and fidelity in

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\(^{46}\) J. Ray, *A compleat history of the rebellion, from its first rise, in 1745, to its total suppression at the glorious battle of Culloden, in April, 1746. By James Ray,...With a summary of the trials and executions of the rebel lords, &c.* (Bristol, 1752), p.249-50.

everything that related to the care of the troops over which he was sat” highlights his moral strengths, but ignores the influence of patronage and the recognition of ability. Indeed, Gardiner’s first commission was bought by his godfather Brigadier-General Rue, and later promotions came through the friendship of the Earl of Stair, in recognition of his actions under Marlborough and at Preston in 1715. His family’s history of loyal service combined with their Lowland origins ensured he was well received in the army. However, the army features only peripherally in Doddridge’s biography, such as in Gardiner’s insistence that his men attend Dissenting services in England, or in relation to the complex position of the honour code and duelling amongst officers. The influence of the Germanic school of military conduct on the British army after 1714 and George I’s and II’s personal interest in their British soldiers would have encouraged Gardiner to provide welfare beyond simple fighting fitness for soldiers under his command.

On the other hand, as contemporary sources, Gardiner and Blackader unwittingly reveal opinions that are of interest to the historian. Despite the rise in Scottish Nationalism since the 1970s and the consequent focus on nationality, it is not blind

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loyalty that is revealed, but rather the complexity of loyalties experienced by Scottish Whigs. When Blackader was ordered to Scotland to counter the 1708 invasion attempt, his use of pronouns reveals a common mix of sympathy for his fellow Scots and abhorrence of the rebels: “Concerned for the public affairs, and the work of God in Scotland. I trust their confusions and troubles shall ultimately turn out for their good, and the disappointment of their enemies”. Of the ’45, Gardiner saw its causes in the “sad state of things as to religion and morals.” Both focused on the religious not the nationalistic significance of the rebellions.

Also inspired by a long family history of defending the Presbytery, Duncan Forbes of Culloden (10th November 1685 – 10th December 1747), Lord Advocate of Scotland from 1709 and Lord President from 1738 to 1746, saw his actions during the ’45 for the preservation of the Government as the only way to save Scotland. Loyalty through national identity, however, was in its infancy in the first half of the eighteenth century. Forbes’s refusal to participate in the trial of Jacobites in Carlisle in 1715 and instead to raise money for their defence was due to Christian duty rather than issues of nationality: “It is certainly Christian and by no means disloyal to sustain them in their indignant estate, until they are found guilty.” Both Forbes and Blackader’s feelings reveal how religion not nationality is their focus; to both, the rebels’ guilt is unquestioned despite a common country of origin. Forbes also advised Walpole against the mass

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56 Crichton, *The Life and Diary*, p.308.
60 Crichton, *The Life and Diary*, p.308.
execution of the Scottish Jacobites during the ’15, not through political sympathy, but rather because he knew grass-roots Scottish pride would not be won over to Hanoverian loyalty by wanton bloodshed.\textsuperscript{61}

An imprecise notion of national identity is revealed in the fluid terminology used by Blackader, Donald Macleod (1688-c.1791) and Donald McBane (1664-c.1728). Blackader refers to Germans rather than Hanoverians, and uses “English” in 1709, after the Union of 1707, but “British” in 1704.\textsuperscript{62} The distinctions of nationality only become specified when religion is involved, as when his pious ideals are frustrated by the English soldiers and officers: “A sad Sabbath…in the middle of an English army. I need say no more to give a notion what a hell on earth it is”.\textsuperscript{63} His attempts at correcting them go unsupported and unappreciated, emphasised by national divisions:

One of the worst days I ever had in this employment…with villany and abominations of all sorts, both against the laws of God and man. Cursing, swearing, drunkedness, robbing, thieving, mutiny, &c. I made some severe examples of punishment, but was ill assisted by some officers, who rather encouraged the villains; so that I believe I shall not be so well liked among many of the English; but I shall be glad to be hated by such.\textsuperscript{64}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[63] \textit{Ibid}, p.314. This example is in 1708, suggesting a slow standardisation to the designation of English or British.
\item[64] \textit{Ibid}, p.312-3. 1\textsuperscript{st} May 1708. On 20\textsuperscript{th} June 1709, he again records his unpopularity with the other officers for his strict stance on punishment for “immortality and scandals”. \textit{Ibid}, p.341.
\end{footnotes}
Interestingly, although Blackader provides evidence for the fluid and unformed nature of the terminology of nationality, he does frequently stereotype by nationality.

That is not to say that Scotland’s military elite remained heartless regarding the fate of their rebel countrymen. Loudoun was regarded as a man of honour, in part thanks to his behaviour following Culloden, when he acted with humanity to those who surrendered, issuing certificates of protection signed by Cumberland.\(^\text{65}\) Loudoun in turn possessed a pragmatic faith in other loyal Highlanders which was more influenced by realism and experience of soldiers than by notions of a unity through common nationality. He argued against disarming well-affected clans after Culloden, placing more faith in them than London and John Campbell of Mamore, Islay’s agent in Scotland,\(^\text{66}\) but was well aware that hastily raised loyal clans were mainly formed from farmers who would desert rather than leave their lands.\(^\text{67}\)

Despite the importance of the legacy of Covenanting zeal in defending the Protestant Succession, strong religious principles were, in many ways, an impediment to life in the army. Blackader found “I am the unfittest for it [recruiting] of any man in the army, and have the least talent that way…I see the greatest rakes are the best recruiters. I cannot ramble, and rove, and drink, and tell stories, and wheedle, and insinuate, if my life

\(^\text{65}\) The certificates were not always respected by the officers on the ground however. ODNB John Campbell, 4\(^\text{th}\) Earl of Loudoun by Stephen Brumwell, Fergusson of Kilkerran, *Argyll in the Forty-Five*, p.203 and J. Oates, *Sweet William or The Butcher? The Duke of Cumberland and the '45* (Barnsley, 2008), p.134.
\(^\text{66}\) Fergusson of Kilkerran, *Argyll in the Forty-Five*, p.188. John Campbell of Mamore is discussed further below in this sub-section.
\(^\text{67}\) The comment was directed against the Earl of Sutherland’s men when ordered to leave Sutherland and follow Cumberland’s army in March 1746. Duffy, *The '45*, p.458-9.
Similarly his role as Governor of Stirling Castle in 1720 came with associated social engagements that led to situations where his principles and social obligations came into conflict: “Went out in the morning with the Duke [of Argyll] and other gentlemen a-fowling…at night there was music and dancing…I laid a restraint upon myself for fear of going too far, and joined but little, only so as not to shew moroseness or ill-breeding.”

Blackader’s diary, as Protestant mode of self-examination to identify “problems of conscience and their resolution,” does focus on his fear of the corrupting nature of military life: “There is now so much tyranny and knavery in the army…it is a wonder how a man of a straight, generous, honest soul can live in it.” However, even this conscious fear was not enough to prevent him joining the army in 1689 and 1715 in order to protect his religion. That he was prepared to socialise despite the risk of sinning, therefore, clearly shows the importance of social interaction and an officer’s personality. Command, it seems, was inextricably linked with society, whether recruiting in taverns or dining with the Commander-in-Chief.

Advancement, whether in society or service to the crown, relied heavily on family ties. The strong hierarchy of eighteenth-century society required an individual to be socially acceptable before he could make the contacts necessary to gain a patron and thus advancement. Most often this entrance was gained through introductions by influential

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68 Crichton, *The Life and Diary*, p.236. 15th February 1705.
70 D.B. Hindmarsh, “‘My chains fell off, my heart was free’: Early Methodist Conversion Narrative in England’, *Church History*, 68:4, December 1999, p.929.
71 Crichton, *The Life and Diary*, p.197.
72 In a letter to the magistrates of Glasgow dated 29th November 1715, Blackader says “…I have long wished…of doing any Service to the Good Town of Glasgow. They have shewn so much Zeal and Forwardness for theses valuable Interests.” P. Rae, *The history of the late rebellion; rais’d against His Majesty King George, by the friends of the Popish Pretender* (Drumfries, 1718), p.312-4.
73 Crichton, *The Life and Diary*, p.236, 462. 15th February 1705 and 17th September 1715
family members or their network of friends. Therefore, the reputation of an individual’s family could open or close doors in an officer’s pursuit of a career. In an age of limited government, social interaction was a key pathway to gain or give influence, so personality, wit and charm were greatly prized. Loudoun benefited from a connection to clan Campbell and, through his mother, to the 2nd Earl of Stair. The Munro brothers’ maternal uncle, Duncan Forbes of Culloden, undoubtedly aided their appointments to Independent Companies, as Forbes suggested the idea and allocated the commissions. Their rise from gentlemen volunteers, however, suggests ability too. Indeed, the then GOC of North Britain, William Cadogan, stated that Robert was “the first man in this kingdom who took arms for his majesty [in 1715]…the preservation of Inverness is very much owing to his vigilance and resolution…and not less useful in Parliament than in the field” and so ensured the government respected Robert’s opinion sufficiently to task him with reporting on the state of Scotland in April 1716, for which he was handsomely rewarded.

Family ties also meant that the friendship between Duncan Forbes, as uncle to the Munro brothers and neighbour of the ‘trimmer’ Lord Lovat, brought a friendship between Robert Munro and Lovat. Though this appears unlikely, considering both found their deaths on opposing sides in the same conflict, it is another example of the complex internecine nature of the Jacobite conflict. Their connection came from a common rivalry over land and inheritance disputes against the Earl of Seaforth and Mackenzie of

74 ODNB Sir Robert Munro by Stuart Handley.
76 BL Add.MS.61161 f.228 in ODNB Sir Robert Munro by Stuart Handley.
77 ODNB Sir Robert Munro by Stuart Handley.
Fraserdale. Prior to Lovat’s overt alliance to the Jacobites in late 1745, their friendship had been strong enough for Munro to banter over the misleading nature of Lovat’s version of his inheritance as inscribed on his father’s monument.\(^78\) Munro was also one of the men that provided money and surety for Lovat’s bail in 1715.\(^79\)

Prior allegiances and enmities also continued uninterrupted by rebellions or the creation of the Union. Robert Munro and Lord Lovat took advantage of Seaforth and Fraserdale’s suspect status following the ’15 by advising the government to take a stronger stance in order to gain an advantage in land disputes with them.\(^80\) Similarly, when cut off on Skye in 1746, Loudoun’s request for arms from General Campbell of Mamore, calling on their family link, only angered Mamore as, besides the presumption of the request, the link dated back to the thirteenth century.\(^81\) This clearly contradicts the nineteenth century romanticised notion of blind loyalty to clan ties. Interestingly, Doddridge made no mention of the friendship between Robert Munro and Lovat or of the Munros’ Highland background. This was either because the complex political and social relations of the Scottish elite were beyond his English comprehension, or because a connection to a condemned traitor was incompatible with his portrayal of Munro as a Protestant martyr.

\(^78\) D.W. Kemp, (ed), ‘Tours in Scotland, 1747, 1750, 1760. By Richard Pockocke, Bishop of Meath, From the original Ms. and drawings in the British Museum’, Scottish History Society (Edinburgh, 1887), p.179 and R. Carruthers, The Highland Note Book (1843), p.82. This inscription can be found in the Appendix No.3.
\(^79\) Burton, Lives of Simon Lord Lovat, p.113-4 and A. Fergusson (ed), Major Fraser’s Manuscript. His Adventures in Scotland and England; His Mission to, and Travels in, France in Search of his Chief; his Services in the Rebellion (and his Quarrels) with Simon Fraser, Lord Lovat 1696-1737 (Edinburgh, 1889), 2 vols, II, p.18-9.
\(^81\) Fergusson of Kikerren, Argyll in the Forty-Five, p.159-60.
The institution of the army was no different from political circles where family and
social connections were of paramount importance in the network-driven world of the
eighteenth century. Blackader was promoted to lieutenant within two months of
volunteering\(^{82}\) thanks to the patronage of the regiment’s commander, Colonel William
Cleland, a college acquaintance, who would naturally look to the interests of friends and
family.\(^{83}\) Once a career was established with the aid of patrons, meritocracy ensured that
ability was promoted, and Blackader’s service in the War of the Spanish Succession
provided the opportunity for friendship with General Cadogan and the Duke of
Marlborough.\(^{84}\) Similarly, the “great promises of friendship both from the Duke [Argyll]
and the General [Wightman]"\(^{85}\) obtained after they served together during the ’15,
ensured his appointment as Deputy-Governor of Stirling Castle.\(^{86}\)

The Hanoverian kings, especially George I, favoured the promotion of ability and
recognition of merit over the purchase system. As the century progressed, a system of
meritocracy increasingly challenged the importance of patronage.\(^{87}\) Stair’s career shows
how his early diplomatic experience\(^{88}\) and military ability\(^{89}\) gained him an appointment

\(^{82}\) Crichton, *The Life and Diary*, p.73.
\(^{84}\) The strength of admiration to Marlborough is demonstrated by the diary entry on the day of his funeral:
“August 2,[1722] The day of Blenheim…This day also the great Duke of Marlborough is to be buried.
This time eighteen years ago, was a glorious day for him; one of the greatest victories ever was obtained. I
could not forbear to solemnize it by dropping guns with my tears, to the honours of my ever renowned, and
ever to be remembered great General.” Crichton, *The Life and Diary*, p.528.
\(^{85}\) Ibid, p.477.
\(^{86}\) Ibid, p.488-9.
\(^{88}\) He attended the diplomatic mission to Vienna in 1700. ODNB John Dalrymple, 2nd Earl of Stair by H.M.
as Second Lieutenant-Colonel in the Scots Foot Guards on 12th May 1702 and brought him to the attention of the Captain-General: “Marlborough honoured Colonel Dalrymple with his particular notice, though, by nation prejudice, not very fond of encouraging Scotsmen.” After 1703, steady promotion followed thanks to a position as ADC to Marlborough, who became his patron and mentor.

Loudoun’s choice of patrons reveals both the pragmatism and necessity of patriotism. When Stair, his maternal uncle, was out of royal favour and in political opposition in the 1730s, he played the Campbell card. However, once Islay fell from favour after the ’45 he turned to Cumberland as a Dalrymple. The nature of eighteenth-century politics and society gave power to individuals who gathered support by personal ability and charisma. These individuals gained position and power, and in turn sought protégés to continue their work. Therefore patronage, and the personality, ability and background of an individual, were of great importance. Argyll’s charisma amongst the public, court and camp, together with Islay’s skill as, “an astute political manager, who knew not only how to use patronage but also how to approach individuals to make them receptive to his needs” allowed the Campbell brothers to gather followers, creating the ‘Argathelians’. Bound by mutual dependence, the Argathelians acted as the Campbells’

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94 ODNB Archibald Campbell, 3rd Duke of Argyll by Alexander Murdoch.
unofficial civil service in Scotland, often managing the daily business of politics. Key amongst them was Duncan Forbes and Andrew Fletcher, Lord Milton. Both proved to be valued advisors, intelligence gatherers and representatives in Edinburgh, especially when Argyll or Islay or both were in London, for example, at the start of the ‘45. The inter-connected nature of the gentry, as civil and military authorities, landowners and politicians, and the importance of reputation and influence was such that personality was as important as ability. Between 1750 and 1794, 208 officers were also MPs, fifty-six of which were also Scottish, demonstrating that the Scottish military elite and Scottish political elite were drawn from the same pool. Similarly, many, such as Stair, Islay and Campbell of Mamore (after inheritance of the dukedom of Argyll) were also Representative Peers, a post that demonstrated royal and governmental trust. Argyll, knowing that the re-election of Representative Peers could act as a check on his independence, demanded an English title in return for acting for the Union during negotiations with the Estates and so sat in the Lords as the 1st Duke of Greenwich. The additional power of seats in the Commons and Lords provided the Scottish military elite with another avenue to contribute to the continuance of the British state and another way to influence how that state was moulded through legislation. The ability to gain influential friends and then draw the able younger generation to you to build a network of supporters that gave a secure power-base was vital when power was needed to gain posts

97 Allan, Scotland in the Eighteenth Century, p.22.
100 Ferguson, Scotland’s Relations with England, p.265.
101 Dickson, Red John of the Battles, p.60.
and influence decisions. Though examined here as soldiers, Scotland’s social elite were multi-faceted; educated and experienced in all branches of leadership whether in politics, diplomacy, the military, economics or estate-management.

The Campbell dominance in Scotland and the importance of long-standing links between families made them the logical agents to fulfil London’s plans in Scotland. With the government-given power of patronage, they dominated all aspects of Scottish society and administration, most significantly through army commissions. In turn, their wider family benefited; both John Campbell of Mamore (1693-1770) and his son John ‘Jack’ Campbell (1723-1806) were anglo-centric Scots who shared their cousins’ belief that the future was ‘British’. They strove for a Scotland equal to England in social, military and political fields, as well as through industry and improvement. It was this patronage, combined with military success on the continent and personal connections in the army and court, which gave Mamore sufficient influence to successfully advise London in October 1745 to permit the raising of voluntary regiments to counter the ‘45. Jack also followed his father into a prosperous career in politics at the start of the ’45 as MP for Glasgow under Islay’s influence. Both prospered in the army, rising to the rank of General and Field-Marshal respectively.

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102 Argyll in particular learned before adolescence that others held his father in awe for the position he held with the king, and that this position had been earned against the odds after his own father’s execution for treason. Dickson, Red John of the Battles, p.22.
103 Mamore and ‘Jack’ were Argyll and Islay’s first and second cousins respectively, who became the 4th and 5th Dukes of Argyll.
104 Fergusson of Kikkeren, Argyll in the Forty-Five, p.34.
105 Ibid, p.16.
However, as Islay’s star waned during and after the ’45, Loudoun’s choice of Cumberland over Campbell was wise. Cumberland provided Loudoun with a strong royal patron, who, as Captain-General, ensured that in 1756 he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of North America, Governor-General of Virginia and Colonel-in-Chief of the Royal American Regiment. Cumberland’s close relationship with his father also ensured George II “spoak well of Loudoun and said he would take care of [him].”

Any prejudice against his nationality was outweighed by Loudon’s family’s strong Whig and Protestant position. The religious sacrifices of his grandfather, who had been exiled for refusing to sign a bond of religious conformity, and the political loyalty of his father, both ensured that Loudoun was an acceptable candidate for the political appointments he received on his inheritance.

The practice of conducting politics on an individual level using individual relationships could also hamper advancement. John Maule (Whig MP for Aberdeen) and former confidential secretary to Islay, informed Mamore on 12th April 1746: “I hope when [Loudoun] comes to you, he will not be imbarassing you with his schemes and disturbing your own. What he has done, has been wrong from beginning to end.”

Thus a MP in Aberdeen was biased against Loudoun because of Loudoun’s behaviour towards Mamore, who was the nephew and heir of Islay. Once such factionalism had begun, political game-playing followed; Maule later wrote to warn Mamore that Loudoun was taking Mamore’s ideas as his own when presenting them to Cumberland.

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109 Fergusson of Kilkerren, Argyll in the Forty-Five, p.156, 165.
These splits also impacted on the command structure of the army at an operational level. On 26th April 1746, Colonel Loudoun ignored General Mamore’s order to remain in the west to search for arms and fleeing rebels, and instead followed Cumberland’s orders to join him at Fort Augustus. This then placed an overwhelming burden on the magazines placed across south-east Scotland from October 1745 by Mamore, and by extension Islay, to support the Argyll Militia in anticipation of ‘mopping up’ the Highlands when the rebellion was quelled.111 Loudoun’s repeated failure to respect the purpose of these magazines and his failure to reimburse or replace items personally paid for by Mamore was symptomatic of the post-rebellion split between Cumberland and Islay. As the relationship deteriorated, Loudoun gained increasing favour with Cumberland. Consequently, his ideas were heard above Mamore’s, causing confusion and inconsistency in the orders issued at this time. For example, on 23rd April Mamore had ordered all clans be disarmed regardless of loyalties. Loudoun, however, persuaded Cumberland to trust the loyal clans, who issued another order on the 3rd May to disarm only the disaffected clans.112 The change of orders, however, did not reach Mamore until 16th May, creating both inconsistency of policy and forcing Mamore to write a grovelling letter to Cumberland begging forgiveness for his mistake.113

Political game-playing also hampered co-operation and communication. On several occasions during the search for Charles Edward, the men under Mamore’s command arrived to find that Loudoun or Captain Fergusson of the Furnace had been

111 Fergusson of Kilverren, Argyll in the Forty-Five, p.181, 179, 187.
112 Ibid, p.188.
113 Ibid, p.198.
there just before them under Cumberland’s orders. This situation kept recurring despite Mamore’s frequent letters complaining that such events were unhelpful, inefficient and wasteful of resources. Similarly, communication between Loudoun and Mamore was so poor that when Jack Campbell, his son, was away from his regiment (Jack was Lieutenant-Colonel of Loudoun’s Highlanders), from May to June 1746, Mamore was left without a channel of communication. That a General (Mamore) could have so little control over a Colonel (Loudoun), and that a Commander-in-Chief (Cumberland) contradicted one of his Generals so frequently, speaks eloquently of the undeveloped nature of command in the British army in the mid-eighteenth century.

Stair also benefited from royal patronage. His family’s standing ensured an early friendship with William III which brought a colonelcy in the winter of 1690-1 and the friendship of Marlborough. This in turn led to an introduction to Anne who favoured him with political and diplomatic posts. Stair’s example also shows the limitations of patronage, royal or otherwise. When Marlborough was in favour, Stair’s stature rose in proportion; when Marlborough fell, Stair sank with him. Stair in his turn tainted those around him while he was out of favour during his years of opposition in the 1730s. His kinsman, Lord Cathcart, took four years to achieve political acceptance by distancing himself from Stair, while Cathcart’s father-in-law, Sir John Shaw, who wanted nothing to

115 Ibid, p.212.
116 They met when Stair was studying law at Leiden University as a youth and William was only Prince of Orange. ODNB John Dalrymple, 2nd Earl of Stair by H.M. Stevens rev. William C. Lowe.
117 Posts included a special mission to Augustus II, Elector of Saxony and King of Poland, 1709-10 and appointment as ambassador-extraordinary to Saxony and Poland from 1710-3. ODNB John Dalrymple, 2nd Earl of Stair by H.M. Stevens rev. William C. Lowe and Cunningham,
do with Stair, was damned by association and was assured he “would never receive the King’s favour again.”\textsuperscript{120} Stair’s career was also hampered by vagaries in royal favour and priorities. He was successful under William III and George I, both men who appreciated military ability, as well as under Anne, thanks to Marlborough’s introduction; Stair fell out of favour under George II, whose dislike of his father led him to reward his father’s enemies and ignore his friends. Even patronage had its limitations given the importance of the individual in politics; Queen Caroline was responsible for Stair’s removal from the Vice-Admiralty of Scotland in April 1733 as punishment for his tactlessness in repeating private conversations between them.\textsuperscript{121}

For all gentlemen of this period, family was an important factor in choice and success of a career. Even with the beheaded traitor, Lord Lovat, as their father, Simon Fraser (1726-1782) and Archibald Campbell Fraser (1736-1815) could call on family links to Argyll and Islay.\textsuperscript{122} Islay’s guardianship ensured that both received good educations and progressed to legal careers, political appointments and military commissions.\textsuperscript{123}

**Pragmatists**

So far Whigs with clear political convictions have been addressed. The following section concentrates on more moderate Whigs, be they Squadrone or Argathelians or

\textsuperscript{120} Harding, ‘Lord Cathcart’, p.199, 206, 215.
\textsuperscript{121} Caroline made herself an intermediary between the King and those out of favour. Stair forfeited this by revealing their private discussions. \textit{Ibid}, p.197, 208-9, 217.
\textsuperscript{122} Archibald’s mother (and therefore Simon’s step-mother) was second cousin to Argyll and Islay.
\textsuperscript{123} ODNB Simon Fraser, Master of Lovat by Stuart Reid and Archibald Campbell Fraser of Lovat, by Robert Clyde.
neither, who were not disaffected but held opinions that were determined by other factors as well as political obedience. It has been seen that for many Scottish gentlemen, service in the British army offered an opportunity for redemption. Simon and Archibald Fraser both spent a lifetime making amends for the disloyalty of their father. Simon became an advocate, and Archibald a diplomat. Both became MPs, Simon from 1761 to his death in 1782, when Archibald took over his seat until his own death two years later. Simon’s loyal government service, in the army, politics and the law, was aimed at recovering his family’s forfeited lands and titles. His greatest asset, his ability to raise large numbers of men from the Highlands, allowed him to seek rehabilitation through the army. At a time of recurrent wars when the prevailing attitude mirrored General Wolfe’s 1750 sentiment that Highlanders were hardy but expendable, military service from 1757 allowed the Government to overlook his family history. Other Scottish gentlemen ‘tainted’ by Jacobitism followed Simon Fraser’s example. Lieutenant-Colonel James Murray (1722-1794), fifth son of the Jacobite Lord Elibank and brother to three active Jacobites, including the perpetrator of the 1752 Elibank Plot, used service in the American War of Independence to prove his loyalty. John Mackenzie (1727-1789), son of the Jacobite Lord Cromarty, had fought, been captured and tried alongside his father, but had been pardoned on 22nd January 1748. Rehabilitation came when the need for men during the American War of Independence gave him the opportunity of raising a

124 Simon worked with Islay from 1752 including the murder trial of Colin Campbell of Glenure, whose murder by James Stewart of the Glen (ODNB James Stewart of the Glen by Allan I. Macinnes) is immortalised in Robert Louis Stephenson’s Kidnapped.
125 ODNB Archibald Campbell Fraser of Lovat by Robert Clyde.
regiment and later a second battalion led by his younger brother George (1741-1787).\footnote{ODNB John Mackenzie by Stuart Reid and ODNB George Mackenzie found within John Mackenzie by Stuart Reid.} It was not until 1771 that Simon Fraser felt secure enough to begin petitioning for the return of the Fraser estates, forfeited after the ’45. Though they were returned a decade before the disbandment of the Annexed Estates Board in 1784 when the remaining forfeited estates were returned, including that of John Mackenzie,\footnote{John still had to pay £19,000 (Sterling) compensation fee. ODNB John Mackenzie by Stuart Reid.} it took three years of petitioning and the payment of £20,983 (Sterling) to finally achieve.\footnote{ODNB Simon Fraser, Master of Lovat by Stuart Reid. The fine covered the expenses of the Forfeiture Committee.} Despite Simon and Archibald’s service, the title was not reinstated until 1857, to Archibald’s heir.\footnote{ODNB Archibald Campbell Fraser of Lovat by Robert Clyde.} The establishment had remembered the 11\textsuperscript{th} Lord Lovat’s disloyalty for two generations and three inheritances. It is little wonder that Archibald felt the need to use his mother’s maiden name as a reminder of his loyal maternal ancestry.

For much of the eighteenth century, the government suffered from an intrinsic suspicion of the loyalty of Scotland, suspecting all of Jacobite sympathies. This affected not only the careers of Scots but the security and effectiveness of government. Duncan Forbes of Culloden (1685-1747) had both personal knowledge of the Highlands and a strong family background of Protestant, Whig loyalty.\footnote{A life-times knowledge was cemented by personal surveys of the country conducted during his recovery after the 1725 Malt Tax Riots. Burton, \textit{Lives of Simon Lord Lovat}, p.327-330.} The family’s estates and influence around Inverness gave him strong links to the Highland chiefs, while their status as landowners rather than chiefs made them acceptable to Lowland and English
peers and to the government. This was invaluable during his career as Lord Advocate and Lord President, serving both Scotland and London, as is best shown during the ’45. His reach, through personal acquaintances, relations and neighbours, allowed him to influence as many Jacobites as possible to remain loyal or, at least, neutral. Burton’s work highlights this role, featuring Lovat’s and Forbes’s correspondence with each other. Forbes’ made a point of maintaining a wide correspondence, recognising its necessity to advancement. Without it, suggestions for the fortification of the Highlands by a loyal former Lord Lieutenant but political nonentity, John Campbell, 3rd Earl of Breadalbane (1696-1782), lacked weight and credibility.

Even so, recommendations to the government concerning legal matters from taxes to the location of ports were generally welcomed, usually because they occurred during peace when the government was amenable. General John Campbell of Mamore’s suggestions, by contrast, though equally knowledgeable, found the government of 1745-6 less receptive. Equally, though Forbes’ knowledge of Corrieyairack’s geography meant he knew General Cope was right not to engage the Jacobites there in September 1745, the government, shocked by Prestonpans and the fall of Edinburgh, did not want to hear that truth. Similarly, despite support from the Argathelians and Walpole,

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136 NAS GD112/47/1/6, Memo concerning pacification of Scotland, 1746; GD112/47/1/8, Memo concerning a General Watch in Scotland, 1746 and GD112/47/1/9, Copy of proposals for roads and redoubts in Scotland, 1746.
137 Fergusson of Kilkerren, Argyll in the Forty-Five, p.188, 197.
Forbes’s suggestion in 1738 for four or five Highland regiments to be raised for the war with Spain and France was ignored.\textsuperscript{139} War on the continent had yet to be declared and Highlanders, regardless of past loyalties, were still regarded with widespread suspicion.

Powerful Scots also worried London. Walpole in particular often found the dukes of Argyll and their followers, the Argathelians, too powerful and would favour Tory agents such as the Marquess of Tweeddale in order not to become dependent on the Campbell hegemony.\textsuperscript{140} Power also attracted enemies; many used the ’15 to criticise and force the brothers out of favour, despite the sense in their argument that harsh punishments would not endear former rebels to the establishment.\textsuperscript{141} What English politicians saw as Jacobite sympathy was actually an awareness, from personal experience, that families accused of treason in one generation could be masters of Scotland in the next.\textsuperscript{142} Though their Scottish rivals could probably understand these arguments, indeed, after the ’15, the feeling of gratitude to those who helped ensure pardons was a major factor in the long period of peace until the ’45, they also saw that granting the Campbells power to give surrendered rebels pardons would leave even more

\textsuperscript{139} The War of Jenkins Ear (1739-42) and the War of the Austrian Succession (1742-8).
\textsuperscript{141} TNA SP54/9/101B, Argyll to Stanhope, Camp at Stirling, 31\textsuperscript{st} October 1715; SP54/10/18A, Argyll to Townsend, Camp at Stirling, 4\textsuperscript{th} November 1715; SP54/10/30, Argyll to Townsend, Camp at Stirling, 8\textsuperscript{th} November 1715 and M. Sankey, \textit{Jacobite Prisoners of the 1715 Rebellion. Preventing and Punishing Insurrection in Early Hanoverian Britain} (Aldershot, 2005), p.99-101.
\textsuperscript{142} Both their grandfather and great-grandfather were executed for treason, in 1661 and 1685, yet within a generation the family title had been increased from an Earldom to a Dukedom and John and Archibald were ‘masters of Scotland’. \textit{Ibid}, p.100-1.
Scottish families in personal debt to them and thus reinforce their already dominant position.\textsuperscript{143}

The tightrope that Forbes, Argyll, Islay and Mamore could walk between London officials and Highland chiefs gave them the rare ability to engage with both parties. Therefore, Forbes could act for and not just advise the government. During the ’45, he obtained many promises of loyalty, or at least neutrality, raising and arming many of the local clans.\textsuperscript{144} It was ironically the Jacobites who recognised Forbes’ contribution in both time and money by the backhand compliment of friends’ warnings in early 1746 “by their [the Jacobites’] discourse here, you was the chief object of their resentment.”\textsuperscript{145}

However, despite repeated examples of loyalty, of which Forbes’s behaviour is but one instance, the government’s inability to distinguish between loyal and disloyal Scots had ensured that, as long as the Jacobite threat existed, any Scot criticising the government was distrusted and marginalised: “Already every man of our country is looked on as a traitor – as one secretly inclined to the Pretender, and waiting but an opportunity to declare. The guilty and the innocent are confounded together.”\textsuperscript{146} Just as Argyll’s desire for moderation towards the Jacobites after the ’15 was viewed as a lack of zeal, so Forbes’ attempts for moderation after Culloden were ignored.\textsuperscript{147} Legend tells of Cumberland’s response to Forbes’ desire to respect the laws of the country: “The laws of

\textsuperscript{144} After the council at Derby, the Jacobites claimed that if the Mackenzies and the Macdonalds and Macleods of Skye had joined them, rather than following Forbes’s advice and remaining neutral, they could have taken London.
\textsuperscript{146} Andrew Mitchell to Duncan Forbes, 23\textsuperscript{rd} October 1746. \textit{Ibid}, p.382.
\textsuperscript{147} TNA SP54/9/101B, Argyll to Stanhope, Camp at Stirling, 31\textsuperscript{st} October 1715; SP54/10/18A, Argyll to Townsend, Camp at Stirling, 4\textsuperscript{th} November 1715; SP54/10/30, Argyll to Townsend, Camp at Stirling, 8\textsuperscript{th} November 1715 and Burton, \textit{Lives of Simon Lord Lovat}, p.383.
the country! My lord, I’ll make a brigade give laws, by God.” The recurrent
contemporary phrase ‘lack of zeal’ was used as a less than subtle suggestion of
disaffection or sympathy for the Jacobite cause that was synonymous with treason, and
appears in this thesis with regularity. Scotland’s political and military elite were often
forced into actions by the threat of showing a ‘lack of zeal’ and were frequently obliged
to protest their ‘zeal’ in advance of a request for men or money, for fear of being thought
indifferent to the state.

Stair’s tendency to act against the government during the 1730s, opposing the
Excise Bill in 1733 and the Mutiny Bill in 1734 causing the loss of his posts, was
viewed as opposition rather than sedition, thanks to his own and his family’s record of
loyalty, his genuine belief that his actions were for the benefit of the country and,
most crucially, because they occurred in times of peace in Scotland. This ensured that
while he lost posts due to his “tactless” behaviour, George II in 1744 “wish[ed] my

149 NAS GD220/5/568/3, Duke of Montrose to Robert Pollock, Whitehall, 21st June 1715; TNA SP54/9/49,
James Anderson to John Lloyd [Postmaster General], Edinburgh, 16th October 1715; SP54/8/74A, Argyll to
Stanhope, Camp at Stirling, 18th September 1715; SP54/8/76, Cockburn to unknown, [18th September
1715]; NAS GD112/47/1/12, Narrative of the Battle of Culloden and FCA A/AAF/40/30/7/1, Petition from
Earl of Rothes to Lords Commissioners of his Majesty’s Treasury, 1748.
151 His government service spanned, on and off, from 1687-1747 militarily, 1700-1720 diplomatically and
from 1707-1747 politically, as well as establishing a successful anti-Jacobite spy network. P.S. Fritz, ‘The
Anti-Jacobite Intelligencer System of the English Ministers, 1715-1745’, *The Historical Journal*, 15:2,
p.279 and ODNB John Dalrymple, 2nd Earl of Stair by H.M. Stevens rev. William C. Lowe and
152 His grandfather lived in exile for refusal to swear the Test Oath and his opposition to James II, and his
father was a key supporter of the Glorious Revolution and Commissioner of the Militia. ODNB John
Dalrymple, 1st Earl of Stair by John R. Young and ODNB John Dalrymple, 2nd Earl of Stair by H.M.
153 For example, Stair’s suspicion of the Walpole-Arthadian pro-French foreign policy was due to his fear
154 20th July 1673 – 9th May 1747.
Lord Stair was in Flanders’ and re-instated him as Commander-in-Chief of South Britain, as a Representative Peer, and as Colonel of the Scots Greys in the summer of 1745.\textsuperscript{156}

Despite the inconsistent attitude the government took towards their Scottish servants’ behaviour, many Scottish Whigs besides Forbes, such as Loudoun, Campbell of Mamore, Stair, Argyll and Islay, showed leniency to their fellow Scots following rebellions.\textsuperscript{157} The government, however, wanted to set an example, believing that leniency after the ’15 had allowed the Jacobites to re-group.\textsuperscript{158} However, Forbes knew, as Argyll did after the ’15, that negotiation would ensure surrender, and that defeated rebels were less likely to rise again if obliged to their contemporaries for their pardon.\textsuperscript{159} Therefore, he continued to act on behalf of captured Jacobites despite the damage this caused to his reputation. The Rev Henry Etough interpreted such actions negatively: “His private character as a man of notice and good temper enabled him to protect the vilest of his countrymen…he was a true Highlander.”\textsuperscript{160} The confused notion of identity is again demonstrated here: as an Englishman, on perceiving a Scot attempting to defend another Scot, he immediately branded him as a ‘Highlander’ with all the implications of barbarity associated with it.


\textsuperscript{157} ODNB John Campbell, 4\textsuperscript{th} Earl Loudoun by Stephen Brumwell; J. Fergusson of Kikkenren, \textit{Argyll in the Forty-Five} (London, 1951), p.185, 195, 201; ODNB John Dalrymple, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Earl of Stair by H.M. Stevens rev. William C. Lowe; Sankey, \textit{Jacobite Prisoners of the 1715 Rebellion}, p.106; ODNB Archibald Campbell, 3\textsuperscript{rd} Duke of Argyll by Alexander Murdoch and Szechi, 1715, p.246.

\textsuperscript{158} Oates, \textit{Sweet William or The Butcher?}, p.107.

\textsuperscript{159} Sankey, \textit{Jacobite Prisoners of the 1715 Rebellion}, p.100-2, 150, 154-5.

\textsuperscript{160} Burton, \textit{Lives of Simon Lord Lovat}, p.383.
However, this should not be confused with feelings of blind national loyalty. Islay demonstrated great compassion to both friends and strangers, including his old friend and open Jacobite, Lockhart of Carnwarth, interceding for many after the ’15.161 However, Szechi suspects that it is no coincidence that one of the few Scottish prisoners executed for treason after the ’15 was not just hung but also, unusually, drawn and quartered, Archibald Burnet of Carlops, had personally promised Islay to remain uninvolved and then broken his word.162 Similarly, the traditional rivalry for dominance between Campbell and Dalrymple163 interrupted all other mutual loyalties towards government and Britain or Scotland, when Stair delayed the government’s reaction to the Jacobite landings in July 1745164 by pushing unsuccessfully to allow loyal Lowland gentlemen to raise their own regiments, as was being done in England.165 This put him in direct conflict with Islay who wanted to raise the loyal Highland clans.166

To make the relationship between the government and its loyal servants more difficult, the task facing Scotland’s officials wishing to bridge the Scotland-London divide was a constant balancing act between fulfilling Scottish expectation without overstepping government-given authority. This is best illustrated through Forbes who, as Lord Advocate and Lord President, found that tension existed between London’s view of him as a government servant, and the Scots’ belief that the role retained the power and

161 Szechi, 1715, p.246.
162 Ibid, p.236.
163 This had already had a detrimental affect on Stair’s career, as opposition to the Walpole-Argyll-Islay alliance kept him out of office in the 1730s. Harding, ‘Lord Cathcart’, p.194, 205.
164 Duffy, The ‘45, p.212.
166 Fergusson of Kilkerren, Argyll in the Forty-Five, p.33.
authority it had under the Privy Council.\textsuperscript{167} This was a matter made more difficult as Forbes needed the traditional position the post gave in society to achieve his goals, whilst not appearing to London as if he were abusing his power or favouring Scots over the interests of the government.\textsuperscript{168} During the inquiry into the Porteous Riot in 1737, for example, the government saw conspiracy in the unusually organised mob and subsequent lack of suspects.\textsuperscript{169} Frightened, they brought a bill of heavy penalties on Edinburgh, threatening the Union itself.\textsuperscript{170} Forbes in the Commons and Argyll in the Lords led the opposition despite government pressure. Both wished to defend the Union and remain loyal to the government but recognised that Scotland would not tolerate such penalties.\textsuperscript{171} This balance had failed after the July 1725 Malt Tax riots in Glasgow. Scandal had followed Forbes’s removal of rioters to Edinburgh using his power as JP of Lanark, when the ‘Squadrone’ faction, the proto-party opposed to the Argathelians in Scotland, ensured that the rioters were pardoned by claiming that Forbes had acted without magisterial permission and outside of his Lanarkshire jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{172}

Such a balance of power was a delicate game. Despite their equal ability, connections and concern for Scotland’s future, Argyll was overlooked for the post of

\textsuperscript{167} ODNB Duncan Forbes of Culloden by John S. Shaw.
\textsuperscript{168} Burton, \textit{Lives of Simon Lord Lovat}, p.357.
\textsuperscript{169} General Wade summed up such opinions in a speech to the Commons at the inquiry: “If we take a view of the whole proceedings in that barbarous murder, we find nothing in it that looks like the precipitate measure of a giddy mob; no, they went coolly and regularly to work, and for my share, I never was witness to or ever hear do any military disposition better laid down or more regularly executed than their murderous plan was.” Burton, \textit{Lives of Simon Lord Lovat}, p.349.
\textsuperscript{170} \textit{Ibid}, p.349-56.
\textsuperscript{171} \textit{Ibid}, p.349-53 and ODNB Duncan Forbes of Culloden.
unofficial Secretary of State for Scotland in 1725, in Forbes’s favour. Significantly, Walpole felt Argyll had too much clan-based power, while Forbes was a neutral Scot detached from the clan system and thus suitable for the post. Additionally, his family’s position in the Highlands as landowners and not as clan chieftains was more acceptable to London. Walpole distrusted Scottish loyalty, suspecting Scots had greater ties to their extended families and local political alliances than to the government in London.

Forbes, like Argyll, Islay and Mamore, and despite a proven career of loyalty and usefulness to London, was still frustrated by government prejudice against Scots and Scotland. This meant a slow reaction to events and to his advice during the ’45. Despite his prompt preparations, he could not act officially until October 1745 when he received blank commissions (dated 4th September 1745) for twenty Independent Highland Companies to offer as inducements to ensure loyalty. This was clearly too little too late for Lovat and the Earl of Cromarty, both of whom Forbes had been corresponding with. Unsupported in Edinburgh, Forbes had to fill all possible roles; political, legal, judicial and military. Only in a private letter written after the rebellion did he let this burden show: “[after Prestonpans] I found myself almost alone, without troops, without arms, without money or credit; provided with no means to prevent extreme folly, except

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174 Forbes’s Great-great-grandfather moved to Inverness-shire in the seventeenth century and subsequent ancestors were all influential in local politics and strict Presbyterians, even when it went against current politics. *Ibid*, p.269-272.
175 Walpole disliked having Secretaries of State for Scotland, appointing only the Earl of Selkirk from 1731-42 and the Marquess of Tweeddale, 1742-6, and then abolishing the post. Though Forbes’s position as an Argathelian gave Argyll significant influence, the loss of status of the post, would have been a blow to Argyll’s pride. *Ibid*, p.332-3.
pen and ink, a tongue, and some reputation.” Even more frustratingly, Forbes and many other Scottish Whigs’ suggestions for pacification became increasingly incompatible with the government policy of ignoring Scotland until it became a problem and then applying heavy-handed methods to suppress it. This occurred both before, and, more overtly, after the ’45, and led to his marginalisation and resignation in 1746. He died in 1747, disillusioned and indebted.

**Trimmers**

The last group of this chapter are the ‘trimmers’, so named for their practise of “fluctuating between two parties...For men to pretend that their will obeys that law, while all besides their will serves the faction: what is this but a gross, fulsome juggling with their duty, and a kind of trimming it between God and the devil.” Just like their contemporaries discussed above, the men who would eventually turn Jacobite or who would play the political game of ‘trimming’, entered the army in their youth to gain a traditional military education. John Sinclair, the Master of Sinclair (1683-1750), joined Preston’s Regiment with a commission as Captain-Lieutenant “without the consent of my Father...But...I lookt on all other ways of living as unworthy of a man of qualitie.” His younger brother James (1687/8-1762), was first commissioned aged six

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in 1694 as an ensign in 1st Royal Scots.\textsuperscript{182} Both brothers served in Flanders under Marlborough.\textsuperscript{183} David Wemyss, 6\textsuperscript{th} Lord Elcho (1721-1787) was educated at the military academy at Angers.\textsuperscript{184} Arthur Elphinstone, 6\textsuperscript{th} Lord Balmerino (1688-1746) began his career with a commission commanding a company in Shannon’s Regiment – a post he regretted on the scaffold.\textsuperscript{185} Lord George Murray (1694-1760) became an ensign in the 1st Royal Scots in 1711 aged seventeen\textsuperscript{186} and accompanied his older brother Charles (1691-1720), who was a cornet in the 5\textsuperscript{th} Dragoons,\textsuperscript{187} to Flanders, arriving at the end of July 1714.\textsuperscript{188} His military experience was limited, however, as he spent the winter in the sick-bay at Dunkirk and the next two years in peacetime soldiering.\textsuperscript{189} George Keith, Earl Marischal (1692/3-1778) and his younger brother James Francis Edward Keith (later known as Marshal Keith, 1696-1758) both served in the British army. After serving under Marlborough from 1708-11, in February 1714 Earl Marischal was appointed Captain of a Scottish troop of Horse Grenadier Guards.\textsuperscript{190}

These men came from the same society, with the same attitudes, as those who loyally served the Protestant succession. Duelling, for example, was as much a part of their lives as it was for their eventual political and military opponents, and often was apolitical. John Sinclair, for example, duelled with brothers Hugh and Alexander Shaw

\textsuperscript{182} ODNB James Sinclair by Jonathan Spain.
\textsuperscript{183} ODNB John Sinclair by T.F. Henderson rev Murray G.H. Pittock and ODNB James Sinclair by Jonathan Spain.
\textsuperscript{184} ODNB David Wemyss by Roger Turner.
\textsuperscript{186} ODNB Lord George Murray by Murray G.H. Pittock.
\textsuperscript{187} ODNB Lord Charles Murray by Margaret D. Sankey.
\textsuperscript{188} Tomasson, The Jacobite General, p.2.
\textsuperscript{189} Ibid, p.2.
\textsuperscript{190} ODNB George Keith by Edward M. Furgol.
in 1708, fighting accusations of cowardice in British service in Flanders.\textsuperscript{191} Seven years later Sinclair fought another duel against George Murray during the ’15.\textsuperscript{192} At some time between 1720 and 1724, George Murray fought a duel against Campbell of Glendaruel whilst attending the Paris Academy at James Edward’s expense.\textsuperscript{193} The unformed nature of nationality also appears apolitical. George Murray’s letters to his wife reflect his world conscious view, though he had a very British outlook.\textsuperscript{194} Similarly, from 1728 onwards, he lived as a country gentleman acting as his brother’s Deputy Lord Sherriff and improving the family’s mining, agricultural and fishery interests.\textsuperscript{195} In 1743, he also insisted his son be educated at Eton, despite causing a breach with his older brother, William, Marquess of Tullibardine (1689-1746). Tullibardine had advised a continental – that is pro-Jacobite and Francophile – education “with the right principles.”\textsuperscript{196}

Despite these commonalities, all mentioned in this section turned Jacobite. Balmerino fought for the Government at Sheriffmuir but, finding this “against his conscience,”\textsuperscript{197} he deserted and fled to France.\textsuperscript{198} Lovat had held commissions in the army in 1683\textsuperscript{199} and 1716,\textsuperscript{200} was Governor of Inverness Castle,\textsuperscript{201} and the Sheriff for

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item He was court-marshalled and sentenced to death (despite the 1st Duke of Marlborough’s desire for clemency), escaped to Prussia (possibly with Marlborough’s aid) until pardoned 1712. ODNB John Sinclair by T.F. Henderson rev Murray G.H. Pittock.
\item Tomasson, \textit{The Jacobite General}, p.11 and J.H. Burton (ed), \textit{Jacobite Correspondence of the Atholl Family during the rebellion 1745-1746} (Edinburgh, 1840).
\item ODNB Lord George Murray by Murray G.H. Pittock and Thomasson, \textit{The Jacobite General}, p.9, 12.
\item \textit{True Copies of the Papers}, p.1.
\item ODNB Arthur Elphinstone by Murray G.H. Pittock.
\item ODNB Simon Fraser, 11th Lord Lovat by Edward M. Furgol.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Inverness-shire.\textsuperscript{202} He ended his life as the last peer to be beheaded for treason. Lovat’s life is a pertinent case study of ‘trimmers’. In a life-long pattern he was vocally loyal to the government but remained an active plotter against it. In 1700 he met both James II at St. Germain and William III at Loo, assuring both of his loyalty.\textsuperscript{203} On finding indifferent support amongst Scottish Jacobites in 1703, he turned against them in what became the Queensbury Plot\textsuperscript{204} and in 1719 he both encouraged and acted against the Spanish-backed invasion.\textsuperscript{205} Later, he joined with several other Scottish gentlemen in 1739 and 1740 to sign Associations promising their support to the Jacobite court and inviting an invasion of Scotland.\textsuperscript{206} By the 1730s it was widely known that Lovat was corresponding, if not plotting, with Jacobites\textsuperscript{207} and his Sheriffship and Independent Company were removed.\textsuperscript{208} During the ’45, he continued to protest his loyalty, even as he raised 700 of his clan for the Jacobites,\textsuperscript{209} blaming the impetuousness of youth when he forced his son to lead them.\textsuperscript{210} Lovat is usually dismissed as purely self-interested. His life, spanning the Restoration period to the end of the last Jacobite rebellion, shows the difficult position his generation were in, as society, constitution and dynasty changed about them. Lovat’s character mirrored that change, remaining both the archetypal Highland chief, who actively sought to retain the old feudal world of the clan system,

\textsuperscript{201} ODNB Simon Fraser, 11\textsuperscript{th} Lord Lovat by Edward M. Furgol.
\textsuperscript{203} \textit{Ibid}, p.48.
\textsuperscript{204} \textit{Ibid}, p.66-9, 71-90.
\textsuperscript{205} \textit{Ibid}, p.193-5.
\textsuperscript{206} ODNB Simon Fraser, 11\textsuperscript{th} Lord Lovat by Edward M. Furgol and Burton, \textit{Lives of Simon Lord Lovat}, p.215-6. Each Associator was responsible for mustering support in a particular area of Scotland. By 1745 they had added the proviso that support would be given only if an invading force landed with 6,000 French troops. Duffy, \textit{The ’45}, p.44. The Associators shouldn’t be confused with the Whig associations that appeared prior to the ’15. Szechi, \textit{1715}, p.107-8.
\textsuperscript{207} ODNB Simon Fraser, 11\textsuperscript{th} Lord Lovat by Edward M. Furgol.
\textsuperscript{208} Burton, \textit{Lives of Simon Lord Lovat}, p.209.
\textsuperscript{209} \textit{Ibid}, p.223-7.
\textsuperscript{210} \textit{Ibid}, p.227-9.
while embracing the new powers of the law. He used his legal education as much as the
custom of Dùthchas and his Heritable Jurisdictions, was multi-lingual and a charismatic
courtier.\textsuperscript{211} However, he, and others of his generation, struggled to reconcile old loyalties
to new dynasties, and to fit old, clan-orientated outlooks to the age of improvement.

‘Trimming’ behaviour earned only distrust from both sides. In 1745, George
Murray informed the Duke of Perth that if the Jacobites landed he would bring out his
men for the government and then take them over to Charles Edward. The Jacobites did
not believe him after his acceptance of a pardon in 1725 and twenty years of peaceful life
in Atholl, so both sides were surprised by his actions when he did just that.\textsuperscript{212} Playing
both sides was not unusual, especially at a time when the elite were closely linked by
inter-marriage, community and political allegiance. That Lovat and Forbes continued
corresponding even after the Frasers had risen for the Jacobites is indicative of how the
elite of eighteenth-century Scotland knew that governance had longer term implications
than the present crisis. The tortuous career of the 1\textsuperscript{st} Duke of Argyll provides a
significant example.\textsuperscript{213} Open correspondence was an acceptable, if delicate, practice.
The Duke of Marlborough, for example, maintained correspondences with William of
Orange despite being in James II’s inner circle, but later kept a secret correspondence
with his nephew, the Duke of Berwick, code-named the ‘00’ letters.\textsuperscript{214} This successfully
kept him informed of both sides and was only dangerous when taken advantage of by

\textsuperscript{211} Dùthchas – cultural heritage linked to land and chiefs role in protecting and proportioning it. Heritable
Jurisdictions – inherited judicial power of chiefs. See Glossary.
\textsuperscript{212} ODNB Lord George Murray by Murray G.H. Pittock.
\textsuperscript{213} ODNB Archibald Campbell, first Duke of Argyll by John S. Shaw.
\textsuperscript{214} D. Chandler, ‘The Great Captain-General 1702-1714’ in Chandler and I. Beckett, The Oxford History of
the British Army, p.83. The code-name later provided inspiration for Ian Fleming, and James Bond as
‘007’.
Thus, it is unsurprising that Lovat was corresponding with both courts from 1737 onwards.\footnote{215 Marlborough’s letters were only an insurance policy in case of Stuart restoration and accusations that he was more active in plots were never proven. C. Hibbert, The Marlboroughs. John and Sarah Churchill 1650-1744 (London, 2002), p.54, 63-6, 71, 290.}

This complex network of family, friends and neighbours within Scotland’s elite proved vital to many ‘trimmers’ when those acquaintances sought pardons for them after the ’15 and ’45. Beyond the role of Forbes and Islay, who saw the government’s approach as damaging, many simply responded to the needs of kinsmen. The women of Scotland’s social elite were particularly important in flooding London with petitions for pardons, appearing at court begging for mercy and even aiding rebel prisoners with food, blankets or escape.\footnote{217 Sankey, Jacobite Prisoners of the 1715 Rebellion, p.28-33, 100-103, 108-9; M. Criag, Damn’ Rebel Bitches. The Women of the ‘45 (Edinburgh and London, 1997), p.29, 88-93 and Széchi, 1715, p.245.}

It was recognised by individuals in London and the army that patronage, with the connotations of obligation, could act to ensure loyalty. Thus it was Lovat’s obligations to the 16th Earl of Sutherland and John Forbes (Duncan Forbes’ elder brother) for their support in gaining his freedom from arrest for treason in 1715 that ensured his assistance in relieving Culloden House for the government during the ‘15.\footnote{218 Burton, Lives of Simon Lord Lovat, p.115-6.} He dispersed the force of Clan Chattan that controlled the area,\footnote{219 ODNB Simon Fraser, 11th Lord Lovat by Edward M. Furgol.} re-took Inverness\footnote{220 Burton, Lives of Simon Lord Lovat, p.117.} and negotiated the surrenders of the Duke of Gordon and the Earl of Seaforth.\footnote{221 Fergusson, Major Fraser’s Manuscript, II, p.83-4.} His incentive for government service was the unspoken promise that such acts of loyalty would be – and
were rewarded with a full pardon on 10th March 1716.\textsuperscript{222} The Governorship of Inverness Castle\textsuperscript{223} and the captaincy of an Independent Company from August 1716\textsuperscript{224} were added extras. Most importantly for Lovat, the government also took his side in his ongoing claim for the disputed Fraser of Lovat lands.\textsuperscript{225} For twenty years, George Murray’s 1725 pardon kept him loyal to the government, even taking the Oath of Allegiance in order to aid his half brothers, John and Frederick (in the Army and Navy respectively), with re-election in Perthshire in 1739.\textsuperscript{226} Balmerino’s pardon in 1734 and his father’s role in negotiating it, was clearly a government expectation that such favour would ensure his loyalty. This was a forlorn hope, however, as on the scaffold, Balmerino explained how his father’s actions “very much surprised me”\textsuperscript{227} and that he only accepted it with James Edward’s approval.\textsuperscript{228}

Despite many successful outcomes, the government’s use of patronage through commissions and obligations to ensure loyalty could not be expected to succeed in all cases. Following Lovat’s pardon in 1716, he remained loyal while he received government favour. However, as these initial benefits expired he increasingly turned to the Jacobites.\textsuperscript{229} By 1719 he was encouraging the Earl of Seaforth to lead a Jacobite

\textsuperscript{222} Loyal service in the ’15 was a condition of his bail and pardon. Duff, \textit{Culloden Papers}, p.32 and Burton, \textit{Lives of Simon Lord Lovat}, p.114.
\textsuperscript{223} ODNB Simon Fraser, 11th Lord Lovat by Edward M. Furgol.
\textsuperscript{224} Burton, \textit{Lives of Simon Lord Lovat}, p.118.
\textsuperscript{225} ODNB Simon Fraser, 11th Lord Lovat by Edward M. Furgol.
\textsuperscript{226} Tomasson, \textit{The Jacobite General}, p.5-6.
\textsuperscript{227} \textit{True Copies of the Papers}, p.1.
\textsuperscript{228} \textit{Ibid}, p.2.
\textsuperscript{229} The Governorship of Inverness (without salary or pension) only lasted a year, the Independent Company eight months. Burton, \textit{Lives of Simon Lord Lovat}, p.118 and ODNB Simon Fraser, 11th Lord Lovat by Edward M. Furgol.

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George Keith, Earl Marischal, clearly had Jacobite sympathies even while serving in the British army; his offer to proclaim James Edward king at the head of the regiment after Anne’s death was refused “[as] the timidity of the Jacobite party would not permit [it].” Shortly afterwards, after leaving or losing his commission, he and his brother James joined Mar in Scotland at the start of the 1715 rebellion. Significantly, James was on his way to London to lobby for promotion, suggesting he was unhappy with his current rank in government service and was, therefore, open to his brother’s persuasion that the Jacobites could offer more.

One major reason why the loss of patronage caused disaffection was that being the recipient of patronage gave men the ability to exercise patronage in turn. This was an important part of self-identification and a measure of status. For Lovat, the loss of power and credibility caused when Walpole removed his sheriffship and Independent Company in 1739 was sufficient that, “if Kouli Khan had landed in Britain, he thought that would have justified him to have joined him with his clan.” The power that lay in arming his clansmen and dispensing patronage by way of officers’ commissions to his tacksmen was vital to both his sense of identity as a chief and to his standing with his clan. Consequently, to Lovat, his policy of switching allegiance as the situation suited

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233 ODNB George Keith by Edward M. Furgol.
234 ODNB Simon Fraser, 11th Lord Lovat by Edward M. Furgol.
235 Lovat is referring to Kublai Khan, thirteenth century Mongol emperor. Burton, Lives of Simon Lord Lovat, p.209.
237 The importance of this motivation is illustrated in the epitaph Lovat chose for his father’s monument. See Appendix No.3.
him was entirely justified if it furthered his personal quest for power. It was this aim that
decided Lovat’s allegiance during the ’15 and in the Queensbury Plot, and the lack of
advancement with the government drove both Mar (in the ’15) and Lovat (in the ’45) into
the Jacobite camp.

That men did change allegiances, in so doing breaking bonds of obligation often
to close friends and family, does not mean that they did so easily. George Murray, in a
letter to his (loyal) brother James, 2nd Duke of Atholl, on 3rd September 1745, just prior
to joining the Jacobite army, wrote “If I err, it is only with respect to you. I owe
obligations to nobody else – I mean the Court of London.” His further comment “I
never spoke or interfered with any of the Athollmen” demonstrates how important it is
that his brother should not think he took advantage of his pardon to plot whilst obligated
to him. Such breaks with bonds of obligation were rare, however. Most felt obliged to
the government for past favour or pardons and so remained neutral during the ‘45, as the
Duke of Seaforth did after his pardons following the ’15 and ’19, or joined the
government forces, as Lord Adam Gordon did (c.1726-1801), entering the British army
as an ensign in 1741 after his mother was sustained by a government pension despite the
presence of his father and grand-father amongst the Jacobites.

Whilst many politicians and military men in London recognised that using
patronage and showing favour was a proven way to ensure loyalty, it was not always

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239 Tomasson, The Jacobite General, p.20.
240 Ibid, p.20.
followed by those in government. The usual level of paranoia over Scottish loyalty increased at times of unrest, often hampering Scotland’s military and political elites just when such a policy would have had most effect. The Earl of Stair lamented after the ’45: “I own to you my opinion would always have been, preferable to everything, to have disarmed the Frasers, and to have secured my friend Lord Lovat, which I should have imagined would not have been disagreeable to him.”

However, the only official government attempt to secure the loyalty of Lovat, and other disaffected Scots, in the form of commissions for Independent Companies, took too long to be sent to Scotland. Duncan Forbes had attempted to gain Lovat’s neutrality, if not loyalty, during the ’45 by offering him, George Mackenzie, 3rd Earl of Cromarty (c.1703-1766) and his son John (1727-1789), command of these Independent Highland Companies with the power to issue commissions. However, the commissions’ arrival on 10th October 1745, dated 4th September 1745 – ten weeks after Charles Edward had landed – was too late to persuade them. By contrast, the Jacobites were quick to use the same tactic of preferment to gain loyalty. David Wemyss, 6th Earl of Wemyss (1721-1787), known as Lord Elcho, was given Jacobite appointments and army ranks before acting as a Jacobite agent in Scotland in April 1744. Cromarty, his pride hurt by the lack of commissions for himself and his son, was open to the flattery of a personal request from Tullibardine to bring his 300-400 men to the Jacobites. Similarly, George Murray rapidly rose to

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244 Ibid, p.373.
245 ODNB David Wemyss by Roger Turner.
Major-General after he, and his elder brothers William (Marquess of Tullibardine) and Charles, joined the Earl of Mar in 1715, despite his lack of active service experience.\(^{247}\)

The personal motivations of those considered ‘trimmers’ reveals much about the genuine beliefs that decided their allegiance and the poor understanding contemporaries had of these reasons. Instead of simple explanations of disloyalty or slavery to Rome and France, the ideological aspirations of a pre-Union Scotland were strong. George Keith made James Edward promise to restore Scotland’s rights taken by Anne in return for proclaiming him at Edinburgh.\(^{248}\) John Sinclair joined the ’15 despite knowing Mar was militarily unskilled because he considered himself a patriot and was anti-Union.\(^{249}\) His memoirs recall witnessing “with horror” the Union making Scotland “a contemptible province to a neighbouring Nation.”\(^{250}\) The final insult was to witness the Representative Peers “beg[ging]” at court for their £100 (Sterling) expenses: “My God! How concerned I was to see those who pretended to be of the ancient Scots Nobility reduced to beg at an English Court!”\(^{251}\) Anti-Union feeling was not universal, however. George Murray saw that the Union could help Scotland contribute to his “desire that the prestige of Great Britain should be upheld among the nations of the world.”\(^{252}\) Some, such as John Sinclair, felt they had been pushed to rebellion by the behaviour of England’s politicians: “I lookt on the Whigs as a set of men very capable to serve their country, but their morals so vitiated that they had not the least inclination. As for the

\(^{247}\) ODNB Lord George Murray by Murray G.H. Pittock.
\(^{248}\) Constable, *A fragment of a memoir*, p.ix-x.
\(^{252}\) Tomasson, *The Jacobite General*, p.11.
Tories, I believed them willing to serve their countrie without the least
capacitie…But…the love of countrie was extinct and forgot by both.” 253 Similarly,
George Murray found Britain increasingly corrupt under Whig administration, especially
after a visit to London in 1743. His letters made no mention of meeting George II. 254
Those in power did not match his own high morals; he, for example, never bought
smuggled goods and was disappointed to find such corruption rife. 255 Despite later
criticism that Cromarty was “one of the slippery correspondents”, 256 his decision to join
the Jacobites in 1745 was not whimsical. He had promised support since 1740 when he
signed the proclamation of support. 257

Some Jacobites were clearly influenced by personal gain; Lovat’s support, such as
the two associations he signed in 1739 and 1740 inviting the court in exile to invade
Scotland, 258 was always in return for a dukedom. 259 Lovat’s life long motivator had been
to acquire and retain land, influence and power. Even his 1716 and 1724 proposals to the
government to create Highland regiments with specific policing powers 260 and the
appointment of sheriffs with a strong position in the community 261 were less than
altruistic. All his suggestions gave greater power to chiefs like himself. However,
others, such as George Murray, demonstrated a greater integrity and strength of belief in

253 Scott, Memoirs of the insurrection, p.8.
257 ODNB George Mackenzie, 3rd earl of Cromarty by Murray G.H. Pittock.
258 ODNB Simon Fraser, 11th Lord Lovat by Edward M. Furgol.
260 ODNB Simon Fraser, 11th Lord Lovat by Edward M. Furgol.
the Jacobite cause. George’s letter to his brother James, 2nd Duke of Atholl, before leaving to join the Jacobites, reads:

My life, my fortune, my expectations, the happiness of my wife and children are all at stake…and yet a principle of (what seems to me) honour, and my duty to King and Country, outweighs everything…I never did say to any person in my life that I would not engage in the Cause I always in my heart thought just and right, as well for the interest, good, and liberty of my country.  

Indeed, the strength of Tullibardine and George Murray’s convictions is revealed in their letters discussing the siege of their ancestral home, Blair Castle, between 18th March and 1st April 1746. Tullibardine’s reply to George’s statement “If we get the Castle I hope you wil excuse our demolishing it” shows the depth of their commitment to the Jacobite cause and the unlikelihood of a tactical split in loyalties within the Murray family. Tullibardine’s reply is just as dedicated to the Jacobites:

Brother George…you may do what…[you] think fit with the Castle.

I am in no concern about it. Our great-great-grandfather, grandfather, and father’s pictures will be an irreparable loss on blowing up the house. But there is no comparison to be made with these faint images of our fore-fathers and the more necessary public service which requires we should sacrifice everything.  

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Motivation was also strongly influenced by family, friends and neighbours. John Sinclair’s father was the only Scottish peer to object to the Act of Settlement of William and Mary\textsuperscript{264} and he later wrote, “I am of a Familie who, at all times and upon all occasions, were attached to the Crown of Scotland… I was earlie instructed in the principles of an indispensable duty and fidelitie towards my Prince.”\textsuperscript{265} Elcho’s family’s traditional Stuart loyalties determined his visit to Rome between October 1740 and April 1741, and introduced him to Jacobite contacts.\textsuperscript{266} Balmerino, too, was influenced by his father’s politics; both were “determined anti-Unionist[s]”\textsuperscript{267} and had a background of “fierce Episcopalian nationalism.”\textsuperscript{268} A desire to find religious toleration and to regain an independent Scotland were two of the fundamental desires that united Jacobites. George Keith followed the family influence of his Episcopalian father and Roman Catholic mother,\textsuperscript{269} while George Murray (and by extension, his brothers Tullibardine and Charles) became Episcopalian in reaction to the oppressive influence of their Calvinist grandparents and parents. Their father, the 1\textsuperscript{st} Duke of Atholl, blamed their Episcopalian and Jacobite paternal aunt, Lady Nairn, who they turned to instead of him.\textsuperscript{270} Ironically, it was likely the same desire to escape the Calvinist family home that led all three brothers into Britain’s armed forces.\textsuperscript{271} Similarly, friend and neighbour Lord

\textsuperscript{264} ODNB John Sinclair by T.F. Henderson rev Murray G.H. Pittock.

\textsuperscript{265} Scott, Memoirs of the insurrection, p.1.

\textsuperscript{266} ODNB David Wemyss by Roger Turner.


\textsuperscript{268} Szechi, Jacobitism and Tory Politics, p.86.

\textsuperscript{269} ODNB George Keith by Edward M. Furgol.

\textsuperscript{270} Tomasson, The Jacobite General, p.1.

\textsuperscript{271} William served in the Royal Navy from 1707/8-1712 while Charles served from 1712-1715 as a cornet in the 5\textsuperscript{th} Dragoons. Tomasson, The Jacobite General, p.2; ODNB George Murray by Murray G.H. Pittock and ODNB William Murray by Murray G.H. Pittock and ODNB Charles Murray by Margaret D. Sankey.
Lovat “was instrumental in getting the weak and inept Earl of Cromartie to rise”\(^{272}\) while Elcho was persuaded towards Jacobitism by his friend Sir James Steuart of Coltness and Goodtrees in 1738, rather than follow the advice of his father’s third cousin, John, Master of Sinclair, that he petition for a government commission.\(^{273}\)

Many men, now remembered as Jacobites to the core, actually displayed a pragmatic attitude towards action. Their motivation ranged from a desire for self-protection or a wariness of risking their families and estates,\(^{274}\) to a practical, less emotional sense of acting at an optimal time. George Murray felt both ideological passion for the Jacobite ‘cause’ and objectivity. Of the 1744 invasion attempt, he wrote: “I cannot consieve how the French can think of making so desperate an attempt, especially Sir John Norris lying in the Downs, who doubtless will give a good account of the transports and men-of-war too, if he meet them”\(^{275}\) but on the eve of joining the Jacobite army in 1745 wrote: “My life, my fortune, my expectations, the happiness of my wife and children are all at stake…and yet a principle of (what seems to me) honour, and my duty to King and Country, outweighs everything.”\(^{276}\) Similarly, Lovat faced many situations where ideology and practicalities clashed. When besieging and defending the town of Inverness in November 1715, for example, he negotiated with Macdonald of Keppoch, the 2\(^{nd}\) Duke of Gordon and the 5\(^{th}\) Earl of Seaforth, rather than engage them

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\(^{273}\) This is the same Master of Sinclair mentioned throughout this chapter. Following his disappointment at the wasted opportunity of the ’15, he became ‘tamed’ and gained a pardon in 1736. Thus by 1738 would have advocated Government not Jacobite loyalties. ODNB David Wemyss by Roger Turner.


\(^{275}\) *Ibid*, p.10.

\(^{276}\) *Ibid*, p.20.
militarily.\textsuperscript{277} Though he recognised that government favour sprang from victory over the Jacobites, he perhaps wished to prevail with minimal damage to those he knew and respected. As Major Fraser recorded, Lovat “had very little inclination for the work… He was more attached to the other party, had not necessity obliged him to draw to the King’s and he was not yet sure of obtaining his pardon”.\textsuperscript{278} Both Lovat and George Murray demonstrated their own caution in the advice they gave others regarding active Jacobite service, motivated by a realistic awareness of the strength of the government’s army and navy and the precariousness of their own position. Lovat, therefore, thought Cameron of Lochiel was “ower rash” for declaring so soon,\textsuperscript{279} while Murray advised Lord Strathallan against involvement in the 1744 attempt: “I told him he had too good sense to join in any such design or attempt…for the French wanted only to embroil Britain to gain their ends elsewhere.”\textsuperscript{280} This interesting evidence of cynicism regarding France’s assistance to the Jacobites shows that even the popularly viewed common enemies of Britain were not always united.

In some cases, a simple desire to increase or preserve power was the motivator. Lord Lovat used both the government and the Jacobite cause to increase his position and power over his clan, as opposed to Argyll, Islay, Forbes and Stair, who used similar tactics and determination but to become part of the British state. He clung to the clan system, using the traditional fiery cross during the ’45\textsuperscript{281} and requesting a coronach and

\textsuperscript{278} Fergusson, \textit{Major Fraser’s Manuscript}, II, p.83.
\textsuperscript{279} Burton, \textit{Lives of Simon Lord Lovat}, p.222. ‘Ower’=over
\textsuperscript{280} Tomasson, \textit{The Jacobite General}, p.11.
\textsuperscript{281} The fiery cross was a partially burned wooden cross used to summon clansmen for military service to their chief. See Glossary. Burton, \textit{Lives of Simon Lord Lovat}, p.27.
that all the pipers from John O’Groats to Edinburgh attend his funeral,\(^{282}\) long after others - like Argyll, Islay, Loudoun and Forbes - had begun to abandon the feudal structure.\(^{283}\) He also used the powers of the new, centralised, legalised Scotland. Law-pleas were used to consolidate and expand his estates.\(^{284}\) His Sheriffship extended his legal control outside his clan.\(^{285}\) This was largely due to the age Lovat lived in, which straddled many political and social changes. The strong Highland clan system of his youth, where John Murray, 1st Duke of Atholl, Lovat’s cousin-in-law, thought nothing of calling on family by marriage to aid recruitment in 1683,\(^{286}\) had changed into a country increasingly centrally governed, where the power of law and the Enlightenment had changed Scotland.

Hindsight and historians have distorted how those who turned Jacobite are remembered. The received Whig version of history makes them appear almost fated to become Jacobite, ignoring the complex nature of their decisions, the influence of countervailing family, religious and political loyalties, as well as the impact of genuine ideology. Some historians, such as Burton writing in the mid-nineteenth century, were

\(^{282}\) A coronach is wail or shriek of woman as lamentation to accompany a funeral. See Glossary. *Ibid*, p.263-4.

\(^{283}\) Burton, *Lives of Simon Lord Lovat*, p.160. Even outsiders like Edmund Burt noticed that he positively discouraged education and agricultural improvements to maintain his control; “He did more towards reviving a clannish spirit (which had greatly declined since the revolution) than any man in the whole country.” As quoted from Burt’s *The Highlands of Scotland described; with some Observations concerning the late Rebellion* in Burton, *Lives of Simon Lord Lovat*, p.161.


\(^{285}\) As a chief, he held the power of Lord of Regality – the highest feudal dignity that allowed complete criminal jurisdiction, excluding only treason. This was reduced to rights of baronies after the 1747 Heritable Jurisdictions Act. See Glossary. Burton, *Lives of Simon Lord Lovat*, p.163-4.

\(^{286}\) *Ibid*, p.10.
scathing of Kilmarnock and Cromarty, who repented their crimes, and were not “martyrs of conscience and principle”.\textsuperscript{287} Balmerino’s unrepentant attitude and loyalty to Charles Edward, even on the scaffold,\textsuperscript{288} gained him the respect and sympathy of the public, and the posthumous reputation as man of integrity with Horace Walpole and, later, Robert Burns.\textsuperscript{289}

Similarly, our understanding of Lord Lovat is coloured by his eventual fate. His arrest, trial and execution bred a public desire for increasingly salacious details of his colourful life, represented by the popularity and tone of Hogarth’s portrait.\textsuperscript{290} Consequently, there are as many legends about him as there is documented evidence. These include, for example, that he slept every night on his journey south to be tried with two Highland women at the head of his bed and two Highland men at its foot.\textsuperscript{291} His public appeal was such that a stranger offered to be executed in his place.\textsuperscript{292} This retrospective distortion has affected the accuracy of the real events in his life. His marriages, for example, read like fiction. While sufficient testimonials from his trial for rape survive to confirm his conduct towards the Dowager Lady Lovat, the circumstances surrounding his marriage to Primrose are less clear.\textsuperscript{293} The legend that Lovat lured her to a brothel in order to compromise her reputation and force a marriage is so widely believed that it is recorded in his entry in the Oxford Dictionary of National

\textsuperscript{287} Burton, \textit{Lives of Simon Lord Lovat}, p.58.
\textsuperscript{288} True Copies of the Papers, p.2.
\textsuperscript{289} ODNB Arthur Elphinstone by Murray G.H. Pittock.
\textsuperscript{290} Burton, \textit{Lives of Simon Lord Lovat}, p.252-3.
\textsuperscript{291} Ibid, p.251-2.
\textsuperscript{292} Ibid, p.263.
\textsuperscript{293} Burton, \textit{Lives of Simon Lord Lovat}, p.27-32.
Biography.\textsuperscript{294} Yet, the existence of their marriage bonds shows the usual negotiations over a four-month period.\textsuperscript{295} It is also unlikely that Lovat would have risked losing the support of the present and three future dukes of Argyll by this reckless action.\textsuperscript{296} However, for the Whig historians, such tales provided proof that Lovat was destined to become a ‘bad’ Jacobite.

Memoirs and letters of people who met Lovat are also coloured by hindsight. Carlyle’s recollections, published in 1860, recall Lovat as a larger than life, abrasive, intemperate man, something which has become his legacy.\textsuperscript{297} Donald Macleod’s \textit{Memoir},\textsuperscript{298} Walter Scott,\textsuperscript{299} King, in \textit{Munimenta Antiqua},\textsuperscript{300} and Captain Edmund Burt\textsuperscript{301} (all published after Lovat’s death) feature Lovat as the embodiment of Highland hospitality rather than the complex character most Scottish gentlemen were. Irrespective of their eventual fate or political allegiances, many were chief and courtier, educated and

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{294} ODNB Simon Fraser, 11\textsuperscript{th} Lord Lovat by Edward M. Furgol.
\bibitem{295} Several legal documents are extant that show the marriage contract drafts between April and July 1733 including the provision of a yearly jointure of £170 (Sterling) to Primrose. Burton, \textit{Lives of Simon Lord Lovat}, p.183.
\bibitem{296} These were Primrose’s two paternal 2\textsuperscript{nd} cousins, father and brother. The confusion could be due to the name Primrose, as 2\textsuperscript{nd} Earl Stair is said to have used a similar method to force the Dowager Viscount Primrose into marriage. ODNB John Dalrymple, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Earl of Stair by H.M. Stevens revised William C. Lowe and ODNB Eleanor Dalrymple, Countess of Stair, former Viscountess Primrose, nee Campbell by Rosalind K. Marshall.
\bibitem{297} Carlyle, \textit{Autobiography of the Rev. Dr Alexander Carlyle}, p.57-61.
\bibitem{298} W. Thomson, \textit{Memoirs of the life and gallant exploits of the old Highlander, Sergeant Donald MacLeod, who, having returned, wounded, with the Corpse of General Wolfe, from Quebec, was admitted an out-pensioner of Chelsea Hospital, in 1759; and is now in the CIII.d year of his age} (London, 1791), p.47-8. See the Introduction for further debate regarding the authorship and authenticity of Macleod’s \textit{Memoirs}.
\bibitem{299} W. Scott, \textit{Tales from a Grandfather. Being stories taken from Scottish history} (London and Glasgow, 1923), 3 vols, III, p.255.
\bibitem{300} E. King, \textit{Munimenta antiqua; or, Observations on antient castles : including remarks on the whole progress of architecture, ecclesiastical, as well as military, in Great Britain ; and on the corresponding changes, in manners, laws, and customs ; tending both to illustrate modern history ; and to elucidate many interesting passages in various antient classic authors} (London, 1799-1805), 4 vols and Burton, \textit{Lives of Simon Lord Lovat}, p.173.
\end{thebibliography}
well travelled but also at ease in the clan world, which was commonly perceived as barbaric. With no sense of hypocrisy, gentlemen could be ‘all things to all men’. Multi-professions were the norm. Even the gentry of Britain outside Scotland were frequently soldiers during campaign season, MPs and courtiers during the winter, and leading members of the community, as JPs, Lords Lieutenants and Sheriffs. Gentlemen such as Forbes were lawyers by trade, administrators by nature, soldiers by necessity but also mathematicians and theologians for pleasure. 302 Highland gentlemen merely extended this ability between more visually and socially diverse worlds. The legacy of the Whig historians was to tar all Highland gentlemen with the brush of Lovat’s jaundiced legacy, so that the polymath, Enlightened gentlemen of Scotland, regardless of eventual loyalty, are remembered as backwards at best and uncultured, oppressive chiefs at worse. 303

Conclusion

The benefit of hindsight and the comprehensive work of the Whig historians have successfully created polarised images of ‘rebel’ and ‘loyal’. Jacobites became noble Highland savages, preserved as the romantic ‘lost cause’ while the government army became oppressors. This chapter shows, however, that the situation was much more complex. Those gentlemen that became Jacobite and those that fought against them in the government forces had very similar up-bringing, education and early military careers. Most entered military service at a young age, often as gentlemen-volunteers. Many were friends, neighbours or related to those they would eventually fight. The close community

of Scotland’s elite, and their knowledge that political and social favour could twist repeatedly within generations, taught them to treat their enemy with pragmatism. Therefore, government soldiers sought pardons for defeated rebels, recognising that today’s defeated enemy could be tomorrow’s leader. Similarly, pardons based on obligations to Whig family and friends after the ’15 remained strong even in the face of another rebellion.

The individuals considered in detail also demonstrate the complexity of choosing loyalty. Far from supporting England or Scotland, Scots were divided in allegiance and motivation. The impact of the religious struggles between the Presbyterian and Episcopalian churches in the seventeenth century were still being felt when the government implemented the Oaths of Allegiance in 1689 and the Oath of Abjuration in 1701, forcing many to decide loyalties instead of remaining neutral. Their religious as well as political nature made swearing these oaths unpalatable to the conscience and had constitutional implications for the legality of the Glorious Revolution and Hanoverian Succession. Considering the martyr mythology of the Killing Times in the 1680s, when Scots died rather than convert, it was unlikely that Catholic and Episcopalian Scots could easily accept the removal of the Stuart dynasty.

Equally, those who were loyal to the government were passionate about the civil liberties Britain enjoyed after the Glorious Revolution. The new balance of power between Parliament and Crown reassured many that they were protected from oppressive rule. Many equated the return of a Catholic crown as a return to the ‘yoke of Rome’ and
the dominance of a distant Papacy. In this context, the continuation of the Covenanter military tradition through the Cameronian Regiment and the transformation of Gardiner and the Munro brothers into Protestant martyrs was a natural reaction for men who feared for the stability of their religion, society, government and constitution. For these men, military service represented a way to contribute to the continuance of the British state, either in temporary service during rebellions for the short-term end of the threat, or in the British army for the long-term aim of creating a powerful Great Britain that could prevail on the continent and in the colonies.
CHAPTER FOUR: SCOTLAND’S AUXILIARY FORCES.

Introduction

This chapter examines the various auxiliary forces active in Scotland during the first half of the eighteenth century. This includes volunteer regiments, corporation regiments, city guards and fencibles. However, the largest and most widely deployed body, the militia, is the main focus of this chapter. In order to establish the purpose and effectiveness of the Scottish militias, their development, duties and the process by which they were authorised, raised, armed, trained and deployed are considered.

Particular attention is focused on the early eighteenth century to explore the impact of the Union Treaty on the Scottish militias and the other factors that shaped their development. Laws regarding the militia in Scotland prior to the Union are particularly relevant to the different development of the Scottish militia compared with its English counter-part as the Scottish legislature and legislation remained separate after the Union. A study of these laws adds to the available literature, particularly concerning the legal confusion regarding who had authority to raise and arm the Scottish militia which has lead to misunderstandings by contemporaries and historians.

A separate investigation of ‘fencibles’ is then conducted in order to establish how militias and fencibles varied from each other and whether a definition can be applied to each. Finally, the auxiliary forces in Scotland are considered together in order to determine their military significance and relationship with the British army and Scotland’s public as regards their military ability and reputation.
The development of the militia

In England, the use of militias can be traced to the levies of men raised by King Alfred to help repel Danish invasions. This Anglo-Saxon Fyrd required able-bodied men aged between fifteen and sixty to provide military service in defence of their shires in times of need.\(^1\) The militia retained such a purpose, with a few alterations, until the early eighteenth century. In the Middle Ages this feudal service evolved into two branches; an army raised for specific wars at home or abroad, with a permanent but small army of ‘guards and garrisons’ and a county-based militia, known as ‘trained bands’, that could reinforce them at times of need.\(^2\) In Scotland, the picture was less clear. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in times of need the crown could call upon armed retinues, usually kept by Highland chiefs and Lowland families for feuding and reiving, and a feudal levy of able-bodied men aged between sixteen and sixty who provided up to forty days service.\(^3\) However, the former depended on the goodwill of the chiefs and were a liability during peace, while the latter were a drain on the population and impractical for more than immediate battle as a campaign was rarely finished within forty

\(^2\) Each parish was responsible for raising, training and controlling these ‘trained bands’, which were replaced with militias by the 1662 Act (PA Rot. Parl.14. C.II.p.1.mu.3, An Act for ordering the Forces in the several Counties of this Kingdome, 1662). They are universally reported to have been retained only in London, where Charles II and later James II felt they could maintain control over them. However, for the first time it can be shown that they continued in Scotland after the Union as well, appearing as part of the defences of Edinburgh during the ‘45 in the trial transcript of Archibald Stewart, the Provost of Edinburgh. As little can be easily found of them for the methodological reason mentioned above, it was beyond the scope of this thesis to investigate further, but remains a subject for further enquiry. Gibson and Dell, *Tudor and Stuart Muster Rolls*, p.5; R.B. Manning, *An Apprenticeship in Arms. The Origins of the British Army 1585-1702* (Oxford, 2006), p.266, 293, 305-6 and A. Stewart, *The Trial of Archibald Stewart Esq; late Provost of Edinburgh, before the High Court of Judiciary in Scotland, For neglect of Duty, and Misbehaviour in the Execution of his Office, as Lord Provost of Edinburgh, before and at the Time the Rebels got Possession of that City in the Month of September 1745* (Edinburgh, 1747), p.15, 31.
days. During the Civil War the system of feudal levy was adapted so that the central government in Edinburgh re-arranged the local musters to create practical regiments, which were raised, armed and paid by regional Committees of War. The last proved a great burden in extra tax and led many regiments to demand free quarters and ‘subsistence money’ from their hosts, partly causing the poor reputation of soldiers that would haunt the British army into the eighteenth century. At the Restoration, something new was desired as a reaction to this and the brutality experienced in Scotland under Cromwell’s standing army during the Interregnum. In 1662 and 1663 the Estates General proposed a bill entitled *A Humble Tender to his Sacred Majestie of the duetie and loyalty of his ancient Kingdome of Scotland* suggesting 20,000 foot and 2,000 horse to be raised as a levy at the expense of the nobility, at a cost in accordance to the value of their property, to serve for domestic defence for a maximum of forty days. Though Lenman believes this was rejected by Charles II, it appears as law within the wording of the 1669 Militia Act. The 1669 Act made crown appointed Commissioners of the Militia responsible for organising ‘wapenshaws’ on pre-appointed days, maintaining muster lists and fining those absent or without the correct arms, while the 1672

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8 B. Lenman, ‘Militia, Fencible Men, and Home Defence, 1660-1797’ in *Scotland and War AD79-1918* (Edinburgh, 1991), p.174 and T. Murrat (ed), *The laws and acts of Parliament made by King James the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Queen Mary, King James the Sixth, King Charles the First, King Charles the Second who now presently reigns, kings and queen of Scotland : collected and extracted, from the publick records of the said kingdom* (Edinburgh, 1681), p.112.
9 The Old English name for a weapon-showing, where the state of weapons were inspected. See Glossary.
amendment assured men on this service exclusion from other duties and was limited to only the shire where they were raised.\textsuperscript{10}

However, neither Charles II nor James II trusted the Scottish or Irish Militias, keeping them as small and as inactive as possible. Instead they used a small force termed ‘guards and garrisons’ that was closer to an internal security force than a standing army. This provided garrisons, domestic security and responded to discontent, but was not intended as a field army. It was intended to be semi-passive but was called out more often than expected by the Restoration regime as political and religious tension persisted in Scotland. In 1665, the Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665-7) brought public disquiet amongst the Presbyterians at fighting a Calvinist power. The majority of Scots were also unhappy at fighting a traditional trading partner in a war begun for reasons that only affected England.\textsuperscript{11} Continuing religious dissent culminated in the Pentland Rising in November 1666. A mob of discontented Presbyterians marched on Edinburgh and were defeated by soldiers of the government’s ‘guards and garrisons’. To finally suppress the Covenanters, Charles II decided “to settle a militia in that our auncient kingdome for the good of our service and preservation of peace ther.”\textsuperscript{12} Commissioners of Excise and JPs would organise this force in key shires under the control of a trusted local elite whose extended family would serve as officers and administrators. When the Third Anglo-Dutch War began in 1672, despite the offer of £864,000 (Scots) from the Scottish Estates, ordinary Scots were again unhappy at fighting the United Provinces and Charles II was

\textsuperscript{10}Murrat, \textit{The laws and acts of Parliament}, p.112-3, 141-2.
\textsuperscript{11}Lenman, \textit{Militia, Fencible Men}, p.175-6 and Manning, \textit{An Apprenticeship in Arms}, p.291.
\textsuperscript{12}Lenman, \textit{Militia, Fencible Men}, p.176.
still wary of Scottish support in the matter,\footnote{Murrat (ed), \textit{The laws and acts of Parliament}, p.145-6 and Lenman, \textit{Militia, Fencible Men}, p.177-9.} favouring the use of the ‘guards and garrisons’. Their use to uncover and prevent trade with the Dutch and Presbyterian religious dissenters caused friction, especially in the Lowlands, and did nothing to alleviate the public’s anxiety regarding standing armies. Charles’ lack of trust in the militia was intensified when part of the militia under the Earl of Callander mutinied on religious grounds in September 1674 in protest at swearing the Oath of Allegiance. Despite this wariness, its embodiment continued and three further regiments were created after peace with the Dutch in 1674 as religious dissent amongst the Presbyterians continued.\footnote{Lenman, \textit{Militia, Fencible Men}, p.177-9.}

The presence of the Argyll Militia in the rebel ranks following the 9\textsuperscript{th} Earl of Argyll in the Scottish adjunct of the Monmouth Rebellion in April 1685 again brought fears of the militia’s reliability to the fore. Militias in disaffected areas were disbanded in June 1685 and those of nearby areas used to police them, further reducing the reputation of soldiers and the militia in Scotland.\footnote{\textit{Ibid}, p.183, 184.} James II used the worsening civil-military relationship as an excuse to abolish the Scottish militia in June 1685, though in reality he sought to curtail the military power of the Scottish nobility, one of the main principles of Restoration policy in Scotland.\footnote{Manning, \textit{An Apprenticeship in Arms}, p.291, 304 and Lenman, \textit{Militia, Fencible Men}, p.184.} The disbandment of the militia was also motivated by their mixed success at Bothwell Bridge in 1679 and against the Monmouth Rebellion in 1685. At the former, the militia had shown its worth as a police force as part of the
Highland Host, but it was unequal to the task of battle, necessitating the presence of a regular army under the then loyal Duke of Monmouth.\textsuperscript{17}

James II attempted to re-raise the militia once William of Orange’s invasion ambitions became clear, though by then it was too late to pre-empt the change of allegiance amongst senior military figures. In Scotland, any response was delayed by crossed-orders from London and Edinburgh and the ‘guards and garrisons’ force remained tactically neutral, neither preventing the taking of the Estates in Edinburgh nor joining the invading force.\textsuperscript{18} Following the Glorious Revolution there was little change in the structure or composition of the militias. Though William III distrusted them, the need for extra men to counter remaining resistance in Ireland and Scotland meant that on 30\textsuperscript{th} March 1689 a proclamation announced the re-establishment of the militia “to be put in a posture of defence, for resisting any foreign invasion, and suppressing any internecine commotion that may arise.”\textsuperscript{19} William’s attention remained fixed on continental matters throughout his reign. His one attempt to re-establish a larger militia force in Scotland with a 1704 Bill of Security was defeated by the issue of Union.\textsuperscript{20}

At the negotiations for the Union, the army was not discussed and did not feature in the Act. The 1708 Bill ‘for settling the Militia of that Part of Great Britain called Scotland’ was meant to partly address this but was the last bill to receive the royal veto

\textsuperscript{17} Manning, \textit{An Apprenticeship in Arms}, p.287.
\textsuperscript{19} TNA WO68/78, ‘Records of Berwickshire Militia, South-East of Scotland, Royal Field (Reserve) Artillery 1685-1909’.
\textsuperscript{20} Lenman, \textit{Militia, Fencible Men}, p.185-6.
from Anne.\textsuperscript{21} Whilst this left the north vulnerable to invasion, as with the Jacobite scare of 1708, the constitutional debate posed by the bill was too complex and it was consequently set aside. The Scottish elite resented the imposition of an English style militia with government-favoured Lord-Lieutenants, while London remained wary of arming and training the Scots, preferring the use of the smaller and more controllable Independent Highland Companies it had been using since 1667.\textsuperscript{22}

The veto of the 1708 Bill meant that, as far as auxiliary forces were concerned, the Union had no impact. Consequently, when the ’15 appeared imminent, government officials in Scotland were in confusion as to whether they had the authority to raise militias, since the veto meant the provisions of the bill, with its English style county-based Lord-Lieutenants that facilitated military responses to domestic or external threats, were apparently lacking in Scotland.\textsuperscript{23} The last act to specifically refer to the Scottish militia was the 1669 Act concerning the Militia, which had only royally appointed commissioners.\textsuperscript{24} As it was unclear if this act still applied, specific warrants had to be issued for Scotland in 1715 to create both militias of foot and militia regiments of horse. Orders given in October 1715 by 1\textsuperscript{st} Earl Stanhope, Secretary of State for the Southern Department, to Sir David Dalrymple, Lord Advocate of Scotland, imply that the militia foot and horse were regarded as separate bodies to be raised and organised individually.\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{21} BL Hardwick Papers Add.MS.35891 f.242-6, ‘An Act for the settling the Militia of that Part of Great Britain called Scotland’. Transcription available in Appendix No.4.
\textsuperscript{24} Murrat, \textit{The laws and acts of Parliament}, p.112-3.
\textsuperscript{25} TNA SP54/9/38, David Dalrymple to Stanhope, Edinburgh, 12\textsuperscript{th} October 1715.
The previous month, on 29th September 1715, an order for the creation of a militia of horse named nine Deputy Lieutenants of Edinburgh, suggesting that warrants giving authority were issued piecemeal. Once militias were authorised, many were created; Haddington, Argyllshire and Glasgow each raised militias, as did the Earl of Glasgow in Ayrshire, the Earl of Rothes for Fife and Kinross and Lord Polwarth for Berwickshire and March.

Even though the 1708 Scottish Militia Bill was not enacted, the system of raising men, as shown in the 1715 warrant to Edinburgh, appears very like the one used in England. Both called for each landowner to supply an armed horseman, a foot soldier or a militia man, depending on his wealth. The gentry armed and paid the soldiers and competed for the officers’ posts. The Country gentry and Tories favoured temporary militias as an expression of the subject’s right to defend the freedoms of the English constitution gained at the Glorious Revolution. However, despite their active use during the ’45, the militia remained a suspect force in North Britain. George II in
particular felt that to arm civilians after the Disarming and Proscribing Acts would be counter-productive. Consequently, apart from when Jacobite activity triggered a need for militias in Scotland, no official structure was created until the Militia Act of 1757.\footnote{H.V. Bowen, \textit{War and British Society, 1688-1815} (Cambridge, 1998), p.12.}

The size of militias varied. Often the crown approved a number suggested by the civil authorities who would raise the men.\footnote{Stewart, \textit{The Trial of Archibald Stewart}, p.38, 41.} However, the number mustered was often more than the number of muskets available and therefore many militias were immediately demobilised. The Midlothian Militia, for example, consisted of 7,000 men in 1715 but less than 100 of these had muskets.\footnote{D. Szechi, \textit{1715. The Great Jacobite Rebellion} (New Haven and London, 2006), p.131.} Official documentation relating to the ‘15 stated that each shire (including Edinburgh, Haddington and Berwick) had to provide 800 infantrymen and seventy-four horsemen for the militia.\footnote{NAS GD158/406, ‘Note concerning the Militia in Scotland’ [1715].} However, this does not imply a standard size. The Argyllshire Militia led by Colonel Campbell of Fonab, for example, already numbered 1,100 men in October 1715, and expected five or six hundred more to shortly join.\footnote{TNA SP54/9/24, Argyll to Townsend, Camp at Stirling, 7th October 1715.} In the ‘45, the Argyllshire men numbered 400.\footnote{NAS GD170/943/4, Campbell [of Mamore] to [Colonel Colin] Campbell [of Glenure], Inverary, [1745].}

\textbf{The extent to which the Union altered militias}

A study of the militia, either in England or Scotland for the period 1700-1750, is made more difficult by the lack of sound primary sources or historiographical coverage. Gibson and Dell state “The first half of the eighteenth century saw the decline and virtual disappearance of the Militia”,\footnote{Gibson and Dell, \textit{Tudor and Stuart Muster Rolls}, p.5.} whilst Williams states “It is unnecessary to follow the
ups and downs of the Militia during the eighteenth century. At the time the Force appeared to have fallen into a bad state, and there was great difficulty in obtaining officers; but the law was enforced and matters were so satisfactorily arranged, that in 1759 there was another embodiment”. These assessments, however, ignore the militia’s well documented and significant contribution to the suppression of the ’15 and ’45.

Any change conclusively a result of the Union, however, is masked by a lack of detail and clarity in the wording of legislature and the correspondence of those responsible for ordering and organising militias. Although governmental power and competence grew in the first half of the eighteenth century, the newness of the Union meant that the mechanics of governmental response had yet to develop. The Union Treaty confirmed that Scottish law “must remain entirely the same as well after as before the union,” so the precedent the government turned to in the ’15 and ’45 was the pre-Union custom of the ‘fencibles’ – discussed further below – and the Restoration era militia acts. These, however, were vague and imprecise. Therefore, identifying the early eighteenth century government procedure for raising the militias is not clear but must be gleaned from orders and letters associated with the formation of a regiment. This limits study, however, to snap-shots in time so it is difficult to establish at what point change occurred, if at all, as a consequence of the Union, because so few sources exist between the 1689-90 rebellion and the ’15. Despite the clarity of the Union Treaty, the government officials in Edinburgh during the ’15 and ’45, such as David Dalrymple, the Lord Advocate of Scotland, and Sir James Steuart, the Solicitor General, were unsure

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where the authority to raise a militia lay; with the pre-Union Acts of 1662 and 1663 and their amendments, including the 1669 Act, with the old customs such as fencibles, or with specific royal warrants?45

What is apparent from a study of the whole picture, is that the protocols for raising a militia appear the same before and after the Union in the documents from 1689 and 1715. Royal warrants bestowed authority on trusted local officials, whether that was the Estates General authorising Commissioners to appoint officers of the militias, or London authorising Lord-Lieutenants to appoint officers.46 Though the 1662 and 1663 Militia Acts could have provided a precedent for Lord-Lieutenants and their deputies to raise militias, the contemporary confusion as to whether the laws applied after 1707 meant that the government officials during the ’15 and ’45 did not look to them for authority. The only time the Union could have triggered clear change to the Scottish militia was if the 1708 Scottish Militia Bill had been enacted.47 Interestingly, its failure was more likely due to royal caution at arming Scots in an anti-Union, pro-Stuart climate, rather than for constitutional reasons. Significantly, when militias were formally implemented in Scotland in the 1790s, the Scots had ceased to be a rebellious threat.48

46 NAS GD50/231/1, ‘Proclamation For calling together the Militia on this side of Tay, and the Fencible Men in same Shires’, Edinburgh, 30th March 1689 and NAS GD158/403, Order for the formation of a Militia of Horse by nine named Deputy Lieutenants, Edinburgh, 29th September 1715.
47 BL Hardwick Papers Add.MS.35891 f.242-6, ‘An Act for the settling the Militia of that Part of Great Britain called Scotland’.
The purpose of the militia

The legacy of the ‘no standing army’ debate and the use of the army during the Interregnum and the religious violence of the end of the seventeenth century meant that the priority in Scotland was to keep a small permanent garrison of regular troops, mainly in Lowland strongholds, with scattered Highland bases, so that domestic peace could be maintained without the expense that a larger standing army would bring. The tendency of the Jacobites to ferment rebellions in Scotland, however, meant that low level domestic peace-keeping could escalate dramatically. The government relied on its ability to augment the forces in Scotland from other sources but, while this was occurring, it relied on the militia as a first line of defence.49 Contemporary sources and subsequent historians refer to these troops by various terms, including “my Highlanders”,50 volunteers, militia, fencibles,51 Independent Highland Companies and the companies raised as the 2nd Battalion of the 43rd Regiment during the ’45, and often mistake one for another.52

The militia had many practical uses, though its main role was essentially to act as an auxiliary and supporting force to the regular British army during times of emergency. For the militia this role focused on home defence against feared or actual invasions and rebellions.53 In Scotland, the Jacobite threat meant that militia service focused on active

50 TNA SP54/11/81, Argyll to Townsend, Erroll, 2nd February 1716; SP54/11/89, Argyll to Townsend, Dundee, 4th February 1716; SP54/11/106, Argyll to Townsend, Aberdeen, 12th February 1716 and SP54/11/144A, Argyll to Townsend, Aberdeen 23rd February 1716.
51 Fencibles are discussed in greater detail later in sub-section ‘Unravelling the militia-fencible tangle’ in this chapter.
service during rebellions and on acting as a deterrent in between them. Militiamen provided an invaluable service, acting as a defence force for an area and augmenting the often low strength of the British army, especially in the early days of an uprising before regular troops could be transported to Scotland from other locations in Britain or the continent. The militia could also perform many lesser tasks for the Army. It garrisoned outposts, guarded baggage and transported arms, food and prisoners, as well as taking part in the fighting. At the threat of the first Jacobite rising in 1689, the militias on the east side of the Tay were called out on 30th March to be rallied by 15th April. The militias of Wigtown, Ayr and Bute were ordered to man beacons along the west coast to warn of invasion from Ireland, while the rest were to be ready to muster if the beacons should be lit. Interestingly, the order that any cattle within ten miles of the coast were to be moved inland was included in the call to muster, suggesting that one of the militia’s roles was to deprive supplies to a potential invader.54

At a time when regular troops were unavailable or over-stretched, militiamen relieved the strain and were better than nothing.55 They also boosted numbers on the battlefield, as at Sheriffmuir on 15th November 1715, Falkirk on 17th January 1746 and Culloden on 16th April 1746.56 Whilst they increased the apparent strength of the British army in the field, providing a psychological advantage, this advantage was partly negated by their lack of experience and training to fight effectively. Undoubtedly, the militia worked best in conjunction with regular troops. This provided the reassurance to the

54 TNA GD50/213/1, ‘Proclamation For calling together the Militia on this side of Tay, and the Fencible Men in same Shires’, Edinburgh, 30th March 1689.
55 Bowen, War and British Society, p.12.
militia of fighting alongside men who were relatively well trained, disciplined and experienced. As the Jacobites attempted to enter Edinburgh in October 1715, the ill-armed Haddington Militia and other volunteers were reinforced by Argyll and a detachment of dragoons who quickly forced the approaching Jacobites back into Leith.\textsuperscript{57}

It was unfortunate that the restricted size of the regular army and the ground it needed to cover, coupled with the reluctance of the militias to leave their communities, prevented them being attached to a parent regiment with consequent benefits to confidence and maintenance of order.

The Argyll Militia was an exception to the rule of militias, as it also viewed itself as a clan army summoned by its chief, Argyll, and therefore often followed Argyll or the British army during the ‘15. This did bring benefits: its usefulness and trustworthiness were honed from an inexperienced, poorly-trained auxiliary force to something equivalent to a newly raised second battalion – competent but not elite. Thus the Argyllshire Militia “served us as an advanced Guard to the army since ye march from Stirling” in February 1716\textsuperscript{58} and were charged with tracking retreating Jacobites in Arbroath after Sheriffmuir and with disarming the common people.\textsuperscript{59} Similarly, the Glasgow Militia were used to man small garrisons in the Lowlands\textsuperscript{60} and to reinforce the garrison at Fort William in 1716.\textsuperscript{61} Argyll firmly believed that such militia units could prove their worth if so employed; in October 1715 he planned to “Garrison three Castles

\textsuperscript{57} TNA SP54/9/49, James Anderson, Postmaster of Edinburgh to John Lloyd, Secretary to Postmaster-General, Edinburgh, 16th October 1715.
\textsuperscript{58} TNA SP54/11/81, Argyll to Townsend, Errol, 2\textsuperscript{nd} February 1716.
\textsuperscript{59} TNA SP54/11/89, Argyll to Townsend, Dundee, 4\textsuperscript{th} February 1716 and SP54/11/126B, Argyll to Townsend, Aberdeen, 17\textsuperscript{th} February 1716.
\textsuperscript{60} TNA SP54/8/68, Argyll to unknown, Edinburgh, 15\textsuperscript{th} September 1715 and SP54/9/2A, Argyll to Stanhope, Camp at Stirling, 1\textsuperscript{st} October 1715.
\textsuperscript{61} TNA SP54/11/106, Argyll to Townsend, Aberdeen, 12\textsuperscript{th} February 1716.
close to the other side [of] this River [Forth] with three Hundred of the Militia in with
[which] places if they would but keep the Gates shut, all the World could not take them
without Battering Cannon”. He must have had faith in them, as he believed whoever
controlled these castles would control the quickest access south, no minor
responsibility.  

During the ’45 the Sutherland Militia consisted of two regiments, but when sent to
guard Inverness in October 1745, they found themselves surplus to requirements as the
Jacobite army left Scotland on its abortive march to London. Consequently, many of the
militia returned home, and though the British army viewed this as desertion, the 18th Earl
of Sutherland, who had raised them, excused their poor discipline as a natural desire to
return for the harvest. In the spring of 1746, the Sutherland Militia’s role was to guard
the Shin Pass, again near Inverness. Although not present at Culloden, their presence in
the pass did hinder the Jacobite army’s movements in the area, ensuring that it had to
move east out of Inverness, contributing to the choice of Drumossie Moor as the site of
the conclusive battle.

Raising a militia regiment

The Militia Act of 1663 allowed for the raising of 20,000 men and 2,000 horse in
times of need. These were to serve within their shires rather than embodied as an army as
the old feudal levy had been. However, as the Crown controlled all three of the armies of

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62 TNA SP54/9/2A, Argyll to Stanhope, Camp at Stirling, 1st October 1715.
63 TNA SP54/9/2A, Argyll to Stanhope, Camp at Stirling, 1st October 1715.
65 Ibid, p.60-1.
England, Ireland and Scotland, they could well have potentially been used anywhere within the King’s ‘dominions and domains’ – most likely limited as an anti-invasion force during the Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665-1667)66 and to counter religious dissent amongst Presbyterians in south-west Scotland.67

Recruitment was based on selection by ballot drawn from a muster list of those eligible for military service. The ballot could include any male between sixteen and sixty,68 the method making militia service an obligation rather than a choice. Inclusion in the muster lists meant the potential to be called away from home and family just at the time when a militiaman might wish to remain closest to them to provide protection and support.69 However, as the eighteenth century progressed, those loyal to the government and Protestant Succession were drawn together by the common threat of Jacobitism and, later, by the threat from Revolutionary and Napoleonic France.70 Consequently, and especially in times of conflict, many volunteered to serve in the militia. Rather than taking advantage of the short service terms offered by the army during rebellions, militias held the assurance of a domestic posting and the likelihood of less than forty days service per year. This duration of service had the traditional precedent of ‘Scottish service’71 but, like many aspects of the militias after the Union, it was unclear what the law was. In

70 L. Colley, Britons. Forging the Nation, 1707-1837 (London, 2003), p.6
1715, a Lord-Lieutenant wrote “severall of our Judges & Lawyers are of opinion, [that the] men cannot be keept together longer, than [the] fourty days.”

This legally limited period of service seems to have been an inflexible stumbling block during the ‘15, as by 31st October 1715, Argyll was urgently petitioning Stanhope to find some way of allowing the militia to remain active beyond its customary forty days. The law was unbending, however, as Argyll complained in early November 1715 when he faced losing all his militia as their terms of service were rapidly running out. Despite the lack of troops which had recently prevented him from pressing his advantage and taking Perth back from the rebels, he was powerless to extend the militia’s active duty. Their loss would also impact on wider military organisation, as various garrisons would then have to be disbanded as they were entirely made up of militiamen. Argyll, who was clearly conscious of the Treasury’s reluctance to spend more than necessary, agreed that to keep the militia active without a purpose was a waste of money. He was aware that they lacked the training and discipline of regular troops, but he also knew that by providing men for garrisons, running patrols and guarding equipment in transit, they relieved pressure on the rest of the army. Consequently, by mid October 1715, Argyll agreed with Townsend to discuss the disbanding of the militia but begged to retain those garrisoning the outposts that protected the River Forth at Stirling. His plea must have been heard, as orders were not given to finally dismiss the militia until 20 March 1716.

One explanation for this break with both custom and law was that of the militia-men

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72 TNA SP54/9/96, Tweeddale to [Mr Pringle], Edinburgh, 29th October 1715.
73 TNA SP54/9/101B, Argyll to Stanhope, Camp at Stirling, 31st October 1715.
74 TNA SP54/10/30, Argyll to Townsend, Camp at Stirling, 8th November 1715.
75 TNA SP54/10/39, Argyll to Townsend, Camp at Stirling, 10th November 1715.
mustered, only some had formed the militia, allowing those whose forty day service had expired to be replaced by fresh men. Another possibility is that once the county-funded forty days were over, the government took up the payment of the militia. In practice this meant the commanders or Lord-Lieutenants had to continue paying their men in the hope of later reimbursement. As the government lacked the funds during the ‘15 to pay the pensions of half-pay officers, it is unlikely that many militias remained embodied for significantly longer than forty days.\textsuperscript{77} The government, however, had no liability to fund the militia. Neither the 1663 Act nor the Union made the government responsible. The constant presence of pleas for money and later requests for reimbursement in both state and private papers suggests, however, that the gentry felt the militias were an extension of the army, a government institution, and therefore, were a government obligation. It was common throughout the century for the government to use the tactic of interpreting failure to pay, or complaints about paying, as ‘a lack of zeal’ which discouraged most from demanding too much for fear of looking unsupportive of the state.\textsuperscript{78} Those who paid for militias during rebellions also gambled on whether the government would prevail in order to reimburse expenses.

There is some confusion between primary and secondary sources regarding the offices of Lord-Lieutenants and their Deputies. Though some secondary sources state “Scotland did not have Lord-Lieutenants, such as had been appointed in England since 1715,”\textsuperscript{79} primary sources, including both the 1662 and 1663 Militia Acts and correspondence between government officials in Scotland, reveal both posts in existence

\textsuperscript{77} Széchi, \textit{1715}, p.133.
\textsuperscript{78} NAS GD220/5/568/3, Duke of Montrose to Robert Pollock, Whitehall, 21\textsuperscript{st} June 1715.
\textsuperscript{79} Duffy, \textit{The ’45}, p.125.
in Scotland during the late seventeenth and first half of the eighteenth centuries. It was they who, like their English counterparts, were the only government officials who had the authority to raise and arm militias. Lord-Lieutenants and their Deputies were crown appointees, often inspired by those who had shown loyalty or had a family history of loyalty. Charles Hay, 3rd Marquess of Tweeddale (1667-1715), had a long history of government service and was Lord-Lieutenant of Haddington and Patrick Hume, 1st Earl Marchmont (1641-1724), supporter of the Union and the Protestant Succession, was Lord-Lieutenant of Berwickshire. There are also many official documents that mention such posts. For example, in September 1715, the Deputy Lieutenants of Edinburgh ordered fifty-seven local nobility and gentry to raise, equip and mount between one and three mounted militiamen each. Local landowners or gentry were deeply involved in the practicality of assembling men and made a natural choice for officers. Some, most notably Argyll and Islay, were chiefs of clans as well as magnates, and could recruit from a larger area of influence. The gentry were also most able to afford the responsibility of arming, clothing and feeding their men. Raising a militia was, of course, an ideal way for local elites to display loyalty to the crown in London, with the hope of gaining favour once the emergency had passed.

However, at the outbreak of the ’45, the government officials and social elites of Scotland again doubted their status as Lord-Lieutenants and the lack of immediate

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81 TNA SP54/9/96, Tweeddale to [Mr Pringle], Edinburgh, 29th October 1715.
82 TNA SP54/10/89, Polwarth to unknown, Red Breas, 28th November 1715.
83 NAS GD158/403, Order for the formation of a Militia of Horse by nine named Deputy Lieutenants, Edinburgh, 29th September 1715.
84 Morrison, *The Defence of Scotland*, p.3.
response from officials confident in their authority meant that loyal Scottish towns were not able to quickly raise militias. In London, any reaction to the invasion was hampered by the absence through illness of the 4th Marquess of Tweeddale, the Secretary of State for Scotland. In any case, his refusal to believe the news of the landing of Charles Edward seriously delayed a government reaction. The Lord Justice Clerk, Lord Milton, as the government’s second most senior lawyer in Scotland, was left to establish legal precedent for allocating authority. Once the king’s permission had been obtained, warrants to raise militias could be issued along the lines of the English volunteer regiments, known as ‘Blues’ for the colour of their coats, who were locally raised volunteers under the command of a local gentleman.85

Government’s mistrust of militias in Scotland, arising partly from a fear of arming Scots and partly from the power it would give Scotland’s elite, debilitated the militias enough, but they suffered also from the Treasury’s reluctance to enlarge or to keep the militia active on the grounds of economy. The militia was an expensive body to fund unnecessarily. John Campbell’s militia regiment of 200 men cost £1,736:16:8 (Scots) to maintain for the period 31st August 1715 to 19th March 1716.86 This was excluding the monies due to Major James Aikman, formally of Brigadier Preston’s Regiment, who refused to be paid, and other ‘incidental’ expenses incurred during the rebellion. These included updating the defences of Edinburgh, barricading streets, laying in provisions in case of siege, providing arms and ammunition for 1,400 inhabitants, expanding and

86 TNA SP54/11/203, John Campbell to unknown, Edinburgh, 31st March 1716.
funding the Edinburgh and Leith Town Guard,\(^{87}\) providing the extra coal and candles for the extra guards and, finally, the unspecified expenses incurred in the quest for intelligence.\(^{88}\) Like the regular army, it was the responsibility of the militia regiments’ colonels to provide for their men and fund these expenses on the government’s behalf. Even Argyll, Commander-in-Chief of Scotland during the ‘15, ran the gauntlet of accusations of Jacobite sympathy and lack of zeal when he complained in October 1715 that he was forced to fund the Argyllshire Militia from his own pocket at £140 (Sterling) a week. Though he had made repeated requests for funds and warned his credit had limits, he still had to couch his warnings in protestations of loyalty.\(^{89}\) His brother, the Earl of Islay, fared better as he was reimbursed for the expense of hiring a frigate.\(^{90}\) For wealthy and successful peers like Argyll, these financial arrangements were feasible, if inconvenient. However, for the majority of the landowners and former soldiers who raised and led the militia regiments, such expenses were prohibitive, partly explaining why they were poorly armed, clothed and fed. Initial expenses were taken from the yearly rent of each shire. Known as ‘cess’, this was a land tax collected by the Commission of Supply of each town or burgh.\(^{91}\) Berwick for example had a yearly rent of £23,442:1:8 (Sterling) from which £12,000 (Sterling) paid for twenty-four horsemen.

\(^{87}\) The Town or City Guard is discussed further in sub-section ‘Other auxiliary forces’ later in this chapter.
\(^{88}\) TNA SP54/11/203, John Campbell to unknown, Edinburgh, 31\(^{st}\) March 1716.
\(^{89}\) TNA SP54/8/74A, Argyll to Stanhope, Camp at Stirling, 18\(^{th}\) September 1715; SP54/8/89, Argyll to Townsend, Camp at Stirling, 24\(^{th}\) September 1715; SP54/9/2A, Argyll to Stanhope, Camp at Stirling, 1\(^{st}\) October 1715; SP54/9/55, Argyll to Stanhope, Camp at Stirling, 19\(^{th}\) October 1715; SP54/9/101B, Argyll to Stanhope, Camp at Stirling, 10\(^{th}\) November 1715; SP54/10/18A, Argyll to Townsend, Camp at Stirling, 1\(^{st}\) November 1715; SP54/10/30, Argyll to Townsend, Camp at Stirling, 31\(^{st}\) November 1715 and SP54/11/7A, Argyll to Townsend, Stirling, 3\(^{rd}\) January 1716.
\(^{90}\) TNA SP54/9/85, James Cockburn to Pringle, Camp at Stirling, 25\(^{th}\) October 1715.
and another £12,000 (Sterling) for each foot soldier, at £50 (Sterling) per man.  This proved a great burden, especially as the money was also relied upon to maintain roads, bridges and ferries across Scotland.

Militia officers were often local men of quality who were chosen for status or a desire to show loyalty, rather than for their military knowledge or experience. Those who were officers during the '15 were drawn from the half-pay lists or retired from active service from the large demobilisation that followed the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 and consequently benefited the militia with their experience. Some would have been young enough to re-enlist, leaving the training and officering of the militias to older soldiers whose experience could date from the Nine Years War (1688-97). As officers were responsible for training or finding someone to train the militia, their personal experience could have significant consequences. This was a particular problem for the militias, as officers were often local gentry who had little or no military experience and lacked the time to acquire it as new officers did in the regular army. Fortunately, there was a large array of training manuals and drill books available, varying from practical advice to reflections on the use, structure and political dangers of a militia.

In 1717, William Breton published *Militia Discipline* in the hope of making the militia “more useful” as “Required by the late Act of Parliament, *Anno Primo GEORG I*

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92 NAS GD158/406, ‘Note concerning the Militia in Scotland’, [1715].
94 Gibson and Dell, *Tudor and Stuart Muster Rolls*, p.5.
Regis”. He believed “knowledge begets Courage.” His step-by-step instructions on drill were, however, based heavily on a 1689 manual and were regarded as too theoretical and impractical. The anonymous *Militia-Man*, published in 1740, had more useful explanations accompanied by sixty-one prints illustrating drills and firing procedures. It also made the suggestion of training English charity schoolmasters in the art of drill, so that they might teach it to their male pupils: “As they aquire a neatness and perfection in handling the weapons, so will the love of arms grow up with their skill to use them…When the use and love of arms is become common, as this means will greatly contribute to make it, there can be no difficulty in keeping full the regiments of militia, as the greater number will be volunteers.” Whilst those suspicious of a standing army might have baulked at inspiring a ‘love’ of arms in so many so young, it is interesting to see this as an early precursor of the Scouts or Army Cadets, as an attempt to solve the perennial recruitment problem.

Officers were also responsible for providing clothing, weapons and provisions for the men under their command, as was the practice in the regular army. However, unlike the regular army the militia frequently lacked the basics of uniform and equipment, and also the surgeons and chaplains who were on the establishment of regular regiments. The nature of granting warrants to local gentry who drew on muster lists from that area

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95 W.B. Breton, *Militia discipline. The words of command, and directions for excersising the musket, bayonet, and carthridge: and the excersise for the soldiers of the militia horse, ... For the instruction of young soldiers. By W.B. gent.* (London, 1717).
96 Houlding, *Fit for Service*, p.189.
created geographical ties amongst the militias long before regiments in the regular army were localised in the 1870s, giving some benefit from a shared sense of camaraderie and common background.\textsuperscript{99} The Earl of Glasgow, for example, raised 500 men from his lands in Ayrshire in September 1715, and offered to “Cheerfully advance my money to maintain Fyve Hundred men more, if it please his majesty to call for it”.\textsuperscript{100} As one of the commissioners who negotiated the Act of Union, his loyalties were clear: “For what would not A man that hath any sense of Religion and Liberty advance in the defense and preservation of a Protestant king and protestant succession to the Crown, and to prevent the king overrun with Popery, Hellish Tyranny & slavery”.\textsuperscript{101}

Over the first-half of the eighteenth century, the earls of Sutherland were loyal to the Protestant Succession for three generations, and consequently raised two regiments of militia from their lands in north-west Scotland during the ‘45. William Sutherland, the 17\textsuperscript{th} Earl of Sutherland, raised one consisting of 108 men, mainly the sons of gentlemen, who were well clothed, well armed and led by Captain Alexander Gunn. It boasted its own piper, who was remembered as “a drinking silly rascal and quite unfit for that charge.”\textsuperscript{102} The second regiment, led by Captain Patrick Sutherland, was made up of common men, who, by contrast, were “poorly clad and there was no fund available from which to clothe them.”\textsuperscript{103}

Unravelling the militia-fencible tangle

\textsuperscript{99} It is possible that the success of the county-based militia gave Edward Cardwell the idea.
\textsuperscript{100} TNA SP54/8/9, [2\textsuperscript{nd} Earl of] Glasgow to unknown, Helburn House, 1\textsuperscript{st} September 1715.
\textsuperscript{101} TNA SP54/8/9, [2\textsuperscript{nd} Earl of] Glasgow to unknown, Helburn House, 1\textsuperscript{st} September 1715.
\textsuperscript{102} Grant, \textit{The Parish of Golspie}, p.60.
\textsuperscript{103} \textit{Ibid}, p.60.
One of the unresolved mysteries of the auxiliary forces in Scotland in the first half of the eighteenth century is the confused nature of its fencibles. The creation of fencible regiments in the 1750s and the 1790s in Scotland has ensured that most historians have viewed fencibles as a late creation.\(^{104}\) However, both ‘militia’ and ‘fencible’ appear in sources from the first half of the eighteenth century. Historians often confuse the two, using the terms as synonyms, or ignoring the more easily confused fencibles altogether, especially when dealing with the first half of the century. Those that do address the existence of fencibles simply provide a definition that makes little attempt to distinguish them from militias without considering any variations in application. Calder simply states that the fencibles (or defensible men) were a force that served within the British Isles after the last Jacobite uprisings were crushed.\(^{105}\) Brander explains that the fencibles were used for “internal defence” while the militia served to defend Britain from outside attack,\(^{106}\) though this seems more a matter of semantics than a meaningful difference. Holmes, though concerned with the period after 1750, defines the Fencibles as a force for home defence.\(^{107}\) The National Archives’ *Readers’ Guide* states that fencibles served only within Great Britain, though they could volunteer for service abroad – presumably depending on whether they were raised against an internal threat such as the Jacobite rebellions, or in times of war such as the American War of Independence.\(^{108}\)

Only Brander, Holmes and The National Archives’ *Readers’ Guide* make an attempt to distinguish fencibles from militias. “Unlike the Militia, Fencible Corps were

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\(^{104}\) Calder, *The Story of the Scottish Soldier*, IV, p.83.
\(^{105}\) *Ibid*, p.16.
not a continuous service liability. Instead, they were raised only at times when the regular army, or the major part of it, was serving overseas."\(^{109}\) This seems to suggest that they were designed to fill a vacuum caused by the army’s absence, rather than raised to provide auxiliary forces to augment the army during times of need at home. Szechi uses fencible and militia within the same sentence, but implies that ‘fencible men’ were the potential strength, while ‘militia regiments’ were those selected to form a force.\(^{110}\) This definition is supported by a letter from 1715 in which Islay ordered that a list of the fencible men in Parstown, in Aberdeenshire, be made, but later refers to militias of various parishes.\(^{111}\) However, the ‘Proclomation For calling together the Militia on this side of Tay, and the Fencible Men in same Shires,’ printed on 30\(^{th}\) March 1689 in Edinburgh, makes a clear reference to both militias and fencibles as if separate entities.\(^ {112}\) This confusion makes any attempt to discover whether a difference exists between them very difficult, as secondary sources rarely address the possibility in detail. This thesis provides a contribution to our knowledge of fencibles by examining their occurrence in primary sources, something that has not been done before.

It was not until 1535, in the third recorded use, that the first Scottish reference was made to fencibles in *Buik of the Croniclis of Scotland* by William Stewart (c.1499-1541): “All other men commandit for to tak,/Withoutin hurt other of lyth or lym,/That


\(^{110}\) Szechi, *1715*, p.119.

\(^{111}\) NAS GD28/2299, Islay to unknown, Hadington, 15\(^{th}\) November 1715.

\(^{112}\) NAS GD50/213/1, ‘Proclomation For calling together the Militia on this side of Tay, and the Fencible Men in same Shires’, Edinburgh, 30\(^{th}\) March 1689.
fensabill war and bring thame all to him.” 113 The first use is recorded as “For we have herinne, withouten fable,/Syxty thousand men fensable” 114 in Richard Coer de Lion (1325). Although the first use of ‘fencible’ was English, it was the Scots who adopted both the term and the idea and made it their own. Therefore by the eighteenth century, its use was so wide-spread in the state and family papers of many of Scotland’s elite, that the term ‘fencible’ continued to be widely used during the ’15 despite the use of militia regiments raised by royal warrant. 115

The earliest use of the term fencible in official documentation originating from London also occurred during the ’15. 116 In Scotland, the term was almost exclusively used by Lowlanders, suggesting that the concept had evolved from the ‘Scottish service’ clansmen owed their chiefs, once the clan system had disappeared from the Lowlands. Beyond that, it is difficult to discern a more detailed geographical divide within the Lowlands as the term appears in documents originating in all areas; in Berwickshire, Ayrshire, Edinburgh, East Lothian and Perthshire. 117 By the ’45 the concept had spread

116 NAS GD28/2292, ‘Copy of Instructions given to Right Hon, Cousin and Councillor, Commander-in-Chief, Duke of Argyll…Signed GR.’
to the loyal towns of the Highlands, with Sutherland and Aberdeen both raising fencible regiments. This position above the Highland Line and as towns loyal to the government, suggests that the concept of fencibles spread over time and hinged on service to the government, not on geography. This further reinforces the theory that the idea of fencibles originated in Lowland Scotland during the sixteenth century, where it was ‘discovered’ and appropriated by London. The concept then spread to other loyal areas either via officials in London or via government officials in the Lowlands.

Another possibility is that the Scottish government officials pragmatically followed the custom of fencibles when London referred to militias. Therefore, although Scotland’s military and civic elite were ostensibly following orders from London to raise militias, they were working within a more familiar, customary framework. Many of the large landowners and politicians given the office of Lord-Lieutenant and the responsibility to raise militias would remember fathers and grandfathers raising men from their lands or clans to act as ‘fencible men’ in times of national threat. To most of the public, from whom the other ranks were drawn, it was merely a continuation of a well-known custom, a familiar obligation, so their officers, who were also their local landlords and social superiors, persisted with well-known terms. Few would have understood the subtlety of the legal changes between the Scottish Militia Acts of 1662, 1663 and 1669 and the need for royal warrants during the eighteenth century. The distance from London and the practice of the government to leave implementation of their orders to their

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118 NAS GD1/400/4/2, ‘List of Sutherland Fencibles’, 14th August 1745 and TNA SP54/26/12B, James Morison to Lord Justice Clerk, Aberdeen, 31st August 1745.
119 TNA SP54/26/12B, James Morison to Lord Justice Clerk, Aberdeen, 17th August 1745.
servants in Scotland allowed the Scots to continue to view and refer to militias as fencibles.

However, attempts to discern a geographical divide between Scotland and London concerning the use and understanding of the term ‘fencibles’ fails when the terms appear together as two different bodies of men. For example, as Lord-Lieutenant of Berwickshire in 1715, Alexander Hume, later 2nd Earl of Marchmont, was responsible for raising 400 men for the Berwickshire Militia.\textsuperscript{120} However, in his letter he reported himself “bussy modelling our fencible men.”\textsuperscript{121} Similarly, also during the ’15, William Johnstone, the 1st Marquess of Annandale, was Lord-Lieutenant of Dumfriesshire and Peebleshire, which made him responsible for raising the militias of those counties. However, he too referred to these men as fencibles.\textsuperscript{122}

Another possible reason why Scotland’s elite might choose to denote militias as fencibles is because of the Scots’ long history of trouble with militias. The use of the militia in Scotland to keep the peace during the unpopular Second and Third Anglo-Dutch Wars (1665-7 and 1672-4) and against religious dissenters in the 1670s had occurred within living memory.\textsuperscript{123} Scottish collective memory would also remember the English militias’ role in enforcing the Aliens Act in 1650, when all Scots residing in England had to report to their local militia to seek permission to stay and pay a minimum fee of £200 (Sterling) in reaction to the Scottish creation of a new Royalist army for the

\textsuperscript{120} ODNB Alexander Hume, 2nd Earl of Marchmont, by G.F.R. Barker, rev by Mairianna Birkeland. Hume did not inherit the title until 1724.
\textsuperscript{121} TNA SP54/8/51, Polworth to unknown, Red Braes, 13\textsuperscript{th} January 1715.
\textsuperscript{122} TNA SP54/10/15, Annandale to unknown, Edinburgh, 3\textsuperscript{rd} November 1715.
\textsuperscript{123} Lenman, \textit{Militia, Fencible Men}, p.176-80.
invasion of England in May and June 1650.124 Scots had to have a trade, apprenticeship, family or contract as a servant to be given leave to remain, making it clear that the public perception of Scots was that of an economic drain. Those who were denied permission or who could not afford the fee by the deadline were hunted down and expelled from England by the militia.125 A second Alien Act had been passed in the English Parliament in 1705 to pressure the Scottish Parliament to enter into Union negotiations. Scots in England were again treated as aliens and Scottish goods were embargoed until the Scottish Estates recognised the Hanoverian succession.126 Both the Scottish public and parliament resented this heavy-handed approach and, recalling the behaviour of the militias of the seventeenth century, made later billeting of a militia difficult, even during times of need during the ’15.127

Another reason for the confusion over the terms militia and fencible is that, at a time when spelling varied wildly and dictionaries with definitions were a novelty,128 rules of terminology were inevitably flexible. Spelling, capitalisation and punctuation varied according to personal use, presenting the possibility that personal preference affected the choice of ‘militia’ or ‘fencible’. As a group who were ‘capable of defence’, fencible men could simply denote an irregular force, raised to counter an internal or external threat. This explanation, however, does not take into account the occasions when both terms were used together, for example at the start of the ’15, when two government officials

125 BL 669.f.15(49) (Microfiche), ‘Instructions to Commissioners of the Militia for the County of [blank] concerning giving licence to some of the Scottish Nation to remain in England. August 21st 1650’.
127 NAS GD28/2299, Islay to unknown, Hadington, 15th November 1715.
128 The first dictionary to contain synonyms or brief descriptions, so showing an interest in the exact meaning of words, was A Table Alphabeticall first published in 1604.
discussed whether to raise both a regiment of militia horse and a regiment of fencible men of Edinburgh.\textsuperscript{129} The use of both terms suggests that there were differences between them.

Terminology during the first half of the eighteenth century varied. Argyll, who understood the court in London as well as the clan in Scotland, rarely referred to the Argyllshire Militia as a militia, though he used both terms regularly. More commonly he wrote of “my men”\textsuperscript{130} or “my highlanders” in his correspondence with London.\textsuperscript{131} However, despite being more clan-like than the other militias raised for the government, they were used in a similar manner to the militia proper. It is likely that Argyll took a proprietary pride in highlighting his contribution against the rebels. Furthermore, some confusion is indicated in the draft of a letter by Sir James Steuart, Solicitor General, in September 1715, who crossed out the word “militia” and replaced it with “fencible men”\textsuperscript{132} – a significant confusion given the Solicitor General’s senior legal position in Scotland.

Other auxiliary forces

Other auxiliary forces were in use in Scotland during the first half of the eighteenth century: city guards, volunteer regiments and corporation regiments, which were used to keep the peace and provide extra troops during times of internal trouble, in much the same way as the militia and fencibles. The tradition of military service, based

\textsuperscript{129} TNA SP54/9/38, David Dalrymple [Lord Advocate] to Stanhope, Edinburgh, 12\textsuperscript{th} October 1715.
\textsuperscript{130} TNA SP54/9/24, Argyll to Townsend, Camp at Stirling, 7\textsuperscript{th} October 1715.
\textsuperscript{131} TNA SP54/11/126B, Argyll to Townsend, Aberdeen, 17\textsuperscript{th} February 1716.
\textsuperscript{132} TNA SP54/8/39, James Steuart to unknown, Edinburgh, 10\textsuperscript{th} September 1715.
in the old ‘Scottish service’ and ‘free service’ of forty days\textsuperscript{133} and evidenced by the early existence of fencibles, combined with the Enlightened belief that civic service aided good citizenship made the adaptation of the militia principle to other forms of service unsurprising.

English militias, unlike their Scottish equivalents, had clear legal authority and precedence but had declined through lack of use so their efficient use when a Jacobite threat occurred was limited. It was not until the 5\textsuperscript{th} September 1745 that London approved their formation, and not until November that the government agreed to fund them. Consequently, the gentry and gentlemen began to form volunteer regiments, the ‘Blues’, using funds from public subscriptions. The first, in Derbyshire, became the model for the remainder but few had any success against the rebels; the Durham Blues, who usefully employed themselves checking travellers and searching for rebels, were far from the path of the Jacobite army.\textsuperscript{134} In a similar vein, fourteen ‘noblemen’s regiments’ were raised and officered by earls, dukes and marquesses, for use in areas the Jacobite army was expected to pass through on the way to London.\textsuperscript{135} Volunteer regiments gave many an opportunity to demonstrate their loyalty to the government and Protestant Succession, without the commitment of joining the army. The publication of Histories by those who experienced the rebellions, often as volunteers, also served to further reinforce that loyalty.\textsuperscript{136} Some, though they give little further personal information,

\textsuperscript{133} Cochrane, \textit{Scottish Military Dress}, p.11.
\textsuperscript{134} Duffy, \textit{The ’45}, p.133-4, 256.
\textsuperscript{136} A. Henderson, \textit{The history of the rebellion, 1745 and 1746. Containing, a full account of its rise, progress and extinction...By an impartial hand, who was an eye-witness to most of the facts} (Edinburgh, 1748) and J. Ray, \textit{A complete history of the rebellion, from its first rise, in 1745, to its total suppression at
provide more detail that indicates motivation, such as Michael Hughes, who described himself as “A Volunteer from the said City [London]; Educated in the Bluecoat Hospital” suggesting that the receipt of home and education from the establishment had instilled a sense of loyalty or at least obligation.  

The Autobiography of the Reverend Alexander Carlyle contains a more useful personal account of his enlistment in the Edinburgh Volunteer Regiment in September 1745. He recounts how he joined old school friends in Edinburgh on 13th September and joined the College Company of Volunteers that had been embodied the previous day. Training was provided once issued with arms, though it was fortunate Carlyle had been taught drill by his father, as the commanding officer was absent in London until the 15th. The presence of Carlyle and his school friends suggests that many gentlemen’s sons volunteered, perhaps with similar experience of drill training from family members. The Edinburgh Volunteers provided some assistance to the army, if only to free other troops from the need to guard Trinity Hospital in Leith, the location of Carlyle’s company during the night of the 15th September. This detachment consisted of twelve men under the command of a captain, who had two days previously been a merchant and was twenty-five or twenty-six, to Carlyle’s twenty-three.  

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137 M. Hughes, A plain narrative or journal of the late rebellion, begun in 1745: describing its progress in Scotland, and England, till the full and glorious Defeat at Culloden (London, 1746).


Edinburgh’s next generation, suggests that the majority of volunteers were young.\textsuperscript{140} Ultimately, the Edinburgh Volunteers were disbanded and then scattered by the storming of Edinburgh during the night of the 16\textsuperscript{th} September. It was only through a personal connection to Gardiner, the family’s neighbour, that Carlyle was able to join the army amassing outside Edinburgh, though, as he spent the day prior to the battle of Prestonpans providing intelligence from the steeple of Trenant Church, he slept through the battle.\textsuperscript{141}

The accusations made against Archibald Stewart, Provost of Edinburgh during the ’45, are even more revealing of a citizen’s options to provide military service in a city’s defence. The main form of enlistment was through the creation of regiments of volunteers raised by public subscription, as was Carlyle’s experience. Stewart was alleged to have refused three offers of such regiments in the weeks leading up to the fall of Edinburgh, protesting both the expense and the legality of raising and arming men. Interestingly, on the third instance, his suggestion that the volunteers take advantage of a three-month term of service with the British army led the men to leave in disgust, insulted that “being Tradesmen or Husbandmen, [they] did not mean to leave their Occupations, and inlist themselves as Soldiers for Hire, but had bravely offered to serve gratis in the then present Exigency.”\textsuperscript{142}

Another form of auxiliary regiment which, unlike the volunteer regiments could become incorporated into the British army, was the ‘corporation regiments’. Corporations or rich individuals could pay to raise regiments on the understanding that

\textsuperscript{140} Carlyle, \textit{Autobiography of the Rev. Dr Alexander Carlyle}, p.118.
\textsuperscript{141} \textit{Ibid}, p.128-41.
\textsuperscript{142} Stewart, \textit{The Trial of Archibald Stewart}, p.14, 16-7.
the government would reimburse the expense once the regiment had reached full strength. Often this was in return for a commission, following the custom of ‘raising for rank’, or to demonstrate loyalty in the hope of receiving royal or governmental favour. Should the individual or corporation fail to recruit sufficient numbers to fill a regiment, the government was not obliged to reimburse the expenses but still gained the men raised. Consequently, there was a great pressure on those who raised a corporation regiment to complete its strength and they often forced their tenants to join. Though the government did not need the extra officers created by ‘raising for rank’, it did gain a supply of men, with none of the expense of recruiting, who were often ‘drafted’ to fill under-strength existing regiments.

The City or Town Guard was slightly different from the militia, in that it had a permanent existence whose purpose was to act as the police force for large cities and towns. Their connection to the civil rather than military establishment meant that only towns and cities wealthy enough to afford them and important enough to warrant them, such as Glasgow and Edinburgh, had Guards. The main responsibility of the City Guard was to maintain the peace. In this capacity, they guarded the main gaols and escorted prisoners to trial and to execution. They were also responsible for detaining beggars, who were forbidden within the city-walls. Those in Edinburgh were known to feed detained child beggars, and allowed them to sleep in the Guard-House beside the fire.

144 BL 1078.k.20(9), Chapbooks 1698-1789, ‘Account of the cruel massacre committed by John Porteous, Captain of the City Guard of Edinburgh, At the execution of Andrew Wilson Merchant, upon the 14th of April 1736...Printed in the Year 1789’.
until their fate was decided by the City Council. The guard functioned under the immediate command of the Guard-Captain and reported back to the Baillies and JPs of their town or city. Its soldiers received an allowance for every person they detained in addition to their pay and received medical cover for duty-related injuries from their town or city. Their numbers varied; the Edinburgh City Guard had a strength of 100 in 1715 and forty were added to counter the rebellion, while Leith had a Town Guard of fifty men. In 1736, seventy soldiers escorted convicted smuggler Andrew Wilson to his execution and guarded the scaffold, while by September 1745, ninety soldiers from the City Guard joined the volunteers in preparing for the defence of Edinburgh. However, when Edinburgh fell during the night of the 16th September, only a third of their full force were on duty, the usual number for peacetime. At the Netherbow Port, where the Jacobites stormed through, only a small detachment under a sergeant was on duty.

Blamed on Stewart at his trial, he denied cutting their numbers and claimed he had suggested the addition of thirty sentinels, bringing their full strength to 126 men but had feared the Guard “were not in a Condition to do Duty, after the Fatigue they had previously undergone”, presumably a reference to preparing the city’s defence. It is open to question whether the old prejudice against Highlanders played any part in this, as

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145 J. MacDonald, Travels, in various parts of Europe, Asia, and Africa, during a series of thirty years and upwards. By John Macdonald, A Cadet of the Family of Keppoch in Inverness-Shire; who, After the Ruin of his Family in 1745, was thrown when a Child on the wide World (London, 1790), p.18.
146 Ibid, p.18 and BL 1854.d.8(14), Proclamation to soldiers of City Guard against cursing and swearing, Edinburgh, 29th November 1720.
147 R.A. Houston, Social change in the Age of Enlightenment: Edinburgh 1660-1760 (Oxford, 1994), p.166; BL 1854.d.8(14), Proclamation to soldiers of City Guard against cursing and swearing, Edinburgh, 29th November 1720 and MacDonald, Travels, in various parts of Europe, p.18.
148 TNA SP54/11/203, John Campbell to unknown, Edinburgh, 31st March 1716.
149 Carlyle, Autobiography of the Rev. Dr Alexander Carlyle, p.119.
150 Stewart, The Trial of Archibald Stewart, p.20-1.
151 Stewart, The Trial of Archibald Stewart, p.29, 31, 34.
the soldiers “were mostly all Highlanders, from…[the] shire of Inverness.” They also provided an aid for the Lowland authorities, as the Highland members of the City Guard could act as translators.

Many Guardsmen were retired soldiers drawn from the Dutch Brigade, which gave them a military identity emphasised by their contemporary title of “guard soldiers”. The common perception of the Guard was that they were troublesome and ill-disciplined. This was due to the notoriety of the Porteous Riot and the later adaptation of the story in *The Heart of Mid-Lothian* by Walter Scott which emphasised Porteous’ past behaviour and consequent implication that the City Guard was an oppressive force over the people. Certainly relations between guardsmen and civilians during the late seventeenth and first half of the eighteenth centuries were strained and often ended in violence. However, records of orders responding to public complaints about the Guardsmen swearing and cursing demonstrate both that the public felt able to complain and that these complaints were acted upon with the threat of stoppages and dismissal for continued misconduct.

The significance of militia use in Scotland

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152 BL 1078.k.20(9), Chapbooks 1698-1789, ‘Account of the cruel massacre committed by John Porteous, Captain of the City Guard of Edinburgh, At the execution of Andrew Wilson Merchant, upon the 14th of April 1736...Printed in the Year 1789’ and MacDonald, *Travels, in various parts of Europe*, p.19.
153 Houston, *Social Change in Age of Enlightenment*, p.278
157 BL 1854.d.8(14), Proclamation to soldiers of City Guard against cursing and swearing, Edinburgh, 29th November 1720.
Due to widespread fears of the oppressive potential of a standing army, public debate in England and Scotland compared the benefits of a militia against those of a standing army, and found the militia preferable. During the Civil War and Interregnum, the public learnt to associate a standing army with military oppression. Fletcher’s *Discourse Concerning Militias*, for example, was constantly in print between 1732 and 1798, and many broadsheets argued that the country’s defence should be left to the navy with a strongly controlled militia for times of need.\(^{158}\) The educated elite, unlike their continental neighbours, remained influenced by Machiavelli and the classical political philosophers, believing that a standing army would become corrupt and a threat to peace, whilst a militia would foster a sense of virtù in its citizen soldiers.\(^{159}\) According to Enlightened theories at the end of the seventeenth century, if an ordinary man contributed to society through military service with the militia, he was actively participating in the continuation of the state and thus ensuring its peace and stability. However, the use of mercenaries or a standing army removed this opportunity and detached citizens from aiding the security of their own state and encouraged disaffection and idleness.\(^{160}\) Though many questioned the wisdom of arming and training ordinary civilians,\(^{161}\) remembering Cromwell’s use of ‘standing militias’\(^{162}\), as memories of the Civil War faded, the idea of relying on a semi-permanent militia gained acceptability.

\(^{160}\) Robertson, *The Scottish Enlightenment*, p.8-12.
\(^{161}\) Bowen, *War and British Society*, p.43.
Raising a militia was the most explicit method of demonstrating a community’s loyalty to London. However, there were other ways that highlighted the desire to defend the Union and the Protestant Succession at all levels of society. In the last four months of 1745, loyal addresses were sent to the Government from Glasgow, Edinburgh, Stirling, Dumfriesshire, Kirkcudbright and Ayr. Additionally, subscriptions were raised to pay for the creation and payment of militiamen as well as regulars in Dumfries and Inveresk and by Presbyterian ministers in Angus. There were also public celebrations to mark George II’s birthday in Aberdeen, Dundee and Perth.163

At the outbreak of the ’45, militias were raised in Edinburgh, Glasgow, Paisley, Kilmarnock, Stirling, Renfrew, Perth, Linlithgow, Kirkcudbright, Hamilton, Renfrewshire, Clydesdale, Aberdeen, East Lothian, Midlothian, Roxburghshire and Dumfriesshire. These are notable for their coverage of the south and south-west Lowlands, areas of traditional Whig Presbyterian loyalties.164 Of the Lowland militias raised by Lord-Lieutenants, there were around 2-3,000 men at most. Of the militias made up of loyal Whig clans, around 3,000 were active, drawn from the Grants, Munros, Gunns, Rosses, Frasers and Campbells of Argyll.165 There was a corresponding lack of militias raised from areas with more Jacobite leanings, the region around Inverness for example. Glasgow raised a militia during the ’15 and ‘45. By mid-September 1715, it already had a strength of 700 men166 which had increased to 800 only two days later.167 Glasgow had benefited from the increased trade opportunities available from the Union

165 Szecuti, 1715, p.120.
166 TNA SP54/8/82, Unknown [possibly Adam Cockburn] to unknown, Edinburgh, 22nd September 1715.
167 TNA SP54/8/89, Argyll to Townsend, Camp at Stirling, 24th September 1715.
of 1707, and was therefore anxious to preserve the dispensation that had allowed trade to prosper.

Those in authority seemed mindful of the need to acknowledge and reward this gesture of loyalty. Though Argyll wrote to Stanhope in September 1715 stating “it would be the last of follies to have any Dependence upon their [the Glasgow Militia’s] assistance”168, he also recognised the significance of the raising of a militia, suggesting that someone should write to the people of Glasgow to thank them “for this proof of their Duty [as its] so strong a Demonstration of the hearty zeal of these honest People”.169 Similarly, the Scottish elite recognised the value of raising a militia regiment. Patrick Hume, 1st Earl Marchmont, used his actions raising and paying for a militia at the start of the ‘15 to demonstrate his loyalty170 rather than his role during the Glorious Revolution, his strong Covenanting background or his support for the Union.

Despite the militia’s weaknesses as an auxiliary force in the eyes of the British army, their presence did at least give the impression that steps were being taken for the defence of those loyal to the crown. When not immediately confronting Jacobite forces, militias also provided genuine support. The Glasgow volunteers guarded the bridge between the battlefield of Sherifmuir and Stirling Castle in 1715,171 a Whig volunteer cavalry unit fought with Argyll’s regulars at Sherifmuir and the Edinburgh citizens prepared to defend the city as a Jacobite force under William Mackintosh of Borlum

168 TNA SP54/8/74A, Argyll to Stanhope, Camp at Stirling, 18th September 1715.
169 TNA SP54/8/74A, Argyll to Stanhope, Camp at Stirling, 18th September 1715.
170 TNA SP54/10/89, Polwarth to unknown, Red Breas, 28th November 1715.
marched past in October 1715. Indeed, letters written at the start of the ‘15, in the
wake of another failed Jacobite attempt to take Edinburgh Castle, reveal that for the
public establishing a militia could go a long way to restoring faith in the safety of those
who stayed loyal. The reaction against Stewart, Provost of Edinburgh, at his trial for
failing to prepare Edinburgh’s defence adequately in 1745, was visceral. The men who
had offered their service as volunteers or their advice regarding repairs to the walls and
the placement of cannon were not merely angry that Stewart had held them back, they
were betrayed. From this it is clear that the act of contributing to one’s own defence
was a key psychological boost at a time of great uncertainty.

Another significant limitation on the effectiveness of the militia in Scotland was
the absence of correct implementation of the Riot Act. A major part of this was due to
the lack of government support felt by Scotland’s elite. The introduction of the Riot Act
in 1715 ensured that civil not military authority was needed to call out a militia. However, since the veto of the 1708 Scottish Militia Bill, civil authorities were left
unsure whether they had the necessary power to raise and arm militias. At the ’15,
individual warrants had been issued from London providing temporary power but the
civil authorities in Scotland believed they became invalid with peace. Therefore, at the
start of the ’45, the same dilemma existed. Many towns, counties, shires and clans
requested permission to raise militias and volunteer regiments. The letter from the
Moderator of the Provincial Synod of Dumfries written to Tweeddale, the Secretary of

\[172\] Szechi, 1715, p.119-20.
\[173\] TNA SP54/8/39, James Steuart to unknown, Edinburgh, 10th September 1715 and SP54/9/21, Islay to
unknown, Inveraray, 7th October 1715.
State for Scotland, was typical: “People are ready to take up arms but require proper Authority & necessary arms.”176 Similarly, Archibald Stewart, Edinburgh’s Provost, was so hesitant of his authority to raise and arm men, as “treasonable or illegal, without special Warrant from the Crown,” and unsure whether London would support his actions without a warrant, that he delayed for too long and so contributed to the city’s fall during the night of the 16th September 1745.177 He was indeed tried for neglect of duty, a charge tantamount to treason, and though found not guilty he would have concluded that his suspicion that London would not support him had been vindicated.

Though Edinburgh quickly raised at least four companies of volunteers in September 1745, totalling 400 men, as well as ninety men of the Town Guard, 100 volunteers gathered by Bruce of Kennett from his lands and 130 or 140 volunteers from Musselburgh and Inveresk, they were disbanded shortly before the battle of Prestonpans.178 A young Alexander Carlyle, present as a volunteer in the College Company of Volunteers, recorded that this was because of public derision, the vocal opinion of the clergy that they were wasting their lives fighting the Jacobites as their number was insufficient to change events, and a lack of official support from the Town Council.179 Indeed, many contemporaries, Carlyle included, lacking an understanding of the complexities behind legal rights to raise and arm men, remained suspicious of Archibald Stewart’s allegiance; Carlyle recorded in his Autobiography: “[it] appeared so

176 Harris, Politics and the Nation, p.151, 153.
177 Stewart, The Trial of Archibald Stewart, p.33.
179 Ibid, p.111, 115-6, 118, 123.
plainly from the Provost’s conduct and manner at that time, that there was not a Whig in
town who did not suspect that he favoured the Pretender’s cause.”180

A great handicap for the militia was the confusion surrounding who had the
authority to raise and arm men. In the opening weeks of the ’45, Tweeddale, Secretary of
State for Scotland, was inundated with requests for warrants and promises of support and
loyalty. A typical letter from Stranraer in Dumfries and Galloway read: “We are talking
of raising volunteers, & nothing Hinders but want of Directors...the County here seems
all Hearty & takes it amiss that they have not an opportunity to rise in Defence of the
present Govern[ment].”181 Even in traditionally loyal areas such as Glasgow, militias
took time to assemble. Confusion over the legal status of militias, authority to arm
militias and indecisive instructions from above hindered the realisation of the true
potential of loyal volunteer troops. The magistrates of Paisley even complained that their
request to raise men was being ignored. This was partly because London doubted many
of the militias would be of any real military use and were concerned about the wisdom of
arming Scots.182 The confusion caused by the question of legality was compounded by
the administrative process of dealing with London. Edinburgh Town Council began the
process of gaining permission to raise and arm men on 24th August, thirty-two days after
Charles Edward landed and sixteen days after news of the landing reached Edinburgh.183
The absence of many burgesses for the weekend caused a further delay, so the meeting to
approve the application did not occur until the 27th, and was not sent until the following

180 Carlyle, Autobiography of the Rev. Dr Alexander Carlyle, p.112.
181 Harris, Politics and the Nation, p.151-2.
183 Stewart, The Trial of Archibald Stewart, p.32-3 and W.B. Blaikie, ‘The First News that reached
day. The royal warrant arrived on 9th September which, at best, left a week to prepare the
city walls and muster, arm and train the militia.184 However, as the quorum’s decisions at
the meeting of the 9th were not approved until the 13th, it is unlikely that enough time was
allowed for effective preparations.185

Unlike the regulars, militia regiments did not benefit from drafts of replacements
and nor were they allowed to raise additional companies.186 This was due to the short
existence of the volunteer regiments, which made extra recruitment duties unnecessary,
and the already difficult lack of available arms in Scotland. The Ordnance Office had
only 7,000 muskets stored in Edinburgh Castle and another 4,000 that were in need of
repair. Therefore, like the Haddington Militia in 1715, most men raised were
immediately dismissed as there were insufficient arms to provide for them all. Despite
initially numbering 800 men, the Haddington Militia was only 400 strong because of lack
of arms.187

The employment of the militia was indicative of the British army’s level of trust
in the loyalty and ability of the militia. The fact that militias were generally positioned at
the rear of an engagement, as the Glasgow volunteers were at Falkirk on 17th January
1746, shows the low level of regard in which the militias were held.188 This also put
them in the same category as Hamilton’s and Ligonier’s Regiments who had fled at

185 Ibid, p.46.
186 Szcechi, 1715, p.121.
187 Ibid, p.131 and TNA SP54/9/89, Marquess of Tweeddale to [Mr Pringle], Edinburgh, 27th October 1715.
Prestonpans, the latter abandoning their colonel, Gardiner, to his death. Both could not be trusted not to flee again. However, for Scottish militiamen, the implication was that they were being treated like the officers and men who had shown their lack of loyalty by abandoning their posts. Worse, they knew that during the ’15, they had been valued on a par with turn-coats; their deployment had been the same as Campbell of Laars and the Laird of Leny in Perthshire, who had recently deserted the Jacobites and who Argyll suggested should be placed “a little distance from the army”\(^{190}\), despite referring to them as “two of my vassals.”\(^{191}\)

The main problem of the militia was that what they were asked to do was often incompatible with what they were capable of, therefore resulting in failure. Their tendency to retreat without a fight when facing a possible encounter with the Jacobite army and when unsupported by regular troops was not due to lack of loyalty, but to a lack of discipline, inexperience and insufficient training. The Haddington Militia, for example, quickly retreated to Edinburgh with no resistance when Jacobite troops landed in North Berwick on the night of 13\(^{th}\) October 1715.\(^{192}\) At the order of their Lord-Lieutenant, the 4\(^{th}\) Marquess of Tweeddale, to return to Haddington, most promptly mutinied and deserted.\(^{193}\) The militia’s inability to stand, in the face of the Jacobites’ approach, meant that they were regarded as amateurs.

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190 TNA SP54/9/24, Argyll to Townsend, Camp at Stirling, 7\(^{th}\) October 1715.
191 TNA SP54/9/24, Argyll to Townsend, Camp at Stirling, 7\(^{th}\) October 1715.
192 TNA SP54/9/41, Anderson [Postmaster of Edinburgh] to unknown, Post Office of Edinburgh, 13\(^{th}\) October 1715 and SP54/9/42, James Steuart to unknown, Edinburgh, 13\(^{th}\) October 1715.
193 TNA SP54/9/89, Marquess of Tweeddale to [Mr Pringle], Edinburgh, 27\(^{th}\) October 1715.
This had serious consequences when planning complex manoeuvres as it was imperative to know that troops positioned in particular locations would stand fast. The Glasgow Militia under the command of three half-pay officers, for example, was deployed to garrison Seton House near Stirling during the ‘15. They had initially been reluctant to spend more than a few days there, instead of the month Argyll planned, and then fled at the Jacobites’ approach so allowing the house to fall into rebel hands and providing the rebels with the benefit of a base for around 1,500 troops and a secure supply route. Argyll was then obliged to re-establish another supply route for powder by sea. Argyll and Tweeddale both believed that militias would not stand against an approaching army without support from regular troops. As Argyll lamented: “In short my Lord [Townsend] a Lamb is not more afraid of a Lyon, than these Low Country people are of the highlanders.”

The militia’s inability to stand and defend the area under its protection, one of its key roles, not only failed to prevent the Jacobites moving freely around the country, but also failed to reassure the local population. Even those involved with the militia, like the Marquess of Tweeddale, lacked faith in their usefulness and repeatedly requested the presence of regular troops. Indeed, even the loyal town of Glasgow had its doubts and the University hired its own private guard of 50 men in August 1715, its Principal expressing concern at the lack of troops and officers stationed in Glasgow, and that their

194 TNA SP54/9/24, Argyll to Lord Townsend, Camp at Stirling, 7th October 1715.
195 TNA SP54/9/55, Argyll to Stanhope, Camp at Stirling, 19th October 1715.
196 TNA SP54/9/89, Marquess of Tweeddale to [Mr Pringle], Edinburgh, 27th October 1715.
197 TNA SP54/9/24, Argyll to Lord Townsend, Camp at Stirling, 7th October 1715.
overstretched and under-strength status left Glasgow vulnerable.\textsuperscript{198} When the rebels attacked Edinburgh during the night of the 13\textsuperscript{th} October 1715, all the militia and local volunteers were gathered to defend the city. However, Lord Ormiston, a Lord Justice Clerk and Lord of Session, was pessimistic about their ability to face the rebel army without the presence of regular troops. Indeed, even before he had attempted to engage the enemy, he wrote “I can say nothing when or how or from where you shall here next from us”, implying that he did not believe he could hold the city.\textsuperscript{199} A petition from the Deputy Lieutenants of Sutherland, signed by ten men and dated 2\textsuperscript{nd} November 1715, blamed: “the Misfortune of the present Circumstances of this Country” on a lack of regular troops. Their location at Inverness may have been particularly significant as regular troops could have been more effective in preventing local clans from joining the Jacobites. Their petition begged that “some Regular Troops [are]… forthwith sent hither”.\textsuperscript{200} The difference in desertion rates indicates the roles the militias were suited for. The 300 strong Argyllshire Militia under Colin Campbell of Fonab had a low desertion rate compared to the Sutherland Militia. However, the former were involved in mopping-up of rebels in February 1716 while the latter suffered mass desertion after a close encounter with a Jacobite force under the Earl of Seaforth in early October 1715.\textsuperscript{201}

The militias’ failure to act in the capacity that the army needed meant that their morale and reputation were further tarnished. When Argyll was asked his opinion of whether to recruit for the regulars from amongst the militiamen in December 1715, he

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{198}] TNA SP54/7/13, Mr Stirling to unknown, Glasgow, 3\textsuperscript{rd} August 1715.
\item[\textsuperscript{199}] TNA SP54/9/45, Cockburn to unknown, Edinburgh, 13\textsuperscript{th} October 1715.
\item[\textsuperscript{200}] TNA SP54/10/4, The Deputy Lieutenants of Sutherland to unknown, Inverkrankie, 2\textsuperscript{nd} November 1715.
\item[\textsuperscript{201}] Szechi, 1715, p.122.
\end{itemize}
declared that this could be expensive and disastrous, as “recruits just raised are of very little Service, and at the last action [Sheriffmuir] they did more harm then good…I will venture to assure you that a thousand of the best Highlanders would drive the whole Militia of Scotland before them”.\textsuperscript{202} Essentially, when militias were raised to counter rebellions in Scotland, the army were looking for auxiliary troops to boost their strength and presence in disaffected areas. However, militias were often only capable of providing assistance by taking over minor roles, such as guard and transport duty, which freed regular troops to be deployed with the main body of the army.

At Falkirk on 17\textsuperscript{th} January 1746, there were around 2,000 men of the Argyllshire Militia raised by the Duke of Argyll from his lands and clan.\textsuperscript{203} It too was kept in the rear of the battle on the right and given patrol duty.\textsuperscript{204} Despite being recruited from amongst the most Hanoverian of clans, as an irregular unit it is clear that the Campbell Militia was regarded with some caution. Its composition and lack of formal training led, perhaps, to the belief that it lacked the experience and discipline to stand in the line during a set-piece battle. To gain victory, General Henry Hawley, commander of the British forces at Falkirk, was relying on his troops’ discipline to hold their fire until the Jacobites were disconcertingly close in order to repulse the Highland charge.\textsuperscript{205} He consequently doubted the Campbell Militia’s steadfastness and they were kept from the main battlefield, guarding the baggage.\textsuperscript{206} By the battle of Culloden, however, they had proved their worth and were placed opposite the Jacobite right flank in order to outflank

\textsuperscript{202} TNA SP54/10/101, Argyll to Townsend, Stirling, 1\textsuperscript{st} December 1715.
\textsuperscript{203} TNA SP54/11/126B, Argyll to Townsend, Aberdeen, 17\textsuperscript{th} February 1716.
\textsuperscript{204} Matthews, \textit{England Versus Scotland}, p.248.
\textsuperscript{205} Duffy, \textit{The ‘45}, p.141.
\textsuperscript{206} \textit{Ibid}, p.416.
it and acquitted itself well in that role. However, they had to earn that trust, serving as scouts for the main army in February, March and April 1746 and forming the vanguard on the morning of Culloden. Of the militias raised to counter the ’45, the Argyllshire Militia were considered the most able. However, they were never considered with the rest of the army. When the 5th Earl of Findlater issued one guinea to each company and troop as they passed through his lands, it took a week for the army to realise that the Argyllshire Militia had been excluded.

During the ’45, as in the ’15, the city of Glasgow again raised its militia but it again fled as the Jacobite army moved into the city on 25th and 26th December 1745. They then took part in the battle of Falkirk that followed, taking a position on the British army’s left flank; however, they were amongst the first to flee in the face of the Jacobite army’s Highland charge. Whilst the Hanoverian loyalties of Glasgow were demonstrated by its ability to raise a militia, its value was clearly limited. On two occasions, it was unable to stand when faced by the Jacobite army; when defending Glasgow and during the battle of Falkirk. While this was a fault of their misemployment, such incidents were interpreted by London and the British army as evidence of the failure of the militia and as a lack of ‘zeal’.

Government behaviour towards militias was a poor return on the risks many Scots took in openly displaying their political allegiances in a situation of civil war. As militias

208 BL Hardwick Papers Add. MS.36257 f.4, 7, 17, 25, 57, Orderly Book of Joseph Yorke.
were the most accessible and overt method for ordinary men and gentry alike to demonstrate their loyalty, it was especially insulting that militias were often not granted permission to form or that the warrants granting permission were fatally delayed because London remained suspicious of Scottish loyalty.\textsuperscript{212} In the years after Culloden, this continued to strain relations with loyal Scots, making feelings of resentment not unique to crypto- and outright Jacobites. The loyal Scots who had joined Blakeney’s Regiment in Stirling as unpaid volunteers after fleeing Perth following clashes with Jacobite soldiers as the town celebrated George II’s birthday on 30\textsuperscript{th} October 1745, were poorly rewarded for their loyalty as, years later, their widows and orphans were living off parish charity.

**Conclusion**

Scotland in the first half of the eighteenth century witnessed, in addition to the regular army, the deployment of a range of auxiliary forces. One premise was common to them all; to demonstrate loyalty to the government and the Protestant Succession. Military service was the main expression, though contributing to subscriptions to fund forces, and participating in petitions and public celebrations connected to the establishment, were other popular manifestations. These auxiliary forces performed a range of services. Chief amongst them was to relieve pressure on the British army. Auxiliary forces could guard baggage, act as scouts, protect cities and form garrisons that allowed regular soldiers to join the main army. Auxiliary forces also participated in battles, though it was in this capacity that they received the most criticism. Unfortunately, London’s engrained suspicions of Scottish loyalty meant that poor behaviour when facing the Jacobite army was blamed on Jacobite sympathies rather than

\textsuperscript{212} Harris, *Politics and the Nation*, p.159-60.
inexperience. Similarly, officers’ inability to continue funding militia regiments was interpreted as a ‘lack of zeal’ that was tantamount to disloyalty. Such mistaken beliefs hindered the creation of auxiliary forces just when they were most needed, at the start of a rebellion when regular reinforcements were en route to Scotland. Legal problems caused hesitation among Scotland’s elite who doubted their authority, or the government’s support, if they acted improperly. This delayed the military reaction to rebellions through the necessity of applying to London for warrants. The trial of Stewart, the Provost of Edinburgh, showed they were right to be dubious of automatic government support.

London’s insistence on issuing warrants, and the paranoia of Scotland’s civil elites about acting without them, was most restrictive during the period between the 1689 and ’45 rebellion. At this time, the power of law courts was becoming more pervasive across the country, and influential by virtue of significant new laws. The Mutiny and Riot Acts gave government officials greater powers than army officers, and the Disarming Acts and later abolition of Heritable Jurisdictions demonstrated the government’s desire to tighten legal control over its domains. The new legal authority, for all its strength, lacked clarity. This was the case with the 1708 Scottish Militia Bill, and the apparent contradiction between Stewart’s trial and the acceptance of the variations of militia that were raised during the rebellions, such as the private guard armed by Glasgow University in 1715 without a royal warrant.

A study of auxiliary forces in Scotland in the first half of the eighteenth century is complicated by a lack of systematically recorded or preserved state documentation. This
hampers study of the British army of the time and the situation is much worse for auxiliary forces as their temporary nature and supra-regular status means that little survives that clearly illustrates the protocol for authorising and raising bodies such as militias. Information must be gleaned from personal correspondence, and from infrequent warrants and orders. At best, this gives an impression of the process of how auxiliary forces were raised and utilised; at worst, any study will contain gaps where extrapolation has to be used. Despite this, a picture emerges of the auxiliary forces in existence in Scotland in the first half of the eighteenth century, contributing to the suppression of the ’15 and ’45. This contradicts many historians’ belief that there was little or no militia activity between 1700 and 1750. It does, however, leave an unclear picture of exactly how auxiliary forces were raised, authorised and funded. Even the length of their service is unclear, as practical experience appeared to contradict warrants and laws. Similarly, confusion obscures the definition of a fencible regiment. The main difficulty is that the concept of ‘Fencible Men’ had long existed in Scotland. This confused Scotland’s interpretation and application of orders from London, and their service has been viewed as identical to service in the militia or non-existent until its reinvention during the Seven Years War, and Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Consequently, geographical, chronological and terminological dividers fail to supply a precise definition. What is clear, however, is that a variety of auxiliary forces were used before and after the Union in Scotland, and that, as the eighteenth century progressed, these became more in line with the English model. Nevertheless, these auxiliary forces made a significant contribution to the suppression of the Jacobite threat and in this way
fulfilled their military requirement as well as proclaiming the loyalty of a large part of Scotland.
CHAPTER FIVE: SCOTLAND’S MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

Introduction

This chapter examines Scotland’s forts, castles and barracks occupied by the British army across ‘North Britain’ or built for it by the Ordnance Office. After an introductory survey of the military structures used to garrison soldiers in Scotland prior to the Union, a more detailed appraisal addresses those used, improved and constructed between the Union and in the years after the ‘45. The construction process is investigated, particularly in relation to soldiers’ involvement in building and problems that arose from the remote locations of these sites. The locations of fortifications and the reasons for their construction are analysed to assess the purpose of these structures and their significance for the army. The composition and strengths of the fortifications are assessed to highlight developments between the Union and the end of the ‘45 and the reasons causing them. The successes and failures of the fortifications are studied to assess whether they were effective garrisons and effective defences, and what impact their presence had on the civil-military relationship. In order to demonstrate the government’s level of attention towards Scotland and its soldiers, the dates of construction and the reasons why action was taken are analysed. Additionally, the developments in the principles of fortification design and architectural changes that occurred over the first half of the eighteenth century are examined to demonstrate the state’s changing attitude towards standing armies and the living conditions of soldiers.

There follows a review of the road building conducted under Generals Wade and Caulfeild, encompassing both the method of construction, the routes selected and, most
importantly, the reaction of the Scots to these roads. Finally, to remedy the absence in
the historiography of a study that covers both fortification building in Scotland and the
history of the Ordnance Office, this chapter includes an examination of the powers of the
Ordnance Office in relation to fortification building, the origins and communication of
orders to build and repair, and the specific role and purpose of Ordnance officials in
Scotland. A consideration of the administrative process reveals the balance of power
between Ordnance Office, government and army, and how this influenced what was
constructed in Scotland.

A schedule of the citadels, castles and forts at Inverness and Fort William is
provided in Appendix No.5 to clarify the various forms of fortification built in close
proximity at the two locations and used simultaneously over the fifty year period covered
in this thesis.¹

**Key fortifications, pre- and post-Union**

For much of Scotland’s history, only royalty and the richest of the nobles could
afford to construct large buildings such as castles. Some, including those at Edinburgh
and Stirling, continued in use because of their secure, naturally defensible positions. The
rest of Scotland’s nobility, Highland and Lowland alike, relied upon the defences of
fortified tower houses for security.² Between the Union of Crowns and the Restoration,

¹ Appendix No.5: Table of the construction and name changes of fortifications in Fort William and
Inverness.
² S. Reid, *Castles and Tower Houses of the Scottish Clans 1450-1650* (Oxford and New York, 2006); D.
MacGibbon and T. Ross, *The Castellated and Domestic Architecture of Scotland. From the Twelfth to the
Eighteenth Century* (Edinburgh, 1887-92), 5 vols and N. Tranter, *The Fortified House in Scotland*
various armies stationed in Scotland used these existing castles and tower houses for barracking, the co-ordination of Scotland’s defence and patrolling and policing duties.

During the Interregnum the existing strongholds of Edinburgh, Stirling, Dunottar, Tantallon and smaller castles like Blair and Dunstaffnage were used. Men were also garrisoned on Orkney, Shetland and the Hebrides, and on the newly improved and repaired Castle of Duart on Mull.3 Roxburgh Castle also provided a supply centre and accommodation for 441 men.4 Between 1652 and 1656 construction of five citadels began at Ayr, Inverlochy, Inverness, Leith and St. Johnston near Perth, in locations chosen for their military significance.5 Intended as permanent garrisons with policing duties and to provide a statement of the Protectorate’s dominance in Scotland, their success was confirmed by their immediate destruction by Charles II.6

Following the Act of Union, the new government of Great Britain continued the policy of relying on pre-existing fortifications. Often these were ancestral castles of leading Scottish families who, since the Union of Crowns, had been encouraged to barrack troops and take responsibility for the defence and internal security of Scotland.7 For example, Balvenie Castle belonged to the Stewart Earl of Atholl family, whose Heritor8 offered it as a fortified garrison for British army use during the ‘15.9 Selective

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8 Heritors were the gentry of the Scottish Highlands, whose lands are awarded from the chiefs in return for providing authority and services at a parish level. See Glossary.
improvements to existing fortifications were undertaken: Edinburgh Castle continued to be a royal palace and military and administrative headquarters through changes in government. The attempt by the 1st Duke of Gordon to hold Edinburgh Castle for the Stuarts at the Glorious Revolution and the Jacobites’ repeated attempts to take Edinburgh and Stirling during the ’15 and ’45 stands testimony to their importance.10

Following the Glorious Revolution, the remains of the medieval castle at Inverness and Cromwell’s citadel at Inverlochy were repaired and used to garrison troops. Their strategic position at each end of the Great Glen, deep in the disaffected Highlands with access to the sea, made them invaluable.11 Converted and improved tower houses continued to be used. Blackness Castle, built on a headland on the south bank into the River Forth upstream from Edinburgh, used from 1684 to 1833 as a barrack and as a prison during the ’15, and Braemar and Corgarff, bought by the Ordnance Office following the ’45, were old tower houses. Designed to resist raids, many were converted and proved effective outposts.12 They became the model for the fortified barracks commissioned in 1717. These barracks and the converted tower houses were an ideal compromise at a time when both the government and public feared standing armies and resented the expense of sustaining them with permanent barracks. An exception was the

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11 M. MacIntoch, A History of Inverness. Being a narrative of the historical events, mainly military, concerning the town and round about, from the earliest times until the early Victorian period (Inverness, 1939), p.111-2, 114.
large and significant barracks at Berwick which, though geographically in England was put, along with Carlisle and Hull, on the North British establishment at the Union in 1707.13

Since the border wars of the twelfth to fifteenth centuries, Berwick had been a walled town where soldiers were billeted on the public. Scattered billeting often resulted in poor discipline and increased tension between the citizens and soldiers, as discussed in Chapter Two. This led to the first request by town leaders for the Ordnance Office to build a specific barrack at Berwick in 1705. Purpose-built barracks had previously only existed in Ireland, where the relationship between military and civilian was even more acrimonious and distant, and barracks had been viewed as militarily essential since the seventeenth century.14 At Berwick, these requests were not acted upon until 1717, when initial plans were drawn up by Nicholas Hawksmoor. These were altered by Captain Thomas Phillips and Andrew Jelfe, both engineers to the Ordnance Office, who created a simpler and therefore cheaper design.15 Further barracks were added in 1740 with the conversion of the ‘Clock Block’, the former powder magazine, which was replaced in 1748, along with other repairs and the strengthening of the curtain walls following the ‘45.16

13 Tabraham and Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.57.
15 Grove, Berwick Barracks, pp.4, 6 and Tabraham and Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.57.
It was more usual to make use of existing ancient castles as fortifications. At Edinburgh from 1688 onwards, soldiers were housed in the Great Hall using wooden galleries. This also occurred at Stirling, which only reverted to its military use during James II’s reign, after acting as a royal residence and nursery since the medieval period.\textsuperscript{17} Despite widespread reluctance to spend money on the military or to encourage a standing army by providing them with permanent accommodation, in July 1708 Captain Theodore Drury, an engineer for the Ordnance Office, began work on an outer defence at Stirling that could withstand siege artillery, with dual-purpose casements that provided storage during peace and extra barracks in times of emergency.\textsuperscript{18} At Edinburgh, Drury created the officers’ block – now known as Queen Anne’s Building – and also built accommodation for the garrison’s chaplain and gunners. Plans to repair the outer defences were abandoned when no design could be agreed upon, while the permanent conversion of the Great Hall into barrack rooms was delayed by twenty-nine years, until 1737.\textsuperscript{19}

In 1708 Drury also turned to Fort William. The Cromwellian citadel at Inverlochy, as well as the medieval castle at Inverness, had been repaired and re-used after the Jacobite insurrections in Ireland and Scotland in 1689-90.\textsuperscript{20} Rough ramparts had been added to Inverlochy Castle, possibly providing temporary billets or an outpost, but the new garrison was built on the site of Inverlochy Citadel, closer to the head of Loch

Linnhe and was named Fort William in July 1690. Built in eleven days, Fort William initially consisted of primitive wooden buildings used as barrack blocks, only the outer defences gaining stone facings. Consequently, the garrison at Fort William suffered greatly, eventually mutinying on 5th November 1690, until food and wages arrived. In 1708, therefore, Drury added a powder magazine and governor’s, officers’ and storekeeper’s houses. It was not until 1711 that two barrack blocks finally replaced the wooden ones with stone, reflecting the order of priority undermined by the Ordnance Office. Work was clearly needed to the outer defences of Fort William in the summer of 1715, but a lack of funds and the distraction of rebellion meant only temporary repairs could be managed.

Triggered by the ’15, barrack blocks were built between 1716 and 1718 at the repaired medieval castle at Inverness. It is sometimes stated erroneously that the expansion at Inverness during this time caused the change in name to Fort George. This did not in fact occur until 1727 when enough of the planned barracks, quarters for gunners, a governor’s house, powder magazine and chapel had been begun for General Wade to dedicate it to the newly ascended George II. Under the management of Captain

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24 TNA SP54/7/60A, Ordnance Office to Townsend, 20th August 1715; SP54/7/60B, R. Johnson to [Ordnance Office], Fort William, 1st August 1715; SP54/8/94, [Robert Pollock] to [Townsend], Fort William, 24th September 1715; SP54/8/116, [Robert Pollock] to unknown, Fort William, 28th September 1715; SP54/8/119, unknown to [Robert Pringle, Under-Secretary of State for the Southern Department], Edinburgh, 29th September 1715; SP54/10/23, Robert Pollock to unknown, Fort William, 5th November 1715; SP54/10/27, Robert Pollock to unknown, Fort William, 7th November 1715 and SP54/11/54, Robert Pollock to unknown, Fort William, 25th January 1716.
John Romer, engineer to the Ordnance Office, building continued until shortly before the '45. 27

Between 1730 and 1737, Romer also supervised the replacement of the north and west curved curtain walls of Edinburgh Castle with the star-traced, bastioned enceintes regarded as the design needed to maintain enfilade covering-fire in an age of siege artillery. 28 The master mason was William Adam of Leith. He and his three sons, James, John and Robert, acted as architects, masons and contractors for the Ordnance Office and were responsible for much of the repairs and new construction commissioned in the first fifty years of the eighteenth century, including the design for the bridge over the river Tay, Wade’s showpiece. 29 Unfortunately, the focus on defence of the Highlands meant the new perimeter walls at Edinburgh fulfilled only the minimum requirements, and the improvements to the barracks in the Great Hall in 1737 and the addition of a governor’s house with wings for the master-gunner and storekeeper in 1742, did nothing to improve its defensibility. 30 Fortunately for the government, when Charles Edward entered Edinburgh in October 1745, he did so without the artillery needed to besiege a castle the size and strength of Edinburgh. Consequently while the castle tolerated the Jacobites’ presence and the Jacobites ignored the castle, it remained undefeated. 31

29 Tabraham and Grove, *Fortress Scotland*, p.75, 85, 95 and ODNB William Adam by James Macaulay, John Adam by A.A. Tait and Robert and James Adam by A.A. Tait. FCA A/AAF/40/30/9/2, Proposal by John Adam for quartering two troops of dragoons at Blair in Fife, c.1750s.
31 Whilst the town welcomed the Jacobites, the Castle remained loyal. After a brief siege, the Castle and Jacobite army reached a compromise, in return for the castle battery cessation of fire on the town, which
All the previously mentioned barracks, such as those built at Woolwich in 1716 and at Berwick in 1717, were unfortified accommodation blocks, which relied on the defences of the castle or fort they were located within for protection. They were based on barracks built in Ireland since the 1680s, where the lack of inns made billeting difficult. The designs for these simple barracks inspired the first purpose-built, self-contained fortified barracks. In August 1717, the Ordnance Office commissioned the construction of four fortified barracks to be built in Scotland, the first permanent barracks to be built on British soil. Unlike the barracks at Woolwich and Berwick, where the barracks were situated in enclosed military communities, the fortified barracks in Scotland had to be defensible and self-contained to survive their role as outposts rather than staging posts.

Inspiration was also taken from the tower houses scattered across Scotland that, for centuries, had been used by their owners to protect themselves from inter-clan raiding. By incorporating their defensive features, such as the corner towers for enfilade fire, the Ordnance Office was adapting to the differences and requirements of Highland Scotland, using architecture with proven success rates against Highland tactics, essentially creating four Z-plan tower houses. Ruthven, Bernera at Glenelg, Inversnaid on the north bank of Loch Lomond in Stirlingshire and Kiliwhimen at the south end of Loch Ness were

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designed as two three-storied barrack blocks, forming two sides of the outside wall. The barrack block’s end walls were linked to form a defensive wall with narrow banquets,\textsuperscript{36} surrounding an enclosure for a small drill ground. Each barrack was designed to contain an internally located well and two latrines, one for officers and one for other ranks.\textsuperscript{37} Funding constraints reduced the original plans for a tower at each corner to provide complete enfilade fire to the entrance and sally-ports, to two on each of diagonally opposite corners. These towers doubled as guard rooms, store rooms, bake- and brew-houses and the officers’ quarters.\textsuperscript{38} Building work was slow on each of the sites; for example, building at Bernera lasted from May 1720 to April 1723.\textsuperscript{39} Delays were caused as policing Jacobite activity was prioritised above construction, by the precautions needed after the kidnap of masons and quarrymen from Inversnaid in 1718, by disputes over design, and the prevarications of Sir Patrick Strachan, Barrack-Master General of North Britain.\textsuperscript{40}

Though construction had only recently finished on Kiliwhimen, and plans were in hand to build an extended version, Wade’s radical suggestion to instead build a larger fort closer to the shore of Loch Ness was duly followed. Work began in 1729 and Wade named it Fort Augustus for the young Duke of Cumberland.\textsuperscript{41} Again, construction had just finished when the destruction of a bastion during the Jacobite siege forced the Fort’s

\textsuperscript{36} A banquette was a platform behind a parapet from which soldiers could keep look out or fire downwards. See Glossary.
\textsuperscript{37} Scanned copies of the Ordnance Office design plans for the fortified barracks, as well as Fort William, Fort Augustus and Fort George (Inverness) and at Ardersier can be found on: http://maps.nls.uk/military/index.html
\textsuperscript{38} NLS MS.1648 Z.03/20a, Ruthven of Badenoch, undated; MS.1648 Z.03/20b, Ruthven of Badenoch, undated; Donet, British Barracks, p.21 and Tabraham and Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.65.
\textsuperscript{39} Tabraham and Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.62.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid, p.61-2.
\textsuperscript{41} Donet, British Barracks, p.21 and Tabraham and Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.79.
surrender in March 1746, after which the Jacobites used nineteen barrels of powder to render it useless, though some rooms, cellars, stables were still sound afterwards.42

In the aftermath of the ‘45, improvements were ordered to Fort Augustus and Fort George, the latter of which had surrendered after a Jacobite siege of two days in February 1746 when its walls were breached.43 Fort Augustus was quickly finished as only necessary repairs were made, the barracks at Kiliwhimen continued to be used as extra barrack space and the powder magazine remained in its original, vulnerable position in one of the four bastions.44 However, the severe damage at the old site of Fort George instigated a move to Ardersier on the triangular spit into the Moray Firth, nine miles from Inverness.45 Building for both began with the bomb-proof, vaulted casements within the ramparts, as had been used at Stirling in 1708, providing extra storage and barracks.46 While Fort Augustus was considered “rather…as a neat barrack then a fortification”47 the new Fort George at Ardersier was “the most considerable fortress and best situated in Great Britain.”48

Of two suggested designs for Fort George at Ardersier, General William Skinner’s plan won over that of another Ordnance Office engineer, Major Lewis Marcell. Begun in 1747, this design was, unusually, faithfully followed to completion twenty-two

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45 Saunders, Fortress Britain, p.110.
46 Tabraham and Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.49-50 and Donet, British Barracks, p.23.
47 Dunbar, Sir William Burrell’s Northern Tour, p.95.
48 Lieutenant-General James Wolfe, 1747, quoted in Tabraham and Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.94.
years later.\textsuperscript{49} Following the shape of the spit, the fort had bastioned curtain walls with a large sea battery at the tip. The landward facing defences were concentrated on the narrow neck of the spit, featuring two bastions, a ravelin, and a covered way with a batardeau flood-sluice.\textsuperscript{50} Other ranks, officers and gunners were barracked separately, as were the governor and lieutenant-governor.\textsuperscript{51} Beyond the necessary military structures, such as the grand magazine, a casement gun battery overlooking the Moray Firth, ordnance and provision stores, and the barracks, additional structures were built, including workshops, houses for the garrison staff and a chapel.\textsuperscript{52} With a capacity of 1,600 men when finished in 1769, with additional transient troops, garrison staff, fort officials, wives and families, Fort George at Ardersier was ‘home’ for 2,000, a community approximately a quarter of the size of Inverness.\textsuperscript{53}

The building work was again contracted out to the Adams family, the sons replacing the father on his death in 1748.\textsuperscript{54} Costs and delays were reduced by using local quarries and timber, and buying metalwork and tools locally. These were transported by sea, so a harbour was one of the first things constructed.\textsuperscript{55} The work force numbered in the thousands, provided by both private contract and from regiments seconded from Ireland and the Scottish Lowlands. For example, Barrell’s regiment was detailed “to

\textsuperscript{50} The Batardeau were dams within a ditch that formed part of a fortifications defences. When the \textit{écusse de chasse} and \textit{écusse de fuite} – sluices – were released, water either flooded or drained the ditch. See Glossary. Donet, \textit{British Barracks}, p.43; Saunders, \textit{Fortress Britain}, p.111 and Meldrum, \textit{From Nairn to Loch Ness}, p.24.
\textsuperscript{51} Donet, \textit{British Barracks}, p.44.
\textsuperscript{52} Tabraham and Grove, \textit{Fortress Scotland}, p.97-8 and Donet, \textit{British Barracks}, p.44.
\textsuperscript{54} Tabraham and Grove, \textit{Fortress Scotland}, p.95.
\textsuperscript{55} \textit{Ibid}, p.95, 96.
carry on the fortifications at Ardersier Point” in 1749.\textsuperscript{56} This followed the same principle as those solders who worked on Scotland’s military roads.

\textbf{The location, purpose and strength of fortifications}

The persistent problem of Jacobite activity and the conduct of Highland chiefs and their clans meant that maintaining a military presence was a priority for the government. Geography, therefore, played a large part of the decision making process in where to locate fortifications. At its most basic level, this determined the location of Stirling and Edinburgh castles atop natural rock formations, and Ruthven barracks used an existing motte from a medieval castle. Similarly, the natural fault line that caused the Great Glen was of strategic significance for ease of movement and access to the east and west coasts, as instanced in the Interregnum by the placement of citadels at Inverlochy and Inverness. Consequently, Forts William and George were constructed in those localities, if not on the same site in Fort George’s case. In 1690, 1719 and 1745-6, troops garrisoned at the repaired Inverness Castle, later to become Fort George, benefited from fast deployment because of Inverness’s geographical position.\textsuperscript{57}

Kiliwhimen\textsuperscript{58} and, later, Fort Augustus were built as a link in the chain of forts along the Great Glen.\textsuperscript{59} They occupied the same location mid-way up the Great Glen, the former as barracks and the latter as a fort, both using their central location to serve as


\textsuperscript{57} MacIntoch, \textit{A History of Inverness}, p.114-5 and M.W. Grant, \textit{The Parish of Golspie in the Shire of Sutherland, 850 to 1850 AD} (hand typed, 1977), p.47.

\textsuperscript{58} Also spelt as Kilicumein and Killichuimen, I shall use Kiliwhimen as this is the commonest spelling.

\textsuperscript{59} Forts William, Augustus and George, running west to east up the Great Glen, shall be referred to collectively as the Great Glen forts.
headquarters of the three other fortified barracks and the outposts that policed Scotland. Kiliwhimen was the largest of the fortified barracks for that very purpose and Cumberland transferred his army to Fort Augustus in May 1746 “from which he could control the Highlands as the hub of a wheel controls the spokes and rim”\(^{60}\) when he began a new strategy towards the remaining rebels as it provided an ideal central base to co-ordinate searches for those that remained in arms.\(^{61}\)

The relative loyalty of a locality was also an important factor in the placement of fortifications. Inversnaid was built on land confiscated from Rob Roy MacGregor, while Kiliwhimen and Fort Augustus were built on Fraser of Lovat land, the chief of which, the 11\(^{th}\) Lord Lovat, had loyalties and motivations known only to himself.\(^{62}\) Similarly, General Mackay declared Lochaber and the south end of the Great Glen a “cradle for a rising”, leading him to instigate the construction of a new fort that became Fort William in 1690.\(^{63}\)

Fortifications were also located to control and protect strategically important routes. Stirling Castle’s location, controlling the largest pass, and therefore the main access route between the Lowlands and the Highlands, gave it great military significance. Such access could make or break a military campaign. For example, when in October 1715 Mar wanted to move south and link up with the Lowland Jacobite forces, he was

\(^{60}\) Prebble, \textit{Culloden}, p.164.
\(^{62}\) For more on Lord Lovat, see Chapter Three: The Scottish Soldier and the State, in sub-section ‘Trimmers’.
unable to do so because Argyll held Stirling Castle with a force of 3,000.64 The British government and Ordnance Office were aware of the benefits of controlling natural access routes, whether pass, river or coastline. Fort Augustus’s location mid-way up the Great Glen provided a safe stopping point and protection on the main route between Forts William and George. Inversnaid was located to protect the Dumbarton to Atholl road in Stirlingshire while Bernera was positioned on the loyal lands of clan MacLeod in Glenelg in order to protect the sea crossing from the Sound of Sleat to the Isle of Skye. Additionally, it provided a military presence near the disaffected Mackenzie clan led by the Catholic and Jacobite 5th Earl of Seaforth.65 Aberdeen provided accommodation to those guarding the coastline and port against smugglers and Blackness acted as protection for the Firth of Forth, and was sufficiently important that Argyll took the time in the midst of rebellion to recommend a Mr Napier to be its lieutenant in November 1715.66 After the ’45, this strategy of protection continued with the additional purchase by the Ordnance Office of Castle Stalker, Dunstaffnage and Taybridge. The former two added links to the chain of the Great Glen forts, and the latter guarded the key route from Stirling to Inverness.67

In addition to fixing a general location, the precise orientation and situation of fortifications was important. Part of General Wade’s task on inspecting the defence of Scotland in 1724 was the situation of the forts and garrisons. He was unimpressed: “It is to be wished that during the Reign of Your Majesty and Your Successors, no

65 Tabraham and Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.61.
66 Houlding, Fit for Service, p.34 and TNA SP54/10/32A, James Cockburn to Mr Pringle, Camp at Stirling, 8th November 1715.
Insurrections may ever happen to experience whether the [four fortified] Barracks will effectively answer the end proposed."68 He judged Kiliwhimen too far from Loch Ness, and moved the site of the future Fort Augustus closer to the loch edge to provide extra defence and ease of relief in case of siege.69 Similarly, Wade rejected the site of Cromwell’s old citadel at Inverness as strategically unsound, and continued to use the site of the old medieval castle for Fort George. This, however, proved a mistake as the site’s foundations rested on loose gravel that made construction difficult and caused Fort George’s surrender in February 1746 as it allowed the easy undermining of its bastion by the Jacobites.70 Fort George’s topographical position was also questionable in an age of artillery, as Sir William Burrell observed in 1758: “Its situation made it untenable against canon (being commanded by a rising ground in front) and like the other 2 forts must be rather intended as a checque upon the turbulency of its highland neighbours than expected to stand a siege.”71 Consequently, the new Fort George was built at Ardersier, a natural spit of land into the Moray Firth nine miles from Inverness.72 This provided ideal natural defences on three sides, which improved its resistance to potential siege and reduced building costs.

When deciding where to build and improve, the Ordnance Office, working on behalf of the government, was reliant for advice from those in Scotland. Garrison storekeepers were charged with regularly reporting on garrison maintenance. However, as pluralism within Ordnance Office roles was common, especially amongst storekeepers

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68 Tabraham and Grove, *Fortress Scotland*, p.65.
69 Ibid., p.70, 78.
72 Saunders, *Fortress Britain*, p.110.
who were usually influential local merchants, regular reports were rare. Intelligence was often sought from garrison governors, as in a survey of Fort William’s outposts requested in June 1715. This too was an erratic method, as garrison staffs were usually under-manned and over-worked. Recommendations also came from a wide range of Scottish gentry, politicians and military men, but this too could be erratic and unreliable, depending on the source. Argyll, as Commander-in-Chief of the forces in North Britain, and Adam Brown, the Provost of Edinburgh, both acted in their official capacities as government officials when they recommended improvements to fortifications to consecutive Secretaries of State. The 1746 recommendations made by the 3rd Earl of Breadalbane represented an attempt to make amends for a father and grandfather’s Jacobitism. Duncan Forbes of Culloden, Lord President of the Court of Session, as chief legal advisor to London and a trusted government official, used personal knowledge of the Highlands to recommend locations for proposed ports and to report on the peacefulness of the country. Similarly, the 12th Earl of Glencairn’s advice regarding repairs to Dumbarton Castle in August 1715 represented the counsel of a reliable Whig Scottish peer, while the memorials of the 11th Lord Lovat were nearly always an attempt to gain the favour of the government and further appointments for himself. Lovat’s

74 NAS GD220/5/568/1 Robert Pollock to [Duke of Montrose], Fort William, 7th June 1715.
75 TNA SP54/4/9, [Adam Brown to 1st Earl Dartmouth], Edinburgh, January 1711 and SP54/9/2A, 2nd Duke of Argyll to 1st Earl Stanhope, Camp at Stirling, 1st October 1715.
76 NAS GD112/47/1/6, 3rd Earl of Breadalbane [1746]; “A Number of small Redoubts garrison’d by 30 or 40 men erected at the principall Bridges and Passes would protect Magazines, preserve the Communicaion and prevent any Provisons going into those Countreys without the Government’s Permission. The principle Bridges are Sterling, Tay Bridge, Kinnachan bridge over the Tunmel, Spay Bridge near Garremore, High Bridge, and the Bridge at the head of Loch Tyne.”
involvement with the government shows that even those with allegiances elsewhere attempted to gain favour with the crown during periods of peace and Jacobite inactivity.  

Occasionally, the defence of Scotland was considered sufficiently important to warrant a general survey, though they were usually in reaction to successful Jacobite actions in Scotland. The succession of James Edward, a younger and more active man than his father, which brought hope to the Jacobite cause, and the ongoing War of the Spanish Succession, in which Louis XIV could back a Jacobite invasion to distract British forces from the continental campaign, led to the commission of a military survey in 1703. Similarly, the unsuccessful Franco-Jacobite invasion attempt of 1708 triggered another military survey under Anne and another was conducted after the 1719 invasion and brief rebellion. Including the survey conducted in 1724, mentioned later, the government commissioned four military surveys in twenty-one years, suggesting a high interest in the defence of Scotland. However, of these, nothing recommended by the 1703 survey had been realised at Anne’s death and the 1719 survey had limited practical effect on Scotland as interest in implementing it lessened once the threat of the invasion ended. This low level of London’s interest was due to many reasons; disinterest in domestic military affairs, distractions from abroad, the Tory focus on ‘blue water policy’ and a dislike of spending money on the army – both for the survey and to implement its recommendations. However, in 1724 General Wade was dispatched to Scotland to

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80 Tomlinson, ‘The Ordnance Office and the King’s Forts’, p.11 and MacIvor, Edinburgh Castle, p.92.
conduct a survey into Scotland’s defences in a rare example of action triggered by another source than a Jacobite attack. The trigger on this occasion was a combination of George I’s greater interest in military matters and the submission of Lovat’s *Memorial concerning the State of the Highlands*, which warned of the lack of military provision to counter disaffected clans. On the basis on Wade’s reported findings from his survey, he was made Commander-in-Chief of the Forces in North Britain, given £10,000 (Sterling) and commissioned to complete a two-year programme of rebuilding, repairs and improvements to Scotland’s fortifications, which were to have a significant impact on the British army’s presence there.81

The majority of repairs, improvements and re-building were also triggered by Jacobite activity. Improvements were ordered to Edinburgh and Stirling castles and Fort William on the basis of the 1708 survey, where the wooden huts built in 1690 were finally replaced with stone structures. However, building speed slowed considerably once the invasion threat had passed.82 It was the size and near success of the ’15 rebellion, the ease of Jacobite recruitment and public support for them, that finally shocked the government into greater action.83 A desire to improve the army’s response to a rebellion was combined with the slowly changing attitude to standing armies after the victories of the War of the Spanish Succession. This helped improve soldiers’ reputation and meant that, as well as additional barracks being built at Inverness and Berwick,

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82 Tabraham and Grove, *Fortress Scotland*, p.46, 50.
83 Szechi, *1715*, p.70, 73.
purpose-built barracks were ordered for the first time on mainland Britain.\textsuperscript{84} Ruthven, Bernera, Kiliwhimen and Inversnaid were commissioned in 1717 as a direct result of the ’15 rebellion to provide a base in the Highlands that would allow quicker deployment of troops during times of trouble and to better police the rebellious element of the Scottish population.

The Spanish-backed invasion attempt of 1719 again turned the government’s attention to Scotland’s defence. However, the defeat of the Jacobites at Glenshiel in June immediately lessened this, and the only effect was the symbolically significant removal of the last vestiges of the royal chambers in Edinburgh Castle and their conversion for use as barracks and magazines.\textsuperscript{85} Unusually, the government was prepared to act decisively and extensively when it received Lovat’s\textit{ Memorial} in 1724 because of a fear that the increased tension felt in the Highlands in the 1720s was a pre-cursor to another rebellion.\textsuperscript{86} Consequently, the works done under Wade were on a larger scale and more expensive than ever before. Evidently happy with the defensive capabilities of Scotland following Wade’s building scheme, very little building work was done until the ’45. However, shock and embarrassment that Fort George, Fort Augustus, Ruthven, Inversnaid, Kiliwhimen and Bernera could fall to “Barbarians”\textsuperscript{87} and “Highland

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\textsuperscript{85} MacIvor, \textit{Edinburgh Castle}, p.92.
\textsuperscript{86} Taylor, \textit{The Military Roads}, p.16.
\end{small}
Banditti”88 again triggered a survey under the authority of the Earl of Albermarle, Commander-in-Chief of the Forces in North Britain after Cumberland’s departure in July 1746.89 Repairs and improvements were made elsewhere, such as the barrack block built at Edinburgh Castle in 1755. However, the increasing size of the British army and a growing tolerance of standing armies allowed the creation of a true statement of military presence and administrative control in Fort George at Ardersier.90 Even there, where the full principles of Vauban-inspired design were used, the threat, in 1759, of a Franco-Jacobite invasion caused London to deploy an additional artillery company to Ardersier. This scare also prompted General Skinner, Chief Engineer in North Britain, to re-assess the fort’s defensibility from the sea.91

Whether castle, fort or purpose-built barrack, a major role of fortifications in Scotland was to quarter soldiers, both as a permanent garrison and temporarily in times of trouble. The fortified barracks’ sole purpose was barracking, space only being provided for activities that would make them self-sufficient in an emergency, such as bake and brew houses. The few additions to Stirling Castle in 1708 and 1715 were all aimed at increasing its capacity.92 Inverness Castle’s barracks commissioned in 1716 were designed to hold an additional 500 men93 while £7,000 (Sterling) was spent on improving

88 J. Ray, A complete history of the rebellion, from its first rise, in 1745, to its total suppression at the glorious battle of Culloden, in April, 1746. By James Ray, of Whitehaven, a Volunteer under His Royal Highness the D. of Cumberland (Bristol, 1752), p.382.
89 Prebble, Culloden, p.219.
90 Ross, Scottish Castles, p.165.
92 TNA SP54/10/18A, Argyll to Townsend, Camp at Stirling, 4th November 1715; SP54/10/18B, List entitled ‘At the Duke of Argylls arrivall at Stirling, 18th September 1715, encamped…’ and Tabraham and D. Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.50.
93 Donet, British Barracks, p.21.
Edinburgh Castle’s ability to quarter men during emergencies between 1727 and 1728. This desire continued despite the apparent defeat of the Jacobites in 1746, resulting in another accommodation block at Edinburgh Castle in 1755. To ensure an effective presence of men needed for policing and responding to disaffection, Berwick, the four fortified barracks and the Great Glen forts were indispensable as secure accommodation. Demand was such that, despite the addition of barracks at Berwick that could house 600 men and thirty-six officers in 1717, and another for a further 600 men in 1721, they were almost immediately over crowded; hence the addition of the ‘Clock Block’ in 1740, as well as the use of a nearby house as a hospital, to free space in the main barracks for more men. These alterations were fortuitously timed, as Berwick was soon under pressure as a staging post, as Hanoverian troops were mobilized and transported to Scotland to counter the ’45.

Stirling and Inverness castles were important bases for administration and military co-ordination. Their position, guarding the entrance to the Highlands, allowed them to assist the British army in monitoring and policing the Highlands. In 1691, for example, troops were deployed from Inverness to prevent religious violence when Episcopalians attempted to bar the entry of Presbyterian ministers to their churches. Indeed, in 1719, William Gordon, Lord Strathnaver, son of the 16th Earl of Sutherland, experienced the same advantage of fast and ready deployment when he rode out from Inverness to help

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95 Ross, Scottish Castles, p.165 and Tabraham and Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.106.
97 MacIntoch, A History of Inverness, p.115.
defend the Highlands against the Spanish-backed invasion fleet.98 The garrison at
Inverness Castle also served to monitor the dubious loyalty of Inverness town. This
‘capital of the Highlands’ did not always favour the government in the south. The
proclamation of the Hanoverian succession was jeered in the streets, and when those who
celebrated it put candles in their windows, the local magistrates encouraged them to be
broken.99 In a similar vein, Fort William was tasked to police the surrounding disaffected
area, providing a base of operations. It was from here that troops were deployed to take
part in the Glencoe Massacre on 13th February 1692.100 Twenty-two years later, in 1714,
the garrison of Fort William included forty-eight men stationed on Mull to watch the
MacLeans, a detachment at Eilean Donan Castle to watch the Mackenzies, and another
barracked at Invergarry Castle to watch the MacDonalds.101 The creation of the four
fortified barracks following the ’15 was also to provide self-contained outposts that could
afford the government troops a quicker, more localised response to unrest. Fort William,
co-ordinating with Blair Castle, Ruthven, Bernera and Inversnaid, became a key base
from which the Independent Highland Companies could direct disarming the Highlanders
according to the Disarming Acts following the ’15 and ’45.102

Fort Augustus’s capacity to house soldiers and supplies, and its location in the
centre of the Great Glen, aided the British army as a forward operating base, easing
communications, transport and deployment times. These factors were important enough

98 Grant, The Parish of Golspie, p.47.
100 J.L. Roberts, Clan, King and Covenant: History of the Highland Clans from the Civil War to the
101 Tabraham and Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.53.
102 Taylor, The Military Roads, p.27.
that the ruinous state of the fort after the ’45 was of little consequence, and it still functioned as the army’s headquarters from which Cumberland organised the hunt for rebels still under arms.103 Similarly, the location of Fort George, and the castle and citadel in Inverness, with access to the sea via the River Ness for re-supply, reinforcement or retreat, provided an ideal base for the Hanoverian forces. The value of Fort George’s location was demonstrated in its use by General Sir John Cope’s army in late August 1745, when Cope decided to return to Edinburgh rather than face the Jacobite army at Corrieyairack Pass and so retreated to Fort George in order to return by ship.104 The appointment of Major Caulfeild as lieutenant-governor of Fort George at Ardersier in 1747 suggests that the fort was intended to provide the dual purpose of both barracks and an administrative base for the ongoing road and bridge building schemes.105

The larger forts and castles also became prisons as the need demanded. After the Jacobite invasion attempts and rebellions of 1708, the ’15 and ’45, many of the captured Jacobite leaders and men were held in Edinburgh and Stirling castles. Edinburgh continued to hold Jacobite suspects until 1753.106 In 1715 and 1716, the 261 prisoners held at Edinburgh were a great financial burden on the castle, its officers even contributing to their upkeep. Mar still took the opportunity to complain to Argyll in October 1715 about the condition gentlemen prisoners were kept in and to offer to pay

103 Prebble, Culloden, p.182.
106 MacIvor, Edinburgh Castle, p.89, 92, 96; TNA SP54/3/10, Report from Richard Dowdeswell, Excise Officer, Edinburgh, 30th March 1708; SP54/3/12, Richard Dowdeswell to unknown [addressed to Whitehall], 6th April 1708; SP54/3/16, Richard Dowdeswell to unknown, 24th April 1708; SP54/3/21, Richard Dowdeswell to George Tilson, 8th May 1708; SP54/11/168C, Petition from fourteen men held prisoner in Edinburgh and Stirling Castles [1716]; SP54/8/113, James Cockburne to Mr Pringle, Camp at Stirling, 28th September 1715; SP54/26/50, William Sn[illegible] to John Brown, undated [1745] and SP54/27/9, General Hawley to unknown, Edinburgh, 7th January 1745/6.
for their maintenance. Though not strictly allowed until the mid-eighteenth century, Edinburgh Castle also held petty criminals when the city gaols were full. In 1752, Lieutenant-Governor Richard Coren complained officers were forced to sleep two to a bed in order to make room for prisoners.

Military installations also fulfilled roles within the local community. In 1690 Colonel Hill was named tenant-in-chief with responsibility for managing the trade rights of Maryburgh, the town outside Fort William, as well as being governor of the fort, while the governor of Berwick was also the governor of the town in 1700. On the one hand, this allowed for greater integration of a garrison into local life, but on the other, it could be resented. Colonel Hill, for example, faced local opposition over the appointment, which was traditionally awarded to local gentry. In a similar manner, Colonel Blackader, was JP for Stirling town as well as lieutenant-governor of Stirling Castle between 1719 and 1729, a dual role that allowed him to take responsibility for the moral welfare of both his soldiers and the local community. The simultaneous appointment of Major Caulfeild as deputy-governor of Inverness Castle and JP of all areas covered by

108 Maclvor, Edinburgh Castle, p.92, 96.
110 GUARD (Glasgow University Archaeological Research Division), Fort William and Inverlochy Archaeological Project (Historic Conflict in the Highlands), data structure report. Project 2348 (Glasgow, 2007), p.10-1.
111 A. Crichton, The Life and Diary of Lt. Col. J. Blackader (London, 1824), p.506-7, 508, 514-6, 533-5, 536. This was discussed further in sub-section ‘Stalwarts’ of Chapter Three: The Scottish Soldier and the British State.
the Disarming Act of 1724 suggests a clear agenda to ensure military personnel would have some control over the application of militarily significant legislation.112

According to official records of pay, Edinburgh and Stirling castles’ garrison staff in 1708 consisted of the governor was supported by a deputy, major, surgeon, chaplain, storekeeper and his deputy, master gunner, gunsmith and around six gunners (three at Stirling), two lieutenants, two ensigns, five sergeants (six at Stirling), six corporals (eight at Stirling), four drummers, two porters and around 200 men.113

These numbers fluctuated during times of action, which, in the eighteenth century was to counter Jacobite activity. During the ’15, re-allocation of manpower left Edinburgh’s garrison strength at twenty, while, in the same month, the government forces encampment at Stirling added three regiments of foot, two regiments of dragoons and two regiments of fusiliers to their strength.114 However by 1745, the permanent cadre of officers and other ranks at Edinburgh of ensigns, sergeants, corporals and drummers had been reduced by approximately half, a pattern continued in 1746 with the loss of two lieutenants and two sergeants. More significantly, the number of gunners had been

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113 TNA WO25/3206, ‘Explanation of changes in the establishment of Garrisons’ 1684-1833 and WO24/25, ‘Establishment of the Pay of Our Standing Forces and Garrison in Our Ancient Kingdom of Scotland at 336 Days of the Year commencing the [blank] Day of 170[blank] in the 12 Year of Our Reign’ ‘Given at our Court at Kensington the 24th Day of June 1701 and of Our Reign the 13th Year’.
114 TNA SP54/8/121, unknown to unknown, Edinburgh, 30th September 1715 and SP 54/10/18B, List entitled ‘At the Duke of Argylls arrivall at Stirling, 18th September 1715, encamped…’
reduced by three and the soldiers only numbered 100.115 Stirling too lost one ensign, two sergeants, and half its corporals, drummers and sentinels.116

The Great Glen forts had similar complements of garrison staff officers to each other: deputy governor, a chaplain, a surgeon and surgeon’s mate, a marshal, storekeeper, master gunner and two gunners and two matrosses.117 All were allotted money for fire, candles, blankets and coverings, in line with the fortifications throughout Britain and the colonies. Fort William’s governor between 1733 and 1748 was also governor of Forts Augustus and George, while its surgeon also treated those stationed at the four fortified garrisons. Additionally, Fort William possessed a smith, a wright and their respective servants. Forts William and Augustus also had funds for a frigate, or “Galley”, and boats for use on the lochs and rivers nearby.118

117 The rank below gunners in the artillery train. See Glossary.
In addition to the permanent cadre of garrison staff, soldiers were also barracked within these fortifications. In 1701 and 1715, Fort William contained two regiments. Fort Augustus contained five companies of 300 men. In 1727, Fort George could house six companies totalling around 1,000 soldiers. One explanation for the surprisingly large number of men expected to barrack within such fortifications, is that the number represents those allocated to the administration of that garrison, not those required to sleep within it. In 1704, detachments from Fort William were billeted at outposts and with local gentry, while in 1729 both Kiliwhimen and Fort Augustus were used simultaneously, even after the latter’s construction, as also occurred at the citadel and Fort George in Inverness between 1745 and 1746. Fort George at Ardersier considerably increased the local military presence with a capacity for two regiments of foot of 1,600 men, plus gunners (permanent and transitory), staff and fort officials.

Berwick, a structure of similar size to a fort, had a similar staff. In 1700 this included a governor, a lieutenant-governor, a town major and a town adjutant, one master gunner and three gunners. The garrison also benefited from a surgeon, a chaplain, a

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119 TNA WO24/25, ‘Establishment of the Pay of Our Standing Forces and Garrison in Our Ancient Kingdom of Scotland at 336 Days of the Year commencing the [blank] Day of 170[blank] in the 12 Year of Our Reign’ Given at our Court at Kensington the 24th Day of June 1701 and of Our Reign the 13th Year’ and NAS GD220/5/568/1, Sir Robert Pollock to the Duke of Montrose, Fort William, 7th June 1715.
120 Tabraham and Grove, *Fortress Scotland*, p.81.
122 TNA SP54/6/41, Petition of Sir Alexander MacDonald of Glengary [1714]; M. MacIntoch, *A History of Inverness. Being a narrative of the historical events, mainly military, concerning the town and round about, from the earliest times until the early Victorian period* (Inverness, 1939), p.119; WO24/233 and WO24/246, which reveal allocation of candle at both sites in Inverness.
turnkey and a storekeeper.\textsuperscript{124} Between 1700 and 1740 the military presence at Berwick grew from one company, including a lieutenant, one ensign, two sergeants, three corporals, one drummer and fifty soldiers, to the equivalent of two regiments.\textsuperscript{125} The barracks added to Berwick in 1717, 1721 and 1740 reflected the changing size and increased use of the army domestically. The four fortified barracks also reflected this trend. They slept a total of 840 soldiers; 120 men each at Inversnaid and Ruthven, 240 men at Bernera and 360 men at Kiliwhimen.\textsuperscript{126} However, each also suffered periods of overcrowding and, conversely, periods when they were insufficiently manned. This, as Wade had predicted, left them vulnerable during the ’45.\textsuperscript{127} Inversnaid, Kiliwhimen and Ruthven all fell to the Jacobites.\textsuperscript{128} When Ruthven fell to its second Jacobite siege on 9th February 1746 the garrison consisted of Sergeant Molloy, one corporal and twelve privates.\textsuperscript{129}

Road building

Prior to the construction of the military road network of the eighteenth century, roads in Scotland were either drovers’ routes or medieval tracks that existed primarily in the Lowlands.\textsuperscript{130} A 1669 Act attempted to improve the road system, but with mixed success. Commissioners of Supply were permitted to tax landowners and could order

\textsuperscript{124} TNA WO25/3206, ‘Explanation of changes in the establishment of Garrisons’ 1684-1833.
\textsuperscript{126} Tabraham and D. Grove, \textit{Fortress Scotland}, p.64 and Donet, \textit{British Barracks}, p.21-2.
\textsuperscript{127} Tabraham and D. Grove, \textit{Fortress Scotland}, p.65.
\textsuperscript{128} Kiliwhimen fell in March 1746, Inversnaid in August 1745, see TNA SP54/26/3A, Robert Craigie to [Marquess of Tweeddale], Edinburgh, 3\textsuperscript{rd} September 1745. Duffy, \textit{The ’45}, p.123, 210, 451 and Tabraham and Grove, \textit{Fortress Scotland}, p.89.
\textsuperscript{129} Duffy, \textit{The ’45}, p.443.
\textsuperscript{130} Meldrum, \textit{From Nairn to Loch Ness}, p.11.
local tenants to give six days work per year for road and bridge maintenance. However, success relied on the cooperation of the local community, most of whom were reluctant if they derived no personal gain from the work. Another option was to apply to the General Officer Commanding for the use of soldiers as labourers, a policy that was widely adopted in the eighteenth century.

In July 1724, the government sent Major-General George Wade to Scotland to report on its loyalty and defensibility. This was in reaction to the Jacobite risings of 1715 and 1719, the boost given to the Jacobite cause at the birth of two male heirs to James Stuart in the 1720s, and the arrival of Lord Lovat’s 1724 *Memorial* warning of the Highlands’ lawlessness. In December 1724 Wade confirmed the government’s fears and recommended the building of fortifications and the re-establishment of the Independent Highland Companies for policing duties. He also mentioned “the great Disadvantages Regular Troops are under when they engage with those who Inhabit Mountainous Situations…The Highlands of Scotland are still more impracticable from the want of Roads and Bridges.” Wade was made Commander-in-Chief, a post he held from 1724 to 1740, on the basis of this report, and his background witnessing the problems of transportation in the hilly landscape of Minorca during a deployment in 1708. Wade was joined by Major William Caulfeild in 1732, after he requested in 1725 that “a sum be

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provided annually for making the roads of communication; and a salary for the person employed as Inspector for carrying on so necessary work.”136 It is another measure of London’s inconsistent interest in Scotland that it took seven years for Wade’s request for an inspector to be fulfilled. Caulfeild remained Inspector of Roads from 1732 to his death in 1767, firstly assisting Wade in the road-making process and then replacing him from 1740 to 1767 when Wade left Scotland.137

The usual pattern of road building followed the seasons; mapping and planning occurred during the summer, with building occurring between April and October when the weather was most suitable. Roads were built to a standard design of sixteen feet wide, though this varied according to geographical circumstance, and as straight as possible. Therefore, like the Romans – a fact not lost on classically educated officers – roads ran over mountains rather than diverting around them. A foundation layer of larger stones (with a timber underlay, if the area was marshy) was then covered by a layer of smaller stones and a final top layer of larger stones and gravel around two feet thick. These were then beaten down by hand and by the wagons transporting material to the next stage of the road.138

As civilians remained reluctant to lose time from their employment to build roads, the usual practice was to use soldiers. At Wade’s insistence, soldiers received double pay

137 Ibid., p.13, 24.
for this, as a reward for the extra duty.\textsuperscript{139} Additionally, on completion of a road, soldiers were rewarded with “bonfires, roasts and good beverages.”\textsuperscript{140} Around 500 men were used per season, living in huts, encampments or, especially in the south-west where cooperation was greater, in billets in the local area.\textsuperscript{141} Materials, wagons and horses could be ‘impressed’ from the local people, though this was a power in principle that could not be used to its full as the army was dependent on the good will of the local communities for billeting, tax for maintenance of roads and for occasional labour. Raw materials were often taken from the locality, landowners providing little objection to this until the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{142} In fact, repairs to Fort William in 1715 were speeded up because the Ordnance Office engineers could help themselves to stone from nearby quarries.\textsuperscript{143} Each work party was issued with shovels, pickaxes, spades, iron crowbars and powder to blow up larger boulders.\textsuperscript{144} As little trouble was expected, they were not issued with much ammunition. However this occasionally left soldiers vulnerable. On 1\textsuperscript{st} September 1745 it was reported that rebels “have this last night seised and Made Prisoners all the Men Who Were Working upon the Roads here [near Inversnaid and Dumbarton Castle] About 19 of them within a few Miles of this House.”\textsuperscript{145}

\textsuperscript{140} McCall, Routes, Roads, Regiments and Rebellions, p.58.
\textsuperscript{142} Taylor, The Military Roads, p.34, 35.
\textsuperscript{143} TNA SP54/10/123, William Pollock to [Townsend], Fort William, 11\textsuperscript{th} December 1715.
\textsuperscript{144} McCall, Routes, Roads, Regiments and Rebellions, p.22.
\textsuperscript{145} Taylor, The Military Roads, p.34; TNA SP54/26/2B, Copy of letter from Mr James Smollet, Advocate, to [Robert Craigie] Lord Advocate, Bonhill, [1\textsuperscript{st} September 1745]; SP54/26/2D, Testimonial witnessed by Robert Craigie Esq Advocate, signed by John Chisholm [2\textsuperscript{nd} September 1745] and SP54/26/3A, Robert Craigie to [Marquess of Tweeddale] Edinburgh, 3 September 1745.
The Great Glen road was the first to be built, linking Fort William to Fort Augustus in 1725, which was then extended to Inverness in 1726. The road from Dunkeld to Inverness followed between 1727 and 1730, then from Crieff to Dalnacardoch in 1730 and 1731, which linked Stirling and Inverness. From 1731 to 1732 Fort Augustus and Dalwhinnie were linked, as were Catcleugh and Ruthven between 1725 and 1732.\(^{146}\) No new roads were intended after 1736, only continuous repairs and improvements. As the first road to be built and therefore the pilot for the project, the Great Glen road was in need of repair within six years of construction. This was quite a success given the harsh climate and weather of the Highlands. Repairs to the Stirling to Crieff road occurred between 1740 and 1745 and a new road was started between Dumbarton to Inveraray. This was not finished until 1750, possibly as it was of lesser importance as it lacked serious military significance. As General Bland complained to Caulfeild in September 1749 “…I have great reason to believe the Ministry will soon grow tired of them [roads], Particularly the Inverara Road, which is of no other use to the Country but for the Ease of a certain great man [Islay]”\(^ {147}\).

In reaction to the ’45, the road network was extended. Three new roads were built linking Dumbarton to the Western Isles, Stirling to Fort William and from the site of the future Fort George at Ardersier to Blairgowrie. An order of 1748 commanded that all regiments at Stirling and Edinburgh except Guise’s were to be used in road building. A year later, 1,350 soldiers were ordered to work on building roads; 300 each from Guise’s, the Royal Welch Fusiliers, Pultney’s, Sackville’s and 150 from Ancrum’s. In addition,

eighty men from various regiments were to be seconded for maintenance duty. Six further roads were also authorised. The first linked Coupar Angus to Fort George at Ardersier in 1750, while the second and third linking Dalmally to Bonawe and Tarbet to Crianlarich, were both begun in 1751. Roads linking Bernera to Fort Augustus, and Inverary to Tyndrum were begun in 1755 and 1758, while the 1760s saw the addition of roads in Galloway. As the eighteenth century progressed, building procedure formalised. Whether this was Caulfeild’s leadership or the effect of wider formalisation of army procedures and structures or both, by 1754 working parties had standing orders, and in 1751 orders were issued to ensure the other ranks remembered to salute officers when on road building duty. A soldier’s primary role was never forgotten, however, as soldiers building Fort George at Ardersier in 1749 had orders to maintain drill practise two days of the week.

A remarkable network of roads was built during the eighteenth century considering the usual reluctance of the government to become financially or physically involved in Scotland unless forced by circumstance. Between 1725 and 1732, Wade was responsible for between 243 and 258 miles of road, while 8-900 miles of road were built under Caulfeild’s command between 1732 and 1767. Wade’s main and original aim in building roads was to link militarily significant locations. The frequent letters justifying expenses reveal what Wade thought the government would like about roads: increased communications, the transportation of men and equipment and the

dissemination of commands and intelligence: essentially – how roads would help maintain crown control.\textsuperscript{152} This is also supported by the inscription on Wade’s showpiece, the Tay Bridge, built in 1733: “This with the Roads & other Military works for securing a safe & easy communication between the Highlands & trading Towns in the Low Country...”\textsuperscript{153} The importance of communications, especially if intelligence of rebel movements, was demonstrated when snowfall broke up road surfaces during the ‘15. On two occasions, at great expense and to the detriment to the civil-military relationship, the solution, perhaps compelled by the ongoing rebellion, was to use local civilian labour: “they [the roads] may easily be rendred very passable by employing three or four hundred of the Country people to mend them”.\textsuperscript{154}

The government’s perception of the use of military roads as a method of control is also revealed by those who wished to ingratiate themselves with the government following different rebellions.\textsuperscript{155} The 3rd Earl of Breadalbane in 1746 focused on positions for future fortifications and roads, while the anonymous \textit{Memorandum concerning the Highlands 1746}, began with the opening statement: “As the opening a Communication and rendering the access quick and easy through a Country full of disaffection and Barbarity is a principal step towards civilising them, some Roads would be proper which might in case of a Rebellion establish an easy and quick Communication

\textsuperscript{152} McCall, \textit{Routes, Roads, Regiments and Rebellions}, p.20.
\textsuperscript{153} NAS GD112/47/1/1, Inscription on Tay Bridge.
\textsuperscript{154} TNA SP54/11/51, J. Jennings to Lord Townsend, [Perth], 24\textsuperscript{th} January 1716; SP54/11/55, Cadogan to unknown, [Perth], 25\textsuperscript{th} January 1716 and SP54/11/89, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Duke of Argyll to Townsend, Dundee, 4\textsuperscript{th} February 1716.
to his majesty’s troops thro the several parts of that Country.” As the inscription on the Tay Bridge suggests, it was also widely acknowledged that better roads would assist trade and industry, which the government hoped would civilise the Highlands, especially after the ’45. Scotland’s social elite were also aware of the benefit roads could bring to trade and industry on their estates, and, therefore, benefit their income. In 1749, the 10th Earl of Rothes requested soldiers with road building experience to teach his tenants to lay roads to aid trade. Similarly, the anonymous Memorandum ended by saying: “It would be worth the government’s while to make Purchases in the more remote and disaffected parts of that Countrey purposely to people them in the above manner particularly along the Coast where so great advantage might arise to the nation for the Fishing Trade.” In the aftermath of the ’45, it was common for Scotland’ gentry to send memorials to the government suggesting ideas for fortification and road placements, partly from a genuine desire to help in the pacification of Scotland and partly to ingratiate themselves with the government. John Elphinstone, a military draughtsman from a notable Jacobite family, even went to the expense of creating a map for the new Commander-in-Chief, the Earl of Albermarle, in 1746, to demonstrate his loyalty and highlight his skills in the hope of patronage.

156 NAS GD112/47/1/6, 3rd Earl of Breadalbane; GD112/47/1/9, 3rd Earl of Breadalbane and GD112/47/1/5, ‘Memorandum concerning the Highlands 1746’.
158 NAS GD112/47/1/5, ‘Memorandum concerning the Highlands 1746’.
159 NAS GD112/47/1/9, Copy of proposals for roads and redoubts, 3rd Earl of Breadalbane [1746] and GD112/47/1/7, Memo concerning the Highlands, 1746, Given to d.arg [3rd Duke of Argyll].
An inadvertent outcome of the military roads was to make the Highlands in particular open to sightseers. Huts built along the roads for storage or billeting were often later used as inns for early tourists and travellers. Both the King’s House at Whitebridge (named for the bridge built in 1732 over the River Fechlin) on the military road between Fort Augustus and Inverness, and the King’s House near the south end of Loch Moy on the military road between Inverness and Ruthven, are early examples.\textsuperscript{161} Sir William Burrell, who travelled Scotland in 1758, praised the higher quality of roads but found the King’s Houses of poor quality: “vile room, remarkable for nothing but its dirt and the antiquity of its furniture.”\textsuperscript{162}

The successes and failures of Scotland’s fortifications

The military installations and road networks built in Scotland in the first half of the eighteenth century were invaluable for the improved access and speed of communications for the government and British army. For example, though Cope’s army did not intercept the Jacobite army from July to September 1745, it was still able to move around the country with greater ease than thirty years previously. Similarly, though most of the two companies of the Royal Scots ambushed on the road between Fort Augustus and Fort William on 16\textsuperscript{th} August 1745 were captured, they were nevertheless marching at a good speed of 2.67 miles per hour before they were surprised.\textsuperscript{163} In the months following Culloden, Major-General Campbell of Mamore was able to use the network of


\textsuperscript{162} Dunbar, \textit{Sir William Burrell’s Northern Tour}, p.12-3, 49.

\textsuperscript{163} Of a twenty-eight mile journey between Forts Augustus and William, the Royal Scots had eight miles, a three hour march, remaining when they were captured, giving an average marching speed of 2.67 miles per hour. Duffy, \textit{The ’45}, p.172.
roads and fortifications to set up an elaborate network of outposts and supply depots from his base at Inverary.  

The fortifications in Scotland also helped to create communities, which allowed for better civil-military relations. For example, in the spring of 1691 the governor of Fort William was awarded a royal charter to establish a neighbouring village to the fort, called Maryburgh. This acted as a settlement for the soldiers’ families and for the army sutlers. These soldiers and their families often became integrated with the local population, especially at a time before rotation of deployment was standardised. The gravestones at Craigs Cemetery in Fort William demonstrate the presence of soldiers and their families throughout the eighteenth century. “HERE LS THE BODY OF NELY BR[stone missing A?]YON SP5 TO SARG MBEATH OF INVDS AT F WM HOW DEP D THIS LIFE 26 NOV 1784 AGED 53 YR.”

Garrisons also represented potentially major areas of demand for local tradesmen and building materials. William Adams, Ordnance Office architect, and his three sons often employed local labourers. Building Fort George at Ardersier required local men as

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166 Tabraham and Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.42
167 Houlding, Fit for Service, p.29.
168 ‘Here lies the body of Nely Brayon spouse to sergeant Macbeth of Invalids at Fort William who departed this life 26th November 1784 aged 53 years.’ Craigs Cemetery is located on the Belford Road, Fort William. Listed on the ‘Royal Commission on the Ancient and Historical Monument of Scotland’ website as site number NN17SW 47. Other military gravestones from this cemetery, along with all containing pre-1855 stones, are recorded in three volumes by A.G. and M.H. Beattie (eds), ‘Pre-1855 Gravestone Inscriptions’, Scottish Genealogy Society, 1990. However, only vital information rather than a transcription is recorded. A photograph of Nely Br[ay]on’s stone is provided as Appendix No.6.
quarrymen, lumberjacks and as skilled and unskilled builders for the sixteen years of
construction. Local industry also benefited as iron work came from Edinburgh and nails,
tools and lead from Inverness.\textsuperscript{169} Significantly, local communities were not required to
pay for the building and upkeep of fortifications, unlike under the Protectorate when
Edinburgh had to contribute a levy for building the citadels at Leith and Ayr.\textsuperscript{170} That is
not to say that there was no expenditure. In 1705, Berwick town had to wait twenty-six
years to be repaid £3,000 (Sterling) for billeting and towns were often ‘taxed’ when
occupied by armies, as they were during the ’15.\textsuperscript{171} Also, one key reason for re-locating
Fort George to Ardersier was because the councilmen of Inverness wanted compensation
for the loss of their harbour if a larger fort was built on the previous site.\textsuperscript{172}

As installations intended to prevent Jacobite uprisings and provide secure bases
from which to operate as an army, the fortified barracks and forts showed mixed success
when tested during the ’45. On the one hand, the fortified barracks, designed to repel
attack by traditional Highland raiding tactics, showed their success. During the first
attack on Ruthven in August 1745, the Jacobites attempted the traditional Highland
raiding tactic of firing the door before storming through it. Sergeant Molloy defended
Ruthven using the design features added to the fortified barracks based on knowledge
gained from the success of tower houses; he fired from the corner tower that provided
enfilade covering fire. Therefore, the defensive features of the fortified barracks were a

\textsuperscript{169} Brown, ‘General George Wade’, p.150; Tabraham and Grove, \textit{Fortress Scotland}, p.95 and Meldrum,
\textsuperscript{172} Tabraham and Grove, \textit{Fortress Scotland}, p.94.
success providing the attackers’ tactics were in keeping with the anticipated mode of
tack.\textsuperscript{173}

However, a more serious failure was the weakness of design and placement in the
new forts built in Scotland revealed by the ease with which they fell during the ’45. In
the first half of the rebellion, the Jacobites manoeuvred undeterred by the network of
frots and only turned their attention to them after the retreat from Derby, when, in a bid to
ensure freedom of movement throughout Scotland, they took all the forts built since the
Restoration except Fort William.\textsuperscript{174} Despite the advanced design and the great expense
of its construction, Fort George could not withstand a siege, and surrendered after three
days of siege once a mined wall collapsed on 21\textsuperscript{st} February 1746.\textsuperscript{175} Fort Augustus fell
after a three-day siege on 5\textsuperscript{th} March 1746, when a coehorn mortar hit the fort’s powder
magazine breaching the walls. The governor was forced to surrender, as, on the arrival of
the Jacobites, he had ordered the majority of the garrison into the old barracks at
Kiliwhimen, which was quickly over-run.\textsuperscript{176} In both cases, failure was partly self-
induced; the former had been built on inappropriate ground, and the latter had placed its
powder magazine in a bastion.\textsuperscript{177} The fortified garrisons also proved vulnerable to
Jacobite attack. This was because their design, which was intended to resist raids from
lightly armed Highlanders, proved insufficient when the Jacobites were reinforced by
French-supplied artillery and engineers. Ruthven fell after one day of siege on 9\textsuperscript{th}

\textsuperscript{173} Duffy, \textit{The ’45}, p.183-4 and Reid, \textit{Castles and Tower Houses}, p.54.
\textsuperscript{174} Saunders, \textit{Fortress Britain}, p.110.
\textsuperscript{175} Duffy, \textit{The ’45}, p.447-8.
\textsuperscript{176} \textit{Ibid}, p.451.
\textsuperscript{177} \textit{Ibid}, p.152, 447 and Saunders, \textit{Fortress Britain}, p.109. A bastion is a projecting part of a fortification
that allows an increased angle of fire, see Glossary.
February 1746; the newly promoted Lieutenant Molloy and his twelve men were outnumbered and out-gunned by the 300 strong force of Jacobites at Ruthven’s second siege. These losses were a heavy blow for the British army. Despite the expense and desire to provide a statement of Hanoverian permanence and dominance in the Highlands, three major forts and two key fortified barracks were taken by the Jacobites within a month of each other.

Fort William was remarkable as the only major new-build installation that did not fall to the Jacobites during the ‘45. The improved defences added under Wade’s administration, its better positioning, and the Jacobite army’s inability to sustain long-term siege operations were all significant. As occurred at the siege of Stirling Castle in January 1746, infighting, desertion and lack of artillery undermined the Jacobites. Finally, despite some success at Fort William, Charles Edward lost patience and recalled the Jacobite force to Inverness in preparation for an engagement that would become Culloden, a factor that also spared Blair Castle a long siege.179

Besides failures of design and positioning, other self-inflicted failures were a consequence of the lethargic pace that the government departments of the Ordnance Office and army moved at. Fear of attack from disaffected Highlanders and clashes over building design created such delays that the fortified barrack at Bernera was prevented from providing the forward operating base needed in the area controlled by the disaffected Mackenzie clan. Therefore, when, in 1719, two years after Bernera was

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178 Duffy, The ‘45, p.443.
commissioned, a Spanish-backed Jacobite invasion fleet landed at Eilean Donan Castle, twelve miles away by land from the site, building had only just started. In this case the representation of power and presence the fortified barracks were intended to symbolise clearly backfired.\footnote{D. Szechi, \textit{The Jacobites: Britain and Europe, 1688-1788} (Manchester, 1994), p.110 and Tabraham and Grove, \textit{Fortress Scotland}, p.61-2.}

Additionally, the loose command structure of the eighteenth century British army and pluralism within the Ordnance Office directly created distractions and caused absenteeism amongst key officials. Often inexperienced and overworked juniors were left doing jobs that required social leverage to do properly, which even their seniors’ positions did not automatically grant.\footnote{For further discussion about the importance of an individual’s personality and social standing, see Chapter Three: The Scottish Soldier and the State, and later in this chapter in sub-section ‘The communication of orders’. Tomlinson, ‘Guns and Government’, p.46.} For example, when Edinburgh Castle was found to be without provisions during the ’15, the blame was placed on a servant of the governor, the 1\textsuperscript{st} Earl of Orkney, who was supposed to have stocked it, not on Orkney.\footnote{TNA SP54/8/121, unknown (possibly Argyll or Islay) to unknown, 30\textsuperscript{th} September 1715.}

The presence of soldiers barracked in Scotland also caused friction with local communities. Though no ‘hearts and minds’ strategy existed, and therefore did not technically fail, the military’s attitude is significant because of the delicate, internecine nature of the Jacobite period when most Scots were either already loyal or neutral and potentially ready to be won over. Public billeting was common but strictly regulated after public disapproval of the expense and behaviour of soldiers. Alexander MacDonald of Glengary, for example, was still owed in 1714, £3,542 (Scots) in losses and damages

\footnote{TNA SP54/8/121, unknown (possibly Argyll or Islay) to unknown, 30\textsuperscript{th} September 1715.}
caused by a detachment of the garrison from Fort William billeted on him in 1704.\textsuperscript{183}

The presence of the military within a community also caused disruption without any malicious intent as the priorities of military and civilian worlds collided. In anticipation of a Jacobite siege in March 1746, the garrison at Fort William destroyed Maryburgh. Though the practice of maintaining an unobstructed glacis in order to deny a besieging army cover was considered standard, Fort William’s actions did nothing to aid civil-military relations.\textsuperscript{184} Recent archaeological research has shown evidence for the burning and demolition of the buildings on ‘the Parade’, west of the fort.\textsuperscript{185}

Relations between the Ordnance Office officials and labourers were not always cordial, and as the Ordnance Office represented the government and army, while the labourers were often drawn from local Scotsmen, their relationship became representative of the civil-military relationship. Labourers were paid weekly, but this depended on the availability of funds. Though this was outside the Ordnance Office’s control, as budgets and expenses were set by Parliament with the Treasury’s approval, the late payment of wages was blamed on the Ordnance officials and the army in Scotland.\textsuperscript{186} Funding difficulties also hampered good relations between Ordnance Office officials and officers of the British army. When, in August 1715, Fort William’s outer defences needed

\textsuperscript{182} Houlding, \textit{Fit for Service}, p.36, 38, 39; Schwoerer, “\textit{No Standing Armies!}”, p.188-9 and Hayter, \textit{The army and the crowd}, p.10-11 and TNA SP54/6/41, Alexander MacDonald to Queen Anne (undated but pre-1714). See Chapter Two: The Scottish Soldier’s Experience for greater detail on billeting.

\textsuperscript{183} Duffy, \textit{Fire & Stone}, p.11; GUARD (Glasgow University Archaeological Research Division), \textit{Fort William and Inverlochy Archaeological Project (Historic Conflict in the Highlands), data structure report. Project 2348} (Glasgow, 2007), p.7 and Fergusson of Kilkerring, \textit{Argyll in the Forty-Five}, p.108. For glacis, see Glossary.

\textsuperscript{184} GUARD (Glasgow University Archaeological Research Division), \textit{Fort William and Inverlochy Archaeological Project (Historic Conflict in the Highlands), data structure report. Project 2348} (Glasgow, 2007), p.41.

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for carrying on any Works in North Britai\n
Despite this lack of support, financial or moral, repairs must have continued because they were reported complete, if limited, in September. Whether the labourers were paid from the governor’s pocket or worked without pay or were paid using the extraordinary fund available at times of rebellion, is unknown, but in the light of the recent Hanoverian Succession, and the increased threat of invasion, it is clear the priority was on making repairs, not on the protocol of correct channels or proceeding only when paid.\n
For the soldiers themselves, the fortifications of Scotland were effectively failures because of their notoriously poor living conditions. The tented cities erected during the building stage and the leaking roofs and smoking chimneys of the fortified barracks undermined health, discipline and morale.\n
The absence of pay, provisions and winter clothing, in combination with a harsh life under canvas while building Fort William in 1690, is a case in point. Disease and desertion reduced numbers and increased building work. When rain undermined an earthwork, increasing the work load considerably, Grant’s regiment mutinied. On 5th November 1690, they nailed up the touch holes of the cannon.\n
The lack of a sick bay or communal cooking and eating areas in the fortified barracks, Berwick and the Great Glen forts, meant that all activities were carried out in the overcrowded bedrooms that measured 5.5 metres square. Morale, especially during the winter, must have been low, and easily explains why duty in Scotland was

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187 TNA SP54/7/60A, Office of Ordnance to Townsend, 20th August 1715.
188 TNA SP54/8/116, Robert Pollock to unknown, Fort William, 28th September 1715.
190 Tabraham and Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.41.
191 Ibid, p.64.
very unpopular amongst the English and Lowland soldiers, and why a posting to Scotland, especially for non-Scots, was unpopular with the officers.  

Fortifications as a measure of governmental interest in Scotland’s soldiers

The Government’s level of interest in Scotland can be gauged through changes in barrack design. The expected capacity per room, the availability of amenities and segregation by rank reveal much about the mentality, social norms and interest the Ordnance Office, and by extension, the government had in the soldier during the first half of the eighteenth century. As the Ordnance Office and the government grew increasingly aware of the negative effect of uncomfortable and unhealthy quarters on morale and discipline, designs were altered, though in a fitful pattern that reinforces the spasmodic interest the government took in Scotland.

Prior to the creation of purpose-built barracks, soldiers built themselves wooden huts seven or eight feet in length, wide enough to fit five camp beds. These slept ten men when pre-existing castles and Cromwell’s citadels were filled to capacity.  

To avoid the expense of building, but to fulfil the desire for sufficient troops in existing fortifications, the unofficial policy was to house as many men in each room as possible. At Fort William in 1711, other ranks slept twelve men per room, while the barracks added to Berwick in 1717 were designed to accommodate 600 men and thirty-six officers.

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192 TNA SP54/11/100, Robert Pollock to unknown, Fort William, 10th February 1716 and SP54/11/132, Robert Pollock to unknown, Fort William, 19th February 1716.
at eight men per room.\textsuperscript{194} The 1\textsuperscript{st} Duke of Roxburghe (1680-1741) even boasted in 1718 about the fortified barracks: “Your Grace will be pleased to observe that we have calculated five beds for ten men in so little room as can be well allowed.”\textsuperscript{195} In reality this only applied to Ruthven and Inversnaid, which each housed 120 men (assuming maximum sized companies of sixty men, as if at war). Bernera and Kiliwhimen were intended to accommodate 240 and 360 men respectively. As each had two barrack blocks of three floors with two rooms per floor, only Ruthven and Inversnaid held ten men per room. Bernera had twenty per room and Kiliwhimen housed thirty. The increased pressure on space is partially explained by the larger size of Bernera and Kiliwhimen, by the practise of half the soldiers of each room alternating guard duty with the other half, and the placing of detachments at outposts, such as the Independent Highland Company quartered at Drumden near Inverness in 1729.\textsuperscript{196} Their role as outposts, police bases and the first military response to disaffection was largely the reason for the government priority of military strength above soldiers’ comfort. Similarly, over-crowding could have been due to government pragmatism rather than disinterest in soldiers’ health and comfort. The decision at Edinburgh Castle to make the Great Hall into six barrack rooms sleeping 310 men in 1737\textsuperscript{197} was probably motivated by a desire to fit the maximum number of soldiers into the minimum space prescribed by the capacity of a pre-existing castle. At Ardersier, where greater design choice and budget were permitted, the men slept eight per room, suggesting the Ordnance Office had

\textsuperscript{194} Grove, \textit{Berwick Barracks}, p.4 and Tabraham and Grove, \textit{Fortress Scotland}, p.50, 57.  
\textsuperscript{195} Donet, \textit{British Barracks}, p.27.  
\textsuperscript{196} Tabraham and Grove, \textit{Fortress Scotland}, p.64 and MacIntoch, \textit{A History of Inverness}, p.119.  
\textsuperscript{197} Donet, \textit{British Barracks}, p.19.
a desire to ensure the comfort of soldiers when the opportunity allowed. Later barracks continue to show an interest in providing good quality soldiers’ accommodation and the awareness from the late seventeenth century that morale, a factor as important as tactics and improved technology to success, was greatly affected by the conditions of soldiers’ billets, suggests that the British army was always aware of the need for good accommodation, but was only in a position to provide it by the mid- and late-eighteenth centuries.

A greater concern for the quality of living conditions of soldiers during the first half of the eighteenth century is also shown by an institutional willingness to design and pay for different designs that added to comfort rather than military needs. The barrack blocks commissioned for Berwick and the fortified barracks in 1717 had no mess rooms or communal spaces. Cooking, eating, living and sleeping were carried out in the soldiers’ rooms, which were supplied with a table and chimney for that purpose. This was benignly done in the belief that this would encourage a sense of belonging and loyalty to the regiment, though the over crowded conditions proved detrimental to health and morale. However, a significant development was that at the purpose-built fortifications the Ordnance Office replaced the usual slop buckets with latrines, even for the other ranks.

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198 Donet, British Barracks, p.44.
199 FCA A/AAF/40/30/5/5(1), Estimate of requirements for the barracks at Leslie, c.1750 and A/AAF/40/30/5/5(2), Two receipts or estimates for barrack furniture and provisions, undated.
201 Tabraham and Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.58.
202 Ibid, p.58, 64.
An additional architectural change whose only purpose was to aid comfort was the introduction of the corridor in fortification design. Though later abandoned in favour of building Fort Augustus, the original designs for an extended Kiliwhimen in 1726 featured a central corridor in each barrack block.203 Prior to this, rooms ran off each other affording little privacy. Corridors were next employed at both other ranks’ and officers’ barrack blocks at Fort George at Ardersier, again suggesting that when given the space and finances, and in a later climate of acceptance of standing armies, the Ordnance Office was aware of and could facilitate the comfort of soldiers.204

Unlike the conscious attempts to improve living conditions, the separation of officers and other ranks’ accommodation would have been natural and acceptable to all. This unwittingly tells us much about the social norms of the eighteenth century. Barracks built at Berwick and Woolwich in 1716 position officers’ quarters at the end of blocks.205 At the fortified barracks in 1717, separation of social order and military rank was extended past the placement of officers’ accommodation in the towers, to the separation of latrines. Social deference to officers is also clear in their larger, better appointed rooms. The officers’ rooms at Berwick were larger, with “subtly better architectural finishes” and only junior officers shared a room.206 At Fort George at Ardersier, three decades later, officers had two rooms each; a bedroom and an ante-chamber.207 This was in keeping with the rigid hierarchy of the eighteenth century, both within the army and society in general. That the Ordnance Office went to some trouble to reinforce this social

203 Donet, British Barracks, p.21.
204 Tabraham and Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.97 and Donet, British Barracks, p.44.
206 Tabraham and Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.59 and Grove, Berwick Barracks, p.10.
hierarchy in a military setting, from the smallest to largest of fortifications in Scotland, is indicative of the army’s understanding of social conventions and the high level of importance in which hierarchy was held.

Scotland’s fortifications also reveal a great deal about the attitude of London towards the governance of Scotland between the Glorious Revolution and the end of the ’45. The date at which fortifications were built and repaired reflects patterns of government interest and the size and design of fortifications is indicative of the commitment the government was prepared to make to garrisoning Scotland. Over the first half of the eighteenth century, investment in building new barracks and fortifications dramatically increased. The four fortified barracks commissioned in 1717 cost £4,937 10s 7d (Sterling). By 1725, General Wade was given £10,000 (Sterling) for fortification and road building in 1725-6, and a further £50,000 (Sterling) for building Fort George in 1726. Minor repairs to Edinburgh Castle in 1727-8 cost £7,000 (Sterling) – already over double what was spent on the four fortified barracks a decade previously.208 The pinnacle came with Fort George at Ardersier, which finally cost £92,673 19s 1d (Sterling).209 This was twice the promised budget and more than Scotland’s annual GNP.210

This trend is significant as it represents an evolution, in both public and political attitudes, away from the seventeenth and early eighteenth century’s fear of standing

208 Donet, British Barracks, p.20; Tabraham and Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.57, 76-7; MacIntoch, A History of Inverness, p.21.
209 Tabraham and Grove, Fortress Scotland, p.95.
210 Ibid, p.97 and Donet, British Barracks, p.44.
armies. Consequently, despite plans for the improvement of fortifications and dockyard defences since the Restoration, little was acted upon until the Hanoverian succession; the Ordnance Office blamed “the little care the parliament has ever taken of them.”211 These political attitudes created a policy of reactive short-term building and repairs triggered by specific Jacobite unrest or rebellions. Consequently, plans were frequently made then abandoned or delayed once a particular threat had dissipated. None of the surveys or building works undertaken in Scotland throughout the period were pro-active; all were a reaction to a trigger from a source outside the government.

The Whigs, however, had a greater interest in continental affairs, through their trade origins and support of the Dutch and Hanoverian interest.212 Unfortunately, this drew attention from Scotland to conflicts on the continent. For example, the first Ordnance Office co-ordinated mapping project in Scotland created innovative, detailed and accurate maps between 1747 and 1755. The fair copy was never completed however, as the outbreak of the Seven Years War re-ordered priorities.213 Even in times of peace, when work such as the fortifications and roads built under Wade could be prioritised, the traditional dislike of a standing army meant that the army was quickly reduced in size and budget. In 1716, mere months after the leaders of the ’15 had fled Scotland for France, a Treasury-instigated investigation to reduce endemic corruption and costs reported that “a saving [was] to be made on guns because in our several forts, castles [and] fortifications...

211 Quoting a letter from the Ordnance Office, 14th November 1698 in Tomlinson, ‘The Ordnance Office and the King’s Forts, p.10.
213 Hewitt, Map of a Nation, p.37, 39.
within our Kingdom of Great Britain [there] are much more than are necessary.” In consequence of this investigation, Stirling Castle lost two cannon and associated gunners, Edinburgh Castle lost ten, Berwick lost twenty-six, and Fort William lost thirty-eight. The inconsistency of the government’s policy towards Scotland’s defence and military structures is highlighted by the contrast between the reduction of cannon and the Treasury approval of expenses for new barracks at Berwick, Tynemouth and the four fortified barracks, all of which occurred in 1717.

The government’s low level of interest in Scotland, its fortifications and defence during peace and the consequent poor state of repair of most forts is also revealed by previously unexamined correspondence between Sir Robert Pollock, Governor of Fort William, and government officials in London. Despite an Ordnance Office proposal to extend barracks at Fort William in early June 1715, Pollock was told on 21st June to find, and presumably, pay his own building agent and prepare his own construction proposal. However, on 20th August, Pollock learned that the Ordnance Office had no money for building in Scotland and it advised him to apply for money from the Treasury. At the outbreak of rebellion in early September, building work was officially postponed but, ironically, occurred anyway when a bastion collapsed on 5th November. This had to be removed and re-built, under conditions of civil uprising and poor weather. Despite being separated from the necessary building materials, which were

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215 Edinburgh was reduced from fifty to forty, Berwick from seventy-six to fifty and Fort William from sixty-eight to thirty. *Ibid*, p.56.
216 NAS GD220/5/568/1, Sir Robert Pollock to Montrose, Fort William, 7th June 1715.
218 TNA SP54/7/60A, Office of Ordnance to Townsend, 20th August 1715.
219 Bastions were sections of fortification that project out to allow increased covering-fire. See Glossary.
in Jacobite controlled areas, the rudimentary repairs were completed on 23rd December. 220 On 6th December, Pollock was ordered by the Ordnance Office to review the fort’s state of repair, but when he discovered that royal permission to make repairs had not been given he had to ask Townsend to rectify the situation before building could begin. 221 Additionally, by 28th December, Pollock had to ask to be reimbursed by the government for money spent on intelligence, the transport of water, coal, candles, bedding and boats to the fort, which he had been paying for in the eight months he had been in governor. He also had to ask for reimbursement for 8-900 Bolls of meal and malt he had purchased to prevent his garrison starving during the rebellion. 222 The government’s attitude that officers of both state and army should pay state expenses in the hope that the government would honour the debt was a common one. A failure to pay the state’s expenses has been seen to suggest ‘a lack of zeal’ that was tantamount to Jacobitism and treason. For example, when Montrose informed Pollock that the repairs Pollock regarded as essential to the defence of Fort William could not be afforded, he added: “However I have such a Confidence in your having the chief Command in those parts that I question not but your Zeal and vigilance will supply the weakness of your Garrison.” 223


221 TNA SP54/10/113 R. Johnson to Townsend, Fort William, 6th December 1715.

222 NAS GD220/5/568/25, Robert Pollock to unknown, Fort William, 28th December 1715. A Boll was the unit of measurement used for grain. See Glossary.

223 NAS GD220/5/568/3, Montrose to [Robert Pollock], Fort William, 21st June 1715.
Fort George at Ardersier is notable for the huge investment it represented. Its size and capacity, at 1,600 men, outstripped anything built before.²²⁴ The next largest and most recently built barrack in England was Fort Cumberland, the base at Portsmouth. Finished in 1747, it housed only 100 men. The largest overseas barrack was Fort Townshend on the Newfoundland coast that housed 100 gunners and 300 soldiers when finished in 1780.²²⁵ Fort George at Ardersier was dramatically larger. The incorporation of a brick vaulted powder magazine at Fort George at Ardersier demonstrated lessons learnt by the engineers of the Ordnance Office. After the destruction of Fort Augustus in 1746, Skinner designed the grand magazine at Ardersier to withstand a direct hit from a mortar bomb.²²⁶ Fort George at Ardersier was widely recognized by contemporaries as the finest defensive work of its age.²²⁷ In many ways this was because at Fort George at Ardersier, the government finally decided to invest enough funds to allow Skinner to follow the full principles of Vauban fortification to the letter, whereas Fort William, Fort Augustus and the original Fort George had only used the essence.²²⁸ Using the natural defence of sea to three sides, Skinner concentrated the bastioned trace on the narrow landward side. When Sir William Burrell visited Fort George on his tour of Scotland in 1758, he pronounced that “when perfected it is thought [it] will be the strongest [fort] in Britain.”²²⁹ Burrell’s visit is testament to the rarity and importance of the structure. To

²²⁵ Donet, *British Barracks*, p.44.
this day it remains the only fortification in Britain entirely constructed according to the principles of ‘trace italienne’ perfected by Vauban in seventeenth-century France.\textsuperscript{230}

\textbf{The Ordnance Office}

The Ordnance Office, once authorised and funded to build, had the necessary powers to enable construction. Crucially however, it could not instigate building. It negotiated all contracts with contractors, and after 1667 could appoint the commissioners who oversaw the building work on site, rather than using overseers who were employed by the crown and so reported to the Secretary of State. Control of commissioners remained inconsistent as many were employed by the Ordnance Office but were not its officers. Those that acknowledged the authority of the Ordnance Office and reported to it regularly gave the Ordnance Office crucial control of building sites, contractors and labourers in Scotland. This was necessary as building work was dependent on the quantity and quality of local labourers, especially as seasonal agricultural work overlapped with the best building weather, and tensions between contractors representing labourers and commissioners who worked for the Ordnance Office was common.\textsuperscript{231} In 1681, for example, the local labourers working on the fort at Hull unsurprisingly suddenly refused to work for less than 10d (Sterling) a day on learning that the Governor of Hull had announced that his soldiers would not be used as labourers to compensate for shortages amongst manual labour due to those lost to seasonal agricultural work.\textsuperscript{232}

\textsuperscript{230} Trace Italienne was the principle of star-shaped fortifications that used triangular bastions to provide maximum enfilade fire. Along with Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban (1633-1707), Sir Bernard de Gomme (1620-1685) and Baron van Coehoorn (1641-1704) also made considerable contributions to its development. See Glossary.

\textsuperscript{231} Tomlinson, ‘The Ordnance Office and the King’s Forts’, p.14, 16, 18-20.

\textsuperscript{232} \textit{Ibid}, p.18.
The process for the ordering of building or repairs to fortifications is revealing of the balance of power within the government and institutions of the British state in the early eighteenth century. After the re-structuring within the Ordnance Office in 1716, when the civil branch took responsibility for fortifications, any request for building or repairs addressed to the Ordnance Office had to be submitted to the Privy Council, which then asked the Secretary of State to prepare a royal warrant. This had to be approved and signed by both the crown and Secretary of State, before the latter returned it to the Privy Council which returned it to the Ordnance Office. Additionally, the Ordnance Office had strict conventions regarding the language of warrants, the need for originals not copies and the number of signatures needed, before it accepted an order. This drawn out process could badly hinder the speed of decisions and actions. However, though the Ordnance Office guarded its powers (for example, they refused to fire a salute at the Tower of London in 1702 when ordered by the Secretary of State as that privilege was reserved to the Master-General) it was not unprecedented for the Ordnance Office to ignore these conventions in times of emergency.

The procedure to authorise building could be accelerated by approaching the Secretary of State directly, who had personal access to the crown, so circumventing the Privy Council. In this way, the Ordnance Office, through the Secretary of State, could have a direct line of communication to the crown. This gave the Ordnance Office a limited influence over appointments and orders. For example, in June 1715, the Duke of

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233 Generally this was a minimum of six from the Privy Council and all or a majority from the Admiralty.  
Montrose, the Secretary of State for Scotland, could act as intermediary to George I and present a warrant to the Ordnance Office, when the governor of Fort William approached Montrose to obtain quick approval for emergency repairs.\textsuperscript{235} This direct line, however, was entirely dependent on the personal relationship between the Secretary of State and the crown, as well as the personal opinions and interest of the crown.\textsuperscript{236} The importance of personality and relationships meant the balance of power could alter with changes in occupancy of posts. Though individuals with greater personal influence were able to enact policies more speedily and react more effectively to sudden events such as invasions, their ability to interfere also increased the inconsistency of policies. A weaker personality allowed departments to settle into their traditional roles and lines of communications, creating stability.\textsuperscript{237}

Given the discrepancy of power and influence, and the weakness of official lines of communication in the face of strong individuals, completing any building project in Scotland was a complicated and slow matter. The army and the Ordnance Office were hampered by their reliance on the Treasury for its approval of funds, on the Privy Council and Secretaries of State for access to the crown to get approval of policy ideas, and dependent on the personalities of the officials involved, as incompetence, disinterest or the complications of political factions could easily detract attention from an unpopular issue such as Scotland and a standing army.\textsuperscript{238}

\textsuperscript{235} NAS GD220/5/568/3, Duke of Montrose to [Robert Pollock], Whitehall, 21\textsuperscript{st} June 1715 and TNA SP44/105 and SP41/34 in Tomlinson, ‘Guns and Government’, p.27.
\textsuperscript{236} Tomlinson, ‘Guns and Government’, p.25.
\textsuperscript{237} \textit{Ibid}, p.42.
The members of the Ordnance Office who had direct contact with Scotland’s fortifications were generally junior officers, clerks, overseers and draughtsmen. They, like the Secretaries of State, Treasurer, Admiralty and Ordnance Office, had variable levels of interest and knowledge of Scotland, factors which depended on the personalities of the individuals involved. This was accentuated during periods of war, when “…care of fortifications was considered a low priority, as the prime responsibility of the Office was to provide munitions for the forces” and engineers were abroad attending artillery in the field. Consequently, when the Ordnance Office was asked to put the castles of Edinburgh and Stirling and the citadel of Inverlochy into a state of defence in 1708, the two remaining engineers in the Tower of London replied that their superiors, Colonel Richards and Colonel Romer, were embarking for the campaign in Spain and a prisoner in France respectively, and that they lacked the experience to do anything by themselves. Peace, however, encouraged lethargy towards Scottish issues and daily management was devolved to clerks. Fortunately for Scotland, the period of peace between the Treaty of Utrecht and the start of the War of the Austrian Succession allowed for most of the building work in Scotland. The four fortified barracks, Wade’s survey and its suggested measures, including Forts Augustus and George and the majority of the road network, were built during this period.

239 Murdoch, ‘The People Above’, p.5-6, 9 and Tomlinson, ‘The Ordnance Office and the King’s Forts’, p.16.
240 Tomlinson, ‘The Ordnance Office and the King’s Forts’, p.15.
After 1714, engineers were allocated responsibility for specific locations. Engineers were supported by draughtsmen, who aided them in their role designing new fortifications, and by overseers whose duty it was to visit sites daily and report back to the Ordnance Office. Not all overseers were Ordnance Office employees and so reports were often variable or non-existent. Consequently, anything from incompetence to corruption could be hidden from the Ordnance Office by distance.

Architects were privately contracted by the Ordnance Office and often doubled as contractors who provided the materials and workforce, both skilled and unskilled. In an environment of possible hostility where those constructing installations regarded as oppressive could find themselves the target for anger, a local connection between the

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242 Tomlinson, ‘The Ordnance Office and the King’s Forts’, p.12.
243 MacIvor, Edinburgh Castle, p.89.
244 Donet, British Barracks, p.43 and ODNB William Skinner by Paul Latcham.
distant Ordnance Office and the local contractors must have reassured locally hired labourers and eased working relationships. The kidnap of eight masons and quarrymen from the site of Inversnaid in August 1718 indicates that the precaution of building a guarded encampment before work began on any fortress, from Fort William in 1690 to Fort George at Ardersier in 1747, was not unwarranted.247 Civilians associated with the British army continued to come under attack from the mid-eighteenth century onwards, including the armed attack on Alexander Bryce, a map surveyor for the Ordnance Office in the early 1740s, and on John Russell, overseer of repairs at Inversnaid for the Ordnance Office in July 1747.248

Conclusion

The fortifications of Scotland reveal a great deal about the history of the army they were created to house and protect. However, the reality was considerably more complex than the popular stereotype of a military occupation. Admittedly, the fortifications and roads were intended to aid military suppression of discontent, were located with military strategy in mind and built by soldiers working for the Ordnance Office, a government department. Additionally, building was triggered by military events or civil disorders and the primary purpose of every structure built, whether fortification, road or bridge, was military. Even later actions such as the mapping project of 1747 to 1755 were intended to improve the government’s knowledge of Scotland’s geography for military purposes. Some Scots clearly disapproved of such military

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247 Tabraham and Grove, *Fortress Scotland*, p.61-2 and NLS MS.1647 Z.03/08b ‘Plan of the Barrack at Kilwhiman and of the Ground within the Bounds of it betwixt the Two Rivers, November 1718.’ This shows an armed encampment, significantly only three months after the kidnapping.
involvement in Scotland, as the attacks on the surveyor in the early 1740s, and on the
labourers from Inversnaid in 1718 and 1747, attest.

On the other hand, the administration of Scotland was often left to the official and
unofficial government servants who were drawn from Scotland’s elites rather than
dominating from London. Additionally, road and bridge maintenance had been the
responsibility of Scottish authorities since 1669 under the Commissioners of Supply, a
power that grew stronger through the eighteenth century. Scots also actively requested
fortifications and roads, either suggesting possible placement for roads and fortifications
to aid or ingratiate themselves with the government, or to gain access to aid trade from
their lands.

The history of Scotland’s fortifications in the first half of the eighteenth century is
a microcosm of the state’s attitude towards governing Scotland. The powers of the
Ordnance Office were designed to control the building procedure once building had been
authorised. Authorisation could only be given by the crown, but could be influenced, to
varying degrees, by the Secretaries of State, members of the Privy Council and Cabinet,
Admiralty and Treasury. Therefore, what fortifications were built and when is very
revealing of the attention these officials gave towards Scotland. The pattern of building,
generally in the aftermath of a Jacobite rebellion, invasion or threat, demonstrates a
reactive policy towards Scotland; only when Scotland represented a problem did it get the
level of attention needed to achieve major building work. The removal of cannon within
a year of a major rebellion is symptomatic of London’s attitude towards the governance of Scotland.

It is clear that a disappearance of the Jacobite threat would have fundamentally changed London’s military policies in Scotland. Without the real or perceived danger of Jacobite unrest, little money or attention would have been given to Scotland’s fortifications. Though letters and memorials from members of the British army and Scotland’s elite show they were aware this reactive policy was militarily imprudent, the power balance in London and the communication structure that controlled the approval of warrants prevented any other policy. Dependence on a series of government departments and posts for funding and official approval had the potential to slow or prevent building projects in Scotland. At a time when the governmental structure was still forming its lines of communications and responsibilities, power-struggles between departments and personalities, often in matters far removed from Scotland or the army, ensured that the Ordnance Office and the army were rarely able to do more than follow the government’s knee-jerk reactions to Jacobite activity.

When building was approved, however, the British army and the Ordnance Office could, and did, influence matters. As the two bodies closest to the fortifications, they were able to utilise the shortcuts in the political system to affect what was built once it had been ordered. Ordnance Office plans for the fortified barracks inspired by tower houses and the addition of star-trace enceinte to tower houses donated or bought by the British army demonstrates an awareness of Highland raiding tactics and adaptation to
local circumstances that is clearly military not political in origin. They were able to adapt again with the creation of the Great Glen forts with the principles of ‘trace italienne’, though the effect was mixed as London’s control of budgets limited the extent of these designs, ultimately leaving the fortifications vulnerable to artillery attack. It is highly significant, however, that by the end of the period, the Ordnance Office was able to design Fort George at Ardersier in keeping with the bastioned defence principles perfected by de Gomme, Coehorn and Vauban. The increasing relaxation in attitude towards standing armies by mid-century is reflected in the Ordnance Office’s desire to address the comfort of soldiers with the addition of latrines, corridors and less crowded rooms. London’s implicit endorsement of these alterations in their approval of the designs and budgets for building work demonstrates that the government was taking a greater interest in the comforts of its soldiers.
CONCLUSION

A military study of Scotland during the first half of the eighteenth century must invariably pay particular attention to the Jacobite movement. Many excellent overviews exist.\(^1\) Of an operational nature, Duffy and Szechi stand out,\(^2\) with the latter also providing valuable political and European contextualisation.\(^3\) This thesis acknowledges the British army’s response to the Jacobite threat, as a key agent of change in the British army in this period since it provided the greatest domestic challenge to Britain’s stability, but goes beyond an operational study restricted to campaigns and extends to examine the life and experiences of the Scottish officers and men in the British army. This includes the army’s structural and infrastructural involvement in Scotland: its fortifications, barracks and roads. Issues of governmental trust and loyalty in Scottish soldiers, and of those soldiers’ motivation and identity are also prominently featured, as the predominance of Scots in the Jacobite armies during the 1689-90, 1715-16, 1719 and 1745-46 rebellions and the frequency that rebellions began on Scottish soil made being a Scot in British service a contentious matter.

The rise of Scottish Nationalism in the 1970s, and the subsequent desire for Scottish independence, have brought into focus the socio-political changes caused by the Union. The historiography pioneered by Phillipson and Mitchison, and furthered by

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Murdoch and Harris, have significantly influenced this work so that the early governance of Scotland and the Scottish military and civil elites’ attempts to function within the structure of the new Great Britain is a theme featured in several chapters. This thesis takes, as its effective point of departure, the Act of Union, which allows the impacts of the Union on the British army and, specifically, the Scottish element within that institution, to be highlighted. Harris makes the link that military service was a way that Scots could contribute to the governance and preservation of the state, an idea furthered in the specifically military studies by Murdoch and Mackillop. Extending this idea, it is established in this thesis that military service allowed Scots to defend the Glorious Revolution, Protestant Succession and Act of Union. However, unlike Murdoch and Mackillop, a broader view is taken here. The recent tendency has been to focus specifically on the Highlander, a trend caused in part by the Scottish Nationalist desire to highlight everything distinctive about Scotland. The nineteenth century romanticisation of the Highlander rehabilitated the Jacobite rebel as a ‘noble savage’, made it natural that Scottish Nationalists would look to the Highlanders as the last group that attempted to end the Union by force. This has forced the British army into the role of ‘the enemy’, its response to the Jacobite risings dominating studies of the British army in Scotland to the

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5 Harris, *Politics and the Nation*.


detriment of its other duties, for example as a police force and fortification builders.\(^8\)
The distinctiveness of the Highlander and government repression following Culloden has caused a recent preoccupation with Highland studies.\(^9\) As a corrective reaction to this, Scotland is considered here as a whole, to provide an inclusive study of Scottish involvement in the British army at a time of change shaped by the Union and the Jacobite rebellions. To this end other forms of military service beyond that in Highland regiments are included: militias and fencibles, together with corporation and volunteer regiments. Individuals of Highland and Lowland background are studied to reveal similarities which prove that eighteenth-century Scottish gentlemen above and below the Highland Line had more in common with each other than is popularly suggested. The history of mercenaries, individuals and regiments of both Highland and Lowland origin, from the pre-Union era, also demonstrated that both groups were working for the benefit of the state before the official creation of Great Britain, when Scotland and England were united only by the Union of Crowns.

Unlike the traditional military studies of the British army of the period which are dominated by the continental wars of the eighteenth century,\(^{10}\) this thesis examines other influential individuals besides Marlborough. It verifies that those who influenced policy in the army’s role in the governance of Scotland were more numerous and more Scottish

\(^{8}\) S. Reid, *British Redcoat* (Oxford, 1996) and S. Reid, *Cumberland’s Army: the British Army at Culloden* (Leigh-on-sea, 2006); S. Reid, *1745: a military history of the last Jacobite rising* (Staplehurst, 2001); Duffy, *The ’45 and Szechi, 1713*.  
than the accepted view of the British army would suggest. Similarly, while most studies of the British army as an institution are focused on England, with very rare mentions of Scotland, this thesis investigates the British army as an institution in developmental and compositional terms and with a close focus on Scotland. Much of this work, therefore, focuses on the formation and command structure of the British army in the early eighteenth century. It establishes the difficulties the army’s elite experienced dealing with London, and its attempts to overcome the challenges of mistrust and confusion which significantly impaired the government’s ability to respond to trouble. The level of trust placed upon individual Scottish soldiers and regiments is a major aspect of this study.

A comparatively neglected sector of the government and its interaction with the military in Scotland is the Office of Ordnance. Though our knowledge of the department itself and architectural studies of the fortifications in Scotland have benefited from detailed and thorough studies, they have been studied in isolation. Here, they are brought together to establish the role of the Ordnance Office in Scotland and its part in ordering, designing and constructing fortifications in Scotland and the mixed success it achieved in maintaining control from London. The use of permanent barracks, the level of

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investment and the implications of designs that government was prepared to approve reflects the fluctuating level of interest the government had in Scotland and the soldiers stationed there.

In the period after the Second World War, British military historians have generally been connected with the British army and a common interest in COIN has emerged influenced by the concerns of the post-war British army. Consequently, the conduct of the British army in Scotland opposing Jacobites has come under scrutiny.\textsuperscript{14} This thesis joins the debate with the results of a study of a wide range of sources providing a counter-argument to assumptions of military oppression during the first half of the eighteenth century. The examination of the law and its application by government officials and the army, as well as trial transcripts and the outcome of disputes between soldiers and civilians have established that the introduction of the Mutiny Act in 1689 and the Riot Act in 1715 limited the freedom of the army to the point of preventing it from fulfilling the tasks it was placed in Scotland to perform. Similarly, an examination of the use of fortifications and its effect on the civil-military relationship has provided a more balanced view of Scottish reactions to a permanent military presence in Scotland.

Therefore, aware of the limitations and inspirations of the existing literature, this thesis addresses the British army in Scotland in the first half of the eighteenth century through five topics. Chapter One: ‘Scotland’s Professional Soldiers’ establishes that Scots had been serving the state long before the Act of Union. The Union of Crowns and

the internecine struggles of the Civil War, Restoration and Glorious Revolution ensured that Scottish regiments were utilised alongside English regiments before they were merged to form the British Establishment with the Act of Union in 1707. Many Scottish regiments were raised and lent on a permanent basis to allied countries such as to France, under the ‘Auld Alliance’, and the United Provinces. ‘Free-lance’ mercenaries as individuals and groups also sought service abroad. Nevertheless, both groups were often motivated by a desire to aid religious and political allies, demonstrating a desire to protect the beliefs and principles of the Revolution Settlement that promised civil liberties and parliamentary checks on royal power.

Some employing nations, such as the Swedes and the Dutch, made concessions in uniform, music and colours to attract Scottish recruits, and valued Scots for their morality and discipline. In Britain, however, the disturbances caused by armed Highland retainers and Border reiving meant that Scots were viewed more warily. To this, a distrust of their loyalty was added once Scotland became a focus of rebellions to reinstate the Stuarts. Therefore, in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the British people and government only slowly accepted the recruitment of Scots, and in particular, Highlanders. Thus, while the Scottish presence abroad during the Thirty Years War was substantial, it was not until the greater need for men in the frequent continental wars of the eighteenth century that the British began to seek Scots for their own army. In addition, the legacy of the Civil War and the religious repression of Protestants in seventeenth-century Scotland ensured that the acceptance of a large standing army was slower in Britain than elsewhere in Europe.
Three Lowland regimental case studies are presented: the Royal Scots; the Scots Fusiliers and the Scots Greys. It emerges that throughout their deployment, both time and the evidence of continuing excellent behaviour were needed for the government to overcome its wariness of Scottish loyalty. By contrasting their experiences with that of the Independent Highland Companies, it is clear that nationality and Highland or Lowland origin impacted very significantly on both deployment and treatment.

Chapter Two: ‘The Scottish Soldier’s Experience’ explores the wariness of the British public and politicians towards standing armies. Recruitment, discipline, role and billeting practices of the eighteenth-century soldier are used to show the extent to which eighteenth-century soldiers deserved the reputation which had been earned by soldiers of previous centuries. The government was sensitive to the public’s fear of standing armies. However, in Scotland the need to counter the Jacobite threat and potential invasions of its vast coastline meant that permanent barracks were a necessity. These structures strained the civil-military relationship by placing often drunk and immoral soldiers near civilian communities but they also provided opportunities for the relationship to evolve and improve. Fortification building brought employment, while their garrisons supported Scotland’s economy, encouraging new communities to appear and others to expand. Regulations controlled recruitment and assuaged the public’s fear of impressment and conscription. Similarly, William III, George I and II’s desire for an increasingly professional army, and the changing tactics engendered by the ‘military revolution’, ensured that officers used both encouragement and coercion in training and maintaining
discipline. This increased control was applied off, as well as on, the battlefield and contributed to improved civil-military relations. However, tensions between civilians and the army continued well into the eighteenth century inflamed by the use of soldiers to assist civil authority, especially against smuggling and rioting.

Chapter Three: ‘The Scottish Soldier and the British State’ re-examines in detail a selection of key individuals from the civil and military elite and establishes that the usual terms ‘rebel’ and ‘loyal’, created with hindsight and the strong influence of Whig historians, are an unhelpful simplification. A comparison of soldiers’ early life and education, especially in the military, demonstrates that men who would fight each other during the Jacobite rebellions nevertheless shared a common background. Early service as gentlemen-volunteers was common, as were their methods of gaining commissions and promotion. Different terminology, therefore, was adopted to characterise individuals according to their attitude towards the government; such as ‘stalwarts’, ‘pragmatists’ and ‘trimmers’.

The inter-connected nature of society and the family links of the Scottish elites proves a key factor in explaining the motivations behind many Scottish events. Loyal government officials, stalwarts of the government, sought pardons and leniency for rebels. This occurred not from a sense of shared nationality but from an awareness that politics and favour could, and easily did change. A degree of cordiality within the social elite, regardless of current events, needed to be maintained in case their situations were reversed in the future. Scotland’s military and civil elite also knew that control of the
disaffected could be maintained more effectively through obligations to loyal friends and family which tapped into the pre-existing pervasive and binding honour-code of eighteenth-century gentlemen. Though this characteristic of Scotland’s inter-woven society ensured peace after the ’15, it was regarded with suspicion by London, who saw only a conspiracy of Scots aiding fellow Scots, and prevented them from following a similar strategy after the ’45. This attitude towards fellow Scots and London’s reaction to such behaviour also damaged the relationship between the government and their political and military servants in Scotland, imposing unnecessary complications and delays on the Scottish elite and hampering their ability to respond to Jacobite activities. The ambivalent behaviour of the ‘trimmers’ accentuated this suspicion and contributed not only to the difficulties experienced by loyal Scots, but also contributed to forcing many Scots into the Jacobite fold.

A significant theme in Chapter Three is the motivation behind the choice of loyalties in a rebellion. Issues such as religious principle, with its fundamental impact on the legitimacy of the Glorious Revolution and therefore Protestant Succession, are shown to be vitally important to many of Scotland’s military elite. They were fully alert to the military implications of a threat to the constitution, and consequent balance of power between crown and parliament, should the Glorious Revolution be reversed. Military service, therefore, provided a way for many Scots to ensure the continuation of the Protestant Succession and the principles of the Revolution Settlement in the form of the new British state.
Chapter Four: ‘Scotland’s Auxiliary Forces’ provides evidence that the desire to contribute to the security of the British state was not just the preserve of the social elite. The range of auxiliary formations created in Scotland to counter the Jacobite rebellions demonstrates that many from the lower orders, and many gentlemen unconnected to the British army, desired to take up arms in defence of Britain’s government, constitution and Protestant monarchs. These auxiliary forces, most typically in the form of militias – though volunteer and corporation regiments were also common during rebellions – had mixed success. The temporary nature of the militias meant they lacked the training, experience and confidence needed to face the Jacobite army, and this consequently made them unreliable. However, when used as scouts, as garrisons or to guard baggage, their additional numbers were beneficial as they relieved regular soldiers for more difficult service.

The militias’ inability to face the enemy and the Scottish civil authority’s legal confusion and subsequent delay in raising auxiliary forces were blamed by a government already suspicious of Scottish loyalties on sympathy for fellow Scots and latent Jacobitism. However, as Chapter Four demonstrates, the confused nature of the 1662 and 1663 Militia Acts, the absence of articles relating to the Scottish army or militias in the Union Treaty and the veto of the 1708 Scottish Militia Bill all ensured that even Scotland’s most senior legal advisors were unclear about who had the authority to raise and arm men. Royal warrants, therefore, were deemed necessary when rebellions occurred but the process of their application and approval slowed official reactions in
Scotland. This generated a hesitance that was viewed as border-line treachery, as the trial of the Provost of Edinburgh attests.

Chapter Five: ‘Scotland’s Military Installations’ examines the construction of military structures and infrastructure in Scotland from the Union to the period following Culloden. Their evident purpose was to support the military response to the Jacobites, and those involved in their construction were occasionally the objects of attack. Nevertheless, many Scots actively participated in their building and maintenance, and viewed roads as an aid to trade and industry. The construction of permanent barracks and forts also represented a warming in British attitudes towards standing armies. Their construction in Scotland was tolerated because the need for a military presence was acute and because Scotland, as the ‘barbarous north’, was far removed from the ‘civilised south’. As such it provides a useful case study of the government’s changing attitude towards standing armies as represented by the increasing funding allowed for building work. Similarly, the consequences of permanent barracks on the civil-military relationship are revealed; while tensions existed between civilians and the army, especially during times of rebellion, garrisons often provided an economic stimulus to communities. It was not uncommon for soldiers to settle and build ties within Scottish society.

The motivations for building, the designs adopted and the degree of fortifications are representative of the government’s interest in the governance of Scotland across the period from Union to mid-century. It emerges that the threat or reality of rebellion, were
the chief causes for building or improving forts and roads. Peace often brought
stagnation to building work and the removal of what were then deemed unnecessarily
expensive cannon. This created a reactive rather than preventative attitude towards
Scotland. A study of the balance of power between the Crown, the Ordnance Office, the
Treasury and the army shows that decisions to build and fund were made in London, with
civil and military elites in Scotland rarely able to do more than petition and advise.
However, what is also revealed is that, as time passed, the government, influenced by the
army and Ordnance Office, began to recognise that less crowded barrack rooms and the
addition of latrines and corridors would boost morale and health amongst its soldiers.
Therefore the changes in barrack design reflect the government’s greater awareness of the
comfort of its soldiers. Still, it was not until Culloden and the desire to make a statement
regarding the state’s military presence in Scotland that enough money was forthcoming to
build an effective fort at Ardersier.

In summation, this thesis is an extension of Colley’s argument that a sense of
‘Britishness’ was created by the common threat from France, by examining the relatively
neglected case that the Jacobites also provided a common threat. In so doing they acted
as a unifier of nationalities and fostered the sense of ‘Britishness’, manifested by Scottish
service in the British army. This thesis is thus a response to Colley’s request when she
stated that: “I have concentrated on civilian responses [to the growing idea of a British
nationality], rather than attitudes in the armed forces, which desperately need separate
and detailed attention.”\textsuperscript{15} Through the work summarised above, it has been shown that
‘Britishness’ manifested itself in Scots seeking service in the British army, so that

military service in the British army was a way for Scots to demonstrate support for the Glorious Revolution, Protestant Succession and Act of Union. The number of Scots who gave long-term service to the British army, as well as short-term service with the many forms of auxiliary forces extant in Scotland in the first half of the eighteenth century speaks of the widespread desire to serve the British state and corrects the simplification of Highlanders as ‘noble savages’ and victims of the Union and Great Britain, as created by the influence of Scottish Nationalism on recent Scottish history because of a desire to use history to influence today’s politics. What has been shown is that Scots across society and the country were politically aware and active, and viewed military service as an avenue to contribute to the safety, security and preservation of the British state and their own ambitions and interests.

The romanticisation and rehabilitation of the Highlander in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries under the influence of Walter Scott, Stewart of Garth and Scottish Nationalism has vilified the British army because of its presence at Culloden provides a clear, if inaccurate, watershed in the history of clan culture and the Jacobites. Therefore, symbolically, both Highlanders and Jacobites, as the last force to oppose the Union, have been used by the SNP to promote independence. However, it is argued here that the governance of Scotland was very much reliant on the support of Scotland’s civil and military elite and was not simply the product of an oppressive army imposing the will of London by force of arms. The construction of Scotland’s fortifications and infrastructure would not have been possible without the assistance of Scottish government officials, labourers and architects working with the government, the army
and the Ordnance Office. Similarly, policing duties that were rigidly controlled by newly created laws could not have been implemented without the cooperation of Scottish magistrates and JPs. Indeed, what emerges is an internecine society where Scots of all social levels faced difficult decisions of loyalty that had serious and far-reaching consequences. Religious principle, family ties, honour, money and pragmatism all had greater influence in the choice of loyalty than simple nationality.

Finally, the impact of the Union in 1707, and the official creation of the British army on a joint British Establishment, have been shown to be less significant to the history of the British army than earlier events. The legacy of royal power over both England and Scotland after the Union of Crowns in 1603 meant that at the Restoration, when a standing army rather than a ‘guards and garrison’ force was permitted for the first time, Charles II became the first monarch to command both Scottish and English Establishments in substantial numbers. Consequently, prior to the Union, Scottish and English regiments deployed to the continent during the Seven Years War and War of Spanish Succession, were acting together, controlled by the same man – even if he acted through two parliaments. It was at this stage, therefore, that the unofficial ‘British’ army – the Scottish and English regiments and their soldiers – developed in unison. After the Glorious Revolution they experienced the difficulties of two countries and nationalities working together within a context of mistrust created by the apparently Scottish dominated Jacobites as they attempted to overthrow the government and the Protestant Succession. Despite this, Scottish regiments continued to serve in the British army, as they had done prior to the Union and long before 1762 when Pitt the Elder claimed: “I
sought for merit wherever it could be found. It is my boast that I was the first minister of the Crown who looked for it and found it in the mountains of the North.”16

GLOSSARY

**Banquette** – A fighting platform behind the parapet of a fortification.

**Bastion** – A section of fortification that projects to allow increased covering-fire.

**Batardeau** – Dams within a ditch surrounding a fortification.

**Boll** – A unit of measurement used for grain.

**Broken-men** – Men without clan affiliation, therefore often engaged in reiving.

**Chirurgeon** – An alternate spelling of 'Surgeon', with the same pronunciation.

**Coronach** – The wail or shriek of woman as a lamentation to accompany a funeral in the Scottish Highlands and Ireland.

**Dùthchas** – The customary link between chiefs and their land that gave them responsibility for protecting and proportioning it.

**Écluse de chasse** – The entry sluice for flooding a ditch of a fortification.

**Écluse de fuite** – The exit sluice for flooding a ditch of a fortification.

**Enceinte** – An enclosure or wall of a fortified place.

**Enfilade** – The ability to fire along the length of a formation or position providing total covering-fire.

**Fiery cross** – A partially burnt cross carried across the lands of a clan to rally its clansmen for military service for their chief.

**Glacis** – A long slope surrounding a fortification outside its defences, kept bare to deny besiegers cover.

**Heritable Jurisdictions** – The inherited judicial power of chiefs.

**Heritor** – The gentry of the Scottish Highlands, whose lands are awarded from the chiefs in return for providing authority and services at a parish level.

**Matross** – The rank below gunners in the artillery train charged with assisting the gunners in traversing, sponging, loading and firing the pieces, as well as guarding them.

**Postern or sally-port** – A small door for sortie access from a fortification during sieges.

**Reiving** – The act of raiding with the purpose of robbery, traditionally of cattle.
Representative Peer – The twelve Scottish peers annually elected to sit in the House of Lords after the Union of 1707. Nominations were made by senior ministers appointed by the crown, who then gave final approval.

Trace Italienne – The principle of star-shaped fortifications that used triangular bastions to provide maximum enfilade fire.

Wapenshaw – The Old English name for a weapon-showing, where the state of weapons were inspected.
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APPENDIX NO. 1: MAP OF ‘NORTH BRITAIN’ DEPICTING THE ‘HIGHLAND LINE’, INCLUDING MAJOR TOWNS AND FORTIFICATIONS DISCUSSED IN THIS THESIS.
APPENDIX NO.2: MAP OF ‘NORTH BRITAIN’ INCLUDING BATTLEFIELDS.

1. 27th July 1689 –
   Battle of Killiecrankie

2. 13th November 1715 –
   Battle of Sheriffmuir

3. 10th June 1719 –
   Battle of Glenshiel

4. 21st September 1745 –
   Battle of Prestonpans

5. 17th January 1745 –
   Battle of Falkirk

6. 16th April 1745 –
   Battle of Culloden
TO THE MEMORY
OF
Lord Thomas Fraser of Lovat, who
chose rather to undergo the greatest
Hardships of Fortune than to part with
The ancient Honours of his house,
And bore these hardships with an undaunted Fortitude of Mind.

This monument erected
by Simon Lord Fraser of Lovat his son,
who likewise having undergone many and
great vicissitudes of good and bad fortune
Through the Malice of his Enemies, He, in the end,
At the Head of his Clan, forced his way to his
Paternal inheritance with his sword in his hand,
And relieved his kindred and followers
From oppression and slavery;
And both at Home and in foreign Countries,
By his eminent actions in the Warr and State,
He has acquired great honour and reputation.

APPENDIX NO.4: TRANSCRIPTION OF THE 1708 SCOTTISH MILITIA BILL
ENTITLED ‘AN ACT FOR THE SETTLING THE MILITIA OF THAT PART OF GREAT

An Act for settling the Militia of that Part of Great Brittain called Scotland.
Whereas the Militia of the severall Parts of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain were before the Union established in a different manner and it will be for the
Strengthening and perfecting of the Happy Union that the Militia of the whole United
Kingdom should be put on the same Establishment and Regulation Be it therefore
Enacted by the Queens most Excellent Majesty by and with the advice and Consent
of the Lords Spirituall and Temporall and Commons in this present Parliament
assembled and by the authority of the same That the Militia of that Part of Great
Britain called Scotland shall from hense forth be settled regulated and established
in the same Manner and Form as the Militia of that part of Great Britain called
England is now settled and regulated and established And that an Act of parliament
Made in England in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Year of the Reign of the late King Charles
the Second Instituted an Act for ordering the forces in the severall Counties of this
Kingdom and all other Acts of parliament made in England for the settling or
Ordering the Militia as far as they are now in force in England shall from and after
the first Day of May in the Year of Our Lord One thousand Seven hundred and Eight
extend to and be on Force throughout the whole Kingdom of Great Britain and that
all Lawes to the contrary thereof or inconsistent therewith shall from thenceforth
cease determine and become void And Whereas for furnishing Ammunition and
other Necessaries the respective Lieutenants and their Deputies in England have
power by the Lawes now in Force there to rate the respective Counties and places not
exceeding the whole in any one Year the proportion of a fourth part of one Months
Assessment in each County after the Rate of Seventy thousand Pounds by the Month
heretofore charged by an Act of parliament in England and the said respective Lieutenants
and Deputies have power to dispose of so much of the said fourth part of the
inferior officers for their Pains and Encouragement as to them the said Lieutenants
and Deputies shall seem expedient And Whereas the said method of assessment
was never used in Scotland Be it therefore Enacted That for furnishing ammunitions
and other Necessaries in that part of Great Britain called Scotland the respective
Lieutenants and Deputies or any Three or more of them shall have power to lay fitting
Rates upon the respective Counties and places not exceeding in the whole in any one
Year the fourth part of one Months Cess according to the proportions contained in an
Act passed this Session of parliament Entitled An Act for granting an Aid to her
Majesty to be raised by a Land Tax in Great Britain for the Service of the Year one
thousand Seven hundred and Eight which Monyes are to be assessed collected and
paid by such persons and according to such directions as shall be given from Time to
Time by the said respective Lieutenants and Deputies or any Three or more of them
last mentioned Act And it is hereby also Enacted that he said respective Lieutenants
and Deputies or any Three or more of them shall from Time to Time have power to
dispose of so much of the said fourth part to the Inferior Officers imploied in or
about the said respective forces for their Pains and Encouragement as to them the said
Lieutenants and Deputies or any Three or more of them shall seem expedient.
APPENDIX NO.5: TABLE OF THE CONSTRUCTION AND NAME CHANGES OF FORTIFICATIONS.

Fortifications in Inverness

Citadel of Inverness
- Built by Cromwell, located close to coast line by mouth of River Ness
- Destroyed by Charles II
- Repaired following 1689-90 Jacobite rebellions in Scotland and Ireland
- Site rejected by General Wade, 1724, in favour of Inverness Castle’s location
- Still in use as barracks, 1745-6

Inverness Castle
- Medieval castle, located on south bank of River Ness within the town
- Repaired following 1689-90 Jacobite rebellions in Scotland and Ireland
- Barrack blocks added in 1716
- Site re-used for fort built under General Wade, 1727-1745
- Named Fort George in 1727
- Fell after two day siege, 21st February 1746
- Site rejected by General Skinner, 1747, as unsound

Fort George at Ardersier
- Located outside Inverness on spit of land over-looking Moray Firth at Ardersier
- Site chosen by General Skinner, who also designed the fort
- Built 1747-69

Fortifications in the town of Fort William

Inverlochy Castle
- Located further inland than the citadel, on River Lochy
- Originally thirteenth century ancestral seat of Cromyn family
- Used as temporary outpost to Fort William; earth ramparts built up on outer wall c.1690 and wooden barracks extant c.1711

Citadel of Inverlochy
- Located at head of Loch Linnhe
- Built on orders of Cromwell, 1658
- Destroyed on orders of Charles II
- Repaired following 1689-90 Jacobite rebellions in Scotland and Ireland

Fort William
- Site of citadel re-used for fort built under General Mackay, 1690
- Named Fort William
- Besieged March-April 1746 but did not fall
APPENDIX NO.6: PHOTOGRAPH OF THE GRAVESTONE OF NELY BR[AY]ON, IN CRAIGS CEMETERY, FORT WILLIAM.