Self and Other in the Theology of Robert Barclay

by

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Abstract

The thesis studies the Quaker thought of Robert Barclay (1648-90), focusing upon his theological views on the relationship between self and others, from his soteriology to peace testimony. The thesis has two main objects; the first is to raise the question about the modern view of Barclay. His theology has long been negatively treated as an exterior or foreign factor by the present Liberal Quakers’ self-affirmative theology. The second is to explore another possibility of understanding Quakerism and its practical applications in pacifism, from a different viewpoint than the empirical, individualistic one today. The whole research is conducted by using the concept of self as the central axis for analysis.

By analysing Barclay’s theology and his peace testimony, and placing them within the contexts of traditional Christianity, the thesis indicates the other-absent character of Liberal Quakerism, and it shows an old-new Christian task that Quakers take on as a testimony to God and to Christ’s openness towards others. The specific themes are (1): ‘self-denial’ in Barclay’s theology as a counter-faith against self-reductive orthodox Calvinism and Arminianism, (2): Peculiarity of Liberal Quakerism and their historiography endorsed by an unexamined premise of self-affirmation, and the re-estimation of Barclay from that viewpoint, (3): Liberals’ self-centred orientation in pacifism in their simple belief in the calculability and reducibility of others, (4): The double-stance, or the possibility and impossibility, in Barclay’s view on perfection and the Kingdom, which is the reflection of self-other relations, as well described in Barclay’s theoretical connection of perfection to Christ’s command to ‘love one’s enemies,’ (5): the Church as a place to embody the Kingdom, and its practical extension to the entire world in pacifism, for the realisation of the Godly rule beyond the self-contained logic.
# Table of Contents

**Introductory Chapter** .................................................................................................................. 1

I. Foreword .......................................................................................................................................... 1

II. Topic and Aims in Detail .................................................................................................................. 5

III. Liberal Quakerism and Quakerism in Japan .................................................................................. 9

IV. Relationship to Previous Scholarship ............................................................................................ 13

1. Robert Barclay’s Theology .............................................................................................................. 13

2. Quaker Peace Testimony .................................................................................................................. 16

V. Thesis Outline ................................................................................................................................... 19

VI. Additions ......................................................................................................................................... 24

## Part I

1. **Issues of Self: The Meaning of Passiveness in Barclay’s Theology** ...................................... 27

   Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 27

   1. 1. Free Will in Christ’s Redemption ............................................................................................... 30

      1. 1. 1. Free Will in Orthodox Calvinism ......................................................................................... 31

      1. 1. 2. Free Will in Barclay’s Redemption ...................................................................................... 36

   1. 2. The Light against the Double Predestination of Calvinism .................................................... 39

      1. 2. 1. The Nature of Inward Light .................................................................................................. 39

      1. 2. 2. Criticism of the Double Predestination ............................................................................... 43

      1. 2. 3. Self-Denial: Relationship between Salvation and Free Will ............................................. 44

   1. 3. The Self as *Cogito* ..................................................................................................................... 47
2. Changes of Self Concept in Quakerism and the Liberal Historical View

Introduction

2. 1. The Self of the Early Quakers: Fox’s Universal Redemption and Perfection

2. 2. The Self in the Period of the Restoration: Bathurst’s ‘Time of Sorrow’

2. 3. The Self in Quietism and Evangelism

2. 3. 1. Quietist Quakerism and Evangelical Quakerism

2. 3. 2. Scott’s Emphasis on the Inward Birth of Christ

2. 3. 3. Tuke’s Presentation of Orthodox and Traditional Quakerism

2. 4. The Self in Liberal Quakers

2. 4. 1. Analysis Points of Liberal Quaker Theology

2. 4. 2. The Self in Liberal Quakers: Faith as God’s Self-Expansion

a. Human Self-Realisation towards the Larger Self

b. Human Conjunctive Nature of God through Conscience

c. The Authority of Conscience and Its Expansion through Education

2. 4. 3. The Estimation of Barclay’s Theology: Liberal Historiography

Summary
Part II

3. Quaker Peace Testimony in the Twentieth Century .............................................. 148

Introduction .............................................................................................................. 148

3. 1. Niebuhr’s Criticism of Liberal Quaker Pacifism .............................................. 150

3. 1. 1. Liberal Quakers’ Attitudes towards Peace ................................................ 150

3. 1. 2. Niebuhr’s Criticism of Liberal Quaker Pacifism ........................................ 152

3. 2. Counterarguments from Pacifists to Niebuhr ................................................ 157

3. 2. 1. Counterarguments from Quakers ............................................................... 157

3. 2. 2. Counterarguments from John H. Yoder ...................................................... 159

3. 2. 3. Counterarguments from Stanley Hauerwas ............................................... 163

3. 3. Philosophical Insights on Violence ............................................................... 173

3. 3. 1. Being and Violence: Theoretical Bottleneck of Liberal Quakerism ......... 173

3. 3. 2. Philosophical Analysis on Niebuhr’s Criticism: Openness to Others .... 180

Summary ................................................................................................................. 186

Part III

4. Perfectionism and God’s Kingdom ................................................................. 190

Introduction .............................................................................................................. 190

4. 1. Perfectionism in the Christian Tradition ....................................................... 193

4. 1. 1. Perfection in Jesus and the Early Church .................................................. 194

4. 1. 2. Perfection in the Church Fathers and the Reformation Theology ........... 201

4. 1. 3. Perfection in the Theology of John Wesley .............................................. 215
4. 2. Barclay on Perfectionism ................................................................. 220
   4. 2. 1. Four Elements in Christian Perfectionism .............................. 220
   4. 2. 2. Quaker Perfectionism in Christian History ............................. 224
   4. 2. 3. Barclay’s Perfectionism and God’s Kingdom ........................... 226
Summary .................................................................................................. 236

5. Barclay’s Ecclesiology and Peace Testimony ...................................... 239
   Introduction .......................................................................................... 239
   5. 1. Barclay’s Ecclesiology .................................................................. 241
      5. 1. 1. The Necessity of Establishing a Church System ...................... 241
      5. 1. 2. Power and Authority of the Church ........................................ 248
      5. 1. 3. Open or Closed Community .................................................. 254
   5. 2. Barclay’s Testimony on Peace ....................................................... 261
      5. 2. 1. Barclay’s Peace Testimony ..................................................... 262
      5. 2. 2. The Church’s Relationship with Civil Power ............................ 267
         a. Freedom of Conscience and Commonwealth ............................ 267
         b. National Church and Sectarian Church ..................................... 271
      5. 2. 3. Church as the Place of Reconciliation and Setting-up of Role Model 275
         a. The Necessity of Narrative Scheme for Human Existence ............ 277
         b. Task of Testifying to Peace in a Quaker Way ............................. 280
   5. 3. The Significance of Barclay’s Peace Testimony in Present Times .... 286
Summary .................................................................................................. 293
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................... 299

I. Summary and Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 299

i. The Meaning of Passiveness in Barclay’s Theology ............................................................ 299

ii. Changes of Self Concept in Quakerism and the Liberal Historical View .......................... 301

iii. Quaker Peace Testimony in the Twentieth Century ............................................................. 303

iv. Perfectionism and God’s Kingdom ......................................................................................... 305

v. Barclay’s Ecclesiology and Peace Testimony ......................................................................... 307

vi. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 309

II. Original Points of the Thesis .................................................................................................... 310

III. Areas of Future Research ........................................................................................................ 315

Bibliography ................................................................................................................................... 320

Lists of Figures

Figure 1 ........................................................................................................................................... 35

Figure 2 ........................................................................................................................................... 45

Figure 3 ........................................................................................................................................... 105

Figure 4 ........................................................................................................................................... 184

Figure 5 ........................................................................................................................................... 298

Note: Except where cited by other authors, the Bible translation used is the King James Version.
Introductory Chapter

There [on the Cross] the essential act of Baptism was carried out, entirely without our co-operation, and even without our faith. There the whole world was baptised on the ground of the absolutely sovereign act of God, who in Christ ‘first loved us’ (1 John 4. 19) before we loved him, even before we believed. –Oscar Cullmann¹

I. Foreword

In a broader context, this thesis aims to reexamine the modernistic value of ‘self’ and reconsider a social model in modern society. It is usually said that Modernism emphasises the principles of ‘individuality,’ ‘freedom,’ ‘autonomy’ and ‘self-decision’; values which are believed in free democratic nations to be supreme achievements accomplished through long-term struggles against the medieval feudal bondage.² However, individualism has been held captive by the desire to control and oppress others. The present age has experienced such realities as the two world wars, in which individuals were violently recollected into ‘Meta narrative’ or ‘Grand narrative,’ such as ‘God,’ ‘Nationalism’ and ‘Ethnocentrism.’³ As a result of

² Erich Fromm, *The Fear of Freedom*, reprinted, ed. (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 30. Whether this image of ‘bondage’ is correct or not, the motif of being emancipated from old restrictions has been repeatedly used for the reproduction and reinforcement of Liberals’ self-understanding, in which they attempt to establish and prove the legitimacy of their value of freedom by depicting the liberation as the battle between authentic sides and false sides. Not surprisingly, such a motif can be also found in the establishment of Liberal Quakerism in the justification of their own ideology and historiography. This is one of the research subjects to be explored in the thesis.
this experience, some people began to go farther to deny the social dimension of community and seem to discard a communal sense of human society under the slogan of freedom. Many small narratives and personal stories have emerged in this process, and these stories are kept by smaller groups of people that exist together around the world. These persons and small groups are usually indifferent to one another; however, if there is a conflict of interest between them, their relationships can be aggressive, or even violent. If it were not so, people today would simply identify themselves with different, larger narratives such as ‘pseudo-religion,’ ‘fundamentalism’ and ‘anonymous public opinion.’ In a sense, new narratives that speak of domination led by individuals have replaced old narratives that speak of domination led by a particular social class or group. Despite this ironic fact, people have not yet been able to discover a way to escape such situations, and they seldom question the values of ‘individuality’ and ‘self’ as their basic frame of reference. This is partly because these values have been tightly linked with a modernistic, science-molded simple view of truth; namely, truth as discovered by subjectivity and verified by its experience and actions is the truth. Certainly, empiricism or positivism has advanced our knowledge in natural science and technology, but even in the areas of value-judgment involved, such as religion, morality and history, it allows members of a discussions on ‘Grand narrative’ and counterarguments developed during the last several decades, but to consider what sort of narrative the Christian Gospel in Quakerism can present to the present days, whilst admitting that, after all, humans must be built into some traditional or social scheme for their existence. The topic will be explored in 5.2.3. in this thesis.


5 ‘[Karl] Barth took issue with liberalism at this strong point, the assimilation of the results and processes of modern science to the Christian faith, the sufficiency of psychology and mysticism as accounts of religious experience, the welcoming acceptance of secular culture and an involvement in social and political life resting on the belief that progress and the Kingdom of God were the same thing.’ (John Punshon, *Portrait in Grey: A Short History of the Quakers* (London: Quaker Home Service, 1984), p. 248).

6 This idea is also related to the principles of ‘autonomy’ and ‘self-decision.’

7 Speaking of Quakerism, Gwyn’s study presents four moments of truth that have been used as the framework of interpretation of truth since early Quakerism: ‘correspondence theory,’ ‘coherence theory,’ ‘operationalist theory,’ and ‘pragmatism.’ By using these philosophical aspects, he analyses the early Quaker experience of transformation and argues about the possibility of dialogues within and outside of Quakerism in the future
society to cry out ‘My truth is truth,’ assuming that what they cannot see and what they cannot understand is non-existence.\(^8\)

Many academic attempts to re-question Modernism and many efforts to construct a new social model have been made in various fields. The main theme of the thesis is to explore this problem as it relates to the field of Quaker studies. Specifically, my intention is to examine Liberal Quaker religion that is based on the appreciation of the self, (more precisely to borrow Dandelion’s term, ‘liberal-Liberal Quakerism\(^9\)’), which seems to have been fallen into the same narrow path as other modern schools of thought in the absence of others.\(^10\) The research especially reexamines so-called second generation Quakerism and its core message of ‘self-denial,’ reflectively in order to reconsider the ideological values of Liberal Quakerism. This core tenet, self-denial, has been much negatively criticised by the self-praising stance of Liberalism. The thesis discovers a way to view self-other relations that was actually unveiled in the traditional Christian message, and by doing so, it explores a new possibility of offering a story about God and his peaceful Kingdom as a social model within the Quaker peace testimony.

All traditions are invented traditions, and there is no tradition where its followers are conscious of the traditional nature from its beginning. Tradition is something reorganised and projected to

\(^8\) According to Rorty, the mind of the west—the mind that is understood especially from the perspectives of Cartesian and Kantian philosophies—has been tightly connected to the ocular metaphor: that is to say, ‘a special Glassy Essence which enables human beings to mirror nature.’ (Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 13 and 37). The ocular metaphor, in a common view, is easily transformed into the belief that what one cannot see does not exist.


I will further clarify what I mean by the term ‘Liberal Quakerism’ in section III of this chapter.

\(^10\) Dandelion, An Introduction to Quakerism, pp. 151-152.
the past, in order to create and maintain the present (or future) value system within societies or communities. Quakerism is no exception. The traditional religious identity of Quakerism, which was passed down to the present generation to some degree, was created by Quakers’ theological formation and establishment of their church system around the period of the Restoration, after the political and ideological chaos in the earlier Quaker movements in the 1650s.\textsuperscript{11} The same thing may be said of Liberal Quakerism. Liberals developed their particular religious identity, by utilising the historical heritage of the Quakers, to adapt to the modernistic sense of the time.\textsuperscript{12} Of course, the formation of tradition or historical identity is not wrong in itself. Human beings are raised and nurtured by their own cultures, learning the patterns of feeling, thought, and relevant behaviour within a community. Without learning from these cultural models, people could not live a common life. The problem is, however, whether or not a tradition or social narrative works well in real situations. If it is dysfunctional, the only choice is to reform the model. I do not intend to say that Quakerism today has failed in all aspects, nor that Liberal Quakers are all uniform in faith and practice, but that we should reconsider whether Liberal theology is able to respond to the changing social and political situations within and outside of the community, or whether it confines itself to its own internal self-world.\textsuperscript{13} Christian theology, and also Quaker theology, should take on the task of answering the questions about the current state of affairs in a constructive way, while respecting the deep roots of its tradition.


II. Topic and Aims in Detail

The Religious Society of Friends (commonly called the Quakers) has borne testimonies against, and actively engaged in, various social problems.\textsuperscript{14} It is especially known as one of the Historic Peace Churches, along with the Mennonites and Brethrens, and it is renowned for its peace-making efforts on various levels.\textsuperscript{15} As is sometimes pointed out, the underlying principle of their social activity is their faith in inward light.\textsuperscript{16} This inward light is, in some way, related to the interiority of human beings, in that God’s light is believed to be endowed and planted into the human heart by Christ’s redemptive death.\textsuperscript{17} In this sense, changes in the concept of self are closely linked to changes in views of the light within, and even changes in pacifist thought. For example, for early Quakers, inward light was considered to strongly contrast human mental faculties, such as reason, will and conscience.\textsuperscript{18} Therefore, Quakers urged that human beings should bring their selves to nothingness, to receive and partake in inward light, and to silently listen to the word of God.\textsuperscript{19} Early Quakers presented their peace testimony out of this understanding. George Fox (1624-91), the founder of the Quaker movement, says in his \textit{Journal}, ‘The Spirit of Christ brings us to seek the peace and good of all men, and to live peaceably; and leads us from such evil works and actions as the magistrates’ sword takes hold on.’\textsuperscript{20} A

\textsuperscript{14} Originally, pacifism did not exist from the beginning of the Quaker movement in the 1650s (Barry Reay, \textit{The Quakers and the English Revolution} (London: Temple Smith, 1985), p. 107). Moore argues that Quaker pacifism was intended to survive in the severe situations that were full of political pressures and persecutions in the Restoration period (Moore, \textit{The Light in their Conscience}, p. 181).
\textsuperscript{15} See the article of ‘Friends, Society of’ in L. Cross (1\textsuperscript{st} ed.), E. A. Livingstone (3\textsuperscript{rd} ed.), ed., \textit{The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church}, 3\textsuperscript{rd} ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
\textsuperscript{16} Howard H. Brinton, \textit{Friends for 300 Years: The History and Belief of the Society of Friends since George Fox Started the Quaker Movement} (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952), p. 29.
\textsuperscript{20} Nickalls, \textit{The Journal of George Fox}, p. 699.
Declaration from the Harmless and Innocent People of God called Quakers (1661), which has been the basis of Quakers testimonies against war;\(^{21}\) also offers a clear statement:

> by the Word of God’s power and its effectual operation in the hearts of men, the kingdoms of this world may become the kingdoms of the Lord, and of his Christ, that he may rule and reign in men by his spirit and truth, that thereby all people ...may be brought into love and unity with God, and one with another\(^{22}\)

As shall be seen in the third chapter, however, such a basic stance on peace issues has considerably changed particularly under the influence of Liberal theology in the twentieth century. Liberal Quakers have come to place a great emphasis upon human conscience and reason, considering these faculties to be deified and sinless. They go so far as to believe God’s light to be merely an attribute of humanity, ‘that of God in everyone.’\(^{23}\) Rufus M. Jones (1863-1948), one of the most influential figures within earlier Liberal Quakerism, states that ‘conscience is both divine and human. In origin it goes back to the very moral nature of God himself.’\(^{24}\) For him, ‘conscience’ is even a synonym for ‘self-conciousness’ as thinking process, or reason.\(^{25}\) This means that a divine and sinless nature is extended even to human subjectivity. Thus, in contrast to early Quakers who regarded the mental fact as different from God’s light,\(^{26}\) human nature came to be considered as sacred: namely, humanised God. The belief in this


\(^{22}\) Nickalls, *The Journal of George Fox*, p. 400.


\(^{26}\) Barclay, *Apology*, pp. 142-146.
capacity for goodness and respect towards each other’s innate divinity came to be believed as the basis for, and the effective means of, Quaker peace-making efforts. Nevertheless, it is a well-known fact that a neo-orthodox theologian named Reinhold Niebuhr (1892-1971), one of the most influential theologians in the United States political sphere, harshly criticised the optimistic belief of the Liberal Quakers during the rise of Nazi Germany in the 1930s and 40s.

In Niebuhr’s view, Liberal pacifism including the Quaker version was an irresponsible attempt to escape from the harsh reality of social conflicts and wars, and to forget the very fact that human beings, as long as they live, cannot avoid participating in sin (violent relations with others). For this reason, humans must take responsibility of realising relative justices in the world. Certainly, his criticism is right to the point. Liberalism has a kind of theoretical difficulty: namely, the total absence of otherness in the identification of God with the self, as Niebuhr claims, which led to the naïve understanding of the world, and to the oblivion of others.

These things considered, Quakers’ ways of self-understanding, or the ways of viewing the self, have a close relationship with their paradigms on God and practical social applications, especially in the peace testimony. Therefore, in this thesis, I address the questions of how to recognise others as otherness and how to properly establish self-other relations, by retrospectively and reflexively examining Quaker soteriology, perfectionism, ecclesiology and

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29 Bennett, ‘Niebuhr’s Social Ethics,’ p. 49 and 66.
30 Bennett, ‘Niebuhr’s Social Ethics,’ pp. 68-69.
32 The matter of absence of others or otherness in Liberal Quakerism will be theologically and philosophically explored in details in the second and third chapters in this thesis.
eschatology, mainly focusing upon the concept of ‘self’ and its neighbouring ideas, such as ‘reason,’ ‘will’ and ‘conscience.’ This is done in order to facilitate an extended discussion of the Quakers’ peace and justice movement. Particularly, here I want to focus on the theology of Robert Barclay (1648-90), one of the leading figures of early Quakerism, who systematised Quaker faith for the powerful defence of this group against persecution from orthodox Calvinism.\textsuperscript{33} Barclay, I would say, who lived during the period when the Medieval framework transformed into Modernism, consciously followed a different path from René Descartes (1596-1650) and his modern thought ‘cogito ergo sum,’ a principle which is characterised by the reduction of all things into subjectivity.\textsuperscript{34} Barclay provides us with an old-new Quaker perspective on self-other relations, when the concept of otherness is neglected in Liberal reductionism.

The specific research themes of Barclay’s theology are about:

(1) Barclay’s universal redemption that is the core part of his theology, which has long been misread in Liberal ideology. The theme is explored as a preparatory study of Barclay’s view on otherness.

(2) Barclay’s theological viewpoint on self-other relations; this point is clarified most thoroughly in his perfectionism and his view of the Kingdom, both of which ideas are summarised by Christ’s command to ‘love one’s enemies.’

(3) Barclay’s application of these two ideas in the practical dimensions of ecclesiastical and


\textsuperscript{34} In regard to the matter of whether or not Barclay is Cartesian, there is an intense controversy especially between Hugh S. Pyper and R. Melvin Keiser. See the section III in this Introductory Chapter. This topic will be also fully dealt with in the first chapter of my thesis.
social activities; especially pacifism is explored to show the characteristics of Barclay’s peace testimony which is narrated within the theological framework of inward light as otherness.

(4) The potentiality for Barclay’s theology, which refuted orthodox Calvinism in the seventeenth century, to reply to the criticism of present Quaker pacifism leveled by neo-orthodoxy, and to respond to present political and pluralistic situations.

This research, in its entirety, also intends to relativise Liberals’ self-oriented religious value, and to reconsider the Neo-Hegelian historical view, which is eager for the final completion of the self in the unity with the Self of God. The whole research is designed to ensure that Quakerism will rediscover the importance of its characteristic tenet of ‘inward light’ as a counter-message against the humanistic logic of self-respect, self-reward and self-retribution.

III. Liberal Quakerism and Quakerism in Japan

It is necessary to define the term ‘Liberal Quakerism’ as Liberal Quakerism is encompassed within my re-examination of the conventional estimation of Barclay’s theology. It is difficult to make a clear definition about who liberal Quakers are and what Liberal Quakerism is. Liberal Quakers are theologically diverse, and also they operate without a creed. However, many researchers attempt to portray theological features of Liberal Quakerism. For instance, Martin Davie argues that since the Manchester Conference, which was held in 1895, Quakerism has accepted Liberal theology, which was fitted for the wider currents of modern

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35 Davie, *British Quaker Theology*, p. 137.
36 Dandelion, *An Introduction to Quakerism*, p. 137.
37 Davie, *British Quaker Theology*, p. 58. See also Elizabeth Isichei, *Victorian Quakers* (London: Oxford
thought, on the initiative of university-educated young Quakers such as Jones, John Wilhelm Rowntree (1868-1905), and John W. Graham (1859-1932). They thus transformed the Quaker faith into a religion which differed ‘substantially from both the core of conviction [the basis of Christian beliefs] and the Quaker tradition.' The theological features are (1) its acceptance of the scholarly results of modern science such as Darwinism and biblical criticism, (2) its progressive view of history, and sense of more intimate relation of humans with God through his immanence, (3) its emphasis upon experience as the primary base of religious truth rather than the Bible.

Since the 1960s, Liberal Quaker ideology, keeping its basic tenets such as the adaptation to modern thought, immanent God, and empiricism, has further changed somewhat to the extreme in terms of its religious diversity, namely diverse-religious interpretations of deity. Pink Dandelion calls this present-day radical orientation of Quakerism ‘liberal-Liberal Quakerism.’ He says:

That set of characteristics [underpinned by their rationalist modernist approach], so rooted in experience and its interpretation in changing times, each new revelation with more authority than the last, allowed and then encouraged Liberal Quakerism to be a religious enterprise always on the move. The term ‘liberal-Liberal Quakerism’ is used here to describe this pluralistic and

38 Davie, British Quaker Theology, p. 57 and 67. See also Isichei, Victorian Quakers, pp. 40-42.
39 Davie, British Quaker Theology, p. 75.
40 Davie, British Quaker Theology, p. 137. In regard to Davie’s definition of the core of conviction of Christianity, refer to pp. 6-8.
41 Davie, British Quaker Theology, pp. 67-74. See also Isichei, Victorian Quakers, pp. 33-39.
42 Davie, British Quaker Theology, p. 268. For the details of Liberal ideological developments since the 1960s, see the fifth and sixth chapters. See also Dandelion, An Introduction to Quakerism, pp. 133-134.
consequential modification of earlier Liberal Quakerism.  

From a sociological viewpoint, Dandelion attempts to identify the nature of the present-day Quakerism with ‘the behavioral creed,’ in contrast to creedal systems of belief in other churches. This behavioural creed, Dandelion argues, is a particular characteristic of Liberal Quakerism today. He argues that Quakers have ‘a credal attitude to form or practice,’ which actually functions to regulate the behavioural patterns of members within Quaker meetings as a place for seeking for truth. This means that the members of the Religious Society are tolerated in terms of what they believe, but constrained on how they perform their Quakerism. As long as Friends conform to the behavioural patterns, it does not matter whether they are ‘Muslim, Hindu, Sikh, and Buddhist Quakers, theist and non-theist, agnostic and atheist.’

Japanese Quakerism, with which my research is contextually concerned, can be said to be marked by both of the early and present-day features of Liberal Quakerism. Quaker faith was first introduced into Japan in 1885 by Philadelphia Yearly Meeting (orthodox). Protestant Christianity including Quakerism was adopted mainly by the intellectual elite, who hoped that

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43 Dandelion, An Introduction to Quakerism, p. 134.
44 Dandelion, An Introduction to Quakerism, p. 137.
45 Dandelion, An Introduction to Quakerism, pp. 134-137.
46 Dandelion, An Introduction to Quakerism, p. 137.
47 Dandelion, An Introduction to Quakerism, p. 134.
49 Drummond says ‘the bulk of the leadership and a relatively large part of the memberships of the church [in Japan] until well into the twentieth century were drawn from these samurai’ (Richard H. Drummond, A History of Christianity in Japan (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1971), p. 168). They were actually the samurai clans who supported Tokugawa Shogunate and who was defeated in the civil wars between the old regime and the Meiji government. In the subsequent ages, they were excluded from the fields of politics and administration, and therefore, they found their places in society by engaging in educational and social activities through Christianity (Dohi, A History of Protestant Christianity, pp. 43-44).
the western spirit of Christianity would make a contribution to the modernisation of the country after the Meiji Restoration (1868), (and would contribute to the establishment of a new liberal democratic and pacifist regime after the Second World War).\(^{50}\) This caused a serious issue how Japanese Christians should think of the traditional religious contexts, such as Shinto, Buddhism and Confucianism,\(^{51}\) but particularly it was claimed by its new adherents that Quakerism was the most appropriate and most easy-accessible western religion for the Japanese people. Inazo Nitobe (1862-1933)\(^{52}\) says that ‘they [Christian sermons and books] were not at all convincing to me. Only in Quakerism could I reconcile Christianity and with Oriental thought.’\(^{53}\) Thus, Quaker faith has been optimistically accepted as a universal method of self-cultivation which would nurture a consequential development of the entire society and the world.\(^ {54}\) As a result of the syncretism with the traditional religions (which stress the awakening of real self or moral development),\(^{55}\) Japanese Quakerism has further enhanced its own liberal modernist

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51 Confucianism had been the main ethical base of the ex-ruling class, namely the samurai class, who constituted the larger part of Japanese Christians after the Meiji Restoration. For some Christians, such as Joseph Hardy Neesima (1843-90), a founder of the Doshisha schools, Confucianism was detestable in its tyrannical nature, whilst for many other Christians the dedication to Jesus Christ was understood in terms of the samurai loyalty to the lord (Drummond, A History of Christianity in Japan, p. 178).

52 Inazo Nitobe was a central figure in Japanese Quakerism. He is still symbolic within the movement in Japan. He was an agriculturist, educator, and also worked as the under-secretary-general of the Leagues of Nations from the years of 1920 to 1926, so that he would be a bridge between Japan and the western countries. See the article of ‘Nitobe Inazo’ in Gen Itasaka, ed. Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1983).


54 ‘the Confucian idea of benevolence – dare I also add the Buddhist idea of pity? – will expand into the Christian conception of love. Men have become more than subjects, having grown to the estate of citizen; nay, they are more than citizens – being man.’ (Inazo Nitobe, Bishido, The Soul of Japan: An Exposition of Japanese Thought, 10th revised and enlarged ed. (New York: G P. Putnam’s Sons, 1905), p. 186).

55 Nitobe found the similarity between Christianity and oriental thoughts in terms of cosmic consciousness, namely the same idea found in early Liberal Quakerism: ‘Eastern philosophy loves to contemplate on the identity of individual life with the life of the Whole, ...this cosmic consciousness is the experience of many minds among all the races of the world. It is an experience whereby man is convinced beyond a shadow of doubt that he is a Spirit and that his Spirit is in close communion with the Spirit of the Universe.’ (Nitobe, ‘A Japanese View of Quakerism,’ pp. 337-338). He continues that ‘The central doctrine of Quakerism is the belief in this Cosmic sense which they call the Inner Light’ (Nitobe, ‘A Japanese View of Quakerism,’ p. 340).
orientation: for instance, as a seeking attitude towards personal spiritual authenticity to help identify the true self, through meditation. I have written this thesis out of this Japanese context; and from these socio-ideological wider contexts within Quakerism, the thesis uses the term of ‘liberal’ to refer to the features of this form of present-day Quakerism, such as empiricism, a mystical interpretation of faith, an optimistic view of human nature in terms of its conjunction with the divine, and religious pluralism unbound by a creed.

IV. Relationship to Previous Scholarship

1. Robert Barclay’s Theology

Barclay was highly approved of by Fox and other Quaker leaders in the seventeenth century for his vindication of the religion, and even now, he is generally estimated to have been a leading theologian of the movement. However, opinions are divided in academic fields as to whether Barclay has truly made a large contribution to Quakerism. On one hand, in the early twentieth century, researchers such as Jones and William C. Braithwaite (1862-1922) accused Barclay of being the main cause of Quakers’ decline, namely Quietism in the eighteenth century. Jones states that ‘Robert Barclay … held the central positions of the continental quietists, and that his Apology is one of the main direct sources of Quaker Quietism.’

Braithwaite says, ‘it [Barclay’s explanation of the Light] is not an adequate expression of the living Quaker experience and would become the parent of a spiritual passivity whose negations

56 Brinton, *Friends for 300 Years*, p. 31. See also Cadbury, *Robert Barclay*, p. 11 and 62.
57 According to Jones, the characteristic of Quietism is a sharp separation between the sphere of natural world and supernatural world (Rufus M. Jones, *The Later Periods of Quakerism*, vol. 1. (London: Macmillan and Co., 1921), p. 35).
would react disastrously in later periods of the Society.⁵⁹ Along the same line, Hugh S. Pyper accuses Barclay’s theology of its Cartesian dualistic way of thinking, and for its failure to express a living experience and a dynamic relationship with God and Christ.⁶⁰

On the other hand, Barclay’s works have come to be closely re-read and his theology has been reevaluated since the middle of the twentieth century. For instance, Howard Brinton argues that Barclay enabled Quaker thought to survive by reinterpreting it in his time, and he regards Barclay’s Apology to be ‘the most complete interpretation that we have of Quakerism as thought about.’⁶¹ D. E. Trueblood appreciates that Barclay intellectually refined the simple messages of the early Quakers, saying ‘Without Fox, Barclay would have had very little to say, but without Barclay, what Fox said would have been forgotten.’⁶² Concerning Barclay’s relation to Descartes, Trueblood also argues that there is a big contrast between Descartes and Barclay, for the latter’s theology relies not on rationalism, but on a direct spiritual experience.⁶³ J. Phillip Wragge, in his studying of Barclay’s theological connection to his colleague, George Keith (1638-1716), asserts that Barclay played a special role in guarding Quakerism against orthodox Calvinism and Pelagianism,⁶⁴ by showing living and saving heart knowledge of God.⁶⁵ Furthermore, Wragge argues that Barclay’s spiritual passivity, which is criticised by Braithwaite, is intended to safeguard the work of Christ against human efforts to reach God, such as the efforts of Pelagians and modern Quakers.⁶⁶ When R. Melvin Keiser builds a counterargument

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⁶¹ Brinton, *Friends for 300 Years*, p. viii.
⁶² Trueblood, *Robert Barclay*, p. 3.
especially against Pyper, he asserts that Barclay certainly uses Cartesian categories to find the common ground with his opponents, but he explains his own religious experience by using a non-dualistic ‘relational method.’

In short, these arguments about Barclay are generally about whether or not his theology is dualism, (or whether there is a sharp separation between subject and object, mind and body, or humanity and God, etc.), and more often about whether or not Barclay fails to fully express a living faith in God. However, as Trueblood rightly points out, all human discourses are essentially dualistic, and so even these critiques concerning Barclay, in fact, end in dualism. (To illustrate the point, both Pyper and Keiser’s discussions fall into a sort of dualism, as they regard dualism to be ‘unessential’ and non-dualism to be ‘essential’). Speaking from a different angle, these conflicting estimations of Barclay result from the fact that the researchers understand human nature in different ways and from different perspectives. Jones and Braithwaite have an optimistic view of humanity, and consider the self to be divine and sacred. Pyper also seems to have an optimistic view; he believes that one can easily overcome, and escape the boundaries of dualistic ways of thinking, when identifying Barclay’s theology as a form of Cartesian dualism. (Furthermore, when Pyper condemns Barclay for giving no details as to how a person can be religiously saved, he incomprehensibly omits Barclay’s main motif of self-denial

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67 R. Melvin Keiser, ‘Touched and Knit in the Life: Barclay’s Relational Theology and Cartesian Dualism,’ *Quaker Studies*, vol. 5/2, (2001): 141-164, p. 162. According to Keiser, the relational method is the way of ‘relating to selves open in their depth and to the divine presence moving in their midst.’ (Keiser, ‘Touched and Knit in the Life,’ p. 142).
69 Pyper, ‘Resisting the Inevitable,’ pp. 17-18. Pyper points out Barclay’s lacking of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. He argues that the Holy Spirit enables us to establish a dynamic relationship with humanity and God. Whether his judgment on Barclay’s theology is correct or not, however, it should be admitted that the work of God through the Spirit could have no power and meanings for human beings, without being recognised by them. In a sense, even the work of God or the Spirit cannot escape from the reduction into human subjectivity and its dualistic way of expression.
for salvation and reconciliation.\textsuperscript{70} It may seem that Pyper assumes the self to be the fundamental essence of reality, which cannot and need not be re-questioned nor problematised, despite his criticism of modern philosophy. Meanwhile, Brinton holds that in contrast to the idealists of the late nineteenth century, people have come to have a more pessimistic view of human nature after the two world wars in the previous century.\textsuperscript{71} Keiser admits to human limitations, or their dualistic inclination, but at the same time, he finds a non-rational and relational dimension in human depth.\textsuperscript{72} In sum, just as Wragge asserts,\textsuperscript{73} these researchers’ understanding of the self can be said to mirror their discussions and estimations of Barclay’s theology. Therefore, I choose not to address the bottlenecking problem of dualism, as it results from the nature of language activity itself, but I think it better to focus my thesis upon the issues of ‘self-identity’ and ‘self-other relations,’ and to consider Barclay’s peace testimony and its significance in present times by thoroughly examining Quakerism from these viewpoints.

2. Quaker Peace Testimony

There are many precedent studies that deal with Quaker peace testimony. As examples in historical science, Peter Brock and Thomas C. Kennedy make detailed surveys of Quaker peace testimony, the former from 1660-1914, and the latter from 1860-1920.\textsuperscript{74} In regard to the present-day Liberal pacifism since the twentieth century, Jung Jiseok provides a useful perspective on its nature. As partially observed above, he analyses Liberal Quaker peace

\textsuperscript{70} Pyper, ‘Resisting the Inevitable,’ pp. 13-14. According to Barclay, a Christian must ‘know the natural will in its own proper motions crucified, that God may both move in the act and in the will.’ (Barclay, Apology, p. 349).

\textsuperscript{71} Brinton, Friends for 300 Years, p. ix.

\textsuperscript{72} Keiser, ‘Touched and Knit in the Life,’ pp. 141-144 and 147-149.

\textsuperscript{73} ‘…compared with our early 20\textsuperscript{th} century optimistic view of man, Barclay is a pessimist; compared with the general 17\textsuperscript{th} century pessimistic view of man he is an optimist.’ (Wragge, The Faith of Robert Barclay, p. 50).

testimony in terms of its four shifts.\footnote{They are as follows; (1): from a testimony against war to the testimony for peace, (2): from a Christianity-centered basis to Christian, non-Christian and non-religious bases, (3): from a prescriptive to a permissive attitude, and (4): from a narrow to a broad concept of peace (Jiseok, ‘Quaker Peace Testimony,’ p. 22).} Especially, in the analysis of the second shift, which was a shift ‘from a Christianity-centered basis to Christian, non-Christian and non-religious bases,’ Jiseok argues that although early Quakers based their peace testimony upon the Spirit and the Word of God, Liberal Quakers have come to place a great emphasis upon human conscience and reason, which they think to be deified and also to be a sure means of peace-making.\footnote{Jiseok, ‘Quaker Peace Testimony,’ p. 45.}

Furthermore, setting aside many writings on how to practically perform peace activities (such as the writing of Laurence S. Apsey\footnote{Laurence S. Apsey, Transforming Power for Peace, 4\textsuperscript{th} ed. (Philadelphia, PA.: Friend Book Store, 2001).}), when it comes to Niebuhr’s criticism, only Lonnie Valentine\footnote{Lonnie Valentine, ‘Power in Pacifism: A Response to Reinhold Niebuhr,’ Quaker Religious Thought. vol. 23. (1988): 23-35.} and Brinton\footnote{Brinton, Friends for 300 Years, pp. 166-170.} bring forward counterarguments, although their counterarguments go little beyond Niebuhr’s critical scope.

As for Barclay’s peace testimony, as far as I know, there are only a few scholars who focus on the topic. For example, Trueblood takes a short look at Barclay’s pacifism and describes its characteristic as below:

> In accepting non-resistance for himself, yet seeing that it would be wrong to try to legislate it for the unprepared, Barclay was upheld by the conviction that advance comes only when a few go on ahead. …Barclay maintained, with equal realism, that there should be some in the world who seek to present a standard of Christian perfection, by going the whole way now. …Such, in any case, was the peace testimony of Robert Barclay.\footnote{Trueblood, Robert Barclay, p. 248.}
Margaret E. Hirst appreciates Barclay’s significance in Quaker peace testimony. She argues that although earlier Quakerism only attempted to defend its pacifism against misunderstanding from the outside, ‘Barclay first showed it in its true relation to their whole body of belief, then urged it on his fellow Christians as an essential part of Christianity, and finally he made a definite effort towards the restoration of peace to the war-ravaged countries of Europe.\(^{81}\) Brock estimates that Barclay took on the task of providing a systematic and thorough explanation of the peace testimony of early Quakers including Fox; they strongly refused to participate in war according to inward light and the Bible, whist admitting magistrates’ power and authority as ordained by God.\(^{82}\) Brock also argues that Barclay’s appeal to human reason is a new element of progress in Quaker peace testimony, saying that this is ‘a humanist strand in their thinking on war and society that eventually blossomed out into the humanitarian relief activity that has become so closely associated with the Quaker name in our century.\(^{83}\)

Thus, Quaker pacifism changed greatly within Liberal Quakerism as a result of its theological alteration of the self. Comprehensively speaking, the issue of self-understanding is a key factor in Quaker theology, in the conflicting academic evaluations of Barclay, and even in Quaker peace testimony. Furthermore, previous studies of Barclay’s peace testimony have simply given outlines of the matter, and no in-depth research has been carried out on the particularities of Barclay’s thought. For these reasons, this research is probably the first one to deal fully with Barclay’s theology and his peace testimony from viewpoints of self-identity and self-other


\(^{83}\) Brock, *The Quaker Peace Testimony*, p. 29.
relations.

V. Thesis Outline

The frame of the thesis is composed of the following contents, excluding the Introductory Chapter and the Conclusion:

The First Part:

Chapter 1: Issues of Self: The Meaning of Passiveness in Barclay’s Theology

Chapter 2: Changes of Self Concept in Quakerism and the Liberal Historical View

The Second Part:

Chapter 3: Quaker Peace Testimony in the Twentieth Century

The Third Part:

Chapter 4: Perfectionism and God’s Kingdom

Chapter 5: Barclay’s Ecclesiology and Peace Testimony

The First Part: The First Part, which includes the first and second chapters, aims at reviewing universal redemption as the core concept of Barclay’s entire thought, and clarifying the meaning of ‘passiveness’ or ‘self-denial,’ which for Barclay is the point of divergence for salvation. Also in relation to this theme, the First Part aims at reevaluating Barclay, who has long been negatively treated in Quaker studies. Given the long-term and large influence of Liberals in Quaker academism, this review is indispensable if we are to look further into Barclay’s pacifist stance.

Specifically, in the first chapter, I make a survey of Barclay’s soteriology in terms of the
following three concepts: ‘Inward Light,’ ‘Day of Visitation’ and ‘Passiveness,’ by examining Barclay’s *An Apology for the True Christian Divinity* (1678) and other writings in *Truth Triumphant* (1690). As for the intricate idea of ‘passiveness,’ researchers in the early twentieth century have condemned Barclay, accusing him of being the main cause of Quietism later in the eighteenth century. Therefore, I attempt to clarify the meaning of ‘passiveness’ by critically examining Barclay’s concept of self and its neighboring ideas (such as reason, will and conscience) in comparison with contemporary theologies and philosophies. For instance, a serious controversy between orthodox Calvinists and Arminians regarding human free will in early seventeenth century Holland is dealt with, because this controversy is considered to have had a significant influence upon Barclay’s theological stance on passiveness. Also, I examine Barclay’s view on the self by clarifying the distinction between his ideas and Descartes’ *cogito*, a concept which was of great influence in his days. And the significance of nothingness as the core of Barclay’s Quaker theology is further clarified by examining German mysticism, which had a close relationship with early Quakerism.

In the second chapter, I find a clue that helps to reconsider Barclay’s thought by tracing changes of the self throughout the entire Quaker tradition, from the first and second generations through Quietism and Evangelicalism to Liberalism today, with references to transformations in contemporary ideologies and social environments. I bring to light differences between Barclay, Jones and Braithwaite’s understandings of the self. Then, I reconsider the conventional estimations of Barclay made by these Liberal writers. Notable figures examined in relation to changes in self concept are especially George Fox, the second-generation Quaker Elizabeth Bathurst (1655-85), Quietist Job Scott (1751-93), Evangelical Henry Tuke (1755-1814), (all of whom are typical of each tradition), and also several Liberal writers including Jones and
Braithwaite. Upon examination, substantial modification of Quaker thought within Liberalism in regard to the self and its accompanying ideas is evident, as is its underlying political motivation to justify itself behind the Liberal historical view of Quakerism. This becomes a focal point to re-assess Barclay’s theology within the Quaker tradition.

The Second Part: The Second Part, namely the third chapter, shifts the topic to peace testimony, going on to review Quaker pacifism as presented by Liberal Quakers in the twentieth century. And I look deeply into the counter-argument against Liberal pacifism at that time. As already seen, Reinhold Niebuhr, one of the neo-orthodox theologians, bitterly criticized Liberal Quaker pacifism around the time of the Second World War. His criticism is shrewd and must not be ignored, given that his thoughts have actually influenced social and foreign policies in the United States.84 Hence, in this chapter, I first outline the differences between Niebuhr’s viewpoint on peace and that of the Liberal Quakers, mainly in regard to their understanding of human nature. Next I make a brief survey of counterarguments made against Niebuhr by Quakers and other Christian pacifists, such as the Mennonite John H. Yoder, and the United Methodist Stanley Hauerwas, in order to identify the characteristics of Liberal Quaker pacifism. Then I raise examples of problematic points regarding ‘computability’ or ‘calculability’ found in the arguments of both Niebuhr and the Liberal Quakers. This is done by critically examining their positions from today’s philosophical perspectives on being (identity) and violence, such as those presented by Jacques Derrida and the post-Derrida generation. These perspectives might provide a new insight about self-other relations. Finally, the third chapter shows theoretical limitations of self-concern found in neo-orthodoxy as well as Liberal thought, and defines

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another possibility of going beyond the logic of selfness from the perspectives of ‘hostility’ and ‘hospitality.’

**The Third Part:** The Third Part, which contains the fourth and fifth chapters, returns to the analysis of Barclay, with the aim of considering a collective dimension in his thought, whilst the first and second chapters focused chiefly on the personal aspect of soteriology. Continuing on to address the topic of self, the fourth chapter further examines the correlation between self and others as it relates to the traditional articles of faith, Perfectionism and God’s Kingdom. In Barclay’s theology, perfection, or full sanctification, is connected to Christ’s command to love one’s enemies, and to foster open attitudes towards otherness, with patience. This attitude towards otherness, Barclay believes, finally leads to the unveiling of the communal nature of God’s Kingdom and to the realisation of the Kingdom in the Church. Specifically, this study is conducted mainly by making comparisons between Jesus, Paul, Augustine (354-430), Martin Luther (1483-1546) on to John Wesley (1703-91), and by referring to previous studies on the idea of perfection, such as that of R. Newton Flew, 85 and Carole Dale Spencer’s detailed work on Holiness in Quakerism. 86 Next, putting Barclay’s theology in these theological contexts, I analyse Barclay’s view on these two ideals and consider their theological meanings in a double-scheme of ‘possible’ (now) and ‘impossible’ (hereafter). This is done to clarify the character of Barclay’s stance, which urged humans to follow the example of Christ’s love for irreducible and uncontrollable others, and identified the Kingdom as the communal realisation of Christ’s order in the Church.

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The fifth chapter examines Barclay’s ecclesiology and pacifism, considering how his communal view of the Church is embodied and organised in a concrete church system, and how he develops Quaker peace testimony as essential part of his ecclesiology, and what answer he would give in response to neo-orthodox criticism and to current situations. The ideals of perfection and the Kingdom summarised by the phrase ‘love one’s enemies’ are carried out practically by believers in the Church. Therefore, I first investigate Barclay’s application of these ideals to practical matters such as church politics, ethics and practice, and his recognition of a theological consistency between church authority and the main principle of inward light. Church politics and ethics are further extended to the members of the invisible church (Catholic Church), namely, to all people in the world, who are endowed with the same single light of God. On the point, there is a good reason to discuss Quaker pacifism as part of his ecclesiology. This is, as Brinton argues, because the sources of Quaker pacifism are the New Testament revealed through the inward light, which brings people to mutual unity.87 Next I review Barclay’s peace testimony by examining the relationship between Church and State, the relationship between the individual and State, in order to clarify the significance of Barclay’s practical distinction between the principles expected of a true Christian and those for people who ‘have not yet come to the pure dispensation of the gospel.’88 I then present the character of Barclay’s pacifism as a counter-message against the logic of self-reward or self-retribution. Finally, I consider how Barclay might respond to Niebuhr’s criticism, and I evaluate this within the context of today’s pluralistic tendencies by drawing out his perspectives on self-other relations.

88 Barclay, Apology, p. 536.
VI. Additions

As already seen, there is no agreement on the estimation of Barclay even today. The reason for this is that his works are mainly written not for Quakers themselves, but for the vindication of Quakerism against contemporary scholars and clergies, by using abundant academic knowledge of theology, philosophy and language. Therefore, it is difficult to correctly understand and interpret the logical flow of his discussion. His writings require a researcher to have enough background knowledge in scholarship, history and cultures of the relevant time period. For example, Barclay builds up his apologetic arguments by employing or referring to diverse sources ranging from Aristotelianism, Patristics, Roman Catholicism, both orthodox and radical Protestant religions, and Libertinism, to early modern trends in thought such as Cartesian philosophy. Especially when examining Barclay’s theology, I think it essential to place him within a broader historical, theological and ideological context. Moreover, Jones and Braithwaite, typical Quaker scholars in the early twentieth century, and their particular Liberal ideological orientation of self-affirmation, have long influenced and decided the academic atmosphere in Quaker studies. Accordingly, it will require more careful and more detailed study for the re-evaluation of Barclay, with thorough re-examination and re-questioning of conventional opinions in regard to their socio-political and theological motivation. As already mentioned, there are very few scholars who focus upon Barclay’s peace testimony. For this reason, there are still vast areas and many aspects of his theology to be explored. Considering this scholarly situation, and Barclay’s theological potentiality to provide an old-new perspective on self-other relations in Christianity as a counter-testimony against reductionist and humanistic inclination of self-contained religion, my research will make an original contribution to the clarification of the nature and characteristics of Barclay’s peace testimony. By doing so, it will discover a clue for a
constructive discussion on peace issues not only in Quakerism but also in the present world. I also expect, with grateful acknowledgments to precedent Quaker and non-Quaker researchers, that this study will stimulate the advancement of Quaker studies by promoting a careful investigation of what has actually been said in Quakerism, so that the study field will no longer remain at the stage that some research seems to have fallen into, a stage of ideological manipulation only for self-justification.
Chapter 1: Issue of Self: The Meaning of Passiveness in Barclay’s Theology

Introduction

In the Synod of Dort held in Holland held from 1618 to 1619, orthodox Calvinism completely rejected Arminianism, which asserted the universal redemption of Christ, and established the Five Points of Calvinism in the Canons of Dort. Originally, Arminianism, (whose advocators were generally called ‘Remonstrant’), was promoted by Jacobus Arminius (1560-1609), a man who studied Calvinism under the instruction of a French orthodox Calvinist named Theodore Beza (1519-1605). During the course of his study, however, Arminius came to feel that Calvinism was too extreme in its claim of the double predestination (or unconditional redemption). Arminius then changed his opinion to a belief in ‘conditional redemption.’ He argued that God had set as a condition that any believer who responds to the natural light given as God’s prevenient grace, in other words, human reason, would be saved (conditional redemption). Therefore, he continued, no one in the world is excluded from the benefit of Christ’s redemption, which is determined by each individual’s conduct in faith. It is true that there are many testimonies to the universal nature of Christ’s redemption in the Bible, for example Heb. 2:9, 1 Tim. 2:6 and 1 John 2:2. The Hebrews says, ‘But we see Jesus, who was made a little lower than the angels, for the suffering of death crowned with glory and honor, that

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1 This chapter is a modified and abridged version of my master thesis, ‘Quaker no Fuhen-Shokuzairon niokeru Jiyu-Ishi no Mondai: R. Barclay no Apology wo Chushin ni (The Role of Free Will in the Universal Redemption of Quakerism: based mainly on R. Barclay’s Apology)’ (MA dissertation submitted to Doshisha University in Japan, 2004).
2 Further details of the progress of the conference can be seen in A. W. Harrison, Arminianism (London: Duckworth, 1937), pp. 82-96.
He, by the grace of God, might taste death for everyone.’ Arminians based their belief in universal redemption on these biblical testimonies. Nonetheless, as mentioned above, they were eventually rejected as heretics in the council, which was mostly constituted of Calvinists. The reason for this is that Arminians advocated the doctrine of conditional redemption, which emphasised the necessity of a human voluntary response to God as a requisite for salvation; Calvinists disagreed, considering them to ground salvation upon human activities rather than upon God’s working.

Basically, the term of ‘redemption’ or ‘atonement’ means that human beings are set free from their sin, and reconciled with God through Christ’s death on the Cross. In regard to this belief, there are various points of issue concerning its details and effects. What matters here is the efficacious scope of Christ’s redemption, and this problem can be generally sorted out into two questions. The first question is to what extent the word ‘all,’ as written in Tit. 2:11, refers to humanity; in other words, whether salvation unconditionally applies to ‘all the human beings,’ or rather only ‘all the true believers.’ If, as in the latter case, salvation has some kind of limitation, this means that the death of Christ was intended for a finite number of people, making it ‘limited redemption,’ or ‘limited atonement.’ It then becomes a new problem to seek assurance of the election for salvation; in other words, whether or not a person belongs to the side of those chosen by God. The other question is that if the word ‘all’ refers to the whole humanity, what matters is

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5 Harrison, *Arminianism*, p. 49.
6 Arminius argues that ‘He [God] determines to justify and adopt believers, and to endow them with life eternal, but to condemn unbelievers, and impenitent person. …unbelief is partly to be attributed to the fault and wickedness of men, and partly to the just vengeance of God, which deserts, blinds and hardens sinners.’ (Arminius, *The Works*, vol. 2., pp. 698-699). For Arminius, ‘Faith is the requirement of God, and the act of the believer when he answers the requirement.’ (Arminius, *The Works*, vol. 2., pp. 49-50). In other words, salvation is a result of the concurrence and agreement between God’s grace and human free will (Arminius, *The Works*, vol.2., p. 52).
7 Harrison, *Arminianism*, p. 93.
8 ‘For the grace of God that brings salvation has appeared to all men,’ (Tit. 2:11).
why some people seem not to have been or be saved. In this case, as well, it is urgently necessary to tackle the dilemma between the universality of Christ’s death and its limited actual effects. In any case, closely connected to both of these points is the human free will, which was precisely the issue under contention by Calvinism and Arminianism as the two large currents of theological and socio-ideological thoughts around the seventeenth century.\(^9\)

In regard to these disputes, Barclay stood on the side of the unlimited nature of Christ’s salvation, and he criticised the conventional advocates of universal redemption. He argued that since they [Arminians] attribute ‘always too much to the power and strength of man’s will and nature,’\(^10\) and therefore, ‘have fallen short of fully, declaring the perfection of the gospel dispensation, others [Calvinists] have been thereby the more strengthened in their errors.’\(^11\) Barclay goes on to state that this was because ‘the way and method by which the virtue and efficacy of his [Christ’s] death is communicated to all, hath not been rightly understood.’\(^12\) Barclay here identifies the fault of Arminians, referring to the second problem addressed above, namely the contradiction between Christ’s universal redemption and its limited efficacy. Then, Barclay responds with a unique non-human-based interpretation of universal redemption. He develops this argument in the fifth and sixth propositions in his Apology\(^13\) by using three concepts ‘Inward Light,’\(^14\) ‘Day of Visitation’ and ‘Passiveness,’ to entirely refute the double


\(^11\) Barclay, \textit{Apology}, pp. 128-129.

\(^12\) Barclay, \textit{Apology}, pp. 127-128.

\(^13\) Barclay, \textit{Apology}, pp. 110-112. The details of Barclay’s soteriology will be introduced in 1.1.2. in this thesis.

\(^14\) Actually, in Barclay’s writings, various terms are interchangeably used to express inward light; for example, ‘inward manifestations,’ ‘inward revelations,’ ‘the inward testimony of the Spirit,’ ‘inward work,’ ‘inward principle,’ ‘inward Seed of Light,’ and ‘inward, spiritual Light,’ etc. This thesis uses the term ‘inward light’ in accordance with the customary practice in Quaker studies.
predestination, whilst well defending Quaker position from criticism as human-centric, as

However, as already seen, the intricate idea of ‘passiveness’ or ‘self-denial’ is regarded
negatively in the present Quaker studies. Researchers such as Jones\(^\text{15}\) and Braithwaite\(^\text{16}\) condemned Barclay as the main cause of later Quietism. This evaluation of Barclay’s theology
has long been accepted and employed by various researchers even into this century, leading to
the fixation to some degree of academic assessment of Barclay. Hence, in this chapter, I clarify
the meaning of Barclay’s passiveness by critically examining his concept of self and its
neighboring ideas, such as human will and conscience. I make comparisons between Barclay
and the English Orthodox Calvinists, and also with a founder of modern thought, Descartes.

Next, I find a clue which leads us to reconsider and re-estimate Barclay’s thought by
investigating the nature of ‘passiveness’ or ‘nothingness’ and relating it with the continental
mystical tradition. What I should like to show here is that Barclay’s idea of passiveness, which is
severely criticised by Liberals, is the essence of the Quaker faith; it distinguishes the religion
from orthodox Calvinism and Arminianism, two large ideological currents in those days, and
even from other major religions and philosophies of the time.

1. 1. Free Will in Christ’s Redemption


1. 1. 1. Free Will in Orthodox Calvinism

First, I examine the matter of free will in the context of limited salvation within orthodox Calvinism. As already observed, orthodox Calvinism decidedly rejected Arminianism, which defined the significance of human free will for salvation in the five articles of Remonstrance: ‘Total Depravity,’ ‘Conditional Election,’ ‘Unlimited Atonement,’ ‘Prevenient Grace’ and ‘Conditional Preservation.’ Against these standards, Calvinists established in the Canons of Dort the formulation of ‘Total Depravity,’ ‘Unconditional Election,’ ‘Limited Atonement,’ ‘Irresistible Grace’ and ‘Perseverance of the Saints.’ In these Canons, human voluntary or willed efforts for salvation were regarded as total nonsense, and the absolute sovereignty of God was strongly emphasised. However, even such a strict attitude in Calvinism was not altogether theo-centric. Calvinism came to take on a different form at the pastoral level, contrary to its keynote concept of God’s supremacy. That is, to lay persons, the assurance of their salvation or of the elect became a great issue, and the matter came to have a close connection to the concept of human will once again.

R. T. Kendall doubts the conventional opinion that English orthodox Calvinists closely followed John Calvin (1509-64), and points out that voluntarism, which originally never existed in Calvin’s doctrine, later entered into orthodox theology in relation to the assurance of salvation. According to Kendall, Calvin himself asserted that Christ sufficiently and indiscriminately died for all the people, and he only advocated the article of the double

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17 Harrison, Arminianism, pp. 49-50.
18 Harrison, Arminianism, pp. 93-94. See also Kendall, Calvin and English Calvinism, p. 1 and 150.
19 One typical counterargument to Kendall’s discussion is Paul Helm, Calvin and Calvinists (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth Trust, 1982). Helm claims that there was a theological consistency between Calvin and orthodox Calvinists in terms of the limited redemption. However, he does not mention the historical fact of the assurance of salvation by good deeds, which was put forwards by orthodox Calvinism.
20 Kendall, Calvin and Calvinism, p. 13.
predestination as an expost explanation of the scope of the atonement. The atonement would be efficacious only for those who received the intercessory work of the Holy Spirit from Christ in Heaven.\textsuperscript{21} As to the assurance of salvation, Calvin insisted that only Christ’s death for all the world should be the pledge of human salvation, and he prohibited people from acting or making any effort to assure the election.\textsuperscript{22} Calvin says, ‘as regards justification, faith is something merely passive, bringing nothing of ours to the recovering of God’s favor but receiving from Christ that which we lack.’\textsuperscript{23} In short, the point of his discussion was the antithesis of the Roman Catholic idea of merits; that is, he discussed the exclusion of works from Christian faith and the utter passivity of belief in God.

Nevertheless, for Calvinists of the next generation, such as Beza, the double predestination, which had initially been of only secondary significance in Calvin’s logic, became central to their doctrines, and limited atonement was developed in details. Besides, supralapsarianism, which states that God’s eternal decree regarding the election and the reprobation logically precedes the Creation and the Fall, was maintained.\textsuperscript{24} The result of these developments was a theological shift in which Christ’s death came to be no longer the pledge of salvation. Consequently, it became a serious issue for the laity to ask whether they really belonged to the elect or not.\textsuperscript{25} Where are the grounds for their assurance? To this question, orthodox Calvinist pastors, who took care of the laity and actually confronted their anxieties on a daily basis, answered with the ‘reflex act’ of the human mind. Specifically, as also identified in

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{21} Kendall, \textit{Calvin and Calvinism}, pp. 16-20.
  \item \textsuperscript{22} Kendall, \textit{Calvin and Calvinism}, pp. 24-28.
  \item \textsuperscript{24} Kendall, \textit{Calvin and Calvinism}, pp. 29-31.
  \item \textsuperscript{25} Kendall, \textit{Calvin and Calvinism}, p. 32.
\end{itemize}
the Weber Thesis,26 this was an intimate reflection by ‘practical syllogism.’ In other words, ‘Whoever has sanctification as the effects of faith is a true believer. But I have the effects. Therefore, I have saving faith.27’ Biblical testimonies which say that true faith bears fruit (or the theological proposition that if believers have true faith, they will have its effects),28 are misemployed by the fallacy of affirming the consequent, with an intention to prove the possibility of salvation based on daily efforts made by believers. Regarding this point, Weber clearly argues:

If we now ask further, by what fruits the Calvinist thought himself able to identify true faith? the answer is: by a type of Christian conduct which served to increase the glory of God. Just what does so serve is to be seen in his own will as revealed either directly through the Bible or indirectly through the purposeful order of the world which he has created (lex naturae).29

Here we can easily discover a certain type of voluntarism, which allows people to create faith (precisely speaking, to create the assurance of the elect) by their own works. Thus, in this phase, the Christian faith finally became an act of the will.30 Years later, such a limited atonement, which includes practical syllogism, was united with Covenant Theology, systematised as English orthodox Calvinism by William Perkins (1558-1602) and William Ames (1576-1633),

26 It is a famous thesis by Max Weber (1864-1920). In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1904-05), he discusses the affinity between the ethic of orthodox Calvinism and various Puritan minor parties, and modern capitalism.
27 Kendal, Calvin and Calvinism, pp. 33. W. Perkins went so far as to identify the will to faith with faith itself (Kendal, Calvin and Calvinism, p. 61).
28 ‘Either make the tree good, and his fruit good; or else make the tree corrupt, and his fruit corrupt: for the tree is known by his fruit.’ (Matt. 12:33).
30 Kendal, Calvin and Calvinism, p. 34.
and afterwards formulated in the Westminster Standards; namely, *The Westminster Confession of Faith* (1647), *the Larger Catechism and the Shorter Catechism* (both in 1648). Kendall concludes that there is an ideological similarity between orthodox Calvinism and Arminianism in terms of the significance of human free will in salvation.31 Indeed, it is not so easy to distinguish these two positions, for the former is grounding the assurance of salvation on human voluntary efforts, although this does not mean that it posits the reflex act as a cause of salvation. The latter is also asserting the possibility of salvation through human voluntary response to God (See Figure 1).

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31 Kendall, *Calvin and Calvinism*, pp. 143-144.
Figure 1:

- **Catholicism**
  - Deed
  - Self-Reductive
  - God
  - Salvation

- **Calvin**
  - God’s grace
  - God
  - Effort
  - Faith

- **Arminianism**
  - Voluntary Response
  - Self-Reductive
  - God
  - Salvation

- **Orthodox Calvinism**
  - Reflex Act
  - Self-Reductive
  - God
  - Assurance of Salvation

Different from Justification by Works?
1. 1. 2. Free Will in Barclay’s Redemption

Barclay severely criticises the Calvinist practical syllogism, which allows one to create faith by oneself, arguing that it is not truth based upon the Bible, but rather an inference based upon human principles. In relation to this criticism, he attempts to identify the true basis for the assurance of salvation and define it as other than human free will.

the scripture can give him no certainty in, neither can it be a rule to him. …And 2 Pet. i. 10, “Therefore the rather, brethren, give diligence to make your calling and election sure.” Now I say, What scripture rule can assure me that I have true faith? That my calling and election is sure? …The scripture gives me a mere declaration of these things, but makes no application; so that the assumption must be of my own making, thus; as for example: I find this proposition in scripture;

“He that believes, shall be saved;” thence I draw the assumption.

But I, Robert, believe:

Therefore, I shall be saved.

The minor is of my own making, not expressed in the scripture; …so that my faith and assurance here is not built upon a scripture proposition, but upon an human principle.

As observed above, orthodox Calvinists accused Arminians of setting the ground of salvation

32 The scripture, 2 Pet 1: 10, was considered to be the steps of assuring efficacious calling by Perkins (Kendall, Calvin and Calvinism, p. 8). ‘Perkins states the hypothesis: ‘Every one that believes is the child of God.’ The test is: ‘But I doe beleive.’ The conclusion follows: ‘therefore I am the child of God.’ …Thus the method of achieving assurance of salvation is to scrutinize the claim of faith in onself; if found to be true, the conclusion follows that one has saving faith.’ (Kendall, Calvin and Calvinism, p. 9).

33 Barclay, Apology, p. 81 (Hereinafter underlines in the cited passages from Apology are my emphasis). The scripture, 2 Pet 1: 10, goes on to say, ‘for if ye do these things, ye shall never fall.’
upon human will, but here in these words, quite interestingly, Calvinists are also criticised by Barclay for relying upon human will for the assurance of salvation. This means that Barclay views both Arminianism and Calvinism as non-biblical or non-Christian in terms of their voluntarism. Pointing out this insufficiency in each religion, Barclay expounds upon the question what and where the assurance of salvation must be, except in the humanistic principle.

Simply stated, as in the second proposition in Apology, Barclay’s answer to these questions is the immediate revelation of Christ. He says, ‘inward and immediate revelation is the only sure and certain way to attain the true and saving knowledge of God.’ Barclay goes on to argue that the singular redemptive work of Christ’s death has two aspects of ‘within’ and ‘without.’ That is to say, ‘the first is the redemption performed and accomplished by Christ for us in his crucified body without us; the other is the redemption wrought by Christ in us.’ First of all, by the death of Christ on the Cross, we receive the capacity to be saved, and to partake in a measure of Christ’s grace; at this stage, the things that we are endowed with as the capacity for salvation are ‘Inward Light’ and ‘Day of Visitation.’

God, who out of his infinite love sent his Son, the Lord Jesus Christ, into the world, who tasted death for every man, hath given to every man, ...a certain day or time of visitation; during which day or time it is possible for them to be saved, and to partake of the fruit of Christ’s death.

... for this end God hath communicated and given unto every man a measure of the light of his own Son, a measure of grace, or a measure of the Spirit.

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34 Barclay, Apology, p. 33.
35 Barclay, Apology, p. 198.
36 Barclay, Apology, p. 198.
37 This inward light is called in the Bible by various names, such as ‘the seed of the Kingdom,’ ‘the Word of God,’ the ‘manifestation of the Spirit,’ or ‘talent’ (Barclay, Apology, p. 132).
38 Barclay, Apology, p. 132.
According to Barclay, at the next stage, this divine grace of ‘light’ and ‘day of visitation’ take effect as the possibility of salvation and reconciliation with God through the inner death and regeneration of Christ within. For Barclay, this makes the second inward redemption.

God, in and by this Light and Seed, invites, calls, exhorts, and strives with every man, in order to save him; which as it is received and not resisted, works the salvation of all, ...by bringing them to a sense of their own misery, and to be sharers in the sufferings of Christ inwardly, and by making them partakers of resurrection, in becoming holy, pure, and righteous, and recovered out of their sins. ...And to those who thus resist and refuse him, he becomes condemnation.39

Barclay argues that if people attend to the workings of the inward light and do not resist them during their day of visitation, (the coming of which cannot be presaged), they will create redemptive effects in these people’s hearts; these workings first teach the people about their sin, and second makes them inwardly crucified, die and resurrect with the Lord Christ.40 This constitutes the entire process of salvation, justification and sanctification. These workings of God are, as Barclay says, the ‘formal object’ of faith in all ages.41 According to L. Kuenning,42 the phrase ‘formal object’ was employed from Aristotelian metaphysics, and traditionally has

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39 Barclay, Apology, pp. 132-133.
40 Tillich, in his sermon titled You Are Accepted, describes the correlation between sin and grace in reference to Rom. 5:20: ‘But Where sin abounded, grace did much more abound.’ This sermon gives a hint to understanding the two-sided work of God’s light. Tillich says that ‘We do not even have a knowledge of sin unless we have already experienced the unity of life, which is grace. And conversely, we could not grasp the meaning of grace without having experienced the separation of life, which is sin.’ (Paul Tillich, The Shaking of the Foundations (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1955), p. 155). See also pp. 161-162.
been used in a pair with the phrase ‘material object.’ ‘Material object’ refers to what is actually believed, whilst ‘formal object’ signifies the means for the conveyance of God’s message to believers.\(^{43}\) In this sense, by using the concepts of ‘inward light’ and ‘day of visitation,’ Barclay exhorts all people to wait for the working of the light as the formal object of faith, and not to resist it as the guide for their salvation and justification.

1. 2. The Light against the Double Predestination of Calvinism

1. 2. 1. The Nature of Inward Light

I look more closely at the features of inward light especially in its theological relation to traditional or contemporary sources of Christian truth, such as the Bible, and reason and conscience. Barclay explains that the scriptures are ‘only a declaration of the fountain, and not the fountain itself, therefore they are not to be esteemed the principal ground of all truth and knowledge, nor yet the adequate primary rule of faith and manners.’\(^{44}\) For Barclay, the Spirit (the guiding light which leads to all truth of God) is the more original and more principal rule ‘which is evident and clear of itself.’\(^{45}\) The Bible derives its excellency and certainty from this divine light, and therefore, the Bible is considered to be a secondary rule.\(^{46}\) Orthodox Calvinism, meanwhile, believes that the spiritual workings ceased and are limited within the biblical

\(^{43}\) In fact, Barclay argues that the revelation by the Spirit is considered in two ways: ‘Materiale’ (the matter of the facts revealed) and ‘Formale’ (how the revelation is made). Barclay says that ‘Now as the Material Part, or the thing and Matter Revealed, this is indeed a Contingent Truth, and of it self is not manifest to the Mind; but because of the Form, that is, because of the Divine Mode, and Supernatural, Inward Operation, the matter is know to be true.’ (Robert Barclay, ‘The Possibility and Necessity of the Inward and Immediate Revelation of the Spirit of God, towards the Foundation and Ground of True Faith, Proved; in a Letter Writ in Latine to a Person of Quality in Holland: and Now also Put into English,’ in Truth Triumphant Through Spiritual Warfare (London: Northcott, 1692), p. 896).

\(^{44}\) Barclay, Apology, p. 72.

\(^{45}\) Barclay, Apology, p. 26.

\(^{46}\) Barclay, Apology, p. 72.
framework, as expressed here: ‘scripture: unto which nothing at any time is to be added, whether by new revelations of the Spirit, or traditions of men.’ In this view, the Bible itself is believed to be the final form of God’s revelation. Hence, Calvinists claims that one should look for the standards of faith nowhere but in the scriptures. Regarding such Biblicism, Barclay, especially in reference to The Westminster Confession of Faith (Section 1-5), argues that as long as the authority and certainty of the scriptures rely on the inner manifestation of the Spirit, they are not the principal base of Christianity. This is because, he continues, ‘there is no knowledge of the Father but by the Son. …there is no knowledge of the Son but by the Spirit.’ Of course, it does not follow that the scriptures are of little use in Christian faith, but that they are profitable for the instruction of believers; the working of the light is not in discordance with the Bible, ‘nor can ever contradict the outward testimony of the scriptures, or of the natural reason of man.’ Barclay quite sufficiently recognised the dangerousness of simple subjectivism, as a result of his experiences with Ranters and Quaker radicals, such as Lodowick Muggleton (1609-98), in the earlier period. In other words, he emphasises the collective side of religion for the purpose of preventing fanaticism, saying that ‘we do look upon them [the scriptures] as the only fit outward judge of controversies among Christians; and that whatsoever doctrine is contrary unto their testimony, may therefore justly be rejected as false.’ This statement is often

49 Macpherson, Westminster Confession of Faith, p. 36.
50 Barclay, Apology, p.34, pp. 35-36.
52 As to the further details of Barclay’s view on subjectivity, see 1.3. in this chapter.
53 Muggleton was among those who joined the earlier Quaker movement, and afterwards left the party, making up a fanatic sect of the Muggletonians. By encountering this kind of people, Barclay came to recognise the dangerous nature of pure subjective religion (D. Elton Trueblood, Robert Barclay (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 51).
54 Barclay, Apology, p. 89.
negatively equated to be a surrender of Quakerism to orthodox Biblicism, but such an assessment is not correct. Barclay only indicates the contraposition of ‘whatever accords to the Spirit must accord to the scriptures,’ but not its converse: ‘whatever accords to the scriptures accords to the Spirit.’ Barclay’s stance is not different from that of earlier Quakers,\(^{55}\) in that he believes the light to be the primary rule, and the Bible, as long as it is illuminated by the light, to be the standards of Christian faith and life. Thus he confirms the complementary relationship between God’s revelation and the accepted testimonies. He appeals to believers to have their individual faith tested by the scriptures and other joint-testimonies, as a countermeasure against the fallible nature of human subjectivity, which is a danger even for those who has partaken in the operation of God’s light.\(^{56}\) This is because Barclay believes the light to be the divine work that brings all people to the ‘oneness’ of God as well as one another, not ‘division.’\(^{57}\)

Secondly, Barclay argues that inward light is not the same thing as the natural light, or human reason, which contemporary Arminians and Socinians proclaimed to be the true foundation of Christian faith.\(^{58}\) In his view, the light of Christ has a totally distinctive nature from the human soul and other mental faculties. For Barclay, human reason is ‘a natural faculty of his soul, by which he can discern things that are rational.’\(^{59}\) Of course, it is not deniable that ‘this is a property natural and essential to him, by which he can know and learn many arts and sciences.’\(^{60}\) Nor does he reject the possibility that man can apprehend things of God by using this human

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\(^{56}\) Barclay, Apology, p. 58.  
\(^{57}\) Barclay, Apology, p. 429.  
\(^{58}\) In regard to the Arminian stance on human reason, see 2.1. in this thesis.  
\(^{59}\) Barclay, Apology, p. 143.  
\(^{60}\) Barclay, Apology, p. 143.
rational faculty. Yet, he asserts, since reason is not an organ fit for the understanding God, ‘it cannot profit him towards salvation, but rather hindereth.’ Furthermore, human conscience is also distinguished from the light of Christ. In Barclay’s view, the conscience is ‘that … which ariseth from the natural faculties of man’s soul, may be defiled and corrupted.’ He explains this concept of ‘conscience’ to derive from the original Latin word ‘conscire’; the meaning of which has a reflective sense, specifically ‘to know something with others,’ or ‘to share a secret with others.’ Therefore, the conscience is defined as ‘knowledge which ariseth in man’s heart from what agreeeth, contradicteth, or is contrary to any thing believed by him, whereby he becomes conscious to himself that he transgresseth by doing that which he is persuaded he ought not to do.’ Hence, Barclay continues, if the heart is defiled with an improper belief or principle, it would make conscience as such. Nevertheless, the argument here is not that human conscience as well as reason should be considered as altogether negative, but rather that if these faculties are rightly enlightened or backed by the divine light, they would be useful even in spiritual matters. Now, whilst human beings can use and exercise these faculties as they please, ‘this light and seed of God in man he cannot move and stir up when he pleaseth, but it moves, blows, and strives with man, as the Lord seeth meet.’ Therefore, Barclay attributes the entire process of salvation to God alone, in contrast to the Arminian position on human free will. And

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61 Barclay, Apology, p. 143.
62 Barclay, Apology, p. 143.
63 Barclay, Apology, p. 144. Barclay also states that ‘the meer Testimony of a humane Conscience, without the Inward Testimony of the holy Spirit, cannot beget in us a firm and immoveable Testimony of our Sonship, because the Heart of Man is deceitful; and if the Testimony [sic] thereof were true, at most it is but a Humane Testimony, which begetteth in us only a Humane Faith.’ (Barclay, ‘The Possibility and Necessity of the Inward and Immediate Revelation,’ p. 898).
65 Barclay, Apology, p. 144.
66 Barclay, Apology, pp. 144-145.
67 Barclay, Apology, p. 144 and 145.
68 Barclay, Apology, p. 146.
so Barclay advises people to wait just patiently:

though there be a possibility of salvation to every man during the day of his visitation, yet cannot a man, …stir up that light and grace, …but he must wait for it: which comes upon all at certain times and seasons, wherein it works powerfully upon the soul, mightily tenders it, and breaks it; at which time, if man resist not, but closes with it, he comes to know salvation by it.\(^{69}\)

1. 2. 2. Criticism of the Double Predestination

Within this religious framework, Barclay resolves the matter, as mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, concerning the universal or limited scope of Christ’s redemption. He addresses the matter especially by refuting the double predestination on two points: ‘Unconditional Election’ and ‘Eternal Damnation.’ In regard to the first dogma, ‘Unconditional Election,’ which states that before the Creation God has predestined a limited number of people for salvation, Barclay argues that this problem can be solved if the elect are defined as a group of people who are graced with inward light in a larger measure, and ‘in whom grace so prevaleth, that they necessarily obtain salvation; neither doth God suffer them to resist.’\(^{70}\) Of course, no one lacks a measure of God’s grace, which operates efficaciously enough for the salvation of each salvation, and therefore, ‘smaller measure’ cannot be used as an excuse.\(^{71}\) Next, Barclay responds to the latter dogma, ‘Eternal Damnation,’ which states that God has ordained the rest of the people to destruction and eternal damnation by inclining and forcing them to sin. He rebuts

\(^{69}\) Barclay, *Apology*, p. 146.
\(^{70}\) Barclay, *Apology*, p. 150.
\(^{71}\) Barclay, *Apology*, p. 150.
by redefining the damned as those ‘whose day of visitation is passed over.’ This is because Christ’s seed will become condemnation if it is resisted on the day when it grows out within believers. Thus Barclay attempts to break down the double predestination by reexamining the very premises of these Calvinistic doctrines. For Barclay, a measure of light is given to everyone, and all one has to do is receive and obey the guidance of the light during each day of visitation. If a person does not resist the light within, and attends to its work, the light will become the birth of Christ within a soul of the person. It will work efficaciously, justifying, actually sanctifying and saving them. In short, it cannot be emphasised too much that in Barclay’s argument, the obedience to the light is the diverging point for partaking in God’s salvation.

1. 2. 3. Self-Denial: Relationship between Salvation and Free Will

In Barclay’s discussion, obeying the light (or not resisting the light) is the very diverging point to salvation. However, it must be still further in question whether or not obedience or non-resistance itself is a volitive act. If so, Barclay’s argument can be regarded in much the same way as Arminian and Calvinist logics (See Figure 2). In fact, this question is the central issue of discussion in this chapter, and it is closely related to the third concept in Barclay’s soteriology, ‘Passiveness.’

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72 Barclay, Apology, p. 151.
73 Refer back to 1.1.2. in this thesis.
74 More detailed descriptions of sanctification in Barclay’s theology shall be given in the fourth chapter on Perfectionism and the Kingdom.
For the purpose of examining this question, I quote here several sentences from *Apology* where Barclay mentions the relationship between salvation and human will (one passage has been cited previously).

> wherein [on the day of visitation] it works powerfully upon the soul, mightily tenders it, and breaks it; at which time, if man resist it not, but closes with it, he comes to know salvation by it.\(^{75}\)

> And we rejoice that we have been made to lay down our wisdom and learning, such of us as have had some of it, and our carnal reasoning, to learn of Jesus; and sit down at the feet of Jesus in our hearts, and hear him, who there makes all things manifest, and reproves all things by his light.\(^{76}\)

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\(^{75}\) Barclay, *Apology*, p. 146.

\(^{76}\) Barclay, *Apology*, p. 175.
Oh! better were it to be stripped and naked of all, to account it as dross and dung, and become a fool for Christ’s sake; thus knowing him to teach thee in thy heart, so as thou mayest witness him raised there, feel the virtue of his cross there, and say with the apostle, “I glory in nothing, save in the cross of Christ, whereby I am crucified to the world, and the world unto me.”

These words illustrate the idea that where salvation is received, conversely, natural will and human reason are denied. It can be said that, according to Barclay’s theology, the workings of inward light sharply conflict with human will or their volitive efforts. It is in such a sense that Barclay preaches the necessity of ‘not only an outward silence of the body, but an inward silence of the mind,’ for salvation. Barclay further discusses the significance of silence in terms of the self:

For he [devil] well knoweth that so long as self bears rule, and the Spirit of God is not the principal and chief actor, man is not put out of his reach; …for he can only work in and by the natural man, and his facilities, by secretly acting upon his imaginations and desires, &c., and therefore, when he, to wit, the natural man, is silent, there he must also stand. And therefore when the soul comes to this silence, and as it were is brought to nothingness, as to her own workings, then the devil is shut out.

As described here, Barclay argues that as long as the self governs the inner dimension of a

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77 Barclay, Apology, pp. 175-176.
78 Barclay, Apology, pp. 344-345.
79 Barclay, Apology, pp. 352-353.
person, the person is and can be controlled, as it were, by the working of the devil. Therefore, he urges people to bring their selves to nothingness, so that they may receive the Spirit of God. Also, Barclay says that the main task of a Christian is ‘to know the natural will in its own proper motions crucified, that God may both move in the act and in the will.80 Thus, I say, in his argument concerning the relationship between salvation and human will, the third concept of ‘passiveness’ means the cessation of the soul’s ‘self-workings.’

1. 3. The Self as Cogito

1. 3. 1. The Self: The Foundation of Knowledge

This word ‘self,’ etymologically speaking, originally implied, for example, ‘the same person or thing,’ ‘thing itself’ and ‘a person’s nature or character in a particular situation.’ However, in the late seventeenth century, especially after the appearance of Descartes’ famous proposition ‘cogito ergo sum,’ the term gradually came to bear the philosophical connotation of ‘subjectum (subject)’ as the epistemological base.81 In contrast, it is ‘objectum (object)’ as being that is posited through the use of reason by this subjectum. Considering such a modern tendency, which intended to place the ground of truth not in external authorities, such as tradition, institutional authority or the Bible, but rather in the human inner side, it may be easier to understand the volitional inclinations of contemporary Arminianism and orthodox Calvinism,82

80 Barclay, Apology, p. 349.
81 See the article of ‘self’ in Simpson and Weiner, The Oxford English Dictionary. The word ‘subject’ has had a philosophical meaning as the epistemological base since the middle seventeenth century. For example, Cambridge Platonist, John Norris (1657-1711) used ‘subject’ as understanding (See also the article of ‘subject’ in Simpson and Weiner, The Oxford English Dictionary).
82 Modern Rationalism is in a sense synonymous with Voluntarism. According to Takahashi, the definition of humanity as a rational being is not a description of human Eidos, but it merely designates its Telos. In other words, human beings can be rational as long as they have the will to be rational (Tetsuya Takahashi, ‘Rekishi
despite their strong insistence on the prevenient grace of God and the absolute sovereignty of God respectively.

Similarly, it is true that under the growing influence of modern thought in Britain,\(^ {83}\) the base of Barclay’s discussion was also partly constituted by such a religious aspect that was matched to Modernism. E. Russell\(^ {84}\) and Trueblood properly point out that Barclay was influenced by Cartesian philosophy, in that he placed inward light as the foundation of religious knowledge, in clear contrast to *The Westminster Confession of Faith*, which placed the Bible as such. Trueblood says, ‘he [Barclay] was searching for the theological counterpart of *cogito ergo sum*,\(^ {85}\)’ and regarded the inward light, which is present inwardly, as the epistemological base that is ‘evident by itself,’\(^ {86}\) (in Cartesian terms, this can be rephrased as ‘so clearly and so distinctly.’\(^ {87}\)

1. 3. 2. The Concept of Self in Barclay’s Theology

Certainly, these arguments somewhat highlight the point of Barclay’s theology, which stresses interior manifestation as the fundamental principle of religious truth. Nonetheless, it is also crucial to look back on the fact that Barclay’s theology has features other than those held in other modern religions. As section 1.2.1. shows, Barclay criticises human faculties, including reason, which Cartesians considered to be the true foundation of knowledge. He regarded reason

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\(^{86}\) Barclay, *Apology*, p. 67.

as only a relative thing: ‘many, and those very wise men, have erred by following, as they supposed, their reason.’ Besides, as briefly mentioned above, the word ‘self’ is found in about 29 passages of his Apology, as used in phrases such as ‘self-cogitation,’ ‘self-working’ and ‘self loves their own inventions.’ Most of these phrases are used by Barclay to describe the origin of evil, a place for the devil’s workings, or things that are against God. Although the following is a well-known episode from Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy (Meditationes de prima philosophia, 1641), Barclay’s contemporary, the great philosopher attempts to outcast the malicious demon by building a bulwark of human reason to discover a firm foundation for scholarship. Meanwhile, I could say, Barclay considers the self as res cogitans to be the very stage for the devil’s working, and therefore, he thinks that the self should be broken down first for God’s sake. Hence, it is valid enough to say that the inward light in Barclay’s theology is not a mere substitute for subjectivity or cogito as Trueblood says. It is not an element of cogito, nor is it an object fully perceived by cogito. Rather, the inward light of God has the nature of passing beyond the limitation of cogito. This is also apparent in Barclay’s explanation of inward light, or the divine seed, as the spiritual substance of ‘vehiculum Dei,’ or a kind of immanent transcendence of God.

88 Barclay, Apology, p. 62.
89 Barclay, Apology, p. 345.
90 Barclay, Apology, p. 348.
91 Barclay, Apology, p. 390.
92 See the first to the third meditations in Meditations on First Philosophy in Cottingham, Descartes Selected Philosophical Writings, pp. 76-98.
93 Barclay argues that God perceived by natural senses as found in Cartesian philosophy is the ‘Natural Idea of God,’ not the ‘Supernatural Idea of God.’ He says that ‘the Devil and most Wicked Men do as clearly perceive this Natural Idea of God, as the most Holy Men or Angels.’ (Barclay, ‘The Possibility and Necessity of the Inward and Immediate Revelation,’ p. 900). According to him, the Supernatural Idea of God can be perceived by the divine and spiritual senses implanted into human interiority by God. It should be admitted that this argument here developed by Barclay smells a scent of Platonism. See also the same book, pp. 901-902.
we understand a spiritual, heavenly, and invisible principle, in which God, as Father, Son
and Spirit, dwells; a measure of which divine and glorious life is in all men as a seed, which of
its own nature, draws, invites, and inclines to God; and this some call *vehiculum Dei*, or the
spiritual body of Christ, the flesh and blood of Christ.⁹⁴

We can further infer Barclay’s views on the relative nature of human perception from the fact
that he lays emphasis upon the necessity of examining personal subjective opinions with a
diversity of other people’s testimonies, (such as the Bible and joint-experience); this examination
is necessary to avoid, as it were, solipsism.⁹⁵ As has been mentioned previously in part, Barclay
argues that ‘these divine inward revelations, which we make absolutely necessary for the
building up of true faith, neither do nor can ever contradict the outward testimony of the
scriptures, or right and sound reason.⁹⁶ And ‘we do look upon them [the scriptures] as the only
fit outward judge of controversies among Christians; …we are very willing that all our doctrines
and practices be tried by them.’⁹⁷ This is because:

For it is one thing to affirm, that the true and undoubted revelation of God’s Spirit is certain
and infallible; and another thing to affirm, that this or that particular person or people is led
infallibly by this revelation in what they speak or write, because they affirm themselves to be so
led by the inward and immediate revelation of the Spirit. The first is only asserted by us, the

⁹⁴ Barclay, *Apology*, p. 137. And ‘a real spiritual substance, which the soul of man is capable to feel and
apprehend; from which that real, spiritual, inward birth in believers arises called the new creature, the new man
in the heart.’ (Barclay, *Apology*, p. 138).
⁹⁵ One of the most serious difficulties modern philosophy since Descartes has had is solipsism: that is, the
impossibility to recognise otherness. The topic shall be more closely examined in 2.3.2. and 2.4.2. in this thesis.
See also the article of ‘other’ in Ted Honderich, ed. *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy* (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1995).
⁹⁷ Barclay, *Apology*, p. 89.
1. 4. Nothingness

Lastly, I discuss the significance of negating the self as the metaphysical or epistemological base of ‘being’ or ‘entity,’ referring to Barclay’s theological framework and its connection to continental Christian mysticism.\(^9^9\) Considering Barclay’s choice of words found here and there all throughout his writings, for example, ‘the birth of Christ within,’ ‘it breaks the soul’ and ‘brought to nothingness,’ we can confirm that his position on silence has a close relationship with the continental mystical traditions of Meister Eckhart (1260?-1328), Johannes Tauler (1300?-61) and Jacob Boehme (1575-1624).\(^1^0^0\) Barclay himself partly admits these influences.\(^1^0^1\) His attitude towards silence may be more clearly understood from this viewpoint. To explain this, Eckhart’s German sermon 52, generally called *Armutspredigt* (a sermon on poverty), which is related to Christ’s Sermon on the Mount, would probably serve as the best

\(^{98}\) Barclay, *Apology*, p. 58.


\(^{100}\) Especially, Tauler and Bernard of Clairvaux (1090-1153) are made frequent mention of as mystics in Barclay’s writings.

\(^{101}\) Barclay, *Apology*, p. 335 and 361. According to Barclay, there is a difference between continental mysticism and Quakerism in the form of worship. He says, ‘who [Quakers] do not, as these Mystics, make of it a mystery, only to be attained by a few men or women in a cloister; or, as their mistake was, after wearying themselves with many outward ceremonies and observations, as if it were the consequence of such a labour;’ (Barclay, *Apology*, pp. 362-363). Trueblood argues that ‘Perhaps the most striking difference between Barclay’s mysticism and mysticism in general was his emphasis upon power. The Light, though it may illuminate, does not give wisdom so much as energy. The Apologist was, in this regard, faithful to the theology of the Holy Spirit which the New Testament provides.’ (Trueblood, *Robert Barclay*, p. 167).
And seeing the multitudes, he [Jesus] went up into a mountain: and when he was set, his disciples came unto him: And he opened his mouth, and taught them, saying, **Blessed are the poor in spirit: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. (Matt. 5:1-3)**

In regard to this famous scripture, Eckhart relates, ‘*armuot in einer hoehern wise; daz ist ein mensche, der niht enwil und niht enweiz und niht enhät* ([in a profound sense] a poor person is someone who desires nothing, knows nothing and possesses nothing). Eckhart attempts to expound upon the scriptural description of poverty in spirit that is blessed by God by following three main ideas: ‘desires nothing,’ ‘knows nothing’ and ‘possesses nothing.’ These descriptive aspects of poverty give us a clue that helps to consider the meaning of Barclay’s negation of self or subjectivity. Here, I think that it suffices to focus on the first idea, ‘*niht enwil* (desires nothing).’ Eckhart goes on to explain the concept as follows:

> as long as it is someone’s will to carry out the most precious will of God, such a person does not have that poverty of which we wish to speak. For this person still has a will with which they wish to please God, and this is not true poverty.

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102 I would like to express my gratitude to Yasukuni Matsuyama and his study on Meister Eckhart, which helped me further realise the significance of nothingness in Quakerism as Barclay’s theology argues. The German translation of his research on Eckhart as well as the Japanese one is available for the reference (Yasukuni Matsuyama, “*Non aliud* als *Spiritus spirans* : im Zusammenhang mit dem ostasiatischen Denken,” *Sapientia University Bulletin of Humanities*, vol. 5. (2005): 21-38).


104 Davies, *Meister Eckhart*, p. 204.
In other words, in Eckhart’s opinion, internal poverty does not mean that a person initially or fundamentally recognises his or her own being as ‘I,’ and then he or she follows the will of, or responds to, God, while recognising God as ‘you,’ which is merely an object of ‘I.’ What Eckhart argues here is that the human response to God establishes God as a target in a way that remains volitional and self-directed. Therefore, in order to be free from this kind of humanistic faith in God, he preaches that ‘we must will and desire as little as we willed and desired before we came into being. It is in this way that someone is poor who wills nothing.’ This is because there will be the place of the first-ever mutual encounter between God as the Creator and human as a creature, as is fully apparent in his words, ‘when creatures emerged and received their created being, God was not “God” in himself but in creatures.’

After consulting this explanation of ‘desires nothing’ by Eckhart, I would say that Barclay’s position on silence, likewise, implies total self-denial or utter passiveness to such an extent that even the human self-will to have faith is denied or abandoned. Barclay argues that since nothing is more opposite to the natural will and wisdom than waiting for God in silence, it is impossible to properly realise or understand the silence unless you lay your own will and wisdom down in obedient to God. In this respect, although some researcher argue that Quakerism is an ‘internal’ experimental religion in contrast to ‘external’ religion such as orthodox Calvinism, I consider it more appropriate to regard Quakerism as an counter-faith

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105 Davies, Meister Eckhart, p. 205.
106 Davies, Meister Eckhart, p. 205.
107 In this sense, the very writing of Apology is somewhat paradoxical.
108 Barclay, Apology, p. 336.
against self-reductive and self-justifying religions that attempt to earn salvation.\textsuperscript{110}

1. 4. 2. Message of Barclay’s Theology

Thus, in Barclay’s view, when a soul ceases in its own workings and is brought to nothingness in such a manner, the door of the heart will be open to the working of God. Barclay explains that the inward light in the heart will come forth and begin to operate. In this phase, for the first time, people respond to the light, as is clear in Barclay’s words: ‘though afterwards, as man is wrought upon, there is a will raised in him, by which he comes to be a co-worker with the grace.’\textsuperscript{111} Then, by this response to the light, people are accepted by God and they come to enjoy fellowship and communion with God.

So it is this inward participation of this inward man, of this inward and spiritual body, by which man is united to God, and has fellowship and communion with him. …This is the true and spiritual supper of the Lord, which men come to partake of, by hearing the voice of Christ, and opening the door of their hearts, and so letting him in in the manner.\textsuperscript{112}

Putting it another way, when responding (being utterly subject) to God’s prevenient calling, which is heard through the working of the light, the ‘I’ is formed for the first time, and the ‘self’ is recognised in the dimension of the responsibility (the possibility of response to the absolute otherness God).\textsuperscript{113} In this relationship, people come to know God as Fatherhood for the first

\textsuperscript{110} Fox also states that ‘And faith is the gift of God and every gift of God is pure.’ (Nickalls, \textit{The Journal of George Fox}, p. 318).
\textsuperscript{111} Barclay, \textit{Apology}, p. 147.
\textsuperscript{112} Barclay, \textit{Apology}, p. 429.
\textsuperscript{113} In regard to the possibility of response to God as otherness, refer to 3.3.1. in this thesis.
time, enabling them to call him ‘Abba, Father’. In contrast, people come to recognise their creatureliness as Childhood. To speak from a different perspective, when we surrender our thoughts and imaginations as a first step to fear God, and allow God’s Spirit to work within us, Christ is formed and raised within our souls. Through our response to the work within us, we are grafted into Christ, allowing us to put on Christ’s righteousness, die in our sins, and resurrect with Christ. This communal experience with God, or participation in Christ, is the meaning of communion, or of salvation by Christ as intended in Barclay’s theology. Hence, in Barclay’s theology, we are strongly persuaded to wait at every moment for the calling of God as the formal object of faith. Barclay says that this is partly to ensure that God’s calling will not be drowned out by the voice of our ‘selves.’

If the soul be still thinking and working in her own will, and busily exercised in her own imaginations, though the matters as in themselves may be good concerning God, yet thereby she

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114 Barclay, Apology, p. 111.
115 ‘For ye have not received the spirit of bondage again to fear; but ye have received the Spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father.’ (Rom. 8:15).
116 Barclay, Apology, p. 363.
117 Barclay interprets baptism as the correspondence of a good conscience with God, based on 1 Pet. 3:21: ‘not the putting away of the filth of the flesh, but the answer of a good conscience toward God.’ Through this baptism, we will be ‘baptized into his death’ (Rom. 6:3-4), put on Christ (Gal. 3:27) and be ‘Buried with him …risen with him’ (Col. 2:12) (Barclay, Apology, pp. 398-400). In regard to this point, Cullmann argues that ‘Christian Baptism in the New Testament is participation in the death and resurrection of Christ.’ (Osar Cullmann, Baptism in the New Testament, trans. J. K. S. Reid, Studies in Biblical Theology, No. 1 (London: SCM Press, 1950), p. 20). He continues that ‘There [on the Cross] the essential act of Baptism was carried out, entirely without our co-operation, and even without our faith. There the whole world was baptised on the ground of the absolutely sovereign act of God, who in Christ ‘first loved us’ (1 John 4. 19) before we loved him, even before we believed.’ (Cullmann, Baptism, p. 23). And he adds that ‘faith as response to this grace is decisive.’ (Cullmann, Baptism, p. 70).
118 This communion is not a mere union with God, but it is the relationship with God like that of the branches with the vine (Barclay, Apology, p. 200).
119 The point to be noticed here is that silence itself is never considered to be autotelic. See Barclay, Apology, p. 343. Trueblood rightly points out, ‘Barclay was careful not to be idolatrous about it [silence]. . . the more strange it seems that anyone would ever have thought of Robert Barclay as the chief architect of quietism in the Quaker Movement. In the subsequent quietistic period silence did sometimes become an idol, but it was never such for Barclay.’ (Trueblood, Robert Barclay, pp. 211-212).
incapacitates herself from discerning the still, small voice of the Spirit, and so hurts herself
greatly, in that she neglects her chief business of waiting upon the Lord.120

Another reason for this teaching is that there are great possibilities for every one of us to receive
the benefit of Christ’s death through the working of inward light. Therefore, repeatedly, he urges
us to ‘Wait upon God silently.’ To summarise Barclay’s soteriology, this repeated exhortation to
wait is the principal element of his entire message, and it is the Alpha and the Omega of his
theology. In regard to the questions about what to believe and how to do, Barclay answers that
God will teach us these things, because ‘God is teacher of his people himself.’121,

Summary

Here I summarise the main points that have been discussed thus far, and introduce the
subject which lies ahead (particularly for that of the next chapter). Barclay’s universal
redemption was composed of three concepts: ‘Inward Light,’ ‘Day of Visitation’ and
‘Passiveness.’ The ‘inward light’ that was purchased by Christ’s death on the Cross dwells in all
human souls, and at some point in time during each ‘day of visitation,’ the light will start to
operate. If a person does ‘not resist’ its work, the light will become their salvation. In other
words, according to Barclay, whether or not people resist the light is the diverging point to
salvation or damnation. Nevertheless, this logic led to another problem. Namely, it called into
question whether or not obedience to the light, or non-resistance to God is a volitional act in and
of itself. If it is considered to be so, Barclay’s discussion then falls into the same pit as the ideas
of orthodox Calvinistic and Arminian voluntarism; Barclay sharply criticised these voluntary

120 Barclay, Apology, p. 349.
121 Barclay, Apology, p. 87.
religions, viewing them as principles that were based on humanism and self-will. In regard to this matter, however, Barclay intends by the third concept of ‘passiveness’ the utter negation of the self, to the extent that believers have no desire to have faith in God or abandon their desire to believe in God. Barclay urges all the people to wait silently upon God, even by forsaking their own self-will to faith and renouncing their imaginations, feelings, thoughts and senses of reason. These renunciations are for participation in the working of God. Recently, Liberal researchers, such as Jones and Braithwaite, have negatively evaluated Barclay’s concept of ‘passiveness’ or ‘nothingness.’ However, the concept of passiveness, as described in Barclay’s theology, is not a mere ‘passivity’ that is criticised by Braithwaite. Rather, it is considered to have great merit in that it opens the door of believers’ hearts to God, allowing an inward spiritual man to emerge for salvation. This creates the opportunity for us to meet God, reflectively enabling us to form an ‘I’ in contrast to the otherness of God, ‘you.’ Therefore, it can be said that in Barclay’s view, the idea of passiveness is the core essence of Quaker theology. Although his theological influence on the following generations, especially those generations living around the period of Quietism in the eighteenth century, deserves to be closely examined as a subject for further study, I can say at least that conventional censures against Barclay are presumably due to the misunderstanding of Barclay’s central idea that arises from examinations made without thorough consideration of the religious, theological, philosophical contexts of his time (regarding this matter, in the next chapter, I look more closely into the Liberal estimation of Barclay’s theology in their historiography, which is based on a particular ideology of self-affirmation). The reason for this is that the very idea of passiveness constitutes a defining characteristic of Quakerism that distinguishes it from orthodox Calvinism and Arminianism, two large ideological currents of those days, and also from other contemporary religions and philosophies such as Cartesian
philosophy, in regard to its views on human free will and reason. Lastly, a special feature of Barclay’s theology is that he demonstrates the relativity of human subjectivity, and suggests the necessity of verifying individual truths with various things such as the Bible and joint-testimonies. This point will also be examined further in the next chapter, but it might be better to estimate Barclay’s opinion of this, not as the negative side of merely leaning towards orthodoxy, but the positive one for a religious movement that wishes to continue a moderate existence in society without considering their faith to be absolute.\textsuperscript{122}

\textsuperscript{122} ‘The struggle to survive Restoration persecution encouraged organization, and organization stimulated conservatism. …It was perhaps inevitable that the anarchical implications of the doctrine of the light within would have to be tempered by some form of group control if the movement was to avoid fragmentation into a thousand competing faiths.’ (Reay, \textit{The Quakers and the English Revolution}, p. 121).
Chapter 2: Changes of Self Concept in Quakerism and the Liberal Historical View

Introduction

In the second chapter, I trace changes in the concept of self in Quakerism, from the beginning of the movement, through the periods of the Restoration, and Quietism and Evangelism, to Liberal Quakerism today. I also refer to transformations in contemporary ideologies and social environments. Following up on the theme of the first chapter, I look more deeply into Barclay’s theology and its conventional estimation by clarifying the differences between the self held by Barclay and by twentieth century Quaker researchers, Jones and Braithwaite, who accused Barclay of being the main cause of the decline of eighteenth century Quakerism.1

A concept is generally determined in relationship to other things, or in the context in which that concept is involved. In Christian theology, the concept of self, or human self-image, is usually described in relationship to God as otherness, specifically in the framework of soteriology; it includes motifs such as the human condition in the world, relations between humanity and God, and the way of reconciliation with God, and the realisation of God’s Kingdom. These ideas are also evident in Quakerism. This chapter considers the matter of the self in Quaker faith and tradition from the perspective of soteriology, expanding upon the previous chapter. The word ‘self’ in the modern era, especially since the late seventeenth century, contains various meanings such as ‘selfishness,’ ‘a person’s individuality or essence’

and ‘personal identity’ or ‘ego’ and ‘cogito’ (the foundation of recognition). Accordingly, what Quakers meant by the ‘self’ also depends on the period of time when they lived, and on the extent to which they profoundly understood the meaning of the word. Therefore, I make a brief, overall survey of Quakers’ views on salvation in the aforementioned four periods, while seeking to clarify their self-image and understanding of human nature. The point that this analysis demonstrates is that Quaker theology kept a certain traditional theological framework in soteriology in terms of the self with some due alterations according to the different situations. It also demonstrates that Quakerism has changed substantially since its acceptance of Liberal self-affirmative idealism during the twentieth century. From this particular viewpoint of self-affirmation, Liberal researchers conducted their interpretations of Quaker history, dubiously identifying themselves with the first generation as the ‘Origin’ and criticising subsequent Quakerism, especially Barclay’s theology, as false due to its self-denial, with the intention of justifying their own self-centred ideology.

In the first section, I review theological differences in self-understanding between Barclay and George Fox, who was the most influential leader and founder of the early Quaker movement. Jones and Braithwaite claimed that Fox’s messages were grossly distorted by Barclay. In the second section, I examine another Quaker systematic theologian, Elizabeth Bathurst (1655-85), who, according to Braithwaite, belonged to the second generation after the Restoration, along with Barclay. Reviewing her theology sheds light upon the theological atmosphere of Quakerism during this period, and also upon the distinctiveness of Barclay’s theology. In the third section, I focus on Job Scott (1751-93) and Henry Tuke (1755-1814). Both

2 See the sections of ‘self’ and ‘subject’ in J. A. Simpson and E. S. C. Weiner, prep., The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989). In fact, it is only in Barclay and Liberals’ discussions that the word comes to have philosophical meanings.
of them were virtually contemporary Quaker writers. However, Scott is generally considered to have been an archetype of the Quietist Quakers, who were allegedly the direct successors of Barclay’s theology, leading the Quaker movement to its serious decline in the eighteenth century. Tuke, on the other hand, is said to have been an anti-Quietist and a prime example of Evangelical Quakers in the nineteenth century. I closely compare Scott’s and Tuke’s theologies with Barclay’s, so as to see whether these Scott (Quietist), Tuke (anti-Quietist, or proto-Evangelical) and Barclay went along the same theological path, and whether Barclay’s theology was really the main factor underpinning Quietism, as contended by the Liberal researchers. Finally in the fourth section, twentieth century Quaker writers, Jones and Braithwaite, are explored. In particular, characteristics of their religious thought, which centered on the value of ‘intimacy’ or ‘presence’ of God as the capital ‘Self,’ are examined. Then, I reexamine their criticism of Barclay’s theology in regard to the concept of self, whilst clarifying the self-contained nature of Liberal Quakerism and their historiography.

2. 1. The Self of the Early Quakers: Fox’s Universal Redemption and Perfection

George Fox was the most influential leader and founder of the early Quaker movement. According to Jones and Braithwaite, Fox’s messages were seriously distorted by Barclay’s theology. However, Fox did not present significantly different positions than Barclay in terms of soteriology. Fox clearly asserts universal redemption by Christ through inward light, with reference to the sinful nature of humanity. In Fox’s view, human beings have been depraved and

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6 In regard to the definition of ‘proto-Evangelical,’ see 2.3.1. in this thesis.
have fallen from the image of God; they cannot do any good by their own fleshly power and self-will, nor can they know the things about God through natural knowledge and understanding, for these human faculties are against and contrary to the spirit of God. However, God gave inward light (in Fox’s terminology, ‘the light in your conscience’ or ‘the light of Christ within you,’ etc.) to all of humanity through Christ’s death. If people believe in the inward light or obey the working of the light that enlightens each person during their day of visitation, it will become salvation for them. These theological themes are found in common with Barclay, and it can be said that Fox and Barclay shared the same basic idea of universal redemption by Christ.

Nevertheless, there are two main theological differences between them regarding the concept of self: namely, Fox’s slight Arminian orientation in self-will, and his emphasis on the possibility of immediate perfection of humanity in this world. As seen in the first chapter, Barclay develops his theological arguments to fully refute the limited redemption of orthodox Calvinism, and at the same time to criticise the inadequacy of universal redemption proclaimed mainly by Arminianism. Barclay does this by expounding the correlation between self-denial and salvation, so that he can show the uniqueness of Quakerism in contrast with the two contemporary major ideological tides. Fox holds almost the same discussion on salvation by

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11 Nickalls, *The Journal of George Fox*, p. 17. In regard to the relation between the inward light and human free will, Fox says ‘Now do not think that I hold free will here, man's free will, I speak of that which is contrary to man's will, and loving it will keep your wills from running, and your wills from willing any thing, and keep them in subjection;' (Fox, *The Works*, vol. IV., p. 20).
15 See 1.1.2. in this thesis.
Christ, but he does not give a detailed explanation of ‘obeying the light,’ though he posits several motifs of self-denial, or of the crucifixion of the self as the way to God, as found in the phrases such as ‘keep thy mind down low, up to the Lord God; and deny thyself.’ Consequently, this may be totally attributable to Fox’s unsystematic expression of his thought, but there is some difficulty in distinguishing Quakerism from Arminianism. For instance, Fox sometimes makes simple arguments about Christ’s universal redemption in his Journal, based on the scriptures.17 This is apparent especially in his counterarguments against the double predestination of Calvinism,18 where Fox presents four reasons why he considers the dogma to be erroneous.19 He states: (1) God ‘gave a promise to Cain if he did well he should be accepted. . . . if they do not do well as Cain, is not here a fault, which fault is in themselves and the cause of their reprobation, and not God.’ (2) Christ would not have sent apostles out ‘into all nations to preach the doctrine of salvation if the greatest part of men was ordained for hell.’ (3) As described in 2 Cor. 5:15 and Rom. 5:6, Christ ‘died for all men . . . and enlightens every man that cometh into the world.’ (4) Christ bids people to believe in the light, ‘so all they that hate the light, which Christ bids all believe in, they are reprobated . . . .’

In short, Fox asserts that reprobation lies in human attitude, not in God, for God has bestowed the light upon all people by Christ’s death and revealed the way to salvation. Whether one will be saved is the matter of his or her will towards God. These arguments do not appear to be distinct from Arminian universal redemption, which placed emphasis on human voluntary

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16 Nickalls, The Journal of George Fox, p. 347. Fox says, ‘keep in the daily cross, the power of God, by which ye may witness all that to be crucified which is contrary to the will of God.’ (Nickalls, The Journal of George Fox, p. 18). And, ‘be still and silent from thy own wisdom, wit, craft, subtlety [sic], or policy that would arise in thee, but stand single to the Lord, without any end to thyself.’ (Nickalls, The Journal of George Fox, p. 194).
17 Nickalls, The Journal of George Fox, p. 34, 425 and 643.
18 In regard to the double predestination developed by orthodox Calvinism, refer to 1.1.1. in this thesis.
19 The citations in the following four points are from Nickalls, The Journal of George Fox, pp. 316-317.
response towards God’s prevenient grace as a key for salvation. (In Arminian belief, however, the light graced by God is equivalent to natural light, namely human reason\(^{20}\)). Addressing this tendency in the teaching of early Quaker leaders including Fox and George Whitehead (c.1636-1723),\(^{21}\) Moore argues:

salvation was some extent a matter of human choice, to be influenced by one’s own efforts.

This doctrine was called “justification by works.” … It [Arminianism] also was taken up by General Baptists and other sectarianists, including many Quakers. The Quakers’ call to turn to “the light within,” … was considered by their opponents to be advocacy of justification by works.\(^{22}\)

Secondly, the most significant difference between Fox and Barclay is their positions on perfection, the doctrine which states that human beings can become perfectly redeemed from sin in this world.\(^{23}\) Both Fox and Barclay assert that perfection is possible through Christ’s work by the grace of God,\(^{24}\) in opposition to the orthodox idea of ‘Persistent Sin.’\(^{25}\) However, they have slightly different opinions in their beliefs. Barclay argues that perfection still leaves room for growth, and that there always remains ‘a possibility of sinning, where the mind doth not most

\(^{20}\) ‘THE word, *arbúrium*, “Choice,” or “Free Will,” properly signifies both *the faculty of the mind or understanding*, by which the mind is enabled to judge about any thing proposed to it, —and *the judgment itself* which the mind forms according to that faculty. But it is transformed from the MIND to the WILL, on account of the very close [*unionem*] connection which subsists between them. LIBERTY, when attributed to the WILL, is properly an affection of the WILL, though it has its root in the understanding and reason.’ (Jacob Arminius, *The Works of James Arminius*, trans. James Nichols, The London ed., vol.2. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, [1828] 1986), pp. 189-190).

\(^{21}\) Moore, *The Light in their Consciences*, p. 221.

\(^{22}\) Moore, *The Light in their Consciences*, p. 100.


diligently and watchfully attend unto the Lord.\textsuperscript{26} On the other hand, Fox goes so far as to insist that people can become as perfect as Christ, never to go astray again. Fox even states: ‘by which [God’s image, and righteousness and holiness by Christ] he comes up into the Paradise of God, as man was before he fell; and into a higher state than that, to sit down in Christ that never fall.’\textsuperscript{27} To our eyes, Fox’s belief in full perfection seems somewhat fearless, but it was closely linked with his apocalyptic understanding of the time.

According to Bernard Capp,\textsuperscript{28} pre-millennialism, a radical belief which states that the second coming of Christ would precede the Millennium,\textsuperscript{29} spread abroad as the consciousness of the time and reached its peak in England in the 1640s. The sense was widely shared by Independents, and some Presbyterians and other radical sects. These puritans preached that the second coming was imminent and would be followed by ‘a perfect society to be established through divine intervention.’\textsuperscript{30} The belief functioned as a strong driving force for the Revolution.\textsuperscript{31} This feeling slightly declined later, but was revived by the Fifth Monarchy Men in the 1650s.\textsuperscript{32} Fox also was among those who shared the apocalyptic hope, although never using

\textsuperscript{26} Barclay, Apology, p. 233. Barclay’s position on perfection will be deeply examined in the fourth chapter in this thesis.
\textsuperscript{27} Nickalls, The Journal of George Fox, p. 665.
\textsuperscript{32} Clark Garret, Respectable Folly: Millenarians and the French Revolution in France and England (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), p. 125. Iwai argues that ‘Thus they [Independents], who themselves became the Establishment, would not any longer posit the force of Antichrist within the country and attack the existing Government. Millennialism was originally an Anti-Establishment movement … In other words, Independents hoped to stop the revolution, but Millennialism was inherited by those who wished a further development.’ (my translation from Jun Iwai, Senmon-Okoku wo Yumemita Kakumei (The Revolution Dreaming of Millennialism) (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1995), p. 146).
the word ‘Millennium.’

Fox proclaimed that people were facing the end of the world right at the very moment and that God’s kingdom had come, saying that ‘his mighty day was coming.’ Criticising the existing churches and hired ministers as ‘Antichrists,’ Fox urged people to turn to God during the day of the Lord. The day of the Lord is the time when humans can be saved, justified and sanctified, if they are obedient to the inward working of God. The day also means the Judgment of the entire outward world, and the coming of God’s kingdom. As for the realisation of the Kingdom, Fox states, ‘…by the Word of God’s power and its effectual operation in the hearts of men, the kingdoms of this world may become the kingdoms of the Lord, and of his Christ.’ Thus, in Fox’s view, the perfection of human society by God’s work is tightly connected to the inward perfection that each person experiences, and so it is possible that Fox did not suppose any possibility of sin again after their conversion, because of his perception of an immediate completion of the time. In other words, he held an optimistic view of humanity that was sustained by his eschatological hope, in marked contrast to Barclay, who like his contemporaries believed that the end-time had already receded.

In summary, Fox and Barclay included almost the same theological themes of universal

35 Nickalls, The Journal of George Fox, p. 121.
36 Nickalls, The Journal of George Fox, p. 123 and 135. ‘Antichrist’ is a concept which has a close relationship with millennialism and eschatology, as described in 1 John 2:18. Generally speaking, the nature of the Kingdom stated by a person can be clearly seen from his or her definition of Antichrist. In Barclay’s discussion, there are also the same motifs of Antichrist (Barclay, Apology, pp. 143-144 and 329-330, p. 306).
38 Nickalls, The Journal of George Fox, p. 121.
40 As to this point, there is little difference between Fox and Barclay. Barclay says, ‘yea he [God] that hath risen in a small remnant shall arise and go on by the same arm of power in his spiritual manifestation, until he hath conquered all his enemies, until all the kingdoms of the earth become the Kingdom of Christ Jesus.’ (Barclay, Apology, p. 542).
41 In regard to Barclay’s view on the gradual realisation of the Kingdom on earth, see Barclay, Apology, p. 532.
redemption by Christ: the depraved state of humanity, the light endowed to all people by God through Christ’s death, obedience to the light as the way to salvation. However, there were slight differences between their views concerning the concept of self. Barclay urged people to bring human will to nothingness, or to totally deny the human will for partaking in God’s guidance,\(^{42}\) while Fox, although also denying human imagination, thought, and willfulness, appears to have left a little room for the human voluntary will towards God. Fox’s vague arguments about the universality of Christ’s redemption reveal a similarity with the thought of the Arminians. In other words, he did not clearly explain how the motif of self-denial was logically connected to obeying the light for salvation; rather he only discussed these ideas apart. In addition, Fox considered it impossible for a believer to fall from the perfect state, once it was achieved. In his belief, there would be an instantaneous maturation of humanity, which idea was influenced by pre-millennialism. In the light of these facts, it might be considered that Fox, in comparison with Barclay, was more optimistic in his understanding of human nature, though it depends upon the ideological position of readers who interpret his writings. On this point, Liberal Quakers, who place much emphasis upon human abilities such as self-will and reason, may feel an affinity for Fox rather than Barclay.

2.2. The Self in the Period of the Restoration: Bathurst’s ‘Time of Sorrow’

Elizabeth Bathurst was Barclay’s contemporary during the period of the Restoration, and one of few systematic Quaker theologians. She was born in 1655 and became a Quaker in 1678.\(^{43}\) By using her sufficient biblical knowledge, she wrote a systematic theological work

\(^{42}\) See 1.4.2. in this thesis.

titled *Truth’s Vindication* (1679). (In 1691, this work was republished posthumously as a collection of her works titled *Truth Vindicated*; including testimonial words about Bathurst and two of her other papers, *An Expostulatory Appeal to the Professors*, and *The Saying of Women*). Her writings were intended to urge Quakers to turn to the Lord and also to clear away outside suspicions against Quakerism. Bathurst clearly mentions the relationships between humanity and God within the frame of soteriology, and shows understandings of human nature both similar to and different from those of Barclay; specifically, they place the same emphasis upon self-denial as the way to salvation, but Bathurst’s simple concept of a linear process of perfection and her belief in human infallibility clearly differentiates her point of view from Barclay’s.

According to Bathurst, human beings were originally created after the image of God and they shared the beautiful divine nature, but unfortunately ‘by yielding to the Tempter, went out from the first Nature.’ As a result, humans became strangers to the divine life, and ‘had not Power to do any thing to appease him [God].’ Human beings are incapable of saving themselves even if they will, and also incapable of doing good things by themselves. This is because the human free will is corrupt and ‘naturally froward and averse to anything spiritually good.’ Thus, Bathurst begins her arguments on Salvation History with the same theme found in the works of Fox and Barclay: a totally-depraved human condition. How then can humans be

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44 Elizabeth Bathurst, ‘Truth Vindicated,’ in Mary Garman, et al. ed., *Hidden in Plain Sight: Quaker Women’s Writings 1650-1700* (Wallingford, PA: Pendle Hill Publications, 1996), p. 397. This is a reprint of the edition published by T. Sowle in London in 1695, omitting testimonies about Bathurst and her paper, *An Expostulatory Appeal to the Professors*. This edition contains many errors especially in indicating the sources from the scriptures, some of which were modified in the later editions. Moreover, the texts in *Hidden in Plain Sight* itself also make several mistakes perhaps in scanning the original ones. However, I do not think that these errors seriously distort the whole discussion of Bathurst’s. Refer to my paper, ‘Elizabeth Bathurst’s Soteriology and a List of Corrections in Several Editions of Her Works,’ *Quaker Studies*, Vol. 13-1, (2008): 89-102.


redeemed out of such a miserable state? Bathurst’s answer is that the Principle of Light was
given to all people through Christ’s death for their reconciliation with God.48 If people believe
in the light, receive and keep its working in their hearts during the day of visitation, they will be
‘called, justified and saved.49 The motif is also the same as used by two previously-mentioned
Quaker writers: obedience to the light as the way to salvation.

From here, however, Bathurst takes a different course. She puts more emphasis upon the
themes of the denial of human will and subjection of the self to Christ.50 In her view, there
should be a time of agony and sadness before victory over sin.51 She says, ‘all that have sinned,
must know a time of Sorrow.’52 And ‘first they must come to know a passing through Judgment,
and their works must be burnt.’53 In regard to the connection between human mind and the Spirit,
she further argues:

Operation of the Spirit (or Principle of God within) is not, nor cannot be known without a
being centred down into the same. …the Spirit’s first work is, to convince of Sin, …before
Remission of Sins comes to be known, there must be a centring down into the Manifestation of
the Spirit of God within, which will bring down every exalted Imagination, and every high
Thing, and lay it Low, even to the Ground; that so every Thought may be brought into
Subjection to Jesus Christ.54

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50 Bathurst, ‘Truth Vindicated,’ p. 370 and 413.
It is not clear what Bathurst actually means by the word ‘centred down’ or ‘centring down,’ but she apparently realises the necessity for humanity to be humbled down before the remission of sin and salvation. She says, ‘it appears by Scripture, that Christians were exercised in Fear and Trembling, (together with Humility, Patience and Self denial).\(^{55}\) Of course, many early Quakers such as Fox,\(^{56}\) Isaac Pennington (1616-79) and Francis Howgill (1618-69) also had a difficult experience, in which they felt as if crucified on the cross before their convincement,\(^{57}\) but it is certain that Bathurst expresses the more positive significance of sorrow for salvation. According to Tousley, this was one of the theological features of second-generation Quakers: ‘The convincement narratives of second-generation Friends follow the form of early Friends, but emphasise struggle with sin rather than the victory of regeneration.'\(^{58}\) On this point, I can say that Bathurst gave a more specific explanation of the relationship between self-denial and God’s salvation than Fox did, (though, as seen above, Fox presented the necessity of self-denial for salvation, as well).


\(^{56}\) In regard to Fox’s deep inner struggles, see Gwyn, Seekers Found, p. 217.

\(^{57}\) Pink Dandelion, The Liturgies of Quakerism (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 15-17. For another example, Richard Hubberthorne (1628-62) explicitly asserted that ‘…be [man] is separated from God and knoweth not any of his ways; but when the Lord revealeth any of his ways within man, man must die and know his ways no more, but must “be led in a way which he knoweth not,” contrary to his will, contrary to his wisdom, contrary to his reason, and to his carnal mind.’ (Leo Damrosch, The Sorrows of the Quaker Jesus: James Nayler and the Puritan Crackdown on the Free Spirit (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 108-110).

\(^{58}\) Nikki Coffey Tousley, ‘The Experience of Regeneration and Erosion of Certainty in the Theology of Second Generation Quakers: No Place for Doubt?’ (MPhil thesis submitted to The University of Birmingham, August 2002), p. 59. This work is useful in that it contains data about different thoughts and positions of first-generation and second-generation Quakers. However, in my opinion, the logical flow to the conclusion is biased because Tousley, like Jones and Braithwaite, apparently falls into logical fallacy in her discussion, and conducts her arguments mainly from her never-examined premise of intimacy with God as fundamental good and telos. The very persistence of the value of intimacy or proximity is being questioned as humanistic in the present theological field. The view that things proximate to God, Reality, Entity, or Being are true or superior, and things remote from it are false or inferior and should be excluded has long been a dominant premise in western metaphysics since Plato and Aristotle. And the intimacy or proximity is merely one aspect of Christian understanding of God. For the details of the discussion, refer to 2.4.1. in this chapter.
In regard to perfectionism, Bathurst goes in almost the same direction as Barclay, with several exceptions. She maintains that perfection is not only a command by Christ but also a promise that is given to people.\(^{59}\) Perfection was the end of Apostles’ ministry, the end of God’s appointment of teachers in the Church, and the end of Christ’s death on the Cross.\(^{60}\) Therefore, ‘those that deny Perfection to be attained by Lord’s People do in effect deny Christ the one Offering.’\(^{61}\) Nevertheless, she admits that if believers, after graced by God, do not persist in their faith, they may fall out of the heavenly state.\(^{62}\) She also states that perfection is not immediately, but gradually attained by continually attending to the working of the light in their hearts: ‘it is a gradual Work, carried on by degrees in the Soul, which is not presently Compleat and Perfect.’\(^{63}\) God’s work ‘will in Time perfect the Soul.’\(^{64}\) Her perfectionist stance seems to be exactly the same as Barclay’s. As already examined, however, Barclay asserts that people can be perfect in this world by God’s grace that is still with further growth. Perfection is in the present tense, and also in the future tense.\(^{65}\) For Bathurst, perfection is a gradual but linear process as stated in orthodox Calvinism,\(^{66}\) although Calvinists thought it possible only after the death of believers.\(^{67}\) The gradual process is also reflected upon her understanding of the Kingdom. In Bathurst’s view, the way to the Kingdom is a long and winding road: ‘yet must we travel through the Spiritual Wilderness, before we arrive at the Heavenly Canaan.’\(^{68}\) The Kingdom is expected to be

\(^{59}\) Bathurst, ‘Truth Vindicated,’ p. 376 and 422.


\(^{61}\) Bathurst, ‘Truth Vindicated,’ 377. Remarkably, Bathurst also placed emphasis on the imputation of Christ’s righteousness along with imparted righteousness of believers. That was not so usual for Quaker theology (Bathurst, ‘Truth Vindicated,’ p. 359).


\(^{63}\) Bathurst, ‘Truth Vindicated,’ pp. 421-422.

\(^{64}\) Bathurst, ‘Truth Vindicated,’ p. 422.

\(^{65}\) See 4.2.3. in this thesis.

\(^{66}\) Tousley says that this view of gradual perfection was another theological characteristic of the second-generation Quakers (Tousley, ‘The Experience of Regeneration,’ p. 60).

\(^{67}\) Macpherson, Westminster Confession of Faith, p. 64.

\(^{68}\) Bathurst, ‘Truth Vindicated,’ p. 421.
gradually realised in the world, after all people become faithful and perfect by following Quakers’ model, ‘as a City set upon a Hill.’\textsuperscript{69} Apparently, she felt that the end-time had already receded as her contemporaries during the period of the Restoration, and especially for her, the Kingdom is what humanity is waiting for, not experiencing immediately.

Lastly, the most significant difference in regard to the self between Bathurst and Barclay is the matter of infallibility of the Spirit and of people guided by its work. Bathurst asserts that the Spirit of the Lord is infallible; this position is common to Fox and Barclay, even to orthodox Calvinists.\textsuperscript{70} However, she goes so far as to argue that ‘They [Quakers] hold not themselves Infallible, as they are Men; but only as they are guided by the Infallible Spirit, namely, the Spirit of the Lord, a Measure of which he hath placed in all Men.’\textsuperscript{71} In other words, she seems to insinuate that people, when led by the infallible Spirit, are possibly infallible. Although Fox himself does not clearly give a comment on this topic, and this point of her discussion makes a sharp contrast with Barclay’s clear distinction between the infallible Spirit and the fallibility of person and people led by God’s revelation.\textsuperscript{72} Bathurst optimistically claims the infallibility of humanity backed by the infallible Spirit, less counting the fact that there can be a fanatic who pretends to be guided by the Spirit.\textsuperscript{73} At least, I can say that she does not provide precautions against such extremities. Furthermore, her view of infallibility resonates with her view of the Bible. For Bathurst, the Bible is useful for believers’ instruction and it directs ‘unto him (to wit, Christ) who is the Object of our Faith, and Lord of Light and Life.’\textsuperscript{74} However, ‘inward Oracle…is of greater Authority …a more Perfect Rule to guide our lives, than the outward

\textsuperscript{69} Bathurst, ‘Truth Vindicated,’’ p. 426.
\textsuperscript{71} Bathurst, ‘Truth Vindicated,’’ p. 379.
\textsuperscript{72} Barclay,\textit{ Apology}, p. 58 and 68.
\textsuperscript{73} Refer to the example of Nayler and his followers described here in this section.
\textsuperscript{74} Bathurst, ‘Truth Vindicated,’’ p. 351.
Writings of the Scriptures.\textsuperscript{75} Therefore, the Bible is not called ‘the Word and the Rule of Faith and Life.’\textsuperscript{76} Such an attitude towards the Spirit and the Bible is not so distinct from early Quakers, but Bathurst never mentions the matter of what happens if revelations, the Bible, and other testimonies contradict each other. In her logic, revelation should be taken as the primary authority.\textsuperscript{77} If so, she might allow people to justify anything that they do under the name of God’s revelation. This stance must have been judged to be irrelevant by Quakers of her time after Nayler’s affair in Bristol in 1656.

Turning aside from the main topic here, the Bristol episode has been repeatedly mentioned in various writings about early Quakerism. It may be unnecessary to describe the incident, but Nayler, a strong leader of the early Quaker movement, entered Bristol on a donkey, with his companions singing around and praising him as the Lord of God, with pretensions of being guided by the Spirit. For Nayler, (not for his followers), the imitation of Christ’s entry into Jerusalem as described in the Bible was intended to be a sign of the second coming of Christ, not to identify himself with Christ. However, this incident sparked further outrage of political and religious ruling-classes against Quakers. Nayler’s act was regarded as blasphemy against God, and at the same time as a great threat to the national authority.\textsuperscript{78} The Parliament severely punished Nayler and used this chance to suppress the growing Quaker movement, setting up several anti-Quaker laws. Strong social pressures and many persecutions came to a climax with new legislations such as the Clarendon Code (1661-65) after the Restoration,\textsuperscript{79} and Quaker

\textsuperscript{75} Bathurst, ‘Truth Vindicated,’ p. 353.
\textsuperscript{76} Bathurst, ‘Truth Vindicated,’ p. 352.
\textsuperscript{77} Bathurst, ‘Truth Vindicated,’ pp. 352-353.
\textsuperscript{79} Reay, \textit{The Quakers and the English Revolution}, p. 106. See also Gwyn, \textit{Seekers Found}, p. 305.
leaders, especially Fox, had to restraint fanatic behaviours within the movement. Quaker leaders attempted to establish institutional disciplines, and to lessen the primacy of Spirit’s authority for unity of the movement. This incident made Quakers keenly realise the risk of putting too much stress upon the personal side of religion. In regard to this point, it must be said that Bathurst had a naïve understanding of human nature and could not fulfill a role that was required by the needs of her times.

To sum up, Bathurst followed almost the same patterns of Quaker thought as Fox and Barclay: depraved human nature, the light given to all human beings by God through Christ’s death, and obedience to the light as the way to salvation. However, she took a slightly different way in regard to the obedience to the light than early Quakers; she placed more emphasis upon the denial of human will and subjection of the self to Christ. She insisted upon the necessity for human will and mind to be thrown down before the remission of sin and salvation by Christ. In this respect, her theology went along with Barclay’s. However, she also had a distinctive understanding of human nature on three points: her simple view of perfection, her idea of the realisation of the Kingdom as gradual and linear progress, and her insistence on human infallibility. Considering these facts, Bathurst is considered to have surely presented a more systematic theory of self-denial and salvation than early Quakers, but she still had an optimistic and simple understanding of humanity. Her optimism is clear if we look at the fact that she lived in a difficult and hard time during the Restoration. In her book, there are descriptions about a

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80 Moore, *The Light in their Consciences*, p. 167 and 215, pp. 222-223. For the details of Nayler affair and its aftermath, see Reay, *The Quakers and the English Revolution*, pp. 54-57. See also the third, fourth, and fifth chapters in Damrosch, *The Sorrows of the Quaker Jesus*. In regard to the theological shift after the affair of Nayler, Spencer says, “however the event may be interpreted, it marked a shift in Quakerism from prophetic mysticism to apologetics and “domesticated Nonconformity’” (Spencer, *Holiness: The Soul of Quakerism*, p. 71).
trouble between Bathurst and a Quaker meeting, where her preaching was rejected by a certain leader of the meeting.\textsuperscript{81} The case is to be further investigated for details, but it is easy to imagine that the developing group authority at that time conversely reinforced her theological counter-positions of the inward light as the principal and highest authority, and of humanity led by the light as infallible. Unfortunately for her, I wonder how convincing her simple view of human nature was within a Quaker circle, when an eschatological sense underlying Quakerism in 1650s had already passed away, and the rethinking of Christian discipline within the movement was under way.

2. 3. The Self in Quietism and Evangelism

2. 3. 1. Quietist Quakerism and Evangelical Quakerism

Job Scott was an American traveling minister, who is alleged by Jones to have been an archetype of Quietist Quaker in the eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{82} Jones claimed that Quietists including Scott inherited introverted theology from Barclay, which led to the serious decline of the Quaker movement.\textsuperscript{83} He is also considered to have been a forerunner of Liberal Quakers in subsequent days.\textsuperscript{84} Jones states that ‘It was Job Scott of Rhode Island who explicitly developed the position [that of the inward principle as the sufficient basis of religion, welcomed by the free thinkers] and pushed it to extreme formulation, …Job Scott is unquestionably the foremost eighteenth century exponent of that position.’\textsuperscript{85} As for Henry Tuke, a contemporary Quaker writer, he is

\textsuperscript{81} Elizabeth Bathurst, \textit{Truth Vindicated}, 3\textsuperscript{rd} ed. (London: Mary Hinde, 1773), pp. 36-39.

\textsuperscript{82} Jones, \textit{The Later Periods}, vol. I., p. 78 and 288.

\textsuperscript{83} Jones, \textit{The Later Periods}, vol. I., p. 59.

\textsuperscript{84} Jones, \textit{The Later Periods}, vol. I., p. 293.

said to have been an anti-Quietist, and a prime example of Evangelical Quakers later in the nineteenth century. Jones says, ‘This tendency toward the evangelical attitude comes into clear light in some attempts …The first of these attempts at this time …was that made by Henry Tuke.’

He also says, ‘Tuke’s books soon became standard interpretations of Quakerism, …There was hardly a single Quaker home which did not own a copy [of Tuke’s The Principle of Christianity], and it became one of the greatest evangelical influences.’ In this section I closely examine Scott’s theology mainly based on his doctrinal work, On Salvation by Christ (first published in 1824, titled Salvation by Christ), and I also examine Tuke’s theology in his introductory work, The Principles of Christianity (1805) and The Faith of the People Called Quakers (1801), so as to determine whether or not Scott (a Quietist), Tuke (an anti-Quietist or proto-Evangelical) and Barclay were in the same theological line, and whether or not Barclay’s theology would be really a key factor to the development of Quietism.

2.3.2. Scott’s Emphasis on the Inward Birth of Christ

Scott also takes almost the same theological line with his predecessors in the 1650s and during the Restoration in terms of soteriology: the human total corruption in their will and reason, God’s spirit or the inward light given to all people, obedience or concurrence to the

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88 In Mingins’ discussions of the Beacon controversy, the extreme Evangelicals in the disputes are referred to as ‘ultra-Evangelicals,’ such as Isaac Crewdson (1780-1844), who took the extreme Evangelical position; for example, the assertion of the Bible as the only direct source of God’s revelation and denial of the inward light as unscriptural. And also the term ‘moderate Evangelicals’ refers to people, such as John Joseph Gurney (1788-1847), who opposed to such an extreme position, but tried to equate Quakerism with mainstream Orthodox Christianity, while still holding the teaching of the inward light and silent worship (Rosemary Mingins, The Beacon Controversy and Challenges to British Quaker Tradition in the Early Nineteenth Century: Some Responses to the Evangelical Revival by Friends in Manchester and Kendal (Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2004), p. xiv, 15, 57 and 63). As shall be observed in 2.3.3., Tuke, who lived before the schisms, showed more or less a different evangelical position from these ultra and moderate Evangelicals of later days. So in this thesis, the term ‘proto-Evangelical’ is used to refer to Tuke, who held a balanced view of the authority of the inward light as well as the Bible.
working of the light for salvation. Scott also has his own unique theological feature: the intensive theological concentration on the concept of ‘a real birth of God in the soul,’ or ‘becoming a mother of Christ.’ All his religious themes, such as ‘justification,’ ‘sanctification,’ ‘salvation,’ ‘reconciliation with God’ and ‘the Kingdom of God,’ converge on that concept. In other words, Scott’s theology is elaborate interweaving Quaker thought and some traditional views of Christianity, but it is very simple in that all the religious ideas are thoroughly internalised and interpreted in relation to human interiority. Although emphasis on humanity’s inner side was a religious tendency common to early Quakerism and Restoration Quakerism, the abstraction of external aspects in Scott’s theology produces a slightly different atmosphere from Quaker thoughts in the previous times.

According to Scott, human beings are born into the first natural state, where they ‘never say God, cannot know him, nor receive the testimony respecting the mystical union and sonship. They can only know about natural things with their own reason and intellect. Their self-will is absolutely ‘opposite to the divine will’ and is ‘enmity to God.’ If they meddle in things of God with their own faculties, the attempt will result in ‘endless mistakes and prevents

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89 Job Scott, Salvation by Christ in Three Essays, 2nd ed. (Manchester: William Irwin, 1876), p. xx. This edition also contains Scott’s theological selection, Twenty-Four Select Extracts, from his Entire Journal.

90 Jones describes that Scott took no orthodox position by claiming his denial of so-called Trinity (Jones, The Later Periods, vol. I., p. 291). In fact, the reverse is true. Scott himself never denied the article of faith, and rather severely criticised deists who had no understanding of it and made three merely separate gods by their natural reasoning (Scott, Salvation, p. 44, pp. 50-51). Jones distorts Scott’s logic and even changes the word order of the citation from Scott’s original text. Namely, Scott’s original text is ‘It is as dark as Egyptian darkness, to talk of three eternal persons in the only one God. He is one forever. There is no twain in him.’ (Scott, Salvation, p. 68. Job Scott, The Works of That Eminent Minister of the Gospel, Job Scott, vol. I. (Philadelphia, PA.: John Comly, 1831), p. 516). It is written in the context where Scott argues that God is one, but is called variously according to his workings and relations, as God and Christ are related, who are never two independent Gods (Scott, Salvation, pp. 68-71). This is his understanding of Trinity. In Jones’ citation, however, the text is cut out from the context and altered as follows: ‘He is one forever. There is no twain in him. It is as dark as Egyptian darkness, to talk of three eternal persons in the only one God.’ The reason for this change is unknown, but it might give readers some impression of Scott’s denying Trinity.

91 Scott, Salvation, p. 27. See also pp. 114-115.

92 Scott, Salvation, p. 41.

93 Scott, Salvation, p. 36. See also p. 2, pp. 93-94.
the true revelation of God, and this merely appropriates God and his position to them. Scott says, ‘Here is the ground and rise of idolatry. And this also constitutes human sin, for ‘Sin is their only separation from God,’ and ‘sin is opposition to him [God].’ God himself never changes, and ‘All the diversity is in men and things; he [God] is to them, as they are to him.’ Therefore, ‘Whilst it [sin and frowardness] remains in us, God must, and will shew himself froward to us,’ and Christ will never reconcile us with God through his death. Therefore, it is definitely necessary for humanity to be inwardly changed, so that sin and frowardness may be removed. For Scott, the only true path is ‘through death, real total death to all corrupt selfishness.’ Specifically, since human beings are created after the image of God, ‘There is therefore something in man, that must eternally pant for enjoyment, unless united to God the source of all real good.’ At certain times, through the something of God in the soul, or the guiding of the inward light, God visits and invites humans to participate in the sufferings of Christ. If they wait silently upon, obey and consent to the inward working of God, and die to their first sinful nature, they will receive the benefit of Christ’s sufferings. Then ‘the new birth of God is brought forth, and the soul’s salvation is wrought out.’ In this new birth, good work

94 Scott, Salvation, p. 102.
95 Scott, Salvation, p. 27.
96 Scott, Salvation, p. 27.
97 Scott, Salvation, p. 114.
98 Scott, Salvation, p. 9, 16 and 111.
99 Scott, Salvation, p. 112.
100 Scott, Salvation, p. 114.
101 Scott, Salvation, p. 113.
102 Scott, Salvation, p. 96, 114.
103 Scott, Salvation, p. 116. See also pp. 93-94.
104 Scott, Salvation, p. 87.
105 ‘There is a time and season in all things: and if thou abidest in the patience, and touchest him not, thou shalt see and know all power.’ (Scott, Salvation, p. 48).
106 Scott, Salvation, pp. 127-129.
107 Scott, Salvation, p. 128 and 135.
108 Scott, Salvation, pp. 10-14, p. 52, 60, 105, 125 and 150.
is also brought forth, and then, they are sanctified and justified.\textsuperscript{110} Scott asserts that this ‘inward birth of God’ or ‘becoming a mother of Christ’ is the true ground of, and the only way to, salvation.\textsuperscript{111} Certainly, Scott uses unique phraseology such as ‘mother of Christ,’ and the central point of Quaker messages has slightly shifted from waiting silently upon God’s guiding to the inward birth of God, but the entire framework of his soteriology is basically similar to those of early Quakers and second-period Quakers.

However, there are two main distinctions, especially regarding the concept of self and its surrounding ideas, between Scott and earlier Quakers; one distinction is his concentration on human inwardness and his removal of all external religious aspects, such as the Kingdom of God. The other is his falling into a kind of solipsism, in that he does not recognise, I venture to say, an epistemological problem that occurs in human perception of God’s work. First, as observed above, if we read Scott’s texts, we can easily find that his entire theology focuses upon the theme of ‘the inward birth of God or Christ’ or ‘mother of God.’ In fact, this is the central point of his thought, which gives meanings to all other theological motifs such as doctrines, profession, devotion, prayer, and sacraments.\textsuperscript{112}

\begin{quote}
all this [devotion, prayers, sermons, psalms, ceremonies, forms, and performances of religion, and teachings on Christ]…will never give him the true rest and enjoyment of souls, nor centre him in God, unless he truly knows the God begotten, formed, and brought forth in himself, wherein alone the union with God, or the Immanuel state consisteth.\textsuperscript{113}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{112} Scott, \textit{Salvation}, p. 84.
\textsuperscript{113} Scott, \textit{Salvation}, p. 84.
Quakers in the first and second generations certainly had the same tendency to place emphasis on inwardness of religion. However, Scott’s internalisation sometimes goes to the extreme, probably with an intention to oppose deists and evangelists within and outside of the Quaker circles in the eighteenth century, whom he criticises as ‘Antichrist.’ This internalisation can be seen more clearly in his understanding of God’s Kingdom. Scott interprets the Kingdom at the same level of personal perfection and other theological themes, only by centralising it in the inward birth. Scott’s view of perfection is the same as that of Bathurst: the gradual process of changing human nature. For example, he says, ‘begetting in him a birth of the seed of God; which gradually increases, and grows in stature, and in favour with God … until Christ becomes completely formed in him.’ He also says, ‘it is sometimes long before the entire adoption, before the sonship is so thoroughly completed … there is no safe stopping by the way, or sitting down at ease.’ However, Scott cuts off the external aspects of the Kingdom, which, Fox, Barclay and Bathurst thought, would be externally realised in the world through the perfect

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114 Fox says, ‘the spiritual birth by which the things of God are known.’ (Fox, _The Works_, vol. IV., p. 15). Barclay also says, ‘thou shalt feel the new man, or the spiritual birth and babe raised, which hath its spiritual senses, and can see, feel, taste, handle and smell the things of the Spirit; but till then the knowledge of things spiritual is but as an historical faith.’ (Barclay, _Apology_, p. 70).

115 ‘The very nature of Antichrist, is to divert from the life of Christ, and from a single dependence thereupon, under a specious profession of him.’ (Scott, _Salvation_, p. 176). See also pp. 173-179. The term ‘Antichrist’ is largely applied to evangelical in Scott’s argument, but considering his own definition of deist and evangelical, he probably thinks both are Antichrists (Scott, _Salvation_, pp. 1-2). For example, he says that ‘these opinions [deistic and evangelical opinions] are very remote from the true doctrine of salvation, which has ever been, in all ages, Christ in man the hope of glory; a real union of the life of God and the life of man.’ (Scott, _Salvation_, p. 2).

116 Barclay, _Apology_, p. 64.

117 Scott, _Salvation_, p. 63.

118 Barclay does not discuss the external realisation of the Kingdom of God in this world at length, but he defines the Church as ‘the kingdom of the dear Son of God,’ which will finally comprehend the whole world through the persuasion of the light in every soul in the future (Barclay, _Apology_, p. 279, pp. 262-265). He says, ‘he [God] that hath risen in a small remnant shall arise and go on by the same arm of power in his spiritual manifestation, until he has conquered all his enemies, until all the kingdoms of the earth become the kingdom of God Jesus.’ (Barclay, _Apology_, p. 542). As for Bathurst, as mentioned in the above section, she looks upon Quakers as ‘new Israel’ and ‘city upon the hill,’ as described in the Bible. In other words, she thinks the group to be the place for establishing the Kingdom of God. In her view, if the whole world follows the example of Quakers, the Kingdom will be fully realised in this world (Bathurst, ‘Truth Vindicated,’ p. 426).
conversion of all humans, whether it is immediate or in the future. Scott argues that when Christ reigns in the human souls and death is completely overcome, ‘Here is that the son renders up the kingdom to the Father; and God, over all, the unresisted sceptre of his kingdom.’ And ‘the enjoyment of that kingdom is the true enjoyment of God …and this cannot be where the life that lives in us, is not a real birth of God.’ External views of God’s Kingdom cannot be found, but there is only the same motif as personal perfection. In short, for Scott, the Kingdom will only be fulfilled in human interiority. Or inferring from his usage of the term ‘Antichrist’ that especially refers to evangelical or orthodox Friends, it might be that Scott considers the Kingdom to be limitedly realised within Quaker meetings by bringing down Antichrists in such members. In any case, in Scott’s view, the extent of God’s Kingdom, which used to comprehend the entire world in Quakers’ belief, is narrowed down and converged into human interiority.

Secondly, Scott’s abstraction of external aspects and his focus upon interiority also resonate with his view of truth or reality. Scott here also internalises the criterion of truth, and this would result in a kind of solipsism, despite his harsh criticism of human reason. For Scott, human reason merely ‘will rear haughty front against this [God’s] mystery …against every

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119 Scott, Salvation, p. 63.
120 Scott, Salvation, p. 88.
121 Scott, Salvation, pp. 172-174.
122 Scott, Salvation, pp. 173-177.
123 The late eighteenth century Scott lived in was the time when pre-millennialism rose again because of the drastically changing social conditions caused by the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain, and because of the Revolutionary Wars in America and France (Iwai, The Revolution Dreaming of Millenialism, pp. 218-219. See also James K. Hopkins, A Woman to Deliver Her People: Joanna Southcott and English Millenarianism in an Era of Revolution (Austin, TX.: University of Texas Press, 1982), pp. xiii-xiv, p. xviii. And J. F. C. Harrison, Robert Owen and the Owenites in Britain and America: The Quest for the New Moral World (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), p. 138). In spite of such social-ideological situations, it is notable that there was no reference to the external realisation of the Kingdom in Scott’s logic. Let me add that, as Garret and Hopkins argue, it is quite difficult to generalise the social composition of the pre-millenarian movement around this period due to the lack of enough information (Garrett, Respectable Folly, p. 11. See also Hopkins, A Woman to Deliver Her People, p. xxii).
If people meddle with the things of God by reasoning, it will lead to appropriating God to humans. Furthermore, Scott criticises the law of retaliation as found in the phrases such as ‘enmity for enmity,’ or ‘love for love’ (in his view, the latter is a version of retribution). He maintains that the Gospel exceeds such a law, for the Gospel teaches people to die to their own selfishness and sin. His criticism of reason and self-centred logic is quite shrewd, in that the appropriation of God to the self is an important matter, when it comes to the legalism and self-reductive nature in modern thought. Probably he did not consider this matter at a philosophical level, but in this respect, he attempted to refute evangelical and deistic ideological currents in his times, which he alleged are establishing their own righteousness in opposition to the divine will.

Nonetheless, when Scott insists on inward light as the absolute ground of and only way to truth, he might walk into a pit of solipsistic faith, although he never claims himself to be infallible as Nayler’s followers and Bathurst. In Scott’s view, the criterion of truth is, to the last moment, the inward principle, which gives people ‘a sure and distinguishing sense of right and wrong, good and evil.’ In regard to the discernment of true or false faith, he says ‘To distinguish this from the real warmth of truth, requires a deep dwelling in the root of life.’

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124 Scott, Salvation, p. 117.
125 Scott, Salvation, p. 118.
126 He [God] supersedes the law of retaliation, an eye for an eye … Instead of only loving those who love us, and returning kindness received, he insists on a heart of inward, settled, universal benevolence, that would do good to all, enemies as well as friends.’ (Scott, Salvation, pp. 157-158).
127 Scott, Salvation, p. 156.
128 Refer to the discussion on the traditional western view on truth developed by Heidegger and Derrida, in 2.4.1. in this thesis.
129 Scott, Salvation, pp. 1-3.
130 See 2.2. in this thesis.
131 Scott, Salvation, p. 181.
other words, God’s life is the only sure standard of truth, not other things such as the Bible. \(^{133}\)

Here also, Scott focuses upon internal aspects, while cutting off every external aspect of religion. Certainly, such an inner criterion of truth is presented by other Quakers of every generation. The fact is, however, that Quaker leaders such as Fox and Margaret Fell (1614-1702)\(^{134}\) found such a sole standard of truth inappropriate as a result of the extremes within the movement during the late 1650s. What if people do evil with pretensions to being guided by the inward principle? In Scott’s logic, misbehaviours only mean that they does not enough dwell in the life of God, and so they must be dead in their sin or sinful nature in a fuller measure. In a word, he reduces the problem into a mere personal problem of religious maturation.

Furthermore, Scott’s theology has a theoretical difficulty in regard to human perception of God. No matter how deeply a person claims to dwell in God’s life, and to reach the intimacy with God, there is always some mediacy of subjectivity between God and God’s work recognised by humans. This means that God’s work is God’s work, but at the same time it is not so.\(^{135}\) Truth is only a personalised truth because, when it is perceived, it has been already categorised in, and reduced into subjective views. Barclay, as observed above, distinguishes

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\(^{133}\) "The Mysteries they [the scriptures] contain, are only “spiritually discerned;”" (Scott, Salvation, p. 64).

\(^{134}\) Refer to 2.2. in this thesis.

\(^{135}\) Tillich argues that such an encounter with God can be never present because it is out of the self, as properly expressed in Greek word ‘ekstasis.’ (Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. 3. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 112). Tillich also admits to the impossibility of separating God’s revelation and its receiver: ‘wherever the divine is manifest, it is manifest in “flesh,” that is, in a concrete, physical, and historical reality, as in the religious receptivity of the biblical writers.’ (Paul Tillich, Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1955), p. 5). In other words, he thinks that the very reception of revelation by human beings is religion. All religious expressions and thoughts necessarily presuppose ontological way of thinking (Tillich, Biblical Religion, p. 3 and 5). In regard to this matter of God-is-not-God, though I think the comparison of religions has no more merit than analogy, I introduce the matter of the awakening to Muso no Jiko (Formless Self) in Zen Buddhism, as is told in a dialogue between a Zen Buddhist, Shinichi Hisamatsu and a Christian theologian, Seiichi Yagi. According to this dialogue, the awakening to Formless Self is inevitably followed by the cognition of it in the next breath: that is, the reduction of the experience by the subjectivity into some form (See Shinichi Hisamatsu, Kaku no Shukyo (Religion of Awakening), Hisamatsu Shinichi Chosaku-Shu (Collected Works of Hisamatsu Shinichi), vol. 9, revised and enlarged ed. (Tokyo: Houzoukan, 1996)). Further philosophical analysis of the matter shall be presented in 2.4.1. in this thesis.
God’s work and the things received by a person, whilst Scott argues that his truth is the truth of God (precisely speaking, he does not mention such a theoretical distinction in his discussion).\textsuperscript{136} Of course, Scott is only asserting the inward light as the final way and ground of truth, not talking of human infallibility.\textsuperscript{137} However, considering this fact along with his stance on perfection, he might allow the possibility of conflating personal truth as God’s truth. Ironically, this is just what Scott criticises as the human appropriation of God.

In summary, Scott followed the same theological line as early Quakers and the second-period Quakers, in that he presented a typical Quaker soteriological view: human total depravity and their natural state of enmity against God, the inward light given by God for everyone, and obedience or concurrence to the working of the light as the way to salvation. However, his theology moved somewhat to the extreme, bringing up a different theological atmosphere from the early and second-generations. He focused upon the motif of ‘the inward birth of God or Christ,’ totally cutting off all external aspects of Christian faith. First, religious things concerning doctrines and practices were all internalised and put into the same level of ‘the inward birth.’ This can be clearly seen in his understanding of God’s Kingdom. In his view, the Kingdom, which used to have the external meanings in Quaker faith, would be realised only in the human inner side, or within the Quaker circle after bringing down Antichrists. Secondly, this internalisation also held true of Scott’s view of truth. The only ground and criterion of truth was the inward light, which taught, in a sure and certain way, various mysteries and duties of God. In his logic, there was not such a problem as the mediacy in the perception of God or truth, in contrast to Barclay’s argument of misinterpretation. In regard to this point, Scott’s theology

\textsuperscript{136}‘divine truth opens upon the passive mind, in full sunshine, as a clear light to our path, enlightening our darkness, and directing our way, in a sure and certain manner’ (Scott, \textit{Salvation}, p. 104).

\textsuperscript{137}‘I have nothing to boast of in regard to the penetrations of my own mind … I am by the grace of God, in things of religious concernment’ (Scott, \textit{Salvation}, p. 181).
unconsciously allowed the possibility of re-appropriating God’s truth, leading to a solipsistic faith, despite his harsh criticism of human reason and self-centredness. Scott probably set up his introverted theology based on inward light, and pushed it forwards to the extreme, to strongly oppose the rise of on one hand deism, and on the other hand, evangelical theological currents in his times. Even if the point is taken into account, I say, Scott’s theology was differently balanced, compared with previous Quaker thoughts, in that it moved towards wholly introverted and personalised faith.

2.3.3. Tuke’s Presentation of Orthodox and Traditional Quakerism

According to Jones, Tuke unprecedentedly leaned towards orthodox Christianity,\(^{138}\) saying ‘one can hardly fail to feel the difference …between him [Tuke] and a Friend of the seventeenth century.\(^{139}\) In this argument, Jones limits the characteristics of ‘orthodox’ or ‘orthodoxy’ only to the insistence on the authority of the Bible and the dogma of human total depravity.\(^{140}\) Indeed, from such perspectives, Tuke presents his theology as an introduction to Quakerism. However, in contrast to Jones’ claim, an orthodox theological stance can also be found in earlier Quakers. Furthermore, Tuke goes in almost the same soteriological line as early Quakers and the second-generation Quakers on three points: the depravity of human nature and inability of salvation by oneself, spiritual workings or the inward light placed in all their hearts by God, and obedience to and dwell in the working of the Spirit as the way to regeneration and salvation. While preserving such a traditional theological framework, Tuke dedicates himself much more to practical problems such as amusements, dresses, civil government and, oath and

war than other Quaker writers who are explored above. Moreover, Tuke puts stress on the usefulness or effectiveness of external religious aspects such as reason, the Bible and discipline in Christian faith. In this respect, his theology, to some degree, shifts its ideological balance to extroverted religion, in a peculiar contrast to Scott’s theology. However, looking at the convergence of his entire theology to the theme of God’s Spirit, Tuke sees things in both introverted and extroverted ways, giving some similar theological tones to Barclay’s theology.

According to Tuke, man was originally created after the image of God, but he disobeyed his command and ‘lost that state of innocence and purity …and having thereby subjected himself and his offspring to sin and misery.’ Things of God became ‘far above the reach of human comprehension,’ and ‘all will fail to procure us Divine favour and acceptance.’ For this reason, God mercifully promised to send the Redeemer, the Son of God, to all the people for the reconciliation with God. This was done ‘in order that man might be restored to favour and to a state of purity, it pleased the Almighty to promise and send a Redeemer …as the means of reconciliation and forgiveness of sins.’ Christ died on the Cross as a propitiation for the remission of sin of all humanity. Christ’s Spirit will work upon human hearts to sanctify them, in such a manner that it will give an end to human sin and lead people to eternal

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141 Tuke deals with these practical problems in six chapters, about half of the whole thirteen chapters in his The Principles of Religion, while Barclay treats such matters only in two propositions out of fifteen in his Apology: that is, the fourteenth proposition ‘Concerning the power of the Civil Magistrate,’ and the fifteenth proposition ‘Concerning Salutations and Recreations.’ Given that Tuke’s work is only an introduction to Quakerism and so widely treats various problems, his theology is much directed to these actual topics.


145 Tuke, The Principles of Religion, p. 25 and 27. ‘the love of God, in sending his Son into the world, was not limited to any part of it.’ (Tuke, The Principles of Religion, p. 28).


147 Tuke, The Principles of Religion, p. 33. ‘through the propitiatory Sacrifice of our blessed Redeemer, and by that Spirit, the more plentiful effusion of which He hath purchased for mankind, the advantages resulting from his death may be received, even by those whose situation may deprive them of the opportunity of an external knowledge of the truths of the Gospel.’ (Tuke, The Principles of Religion, pp. 28-29).
righteousness.\textsuperscript{148} This single process\textsuperscript{149} of justification and sanctification by the Spirit is totally attributed to God’s dispensation.\textsuperscript{150} Therefore, Tuke urges that it is ‘right to sit down in silence, and wait therein upon God for the assistance of that Spirit which helpeth our infirmities.’\textsuperscript{151} He also advises people to ‘be willing to take up the cross and despise the shame; then you may become partakers of that crown of righteousness.’\textsuperscript{152} If humans attend to, and patiently dwell in, this working of the Spirit (the inward light placed in their hearts), deny themselves, and take part in the crucifixion of Christ,\textsuperscript{153} then good works will be brought forth in them. And people will be sanctified, justified and regenerated to the image of God.\textsuperscript{154}

as far as is consistent with the free agency which He has seen meet to endow us, He is ever willing our happiness, and furnishing us with the means of procuring it … trusting in that merciful redemption, by which we have, on repentance, the forgiveness of sins … Thus will that sanctification of heart and holiness of life be experienced, without which we are told ‘no man shall be see the Lord;’\textsuperscript{155}

If a person is inconsistent with the principle or light by inattention and disobedience to it, he or


\textsuperscript{149} ‘In attributing our justification, through the grace of God in Christ Jesus, to the operation of the Holy Spirit, which sanctifies the heart, and produces the work of regeneration…’ (Tuke, \textit{The Principles of Religion}, p. 33). Here we can find out traditional Quaker understanding of justification as tightly connected with sanctification.

\textsuperscript{150} Tuke, \textit{The Principles of Religion}, p. 39 and 51. ‘it was by the Gospel dispensation, not only that life and immortality were brought to light, but that the Holy Spirit was more plentifully poured forth, and became, as it were, the leading feature of that religion, which our blessed Redeemer has introduced into the world.’ (Tuke, \textit{The Principles of Religion}, p. 45).

\textsuperscript{151} Tuke, \textit{The Principles of Religion}, p. 55. Precisely speaking, this sentence is written in connection of the true worship of God, but the relationship between human attitudes and acceptance by God.

\textsuperscript{152} Tuke, \textit{The Principles of Religion}, p. 133.

\textsuperscript{153} ‘the condition on which only we can be true Christians requires us to deny ourselves, and take up a daily cross to our evil propensities.’ (Tuke, \textit{The Principles of Religion}, p. 38).


\textsuperscript{155} Tuke, \textit{The Principles of Religion}, p. 53.
she will fall ‘into those enormities that produced that just judgments of an offended God.’\textsuperscript{156} Tuke adds that ‘hardness of heart is the punishment.’\textsuperscript{157} Here we can find that obeying to the inward Spirit is regarded as the way to regeneration and salvation, as also asserted by other traditional Quakers. Another notable thing is that Tuke clearly distinguishes the Quaker position on justification from the Protestant view of imputed justification: ‘some [people] imputing it wholly to faith, and others principally, if not wholly, to works.’\textsuperscript{158} This point is also common to the above-examined Quakers: Fox, Barclay, Bathurst and Scott, (although Fox’s position was not so clear because of his vague arguments).

In spite of this theological similarity, Tuke has some distinctive points in terms of self-understanding; the first distinction is his assertion of the usefulness of human reason. The second is his stress on the significance of the Bible and discipline in faith and practice, and the necessity of correcting faith by these things. The former point is argued from a positive self-image of human good abilities, and the latter is from a negative image of human evil-tendency, but both are emphasising external aspects of Christian faith. First, Tuke argues that humans cannot comprehend things of God with their abilities, ‘because they [things of God] are spiritually discerned.’\textsuperscript{159} However, human reason is not useless in acquiring knowledge of God. He regards this faculty as a grace given by God that assists believers with God’s revelation.\textsuperscript{160} If reason is rightly used, it will promote the knowledge of God, especially about creation and nature.\textsuperscript{161} And if reason is never ‘misled by the vanity of the human heart, reason

\textsuperscript{156} Tuke, \textit{The Principles of Religion}, p. 45.
\textsuperscript{157} Tuke, \textit{The Principles of Religion}, p. 52.
\textsuperscript{158} Tuke, \textit{The Principles of Religion}, p. 33.
\textsuperscript{159} Tuke, \textit{The Principles of Religion}, p. 42.
\textsuperscript{160} ‘there are two assistants afforded us, by our gracious Creator –Reason and Revelation.’ (Tuke, \textit{The Principles of Religion}, p. 128).
\textsuperscript{161} Tuke, \textit{The Principles of Religion}, pp. 128-129.
sees and feels its own imperfection, and readily embraces and submits to those advantages which Revelation affords.\textsuperscript{162} Regrettably, there is no way telling what he actually intends by ‘rightly used’ or ‘never misled.’ Yet, since he asserts that human reason itself is finally imperfect,\textsuperscript{163} and that the inward light gives knowledge about what is good or evil,\textsuperscript{164} he probably uses the word ‘rightly’ to mean to be ‘rightly’ under the influence of the Spirit. In any case, given that Tuke also thinks of human literature and learning as helpful or beneficial for ‘the promotion of religion and virtue,’ (not regarding them as essential for Christian ministry\textsuperscript{165}), he certainly places more emphasis on the usefulness of reason and knowledge than earlier Quaker writers.

Secondly, Tuke stresses the significance of the Bible and Christian discipline. In regard to the Bible, he deals with the authoritative nature as the first topic in his \textit{The Principle of Religion},\textsuperscript{166} and defends the Bible as the foundation of Christianity presumably against deism and its budding biblical criticism of the time.\textsuperscript{167} He asserts that the Bible was written by God’s inspiration and contains the Words of God within it.\textsuperscript{168} While being only the mediate way, the Bible gives us ‘very ample accounts of the being and nature of God.’\textsuperscript{169} Therefore, it is

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{162} Tuke, \textit{The Principles of Religion}, p. 129.
\item \textsuperscript{163} Another example is that, in bringing forwards the arguments for the existence of God by mixing the cosmological and teleological (natural theological) ones, Tuke considers that the principle of God as the great first cause is essential and deeply connected with human nature. However, he urges that the principle should be felt as the object of faith, not the object of reason (Tuke, \textit{The Principles of Religion}, pp. 2-4).
\item \textsuperscript{164} Tuke, \textit{The Principles of Religion}, p. 41.
\item \textsuperscript{165} Tuke, \textit{The Principles of Religion}, p. 65.
\item \textsuperscript{166} The treatment of the Bible as the first theme and also as the foundation of Christianity in Tuke’s theology is certainly distinctive, compared with Barclay’s stance; Barclay presents the immediate revelation as the foundation of true knowledge as treated in the first and second chapter in his \textit{Apology} (Barclay, \textit{Apology}, pp. 23-71). But at the same time, Tuke argues that the foundation of Christianity is upon Christ’s mercy and his truth (Henry Tuke, \textit{The Faith of the People Called Quakers, in Our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, Set Forth in Various Extracts from Their Writings}, 2nd and enlarged ed. (York: R. and J. Richardson, 1810), p. 4 and 9).
\item \textsuperscript{167} Tuke, \textit{The Principles of Religion}, p. 7.
\item \textsuperscript{168} Tuke, \textit{The Principles of Religion}, p. 24.
\item \textsuperscript{169} Tuke, \textit{The Principles of Religion}, p. 129.
\end{itemize}
‘profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness.’ A series of discussions here concerning the biblical authenticity (the authenticity of bible writers and of the contents) are interesting in itself, but the important point is that Tuke insists upon the scriptures as the standard of Christian faith and practice:

as everything relating to the Divine Being. …is far above the reach of human comprehension, we are desirous of avoiding all such particular disquisitions as lead beyond the clear expression of Holy Writ. …we believe all that the Scriptures have spoken and inculcated.

As the Holy Scriptures are the blessed means of introducing us to an acquaintance with the way of life and salvation, and of affording us much instruction in our various duties to God, and one to another, I earnestly press on you, …a frequent and serious perusal of them.

Tuke’s stress upon the external authority is also more apparent in his view of Christian discipline. According to Tuke, human beings naturally have an inclination towards evil. There is always a possibility to fall from God’s grace, even if they participate in the benefit of Christ’s redemption.

However excellent any of our religious principles may be, we who profess them are all frail and fallible. …if we have even experience some degree of redemption from the state of fallen

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nature, we are still liable, without watchfulness, to fall or to be drawn aside in principle or practice.\textsuperscript{174}

Churches or religious meetings inevitably have discreditable members within them.\textsuperscript{175} To ensure that such members may be corrected for the prevention of immorality and of the breakdown of the organisation, Tuke urges the necessity of discipline and order in Christian faith.\textsuperscript{176} ‘the first object of which [discipline] is to labour, in Gospel love and by private advice, for the reformation of those who walk disorderly.\textsuperscript{177} Thus, in Tuke’s view, by the Bible and discipline, individual faith and practice, which might easily go astray, will be (self-) examined, verified, and they will be led to watchfulness towards God.\textsuperscript{178} With regard to these positions, his religious stance can be thought as extroverted theology, especially compared with Scott’s introverted position. Tuke’s theology indeed leans to orthodoxy; his insistence upon the Bible as the standard of faith and his encouragement of reading the Bible were actually one of the theological characteristics of evangelicalism in the late eighteenth and nineteenth century.

Nevertheless, it should be noted, despite these orthodox tendencies, Tuke does not regard the Bible and Christian discipline as final objects in Christian religion. He distinctly warns that the Bible should not be too much relied upon and preferred to God’s inward working, which he thinks will result in the negligence of the Spirit.

Highly, however, as these writings are to be valued, and highly, indeed, we esteem them,
there is not only a possibility, but a danger of placing too much dependence upon them, by preferring them to that Divine Spirit from which they proceed, to which they direct our attention, and by which only they can be rightly opened to our understandings.179

For Tuke, the Bible and discipline are the standard of Christian faith and practice, but at the same time these things are only the guides which lead people to the inward Spirit as the way to salvation.180 As observed above, the purpose of discipline is to protect the organisation and order from breakdown, and finally to turn members’ eyes to God. As for human reason, he also says that it is finally imperfect and subject to God’s revelation.181 Thus, in Tuke’s view, although the Bible, discipline and reason play important roles, the agency of religious activities is ultimately ascribed to the working of God in everyone’s mind and heart. He asserts that living faith and acceptable works proceed from ‘the sanctifying operation of the Spirit of Christ.182’ He also says, ‘to unite these [faith and works] in our hearts and in our actions, is what appears to me to constitute the true and perfect Christian.183 If people walk along this long and gradual way to perfection by patiently dwelling in the Divine influence, they will become ‘living members and bright examples in his Church, and among his people.184,

Lastly, the concepts of perfection and the Kingdom are not so much mentioned in Tuke’s theology. He only asserts that ‘notwithstanding the variety of opinions into which the Christian world is divided, the light of Gospel will increase in the earth; and we may together

180 ‘Now, that from which the Scriptures proceeded, and to which they amply bear witness as the means of salvation, is what we apprehend there is a danger of neglecting.’ (Tuke, The Principles of Religion, p. 23).
promote the coming of that day, in which the Divine promise and prediction will be fulfilled.\textsuperscript{185} And ‘We trust we are called to show forth to the world, in life and practice, that the blessed reign of the Messiah, the Prince of Peace is begun.'\textsuperscript{186} Considering these words, the Kingdom has come and will be established through Christians who work against contemporary deism as Antichrist.\textsuperscript{187} Here, the range of the Kingdom is no longer within Quakers, but it covers the entire Christian world.\textsuperscript{188} Be the matter what it may on these points, Tuke’s orthodox theology is still focusing upon God’s Spirit, while giving due considerations to external aspects, as if internal and external faiths were working like two wheels.\textsuperscript{189} Tuke’s theological stance can be seen as an extension of Quakers’ emphasis upon institutional disciplines to restrain religious extremists and to defend the integrity of Quakerism, whilst he thinks of the inward light as the base of Quakerism.

To sum up, Tuke had a theological similarity in soteriology to earlier Quakers: human total depravity, the inward principle or light placed in all human hearts by God, and obedience to the working of the light as the way to regeneration and salvation. However, Tuke’s theology had two distinctions especially in his understanding of the self and its surrounding ideas. First, Tuke placed emphasis on the usefulness of human reason as well as learning in gaining knowledge of God. Secondly, he stressed the significance of the Bible and discipline, and urged the necessity of verifying each person’s fallible faith and practice by these standards. Considering these points

\textsuperscript{186} Tuke, \textit{The Principles of Religion}, p. 118.
\textsuperscript{187} In Tuke’s discussion, the term ‘Antichrist’ is used to mean those who deny the authority of God and the Bible, probably deists at that time (Tuke, \textit{The Principles of Religion}, p. iv).
\textsuperscript{188} Tuke advocates the necessity of the unity of all Christians in all denominations for the support of Christianity (Tuke, \textit{The Faith of the People Called Quakers}, p. 3 and 5).
\textsuperscript{189} ‘And this [to advise the younger to read the Bible and to attend to the sanctifying workings of the Spirit in their hearts] we recommend as the most effectual means of begetting and establishing in their minds a firm belief of the Christian doctrine in general, as well as the necessity of the help of the operation of the Holy Spirit of God…’ In fact, this sentence is an extract from advices by the Yearly Meeting in London in 1728 (Tuke, \textit{The Faith of the People Called Quakers}, p. 26).
along with his concern about practical matters, Tuke’s theology appears to have been modified to extroverted or orthodox theology, especially in comparison with Scott’s introverted theology. Nevertheless, for Tuke, the Bible and Christian discipline were not final authorities, but they were mere guides which directed people’s attention to the Spirit. Even human reason ultimately should be subject to the inward principle. In short, the centre of Tuke’s theology was still upon the Spirit or inward light at doctrinal levels such as soteriology and liturgics and he ascribed the agency of Christian faith and practice totally to God’s spiritual working. From that point of view, his theology balanced introverted and extroverted religious elements, and might be rather closer to Barclay’s theology than Scott’s inward-looking theology, even though there were naturally several theological alterations between Tuke and Barclay due to the differences of the time and social settings.

2.4. The Self in Liberal Quakers

2.4.1. Analysis Points of Liberal Quaker Theology

As observed in the previous chapters, Barclay’s theology was negatively evaluated by Quaker scholars in the twentieth century in regard to the concept of passiveness or self-denial. In this section, I further examine the conventional estimation of Barclay mainly by examining the concept of self as presented by twentieth century Quakers. Before entering into discussions of Liberal Quakers’ view, I reconfirm several points, which I have explored above concerning the changes of self concept in the framework of soteriology throughout the Quaker history. I then introduce the idea of ‘Onto-Theo-Teleology’ as a tool for analysis on Liberal Quaker stance.

The first and second-generation Quakers, Quietist and (proto-) Evangelical preserved a peculiar theological structure in soteriology on three points: the total depravity of human nature, the inward light endowed to all humanity by God for their redemption, and obedience to the light as the way to salvation. It is remarkable that such a simple structure was kept for a long time, taking account of Quakers’ general objection to theological formulation of their faith.\footnote{Fox says that it is not by the knowledge gained at university or college that would make a person minister (Nickalls, \textit{The Journal of George Fox}, pp. 333-334).} However, this does not mean that Quaker theology was subject to no alterations. Quakerism changed in regard to the understanding of the self, according as the times changed socially and ideologically on three points:

(1): The first large shift was the recession of the eschatological sense of the time, and the following changes of Quakers’ understanding of perfection, or self-understanding of their own possibilities of sacredness. Quakers traditionally understood the Kingdom to be realised and completed when all people become perfect through the working of the Spirit.\footnote{For instance, Nickalls, \textit{The Journal of George Fox}, p. 400.} Fox, who was influenced by radical eschatology, considered perfection to be fully possible right at the moment. Barclay and Bathurst of the second generation also thought that perfection was possible through God’s Spirit, but in their understandings, perfection was not immediate due to their sense of the recession of the end-time (for example, Barclay used the logic that the Kingdom has come and is still coming). In Scott’s view in the eighteenth century, the Kingdom remained receded temporally. Furthermore its fulfillment was completely internalised or limited only within the Quaker circle. I could say this was also ‘spatial’ recession. God’s Kingdom was not fully mentioned in Tuke’s theology, but judging from his wording, he probably believed that it had
already come and still had a long progress towards the accomplishment, as Barclay did. However, the Kingdom was not limited to the Quaker realm, and its range came to cover the Christendom, whilst fading out the motif of Quakers’ special roles in establishing the Kingdom. For both Scott and Tuke, perfection meant a long, gradual and struggling way, although the former emphasised only the internal aspect, and the latter made much of the unity of internal and behavioural aspects. Thus, by and large, the shifting sense of the end-time was correlative in accordance with the changes of Quakers understanding of perfection.

(2): The second large shift was the changes of Quakers attitudes towards the authority of the inward light. The centre of Quaker theology was the light, as said by every writer from Fox, Barclay, Bathurst, Scott and Tuke. The light was the foundation of religion, the base of knowledge of God, a guide for the right way, and the very working of salvation and regeneration. However, there was a large shift between the first generation and the second generation in regard to the necessity for religious faith to be verified and discerned by outward authorities and other diverse testimonies. In the beginning of Quakerism, the inward principle functioned as harsh criticism of the Establishment, such as existing governments, churches and societies. The authenticity of the criticism was based on the authority of the light or God’s Spirit itself.

193 Spencer, Holiness: The Soul of Quakerism, p. 18. This theme shall be more deeply explored in the fourth chapter in this thesis. Now, in Quakerism, justification and sanctification were traditionally considered to have a tight connection as if they were the single process. Unlike the orthodox faith in the imputation of Christ’s righteousness without being pure, Quakers urged that people should be actually made just and pure through the Spirit for God’s acceptance. Hence, perfection, namely sacred and holy life, may have significant relations with Quaker activism. Probably, this point of discussion might be a key factor to be further studied as to whether or not the estimation of Quietism, allegedly including Barclay’s theology, as lacking an ethical dimension by Jones and Braithwaite is valid (Jones, The Later Periods, vol. I., pp. 55-56, p 74 and 101. Rufus M. Jones, ‘Introduction’ in William C. Braithwaite, The Second Period of Quakerism, 1st ed. (London: Macmillan and Co., 1919), pp. xlvii). 194 so the covenant of light achieves remarkable open-endedness in all three areas. In the area of personal
Certainly, testimonies given by Quakers were backed and ensured by the Bible, and the worldview of early Quakers abode within the biblical realm, but the Bible was believed to be properly understood only by the guidance of the light. During the period of the Restoration, a series of anti-Quaker laws were enacted as results of several extreme actions within the Quaker movement such as Nayler’s affair, and persecutions became intensified, which pushed the movement to the brink of collapsing. Consequently, Quaker leaders such as Fox and Fell had to establish a national-wide body for the defense of the movement, and develop institutional disciplines for restraining fanatic behaviours within the movement. The leaders considered it necessary to verify each faith and practice by discipline and by central figures such as elders. As seen above, this revised Quakerism was represented by Barclay and Tuke, while it was Bathurst and Scott who stoutly opposed the modification, which they think to be the limitation of Quaker faith, and who continued asserting the single authority of inward light. These theological differences can also be found in internal troubles between Hicksites and Orthodox Quakers in the early nineteenth century. I say that the history of changing Quaker thoughts swung mainly

spirituality, the commodified "salvation" was broken down by radical surrender to the desolating power of the light. In social relations, established roles, class, and status were questioned and relativized by the powerful conviction that Christ had come to re-order society and had to be given full freedom in that work. '(Douglas Gwyn, The Covenant Crucified: Quakers and the Rise of Capitalism, (Wallingford, PA.: Pendle Hill Publications, 1995), p. 118).

195 For example, Fox says, 'Yet, I had no slight esteem of the Holy Scriptures, but they were very precious to me, for I was in that spirit by which they were given forth, and what the Lord opened in me I afterwards found was agreeable to them.' (Nickalls, The Journal of George Fox, p. 34).

196 Nickalls, The Journal of George Fox, pp. 561-562. Braithwaite adds the leadership of first Friends as one of the controlling factors of each individual and common faith in Quaker meetings. He says, 'from the first there was undoubtedly a strong personal leadership exercised which, while it could be maintained, carried forward the whole body in a common testimony, and sought to check disorder by methods of personal influence rather than by church organisation.' (William Charles Braithwaite, Spiritual Guidance in the Experience of the Society of Friends (London: Headley Brothers, 1909), p. 54).

197 The internal schisms between orthodox Quakers and Hicksites in the early eighteenth century could be described as a kind of social struggle mainly between the wealthy classes in an urban commercial activities, who wanted to hold the hegemony in Quaker meetings and make Quakerism adjusted to Evangelical (or mainstream orthodox Christianity) to be fit for their own new way of life, and the lower classes in rural areas, who tried to keep individual freedom in meetings and could not admit such an innovation. When it comes to the doctrinal point at issue in this dispute, it was as to whether the guidance of the inward light needed to be
as to how to balance the authority of inward light and that of other standards such as the Bible, discipline and joint-experience. Remarkably, this was a theological dividing point between Scott (a Quietist Quaker) and Barclay, and so the conventional view of Barclay’s negative influence on Quietism should be reexamined from this aspect.198

(3): The third large shift was the rise-to-the-front of the motif of self-denial especially after the second generation, which is just what Jones and Braithwaite make a claim against. This is an important issue, in which Quietist Quakerism and Barclay’s theology are at stake in Liberal Quakers’ assessments of them. As argued in Tousley’s study, one of the theological characteristics of the second-generation was their emphasis on struggles with sin rather than victory over sin.199 In fact, Barclay presented Quaker thought in terms of this ‘self-denial’ in contrast to orthodox Calvinism as well as its counter-ideology, Arminianism, both of which stressed the significance of human voluntary will for salvation in different ways. Barclay thought that the crux of Quakerism was to be guided by the inward spiritual working through crucifying the self to death. Bathurst, his contemporary, also firmly asserted the necessity of ‘time of sorrow,’ or the necessity for human will and minds to be thrown down before salvation by Christ. Considering early Quakers’ plentiful narrations of regeneration and their slightly Arminian tendency (especially, this can be said of Fox due to his unclear expressions), these two theologians certainly seemed to think more of self-denial or passiveness. Nevertheless, this does not mean that there were no motifs of self-renunciation or crucifixion in early Friends. For the first generation such as Fox and Hubberthone, self-denial was an important factor for salvation controlled by the collective authority (Mingins, The Beacon Controversy, p. 43. See also H. Larry Ingle, Quakers in Conflicts: The Hicksite Reformation (Knoxville, TN.: University of Tennessee Press, 1986), p. 3).

198 The authority of the Church in Barclay’s view shall be dealt with in the fifth chapter.

and God’s acceptance. The difference between the first and second generation Quakers was, I suggest, that the former could strongly urge for conquering sin, chiefly because they vividly felt the possibility of full sacredness with a keen sense of the coming Kingdom. Meanwhile, for the latter, such as Barclay and Bathurst, who not only lived in the midst of serious persecutions, but also felt the Kingdom receding, there was no urgent need to prepare for the impending Last Judgment, and rather they had to engage themselves in solving real and concrete problems in a meeting, waiting and hoping for the realisation of God’s ruling some time in the future. Naturally, in such social and ideological situations, they came to focus upon ‘not yet’ as well as ‘now,’ or to shift an emphatic point from ‘now’ to ‘not yet,’ and they advised people to be watchful and attentive to their own religious states in every time.200

Out of these theological shifts, especially the third one is what Liberal Quaker writers criticise as an aspect of the Quaker decline. However, it should be first noted that non-radical views of the Kingdom, including post-millennialism, usually takes almost the same form: namely waiting in patience and watchfulness, whilst living in the meantime, as described in 2 Pet. 3:3-18. This Meantime theology is defined by Dandelion as follows:

Christianity was created as a religion of waiting. Founded on the promise of the second coming of Christ, and the end of the world (the endtime), the history of Christianity, …has been about delay. Similarly the history of Christian diversity can be charted as a story of differing perspectives on the timing of the end of waiting. …or on the best ways in which to wait.

Christianity has seen itself as a temporary institution, helping humanity remain faithful in the

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200 For the further details of the theological shift on the Kingdom and its influence on practical matters, refer to 5.1.1. and 5.1.2. in this thesis.
meantime, in the interim.\footnote{Pink Dandelion, *An Introduction to Quakerism* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 5.}

Secondly, such criticism leveled by Liberal Quakers is at first sight based on critical studies, but their logical flow to the conclusion is rather directed by their peculiar religious orientation, or their unconscious premise of the value of ‘intimacy’ or ‘presence’ as fundamental good and *telos*. More specifically, Liberal Quakers develop the criticism mainly as to the matter of which faith is good or wrong, which theology is superior or inferior in terms of the value of ‘intimacy.’ This inclination is, as above, clearly apparent in Tousley’s discussion. She places the first-generation over the second-generation Quakers, in that the latter allegedly could not enjoy more intimacy with God, and concludes that the second generation represented erosion. She says, ‘The most crucial change [of the second generation] is that regeneration was no longer placed in the context of the fulfillment of salvation history.’\footnote{Tousley, ‘The Experience of Regeneration,’ p. 76.} And ‘Yet many [of the second generation] seem to experience less intimacy with God and focus on perfection without sense of assurance. This may mean that they fail to recognize sanctification as a gift.’\footnote{Tousley, ‘The Experience of Regeneration,’ p. 77. The word ‘fail’ that Tousley uses seems to show that she thinks of salvation as something that human beings can take hold of by their understanding.} Whether her arguments are to the point or not, she does not take so much account of social and ideological influences upon Quakers after the Restoration, such as the recession of eschatology, only regarding the shift as a theological fault because of the second-generation Quakers’ sense of a distant God. Regrettably, she gives no grounds to make an assertion of the second generation as a theological failure, except for her-favoured method of ‘false cause.’\footnote{See the section of ‘*post hoc ergo propter hoc*’ or ‘false cause’ in the article of ‘Fallacies.’ (Donald M. Borchert, ed. in chief, *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2nd ed. (Detroit, MI: Macmillan Reference USA, 2006)). This arguing method is widely used in the field of historical science. However, this kind of argument is valid only as long as cause-and-effect relations are made evident as in natural science. In many case, a}
pretending to be an historical analysis, is only expressing her personal religious preference, or something of modern Onto-Theo-Teleology.

Just digressing from the subject at hand, ‘Onto-Theo-Teleology’ is one of the terms used in Jacques Derrida’s arguments to signify the auto-affective nature of western metaphysics and Christian theology based on it. According to M. Heidegger, although there have been various types, western metaphysics since Plato and Aristotle can be throughout described as the metaphysics of presence. Philosophers have experienced the Being of beings (der Sein der Seiendes) only as presence (Anwesenheit). This means that they also have understood the meaning of Being only with regard to a definite mode of time, the Present (die Gegenwart). Heidegger argues that, based on this view of presence or proximity, western metaphysics has developed the wholeness of conceptions which has the onto-theo-logical constitution.

Because Being appears as ground, beings are what is grounded; the highest being, however, is what accounts in the sense of giving the first cause. When metaphysics thinks of beings with respect to the ground that is common to all beings as such, then it is logic as onto-logic. When metaphysics thinks of beings as such as a whole, that is, with respect to the highest being which accounts for everything, then it is logic as theo-logic.

researcher traces back history for the origin of some phenomenon or problem, eliminating many factors such as social, economical and ideological differences between the past and present, or between two ages, and oversimplifying the problem. And he or she finally claims that something is the first cause. I would think that this is a typical way of discussions by Liberal Quakers such as Jones and Braithwaite in criticising the second generation as the origin of Quietism or later schisms, and this way is closely related to their Liberal interpretation of history (as for the Liberal interpretation of history, see 2.4.3, in this thesis).


Critically borrowing this concept of the metaphysics of presence, Derrida argues that western ontology has been essentially logo-centrism. In his view, ‘logos’ is speech in a sense of the Greek word ‘legein,’ and the speech as logos is spoken language (parole), where the purest self-presence directly to the self can be realised. The structure of self-presence or self-proximity, in which human spoken-words are directly and instantly heard (present) to their own ears, has been the model of ‘truth,’ ‘being,’ or ‘reality’ in western philosophy.\textsuperscript{207} He indicates that, according to the standard of truth, western metaphysics builds up the hierarchies of opposite concepts [presence/absence, being/non-being, inside/outside, self/other, etc.], where the former concept has superiority over, and governs, the latter, and which intends to subordinate and exclude the latter for purer presence of the former.\textsuperscript{208} On this point, Derrida continues, Onto-Theology can also be called Onto-Theo-Teleology,\textsuperscript{209} for it is teleological in a way that aims for final presence of the purest presence such as ‘God,’ ‘Being,’ ‘Truth,’ or ‘Reality.’ Especially in regard to the metaphysics of subjectivity in modern ages since Descartes, it is based on the presence or proximity to ‘cogito’ or ‘transcendental subjectivity.’\textsuperscript{210}


\textsuperscript{208} ‘All dualisms, all theories of the immortality of the soul or of the spirit, as well as all monisms, spiritualist or materialist, dialectical or vulgar, are the unique theme of a metaphysics whose entire history was compelled to strive toward the reduction of the trace. The subordination of the trace to the full presence summed up in the logos, the humbling of writing beneath a speech dreaming its plenitude, such are the gestures required by an onto-theology determining the archeological and eschatological meaning of being as presence, as parousia, as life without difference: another name for death, historical metonymy where God’s name holds death in check.’ (Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 71). See also pp. 62-63.

\textsuperscript{209} Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 71.

\textsuperscript{210} ‘Between the overture and the philosophical accomplishment of phonologism (or logocentrism), the motif of presence was decisively articulated. It underwent an internal modification whose most conspicuous index was the moment of certitude in the Cartesian cogito. ...Ideality and substantiality relate to themselves, in the element of the res cogitans, by a movement of pure auto-affection. Consciousness is the experience of pure auto-affection. It calls itself infallible and if the axioms of natural reason give it this certitude, overcome the provocation of the Evil Spirit, and prove the existence of God, it is because they constitute the very element of thought and of self-presence. ...God is the name of the element of that which makes possible an absolutely pure and absolutely self-present self-knowledge.’ (Derrida, Of Grammatology, pp. 97-98).
This criticism of the autocratic constitution of western metaphysics or ontology is especially an antithesis of Hegelianism, which asserts that Reason as logos expands itself and finally achieves the completion of the world, under the slogan: ‘Was vernünftig ist, das ist wirklich; und was wirklich ist, das ist vernünftig’ (What is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational). This phrase expresses the identification of thinking and being since Parmenides, which allows a person to finally identify his or her self with the world. Such critique of Hegelianism also resonated with many theological counter-moves such as neo-orthodoxy against Liberal theology, which is based upon the simple trust of human nature and upon voluntarism.

Of course, the presence of God has been traditionally regarded as the high status that Christians or Church should partake in as eschatological reality, and Quakers as well consider God’s presence as his grace. However, as long as the presence is necessarily the thing that is present on the borderline of the field of human intuition and recognition, if one attempts to rank one faith above another, or one thing over another, only in terms of the ‘presence’ which is perceived and grasped as its trace in his or her subjectivity, it necessarily follows that he or she constitutes

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213 Parmenides was the first person to attempt to base the foundation of knowledge upon the relation between the human mind and its perception of objects. See the article of ‘Parmenides’ in Ted Honderich, ed., The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
214 See the article of ‘Vision of God’ in Anderson, A New Dictionary of Christian Theology.
215 According to Derrida, the formation of a concept is an effect which is made possible and impossible by repetitions of itself and differences from others. The constant presence of it is established only by cutting off the relationships with others and by being held as trace of it. However, the presence without such relations with others has already been undermined and disabled without the motion of repetitions and differences. This means that the final presence of the concept is always deferred and ultimately made impossible. Derrida says that ‘Since the trace is not a presence but the simulacrum of a presence that dislocates itself, displaces itself, refers itself, it properly has no side – erasure belongs to its structure.’ (Jacques Derrida, ‘Différence,’ in Margins of
some kind of hierarchy according to the proximity to the self. Namely, as Derrida argues, God (or Truth of the purest presence or proximity) grounds and regulates all other things in the hierarchy, but actually the top-seat of the constitution is occupied by the self, *subjectum* as the epistemological ground (See Figure 3).

Figure 3:

The World Reduced to the Self (Social Identity):
Self-Oriented, but Essential to Human Life

*On the top of the value-system is Divine Being of the purest presence to itself. According to the intimacy or remoteness to the Highest Being, every other thing is ranked, which finally builds up the whole constitution of opposite concepts. Since the Highest Being is posited in, and put in the scope of, human subjectivity, in a sense, the top of the system can be said to be occupied by the human self. That is, the highest Judge in the structure, who is designed to ground the self and the entire world, is the same as the self, although it makes a detour around the idea of ‘Divinity’ or ‘God.’ It must be said that this is self-based or circular logic: namely, something of Grand Tautology.

*Human subjectivity thus becomes the basis on which to constitute the entire system of meanings. Technically, however, subjectivity cannot grasp the ultimate meaning of itself. The reason for this is that, just as a basis cannot found itself, such an ontological quest is necessarily impossible to accomplish. Notwithstanding this difficulty, human reason, knowing its own limitedness as appears in death, attempts to get a panoramic and transcendental view of the self, (and the world), in order to go beyond the limitedness. In this effort, the Highest Being or God plays a role of giving the self-deceptive ground that enables humans, in positive and negative senses, to establish and maintain the identity of the self or society.
Now, Liberal Quakers’ criticism of the second generation is, in many cases, imperceptibly replaced by trumpeting their own peculiar religion, namely Liberal ideology of self-affirmation and self-justification. In the next two subsections, while considering the three points of the theological shifts of Quakerism as seen above, and keeping an eye on such Liberal ideological motivation, Quaker writers in the twentieth century, especially Jones and Braithwaite, are explored; for instance, the matters to be examined are what kind of religious thoughts Liberal Quakers have, why and in what sense they persist in emphasising the value of intimacy or presence of God, and whether or not their criticism of Barclay’s theology is defensible.

2.4.2. The Self in Liberal Quakers: Faith as God’s Self-Expansion

Jones was one of the most significant figures within Liberal Quakerism, and still has largely determined the religious direction of Liberal Quakers to the present day. His theology was typical idealism, which was academically influenced by contemporary British and American idealists,216 such as Josiah Royce (1855-1916),217 Thomas Hill Green (1836-82)218

216 These names including James are referred to as those who influenced Jones’ own view of religion, in Rufus M. Jones, Religion as Reality, Life and Power (Philadelphia, PA.: Walter H. Jenkins, 1919). It should be mentioned that Jones was also influenced by Cambridge Platonists such as Benjamin Whichcote (1609-83) and John Smith (1618-52). Jones criticises Barclay for he allegedly did not pay attention to the religious expressions and logic of Cambridge Platonists (Jones, ‘Introduction,’ in The Second Period, 1st ed., p. xxxii). See the discussion about Jones in Spencer, Holiness: The Soul of Quakerism, pp. 204-205.

217 Josiah Royce was an American absolute idealist. His philosophical stance is summarised by Roth as follows: ‘(1) the view that man can know the basic structures of reality and that it is possible to develop a philosophical system that will describe, clarify, and prove these structures for us; (2) the conviction that reality is an Eternal and Absolute Mind and Will, (a) which manifests itself in, but is not exhausted by, a vastly rich temporal universe of real individual beings who are organically and socially related, and (b) whose awareness unifies and knows all of these manifestations as a fully good and meaningful totality; and (3) the belief, in particular, that human life is a manifestation of the Absolute and that every man is ultimately assured of fulfilling, positive significance for his reality by virtue of his being an essential component in the universal community known and willed by the Absolute.’ (John K. Roth, ed., The Philosophy of Josiah Royce, reprinted ed. (Indianapolis, IN.: Hackett Publication Co., 1982), pp. 4-5).

218 Thomas Hill Green was a British absolute idealist, whose philosophy had a great influence not merely on philosophical fields but also on social and political areas (Maria Dimova-Cookson and William J. Mander, ed.,
and George Herbert Palmer (1842-1933), and also partly directed by Jamesian pragmatism through the work of William James (1842-1910). Idealism in the English-speaking world was largely cultivated in Scottish universities, and also Oxford and Cambridge in England, and then made spread by the hands of disciples of British idealists throughout Australia, New Zealand, Canada, India, South Africa and the USA. The general position of British idealism about religion was that ‘Religion was viewed by the idealists, in general, as an inextricable part of the process of self-realisation. Again this was a view which was derived largely from Hegel.’ And ‘For many [idealists], God is immanent in the world …The divine and human constitute the inseparable spiritual unity of the world. …Social reform and moral development were closely linked with religious self-realisation.’ This idealism played an important role as a counter-ideology against the rapid industrialisation, modernisation, and secularisation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century: ‘It acted as a counterbalance to the individualism of the more brash variants of utilitarianism, offering a philosophy that gave a much needed emphasis to social cohesiveness and to the closeness of the relation between individual and collective

T. H. Green: Ethics, Metaphysics, and Political Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), p. 6). His thought is illustrated by the following account: ‘there must exist some conscious principle analogous to our thought which grounds and unifies the world itself. A kind of world-consciousness in which resides everything that there is, this principle he [Green] terms the ‘eternal consciousness’. ’ (Cookson and Mander, T. H. Green, p. 7).


220 There would be no need to give a detailed explanation of William James, his profile and pragmatic thought, but, to add one thing about him, he was a friend and colleague with Royce at Harvard University, and he shared much of idealistic atmosphere in those days with Royce. However, there were also clear distinctions between them. Roth points out the philosophical differences in terms of the standard of truth and falsehood: ‘James argues that if a belief or proposition is true, it is sufficient to say that this means that it leads us to have particular expectations which, upon critical testing, get fulfilled in experience. By the same token, if a belief or proposition is false, it is sufficient to say that this means that the belief or proposition leads us to have particular expectations which, upon critical testing, do not get fulfilled. …This means that, Royce to the contrary notwithstanding, truth is not something fixed and complete in an Eternal Mind, but a property that a belief or proposition comes to have as it is tested and verified in experience.’ (Roth, The Philosophy of Josiah Royce, pp. 6-7).


222 Boucher and Vincent, British Idealism, p. 9.
responsibility.\textsuperscript{223} Along this line, Jones puts much stress upon the immanence of the divine nature within human beings and upon God’s continuance with humans, and also upon the significance of human subjective and voluntary actions towards God as ‘the larger whole.’ Basically, his colleague, Braithwaite also goes along the same idealistic line, although seemingly attempting to balance Hegelian ideology and orthodox Christianity within traditional Quakerism.\textsuperscript{224} In their writings, Christian motifs such as ‘God,’ ‘Christ,’ ‘the Kingdom,’ and ‘sin’ are found here and there. But their religion, especially Jones’ theology, goes beyond the framework of traditional Christianity, and creates a different religion from earlier Quakerism,\textsuperscript{225} though showing a resemblance to it. Here in this subsection, I examine and make clear Liberal Quakers’ peculiar religious positions mainly based on Jones’ arguments; Braithwaite himself was not so much involved in Christian doctrinal matters.

\textbf{a. Human Self-Realisation towards the Larger Self}

According to Jones, Christian religion begins with the incarnation or the revelation of God’s love in a personality: ‘Christianity begins with the appearance of a Being who is genuinely human so that he can speak to human conditions, and genuinely divine so that he can reveal God.’\textsuperscript{226} The revelation in Christ manifests that ‘man was meant to be in the Divine image,’\textsuperscript{227} and that humanity must be brought to the participation in this infallible image of God.

\textsuperscript{223} Boucher and Vincent, \textit{British Idealism}, pp. 21-22.
\textsuperscript{224} Unlike Jones, who reductively organises his whole discourses centering around his peculiar religious stance of self’s approach to the larger Self, Braithwaite seems to use more motifs of Christianity and to show some understanding of the theological shifts in Quakerism. However, his ideological roots are also based on human consciousness as the religious foundation, as shall be shown later in this section.
\textsuperscript{225} Dandelion, \textit{A Introduction to Quakerism}, p. 130.
\textsuperscript{227} Jones, \textit{The Message}, p. 8.
like Christ. For Jones, this is the very purpose of Christianity. Human beings are endowed with souls which a priortistically have a capacity of recognizing truth and of responding to love and of assenting to righteousness. Namely, human consciousness is the foundation of religious conviction and faith. Therefore, the path to that final step towards God’s full image, Jones asserts, starts from the human soul or consciousness’s answer towards God’s work. God is always mercifully extending his arms to humans for welcoming them to his sonship and the reconciliation with him, staying close to them as an Emmanuel God. Therefore, it depends upon human attitudes whether or not individuals are led to truth and can take part in God’s saving power. Jones says, ‘each person holds the key to his own destiny, and his personal choice is of all things the most momentous.’ If humans turn their faces towards and believe in God, or ‘Turn your face to Christ, follow Him, obey every gleam of light you get,’ and if they are convinced that God is the continuous reality with them, then they will have a new person formed in their hearts and can overcome their sin in the power of the new life.

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230 Jones, Dynamic Faith, p. 6.
231 ‘There is no convincing authority beyond this appeal to consciousness. This appeal to consciousness carries conviction and wins assent because the human spirit has a capacity for truth, because it is not wholly foreign in nature to Him who is the truth.’ (Jones, Dynamic Faith, p. 6). Braithwaite also thinks of human consciousness or conscience as the central principle of the Reformation, namely as the throne of religious authority (Braithwaite, Spiritual Guidance, p. 23, pp. 26-27).
234 Jones, Religion as Reality, p. 33 and 39.
236 Rufus M. Jones, Quakerism: A Religion of Life, 2nd ed. (London: Headley Brothers, 1908), pp. 31-32.
238 Jones, Quakerism, p. 18.
239 Jones, The Message, p. 12 and 14. In Jones’ view, sin is described as the separation between humanity and God or lacking the recognition of the higher Self. For example, he says, ‘There is but one possible separation between them [men and God], namely, sin, which, like a cataract destroys vision, no the light, and which, once removed, leaves the two spirits face to face.’ (Jones, Dynamic Faith, p. 5). He also says, ‘The positive evil and the appalling sin in the world come from this tendency to caprice, to wayward independence, to sheer self-will, to lack of vision of the higher unifying Will and Purpose.’ (Jones, Religion as Reality, p. 38).
This is also the choice to achieve the completion of the true self in each person.

It [the message of Quakerism] declares that men were meant for God and that a man can never be his true self until God possesses him. That his darkness is made like that of the earth, because he lives in his own shadow. Wheel about and the light fronts you, and has been shining all the time. You made your own darkness.240

Thus, in Jones’ argument, salvation means that human beings become or acquire their true self by appreciating their continuous nature with God.241 Furthermore, he expects that this fulfillment of the whole self in each person will finally lead to the completion of the whole world, namely the realisation of the Kingdom of God.

Our Quakerism must believe in and proclaim a Christ who can completely save individuals and who can establish His Kingdom …by changing their natures and by ruling and governing their lives; and because I believe that, I feel the tremendous obligation upon every Christian to become a centre of force for the transformation of our now imperfect society.242

At first sight, Jones’ view of salvation seems to share the same logic with traditional Quakers, and to be deeply influenced by earlier Quaker writings. Surely, he is using a lot of traditional Christian terminology and some particular phrases of Quakerism. However, notably, the authority of Christian religion is shifted from inward light, as in earlier Quakerism, to human

241 Jones, Dynamic Faith, pp. 4-5.
consciousness itself. There are only a few motifs such as ‘human total depravity,’ ‘Christ’s redemption’ and ‘the Judgment’; namely there is no traditional frame of salvation. Unlike earlier Quakers, Jones argues that human aspiration towards God starts with a human’s own choice, not with God’s specific ‘day of visitation’ or his initial work on humanity. In this sense, I argue, God is more passive, always welcoming those who have made a choice to turn to the true Self. Moreover, sin is in a lack of human recognition of the higher Self, and sin becomes an unessential quality of human condition. This view considers human nature in a different way from the idea of ‘the original sin’ as asserted in earlier Quakerism. Consequently, salvation is not so much an escape from human devastated condition as a development towards the real Self. There, the soteriological stakes are less high; if someone does not choose this path, they only continue to suffer separation from God, rather than the sense of being eternally lost and cast out from God’s realm, as proclaimed in earlier Quakerism. In any case, the very core theme which underlies these theological changes in Jones’ views and runs through his many writings, as partly observed above, is his progressive view of human self-realisation or God’s self-expansion by a finite self reaching the higher and whole Self.

As for Braithwaite’s view, he does not clearly speak about his own stance on salvation, only citing some words from early Quakers such as Fox and Edward Burrough (1634-63). It can be seen that he sets some value on daily crossing of human flesh and carnal mind for partaking in a living fellowship with God and other human beings. However, Braithwaite also shared

243 Jones himself asserts that ‘The Quaker method is to present, not a plan of salvation so much as a power of salvation.’ (Jones, The Message, p. 22).
245 ‘And all this [The Kingdom of Heaven] was the reward and the result of a single-hearted sincerity, --full righteousness of heart, full humility of soul, full searching after truth, full opening of the heart to the incoming of the Divine life. …it had meant the daily crossing of the carnal mind. …but it had meant also the incoming of the Life of Christ, bringing men into a new fellowship with one another and with God.’ (William C. Braithwaite,
progressive views of the world as the expansion of God’s consciousness and of human
development as a part of the process. He says, ‘the gradual development of man out of lower
forms of life made him, …responsive to a higher form of consciousness than other animals
process: he became an organ through which the universal consciousness could express itself as
mind and spirit.’ Here we can see Liberal Quakers’ most distinctive religious position: that is,
Quakerism molded out of British and American idealism and its ‘Onto-Theo-Teleological’
character.

b. Human Conjunctive Nature with God through Conscience

To proceed to a further discussion on Jones’ view, he states that there are three types of
agencies involved in Christian faith and life: (1): the pursuit of truth, (2): the appreciation of the
value of beauty, (which allegedly has a close connection with goodness), and (3): love and
dedication to others or the larger Self. He argues that these agencies are fundamentally sustained
and made effectual by the fact of the inherent continuous junction of human nature with the
divine life through conscience. The point seems to fully show that Jones’ religion consists of
a sort of Hegelian idealism as Absolute Spirit or Reason’s self-expansion, and the completion of
the self through the final correspondence to the Self.

Firstly, Jones argues that the pursuit of truth belongs to human instinct and is a
‘fundamental feature of human personality.’ Human beings naturally have a tendency to
search for truth going beyond things given in ordinary experience, not being satisfied with

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The Essentials of Quakerism, in William C. Braithwaite and Henry T. Hodgkin, The Message and Mission of

246 Braithwaite, Spiritual Guidance, p. 87.
248 Jones, Religion as Reality, p. 12.
249 Jones, Religion as Reality, p. 12.
merely a bundle of single facts. They go so far as to discover the larger whole, by which all these facts should be clearly explained. In Jones’ discussion, as does western metaphysics, it is the true whole or God that plays a role of giving the meanings of things in the world as well as grounding their beings.

The rational pursuit of truth is thus the method of discovering the meaning of some fragment of experience by setting it into its place in the larger whole which explains it. There is obviously no place to stop in this process until one has arrived at that One Highest Nature of Things in which all things and we ourselves are—that true whole in which all finite bits and fragments have their meaning.250

The second agency of religion is the appreciation of beauty. This agency is ‘one of the great exalting and liberating influences.’251 Jones thinks that ‘love of beauty is a great ally to goodness. The cultivation of appreciation for the beautiful …is one of the surest high roads to the formation of fine ideals of character, which is the most triumphantly beautiful creation in the world.’252 According to him, a person who ‘has a passion for beauty is morally safer’ than those who have no such a zeal, for the sense of beauty leads people out of their selfish interests.253 ‘When we appreciate beauty we apprehend an object as an indivisible whole and not as something made up of parts added together.’254 This appreciation makes us realise ‘a harmonious unity in diversity, …which appears to us as something that is just as it ought to be.

250 Jones, Religion as Reality, pp. 13-14.
251 Jones, Religion as Reality, p. 17.
252 Jones, Religion as Reality, pp. 17-18.
253 Jones, Religion as Reality, p. 18.
254 Jones, Religion as Reality, p. 19.
…Every aspect must minister to produce, and must be harmonious with, an integral whole.\textsuperscript{255} Then, Jones asserts that by aiming at such ideals, human souls are brought ‘into a harmony in which the dualisms and contradictions of life are overcome and annulled,\textsuperscript{256} and they are expanded and liberated from the limit of the finite into the one infinite.\textsuperscript{257}

The third agency of Christian life is ‘the active spirit of service, the promotion of social causes, devoted struggle for the life of others.’\textsuperscript{258} Jones argues that this agency also lies in human fundamental instincts and emotions, and it is as original and important a factor of personality as ‘the self-seeking struggle for existence.’\textsuperscript{259} An individual self would never take part in reality if there were no relationships with others: ‘Stripped of social affiliations, a person shrinks at once to zero.’\textsuperscript{260} He continues that ‘We are joined in with the deeper life of humanity and we cannot cut ourselves asunder.’\textsuperscript{261} Therefore, working for others and for their sakes is a rational motivation for us and love is the highest form of the sentiment.\textsuperscript{262} This love will enlarge our lives and lead us to the end of unselfish goodness.\textsuperscript{263} He illustrates the point by employing the logic of Royce.

By loyalty he [Josiah Royce] meant willing and thorough-going devotion to a cause which unites many selves into one organic community-self. …The highest form of it, its consummate stage, is love. …The “me” and the “mine” are swallowed up in the “us” and “our.” …It is …a

\textsuperscript{256} Jones, \textit{Religion as Reality}, p. 20.
\textsuperscript{257} Jones, \textit{Religion as Reality}, p. 21.
\textsuperscript{258} Jones, \textit{Religion as Reality}, p. 22.
\textsuperscript{259} Jones, \textit{Religion as Reality}, p. 23.
\textsuperscript{262} Jones, \textit{Religion as Reality}, p. 25.
way of completion and fulfillment [of the self].

Thus, in all these three religious agencies, ‘intellectual,’ ‘ideal,’ and ‘ethical or behavioural,’ his whole theology is apparently based on, and summarized into, the structural outline of the self’s approach to and unity with the larger Self. Of course, such a metaphysical view of religion seems to have been partly incorporated into Christianity, though never using the term such as ‘the whole reality,’ ‘the larger Self’ or ‘the true Self.’ The crucial point of Jones’ case is that this religious structure is and should be fundamentally sustained by his claim of humanity’s continuous nature with immanent God, and that this state of affairs is fully ensured by reasonable and volitional efforts of human side.

we should look for Him very much closer home, as the God in which we live and move and are; the immanent, and, at the same time, transcending, Spirit in immediate junction with our own souls. He is, thus, as Thomas Hill Green used to say, as near to us as our own conscience is.

The Beyond is within, or, as William James puts it, the inner self is “conterminous and continuous with a More of the same quality, which is operative in the universe outside of him,” a Wider Self through whom saving experiences come.

It is, in fact, immanent in all the processes of our complex inner life and yet transcends them all and is the organic formative spirit always present whenever we perform any rational exercise of will or insight.

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265 Jones, Religion as Reality, pp. 36-37.
266 Jones, Religion as Reality, p. 35.
In these views, Jones believes that humanity and God are really continuous and intimate through human conscious approach towards God. However, it must be pointed out that it allows humanity to be identified with God by putting so much stress on God’s intimacy or proximity. Notably, Jones even says, ‘We feel ourselves a part of the entire process of truth.’ He also says, ‘The inevitable process of our world leads up to a being who is self-conscious, who has experience of values, and who reveals moral preferences.’ And, ‘It [faith] is the soul’s grasp of divine reality, and therefore it implies both vision and obedience to it. In a word, it is dynamic—it is the movement of the whole self toward the goal which it sees.’ As can be seen here and there in Jones’ writings, there is no separation between human self and God’s Self. (The term ‘the larger Self’ originally means to Jones the fulfilled human self, but it is used interchangeably to signify God’s Self). Much more surprisingly, human faith itself is regarded as part of the process of the whole reality towards its own goal. This stance is, more or less, shared by Braithwaite, who views human development to be the expansion of God’s consciousness. Such an equation of humanity and God can be further demonstrated in their views of human conscience.

As seen in the Introductory Chapter, Jones describes human conscience as something belonging

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270 Jones, *Dynamic Faith*, p. 16.
271 ‘There is opening before us a conception of the wholeness of that great process to which we give the name of life…and we understand that “the spirit which is within us is not other than the Spirit which upholds and maintains the whole universe and works after the same fashion.”’ (Braithwaite, *The Second Period*, 2nd ed., p. 395). Braithwaite also says about human intimacy with God: ‘It [The Society of Friends] has always borne witness to this Light of the Spirit as a gift offered to all men, and able to be received by all men, in virtue of an essential kinship between the spiritual side of human nature and the divine Spirit.’ (Braithwaite, *Spiritual Guidance*, p. 81).
to the divine: ‘conscience is both divine and human. In origin it goes back to the very moral
to the divine: ‘conscience is both divine and human. In origin it goes back to the very moral
nature of God Himself. …in the depth of our being we are never sundered from God. He
thinks of human conscience as ‘the whole integral self,’ which is on one hand directed by
morality or ideals formed and sustained by the fundamental fact of the inherent junction with
God, and on the other hand by temporal and historical moral factors in this world, such as
tradition, experience and education. The important point here is that the word ‘conscience’ is
used as a synonym for ‘self-consciousness’ as thinking process (reasoning). Jones argues that
‘It [conscience] is an irreducible fact of reason itself. …It is bound up with the very nature of
reason.’ In other words, the divine nature is extended even to subjectivity and reason. In
addition, Jones comprehends God as related to human sub-consciousness. Borrowing words
from Henri Frédéric Amiel (1821-81), who was influenced by German idealism, Jones says
that ‘…Deeper even than consciousness there is our being itself, our very substance, our
nature…’ …the self of which we are conscious is but a fraction of our real self. …We are never
absolutely sure of anything until we know it and do it subconsciously. In short, Jones places
emphasis upon intimacy with God through human conscience and (sub-) consciousness, not
human remoteness from God. This logic is also true of Braithwaite’s argument as found in his
criticism of Barclay’s passiveness. Namely, Braithwaite argues that ‘below the threshold of our

273 Jones, The Nature and Authority, p. 25, 66 and 70, pp. 52-53. Jones says, ‘this moral capacity marks the
point of juncture with a spiritual realm from which we have come and with which we are still connected. The
Beyond is within. We are embedded in a larger consciousness than that bounded by the margins of our finite
277 See the ‘introduction’ in Humphry Ward, trans., Amiel’s Journal: The Journal Intime of Henri-Frédéric
278 Jones, Dynamic Faith, pp. 51-52. ‘It [conscience in its loftiest stage] is the voice of our ideal self, our
complete self, our real self, laying its call upon the will. This voice, this call, comes out of the deep, for the ideal
which a man has and by which he shapes his life is, as I have said, subconscious rather than explicit and thought
separate consciousness lie regions of personality that unite us to one another and to God in a larger self ‘“which is both our very own and yet common or universal, the self of each and yet the self of all.”’279 This way, Jones and Braithwaite think that even human (sub-) consciousness, thinking, and reason have the divine value, and human beings are, on this point, said to be ‘more than finite’ or ‘over-finite.’280,

Thus, Jones and Braithwaite’s ideological structure stresses that human beings are in the direct conjunct with God, and that human faith and their developments are part of the process of divine truth. Jones continues that human divine-like conscience moves auto-regressively towards the end, out of which it originally has come: ‘It [conscience] becomes rather the deep ground-swell of a whole unified, organised personal self, moving toward the end of which it dimly feels it was made.’281 Therefore, quite apparently, their religious attitude (which is especially distinctive in Jones) takes a form of a sort of Hegelian Onto-Theo-Teleological constitution, although this is without the logic of so-called dialectic.282 In other words, Jones’ theology can be seen as idealism in the clothing of Quakerism, which is eager for the purest and final presence of the whole Self as the Origin, and it grounds and orders all other things according to their extent of the proximity to the original fountain.283 For Jones, theology, dogmas, priesthood and church

282 ‘In Hegel, dialectic refers to the necessary process that makes up progress in both thought and the world (which are identified in Hegel’s idealism, although the idea that processes in the world unfold in a way that mirrors the processes of reason is as old as Heraclitus). The process is one of overcoming the contradiction between thesis and antithesis, by means of synthesis; the synthesis in turn becomes contradicted, and the process repeats itself until final perfection is reached.’ (from the article of ‘dialectic’ in Blackburn, Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd ed.). However, ‘It should be noted, however, that none of the major British Idealists accepted the stylised dialectic method which Hegel used to address the process of differentiation.’ (Boucher and Vincent, British Idealism, p. 5).
283 As to Hegelian slogan: ‘What is reasonable is real, and what is real is reasonable,’ which expresses reason as truth and its identical nature with the progress of the world itself, these words might be also true in Jones’ view
system, are all corrupt or immoral just because these things are distant from God, although, I admit, this emphasis upon the value of intimacy with God can be also observed in earlier Quakerism. Furthermore, as to human beings, Jones goes so far as to insist that the presence of God is a necessary condition for human to become human: ‘To be fully and truly human is continually to approximate God.’ Jones claims that human self, if it has fully realised its human nature by pursuing and reaching the purest presence of the highest Self through the loyalty to an example of Christ, will have the unerring and surest authority. Here, we can clearly realise that his theology gives an idea of remoteness from God as ‘corrupt’ and ‘non-human,’ possibly constituting an autocratic hierarchy of binary opposites such as [present/absent, pure/corrupt, true/false, and human/non-human], where human selves are sitting on the highest position as the whole Self.

Considering all these aspects, it is apparent that Jones’ theology makes his faith into a self-contained or self-complete religion, which begins with the self and ends with the Self, forming a quite different religion from earlier Quakerism that stresses human sin and the initiative of God in religious affairs such as salvation.

and, in fact, they are the very foundation of his theology. Jones says, ‘Every truth, whether of common sense or of science, rests in the last resort upon some irreducible conviction, which is after all what we mean by faith. It is not something different from reason; it is, rather, reason working unconsciously. . . . These ultimate realities are their own all-sufficient witness to our consciousness, and the certitude which the human spirit has in this immediate response of the heart to primary truths, is not weaker but stronger than reasoned knowledge; and without such immediate response no knowledge would ever be possible.’ (Jones, Dynamic Faith, pp. 14-15).

286 Jones, The Nature and Authority, pp. 64-67. See also Jones, Dynamic Faith, p. 38 and 77.
c. The Authority of Conscience and Its Expansion through Education

Lastly, I add a little about two important points in Jones’ argument: the limit of the authority of conscience or consciousness, and the necessity of testing religious affairs by each own experience. In spite of Jones’ claim of the unerring and surest authoritative nature of human conscience, he argues that this supremacy of conscience is only limited to each person’s own realm. He says, ‘Believers in Christ, as we have seen, constitute an organism – it is a body of royal priests – and one member, though authoritative in his sphere, can no more be allowed to rule or wreck the whole.288’ And ‘every individual is, to the limit of his spiritual range, a king and a priest.289’ This is because, Jones asserts, ‘conscience, as soon as it rises as a fact, is, first, last, and always, an individual thing,290’ and also because ‘The only consciousness which psychology can recognise is consciousness appealing in individual persons.291’ It is quite a natural consequence of setting up individual conscience as the religious foundation, which results in a solipsistic situation that modern philosophies and metaphysics have ever fallen into.

Modern philosophy and metaphysics have based the foundation of recognition on personal consciousness, and have only considered beings or realities which can be categorised, received and posited by the subjectivity. As a result, for instance, ‘the problem of other minds’ has arisen, for other minds are never present to, and proven within the limit of, each individual consciousness and reason.292 How can Jones overcome this bottleneck? Jones argues that

288 Jones, Dynamic Faith, p. 38.
289 Jones, Dynamic Faith, p. 37.
292 This issue usually contains the following questions: How can we know that other people and animals have thoughts and feelings? Can we actually know their thoughts and feelings? Although various explanations have been offered by philosophers, these matters cannot be solved as long as their way of inquiry is based on reason and subjectivity. For instance, some philosophers tried to answer this question by analogical reasoning through mediations such as language, feeling, body and behaviour. However, this turned out to be no more than the projection of a personal subjectivity. Other thinkers asserted that it can be solved by setting up ‘intersubjectivity,’ or the common subjectivity shared by human beings. It is also no more than the extension of a personal
believers’ authority is something like ‘the authority which the master who knows has over the pupil who wants to know.’ The sole task is to interpret the divine truth to those who do not see so clearly, and to help others to see the truth. In this logic, education is the primary ministerial method for spreading the truth, which helps build up the whole membership of the Church, and transform a society for the presence of God’s Kingdom. This view of a human-created Kingdom is somewhat tied to post-millenarianism which would have been a feature of Jones’ Orthodox Quaker upbringing, but it is more human-centric than mainstream evangelical Christianity. Earlier Quakers acted as co-agents with God, but in this version of Quakerism, Quakers themselves act as the agents of transformation.

The humanistic and personal character of Jones’ theology is also found in his opinion that Christian faith should be tested. Religious things, such as God’s truth and the Bible, are assessed by their usefulness and effectiveness in each life at the same level of scientific tests.

subjectivity. Others are certainly encountered within the meanings posited by our subjectivity (Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), p. 156 and 160). If not, we can never recognise the existence of others. However, if others are within the realm of recognition, they are no longer others. They are only part of us. Namely, others are encountered within the realm of our subjectivity, but they are never fully reduced into it, always deviating from it. According to Heidegger, this becomes apparent especially in the experience of death or the experience of others’ death: ‘The dying of Others is not something which we experience in a genuine sense; at most we are always just ‘there alongside.’’ (Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 282). To put it in another way, it is this impossibility of reduction that constitutes (makes us notice) other as otherness. Lévinas gives a clear explanation of this point: ‘The relationship with the Other is the absence of the other.’ (Emmanuel Lévinas, Time and the Other, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh, PA.: Duquesne University Press, 1987), p. 90). Modern philosophy and metaphysics are constituted based on the logic of ‘presence,’ but for this reason, they have failed to recognise others. The theme shall be further explored in 3.3, in this thesis.

293 Jones, Dynamic Faith, p. 38.
294 Jones, Dynamic Faith, p. 78.
296 Jones, The Message, p. 24. It may probably be further questioned whether or not Jones’ stance both on individualistic nature of truth and the privilege of teaching and leading other people to the same truth are logically consistent.
298 Dandelion, Heaven on Earth, p. 186. For instance, in traditional Christianity, the coming of the Kingdom as the perfection of the world is through God’s intervention, never by human efforts themselves (Capp, ‘Godly Rule,’ p. 107).
299 ‘The supreme test of the Scriptures is the practical one of their power over us when we use them rightly.’ (Jones, Dynamic Faith, p. 93).
This position is probably derived from Jamesian pragmatism. Jones says, ‘We must, again, approach Christ and the Christian doctrines with our tests of experience.’\textsuperscript{300} He also says, ‘We are to believe because we can test the power of His life in our lives …It [Christ’s claim to spiritualise and transform believers’ lives] is a claim which can be as carefully tested as the law of gravitation can.’\textsuperscript{301} On this point, religion is reduced into, and confined to individual experiences, and Christian faith is evaluated from humanistic points of view, namely from the point of demonstrativeness and effectiveness in life. Things outside individual and pragmatic scope are inevitably excluded. Consequently, as Heidegger criticised, only the ‘present’ tense of religious aspects, (not the past tense, the future tense, nor atemporal tense), tends to be focused upon, which leads to the loss of various Christian motifs such as ‘the Creation’ and ‘eschatology.’\textsuperscript{302}

Over all, Jones and Braithwaite’s idealistic theology is based on human self-consciousness as the foundation of religion, and it comprehensively sees the entire world from a viewpoint of the expansion of God’s self and his consciousness. In this respect, especially Jones’ thought become a logic only valid for each individual, and cannot deal with others as otherness; his theology reduces things to an autocratic hierarchy of opposites [true/false, human/non-human] for the final presence of the whole Self, (by denying the inferior sides of the opposites just because the latter are remote from the Wholeness). We have already observed that Jones say, ‘Stripped of social affiliations, a person shrinks at once to zero.’\textsuperscript{303} However, if humanity becomes deified (conversely, God becomes humanised), and if all beings are centered

\textsuperscript{300} Jones, \textit{Dynamic Faith}, p. 94.
\textsuperscript{301} Jones, \textit{Dynamic Faith}, p. 95.
\textsuperscript{302} Dandelion, \textit{Heaven on Earth}, p. 189.
\textsuperscript{303} Jones, \textit{Religion as Reality}, p. 24. This word signifies the importance of the relation with others, but it is finally swallowed up in the monistic structure of the Self.
into the monistic structure of the Self, then can they still consider others to be ‘others’? Unfortunately, I say, there are no more relations between human and God, and between self and others.

To sum up, Jones used much Christian terminology and traditional Quaker phrases, giving an impression that he shared the same theological positions on soteriology as those presented by earlier Quakers. According to Jones, human beings are in the image of God, and aprioristically endowed with a capacity of recognising truth and of responding to love and of assenting to righteousness, as the foundation of religious faith and conviction. God is always open to people for their reconciliation with himself as Emmanuel God. Therefore, if they only turn their faces towards and believe in God, they will be able to overcome their sin in the power of the new life and achieve the completion of true self. It is up to human choice. At first sight, Jones’ theology seems not so different from earlier Quakerism, but he shifted the place of religious authority from God’s inward light to human consciousness, and centralised religious affairs into human reason and voluntary will. (And he judged the values of religious things in terms of their effectiveness in human lives and experiences). His thought was deeply influenced by, and molded out of the contemporary British and American idealism. This can be said of Braithwaite’s theological positions. Their Liberal theology was intellectually, ideally and ethically constituted of a version of Hegelianism, which asserted God’s self-expansion as the process of truth, and insisted upon the completion of human self through the auto-regressive correspondence to the Self as the Origin. This claim was totally ensured by their belief that humanity was in the inherent conjunct with God through consciousness. In their views, every other thing is grounded and ordered according to the extent of its intimacy with God, which
makes an autocratic hierarchy of binary opposites. Human beings are qualified to be human only when they are proximate to the whole Self, and are led to achieve the final completion of the self through their consciousness of, and will towards God. In this system, the human self literally becomes ‘a king’ sitting on the top of that hierarchy. Probably, as seen in British and American absolute idealists, Liberals employed this type of thought as a counter-ideology against the individualisation in those days. In fact, Liberal Quakerism played a large role of integrating split Quaker communities and of advancing various social movements, under their belief in the oneness of the world. However, such an Onto-Theo-Teleological nature of their theology, combined with humanistic and present-focused religious tendencies, made Liberal Quakerism a quite different religion from traditional Quakerism; the latter, for instance, stressed God’s initial work in faith and practice, the transcendence of God, and the necessity of self-denial as well as human communion with God. Jones criticised the systematising and theologising of traditional Quaker thought, and accused it of being dualistic especially in regard to Quietist Quakerism. However, under the guise of overcoming these matters, I have to say, he actually only replaced these things with a new dualism (which finally resulted in monism), a new metaphysics, or a new self-contained, self-complete, self-affirmative theology based on humanism.

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307 According to Nancy, western history has long been narrated in relation to the myth of ‘a lost community’ such as the natural family, the Athenian city, and the first Christian community (Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Inoperative Community*, ed. Peter Connor, trans. Peter Connor et al., *Theory and History of Literature*, vol. 76. (Minneapolis, MN.: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), p. 9). Nancy says that ‘it [a lost community] is a matter of a lost age in which community was woven of tight, harmonious, and infrangible bonds and in which above all it played back to itself, through its institutions, its rituals, and its symbols, the representation, indeed the living offering, of its own immanent unity, intimacy, and autonomy.’ (Nancy, *The Inoperative Community*, p. 9). However, Nancy argues that the motif of the lost immanence and intimacy of a communion ‘is lost only in the sense that a “loss” is constitutive of “community” itself.’ (Nancy, *The Inoperative Community*, p. 12). That is,
2. 4. 3. The Estimation of Barclay’s Theology: Liberal Historiography

Jones and Braithwaite, who are taken here as archetypal Liberal Quakers, claim that there are three main problems in regard to Quaker Quietism and its primary cause, namely Barclay’s theology. The first problem is a dualistic way of thinking. 308 Liberals claim that Barclay and Quietist Quakers lived in a dualistic worldview of ‘natural’ and ‘supernatural,’ and therefore, in their beliefs, human faculties such as reason and conscience, and activities such as education and religious exercises, could never help contribute to, and sometimes might take away from, the knowledge of God and salvation. 309 The second, therefore, Jones and Braithwaite allege, is the necessity of a passive attitude towards God’s work, leading to the introverted and inactive nature of Quaker meetings after the second generation and to the decline of the movement in the eighteenth century. 310 The last problem is their lack of ethical and behavioural dimensions. 311 However, as pointed out above, the method of tracing back Quaker history in search of the primary cause of Quietism and subsequent schisms by projecting these

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later factors to Barclay’s theology, and claiming it as the chief cause is considered to be academically unsatisfactory,312 (though I readily admit that such an procedure of ‘tracing back’ sometimes helps find out a new viewpoint, if it is confirmed and supported by clear causal relationships). The reasoning oversimplifies the problem in an arbitrary manner, and takes little account of social, political, economical and ideological differences between the middle-seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Furthermore, although Jones says that Quietist theological tendencies cannot be attributed only to Barclay, the distinction between Barclay and Quietists in Jones and Braithwaite’s criticism is quite unclear; they argue this matter without clearly saying where Barclay’s responsibilities end, and they put both Barclay and Quietists roughly in the same category. Moreover, Jones and Braithwaite’s views of Christianity, as the previous subsection showed, are occupied with a sort of Hegelianism. Especially Jones tends to interpret and judge anything of religious affairs from such an angle, not from their own contexts and backgrounds. While considering these peculiar ways of approaching historical, theological and ideological problems of Liberals, I examine the conventional estimation of Barclay’s theology presented by them.

According to Jones, it is in Barclay’s theology that the dualistic worldview of ‘natural’ and ‘supernatural’ was first employed in Quaker thoughts.313 He claims that Fox and early Friends had challenged an Augustinian and Calvinist dogma of the degenerated man, namely ‘Total

312 For example, Jones says, ‘One who studies with care and insight the history of Quakerism through the two centuries succeeding Barclay’s formulation will see that many of the tragedies and many of the internal difficulties have sprung out of this assumed spiritual bankruptcy of man and this Quietistic contrivance for obviating it [in Barclay’s theology]. All the controversies of later Quaker history involve Barclay.’ (Jones, ‘Introduction,’ in The Second Period, 1st ed., p. xliv).
Depravity,’ based on their living experience of the God. 314 Jones says, ‘Barclay, however, goes back to the accepted dogma about man, and adopts it as his theological basis, and then endeavours to alter it to fit his view of the Inward Light. 315 In Barclay’s view, human beings are naturally fallen and depraved, and, Jones alleges, they cannot do anything with their natural power and abilities for salvation and reconciliation with God. 316 Therefore, the main problem for Barclay, who insisted upon human total corruption, is ‘to discover how salvation can be effected for this fallen beings, and how spiritual experiences and processes can begin and can operate in a creature that by “nature” is wholly unspiritual.’ 317 On this point, Jones argues, human passivity becomes crucial. 318 That is, he says ‘It is a supernatural contribution divinely made to effect man’s escape from his lost and fallen condition, and man’s part in the work of salvation is to give the Seed of God an opportunity to operate unhindered and unopposed.’ 319 Human beings have nothing to do by themselves except wait patiently for spiritual workings, 320 and they will be only miraculously saved by the intervention of God. 321 According to the Liberal researchers, who believe in human organic relation with God, and in their potentiality of moving towards God, 322 the motifs of self-denial and waiting for God are merely an inactive attitude like a puppet which has not yet been aspirated with God’s breath: ‘There is thus no co-operation between man and the superadded grace. It [God’s grace] works in its own way.

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321 Jones, ‘Introduction,’ in The Second Period, 1st ed., p. xI. It should be pointed out that Barclay never asserted that salvation was brought to humanity as a mere miracle.
accomplishes its own end. Man’s only act is a decision to lie passive and not resist it.\textsuperscript{323} Furthermore, as far as the criterion of the truth is concerned, the negation of human faculties as a means of reaching God makes Christian faith quite uncertain without any judgmental standard of truth. Jones states that ‘There is no test, no criterion. The moving is its own evidence. One must not question why, one must not ask for rational grounds. Reason is excluded.’\textsuperscript{324} He also says, ‘There is, however, unfortunately, no safe and sound way on this basis of “pure truth” of discriminating between the true Divine motion and the motion which has a human and subjective origin. Reason has been ruled out as the arbiter. Experience is not admitted as the test.’\textsuperscript{325} Jones alleges that such a religious negative attitude in Barclay’s theology, along with the later influences of continental Quietism,\textsuperscript{326} led Quakers in the eighteenth century so far as to have a fear of influence of human nature such as reason and intellect in business matters as well as religious ones: ‘This timidity toward reason, or creature-will, was, in the case of many Friends, carried out even to the matters of daily life and the decisions of practical affairs.’\textsuperscript{328} Consequently, Jones believes, although first Quakers had been eager over world-mission, Quietist Quakers became ‘content with a much more humble mission –the perfecting of a select and chosen body, or Society.’\textsuperscript{329} And they came to withdraw ‘from contact with the world and from responsibility for shaping the affairs of men and of nations –withdrawal even from an interest in politics.’\textsuperscript{330}

\textsuperscript{323} Jones, ‘Introduction,’ in \textit{The Second Period}, 1\textsuperscript{st} ed., p. xlii.
\textsuperscript{324} Jones, ‘Introduction,’ in \textit{The Second Period}, 1\textsuperscript{st} ed., p. xliv.
\textsuperscript{325} Jones, ‘Introduction,’ in \textit{The Second Period}, 1\textsuperscript{st} ed., p. xliii.
\textsuperscript{326} Jones, \textit{The Later Periods}, vol. I., p. 34 and 60.
\textsuperscript{327} Jones, \textit{The Later Periods}, vol. I., p. 94.
\textsuperscript{328} Jones, \textit{The Later Periods}, vol. I., p. 94.
These descriptions of Barclay and Quietist Quakerism seem to show one side of the dissimilarity between the first generation and the second generation (and Quietist Quakerism), but in fact, their indications are on the whole based on inaccurate and irrelevant reasoning. For instance, in the fashion of tracing back the Quaker history as the Liberals do, if we go beyond the second generation, we easily find out that the first generation also had a dualistic worldview of ‘natural’ and ‘supernatural,’ and took the same theological position on human sinful nature, as did the other Quaker traditions (except Liberalism). Despite Jones and Braithwaite’s claim that the first Friends never began with the dualistic view of human and the divine, (namely a view of human total depravity), they, who were brought up in a puritan atmosphere, did actually start their religious statements from this point. Moreover, the first Friends, as seen above, even went to state that self-denial was an important factor for salvation and God’s acceptance. In this sense, the premises of Barclay’s and Quietists’ alleged theological failures are already broken down. Early Quakerism, Restoration Quakerism, and also Quietism and Evangelism hold a common view of human sinful nature even with some modifications, and they asserted the necessity of humbling down human nature to partake in God’s grace. Remarkably, Braithwaite himself clearly shows this point in his work titled *Spiritual Guidance*, quite contrasting to his own discussion in Rowntree Series. He says, ‘The early Friends …remained in many other respects the children of their own age. They accepted, for example, what is called the dualistic conception of the universe.’ And ‘their [the first generation Friends’] failure to give its proper

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331 Refer back to 2.1., 2.2. and 2.4.1. in this thesis.
332 Unlike the discussions in one of the Rowntree Series, namely *The Second Period of Quakerism*, he presents a somewhat balanced view of the changes of Quakerism in *Spiritual Guidance*, although his discourses are penetrated with a Hegelian idealism like Jones’. In this book, he describes Quaker history as going by the stages of the light as the religious foundation, the recognition of the hazardous nature of the light itself, the revision of the teaching of the light by community and joint-testimonies, the reinforcement of Church discipline by Fox, and later divisions of the movement.
333 Braithwaite, *Spiritual Guidance*, p. 34.
place to the intellect and to allow for the mixture of human weakness which remained even in their renewed nature, led them into frequent error.\textsuperscript{334} Leaving the matter of the relation between human intellect and Christian faith, it might be appropriate, as Braithwaite does, to recognise the existence of a dualistic way of thinking from the beginning of Quakerism. Of course, this does not mean that there were no theological changes between the first and second generations, or among respective ages of Quakerism. As already examined, there existed three large theological shifts in regard to the self throughout the entire Quaker history (except Liberalism). To repeat these points briefly:\textsuperscript{335}

(1): The first shift was the recession of the eschatological sense of the time, and the following changes of Quaker understanding of the self, especially the possibility of human perfection. According as the flourishing of pre-millennialism as the consciousness of the time in England around the Revolution, and the recession of the sense especially after the Restoration, the Quaker understanding of the Kingdom inevitably changed in its nature. Quakers traditionally understood the realisation of the Kingdom as the religious maturation of all humanity through the working of the Spirit, and therefore, changing concepts of the Kingdom also affected their understanding of perfection. The first-generation Quakers understood God’s Kingdom in the ‘perfect’ and ‘present progressive’ tenses, and could assert the full possibility of human perfection right at the moment. For the second generation Quakers, the sense of the Kingdom has already receded, and so they generally came to consider that perfection was possible, but the journey to the holy state was a long and gradual way. To describe particularly Barclay’s and the Quietist Scott’s positions, Barclay himself considered that the Kingdom had come and was still

\textsuperscript{334} Braithwaite, \textit{Spiritual Guidance}, pp. 48-49.

\textsuperscript{335} See the section 2.4.1. in this thesis.
coming, and correlatively thought that perfection was quite possible in the present but still had room for growing. Meanwhile, Scott completely internalised the Kingdom into believers’ hearts, putting it at the same level of personal perfection, or limited the realisation of the Kingdom only within a Quaker circle.

(2): The second shift was the changes of Quakers attitudes towards the authority of inward light and the growing emphasis on the necessity of verifying faith by other testimonies. Quaker theology, as repeatedly seen, based its religion on inward light. This is true of every theologian and minister from Fox, Barclay, and Bathurst to Scott and Tuke. However, there was a large shift between the first period and the second period as to whether each believer’s faith needed to be verified and discerned by outward authorities and diverse testimonies, such as the Bible, discipline, joint-experience, and weighty persons such as elders. The reason for this is that the Quaker movement had to seek for survival under the pressures of a series of anti-Quaker laws and intensified persecutions. Such a revised Quaker position was adopted by Barclay and Tuke, whilst Bathurst and Scott opposed the revision as the limitation of Quaker faith, and continued to assert the single authority of inward light.

(3): The third shift was the emphasis on self-denial especially after the second generation as a result of (1) and (2). Self-denial was originally not limited to Barclay’s theology or the second generation and Quietist Quakerism. All Quaker traditions except Liberal Quakerism shared this theological theme as the way or process to salvation, although they had different emphasis points. Indeed, as Tousley argued, one of the theological characteristics of the second generation was their emphasis on struggles with sin rather than victory. The primary reason for this
theological modification was not because the second generation simply failed to have the same faith as the first generation, nor did they suddenly fall back to an Augustinian and Calvinistic position, but because the second generation lived in such different political, social and ideological situations as mentioned above. The first generation could strongly emphasise conquering sin, or the possibility of human full sacredness under a keen eschatological sense. Quakers after the Restoration, under harsh situations of serious persecutions and social discriminations and with a sense of the recession of the Kingdom, had to engage in solving real and concrete problems within a meeting rather than to urge for, or prepare for, the impending Last Judgment. Subsequently, as those who have Meantime-theological views such as post-millennialism, the second-generation Quakers came to focus on ‘now’ and at the same time ‘not yet,’ or emphasise ‘not yet’ in regard to the completion of humanity and the world, advising people to be watchful and attentive to their own religious status in every moment.

Thus, there were certainly ideological changes especially between the first and second generations (of course, between respective ages), but these things cannot be attributed only to the second generation or Barclay’s theology, nor to their theological faults. Rather, these shifts were direct results from political, social and ideological changes within and without Quakerism, and from the reconsideration of the teaching of inward light by early Quaker leaders such as Fox and Fell, and also from the power struggles within the movement over the revision.336 Especially, the significant scholarly viewpoint of ‘pre-millennialism’ as a common sense of the time in 1640s only came out around the late 1950s,337 and full-fledged studies have been done

336 In regard to the power struggles within the early movement, including those between Fox and Nayler, see the chapters 10 and 11 in Gwyn, Seekers Found.
337 Garret, Respectable Folly, p. 1.
since the 1970s in the research field of English history.\textsuperscript{338} Therefore, we cannot accuse Liberal researchers in the early twentieth century of lacking the historical perspective that was after their time. And it could not be helped that they more or less mistook the vigorous nature of the first generation for an inherent characteristic of their thought, although it was actually in correlation with the vigorous sense of the Kingdom in those days. Nevertheless, considering Liberals’ academic attitude of ignoring the facts, (such as first Friends’ tendency to dualism, their emphasis on self-crucifixion, and their own modification of the teaching of inward light), and also conversely imposing all unfavorable things only upon the second generation or later Quietism, (and putting Barclay’s theology and Quietism, both of which apparently had different theological stances on the authority of the light, into the same category), we must feel skeptical about their arguments.\textsuperscript{339}

Liberals’ arbitrary discussions are not limited to this one case. To take some more instances, we have already seen another example of Jones’ incorrect handling of Scott’s original texts. In regard to Barclay’s attitude towards human nature, Barclay never denied the usefulness of human faculties in business and human life,\textsuperscript{340} and even stated the effectiveness of reason in religious affairs when being enlightened by God’s light.\textsuperscript{341} However, this point was not mentioned in Jones and Braithwaite’s criticism of Barclay’s theology (and Quietism).\textsuperscript{342} A Quietist Quaker, Scott himself indeed considered inward light as the only foundation of

\textsuperscript{338} See the book lists on English millennialism in Garret, \textit{Respectable Folly}, p. 121.
\textsuperscript{339} Especially, considering Braithwaite’s balanced view of early Quakerism in \textit{Spiritual Guidance}, I would say that it is all the more appropriate to question the historical criticism of theological transformations of the second generation developed in the Rowntree Series.
\textsuperscript{340} Barclay, \textit{Apology}, p. 143.
\textsuperscript{341} Barclay, \textit{Apology}, p. 144.
\textsuperscript{342} In \textit{Spiritual Guidance}, Braithwaite recognises Barclay’s position on the usefulness of human reason illuminated by spiritual workings in religious matters (Braithwaite, \textit{Spiritual Guidance}, pp. 95-96).
Christian faith and the single criterion of truth (in his case, he made no mention of the necessity of excluding human reason from daily and business affairs), but his assertion might be well understood in the light of political and ideological dynamism surrounding him: namely, contemporaneous deistic and evangelical movements as ‘Antichrist’ which were prevalent within and outside of a Quaker meeting. Furthermore, Quietist introverted attitudes, which were criticised by Jones as the withdrawal from social, political activities as well as world-mission, might have been like that way, as can be clearly seen in Scott’s attitude towards the Kingdom. However, it is unfair not to mention that Quakers at the time were under various strong social pressures and discriminations; for example, non-conformists were excluded from political and official positions from the year of 1673 to 1828 by the Test Act, and also from the chance to be educated in university such as Oxford and Cambridge until the late nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{343} Especially, Quakers had long been regarded as heretics by other members of their society, and they always had to live their lives, caring for their external impression to the outside.

There are more than that, but in regard to these points, actual circumstances concerning theological shifts from the first to the second generation and later Quakerism are not as simple as assumed by Jones and Braithwaite in the Rowntree Series. Rather, I suggest that their interpretation of Quaker history was only self-interested interpretation, in that they talked much about themselves by using these historical materials. In other words, they overlooked and abstracted several significant facts as mentioned, and discussed historical problems not from their own historical contexts, nor precisely on original texts and documents, but by making Quaker history work for Liberal Quakers’ advantages. If we look through the discussions

\textsuperscript{343} Dandelion, \textit{An Introduction to Quakerism}, p. 130
presented in the Rowntree Series, we can easily find that the main body of their arguments on historical matters in many cases is virtually Liberal Quakers’ expression and justification of Liberal ideology. For instance, where Jones claims Barclay’s theology as a tragedy for his employing the dogma of ‘corrupted man,’ Jones abruptly puts his own Liberal logic face by face with Barclay’s theology, and trumpets the authenticity of his position by criticising the latter as a theological failure.

It is peculiarly tragic that the fresh discovery of spiritual truth which Friends made should so quickly have been attached to the ancient dogmatic theory of “man,” …Man …is a being who lives by ideals which come from beyond himself, who organizes all the facts of his experience under universal forms of thought that ally him at once with a deeper universe of spiritual realities. ...The presence of the eternal reality, that gives permanence to any of our facts of experience, is indissolubly joined to our consciousness of self. …We are organic with a wide deeper inner life.344

Braithwaite also discusses Barclay’s theological fault in the same way. The word ‘personality’ probably means the wholeness of human character in conjunct with God’s consciousness.

There can be little doubt that the failure, however inevitable under the conditions of the age, to reach a Christology and a conception of human personality which covered all the facts was a serious weakness to Quakerism and in its Quietist period led to a disastrous vagueness of experience which tended to reduce Christianity to obedience to a indefinite principle of life in

As examined in the previous subsection, for Liberal Quakers, the value of ‘intimacy with God’ means ‘true,’ and this also is the sole standard of ‘truth.’ For them, the value of ‘remoteness from God’ is false. Human self is identified with the process of the whole Self, and therefore, the value of ‘intimacy with God’ easily goes to imply ‘intimacy with the self.’ The hierarchy of the lager Self is likely to convert into the hierarchy of the human self, in which all things are evaluated and ordered according to the extent of the intimacy with the self as ‘a king.’ This means that things remote from the self are all false in that structure, and that religious ideologies and thoughts which are foreign to his or her own position are regarded as inferior and problematic. Therefore, looking at Quaker history from a Liberal perspective based on self-consciousness and self-will, it is quite natural that Liberals should feel affinity with early Friends such as Fox, who had a slight Arminian, voluntary tendency (because of the unsystematic way of expressing his religious views), and also who stressed the imminent presence of God under the influence of radical eschatology; both theological contents of the first generation and Liberal Quakerism are totally different, however. (Liberals also have a particular sense of the time, namely ‘a progressive view of history,’ in which human society is seen to be gradually advancing to the completion of its final form through illumination and education. 

346 A progressive view of history is ‘the belief that human history is developing in a positive, rather than negative, direction.’ This idea of progress came to rise since the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century ‘in the aftermath of the early colonization of the New World, the virtual end of religious warfare (although not, of course, of war itself), and the achievements of the scientific revolution.’ (See the article of ‘Progress, Idea of in Historical Writing’ in D. R. Woolf, ed., A Global Encyclopedia of Historical Writing, vol. II. K-Z (New York and London: Garland Publishing, 1998)).
347 ‘British Idealism, at its peak, rode the way of enthusiasm for evolution. Essentially, it critically adapted evolution to its own ends by eschewing its naturalistic form and emphasising the developing spiritual unity of existence.’ (Boucher and Vincent, British Idealism, p. 3).
For Liberals, the end-time is progressively coming, but the future is a mere extension of the present, and the completion of the time is in some sense promised and present in the present. Therefore, they could optimistically state the presence of God with such a sense of the promised end-time. It is also natural that the second generation Quakers should seem to Liberals to have an inferior value due to their assertion of ‘remoteness from God.’ For, as repeatedly seen, the second generation came to emphasise the necessity of waiting patiently in silence for God partly with the recessing sense of the end-time, and partly as a result of their experiences of fanaticism in early Quakers.

Thus, under the influence of Hegelian idealism aiming at the final unification of human self and the world into one whole consciousness, Jones and Braithwaite conduct their historical examinations mainly from the viewpoint of ‘intimacy’ and ‘proximity,’ and they dissolve all the matters, historical, political or religious matters into this ideal of their own. For them, history is the manifestation of God’s Self, and the interpretation of history can be considered to be the self-understanding of the whole Self. In this respect, the legitimacy of Liberals’ role as an arbiter of history is presumably secured by the paradigm of Hegelianism in itself. At the same time, these Liberal researchers and their followers such as Tousley, have been, consciously or unconsciously, easily charmed into projecting their own religious position onto

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349 Jones, *Dynamic Faith*, p. 86.
350 About the privilege of Liberals in interpreting Quaker history, Braithwaite says, ‘Our own age, far beyond anything possible in the seventeenth century, is equipped for this high task, without which the doctrine of the Inner Light and of spiritual guidance, the value of prayer and of silent worship, and the truth that all men have some faculty of response to the Divine, cannot take their full place in Christian thought and experience. …we are learning that below the threshold of our separate consciousness lie regions of personality that unite us to one another and to God in a larger self “which is both our very own and yet common or universal, the self of each and yet the self of all.”’ (Braithwaite, *The Second Period*, pp. 394-395). That is to say, Braithwaite considers that Liberal Quakers are most closely approaching the truth in their religious view of ‘the larger self’ than earlier Quakers, and on this point, he is full of confidence in Liberals’ supremacy in interpreting Christian truth and the Quaker history.
the first generation as the idealised, mythologised, historical origin of the movement which only seems akin to them, so that they could establish and justify their own Liberal position as authentic. To project one’s own particular position on the claimed origin, and pull it back to the present moment is a usual method of proving the authenticity of the position, whether it is good or bad, (as we can see, for example, in the formation of national or ethnical identity or in the ‘Whig interpretation of history’). Of course, history is always construed from a standpoint (my interpretation in this thesis is also no exception), and history is the field, in which each identity, whether personal or collective, is made up, kept and reformed for the future. Therefore, the interpretation of history and the formation of identity based on it are not to be blamed, and rather should be regarded as a necessary process for human (social) existence. However, as can be easily seen in this case, the Liberal historiography contains several interpretational fallacies, and eliminates many factors that are alien to the system, because it finally intends to grasp the world and the history as an organic whole, consequently giving the Liberal historical interpretation a monochromatic and self-interested impression.

In such a situation, if the Liberal interpretation of history is received as factual truth, not as one interpretation of the history, the legitimacy and orthodoxy of Liberal Quakerism may

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351 For Hegelian idealists, ‘Origin’ is a fundamental matter because it is, as seen above, the base of their ontology and the source of their identity. In this sense, it is natural that Liberal Quakers adherent to the first generation as the origin of their movement.


353 ‘Whig interpretation of history’ is the term which criticises ‘as Whig historians those who wrote with one eye on the present, who were preoccupied with the study of origins and who were obsessed with the evolution of political, civil or religious liberty’ in English history (See the article of ‘Whig interpretation of history’ in John Cannon, et al. ed., The Blackwell Dictionary of Historians (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988)). This term is also used for the same type of historical interpretation. The fallacies contained in such an argument are ‘the assessment of the past not on its own terms but from the standpoint of the historian’s alien present; writing history as if the present was the teleological endpoint of that process; and assuming that the historical process could be studied from the perspective of one side only –those who temporarily prevailed in the present day –rather than as the outcome of an infinitely complicated dialectic.’ (See the article of ‘Whig Interpretation of History’ in Kelly Boyd, ed., Encyclopedia of Historians and Historical Writing, vol. 2, M-Z (London: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 1999)).
have been established. But then, the very ideological nature of the historiography will be forgotten, and various factors that have been ruled out of the Liberal historical view will become complete aliens to the history. There is no more chance to listen to voices that are buried away in and outside of the history, and to pick up things obliterated in and outside of the history. Needless to say, this does not mean that a series of the Liberal interpretation of Quaker history from the second generation to Quietism is completely nonsense, nor does my examination in this chapter clear up everything in question about these ages. For instance, there was indeed a kind of theological continuity between the second-period Quaker, Bathurst, and a Quietist, Scott, in terms of their theological centralisation into inward light, in contrast to the revised Quaker position. Besides, my analysis on the historical flow of Quaker theology in regard to the changing concepts of self is designed to respond to Liberal criticism of self-denial, and therefore, the investigation in this chapter does not cover phenomena outside this perspective, such as the matters of education, commercial success, and other practical problems, which deeply affected the transformation of Quakerism.\(^{354}\) However, regarding the conventional estimation of Barclay’s theology by Liberals as the main theme of this subsection, at least I would say that their assessments are made from several unrelated aspects of later Quietism and schisms, and that the logic of Barclay’s theology and even the messages of the first generation, which Barclay is claimed to have distorted, are not carefully and closely listened to by Liberal Quakers.

In sum, according to Liberal researchers, Jones and Braithwaite, there are three main problems in Quietism and Barclay’s theology. The first problem is their dualistic way of thinking. Barclay and Quietist Quakers lived in a dualistic worldview of ‘natural’ and ‘supernatural.’ In their

\(^{354}\) See the summary of this chapter.
beliefs, human faculties and human activities could never be useful for having knowledge of God and for salvation. The second is the necessity of a passive attitude towards God, allegedly leading to the introverted and inactive nature of Quietism, and the later decline of the Quaker movement. The last problem is their lack of ethical and behavioural dimensions in their religion. These assessments certainly seem to indicate one side of theological differences between the first, and the second generation and its subsequent ages, but they are actually based on inaccurate reasoning. Namely, their reasoning contains several interpretational fallacies similar to Whiggish historical views, and excludes many factors that are unfavourable to the monistic system of Liberal Hegelianism and its historiography. Liberals argues that the first generation Quakers had nothing to do with an Augustinian and Calvinistic dogma of ‘depraved man,’ and that Barclay fell back to this dogma and employed the dualistic way of thinking, leading to passive and introverted attitudes. However, the fact was different from what they assume. Of course, there were theological shifts in regard to the concept of self between the first and the second generation, or among respective ages, but it can be said that these shifts were the direct results from different political, social and ideological changes within and outside of the religion, such as influence of radical eschatology, and also from the revision of the teaching of inward light by early Quaker leaders, and from reactions and counter-reactions over such revised Quakerism. The Liberal historical view is enabled by projecting Liberals’ own position onto the first generation, and conversely by projecting later unfavourable aspects onto the second generation (particularly Barclay). Then, they describe the Quaker history as battles between authentic faith and false faith, and by finally triumphing over the latter, establish their own position as the true heir of the ‘Origin.’ Therefore, I say, the Liberal interpretation of history especially concerning the relations between Barclay’s theology and Quietism is largely
conducted by their political and ideological motivations rather than a historical analysis based on the logics of the first and second generation and later Quakerism.

**Summary**

The first and second generation Quakers to Quietists and Evangelicals kept a set of peculiar theological positions: the total depravity of human nature, the inward light endowed to all people by God for their redemption, and obedience to the light as the way to salvation. However, as time changed socially and ideologically, there were inevitably several theological alterations in regard to the concept of self, which are chiefly classified into three large shifts: (1): one was the recession of the eschatological sense of the time, and the following changes of Quakers’ understanding of perfection, or self-understanding of their own possibilities of human sacredness. (2): The second was the changes of Quakers attitudes towards the authority of inward light; namely, they came to consider whether the light is the only authority in Christian faith and practice, and whether God’s revelations in human hearts need to be tested, for example, by the Bible, joint experience or other testimonies. (3): The last was the increasing emphasis upon struggles with sin rather than victory over sin, or upon self-denial especially after the second generation.

Fox, the founder of the Quaker movement, presented the above-mentioned set of peculiar theological positions of Quakerism, which would be succeeded by later Quakers. One of the characteristics of Fox’s theology was that he, while using the motif of self-denial, appeared to leave a little room for human voluntary will towards God due to his unsystematic arguments. He did not clearly explain the logical relation between self-denial and obedience to the light. In addition, Fox considered it impossible for a believer to fall from the state of
perfection, once the state was obtained. In his thought, there could be the immediate maturity of human beings along with an eschatological sense of the immediate perfection of the time. The second generation Quaker, Bathurst, followed almost the same pattern of Quakerism as the first generation. However, she took a slightly different way in placing more emphasis on self-denial, under the influence of the receded eschatology. Yet she also had a different understanding of human nature from a contemporary, Barclay; she presented a simple view of gradual perfection with a sense of gradual progress towards the Kingdom, and she insisted on the infallibility of humanity led by the infallible Spirit. A Quietist Quaker, Scott, also went along the same theological line as the first and second period Quakers in presenting a typical Quaker view of salvation. However, in some degrees, he moved to an extreme position, giving a different theological atmosphere from earlier Quakerism. His theology focused completely upon the concept of ‘the inward birth of God,’ whilst totally diminishing external aspects of faith. He internalised the Kingdom into human hearts or limited the realisation within a Quaker meeting, and connected the ground of truth only to inward light. Scott’s theology was wholly an introverted and personalised religion. A (proto-) Evangelical Quaker, Tuke, also showed a theological similarity in soteriology with earlier Quakers. However, Tuke’s theology had two distinctions especially in his understanding of the self. The first was his emphasis on the usefulness of human reason as well as human learning in gaining knowledge of God. The second was his assertion of the significance of the Bible and Christian discipline, and the necessity of verifying each person’s fallible faith and practice by such standards. Over all, it can be said that these theologians and ministers kept the particular traditional theological positions on soteriology, but at the same time, their theologies shifted as results of different situations within and outside of Quakerism. They swung ideologically right and left with regard to the
value of inward light as the religious foundation.

The traditional framework of Quakerism seems to be kept in rhetoric even by Liberal Quakers. However, they actually transformed Quakerism into a different type of religion. Their theology was deeply influenced especially by Hegelianism as found in their logic of God’s self-expansion as the process of truth, and the completion of human self through the auto-regressive correspondence to the Self as the Origin. This ideology was sustained by their belief in human conjunct with God through consciousness. Then, the Hegelian motif of the completion of the world as God’s self-expansion was turned into a sense of human self-realisation. Such a self-complete, self-affirmative religion together with its humanistic tendency put Liberal Quakers into a different ideological dimension from traditional Quakerism.

In regard to the conventional estimation of Barclay’s theology by Jones and Braithwaite, they accused Barclay of being the main cause of Quietism and the later decline of the movement because of his dualistic way of thinking and passive attitude towards God. Nevertheless, it would be correct to recognise the existence of such a dualistic way of thinking and the concept of self-denial from the beginning of Quakerism, and to think of these shifts from the first to the second generation and Quietism to be the results of political, social and ideological dynamisms within and outside of the religion. However, in the Liberal historiography, the whole of Quaker history was restructured in the light of Liberal self-affirmative theology. Liberals projected their own position onto the first generation, and conversely later unfavourable aspects onto the second generation, particularly Barclay’s theology. They described the Quaker history as a battle between authentic and false faiths in terms of the value of ‘intimacy with God,’ or ‘proximity to the self.’ Then, Liberal Quakerism, finally triumphing over the latter false faith, managed to establish their own position by affirming itself as the true heir of the original authentic faith. As
such, the Liberal interpretation of history especially concerning the connection between Barclay’s theology and Quietism was largely conducted by their political and ideological motivations. Of course, the Liberal historical indications were all wrong, but there is little to learn from the history over-simplified and modeled to the peculiar intention.

Several decades before such Liberal criticism of Quietism was presented, a careful attempt to tie up the phenomenon of the decreasing number of Quakers in Great Britain with the theological degeneration of Quakerism was done in Quakerism, Past and Present by John Stephenson Rowntree (1834-1907). In this work, Rowntree, from his evangelical standpoint, argued the positive and negative aspects of theological emphasis upon inward light since the first generation. He enumerates, as the negative aspects: for example, the neglect of external means such as human reason, the Bible, and ministerial and educational work (which led to an introverted and non-aggressive church system). These negative aspects became obvious and injurious especially in later years because of changing social conditions. However, he does not merely attribute the decline of the movement to such a doctrinal level, and points out several other factors, such as the significant decrease by the disownment of members for the reasons of (1): the breach of paying tithes and mixed marriage especially after the revival of discipline in 1760, (2): birthright and hereditary members which brought exclusive atmosphere upon

356 ‘When an error has to be combated, the opposing truth will probably be dwelt on, with an emphasis proportionate to the greatness of its previous neglect—an emphasis that is injurious and out of place, when the error it was to counteract has greatly abated or ceased to exist. …Somewhat analogous was the position occupied by the founders of Quakerism in the religious world.’ (Rowntree, Quakerism, p. 52). Also, according to Rowntree, this theological leaning of Quakerism had been balanced by personal influence of Fox and his common sense (Rowntree, Quakerism, p. 110). Rowntree thinks that the loss of such power was another factor of the aggravation of the Quaker church (Rowntree, Quakerism, p. 181).
357 Rowntree, Quakerism, p. 31, pp. 154-159. Rowntree argues that disownment for mixed marriage was the most influential cause of the numerical decline in Quakerism. It should be mentioned that, in Rowntree’s
Quakers\textsuperscript{358}, \textsuperscript{359} (3): Quakers’ commercial success and the following religious indifference: \textsuperscript{359} (4): the establishment of schools which advanced the status of members but also promoted the emigration to America and decreased marriage and birth rates. \textsuperscript{360} Thus, his study can be seen as a composite approach to the matter rather than a reductionistic approach as Liberal researchers do. \textsuperscript{361} Of course, Rowntree conducted his research from his particular points of view, such as the belief in the usefulness of human reason in religious matters\textsuperscript{362} and in the permanent Christian obligations of Baptism and Eucharist. \textsuperscript{363} However, his discussions are still in some degrees valid in the present academic situation. \textsuperscript{364} Therefore, I think it important to see Quaker history, especially the controversial periods of the second generation including Barclay and Quietism, not from propagandistic viewpoints,\textsuperscript{365} but based on primary sources, whilst being careful of ideological orientations that necessarily accompany interpretational work, so that we can listen to voices and see things that are missed in the conventional Liberal Quaker history. If Jones’ words, ‘Stripped of social affiliations, a person shrinks at once to zero,’ should be followed, an ideological manipulation by reducing all things into its monistic structure should be given second thought. There will be no relationships with others and no different elements, and

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Rowntree, \textit{Quakerism}, p. 118.
\item Rowntree, \textit{Quakerism}, p. 100.
\item ‘we are thus unable to say what proportion of decline is due to this cause, and what to that,’ (Rowntree, \textit{Quakerism}, p. 186).
\item Rowntree, \textit{Quakerism}, pp. 56-57.
\item Rowntree, \textit{Quakerism}, p. 48.
\item In fact, historical studies, as long as it is based on the method of interpretation from some perspective, will never escape from such arbitrariness, for interpreter’s standpoint and prechosen methodology make prejudices and biases. Therefore, it is quite important to recognise such preoccupations as we have unconsciously when seeing history.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
such an attempt will finally result in the shrinking of the self to zero.
Part II
Chapter 3: Quaker Peace Testimony in the Twentieth Century

Introduction

In 1930s and 40s in the United States, facing the rise of Nazi Germany, Reinhold Niebuhr (1892-1971), who has been one of the most influential theologians in the political sphere of the country, changed his position as a pacifist into a strong critic of nonviolence, which was based on Liberalism prevalent in the country at that time.\(^1\) He regarded Liberal pacifism including Quaker pacifism as an irresponsible escape from the harsh reality, and criticised those who believed nonviolence to be the best attitude for a Christian, probably leading, as Niebuhr claimed, to the expansion of totalitarianism in Europe.\(^2\) Niebuhr’s position was not merely an affirmation of coercive forces, nor a simple argument for just war. The point of the discussion lies in his particular understanding of human nature: that is, human sin and depravity, in contrast to an optimistic Liberal view. For Niebuhr, who was a neo-orthodox theologian,\(^3\) human life is never immune from power-relations and participation in sin (violence), and this cannot be overcome by humans themselves,\(^4\) especially at a collective level.\(^5\) In this sense, he advocated


\(^2\) Bennett, ‘Niebuhr’s Social Ethics,’ p. 49 and 66.

\(^3\) Neo-orthodoxy was a Protestant theological position developed just after the First World War. ‘Its major characteristics are the critique of 19\(^{th}\) and 20\(^{th}\) century liberal theology with its failure to distinguish sharply between God and the world, and the construction of a theology firmly based on the proclamation of God’s word in the bible.’ Typical theologians were Karl Barth (1886-1968) and Emil Brunner (1899-1966). See the article of ‘Neo-orthodoxy,’ in Adrian Hastings et al., ed. *The Oxford Companion to Christian Thought* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). Macquarrie describes Barth as follows: ‘In reaction against the humanized God of the liberal theologies, Barth has insisted on God as ‘wholly other’, the One who is qualitatively different from creaturely and fallen men.’ (John Macquarrie, *Twentieth Century Religious Thought: The Frontiers of Philosophy and Theology, 1900-1980*, revised ed. (London: SCM Press, 1981), p. 323).


that we must take the responsibility of realising relative justice through our struggles in the sinful world.\textsuperscript{6} His criticism and theory of just war is shrewd and must not be ignored, given that his thoughts have actually influenced social and foreign policies in the United States.\textsuperscript{7} To give one example of this, in the award ceremony of Noble Peace Prize in 2009, the 44th president, Barack H. Obama, delivered the message which says that the belief in peace is not sufficient for the achievement of peace, and peace requires our responsibilities and sacrifices.\textsuperscript{8} His message left us the impression that Niebuhr’s theo-political spirit is still alive in the country. However, there are some crucial contradictions in Niebuhr’s theology, particularly in regard to his understanding of human sinful nature, which might theoretically tend to block a path of dialogue for reconciliation. The case I put forward in this chapter is the ironic fact that our acts for justice easily turn into egocentrism, if they are conducted only in a computable way. This chapter also shows that it is necessary for us to keep looking both at the difficulty and significance of being open to otherness, because others are easily and unintentionally susceptible to the reduction into human subjectivity, which consequently leaves no room for sensitivity to others. Niebuhr’s view on pacifism, and his arguments and counterarguments mentioned here may reflect the debates within Liberal Quakerism, which actually has a wide range of opinions about peace testimony, and can be used as a case study of peace issues in orthodox Protestants, Quakers, and other sectarian Christians.

First, I outline the differences between Niebuhr’s view on pacifism and that of Liberal Quakers especially in regard to human nature. Secondly, I make a survey of counterarguments

\textsuperscript{6} Niebuhr, \textit{Moral Man and Immoral Society}, pp. 31-32.

\textsuperscript{7} See the article of ‘Reinhold Niebuhr’ in Michael Walsh, ed. \textit{Dictionary of Christian Biography} (London and New York: Continuum, 2001).

against Niebuhr from Quakers and other Christian pacifists, such as John H. Yoder and Stanley Hauerwas, in order to identify the features of Quaker pacifism. Finally, I find a clue for a constructive discussion on peace by critically examining Niebuhr’s and Quaker positions from a viewpoint of present philosophical arguments on being (identity) and violence, such as those put forward by Jacques Derrida and the post-Derrida generation; their arguments might provide us with a new insight about relationships between self and others.

3. 1. Niebuhr’s Criticism of Liberal Quaker Pacifism

3. 1. 1. Liberal Quakers’ Attitudes towards Peace

Jung Jiseok analyses the Quaker Peace Testimony in the twentieth century in terms of four shifts: (1): the shift from a testimony against war to the testimony for peace, (2): from a Christianity-centered basis to Christian, non-Christian and non-religious bases, (3): from a prescriptive to a permissive attitude, and (4): from a narrow to a broad concept of peace. Here I focus on the second shift, a shift from a Christianity-centered basis to Christian, non-Christian and non-religious bases. The reason for this is that the change closely reflects the modification of Quakers’ view of human nature.

According to Jiseok, Quakers in the twentieth century changed their ground of their peace testimony from a spiritual and biblical base to a spiritual and humanitarian one. Early Quakers, such as Fox, advocated an anti-war position, based on spiritualised and biblical viewpoints. For example, Fox’s *Journal* says, “The Spirit of Christ brings us to seek the peace

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9 In regard to the connection between being and identity, refer to 3.3.1. in this chapter.
and good of all men, and to live peaceably; and leads us from such evil works and actions as the
magistrates’ sword takes hold on.12 He also says, ‘I lived in the virtue of that life and power that
took away the occasion of all wars, and I knew from whence all wars did rise, from the lust
according to James’s doctrine [Jas. 4:1].13 However, in the twentieth century, the Quaker stance
has largely changed under the influence of Liberal Quaker theology, which prevailed in Britain
and in parts of the United States since the Manchester Conference held in 1895.14 Jiseok
explains that ‘One distinctive shift was a reduction of Scriptural ground and an increase of both
spiritual and humanitarian grounds in the QPT [Quaker Peace Testimony].15 One reason for this
change was the revival of early Quaker spirituality alleged by Liberal theology.16 Especially
under the leadership of Rufus M. Jones, one of the most influential figures within Liberal
Quakerism, the concept of inward light was rediscovered, and the mystical aspect and
experience of early Quakerism was fully emphasised. Most importantly, the light was
transformed into merely an attribute of humanity as part of the rubric of ‘that of God in
everyone.17 As Martin Davie indicates, this is apparent from the facts that Jones considers the
subconscious self as the path to, and capacity of, direct experience of God,18 and that a Liberal
Quaker advocate at the Manchester Conference, John W. Graham, went so far as to ascribe the
place of God’s presence to human genetic components.19 The second reason for the change was
their emphasis of human conscience as the ground of anti-war position: ‘Core ideas of this moral

13 Nickalls, The Journal of George Fox, p. 65. ‘From whence come wars and fightings among you? come they
not hence, even of your lusts that war in your members?’ (Jam. 4:1).
16 Jiseok, ‘Quaker Peace Testimony,’ pp. 43-44.
18 Davie, British Quaker Theology, p. 104.
19 Davie, British Quaker Theology, p. 120.
ground against war are the sacredness of personality and the supreme worth of personal life.\textsuperscript{20} For instance, as seen in the previous chapter, in Jones’ view, ‘conscience’ is a synonym for self-consciousness as thinking process (reason),\textsuperscript{21} and reason is considered to have both human and divine nature.\textsuperscript{22} Another Liberal Quaker writer, Edward Grubb, links human will to goodness with God’s salvation, and lays special emphasis upon the sacredness of the free will,\textsuperscript{23} which stance is in close parallel with Arminianism in the seventeenth century.

Thus, unlike early Quakerism,\textsuperscript{24} human nature came to be considered as sacred and deified in regard to conscience, reason and personality (in other words, humanised God), far from a depraved nature as in the framework of traditional Christianity. The belief in such a capacity for goodness and respect towards each other’s innate divinity of human beings came to be regarded as a sure ground and effective means of Quaker peace-making efforts,\textsuperscript{25} although it was with the result that the movement certainly expanded its horizons beyond the limit of Christianity into cooperation with other religious and secular peace activities by philanthropists in political and economical fields.\textsuperscript{26}

\textbf{3. 1. 2. Niebuhr’s Criticism of Liberal Quaker Pacifism}

Nevertheless, as already seen, Niebuhr harshly criticises Liberal Quaker pacifism as

\textsuperscript{20} Jiseok, ‘Quaker Peace Testimony,’ p. 45.
\textsuperscript{22} Jones, \textit{The Nature and Authority of Conscience}, p. 66.
\textsuperscript{23} Davie, \textit{British Quaker Theology}, p. 136.
\textsuperscript{24} Barclay describes inward light as sharply in conflict with human faculties, such as reason and conscience. (Robert Barclay, \textit{An Apology for the True Christian Divinity}, Stereotype ed. (Philadelphia, PA.: Friends’ Book Store, 1908), pp. 142-146).
\textsuperscript{26} Jiseok, ‘Quaker Peace Testimony,’ p. 45.
based upon an optimistic view of human nature. His criticism is given especially in Why the Christian Church Is Not Pacifist. First, Niebuhr divides Christian pacifism into two categories; one is traditional absolute pacifism, such as that of the Mennonites, who retire from a secular world to faithfully follow the teachings of Jesus in the Bible (so-called religious pacifism), and the other is political pacifism advocated by Liberalists (pragmatic pacifism).  

Niebuhr places high value upon Mennonite pacifism because, he considers, it plays an important role, regardless of its actual efficacy in society, as ‘a reminder to the Christian community that the relative norms of social justice, which justify both coercion and resistance to coercion, are not final norms.’ Religious pacifism enables us, who must live in conflicts and power politics, to be free from cynical resignation and mere affirmation of the status quo, as an ideal norm of love. On the other hand, pragmatic political pacifism including Liberal Quaker pacifism, in Niebuhr’s view, falsely claims that nonviolence is the single political means for the resolution of conflicts. Particularly, for Niebuhr, Liberal Quakers are the people ‘who have generally held to an optimistic view of man and history and who usually believe that they do have a clue to a strategy which will avoid violence and at the same time restrain conquerors and oppressors.’ To take an illustration of their optimism, Liberal Quakers gave a favorable response to the Munich Pact (1938), a large compromise with Nazi Germany which was made by Neville Chamberlain, and rejoiced that the agreement would ensure peace in Britain, whilst conniving at the invasion of


29 Suzuki, Niebuhr’s View of Humanity, p. 148.

30 Niebuhr, ‘Why Not Pacifist,’ p. 30. To be fair, of course, the real images of Liberal Quaker practical thoughts and actions in peace-making, especially in terms of what was common with, and different from, other Liberal pacifists, (as Niebuhr jumbles them together), should be more closely examined as a subject for further study.

Czechoslovakia and sacrificing the people for the sake of peace. What was worse, in the case of Nazism, this political appeasement merely caused and amplified their feeling of hatred against, and contempt of, Britain.

As already mentioned, Niebuhr’s criticism of pragmatic pacifism is leveled mainly from his realistic view of humanity; namely, human beings, especially at a group level, cannot live without participating in sin (violence), as long as they belong to the world. Conflicts and wars are only the reflection of this sinful nature of humanity. Therefore, one must manage to realise relative justice in the world through some struggles, which of course should be done in a nonviolent way if possible, but in other cases with coercive forces. To use a theological term, his understanding of human nature as sinful is clearly based on the orthodox doctrine of ‘Total Depravity.’ Along the line, Niebuhr maintains:

Man is a sinner. His sin is a rebellion against God. …Sin is occasioned precisely by the fact that man refuses to admit his “creatureliness” and to acknowledge himself as merely a member of a total unity of life. He pretends to be more than he is.

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34 Bennett, ‘Niebuhr’s Social Ethics,’ p. 49.


36 The article of faith says that as a consequence of the Fall, human beings have become unable to love God wholeheartedly, only inclining to love themselves, and their capacities for salvation has been totally ruined. And it also says that the triumph over the depravity is promised (only to the elect) in an eschatological hope, in other words, just realised after their death (John Macpherson, rev., *The Westminster Confession of Faith: with Introduction and Notes* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1977), p. 64, 96 and 110).

Sin is thus the unwillingness of man to acknowledge his creatureliness and dependence upon God and his effort to make his own life independent and secure. ...man hides the conditioned, contingent and dependent character of his existence and seeks to give it the appearance of unconditioned reality.\(^{38}\)

In short, Niebuhr argues that sin lies in human nature of denying their own finitude, considering the self to be an absolute reality, and making themselves God. It is certain that this view makes a sharp theological contrast with that of Liberal Quakers, who think of the self as half-deified in its direct connection and intimacy with God.

The differences in views of humanity between Liberals and Niebuhr have also a close relationship to their understanding of love. In a word, Liberal pacifists consider violence to be utterly incompatible with the law of love, while for Niebuhr, Christianity is not simply the law of love. In Niebuhr’s view, Christianity contains ‘total dimension of human experience not only in terms of the final norm of human conduct, ...but also in terms of the fact of sin,’\(^{39}\) which cannot be overcome by efforts on the human side. The law of love is surely the ultimate principle in our faith and practice in Christianity, but it is the ‘impossible possibility’ in the events of our history.\(^{40}\) At this point, Niebuhr seems to show the significance of the central doctrine of the Reformation, ‘Justification by Faith,’\(^{41}\) in that sin can be redeemed not by good deeds, but only by faith in Christ. Notwithstanding this fundamental Christian principle, Liberal pacifists do not realise such human sinfulness at all, and attempt to reduce an un-reckonable principle of love of


\(^{39}\) Niebuhr, ‘Why Not Pacifist,’ p. 28.

\(^{40}\) Niebuhr, ‘Why Not Pacifist,’ p. 29.

\(^{41}\) Niebuhr, ‘Why Not Pacifist,’ p. 29.
God into merely computable political methods. Niebuhr says:

they [Liberal pacifists] have really absorbed the Renaissance faith in the goodness of man, have rejected the Christian doctrine of original sin as an outmoded bit of pessimism, have reinterpreted the Cross so that it is made to stand for the absurd idea that perfect love is guaranteed a simple victory over the world.

In Niebuhr’s view, Liberal pacifists simply think that ‘the necessity of coercion in social life is attributed to the failure of other people to arrive at the same degree of enlightenment enjoyed by the pacifists.’ Liberals optimistically believe that the main difficulty for peace is due to the misunderstanding between peoples. Therefore, if all human beings are fully enlightened, or only if they perfectly love and respect each other, then there would be no conflicts and wars. Kennedy concisely explains about this point: ‘They [ordinary Quakers] opposed the war ...as a product of mankind’s inability to see and embrace the Light.’ However, Niebuhr argues that it is the oblivion of human ethical and moral dilemmas, and it is the oblivion of the fact that coercion will necessarily cause another oppression; he says that, in order to correct injustice, coercion is ‘necessary.’ Therefore, ‘it is also the business of a Christian to preserve some

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42 Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society, p. 57. “[In religious life] ...everything in human history being identified with evil, the ‘nicely calculated less and more’ of social morality lose all significance.” (Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society, pp. 67-69).
44 Robertson, Love and Justice, p. 264.
45 Robertson, Love and Justice, p. 297.
46 Mendl makes the same point from a different perspective: ‘Their [Liberal Friends’] thinking was strongly colored by the optimism of an earlier age. War was attributed to particular and well defined causes, such as the arms race or economic injustice and exploitation. It was thought that if one could remove the causes, the prospect of permanent peace would be at hand.’ (Mendl, Prophets and Reconcilers, p. 42).
47 Kennedy, British Quakerism 1860-1920, p. 378.
48 Suzuki, Niebuhr’s View of Humanity, p. 150.
relative decency and justice in society against the tyranny and injustice into which society may fall, and he adds the fact that even Quaker pacifists actually in their ‘family life might benefit from a more delicate “balance of power.”’

3. 2. Counterarguments from Pacifists to Niebuhr

3. 2. 1. Counterarguments from Quakers

Quakers today are rarely concerned about doctrinal issues of Christianity, and do not readily respond to any theological discussion. However, there are some Quaker writers who rise to Niebuhr’s challenge, although we should admit that their arguments go little beyond a hopeful declaration of their faith, nor beyond Niebuhr’s critical scope, without presenting any thoroughly-examined theological views. For example, Brinton criticises neo-orthodox just-war theory as the denial of the core of Christianity and as a kind of defeatism. He says, ‘All this [Neo-Calvinist’s position on the inevitability of evil] seems to be so much at variance with the teaching of the New Testament and the religious experience of the great Christians that it is difficult to see how it can be held sincerely.’

In this section, as an initial step to bring to light the features of Quaker pacifism, I pick up Lonnie Valentine’s counterargument against Niebuhr. I then compare the Quaker stance with those of other pacifists, such as Yoder and Hauerwas, who are leading Christian pacifists in the present times. What I clarify here is, as Niebuhr criticises, that Liberal Quakers believe in the

49 Robertson, *Love and Justice*, p. 270.
52 Brinton, *Friends for 300 Years*, pp. 166-167.
power of nonviolence, whilst they have an unconscious desire for nonviolence to be practical and effective for their manipulation of the world.

Lonnie Valentine is the only Quaker who has directly responded to Niebuhr’s criticism so far. Here I focus upon three points where Valentine is in disagreement with Niebuhr: specifically, (1): the contradiction of the law of love in Niebuhr’s discussion, (2): Niebuhr’s over-reliance on human reason, and (3): the possibility of alternative paths for peace and justice. First, Valentine criticises Niebuhr’s concept of the law of love. If Niebuhr is, on one hand, seriously asserting that the principle of love is not effective in this world, but on the other hand, is still maintaining that it actually works as an ideal norm for preventing Christians from falling into cynical resignation or the justification of the status quo, Valentine says that Niebuhr’s discussion appears to be self-contradictory in regard to the effectiveness of love. Valentine goes on to say that ‘Niebuhr must either surrender agape as a source of justice or acknowledge that agape has power.’

Secondly, as is apparent from ‘Deterrence Theory,’ which is based on the reality of power-balance, Niebuhr relies too much upon the goodness of human nature and reason; Valentine points out the fact that it is on this human sinfulness or their immorality which Niebuhr bases the difficulties of resolving conflicts and strives in the world. Valentine argues that ‘deterrence theory depends entirely upon the rational capacity of the enemy. …Thus both sides must continually make the rational decision not to begin a fight based upon their clear-headed assessment of the situation.’ In Valentine’s view, here is also a contradiction. He

54 In actuality, Valentine picks up this point as the third query to Niebuhr’s theory (Valentine, ‘Power in Pacifism,’ p. 27). I rearrange the order of Valentine’s queries for the discussion here. See also p. 29.
55 Valentine, ‘Power in Pacifism,’ p. 27.
continues that, since human beings were created in their nature after ‘the image of God prior to sin,’ nonviolence, (which does no harm to the divine image itself, and rather is in harmony with it), is closer to Christian understanding of human nature, and therefore nonviolence ‘has more potential to address the goodness’ of persons of opposing groups in the human world. (It is probable that the word ‘goodness’ can be translated into the Quaker concept of ‘inward light,’ although Valentine himself does not use the term). Lastly, Valentine asserts that ‘there are no guarantees that the use of physical coercion between groups will establish a more relative justice than nonviolence.’ Therefore, he says that there is still room for an alternative path to the settlement of peace. For example, he states that nonviolent resistors may reduce conflicts by enduring more pain than enemies receive; he says that this stance is supported by the scriptures, such as Rom. 12:21: ‘Be not overcome of evil, but overcome evil with good.’ In this respect, Valentine goes on to argue that nonviolence certainly does have power for peace and justice, without any resort to coercive physical forces.

3.2.2. Counterarguments from John H. Yoder

Yoder takes opposing views to Niebuhr’s just war theory from his nonviolent Mennonite position, as well. The points that he disagrees with are summarised into the followings; (1): one is Niebuhr’s presuppositions and the inconsistency of these presuppositions in his discussion, and (2): the second is his misunderstanding of the Bible. First, Yoder

58 Valentine, ‘Power in Pacifism,’ p. 26. This is the second query that Valentine puts to Niebuhr.
60 Valentine, ‘Power in Pacifism,’ p. 3.
62 John H. Yoder, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Pacifists, Heerewegen Pamphlet Number One (Zeist, The
criticises three presuppositions of Niebuhr’s ethics: ‘Impossibility,’ ‘Necessity’ and ‘Responsibility.’ According to Yoder, Niebuhr claims the ‘impossibility’ of love from these grounds: the empirical fact of the persistency of human selfishness, the incompatibility of multiple conflicting demands and interests in society, and the grosser immoral nature of collectives than individuals.63 In these respects, Niebuhr asserts that humanity ‘needs’ to take the ‘responsibility’ of realising relative justice just in the middle of the conflicting world, even if it requires of them the responsibility to use some physical forces. However, Yoder indicates that there are crucial contradictions. To begin with, ‘The observable phenomenon that there is pride and selfishness in every action proves not that there cannot be a loving act, but only that there are no perfectly loving agents, ...ethics is not interested in what is, but in what ought to be.64’ The point of argument here is that the fact of human selfishness never means to destroy the ideal of Christian love. As to ‘necessity,’ Yoder states that ‘there is no necessity of abandoning love as an ethical absolute unless something more important than love stands to be lost. This is in turn possible only if there is a moral absolute higher than love, but for a Christian such an absolute is difficult to imagine.65’ As for ‘responsibility,’ as is the third presumed ground for Niebuhr’s discussion, Yoder objects that such responsibility only means:

> an inherent duty to take charge of the social order in the interest of its survival or its amelioration by the use of means dictated, not by love, but by the social order itself. ..."Responsibility” thus becomes an autonomous moral absolute, ...the law of love is no

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63 Yoder, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Pacifists, pp. 10-11.
64 Yoder, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Pacifists, p. 17.
longer decisive.66

To put it briefly, in Yoder’s view, Niebuhr’s arguments ultimately move relative social orders to the center stage, and make the law of God’s love aside as a marginal principle. In a sense, I say that here is Niebuhr’s theological switch back from ‘Justification by Faith’ to the humanistic principle, ‘(Self-) Justification by Works,’ as already observed in the case of orthodox Calvinism in and around the seventeenth century.67

Secondly, Yoder criticises Niebuhr’s interpretation of the Bible. Niebuhr develops his social ethics from the facts of human nature and their sinfulness, but the Bible derives all the principles from God’s redemption and its neighbouring concepts such as God’s love and grace. These concepts are, according to Yoder, utterly neglected and misunderstood by Niebuhr.68 In Yoder’s view, the Bible shows that even in this world, human beings can acquire new ethical possibilities through God’s grace, and that they will be given power to conquer sin through the Holy Spirit.69 People who have been regenerated by the godly work thus become the members of the body of Christ and form the Christian Church, which ‘differs from other social bodies in that it is not less moral than its individual members.’70 The final point of Yoder’s arguments, which views the Church as a special sort of group, is essential to a counterargument to Niebuhr. This is because Niebuhr’s fundamental thesis is based upon his alleged great differences between individual and collective in regard to morality. Yoder says, ‘That triumph over sin is incomplete changes in no way the fact that it is possible, and that if God calls us to deny

66 Yoder, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Pacifists, p. 18.
67 In regard to the human-centred character of orthodox Calvinism, refer back to 1.1.1. in this thesis.
68 Yoder, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Pacifists, p. 20.
69 Yoder, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Pacifists, pp. 20-22.
70 Yoder, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Pacifists, pp. 20.
ourselves, accept suffering, and love our neighbours, that too is possible.\textsuperscript{71}

Yoder thus criticises Niebuhr’s relative justice from such a new ethical possibility of love, which is realised especially in the form of the Church. Yoder’s counterargument seems to be not so different from Valentine’s, but regarding this point, we need to further examine Yoder’s another work \textit{What would you do}? He argues here that Christians are urged to love their enemies, not because love is effective in a computable way. Love will not necessarily work on people in hostility, nor make these people change their minds and come to give a reciprocal love.\textsuperscript{72} He does not support pacifism on such grounds. The point is that Christians should live their religious lives in unlimited love because it means to follow the way of Jesus and his command.

Neither is my acceptance of Jesus’ way founded in the confidence that, if you really put your mind to it, you can be reassured that there might be at least a fighting chance of a safe way through the brutal encounter. I accept Jesus’ way because it is my confession.\textsuperscript{73}

Thus, Yoder’s pacifism stresses the necessity of giving testimony to God’s love as a test of Christian faith by showing Christ’s way in the middle of violence. He argues that love should not be measured by any other criteria.\textsuperscript{74} Even more important for Yoder’s pacifism is the fact that, as Hauerwas rightly points out,\textsuperscript{75} his principle of nonviolence is underlain with his firm belief in God’s providence, or God’s government.\textsuperscript{76} Yoder strongly asserts that our fates in

\textsuperscript{71} Yoder, \textit{Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Pacifists}, p. 22.
\textsuperscript{73} Yoder, \textit{What Would You Do?}, p. 37.
\textsuperscript{74} Yoder, \textit{What Would You Do?}, p. 38.
\textsuperscript{75} Stanley Hauerwas, \textit{The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics} (Notre Dame, IN.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), p. 126. The pacifist stance of Hauerwas will be explored in 3.2.3. in this thesis.
\textsuperscript{76} Yoder, \textit{What Would You Do?}, pp. 28-29 and 34-35.
history cannot be totally calculated nor controlled by ourselves, but Christians can leave their fates to God by believing in his providence and the possibility of resurrection in the future. Yoder continues that the beliefs would lead Christians to reinforce their ‘readiness to accept the cost of obedience when confronted by a hostile aggressor.’ Technically, ‘providence’ is a difficult theological matter to deal with, in that it sometimes tends, consciously or unconsciously, to reduce God and his scheme into human narrow visions, finally driving the principle of God into human principles. However, it is also true that the concept of ‘providence,’ along with the concept of ‘creatureliness,’ is traditionally interpreted as a counter-testimony against a humanistic fantasy of ‘self-control’; these concepts teach us that things will not always work out as we expect. In the case of Yoder, he entrusts the divine providence with his own being and escapes from a pitfall of egocentrism or self-centredness in the present world, by hoping that God will eventually recollect his hopes and meanings beyond death or in the far distant future. Indeed, this might well be criticised as a kind of re-appropriation of God. However, it would suffice to note here that the significant point with Yoder’s pacifism is that, by leaving everything to God, he keeps open a door to the reconciliation with enemies or offenders by overcoming the logic of retribution or humanistic principle of calculability.

3. 2. 3. Counterarguments from Stanley Hauerwas

Hauerwas, a leading theologian in Christian ethics today, also argues against Niebuhr’s theory of relative justice from his evangelical Christian position; (he belongs to the United

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Following the pacifist line of Yoder, his old mentor at the University of Notre Dame, Hauerwas develops his ethical arguments for nonviolence, theoretically based on ‘Narrative Theology.’ The wide range of the theological movement does not allow us to give a simple definition, but the theology generally puts more emphasis upon contexts in the understanding of Christianity rather than principles or articles of faith. This is because, without contexts, any meaning of a word or behaviour cannot be correctly defined. Specifically, in Hauerwas’ view, people are made contextually to realise who they already are and should be, and how they behave in the world, only through historical narratives shown in their community. In the case of Christianity, it is in the Bible that Christians are prepared to take part in God’s story and the tradition of their community; they can become inhabitants of the biblical stories by crossing their own life-stories over with narratives such as Jesus’ life and death. The Bible helps these people to recognise themselves as sinners, or those who attempt to control the world or history by themselves, and at the same time to realise themselves as an historical gift or God’s creatures, which leads them to have the gratefulness of the gracefulness.

The story Christians tell of God exposes the unwelcome fact that I am a sinner. For without such a narrative the fact and nature of my sin cannot help but remain hidden in self-deception.

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80 Hauerwas described himself as ‘an evangelical Methodist.’ (Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, p. xxvi)
81 It is certain that the word ‘context’ seems to more clearly express what the narrative theologians intend to say. However, ‘narrative’ of Narrative theology is connected to the contexts of the biblical ‘stories,’ and so the term ‘narrative’ might be more relevant.
82 Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 28. ‘We see that because the self is historically formed we require a narrative to speak about it if we are to speak at all. One should not think of oneself as exemplifying or being some individual instance of a self, but one understands in what his or her selfhood consists only insofar as he or she learns to tell that particular story.’ (Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 26).
83 Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, pp. 61-63.
84 Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 31, pp. 46-47.
Only a narrative that helps me place myself as a creature of a gracious God can provide the skills to help me locate my sin as fundamentally infidelity and rebellion.86

When people come to know themselves as a gracious creature of God and his history, they are integrated into the relationships of, and take responsibility for, their religious community, or church; there they are transformed into the disciples of Jesus or his peaceable people.87 Hauerwas says, ‘the narrative mode is neither incidental nor accidental to Christian belief. There is no more fundamental way to talk of God than in a story.’88 Thus, Hauerwas places much emphasis on the significance of narrative rather than abstracted articles of faith or philosophy or any kind of other unchangeable meta-theories. The reason for this is that, without the historical contexts, he strongly assures us, the contents of Christian ethics could not be fully expressed.89

For Hauerwas, a great fallacy in modern ethics consists in its presumptions that people have the freedom of choice, and that as long as people direct themselves, they can take the responsibility of what they have done.90 In short, modern people presume themselves to have a capacity of choosing their own actions by grounding their behaviours upon, and deducing them from, the autonomic moral principle such as utilitarian teleology or Kantian deontology.91 In contrast to

86 Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 31.
87 Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 33, pp. 44-46 and 60-61.
88 Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 25.
89 ‘The nature of Christian ethics is determined by the fact that Christian convictions take the form or a story, or perhaps better, a set of stories that constitutes a tradition, which in turn creates and forms a community. Christian ethics does not begin by emphasizing rules or principles, but by calling our attention to a narrative that tells of God’s dealing with creation.’ (Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, pp. 24-25).
91 Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 7, pp. 10-11 and 20-23. Hauerwas’ argument on the fault of Kantian deontology here is not so explicit, but his mentor, Yoder, gives us a clear explanation on the matter. Namely, Kantian autonomic ethics is often simply expressed with the following axiom: ‘treat you neighbors as you wish to be treated.’ This stance, Yoder criticises as ‘simply out of reciprocal self-interest.’ (Yoder, What Would You Do?, p. 37). He continues that Jesus’ command goes beyond such the logic of retaliation, saying ‘Jesus’ ‘new
its original intentions, however, such modernistic liberal presuppositions would finally make people become irresponsible for their own behaviours, and lead them to the separation between moral agents and morality itself.\textsuperscript{92} The reason for this is that human actions are considered to be the mere logical and calculated consequences of these principles, not their own decisions. Besides, Hauerwas picks up ‘democracy’ as one example of liberal institutions, (and he links the matter with the problem of technology, which is another feature of modernity), suggesting an implication of our present-day ideological and political presumption of ‘autonomy’: ‘The alleged democracies in which we live run on speed, necessitating technologies designed to help us become the sort of people who do not need anyone. …democracies want to produce people who do not need to rely on trusting one another.’\textsuperscript{93} However, for Hauerwas, the concept of autonomy is somewhat self-deceptive, given that human beings necessarily ‘impinge on the “freedom” of others. …and tied altogether in a manner that mutually [sic] limits our lives.’\textsuperscript{94} As a result of the self-deception, ‘our relations have become unrelentingly manipulative. We see ourselves and others as but pawns engaged in elaborate games of power and self-interest.’\textsuperscript{95} In Hauerwas’ view, freedom as ‘possession’ or ‘manipulation’ is the manifestation of human sin, which he defines to be ‘the positive attempt to overreach our power as creatures.’\textsuperscript{96} Thus, modern freedom or autonomy is the main point that Hauerwas calls into question when

\textsuperscript{92} The concentration on “obligations” and “rules” also has the effect of distorting our moral psychology by separating our actions from our agency.’ (Hauerwas, \textit{The Peaceable Kingdom}, p. 18). See also p. 21.


\textsuperscript{94} Hauerwas, \textit{The Peaceable Kingdom}, p. 9. ‘The self is fundamentally a social self. …We are not “I’s” who decide to identify with certain “we’s”; we are first of all “we’s” who discover our “I’s” through learning to recognize the others as similar and different from ourselves.’ (Hauerwas, \textit{The Peaceable Kingdom}, pp. 96-97).

\textsuperscript{95} Hauerwas, \textit{The Peaceable Kingdom}, p. 9. Of course, this does not mean that Hauerwas considers manipulation of powers to be a particular phenomenon in the modern era, as he adds after the citation.

\textsuperscript{96} Hauerwas, \textit{The Peaceable Kingdom}, p. 46.
considering Christian ethics. For him, morality cannot be in any sense guaranteed by metaphysic or transcendental principles, including modern liberalism, because of the violent nature of metaphysical foundation of ethics. Morality or ethics can be only located and upheld within its own contexts such as history and community, for a context is the birth-places of meanings. Hauerwas goes on to argue that true freedom is only made possible by accepting and living in a narrative which invites people to recognise their beings as sinners and creatures under the grace of God’s acceptance. He vividly describes the point:

Our “freedom,” therefore, is dependent on our being initiated into a truthful narrative, as in fact it is the resource from which we derive the power to “have character” at all. Put simply, our ability to “have character” does not require the positing of a transcendental freedom, rather it demands a recognition of the narrative nature of our existence. The fundamental category for ensuing agency, therefore, is not freedom but narrative.

Speaking of just-war theory, Niebuhr severely criticised Liberals and their romanticism in their optimistic confidence in human nature. For Hauerwas, however, Niebuhr is also ‘a pragmatic American liberal,’ in that he still assumes humans to have the capacity for controlling their

97 ‘When Christians assume that their particular moral convictions are independent of narrative, that they are justified by some universal standpoint free from history, they are tempted to imagine that those who do not share such an ethic must be particularly perverse and should be coerced to do what we know on universal grounds they really should want to do.’ (Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 61). See also pp. 41-42.

98 Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 48. Tillich’s words about the correlation between sin and grace might be again instructive: ‘Grace is the reunion of life with life, the reconciliation of the self with itself. Grace is the acceptance of that which is rejected. Grace transforms fate into a meaningful destiny; it changes guilt into confidence and courage. There is something triumphant in the word “grace”: in spite of the abounding of sin grace abounds much more.’ (Paul Tillich, The Shaking of the Foundations (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1955), p. 156).

99 Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 43.

100 Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, p. xxiii.
own stories by their own power.\textsuperscript{101} Firstly, Hauerwas denies that, as in Niebuhr’s discussion, once the concept of justice becomes a (meta-) criterion or principle of social strategies, the principle could be pursued without Christians’ conviction of God, probably leading to the simple justification of coercive forces under the banner of the logical application of the principle.\textsuperscript{102} Hauerwas even says that freedom and equality claimed as human rights are not the principles that requires self-interpretation, but that they do require the contexts of tradition or history.\textsuperscript{103} Once these ideals are abstracted from their contexts and treated as a fundamental truth, they would be used to excuse coercive suppressions, (for example, when an offender violates others’ rights and lives), as an intrinsic exertion of the laws, which consequently eliminates imaginative power for developing the resistance to injustice in a nonviolent way.\textsuperscript{104} For Hauerwas, Christian justice is already present in foretaste in the life, death and resurrection of Christ, and it invites us to rely on the truth and to bear testimony against human sinfulness as an attempt of control over themselves and other people.\textsuperscript{105}

Secondly, Christians should not consider the matter of good and evil simply from a perspective of actual effectiveness in society.\textsuperscript{106} Effectiveness is usually measured by results of an act, or by its returns and rewards, but such a concern would also restrict imaginative power for coping with violence; it just allows people to care about their interests, not about the possibility for resolutions other than calculation and manipulation.\textsuperscript{107} The main task of

\textsuperscript{101} Reinhold Niebuhr was mistaken in suggesting that the tragedy which marks our existence follows from realizing that the limited good we can achieve can only be accomplished ultimately through coercion and violence.’ (Hauerwas, \textit{The Peaceable Kingdom}, p. 145).

\textsuperscript{102} Hauerwas, \textit{The Peaceable Kingdom}, p. 12 and 61, pp. 112-113.

\textsuperscript{103} Hauerwas, \textit{The Peaceable Kingdom}, p. 113.

\textsuperscript{104} Hauerwas, \textit{The Peaceable Kingdom}, pp. 114-115.

\textsuperscript{105} Hauerwas, \textit{The Peaceable Kingdom}, p. 15 and 85, pp. 46-47 and 108-111.

\textsuperscript{106} Hauerwas, \textit{The Peaceable Kingdom}, p. 128.

\textsuperscript{107} Hauerwas, \textit{The Peaceable Kingdom}, pp. 125-126, p. 128.
Christians is to call themselves and other people to have faithful attitudes towards their own beings as creatures of God, not as the author of their own life-stories. If we come to know who we are and how we are required to behave in our history and community, we can naturally make decisions that are appropriate to the contexts without any difficulties. This sounds unreasonable to our ears, but, Hauerwas continues, decision-making is not conducted based on given principles, but it is the ‘confirmation of what we have become without realizing it’ through following the patterns presented in our society or community.

Hauerwas clearly says that his pacifist position is in agreement with biblical pacifism as shown by Yoder and H. Richard Niebuhr (1894-1962), Reinhold’s brother. At the same time, he admits to the significance of Reinhold’s spirituality, which realistically illustrates the tragic nature of human beings and teaches us to be all patient with hope, setting the realisation of the ideal Kingdom beyond history. Hauerwas stresses that the disciplines of patience and hope are necessary for maintaining pacifism, in which people tend on one hand to pessimistically deny the possibility of peace, and on the other hand to fall into a fanatical fantasy or utopianism which imagines perfect harmony in the world. Now, human institutions and social orders are to ensure the security of our own selves, (the security is generally-called ‘peace’), but they are built upon the potentiality of violent forces. In Hauerwas’ view, however, the peaceable

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108 Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, 128. ‘Our sin –our fundamental sin– is the assumption that we are the creators of the history through which we acquire and possess our character.’ (Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 47).
109 Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 129.
110 Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 130. Hauerwas’ insight of decisions which have been already made in given narratives will lead us to ask another question whether or not it is possible to criticise the immanence of narrations themselves. For example, just-war theory, too, includes some narrative factors such as the victory of goods over evils, which means to justify the decisions to wage a battle against ‘enemies.’ This problem will be dealt with in details in the fifth chapter.
111 Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 141.
112 Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, pp. 140-141.
113 Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, pp. 103-105 and 145-147, p. 142.
114 Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, pp. 142-144.
Kingdom is the reality revealed in Jesus Christ himself and his self-renunciation as ultimate dispossession,\(^\text{115}\) and God’s revelation inevitably puts instability to these worldly institutions and orders.\(^\text{116}\) Therefore, the Church and its members are required to walk upon a path to holiness as shown by Jesus,\(^\text{117}\) and testify to the Gospel with patience and in the hope of God’s providence, fearlessly waiting for others.\(^\text{118}\) This is because, through hearing and being open to others, a Christian can accept the truth of God as otherness and become a peaceable member of the Kingdom.\(^\text{119}\)

Our only hope is the presence of the other, through which God makes present the kingdom in which we are invited to find our lives. Only in that way are we able to acquire a self, a story, that is based on trust rather than fear, peace and not violence.\(^\text{120}\)

Hauerwas thus expects that the Church is and should be the foretaste of God’s Kingdom,\(^\text{121}\) and the first task of the Church is not to attempt to make the world better by control, but to be the Church.\(^\text{122}\) Namely, Christians should take the task of traveling with Christ and to be trained for

\(^\text{115}\) Hauerwas, *The Peaceable Kingdom*, p. 85 and 142. ‘Unless we learn to relinquish our presumption that we can ensure the significance of our lives, we are not capable of the peace of God’s Kingdom. …For our possessions are the source of our violence. …the cross is Jesus’ ultimate dispossession through which God has conquered the powers of this world.’ (Hauerwas, *The Peaceable Kingdom*, pp. 86-87).

\(^\text{116}\) ‘When we say we want peace, we mean we want order. Our greatest illusion and deception, therefore, is that we are a peaceable people, nonviolent to the core. …The order of our lives is built on our potential for violence. …Thus the peace Christians desire, pray for, and receive cannot help but create instability in a world based on the assumption that violence is our ultimate weapon against disorder.’ (Hauerwas, *The Peaceable Kingdom*, p. 144).

\(^\text{117}\) ‘The kind of holiness that marks the church, however, is not that of moral perfection, but the holiness of a people who have learned not to fear one another and thus are capable of love’ (Hauerwas, *The Peaceable Kingdom*, p. 110).

\(^\text{118}\) Hauerwas, *The Peaceable Kingdom*, p. 76 and 144.

\(^\text{119}\) Hauerwas, *The Peaceable Kingdom*, p. 109. The theme of ‘hope for others’ might be more clearly understood if placed in the present-day philosophical contexts. See 3.3. in this thesis.

\(^\text{120}\) Hauerwas, *The Peaceable Kingdom*, p. 144.

\(^\text{121}\) Hauerwas, *The Peaceable Kingdom*, p. 97.

nonviolence to become the members of his body through openness to otherness. Without any intention to make the world under God’s control through a certain practical method, the Church has to learn to be faithful and truthful in order to let the world see its violent state as falsehood, by testifying to the nature of the peaceable Kingdom.

Christians are called to nonviolence not because we believe nonviolence is a strategy to rid the world of war... Rather, as faithful followers of Christ in a world at war, we cannot imagine being anything other than nonviolent. Of course we want to make war less likely. But nonviolence is a sign of hope that there is an alternative to war. And that alternative is called church.

To make a summary of the above-examined discussions of the three pacifists, it can be at least said that behind Quaker pacifism, as Niebuhr points out, there still exists a simple optimistic view of human nature; it describes the power of love as beneficial or efficacious in the midst of conflicts and violence. Yoder has full belief in God’s providence and grace, and advocates the following of Jesus’ way as Christian witness, regardless of its effectiveness in the world, whilst Valentine thinks human nature is as good as God, and asserts that responding to the goodness of enemies will potentially bring peace to this world. Hauerwas, taking almost the same stance as Yoder, uses Narrative Theology to achieve a deeper analysis, and sharply criticises both Liberalism and Niebuhr’s just-war theory, in that both are managing to justify their attempt to control over things under the name of self-determination. For Hauerwas, Christians have to call

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123 Hauerwas, *The Peaceable Kingdom*, p. 76.
themselves and other people to take part in the story of God revealed in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, and to form the Church as the foretaste of the Kingdom that works for a counter-testimony against human coercive forces and manipulation. Meanwhile, Valentine seems not to give up a dream of realising human desires (which might be identified with God’s will), without assuming the probability of the breaking-down of human intentions. This is apparent, when we see that Valentine does not make any mention of the concept of providence that Yoder put great emphasis upon, despite the fact that he uses Yoder to support his own argument. In these respects, I say, Valentine is quite an optimist in calculating benefits from faith and from methodical nonviolence. There is a clear theological distinction between Liberal Quaker pacifism as presented in Valentine, and the pacifist stances of Yoder and Hauerwas.\textsuperscript{126} The former unconsciously treats otherness or others as if they were ‘controllable’ through self-sacrifice or resorting to the sacredness in each person, while the latter locates Christian holiness or perfection in giving up, and setting up a counter-testimony against, the self-control itself.

The reduction of otherness into computability is also clear in the case of Laurence S. Apsey’s \textit{Transforming Power for Peace}. I readily applaud his psychological insights into human behaviours, and his ample knowledge and skills about how to organise the nonviolent movement. However, when he simply says, ‘love can overcome evil through transforming power,\textsuperscript{127}’ and ‘Non-violence gradually dissolves prejudice and selfishness while violence only

\textsuperscript{126} In regard to Yoder’s basic stance of peace, it is mainly based on Matt. 22:40 and Mark 12:28ff. (Yoder, \textit{What Would You Do?}, pp. 37-38). ‘It is an altruistic form of egoism when I defend my wife and my child because they are precisely my own. ...The reason I should defend my wife and child in this argument is not that they are my neighbors, innocent threatened third parties, but because they are mine. Thus this becomes an act of selfishness; though covered over with the halo of service to others, it is still self-oriented in its structure.’ (Yoder, \textit{What Would You Do?}, p. 20).

suppresses them in such a way that they will rise again with redoubled fury when opportunity permits, it must be said that Quaker pacifism (of course, if not all) naively connects the method of nonviolence to benefits, and runs the risk of taking a unbridgeable gap of self-other relations back to the realm of calculability. Quaker pacifism there becomes no more than a (group-) psychological strategy to violently use ‘nonviolence’ by making people on the opposing side feel indebted or stigmatised. After all, this makes a game that takes advantage of the logic of retribution in a reverse way.

3. 3. Philosophical Insights on Violence

3. 3. 1. Being and Violence: Theoretical Bottleneck of Liberal Quakerism

Even in a philosophical field, after the experiences of many crises such as two world wars in the twentieth century, many philosophers have recognised the finite nature of human reason, and have made various efforts to overcome the matter of human-centredness and its ‘other-absent’ view. As partly observed in the second chapter, for instance, two typical attempts to reexamine modern thought are the destruction of western metaphysics by Heidegger and déconstruction by Derrida; especially the latter is considered to be the first to offer words with which to speak about and deeply consider self-other relations. In this section, by employing

129 For the further analysis on matter of the use of nonviolence as a strategy, see 3.3.1. in this thesis.
130 For example, Apsey states that ‘the opponent is suffering courageously and maintaining good will; and, as a result, the bystanders are sympathizing with the opponent and disapproving of the adversary’s action. This unexpected and unfavorable turn of events leads to a reconsideration of the adversary’s motives.’ (Apsey, Transforming Power, p. 7). This strategy can be regarded as a kind of power-game using the third party. The game can be easily transformed into a victim-pretending game, which situation could well be further exploited by the opposing side.
the fruits of philosophical arguments on being (identity) and violence as those developed particularly by Derrida and the post-Derrida generation, I search for clues to consider the matter of ‘absence of others’ in Liberal Quakerism, and its lack of the viewpoint of the (in-)calculability of self-other relations. I then make a philosophical attempt to assess Niebuhr’s just-war theory and his criticism against Liberal pacifism.

We have already seen in 2.4.1. that traditional western metaphysics and Christian theology have an auto-affective hierarchical structure, and they tend to be a sort of Grand Tautology, which is based upon the self-based and self-circulating logic. To do Liberal Quakers justice, the relative or limited nature of human recognition seems to be understood by them, especially liberal-Liberal Quakers. As briefly seen in the second chapter, Jones admits that the supremacy of human conscience is only limited to each person’s own realm, saying ‘every individual is, to the limit of his spiritual range, a king and a priest.’ In his view, human conscience is the mere personal and individual thing. Almost in the same but advanced line, liberal-Liberal Quakers, who have pluralistically modified earlier Liberalism, realise such an epistemological matter, and insist that no one can claim the absolute truth of God. Regarding this point, Dandelion clearly argues:

The idea of progressivism and of being open to new Light have become translated into the idea that the group cannot know Truth, except personally, partially, or provisionally. …In other words, they are absolutely certain (rationally) that they can never be certain (theologically).

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132 See 2.4.2. c. in this thesis.
...All religious groups have to be partly wrong theologically: liberal-Liberal Quakers know this only from outside of that epistemological difficulty of theology.

...they [liberal-Liberal Quakers] also tend to judge down all those groups who do place belief as central and who think theology can be or is true.\textsuperscript{135}

Certainly, this viewpoint is philosophically and theologically relevant, and it can be said that thereby liberal-Liberal Quakers may surpass the primitive level of the view of truth, or the Parmenides-like identification of thinking and being. However, when they speak of the relativity of human recognition, they seem not to further reflect upon the matters of how and why they have come to gain such awareness of relative perception, whilst speaking in a transcendental way that includes God and all other things into the single scope of their own. In other words, why can they assume the existence of the transcendental Truth? In relation to this point, I would say, they have still fallen into the same philosophical dilemma, as experienced in traditional dualism and agnosticism, which would finally result in insufficient concerns about others. For instance, as in Dandelion’s analysis, liberal-Liberal Quakers simply state that we ‘cannot know Truth,’ and judge those who claim to know the Truth. We can easily find the contradiction between their words and actions. That is to say, in their logic, there are two kinds of people: those who do not know the ‘truth’ of human inability to reach the Truth, and those who know the ‘truth.’ On this point, they seem as if to proudly claim that the former are not so proximate to the Truth as the latter (namely, liberal-Liberal Quakers), because they know the fact of truth. Here, the assertion of relative truth is easily transformed into the absoluteness of

\textsuperscript{135} Dandelion, \textit{An Introduction to Quakerism}, p. 152.
their truth. In this sense, liberal-Liberal Quakers still cannot break though the wall of self-circulating thinking, adhering to the desire to stand over others from high up in the self-based metaphysics. It is not too much to say that such a naïve view certainly has ever appeared in their reduction of others at various religious and practical levels, as vividly described in the examples of their Liberal historiography and pacifist stance.

One more step must be taken to examine such a collusion of Liberal religion and ‘absence of others.’ The matter of the self must be seen from another angle of the matter of otherness or others. According to E. Lévinas, the knowledge of God cannot be divided from human relations. He says, ‘There can be no “knowledge” of God separated from the relationship with men. The Other…is indispensable for my relation with God. …by his [the Other’s] face …is the manifestation of the height in which God is revealed.’ His words, I think, might help identify one cause of the bottleneck of Liberal Quakerism (and modern thoughts), which is based on human consciousness as the basis of truth. What makes us recognise the relativity of Truth, and what makes us believe in the existence of Truth that is never-reducible to the personal realm of subjectivity? In Lévinas’ view, it is the impossibility of reduction that constitutes other as otherness and let us know the finiteness of our recognition: ‘The relationship with the Other is the absence of the other. Experiences of otherness – parents’ discipline, fighting with friends,

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136 Dandelion makes an analysis upon this dilemma found in liberal-Liberal Quakerism in terms of the behavioural creed. He argues that 'there is a certainty around the opposition to credal statements of belief which is in paradoxical opposition to the freedoms these defences are designed to protect. In effect, there is an almost credal attitude to the fact that the group does not have creeds. In other words, there is a credal attachment to the way in which Liberal Friends are a religious group' (Ben Pink Dandelion, et al., Heaven on Earth: Quakers and the Second Coming (Birmingham: Woodbrooke College, 1998), p. 180).


conflicts, sufferings, and death; all these things come under the general term ‘otherness’—consciously or unconsciously differentiate the self, and break its sense of omnipotence as possessed since infancy. In this way, people usually learn that they are not always right, they do not know all the things, and they cannot completely control the world. Lévinas argues about the point:

The evidence of cogito –where knowledge and the known coincide without knowledge having had to be already in operation, …—cannot satisfy the critical exigency, for the commencement of the cogito remains antecedent to it. It does indeed mark commencement, …But this awakening comes from the Other. …It is because it [cogito] suspects that it is dreaming itself that it awakens. The doubt makes it seek certainty. But this suspicion, this consciousness of doubt, implies the idea of the Perfect. …

…it this unsettling of the condition and this justification come from the Other. The Other alone eludes thematization. Thematization cannot serve to found thematization.139

Although it has been argued by various philosophers, such relations with others are also prescribed in language activity.140 Human beings use languages in some form or another, in order to express their feelings or convey their thoughts by speech, written word or body language. The fact of language-exchange indicates that one has already had, and always has, relationships with others. This is so, as Derrida argues, even when one gives a negative answer

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139 Lévinas, *Totality and Infinity*, pp. 85-86. ‘Thematization’ is the term used by Lévinas to signify the objectification of being and reduction of it into subjectivity.

140 For example, the primary relations of self and others prescribed in human language are well discussed by Lévinas: ‘Words are said, be it only by the silence kept, whose weight acknowledges this evasion of the Other. The knowledge that absorbs the Other is forthwith situated within the discourse I address to him. Speaking, rather than “letting be,” solicits the Other.’ (Lévinas, *Totality and Infinity*, p. 195).
of ‘no.’ This is because, without the primary relations with others, there could be no need of language. After all, being is not a fundamental entity as is assumed by modern philosophy; rather, as Jean-Luc Nancy expresses, ‘Being cannot be anything but being-with-one-another.’

This state of ‘being with others,’ which on one hand marks the limitation of our ‘selves,’ and on the other hand induces our metaphysical quests after the ground of the ‘self,’ usually seems to the self to be negativity, or that which is not ‘myself.’ In such a situation, we usually think otherness to be a mere threat to our self-preservation, or the object of manipulation for our subsistence, and then, the state of ‘being with others’ must be accepted as a kind of potential violent force. This potential violence would elicit another violent reaction in a reciprocal way. To put it briefly, self-other relations can be a hotbed of violence. In this sense, whether we like it or not, we are inevitably thrown into ethical-political contexts; we are thrown into ethical responsibility for (or the possibility of response to) others or otherness. As Derrida

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141 ‘yes’ is the transcendental condition of all performative dimensions. A promise, an oath, an order, a commitment always implies a yes, I sign. …Before the Ich in Ich bin affirms or negates, it poses itself or pre-poses itself: not as ego, as the conscious or unconscious self, …but as a performative force which, for example, in the form of the ‘I’ [je] marks that ‘I’ as addressing itself to the other, however undetermined to be or she is: ‘Yes-I’ or ‘Yes-I-say-to-the-other,’ even if I says no and even if I addresses itself without speaking.’ (Jacques Derrida, ‘Ulysses Gramophone: Hear Say Yes in Joyce,’ in Acts of Literature (New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 298). Derrida adds that this yes should be started as a response to others’ yes; the yes addresses itself to some other and can appeal only to the yes of some other; it begins by responding.’ (Derrida, ‘Ulysses Gramophone,’ p. 301).


144 Hauerwas mentions this point: ‘But to see the other as other is frightening, because to the extent others are other they challenge my way of being.’ (Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 91).


147 ‘The discourse on Being presupposes the responsibility of the yes, yes what is said is said, I am responding to the summons of Being, the summons of Being is being responded to, and so on.’ (Derrida, ‘Ulysses Gramophone,’ p. 302).
metaphorically argues, the question to be asked at this stage is how to ‘eat well,’ not how to stop eating. The word of ‘eat’ symbolises the unavoidable violent relations among beings. Namely, the point of Derrida’s discussion is that, as long as we exist, we participate in potential violence against each other. Therefore, the first question is not whether it is possible to avoid it, nor how to eliminate the possibility of it, but the proper question is how we can deal with the situation well.

The question is no longer one of knowing if it is “good” to eat the other or if the other is “good” to eat, nor of knowing which other. ...The moral question is thus not, nor has it ever been; ...but since one must eat in any case and since it is and tastes good to eat, ...how for goodness sake should one eat well (bien manger)?

Referring to these philosophical analyses upon relations between self and others, and between being and violence, I proceed to think about the main issue of this chapter, namely about Liberal Quaker pacifism and Niebuhr’s just-war theory. Obviously, Niebuhr’s analysis of Liberal Quakers is right in the sense that Quaker attitudes towards wars and conflicts could be said to be an irresponsible one. This is because Quakers certainly neglect the fact that, unlike their optimistic understanding of humanity, the co-existence of beings makes them also inevitably take part in sin and violent relations, whilst they assume it is possible for them to stand outside. Moreover, such an attitude of pretensions to get over the ontological limitation might well result in the same kind of self-absolutisation as found in an enthusiastic support of violence. The reason for this is that both stances easily ignore, and do not sincerely consider, the ethical

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responsibility for others at a deep level of our way of existence. Here we can see the irony, where seeking for security (generally-called ‘peace’) might lead to the erase of, or violent actions against, others. For Quakers, others are not others who appear as uncontrollable and incalculable, but mere objects of control. This oblivion of others has already been found in the case of Liberal Quakers’ metaphysical hope for the final unity of God’s Self and human self.\textsuperscript{149}

In this regard, I admit that Niebuhr’s criticism, –and his realistic insight, namely his judgment that there is no sharp line between violence and nonviolence\textsuperscript{150} –are well founded. Probably having fully covered this context of philosophical and theological criticism of pragmatic pacifism, Hauerwas also describes the danger of nonviolence that is done for seeking for its effectiveness. He says, ‘the temptation of the nonviolent to use their “weakness” to manipulate others to achieve their own ends –ends that others would pursue in more aggressive manner. Self-deception is no less a problem of the nonviolent than the violent.\textsuperscript{151}

3. 3. 2. Philosophical Analysis on Niebuhr’s Criticism: Openness to Others

Nevertheless, Niebuhr’s position has a crucial problem as well. To be specific, in his discussion, a path of dialogue with others might probably be closed from the beginning. Again, Derrida’s idea of ‘hospitality’ clearly sheds light upon the matter. In Derrida’s view, identity is given birth by differences from others and repetitions of itself, and so no identity could exist before such moments of differences and repetitions: that is, the movement of \textit{différence}.\textsuperscript{152}

Therefore, for example, identity of subjectivity or objectivity does not exist principally and

\textsuperscript{149} See 2. 4. 2. in this paper.

\textsuperscript{150} Robertson, \textit{Love and Justice}, p. 261.

\textsuperscript{151} Hauerwas, \textit{The Peaceable Kingdom}, p. 148.

primarily by itself. He says, ‘Subjectivity—like objectivity—is an effect of différence, an effect inscribed in a system of différence.’\textsuperscript{153} Conversely, self-identity or self-presence is endlessly deferred by virtue of différence, which always brings differences and other-relations into it.\textsuperscript{154} Thus the movement of différence is viewed as the possibility, and at the same time the impossibility of the formation of identity. In short, what Derrida implies here is that there are two contrasting ways to accept the possible and impossible relations with others as a place of ‘hostility’ or ‘hospitality.’

**Hostility:** If self-identity is estimated only to be a fundamental and good thing like an ontological entity, then the relation with others, who bring differences into it and jeopardise it, will be considered to be a place of ‘hostility.’ In this case, others are only seen as the objects of expulsion, or imprudent control, which more often than not results in vain. (For example, according to Nancy, the epilogue of a closed-to-the-self story, which is narrated in a trial to drive away fear and anxiety, will be physically or symbolically death. As seen before,\textsuperscript{155} such a story based on the value of proximity to the self relies upon the mechanism of exclusion of others for self-confirmation and self-preservation. It is by the repetition of excluding others that the self is reflectively reconfirmed. If there are no more others outside, the self attempts to find out foreign elements inside the circle of the self or the same group, and to kick them out for the re-establishment of the self. In Nancy’s view, the final goal of ceaseless violence might mean at a personal level to be the loss of the self, and at a collective level to be the internal collapse or

\textsuperscript{153} Derrida, *Positions*, p. 28.
\textsuperscript{154} ‘This is why the a of différence also recalls that spacing is temporization, the detour and postponement by means of which intuition, perception, consummation—in a word, the relationship to the present, the reference to a present reality, to a being—are always deferred.’ (Derrida, *Positions*, p. 28).
\textsuperscript{155} Refer back to the footnote 307 in the second chapter.
In every sense, it is natural that there will be no way to reconciliation between self and others, just as Yoder and Hauerwas point out. Such a hostile stance can be clearly seen in Niebuhr, for he tends to think conflicts and collisions only to be evil things that must be controlled by any means. On this point, I say, he sticks to the value of the self, despite his own definition of sin. Furthermore, as already seen in Yoder’s argument, Niebuhr tends to focus merely upon relative social orders and to be finally absorbed in these computable logics, in spite of his emphasis on the principle of love. John Marsden also makes the same point, saying ‘for Niebuhr, politics increasingly became the art of the possible,’ and this finally has driven Niebuhr’s stance approximate to pragmatic pacifism that he himself used to severely attack. Regarding such a calculable responsibility as found in Niebuhr’s discussion, Derrida says:

A limited, measured, calculable, rationally distributed responsibility is already the becoming-right of morality; it is at times also ...the dream ...in the worst hypothesis, of the small

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156 ‘Now the community of human immanence, man made equal to himself or to God, to nature, and to his own work, is one such community of death—or of the dead. The fully realized person of individualistic or communitarianism is the dead person. In other words, death, in such a community, is not the unmasterable excess of finitude, but the infinite fulfillment of an immanent life: it is death itself consigned to immanence;’ (Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community, ed. Peter Connor, trans. Peter Connor et al., Theory and History of Literature, vol. 76. (Minneapolis, MN.: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), p. 13). These words of Nancy are leveled against Neo-Hegelianism and its worldview swallowing everything into the structure of the whole self. As seen in the previous chapter, this is the very theoretical foundation of the early twentieth Liberal Quakerism.


158 See 3.2.2. in this thesis.

159 ‘...the more intricate social relations in which the highest ethical attitudes are achieved only by careful calculation.’ (Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society, p. 74).

160 ‘His [Furuya’s] criticism of Reinhold Niebuhr in this context is significant. He is appreciatively aware of the contributions to American life during the thirties and forties of Niebuhr’s “Christian realism,” but he believes that in the fifties it came to constitute a kind of establishmentarianism of America and was overly affirmative of the political and even social status quo.’ (Richard D. Drummond, ‘Book Review of America the Christian Nation by Yasuo Furuya,’ Theology Today, vol. 25 (April 1968): 114-117, p. 116).


or grand inquisitors.\textsuperscript{163}

...it is no doubt the case that there neither can be nor should be any concept adequate to what we call responsibility. ...It regulates itself neither on the principle of reason nor on any sort of accountancy. To put it rather abruptly, I would say that, among other things, the subject is also a principle of calculability.\textsuperscript{164}

**Hospitality**: on the other hand, if differences, or the possibility and impossibility of identity, are positively understood to be, as it were, ‘grace’ for the condition of identity, or at least if we cease to regard differences as a place of hostility, the relations with others will be a place of ‘hospitality.’ And then, there might be room open to others (See Figure 4). In regard to the concept of hospitality, Derrida explains:

“One must eat well” does not mean above all taking in and grasping in itself, but *learning* and *giving* to eat, learning-to-give-the-other-to-eat. One never eats entirely on one’s own: this constitutes the rule underlying the statement, ...It is a rule offering infinite hospitality.\textsuperscript{165}

\textsuperscript{163} Derrida, ‘Eating Well,’ p. 118.
\textsuperscript{164} Derrida, ‘Eating Well,’ p. 108.
\textsuperscript{165} Derrida, ‘Eating Well,’ p. 115.
The concept of ‘hospitality’ or ‘hospitability’ is commonly found in the discussions developed by religious pacifists, Yoder and Hauerwas. Hauerwas makes the same point by using a similar kind of metaphor of ‘sharing goods’: ‘Such people [people in church who partake in the story of Jesus] serve the cause of justice best by exemplifying in their own lives how to help one another...’
–i.e., how goods can be shared since no one has a rightful claim on them. Hauerwas goes on to expound upon hospitality that is required of Christians: ‘…a peace that is based on the truth that requires we be hospitable to the ultimate stranger of our existence: God.’ And ‘The church is thus these whose lives have been opened by God, often an opening that has extracted a great cost, and so are capable of being open to others without fear and resentment.’ Of course, hospitality never means that Christians must not make any plan nor use any calculation for their daily lives and must completely renounce the right to protect themselves. What the idea intends is the deeper-lying condition of human beings, which invites them to the possibility of keeping themselves sustainable in living together with others. Put another way, conflicts and confrontations are the given condition for human beings, and the problem is how to properly respond to the situations. In this sense, the following words by Wolf Mendl, a present Quaker pacifist who neither wipes out ethical dilemmas nor regards conflicts as evil (or a place of hostility), are really suggestive for further discussions on Quaker peace testimony. He shows one way to be taken for considering the relations with others and otherness, which have been theologically missed in the Liberal self-centred view.

[early] Friends did not deny the reality of evil and of conflict. Nor did they equate conflict with evil. They were well aware of the suffering which a non-violent witness could bring in an imperfect world. This is in contrast to those who identify peace with the absence of conflict and value that above all things. ...The failure to take evil and conflict into account as elements in our human condition and an obsession with the need for peace and harmony have led pacifists badly

166 Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 114.
167 Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 144.
168 Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 146.
169 Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 105.
Summary

Niebuhr’s criticism of Liberal Quaker pacifism was based on his realistic understanding of human sinful nature. For Niebuhr, an orthodox theologian, human beings, especially at collective levels, are never immune from participation in sin and violence. Conflicts and wars are the reflection of this sinfulness of human nature. Therefore, Niebuhr insisted that one should take the responsibility of realising relative justice through struggles, whilst holding up God’s love as an impossible moral ideal. In Niebuhr’s view, Liberal Quakers falsely claimed nonviolence to be the single political means to resolve conflicts, assuming this way to ensure peace and justice in this world. Niebuhr argued that they are wrong and irresponsible because of their optimistic view of humankind, and of their oblivion of the ethical dilemmas resulting from human sinfulness that they are also inevitably taking part in. In actuality, since around the Manchester Conference, Liberal Quakers have considered human nature to be divine and innocent, broken the tension between God and man, and forgotten the deep dimension of human existential limitation. This chapter confirmed that this criticism by Niebuhr is still applicable to present Quakerism, as well observed in Valentine’s argument. That is to say, Quakers (of course, if not all) consider nonviolence to be an effective means for reconciliation, and their pragmatic pacifist stance ends in taking an unbridgeable gap between self and others back to the mere realm of calculability or controllability. Quaker pacifism then becomes no more than a (group-) psychological strategy to violently use ‘nonviolence.’ In this regard, Quakers makes a clear

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theological contrast with those of other Christian pacifists; Yoder and Hauerwas just urge the following of the pattern of Christ’s self-renunciation as a counter-testimony against human self-centred orientation to manipulate or control others.

However, Niebuhr also had a crucial problem in relation to his understanding of humanity. In his argument, a path of dialogue with others is probably closed from the beginning. As Derrida’s analysis helps to show, Niebuhr tends to regard the self as fundamental, and the relations with others are regarded only as a place of hostility or hegemonic conflicts. He continues to stay to the last moment in a calculable domain of subjectivity, despite his assertion of Christian love. It is certain that this might lead to blocking the path of dialogue with others. We can see here ironic situations, in which justice-seeking efforts finally shut out the possibility of having peaceful relations with others, as can be seen in both cases of Niebuhr as well as Liberal Quakers. On the other hand, if relations with others are regarded as the possibility of the formation of identity, namely as a graceful place for the self, or at least if such relations are not looked upon as a place of hostility and evil, then it could open room for ‘hospitable’ attitudes towards others. This is the way which religious pacifists, Yoder and Hauerwas, call us to walk along with Jesus, and which we have to learn for the reconciliation with others. (One more thing I have to add is that the following two propositions are different: one proposition is that ‘If we do not believe that it is possible to achieve peace, it is not possible.’ Another is that ‘If we believe that it is possible to achieve peace, it is possible.’ The latter is the inverse of the former, and the truth-values are not identical. I can say that Yoder and Hauerwas’ open attitude for peace deals with the former, and Liberal Quaker pacifism with the latter). This concept of hospitality would show an old-new direction in Christianity for facilitating further discussions on peace issues.
within Liberal Quakerism. As Mendl suggests,\textsuperscript{171} this trial may begin with learning again from the examples of early Quakers, and from the Word and the Spirit of God as otherness, on which early Quaker ant-war position was founded. Therefore, it is better to reexamine what has been missed in the formation of Liberal Quaker ideology and its practice. The examination would provide us a clue to seek for another way of peace-keeping in a Quaker style, not of nonviolence as a means of calculation, which tends to be finally recollected to human narrow intentions.\textsuperscript{172}

\textsuperscript{171} Mendl, \textit{Prophets and Reconcilers}, p. 19.
\textsuperscript{172} More detailed discussion on the possibility of Quaker pacifism shall be argued in the fifth chapter on Barclay’s pacifism.
Part III
Chapter 4: Perfectionism and God’s Kingdom

Introduction

This chapter and the next chapter consider collective aspects of Barclay’s theology, while the first and second chapters focused chiefly upon the individual aspect of soteriology. In the fourth chapter, I closely examine the concrete relations between self and others in Barclay’s thought from an essential viewpoint of perfectionism as a vertical relationship between God and humans. In the fifth chapter, I examine the application of Barclay’s thought to aspects of the lateral and practical dimension among humans, such as church politics, ethics and practices including peace testimony.

In the second chapter, I briefly surveyed the relationships between Christian perfection and God’s Kingdom in Quakerism, and it came to light that, in the Quakers’ view, their perfectionist stance and their sense of the Kingdom were correlatively linked. A recession in the eschatological awareness of the time was followed by changes of the Quakers’ understanding of perfection. Quakers assumed that the Kingdom was made possible by the completion of perfection in each believer,1 and conversely the changing awareness of the Kingdom over time correlatively affected and deeply altered their attitudes towards perfectionism during each period. Basically, in the case of traditional Quakerism, perfection is considered as a matter of the response to God’s will through inward light. It is necessarily related to the responses to the light within other people, for God gives the light to all through the redemptive work of Christ. For example, Fox states: ‘by which spirit [the spirit of God] they might know fellowship with the

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Son and the Father and with the Scriptures and one with another. Brinton also says, “The early Friends seldom used the phrase “joined to the Lord” without adding its complementary expression “and to one another.” Therefore, particularly when it comes to the Quakers’ active approach or openness to others on the collective level, it is naturally important to further analyse both these concepts of perfectionism and the Kingdom of God in Quaker faith. This is because, I suggest, in the traditional Quaker logic, a hopeful idea of the Kingdom is closely accompanied by a hopeful sense of human perfection, which finally bears fruit in human attitudes and actions towards others in society as a peaceful testimony to God.

There is one thing to keep in mind before entering into a full discussion here. As observed in the second chapter, the concept of the Kingdom as described in Liberal Quakerism is based upon a Hegelian view of the self-development of God, and also identified with the progress of society. The Kingdom is realised here now through social transformations by Quakers’ own actions in various fields such as education and politics. However, they assume that there is no separation between God’s self and the human self. Liberal Quakers tend to unconsciously project their own human desires to God’s will or Truth. Then, the Kingdom finally becomes the kingdom dominated by the self, whilst using the mechanism of exclusion of others or alien factors for its self-establishment and self-preservation, (in spite of Liberals’ original promotion of the integration of society). Therefore, I think it essential to reconsider the way of communicating with others as otherness in Quaker faith; first, this study is done by

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4 Refer back to 2.4.2. in this thesis.
investigating the traditional views of Quakerism again, which were presented before any steps towards the Liberalisation of the religion were taken. What I would like to shed light upon in this chapter is that there are two paradoxical aspects (‘now’ and ‘hereafter’) that have been connected to the Kingdom and perfection in the Christian tradition. This chapter also shows that within this contextual flow of Christianity, Barclay developed his particular standpoint on these two ideals, perfectionism and God’s Kingdom, within the framework of inward light as otherness. Barclay’s double-stance, which includes both the possibility and impossibility of perfection and the Kingdom, reflects the possibility and impossibility of relations between self and others, whilst deferring the immanentism of the self, and to open the possibility of love towards others. This is the core concept of perfectionism and the Kingdom of God in Barclay’s theology.

Specifically, this chapter traces the history of Christian perfection, and it examines the historical and theological characteristics of Barclay’s perfectionism in the traditional Christian context. This is done to ensure that it will be a preliminary study of ecclesiology and more specific actions in the Quaker peace testimony in the final chapter. In the first section, I briefly review perfectionism along with the concept of the Kingdom from the primitive Church, Augustine (354-430), and the Reformation theologies such as Lutheranism and Calvinism, and Methodism, to clarify the overall contexts. These persons and religions represent typical stances on perfection in each period of the time: early Christianity, (pre-) Catholicism, the Reformation, and the post-Quaker period. Examinations of each stance are useful in describing the characteristics of Quaker perfectionism by comparison. In the second section, I closely examine the Quakers’ idea of perfection and the Kingdom, especially in Barclay’s theology, which are considered to correlate with Quakers’ open attitudes towards others or their nonviolent activism.
on the practical and theological levels. The unique value of Quaker perfectionism would be clearly revealed in Barclay’s theoretical connection between perfectionism and Christ’s command to ‘love one’s enemies.’

4. 1. Perfectionism in the Christian Tradition

Admittedly, there have been strong objections to the Christian belief in perfection, especially found in Protestant history, in regard to the supposed claim of human total sinlessness in this world. However, perfection or full sanctification, which is the process started with justification by God, has consistently been the thing that Christianity describes as the goal of a Christian and also of the Church as the body of true believers. Of course, the faith derives from the words of the Bible. For example, Matt. 5:48 says, ‘Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect.’ 2 Cor. 13:11 also says, ‘Finally, brethren, farewell. Be perfect, be of good comfort, be of one mind, live in peace; and the God of love and peace shall be with you.’ And Eph. 4:13 follows, ‘Till we all come in the unity of the faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ.’ Grounded on these biblical testimonies to the possibility of human perfection, Christians in each age took perfection to be the ideal of Christianity, even within a variety of ideological frameworks and with some historical constraints. This section is mainly based upon the discussion of R. Newton Flew, who surveyed the history of perfectionism in Christianity. I briefly review the historical flow of the concept of perfection from the times of the early Church, Fathers such as Augustine, on to the Reformation theologian, Martin Luther (1483-1546), Phillip Melanchthon (1497-1560) and John Calvin (1509-64), and then skip to the time of John Wesley (1703-91), the founder of Methodism, who was an eminent advocate of Christian perfection in
the post-Quaker period. The purpose of this review is to ensure that this study may become a preparatory examination of Quaker view on perfectionism and God’s Kingdom.

4. 1. 1. Perfection in Jesus and the Early Church

According to Flew, the concept of God’s Kingdom was tightly connected with Jesus and his personality in the primitive Church. For Christians in those days, the Advent of Jesus was identified with the coming of the Kingdom. Therefore, the understandings of perfection held by the primitive Church can be found in scriptural eschatology, namely in the words of Jesus as he spoke about his Kingdom: ‘the primary and determinative description [of perfection] is to be sought in the teaching of our Lord about the Kingdom of God.’ Flew argues that there are indeed two paradoxical views on perfection and God’s Kingdom revealed in Jesus’ words: ‘at the heart of the teaching of Jesus was an ideal [perfection] attainable in this world, while the ultimate goal of all aspiration was set in the age to come.’ For example, when teaching the disciples how to pray in Matt. 6:10, Jesus tells them about the futurity of the Kingdom: ‘Thy kingdom come. Thy will be done in earth, as it is in heaven.’ In Mark 10:30, he refers to eternal life as being realised in the coming world: ‘But he shall receive an hundredfold now in this time, houses, and brethren, and sisters, and mothers, and children, and lands, with persecutions; and in the world to come eternal life.’ At the same time, Jesus stresses his view that the Kingdom has already come in this world, as apparent in Luke 17:21: ‘Neither shall they say, Lo here! or, lo there! for, behold, the kingdom of God is within you.’ In another place (Matt. 12:28), he speaks of the presence of God’s Kingdom: ‘But if I cast out devils by the Spirit of God, then the

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kingdom of God is come unto you.’ Thus, Jesus proclaims these both the futurity and presence of the Kingdom, leaving readers of the Bible facing somewhat paradoxical and two-sided views of God’s rule on earth.\(^9\)

Notably, the completion of the Kingdom in Jesus’ words is not related to earthly ‘developments within human history’ that are results of human efforts, but rather it is regarded as gracefully given ‘from above.’\(^10\) However, Jesus also describes Heaven as having a gradually-growing nature among humans, or within a human society, that is under the divine leadership of God’s will. The characteristic of Heaven is described in the parable of the mustard seed found in Matt. 13:31, Mark 4:30 and Luke 13:19. Flew continues by stating that this two-sided nature of the Kingdom can be explained by the relationship between Heavenly Rule and Jesus’ own personality. The manifestation of God and his Rule in the world are present in, and closely knitted with, the peculiarity of Jesus himself. For instance, this is evidenced from the very beginning of Mark:\(^11\) ‘The beginning of the gospel of Jesus Christ, the Son of God’ (Mark 1:1). More importantly, the same scripture says that Jesus is aware of his own special role to realise the will of the Farther.\(^12\) The Sonship of Jesus, or his divine nature, implies that God’s Realm on earth has already begun, as embodied in the very person. Jesus also expects his disciples and followers, those who would be called for God’s sonship, to believe in him and to follow his example, so that they can become real member of His Kingdom.\(^13\) Although they are

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\(^9\) Flew says, ‘The end is sudden, but the process is gradual,’ and ‘Even if the kingdom is in some sense present, its full manifestation is lacking.’ (Flew, The Idea of Perfection, p. 26).


\(^11\) Flew, The Idea of Perfection, p. 31. ‘His teaching on the Perfect Realm cannot be seen except in the light of His Personality, and especially as that light streams from the Cross. In that light the varied elements of His preaching are fused into one.’ (Flew, The Idea of Perfection, p. 34).

\(^12\) ‘All things are delivered unto me of my Father: and no man knoweth the Son, but the Father; neither knoweth any man the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him.’ (Matt. 11:27).

\(^13\) The necessity of taking part in the Cross is described as follows: ‘Then said Jesus unto his disciples, If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross, and follow me.’ (Matt. 16:24). And as to becoming the sons of God, ‘But as many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God,
neither logical nor straight, these are the steps that lead towards the realisation of the Kingdom in the world, for they describe the process of eternal time entering the dimension of human historical time as realised in the Incarnation. If we live by the Law of God, or the Law of self-sacrifice and the Cross, we will be led to the eternal life of the Kingdom. Jesus says, ‘he that taketh not his cross, and followeth after me, is not worthy of me. He that findeth his life shall lose it: and he that loseth his life for my sake shall find it’ (Matt. 10:38-39). He also says, ‘Verily I say unto you, Whosoever shall not receive the kingdom of God as a little child, he shall not enter therein’ (Mark 10:15).

From these words, obedience to God can be understood as the standard of religious maturity, in that the coming of the Kingdom requires self-sacrifice and altruistic actions. (This fact changes the focus of the discussion to religious ethics. I might assume that there are also two paradoxical aspects of perfection. However, this is not so clearly evident in the words of Jesus, for he proclaims the imminence of God within radical eschatology, calling for the imminent completion of the end-time). This paradoxical view of perfection and the Kingdom is far more apparent in the teachings of Paul, who is said to have best understood and inherited the messages of his Lord.

Jesus’ stance was passed down to his disciples and to biblical writers. Paul, especially, agrees with Jesus on almost every point concerning apocalyptic ideas. Paul’s understanding of the Kingdom also places it within the framework of eschatology, as he states that its

even to them that believe on his name:’ (John 1:12).

consummation is in the Cross, as does Jesus. For Paul, Christ and his Cross are the very presence of God’s eternal Love in the world, and the goal for the future world. Paul says, ‘For it pleased the Father that in him [Christ] should all fulness dwell; And, having made peace through the blood of his cross, by him to reconcile all things unto himself; by him, I say, whether they be things in earth, or things in heaven’ (Col. 1:19-20). Paul delivers almost the same words as Jesus, who is God’s presence and his salvation here and now. Therefore, Paul, like Jesus, urges other people to partake in the saving power of the Cross, under the guidance of the Spirit endowed to them (2 Cor. 1:20-22).

The next question is what position Paul was actually taking on perfection. Flew summarises Paul’s viewpoints on perfection into the following four points. (1): One is his distinction between ‘absolute perfection’ (to be realised in the future), and ‘relative perfection’ (possible for believers even in the world). (2): The second is his descriptions of absolute perfection as a face-to-face vision of God, or as the likeness of the image of Christ. (3): The third is the doctrine of perfection as a principle of growth: ‘The relative perfection attainable in this life is a progress towards the goal of the final destiny.’ (4): The last is his recognition of the

19 Biblical critics have argued about the authenticity of the Pauline letters: ‘Of the thirteen letters in the NT that are attributed to Paul, seven are generally accepted as authentic. They are Romans, 1 and 2 Corinthians, Galatians, Philippians, 1 Thessalonians, and Philemon. The authorship of 2 Thessalonians and Colossians is more controversial. Ephesians was probably written in order to present Paul’s message to the church of a slightly later day: it is steeped in Pauline vocabulary and shows close dependence on Colossians. The Pastoralss, too, appear to have been written at a later period; although they may contain Pauline fragments, their overall style, vocabulary, tone, approach, and concerns are very different from Paul’s,’ (from the article of ‘Paul’ in Adrian Hastings, et al., ed. The Oxford Companion to Christian Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
20 Flew, The Idea of Perfection, p. 42. As to the necessity of partaking in the Cross, Paul said, ‘For if we have been planted together in the likeness of his death, we shall be also in the likeness of his resurrection:’ (Rom. 6:5).
22 Flew, The Idea of Perfection, p. 52 and 68.
lasting sin of human beings, but also of God’s promise of perfect victory over sin.\textsuperscript{24} Paul tells of the possibility of perfection, or the fulfillment of the Law under the power of the Spirit.

\textit{This} I say then, Walk in the Spirit, and ye shall not fulfil the lust of the flesh. ... But if ye be led of the Spirit, ye are not under the law. ...And they that are Christ's have crucified the flesh with the affections and lusts. If we live in the Spirit, let us also walk in the Spirit. (Gal. 5:16, 18, 24-25)

Yet, as can be inferred from the ‘present’ and ‘future’ tenses in this citation, Paul himself does not necessarily assert that believers would be completely cleared of their sins. This motif is seen in the story of Paul himself after his conversion; Paul confesses, ‘Not as though I had already attained, either were already perfect: but I follow after, if that I may apprehend that for which also I am apprehended of Christ Jesus’ (Phil. 3:12). Nevertheless, this viewpoint does not equal the opinion that ‘defeat is the inevitable end of struggle.’\textsuperscript{25} For Paul, the final victory over sin (absolute perfection) is promised in the messianic time of God. Christ, the Son of God, is the example of the realisation of eternity in the present, demonstrating the possibility of humanity becoming perfect in their religious and ethical natures.\textsuperscript{26} Therefore, Paul proclaims the necessity for us to conquer sin and fleshly temptation, and to mature to the perfect state, which belief and hope have been purchased through Christ. ‘Having therefore these promises, dearly beloved, let us cleanse ourselves from all filthiness of the flesh and spirit, perfecting holiness in the fear of God’ (2 Cor. 7:1). In regard to the growing nature of perfection that strives for the image of

\textsuperscript{24} Flew, \textit{The Idea of Perfection}, p. 53.
\textsuperscript{25} Flew, \textit{The Idea of Perfection}, p. 54.
\textsuperscript{26} Flew, \textit{The Idea of Perfection}, pp. 43-45, p. 52.
Christ, Paul also says:

Till we all come in the unity of the faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ: That we henceforth be no more children, tossed to and fro, and carried about with every wind of doctrine, by the sleight of men, and cunning craftiness, whereby they lie in wait to deceive; But speaking the truth in love, may grow up into him in all things, which is the head, even Christ. (Eph. 4:13-15)  

Thus, under the guidance of the indwelling Spirit, Paul states, believers would not have to commit sin any longer. What lives within them is not themselves, but it is Christ, who has emancipated the whole of humanity from sin: ‘I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me: and the life which I now live in the flesh I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself for me’ (Gal. 2:20). Paul repeats this theme; ‘Knowing this, that our old man is crucified with him, that the body of sin might be destroyed, that henceforth we should not serve sin’ (Rom. 6:6). And ‘There is therefore now no condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit’ (Rom. 8:1). These words are considered to be declarations of his joyful feelings of victory, graced with by God, and at the same time of his sharp crying for God’s victory in the future.  

Of course, at first sight, it seems to be quite a complex matter theoretically to argue about what is really meant by these words, and what they say about the realistic possibility of clearing away sin. As already seen, in a sense, even Paul does not clearly state that human beings

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27 Timothy Peat argues that ‘If Ephesians is not by Paul then it has been said that it is by his best disciple.’ (Timothy Peat, ‘A Biblical Frame,’ in Ben Pink Dandelion, et al., Heaven on Earth: Quakers and the Second Coming (Birmingham: Woodbrooke College, 1998), p. 13). See also the footnote 19 in this chapter.
28 Flew, The Idea of Perfection, p. 133
are capable of being completely freed from sin. This might be the matter of human trust in God, and human persistent effort towards His will. Paul distinguishes between the state of perfection and the continuous necessity of struggling against sin, saying ‘I press toward the mark for the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus. Let us therefore, as many as be perfect, be thus minded’ (Phil. 3:14-15). I would say that it suffices for the needs of this section to note the two-sided, but non-contradictory, viewpoint which Paul holds concerning perfection. ‘There is striving in St. Paul (Phil. iii. 8-9), but it is the striving of one who has already won a victory and received the peace of God.29.

In short, in the earliest period of Christianity, both Jesus and Paul preached two seemingly paradoxical views regarding God’s Kingdom and human perfection. In the words of Jesus, the Kingdom was described as both having already been here, and as to come in the future. The realisation was regarded by the earliest Christians as tightly connected to the divine and historical personality of Jesus. In this sense, the eternity of God had already entered the present. In the meantime, Jesus describes God’s Realm as growing towards completion among human beings. Jesus expected humans to believe in him and follow his example by bearing the Cross, leading them up into the image of Christ, or the appearance of the God’s Rule. Paul too, following Jesus, maintained that there were two sides to the nature of God’s Rule and perfection. Paul assumed the climax of the Kingdom to be in the Cross. For Paul, Christ and his Cross were identical to God’s eternal Love in the present and the goal of our future. Paul expected people to

29 Flew, The Idea of Perfection, p. 133. The Bible referred to here reads as follows, ‘Not as though I had already attained, either were already perfect: but I follow after, if that I may apprehend that for which also I am apprehended of Christ Jesus. Brethren, I count not myself to have apprehended: but this one thing I do, forgetting those things which are behind, and reaching forth unto those things which are before, I press toward the mark for the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus. Let us therefore, as many as be perfect, be thus minded: and if in any thing ye be otherwise minded, God shall reveal even this unto you.’ (Phil. 3:12-15).
follow the examples of Jesus and his altruistic action of love, defining the ‘moment’ of realising the Kingdom on earth and within a human society. As for perfection, Paul professed victory over sin through being filled with Christ, but he employed a distinction between absolute and relative perfection (in Flew’s terminology), believing that the growing nature of relative perfection would evolve into absolute perfection, which is compared to the likeness of Christ. Whilst insisting on human persisting sin, he proclaimed God’s promise of final victory over the world in the presence of eternity. As seen especially in Paul’s faith, the two dimensions of ‘now’ and ‘hereafter’ existed in relation to perfection and the Kingdom in the earliest messages of Christianity.

4.1.2. Perfection in the Church Fathers and the Reformation Theology

In the early Church and the patristic times, from around the second to eighth centuries, the ideals of the Kingdom and perfection were systematised by the Church Fathers through the employment of Hellenistic thought. Augustine of Hippo was the first theologian to present the concept of the Kingdom, Flew argues, on which basis Christian perfection can be also correctly understood. Until the time of this great theologian, there had been several changes in the type of messages in regard to the Kingdom, (actually since the time of Evangelist John). (1): One change was the retreat of eschatology from the centre stage of Christian faith, and the following decline in expectation of the imminent Kingdom. (2): Another change was, as far as the

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31 Flew, The Idea of Perfection, p. 119. It is clear that John’s theology showed a deep influence from the Hellenistic way of thinking; ‘the framework of Paul’s thought is that of Jewish apocalyptic, whereas the achievement of the Johannine writings was to set the Christian message in a new framework of thought for the Greaco-Roman world. Something of power and urgency has been lost in the process.’ (Flew, The Idea of Perfection, p. 116).
Kingdom is concerned, the self-identification of Church, or the gathering of the saints on earth, with the Realm of God.\textsuperscript{33} ‘So the idea of the Church in the Second Epistle of Clement is parallel to the Kingdom of God in the New Testament.’\textsuperscript{34} (3): The aforementioned changes were followed by an inevitable consequence, where, as in the case of Ambrose (339-397), the Church came to be regarded as ‘Israel,’ and the realisation of ‘the Heaven’ was projected into the afterlife.\textsuperscript{35} (4): A further alteration was the transformation of Christianity into a sort of new legalism, fused with the Greek concept of Natural Law. God became the Giver or the Judge of the Law, and the members of the Church were ranked according to their works of faith or the degrees of obedience to the Law.\textsuperscript{36} In this ecclesiastical and hierarchic framework, ‘the Heaven’ came to be described merely as a place of reward, and ‘the Hell’ as a place of punishment.\textsuperscript{37} Thus, in the minds of Apologists, there was only a narrow range for the ideas regarding God’s Kingdom and perfection.\textsuperscript{38} However, certainly these changes laid the religious groundwork that

\textsuperscript{33} Flov, The Idea of Perfection, pp. 120-121. In regard to these changes of (1) and (2), Gilson gives a right explanation of the processes. According to him, there were two difficulties faced by Christians at that time who tried to live not upon the earth but in the heaven. ‘The first difficulty is concerned with the very universality of the [Christian] society which it was to found. …the simple possibility of not giving assent to the faith implies the possibility of two societies instead of one, a possibility which would jeopardize the complete universality of the first. Open to all whom faith in the message and Person of Christ justifies, Christian society is immediately paralleled by another, to which belong all who exclude themselves from Christianity. …A second problem directly concerns the possible relations between Christian society and the temporal order. …the Christian, we can say with St. Paul, lives not upon the earth but in heaven. Here, a new difficulty arises. For, if such is the faith of the Christian, the more intense it is, the more it will draw him away from a love of this world and especially from a love of the city. It is not surprising, therefore, that one of the outstanding effects of Christianity was denationalization.’ (Etienne Gilson, ‘Foreword,’ in Saint Augustine, The City of God, trans. Demetrius B. Zema and Gerald G. Walsh, Books 1-7, reprinted ed. (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, [1950] 1962), pp. xxvii-xxix). Then, Gilson continues to explain that ‘some of the first Christians discovered, and put into practice, one of the possible answers to the new question raised by Christianity; it was to renounce the world, that is, to renounce the city. There were others, however, to whom the diffusion of the Gospel could not help suggesting a quite different, even contrary, solution. It was to Christianize the city rather than renounce it. and, in Christianizing it, to take it over.’ (Gilson, ‘Foreword,’ p. xxxii).

\textsuperscript{34} Flov, The Idea of Perfection, pp. 120-121.

\textsuperscript{35} Flov, The Idea of Perfection, pp. 129-130. ‘But his [Tertullian’s] millennarianism [sic] has little meaning for his thought. All his expectation is centred on the kingdom on the other side of the grave, not on earth but in heaven.’ (Flov, The Idea of Perfection, p. 128).

\textsuperscript{36} Flov, The Idea of Perfection, p. 120.

\textsuperscript{37} Flov, The Idea of Perfection, p. 130.

\textsuperscript{38} Flov, The Idea of Perfection, p. 123.
allowed Augustine to revive the significance of the two ideals, and to provide a theological system to these ideals for the first time in the Christian history.\textsuperscript{39}

It is well-known that Augustine fought against a Christian heterodoxy at that time, namely Pelagianism, whose theological stance was defined by the negation of the Original Sin and an emphasis on the initial power of human free will towards salvation.\textsuperscript{40} In this respect, Augustine may well be considered to have been an anti-perfectionist, but in fact, he was the first theologian to establish the ideals of the Kingdom and perfection as one of the most important Christian articles.\textsuperscript{41} It may be believed that Augustine simply saw the Church on earth as God’s Kingdom, following the theological current up to his day. Of course, in his writings, there are many descriptions which seem to identify the Church with the Kingdom, but he differentiated between the ‘visible church’ and the ‘invisible church’.\textsuperscript{42} In his theology, three concepts, namely the City of God (the invisible church), the visible church, and the earthly city (including cities in the heathen world), are complicatedly linked. In regard to the Kingdom, Augustine declares:

\begin{quote}
there are surely two kinds of 'kingdom of heaven': one embracing both the 'least' teacher who does not practice and the 'great' teacher who does practice what he preaches; and a different kingdom, openly to him who practices. …the mixed kingdom must be the Church, such as she exists in her temporal stage, while the unmixed kingdom is the Church such as she will be when she is to contain no evil-doer. Consequently, the Church, even in this world, here and now, is the
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{39} Flew, \textit{The Idea of Perfection}, p. 118 and 193.

\textsuperscript{40} See the article of ‘Pelagianism’ in Adrian Hastings, et al., ed. \textit{The Oxford Companion to Christian Thought} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

\textsuperscript{41} Flew, \textit{The Idea of Perfection}, p. 118.

\textsuperscript{42} ‘The City of God is the society of all God’s elect, past, present and future. Now there were obviously just men among the elect prior to the establishment of Christ’s Church, and even now there are, outside the Church and perhaps even among her persecutors, future members of the elect who will submit to her discipline before they die.’ (Etienne Gilson, \textit{The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine} (London: Victor Gollancz LTD, 1961), pp. 180-181).
kingdom of Christ and the kingdom of heaven.\textsuperscript{43}

Judging from the statement ‘the Church even in this world…is the kingdom of Christ,’ apparently the present church, or its membership, is regarded as part of, or the extension of, the true Kingdom.\textsuperscript{44} Nevertheless, here in these words, the differentiation of visible and invisible is effectively introduced to indicate the realisation of the Kingdom and its temporal deferment. The visible church is technically different from the Heavenly Church, and the fulfillment is set in the future.\textsuperscript{45} The fellowship of the visible church, whose social range was the same as Christendom according to the world-view of that time, includes both the elect and the reprobate as members of the institutional church.\textsuperscript{46} However, Christ rules over the Church through the saints, who are also members of the earthly city, by the power of the Spirit. God enables the people to virtually constitute the invisible church, or realise the divine Rule here in this world that becomes the sure ground of world order.\textsuperscript{47} Of course, ‘This ideal is realizable only in part and fragmentarily on this earth,’\textsuperscript{48} but the rule of God through the saints (with an eschatological hope for the world to come) will expand its boundary under the guide of God finally to the entire world, or to the


\textsuperscript{44} ‘the Church is …the incarnation of the City of God.’ (Gilson, ‘Foreword,’ p. lxiv).

\textsuperscript{45} In Augustine’s view, there are two kingdoms or cities; one is the City of God (or the divine society), ‘whose head is Christ.’ The other is the earthly city (or the diabolical society), ‘which constituted by all men, whose head is not Christ.’ (Gilson, ‘Foreword,’ p. xlix and lvi. See also Gilson, \textit{The Christian Philosophy}, p. 181). What differentiates between these cities in nature is love or \textit{caritas} as a bond for integration: ‘one, in which the love of God unites all men; a second, wherein all citizens, regardless of time and place, are united by their love of the world.’ (Gilson, ‘Foreword,’ p. lvii. See also Gilson, \textit{The Christian Philosophy}, pp. 172-173). Strictly speaking, as seen above, the Church is not the same as the City of God. The matter of who belong to the City of God ultimately depends upon the divine predestination (Gilson, ‘Foreword,’ p. lx).

\textsuperscript{46} ‘On the other hand, there are within the Church Christians who are not destined to heavenly happiness; these members of the Church, but they are not citizens of the City of God.’ (Gilson, ‘Foreword,’ p. lxiv).

\textsuperscript{47} ‘Christ reigns wherever faith reigns, and, where Christ reigns, there also is the Kingdom of Christ.’ (Gilson, ‘Foreword,’ p. lxv). ‘Christian law goes even farther, but in doing so it only helps to establish the dominion of good over evil within the city, and this is the surest foundation of order.’ (Gilson, \textit{The Christian Philosophy}, p. 178).

\textsuperscript{48} Flew, \textit{The Idea of Perfection}, p. 205.
realisation of the Kingdom.\(^{49}\)

Here and now Christ’s saints reign with Him, although not in the way they are destined to reign hereafter; but the ‘weeds’ do not reign with Him, even now, though they grow along with the ‘wheat’ in the Church. ...Those alone reign with Christ whose presence in His Kingdom is such that they themselves are His kingdom.\(^{50}\)

In this way, the Kingdom on earth is described as both impossible and possible. Eternity has never been fully realised in the temporal world, but it is partly realised and promised in the faith and religious lives of the believers. The two-sided nature of God’s eternal rule and the continuance of the present and future by way of the Church are both characteristics that faintly suggest ‘Catholic Church.’ In this sense, Augustine’s view of the Kingdom might be better understood as the statement of ‘no salvation outside the Church.’\(^{51}\)

Furthermore, in regard to perfection, it is highly probable that a two-sided perspective can also be found in Augustine’s view. For instance, Augustine clearly states that a man cannot be perfect in this present state of existence,\(^{52}\) but he adds a reservation to the statement; namely

\(^{49}\) When the earthly city does not surrender itself to the order of God, ‘the just have much to suffer and forgive. Things round about them which they can correct, they correct; things they cannot improve, they patiently endure; beyond that, they continue to observe the law which the others choose to disregard’ for the sake of God (Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy*, pp. 178-179). However, ultimately, ‘this earth offers no refuge for peace outside the Christian hope of a peace which finds its fulfillment, not on this earth, but in the beatitude of heaven. That is the reason why Christians, even though still in this world, are already in the next.’ (Gilson, ‘Foreword,’ p. lxxiii).


\(^{51}\) ‘the City of God could not sanction the earthly city; rather, it must blame, condemn and, if possible, reform the latter. ...When the spiritual opposition between the two cities unfold in time, it inevitably degenerates into conflict, and, although St. Augustine does not seem to have foreseen it, it is not impossible to imagine an earthly city with a unity modeled upon and organized against the heavenly City, possessed of its own doctrinal authority, excluding every kind of heresy and intolerant of all contradiction.’ (Gilson, ‘Foreword,’ p. lxxii).

\(^{52}\) Augustine, ‘On Man’s Perfection in Righteousness,’ in Peter Holmes, et al., trans., *Saint Augustin’s Anti-Pelagian Writings*, in Phillip Shaff, ed. A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the
it is possible through faith graced by God.\textsuperscript{53} And he says:

\begin{center}
this perfection may be attained, there is even now a training carried on in growing
\end{center}

[Christians,] and there will be by all means a completion made, after the conflict with death is
spent, and love, which is now cherished by the operation of faith and hope, shall be perfected in
the fruition of sight and possession.\textsuperscript{54}

Augustine thus argues that humans cannot be free from struggles against the flesh,\textsuperscript{55} but at the
same time, he insists that religious maturity progresses day by day through the help of the Spirit
and in believers’ daily efforts for good works.\textsuperscript{56} And the final completion is eschatologically
promised in hope for Christ.\textsuperscript{57} In a sense, this stance can be said to be a kind of ‘relative
perfection,’ which has been also observed in the teachings of Jesus and Paul. Absolute perfection
is postponed until the future, allowing Christians to have a sense of future life, and also inspiring
ceaseless and all-out efforts to see the image of God and to live up to his love.\textsuperscript{58} We need to
consider the socio-ideological context of Augustine’s strong opposition to Pelagianism
(optimistic perfectionism), but it is also realised that Augustine confesses the possibility of

\textsuperscript{53} Augustine, ‘On Man’s Perfection,’ p. 162.
\textsuperscript{54} Augustine, ‘On Man’s Perfection,’ p. 164.
\textsuperscript{55} It must be noted that Augustine does not insist upon the dichotomy of the spirit and the flesh as found in
Manichaeism. He says ‘the soul or the body, which God created, and which is wholly good.’ (Augustine, ‘On
Man’s Perfection,’ p. 163).
\textsuperscript{56} The efforts that Augustine particularly mentions are fasting, alms-giving and prayer (Augustine, ‘On Man’s
Perfection,’ p. 164).
\textsuperscript{57} ‘we are saved by hope. …Full righteousness, therefore, will only then be reached, when fulness of health is
attained; and this fulness of health shall be when there is fulness of love, for “love is the fulfilling of the law,”
and then shall come fulness of love, when “we shall see Him even as He is.’ (Augustine, ‘On Man’s
Perfection,’ p. 161).
\textsuperscript{58} Another example of such efforts is the Neo-Platonic or pre-Catholic meditation of denying all human
faculties and concentrating on the depth of the soul (Flew, \textit{The Idea of Perfection}, pp. 211-212). Flew argues
that ‘the mystical experiences described in the seventh book of the \textit{Confessions} were admittedly pre-Christian
or, as Dom Cuthbert Butler calls them, pre-Catholic.’ (Flew, \textit{The Idea of Perfection}, p. 214).
relative perfection to a certain extent. Flew summarises Augustine’s position by selecting and compiling excerpts from his works: ‘No one is perfect in this life. There is a perfection in this life. But this perfection is of those who are pilgrims and strangers on the earth, not of those who are perfectly in possession of their promised home.’

Next, this investigation focuses upon the Reformation Theology of the sixteenth century, to which the Quaker movement of the next generation is usually religiously attributed. The Reformation originally emerged from the historical flow of reactions against Roman Catholicism and its institutional degeneration. Therefore the Reformation Theology is sometimes believed to have left no room for the doctrine of perfection as equivalent to Catholic piety. However, the truth is that especially Luther and his colleague, Melanchthon, whilst their views were different from those of Catholicism, admitted the possibility of Christian perfection in terms of ‘calling’ or ‘vocation.’ Even Calvin, who never accepted the likelihood for humanity to reach the perfect state and who placed a strong emphasis upon God’s supremacy, agreed with Lutherans; he also believed that the whole-hearted attitudes towards God in vocation were of great importance.

Luther and Melanchthon notably allow much theoretical space for human perfection. Generally, they represent this belief, above all, as a matter of religious conscious attitude towards

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God. It might be possible to trace the root of Protestant perfection, which flourished in various religious movements of the later periods, such as Quakerism and Methodism, here to this point. Luther, although counter-attacking Catholicism and its monasticism, makes clear reference to perfection. ‘With a living faith the state of perfection despises death, life, glory, and all the world, and serves all men in fervent love.’ He also says ‘If we have to advance from the imperfect to the perfect, we must move from monastic obedience to the obedience shown to parents, masters, husbands, tyrants, enemies, and everyone. The nature of perfection is thus ascribed not to the static moral or ethical status of believers, nor to the extent of their adherence to the Law, but rather to their all-heart-and-soul attitudes towards faith and in religious life. In particular, in the light of Luther, growth in love is defined as the crucial factor.

As we know, this stance of Luther’s would wane or be somewhat modified in the late 1520s, when facing Antinomians such as Thomas Münzer (1490?-1525) and the Anabaptists in Münster, and finally the legalistic and traditional aspects of his views came to be emphasised more. Yet, the concerns of balancing the issue of ‘perfection’ as a matter of the straight

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62 ‘On the other hand, the teaching of George Fox may be regarded as the logical outcome of the Lutheran conception of faith. Faith for the Protestant was a man’s conscious attitude of trust in God.’ (Flew, The Idea of Perfection, p. 281).
64 However, it should be noted that ‘These sayings [about perfection] are rare in the writings of Luther. They are mere obiter dicta, only drawn from his when he is tilting against monasticism. They do not constitute a doctrine.’ (Flew, The Idea of Perfection, p. 246).
66 Luther, ‘on Monastic Vows,’ p. 365.
67 ‘Here an everywhere in Scripture [Matt. 5:48] “to be perfect” means, in the first place, that doctrine be completely correct and perfect, and then, that life move and be regulated according to it. Here, for example, the doctrine is that we should love not only those who do us good, but our enemies, too. Now, whoever teaches this and lives according this teaching, teaches and lives perfectly.’ (Martin Luther, ‘The Sermons on the Mount and the Magnificat,’ trans. Jaroslav Pelikan, in Jaroslav Pelikan, ed. The Sermons on the Mount and the Magnificat, Luther’s Works, Vol. 21. (Saint Louis, MO.: Concordia Publishing House, 1956), p. 129).
68 Flew, The Idea of Perfection, p. 245.
69 Luther’s assertion of moral perfection as full obedience to God and his Law, along with ‘anti-clericalism,’ allowed people to mistakenly think that it is enough to follow their own laws allegedly inscribed in their own
religious mind with more practical moral issues are quite vividly expressed in one of his earliest writings, *Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen* (Concerning Christian Liberty, 1520). In the first section of the treatise we can see the famous phrase: ‘A Christian man is the most free lord of all, subject to none; a Christian man is the most dutiful servant of all, and subject to everyone.’ These words assert Christian to be free from everything by their faith in Christ even in the world, but at the same time to have an obligation to conform to ethical and moral laws, and especially to foster love towards God and neighbours on both the religious and social levels. Christians, as inwardly spiritual beings, can be justified by believing in Christ; they are imputed with the righteous power to go beyond, and to readily follow, every law of God, which saves them from sin and weakness. This belief is based upon the traditional understanding of perfectionism of the New Testament. On the other hand, Luther argues that faith will or should be constantly followed by good works. For Christians, as outward beings, who still remain in the flesh and live among other people (even if they feel safe, filled in their spirits with God’s Love), must choose a way of life and of interacting with others in every moment in their daily lives. Hence, the conduct of Christians must be controlled or heeded till the end of their lives so that they will be suitable for God’s glory and for the service of others, as demonstrated in Christ’s love for them. More specifically, just as Adam farmed to fulfill the will of God in the minds. This resulted in these revolts and antisocial behaviours. See the article of ‘Luther, Martin’ in Hastings, *The Oxford Companion to Christian Thought*.

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71 Luther, *Christian Liberty*, p. 7 and 14, pp. 16-20 and 22-23. It should be mentioned that the term ‘impute’ or ‘imputation’ used here is the word, which expresses Lutheran and Protestant stance on the remoteness of God from human beings, especially compared with Catholic stance on the connection of human beings to God by their efforts in the legal or monastic system.

72 Luther, *Christian Liberty*, p. 50.

73 Luther, *Christian Liberty*, p. 28.

74 Luther, *Christian Liberty*, p. 27.

209
Paradise, and just as Christ assumed human form, lived a human life on earth and died for the love of humanity. Christians are also urged to work in their own vocations to fulfill their God-given tasks or necessary roles in society. This constitutes the service to God and to neighbours. Here lies the significance of Luther’s perfectionism, in the sense that the scope of the concept is extended to ordinary people, going beyond what is found in Catholic monasticism.

Luther’s position can thus be said to support relative perfection, judging from his distinction between the spiritual and the corporeal. (However, since this differentiation of the spiritual and corporeal has a deferent effect upon the realisation of perfection, it might be better to regard his perfection as ‘negative’ relative perfection). Luther proclaims the possibility of full spiritual maturity: ‘Thus a Christian, like Christ his head, being full and in abundance through his faith, ought to be content with this form of God, obtained by faith; except that, as I have said, he ought to increase this faith, till it be perfected.’ At the same time, these words are presented together with statements that assert the impossibility of perfection, (as is also seen in other precedent Christian leaders): ‘but that [absolute perfection] will not happen until the last day, when the dead shall be raised. As long as we live in the flesh, we are but beginning and making advances in that which shall be completed in a future life.’

75 ‘And the LORD God took the man, and put him into the garden of Eden to dress it and to keep it.’ (Gen. 2:15). Luther, Christian Liberty, pp. 30-31.
76 Luther, Christian Liberty, pp. 37-40.
77 Luther, Christian Liberty, pp. 29-30, p. 37. As seen above, later on, with his theological revision, the ideal of Luther’s would come to be further re-built in the structure of the Natural Law, and more weight be put on the daily roles so as to maintain the established society.
78 Luther, ‘on Monastic Vows,’ p. 365.
79 ‘In the place of a present deliverance from sin, Luther sets a doctrine of progress.’ (Flew, The Idea of Perfection, p. 251).
80 Luther, Christian Liberty, p. 40.
81 Luther, Christian Liberty, p. 27. Melanchthon also presented his positions on the possibility and impossibility of Christian freedom in his On Christian Doctrine. He says that ‘…the perfect freedom which will come after this mortal life in eternal blessedness, when God will be in all the saved, who will have eternal joy in God
Melanchthon, Luther’s most competent colleague, is much clearer in his position that Christian perfection is to be realised in the daily fulfillment of the duties of vocation or calling. *The Augsburg Confession of Faith* (1530), which was written by Melanchthon and approved by Luther, clearly states that Christian perfection lies not only in faith in God, but also in one’s devotion to his or her daily work.

For this is Christian perfection: honestly to fear God and at the same time to have great faith and to trust that for Christ’s sake we have a gracious God; to ask of God, and assuredly to expect from him, help in all things which are to be borne in connection with our callings; meanwhile to be diligent in the performance of good works for others and to attend to our calling. True perfection and true service of God consists of these things and not of celibacy, mendicancy, or humble attire.82

They [Our Churches] condemn also those who place the perfection of the Gospel not in the fear of God and in faith but in forsaking civil duties. The Gospel teaches an eternal righteousness of the heart, but [meanwhile] it does not destroy the state of the family. On the contrary, it especially requires their preservation as ordinances of God and the exercise of love in these ordinances.83

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In Melanchthon’s view, which was undoubtedly shared by Luther, people should live a faithful life with trust in Christ, and faithfulness to God and love towards their neighbours should be displayed, not within cloisters, but in the fulfillment of their daily work. This way of life would allegedly lead to the sustenance of the entire world, and also to the exhibition of God’s glory. To the eyes of people today, such a definition of calling appears similar to that in Roman Catholicism, in that it defends the status quo by persuading people to be assiduous to their work and roles in society. However, it is highly significant that the criteria defining Christian piety is shifted from the decision-making range of Catholic Church to each believer’s personal faith and attitude towards God. This could be said to be the archetype of Protestant piety, which is developed later in various sects and denominations.

It must also be mentioned that although Calvinists in later years completely denied the possibility of becoming perfect in this world, and although Calvin himself showed a negative attitude towards the ideal of perfection, it was Calvin and his followers who thoroughly pursued this theme of Christian piety in daily vocation or calling. Such endeavours are quite

84 One of the reasons why Melanchthon seemed to be in resonance with Catholic traditionalism is that Melanchthon (and also Luther) originally had no intention to break with, and attack, Catholic Church in order to construct a new ecclesiastical and social system. Melanchthon and Luther made efforts until the last moment to be in accord with the Church, which is apparent in the dedicatory messages of *The Augsburg Confession of Faith* to the Emperor Charles V. It says ‘we are prepared, in obedience to Your Imperial Majesty, our most gracious lord, to discuss with them and their associates, in so far as this can honorably be done, such practical and equitable ways as may restore unity. Thus the matters at issue between us may be presented in writing on both sides, they may be discussed amicably and charitably, our differences may be reconciled, and we may be united in one, true religion,’ (Grane, *The Augsburg Confession*, p. 25).

85 ‘all the godly ought to aspire to this goal [perfectionism], that they may one day appear spotless and blameless before God’s face [cf. Col. 1:22, cf. Vg.]. But because even the best and most excellent plan of the present life is only a progression, we shall arrive at that goal only when, having put off this sinful flesh, we cleave wholly to the Lord.’ (Calvin, *Institutes*, vol. 1, p. 820). Calvin also says that ‘in the first section of the prayer [Matt. 6:10], the highest perfection is set before us, but in the latter, our weakness. Thus these two admirably accord with each other, so that, in aspiring toward the goal, we may not neglect the remedies that our necessity requires.’ (John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, ed. John T. Mcneill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles, vol. 2, *The Library of Christian Classics*, vol. XXI. (Philadelphia, PA.: The Westminster Press, 1960), p. 912). See also Flew, *The Idea of Perfection*, p. 209.

86 ‘each individual has his own kind of living assigned to him by the Lord as a sort of sentry post so that he may not heedlessly wander about throughout life. …that no task will be so sordid and base, provided you obey your
apparent in the formulated article of ‘Perseverance of Saints.’ It says that according to the ‘Double Predestination,’ some part of humanity, (if they are selected by God to be the saints), would and could persevere in adhering to God’s law until their deaths by the grace of God. They would also preserve by practical means to maintain their faith such as partaking in the sacraments, learning from the Bible and engaging in earnest prayer. As mentioned in the first chapter, in offering the converse of this proposition, Calvinists claimed that success or achievement, especially in their daily work or vocation, is evidence that they are among the elected. Of course, the possibility of human perfection is ruled out here in Calvinist arguments, but final victory is promised by God in the eschatological hope of the future, which allows people to expect the fulfillment of God’s word, inspiring their ceaseless efforts to accomplish it.

In sum, in the early Church and patristic period, Augustine represented the ideals of the Kingdom and perfection as the core of Christianity. In his view, even though the realisation of the true Kingdom was deferred to the future, the present church was regarded as part of, or an extension of, the true Kingdom. The visible church contained both the elect and the reprobate. However, Christ ruled the Church through these saints, which enabled the people to be manifest as the invisible church or as the Heavenly Rule on earth. Augustine eschatologically hoped that this invisible church would lead to expand the Kingdom to encompass the entire world. Thus, the Kingdom was described as partly possible and at the same time impossible in terms of the sequence of the Catholic Church and God’s Church. This two-sided nature was also reflected in

calling in it, that it [no task] will not shine and be reckoned very precious in God’s sight.’ (Calvin, Institutes, vol. 1., pp. 724-725).
88 Macpherson, Westminster Confession of Faith, p. 97.
89 See 1.1.1. in this thesis.
90 Macpherson, Westminster Confession of Faith, p. 96.
his discussion about perfection. He stressed human sin (impossibility), especially in his opposition to Pelagianism, but admitted that we might hope for the possibility of achieving religious maturity day by day until the last moment through the work of the Spirit and also by using practical means such as prayer and meditation. On this point, I can say, Augustine’s perfectionism was moderate relative perfection.

Later, in the sixteenth century Protestantism, more alterations were made to the concept of perfection, with the intention of freeing it from old restrictions imposed upon believers by Catholicism and monasticism. Luther and Melanchthon presented the article of faith as a matter of religious mind and spirit, not as that of a static moral status within the ecclesial legal system.

Luther’s position was summarised in his statement regarding Christian freedom; namely, that Christians as inward spiritual beings can be justified by believing in Christ and imputed with his righteous power, setting them free from any restrictions. Nevertheless, this faith must be followed by good works, for Christians as outward beings living in flesh and among other people must take heed of their conduct until their days of deaths in order to be suitable for God’s glory and for the service of others. According to Luther and especially Melanchthon, duties towards God and neighbours were fulfilled in daily vocation and calling. This stance can be referred to as ‘relative perfection’ (or negative relative perfection) with the double-nature of the possibility as spiritual beings and the impossibility as corporeal beings. (The significance of sincerity in daily work was also stressed in Calvinism in connection with the assurance of salvation. That is, success in daily business was exhorted, and those who achieved it were regarded as the elected).

Last but not least, in Protestant perfectionism, there were few perspectives on God’s Kingdom on earth. For instance, in *the Augsburg Confession*, there are only a few descriptions
of the Heavenly Kingdom, and these words are only used to indicate the Kingdom as being beyond the world or realised within human interior, which is virtually identical with the concept of personal perfection. It must be said that the matter of the Kingdom had totally faded and been assimilated into perfectionism in the context of old Protestantism, in particular under the Lutheran concept of The Two Kingdoms.  

4. 1. 3. Perfection in the Theology of John Wesley

It was John Wesley, the founder of Methodism, who is generally considered to have most earnestly advocated and expounded the full possibility of Christian perfection. Indeed, Wesley belonged to the period after the early Quaker movement, and his stance was formed in the historical context of other contemporary religious ideologies such as Antinomianism and Quietism, and under the influence of many other predecessors as well, including Quakers.  

91 ‘The Two Kingdoms’ is Luther's famous doctrine on God's rule in the world in two ways. Although it can be traced back to Augustine’s theology, the doctrine is considered to reflect the human mixed nature as the spiritual and the fleshly (Augustine, The City of God, trans. Gerald G Walsh and Grace Monahan, Books 8-16 (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1952), p. 347. See also Gilson, The Christina Philosophy, p. 176). In Luther’s view, God rules over the earth on one hand by using earthly Kings and church systems through their laws and swords, and on the other hand in the cooperative work of the saints under the power of the Gospel and Spirit. The Lutheran position on politics and God’s rule is clearly seen in the article XXVIII ‘Of Ecclesiastical Power’ in The Augsburg Confession (Grane, The Augsburg Confession, p. 241). This political view was mostly shared by Calvinists (Macpherson, Westminster Confession of Faith, p. 135). Wesley advocated ‘Conditional Redemption’ based on human voluntary choice in opposition to Universal Redemption, Antinomianism and Quietism in the eighteenth century. As Wesley himself admits, he inherited a lot of ideas on perfection from earlier writers and saints such as Jeremy Taylor (1613-67), Thomas à Kempis (1379/80-1471) and William Law (1686-1761) (John Wesley, A Plain Account of Christian Perfection, ed. Thos O. Summers (Nashville, TN.: Publishing House of the M. E. Church, 1894), pp. 5-7), and also from his contemporaries such as the Moravians, positively or negatively (Flew, The Idea of Perfection, p. 314).

is worthwhile to briefly examine Wesley’s views on perfection, before estimating the Quakers’ standpoints and defining their theological features.

One of the characteristics of Wesley’s view on perfection is his proclamation that Christ’s love should be embodied and realised in and within each Christian through living and walking as Christ did. His stance can be summarised in the very words of Johannes, ‘He that saith he abideth in him ought himself also so to walk, even as he walked’ (1 John 2:6). If Christians live like Christ, and if Christ lives within them, then they are justified, and instantly and gradually sanctified, making them perfect like Christ.94 Of course, Wesley does not assert that it is fully possible for human beings to attain a perfect state equal to as that of the Lord in all respects. This possibility is quite slim due to innumerable human defects such as the weakness of the intellect, the understanding and the imagination, as well as a lack of manners and morality, which stem from human physical limitation.95 Wesley says, ‘From such infirmities as these, none are perfectly freed till their spirits return to God; neither can we expect till then to be wholly freed from temptation.’96 In this sense, there is no sinless or absolute perfection, as long as humans live within their mortal and corruptible bodies.97 Wesley readily confesses that even the saints, who are filled with God’s love, are liable to commit sin. This is the same logic as in Luther’s distinction between the human spiritual and corporeal natures.

Wesley, however, adds new insight regarding human sin in his advocacy of possible perfection. Namely, he differentiates capital sins against God’s law that are committed voluntarily, from minor sins and faults that are involuntary or unconscious.98 Based on this

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95 Wesley, Christian Perfection, pp. 22-23, p. 106.
96 Wesley, Christian Perfection, p. 22.
97 Wesley, Christian Perfection, p. 67. See also Wesley, ‘Brief Thoughts,’ p. 532.
98 Wesley, Christian Perfection, p. 66.
differentiation, he goes so far as to say that if a behaviour or conduct results from the love of God, or if it is not voluntarily committed against God, it is never regarded as sin as described in the Bible (even if it is defective in morality or ethics): ‘Yet, where every word and action springs from love, such a mistake is not properly a sin.’\textsuperscript{99} This is because love is the very summation of the Law of God,\textsuperscript{100} and the idea of perfection lies in this: ‘That Christian perfection is that love of God and our neighbour, which implies deliverance from all sin.’\textsuperscript{101} Also, perfection is ‘The loving God with all our heart, and mind, and soul; Deut. vi. 5.’\textsuperscript{102} Wesley thus defines perfection (possible or relative perfection) as total human love for God, while separating it from matters of actual moral states.\textsuperscript{103} For him, perfection depends on the conscious states and the assurance of believers: ‘He [the saved] testifies before God, ‘I feel no sin, but all love; I pray, rejoice, and give thanks without ceasing; and I have as clear an inward witness, that I am fully renewed, as that I am justified.’\textsuperscript{104}

However, one problem emerges here. As Flew points out,\textsuperscript{105} if sin is determined based on whether an act is voluntary or involuntary, or on the consciousness of the believers, then all transgressions committed unconsciously might be justified. The problem becomes to what extent each person understands what he or she is doing within the context of pre-established ethical and moral standards. Moreover, what if people simply become obsessed with the delusion that they are perfect even without any divine workings? In response to these problems,
Wesley answers that even if Christians are justified by faith in Christ and can be called perfect, they still are not perfect enough to reach the state of sinlessness, or absolute perfection.\(^{106}\) Therefore, Christ’s power of mediation is still necessary for both those who are already in a perfect state and those who are imperfect in their faith.\(^{107}\) Until the last moment, even the saints must continue to grow in love towards God and their neighbours by walking in the guiding light of Christ,\(^{108}\) as well as by using methods of verifying their faith, such as learning the Bible, praying and worshipping in earnest.\(^{109}\) Through these practical methods, false faith can be unmasked. The perfection instantly conferred by God’s grace will rise higher and higher in modesty (self-annihilation), meekness, and patient love in the eyes of God, until believers’ final departure from this world.\(^{110}\) Wesley considers this to be the core teaching of Christian salvation, justification and sanctification.\(^{111}\) As for Wesley’s view on the Kingdom, he does not discuss it much. He argues that by repentance and believing the Gospel, people will be given three gifts: righteousness, peace and joy.\(^{112}\) In Wesley’s view, the enjoyment of these gifts is called in the scriptures as ‘the kingdom of God,’\(^{113}\) which would be wholly realised when all human hearts are reigned by God.\(^{114}\) In short, Wesley identifies the Kingdom with salvation itself, which is now being graced to people by the manifestation of Christ within them.

\(^{107}\) Wesley, *Christian Perfection*, p. 66 and 111.
\(^{109}\) Wesley, *Christian Perfection*, pp. 135-137.
\(^{110}\) Wesley, *Christian Perfection*, pp. 143-144 and 152-163. See also Wesley, ‘Brief Thoughts,’ p. 532.
\(^{111}\) Wesley, *Christian Perfection*, p. 107. However, Wesley’s view on the relation between justification and sanctification is not the same as Quakers’ identification of these two aspects (Wesley, ‘A Letter to a Person,’ p. 6).
\(^{113}\) Wesley, ‘The Way to the Kingdom,’ p. 63.
\(^{114}\) Wesley, ‘The Way to the Kingdom,’ p. 64.
In summary, the ideal of perfection was the central part of Wesley’s theology. His point was that Christ’s love should be realised and replayed within a Christian by living and walking as Christ did. If Christians lived like Christ, and Christ lived within them, they would be justified, both instantly and gradually sanctified and perfect like Christ in their love for God and for their neighbours. For Wesley, this love is the summation of the Law of God, and perfection is considered to be at stake here on the criteria. However, this does not mean that it was possible for believers to become totally sinless. He admitted that even the saints could commit sin due to their human physical limitations. Wesley argued that total perfection was only possible after passing away. To clarify his definition of possible perfection, a distinction was introduced between voluntary sin and involuntary sin. Based on this discussion, Wesley even argued that, if an action resulted from love towards God, any sort of conduct would not constitute sin in a biblical sense. That is, perfection or imperfection depends on the state of human consciousness. As mentioned above, such a definition of human sin was problematic, but Wesley also stated that Christ’s redemptive power continued to be necessary for both the perfected and the defiled. Therefore, Christians must continue growing in love for God and their neighbours by walking by the guiding light of Christ, and by practical methods testing their faith. According to Wesley, these practical things can reveal what and where false faith is, and help to encourage the growth of perfection in modesty, meekness and patient love until the final moment. Wesley’s understanding of perfection left much to be debated, but it most clearly demonstrated the Pelagian aspect of Methodism; it features an optimistic concept of perfection that is grounded upon human consciousness and voluntary efforts. I finish this review of Wesley’s position by borrowing some of his words.
In one view, it [perfection] is purity of intention, dedicating all the life to God. It is the giving God all our heart: it is one desire and design ruling all our tempers. It is the devoting, not a part, but all our soul, body, and substance to God. In another view, it is all the mind which was in Christ, enabling us to walk as Christ walked. It is the circumcision of the heart from all filthiness, all inward as well as outward pollution. It is a renewal of the heart in the whole image of God, the full likeness of him that created it. In yet another, it is the loving God with all our heart, and our neighbour as ourselves.\(^{115}\)

4. 2. Barclay on Perfectionism

4. 2. 1. Four Elements in Christian Perfectionism

We have thus briefly reviewed the historical flow of the Christian idea of perfection, and see that Jesus, Paul, and other Christian writers in each period present two seemingly paradoxical aspects. Namely, those aspects are the ‘now’ and the ‘hereafter,’ (in other words the ‘possible’ and the ‘impossible’), although some of writers stressed the latter aspect over the former. In this subsection, I indicate several common factors constituting the idea of Christian perfection as a whole in order to look into the matter of how the idea of perfection actually works in the arguments of selected writers. Then, I use these factors as criteria for considering the historical and ideological position of Quaker perfectionism within Christianity.

I can say that surrounding the ideals of perfection and the Kingdom, there are four common factors, and each stance in each period is a mixture of these factors in different

proportions or with different emphasis.\(^{116}\) (1): The first factor is their profession of (being filled with) God’s love, or forming full trust in and full love towards God (possible or relative perfection or ‘fullness’). (2): The second factor is their matter-of-fact assertion of the impossibility of absolute or sinless perfection due to human fleshliness or physical limitations (the impossibility of perfection). (3): The third factor is, (despite the outlook expressed in the factor (2)), their religious encouragement of fulfilling their duties in their daily life for God’s glory, or in service to other people. This phase is presented as a sign of the growing nature of perfection (the principle of growth in real life) and such the social application of God’s love is regarded as the Kingdom on earth (the social dimension of perfection). (4): The last factor is the tight connection between the imminence of the Kingdom and the possibility of perfection. For example, the impendency of the Kingdom was related to an emphasis on the imminent possibility of perfection as found in the views of Jesus and Paul, and meanwhile the recession of eschatology led to the provision of practical advice on how to live a religious life in the world, as in the messages of Augustine, Luther and Wesley.

(1): More specifically, the first factor is certainly apparent in the writings of Paul, Luther and Wesley, even though they are based on various religious frameworks such as the imputation of Christ’s righteousness, or real sanctification. For Paul, victory over sin was achieved by the grace by God, and it was felt by embracing the fact that Christ lived within, and ruled over, his mind and spirit. He even declared joyfully that he need not commit sin any more because Christ was within him. Luther also proclaimed that Christians could be freed from sin by faith in Christ.

\(^{116}\) Largely speaking, it can be said that perfectionists and anti-perfectionists share these four elements based on the biblical testimonies. The most serious disagreement between them is as to whether or not perfection is fully possible in this world.
and by the imputation of his righteousness. Wesley did found a definition of perfection on this very point; namely, if Christ lived within us, this would make people justified and sanctified like Christ. In other words, being filled with God’s love and living in love towards God and our neighbours leads up to perfection. Thus, Paul, Luther, and Wesley come to a certain consensus about the possibility of perfection.

(2): However, according to the second factor, this assertion of relative perfection was counter-balanced by a certain condition. Perfection was regarded as actually unattainable in the sense that human beings could not be sinless in the world due to human fleshliness or physical limitations. Such a position was in common within every generation except that of Jesus\(^\text{117}\) (and the early Quakers). The motif of flesh was vividly repeated in Pauline writings, and he admitted that he had not yet attained perfection. Luther, Melanchthon and Wesley markedly expounded upon this impossibility in the Protestant context. Luther clearly distinguished human spirituality from corporeality. He argued that human beings, even the saints, were physically inclined to errors, and that they needed to think about how to act towards God and their neighbours. Wesley also asserted that it was actually impossible for human beings to reach the sinless state because of their intellectual and moral defects.

(3): The third factor is the principle of growth. Every Christian writer earnestly professed the relevance of growth, although there were some differences as to how the progress is possible. According to Jesus and Paul, the Kingdom of God’s Love would come simultaneously when his

\(^{117}\) The inability of the flesh to reach salvation can be tracked down to Jesus’ words, but he did not clearly relate it to the idea of the impossibility of perfection. In his messages, the testimony of possible perfection was dominant as in Matt. 5:48 and John 17:23.
people believed and followed Christ on the Cross. Jesus compared the growing process of the Kingdom to a grain of mustard seed, and this parable was also applied to personal growth in faith. Augustine believed it was through the saints that God’s Realm would finally extend to the whole world, whilst moderately confessing the possibility of relative perfection in this world. The Kingdom faded from the scopes of Luther and Melanchthon, but they both strongly advocated the possibility and significance of ordinary people living up to God’s will, encouraging them to demonstrate it in their daily callings. The expression of such religiosity during daily work could be seen even in Calvinism. While admitting possible perfection in full love towards God and other people, Wesley urged that Christians still under their physical limitations should continue to grow in love by walking with Christ.

(4): Lastly, the fourth element is the correlation between the Kingdom and the concept of perfection. In the primitive Christianity the Kingdom was believed to be approaching fast, and accordingly, personal perfection was also expected to be immediate. In such an ideological and social situation, Jesus and Paul earnestly called for people to repent for their sins in the preparation for the coming of God’s Realm and his victory over the world. Later in the patristic days, the focal point of God’s Kingdom was shifted to the Catholic Church system. Perfection, in this case, came to be gauged merely by as possible observance to Church or its legal system as in the apostolic examples. In Luther, Melanchthon and Calvin, eschatological themes almost completely waned. The term ‘Kingdom’ was usually used to refer to earthly kingdoms ruled by earthly kings, and therefore the term ‘God’s Kingdom’ lost its temporal and spatial dimensions. Thus, the Kingdom was treated as an inner and personal matter, and accordingly it was naturally thought that God’s Kingdom could be realised only after death. As a result, as in other cases of
Meantime theology, practical advice about religious life became more and more emphasised. This change mostly corresponds with the views of Wesley, who lived in the eighteenth century, when the eschatological views of the world were quite limited.118

4. 2. 2. Quaker Perfectionism in Christian History

The four common elements functioned in different proportions with different points of emphasis in the works of each Christian leader and writer. Now, the problem is how we posit Quaker perfection in Christian history by using these factors as criteria.119 As already seen, Quaker perfection in the middle sixteenth century was deeply affected by pre-millennialism, which was the common belief at that time in England and shared by every religious sect and denomination around the Puritan Revolution.120 With such radical expectations, Fox and other early Quaker leaders like Nayler preached the necessity of repentance before God through denying the self and obeying the inward light of Christ. They professed the full possibility of perfection under the guide of the light present in all the believers. They also believed that there would be an immediate maturation of humanity with the belief in an immediate attainment of the end-time. It was assumed by these leaders that when all the believers became perfect in their

118 Radical eschatology in the western world only revived in the late eighteenth century, which was triggered by the French and American Revolutions (Clarke Garrett, Respectable Folly: Millenarians and the French Revolution in France and England (Baltimore, MD.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), p. 133).
119 Spencer summarises the points of Holiness Quakerism into eight essential elements: ‘Scripture,’ ‘Eschatology,’ ‘Conversion,’ ‘Charisma,’ ‘Evangelism,’ ‘Suffering,’ ‘Mysticism’ and ‘Perfection.’ Radical Holiness in early Quakerism had all these elements, and in terms of each of these elements, the subsequent Holiness Quaker traditions would evolve and develop with differences in theological emphases and tones (Carole Dale Spencer, ‘Holiness: the Quaker Way of Perfection,’ in Pink Dandelion, ed., The Creation of Quaker Theology: Insider Perspectives (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004), pp. 153-154). Nevertheless, in her claim, the religious source of holiness lies in ‘experience,’ (Spencer, ‘Holiness: the Quaker Way,’ p. 153). In this regard, her examination of Quaker holiness or perfection seems to go little beyond the scope of personal or individual faith in God. My thesis focuses not upon the personal side of Christian belief, but upon the social side in relationship with others. Therefore, in my examination, I think it suffice to use only four elements, which ultimately converges into ‘possibility’ and ‘impossibility’ of the ideals of perfection and the Kingdom.
120 See 2.1. in this thesis.
faith, the Kingdom would be realised on earth simultaneously.

When it comes to the four common elements, the second factor (the impossibility of absolute perfection), and part of the third factor (the principle of growth) are not found in early Quaker views on perfectionism and the Kingdom. Of course, there were a variety of perfectionist views in the earliest Quaker movement, before the later systematisation of the faith. For instance, as Spencer shows, Nayler, another prominent leader, presented a similar view on holiness as Barclay’s: namely, Holiness with the principle of growth in each measure and the internally-realised and realising Kingdom of God. However, in their typical view presented by early Quakerism (especially by Fox), a differentiation of ‘relative’ and ‘absolute’ were not assumed within there. In this respect, as Flew points out, early Quakers were the closest to primitive Christians in perfection compared with other Christian traditions. Flew says, ‘The Quaker doctrine has this distinction among all the types of teaching from the third century to the eighteenth, that it returned whole-heartedly to the attitude of the New Testament.’ I might agree with him on this point, considering the similarity between the atmospheres of each period, where radical eschatology was prevalent as a religious, ideological and political atmosphere amid the social confusions and disorders that might have led both peoples to deliver strong messages of God to the world. ‘Victory over the world’ and ‘the requirement of repentance’ can be picked up as motifs common both to early Christians and early Quakers. However, to look at how the four factors in question were actually functioning in Quaker idea of perfection, it

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121 The other part of the third element is the social dimension of perfection. This is found in their view of the realisation of the Kingdom through everyone becoming perfect and in their attitude of answering inward light in other people with God’s love.
122 Spencer, *Holiness: The Soul of Quakerism*, p. 69 and 76.
124 According to Flew, this makes Quakerism appear close to the teachings of the New Testament: ‘but the struggle is not longer hopeless. In this we trace a return to the New Testament teaching. There is no longer any acquiescence in the presence of sin in the life of a believer.’ (Flew, *The Idea of Perfection*, p. 290).
seems that the historical position of early Quakerism was not totally in the line with that of the primitive Church, especially that of Paul. Early Quakers probably treated personal perfection as a more pressing issue for the coming world than early Christians, leading to produce a more radical atmosphere in their ministry. This was especially facilitated by the fact that their teachings lacked the second factor, which is a belief in the ‘impossibility’ of human perfection on earth. In other words, the dimension of ‘now’ was particularly stressed in their beliefs on perfection.

Meanwhile, there is a Quaker belief in a direct relationship between God and people through inward light that makes unnecessary outward means such as conventional religious ritual. There are other motifs of self-denial in obedience to this light, and being responsive to God’s love and to the light within others. On these points, Quakerism can be also considered as one of the logical consequences of the Reformation theology. This is because it placed its crux on believers’ attitudes towards God and neighbours, a characteristic which has been seen as the core factor of Protestantism since Luther (although, in Quakerism, these beliefs were indeed illustrated within a peculiar mystic paradigm of inward light, or Christ within). To merge these analyses, I would reconfirm the fact that early Quakerism can be properly defined, on one hand, as a tide of Protestantism in its religious and perfectionist mood, and on the other hand, as the segmental restoration of the New Testament in their victorious message of Christ within.

4. 2. 3. Barclay’s Perfectionism and God’s Kingdom

Next, I return to the examination of Barclay’s perfectionism. I give a comprehensive

126 ‘This view of a Quakerism rooted in puritanism, the ‘Puritan School’, gathered pace in the middle of the twentieth century.’ (Dandelion, An Introduction to Quakerism, p. 2).
picture of Barclay’s theological views on the possibility and impossibility of perfection, and the logical connections drawn between perfection and God’s Kingdom, as seen in contrast with the views of the early Quakers in particular. As already confirmed in the previous chapters, theological themes of salvation, justification, sanctification and perfection in the traditional Quaker faith were tightly connected and intertwined with one another, for these concepts of benefit were all identical to the same process of the saving work of Christ. Therefore, this section may repeat some of the discussions already examined about the case of Barclay’s soteriology. This study shows that the focus of Barclay’s theological arguments on perfection is upon his exhortation of love in relations with others, especially in reference to Christ’s supreme command to ‘love one’s enemies.’ And Barclay expects that the Church should be a place for realising the command and testifying to the importance of communality with others. On this point, Barclay’s perfectionist stance naturally exhibits a two-sidedness defined by the ‘now’ and ‘hereafter,’ or ‘possible’ and ‘impossible,’ due to the incommensurability of the relations between self and others.

Barclay clearly presented his perfectionist stance in the eighth proposition of *Apology* as follows:

> In whom this pure and holy birth is fully brought forth, the body of death and sin comes to be crucified and removed, and their hearts united and subjected to the Truth; so as not to obey any suggestions or temptations of the evil one, but to be free from actual sinning and transgressing of the law of God, and in that respect perfect: yet doth this perfection still admit of a growth; and there remaineth always in some part a possibility of sinning, where the mind doth

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127 See 2.1. to 2.3. in this thesis.
not most diligently and watchfully attend unto the Lord.

The words in the beginning of the passage clearly tell of the possibility of perfection on the condition of people’s hearts being tied to the Truth, or Christ. Barclay argues that justification and sanctification by Christ is not given through ‘Imputation’ of his righteousness as in Lutheranism and Calvinism, nor is it achieved by human will, ability, or outward knowledge of God, as in Arminians claim. Perfection is realised in the birth and formation of Christ within people’s hearts and minds through the inward light, causing people to come to do the will of God, never to transgress against God’s Law again; for instance, Barclay cites 1 John 3:6 as the biblical proof: ‘Whosoever abideth in him sinneth not: whosoever sinneth hath not seen him, neither known him.’ The reason for this is that, in Barclay’s faith, Christ’s light not only reveals our sin, but also gives us the power to overcome it. We can find here almost the same reasoning as held by the early Quakers concerning human sin and victory over it. That is, it is Christ within us, not on our own effort, which allows us to conquer sin and become perfect. This is also unquestionably in following with the traditional standpoint of Christian perfectionism, especially the first element of ‘possible perfection’ achieved through being filled by Christ.

In the latter half of the proposition, however, Barclay includes some reservations about fully-realised perfection as is presented by earlier Quaker leaders. In his arguments, perfection in Quakerism does not mean the same pure and holy state as ‘God in his divine attributes of

132 Barclay, *Apology*, pp. 237-238 and 244-245.
wisdom, knowledge, and purity,\textsuperscript{133} but it is ‘only a perfection proportionable and answerable to man’s measure.’\textsuperscript{134} Namely, it allows for daily growth and admits the likelihood of returning to sin, if people neglect to hear God’s word.\textsuperscript{135} Barclay compares the growing nature to various images, such as the development of young holy Jesus in wisdom and stature, or to gold, which even in small amounts may be still called perfect gold.\textsuperscript{136} In another instance, Barclay argues by using the parable of talents, writing: ‘even as he that improved his two talents so as to make four of them, perfected his work, and was so accepted of his Lord ...nothing less than he that made his five ten.’\textsuperscript{137} In this way, Barclay adds motifs of ‘impossibility’ and ‘growth’ to earlier Quaker views.

Regrettably, there is no clearer explanation in Barclay’s discussion of why growth is necessary for already-sanctified Christians, other than the old Protestant logic of physical limitations. However, it can be inferred from the definition of sin in the fourth proposition of Apology; namely, sin is being ‘deprived of the sensation or feeling of this inward testimony or seed of God; and is subject unto the power, nature, and seed of the serpent,’\textsuperscript{138} (which is working within the fort of the self as a place for the devil). Also elsewhere it is written that ‘watchfulness and diligence is of indispensable necessity to all mortal men, so long as they breathe in this world.’\textsuperscript{139} Judging from these expressions, Barclay definitely thinks that the possibility of remaining perfect depends on a continual conscious devotion to God to counteract against one’s mortal propensity. In other words, human beings have a choice between continuing to obey

\textsuperscript{133} Barclay, Apology, p. 234. These words of Barclay’s make a clear contrast to Fox’s assertion of the full possibility of becoming perfect to the extent of Adam before the Fall and even Christ. See 2.1. in this thesis.
\textsuperscript{134} Barclay, Apology, p. 234.
\textsuperscript{135} Barclay, Apology, pp. 234-235.
\textsuperscript{136} Barclay, Apology, p. 235.
\textsuperscript{137} Barclay, Apology, p. 235.
\textsuperscript{138} Barclay, Apology, p. 97.
\textsuperscript{139} Barclay, Apology, p. 258.
God’s will or obeying the seed of sinning self; (as seen above, this devotional attitude is one of the central points in the Protestant perfectionism).  

The important thing we must not miss about Barclay’s stance is that Christians are not urged to conform thoroughly to some ethical set of values that are defined as substantially or metaphysically good in some system. As shown in the first chapter, Barclay’s theological emphasis is placed upon partaking in the life and death of Christ, more specifically upon following the work of the inward light revealed through self-denial or the annihilation of all human-oriented thinking, imaginations and feelings (even to the extent of forsaking to the will to faith itself). It must be noted that this also makes the most significant point of Barclay’s perfection; that is, he equates perfection (sanctification) with total self-renunciation. It is most clearly expressed when Barclay connects the idea of perfection to Christ’s command to ‘love of enemies.’

as to what relates to this thing [Christ’s command, ‘love one’s enemies’], since nothing seems more contrary to man’s nature, and seeing, of all things, the defence of oneself seems most tolerable, as it is most hard to men, so it is the most perfect part of the Christian religion, as that wherein the denial of self and entire confidence in God doth most appear, and therefore Christ and his apostles left us hereof a most perfect example.

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140 It might be also proved by Barclay’s citation from Jerome for the defence of his position; that is, ‘it is put in our power, to wit, being helped by the grace of God, either to sin or not to sin.’ (Barclay, Apology, p. 252).
141 See 1.4. in this thesis.
142 Barclay, Apology, p. 536.
As discussed in the third chapter, others are encountered just at the horizon of our own subjectivity. If others do not come into our subjective realm, they cannot be recognised as others. This does not mean that others can be completely controllable objects of our subjectivity. Other beings are always perceived as foreign to us. In actuality, this impossibility, or foreignness itself, is what composes the ‘otherness’ of others. As also observed in Derrida’s arguments in the same chapter, self-identity is given as the possibility and impossibility between differences with others, and the differences should be more hospitably regard as a graceful chance for constituting the self. In these senses, in Barclay’s argument, love of enemies, or openness to the most unfavourable beings, (as Barclay describes in his above-cited words), would seem the most abhorrent and threatening thing to human intentionality. But for this very reason, self-renunciation as modeled in Christ’s love is the very example of a perfect religious attitude towards God, otherness, and others. Therefore, it can be said, as Hauerwas’ words precisely shows, that Barclay’s stance on perfection or full sanctification might mean ‘the holiness of a people who have learned not to fear one another and thus are capable of love.’

In regard to the connection between perfection and the Kingdom, the word ‘God’s Kingdom’ is used at times by Barclay to mean the spiritual status of sanctification received by partaking in the workings of inward light, or the seed of God. In this sense, in Barclay’s view, God’s Kingdom is already realised in the interiors or in the hearts of true believers. His other words clearly indicate that the Kingdom is also communally established within a religious community

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143 See 3.3.1. in this thesis.
146 Barclay, Apology, p. 173.
of true saints,\textsuperscript{147} as it is stated in the Bible: ‘The kingdom of God cometh not with observation: Neither shall they say, Lo here! or, lo there! for, behold, the kingdom of God is within you.’\textsuperscript{148} However, on the other hand, Barclay believes that the Kingdom will be realised through Quakers’ ministerial efforts, calling upon the earthly kingdoms to changing their ways from the earthly to the divine.

> The mouth of the Lord hath spoken it, yea he that hath risen in a small remnant shall arise and go on by the same arm of power in his spiritual manifestation, until he hath conquered all his enemies, until all the kingdoms of the earth become the Kingdom of Christ Jesus.\textsuperscript{149}

Considering all these things, perfection in Barclay never refer to the static moral status that is generally equated with the ideas of the completion of the self or the collective Self, nor can it be compared to progressive volitional efforts towards a certain set moral goal. His perfectionist stance shows its distinctiveness in the double sided nature: the possible and the impossible. Namely, as Barclay argues, otherness always has its own way, escaping human calculation, as is theologically formulated in his terminology, \textit{vehiculum Dei} (the impossibility).\textsuperscript{150} Yet, open attitudes towards these others are emphasised in the connection with Jesus’ supreme command of love of enemies (the possibility). This double stance is also true of his view on God’s Kingdom. The Kingdom is not like the nations on earth, nor can it be set up through some political efforts by coercive power or through a hegemonic expansion.\textsuperscript{151} Rather, in Barclay’s


\textsuperscript{149} Barclay, \textit{Apology}, p. 542.

\textsuperscript{150} Barclay, \textit{Apology}, p. 137. For the detailed discussion of inward light as irreducible or incalculable otherness, refer to 1.3.2. in this thesis.

\textsuperscript{151} ‘…the nature of the gospel, which is a thing altogether extrinsic to the rule and government of political
view, the Kingdom is revealed and realised in believers’ hospitable attitudes towards others in two ways. Namely, the reconciliation with others is already manifest on a small scale as the realisation of Christ’s command in a church community (the possibility); at the same time the complete manifestation of Christ’s command on a large scale is the focus of eschatological hope for believers, and promised by the divine power (the impossibility); the accomplishment is eschatologically exemplified by Jesus himself on the Cross.

In short, in Barclay’s theology, a deep-lying condition of co-existence in self-other relations is exactly the location of perfection and the Kingdom, and it is the dimension in which Christian truth is present. (This idea is also central to the main point of the discussion of Barclay’s ecclesiology and pacifism in the next chapter). In Barclay’s belief, the maintenance of the Church as the embodiment of communal truth is intended to serve as a testimony to the truth of God, and it is in fact the task of the Christian Church. Regarding this point, Barclay identifies the Quaker community as a place for testifying to the love of God.

*Universal Love*, in that they [Quakers] *Preach Love to Enemies*, and the necessity of bearing and suffering *Injuries* without *Revenge*; ...As this is most agreeable to the *Doctrine and Practice* of Christ, so is it to the *Universal Love of God*, ...And seriously Consider, whether there be any *Intire* [sic], *United Body of Christians*, except here mentioned, who do *Unanimously* hold forth so many *Doctrines*, so directly *Establishing and Agreeing to True Universal Love*?

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152  ‘And as this inward Power they [Quakers] longed for, and felt to give them Victory over Sin, and bring the Peace that follows thereon, was that, whereby they were brought unto that Unity and Community together;’ (Robert Barclay, ‘Universal Love Considered, and Established upon its Right Foundation, &c.,’ in *Truth Triumphant Through Spiritual Warfare* (London: T. Northcott, 1692), p. 697).

153  ‘...he [God] may defend us, and lead us by the way of the cross unto his kingdom.’ (Barclay, *Apology*, pp. 538-539).

Barclay, in the manner of Paul’s narrative in Phil. 3:12, confessed that he had not attained perfection yet but was always struggling for it, and, as seen in the above-cited words, he urges that Christians should try to be perfect in persevering with sufferings and showing love without revenge. This is because perfection relates to the very promise of God, the exhortations of Christ and the practice of the Apostles in the Bible.

Lastly, I reorganise Barclay’s concept of perfection by using the above-mentioned four common elements. (1): First, humanity is believed to be capable of perfection through the working of Christ’s light to the extent that they are fully open to otherness in self-renouncing love like the Lord of Christ. After that, they can say they will commit no sin. (2): At the same time, infallibility is considered to extremely difficult for human nature to attain; since human beings have a natural tendency towards self-centredness (sin), they are tempted to shut themselves out of God’s love. (3): Nevertheless, if one continues to be open to God as represented by otherness within (light within), and to grow up in reverence to it, one can remain perfect with growth even in the world. This process would finally lead to the realisation of the Kingdom at a collective level. (4): As for the fourth element, the connection between the imminence of The Kingdom

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155 ‘With respect to myself, I speak moderately, because I ingenuously confess that I have not yet attained it; but I cannot deny that there is such a state.’ (Barclay, Apology, p. 235).

156 Barclay insists upon the necessity of continuing fighting: ‘Let rational men judge which hath most sense in it, to say as our adversaries do, It is necessary that we fight and wrestle, but we must never think of overcoming, we must resolve still to be overcome; or to say, Let us fight, because we may overcome?’ (Barclay, Apology, p. 251).

157 ‘…[those who] daily go on forsaking unrighteousness, and forgetting those things that are behind, “press forward toward the mark, for the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus;” such shall not find their faith and confidence to be in vain, but in due time shall be made conquerors through him in whom they have believed; so overcoming, shall be established as pillars in the house of God, so as they shall go no more out, Rev. iii. 12.’ (Barclay, Apology, p. 253). See also p. 236 and 243.

158 Barclay says ‘I affirm, that after a man hath arrived at such a state, in which he may be able not to sin, yet he may sin; nevertheless, I will not affirm that a state is not attainable in this life.’ (Barclay, Apology, p. 235). See also p. 253.
and perfection, the late seventeenth century saw the regression of radical eschatology (as we have already discussed). One of the consequences was that the messages of Barclay’s generation became moderate and changed their focal points from a single motif of victory to a dual motif including both the possibility and the impossibility of perfection, in other words the ‘now’ and ‘hereafter’. 159

Taking into consideration what these indicators show, Barclay’s perfection literally became closer to so-called orthodox Christianity, compared with the early Quakers who had stressed the first of the common elements (the possibility of perfection) in particular. In other words, in Barclay’s belief, the restored versions of early Christian victorious messages espoused by the earlier generation might have moved in the direction of the second (the impossibility) and third elements (the principle of growth), without ruining the first element in a large measure. Consequently, Barclay’s view on perfection and the Kingdom came to somewhat resemble the internalised eschatological models of Luther and Wesley. Nevertheless, this does not mean that Barclay’s theology was a simple return to orthodoxy. The most important idea distinctive from those in other Christian traditions is that Barclay’s bifocal view reflects the possibility and impossibility of the relations between self and others. In other words, Barclay’s stance does not aim for the final elimination of relationships between self and others, as seen in the Liberal version of the Kingdom; but it is intended to work as a counter-testimony against human impulse to follow the unconscious preference for the self over others. Of course, Wesley also posits the centre point of perfection in pure loving attitudes towards God and neighbour. Barclay, however, is even more vivid with the logic of his theoretical connection between perfection and

159 This is one of the characteristics of the Restoration Quakers (Barry Reay, *The Quakers and the English Revolution* (London: Temple Smith, 1985), p. 112). See also the discussion of the theological changes in Barclay’s theology in the second chapter in this thesis.
altruistic love. Barclay employs Christ’s command to ‘love one’s enemies’ as a core tenet of Christian perfection and the Kingdom. Therefore, I would say, his perfectionist stance has theological potentialities to bear a peace testimony to realisation of the peaceful Kingdom of God, as shall be explored in the next chapter. In regard to this point, Spencer precisely says:

Perfection is growth in love, a continuing expansion of the heart to include even one’s enemies and the ultimate test of the ethical side of holiness because it is so humanly unnatural.

This leads to one distinctive aspect of Quaker holiness that diverges from later Wesleyan forms –the integration of pacifism and holiness.¹⁶⁰

Summary

This chapter showed that there were four common elements in traditional concepts of Christian perfection and the Kingdom, namely, (1): the possibility of relative perfection, (2): the impossibility of absolute perfection, (3): the principle of growth and the social application of God’s love as the realisation of the Kingdom, and (4): the close connection between the imminence of the Kingdom and the possibility of perfection. Every view on perfection in every generation in Christianity was made up of these factors in different proportions and with different stressing points. Using these common elements to analyse the historical and ideological position of early Quakers within the Christian tradition, they are found to have been the closest to the primitive Christians, in that both of them stressed the first aspect, victory over sin. However, this does not mean that the first generation Quakers were totally in the same

¹⁶⁰ Spencer, Holiness: The Soul of Quakerism, p. 81. Wesley’s perfectionism certainly consists in the whole-hearted love towards God and neighbours, but his ‘peace’ is only tied with ‘joy’ in the heart blessed by the Spirit of God (Wesley, The Way to the Kingdom, p. 63).
theological line with the primitive Christians. The teachings of the first generation lacked the second element (the impossibility of absolute perfection) and part of the third element (the principle of growth), and thus, especially compared with Paul, they believed personal (and collective) maturity to be more pressing matters, producing a more radical atmosphere through their ministries. However, it is no exaggeration to say that they partly restored the victorious spirit of the New Testament, whilst even adopting several motifs from the Protestant tradition.

Barclay, who belonged to the second generation, made some alterations to the radical thought presented by the earlier leaders. Namely, he slightly modified the concept of perfection by supplementing it with the elements of ‘impossibility’ and ‘the principle of growth.’ These adaptations made Quakerism suitable for the sense of the receding Kingdom in the late seventeenth century, and for the perceived necessity to reconsider the extremism of the first generation in order to ensure the survival of the movement.¹⁶¹ On this point, Barclay is thought to have taken the more orthodox stance by grafting these two elements to the early Quaker thought, which led to show some resemblance to the concepts found in Lutheranism and Wesleyanism. Nevertheless, Barclay’s perfectionist stance was not a simple return to orthodoxy. The most important idea distinctive from those in other Christian traditions was Barclay’s bifocal view on perfection and the Kingdom; it is intended to reflect the possibility and impossibility of the relations between self and others. Barclay connected the article of perfection to Christ’s supreme command to love one’s enemies, or to foster open attitudes towards others. And he expected Christians not to aim for the final elimination of relationships between self and others; rather, they were urged to work as a counter-testimony against human impulse to follow the unconscious preference for self-preservation by excluding others. This coexistence or

¹⁶¹ Reay, *The Quakers and the English Revolution*, p. 104 and 121
communality in self-other relations was believed by Barclay to be the very truth of Christianity, and the loving activities in a church community were regarded as the very possibility of the Kingdom. In a word, the principle of love, which was expected to be performed only in an unbridgeable gap between self and others, was Barclay’s core message of his perfectionism and the Kingdom.
Chapter 5: Barclay’s Ecclesiology and Peace Testimony

Introduction

In the previous chapter, we saw how Barclay modified earlier Quaker radical perfectionism, which had placed stress on the rapid perfection of humanity at the personal and communal levels with a keen sense of the impendence of the Kingdom. Barclay modified these concepts to suit the receding end-time, and to guard the faith against the religious extremism of early Quakers and persecutions from the outside. What Barclay theologically intended in his revision in double-stance was to reflect the (im-) possibility of relationships between self and others, and to indicate that these relationships are locations where Christian communal truth should be unveiled and practiced as taught in the words of the Lord. For Barclay, perfection was tightly connected to Christ’s command to love others and even enemies, who always escaped submission to the subjectivity and intentionality of the self. Encounters with others were accepted as the places of grace, and in Barclay’s view, the coexistence or communality in the self-other relations symbolised the very possibility of the Kingdom. Therefore, for Christians, the maintenance of the Church as a collective embodiment of the ideals stands out as the most important task as a testimony to God’s truth.

The question to be explored in this final chapter is how the ideals of Quaker perfection and the Kingdom, which can both be summarised into the supreme principle of ‘love one’s enemies,’ are practically applied to ecclesiological matters such as ministry, ethics and practice. As is usual with any type of Meantime theology in post-millennialism, Barclay provides insights on many practicalities regarding church matters, especially the establishment of a particular meeting system in Quakerism. I also investigate whether there is a logical consistency between
the discipline of the established Quaker meeting system (or the Church authority), and Christ’s supreme command to love, (or the main tenet of Quakerism, the inward light). Moreover, in Barclay’s view, Christian ethics theoretically can also apply to members of the invisible church, or all sorts of people in the world, who are universally endowed with the same inward light by God. The divine light placed in all humans is believed to be an invitation to reconcile with God, and it is this unifying power of God by which human beings can form relationships with each other, thus forming the Catholic Church. At this point, I also address Barclay’s peace testimony as part of his ecclesiology, for this matter is relevant to his views on Catholic Church. Therefore, in the last part of this chapter, I study Barclay’s position on pacifism as the extension of his ecclesiology, and judge its theological significance in the context of present religious, ideological and socio-economic and political contexts.

Specifically, in the first section, I consider Barclay’s view on the Church as a practical application of the principle of love, by tracing the logic by which he theologically supports the establishment of a particular meeting system. I also consider the Church’s power and its authority over its members in faith and practice, which seems to be intolerant of, and to limit, religious freedom and love (seemingly contradicting the tenet of inward light).

1 In the second section, I review Barclay’s pacifist position, which can be said to be the theological conclusions to his concepts of universal redemption, perfectionism and church ethics; all being based on the teaching of inward light. Barclay’s peace testimony is outlined and the nature of his stance is evaluated by examining the relationship between Church and State, the relationship between

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2 Brinton argues that the sources of Quaker pacifism are the New Testament, the teaching of inward light, which brings us to mutual unity, and Quakers meeting itself; for Brinton, the meeting is training ground for pacifistic methods (Howard H. Brinton, *Sources of The Quaker Peace Testimony* (Wallingford, PA.: Pendle Hill Publications, 1942), p. 6, 10, 34 and 40).
individual and State, the authority of magistrates in this world, and the practical distinction of true believers from those for people who ‘have not yet come to the pure dispensation of the gospel.’ Next I consider the characteristics of Barclay’s pacifism by comparing it with, and placing it within Quaker as well as Christian traditions; his pacifism when examined from the viewpoint of Christian truth as a testimony, could be seen as providing an example to the world. Finally, I consider how Barclay would respond to Niebuhr’s criticism and just-war theory, basing on my understanding of Barclay’s pacifism. In addition, in the light of today’s pluralistic tendency of thought, I reevaluate Barclay by applying Barclay’s perspectives on self-other relations to the current situations.

5. 1. Barclay’s Ecclesiology

5. 1. 1. The Necessity of Establishing a Church System

We have already seen the establishment of a nation-wide church organisation in Quakerism initiated by Fox and Fell during the late 1650s. Barclay took over the task of theoretically supporting the establishment of this system. In this section, I explore how Barclay’s interpretation of perfection as love and his view on the collective realisation of the Kingdom in the Church influence and function in ecclesiological matters such as ministry, ethics and practice in the second generation. To put it the other way around, I explore this question by looking at how Barclay grafts the realistically-required (but seemingly-closed) systems of the Church and its practical management onto these two ideas, which are intended to re-question

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self-immanentism and open the possibility of love towards otherness. What I show here is that
the bifocal nature of the Church, (which is ideally a place for testifying and practicing
reconciliation, and administrated through down-to-earth decision-making based on
temporally-revealed truth), represents the very nature of Body of Christ. In this
incommensurability, we can see the Church’s role and significance in the world.

As a first step, this subsection describes pastoral motivations and ministerial necessities
in the establishment of the Quaker meeting system: namely, preservation and edification of true
belief and Church unity. The unity or oneness of the Church is the point at issue here. Barclay,
referring to the Greek original word, ekklesia or ekkaleo, defines ‘Church’ as the people called
by God through the inward light to gather in the same faith and principle, regardless of
nationality, kindred, and race. He also says that these true believers constitute one Catholic
Church (the invisible church).\(^5\) The body of Christ consists of his followers from all over the
world, and Christ himself is the head of the people of God.\(^6\) In Barclay’s view, there is no
distinction between ministry and laity, (unlike other sects and denominations), for they both
participate in the same workings of God.\(^7\) The light well qualifies both of them to prophesy and
preach without any scholarship, languages, or academic qualifications.\(^8\) Barclay says, ‘the Holy
Spirit, ...the power, life, and virtue thereof, and the pure Grace of God that comes therefrom, the
chief and most necessary qualification without which he can no ways perform his duty, neither

\(^5\) Barclay, Apology, pp. 262-263. Robert Barclay, ‘The Anarchy of the Ranters, and Other Libertines; the
Hierarchy of the Romanists, and Other Pretended Churches, equally Refused and Refuted, in a Twofold
Apology for the Churches and People of God Called Quakers, &c.’ in Truth Triumphant Through Spiritual


\(^7\) Barclay, Apology, p. 310. Robert Barclay, ‘Universal Love Considered, and Established upon its Right
Foundation, &c.,’ in Truth Triumphant, p. 703.

acceptably to God nor beneficially to men. And ‘That which we oppose is the distinction of laity and clergy which in the Scripture is not to be found, whereby none are admitted unto the work of ministry.’ Thus, along the theological path paved by early Protestantism, Barclay takes a strong position of Anti-clericalism, placing ministerial authority only in God’s power given to everyone. On this point, Quakerism might be regarded as one of the religious movements in which normal sorts of people struggled to bring back their religious initiative in the modern context of the discovery of the individual. However, despite strong criticism against Catholic and contemporary Protestant maintenance of rigid national or institutional systems, Barclay does not consider it unnecessary to establish an orderly church or meeting (a so-called ‘visible church’), not simply considering the Church to be the mass of saints ruled over by God. For Barclay, the order and government of the Church is what the Lord Christ appointed and ordained, and his ‘Spirit, being the Spirit of order, and not of confusion, leads us, and as many as follow it, into such a comely and decent order as becometh the church of God.’ He continues:

we say, the substance is chiefly to be sought after, and the power, virtue and spirit, is to be known and waited for, which is one in all the different names and offices the scripture makes use of …thereby God hath set in the church, first apostles, secondly prophets, teachers, …by these gifts “he hath given some apostles, some prophets, some evangelists, some pastors, some

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9 Barclay, Apology, p. 287.
10 Barclay, Apology, p. 311.
11 The Reformation was one of such movements which took back Christian faith from ‘Babylonian Captivity’ of the Medieval Church. Barclay as well uses the term ‘Babylon’ or ‘Babylonish’ to describe the tyrannical nature of Catholic and contemporary Protestant churches (Barclay, Apology, p. 265, 285 and 303).
12 Barclay, Apology, pp. 267-268.
14 Barclay, Apology, p. 304.
the ministers are counted among the most eminent members of the body. …the diversity of
gifts and members of the body, showeth how by the workings of the same Spirit in different
manifestation or measures in the several members of the body the whole body is edified.16

What is mentioned here is the necessity for all church members to work to serve on one another
by using their gifts.17 Also mentioned is the possibility that, according to different divine gifts,
some of them would be assigned the ministerial responsibility for edifying the entire
congregation. For example, in one feature of the Quaker ministerial system, Barclay justifies the
special function of elders and overseers in a meeting, whose task he defines to instruct the young
and give some advice to those who are in need.18 The final purpose is that ‘peace, love, unity,
concord and soundness be preserved in the Church of Christ.19 Of course, the workings of the
Spirit are ‘the free gift of God to choose any whom he seeth meet unto.20’ Barclay has no
intention to set up a rigid institution such as seen in Catholicism and Protestantism, but to set up
an orderly system that is open to anybody who has been invited into the divine power: ‘this
diversity of names [the traditional distinction of the roles in Church] is not for to distinguish

15 Barclay, Apology, pp. 305-306.
16 Barclay, Apology, pp. 288-289.
17 ‘…when he [Christ] ascended up on high, gave gifts unto men: And he gave some apostles, some prophets,
some evangelists, some pastors and teachers, for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry. …As
every man hath received the gift, so ought the same [every man] to be ministered: if any man speak, let him
speak as the oracles of God; if any man minister, let him do it as of the ability which God giveth.’ (Robert
18 Barclay, Apology, pp. 310-311. See also a letter sent from the London meeting with Barclay’s signature in
Abram Rawlinson Barclay, ed. Letters and &c., of Early Friends; Illustrative of the History of the Society From
Nearly its Origin to About the Period of George Fox's decease, with Documents Respecting its Early Discipline,
19 Barclay, Apology, p. 311.
20 Barclay, Apology, p. 306.
separate offices, but to denote the different and various operations of the Spirit.\(^{21}\)

As just seen, Barclay admits the distinction of operations according to the spiritual workings, allowing for different roles within the Church, and different measures of faith. On this point, the fact is also implied that there are weak and immature Christians such as young children within a meeting, who would increase the possibility of causing some tensions within or outside of the group,\(^{22}\) (intentionally or accidentally).\(^{23}\) In actuality, as observed many times, the earlier movement witnessed their radical behaviours and risky ways, as in the case of Nayler’s affair.\(^{24}\) From this perspective, as well, Barclay insists on the need for particular people to act as role-models to these weak people,\(^{25}\) who are present in a meeting of Christ’s body.

There are then Fathers, that have begotten us unto Christ Jesus through the Gospel, of whom We ought to be Followers, and to remember their Ways, which be in Christ. There are then Fathers and Children, Instructors and Instructed, Elders and Young Men, yea, and Babes; there are that cannot cease, but must Exhort, Instruct, Reprove, Condemn, Judge; or else, for what End gave Christ the Gifts mentioned Ephes 4. 11, 12? And how are the Saints perfected?

And the Body of Christ Edified of those, who come under the Cognizance, and as it were, the

\(^{21}\) Barclay, Apology, p. 307.
\(^{22}\) These people who have a tendency towards the desolation and dissociation are classified into three categories: ‘Profane Backsliding Apostates,’ ‘Unwary Repenting Sinners,’ and ‘Self-separating, troublesome Opposers.’ (Barclay, ‘Anarchy,’ pp. 192-193). As to the diversity of the people in the Church, see also Barclay, ‘Anarchy,’ pp. 187-188, p. 191 and 204.
\(^{23}\) ‘Order reacheth taking up and composing of Differences as to the outward things, which may fall out betwixt Friend and Friend, for such things may fall out through the Intricacies of divers Affairs, where neither hath any positive intention to Injure and Defraud his Neighbour.’ (Barclay, ‘Anarchy,’ p. 207).
\(^{25}\) Barclay, Catechism and Confession, p. 86.
Another reason for church ethics, Barclay shows, is the significant difference between the ‘natural’ (or ‘outward’ nature), and the ‘spiritual’ nature of human acts. For Barclay, the former outward acts are based on the natural principle of self-love (or reciprocal love of each other based on of self-respect), and include general moral duties that are expected to be performed everyday in a social life. The spiritual acts are related to religious matters, such as how to live faithfully and religiously for God. Barclay is not stressing the unbridgeable gap between the outward and spiritual life-aspects of Christians. In Barclay’s logic, we have already seen, human nature such as reason and conscience is unquestionably defiled and corrupted because of self-directedness. However, if natural things are conducted and utilised according to the workings of God (and they must be), they will be accepted as good by God and will be beneficial to human beings. Yet, the main point here is that Quakers proclaim that everything is to be guided by the Spirit, but also that any perceived lack of spiritual accompaniment does not exempt humans from moral decision-making. This stance might have been formed against those, within or outside of the community, who tried to justify themselves in neglecting ethical or moral matters, by pretending to not yet be guided by the Spirit. Given that Barclay also

27 One example Barclay gives is for ‘children to honor their parents, men to do right to their neighbours.’ (Barclay, Apology, p. 383).
29 Barclay, Apology, p. 384.
30 ‘And it doth not follow, because man ought not to go about spiritual acts without the Spirit, that therefore he may not go about natural acts without it.’ (Barclay, Apology, p. 384).
31 For example, Barclay discusses the necessity and obligation of holding a meeting in a particular place at a particular time for practical matters including the care of the poor. He argues that the meeting must not be neglected by Christians, and by saying so, he implies the existence of the people who disregarded such a common duty and responsibility, not seeing the correspondence between the meeting functions and the working of the Spirit (Barclay, ‘Anarchy,’ pp. 205-206). In another case, he criticises the false assumption of some of the fellow members, which says that ‘God hath not power to Command any thing, unless Men be content to agree
protected Quakerism against people who behaved as they pleased while claiming falsely to be
guided by the Spirit (as in the examples of Ranters and some earlier radical Quakers), there is
every reason to conclude that Barclay distinguishes general social duties from spiritual ones (at
least, he does not advocate the singularity of the spiritual guidance as a source of morality). As
will be more closely examined later, this point is most evident in Barclay’s statements about the
limitation of freedom of religion and conscience for the sake of the public welfare within the
commonwealth, and the importance of obedience to the laws in general. Such reasoning
concerning natural and religious duties seems to be working to build up some special ethical
system in a visible church constituted of various sorts of people, all waiting temporarily for
God’s time.

Thus, it is totally for the unity and preservation of the Church that Barclay tries to set up
a particular church system in terms of ministry and ethics in Quakerism. This is because, as seen
in the previous chapter, unity, not division, is the special quality of the Church as a place for
cos-existence or communality between human beings. In the organisation of the Church, (the
motives of which extend mostly from the need for edifying and nourishing the faith and practice
of the entire congregation), we can see Quakers struggling to grope for practical answers to on
question: how they could accept an actual situation in which the Kingdom was paradoxically

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33 ‘no man, under the pretence of conscience, prejudice his neighbour in his life or estate, or do anything
destructive to, or inconsistent with human society, in which case the law is for the transgressor, and justice is to
be administered upon all without respect of persons.’ (Barclay, Apology, p. 460).
expected to come both ‘now’ and ‘hereafter,’ whilst living ‘faithfully’ and ‘realistically’ in the Meantime.

5. 1. 2. Power and Authority of the Church

The next issues are the power and authority of the Church in decisions and judgments, and their logical relationship with the central tenet of inward light. The matter of ecclesial authority in Barclay’s theology is quite a knotty point, (whether or not Barclay himself well understood and clarified the difficulties), in that it involves an incommensurability between God’s truth and human-perceived truths. God’s truth slips through human subjectivity and ‘never’ reveals its complete, pure presence to anybody, except in special personalities like Jesus.\footnote{In regard to the perfect unity of God and Christ, Barclay says ‘For, though we affirm that Christ dwells in us, yet not immediately, but mediately, as he is in that seed, which is in us; whereas he, to wit, the Eternal Word, which was with God, and was God, dwelt immediately in that holy man.’ (Barclay, Apology, p. 138).}

As seen above, the matter of Church’s authority also involves the practical necessity of acting and doing something in the world based on the posited and shared temporal truth present ‘here and now.’ In regard to this theoretical intricacy, ecclesial authority has been regarded as the rigidity in Quakerism, provoking a lot of later arguments claiming inward light as the only valid religious source and labeling church system as a vicious limitation on the free faith.\footnote{Refer back to the cases of Bathurst and Scot in the sections of 2.2. and 2.3.2. respectively. See also the case of internal division between Hicksites and orthodox Quakers (Rosemary Mingins, The Beacon Controversy and Challenges to British Quaker Tradition in the Early Nineteenth Century: Some Responses to the Evangelical Revival by Friends in Manchester and Kendal (Lewiston, NY.: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2004), p. 43. H. Larry Ingle, Quakers in Conflicts: The Hicksite Reformation (Knoxville, TN.: University of Tennessee Press, 1986), p. 3).} And this is the central point of one long-debated matter where to find the authority in Quakerism. Therefore, we need to be clear about what the power and authority of the Church mean from Barclay’s point of view, especially in connection with inward light.

Barclay develops his arguments on the matter of church government and its authority in
The Anarchy of the Ranters (1674), although his discussions are conducted in such a complicated manner that they sometimes appear to conflict with the simple Quaker tenet of the light within. According to Barclay, there are two fundamental things ordered and appointed by Christ for the edification of the whole church; the one is ‘The Power and Authority, which the Apostles had given them of Christ for the Gathering, Building up and Governing of his Church,’ and the other is ‘That Priviledge given to every Christian under the Gospel to be led and guided by the Spirit of Christ, and to be taught thereof in all things.’ In the primitive church, or in the earlier period of the Apostles, Barclay argues, these two parts functioned in complementary harmony for the same purpose of instructing and edifying the whole congregation. But soon ‘by the Workings of Satan and Perversness of Men they were made to fight against and destroy one another.’ Historically, the ecclesial authority, as annexed only to particular outward ordination and succession in the Church, had been used to justify and ‘cover all manner of Abuses, even the height of Idolatry and Superstition,’ as in the cases of Catholicism and Protestantism. On the other hand, some of the other religious groups at that time, for example, the Ranters and the Libertines neglected Christian fellowship and community, and even good order (the former pretending to be guided by the Spirit, and the latter placing much emphasis on natural light, namely human reason, but in reality both were merely acting according to their own minds). Against these extremes on both sides, Barclay aims to present his ecclesiastical views by walking the middle way between ecclesial order and God’s Spirit. For

40 In Barclay’s view, Lutherans and Calvinists are usually included in this general category (Barclay, ‘Universal Love,’ p. 690).
41 Barclay, ‘Anarchy,’ p. 185 and 212.
Barclay, the authority of the Spirit shown through inward light is certainly the main principle of religion, providing the whole basis for all things in Christian faith. Meanwhile, as observed in 5.1.1., he also justifies the necessity for control, and for special persons such as ministers, teachers, and elders to engage in special roles and to watch over all church members. Fully detailed rules and orders concerning church government are not actually provided during the course of Barclay’s discussion; he only illustrates a general policy, setting up the basic framework of conduct-codes that Quakers should follow. For example, the interior religious purposes of the orders and offices are to bring people into religious fellowship, to keep fellow members from falling out of the community,\textsuperscript{42} to restore the faith of the re-apostate through advice, persuasion and censure based on the gospel order or reasoning,\textsuperscript{43} and if every effort proves vain, to spiritually disown those people who have gone against the workings of God.\textsuperscript{44}

On the exterior practical level, the orders and rules are intended to take care of church members in need, such as the poor, widows and orphans,\textsuperscript{45} and to make arrangements and decisions about outward necessities, which range from trifles, to marriage, to internal conflicts such as property disputes.\textsuperscript{46} Church members are even forbidden to take brethren to secular courts, as 1 Cor. 6:1 states that problems within a church should be resolved amongst themselves.\textsuperscript{47} Of course, we should take into account the socio-ideological situations surrounding the second generation

\textsuperscript{42} Barclay, ‘Anarchy,’ p. 203 and 212.
\textsuperscript{44} Barclay, ‘Anarchy,’ 212. Barclay clarifies the point by using the expression: ‘to cut them off from her fellowship by the sword of the Spirit, …but not to cut them off from the world by the temporal sword,’ (Barclay, Apology, p. 462). According to Gwyn, the necessity of the establishment of corporate discipline was already recognised before the period of the Restoration. In 1653, William Dewsbury sent a letter to local Quaker meetings to counsel them about corporate discipline, which includes the matters such as the role of elders and overseers, and disownment. A second letter which added further instructions about discipline was sent in the same year by a meeting of Quaker leaders with Fox’s signature (Gwyn, Seekers Found, pp. 307-308).
\textsuperscript{45} Barclay, ‘Anarchy,’ p. 206.
\textsuperscript{46} Barclay, ‘Anarchy,’ p. 207.
\textsuperscript{47} Barclay, ‘Anarchy,’ pp. 208-209.
Quakers, such as pressure felt from the outside world, and harsh persecution. Barclays says that each of aforementioned instructions are intended to prevent potential and actual damage to God’s truth and to the entire meeting of Christ’s body, and also to take loving care of the faith of the believers and their immortal souls.

Yet with a respect to remove the general Reproach from the Christian Name, with a tender Respect to the good of their Immortal Souls for the Zeal we owe to God’s Glory, and for the Exaltation and Propagation of his Everlasting Truth and Gospel in the Earth, we have not been wanting …to seek the Scattered Ones; …and inviting and persuading all to obey the Gospel of Christ, and to take Notice of his Reproofs, as he makes himself manifest in and by the Light in their Hearts.

The crux of Barclay’s church politics lies in whether a church or meeting has the real power and authority to make decisions concerning practical businesses, or even to pass judgment on matters of personal faith or the consciences of the fellow members. If so, it follows that every member is bound to obey the instructions given by certain ecclesial offices or by the entire gathering, whilst at the same time having the guide of the Spirit present in their religious lives. The way these two authorities are reconciled, in Barclay’s belief, is that the Spirit agrees with the judgments of Church as a whole in terms of faith, worship and practice. For him, as seen above, the Church is the Kingdom realised and testified to by following the pattern set forth by

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48 See 2.2. in this thesis.
Jesus, (which is enabled by the power of the Spirit). Accordingly, the Church is a manifestation of unity, not division. Therefore, Barclay stresses that God’s Spirit accompanies a particular person or persons for the entire meeting, giving them the power and ability to decide and pass judgments on various issues, while persuading other members to accept those judgments by the power of the spiritual bond.\(^\text{53}\) Barclay goes so far as to assert the total lawfulness of judgments and obligations imposed by the assembly, stating that God’s infallible workings are the guide of the people.\(^\text{54}\) This does not mean, however, that church ministry itself is incapable of error.\(^\text{55}\) On this point, as we have already observed,\(^\text{56}\) Barclay justifies the church or meeting’s right to break with the apostates\(^\text{57}\) who have strayed away from such principles of truth, ‘as are already received as true, and confirmed by God’s Spirit in the Hearts of the Saints.’\(^\text{58}\) This is because Church in its definition is a gathering of people led to willingly agree with the same principles that are working as a bond, and thus it is natural for opposition to be cut out of the communion.\(^\text{59}\) It is compared by Barclay to the contract of individual and society based on the same basis of laws, legitimating the punishment and the exclusion of offenders who violate the contract.\(^\text{60}\)

\(^{53}\) Barclay, ‘Anarchy,’ p. 213.

\(^{54}\) Barclay, ‘Anarchy,’ p. 225. This phrase might sound dubious, but the theme will be discussed later in 5.1.3.

\(^{55}\) ‘So that this Infallibility is not annexed to the Persons, to the Succession, and to the bare Visible Profession or any Society, because of its Profession;’ (Barclay, ‘Anarchy,’ p. 232).

\(^{56}\) See the section 5.1.1.

\(^{57}\) The apostate are ‘either in Principles or Practices, that have a Pretence of Conscience, and that either in Denying some Truths already Received and Believed; or Asserting New Doctrines, that ought not to be Received’ (Barclay, ‘Anarchy,’ pp. 235-236).

\(^{58}\) Barclay, ‘Anarchy,’ p. 217. In Barclay’s view, God is revealed through the light within, and things present to some person must be examined and tested by the Spirit itself and in the plurality of different testimonies showed by the Bible, the church authority and other fellow members. Knocked into shape this way, it makes ‘the Truth,’ but of course it does not mean such final manifestation of God as requiring believers not to wait any more. See the second chapter in this thesis.

\(^{59}\) ‘For since he takes the Liberty out of Conscience (as he judgeth) to differ from all his Brethren, it were a most unreasonable thing in such a one to deny them the Liberty (being persuaded in their Conscience they ought) to Withdraw from him; seeing, the Band of their Unity, which as least in part was an Agreement in Doctrine, is so far by him broken.’ (Barclay, ‘R. B’s. Apology Vindicated,’ p. 867).

\(^{60}\) ‘Now this cannot be accounted Tyranny and Oppression, no more than in a Civil Society, if one of the Society shall contradict one or more of the fundamental Articles, upon which the Society was contracted, if can be reckon’d a breach or iniquity in the whole Society to declare, that such Contradictors have done wrong, and
Not surprisingly, this kind of church system was not historically peculiar to Quakerism of the day; in fact it was common to the Free Churches as gathering of spontaneous believers.\textsuperscript{61} Take for instance the \textit{Dordrecht Confession of Faith} (1632), which was the summation of the Dutch Mennonites’ beliefs during the seventeenth century, and is still accepted as canon by some Mennonites and Amish communities. It says that the Church, as the body of Christ, has different ministerial roles such as Teachers, Deacons, and Deaconesses, whose purposes are to ‘govern the church, feed his flock, watch over, maintain, and care for the same,’\textsuperscript{62} so that ‘the body of Christ may be edified, and the Lord’s vineyard and church be preserved in its growth and structure.’\textsuperscript{63} The Church has the responsibility to reprove the re-apostate, and if necessary, to exercise its authority to shut them out of the communion, so as to protect Christ’s truth and the church against dishonor and prevent them from doing something offensive to the people outside. However, the Confession adds that these things should be done with love, not enmity, towards offenders,\textsuperscript{64} and also with the hope that they will be finally restored to their faith.\textsuperscript{65}

As for Barclay’s ecclesiology, he makes the same point concerning pastoral punishments and excommunication; they should work hand in hand with forgiveness and prayer for the salvation of the re-apostates’ souls.\textsuperscript{66} Also, as is usual with the Free Churches, while refuting the

\footnotesize{\textit{forfeited} their Right in that Society; in case by the \textit{Original Constitution} the Nature of the \textit{Contradiction} implys such a \textit{Forfeiture}, as usually it is; and will no doubt hold in \textit{Religious Matters.’} (Barclay, ‘Anarchy,’ pp. 213-214).

\textsuperscript{61} Reay points out that Quaker discipline after the Restoration was rather gentle compared with the standards in those days (Reay, \textit{The Quakers and the English Revolution}, p. 116).


\textsuperscript{63} The article IX in Wenger, \textit{Mennonite History and Doctrine}, p. 221.

\textsuperscript{64} The article XVII in Wenger, \textit{Mennonite History and Doctrine}, p. 225.

\textsuperscript{65} The article XVI in Wenger, \textit{Mennonite History and Doctrine}, p. 224.

lawfulness of stepping into the matters of human conscience and soul in all cases both secular and religious, the he distinctly defends the legitimacy of the Church’s judgments regarding the consistency or inconsistency of each believer’s faith and practice with the principles that have been already confirmed, accepted and professed by the whole religious community. Even considered in the most favorable light, it should be admitted that these kinds of particular sectarian principles virtually creates a boundary for the distinction of Quakerism, seemingly defining the closed and exclusive nature of the Quaker religious community.

5. 1. 3. Open or Closed Community

Such an explanation of church government by Barclay might well seem to represent a strict and authoritarian stance towards group members especially in regard to the matter of the conscience. He only seems to show a hypothetic compatibility between the two authorities of the Church and the light, although amply grounding his arguments upon biblical testimonies such as the command and the promise of Christ, the examples of the Apostles and the ancient Christians, and also upon parallel relationships between his days and ancient times. Theologically speaking, as seen above, Barclay’s logic concerning the authority and power of the Church is double-bound between God’s eternal truth and the practical needs to be addressed ‘now.’ That is to say, Christians always have to be open to the workings of God as otherness, which cannot be fully reduced to human recognition. At the same time, Christians must speak through words and must act provisionally upon the beliefs manifested in them through the

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inward light, while further waiting for God. The reason for this is that as long as the Church intends to be the body of Christ as God’s revelation, it should take on the responsibility of bridging the gap between this world and God’s world. The Church must be the location for the possibility opened by Christ’s supreme command of love, and must also be a place where the Christian ideal is practically realised and presented as examples for the world to follow. Nevertheless, due to the very inevitable nature of love, the Church ultimately cannot transcend the double-bounded state.

Furthermore, in regard to personal or collective matters, decision-making is only made possible by isolating things from infinite differences by fixation, presumption and repetition of the immanent. In other words, the formation of ‘identity’ or capital corporate ‘Identity,’ is compared to the temporal determination of a certain compass of the matter concerned. However, it is possible on the condition of things differentiating and differing. This might merely be the extension of certain internal political values and hegemony claimed and imposed by the subject of a particular person, or by particular persons or by the whole group, (although there could be actually diverse motives and opinions). 72 What must be noted here is that as C. Mouffe argues, there is inevitably a moment of coercive force involved in establishing the inner system, because others and otherness are contrastively posited and excluded as the external. 73 Thus, even if decisions appear just or right, they are necessarily attended by violence and its justification. 74

72 As long as speech act is turned to other people, there is certainly some political motivation. It consciously or unconsciously shows human desire to expand or share their own realm by an agreement, or through sympathy, or in other ways. In this sense, religious discourses cannot be exempted from such nature of language.
74 Critchley exactly points out that ‘the greatest danger in politics is the threat of totalitarianism, or what Jean-Luc Nancy calls ‘immanence’, in all of its most recent terrifying disguises: neo-fascism, nationalism, ethnocentrism, theocracy. Totalitarianism ...would claim that a particular political form and hence a particular state, community or territory embodies justice, that justice is immanent to the body politic.’ (Simon Critchley, ‘Derrida: Private Ironist or Public Liberal?’, in Mouffe, Deconstruction and Pragmatism, pp. 35-36).
However, surely I have to say that this kind of enforcement is necessary for the process of determination on a practical level.\(^75\) (To put it differently, it is necessary to establish a closed system for a word or an action to be meaningful. For example, a player’s acts in baseball are only valid within the system of the sport’s rules, and if these acts (such as stolen base) are put in another context, they will be nonsense. In this respect, human beings, who have been thrown down to this world, definitely need a closed system of a context or narrative so that they can make a meaningful decision).\(^76\)

These things considered, the most important question is not whether Barclay’s political or ecclesiological views on the double authorities is coercive or not, (avoidable or not), because every decision-making process is inevitably involved with the use of force. Rather, the question to be asked is whether church authority is equipped with some aspect or attitude in which such immanantism would be deferred, re-questioned and made forever receptive to the outside as otherness. To put it another way, Barclay can or cannot speak about the church system with its theoretical structure that allows it to turn its eyes again to others or otherness excluded or looked over during the decision-makings. This problem can be comprehensively paraphrased with the following theological question: how Barclay connects his ecclesiology into the central Christian belief in ‘love one’s enemies.’ Or, on a more dogmatic level, on what points Barclay reflects on his ecclesiology, Christology or the formula of Incarnation, (namely the unity and difference, or proximity and remoteness of God-man relationship).\(^77\) Through these questions, the special

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\(^75\) ‘once it is granted that violence is in fact irreducible, it becomes necessary –and this is the moment of politics– to have rules, conventions, and stabilizations of power. ...since convention, institutions and consensus are stabilizations..., this means that they are stabilizations of something essentially unstable and chaotic. ...it is because there is instability that stabilization becomes necessary; it is because there is chaos that there is a need for stability.’ (Jacques Derrida, ‘Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism,’ in Mouffe, Deconstruction and Pragmatism, pp. 83-84).

\(^76\) This point shall be further argued in 5.2.3.a. in this thesis.

\(^77\) Christian God is traditionally and theologically formulated into Trinity. The core concept of Trinity is
nature and task of the Church (which is distinctive from human institutions grounded on the value of presence or proximity) can be clarified.

As already seen, Church is characterised by the word, ‘the body of Christ.’ In Barclay’s view, the power and authority are given to every person sanctified by God’s spiritual workings. This work of God gives a precise definition for ‘the true Church.’ Namely, within the Church there are people sanctified by God, and people serving on one another for their sanctification under the divine leadership. Indeed, decision-making by individual (s) or by the entire meeting is claimed by Barclay to be infallible and totally in accord with God’s will, but he never says that infallibility is theoretically fixed to certain established offices, roles, or persons within a meeting, (as it is in Catholics and general Protestants). Infallibility is only annexed to ‘the True, Real and Effectual Work of Sanctification and Regeneration, the New Creature brought forth in the Heart.’ Thus, in Barclay’s argument, the definition of the Church is fundamentally based upon the ideal of ‘sanctification.’ This might sound incomprehensible, if ‘sanctification’ is considered to be merely an ideal upon personal moral concepts or the ethical status of the individual. For Barclay, sanctification is a close synonym for justification and perfection to be graced by God through the denial and annihilation of the self. As the previous chapter confirmed, the concept of

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78 See 5.1.1. in this thesis.
80 ‘I understand all those, that truly and really have received and hold the Truth, as it is in Jesus, and are in measure sanctified, or sanctifying in and by the Power and Virtue thereof working in their inward Parts; and this may be made up of divers distinct Gatherings or Churches in several Countries or Nations.’ (Barclay, ‘Anarchy,’ p. 227).
perfection or full sanctification is connected to Christ’s supreme command to love others and to practice it in the Kingdom.\textsuperscript{83} Thus, sanctification becomes the definition of the Church, inviting us to think of it as having a different nature than that of other established social systems. From Barclay’s viewpoint, the Church is not the same as a merely human organisation, but rather it is realised in practices which welcome the possibility and impossibility of God-human or self-other relations. Here we can see both the deterministic and in-deterministic nature of Quaker church authority, which is finally and thoroughly ascribed to God.\textsuperscript{84} (However, Barclay of course also attempts to emphasise the deterministic side for initialising daily businesses).\textsuperscript{85}

Even more remarkable is the fact that Barclay also combines all of the Christian beliefs (including freedom and peace) into such a hospitable attitude towards others and acceptance of different manifestations in a meeting. For example, Barclay says of true liberty and peace:

\begin{quote}
The true \textit{Liberty} then in the \textit{Church of Christ} is exercised, whenas one \textit{judgeth} not another in these \textit{different Places}; but live in \textit{Love} together, all minding the \textit{Unity} and general good of the \textit{Body}, and to work their own \textit{Work} in their own \textit{Place}.\textsuperscript{86}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
And since there is no greater \textit{Mark} of the \textit{People of God}, than to be at \textit{Peace} among themselves; whatsoever tendeth to break that \textit{Bond of Love and Peace}, must be testified against.
\end{quote}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{83} Barclay, ‘Anarchy,’ p. 536.
\textsuperscript{84} Barclay, ‘Anarchy,’ p. 216. See also Barclay, Apology, p. 306.
\textsuperscript{85} ‘it is no way Inconsistent with this \textit{Sound} and \textit{Unerring Principle}, to affirm, That the \textit{Judgment} of a certain \textit{Person} or \textit{Persons} in certain \textit{Cases} in \textit{Infallible}, or for a certain \textit{Person} or \textit{Persons} to give a \textit{positive Judgment}, and pronounce it as \textit{Obligatory} upon others, because the \textit{Foundations} and \textit{Ground} thereof is not because they are \textit{Infallible}; but because in these \textit{Things}, and at that \textit{Time} they are \textit{Led by the Infallible Spirit.’ (Barclay, ‘Anarchy,’ p. 225).
\textsuperscript{86} Barclay, ‘Anarchy,’ p. 222.
\end{flushright}
Christ be the Prince of Peace, and doth most of all commend Love and Unity to his Disciples.\(^87\)

Barclay argues that Christian love, liberty, and peace can be realised by demonstrating patience. Patience here means not pushing one’s self to the front, but conceding differences for the sake of the whole. For Barclay, love is ‘the principal Token of his [Christ’s] Disciples\(^88\), and ‘the fulfilling of the Law.’\(^89\) He also believes that ‘to love God above all things, and our Neighbour as our Selves, is the sum not only of the Law; but of the Gospel also.’\(^90\) The Church is the gathering which serves as a testimony of peaceful loving truth on earth, (although there are admittedly some minor differences and collisions within). Hence, the concept of ‘oneness’ or ‘unity’ that Barclay portrays as the standard of the Christian Church and that defines what is appropriate and what is inappropriate, is not the mere expansion of the inner value of a particular subject (Subject), or the hegemony of a certain political intention.\(^91\) It is expected to be the binding power of God’s workings; we cannot tell from ‘whence it cometh, and whither it goeth.’\(^92\) It invites all members to live holy lives together and await the coming of God and others. Barclay says, ‘that which is the Bond that keeps the Oneness, here he [the Apostle Paul] mentions, to wit, The Same Spirit, the Same Lord, the Same God.’\(^93\) The concept of oneness is theologically expressed by using the basic formula of the Trinity, (or the divine moment), to keep things both possible and impossible, or reducible and irreducible. In these senses, Barclay’s

\(^{87}\) Barclay, ‘Anarchy,’ p. 219.
\(^{88}\) Barclay, ‘Universal Love,’ p. 679.
\(^{89}\) Barclay, ‘Universal Love,’ p. 679.
\(^{90}\) Barclay, ‘Universal Love,’ p. 679.
\(^{91}\) Barclay, ‘Anarchy,’ pp. 217-221.
\(^{92}\) John 3:8.
\(^{93}\) Barclay, ‘Anarchy,’ p. 221.
ecclesiological stance has a structure, in which every decision-making process is theoretically invited to the deferential, reflecting the irreducible (but graceful) relationships, or the possible and impossible relationships, between God and human, and between the self and others.

The point of Barclay’s entire ecclesiology is that such a balance between possibility and impossibility would enable the advancement of, and reflection on, religious activities both ‘now’ and ‘hereafter,’ being supported by other supplementary methods such as ministry, joint-testimonies and the Bible. This concept can be compared to the separation of powers in a political field that allows them to check one another for individuals and the whole society.94 Certainly, such an ideally-integrated system would easily collapse without realistic managements. Human beings have a tendency to run towards the extremes rather than to stay balanced, despite the total incommensurability of God as otherness and the truth as it is temporarily revealed. Nevertheless, it is also essential to posit the temporarily-accepted truth as the absolute base for making decisions and for reaching the agreements in church matters here and now. On this point, technically, Barclay’s theory does not simply ensure the effectiveness of the church management in and of itself.95 After all, it has yet to be seen whether people engaged in ministry or practical care have been, are, or will be successful in mastering the way of balance when faced with these diverse and different factors in daily pastoral work. However, at least I would say, in this very condition of possibility and impossibility, the Church is expected to

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94 The same structure appears, as seen in the second chapter, in the relationship between the Scriptures and the Revelation, the former containing the testimonies of God given through believers and the latter newly revealing God’s truth, but both in unity with each other for the edification (Barclay, ‘Anarchy,’ p. 201).
95 Barclay cites an example of Apostles’ disputes concerning circumcision in the primitive church, which finally reached the agreement by trials under the work of the Spirit (Barclay, ‘Anarchy,’ p. 196). In regard to such a case, Barclay repeatedly insists on the necessity of forbearance or condescension of believers to diverse opinions and judgments (Barclay, ‘Anarchy,’ pp. 223-224).
maintain its meetings as environments where the communal truth is revealed. By doing so, the Church would serve as a living testimony of God for the world, and as a model of his peaceful Kingdom on earth, which is managed sometimes in an idealistic way, and sometimes in a practical or realistic way.

5. 2. Barclay’s Testimony on Peace

The ethical and political arguments are also further applied to people outside the Church. The basis of Quakerism is that all the humans are endowed with inward light by God through the redemption of Christ. And we might assume that people outside a Quaker circle or even in the whole world have a chance to hear the spiritual voice inviting them to salvation. Therefore, we might also assume that these people would be accepted based upon their potentiality, regardless of religion, creed, nationality, sex, age, social status, etc. This is true, but almost the same logic of church ethics as above seen is at work in the examples of friendliness, love, and patience towards all human beings outside of the group. As partly observed above, in the distinction of ‘visible’ and ‘invisible,’ Barclay classifies the Christian Church into two types; the first one is the visible church, which contains a diversity of people whose characters range from the pious to the defiled. The second type, the invisible church, consists of true saints, who have truly been sanctified by the light within. For Barclay, the true church is not limited to particular sorts of people or to particular regions of Christendom. On this point, Quaker ethics is applied to all those who have a chance to listen to God’s voice, and this makes the entire

96 ‘The basis of all of them [the testimony the Light in inward life, business in the Quaker community and the application of the doctrine of the Light to the world outside] is the doctrine that the same identical Light is in all human beings.’ (Howard H. Brinton, Quaker Journals: Varieties of Religious Experience among Friends, 3rd ed. (Wallingford, PA.: Pendle Hill Publications, 1993), p. 59).
97 Barclay, Apology, pp. 262-263.
invisible church of Christ. This is the very reason why it is better to deal with the matter of peace testimony as a part of Christian ecclesiology. Therefore, in this section, I briefly review Barclay’s peace testimony and consider it as a natural logical extension of the principle of love. Love will finally unveil the existential communal nature of human beings, and, Barclay hopes, will expand the function of the Church so that it may become both a place for the realised communal truth and a place for realising the communal truth as well. Then, I explore the theological characteristics of Barclay’s pacifism in comparison with other pacifist traditions.

5.2.1. Barclay’s Peace Testimony

According to Brock, Barclay’s peace testimony has two sides; one is traditional Christian pacifism in that it follows the command of Christ as written in the Bible or the teachings of the inward light. It was on a biblical and spiritual basis that the early Quakers advocated their anti-war position. Barclay took over the anti-war stance, and further developed and systematised it. The other side is humanitarianism, in that Barclay tries to appeal to the human reason, which, Brock alleges, ‘eventually blossomed out into the humanitarian relief activity that has become so closely associated with the Quaker name in our century. Whether this analysis is correct or not, (although Barclay certainly uses reason to vindicate Quakerism, along with other resources of patristics, traditions and the scriptures), Barclay’s peace testimony is not so complicated. It is a very simple following of a strain of Christian pacifism, but it also

99 ‘the doctrine of perfection is also the foundation for the Quaker peace testimony.’ (Carole Dale Spencer, Holiness: The Soul of Quakerism An Historical Analysis of the Theology of Holiness in the Quaker Tradition (Colorado Spring, CO.: Paternoster, 2007), p. 81).
101 Quaker pacifism was originally the testimony against wars, not for energetically making peace and stability in a society and the world (Jung Jiseok, ‘Quaker Peace Testimony, Ham Sokhon’s Idea of Peace and Korean Reunification Theology’ (PhD dissertation submitted to the University of Sunderland, March 2004), p. 22).
102 Brock, The Quaker Peace Testimony, p. 29.
merges with the main Quaker principle of inward light, (just as it does with other theological themes, such as soteriology and perfectionism). Barclay’s testimony possesses a similar two-sided structure, due to the limitation of human existence and the incommensurability of self-other relations. These factors lead to the exhortation of love and the extension of patience towards each other.

From Barclay’s viewpoint, the main cause of wars and conflicts is human negligence of, and opposition to, the life and virtue of Christian truth. Even if people engaged in warfare are nominally Christians, in actuality they are betraying the Lord through their behaviours; Barclay says, ‘The Ground then of all this is the Want of True Christianity, because the Nature of it is not begotten, nor brought forth in those called Christians; and therefore they bear not the Image, nor bring not forth the Fruits of it.’ It is the priests and pastors who most wrongly use the name of God or Christ; they even pray for God for the promotion of their own justice, and for gratitude towards their victory over their enemies. For them, the word ‘Peace’ becomes a mere pretext for their brutal desires, ‘while their Fruits manifestly declare the Contrary.’ For Barclay, Christian goodness and virtue are revealed and practiced through love by following Jesus’ examples in the Bible and illuminated through the light. This is completely summarised by his command of ‘love one’s enemies,’ a command that requires us to overcome the logic of retribution. Retribution or revenge is based on self-respect or self-interest, which accompanies

103 Barclay, Apology, p. 526.
104 Robert Barclay, ‘An Epistle of Love and Friendly Advice to the Ambassadors of the Several Princes of Europe, Met at Nimegnen to Consult the Peace of Christendom, &c.,’ in Truth Triumphant, p. 708.
107 Barclay, ‘Epistle of Love,’ pp. 709-710. Barclay also says, ‘the Clergy, who through their Ambition and Turbulency did from the Pulpits blow the Trumpet of all the late Confusion and Treason in the Civil Wars,’ (Robert Barclay and George Keith, ‘Quakerism Confirmed: A Vindication of the Chief Doctrine and Principles of the Quakers, from the Objection of the Students Aforesaid, in their Book Called, Quakerism Canvased,’ in Truth Triumphant, p. 668).
the reduction and re-appropriation of all other things according to the nearness or proximity to the self. Christ’s commandment of love demands that his followers challenge this self-value and the violent nature which goes along with it. Barclay says:

> our peaceable Lord and master Lord Christ, who by excellency is called the Prince of Peace, and hath expressly prohibited his children all violence; and on the contrary, commanded them, that, according to his example, they should follow patience, charity, forbearance, and other virtues worthy of a Christian.

Because Christ calls his children to bear his cross; not to crucify or kill others; to patience, not to revenge; …to flee the glory of this world, not to acquire it by warlike endeavours; therefore war is altogether contrary unto the law and the Spirit of Christ.

Notwithstanding this, in Barclay’s view, contemporary Christians have fallen into political struggles to gain their own hegemony against one another, forgetting to follow Jesus’ pattern, ‘So that the Peace-Contrivers Rule is not the Equity of the Cause, but the Power of the Parties.’ Barclay admits that there could be a temporary ceasefire between opposing groups by such power-games with arms. He argues, however, that ‘unless the Lord Jesus Christ can be Restored to his Kingdom in their Hearts, …Evil Ground and devouring Nature being still alive

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108 In Barclay’s view, these clergies and priests use magistrates only for their interests: ‘All the Power, Dignity and Honour they put upon him [a magistrate], is, To be the Clergy’s Burrow: …So he must only serve to be their Executioner, and persecute such, as they find prejudicial to their Interest.’ (Barclay and Keith, ‘Quakerism Confirmed,’ p. 667).
109 Barclay, Apology, p. 526.
110 Barclay, Apology, pp. 530-531.
111 Barclay, ‘Epistle of Love,’ p. 710.
and predominant in them, will quickly stir some of them up again’ for wars. Therefore, Barclay urges that, not resorting to human wisdom, as the first step to peace, Christians must fear the Lord, waiting for the revelation of inward light, ‘which is given you as a sufficient Guide and Leader, to lead out of Darkness, to lead out Strife, to lead out of the Lusts, from which the Wars come, unto the Ways of Righteousness and Peace; which leads not to destroy, but to Love, and forgive Enemies. This is the very fruit of God’s love towards humanity, and of his grace, which allows people to attain peace and truth by spiritually conquering violence and persecution through loving perseverance in Jesus’ Spirit. Barclay believes that if everyone’s eyes turned to the light, ‘the Good and Universal Peace of Christendom’ would be finally established in the whole world. He continues that ‘their wars against the wicked nations were a figure of the inward war of the true Christians against their spiritual enemies, in which we overcome the devil, the world, and the flesh. Thus, Barclay calls upon all sorts of people, especially politicians and magistrates in secular nations, to mind the divine power of God’s light. This makes up a very simple pacifist testimony in Quakerism.

What should be further noted about Barclay’s Quaker pacifism is that he does not go to theological extremes here on the point, too; rather it rests in a balance between the ideal and the real. Barclay gives concessions to people who have not yet reached such an advanced spiritual

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116 Barclay, Apology, p. 468. Given the seventeenth century socio-political situations among European countries, it might be irrelevant to criticise the limited scope of Barclay’s pacifism into Christendom.
117 Barclay, Apology, p. 531.
state, and does not forcibly impose the pacifist stance on them. This is also seen in the cases of Fox and other Quaker leaders.\textsuperscript{119} Barclay readily admits the legitimacy of human self-defense as a ‘natural right,’\textsuperscript{120} and he even says ‘while they are in that condition, we shall not say, That war, undertaken upon a just occasion, is altogether unlawful to them.’\textsuperscript{121} Nevertheless, this does not mean that Barclay justifies wars and violence wrought by immature Christians. The point is that he stresses the significance of the Christian task of being an example of nonviolence for the world to emulate, patiently waiting and inviting all other people to follow in partaking in the workings of Christ’s light. The reason for this is that a human society contains every sort and every rank of person, and therefore it is dangerous to impatiently and hastily step in their conscience with different backgrounds.\textsuperscript{122} Barclay’s peace testimony is not intended to have a political effect upon other members of society, but to deliver a testimony to God’s peace in the world. Trueblood rightly points out that ‘In accepting non-resistance for himself, yet seeing that it would be wrong to try to legislate it for the unprepared, Barclay was upheld by the conviction that advance comes only when a few go on ahead.’\textsuperscript{123} In this sense, Barclay urges saints above all to show love and forbearance in the establishment of Christian models. He says:

\begin{quote}
Vers. 17. [Phil. 3:17] Brethren, be Followers together of me, and mark them which walk so, as ye have us for an Example.
\end{quote}

So here, though the Apostle grants \textit{Forbearance} in things, wherein they have not yet \textit{attained}; yet he concludes, they must \textit{walk} so, as they have him for an \textit{Example}, and so

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{119} Hirst, \textit{The Quakers in Peace and War}, p. 45.
\item \textsuperscript{120} Barclay, \textit{Apology}, p. 531.
\item \textsuperscript{121} Barclay, \textit{Apology}, p. 536.
\item \textsuperscript{122} The matter of conscience shall be closely examined in next subsection, 5.2.2.
\end{itemize}
consequently not *Contrary*, or otherways.\textsuperscript{124}

5. 2. 2. The Church’s Relationship with Civil Power

In regard to Barclay’s peace testimony, another problem is further examined: namely the relationship between the individual and the State, or between the Church and the State. Both of these issues come down to the issues of religious and secular authority; to rephrase this statement as a question, how Barclay provisionally deals with the balance between secular kingdoms and God’s rule. Or another question is how he deals with the balance between these two authorities until the Second Advent. Barclay develops his argument about secular and church authority along the line of the old Protestant doctrine of the Two Kingdoms, the separation of the spiritual and secular realms, by using two very modernistic concepts: ‘freedom of conscience’ and the ‘commonwealth’ (the public interest).\textsuperscript{125} His discussion has the same structure as in the double authorities of God’s revelation and church judgments.

a. Freedom of Conscience and Commonwealth

Unlike Catholics and Protestants in those days, who even justified the capital punishment of people outside their religion by secular powers,\textsuperscript{126} Barclay argues that civil authority has no right to step into the realm of human conscience, for example, to interfere in matters involving freedom of religion or the rights of assembly and worship. Nor do civil authorities have the right to take away life and property for the matter of conscience.\textsuperscript{127} For Barclay, conscience is socio-culturally cultivated in various manners, and it is a kind of mental.

\textsuperscript{124} Barclay, ‘Anarchy,’ p. 217.
\textsuperscript{125} Barclay, *Apology*, pp. 460–462. See also Barclay and Keith, ‘Quakerism Confirmed,’ p. 666.
\textsuperscript{126} Barclay, ‘Anarchy,’ p. 234.
\textsuperscript{127} Barclay, *Apology*, p. 461.
function used to judge if something is contrary or not to the things taught by a society.\textsuperscript{128} (This point shall be fully developed later in relation to the necessity for role-models in a church). Just as written in Rom. 14:23: ‘for whatever \textit{is} not from faith is sin,’ any act against conscience, whatever it may be, will only make people feel guilty in their social or cultural contexts.\textsuperscript{129}

When it comes to faith and religion, however, it is God alone who instructs and rules human conscience, and human souls are his throne. Therefore, Barclay asserts, it is improper and wrong for secular kings and civil magistrates to reign over the spiritual realm.\textsuperscript{130} Of course, this does not mean that believers are free to do anything they want in a society if it is done in the name of conscience. As the Anabaptists of Münster and the Libertines claimed, religious liberty is not unlimitedly permitted to the extent of ‘the prejudice of their neighbours, or to the ruin of human society.’\textsuperscript{131} In Barclay’s view, freedom is restrained by the conditions that actions should not be against the interests of the commonwealth, nor should they violate the rights of others (such as life and property).\textsuperscript{132} For the purpose of securing outward peace, as early Quakers did, Barclay states that civil kings and magistrates have been left by God to rule the world, and they do bear the power of arms for social security and public interest.\textsuperscript{133} It may sound embarrassing to the present-day Quakers, but Barclay, whilst holding the position of universal charity, does not deny the social (not ecclesiological) necessity of penal treatment including death.\textsuperscript{134} He argues that

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Refer back to 1.2.1. in this thesis.
\item Barclay, \textit{Apology}, p. 461.
\item Barclay, \textit{Apology}, p. 460 and 462.
\item Barclay, \textit{Apology}, p. 461.
\item Barclay, \textit{Apology}, p. 462.
\item In Barclay’s logic, there is the fundamental distinction between penalty on social crimes and penalty on the exercise of conscience (Barclay, ‘Universal Love,’ p. 687). The latter is the thing that he denies. It is true that it would be possible for wicked people to be saved in the future if they repent their sins. As long as they stay in that state, they should not be given compassion. This is because God has revealed and is revealing the way for salvation to everyone. Barclay’s discussion of the secular legal system which allows death penalty seems not to be so logically coherent with his stance on nonviolence. Nevertheless, it can also be understood as a sort of
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
this is not a breach of Christian love; For ‘[crimes] are not Justified as matters of Conscience, or Conscientiously practiced; which are unanimously Condemned not only by the Consent of all Christians, but of all Men, as being Destructive to the very Nature of Man-kind, and to all Humane Society.135

Barclay goes on to consider how about the case in which a religion or belief system seems to be potentially harmful to a society or community, for example, heresy, hypocrisy, or paganism. As to whether civil powers still have the authority to judge or control such matters, Barclay draws clear distinctions between the proper and improper about the things secular powers should be allowed to do, based on the epistemological impossibility of discerning the human mind. He mentions Matt. 13:25, in which a farmer forbids his servants from pulling out the tares.

Now it cannot be denied but heretics are here included; and although these servants saw the tares, and had a certain discerning of them; yet Christ would not they should meddle, lest they should hurt the wheat: thereby intimating, that that capacity in man to be mistaken, ought to be a bridle upon him, to make him wary in such matters;136

Barclay asserts that true believers might be given the ability to spiritually discern false faith by the inward light. He argues that the Church has the legitimate power to cut them off those of false faith away from the fellowship with the spiritual sword, but he also states that ‘those who

concession to the people who have not yet come to the gospel, as in the case of his stance on wars (Barclay, ‘Universal Love,’ p. 692).

136 Barclay, Apology, p. 466.
want it, cannot discern either.\textsuperscript{137} Therefore, he makes an appeal to civil authorities to refrain from judging people in faith and conscience, until a person has actually done some harm to the commonwealth or violated the rights of others. This is because humans tend to be fallible and have practical difficulties in sifting wrong from right when based on mere appearances alone.\textsuperscript{138} In other words, Barclay thinks that there must be a social margin for various kinds of conscience in a society in which various kinds of people live, even when considering the bad examples of Catholics and Protestants in the past, (such as wars and religious oppressions in the excuses of different opinions and beliefs).\textsuperscript{139}

Barclay also indicates that there are some ‘logical’ faults in stepping into the conscience, and that it is against the nature of Christianity. As Jesus’ words clearly express,\textsuperscript{140} God’s realm does not belong to this earthly world. His kingdom is set up and upheld only through spiritual convincement and persuasion by inward light, not by any political coercive force.\textsuperscript{141} It is achieved by spiritual wars against carnal powers within and without, a process that is unlike political struggles in secular kingdoms.\textsuperscript{142} Barclay argues that if magistrates force the citizens to believe in a certain set of religious tenets for the sake of earthly or political unity, this forced faith will turn the citizens into the very sort of ‘hypocrites,’ which actually civil authorities intend to eliminate.\textsuperscript{143} Also, forcing faith upon others is utterly inconsistent with the nature of Christian Gospel.\textsuperscript{144} In Barclay’s view, persecution emerges from self-proud love, and from

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[137] Barclay, \textit{Apology}, p. 466. See also Barclay and Keith, ‘Quakerism Confirmed,’ p. 663 and 665.
\item[138] Barclay, \textit{Apology}, p. 467 and 470. See also Barclay and Keith, ‘Quakerism Confirmed,’ p. 666.
\item[139] Barclay, ‘Universal Love,’ pp. 687-692.
\item[140] John 18:36.
\item[141] Barclay, \textit{Apology}, p. 463 and 468.
\item[143] Barclay, \textit{Apology}, p. 470.
\item[144] Barclay, \textit{Apology}, p. 464.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
unwillingness to suffer. These feelings tempt political oppressors to use violence in efforts to avoid being tortured by their adversaries.\textsuperscript{145} Priests and pastors instigate politicians and the public to attack one another. Also, they even consider themselves to be law-abiding in God’s mercy, while considering their enemies to be lawless, merely because the adversaries seem foreign and different to them ideologically.\textsuperscript{146} For Barclay, this is quite unreasonable and contradictory in itself, arguing that ‘They [opponents] have no reason to persecute us, because they are in the wrong, and we in the right is but miserably to beg the question. Doth not this doctrine strengthen the hands of the persecutors every where, and that rationally, from a principle of self-preservation?\textsuperscript{147}’ In Barclay’s view, the values of self-interest or self-proximity are quite against the core principle of Christianity and Christ’s love. Barclay blames civil magistrates and church ministers, because despite their nominal status as Christians, they grossly offend Christ himself with their actions.\textsuperscript{148} In regard to this, Barclay urges that secular powers should allow for ‘the liberty of conscience,’ with the condition that this liberty should only be allowed ‘as long as it is not against commonwealth.’ He also urges that secular authorities should turn their eyes towards God’s true guide, and rule over the country as a Christian who expects the true Kingdom to be realised in the future world.\textsuperscript{149}

\textbf{b. National Church and Sectarian Church}

One inevitable consequence of Barclay’s logic on the separation of the Two Kingdoms is that the Christian Church must not constitute the ‘National Church,’ nor should Christians

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\textsuperscript{145} Barclay, Apology, p. 465 and 479. \\
\textsuperscript{146} Barclay, Apology, p. 472. Barclay, ‘Universal Love,’ p. 684. \\
\textsuperscript{147} Barclay, Apology, p. 472. \\
\textsuperscript{148} Barclay, Apology, p. 465. \\
\textsuperscript{149} Barclay, Apology, p. 542.
\end{flushleft}
belong to such an organisation.\textsuperscript{150} We can point out several other positions such as Anti-clericalism and Anti-tithing,\textsuperscript{151} for Quakers was convinced that priesthood and tithing in those days had fallen to be merely commercial dealings of religion.\textsuperscript{152} In any event, for Barclay, the State Church system indicates that non-members and outcasts from the State Church become non-members and outcasts from the nation itself.\textsuperscript{153} This automatically deprives citizens, who are not born into the diocese or parish by their own will, of natural rights and privilege (the rights of freedom, life, property, etc.). Such citizens have no choice but to conform to the detailed regulations enforced by the nation to restrain their consciences.\textsuperscript{154} Barclay argues that such regulation is utterly against the loving nature of God, who ‘makes His sun rise on the evil and on the good, and sends rain on the just and on the unjust.’\textsuperscript{155}

On the other hand, Barclay insists, the Christian Church must not assume the characteristics of a ‘sect’ or ‘denomination.’ In this case, a sect has two characteristics; one is that its members are gathered and joined by mere agreement to one particular judgment or opinion. The other is that the formation of a sect is motivated by self-love.\textsuperscript{156} As to the latter point, Barclay’s stance is similar to his opinions on self-love or self-preservation in the case of persecution. Sectarians, as well, advance their own agendas by the strength of their own spirits such as outward political pressures and coercive force, revealing their real nature to be against

\textsuperscript{150} Barclay, ‘Universal Love,’ p. 691.
\textsuperscript{152} Commercialism is one of the significant themes that Quakerism criticised as ‘self-respect,’ which dealt with religious things in the name of God, but ultimately for the care of interest in terms of money and social status. The discussion is fully developed by Barclay in the tenth proposition ‘Concerning the Ministry’ in \textit{Apology} (Barclay, \textit{Apology}, p. 302).
\textsuperscript{153} Barclay, ‘Universal Love,’ p. 691.
\textsuperscript{154} Barclay, ‘Universal Love,’ p. 691.
\textsuperscript{155} Matt. 5:45.
\textsuperscript{156} Barclay, ‘Universal Love,’ p. 698.
Returning to the first characteristic of sect and denomination, according to Barclay’s definition, ‘a Sect is a Company of People following the Opinions and Inventions of a particular Man or Men, to which they adhere more, and for which they are more Zealous, than for the Simple, Plain and Necessary Doctrine of Christ.’ A sect is created by agreements on outward notions and opinions, not by God’s operation. However, true fellowship would never break down, if there are different people of different opinions and judgments. This is because the Church depends on the unity of hearts by ‘the prevailing of the same Life of Righteousness.’ This may sometimes lead to the unanimous agreement on certain judgments or the same understandings, however. Furthermore, for Barclay, believers who follow and accept the teachings of Christ are simply called Christians, and they never create any particular ideological outer wall of identification. Barclay says that the principle of unity in the Church is based on a sense of want, and the operations provided by otherness which fill the want.

The manner of their Gathering was by a secret Want, which many truly tender and serious Souls in divers and sundry Sects found in themselves: which put each Sect upon the Search of something beyond all Opinions, which might satisfy their weary Souls, even the Revelation of God’s righteous Judgment in their Heart to burn up the unrighteous Root and Fruits thereof; that the same being destroyed and done away, the inward Peace and Joy of the Holy Spirit in the Soul might be felt to abound, and thence Power and Life to follow him in all his Commandments.

And so many came to be joined and united together in Heart and Spirit in this one Life of

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159 Barclay, ‘Universal Love,’ p. 697.
Thus, Barclay points out, the Church has an utter different nature than other human authorities including national authority in terms of the principle of integration, as found in Augustine’s argument about the distinctive nature of the Church based upon caritas. Now, as some researchers indicate, regrettably, Barclay does not provide concrete clear pictures of the end-time. Certainly, it is unclear when Barclay believes God’s rulings will finally be established on earth, nor how God’s and earthly authorities of the Two Kingdoms will be bridged. However, this does not mean that Barclay’s theology lacks the theological dimension of eschatology, especially in comparison with the theology of the first generation. Given the sense of the receding time at that time, and the general theological tendency to emphasise the more practical dimensions of the Christian message, the important question to be asked is what Barclay thinks of the ‘present’ and ‘future’ role of the Church both in the ‘realised’ and ‘realising’ Kingdom, which has a distinctive nature from that of political hegemonies and secular authorities.

162 Barclay, ‘Universal Love,’ p. 697. The phrase ‘by a secret Want’ and its following words about the divine operation cannot be misunderstood as something metaphysical or ontological value that gives particular immanent meaning or identical determinant to an institutional system. Barclay’s discussion on Christianity and its main principle of love positively shows a loophole of human existence and the world as the place of grace. It is in this sense that the sense of Want works for the formative power of a Quaker meeting. Refer to Nancy’s discussion of the necessity of community as being with others, as shown in the footnote 177 in this chapter.
165 One example is that Barclay refers to the book of apocalypse, the Revelation of John, only a few times. In most cases, he uses these texts of John for supporting the doctrine of Christ’s light in the scheme of the battle between light and darkness. Throughout all his writings, he only gives a vague hopeful image of the final convergence of the Church into God’s Kingdom through Quaker missionaries.
5.2.3. Church as the Place of Reconciliation and Setting-up of Role Model

It is admitted that the Quaker Church does have particular ideological determinants, such as ‘the Truth professed and owned,’ which actually function to keep Quakerism united and to exclude heterogeneous elements. However, as observed above, this kind of mechanism could not be dispensed with in forming any organisation and especially in the process of decision-making. The Christian principle of love, revealed especially in the example of ‘powerlessness’ of Christ on the Cross, merely works as a critical or counter-testimony against human self-orientation. Love itself does not exercise any powers of formation. It is by practice on the side of believers as a co-worker with God that the church establishment and ministerial work are cooperatively performed. There must be some mediacy by humans. Moreover, it should be also stated that, in the history of Christianity, the idea of ‘God,’ particularly as identified with ‘the Natural Law,’ played a role as the metaphysical ground for building up and maintaining state-sponsored religious institutions. Undeniably, Quakers also used such metaphysical speech in their missions and theological writings. However, as discussed in the second chapter, God as perceived by humans is not God itself; this is a result of the reductive nature of human recognition and the limitations of verbal limitation. One cannot help but to express ‘God’ by using the possessive adjectives ‘my’ or ‘our.’ It is ‘I’ who am actually sitting on the top of a human-centered view of the entire world. Mediacy is necessary,

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166 Barclay, ‘Anarchy,’ p. 216.
167 See 5.1.3. in this thesis.
168 Barclay, Apology, p. 147.
169 It is often said that Quakerism was mainly based on Pauline and Johannine theologies (Howard H. Brinton, *Friends for 300 Years: The History and Belief of the Society of Friends since George Fox Started the Quaker Movement* (Wallingford, PA.: Pendle Hill Publications, 1965), p. 17 and 38). Especially Johannine theology was affected by Greco-Roman ideologies and metaphysics such as Gnosticism in the process of the propagation of the Gospel to the heathen world. See the article of ‘Gnosticism’ in Alan Richardson and John Bowden, ed. *A New Dictionary of Christian Theology* (London: SCM Press, 1983).
but this is the very point where Christian love goes head to head against human logic. Reduction of otherness or others is the very opposite of Christ’s command to ‘love one’s enemies,’ and it is against his example of death on the Cross. Nevertheless, it is true that realistic church management needs to be accomplished by the aggregation of limited human knowledge about God including tradition, the Bible, and joint-testimony. Focusing upon these difficult factors, this subsection questions what sort of task the Christian Church should take on as the realised and realising peaceful Kingdom of God on earth between the possibility and impossibility of God-human or self-other relations.

Generally speaking, Barclay’s theology and traditional Quakerism tend to focus all the theological themes on its main tenet of the inward light manifested within human interiority. Quakers seem only to have placed emphasis on the individualistic side of religion, lacking a sense of the historical or collective elements involved. Certainly, the Quaker movement originally belonged to the larger ideological modern tides such as the Reformation, where individuals tried to take back their political or religious initiatives from the Old Order. Nevertheless, Quakers regarded their own movement as the restoration of ‘the eternal Gospel’ long lost in the period of apostasy since the Apostle days. This is a key issue in considering the Quakers’ views on the realising and realised Kingdom as the communal relationship between self and others.

170 Refer back to Barclay’s distinction between natural (external) and spiritual (internal) acts, as examined in 5.1.1. in this thesis. His discussion of the necessity of realistic ecclesial management has the same structure of argument as that of human natural and spiritual duties.

a. The Necessity of Narrative Scheme for Human Existence

Before entering the further discussion on the issue, as a preliminary study, I briefly explore the deep mental conditions of modern people who take ‘freedom’ and ‘self-judgment’ for granted. Human beings are usually preoccupied with some sort of prejudices or biases. Of course, in some sense, prejudgments enable people to look at things or behave in a certain manner suitable for their own historical and social contexts, but it is quite important to understand what constitutes our biases so as to gain a clear vision on the further analysis on Barclay’s ecclesiological scope. Then, after the investigation, I discuss the Quaker perspective on the Church’s undertaking to foreshow the peaceful rule of God on earth, partly by adopting Narrative Theology.

Freedom is, by its general definition, ‘The state of being able to act without hindrance or restrain.’ People who live in so-called free nations enjoy ‘freedom’ as a given, regard ‘self-decision’ as an inherent part of their personalities, and think it important to respect one another’s freedom of choice as a fundamental human right. Yes, these are in fact true. However, it will be quite a complicate problem to discern to what extent people today make their decisions autonomously, and how free they are to behave as they like in actuality. Human beings are quite deeply conditioned in terms of the way they feel, think and act, for example, by biological instincts and impulses. On a daily basis, people do not utilise their own powers of judgment and comprehension to make decisions by thoroughly considering and understanding every relevant factor in a given circumstance. Because they do not have enough time nor enough intellectual and mental leeway to make judgments about everything at every moment, people usually leave

their decisions in suspense and, consciously or unconsciously, choose to conform to the pre-established value systems such as prevalent social rules and standards, or they simply conform to the opinions of others. Particularly in a modern life, the social system has been highly developed and fractured, consequently causing people to lose a sense of control over their own lives. Consequently, people tend to unconsciously abandon their powers of self-judgment, allowing themselves to be carried along by the waves of sensational discourses spawned by the media or anonymous opinions.\textsuperscript{173} They try to transcend their own tiny individual beings by identifying themselves with the popular social tides. It was a psychologist, Erich Fromm (1900-80), and his writing \textit{The Fear of Freedom} (1941) that thematised such abandonment of freedom through his analysis of the mass-psychology which supported Nazi-Germany. According to Fromm, modern people, who have been emancipated from the medieval bondages, cannot stand the sense of solitude and powerlessness, which liberty itself has brought upon them, and they will readily flee from their own autonomy.\textsuperscript{174}

After the two world wars in the last century, in reconsidering Grand narratives that recollected individual freedom into the authority such as nationalism and imperialism, western countries have been groping for a way out through various fields of politics, philosophy and religion.\textsuperscript{175} Surely, Grand narratives and Grand theories have somewhat lost their centripetal force. However, in contrast, individual freedom has become excessively emphasised, resulting in the de-centralisation of community and the loss of a sense of social responsibility. Namely,
there are a lot of small narratives and theories put forth by individuals or small groups, and mega-Grand narratives such as (pseudo-) religion and ethnocentrism, which stand together side by side in place of the old Grand narratives. In such a pluralistic situation, each small narrative maintain an apathetic attitude towards others, but if there is a conflict between their interests, these narratives easily cause violent clashes, (which often go beyond the mere legal binding force of one country and even the possibility of political mediation between nations). The world today is facing no less chaotic situations than in the past.

The modern idea of human beings as ‘rational’ and ‘autonomic’ (and the modern concept of a society as a collection of individuals) is not the substantial definition of human nature, but rather it is a kind of telos to be unceasingly pursued as an ideal in the context of Modernism. Of course, it is not worthwhile to continue to strive towards the ideal in present-day society. Nonetheless, I think that several facts should be admitted. (1): human beings sometimes act in unreasonable ways. (2): There is a limitation on the powers of human judgment, and therefore they often rely on other people’s opinions. (3): Humans cannot dispense with some type of narrative as a Meta-scheme in order to understand how they should conduct themselves, and as a function to integrate individuals into a society. All these points boil down to the fact that it is more useful to recognise the necessity of a narrative as a communal guide or an example for people in daily life than to entirely deny its worth (as Nancy points out), and also to consider how to coordinate the relationships between individual and social stories, even in

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177 As seen above, Nancy sharply criticises the function of community that attempts to reabsorb individual death. However, he does not deny the significance of community as being with others: ‘We are condemned, or rather reduced, to search for this meaning beyond meaning of death elsewhere in community. But the enterprise is absurd (it is absurdity of a thought derived from the individual). Death is indissociable from community, for it is through death the community reveals itself—and reciprocally.’ (Nancy, The Inoperative Community, p. 14).
Church life.\textsuperscript{178}

b. Task of Testifying to Peace in a Quaker Way

Looking back at the Quaker narration of God’s ruling in this world, Barclay as well as earlier Quakers seems not to have provided enough concrete and clear visions of the church task on the human side, only focusing upon the spiritual power of inward light. In fact, Barclay argues that God will teach us how to live a daily religious life: ‘God is teacher of his people himself.’\textsuperscript{179} The inward divine principle that teaches everything to everyone individually is precisely consistent with the modern ideology of individual free-decision. However, it is also true that Barclay does realise the significance of standards such as tradition, the Bible, and joint-testimony. Also, in comparison with the importance placed on inward light, these things are not spoken of in an emphatic way. This is probably because Quakers in those days took the biblical world-view for granted, and gave precedence to expounding their new revelation of the old truth shown through the light without feeling a need to defend such standards.\textsuperscript{180}

Furthermore, the divine principle in everyone’s heart was to criticise the institutionalised religion, which had re-appropriated God’s truth to the profit of secular magistrates and ministers, who declared their own authenticity, authority and power to be granted by God.\textsuperscript{181} This theological

\textsuperscript{178} In explaining the thought of H. Richard Niebuhr, Macquarrie points out the significance of the correlation between faith and history: ‘religious attitudes are always conditioned by the historical society by which they are held. It follows then that no theology can prescribe universal conditions for the religious life, beyond its own historical point of view; …In the Christian community, we confess the whole biblical tradition as our history, and find in it the luminous moments which give meaning to our lives and indeed to all history.’ (John Macquarrie, \textit{Twentieth Century Religious Thought: The Frontiers of Philosophy and Theology, 1900-1980}, revised ed. (London: SCM Press, 1981), p.348).

\textsuperscript{179} Barclay, \textit{Apology}, p. 87.


orientation of Quakerism, along with other factors such as socio-economical situations, might have allowed the later adherents and followers to perceive the religion as spiritually-inner-focused.\textsuperscript{182} However, in Barclay’s view, these outward religious aspects would be in final agreement with the workings of the light, and in this regard, they have practical significance for guiding and inviting believers to the correct path towards God’s truth.\textsuperscript{183} In regard to the significance of knowledge of history, Barclay states: ‘The history then is profitable and comfortable, with the mystery, and never without it; but the mystery is, and may be profitable without the explicit and outward knowledge of the history.’\textsuperscript{184}

Given that human beings cannot live without some narrative or scheme to give them cultural patterns particular to the society or community that they have been born into, it can be comprehensively said that Quakers have to tell a story about God, and that this future-formative story should on one hand stand within their own historical and traditional contexts, and on the other hand be open to the divine principle of inward light. This is because a tradition or narrative of community is not merely the thing that nurtures its member, but also the thing by which they can create a community with fresh insights. Therefore, in Barclay’s view, Quakers are the people of God who testify to a hopeful and peaceful church community.\textsuperscript{185} Barclay says about the task of Quakers:

\textsuperscript{182} As to the theological changes of Quietism in the eighteenth century, see the examples of Bathurst and Scott in the second chapter. As discussed in the first chapter, the thesis regards Quaker thought not as an inner or experimental religion, but rather as a counter-faith against self-reductive religions and ideologies.

\textsuperscript{183} Barclay, \textit{Apology}, p. 26.

\textsuperscript{184} Barclay, \textit{Apology}, p. 141. It must be noted that Barclay also stresses the possibility for those who live outside the range of the Gospel preaching to know God through the workings of inward light given to everyone. Barclay says, ‘By the inward and effectual operations of which, as many heathens have come to be partakers of the promises who were not of the seed of Abraham after the flesh, so may some now, to whom God hath rendered the knowledge of the history impossible, come to be saved by Christ.’ (Barclay, \textit{Apology}, p. 171).

he [Christ] hath now again the *Second time Appeared*, and is appearing in *Ten Thousands of his Saints*; in and among whom (as a *first Fruits* of many more, that shall be gathered) he is restoring the *Golden Age*, and bringing them into the *Holy Order and Government of his own Son*,

who is *ruling*, and to *rule* in the midst of them, setting forth the *Cousellors* as at the *Beginning*, and *Judges* as at *first*; and establishing *Truth, Mercy, Righteousness and Judgment* again in the Earth: *Amen, Hallelujah*.

Quakers originally held a particular tradition of showing a high amount of respect towards others, and this stance stemmed from their belief in inward light as inward otherness. Barclay posited the centre of all the Christian teachings upon this principle, as well as upon self-renunciation or denial of self-interest for partaking in the light. This is closely related to Christ’s command to ‘love one’s enemies.’ God-human or self-other relationship is expressed in the theological form of inward light, which is not a thing controllable and computable by human own power. God’s power is not the mere power of human resolution or manipulation. It is powerless power, which often disappoints human expectations, as amply demonstrated in Christ’s helpless miserable death. Christ’s power is the power that invites us to wait and exercise patience against the use of coercion, and consequently opens the door to reconciliation with others and other possibility in the future. Of course, the approach might sometimes be successful and sometimes not. Regardless of the final results, Christians are urged to follow the charitable example set forth by their Lord Christ, and by this criterion, they are, and can be, 

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187 To open the possibility of reconciliation with others is not the same thing as to reach the goal. Liberal Quaker pacifist position might be generally formulated in ‘If we believe peace is possible, it is possible.’ It must be said that this is not so different from magical thinking. Christian peace testimony as in the Bible is that ‘If we do not believe peace is possible, it is not possible.’ The latter proposition is utterly different from the former. For the details of the discussion, refer back to the summary of the third chapter.
called a Christian.\textsuperscript{188} And this practice of love can unveil the communal nature of Christian existence.

As seen in the previous chapters, the Church is expected to be a place for embodying Christ’s ideal of reconciliation with others by accepting the (im-) possibility of self-other relations as a kind of the place of grace, and not regard it as that of threatening and abhorrence. To borrow Hauerwas’ words again, Church is the place of ‘a people who have learned not to fear one another and thus are capable of love.’\textsuperscript{189} Therefore, the Quaker Church, as the gathering of those who ‘go on ahead,’\textsuperscript{190} has to assume the responsibility for telling the story of God and his peaceful people, and give the testimony to the possibility of peace to the world by actually practicing reconciliatory relations with others. Each Quaker member not only lives in the tradition of the community, and at the same time, each member (and the entire church) is expected to behave as a role-model to the world, by demonstrating the old truth of Christianity and the eternal Gospel anew.\textsuperscript{191} As seen above, in such a way, earlier Quakers and Barclay appealed to general people, and ministers and civil magistrates to criticise their inner sins as well as its outward manifestations such as wars and conflicts, and social unfairness and injustice.\textsuperscript{192}

Lastly, this does not mean that whatever goes beyond the reaches of the traditional Quaker peace

\textsuperscript{188} Barclay, ‘Universal Love,’ p. 696.
\textsuperscript{190} Trueblood, Robert Barclay, p. 248.
\textsuperscript{191} ‘and now again in the restitution and renewed preaching of the eternal gospel, they [testimonies both against oath and fighting] are acknowledged as eternal and unchangeable laws, properly belonging to the evangelical state and perfection thereof; from which if any withdraw, he falls short of the perfection of a Christian man.’ (Barclay, Apology, p. 528). See also p. iii and 458, pp. 130-131, Barclay, ‘R. B’s. Apology Vindicated,’ p. 869.
\textsuperscript{192} Moore points out that Quakers appealing to civil kings and magistrates was not always in effect around the Restoration period of severe persecutions, and so they came to employ some strategic approaches for survival, such as lobbyism and the development of theology and literature of sufferings (Moore, The Light in their Conscience, pp. 157-163). See also Reay, The Quakers and the English Revolution, p. 108.
testimony is not Quakerish, for example political activities or humanitarian aids. As to whether Quakers should actively take more pragmatic and practical approaches to peace-keeping or peace-making, the answer depends on the social and political situations surrounding them. When there are a lot of things we can do, if we leave things to God’s workings, we cannot escape the charge of indiscretion, as doing so would be injustice to human nature. After all, (just as Barclay himself grants that human faculties such as reason and conscience function well in the realms of natural matters\textsuperscript{193}), the important thing is that what should be left is left, and what can be done by ourselves should be done by ourselves.\textsuperscript{194} Elimination of the distinction of cans and cants breaks down the sacred dimension of religion. Needless to say, if practical matters are not grounded on the Christian principle of love and its eschatological dimension, but merely on the common ideas of peace and order that are sometimes identified as containing no oppositions and no differences, they could end in a mere expansion of a certain political or ideological hegemony that is based on my or our self-based norms. When making realistic and pragmatic decisions, Quakers are urged to listen to voices of God as otherness and others in every moment through the rhetorical and theological framework of inward light.

It can be also pointed out that a narrative or tradition is not always correct. There are a lot of varieties of Grand narratives and theories, which range from destructive ones which willingly resorted to exclusive and exploitive violence, such as Imperialism, Nazism, Communism, and Japan’s Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, to more constructive ones. The question of

\textsuperscript{193} Barclay, \textit{Apology}, p. 143.

\textsuperscript{194} This is what Hauerwas appreciates Niebuhr’s patience for realising relative justices in the world (Hauerwas, \textit{The Peaceable Kingdom}, p. 140), as well expressed in Niebuhr’s serenity prayer: ‘O God, give us serenity to accept what cannot be changed, courage to change what should be changed, and wisdom to distinguish the one from the other.’
what should be the criterion for deciding the properness of a narrative cannot be fully answered (asking such a question itself is unconsciously a result of the unconscious temptation to calculate uncontrollable things). However, Hauerwas suggests two tests for determining what sorts of narratives are truthful. (1): The first test is whether a narrative is open to changes or not. He says, ‘At least one of the conditions of a truthful tradition is its own recognition that it is not final, that it needs to grow and change if it is to adequately shape our futures in a faithful manner.’ For Hauerwas, growth to true religious freedom is realised by learning ‘to trust others and make ourselves available to be trusted by others.’ (2): The second test, (which is the opposite side of the coin of the first) is whether a narrative is sustainable. In Hauerwas’ view, the Christian Church does have some particular prohibitions, which are traditionally called ‘Casuistry.’ These prohibitions serve as ‘the markers of the outer limits of the communal self-understandings.’ However, these prohibitions, traditions and narratives are challenged by the ongoing experiences of believers living in the world, and if these things can be more open to the outer world and others, then they would be renewed. For Hauerwas, ‘the telos [of a community] in fact is a narrative, and the good is not so much a clearly defined “end” as it is a sense of the journey on which that community finds itself.’ That is, the most significant task and goal of the Christian Church is not to think of how members can actually change the world, but to be the people who continue to tell the eschatological hope for God’s ruling and to show Christ’s peaceable way of living.

Barclay says about God’s victory over the world:

195 Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 45.
196 Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 46.
197 Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 119.
198 Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 119.
199 Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 119.
200 Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 99 and 128. He also says, ‘The church must learn time and time again that its task is not to make the world the kingdom, but to be faithful to the kingdom by showing to the world what it means to be a community of peace.’ (Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, p.103).
Yet because the Lord has Chosen them [Quakers] to be a First Fruit of that Glorious Work, which he is bringing about in the Nations; therefore they hitherto have, notwithstanding of all that Opposition, and yet shall Prosper: By a Patience Enduring in the Spirit of Jesus they do and shall OVERCOME.201

If the core messages of Christianity in Barclay’s theology, (namely the communal dimension of self-other relations as revealed in Christ and his supreme command to ‘love one’s enemies’), are remembered, Barclay’s words about God’s victory come to take a different tone. It is not by exercising force to control the world, but by living within and manifesting a narrative that may seem to be ‘foolishness’ to the world,202 that Christians will open the possibility of peaceable relationship. By addressing other people in such a way, Christians also invite them to follow the same path. Over all, this is the whole outline of Barclay’s peace testimony, and I think that this is the hope that Barclay is imploring us to live with.203

5. 3. The Significance of Barclay’s Peace Testimony in Present Times

This final section explores the questions that are the main theme of the thesis; to what extent Barclay’s pacifism can be practicable in the present situations, and what Barclay can say about the neo-orthodox criticism against Quakers and the just-war theory. Some might think that

201 Barclay, ‘Epistle of Love,’ p. 714.
202 1 Cor. 1:18.
203 Barclay’s peace testimony was not peculiar; the message was broadly shared among Quakers of his days and later days. Citing the cases of Joseph Hoag (1762-1846) and Thomas Story (1666-1742), Brinton indicates that ‘Most [Quaker journals] include the assertion that the writer is willing to live as if the Kingdom of Heaven had arrived in himself since he believed that that is the only way the Kingdom can eventually come.’ (Brinton, Quaker Journals, p. 60).
peace studies in the present day must be dealt with as issues of research in economics, politics and social studies, or even in polemology; for example, as in research with the aims of reaching an economic balance, expanding human fundamental rights, or preserving the equilibrium between national powers. Attempts to achieve these things are of course desirable, if compared with the alternatives of economic imbalance, social instability or tyrannical polity, but such problems would be better left to experts or to specialists in each field, (or to collaborative work with them). Therefore, these aforementioned matters do not come into the scope of this theological work. The reason for this is that the first task of the Church and its goal are, as seen above, to tell the message of God, in which people are nurtured and encouraged to discover proper methods for living together in harmony with others.

First, I briefly review the neo-orthodox stance regarding Liberal Quakerism. As shown in the cases of the Liberals, as well as Valentine, Quakers even today, (if not all), continue to believe nonviolence to be the most powerful and practical means to realise peace among human beings. As we have seen, Niebuhr distinguished religious pacifism from pragmatic pacifism; the former, Niebuhr argued, tries to follow the patterns of Jesus Christ; and even if this approach is not so effective at the practical level, it might sometimes work as a counter-testimony against the humanistic and self-centric ways of human life. The latter form, including Liberal Quaker pacifism, in Niebuhr’s view, irresponsibly neglects the inescapable reality of sin, or power relations, and consequently not hesitates to sacrifice other people while placing themselves in safer places. Speaking from a different theological angle, these Quakers fall into the same error evident in the sixteenth-century controversies between Arminianism and Calvinism. That is, they optimistically presume the calculability of peaceful relations with others through the
method of nonviolence, just as Arminians at that time counted upon God’s salvation through the method of human voluntary response. Both theological approaches can be regarded as forms of self-righteousness in trying to re-appropriate and subordinate otherness or others by their own intent. This might have contributed further to convincing the orthodox theologian, Niebuhr, of the ultimate impossibility and limitation of human justice and fairness, (just as the human-centric Arminian tendency further reinforced the Calvinistic view that human nature is innately depraved).

Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that Niebuhr’s just-war theory also had a problem. I will not repeat the details of Niebuhr’s theological weak point here, but simply saying, Niebuhr’s stance persists in seeing the self as fundamental and otherness as threatening. This is apparent in Niebuhr’s coherent view of human relations as mere a place of sin and conflicts. And he tended to focus merely upon relative social orders and to be finally absorbed in the methodology of controllability or calculability. Consequently, his stance is highly likely to shut out the possibility of dialogue itself. As seen in the third chapter, it is this calculability that religious pacifists, Yoder and Hauerwas, entirely refuted. They contrastively put much stress on the distinctive nature of the Christian Church, in comparison with ordinary human organisations that are motivated by self-preservation. For these pacifists, Christians are people who have been given the new ethical possibility of conquering human sin, and of forming a new human community as the holy Body of Christ. This view is undoubtedly based upon the Bible and it is the very testimony that Christianity (and Quakerism) have tried to portray as ‘the light

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204 Refer back to 3.3.2. in this thesis.
206 Refer back to 3.2.2. and 3.2.3. in this thesis.
of the world’ and ‘a city that is set on a hill.’ (It is another matter whether the Church actually has succeeded in meeting its own standards throughout history).

Now, if it is allowable to cite one case of a still-raw example for a case study of the significance of Christian pacifism, in 2006 in Nickel Mines, Pennsylvania, several children in an Amish school were shot to death by a man living nearby (the shooter was not Amish, and he subsequently committed suicide on the spot). The local Amish community almost instantly stated that they held no hard feelings towards the offender, and they went on to offer their forgiveness to his family. This forgiveness was expressed according to the Christian tradition and its peace testimony, and particularly to the religious and cultural customs that the community has fostered. This extension of Amish grace, more so than the incident itself, spread deep amazement throughout the entire country. Soon, reactions to this incident induced heavy criticism of the Bush government, and called into question whether or not this kind of religious charity should and could be applied to US politics and to foreign policy. This is a good example of a key issue for further consideration of the possibility of applying any particular religious peace testimony, including Barclay’s pacifism, to the present-day situation. Surely, as Niebuhr points out, Amish people and their religious pacifism played a large role in giving people there the chance to reflect upon their self-interested way of life. Yet, it does not follow that peace testimony is always effective in any given situation, or that it can be easily practiced at the political level in any given society. Modern societies or communities contain a variety of people with different beliefs and thoughts, and this fact virtually all but eliminates the

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207 Matt. 5:14.
209 As to the details of reactions of the US society to the incident, see the fifth chapter in Kraybill, Amish Grace.
possibility for a single one ideological or religious position to be shared across the entire society. (Setting aside society-integrating principles such as national identity), if people are forced by the society to accept a particular belief and faith without any agreements, (more specifically in this case, when someone intends to attack another person’s child, if the child’s parents are politically and ideologically required to let the offender achieve his or her goal, this type of requirement would naturally be charged as personal irresponsibility, as a form of social irresponsibility). As Barclay argued, pacifism or nonviolence is totally the opposite of the human natural instinct of self-preservation, and if it is imposed even upon people unprepared (those who have not yet come to the Gospel), this imposition could easily turn into another sort of violence. 210

As long argued in regard to the traditional theological theme of ‘the Two Kingdoms,’ there is a large gap between social institutions or secular kingdoms that are founded upon the legal system of reward and retribution, and the Kingdom of God upon selfless love. There is a large gap between the general human reductive principle, and the critical and transcendental religious principle. These two principles are incompatible in many aspects, and so if they are forcibly or hastily amalgamated, there would bear various crucial consequences; for example, in many case of politicised religion such as medieval Catholicism and Protestantism, belief in God is often related to the logic of humanistic retribution, making God a mere tool for the purpose of ruling others. On the other hand, in the case of religiously influenced political system, where the social members are forced unconditionally to forgive and accept anything that has been done to them, the community could fall into anarchistic, irresponsible disorders. Actually, this is the thing which the Amish, who have devoted themselves to the way of Christ’s life, never hope for.

210 Barclay, Apology, pp. 531-536.
The Amish approve of the sword-power held by secular kings and magistrates.\textsuperscript{211}

Nevertheless, we must not assume that religious pacifism is unable to do something in the secular world, (but to expect casual effects of religious testimony, or to leave everything to the eschatological hope for God’s rule). As Hauerwas argues, human beings are those who foster, and are fostered in, each history and tradition. Histories and traditions culturally determine people’s behavioral patterns, and they can reform or recreate these histories and traditions. On this point, the author of \textit{Amish Grace} hints at the significance of the formation of a culture that nurtures forgiveness.

What we learn from the Amish, both at Nickel Mines and more generally, is that how we choose to move on from tragic injustice is culturally formed. 

How might the rest of us move in that direction? Most of us have been formed by a culture that nourishes revenge and mocks grace. 

Running against that grain [of revenge], finding alternative ways to imagine our world, ways that in turn will facilitate forgiveness, takes more than individual willpower. We are not only the products of our culture, we are also producers of our culture. We need to construct cultures that value and nurture forgiveness. In their own way, the Amish have constructed such an environment. The challenge for the rest of us is to use \textit{our} resources creatively to shape cultures that discourage revenge as a first response.\textsuperscript{212}

In the pluralistic world of today, it is no longer possible to have a naïve dream of sharing one

\textsuperscript{211} Kraybill, \textit{Amish Grace}, p. 146 and 170, pp. 177-178.
\textsuperscript{212} Kraybill, \textit{Amish Grace}, pp. 181-182.
particular point of view worldwide, or of establishing the stability through the rule of one transcendental principle. The fault is not attributable to one policy or another, nor one person or another. It must be said that our world is in reality chaotic both in positive and negative senses. Encounters and conflicts with others are common, but the fact is that such relations with others make both possible and impossible the formation of our individual and social identities. Therefore, we have to learn not attempt to control others, but to live with, and get along with them. As so-far examined in the cases of Yoder, Hauerwas, and also Barclay, the Christian Church has the special task of preaching the Gospel and testifying to the realised and coming of God’s Kingdom on earth, or the communal way of life which re-questions the human logic of self-reduction and self-retribution. At the same time, since we have to move forward in our lives by making all decisions at every moment, even if decision-making usually means driving a violent wedge among people, we cannot simply remain in a state of indeterminism (as often argued under the post-modernistic slogan). After all, the most important thing is that whilst we make necessary judgments in daily lives and business activities, if we make sure not to forget that such judgments are ultimately temporal, this recognition will open the door to other possibilities. We also should keep in mind that this openness to others will give us all the more chances (if not always). This is fully expressed in Jesus’ words: ‘Whoever seeks to save his life will lose it, and whoever loses his life will preserve it.’

To reach settlements in a society or world and to control conflicting interests, we actually need to

\[213 \text{ Luke 17:33.}\]
consider each matter from manifold perspectives, for example, economics, politics, group psychology and cultural studies, and like that. There remains only a small task for religion to carry out in order to construct a peaceable society or world. As Niebuhr advocates (and as many present-day Christian churches demonstrate in practice), more practical efforts and measures should be taken for peace-keeping or peace-making. But I believe that the Christian narrative of Jesus’ life and death gives us the courage to admit the insufficiency of human existence and our desire of self-centralisation, and to accept different others as graceful complements to the self, and that it shows us the possibility of new life for our own self as well as others’ selves. Christians must preserve the Church as a place to continue telling such a story of reconciliation to the world from generation to generation. Also, Quakers have to take over the task of Gospel-preaching, by acquainting themselves with their peculiar theological scheme of ‘inward light.’ This is digested into the rediscovery and revival of the self within the communal state with otherness and others.

Summary

Barclay developed theological arguments for supporting the foundation of the Quaker church system by using the double structures of ‘now’ and ‘hereafter,’ which are fully expressed in his view on the (im-) possibility of personal perfection and its communal realisation in God’s Kingdom as the Church. Of course, the nation-wide church was established by Quaker leaders with several practical social motivations; (mainly the necessity of countermeasures against harsh political pressures, and religious persecutions, which made them keenly aware of the high probability of the group’s extinction). Barclay’s theology in the second generation must be above all placed within these particular kinds of socio-ideological contexts, such as the receding
enthusiasm of pre-millennialism, the revision of religious fanaticism, and also within the context of his special task to systematise Quaker thoughts for the vindication of their faith. Faced with such social conditions, Barclay attempted to justify the ecclesiological construction with some checking systems of extremities, by putting more emphasis on the public side of Quaker faith. In regard to church authority (including the establishment of some ministerial roles such as elders, and the setting-up of pastoral and practical businesses, and the theological justification of church judgments), these arrangements were intended for the instruction of the entire congregation and for the maintenance of ‘oneness’ of the group. The concept of oneness or unity, which required the agreement of all its members, sounds quite contrary to the Quaker core tenet of inward light. This criticism has been repeatedly made, declaring the second-generation theological revision (including Barclay’s theology) to be false. However, it can be said that Barclay’s ecclesiology was developed in a bifocal ways, reflecting both the ‘now’ and ‘hereafter,’ both the two-sidedness of perfection and God’s Kingdom. These double-structures make room for the (im-) possibility of both God-human and self-other relationships. In Barclay’s view, the authoritative judgment of the entire church was designed practically to facilitate the decision-making necessary in daily affairs. At the same time, ‘oneness’ of Church was not a mere hegemonic expansion of a particular opinion of one particular office or person or another, but it was considered to be the divine work of sanctification itself. The authoritative work of ‘oneness’ was thoroughly connected to, and referred to, believers’ fulfillment of the supreme command of the Lord Christ, ‘love one’s enemies.’ On this point, Barclay’s view of the ecclesial authority was theoretically equipped with a function that re-questions the self-closedness or immanentism of decisions in every moment. Surely, a theory does not mean to be always applicable at the practical level; it actually requires processes of trial-and-error on the part of the
people engaged. Nevertheless, at the point, Barclay expected that the Church would become the place for Christian communal truth to be revealed, and the place for the peaceful Kingdom to be realised as a living testimony to God to the world.

Furthermore, Barclay’s church ethics was also applied to the people outside who are believed to be equally endowed with the light of Christ. This approach towards others would finally bear its fruit in the Quaker peace testimony. In Barclay’s eyes, the main cause of war and conflict is the human self-centric tendency of neglecting, and opposing to, the life and virtue of Christianity. This virtue was revealed in Jesus’ way of life and death on the Cross; that is, the principle of Christ’s love that requires believers to go beyond the humanistic logic of self-reward and self-retribution. For Barclay, the first step towards the divine goodness is to open the mind to, and to accept the voices of, the inward otherness that is theologically formulated as ‘inward light,’ which guides them to the recognition of the communal nature of human existence. Therefore, Barclay’s primary methodology in pacifism was, not to work upon a society in some politically practical way or another, but rather to make appeals to people as well as to magistrates by spiritually turning their attention to the workings of the light within. On this point, he also expected that Quakers as the few referred to in the phrase ‘a few go on ahead’ must present themselves as role-models, or as people who live peacefully with others as embodiments of the ideal of God’s rule on earth.

This kind of religious pacifism as testimony, as also seen in the Amish case, was intended to be devoted to following the example of Jesus Christ in the Bible; it did not matter whether it was socially effective or not. (Indeed, the motif of victory over the sins of the world is often given in the religious or theological scheme of ‘God’s providence,’ which functions finally to recollect believers’ wishes and desires in the eschatological hope). Yet, if pacifism is only
measured in terms of present usefulness and effectiveness in this world, as it is in Liberal Quaker pacifism, it runs the risk of reducing others or otherness back into the realm of calculability or computability, looking upon them merely as objects of manipulation. Despite its banner of social harmony, pacifism based on calculation would eventually end in shutting out the possibility of reconciliation. This is because others, who are abhorrent to the self, are totally others, and the significant problem is how to find a way for keeping better relations with them whilst seeking a mutual feasible consensus in a practical way, without resorting to coercive forces. Thus, religious pacifism is not a method to realise human intention, but rather to change their hope and attitude in such a way that it would work as a counter-testimony against their conscious or unconscious instinct of self-preservation. For this reason, second thought should be given to the immediate application of religious pacifism immediately to real politics and international relations. The dynamics of the secular world, which contains every sort and rank of person, is in complicated adjustments between conflicting-interests; its mechanism is different from that of God’s Kingdom. The imprudent introduction of a particular pacifist faith or belief to this secular dimension might easily go wrong, as Barclay rightly argued, probably creating another sort of violence for the people who ‘have not yet come to the Gospel.’

Nevertheless, it does not follow that religious pacifism cannot make any contribution to the world, nor that it should be confined in a church. Given that human beings depend upon some sort of story or narrative that fundamentally prescribes their behavioral and thought patterns for them, and considering that the re-creation of a social model for the future is the task of the entire members of a community, the first responsibility of culture-formation is to find ways to develop better relationships with others in society, or with other people in other societies. Not to choose hostility towards alien beings, but to arouse doubt in regard to the justification of
such a hasty hostile response,\textsuperscript{214} the Christian narrative of Immanuel God (Go with us) presents a powerful scheme that shows us how to courageously admit our own self-centralised orientations, and to patiently accept different others as graceful, while seeking a new possibility of co-habitation. Christ’s model also gives consolation to those in trouble, and makes other people feel the necessity to work for, and to be with those suffering. This is the thing that ‘opening the door to reconciliation’ with otherness means, regardless of its actual results (See Figure 5). Christian must learn to stand face-to-face with irreducible otherness with hospitality and patience. On this point, in Barclay’s vision, Quakers are urged to keep testifying and representing God’s peace and truth both in their speech and behaviours, by standing in a particular theological tradition of ‘inward light’ as a place of rediscovering and reviving the self in the communality with otherness and others.

\textsuperscript{214} Kraybill, \textit{Amish Grace}, p. 182.
Figure 5:

Christian God = Immanuel God  (God with Us)

Images of Love and Patience in the Story of Jesus

Gives Power to People Suffering  

Acceptance

Otherness: (Death, Sufferings, Unseen Future and Other Beings)

Presents Role-Models of Our Lives and Relations with Others

To be with them
Conclusion

I. Summary and Conclusion

i. The Meaning of Passiveness in Barclay’s Theology

Barclay’s universal redemption consists of three main concepts; ‘Inward Light,’ ‘Day of Visitation,’ and ‘Passiveness.’ In Barclay’s faith, ‘inward light’ purchased by the redemptive work of Christ’s death on the Cross will start to work during ‘each day of visitation.’ It is possible for all people to be saved, if they listen to the voice and ‘does not resist the working in self-denial.’ In a word, the peculiar belief of Quakerism is presented in such a way that ‘obedience to the light or not’ is the diverging point to salvation. Originally, Barclay’s theology was designed to refute the two large ideological tides at that time. Namely, Barclay refutes the conventional universal redemption, particularly that held in Arminianism, which simply advocated the soteriological possibility that all human beings could be saved through their voluntary response to God’s prevenient grace, or human reason. He also intends to rebut the double predestination of orthodox Calvinism, which emphasised God’s absolute sovereignty and so bitterly criticised Arminian unlimited redemption. For, in the Calvinistic view, Arminians grounded salvation on the human side of self-will, not God’s workings. The previous Quaker studies have noted the confrontation of Barclay’s Apology versus Westminster Catechisms, but if Barclay’s double aims are missed in Barclay’s formulation of Quaker redemption, it would result in a misunderstanding of the aims of his thought. To be more specific, (to say nothing of the simple self-willed religion of Arminianism), in Barclay’s view, even orthodox Calvinism is a different version of voluntarism. That is, with the double predestination, it becomes another
serious matter to seek the assurance of the elect at the pastoral level. Calvinists based the assurance of election in human voluntary efforts especially in daily businesses, as formulated in ‘practical syllogism.’ The result was that they brought on a paradoxical situation, where humans virtually could produce their own salvation by themselves. Against these self-oriented religions, Barclay presented the Quakers’ particular understanding of Christian faith by using three concepts mentioned above, so as to clarify the significance of passiveness in God’s salvation. That is, Barclay insists on the necessity of self-denial, by bringing our own thinking, feelings, imaginations and everything to ‘nothingness,’ for the purpose of hearing God’s initial words through ‘inward light’ during ‘day of visitation.’ Yet, there remains one more question as to whether ‘passiveness’ itself is a volitional act or not. Referring to the tradition of Christian mysticism to which, Barclay himself confesses, Quakerism partly belonged, it becomes clear that ‘passiveness’ in Barclay’s theology is the total renunciation of self to such an extent that even the human-will to have faith or to fulfill the will of God is forsaken. In such a way, when a human soul stops its own workings and is brought to nothingness (death on the Cross with Christ), the door of the heart, which otherwise is filled with voices of the self, would be open to the working of God. Then the inward light comes forth in the heart as the spiritual birth (revival with Christ). In this phase, humans can respond to the light, which leads to constitute their new ‘self’ for the first time in the dimension of responsibility to God (otherness). Through this response, they can be accepted by God as his sons and come to enjoy fellowship and communion with God as the Father. Thus, passiveness or nothingness is the crucial element of the Quaker faith in Barclay’s theology, which presents Quakerism as a counter-faith mainly against the two mainstream self-reductive religions in those days, Arminianism and orthodox Calvinism. Therefore, Barclay advises all people to wait silently upon God even by renouncing
their self and even by forsaking their own will to faith.

ii. Changes of Self Concept in Quakerism and the Liberal Historical View

For a long time Barclay’s theology has been negatively estimated to be the main cause of the later decline in the eighteenth century Quietism, by Liberal researchers such as Jones and Braithwaite. Their studies still determine the general direction in the filed of Quaker studies, and this is especially true in the academic estimation of Barclay. However, the thesis clarifies that Quakerism from the first and second generations, and to Quietism and Evangelicalism, preserved a certain theological consistency, including the problematic motif of ‘passiveness.’ That is, the core motifs long-preserved in the traditional Quakerism were (1): the total depravity of human nature, (2): inward light endowed to all people by God for their redemption, and (3): obedience to the light in self-denial for salvation. Of course, according to the changes of the time and of its socio-ideological conditions, there were inevitably several theological modifications (especially around the concept of self) from generation and generation. As to the first and the second generations, (i): one of the large shifts was the receding eschatological sense of the time, which affected Quakers’ views on perfection, or the self-understanding of human sacredness. (ii): The second shift was Quakers’ altered attitude towards the authority of inward light, in terms of whether the light was the only authority in Christian faith and practice, or whether revelations in each heart needed to be tested by communal aspects of faith, such as the Bible, tradition, and joint-experience. (iii): The last shift was the placement of more emphasis upon struggles with sin than upon the victory of regeneration, or upon the significance of self-denial. For example, Fox, under the influence of pre-millennialism, declared the immediate perfection of individual believers and the whole world. In the second generation, such an optimistic view waned into a
more precautious one, resulting in so-called Meantime theology. This was mainly due to the sense of the suspended Kingdom, and to their experience of, and reflection upon, fanaticism in the first generation, (along with other conditions such as strong social pressures from the outside and harsh religious persecutions).

In any case, surprisingly enough, a peculiar set of theological motifs including passiveness was long held in Quakerism up to around the twentieth century. Even by Liberal Quakers, such a traditional religious framework seems to have been maintained rhetorically, but they actually transformed Quakerism into a different type of religion based upon self-affirmation. Namely, their religion was under the deep influence of Neo-Hegelianism, which believed in God’s self-expansion as the process of Truth, and the completion of the human self through auto-regression to the Self as the Origin. Certainly, it is not deniable that metaphysical ideas of God could be found everywhere in traditional Christianity, particularly those which were integrated with Platonism, Aristotelianism, or the concept of the Natural Law. However, it is noteworthy that Liberal Quakerism was based on the peculiar belief in human intimate conjunction with God through human mental faculties such as reason, consciousness and conscience, making Quakerism a religion of human self-realisation. Such a self-complete, self-affirmative faith pushed and has been pushing Liberal Quakers towards a different ideological dimension in comparison with earlier Quakers, leading to the erasure of several traditional beliefs such as ‘the Original Sin’ and ‘redemption.’ Considering these things, it is quite proper to re-check the conventional historical view of Quakerism presented by Liberals, whilst keeping their ideological peculiarity in mind.

As seen above, unlike the Liberal historical view, there existed a dualistic way of thinking and the element of ‘self-denial’ or ‘passiveness’ from the beginning of Quakerism. Theological
alterations from the first to the second generation, and to Quietism and Evangelicalism, were actually to a large extent the results of political, social and ideological dynamism in each period within and out of the religious body. Notwithstanding, in Liberal historiography, the entire Quaker history was re-described from the perspective of Liberal self-affirmative theology based upon the value of intimacy and proximity between the self and God. Liberals naively projected their own distinctive belief in ‘intimacy’ onto the first generation, who seemed to be ‘near’ to themselves in that they stressed victory over sin, and conversely, they projected later unfavourable features onto the second generation including Barclay, who seemed to be ‘remote’ in their assertion of God’s distance. Thus, Liberals depicted Quaker history as a battle between an authentic side and a counterfeit side in terms of ‘intimacy.’ Liberal Quakers, finally triumphing over the latter, attempted to establish their own ideological position as the true heir of the ‘Origin.’ I would say, the Liberal interpretation of Quakerism, especially in regard to the linkages between Barclay and Quietism, is considerably motivated consciously or unconsciously by their particular political and religious values, whilst leaving unheard voices here and there in Quaker history, hidden from the historical stage by the disguise of academic study.

iii. Quaker Peace Testimony in the Twentieth Century

Liberal Quakerism, as also seen in their practice of pacifism, was harshly criticised in the twentieth century by Reinhold Niebuhr, who continues to this day to be influential in the US politics and foreign affairs. In Niebuhr’s view, Liberal Quakers had only an optimistic view of human nature, and they overlooked the fact that human beings inevitably take part in sin, specifically in power-relationships with others. Niebuhr alleged that Liberals naively assume
peace to be possible through adopting the method of nonviolence due to their belief in the sacred nature of human reason and conscience. As shown in the second chapter, behind their assumption of intimacy with God was their deep hope for the reduction of otherness and others according to a Hegelian scheme to unify the self with the whole world. In this sense, it must be said that Niebuhr’s criticism against the Liberals was right to the point. For example, the case of Valentine, in comparison with those of Yoder and Hauerwas, clearly illustrates that Quakers still unconsciously deal with otherness or others as phenomena that are controllable through love or by resorting to the sacredness in each person. Thus, they make God’s love, which is optimistically identified with their own desire, degrade into a reckonable and reasonable method of politics, while ignoring the tension between God and humans (or the dimension of eschatology). Consequently, they seem to have no hesitation in justifying the self-expansion of their own hegemony in the name of the harmony of love. They think little of any possibility for their dreams to be betrayed, as is quite apparent in the lack of vision in regard to ‘providence,’ (in other words, the unforeseeable fate of humans and the world that is determined by God). This practical posture of the Quakers is in quite impressive consistence with their self-based theology, which holds the motif of otherness or others to be almost absent.

Of course, this does not mean that orthodox just-war theory was totally correct, and coercive violence is the only choice in the reality of human power-relations. It was pointed out that Niebuhr’s position on relative justice fell into the same pit as that of Liberals in terms of not doubting the value of self and seeing others as mere objects of control. Basically, the way of looking at the self primarily determines one’s attitudes towards others, and it has a deep connection with the matter of whether there would be a chance, or no chance, to open the possibility of conciliation with the others. Namely, for those who see the self as fundamental, the
relations with others must become a mere place of hegemonic conflicts, and a place of ‘hostility.’
Thus, Niebuhr focused merely upon struggles for relative social orders and his stance tended to be absorbed in controllability or computability, as Liberal did. Here the possibility of dialogue with others would be closed from the beginning. On the other hand, for those who regard the self as in relations with otherness and others, others are regarded as graceful possibilities of the self, and therefore, the relations with others are considered to be a place for ‘hospitality.’ Indeed, it depends on the situation, but I can say at least that the doorway to reconciliation with others is not closed here.

iv. Perfectionism and God’s Kingdom

The significance of Christ’s love (‘hospitality’ or the logic beyond self-reward and self-retribution) was further considered by exploring the concepts of Christian perfectionism and the Kingdom. The thesis shows that there are four elements in the tradition of these ideals: (1): the possibility of relative perfection, (2): the impossibility of absolute perfection, (3): the principle of growth and the social application of God’s love as the realisation of the Kingdom, and (4): the tight connection between the concept of perfection and the imminence of the Kingdom. According to these theological elements, early Quakers could be said to have restored the victorious spirit of the New Testament in that they stressed victory over sin with a keen sense of the coming Kingdom, whilst borrowing several motifs from early Protestantism. However, they became potentially dangerous in their extremism. Barclay in the second generation modified this somewhat radical view of the early Quakers. That is, he added the elements of ‘impossibility’ and ‘the principle of growth’ to Quaker perfectionism and he described the natures of these two ideals of perfection and the Kingdom in terms of ‘now’ and ‘hereafter.’ For
Barclay, perfection is realised ‘here and now’ in the birth and formation of Christ within human hearts through their response to inward light, which enables them to do the will of God. On the other hand, he also argued, perfection is not meant to be the same as God’s pure state, and it is proportionate and answerable to each measure, which leaves the room for daily growth as well as the likelihood of sinning again (the aspect of ‘hereafter’). In this regard, Barclay’s perfectionism showed some resemblance to the orthodox concepts found in Lutheranism and Wesleyanism. The most distinctive idea of Barclay’s stance, however, in comparison with other Christian traditions, was his bifocal view on perfection and the Kingdom, which reflected the reducible and irreducible aspects of God-human and self-other relations. We encounter God as otherness, a phenomenon that is only recognised by our subjectivity. God that is met by us is not God himself, because it has already been reduced into the structure of our subjectivity. Otherness always appears to be foreign, never totally confined to the range of our reduction and manipulation, as fully described in his term *vehiculum Dei* as inward otherness. However, as seen above, the encounter with, and the response to the light gives us the chance for salvation, justification, and sanctification, (or for the chance of constituting our self-identity) in the dimension of the response to, and in contrast with, the otherness. The relations with God (and relations with others) can be accepted as a place of grace and hospitably. In this sense, the ideal of perfection or sanctification was connected by Barclay entirely to Jesus’ supreme command to love one’s enemies, (namely, to have open attitudes towards the most remote of abhorrent beings). Thus, Barclay believed that the coexistence or communality in self-other relations was the very truth of Christianity, and that the loving activities in a church community were the very possibility of the Kingdom.
v. Barclay's Ecclesiology and Peace Testimony

The communal ideals of perfection and the Kingdom (that are expressed in the bifocal ways ‘now’ and ‘here after’) were closely reflected in Barclay’s ecclesiology, and they were practically applied in church politics and ethics. Barclay was a theoretical supporter of the establishment of the Quaker church system around the period of the Restoration. The most significant change in the system is that it was furnished with several ecclesial checking systems of fanatic extremities, stressing the public side of religious faith, such as the Bible, church power, and joint-testimony. Especially, ministerial roles such as elders and the church authority are seen to be the most problematic point, when it comes to the theological relation with the authority of inward light. However, the double authorities, (or the two seemingly-fluctuating powers of God’s revelation and church judgments), were the role that the Christian Church must assume as a place of embodying God’s communal truth. Namely, on one hand, the necessity of church authority and its ministerial roles was emphasised for the instruction and the ‘oneness’ of the entire congregation, as well as for facilitating daily businesses that were carried out based on collective knowledge about revealed truths. Without a common goal, we cannot move forwards here now. The concept of ‘oneness,’ on the other hand, always invites ministerial judgments to go beyond mere hegemonic expansions of particular opinions. Barclay theoretically linked ‘oneness’ to the divine work of sanctification, or perfection, and to believers’ practice of the supreme command of the Lord Christ to love. As seen above, the standard of perfection or sanctification was Christ’s command to love one’s enemies or to accept the most abhorrent beings. On this point, Barclay expected that this would safeguard church decisions from immanentism, whilst, as a result of this very incalculable indecisiveness, the peaceful Kingdom
would be embodied as a living testimony of God’s truth on earth.¹

Such an open attitude was further extended to people outside of the religious community, for these people are also capable of hearing God’s voices and participating in his working through inward light. One of the ethical fruits that the Quaker’s open stance bore was their peace testimony. In Barclay’s view, the main cause of war and conflict was the human self-centric tendency of neglecting, and opposing to, the life and virtue of Christianity; the virtue was revealed in Jesus’ way of life and death in the Bible, and his supreme command to love. Therefore, Barclay’s pacifism took the first step for the realisation of the peaceful Kingdom by appealing to other people, especially civil kings and magistrates, to mind the inner working of the light, which invites them to find their selfness and recognise the communal nature of God-human and self-others. In Barclay’s theology, religious pacifism was not to work upon other people in a political or practical way, but rather it was designed to work as a counter-testimony against human conscious or unconscious self-centredness. The more significant point is that Barclay did not hastily apply such religious pacifism to real politics and foreign affairs. The reason for this is that the secular world, which contains every sort and rank of person, involves complicated adjustments of conflicting-interests, and its mechanism is different from that of God’s Kingdom. (Here also, Barclay attempted to take the balances in the bifocal ways ‘now’ and ‘hereafter’). The imprudent introduction of a particular pacifist faith or belief to this secular dimension would create another sort of violence for those who have not yet come to the Gospel. Therefore, Barclay urged that, above all, Quakers as expressed in the phrase ‘a few go on ahead’ must show role-models of those who live peacefully with others in order to foreshow the ideal of God’s ruling on earth. Quakers must keep testifying to and showing God’s

¹ ‘Neither shall they say, Lo here! or, lo there! for, behold, the kingdom of God is within you.’ (Luke 17:21).
peaceful truth in their speech and behaviours, with the hope that other people would follow the
examples revealed and practiced by Quakers. Thus, Barclay’s pacifism might invite people to
see the communal nature of human existence in the framework of inward light, and to think of
the possibility of reconciliation with otherness.

vi. Conclusion

In the conclusion, I return back to the theme first presented in the Introductory Chapter,
namely the matter of a social model in the Quaker peace testimony. The Christian God is
Immanuel God, which literally means ‘God with us.’ This images of ‘God suffering’ and ‘God
stands by us’ that are described in the Bible give role-models, which can give comfort to those in
hardship, enabling them to accept the reality for the next step, and also to inspire other people to
support and live with others, the suffering fellows. Even in regard to the matter of human
peaceful relations, the Gospel does not describe a concrete method of ensuring personal or group
security in the world through politics. Nor does Christian faith imbue magical powers for
resolving problems. Rather, the Christian message is the principle of changing human hope and
attitude. Immanuel God admonishes people to bear sufferings with Christ, help others in need as
Christ did, and to be open in love towards others as Christ’s love towards us. The narrative of
God and his peaceful Kingdom is to tell people not to make a primary choice of hostility
towards alien beings, but to arouse doubts to the justification of such a hasty hostile response.

2 In his The Politics of Jesus, Yoder decidedly indicates the political dimension of Jesus’ message in terms of
their nonconformity to the way of using coercive force to control others and the world, which was intended to
create a new kind of human relations and human community (John H. Yoder, The Politics of Jesus: Vicit Agnus
about the church, ‘It [its refusal to take sides in favor of victims] is rather a major negative intervention within
the process of social change, a refusal to use unworthy means ever for what seems to be a worthy end.’ (Yoder,
The Politics of Jesus, p. 154).
This keeps us patiently exerting our maximum efforts to solve problems with others, in the murky situations within the limitation of relative values, seeking for co-livingness. These efforts sometimes succeed and sometimes fail. Humans often focus only upon what they can see, and sometimes lose the self in the midst of calculations and tactics with a limited vision of the future. However, the image of ‘being with’ helps make room for another possibility to be with others in the unforeseen future, which, I believe, enables people to have a new hope for keeping traveling in their lives with patience. The thesis concludes that this is the significance of Barclay’s theology and his peace testimony that are fully expressed in the framework of inward light as inward otherness.

II. Original Points of the Thesis

According to the modern academic tendency, Quaker studies has been fundamentally determined by the unconscious, unexamined high-estimation of ‘self-value’ (around the value, there are many other premises such as ‘individuality’ and ‘freedom’), and by the human desire for ‘self-affirmation.’ To say nothing of Jones and Braithwaite, who pioneered the re-organisation of Quakerism and its history from a self-affirmative theological view to establish a Liberal ideology, many present-day Quakers still make a conventional analysis of Barclay’s thought based on that unconscious premise: ‘intimacy with God’ (actually it is ‘self-intimacy’). As a result, their discussions seem to have fallen into the bottle-neck regarding the matter of who is nearer to, and further from, the Truth of the self. It is true that a quest for the fundamental meaning of existence may be a departure point for any religious pilgrimage, but what believers seek is not necessarily the same thing as religion gives to them. Of course, all academic research cannot be done without premises and biases, but if there is no awareness of researchers’ own
preoccupied standing points and desires, it must be said that their discourses will turn into a Grand tautology of those underlying ideas. Therefore, this thesis has taken Quakerism, especially Barclay’s theology, (which has been treated as an exterior, or foreign factor by the Liberal self-affirmative tradition), and attempted to present another way of understanding Quaker thought, along with its practical applications especially in pacifism, by using the concept of the self as the central axis of analysis. The original contributions made by this thesis are outlined in the following five points, each of which referring to corresponding chapters.

(1): Previous studies only stress the anti-Calvinistic character of Quakerism and of Barclay’s theology (except Wragge), but this thesis shows Barclay’s thought as a counterargument against Calvinism on one hand and Arminianism on the other hand, both of which were regarded by the Apologist as self-based and self-reductive religions. Unlike the conventional Liberal estimation, the significance of passiveness or self-denial for salvation is given a valid ideological context, which is also confirmed in terms of the socio-political situation within and outside of the religious community in the second generation. This leads us to rightly understand what Barclay theologically intended to identify as the theological distinctiveness of Quaker faith.

(2): A review of the transformation of Quaker theology made by tracing the changes in the concept of self shows that the entire Quaker tradition (but Liberalism) maintained certain religious themes, including the motif of self-denial as crucial to God’s redemption. This fact reveals that self-denial was not an idea only particular to Barclay (and Quietist Quakerism in the eighteenth century). Rather, Liberal Quakerism itself has largely diverged from traditional

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Christianity and Quakerism under the self-affirmative influence of Neo-Hegelianism. Liberal Quakerism has become a sort of self-grounded religion, which amalgamates everything into the unifying scheme of the self and God. There, otherness is only the object of the self’s final integration. It is also pointed out that the Liberal historical view is motivated by a desire to achieve and justify such Liberal ideological hegemony in Quakerism, by framing Quaker history within an opposing structure of the true faith (that of the first generation) and a false one (especially, that of the second generation and Quietism), and by groundlessly identifying itself with the origin of the religion. In regard to this point, as well, the Liberal estimation of Barclay’s theology comes to sound academically dubious. Thus, this thesis is the first attempt to reinterpret Quaker history in terms of the changes of the self, and by doing so, to also re-estimate Barclay’s theology which has been long-underestimated as a herald of the gloomy days of Quakerism.

(3): The nature of self-approval resounds throughout the practices of Liberalism, including pacifism. As clarified in Niebuhr’s criticism, the comparison of Liberal Quaker pacifism with other Christian peace testimonies reconfirms the fact that their understanding of human nature is optimistic, in that it does not consider any possibility of taking part in inevitable violent human relations (sin), and in that the irreducible dimension of self-other relations is erased in their view. They naively believe in love and nonviolence as a powerful means for realising the dream of a harmonious world (which is actually identical with their desire), ultimately turning others into calculable objects of manipulation and mental or psychological gameplay. The introduction of recent philosophy gives a hint towards the realisation that the irreducibility of others is what otherness itself consists of, that self-identity is not fundamental, and that others represent the possibility and impossibility of self-formation. The concept of otherness, which is abhorrent to
the self, can be accepted as grace and the relations with others can become a place for hospitality. Opportunities for reconciliation are formed there. This thesis again brings to light the Liberals’ underlying desire for calculability and reducibility to the self, and presents another way out of the theoretical and logical pit found in their self-closed, self-complacent pacifist thought.

(4): The entire history of the Christian concepts of perfection and the Kingdom tells us that these two ideas have been spoken of in a bifocal way, which is defined by ‘possibility’ and ‘impossibility,’ or the ‘now’ and the ‘hereafter.’ This thesis also states that there are four factors in the traditional views on perfection and the Kingdom, and that Christians or theologians in each period had different point of emphasis in their way of thought according to changes in the circumstances of the time. Using these four elements as criteria, the first generation of Quakers can be said to have been the closest to ancient Christians in that they placed emphasis upon victory over sin with a keen sense of the imminent possibility of the end-time. However, in the second generation, Barclay modified earlier Quakerism to become a more orthodox belief system by grafting to it the second factor of ‘impossibility’ and part of the third factor of ‘the principle of growth,’ to meet the socio-ideological needs found within and outside of the community. Spencer discovered the distinctive point of Quakerism to be the integration of holiness and pacifism. This thesis confirms that point in regard to Barclay, and also further investigates the core message of his thought. The most characteristic point in Barclay’s view, when compared with other Christian traditions, is his connection of the perfectionist ideal to Christ’s command to ‘love one’s enemies,’ or to foster an open attitude towards the beings most remote and most abhorrent to the self. This thesis explains Barclay’s bifocal view of perfection and the Kingdom to be a theoretical reflection of the possibility (reducibility) and impossibility
(irreducibility) of relations with others, (who can never be submitted to our intention of control), whilst enabling the re-questioning of self-immanentism. The thesis first focuses upon two-sidedness, (not simply intimacy with God, nor God’s remoteness), as the location of the communal truth of God and others.

(5): The final point that the thesis clarifies is that this double-logic of perfection and the Kingdom, or ‘now’ and ‘hereafter,’ is also applied to Barclay’s ecclesiology and its practical extension to the world outside of the Quaker community, especially in the peace testimony. The double authorities in the Church, (or the two seemingly-fluctuating powers of God’s revelation and the judgments of the Church), represent the role that the Christian Church must assume as a place of the embodiment of God’s communal truth. In Barclay’s ecclesial view, the necessity of church authority and its ministerial roles is emphasised under the cause of the ‘oneness’ of the entire congregation as well as the facilitation of daily businesses. However, the unifying concept of ‘oneness’ is theoretically always invited to the deferment, in that the formative powers of the Church are the workings of God in perfection or sanctification, which is the power to invite us to openness to otherness, and away from self-immanentism. Such a stance is also reflected in the Quakers’ attitudes towards people outside of the community, and the fruit of this stance is pacifism. Barclay continues to exhort other people to turn their eyes to the workings of God through the inward light that is given in their hearts. He also expects Christians to be role-models of love and to embody God’s communal truth in the Church on earth, so as to become peaceable counter-testimonies against the worldly logic of self-reward and self-retribution.

To summarise all five points, this thesis presents, in the case of Barclay’s theology, another
possibility of understanding Quaker history and thought, by raising and criticising the underlying value of the self in Liberalism and its self-affirmative academic orientation. The thesis also seeks another possibility of presenting a social-model where Quakerism can testify to God’s communal truth to the present times in the traditional framework of inward light. Of course, interpretation is not absolute, (and my thesis is no exception). However, to answer the question posited by Dandelion: ‘Present-day Friends are confronted by two challenges. The first is to identify what is and what is not true ministry. The second is to deliver God’s word in the right way,’ the thesis suggests that one of the first steps is to re-question the modern value of the self, and its simple view of truth and practice.

III. Areas of Future Research

If my understanding that ‘theology’ is conducted mainly for the purposes of ministry and the upkeep of the Christian Gospel is correct, and if Liberal Quakers are to maintain their religious tradition and identity, and to accomplish their ministerial task even in today’s world, I offer three suggestions or research and ministerial subjects for further developing Quaker studies as a whole: (1): Contextual Research on the theological influence of Barclay’s theology upon Quietism, (2): Re-examination of the self-understanding of the Quaker tradition by learning from other Christian traditions and other thoughts, (3): Examination of the concepts of ‘providence’ and ‘resurrection’ as key issues to further consider the possibility of religious pacifism.

(1): My thesis attempts to show that the Liberal conventional theological and historical views of

Quakerism were ideologically oriented. The thesis points out that Liberal Quaker thought and its historiography was preoccupied with a Neo-Hegelian metaphysical desire for the self’s final unity with the Self, and on this point, that its practical application in pacifism was high likely to fall in a theoretical bottleneck in the obliteration and control of others. This thesis then considers how to tell the communal truth of God as otherness, and explores another possibility of living nonviolently with others, whilst reading a clue in the traditional framework of inward light. Therefore, detailed historical research on the theological influence of Barclay upon later Quakerism, especially Quietism, is outside the main scope of this thesis. I think, however, there are still many researchers who are interested in the theme. If the theme is further investigated, it is better to conduct the extensive research on the basis of full critical and comparative analysis on documents and data between two ages, for example, by examining how Barclay’s theology was used to establish and justify Quietist Quakerism by Quietists (and also counter-ideology by the counter-ideologists within the Quaker community), with reference to inner and broader socio-economical ideological contexts.

(2): In other lines of (Protestant) Christianity around the first half of the twentieth century, Liberal theology, which had a simple belief in the power of human individuality and reason, lost its ability to criticise the inner contradictions of Modernism. It faced a lot of counter-criticism, for example, from Barthian dialectical theology, which tried to restore the dimension of otherness to Christian God. Postmodern thought as well has attempted to question the self-based or self-intimate value of Modernism. However, for better or for worse, Liberal Quakerism has long kept itself detached from such theological and ideological storms, still confined to the
simple value of human sacredness.\footnote{In regard to Barth’s little influence on present-day Quakerism, see John Punshon, \textit{Portrait in Grey: A Short History of the Quakers} (London: Quaker Home Service, 1984), pp. 247-250.} If Liberal Quakers are to reconsider their contradiction of the self-absolutisation under the banner of the relativity of the Truth, they may have a lot to learn from other Christian traditions and other schools of thought. Since humans have in common the general structure of existence and experience, parallel examples of the difficulties that any field of any time would have encountered can be easily found there. These examples should be instructive for reflecting upon the internal problems that Liberal Quakerism is now facing. We can learn about ourselves by learning about others. As the present-day Quaker researchers are sometimes unaware of their unconscious projection of Liberal premises onto Quaker history and thought, they seem to forget to look at Quaker history and thought within their own contexts. Of course, I do not mean to say that my study completely succeeds in this regard, nor am I free from ideology-based interpretation (actually it is unavoidable), but there are many possibilities to cast a different light upon what has been fixedly-estimated, as the thesis attempts to show in the case of Barclay’s theology. Learning from the outside will give the chance to realise and relativise researchers’ unexamined premises in relation to the larger currents of the time.

(3): To modern people, the traditional Christian concepts of ‘providence’ and ‘resurrection’ might seem to be the most difficult themes to understand. However, as clearly showed in the case of Yoder, it is certain that these concepts help Christian pacifists to go beyond the logic of self-reduction in this world. In Yoder’s view, Christians can leave their fates to God by believing in God’s providence and the future possibility of their resurrection, which enables them to readily accept the cost of hostile aggressions.\footnote{Refer back to 3.2.2. in this thesis.} However, in order to avoid digressing from the
flow of the entire arguments of reconsidering a social model in Quakerism, and (I readily confess) due to my lack of enough knowledge of ‘providence’ and ‘resurrection,’ the thesis could not examine how these concepts work in the Quaker pacifism, especially in Barclay’s case. These concepts are essential parts of the entirety of God’s Salvation History. In fact, without these contextual parts (as related to eschatological hope), religious pacifism cannot give a clear vision of what will become of Christians after they follow the path of self-sacrificing love for others and even enemies. This will probably discourage believers, especially when they have to make a serious decision as a pacifist.

Overall, if the term ‘liberal’ in Liberal Quakerism means self-decision or self-determination, it should be noted how much the idea of self has been challenged in Christianity. If the term ‘liberal’ means Christian faith and practice attempted in free academic studies, it should be considered whether Liberal Quakers (of course, not all) have been sincere in their attitudes. As repeated in the histories of Christianity and theology, Liberalism posits God as a mere projection of the self, and uses it to secure the metaphysical ground or to guarantee of the self, or the

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7 In Barclay’s writings, the concepts of ‘providence’ and ‘resurrection’ are usually used in connection to God’s plan beyond human comprehension in the past and present, and to the redemptive working of inward light put forth in believers’ hearts, respectively (for example, see Robert Barclay, An Apology for the True Christian Divinity stereotype ed. (Philadelphia, PA.: Friends’ Book Store, 1908), p. 110 and 132). However, Barclay also argues that ‘What he [John Brown] says here, …of the necessity of defensive War, to defend from those that unjustly Assault, and Thieves, and Robbers, and Cut-throats, & c. he speaks more like an Atheist, than a Christian, and like one, who believeth nothing of a Divine Providence of Restraining evil Men at his pleasure, and not suffering them to go further, than he seeth meet. …such Carnal and Atheistical Reasons can brangle the Faith of those, who out of pure Obedience to God desire to be Conform to the Image of his Son, according to the measure of the Grace given them, so as to make them think, they are less secure under the protection of the ALMIGHTY, than by their Guns and Swords.’ (Barclay, ‘R. B’s. Apology for the True Christian Divinity Vindicated from John Brown’s Pretended Confutation, &c. with L. S’s Letter to R. M. C.,’ in Truth Triumphant Through Spiritual Warfare (London: T. Northcott, 1692), pp. 870-871. As for the concept of ‘resurrection,’ see also p. 877). Therefore, more investigations should be conducted by placing Barclay’s view on providence and resurrection on the traditional and historical contexts and in comparison with the contemporary theologies the philosophies.

ultimate entity in which the meaning of the self is finally recollected. There is necessarily a naïve contradiction in which God’s story is finally changed into that of the self. It may be true that one of the roles of religion is to seal the loophole of the meanings of existence with a metaphysical system, but (as Gilson rightly defines Christianity as denationalization\(^9\)), it is the task and hope of the Christian faith to defer and break down such self-reduction, and to guide people to re-question their ways of relating to others. Since Liberal Quaker meetings have turned into a place for a religion of self-concern, it seems difficult to imagine the Church as a place of peace opened by accepting, or being accepted by, others. A mass of mere individuals, failing in the tasks of embodying and telling about the communal nature of self-other relationships, must be said to have completely forgot the core tenet of Christianity and Quakerism. In actuality, there are many things and tasks (including pacifism) that are difficult for only one person to assume. I truly hope that Quakers will recover the centre value of Quakerism, ‘listening to otherness,’ and its communal truth, as well expressed in the traditional teaching of ‘inward light.’

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\(^9\) ‘A second problem directly concerns the possible relations between Christian society and the temporal order. Inasmuch as he believes in Christ, the Christian, we can say with St. Paul, lives not upon the earth but in heaven. Here, a new difficulty arises. For, if such is the faith of the Christian, the more intense it is, the more it will draw him away from a love of this world and especially from a love of the city. It is not surprising, therefore, that one of the outstanding effects of Christianity was denationalization.’ (Etienne Gilson, ‘Foreword,’ in Saint Augustine, *The City of God*, trans. Demetrius B. Zema and Gerald G. Walsh, Books 1-7, reprinted ed. (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, [1950] 1962), p. xxix).


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