

THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN MOSCOW 1925-1932

CATHERINE ANNE MERRIDALE

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Synopsis.

The thesis examines the Communist Party in Moscow between 1925 and 1932. Its structure, role and membership are studied, together with its relationship with the population of Moscow. A study is also made of politics in the period, with special reference to the oppositions of the 1920's.

Four broad problems are discussed. The first is the relationship between the central Party leadership and the Moscow Committee. Second is the role of the grassroots activist in political life. Thirdly, the failure of the oppositions is studied in detail. Finally, popular influence over the Party is examined with a view to discussing how far the revolution had been 'betrayed' in this period.

It is found that the Moscow Committee was less autonomous than other regional organs, but that grassroots initiative played an important part in political life. In general, people were reluctant to engage in formal opposition. This largely explains the defeat of the Left and Right oppositions, who failed to attract significant support. The majority of Muscovites remained apathetic or hostile to the Party, but a core of committed activists within it was responsible for many of the period's achievements. To the extent that they supported and even initiated policy, Stalin's 'great turn' included an element of 'revolution from below'.

The total number of words in the thesis (excluding footnotes, appendices, etc.) is approximately 76,000.

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Introduction

This thesis deals with the Moscow Communist Party organisation at a crucial time in its history. For Moscow, as for the whole of the USSR, these were years of transformation, when the broad promise of the revolution finally narrowed into the Stalinist political and economic system. The period saw rapid economic change, the transition from the New Economic Policy to state-directed industrialisation. Soviet society was transformed with unprecedented rapidity and turbulence. It was also in these years that the foundations were laid of the political system which was to dominate the USSR for three decades. In 1925, the Communist Party was still a small fraction even of the urban population. It lacked an acknowledged leader or an agreed programme. Nowhere were the debates over policy more bitter than in the Soviet capital. By 1932, all this had changed. The Party had grown more than threefold, the majority of the new recruits being concentrated in urban areas like Moscow. This expansion at the base was accompanied by the ascendancy of a powerful single leader at the top. Within the Party, and indeed in society as a whole, debate had become muted and policy was formed by leaders who insisted on inflexible unanimity.

These developments may well be described as a 'second revolution'. Events so significant have naturally provoked a great deal of historical controversy. When they look at this period, historians disagree about the methods by which the various changes were achieved, especially the degree to which they were imposed from above. Their lack of agreement to some extent reflects the range of political responses to the USSR in the West. Because of its importance in ideological discourse, the writing of Soviet history has been invested with a special significance. In general, the result has not been healthy from the academic point of view¹. Serious scholarly work has been hindered by the political implications of its findings. Historians may agree that 'objectivity' is neither possible nor desirable, but the

¹ Walter Laqueur, who also noted the political importance of the study of Soviet history in the West, took the view that Western experiences helped to 'promote a better understanding of the significance of the Russian revolution'. However, he was prepared to concede that 'distortion set in ... when the impact became too overwhelming or when Western students accepted passing political phases...as permanent absolutes.' The Fate of The Revolution (New York, 1967), p. 161.

involvement of committed partisan interests in their work is a different matter. The controversy is important, and some idea of its dimensions is desirable to set the present work in context.

One of the most influential theories in the study of Soviet politics has been totalitarianism². It has now become so regular a target that its merits need not be discussed here³. It is important for us only because of its effect on the writing of Soviet political history. Although it was never the only acceptable model in the field, its influence, especially in the USA, was pervasive. As a result, until recently, the work of historians interested in the political development of the Soviet Union concentrated mainly on a narrow clique of Party leaders, Stalin and his immediate entourage⁴. Where scholars strayed beyond the Kremlin, it was usually to discuss the means - police, army, propaganda - by which totalitarian control might have been achieved. Even critics of the theory often chose to attack it on its own ground. Historians looking at the period before the emergence of the totalitarian system were influenced by the need to explain its antecedents. There was little room for studies which looked at society and its influence on the political process. The totalitarian theory, indeed, required that society be viewed as inert, 'atomised', incapable of influencing politics to any significant degree.

² Definitions of the term vary in their choice of emphasis, but in general the idea of a single hierarchical ruling party, usually led by one man, is central to the interpretation. See, for example, Leonard Schapiro, Totalitarianism (London, 1972), pp. 124-5. Other common features of 'totalitarian regimes' include the use of psychological or actual terror as a means of control, backed up by powerful official ideologies which promise future rewards for present sacrifices, central control of the armed forces and mass media and the centralised direction of the economy. These characteristics are based on the influential model provided by C. J. Friedrich and Z. K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (New York, 1956), pp. 9-10.

³ The totalitarian thesis has been under attack since the 1950's, partly as a result of political changes within the countries (especially in Eastern Europe) to which it was applied. The academic discussion has been voluminous. Schapiro's book gives a defence of the model, written in the light of a number of criticisms. For a recent contribution on the other side of the debate, see S.F. Cohen, 'Scholarly Missions: Sovietology as a Vocation', in his Rethinking the Soviet Experience, Politics and History since 1917 (London 1985).

⁴ So many accounts fall into this category that it would be impossible to list them all. Studies which fall broadly within the totalitarian model and which focus on the leadership include L. Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (London, 1960), R. V. Daniels, The Conscience of the Revolution; Communist Opposition in Soviet Russia (London, 1960), R. Conquest, The Great Terror. Stalin's Purge of the Thirties (London, 1968), and A. B. Ulam, Stalin, the Man and His Era (London, 1974).

Totalitarianism was not the only theory to discount popular influence as a force in Soviet politics. Some Marxist historians, including a number of Soviet and East European emigres, also emphasised the weakness of society in the face of the political elite. Broadly, their general argument was that the working class, the authors of the revolution, were expropriated by the Communist Party after 1917. The nature and timing of this expropriation were variously described, as was the degree to which the ruling elite continued to recruit new members throughout the period⁵. However, the essential point was that the revolution had been 'betrayed', and that historians would seek in vain for evidence of a harmony of interests between the ruling Party and the working class after 1917.

Despite the influence of these theories, an empirical tradition persisted, especially in Great Britain⁶. Even during the 'Cold War', historians here were producing studies of the Soviet period whose theoretical assumptions owed little to the totalitarian debate⁷. Their principal shortcoming arose from the impossibility of obtaining Soviet primary materials. For this reason, studies of the Party itself were confined to what could be written on the basis of the Soviet national press, Trotsky's papers and the Smolensk archive. The latter, still the richest

⁵ Included in this category would be Trotsky (and Trotskyists, such as Ernest Mandel), who described the USSR as a 'degenerate workers' state', dominated by a clique (not a class) which no longer ruled in the interests of workers (The Revolution Betrayed, New York, 1937), and the group of critics who saw the Party and bureaucracy collectively as a new 'ruling class' in the Soviet Union. Among these, the more prominent are Milovan Djilas (The New Class, 1966) and Tony Cliff (Russia, a Marxist Analysis, 1964).

⁶ 'Objectivity' was singled out among the virtues of writing in this tradition. Early contributions to Soviet Studies, including some written in Stalin's lifetime, provide examples of the approach. A quotation from Schlesinger's review of the first volume of E. H. Carr's History shows how different was this tradition from the two schools described above. Schlesinger praised Carr's work because it contrasted with work 'produced either by outsiders whose judgement is affected by hopes and fears in the Western framework rather than by characteristics of the society under discussion, or by persons whose acquaintance with the subject originated in their more or less active participation in the struggles through which the USSR attained its present form.' Soviet Studies, 1950-51, p. 389.

⁷ These included the works of emigres who managed, for the most part, to use personal experience as a basis for academic work rather than an excuse for propaganda. Among these, Rudolf Schlesinger and Isaac Deutscher stand out. Important contributions to our understanding of Soviet politics under Stalin were also made by E. H. Carr and T. H. Rigby. Carr's work, although notable for its discussion of the leadership and its internal politics, included sections on the rank and file which were unique when they appeared. Rigby's Communist Party Membership in the USSR (Princeton 1968) remains the best guide to the history of Party membership, although it tends to concentrate on membership as an aspect of centrally-controlled policy.

single source for Party history, provided the material for the only full-length study of a local Party organisation in the 1920's and 1930's to appear in English to date⁸.

There is now little doubt that the old warhorse of totalitarianism is being put out to grass by serious scholars of Soviet history. A combination of circumstances has brought it more widely into question at both the theoretical and substantive levels. The idea of 'revolution betrayed' seems more robust, and continues to inspire research among historians and political scientists⁹. However, a number of different approaches are now being explored. Historians are also able to support new interpretations with fresh evidence. Archival and other primary source materials are now more easily available than they were twenty years ago. The search for more satisfactory models, combined with the new evidence, has allowed a range of issues formerly unexplored to come into focus¹⁰.

The idea that the regime was influenced by pressures from below as well as by its leadership has gained a wider currency. Decision-making is beginning to be seen in terms of competing interest-groups, implementation as a question of compromise and makeshift. However, as a result of a number of intellectual constraints, the relationship between the Communist Party and Soviet society is only beginning to be explored¹¹. The pressures within the Party as a whole and its relationship with the Soviet population are not much better understood now than a decade ago. Part of the difficulty is that the increasing sophistication of recent social and economic histories has not, for the most part, been mirrored in the field of politics. Problems of access to source material, especially for the

⁸ M. Fainsod, Smolensk Under Soviet Rule (London, 1958). This book was striking because it was written by an avowed 'totalitarian' theorist. Its findings, however, significantly modified and weakened the theory. See, e.g, p. 76, where Fainsod refers to the obkom secretary's role as 'broker' between the centre and his region.

⁹ A recent historical work in the tradition is Donald Filtzer's Soviet Workers and Stalinist Industrialisation (London, 1986). Michael Voslensky's La Nomenklatura (French trans., Paris, 1980) focuses on what he sees as the new ruling class from the revolution to the present.

¹⁰ The most notable developments have been in the fields of economic and social history, and would include the work of R. W. Davies, S. Fitzpatrick, L. Siegelbaum and S. G. Wheatcroft.

¹¹ The pioneer of this type of research was undoubtedly Moshe Lewin, whose essay, 'Society, State and Ideology during the First Five Year Plan' (published in S. Fitzpatrick, ed., Cultural Revolution in Russia (Bloomington, 1978), pp. 41-77) was seminal. See also the Making of the Soviet System, Essays in the Social History of Interwar Russia (London, 1983), especially chapters 8-12.

central Party organs, have been partly to blame for this. It is also a consequence of the move away from 'high' political history. First economic and then social history have attracted more scholarly attention recently. With few exceptions, political histories of the USSR in this period continue to be written by the system's avowed critics. Emphasis is still laid on leadership and control. Even those seeking to present alternatives to the crude picture of the 'rise of Stalin' have not explored the relationship between the Party leadership and its grass roots¹². Despite extensive studies of workers, economic managers and intellectuals in this period, we know very little about the way these people related to the Party or influenced it from within.

Another issue which has obstructed the writing of Soviet political history is that of collective or individual blame. In this period, mass collectivisation, and a little later, the purges of 1937-8, create serious difficulties. The old models - totalitarianism or dictatorship in some form - were convenient because they provided a clear framework in which 'crimes' could be placed. The tradition was as much cathartic as historical. Explanations based on personal responsibility continue to be offered. Depending on the writer's viewpoint, the negative sides of Soviet development after 1929 have been attributed to both Lenin and Stalin¹³. Other historians have sought to condemn the Communist Party leadership as a whole¹⁴. If alternative theories, involving wider social participation in these events, become established, historians of the USSR will be faced with the dilemma of their counterparts in the study of Nazi Germany; the problems of guilt and blame where a whole society is involved¹⁵. Recent research has begun to suggest that a substantial section of the Soviet population accepted or

¹² Cohen's biography of Bukharin is an example of the problem. Excellent where it is discussing Bukharin's contributions to Bolshevik theory or his relationship with his colleagues in the Central Committee, it dissolves into speculation when the question of broad support for the Right arises. For a further discussion of this problem, see below, pp. 97-9.

¹³ A striking example of the former approach is given in Ante Ciliga's memoir of the period, The Russian Enigma (reprinted London, 1979), chapter 9, pp. 274-291. Roy Medvedev, in his important study of the purges, takes the other line, blaming Stalin personally for the excesses of the 1930's in order to exonerate Lenin and the revolutionary tradition of 1917. Let History Judge; The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism (London, 1972).

¹⁴ Robert Conquest, for example, concludes his chilling study of collectivisation in the Ukraine with the remark that 'the verdict of history cannot be other than one of criminal responsibility.' The Harvest of Sorrow; Soviet Collectivisation and the Terror-Famine (London, 1986), p. 300.

¹⁵ See Ian Kershaw's review of C. R. Browning's Fateful Months in the Times Literary Supplement (TLS), 7 November 1986, p. 1242.

even supported change¹⁶. Critics have already attacked these interpretations for 'shifting the blame' and 'apologising for Stalin'.¹⁷ For historians, this criticism is misconceived, for it is no part of their task to allot 'blame' or write in apology. However, it will almost certainly continue to cloud the debate. Another charge, which also reflects the heat of the current controversy, is that some recent scholars have stood the conventional wisdom on its head. In their attempts to revise existing theories, some have lost sight of Stalin and the central Party apparatus altogether.¹⁸

The present study will attempt to re-appraise the Party of the 1920's and early 1930's in the light of these points. Local Party history has many attractions. Not least is the fact that it can take advantage of improved access to Soviet sources. With this indispensable tool, it offers the chance to examine a specific case in detail and to test a number of current hypotheses. The interaction between the leadership and the rank and file was of crucial importance in these years, and the study of a single organisation offers unique insights into its dynamics. The period was a crucial one, the last in which attempts to alter central policy took the form of formal opposition movements and the heyday of the 'mass' Party; never again were rank and file Communists to have so much influence on decision-making. In this study, both the 'high politics' of Moscow, the political debates at senior level, and the 'low

¹⁶ The most recent such study is William Chase's book on Moscow workers under NEP, which tentatively concludes that a substantial section of the Moscow working class supported Stalin's policies in 1928-9. W. J. Chase, Workers, Society and the Soviet State, Labor and Life in Moscow, 1918-1929 (Illinois, 1987), especially, pp. 300-304. Roberta Manning's work on Belyi raion takes a similar line, this time positing peasant 'consent' to Soviet government in 1937. Government and the Soviet Countryside in the Stalinist Thirties: The Case of Belyi Rayon in 1937, Carl Beck Papers in Soviet and East European Studies, No. 301, p. 44. (1983)

¹⁷ As Alfred G. Meyer put it, they appear to be 'whitewashing' some aspects of Soviet history. Russian Review, Vol 45, 1986, p. 404. Meyer's is far from the most extreme example of this type of criticism. Peter Kenez, writing in the same discussion, remarked that 'the revisionists make an extraordinary leap and absolve the leadership of responsibility for mass murder.' (ibid., p. 397) This moral charge was the main substance of his argument. Stephen Cohen makes similar criticisms in the essay on historical approaches cited above.

¹⁸ This accusation has been levelled in particular at the most controversial recent study of the Communist Party in the 1930's, J.A. Getty's Origins of the Great Purges (Cambridge, 1985). In his review of the book (TLS, May 9 1986, pp. 503-4), Conquest remarked that 'the establishment of the Stalinist autocracy...is treated [by Getty] as a fairly minor matter, hitherto exaggerated.' A similar criticism could be made of the work of the French sovietologist, Gabor Rittersporn. See G. T. Rittersporn, 'Société et appareil d'état soviétiques (1936-38): Contradictions et interférences', in Annales Economies Sociétés Civilisations, No. 4, 1979.

politics' will be examined, together with the relationship between the apparatus and the grass-roots movement within the Party and beyond it. Only thus can a full picture of the Party as a working organisation be obtained.

Since Moscow was the capital, systematic information on its development is more easily available than for other cities in the USSR. This includes familiar sources, such as Pravda, which was partly devoted to the Moscow Committee, and national journals like Bol'shevik and Izvestiya Tsentral'nogo Komiteta. In addition, new sources, many of them unavailable in the West, have been used to build up a detailed picture of the Moscow Party at all levels. These include the Moscow Party's newspaper, Rabochaya Moskva, and its journals, Sputnik Kommunist, Izvestiya Moskovskogo Komiteta and Propagandist. Invaluable information about the debates in the Moscow Party Committee is furnished by the stenographic reports of Moscow Party conferences and Moscow Committee plenums, few of which have been studied before because of difficulties of access. Finally, Soviet archival material on Moscow factories, including the stenographic reports of party cell meetings, extracts from factory newspapers, and the reminiscences of workers and Party activists, provides insights into the Party at the local level which have been lacking from virtually all studies of the Party outside Smolensk.

Moscow is a valuable case study for several reasons. First, it shows what could be expected from a 'model' Party organisation in these years.¹⁹ Moscow was closer to the centre, and received more careful scrutiny, more guidance, and more Central Committee intervention, than anywhere else. Leading Party personnel in Moscow were among the most experienced politicians in the land. Moscow illustrates the best the centre could expect to achieve from a local organisation in terms of compliance and efficiency. Relations between the Moscow Party and the Central Committee should tell us a great deal about the ways in which central

¹⁹ Both Fainsod and Getty used rural Smolensk for their studies. The reason for this was the availability of evidence, the Smolensk archive having been in Western hands since the Second World War. However, both agreed that Smolensk might not be typical of the Party as a whole, although as a rural organisation in a predominantly peasant country, its study was amply justified.

control was achieved. Where Moscow fell short of expectations, we will be able to see the limitations of central authority and can examine the reasons for them.

The Moscow Party drew on a population more literate, more proletarian and closer to power than almost any other in the country²⁰. Party activists in the capital had a clear sense of their role as the vanguard of the revolution. If any are to be found, Moscow can provide examples of 'revolution from below'. This does not necessarily mean simply initiatives seized by local activists. As one historian asks, 'It may be that Stalinist "revolution from above" not only permitted but actually *required* lower-level officials to respond to urgent but imprecise "signals" by improvising and taking initiatives that, if unsuccessful, could always be disavowed by the leadership.'²¹ Moscow's experiences will also illustrate how tentative many new projects in this period could be, how experimental and quickly reversed. All this, together with the sheer volume of the Party's work, imposed enormous strains upon the local organisations. Here again, because of its access to resources and central support, Moscow was a paradigm case.

Despite close supervision by the Central Committee, the Moscow Party organisation was deeply involved in the political struggles of the 1920's. The Left had been influential in the capital in the early 1920's, but failed to secure a significant following after 1923. In the mid-'20's, however, they ran a campaign in Moscow which tells us a great deal about their tactics and appeal. The Right tried to use the Moscow Party as a power base in 1928, but were also unable to win much support among the Party rank and file. Why did the movements fail? What kind of following were they able to command, and how were they perceived in Moscow? The fates of the oppositions are important in themselves, but they also provide evidence necessary for an understanding of Stalin's eventual victory within the Party.

²⁰ The Leningrad Party was more 'proletarian', and also considered itself a legitimate pretender to the title of 'vanguard Party organisation'. The result was a vigorous and not always healthy rivalry between activists in the two cities.

²¹ Sheila Fitzpatrick, writing in Russian Review, Vol 45, 1986, p. 369.

Lastly, there is the question of general support for the new regime. This can be approached by looking at who joined the Party and for what reasons. It can also be inferred by studying archival references to popular attitudes, including those produced by opposition groupings. 'Revolution from below' requires supporters and beneficiaries. These will be examined as far as possible with currently available sources. It is also important to understand what people with less political commitment thought of the Party and its policies. To what extent, in Moscow, did the Party seem inaccessible to ordinary people? How much popular control was there over its decisions at the local level? These are important questions, with a bearing on all our calculations about the development of the Stalinist political system.

Moscow 1925-32.

Moscow had been the capital of the USSR since March 1918. Further east than Petrograd, it had been considered safer at the height of the Allied invasion.²² It was also more Russian than Petrograd, which had always looked to Europe, culturally less sophisticated, architecturally haphazard, 'a large village', as it is still sometimes called. After the Civil War, it was this city, so long neglected, which the Bolshevik leaders set out to transform into a socialist capital. By 1925, Moscow still fell far short of their ideal. Since the revolution, changes had been introduced, such as the re-naming of streets and districts, but essentially the city had not altered, and certainly not improved, since the days of the last Tsar.

Moscow lies on the rivers Moskva and Yauza.²³ Despite frequent devastation by fire, it has retained its original street pattern, which is based on the oriental system of concentric circles, originally lines of fortification. The Kremlin stands at the heart of the first circle, the second is the 'boulevard ring', including the present Tverskoi, Gogol'evskii and Petrovskii boulevards, and the third, which in the 1920's marked the boundary between the fashionable

²² Ocherki Istorii Moskovskoi Organizatsii KPSS (2nd. edn., vol. 2, M., 1983), p. 60.

²³ See map 1, p. 247. A more detailed description of Moscow in the early twentieth century can be found in D. Koenker, Moscow Workers and the 1917 Revolution (Princeton, 1981).

centre and the sprawling suburbs of the city, is the Sadovoe ring. For administrative purposes, the city is divided into districts, called raions.²⁴ In this period, there were six of them, and they cut the circular city into slices, meeting near the Kremlin.²⁵ The largest, Krasnaya Presnya, lay to the west of the centre, and was a mainly proletarian area. By contrast, Khamovniki raion, to the south-west, was dominated by institutions of higher education (VUZy) and government offices. However, the organisation of the city meant that no raion was exclusively proletarian or white-collar, and in all districts, the redistribution of apartment rooms within buildings had pushed the different social groups together. Workers, employees and professionals lived cheek by jowl.²⁶

Despite the blurring of social divisions, some areas of the city were more affluent than others. The centre of Moscow was mainly the preserve of educational institutions, government offices, and the apartment residences of the influential. The exception was the area from the Arbat²⁷ to Okhotnyi Ryad (now Gorkii Street), which was largely occupied by ordinary working people, some of whom had been accommodated in the requisitioned houses of the bourgeoisie. Beyond the Sadovoe were the 'new' areas, mostly industrial. The majority of the city's proletariat lived in the south-east and west of the city, near factories dating from the turn of the century. Living conditions for workers were cramped, with several families sharing single rooms and unmarried workers packed into pre-revolutionary barracks-style accommodation²⁸. At the same time, however, Moscow was a sprawling city, with large parks and farms between the crowded suburbs.²⁹ Everywhere, even beyond the Sadovoe, the skyline was dominated by churches. Moscow was fertile ground for any planner, and for years before the revolution had been the subject of

²⁴ See the glossary of Russian terms, pp. 277-8.

²⁵ See map 1.

²⁶ See Chase, *op. cit.*, p. 199.

²⁷ Home of Peter the Great's palace artisans, and still characterised by narrow streets bearing names like Kalashnyi Pereulok (Biscuit lane) and Plotnikov Pereulok (Carpenters' lane).

²⁸ The extent of the housing crisis is graphically described by Chase. Those fortunate enough to be housed were packed into single rooms, while the homeless 'were forced to sleep in corridors, storerooms, sheds, kitchens, bathhouses, and even asphalt cauldrons.' *op. cit.*, p. 185.

²⁹ Until the 1950's, indeed, a farm remained on the edge of the South-Western bend in the Moskva river, now the site of the Lenin Stadium, and well within the City limits.

improvement schemes, all of which had been postponed for lack of money³⁰. Under the new regime, resources were less of a problem. Now that Moscow was the capital, it took priority in the national budget as the country recovered from the long years of war and revolution.

a) Moscow's Population.

The war, revolution and civil war had ravaged the country. The loss of life and wastage of material resources were to cripple the Soviet Union for the next six years. From Moscow's point of view, one of the most devastating effects was the mass desertion of the city by people fleeing to the countryside. Largely as a result of this, the population of Moscow fell by 620,000 between 1918 and 1921. During NEP, however, demographic recovery was swift. By 1925, the size of the city's population had begun to arouse concern among planners.³¹ In 1925, Moscow's population was approximately 1, 743, 500.³² By 1933, it had risen to well over three and a half million.

The most numerous section of the population, and the fastest-growing, was the industrial proletariat.³³ In 1929, the largest single group among workers was still those who had joined the workforce during the First World War. However, the rapid growth of this period also required the hiring of new workers from the surrounding countryside. As their numbers increased, friction between the 'cadre' workers and the newcomers grew, and was to remain a feature of life in Moscow factories throughout the period. A substantial proportion of all workers still retained land outside the city, often farmed by relatives. This phenomenon, more common among older workers than the new generation, was believed to lead to 'reactionary' political behaviour, a definition which included reluctance to join the

³⁰ Among the many reformers who recorded the poverty of Moscow's proletarian rookeries was the novelist Tolstoi. His article, 'On the Moscow Census' was an appeal for funds to improve conditions in the poorest areas. See H. Troyat, *Tolstoi* (Pelican Edn., London, 1970), pp. 581-2.

³¹ *Rabochaya Moskva* (RM), 27/9/1925.

³² See Table 1, p. 257.

³³ See Table 2, p. 258.

Communist Party, and was officially discouraged.³⁴ Despite this, farming in the Moscow area was so profitable, and the workers' sense of their rural origin so strong, that only mass collectivisation put an end to the practice.

In a country dedicated to the eradication of private capital, the private craftsmen, kustari, and the small but often flamboyant capitalist class gave rise to considerable official concern.³⁵ In 1926, a survey for the Party journal Bol'shevik found that the number of privately-owned enterprises in the capital was growing and that workers in the private sector earned more on average than those in the employ of the State. These higher wages were more alarming from the official point of view when the 'political level' of the workers was also considered. Religious festivals were still observed, trade unions were weak and Party membership was as little as 15% of the average in state enterprises.³⁶ Throughout the 1920's, attempts were made to bring workers in this sector into the Soviet fold³⁷, but it was only after 1929, when a new regime in the capital declared war upon the 'NEPman', that the problem, from the Bolsheviks' point of view, was finally resolved.

A further scourge of the period was unemployment, which reached alarming levels in the 1920's. In 1927, one industrial worker in four in Moscow was unemployed.³⁸ The problem was compounded by the 'regime of economy', a campaign launched in April 1926 aimed at cutting production costs. Only in 1929 did the number of unemployed begin to fall

³⁴ For a discussion of the relationship between *landholding* and political attitudes among workers, see Chapter 3, pp. 131-2.

³⁵ A report of 1929 found 125, 000 people living in Moscow who were from social groups 'deprived of voting rights'. Of these, 'several thousand' were NEPmen, the private capitalists whose fortunes derived from the relatively liberal conditions under the New Economic Policy (NEP), 19, 500 were private traders, 8670 lived on unearned income, 8,000 were priests, 2, 500 Tsarist policemen and roughly 10, 000 were kustari. N. S. Davydova, 'Moskovskaya Partiinaya organizatsiya v bor'be za provedenie kursa kommunisticheskoi partii na sotsialisticheskuyu industrializatsiyu strany, 1926-28 gg.', Doktorskaya Dissertatsiya (M. 1971), p.114.

³⁶ Bol'shevik (B), 1926, No. 14.

³⁷ Students from Moscow's VUZy were used in 1925, but the workers 'did not understand the language of the educated person', and later attempts were made using workers from local state concerns.

³⁸ Precise figures are hard to calculate, since the definition of an unemployed person varied. This figure is taken from Statisticheskii spravochnik goroda Moskvy i Moskovskoi gubernii (1927) (M., 1927), introduction. See also Uglanov's speech at the XVI Moscow provincial Party conference in 1927, XVI Moskovskaya Gubernskaya Konferentsiya VKP(b), stenograficheskii otchet (M. 1927), bulletin no. 5.

substantially. With rapid industrialisation, unemployment virtually disappeared, to be replaced by the labour shortage which has characterised the economy ever since.

For a regime which avowedly ruled on behalf of the proletariat, the other difficulty was the composition of the white collar sector, the employees in the various State bureaucracies, and the managerial staff of enterprises. As the capital, Moscow had a greater concentration of these people than any other city in the USSR. In the 1920's, the majority of civil servants, except at the highest levels, were ex-employees of the Tsarist government, whose political loyalty to the revolution was always open to doubt.³⁹ The late 1920's saw the beginning of rapid changes in this sector. A policy of promoting workers to official posts in the State and economic apparatus (*vydvizhenchestvo*) was practised, together with the intensive training of Communists for jobs in the administration. In 1930, the state apparatus was purged, with large numbers of the old bureaucrats losing their jobs to a new generation of Communists and workers. In Narkomfin, for example, the Finance Commissariat, the number of old specialists was cut by 11% in 1930⁴⁰. It was not until the later 1930's, however, that the social composition of the apparatus was finally 'proletarianised', and throughout our period, suspicion continued to dominate the Moscow Party's dealings with the state bureaucracy.

b) Planning in Moscow.

Between 1912 and 1933, the area of the city grew by over 10, 000 hectares⁴¹, much of the new territory being occupied by factories and workers' flats. In this period, however, expansion was not accompanied by significant improvements for the population. Although street lighting was introduced in the centre in 1927, the drainage and sewerage systems were

³⁹ Davydova, op. cit., p.114. For a discussion of the way in which the social origin of bureaucrats influenced their behaviour in office, see M. McAuley, 'Bureaucracy and Revolution, the lesson from Leningrad, 1917-27', University of Essex Russian and Soviet Studies Centre Discussion Paper, October 1984. The problems raised in Moscow are discussed in more detail in chapter 6, below.

⁴⁰ Tsentral'nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Oktyabr'skoi Revolyutsii, (TsGAOR), fond no. 7952 opis no. 3 delo no. 488, listok no.13. (Hereafter, archival references will be presented as follows: 7952/3/488, 13.)

⁴¹ Moskva v Tsifrakh (M. 1934), p. 9.

rudimentary. In 1927, the river Yauza flooded the northern part of the city for over two weeks; later reports found that new housing was being built with no drainage whatsoever. Until 1931, cobbled streets were the rule. Public transport was overcrowded and did not reach outlying districts. Above all, the problem of housing for the growing population worsened steadily, so that by the end of the decade, politicians had begun to refer to a 'housing crisis' in the capital, despite substantial investments by the State.⁴²

Improvements in the 1920's were sporadic and did not always enjoy the support of the population.⁴³ Particularly controversial was the conversion of old church buildings into workers' clubs, schools and canteens. The practice had the dual benefit of providing much-needed facilities and eliminating relics of the 'religious cult' in the city, but in a society where religion still mattered to a majority of the population, resistance could be serious. One particularly popular church, which stood in the way of a new vista in the centre, had to be demolished at night by Komsomols working in secret.⁴⁴

In 1931, the Central Committee approved a plan for improving conditions in the capital.⁴⁵ The preamble to the new proposals noted that improvements in the city, although substantial, had failed to keep pace with the growth in population, and singled out trams, housing, roads and the 'very unsatisfactory sanitary conditions in the city' as the main problems.⁴⁶ The proposals which followed included the building of housing for not less than half a million in the next year, the provision of more kindergartens and creches, the building of more shops to serve the outlying districts, and the improvement of services, including trams, heating, especially domestic heating, and a better sewerage network. The most ambitious part of the

⁴² Per capita 'living space', had fallen to half the 1918 level by 1925. *Istoriya Moskvyy*, Vol 6, part 1, (M., 1957), p. 297.

⁴³ The introduction of more bus routes in 1927, for example, was condemned by representatives of the Moscow working class as being of benefit only to the 'bourgeoisie', since workers either walked or took trams.

⁴⁴ No church building was safe, regardless of historical or architectural merit. Part of the Andronnikov monastery, for example, was converted in to a crematorium in 1927, and the Donskoi came within an ace of being demolished in order to make way for a club for the workers of the Krasnyi Proletarii factory. Only the intervention of the Commissar for 'Enlightenment', Lunacharskii, saved it.

⁴⁵ *KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s'ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK* (seventh edn., 1953), Vol 2, pp. 656-663.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 660.

plan, the building of an underground transport system, was to absorb the lion's share of the city's transport budget for the next decade.

c) Industry in Moscow.

Industry was the top priority for Moscow's leaders in this period. Moscow was an industrial centre of the first importance, accounting, in 1927, for 16.1% of the country's industrial proletariat.⁴⁷ This proportion fell as new industrial centres were established in the 1930's⁴⁸, but investment in Moscow industry continued to expand at an unprecedented rate. The city's industrial profile also changed. Since Tsarist times, Moscow had been dominated by the textile industry. At the end of 1925, the Moscow province, including the capital, produced 66.9% of the woollen products and 51.6% of cotton goods in the USSR, the next centre, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, producing only 36.6% of cotton products and virtually no woollens.⁴⁹ Over half the workers in the capital were employed in the textile industry, many of them in large plants, such as Trekhgornaya Manufaktura in Krasnaya Presnya raion, which employed 6,600 workers in 1926.⁵⁰ More enterprises, such as Glukhovskaya Manufaktura and the Ramenskaya Fabrika, were sited in the countryside beyond the city, mainly employing women from surrounding villages.

By 1929, the predominance of the textile industry had come to be regarded as a liability in Moscow. Strategically, textiles were not viewed as a priority industry for the first Five Year Plan, which attached the greatest importance to heavy industry, 'the production of the means of production'. Moreover, the textile industry relied too heavily on imported cotton at a time when scarce hard currency was being concentrated on engineering imports. Even before the adoption of the plan, however, political attitudes among textile workers, including their

⁴⁷ Statisticheskii spravochnik goroda Moskvy i Moskovskoi gubernii (M. 1927), introduction.

⁴⁸ Precise comparisons are difficult to establish because of the changing methods of accounting used in Soviet statistical sources. However, if we take figures for the total number of people employed in industry as a whole (including white-collar workers) the figures for 1932 were 24.2 million nationally and 1.7 million in Moscow. Sources, D. Filtzer, op. cit., p. 45 and Moskva v tsifrakh (M., 1934), table 1, p. 83.

⁴⁹ Yu I. Suvorov, 'Moskovskie Bol'sheviki v bor'be za effektivnost' proizvodstva v tekstil'noi promyshlennosti 1925-28 gg', kandidatskaya dissertatsiya (M., 1969), p.7.

⁵⁰ Davydova, op. cit, p.96.

reluctance to join the Communist Party, had begun to give rise to concern about the industry for other reasons. After 1929, its importance in Moscow relative to group A industries like metals and chemicals, declined steeply.⁵¹

After textiles came the various metalworking industries, accounting in 1927 for about 15% of Moscow's workers. This branch of industry was to be one of the growth areas of the next decade. The characteristic small workshops, employing skilled labour, were replaced by large plants where new workers predominated and skill levels were lower than in other industries, including textiles.⁵² Metalworking factories in Moscow which featured regularly in the press included *Serp i Molot*, a giant steelworks in Rogozhsko-Simonovskii raion, which employed 4, 868 workers in 1926, *Krasnyi Proletarii*, a metal-working and machine tool factory in Zamoskvorech'e raion, and *Dinamo*, an engineering works in Bauman raion. Allied to the metal industry, the automobile industry in Moscow, which included the first car plant in the USSR, the AMO works⁵³, expanded rapidly after 1929.

Other growth areas in these years were the construction and transport sectors. Construction workers were often 'seasonal' employees, dividing their time between the city and the countryside. Transport workers, the railway workers and tram drivers, began to figure regularly in the press after 1931, when it was maintained that inefficient transport accounted for many of the bottlenecks in Soviet production. Both groups were notoriously independent when it came to political activism, and included more than the average proportion of 'backward elements' such as alcoholics, anti-Semites and religious believers.⁵⁴

Despite innumerable problems, production in Moscow leaped in the years of the first Five Year Plan. The value of output from the Moscow metal industry rose from 201,824,000 rubles in 1927/8 to 1,206,857,000 rubles in 1932, that of the electrical industry increased

⁵¹ For levels of capital investment in Moscow industries, see Table 3, p. 259.

⁵² Davydova, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

⁵³ Later the *Avtozavod imeni Stalina* and now the *Zavod imeni Likhacheva* (ZIL), after a director of this period.

⁵⁴ This was a complaint uttered whenever the subject of seasonal workers came up in Party circles. See, eg., *Sputnik Kommunist* (SK), 1929, No. 8, p. 4.

eightfold, and output from the chemical industry more than doubled.⁵⁵ In accordance with official policy, the proportion of group A industry rose, from 28.3% of output in Moscow in 1927/8 to 48.2% in 1932.⁵⁶ These changes put a heavy strain on the city administration. Rapid growth and changes in the pattern of life in the city created turmoil, social and political, at all levels in these years. In addition to the changes within the city, the dramatic upheaval of rapid collectivisation in 1929-30, particularly traumatic in the Moscow province, caused discontent to reach desperate proportions both in the countryside and in the cities, since many of the workers' families were directly affected⁵⁷.

In theory, a number of bodies were responsible for planning and administration in Moscow; the Soviet, or Council, for the administration of the city, the trade unions for the needs of the workers, and a variety of organisations for the economy.⁵⁸ By the end of the first Five Year Plan, however, the Party had taken command of many aspects of economic life. It was also ultimately responsible for the development of the capital, and for a wide range of personnel appointments. These responsibilities put enormous strains on the Party apparatus. Its attempts to cope with them will be a recurrent theme in this study.

d) Moscow Politics before 1925.

By 1925, the Moscow Party organisation had a reputation for instability acquired during the political debates of 1920-21. In 1920, a coalition of broadly 'Left' oppositionists succeeded in gaining control of local Party organisations in two of the city's seven⁵⁹ administrative districts.⁶⁰ The protesters included members of the 'Workers' Opposition' and the

⁵⁵ Materialy o khozyaistve Moskvy v itoge pervoi pyatiletki (M. 1934), p. 132. These figures should be treated with a certain amount of caution. Soviet handbooks of the period make no allowance for the effects of rapid price inflation between 1928 and 1932.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p.17.

⁵⁷ A specific case of urban unrest, the Podol'sk incident of 1929, is cited below, p. 108.

⁵⁸ For a more detailed study of the various organisations which ran the economy at the enterprise level, see below, chapter 4.

⁵⁹ The seventh district, Gorodskoi raion, was absorbed into the other six in 1922.

⁶⁰ See R. Sakwa, 'The Party and Opposition in Moscow, 1920-Early 1921', Russian and East European Studies Centre, University of Essex, Discussion Paper series, No. 7 (1986), pp. 9-10. Eventually, the number of district Party committees critical of central policy in some degree was five out of seven.

'Democratic Centrist' groups, both, in different ways⁶¹, critical of the suppression of debate and the dirigiste spirit of Party leadership which had developed during the Civil War. The movement was defeated, partly because it lacked support among the Party leadership, and 'factional activity' was banned at the X Party Congress in 1921.

A year later, discontent among the Moscow population led to a search for alternatives to the current policies of conciliation towards the peasant and bureaucratic centralism. The unrest focussed on continuing poor living conditions for workers, low wages, unemployment and the insensitivity of management and Party leadership to the needs of the working class. To some, possibly a large number, of the Moscow Party rank and file, though not the full-time Party officials, the policies proposed by opposition groupings, including the small 'Workers' Truth' and 'Workers' Group' organisations, and the more senior Party members' coalition known as the 'Forty-six', seemed to provide attractive solutions to the social, political and economic problems of the time. The 'Forty-six', whose members included Pyatakov, Preobrazhenskii, Osinskii and Rafail, was identified with Trotsky, who shared many of its goals and voiced criticisms similar to its own. For constitutional reasons, Trotsky did not formally lead the movement, but its supporters were nonetheless known as 'Trotskyists'. This general label concealed the fact that many of those who opposed the Party leadership in 1923-4 were not aligned with formal political groups in the Central Committee⁶².

⁶¹ Both the Workers' Opposition, whose leaders were Shlyapnikov and Kollontai, and the so-called 'Decemists', a group including Osinskii and Maksimovskii, opposed the growing power of the Party and state bureaucracies. The Workers' Opposition, for example, argued that Party control of the organs of the state should be dismantled and that officials in all organisations should be the subjects of genuine local elections. While the Workers' Opposition sought to open the discussion of policy to the working class as a whole, however, the Decemist group confined itself to a campaign for 'inner Party democracy'. For this reason, the alliance between the two groups was tentative and insecure. For more information, and some very different views of this line of criticism, with the details of which, incidentally, Trotsky did not always concur, see I. Deutscher, The Prophet Unarmed, Trotsky 1921-1929 (London, 1959), pp. 51-4; R. Service, The Bolshevik Party in Revolution 1917-1923 (London, 1979), pp. 130-3 and 209-210; E. H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, Vol. 1 (London, 1951), pp. 196-7.

⁶² Trotsky himself was ill at the height of this opposition movement, and was resting in the Caucasus.

The various 'Left' groups in the capital, and the followers of Trotsky and the 'Forty-six' in particular, attracted support in all areas of the capital in the last months of 1923. Soviet accounts of the period stress the 'petty-bourgeois' character of the movement, identifying the main Leftist strongholds as the institutes of higher education and government offices.⁶³ It seems clear from the sources that the Leftists' most consistent supporters were students and the young in general, their most solid base being Khamovniki raion, where most of the educational institutions were concentrated. A majority of Party cells in educational establishments supported the opposition in December 1924, attracted by the arguments against centralism and advocating a reversal of current economic policy in favour of the urban proletariat⁶⁴. The opposition were less successful in recruiting among older workers, who were already asking what distinguished the various groups within the leadership, uncertain that anyone offered the kind of policy which could hold their allegiance. Despite this, enthusiasm in some factories was considerable, and the picture of a movement supported only by 'non-proletarian' elements is clearly exaggerated.⁶⁵

The Left's most obvious weakness in Moscow was its lack of support in the Party apparatus⁶⁶. At each successive layer in the Party hierarchy, its strength dwindled. At the level of the Moscow Party Conference, it could count on only 18 supporters⁶⁷, and subsequent purges suggested that only two or three members of the Moscow Party's bureau were involved. This was a crucial shortcoming, and it led to defeat at the Thirteenth Party Conference as well as at the Moscow provincial Party conference which preceded it. In Moscow, this defeat later led to the replacement of the Party first secretary, Zelenskii, by the Bukharinist Uglanov, who proceeded to purge the Moscow Party with great vigour⁶⁸. The centre's victory of 1924 made further discussion of the Party's future in any arena other than the Central Committee more likely to be construed as 'factional' activity. It was to be a

⁶³ Moskovskie Bol'sheviki v bor'be s pravym i "levym" opportunistom (M., 1969), pp. 61 and 74-5.

⁶⁴ Carr, *op. cit.*, pp. 334-5.

⁶⁵ Even Rykov, no friend of the Left, admitted this in 1923. Deutscher, *op. cit.*, p. 132, note.

⁶⁶ Elsewhere, where senior Party secretaries were sympathetic to the movement, it gained control of local organisations. This was said to be the case in Ryazan', Penza, Kaluga, Simbirsk and Chelyabinsk. E. H. Carr, The Interregnum (Pelican edn., 1969), p. 340.

⁶⁷ Deutscher, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

⁶⁸ This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.

feature of the period after 1925 that the defeat of every opposition movement encouraged those remaining to close ranks around the issue of Party discipline, reducing the range of activities which could be considered acceptable for loyal Party members.

Even after its 1924 defeat, however, the opposition left an important legacy. The issues which it had raised were not trivial. Outward defeat concealed the fact that the triumphant Party majority continued to be troubled by questions like the Bolshevik Party's relationship with the working class, the correct approach to the problem of landowning peasants, and the growth of bureaucracy. The group within the Politburo which opposed Trotsky and his allies was not itself united, and its members were to revise their own policies on these questions in the next five years, sometimes more than once. The same was true lower down in the Party apparatus, at the level of the Moscow Party organisation. Despite the boldness and dogmatism of its public slogans, the Bolshevik Party leadership in 1925 was not a united or self-confident body. Its approach to economic and political questions in the period after 1925 would be cautious and often defensive.

If the Party leadership was divided and uncertain of its policies, the rank and file presented an even more confusing picture. The fight against 'Trotskyism' concealed a reality which was more complicated than the bi-polar language of the propaganda suggested. In Moscow, popular perceptions of the proper role and structure of the Party varied widely, in their notion of the need for 'democracy' often going far beyond what the essentially 'loyal' oppositions of the mid-1920's were prepared to concede. One lesson of the struggles of 1923-4 was that the population of Moscow, including many students and a substantial section of the working class, had definite and original views about the future of the revolution, as well as a keen perception of its own interests.

This point will be demonstrated repeatedly in this study, in the analysis of the Party's efficiency and role as well as in the account of the 'oppositions' of the period themselves. It was not the case, for example, that the mass recruitment drive which followed Lenin's death in 1924, during which over 25,000 new members joined the Moscow organisation, simply flooded the Party with 'the politically immature, the backward, the dullminded and the

docile, the climbers and the nest-featherers'⁶⁹. Even if the 'declassing of the proletariat' is accepted, the loss through war and desertion of the cities of large numbers of the workers who had made the revolution in 1917, the new members were drawn from the same Moscow proletariat which had listened to Trotsky, Pyatakov and their allies in the factories in 1923, the same people who had encouraged Workers' Opposition speakers in 1920. In the period of this study, central discipline increased, but the Moscow Party Organisation remained lively, controversial, anything but 'docile'.

Many questions vital to the revolution remained undecided in 1925. The Moscow organisation was neither united nor self-assured. Like the Central Committee, it had recourse repeatedly to interim measures to tide it over the problems which were to loom over political life in the USSR for the next decade.

⁶⁹ Deutscher, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

Chapter 1. The Structure of the Party in Moscow, 1925-32.

A knowledge of the internal structure of the Bolshevik Party is necessary before its history can be studied. The difficulties of this essentially mechanical task rapidly become apparent. Although several works on the subject exist,¹ many details are still unclear. Official Soviet accounts are often misleading. Moreover, in the eight years of the present study, Party structure was the subject of wide ranging modifications. At the local level, experiments were encouraged, which meant that no two organisations were necessarily alike. Taken in combination with the usual problems of studying the Party at any time, these difficulties make a thorough systematic study of the internal arrangement of a local organisation virtually impossible.

Among local organisations, Moscow was particularly thoroughly covered in the Party press, and is thus easier to study than many remoter areas. Experiments first attempted in Moscow were frequently generalised, helping to illustrate some of the trends in official thinking on structural change. On the other hand, certain aspects of the Moscow Party were untypical, largely because it was under the constant scrutiny of Central Committee (TsK)², and also because its leading cadres were unusually senior by comparison with those of other local organisations. Before the case of Moscow is discussed specifically, however, an outline of the Party's general structure must be provided by reference to its own rules.

The guiding principle of Party organisation was democratic centralism, defined in the 1934 Party rules, which codified changes which had taken place in this period, as

- i) The election of all leading Party organs from the highest to the lowest ranks;
- ii) Periodic reports by Party organs before the Party organisation;

¹ M. Fainsod, Smolensk under Soviet Rule; L. Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union; E. H. Carr, Socialism in One Country, Vol. 2 (London, 1959), and Foundations of a Planned Economy, vol. 2 (London, 1971); J. A. Getty, Origins of the Great Purges (Cambridge, 1983); A. Sadler, 'The Party Organisation in the Soviet Enterprise' (unpublished MSocSci. dissertation, CREES, University of Birmingham, 1979), which is confined to the factory level Party organisation between 1928 and 1932.

² The TsK was the most powerful of the standing committees of the Party. In practice it was increasingly superseded unofficially by one of its organs, the Politburo.

- iii) Strict Party discipline and the subordination of the minority to the majority;
- iv) Unconditional adherence by the lower ranks and all Party members to the decisions of the higher Party organs.³

The lower ranks referred to in clause four were also organised according to the 'democratic centralist' principle. As the rules put it, 'the organisation serving a given district is considered to be higher than all the organisations serving parts of that district.'⁴ The rules provided for a tiered structure, beginning with the All-Union Congress and Conference and their standing committee, the TsK, in theory the supreme Party organ. Below that, corresponding to the administrative organs of the State, came

- i) Oblast's⁵, republics and gubernias and their conferences (in the case of oblast's, krais⁶ and gubernias) and congresses (in the case of national republics); oblast' and krai committees, the central committees of national republics, gubernia committees;

- ii) okrugs and uezds⁷ and their conferences and committees;

- iii) volost's⁸ and raions⁹ and their conferences and committees;

- iv) enterprises, villages, red army units and institutions and their general cell meetings and buros.¹⁰ This lowest level, known as the Primary Party Organisation by 1934, could be formed in any enterprise, institution, village, etc., with a minimum of three Party members. As will be seen below, its precise constitution changed as the pressure of growing Party membership called for a more structured organisation at the grass roots level.

No precise definition of the duties of the Politburo and Orgburo were given. Despite their indefinite status, these two organisations were to take over many of the duties and powers of the Central Committee in the 1920's. What was true of the central Party organisation was

³ KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh (seventh edn., M., 1953), vol 2, pp. 778-9.

⁴ Ibid., p. 124.

⁵ Usually translated as province, the oblast' was the successor of the gubernia, the old Tsarist provincial unit. See also the glossary of Russian terms, pp. 277-8.

⁶ Krais were territorial units in the non-Russian national republics, usually larger than gubernias or oblast's.

⁷ Subordinate units within the oblast' or gubernia.

⁸ Usually translated as county.

⁹ In the countryside, a raion was a small district of a few villages, while in a city it corresponded to a ward.

¹⁰ KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh, (seventh edn.) vol 2, pp. 124-5.

also true in Moscow, where real power in this period lay not with the Party conference, but with the buro and secretariat. However, Moscow's subordination to the TsK was genuine, and went considerably further than the rules provided.

1. The Party Apparatus

Moscow's relationship with the Central Committee

The TsK exercised both a formal, constitutional, control over the MK and an informal one based on personal links and the presence in Moscow of many of the TsK's leading figures. In general terms, the TsK was responsible for the formulation of policy and for checking on the fulfilment of directives, in which function it was helped by the Central Control Commission, TsKK¹¹. Thus throughout this period, TsK meetings would be followed by meetings of the MK, addressed by TsK members, at which the implementation of the TsK's decisions would be discussed. These would be followed by local meetings all the way down to the shift level in the factories. Formally, a TsK decision was never in this period called into question at the MK level, and for factory cells to do so, as they did occasionally, was a serious breach of Party discipline.

Moscow's position within the USSR meant that the TsK regarded its internal politics as a matter of special importance, meriting direct intervention on frequent occasions.¹² In this respect and others, the TsK broke its own rules where Moscow was concerned. In spite of 'democratic centralism', the TsK appointed the MK secretary and his deputies, who were the most senior figures in Moscow city politics, and also had a share in the selection of the local Party secretaries in the six raions.¹³ Technically, all these people were 'elected' at plenary

¹¹ The control commissions, of which the Central Control Commission was the highest body, were responsible, in theory, for checking the work of the Party organs to prevent 'bureaucratic excesses.' They were independent of the Party apparatus, and no member of a Party committee could serve on them, although movement between the two was common. Disputes between the control commissions and the equivalent Party organs would be placed before a joint session of the two, and could eventually end up on the agenda of local Party conferences. It will be seen that joint sessions of the MK and Moscow Control Commission (MKK) were common, as in practice the two organs were responsible for scrutinising the same kinds of problem.

¹² For a full discussion of the strategic importance of Moscow, see Chapter 2, pp. 50-51.

¹³ The question of central influence over appointments and personnel is discussed in detail in Chapter 6, especially pp. 206-7.

sessions of the MK, and in the case of the raions, of the raion Party committees (raikoms), but no secret was made of the reality, even in the Party press.¹⁴

The TsK's involvement went further than the selection of personnel. It took several resolutions on the MK during this period; on its economic and political work¹⁵, on the work of the MKK,¹⁶ and on the 'Right deviation'¹⁷ in Moscow.¹⁸ During the period under study, it also commissioned reports on individual raikoms,¹⁹ and even on specific Moscow factories, such as AMO and Serp i Molot.²⁰

Many senior politicians resided in the capital, and they also intervened in the MK's affairs. In all major centres in the USSR, Politburo members gave occasional reports on recent developments in the TsK and other central organisations like the Comintern, but in Moscow, they were known to appear at raion meetings, and some major factories were regularly visited by 'their' Politburo member, who would tour the various shops and also attend meetings of the factory Party organisation.²¹

Unlike some remoter areas of the USSR, Moscow thus had no excuse for misunderstanding its duties as defined by the TsK. It was also under constant central scrutiny to check that it was carrying them out. But the lines of communication between the TsK and the MK

¹⁴ The formula 'chosen by the TsK' was used for the appointment of Bauman in 1929, for example, and Molotov's removal was explicitly ordered by the TsK and ratified by the MK.

¹⁵ 29 July 1926. This and the next resolution are described in N.S. Davydova, *op. cit.*, introduction, p. 56.

¹⁶ 26-27 July 1927

¹⁷ The political movement opposed to rapid industrialisation and to the use of 'extraordinary measures' in the countryside for the collection of grain. See below, Chapter 2.

¹⁸ 18 October 1928.

¹⁹ Such as the two reports on Krasnaya Presnya, 1928 and 1930. P., 10/10/1928 and Dokladnaya zapiska v TsK VKP(b) o vypolnenie reshenii TsK po Krasnopresnenskomu raionu (M., 1930).

²⁰ Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo (PS) 1931, No. 8 and Tsentral'nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Oktyabr'skoi Revolyutsii (TsGAOR), 7952/ 3/267, 8.

²¹ Molotov and Mikoyan were regular visitors at the Krasnyi Proletarii factory, for example, and Kaganovich took a close interest in Serp i Molot. TsGAOR, *loc. cit.*, and 7952/ 3/ 94, 84.

operated in both directions.²² Moscow's position guaranteed it privileged access to the country's resources, and Moscow politicians could always secure a hearing for their problems at the highest level. The cost of these privileges was high. One problem was the frequency of disruptions in Moscow. The TsK sought to create a model organisation in the capital, and was intolerant of even minor shortcomings. The need for perfection in Moscow, together with the fact that failures and political deviations were more than usually apparent to the TsK, partly explains the rapid turnover of Party secretaries which marked the period up to 1930.²³

The Moscow Committee (MK).

The Party rules provided that within Moscow, the leading Party organ was the Moscow Committee of the Communist Party (MK), which was responsible for the city of Moscow and for the Moscow province. After 1931, the city of Moscow was separated from the province for administrative purposes, and was the responsibility of the Moscow City Committee of the Communist Party, the MGK. In practice, there remained some overlap in personnel between the MGK and the provincial Committee, and the two organisations held their conferences together in February 1932 and January 1934.²⁴ In order to understand the city organisation, it is thus necessary to look at the provincial committee, at least until February 1931.

The divisions of the Party organisation corresponded throughout the period to the state units. When there was a change in the state administration, the Party followed. Until 1929, the MK controlled an area called the Moscow gubernia, an administrative unit dating back to the Tsarist era. Thereafter, a Moscow province with new boundaries was created and re-named the Moscow oblast'. The change had been discussed throughout the later '20's, with reports on the administration of Moscow pointing to the need for rationalisation. The

²² This point is also made by Fainsod in his study of Smolensk. 'As a representative of the Oblast'', wrote Fainsod, 'the Oblast' secretary had to press for allocations of supplies to the Oblast', for budgetary appropriations which would enable him to fulfil the commitments which the centre imposed on him.' Fainsod, Smolensk, p. 76.

²³ See below, chapter 2, p. 50.

²⁴ A full list of conferences is given in Moskovskaya Gorodskaya i Moskovskaya Oblast'naya Organizatsiya KPSS v Tsifrah (M., 1972), pp.195-7.

catalyst was rapid industrial change and the increasing complexity of life in the gubernia. The reform was Union-wide, and was presented as both rationalisation and decentralisation. Ukhanov, the Chairman of the Moscow Soviet, speaking at the IV MK plenum in 1929²⁵, described how the redrawing of the boundaries would align the political units with the economic ones. The Moscow oblast' was to be much larger than the old gubernia, and was to be economically self-sufficient as far as possible. It was to absorb the former provinces of Ryazan', Tula, Tver', and part of the old Kaluga province,²⁶ and was to account for 30% of industrial output in the USSR and 40% of that of the RSFSR. Until 1929, the MK was also known as the Moscow gubkom (gubernia committee); thereafter, it became the Moscow obkom (oblast' committee).

Throughout the period, the MK was a very large body, numbering more than 100 members.²⁷ The majority of these were full time Party officials²⁸. They included representatives of the TsK, the secretaries of the MK, the heads of the various departments within it, together with their deputies, the secretaries of all the raikoms in the city, together with their heads of department, and also the secretaries of the local organisations in the Moscow province. There was a tendency for the number of these full-time Party officials to increase as the years passed, and in particular, TsK representation on the MK increased markedly. Other members of the MK throughout the period included senior trade union officials, representatives of the Moscow Soviet, heads of Moscow economic trusts²⁹, representatives of the military district, the educational establishments in the capital and the Komsomol, and the editors of the main local newspapers and of Pravda. A large number of the rest were local delegates, elected for a single term. These included the secretaries of local cells, either in factories or transport depots, or in government institutions, and also workers 'from the bench'. Not all factories and institutions could be represented, although important

²⁵ IV plenum MK (M., 1929), pp. 115-6.

²⁶ See map 3, p. 249.

²⁷ For a detailed breakdown of the membership of the MK, see table 4, pp. 260-2.

²⁸ The precise number of full-time officials in the Moscow Party organisation is not given in the sources, and although occasional references to the numbers in specific areas occur, the absence of systematic statistics rules out a realistic estimation of the size of the 'apparatus'.

²⁹ Trusts, which existed at all-Union, national and regional levels, were responsible for the running of groups of factories within given industries. Thus Mashinotrest' was responsible for the machine-tool industry, Moskhimtrest' for the Moscow chemical industry, etc.

plants like Trekhgornaya Manufaktura, Serp i Molot and AMO always sent delegates. The others were represented occasionally, on a rotation basis. These local representatives did not appear on the lists of committees of the MK which were also elected at the conference, and their influence was minimal except where they represented priority areas, such as the automobile or defence industries³⁰.

Conferences of the Moscow Party organisation were held at irregular intervals during this period.³¹ The format did not change and the purpose of the conference remained more the propagation of information than the real discussion of issues. The conference would begin with a brief speech by the Party secretary and the playing of the Internationale. The first business would then be to appoint a presidium, consisting of the most eminent politicians present, which would occupy the stage for the duration of the conference. After 1927, the practice was introduced of also appointing an 'honorary presidium', made up of the senior figures in the Politburo, whose spiritual presence was thus also invoked to watch over the proceedings. More tangibly, the conference would also appoint a secretariat to draft a report of its work, and a commission to draw up resolutions. The members of these bodies were not politicians of the first rank, and it may thus be inferred that their job was a genuine one, requiring time and thought at the time of the conference, even if the resolutions and reports had then to be checked and approved by their superiors.

The reports at the conference would typically open with a speech given by a prominent member of the TsK. He would begin with a statement of the USSR's international position and then outline developments in national politics since the last conference. This report generally occupied the first evening session, and was followed by a discussion the next day

³⁰ Likhachev, for example, the director of the AMO plant in Moscow, was both a charismatic and assertive personality and the head of one of the nation's key plants. He was also allegedly a personal friend of Khrushchev's in the 1930's. Ed. E. Crankshaw, Khrushchev Remembers, Vol. 1 (London, 1971), p. 86.

³¹ The Party rules, amended at the XIII Congress, stipulated that provincial organisations should hold conferences twice a year, but the rule was not invariably observed in Moscow. The Moscow Party held the following conferences in this period: XIII Conference, January 1925; XIV Conference, December 1925; XV Conference, January 1927; XVI Conference, November 1927; XVII Conference, March 1929; I Oblast' Conference, September 1929; II Oblast' Conference, June 1930; I Moscow city conference, February 1931; III Oblast' and II city Conference, January 1932.

which could occupy as many as four sessions, or two days. The same pattern would then be repeated with reports from the TsKK, the MK, usually given by the first secretary, and the MKK. Sometimes, a report was also given by the Moscow Komsomol. The conference would also hear greetings from fraternal Party organisations and from individual factories in the region. It was not unusual for conferences to last over a week. They would close with the submission and approval of resolutions on the main reports, the purpose of which was to affirm the organisation's approval for past policy as presented by the TsK and MK, and to state its intentions for the future. The conference was technically responsible for deciding the outlines of policy. The standard of debate, however, declined in this period, and after 1928, genuine disagreements disappeared from the stenographic reports. Moreover, throughout the period, if changes in policy were felt to be necessary between conferences, the organisation would not feel irretrievably tied to its conference commitments.³²

The conference would immediately be followed by a plenum, at which the secretaries and the MK buro were formally elected, together with the editor of Rabochaya Moskva, the MK newspaper. Plenums, the only other occasion on which the whole MK could meet as a body, were held five or six times a year, numbered from the last provincial conference. They were often held in conjunction with the MKK. The agenda would usually consist of three or four main items, though plenums could be held which limited themselves to a single topic, as in the case of the October joint plenum of the MK and MKK in 1928. The regular, as opposed to 'extraordinary' plenums, met according to a prescribed plan, drawn up every six months.³³ These plans provided the topics for discussion, and also stipulated which non-Party experts were to be consulted. Plenums would thus be attended by members of the MK and invited speakers, such as heads of trusts or trade union officials. The topics discussed ranged from internal Party matters to planning and such detailed economic questions as the internal organisation of the textile industry. Depending on the volume of

³² This may be illustrated with an example from 1928. The Party rules specified that the congress, or, in this case, the conference, 'revises and alters the Party programme and rules', but in October 1928, the head of the Moscow organisation department, Polonskii, altered the rules for electing cell buro members at the local level in Moscow without reference to any other body. P, 10/10/1928.

³³ For a specimen work plan, see appendix 2, pp. 273-276.

business, a plenum could last up to three days, running to three three- or four-hour sessions a day.

Like the MK, the plenum altered during this period, with working class representatives virtually disappearing from the attendance lists. Increasingly, the plenum was merely an expanded meeting of the MK buro, though it still retained the rights of the plenum as defined in the Party rules. Moreover, as the plenum became more exclusive, so press coverage of its deliberations began to change. Until 1928, plenums were reported in Rabochaya Moskva as they happened, and the major speeches were printed verbatim. By 1932, however, the only indication a reader might have that a plenum had occurred would be a paragraph published up to a week after the proceedings had ended, and giving only the barest outline of what had taken place.

Even before these changes, the MK buro and secretariat had been the real power in the capital, however. The most important figure in Moscow politics was the first secretary of the MK. He³⁴ was appointed by the TsK and was throughout this period a politician of national standing. Uglanov, the first secretary from 1925 to 1928, was a candidate member of the Politburo, as was his successor but one, Karl Bauman. Both Kaganovich, the secretary from 1930 to 1934, and Molotov, who succeeded Uglanov for four months in 1928-9, were Politburo members and close associates of Stalin. All had experience of senior office in another province before taking over in the capital. A politician of this calibre naturally had considerable influence in local politics, including extensive powers of patronage. Uglanov, for example, was able to promote both Pen'kov and Mandel'shtam, who closely shared his political outlook, from minor posts in the gubernia to senior positions involving membership of the MK buro. However, it has already been suggested that the patronage powers of the MK secretary were not untrammelled. The TsK retained a share in the selection of senior MK officials, including the other MK secretaries and the heads of departments. It was thus possible for figures politically opposed to the first

³⁴ All Moscow First Secretaries have so far been men. In general, I have also used 'he' rather than 'he or she' elsewhere. The reason (apart from the need to avoid tedium) is that the Communist Party of this period, especially at the official levels, was overwhelmingly male.

secretary to be promoted to senior rank within the Moscow organisation in a 'divide and rule' policy which ensured that the organisation would never align itself solidly against the TsK secretariat.³⁵

The number of subordinate secretaries on the MK varied.³⁶ Although they were not formally allocated spheres of responsibility, it was understood that each would cover a specific area of Party work. In general, the second secretary seems in this period to have been responsible for internal Party matters, while the third secretary took charge of economic questions, although this was not a hard and fast rule of Party policy.³⁷ In 1927, the secretariat consisted of the first and second secretaries and three others, the head of the powerful organisation department of the MK secretariat, the chairman of the gubernia council of trade unions (MGSPS) and the head of the agitation and propaganda department.³⁸ As with the MK itself, the size of the secretariat reached its maximum in 1929 after the incorporation of the new territory, with seven full members, including a first, second and third secretary, and two candidates.³⁹ After the second oblast' conference in 1930, the size of the secretariat shrank back to five.⁴⁰ A similar pattern can be seen in the size of the MK Buro, which averaged 15 members throughout the period, except in 1929 when the numbers swelled to 27.⁴¹

The composition of the MK buro did not vary much, despite other changes in Party structure.⁴² It always included the first and second secretaries, and also the third secretary,

³⁵ The promotion of Bauman, who was known to oppose Uglanov's line on the rural question, to the head of the organisation-assignment department, is an example of this policy. In general, the members of this department were clients of Stalin, rather than of the current MK secretary. See below, p. 94.

³⁶ See appendix 1, pp. 264-272.

³⁷ In 1924, Uglanov, as second secretary, was responsible for Party matters, while Mikhailov, the third secretary, was in charge of economic questions. Kotov, who became second secretary in 1925, took particular responsibility for Party propaganda and education. Under Bauman, in 1929, Polonskii, the second secretary, was responsible for organisational and Party questions, while Leonov seems to have made more speeches and reports on economic issues.

³⁸ P. 18/1/27.

³⁹ P. 19/9/29.

⁴⁰ P. 15/6/30.

⁴¹ P. 19/9/29.

⁴² For the membership of the buro, see appendix 1.

if there was one. The secretaries of the raikoms were also included, although recent appointments might only be candidate members. The heads of the most important departments (otdely) of the MK secretariat, such as the head of the otdel responsible for agitation and propaganda (agitpropotdel) and the head of the otdel responsible for organisational and cadres work within the Party (orgraspredotdel) were also included. Until 1927, the head of the women's department was not a member of the MK buro, and even thereafter, she might only be a candidate member, a reflection of the lack of importance attached to this aspect of Party work. The remaining posts on the MK buro were occupied by the chairmen of Mossoviet, the Moscow Economic Council (MSNKh) and the Moscow Provincial Council of Trade Unions (MGSPS), representatives of the military district and of the local OGPU, the secretary of the local Komsomol and the heads of one or two key trade unions and economic trusts. Usually, one or two places were reserved for the secretaries of the most important local Party organisations from the province (ukoms), although at the time of the re-organisation of the province, when many new areas were being absorbed, the number of local secretaries from outside Moscow itself increased to a maximum of ten.⁴³ The buro thus represented the various interest groups in the province, and was not merely a forum for the ratification of central Party directives. Closer study of Party practice will show that it was the forum for genuine discussions about policy in which the Party officials had to take account of the views of administrators from other bodies.⁴⁴

A study of the composition of the MK buro indicates the priority attached to the various posts within the Party hierarchy.⁴⁵ The importance of the MK is emphasised by the fact that many senior MK officials had previously been first secretaries in other gubernias. To move to Moscow, even to a subordinate post, was considered a promotion. Another notable feature was the importance attached to instructors.⁴⁶ Full-time 'instructors' worked at all levels in the Party, and were drawn from the ranks of the most trusted officials. A raikom

⁴³ In September 1929. See appendix 1. Essentially, the MK buro's membership does not seem to have differed from that of the Smolensk Party committee buro, although from time to time, individual posts would be omitted. In 1929, the editor of the provincial newspaper was not a member of the MK buro, for example. (Fainsod, Smolensk, pp. 67-8.)

⁴⁴ See below, chapter 4.

⁴⁵ See appendix 1.

⁴⁶ See below, pp. 34-35

secretary, for example, might be promoted to instruction work if his record was satisfactory. The official task of instructors was the conveying of policy to the lower cells, but their seniority indicates that their role was more to take charge of difficult cases than to act as consultants. Finally, it is clear that the buro had its own hierarchy, in which the head of the department responsible for the assignment of cadres and organisational work (orgraspredotdel) was subordinate only to the first and second secretaries.

The buro and secretariat were responsible for the day to day work of the MK, but like the plenums, they worked to a plan which was elaborated every six months and submitted to the plenum for approval. These plans were lengthy documents, meticulously presenting the work to be done on prescribed dates. The plan adopted at the II MK plenum in 1929, for example, was five pages long, and listed eight separate headings for the buro's work - industry and construction, the re-organisation of agriculture, trade and co-operatives, the material condition of the working class, the structure of the Soviets, cultural and mass work, the Red Army and Party work.⁴⁷ In practice, these ambitious plans were often unfulfilled, as the MK buro also had to respond to less predictable crises, including changes in policy outlined from the centre and the removal of its own personnel as a result of political struggles.

The routine work of the MK was carried out by a number of departments (otdely) responsible to the secretariat and, at least theoretically, to the whole committee.⁴⁸ These were modelled on the departments of the TsK. Thus, until 1930, the MK had five main departments, to which were attached sub-departments for matters like the press and information. These were the orgraspredotdel, which was responsible for questions of organisation and for the selection and assignment of cadres to posts controlled by the Party within the gubernia⁴⁹, the agitpropotdel, which was responsible for agitation and propaganda

⁴⁷ See appendix 2. The plan was attached to the stenographic report of the plenum, pp. 33-37.

⁴⁸ The arrangement of these departments was a matter of supreme complexity. Diagram 1 (pp. 250-2) presents the major changes.

⁴⁹ The Party authorised appointments to positions in most strategic areas, including the economy and the state apparatus. The posts, which were filled by candidates from lists approved by the orgraspredotdel, were considered to be within the Party's control, or nomenklatura. See below, chapter 6, pp. 206-7.

and provided briefing materials through its journal Propagandist, the so-called 'secret otdel', whose head was referred to as the 'assistant' (pomoshchnik) of the MK secretary, and whose function was to collect information about the Party as a whole for the secretary's use,⁵⁰ and the departments for women (zhenotdel) and for rural affairs (otdel po rabote v derevne), which were very much junior partners, and whose heads did not generally qualify for full membership of the MK buro. In 1930, the rural department was abolished and the women's department reduced to the status of a 'sector'⁵¹.

These otdely were headed by senior politicians, and included on their staff a deputy head, technical secretary, and a number of 'instructors', both full-time and supernumerary. Instructors, who were also to be found at lower levels in the Party hierarchy, served both to help cells to implement the directives which came down from the higher committees, and to check on fulfilment and report back to the committee to which they were attached. Full-time instructors were usually attached to a department and worked within its sphere of competence. Others, who might have a specific skill, would be at the disposal of the obkom as needed.⁵² They were introduced as a response to the 'rationalisation of the apparatus' in 1927-8, and were intended to save on full-time paid Party staff.⁵³ Their duties were redefined at various times during the period, usually to include yet more tasks, since as messengers to the lower cells, they were indispensable. Whenever communications between the various levels came under strain, therefore, and when the other full time Party committee staff felt beleaguered with work, the instructors were invoked as the vital link in the hierarchical system. Under these conditions, they could not hope to fulfill all the tasks

⁵⁰ The most thorough account of this otdel is given by N. E. Rosenfeldt, Knowledge and Power: the role of Stalin's secret chancellery in the Soviet system of government (Copenhagen, 1976). Rosenfeldt suggests that the secret otdel had disappeared from the TsK apparatus in or soon after 1930. This seems unlikely in view of the fact that a secret department was quoted at the III Moscow oblast' conference in January 1932. Possibly, Rosenfeldt was misled here by the unreliable Avtorkhanov, whose work contains several outright fabrications. The secrecy of the otdel also militates against a thorough study of it. So secret was the pomoshchnik's work, for example, that no holder of that post in Moscow features in the Party press or on the lists of buro members, although the Conference reports of 1930 and 1932 name them as Shurov and Kryskii respectively.

⁵¹ These changes, like most others in the MK apparatus, followed the TsK.

⁵² The same principle applied for raikom instructors. See V. P. Pospekhov, Deyatel'nost' Moskovskoi Partiinoi Organizatsii po dal'neishemu razvitiyu vnutripartiinoi demokratii v gody pervoi pyatiletki, 1928-32 gg., Avtoreferat Dissertatsii (M., 1976), p. 24.

⁵³ P 17/3/28.

expected of them, and complaints were frequently made, usually about their unfamiliarity with the lower ranks for which they were responsible.⁵⁴

In January 1930, the organisation of the TsK apparatus was altered in response to the pressures on the two largest departments, the orgraspred and agitprop otdeley. At a TsK Orgburo meeting, Kaganovich outlined the changes, which were soon to be mirrored in the local organisations. The orgraspredotdel was to be divided into two departments, the otdel raspredeleniya, responsible for the selection and appointment of administrators for the State and the economy, for trade union leaders and any other nomenklatura posts, and the organisation-instruction otdel, with responsibility for organisational work within the Party, including Party appointments, and for checking on the fulfilment of directives. The agitpropotdel was also to be divided, the new departments being responsible for 'agit-mass', or agitational work among the population as a whole, on the one hand, and for 'culture and propaganda', political education work among Party members, on the other. At the same time, the rural and women's departments were abolished, a sector for women's work being established under the leadership of the organisation-instruction department.⁵⁵ These changes were carried out in Moscow in late January.⁵⁶

The reforms did not solve the problems of parallelism and overwork which beset the Party apparatus, however. Far from diminishing, the pressures on it increased. Among the causes was the rapid growth of the Party, which virtually doubled in size between 1930 and 1932.⁵⁷ Again, an organisational solution was sought. Alongside the otdeley, more 'sectors' were now established, the new units being the accounting, Party construction, cadres, women and information-statistics sectors.⁵⁸ However, the Party had also become

⁵⁴ Sbornik Vazhneishikh Postanovlenii MK i MGK VKP(b) (Material k IV Oblast'noi i III Gorodskoi Konferentsiei VKP(b)) (M., 1934), pp 546-550.

⁵⁵ Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo, (PS), 1930, No 2, p.10.

⁵⁶ P 8/2/30.

⁵⁷ For the national Party, the membership figures were 1/1/1930, 1,677,910 members and candidates; 1/1/1932, 3,117,250 (T. H. Rigby, Communist Party membership in the Soviet Union, p. 52); for Moscow, the corresponding figures for the oblast' as a whole were 226,333 and 395,104, and for the city alone, 135,888 and 225,554 (Moskovskaya Gorodskaya i Moskovskaya Oblast'naya organizatsiya KPSS v tsifrakh (M., 1972), p.28). For more information on Party membership, see chapter 3.

⁵⁸ Ocherkii Istorii Moskovskoi Organizatsii KPSS, 2nd. edn. (M. 1983), p. 384.

responsible for the detailed running of the economy, and the old structures provided no specific organs for this new work. In Moscow, therefore, these 'functional' sectors were supplemented, in the summer 1930, by 'production-territorial' sectors, initially six in number, each responsible for about 30 raions, supposedly grouped according to the type of industry which predominated in them.

By 1931, the organisation of the administration had changed again.⁵⁹ The information sector had been abolished, and its work had been spread between the others, so that each sector had its own full time information worker. In response to the demands of the economy, however, a further four 'production-territorial' sectors had been added, making a total of ten. Three of these were based simply on a branch of industry, the transport, metal working and war industry sectors, and took responsibility for all major factories in that industry wherever they were situated. The rest were based on territorial areas within the oblast'.⁶⁰ At the Party conference of January 1932, the following offices were cited: the agitmass otдел, the kul'tprop otдел, the orgotдел, the cadres otдел and the secret otдел, and sectors for women, metalworking, transport, energy and heat, and flax growing. By 1936, this structure was again modified, so that overworked staff never had the opportunity of growing accustomed to any of the various systems.

All this was extremely complicated, as even the most ardent contemporary admitted. The system adopted in Moscow was not a national standard, although the Ukraine also tried the territorial-production principle. Thus the idea could be regarded as experimental, and was the subject of a careful investigation by a representative of the TsK's own organisation-instruction department. He considered the principle to be a sound one, but pointed out half a dozen problems with it which would continue to present difficulties well into the '30's. The most obvious was the very complexity of the system, which led to poor communications with the obkom and disputes over spheres of competence, usually solved either by inactivity

⁵⁹ See diagram 1.

⁶⁰ These were the grain growing raions sector (responsible for 20 raions), the cottage industry sector (24), the milk and livestock sector (20), the flax sector (23) the heavy industry sector (10), the light industry sector (23) and the heat and energy sector (9). PS 1931, no. 21.

or by its opposite, the sector's involvement in every minute detail of local life. Often, the sector head knew only a few of the raions for which he was responsible and even telephone links did not exist with some of the remoter ones.⁶¹

The subordinate organisations.

Until 1929, government in the gubernia had been administered through uezds, of which there were 17 in 1927. These were roughly the equivalent of urban raions, each having its own committee, secretary and buro. Below the uezd came the volost', often translated as county, a much smaller unit, and directly running the villages within its boundaries. In the city, there were only raions, six of them after the abolition of Gorodskoi raion in 1922.⁶² These were smaller-scale versions of the MK, each with a committee, a buro and secretariat and officers for such matters as agitprop and information.

After the reorganisation of the oblast', the administration of the province was shaken up considerably. Power was now mediated through okrugs, of which there were ten in the Moscow oblast', loosely based on the old uezds and the annexed gubernias. Within these, the 145 raions were to be given increased powers, including larger staffs and increased budgets. Through their executive committees, the raispolkoms, they were now expected to manage affairs within their boundaries, including the formation of economic strategy, without the intervention of superior bodies. Parallel with the government structure ran the Party apparatus, whose new bodies were the okruzhkom and the raikom.

With the raions thus strengthened, it was hard to see where the responsibilities of the okrug ended and those of the raion began. According to Ukhanov, the chairman of Mossoviet, the distinction was to be between the okrugs' overall planning function and the executive role of the raions,⁶³ but in practice, there was considerable overlap. In September 1929, the old structure of gubernia-uezd-volost'-selo was replaced in the province by oblast'-okrug-raion-

⁶¹ PS, 1931, no.21.

⁶² See map 1, p. 247.

⁶³ IV Plenum MK (M., 1929), pp. 115-136.

selo, but only nine months later, the anomalous okrug was abolished, as being superfluous in a system which placed such emphasis on the raion.⁶⁴

The disruptions of these years left some of the full-time officials of both Party and state discontented and resentful. The reorganisation of the oblast', for example, involved the absorption of several hitherto self-contained gubernias, whose staff could not all find posts of equal status in the new structure. Worse was the abolition of the okrugs, which led to the re-disposition of their staff in the raions, a deliberate demotion which caused widespread dissatisfaction.⁶⁵ Moreover, this rationalisation, which had been expected to lead to a reduction in the size of the paid staff, actually led to an increase, as did almost any reorganisation during this period.⁶⁶

The above account has centred mainly on the Moscow province as a whole. Within the city, there was also change, but the structure was from the outset less complicated. It is now time to turn to the city itself.

The creation of the Moscow City Committee.

Although the idea that the capital city should be part of a large and substantially rural hinterland for administrative purposes seems unrealistic in retrospect, Moscow was governed with the gubernia from May 1920 until February 1931. The decision to re-separate the city was taken suddenly, and does not appear in the Party rules or in any of the outline plans for the development of the oblast' before 1931. The way in which it was taken illustrates the Party's supremacy over the state organisations, both in organisational matters and in the appointment of personnel.

The background to the change was the continuing problem of poor conditions in the capital, including the housing shortage, poor health care and inadequate public transport. These and similar issues were the subject of an MK plenum in February 1931, which met at the same

⁶⁴ PS 1930, No. 13-14.

⁶⁵ Fainsod, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-3.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

time as the second Moscow oblast Congress of Soviets. A report in Rabochaya Moskva told how the Soviet Congress had 'developed severe, truly Bolshevik criticism of the Moscow Soviet and Oblispolkom,' who 'until now have not turned themselves sufficiently "face to production" and have not developed sufficiently concrete leadership of the local Soviets.'⁶⁷ The day after this report appeared, a meeting of Party members, the so-called 'Communist fraction', on the Soviet was called by the MK, followed an hour later by a meeting of the Soviet as a whole.⁶⁸ From this, it may be concluded that the separation was the result of an initiative by the MK plenum, and that the Soviet had no choice but to approve the Party decision. The new arrangements were announced on 25 February, at the same time as it was announced that Ukhanov, the Chairman of the Soviet since 1926, was to be replaced by N. A. Bulganin.⁶⁹

The creation of a new Moscow city Soviet was followed by an extraordinary joint plenum of the MOK and MKK at which a new body, the Moscow Gorkom, or city committee of the Party, was elected.⁷⁰ At its first conference, held that day, the new body had 86 members and was headed by the MOK first secretary, Kaganovich, and his deputy, Ryndin. For practical purposes, however, the two senior members had too many other commitments, and the real head of the city organisation was its own secretary, at first Gikalo, and after 1932, Nikita Khrushchev. In the course of his daily work, the MGK secretary spent more time with the head of the Moscow Soviet than had been the case before, since the gorkom's main task, the running of political life in Moscow, overlapped almost entirely with the work of the Soviet. This closer relationship, in which the Party remained the dominant partner, was reflected in the increased number of Soviet representatives on the MGK, especially in comparison with the MOK⁷¹. It is also attested in Khrushchev's memoirs.⁷²

⁶⁷ RM, 22/2/31.

⁶⁸ The meetings took place at 3 and 4pm on 23 February. RM, 25/2/31.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ A full list of the new MGK appeared in RM, 27/2/1931.

⁷¹ See table 4.

⁷² Khrushchev Remembers, Chapter 2.

The Moscow Raikoms.

Since the early 1920's, the city of Moscow had been divided into six raions.⁷³ With the growth of industry and the influx of new workers, these had reached an unreasonable size by 1928. In that year, the largest, Krasnaya Presnya, was the subject of an enquiry by the TsK, which found that administration in the raion was under undue strain because of this.⁷⁴ By 1930, the irrationality of the old divisions had led to a situation in which the largest raion occupied 35% of the area of Moscow, and accounted for 28% of its population, while the smallest, Khamovniki, covered only 7.8% of the city's area, and Proletarskii, the old Rogozhsko-Simonovskii raion, contained only 11% of the city's population.⁷⁵ Discussions about re-drawing the map of Moscow began in 1925, but it was not until December 1930 that the city was finally divided into ten new units.⁷⁶ Even these new divisions soon proved inadequate, and by 1936, the whole structure had been altered again.

Until 1920, Moscow's raikoms had been unusually autonomous, prompting Myasnikov to refer to the city as a 'federation'⁷⁷. This autonomy had been eroded in the campaign against the Left of the early 1920's. However, the raion Party organisations, or raikoms, were important organisations. They were responsible for recruitment, agitation and the correct organisation of Party work in all the subordinate cells in the raion. They were also ultimately responsible to the MK for economic development in the raions, for the provision of facilities like transport and housing, although these were technically the responsibility of the raisoviet, and for such campaigns as shef svo⁷⁸ in the countryside.

⁷³ See map 1.

⁷⁴ See, e.g., P 10/10/28.

⁷⁵ RM 14/12/1930.

⁷⁶ Originally, three extra raions were proposed, Butyrki, to be carved out of Krasnaya Presnya, Ostanskii, to be drawn from parts of Sokol'niki and Krasnaya Presnya raions, and Blagu-Lefortovo, to come mainly from Bauman raion. These names were taken from villages which Moscow now incorporated, but for this reason they were deemed to be unsuitable for a socialist city, and, ostensibly at the suggestion of workers in local factories, they were changed, and a new raion added, in the final plan approved in December 1930. The final raions were Bauman, Stalin, Oktyabr'skii, Krasnaya Presnya, Sokol'niki, Dzerzhinskii, Frunze, Lenin, Proletarskii and Zamoskvorech'e. (See Map 2) P, 9/1/1931.

⁷⁷ R. Sakwa, 'The Communist Party and War Communism in Moscow, 1918-1921', unpublished PhD Thesis (University of Birmingham, 1984), pp. 182-3.

⁷⁸ The tutelage of city organisations over rural areas, aimed at bringing the peasants closer to the regime.

The raikom was thus a crucial link in the Party hierarchy, and its secretary, in Moscow, would be a politician of proven skill and seniority. Raikom meetings were often written up extensively in Pravda, the city's six committees warranting at least the same amount of space as a distant Asian gubkom many times their size. If they were prestigious, however, they were no longer independent. Never were they accorded more column space in Pravda than when they were merely approving a TsK or MK resolution; and their role seems mainly to have been to implement these. In carrying out this responsibility, they were faced with a formidable task, since it was the raikom which would be blamed if mistakes were made at the local level. Raikom secretaries were expected to know every local Party committee, a difficult duty to fulfill in view of the rapid turnover of personnel in the factories, and also the management of the plants and the heads of department of institutions within their boundaries. It is not surprising that a frequent criticism of them was that raikom staff knew very few of the first secretaries of their factory committees, let alone full-time functionaries further down in the hierarchy.⁷⁹ This failure was portrayed in the press as the result of laziness and inefficiency, but was probably due to the impossibility of the task.

Internally, the raikom was like a scaled-down gubkom. Technically, it was headed by a raion committee of roughly 75 members, including a proportion, between 30 and 40%, of workers 'from the bench'.⁸⁰ The real direction of the raikom, however, like that of the MK, came from its buro and secretariat. The raikom buro would consist of the first secretary and the heads of the raion otdely, together with the heads of the Party committees of major factories in the raion, some of their directors, where these were Party members, and representatives of the raion Control Commission (RKK), the Raisoviet, the local komsomol, any academic or government institutions in the area, the local OGPU and the army.⁸¹ The organisation of the otdely of the raikom changed in response to the MK, even down to the use of the territorial-productive principle in 1931.

⁷⁹ For an example of this, see P., 15/7/26.

⁸⁰ V. F. Starodubtsev, 'Deyatel'nost' Moskovskoi Partiinoi organizatsii po razvitiyu obshchestvenno-politicheskii aktivnosti rabocheho klassa v gody pervoi pyatiletki, 1928-32 gg.' Kandidatskaya dissertatsiya (M., 1972), p.86.

⁸¹ For examples, see RM, 18/12/1926, 19/12/1926 and 24/12/1926.

Like the MK, the raikom also controlled a number of responsible instructors. At the raion level, these were introduced in 1928 in response to the MK resolution, 'On practical measures for putting Party work in order'. Although there were only one or two full-time instructors, the number of unpaid ones was formidable. In Bauman raion, for example, there were about 70 of them in 1928, working at all levels.⁸² An article in Pravda at the time stressed their importance for the smooth running of the raion and the successful work of the cells. They were expected to assume responsibility for about 5 cells each and to report back to the raikom on their work at least once a month.⁸³ As the report on Krasnaya Presnya implies, this was a counsel of perfection very rarely adhered to in reality.⁸⁴

2. The Mass Party Experiment

The Development of the Workplace Party Network.

The raikoms were too large to serve as effective local Party organisations, so the primary units of the Party were based at the workplace. Although the constitution provided very basic guidelines for their establishment, such as a minimum number of members, at this level, Party structure was idiosyncratic. There were often exceptions to the general rules, despite numerous detailed articles in the Party press on organisation at the primary level.

Until 1924, the basic unit of the Party, soon to be called the Primary Party Organisation (PPO), was the all-factory or all-institution Party organisation, which was founded wherever numbers justified it and then only with the approval of the raikom.⁸⁵ It was headed by a buro and later by a full committee elected by its members and numbering between 11 and 25, depending on the size of the cell.⁸⁶ In larger factories and institutions, the Party committee would be chaired by a full-time official, often a worker excused other work in order to run the Party organisation's affairs. He provided the co-ordination and leadership for the

⁸² Pospokhov, op. cit., p.24.

⁸³ P 17/3/28.

⁸⁴ P 10/10/28.

⁸⁵ The rules for Primary Party Organisations in this period were set out at the XIV Party Congress. See Resolutions and Decisions of the CPSU, vol. 2, 1917-29. Ed. R. Gregor (Toronto, 1974), p. 278.

⁸⁶ Izvestiya MK 1929, No 8.

committee, whose responsibilities included Party recruitment in the workplace, agitation and propaganda. Party committees worked closely with the trade union committee in the factory (zavkom) and management, although conflicts were frequent, particularly over questions involving the promotion and discipline of workers.⁸⁷

The Party committee was to meet not less than twice a month and was to work in close collaboration with the raikom.⁸⁸ At the twice-yearly elections to the cell buros in Moscow, just over half of the members would be replaced. Not all, even in the factories, were workers. A survey of 1928 found that under 40% of the members of cell buros in Moscow were workers 'by current occupation', as opposed to 'social origin'.⁸⁹

The increased enrolment after the 'Lenin levy' of 1924-5 brought pressure for the creation of smaller units, and in 1924 the first 'shop cells' (tsekhyacheiki) appeared.⁹⁰ Initially, they were established in factories where there were overall more than 1000 workers and other employees and where there were more than 25 available members and candidates of the Communist Party in the shop or group of shops, and it was stipulated that they were not 'independent cells, having all statutory rights'.⁹¹ They were to meet not less than twice a month, like the factory committees, or when one third of the members requested a meeting.⁹² They were to take responsibility for such matters as recruitment and increasing the activism of Party members. The shop cell was to be headed by a buro of 3-5 full members, including a secretary, who was not to be excused from his usual work 'unless the raikom decides that he has an especially heavy burden'.⁹³ The cell buro was to be elected every 6 months, and was then itself to elect the secretary, who was supposed to be a full Party member of not less

⁸⁷ These issues will be dealt with in more detail in chapter 4. Diagram 4 (p. 256) illustrates the relationship between the various branches of the factory administration.

⁸⁸ Izvestiya Tsentral'nogo Komiteta (Iz TsK), 1926 No. 33-4.

⁸⁹ The figures were 36.2% in the spring of 1928 and 37.7% in the autumn. Partiinoe, Khozyaistvennoe i kul'turnoe stroitel'stvo v Moskve i gubernii. Sbornik diagramm (M., 1929), p.28.

⁹⁰ Iz TsK, 1925, no. 4.

⁹¹ Ibid., no. 28.

⁹² Ibid., 1926, nos. 33-4.

⁹³ Ibid.

than one year's standing (stazh).⁹⁴ The idea of shop cells did not take hold immediately, and some Party committees resented the complications it involved⁹⁵, but by 1928, the number of cells in the city had doubled, largely as a result of the widespread adoption of the new unit.⁹⁶ In January 1929, in an effort to spread the load caused by an expanding Party membership, the TsK finally gave shop cells in factories with more than 5,000 workers and 1,000 Communists the full statutory rights of cells.⁹⁷

From 1927 until 1931, Party work in the factories was dominated by the perceived need to recruit workers 'from the bench' and to mobilise the workforce around slogans calling for greater activism and vigilance. When the shift system became widespread in 1928, it was logical for Party organisers to consider the establishment of Party cells in the shifts, since these were now the working environment rather than shops. The idea was not uncontroversial, and was debated in successive numbers of Bol'shevik in May 1928. The objection was that the upheaval was not justified, and that the existing number of shop cell members would be unable to ensure full coverage of all workers.⁹⁸ In the end, however, shift cells were introduced. The argument, as proposed, for example, by I. Dymshits, was that only through shift cells could the whole workforce be reached, and individual recruitment, as opposed to mass campaigns, take hold. Dymshits also claimed that shift cells were essential for a thorough knowledge of the mood of the workers. If they had existed before, he claimed, there would have been no Shakhty affair, and their establishment in 1928 would deal a vital blow to bureaucratism, waste and inefficiency.⁹⁹

The shift was the smallest unit in which Party cells were established, but in units which were too small for a cell, the Party could still be organised, this time in a group. Groups were led by group organisers, grupporgs, first introduced on the eve of the XIII Moscow Party

⁹⁴ Ibid. Stazh was an important concept, meaning the length of time a person had served, usually in the Party or as an industrial worker.

⁹⁵ Ibid., no. 4.

⁹⁶ Ocherkii Istorii Moskovskoi Organizatsii, 1st. edn., p. 431.

⁹⁷ G. D. Safronova, 'Deyatel'nost' pervychnykh partiinykh organizatsii goroda Moskvy po rekonstruktsii tyazheloi promyshlennosti, 1928-32', Kandidatskaya dissertatsiya (M., 1975), p. 37. In 1931, these rights were extended to all shop cells.

⁹⁸ This was E. Kolokol'tseva's argument in Bol'shevik, 1928, No.12.

⁹⁹ Ibid., No 10.

conference in 1925. An article in Izvestiya MK defined their tasks. 'The grupporg', it explained, 'is the political leader of his or her group - he raises the activism and strengthens the unity of the Communist Party members, informs them of the most important resolutions of the cell, answers for the fulfilment of the shop and factory cells' directives in his group and draws the non-Party workers around the Party.'¹⁰⁰ In practice, the tasks which pre-occupied the grupporgs tended to be mundane ones like the collection of Party membership fees and ensuring the transfer of candidates to full Party membership.¹⁰¹ Like any other Party officer, grupporgs were expected to be full members themselves, although there were cases where a shortage of suitable cadres led to candidate members shouldering the task.¹⁰² Moreover, the same shortage meant that many grupporgs were unsure of their precise responsibilities, a problem to which the Party press was constantly returning.¹⁰³ Similar difficulties beset the hybrid 'link cell' (zven'yacheek), which was established in some sections of shops after 1931.

The winter of 1929-30 saw further elaborations in Party organisation in the factory. Contributions on the subject by local Party secretaries appeared in virtually every number of Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo. The slogan 'face to production' involved a new emphasis on the factory cell, and soon the shop cell, as opposed to the all-factory committee, was being heralded as the vital link in the factory Party structure.¹⁰⁴ In September 1930, a series of meetings were scheduled for the factories on the subject 'On the new contents, forms and methods of Party work in the enterprises.' Part of the purpose of these was to discuss the structure of the factory Party organisation. At the time, two systems were in operation, one typified by Moscow and the other by Leningrad, and thus presumably rival experiments. In Moscow, the structure was 3-tier, factory committee, shop cell and lowest organs. In Leningrad, a fourth tier, the group of allied shop cells, was added.¹⁰⁵ Eventually, the three

¹⁰⁰ Izvestiya MK, 1926, no.1.

¹⁰¹ PS 1931, No. 31.

¹⁰² PS 1931, No. 3.

¹⁰³ Grupporgs could be forgiven for this in view of the confusion of their superiors. An article in Izvestiya TsK in 1927, for example, emphasised the need for them to concentrate on the Party members in their group, while in 1929, Sputnik Kommunist was urging them to pay more attention to the non-Party. Iz TsK, 1927, nos. 14-15; SK, 1929, nos. 1-2.

¹⁰⁴ PS 1930, No. 17.

¹⁰⁵ PS 1930, No. 17.

tier option was generalised, with instructors introduced to cement the links between the layers.¹⁰⁶

At the same time, complicated proposals for the division of tasks between the various organs were regularly mooted in the press. In response to the establishment of sectors in the obkom, factory organisations began to reorganise their work. In Elektroavod, which was regarded as a 'model' factory organisation, 18 sectors were set up; basic ones like production, trade unions, cultural and mass work and information, and more esoteric ones like the national minorities sector and the sector for links with foreign countries. The heads of each of these sectors were responsible to the Party committee for their area of work in the factory, although they were not given lighter duties in the factory to make extra time for this. Under their guidance, each of the shop and shift cells would take on responsibility for some of the functions, the larger ones having sectors for all 18, the smaller for only 5¹⁰⁷. These sectors were to work to 3-month plans, while the sectors of the factory committee guided them according to a 6-month plan.¹⁰⁸

The sector system, with various modifications, was the norm at all levels of the Party organisation in the factory until 1932. In September 1930, an article in Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo advocated reducing the number, mirroring the otdely of the TsK, such as agitmass and organisation-instruction, but it still called for such sectors to be organised, even in the brigades.¹⁰⁹ Not surprisingly, such reorganisation was baffling to the average factory committee, and in 1929, organisational groups were introduced, flying squads from the MK organisation department with a brief to set up the work of the factory committees along the new lines.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁶ Diagram 2 (p. 253) shows how this worked in Elektroavod in 1930.

¹⁰⁷ See diagram 3, pp. 254-5.

¹⁰⁸ PS 1930, no. 3-4.

¹⁰⁹ PS 1930, no. 17.

¹¹⁰ SK, 1929, no. 15.

The Experiment Abandoned

The problems with this system were glaring. Even if so much cross-checking and parallelism had been desirable, the Party did not have the personnel to run the scheme. Most duties at the lower levels were carried out by unpaid Party members, the aktiv, full-time workers or administrators who had to fit their Party responsibilities into their spare time. Meetings, often lasting well into the night, occupied nearly every evening for such people, and they were expected to be model producers at the same time. The result was that many aspects of Party work, including basic ones such as the collection of Party dues, were neglected.¹¹¹ Lower cells often ceased to function at all, leaving their tasks to the factory committee, which in practice meant that many problems were not even discussed.¹¹² The system which had been intended to harness the creative power of the mass ended up earning the Party a reputation for incompetence. Moreover, the idea of mass participation was a reality in very few factories. Not only were the lower cells too overworked to realise the ambitious plans expected of them, but in some places, corrupt or inefficient factory committees, threatened by the system of checking, resisted reorganisation and suppressed initiatives from the shop floor.¹¹³

It was thus no surprise when the system was called into question in 1932. On 14 May that year, Kaganovich made a speech to a plenum of the MGK outlining the need for change. He referred to the Party's problem of overstretched resources. The solution he proposed was to reduce the total number of cells and to use mainly 'professional', rather than volunteer cadres.¹¹⁴ Within a month of this speech, shift cells had been abolished in most factories, and the number of shop cells reduced. At the same time, their size and importance increased. Now they were to be headed by experienced, full-time Party workers and to lead the struggle for greater responsibility at work. They were also to forge closer organisational links between the shop floor and the factory Party committee.

¹¹¹ In the Parizhskaya Kommuna factory, for example, more than 10% of members in one shop had not paid for up to 10 months. PS, 1930, no. 24.

¹¹² PS 1931, no. 1.

¹¹³ PS 1930, No 21. This is a point which Chase overlooks in his eagerness to find 'forums' in which workers' grievances and demands could be voiced. Op. cit., pp. 298-299.

¹¹⁴ P., 7/6/32.

'Greater responsibility', however, did not simply mean the more efficient running of the local workplace cells. The effect of the changes on the individual Party member's ability to make his views heard can be judged by changes in the proportion of cells to members. In early 1932, the heyday of shift cells, the number of local cells and groups in Moscow was 15,280¹¹⁵, while Party membership stood at 225,554. By 1935, there were only 3,435 PPOs in the city¹¹⁶, and although Party membership had also dropped, to 162,546¹¹⁷, the ratio of *cells to members* was less than a third of the 1932 figure. In view of this change, and of the emphasis placed on 'responsible' and 'experienced' Party staff to head the cells, it must be concluded that part of the purpose of the change, like the ending of mass recruitment which closely followed it,¹¹⁸ was a desire by the centre to regain control of the lower Party ranks.

The philosophy behind the various reforms of these years was a paradoxical combination of centralisation, expressed in the formation of *oblast's* and the work of the instructors, and the desire to harness the enthusiasm, as well as the full productive potential, of the workforce. At the senior level, the emphasis in Party work increasingly lay in centralisation, with the powers of conferences decreasing as the buro and secretariat took over the practical running of Party life. The Party organisation did not operate in a vacuum, however, and there is evidence, such as the inclusion of senior state and economic officials on the MK buro, that Party decision-making took account of a wide range of different interests.

The leadership at this time required popular support, and structural reorganisations were intended to harness this without losing central control. After the first Five Year Plan, however, the populist element was played down, and the Party embarked on a succession of purges and rationalisations intended to bury the 'proletarian' past in favour of a future which was to belong to a small and carefully-screened elite.

¹¹⁵ Starodubtsev, op. cit., p. 54. The breakdown was shop and shift cells, 3171; link cells, 588; party groups, 11521.

¹¹⁶ *Moskovskaya Gorodskaya i M. Oblast'naya organizatsiya*, table 15, p. 158.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 28

¹¹⁸ See below, chapter 3.

On balance, however, it cannot be said that the mass structure of the Party in these years was simply a failure. The Party's task of creating a united society dedicated to the sacrifices needed to achieve rapid industrial growth required a broadly based organisation sensitive to the mood of the grass-roots. At a time when ordinary workers frequently complained about the division between 'them', the verkhi, or higher Party officials, and 'us', the nizi at the bottom of the social pyramid, the extension of the Party network into every shift was a logical aim. On the other hand, the mass Party of this period created problems for the leadership which led to its abandonment in 1932. These were of two kinds. Incompetence and corruption, inevitable in a large and mainly voluntary organisation, brought the Party a bad name, but there were other aspects of the mass Party which received less coverage in the press. Local cells in this period sometimes displayed too much initiative and liveliness, occasionally using their status to lobby on behalf of their non-Party fellows against official policy. It was not unknown, for example, for Party cells to help with the organisation of strikes in the 1920's¹¹⁹, and in 1930, a group of komsomols in Serp i Molot acted as the nucleus for a movement protesting against the introduction of night shifts.¹²⁰ The Party press preferred to stress the aspects of the problem which reflected on individuals, such as corruption, or the problem of overwork, which was not discreditable to the Party's general reputation, but as with other aspects of the mass Party in these years, the problem also had a less discussable side, which was that politically active and thoughtful members of the proletariat did not always support every aspect of official policy. Various euphemisms were used for the problem in this period. Often, workers were accused of 'misunderstanding' policy, a term which crops up frequently in accounts of the problems of mass agitational work.¹²¹ When the time came to reform Party structure, the difficulties of communication in the mass Party were stressed, together with the problems of 'overwork' for voluntary activists. These official reasons gave part of the truth, but it has been seen that the reforms of 1932 also reflected the centre's desire for tighter control.

¹¹⁹ Uglanov referred to this problem at the XV Moscow Party conference. XV Moskovskaya Gubernskaya Konferentsiya VKP(b) (M. 1927) p. 359.

¹²⁰ S. Filatov, Partrabota na zavode Serp i Molot (M., 1931), p. 23.

¹²¹ See below, Chapter 5.

Chapter 2. Political Change in Moscow 1925-32.

Throughout the 1920's, the history of the Moscow Party organisation was a troubled one. Between 1925 and 1932, there were four first secretaries of the MK, only one of whom was replaced without a scandal.¹ The Moscow Party was the country's showpiece, but repeatedly it failed to live up to the standards expected of it. To understand this, it is important to consider the role of the Moscow Party in the politics of the whole country, as well as the internal situation in the city itself.

For any group in the Politburo, Moscow was a prize worth fighting for. As the capital, it had great propaganda value, but there was more to the control of Moscow than its publicity potential. In the first place, it was the largest Party organisation in the country, and thus the most influential local bloc on the Central Committee. Every Party organisation had voting representatives on the TsK, but Moscow had the most, and also tended to take a larger share of places on the Orgburo and other executive departments of the TsK apparatus. As their local Party organisation, the MK had considerable influence over the work of various national and regional authorities, such as VSNKh, the People's Commissariats and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.² Senior politicians in the Moscow Party organisation were powerful and influential figures, living and working cheek by jowl with their colleagues in the Politburo. Moreover, as has been seen, many national figures, including Molotov, Bukharin and Mikoyan, took a close personal interest in the affairs of the city. The political atmosphere in the capital would make itself felt immediately at the highest level.

At the very least, therefore, a hostile party organisation in Moscow would have had great leverage over the TsK. Beyond that, however, there lurked spectres of which all Bolsheviks would have been aware; Paris in 1870, Petersburg in 1905, above all, Petrograd in 1917; capital cities which turned completely against the regime of the time and made the country temporarily ungovernable. That had been the fear at the height of the struggle with the Workers' Opposition in 1920 and 1921, and although it receded rapidly in the 1920's,

¹ This compares with only two in both Leningrad and Smolensk, whose political scandals also reached the national press.

² N.S. Davydova, *op. cit.*, introduction, p. 55.

no Bolshevik leader could contemplate a hostile local Party organisation in Moscow with equanimity.

The senior political figures in Moscow were therefore hand-picked by the TsK Secretariat. All four first secretaries during this period had previous experience of high office in a local Party organisation elsewhere, together with long records of responsible Party work. Even the secretaries of the raikoms were often former gubkom secretaries from other parts of the Soviet Union. They were all forceful political characters, with connections of their own from earlier days, and were thus powerful adversaries if they turned against the TsK majority.

The Party apparatus was not the only potential source of political discontent in the capital. Beyond the MK lay the mass of the Party rank and file, who in the early 1920's had included many members sympathetic to the Left. Questions like Party democracy and the relative position of workers and peasants within the economy were capable of arousing lively interest among the cadre workers who made up the backbone of the Moscow Party rank and file in the early 1920's. After the Lenin enrolments of the mid-'20's, it is true that these members were 'diluted' with a large number of people for whom membership of the Party was a means - to better living conditions, improved career prospects, a chance to take part in local affairs - rather than an end in itself. It has been observed, however, that these people were not simply 'a passive mass, hissing and voting according to the orders of the bureaucracy'³. Their concern for questions of policy was part of the reason for their having joined the Party in the first place, and interest in Party debates continued at mass meetings of members throughout the period⁴.

³ R. Schlesinger, 'The Turning Point' (Review of Carr's Socialism in One Country Vol. 2), Soviet Studies, 1960, No. 4, p.397. The impact of the recruitment drives of the period will be discussed in a subsequent chapter. See below, chapter 3.

⁴ This interest can be demonstrated by looking at reports from almost any 'broad workers' meeting' in the period. Questions about current policy debates outnumbered any others, for example at the open meeting of the Krasnyi Proletarii Party organisation which discussed the Sixteenth Party Conference in 1929. (TsGAOR 7952/3/82, 152-168.) This interest should be taken into account when considering Isaac Deutscher's claim, in his persuasive biography of Trotsky, that the Opposition suffered from the 'tame and torpid popular mood'. I. Deutscher, The Prophet Unarmed, Trotsky 1921-1929 (London, 1959), p. 272. See also the reference to Deutscher's view, above, pp. 20-21.

Economic policies also received much attention, and in view of the twists and turns in the majority's position, principled observers could hardly fail to have supported some of the policies later identified with the 'deviant' movements in the course of this period. Only by insisting on support for the majority for its own sake, a course which would have required several rapid volte-face, for example in 1925 and again in 1928, could a Communist have avoided ever advocating economic policies which might be open to official criticism. However, to break Party discipline and formally align themselves with opposition groupings, rank and file members needed more than economic alternatives. The oppositions of this period were hampered from the start by the fact that joining them required a positive act of defiance, and this unquestionably meant that many who sympathised with their policies remained silent and outwardly loyal to the majority. However, opposition leaders were not entirely political outsiders; the act of defiance amounted to the choice of one group of prominent and reputable Bolshevik leaders rather than another, albeit larger and more powerful one. If the oppositions of the time did not win over large numbers of supporters, it was partly because their policies did not offer the solutions Party members sought on the issues they considered fundamental to political life in the 1920's in Russia.

The reason why opposition movements from the mid-20's onwards failed to secure mass followings lay mainly in their advocacy of continued Party discipline and centralism. This was an integral part of their commitment to Bolshevism. After the defeat of the Workers' Opposition, no prominent politician advocated broad participation in the making of policy; debate was to be confined to the ranks of the Bolshevik Party, and limited by its increasingly narrow rules. This approach had proved unpopular with young intellectuals in 1923; it also helped to alienate many of Moscow's workers. Although it would be a mistake to attribute to them goals peculiar to the Western democratic tradition, cadre workers clearly felt strongly the need to make their views known and to influence a political process which ostensibly operated on their behalf. For those who had been active during the revolution, the idea of a single, highly centralised and unified Party was a disappointment, especially as their original allegiance had been divided between a number of Marxist and other Left-wing

groups. Increasingly after the Civil War and the defeat of the Workers' Opposition, the mass of the Party rank and file, including many new recruits, had been cajoled into rejecting any opposition movement on principle. However, those who still accepted the desirability of debate, and these were the only people who could have supported the oppositions of the later 1920's, tended to think in terms of an end to the more repressive features of 'democratic centralism', as well as demanding that the voice of the working class be heard on bread and butter issues like wages and conditions. The Trotskyists, the last opposition movement in the USSR to seek widespread support among the population, did not really offer any solutions on the first point.

It was also a feature of the history of Bolshevik oppositions in the 1920's that every successive failure made the task of the next movement more difficult, both because of tightening Party discipline and because majority propaganda became more effective against them. As the field of manoeuvre was reduced and fear inhibited the actions of potential supporters, so the chance for any kind of opposition success became slimmer. When the meaning of 'success' also seemed increasingly questionable, the democratic aims of 1921 never resurfacing in an opposition programme, potential supporters came to regard opposition movements with cynicism. Increasingly, the debates within the Party leadership took on the appearance of struggles for position within the hierarchy⁵. 'They say a lot about opportunists,' remarked a Moscow factory worker in 1930, 'but it's not clear to me what they mean. Someone ought to explain it in Russian. In my opinion, the struggle...is a struggle for a portfolio.'⁶ There remained a pool of discontented rank and file Party members in the factories in Moscow, but they were decreasingly the reason or the power behind the political conflicts which marked the city's history at this time. Although fear of the revival of a popular Left Bolshevik movement dogged successive MK secretaries until the end of the decade, the political arena was occupied almost exclusively by the apparatus.

⁵ It should be stressed that this was a distorted view. Personal ambition played a part in these, as in all political struggles, but the stakes in the developing Soviet state were very high. As Isaac Deutscher put it, 'the issues over which they struggled were among the greatest and the gravest over which men had ever fought: the fate of 160 million people; and the destinies of communism in Europe and Asia.' Deutscher, *op. cit.*, p. 271.

⁶ TsGAOR, 7952/3/82, 213.

In this chapter, three successive crises in the Moscow Party will be examined; the struggle against the 'Left' of 1925-7, the defeat of the 'Right' of 1928, and the removal of Bauman in 1930. Of the three, only the first movement had all the trappings of an 'Opposition' in the formal sense: its own organisation, propaganda network, and programmes.

1. The Moscow Committee and the Left, 1925-7

The problem of the Left had dominated Moscow politics since 1920, and its former influence lent it a reputation for being more of a threat to the stability of the Party than it really was after 1924. Its activities after 1924 took place in the same blaze of publicity as had the debates of the early '20's, and the Politburo majority and its supporters continued to deal with the problem with great circumspection, but after 1925, the Left never gained the initiative in the TsK or elsewhere. Between 1925 and 1927, the Moscow Party was constantly to be taking stock of the Left; many of the changes which took place cannot be understood without it.⁷ On the other hand, the old adversary never again threatened to pose any real challenge to the hegemony of the 'general line'.

Initially, the problem was to purge the organisation of the remnants of the Left Opposition group of 1923. In the autumn of 1924, as part of this campaign, the MK first secretary, Zelenskii, a Leftist, was replaced by Nikolai Uglanov. The new MK secretary was an experienced politician whose background since before the revolution fitted him admirably for the task in hand.

Uglanov came from a peasant background in Yaroslavl' and was a metal worker by profession. Joining the revolutionary movement in 1903, at the age of 17, he became a member of the Party in 1907. From the age of 12, he lived in Petrograd, and received all his early revolutionary experience there, first organising a revolutionary group amongst

⁷ Among the problems raised by the Left were various questions relating to labour, such as wages policy and the nature of employment under NEP. Such issues were obviously part of the Party's agenda throughout the period, but constant criticism from the Left ensured that they would remain at the top of the list of items to be discussed, along with other controversial matters like 'intra-Party democracy'.

white collar workers in trade and industry and then working as a correspondent for Pravda, for which he was arrested on the eve of the war. He must have been released soon after, however, for he fought in the war and was severely wounded. Returning to Petrograd, he was able to participate in both revolutions as a member of the Petrograd Soviet. Thereafter, he played a leading role in the affairs of the city, becoming the secretary of the Petrograd gubernia council of trades unions in 1919, and then, in February 1921, a secretary of the Petrograd gubkom. Shortly afterwards, he took a leading part in the suppression of the Kronstadt mutiny, for which he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

It is not clear why Uglanov left Petrograd, although the most likely reason was that he had quarrelled with Zinoviev, who was in charge of the Petrograd Party organisation. In 1922, he was moved to Nizhníi-Novgorod, where he spent two years as the secretary of the uezd Party organisation, before being brought to Moscow as the second secretary in August 1924, taking over as first secretary in October.⁸

The story persists that Uglanov was picked for the Moscow job because of a recommendation by Zinoviev and Kamenev.⁹ Even if this were true, it should not be taken to imply that he was their client at the time. Politically, he was closer to Bukharin than to Zinoviev.¹⁰ His differences with the latter, indeed, were to increase during the two years which followed his appointment to the Moscow secretaryship.

By the beginning of 1925, many of the Left Oppositionists had already been removed from the Moscow Party organisation. A purge was conducted in the spring of 1924 which removed 22.2% of Party members, that is, 2072 people, mostly from the institutions of

⁸ Biographical details from RM, 30/1/1925 and 3/2/1925.

⁹ This is the line taken by Carr, (Socialism in One Country, Vol.2, pp. 30 and 62) but there is no clear evidence for the story. In his review of Carr, Schlesinger discounts it altogether, while a more recent study of the Leningrad organisation in 1925 sees Uglanov's appointment in Moscow as a move against Zinoviev. D.A. Hughes, 'Zinoviev, the Leningrad Party organisation and the 1925 Opposition', MSocSci. dissertation (University of Birmingham, 1977).

¹⁰ Like Bukharin, Uglanov saw the development of the USSR in terms of gradual change rather than rapid economic growth. Thus he never advocated the enforced collectivisation of peasant farms, and argued for continuing investment in the textile industry of Moscow rather than for high rates of investment in the 'group A industries', that is, the production of the means of production.

higher education, where levels of purging ran as high as 29%.¹¹ A speaker at the XIII Moscow Party Conference in January 1925 reported that the problem of Trotskyism in the VUZy was 'almost eliminated, at least, if not almost, then three quarters.'¹² After 1924, it is difficult to credit the Left with much committed grass-roots support in Moscow. In 1926, one of their own partisans was to feel proud that they could muster as many as 500 comrades.¹³ This handful of genuine Trotskyists, retaining their links with the Left as a whole, were to be the organisers of the Leftist activity at grass roots level which featured so prominently in the press of 1926 and 1927. However, the majority of 'Trotskyists' discovered in the capital after 1925 were merely workers disillusioned with the circumstances of the time. The term 'Trotskyist' became a catch-all for malcontents, especially in the 1930's, but it had little real meaning. Occasionally a so-called 'Leftist' might have read Opposition literature, often as part of a wider search for alternatives, but most had no direct link with Trotsky at all.¹⁴

Within the Party apparatus, the purge of the Trotskyists was as thorough as among the rank and file, though there were one or two notable officials who slipped through the net. In particular, the secretary of Krasnaya Presnya raikom, Belen'kii, remained until 1926, despite Leftist sympathies which he had done nothing to hide. The MK did not embark on a general witch-hunt against the Left in 1925. Publicly, Uglanov's line towards the Left was close to that of Stalin and Bukharin; repeatedly he urged the Party rank and file, some of whom were calling for the most severe discipline to be meted out to oppositionists, to leave

¹¹ RM 17/5/1924.

¹² XIII Moskovskaya Gubernskaya Konferentsiya VKP(b), stenograficheskii otchet (M., 1925), p. 115.

¹³ V. Serge, Memoirs of a Revolutionary (OUP paperback, London, 1980), p. 209.

¹⁴ A Party official in Krasnaya Presnya distinguished between the 'half-baked' kind of oppositionist, whose political discontent was the result of hardships, and the 'other type, who took an interest in a wider range of subjects.' Pyatyi Ob"edinennyi Plenum MK i MKK VKP(b) (M., 1928), p. 65.

the matter to their superiors and to remember that Trotsky was still a member of the TsK.¹⁵ Only after Trotsky's expulsion from the Party was the campaign against the Left unleashed at all levels. Despite this official caution, after 1925 the capital acquired the reputation of being the most staunch supporter of the Politburo majority in its struggle against the Left.¹⁶

The 'New Opposition' of 1925.

The first occasion on which this was demonstrated was the well-publicised struggle between Zinoviev, Kamenev and their supporters in the Leningrad organisation on one hand, the so-called 'New Opposition'¹⁷, and the rest of the Politburo on the other. The conflict resolved itself into a duel between the Moscow and Leningrad Party committees, the only significant voice of dissent from the majority line in the capital being that of Lev Kamenev, who was then chairman of the Moscow Soviet and a member of the MK buro.

Kamenev's political position was very similar to that of Zinoviev in 1925. Indeed, the two had often been regarded as a duo since 1917. As chairman of Mossoviet, Kamenev did not bend with the changing political wind that blew through the capital after 1924. While the Moscow organisation moved towards the right within the Party, paradoxically, the 'New Opposition' borrowed its political programme in large measure from the Trotskyists, whose

¹⁵ In January and February 1925, for example, Rabochaya Moskva ran a series reporting questions which had been put to Uglanov during his visits to factories and his replies to them. The point of the series appears to have been to publicise the 'correct' approach to the Trotsky problem, which was a major concern at grass-roots level at the time. Uglanov was as cautious as possible in public about the measures to be taken against the old Left. He urged the XIII Moscow Party conference in January 1925 not to be 'in a hurry, comrades, too soon to get used to the knife' and explained that 'not to hurry' meant 'to give the Party the possibility of thinking this question out well, to establish a firm, unwavering viewpoint, to explain it properly to the whole mass, to prepare it.' XIII Moskovskaya Gubernskaya Konferentsiya VKP(b), stenograficheskii otchet (M, 1925), pp. 145-6.

¹⁶ Moskovskie Bolsheviki v bor'be s pravym i "levym" opportunizmom (M. 1969), p. 127.

¹⁷ Although the 'New Opposition' raised many issues of crucial importance for the future of the revolution, including the question of the legitimacy of 'socialism in one country' and the serious problems inherent in the NEP economic balance, as an organised movement, it was flawed from its inception. Personal ambition seems to have been more prominent in the motivation of its leaders than was usually the case in the 1920's. Both Zinoviev and Kamenev executed rapid political volte-face, for example over the peasant question, in pursuit of a coherent and attractive 'Opposition' platform. For this reason, historians have tended to be less generous to this than to any other opposition movement. See Carr, Socialism in One Country, Vol. 2, Chapters 13-17. Daniels is less critical. Op. cit., Chapter 11.

most vigorous opponents they had been only the previous year.¹⁸ The reason for their policy shift was partly personal opposition to Stalin,¹⁹ but also alarm at the Politburo majority's adoption of new, unprecedented policies in the winter of 1924-5. At a Politburo session in the summer, for example, Kamenev attacked the new slogan of 'Socialism in One Country'²⁰, arguing that Russia could not overcome her technological backwardness without assistance from a revolutionary Europe.²¹ To this were added criticisms of the pro-peasant shift in agrarian policy, the management of industry and Party democracy, although individual members of the Opposition seem to have disagreed about specific issues.

It was in September 1925 that the Opposition's criticisms hardened into a clear programme. In Moscow, the first expression of this came at a plenum of the MK on 4 September. Kamenev delivered a substantial report, criticising the official policy on industry and labour as 'State Capitalism' and proposing a profit-sharing policy for industry, together with a general rise in wages of about 20% for industrial workers. On the condition of the countryside, he argued that the kulak was growing more powerful, holding the regime to ransom by 'regulating' the collection of grain.²²

These criticisms and proposals were embodied in a document which came to be known as 'the platform of the four', signed the following day by Zinoviev, Kamenev, Krupskaya and Sokol'nikov.²³ Although the document is not available, its contents may be surmised from the statements of the authors and must have included the points referred to above.

¹⁸ Zinoviev and Kamenev, in contrast to the Stalin-Bukharin group, argued for the most severe disciplinary measures to be used against the Left, and for Trotsky's expulsion from the Politburo and the Party.

¹⁹ The most outspoken public expression of this was Kamenev's speech at the XIV Party Congress in December 1925. See below, p. 63.

²⁰ *Moskovskie Bol'sheviki*, p. 123.

²¹ See also Carr, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

²² *Moskovskie Bol'sheviki*, pp.120, 128-9. It has been argued convincingly that Kamenev's concern was justified, in that peasants in general, encouraged by Bukharin's exhortation to 'get rich', were indeed gaining ground under NEP. S. G. Wheatcroft, 'Views on Grain Output, Agricultural Reality and Planning in the Soviet Union in the 1920's', unpublished MSocSci thesis (University of Birmingham, 1974).

²³ Historians of the 'New Opposition' have tended to be dismissive of this document, and to doubt whether it represented anything more than a tool in their campaign against Stalin. Carr, for example, remarks that 'Given the character and opinions of the signatories, it is unlikely to have been an original or constructive document. Fear and detestation of Stalin was the one link which united the four.' *Socialism in One Country*, Vol. 2, p.77.

Zinoviev's influence in Leningrad, combined with the enthusiasm of many Leningraders for such a programme, seems to have ensured the support of the majority of the Leningrad Party Committee, but Uglanov's Moscow was less amenable. Kamenev was isolated in the capital, and the differences between the Bukharin-Stalin group and the new opposition now crystallised into a battle of words between the Leningrad and Moscow Party organisations.

The debate was fuelled by the rivalry between the two cities, and the result was that both organisations went further in their criticism of the other than their leaders might have considered prudent.²⁴ However, the solidarity of the Moscow leadership and the policies which it defended indicate how far it had moved away from the leftism of the early 1920's. From the spring of 1925, an identifiable 'Moscow line' can be seen developing,²⁵ repeatedly outlined in Uglanov's speeches and propagated among the population by the reformed agitpropotdel. This line was to dominate Moscow politics until the autumn of 1928, and was characterised by its emphasis on the gradual development of the economy along the lines advocated by Bukharin. In 1925, it was identified with an anti-Left approach to issues such as recruitment into the Party and rural policies.

On the subject of recruitment, the Moscow line was to advocate the 'proletarianisation' of the Party while calling for circumspection in the selection of candidates. The official goal of recruitment policy until 1933 was to achieve a Party membership half of which would consist of 'workers from the bench'.²⁶ In Moscow, this presented particular problems. Firstly, the presence of so many bureaucracies in the city, national, regional and local, meant that a high proportion of Party members were bound to be white collar workers. Moreover, as the demand for new administrators sympathetic to the revolution increased, many people originally recruited as workers were drafted into the state apparatus. Secondly, the predominant industry in Moscow was textiles, and many of the largest factories were situated in the countryside and employed a considerable number of women, a

²⁴ Carr makes this point, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

²⁵ See Schlesinger, *op. cit.*, p. 406. During the spring of 1926, a series of textbooks was put out by the Moscow Party agitpropotdel, the contents of which were to be criticised by the Leningraders for the kind of bias to which Schlesinger refers.

²⁶ For recruitment policy, see below, chapter 3.

group, as the 1927 Party census explained, which was 'more backward than men, more difficult to involve in political life.'²⁷ In Moscow, a larger proportion of workers than in Leningrad had entered industry in the years since the revolution, and these, as well as some of the older generation, retained their 'links with the countryside'²⁸. It was thus both harder to arouse much interest in politics in a section of the Moscow working class, and perilous, from the class point of view, to draft many of them into the Party. At the XIV Moscow Party conference in December 1925, a delegate from the Kolomenskoe factory, one of the largest textile works in the province, pointed out that 80% of the workforce there was composed of peasants. If recruitment continued, he added, 'we shall not have a working-class cell, but a peasant cell, in our enterprise.'²⁹

For these reasons, the composition of the Moscow Party organisation included fewer workers than that of Leningrad throughout the period.³⁰ In the course of the argument between the two organisations, this fact was often used by the Leningraders to discredit the Muscovites. Leningrad, which had been the cradle of the revolution, assumed the role of the true defender of the Russian proletariat against the 'State Capitalist' and pro-peasant capital. The same kind of argument was used in the debate about the countryside. Moscow's line was drawn from Bukharin and emphasised the need to conciliate the peasant, even to the point of allowing the kulak to flourish, in order that the economy should grow along the lines of NEP. In their defence of the kulak, Bukharin and the Moscow ideologues went further than the more cautious Stalin, but at the time, their policy was more in line with that of the TsK majority, whose views at this time themselves tended towards the right. On

²⁷ Sotsial'nyi i natsional'nyi sostav VKP(b) (M., 1928), p.19.

²⁸ More detailed statistics on this question are presented in chapter 3, pp.131-2.

²⁹ Moskovskie Bol'sheviki, p. 132.

³⁰ See below, Chapter 3. In 1925, the figures for membership in the two Party organisations were as follows:

	<u>Moscow</u>	<u>Leningrad</u>
<u>% (by social origin)</u>		
workers	71	74
peasants	5	14.5
white-collar workers	24	11.5

Source: Moscow figures from Izvestiya TsK, 1925, Nos. 43-44, Leningrad figures from D.A.Hughes, op. cit., p. 19.

the other hand, the argument of the 'New Opposition' sounded more like that of the old Left, holding that the kulak was holding the revolution to ransom and must be suppressed.³¹

These differences came to a head at the conferences of the Moscow and Leningrad organisations, held in November and December 1925. The Leningrad Conference opened first, and was marked by some outspoken speeches from the floor criticising Bukharin and his policies.³² The Moscow Conference, beginning on 5 December, was the scene for some of the most bitter debate in the whole episode, much of which failed to reach the national press. Only the local Moscow newspapers reveal how openly Kamenev was prepared to discuss his personal and political differences with the Bolshevik majority, and how thorough was the Moscow Party's resistance. The main reports at the Conference were restrained³³, but the debate soon gave way to open criticism of the Leningraders. Contributors to the discussion between them attacked every plank of the Opposition platform, from the kulak danger to recruitment, wages and the future of NEP.³⁴ Bukharin himself made a sharply aggressive speech, heavily larded with insults, which revealed a personal dislike for Zinoviev as well as a contempt for his policies. Zinoviev was accused of 'prattle', and his study of Leninism dismissed as the work of a man who knew nothing either of current policy or of Leninism. The country, Bukharin said, needed a united working class and a united Party, and he implied that many of its difficulties had been exacerbated by the factional activities of the Leningrad organisation. After the trouble over his 'get rich' slogan of the previous spring, Bukharin was prepared to recognise the 'kulak danger', but he still insisted that the formation of agricultural co-operatives was taking the country forward to socialism. The accusation that NEP was a form of 'state capitalism' he dismissed as 'Menshevism of the purest water.'³⁵

³¹ An account of the Leningrad Conference may be found in Carr, *op. cit.*, chapter 16.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 134.

³³ The TsK report was given by Rykov. RM 9/12/1925.

³⁴ RM 10/12/1925.

³⁵ RM 10/12/1925.

Kamenev's was the only dissenting voice of any consequence at the Moscow conference.³⁶ Although he was isolated in Moscow, he was still important enough to make a lengthy speech criticising the line the majority was taking. Where Bukharin had hinted that his target was Zinoviev, Kamenev named his adversary, telling Bukharin to his face that he was the only person who did not understand Leninism. Once again, he set out the New Opposition's line on the kulak, remarking that it was a good thing for Bukharin that he had already taken back his 'get rich' remark. In defence of the Leningrad organisation, he told the conference that he had scoured Leningradskaya Pravda for evidence of a breach of Party discipline, but had found nothing except approval for the activities of the TsK.³⁷

Despite Kamenev's intervention, the final resolution of the Moscow Conference, while mentioning no-one by name, clearly favoured the Moscow interpretation of the political situation. The resolution, together with the generally belligerent tone of the Moscow conference, provoked a reply from Leningrad in the form of an open letter.³⁸ Leningrad answered Moscow point by point,³⁹ identifying five major charges which had been laid at Zinoviev's door and setting out to show that no major differences in fact existed between the Moscow and Leningrad organisations.⁴⁰ Moscow replied at even greater length, re-examining each of the five points and adding a few extra remarks for good measure.⁴¹

It was in this atmosphere that the XIV Party Congress opened on 18 December 1925. The 'New Opposition' was not a mass movement, but its leaders were able to count on a

³⁶ His speech was not published in Pravda, unlike those of many far less significant contributors to the debate. From September 1925 onwards, his speeches began to disappear from the pages of the press, and even from the stenographic reports of Moscow conferences.

³⁷ RM, 13/12/1925. It is not surprising that he should have found such approval, since all conferences routinely passed resolutions agreeing with current policy and praising the TsK for its efforts on behalf of the revolution. Moreover, the Leningrad Oppositionists naturally considered that they were the guardians of Leninist policy, and that certain individuals within the TsK who dissented from it would be removed.

³⁸ 'Reply to the resolution of the Moscow Conference', 'Novaya Oppozitsiya' (Leningrad, 1926), pp. 40-44.

³⁹ See the account in Carr, op. cit., chap. 16.

⁴⁰ The five headings were 'a liquidationist lack of faith in the working class', the Leningrad Party's claim that current policy was the equivalent of State capitalism, its exaggeration of the kulak danger, its 'Axelrodism' in swelling the Party with unsuitable elements from the working class, and its pessimism.

⁴¹ Novaya Oppozitsiya, pp.44-50. The extra paragraphs were on co-operatives.

substantial number of supporters among the Congress delegates. This was to be the last Party Congress at which any opposition group secured a vote. Stalin gave the main report on behalf of the Central Committee, but Zinoviev made a co-report, the last oppositionist to do so at a Party Congress. Although restrained in general, he used the opportunity to deliver another broadside against the majority's peasant policy, and against Bukharin in particular. The most outspoken contribution by a member of the Opposition, as usual, came from Kamenev, whose speech of 21 December contained an unprecedented attack on Stalin. 'We cannot regard it as normal', he declared, 'and we think it harmful to the Party, to prolong a situation in which the secretariat combines politics and organisation, and in fact decides policy in advance...I have reached the conclusion that Comrade Stalin cannot perform the function of uniting the Bolshevik general staff.'⁴²

Kamenev's views must have met with the sympathy of many of his hearers, but his boldness could not secure the success of the 'New Opposition'. As he had indicated, the Party Congress had become a tool of the secretariat, and the opposition could not hope to raise a majority. The XIV Congress was to witness their defeat. It was followed by the denunciation of Kamenev in Moscow⁴³ and his removal from the presidency of the Council for Labour and Defence, STO.⁴⁴ The following April, he was removed from his post in Moscow. The resolution of the IV MK plenum explained that 'the great growth in the work of the Moscow Soviet demands the constant participation and leadership of its work by the chairman, and in view of the fact that Comrade Kamenev has taken virtually no part in the work of Mossoviet, and because of the necessity of promoting new people, especially workers, the buro of the MK has decided to relieve Comrade Kamenev from his responsibilities as chairman of the Moscow Soviet and gubispolkom and to replace him with Ukhanov.'⁴⁵ Such a dismissal, containing no mention of the victim's 'own request' and no reference to his valuable work in the post, was only one degree short of complete disgrace.

⁴² Carr, op. cit., p.153.

⁴³ A meeting of the Moscow Party aktiv in January, attended by 3,700 people, condemned the whole opposition and Kamenev in particular. P. 12/1/1926.

⁴⁴ Carr, op. cit., p. 167.

⁴⁵ IV plenum MK (M., 1926).

Many of the issues raised by the New Opposition might be thought to have popular appeal, particularly where wages and working conditions were concerned. However, their impact in Moscow, as opposed to Leningrad, where a full-scale purge followed the XIV Congress,⁴⁶ appears to have been slight. Neither Kamenev nor Zinoviev was a popular figure in Moscow politics, and from the start, there had been no campaign among the Party rank and file in the capital.⁴⁷ Contemporary sources, compiled by the Trotskyists or under the control of the TsK majority, do not give a clear picture of the extent of support for the Opposition in Moscow, but a report of January 1926 from one Moscow factory may have been typical. The interest aroused by the XIV Congress, it claimed, was limited. 'Over there,' said one worker, 'they had their argument, but in the end they'll work out a resolution and will get on with their work in peace again.' Some workers admitted to the reporter that they sympathised with the Opposition line about the exploitation of the proletariat, but this does not seem to have been translated into support for Zinoviev and Kamenev. It was not thought surprising that these two should have been in opposition, though Krupskaya's position was unexpected. One worker sympathetically remarked that she must have found it difficult to think about things without the guidance of Lenin, and thus had fallen into one or two errors.⁴⁸

The discontents of the city's population thus failed to give rise to open support for the Opposition in 1925. If anything, the Moscow Party organisation proved to be more royalist than the king in this debate. The campaign of 1925, however, was not a real test of popular feeling in Moscow, confined as it was to the Party elite. It was in the next two years that the level of support for the Left was really to be put to the test, and in circumstances which looked very bleak for the Party majority.

⁴⁶ A TsK commission was sent to Leningrad in January to put the Party organisation there into order.

⁴⁷ Even in Leningrad, the struggle was mainly confined to the Party committee, with the rank and file playing no significant role. V. Serge, *op. cit.*, pp. 210-211.

⁴⁸ RM, 20/1/26.

The winter of 1925-6 saw a worsening in living conditions brought about by the need to cut production costs and raise productivity.⁴⁹ So serious had the problem of workers' conditions become by February 1926 that when the MK held a plenum to discuss the difficulties, the deliberations were kept secret.⁵⁰ From February, the MK embarked on a programme of 'explanatory work' among the population of the capital,⁵¹ and in April, a further plenum was held to discuss the mood of the Moscow proletariat. In his report, Uglanov optimistically claimed that 'the problems which we are living through' had been 'considerably more acute two or three months ago', although they were still a cause for concern, with dissatisfaction particularly serious among unskilled and semi-skilled workers.⁵² Thereafter, however, the workers' difficulties were further compounded by the introduction of the 'regime of economy', which led to cuts in wages and extensive job losses in all sectors of Soviet industry. Concern was so widespread that in August, an MK closed letter describing the problems, marked 'absolutely secret' was circulated among Moscow Party cells. It referred, among other things, to mistakes associated with the regime of economy, such as the 'inaccurate payment of wages' in some enterprises, to the 'unstable mood of the workers', which had reached a peak of dissatisfaction in the spring, and to rising unemployment, and noted that the Opposition had been gaining ground as a result of these 'difficulties'.⁵³

Support for the Opposition was not the only fruit of these problems. Another direct result was the growth of 'khuliganstvo' in the capital, both in the form of individual petty crime and, more disturbingly, group attacks on Party meetings, club houses and workers'

⁴⁹ Stepanov, the director of the Serp i Molot factory, described later how when he joined the factory in 1925, collective agreements were being concluded between management and workers which provided for average cuts in wages of 13%, rising to 23% in some shops. TsGAOR 7952/3/ 258, 3.

⁵⁰ Such secrecy was unusual at the time. Until the summer of 1928, MK plenums were reported as they happened in Rabochaya Moskva, and it was very unusual for major speeches not to be reported more or less verbatim. The February plenum is still unavailable, although Suvorov, who has read a stenographic report in Party archives, reports that its main business was the discussion of the problems surrounding productivity and wages. Yu I. Suvorov, 'Moskovskie Bol'sheviki v bor'be za effektivnost' proizvodstva v tekstil'noi promyshlennosti. 1925-28 gg.' Kandidatskaya dissertatsiya (M., 1969), p.119.

⁵¹ RM, 20/2/26.

⁵² IV plenum MK (M. 1926), p. 3. Another speaker, however, argued that it was the skilled workers who were most inclined to 'tailism'. Ibid., p. 28.

⁵³ Zakrytoe informatsionnoe pis'mo Moskovskogo Komiteta VKP(b) (M, 1926).

correspondents in factories.⁵⁴ Unrest arising from hard living conditions often manifested itself in complete disenchantment with all political groups. To the Opposition, however, the mood of the working class seemed a vindication of their policies; moreover, it provided them with an opportunity too attractive to ignore. From April 1926, the defeated groupings of Trotskyists and Zinovievists combined to form the 'United Opposition', mounting a comprehensive critique of Party policy over the next two years. The main forum for their efforts, outside the TsK, was the Moscow Party organisation. Although events in the TsK cannot be ignored, the following account concentrates on Moscow. For that reason, individual leaders of the United Opposition, particularly Trotsky, receive less emphasis than they would in a more general survey.

The United Opposition, 1926-7.

The new bloc made its public debut in April 1926 at a plenum of the TsK. Although the policies of the two disaffected leaders, Trotsky and Zinoviev, were now closer to each other than to the Stalin-Bukharin group, the Trotskyists had held back from an alliance with their old adversaries, and at one stage had even considered the idea of an alliance with the Stalinists against Zinoviev.⁵⁵ Only the continued campaign by the centre against the Left forced the Trotskyists belatedly to identify their common enemy.⁵⁶ Whatever the tactics of the leadership, moreover, Trotsky's rank and file supporters continued to mistrust the Zinovievists, so that the group lacked cohesion.⁵⁷ Individual members of the group held very different views about the solutions to be offered for Russia's economic and political problems. Three major policy documents were produced in the course of 1926-7, attacking the majority's turn to the right and proposing a number of reforms, including more rapid industrialisation and an attack on the growing Party bureaucracy. However, essentially the United Opposition remained open to the criticism that it was devoted primarily to replacing

⁵⁴ P., 28/9/1926.

⁵⁵ Daniels, p. 274. In 1924, Zinoviev and Kamenev had been the advocates of the most repressive measures against the Left, while Stalin had argued for caution.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 275.

⁵⁷ Serge, a Trotskyist, recalled that 'we were taken aback by the news that Trotsky had concluded an agreement with the Leningrad opposition. How could we sit at the same table with the bureaucrats who had hunted and slandered us, who had murdered the principles and ideas of the Party?' Serge, op. cit., p. 212. See also Deutscher, op. cit., p. 267.

the personnel at the top, and riven beneath with differences on important questions of what to do thereafter.⁵⁸

In Moscow, the activities of the new faction began in the spring. The MK's solidarity was now beyond question, but the Left still had hopes of attracting support at the grass-roots level. Initially, their campaign focussed on the workers' conferences being held to discuss and explain current policy in the factories. Part of the purpose of these conferences was to counter the claims of the Left about the economy by clarifying the official line, but the opportunity was ideal for an opposition group. At open meetings of workers, often at the shop level and not attended by eminent speakers from the MK, oppositionists put their views unchecked. Opposition speeches were made in Sokol'niki, Khamovniki, Zamoskvorech'e and Bauman raions. 'The Opposition is trying to make demagogic speeches about wages, about the building of houses and other questions of daily life among the unconscious Party mass,' ran a report from the Klara Tsetkin factory, adding, however, that 'The party has grown since 1923, it knows how to understand questions, and the Opposition has not broken its ranks. We only rally more closely around the TsK, our leader.'⁵⁹

The height of this phase of the United Opposition's activities came in the summer. On June 6, a meeting was held in the woods near the Dolgorupaya railway station, 39 kilometres from Moscow at which the Oppositionist deputy Commissar for War, Lashevich, spoke. About 70 people attended⁶⁰, despite the risks, which now included expulsion from the Party as well as the attentions of the OGPU. Thereafter, secret Opposition groups seem to have proliferated in the city, holding regular meetings and often producing their own literature.⁶¹ Generally, the Opposition's tactics in this period were to work among the Party rank and

⁵⁸ Carr is most scathing about the United Opposition, remarking that 'it was cemented by hostility to the ruling group, and by little else.' Foundations of a Planned Economy, 1926-1929, Vol. 2 (London, 1971), p.12. The most thorough account, and a more sympathetic one, of their policies is in Daniels, op. cit., pp. 288-311.

⁵⁹ This rider may have been mainly cosmetic, for the Klara Tsetkin factory was a stronghold of the Democratic Centrist group, staunch allies of Trotsky, until the end of 1927. Moskovskie Bol'sheviki, p. 181.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 161.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 162.

file, together with people who remained outside the Party, in order to build Opposition groups in as many factories and institutions as possible. It was hoped thus to control the Party grass-roots, a goal almost achieved in 1923, and thence to 'capture' raion level organisations, and ultimately the MK itself, through the local election process. Even if they were unsuccessful in winning over absolute majorities, it was hoped that the discussion of policy issues by Oppositionists in the cells would build up a climate of opinion in which the centre would be unable to persist with its current strategy. Although they were able to attract small groups of workers, particularly in the larger factories, the Opposition were more successful in the VUZy and the government institutions.⁶² Reportedly, their greatest numerical strength was in Sokol'niki raion, where a number of State institutions were concentrated.⁶³

The MK responded by intensifying its propaganda campaign against the Left. In July, a plenum of the TsK dismissed Zinoviev from the Politburo and deprived Lashevich of his candidate status on the TsK. This plenum provided the focus for a propaganda campaign in Moscow, including a meeting of the Moscow Party aktiv, attended by 4,200 members, at which a resolution was passed condemning the 'Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc'.⁶⁴ Throughout the summer of 1926, the Moscow press carried articles exposing Oppositionist groups in the capital and repeating the propaganda message that the Opposition was fighting a lost cause against the united proletariat.

In September, the question of the Opposition was discussed at the VII MK plenum. To a certain extent, the leadership were necessarily on the defensive. The regime of economy continued to bring hardship to the city in a variety of ways. For example, cuts in the demand for paper from government departments had led to growing unemployment among print-workers⁶⁵, traditionally an articulate group with little sympathy for the Bolsheviks. Other sources of grievance included wage levels and rent increases, both of which were

⁶² Among their targets were the main VUZy, including the mining and agricultural academies, and institutions like Narkomfin, Narkomtorg, Glavkontsesskom and Glavkhlopkom. Ibid., pp.167-9.

⁶³ More than a third of cells in this raion were in institutions. Ibid., p.182.

⁶⁴ Ibid., pp. 175-6.

⁶⁵ Sed'moi plenum MK (M., 1926), pp.69-70.

problems for which the Opposition proposed attractive solutions. In his report on the conduct of the regime of economy, Savvat'ev, the chairman of the MKK, emphasised the need for wages to be kept at reasonable levels and for cuts to come from other spheres, especially reductions in the size of middle and senior management.⁶⁶ Uglanov, who gave the main report to the plenum, again warned his audience that the Opposition were drawing strength from current hardships, illustrating his point with reference to a meeting of 11 Oppositionists held in Sokol'niki raion, and to the discovery of illegal printing machinery in a private flat.⁶⁷

The Opposition were sanguine about their prospects in this climate. Belen'kii, who knew Krasnaya Presnya from the days of his secretaryship there, believed that the Opposition could count on 62 of its cells, and declared that 'if we can take Krasnaya Presnya, we can take everything.' Trotsky is reported to have said in September that he 'could take the Moscow heights in two weeks.'⁶⁸ These claims, however, were not borne out in the event. On 1 October, the Opposition attempted to take over a meeting of the factory cell at the Aviapribor factory, which had been a Trotskyist stronghold in 1923.⁶⁹ All their most prominent speakers attended, including Trotsky, Zinoviev, Pyatakov, Smilga and Radek. The meeting, to which Uglanov was hastily summoned, lasted until four in the morning, and the discussion must have been lively, but the Opposition were eventually defeated by 27 votes to 78 on the final resolution.⁷⁰ Although that was not a discreditable result in the circumstances of 1926, it was a turning point for the Left, and provided ammunition for a relentless campaign against the Opposition which continued into 1927.

The failure at Aviapribor, and a similar rebuff for Zinoviev at a meeting in Leningrad, contributed to the Opposition's decision to refrain from 'factional activity' from October

⁶⁶ Sed'moi Plenum, p.10. In this month, wage cuts nationally came in for criticism, the TsK ordering wage levels to be restored.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

⁶⁸ Moskovskie Bol'sheviki, pp. 189-90.

⁶⁹ P. 3/10/1926.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

1926 onwards. Their self-denying declaration appeared in the press on 17 October.⁷¹ At the XV Party Conference, which met at the end of the month, they spoke on economic issues, but there was none of the outspoken personal criticism of the previous December. The Conference was a triumph for the majority. It was not until the spring of 1927 that the Opposition returned to the centre of the political stage.

The lull in factional activity between October 1926 and April 1927 did not mean that the Moscow Party leadership lapsed into complacency about the issue. Almost all areas of its work were affected by the struggle against the Left. The Party majority sought to prove itself to be the real guardian of the revolution. In December 1926 and early January 1927, local Party conferences were convened in the six raions to prepare for the Moscow Party Conference. Reports in Pravda and Rabochaya Moskva indicate that the Opposition issue was at the centre of all calculations. The contributions of the main speakers were largely directed towards rebutting Opposition criticisms of current Party policy. Uglanov's report to the Krasnaya Presnya Party organisation dealt with the question of wages, the problem of private capital, the importance of which he claimed was diminishing, and the existence of a large and growing aktiv, which he used as an indicator of the healthy state of intra-Party democracy.⁷² He also mentioned the Opposition, remarking that their activities were continuing 'in the peripheral cells in the gubernia'.⁷³ The question of the Opposition was raised at all the local conferences, and reportedly dominated the questions submitted by the rank and file.

This concern indicated that the 'truce' between the Opposition and the Centre was not to last. Uglanov seemed to be taking no chances. Later in the month, an article in Izvestiya Tsentral'nogo Komiteta noted that the Moscow organisation had supplied only 60% of its quota of the cadres to be sent into the countryside on Party work, owing to the difficulties of

⁷¹ The document was a statement signed by Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Pyatakov, Sokol'nikov, and Evdokimov. After an admission of various 'errors', including 'factional activity', it formally declared the Oppositionists' intention of refraining from any further work which might be considered 'anti-Party'.

⁷² The question of intra-party democracy was one on which the Opposition had reserved particular criticism for Uglanov, whom they regarded as an archetypal bureaucrat of the new school. See below, pp. 83-4.

⁷³ RM, 22/12/1926.

sparing valuable Party supporters at this critical time. Ivanovo-Vosnesensk, by comparison, had completely fulfilled its quota.⁷⁴ The Opposition, too, were not entirely silent in Moscow or even confined to remote areas. In February 1927, speeches were reported by Oppositionists in the Party cells of major factories like 'Trud' and 'Serp i Molot', and in the cell of the Artamonovskii trampark. With this excuse, the raion committees intensified their agitation campaign against the Opposition at once.⁷⁵

It was in May, however, that these undercurrents came to the surface again. Responding to the USSR's worsening international position, and in particular to the TsK's unpopular and erroneous Chinese policy, the Opposition issued a formal condemnation of the majority line, denouncing 'socialism in one country' as petty bourgeois, and calling for 'a Marxist analysis of the real situation of the proletarian dictatorship in the USSR.'⁷⁶ In Moscow, reaction to the 'platform of the 83' was swift, with local cells denouncing the Opposition as 'a worse threat than Chamberlain' and calling for their ejection from the Party.⁷⁷

Encouraged by the popular unrest over the defeat of the Chinese proletariat, the Opposition persisted with its Moscow campaign, and its occasional successes were signs of a wider following than the official reports allowed. In June, a large demonstration was staged to accompany Smilga's exile to Khabarovsk, with students choking the platform at the Yaroslavl' station and Trotsky and Zinoviev addressing the multitude.⁷⁸ Responding to the solidarity of the Party apparatus, which seemed virtually united against them, the Opposition took their cause to the lowest levels in the Party, addressing meetings of Party cells in all the

⁷⁴ Izvestiya Tsentral'nogo Komiteta, 31/1/1927.

⁷⁵ Meetings mainly devoted to the question of the Opposition were held in Bauman raion on 25 February and in Krasnaya Presnya raion on 21 April. Moskovskie Bol'sheviki, pp. 206-7.

⁷⁶ Carr, Foundations, vol. 2, p.26.

⁷⁷ Moskovskie Bol'sheviki, p. 212.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 209, and Carr, Foundations, vol. 2, p. 27. This kind of demonstration at a railway station, with a mainly student crowd, continued to accompany the exile of oppositionists, possibly as a legacy of the student fervour of 1923. An eye witness interviewed in Moscow recalled that students prostrated themselves on the tracks in front of Trotsky's train as he left for Alma-Ata in 1928. If the Left were numerically insignificant in terms of the whole Moscow organisation, they could still muster a core of zealous supporters when needed.

capital's raions.⁷⁹ In November, the demonstration marking the tenth anniversary of the October revolution was the scene of a Trotskyist counter-demonstration, supporters of the Opposition stepping out of the crowd at pre-arranged places to raise their banners and make speeches putting their view to the capital's population. The official version of the affair claims that the crowd were sickened by this display of factionalism on such an occasion, and fell upon the offenders spontaneously, although the Opposition seemed to regard the attempt as a qualified success for themselves.⁸⁰

The problem for the Politburo majority in the autumn of 1927 was to prevent the Opposition from using the forthcoming XV Party Congress as a forum for the discussion of the future of the USSR. Under these circumstances, no tactics against the Left were barred. Opposition speeches at Party meetings were systematically interrupted. While Trotsky was speaking at the Central Committee, a glass and a book of control figures were hurled at his head. Uglanov was alleged to have conducted interruptions at a Moscow meeting by waving his order paper.⁸¹ In the press, the campaign against the Opposition sank to the level of personal invective,⁸² while Uglanov set the tone by calling Rakovskii 'no better than a defence lawyer' and accusing him of playing 'hide and seek with the Party'.⁸³

The TsK's campaign proved to be effective in crippling the Opposition in advance of the XV Party Congress. It was possible to exclude known Oppositionists from the lists of candidates at local elections to the Congress, thus providing that the centre would have an overwhelming majority. Mere numbers were not sufficient, however. The criticisms made by the 'United Opposition' also had considerable force in the atmosphere of 1927, and even at the Congress, the delegates were rehearsed in advance to make sure that they would be

⁷⁹ According to archival sources reported in one Soviet account, 26 Opposition speeches were made in Krasnaya Presnya raion, 24 in Bauman raion and 28 in Zamoskvorech'e in August and September 1927. *Voprosy Istorii KPSS*, 1967, No. 2, p.126.

⁸⁰ P. 14/11/1927

⁸¹ Carr, *Foundations*, vol.2, pp.39-40.

⁸² Demyan Bednyi's speech to the Zamoskvorech's raion Party organisation in October 1927 was little more than a string of insults aimed at Radek, Zinoviev and Trotsky. It was published in full. P. 1/11/1927.

⁸³ P. 1/11/1927.

able to argue in support of the official line.⁸⁴ Against the Party apparatus, the United Opposition was virtually doomed from the start.

It remains to be seen, however, how much support they had lower down in the Party. The campaign against them was flamboyant and relentless, but what was the justification behind it? The Left Opposition and its successors have attracted a great deal of sympathetic coverage in the West because they seemed to be defending the ideals of the revolution against the encroachments of the bureaucracy. In the 1920's and early 1930's, the rump of the Left continued to speak out against the betrayal of the revolution, a romantic campaign of self-promotion which did much to distort the record of the Oppositions of 1923-7. This sympathy has made establishing the real history of the Left more difficult, a task which is further complicated by the official records of the time, which are full of lurid exaggerations about the conspiracies, but contain very few reliable details. Any conclusions about the Left must necessarily be tentative.

There is little doubt that the Opposition's campaign in Moscow in 1923 rocked the TsK at a time when the political future of the country was very uncertain. Later, support for the Opposition would never again achieve such numbers, but the Muscovites' enthusiasm would be hard to forget. Moreover, the very existence of 'circles' plotting against the Politburo majority gave rise to excessive official concern. Russia was used to the idea that such conspiracies could lead to momentous changes. The tactics which the Opposition used to gain support among the population were part of the reason for the disproportionate reaction of the Party and the OGPU. On the other hand, the Opposition does not seem to have gained significant numbers of supporters through its network of circles and publications. If the struggle between the Left and the centre after 1925 had ever come to a show of hands in the Party, at least in Moscow, the Opposition would have been the clear loser. This point can be demonstrated by looking at the figures for Trotskyists purged from

⁸⁴ Khrushchev, a delegate from the Ukraine at the XV Congress, recalled in his memoirs how Yakovlev had visited the Ukrainian delegation one evening to explain to them 'where we differed from the Zinovievites and what we were to do. In other words, he prepared us to carry out factional work against the Zinoviev-Kamenev opposition which was then gathering force.' Ed. E. Crankshaw, Khrushchev Remembers, Vol.1, p.54.

the Moscow Party organisation in 1927. According to archival sources, 143 Oppositionists were excluded in 1927; 41 white collar workers, 82 students and 16 workers.⁸⁵

Numerical strength was not the only weapon of the Left, however. Beyond the mere fact of its existence, which was a clear demonstration that the Party was not a single, unified body, it was a threat to the majority because of the nature of its criticisms. In Moscow, and probably in every other major industrial city, the pro-peasant line of 'high NEP' gave rise to doubts among cadre workers⁸⁶. As Bauman, the future MK secretary, was to put it in the autumn of 1927, 'there can't be two socialisms, one for the countryside and one for the city.'⁸⁷ More than elsewhere, moreover, Moscow saw the inequality and corruption which accompanied the new world of the NEPman. To the majority, these were necessary evils, but the Opposition was able to strike a genuinely sensitive nerve by drawing attention to them. The elaborate campaign against the Left was partly fuelled by the fact that its criticisms came at a time when the Party felt threatened by the compromises it was having to make.

The future was to show, however, that it was not only observations on the economy, or even the attack on the TsK's disastrous Chinese policy, which attracted popular sympathy. Ironically, in view of Trotsky's commitment to Bolshevik Party discipline, it was the Opposition's status as an alternative which drew rank and file Party members towards the Left for the next few years. Workers who had made sacrifices for the revolution were to show that bread and butter issues, although important, were not the only key to their political allegiance. It was the stifling of discussion which alienated them, a betrayal of the cause for which many had fought so bitterly a decade before. In the matter of 'Party democracy', Uglanov was an uncompromising centraliser, and under his regime the grip of the MK over the lower echelons was tightened as never before.⁸⁸ A report by the MK's own information department on the condition of the Moscow organisation in November

⁸⁵ Moskovskie Bol'sheviki, p.233.

⁸⁶ This is a point made forcefully by William Chase, although he does not mention the Left Opposition in Moscow specifically. Chase, op. cit., esp. Chapter 5.

⁸⁷ XVI Moskovskaya Gubernskaya Konferentsiya VKP(b) (M., 1927), Bulletin No. 10, p. 88.

⁸⁸ See below, p.84.

1928 stated that 'Party members virtually everywhere' were expressing disapproval of control by the centre. 'They want real democracy', it read, 'up to date information and the guarantee that workers will have the right to pass resolutions and not just to carry them out.'⁸⁹

The case of a worker at the 'Krasnyi Proletarii' factory illustrates the attraction of the prospect of an alternative, a group which in defeat could appear as a 'democratic', anti-centralising movement. In March 1929, a Party member called Panov was called before the Party cell in the factory to account for his interest in the Left, now clearly condemned as 'anti-Party' activity. Already doomed, he made no secret of his disagreements with the Party majority, listing among his criticisms the handling of the Chinese question and the treatment of poor peasants. On the question of the Party itself, he declared that 'there is no broad democracy, the apparatus decides for the whole Party, the Party mass is a consultative and not a deliberative organisation, everything is decided up above.'⁹⁰ It was this aspect of the political situation, together with the Chinese crisis, which had drawn him to the Opposition. 'The situation was getting worse,' he said, 'and there was no information,' so 'I began to read a lot of Opposition material.'

The Opposition's problem was that mere sympathy was not enough to alter the course of policy. At their most active, sympathisers might hand on a few illegally-printed documents⁹¹ and perhaps hold tiny secret meetings, soon discovered and suppressed by the authorities. People like Panov seldom participated in organised 'factions'. It is not clear from his account whether he intended to take his reading any further, and he represented no threat whatsoever to the majority's hold on power and policy-making. Opposition sympathisers remained a very small fraction of the Party. The majority of the rank and file by the late 1920's were dedicated to practical changes, the building of socialism, and if they were sometimes doubtful about the activities of the central authorities, they could submerge

⁸⁹ Trotsky Archive, (T), 2852.

⁹⁰ TsGAOR, 7952/3/82, 25. This file contains records of the Krasnyi Proletarii Party cell for the year 1929.

⁹¹ In Panov's case, it was 'Kamenev's diary', though whether the document was genuine is open to doubt.

their doubts in their hopes for the future and in the powerful fear of reprisals. Moreover, some of the older generation had brushed with Trotsky's 'democracy' in the early 1920's, and knew it to be a chimera. The Opposition's supporters were often vague about the real aims of the movement, which was understandable in view of the divisions in its leadership, and many, like Panov, turned to it because it was the only alternative. It alarmed the Stalin-Bukharin group, but it could never have stormed the Party by mere numbers in the late 1920's.

The United Opposition in Moscow was thus more feared by the Centre than its real strength deserved, and more embarrassing, because of its political standpoint, than it was feared. It was at least a real political movement, however, complete with conspiracies, secret couriers, and invisible ink. The following year, 1928, was to see a very different phenomenon in Moscow, an 'opposition' movement that was confined to the leadership, which never stated its position in a systematic way and which was swept aside before the mass of Party members knew exactly what had been going on. At the time of its defeat, however, it proved so useful that its importance was to be exaggerated for years to come.

2. The Right Deviation in Moscow; 1928.

Unlike the Left Opposition, the Right has never qualified as anything more than a 'deviation' (uklon) in post-war Soviet historiography.¹ Its organisation was looser and its support less specific than that of the Left group, but beyond that, the precise nature of the last major opposition movement of the 1920's remains unclear, despite the fact that several studies of the politics of the period have appeared in the West since the 1960's². The case of Moscow is particularly important for an understanding of the Right, for it was here that the movement had its only real organisational base and here also that it was first and decisively defeated.

In order to understand the Right in Moscow, it is necessary to begin with the developments in the Politburo and the issues which gave rise to the controversy. It will then be possible to see where the leaders of the Moscow Party organisation stood in this debate, and what steps they took, as the most concentrated and determined group of oppositionists, to further their cause.

The Left, the Right and the 'Centre', 1927-8.

The policies of the Right are familiar to all students of the 1920's in Russia. Drawing on Lenin's formulations, they emphasised the need for NEP to be conducted 'seriously and for a long time', without recourse to the kind of exaggerated planning targets which were to characterise the period after 1928. For agriculture, this meant voluntary marketings by the peasants, with any surplus going to finance imports of industrial goods from abroad, while in the towns, it meant an emphasis on light industry and the production of sufficient

¹ The most thorough Soviet work on the Right is by F. M. Vaganov, Pravyi uklon v VKP(b) i ego razgrom (M.1970).

² For example, E.H. Carr, Foundations of a Planned Economy, 1926-1929, Vols 1 and 2 (London 1969 and 1972); S. F. Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution (OUP paperback 1980); R.V. Daniels, The Conscience of the Revolution; Communist Opposition in Soviet Russia (Cambridge, Mass., 1965); M. Lewin, Russian Peasants and Soviet Power: A Study in Collectivisation (Evanston, Ill., 1968); N. Shimotomai, 'The Defeat of the Right Opposition in the Moscow Party Organisation: 1928', Japanese Slavonic and East European Studies, Vol.4, 1983.

consumer goods to avoid domestic shortages. As Bolsheviks, Rightists looked to a future in which the peasants would cease to be small holders and become a true rural proletariat, but this goal was to be reached with the co-operation of the peasants, who would discover for themselves the benefits of joining forces to exploit new, larger scale, farming technologies. This was the classic version of NEP, and its power as a guiding theory was so great that even after the voluntary principle had been abandoned in practice after 1929, official statements claimed that it was the government's policy. What distinguished the Right from the Stalin group was that they defended this principle when they perceived that Stalin was entertaining other measures in the spring of 1928, and continued to do so despite Stalin's successful campaign to brand them as a faction.

Rightists did not refuse to consider any revisions in the mid-1920's policy of 'high NEP'. However, they balked at the extent of what they took to be Stalin's proposals, especially the threat to the peace of the countryside, and this, combined with their coherence as a small but popular group within the Politburo, was enough to condemn them in the General Secretary's eyes. The unity of the Politburo majority based on the Stalin-Bukharin alliance began to crack in 1927 when the defeat of the Left, by removing an obstacle to Stalin's own shift leftwards, also deprived the victors of their common enemy. However, this potential rift between the two groups only acquired substance later, in 1928.

As early as the autumn of 1927, pressures had begun to accumulate for a more voluntaristic approach to the economy. Among these, the demand for increased levels of investment in industry, and particularly in heavy industry, was crucial, and called for greater surpluses to be extracted from the countryside than were thought to be possible under the classic form of NEP. It was not suggested that NEP had failed, although the problems it caused were serious, but that modifications were needed. The changing atmosphere also had to do with growing international pressure on the USSR in 1927.³ Moreover, the idea of gradual development, 'the peasant nag' of NEP, was one which held little appeal to members of a party dedicated to the revolutionary transformation of society. A heavy industrial base, the

³ Including the Chinese crisis and the rupture of diplomatic relations with London.

'production of the means of production' was needed not only for national security, but also because it was a sine qua non of a society ripe for communism. In December 1927, despite perceptible differences of emphasis between individuals, it was generally agreed by the leadership that moves in the direction of planning were essential. At the XV Party Congress, one of the two main speeches on industrial development was made by Rykov. Soon he was to be regarded in some Party circles as the leader of the Right deviation,⁴ but at this time his position was comfortably within the spectrum of accepted policy.

It was in the early spring of 1928 that the two sides began to harden into opposing camps. The occasion for this was not a change in policy by the Right, but an initiative by Stalin, the use of 'extraordinary measures' to enforce grain collections.⁵ In order to meet the grain quota for the winter of 1927-8, a forced marketing policy was implemented, including the prosecution of hoarders, the closure of rural markets and the seizure of grain from supposed 'kulaks'. The peasants were enraged, and reports of risings began to reach Moscow. Rykov is supposed to have expressed his opposition to the methods in a letter to Stalin in February 1928, while Stalin justified the steps in a TsK circular, 'The first results of the grain procurement campaign and the task of the Party', which is seen by many as the real beginning of the Right deviation.⁶

Throughout the spring of 1928, events helped to sharpen the quarrel. In May came the Shakhty affair, the public trial of a group of mining specialists for alleged 'sabotage', and the second round of 'extraordinary measures', which were both better publicised and less effective than the first. By the early summer, rumours of an impending struggle were rife in political circles. The Stalinists and the Rykovites were said to be talking to one another 'in

⁴ Although Bukharin, who was the principal theorist of the Right, has come to be regarded as its archetype in the Western literature, Rykov, who was then chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom), was viewed by many as the leader of the movement at the time, and, indeed, in some circles, as the heir of Lenin as the Party's unofficial head. This can be substantiated by reference to the Trotsky Archive, where the Right is referred to almost without exception as the 'Rykovites', and by considering the fact that all the major reports to the MK from the TsK in 1928 were made by Rykov, and not by Bukharin, however popular and influential the latter may have been in the capital.

⁵ For a discussion of this new policy, see Y. Taniuchi, 'A Note on the Ural-Siberian Method', Soviet Studies, 1981, No. 4.

⁶ This is Shimotomai's view, for example. *Op. cit.*, p. 21.

an incredible tone' and rumour had it that a Rykovite platform had appeared.⁷ As one historian puts it, 'by late June, despite its public facade, there was neither pretence nor grounds for unity within the leadership.'⁸

The 'public facade' remained unbroken, however, and this is an important distinction between the Right and previous opposition groups. On Stalin's part, silence was obviously preferable to admitting that he was departing from Party policy in order to follow a line almost indistinguishable for practical purposes from that of the Left. Moreover, it is likely that he did not know this early where his initiative would take him; his tactics were seldom the result of a carefully-planned long-term strategy. Although he had hinted at the plenum that he intended to extract more from the peasants, thus alarming Bukharin and his supporters, he made no public statements to that effect. 'Stalin is silent', wrote Trotsky in July, 'because he has nothing to say.'⁹

The silence of the three Politburo rightists is harder to explain, especially in view of the fact that theirs has been regarded as the more popular policy. In large measure, it can be attributed to their fear of appearing as a 'faction'. The danger of this had recently been demonstrated in the defeat of Trotsky. Moreover, appeals to a wider public had failed to help the Left, and the Right must have drawn the obvious conclusion from this. They were thus caught in a position where their tactics were dictated to them before the struggle began. The debate was bound to be confined to the Party apparatus, and under those conditions, Stalin, as General Secretary, held all the trump cards. The Right might have seemed the stronger in the spring, being the upholders of the official line against Stalin's seemingly fantastic schemes,¹⁰ but they were not adept enough to forestall disaster. First of all, they were forced into a position where they looked like the initiators of the rift. 'Stalin manoeuvres,' Bukharin told Kamenev in July, 'so that we appear as splitters'.¹¹ Then even

⁷ T 1588, letter from Trotsky to his supporters, June 1928.

⁸ Cohen, *op. cit.*, p. 285.

⁹ T 3126. Trotsky's paper, 'The July Plenum and the Right Danger', July 22 1928.

¹⁰ It was even rumoured at the time that Kaganovich was sympathetic to them, incredible though this now seems. T 1588, letter from Trotsky, June 1928.

¹¹ T 1897. For a discussion of the reliability and presentation of this document, see Carr, Foundations, Vol. 2, p.65.

their majority in the Politburo disappeared before their eyes. In July, Kalinin and Voroshilov unexpectedly turned out to be on Stalin's side at the TsK Plenum. Bukharin concluded ruefully that 'Stalin has some special hold over them'.¹²

The July plenum of the Politburo was to some extent a turning point for the Right, although the final resolutions, condemning 'extraordinary measures' and proposing to regulate grain marketings through adjustments in price policy, appeared to be a victory for the Bukharin line. Although the two principal protagonists were rather restrained, with Rykov and Stalin 'using the language of diplomats when talking to each other'¹³, it was clear that a power struggle had taken place, in which the Right had been outflanked. Bukharin was so alarmed by the turn of events that he appealed to his erstwhile adversary, Kamenev, for support¹⁴, and it was after July that the Right began to organise themselves, or so rumour had it, holding that Bukharin had begun to co-ordinate the activities of his colleagues and supporters.¹⁵

Outmanoeuvred, the Right was powerless to prevent a succession of setbacks in the summer and autumn of 1928, including a change in the editorial board of Pravda in June, which broke Bukharin's control over editorial policy, and more dramatically, the public condemnation of Rightism, though not, as yet, of anyone within the Bolshevik Party, at the Comintern Congress in September.¹⁶ The public disgrace of the Politburo Rightists was still distant, however. In the autumn of 1928, and particularly after the purging of the Moscow Party Organisation in October, a succession of articles condemning the Right and those who appeased it appeared in Pravda, but not until April 1929 did direct attacks begin on the Politburo triumvirate, and even then, these were not made public. After the Comintern Congress, the next stage in the defeat of the Right was the debacle in Moscow, which began

¹² T 1897.

¹³ T 2502, letter from a Moscow Trotskyist to Trotsky, 7 September 1928

¹⁴ T 1897.

¹⁵ Carr, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p.76.

¹⁶ See *Ibid.*, p. 63, for the changes in the Pravda editorial board, which were completed in September, when the Stalinists finally secured an overall majority, and pp. 68-71 for the Comintern Congress.

in February and came to a head at a joint Plenum of the MK and the Moscow Control Commission (MKK) in October.

The Right Deviation in Moscow.

Unlike the 'United Opposition', the Right's main source of support in Moscow lay in the MK itself, and it is thus possible to identify the leading Moscow Rightists. It will be seen that their backgrounds differed significantly. Moreover, they were not all 'clients' of the first secretary.

The leading Rightist in Moscow was the Party first secretary, N. A. Uglanov. His hostility to the Left had been an example to the Party as a whole between 1925 and 1927.¹⁷ His policies in office were consistently identified with the 'right' in the Politburo at a time when no stigma yet attached itself to the word¹⁸. Uglanov's political line in Moscow remained essentially unchanged from his appointment until the time of his dismissal. As far as industry was concerned, he favoured the development of existing light industries, particularly textiles, which were the staple industry of Moscow in the 1920's. The idea of rapid industrial development alarmed him. He spoke out against the building of Dneprostroi in 1927, for example, and referred on a number of occasions to the need for 'responsible' investment, even declaring that factories which overfulfilled their plans for capital construction out of their profits should be taken to court.¹⁹ As he put it in 1928, 'we should not rush forward, with our heads thrown back, we should build less, and give up our pretensions to large construction.'²⁰

As far as relations within the enterprise went, his line was publicly to advocate the strict observance of the 'triangle', that is, the clear demarcation of responsibility between the management, the trade union and the Party cell. In the pursuit of this goal, however, he

¹⁷ In 1925, he was rewarded for his loyalty with candidate membership of the Politburo.

¹⁸ See also above, pp. 55 and 59-60.

¹⁹ Vaganov, *op. cit.*, p.177.

²⁰ Vtoroi Plenum Moskovskogo Komiteta VKP(b) (M. 1928), p.20.

tended to uphold the rights of the former against those of the Party and trade union, although he was not simply 'pro-manager', and, until the Shakhty trial of the spring of 1928, his policies in the enterprise were in no way unusual. It was only later that his position began to be criticised as excessively sympathetic to management. However, his attitude towards the problem, which included allowing the director to over-rule the Party cell in the enterprise, especially on questions relating to the economy and the hiring and firing of workers, caused arguments, for example at the February 1928 plenum of the MK.²¹ It is possible that the Right later courted sympathetic managers in an effort to win support in the city²². The readiness of management to support them can be explained partly in terms of their policies and also, undoubtedly, because at the time and within the parameters of Party policy, Uglanov's attitude had been identifiably sympathetic.

As far as agriculture was concerned, Uglanov emerged as a 'deviationist' only after February 1928. It is almost certain that he did not share the views of his deputy, Karl Bauman, at this time also the TsK spokesman on rural affairs, who was a firm advocate of rapid collectivisation and called as early as November 1927 for the ending of class differences in the countryside.²³ However, Uglanov was one of the Party secretaries who travelled to the grain areas in the winter of 1927-8, in his case making an inspection of the Volga region in February 1928²⁴. This suggests that his views were respected at the time, rather than being regarded as dangerously wayward.

There were issues on which the Moscow leader clashed with his own organisation, however, and he was also unpopular in the capital for most of his term of office. It has already been noted that he and Bauman did not agree on agricultural policy, and also that there were arguments about the rights of management and workers. Another issue, linked to the latter, over which a dispute arose, was that of the promotion of workers 'from the bench' to responsible posts in the administration of the factory. Uglanov was opposed to

²¹ Ibid.

²² Vaganov, *op. cit.*, p. 178. Courting the managers was one of the accusations levelled at Uglanov at the October joint plenum of the MK and MKK.

²³ See above, p.74

²⁴ Shestoi Ob'edinenyi Plenum MK i MKK (M., 1928), p. 17.

promotion if it impeded what he regarded as the smooth running of the enterprise, and was therefore criticised by Kulikov and another MK member in February for suppressing promotions.²⁵ Within the Party organisation, moreover, he insisted on very tight discipline, defining 'intra-party democracy' in terms which indicated that the initiative lay firmly with the apparatus and senior officials.²⁶ In sum, he was an 'organisation man'²⁷, and for this reason was always likely to make enemies among those whose interpretation of the aims of the Bolshevik party inclined towards the left.

Among the Moscow working class, the source of his unpopularity lay in the economic hardships of 1925-6. Of course, Uglanov should not have been held exclusively responsible, since he was merely implementing the policy of the day. Moreover, the harsh conditions in Moscow, especially unemployment, were partly caused by the regular overcrowding of the city by migrant labourers, a problem peculiar to the largest cities at this time, and one which no measures entirely alleviated before 1929²⁸. Ironically, despite their championship of the textile industry, Moscow was one of the last places where rightist politicians, identified with the NEP of high unemployment and an over-prosperous countryside, were likely to attract support. Whatever the reasons, however, Uglanov's behaviour made him seem unsympathetic to the problems of Moscow workers. His implementation of the regime of economy was regarded as unusually thorough, even by Moscow managers.²⁹ Among workers in the capital, the harsh living conditions of the mid-'20's, together with the suppression of criticism, became known as the 'Uglanovshchina',³⁰

²⁵ Vtoroi plenum (1928), p. 43.

²⁶ His definition of 'intra-party democracy' was 'to present promptly and correctly to the party organisation for solution the fundamental tasks confronting the party and the country; to draw into the discussion and solution of these questions the broad masses and Party members; promptly and correctly to expound to the proletariat the fundamental questions of socialist construction; to test modifications of our policy by the reactions of the working class and of its separate sections, and in the light of this test to modify the party line.' P. 4/6/1926.

²⁷ Daniels, *op. cit.*, p. 337.

²⁸ At the beginning of the building season in 1928, so many migrant workers descended on Moscow that those who wished to return home were offered the fare to do so. Chase, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

²⁹ TsGAOR, 7952/3/258, 3. Stepanov, the director of the Serp i Molot factory in 1926, recalled in this document how difficult conditions for workers had become in the factory. Writing in 1932, he noted how conditions in this factory shocked him on his arrival to take up the post there.

³⁰ Shimotomai, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

and drove many to consider the options offered by the Left. It will be seen that when the time came to put his popularity to the test in the autumn of 1928, Uglanov could not count on the loyalty of the workers of Moscow.

As already noted, the Moscow Party apparatus was solidly anti-Trotskyist after the purge of 1924-5, and thus, in 1928, potentially Rightist. Most senior officials in 1928 were not new appointments, brought in after the removal of the Left, but officials with long records of service in the capital. Next in seniority to Uglanov came his deputy, Kotov. Like Uglanov, he had a long record of revolutionary work, having joined the Party in 1915. He participated in the Civil War in Rostov-on-Don. In 1919, he was moved to Moscow to be secretary of the Sokol'niki raikom. As a delegate to the Xth Party Congress, he assisted in the suppression of the Kronstadt mutiny.³¹ He proved loyal against the Left in 1923-4, and for this was chosen as second secretary in January 1925.

Other future Rightists who had served for long periods in Moscow included N. N. Mandel'shtam, M. N. Riutin and M. A. Pen'kov. Mandel'shtam was a veteran revolutionary, active since the 1890's, who had joined the Bolsheviks at the time of the split between the two factions in 1902 and participated in the Bolshevik revolution in the capital³². After a spell as head of the MK committee on shef svo, he took over the Moscow agitpropotdel in 1927, and remained there until October 1928, despite ill-health.³³ Riutin, who joined the Party in 1914, was the secretary of Zamoskvorech'e raikom in 1924, moving to the more important Krasnaya Presnya raikom in 1927.³⁴ Pen'kov joined the Party in 1907 and spent seven years in exile in Siberia before the revolution. In the early 1920's, he worked in the Moscow Province as secretary of Bogorod ukom, where the Left were particularly strong, and it was from there that he was moved to the city as secretary of

³¹ Biographical information from RM 30/1/1925, at the time of his appointment to the second secretaryship.

³² He is commemorated for this in a recent Soviet work on the revolution in Moscow, Soratniki: Biografii aktivnykh uchastnikov revolyutsionnogo dvizheniya v Moskve i Moskovskoi Oblasti (M.1985), p. 471.

³³ He died in May 1929.

³⁴ As an oppositionist, Riutin appeared later in the Party's history as the author of the famous 'Riutin Platform' of 1932.

Rogozhsko-Simonovskii raikom in May 1928.³⁵ Another influential Rightist in Moscow was the secretary of the Moscow Control Commission (MKK), G. S. Moroz, whose work prior to his appointment to the MKK had been in the OGPU. Outside the Party apparatus, both the chairman of MGSPS, Mikhailov, and the Chairman of the Moscow textile workers' union, Mel'nichanskii, 'idealised calico' for Moscow and were associates of the national trade union chairman, Tomskii.³⁶ As such, they were to become identified as Rightists in 1928.

'Factional Activity': February-October 1928.

If it is easy to identify the 'Rightists' on the MK, specifying exactly what they did to further their cause in 1928 is far more difficult. Their own later statements must be treated with caution, for some tried to exonerate themselves by denying that they had engaged in 'factional activity' while others attempted to win clemency by admitting to an extensive conspiracy. Among the latter was Pen'kov, who made a long speech at the Sixteenth Party Congress in 1930 'to correct the view that no factional work was carried on.' At MK meetings, he explained, 'whenever we discussed any question, Uglanov nearly always declared what the view of our leaders was, that is, the view of the leaders of the Right Deviation.' Pen'kov affirmed that the Right began to mobilise in response to the first letter of the Politburo relating to the grain collections of February 1928. The Moscow Rightists discussed how best to proceed, allegedly consulting Bukharin so that their efforts could be 'more fruitful' and deciding to begin by winning over the leading cadres in the raions. Those who would not agree were to be removed from their posts. By July, there were two MKs, he said, 'us', and those who did not share these views, mostly heads of MK otdely rather than raikom secretaries.³⁷

³⁵ RM 9/5/1928.

³⁶ Cohen, Bukharin, p. 235.

³⁷ XVI S"ezd VKP(b), stenograficheskii otchet (M. 1930), pp. 363-4.

Exaggerated though Pen'kov's account is likely to be, much evidence of the time supports the claim that the Moscow Right was more active in the furtherance of its cause than the Politburo triumvirate. They seem to have been more outspoken in their criticism of Stalin at the highest level, and also more prepared, perhaps because they had a more accessible constituency, to canvass for support within the Party at large. When these activities have been discussed, however, it will still remain to ask how effective their campaign was or could have been.

The Moscow Rightists are said to have begun their campaign in March 1928, using sessions of the Orgburo to raise the issue of grain policy with Stalin.³⁸ This activity continued into the summer, and culminated with Uglanov's speech at the July plenum, which was by far the most outspoken by any Rightist. Uglanov called on the Stalinists to make it clear what they intended 'in order that the peasants shall have no grounds for fearing that we're returning to War Communism', and then went on to explain that workers had reaped no benefit from the controversial spring campaign. 'They are having to put up with rationing or its near equivalent,' he said. 'This cannot go on forever, particularly as they are asking what they gained from eleven years of revolution. I have to say this, even if I am branded as a deviationist who panics.' In the face of ridicule from Stalin, he concluded by saying that the resolutions of the Fifteenth Party Congress needed clarifying, both for industry and for agriculture. He also attacked the 'excessive centralism' of the Politburo in terms more forthright than anyone had used since the defeat of the Left.³⁹

Uglanov's outspokenness was to attract the criticism of his senior colleagues on the Right in the autumn.⁴⁰ In every respect, he seemed to be willing to go further than they considered prudent. It does not seem, however, that any members of the Right, even in Moscow, were prepared to incite potential supporters to open factionalism. Rykov's report to the Moscow Party aktiv after the July Plenum, for example, makes no mention of the struggle within the

³⁸ Vaganov, op. cit., p.180.

³⁹ T 1835.

⁴⁰ Carr, Foundations, vol. 2, p. 76.

leadership. It is very revealing, however, as a guide to the extent to which the Moscow group were prepared to organise meetings as a means of propagating their views.

The meeting, held on 13 July, was attended by 3, 500 Moscow Communists, a group whom Polonskii, a Stalinist, was later to call 'a very peculiar aktiv, unlike anything we have seen for the last two years'⁴¹, in other words, a group picked for its reliability. This 'peculiar aktiv' heard a speech which Rykov claimed was his 'personal view', but which, while naming no-one directly, amounted to a comprehensive attack on 'extraordinary measures'. The crisis, he said,

is visible to anyone who walks down the street of any provincial city....Generally, the sharpening of the grain question and the widespread use of so-called "extraordinary measures" has led to a change in their attitude towards us by the broad peasant mass, both middle and poor peasants, which, if the elements of disaffection are not removed, could represent a serious threat to the smychka between workers and peasants.

To prove that the 'extraordinary measures' had hit the middle peasants, a claim which the Stalinists would have denied, Rykov quoted figures from the local courts, where the incidence of prosecutions for hoarding was recorded. In Siberia itself, only 5% of the cases had been brought against the middle peasants, but in Tiumen okrug, the worst example, out of 837 cases, over a quarter had involved poor peasants, while 64% had been brought against middle peasants and only 7% against kulaks. Furthermore, he continued, the question was not simply a numerical one. Even 'one or two' cases in which middle peasants were attacked 'would create resonances of discontent throughout the peasant population.' Unlike the period of War Communism, when the peasants had at least been able to view the Bolsheviks as allies against a common enemy, there was now no basis for co-operation except mutual economic benefit, and if this were threatened, then the regime could expect serious trouble. Rykov then set out to show that there was no basis for the 'extraordinary measures' in the resolutions of the Fifteenth Party Congress, and to imply that those who sought to use compulsion against the peasants were guilty of Trotskyism. Such policies, he

⁴¹ Shestoi Ob"edinennyi plenum MK i MKK VKP(b) (M., 1928), p.77.

said were 'suicide' along the lines attacked by Lenin in his pamphlet of 1921 'On the Food Tax'.⁴²

In view of the contents of this speech, it is not surprising that Pravda, now in the hands of the Stalinists, refused to publish the original text, and it was a heavily amended version, omitting any reference to problems in the countryside, which appeared on 15 July. Rabochaya Moskva, however, still a Rightist organ, published the full text, and did so after the Pravda report appeared, thus defying the line of the central paper.

As the autumn wore on, the frequency with which the MK Rightists held closed meetings of their supporters increased. At the October Plenum of the MK and MKK, one of the most frequent specific criticisms of Rightist secretaries was that they had organised meetings at odd hours and in unusual or even locked venues. Pen'kov, for example, was accused of calling a meeting of Party secretaries, usually held at noon, at 8 a.m., and using it to discuss Polonskii's 'factional' activity.⁴³ By using their administrative positions to call official meetings, Rightist Party secretaries may have hoped to avoid the accusation of forming a separate faction. This fear, however, almost certainly prevented them from rallying their supporters openly, and may have prevented them, even at the closed meetings, from specifying exactly what was going on.

There are, of course, no available stenographic reports of closed meetings, so what was said must remain the subject of conjecture. Contemporary rumours tell conflicting stories. Trotsky's correspondents preferred to present the struggle as dramatically as possible. One accused Uglanov of telling meetings of carefully-selected activists in September that Stalin was wrong, that his figures were falsified and that steps were being taken to contain him.⁴⁴ This report, however, does not square with the other evidence, including that of some other papers in the same archive. On 25 September, for example, another of Trotsky's correspondents has Uglanov holding a meeting behind locked doors and in a building with

⁴² The full text of his speech is in RM, 17 and 18/7/1928.

⁴³ Shestoi ob"edinennyi plenum MK i MKK VKP(b) (M., 1928), p.70.

⁴⁴ T 2442, letter from a Moscow Trotskyist to Trotsky, September 1928.

every exit, including the windows, sealed; but he is supposed to have spoken about the mood of the workers and the dangers of Trotskyism, and not about the need to resist the Stalinist threat.⁴⁵

This version is supported by the evidence of the September Joint Plenum of the MK and MKK. The main speakers here were Uglanov and Moroz, the head of the MKK. Uglanov's speech, 'On the forthcoming tasks of the Moscow Organisation', was criticised a month later when the Moscow leadership came under fire, and Uglanov was forced to apologise for it, admitting that he had made 'serious errors'. These 'errors', however, were ones of omission; failure to mention the danger of the Right, reference to which had become mandatory in this kind of speech after the Comintern Congress, failure to dwell on the economic achievements of the period, failure to refer to the role of the working class in building up the economy.⁴⁶ The speech contains no reference to the activities of Stalin, and nothing to suggest that there were any real arguments going on in the Politburo. The omissions mentioned earlier made it a bold speech, but it may seem surprising as the speech of a leader of opposition, and it is interesting that Pravda was prepared to publish the full text, albeit eleven days later.⁴⁷

To Uglanov's audience, there were plenty of clues as to his point of view. From the start, the speech dwelled on the mood of the workers, and especially those 'with links with the countryside', whose main worry was the future of the countryside and of the agricultural tax. 'The workers', he said, 'are looking closely at our work in the sphere of setting our relations with the peasants in order.'⁴⁸ Later in the speech, he turned to this question in more detail, referring to the need for 'revolutionary legality' in the collection of the agricultural tax. 'I do not have any official figures', he said, 'but all the same, individual facts indicate that there is a growing tendency to crush the peasant farms. I repeat that I do not have any precise figures, but we must clarify this question.'⁴⁹

⁴⁵ T 2668, summary of Uglanov's speech by a Moscow Trotskyist, 25 September 1928.

⁴⁶ These criticisms are listed in Uglanov's report in October. Shestoi Ob. Plenum MK i MKK, pp. 10-11.

⁴⁷ P. 21/11/28.

⁴⁸ Pyatyi ob"edinennyi plenum, p.4.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p.14

As far as industrialisation was concerned, he quoted the resolutions of the Fifteenth Congress at length before going on to show what progress was being made in fulfilling them. Although he mentioned the need for an 'unrelenting pace' of development, his main worry was for the future of the textile industry in Moscow, faced with a shortage of cotton. He appeared to be satisfied with the progress of heavy industry, an emphasis which held a clear meaning in the autumn of 1928.⁵⁰

Uglanov's version of the workers' mood, particularly his claim that they were worried by the possibility of disaster in the countryside, was attacked in the debate which followed by Alferov, the head of the Rogozhsko-Simonovskii raion agitpropotdel. Alferov argued that the kind of concern Uglanov had identified was the result of the presence within the working class of 'petty-bourgeois elements', evidence of which he saw in alcoholism, anti-semitism and poor discipline at work. He also discussed the problem of 'enemies' within the working class, and called for a purge to remove them.⁵¹

The last part of Uglanov's speech was about the intra-party situation, and it is most revealing in that it shows how fearful the Right had become of even the slightest hint that they might be organising any kind of opposition against anyone. Uglanov set out to show that the Left were enjoying a revival, one aspect of which was that they were trying to divide the Party by suggesting that it had split into 'centre' and 'right' factions. 'In the course of solving the gigantic problems which face us, on particular occasions it happens that we even argue,' he explained. 'The Opposition is trying to make use of this, putting out a version about "right" and "centrist" deviations in the Party leadership, about "right" groups within it, and some members of the Party have swallowed this line of the opposition's.' The rumours, however, had no foundation, Uglanov assured his audience, but were the product of Leftist propaganda at the time of the Comintern Congress.⁵²

⁵⁰ Ibid., p.10.

⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 44-5. Uglanov devoted most of his concluding remarks to an attack on this opponent, suggesting that Alferov's analysis was at the level of the primary classes at a Party school. Ibid., pp. 83-4.

⁵² Ibid., p.22.

The question of factions was to occur many times in the rest of the discussion. In particular, Alferov and another critic of the Right, Glezarov, attacked Uglanov's version of the case. According to Alferov,

If we put the question in the way Uglanov did, it would be difficult to face the Party aktiv. We musn't say that all the disagreements were exaggerated by the opposition, and that in fact there aren't any disagreements. Our Party members understand, they have a feeling, that at the top level, in the Politburo, something was going on, that there were arguments of some sort, that there was something of a "punch-up"....I think, that we must say this directly, and try to make sure that this "punch-up", if it exists, comes to an end, so that our comrades, who are dealing with these matters, don't hurt each other.⁵³

Uglanov did not answer this criticism in his closing remarks, leaving it to Moroz to do so. The latter, after a few pointed remarks about the motivation of Alferov and Glezarov, explained that there were always differences of opinion at plenums of the TsK.

Comrade Stalin said this to one of the Moscow aktiv', he quoted, "'Whatever do you think, that we get together in the Politburo so as to exchange compliments with each other? Come on, can't shades of opinion be expressed at the plenum of the TsK?" And that's what happened....They argued. However, any mutterings which say that in the TsK there are Rights and Lefts...undoubtedly provide grist to Trotsky's mill.⁵⁴

Why was the Right being so cautious at this point? Partly, it was because they felt themselves to be cornered, with the Stalinists calling the tune from the Comintern Congress to the columns of Pravda. Instead of supporting a successful Politburo faction, the Moscow Rightists found, in the autumn of 1928, that they were in the front line of a retreat, even if it was felt at the time that the retreat was not to be the prelude to an utter rout. Instead of

⁵³ Ibid., p.45.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p.147.

stepping into Stalin's shoes as general secretary, which is what was said to have been planned for him,⁵⁵ Uglanov was fighting in September for his political life, and it is notable that there were no attempts by his colleagues in the Politburo to speak out publicly in his defence. It is said, indeed, that the triumvirate, seeing that they had been outmanoeuvred by the Stalinists, deliberately dropped Uglanov in September, allowing Stalin to devour the Moscow Rightists in return for a breathing space for themselves.⁵⁶ Whether or not this is true, the strain of it all made Uglanov ill, and he disappeared from public life from the middle of September until the second week of October. By then, the net had been closed around him.

The Rightists' Constituency: Moscow in 1928.

It has already been shown that both majority and opposition groups in the Bolshevik Party regarded Moscow as a valuable asset in political struggles, but there was room for debate about what was involved in controlling the capital. The Trotskyists attempted a broad campaign, not confined to the Party, but also including workers, in the hopes of storming the Party leadership from below. Some of Uglanov's remarks indicate that he, too, saw the value of mass support, but open opposition was not a course available to him. As one of Trotsky's friends scathingly remarked, 'the idiots do no work among the workers themselves, but confine themselves to scheming.'⁵⁷ The Rights' campaign in Moscow was directed mainly at winning over the intermediate ranks of the Party, although even here, they could not call for overt support against the Stalinist group. It was a strategy that they were largely forced into, but it has been seen that if they had succeeded, they could have had a substantial impact on the political situation. It remains to show that in the event, for a variety of reasons, their campaign was a failure in every respect.

⁵⁵ T 2852.

⁵⁶ T 2850.

⁵⁷ T 2850, letter from a Moscow Trotskyist, November 1928.

Because of the way in which the Right emerged, not as a new political faction but as the defenders of the existing situation, they could count on a certain amount of support without doing anything. However, outside the Party apparatus at the senior level, this support was really passive unless they were prepared to explain that the status quo was under threat. Although they succeeded in keeping the important questions in the debate with the centre on the agenda in Moscow, they failed to make explicit their need for support. Thus, even if their policies were potentially appealing to a large proportion of the population, it was not clear what action ordinary Party members and Muscovites ought to take in order to make sure that potential changes of course were prevented. The Right were unable to present themselves as the group who could translate the vague unease of the population with Stalin's alleged plans into concrete alternatives. The whole situation was left much vaguer than that. What hampered them was firstly their failure to control the whole of the senior Party apparatus in Moscow and then their inability to make use of their non-party supporters in the bureaucracy and elsewhere as a source of additional, overt, pressure.

To look at the disposition of forces more closely, it is logical to begin with the Party organisation itself. The Rightists at the top in the MK have already been described. In general, it is true, as Trotsky was told, that they were mainly secretaries or raikom secretaries, while the heads of the otdely tended to be less sympathetic. Of the raikom secretaries, Giber, from Sokol'niki raikom, and Tsifrinovich, the new secretary of Bauman raikom were on the Stalinist side; of the other four, Riutin, Yakovlev and Pen'kov were unambiguously Rightists, while Kulikov appears not to have made any definite commitments at the time. The MK departments were divided. The Right controlled the agitpropotdel, and thus also the press, and it was to the Rights' advantage that both the Moscow Party journals - Sputnik Kommunista, Propagandist and Sputnik Agitatora - and the Party newspaper- Rabochaya Moskva, which had the largest circulation of any newspaper in the capital - printed only material supporting the Rightist line until after October. On the other hand, the strategic orgraspredotdel was solidly opposed to the Uglanov faction, and its head, Polonskii, was to take a lot of the credit after 1928 for the defeat of the Right in Moscow. Another member of the orgraspredotdel, Tsifrinovich, was identified with the Stalinists, and Bauman, who eventually stepped into Uglanov's job, had

been its head until the spring of 1928. This confirms the theory that the General Secretary was able to use his influence in this side of Party life to build a 'Stalin faction' within the apparatus. In order to circumvent the Stalinist group, Uglanov seems to have attempted to revive the sub-department of records-assignments (uchraspred) under a trusted deputy,⁵⁸ but the move came to nothing, and the Right were thus unable to control appointments within their own organisation. Apart from the strategic significance of the department, the presence of Stalinists at the highest level in the MK made it impossible for the Right to use MK buro meetings to discuss their strategy and gave their opponents a valuable insight into their activities from day to day.

One of the keys to Stalin's power thus clearly lay in his control over the deployment of cadres and the organisation of routine Party work. That alone was not sufficient, however. The city Party secretary also had considerable patronage, and in Leningrad, Zinoviev had been able to use this to build up a loyal 'Zinovievist' organisation. Uglanov's situation was complicated by his own unpopularity. His insistence on the rights of management within the factory and on strict discipline earned him not only the criticism of some of his colleagues on the MK, but also the resentment of the lower Party apparatus in the raions and local cells. Control of the raikoms might have meant solid control of the Moscow Party organisation, although there would still have been the problem of close TsK involvement. However, at this level, as in the MK itself, the situation was complicated. Although at least half of the secretaries were Rightists, the other members of the raikom buros were not necessarily so, as the example of Alferov illustrates. It was in the raions, indeed, that the opposition to the Right finally came to a head in October.

Lower down, in the Party aktiv, the picture is harder to reconstruct. A report compiled by the information section of the Moscow orgraspredotdel in July 1928 indicated that there was a great deal of interest in economic policy issues, but also a certain amount of confusion about where the leading figures stood. The report⁵⁹ was a study of how the cells of the Moscow Party had discussed the July TsK plenum and was based on the evidence of 137

⁵⁸ The claim was made by Polonskii. Shestoi Ob. Plenum, p.77.

⁵⁹ T 2167.

cells with a total of 12,925 members. In view of the orgraspredotdel's concern about the Right, it is unlikely that the information was deliberately distorted in any way, although it is clearly incomplete. What it found was that 'at the majority of meetings, both speakers and those who contributed to the debates paid particular attention to the questions of grain collections and the preparation of new cadres of specialists.'⁶⁰ In discussing grain collection questions the main attention was focussed on the emergence of the grain collections crisis, on the need for planning in the collection of grain, on the dangers of a break in relations between the working class and the peasantry, etc. Although noting a number of Leftist speeches, the report indicated that the mainstream Party aktiv was critical of 'extraordinary measures' and concerned about the future of the smychka, although the Rights' solution of raising prices for grain was regarded by one speaker as a sell-out to the kulak. The aktiv were both interested in the issues discussed at the July Plenum and anxious to make themselves heard on the subject, and although their views were mixed, there was considerable sympathy for what might be identified as a Rightist line.

This support continued into the autumn, and at the time of the liquidation of the Moscow Right in October, speeches of a Rightist nature were reportedly made in about a third of cells.⁶¹ This sympathy, however, was unfocussed. Fears about the future of the countryside were not the same as active support for Uglanov and his allies. If this was true of the Party, moreover, it was doubly true of those who stood outside it. Many groups sympathised with the sort of policies which Uglanov was advocating, but without influence within the Party and without guidance and co-ordination from the MK faction, they were unable to affect the eventual course of events.

The most important of these groups in Moscow was the bureaucracy, white collar workers and administrators in the state institutions, both central and regional. Many of these people were not Communists at all, but those who were tended to fight shy of the dramatic changes threatened by proposed Stalinist reforms. 'The bureaucracy in Moscow is divided in the following way,' Boguslavskii wrote to Trotsky in October. 'The Soviet, economic and co-

⁶⁰ Underlined in the original.

⁶¹ T 2852, MK report 'O nastroeniyakh v partorganizatsiyakh'.

operative apparatuses are mainly on the Right and the Party apparatus is mainly centrist, though there are also people tolerant of the Right in the Party apparatus.' He added that the higher echelons of the trade union apparatus were on the Right, though lower down there was bitter controversy.⁶²

Like the bureaucrats, the directors of Moscow's many textile enterprises were mainly Rightist, an allegiance which is easily understandable both in terms of the Rightists' policies and because of Uglanov's efforts to win their support.⁶³ Among VUZ students, despite the fact that these had been the main source of Trotskyist agitation in the early 1920's, there was also considerable support for the Right. Students at the 'Institute of Red Professors', where Bukharin was a frequent and popular speaker, were known to sympathise with the Right, as were students on technical courses at institutions like the Industrial Academy⁶⁴ and the Timiryazev Agricultural college. However, the support of all these groups - directors, bureaucrats and students - being mainly passive, did not affect the policies of the Politburo in 1928. Although a sit-down strike of civil servants was mooted in the autumn⁶⁵, for example, it never materialised, which is not surprising in view of the personal risk such action would have carried. Moreover, the fact that Stalin's policies seemed so far-fetched to the many people involved in the details of administration may have led to a certain amount of complacency about the future. 'It's all very well for them to pass resolutions,' said one Muscovite, 'but let's see them put them into action.'⁶⁶ As the champion of the status quo, the Right was always likely to suffer in that its supporters were likely to balk at running risks on its behalf. Resistance in the government institutions to excessively voluntarist measures continued throughout the early 1930's, but failed to prevent the worst excesses of collectivisation or the mistakes of the all-out drive for production.

The one group in Moscow which had almost nothing to lose from supporting the Right was the proletariat. Cohen and others have seen the Rights' failure to mobilise the population

⁶² T 2818, letter from Boguslavskii to Trotsky, 19 October 1928.

⁶³ Directors of some metal-working factories also inclined towards the Right, for example, the director of 'Krasnyi Proletarii'. TsGAOR 7952/3/82, passim.

⁶⁴ A 'Rightist' group persisted here until 1930. See below, pp. 114-5.

⁶⁵ T 2850, letter from a Moscow Trotskyist, November 1928.

⁶⁶ T 2850.

beyond the Party as their great tragedy, suggesting that the policies of the Right were potentially very popular in 1928⁶⁷. Undoubtedly, a referendum among the peasantry, had such a thing been conceivable, would have shown overwhelming support for the Rykov line, but the views of Moscow workers were more ambiguous.

There is unfortunately no systematic information on their position in 1928, and the anecdotes of the time point in every direction. A correspondent of Trotsky's, for example, reported that at the Frunze factory, workers considered that collective farms were the only answer to the chaos in the countryside and that there was widespread mistrust of the kulak.⁶⁸ 'The mass of the workers,' wrote another Trotskyist in November, 'are on the left.'⁶⁹ An orgraspredotdel report⁷⁰, however, indicated that, although there was a lot of confusion, many workers expressed views which were similar to those of the Rightists and were interested in the prospects for the countryside and for food supplies in the towns.

The Moscow proletariat in 1928 was not a homogeneous group, and this helps to explain the diversity of its views. In 1929, for example, 22.6% of metalworkers and 11% of textile workers in the capital were ex-peasants, many of whom still held land.⁷¹ As Anikeev, a Komsomol organiser in the Krasnyi Proletarii factory, put it, this group 'always opposed the proposals of the factory management for raising the productivity of labour, raising norms and checking on piece-rates.' They 'were always the leaders of any unhealthy tendencies.'⁷² It is likely, then, that such workers would have sympathised with the Right, although they were also, for the most part, the least articulate group. Among the longer-established workers, sympathy for the Right may also have been common, but 'Leftist' speeches, advocating economic change, were also frequently reported at Party meetings in the factories. Uglanov, moreover, was no more attractive to workers than he was to the Party aktiv. On the other hand, Stalin's position, partly because of its vagueness, had much to

⁶⁷ See Cohen, *op. cit.*, p. 322.

⁶⁸ T 2534

⁶⁹ T 2850

⁷⁰ T 2021

⁷¹ SK, 1929, no. 23, p. 46.

⁷² TsGAOR, 7952/3/94, 17-18.

commend it. Without specifying details, he managed to present his policies as mainstream, so that support for him was not an act of opposition. He also offered a chance for workers to rescue the revolution from the choking sands of NEP. The evidence of the period from late 1928 to the summer of 1929 suggests that the idea of a 'socialist offensive' met with widespread support⁷³. The compromises of the 1920's were to be abandoned in favour of positive action to build socialism, incidentally reducing unemployment and temporarily increasing the status of the industrial worker. It was only when the details of this - food shortages, lower piece rates, strict labour discipline, the reality of 'collectivisation' - became apparent, that support for the Stalinist solution began to fade.

It was thus by no means axiomatic that the Right were the more popular faction in the capital 1928, despite the prejudices in its favour of subsequent historians. If more people had been prepared to take action on its behalf, it seems unlikely that a politician as astute as Stalin would have moved against it. As it was, his campaign was carefully prepared, and went off without problems.

The Liquidation of the Moscow Right.

The defeat of the Right was staged at an extraordinary joint plenum of the MK and MKK in October. By then, two important changes in the Moscow Party had taken place. First, the efforts of Stalinists like Bauman and Polonskii, who had been working within the MK leadership since the spring to create a strong base for opposition to Uglanov, now paid off, and a large proportion of MK members were ready to condemn Uglanov's activities. Secondly, the routine elections of the cell buros in factories and administrative establishments had taken place, and Polonskii, whose responsibility it was to run these, had made sure that they were organised so as to favour candidates of which he approved.⁷⁴ It

⁷³ This is a thesis difficult to prove. It is central, for example, to Chase's conclusion (op. cit., p. 300), but he provides little concrete evidence beyond the fact that many Moscow workers had suffered under NEP and had nothing to lose by the change of course. The impression that a section of the workforce was enthusiastic about the new policy is inescapable, however, from reading memoir literature (whether sympathetic or hostile to the regime) or from the study of the role of the komsomol in the early stages of socialist competition.

⁷⁴ RM 29/9/28

was thus a new cell aktiv which called, between 14 and 16 October, for an investigation into the MK leadership, although the outcome of it was never in any doubt. By mid-October, Uglanov discovered that he no longer had any control over appointments and transfers within his own organisation. His attempt, for example, to remove the Stalinists Laz'yan, Kuznetsov and Alferov from the MK aktiv, was foiled at the level of the TsK, which was now taking a direct hand in the affairs of the MK.⁷⁵

Between the September and October Plenums, the situation in Moscow polarised considerably, with the TsK intervening to call Uglanov to order over his 'errors' of September. The result was a letter, drafted on 2 October and approved at a closed meeting of the MK buro, which consisted of a programme for the MK in the coming months and a recognition of past mistakes. This letter was not enough for the Stalinists, and in the following week, they began their own public campaign in the raions to depose the MK rightists.⁷⁶ The October plenum was the fruit of this campaign, and the circumstances which had led up to it made it more bitter than any other open meeting in the history of the Moscow Right.

Uglanov's speech at the Plenum began with an admission of his errors of September, but was balanced by the claim that, once these errors had been pointed out, he did everything he could, including drafting the letter of 2 October, to put them right. He protested throughout that his errors were ones of judgement and emphasis rather than evidence of a campaign of opposition. Thus he attacked his colleagues on the MK, who, having approved the draft of his letter in a closed session of the MK buro, then went on to mount a campaign against him. Giber, he said, 'in recent weeks, in recognition of our years of friendship, has called me a political bankrupt.'⁷⁸ Polonskii, who produced a rival letter, he accused of stirring up trouble, and he dismissed the letter itself, a mere page, as unconstructive.⁷⁹ His line was to argue that he was a loyal Bolshevik, whose policies were almost indistinguishable from

⁷⁵ Davydova, *op. cit.*, p. 313.

⁷⁶ Shestoi ob. Plenum MK i MKK, pp.12-13.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p.12

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p.13

anyone else's in the TsK, but to admit that certain members of the MK buro, who were to be the sacrificial victims of the plenum, were guilty of serious errors. He related how he had reprimanded Mandel'shtam publicly for urging the Party rank and file to criticise their superiors 'without being afraid of the word "deviation"'.⁸⁰ He also declared that Riutin had been in 'error' to tell a meeting of the Krasnaya Presnya raikom that Stalin had his faults, 'which Lenin had talked about'. 'That,' Uglanov commented ironically, 'musn't be said.'⁸¹

Although the debate which followed was lively, with the Rightists refusing to accept criticism meekly, the Stalinists had most of it their own way, particularly as Stalin himself attended. He achieved the maximum dramatic effect by striding into the auditorium, accompanied by Molotov, in the middle of Uglanov's speech. Uglanov was then interrupted in mid-sentence by a standing ovation.⁸² The accusers of the Uglanov group mentioned the irregular activities of individual MK officials, as well as looking further back in time to show how their tactics had always been high-handed when dealing with junior officials. Kuznetsov, an activist from Zamoskvorech'e raion, coined the term 'po-Uglanovski' to describe Uglanov's misleading way of presenting facts.⁸³ Gubel'man remarked that it was the first time in five years that the Moscow organisation had been subjected to any sort of internal criticism.⁸⁴ All deplored the situation in the MK, and there were frequent allusions the sullyng of its record of resistance to the Left. As Strel'tsov, a Party theorist, put it, the only good thing about the current crisis was that it revealed who did not support Party policy.⁸⁵

On the other hand, the Rightists gave carefully edited accounts of their errors, for the most part adopting Uglanov's line of denying that there had been any plot. They also counter-attacked by accusing the Stalinists of equally underhand tactics in the raions 'while Uglanov

⁸⁰ Ibid., p.12. The speech was made in August. At Stalin's direct instigation, Uglanov had already reprimanded Mandel'shtam for this at a closed session of the MK buro, but he was now called upon to do so openly, and to explain why he had not spoken out sooner.

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 18

⁸² Ibid., p. 15.

⁸³ Ibid., p. 71.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 92.

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 26.

was trying to solve the current problems'.⁸⁶ The balance of the debate, however, was tipped by the presence of the two Politburo heavyweights. Molotov came to Polonskii's defence, referring to his activities as 'what any loyal Bolshevik would do', while Stalin, summing up, gave a characteristically low-key speech, in which he denied categorically the existence of a Right in the Politburo but admitted, with heavy irony, that such a thing did seem to have been active in Moscow.⁸⁷

Uglanov, temporarily, escaped retribution at this plenum. Only four MK officials were removed; Pen'kov, who anticipated his speech of the following April by a confession here, Riutin, Mandel'shtam and Moroz.⁸⁸ The respite was even said to have given Uglanov fresh hope, and he was rumoured in early November to be planning a new campaign.⁸⁹ However, in the long run, his fate was inescapable, and in November, he was replaced as first secretary in Moscow by Molotov. He was moved, it was alleged at the time as the result of a deal between Rykov and Stalin, to the People's Commissariat for Labour, a job which he held for just as long as his erstwhile colleagues had enough influence to prevent his downfall.⁹⁰

To complete the analysis of the Moscow Right, it is useful to look at the Party purge of 1929, together with the purge of the officials of 1930, to see whether large numbers of Rightists were publicly uncovered. At the MK level, the purge did not bite deep. Only 55 people who had been MK members at the sixteenth Moscow Party Conference in November 1927 remained so at the seventeenth in March 1929, or a total of 48%. This compares with

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 96.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p.112.

⁸⁸ Ibid., p.129

⁸⁹ T 2850.

⁹⁰ A. Avtorkhanov (op. cit., p. 63) gives a particularly vivid account of Uglanov's departure. At the plenum in November at which Uglanov was dismissed, he is reported as losing his temper and crying, 'Who is the secretary of the MK here, you or I, comrade Kaganovich?', to which Kaganovich, 'with perfect composure', replied, 'you are, Comrade Uglanov, for the time being.' At this, Uglanov shouted, 'Let me tell you, then, that I am such no longer', and 'picking up his briefcase, stalked out of the room.' This account has the merit, at least, of fitting in with Uglanov's personality, and it throws a new light on the familiar formula of Party secretaries quitting their posts 'at their own request'. Like all Avtorkhanov's reports of the dealings of the MK, however, it cannot be trusted without corroboration. Reznikov, for example, the rapporteur in this case, does not appear in any list of MK or MKK members I have seen.

73 people who survived between the fifteenth Conference in January 1927 and the sixteenth, a total of 55%.⁹¹ It should be noted that the two latter conferences took place in the same year, however, so that there was almost no wastage due to members moving out of the area to other posts. By far the largest number of non-continuing members in both cases, moreover, were rank and file representatives serving at only one conference. Overall, the proportion of Party members in Moscow who were purged for all reasons was 6.5%,⁹² far lower than the national average of 11.7%⁹³ These figures would seem to confirm the view that the Right was not in any way a mass phenomenon.

Sympathy for the Right had been strong in the apparatus, however, and here the purge was more severe.⁹⁴ Many of the exclusions were for reasons of efficiency, and were not specifically 'political'.⁹⁵ However, it would be naive to assume that 'rationalisation', and the removal of people in categories like 'class alien' and 'passive', was never a cover for the purging of political undesirables. The same thing goes for VUZ students, of whom 4.6% were excluded from the Party. Among the latter, however, only 43 individuals (out of 22,862)⁹⁶ were excluded for 'fractional work'. Outside the MK apparatus, Rightism was more a state of mind than an active political movement.

The contrasts between the Right and the Left are stark. The tactics of the two movements differed entirely, the Left adopting a popular campaign while the Right confined itself to the upper echelons of the Party hierarchy. Their impact on the Party differed also. By 1927, the Left's criticisms were becoming uncomfortable for the majority group, while those of the

⁹¹ These figures are based on the lists printed at the end of the stenographic reports of the two 1927 conferences and in *Pravda* on 7 March 1929.

⁹² K. Ya. Bauman, *Polosa velikogo stroitel'stva. Doklad o rabote MK i orgburo TsK VKP(b) na 1 Mosk. Ob. Konf.* (M., 1929), p.100.

⁹³ L. Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, p. 439

⁹⁴ Typical figures were NKFin, 12.6% reduction, NKZemRSFSR, 60.3%, Mosfinotdel, 57.8%. *XVI S"ezd*, p. 316.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.* Presumably, many of those removed from one department might be re-deployed elsewhere.

⁹⁶ P 22/5/1930.

Right, suitably packaged, proved extremely useful⁹⁷. For years later, doubts about the wisdom of current policy could be labelled as 'Rightism'; the period of rapid collectivisation saw particularly heavy use of the word. On the other hand, the leaders of the so-called 'Right' were among the most popular politicians in the country, while by 1927, Trotsky and Zinoviev had lost much of their former prestige. Uglanov may not have been difficult to remove, but much greater care was required in the cases of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomskii, and thus the campaign against them mentioned no names until long after their effective downfall.

Despite the contrasts, however, there were profound similarities between the two movements. In the first place, both were 'loyal oppositions'; as Bolsheviks, they made no attempt to discredit the Party as a whole. Their activities were thus circumscribed; really the only route to success under the conditions which they set themselves would have been to win over a majority in the TsK, but because they all underrated Stalin, a successful bloc against him never materialised. Without this, any tactics they might adopt would be 'factional activities', and by their own rules, illegal. Whatever methods they may have used, therefore, they were both, in a sense, equally doomed to failure.

⁹⁷ Avtorkhanov claims that Riutin 'openly told Stalin that the Right-wing deviation was something that he had invented in order to get rid of Politburo members whom he did not like.' *op. cit.*, p. 35.

3. Bauman and the Crisis over Collectivisation: 1929-30.

The last major crisis of the MK leadership contrasted sharply with the disturbances of the 1920's. After a brief interlude during which Molotov presided over the Moscow organisation, his deputy, Karl Bauman, succeeded him as first secretary. Bauman's loyalty to the TsK was beyond doubt. He had a long record of support for the idea of collectivisation, together with an impatience with what were regarded as the less acceptable aspects of NEP which made him an ideal leader for the purged MK in 1929.

Bauman was born in Latvia in 1892 and joined the local Social Democratic group when he was 14 years old. According to witnesses at the time, he displayed great leadership qualities even at this age, and was the organiser of a local circle by 1910. After several terms in prison, during which he read widely, he succeeded in getting a place at the Kiev Institute of Commerce, where he was among the best students of his generation. While Uglanov, fishing for sympathy at the October Joint Plenum, declared that he was 'not a Red Professor, but Nikolai Uglanov, who did only four years at a rural school', Bauman had a degree in economics, specialised in price theory, and began his career in banking, becoming a senior official in Gosbank for a short period after the revolution.¹

As secretary of the Kursk gubkom in the early 1920's, Bauman showed himself to be an effective politician. Here also, he developed a particular interest in rural affairs. As a result of his record, he was promoted to TsK work in Moscow in 1923. He served first as deputy head of the TsK cadres (raspred) department, and then, from 1924, as head of the organisation department of the MK. This apparatus background indicates that he was a client of Stalin's from an early stage. In 1928, he moved back to the TsK, this time as the head of the department for rural affairs (otdel po rabote v derevne), although he remained a member of the MK buro. It has already been noted that in Moscow politics, his line contrasted with that of Uglanov.² In November 1928, when Uglanov lost his post in

¹ Biographical details from S. Zdanovich, Karl Bauman (M. 1967).

² See above, p.74

Moscow, Bauman was promoted to the second secretaryship under Molotov, a position in which he was probably de facto first secretary because of the latter's heavy workload. In April 1929, he was formally appointed to the first secretaryship.³

There were many familiar faces among the Moscow leadership in 1929, including Polonskii, who was now second secretary, and raikom secretaries Tsifrinovich, Giber and Kulikov. All had survived the witch-hunt which followed the defeat of the Right, and were committed to rapid change in both industry and agriculture. In one of his first speeches as first secretary, Bauman attacked the 'vestiges of capitalism' in Moscow, and called for a campaign to root them out.⁴ His brief tenure of office thereafter was to be characterised by his hostility to both NEPmen and private *farming*. His position on these seems to have been the fruit of his Bolshevik convictions and, in the case of the countryside, detailed knowledge. He was not merely a puppet of Stalin, although his enthusiasm for the implementation of 'Stalinist' measures in 1930 was greater than that of any other Party secretary.

The crisis which led to Bauman's downfall was the collectivisation campaign of the winter of 1929-30. For various reasons, especially the fact that it was not a major grain producing area, the Moscow oblast was not, in 1929, among the front runners in the campaign to

³ RM, 7/4/1929. According to this report, both Bauman and his deputy, Polonskii, were appointed by the TsK, while the third secretary, Leonov, was formally appointed by the MK Plenum.

⁴ P 14/5/1929.

collectivise private farms in the USSR.⁵ By February 1930 it was among the top six⁶, entirely because of the determination with which the collectivisation campaign had been pursued over the winter. Throughout the period, Bauman's speeches had shown him to be a tireless advocate of the campaign. In March 1930, when Stalin called for the suspension of the programme in order to stave off disaster in the countryside, Bauman was compromised to the point where he had to be removed, although his dismissal was not accompanied by a campaign to disgrace him.

Bauman's opposition to landholding by peasants dated from his Kursk days, and his statements on the subject as early as 1927 showed his thinking to have been well in advance of his superiors in the Politburo.⁷ In June 1929 he announced that a quarter of peasant households in the Moscow Oblast' should be collectivised in the next five years,⁸ a target which, as he later admitted, many regarded as unrealistic.⁹ Only with hindsight could this goal have been regarded as 'moderate'. At the time, it cost the Bolsheviks in the capital such support as they had previously enjoyed in rural districts. Bauman's initial position on the fate of the kulak was less extreme than his opposition to private farming. Despite his hostility to all groups who were profiting from NEP, he understood the rural situation sufficiently to see that the kulak, as a member of the rural community, should be allowed to remain in the region from which he came. In this respect, he appears to have been more

⁵ The relative position of Moscow is clearly illustrated by figures presented by R.W. Davies. On June 1 1928, 0.7% of peasant households in the Moscow gubernia were collectivised, compared with a USSR average of 1.7% and an average for the RSFSR of 1.6%. The North Caucasus and Volga regions had the greatest number of collectivised households, the most extensive collectivisation being in the North Caucasus, where 5.2% of peasant households were collectivised. By 1 October 1929, 3.3% of peasant households in the Moscow oblast' were collectivised, still below the national average of 7.5% and the RSFSR figure of 7.3%. The real leap in Moscow's collectivisation figures occurred between January and March 1930. On March 1 1930, 74.2% of households in the Moscow oblast' were collectivised, while the national average was only 57.2% and that for the RSFSR, 58.8%. Moscow now outstripped the Central and Lower Volga regions (60.3 and 70.1% respectively) and approached the levels of the North Caucasus (79.4%). R.W.Davies, The Socialist Offensive: The Collectivisation of Soviet Agriculture, 1929-1930 (London, 1980), Table 17, pp. 442-3.

⁶ Leonov, in a speech of June 1930, explained that the Moscow oblast' had started off in 21st place in June 1929, had leapt forward to ninth place in January 1930 and then to sixth in early March, but had returned to 22nd in May 1930 as a result of the excesses of the early spring. P., 20/6/1930.

⁷ See above, p. 74

⁸ P., 16/6/1929.

⁹ K. Ya. Bauman, Sotsialisticheskoe nastuplenie i zadachi moskovskoi organizatsii, report to the January Joint Plenum of the MK and MKK (M., 1930), p.16.

moderate than some of his colleagues on the TsK, such as Kaminskii and Ryskulov.¹⁰ His rhetoric, however, declared him an implacable opponent of the prosperous peasants, even if he did not regard the solution eventually adopted for 'liquidating the kulaks as a class' as a satisfactory one.¹¹ At the first Moscow oblast' conference in September 1929, for example, he announced a 'struggle to the death' in the countryside and declared NEPmen and kulaks to be in league with the 'class enemy abroad'¹².

The autumn of 1929 saw increasing tension in the countryside around Moscow. At the I Moscow oblast' conference, Polonskii related how 'kulaks' in one village had already crucified one peasant who advocated collectivisation, a measure to which the authorities had responded by shooting a number of suspects in the area.¹³ The conference also heard the official version of the recent Podol'sk affair. Authorities in the machine tool factory in Podol'sk, a town a little to the south-east of Moscow, had invited Kalinin to address a meeting. This move, by the allegedly popular 'peasant' member of the Politburo, was aimed at improving the political atmosphere in the factory, where a number of 'kulak' workers, landowners from the district, were influencing their comrades against collectivisation. At the meeting, Kalinin was shouted down, and was forced to sit and listen to an attack on current Party policy from these 'kulak' elements, throughout which 'the Party members in the factory sat and were silent'¹⁴.

Until 1930, the MK's position, although extreme, was in line with the most advanced advocates of collectivisation on the TsK. The turning point for the Moscow leadership was its January 1930 plenum. Although the TsK had also adopted a more extreme line on the collectivisation question after its November plenum, the MK increasingly stood out for its radicalism. In January, Bauman announced the abandonment of the 25% target, declaring that 40% of households in the oblast' as a whole, and 100% in Ryazan' okrug, were to be

¹⁰ Davies, op. cit., p. 190.

¹¹ Bauman was one of the first people to use this phrase. See Shimotomai, op. cit., p. 22.

¹² K. Ya. Bauman, Polosa velikogo stroitel'stva, speech at I Moscow oblast' conference (M., 1929), p. 53.

¹³ I Moskovskaya Oblast'naya Konferentsiya VKP(b), stenograficheskii otchet (M., 1929), p.128.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 107.

collectivised by the end of the current sowing season.¹⁵ He also called for 'the annihilation of the kulaks as a class', demanding their expropriation and expulsion from the kolkhozy. The task would be a major one, as 'kulaks', in Bauman's view, owned 1,300 farms in the oblast.¹⁶ The process was conceived as a military-style campaign, and rapidly claimed large numbers of casualties. Bauman admitted in mid-January that 603 'counter-revolutionary acts' had already occurred in the oblast during the campaign, involving the deaths of 19 Communists, and the wounding of a further 82. 76 'class enemies', according to Bauman, had been shot in retribution.¹⁷ These figures may well have been inaccurate, either because Bauman was deliberately understating the problem, or because precise information could not be obtained in the chaotic conditions of 1930.

After the January Plenum, even the relatively low figure of 40% was abandoned. As a later article in Rabochaya Moskva admitted, the Moscow leadership set about obtaining full collectivisation by the end of the current spring sowing.¹⁸ Bauman gave full encouragement to this campaign.¹⁹ In doing so, he was abetting the activities of scores of zealous officials and volunteers, whatever tactics they adopted. It was not simply a matter for the top leadership. Substantial numbers of Moscow's urban workers supported and even participated personally in the collectivisation drive. After nine years of NEP, during which the urban proletariat had suffered unemployment and food shortages, the campaign to create a socialised countryside received enthusiastic support in many factories. Some, like Elektrozaod, 'adopted' collectivisation areas, sending equipment, money and personnel to help establish the new farms²⁰. As a result of the redoubled assault, between 1 January and 1 March 1930, the number of collectivised households in the Moscow oblast rose from

¹⁵ RM, 17/1/1930.

¹⁶ Bauman, Polosa velikogo stroitel'stva, pp. 18-20.

¹⁷ RM, 17/1/1930.

¹⁸ RM, 25/4/1930.

¹⁹ Zdanovich, op. cit., p. 43, and Davies, op. cit., pp. 262-3.

²⁰ Moscow was no different from other urban areas in this respect, and may even have produced fewer volunteers for collectivisation work than centres like Leningrad or Ivanovo. (See L. Viola, 'The 25, 000ers: A Study of a Soviet Recruitment Campaign during the First Five Year Plan', Russian History, 1983, no. 1) However, the enthusiasm of some Muscovite collectivisation teams was impressive. TsGAOR, 7952/3/493, for example, contains an account of the activities of Elektrozaod workers. For further comments on this, see below, p. 245.

14.3% to 74.2%.²¹ The 'excesses' involved shocked even the Bolsheviks. A report in Rabochaya Moskva, which was not inclined to admit the worst outrages, related how these figures had been achieved in some areas. The secretary of one raikom in the Tula area had telegraphed that 'on the night of 4/5 February, the batrak, bedniak and seredniak masses of the countryside were collectivised to 100%'. The campaign against the kulak had also misfired. In one area, two teachers who had formerly served in the Red Army and two septuagenarian agronomists were 'dekulakised', excesses typical of the oblast' as a whole.²² Such errors were unavoidable in conditions where the effectiveness of a local Party organisation was judged solely on the percentage of collectivised households. Throughout February, Rabochaya Moskva treated the exercise as a competition, and ran a series of league tables on the progress of the campaign.²³

The reason for the remarkable campaign in Moscow remains unclear. It is possible that Bauman took the initiative himself, to demonstrate how rapidly collectivisation could be achieved under the control of the country's most prestigious local organisation. This explanation seems unlikely, however, for although Bauman was enthusiastic about collectivisation, he was more aware of the problems than the average local secretary. It is quite possible that the Moscow campaign was inspired by orders from the centre as an example to the rest of the country. Certainly a campaign so well-publicised in the capital could not have proceeded without the tacit support of the TsK and Stalin. Bauman's fate after March 1930 also strongly supports the theory. Although removed from office in Moscow, he was not disgraced, and after a spell supervising cotton production in Kazakhstan, returned to Moscow to an important post in the newly-created TsK department for science.²⁴

²¹ Davies, op. cit., p. 442.

²² RM, 28/3/1930. A further 'error' to which the editors of Rabochaya Moskva thought fit to admit was the order in one okrug issued to shopkeepers that they should only sell liquor to collective farmers. Serious though this was, it was definitely one of the less shocking excesses of the period.

²³ The half page item on 4/2/1930 was typical, headed 'only full collectivisation can be the base for the liquidation of the kulaks' and comparing the records of the ten okrugs.

²⁴ Otdel nauki, nauchno-tekhnicheskikh otkrytii i izobretenii. Zdanovich, op. cit., p. 53. Leonov, who, as second secretary after the promotion of Polonskii in January, was implicated in the affair (see P. 5/4/1930, which explicitly identified him with Bauman 'and others'), was not punished, and moved to the TsK orgburo as a secretary in July. RM 27/7/1930.

Bauman's removal followed the TsK policy reversal begun by Stalin's 'Dizzy with success' article in Pravda.²⁵ Over the next fortnight, a succession of articles in Rabochaya Moskva called for the restoration of the 'voluntary principle', the consolidation of existing kolkhozy and the exposure of the 'excesses' of the previous two months.²⁶ On 26 March, the MK began its third plenum, the atmosphere at which contrasted sharply with the January session. By this time, the peasants so hastily 'collectivised' were leaving the kolkhozy in droves, a process which resulted in a fall in the number of collectivised households in the oblast' from 74.1% on 1 March to 12.5% by 1 April.²⁷ In his speech, Bauman denounced the 'leftist excesses' of the recent past, and ordered the local organisations to correct their mistakes.²⁸ The resolution which followed also called for a reduction in the size of the collective farms, so that they would approximate to the existing villages.²⁹ However, the March plenum was later to be criticised for minimising the extent of the MK's errors; no self-criticism at this stage could atone for the damage which had been done in February.³⁰

Bauman's removal followed in April, after he had succeeded in containing the crisis in the Moscow oblast'. It took the form of his resignation, approved at the IV MK plenum. His departure was not marked by a campaign of denunciation. Leonov, the second secretary of the MK, carefully avoided personal recriminations in his speech on recent errors.³¹ Soon after his removal, Bauman was back in the newspapers,³² and he remained a member of the TsK orgburo.³³ Press reports of the II Moscow Oblast' conference in June did not mention Bauman by name, and the 'Leftist excesses' of his regime were considered to be less dangerous than the 'Right deviation'.³⁴ Leonov, who was also implicated in the affair, was

²⁵ P 2/3/1930. It appeared simultaneously in Rabochaya Moskva.

²⁶ For examples, see RM, 12/3/1930 and 15/3/1930.

²⁷ Davies, op. cit., p.442.

²⁸ P, 30/3/1930

²⁹ P. 29/3/1930.

³⁰ RM, 20/6/1930.

³¹ F. G. Leonov, Za Bolshevistskoe ispravlenie oshibok k itogam III i IV plenumov MK VKP(b), extracts from his speech to a meeting of Moscow propagandists on 3 May 1930 (M., 1930), p. 6.

³² Rabochaya Moskva printed most of his speech on food procurement in July 1930, together with a prominent photograph of him. RM, 24/7/1930.

³³ RM, 15/7/1930.

³⁴ See, for example, the report of Kaganovich's speech, P, 8/6/1930.

shortly promoted to the TsK orgburo himself.³⁵ The fate of the numerous local officials in the oblast' who were removed after March 1930 is less certain.³⁶

Although the Moscow countryside bore the brunt of the Bauman regime's enthusiasm, a campaign to eradicate the urban capitalist accompanied the collectivisation drive. In a speech of February 1929, Bauman equated the NEPman with the 'kulak-spider'³⁷, and in January 1930 he identified the main task of the moment as the 'liquidation of kulaks and the new bourgeoisie as a whole, as a class, in the Soviet state.'³⁸ Unlike his zealous stand on collectivisation, Bauman's policy on the 'urban bourgeoisie' attracted an instant response from the TsK³⁹. On 9 February, Stalin attacked the identification of the 'urban bourgeoisie' with the kulak⁴⁰. The reason for the discrimination was that while the kulak retained a crucial influence over the economy, the Nepman had lost all power to distort the course of the revolution. A few days later, the MK issued a revised resolution, in which the phrases dealing with Nepmen were considerably diluted. Although the most controversial breach with official policy, this aspect of the MK leadership's 'dizziness' is very poorly documented, and even the speeches criticising it after March 1930 mention no details.⁴¹ The matter again arose at the II oblast' conference in June, where a number of prominent Moscow Communists attacked the MK's error of grouping together the kulak and the whole of the new bourgeoisie.⁴² The resolution on the main MK report also identified this error.⁴³ However, no details of the campaign were given. By June, it was this aspect of Bauman's regime, and not the collectivisation campaign, which had come to be seen as the most mistaken.

³⁵ RM, 27/7/1930.

³⁶ 153 senior okrug officials were dismissed in 1930, and 74 were transferred to other work. Davies, *op. cit.*, p. 280.

³⁷ K. Ya. Bauman, General'naya bol'shevistskaya liniya i nasha rabota, speech to the XVII Moscow gubernia conference, 28 February 1929 (M., 1929), p. 25.

³⁸ RM, 8/1/1930.

³⁹ I owe much of this account to R. W. Davies, who kindly showed me part of the draft of his forthcoming book on Stalinist industrialisation.

⁴⁰ Reply to students at Sverdlov University, Sochineniya, vol. xii (M., 1949), p. 186.

⁴¹ Leonov's only example was a proposal to end days off for workers. RM, 13/5/1930.

⁴² RM, 8/6/1930. Speeches by Apasov, Fruntov and Gaidul'.

⁴³ RM, 12/6/1930.

Bauman was the main scapegoat of the TsK for the gross miscalculation of February 1930. His removal alone was considered a sufficient gesture, and thus, compared with the liquidation of the Right, the affair saw no major personnel changes at the top level in the MK. At the local level, however, Party secretaries in the okrugs and raions were dismissed in large numbers. The affair cost the MK the support of the rural cells and of many local secretaries in areas where Party membership was thin. As a result of the collectivisation campaign and the drive against the NEPman, the MK was probably less popular than it had ever been among the rural population, including workers with 'links with the countryside'. At the same time, the reversals of policy created confusion even among the campaign's original supporters.

The use of Moscow as a showpiece in the period up to 1930 consistently made the Party's control of the city more difficult. The need to make the organisation a model of efficiency and loyalty meant that comparatively minor deviations from official policy could not be tolerated, and their eradication was accompanied by major campaigns. As one Muscovite remarked, 'they change their leader every autumn in Moscow.' The tactic of creating a 'Right danger' out of a handful of party secretaries disrupted party life and brought discredit on the MK as an institution, despite repeated claims that it had handled the affair in true Bolshevik fashion. The Bauman incident, which was intended again to make Moscow into an example for the rest of the nation, misfired disastrously. For the next four years, the MK would be led by one of Stalin's most trusted allies, Lazar Kaganovich, followed in 1934 by Khrushchev, both of whom proved so loyal that, unlike most TsK members with backgrounds in oblast level politics, they escaped arrest during the Ezhovshchina of 1937-8.

4. The Model Party Organisation, 1930-32.

Formal opposition did not survive in Moscow after 1930. The capital's political leaders presented a united facade through which no glimmer of organised dissent could penetrate. Elsewhere within the leadership, more or less public debate continued, the most notable controversy being the affair of the 'Right-"Left" bloc' of Syrtsov and Lominadze¹. M. N. Riutin, an ex-member of the MK buro and 'right deviationist' also organised an attack on the leadership, although less is known of its extent. In 1932, he is alleged to have produced a political broadside, the 'Riutin platform'². Little is known about this document except that it was explicitly critical of Stalin, both personally and as a leader for the Communist Party. It is likely that Riutin attracted a certain amount of sympathy in Moscow, but there is no available record to suggest that he had any support within the MK, and no mention is made of a 'Riutin group' in the Moscow Party as a whole. A purged MK followed the Stalinist line without apparent demur. Moscow's Party leadership entered a phase of unprecedented stability. A ruling elite was emerging whose tenure of office was to extend well into the 1930's.³ Henceforward, any organised political dissent to be found in the capital would be small-scale and confined to the rank and file.

The only opposition movement in Moscow of any substance mentioned in the sources of this period was the 'Rightist' group among students in the Industrial Academy in Bauman raion. The evidence about it relates to its activities between the autumn of 1929 and May 1930. An article in Rabochaya Moskva in November 1929 referred to a group in the Academy whose 'links reached out far beyond' its walls. The article claimed that the group

¹ See R.W. Davies, 'The Syrtsov-Lominadze Affair', Soviet Studies, January 1981.

² See B. Nikolaevsky, Power and the Soviet Elite (London, 1966), p. 28 ('The Letter of an Old Bolshevik').

³ The number of members of the MK and MGK buros who continued to hold office between 1931 and 1934 was strikingly higher than the average over the previous three years, reflecting the central authorities' general satisfaction with Moscow's leaders. Of the 24-strong MK buro in November 1927, for example, only three (Polonskii, Ukhanov and Strievskii) were still there in June 1930 (an average attrition rate of roughly 2.9 people per month). This contrasts with the continuity of the following three years. Of the 22 members of the MGK of February 1931, ten remained at the third MGK conference in January 1934 (an attrition rate of roughly 1.5 per month), while of 27 MOK members elected in January 1932, only three, Ruben, Gaidul' and Trofimov, had disappeared from Moscow politics before the 1934 conference (on average, about 0.4 per month).

had been 'unmasked'. Although the cell was described as 'disorientated' as a result of the affair, readers could expect that its political activities would no longer give rise to official concern.⁴ However, it surfaced again in May 1930, apparently as resolute as before. Khrushchev referred to it in his memoirs, claiming its unmasking and defeat in 1930 as one of his earliest successes.⁵ Rabochaya Moskva confirms that a renewed assault by the 'Right' group took place in May, blaming the 'complacency' of the cell secretary, Khakharev, and calling on the Bauman raikom to increase its vigilance where the Academy was concerned.⁶ Thereafter, no more was heard of it, and the promotion of Khrushchev to the secretaryship of the Bauman raikom put an end to complaints in the press about its laxity. For Moscow, so recently the scene of heated debate and organised opposition, the affair was very small beer.

Perhaps after the purges and repressions of the 1920's, it should not be surprising that opposition disappeared from view. Given the controversial nature of politics in the early 1930's, however, it stretches credulity too far to accept that even the Party leadership ceased to argue. The problem for historians of the period's politics is to trace the extent and form of these debates. This task is complicated by the fact that after 1930 the evidence becomes very scanty. The press reporting of discussions at MK plenums ceased at this time. The historian is thus limited to Party sources themselves. These show that the change in the press was not an isolated development. The debates printed in stenographic reports also grew stilted after 1930. The arguments which had characterised the 1920's no longer featured.

What was the reason for this change? It can be seen as a stage in the process which concentrated absolute power in the hands of the Stalinist ruling group. Similarly, it is clear that the change marked a reduction in rank and file influence. In the 1920's, the power of junior politicians was limited, but they at least had the opportunity to debate current issues in

⁴ RM, 3/11/1929.

⁵ According to him, the 'strongly Right' Party cell in the Industrial Academy 'put up a slate including Stalin, Rykov, Bukharin and (I think) Uglanov' in raikom elections of that year. Khrushchev Remembers, p. 67.

⁶ RM, 29/5/1930.

the Party's forum. The striking development of the post-1930 period is the absence of this debate. Even the pretence that national policy was being discussed by the broad Party ranks was dropped. However, these developments - the emergence of a small clique around Stalin and the growth of secrecy in politics - did not signal the beginning of totalitarian rule. The leadership did not dispose of absolute power. The period between 1930 and 1932 was one of extreme tension, a time when even the Party's leaders did not know how to solve the problems they had created for themselves. In later chapters, we shall see that the absence of information and debate may have reflected a lack of policy, to cover which important problems were left undiscussed.

Among Stalin's close associates, disagreement persisted, although it was not public. Increasingly, controversy centred around practical issues⁷. Now that the Party was locked into a programme of rapid industrialisation, the economic debates of the 1920's must have appeared luxuriously leisurely. In Moscow, issues like transport and food procurements occupied virtually all the available discussion time⁸. The other question which pre-occupied the leadership concerned the Party organisation itself, its membership, structure and ideological education.⁹ Kaganovich was capable of taking initiatives in these areas, suggesting that he was dissatisfied with aspects of the official line. It is not clear that less senior figures could do so, although unanimity on all matters cannot have been achieved. One reason why the MK appeared to take a less controversial line after 1930 may have been that for practical purposes, Kaganovich was too busy to spend much time on the capital's affairs. As a result, decision-making devolved to his deputies, especially F. G. Leonov (second secretary of the MK in 1930), K. V. Ryndin (his successor from July 1930) and N. S. Khrushchev (second secretary of the MGK from January 1932). These people were less senior, they had less experience, and they had all risen through the ranks by virtue of their

⁷ People were still removed from their posts as a result of disagreements within the leadership. Such a case was that of Ukhanov, who was replaced in 1931 as chairman of Mossoviet by Bulganin. His dismissal, which had been foreshadowed for some time by sporadic criticisms in *Rabochaya Moskva* (some as early as 1928), was related to the poor performance of Mossoviet.

⁸ They were the most frequent single issues to appear among the resolutions and decisions of the MK and MGK in 1932-4, for example. See *Sbornik vazhneishikh postanovlenii MK i MGK VKP(b)* (M., 1934).

⁹ For membership, see chapter 3, below. For structure, see above, chapter 1, especially pp. 36, 45 and 47, and for the education debates see below, chapter 5.

loyalty to the post-1928 Stalinist line.¹⁰ If Khrushchev is to be believed, they were quick to respond to Stalin's directives, however intrusive or insignificant.¹¹

Central intervention was sporadic, however, and large areas of Moscow's government remained outside its reach¹². The problems of local government in the capital mounted as economic life became more complex and the city's population grew. The extent of the difficulty was reflected in the hasty formation of separate Party and Soviet organisations for the city in February 1931.¹³ Despite this and other attempts to streamline the Party organisation, the Moscow leadership's control over the grass-roots cells was still weak. Political opposition was less of a problem than a generalised indiscipline arising from overwork and the impossibility of fulfilling all the centre's complicated and often contradictory instructions. This is a subject to which we will return in more detail in the chapter about the Party's role in Moscow industry. Its importance for Moscow's 'high' politics was that the capital's leaders were not wholly secure in their control of affairs. Crises, including the transport problem or the shortage of meat and other products after 1930, arose rapidly and seemed at times to be beyond administrative control. Between 1928 and 1932, the leadership repeatedly abandoned the initiative to the rank and file, hoping that solutions to practical problems could be found on the spot. The idea of a secure ruling clique enjoying the fruits of absolute power does not fit the picture at all. Even their policy of grassroots initiative came to be seen as a failure, and in 1932 they were again seeking alternative ways of controlling economic and municipal affairs.

¹⁰ Leonov had been Bauman's deputy, Ryndin's background included a lengthy period as a TsK instructor, followed by a spell as head of the MKK during the 1929 purge, and Khrushchev was closely identified with Kaganovich and later, Stalin himself. As we saw in chapter 1, central intervention in the MK was exceptional by virtue of its proximity to the TsK. What was true of Moscow was unlikely to hold good in provinces as remote as Smolensk.

¹¹ One of the most colourful examples was again provided by Khrushchev, who described how he responded to a telephone call from Stalin ordering Moscow's two leading administrators, himself and Bulganin, to improve the city's public lavatories. Important though the problem no doubt was (and is), it scarcely merited the personal attention of two senior politicians. However, Khrushchev recalled how he and Bulganin 'began to work feverishly. We personally inspected buildings and courtyards...Later, Stalin assigned us the task of installing clean, modern pay toilets.' *Khrushchev Remembers*, p. 85.

¹² See below, chapters 4 and 5, for a further discussion of this matter.

¹³ See above, pp.38-39.

The absence of organised dissent thus needs to be seen in its context. We have suggested that it did not involve a corresponding increase in the leadership's ability to predict and control the grassroots, let alone affairs in the city as a whole. The various limitations on central control will be one of the themes in the chapters to follow. Formal opposition was not the only route by which Party members outside the central elite were able to affect the unfolding history of the Communist Party in the capital. Even after 1930, the influence of the grassroots determined the shape of many aspects of political and economic administration.

To conclude, however, it is important to stress how far the Moscow Party had travelled since the mid-1920's. Although the opportunities for expressing dissent, and indeed the value of doing so, had diminished between 1917 and 1925, with a crucial watershed around 1921, the Moscow organisation had seen a great deal of controversy in the second half of the 1920's. The continued incremental reduction in debate was not something inevitable in 1925. We have discussed the reasons for the defeat of the Communist oppositions, but should not overlook the fact that their extinction was remarkable. By 1932, organised dissent was no longer a problem for Moscow's political leaders. While it did not amount to the establishment of totalitarian rule, the disappearance of public discussion was an event of great political significance. Although successive opposition leaders had denounced Stalin's use of behind-the-scenes tactics, they had all acquiesced in them until it was their turn to face the consequences. After 1930, his approach - corridor intrigue supplemented by unfocussed popular pressure - was to dominate high politics in the Soviet Union for two decades.

Chapter 3. Party Membership and Recruitment in Moscow.

From 1924 until the end of this period, Bolshevik recruitment policy was designed to enlist as many workers into the Party as possible. The reasons for this line were both theoretical and practical. On the theoretical side, it was axiomatic that the proletariat was the class on which socialism would be based. In Marx's writings, the Communist Party was merely the politically-conscious wing of the proletariat, even if it included members whose origins were intellectual and bourgeois. In 1917, Lenin had added the poor peasants to the revolutionary alliance, but they were junior partners in theory as well as practice. As the vanguard of the proletariat, the Communist Party needed to show that its own membership included a high proportion of workers. It was also necessary for it to be seen to be popular among the class it sought to represent. As Kaganovich put it in 1930, 'the growth of the Party, both quantitatively and qualitatively - the growth of its ideological and political level - is one of the clearest indicators of its viability, its deepest links with the masses and the confidence of these masses in their Party.'¹ Repeatedly during this period, high levels of worker recruitment were quoted as proof of the correctness of the Party's line, especially in answer to the challenge of the Left.²

On the practical side, it was necessary for the Party to reach the mass of the population directly. After the Civil War, the number of Communists, especially in urban areas, was small. In many factories, the Party was not represented at all. This was not only bad for its image. It meant that the Party's aims and policies could not be effectively represented, and that it was in danger of losing touch with sections of the population. The 1920's were to witness a struggle to restore this link between the Party and the mass.

Recruitment and the Party's social composition were thus major issues in this period. In this chapter, it will be seen that the Moscow Party lagged behind those of other industrial centres as a workers' organisation. There were many reasons for this, and these, together with the

¹ SK, 1930, No. 31.

² RM, 10/1/1927.

leadership's efforts to alleviate the problem through recruitment, will be discussed. Ultimately, the policy of mass proletarian recruitment was abandoned at the national level. The example of Moscow demonstrates some of the reasons for this, showing how 'proletarianisation' imposed intolerable strains on the Party's resources. However, the nine years of mass proletarian recruitment left their mark. Lenin's vanguard was superseded by a new generation, in which members who had joined since 1924 predominated, the largest group being those recruited between 1929 and 1931. These changes were to have lasting significance for Party life.

The Composition of the Moscow Party Organisation, 1925-32.

The size of the Moscow Party can be estimated for any time in this period,³ but assessing its social composition is more difficult. The first problem is that two basic categories were used by Soviet statisticians at this time; 'social origin', which was ostensibly used to distinguish members of the Tsarist bureaucracy from proletarian, mainly Bolshevik, promotees, and 'current occupation'⁴. Secondly, the categories themselves changed. In 1927, for political purposes, the classes 'worker' and 'employee' were expanded at the expense of the 'peasants'⁵. 'Employees' (*sluzhashchie*) were a particularly broad and fluid category, including, at different times, office cleaners and doormen, storekeepers, nurses and some junior technical personnel. For Moscow, moreover, the difficulties of analysis are further complicated by the frequent failure of statisticians to specify whether they were referring to the city of Moscow or to the province as a whole.

Although it is possible to give approximate figures for social composition, therefore, a precise and systematic study cannot be offered. Even at the time, this was a difficult matter to assess, as well as a subject heavily influenced by political considerations.⁶ However, it

³ See table 5.

⁴ The use of the category 'worker by social origin' was also convenient for senior officials who wished to present themselves as 'proletarian' despite the fact that their most recent personal acquaintance with the factory floor had been before the revolution. See below, p.121, and chapter 6, pp. 222-3.

⁵ Rigby, *Communist Party Membership*, pp.159-60.

⁶ Official figures for Party composition frequently conflicted at the time.

seems that the number of workers in the Party increased slowly, even declining slightly at the beginning of the period of this study, after the dramatic increase resulting from the 'Lenin enrolment' of 1924. A survey of composition 'by social origin' found that in July 1925, 70.5% of the Moscow Party organisation started as workers, 5.2% as peasants and 23.4% as white collar workers and students, while in November 1926, the proportions of workers and peasants were 70.6% and 6.1% respectively, employees and students representing 23% of the total.⁷

In the next two years, the proportion of workers fell slightly, to 67.7% in July 1927⁸ and 66.7% in January 1928⁹. Thereafter, until 1930, the proportion of workers by social origin rose steadily, while the percentage of white collar employees fell. At the end of the period, the proportion of workers again dropped, though it remained high. At the oblast' and city conference of January 1932, the following figures were quoted¹⁰:

	Workers	Peasants	White collar workers
In <u>oblast'</u>			
1/1/1931	75.4%	9.9%	14.7%
1/1/1932	74.5%	13.2%	12.3%
In city of Moscow			
1/1/1931	69.8%	3.1%	27.1%
1/1/1932	76.7%	6.8%	16.5%

The concept of 'social origin' was crucially important to the calculations of the Bolsheviks, most of whose leaders prided themselves on their own proletarian roots. After 1930, the names of senior bureaucrats like Molotov and Kaganovich began to appear on reports with the initial 'r', for rabochii, worker, in brackets after them, although their acquaintance with

⁷ SK, 1927, no. 1, p.15.

⁸ P, 25/8/1927.

⁹ Iz TsK, 20/6/1928.

¹⁰ III Moskovskaya oblast'naya i II Moskovskaya gorodskaya konferentsiya VKP(b), stenograficheskii otchet (M., 1932), bulletin no. 3, p. 42.

the realities of workers' lives grew fainter as the years passed. On the other hand, the need to retain a genuinely proletarian element, the 'workers from the bench', in the Party was also perceived, and after 1929 'current occupation' became the more common statistic. Here again, the proportion increased over the whole period, after having declined between 1926 and 1928. It reached its maximum in 1930¹¹, and fell steadily thereafter, reaching 43.1% in January 1932.¹²

The social composition of Party officials was also studied. Among the aktiv, workers by social origin predominated, although the number of activists still 'at the bench', even in factories, was much lower. A report of 1930, looking at the aktiv in the factories as a whole found that 84.2% were workers by social origin and 72.5% by current occupation.¹³ This survey, however, covered all activists, including grupporgs and other unpaid Party workers. The higher up the Party hierarchy, the fewer workers, proportionately, would be found, although in the factories, cell secretaries were more likely to be workers than the members of their buros, who included representatives of the factory administration. Approximately 70% of cell buro members were workers in the 1920's, compared with 80% of secretaries¹⁴. Of raikom secretaries, only just over half, even in 1931, were workers by social origin,¹⁵ and workers by social origin comprised about 45% of the MK itself in 1930. This figure included bureaucrats who had been full-time Party workers since the revolution.¹⁶ At the level of Party conferences, however, the worker contingent was impressively large, 81.9% at the second Moscow oblast' conference in June 1930 and almost as high at the raion conferences in the city the same year.¹⁷

¹¹ The highest recorded figure was 50.3%. K. Ya. Bauman, Sotsialisticheskoe nastuplenie i zadachi Moskovskoi organizatsii, report to the January joint plenum of the MK and MKK (M., 1930), p. 76.

¹² III oblast'naya i II gorodskaya konferentsiya, loc. cit.

¹³ SK, 1930, No.6, p.24.

¹⁴ SK, 1927, Nos. 19-20, p.95, RM, 5/11/1925, and Partiinoe, khozyaistvennoe i kul'turnoe stroitel'stvo v Moskve i gubernii. Sbornik diagramm (M., 1929), p.28.

¹⁵ PS, 1931, nos.10-11. The figure of 55.6% is quoted for the whole of the Party in 1931.

¹⁶ I Moskovskaya Oblast'naya Konferentsiya VKP(b), stenograficheskiy otchet (M., 1930), vol. 2, p.65.

¹⁷ V. F. Starodubtsev, op. cit., pp.85-6. The implications of the social composition of the aktiv and apparatus are discussed in chapter 6, pp. 222-3.

The significance of these figures cannot be understood, however, unless Moscow is compared with other Party organisations in the USSR. Repeated references to high proportions of workers in the Moscow Party concealed the fact that Moscow lagged behind other urban Party organisations in this matter. On 1 January 1928, the situation was as follows:

Social composition of the Moscow, Leningrad and Baku Party organisations compared. (percentages of workers, peasants and employees by social origin).¹⁸

	Workers	Peasants	Employees
Moscow	66.7	4.5	28.8
Leningrad	75.3	3.9	20.6
Baku	80.3	6.9	13.6

Even compared with the national average, which included peasant areas far from the centre, Moscow's record was poor.¹⁹ Between 1928 and 1930, the rate of recruitment in Moscow briefly jumped ahead of the national average, but it fell behind again thereafter for the rest of the period.²⁰

¹⁸ Iz TsK, 20/6/1928.

¹⁹ Nationally, the size of the Party was 304.9% of its 1924 figure in 1928, while the Moscow organisation had only increased to 290%. Partiinoe, khozyaistvennoe i kul'turnoe stroitel'stvo, introduction, diagram 2.

²⁰ The figures for recruitment as a whole were as follows:

	<u>Percentage increase</u>	
	<u>1928/30</u>	<u>1930/32</u>
National CPSU	128.49	185.8
Moscow city	130.6	165.9
Moscow <u>oblast'</u> as a whole	162.4	174.5

The exceptionally high oblast' figure for 1928-30 is explained by the territorial expansion of the area in 1929. Figures for Moscow from Moskovskaya gorodskaya i Moskovskaya oblast'naya organizatsiya KPSS v tsifrakh, M., 1973, p.28 (see appendix 6); national figures from Rigby, op. cit., p. 52.

Moscow thus suffered from two shortcomings in this period from the recruitment point of view; the first, that it was behind other areas in improving its social composition; the second that the overall rate of recruitment there was lower than average. For the capital city, the Party's showpiece and the home of nearly a fifth of the USSR's proletariat, this was an embarrassing situation. Various explanations were offered. To set the problem in context, national recruitment will now be discussed. Moscow's record can then be assessed. Commentators at the time identified two types of problem; those relating to the 'objective' conditions in the capital, and those arising from the failings of responsible activists, called 'subjective' problems.

Recruitment policy in the Soviet Union.

It has been noted that the proportion of workers in the Moscow Party fell between 1926 and 1928. This fall reflected a national trend. Officially, the target set by the TsK throughout the period was that half of the Party's membership should be 'workers from the bench'. Between 1925 and 1927, however, the leadership were reluctant to engage in campaigns of mass recruitment among workers. The reasons for this were complex, as was the motivation behind renewed enrolment in 1927.

The Party in 1925 was in the process of absorbing the first mass wave of recruits since the Civil War, the products of the 'Lenin enrolment' of 1924. Between 1 January 1924 and 1 January 1925, the Party added 329,804 new members and candidates to its roll, almost doubling its size and bringing it up to its largest membership to date.²¹ While applauding the new influx of 'class-conscious' workers, the Party's leaders were wary of the implications of the change. The dedication and political awareness of some of the new generation were questioned. As an article in Izvestiya TsK pointed out, 'when the interests of the working class as a whole are at odds with those of a specific group of workers...for example, on the question of wages...a proportion of the 'Lenin recruits' fall under the influence of the surrounding non-Party environment.'²² Workers who joined the Party used their new status

²¹ A total of 801,804 members and candidates. Rigby, op. cit., p. 52.

²² Iz TsK, 1925, No. 15-16.

to press for improvements in living conditions and work regulations, upsetting stringent policies on production and calling attention to the failure of the revolutionary regime to fulfil its promises to the working class. New recruits were also less resistant to Opposition speeches, as well as to general disagreements with central policy, than the TsK majority might have hoped.

Training the new generation also presented problems, and 1925 saw a spate of articles in the press criticising the large proportion of candidate members whose promotion to full membership was overdue. Often this was the result of bureaucratic log-jams at the level of the raion. Sometimes it was because candidates repeatedly failed to satisfy the requirements for 'political literacy'.²³ Although later recruitment campaigns had more drastic effects on the composition of the Party than the first 'Lenin enrolment', this was the first experiment in mass recruitment, and the leadership were naturally inclined to tread carefully.

Concern about the political reliability of the new recruits was not the only reason for the slowing down of proletarian recruitment between 1925 and 1927. The recruitment issue was linked with other political considerations, including the struggle for supremacy in the Politburo. The years 1925-6 saw an emphasis by the Party leadership on recruitment among the peasantry, part of the reason for which was the need to demonstrate the extent of rural support for the Party at a time when the opposition was claiming that the peasant represented a capitalist element in society.²⁴ However, although the campaign to recruit peasants intensified in these years, it cannot be used to account entirely for the drop in the intake of

²³ Examples of such articles can be found in *Iz TsK*, 1925, nos. 36-7 and RM 6/10/1025. 'Political literacy' obviously included basic familiarity with Marxist and Leninist texts, and for many new recruits, some of whom could scarcely read, this presented difficulties. Those who repeatedly failed to satisfy their teachers also included workers whose image of the Party did not square with current policy, however. The official language, which suggests that workers who would not reproduce current formulae were simply dunces, is thus misleading. See below, chapter 5, p. 189.

²⁴ Rigby in particular emphasises this aspect of the issue, stating that 'the mass intake of peasants was a logical consequence of Stalin's realignment with the 'Right' in this period'. *Op. cit.*, p. 136.

workers. At the XIV Party Congress, Stalin was cautious in his advocacy of the new line,²⁵ and national figures indicate that the proportion of peasants in the Party, though increasing, remained well below that of other social groups.²⁶

The struggle with the Left had other effects on recruitment, however. Open meetings of the Party were often used as a forum for recruiting in the factories, but in 1926 and 1927, discussions about the Opposition obliged local organisations to hold up to half their meetings behind closed doors.²⁷ The Party was so pre-occupied with the Opposition that little time was available for discussing the recruitment issue.²⁸ Although Party sources could not mention the problem specifically, moreover, it seems clear that the unseemly struggle with the Left discredited the Party in the eyes of many potential recruits. The enthusiasm with which Party commentators insist that the Left caused no losses among Party members suggests that the reverse was the case.²⁹ Mass proletarian recruitment was frequently to be invoked after 1927 as an indicator of the Party's popularity in the face of the Opposition challenge.³⁰

For all these reasons, the proportion of proletarian members declined between 1925 and the end of 1926. The Party census of January 1927 provided the advocates of a renewed enrolment campaign with powerful ammunition, showing that the proportions among candidates presaged a rise in peasant and white-collar membership and a fall in the

²⁵ 'Ours is a working class Party,' he said. 'Workers should predominate in it. This is a reflexion of the fact that we have a dictatorship of the proletariat. But it is clear that, without a union with the peasantry, a dictatorship of the proletariat is impossible, and that a given percentage of the best people from the peasantry in the membership of the Party is an essential anchor for the Party in the countryside. Things are still not so good on this point.' Quoted in Rigby, *op. cit.*, p.151.

²⁶ In 1925, the proportion of peasants by current occupation in the Party as a whole was 9.5%, in 1926, 13.4% and in 1927, 13.7%. The proportion by social origin fell in these years, from 28.8% in 1924 to 25.9% in 1926 and 27.3% in 1927. Rigby, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

²⁷ SK 1927, no. 1, p. 12.

²⁸ Davydova, *op. cit.*, p. 384.

²⁹ SK 1927, No. 7, p. 8.

³⁰ See Riutin's speech in RM 10/1/1927, for example.

proportion of workers.³¹ 1927 saw a gradual increase in worker recruits, but it was not until October, at the time of the tenth anniversary of the revolution, that a major recruitment drive was launched. The timing suggests that a further motive for the change was the planned industrialisation drive, for which the co-operation of the proletariat was to be crucial.³²

The 'October Enrolment' was the first of a succession of campaigns to recruit workers covering the period of the first Five Year Plan. The need to demonstrate overwhelming mass support and to mobilise industrial workers drove the Party to call for consistently high levels of proletarian recruitment. The 'October Enrolment' itself ended in February 1928, by which time, the proportion of workers by social origin in the Party had risen from 55.7% to 56.8%.³³ The summer of 1928 saw a slackening in worker recruitment, but in November 1928, at the time of the defeat of the Right in Moscow and the beginning of the campaign of rapid industrialisation, the TsK specified that 80% of new recruits in the next year were to be drawn directly 'from the bench'. At the same time, a target membership of 70% 'workers from the bench' was set for Party organisations in industrial areas.³⁴

The steady rise in the number of worker recruits was temporarily interrupted by the purge of 1929, most severe among the latest generation of recruits.³⁵ However, the evidence that recruitment was proceeding too rapidly for the adequate screening of candidates did not deter the advocates of mass enrolment. High targets continued to be set, and industrial areas were presented with the task of increasing their worker intake to 90% of the total in order to fulfil

³¹ The figures were as follows:

Social Composition of the VKP(b) by social origin (not counting members in the Red Army or in establishments abroad)

	All	Workers	Peasants	White-collar	Other
Members	100%	63.9%	13.5%	20.3%	2.3%
Candidates	100%	40.7%	28.8%	26.9%	3.6%
Total	100%	56.4%	18.4%	22.4%	2.8%

Source: E. Smitten, Sostav VKP(b) po materialam partiinoi perepisi 1927 goda (M., 1927), p. 9.

³² A further reason was the political effect of the recent peasant enrolment, which had drawn mainly richer peasants into the Party. Increased proletarian enrolment naturally reduced the proportionate share of peasants. Rigby, op. cit., pp.172-3.

³³ Rigby, op. cit., p. 116.

³⁴ KPSS v Rezolyutsiyakh (seventh edn., 1953), vol 2, pp.420-428.

³⁵ For a more detailed study of the purge, see chapter 6, pp. 230-233.

their quotas. Further campaigns, including a second 'Lenin enrolment' in the early spring of 1930, kept the subject permanently in the Party press. After 1931, however, the question of the 'quality' of recruits, their suitability as potential Party members, began to attract attention.³⁶ From February 1930 onwards, white collar workers and peasants again began to be admitted to the Party in numbers.³⁷ In August 1932, Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo announced the end of 'campaign recruitment' and called for steadier, planned growth. The following year, recruitment ceased altogether, not to begin again until 1936. The 50% national target had never been reached,³⁸ and the policy had brought more problems than it had solved.

Recruitment in Moscow

a) 'Objective' problems

As the capital, Moscow had a number of difficulties from the recruitment point of view which partly cancelled the benefits it received from its large proletarian population and experienced Party elite. A TsK resolution of June 1926 summed up the problem as

A huge State apparatus, numbering hundreds of thousands of employees, among them a significant bureaucratized element and even some remaining from the pre-revolutionary past; the concentration in Moscow, as the chief economic centre in the country, of bourgeois Nepman elements, the difficult living conditions for workers, the large masses of new workers, introduced into the production process for the first time, and also a very significant number of unemployed people.³⁹

³⁶ See, for example, the articles on workers leaving the Party in PS no. 6, March 1932 and on training recruits, PS, no.7, April 1932.

³⁷ Rigby, op. cit., pp. 185-6.

³⁸ The highest proportion of workers nationally was 46.3% in 1930. Thereafter, the increased enrolment of other social groups reduced the proportion of workers, although total recruitment was higher than ever. Rigby, op. cit. p. 116.

³⁹ Quoted in Ocherki istorii Moskovskoi organizatsii KPSS, 1st ed., p. 422.

The consistently high proportion of white collar workers and students in the Moscow organisation helps explain both the relative weakness of the organisation in terms of worker recruitment and its slower growth overall. Although employees stood to gain more from membership in terms of enhanced career prospects than did workers,⁴⁰ before 1931, discriminatory rules⁴¹, including a longer candidate stage and the production of references, made it harder for them to join.

Unemployment was less of an excuse for Moscow's relatively poor performance. Although the problem in the city was acute in the 1920's, it also affected other industrial centres. All cities acted as magnets for peasants from the hinterland at this time, and the problem was exacerbated by the job losses associated with the regime of economy. What the TsK report did not mention, however, were the problems specific to recruiting among workers in Moscow.

The outstanding feature of Moscow industry in the 1920's was that it was a textile centre.⁴² Workers in the textile industry nationally were less likely to join the Party than those of most other industries. The reasons generally given were the predominance of women in the workforce⁴³ and the low skill levels of many of the operations in the industry. However, Party membership in the Moscow textile industry was lower than that in other areas.⁴⁴ In the metal industries, the situation was no better.⁴⁵ Why did Moscow lag behind other industrial areas in the USSR?

⁴⁰ Rigby, op. cit., p.158. For many white collar employees, Party membership was a prerequisite for promotion.

⁴¹ Another method of restricting the number of white-collar workers in the Party was the introduction of quotas for new recruits. SK, 20/9/1927.

⁴² See introduction. Textiles still accounted for more than half of Moscow's output in 1930.

⁴³ Women accounted for more than half of Moscow's population, but only 18% of the Party organisation in 1927, a proportion which fell in the years of mass recruitment which followed. Moskovskaya gorodskaya i Moskovskaya oblast'naya organizatsiya KPSS v tsifrah, p.133.

⁴⁴ As Polonskii explained in 1928, 'In Moscow gubernia, the Party layer among textile workers is 5.2%; 95% of our textile workers are not members of the Party.' The comparative figures for the textile industry in other areas were: Leningrad, 12%; Ukraine, 10%; Yaroslavl' gubernia, 7.6%; Ivanovo-Vosnesensk, 5.4%. SK, No. 12, 30/6/1928.

⁴⁵ In Moscow, the 'Party layer' in the metal industries in 1927 was 14%, compared with 19% in Tula gubernia, 23.8% in Leningrad and 30% in Saratov gubernia. Ibid.

No single factor explains the difference between Moscow and the areas like Ivanovo and Leningrad. The 'subjective' failings of Moscow's recruiters played a significant part, as will be seen later. However, their task was complicated by some of the features of Moscow industry in these years. In the first place, large-scale industry in Moscow was comparatively new; until the turn of the century, the characteristic pattern had been small firms, consisting of a handful of craftsmen, operating in the city itself, with one or two large concerns sited beyond the city limits. Factories built outside the city, such as the giant Kolomenskoe metalworks or the Ramenskaya fabrika, a textile plant, characteristically drew on labour from nearby villages. The workers were thus mainly peasants still resident in their villages. The system saved on housing costs for the factory owner, but it hindered the development of a politically conscious proletariat. The problem can be illustrated by looking at Party membership at the Ramenskaya fabrika. In 1926, roughly half the workers there still lived in their villages, while the others were housed in dormitories attached to the factory. Of the first group, only 12 had joined the Party, while 230 of those living on the site had done so. Landownership, with its implications for the workers' political outlook, was not the only explanation, moreover. Since many workers who lived off the site had substantial distances to travel to work, they could claim that they had no time for Party responsibilities in the evenings, and no sense that Party discussions in the factory would alter their own lives.⁴⁶

A further reason for the difficulties of recruitment among textile workers in the Moscow region was suggested by a survey conducted in 1929. Textile workers, by this time, tended to be older than metalworkers, and their overall literacy rates were lower. While only 20.3% of metalworkers were over 40, 26.1% of textile workers had reached the age at which it was 'extremely difficult to involve them in active work' and when they could have 'only a weak commitment to political education'. On the question of literacy, textile workers were even

⁴⁶ SK 1927, No. 1, p. 13.

further behind those in the metal-working industry,⁴⁷ and although the high proportion of women was partly responsible, male literacy in the textile industry was also low. As the report noted, overall literacy rates in the Moscow textile industry were lower than in other textile areas.⁴⁸

The issue of workers' 'links with the countryside' was a persistent source of concern to the Moscow leadership⁴⁹. The problem had two aspects; industrial stazh - the length of time a worker had spent in industry - and landownership by workers. A survey conducted for the Moscow Party journal, Sputnik Kommunista, in 1929 found that 44% of a sample of metalworkers and 41% of textile workers had started as peasants. Although about a fifth of these had joined the workforce during the war, the number of recent recruits to the workforce was high, and increased over the next two years⁵⁰. Party officials were in no doubt that recent recruits to the workforce were less likely to join the Party, or to take part in any 'social' activity at work, than the cadre workers. On the other hand, it was the longer-established workers who tended to own land. The Sputnik Kommunista survey found that 46.3% of metalworkers who had joined the industry before 1905, but only 32.7% of those who had joined since 1928, still owned land in 1929. Textile workers were less likely to be landowners, mainly because of the number of women in the industry.⁵¹ However, the existence of direct links between workers and the villages led to problems in all industries in Moscow. 'The mood of the country prevails,' Mandel'shtam, the head of the Moscow

⁴⁷ The figures quoted were as follows:

Literacy rates among textile and metal workers in Moscow, 1929.

	% 'illiterate'	men	women
textile workers	21.1	6.5	30.4
metal workers	3.6	2.2	14.5

Source: SK, no.3, 1930.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ In 1929, the political attitudes of workers who lived in rural areas in the Central Industrial Region were the subject of a general study by N. Semenov. His findings indicate that Moscow's rural workers were typical of those in other similar areas. Litso fabrichnykh rabochykh prozhivayushchikh v derevnyakh i politprosvetrabota sredi nikh (M-L., 1929). The Moscow Party was not the only organisation which had to deal with this type of problem, although its poor general record made the matter especially important.

⁵⁰ In 1932, workers who had started their career since 1921 accounted for about 42% of the Moscow workforce. V. F. Starodubtsev, op. cit., p. 40.

⁵¹ SK, 1929, No. 23, p.47.

agitpropotdel, declared in 1928, 'and will give rise to reactionary waverings even in the working class, causing nervousness and raising its sensitivity to difficulties.'⁵²

All this helps to explain why it was the large enterprises in Moscow which were the most backward in recruiting Party members.⁵³ In revolutionary Petrograd, the large factories saw the greatest activism among workers, but even here, recent recruits to the workforce were too disorientated to participate in organised political movements⁵⁴. Just as it was the established workers who led the proletarian revolution in Petrograd, so in Moscow, cadre workers predominated in the Party. In large factories, such as Serp i Molot, a particularly poor recruiter in the 1920's, the workforce had expanded very rapidly since the war, putting a brake on political activism⁵⁵. Larger factories also experienced problems of communication, and it was more difficult for Party workers there to make personal contacts with potential recruits.

As Moscow expanded in these years, large numbers of migrant construction workers competed for work in the city during the summer building season. Peat cutters and workers in some branches of the transport industry were also included in the 'seasonal' category. The number of 'seasonal workers (otkhodniki) arriving in Moscow increased steadily in this period. In 1926, there were more than 200, 000 of them in the city⁵⁶. By definition, otkhodniki usually returned to the countryside in the winter, thus renewing their 'reactionary moods', and while in the city were notorious for their hard living, drinking and gambling.

⁵² Propagandist, October 1928, p.110.

⁵³ In 1928, the figures for Party membership by size of factory in Moscow were as follows:

<u>Number in enterprise</u>	<u>% of communists</u>
up to 30	7.2
30-100	15.8
101-500	13.8
501-1000	12.0
1001-3000	9.5
3001-5000	5.7
5000 upwards	5.9

Source: SK, 1928, No. 12.

⁵⁴ See S. Smith, Red Petrograd, (Cambridge, 1983).

⁵⁵ 65% of workers in Serp i Molot in 1929 had joined the workforce since the revolution, 15% in 1928 alone.

⁵⁶ Chase, op. cit., p. 86.

Commented N. Rabinovich in Sputnik Kommunista, 'Party workers find the environment among them extremely unfriendly.'⁵⁷

A different kind of explanation for low worker membership in Moscow is provided by Moscow's status as a provider of cadres for the rest of the country. Although the numbers involved were not sufficiently large to make up for the whole shortfall, the problem was significant even in the 1920's. Workers who were promoted into administrative posts might remain in the capital, but large numbers were needed for the provinces, and Communists were the overwhelming majority of these. In 1925, 1028 Moscow Communists were mobilised for work in the countryside, 48% of whom were workers 'from the bench'⁵⁸. Collectivisation called for even greater numbers. In 1930, 1032 of the most trusted Communists in Moscow left factory jobs for work on the collective farms, while a further 2,000 took up posts as farm managers, instructors and mechanics⁵⁹. While Moscow was not unique in providing such cadres, its burden was second only to that of the Ukraine⁶⁰. Even Leningrad finally contributed only a third of the Moscow figure in 1930.⁶¹

Such were the 'objective' problems of the capital, difficulties which reflected on neither the enthusiasm nor the efficiency of the Party recruiters. Critics of Moscow, particularly the Leningrad oppositionists of 1925, were apt to stress the latter as the reason for its lack of proletarian Party members. The grounds for this criticism must now be examined.

b) 'Subjective' problems

The Party organisation in the city of Moscow was not greatly affected by the emphasis on peasant recruitment which characterised the beginning of the period. The main brake on

⁵⁷ SK, 1927, No. 5, p.27.

⁵⁸ RM, 20/10/1925.

⁵⁹ The administrative problems caused by this steady drain were such that many officials attempted to resist the draft, 'hoarding' their best cadres for work nearer home. TsGAOR, 7952/3/82, 152. It was also not the first time that Moscow's attempts to mobilise volunteers for national campaigns had fallen short of official requirements. (see above, pp. 70-1) 'Hoarding', rather than residual 'rightism' may have been the main reason for Moscow's poor record in filling its quota of '25, 000ers' in 1929. On this subject, see L. Viola, op. cit., pp. 14-16, and above, p. 109.

⁶⁰ The official quotas were: Ukraine, 7,500; Moscow, 6,600; Leningrad, 4,390. Ibid., p. 9.

⁶¹ PS, 1931, No. 14.

recruitment from the policy point of view was concern about the political attitudes of new recruits and thus about the discipline problems raised by mass enrolment. Under the Uglanov leadership, this concern was emphasised more frequently than usual.⁶² Mandel'shtam, a close political ally of Uglanov, declared in 1925 that 'We bowed too early to the democratic pressure after 1923...and too often the membership of our cell buros is too young...We must not lose sight of the need to ensure firm Party leadership.'⁶³ The responsibility of urban areas to recruit more workers than the national average was not mentioned, the targets in Moscow remaining those of the country as a whole.⁶⁴ It was only after the promotion of Bauman that rapid recruitment in Moscow began to receive the emphasis required to reach the TsK's targets.

Between 1928 and 1930, recruitment rates in Moscow were among the highest in the country, and by October 1930, 53.8% of the Moscow Party membership were workers 'from the bench'.⁶⁵ The impact of the more enthusiastic leadership was immediate, but it was not the only influence on recruitment rates. After 1930, problems began to surface, and the rate of proletarian recruitment began to fall in the capital as elsewhere. Bauman's dismissal may have played a small part in this, as he had shown himself to be more zealous than the TsK majority in most spheres, but on its own, it was not an adequate explanation.

Part of the problem of recruiting workers in Moscow lay with the procedure required for approving a new candidate. In theory, candidates for Party membership were to be chosen from the 'non-Party aktiv', people who took an interest in trade union, soviet or other 'social work'.⁶⁶ These people were to be approached personally by Party representatives at their

⁶² See the article by Gutman in SK, January 1927, no. 1.

⁶³ VI plenum MK (M., 1925). See also above, pp. 59-60.

⁶⁴ P, 21/12/1926.

⁶⁵ SK, 1930, nos.19-20.

⁶⁶ The Russian phrase obshchestvennaya rabota, 'social work' covers any voluntary work carried out on behalf of society, from voluntary farm labouring to participation in local government.

workplace, such as the grupporg or cell secretary.⁶⁷ After a discussion at which the applicant's political views and motivation were to be explored thoroughly, their name could go forward to the workplace Party committee. A further scrutiny followed, after which the names and records of satisfactory candidates were sent to the orgraspredotdel of the local raikom for approval. The MK orgraspredotdel did not take an individual interest, although it was supposed to monitor the number of recruits and their overall progress.⁶⁸ Successful applicants then began their 'candidate stage', the minimum length of which, for workers, was six months. At the end of this period, if they satisfied the various educational and other requirements, they were eligible for promotion to full membership, which involved a repeat of the process described for initial recruitment.

The process demanded consistent vigilance and enthusiasm on the part of the aktiv in the cells, and the leadership were aware that sometimes the latter could not fulfill all the tasks expected of them. Some were incompetent, more were overworked and lacked the opportunity to approach individual workers and discuss the complex issues of Party life with them in their spare time.⁶⁹ Accordingly, other methods of recruitment were introduced as the targets successively increased. In 1927, for example, a special commission was established in the gubernia to deal with the October enrolment. The method it adopted was to send 'troikas' of Party officials into the factories to drum up recruits, a task in which they were so successful that the technique was retained after the campaign had ended.⁷⁰ Although the 'individual' approach continued to be encouraged, 'campaigns' to keep numbers up became the staple means of recruitment. Thus election campaigns of all kinds, and later,

⁶⁷ Gaidul', the secretary of the Serp i Molot Party committee in 1929, described how workers should be drawn to the Party through invitations to participate in special commissions on matters like production questions and living conditions. 'It is very important,' he explained, 'that leading skilled workers, especially older production workers, feel and see that we take notice of their views, and trust them. Then these leading workers will join the Party.' L. Gaidul', Litsom k proizvodstvu, Opyt raboty partkomiteta zavoda Serp i Molot (M., 1930), p. 118.

⁶⁸ A report of the work of the orgraspredotdel, including this aspect, appears in RM, 17/1/1925.

⁶⁹ Faliks, the secretary of the Krasnyi Proletarii cell, noted that the 'individual approach' was a rarity even in the 1920's. TsGAOR, 7952/ 3/ 96, 83. After 1928, as the pressure of production targets absorbed virtually all the factory cells' time, the situation deteriorated even further.

⁷⁰ Davydova, op. cit., p. 377.

episodes of socialist competition and shock work were used as opportunities for pulling more workers into the Party.⁷¹

If the 'individual approach' was impracticable as a means of satisfying the quotas of the first Five Year Plan, the campaign method brought other problems. Too often, the grupporgs, confused and overworked, simply abandoned any pretensions of recruiting, and the project was left to the Party committee in the factory, which could give the matter only cursory attention. The emphasis on numbers led all recruiters to overlook the criteria for suitable candidates. In 1927, 89% of workers who applied for membership in Zamoskvorech'e raion, but only 60% of students, were permitted to become candidates.⁷² After 1929, the directive about recruiting 'the best shock workers' into the Party was frequently interpreted as meaning all shock workers, and whole shifts would be recruited at once, regardless of the individual merits of the members.⁷³ In Serp i Molot in 1930, the Party committee printed ballot forms for the Soviet elections which also invited workers to delete the words 'I join the Party' and 'I join the Komsomol', an 'error', as they later confessed, 'which would only have led to a growth on paper'.⁷⁴ In the struggle to produce impressive figures, workers were sometimes deliberately misled about the responsibilities of Party membership. One group of seasonal workers was found to have been told that they could join the Party 'po-sezonno', on a seasonal basis, letting their membership, and responsibilities, lapse in the slack season.⁷⁵ A frequent explanation for otsev, the loss of Party members, was that they had joined 'accidentally' in the first place.⁷⁶

Such baits were needed because the opening of the Party's doors to the mass of workers did not lead to an immediate rush to join. Party membership was not something to which large numbers of Moscow's citizens aspired in this period. The Party press, in its campaign to overcome this reluctance, attributed it to the widespread but misplaced modesty of workers.

⁷¹ Starodubtsev, op. cit., p. 61.

⁷² SK, 20/9/1927, p.49.

⁷³ SK 1929, no.16, p.32.

⁷⁴ TsGAOR, 7952/3/267, 11-12. This puts Gaidul's vaunted 'individual approach' of the previous year into a dubious light.

⁷⁵ RM, 1/1/1927.

⁷⁶ P 2/4/1926.

Party membership, it was argued, involved both 'political literacy' and a commitment of time, and workers felt that they were unequal to both. Excuses included pleas of old age, inadequate knowledge and family commitments.⁷⁷ However, behind these rationalisations were more concrete grounds for resisting the drive, of which officials were aware, but which reflected on the Party less agreeably.

Party membership had little to commend it to workers who did not share the Communist ideal. Although membership dues were scaled at this time to take account of income, they represented a substantial imposition on the average budget.⁷⁸ The burdens of membership usually exceeded the official norms. An investigation in 1927 reported that in one Moscow factory, Party members might be expected to attend up to 33 meetings per month.⁷⁹ A survey conducted in 1925, before the hectic years of the first Five Year Plan, found that of a sample of 304 members and candidates, 119 were chronically ill, while a further 34 complained of ill-health. The most common illness was neurasthenia, followed by lung disorders, malaria, anaemia and stomach disorders. The nervous complaints were blamed on the Civil War, but the stresses of Party life, combined with the poor living conditions of the period, were known to aggravate the problems⁸⁰. Very few people were capable of sustaining the effort required by Party life in these circumstances. As well as seeming forbiddingly demanding, the Party thus acquired a reputation for incompetence. In Serp i Molot in 1928, only 30% of Party members attended the plenary meetings of the Party cell, and the Party presence at general factory meetings was even lower.⁸¹ As workers at the factory commented, 'they make plans about how to build socialism the day after tomorrow, but how Party work in their own shop is going is something they don't see.'⁸²

⁷⁷ 'I haven't joined the party', said one worker, 'because I am old and ill and the years are slipping away. I couldn't do anything for the Party and Party members must have heavy responsibilities.' SK, 31/8/1928.

⁷⁸ In 1925, Party dues were calculated at an average of 7% of wages, although the unemployed were not expected to contribute.

⁷⁹ SK, 1927, nos. 23-4.

⁸⁰ *Bol'shevik* (B), 1925, nos. 21-2, pp. 61-74. The pressures of Party life were a problem at all levels. Molotov apparently complained to Khrushchev about the fact that he never had time to read a book. *Khrushchev Remembers*, p. 65.

⁸¹ *Martenovka*, 21/9/1928. Quoted in TsGAOR, 7952/3/253, 14.

⁸² *Martenovka*, 7/2/1928. Quoted in *ibid.*, 1.13.

More serious were the abuses committed by some Party members. It was hard to regard people who regularly drank and vandalised factory property as the representatives of the vanguard of the proletariat. Although the sources do not suggest that the majority of the rank and file were drunkards, it took only a few cases to create an unfavourable impression. An incident at the Tsindel' factory was typical of the problem. A Communist called Gorshkov went out one evening and got himself so drunk that he could hardly stand. Coming home with a prostitute he had picked up at the Saratov station, he smashed some of the windows in his hostel, although he only noticed the cuts in his hands the following morning, and had to ask the factory administration to give him time off for them to heal. 'Non-Party workers', noted the report, 'laughed when he asked this.'⁸³ Another Party member, in Rogozhsko-Simonovskii raion, complained to his local Control Commission when he discovered that his party card did not entitle him to buy vodka without queuing. When he was admonished for this mistake, he lost his temper, and tore up his Party card in the Control Commission's office.⁸⁴

Corruption was also common, and the bribing of workers for career and other purposes⁸⁵. Above all, the condescending behaviour of many Communists was calculated to antagonise workers. They feared that if they joined the Party, they would lose their friends and be seen as careerists.⁸⁶ The behaviour of some Party members reinforced this impression. One Communist, watching a worker in his factory making a poster for a local campaign, began to laugh at his simple-mindedness, but when asked to explain to the worker what was wrong, put his hands in his pockets and walked away.⁸⁷ Another group of Communists got drunk and started firing revolvers at the workers as they passed.⁸⁸

⁸³ RM, 10/9/1927.

⁸⁴ K. Ya. Bauman, General'naya Bol'shevistskaya liniya i nasha rabota (M., 1929), p. 96.

⁸⁵ TsGAOR, 7952/3/253, 20.

⁸⁶ SK, 1929, no. 30.

⁸⁷ RM, 10/9/1927.

⁸⁸ Bauman, loc. cit.

These problems, though serious, could be discussed in the press, because they reflected on individuals rather than on the Party as a whole⁸⁹. However, hostility to the Party itself was common. Sometimes, the cause was a specific scandal, such as the Chinese debacle of 1927. More often, it was simply a general hostility. 'I wouldn't join the Party', one woman, critical of the imposition of the 'general line', declared in 1928. 'If you're going to join, you have to cut half your tongue out first'.⁹⁰

In the light of these circumstances, recruitment levels in Moscow begin to seem more impressive, and it is surprising that more recruits of these years did not leave the Party. As it was, official concern about otsey was not justified. In certain factories, large numbers of workers might leave the Party, occasionally causing total membership locally to decline, but overall, the rate of otsey was about 3% per year.⁹¹

Undoubtedly, however, many mistakes were made in these years. At the time of the purges of 1929 and 1933, many Moscow workers were found to have joined the Party 'accidentally', and others failed to re-register, thus 'mechanically' forfeiting their membership. The recruitment campaign imposed unprecedented strains on the local Party organisations, and these must now be examined.

Problems of mass recruitment

The most obvious problem with the pace set in this period was the number of recruits in these years who were unfitted for the demands of Party life.⁹² Among the problems discovered were expectations by new members that they would receive material goods as a

⁸⁹ The propaganda value of these stories should not be forgotten. Examples like this were chosen to discourage others, and were not necessarily typical of all rank and filers.

⁹⁰ TsGAOR, 7952/3/253, 11. The Party was also blamed for unpopular work regulations and poor living conditions. Ibid., p. 122.

⁹¹ In Trekhgornaya Manufaktura, for example, otsey in 1928 led to an overall drop in the number of Party members, with 159 members leaving and only 100 new ones joining the Party. However, even this represented a fall of only 2.4%. P, 5/8/1928. In such local cases, disputes in the factory or industry affected were often the cause of the problem.

⁹² P, 29/6/1928.

reward for Party membership, as in the case of Bauman's vodka drinker, or unwillingness to pay Party dues and carry out duties.⁹³ Others found that hard living conditions made the concentration and sacrifice of party life impossible.⁹⁴ A further worry for local Party officials was the claim that many recruits felt neglected after joining, and left because they considered themselves to be superfluous.⁹⁵ Between April and June 1928, an average of 47% of candidates left the Party, and in the year as a whole, the figure was about 20%.⁹⁶

For the local cells, processing the new candidates proved a daunting task, and many were incapable of ensuring a smooth progress for new recruits through training to full membership. Repeatedly in this period, Party directives appeared in the press criticising the proportion of candidates in the Party who had exceeded the normal candidate stage. In 1932, a report found that 70% of candidates in one Moscow factory were overdue for promotion, a figure which was not regarded as unusual.⁹⁷ Often, the reason was simply overwork. The local cells could not cope with the volume of paperwork involved, or organise the courses and ensure regular attendance by candidates who were likely to be under strain themselves. In other cases, candidates were not promoted because they failed to satisfy even the basic requirements for promotion.

However, incompetence also had a part to play, and the factory cells were not always principally to blame. A particularly scandalous case appeared in Rabochaya Moskva in 1925. Comrade Mukhin had joined as a candidate in 1923, before the mass campaigns. In May 1924, he applied for full membership, but his papers were lost by the raikom. He therefore re-applied, after waiting two months, and was told to wait another two, which he did. He then wrote a personal letter to the raikom secretary, but had to wait a further two months for a reply. Finally, his application was approved, and he was asked to pay his Party membership dues retrospectively for the period of the delay. The letter he wrote to Rabochaya Moskva was his resignation from the Party.⁹⁸

⁹³ Iz TsK, 1926, no. 37-8.

⁹⁴ SK 1927, no.7, p. 8

⁹⁵ SK 1927, no.1, p. 10.

⁹⁶ Partiinoe, khozyaistvennoe i kul'turnoe stroitel'stvo, p. 19.

⁹⁷ PS 1932, no.10.

⁹⁸ RM, 24/9/1925.

In conditions where all active members of the Party were overworked, the temptation to use candidates in low-level Party posts was irresistible. Directives on the need to involve them in the life of the Party specified that they should early be given tasks to perform on its behalf. A situation soon arose where candidates were fulfilling many functions for which they were not qualified, from grupporg to cell secretary.⁹⁹ Repeatedly, the leadership had to stress that candidates were not full members of the Party. Officially, their attendance at closed meetings was also forbidden, and they had no voting rights. Where their promotion was long overdue, however, and when numbers alone were required as proof of 'activism', it was tempting for cell secretaries not to insist on the difference between candidates and full members.

A number of measures for alleviating these problems were tried in this period. The extension of Party cells into every shift and brigade was partly inspired by the need to reach every potentially sympathetic worker. Enlarging the structure made broad recruitment even more important, however, as the Party sought activists for night shifts and 'backward' factories, so the solution brought problems in its wake. To combat the cheapening of Party membership, the purge of 1929 removed a certain amount of 'ballast', although the need to retain as many proletarian members as possible inclined the commissions to overlook shortcomings which would have been condemned in office employees or students. The system of Party education was reformed and strengthened in this period, although finding suitable propagandists and even affording textbooks and providing classrooms remained a problem.¹⁰⁰ In particular, to cope with the mass enrolments of 1929-31, 'candidate schools' were set up the raions. In 1929, they processed only 12.8% of candidates in Moscow, but by 1932 they were preparing over half for full membership.¹⁰¹

⁹⁹ PS 1931, nos 3-4, and P 6/10/1925. The latter report explained that 'the presence of non-Party people at cell meetings is one of the most valuable achievements of our Party. But inviting non-Party people to all Party meetings leads to a situation in which the role of the Party becomes blurred, and the distinction between Party and non-Party fades.'

¹⁰⁰ See chapter 5, pp. 185-6.

¹⁰¹ Yu.A.V'yunov, Deyatel'nost' Moskovskoi organizatsii VKP(b) po sovershenstvovaniyu partiinoi propagandy v gody pervoi pyatiletki, (Avtoreferat dissertatsii, M., 1972), p.14. In 1932, 64.9% of candidates were educated in the schools.

The impact of these reforms on the various problems posed by mass recruitment proved marginal by 1932. Officially, the continued failure was used to explain the cessation of mass recruitment and purge which followed, and it is unquestionably true that the need to preserve the Party's 'vanguard' status demanded that indiscriminate recruitment should end. Discussions began openly in 1931, though as early as 1930, Party spokesmen had been advocating the recruitment of 'the best representatives of the intelligentsia' to accompany high proletarian quotas.¹⁰² An article in Rabochaya Moskva in August 1932, headed 'Raising High the Title of Party Member' quoted Lenin's injunction that 'We must try to raise the name and significance of a member of the Party higher and higher.' It emphasised the individual's responsibility to ensure that his work entitled him to remain in the Party, concluding that 'we must raise the ideological quality of Party work, and the principled approach to the assessment of every Communist Party member.'¹⁰³ At the same time, the press began to carry letters criticising the neglect of 'educational work' which had accompanied the all-out drive for production¹⁰⁴.

Was this perceived 'failure' of the mass recruitment drive the only reason for its abandonment in 1932? It is likely that it was not, since the problems had been ignored or tolerated for five years. Moreover, the abandonment of mass recruitment co-incided with a number of other retreats from the Party's 'proletarian' phase, including the streamlining of its structure and the attack on uravnilovka, the policy of equal wages for workers and specialists. With the ending of the first Five Year Plan, the regime no longer felt a need for direct mass support, and the problems it had created outweighed its advantages. After 1932, on virtually all fronts, the emphasis shifted to discipline. Management and experts, provided they remained loyal and successful, enjoyed more power and status than they had since 1928, and their relatively cautious estimates of output potential governed the second Five Year Plan in contrast to the first. In part, as will be seen below, this change was possible because the 'mass' policies of the first Five Year Plan had already broken the power of the 'bourgeois' specialist¹⁰⁵. Once this goal had been achieved, it was possible to abandon the troublesome

¹⁰² Rigby, op. cit., pp.190-92.

¹⁰³ RM, 28/12/1932.

¹⁰⁴ See below, p. 185

¹⁰⁵ Chapter 4, p. 173.

mass Party. What was needed after 1932 was a distinct and reliable vanguard, recruits for Party training schemes and promotion to administrative and specialist jobs, rather than cheerleaders on the factory floor. However, most of these future specialists had themselves been recruited during the mass campaigns. To conclude this study of recruitment policy, its lasting impact on the Party must be examined.

The Transformation of the Bolshevik Party.

Between 1925 and 1932, the Party in Moscow more than doubled in size, and increased the proportion of production workers in its ranks from about 45% to over 50%. The overwhelming majority of new recruits in the period were workers, although the proportionate share of workers among new recruits reached its highest in 1930. Although the 'Party layer' in most industries was less than 20% on average, it was unlikely that people anywhere in Moscow would not know a Communist at all. This represented a great improvement in terms of the Party's visibility and ability to keep in touch with the population.

The grounds for concern, however, were about the 'quality' of these Party members. It has been seen that a substantial number of mistakes were made. However, reports of illiteracy, corruption and overwork were not the only aspect of the campaign. Corruption remains a problem for the Party even now, despite stricter criteria for membership, and is almost inevitable where the Party provides access to scarce privileges. In general, recruits of the period 1925-7 were cadre workers with genuine commitment to the ideals of the Party. The decision to pause in 1925 was influenced as much by political considerations and nervousness as by genuine difficulties with the new generation, and the 'October enrolment' of 1927 was mainly successful. In 1928, over half the cell secretaries in Moscow were recruits from the first 'Lenin enrolment'¹⁰⁶ and by 1932, the majority were recruits from the

¹⁰⁶ Partiinoe, khozyaistvennoe, kul'turnoe stroitel'stvo, p. 28.

period since 1927.¹⁰⁷ The proportion of pre-revolutionary members, the podpol'shchiki, declined steadily in all fields of local politics¹⁰⁸.

It was the generation of recruits admitted after 1929, when the campaigns became less selective and officials in the factories could devote less time to vetting candidates, which produced the most problems. Even these recruits, however, were not without their successes. Most of Brezhnev's generation of Party leaders, including Brezhnev himself, joined the organisation during the first Five Year Plan.¹⁰⁹ The problem was more the inexperience of the new generation, and the lack of guidance. The secretary of one cell in Moscow explained how the old guard, the recruits of the 1924-7 period, 'left us as promotees for foreign work. They had been very useful in the apparatus, and had made work in the factory easier.' Now life had changed, and the factory could no longer spare cadres for work outside its own walls.¹¹⁰

The new generation also brought about an overall change in the Party's ethos. As Lenin had predicted in 1921, a Party in power was likely to develop differently from an underground organisation, attracting people who were interested in power and government. Lenin had meant the comparison pejoratively, as a justification for the 1921 purge, but the implications of the change were not necessarily negative. As the Party was now responsible for government, it needed to attract people with administrative skills rather than revolutionaries of the romantic persuasion, and it needed a core of administrators at all levels who were dedicated to improving daily life on a local basis as well as to the grand progress of the revolution. It was precisely this type of person, even if his critics might call him a careerist, who was attracted by the recruitment campaigns of the 1920's, and went on to form the

¹⁰⁷ PS, No. 6, 1932.

¹⁰⁸ This contrasted with the situation in the higher levels of the apparatus. See pp. 223-4.

¹⁰⁹ Brezhnev, Gromyko and Kirilenko, among the most prominent, all joined the Party in 1931 having been 'non-Party' activists or Komsomols.

¹¹⁰ TsGAOR 7952/3/96, 89-90.

professional backbone of the Party, studying in night schools during the 'cultural revolution' and taking over in the factories in the 1930's.¹¹¹

Another aspect of the recruitment campaigns, the truth of which is seldom questioned in the West, was their political purpose. The theory runs that Stalin sought to overwhelm the Left Opposition, and any other potential maverick tendencies surviving from the pre-revolutionary period, by swamping the Party with new recruits in the mid-'20's. If that had been his purpose, mass recruitment turned out to be a mixed blessing. The new recruits, especially in the mid-20's, were not like blank pages awaiting Stalin's handwriting. Like existing Party members, they had lived through the revolution and Civil War, and were aware, if they were interested in politics sufficiently to join the Party, of the debates of the time. Recruitment may have been a useful way of showing how much support the Party enjoyed among the working class, pace the Left, but to suggest that the new generation were all passive dupes of the General Secretary is to underestimate the interest that the average worker had in the progress of the revolution, both in general and in terms of his own prospects in the new society. Those who did not have this interest tended to stay away from politics altogether.

Recruitment in Moscow in these years was not without its problems. These reflected the incompetence of Party officials at all levels. However, in view of all the difficulties, the novelty of the project, the other demands on Party members' time and the contradictory nature of central directives, the record of the Moscow Party is not discreditable. Without a large and widespread Party, it is unlikely that the demands of the first Five Year Plan could have been met. Moscow also provided cadres for other areas in the USSR, though never as many as required. The criticisms of Moscow's record which abound in the Party press at this time reflect less on the enthusiasm of Moscow's aktiv than on the realism of the task they had been set.

¹¹¹ The career of Victor Kravchenko is typical. Although he later defected, Kravchenko was a dedicated Bolshevik in the 1920's, drawn to the Party by his desire to build socialism in practical ways as well as by the attractions of promotion. V. Kravchenko, I Chose Freedom, New York, 1946.

Chapter 4. The Moscow Party Organisation and Moscow Industry.

Moscow's industry saw some of the most rapid and spectacular changes in this period. In 1925, the capital was still primarily a textile centre, 'calico Moscow'. From the end of 1928, despite the lack of local raw materials, the emphasis began to shift away from textiles to the metal, electrical and other 'heavy industries'.¹ New factories were built in the city, including the electrical giant, Elektrozavod, and the bearings works, Sharikopodshipnik, which claimed to be the largest factory in the world. Others were rebuilt, such as the AMO automobile works, which closed for two years while it was completely refurbished, reopening in 1931 as the ZIS factory, and the Serp i Molot metal works, which was re-fitted to produce fine quality alloys in the early 1930's. In the course of this transformation, thousands of new workers were added to the Moscow proletariat, including peasants straight from the villages. New skills had to be taught at all levels, from shop floor to technical specialist.

The transformation of Moscow industry cannot be summarised in a single chapter. A number of questions not germane to the role of the Party, including the success of the programme as a whole, its costs, and some aspects of industrial relations, will not be discussed here. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the way the Party worked in a practical sphere; in this case the development and management of Moscow industry. Questions relating to industry occupied a large amount of the Party's time throughout the period, and dominated its meetings during the First Five Year Plan. A number of formulas were proposed for defining the relationship between the Party and other management organs, but in practice, the Party's role developed in response to empirical pressures and the force of groups and personalities. Official guidelines were only one of a number of influences and did not alone decide how industry would be run.

¹ See introduction, pp. 15-17, and table 3, p. 259.

Theoretical Statements of the Party's Role in the Economy.

Directives on the role of the Party in the running of industry came from a number of sources. The most important was the TsK. Its message was somewhat confused. Officially, the Party was responsible for the broad outlines of policy, but the detailed running of the economy was in the hands of a number of trusts and economic councils. At the factory level, the director was supposed to be in sole charge of economic affairs, a principle known as edinonachalie, 'one-man management'. However, the Party, at all levels, was also expected to take an active part in factory life. Despite repeated efforts, the TsK neither adequately defined how the system was to operate, nor succeeded in guaranteeing the observation of its directives in practice.

The overlapping responsibilities of the Party cell and the factory director were illustrated in the TsK's letter of 24 February 1924 'On the closer participation of cells and factory trade union committees in the productive work of enterprises.'² The Party cell's work was circumscribed by the instruction that 'it cannot and must not substitute itself for the organs of trade union and managerial leadership.' However, the aim of the letter was to draw workers' attention to industrial questions, and to ensure maximum support for the drive for productivity. This involved wide discussions and consultation between management and workers through trade union and Party meetings. The Party cell was urged to 'discuss the questions of the productive tasks of the enterprise, explaining from all aspects the reasons for its successful or unsuccessful activities.' The factory management was to report to the cell every two months on the progress of the enterprise, 'having first acquainted the cell through its buro with the fundamental points of the report.' Trusts were to make similar reports once or twice a year in larger factories. Conflicts were to be referred to the Party. Representatives from Party cells in particular fields of production were to meet at fixed intervals to 'exchange experience' and discuss in detail issues relating to production and the financial affairs of the industry. The TsK also called on Party representatives to familiarise themselves with the production processes and the use of labour in their industry. The Party

² KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh, eighth edn. (M., 1970), Vol. 3, pp.17-21.

cell could not avoid economic questions, and the temptation to interfere in the affairs of management was irresistible.

The need to enlist the active support of workers in production ensured that their participation in managerial affairs would continue. 'Production conferences' were one forum for this participation, although general meetings of workers were also supposed to raise the matter. Workers, including Party members, were encouraged to discuss reports from the management and to make their own suggestions as to how the work of the enterprise might be improved. 'All measures,' insisted the TsK, 'being taken to raise the productivity of labour, must be broadly discussed at meetings of the cells, at production meetings and at broad meetings of workers.'³

In the 1920's, the Party cell and factory director frequently found their duties overlapping, a situation which inevitably led to conflicts between the two on issues which were properly the responsibility of the director. Campaigns such as the regime of economy and 'self-criticism' (samokritika) involved the Party more deeply in economic affairs. Self-criticism, which encouraged the broad criticism of the factory leadership from all quarters, frequently resulted in conflicts with management.

In 1929, in an effort to remove the confusion and parallelism, the TsK issued a definition of edinonachalie⁴. Although mainly aimed at eradicating the practice of shop floor workers' electing their own foremen and other representatives on the managerial side, the resolution also dealt with the relationship between management and Party. As it noted, 'there is no clear and sufficiently strict delineation of functions and responsibilities between the factory organisations - between the director, the zavkom and the Party cell; at enterprises there are still cases where the Party and trade union organs involve themselves directly in the operating-production work of the factory management.'⁵ This situation not only hampered

³ Ibid., p. 154.

⁴ For a further discussion of the background to the resolution, see, H. Kuromiya, 'Edinonachalie and the Soviet Industrial Manager, 1928-37', Soviet Studies, 1984, no.2. The resolution was dated 5 September 1929.

⁵ KPSS v Rezolyutsiyakh, eighth edn., vol. 4, pp. 310-311.

the director's freedom of movement, but also led to 'lack of responsibility', as no organ believed itself exclusively answerable for decisions on production issues. The resolution outlined the director's responsibilities, insisting that he was 'directly answerable for the fulfilment of the promfinplan and all production tasks' and adding that only the management should be responsible for appointments and transfers within the factory, although the Party and trade union should also be consulted. Management was also responsible for labour discipline. However, other organs continued to have responsibilities which could bring them into conflict with the director despite the new definitions. Workers were still to be involved in the decision-making process through production conferences. Trade union and Party organs were to help mobilise the workforce. The Party had a very narrow tightrope to walk, its role being defined as

to implement the leadership of the social-political and economic life of the enterprise so as to ensure the fulfilment of fundamental Party directives, without interfering in details of the work of the zavkom and the director, especially in the operating instructions of the administration. The Party cells must actively promote the fulfilment of the principle of edinonachalie in the whole system of industrial management.⁶

Historians are agreed that one of the purposes of this directive was to increase the responsibility and powers of the director, but at the time, it left some factory officials in confusion, and further definitions, including characteristically terse statements by Stalin and M. M. Kaganovich, had to follow.⁷ In this period, the demand for high output and the constant bottlenecks and crises in production ensured that the enterprise could not work effectively, and harassed directors constantly turned to other authorities, where the latter had not already invited themselves, to take a hand in production questions. Moreover, campaigns like socialist competition and 'shock work' (udarnichestvo) involved workers and Party, trade union and Komsomol organisations in every aspect of life on the shop

⁶ Ibid., p. 313.

⁷ An example was Stalin's speech of February 1931 'On the tasks of managers'. J. Stalin, Sochineniya, Vol 13, (1951), pp. 29-39. M. M. Kaganovich's view that the 'earth should tremble when the director is entering the factory' is quoted in M. Lewin, The Making of the Soviet System, (London, 1985), p. 252.

floor, from the setting of norms to the organisation of production and the allocation of wages.

Moscow was no exception in the confusion of the period. In line with the TsK, the MK attempted to clarify the question of responsibility in the factory several times. In the mid-1920's, Uglanov made a number of statements about the role of the Party in Moscow industry which supported the formula of one-man management. His remarks at the second MK plenum of January 1928 show that the MK was not united on the question of managerial power. 'The question, comrades,' he explained, 'is clear. We must allow the director more independence and responsibility in the task assigned to him...The director runs the factory and the Party cell helps him to run it, helps him to organise the workers, to raise the productivity of labour.'⁸ Uglanov further defined the relationship between director and Party cell in response to breaches in the principle of edinonachalie. 'It often happens,' he explained, 'that in our factories, the director is removed on a caprice of the Party secretary. We should have kept the director, since the productivity of labour depends on him, and the growth of wages, and the lowering of costs...We should remove the secretary, who knows nothing about the production process.'⁹

The TsK resolution on edinonachalie of 1929 received wide publicity in Moscow, but so did the slogan 'face to production', and confusion about when the Party should abstain from involvement in production problems continued. The difficulties were not confined to the factories themselves. Parallelism existed between the MK and the raikoms on one hand and the trusts and factory administrators on the other. The organisation of Moscow industry was a complicated matter, involving every tier of Party and government from the TsK and VSNKh to the factory directors, foremen and Party cell secretaries.

Moscow industry, like industry everywhere in the USSR, was organised in a series of layers, according to the significance of the branch of industry and individual enterprise. The majority of factories were under the direct control of trusts, which in turn were attached to

⁸ II Plenum MK (M., 1928), p. 41.

⁹ P 7/2/1928.

the all-union, national, regional or Moscow council for the economy, or sovnarkhoz. Thus enterprises deemed to be of 'all-union' significance were under the control of trusts responsible to VSNKh, the Supreme Council for the National Economy. Among these, in Moscow in 1928, were the 'Borets' machine-building factory, answerable to Mashinotrest', the Armatura factory (Armatrest'), AMO (Avtotrest') and Dinamo (GET, the State electricity trust).¹⁰ In deciding which factories should be attached to VSNKh, size was also a crucial factor; smaller factories, even if they produced strategically important goods, were subordinated to local sovnarkhozy.¹¹

The Moscow Sovnarkhoz, MSNKh, controlled industry of 'local significance', together with textiles and other clothing, which accounted for 75% of the value of MSNKh's output in the 1920's. Other industries under its control were the production of spare parts, certain branches of the construction industry and the manufacturing section of the transport industry.¹² Below the level of MSNKh came co-operative ventures and concerns under the control of the local soviets, mainly food processing factories, including bakeries and sweet factories. Outside this structure altogether were the enterprises run by the OGPU, including certain printing and publishing works.¹³

The trusts and economic councils were not themselves independent of Party control, although their interests, as economic bodies, were different from those of their political counterparts. Heads of trusts, from the early 1920's, were Bolshevik Party members, although their advisory staffs were unlikely to include many Communists. Moreover, trust heads, and the head of MSNKh, were members of the MK, and the MK buro also included several economic administrators at this level.¹⁴ There was thus provision for the economic organs within Moscow to make their needs known directly to the MK, and for reports to be made to the MK on their work. The trusts could anticipate positive as well as negative

¹⁰ Fabriki i zavody Moskovskoi oblasti na 1928-29 god (M., 1929), pp. 104 and 148.

¹¹ Serp i Molot, for example, was attached to MSNKh in 1925, despite the director's opinion that it merited all-union status. TsGAOR, 7952/3/258, 12.

¹² Davydova, op. cit., p. 100.

¹³ Fabriki i zavody Moskovskoi oblasti, pp. 98 and 184.

¹⁴ See appendix 1.

results from this political 'interference', as direct access to a senior Party organ could bring rapid decisions in times of crisis.

Within the enterprise, there was a similar blurring between economic and political staff. Bolshevik theory, and also hard experience, indicated that the most dedicated supporter of the regime's economic goals would be a Communist director, 'bourgeois' specialists from the pre-revolutionary period being less amenable to the new methods and tempos required even in the 1920's. However, Bolsheviks with the technical expertise to run a complex economic venture were few, and the result was a compromise, in which the titular head of the factory was the 'Red' director, but the details of administration were in the hands of the 'technical' director, who was seldom a member of the Communist Party¹⁵. In the 1920's, indeed, despite positive promotion policies, the number of Communists in management remained small.¹⁶

While the number of technically qualified Party members remained inadequate, alternative methods of ensuring a politically correct line in managerial matters were adopted by the Party administration. Even Communist factory managers could not be expected always to act in the general interest if this conflicted with the needs of their enterprise. Direct Party involvement in industry was thus inevitable, even where the enterprise was in the hands of Communists who had themselves been appointed by the MK.

The Role of the Party in Practice

a) The Role of the MK and TsK in Moscow industry.

As the organisation responsible for overall policy making within Moscow, the MK had a clear duty to inform itself about economic matters and to provide guidance in cases where

¹⁵ In 1930, a survey of 20,814 foremen found that 36.5% were Party members. Sostav rukovodyashchikh rabotnikov (M., 1935), pp. 32-3. Among technicians, however, the figure was much lower, about 2% at the end of 1927. N. Lampert, The Technical Intelligentsia and the Soviet State (London 1979), p. 24.

¹⁶ Stepanov, a former director of the Serp i Molot factory, recalled in 1932 that in 1925, only two members of the factory administration had been Communists. Not one foreman had been a Party member. To correct this situation, a policy of promoting only Communists was followed in the factory, although after eight months, only two foremen were Party members. TsGAOR, 7952/3/258, 21.

policy was unclear or problematic. Broadly, its involvement in industry took two forms. First, it took a close day to day interest in the work of the constituted economic administrators, an interest which often extended beyond supervision, although officially it was merely 'guidance'. Secondly, it initiated and led a number of specific campaigns, bypassing the normal channels of managerial authority.

The MK's work plans in this period provided for regular reports on different branches of industry.¹⁷ Although economic questions only came to dominate Party discussions during the first Five Year Plan, there was never a time when the MK considered details of the economy to be outside its responsibility. According to one Soviet historian, not a single meeting of the MK buro or plenum passed without discussing the economy between 1925 and 1928.¹⁸

The MK also discussed detailed questions, intervening directly in the running of enterprises. In 1927, for example, it set up an industrial commission, which examined 60 questions between 8 August and 2 September. Of these, 41 were 'confirmations' of directors or deputy directors, evidence of direct involvement in the selection of the economic management of Moscow enterprises. A further ten questions examined concerned the personnel of Moscow trusts and MSNKh, and five more were on the checking of cadres at other levels.¹⁹

The MK had close links with the Moscow trusts, but it also intervened in individual enterprises on its own account, circumventing the raion and factory Party committees.²⁰ Although it was usually the larger and more important enterprises which attracted this sort of attention, especially those represented on the MK itself, smaller plants occasionally came up for discussion at MK meetings, particularly where there was an intractable problem of some

¹⁷ See appendix 2.

¹⁸ Yu. I. Suvorov, Moskovskie Bol'sheviki v bor'be za effektivnost' proizvodstva v tekstil'noi promyshlennosti, 1925-1928gg (avtoreferat dissertatsii, M., 1969), p. 12.

¹⁹ Davydova, op. cit., introduction, p. 55.

²⁰ This is a feature of Party administration also noted by a student of the later Soviet period. J. Hough, The Soviet Prefects (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), p. 29.

kind, or egregious corruption on the part of the factory Party committee or management.²¹ Generally, the MK was one of several courts of last resort for the smaller factories, whereas for important plants it played a more regular supervisory role.²²

Intervention by the MK was not confined to debates in its central offices. Formally and informally, members of the MK visited Moscow enterprises, sometimes spending time collecting information and supervising Party and other administrative work. In January 1930, for example, a number of 'brigades' of the MK were delegated to work in 58 Moscow factories for the month of February, collecting information on the reasons for recent shortfalls in output and establishing ways of improving production. Among the heads of these brigades, although personally they might not be based at the factory throughout the period of the study, were I. M. Gordienko, chairman of the oblast' union of metalworkers and a member of the MK buro, to be stationed at Serp i Molot, E. S. Kogan, head of the agitpropotdel and also a buro member (Elektrozavod), Ryabov, buro member and the secretary of Zamoskvorech'e raikom (Krasnyi Proletarii), Volkov, buro member and head of MSNKh (AMO), and Trilisser, a senior OGPU official, who was to work in the troublesome Podol'sk machine tool factory.²³ Such brigades continued to be deployed by the MK in 'problem' factories. In 1931, for example, a brigade from the MK led by Ryndin worked at the Krasnyi Proletarii factory for several months. Its ruling on the reconstruction of the factory was final, and involved overturning the previous policy of the director.²⁴

If the MK sometimes circumvented the lower levels in the Party hierarchy in industrial matters, then it was also the case that the TsK could take a hand in Moscow's domestic affairs, sometimes reversing the decisions of Moscow trusts or the MK. Such a case was the reconstruction of the Dinamo factory. In April 1929, the Party cell there appealed to the TsK on the grounds that reconstruction in the factory was being held up by the trust, GET.

²¹ Several examples of corruption were handled by the MK in 1929, partly because of the concurrent purge. Among the factories affected were Geofizika, in Sokol'niki raion, and Kauchuk, in Krasnaya Presnya.

²² For example, it heard regular reports on the progress of large plants like AMO and Sharikopodshipnik.

²³ RM, 29/1/1930. For the Podol'sk affair, see above, p. 108.

²⁴ TsGAOR, 7952/3/94, 183.

The TsK responded by setting up a commission of its own members and members of VSNKh of the USSR which found in favour of the Dinamo factory cell and against the trust.²⁵ Again in 1929, the TsK was asked by the director of AMO, Likhachev, to give a ruling on the reasons for the slow progress of reconstruction in the factory. Although the MK had earlier responded to a similar appeal by supporting Sorokin, the chairman of Avtotrest', who blamed the difficulties on the 'conservatism' of AMO workers, Ordzhonikidze, to whom Likhachev had appealed in person, finally agreed to the levels of investment requested by the director, thus finding against both the MK and the trust.²⁶

This type of personal intervention was common in Moscow affairs. In a society where individual political figures had so much power, it was unavoidable that direct appeals would be made to influential members of the TsK, whatever protocol required. In 1930, for example, Apasov and Nikitin, two senior Party officials at Elektroavtomat, wrote personally to Krzhizhanovskii, who was an 'honorary shock worker' at the factory, requesting help with raw materials supplies, shortages of specialised glass and imported alloys having caused a drop in output in the lamp department.²⁷ At the time of the reconstruction of Serp i Molot, Kaganovich, newly-appointed to the first secretaryship of the MK, took a personal interest in the factory, and used his influence to get the question of its future settled at the highest level. Thus in 1931, a distinguished group, including Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Ordzhonikidze, Mikoyan, Mezhlauk and Gurevich paddled around in the mud of the factory site 'investigating' the reconstruction project.²⁸ This appeal to the highest level, rather than to the MK, reflects the popular, and probably correct, perception of the distribution of power between the centre and the regional committee.

Besides intervening directly in economic affairs, the TsK was the originator of Party policy on economic questions, but the regional committees were responsible for their detailed implementation. Thus, in accordance with TsK policy, the MK regularly issued injunctions

²⁵ Dinamo v gody stroitel'stvo sotsializma, vol. 2 (M., 1964), p. 141.

²⁶ Istoriya Moskovskogo Avtozavoda imeni I. A. Likhacheva (M., 1966), pp.152-4.

²⁷ TsGAOR, 7952/3/490, 77.

²⁸ As Filatov recalled, 'Voroshilov in particular swore violently about our mud'. TsGAOR, 7952/3/267, 8-9.

to the raikoms and factory cells to take a more active part in the supervision of the economy. In particular, it called for more 'concrete' discussions of economic questions, the examination of detailed problems rather than generalities, and for Party organs in the raions to acquaint themselves with the leading personnel in all branches of the administration of factories for which they were responsible.²⁹ Where the local cell had turned its 'face to production', the MK provided guidance, although it did not always support the factory cells in disputes with management.³⁰

These interventions were a regular part of the MK's work. Even high-level involvement of this kind often failed to solve economic problems, however. Several times in this period, campaigns were launched, usually on the TsK's initiative, to overcome problems through the combined concentration on them of the efforts of Party, local soviets, control commissions, workers and management. Among these were the regime of economy in 1926, the 'rationalisation of industry' campaign of 1927, and the drive for factories to balance their budgets, khozraschet, in 1931. The MK acted as the local executor of the TsK in these campaigns, but within broad guidelines, it had responsibility for the details of their implementation, organising publicity for them, hearing reports on their progress, and attempting to make improvements where they failed. Although launched on the Party's initiative, campaigns of this type were not exclusively run by its members. The regime of economy, for example, was the joint responsibility of the Soviet, trade union, co-operative and other mass organisations.³¹ Because of this wide involvement, it was susceptible to modification in the enterprise. In fact, it ended up being controlled by managers anxious to protect their own position at the expense of workers' wage packets³². Where interests competed like this within the framework of official campaigns, it was crucially important to mobilise the grass-roots Party membership. The problems this raised will be discussed below.

²⁹ See, e.g., article by Kulikov and Giber, RM, 31/1/1928, and the MK resolution of 28/2/1932, RM 3/3/1932.

³⁰ Uglanov's attitude towards interference by local cells in economic affairs was an example of the MK siding with management, a phenomenon which became more common after 1931.

³¹ RM, 25/4/1926.

³² VII Plenum MK (M., 1926), pp. 9-12.

The other type of campaign by which the MK influenced economic life took the guise of a drive against 'bureaucratism' or 'corruption'. As Bauman explained in 1927, on the eve of one such campaign, 'it is unquestionable that soviet democracy has developed in depth and in breadth. But, despite the great growth of the aktiv, the work of our state, economic and co-operative apparatuses continues to be very tenuously linked with the masses.'³³ The 1927 anti-bureaucratism campaign in Moscow was followed in 1929-30 by a full-scale purge of the state and economic apparatuses supervised by the MK and MKK. In August 1929, the MK ordered the mobilisation of 150 people, including its own members and members of the MKK and Gubispolkom, 'but especially members of the Communist Party with specialist experience', to review the progress of the purge and to ensure more thorough work by the local commissions.³⁴ In the course of the campaign, major reductions were made in the size of the apparatuses affected, while new promotees, often ex-workers, took up bureaucratic jobs vacated by 'corrupt' or 'bureaucratized elements.'³⁵ Political interference in the appointment of cadres for administrative work was a persistent feature of the first Five Year Plan, and affected economic administration at all levels.³⁶ Intervention in this and other forms, did not decrease during the period. The MK remained a powerful force in Moscow's economic life.

b) The role of the Raikoms.

The raikoms initially played a direct part in the life of Moscow factories. Until 1929, factory Party organisations were not independent Party units with all statutory rights, but were

³³ RM, 20/2/1927.

³⁴ Osnovnye resheniya po bor'be s byurokratizmom i uluchsheniyu gosapparata (M., 1929), p. 4.

³⁵ Workers from Elektrozavod, mobilised to purge the apparatus of Narkomfin, cut the number of posts from 870 to 674 (May-August 1929). 12 workers from the Elektrozavod (out of a total of 95 promotees) were moved into jobs in the Narkomfin apparatus. V. F. Starodubtsev, op. cit., p.173.

³⁶ William Campbell, a sympathetic observer at the time, recalls how the managing director of Soviet factories had two deputies in 1932, one of whom, the 'red director', was appointed by the city Party Committee. His 'sole function', according to Campbell, 'was to watch over the other two...Mostly they were former sailors from the revolutionary navy. The theory was that sailors were supposed to know all about machinery though in fact, with the odd exception, they were simple peasants whose only contact with machinery had been washing out the engine rooms of warships.' W. Campbell, Vili the Clown (London, 1981), p. 28.

classified as 'cells', major decisions being left to the raikom. Although some factory Party cells acquired the status of full primary organs, with their own Party committees and full-time staff, smaller factories retained the less privileged cells. The raikom's responsibilities included supervision of Party life in the factory, together with a direct involvement in the strictly economic aspects of factory administration. Even after the creation of full factory committees, the raikoms were still felt to have overall responsibility for economic and political affairs within their boundaries.

Although plenary sessions of the raikoms discussed a wide range of topics, including economic, social, cultural and political affairs in the raion, most of the raikom buro's time was taken up with the discussion of reports from enterprises, many of them concerned with the managerial aspects of factory administration.³⁷ A report of 1928 outlined the main tasks of the raikom in this area. They included daily contact with factory cells, investigations of individual enterprises and the study of specific questions of practical work, the selection and deployment of promotees and regular meetings with all cell secretaries and activists in each branch of industry.³⁸

The extent of their involvement was considerable, and could include intervention even at the level of the trust. In 1930, for example, a report by the head of the precision engineering trust, Tochmech, showed that relations between some of its factories, especially Geofizika, Aviapribor and Memza, had become strained over the past two years as a result of problems with raw materials and technical changes. This strain had led to a general shortfall in the group's plan fulfilment. As a result of the report, the Krasnaya Presnya raikom was instructed to intervene in the running of the trust, to try to establish better relations between the directors of the factories concerned and to 'liquidate the hold-up (proryv) in production

³⁷ The workplans for the Krasnaya Presnya raikom for July-September 1928 illustrate this point clearly. Of eight items on the programme for the plenum, only one concerned economic affairs, a debate on the prospects for the woollen industry in the raion. The buro had a larger programme, consisting of 35 items, 14 of which concerned industry, the majority of these being reports by the directors or Party cells of factories in the area. Plan raboty Krasno-Presnenskogo raikoma VKP(b), iyul'-oktyabr' 1928 g. (M., 1928), pp. 3-4.

³⁸ Dokladnaya zapiska v TsK VKP(b) o vypolnenie reshenii TsK po Krasnopresnenskomu raionu (M., 1930), p. 50.

of the previous quarter.'³⁹ To a large extent, the success of a raikom would be judged on this kind of work. In 1928, for example, a report on Khamovniki raikom found that its work in this field, including its record on enforcing Party directives on the economy at the factory level and its liaison with lower cells, was unsatisfactory. The raikom was to be 'put in order' by a team of half a dozen responsible workers from the MK orgraspredotdel.⁴⁰ In 1930, similar criticisms were levelled at the Zamoskvorech'e raikom, this time resulting in the removal of its secretary, Ryabov.⁴¹

c) The role of the factory Party organisation and its subsidiaries.

Officially, three main organisations were responsible for administrative questions within the factory; the Party cell, the trade union committee and the management, with mass meetings of workers, production conferences and commissions, adding suggestions from the shop floor. Each of these, as outlined above, had its own sphere of responsibility, although the precise boundaries between them were uncertain.

Of the three, consistently the weakest was the trade union. Party control of the trade unions at this level, especially after the defeat of the Rightist trade union chairman, Tomskii, was clear. As with the local soviets, the Party 'fraction' of the zavkom, the trade union committee in the factory, reporting to the Party cell, provided the real leadership in trade union affairs.⁴² Even elections to the zavkoms were supervised by Party brigades from the raikoms.⁴³ Filatov, the secretary of the Serp i Molot Party cell, remarked that the zavkom there was so ineffective that non-Party workers who joined it with a view to taking a part in factory affairs generally left it within two months in order to join the Party instead.⁴⁴

The responsibilities of the other two corners of the 'triangle', the cell and the director, are still the subject of controversy among students of the period. General definitions are hard to

³⁹ TsGAOR, 5469/14/45, ll.4-5.

⁴⁰ RM, 3/6/1928.

⁴¹ RM, 27/7/1930.

⁴² The Party's domination of the trade unions is emphasised by Davydova in her study of the Party's role in industrialisation between 1925 and 1928. Davydova, *op. cit.*, p. 591.

⁴³ Starodubtsev, *op. cit.*, p. 195.

⁴⁴ TsGAOR, 7952/3/267, 16.

sustain because of the importance of local factors, including the relative vigour of the two organisations in specific instances. Central directives were confused and contradictory. In the mid-'20's, the main fear of the Party leadership was that the cells were not discussing economic matters with sufficient frequency or confidence. By 1932, the problem, from the centre's point of view, was that the cells were overruling the director too often. This varying emphasis reflected the policy shifts of the TsK and MK as well as genuine changes in the situation in the factories. In view of the confusion, economic administration was a sphere in which local cells were obliged to work out their own solutions. Policy, as far as the cell's precise responsibilities within the factory was concerned, was hammered out by the activists involved.

'The Party' in the factory did not speak with a single voice. Among the distinctions which gave rise to different tendencies among Communists, generation, 'links with the countryside' and position within the factory were important. The individual's status in the Party also contributed to his outlook. Attempts to subordinate all Communists to Party discipline, regardless of the organisation in which they worked, had largely failed⁴⁵. Broadly, too, there was a distinction between full-time Party staff and the rank and file. Official pronouncements on the Party in the factory often ignored these differences. In the 1920's, they ~~were~~ less marked than subsequently, many factories lacking full-time Party staff, while others had only officials and no mass base on the shop floor⁴⁶. In factories without full-time staff, rank and file members, often including those who were temporarily given responsible posts, tended to have the same outlook as their fellow-workers. The widespread disillusionment caused by low wages and unemployment affected these Party members no less than other workers, and incidents where members of the Party cell, as well as the zavkom, 'mis-understood' their role in the factory and led workers' protest movements,

⁴⁵ For a discussion of the loyalty of Party members who worked in the state apparatus, see below, p. 205.

⁴⁶ There is no available systematic information on the number of full-time officials in Moscow factories. Records quote the number of 'activists' (see below, p. 225), but these were mainly people who worked on a voluntary basis. Although factory committee secretaries and shop cell secretaries in large factories were 'relieved from other work', the shortage of full-time officials was clearly a problem, as the use of 'flying squads' to solve problems suggests.

including strikes, occasionally reached the Party press⁴⁷. On the other hand, full-time Party members, career politicians appointed by the MK, often sympathised more with the factory administration than with their own rank and file. The same was occasionally true of cell secretaries from the bench who 'grew in office' even if their appointment was only temporary, incurring the criticism from their fellow-Communists that they had turned their back on the 'mass'.

The regime of economy provides examples of both types, rank and file and professional. In general, Party cells neglected the work required of them during the campaign. Savvat'ev reported that on average less than a quarter of Communists in the Moscow factories studied in 1926 had attended the general meetings where the issue had been discussed.⁴⁸ On the other hand, all branches of the administration in some factories were guilty of 'misinterpreting' the campaign, and making economies along the line of least resistance, by cutting workers' wages, raising norms, and reducing the size of the workforce.⁴⁹

Confusion also arose between rank and file Party members' two roles as 'model producers' and as part-time administrators. This can be illustrated by the example of production meetings, a persistent source of concern from the 1920's onwards. First introduced in 1921 and made general in 1924, production meetings were supposed to be forums at which workers could propose ways of improving the production process, ranging from alterations in their own machinery to major reforms within the enterprise or branch of industry.⁵⁰ Attendance by Communists was regarded as valuable for two reasons. On one hand, they were expected to set an example, to attend and to propose suitable measures themselves, while on the other, they were expected to use the meetings as a means of mobilising the

⁴⁷ Examples were quoted above, p 49.

⁴⁸ VII plenum MK (1926), p. 4. Suvorov, writing about the Moscow textile industry and using Party archives, remarks that 'in some textile enterprises, the Party and trade union organisations did not show the necessary activism in the matter of implementing the regime of economy, they did not involve workers in the struggle for the further improvement and modernisation of the organisation of labour and productivity.' Yu. I. Suvorov, Bor'ba Kommunisticheskoi Partii za povyshenie proizvodstva v oblasti promyshlennosti (Yaroslavl' 1972), p. 42.

⁴⁹ Suvorov, loc cit. At the plenum, Savvat'ev reported how workers had come to see the regime of economy (rezhim ekonomiki) as 'cutting the economy' (rezhem ekonomiyu), and regarded it as another measure directed against them by the state. VII plenum, p. 68.

⁵⁰ Davydova, op. cit., p. 56.

workforce from above. In July 1927, for example, the MK buro noted that not enough work had been done through the production meetings 'to prepare the general mood of the workers' for the rationalisation of industry campaign.⁵¹ Production meetings were expected to yield more than just suggestions from workers. Repeatedly, MK reports on the meetings condemned the local cells' failure both to encourage workers' enthusiasm and to mobilise mass support.

Figures provided by MGSPS indicate that attendance by Communists at production meetings was not as low as the MK suggested, however, especially in industries where the Party 'layer' was substantial.⁵² The failure of production meetings was not merely caused by weak attendance, or even lack of zeal, but by confusion about their purpose, and a certain amount of reluctance on the side of both management and Party leadership to implement the suggestions raised. On average, only about a third of workers' suggestions got any further than the foreman's desk. Sometimes this was because of a lack of resources to implement them⁵³, otherwise it seems to have been because of the unlikely nature of the suggestions themselves⁵⁴.

Not surprisingly, the low level of implementation led to cynicism about the meetings, and attendance by ordinary workers was at best sporadic. All kinds of mass meeting in the factories were liable to boycott by disillusioned workers, who rightly perceived that their contribution might be meaningless, except as an addition to the record of 'activism'. Party members, anxious to show high turn-out figures at their workplaces, often devised

⁵¹ Dokumenty trudovoi slavy moskvichei, 1919-1965. Iz istorii bor'by za razvitie kommunisticheskoi form truda. Sbornik dokumentov i materialov (M., 1967), p. 77.

⁵² The figures for September/October 1925 showed that on average, half the people attending production conferences in the metal and food processing industries were Communists, and two-thirds of those in the printing industry. The lowest percentages were in areas where Party membership was itself low; the textile, construction and chemical industries. Dokumenty trudovoi slavy, p. 42.

⁵³ This was particularly the case with expensive proposals, like the regularly mooted suggestion that transport between shops should be mechanised.

⁵⁴ Roughly a quarter of suggestions concerned 'improvements' to individual machines, some of which were implemented successfully, while others, if implemented, would have made production so complicated that only the worker who had designed the improvement could ever have operated the machine. The rate of implementation is discussed in Dokumenty trudovoi slavy. Some of the suggestions for improvements at the Krasnyi Proletarii factory were recalled by engineers in 1932. TsGAOR, 7952/3/94 and 96, passim.

unorthodox tactics of their own to improve the situation. Inducements like scarce and attractive food might be offered at the end of meetings. If the carrot failed, then Party officials might resort to compulsion, as in the case of a mine in the Moscow oblast', where meetings were held at the bottom of the shaft at the end of shifts, thus obliging workers to attend⁵⁵. When official policy was particularly unpopular, attendance by every kind of worker, including rank and file Communists, plummeted. In 1929, for example, enthusiasm for Party work was so low that election meetings in AMO, Serp i Molot and other factories, including a printworks, could not even attract quorums⁵⁶.

The problems raised by the tension between Party, mass and management could be smoothed over in the 1920's, when Party cells could avoid production issues by concentrating on mass work, recruitment and intra-Party affairs. Although economic questions were part of the agenda of local cells in the 1920's, it was not until 1928 that the details of economic management began to dominate the meetings of local cells, as they also did those of raikoms and the MK itself. Conflicting criticisms were made of the local cells in the Party press during the first Five Year Plan. On one hand, they continued to be accused of taking too little interest in economic matters, while on the other, to an increasing extent, they were reprimanded for their breaches of edinonachalie. Which criticism reflected the real state of Moscow industry in the period 1928-32?

There is no doubt that factory Party cells were grossly overburdened with duties of all kinds throughout the period, and also that members often lacked the training or the motivation to fulfil them adequately. As a result, production questions were still often neglected. In 1928, the Dinamo Party cell discussed economic issues once at a total of 13 meetings over an eight-month period.⁵⁷ In Serp i Molot in the economic year 1927/8, 194 separate questions were discussed by the Party cell, only 4 of which concerned the economy.⁵⁸ Among the other pressing duties of the Party cells, the purge of 1929 and the campaign of mass-recruitment were particularly important in this period. Moreover, most cell secretaries,

⁵⁵ P, 18/7/1932

⁵⁶ Izvestiya MK, 1929, Nos 1-2, p. 14.

⁵⁷ P, 28/10/1928.

⁵⁸ Voprosy Istorii KPSS (V I KPSS), 1969, No 6, p. 88.

full-time or voluntary, had no training for economic matters. This was especially a problem for full-time officials brought in from outside the industry concerned. A survey carried out in January 1930 covering 20 major factories, including AMO, Dinamo and Trekhgornaya Manufaktura, found that of 80 leading figures in the factory Party committees, almost none had any technical training. More investigations in April showed that 27% of Party secretaries in Moscow's metal industry had no working experience of the industry at all.⁵⁹

Lack of time, training or enthusiasm could easily bring the factory Party organisations into disrepute among the workforce. A study conducted by the metalworkers' union in 1930 concluded that low attendance rates at planning meetings by Party members suggested to workers that 'the approach of the administration to the establishment of control figures is not serious.'⁶⁰ 'Our meetings,' noted a Party member from the Tsindel' factory, 'often lack a businesslike quality.'⁶¹ Rank and file Communists also failed to set a good example in many cases. When party members themselves did not turn up for subbotniki, ordinary workers could not be blamed for 'absenteeism' at these 'voluntary' sessions.⁶²

After 1929, however, excessive tampering in the affairs of management began to be seen as more serious than the laxity described above. While resolutions urging Communists to take an active part in socialist competition and shock work streamed from the press⁶³, more emphasis was laid, especially after September 1929, on the director's formal economic leadership. Among the reasons for this was the proven effect of Party intervention. Far from improving production and industrial relations within the factory, the Party often made matters worse. Between 1928 and 1931, the Party cell had a chance to take a creative lead in industrialisation. Thereafter, for reasons which will be discussed below, the manager was confirmed in his position of supremacy within the factory.

⁵⁹ PS 1931, No. 1.

⁶⁰ TsGAOR, 5469/14/242, 20.

⁶¹ RM, 10/9/1927.

⁶² PS 1930, No. 21.

⁶³ By the middle of 1929, all workers in the Party were expected to participate in socialist competition, although there is no evidence that they all did so.

During the first Five Year Plan, after the Shakhty trial, the purge of the apparatus and the promotion campaigns, Party involvement reached a peak. After 1928, the size of the factory Party organisations⁶⁴, structural reform of the factory Party⁶⁵ and the increased burdens imposed on all branches of the factory administration by the tempo of industrialisation led to greater Party involvement in all aspects of factory life, especially economic administration. Cell buros' responsibility to the raion and other senior Party organs included a regular report on the economic affairs of the enterprise, for the purposes of which they were held responsible for many of the economic problems, or achievements, which occurred. Moreover, regular directives from above demanded that they take an interest in the details of economic administration. 'Our work', said one directive, 'is composed of the minute details of life'.⁶⁶ Party members, even only in their capacity as Communists, were urged to study productive processes and to examine every detail systematically with the director.⁶⁷

At a time when many directors were believed to harbour 'oppositionist tendencies' on questions like the tempo of industrialisation, the more politically 'reliable' Party cell had to take a lead in production issues. Even directors who did not oppose current policy feared the possibility of unpredictable condemnation and were thus reluctant to take decisive action. An example from the 'Duks' factory was used to illustrate the problem to delegates at the September 1928 plenum of the MK. The director there wanted to increase the allowance of soap in the factory washrooms by 50 grammes, at a cost of two kopeks, but before doing so, telephoned the trust to make sure it was permissible. The phone calls and other communications between the trust and the director ended up incurring costs of about thirty roubles. A cynical voice from the floor interrupted at this point, commenting that 'the trust

⁶⁴ As we have seen, the increase in the number of Party members in the factories was specifically aimed at improving the Party's effectiveness as an organiser of economic campaigns and a 'transmission belt' between economic decision-makers and the mass of workers.

⁶⁵ See Chapter 1. The factory Party now reached, in theory at least, every shop, shift and brigade.

⁶⁶ RM, 3/9/1927.

⁶⁷ See Bauman's speech, quoted in I. Gaidul', Litsom k proizvodstvu. Opyt raboty partkomiteta zavoda 'Serp i Molot' (M., 1930), p. 22. For an example of the detailed intervention which followed, and was encouraged officially, see RM, 11/1/1932, which refers to Party 'troikas' working in the Kauchuk factory.

no doubt set up a commission to look into it.'⁶⁸ The economic organs did not have a reputation for taking quick decisions.

Directors also had a reputation for not fulfilling plans enthusiastically, and in fact often resisted over-ambitious planning. This was the case in the Krasnyi Proletarii cell, for example, where two directors in succession, Prokhorov and Stepanov, resisted optimal plans for the reconstruction of the factory and were eventually replaced. Faliks, the secretary of the cell in 1928-9, later gave his account of its role. It consisted, he said, 'of the Party itself leading the struggle for the fastest possible reconstruction of the factory. The cell itself took an active part in seeing that the first diesel shop should be completed, the construction of which had begun in 1914.'⁶⁹ Gaidul', the secretary of the Serp i Molot committee in 1929, listed eight functions for the factory committee in the economic field, including the introduction of a 12-month working year and seven-day week, the drawing up of control figures for the factory on a monthly, six-monthly and yearly basis, rationalisation plans, and a number of detailed questions of administration.⁷⁰

Details of the work of the Party committees from both factories indicate how far, on their own initiative, they had become involved in management by 1929. In that year, production at Krasnyi Proletarii, and also at the nearby Vladimir Il'ich factory, was seriously hampered by the demolition of the factories' foundries, a political decision aimed at 'rationalising' production by paving the way for a shared, purpose-built foundry in the area. The affair, the centre of a long scandal, contributed to the downfall of the technical director of the trust, Satel', and the director of the factory, Stepanov, both of whom were later implicated in the 'Industrial Party'. Neither Stepanov nor his successor, Mozgov, enjoyed the whole-hearted confidence of the Party cell buro. As one report later put it, 'two corners of the triangle have burned up, one remains - the cell, and therefore the cell has had to take on part of the work' of the other two.⁷¹ The cell buro's discussions in 1929 were thus dominated by economic

⁶⁸ V Ob"edinennyi Plenum MK i MKK VKP(b) (M., 1928), p. 63.

⁶⁹ TsGAOR, 7952/3/96, 78. Faliks' reminiscences were written down in 1933, after Party policy had shifted back in favour of the director's sole power in the economic field.

⁷⁰ Gaidul', op. cit., p. 8.

⁷¹ TsGAOR, 7952/3/82, 27. This file consists of notes taken at the meetings of the Krasnyi Proletarii factory cell buro for the years 1929-30.

affairs. At the time of Mozgov's appointment, it held a detailed discussion of his tasks, at which technical issues were debated as if the resolution of such problems rested primarily with the cell.⁷² Other appointments were discussed throughout the year, the cell showing a clear independence in all matters affecting factory life.

To see this as a simple confrontation between the director and the cell would be a mistake, however. The terms in which edinonachalie was to be discussed in September concealed a more complex reality than the simple 'triangle' image suggests. Where there were disputes at Krasnyi Proletarii, it was not always the case that the cell buro as a whole was aligned against the director. The buro itself was divided and its members were individuals who did not always group the same way on every question. Moreover, members of the buro could side with the director rather than with their Party comrades. This was particularly true of Faliks, the cell secretary.

Faliks had risen from the ranks of the factory Party organisation, and was regarded very much as a comrade by the other members of the cell, but as secretary, he identified with the management on several occasions. In January and February, the cell buro devoted two meetings to the appointment of a head for the mechanical shop. Although Men'shikov, clearly a 'bourgeois specialist', had been appointed to the post the previous year, the recent MRKI resolution on specialists, in connection with the anti-Right campaign, cast doubts on his suitability. In particular, the director and the factory cell secretary were alarmed about the possibility of future criticism, and proposed that he be withdrawn. Men'shikov himself declared that he 'had never wanted the job anyway.' The buro discussed the matter, at first supporting Faliks and Stepanov.

It was a speech by Babaev which swung the discussion the other way. He declared that 'this is the first buro which has given way on every question; now we have to kneel in front of the manager, so that he will fulfil the Party's resolution.' After that, other speakers weighed in against the director and cell secretary, with the result that Men'shikov was

⁷² Ibid, II. 35-40.

eventually appointed as planned.⁷³ At the next buro meeting, Stepanov and Faliks again raised the question of Men'shikov, but the cell refused to consider the alternative candidate, Ganrio, and Men'shikov remained in his post, despite flurries of criticism, concerted by Faliks, that he was disliked by the other specialists in his shop.

The files from Krasnyi Proletarii illustrate how divided the Party was at all levels. The 'chain of command', far from connecting the tiers of the hierarchy in an orderly fashion, appears to have been broken or twisted in many places. Everywhere, people were having to take initiatives in order to solve problems on which there were no official guidelines. To avoid punishment for the inevitable mistakes, they often had to conceal what they were doing from colleagues and superiors. The cell buro at Krasnyi Proletarii, for example, systematically attempted to deceive the raikom about its performance in September 1929. It also defended its interests against raikom intervention. An attempt in August by the raikom to remove the recently-appointed cell buro secretary, Kulikov, on the grounds of his inexperience, failed. The cell showed no fear of expressing its views, even if Ryabov, the raikom secretary, was present. When the raikom met at Krasnyi Proletarii to discuss the factory's poor record, cell buro members criticised their Party superiors for disrupting their work as well as taking criticism from above. 'If you will take ten people from us every month,' remarked one buro member, 'we can't really be expected to develop an aktiv'⁷⁴.

The lower levels in the Party hierarchy showed a similar attitude towards the cell buro. Concealing its work from them or over-ruling them for the sake of convenience, the cell buro treated them no better. Official communications between the layers were stilted and often misleading. For example, the September 1929 open meeting of the Krasnyi Proletarii buro, attended by the aktiv, came to conclusions about the state of Party work in the factory quite different from those of the closed meeting which immediately followed it. The buro's regular report, which also appeared in September, used bland phrases such as 'satisfactory' to describe the work of the zavkom and production meetings, although closed sessions of the buro had recently condemned them, and passed urgent resolutions calling for reform.

⁷³ Ibid., ll. 20-21.

⁷⁴ Ibid, l. 153.

Misleading or euphemistic reports like this were seldom investigated by the senior Party organs⁷⁵. The latter understood that too much was expected of the local cells, and that investigations would reveal shortcomings to which no-one had a solution. Despite central admonitions on 'concrete' reporting, most local officials were happy with a *modus vivendi* which enabled them collectively to ignore intractable problems.

In general, the lower Party activists showed that they were not easily manipulated by the factory Party buro. Their interests were wide-ranging, and not always confined to the orderly discussion of economic issues. In this sense, they were an imperfect organ for transmitting central labour and industrial policy to the broad ranks of the working class. While the factory committee was obliged, for practical reasons, to discuss management questions as a matter of urgency, the lower cells, lacking the ultimate responsibility for the factory's success or failure, pressed their superiors on political issues such as the defeat of the Right and the expulsion of Trotsky. At a meeting at Krasnyi Proletarii held to discuss the resolutions of the XVI Party Conference, for example, all but one of the questions from the *aktiv* were concerned with high politics, and the approach of the questioners was critical of the leadership. The banishment of Trotsky in particular drew hostile comment, workers feeling that from abroad, 'Mister Trotsky' could do more harm to the Soviet Union than he might have done in Alma-Ata⁷⁶. When economic policy was discussed, it was to express scepticism about the wisdom of the latest directives⁷⁷.

Krasnyi Proletarii's problems were regarded as particularly acute in 1929, but they were by no means unique. Complaints about cell secretaries' 'bureaucratism', directors' 'opportunism', the lack of communication between the layers in the factory Party organisation, and about buros which 'substituted themselves' for the lower Party organs,

⁷⁵ When the lamp department in Elektroavod was destroyed by an explosion, the Party committee there reported only that 'socialist competition brought no results in this department.' TsGAOR, 7952/3/490, 42. No criticism of this report was made, and no investigation followed in the Moscow press.

⁷⁶ This was partly the regime's own fault, for giving prominence in the national press to Trotsky's publication, in the West, of articles critical of the USSR. The idea had been to show how inimical he was to the national interest, but these reports suggest that the propaganda move backfired.

⁷⁷ TsGAOR, 7952/3/82, 71-5.

were common in the press of the period. At the lowest levels, in the shifts and brigades, the multiplicity of organisations, even within the Party structure alone, led to a situation in which nobody knew who was responsible for implementing policy, a problem which commonly lead to paralysis at this level. Collecting membership dues on time was too much for many grupporgs; when it came to the details of economic life their interventions were often sporadic, clumsy and disruptive.⁷⁸ In this period, the Party leadership repeatedly instructed organisations in the shifts and brigades to distinguish between their tasks and the details which were outside their responsibility, but even these instructions were confusing and contradictory.

At Krasnyi Proletarii, all these problems led to chaos in 1930-31, although here again the factory was not an exception. In these years, factory administrations everywhere were liable to crisis, as directors feared to take responsibility and Party organisations lacked the coherence or the technical expertise to substitute for them adequately. The result was direct intervention from outside to re-establish workable production relations in the factory. Here again, Party officials played a prominent role, but more as bearers of ideology than as surrogates for management. The struggle was not only about who should take decisions in the factory, and covered such matters as the pace of change and the methods to be used in plan fulfilment. Setting the factories on the 'correct' path, in 1930-1 terms, involved eradicating opposition to high plan targets, socialist competition and new work norms. Within factories, there were confrontations between generations (old specialists versus the new generation from the VTUZy), between layers in the Party hierarchy, between Party and workers and Party and management. The tactics used by Communist officials, assisted at times by the OGPU, involved the creation of a new demonology of 'enemies'. Once again, politics took over in the administration of the enterprise.

⁷⁸ The cells' 'lack of responsibility' was one of the main criticisms of them made in Kaganovich's May 1932 speech. PS, 1932, Nos. 11-12. The records from Krasnyi Proletarii contain plentiful evidence that workers resented interference by 'crude' Party members. Balashov, a member of the cell buro, made the point at a meeting in September 1929, when he remarked that factory staff in general disliked working with Communists. TsGAOR, 7952/3/82, 56.

At Krasnyi Proletarii, the struggle was particularly bitter. Accounts of the cell buro's meetings for 1930 and the first part of 1931 are written in pencil on a few scraps of paper, a sharp contrast to the orderly typescript records of 1929. Faliks later recalled the difficulties of the period, but his account has been carefully cut out of the archival record with scissors or a razor blade⁷⁹. All that remains are his recollections of meetings which went on into the small hours, sometimes until four in the morning, where the difficulties were hotly debated, more than once in the presence of the OGPU. At Serp i Molot, the account of 'enemies' shows how crude the campaign could be. Here again, Satel', and another representative of Mashinotrest', List, were among the highly-placed 'enemies' removed in the autumn of 1929. The factory's own chief engineer, Mattis, was another. Their well-grounded doubts about the chances of reconstructing the original Serp i Molot rather than building on a more suitable site⁸⁰, were one of the main reasons for their disgrace at the factory⁸¹. After their defeat, resistance to the reconstruction plan could always be branded as 'wrecking', and the campaign to eradicate opposition, waste and idleness continued at a high pitch. 'Our enemies' tails', said one article in the factory newspaper, Martenovka, 'are being concealed under a workers' blouse'⁸².

The Party cell's role thus shifted, in 1930 and 1931, towards instilling discipline and setting examples, and away from detailed intervention in the director's work. At the same time, the campaigns run by Party and Komsomol activists under the guise of 'mass work' were as disruptive as former breaches in edinonachalie. Campaigns like socialist competition on one hand, and the drive for optimal planning on the other, with its concomitant, the removal of people who doubted the feasibility of high targets, continued to ensure that if the earth trembled before anyone in the factory in the period before 1932, it was the Party secretary, rather than the director. Even on the shop floor, Party members could interfere with such matters as the nomination of 'shock' workers, despite the fact that this was strictly a managerial matter. It has been seen how even the shift cells had members responsible for

⁷⁹ TsGAOR, 7952/3/96, 75.

⁸⁰ Among their reasons for doubting the reconstruction project were the factory's record of accidents caused by cramped and poorly-ventilated conditions and the desirability of a much larger site than was available at the factory's existing premises.

⁸¹ Martenovka, March 1930, quoted in TsGAOR, 7952/3/253, 130-3.

⁸² Ibid., I.105.

economic questions, and were supposed to hear reports on the economic life of the shift at regular intervals. Both rank and file Party members and their leaders succeeded, by their often ill-informed interventions, in alienating large sections of the technical staff in enterprises in this period, a problem not solved by the belated holding of conferences to draw the latter into the current campaign.⁸³

The Party's involvement in industry in the years 1929-31 cannot be seen as an aberration by the lower ranks. Despite the resolution on edinonachalie, the centre's policies on Party structure and on recruitment in these years indicated its strong desire to involve the masses in production and to politicise them as far as possible. The need to do so was obvious. Without the support and sacrifice of the mass of workers, the production leaps of the period would have been impossible. From the late summer of 1929 until late in 1930, as the hardships of the 'second revolution' drowned the flush of early enthusiasm, worker resistance, including organised protest, was a worrying problem. It is possible that without the Party to cajole and coerce the mass, and also to supervise reluctant directors, rapid industrialisation would have been impossible. By 1931, however, a different emphasis began to be apparent.

The change involved a number of policy shifts, including the differentiation of wages, the renewed recruitment of specialists into the Party, and encouragement to the director, now almost certainly a Party member, to shoulder responsibilities on his own. The other side of this coin was a retreat from the 'proletarian' policies of the previous three years. It has been seen how proletarian recruitment came to an end in 1933, and how the shift cell and its subsidiaries disappeared, to be replaced by more streamlined, professionally-run shop and factory Party committees. In his speech proposing the change, made at an MGK plenum in May 1932, Kaganovich placed particular emphasis on the need for responsibilities within the factory to be clearly defined.⁸⁴ One effect of the changes of 1932 was undoubtedly to

⁸³ Such a campaign was held at Elektrozaovod, where relations between the technical personnel and the Party had deteriorated during the first half of 1929. TsGAOR, 7952/3/490, 75, which is an account of a technicians' meeting held in Moscow's Meyerhold theatre.

⁸⁴ For example, he quoted a 'hot' shop in the Dinamo factory where drinking water had not been available for six days as a result of obezlichka, lack of responsibility.

strengthen the position of the director and the technical side of management. This was not the same as returning to the pre-Shakhty status quo, however. Although the Party cells' involvement in economic decision-making raised problems of both discipline and economic efficiency, and was thus in many senses a failure, the period between 1928 and 1931 was important for the Bolsheviks in that it saw a decisive reduction in the power of the old-style 'bourgeois' specialist. The retreat from the policies of 'cultural revolution' was possible because in that respect, they had succeeded.

It would be excessively teleological to argue that the power of the Party rank and file had been invoked in this period temporarily and for that end only. There is no reason to suppose that the political leadership foresaw in 1928 that they would soon have to reverse the 'mass' policies of the first Five Year Plan. Their hope that a broadly-based Party could solve the problem of mass working class mobilisation was briefly justified by the enthusiasm for the economic drive in 1929.⁸⁵ By 1932, however, the idea was almost entirely abandoned. As has already been argued, the other aspect of the change of 1931-2 was to reduce mass participation in the life of the factory. As the example of Krasnyi Proletarii showed, the Party in the factory in the years 1929-31 was not a strictly disciplined unit. The elaborate system had failed to work to the leadership's satisfaction. The reform of 1932 reduced the possibilities for confusion, concentrating responsibility in fewer and more trusted hands.

As in the case of re-structuring, it was not simply a matter of improving efficiency. Filatov, writing about the reorganisation in Serp i Molot, explained that the change ensured that there would be strong leaders for every cell and that leadership henceforward would be 'concrete'.⁸⁶ Party work was now to be more disciplined and predictable. By 1932, the emphasis of Party work in the factories was on the full-time, 'responsible' staff, and their fellow-Communist, the director. The important shift in the Party's involvement was not that it was reduced, for high-level involvement probably increased, but that it no longer involved

⁸⁵ The evidence for widespread enthusiasm among workers in the first half of 1929 is overwhelming. It is attested in the memoirs of Western visitors to the USSR, including critics like Eugene Lyons, and also in the initial levels of participation in the socialist competition and shock work campaigns.

⁸⁶ TsGAOR, 7952/3/267, 13.

the mass of the rank and file. The Party presence in the factories now principally took the form of intervention by the TsK, MK and raikoms. The role of the factory level Party organisation changed, reducing the amount of initiative and power in untried hands. As one historian put it, 'the Party cell...would end up, in fact, as the manager's supportive lobby, his tolkach, thus losing its leading position in the factory when at the same time the Party's higher authorities were strengthening their own grip on affairs nationally.'⁸⁷

This example of the Party's role shows how much it changed in this period, and how much confusion, even at senior levels, existed over the form Bolshevik control of the country's development should take. The Moscow Party could not carry out all the tasks expected of it without confusion and occasional disastrous mistakes. Although it was sometimes used as an example to other organisations, the Moscow Party had its fair share of problems coping with economic life in this period. For this reason, the leadership concluded that some kind of reform was urgently needed. The abolition of the shift cell was heralded by Kaganovich's speech in Moscow, and influenced directly by his observations in Moscow factories in 1932.

It remains to be asked whether the TsK was correct to take action in response to Kaganovich's initiative. It seems unquestionable, in this instance, that it was. If even the Moscow Party could not carry out all the tasks expected of it without costly mistakes, then reform on a national basis was almost certainly required. Not even in the Stakhanovite period was the power of the factory Party cell relative to the director again to be so great. For the most part, local Party cells lacked the skill or the personnel to meet the many demands upon them. However, it should not be assumed that they were to blame for all the mistakes officially attributed to them. Responsibility for the failures of this period more often lay with the central authorities. The goals of the first Five Year Plan put a strain on all levels of the Party, but the centre, itself unable to cope, increasingly passed the burden down to the regional and local organisations. It relied on their initiatives. Sometimes, its dissatisfaction with the cells arose from a fear that they were developing excessive

⁸⁷ M. Lewin, *op. cit.*, p. 252.

autonomy, rather than that they were incompetent. At other times, it decided that the aktiv were incapable of meeting all the demands laid on them. The latter should not be blamed for either. Often, admittedly, activists lacked training, enthusiasm, time or skills. On the other hand, even if they had been endowed with all these things, they could never have fulfilled all that was expected of them.

Chapter 5. 'Political Education', Agitation and Propaganda.

The Party's involvement in management, as in all spheres of government and administration, was contentious. In many ways, theorists and overworked activists alike were unhappy with the Party's ousting of the formal executive organs. Ideological work, however, was indisputably the Party's preserve. For the vanguard of the proletariat in a backward country, education was a major priority.

Officially, the goal was to turn all Soviet citizens into motivated and active builders of socialism. By the 1920's, however, the object of 'agitational work' had changed. It retained its idealistic overtones, but short term goals, such as the explanation of unpopular aspects of Party policy or the inculcation of narrow 'Party lines' for factional purposes, the common stuff of all governments in power, occupied most of the agitators' energy. Agitational work rapidly acquired a manipulative aspect. New pressures brought a further change by the end of the decade. During the period of the first Five Year Plan, theoretical issues slid into second place behind the supervision of the economy. Increasingly, agitation came to mean mobilising the masses for production efforts.

As an instrument for agitation, the Party had many shortcomings. Dedicated and effective agitators were woefully lacking in 1925, and despite efforts in this period, remained so in 1932. Part of the Party's object in recruiting thousands of workers from the factory floor had been to extend its influence to all sections of the working class. In theory, all of these new members should have been able to explain the Party's line, as well as providing living examples of its benefits. But new recruits were often ignorant of Party policy. Some even chose to interpret it in their own fashion, as the participation in strikes demonstrated. Thus, rapid recruitment left the Party leadership with the problem of moulding thousands of raw recruits into a politically reliable body, schooled to accept the official version of the Party's history, goals and tactics. The Lenin Enrolment of 1924 brought the problem into sharp focus, and provoked the foundation of numerous schools for the training of recruits. Subsequent campaigns of mass recruitment kept the question of training and re-training high

on the agenda. Even long-standing members needed to be kept informed of recent resolutions on foreign and domestic policy. The task of Party education was potentially endless.

Both agitation (work among people who were not Party members) and propaganda (political work among Party members) were the responsibility of the agitpropotdel, or APPO. Its head was a member of the MK secretariat, although he ranked second to the head of the orgraspredotdel.¹ The other members included a deputy head, the editors of the Moscow Party newspapers and journals, and representatives from the the raion and uezd APPOs. It met about three times a month to co-ordinate its activities and to hear reports about aspects of its recent work. In addition, a number of responsible instructors were attached to the APPO at the MK and raion levels. They acted as a link between the APPOs and groups of enterprises, checking on the fulfilment of directives and giving advice.²

Below this level, where APPO workers were full-time politicians, were the propagandists, usually part-time activists who ran courses of Party education, and the less prestigious agitators. It will be seen later how much difficulty the Party found in training suitable people for this work. Ambitious targets were the first problem. The second was the consistently lower priority accorded to agitprop work compared with more pressing administrative tasks. Everything depended on the education of Party members, so this will be studied first.

Party Education.

Party education is a subject which easily lends itself to misunderstandings. One of its goals was to bind the Party membership into a coherent body, capable of setting an example for the rest of the population and providing leadership wherever needed. As well as theoretical training, practical skills were required, especially for those who were to chair meetings, act as secretaries or carry out other administrative tasks. On the other hand, 'education' for the Party rank and file can be viewed as indoctrination in the pejorative sense. The idea that new

¹ For the secretaries of the APPO, see appendix 1.

² N.S. Davydova, *op. cit.*, p. 404.

recruits were trained as unquestioning supporters of the current line is widely and uncritically accepted. Our understanding of the Bolshevik Party of the 1920's requires a more sophisticated picture of the education provided for members. The notion that it was simply indoctrination needs to be examined. More significantly, the results, in terms of the degree of homogeneity of Party members' political views, require careful assessment.

The first problem for Party members was basic education. Illiteracy was not as much of a problem in Moscow as elsewhere in the USSR, but it remained a stumbling block for all aspects of agitprop work. Statistics on illiteracy vary widely, usually because the problem was defined variously in different surveys.³ Whether or not they were technically defined as 'illiterate', it is clear that a large proportion of Party members and candidates lacked the skills of fluent reading and comprehension necessary for an appreciation of Bolshevik theory and policy. Figures collected for the national Party census in 1927 showed that only 0.8% of Party members, and only 3% of white collar employees (sluzhashchie)⁴, had completed courses of higher education. In Moscow, where there were fewer peasant Communists, and many more white collar workers, than the national average, the proportion of Party members with higher or secondary education must have been slightly greater, but the lack of specialists was a problem everywhere. Not surprisingly, the valued worker cadres generally lacked even secondary education. Nationally, the figures were as follows:

³ In 1925, one survey gave the overall percentage of illiterate Party members (including candidates) as 3%. In the industrial region which included Moscow, the figure quoted was much lower, only 0.5%. Iz TsK, 1925, Nos. 43-44. This seems too low in view of the general levels of illiteracy outside the Party. Davydova (op. cit., p. 677) quotes figures which suggest a much greater problem. According to her statistics, 27.2% of workers in the Krasnaya Roza textile factory and 12.1% in the Babaeva chocolate factory were illiterate. Overall, she states that 14% of workers in the city of Moscow, and 24% in the gubernia, were illiterate in the mid-1920's. There is also some evidence to suggest that the problem would have increased as the number of workers coming directly from the villages rose. See V. A. Kumanev, Sotsializm i vsenarodnaya gramotnost' (M., 1967), p. 161.

⁴ Sluzhashchie included office workers and clerks, technical personnel (ITR) and also certain categories of cleaners, doormen, and ancillary staff. See chapter 3, p. 120.

Education of Party Members by Social Origin⁵

<u>Social Group</u>	<u>Education</u>				
	<u>Higher</u>	<u>Secondary</u>	<u>Primary</u>	<u>Self-taught</u>	<u>Illiterate</u>
Workers	0.1%	3.9%	63.9%	30.3%	1.8%
Peasants	0.1%	3.6%	60.9%	28.5%	6.9%
<u>Sluzhashchie</u>	3.0%	20.9%	62.8%	12.8%	0.5%
Others	1.6%	12.7%	51.9%	30.5%	3.3%
Total	0.8%	7.9%	62.8%	26.1%	2.4%

Party strategists did not consider it the task of the Party's own education network to make up for missed general education, but all programmes of political training were hampered by recruits' lack of learning skills and basic general knowledge. These problems must be borne in mind when considering the Party's figures for 'political education', which show how many members were enrolled in the various courses offered by Communist propagandists. Although the enrolment figures appear impressive, and the texts studied could be complicated or abstruse, the scheduled courses were seldom satisfactorily completed.

Although the enrolment figures must be treated with caution, they were viewed with optimism at the time. They suggested a widespread success for the Party education network. Smitten's figures showed that in 1927, 41% of Party members had completed courses of political education nationally.⁶ Figures from the Moscow Party suggested that it was slightly in advance of the national average in terms of political education.⁷

⁵ Source: E. Smitten, Sostav Vsesoyuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (bol'shevikov) (po materialam partiinoi perepisi 1927 goda) (M., 1927), p. 60.

⁶ The percentages for members and candidates were as follows:
 Graduates of Communist Universities (Komvuzy) 0.3%
 Completed courses at Party Schools (Sovpartshkoly) 5.9%
 Completed courses at political literacy schools (shkoly politgramoty)
 In urban areas 29.2%
 In rural areas 5.5%

Percentages based on figures in E. Smitten, op. cit., p. 63.

⁷ G. Gak, Za kachestvo propagandista (soderzhanie i metody raboty nad povysheniem kvalifikatsii propagandista) (M-L, 1929), p. 8.

Moscow had a number of special advantages from the education point of view. Most importantly, the majority of the country's VUZy were situated there, and their facilities were available to the MK in the holidays and evenings. Their students were also available to act as propagandists in the city.⁸ The Moscow Party organisation was expected to provide cadres for other areas of the USSR, but it enjoyed a number of privileges in educating them. There were thus considerable pressures on it to show a good training record. In this respect, Moscow differed from many other industrial areas where political education was increasingly neglected.

From the early 1920's, a tiered system of Party education evolved to cope with the wide range of needs. Basic education was provided by the schools of 'political literacy' (politgramota), small classes in factories or workers' clubs, open to both Party members and ordinary people. These were modified after the Lenin enrolment in order to prepare large numbers of recruits for Party life as quickly as possible.⁹ There were two courses offered, the first and second grades. In the first grade, students learned the Party programme and rules and were instructed in the principles of current policy. The course was expected to last three months, and students who failed to complete it successfully were not supposed to be permitted to join the Party or to repeat the course. The ease of the course is reflected in the fact that illiterate and semi-literate students were allowed to join it if they also agreed to learn to read and write.¹⁰ The number of first-grade schools was loosely linked to the rate of recruitment. In 1927, the number of classes was reduced, but by 1930, attention again turned to this kind of political education.¹¹

The second grade at the political literacy school taught the principles of current economic policy, Marxist economics in general and the history of the Communist Party. Only students who had completed the first grade could join, and the course, consisting of classes once a

⁸ IV Plenum MK (1925), p. 24. The work counted towards students' obshchestvennaya rabota and was virtually compulsory.

⁹ Davydova, op. cit., p. 424.

¹⁰ N. Maslova, Agitproprabota na predpriyatii (M., 1927), pp. 33-4.

¹¹ Davydova, op. cit., p. 425.

week¹², lasted for seven months.¹³ Like the first grade classes, these were reduced in number after 1927. In 1928, the two grades were abolished and a single school of political literacy (edinaya shkola) for all recruits and interested people who were not Party members was introduced.¹⁴

Students who successfully completed both these courses would almost certainly join the Party, after which they would be under pressure to attend the sovpartshkola, or Party school. Here, further instruction in Party history, current affairs, economics and even such subjects as mathematics and geography would be given. In 1927, classes at this level were typically held twice a week in Moscow, after work, and lasted for four hours.

The other type of education offered to Party members was the 'study circle'. Although ostensibly more independent, discussions in these circles were supposed to be carefully directed.¹⁵ Among the texts chosen were the collected works of Marx and Lenin. Alternatively, study circles could focus on specific aspects of theory or policy, often using articles from the Party journal Bol'shevik as discussion material. These 'subject' (predmetnye) circles were regarded as the most effective method of dealing with particular aspects of theory, and were officially encouraged.¹⁶ After 1927, however, the increasing number of new recruits with very limited reading and discussion skills made this form of study difficult to organise. Claims were made that there was no demand for study circles, and funding in individual clubs dropped off.¹⁷

¹² At this level, a greater commitment of time by students could not be expected, although the Moscow APPO regarded a single weekly class as insufficient. SK, 1929, nos. 17-18, p. 45.

¹³ Maslova, op. cit., p. 35.

¹⁴ Davydova, op. cit., pp. 425-6.

¹⁵ R. Pethybridge, The Social Prelude to Stalinism (London, 1974), p. 178, quoting from the Smolensk archive.

¹⁶ Their importance as 'the most versatile method of teaching individual theoretical Marxist-Leninist disciplines to the broad ranks of the Party aktiv' was stressed in the TsK's resolution on Party education of September 1930. KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh, (eighth edn.) vol. 4, p. 483.

¹⁷ The funds for 'circles' in metal workers' clubs were severely cut in the year 1926/7. TsGAOR, 5469/13/305, 26.

Beyond this level, Party education was aimed at training the aktiv. The sovpartshkola also had a second grade, where classes covered political economy, economic geography, Party history and other questions related to Party work. Classes were held three times a week in four-hour sessions.¹⁸ Short courses on Party structure and practical work followed all election campaigns and were aimed at new cell secretaries and other activists. The number of places on these courses grew considerably in this period, as formal classes were supplemented by the 'sovpartshkola at home', a correspondence course¹⁹, and by short, intensive summer or Sunday courses.

In 1929, 10,000 people in the Moscow Oblast' were studying within the network of sovpartshkoly.²⁰ The pre-eminence of Moscow as a training centre at this level was clear. In 1928, for example, a directive from the TsK required that courses be established in major centres for the training of Party members who had been selected for senior political posts. Moscow was to take 1,125 of these people, while Leningrad had only 500 and Kharkov 750.²¹

The top level of the study system was the komvuz, or Communist University. In all, there were nine komvuzy in the Moscow gubernia, eight of them in the city itself²². Moscow activists from the raikoms and senior committees could attend courses at establishments like the Institute of Red Professors, which trained senior Party theorists, but organised evening and summer courses on specialist practical subjects. The most important specialised centre for professional activists was outside Moscow at Zvenigorod. Established in 1925, it took small numbers of students, selected on the basis of quotas for each raion and department of the MK, for three-month full-time courses. The minimum requirements for individuals were two years Party stazh, one year of Party work and basic skills including 'reading , writing and whole-number arithmetic'²³. Overall, the number of senior activists enrolled on

¹⁸ Maslova, op. cit., p. 41.

¹⁹ First introduced in 1926 in Moscow. Iz TsK 1926, nos 40-41.

²⁰ RM 1/12/1929.

²¹ P 18/10/1928.

²² Davydova, op cit., p. 430.

²³ RM 4/10/1925.

specialist courses was relatively small. At the level of the provincial committee, only 350 people were enrolled on Komvuz courses in 1929.²⁴

The network looked satisfactory on paper, but as with all Party work in this period, optimistic plans often failed to bear fruit at the local level. An acute lack of resources characterised the education system. Most serious was the shortage of people capable of teaching courses. Ideally, propagandists should themselves have received detailed training, not only in Marxist theory but also in communicating, especially with factory workers. By 1925, however, the Party had scarcely had the time or resources to devote to this task. The result was that propagandists were a persistent source of complaints from all quarters.

From the leadership's point of view, the most troublesome aspect of the shortage at first was the need to rely on people whose commitment to current policies was questionable. In 1925, about a third of Moscow's propagandists were former members of other parties, including the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries.²⁵ Their knowledge of Marxist theory was often excellent, and for some of them, propaganda work provided a foothold in the new regime, but the results could be embarrassing for the Party leadership. On the subject of Kautsky, for example, one ex-Menshevik answered a query from a student by musing that 'I've never agreed with Il'ich [Lenin] on this point'²⁶. Former oppositionists showed a reluctance to follow the current Party line on many occasions, suppressing the centre's criticisms of dissident groups, while they themselves posed as politically 'neutral' Marxists.²⁷ Although aware of the problem, the leadership had no choice unless they were willing to abandon their goal of general political education altogether. The continued use of these people suggests that, in the 1920's at least, a basic knowledge of Marxism was viewed as more important for Party members than a drilled loyalty to specific policies. The purge of 1929 ended the era of the 'unreliable' propagandist, and soon afterwards most areas of Party discussion became more circumscribed and standardised.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ RM, 14/5/1925.

²⁶ SK 1929, no. 15, p. 39.

²⁷ P 3/12/1925.

Despite the removal of these older cadres, the complexity of Party policy and the new commitment to 'worker propagandists' perpetuated the problem of political heterodoxy. Worker propagandists of the new generation had little experience and very little training. Even if they believed themselves to be loyal, their classes could be erratic or even prejudicial to official interests. In 1930, for example, a worker propagandist in the Serp i Molot factory concluded a discussion of the Right deviation by holding a poll among his students to determine 'who was for Stalin, who for Bukharin'²⁸. Deliberate expressions of politically suspect views were also frequent: this was a time when policy changes deeply affected the interests of ordinary people in town and countryside. Collectivisation caused particularly strong dissent²⁹. A 1930 survey of the 10 worker propagandists in one area of the oblast found that 4 had received strict reprimands for breaches of Party discipline and 2 had explicitly deviated from the Party line when leading discussion circles²⁹. From 1929 onwards, concern about 'co-ordinating' the work of propagandists featured in every issue of the APPO journal.

A large number of propagandists in the early 1920's were graduates or students at Moscow VUZy. In 1925/6, for example, 119 Moscow propagandists were from the Institute of Red Professors, 114 from the Sverdlov University and 111 from MGU, together accounting for about a fifth of Moscow's propagandists³⁰. The problem with this academic bias was that few propagandists possessed the skill of communicating with ordinary workers. Complaints about the content of courses and style of delivery were frequent. The idea became widespread that propaganda work was the task of the intelligentsia, making classes even less attractive to workers and discouraging them from training as propagandists themselves.³¹ Moreover, many propagandists had no time to get to know their students, and their aloofness earned them the nick-name of 'touring actors'.³²

²⁸ Propagandist, April 1930, nos. 13-14, p. 66.

²⁹ Ibid., September 1930, nos. 3-4, p. 28.

³⁰ Davydova, op. cit., p. 434. The total number of propagandists in the Moscow gubernia in 1925 was just over 2,000. RM, 14/5/1925.

³¹ IV Plenum (1925), p. 26.

³² SK 1929, no. 15.

It was to solve this problem that the Zvenigorod scheme was first set up in 1925. A similar training school opened later at Arkhangel'skoe. Courses here were designed to produce up to 1,000 extra propagandists a year, for work in Moscow and elsewhere. The number of propagandists did increase, but their quality remained a problem. The proportion of propagandists with higher or secondary education fell over the period, and as the demand for them increased, the length and quality of their training dropped.

Aware of the neglect caused by the pressures of economic work, the TsK passed a resolution in September 1930 stressing the importance of political education and making a number of stipulations intended to improve the situation. The effect was to increase the stress on the overworked network. Among the TsK's directives was an announcement that by the end of the current academic year, 50% of propagandists at the basic levels should be workers³³. The number of propagandists increased rapidly as a result. In *Serp i Molot*, for example, there were seven propagandists in 1930, 22 in 1931 and 60 in 1932.³⁴ The preparatory course, once of three months' duration, was shortened, by 1930, to six weeks.³⁵ The cost of this combined policy of short courses and more workers was clear. In 1931, an article in Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo complained that the quality of propagandists had never been lower. Training, it observed, was merely a formal way of alleviating the shortage of numbers. It called for the re-introduction of three month courses, as well as stressing that propagandists should not be used for other Party work.³⁶

The complaint about the mis-use of propagandists was a serious one. Part of the problem was the general lack of skilled activists for all kinds of Party work. Factory Party committees who succeeded in finding workers eager enough to be trained for 'responsible Party work' of any kind were likely to try to prevent their being moved on through promotion. In this way, propagandists who had come directly from factories were often

³³ KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh (eighth edn), vol. 4, p. 485. This proportion was not achieved.

³⁴ TsGAOR 7952/3/282, 179.

³⁵ Gak, op cit., p. 19, and TsGAOR, 5467/14/44, 98

³⁶ PS 1931, No. 2. An article in Rabochaya Moskva published in 1932 noted that of 50 propagandists trained in Bauman raion in 1931, only 30 were still engaged in propaganda work. RM, 4/7/1932.

'hoarded'³⁷. Disrespect for political studies was widespread among the people who had to find the time and resources to organise it. As the cell secretary of the Parizhskaya Kommuna factory remarked, studying interfered with the fulfilment of the plan.³⁸ Propagandists with other Party responsibilities left the preparation of classes until the last moment, reading teaching materials 'on the tram on the way in'³⁹. The low priority accorded to propaganda work in the factories was noted by the APPO journal, Propagandist. Looking at the proportion of worker propagandists in Moscow in 1928-30, it noted that in 1928/9, only 7% of the total had been workers by social origin. In 1930, the figure had increased to 20.4% (14% of whom were still 'at the bench') but in view of the recent TsK resolution, this was not regarded as a healthy figure. Moreover, 40% of all propagandists in Moscow had been working for the APPO for less than a year, evidence of the rapid turnover of cadres, including the provision of propagandists for the rest of the USSR, which hampered work in the capital.⁴⁰

Propaganda work often came last on the agendas of factory or raion committees. The problem worsened as the demands on the Party increased after 1928. Apart from the shortage of propagandists, basic teaching materials were also often lacking. Among the problems were the shortage of suitable premises. One report stated that propagandists should have access to a chair, blackboard and paper, suggesting that often these were not available. Textbooks were another problem. Apart from the general shortage of books, there were difficulties making them accessible to ordinary readers, problems coping with the need to keep up with radical changes in policy and personnel, and the challenge, never satisfactorily met, of making the books interesting, let alone attractive.

Initially, the prescribed texts, including philosophical works on Marxism, were incomprehensible to many worker Communists. In response to the needs of worker recruits, the resources were found to produce simpler works like Yaroslavskii's Short

³⁷ The Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo article noted how nine out of ten 'kids' might be kept 'in reserve' by some factory committees. PS 1931, no. 2.

³⁸ Davydova, op. cit., p. 422.

³⁹ Propagandist, September 1930, nos. 3-4, p. 30.

⁴⁰ Ibid., April 1930, nos. 13-14, p. 47.

History of the VKP(b).⁴¹ However, until the middle of 1930, more complicated texts still commonly featured in reading lists for the Party schools. A 1929/30 course on the history of the Comintern for Moscow's urban unified schools specified chapters from Lenin's collected works, speeches by Molotov and Bauman and Bukharin's Notes of an Economist.⁴² Study circles tackling the 1930 course on political economy were prescribed Marx's Kapital, a number of commentaries on it by Russian and German Marxists, and lengthy essays by Bukharin and Rosa Luxemburg.⁴³ The propaganda of the 1920's included arguments about politics at sophisticated levels. Where controversies between members of the Politburo were involved, the 'general line' would be clearly stated but references to the original works of the minority group would also be given, and their views would receive more than a minimum of coverage⁴⁴.

By April 1930 the lists had changed. Works by European Marxists, with the exception of Marx and Engels, no longer featured in bibliographies for propagandists, and works by Russian Marxist theorists had almost disappeared. In their place, the bulk of reading now consisted of extracts from the speeches of Stalin or Molotov, very short extracts from the works of Lenin and Stalin, often only a page in length, and prescribed pages from Kerzhentsev and Leont'ev or Yaroslavskii. The element of debate was absent from propaganda material, which concentrated on giving as many 'facts' as possible rather than on developing any kind of argument about crucial issues. The sentences were kept simple, using limited vocabularies and portraying arguments without qualification. Many of the propaganda materials read like printed versions of the Party posters of the period, triumphant in tone and simple in substance. Statistics were another favourite feature, but they were carefully chosen, and were used only where they unconditionally supported the current line. Thus, figures would be given about the economy or recruitment, but based on only a small section of the whole. Not surprisingly, a frequent criticism of Party education made by

⁴¹ Davydova, *op. cit.*, p. 410. Among the other texts mentioned were Azbuka Leninizma by Kerzhentsev and Leont'ev and Ol'kovskii's textbook of the same title.

⁴² Propagandist, 1929, no.1, p. 40.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 1929, no. 2.

⁴⁴ As late as 1929, readers interested in Bukharin's 'errors' were still being referred to his Notes of an Economist, for example. No reference to the works of 'oppositionists' like Syrtsov and Lominadze or Riutin would appear after the conflicts of the next three years.

workers was that it was 'divorced from real life'⁴⁵. This simple message may have convinced the least sophisticated; certainly that was the intention. However, it also had a negative effect. By insisting on a single line, the Party leadership sacrificed their credibility in the eyes of people who could see the reality - economic or political - for themselves. Propaganda, a crucial tool for the makers of the new state, was thus irretrievably devalued.

In view of the other demands on their time, it is surprising how many workers and Party activists persisted with education courses. By 1929, about a third of Party members had some formal political training.⁴⁶ In 1925, about 45,000 people were studying on basic Party courses in Moscow and the Moscow gubernia, while a further 35,000 were on advanced courses.⁴⁷ The APPO's estimate in 1930 was that 15% of Party members in the Moscow organisation as a whole were enrolled on some kind of political education course⁴⁸, though the figure for the city alone would have been higher.

The problem with these figures is that they give only the number who enrolled, and say nothing about subsequent attendance rates. Like the leadership, Party members were often forced to relegate propaganda work to the bottom of their list of priorities. The other demands on members' time were more pressing, and studying less exciting than the active work of 'socialist construction'. On average, about a third of those who enrolled failed to complete the courses, many dropping out after only one or two sessions.⁴⁹ The highest rate of drop-out was among Party activists, 56% of whom left courses in Bauman raion in 1932, suggesting that the problem of other work was uppermost⁵⁰. This example was not lost on the rank and file. Starved of resources, courses were often unattractive, while the heavy burden of Party work left little time for them. In view of the general attitude towards education, disciplinary measures were rarely taken against absenteeism from classes. It was

⁴⁵ Ibid., 1930, nos. 13-14, p. 50.

⁴⁶ SK 1929, nos. 17-18.

⁴⁷ IV Plenum, p. 19.

⁴⁸ Propagandist, 1930, nos. 13-14, p. 50.

⁴⁹ This figure is based on several accounts of otsev among Party students, including studies of Zamoskvorech'e and Krasnaya Presnya raions in 1929. SK, 1929, No. 15; Dokladnaya Zapiska, p. 47.

⁵⁰ RM, 4/7/1932

not uncommon for courses to fold after a few weeks, and very little pressure would be applied to re-open them.⁵¹

There were some satisfied customers, although their reports cannot be regarded as typical. Among the benefits conferred by regular attendance at a Party course, the ability to understand the newspapers was regarded as valuable.⁵² In general, members reported that the classes had helped them to understand current affairs and especially the complicated debates among Russia's political leadership.⁵³ Such accounts suggest that classes could be used as a means of disseminating the current 'general line'. On the other hand, reports of workers who 'failed to understand' issues like the banning of factions or the difference between the Left and the Politburo majority indicate that the classes were not filled with passive students who would accept whatever they were told.

In all, the system of Party education, separate from other Party work and held in free time, was of limited success as a means of instilling Communist ideology in Party members. Parallel to it, however, were a number of other channels of communication between the leadership and the rank and file which appear to have been a little more effective.

In a society where active literacy was a scarce achievement, but which still lacked mass access to radio, speeches played a crucial part in spreading ideas and information. In this period, large meetings addressed by leading Party orators, a striking feature of the revolution itself, were still commonplace. Bukharin and Rykov were especially frequent speakers in Moscow in the 1920's, to be superseded in 1929 by Molotov, Ordzhonikidze and Stalin. The contents of their speeches were relayed to the Party rank and file by 'activists' from their audience. Any Party member who had participated in a congress, conference, plenum or other meeting, was expected to report back to a meeting at his place of work. Occasionally, especially in larger cells, senior Party officials would deliver the reports. Where no politically sensitive issue had been discussed, the meetings might be 'open' to anyone.

⁵¹ PS 1932, no. 9.

⁵² RM 29/5/1926.

⁵³ Davydova, *op. cit.*, p. 462.

More usually, they were closed discussions. The evidence suggests that rank and file Party members were deeply interested in political affairs, especially where high-level quarrels were concerned, or their own direct economic interests. They were not afraid to raise awkward issues⁵⁴. Although questions generally had to be submitted in advance, and agendas controlled the range of discussion, the meetings could be lively. In cells where there was no reliable speaker, however, or where political education was neglected, there was no guarantee that political issues would be loyally discussed. Sometimes, no report at all would be given. Any tendency to neglect report meetings intensified as the range of the Party's practical tasks increased. At the same time, the deliberations of the TsK were becoming more secretive, and the scarcity of information led to awkward questions at discussions. Both these developments influenced the search for more directed means of informing the rank and file about current affairs.

One of the solutions adopted was the Party Day (Partden'). First mooted in 1921, it was described then as 'a day for the strengthening of the Party, not filled with soulless reports, but with speeches and discussions about the current tasks of the Party, and also about its history, victories...and heroes...so that on this day each Party member shall feel himself to be... a fighter for a great ideal and a member of a great Party.'⁵⁵ The idea was regularly to set aside a day for Party study. If all members were involved, then the temptation to miss the class would be lessened. To prevent drift and boredom, the subjects for study would be arranged on an all-city basis, with local newspapers co-operating in the publication of study materials. Party days were held in Moscow in 1924 and 1925.⁵⁶ For the rest of the decade, however, the subject of the 'single Party Day' received scant attention in the press, and it was not until 1932 that the idea was revived and seriously implemented.

In April 1932, the MGK called for Party days to be organised twice a month in all Moscow Party cells. Part of the reason for the revival, which was at this time confined to Moscow, was the general concern about ideological and theoretical issues at the end of the hectic Five

⁵⁴ See above, p. 169.

⁵⁵ Partden' na predpriyatii (M., 1933), p. 6.

⁵⁶ RM, 25/5/1924, 20/9/1925.

Year Plan. Investigations into Party study conducted in 1931 had found that the existing system still lacked the personnel or the appeal to attract and train the mass of Party members.⁵⁷ Moreover, economic difficulties and the unpopularity of many Party policies made effective propaganda imperative. Although Party education remained a lower priority than practical work, concern about it was widespread by 1932. At the same time, the suggested solution to the problem, in common with many other policy changes of this year, involved more centralisation and a curbing of local initiative.

The first Party days of 1932 received widespread publicity. The need to put current developments in a positive light was reflected in the first discussion topic, which was called 'the economic achievements in the first quarter of 1932'. Other subjects covered included the international position of the USSR, the IX Congress of Trade Unions and the forthcoming autumn harvest campaign. In principle, as the press pointed out, the 'days' were an improvement on Party schools. First, the subject matter was more practical, and closely linked with the day to day concerns of workers. Second, because the subjects were decided well in advance, discussion materials could be collected. The major sources of materials were the press and leaflets issued to propagandists by local Party organisations. In some cases, workers themselves also organised exhibitions. In Elektroavod, for example, exhibitions about life on a kolkhoz, the rabbit campaign, industrial processes and other subjects were mounted in 1932.⁵⁸ Finally, the intensive publicity gave the 'days' a campaign feeling, raising their importance but indicating that the effort could be concentrated on a single day and then relaxed. Concessions were made by all participants in the campaign, and included the provision of good catering facilities and more interesting speakers drawn from the factory administration, trade unions and medical services as well as the Party itself.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ The most thorough public stage in this investigation was the 'day' in June 1931 when a city-wide survey of schools was conducted by the MK. RM 24/5/1931.

⁵⁸ Partden' na predpriyatii, pp. 3-6.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

The experiment was most successful in the Elektrozavod factory, where attendance at the Party days increased steadily between April and September 1932.⁶⁰ In Moscow generally, attendance was encouraging. Short meetings, often held at lunchtime in the canteens of factories, attracted large audiences, although audience concentration must have been limited. In Krasnaya Presnya, some factories achieved 90% overall attendance rates at meetings on Party days, including people who were not Party members.⁶¹ On the other hand, not even the intensive campaigns adopted over Party days could overcome the problems of apathy or overwork in most cells. While praising Elektrozavod's record, for example, Rabochaya Moskva noted that some factory cells had done nothing to prepare for recent Party days, while others failed to make them interesting.⁶² The pressures of production and the problems thrown up by the excesses of the Five Year Plan forced propaganda work into a minor position. A report of 1932 noted with regret that a gas explosion which had destroyed the lamp department in Elektrozavod had forced the survivors to abandon propaganda work in 1932 for more pressing tasks⁶³.

Party Days were more successful than schools, but they had severe limitations. Despite central encouragement, the shortage of propagandists meant that they were only as good as the local speakers and activists could make them. The period 1931-2 was one of crisis in the urban economy. People's time was short; their willingness to listen to accounts of economic successes must have been even shorter. The meetings themselves were brief and the need to attract large numbers of people restricted the amount and type of information which could be discussed. By comparison, the most reliable form of communication between the centre and the grass-roots was the Party press. Moscow Communists were barraged with advertisements urging them to subscribe to the many Party publications available. These included national and local newspapers and journals and local factory newspapers. Despite the availability of newspapers and periodicals, however, official concern was repeatedly

⁶⁰ The booklet, Partden' na predpriyatii, was devoted to Elektrozavod, and intended as a means of generalising the factory's experience.

⁶¹ PS, 1932, nos. 11-12.

⁶² RM, 7/6/2932, 9/6/1932 and 26/6/1932.

⁶³ TsGAOR, 7952/ 3/490, 42.

expressed about the low subscription rates and small readerships of key publications. What did the Party press offer its readers?

The newspaper with the largest readership in Moscow was Rabochaya Moskva, officially the organ of the MK, Moscow Soviet and MGSPS. Between 1928 and 1930, it had a circulation of 112,500, comparing favourably with other local papers, including the evening paper, Vechernaya Moskva and the gubernia paper, Moskovskaya Derevnnya, and with Pravda.⁶⁴

Rabochaya Moskva's popularity over Pravda, which was also an organ of the MK, can be explained by the space given to local news and the publication of short stories and serials. In the early 1920's, Rabochaya Moskva appeared in tabloid form, with up to ten pages. Later it was produced in a standard format, but continued to carry the same broad mixture of articles. The first page would be devoted to the main news stories, but reports of local events, such as the flood of 1926, could occupy pride of place as easily as the more austere reports of the TsK. Inside, although one or two pages would be devoted to Party matters, short stories, especially adventure stories or tales from exotic corners of the USSR like Kazakhstan, could be expected, as well as news of local projects, including the construction of an underpass under Okhotnyi Ryad, the demolition of churches and the building of children's holiday centres in the Moscow woods. In 1926, it ran a gruesome series on health problems and simple anatomy, in 1927, a short collection of articles on life in China.

In keeping with the presence of these lighter attractions, the reporting of political news and Party campaigns was excellent in this early period. MK plenums, for example, were reported verbatim, and even the more important speeches at factory cell meetings were given generous coverage. The proceedings of national level conferences, congresses and plenums were also reported as they happened, with verbatim reports of speeches and fuller accounts

⁶⁴ The circulation of Vechernaya Moskva was approximately 84,000 and of Moskovskaya Derevnnya, 50,000. Davydovâ, op. cit., p. 408. See also TsGAOR 7952/3/253, 21, where a correspondent in the Serp i Molot factory paper noted that Rabochaya Moskva had the largest circulation in the factory but that three quarters of workers did not receive a paper at all.

of discussions even than appeared in Pravda. Furthermore, Rabochaya Moskva published answers to some of the questions Muscovites were asking about the Left in the mid-1920's, and was one of the few organs of any stature to give space to the opinions of Rightists in 1928.

The informative approach of the 1920's had given way to a more laconic style by 1932, although local incidents still received substantial coverage. In October 1928, the Rightist editor of Rabochaya Moskva, P.V. Antoshkin, was replaced by V. N. Barkov. This was to be the first of a series of rapid editorial changes.⁶⁵ By July 1930, the paper had dropped most of its reporting of MK plenums, which were hereafter referred to up to a month after they had occurred, and then without reference to the main speeches made. The Party pages concentrated on prescriptive articles about better production work or discipline, together with uninformative statistical pieces about such matters as election campaigns and socialist competition.

As a source of detailed information about Party discussions, the major daily paper thus declined after 1930. In that year, another major source of information was reorganised. The MK journal Sputnik Kommunist, criticised for its poor production, was merged with the more factual, centrally-directed Izvestiya Moskovskogo Komiteta.⁶⁶ Whereas the latter confined itself largely to the same Party coverage as Rabochaya Moskva, Sputnik Kommunist had been the local version of Bol'shevik, containing reports of TsK debates, together with discursive contributions about their implications and the best ways of tackling current problems. It also ran a number of pieces on theoretical questions, and although debate was muted, genuine differences of approach were encouraged, sometimes with editorial intervention. After 1927, it also encouraged contributions from the Moscow Party aktiv, who were asked to submit accounts of their problems and campaigns so that activists

⁶⁵ Laz'yan edited the paper in 1929, but was replaced by L. Murafer on 15 June 1930. Murafer was replaced by Kovalev ten days later. The details were printed on the final page of the paper.

⁶⁶ PS 1930, nos. 3-4.

could pool their experience. Despite the appeal of some of its material, it had a small readership, reaching fewer than one Communist in eighteen.⁶⁷

The same problem beset other Party journals, including Propagandist, the APPO's own journal. This provided material for propagandists to use in their work, including simplified question and answer discussions on current topics. As a source of information, it tended to lag behind current events, and many of its articles seemed out of date before their appearance. In 1928, for example, at the time of the defeat of the Moscow Right, it made no reference to the affair. Other journals controlled by the propaganda organs included Sputnik Agitatora, another APPO journal, and V Pomoshch' Partuchebe, a journal jointly run by the TsK and MK APPOs. Like the MK, the raions had their own papers for the dissemination of information within their own organisations.⁶⁸

At the local level were the factory newspapers, which appeared in a number of formats and were not subject to censorship. Although not exclusively the responsibility of the Party cell, they often devoted large amounts of space to Party affairs and included on their editorial boards at least one Party representative. Among the more successful of these papers were Martenovka, from Serp i Molot, Motor (later Kirovets), the Dinamo paper, Vagranka, the AMO paper and Dvigatel', the paper of Krasnyi Proletarii. The financial bases of these papers were always precarious, and their readership unwilling to subscribe. Martenovka disappeared altogether for months at a time because of financial problems.⁶⁹

The differences between individual papers can be illustrated with reference to Dvigatel' and Martenovka, extracts from which can be read in Soviet archives⁷⁰. While Dvigatel' concentrated on production issues, and contained debates about improving the factory's performance through the introduction of new shops, Martenovka seems to have run more

⁶⁷ RM 26/5/1925. Its readership had declined even further by 1929. According to Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo, its print run was only 7,500 by the end of the year. PS, 1930, nos. 3-4.

⁶⁸ PS 1931, no. 8.

⁶⁹ The problems of Martenovka are discussed in TsGAOR 7952/3/253, 5. In 1930, it was criticised in Pravda for its uncritical articles, low circulation, and failure to carry out its own plans. P, 30/1/1930.

⁷⁰ TsGAOR 7952/3/253 for Martenovka and 7952/3/87 for Dvigatel'.

articles on Party work, and generally on political problems in the factory. The balance of material was a matter for the editorial committee in the factory and was not controlled by the Moscow APPO, although Party authorities took a close interest in the papers and frequently criticised them for failing to carry out specific agitational tasks.⁷¹ Informative and even critical articles⁷² were encouraged, but the papers remained turgid and were thought not to address the problems which interested workers.⁷³

At the bottom of the hierarchy of local papers were the wall newspapers, stengazety. These were not exclusively the responsibility of the Party cell, and relied for most of their material on workers' correspondents (rabkory) who produced regular articles. Although they avoided the financial problems of the factory papers, they suffered from the same shortage of articles and lack of enthusiastic support. A report published in 1928 noted that only about 3% of workers ever contributed to wall newspapers, and that they often completely failed to appear.⁷⁴ Wall newspapers seem to have been mainly devoted to local, factory questions, including rationalisation suggestions from workers, and were not intended as a major source of information about Party activities.

The Effectiveness of Propaganda

For a number of reasons, the propaganda network did not provide the Party with a loyal and fully reliable rank and file. In view of the bewildering twists and turns in official policy, it was difficult always to be sure of the 'general line'. The need for activists to have some ability to think independently and to solve problems presented propagandists with the problem of how much open discussion to allow. This question was never settled, and the grass roots activists' demand for information remained an embarrassment to the leadership.

⁷¹ TsGAOR 7952/3/253, 6-7.

⁷² An unusually self-critical account of why workers did not join the Party appeared in Martenovka in 1928, for example.

⁷³ TsGAOR 7952/253, 6

⁷⁴ Informatsionnaya spravka o rukovodstve partyacheek stengazetami. Sostavlena po materialam Sokol'nicheskogo, Zamoskvoretskogo, Baumanskogo, Khamovnicheskogo RK, Bogorodskogo i Orekhovo-Zuevskogo UK i MRKI (M., 1928), p. 1. The factory which failed most signally in this respect was the Tormoznyi zavod, whose 'fortnightly' wall newspaper had appeared only four times in 1927.

On the other hand, among the working class rank and file, problems of low general education, boredom, overwork and hostility to the tone of propaganda led to low completion rates on Party courses. Many Bolsheviks let Party education pass them by. Activists themselves neglected their classes, and official toleration of this showed that priority was not given to training where practical work might suffer.

Although a problem-solving approach and wide knowledge of Marxist-Leninist classics was encouraged, the discussion of political developments among the leadership was kept under tight control. In general, the amount of information available to Moscow Communists diminished in this period. In 1925, readers of Rabochaya Moskva would have known most of the details of MK plenums, including some of the discussions which followed major set piece speeches, and would have been able to read Uglanov's opinion of how to deal with Trotsky, together with contributions from Kamenev which would not appear in the national press. By 1932, such open reporting had disappeared, and the curious Muscovite would have had to rely on rumour, always a rich source in Moscow, but now subject to wild exaggerations and lies. Party education also had undergone a change. There was generally less time available for theory, the main priority being industrial development. 'Party days' were now controlled from the MK and studied closely by its members, while extensive provision was made for checking on the work of individual propagandists. However, these changes did not mean that Party members became less questioning. The lower quality of classes, the lack of time, the dearth of teachers and the general scarcity of information led to an ill-informed generation of Communists, but not necessarily a more acquiescent one.

Agitational and Mass Work

People who were not Party members were supposed to receive less information than rank and file Communists. Agitational work among the 'non-Party mass' was aimed at interesting people in communal issues, including politics, and fostering 'socialist' culture and a devotion to the future goals which justified present hardships. The internal affairs of the Party were not at issue. Thus, officially, 'open' Party meetings could not discuss sensitive political issues, including the oppositions of the 1920's, problems of discipline

among Party members or the finer points of current economic policy. Repeatedly, Communists were reminded that they were set apart from their fellows. They were encouraged to underline the distinction by setting an example of 'Communist behaviour' in all spheres of public and private life. They were also supposed to explain current policy to other workers whenever the opportunity arose. This deliberate singling out of Communists created animosity in many places, because it fostered feelings of insupportable superiority or because in practice it led to breaches of the codes of behaviour set up by the Party.

Despite the official distinction, however, the differences between rank and file Communists and their non-Party colleagues were blurred. They were the same factory workers, working the same shifts and reading the same papers. Party education courses below the level of the sovpartshkola were open to non-Communists, who were encouraged to attend as a means of drawing them into the Party's ambit. Their attendance at such courses was noted with pride. Attendance rates among non-Communists, indeed, were better than those of the Party 'activists, who had less time. Similarly, non-Communists were warmly invited to open meetings and 'Party days'. So unclear was the boundary between the Party rank and file and their colleagues that cases where non-Party people or candidate members took on Party responsibilities were not unknown. This blurring may partly account for the secrecy with which the professional Party apparatus increasingly concealed its deliberations from its own rank and file. A democratically organised Party could not also be a secret Party. The separation between 'verkhi' and 'nizi', so controversial in the early 1920's, widened in this period.

Because of this, 'agitational work' was often directed as much at the Party rank and file as to their neighbours who were not Party members. However, Party members were still expected to be different, ready with the correct answers, identified with Party policy and eager to stand by it. Confusion and resentment inevitably followed. The most direct form of agitational work was informal discussion between Communists and their colleagues at work. Party members were encouraged to take any opportunity to air political issues,

including lunch breaks, spare moments at work and even informal discussions at home⁷⁵. The aim was to establish a two-way line of communication, so that ordinary people's views could reach the Party and the Party's policies could be explained to them. These informal conversations had many disadvantages, although they were continuously advocated. Where Communists were scarce, agitational work would be neglected; it was almost completely absent from night shifts, for example⁷⁶. Discussions could not be supervised, and occasionally broke down as the non-Party worker appeared to be getting the better of the argument. They were also easily avoided by embarrassed or ill-informed Communists, reluctant to embark on unstructured political discussions in their colleagues' free time⁷⁷. Where practical tasks were pressing, agitational work might be forgotten⁷⁸. At the other extreme, carping activists made more enemies than converts, despite official remarks about the need for tact⁷⁹. A more formal approach was needed if communication between the Party and the people was to thrive. Any mass organisation, including trade unions as well as the Party, could be used as a channel. In addition, wall newspapers, posters and the local press were used to reach literate workers and sluzhashchie.

Meetings of all kinds suffered from the same handicap as far as agitation was concerned. Often dismissed even by Party devotees as 'boring', they were held in free time. People who lived far from their place of work were thus unlikely to attend, as were women, whose domestic burdens occupied all their spare time. Shift work also reduced the number who could attend meetings. Nonetheless, Party open meetings at the factory level could attract large numbers of non-Communists where the subject matter was interesting. A report of 1927 in Bol'shevik noted that non-Party people were most interested in economic questions, local issues, production and trade union questions and Party discipline. All-factory meetings in Krasnaya Presnya where these were discussed could attract as many as 150 people from

⁷⁵ RM, 7/7/1927.

⁷⁶ This problem was noted in a TsK resolution of 21 November 1930. Pervichnaya partiinaya organizatsiya - dokumenty KPSS (M., 1970), p. 215. At the local level, there were many examples of the difficulty. TsGAOR, 7952/3/82, 35.

⁷⁷ This criticism was typically made against grupporgs. See, e.g., RM, 10/2/1927.

⁷⁸ As one critic remarked, 'Some comrades have Party legs, but they do not have a Party head.' TsGAOR, 7952/3/82, 35.

⁷⁹ A report on agitation in the Zamoskvorech'e raion remarked that the 'haughtiness' of some its members deterred workers from the Party. SK, 31/8/1928.

outside the Party.⁸⁰ The increasing secrecy of Party life put a limit on the use of open meetings, however. Even economic questions, where they included the reviewing of problems, were kept secret, in some cases even from the Party rank and file. The open Party meeting became little more than a platform for exhortation and encouragement, occasionally also serving as a forum for the discussion of local production difficulties.

The trade unions, with their large memberships, were a more promising channel for agitation. A common pattern was for the Party cell to discuss a production matter and then mandate the Communist fraction of the zavkom to raise it in the trade union meeting. Notoriously, however, the trade union committees were less efficient even than the Party cells. One problem was that trade union activists tended not to have much Party or even general education beyond the elementary level.⁸¹ Mass work delegated to the zavkom generally had to be closely supervised by the Party cell. Election campaigns to all mass organisations, including the trade unions and the soviets, also provided platforms for the discussion of current policy. Here again, the Party cell generally took responsibility for co-ordinating the reports and speeches. In this period, voting at elections increased sharply, comfortably exceeding 90% by the end of 1932. On the other hand, attendance at meetings, as has already been mentioned, and even voting, did not necessarily reflect enthusiasm or attention to the speech on offer. The extent of workers' real commitment to these meetings is very difficult to assess.

Meetings were not the only other medium for communication. Workers' clubs, mainly funded by the trade unions, were intended as places where information could be dispensed and approved cultural activities enjoyed. Not all factories had a club; many shared with neighbouring establishments. Clubs were inaccessible to many workers for the same reason as meetings. Despite these problems, workers' clubs provided premises for more valuable collective activities than the usual heavy drinking, and were always in demand when not available. In the early 1920's, many clubs were lively meeting places, but their use as a centre for 'mass work' led to a decline in popular cultural activities. By 1927, the major

⁸⁰ Bol'shevik, 1927, nos 7-8

⁸¹ Propagandist, April 1930, nos. 13-14, p. 62.

growth area in their activities was 'mass work', mainly political propaganda⁸². Whereas broadly cultural activities, especially cinema, dominated the clubs in 1929, political meetings, lectures, reports and discussions were the main activity by 1932.⁸³

For the literate worker, the final channel of communication with the Party was printed or written material, the press or pamphlets available in libraries. The quality of the press has already been discussed. Wall newspapers were often supplemented by the displays in 'red corners', exhibitions, posters and notices available in a permanent area of the plant or office. As space became scarcer, however, 'red corners' were squeezed out, often in favour of extended canteen facilities⁸⁴. Exhibitions were replaced by pamphlets and papers, available in clubs and from the offices of agitprop departments. These pamphlets explained recent decisions, summarising controversial policy changes and discussing economic questions. Their popularity is hard to determine, especially as workers were encouraged to borrow them whenever they also wanted a popular light read such as a novel. On the other hand, it is clear that they reached smaller, more exclusively literate and more committed audiences than permanent displays and wall newspapers. Agitation's lower priority compared with production was a serious barrier to mass political education.

This description of the means by which the Party hoped to reach out to the mass of Moscow's population provides only an impression of the real state of affairs. The deeper question is the extent to which it was effective. Soviet sources provide no clear answers to this, and other evidence tends to be anecdotal or impressionistic. Although a number of surveys into workers' attitudes towards political affairs were conducted during the 1920's, the specific question of their view of the Party was seldom asked, and was likely anyway to

⁸² A report on the expenditure of clubs controlled by the metalworkers' union in 1927 found that spending on 'mass work' had increased by 24.4%, while spending on independent 'circle work' had dropped by 17.9% and that on libraries by 4.4%. The next largest growth area was 'physical culture', but spending on this had increased by only 3.6%. TsGAOR, 5469/13/305, 26.

⁸³ Starodubtsev, *op. cit.*, p. 263.

⁸⁴ The problem of space affected agitation in many ways. In factories whose canteens had been 'reorganised' to provide more space for machinery, workers might have to walk some distance to another canteen, thus cutting down on the time they could spend at meetings or in discussion with comrades at lunchtime. The closing of red corners and libraries was a further problem of the space shortage. See, e.g., TsGAOR, 5469/15/165, ll.1 and 13, where problems at Manometr are discussed.

attract an artificial response. Indicators like Party membership, we have seen, could be misleading, as could attendance rates at meetings. A further study is clearly needed, but what can be said on the basis of available evidence?

The response of intellectuals and white collar workers to the Party was different from that of workers. In general, propaganda work among the former groups was a low priority. The approach of Party work in the 1920's was heavily biased towards the working class. The same attitude which restricted non-workers from entering the Party led to a neglect of propaganda work in Moscow's offices. Even the factory staff, the ITR, were left out of many campaigns⁸⁵. In 1928, the Shakhty trial marked the beginning of a period of assault upon the rights and position of specialists. Hard on its heels came the Party purge of 1929 and the purge of the state apparatus of 1930. It was only after 1930 that a more liberal policy towards specialists emerged⁸⁶, and with it came more attention to propaganda work among them. In general, specialists and white collar workers had more to gain from the Party in career terms than did workers, and this was reflected in their willingness to join it in the period after 1931.

The attitude of workers was mixed. As Soviet sources emphasised, political attitudes among workers were heavily determined by skill levels, sex, age, landholding and other factors. Workers with 'links with the countryside' were unlikely to join the Party and equally unlikely to sympathise with its aims, especially after 1929⁸⁷. Textile workers, especially women, were also largely unmoved by political propaganda, although economic questions were crucial and food shortages or wage cuts could lead to strike activity. Consistent complaints were made about 'seasonal workers' and workers in the transport industry, who

⁸⁵ The neglect of the ITR was noted by the Elektroavod factory organisation in 1929 when it was seen as a serious hindrance to the development of socialist competition. TsGAOR, 7952/3/490, 69.

⁸⁶ For general comments on this change of policy, see J. F. Hough and M. Fainsod, How the Soviet Union is Governed, pp. 161-2, and T.H. Rigby, Communist Party Membership in the USSR, pp. 190-1.

⁸⁷ This pattern was noted in the extensive survey of landholding and political attitudes carried out by Semenov in 1929. Landholding alone was less of a decisive factor than the frequency with which the subject visited his plot. Absentee landholders showed more willingness to participate in political meetings than did people who visited their plots regularly. Semenov, op. cit., p. 55.

took very little interest in political discussions. As with recruitment, the most fertile ground for propagandists appears to have been the skilled metal working trades, and also some sections of the chemical and leather industries. Age was also a decisive factor, the younger workers showing much more sympathy for the Party's goals than the older, established workers⁸⁸.

The point to be emphasised is that however receptive and enthusiastic Muscovites may have been, and it is clear that some groups within the population were genuinely committed to the Bolshevik Party, agitation and propaganda did not meet an accepting or passive audience. People accepted what they chose, rejected some points, argued with others. Party members gave different accounts of their organisation to fellow workers, some painting an attractive picture, others giving the Party a poor reputation by their behaviour or ignorance. Debate had not vanished by 1932, and hostility or indifference continued to greet agitators who addressed proletarian audiences in the capital.

Among the more controversial areas of Party life, the growth of corruption and careerism was widely criticised. Apart from policies which were unpopular or controversial, the idea that the Party was becoming an exclusive and oligarchical elite was probably its major weakness in the eyes of both the rank and file and the uncommitted population. In the next chapter, the justice of this criticism will be examined.

⁸⁸ Both of these factors were noted in the Sputnik Kommunista survey of 1929. SK, 1930, No. 3.

Chapter 6. Political Participation and Party Democracy.

We have seen in preceding chapters that the Party rank and file had a certain amount of influence over local affairs. Central policy was not always clear, leaving room for local adjustments, initiatives and amendments. Such initiatives could influence central policy, and certainly determined the extent to which it was effective in a range of areas from industrial management to education. However, as we saw, the autonomous activity of the rank and file could be curbed by the leadership, and decisions were frequently taken by the elite without consultation of any kind. To set the 'revolution from below' in context, it is thus essential to discuss the question of political participation in the formal sense. Although Soviet scholars have argued that even participation in social activity amounts to political involvement¹, political scientists in the West prefer to focus on two issues: recruitment into the political elite and the degree to which that elite is susceptible to influence from below². In this chapter, two questions will be studied in this context. The first is the composition of the elite, its accessibility to rank and filers and the principles by which promotions were made. The second is the degree to which the elite could be influenced by pressure from below, either through the Party network or through channels like production meetings, control commissions and 'self-criticism'.

The Party's directing role in Soviet life created a situation in which even economic appointments were considered 'political'. The discussion of access to the elite thus includes an analysis of the state and economic apparatuses. Elites outside the Party also provide valuable comparisons, illustrating the extent to which the Party was justified in describing itself as the most 'democratic' organisation in the country.

¹ The example quoted by T. H. Friedgut in his study, Political Participation in the USSR (Princeton, 1979), is the definition given by T. A. Iampolskaia (Organy sovetskogo gosudarstvennogo upravleniia v sovremennom etape, M., 1954). According to this, even participation in socialist competition, mass meetings and production organs amounted to 'political participation.' Friedgut, pp. 23-24.

² Ibid., p. 26.

State and Party hierarchies had many features in common, but experienced different problems. The apparatuses of state and economic administration were heirs to many of the traditions of the pre-revolutionary era. Their staffs included a significant number of officials trained before 1917³, but 'chinovnik' practices were observed even by new recruits to Moscow's offices. Even Party officials deployed in state posts frequently adopted the 'bureaucratic' approach they had been appointed to eradicate⁴. The relationship between administrators in the state and economic sectors and the Communist Party was thus strained. The new government needed the skills of its 'bourgeois specialists', but feared their influence on its political development. Before 1928, the shortage of specialists and the need for their skills ensured that political considerations about their 'loyalty' would not threaten their tenure of office⁵. Even during the 'cultural revolution', when criticism of specialists was at its most severe, change was hindered by the need for skilled cadres and the shortage of people capable of submitting the various apparatuses to detailed scrutiny.

The Party apparatus was a different case. There a new hierarchy was being created which did not need, in theory, to be hobbled by the traditions of the previous era. The possibilities for 'intra-Party democracy' were theoretically great. Equally, the need for special knowledge could not be pleaded as an excuse for restricting access to posts of responsibility. After the revolution, the Party elite could not yet claim to possess superior administrative or technical skills, whatever the strains of 'underground' work had been. It was less clear that the Party's internal business should be subjected to the scrutiny of people who were not Communists, but the possibility of criticism from within was discussed and officially welcomed. However, we shall see that despite these 'objective' advantages, the Party apparatus was less accessible to promotees, and much more insulated from popular opinion, than the state sector.

³ Just over a third in 1929. See below, p. 207.

⁴ The problem had existed from the first days of the revolution, and was the subject of a TsK circular letter in May 1918. This stated that 'all Party members, regardless of their type of work and the functions they fulfil, must participate directly in Party organisations and must not deviate from instructions issued by the corresponding Party centre.' KPSS v resolyutsiayakh, (eighth edn.) vol. 2, p. 32.

⁵ The phrase 'bourgeois specialist' was initially used rather than 'intelligentsia' because of the latter's pejorative connotations in the 1920's. S. Fitzpatrick, 'Cultural Revolution as Class War', p. 19, in Fitzpatrick, ed., Cultural Revolution in Russia.

One feature which both types of apparatus shared was the system of appointments to key posts. Above a certain level, appointments to both state and Party posts were controlled by nomenklatura, which limited the number of people eligible for promotion across the board. Nomenklatura operated through two types of list; one for positions to be filled and one for people eligible to fill them. Each level of political administration had its own nomenklatura sphere, from the TsK to the raikom. For the most part, nomenklatura was controlled through the cadres section of the orgraspredotdel of the relevant Party organisation. Examples of posts controlled through TsK nomenklatura were Party offices such as MK secretary and the headships of strategic trusts and even some selected enterprises. Likhachev, for example, the director of the AMO plant, was a TsK appointment⁶. As we saw earlier, the TsK also apparently controlled appointments to the Moscow orgraspredotdel.⁷ On the MK's nomenklatura were raikom secretaries, heads of Moscow sovnarkhozy and directors of enterprises of local or regional significance⁸. The raikoms and MK also had some say in the choice of factory Party committee secretaries in key enterprises, although it is not clear whether this stake amounted to a power of selection⁹.

Although consultation was practised formally, the organisation with the power of nomenklatura made the final decision on any appointment¹⁰. The system was cumbersome, with its tiers and parallel responsibilities. Officially, however, it was preserved because it ensured that only people of proven capability could be appointed to strategic jobs in the new administration¹¹. As Uglanov put it, vetted appointees carried a guarantee endorsed by the Party leadership itself.¹² For the leadership, the other advantage of nomenklatura was that it acted as a patronage structure. In a system split by factional rivalry, it was important to be

⁶ V I KPSS, 1963, no. 11, p. 123.

⁷ See above, pp. 94-5.

⁸ PS 1930, no. 15.

⁹ At Krasnyi Proletarii, the factory cell discussed their secretary as if they had the right to veto his appointment by the raikom and to propose an alternative. TsGAOR, 7952/3/82, 107.

¹⁰ There were rare cases where pressure from below caused the removal of a nomenklatura official. See below, pp. 229-230.

¹¹ Voslensky, La Nomenklatura, p. 76.

¹² RM, 1/4/1927.

able to appoint cadres who were not only competent, but also politically reliable from the leadership's point of view.¹³ The existence of the lists was not an insuperable barrier between the apparatchiki and the mass, however. As we shall see, despite various problems, it was possible for rank and file Party members to gain access to elite positions if they satisfied the criteria of loyalty and class origin.

The State and Economic Apparatuses

The question of popular participation in government through the state and economic apparatuses has been the subject of a number of detailed studies, and cannot be covered in comparable detail here¹⁴. However, as we have noted, it has an important bearing on the broader question of Party 'democracy'. Moreover, Moscow, as the capital, exhibited a number of important features which shed light on the more general conclusions of other studies¹⁵.

The promotion of a new generation of administrators proceeded steadily in the 1920's. Although a large number of old St Petersburg government servants moved to Moscow in 1918, figures showed that by 1929, the proportion of sluzhashchie in Moscow who had been appointed before the revolution was only 35.1%¹⁶. However, the deployment of these new officials showed what to the leadership was a worrying pattern. Although 72% of sluzhashchie in the USSR in 1929 had been appointed since the revolution, most of these were at the lower levels. The low-ranking jobs in which the remaining 64.9% were employed included posts which would hardly count as 'white collar' at all in the Western

¹³ On the dissolution of local 'cliques' by the use of central nomenklatura, see T. H. Rigby, 'Early Provincial Cliques and the Rise of Stalin', Soviet Studies, January 1981, p. 24-5.

¹⁴ In particular, S. Fitzpatrick, ed., Cultural Revolution in Russia; J. Hough, The Soviet Prefects; S. Fitzpatrick, Education and Social Mobility in the USSR (Cambridge, 1979); and the unpublished works of Arfon Rees on Rabkrin.

¹⁵ Popular supervision of state organs like Narkomfin, for example, was carried out by workers from Moscow factories. See below, pp. 218-9.

¹⁶ SK 1929, no. 8. Leningrad, as the pre-revolutionary capital, had the biggest proportion, with 52% of its white collar workers appointed before the revolution. It should be noted that the category sluzhashchie is somewhat misleading. As we saw earlier, it varied over time, and also included people like doormen, office cleaners and shop assistants as well as clerks and office workers. See above, p. 120.

sense. Party representation in the state sector was mainly confined to the 'commanding heights' at one extreme and menial jobs at the other.

The same general rule applied to the administration of industrial enterprises. Thus, in 1928, figures for Party membership in trusts and syndicates nationally indicated that over 70% of leading officials in these organisations were Communists¹⁷. A survey published in 1929 gave the Party layer among directors nationally as 93%¹⁸. On the other hand, Party membership among engineers stood at approximately 2% at the end of 1927¹⁹. The 1929 survey in Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo found that while 73% of enterprise directors were drawn from the working class, only 4% of technical staff had proletarian backgrounds. Although figures for Party membership did not fully correspond to promotions, in general the problem of replacing the 'bourgeois' specialists remained unsolved.

The fact that the various institutions generally had Bolshevik leaders was thus overshadowed by the position of their advisers. Important technical decisions were being made by old specialists whose reliability, from the Bolsheviks' point of view, seemed questionable. Even people who had received their training in Tsarist institutions were regarded as suspect. Before this situation could be changed, a programme of specialist education to train 'red' cadres was needed. Generally, resources for this were inadequate in the 1920's. Moreover, although a high proportion of clerks and junior office personnel were 'workers by social origin' appointed after the revolution, the atmosphere in their offices had hardly changed. Far greater numbers of promotees, together with a general change of heart by the existing cadres, would be needed to stamp out 'bureaucratic' practices in Moscow's offices.

These two problems bedevilled the Party's promotion campaigns. Ultimately, as the Stalinist leadership struggled to eradicate all opposition to the 'new course', the solution adopted would be the radical one of 'cultural revolution.' However, in order to see this in

¹⁷ Bol'shevik, 1928, no. 8.

¹⁸ PS 1929, no. 3.

¹⁹ N. Lampert, The Technical Intelligentsia and the Soviet State, (London, 1979), p. 24. The proportion among foremen, who included worker promotees, was higher: about 28%.

context, and to understand some of the reasons for its subsequent abandonment, the policy of promotion in the earlier 1920's will be examined.

Although an intensified programme characterised the 'cultural revolution' period, vydvizhenie began in the 1920's. In a single campaign in 1925, 300 people were 'promoted' to white collar jobs in Moscow under the auspices of the Party²⁰. Between June 1926 and June 1927, 2, 253 people were 'promoted to responsible work' in Moscow, 53% of whom were workers from the bench.²¹ In 1928, 2, 002 people were 'promoted' in Moscow.²² Ostensibly, the selection process was democratic. Not all promotees, indeed, were Party members. In theory, everyone at a given workplace would be consulted about promotions, and candidates would be selected after a succession of meetings and discussions. There was a certain amount of controversy about how the promotee should relate to his or her former workplace after promotion,²³ but the principle that they should retain ties with it was firm. Thus the policy of promotion should have enabled ordinary people to gain insights into government decision-making, eliminated the pettifogging bureaucratic practices and hierarchies, and given workers' representatives a real share in administration.

Reality fell far short of this ideal. In the first place, the scale of promotions was insufficient to make a decisive impact. The promotion of two thousand people a year was not likely to create a revolution in the practices of bureaucracies whose combined staffs totalled roughly 400, 000 people.²⁴ Comparatively few of those 'promoted' actually left their enterprises. Of the 2, 253 promoted in the year ending June 1927, 1,602 remained in their enterprises, taking 'responsible' jobs such as foremen.²⁵ The comparable proportion of the 1928 promotees was 1, 471 out of 2, 002.²⁶ That left 650 and 531 promotees each year

²⁰ Iz TsK, 1925, no. 34.

²¹ Ibid., 1927, no. 43.

²² SK, No. 8, 1929, p. 78.

²³ In particular, it was unclear whether they were to remain members of the original Party cell.

²⁴ See table 2, p. 258.

²⁵ Iz TsK 1927, No. 43.

²⁶ SK No. 8, p. 78.

respectively for state posts, but even this figure is too high. Not everyone who left their own factory went into state or even managerial posts. Many seem merely to have become foremen elsewhere.²⁷

Another problem for the promotion programme was that the selection process seldom went according to the model described. In the first place, there was a lot of animosity from workers themselves about 'careerists' who sought to rise out of the ranks of the working class. Participation in selection meetings was very limited. Even within the factory Party organisation, selection was often left to the cell buro or even to the secretary alone²⁸. The workers themselves, who knew the candidates best and should have wished, in Party thinking, to influence selection, were largely indifferent or hostile to the process. In part, this indifference arose from their correct perception that the ultimate choice lay with the Party secretary. Even the lists from which successful promotees would be chosen were drawn up in advance by the cell buro.²⁹ The fate of workers' 'own' candidates depended on their acceptability to senior officials. This was true even during the period of 'cultural revolution'. In 1930, for example, Breev, a peasant from the central black-earth area, was nominated both by his fellow-kolkhozniks and by the rank and file Communists of the supervising factory, Serp i Molot, to chair a local kolkhoz. His candidacy, although supported by everyone involved at the grass-roots level, was rejected by the factory authorities, in this case the trade union, on the grounds that he was 'too closely linked with agriculture' and that he had no administrative experience³⁰. The idea that ordinary people could choose their own leaders from among their ranks was not upheld in practice.

Promotees were thus sent off to the alien world of the city's offices without the support of their former workmates as a source of self-justification. Many also lacked the basic skills necessary for their new tasks. Factory committees often resisted the removal of their 'best'

²⁷ Iz TsK 1927, No. 43.

²⁸ Ibid., 1926, nos. 16-17.

²⁹ Ibid., 1925, No. 34.

³⁰ TsGAOR, 5469/14/45, 7-8.

cadres, preferring to dispose of misfits if promotions had to be made³¹. Party discussion papers calling for better training to be lavished on raw promotees missed the basic point that the most able candidates were not getting as far as the selection meetings. Training remained a problem, moreover, and promotees frequently arrived incapable of taking on more complicated tasks than simple filing³². Where such tasks were available to promotees, it was possible to absorb them with relatively little disruption. In industry, however, it was widely felt, especially by people who already had a vested interest in resisting promotions, that the Party's policies were more damaging than beneficial.

The tensions created by vydvizhenie thus involved strains within the Party itself, between Party 'specialists' and the doctrinaire advocates of proletarianisation at any cost.³³ Uglanov, for example, resisted vydvizhenie on the grounds that it was harmful to Moscow's industry³⁴. At a time when the Party's face was turned towards the proletariat, his opposition to proletarian promotees was notable and unpopular, but it seems to have gained him the support of Moscow's managers, the majority of whom, by 1928, were Communists.

In principle, it was the host institution's task to train promotees to take up responsible positions in their hierarchies. Since most institutions take some recruits from the lowest levels and train them to rise through the ranks, this was not an unreasonable plan in theory. Gosbank was mentioned in one report as an example of the principle in action. According to the report, new promotees there were given courses in banking and politics so that some could go forward into influential positions in the organisation³⁵. For every account of successful deployment, however, there were many more claiming that promotees were given the most menial jobs. According to one writer, they were typically set to keep a register of

³¹ This point was made frequently. See, e.g., PS, 1930, no. 15. The removal, through promotion, of able Party activists caused serious problems for administration in Moscow enterprises. SK, 1929, no. 19, pp. 26-7.

³² Iz TsK, 1926, nos. 16-17.

³³ This is a point emphasised by Leonard Schapiro. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, p. 328.

³⁴ In January 1928, he remarked that 'if we must always promote and promote and replace' the result would include a 30% loss in output. His own solution was to encourage 'healthy competition' among young intellectuals for posts in the apparatus. II Plenum MK, p. 43.

³⁵ P, 10/4/1926.

the number of people who went in and out of the building where they worked³⁶. In Narkompros, a woman promotee was reportedly set to pack books as her 'responsible work'.³⁷

Not surprisingly, promotees often felt disorientated and disappointed. Many did not remain in their new posts for long, preferring to return to production work. Statistics published in 1929 showed the extent of the problem. They show the small numbers of promotees overall and also that only about half remained in their new institutions, with NKYust and the financial institutions having especially poor records.

Promotion into the State Apparatus 1924-1929³⁸.

Institution	No. of responsible workers	No. of promotees			No. remaining in 1929.
		1924	1925/7	1928	
NkTorg USSR	600	2	-	-	1
NkYust RSFSR	120	4	7	-	-
NkPros RSFSR	250	3	-	4	7
NkFin RSFSR	200	6	-	3	9
Gosbank USSR	250	22	11	4	13
Tsentrosoyuz	450	20	-	12	22
NkFin USSR	500	15	9	8	22

For the promotees who remained, it was difficult to preserve any kind of link with working class life. People complained that they were stifled by the bureaucratic atmosphere in which they had to work. It was suggested that promotees should be incorporated into institutions in groups, so that they could provide support for each other, but this was not realistic in view of their small numbers. For many, the responsibility of reporting back to old

³⁶ RM, 13/2/1926. To set the claims about Gosbank in context, moreover, see below, pp. 214-5.

³⁷ P, 10/4/1926.

³⁸ Bol'shevik 1929, No. 8.

colleagues at their factory was too time consuming, and when their reports were greeted with hostility or incomprehension, it was tempting to 'break off from the mass' altogether. Ambitious promotees, including those who arrived in Moscow from the provinces, were often anxious to use their new opportunities to the full by embarking on study courses in the capital. The result was often that they took little or no part in the life of the institution to which they were attached³⁹. For all these reasons, promotion, as a steady policy for changing the composition and ethos of the state institutions, was of only limited value in the 1920's. Beginning in 1928, a more radical policy aimed to cut through these problems by mass promotion and its corollary, the purging of existing officials. The reasons for the break were complex,⁴⁰ but included frustration at earlier failures.

Purges in the State apparatus had occurred periodically before 1930. In particular, a campaign to reduce office staffs, known as 'rationalisation', was launched in the summer of 1926.⁴¹ Linked to the 'regime of economy', it was intended to reduce administrative costs both through rationalisation of systems and through reductions in paid staff. Accompanying the rationalisation were flamboyant revelations of corruption and 'bureaucratism' by officials⁴². Under the leadership of the TsKK, commissions of Moscow workers were used to examine the practices of major institutions and to rule on methods of rationalising their work⁴³. An atmosphere of public vigilance was thus created, although staff reductions did not always fall in the desired areas. Among the problems was the reluctance of rationalisation commissions to take measures against the advice of senior administrators. Some cases where workers were intimidated or overruled by 'bureaucratic' administrators

³⁹ PS, no. 5, March 1930, p. 25.

⁴⁰ Fitzpatrick describes 'cultural revolution' as follows: 'It was a worker-promotion movement linked to a political campaign to discredit the "Right Opposition" within the Party. It was an iconoclastic youth movement directed against "bureaucratic" authority. It was a process whereby militant Communist groups in the professions established local dictatorships and attempted to revolutionize their disciplines. It was, finally, a heyday for revolutionary theorists and "hare-brained schemers", whose blueprints for the new society not only attracted disciples among the Communist cultural militants but also in many cases gained solid institutional support.' Cultural Revolution in Russia, pp. 11-12.

⁴¹ In Moscow, the MK and MKK took a leading role in the campaign, which received more publicity than the regime of economy. As well as helping to cut administrative costs, it was intended to make economies in the factories more palatable by showing that they were also biting in offices and government departments. RM, 7/9/1926.

⁴² See, e.g. Bauman's comments on bureaucratism in the state apparatus, RM, 20/2/1927.

⁴³ RM, 8/9/1927.

were reported in the press, but these were probably only the tip of the iceberg. Generally, the workers themselves resented rationalisation, for despite the rhetoric, the axe fell more frequently on them than elsewhere.

Between 1927 and the beginning of the purge of 1929-30, a new campaign to reduce the power of the older generation of career administrators was launched. Although rapidly extended to the rest of the Soviet Union, the 'self-criticism' (samokritika) campaign began in Moscow, where experiments were first mounted in the spring of 1928.⁴⁴ Coming hard on the heels of the Shakhty trial, the self-criticism campaign encouraged junior personnel - workers and technical personnel in factories, junior administrators in offices - to criticise the shortcomings of their superiors. As the term implies, senior officials were also supposed to examine their own work, and to make suggestions for general or specific improvements. At the factory level, the campaign was a success. Like the other attacks on specialists which followed, it met with popular approval, directing discontent about the difficulties of factory life at a target which had long been a cause of resentment. As a participant recalled, 'everyone was stimulated to "tell all" about defects, errors, methods for improving things - in the general press, in factory and farm papers, on the bulletin-board sheets known as wallpapers.'⁴⁵

This 'stimulation' itself came partly from the press. Among the scandals mentioned, corruption or embezzlement were 'uncovered' at the Geofizika factory, at Gaz No. 1, at the Kauchuk factory, and in the administrations of Narkompros and Gosbank.⁴⁶ The factory scandals mainly concerned the Party cells, and were dealt with under the auspices of the Party purge of 1929, but those in Gosbank and Narkompros were linked with the more general need for a purge of the state bureaucracy. Leaders responsible for 'suppressing self-criticism' were removed, and officials deemed to have been shielding them reprimanded.

⁴⁴ V I KPSS, Vol II, 1963, p. 122.

⁴⁵ Kravchenko, op. cit., p. 53.

⁴⁶ P, 21/8/1929 and 25/8/1929. The political motive behind the purging of these two institutions was strong. Both were opposed to changes involved in the transition to Stalinist industrialization, the first on financial grounds, the second because of the new emphasis on technical training under the leadership of VSNKh. This 'political element' will be discussed further below.

The Gosbank affair received the most publicity, with fresh revelations about corruption appearing daily for a two-week period in August 1929. Heavily implicated were Sheinman, the director of the bank, and a number of his deputies, including Telesin and Polyakov. Sheinman was initially accused of treating Communist members of the bank's administration as 'lackeys', and of excessive drinking, peculation, 'careerism' and corrupt promotion practices.⁴⁷ The leadership of the bank's administration were collectively accused of 'suppressing self-criticism', together with the more specific charge of mis-appropriating the bank's funds for speculation over a long period.⁴⁸ Members of Sokol'niki raikom were also reprimanded for tolerating the situation.⁴⁹

The whole affair was accompanied by renewed calls for a popular assault upon the 'bureaucrats' who were 'suppressing self-criticism'. The campaign stirred latent tensions at all levels in the city's administration. Like a genie released from its bottle in 1928, self-criticism caused widespread disruption. Criticism was often orchestrated by the Komsomol, and could not always be controlled by the Party leadership. Doubts about its wisdom are the surest proof that samokritika was not simply a matter of window-dressing to hide a more concerted attack on political targets⁵⁰.

Despite these misgivings, the leadership achieved what it desired more often than not. At Krasnyi Proletarii, debates between younger specialists and the older, pre-revolutionary technicians flared into a major argument about the factory's reconstruction. Anastas Mikoyan, then closely associated with the factory's affairs, helped the younger group to organise its 'complaints' against the older specialists. The result was a stormy meeting, at which the views of the younger cadres prevailed. The dislocation in the factory's administration may have been disruptive - certainly this was the view of Satel', the trust head

⁴⁷ P, 7/8/1929.

⁴⁸ P, 25/8/1929. The total profits of their speculation were given as 40 million rubles.

⁴⁹ Especially Gurovich, who was also the secretary of the Party cell in Gosbank. P, 15/8/1929.

⁵⁰ The September 1928 plenum of the MK saw a number of speeches expressing concern about the implications of samokritika for Party discipline. Among these was that of Kotlubovskii, not later specifically associated with the Right. Pyatyi Ob. Plenum, p. 108. Stalin, an early advocate of the campaign, also later attempted to restrain samokritika. Sochineniya, vol xi, pp. 28 ff., 127-8.

- but it caused a shift in the balance of power away from the 'bourgeois' specialists and in favour of a group more zealous for rapid changes within the factory.⁵¹ In the next two years, this process would be continued in an atmosphere dominated by the anti-specialist trials of the 'Industrial Party' and the 'Mensheviks'⁵².

Clearly, these campaigns were not launched simply because the Party needed samokritika as much as it needed 'air and water'.⁵³ The 'revelations' at Gosbank were extremely convenient, providing a means of disgracing the staunchly anti-inflationist Sheinman without the necessity for a public discussion of the real arguments. It is unlikely that the specific charges levelled at him were true, with the possible exception of the 'suppression of criticism' itself. The very excess of the accusations betrayed the campaign's deeper political origins. These were very broad, and probably not initially specific. Although the self-criticism campaign, like the subsequent purge, was directed at the political Right, its focus was not as narrow as that implies. As one commentator noted, it was aimed at those who 'although they have done nothing wrong, merely want a quiet life.'⁵⁴ Its effect was to shake the city's specialists and to create an atmosphere where complacency about the new course could not be sustained.

This process was continued by the purge of 1929-30. Although its initial stages appear to have been sluggish, it helped to generate a new atmosphere in relations between the Party and the state apparatus. Early failures were attributed to the unexpected intensity of bureaucratic resistance to the purge, although they were probably also the result of poor preparation and a general disbelief among members of purge commissions that the leadership really meant them to speak out⁵⁵. By the autumn, little progress had been made. In August,

⁵¹ The affair was recalled by one of the younger participants, Gorbunkov, in TsGAOR, 7952/3/94, 96-99.

⁵² Both trials involved fantastic accusations against specialists, and were conducted as 'show trials' in Moscow. The 'Promparty', consisting mainly of specialists and VTUZ professors, was accused of sabotage on a wide scale, funded partly from France. See RM, November-December 1930. The Menshevik trial is discussed in Sotsialisticheskii Vestnik, March-April 1931.

⁵³ The phrase, quoted by Bauman in August 1929, was Stalin's. (Sochineniya, vol xi, p. 29). It is interesting that Gorbachev has also used it in recent statements about democracy.

⁵⁴ SK, 1929, no. 3, p. 47.

⁵⁵ I Moskovskaya Oblast'naya Konferentsiya, p. 130.

a joint plenum of the MK and MKK noted that the purge of the state apparatus was unsatisfactory. In particular, it was said to be being carried out 'formally', too rapidly and without the participation of workers. The plenum resolution called for the establishment of a commission of 150 experienced 'responsible' Party and other administrative cadres to supervise the work of the purge commissions. 'Passivity' was henceforth to be a breach of Party instructions.⁵⁶

The first Moscow oblast' conference reiterated the need for persistence. Molotov emphasised the difficulties raised by the purge in his speech, giving the example of resistance by specialists in the Leningrad Academy of Sciences.⁵⁷ Bauman's speech focussed on the need for an intensification of the class struggle against 'enemies' abroad and at home. As well as stressing the need for self-criticism, he reviewed the current state of the purge, although his interpretation of the 'class struggle' extended far beyond a check on bureaucratic practices and personnel⁵⁸. Criticism of the laxity of the purge was a feature of the discussion which followed.⁵⁹ Thereafter, the campaign took on a new intensity. Military language was used to describe it, emphasising the atmosphere of attack upon entrenched officials. Bauman's use of phrases like 'class struggle' and 'socialist offensive' reflected the standard practice. 'I come to you from the front,' Ryndin told a meeting in October 1929. 'From the purge of Narkomfin front!'⁶⁰

Despite the rhetoric, including the conscious revival of Civil War imagery, the effects of the purge on the state apparatus were not everywhere disruptive.⁶¹ The most affected branch of the apparatus was the financial and banking side, now suffering for its calls for financial stringency in the face of the rapid industrialisation drive. The financial organs were

⁵⁶ Osnovnye resheniya po bor'be s byurokratizmom i uluchsheniyu gosapparata (M., 1929), pp.4-8.

⁵⁷ I Moskovskaya Oblast naya Konferentsiya, p. 43.

⁵⁸ Bauman, Sotsialisticheskoe nastupleniye i zadachi moskovskoi organizatsii.

⁵⁹ Efremov, from Elektrozaod, described the cells in Narkomfin as 'having a rotten smell' and called for further reviews of the institution. There were many similar examples. I Moskovskaya Oblast naya Konferentsiya, p. 171.

⁶⁰ RM, 11/10/1929.

⁶¹ Fitzpatrick describes the purge of the state apparatus as 'in fact a bureaucratic purge of the bureaucracy, quite efficiently conducted by Rabkrin in the spirit of organizational rationality.' Cultural Revolution, p. 27. In the cases of Narkomfin, Gosbank and Narkompros, this is clearly an understatement.

consistently the highest priority in accounts of the purge, the first to be examined and then the first to be re-purged. The result, at the level of the Moscow oblast' alone, was a loss of 324 jobs in the oblast' financial department, the cutting of 84 posts from the oblast' land department (zemotdel) and a 24% cut in the trade department (torgotdel)⁶². Although accounts of the purge now stress the savings produced by these cuts⁶³, these were only secondary compared with the political effects. A report of June 1930 marked the end of the purge in a number of Moscow institutions. At that time, a total of 83, 040 people had been checked, of whom, 6,917 (8.3%) had lost their jobs. A further 13% had received reprimands or warnings relating to their work. In the financial organs, the most common single reason for purging was that individuals were found to be 'class alien'. 41% of exclusions in these organs were for this reason. Other categories used to explain exclusions were drunkenness, indiscipline and 'bureaucratism', and embezzlement⁶⁴. Pure fabrications would have been difficult to sustain, and undoubtedly indiscipline, broadly defined, was a problem. On the other hand, 'class enemies' had been at work in the State apparatus for thirteen years, and lax behaviour was a problem which pervaded the whole of the Soviet system. There is no doubt that 'discoveries' made during the purge were intended as excuses to rid the apparatus of people who would not follow the current line and to create an atmosphere of vigilance.

The purge did not end the tensions between the Party and the state apparatus. Although it contributed to a change in atmosphere, the difficulties already outlined persisted even at the height of the 'cultural revolution'. This can be illustrated by looking at the question of sheftstvo, the relationship of patronage which was supposed to exist between state institutions (the client) and Moscow factories (the patron). The idea was that a standing commission of factory workers would regularly inspect the work of the state institution for

⁶² Starodubtsev, op. cit., p. 178.

⁶³ Starodubtsev reports that over a million rubles a year were to be saved by the cuts achieved in the oblast'. However, the bureaucracy was set for expansion, and any reductions were soon to be cancelled by its continuing overall growth. As Lewin points out, most of the purged officials eventually returned to bureaucratic posts of some kind. He quotes Ordzhonikidze's complaint that 'every time reductions of personnel and financial economies were decreed the result was bigger expenditure and an increase in the number of officials.' Cultural Revolution in Russia, p. 76.

⁶⁴ RM, 5/6/1930.

which they were responsible. In this task, they were to receive direct guidance from the TsKK. Introduced as a spin-off of the purge, sheftstvo had the potential to overcome some of the problems which obstructed vydvizhenie and purging. First, the factory had a steady, identifiable responsibility; evasion by members of the commission was more difficult. Secondly, sheftstvo commissions were groups of people who knew each other and could provide backing for each other when the client institution tried to overrule workers' demands. Third, the length of the relationship would help to overcome the difficulty workers felt in getting to know the technical intricacies of an institution.

The report of the Elektroavod shes s vo commission, which had been working in Narkomfin, shows the problems which still existed. The shes svo commission was divided, and did not always find time to meet and discuss a collective strategy. Despite the involvement of the TsKK, authority was still a problem, with the factory workers feeling they did not have the power to overrule Narkomfin 'experts'.⁶⁵ Understanding the finance organisation was another problem. Elektroavod representatives felt that they needed more help, if not from Narkomfin experts, then from the MK's own advisers in this sphere. Finally, there remained the problem of apathy back in the factory; members of the shes s vo commission complained that they did not feel they had any kind of reserve to call on for support or additional workers in carrying out their task.⁶⁶

To some extent, the problems of Elektroavod arose because it was one of the first factories to experiment with the idea of sheftstvo over an institution (as opposed to a collective farm or agricultural region). In general, the idea of sheftstvo was regarded as an improvement on 'campaign' purging alone, and was advocated by an MKK resolution of 29 December 1929.⁶⁷ Sheftstvo continued after the purge, although problems of the kind experienced by the Elektroavod workers persisted. In 1931, AMO's sheftstvo of a central state institution was ended as a result of its poor record, and Dinamo's sheftstvo of a tank regiment was

⁶⁵ As Tamarina, a member of the shes svo commission, put it, 'our authority, the authority of the working mass, does not stand as high as it should.' TsGAOR, 7952/3/488, 1.

⁶⁶ All these points were raised at a meeting of the shes s vo commission on 12 October 1929. TsGAOR, 7952/3/488, ll. 1-7.

⁶⁷ O sheftsve predpriyatii nad uchrezhdenii. M, 1930.

ordered to be submitted to a regular check by the presidium of the metalworkers' union.⁶⁸ Part of the problem, especially at this time, was the shortage of cadres capable of carrying out sheftstvo responsibilities, but underlying this were tensions between the factories and government departments. These could not be dispelled by declaring that the proletariat ought to be master of the institutions in a workers' state.

In general, then, it appears that popular control over the state, as opposed to Party institutions, was extremely limited. The campaigns and show trials of the period 1928-1931 significantly reduced the 'bourgeois' specialist's influence. Whatever reversals of policy might follow the 'cultural revolution', the primacy of political goals in economic administration, and the right of a new 'proletarian' generation to carry them out, were established. However, the party leadership were not committed to 'mass' politics in the long term. 1931 saw the beginning of the specialist's rehabilitation⁶⁹ and the first signs that 'proletarian policies' were going to be curbed⁷⁰. Even during the 'cultural revolution', the leadership's position had been ambivalent. In industry, for example, technical specialists could not always be spared, and many were quietly re-instated despite the purge rhetoric⁷¹. Criticism from below was only unleashed when it was needed. Among the country's leaders, fears that excessive licence to samokritika would disrupt the whole system of government were not dispelled⁷². There was cynicism from ordinary people as well. 'The sooner we're finished with this rubbish, the better', was a typical comment, reflecting a lack of faith in the sincerity of the leadership's goals⁷³.

⁶⁸ TsGAOR, 5469/15/10, 166.

⁶⁹ Lampert, op. cit., p. 56, and see above, pp. 48, 142, 172-3 and 202.

⁷⁰ Among these were the new emphasis on Party education and the emphasis on technical expertise outlined in Stalin's speech 'On the Tasks of Managers' of February 1931. Sochineniya, vol xiv, pp. 29-41.

⁷¹ Krasnyi Proletarii was no exception. There the chief engineer, Tugarinov, was purged, along with two other leading specialists, one of whom, Mart'yanov, was a 'professor of machine construction'. Despite the efforts of the new promotees, the factory suffered as a result of these losses, and by the end of 1929, Tugarinov at least had been re-instated, 'having given his word to the government.' TsGAOR, 7952/3/96, 85-6.

⁷² Bauman made this point in his speech at the I Moscow oblast' conference.

⁷³ P 3/4/1929.

On the other hand, these years were not without their lasting legacy. Like mass proletarian recruitment, mass promotion was studded with problems. Many people embarked on training courses without the ability or dedication to complete them. However, the scale of the campaign was sufficient to alter the composition of the economic and state apparatuses permanently⁷⁴. Vydvizhenie provided the majority of the cadres needed for the rapidly expanding technical and managerial elites of the 1930's⁷⁵. The problem of the 'bureaucratisation' of promotees was still serious. People who attained the status of administrator did not necessarily improve the efficiency or receptiveness of the office for which they worked simply because they were 'workers by social origin'⁷⁶. But the fact remains that large numbers of ordinary workers were able to move into more influential administrative posts as a result of the policies of the 'cultural revolution.'

Intra-Party Democracy, Samokritika and Party Discipline

What were the possibilities for promotion and popular influence within the Party elite? Unlike the state apparatus, the Party was a closed organisation in the sense that promotion was open only to its own members. Within that structure, however, the chances of promotion were theoretically greater than in more technical spheres. Official statements presented the purging of the Party and 'intra-Party democracy' as crucial to the political health of the regime. In theory, too, the Party was an organisation of equals. Although professional politicians, the apparatchiki, were separated by their work from ordinary activists 'at the bench', the notion of 'comradeship' was still officially accepted. In the 1920's and early 1930's, it was still common practice, for example, for Party officials to be

⁷⁴ Figures on promotion in the Moscow oblast' are not given in the sources for this period. However, the pervasiveness of 'training' during the first Five Year Plan is clear, and national statistics indicate that the period 1929-31 saw unprecedented numbers of workers rising to white collar jobs. See N. Lampert, *op. cit.*, esp pp. 63-79.

⁷⁵ Fitzpatrick, Cultural Revolution, p. 33. As she remarks, 'the figures were impressive: over 120, 000 university students in 1931 were classified as workers or children of workers, as against 40, 000 in 1928.'

⁷⁶ This is a point particularly stressed by Mary McAuley in her study of the Leningrad bureaucracy. Bureaucracy and Revolution: The Lesson from Leningrad 1917-1927 (University of Essex Russian and Soviet Studies Centre, Discussion Paper Series, no. 4, 1984), p. 28.

addressed as 'ty', the singular, familiar form of address, rather than 'vy', even by lower-ranking Party members⁷⁷.

Behind this informality and 'comradeship', the reality was that an elite had emerged which was clearly differentiated from the Party rank and file. Whatever the social origin of the Party elite, by the early 1920's, their lives were far removed from those of the workers their Party was supposed to represent. The 'freeing' of key administrators was regarded as necessary for efficient government; 'commune' theories of administration had been abandoned within weeks of the revolution.⁷⁸ However, certain other aspects of elite life, including the infamous 'Kremlin Ration' were less obviously justified.⁷⁹ Recruitment into the top jobs, moreover, was restricted before the mid-1930's⁸⁰.

Party statisticians generally used social origin when they were aiming to show how democratic the organisation was. Increases in the proportion of workers by social origin were taken as proof that the Left were wrong to dub the Party as bureaucratic rather than proletarian⁸¹. Despite the propaganda, however, the figures on social composition were not consistently comforting to the leadership. At raikom level, the proportion of workers by social origin was considerably lower than in the organisation as a whole⁸². In 1927, only 26% of raikom members in Moscow were workers by social origin⁸³. In July 1930, only 41.1% of raion-level activists in the Moscow oblast were workers by social origin. Among raikom secretaries, the proportion was higher, 68.3%, reflecting the careful selection of

⁷⁷ This practice has been attested by several Party members from this period in conversation in Moscow.

⁷⁸ As one historian put it, 'Life killed a beautiful theory. Instead of the death of the state, the death of The State and Revolution.' L. Fischer, quoted in Friedgut, op. cit., p. 36, n.

⁷⁹ See Lewin, 'Society, State and Ideology', in Cultural Revolution in Russia, p. 74.

⁸⁰ It is ironic that the Trotskyist attack on Stalin's 'bureaucratism' includes criticism of the fact that the 'Old Bolshevik' generation were purged in the mid-1930's to make way for new appointees. Even allowing for the fact that many of these new people were 'Stalin's creatures', the replacement of an elite which had dominated Soviet politics for twenty years by a new generation from the ranks cannot be regarded merely as a step backwards. For the Trotskyist critique, see Voslensky, op. cit., pp. 90-91. Of course, it is impossible to defend the methods by which the replacement was effected.

⁸¹ P 25/5/1929.

⁸² For figures on the proportion of workers by social origin in the Moscow Party, see chapter 3. In general, the proportion in this period was about 70%.

⁸³ SK, Oct 1927, 19-20, p. 95.

these people as well as the effect of ex-officio members from the local factories and offices on the composition of committees.⁸⁴

If the propaganda of the time made much of increases in the proportion of workers by social origin, as an indicator for the historian, they have serious shortcomings. Statistics about social origin may tell us something about the outlook of the people who ran Moscow's Party committees, but they cannot be treated as a clear guide to the extent of democratic processes within the Party. 'Social origin' did not necessarily correspond with current occupation, and even in the factory cells people who appeared as 'workers' might not have been at the bench for some time.

Further up the Party hierarchy, this tendency was more marked. At the level of the senior Party apparatus, the proportion of 'real' workers was negligible. Real power in Moscow was in the hands of a stratum of people who were working class in origin, but whose careers since the revolution had been in the Party apparatus itself. With few exceptions, they were also podpol'shchiki, Party members since before the February revolution. This was more remarkable because at this time the proportion of podpol'shchiki in the Party as a whole was falling. In October 1927, for example, there were only 10,758 podpol'shchiki in the Party as a whole, or 1.4% of the total. A large number of these, 2,709, were in the Moscow Party, bringing the proportion there to roughly 2%⁸⁵. Although slightly higher than the national average, this was nowhere near to reflecting the proportion in the leading Party organs. In September 1929, while 69.2% of the 130 MK members elected to represent Moscow or the raions (as opposed to the rural okrugs) at the I Moscow oblast' conference were workers by social origin, the proportion of MK members recruited since the Civil War was very small. After nearly six years of rapid recruitment, only 6.9% of MK members in 1929 had been recruited since 1924, while 44.6% were podpol'shchiki.⁸⁶ Of the 20 MK buro members in 1929 (excluding the members from the okrugs, for whom

⁸⁴ PS, 1930, nos. 11-12, p. 62.

⁸⁵ P 9/10/1926.

⁸⁶ The Party stazh of nearly all members was given in the list which appeared at the end of the stenographic report of the conference. I Moskovskaya oblast'naya konferentsiya VKP(b), vol. 2, pp. 217-228.

information is not given), all except five were podpol'shchiki. The five, all of 1918-20 stazh, were Goreva and Zaitsev, both relatively junior members, and three of the six raikom secretaries, Kozlov, Shirin and Mikhailevskii.

In 1932, the MGK elected at the January joint Moscow conference included two people who had joined the Party in 1928, but they were both workers from the bench serving a single term. The proportion of podpol'shchiki among the 112 full members had increased since 1929, to 50.9%⁸⁷. Members with a Civil War (1918-20) stazh made up 31.3% of the total, leaving only 17.8% with post -1921 membership, of whom 9.8%, slightly more than in 1929, had joined during the mass campaigns since 1924⁸⁸. The MGK buro remained dominated by podpol'shchiki (12 out of 14 full members), the exceptions being Khrushchev (1918) and Gaidul' (1919). Among the candidates, one exception stood out, the Komsomol representative, the only person whose stazh was later than 1920.

These figures show that the political struggles of the 1920's were not fought between Party generations or between members of the apparatus and new 'proletarian' activists. The replacement, between 1928 and 1932, of Moscow's old, broadly 'Right' leadership with a Stalinist group did not alter the composition of the MK by Party stazh. Politics continued to be dominated by the same type of elite. Even in 1932, the Party apparatus was headed by an stratum which was not typical of the organisation as a whole⁸⁹. If Party stazh, rather than social origin, is taken as the test for the accessibility of posts, then the best most rank and filers could aspire to in Moscow before 1932 would be the secretaryship of a factory or shop cell.

The composition of the MK was different partly as a result of nomenklatura. The difference between the elite and the rank and file in Moscow was probably more pronounced than

⁸⁷ This increase is partly explained by the fact that TsK representation on the MK and MGK had also increased.

⁸⁸ Figures from lists printed in the stenographic report of the conference, bulletin no. 13, pp. 26-29.

⁸⁹ For comparison, the national Party census of 1927 found that 59.1% of Party members had joined since 1924, while only 33.9% had joined before the end of the Civil War. (Smitten, op. cit., p. 55.) By 1932, it is estimated that just under half of the Moscow party organisation had joined since January 1929. See table 5.

elsewhere precisely because of the prestige attached to posts in the capital. Careers like Khrushchev's were rare in Moscow politics⁹⁰. Most political figures spent a period outside the capital, either in Party or other administrative posts, between their years as local aktivy and their eventual promotion to a position of leadership in Moscow. Polonskii, for example, spent several years as the head of the Nizhnĭ i-Novgorod Trade Union Council, a post which also gave him a seat on the gubernia Party committee buro, before returning to Moscow in 1925 as the secretary of the Rogozhsko-Simonovskii raikom.⁹¹ Ryndin, who like Polonskii was to become second secretary of the MK, spent six years in the provinces, in Perm, the Urals and Zlatoust, before coming to Moscow to work in the MKK⁹². Rather than rising within the Moscow organisation, successful activists from the capital were likely to be moved to work in the provinces.

Below the level of the top leadership, there were greater possibilities for promotion. The turnover of personnel was rapid, and the number of responsible administrative posts expanded considerably in this period. Reports of the period stressed the expansion of 'democracy' represented by the increasing number of people who shared in the administration of Party affairs. Party expansion into the factories and offices of Moscow brought a need for more local administrators. Just between December 1926 and October 1927, the aktiv is said to have expanded from 30,915 people to 40,673.⁹³ At this level, promotion for ordinary workers was common, and the Party stazh of activists more or less reflected levels in the Party as a whole. It was hoped that workers who joined the Party would take on duties, including propaganda work, the leadership of societies and the responsibilities of grupporg. Members who showed dedication in these tasks were eligible to run for more senior posts, including membership of the factory cell buro. In theory, the secretary of the buro was elected from these members. Figures on the composition of cell buros in Moscow factories illustrate this process in action.

⁹⁰ Coming to Moscow as a student, Khrushchev rose rapidly from a VUZ Communist cell to the secretaryship of Bauman raikom, then to that of Krasnaya Presnya raikom, and ultimately to the position of MK secretary.

⁹¹ RM, 26/4/1928.

⁹² RM, 22/9/1929.

⁹³ Davydova, op. cit., p. 518.

Composition of cell buros in selected Moscow factories by social origin and Party stazh⁹⁴.

	cell secretaries		buro composition	
	Workers	Party <u>stazh</u> pre-1918	workers	Party <u>stazh</u> pre-1918
April 1923	63%	18%	-	-
Dec 1923	63%	23%	-	-
Nov 1924	70%	18%	72%	20%
Oct 1925	81%	21%	78%	14%
Dec 1926	83%	17%	79%	12%
Oct 1927	87%	12%	84%	9%

From the table, it is clear that the number of older Party members was declining steadily at this level as new recruits were taking their places. The process continued later in the 1920's as the pace and scale of recruitment increased. Figures given in Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo suggest that by 1930, between 2 and 7% of members of factory committees in Moscow were of pre-1918 Party stazh (roughly equivalent to the Moscow average), although the composition of the buros may have been slightly different.⁹⁵

Did this expansion in the aktiv reflect a greater distribution of power within the population? The problem is that the definition of 'activist' included both cell secretaries, who could have a large amount of local responsibility, and figures like grupporgy and agitprop workers. Far from having a decisive part to play in political events, these people often regarded their work as a burden, nagruzka. They were often poorly prepared for responsibility, over-worked or unwilling to devote time to Party affairs. Closely guided, or even by-passed by the cell buros⁹⁶, many were the executives of other people's policies,

⁹⁴ SK Oct 1927, nos. 19-20, p 95.

⁹⁵ PS 1932, no. 6.

⁹⁶ Cell buros were frequently accused of 'substituting' themselves for the lower organs. See, e.g., Iz TsK, 1925, no. 1.

rather than initiators themselves. However, hard and fast conclusions about their influence are risky; we have already seen how important a role they played in the shaping of the Party's role in industry. The relationship between the aktiv and the leadership can be analysed only by looking at real cases. Neither the official statements about 'democracy' nor the conclusions of outside observers provide a reliable guide.

In general, the Moscow aktiv was not typical of the national picture. Although the MK and raion leaderships were figures of national status, Moscow Communists were aware of their own importance. Described by Lenin as the vanguard of the Soviet Communist Party, they were keen to defend their claim against that of their Leningrad rivals. In this respect, they were generally more committed politically than activists in more remote areas of the USSR. How much influence did they exert over the city's political elite?

An important aspect of 'intra-Party democracy' was the selection of local officials. Theoretically, local cells were encouraged to elect their own. Appointments from above were officially presented as being unfortunate necessities occasioned by the local cell's inability to decide on a suitable candidate.⁹⁷ Reports of election campaigns, which were held in all localities simultaneously, boasted of the percentage turn-out at 'report-election meetings' as evidence that democratic processes were in healthy order. Moscow in particular was expected to show high levels of participation because of its concentration of workers and capital city status. Typically, turn-outs would reach about 70% of voting members, although the figure for women could be as little as half of that⁹⁸.

The turn-out bore little relation to the extent of 'democracy', however. Two criticisms in particular stood out. First, candidates were not selected by straightforward nomination, but by pre-arranged 'lists'. These were vetted by Party officials, thus preventing the discussion of obviously unsuitable candidates. Lists were a powerful means of extending official influence. Their use to boost support for the apparatus was a stumbling block for the Stalin

⁹⁷ P, 25/5/1929.

⁹⁸ V. P. Pospekhov, Deyatel'nost' moskovskoi partiinoi organizatsii po dal'neishemu razvitiyu vnutripartiinoi demokratii v gody pervoi pyatiletki, 1928-32 gg. (avtoreferat dissertatsii, M., 1976), p. 15.

group in Moscow in 1928. In October 1928, Polonskii proposed the abolition of these lists, a move which was described as 'broad democracy' but which was no more than a temporary device to break the power of rightist appointees in the raions and factory cells.⁹⁹ Secondly, a number of posts were anyway reserved for apparatus nominees through the nomenklatura system, giving the lie to the idea that the Party leadership desired the abolition of official nominations on all fronts.

'Party democracy' thus involved two principles. People had to be involved in the Party's work and encouraged to feel that they shared in the shaping of its goals. On the other hand, participation was limited by the centre's fears of indiscipline and the emergence of oppositions from among the rank and file. After 1928, a tendency to less caution developed, partly co-inciding with the industrialisation drive, but also encouraged by the results of a number of experimental policies. The election experiment of October 1928, for example, illustrated that the lowest levels in the Party tended to be loyal to the TsK majority, particularly if they could be allowed to criticise the intermediate party organs. An appeal to the 'masses', if carefully controlled, could be a useful weapon against recalcitrant local officials. The expansion of recruitment and growth of the Party aktiv were also signs of the new emphasis. Other policies characteristic of the period included self-criticism and the purge of 1929.

Self-criticism was less of a success within the Party than outside it. The press tended to exaggerate the failures, giving many examples of 'suppression' in order to whip up enthusiasm for the campaign among the rank and file. Martenovka, for example, caricatured the reaction of Party cells in *Serp i Molot*. "Why should we stand there and beat ourselves in front of the aktiv?" it reported secretaries as asking, or "Since we don't work badly, all we need to do is to say our work is satisfactory".¹⁰⁰ Criticisms of the Party apparatus, however, were conspicuously absent. The censored press reflected official values in this respect. Individual local officials might be attacked, but it was clear that the Party's policy

⁹⁹ P. 10/10/1928. The only other time in the period before 1941 that direct elections were held was on the eve of the 'Great Purge' of 1937-8. Clearly, an appeal to popular opinion was a valuable means of attacking middle-ranking Party officials.

¹⁰⁰ TsGAOR 7952/3/253, 14.

and leaders were intended to be virtually immune. Thus when Mandel'shtam encouraged members not to fear the word 'deviation', he was committing a serious error¹⁰¹. Partly this was because of his own 'deviant' position, but this alone is not an adequate explanation for the reaction of the Stalin leadership. As well as appearing to be a rallying-cry for the Right, his words suggested that rank and filers might criticise broad policy issues. The leadership's fear that discipline would collapse set clear boundaries for the campaign. As one MK member remarked at the September 1928 plenum, 'we must not under any circumstances relax discipline, and we must even increase it, because if we do not we may have a lot of problems over discipline.'¹⁰²

It is hard to assess how far 'discipline', as officially defined, was maintained. Judging from the published sources, the Party's leaders were very seldom attacked, and only then by 'opportunists' like the Podol'sk factory workers. On the other hand, accounts in the archives record direct criticisms of policy by rank and file members. The exile of Trotsky, the export of grain at a time of shortage, the policy of deploying Party activists outside their factories to the detriment of local interests - all these were criticised at *Krasnyi Proletarii* in 1929. Moreover, the Party's leaders were not the only people who could use self-criticism as a means of removing opponents. In the localities, it was a tool of the rising generation in the struggle for promotion, and was used against Party officials as well as specialists. As Kravchenko recalled, 'self-criticism sometimes became an underhand method of struggle for place and for power.'¹⁰³

Self-criticism also created an atmosphere in which nomenklatura officials could find themselves exposed to attack, although very few examples of this occur. One was the Giber case of 1929. Giber, the secretary of Sokol'niki raikom, was criticised for negligence in the Gosbank affair. Although Bauman intervened to re-instate him, overturning a raikom resolution calling for his removal, he disappeared from Moscow politics a few weeks

¹⁰¹ See above, p. 101.

¹⁰² Pyatyi Ob"edinennyi Plenum MK i MKK (1928), p. 108.

¹⁰³ Kravchenko, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

later.¹⁰⁴ This kind of popular pressure was precisely what the leadership feared from samokritika, so incidents like this were kept as quiet as possible. However, it is important not to dismiss the whole movement because extreme cases were not common. Self-criticism did produce attacks on the Party apparatus from below, even if most of the 'spontaneous' conflicts were confined to the lower ranks and to criticisms between adjacent tiers in the hierarchy. Senior Party officials could be protected, although they were not wholly immune from attack. Below the level of the raion and MK leaderships, however, criticism was more open and produced noticeable changes. This fact helps to account for the enthusiasm of participants in the campaign, some of whom believed that by attacking corruption or irrationality they were truly contributing to the building of socialism. The purge, however, aroused less enthusiastic responses, mainly because it was neither as spontaneous nor as effective.

The timing of the purge was not accidental. Although purging was a regular feature of Party life, no full-scale campaign had been held since 1921. It was not that the leadership needed a cover for removing Right deviationists. Organised opponents of the new course had been removed from the Moscow Party in 1928. Further political removals followed during the purge, but a public trial would have been much less difficult to arrange. Purging was time-consuming, and in 1929 Party members already had too many calls on their time to fulfil their duties adequately. The purge was disruptive in the first full year of the Five Year Plan. More than another duty for overworked officials, it was also the cause of widespread stress as people's careers and livelihoods hung in the balance. Despite these problems, its advantage was that it raised the consciousness and vigilance of Party members, warning them of the consequences of even a passive attitude towards the new policies of socialist offensive.

As well as this political advantage, it was hoped that the purge would raise the standing of members by showing that the Party cared about issues of personal and public discipline. The leadership did not worry excessively about the amount of 'ballast' in the Party at this

¹⁰⁴ See Bauman, Polosa velikogo stroitel'stva, pp. 92-3, for his re-instatement, and P, 19/9/1929 for the composition of the MK burol after his removal. No reason was given.

time. The 1929 purge was accompanied by a campaign of intensified recruitment which led to a further reduction in standards at the level of selection. However, it was important to discredit the idea that anyone could remain a Communist Party member regardless of their conduct. At a time of uncertainty, when the Party needed to show that it was united and self-confident, the advantages of a public cleansing operation were clear.

The practice differed from the theory from the outset. The first problem was lack of preparation. Announced at the XVI Party Conference in April 1929, the purge in Moscow was to be conducted in two stages, ending in September¹⁰⁵. Given the other pressures on Party activists at the time, this schedule was excessively optimistic. The demand for speed also helped to foster the impression that the purge was not to be taken seriously. Two types of complaint followed; the first, that the cells were not moving fast enough¹⁰⁶, the second, that important questions were being neglected in an attempt to get through the disruption too quickly¹⁰⁷. Officially, the standards required were very high. In production cells, for example, all members were expected to attend the purge meetings¹⁰⁸, and a wide range of aspects of individual behaviour were to be scrutinised¹⁰⁹. Such meetings could last for hours, the checking of an individual cell lasting for several days. During this time, normal Party activities would have to be suspended, not only because members were at the meeting, but also because of the stress under which they would be living.¹¹⁰

Naturally, these high standards were not fulfilled in all cases. The press, again attempting to agitate for better results, reported many instances of errors, sloppy questioning and the suppression of information. Often the reason was that the Party cell or its individual members were trying to shield themselves. When enthusiastic activists were scarce, the

¹⁰⁵ P, 10/5/1929.

¹⁰⁶ In the end, the purge was not completed in Moscow until the spring of 1930.

¹⁰⁷ P, 3/4/1929.

¹⁰⁸ RM, 23/12/1929.

¹⁰⁹ There was some confusion over this issue. Officially, 'personal' activities were none of the purge commission's business, and the idea that concierges should be asked to report on the inhabitants of their buildings was discouraged. (P, 3/4/1929) However, the evidence shows that personal behaviour, including drunkenness and promiscuity were high on the list of reasons for eventual exclusion from the Party.

¹¹⁰ Kravchenko, op. cit., pp. 133-5, referring to the purge of 1933.

threat that the purge might remove some of them was a constant worry.¹¹¹ An article in Rabochaya Moskva referred to the 'conspiracy of silence' in the cells when faced by the Control Commission investigators¹¹². Other Communists feared or resented discussing their shortcomings in front of non-Party people. To avoid this, one cell held its purge meetings in a room too small to accommodate anyone but the commission and the Party activists.¹¹³ Finally, individual Party members resisted criticism either by withholding information or by suppressing criticism from below. In the Mospoligraf cell, for example, criticism of a senior figure, Krasilovskii, who was also a member of the MKK, was suppressed when he held a meeting to warn his critics that attacking him amounted to a breach of Party discipline. His decision was then upheld by the next cell meeting. As he put it, 'we must deal seriously with kids like that.'¹¹⁴

People in influential positions were more easily able to protect themselves than ordinary Party members. The most powerful seem not to have been subjected to any kind of public scrutiny. A charmed circle of MK, MKK and raikom officials escaped exclusion. To a certain extent, the MK escaped in 1929 because it had been thoroughly shaken up the previous autumn. However, when the records of MK and MKK members are examined more closely, it is clear that they were being spared the worst of the purge in 1929. Five people (four from the MKK and one from the MK) were to be kept under observation as a result of misdemeanours, three members of the MKK were removed from the proverkoms, one member of the MK was criticised for 'political illiteracy' and two people were transferred to other work¹¹⁵. Although the number of people affected was substantial, their punishments were relatively light compared with those meted out to rank and filers for comparable offences. The member of the MKK who was excluded had lied about his Party stazh. Serious though this was in Party terms, it is surprising that he was excluded while a member of the MK, who received only a reprimand, was accused of being of kulak origin

¹¹¹ This concern was expressed in Martenovka, which quoted a common view as 'because of the chistka we'll lose all our best Communists.' TsGAOR, 7952/3/253, 25.

¹¹² RM, 24/10/1929.

¹¹³ P, 22/5/1929.

¹¹⁴ P, 13/7/1929.

¹¹⁵ A report on the purge of the MK and MKK by Yanson is given in IV Plenum MK (M., 1929), pp. 84-90.

and having fought with the Whites in the Civil War. Others were merely 'reprimanded' for persistent drunkenness at meetings, 'small crimes', and, in the case of one MKK member, for not knowing she had been elected to it because she had not been told by her cell and didn't read the papers. Among leading raion and uezd cadres, 150,000 had been checked, but only 4, or 0.3%, had been excluded from the Party.¹¹⁶

The suppression of criticism during the purge, and the sparing of the MK, helped to spoil any image of 'democracy' intended in the exercise. The other disappointment was that the purge did not improve the Party's social composition, and exhibited workers and peasants in a worse light than specialists and sluzhashchie. Although the proportion of members excluded was below the national average,¹¹⁷ more workers were excluded than employees.¹¹⁸ The effect of the purge was thus to weaken the representation of workers in the Moscow Party.¹¹⁹ Proletarian recruitment, which was intended to accompany the removal of undesirable elements, did not compensate for the loss.

In many ways, then, the purge was a failure on its own terms. Its most important purpose - creating an atmosphere in which opposition to the new economic course would be stifled - was fulfilled, but not its secondary, but explicit, aims of improving the Party's composition and overall discipline. Other means would soon be found to achieve both these ends, neither of them encouraging to 'intra-Party democracy'.¹²⁰ Overall, the prospects for that looked bleak.

What conclusions can be drawn on the basis of this evidence? First, it is clear that official rhetoric about 'intra-Party democracy' was mainly a cover for political manoeuvres which had little to do with popular control of the organs of government. The attack on the state

¹¹⁶ Ibid., p. 102. The national average at all levels was about 11%.

¹¹⁷ 6.9%, as opposed to the national 11%. Ocherki Istorii Moskovskoi Organizatsii, first edn., p. 454. This was probably because there were fewer peasants in Moscow than the average.

¹¹⁸ The figures were workers 7.3% excluded, employees, 6.7% and peasants, 12.9%. Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Bauman, Sotsialisticheskoe nastuplenie, p. 75.

¹²⁰ The policy of all-out proletarian recruitment led to the flooding of the Party with people whose commitment was low, while the subsequent campaigns to streamline Party administration reduced the number of channels through which these new recruits could communicate with the leadership.

apparatus involved popular participation, but grass-roots criticism had less effect on the Party leadership. As we have seen, this was a paradox, because the Party consistently posed as the more 'democratic' body. Despite this posture, the elite remained aloof from criticism. It also remained a distinct group within the Party, separated by experience, Party stazh and material circumstances. In general, Party campaigns were regarded with cynicism. It was virtually unknown for popular pressure alone to remove a senior Party official, and the wishes of the rank and file played a minimal role in their selection. Indeed, in view of the fact that none of the MK first secretaries in this period was a Muscovite, it may be suggested that popular pressure was deliberately ignored by a TsK anxious to prevent the formation of a 'Moscow bloc'.

Below the level of the elite, however, the promotion of activists to posts of local influence increased. For Party activists recruited in the 1920's, campaigns like self-criticism and the purge were stepping-stones to political careers. If they could pass the test themselves, this was a period when the Party elite was expanding, a period of rapid turnover among state officials, and one where successful administrators were at a premium. They could even expect protection against the worst of the purge because they were needed for the Party's urgent work. Although they could not yet hope for promotion into the really senior jobs, nor expect to be able to criticise official policy or agitate for broad changes, they wielded considerable local power. Those who worked to the satisfaction of the apparatus were to form the backbone of the 'professional' shop cell aktiv after 1932. These people would have had a very different experience of Party life from that of the disaffected oppositionist or the uncommitted rank and filer. Their power rested on the absence of central control in a wide range of areas. Since most of them were post-1924 recruits who had not participated in political administration during the Civil War, it was, to them, a new power.

The growth of popular influence in this period, therefore, is less apparent in policies officially labelled 'intra-Party democracy', than in the aspects of Party life we have already considered; recruitment, the administration of industry, the gaps in official control and the acute shortage of cadres. It was not a system of 'political participation' as western critics would define the term, lacking free elections and the possibility that citizens could choose

between alternative policies. But it was a system which in this period provided its promotees with unprecedented access to local power and very little interference in its administration. Because they affected ordinary people at their places of work, these aspects, arguably, would have been as noticeable at the time as the regimentation which is commonly associated with the period of Stalin's rise to power.

Conclusion

In the introductory chapter, four broad issues were raised, to which we now return. The degree of autonomy of local Party organisations relative to the centre was the first issue. The second, which also relates to the question of political autonomy, concerned the influence which rank and file members were able to exert over decision-making and implementation. Thirdly, questions were raised about the nature of political opposition in the local context. Finally, it was asked how far the Party leadership and the grass-roots shared the same goals, how far their ideas about the revolutionary process in this period coincided. As we saw in the introduction, various possible solutions to these problems have been proposed. In conclusion, we will examine the answers suggested by this study.

In a country as large and diverse as the USSR, generalisation based on one area has to be tentative. As the capital, Moscow was unusual; its importance meant that political battles there were more bitter, and that any kind of deviant movement was likely to evoke a swift response from the centre. Moscow's population, predominantly proletarian, but with a larger than average leaven of students and civil servants, was unique. Resources, even basic ones like food, were more abundant in Moscow than elsewhere in the USSR. All these things made Moscow different. However, they also make it a valuable test case for the theory that the dominant theme in this period was the consolidation of absolute power. Given the higher living standards, the calibre of the Party officials at the more senior levels and the degree of intervention by the Party leadership, Moscow might have been expected to be a better model of compliance and order than other areas in the USSR. If it was not, then a revision of our assumptions about politics in the period is justified.

1. The relationship between the Moscow and Central Committees

As we saw in chapter six, members of the MK had more in common with their colleagues in the Politburo than with their own rank and file. Moscow's leaders were drawn from the same small pool of Party cadres as members of the central apparatus, and had often spent

periods working in the central organs. Each of the four MK first secretaries after 1925 was either a full or candidate member of the Politburo. Not accidentally perhaps in a city with a tradition of political dissidence, none of them was a Muscovite. Unlike the mass of the rank and file, both the central and Moscow leaderships were predominantly composed of former podpol'shchiki. They had experiences in common dating from before the revolution. Living and working close together, their personal links were continually being consolidated. The distance between this elite and the rank and file was emphasised by the growing secrecy of debates in this period, and the by-passing of the Party conference by the secretariat and buros. For the ordinary Party member, all senior politicians, whether from the central or Moscow elites, must have seemed remote, inaccessible figures, united by a common interest in government.

Despite all this, Moscow officials were not allowed a free hand, even in local affairs. From the centre's point of view, their very seniority was one of the reasons for keeping them under close supervision. Moreover, Moscow itself was too important to neglect. Broadly, of course, all policy was made at the all-Union level. Local representatives participated in the formal process, but as a body, any local organisation was bound by the TsK's resolutions, and the extent of consultation was almost negligible. However, the centre's involvement in Moscow politics went further than this formal policy-making role. It took a direct interest in the capital's affairs. Senior though Moscow's leaders were, the MK was often by-passed by the Politburo.

We have seen that this intervention could be official and collective, involving the TsK as a body. It could also take the form of personal intervention by individual Politburo members. Either way, it limited the MK's freedom of action within Moscow. The same was true of patronage in the capital. The MK secretary's power was limited; where his appointees were unacceptable to the centre, he could not protect them. Moreover, he had no power over appointments to the strategic orgraspredotdel. In these respects, the MK's power was probably smaller than that of more remote local organisations.

Moscow's political leaders were not entirely overshadowed by the central Party organs, however. Within the broad limits of national policy, they had a certain amount of leeway in which to establish a recognisable 'Moscow line'. This was the case under Uglanov and Bauman, who were able to construct their own policies within vague central guidelines. They suffered only when a re-definition of central policy put their approaches beyond approved limits. MK initiatives could also influence national policy. It was Kaganovich, for example, who started the reorganisation of Party structure in 1932, a reform which began in Moscow but was soon generalised. The same could be said of changes in a number of other spheres, including Party education. Sometimes, as with the samokritika campaign, what looked like a 'Moscow initiative' was actually a case where Moscow was being used as a laboratory by the centre. On other occasions, however, the local organisation was able to affect national political life through ideas of its own. The relationship between the centre and the MK was not an equal partnership and it infringed the Party's own rules in several ways. On the other hand, the MK was not merely the centre's local executive.

2. The role of the rank and file

The MK's freedom of action was partly determined by the amount of time the Politburo could devote to supervising local matters. Further down the hierarchy, supervision presented even more of a problem. Accordingly, the local Party cells had considerable influence over their own affairs. A hierarchical structure existed, with authority mediated through the raikoms and the network of instructors, but there were too many demands on the Party apparatus at the raion level for control to be reliably maintained. Below the level of the raion Party apparatus, moreover, the multi-tiered Party structure had largely to be staffed by amateurs. This had a number of consequences. Undoubtedly, it contributed to a certain amount of 'bungling'¹. The example of Party education shows how the use of people whose time was limited and who were anyway under-qualified could lead to the failure of

¹ It is this aspect which Getty emphasises in his study of the Smolensk Party. (See, e.g., Origins of the Great Purges, pp. 36-37) The question he begs, therefore, is how the Party was able to achieve anything, since its records were in chaos and its officials corrupt, inept and beyond the reach of central government.

policy. On the other hand, it should not be assumed that all rank and file activists were incapable of implementing resolutions successfully.

It is clear from the evidence about recruitment that Party membership was not an easy option for the worker-Communists who staffed the majority of cell buros and factory Party committees in this period. Their duties involved attendance at after-work meetings which could drag on until the small hours of the morning. Illnesses associated with exhaustion and poor living conditions were common among Party activists. Party membership itself carried a stigma; other workers were often suspicious of Communists, while non-party factory officials - foremen, technical staff and management - frequently resented the interfering role of the local cell. High standards of personal conduct were expected of them; the continual references in the Party press to drinking, corruption and indiscipline were as much hortatory propaganda as a true reflection of the behaviour of local party members.

It is thus reasonable to conclude that a majority of local Party officials in the factories were serious about their work. The records of their meetings in Krasnyi Proletarii and Serp i Molot confirm this view. This seriousness, combined with the ineffectiveness of central control, gave them a crucial role in local decision-making. They were not colourless 'transmission belts' for central policy². In the maelstrom of the first Five Year Plan, the Central and Moscow Party Committees did not necessarily know themselves how to approach the problems which arose. Where a local body could be made responsible for finding a solution, as in the Moscow factories, it could be easier to abstain from specifying a detailed general line. Sometimes, as in the case of the re-structuring of the Party between 1929 and 1931, local activists pointed the way forward nationally. On the other hand, their initiative could be curbed when it caused problems for central government. Collectivisation was a case in point. Faced with the task of driving peasants into collectives, and knowing that speed was of the essence, local officials worked out their own tactics. Although

² For those who doubt that they could be so described, the following quotation from Ulam's biography of Stalin may be instructive. Describing the cities after 'Stalin's war against the nation' (collectivisation), he writes, 'the urban and industrial part was to [Stalin's] mind like a strict-regimen school: those who failed or showed the slightest sign of indiscipline were severely chastised, but those who adopted, obeyed, and passed examinations would be warmly praised, rewarded and even elevated to be senior prefects.' (Ulam, *op. cit.*, p. 354)

ultimately responsible for the decision to unleash the campaign, Stalin was not the only person responsible for the excesses of 1930. He intervened, however, when civil war in the countryside threatened the whole programme.

During the 1920's and early 1930's, the senior Party organs tolerated grass-roots autonomy to an extent which historians, seeing the period through the prism of the late 1930's, have tended to underestimate. Stalin, for example, was careful to test the temperature of local opinion before moving against the Right in September 1928³. To a certain extent, moreover, the leadership colluded with what appeared to be incompetence, allowing local cells to decide their priorities for themselves. Record-keeping, or the lack of it, was an example of this. Usually, fudging of the records was a cloak for failure to fulfil the enormous tasks expected of local organisations. Such failure was inevitable in view of the size of the demands made on local organisations, and rarely met with serious reprisals. Local leaders were aware that too much was being asked of the aktiv, so they frequently turned a blind eye to its shortcomings. The factory committee of Krasnyi Proletarii misled the local raikom about its performance in 1929, and also tried to prevent its own subordinate cells from attacking its record. Cases like this were taken up by the MK only where they had become so serious that they could no longer be ignored. Several other examples were given in chapters four and five. Among these was the shirking of Party propaganda courses. It was the most 'responsible' activists who had the worst records here, overloaded as they were with practical duties. Despite formal complaints about this in the press, little was done to alleviate the problem before 1932.

The Party's leaders, like some historians subsequently, blamed local activists for many of the errors of the First Five Year Plan. Their faults were said to include 'lack of responsibility' and incompetence. Frustrated by the failures of the first Five Year Plan, and suspicious of the role played by grass-roots activists, the leadership responded by introducing a more centralised structure in 1932. However, judging by what we know of

³ T 2534. Another case where the leadership bowed before local pressure was the removal of Giber from Sokol'niki raikom in 1929. See above, pp. 229-230.

political life after 1932⁴, this was not the answer, and we must therefore question the original diagnosis. Although the rank and file activists had their problems, they were neither as incompetent nor as powerless as we have been led to believe. Continuing failure had the effect of driving the leadership to adopt more repressive policies, however. Ultimately, too, the implementation of many important resolutions would be entrusted to the most disciplined and politically reliable organisation available: not the Party, but the secret police⁵.

3. Political Opposition in Moscow

Influential though local initiative was, and impotent though the centre may have been to control its every manifestation, the formation of an organised opposition was virtually impossible. This was the sphere in which the autonomy of the rank and file decreased most sharply between 1925 and the beginning of 1932⁶. The emergence of the 'monolithic' Party has attracted a great deal of historical attention. It is seen as one of the most important aspects of the 'rise of Stalin'. As such, it is usually viewed negatively. When historians seek to explain how Stalin defeated his rivals in the 1920's, the underlying assumption is often that a crucial historical opportunity was missed. Stalin's victory is regarded as illegitimate in the light of assumptions about the potential appeal of the oppositions, either as alternatives per se, or in terms of the programmes they offered⁷. Their defeat is explained mainly by their tragic weaknesses, or as the result of Stalin's 'underhand tactics'⁸.

The study of Moscow showed that the traditional explanations still have a lot to offer. In particular, Stalin's use of the orgraspredotdel was seen as important, at least in 1928. However, two common assumptions need revision in the light of our findings. The first is

⁴ Historians of diverse views, including both Getty and Fainsod, see the 1930's as a period no less chaotic than 1928-1932.

⁵ See Lewin, Making of the Soviet System, pp. 265-6.

⁶ Of course, the crucial turning-point was already passed. The defeats of 1921 and 1924 both had more impact on political opposition than the events of the later 1920's.

⁷ In view of the current vogue for NEP in the Soviet Union, it may be that this kind of explanation will begin to gain support among Soviet historians in future.

⁸ Daniels emphasised the 'tragic weakness' aspect. Among the reasons for the defeat of the oppositions of the 1920's, 'lack of resolute leadership', 'disunity' and the effects of Leninist doctrine were in his view the most important. Op. cit., p. 398. Among the 'underhand tactics', greatest prominence is usually given to Stalin's control of the Party apparatus as General Secretary. For a recent account of this, see Voslensky, op. cit., pp. 78-9.

the idea that the oppositions could have used radically different tactics. The second is the notion that if they had, they could have gained widespread popular support.

The point about tactics relates primarily to the Right. The Left mounted a determined campaign, and there was not much they could have done, as Bolsheviks, that they did not try between 1925 and 1927. It was the Right who restricted themselves to closet tactics, so that even their potential supporters had little idea that they needed backing. However, we saw that this was the only course open to them at the time. In 1928, it was Stalin's policies, not theirs, which deviated from the norm. After the defeat of Trotsky, factional activity carried even more risks than it had before. The Right could not afford to put themselves in the wrong by publicly forming a faction. Theirs, after all, was the moral high ground. It is true that their leaders made a number of mistakes, and that, as politicians, they were outclassed by Stalin all the way⁹. However, within broad limits, the methods they adopted were obvious and logical.

The issue of potential support is more important, and also harder to resolve. In general, we found that the oppositions of 1925-8 failed to attract significant followings. This was not simply because people were coerced or terrorised into orthodoxy. The leadership's response to the Left Opposition of 1923 had been an object lesson for many Muscovites, but fear alone was not enough to prevent discontent from finding organised forms thereafter. Stalin's control of the appointments apparatus prevented the formation of a solidly oppositionist MK under the first secretary's patronage. After 1924 all minority groups in Moscow thus relied on coalitions involving Party members and representatives of different interests in the capital. They failed because they did not find sufficient support in the lower echelons of the Party or among the population as a whole.

Their lack of appeal was not a simple matter. The first problem for the groups which found themselves in opposition to the majority in these years was that they *were* oppositions. By

⁹ Among their mistakes, disunity, especially Bukharin's apparent failure to back Uglanov in October, stands out. As politicians, their weaknesses ranged from an excessive pre-occupation with theory (Bukharin) to alcoholism (Rykov).

1925, this implied several further handicaps. Joining a deviant political movement came to be seen as risky for the individual. More importantly, perhaps, opposition activity was also widely considered detrimental to the interests of the revolution. The Politburo majority had discovered a great propaganda weapon when it succeeded in labelling politicians who disagreed with it as 'oppositionists'. That much was partly the result of manipulation of the centrally-controlled press. What it meant in practical terms was that any opposition would have an uphill struggle to attract supporters within the Party or outside it.

The second reason for the unpopularity of Bolshevik opposition groups was that they failed to present themselves as credible alternatives. Since all Party factions after 1921 were loyal to the fundamental principle that only the Bolshevik Party could guide Russia's still peasant-dominated population safely to socialism, the idea of political pluralism was ruled out. Even the Left, who were prepared to canvass for support among the non-Party population, could not promise that the Party's monopoly of power would be broken. For this reason, although some Muscovites were interested in the economic alternatives under discussion, there seemed little point in making the risky commitment of support for the opposition movements themselves.

All this can be admitted without suggesting that the programmes of the different factions were unattractive in their own right. We do not have enough evidence about popular reactions to the oppositions' platforms to discuss this question authoritatively. However, it is clear that the assumption that either faction necessarily had more appeal than Stalin is not tenable. First, the population of Moscow included social groups whose interests conflicted sharply. For the hereditary urban worker, policies which favoured the peasant had little to offer. Food shortages and unemployment aggravated tensions between city and village. On the other hand, many Moscow workers retained 'links with the countryside', and had a lot to lose by proposed changes in the relationship between industry and agriculture. Secondly, the actors involved had no idea where history was taking them. A Communist who rejected Trotskyism in 1927 could not have realised what the consequences would be. Historically, after all, it was a Bonaparte they all had to fear. Similarly, someone who felt that the time had come to put pressure on the more prosperous peasants in 1928 was not necessarily

voting for the famine of 1932. Sinister explanations for Stalin's victory still have validity, but there are plenty of simpler ones.

4. Support for the Communist Party

The fact that there was little support for opposition movements does not mean that even its own members were satisfied with the Party's record in this period. A large section, probably a majority, of Moscow workers were hostile to the Party. This was expressed passively - by resistance to the recruitment drives and abstention from meetings - and actively, by strikes and the organisation of protest against shift work and raised norms. The evidence from Podol'sk suggests that hostility, in an area whose population was closely linked with the countryside, increased dramatically at the time of rapid collectivisation in 1929-30. Rank and file Party members were not immune from the prevailing mood in their factories. Communists joined in the protest in Podol'sk, and on other occasions participated in strikes or attempted to negotiate for higher wages, clearly taking literally their role as the vanguard of the proletariat. In general, ordinary workers in the Party, like their non-Party fellows, regarded the verkhi with a mixture of suspicion and fascination. Although not organised, opposition to Bolshevik methods, and particularly to Stalin's policies after 1928, also continued into the 1930's in the state bureaucracies.

It is hard to argue against the theory that the ideals of the revolution had been 'betrayed' by the Communist Party. The identity of interest between Party and working class scarcely seems to have survived the revolution of October 1917. An elite emerged over whose policies the bulk of the population, including ordinary Party members, had no control at all. However, the degree of betrayal can be exaggerated. Bolshevik policy was not as hostile to workers' interests as the concept implies¹⁰. In this period, and especially between 1928 and 1931, it was possible for workers to re-train for positions in the Party or state apparatuses. Moreover, as we have seen, even relatively junior Party activists were not incapable of

¹⁰ See Chase, *op. cit.*, pp. 293-8. As he suggests, 'the revolutionary agendas of the working class and that of the party, springing as they did from different historical and experiential sources, remained qualitatively different. But by no means were they exclusive; on the contrary, they intersected on key items.' (pp. 293-4)

moulding policy to suit local interests. Rank and filers often had ideas at variance with those of the leadership, for example over work discipline or the relative importance of the director and Party cell within the factory. Although they could not organise overt national campaigns to implement their ideas, they could often achieve what they wanted on a smaller scale in their own locality. If that was true in Moscow, it would be fair to assume that it was an even larger feature of Party life in remoter places.

At the local level, then, policy was more flexible than official statements suggested. The benefits were not confined to the Party alone. Activists within it could often modify unpopular resolutions to make life easier for their non-Party peers. Less positively, they could also help to shape the harsher campaigns of the Stalinist period. The participation of urban workers in the collectivisation process, for example, made matters worse for the peasants in many cases. Many volunteer activists had little sympathy for the peasants; as workers, their experience of NEP Moscow had made them mistrustful of a class which had prospered while they went short of bread, housing and jobs¹¹. When the different goals and programmes of leadership and activists are compared, it should not be assumed that the latter were always interested in softening central policies at the local level. Stalin, as we have already seen, was not alone responsible for the brutal aspects of Stalinism.

The participation of activists in Stalinist policies has important implications for the interpretation of Soviet development. Historians who see elements of 'revolution from below' in this period have been criticised for 'apologising' for Stalin or for the regime as a whole. If that is really what they have been doing, then they must be wrong. Stalin's own murderous character, his colleagues' disregard for human lives, the brutality of the secret police - all these are undeniable facts about the Soviet Union after 1930. However, if it is true, as this study has attempted to show, that a large number of ordinary people in the

¹¹ Incidents involving workers from the Elektroavod factory show how tense the relationship between urban workers and the peasants they were 'guiding' could be in 1929-1930. Two workers from the factory were shot in separate incidents while participating in the campaign at the 'Elektroavod' kolkhoz in December 1929. After the first incident, another worker from the factory wrote back to his comrades that 'the carrying out of full collectivisation of the poor and middle peasants and the grain collections which have been overfulfilled here' did not get done 'without a struggle. Sometimes it is done with the revolver and the whip in hand.' TsGAOR, 7952/3/493, 10.

Communist Party supported the policies of the period, shaped them to their needs, and even prospered by them, it is not 'apologising' for the regime to say so. Denying it distorts the historical record, while doing nothing to avenge the period's victims. Historians should be able to describe achievements and benefits without being attacked for their supposed partiality.

On the other hand, those who accept that there was a degree of 'revolution from below' should not imagine that they are necessarily presenting Soviet development in a rosier light. The concept is usually treated in a positive way. Concentrating on history 'from below' helps restore to ordinary Soviet people their share in the achievements of the revolutionary period. This is progress, especially after so many years of Stalin and regime-centred historical studies. At the same time, however, the darker sides of Soviet history still have to be accommodated. If the idea of popular participation is accepted, these may become more, not less, chilling.

As historians of this period are constantly reminding each other, coming to terms with the past is a difficult process. Moreover, as students of Soviet history should be particularly aware, it is not something which can be completed for all time. Each generation has to do it for itself. Every time, the message is different, reflecting the preoccupations of the present as much as the record of the past. Perhaps the most valuable legacy history can offer to the generation which lives in the shadow of nuclear annihilation is the reminder that it is collective, not individual action, which shapes the greatest events.


Map 1

Moscow in 1925-Raion Boundaries.




Map2

Moscow in 1930: the new Raion Boundaries.




Map3



The Moscow Oblast' in 1930, showing the ten Okrugs.

Diagram 1: The Departments of the MK

1. 1925-1929



2. 1930




Diagram 1 (Continued)

3.1931.





Diagram 1 (Continued)4. Departments mentioned at the III Oblast Conference, 1932.

Diagram 2: The Party Organisation in Elektrozavod, 1930.





Diagram 3: Party Structure in Serp i Molot in 1931, showing the complexity of the sector system.

Key:




Basic sectors:

1. Party recruitment
2. Kul'tprop
3. Agit-mass
4. Distribution of duties
5. Socialist competition
6. Checking on the fulfilment of directives
7. Women.

Plus sectors for international affairs, liaison with foreign workers, etc.


The number written inside the sector or group symbol indicates the number of sectors attached to the cell or group in order, thus:



indicates a shift cell with five sectors, for recruitment, cultural work, agitation work, distribution of duties, and socialist competition.

Diagram 4

Economic administration in Elektrozavod in 1930.



Key: Party organ Other responsible organisation

Factory administration Lines indicate main channels of communication.

Source: PS, 1930, No. 3-4.

Table 1. The Population of Moscow 1913-34¹.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Population size²</u>	<u>Percentage of previous year.</u>
1913	1, 665, 800	-
1914	1, 724, 800	103.5%
1915	1, 800, 600	104.4%
1916	1, 893, 200	105.1%
1917	1, 896, 300	100.2%
1918	1, 768, 600	93.3%
1919	1, 550, 200	87.7%
1920	1, 267, 800	81.8%
1921	1, 148, 000	90.6%
1922	1, 278, 400	111.4%
1923	1, 520, 700	118.9%
1924	1, 628, 200	107.1%
1925	1, 743, 500	107.1%
1926	1, 888, 400	108.3%
1927	2, 031, 800	107.6%
1928	2, 167, 300	106.7%
1929	2, 313, 900	106.8%
1930	2, 468, 700	106.7%
1931	2, 724, 000	110.3%
1932	3, 135, 000	115.1%
1933	3, 663, 300	116.9%
1934	3, 613, 600	98.6%

¹ Moskva v Tsifrakh, M., 1934, p.13.

² 1 January of relevant year.

Table 2. Social Composition of Moscow's Population, 17/12/1926, 1/4/1931 and 1/7/1933.¹

	1926	<u>Year</u> 1931	1933	1933 as a % of 1926
<u>Social group (thousands)</u>				
Workers	293.2	673.0	823.4	280.8%
Employees	263.3	427.6	649.9	246.8%
Ancillary workers	91.4	160.7	214.6	234.8%
Domestics	42.2	54.2	52.6	124.6%
All employed workers	690.1	1, 325.5	1, 740.5	252.2%
Self-employed craftsmen	91.1	94.3	76.0	83.6%
Students receiving stipends	34.9	98.1	89.1	255.3%
Pensioners	39.8	74.2	85.9	215.8%
Unemployed	130.3			
Not working	35.0	3.6	1.3	3.7%
Dependants	939.3	1, 088.6	1, 339.3	142.6%
Others	65.4	64.8	59.0	90.2%
Total Population	2,025.9	2,781.3	3,416.5	168.6%

¹ Materialy o khozyaistve Moskvyy, p.116.

Table 3: Capital Investment in Moscow Industries, 1928-32.¹

<u>Branch of Industry</u>	<u>Investment (thousands of rubles)²</u>			
	<u>1927/28</u>	<u>1928/29</u>	<u>1932</u>	<u>1928-1/1/33</u>
Total in Moscow	83,373.1	118,818.0	455,861.3	1,147,218.3
Of which group A	56,965.6	75,981.9	395,963.5	943,523.9
" " group B	26,407.5	42,836.1	59,897.8	203,694.4
<u>Main branches</u>				
Electricity stations	8,416.5	3,841.8	25,508.6	45,376.9
Fuel industry	147.9	177.3	6,807.5	30,290.0
Metalworking	26,638.0	37,253.0	261,353.3	595,024.4
Of which machine- building	17,332.2	24,322.1	131,456.5	338,849.2
Electro-technical	7,962.3	12,372.2	49,881.2	119,271.3
Chemical	16,927.3	24,352.3	41,745.3	150,421.6
Production of building materials	953.7	3,414.7	14,194.6	29,746.9
Textiles	13,113.2	12,169.1	12,187.1	43,631.9
Food processing	4,779.7	12,768.3	23,783.2	65,078.3
Refrigerators	—	183.0	291.0	939.0

¹ Source: Moskva v Tsifrakh, M. 1934, pp.48-49.² At current prices.

Table 4: Delegates to Moscow Party Conferences, 1925-34.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Conference</u>								
	XIII 1/25	XV 1/27	XVI 11/27	XVII 3/29	I 9/29	III 1/32 MOK MGK	IV 1/34 MOK MGK		
<u>Delegates</u>									
Representatives of the TsK %	2 1.6	1 0.6	2 1.0	1 0.4	2 0.7	7 3.8	8 5.0	8 8.4	6 6.3
Representatives of the MK (inc- luding heads of otdely) %	15 11.8	15 8.5	15 7.7	16 7.1	21 7.3	23 12.5	19 11.9	9 9.5	20 21
Representatives of the RKs %	17 13.4	19 0.7	18 9.2	22 9.7	19 6.6	11 6.0	23 14.4	11 11.6	18 19
Representatives of local organisations outside Moscow (ukoms, okruzhkoms, etc.) %	22 17.3	30 16.9	32 16.4	30 13.3	93 32.3	42 22.9	0 0	15 15.6	0 0
Representatives of Soviet organisations %	2 1.6	11 6.2	8 4.1	7 3.1	10 3.5	9 4.9	16 10	1 1	3 3.2
Representatives of trade union organisations %	8 6.3	13 7.3	14 7.2	10 4.4	19 6.6	11 6.0	7 4.4	3 3.1	1 1
Heads of trusts, directors of factories, etc ¹ . %	-	20 11.3	20 10.3	-	30 10.4	-	-	-	-
Representatives of Komsomol organisations %	4 3.1	5 2.8	2 1.0	7 3.1	7 2.4	2 1.1	7 4.4	2 2.1	1 1.0
Representatives of military organisations %	2 1.6	3 1.7	4 2.0	4 1.8	7 2.4	6 3.3	2 1.3	4 4.2	0 0

¹ Detailed figures available for XV, XVI, and I Conferences only. For the other conferences, this and other categories appear under 'others'.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Conference</u>								
	XIII 1/25	XV 1/27	XVI 11/27	XVII 3/29	I 9/29	III 1/32		IV 1/34	
<u>Delegates</u>						MOK	MGK	MOK	MGK
Representatives of the press	2	5	3	6	6	3	1	3	1
%	1.6	2.8	1.5	2.7	2.1	1.6	0.6	3.1	1.0
Representatives of the GPU	1	2	2	2	2	3	4	2	1
%	0.7	1.1	1.0	0.9	0.7	1.6	2.5	2.1	1.0
Representatives of educational establishments. ²	3	3	5	6	5	3	4	-	-
%	2.4	1.7	2.6	2.7	1.7	1.6	2.5	-	-
Secretaries of local (factory or office level)	-	23	27	-	22	-	-	-	-
Party cells. ³	-	13.0	13.9	-	7.6	-	-	-	-
%	-	13.0	13.9	-	7.6	-	-	-	-
Workers ⁴	-	23	37	-	38	-	-	-	-
%	-	13.0	19.6	-	13.1	-	-	-	-
Others	78	4	6	115	7	64	69	37	44
%	38.6	2.3	2.5	51	2.4	34.8	43.1	39	46.5
Women ⁵	10	12	16	29	-	16	14	2	8
%	7.9	6.8	8.2	12.9	-	8.7	8.7	2.1	8.4
<u>Total</u> members	101	131	141	146	201	118	112	70	70
%	79.5	74	72.3	64.6	69.8	64.1	70	73.6	73.6
candidates	26	46	54	80	87	66	48	25	25
%	20.5	26	27.7	35.4	30.2	35.9	30	26.4	26.4
<u>Total</u>	127	177	195	226	288	184	160	95	95
%	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Notes.

1. The large increase of representatives from the province in September 1929 co-incided with the formation of the Moscow Oblast' and the incorporation of several new areas, whose old staffs were added to the MK, at least temporarily.

² No information available for 1934.

³ See footnote 1

⁴ See footnote 1

⁵ No figures available for I Oblast' conference.

2. Although the number of workers, cell secretaries, etc., is not always available, it may be extrapolated from the number of 'others'. The figures indicate that the proportion of these categories rose steadily, reaching a peak in March 1929, and then declined to around 35% in the Obkom and 45% in the Gorkom.

3. The women delegates were predominantly candidate members, which explains why they reached a maximum at the March 1929 conference, when the number of candidates was at its highest.

Sources:

XIII Moscow Gubernia Conference data from XIII Moskovskays Gubernskaya Konferentsiya RKP(b), stenograficheskii otchet, p. 250.

XV Moscow Gubernia Conference from XV Moskovskaya Gubernskaya Konferentsiya VKP(b), stenograficheskii otchet, pp. 468-472.

XVI Moscow Gubernia conference from XVI Moskovskaya Gubernskaya Konferentsiya VKP(b), stenograficheskii otchet, Bulletin No. 10, pp.172-176.

XVII Moscow Gubernia Conference from Pravda (P), 7/3/1929.

I Moscow Oblast' Conference from I Moskovskaya Oblast'naya Konferentsiya VKP(b), stenograficheskii otchet, Vol. 2, pp. 217-229.

III Moscow Oblast' Conference from III Moskovskaya Oblast'naya i II Gorodskskaya Konferentsiya VKP(b), stenograficheskii otchet, Bulletin No.13, pp. 9-16.

II Moscow City Conference from Ibid., pp. 26-31.

IV Moscow Oblast' Conference from IV Moskovskaya Oblast'naya i III Gorodskaya Konferentsiya, stenograficheskii otchet, pp.625-626.

III Moscow City Conference from Ibid., p.626.

Table 5: Membership of the Moscow Party Organisation 1924-32 (1 January of relevant year).¹

Year	In Moscow			In the Moscow province as a whole		
	Members	Candidates	Total	Members	Candidates	Total
1924	35,244	9,319	44,563	41,537	11,584	53,121
1925	48,246	22,241	70,487	58,018	32,116	90,134
1926	66,225	24,967	70,487	83,915	37,976	121,711
1927	76,542	20,916	97,548	97,925	31,486	129,411
1928	84,225	19,796	104,021	108,732	30,656	139,388
1929	100,077	20,886	120,963	130,045	33,661	163,706
1929 (July) ²	105,722	22,306	128,028	168,293	49,461	217,754
1930	112,203	23,685	135,888	175,153	51,180	226,333
1931	126,740	39,372	166,112	197,376	89,486	286,862
1932	162,665	62,889	225,554	255,549	139,555	395,104
1933	190,280	51,938	242,218	302,857	119,322	422,179
1934	138,532	37,737	176,269	217,069	72,099	289,168

¹ Source: Moskovskaya Gorodskaya i Moskovskaya Oblast'naya organizatsiya KPSS v tsifrakh, M. 1973, p.28.

² The expansion since January was mainly in the size of the provincial Party organisation, which increased from 42,743 members and candidates in January to 89,726 in July. This growth was due to the creation of the new Moscow Oblast', which absorbed several neighbouring provinces and their populations.

Appendix 1: Composition of the MK Buro 1925-32.¹**MK Buro on 13/8/1924.**²

Secretaries: Zelenskii (first secretary)
Uglanov, N.A. (new-second secretary)
Mikhailov (third secretary)

Buro members: Zelenskii
Uglanov (new)
Mikhailov
Kamenev, L.V. (chairman of Mossoviet)
Kotov, V.A. (secretary of Sokol'niki raikom)
Zakharov (secretary of Rogozhsko-Simonovskii raikom)
Belen'kii (new-secretary of Krasnaya Presnya raikom)
Mel'nichanskii
Burtsev
Bumazhnyi
Karavai, M.M. (secretary of Zamoskvorech'e raikom)

Candidates: Rogov, M.I. (Mossoviet)
Tsikhon, A.M. (secretary of Bauman raikom)
Petrukhin
Drozhzhin, I.V. (secretary of Khamovniki raikom)
Pavlov (MGSPS)

MK Buro elected after the XIII Moscow Party Conference, January 1925.³

Secretariat: Uglanov, N.A. (first secretary)
Kotov, V.A. (second secretary-new. Was secretary of Sokol'niki raikom)
Bauman, K. Ya. (head of orgraspredotdel)
Knorin, V.G. (head of agitpropotdel)
Mikhailov, V.M. (chairman of MGSPS)

Buro members: Kamanev, L.V. (chairman of Mossoviet)
Uglanov.
Mikhailov.
Kotov.
Bauman.
Knorin.
Voroshilov, K.E. (MVO)
Belen'kii. (secretary of Krasnaya Presnya raikom)
Karavai, M.M. (secretary of Zamoskvorech'e raikom)
Tsikhon, A.M. (secretary of Bauman raikom)
Rogov, M.I. (Mossoviet).

Candidates: Drozhzhin, I.V. (secretary of Khamovniki raikom).
Ukhanov, K.V. (chairman of Elektrotrest')
Ovshin
Giber, B.V. (new-secretary of Sokol'niki raikom)

MK Buro elected after XIV Moscow Party Conference, December 1925⁴

Secretariat: Uglanov, N.A. (first secretary)

¹ Where possible, the initials and posts of the members have been given, but this information is not always available.

² Rabochaya Moskva, (RM), 13/8/1924.

³ RM 30/1/1925.

⁴ Pravda, (P), 15/12/1925.

- Kotov, V.A. (second secretary)
 Mikhailov, V.M. (chairman of MGSPS)
 Bauman, K.Ya. (head of orgraspredotdel)
 Knorin, V.G. (head of agitpropotdel and MK representative on MK RLKSM)
- Buro members:
 Uglanov
 Kotov
 Bauman
 Knorin
 Mikhailov
 Kamenev, L.V. (chairman of Mossoviet)
 Rogov, M.I. (Mossoviet)
 Ukhanov, K.V. (chairman of elektrotrest')
 Riutin, M.I. (secretary of Krasnaya Presnya raikom-new. Replaces Belen'kii)
 Kulikov, E.F. (secretary of Zamoskvorech'e raikom-new. Replaces Karavai, M.M.)
 Polonskii, V.A. (secretary of Rogozhsko-Simonovskii raikom-new. From Nizhnyi-Novgorod gubkom buro. Appointed to Moscow post in Feb.)
 Tsikhon, A.M. (secretary of Bauman raikom)
 Giber, V.V. (secretary of Sokol'niki raikom)
 Yurevich, E.I. (secretary of Khamovniki raikom-new. Replaces Drozhzhin, who was promoted to post of TsK instructor)
- Candidates:
 Bulin, A.S. (political department of MVO)
 Gorshin, I.V. (secretary of Orekhovo-Zuevo ukom)
 Liubimov, I.I.
 Lobanov, S.G. (secretary of Moskovskii ukom)
 Pen'kov, N.A. (secretary of Bogorod ukom)
 Mandel'shtam, N.N. (head of gubernia committee on sheftsvo)
 Matveev, D.I. (MK RLKSM)

3/4/1926 MK plenum.⁵

Kamenev, L.V., replaced as chairman of Mossoviet by Ukhanov, K.V., hitherto chairman of Elektrotrest'.

MK Buro elected after XV Moscow Party Conference, January 1927.⁶

- Secretariat:
 Uglanov, N.A. (first secretary)
 Kotov, V.A. (second secretary)
 Bauman, K.Ya. (chairman of orgotdel)
 Mikhailov, V.M. Chairman of MGSPS)
 Mandel'shtam, N.N. (Head of agitpropotdel-new. Was head of gubernia committee on sheftsvo)
- Buro members:
 Uglanov
 Kotov
 Bauman
 Ukhanov, K.V. (Chairman of Mossoviet)
 Mikhailov, V.M.
 Mandel'shtam

⁵ IV Plenum, MK VKP(b), M. 1926, resolution.

⁶ P. 18/1/1927.

Rogov, M.I. (Mossoviet)
 Bulin, A.S. (political department of MVO)
 Strievskii, K.K. (chairman of MSNKh)
 Yagoda, G.G. (OGPU)
 Riutin, M.N. (secretary of Krasnaya Presnya raikom)
 Kulikov, E.F. (secretary of Zamoskvorech'e raikom)
 Polonskii, V.I. (secretary of Rogozhsko-Simonovskii raikom)
 Tsikhon, A.M. (secretary of Bauman raikom)
 Giber, B.V. (secretary of Sokol'niki raikom)
 Yakovlev, V.A. (secretary of Khamovniki raikom-new.
 Replaces Yurevich, E.I.)
 Pen'kov, M.A. (secretary of Bogorod ukom)
 Candidates: Markov, A.T. (new-chairman of gubernia ot del of textile workers)
 Uryvaev, M.E. (new-chairman of avtotrest')
 Berzin, Yu. P. (new-secretary of Orekhovo-Zuevo ukom)
 Verbitskii, K.V. (new-MSPO)
 Sofronov, P.P. (new-secretary of Moskovskii ukom)
 Baikova, O.L. (new-head of women's department)
 Ivanova, M.A. (new-Dukat)

MK Buro elected after XVI Moscow Party Conference, November 1927.⁷

Secretariat: Uglanov, N.A. (first secretary)
 Kotov, V.A. (second secretary)
 Mandel'shtam, N.N. (head of agitpropotdel)
 Bauman, K.Ya, (head of orgotdel)
 Mikhailov, V.M. (chairman of MGSPS)

Buro: Uglanov
 Kotov
 Bauman
 Mandel'shtam
 Mikhailov, V.M.
 Ukhanov (chairman of Mossoviet)
 Rogov, M.I. (Mossoviet)
 Bulin, A.S. (political department of MVO)
 Strievskii, K.K. (chairman of MSNKh)
 Yagoda, G.G. (OGPU)
 Riutin, M.N. (secretary of Krasnaya Presnya raikom)
 Kulikov, E.F. (secretary of Zamoskvorech'e raikom)
 Polonskii, V.I. (secretary of Rogozhsko-Simonovskii raikom)
 Tsikhon, A.M. (secretary of Bauman raikom)
 Giber, B.V. (secretary of Sokol'niki raikom)
 Yakovlev, V.A. (secretary of Khamovniki raikom)
 Pen'kov, M.A. (secretary of Bogorod ukom)
 Candidates: Markov, A.T. (secretary of gubotdel of textile workers)
 Berzin, Yu. P. (secretary of Orekhovo-Zuevo ukom)
 Sofronov, P.P. (secretary of Moskovskii ukom)
 Verbitskii, K.B. (MSPO)
 Baikova, O.I. (head of women's department)
 Busarev, N.M. (secretary of Kolomenskoe ukom)
 Kosarev. (secretary of MK VLKSM)

⁷ P., 29/11/1927

9/5/1928.⁸

Polonskii replaces Bauman as head of orgraspredotdel.
(Bauman promoted to TsK rural department.)
Pen'kov replaces Polonskii as secretary of Rogozhsko-Simonovskii raikom.

18/10/1928 joint plenum of MK and MKK

Mandel'shtam, Riutin and Pen'kov removed from their posts.
Mandel'shtam replaced as head of agitpropotdel by Popov, N.N.

At subsequent plenums of raion committees;

Riutin replaced as secretary of Krasnaya Presnya raikom by Leonov, F.G.,⁹
Pen'kov replaced as secretary of Rogozhsko-Simonovskii raikom by Davidson, P.E.¹⁰

MK plenum of November 1928.¹¹

Uglanov removed from post as first secretary and replaced by Molotov, V.M.
Kotov replaced as second secretary by Bauman, K.Ya.
Baikova replaced as head of women's department by Goreva, E.G.
Kulikov replaced as secretary of Zamoskvorech'e raikom by Ryabov., A.N.
Yakovlev replaced as secretary of Khamovniki raikom by Fin'kovskii.
Sofronov replaced as secretary of Moskovskii ukom by Gordienko, I.M.
Kulikov, Yakovlev, Baikova, Busarev, Berzin, Sofronov, Kotov and Uglanov removed from MK.
Leonov, Ryabov, Fin'kovskii, Davidson, Volodin (PUOKR), Gordienko and Goreva co-opted on to MK.

New MK Buro of November 1928 thus¹²:

Secretaries:	Molotov, V.M. (first secretary-new)
	Bauman, K.Ya. (second secretary-new)
Buro:	Tsifrinovich, V.E. (secretary of Bauman <u>raikom</u>)
	Leonov, F.G. (Secretary of Krasnaya Presnya <u>raikom</u>)
	Ryabov, A.N. (secretary of Zamoskvorech'e raikom)
	Fin'kovskii (secretary of Khamovniki <u>raikom</u>)
	Davidson, P.E. (secretary of Rogozhsko-Simonovskii <u>raikom</u>)

⁸ RM., 9/5/1928.

⁹ RM., 29/1/1929.

¹⁰ P., 21/10/1928.

¹¹ RM., 28/11/1928.

¹² Small size of MK buro indicates that this new body was a stopgap.

Candidates: Volodin, V.G. (PUOKR)
 Gordienko, I.M. (secretary of Moskovskii ukom)
 Goreva, E.G. (head of women's department)
 Liubasov (head of rural department)

MK Buro elected after XVII Moscow Party Conference, April 1929.¹³

Secretariat: Bauman, K.Ya. (first secretary-new. Replaces Molotov.)
 Polonskii, V.I. (second secretary-new.)
 Leonov, F.G. (third secretary-new.)

Buro: Bulat, I.L. (head of orgraspredotdel-new. Was secretary of Tul'skaya gubkom.)
 Bauman
 Polonskii
 Mikhailov, V.M. (chairman of MGSPS)
 Popov, N.N. (head of agitpropotdel)
 Goreva, E.G. (head of women's department)
 Leonov
 Nosov (secretary of Tver' gubkom)
 Timofeev (secretary of Ryazan' gubkom)
 Korostelev (MKK)
 Zaitsev, P.E.
 Volkov, P.Ya (Mossoviet)
 Vasil'ev (MK VLKSM)
 Yagoda, G.G. (OGPU)
 Volodin, V.G. (Head of PUOKR)
 Ryabov, A.N. (secretary of Zamoskvorech'e raikom.)
 Giber, V.V. (secretary of Sokol'niki raikom)
 secretary of Kaluga okruzhkom (ex-officio)

MK Plenum, June 1929.¹⁴

Mikhailov removed from post of chairman of MGSPS, and also from MK and MK buro.
 Replaced by Strievskii, K.K., hitherto chairman of MSNKh.
 Zaitsev, P.E. appointed to head rural department and becomes candidate to MK secretariat.
 Goreva, E.G. becomes full member of MK secretariat.
 Kozlov, I.I., hitherto head of the Krasnaya Presnya orgotdel, replaces the promoted Leonov as secretary of Krasnaya Presnya raikom, and is co-opted on to MK buro.
 Palkina, replacing Giber as secretary of Sokol'niki raikom, becomes full member of MK buro.

¹³ RM 7/4/1929. These were to be the nucleus of the new obkom, hence the ex-officio posts and the appointment of Bulat.

¹⁴ RM., 14/6/1929.

Buro of Moscow Oblast' Committee (MOK) after 1 Oblast' Conference, September 1929.¹⁵

Secretariat: Bauman, K.Ya. (first secretary)
 Polonskii, V.I. (second secretary)
 Leonov, F.G. (third secretary)

Candidates: Goreva, E.G. (head of women's department)
 Zaitsev, P.E. (head of rural department since June 1929)

Buro: Bauman
 Polonskii
 Leonov
 Ukhanov, K.V. (chairman of Mossoviet)
 Strievskii, K.K. (chairman of MGSPS)
 Yagoda, G.G. (OGPU)
 Bulat, I.L. (head of orgotdel)
 Kogan, E.S. (head of agitpropotdel)
 Goreva, E.G. (head of women's department)
 Zaitsev.
 Volodin, V.G. (head of PUOKR)
 Volkov, P. Ya. (chairman of MSNKh)
 Gordienko, I.M. (chairman of oblast' union of metalworkers-new. Was secretary of Moskovskii ukom)
 Markov, A.T. (chairman of oblast' union of textile workers)
 Kozlov, I.I. (secretary of Krasnaya Presnya raikom)
 Ryabov, A.N. (secretary of Zamoskvorech'e raikom)
 Shirin, A.P. (secretary of Bauman raikom)
 Davidson, P.E. (secretary of Proletarskii raikom)
 Mikhailevskii, I.V. (secretary of Sokol'niki raikom)
 Finkovskii (secretary of Khamovniki raikom)
 Nosov (secretary of Moskovskii okruzhkom)
 Granovskii
 Kalygina (secretary of Tver' okruzhkom)
 Timofeev (secretary of Ryazan' okruzhkom)
 Lyubasov (secretary of Orekhovo-Zuevo okruzhkom)
 Laz'yan (secretary of Kolomenskoe okruzhkom)
 Makarov (secretary of Serpukhov okruzhkom)

Candidates: Khlopyankin, N.I. (deputy chairman of Mossoviet)
 Blinov (Zvenigorod)
 Koz'min
 Cherkasov
 Sorokin, P.S. (MSPO)
 Chemodanov (secretary of MK VLKSM)

Joint MOK and MKK plenum, January 1930.¹⁶

Polonskii promoted to work in VTsSPS, and removed from post as second secretary of MK.
 Fin'kovskii removed from post as secretary of Khamovniki raikom and replaced by Kronberg, who is co-opted on to MK.

MOK Buro after 2 Oblast' Conference, June 1930.¹⁷

Secretariat: Kaganovich, L.M. (first secretary-new. Replaced Bauman after the latter's disgrace in April 1930)

¹⁵ P., 19/9/1929.

¹⁶ RM 10/1/1930.

¹⁷ P., 15/6/1930.

Leonov, F.G. (second secretary-new. Promoted when Polonskii moved to TsK. Was third secretary.)
 Ryndin, K.V. (third secretary-new. Head of organisation-instruction section)
 Ukhanov, K.V. (chairman of Mossoviet)
 Strievskii, K.K. (chairman of MGSPS)

Buro:
 Kaganovich
 Leonov
 Ryndin
 Ukhanov
 Strievskii
 Volkov
 Kogan, E.S. (head of kul'tprop section)
 Ruben, R.G. (head of agit-mass section)
 Nosov (MOSPS)
 Bel'skii
 Ryabov, A.N. (secretary of Zamoskvorech'e raikom)
 Kozlov, I.I. (secretary of Krasnaya Presnya raikom)
 Davidson, P.E. (secretary of Proletarskii raikom)
 Sedel'nikov, A.I.
 Kalygina, A.S.

Candidates:
 Volodin
 Shirin, A.P. (secretary of Bauman raikom)
 Kronberg (secretary of Khamovniki raikom)
 Mikhailevskii, I.V. (secretary of Sokol'niki raikom)
 Goreva, E.G.
 Gordienko
 Makarov (head of cadres section)
 Khlopyankin, N.I.
 Arutyunyants, P.G.
 Chemodanov (secretary of MK VLKSM)

MOK plenum, July 1930.¹⁸

Leonov promoted to secretary of TsK orgburo, and replaced as second MK secretary by Ryndin, K.V., hitherto third secretary and head of orgotdel of MK. Kaminskii, hitherto head of TsK agit-mass section, replaces him as third secretary and head of orgotdel.
 Strievskii appointed to MOSPS.
 Nosov (MOSPS) becomes a member of the MK secretariat.
 Ryabov removed from post as secretary of Zamoskvorech'e raikom for incompetence and replaced by Filatov, hitherto secretary of the Serp i Molot factory cell.

Buro of Moscow City Committee (gorkom) elected after extraordinary plenum of MOK and MKK, February 1931.¹⁹

Secretariat:
 Kaganovich, L.M. (first secretary)
 Ryndin, K.V. (second secretary)
 Gikalo (secretary of Moscow gorkom)

¹⁸ RM., 27/7/1930

¹⁹ RM., 27/2/1931

Kogan, E.S. (secretary of Moscow gorkom)
 Bulganin, N.A. (chairman of Mossoviet)
 Il'in, I.L. (head of orginstruction section)
 Fedoseev (head of kul'tprop section)
 Erogov, M. (head of agitmass section)
 Buro: Kaganovich
 Ryndin
 Gikalo
 Kogan
 Bulganin
 Kozlov, I.I. (secretary of Krasnaya Presnya raikom)
 Filatov (secretary of Leninskii raikom)
 Ruben, R.G. (secretary of Frunze raikom)
 Trofimov (secretary of Stalin raikom)
 Egorov, V.G. (secretary of Oktyabr' raikom)
 Bessonov
 Kul'kov, M.M. (secretary of Zamoskvorech'e raikom)
 Soifer (secretary of Dzerzhinskii raikom)
 Gaidul', I.P. (secretary of Proletarskii raikom)
 Candidates: Khrushchev, N.S. (secretary of Bauman raikom)
 Voropaev, F.G.
 Il'in, I.L.
 Fedoseev
 Petrosyan
 Samoshkin
 Shurov
 Artemenko

MOK elected after 3 Moscow Oblast' Conference, January 1932.²⁰

Secretariat: Kaganovich (first secretary)
 Ryndin (second secretary)
 Gei, K.V.
 Mikhailov, M.E.
 Erogov, M.
 Donenko, V.A.
 Buro: Kaganovich
 Ryndin
 Kaminskii
 Gei
 Mikhailov
 Donenko
 Erogov, M.
 Agranov, Ya. S. (OGPU)
 Drozhzhin, I.V. (MOSPS)
 Kalygina, A.S. (secretary of Kalinin gorkom)
 Sedel'nikov, A.I. (secretary of Tula gorkom)
 Veklichev, G.I. (PUOKR)
 Ruben, R.G. (secretary of Frunze raikom)
 Khrushchev, N.S. (secretary of Krasnaya Presnya raikom-
 new. Was secretary of Bauman raikom)
 Bulganin, N.A.
 Kogan, E.S. (MGK)
 Davidson, R.E. (MGSPS)
 Malenkov, G.M.
 Candidates: Luk'yanov, D.D. (MK VLKSM)
 Kuchmin, I.F. (deputy chairman of Mosoblispolklom)

²⁰ RM 31/1/1932.

Voropaev, F.G. (chairman of Oblast' machine builders' union)
 Dubyna, T.M. (Institute of Red Professors)
 Rummyantsev, G.K. (TsKK)
 Apasov, N.I. (secretary of Podol'sk gorkom)
 Shurov, V.Ya. (secretary of Orekhovo-Zuevo raikom)
 Andreev, S.Ya. (secretary of Serpukhov gorkom)
 Arutyunyants, P. G. (Bobrikovskoe stroitel'stvo)

MGK buro elected after 2 Gorkom conference, January 1932.²¹

Secretariat: Kaganovich (first secretary)
 Khrushchev (second secretary)
 Ruben, R.G. (secretary of Frunze raikom)
 Kogan, E.S.
 Davidson, R.G. (MGSPS)
 Voropaev, F.G. (chairman of Oblast' machine builders' union)

Buro: Kaganovich
 Khrushchev
 Ruben
 Kogan
 Davidson
 Voropaev
 Bulganin, N.A. (chairman of Mossoviet)
 Soifer (secretary of Dzerzhinskii raikom)
 Margolin, N.V. (secretary of Bauman raikom)
 Badaev, A.E. (chairman of MSPO)
 Gaidul', I.P. (secretary of Proletarskii raikom)
 Trofimov (chairman of Oblast' union of cotton textile workers)
 Starostin, K.F. (secretary of Sokol'niki raikom)
 Kul'kov, M.M. (secretary of Zamoskvorech'e raikom)

Candidates: Il'in, I.L.
 Drizul, A.Ya.
 Angarov (Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute)
 Ratner (Economic Department of the Institute of Red Professors)
 Khveshin, T.S. (deputy chairman of Mossoviet)
 Persits, P.E. (MK VLKSM).

²¹ RM., 31/1/1932.

Appendix 2:Work plans of the MK plenum and MK buro, April-September 1929.¹a) Plan of Work for MK plenum.

1. Resolutions of the XVI Party conference and TsK plenum - May. (Plenum of MK together with aktiv)
2. MK work plan - May. (Report by Comrade Bauman).
3. On the state of procurements in Moscow and the gubernia - May. (MSPO and the gubernia trade department).
4. On the progress of the spring sowing campaign. - May. (Communist fraction of the gubernia ispolkom with co-report by RKI).
5. Questions regarding the organisation of the oblast' and the raions. - May. (Communist fraction of Mossoviet).
6. Rationalisation in industry under MSNKh and the lowering of costs - July. (Report by MSNKh and co-report by MRKI).
7. On the condition and lowering of costs of the textile industry - July. (Report by VTS and gubotdel of textile workers).
8. Measures for raising the productivity of labour and involving workers in the construction of industry - July. (Report by MGSPS and RKI).
9. Results of the transfer of enterprises to a seven-hour working day and further prospects - August. (MSNKh and co-report by MGSPS).
10. On the Five Year Plan for the Moscow Industrial Region - August. (Report by the Communist fraction of Mossoviet).
11. The material and cultural condition of Moscow workers (composition, wages and budget, housing, unemployment, cultural level, etc.) - August. (MGSPS, co-reports from MSNKh and RKI).
12. On the course of the Party purge - August. (MKK).
13. Report on the Komsomol - August.
14. The purge of the Soviet apparatus, the struggle against bureaucratism and promotions - September. (Report by RKI and orgraspred).
15. Measures for increasing the improvement in agriculture and the rate of collectivisation - September. (Rural department - otdel po rabote v derevne).
16. Recruitment of workers into the Party - September. (Report by orgraspred).
17. Mass anti-religious work - September. (Report by agitpropotdel).
18. Work among women workers and peasants - September. (Otdel for work among women).

b) Plan of work for the MK buro.Industrial and construction questions.

1. Work of MSNKh industry towards the rationalisation of industry and the lowering of costs. (Report by MSNKh, co-report by RKI - April).
2. The condition of the textile industry in the Moscow gubernia from the point of view of the lowering of costs, the rationalisation of production and the raising of labour productivity. (Report by VTS and the gubernia otдел of textile workers - April).
3. On the progress of work for mobilising the internal resources of MSNKh industry. (Report by MSNKh - May.)

¹ These workplans are reproduced verbatim because they graphically illustrate the range of the MK's responsibilities, and the number of other organisations which co-operated in policy-making. Despite the fact that the MK and its buro could not always fulfil the tasks set out in such plans, its record, judging by accounts in the Party press and the stenographic reports of later plenums, was better than that of the Smolensk organisation, the only other for which we have such detailed information. The source for these plans is the stenographic report of the second 1929 Plenum of the MK, II Plenum MK VKP(b) (M., 1929), pp. 32-37.

4. New construction of industrial enterprises, the reconstruction and specialisation of enterprises, use of new equipment. (Report by MSNKh and RKI - May).
5. Prospects and tasks for the procurement of raw materials for industry in the Moscow gubernia in the second half of the year. (Report by Gubplan and MSNKh - April-May.)
6. On the Five Year Plan for the development of industry in the Moscow industrial region. (Report by Gubplan - June).
7. Report by Gomza and Kolomenskoe factories. (May).
8. Report by Avtotrest' and AMO factory. (April).
9. On the construction of an instruments factory.
10. Report by Aniltrest'.
11. On the work and concentration of the printing industry. (Report by Mospoligraf - June).
12. Results of the transfer of factories to a seven-hour working day in 1928/9 and on the transfer to a seven-hour working day in 1929/30. (Report by MGSPS - August).
13. Preliminary results of rationalisation and the lowering of costs in construction. (Report by Mosstroj (Moscow construction), co-report by RKI - September).
14. On the execution of directives on the strengthening of edinonachalie in the administration of enterprises. (Report by RKI and MSNKh - July).
15. The condition and training of industrial cadres. (Report by orgraspred, co-report by MSNKh - July).
16. Participation of trade unions in raising production discipline and lowering costs. (Report by MGSPS - April).
17. Results of production conferences and investigation into production meetings. (Report by MGSPS and one production meeting from two large enterprises - May).
18. Results of conclusion of collective agreements, review of piece-rate norms and state of production discipline. (Report by MGSPS - June).
19. On the plan and control figures for wages and labour productivity in 1929/30 and on conclusion of collective agreements for 1929. (Report by MGSPS - September).
20. Industrial training and the education of workers. (report by agitprop, kul'totdel of MGSPS, co-report by 'tekhmass' - July-August.)
21. Preliminary results of workers' competition. (September).
22. On the condition of the proletariat in the Moscow Gubernia. (Report by orgraspred, MGSPS and gubstat(statistics) otdel - August).

Questions concerning the growth and socialist reconstruction of agriculture.

23. Results of the spring sowing campaign from the point of view of expanding the sown area, carrying out the agrominimum and broadening production co-operatives. (report by otdel for work in the countryside, co-report by zem(land) otdel - July).
24. On tasks and prospects for technical assistance in developing agriculture in the Moscow gubernia (introduction of mechanical technology, mineral fertilisers, etc.) (report by gubplan - July).
25. On the results of measures for increasing crop capacity (report by zemotdel - September).
26. Results of spring and tasks of autumn contracting, the development of long term contracting and preliminary results of contracting outside gubernia in Moscow industrial region. (Report by Mossel'kred(agricultural credit)soyuz, co-report by MSPO - June)
27. Measures for increasing the tempo of formation of production co-operatives and collectivisation. (Report by otdel for work in the countryside and kolkhoztsentr - July)
28. Report on condition and prospects of sovkhos construction. (Report by fraction of Mossoviet and Gubsel'sindikatsiya)
29. On the agricultural tax. (Report by fraction of Gubispolkom - April).
30. Report by Mossel'kredsoyuz on progress of fulfilment of agricultural credit plan (from the point of view of productive effect and class line - September)
31. Development of market gardening and the process of its collectivisation. (Report by zemotdel - August).
32. Participation of Party, Komsomol, Soviet and co-operative organisations in involvement of peasant aktiv in socialist reconstruction of agriculture. (Report by otdel for work in the countryside, one volost' Party and one Komsomol organisation - August).
33. Help from industrial workers for development and socialist reconstruction of the countryside. (Report by shefstvo society and otdel for work in the countryside - August)
34. On the composition and training of agricultural cadres (agricultural VUZy, technical schools, schools, courses, etc.). (Report by Commission of the MK - June).

35. On the Five Year Plan for agriculture in the Moscow Industrial Oblast'. (Report by Gubplan - June)

Trade and Co-operatives.

36. On the condition of procurements in Moscow and the gubernia. (Report by MSPO, trade otdel - May)

37. Results of the work of procurement co-operatives in the first half-year and price policy for the second half-year. (Report by MSPO - May)

38. On regulation of the private market. (Report by gubotdel on trade - April)

39. Organisational questions of the procurement co-operatives (the co-operative aktiv and the links of co-operatives with enterprises, MTsKR, etc) (Report by MSPO and orgraspred - June)

40. On the progress of capital construction in the procurement co-operatives. (Report by MSPO - July)

41. Broadening of products of handicraft co-operatives and the process of further collectivisation (results of first half-year and prospects). (Report by Gubplan, handicraft co-operatives - June)

Material Condition of the Working Class

42. Condition of real wages in first half-year and prospects. (Report by MGSPS - May)

43. Questions of unemployment and the struggle against it, especially among women and youths. (Report by MGSPS, labour department and MK VLKSM - May)

44. Provision of workers with rest homes, health resorts, organisations for using summer holidays. (Report by MGSPS, Moszdrav - April)

45. Condition and tasks of social and material services for workers, especially from the point of view of liberating women from housework (socialised provision of meals, laundries, results of cultural-material campaign, etc.). (Report by women's department - May)

46. Measures for alleviating the housing needs of workers, new housing construction, organisation of hostels, eviction of non-working elements. (Report by fraction of Mossoviet - July)

Questions of Soviet Construction

47. Results of Mossoviet elections. (Report by fraction of Mossoviet and orgraspred - April)

48. Questions concerning the gubernia Congress of Soviets. (April)

49. Questions concerning the regionalisation of the oblast'. (April-May)

50. On the communal loan and the construction projects based on it. (Report by Mossoviet - April).

51. Results of use of Moscow Gubispolkom budget in the first half-year. (Report by fraction of Mossoviet - May)

52. Directives on the control figures for 1929/30. (Report by fraction of Mossoviet - May)

53. Widening the powers of raion Soviets. (Report by fraction of Mossoviet - May)

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80. Practical work by Party committees in large enterprises. (Report by orgraspred - August)
81. Summer re-training of Party aktiv. (Report by orgraspred and agitprop - April)
82. On the system of Party education and training for recent recruits to the Party. (Report by agitprop and orgraspred - June)
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Glossary of Russian Terms used in the Text

<i>agitprop</i>	<i>agitatsiya i propaganda</i> (agitation - mass political education, and propaganda - work among Party members.)
<i>aktiv</i>	activists, in Party or other organisations.
Comintern	<i>Kommunisticheskii International</i> (Communist International).
<i>edinonachalie</i>	One-man management (see chapter four).
<i>grupporg</i>	<i>gruppovoi organizator</i> (organiser of Party groups - lowest unit in factory Party hierarchy).
<i>gubernia</i>	province (until 1929)
<i>gubkom</i>	Party committee in <i>gubernia</i> .
<i>ispolkom</i>	<i>ispolnitel'nyi komitet</i> (executive committee of Soviet)
<i>kolkhoz</i>	<i>kollektivnoe khozyaistvo</i> (collective farm).
<i>Komsomol</i>	<i>Kommunisticheskii Soyuz Molodezhi</i> (Communist League of Youth).
<i>krai</i>	large territorial unit, usually in national republics.
<i>kraikom</i>	Party committee in <i>krai</i> .
<i>kul'tprop</i>	<i>kul'tura i propaganda</i> (culture and propaganda).
MK	<i>Moskovskii Komitet</i> (Moscow Committee of the Communist Party).
MGK	<i>Moskovskii Gorodskoi Komitet</i> (Moscow City Committee of the Communist Party)
MGSPS	<i>Moskovskii Gubernskii Sovet Professional'nykh Soyuzov</i> (Moscow Gubernia Council of Trade Unions).
MKK	<i>Moskovskaya Kontrol'naya Kommissiya</i> (Moscow Control Commission)
MOSPS	<i>Moskovskaya Oblast'naya Sovet Professional'nykh Soyuzov</i> (Moscow Oblast' Council of Trade Unions).
<i>Mossovet</i>	<i>Moskovskii Sovet</i> (the Moscow Soviet).
MSNKh	<i>Moskovskii Sovet Narodnogo Khozyaistva</i> (Moscow Council for the National Economy).
<i>Narkom</i>	<i>Narodnyi Kommissariat</i> (People's Commissariat).
NEP	<i>Novaya Ekonomicheskaya Politika</i> (New Economic Policy)
<i>nomenklatura</i>	system of official appointments involving lists of key posts and of officials eligible to fill them
<i>obkom</i>	Party Committee in <i>oblast'</i> .
<i>oblast'</i>	Province (after 1929).
OGPU	<i>Ob"edinennoe Gosudarstvennoe Politicheskoe Upravlenie</i> (Unified State Political Administration: the political police)
<i>okrug</i>	territorial unit between <i>oblast'</i> and <i>raion</i> , abolished in 1930.
<i>okruzhkom</i>	Party Committee in <i>okrug</i> .
<i>orgasped</i>	<i>organizatsionno-raspredelitel'nyi otdel</i> (the organisation-assignments department).
<i>otdel</i>	department
<i>otsev</i>	'dropping out' from Party or other organisations.
<i>raikom</i>	<i>raion</i> committee of the Communist Party
<i>raion</i>	administrative unit, coinciding with a ward in a city or a district in rural areas.
RKP(b)	<i>Rossiskaya Kommunisticheskaya Partiya (bol'shevikov)</i> Russian Communist Party (bolsheviks).
<i>sheftsvo</i>	'patronage' or tutelage by one organisation or group over another. Most used of factories' patronage of collective farms or government institutions, involving the supply of advice, materials and cadres.
<i>smychka</i>	revolutionary alliance between peasantry and proletariat, the basis of NEP.

<i>sovnarkhoz</i> <i>Sovnarkom</i>	<i>sovet narodnogo khozyastva</i> (economic council) <i>Sovet Narodnykh Kommissarov</i> (Council of People's Commissars).
<i>stazh</i>	length of time, for example of Party membership or work in industry.
<i>troika</i> <i>TsK</i>	group of three people. <i>Tsentral'nyi Komitet</i> (Central Committee of the Communist Party)
<i>TsKK</i>	<i>Tsentral'naya Kontrol'naya Kommissiya</i> (Central Control Commission).
<i>VKP(b)</i>	<i>Vsesoyuznaya Kommunisticheskaya Partiya (bol'shevikov)</i> All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks).
<i>VSNKh</i>	<i>Vysshiĭ Sovet Narodnogo Khozyastva</i> (Supreme Council for the National Economy)
<i>VUZ</i>	<i>Vysshee Uchebnoe Zavedenie</i> (Higher Educational Establishment)
<i>VTUZ</i>	<i>Vysshee Technicheskoe Uchebnoe Zavedenie</i> (Higher Technical Educational Establishment)
<i>vydvizhenie</i>	Promotion (usually of workers into state and economic apparatuses).
<i>uezd</i>	territorial unit between <i>gubernia</i> and <i>raion</i> .
<i>ukom</i>	<i>uezd</i> Party committee.
<i>zavkom</i>	<i>zavodskii komitet</i> (trade union committee in factory)

Abbreviations used in the Footnotes**Journals and Newspapers**

B	<i>Bol'shevik</i>
BO	<i>Bulleten' Oppozitsii</i>
Iz TsK	<i>Izvestiya Tsentral'nogo Komiteta</i>
Iz MK	<i>Izvestiya Moskovskogo Komiteta</i>
P	<i>Pravda</i>
PS	<i>Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo</i>
RM	<i>Rabochaya Moskva</i>
SK	<i>Sputnik Kommunista</i>
SR	<u>Slavic Review</u>
SS	<u>Soviet Studies</u>
VI	<i>Voprosy Istorii</i>
VI KPSS	<i>Voprosy Istorii KPSS.</i>

Archives

T	Trotsky Archive
TsGAGM	<i>Tsentral'nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Goroda Moskvy</i> (Central State Archive of the City of Moscow)
TsGAOR	<i>Tsentral'nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Oktyabr'skoi Revolyutsii</i> (Central State Archive of the October Revolution).

References to official Soviet archives appear in the text with the name of the archive, e.g. TsGAOR, followed by the *fond*, *opis* and *delo* numbers, and finally the number of the *listok*, e.g., 7952/3/231, 4.

Places of Publication

L	Leningrad
M	Moscow.

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Fonds 5457
 5469 (Central Committee of All-Union Metalworkers' Union)
 7952 (History of Factories)

Tsentrāl'nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Goroda Moskvyy (TsGAGM)

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Trotsky Archive**Section 2 Newspapers, Journals and other Periodical Publications in Russian**

Bol'shevik
Bulleten' Oppozitsii
Izvestiya Moskovskogo Komiteta
Izvestiya Tsentrāl'nogo Komiteta
Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo
Pravda
Propagandist
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