GLOBAL FRAMEWORKS, LOCAL REALITIES: MIGRANT RESETTLEMENT IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

by

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Abstract

The thesis explores the ‘return’ migration and resettlement experience of members of ethnic Russian and Russian speaking migrant populations who over the period 1991-2000 left their homes in the former republics of the Soviet Union to resettle on the territory of the Russian Federation, their ‘historical homeland’. The study focuses upon individual experiences of resettlement in two regions of the Russian Federation, but locates these experiences within the context of the wider regional, national and global migration regimes. The thesis traces the development of the institutions and legislation of the Russian federal and regional migration regimes over the period 1995-2001.

The study demonstrates that the way in which the migration process (the migration movement and subsequent resettlement) and the space of ‘return’ are constructed, through political and non-political discourse and practice, often conflicts with migrant experiences of the same process and their expectations of ‘return’. It charts how migrants, despite displacement and the often constraining features of the surrounding migration environment, begin to re-construct their own sense of ‘home’ at the site of settlement. The study concludes that rather than the migration process of the Russian populations from the former republics being a ‘return’ to a ‘homeland’, for the individual migrant the process represents an attempt to re-create an immediate ‘home’, that is primarily achieved through a reliance upon personal networks of family and friends.
Acknowledgements

Writing this thesis would not have been possible without the support of a number of people. I would like to thank my supervisor, Hilary Pilkington, who provided me with the opportunity to pursue my interest in Russian migration, and who throughout the period of research gave me her endless encouragement, support and understanding. Within the Centre for Russian and East European Studies my thanks in particular go to Nigel Hardware and Mike Berry who constantly alerted me to new materials. Thanks also go to Marea Arries and Tricia Carr for their technical assistance and for making the department an enjoyable one in which to work.

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# Glossary of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAC</td>
<td>Civic Assistance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCARFM</td>
<td>Coordinating Council for Aid to Refugees and Forced Migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EBRD</td>
<td>European Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMP</td>
<td>Federal Migration Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMS</td>
<td>Federal Migration Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSI</td>
<td>Open Society Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POA</td>
<td>Programme of Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tacis</td>
<td>Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMS</td>
<td>Territorial Migration Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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The Library of Congress transliteration system has been used throughout the text, apart from for frequently used Russian names, e.g. Yeltsin. Transliterated Russian words used in preference to the English translation in the text are:

- Krai/a: Territory/Territories
- Oblast'/oblasti: Region/s
- Raion/y: District/s
Introduction

Following the collapse of the USSR in 1991, and the rapid political, social and economic change that ensued, widespread population movements took place across the former unitary territory of the Soviet Union. One of these movements has been that of the ethnic Russian and Russian speaking populations in the Soviet successor states to the Russian Federation. In 1991 25.3 million ethnic Russians were living outside the borders of the Russian Federation, along with 11 million members of other ethnic groups whose primary cultural affinity was to Russia, and who have become known as the ‘Russian-speaking’ populations.\(^1\) Over the period 1991-2001, approximately 1.5 million individuals from these populations have been officially registered as ‘forced migrants’ or ‘refugees’ by the Russian government.\(^2\) However, it is estimated that up to 8 million individuals have actually made the journey from the former republics and come to reside within the borders of the Russian Federation.

The thesis explores the ‘return’ migration and resettlement experience of members of ethnic Russian and Russian speaking migrant populations who over the period 1991-2000 left their homes in the former republics of the Soviet Union to resettle on the territory of the Russian Federation, their ‘historical homeland’. The study explores how the migration process (the migration movement and subsequent resettlement) and the space to which individuals ‘return’ – the physical territory of the ‘homeland’ – are constructed by key actors within the international, federal and regional migration regimes. The study compares and contrasts the ways in which the migration process and the space of ‘return’ are created at these different levels, and the way individual

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\(^1\) Throughout the thesis the terms ‘Russian communities’ or ‘Russian populations’ should be taken to include both the ethnic Russian and Russian speaking populations resident in the Soviet successor states unless ‘ethnic Russian’ or ‘Russian speaking’ is specified.

\(^2\) The majority of registered returnees have been awarded ‘forced migrant’ status. The legal specifics of the status are explored in detail in Chapters 1 and 3. The status is awarded to those individuals, who are entitled to Russian citizenship, and who have been forced to leave their former place of residence due to persecution or violence on the grounds of race, nationality, religion, affiliation to a particular social group or political conviction. ‘Refugee’ status was originally available to those Russian returnees who did not hold Russian citizenship at the time of arrival. The amendments that were introduced to the Russian law on refugees in June 1997, made refugee status more difficult to acquire, and in practice it was no longer awarded to those returnees who did not possess, but who were entitled to, Russian citizenship.
migrants are envisaged as fitting into this space – the wider ‘homeland’. The study also charts how migrants construct their own idea of ‘home/land’. It asks how migrants, despite displacement and the often constraining features of the surrounding migration environment, begin to re-construct their own sense of ‘home’ at the site of settlement.

Existing academic frameworks

Although the break up of the Soviet Union generated a large number of diverse migration movements, it is the ‘migratory’ potential of the Russian populations resident in the former republics of the Soviet Union, and the nature of their ‘return’ and resettlement which has generated the most academic debate. The body of academic literature, both Russian and Western, that has addressed the issue has tended to be at the macro-level of analysis. Much of the literature addresses the ethnic, socio-economic, and demographic characteristics of the Russian communities resident in the successor states, their political significance for the Russian state, and the likelihood and possible significance of their ‘return’ to the Russian Federation (see for example Kolstoe 1995; Shlapentokh et al. 1994; Chinn and Kaiser 1996; Melvin 1998; Smith 1999). Only a small proportion of this ‘diaspora’ literature has addressed the question through micro-level analysis; it tends to focus rather upon the tendencies of the Russian communities to remain ‘in diaspora’, and predicts the likely form the ‘diaspora’ will take (Lebedeva 1997; Kosmarskaia: 1998b). A second body of literature considers the actual migration flows, and attempts to understand the nature of the migration movement by exploring its historical roots, the socio-economic, demographic and ethnic composition of the migration flows, and their direction and likely destination points (see for example Mitchneck and Plane 1995; Codagnone 1998a and 1998b; Robertson 1996; Oberg and Boubnova 1995; Vishnevskii and Zaionchkovskaia 1994).

Studies that are sited in the Russian Federation also tend to adopt a macro-level approach. Increasing attention has been paid by academics, policy experts and advisors, to the development of the legislative and institutional frameworks that are part of an

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3 The term home/land is used to indicate the multiple levels at which ‘homeland’ may be understood. Two initial divisions that might be suggested are at the macro-level, the wider physical territory of a [national] ‘homeland’, or at the micro-level, a more immediate ‘home’ located at the site of everyday lived experience. The dichotomy proves to be far more complex, however, and is explored through the thesis.
evolving Russian migration regime (Codagnone 1998a and 1998b; Mukomel 1998; Regent 1999; Tishkov (ed.) 1998). Over the period of the 1990s a number of studies have been carried out, frequently under the auspices of international organizations and conducted by Russian human rights organizations and teams of Russian scholars. These concern the abuse of the rights of forced migrants and refugees, the quality of state legislation and policy initiatives at a federal and regional level, and alternative, non-governmental forms of assistance (Memorial 1998, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c; Arutiunov (ed.) 1998).

The resettlement of the Russian communities has been addressed at both the macro and micro-levels. In-depth, regional level studies, carried out by Russian researchers, address general patterns of migrant resettlement, and the socio-economic adaptation and integration of the migrant populations within Russian society (Vitkovskaia 1998a; Vitkovskaia 1999; Tishkov 1997). More focused studies have looked at the political orientation of forced migrants (Vitkovskaia and Petrov 1997), particular forms of migrant settlement (Grafova et al.), and the position of forced migrants within the post-Soviet Russian labour market (Vitkovskaia 1998c). The data for the majority of those studies are derived from large scale survey methods. Their focus at a regional level, and insights into patterns of migrant resettlement and housing and employment perspectives, alongside investigations into the socio-economic and demographic constitution of the arriving migrant populations, are valuable. However, due to the scale of the studies, in the majority of cases they are unable to address the motivations, perceptions, and experiences of resettlement at the level of migrant agency.

An emerging body of literature has moved to the micro-level in order to understand the experience of the migration and resettlement of Russian speaking forced migrants. A number of Russian academics have focused their attention on specific regions and amongst particular communities of migrants. Gritsenko’s study (1999) looks at the difficulties of socio-cultural and socio-economic adaptation amongst forced migrant communities in Volgograd and Saratov oblasti. Kiseleva and Damberg (2001), in what is described as a pilot stage study, but is in fact a very comprehensive research project, focus upon the resettlement and adaptation experience of forced migrants in St. Petersburg. The authors suggest that the migrant community represent a specific 'social
stratum’ that is distinguished by particular behavioural, moral and cultural norms, biographical make-up, and life ‘survival strategies’. A research project by Lapshova, Reprintseva and Rusina (1996) looked specifically at the socio-economic adaptation of forced migrants arriving to different localities of Samara oblast’. All of these studies draw upon data collected through in-depth interviews with individuals and groups of migrants. The value of these studies for understanding displacement at an individual level, their attention to the socio-economic, socio-cultural, and socio-psychological effects of migration, and their illumination of individual strategies of survival are far-reaching. The study by Kiseleva and Damberg points to the need for research into the ‘individual trajectories’ of migration, and for such research to draw upon how the migration and resettlement processes are verbalized and expressed by the research respondents themselves (2001: 6). Although the local case-study approach provides valuable and in-depth accounts of individual migrant activity, the research sometimes fails to adequately contextualize migrant experiences within wider regional or federal migration regimes, although the study by Lapshova at al. achieves this at the regional level.

Two western studies have attempted to broach the micro/macro divide that has tended to exist within migration literature as a whole by addressing the interaction between the individual/collective migrant and the wider institutional and structural specifics of the surrounding environment. Pilkington (1998a) explores migrant experiences of displacement and resettlement through an analysis of the socio-economic and socio-cultural adaptation of migrant communities in two case study regions: Ul’ianovsk and Orel oblasti. The study originates from the perspective of the migrant, yet provides a wider assessment of how the migrant is positioned within Russian migration and political discourse. The research specifically addresses the question of the cultural identity of the returning Russians, who often self-identify, and are identified as, ‘other Russians’, and the implications of this contested identity for the re-construction of a wider post-Soviet Russian identity. Drought (2000) focuses on compact forms of migrant settlement in a number of Russian regions (Voronezh, Saratov, Kaluga oblasti). The study explores how group strategies of resettlement are negotiated within the frameworks of the Russian migration regime, and explores the implications of group migrant identity formation for impeding or facilitating integration and adaptation. The
collective migrant is the primary focus of analysis. Drought illuminates the specifics of group experiences and group strategies for survival, however her own suggestion is for further research to focus upon the resettlement experience of those who do not rely on the support networks of large migrant communities, that is the individual (2000: 375).

Conceptual frameworks

The present study locates itself within those approaches that prioritize attention to the nature and experience of migration and resettlement at the micro-level, where the focus is that of the perspective of the individual migrant. However, the study accepts that the experience of migration and resettlement must be read within the context of the wider global, national and regional migration regimes. The thesis argues that the migration process (the ‘return’ movement and resettlement experience) is a continual process, connecting the region of departure and region of arrival. The process is constructed through political and non-political discourse. This discourse translates into the formulation of concrete responses to ‘return’ and resettlement in the form of policy, legislation and institutions. However, the migration process is lived out by the individual/collective migrant. Although this experience is shaped by the dominant discursive constructions and institutional labellings of the migration regime, migrants respond to and in some instances, disrupt the operation of the migration regime. Migrants may need to distance themselves from the migration regime in order to fulfil what they prioritize in the migration and resettlement process. The dual attention to migration discourse, and to migrant agency, enables the interrogation of the validity of three main characteristics that are applied to the migration process in question: the ‘ethnic’ nature of the migration, the ‘forced’ nature of the migration, and the assumption that it is a ‘return’ to ‘homeland’.

The research is consciously located across two key interdisciplinary fields of study – Russian studies and migration studies. The former facilitates an understanding of the historical and political significance of the ‘final stage’ of the migration cycle, i.e. the ‘return’ back of the Russian populations from the ‘empire’ periphery to the central core. Russian studies literature also helps to contextualize historically the specifics of the present-day response to the new Russian ‘diaspora’ and the possibility of their ‘return’; it provides a means of tracing the historical connections between the Russian state and
the Russian communities in the Soviet successor states, and of understanding the centrality of the communities to present day attempts by conflicting political and non-political forces to re-define the nature of the Russian nation. The historically rooted nature of the out-migration of the Russian communities, the multi-levelled connections that have bound them to the Russian state, and their subsequent importance within contemporary Russian society, is considered throughout the thesis both at the level of the Russian state and the individual migrant. Where the study departs somewhat from most published work on the Russian communities and the nature of their migration is in its treatment of 'ethnicity'. The study suggests that the tendency for both the Russian communities ‘in diaspora’, and those communities who ‘return’, to be treated primarily within frameworks that prioritise issues of Russian national identity, the political significance of the Russian ‘diaspora’ and its centrality to the development of the wider Russian nation (see for example Abdulatipov 1994; Dunlop 1993; Brubaker 1999), may serve to restrict an understanding of the greater complexity of the migration process at individual and migration regime levels.

Reference to broader Russian studies literature helps to place the migration process within the context of wider political and socio-economic change taking place in post-Soviet Russia. The response of the Russian government has been determined by the desire to re-define a relationship between the Russian state and ‘diaspora’ communities; yet, the development of an approach to the reality of migrant return is complicated at the regional level by other socio-economic and political factors of concern to local authorities, beyond the fact it is co-ethnics who are returning. An understanding of the ambiguous nature of federal-regional relations in contemporary Russia helps to illuminate the discrepancy in federal and regional practice regarding migration. At the individual level, the environment of ‘decolonization’ within which the migration movement is taking place cannot, and should not, be ignored. Yet, migrants are moving between and within wider structural forces at a very personal level. The movement and resettlement of migrants reveals the practical process of re-creating ‘home’ within the socio-economic and political realities of post-Soviet Russia that is not adequately conceptualized using the framework of an ethnic repatriation to an ‘historical homeland’.
To address the disputed nature of a complex migration process, the study draws upon debates within the field of migration studies, and related diaspora/homeland literature. A number of contested issues alluded to already within migration studies provide a starting point for addressing the case in question. The study attempts to further the resolution of 'structure' and 'agency' addressed in both general migration literature (Goss and Lindquist 1995; Wright 1995) and with specific reference to the migration processes, and developments of migration regimes, in the former Soviet Union and post-Soviet Russia (Codagnone 1998a; Pilkington 1998; Phizacklea 1996; Schwarz 1996). It draws upon Giddens' theory of structuration to inform understandings of migration and the interaction between 'agency' and 'structure', whilst taking account of qualifications of both the theory itself and its application to post-Soviet migration (Pilkington and Phizacklea 1999).

The study establishes as its broad conceptual framework a migration system, within which the migration process (the movement and resettlement) takes place. The migration system encompasses the migration flows made up of individual migrant and migrant networks and other institutions, political and non-political, of the surrounding migration regime. The migration system is in a state of flux and constant transformation, because it is a product of the interaction, and activity, of its structural properties and individual agencies, which themselves allow the migration process to be perpetuated over time and space, i.e. between the regions of departure and the site of arrival and settlement. Yet despite this interaction, the attention given to the properties of the migration system, specifically the institutional structures of the migration regimes, and the way in which they impact upon and constrain the individual agent acknowledges what Pilkington and Phizacklea term the 'analytical distinctiveness' of 'structure' and 'agency' (1999: 96). Such an approach avoids any latent tendency within structuration theory to collapse, rather than explore, the distinguishing characteristics of 'structure' and 'agency'. At a concrete level, the identification of intermediary 'social phenomena' – migrant organizations, migrant networks, migrant households – and a detailed exploration of their activity, provides a way of illustrating just how 'structure' and 'agency' act upon each other. This does not imply a fusion between structure and

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4 The authors draw upon the work of Derek Layder (1997) in developing their critique.
agency, however; indeed the study reveals that individual migrants not only engage with the structures of the surrounding migration regime – drawing upon their resources for their personal advantage – but, in certain circumstances, may withdraw from the operation of the regime. The relative ‘independence’ of the ‘agent’ therefore problematizes the ‘duality’ of structure and agency that is assumed within structuration theory.

The importance of political and non-political discourse, and how it constructs the migration process, is central to the migration system. Of equal relevance is migrant response to, and re-reading of, this discourse. The study appreciates the importance of migrants’ narratives and argues that they deserve greater consideration in migration research. The attention to the relationship, and to the discrepancy, between migration discourse and migrant reality provides a supplementary and alternative way of understanding the migration process in question, and could be extended to the study of other contemporary processes. The ‘migration system’ approach allows the necessary consideration to be given to individual migrant agency that reveals the contested nature of the migration process underway, and the presence of alternative migrant narratives. It enables a move away from another dichotomy that has existed in migration literature – that of the voluntary/economic and involuntary/political migrant. This theoretical construct is widely reflected within migration discourse and legislation, and the term ‘forced migrant’ adopted by the Russian government epitomizes its durability. Other research has questioned the possibility of strictly defining the movement as either ‘forced’ or ‘voluntary’ (Codagnone 1998a; Brubaker 1998; Pilkington and Phizacklea 1999). The present study furthers this line of inquiry. Attention to individual interpretation and interaction with the specifics of the surrounding migration system, reveals the ambiguous and contested nature of the official ‘forced migrant’ discourse, and allows the break-down of the voluntary/involuntary dichotomy. By affording adequate attention to individual agency, the approach can move away from identification of the migration process taking place as either that of the forced migration or voluntary ‘return’ of a Russian ‘diaspora’ to its ‘historical homeland’, dominant in

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5 The status of ‘forced migrant’ is only awarded to those who can prove they were forced to leave their former place of residence, and, in theory, strictly refuses the status to those who moved for economic reasons. Little account is taken within official legislative discourse therefore of the complex interaction of political, and socio-economic causes that lead to individual decisions to migrate.
both state and non-state constructions of migration. Instead, an attempt can be made to understand the process as one of the individual and collective migrant, displaced from a place they identified as ‘home’, and forced to re-negotiate a relationship with what to many is a foreign territory.

This dual understanding of the migration process necessitates the introduction of a further level of conceptual analysis: that of understandings of ‘homeland’ and ‘home’ and what causes allegiances and attachments to place. The Russian populations still resident in the successor states are frequently labelled as a ‘diaspora’. The political and media usage of the term stretches the traditional theoretical boundaries of the concept. However, if a flexible and critical use of the concept of ‘diaspora’ is adopted, with its implicit attention to relationships to ‘homeland[s]’, then it can be used not only to understand the Russian ‘diaspora’ resident in the former republics, but equally to comprehend the ‘return’ of the ‘diaspora’ to the traditional ‘homeland’. In this way the complex attachments people have to different ‘homelands’ may be illuminated. For the individual, the decision to migrate initiates a process of transferral of a ‘home’, that is lived out through the migration and resettlement process. Yet, the migrants are returning to a territory that might represent a differently constructed ‘homeland’ to that which they imagined; an environment that might impede their efforts to re-construct ‘home’. Integral to the analysis of the migration process is thus a parallel investigation of ‘home’ and ‘homeland’. Such an investigation provides a more holistic understanding of the multi-layered nature of the migration movement, and moves away from approaches within Russian studies that frame this migration movement as a ‘return’ to an ethnic ‘homeland’. Other research has problematized the assumption of the ‘ethnic homeland’ by exploring the different socio-cultural identities of the returning Russians (Pilkington 1998; Drought 2000; Gritsenko 1999). By concentrating on understandings of ‘home’ and ‘homeland’ at the micro-level, the present study finds an alternative way of disrupting the idea of an unproblematic native land. It reveals both what migrants see their new place of residence as, and what they do not see it as. The approach contributes further to bridging the theoretical and empirical gap that exists between migration discourse and migrant reality.
Levels of analysis

The study moves between different spatial levels of analysis: global, national, regional, local, and individual/collective migrant. These levels were identified initially through theoretical enquiry but their relevance was subsequently gauged through empirical investigation. An empirically grounded study enables the continual interrogation and development of the suggested theoretical framework. The multi-layered approach allows movement between the levels and findings at one level to inform understandings at another. Therefore, the constructed nature of the migration process may be directly, and in situ, compared to the reality of the migration process. At each level of analysis, academic and policy literature, primary empirical data (direct dialogue through expert and migrant interviews, and observation) and secondary empirical data (documentation, legislation, media reports) are combined, and related to the research questions emerging from theoretical enquiry. The analysis at, and movement between, the different levels takes place in the following way:

• At the global level, attention is paid to the contemporary international frameworks (legislative and organizational) governing migration, their influence within the post-Soviet space at the national, regional, and individual/collective migrant levels, and their interaction with Russian federal and regional, political and non-political agencies.

• At the federal and regional levels, the development of the corresponding migration regimes (the institutional and legislative frameworks) and the complex relationships existing between the different key actors are explored. Analysis at these levels concentrates on how interacting, but equally conflictual, perceptions of the migration process translate into discourse and policy. The impact of discourse and policy upon the subsequent positioning of the migrant within the receiving society is empirically tested at the local level of analysis.

• At the local case-study level two regional migration regimes are examined in detail. The key state and non-state actors in the two migration regimes are identified. Their attitudes to migration and involvement in the development of policy are explored. The wider socio-economic and political regional environment is also considered. The activity of these regional actors is compared with established federal and
international priorities and directives, and equally with the needs and concerns of
the individual/collective migrant.

- At this same local level, individual and collective migrant experiences of
resettlement are analysed also. The case-study approach allows a focus upon the
nature of migrant response which is set within, and contrasted with, the findings
from the other levels of analysis. Attention is given to individuals’ motivations for
migration and the experience of the movement. The site of resettlement is the
primary focus where group and individual strategies for coping with displacement
and re-location are assessed within the context of the surrounding migration regime.
The positioning of the migrant within that migration regime, their interaction with
the key actors in that migration regime, and their location within the wider socio-
economic and political structures of the receiving society are explored.

Thesis structure
The structure of the thesis reflects the way that the key conceptual themes of analysis
and levels of empirical investigation are interwoven throughout the text, and
demonstrates how a holistic, yet complex, view of the migration process is provided
through the movement between those themes of analysis and locales of empirical focus.

Chapters 1 and 2 combine an introduction of the focus of research with a detailed
presentation of the conceptual frameworks that shape the theoretical and empirical
directions of the study. Chapter 1 describes the migration movement of the Russian
populations within the broader context of contemporary global, and regional migration
flows. The chapter introduces the necessary frameworks for understanding the nature of
migration systems, and identifies the key levels of analysis (global; national; regional;
local; network/individual) that structure the rest of the study. Chapter 2 explores in
more depth the specific nature of the migration process underway by focusing upon the
historical out-migration of the Russian communities to the periphery of the Tsarist and
later Soviet ‘empires’ and the implications of the nature of this settlement for current
state and individual responses to ‘return’ migration. This discussion provides a
background for the chapter’s introduction of the second conceptual framework that
shapes the study: that of understanding attachment to place through the dichotomy of
‘homeland’ and ‘home’. The chapter outlines the multi-layered and fluid nature of
'home/land'. and shows how it might be under re-negotiation at the levels of both the Russian state, and the individual migrant, during the 'return' migration and resettlement processes.

Chapters 3 and 4 draw heavily upon primary and secondary empirical data, but make use of the theoretical frameworks introduced in the previous chapter, specifically that of the migration system introduced in Chapter 1. Chapter 3 is located at the federal level of analysis, and concentrates upon the development of the Russian federal migration regime – its legislative and institutional frameworks – over the period 1995-2000. Through a mapping process, the chapter identifies the relative powers that different actors have within the migration regime to shape the migration process and migration discourse. Chapter 4 follows a similar pattern but takes the analysis to the regional level where the nature of regional migrant resettlement, and the development of regional migration regimes, are explored. The key actors within regional migration regimes are identified, their activities are assessed within the context of the political and socio-economic specifics of the regions, and a typology of regional responses to migration is identified. The chapter highlights the discrepancies that exist in migration practice both across regional migration regimes, and between the regional, federal and international migration regimes.

Chapter 5 of the thesis suggests how the gap between the theoretical and empirical parts of the study is bridged. It interrogates the methodology adopted in the study, and discusses how this methodology provides a link between theory and data. The chapter recounts all the stages of the research process: the choice of methodology; methods of data collection; the experience of data collection; approaches to data analysis; and the use of data in the written text. Attention is paid to the methodological and ethical issues that emerged during the research process, particularly the question of the position of the researcher within that process.

Chapters 6 and 7 present the empirical data from the case-study regions: Saratov and Samara oblasti. Chapter 6 draws upon the typological framework of regional migration regimes provided in Chapter 4 to describe the development, and characteristics, of the migration regimes in the two regions of study. The chapter maps areas of influence of
the different state and non-state institutions that have shaped the nature of the regional responses to in-migration and assesses the real levels of state assistance for resettlement that exist for migrants arriving in the two regions. Chapter 7 turns to an issue that is alluded to throughout the study, but which is not directly dealt with until this chapter – the understandings and experiences of the process of migration (the migration movement and subsequent resettlement) at the level of the individual. The chapter is structured around migrants’ own verbalization of the experience of migration and resettlement, exploring in particular the way that they identify the process as a means of achieving the transfer and reconstruction of a home/land. Interaction of the individual/collective migrant with the legislative and institutional specifics of the surrounding (regional, national, global) migration regimes is described. The chapter describes the migration movement and resettlement process through an analysis of what migrants prioritize in the migration process, what strategies they adopt, and what structures and networks (formal or informal) they draw upon to facilitate their ‘return’.

The Conclusion to the thesis summarizes the key discourses and dominant experiences of the migration process that both span and weave together the different locales of theoretical and empirical investigation that run through the body of the text. The findings from the research are brought together to question the adequacy of the terms ‘forced’ and ‘ethnic’ to describe the migration movement, and the concept of ‘homeland’ to portray what Russia represents to the returning migrants. The Conclusion re-addresses the discrepancy that is traced throughout the thesis – the gap that exists between the construction of the migration process, through political, academic, and media discourse and policy making, and the perceptions and experience of the same migration process that emerge from migrants’ narratives. At the individual migrant level the priority of re-creating ‘home’ often engenders a withdrawal from the operation of the migration regime, and the wider territory of ‘homeland’, to an immediate and supportive locale made up of close family and friendship networks.
Chapter 1: Theorizing migration ‘processes’: the resolution of agency and structure

Introduction

This chapter introduces the research space, the research focus and the main theoretical approaches of the study. The focus of the research – the ‘return’ and resettlement experience of ethnic Russian and Russian speaking migrants arriving from the former republics of the Soviet Union to the territory of the Russian Federation – is located within debates concerning contemporary global and regional migration processes. Ways of understanding the migration process – the nature of the movement and subsequent resettlement – are explored by examining the migration taking place within the space of a ‘migration system’. The migration system encompasses both the regions of departure and arrival; locales that are connected via the migration process. Migration is a contested process that is constructed and experienced in conflicting ways by the individual migrant and other key agencies of the surrounding migration system. At the individual level, the migration process represents the attempted transferral by the individual migrant of their immediate ‘home’ from the region of departure to a new location in the region of arrival. Yet, in the case of the present study, the process could also be seen to represent a collective ‘return’ of co-nationals to a wider ‘ethnic homeland’. However, the way in which the ‘ethnic homeland’ is constructed at the state level for the returning migrants conflicts with the individual migrant’s need for an immediate sense of home, as well as their perceptions of what a ‘homeland’ should be.¹

¹ In Chapter 2 the specific nature of the migration and resettlement in question is explored further. The discussion is extended to encompass historical and contemporary theories of ‘return’, ‘homeland’ and ‘home’ which are central to the experience and identities of the ‘returnees’ in the present study.
1.1 The global context

1.1.1 The global migration system

The last decade of the twentieth century witnessed great political, economic and social upheaval and change, which had significant implications for contemporary migration movements (Brah 1996: 178; Castles and Miller 1998: 1; Papastergiadis 2000: 6). The changes in the character of migration flows has led to the application of the term a ‘new migration’ (Koser and Lutz 1998: 1) and for the period of the late twentieth century and beginning of the twenty-first century to be labelled by some as an ‘age of migration’ (Castles and Miller 1998: 3). A number of characteristics of contemporary migration are used to justify the application of the term ‘new’. All areas of the globe, to a greater extent than any other period, have been drawn into both global and regional patterns of migration. Since 1989, Europe has witnessed its most intense migration movements since the Second World War, and such movements are increasing in volume in all major regions of the world. Individual countries are affected by a greater range of migrants of different origins and backgrounds than in previous periods. There has been an increase in the numbers of refugees and asylum seekers, and, with the shift to a post-industrial global economy, new ‘types’ of migrants have emerged. These include highly skilled, elite labour migrants, together with increased numbers of migrants employed in the private service industries and domestic services. This latter trend has led to the ‘feminization’ of migration. In response to contemporary migratory flows, there has been a growing politicization of the issue, and a corresponding securitization and institutionalization of migration at the domestic and international levels. Improvements in transportation and communication have meant that migrants are increasingly able to sustain simultaneous, multi-stranded, transnational relationships that link societies. Multiple attachments to different localities have allowed the development of new and complex ‘diasporic’ identities amongst migrant communities (Castles and Miller 1998: 8-9; Koser and Lutz 1998: 1-3; Portes et al. 1999; Held et al. 1999: 297-304; Brah 1996: 179).

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2 Zolberg suggests that the increase in numbers of refugees and asylum seekers is predominantly the by-product of two major historical processes: the formation of new states; and confrontation over the social order in both old and new states (Zolberg et al. 1989 cited in Held et al. 1999: 302).
The increasing complexity and intensity of contemporary migration movements provides a continuing theoretical challenge when trying to conceptualize the nature of migration processes. Two key issues emerge which are pertinent for any study of contemporary migration and resettlement and are therefore central to the present study. Firstly, the level of analysis prioritized by the theory, and the attention given to either 'agency' or 'structure'. Secondly, whether the theory is confined to examining the causes for the migration movement at the site of departure, or whether the theory attempts to explain the reasons for the initiation and continuation of migration across time and space extending to the site of resettlement. Both of these key issues will be discussed in turn below.

1.1.2 Theories of migration
Early neo-classical models of migration identified the process of migration as a rational and individual response to the disparities in economic development. Migration is driven by a combination of push and pull factors. Individuals are propelled to leave their home country because of underdevelopment or economic hardship and are pulled towards certain destinations which offer employment and higher wages (Todaro cited in Phizacklea 1998: 24). The approach assumes that the individual migrant makes rational decisions based upon an evaluation of the choices available according to their knowledge of objective conditions (Phizacklea 1998: 24; Goss and Lindquist 1995: 320). Structural approaches to migration moved attention away from the motivations of individual migrants, to the larger historical and structural causes and consequences of migration within the context of dependent capitalism (Kearney 1986: 339). Both of these theories prioritize analysis at the site of departure, and present individual migrants as either atomized individuals who calculate the costs and benefits of migration on a socio-economic basis, or view migrants as subjects upon whom the structural differences in socio-economic and demographic conditions in the world economy are imposed.

1.1.3 Structuration theory and migration
A desire to understand the perpetuation of migration, and a concern to bridge the gap between the micro and macro level, led to integrative approaches: migrant systems (Fawcett 1989; Kritz and Zlotnik 1992); migrant networks (Boyd 1989; Gurak and
Caces 1992); and articulationist models (Kearney 1986). All of these focus upon the household or social network as a connecting structure. Their attention to the micro/macro duality reflected an abiding concern present within sociology and attempts to theorize the nature and operation of society and social systems. Giddens’ theory of structuration, which has built on and reflected other work including that of Weber and Bourdieu, aims to challenge the opposition of structure and individual action. Structuration theory suggests that to understand the nature of social systems we must study the production, reproduction and transformation of structures across time and space by knowledgeable actors drawing on rules and resources contained within the system. This is termed the duality of structure where ‘the structural properties of social systems are both medium and outcome of the practices they recursively organize’. Structures are not only constraining therefore, but may be enabling (Giddens 1984: 25). The positive contribution of structuration theory to reconciling structure and agency is its recognition that they are not separate and unrelated entities, but are deeply implicated in each other. A further question, however, is in what way, or in what sense, are they implicated (Layder 1994: 148). The empirical application of structuration theory enables this question to be explored, and for the analytic reach of the theory to be furthered.

Structuration theory was reflected in developments in migration theory and adopted within approaches that analyse a ‘migration system’ in its entirety; a system that incorporates the two key levels of ‘agency’ and ‘structure’ (Goss and Lindquist 1995; Phizacklea 1998; Wright 1995; Schwarz 1996). A structuration approach provides the analytical space for an analysis of the interaction of migrant agency and the structures which surround them (Wright 1995: 771). The process of migration takes place within the migration system and is a complex interaction of both individual agency and social structure (Goss and Lindquist 1995: 344). The migration system represents the complex articulation of individuals, associations and organizations, which extends the social action of, and interaction between, these agents and agencies across time and space (Goss and Lindquist 1995: 319).³ To understand the process and perpetuation of migration, the migration system is seen as a fluid framework which is under formation.

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³ The term ‘migration system’ is preferred in the present study, Goss and Lindquist apply the term ‘migrant institution’.

due to this interactive relationship of 'agency' and 'structure'. Key levels or locales of analysis – individual, household, network, the host society, state, and global environment – can be identified, allowing the production and transformation of the migration system to be explored. Due to the attention to both human agency and structural determinants a structuration approach enables the diversity of causation of migration to be considered (Phizacklea 1996; Richmond 1988: 19-20, 1993: 12). Equally the approach allows the nature of relationships between individual migrants, other key actors, and the structural and institutional specifics of the wider national and global migration system, to be understood. The consideration of the properties of the migration system and the structures of the migration regime, their impact upon individual agency, and, in turn, individual response, allows the 'analytical distinctiveness' of 'structure' and 'agency' to be maintained, whilst accepting that in real life they are closely intertwined with one another (Pilkington and Phizacklea 1999: 96). The attention to separate levels of analysis demonstrates the way in which the migration process, the 'return' movement and subsequent resettlement, is under constant negotiation by all the actors involved.

1.1.4 The migration system and 'globalization'

Any understanding of contemporary migration benefits from being placed within current debates concerning globalization. Within these debates, the concept of 'power' is understood as a relational phenomenon where power relationships are always specific to a given configuration of actors and institutions (Held et al. 1999: 20; Castells 1998: 347). One feature of contemporary 'globalization' is when 'the spatial reach and density of global and transnational interconnectedness weave complex webs and networks of relations between communities, states, international institutions, non-governmental organizations and multi-national corporations which make up the global order' (Held et al. 1999: 27). The 'global migration system' is a structure produced by the emergence and interaction of such networks, a structure which both imposes constraints on the ability of, and empowers, individuals, communities, states and other agencies to act. States are located within the global migration system, and they often act to affect the nature of migration flows. One consequence of the increase in 'illegal' and undocumented economic and non-economic migrants in contemporary migration flows is a challenge to the capacity of 'nation-states' to secure independently their own
borders (ibid: 321). The situation has led individual states to recognize the need to increase trans-border cooperation in the sphere of migration. A frequent response on the part of governments, particularly those in Western Europe and North America, has been the introduction of restrictive policies at both the domestic and regional levels in an attempt to control and regulate migration. Such attempts at control, however, ignore the wider system within which national states are located, and often contradict pre-existing international agreements and conventions. The space within which migrants are travelling is regulated not just according to bounded, territorial principles, but is also influenced by transnational concerns (ibid: 28, 324).

The governance of migration demonstrates how nation states are now located within ‘nodes of a broader network of power’ where other flows of power in the network may contradict the exercise of their authority (Castells 1997: 304). Equally, the transformation of power relations and the diffusion of power within networks ‘below’ or outside of the state, enables the individual to better represent their interests through relationships with other social actors and institutions, often in opposition to, or isolation from, the state (ibid; and Castells 1998: 347). However, within the global migration system, a ‘hierarchy’ of power exists both within and between different actors. The members of migratory flows, i.e. mass or elite, possess different capacities to choose destinations, and to access the resources for successful migration and resettlement. Equally, within the different migratory flows, individuals are unequally positioned according to class, gender, and ethnicity. The hierarchy of power is reflected at the level of the migration regime, where national governments possess varying capacities to control population movements, to maintain the integrity of their borders, and to shape the structure of international migratory regimes (Held et al. 1999: 285).

1.1.5 Involuntary and voluntary migrations

The restrictive approach of national governments to in-migration is often centred upon defining a migrant as ‘political’ or ‘economic’, ‘voluntary’ or ‘involuntary’. The
approach is insensitive to the complexity of causes and motivations that exist at the level of the individual migrant, where such constructs are increasingly no longer viable (Brah 1996: 178-9). The institutional definition of a migration movement using these constructs reflects a corresponding theoretical dilemma. In migration theory there has been a tendency to concentrate upon labour migration and the prioritization of economic factors as causing migration. There has been a reluctance in the past to theorise forced movements, which were often seen as unpredictable, spontaneous and ephemeral in nature. Instead the ‘unique’ nature of refugees was stressed to distinguish them from other types of migrants (Suhrke 1995: 201). A number of efforts have been made to draw upon material from the general field of migration theory and combine it with literature specific to forced displacement (Kunz 1973; Richmond 1998, 1993). Richmond provides a useful model that attempts to disrupt the voluntary/involuntary dichotomy. He identifies a continuum on which he places the ‘reactive’ migrant, whose freedom to choose is severely constrained by an immediate crisis situation, and the ‘proactive’ migrant, who has the time to make rational choices based upon available information and who seeks to maximize personal net advantage (1993: 10; 1998: 17). However, most ‘political’ and ‘economic’ migrants fall somewhere between these extremes. They make decisions in response to the immediate, or predicted, failure of society to provide for their individual needs: biological, economic and social (Richmond 1988: 17).

The problems involved in neatly categorizing migrants are particularly relevant across the post-Soviet space and the territory of the Russian Federation on both a practical and theoretical level. The movements themselves are caused by a complex interplay of political, ethnic, social and economic factors, rooted in the wider environment of political change, new nation building, and fundamental changes in the nature of the economic system. Governments, the media, and academic commentators have attempted to label the movements; for example, as ‘forced’, ‘economic’, or as those of ‘repatriation’. Neat definitions, however, do not suffice due to their failure to take into account individual agency; the complexity of factors operating at the individual level, and the close interplay of external ‘push’ factors, and individual motivations and possibilities.
1.2 The former Soviet Union: a new global migration space

1.2.1 Population movements across the former Soviet Union

One of the new spaces of migration within the complex and changing global migration environment is the territory of the former Soviet Union (FSU) (Koser and Lutz 1998: 1; Brah 1996: 178; Castles and Miller 1998: 12). The opening up of borders between East and West, and the relaxation of restrictions on movement, meant that a previously isolated area was included within a wider global migration system, and became caught up in both regional and global migratory flows (Held et al. 1999: 299). The emergence of fifteen independent states in 1991 transformed the volume, direction and nature of what had been previously internal population movement into significant international migration flows. Millions of former Soviet citizens migrated within, between, and out of the former republics of the Soviet Union during the last decade of the twentieth century. The reasons for the migrations taking place are diverse and include ethnic conflict and discrimination, severe socio-economic and political collapse, and environmental disaster. Central to understanding the complexity of the movements is the specific environment of political, social and economic change in which they are located where processes of ‘decolonization’ and nation building are taking place concurrently. Many of the migration movements are motivated by the influences of nationalism and ethnic sentiments, which have brought about a return of groups of repatriates to their respective ‘homelands’ and the rehabilitation of formerly deported peoples (Zaionchkovskaia et al. 1993: 206; Robertson 1996: 113; Mitchneck and Plane 1995: 22). The role that issues of nationalism and ethnicity play in influencing the noted migration movements means that they become inextricably related to wider issues of identity, citizenship, and belonging for the individual and wider definitions of territory and nation for the state (Chinn and Kaiser 1996).

The migratory processes on the territory of the former Soviet Union have provided a policy challenge to the international community. As noted above, within the global migration system there exists a ‘hierarchy’ of power within which nation states are located (Held et al. 1999: 285). At the present time, the West is dominant in this hierarchy. From 1989 the potential for a mass migration from the territory of the former
Soviet bloc generated great concern at the international and particularly European level (Castles and Miller 1998: 9; Codagnone 1998b: 39). It is ironic that after the west had called for the liberalization of emigration from the Soviet Union during the 1970s and 1980s, and following the break down of borders between east and west from 1989, the west then perceived the potential migration as a threat and used this to legitimate the policies of an increasingly ‘Fortress Europe’ (Codagnone 1998b: 55). Where previously migrants who arrived from the FSU had been unconditionally accepted as political refugees, they were now treated as ordinary, voluntary/economic immigrants. As such, they faced increasingly severe entry restrictions. In many ways, movement between east and west was as restricted as it had been prior to 1989 (Zolberg 1989: 414).

The fear of a mass migration has not been realized. Just over two million individuals left the FSU for the far abroad during the period 1989-1995, which was less than one percent of the 1989 population (Heleniak 1999: 5). Most of these were ethnic migrants moving to Israel, Germany and Greece (Zaionchkovskaia et al. 1993: 206). Western government policy may have discouraged migration, but equally has failed to move beyond the idea that the economically ‘superior’ conditions in the west are sufficient to generate mass migration, and ignores other essential factors influential in determining movement such as individual motivation, psychological readiness, adequate infrastructure, and family and friendship networks in the destination country (Vishnevskii and Zaionchkovskaia 1994: 257). As Codagnone suggests, we must therefore theorize not only why people move, but also why people stay, despite the existence of strong socio-economic push and pull factors. Of significance to the present study is a need to understand why migrants choose to move within the territory of the FSU, i.e. that is from the former republic to Russia, rather than consider a possibly beneficial socio-economic move to the west (Codagnone 1998a: 47, 48).

Another result of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the opening up of its external borders has been the arrival to the territory of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Baltic states of individuals from the ‘far abroad’; these include refugees in

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5 The term ‘far’ abroad is used in the text to refer to those countries which were outside of the borders of the former Soviet Union, the term ‘near’ abroad is used to refer to the other former non-Russian republics of the former Soviet Union.
search of asylum or economic migrants seeking employment. The intended final
destination of many of these migrants is the west; however the increasingly restrictive
policies of western governments has meant that they frequently find themselves trapped
on the territory of the FSU. The consequent challenge for all the former Soviet
republics on an institutional and policy level has been immense. None of the present
governments had any experience of dealing with the problems of mass migration,
specifically the complex nature of the migration movements in question
(Zaionchkovskaia et al. 1993: 205; Heleniak 1999: 2). Institutional and legislative
structures have rapidly been created to manage the migration flows which are
underway. Nevertheless in most states these are still in an evolutionary state (Heleniak
1999: 2).

1.2.2 Migration flows to, and within, the Russian Federation
The Russian Federation is the successor state perhaps most affected by the population
movements brought about by the social, economic and political changes following the
break-up of the Soviet Union, both in terms of migration into the territory from the
‘near’ and ‘far’ abroad, and by internal migration within the borders of its territory. The
territory of the Russian Federation is experiencing the arrival from the former Soviet
republics of ethnic Russian and Russian speaking ‘returnees’, other ‘returnees’
belonging to ethnic groups of the Russian Federation, refugees and forced migrants,
formerly deported peoples, and economic migrants. Amongst the arrivees are
immigrants of former Soviet nationalities arriving from their respective home countries,
primarily Ukrainian, Armenian, Belorusian, Azeri, Georgian and Tajik. During the
period 1989-1996, one million of these immigrants arrived in the Russian Federation as
a result of the push and pull of socio-economic factors and, in the case of Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Georgia and Tajikistan, due to ethnic and civil conflict which forced the
titular nationalities to leave (Codagnone 1998a: 16-17). In addition, the country is
facing large-scale internal migration and displacement as a result of the Chechen

6 The terms ‘returnees’, ‘refugees’, ‘forced migrants’, ‘economic migrants’ are used here as broad
descriptive categories. However, the difficulties of defining migrants using such categories is
acknowledged. This is explored further below.
conflict\textsuperscript{7}, and due to socio-economic out-migration from the North, Eastern Siberia and the Far East.\textsuperscript{8} Migration from the far abroad has increased and is made up of refugees and undocumented migrants from Asia, Africa and the Middle East, many of whom are using the Russian Federation as a transit region to reach Western Europe, and permanent and temporary economic migrants arriving, primarily, from China and Vietnam (Codagnone 1998b: 42-44; Heleniak 1999: 15, 16). Migration flows out of the Russian Federation consist largely of Greek, Jewish and German repatriates returning to their ‘historical’ homelands. Between 1990 and 1996, 86.3\% of emigrants from the Russian Federation went to Israel, Germany and Greece (Codagnone 1998a: 5). This shows a continuation in the dominant trend in emigration during the late Soviet period. From 1976-1990 nine out of ten emigrants were Jewish or German (Oberg and Boubnova 1995: 245).

1.2.3 The ‘return’ of the ethnic Russian and Russian speaking populations of the successor states of the former Soviet Union

A population greatly affected by the upheaval and change in the FSU over the last decade has been the community of ethnic Russians who found themselves in the newly independent states following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. According to the last Soviet census conducted in 1989 there were 25.3 million ethnic Russians living in Soviet republics other than the Russian Federation (see Table 1.1). In addition there were 11 million Russian speaking (russkoiazichnii) members of the non-titular nationalities in the FSU whose primary cultural affinity is to Russia.

The movement of Russians within the territory of the Russian and later Soviet ‘empires’ has dominated the nature and direction of migration flows since the sixteenth century (Heleniak 1999: 11; Messina 1994a: 627). However, it was during the Soviet period that the greatest number of Russians and other Slavic nationalities, involved in the drive for agricultural and industrial development, migrated out to the former

\textsuperscript{7} By the end of 1999 130,943 refugees and forced migrants who had fled Chechnia as a result of the conflict had been registered by the Federal Migration Service (Goskomstat Rossii 2000: 113. Goskmostat is the State Statistics Committee).

\textsuperscript{8} Internal movements within the Russian Federation, apart from the refugee movements from the Chechen conflict, have received little attention in the West. However, between 1990 and 1996 about 23 million people changed their residence, either within the same region (12.5 million) or moved from one region to another (10.6 million) (Codagnone 1998a: 51).
### Table 1.1 Russians in the other Soviet Republics, 1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Republic</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>As percentage of total number of Russians in republics of the FSU</th>
<th>As percentage of Republic’s total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td><strong>Baltics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1.9</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>906,000</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>344,000</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>1,342,000</td>
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<td>13.2</td>
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<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>392,000</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>5.6</td>
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<td>1.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
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<td>9.5</td>
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<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>1,653,000</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>25,289,000</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

republics of the Soviet Union (see Tables 1.2 and 1.3). This movement peaked in the 1960s when the number of Russians in the republics as a whole grew by almost one third (Zaionchkovskaia 1996: 7). Yet, although the share of the Russian population in the eight southern republics of the FSU reached its optimum point in 1959, in the six European republics this only occurred in 1989 (Heleniak 1999: 11). The ‘return’ movement began at different times depending upon the republic in question; the number of Russians in Georgia and Azerbaijan began to decrease in the early 1960s and 1970s, in Kazakstan at the beginning of the 1970s, whilst in the Central Asian republics the ‘return’ of Russians only occurred at a significant rate from the late 1970s (Codagnone 1998b: 48; Zaionchkovskaia 1996: 7). The Baltic republics and Ukraine, however, continued to receive the immigration of Russians until the late 1980s (Codagnone 1998a: 13). Prior to 1989, processes of modernisation in the former Soviet republics were seen as the primary cause of the return movements. The development of the education and training of members of the titular nationality increasingly brought competition for urban residence and employment opportunities in professional, management and skilled labour sectors (Rowland 1993: 171).

From the late 1980s and early 1990s the process of ‘return’ accelerated rapidly. Initially this was due to ethnic Russians and Russophones fleeing from former republics where there was civil war and ethnic conflict. Significant flows of Russian refugees occurred as a result of outbreaks of violence in Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan) and the Ferghana valley (Uzbekistan) in the late 1980s, in Baku (Azerbaijan) in 1990, and later conflicts in Georgia, Moldova, Tajikistan and the North Caucasus (Codagnone 1998b: 46; Messina 1994a: 631). By 1994 the main regions of departure had shifted to Central Asia and Kazakstan. By 1999 the highest levels of out-migration were to be found in Kazakstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan10 (Goskomstat Rossi 2000: 113). Out-migration of Russians from the Baltic States, Ukraine and Belarus in the 1990s for the first time replaced the in-migration of Russians which had been characteristic of the population exchange up to the end of the 1980s (Codagnone 1998a: 13).

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9 The nature of the historical, centre to periphery, migratory movements of Russians is looked at in more detail in Chapter 2.
10 Since 1994, Tajikistan has been the only former republic to experience open conflict in the form of civil/clan warfare.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
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<td>+1,526,000</td>
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<td>+104,000</td>
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</table>

### Table 1.3 Percentage of Russians in the total population of the Soviet Republics 1926-1989

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<td>29.8</td>
<td>32.8</td>
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<tr>
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<td>16.9</td>
<td>19.4</td>
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<td>22.1</td>
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<td>6.3</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Kazakstan</td>
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<td>40.8</td>
<td>37.8</td>
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<td>20.8</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>29.2</td>
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<td>11.9</td>
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<td>7.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
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<td>18.6</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>14.5</td>
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<td>9.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
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<td>13.5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The official registration of returnees from the former Soviet republics by the Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation began in July 1992 and by the end of 1999 1,388,400 ethnic Russian and Russian speaking forced migrants and refugees had been registered in the Russian Federation (Goskomstat Rossii 1998: 68; Federal Migration Service 1998, Goskomstat Rossii 2000: 113) (see Tables 1.4 and 1.5). The peak of immigration was reached between 1993-1995, thereafter there has been a slow decline in numbers. However, these figures do not account for the total migration occurring between the former republics of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation due to the high incidence of non-registration with the branches of the Federal Migration Service, and overall inconsistencies in the collection of data on migrants and refugees.\footnote{See Appendix 1 for a discussion of the limitations of statistics concerning forced migrants and refugees.} It is estimated that the actual number of returnees from the CIS states to date may be as high as 8 million (see Table 1.6).\footnote{On 4th January 2001 Russian migration officials stated that more than eight million people have arrived in the Russian Federation from the former Soviet republics since 1991 (RFE/RL Newsline Part 1, 5 January, 2001).}
Table 1.4 Annual registration of ‘forced migrants’ and ‘refugees’ by Country of Origin 1992-1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>108</td>
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<td>2,682</td>
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<td>2,476</td>
<td>1,394</td>
<td>792</td>
<td>540</td>
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<td>2,262</td>
<td>2,838</td>
<td>2,182</td>
<td>1,086</td>
<td>541</td>
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<td>1,334</td>
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<td>20,796</td>
<td>12,903</td>
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<td>4,326</td>
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<td>168</td>
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<td>73</td>
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<td>254,518</td>
<td>271,977</td>
<td>172,926</td>
<td>131,130</td>
<td>117,717</td>
<td>78,745</td>
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</table>


* It should be noted that only in 1998 did Goskomstat publish data that distinguished between refugees and forced migrants. Russian returnees would make up the large part of the figures shown, however, it is for the years 1998 and 1999 that figures for forced migrants only are shown. Problems associated with registration figures for forced migrants and refugees are discussed in Appendix 1.
Table 1.5 Cumulative indication of registered ‘forced migrants’ and ‘refugees’ by country of origin 1993-1998

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<tr>
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<td><strong>The Baltic States</strong></td>
<td>189</td>
<td>6,805</td>
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<td>Lithuania</td>
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<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>924</td>
<td>998</td>
<td>1,029</td>
<td>1,048</td>
<td>310</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total from abroad</strong></td>
<td>138,515</td>
<td>377,982</td>
<td>609,460</td>
<td>846,566</td>
<td>998,812</td>
<td>997,607</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Russian Federation</strong></td>
<td>21,826</td>
<td>69,951</td>
<td>92,991</td>
<td>127,862</td>
<td>148,542</td>
<td>194,332</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chechnia and Ingushetia</td>
<td>21,588</td>
<td>62,245</td>
<td>84,414</td>
<td>118,440</td>
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<td>153,906</td>
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<td>Northern Ossetia</td>
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<td>6,414</td>
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<td>6,971</td>
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<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>58</td>
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<td>2,163</td>
<td>2,632</td>
<td>2,888</td>
<td>1,213</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>160,341</td>
<td>447,933</td>
<td>702,451</td>
<td>974,428</td>
<td>1,147, 354</td>
<td>1,191, 939</td>
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Table 1.6 Total annual migration inflows to the Russian Federation from the CIS and Baltic States, 1992-1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>21,364</td>
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<td>17,847</td>
<td>13,750</td>
<td>10,762</td>
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<td>188,443</td>
<td>170,928</td>
<td>138,231</td>
<td>111,934</td>
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<td>465,401</td>
<td>625,468</td>
<td>442,468</td>
<td>297,064</td>
<td>328,829</td>
<td>291,582</td>
<td>210,620</td>
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<td>346,363</td>
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<td>172,860</td>
<td>235,903</td>
<td>209,880</td>
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<td>66,489</td>
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<td>16,501</td>
<td>10,509</td>
<td>7,998</td>
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<td>91,164</td>
<td>146,670</td>
<td>112,312</td>
<td>49,970</td>
<td>39,620</td>
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<td>The Caucasus</td>
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<td>162,822</td>
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<td>104,280</td>
<td>73,518</td>
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<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>15,750</td>
<td>29,806</td>
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<td>34,112</td>
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<td>66,847</td>
<td>51,412</td>
<td>38,551</td>
<td>24,517</td>
<td>21,059</td>
<td>19,626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Baltic States</td>
<td>67,065</td>
<td>126,703</td>
<td>56,076</td>
<td>27,576</td>
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<td>10,926</td>
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<td>3,055</td>
<td>1,785</td>
<td>1,384</td>
<td>987</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>925,733</td>
<td>922,886</td>
<td>1,146,349</td>
<td>841,505</td>
<td>631,173</td>
<td>582,829</td>
<td>494,819</td>
<td>366,655</td>
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</table>


* Vitkovskaia notes that these figures are likely to be incomplete due to the gradual dismantling of control over the movement of people, specifically the ‘abolition’ of the propiska, and the porous borders and lack of control over migration.
1.3 Exploring the migration ‘system’ – a theoretical and empirical framework

The migration of the ethnic Russian and Russian speaking populations from the former republics of the Soviet Union to the territory of the Russian Federation provides a challenge to existing migration theories and their capacity to adequately conceptualize the character of migration flows and the nature of ‘return’ movements and resettlement processes. The complexity and diversity of the migrant population is immense, as is the nature of their ‘return’ to and resettlement in the Russian Federation. The migration system in the present study encompasses the space where a complex set of relationships between the key actors are articulated: the migratory flows of individual migrants; the regional, federal and international government bodies in both the former republics and the Russian Federation, and national and international humanitarian organisations (see Figure 1.1). The migration process is being differently constructed and experienced by the key actors. The migration system stretches between the region of departure and the region of settlement. In the present study this is seen as particularly pertinent. The regions of departure and region of settlement are connected via historical, political, social, economic and cultural links, which are presently undergoing transformation.\(^\text{13}\) As states re-negotiate their own national identities, inter-state level relationships are being re-formulated. Equally, at the individual level, physical and emotional attachments to the former republic, are having to be re-negotiated and re-imagined in the adjacent ‘ethnic’ homeland, a process that is often facilitated by personal (family or friendship) connections. However, the existence of past physical and emotional ties in the former ‘homeland’ problematize the migrants’ connection via ethnicity to the Russian ‘homeland’. As Castells suggests, ethnicity does not always provide a basis for a ‘communal heaven’ because ‘it is based upon primary bonds that lose significance, when cut from their historical context’ (Castells 1997: 59).

\(^{13}\) Codagnone suggests that the presence of institutional links between the former republics and the Russian Federation are an important reason in explaining why migrants mainly choose to migrate to Russia, rather than to the West, where such institutional links are absent (1998a: 48).
Figure 1.1 The Russian migration system

THE GLOBAL MIGRATION SYSTEM

POLITICAL FORCES

ECONOMIC FORCES

THE CONTESTATION AND EXPERIENCE OF 'RETURN' AND RESETTLEMENT

INDIVIDUAL MIGRANTS

THE MIGRATION FLOWS

MIGRANT NETWORKS

POLITICAL AGENCIES

THE MIGRATION REGIME

NON-POLITICAL AGENCIES

THE MIGRATION PROCESS

THE SITE OF DEPARTURE

SOCIAL FORCES

THE SITE OF SETTLEMENT

CULTURAL FORCES

THE SITE OF DEPARTURE

SOCIAL FORCES

THE SITE OF SETTLEMENT

CULTURAL FORCES

34
1.3.1 The migration flows

Understanding the position of the potential migrant at the site of departure, and the causes of migration, is central to an understanding of the whole migration process, and informs analysis at the site of resettlement. The migration is a journey, in which the circumstances of leaving, and those of arrival and settling down are equally important. The intersection of the different stages of the journey, on a temporal and spatial level need to be considered (Brah 1996: 182). For the individual migrant, the journey represents the leaving of a ‘home’, and the attempt to re-create this ‘home’ at the place of settlement. However, the individual journey must be placed within the context of the wider connections between the former republics and the Russian Federation, and the interests of the other actors involved in the migration process.

The combination of causes which encourages the migration of the ‘returning’ Russians impedes any neat typology of the returnee population. As Codagnone suggests, the problems of distinguishing between migrant ‘types’ increases in the post-Soviet context due to the coincidence of widespread socio-economic crisis, the outbreak of ethnic and civil wars, the simultaneous processes of empire break-up and the birth of ‘new nationalizing states’ in which national minorities find themselves disadvantaged. Thus, a strict categorization of Russian returnees as ‘repatriates’, ‘forced migrants’ or ‘economic migrants’, which are the typologies often suggested, is problematic (Codagnone 1998b: 41). The causes of out-migration of the Russian populations from the former republics reveals: the difficulty in determining a single or predominant cause; the need for a multi-level analysis incorporating both agency and structure; and shows the importance of locating this stage of the migration, i.e. that is the move, within the context of the whole migration and resettlement process.

Theories which attribute the migration movement of Russians back to the Russian Federation to the effects of the wider historical, political and economic structural context identify it as a continuation of a repatriation or decolonization movement which had already begun from the late 1960s (Migratsiia bedstvie ili blago 1996; Messina 1994a; Brubaker 1995; Codagnone 1998b; Vishnevskii and Zaionchkovskaia 1994: 246). The movement is not seen as new, but ‘newly relevant’. It is acknowledged that the political, social and economic environment in which the migration is taking place
has radically changed to cause an intensification and acceleration of the process of ‘repatriation’ (Messina 1994a: 627; Codagnone 1998b: 39, 48; Vishnevskii and Zaionchkovskaia 1994: 249; Zaionchkovskaia 1996: 10). This interpretation places the migration movements of Russians within a wider structural relationship of colonialism that existed between Russia and the former Soviet republics during the Tsarist and Soviet periods and which initially impelled out-migration to the periphery of the ‘empire’. With ‘decolonization’ the migration flows have reversed producing the ‘return’ of the Russian populations.\textsuperscript{14} Although the ‘return’ migration process is labelled as one of continued ‘repatriation’, the distinction is clearly made between the prior voluntary and predominantly socio-economic nature of the movement prior to the break up of the Soviet Union, and the more ‘forced’ and ethnically rooted nature of the migration processes currently underway (Vishnevskii and Zaionchkovskaia 1994: 249; Vitkovskaia 1999: 53)\textsuperscript{15}

Attention to the wider historical and structural causes of migration is essential to understanding the nature of the movement currently taking place. Refugee and forced migration movements are particularly associated with the break up of empires and the formation of new states and the associated social and economic disorder (Zolberg 1989: 416). The ‘pull’ factor of the Russian Federation as a destination point for potential Russian migrants from the former Soviet Union is connected also to the historical and ethnic roots of the original out-migration. A repatriation discourse constructs Russia as the ‘ethnic historical homeland’. Yet, the broad label ‘repatriation’ tends to overlook the diversity of causation of both the present movement, and the original out-migration from centre to periphery, and pays insufficient attention to migrant agency.

Certain theorists have tended to prioritize individual agency in their interpretations of both Soviet and post-Soviet Russian migration movements. In their study of migration patterns within the former Soviet Union, Mitchneck and Plane refute the relevance of repatriation, return migration and forced migration theories for the Russian case,

\textsuperscript{14} The significance of the out-migration of Russians as a part of the structure of the Tsarist and Soviet ‘empires’ is explored in more detail in Chapter 2.

\textsuperscript{15} The presence of a ‘repatriation’ discourse within the development of the Russian migration regime is considered in detail in Chapter 2.
choosing to stress the voluntary, individual and frequently economically rooted nature of both past and present migration movements, which, they claim, may be understood using an analysis of historical trends and standard approaches (Mitchneck and Plane 1995: 19, 27). Rowland and Lewis’s study of Soviet migration (1979) also prioritized the role of the individual, and the economic nature of the majority of migration movements. Rowland continues with this approach in his study of regional migration in the late Soviet period, where he attributes the movement of Russians back to the Russian ‘centre’ of Soviet territory to improved educational and skill levels amongst the titular nationalities rendering Russian ‘labour’ redundant (Rowland 1993: 171). Such interpretations are valuable for their attention to individual agency, however, they tend to ignore the presence of motivations beyond that of economic factors or wider structural causes. As re-interpretations of Soviet migrations have shown (Oberg and Boubnova 1995: 241), and as the analysis of the present movements reveals, a ‘forced’ aspect to the movements was present during the Soviet period, and is a central factor to the movements underway today.

The ‘forced’ nature of the ‘return’ movement has been recognized through legislation, by the introduction of the status of ‘forced migrants’ by the Russian government for those Russian returnees who are able to prove the forced nature of their movement. However, the dominance of the term ‘forced migration’ in Russian political discourse and administrative practice needs to be questioned; in practice only a minority of returnees have experienced ‘immediate force’. The term is seen as too narrow and misleading for analytical purposes (Brubaker 1998: 1048).16 Codagnone has also questioned the forced nature of the migration taking place, and suggests that many of those who receive the status are indeed better defined as ‘repatriates’ (Codagnone 1998b: 45, 47). The discrepancy does not suggest that those ‘repatriates’ who return are not in need of government assistance, or that the severity of their life situation in the former republics was not sufficient to necessitate migration, but rather reveals the difficulties in labelling diverse movements in a uniform way at a policy level.

16 Apart from the case of Tajikistan, and internal to the Russian Federation, from the Chechen Republic, the majority of the movements from the former republics since the mid 1990s have not been from regions where there has been open conflict.
The labels ‘repatriation’, and as Brubaker (1998: 1049) suggests ‘forced migration’, tend to ignore the different ways in which individuals and communities are affected by the changing political and socio-economic environments in the former republics, and to obscure the extent of individual will or choice that is involved in the act of migration. Reasons that influence the decision making process, in fact, may be rooted elsewhere. In attempts to account for rates of out-migration, and predictions of future migration flows, commentators have suggested that greater attention needs to be paid to the specifics of the Russian communities situated in the newly independent states including: the size, concentration and rootedness of the Russian populations and the changes in these variables over time; the geographical location of the settlements of Russian communities in relation to the Russian state and the capital cities of the former republics; the nature of everyday life and the levels of insecurity experienced; and the impact of official nationalizing policies upon communities relative to their overall economic and political position (Schwartz 1993: 39; Brubaker 1998: 1061; Codagnone 1998a: 47).

To more adequately assess the diversity of causation, consideration is required of individual and group concerns as they are manifest within the wider historical, political, economic and social environment. A useful part of such an analysis is an exploration of the intertwining of ethnic and socio-economic motivations at the level of the individual (Pilkington 1998: 16; Vitkovskaia 1999: 54). Within the newly independent states the introduction of official policies concerning the official state language and citizenship rights initiated a process of the institutionalization of ethnic dominance of the titular nationalities over the new minority groups. The response to these official policies at the individual level, and their immediate translation into concrete concerns about future employment, social and political status, education and futures of children, inform the migration decision making process. The movement is inspired by a consideration by the individual of the ‘push’ factors rooted in both ethnic discomfort and socio-economic concerns, and the relative ‘pull’ factors rooted in ‘ethnic’ affinity and socio-economic prospects. It is acknowledged that the push factors are usually more potent than the pull factors. The ethnic affinity is heightened by the experienced ethnic discomfort, and the movement may be undertaken to avoid downward mobility as much as for increased opportunity (Robertson 1996: 124). Migration, however, cannot be an assumed
outcome. The individual consideration of the political, socio-economic, cultural and psychological advantages and disadvantages of movement may result in a decision to stay. The relatively small outflow of Russians from the Baltic Republics, despite the existence of anti-Russian sentiment and language and citizenship legislation, is testimony to this (Brubaker 1998: 1061).

The complex interaction of ethno-political with socio-economic concerns and fears that lead to the decision to move, reflects observations which have been made of the situation in the present global migration environment where the constant interplay of political and economic causal factors can be observed. Economic forces and motivations may be the immediate reason for displacement but the root causes may be political factors shaping the migration process (Suhrke 1995: 203; Held et al. 1999: 303). Within migration research there has been a move towards a position which stresses the similar structural positions of ‘forced’ and ‘voluntary’ migrants (Escalona and Black 1995: 368). Although this move has occurred in some academic literature, it has rarely been adopted at the level of policy-making, where attempts are continually made to make a clear distinction between ‘political’ and ‘economic’ migrants.

The above discussion demonstrates the need for the motivations for migration to be unpacked to reveal how the decision is constructed from, and dependent upon, a wide range of factors. Attention to different levels of analysis – the individual, the group, the state, wider environment – allows the false dichotomy of voluntary and involuntary migration to be broken down, and points to the discrepancy between policy labelling and migrant reality. The exploration of the ethnic and socio-economic motivations is valuable when considering the nature of ‘return’ and the expectations which are held upon ‘return’; and demonstrates how ‘push’ factors in the place of residence, interact with ‘pull’ factors in the Russian Federation. Yet, the presence of push and pull factors does not sufficiently explain the ‘process’ of migration. The theoretical and empirical reach of the study is now broadened to the ‘process’ of migration; the continuation and perpetuation of migration beyond the site of departure to the site of resettlement. The movement of people does not occur in a vacuum but within the migration system, and

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17 A case which brought this question to light was the status determination of Cuban and Haitian refugees in the United States in 1979-1980 (Suhrke 1995: 203).
must be organized and coordinated across time and space, both formally and informally (Held et al. 1999: 285). It is essential to explore the institutions and networks that develop within the migration system and which encompass both the region of departure and the site of resettlement. These institutions and networks may be formal (state) or informal (migrant), and their presence may enable or restrict the possibility for initial migration to take place. The identification and analysis of these key ‘actors’ demonstrates how connections are made with the wider structural environment of the migration system, and how the whole migration process is constructed and, in turn, experienced, and shaped, by the individual migrant.

1.3.2 The site of resettlement and the migration regime

An important element of the structuration project is ‘recognizing the resources through which societies alter or transform the process of migration’ (Wright 1995: 779). A key level of analysis within the current study is the process of institutionalization which has taken place, in reaction to the migration flows in question, and has resulted in the formation of the ‘migration regime’ (Schwarz 1996: 3).18 The migration regime is made up of political and non-political agencies at the local, national, transnational and international level. This has occurred in a distinct and intense way since 1991 within the post-Soviet space as a whole, and on the territory of the Russian Federation. The creation of institutions to ‘manage’ the migration has played a part in defining the nature of the migration taking place, and in shaping responses to the migration. The process of institutionalization has altered the structural environment in which migration movements between the former republics and the Russian Federation occur. On the territory of the Russian Federation the migration regime is in a particularly fluid and formative state, and has been formed largely in response to chaotic and forced types of movement.

A number of key areas require attention when analysing the migration regime and the nature of its relationship with the individual migrant. The migration regime possesses

18 Meznaric (1995) has suggested an analytical framework for analysing the experience of Croatia and the evolution of a migration regime. Some parallels may be drawn with Russia as both countries have similar institutional legacies and no migration structures previously existed. Meznaric stresses the need for research and policy making within the area of refugee studies to be informed by the contextual variables of local situations.
the power to define the nature of the migration movement. The orientation to power is a vital component in the relationship between ‘agency’ and ‘structure’ in migration, permeating individual action and social interaction (Goss and Lindquist 1995: 331; Richmond 1994: 3). The way the movement is perceived by institutional and legislative structures influences the nature of policy making and provision for resettlement. The Russian Federation law ‘On Forced Migrants’ introduced in February 1993 is the main piece of legislation pertaining to Russian returnees. To qualify for the status it is necessary for the individual to prove the forced character of the movement they have undertaken.\(^\text{19}\) The law is the key piece of official legislation which defines those who are of official concern for the Russian government, and for whom responsibility has been accepted. What requires empirical analysis, however, is the ‘discrepancy between official categories contained within legislation and administrative regulations, as interpreted in administrative practice, and as deployed in political rhetoric - and everyday identifications and self-understandings’ and ‘the way agents ‘play’ with official categories’ (Brubaker 1998: 1064).

The label ‘migrant’ or ‘refugee’ categorises people and conveys certain identities (Zetter 1991; Hansen 1996). The status conferred is, to a large extent, a symbol of bureaucratic and political interest, and may be distinct from the prior identity of the migrant and from the present identity s/he is attempting to recreate in the new place of residence. Labelling is a non-participatory process. The official migration regime holds the power to confer an identity to which the displaced person must conform in order to qualify for the associated resources. However, the label’s implications are not just material in impact, they serve to create the space in which the individual exists in the

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\(^{19}\) According to Article 1 of the law ‘On Forced Migrants’, a ‘forced migrant’ is an individual who has citizenship of the Russian Federation and who has, or intends to, leave his/her place of residence on the territory of another state or on the territory of the Russian Federation as a result of violence or other form of persecution towards him/herself or members of his/her family, or who is under real threat of being subjected to persecution towards him/herself or members of his/her family, or who is under real threat of being subjected to persecution on the grounds of his/her race, nationality, religion, language, affiliation to a particular social group or political conviction in connection with the conducting of hostile campaigns towards individual groups of individuals, mass violations of public order or other circumstances significantly restricting human rights’. Point 3 of Article 2 of the Law on Forced Migrants states that persons who may be refused forced migrant status are those ‘leaving their place of residence due to economic causes or owing to hunger, epidemic or extreme situations of a natural or technical character’ (Law of the Russian Federation on Forced Migrants, Sobranie zakonodatel’stva Rossiskoi Federatsii, No. 52, 25 December, 1995, pp. 9317-27).
host society, for example, as part of a government programme of resettlement which positions them in a particular relationship vis à vis the state (Zetter 1991: 54-55).20

The significance of the use of the term ‘forced migrant’ in the Russian Federation, and how it affects those returning, is central to the empirical study. The legislative discourse of ‘forced migration’ positions the returnee in a particular way vis à vis the Russian ‘homeland’. The analysis is taken to the individual level and extended to understand what identity the returnees ascribe to themselves upon ‘return’ – ‘forced migrant’, ‘repatriate’, or other – and how this is distorted and transformed after ‘return’. Of importance is the relevance the migrants attach to the status of ‘forced migrant’, and as Brubaker suggests the way they may ‘play’ with this official category. Evidence of non-registration and of indifference amongst those who receive the status to the benefits and provision it confers, suggests that to many it is of little relevance and is a status they disregard. The role of ‘forced migrant’ given to the individual needs to be separated from, and must be seen to have less meaning than, the personal identities that migrants construct for themselves (Castells 1997: 7).

Another key area when understanding the development of the migration regime is the wider social, economic and political concerns which determine the policy making of the regime. Policy decisions concerning migrants are made based upon certain assumptions which stem from the interpretation of the migration flow and the perceived implications of movement or lack of movement.21 At a global level policy makers are seldom able to deal with the complexity of migrant flows, especially the question of defining the ‘type’ of migrant (Ramakers 1995: 84). Confronted with a high visibility of arrivees migration is often seen as a threat. Government level policy and discourse is influenced by the wider social, economic, political and cultural concerns existing in the Russian Federation in relation to these populations. The current political and economic

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20 In the Russian Federation efforts have been made through government policy to settle the mainly urban population of migrants in rural areas of the territory with the purpose of re-populating these regions and fostering their revival. This is discussed in more detail in Chapters 3, 4 and 7.

21 A comparative study of reception policies of Chilean and Vietnamese refugees in France and Britain demonstrated that how the influx was viewed, as a temporary occurrence or long-term, affected the provision. In this case Britain saw the process as temporary and responded with an ad hoc approach, whereas France interpreted the situation as long term so attempted to create a positive infra-structure (Joy 1995:18)
transitional’ state of the Russian Federation, and the ‘responsibility’ the Russian state feels for the Russian communities in the former republics is key to understanding the development of migration policy (Brubaker 1998: 1064). In the Russian Federation, rather than viewing the process as one of social change and of possible demographic and economic benefit, the dominant approach has been to control and restrict migration flows. The politicisation of the issue of the position of the Russian communities in the ‘near’ abroad, and their possible return, is central to the development and nature of the Russian migration regime. Equally significant have been economic concerns about the capability of state resources to provide for a large influx of migrants. State policies, rather than encouraging the in-migration of co-ethnics, may through their restrictive, limited or ill-suited nature, act as a negative incentive for future migration (Robertson 1996: 125). Thus, the way in which official governmental bodies at both the regional and national levels define the migration flow has long term effects. Political discourse may be repeated in media and popular discourse, and has implications for the construction and perception of the issue within the receiving society as whole.

The receiving government is one provider of information within the migration system. The channels of information which extend between the constituent parts of a migration system are key to its development. Koser (1993) provides an excellent analysis of the role of information in shaping ‘repatriation’ processes. The transfer of information is one medium of connection between the individual migrant and the wider structural environment, is key to individual decision making, and is important in subsequent stages of the migration process. The source and type of information is a

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22 The attitudes of the Russian state towards the Russian communities in the ‘near abroad’, the historical and political nature of this relationship, and the impact for migration and resettlement policy is looked at in more detail in Chapter 2.

23 There are signs of a shift at the government level to recognizing the in-migration of the Russian populations as a possible solution to the demographic ‘crisis’ identified in the Russian Federation. See Chapter 3 for a discussion of this development.

24 Russian and Western commentators have suggested that the continued presence of the communities is seen by the Russian government as a means to maintaining the country’s influence in the ‘near’ abroad, and identify the issue of the Russian speaking population in the ‘near’ abroad as an overtly political one. The development of the political significance of the issue may be traced over the period since the break up of the Soviet Union in 1991. Lidiia Grafova (head of the Coordinating Council of Aid to Refugees and Forced Migrants, and president of the Forum of Migrant Associations) claimed that ‘the fate of our abandoned compatriots is still a card that is being played in various political games’ (1993: 9). Messina states that many observers see Moscow’s hidden agenda as retaining a Russian presence in the republics as a fifth column’ (1994b: 15). This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.
vital factor. For example, if there is a possibility of concrete assistance then migration may be encouraged, however, if knowledge is gained of restrictive or limited policies, then migration may be deterred. The information is supplied by the ‘mediator’. Amongst possible mediators are the home government, another institutional body or the media. Each of these agents has the power to distort the information which the potential returnee receives, depending on their own motivations and interests in the possibility of large-scale migration. The transfer and availability of information is a major component in the way the return movement and resettlement process is framed and experienced. Thus, the individual needs to be aware of distortions and gaps in the information. There is also the possibility of personal information channels opening up as bridges are developed between those individuals who have already migrated and potential returnees. The present study will demonstrate how the presence and absence of information from both official and non-official sources at the site of departure and arrival impacts upon the process of migration and resettlement.

The Russian migration regime must be placed within the context of the wider European and global migration regimes. The inclusion of Russia within the global migration system ensures that actions at the Russian state level are mediated by other connections which transcend state borders, such as required adherence to international agreements and conventions. Equally, within the migration regime, international and domestic non-governmental organizations are operating. These agencies are able to establish both relationships and networks, which may bypass the national government (Held et al. 1999: 67). The attitude of Western governments to the migration situation on the territory of the Russian Federation is equally significant. One of the responses to possible large-scale in-migration from the territory of the former Soviet Union was the participation of Western governments in a conference in 1996 to examine the issues of refugees and migrants across the CIS. One of the main aims of the conference, and the

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25 The presence of incentives and benefits to attract the return of migrants has not always proved to be influential. In return migration to Israel in the 1960’s, migrants have stated that special benefits were not a major factor in deciding to return (Toren 1978).

26 Studies of migration stress that the global context in which the movement of populations is taking place is integral to any analysis of migration movement, where there is a need to link analysis of the global context to the level of a specific case study (Suhkre 1995: 206; Escalona and Black 1995: 384).

27 The extent to which Russia adheres to its international commitments, particularly at the regional level, is explored in Chapters 3 and 4.
subsequent `Programme of Action’, was to enable the national governments of the CIS to develop the institutional and legislative capacities to deal with the population movements and their effects.\textsuperscript{28} However, political self-interest seems to have hindered commitment to the development of new legislation, structures and programmes which would aid the management of the population movements and encourage stability within the post-Soviet space.\textsuperscript{29} The subsequent decline in Western interest and funding is an indication of the fluctuating political significance attached to the issue by the West which has impacted upon the internal development of the national level migration regime within the Russian Federation.\textsuperscript{30}

1.3.3 The individual migrant and the migration system

The present study recognizes that a key level of analysis is the individual migrant, where the individual is an independent actor, capable of strategic action within the migration system. A primary focus for analysis is migrant response to displacement, and contribution to resettlement, an area often neglected in migration and especially refugee literature (Escalona and Black 1995: 379, 383). The empirical research will demonstrate that migrants, displaced from their former ‘homes’, and then confronted with an often hostile and unwelcoming reception in the Russian Federation, are still able to shape the nature of the migration process and subsequent resettlement. As Burawoy states, in an acknowledgement of the Foucauldian shift in social theory to the ‘micro-physics’ of power, the power to influence is not confined to the state, instead it extends throughout society (Burawoy 1999: 306). The migration system contains rules and resources which offer constraints and opportunities for the individual migrant. Individuals act strategically within the system to further their interests, and from a seemingly powerless position may mobilize the resources to secure ‘spaces of control’.

\textsuperscript{28} The full name of the conference was the `Regional conference to address the problems of refugees, displaced persons, and other forms of involuntary displacement and returnees in the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States and relevant neighbouring states’ and was held in Geneva on 30-31 May 1996. The conference was organized by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The aims and achievements of the conference and the Programme of Action are explored in detail in Chapter 3.

\textsuperscript{29} For example, due to the general tightening of asylum provision and immigration laws Western governments and other states resisted the inclusion of a broadened definition of the term `refugee’ at the conference possibly fearing that it might be used as a precedent to challenge the global move towards greater restrictive asylum policies (Helton 1996: 54).

\textsuperscript{30} The role of international humanitarian organizations at both the federal and regional level is explored in Chapters 3, 6 and 7 of the thesis.
Their capacity is determined by their knowledge of rules, or access to resources, which in turn may be partially determined by their position within other social institutions (Goss and Lindquist 1995: 345; Giddens 1984: 25). The process of migration highlights how the social nature of space is something created and reproduced through collective human agency, and reminds us that within the limits imposed by power, existing spatial arrangements are always susceptible to change (Rouse 1991 cited in Lawson 2000: 177).

In accepting that the migrant is an ‘active’ rather than a ‘passive’ social agent in the processes of migration and resettlement, an exploration of the nature of migrant response at both the individual and collective level and how it shapes the nature of the migration system is demanded. However, an understanding of migrant agency must accept that not all migrants are equal in their potential to influence social events. The power which the individual has to act is connected to the specific, hierarchically arranged social positions in which s/he is located (Elias cited in Tucker 1998: 73). In studies of migration, attention has been paid to differentiated positioning according to class and ethnicity, however, gender has often been neglected (Wright 1995: 780). Wright suggests that a ‘structuration’ model, whilst acknowledging the role of migrants, also recognizes the unequal distribution of resources and relational power, along class, gender, and age lines. Some migrants, therefore, possess a greater influence and capacity to promote their interests (Wright 1995: 797).

The study traces the attempts at transferral and re-location of the migrants’ ‘home’ from the former republic to the territory of the Russian Federation through the process of migration (Koser and Lutz 1998: 14; Brah 1996: 180). The migration movement, and subsequent resettlement, impacts upon both the personal identities, and the practical lives of migrants. At the level of personal identity, the influence of past lives, the experience of ‘return’ and the way the identity of the migrant is shaped by, and shapes the perception and reality of resettlement is explored. Associations with a place are unpacked to reveal the combination of emotional and physical factors that determine attachment. Although the tie of ethnicity could be seen to be straightforward, the study reveals the unequal and complex relationship which develops between the returning Russians and the host population despite a ‘common’ ethnicity, and disrupts any idea of...
a straightforward ‘return’ to an ‘ethnic homeland’. The attachments to ‘place’ underlie the practical process of migration and resettlement. The move demands the reconstruction of the physical attachments – housing, jobs, social networks – that the individual possessed in the former place of residence. The possibilities of migrants to regain these attachments, depending upon their access and positioning within the migration system, are explored, as are the strategies which are adopted.

1.3.4 Migrant networks and the migration system

Household or social network approaches to migration identify a level of connection between the individual and surrounding structural environment and provide a method for analysing migrant action and response and interaction with other parts of the migration system. The approaches examine the processes of integration and settlement in the country of destination, and the development of links between the departure region and site of resettlement. The household or social network is understood as a structure which operates to provide housing, employment, food or other requirements. In the case of the network, or association, it may be created to solve a particular purpose (Boyd 1989: 639; Gurak and Caces 1992: 160). The association is usually based upon kinship and friendship ties and is used to facilitate both the process of migration, and integration and resettlement upon arrival, in the absence of concrete government provision. Informal networks made up of family and friends are of central importance in the process of ‘return’ and resettlement of Russian migrants to the Russian Federation. In some instances more formal migrant associations have developed, either in the former republics or after arrival. The growth and influence of both federal and regional level migrant NGOs has been significant and they have become a central actor within the Russian migration regime. The analysis of collective migrant action demonstrates the importance of networks which stretch beyond the local, to the federal and the international. In the absence of sufficient government provision, migrant groups draw upon resources within the wider migration system, for example, the presence of national and international non-governmental structures, which disrupt the borders of the region, or nation, where the individual is located.

Criticisms which have been made of integrative approaches are valuable when analysing the role of the household or network. The models are inclined to idealise the
notions of household/family and community as homogenous and all-inclusive. The choice of the household tends to replace the idea of a rational individual with that of a rational household making calculated decisions and ignores the presence of individual interest. Feminist critiques have accused the approach of ‘gender blindness’ as it tends to assume that collective interest is represented by the male head of the household (Goss and Lindquist 1995: 327-328). 31 In the same way the networks approach has been criticized for its reproduction of the individual at a group level and a lack of analysis of the actual constitution and boundaries of networks (Snowdon 1990: 578; Goss and Lindquist 1995: 330). The present study acknowledges the centrality of the family, and the development of friendship and social networks developing between regions of departure and at the site of development, both between migrants, and with the non-migrant community. However, it is essential to analyse empirically the nature of the relations within these social units, to assess individual perceptions of the role of the household/social network in the resettlement process, and to explore feelings of inclusion or exclusion from the structure. Both the household and network, as the individual, must be articulated within the migration system as a whole.

1.3.5 The power of migrant agency

In the present study the reaction to the Russian state’s migration approach and policy initiatives amongst migrants is a key level of analysis. The absence of a comprehensive resettlement programme hinders migrant resettlement, and distances them from identification with the Russian state. The study addresses the capabilities of migrants to influence the social system around them, and the activity of other agencies. The extent to which the agent has the possibility to change social systems which is allowed within structuration theory has been questioned (Bourdieu cited in Tucker 1998: 71; Layder 1994: 142). Criticisms centre on the lack of attention to the constraining aspects of social systems and the differentiated nature of the distribution of power amongst agents. It has been suggested that power structures, once the products of human actions, have become sedimented in social systems affecting the degree to which agency can mobilize power in subsequent actions. There are instances where action is not possible, and

31 See Wright 1995 and Phizacklea 1998 for a more detailed look at the need for gender awareness in the analysis of migration.
where people instead distance themselves from the rules that they find oppressive (May 1996: 116-117).

However, ‘the distancing from rules’ may be re-interpreted as a strategy of alternative action at the level of the migrant. As Castells suggests, power relations are being transformed, where social actors may maximize the chances of the representation of their interests by playing out strategies in the networks of relationships between various institutions, at various levels of competence (Castells 1998: 347). As wider migration research has demonstrated, despite the increasingly restrictive and controlled environment in which individuals move, migrants are increasingly responding and developing alternative self-strategies to cope with the surrounding regime (Koser and Lutz 1998: 4). Migrants may form other relationships within the migration regime which enable action. Empirical analysis needs to be carried out at the individual and collective migrant level to explore whether migrants gain the capacity to influence the environment around them through direct negotiation with the state, or whether they exclude themselves from the action of the state and develop group strategies, by drawing upon alternative resources and networks of power within the migration regime, to facilitate their priorities of resettlement. In some cases migrants might withdraw from interaction with the surrounding migration regime, and negotiate the migration process, and the re-creation of ‘home’, within personal networks made up of family and friends.32

**Conclusion**

The chapter has introduced the key locales of analysis at which the experience of migrant resettlement is negotiated – individual, household, social network, state

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32 These levels of ‘involvement’ may tentatively be compared to Castells’ discussion of the transformation of identities within his ‘network society’. He suggests the loss of ‘legitimizing’ identities, which existed through attachments to a legitimate government, and institutions and organizations of ‘civil society’, results in the emergence of either communal ‘resistance identities’ which do not communicate with the state except to struggle and negotiate on behalf of their specific interests, or ‘project identities’ which emerge from ‘resistance identities’ with the aim of transforming the social order around them, and resulting in the possible reconstruction of a new civil society, and eventually, a new state (Castells 1997: 355-357)
(regional, national, global). The negotiation takes place within the surrounding migration system. The study traces the development of the migration system, and the shaping of the migration process, by exploring the 'interaction' of human agency and social structure. Chapter 2 explores the historical implications of the nature of the migration process underway and asks whether the 'return' can be understood as one of 'return' to a 'historical homeland'. The analysis moves between the wider historical and contemporary structural environment in which the 'return' is taking place, that of the break-up of a former unitary state and processes of new nation building accompanied by mass political, economic and social upheaval, and the level of the individual migrant. By exploring the notion of the movement being a personal reconstruction of 'home' rather than a collective return to a 'historical homeland' this provides a framework within which individual understandings of the movement to the Russian Federation may be better understood and contributes to the resolution of 'agency' and 'structure'.

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Chapter 2: Exploring concepts of ‘home’ and ‘homeland’ in migrant ‘return’ and resettlement

Introduction

This chapter discusses the way in which ‘home’ and ‘homeland’ might be constructed and experienced by two of the key actors in the migration process – the Russian state, and the individual/collective migrant – through the process of ‘return’ and resettlement. The discussion draws upon the specifics of the wider historical and contemporary environment to inform understandings of how ‘home’ and ‘homeland’ are perceived at these two key levels. The chapter firstly introduces some ideas of the boundaries of ‘home’ and ‘homeland’ relevant to the present study. Secondly, it explores the historical context of the migration to, and position of, the Russian communities in the former republics during the periods of the Tsarist empire and the Soviet Union. This provides a background within which the ‘return’ movement of the populations, and responses to migration and resettlement at the individual and state levels, may be better conceptualized. Thirdly, the way that understandings of ‘home’ and ‘homeland’ may be shaped is explored in the contemporary reality of the Russian communities’ possible migration to the Russian Federation, and their resettlement on that territory. Implicit in this is how the process of migration, and the place of ‘return’, are perceived and experienced at the level of the state and individual. The Russian state, through political discourse, legislative and institution building, constructs the Russian communities in the successor states as being in ‘diaspora’, whilst their ‘return’ movement is labelled as ‘forced migration’. These constructions prevent the territory of the Russian Federation, at a state level, being represented as a real ‘homeland’ to which the communities may ‘return’ and limits the positive response of the Russian state to ‘returnee’ resettlement. The construction of both the ‘return’ movement, and the space of ‘homeland’, therefore, may not correspond to, and in fact often conflicts with, individuals’ own understanding of the migration movement, and their expectations of ‘homeland’. For the individual migrant, the idea of ‘homeland’ must be unpacked into ‘homeland’ and ‘home’, i.e. home/land. The priority upon ‘return’ is a reconstruction of ‘home’ and the
re-establishment of attachments to the new locale that can make a place ‘home’. This is integral to whether that place can represent a wider ‘national homeland’. However, the nature of the confronted ‘homeland’ might impede the re-location of ‘home’, and delay any identification with the wider ‘land’.

2.1 Shifting global boundaries of ‘homeland’ and ‘home’

A ‘generalized condition of homelessness’ has been suggested to describe the situation of many people in the contemporary world (Said 1979: 18 cited in Gupta and Ferguson 1992: 9; Berger 1974 cited in Morley and Robins 1993: 4) This is a condition that is perhaps experienced in its most complete form by refugees, migrants, displaced persons and stateless people (Gupta and Ferguson 1992: 9). Against a background of increased fluidity of movement, and emerging ‘diasporic’ attachments that construct allegiances ‘elsewhere’, absolute and fixed ideas of ‘home’ and ‘homeland’ are increasingly difficult to determine (Morley and Robins 1993: 27, Clifford 1994: 307). Yet, the contested nature and experiences of ‘home’ and ‘homeland’ makes any analysis of them all the more relevant. As Clifford suggests, mobility and the deterritorialization of identity leads to the question of ‘what’ constitutes a native land, and enables the creation of multiple allegiances outside of the ‘nation state’ (Clifford 1994: 307; Clifford 1988 cited in Gupta and Ferguson 1992: 9).1 The present study interrogates both of these questions in relation to the understandings of ‘home’ and ‘homeland’ amongst the returning Russian communities. Firstly, what constitutes a ‘native land’. Secondly, what is the nature of the ‘multiple allegiances’, i.e. what facilitates attachment to a specific territory or place. Through such an interrogation, both the concepts of ‘home’ and ‘homeland’ may be rigorously unpacked.

‘Homeland’, and to a lesser extent ‘home’, are both territorializing metaphors, which suggest something to which one is ‘naturally tied’ (Anderson 1983 cited in Malkki 1992: 26). The movement of the ethnic Russian and Russian speaking populations back

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1 Malkki notes that accepting a generalized condition of homelessness does not negate the importance of place in the construction of identities, instead ‘deterritorialization’ and identity are intimately linked (1992: 37-38)
to the Russian Federation is particularly useful for investigating such ideas of ‘home nation/homeland’ as it represents a ‘return’ movement to an ‘ethnic homeland’. Therefore, the example could be adopted as a case to reinforce ideas of a primordial attachment to a bounded territory – the fusion of blood and land – yet a ‘natural’ attachment to an ethnic homeland cannot be assumed. When considering ‘return’ migration movements, Stepputat (1994) suggests the adoption of a more transnational perspective that does not presume the natural attachment of people to certain territories. As earlier studies of identity formation amongst Russian speaking forced migrants have shown, the centrality of ‘ethnicity’ to understandings of ‘homeland’ is problematized by the ideas of native land amongst the Russian migrants themselves, since migrants do not necessarily identify their ‘homeland’ as the ‘historical homeland’ – Russia (Pilkington 1998b: 99; Drought 2000: 336). The present study accepts the importance of ethnicity as one of the central strands in understanding the movements of the Russian speaking populations, however, as Pilkington suggests, ‘blood and earth do not necessarily have to be fused for territory to have significance’ (ibid: 100). ‘Homeland’ for the individual migrant is frequently not associated with the ‘ethnic’ homeland. What is sought is an understanding of the other attachments to a territory which cause this territory to ‘have significance’, as a ‘home’ or ‘homeland’.

Investigation of the ambiguous concept of ‘homeland’ at the individual level, uncovers an equally complex notion of ‘home’. Nevertheless, the process of unpacking what constitutes ‘home’ serves to clarify what constitutes the wider ‘homeland’. If the roots established at the location of ‘home’ and ‘homeland’ are recognized as being in a state of flux, and not necessarily ‘rooted’ in one place (Malkki 1992: 37), then it is possible to see ‘home’ and ‘homeland’ as being transferable and able to be established in different locations through a process of migration. An important area which is explored on a conceptual level in this chapter, and empirically further in the study, are the different locations and levels of ‘home’ for the individual. Brah suggests two meanings of ‘home’: (i) ‘an invocation of narratives of the ‘nation’ or (ii) ‘home as a site of everyday lived experience’ (Brah 1996: 3). This dichotomy is useful in the present

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2 Tuan suggests two similar levels of ‘homeland’ and ‘home’ with specific reference to China. T’ien, as the formal, imperial core of Chinese civilization, and Tu as the soil, locality, homestead, hearth – location
study. The 'returnee' can be seen to have suffered the loss of both – the wider 'homeland' of the Soviet Union or national republic and the immediate surroundings of their physical 'home' in the former republic. With 'return' and resettlement a process of re-negotiation of both 'homeland' and 'home' is undertaken. Although displacement and a loss of a 'home' and 'homeland' is acknowledged, the individual desire for re-location and a re-creation of 'home' on the part of the individual is prioritized. The desire for re-location, however, may not be rooted in a wish for a distinct 'homeland', but rather in a 'homing desire' – the need to 'feel at home' in the new location (ibid: 197). The analysis therefore moves between the levels of constructions of a national 'homeland' and that of a more immediately experienced and located 'home'.

2.2 Historical contexts: the migration and settlement of the Russian populations

2.2.1 The movement towards the periphery prior to 1917

Although the Russian Empire was not formally established until 1721, the birth of a multi-national Russian empire, the beginnings of rapid territorial Russian expansion, and the significant movement of Russians beyond the borders of what is the present day Russian Federation, may be traced to the conquest of Kazan in 1552 (Levita and Loiberg 1994: 3; Dixon 1996: 50; Kolstoe 1995: 14; Melvin 1998: 29). The nature of the migration taking place, the causes of the migration, and the role of the settler communities in the peripheral regions of the empire, influenced the development of the character of the Russian communities outside of the present borders of Russia, and their identity and relationship vis à vis the Russian state.

The territorial expansion of the Tsarist empire was accompanied by the out-migration of increasingly large numbers of Russians from the centre of the empire to the outlying borderlands, whose settlement became a key factor in the consolidation of the power of

_of childhood experiences, local customs and practices, and the unique qualities of 'place' (Tuan 1996: 15).
Migratory movements were caused by a combination of factors: demographic pressure within European Russia, individual desire for economic improvement and religious or political freedom, and state policies which encouraged migration (Melvin 1998: 30; Kolstoe 1995: 14-39). To understand the nature of the migratory movements it is useful to explore whether the migration was determined more by state policies or individual will. During the period of the Russian empire, policies concerning migration both encouraged and restricted movement depending upon priorities and concerns at the government level. The migration of Russian settlers was promoted to increase security and to raise the material and cultural levels of the populations in the border regions of the empire. However, the existence of serfdom impeded free movement, and even after its abolition in 1861, migration was still controlled through a state policy that branded ‘irregular’, spontaneous migration as a punishable offence. During earlier periods the state restricted migration, when it feared it would lead to revolutionary feelings. Later it promoted migration as a method to dilute revolutionary ferment. In the late nineteenth century a more active state policy to encourage migration was pursued due to increased demographic pressure in European Russia when incentives were offered for individuals to settle in the border areas of the empire. The state, therefore, played an active role in managing and controlling migration. Yet, as in other parts of Europe, the prospect for the individual of increased economic opportunities and free land played an important part in the large scale out-migration. Although state policy legitimised the migration taking place, these processes were often already underway (Kolstoe 1995: 18-39; Messina 1994a: 621).

Whatever the primary cause of the movement, the presence of the Russian settlers in the border regions played a central role in the expansion of the Russian state and provided a means of unifying a diverse empire (Melvin 1998: 30). The migration and settlement of Russians enabled the imposition of political control and the introduction of a distinct Russian culture to the outer borderlands. During the later nineteenth century, policies of russification increased. Yet, although Russian identity was central to the expansion of the imperial order, the priority was the consolidation of the ‘empire-state’ rather than

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3 As a percentage of the whole Russian population, the numbers of Russians in the territories of the later Soviet republics rose from 0.1 per cent in the eighteenth century, to 1.9 per cent in 1897. Migration was a significant factor in this growth (Kolstoe 1995: 15).
the development of a Russian ‘nation’ (Hosking cited in Dixon 1996: 52; Melvin 1998: 28-30). Policies of russification, despite the imposition of the Russian language, did not have an ethnic focus, but were an attempt to generate identification of the minority communities with the tsarist system and inclusion within a broad civic Russian national identity (Melvin 1998: 30). A Russian empire where a commitment to the Russian ‘state’ displaced a commitment to a ‘nation’ or ‘homeland’ (rodina) impeded the development of an ethnic Russian national identity or politicized Russian ethnic consciousness (ibid: 29). The continued ‘fusion’ of Russian identity with the colonial state rather than with a Russian nation state would be significant in the constitution of the later Soviet ‘empire’.

2.2.2 Russian migration and settlement under the Soviet regime

The Soviet period saw the continued out-migration of Russians from the central Russian republic to the other ethno-republics of the Union. Between 1897 and 1970 the Russian population outside the area of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) increased by more than 15 million. Migration was the main reason for the increase (Kolstoe 1995: 46). The out-migration is identified as a continuation of the already established migratory processes which had been underway since the sixteenth century, and were to continue to the 1960s, when a significant reverse movement was first apparent (Messina 1994a: 620; Kolstoe 1995: 48). However, there was a change in the nature and intensity of the migratory movements. During the period of the Tsarist Empire the flows had been predominantly rural to rural; from the late 1920s they shifted to being overwhelmingly rural to urban, and a distinct acceleration of the migration took place (Messina 1994a: 622; Mitchneck and Plane 1995: 20; Kolstoe 1995: 49). A number of factors during the Soviet period influenced and stimulated migratory movements of Russians including the Soviet industrialization drive and urbanization, the collectivization of the rural economy which led to famine and rapid out-migration from the countryside, the Second World War and the movement of large industrial enterprises to the east, and the 1959-1970 campaign to develop the virgin lands in Kazakstan.

There has been much debate concerning the specific underlying causes of the mass movement of Russians to the non-Russian republics of the Soviet Union. Two principal
theories exist: a socio-economic model that places the movements within wider processes of modernization; and an ethno-political model that prioritizes the role of the state and the desire for either ‘russification’ of the populations in the other republics or the promotion of migration as part of a ‘transcendence of nationality’ to result in the creation of a ‘de-nationalized’ Soviet man (Kolstoe 1995: 52). Both models have come under criticism: the former for ignoring the ethnic, and sometimes forced, nature of the mass migration of many different nationalities in the Soviet Union, and the latter for its assumption that the state could control phenomena on such a scale. Furthermore, the actual impact of migration on nationality relations and processes of ‘russification’ in the former republics may be questioned (Kolstoe 1995: 58, 61; Aasland 1996: 483). The debate touches on whether it is the individual, or other wider structural and institutional factors, that are key in determining movement. State policies were employed to encourage migration, whether for political or economic reasons, although movement was also highly restricted by the state through the operation of the internal passport system. Yet, in spite of the state promotion and restriction of migration, there is also evidence of large scale, spontaneous movement rooted in individual volition (Messina 1994a: 623; Schwarz 1996: 2). As Kolstoe suggests, both models provide important insights into the nature of the movements, and whether influenced predominantly by the specific ethno-political motivations of the state, or by wider processes of economic development and modernization, the migration of the Russians was central to the Soviet agricultural and industrial drives and the consolidation of territory (1995: 53).

Of relevance to the present study is the suggestion that the nature of the migration taking place, and its underlying purpose, impacts upon the contemporary situation and identity of the Russian communities in the former republics, and on perceptions of them amongst the titular populations, specifically in the post-Soviet period, as either ‘agents’ or ‘victims’ of the Soviet ‘empire’ (Brubaker 1993 cited in Kolstoe 1995: 13; Kolstoe 1995: 53). The difficulty in defining a single underlying cause for the migration is acknowledged. Nevertheless, an exploration of the position of the Russian communities in the non-Russian republics, and their role in the process of Soviet nation building, provides a fuller picture of the nature of the migration and settlement which took place. The exploration also informs an understanding of the relationship of the Russian communities during the Soviet period vis à vis their physical ‘homeland’ – the former
republic, their ‘ethnic’ ‘homeland’ – the Russian republic, and the wider territorial ‘homeland’ – the Soviet Union. This provides a base for comprehending the impact of the break up of the unitary state in 1991 on the Russian communities, their changing situation and identity, and the significance of their possible ‘return’ to the Russian Federation.

The role of the Russian communities in the non-Russian republics during the period of the Soviet Union reflects some of the ambiguities of their position during the time of the Tsarist empire. The ambiguities are rooted in the close association of Russians with the ‘imperial’ power, that was now the Soviet state and dominant Communist ideology. The issue has been widely debated by Soviet, Russian and Western scholars and there is little doubt that the Russians occupied a privileged position within the Soviet Union. Russians occupied top posts in the state and party apparatus at both the central and republic level and enjoyed both linguistic and cultural privileges which other non-titular groups did not possess (Levita and Loiberg 1994: 11; Kolstoe 1995: 102). During the Stalinist period, Russian superiority was promoted and Stalin declared the Russians to be ‘the guiding force of the Soviet Union’ (Dixon 1996: 55). The Russian populations were concentrated in the major industrial cities and administrative centres of the Soviet republics where they enjoyed a higher standard of living and professional status than that of the indigenous populations (Abdulatipov 1994: 39; Kolstoe 1995: 85). Although their position of superiority lessened towards the end of the Soviet era as educational and employment advances were made by the titular populations, the Russian populations were still seen as the ‘glue’ which held the Soviet Union together and were often perceived by the titular nations as representatives of the Soviet ‘empire’ (Payin 1994: 25; Kolstoe 1995: 99).

The state sponsored nature of the Russian migration to the Soviet borderlands, and the subsequent position of political, linguistic and cultural security and dominance the Russian communities occupied within the structures of the Soviet state, impacted upon their own sense of Russian identity and their self-perceptions of what territory represented their ‘national homeland’. The specific role the Russians had occupied in the Tsarist empire, which continued during the Soviet period, ensured the strengthening of the Soviet state and its institutions, but at the same time impeded the development of
a distinct Russian ethnic and national identity (Melvin 1998: 29; Zevelev 1996: 267). The Soviet Union was never organized as a Russian nation-state despite the dominance of the Russian nation within it; an imperial nation was rather substituted by an imperial party (Brubaker 1994: 51; Levita and Loiberg 1994: 16). In the other ethno-republics of the Soviet Union, national identity was organized on the basis of territoriality, and defined through the creation of national institutions (Castells 1998: 46). This did not occur with the Russian republic, or Russian 'national identity'. The lack of national institutions within the Russian republic impeded the development of the Russian republic as a central 'national homeland' for the Russian communities (Szporluk 1994 cited in Smith 1999: 506). The lack of this 'homeland', and the unique position of the Russian populations within the Union, meant that rather than an identification with their 'native land' – the Russian republic, they more frequently thought of the entire Union as their 'national homeland' (Brubaker 1994: 68). A study conducted in the late 1980s showed that in contrast to members of the titular nations who mostly referred to their republics as their 'homeland', seventy percent of Russians in Estonia, Uzbekistan, Georgia and Moldova named the Soviet Union as their 'homeland' (Payin 1994: 22).

2.2.3 The Russian communities in the post-Soviet space – the emergence of a Russian 'diaspora'? An understanding of the position of the Russians populations in the non-Russian republics during the period of the Soviet Union, demonstrates how rather than them possessing a distinct 'ethnic' identity, they developed a social and cultural identity, rooted in their position within the Soviet political and economic system (Melvin 1998: 34). The distinctiveness of this identity, and its implications, are important for understanding the position of the Russian communities in the former republics after the break up of the Soviet Union, the relationship existing between them and the Russian state, and their experience of 'return'.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, had impacted upon the situation of the Russian populations possibly more than any other nationality group. The communities were no longer representatives of the 'imperial' power and had become 'ethnic minorities' overnight, their previous wider 'homeland' – the Soviet Union – was now defunct and they were located outside of what was technically their 'ethnic homeland' –
the newly formed Russian Federation — but which for many was a highly ambiguous and unknown concept (Smith 1999: 506). Apart from their own self-identity which was in a state of re-definition, both the host nations of the newly independent states, and the government of their ethnic ‘homeland’, the Russian Federation, were re-defining their national identities. In the newly independent states, government level policies would threaten the previously dominant position of the settler communities, whilst at the popular level the settlers were increasingly branded as ‘occupiers’ and representatives of a now compromised former colonial power (Abdulatipov 1994: 40). The Russian Federation, meanwhile, had emerged as an independent state following the collapse of the Soviet Union, but not necessarily as a Russian ‘homeland’ (Melvin 1998: 35). As part of the search for a new national identity, the Russian government would attempt to re-define the relationship of the settler communities to the Russian state and nation, which had been severed with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The question of the position of the Russian communities in the former republics, and their possible ‘return’ to their ‘historical homeland’, thus became crucial both on the individual, personal and the state, political level.

The location of the Russian communities outside the borders of the Russian state, from 1991, has led to tentative suggestions that the communities may constitute a new Russian ‘diaspora’. In fact, it was in the late 1970s that an interest first developed in the specific identity of the Russian populations located beyond the borders of the Russian republic, as distinct from the core group of ‘central’ Russians.  

This identity was seen as rooted in the nature of the position the ‘peripheral’ Russians occupied during the Soviet Union, the experience of living in another cultural environment, and the adoption of traditions and customs of the nationalities living in the republic (Kolstoe 1996: 614). The proposal of the term ‘diaspora’ was to move from being purely figurative to gain wider political, and academic, significance after the break up of the Soviet Union. Although the use of the term to describe the Russian communities in the ‘near abroad’ is contested, an interrogation of its usage can serve to question the

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4 A colloquium was held in 1978 on ‘Ethnic Russia Today: Undergoing Identity Crisis’ organized at Columbia University, New York, which discussed the nature of the communities of Russians resident in the non-Russian republics of the Soviet Union and their possible identification as a ‘diaspora’ (Kolstoe 1995: 3).
relationship of the Russian ‘diaspora’ to the former republic, and the Russian Federation, on both an empirical and theoretical level.5

On an empirical level, the term has been widely adopted in post-Soviet Russia by politicians and the media, but is often used in an indiscriminate and insufficiently analytical way (Kolstoe 1995: 262-263; Kosmarskaia 1998a: 76). However, the Russian communities have been an object of ‘diasporization’ via these different discourses. The present study addresses the process of political ‘diasporization’ of the Russian communities in the former republics, and the implications this has for the construction of the Russian Federation as ‘homeland’. On a theoretical level the question of the applicability of the term ‘diaspora’ to the case of the Russian populations in the ‘near abroad’ has received considerable attention in western and Russian academic literature.6 It is difficult to locate the Russian ‘diaspora’ within the frameworks that traditional understandings of the concept offer. However, as the central pillar of diasporic identity is the question of the relationship to ‘homeland’, the majority of the studies critically and usefully address the emerging relationship of the Russian ‘diaspora’ resident in the former republics to the Russian state/homeland. Although the present study does not engage with this particular debate in detail, it draws upon critiques of traditional notions of ‘diaspora’ and their interrogation of the idea of a single ‘homeland’. As Clifford states, ‘the empowering paradox of diaspora is that dwelling here assumes a solidarity and connection ‘there’. But ‘there’ is not necessarily a single place or exclusivist nation’ (1994: 321). This breaking down of the concept of ‘homeland’ is useful for understanding the connections the Russian communities retain in their former ‘homeland’ after migration, and the significance of these connections to the relationship they form with the present Russian ‘homeland’ upon ‘return’.7

5 For a more detailed analysis of the application of the term ‘diaspora’ to the Russian communities in the ‘near abroad’ and to communities upon ‘return’ see Pilkington and Flynn 2001.
7 The idea of the returning Russian communities being a ‘diaspora in diaspora’ is dealt with at length in Pilkington and Flynn 2001.
2.3 State conceptions of ‘home’ and ‘homeland’

The nature of the relationship between the Russian state and the Russian communities in the 'near abroad' is therefore an issue of both political and theoretical debate. Of significance for the present study is the way in which this relationship impacts upon the response of the Russian state to the 'return' of these populations, and how, at the state level, a 'homeland' is constructed. The nature of a 'return' migration movement is influenced by key actors who hold varying degrees of power to shape the nature of the space of 'return' and the identities of those involved in the process of 'return' (Stepputat 1994: 177). As identified in Chapter 1, a key actor involved in defining migration movement and resettlement experience is the 'host' nation and particularly the government of the 'host' nation. Since 1991 a dual policy has emerged on the part of the Russian government towards the Russian communities. One side of the policy upholds the right of the communities to remain in the former republics and constructs them as part of the Russian nation, but in 'diaspora' from the Russian state. The other side of the policy accepts the 'return' and resettlement of the Russian communities on the territory of the Russian Federation, but positions them as 'forced migrants' within the Russian state. The development of the dual policy has been located within a wider negotiation by the Russian state of its relationship to the Russian communities, the successor states, and its own re-negotiation of ideas of Russian nationhood.

2.3.1 The location of ‘homeland’ in the newly independent states

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Russian state has gradually developed its policy towards the Russian communities resident in the former republics. The development of the policy has gone through a number of stages which, along with the mechanisms and implementation of the policy, are looked at in more detail in Chapter 3. The present chapter concentrates upon how the policy illustrates the Russian state’s conception of its relationship with the Russian communities, and whether the Russian Federation is constructed as a 'homeland' for the communities through the policy.
Diaspora discourse

The state’s relationship to the communities located in the successor states has undergone a process of redefinition over the period 1991-2000 but is still under negotiation. The development of the policy took place against the background of a political battle between competing post-Soviet Russian elites over the future nature of the Russian state and nation, and its redefinition at both the regional FSU and global levels (Melvin 1998: 36). In 1991 post-Soviet Russia was faced with a ‘non-coincidence’ of state and nation (Pilkington 1998b: 100). Due to the role of the Russian centre and the out-migration of its populations during the Tsarist Empire and the Soviet Union, the legacy the Russian Federation inherited was a country whose national self-understanding spread beyond its present day territorial and institutional borders (Brubaker 1994: 70). Different opinions were held at both a political and popular level concerning what should, territorially and ‘spiritually’, constitute the Russian nation. The Russian communities located beyond the borders of the Russian Federation became a logical focus for the debate. Over the period of the 1990s the need to re-establish links between Russia and its ‘compatriots’, and in fact for Russia to protect these communities, became gradually accepted (Melvin 1998: 36, 46).

In 1991, the Russian government was looking in the direction of the west to develop its foreign policy and standing on the international stage. Russia wished to develop a relationship of cooperation with the former republics of the Soviet Union, and to further this relationship, supported the ethnic Russian and Russian speaking communities becoming citizens of the those states. The liberal approach, however, was shortlived, and was replaced by increased concern about the position of the Russian communities in the Soviet successor states, and Russia’s responsibility for them. A more aggressive stance was championed by neo-nationalist and neo-Soviet forces who promoted the expansion and strengthening of a Russian state to bind together the Russian people as one. Democratic statist forces combined the ‘return to empire’ stance with the previously more liberal approach. A domestic political consensus was reached that recognized the physical boundaries of the new Russia, but upheld the idea that the Russian state was organically linked to the settler communities, and bore responsibility for their well being (Melvin 1998: 37; Smith 1999: 507). The consensus led to the development of a series of policy initiatives from 1993 in relation to the communities,
and culminated in the final passing of a Law ‘On the state policy of the Russian Federation regarding compatriots abroad’ in March 1999 (see Chapter 3). The legislation has had little actual impact. Of significance, however, is that over the period the gradual political ‘diasporization’ of the Russian communities in the successor states, the re-definition of the ‘boundaries’ of the Russian state and nation, and the clarification of what constitutes the Russian ‘diaspora’ for whom Russia has responsibility, took place.

The policy of the Russian government has continued the attachment of the Russian state to the Russian communities beyond the borders of the Russian Federation. However, rather than the attachment being rooted in an ‘ethnic’ identification, it is located within a broader identification with the Russian state. This is connected with the definition of who constitutes the diaspora. Although the Russian Federation is talked about as the istoricheskaia rodina (historical homeland), the term used in relation to those within the ‘diaspora’ is sootechestvenniki (compatriots) and does not confine the ‘diaspora’ to ethnic Russians (russkie) or the Russian speaking populations (russkoiazichnie). The term sootechestvenniki is itself ambiguous. It is commonly taken to include those who may not hold Russian citizenship, but who have hereditary links with Russia or the FSU, and who possess cultural and spiritual links with Russia. The core of the term sootechestvenniki is otechestvo (fatherland), that is a political rather than an ethnic concept (Kolstoe 1995: 261). This Russian ‘diaspora’ is included as a constituent part of the Russian nation and the territory of the Russian Federation has been established as a possible ‘homeland’. The prioritization of a ‘civic’ as opposed to an ‘ethnic’ basis for the Russian ‘diaspora’ links the diaspora to the Russian state, rather than to the Russian nation, and restores the historical-political element that had previously defined the Russian communities’ relationship to the Russian state (Melvin 1998: 36-38). It also deflects attention away from the ‘ethnic’ axis of ‘homeland’ usually contained in definitions of diaspora, and, to an extent, more successfully characterizes the relationship that might exist between the Russian communities and the Russian Federation.

The ‘diasporization’ of the settler communities clearly establishes the right and responsibility of the Russian state to be concerned about the Russian communities, and
locates them centrally within the process of developing a Russian national identity (Smith 1999: 508). It demonstrates a continuity with the past in its attempt to restore the idea of a larger homeland for these communities. Yet, it seems to be a removed or virtual ‘homeland’ for the settler communities, and the reality of ‘return’ for the ‘diaspora’ is not as firmly established. A ‘home’ is constructed for the communities in the successor states, alongside a spiritual, cultural, and historical attachment to a ‘homeland’ in the form of the Russian Federation. The ‘diasporization’ of the Russian communities at the level of political discourse, does not necessarily result in the development of a ‘diasporic’ identity amongst the Russian populations in the ‘near abroad’. The identities of the Russian communities are influenced by the actions of the governments and populations within the newly independent states, their ideas concerning the place of the Russian communities within their new national ‘homelands’, the nature of the settler communities themselves, the form of their historical settlement in the former republics, \(^8\) and the subsequent way in which the communities are presently re-defining their own sense of place within their territorial ‘homeland’ (Melvin 1998: 48).

2.3.2 The location of ‘homeland’ on the territory of the Russian Federation?

Forced Migration discourse

The second strand of the dual policy that shapes the nature of the ‘return’ of the Russian communities is embodied in the migration policy of the Russian government and specifically the legislation on ‘forced migrants’. \(^9\) The Russian Federation law on forced migrants applies only to Russian citizens or those entitled to citizenship. \(^10\) Forced migrant status distinguishes ‘Russian forced migrants’ from those ‘non-Russian forced

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\(^8\) Russian communities vary between, and even within, the former republics by socio-economic origin, length of time in the republic, and degree of integration into the host community. The ethnic identity of the settlement communities is also complex, although Russians formed the nucleus of the settlement communities, the ethnic make-up depended upon the region of settlement and always included Ukrainians and Belorussians alongside the Russians (Melvin 1998: 33).

\(^9\) The development of Russian migration policy, and the content and implementation of migration legislation is examined in detail in Chapter 3.

\(^10\) The February 1992 law on Citizenship states that any resident of the Former Soviet Union is entitled to Russian citizenship if they apply before the end of the year 2000. The possibility of extending the period of the 1992 law to 2006 is currently under discussion in the Russian Federal Duma. If the measure is not extended CIS citizens will have to follow the same naturalization procedures as anyone else hoping to become a Russian citizen (RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 5, No. 21, Part 1, 31 January 2001).
migrants' who may apply for refugee status. To obtain forced migrant status the law requires the proof of experience of violence or persecution. If economic reasons are identified as the reasons for migration then the status is denied. In one sense the creation of a forced migrant law has responded to the perceived nature of the movements going on, and has recognized the impact of nationalizing policies and ethnic discrimination upon the Russian communities within the newly independent states. However, there is a lack of recognition, at a legislative level, of the possibility of a voluntary 'repatriation' of the Russian 'diaspora' shown by the complete absence of alternative legislation or programmes for 'voluntary' returnees. The implication of the forced migrant law is that the movement would not be taking place if conditions were different, i.e. were not 'forcing' movement out of the former republics (Codagnone 1998a: 26). Yet, as shown in Chapter 1, the close interplay of political, economic, social, and cultural forces affecting the decision making of the potential migrant renders it difficult to define a predominant cause of migration.

The lack of any alternative legislation contradicts to an extent the Russian state policy of 'diasporization'. The political 'diasporization' of the Russian communities constructs the Russian Federation as the natural/historical 'homeland' of these communities, yet the right of the 'diaspora' to return to this 'homeland', with the assistance of the state, is limited to those returnees able to prove they were 'forced' to move. Subsequently, how migration legislation and associated migration programmes shape the 'return' of those recognized by the 'homeland' state as 'forced migrants' impacts upon individual experiences of resettlement. As suggested in Chapter 1, government policy often attempts to shape resettlement to meet wider political and economic priorities. However, as studies of 'return' migration movements in other regions of the world demonstrate, government resettlement programmes may fulfil the desires of policy makers, but fail to meet the expectations and needs of those actually

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11 See Chapter 1, Footnote 19, for the stipulations of the Law on Forced Migrants concerning the nature of the movement.

12 This is in contrast to repatriation programmes which exist for Russian Jews returning to Israel, and ethnic German Russians returning to Germany. Claims have been made that the 1992 Citizenship Law created the conditions for the voluntary 'repatriation' of people who were not claiming forced migrant status (Migratsiia bedstvie ili blago 1996: 35).
experiencing the process of ‘return’ and resettlement. The contradiction between government programmes and the requirements of the migrant populations is brought out throughout the study. One example of misconceived policy may be given here. A policy of resettlement of migrants in rural and depressed regions of the Russian Federation, as part of an attempt to achieve the repopulation and regeneration of these regions has been central to government resettlement policy. The policy is a demonstration of the wider priorities of the government, and their perception of what role the returning communities could play in the economic revival and redevelopment of the Russian Federation. Yet, the policy fails to address the specific make-up of the migrant population which is predominantly urban, with a high proportion of highly educated and qualified specialists. Instead of facilitating resettlement, the lack of an urban environment and infrastructure, unfamiliar surroundings, and unsuitable employment, hinders the recreation of the kind of attachments to place that characterized the migrants' lives in the former republics.

**Repatriation discourse**

The lack of alternative legislation to allow the voluntary return of the Russian communities to the Russian Federation was identified by certain actors during the development of the policy towards the Russian communities in the ‘near abroad’ and their possible ‘return’. During 1996-1997 ‘repatriation’ entered the mainstream migration debate, and calls were made for the introduction of a ‘repatriation’ law. Amongst its main advocates were representatives of the democratic camp and the growing non-governmental sector. A bill on repatriation was proposed by the State Committee on the Affairs of the CIS and Relations with Compatriots with significant input from the non-governmental sphere. The bill was set within a wider draft law on support for the Russian diaspora and the protection of Russian compatriots and repatriates. The bill suggested a shift away from ‘forced migration’ as the central

13 For example, in a study of the return of the Mayan diaspora to Guatemala, the government wished the returnees to fit into the ‘national space’ through their resettlement in villages within the territory. However, the refugees wished to resettle in a number of segregated returnee communities (Stepputat 1994: 177).

14 The limited success of the rural resettlement of urban migrants is illustrated in Chapter 7.

15 For a more in-depth discussion of the development of a repatriation discourse within the Russian migration regime see Pilkington and Flynn 1999.
concept of the legislative framework in an attempt to establish a fundamental right to return irrespective of the reason for departure for citizens of the Russian Federation and Russian compatriots - sootechestvenniki. The draft bill tried to bridge the artificially created gap between economic or political migrants by instilling the ‘right’ to return, and not concentrating on the reason for departure. The NGOs promoting a repatriation bill were also attempting to increase aid to a larger number of migrants in the face of the increasingly restrictive attitude of the Russian state, and to re-frame the ‘return’ as a positive movement where the returning migrants would be seen as a beneficial population influx who could help rebuild the Russian nation. Despite support from certain sectors of the government, there was no legislative outcome and a ‘repatriation’ discourse faded from the migration agenda.

Nevertheless, the ‘repatriation’ debate is significant for its attempt to re-frame the nature of the possible ‘return’ of the Russian communities to the Russian Federation, the relationship between the Russian state and the Russian communities and the understanding of what is the ‘homeland’ of the communities. The discourse recognizes the need for a distinction between the different types of migration that inevitably occur with the collapse of a multi-national empire. Repatriation discourse reflects the widespread interpretation by western and Russian academics, and some Russian non-governmental and governmental experts, of the migration processes going on between the Russian Federation and the ‘near abroad’ as a continuation of those which began before the break up of the Soviet Union (see Chapter 1 and Migratsiia bedstvie ili blago 1996; Messina 1994a; Brubaker 1995; Codagnone 1998b; Grafova 1995). With the change in circumstances, the inevitability of repatriation has been exposed, and its speed and intensity increased (Grafova 1995: 8). If the ‘repatriation’ discourse had been accepted, the movement of the Russian communities would have been legislatively re-framed as the official ‘return’ to homeland, rather than a forced movement away from a territorial, but not according to the ‘diasporization’ policy, ‘historical’ homeland. The lack of a programme of repatriation reflects the economic and political priorities of the state. The communities may be identified as a ‘diaspora’

16 The ‘return’ of the Russian communities to the Russian Federation has been compared to other cases of post-colonial ‘repatriation’, including that of the return of the pieds noirs from French Algeria in 1962 (Brubaker 1995: 210; Grafova 1995: 6).
whilst outside of the Russian Federation, but their ‘return’, at a legal and institutional level, is not encouraged by the Russian state with an open invitation to settle in a ‘historical homeland’ eager to receive them.

However, as forced migration discourse assumes that migrants would not have moved without the changes in their wider environment, an interpretation of the movement of Russians back to the Russian Federation rooted in a repatriation discourse tends to assume that the individuals returning would have done so in spite of the changes in their environment. How many of the returning migrants would have chosen to move if they had not suffered discrimination is open to debate.\(^\text{17}\) Like the policy of ‘diasporization’ of the Russian communities, ‘repatriation’ is an attempt to include the movement of Russians within the wider development of the Russian nation and its emerging national identity. Repatriation tends to assume an unproblematic collective view of Russia as a natural ‘homeland’.\(^\text{18}\) Absent from the debate is consideration of those who wish to remain, many of whom regard their former places of residence as their home and do not feel a ‘natural’ attachment to Russia. The gaps in the debate highlight the need to move away from state constructed discourse concerning the migration process, to the understandings of the process amongst individual migrants. Only attention at this level of analysis can reveal the existence of the multiple attachments to the territory of the former republics which made this place both ‘homeland’ and ‘home’.

Government policy towards the ‘return’ and resettlement of the Russian populations demonstrates the ability of key actors to frame a potential migrant population and their arrival, in a particular way. Discourse and policy at the state level determines the way in which the ‘return’ process is constructed and how it may affect the experience at the individual level. The ‘diasporization’ of the Russian communities in the successor states established a connection between the Russian state and the individual

\(^{17}\) In Chapter 7, empirical data from migrant interviews shows that the majority of migrants had never considered, or thought about, a move back to Russia until the wider circumstances of their lives in the former republics underwent a significant change.

\(^{18}\) The process of defining ‘repatriation’ in wider migration literature has been found to be problematic, as it tends to imply a return to ‘home’ rather than just to a country of origin, and the existence of a natural identity between people and physical places (Warner 1994: 162; Stepputat 1994: 176).
populations, however the ‘homeland’ created for these populations is removed from the lived experience of their immediate reality. In addition, the individuals themselves may not feel an attachment to the Russian state, or Russian territory. The construction of policy towards the ‘return’ and resettlement of those who choose to migrate does not necessarily reflect the reality and needs of the returning individuals, and may in fact impede a sense of ‘home’ and ‘homeland’ from developing upon ‘return’. The clear discrepancy between the two levels of construction – state and individual – necessitates further empirical analysis.

2.4 Shifting migrant identities and constructions of ‘home’ and ‘homeland’

When considering the individual and collective experience of ‘return’ migration the idea of home is something which demands greater exploration, not only where is home, but what it constitutes (Zetter 1994: 318). As suggested at the beginning of the chapter, there are a number of levels of ‘homeland’ and ‘home’. In the final part of the chapter, these levels are explored through the individual and are initially broken down by exploring how migrants can experience the loss of a ‘homeland’, and the loss of a more immediate ‘home’; and confrontation with a new ‘homeland’, and the re-construction of a new ‘home’. This is not to suggest that the divisions between understandings of ‘home’ and ‘homeland’ are so clear cut – rather the discussion serves to clarify the different foci of analysis required for understanding the dislocation from, and possible relocation of, ‘home’ and ‘homeland’ via the migration process.

2.4.1 The loss of a wider ‘homeland’

In instances of ‘return’ or repatriation movements, although the migration is interpreted as one of ‘returning’ to a historical ‘homeland’, individuals are often moving in fact to a territory where they have never lived.19 An important consideration when exploring the relationship between the ‘return’ movement and notions of ‘homeland’ is that many of

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19 This is seen in cases of refugee repatriation. In a study of the return of Eritreans to eastern Sudan the majority of the returning refugee population had never lived in Eritrea, or were so young when they left that they had no recollection of their homeland. For these individuals the process of ‘repatriation’ was in fact one of leaving their home rather than returning to it (Bascom 1994: 237).
the potential migrants in the former republics have been born outside of what is now the Russian Federation. In many respects, Russia was an ‘unknown’ physical territory for the potential returnees prior to 1991. A move to this territory had never been thought of, and the process of ‘return’ was one of leaving their ‘homeland’, in terms of ‘the place where they were born’ (rodina), rather than returning to it. Through the actual physical displacement from the ‘earth/land’ where the individual had been born, the vast majority of ‘returnees’ were leaving their homeland/place of birth to confront a foreign physical ‘homeland’. The situation is complicated further due to the loss of the existence of the wider physical territory on which they were born – the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union represents a territory and wider ‘homeland’ which no longer exists and cannot be returned to. In a study located in the Former Yugoslavia, it is shown how the private narratives of certain individuals and their sense of belonging to the ‘former Yugoslavia’ have been displaced by the war, an event which led to a breaking point both in the grand narrative of Yugoslavia, and in the narration of individual identities. A ‘return’ to this ‘homeland’ is no longer possible as it would involve not a spatial, but a temporal journey (Jansen 1998: 94-96). Although the circumstances of the break up of the Soviet Union were very different, the relationship between the former Union and the individual sense of belonging to this Union has been broken. The wider homeland cannot be returned to either in temporal or territorial terms.

As was demonstrated earlier in the chapter, the specific nature of the Soviet Union and the particular position which the Russian communities held within Union structures and institutions meant that identification to a ‘homeland’ was often at the level of the wider Union. The loss of this connection and sense of belonging to a wider ‘homeland’ may be particularly relevant for many Russians in the former republics. Although the Soviet Union was politically a single country, comparisons with the effects of other ‘empire’

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20 Only ten of the sixty two migrant respondents interviewed in the empirical part of the study had been born on the present territory of the Russian Federation. The ten had spent the majority of their lives outside of Russia. Abdulatipov notes that most of the Russians who were permanently living outside of the Russian Federation in 1991 were born in these non-Russian regions. 66 per cent of the Russians in Azerbaijan were born there. In Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Latvia, Moldova and Turkmenistan, the figure was over 50 per cent. In the remaining republics of Lithuania, Tajikistan, Georgia, Belarus and Estonia the figures were between 40 and 50 per cent. Armenia is the exception where the percentage of Russians born on its territory was around 26 per cent (1994: 38).
break-ups are also useful. Studies addressing the identities of post-imperial diasporas, such as the pieds-noirs, ask the question whether the centre, in this case France, should be considered the 'true homeland', or whether this should be the periphery, where the individual was born, and has kinship and emotional ties (Safran 1999: 20).

2.4.2 The loss of the locality of 'home'

Alongside the loss of a wider homeland, the nature of the more immediate physical homeland in which the Russian communities were resident, the individual and collective relationships developed within this locality, and the attachments that made the territory 'home' have altered. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the movement of international and national borders, the Russian communities, despite remaining stationary, found themselves displaced. The nature of the immediate physical territory in which they were located changed, and their sense of 'home', which had been located in this space, shifted from one of security and safeness to one of uncertainty and in some cases danger. The same physical space which had represented the established past had come to articulate a very different present reality (Brah 1996: 180). This sense of 'home' was situated both at the level of the wider territory of the former republic, and at the level of the immediate lived locality.

The Russian communities within the former republics had occupied a certain role, connected with their often privileged place within the social and economic structures of Soviet society. In addition, the stability and security of their position, as for most of the population in the Soviet Union, was very much linked to the particular locality of residence. Humphrey talks of the way an individual's life was ordered by the possession of certain documents: internal passport, propiska (registration at place of residence), trudovaia knizhka (document of work), order na dom (certificate of proprietary rights on accommodation), which ensured wider inclusion within the framework of the operating structures of society. The possession of this 'legitimate identity', symbolized through the possession of these documents, enabled participation within

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21 Jansen points to the contradictory nature of 'movement' where even when people 'stay at home' they can find themselves displaced because borders are 'travelling' as well (1998: 98).
22 Castells uses the term 'legitimizing identities' as those introduced by the dominant institutions of society to extend and rationalize their domination vis à vis social actors (1997: 8). The term is adopted here to describe the identity given to individuals through the operation of the Soviet state and society.
society and access to employment, education, housing etc, but at the same time discouraged mobility due to the fear of being outside ‘the system’ (Humphrey 1996: 75,79). The collapse of the Soviet system, and the move of the republics towards independence, meant that firstly the position of the Russian communities within the former republics was questioned by both the newly formed governments of the now independent states, and by representatives of the titular majority population. Secondly, if a move away from the previous place of residence was considered, this would put under threat the security that had been guaranteed by residence in one locality.

At the level of the immediate lived locality, a sense of home is connected to a feeling of belonging and attachment to that place. To appreciate what makes the immediate lived locality ‘home’, consideration of both the physical and social aspects of the place of residence are needed (Fried 1963: 153). Massey suggests that a ‘place’ is formed out of the particular set of social relations which interact at a particular location (1992: 12). Participation within the socio-economic structures of that location would facilitate the formation of such social relations, as would more personal friendship and family networks. In addition, the location may be seen as an ‘extension’ of the immediate ‘home’; an area where the individual feels ‘at home’ due to a familiarity with the area and its physical environment (Fried 1963: 154). The presence of social relations within these spatial regions contribute to a ‘sense of belonging’ in this area. However, the secure spatial identity of the individual, their knowledge of, movement within, and memories of, the physical space are equally as important (ibid: 156). With significant changes in this environment, both a fragmentation of a personal sense of spatial identity, and a sense of individual/group identity centred around both immediate, and wider stable social networks, occurs (ibid: 168).

It is important, however, not to assume that this ‘sense of place’ either at the wider

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23 Dowty notes the lack of a tradition of freedom of movement in Russia, and traces this to the pre-revolutionary period where movement, whether internal or external, was incompatible with the maintenance of serfdom (Dowty 1997, cited in Zolberg 1989: 413).

24 In particular, the loss of a propiska (registration at place of residence) was found to be a significant problem, both practically and psychologically, for returnees, see Chapter 7.

25 Parekh notes how identity is closely bound up with the environment. When changes in the environment, the loss of a building, a traditional meeting place, occurs, then individuals may draw back into themselves and become isolated and self-contained (1995: 267)
economic-societal or immediately located level is permanently lost. Massey notes that the identities of places are unfixed, precisely because the social relations out of which they are constructed are themselves dynamic and changing (1992: 13). This allows for a place to be thought of as ‘home’. but, also allows for the mobility of ‘home’, and its re-creation in a new location. The radically changed situational contexts in which the Russian communities were now located, forced them to re-negotiate their relationship with the territory of the former republics (Smith 1997: 75). Some members of the communities would successfully rebuild their sense of home and ‘belonging’ within that same territory. Another outcome of the re-negotiation is the choice of migration and ‘return’ to the Russian Federation. The processes of ‘return’ and ‘migration’ would, in turn, engender a negotiation of a relationship with the Russian Federation and its possible existence as a location for the creation of a new ‘home’, where it was hoped re-entry into the ‘operating structures’ of society, the re-creation of social networks and a sense of security within the surrounding environment would occur.

2.4.3 Confronting ‘homelands’

During the period of the Soviet Union, Russia was present in the consciousness and imaginations of the Russian communities resident in the former republics. Anderson (1991) suggests the notion of ‘imagined communities’ which are constructed around remembered or imagined places and the identities which individuals attach to these places. The communities in the former republics are having to make the transition from a situation of being attached to the imagined community (Russia) to one where their physical homeland (former republic) has been suddenly cut off from this imagined community (Pilkington 1998a: 195). Through the process of ‘return’ the imagined and physical space are brought into confrontation. Yet, important tensions arise when places that have been imagined at a distance, become ‘lived spaces’, and the political and economic realities of the space are experienced (Gupta and Ferguson 1992: 11). The image which the individuals kept in their minds when actual confrontation was not an issue, has suddenly become much more immediate, and is put to the test with ‘return’ and the reality of living in that space.

When considering the experience of ‘return’, individual identities are central to responses and reactions to the place of settlement. Past experience will have shaped the
identity of the individuals involved and affects their attitudes of return and perceptions about the future (Zetter 1994: 307). Of relevance to the present study is the way individual identity was formed and shaped by the experience of living in the non-Russian republics of the Soviet Union, and the subsequent re-shaping of this identity by the experience of the disruption of this life and displacement from the territory of the former republic. Recognition of the fluid and changing nature of individual identities is important: although identities are rooted in the past, they are undergoing constant transformation. The evolution of identity is a process of ‘becoming’ as well as ‘being’ so belongs to the future as well as the past (Hall 1990: 225).

Of significance to the ‘confrontation’ with the Russian Federation is the fact that it is the ‘ethnic’ homeland. Common ethnicity of the returning and host populations cannot be assumed to make a ‘return’ unproblematic. Studies of ‘return’ migration movements have shown tendencies amongst ‘returnee’ populations to develop a sense of difference upon ‘return’. The sense of difference may be grounded in feelings of superiority amongst the returnee population in relation to the local populations. This was the case in the ‘return’ of Greek Asia-Minor refugees to Macedonia when feelings of superiority were interpreted as a result of the interaction between arrivees and hosts who find themselves competing for the same scarce resources (Voutira 1997: 120). Similar feelings of superiority have been identified amongst returnee Russian communities vis-à-vis the local Russian population.26 The feelings of superiority must be placed within the context of the nature of the migration and settlement of the Russian communities during the Soviet Union, and their specific and often privileged role within the institutional make-up of the Union. Instead of being welcomed as the ‘positive resource’ the returnees often identify themselves as, they are positioned very differently as ‘forced migrants’ ‘refugees’ and ‘immigrants’ within Russian society. Comparative studies of ‘return’ ethnic migrations also point to instances where the ‘ethnic’ identity of returnee populations has been questioned by the local population due to the presence of cultural

26 Feelings of superiority were expressed by migrant respondents involved in the present study, this is explored in greater detail in Chapter 7. Evidence from other studies of the Russian returnee population reflects the presence of similar feelings (Pilkington 1998a: 187).
and linguistic differences (Voutira 1997: 119-120; Glytsos 1995). A tendency amongst the returning Russians to feel like strangers or aliens upon ‘return’ has been identified (Kolstoe 1996: 631). The sense of difference is rooted in the past cultural environment, and the adaptation of the customs, traditions and norms of this society, which causes a sense of ‘otherness’ to be felt upon confrontation with the ‘homeland’ and the ‘homeland’ communities.

2.4.4 Reconstructing ‘home’

Memories of the past are important to consider when understanding processes of ‘return’ and ‘resettlement’ and the reality of creating ‘home’ in a new environment. In addition to the returnees’ experience of physical dislocation from their place of previous residence, they undergo a complete separation from all the things which made the place ‘home’. As suggested earlier home may be located at the ‘site of everyday lived experience’, where it encompasses the physical and social aspects of that environment, ‘the networks of family, kin, friends, colleagues and various other ‘significant’ others’ which create a sense of ‘feeling at home’ (Brah 1996: 4). This particular sense of ‘home’ has been lost through displacement. Even if the physical territory where it was located still exists, the lived experience of it on an everyday basis, and the features which made it operate – the social networks of friends and acquaintances, the possession of employment and housing, the familiar settings – have been lost.

Nevertheless memories of the past are important at the site of resettlement. Studies of immigrant communities have shown how the memories of previous places are used in the construction of new lived worlds (Gupta and Ferguson 1992: 11). The past is seen as increasingly important for people whose perspective on the present is unstable due to (enforced) displacement (Jansen 1998: 89). Due to the impossibility of ‘return’, nostalgia and a longing for the ‘image’ of the lost ‘home’ increases. Yet, the memories of the lived past and of the ‘place’ of that experience, often expressed through spoken narrative, form a part of the present self-identity and self-understanding of the returnee.

27 Voutira makes the point that often in literature on integration it is assumed that people coming ‘home’ will be welcomed by those who share common origins, culture and heritage. Such an assumption is disproved by actual experience (1997: 123)
The expressions of loss of what has been left behind provide one way of actually maintaining some continuity with that past life (Fried 1963: 162). However, the memories also allow the individuals to position themselves within the new environment, and may provide the basis of norms around which a reconstruction of the present home can begin. Nevertheless, the memories of the past ‘home’, remain so that although the present is being lived in another place, there is still an attachment elsewhere. This connection which is maintained with the prior home disrupts the existence of a single ‘home’ or ‘homeland’ at the individual level (Clifford 1994: 307, 310).

In processes of displacement, ‘return’ and ‘resettlement’, where the notions of ‘homeland’ and ‘home’ as fixed places and concepts are in doubt, attention needs to be paid to the highly localized nature of the lives of individuals (Gupta and Ferguson 1992: 11). The ways in which an immediate sense of ‘home’ may be re-constructed at a new locality need to be understood. Studies of ‘return’ migration show that there is a tendency amongst recent returnees to depend upon immediate and familiar networks of friends and family, whether a comprehensive government programme of resettlement exists or not (Glytsos 1995: 162; Hunt 1992: 563). Movement, and resettlement, with a family network may provide a means of preserving some sense of continuity with the past (Fried 1963: 162). In the case of the return of the Russian migrants, family and friendship networks are central, during the process of migration, in defining the place of settlement and during resettlement. The presence of family and friends may establish the first roots of what has been lost. The dependence upon family networks may be placed within the wider specifics of Russian society. Castells suggests that in the face of the collapse of socialist ideology, the reconstruction of people’s identities can only take place around the basic institutions of their collective memory, one of these being the family. In addition, with the disintegration of the Soviet system, and the lack of a adequately functioning alternative, Russian people, and people of ex-Soviet societies,

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28 The establishment of migrant associations and organizations is another indication of the attempts to rebuild social networks and feelings of community. The growth of migrant associations is often a common survival strategy used by migrants to help with integration and the creation of a sense of self-identity and security in the new society (Voutira 1997: 120-121). In the present study the role of migrant associations in providing an immediate social network of people with similar backgrounds and experiences, and who would listen and provide support, was essential to many migrants.
are reduced to networks of primary identity and individual survival (1997: 41; 1998: 68).²⁹

Conclusion

The migrant experience of ‘return’ and resettlement must be firmly located within the wider environment of the post-Soviet space, and that of the now ‘physical homeland’ – the Russian Federation. The changes which are occurring within this environment – political, economic, social, cultural – all impact upon the chances and opportunities of the migrant. Approaches towards migrant ‘return’ and ‘resettlement’ are influenced by the surrounding environment, and are embodied specifically through the attitudes of the Russian state and the nature and operation of the Russian migration regime, that jointly create the ‘official’ space, or ‘homeland’, the migrants return to. Yet, sufficient attention must be given to understanding migrant ‘return’ and resettlement at the individual and local level. The Russian ‘returnees’ are experiencing displacement at a number of emotional and practical levels³⁰ – from their ‘homes’ in the former republics encompassed by the realities and experiences of their previous everyday lives, the security of jobs, employment, the social networks, the memories and roots located ‘there’; and equally from their wider territorial belonging to the ‘homelands’ of both the former republics and the Soviet Union. The processes of migration to and resettlement on the territory of the Russian Federation are the means by which subsequent processes of re-location and reconstruction may be enabled. The initial localized siting of ‘home’ may take place to an extent independently of the re-negotiation of ‘homeland’, and its siting may in fact be impeded by the nature of the confronted ‘homeland’. This

²⁹ In a wider global context and increased challenges to the patriarchal order, Castells argues that there will be a crisis in the traditional family structure leading to a more ‘egalitarian’ form of family. However, he still believes that the family structure is an important provider of ‘psychological security and material well-being’ in a world characterized by the ‘destructuring of civil society and the delegitimation of the state’ (1988: 349).

³⁰ The use of the terms ‘emotional’ and ‘practical’ are problematic. As Jansen notes, when trying to understand movement we have to recognize that people are travelling physically and mentally (1998: 98). The terms ‘emotional’ and ‘practical’ attempt to encompass the multi-layered ‘movement’ the individuals are experiencing; due to displacement from both material and psychological security, and from a time and space that no longer exists.
indicates the way in which ‘home’ and ‘homeland’ may be negotiated and re-constructed at different levels, and in varying and conflicting ways, through the ‘return’ migration and resettlement processes.
Chapter 3: The contemporary migration regime in post-Soviet Russia
legislative frameworks and institutional structures

Introduction

Since the beginning of the 1990s and the first appearance of mass forced migration flows on the territory of the FSU a migration regime has emerged rapidly in Russia. The 'migration regime', as defined in Chapter 1, includes all political and non-political agencies within the given 'migration system', which influence the migration process, i.e. the character and form migration flows and migrant resettlement takes. The migration regime encompasses the legislative and institutional frameworks and discursive tendencies, as appropriate to the political and non-political agencies. Chapter 3 analyses the contemporary state of the migration regime in post-Soviet Russia at the federal level and assesses the effect of the regime on the migration process and the form of migrant resettlement taking place. Although the legislative frameworks and institutional structures are discussed discretely, their evident interdependence means that the debates inform one another.

The chapter concentrates on the period from November 1995 to December 2000.1 The major pieces of legislation relating to forced migration are examined: the direction of that legislation; how that legislation shapes the reception of migrants on Russian territory; and the wider legislative framework within which forced migration legislation is located. The discussion moves on to an analysis of the institutional framework of the Russian migration regime and maps the complex set of relationships that exist between the multitude of federal level government and non-governmental bodies. The chapter demonstrates the emergence of a complex migration regime, characterized by, as Codagnone suggests, competing interests and discourses, the interaction of international, federal and regional factors, and a sort of 'planning in the dark' with the

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1 The doctoral research was conducted over the period 1995-2000. The main empirical research took place from 1997-1999 (see Chapters 5, 6, and 7). A review of the institutional and legislative developments for the period 1995-2000 enables the case studies of the experiences of 'return' and resettlement to be placed against the background of the changing nature of the wider migration regime.
unexpected and ad hoc responses typical of migration policy (Codagnone 1998a: 25). The possible ‘return’ of the ethnic Russian and Russian speaking populations, and the political and economic implications of such a ‘return’ has heightened the contested development of the Russian migration regime at a time when the country is attempting to re-define its national identity and status at both the regional and international levels, and is facing the difficulties of internal economic and political crisis (ibid). The chapter, however, consciously takes a holistic view of all aspects of the migration regime, not only those parts directly pertaining to Russian forced migrants. This approach serves to highlight issues that demonstrate how the Russian migration regime is firmly located within the wider context of a changing regional and global migration system.

3.1 The developing Russian migration regime: an overview

The analysis of legislative and institutional frameworks focuses on the post-1995 period, although reference is made to events and developments in the preceding period (1991-1995). The complete absence of administrative structures or legislation during the Soviet period to deal with any uncontrolled movement of peoples meant that a rapid response was required when large-scale, ‘forced’ migration began at the beginning of the 1990s. The Russian Federation joined the international migration regime in 1992 when it acceded to the 1951 UN Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. An institutional body, the Federal Migration Service (FMS), was established by presidential decree in July 1992 and relevant legislative documentation, primarily the Russian Federation laws on forced migration and refugees, was passed in February 1993. The regime initially appeared to reflect a liberal approach towards migration. However, the difficulties of an inexperienced migration service, with legislative support of little practical use and suffering from severe financial constraints, were compounded by the politicization of the question of the Russian communities in the ‘near abroad’, and the economic and social crisis being faced on the territory of the Russian Federation. The early period of the Russian migration regime was marked by conflicts between parliamentary and government actors over the question of Russia’s

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responsibility to ‘protect’ its ‘compatriots’ in the ‘near abroad’, and between state and non-state actors over the question of the ‘return’ and resettlement of these same populations.

By the end of 1995, the ‘liberal’ approach towards migration had been replaced by an increasing securitization of the issue and the prioritization of ‘immigration control’. The shift reflected a consensus reached between different factions of the parliament and government apparatus over the need to ‘protect’ the Russian communities in the ‘near abroad’, to encompass them as part of the Russian nation’s sphere of influence, and to encourage them to remain in the former republics. Although the other side of the dual policy towards the Russian communities accepted their ‘return’, this was framed firmly within a discourse of ‘forced migration’. The shift both influenced, and corresponded with, the changing priorities of the Federal Migration Service. The service moved away from its initial primary role to ‘protect the rights of refugees and forced migrants and help in their resettlement’ to prioritize the wider management and regulation of migration flows. The shift was rooted in the severe lack of resources to enable comprehensive provision for returnees to take place, internal interests of the bureaucrats within the service who favoured responsibility for monitoring and control of migrants over providing assistance, and corresponded with policy shifts at the higher levels of political power in Moscow (Pilkington 1998a: 53-89; Codagnone 1998a: 37, 46). Security and control dominated, therefore, over humanitarian concern and social provision.

The period 1995-2000 marked a continuation with the immediately preceding period. However, new challenges also presented themselves to the developing migration regime: the large forced migration ensuing from the Chechen conflict, the increase in ‘illegal’ migration from both the CIS and ‘far abroad’, and greater demands on the side of migrants, migrant organizations and other non-governmental actors for improved policy. From the end of 1995, the political resonance of the migration issue at a domestic level declined as consensus was reached over the need to ‘protect’ the Russian communities in the ‘near abroad’. The control of the ‘return’ migration of the communities continued, rooted in the now accepted prioritization of their right to stay in the former republics, and the socio-economic and financial concerns about the
implications of their ‘return’. The continuation of a policy of securitization and control also reflected the increase in ‘illegal’ migration flows into Russia, which was faced on its western borders with restrictive European migration policies. The consequences of being included within a wider regional and international migration system led to demands, but little concrete help, from western actors for Russia to meet its international obligations. However, at the end of 2000, there were signs of a change in the existing consensus over the issue of the Russian communities in the ‘near abroad’. Unease within domestic political circles about the ‘demographic crisis’ of the Russian population, and the wider recognition, led by President Putin, of a need to rebuild and strengthen a ‘new Russia’, brought the Russian populations back onto the political agenda but in a new guise as a possible solution to Russia’s demographic problems.

3.2 Legislative frameworks and the migration regime in post-Soviet Russia

Figure 3.1 attempts to represent the inter-relationship between regional, federal, inter-state, and international levels of legislation that constitute the legislative framework concerning migration in the Russian Federation. Russia is located within a wider global migration system and is accountable to international agreements, conventions and laws. Federal level legislation is formulated taking into consideration international norms and practices, as is regional inter-state level (bi- and multi-lateral) legislation. However, in the Russian Federation, federal and international legislation is subject to the operation of regional legislative practice, which impacts upon its effectiveness and implementation. The legislative field, therefore, is created by the interaction of these levels, rather than the dominance of one level over another. This is indicated in Figure 3.1 by the vertical, two-directional, dashed line. The individual experiences the mediation of the different legislative practices and priorities.

3 The new Russian Constitution of December 1993 established the primacy of norms, contained in international agreements ratified by Russia, over federal laws and made the general principle of international law and of international agreements a constituent part of the Russian legal system (Codagnone 1998a: 25-26).
1951 UN Convention and 1967 Protocol on Refugees
International Convention of Citizenship and Political Rights
Programme of Action

CIS Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
CIS Convention on Human Rights of National Minorities
Cooperation of CIS States in the Prevention of Illegal Migration

CIS Agreement on Help to Refugees and Forced Migrants
Interstate Fund for Help to Refugees and Forced Migrants

Bi-lateral Agreements on Voluntary Migration/Dual Citizenship

Federal Migration Programme

Russian Federation Law on Refugees
Russian Federation Law on Forced Migrants
Russian Citizenship Law

Regional Restrictive Practices

Arrivees not entitled to Russian Citizenship
Arrivees entitled to Russian Citizenship

Russian Communities in the Former Republics

Figure 3.1 The Legislative Framework of the Russian Migration Regime 1995-2000
3.2.1 Forced migrant legislation

The two pieces of legislation which apply to forced movement are the Russian Federation laws ‘On Forced Migrants’ and ‘On Refugees’. Both laws were introduced in February 1993 following the accession of Russia in November 1992 to the 1951 UN Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. The initial enthusiasm for legislation was led by the western oriented Ministry of Foreign Affairs, headed by Andrei Kozyrev, and a desire for international recognition in the field of human rights (Voronina 1997: 35; Codagnone 1998a: 25). The principle difference between qualification for refugee or forced migrant status is rooted in the possession of Russian citizenship. The law on forced migrants applies only to Russian citizens or those entitled to citizenship, covers the reception, allocation of status and resettlement of those individuals, and, in theory, guarantees additional benefits and rights for their settlement on Russian territory. The initial form of the forced migrant legislation reflected the lack of Russian experience in migration policy making. The law was criticized for its legal shortcomings, declaratory nature, ambiguity and unrealistic promises of economic provision (Pilkington 1998a: 38; Voronina 1997: 34).

Draft amendments to the law on forced migrants (and the law on refugees) were presented to the State Duma in the summer of 1994. Both documents were condemned for being ‘anti-refugee’ which led to the formation by the State Duma of a Parliamentary Commission on Refugees and Forced Migrant Affairs. The commission included parliamentary deputies, and representatives of the Federal Migration Service, the presidential apparatus, the Federation Council and international and Russian non-governmental organizations (Memorial 1997a: 8; Pilkington 1998: 54). The discussions of the group led to a thorough re-working of the amendments to the Law on Forced Migrants, which were adopted by the State Duma on 22 November 1995. The major amendments to the law were:

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4 For the full texts of the original 1993 laws see Vedomosti S’ezda Narodnikh Deputatov RF i Verkhovnogo Soveta RF 1993: 714-20, 721-7.

5 Initially, refugee status was often acquired by those returnees who had arrived in the Russian Federation without Russian citizenship, but who were entitled to citizenship. With the amendments to the forced migrant law in 1995, refugees could then apply for forced migrant status upon receipt of Russian citizenship. The practice ceased completely with the introduction of amendments to the refugee law in 1997 (see below and Appendix 1).
• the inclusion of a separate article (Article 2) defining those who *cannot* qualify for forced migrant status with a clear distinction between economic and political migrants, excluding economic migrants from forced migrant status.\(^6\)
• the delimitation of the period for which forced migrant status is granted to five years (Article 5).
• the recognition of not only individual settlement, but also compact settlements of migrants (Article 7).
• the possibility of acquiring a long term, interest free loan for the construction, renovation or purchase of housing (Article 7).
• a new interpretation of the 'housing fund for the temporary settlement of forced migrants' as temporary accommodation provided by the FMS (Article 11).
• the possibility for refugees eligible for Russian citizenship to apply for forced migrant status within a month of acquiring citizenship (Article 1).

The amendments point to a new direction in migration policy that shaped the character of the migration regime from the beginning of 1996; the desire of the Russian state, and the Federal Migration Service, to discourage migration through a tightening of definition of status and a reduction in social provision.\(^7\) The content of the new law reflected the economic realization that the initial liberal legislation of 1993 was ill-suited to the practical possibilities for migrant resettlement on Russian territory. The 'involuntary' nature of the movement inscribed in the new law allowed the Russian state to reduce its financial burden by restricting access to forced migrant status. The amendments reflected the changing priorities of the FMS at the time, and those of the former head of the service, Tat’iana Regent, who spoke of the security threat from forced migrants, and the need for migration containment (Codagnone 1998a: 26, 37).

The economic and security justifications corresponded with the developing political priorities of the Russian state which had moved towards encouraging 'compatriots' to

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\(^6\) See Chapter 1, Footnote 19, for the stipulations contained in the law concerning the distinction between 'economic' and 'political' migrants.

\(^7\) The first version of the forced migrant law spoke of the obligations of the state authorities, i.e. FMS, towards individuals granted such status. The amended version of the law no longer spoke of obligations, and defined the duty of the FMS as conditional upon its powers, i.e. its resources (Codagnone 1998a: 29).
remain in the former republics.\textsuperscript{8} The amendments also reflected a rejection of 'statist' ideology with the increased acknowledgement and encouragement of self-initiated migrant resettlement through the proposal of a long term loan, the recognition of the role of compact settlements, and the reduction in the 'obligations' of the FMS to provide housing and employment (Article 7, 10). The limitation of the period of status to five years again reduced the responsibility of the state for forced migrants.\textsuperscript{9}

The attempt to distinguish 'economic' from 'political' migrants is rooted in the debate over the relationship of the Russian state to the Russian communities in the former republics of the Soviet Union. The legal category of 'forced migrant' is a peculiarity of the Russian context, and reflects the contentious nature of the position and possible 'return' of the Russian communities. The legislation on forced migrants and refugees in 1993 established a polarity of status which separated 'forced migrant' from 'refugee' and recognized the responsibility of the Russian Federation, as a post-imperial state and legal successor to the Soviet Union, to provide for its 'compatriots' who were forced to return from the 'near abroad' (Pilkington 1998a: 36). However, the term 'forced', reiterated in the 1995 amendments, stresses the involuntary nature of the movement, and rejects that the movement is that of a natural and voluntary 'repatriation'. Although forced migrants are legislated greater rights regarding residence and assistance than non-Russian refugees, the legislation from the outset did not provide for the possibility of state assisted large-scale 'repatriation'. Russians living in the near abroad who wish to obtain assistance in resettling on the territory of the Russian Federation are not protected by any legal acts unless they can show evidence of clear discrimination.\textsuperscript{10} The law on forced migrants, and the lack of other legislation, does not recognize the complexity of different factors affecting the Russian communities resident in the 'near abroad', which are experienced in different ways by the individuals within these

\textsuperscript{8} The attempt to clarify the term 'forced migrant' and distinguish between 'economic' and 'political' migrants, was interpreted by non-political actors as a politically influenced effort to discourage the movement of Russians to the Russian Federation and to encourage their continued residence in the countries of the near abroad (Gannushkina 1996: 1; Grafova 1995: 10).

\textsuperscript{9} A positive result of the limitation was that it prevented some regional level authorities from arbitrarily demanding yearly or even half-yearly re-registration of forced migrants who, if they failed to do so, lost their status (Memorial 1997a: 9).

\textsuperscript{10} Vitkovskaia noted that proving discrimination through the presentation of documents is widely regarded as unrealistic. Even regional leaders of the FMS have admitted that if their employees paid strict attention to this clause, then no-one would receive status (interview conducted by the author, Moscow, 13 September 1999; and see Kornev 1998).
communities (Vitkovskaia 1999: INT). Through the law’s prioritization of the ‘forced’ nature of the movement, the government is suggesting that under normal circumstances the Russian communities would stay; a position that is central to wider Russian government policy towards the communities in the newly independent states, their construction as a Russian ‘diaspora’, and reflects a combination of symbolic, political, and economic interests (Codagnone 1998a: 26).

Resolutions to the forced migrant law
In 1997 a number of government resolutions were introduced to the law on forced migrants to make the law more workable, and to reiterate migrant self-initiated resettlement. The resolutions concerned loans for the construction, renovation or acquisition of housing, temporary resettlement centres for forced migrants, and compensation payments for forced migrants from Chechnia. A resolution of 28 January 1997 set up a loan system taking into account the socio-economic specifics of a region, where the loan was based upon the average cost of housing. More favourable loan terms were offered in areas where resettlement was desired, whereas in overpopulated regions only a minimal loan was available. The system of differentiation, as the head of the Federal Migration Service, Tat’iana Regent admitted, was to be used as a tool to direct and influence migration flows, in effect, in the interests of the Russian state (Kirillova 1998: 6). A lack of in-depth research into the regional suitability for the resettlement of migrants meant the system was in danger of pushing migrants into unsuitable regions where they did not wish to settle (Memorial 1997a: 29).

The resolution concerning centres of temporary resettlement (of 22 January 1997) reinforced that centres were to provide temporary housing for only three months, and

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11 The abbreviation INT is used when information from an expert interview is cited directly in the main text (rather than in a footnote) along with the name of the interviewee and the year of the interview. This reference can be cross-checked with the list of expert respondents given in Appendix 5.
12 For a full draft of the resolution on temporary resettlement centres see Migratsiia, 1, 1997: 41-44, on loans see Migratsiia, 2 1997: 29-31, and on compensation see Migratsiia, 2, 1997: 39-41.
13 Loans had been available under the existing forced migrant law but from 1994 to 1996 the number of successful applications had gradually decreased as the maximum size of the loan was clearly inadequate for the cost of building or buying accommodation (Shapenko 1997: 51).
14 In 1997 in Altaiskii krai, the Urals, Siberia, Pskov, Leningrad and Novgorod oblasti forced migrants could receive a ten year interest free loan of up to 70 per cent of the cost of the housing, in Central Russia 50 per cent. The lowest loan of 1.5 per cent was offered in Moscow (Gorodetskaia 1997).
not for the two to three years which had become the normal period of residence (Memorial 1997a: 46).\textsuperscript{15} Most forced migrants housed in temporary resettlement centres are either socially disadvantaged (lone pensioners, lone invalids, single mothers, large families), or are forced migrants from the Chechen conflict. After three months, they are legally entitled to choose from a list of available permanent housing but in reality this is rarely an option (ibid). The continued existence of the centres, usually in remote regions where there is little chance of acquiring work, has been criticized for making migrants dependent upon the migration service, and for taking up large amounts of funds which could be more usefully distributed, for example, to provide loans for housing (Peerevozkina 1997: 51).\textsuperscript{16} The resolution, however, achieved little success. In 1999, the new head of the FMS, Viktor Kalamanov, criticized the centres for continuing to encourage the long-term residence and dependence of socially disadvantaged migrants and for becoming ‘refuges’ for the homeless (bombzhatniki) and criminal elements. Kalamanov called for an overhaul of the system, the restriction (again) of residence to three months, and suggested that the centres of temporary resettlement (razmeshchenie) should instead become centres of ‘temporary residence’ (zhil’ie) (Airapetova 1999b; 1999c). How the distinction would succeed in changing the nature of the centres is unclear. The idea was floated in a draft version of a new federal migration policy, which was under discussion in 1999. The new policy did not materialize however (see below), and no decision has been made concerning the future of the temporary resettlement centres.

The introduction of government resolution No. 510 in April 1997 concerning the payment of compensation to forced migrants from the Chechen republic caused widespread protest amongst migrants, NGOs and human rights activists. A series of earlier resolutions and presidential decrees had attempted to set up a system for the

\textsuperscript{15} At the largest of the three temporary settlement centres in Saratov oblast', most migrants had lived for two to three years (interview conducted by the author with the head of the temporary resettlement centre, Krasnoarmeisk, Saratov oblast', 1 September 1997). The numbers of temporary resettlement centres in Saratov oblast were reduced from three to two in 1999 due to a lack of resources.

\textsuperscript{16} The head of the regional migrant association ‘Saratovskii Istochnik’ stated that the money spent on housing migrants in the centres could be better spent in providing concrete provision for resettlement, i.e. loans for housing, creation of work places, etc. (interview conducted by the author, Saratov, 22 August 1997).
payment of compensation but had proved to be highly ineffective (Memorial 1997a: 41). The new resolution was seen as an infringement of the rights of forced migrants from Chechnia due to its stipulation that only citizens who had registered at a territorial migration service between 12 December 1994 and 23 November 1996 (the period of actual conflict) were eligible to apply for compensation. A large number of documents was demanded upon application, which failed to take into account the departure circumstances of migrants fleeing conflict. Temporary commissions started work in sixty nine regions of Russia and some progress was made in the granting of compensation. However, the process has been crippled by a lack of funds. Due to the restrictive stipulations large numbers of migrants have been excluded from receiving compensation (ibid: 42). Despite the widespread criticism and calls for the reworking of the compensation resolution, including by regional migration service officials, no changes have been introduced (Airapetova 1999d; Kornev 1998).

3.2.2 Contradictory legislative practices

The implementation of forced migrant legislation, and the protection of the established legal rights of individual forced migrants, is hindered by the mis-interpretation of the law at a regional level and the use of regional sub-laws and the propiska system which contradict both the law on forced migrants, the Constitution of the Russian Federation and Russia’s international commitments (see Chapter 4). The propiska or registration system was officially abolished on 1 October 1993, however, in reality the permanent propiska was replaced by ‘registration at a place of residence’ (zhitel’stvo) and the temporary propiska by ‘registration at a place of temporary abode’ (prebivanie) (Memorial 1997a: 26; Gannushkina 1997: 16). A lack of a propiska is used to prevent registration for forced migrant status. Without a propiska, individuals are denied access to employment, and educational, medical and other state services.

17 The temporary commissions where not set up as FMS bodies, but are made up of migration service representatives, local government representatives, and in some cases, as in Saratov where the commission has worked successfully, representatives of non-governmental, migrant associations.
18 In the Russian Federation state budget, 200,000 billion rubles (before denomination) were allocated in 1997 for compensation, and in the draft budget for 1998, 388 million rubles (after denomination). This amount of funds allowed for compensation payments to not more than approximately 6-7,000 families. Estimates at the time by the FMS suggested that compensation had to be paid to 30,000 families (Regent 1997: 1).
19 The difficult situation in the temporary resettlement centres were exacerbated as forced migrants from Chechnia were unable to leave.
The registration system complicates the acquisition of citizenship, which applicants for forced migrant status must hold. Citizenship may be obtained in the former republic prior to migration. However, when an application for citizenship is made after the migrant’s arrival, the individual must be permanently resident on the territory of the Russian Federation, interpreted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs as ‘permanently registered’. This stipulation ignores the fact that the migrant is usually accommodated in housing which does not offer a propiska. The result is a vicious circle where the individual, without a propiska cannot receive citizenship, and without citizenship, is unable to apply for forced migrant status – the only means by which to obtain a propiska (Fillipova 1997: 54). The difficulties in acquiring citizenship upon Russian territory, and the ‘apparent’ fact that citizenship was easier to acquire in the former republics, reflected the interest of the Russian state in the growth and permanent residence of numbers of Russian citizens beyond its borders (ibid: 52). Obtaining Russian citizenship prior to migration in the former republics has become increasingly difficult, however, and can be both dangerous and expensive (Gannushkina 1999: INT).

Although a more comprehensive migration legislation framework developed from 1995, this did not guarantee the individual forced migrant greater protection, or concrete assistance in resettlement. The haphazard application, ambiguity and restrictive nature of federal migration legislation, a lack of available resources and implementing mechanisms, and regional level interpretations and limiting migration legislation, creates a situation where ‘control’ of migrants predominates over resettlement provision. Resettlement is further hindered by the low levels of information provision regarding rights, the content of legislation and new regulations.

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20 The assistant head of the FMS department for International Cooperation stated that the use of the propiska, or as he termed it the system of registration, is not to restrict movement but is rather to obtain a register of the population in the interests of security. He stated that every refugee or forced migrant must hold a document which states that they live at a certain place, but did not suggest how this document can be acquired (interview conducted by the author, Moscow, 23 September 1999).

21 The current practice in Saratov oblast' is that if an individual wishes to apply for forced migrant status, s/he must have received Russian citizenship in the former republic before departure (see Chapter 6).

22 Further complicating the acquisition of forced migrant status and registration is the demand for a vyipiska (notice of departure) from the former place of residence to ensure that forced migrants do not possess two places of residence. Such a demand ignores the difficult circumstances in which some forced migrants leave their former place of residence, and the often problematic process of obtaining a vyipiska.
which might affect migrants' status and entitlements (Komarova 1997: 15; Voronina 1997: 43; Fillipova 1997: 51; Memorial 1997a: 34).  

3.2.3 Legislation within the CIS migration space

The Russian migration system is situated within the wider CIS, European and global migration systems; and the migration flows and migration regimes of those systems. Although there is a necessity to develop agreements on migration and human rights at the CIS and Western European levels to avert future forced migration and foster more organized, systematic processes of migration and resettlement across and within the boundaries of the FSU there has been a distinct lack of cooperation and paucity of effective legislation (Azrael and Payin: 1996; Mukomel' and Payin 1996; Kamakin 1998b). Legislation which has been passed, is not implemented, or in some cases comes into conflict with domestic legislation.

Multi-lateral and bi-lateral agreements

The key CIS legislation concerning forced migration movement and resettlement is the 'CIS Agreement on Help to Refugees and Forced Migrants', introduced in September 1993, and the 'Interstate Fund for Help to Refugees and Forced Migrants', introduced to implement the earlier agreement in January 1995. Two CIS human rights conventions have been introduced: the 'Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms'; and the 'Convention on Human Rights of National Minorities' (21 October 1994). The agreements, however, have not been implemented, due to a range of specific factors and circumstances impeding joint CIS cooperative action on the question of 'forced migration' in the post-Soviet space.

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23 Many refugees were not informed of the amendment to the forced migrant law that allowed them to apply for forced migrant status within a month of acquiring Russian citizenship, which meant they lost the entitlement to the status and the provisions it allowed (Drought 2000: 105).

24 The CIS Agreement was approved and signed by all states of the CIS except Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, and ratified by Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, the Russia Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The Interstate Fund, although approved and signed by Armenia, Belarus, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation and Tajikistan, has not been ratified by any of the CIS states (Mukomel' and Payin 1997: 45; IOM: 1999: 184).

25 In accordance with Article 14 of the Convention, the 'non-existent' Human Rights Commission of the CIS has been entrusted with monitoring the execution of the Convention's provisions (Azrael and Payin 1996:153).
Cooperation has been hindered by the opposing interests of the sending and host states. The ‘sending’ countries tend to deny the forced nature of relocation and its roots in the socio-political instability and discriminatory practices of their countries (Azrael and Payin 1996: 147). For viable cooperation states must acknowledge some responsibility for the circumstances which are leading to the migration. However, a number of the CIS and Baltic States have refused to recognize the presence of forced migration, for example Kazakhstan (Sedykh 1996). At the 1996 CIS Geneva Conference the more neutral term ‘involuntary relocating persons’ was preferred to the Russian definition of ‘forced migrant’ due to the claims by a number of states that no-one was forced to leave but were doing so out of ‘nostalgic-patriotic’ feelings (Grafova 1996). On a practical level, the formulation and implementation of agreements have been greatly hindered by a lack of resources, no channel for the exchange of migration data and a subsequent lack of comparable statistical information (Mukomel’ and Payin 1996: 27).

The problems of cooperation are replicated at the bi-lateral level. Potential migrants face problems upon departure concerning the privatization of apartments, the right to sell property, and obtaining permission to leave. The former head of the FMS, Tat’iana Regent, spoke of national laws in a number of CIS States and the Baltics which made the privatization of apartments difficult. A number of bi-lateral agreements have been concluded to regulate migration processes and protect migrants rights between the Russian Federation and other CIS states (IOM 1999: 185). Yet, although bi-lateral agreements on ‘voluntary migration’ may facilitate departure, they may equally problematize arrival and resettlement in the Russian Federation. An agreement between the Russian Federation and Turkmenistan on voluntary migration meant that arriving migrants were no longer eligible for forced migrant status.

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26 Representatives of migrant associations in Saratov spoke of the problems facing Russians living in Tajikistan who wished to move but were being prevented from doing so due to the difficulties of selling property and obtaining permission to leave (interviews conducted with representatives of migrant associations, May 1998, Saratov). Migrants interviewed in both Samara and Saratov oblasti spoke of the increasingly difficult situation in the former republics, particularly Tajikistan and Kazakhstan, over obtaining a vypiska, selling property, and obtaining citizenship (see Chapter 7).

27 In particular Estonia objected to the use of the term ‘forced migrant’, and claimed it hindered inter-governmental cooperation and led to diplomatic tensions (Codagnone 1998a: 26).

28 By the time of the CIS Conference in May 1996 Russia was the only country which had allocated any resources for the fulfillment of the agreement (Sedykh 1996).

29 Migrants and representatives of migrant associations in Saratov (May 1998) spoke of the difficult situation of migrants coming from Turkmenistan. A number of migrants from Turkmenistan had been refused forced migrant status.
The development of CIS level migration and human rights legislation has been influenced to an extent, by the international community. One of the aims of the 1996 CIS Conference, and the subsequent annual steering group meetings, was to provide a 'forum for dialogue and exchange' between migration-related ministries of the CIS countries, to lead to the 'de-politicization' of migration issues, to provide standard migration terminology, and to develop common strategies for migration management. The 'CIS Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms', and the agreement 'On the Cooperation of CIS States in the Prevention of Illegal Migration' (1998) is attributed to the success of the forum (UNHCR/IOM 2000: 21). The 'Programme of Action' (POA), adopted at the 1996 CIS Conference, was signed by all CIS states apart from Moldova and Uzbekistan. The programme was heralded as strengthening legislative and institutional migration structures of the states concerned, and working as 'a factor of stability and security' by the steering groups which have met annually since 1996 (Diplomaticeskii Vestnik 1997: 44). However, the POA was not legally binding and had no obligatory force (Grafova 1996; Sedykh 1996). The lack of internal resources for the fulfillment of the programme, a reduction in international donor support, and the absence of governmental cooperation in the post-Soviet migration space impeded the implementation of the programme.

3.2.4 Legislative approaches to the resident Russian communities in the former republics

The approach of the Russian state to the 'return' of the Russian communities follows a dual policy which combines an acceptance of their resettlement on Russian territory (encoded in the forced migrant law) alongside measures to facilitate the integration of the communities in the 'near abroad'. The increasing attention to the fate of the Russian communities amongst the Russian political elite led to the introduction of two legislative documents in August 1994: a Presidential decree on the 'Basic Conception of a Programme to Help Compatriots' and the accompanying resolution of the Russian

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30 Recommendations from the programme were used for the correcting of the Federal Migration Programme of Russia (1998-2000) and in the federal policy 'Children of Russia' (19 September 1997) which contained a separate programme for refugee and forced migrant children (Diplomaticeskii Vestnik 1997: 47).

31 The implementation of the Programme of Action is explored in more detail later in the chapter.
Government on ‘Measures for the Support of Compatriots Abroad’. The programme prioritized the integration of the Russian communities in political, economic and socio-cultural terms, but was unsupported by any significant action (Sadkovskaia 1998). The policy guidelines of the programme also promoted the development of bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements on dual citizenship. The possibility of dual citizenship is a sensitive area of debate. The Russian state has accepted that such agreements can only be concluded in cases where there is a small Russian population. Dual citizenship agreements have been concluded between the Russian Federation and Turkmenistan (1993) and with Tajikistan (1997) (IOM 1999: 186). However, in the case of Ukraine or Kazakstan, an agreement would be impossible due to the political implications of large areas of land being occupied by citizens of another state (Pilkington 1998a: 58).

After much debate a law ‘Concerning the State Policy of the Russian Federation in Relation to its Compatriots Abroad’ was adopted by the State Duma in March 1999. The law defines who are ‘compatriots’, outlines the responsibility of the Russian state to its ‘compatriots abroad’ and details measures of support in the political, social, cultural, economic, linguistic and educational spheres (Lebedev 1999a; Federal’nyi zakon ‘O gosudarstvennoi politike Rossiiskoi Federatsii v otnoshenii sootechestvennikov za rubezhom’, 5 March 1999).32 Calls have been made for the development of an accompanying implementing mechanism and for greater direction in the allocation of resources (Lebedev 1999a; Semenov 2000). Any implementation of the measures of the law has been limited, and as yet, the policy is largely symbolic and has little practical and material significance for the Russian communities in the near abroad.33 However, the law represents the clarification and consolidation of the policy

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32 Compatriots are defined ‘as persons, born in one state, and who live or lived in that state, and possess common characteristics of language, religion, cultural heritage, traditions and customs, and also descendents of the indicated persons by a direct line of ancestry. The term ‘compatriots abroad’ includes citizens of the Russian Federation permanently living beyond the borders of its territory, former citizens of the USSR, and now citizens of the ‘former states of the USSR’, former emigrants from the Russian empire, the RSFSR, the USSR, and the post-Soviet Russian Federation, and the direct descendents of the above groups excluding descendents of the titular nations of foreign states (Federal’nyi zakon ‘O gosudarstvennoi politike Rossiiskoi Federatsii v otnoshenii sootechestvennikov za rubezhom’, 5 March 1999).

33 52 million roubles were allotted in the federal budget of 1999 for support of ‘compatriots’. A figure of 100 million roubles was allocated in 2000, however, for both years it is uncertain exactly how this money has been used and at the ground level, the presence of these resources has not been greatly felt (Tuleev 2000; Sokolova 2000). A further 100 million roubles has been allocated for 2001. Vitkovskaia noted that it is ironic that such a policy is promoted to protect the rights, and support ‘compatriots’ whilst they are
that developed from the early 1990s with relation to the Russian communities in the former republics of the Soviet Union that constructed the communities as a Russian 'diaspora' and a constituent part of the Russian nation (Melvin 1998: 36), although it contains no encouragement of the repatriation of the communities to the 'homeland', the Russian Federation.

3.2.5 'Illegal' migration and asylum seekers

Russia's ratification of the 1951 UN Convention meant that Russia became an active participant of the international migration regime as a country of 'first resort' that had responsibility for those individuals arriving from the 'far abroad'. However, the majority of asylum seekers face severe difficulties obtaining protection in the Russian Federation. Despite the 1993 law on refugees, few asylum seekers from outside the former Soviet Union arriving on Russian territory have been granted asylum, or even had their applications dealt with. Estimates vary widely of how many refugees are present on Russian territory. As of June 2000, there were 52,961 recognized refugees in the Russian Federation (UNHCR 2000: 43). The majority of these, however, are from CIS states.\(^34\) From 1993 until June 2000, only 580 persons from non-CIS and Baltic states have been recognized as refugees in the Russian Federation (ibid). By the end of 1998 the UNHCR had documented 30,000 applicants for asylum which Russia has not yet reviewed and processed as asylum seekers (Forced Migration Monitor 1998 No. 23).

A new version of the 1993 law on refugees came into force on 11 June 1997.\(^35\) Human rights organizations acknowledged that the law was an improvement on the previous declaratory document due to its greater clarity and exactness (Memorial 1997a: 17; Chernisheva 1997: 29). The new law clarified the understanding of a 'refugee' in accordance with the 1951 UN Convention and detailed the procedure of applying for

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\(^34\) The total number of recognized refugees decreased by 180,000 between December 1997 and December 1999. The reason is that refugees from the CIS and Baltic States, who were granted refugee status initially during the early 1990s, after acquiring Russian citizenship, lost their refugee status (UNHCR 2000: 43).

\(^35\) For a full draft of the amended 'Law on Refugees' see Sobranie Zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 1997, No. 26, pp. 4930-4949.
refugee status, the process of decision making and the bodies responsible for each stage of the application procedure. Yet, although the new law met the standards of the 1951 UN Convention, it was more restrictive than the earlier law, and reflected tendencies in Western European migration legislative practice of the early 1990s. This was shown in the removal of the provision for the collective granting of refugee status in cases of emergency, and, in accordance with the new restrictive concept of ‘safe third countries’ which became widespread in Western Europe after 1990, the amended law refused status to individuals who had passed through a country in which the applicant could have been granted refugee status, although a list of these ‘safe’ countries was absent (Codagnone 1998a: 27).

The asylum procedure improved over the period 1999-2000. Out of the 580 persons recognized as refugees between 1993-2000, 332 persons (62 per cent) acquired the status in 1999 and 2000 (UNHCR 2000: 43). This improvement may be attributed to the gradual enforcement of the practices of the amended law, and to the improved institutional practice of the federal and regional institutions which deal with asylum seekers. Yet, police harassment and unlawful detention of asylum seekers are common practice. Even when an application for asylum is submitted departments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs refuse to register the individual concerned (UNHCR 2000: 44; Memorial 1997a: 52). UNHCR issue their own certificates to asylum seekers, but these are not recognized by the Russian authorities. This demonstrates both contradictions within the Russian domestic approach towards asylum seekers, and the limited capacity of organs of the UN regime, such as UNHCR, to uphold individual human rights, due to a lack of coercive power within sovereign states (Held et al. 1999: 67).

The ‘threat’ of ‘illegal migration’ has received increasing government and media attention in Russia. Russia is following a similar path to Western Europe embodied in a ‘culture of disbelief’ where the majority of asylum seekers are identified as bogus economic migrants even before an asylum application is made. In 1998, Tat’iana Regent, estimated that there were approximately 700,000 illegal migrants on Russian territory and claimed that only two percent of these were eligible for refugee status (Kamakin 1998b). Current estimates of numbers of ‘illegal’ migrants are as high as 1-3
million (Shuikin 1999). Understandably Russia identifies the solution to ‘illegal migration’ not only at the CIS, but also at the international level. It is argued that the decision to ratify the 1951 UN Convention did not take into account the consequences of turning Russia into a country of ‘first resort’ given its lack of a solid legislative and institutional basis with which to deal with refugees, the financial and economic crisis, and the porous nature of its borders (Codagnone 1998a: 26). Over the past decade Russia has faced increasing criticism from international governments and human rights observers for its treatment of asylum seekers (Grankina 1996). Yet, responsibility for the decision also lies with western governments. The debate reflects the growing interdependence of global and regional migration systems, and the relative powers national governments hold to regulate and restrict in-migration. Russia has demonstrated its growing disillusionment with the west concerning international migration relations, has criticized European attempts to protect itself from illegal migration through restrictive visa regimes and border controls which heighten the problems on Russian territory, and has spoken of the need for the help of the global community in resolving the issue (Shuikin 1999; Kamakin 1998). The ‘alarmist’ construction of the issue by the Russian state, and the little effort made to accommodate and assist asylum seekers, are evidence of Russia’s resentment, but has had little effect upon western response and practice (Codagnone 1998a: 41).

3.3 Mapping the government structures of the migration regime in post-Soviet Russia - a federal view

An analysis of the development of the structures that make up the Russian migration regime serves to reinforce the contested nature of the ‘return’ and resettlement of the Russian communities from the ‘near abroad’. The federal structures (governmental and non-governmental), directly involved in migrant reception and resettlement are the

36 Solutions have been sought at the CIS level with a call for bi- and multi-lateral agreements to address the causes of illegal migration (Airapetova 1998b). An agreement ‘On the Cooperation of CIS States in the Prevention of Illegal Migration’ was introduced in March 1998. Federal level government resolutions on the ‘Consolidation of the Position Concerning Immigration Control’ and on ‘Measures for the Prevention and Reduction of Uncontrolled External Migration’ (1994) exist (Tishkov 1997: 38).
focus of the analysis. The discussion also covers the wider institutional setting influencing migration policy. Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show the main institutional bodies involved in the Russian migration regime over the period 1995-2000. Figure 3.2 depicts the three main spheres of influence: Russian state structures; Russian non-governmental organizations; and international organizations. Figure 3.3 shows in more detail the presidential, parliamentary and government agencies which have influence in the sphere of migration. The discussion will demonstrate how conflicting priorities and interests between the different state structures impacts upon adopted policies. The solid and broken lines in Figure 3.3 show the levels of connection which exist within and between the different spheres; the solid lines signify direct connections, the broken lines signify in-direct and tentative connections.

3.3.1 The Federal Migration Service – from ‘protection’ to ‘control’

The increase in forced types of in-migration to the Russian Federation from 1989 demanded the formation of a corresponding federal level state structure. A Committee of Migration was set up within the Ministry of Labour in early 1992. An independent body - the Federal Migration Service of Russia - was established by presidential decree on 14 June 1992. At its maximum size in 1997 the service comprised: a central apparatus of approximately 219 people; eighty nine territorial migration services (TMS) in each of the subjects of the Russian Federation employing a total of 4,000 workers; and additional raion branches in some regions subordinate to the oblast’ service (Kamakin 1998a; Shlichkova 1997; Kirillova 1998). The number of territorial organs and temporary resettlement centres was reduced by twenty per cent in 1998 due to insufficient resources in the budget (Kamakin 1998a). In May 2000, upon a decision by the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, and as part of a wider restructuring of executive federal organs, the Federal Migration Service was abolished. The structure, and its attendant responsibilities, were incorporated into the newly formed Ministry for Federal Affairs, National and Migration Policy of the Russian Federation.

37 The federal structure also included a system of immigration control points; illegal migration centres (in Moscow, Moscow oblast’, St. Petersburg, Leningrad oblast’); representatives of the FMS at Russian consulates abroad; ninety centres of temporary resettlement and two rehabilitation centres (Moscow oblast’, Krasnodar krai)
Figure 3.2 The Institutional Spheres of the Russian Federal Migration Regime
Figure 3.3 The Institutional Framework of the Russian Migration Regime 1995-2000
The Federal Migration Programme: The Federal Migration Service as ‘provider’

The FMS was established as an executive body, but acquired a consultative role. The service was involved in the development of policy and legislation, and then responsible for its implementation. The first federal migration programme, ‘Migratsiia’, introduced in March 1993, was developed by the FMS and a number of other departments and ministries.\footnote{The programme consolidated the position of the service and laid out a wide and optimistic range of tasks covering: the protection of the rights of refugees and forced migrants and help with their resettlement; the formulation of federal and regional migration programmes; the preparation of proposals for legislation in the field of migration; the regulation of migration flows in the country; and programmes for external labour migration and the attraction of foreign labour (Totskii 1996: 36).} Migratsiia was a transitional document that was corrected on an annual basis. In 1997, following an apparent stabilization of the migration situation, the FMS was given the task of formulating a federal programme of migration for the following three years. The Federal Migration Programme (FMP) came into force on 10 November 1997 (Kuznechevskii 1997).\footnote{For a full draft of the Federal Migration Programme 1998-2000, see Sobranie zakonodatel’stva Rossiskoi Federatsii, 1997, No. 47, pp. 9517-9576. Although the FMS was given the task of developing the document, twenty three other governmental and presidential ministries and departments were involved in its formulation (UNHCR 1996: 140).} Responsibility for the fulfillment of the FMP was allocated to the Federal Migration Service, the Ministry of the Economy, the Ministry of Finance, and ‘other interested federal and local administrative organs’. The main areas of the programme were:

- the regulation of migration flows - external, internal and forced, the prevention of negative consequences of spontaneous migration processes, and the formation of a system of immigration control for the prevention of illegal migration
- the realization of the rights of migrants through the improvement of corresponding legislation defining the basic rights of migrants and the obligations of the state
- the development of a mechanism of territorial redistribution of migrants in the interests of the socio-economic development of the state, and the formulation of regional and inter-regional migration programmes.
- the creation of conditions for the reception, accommodation and adaptation of migrants using available budgetary resources
- the development of cooperation with international and Russian social organizations in the area of practical and financial help for migrants
• the realization of the international obligations of Russia in accordance with adopted UN agreements
• the conclusion of inter-state agreements for the protection of refugees and forced migrants, including the effective protection of the rights and legal interests of Russian citizens living abroad

To address the problems of forced migrant resettlement the programme proposed the improvement of points of primary reception and temporary resettlement centres, the availability of monetary and material help to unprotected categories of migrants, improved assistance with finding employment, and the implementation of adaptation programmes for the migrant in the new place of residence. The programme advocated forced migrant resettlement in scarcely populated regions of the Russian Federation. Although individual regions were not listed, as in the earlier Migratsiia programme, the introduction of the differentiated loan system was designed to influence the choice of resettlement of forced migrants and, along with other economic stimuli noted in the programme, to encourage resettlement in areas favoured by the state. As recognized in the 1995 law on forced migrants, the resettlement process was defined in the programme as either being ‘independent’, where state help came in the form of a long-term, interest free loan, or as a ‘group’ at a compact settlement site, where the state provided help for the development of infrastructure and employment.

The debate over whether group/compact or individual migrant resettlement is preferable has been a central issue in the development of migrant resettlement policy. In the FMP independent settlement was recognized, but state support was equally pledged for ‘compact type settlements’. The idea for the creation of compact settlements first appeared in the newspaper Literaturnaia gazeta in July 1990 proposed by the NGO the

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40 The migration programme estimated that monetary help would be given to 120,000 individual migrants and housing for 5,000 migrant families belonging to the ‘socially disadvantaged’ category (Federal’naia Migratsionnaia Programma 1998-2000).
41 The programme proposed the annual allocation of long-term, interest free, returnable loans for the construction or acquisition of housing to 25,000 migrants and annual help for the creation of an engineering infrastructure in compact settlements of forced migrants to 3,000 individuals (ibid). The realization of these proposals, however, in Samara and Saratov oblasti, were largely unrealized (see Chapter 6), as was the case in other regions of the Russian Federation, due to a severe lack of financing.
42 For an in-depth and comprehensive examination of compact settlements as a form of migrant settlement in the Russian Federation see Drought 2000.
‘Civic Assistance Committee’ and gained popularity amongst potential migrants in the former republics who had started to gather into collectives prior to return. Compact settlements seemed to offer a ‘realistic solution’ to the key problems of resettlement – housing, employment and cultural adaptation faced upon return – which were an even greater obstacle for the individual migrant (Grafova et al. 1995: 3).\(^43\) Initial construction began at the end of 1991. There are different estimates of the current numbers of compact settlements in existence. The FMS spoke of about fifty six compact settlements to whom they provided support, whilst the Compatriots’ Fund estimate the number is as high as seven hundred. This discrepancy demonstrates the difficulty in defining what constitutes a ‘compact settlement’ (Filippova 1998: 6).

FMS opinions concerning compact settlements have varied over time. Initially the service feared that the settlements would generate: the exclusion of migrants from Russian society through the concentration of individuals with similar mentalities from the same republic; the potential of ‘Nagorno-Karabakh’ type enclaves; and feelings of superiority of migrants over local Russians reinforced by the nature of the settlements.\(^44\) From 1996, there was a distinct change in the FMS attitude, possibly linked to pressure from non-governmental circles and migrant associations, and the realization that it was more profitable for the FMS to allocate resources for group settlement and construction than to direct help individually. Yet, although the FMP included plans for investment and the creation of work places at compact settlements budgetary constraints meant that these plans were not always realized.\(^45\) Attitudes towards compact settlements underwent another shift in the late 1990s. A consensus that recognized that the

\(^{43}\) Arguments that were made in favour of the creation of compact settlements included: the lack of compensation for housing left behind in the republics; insufficient levels of government support; difficulties faced by individual migrants in the purchase or construction of new housing; the benefit of group efforts in acquiring materials for, and carrying out construction of, housing; the need for the social support of people united by a common poverty and common fate; the desirability of preserving the unique ethno-cultural communities which had developed in the republics over a period of several generations; the ability of a collective to resist the influence of indifference and hostility; and the desire to prove that able and talented workers, rather than ‘dependents’, had migrated to Russia (Grafova et al. 1995: 3–4).

\(^{44}\) The FMS showed its hostility to the idea through its dealings with a number of compact settlements, including the withdrawal of funding for the Novosel compact settlement in Kaluga oblast after a land dispute with the local administration (Grafova et al. 1995: 20).

\(^{45}\) In Samara oblast during 1998-1999 no financial support had been received for the creation of 100 work places at sites of compact settlement envisaged in the FMP (interview conducted by the author with a representative of the Samara territorial migration service, Samara, 30 September 1999).
majority of compact settlements had failed, and that they impeded long-term social and economic integration, was reached by both state and non-state commentators (Gannushkina 1999: INT; Vitkovskaiia 1999: INT). The only successful settlements were those situated close to urban centers with an existing infrastructure. The current state policy offers continued support to existing settlements, however, the formation of new settlements is not encouraged and individual resettlement is prioritized.46

Although resettlement provision directives in the FMP appeared comprehensive, the practical realization of the programme was limited. The reasons lie in both the lack of real resources and the shifting priorities of the FMS.47 From 1992 the FMS attempted to unify two policy directions of the service: the control and redistribution of migration flows according to the interests of the state; and socio-economic support and provision for migrants. The earlier Migratsiia programme was directed more to the solution of the resettlement problems of migrants from the near abroad (Totskii 1996: 38). In the later programme a move was made away from providing assistance to forced migrants, to, as stated by Tat’iana Regent, 'the regulation of migration flows in accordance with the socio-economic and geo-political interests of the Russian state' (Kirillova 1998; Shapenko 1997).48 The programme represented the continued prioritization of 'control' and state interests, over 'provision' and individual interests, within migration policy. The FMS itself drew back from its responsibility for the social provision of migrants, and adopted a wider, more regulatory role to control and manage migration.

The changing status of the Federal Migration Service

The shift in the role of the FMS was accompanied by demands for the service to gain ministry status, led by the then head of the service, Tat’iana Regent. The FMS felt that the absence of a single structure to fully coordinate migration policy, and the lack of

46 Interview conducted by the author with the head of the FMS department for Migration Policy and Data Analysis, Moscow, 24 September 1999.
47 12.5 milliard rubles were allocated to the FMP (1998-2000) in the federal budget. Only 2.4 milliard rubles were received. The deputy head of the Department of International Cooperation of the FMS stated that the reasons for the increasingly restrictive programmes of the FMS were rooted in these economic difficulties. He stated that although Russian cannot deny the 'right' of 'compatriots' to return, the resources do not exist, and that previous migration programmes that had been adapted annually where not fulfilled due to a lack of resources (interview conducted by the author, Moscow, 23 September 1999).
48 In the budget for the Federal Migration Programme 1998-2000, only 3 per cent of the expenditure was to be allocated to working directly with migrants from CIS countries, 65 per cent of this for loans and the construction of housing for migrants (Maksimov 1998).
cooperation and coordination between the different ministries and departments regarding resettlement and migration flows, hindered successful policy fulfillment (Maksimov 1998; Kuznechevskii 1997). The proposal proved untimely as it coincided with severe criticism of the FMS for its infringement of the rights of refugees and forced migrants, and the failure of the service to create a successful 'vertical management structure' with sufficient central control over regional branches. The FMS had been unable to prevent the adoption of damaging legislative acts at the local level which prevented the fulfillment of one of the basic tasks of the service – that of the provision of the relevant status to forced migrants and refugees (Gannushkina 1997: 16; Kamakin 1998a). The reasons lay in a combination of local mis-management, lack of accountability, inexperience and financial negligence in a number of territorial migration services, and the dual subordination of the TMS to both the FMS and individual oblast' governmental departments or heads of local administrations (see Chapter 4).

The increasingly broad agenda of the FMS and its monopoly as a single body over the rights of thousands of migrants was increasingly questioned during the period 1997-1999 (Airapetova 1997c; 1999a). Criticism was made of the FMS having sole control over the implementation of policy, and of being involved in drafting legislation and policy (Lebedeva et al. 1997 cited in Codagnone 1998a: 30). The FMS did not fulfill its responsibility for provision in the areas of employment, housing and compensation, and the only function the service adequately achieved was the defining of status. Although other ministries and departments were given responsibility for specific areas of migrant provision, the tasks were rarely fulfilled (Gannushkina 1997: 16). The fault for this lay both with FMS structures, and the other departments and ministries which, as was seen at the case study level, have been reluctant to accept responsibility for direct migrant provision.49

49 In Samara and Saratov oblasti although other ministries and departments were identified by the TMS as having responsibility for some areas of migrant provision, i.e. employment, these bodies tended to identify the TMS as the sole provider of assistance for forced migrants (this is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6).
A major shift in FMS structure and policy occurred during 1999. In February 1999 Tat’iana Regent, was replaced as head of the FMS by Vladimir Kalamanov. The new head introduced internal changes within the federal structure and initiated the development of a ‘Concept of a State Migration Policy of the Russian Federation’. The draft concepts under discussion during the summer and autumn of 1999, by representatives of the FMS, TMS, government ministries and departments, NGOs and academics, envisaged both transitional and long term approaches to the solution of migration issues. The main priorities of the draft concepts were: the protection of the Russian Federation from the growing threat of illegal migration through increased cooperation between all interested federal ministries; the realization of effective administrative and socio-economic measures to stimulate and control the movement of people to meet the needs of the Russian state; increased regulation and protection of external labour migrants; and the protection of the rights of refugees and forced migrants through correcting procedures of registration and status determination and effective resettlement procedures (Airapetova 1999b; Airapetova 1999c; ‘Proekt kontseptsiiia gosudarstvennoi migratsionnoi politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii’). The priorities reflect the continued importance of ‘security’, and the regulation and control of migration flows. The new head also proposed the creation of a Department of Control to monitor the activities of the service particularly at the regional level and initiated the creation of ‘consultative committees’ made up of representatives of the migration service and migrant organizations at both the federal and regional levels, to make the service both more internally accountable, and open to the public (Airapetova 1999b).

A number of events prevented the full implementation of the envisaged proposals. The intensification of conflict in the autumn of 1999 in Dagestan and Chechnia resulted in

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50 Kalamanov was former head of the Department of Nationality Affairs and then presidential representative to the Republics of North Ossetia (Alaniya) and Ingushetia.
51 The reasons for the development of a national migration policy were seen to be rooted in a desire to raise the status of the FMS, increase its powers, and obtain increased funding for the FMS from the federal budget, concerns which reflect the previous orientations of the service (interviews conducted by the author with Edwin McClain, Chief of Mission, IOM, Moscow, 15 September 1999, and with Galina Vitkovskaja, Scholar-in- Residence, Carnegie Moscow Centre, 23 September 1999).
52 As Vitkovskaja noted although the draft concepts provided for the protection of and provision for forced migrants and refugees, Kalamanov declared at a public meeting discussing the development of the concept that Russia must not provoke migration, but rather that people should remain in the former republics (interview conducted by the author, Moscow, September 1999).
the attention of the migration service, and all available resources, being directed at the humanitarian crisis which ensued. In February 2000, Vladimir Kalamanov was appointed as special presidential representative to Chechnia for ‘safeguarding human rights and liberties’. Finally, on 17 May 2000, a Presidential Decree abolished the Federal Migration Service and incorporated it into the Ministry of Federation Affairs, National and Migration Policy.

The decision to abolish the FMS has been criticized. Early fears that the territorial migration services would be completely abolished, however, have not been realized (www.migrant.ru/index.php/news, 14 August 2000). Recent indications show that not a great deal has changed in the actual structure and operation of the previous service, the regional migration services are now formally considered as regional affiliations of the new ministry. The abolition was interpreted as the further withdrawal of the state from provision for refugees and forced migrants, and the lowering of the status of the problem of migrants within state priorities. The FMS, over its eight year existence, had started to gain the experience and knowledge required to adequately deal with migration issues. It seemed that the process would have to start again and the capabilities of the ministry to deal with such pressing issues as illegal migration were questioned (Airapetova 2000). Yet, the fact that the migration service is now part of a ministerial structure has been heralded by some as an increase in status that could provide more opportunities for the solution of migration related problems.

The significance of transferring the FMS into the Ministry of Federation Affairs, National and Migration Policy with relation to the overall direction of state policy concerning the ‘return’ of Russian populations from the former republics is unclear. The FMS previously worked closely with the former Ministry of Federation and Nationality Affairs mainly in relation to policies towards compatriots in the near abroad, and their integration and residence in the former republics. Thus the move initially suggested a shift towards a further consolidation of the policy of integration.

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53 The decision to appoint Kalamanov received heavy criticism from both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. President Putin had earlier suggested he would name an independent, international ombudsman (RFE/RL Newsline, Part 1, 18 February 2000).

54 Interview conducted by the author with the assistant head of the FMS department for International Cooperation, Moscow, 23 September 1999.
and further restrictions concerning the granting of status and provision for individuals who return. However, for further clarification, the history of the FMS, its incorporation into the Ministry, and the role of the Ministry, needs to be placed within a wider analysis of governmental and parliamentary approaches to the situation of the Russian communities in the 'near abroad' and their 'return'.

3.3.2 Government and parliamentary approaches to migrant 'return' and resettlement

Government and parliamentary approaches to migrant resettlement are firmly located within the development of the dual policy towards the question of the status of the Russian communities still resident in the former republics, and provision for their 'return'. The development of government and parliamentary institutions and legislation shows the shifting of priorities over time, which centre around the contested role of the Russian state towards the Russian communities and the nature of Russian foreign policy vis-à-vis the newly independent states. The interest of the Russian parliament in the situation of the Russian communities resident in the newly independent states influenced the subsequent development of government policy and legislation that prioritized the integration of the Russian populations in these states, and led to the securitization and politicization of the issue of migration. The Russian government formulation of policy concerning the resettlement of the populations on Russian territory, therefore reflected the move towards securitization, and also took into account domestic socio-economic issues.

Government bodies

A number of government ministries are indirectly involved in issues of migrant registration and provision: the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Labour and Social Development and the Federal Employment Service. The Ministry of the

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55 Previously status for those forced migrants who had not successfully resettled after five years was renewed, this practice has now been stopped. The resources available for forced migrant resettlement have been stretched to the limit over the past eighteen months due to the continued conflict in the Chechen Republic
Economy has been particularly involved in the development of regional migration programmes (Maksimov 1998). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the former Ministry of Nationalities and Federation Affairs, the now abolished Ministry for Co-operation with the CIS (incorporated into the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade) and the Governmental Commission on the Affairs of Compatriots have directed their attentions to the Russian communities resident in the former republics. Government ministries and departments are consistently involved in the development of state migration legislation and policy, and were central in the debates over a new concept of a state migration policy which took place in 1999.

The development of government policy towards the question of the resident Russian communities in the ‘near abroad’ reflects wider foreign policy interests, and the influence of parliamentary concerns. In 1991, the foreign policy of the Yeltsin government was directed westwards, and favoured the development of relationships between the Russian Federation and the successor states within an international context. During 1992 the policy was increasingly attacked by factions within the parliament as the ‘near abroad’ came to be seen as a key area of national Russian interest. Following the December 1993 elections there was a shift to the right as the ‘near abroad’, and the protection of the ‘compatriot’ communities, gained greater relevance. Yet although the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Kozyrev, expressed concern about the status of Russian speakers in the ‘near abroad’, he advocated a moderate policy which upheld the use of peaceful means, support for human rights and the protection of national minorities (Pilkington 1998a: 57). The creation of the Governmental Commission on the Affairs of Compatriots in December 1994 reflected the increased concern. The commission includes representatives of most governmental, presidential and

56 Other ministries have developed policies regarding specific migration flows: the Ministry of Defence (concerning the return of military personnel from Eastern Europe and the FSU), the former Ministry of Nationalities and Federation Affairs (concerning the return of formerly deported ethnic groups), and the State Committee for the North (concerning the out-migration from regions of the Far North to Central and Southern parts of the Russian Federation).

57 As Codagnone notes, the involvement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Internal Affairs is in line with other states’ practices towards migration at an international level, whereas the involvement of the former Ministry of Federation and Nationality Affairs and the former Ministry for Co-operation with the CIS is peculiar to the Russian situation (1998a: 30).

58 For a detailed discussion of this debate see Pilkington 1998a: 50-60.

59 The advocacy of a moderate policy may have been influenced by the desire of key members of the Russian government to develop inter-state relations on the basis of international law and the protection of human rights, rather than on the basis of ethno-nationalist claims (Melvin 1998: 41).
Parliamentary bodies related to the question of the Russian communities in the 'near abroad' and representatives of NGOs, and is responsible for coordinating activity and the realization of policy with regard to 'compatriot' issues (Tishkov 1996: 47; Codagnone 1998a: 30). Evidence of recent years, however, shows that the precise role of the commission has been unclear and it has had little influence in the implementation of agreements. It has been suggested that the body was created merely to show evidence of help to the compatriots in the 'near abroad' (Karelin 1998; Lebedev 1999a).60

Parliamentary approaches

The Russian parliamentary approach to migration has been dominated by a concern for the rights of Russians in the near abroad. The initial approach of the parliament was characterized by a neo-imperialist stance advocating the active involvement of the Russian state in deciding the fate of the 'compatriot' communities. The Committee on CIS Affairs and Relations with Compatriots was created to further this policy. A sub-committee of the body was subsequently formed – the Parliamentary Commission on Refugee and Forced Migrant Affairs – which combined parliamentary and NGO forces and was central in the re-working of the amendments to the forced migrant law in 1995. However, although the sub-committee brought the two interest groups together, the priorities of the representative bodies of the State Duma and non-governmental organizations regarding the fate of the Russian communities differed. The parliamentary position favoured a policy of promoting integration whilst the NGO lobby championed the right of Russians to return (Pilkington 1998a: 53). At the time of the parliamentary elections in December 1995 a powerful bloc of support for the Russian communities seemed to have developed in the form of the Congress of Russian Communities. However, their showing in the elections was poor and following this, parliamentary interest declined concerning the fate of the Russians in the near abroad.

The decline in interest may reflect the consensus that was reached by 1995 between both government and parliamentary bodies over the need to develop official government policy towards the Russian settler communities, and the development of

60 In late 2000 the government approved procedures for the use of funds allocated for measures to assist 'compatriots' living in the CIS and Baltic Countries, which may increase the influence of the Commission (Sokolova 2000).
the corresponding programmes of action (see above). That these programmes have not been implemented, however, has meant the Russian parliament has been keen to keep the issue on the political agenda (Melvin 1998: 40). The Committee on CIS Affairs and Relations with Compatriots was involved in the development of a draft bill on repatriation over the period 1996-1997 (see Chapter 2). The main responsibility for the development of the federal law ‘Concerning the State Policy of the Russian Federation in Relation to Compatriots Abroad’, adopted in March 1999, also lay with the Committee on CIS Affairs and Relations with Compatriots. The broad definition of ‘compatriots’ contained within the law, that comprises all individuals linked culturally, historically, and spiritually to Russia, and therefore refutes an ethnic principle of belonging, is commendable. However, the presence, and adoption of the law, is also a sign of the continued desire of the Russian state to maintain influence beyond the borders of the Russian state. The Committee on CIS Affairs and Relations with Compatriots continues to push for the protection of the rights of the ethnic Russian and Russian speaking populations in the ‘near abroad’ witnessed in a statement by the Committee chairman in February 2001 advocating an increase in Russian state protection for these communities (RFE/RL Newsline 2001, 12 February).

Although parliamentary concern is primarily directed at the Russian communities still resident in the former republics, there are a number of voices within the parliament which lobby for the rights of Russians upon ‘return’. In 1998, as a result of the permanent petitioning by certain deputies of the State Duma and a number of social organizations, an inter-departmental Parliamentary Commission on Migration Policy was established. The formation of the commission was seen as a sign of recognition of

61 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation approved by President Putin on June 28, 2000, contained clear references to continued support for the Russian communities: amongst its general principles was the stated aim ‘to uphold in every possible way the rights of Russian citizens and fellow countrymen abroad’. The need to protect the rights of Russian citizens and compatriots abroad was also noted in the section on human rights and international relations, and in regional priorities regarding the CIS and Baltic States.

62 Parliamentary concern with the protection of compatriots is reflected in the creation of another organ in November 1996, the Council of Compatriots. The organ is a permanently operating consultative body composed of the representatives of associations of compatriots living abroad (Codagnone 1998a: 30). In 1999 the organ was extended to include representatives of Russian communities from the ‘far abroad’ (Lebedev 1999b).

The Commission includes heads of seventeen ministries and departments, deputies of the State Duma, and two representatives of social organizations. In addition, under the speaker of the State Duma, the ‘Council of Migrant Associations’ was created, which is made up of representatives from federal and regional level migrant associations.64

Another body which has influenced Russian migration policy is the Security Council, which is part of the presidential apparatus. The Security Council has attempted to make migration a matter of security and national interest (Codagnone 1998a: 30). The Inter-Departmental Commission on Social Security of the Security Council was integral to the introduction of a mechanism for limiting migration flows into Russia based on the fear that large migration flows would be a de-stabilizing influence (Fadin 1994 in Pilkington 1998a: 58). The Security Council pursues the line that as Russia is unable to provide adequate provision for migrants, then flows must be restricted in the protection of national interest – otherwise migrant communities could provide a source for resurgent nationalist-communist sentiment (Pilkington 1998a: 59).65 The priorities of the Security Council regarding migration brought it into conflict with the FMS. An investigation by the Inter-Departmental Commission of the Security Council in 1997-1998 found that the FMS’s lack of control over the activity of its regional branches resulted in the distortion of state national policy and led to demands for the reform of the migration service particularly at a regional level (Kamakin 1998a).

The approach of parliamentary and government institutions to the issue of migrant ‘return’ and ‘resettlement’, reflects the dual policy towards the Russian communities in the former republics, that of reserved acceptance of resettlement, but prioritization of

63 Svetlana Gannushkina who is one of the NGO representatives on the parliamentary Commission, although recognizing the necessity of the Commission, stated in September 1999, that the commission was not operating. However, she felt that her membership was useful as she quoted it in any correspondence on migration issues, which often had the desired effect (interview conducted by the author, Moscow, 13 September 1999).
64 The political purpose of this council however has been questioned by Lidiia Grafova, head of the Forum of Migrant Associations, who claims the Communist Party has approached associations within the Forum and has made ‘empty promises’ in order to attract their support. A number of organizations subsequently left the Forum (see below) (interview conducted by the author, Moscow, 22 September 1999).
65 Taking into account the demographic profile of the migrant population, they actually appear to be a likely pro-democratic, reform electorate. It is the disillusionment of resettlement experience which encourages reactionary tendencies (Vitkovskaia 1997).
the right to remain. With respect to the position of the Russian communities in the 'near abroad', parliamentary debate set the agenda to which the executive (the government) reacted, that resulted in a consensus between the different institutional spheres in support of the right of the Russian communities to remain. This was part of, and reflected, the re-direction of the foreign policy concerns of the Russian government away from the west, towards the former Soviet republics. Although any practical and material realization of the 'integration' policy has been limited, the discourse has established Russia's special role as protector of the Russian communities who live in the former republics and establishes Russia as a wider 'natural' homeland (see Chapter 2). The implication of the consensus, however, also influenced the development of migration legislation, resettlement policy, and the role of the Federal Migration Service. All three moved away from 'provision' for forced migrants, towards the securitization and control of migration flows.

A shift in the 'dual' policy?
Towards the end of 2000, however, signs of a shift in government policy towards the Russian communities appeared. The possible change is rooted in the increasing significance of the demographic question for post-Soviet Russia. Over the past decade Russia has witnessed a continual negative natural population growth due to rising death rates and falling birth rates. This decline has partly been compensated for by levels of in-migration from the 'near abroad', however, those migration flows have been continually falling since 1995. In November 2000, President Putin suggested that increased immigration from the former Soviet republics to Russia might solve the country's demographic problems. Although Putin was not specific, it is highly probable that he had in mind the twenty million ethnic Russians in the former republics, rather than the non-Russian populations from these countries (Goble 2000). Significantly,

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66 At the end of 2000, the Russian population had suffered a negative natural population growth of 6 million since 1992. However, this has been compensated for by the levels of in-migration from the ‘near abroad’, officially recognized as around 3 million, but unofficially as high as 8 million. This is indicated by the figures for the actual total population at the end of 1991 being 148,704,300, and at the end of 1998, 146,693,300, so in real terms over this period the actual decline was only 2 million (Goskokmstat Rossi: 1999b: 18). According to some forecasts, Russia could move from being the seventh most populated country in the world to the fourteenth by 2015 if the negative growth of population continues (RFE/RL Newsline, Part 1, 20 November 2000).

67 Putin advocated the formulation of a migration policy by the government directing immigrants to specific areas of Russia, including Siberia, once that priority industries and regions have been determined (Goble 2000).
taking into account the previous direction of parliamentary thinking, a number of parliamentary deputies have called for the state sponsored repatriation of the Russian communities to help solve the demographic crisis.\(^{68}\) In February 2001, Prime Minister Kasianov, stated that the continuing decline in the population of Russia represents a threat to the country's economic, political and national security and advocated a programme to correct the situation by trying to attract Russian migrants from the former Soviet republics. Subsequently, the Russian government gave responsibility to the Ministry of Federal Affairs, National and Migration Policy, and other relevant structures, to develop a programme for 2001, and a long-term migration policy for 2002-2005. Both documents were to devote particular attention to providing support for displaced persons (Goble 2001).\(^{69}\)

Such a policy would represent a dramatic reversal of the previous dominant tendency in governmental circles to encourage the integration of Russian communities in the former republics and, for the first time, will encourage the unlimited 'return' of these populations. However, there has been criticism of the implications of pursuing such a policy. Encouragement by the Russian state of the mass migration of 'ethnic' Russians from the former republics would problematize the future residence of those who wish to remain, may prevent the communities from attempting to fully integrate, and would affect Moscow's relations with the states it has long declared its primary foreign policy focus. It is likely the policy would be accompanied by the increased restriction of the in-migration of non-ethnic Russians. Doubts have also been expressed about the capabilities of the Russian state to find the funds needed for such an effort in the current economic climate, taking into account the fact that the Russian government has failed to meet its obligations to those who have already returned (ibid).

\(^{68}\) The deputies were both members of centrist factions and in December 2000 also called for the introduction of a repatriation law, and accompanying programme of repatriation, to encourage the 'return' of the Russian communities in the 'near abroad' as a way of solving the demographic 'crisis' (Smirnova, Alksins 2000a, 2000b).

\(^{69}\) Russian officials suggested that such new programmes could attract as many as three to five million people a year back to the Russian Federation (Goble 2001).
3.4 Non-governmental actors in the Russian migration regime

3.4.1 Russian non-governmental organizations

The origin, and development, of Russian non-governmental organizations in the migration sphere reflects the specific nature of the migration regime in post-Soviet Russia. The organizations have focused predominantly upon the issues of Russian forced migrants, rather than on refugees from the ‘far abroad’. The first organizations evolved soon after the initial large-scale migration movements took place in 1989 and 1990; up to this point there were no informal, non-state organizations concerned with migrant or refugee issues. Over the following decade, in the face of ineffective legislation, a lack of concrete state support for migrant resettlement, the infringement of the rights of refugees and forced migrants, and the shift in the role of the FMS from one of provision to control, the role of NGOs strengthened. The organizations attempted to protect the rights of migrants and refugees, fill a gap left by the state in migrant provision, and develop strategies and methods to better represent migrant interests within official institutions and legislative practices. Through their discourse and activities, they provided an alternative construction of the ‘return’ and resettlement of the Russian communities than that developed by the state; one of welcoming the ‘return’ of ‘repatriaties’ and prioritizing their provision and successful resettlement.

The development of the federal level organizations directed at helping refugees and forced migrants originated primarily in Moscow amongst activists from professional legal, journalistic and academic backgrounds. At the same time self-initiated migrant associations began to develop at the regional level. The origins, priorities, and nature of the federal level NGOs and regional level migrant associations differ significantly. The federal level Moscow based groups were NGOs in the more ‘true’ sense of the term, rooted in the circles of the liberal intelligentsia and former dissidents, and the

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70 The regional activity and significance of international and federal bodies, and the development of regional level, migrant NGOs are explored in Chapters 4, 5 and 7, both on a Russian wide regional basis and in the two case study regions of Samara and Saratov.
experience of the informal groups of the perestroika period. This background is reflected in the predominantly political nature of the federal organizations and their defence of ‘human rights’, alongside the provision of humanitarian assistance. The local organizations, established by groups of returning migrants, are more pragmatic and focus upon socio-economic concerns. They are not always ‘strictly’ NGOs, but may be informal self-help groups or commercial legal entities involved in commercial or industrial activities and/or attached to a compact settlement site; however, they are still concerned with migrants’ rights and the socio-economic integration of migrants into society (Codagnone 1998a: 31). Over the period of their evolution institutional links have developed to connect the federal and regional level non-governmental migrant sectors.

The Civic Assistance Committee
The Civic Assistance Committee (CAC) was created in 1990 following the outbreak of violence in Baku, Azerbaijan, and the arrival of the first refugees in Moscow. The organization was the first non-governmental body concerned with refugees and forced migrants to be created in Russia. The committee is headed by a joint committee of Svetlana Gannushkina (an academic and legal expert), Lidiia Grafova (a journalist at Literaturnaia gazeta) and Viacheslav Igrunov (a state deputy, human rights campaigner and former dissident). The primary role of CAC is to serve as a mediating body between refugees, forced migrants and state structures on questions of status, registration, and social provision (Gannushkina 1997: INT). CAC provides information and basic material aid to refugees and forced migrants, and attempts to influence state

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71 Stephenson (2000) provides a detailed break down of the post-Soviet Russian voluntary sector. Two of the ‘types’ of NGOs she identifies are those rooted in the ex-dissident movement (such as ‘Memorial’ discussed below) that primarily champion human rights, and the NGO sphere which has developed in recent years to care for the most underprivileged, including migrants and refugees. These organizations have been created by professionals (teachers, doctors, lawyers etc.) who are able to make an independent living and/or use the resources of western Foundations. The organizations have become a driving force in the voluntary sector working mainly in ‘opposition’ to the state through lobbying and directing resources to the most needy. Stephenson is critical, however, of the predominantly paternalistic approach which is adopted by the organizations who rarely develop self-organization or self-help initiatives. Stephenson includes the Civic Assistance Committee headed by the academic Svetlana Gannushkina (discussed below) in this sphere. Both of the latter ‘type’ of organization are distinct from local self-help organizations.

72 The committee holds a twice weekly reception providing material, humanitarian, medical and legal help for migrants, and has established an education/adaptation centre for migrant and refugee children.
policy through lobbying on behalf of migrants and involvement in the formulation of legislation. Over recent years the Committee has made a large number of successful representations of migrants in court, particularly over the question of registration in the city of Moscow (Gannushkina 1999: INT). Although conflict has arisen with the FMS over questions of government migration policy, CAC accepts that it is necessary to work with state structures and does not claim that NGOs should or can replace basic services offered by the state, or other professionals such as lawyers (Gannushkina 1997: 13; 1999: INT). The organization has received financial support from Helsinki Human Rights Watch and UNHCR, and cooperates with these organizations, Doctors Without Borders, Equilibre, the Quakers, and Moscow Caritas.

The human rights organization ‘Memorial’ is closely linked to CAC. The main focus of the organization is the defence of the legal rights of refugees and forced migrants, it uses the activity of CAC as a base for its more analytical work. ‘Memorial’ is involved in two major programmes with the CAC: the organization of a legal consultation network for refugees and forced migrants across the territory of the Russian Federation; and a programme for the analysis of the situation of refugees and forced migrants in Russia. The legal consultation points provide access to a widespread network of information and advice for a large number of refugees and forced migrants. At the inter-state level ‘Memorial’ was an active participant in the preparation for the 1996 CIS Geneva Conference and in the follow-up discussions concerning the implementation of the Programme of Action (Memorial 1997a: 4-5).

The Coordinating Council for Aid to Refugees and Forced Migrants.
The Coordinating Council for Aid to Refugees and Forced Migrants (CCARFM) evolved from CAC, under the chairmanship of Lidiia Grafova. The council was officially formed in April 1993 with the support of international bodies as an umbrella

73 Gannushkina stated that the committee has a positive relationship with a number of governmental officials and bodies, primarily the chief procurator in Moscow and the Ministry of Health. Less productive relations exist with the Ministry of Education and the Committee for Social Protection in Moscow (interview conducted by the author, Moscow, 13 September 1999).
74 As Svetlana Gannushkina stated, the organizations are made up of one and the same people (interview conducted by the author, Moscow, 13 September 1999).
75 The programme was originally supported by UNHCR and is to be extended into fifty regions of Russia due to a recent funding grant received from Tacis (interview conducted by the author with Svetlana Gannushkina, Moscow, 13 September 1999).
organization to coordinate twenty eight separate NGOs and forty seven individuals. CCARFM has a dual approach to migration issues: lobbying for migrants’ rights and influencing migration policy and legislation; and direct involvement in the resettlement of forced migrants. Representatives of CCARFM are present in a number of presidential and governmental structures. Lidiia Grafova is a member of the Governmental Commission on Affairs of Compatriots Abroad. The council also works with the Parliamentary Committee on CIS Affairs and Relations with Compatriots and its Sub-committee on Refugee and Forced Migrant Affairs. The organization attempts to bring migration issues into the public arena and to positively influence public opinion.

The work of the council as a lobbying, pressure group is enhanced through the experience of providing direct assistance and advice to migrants at the level of resettlement. CCARFM holds weekly receptions for forced migrants providing legal, medical and material aid. In 1995 the council published a handbook Kompas, updated in 1998, that provides an important source of information for forced migrants and refugees. The handbook details legislation, advice on migrants rights, and information about relevant state and non-state bodies, and is distributed widely to migrant, state and NGO organizations throughout the Russian Federation. CCARFM has been heavily involved in the development of compact settlements, both researching the viability of settlements, and providing legal and organizational help to a number of individual settlements. CCARFM, at present, operates as the permanently functioning working apparatus for the Forum of Migrant Associations.

The Forum of Migrant Associations

The Forum of Migrant Associations is an umbrella organization for federal level migrant NGOs, and the widespread network of migrant associations which exist in the Russian Federation. The initial aim of the forum was to create a general mass

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76 Regular publications are prepared and distributed amongst state and non-state organs. Lidiia Grafova, over the course of the last decade, has consistently published articles on refugee and forced migrant issues in the Russian press.

77 The weekly reception is supported by funds from UNHCR.

78 The member associations of the Forum now number more than 170 in forty seven regions of Russia, together with five organizations located in the former republics of Uzbekistan, Latvia, Kazakhstan,
movement to foster the idea of the transformation of a chaotic form of migration to that of organized resettlement. The initiative for the first meeting of regional migrant associations and federal level NGOs came from leaders of a number of migrant associations and CCARFM. The inaugural meeting was held in April 1996 and involved representatives of eighty seven migrant associations from twenty seven regions of Russia, State Duma deputies and representatives of different ministries, Russian human rights organizations, IOM and UNHCR. Further meetings of the Forum have been held in April 1998 and April 2000.

The organizational structure of the Forum comprises a central core of federal level NGOs and a permanently acting executive committee elected for a period of two years. The aim of the Forum was to extend out to the regions of the Russian Federation through a network of seven umbrella migrant organizations which would provide support for smaller organizations, represent their interests at the federal level, and facilitate the development of new organizations. The Forum has developed in size and scope over the period of its existence. Its current activities are: to enable the self-organization of migrant groups and facilitate their growth and development through seminars, training and the provision of technical equipment; the creation of an information network and constant exchange of information between migrant organizations through the information-analytical centre in Moscow, twenty regional information points, the Forum internet page, and distribution of the Forum’s newspaper Vestnik; and the continued representation of migrants’ rights and influence on policy.

Turkmenistan, and the Kyrgyz Republic (interview conducted by the author with Lidiia Grafova, Moscow, 22 September 1999).

79 The members of the first executive committee of the Forum were N. Tagil’tseva of the Ural Association of Refugees, A. Zuev of ‘Saratovskii Istochnik’, B. Krasnov of ‘Khoko’, G. Pafailov of the Association for help to refugees in St. Petersburg, V. Nemov of ‘TOO Servistsentr’, and V. Zakhvatov of ‘TO – Grinvyd’, and representatives of the Compatriots Fund and Lidiia Grafova. Apart from Grafova and Krasnov, none of the other original executive members were elected to the current executive committee in April 2000.

80 The seven organizations were located in: the South West (St. Petersburg); Central Russia (either Yaroslavl’, Tver’ or Moscow); the Central Black Earth region (either Belgorod, Lipetsk or Voronezh); Southern Russia (either Rostov or Krasnodar); the Volga region (Saratov); the Urals (Ekaterinburg); and Siberia or the Far East (either Omsk or Novosibirsk). The Ural Association of refugees and the Association of forced migrants ‘Saratovskii Istochnik’ were to serve as examples for the development of like organizations in the other regions.
through the mass media, and participation in parliamentary and governmental bodies (www.migrant.ru/index.php/news, 14 August 2000). At the latest Forum meeting in April 2000 the development of a programme ‘Forum of Migrant Associations to the year 2003’ was initiated. The Forum demanded that the Russian Government immediately develop a concept of a state migration policy, allocate funds from the federal budget for the migration policy and work out a law on migration with a classification of types of migrants, their rights, and the responsibilities of state organs at different levels (www.migrant.ru/index.php/news, 14 August 2000).

The Forum of Migrant Associations has become central to both federal and regional level non-state activity concerning forced migrants and refugees. The mass movement has been interpreted by some as a sign of the political strength of migrants and their ability to articulate their demands, and be heard, at the level of the Russian government (Filippov 1998). However, the Forum has been accused of representing an ‘NGO monopoly’ which has created a ‘battleground’ between different migrant organizations vying for western grants and projects. Those organizations who succeed in being included in the Forum, and getting the support of Grafova, receive assistance; those who are excluded are left to survive alone (Airapetova 1998a). Over the last year conflicts have developed within the Forum due to the ‘ politicization’ of certain regional associations. The ‘Council of Migrant Associations’, formed under the State Duma is predominantly made up of migrant associations who support the Communist Party; these migrant associations have broken away from the Forum (Vitkovskaia 1999: INT). Representatives of the FMS and UNHCR praised the Council of Migrant Associations under the Duma. However, it seems to exist in opposition to the Forum.

**The Compatriots Fund (Russian Fund for Aid to Refugees)**

The Compatriots Fund (Russian Fund for Aid to Refugees) is not connected to such an extent to the other main organizations. The reasons for this are rooted in the origins of the organization. The fund was created in 1991 by the former deputy of the Committee on Population Migration (Drought 2000: 97). The organization began its existence as a semi-state structure. In 1992 the Fund was allocated 600,000 US dollars by the Ministry
of Finance to fund the creation of workplaces for forced migrants and refugees at compact settlements and in small enterprises (Drought 2000: 97) and the organization signed an agreement with the Federal Employment Service for a joint programme of action and help in the functioning of about 700 migrant organizations in different regions of Russia (Heradstveit 1993: 55, Pilkington 1998a: 78-79). In 1994 there was a change in its role as state support ceased and it assumed the role of an independent non-governmental organization.84 Problems arose between the Compatriots Fund and the FMS over the allocation of state resources to a ‘non-state’ body, and subsequently over the misuse of these resources. However, the relationship improved after the appointment of Viktor Kalamanov.85

Through their regional level projects the Fund stresses: the use of migrant initiative and direct participation; the involvement of the local community; and the facilitation of cooperation between organizations and enterprises of forced migrants with state ministries, departments and local administrations. There are now forty-five regional branches of the Compatriots Fund86 and in many regions the Fund has concluded agreements with local administrations guaranteeing tax and land privileges for migrant organizations and enterprises regarding general resettlement, housing and employment (Tishkov 1996: 219). The Fund’s projects focus on the creation of work places, through support to migrant group enterprises which can subsequently provide the funds and materials for the construction of housing. The Fund supports the idea of migrant communities (obshchina) – a group of migrants form a community, made up of a central ‘social’ organization and commercial enterprises, that collaborates in enterprise production and the construction of housing at a site of settlement, but insists the community should be located near an existing urban settlement. The Fund today is the only ‘non-governmental’ body concerned with migrant provision which ‘nominally’

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84 This is probably attributable to the increasingly critical stance of the fund vis à vis the FMS (Pilkington 1998a: 78).
85 The more cooperative relationship which developed between the Fund and the FMS was attributed by Edwin McClain Chief of Mission, IOM, Moscow to the better understanding on the side of the FMS of the role of NGOs in society, their relationship to the government, and their role in migrant provision (interview conducted by the author, Moscow, 15 September 1999).
86 This figure was given by a representative of the Compatriots Fund in Moscow (interview conducted by the author, Moscow, 9 September 1999).
receives state subsidies for its work at compact settlement sites.\textsuperscript{87}

\textit{Relations with the state}

The development of the Civic Assistance Committee, the Coordinating Council and the Forum of Migrant Associations has been closely linked although they have developed their own priorities and approaches to migration issues.\textsuperscript{88} The three organizations evolved completely independently of, and in opposition to the state, and saw their role as both challenging state policy, and filling a ‘gap’ left by the ineffectiveness and inadequacy of state action. This demonstrates the ‘dual structure’ of the organizations – as political, human rights organizations which champion the rights of migrants, and as providers of humanitarian and direct assistance to migrants and migrant associations. Although the organizations evolved as critics of the FMS and the Russian government policy towards forced migrants, relations with the FMS, and government and parliamentary bodies, have improved as a result of the inclusion of the NGOs within joint-institutional structures. This improvement has required compromise and movement on the side of both the state and non-state structures. As yet, the relationship cannot be described as one of ‘partnership’ but mutual cooperation and acceptance is apparent which has been facilitated by the development of institutional structures which include both state and non-state representatives and that have allowed participation in legislative development.\textsuperscript{89} However, in the environment of a continued lack of state funding, the state could attempt to increasingly shift the burden for social help and provision away from the state and solely, and not necessarily with the accompanying input of resources, to the non-governmental sphere.

\textsuperscript{87} In September 1999 a representative of the Fund stated that its work at compact settlement sites was on hold due to no resources being received from either the state, or from international donors (interview conducted by the author, Moscow, 9 September 1999).

\textsuperscript{88} Lidiia Grafova described them as making up a set of Russian matreshka dolls (interview conducted by the author, Moscow, 22 September 1999).

\textsuperscript{89} The head of the FMS department for Migration Policy and Data Analysis noted the more effective relationship existing between the FMS and NGO sphere and stated that responsibilities and resources for certain tasks could be handed over to the NGO organizations. However, she stressed the need for this to be established on a legal, contractual basis to ensure that responsibilities were adequately and professionally fulfilled (interview conducted by the author, Moscow, 24 September 1999). As yet, in post-Soviet Russia, NGOs very rarely receive government funding, especially at the federal level. A law is currently being proposed by the NGO sector to allow ‘social contracting out’ where the state would commission ‘welfare’ projects from NGOs (Stephenson 2000: 289).
The Compatriots Fund differs from the other main federal level non-governmental organizations both in its activities and the nature of its relationship with the state. Rather than the political and human rights of migrants, the Fund focuses upon socio-economic provision and assistance for migrant resettlement. Its emergence as a semi-state structure set the organization apart. The previous relationship could have been seen as one of 'partnership' between a state and non-state structure based upon a cooperative financial relationship, the reality was more that the Compatriots Fund worked as an extension of the state.90 There is not a great deal of cooperation between the Fund and the other Moscow based organizations. Although the Fund was one of the joint organizers of the first meeting of the Forum of Migrant Associations in April 1996, and a member of the first executive committee, links with the Forum have broken down, and the Compatriots Fund clearly separates itself from the activity of the Forum which a representative of the Compatriots Fund identified as purely ‘legal’.91

3.4.2 International actors in the Russian migration regime

International organizations concerned with migration issues have become a significant sector within the Russian and post-Soviet migration regimes. The international organizations provide one of the key links with the global migration regime of which Russia has become a part. The nature of this wider migration regime, and the activities of international organizations on Russian territory, have influenced the development of the national migration regime, regional migration regimes and individual migrant resettlement.

As is the case for both Russian state and non-state bodies, a number of different priorities influence the activities of western actors within the Russian migration regime; economic, political and ideological. Initial reactions of western governments to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ‘threat’ of possible large-scale migration flows from the east led to the consolidation of a ‘Fortress Europe’ (UNHCR 1995: 24). Western governments were keen for institutional and legislative structures to develop

90 Stephenson notes that in post-Soviet Russia dependency upon government funding can significantly undermine the capacity of the voluntary sector to put forward alternative ideas and be an equal partner of the state (2000: 277).
91 Interview conducted by the author with a representative of the Compatriots Fund, Moscow, 9 September 1999.
on the territories of the former Soviet Union so that the migration flows would be managed and controlled within the post-Soviet space. The concern was reflected in the participation of western governments in the 1996 Geneva CIS Conference, and their support for the subsequent ‘Programme of Action’. As the fear of the ‘threat’ has decreased, however, the amounts of money being allocated by donor countries for the solution of migration problems on the territory of the FSU have been reduced, which has impacted upon the programmes, priorities and capabilities of international organizations (Forced Migration Monitor 1998: 4).92

The specifics of the post-Soviet migration space have influenced the action of international organizations. As a representative of UNHCR stated in 1992; Russia was unknown territory, it had not been part of the global migration regime and there was very little information indicating the necessity of international help as the extent of population displacement was unknown to the world community (Mikheev 1996). The initial activity of international organizations was marked by uncertainty, a reluctance to get directly involved in the regulation of migration issues, and an often inefficient and patronizing level of assistance to local NGO groups (Grafova 1995; Schwarz 1995 in Pilkington 1998a: 82). Greater understanding of the complexity of the problems of migration flows in the post-Soviet space has developed, there is more cooperation between different international actors, and facilitating and enabling links between international and domestic NGOs and governments have evolved. Nevertheless, the activity of international organizations on Russian territory demands a more critical approach to provide a fuller picture of the impact of western organizations, western funding and western priorities concerning migration issues in the Russian Federation and post-Soviet space.93

92 The Open Society Institute, funded by Soros, ran a programme ‘Forced Migration Projects’ which concentrated on issues of forced migration and displacement in the post-Soviet space. However, at the end of 1999, the programme was suddenly curtailed. The reason given for the curtailment was ‘strategic consolidation’ within the OSI (www.soros.org/fmp2/html/july1999.html, 20 April 2001).
93 The wider debate around the impact of western funding bodies and development aid is not dealt with in detail in the thesis although the conclusions drawn from the experience of the migration sphere can provide a valuable contribution to this ongoing debate. For a more in-depth discussion of the debate see: Thomson 2001; Kay 2000; Hemment 1999; Bruno 1998.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

A regional branch of UNHCR opened in Moscow on 6 October 1992 following the signing of an agreement with the Russian government. The agreement was succeeded by the accession of the Russia Federation to the UN Convention of 1951 and Protocol of 1967. The creation of the FMS and the introduction of the laws on forced migrants and refugees were recognized by UNHCR as the first institutional and legislative steps for the realization of the organization’s aims: to ensure the realization of laws in accordance with international standards; to uphold the principle of non-refoulement; to ensure the correct and fair procedure of defining refugee status; and to assist in the elaboration of long-term solutions to the problems of refugees (Migratsiia 1996: 35; Silvestri 1997: 7). The UNHCR mandate establishes the organization’s responsibility for ‘refugees’ as defined in UN legislation. Initially, this placed restrictions upon UNHCR’s action in the Russian Federation. However, the experience of the situation in Russia led to the widening of UNHCR activity to include internally displaced persons and forced migrants from the former republics of the Soviet Union (Migratsiia 1996: 35).

The work of UNHCR is divided into support for the legislative and institutional development of migration structures, and the provision of direct assistance to different categories of migrants. UNHCR has been involved in the evaluation and formulation of national legislation on refugees and forced migrants in cooperation with the FMS, other federal departments and the State Duma. The organization has provided support and training for Russian structures working with refugees at both the federal and regional level, specifically regarding correct status determination of both forced migrants and asylum seekers from the far abroad. UNHCR plays an important role in the provision of direct assistance to migrants. The organization implemented a series of regional micro-credit projects targeted at Russian forced migrants through the American NGO Opportunity International, and a project in Stavropol krai through the Danish Refugee Council to provide loans specifically for internally displaced persons. In addition, UNHCR has provided emergency humanitarian assistance in areas affected by conflict. UNHCR runs a ‘Capacity Building Programme’ to facilitate the development of regional migrant associations and provides grants for the implementation of larger scale
projects to already established migrant associations. As referred to earlier, UNHCR cooperates with, and provides technical and resource support for, a number of federal level NGOs and their programmes.

*The International Organization of Migration*

IOM is the main international organization outside the UN system that specifically assists migrants and refugees. The global objective of IOM is ‘to ensure throughout the world the orderly migration of persons who are in need of international assistance’. To fulfil this objective the organization responds to requests of individual states in coordination with international and non-governmental institutions (Rogers and Copeland 1993: 37). In March 1992, IOM signed an agreement of cooperation with the government of the Russian Federation and opened a regional bureau in Moscow. The original areas of IOM activity in Russia encompassed: institution building in the field of migration; information activities; direct assistance to migrant groups; and other migration operations (IOM 1997b: 18-21). IOM organized training seminars and foreign exchange visits for representatives of the FMS, other governmental departments and NGOs and provided equipment for the development of the infrastructure of the central FMS, TMS, temporary resettlement centres, immigration control posts and NGOs (IOM 1997b: 19). The organization also worked through its migrant processing centre in Moscow, to aid emigration from the Russian Federation, and the return of stranded students from developing countries (IOM 1997b: 21). The IOM ‘Direct Assistance Programme’ (DAP) provided the most immediate, ground level help to facilitate the resettlement of forced migrants on the territory of Russia. DAP began in 1993, and provided equipment to help migrant organizations form small private enterprises.

The priorities and activities of IOM underwent a significant change from 1999 due to internal changes in the staffing of the organization, and the reduction of resources available for funding the existing programmes. The lack of resources was due to a

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94 The Capacity Building Programme was part of the Programme of Action developed at the 1996 CIS Conference.

95 By November 1997 representatives of the IOM had visited over 150 resettlement sites, among them over 100 have been assisted in the amount of approximately 1,000,000 US dollars (IOM 1997b: 20).
decrease in contributions from donor countries, and the impact of humanitarian and refugee crisis in other parts of the world – namely Kosovo, Macedonia, Albania and Bosnia. The main priorities of the organization became: direct assistance to migrants in four targeted regions of the Russian Federation specifically through the establishment of micro-credit programmes; the improvement of health care services for displaced persons (in conjunction with the Red Cross); and migration management and border control (in conjunction with the Russian government and relevant ministries). The head of the IOM mission in Moscow attributes the shift in focus, and narrowing of the scope of IOM programmes in the Russian Federation, to a realization of the mass nature of the problems being faced, and the need to target resources (McClain 1999: INT).

Amongst other international organizations active in the Russian Federation are Caritas (the International Confederation of Catholic Organizations of Church Charity and Social Help) and the International Red Cross. Caritas acts through the Russian branch of the organization which was set up in Moscow in 1992. The organization initially cooperated with UNHCR on a programme for refugees from the third world, but from October 1993 began work with migrants from CIS and the Baltic Republics. The organization has a permanent reception at the Moscow FMS where it provides additional social support and emergency material help for both forced migrants from the FSU and refugees from the far abroad. A regional delegation of the International Red Cross opened in Moscow in 1992. The organization is entrusted with ensuring that displaced persons are treated and assisted in accordance with international humanitarian law. The organization has been heavily involved in providing humanitarian assistance to displaced persons particularly in Chechnia, Ingushetia and Northern Ossetia. The Swiss Red Cross provided direct assistance to the compact settlement Novosel for the construction of a social centre.

*The CIS Conference on Refugees and Forced Migrants and the Programme of Action (1996)*

UNHCR and IOM, together with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Open Society Institute (OSI), were the main organizers of the

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96 The regions are Tambov, Belgorod, Voronezh and Briansk.
CIS Conference on refugees and forced migrants issues, held in Geneva May 1996. The idea for the conference began with Russia’s sponsorship of a 1993 UN General Assembly resolution calling for a world conference on migration. Despite a lack of international enthusiasm, in 1994 the Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, requested that UNHCR and IOM organize a conference on issues of migration in the Russian Federation (Helton 1996: 53). The conference was attended by representatives of governments of twelve countries of the CIS, seventy other interested states, thirty international organizations and 100 NGOs (Migratsiia 1996: 35). A ‘Programme of Action’ (POA) was adopted, and annual steering group committee meetings, involving representatives of governments, international and inter-governmental organizations and accredited NGOs, have been held to review the progress of implementation of the programme. A final meeting was held in April 2001 to determine the future course of action.

A number of positive consequences resulted from the CIS Conference and POA which have impacted upon the development of the Russian migration regime. One of the main achievements of the conference was that it stimulated the activity of the non-governmental sphere across the post-Soviet space, generated communication between NGOs across the CIS and facilitated links between state bodies and non-governmental organizations. This benefit is widely acknowledged both by external commentators, and representatives of NGOs at the federal and regional level (Codagnone 1998a: 32; Gannuskina 1999: INT; Vitkovskaia 1999: INT). The process facilitated the development of relations between international organizations working in the CIS. The collaborative action of IOM and UNHCR on a number of programmes was recognized by the Russian state as ‘commendable’ (UNHCR/IOM 2000: 24). Although it is acknowledged that as a result of the CIS Conference, and the POA, the post-Soviet migration regime as a whole is further ‘developed’ than before, criticism has centred on the lack of both western and CIS government commitment, the nature of the POA which had no obligatory force, the lack of internal and external resources, and the

97 UNHCR and IOM implemented a number of joint projects which provided: technical equipment to the central FMS and its regional branches to improve data collection and communications; equipment and facilitation of enterprise development at temporary resettlement centres; technical equipment and training of staff at immigration control posts and oblast' migration services; and material help for regional and national NGOs (Migratsiia 1996).

The programmes of the major international actors have responded to some of the problems of forced migrants who are negotiating resettlement, and support has been given for the institutional and legislative development of Russian migration structures. However, the reduction of donor support has impacted directly upon these operations. Criticism has been made of international organizations, and their failure to fulfill their obligations to Russia (Airapetova 1999c). Particular criticism has been leveled at IOM: for misusing funds allocated by the Geneva conference; for acting in a political rather than neutral manner; for prioritizing donor over Russian interests; for violating the contractual agreement between the organization and the Russian government; and for bypassing the Russian state and dealing directly with regional NGOs (Airapetova 1998a; Sanikidze 1998). The problems of international organizations that have developed operations on Russian territory are identified as rooted in a lack of understanding of the specifics of the Russian situation and operation of Russian culture and society; the hasty imposition of western priorities and practices; the unrealistic expectations of the west concerning the transition of Russia to a 'democratic' and working 'civil society'; and the failure to develop 'equal' relationships of partnership with their Russian counterparts, both state and non-state. These problems have been acknowledged by both Russian and western commentators as deserving of greater attention and resolution.

98 These criticisms were made by the former deputy director of the IOM mission in Moscow, Gurami Sanikadze and a journalist who repeatedly writes on migration issues for Nezavisimaia gazeta, Natal'ia Airapetova.
99 Particular criticism has been made of international organizations which insist on the organization of seminars and conferences, whereas it is felt that the resources would be better used for housing construction and direct assistance to migrants (Gannushkina 1999: INT; Sanikadze 1998).
100 The POA called for the 'establishment of civil society in the CIS As an independent expert observed ‘ this would take more than an inter-governmental process and longer than five years to achieve’! (UNHCR/IOM 2000: 28).
101 These criticisms, particularly the lack of attention to the specific Russian cultural context and practices, the unequal nature of the ‘partnership’ and the imposition of western practices, have resonance with other studies which have looked at the effect of western funding and the operation of western organizations in the ‘development’ in post-Soviet Russia. See especially Kay 1998; Bruno 1998.
102 Edwin McClain, the Chief of Mission of IOM in Moscow admitted that there was a problem in gaining true information about what was going on, and spoke of the specifics of working in Russia (interview conducted by the author, 15 September 1999). Gannushkina noted the mutual disappointment of both the west and Russia over how cooperation in the field of migration had developed. She identified the problem as one of different perceptions of priorities (interview conducted by the author, 13 September, 1999).
The CIS Conference, the POA, and the activity of international organizations in the Russian Federation, reveal the larger debates within which the relationship of the Russian migration regime to the international migration regime, western governments and western humanitarian organizations, should be placed. The reduction in western governmental attention and funding to migration issues across the FSU reflects a tendency to see the former unitary territory as distinct and separate from the European and global migration systems. The Russian state has clearly articulated its disappointment concerning the input of international assistance since 1991 and has called it 'disproportionate to the migration problems being tackled' (UNHCR/IOM 2000: 23). Concerns about the reluctance of the west to be involved are not confined to the financial level, but extend to the lack of understanding of Russia's migration problems at the level of international society, which will deepen if western interest subsides.\footnote{This observation was made by the assistant head of the FMS department for International Cooperation (interview conducted by the author, Moscow, 23 September 1999).} Russia clearly places the solution of the migration problems within its territory within the wider European and global arena, but interprets current western governmental approaches as closing the door 'literally' on the migration processes going on beyond their eastern borders (Shuikin 1999; Kamakin 1998b). The relationship of Russia towards the west, and its position within the international regime, reflects the multi-layered nature of that regime, and the loss of control that a nation state can experience over the management of migration, due to the operation of transnational government and non-governmental concerns (Held 1999 et al.: 321-324).

**Conclusion**

The nature of the migration movement in response to which the migration regime has evolved – namely the 'return' of the ethnic Russian and Russian speaking populations – has problematized the development of the legislative frameworks and institutional structures of the Russian migration regime. The Russian parliament has been influential in determining the nature of a government policy that prioritizes the integration of the Russian communities in the former republics. The integration approach reflected the changing foreign policy concerns of the Russian government, and influenced the way
government ministries, and the former FMS, have formulated a strategy towards the resettlement of those individuals who wish to return, or have returned. Combined with a severe lack of resources, the dual policy has contributed to the development of an official migration regime that prioritized ‘control’ and regulation, over social provision and humanitarian assistance, during the period 1995-2000. Government migration policy and legislation reveals how the potential migrant population are constructed as an instrument of state control. Their continued residence in the former republics maintains Russian influence, or their ‘return’ is controlled and directed to further the socio-economic and demographic revival of the Russian Federation. Within the official migration regime, the individual and group specifics of the migrant populations are not accounted for.

The state move from ‘provision’ to ‘control’ created the necessity and the space for the non-governmental sphere to both challenge state discourse and to adopt responsibility for some migrant provision. However, it is only due to attitudinal and institutional changes in the make-up of the migration regime that the voices of ‘alternative’ and non-state actors have been heard, and interaction between the two sectors made possible. Their voices have had effect. Nevertheless, the nature of the Russian federal migration regime is determined by government priorities. At the federal political level, a ‘welcoming environment’ has not been created for those Russians who wish to ‘return’ from the former republics to the Russian ‘homeland’, through either political discourse or legislative and institutional practice. The non-governmental sphere has not gained the power to sufficiently influence the dominant discourse or practice, although it has effected change at a more local and individual level (see Chapters 4 and 6). The examination of regional migration regimes in the following chapter reflects many of the inconsistencies and ambiguities of the federal level regime. The inadequacies of both in providing a positive environment for ‘return’ is reflected later in the thesis when it is shown how individuals and groups of migrants are accepting responsibility for negotiating the migration process – both the migration movement and subsequent resettlement – independently and on their own terms.
Chapter 4: Regional patterns of migration in the Russian Federation and the formation of contemporary migration regimes

Introduction

In addition to the development of the Russian federal migration regime, the arrival of forced migrants and refugees to the eighty nine subjects of the Russian Federation has led to the creation of parallel regional institutions and legislative frameworks. Chapter 4 of the thesis provides an overview of regional patterns of migrant settlement in the Russian Federation, combined with a discussion of the ‘types’ of regional migration regimes that have developed across the territory since 1991. The chapter takes the analysis away from the macro level of the federal, and the international, to the more micro-level of the regional. The regional migration regimes are not distinct entities, but are connected to the federal level migration regime, and are located within the framework created by that regime. The analysis reveals the interactive, but equally, contradictory, relationship which exists between the federal ‘view’ and the regional ‘reality’. The range of complex regional, and federal, level variables which impact upon, and are a part of, the developing regional migration regimes, and the experience of individual migrant resettlement, are introduced. To focus the chapter, two main ‘types’ of regional migration regime are identified: ‘restrictive’ and ‘receptive’. The labels ‘restrictive’ and ‘receptive’ describe the dominant institutional, legislative and discursive mechanisms that operate and shape the migration environment existing in a region, form responses to migration flows arriving to the region, and subsequently impact upon the experience of resettlement. These descriptive categories provide the base for a broad typological framework within which the detailed mapping of the two regional migration regimes of the case study regions of Samara and Saratov are placed in Chapter 6.
4.1 The formation of regional migration regimes

The priorities of the federal migration regime are apparent in the development of regional migration regimes. In the majority of regions, the regulation and control of migration flows is practised, and provision of resettlement assistance is limited. However, the chapter suggests that regional administrations are able to establish their practices as dominant over those of the federal migration regime, and it is these regional economic and political priorities which determine whether the regime is more 'restrictive' or more 'receptive'. Implicit within this argument is the contention that the development of 'restrictive' or 'receptive' regional migration regimes is not only influenced by objective migration flows – the levels and types of migrants arriving to the region – but by the way in which migration issues are constructed according to the local social, economic and political environment. The power regional administrations have to determine policy lies partly in the ambiguity of federal migration legislation, and the lack of substantial connections – both financial, and directive – between the federal and regional branches of the state migration service. The uncertain, and evolutionary, nature of the federal migration regime, provides the space within which very different types of regional migration regimes may develop.

As at the federal level, the development of state structures has been accompanied by the emergence of non-state activity in the form of migrant communities and organizations, and an emergent involvement of federal and international non-governmental organizations. As the government structures in the region are the main determining factor in the development of the migration regimes, they, to an extent, dictate also the nature of non-governmental activities.1 Non-governmental structures must work within this regime, and their involvement is often determined by the nature of the regime. However, the ‘alternative’ actors may acquire the influence to affect the form of the evolving regime, and subsequent nature of migrant resettlement. The

1 The significance of the state, and specifically the migration service, approach towards development of migrant activities is explored in Chapter 6. In Samara oblast, for example, relatively hostile attitudes on the part of the territorial migration service have greatly impeded the development of viable migrant institutions.
analysis of both regional migration flows, and the development of regional migration regimes, uncovers a final point which is central to the overall thesis. The nature of regional resettlement demonstrates the presence of individual choice in determining place of settlement, although this is heavily mediated by limitations placed upon resettlement by government priorities. In addition, although sufficiently different migration regimes are uncovered, individual experience of resettlement is not determined by these regimes, rather it is a product of the interaction of the migrants with the regimes, and the capabilities of migrants to determine the nature of the migration process for themselves. The chapter therefore further demonstrates the combination of the construction of the migration process, in this instance at the regional level, and points to the contrast in the experience of the same process by the individual, which is explored in more detail later in the thesis.

The purpose of focusing upon regional migration regimes is not to set these regimes apart from the national migration regime, or equally the international migration regime. As Schwarz suggests, each level of migration regime, e.g. the national and international, needs to be located within the context of the other. Migration regimes act on migration flows at all different levels – local, regional, national, intra-national, international (Schwarz 1999: 15). However, Schwarz suggests that in the context of the Russian Federation, development of official institutions and legislation has mainly taken place on the national and international levels, and due to the lack of the viable operation of institutions, as yet, at the local, regional, and intra-national levels, these regimes, ‘in essence’, cannot be a subject of examination. At the same time Schwarz acknowledges the need for the analysis of migration flows and the reception of refugees and migrants at the local and regional levels (ibid: 21-22, 28). The present study recognizes the necessity for concentrated regional level analysis when understanding migrant resettlement precisely because of the wide variations and mass contradictions existing between different regions, and equally between regional practices and federal and international directives. The chapter shows that despite federal, and global directives, approaches to migration management and resettlement vary immensely across the territory of the Russian Federation due to a set of variables that operate to different extents in the different regions.
The chapter, therefore, hopes to demonstrate the importance of a regional level analysis within a research project that attempts to understand the process of migrant resettlement, and equally any process of change, occurring in the post-Soviet space. Research of the ‘transition’ period in post-Soviet Russia often ignores the importance of the regional dimension. To an extent this is understandable, as the challenge of presenting any coherent, or representative, picture of the diversity of experience across the eighty nine subjects of the Russian Federation is immense. However, a federal Moscow centred view is increasingly inadequate. The processes of change and ‘transition’ across the Russian Federation are taking very different forms due to the influence of a wide range of temporal and spatial factors operating at varying levels. There is a constant negotiation of the division of power between the federal centre and regional and local levels of government, specifically in the fields of financial responsibility and legislative authority. The political and economic positioning of the regions in relation to the centre, impacts upon events at the regional level. Increasingly, macro-level, uni-disciplinary studies of change do not satisfy the Russian reality, and calls have been made for micro-level, multi-disciplinary approaches to increase understanding (Hanson and Bradshaw 1998: 286).

4.2 Regional and intra-regional patterns of migrant resettlement in the Russian Federation

4.2.1 The regional distribution of migrants

The patterns of migrant resettlement across the territory of the Russian Federation reflect the influence of a range of factors. Migrant choice of a region of settlement is affected by the interaction of individual preference and circumstances\(^2\), wider social, economic and geographic determinants, and state policy and directives.

The geographical proximity of the region of settlement to the region of departure is

\(^2\) The influences upon personal choice of regions of settlement, and the factors involved in the decision making process are explored in detail in Chapter 7.
central to understanding the regional distribution of migrants. Since 1990 the main regions for settlement have shifted partly due to a change in the primary regions of departure. During 1992-1993, seventy percent of forced migrants and refugees settled in the North Caucasus, the Central region and Central Black Earth region of the Russian Federation. The main regions of departure at that time were the Transcaucasian states. Settlement has continued in these regions, however, by 1994-1995, large numbers of ethnic Russian and Russian speaking migrants were arriving to the Volga region, the Urals, and Western Siberia. The main regions of departure had shifted to Kazakstan and Central Asia (Vorob'eva 1997: 4). During 1998 and 1999, the major regions of departure continued to be Kazakstan, and Central Asia, specifically Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The primary regions of settlement were in order of intensity: Western Siberia, the North Caucasus, the Urals, and the Central and Volga regions (Goskomstat 2000: 113-116) (see Tables 1.4, 1.5, 4.1 and Map 4.1). Within these broad economic regions, resettlement differs according to particular republic, krai or oblast'.

Patterns of resettlement, therefore, are often determined by the proximity of the region of departure to the region of arrival. Other considerations, often related to geographic proximity, determining migrant choice of region of settlement are the attractiveness of the region in climatic and socio-economic terms, historical roots in the region, social and economic ties in the region, and the similarity of the ethnic and cultural environment to the region of departure (Vitkovskaia 1998a: 36). In some areas, such as the Central region of Russia, the migrant population is made up of individuals from all the former republics which is evidence of the operation of factors such as the concentration of administrative, industrial and transportation infra-structures in the region (ibid: 33). The freedom the individual migrant has to choose her/his place of

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3 In 1990, the Central and North Caucasus regions of Russia received 82 per cent of all refugees and forced migrants from the CIS and Baltic states registered in the Russian Federation (Vitkovskaia1998a: 25).

4 In 1996, more than 80 per cent of Bashkir refugees and forced migrants were resident in the Urals region, whilst 59 per cent of these were actually in Bashkortostan. However, preference of particular ethnic groups concerning settlement is influenced by other factors. Although half of the ethnic German population of refugees and forced migrants settled in the Volga region in 1992-1993, there was then an increase in movement to Western Siberia from Kazakstan, due both to geographical proximity and the restrictive policies of administrations in the Volga region which feared high concentrations of ethnic German Russians would strengthen the movement for the revival of a Volga German Republic (Vitkovskaia 1998a: 37).
Table 4.1 Cumulative distribution of ‘forced migrants’ and ‘refugees’ in the Russian Federation by region 1991-1999 (rounded up to thousands of persons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwestern</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volga-Viatka</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Black Earth</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volga</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Caucasus</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urals</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Siberian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Siberian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far East</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaliningrad</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Map 4.1 Distribution of forced migrants and refugees, Russian Federation, 1999

Numbers of forced migrants and refugees

- 54,000 to 67,300
- 40,500 to 54,000
- 27,000 to 40,500
- 13,500 to 27,000
- 0 to 13,500

Sources: Goskomstat, 1998; Federal Migration Service, 1999
settlement varies, however. Besides the main areas of settlement indicated above, many migrants are also located in less popular regions such as the North and Far East, which, rather than reflecting individual preference, indicates the difficulties faced in finding a place of settlement elsewhere due to the lack of housing and employment opportunities, and the operation of restrictive government measures limiting settlement (see below). The extent to which forced migrants fleeing war are able to make a choice is constrained to a greater extent due to both, the conditions of departure, and also government regulations which specify certain regions for resettlement (ibid: 35, 36).

4.2.2 Intra-regional settlement
In a discussion of regional migrant resettlement (i.e. at the level of oblast', krai or republic) attention needs to be paid to the diversity existing within the chosen region, for example the urban/rural divide. The regional analyses, specifically of Saratov oblast' and Samara oblast', show interesting resettlement patterns within the region (urban, semi-rural, rural), which reflect a combination of migrant choice, and the restriction of choice due to economic and social factors at the internal oblast' level, and regional administrative policy and priorities. The majority of forced migrants and refugees resettling in the Russian Federation are urban dwellers and prefer to settle in more urbanized, economically developed regions. However, due to a government policy that, despite the dominant urban and professional composition of the migrant population, has sought to direct migration flows to rural areas in an attempt to revive these regions (through the use of restrictive mechanisms such as the propiska system), and the lack of both housing and unemployment in urban areas, urban resettlement of long distance migrants from the former republics has declined gradually since 1992 (Mitchneck and Plane 1995: 26). Rural areas received net inflows of about 1.3 million people over the 1990-1996 period as a result of immigration from the 'near abroad', which compensated to an extent the outflow of internal Russian migrants (Codagnone 1998a: 21). The settlement patterns of forced migrants varies depending upon the

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5 Eighty per cent of forced migrants and refugees moving to the Russian Federation come from the capitals and other administrative centres of the former republics of the Soviet Union (Vitkovskaia 1998a: 29).
6 An interesting trend was seen in internal movement from 1990-1993 when, for the first time in more than 30 years, the steady movement from rural to urban areas was replaced by a dominant movement from cities to rural areas as a result of the socio-economic shock after the collapse of the Soviet system. However, the trend switched back in 1994 (Codagnone 1998a: 21).
attractiveness of a region. In more attractive regions, that receive the highest number of migrants, individuals are prepared to settle in rural areas due to the presence of a developed social and economic infrastructure. In less attractive regions they tend to predominantly settle in the towns (Vitkovskaia 1998a: 8). Migrants are more willing to settle in a rural area of a non-depressed region, than an urban area of a depressed region. Choice of region, therefore, predominates over urban or rural settlement (Vitkovskaia 1998a: 32). Migrant settlement in rural, rather than urban areas, demonstrates in the majority of cases the operation of external restrictions, rather than personal choice.

4.2.3 Internal migration movements in the Russian Federation

Although the present study does not address the question of internal migration movements or the resettlement of internal migrants, apart from the forced migrants displaced as a result of the Chechen conflict, a correlation may be drawn between internal migration and forced migrant and refugee resettlement. Internal movements, consisting of both intra-regional and inter-regional migration, have numerically been the most significant migration flows affecting Russia in the 1990s. Between 1991 and 1996, about 23 million people changed their residence, either within the same region (12.5 million) or moving from one region to another (10.6 million) (Codagnone 1998a: 21). Internal migration movements are relevant for forced migrant resettlement as firstly, inter-regional movements of the population impact upon regional responses to migration. The arrival of internal migrants impacts upon the availability of housing, employment, and other services and resources at the regional level. Secondly, the internal movements are useful for understanding the nature of the resettlement of forced migrants from the former republics. Reasons for inter-regional movement are often taken as an indicator of the economic well-being of a region and the re-distribution of labour is recognized as a vital factor in the development of the economic structures of a region (Sutherland 1997: 182, Shaw 1999: 104). Between 1959 and 1989 the populations of the extreme north and east increased steadily due to immigration from

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7 The movement of ethnic Russians from the Chechen Republic is considered in the research. Forced migrants from Chechnia qualify for the status of forced migrant, and their presence is central to the development of resettlement policy in many regions of the Russian Federation, including the two regions chosen for in-depth analysis - Saratov and Samara oblasti.
other central and southern Russian regions, influenced by the presence of state economic incentives. The economic stagnation and deterioration of the infrastructure in the areas of the Far North, Far East and Eastern Siberia have meant that the local populations have attempted to move south-west, and the central and southern European districts of Russia are now experiencing the return of these populations (Codagnone 1998a: 23).8

Forced migrants and refugees, however, faced with enormous difficulties elsewhere, have been prepared to settle in these regions and have compensated, to an extent, for some of the population loss. For example, in Primorski krai, from 1995-1998, the inflow of forced migrants compensated for two-thirds of the losses due to the out-migration of the population (Vitkovskaia 1998a: 28), and in 1996 the in-migration to urban areas of Eastern Siberia outweighed out-migration from these areas, although overall net migration was negative due to the large scale movement away from rural areas (Codagnone 1998a: 22). This particular migration and resettlement of migrants from the former republics is evidence of the forced and constrained nature of the movement, which does not correlate with rational, economically motivated movement.

4.3 Regional responses to in-migration and migrant resettlement

The main structures of a regional migration regime are the territorial migration service (now regional branch of the Ministry of Federation Affairs, National and Migration Policy), the regional government, regional and local level administrations, ministries and departments, and the non-state structures, migrant associations and international and federal level non-governmental organizations active on the territory of the particular region. The resulting migration environment and migration policy reflect the interaction of the relative powers and underlying priorities of the different actors. The

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8 The highest regions of out-migration within the Russian Federation are Magadan, Kamchatka, Sakhalin oblasti, and the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia). The preferred regions for settlement of these populations are the Central Black Earth and Volga regions, Leningrad, Pskov, Bryansk, Kaluga, Smolensk, Tver' and Kaliningrad oblasti (Shuvalova 1998: 6). About 1.5 million residents of the Russian North, mostly able-bodied citizens, have moved away from the North in the past seven years. A pilot project is being launched by the World Bank in 2001, which if approved, will issue vouchers to families in certain regions of the Russian North to purchase housing in other parts of Russia (RFE/RL Newsline Part 1, 14 March 2001).
official regional government response to migration sets the parameters for whether a regime is ‘restrictive’ or ‘receptive’. Non-political agencies work within the regime, and their activities are determined to an extent by the nature of official response. Nevertheless, particularly in ‘restrictive’ environments the non-political agencies may negotiate for increased power to lessen the effect of the restrictive nature of the regime for migrants.

Figure 4.1 presents the key variables and key actors within a regional migration regime that are significant for determining whether a ‘restrictive’ or ‘receptive’ regime develops. The operation of these variables and actors are explored below. The analysis acknowledges that it is hard to strictly define a migration regime as either ‘restrictive’ or ‘receptive’. Rather the nature of a regime should be placed on a sliding scale. A number of key examples are provided of regional migration practice in the Russian Federation to provide indications of the more ‘extreme’ forms of these ‘restrictive’ and ‘receptive’ practices, these examples are supplemented by additional cases to show the degrees of practice which exist. The purpose of the examples is to provide indications of the range of migration regimes that are present, and the different factors that play a part in their formation.

The term ‘restrictive’ describes a regime which is predominantly directed at reducing in-migration. The policy is achieved by limiting actual migration and resettlement possibilities through certain legislative and institutional mechanisms. In these cases, the economic and political priorities of the regional administrations are paramount and inform, and often dictate, the practice of other state structures, i.e. the territorial migration service. A ‘restrictive’ migration regime impedes the development of non-governmental activity, although, in certain cases can provide extra impetus for such activity to occur. The ‘receptive’ regimes place less constraint upon migration, and in fact may encourage in-migration due to socio-economic and demographic concerns. In these regions, there is less contradiction with federal directives and legislation, and both regional administrations, and the regional state migration structures, show a ‘liberal’ approach to migration. The ‘liberal’ environment often facilitates the development of non-governmental structures, and encourages cooperation between the state and non-state sector. However, the ‘receptive’ regimes are limited in the extent of positive
### Figure 4.1 Variables affecting the operation of regional migration regimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Restrictive</th>
<th>Receptive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Size and nature of flow</td>
<td>High levels seen as ‘threat’ Certain ethnic groups of migrants seen as a security problem/threat to ethnic homogeneity</td>
<td>High levels of in-migration welcomed In-migration of particular ethnic groups of migrants encouraged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-economic priorities</td>
<td>Concerns of competition for housing/employment Resources limited for migrant provision</td>
<td>Migration seen as source of labour for socio-economic revival and for demographic growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political priorities</td>
<td>Migration as a political issue/security concern</td>
<td>Migration not constructed as a political issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation of regional actors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal-regional relations</td>
<td>Violation of federal/international legislation Federal ‘unwritten’ support for restrictive measures</td>
<td>Federal ‘targeted’ region Operation of ‘fairer’ federal legislation Lack of allocation of federal resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional administration</td>
<td>Discourages migration - use of legislative, institutional and discursive barriers.</td>
<td>Encourages migration – incentives, positive media portrayals. Development of regional migration programmes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant activity</td>
<td>High levels of activity in response to restrictive measures, lack of coordination with state structures Lack of activity due to environment</td>
<td>High level of migrant activity due to open regime, coordination with state structures. Lack of activity due to lesser need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence and activity of</td>
<td>High levels of activity due to increased need of migrants Low levels of activity due to restrictive nature of regime, difficulties of working in regime</td>
<td>High levels of activity due to conducive regime and presence of contacts and partners Low levels of activity due to lesser need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>international actors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
encouragement they can offer, due to the wider socio-economic situation existing in the Russian Federation, the lack of available regional and federal resources, and established federal priorities.

4.3.1 ‘Restrictive’ approaches to migration flows and migrant resettlement

The size and nature of migration flows into a particular region are significant in shaping ‘official’ regional responses to the inflow, and subsequent provisions for resettlement. However, the intensity of the levels of in-migration are not the key determinate in policy response to migration; high levels of migration do not necessarily lead to uniformly restrictive responses. In the two case study regions of Samara and Saratov, despite comparable levels of high in-migration of similar populations of migrants, significantly different regional migration regimes have developed. A number of regions that have experienced very large levels of in-migration, and which demonstrate a restrictive approach to migration are Krasnodar krai and Stavropol’ krai. Yet, other areas that have been experiencing similar levels of in-migration, for example Novosibirsk oblast’ (see below), practice a more ‘receptive’ approach.9 The particularly restrictive migration regimes which have developed in Krasnodar krai and Stavropol’ krai are rooted in a combination of ethnic, socio-economic and political concerns which reflect the wider structural environment and the agendas of the regional administrations.

The two territories of Krasnodar and Stavropol’ are situated in the region of the North Caucasus. The geographic proximity to regions of conflict in Chechnia, North Ossetia, and the Transcaucasus, and the climatic attractiveness of the territories, has meant the arrival of a large number of displaced persons from these regions, alongside the in-migration of Russian speaking migrants from Central Asia and internal migrants from the north and east of Russia. The ethnic composition of the migration flows to the two regions, which themselves have a complex ethnic make-up, has provoked fears of inter-

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ethnic conflict and social upheaval.\textsuperscript{10} The perceived fear has been used as the main justification of the subsequent restrictive migration policy in the two regions which aims towards an overall lessening of all migration flows accompanied by attempts to increase the ethnic homogeneity of the flow to the detriment of non-Slavic peoples.

In Krasnodar krai, restrictions have been placed on particular ethnic groups, specifically Armenians, Afghans and Meskhetian Turks. The Meskhetian Turks fled from Uzbekistan on mass in 1989 following the pogrom in the Fergana Valley region. Due to the nature of the departure of the Meskhetian Turks the majority of the displaced were unable to de-register their residency in Uzbekistan, which provided the Krasnodar authorities with a pretext to deny them Russian citizenship and thus permanent residency rights. In effect they are stateless as they fail to fit into the category of forced migrant, refugee or Russian citizen (Gaidash 1997: 69, 71). The lack of a residence permit (propiska) limits access to social services and other property and land rights. The authorities have been open about their reasons for pursuing such a policy; by instigating discriminatory policies against the Meskhetian Turk population they will discourage further migration, which will, in turn, reduce social upheaval, preserve the delicate balance in the socio-economically impoverished oblast’ and protect the interests of the local population (Open Society Institute 1998a: 11).\textsuperscript{11} Such policies towards Meskhetian Turks are repeated in Stavropol’ krai through restriction of their rights to obtain a permanent residency permit (propiska).

The restrictive migration policy is partly rooted in concerns for maintaining the ‘ethnic homogeneity’ of the local population. On the two territories, however, the restrictive measures extend to all forced migrants and refugees. In Stavropol’ krai in 1996, a law was introduced ‘On guarantees for the realization and protection of the rights of the citizens of the Russian Federation – residents of Stavropol’ krai’. The clear agenda of

\textsuperscript{10} Krasnodar krai is comprised of 4 million Russians and an additional twenty two ethnic groups, including Ukrainians, Armenians, Adygei, Greek, German, Belorussian and Tatar communities. Although in the major towns and some rural areas, the ethnic groups mix, in many rural districts there are settlements which are dominated by one ethnic group (Pilkington 1998a: 94; McAuley 1997: 113).

\textsuperscript{11} The argument by the authorities that the arrivals endanger stability is seen as a myth by Alexander Osipov (a human rights activist with the organization Memorial) who argues that the migrants have not caused any drastic demographic shift in the krai. He states that the recent annual population growth rates in the krai were less than one per cent (Open Society Institute 1998a: 11)
the law was to limit migration through the restriction of migrants’ rights, especially the right to the acquisition of property and land, in favour of the residents of the krai (Institut etnologii i antropologii 1997: 40). In addition to the law an ‘Immigration Code’ was introduced, one of the stipulations being that migrants must only reside in certain localities (Mukomel’ 1998: 5). In Krasnodar krai freedom of movement and choice of place of residence has been limited for all forced migrants and refugees through special residence registration procedures in a number of cities, towns and districts which stipulate that migrants must have relatives who have been residents in the region for a specific time.

These policies have been justified through socio-economic and political concerns. Despite the high numbers of migrants, many of whom are categorized as ‘socially disadvantaged’ (invalids, pensioners, single mothers, children), and their need for special provision due to the nature of their departure from conflict zones, the regions were not specified by the Federal Migration Service as areas of settlement for forced migrants, and were not given additional resources for the construction of housing, employment generation, payment of loans, and compensation (Popov 1997: 58). The social infrastructures in the regions were not prepared for the amount of arrivals and found it increasingly hard to cope. ‘Official government data’ showed that as a result of the migrant population housing prices had risen, there was greater competition in the labour market, standards of living had fallen, and there had been an increase in crime (Sukhova 1998).

The particular way the information was used by the authorities, and the ‘politicianization’ of the migration issue, greatly impacted upon local responses and the development of the corresponding legislative and institutional framework in the two regions. In Krasnodar krai the issue of migration has been at the centre of regional political struggles over the past few years. Krasnodar krai is viewed as strategically important

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12 The resolution on loans, within the framework of the law on forced migrants, was welcomed by the head of the migration service of Krasnodar krai, due to its calculation being dependent upon the socio-economic specifics of the region, and thus its capacity to direct flows of forced migrants to regions where higher loans were offered and away from Krasnodar (Ostrozhnii 1998: 13)

13 The North Caucasus as a region is relatively poor in comparison with other Russian economic regions. The territory as a whole is less urbanized than the Russian Federation on average and more dependent upon agricultural than industrial production (Hansen 1997: 4).
both by the regional and the federal authorities from a geo-political point of view and as a potential economic gateway (Magomedov 1998: 363). The desire to maintain socio-political stability in the territory has been at the forefront of regional policy and receives unwritten support from Moscow. The regional administration of Krasnodar krai is traditionally conservative and had committed itself to maintaining stability in the oblast'. During the regional election battles in 1993 the arrival of large numbers of migrants was linked to the economic difficulties of the region, the increase in crime, lack of jobs and housing and the danger of ethnic conflict and upheaval, and so constructed as a threat to the stability of the region and a severe drain on regional resources. The claims were used to justify the introduction of restrictions on migrants' rights, specifically over the issue of registration (McAuley 1997: 140; Magomedov 1998: 372). Although the violations were reported to Moscow no pressure was exerted reflecting the desire by the federal authorities to support these means of maintaining stability.

The two regions have developed noticeably extreme 'restrictive' migration policies and practices. Although the size of the migration flows needs to be taken into account, the political and socio-economic priorities of the regional administration are clearly paramount. Other regions such as Ul’ianovsk oblast' (situated in the Volga region) have followed similar restrictive practices, although to a much lesser extent. In Ul’ianovsk oblast', despite the much smaller flows of in-migration, the possibility of population growth is identified as increased competition for resources and thus a potential threat to social stability.14 The development of migration policy must be rooted in the wider Ul’ianovsk environment and dominant agenda of a regional administration that prioritizes the maintenance of social stability and social guarantees in order to prevent social and economic disruption. This agenda has been introduced into the practices of the territorial migration services. The policy of 'restriction' is practised in a number of ways: the use of the propiska, where only forced migrants and refugees with relatives in the region are registered; the discouragement of new arrivals by the territorial migration service and local media by emphasizing the difficulties, rather than opportunities in the

14 A total of 8,993 refugees and forced migrants were registered in Ul’ianovsk oblast' over the period 1992-1999 (Goskomstat 2000: 115).
region; and the refusal of forced migrant status by the territorial migration service for reasons not strictly stated in federal legislation (Pilkington 1998a: 94-105).

4.3.2 ‘Receptive’ approaches to migration flows and migrant resettlement

What may be described as ‘receptive’ approaches to migration have developed in a number of regions of the Russian Federation. Novosibirsk oblast’ provides a valuable contrast to the former examples of ‘restrictive’ practice as the region is experiencing similar high levels of in-migration to Stavropol’ krai and Krasnodar krai. However, the nature of the migration flows, the socio-economic, political and ethnic environment of the region, and the corresponding priorities of the regional administration are very different. Novosibirsk oblast’ is situated in the Western Siberian economic region. The whole region, and Novosibirsk oblast’ in particular, has suffered from a serious economic crisis during the 1990s, accompanied by a worsening demographic situation due to an increase in mortality rates, decrease in birth rates and the out-migration of the local population. The demographic decline has been partially offset by the increasing numbers of migrants arriving to the oblast’ from the former republics of the Soviet Union since 1994. The ethnic composition of the migrants is overwhelmingly Russian which corresponds to the predominantly Russian population of the oblast’ (Doschitsin 1997: 44). In addition to forced migrants arriving from the former republics of the Soviet Union, internal migrants are arriving from the regions of the North, and ‘illegal’ migrants from Korea, Vietnam and China (Soboleva 1996: 122).

Socio-economic and demographic concerns are at the root of the development of a regional response to migration on the territory of Novosibirsk oblast’ that attempts to attract migrants and facilitate their resettlement. The temporary or permanent residence permit is not used by local power structures (the Ministry of Internal Affairs) to restrict settlement. A regional migration programme for Novosibirsk oblast’, was prepared in 1995 (jointly by the local administration, the regional migration service and local academics) and a large amount of collaborative research has been carried out across the oblast’ to address the problems of migrant resettlement (Kalugina 1996: 145). The regional response also reflects federal priorities. Western Siberia was listed as one of

15 The oblast’ loses migrants to Moscow, Krasnodar krai, Rostov oblast’ and also other regions of Western Siberia: Omsk oblast’, and Tiumen oblast’, and Altai krai (Soboleva 1996: 129).
the regions for migrant resettlement in the Federal Migration Programme of 1994, and the fourteen regions allocated as specific reception areas for the resettlement of forced migrants included Novosibirsk oblast’ (despite the fact that the socio-economic situation in the oblast’ is one of the worst in Western Siberia). In 1997, with the introduction of a differentiated loan system, migrants could receive an interest free loan for ten years of up to 70% of the cost of housing on the territory of the oblast’ (Gorodestkaia 1997). Thus, at the federal level it is seen as being in the interests of the state to direct the migrants to this territory. Theoretically, this means that greater federal resources should have been received by the region for migrant provision than in other regions not ‘targeted’ as resettlement regions.

The situation on the territory of Novosibirsk oblast’, however, demonstrates that despite apparently encouraging and open policies towards resettlement, certain obstacles prevent the policies’ operation. The targeting of Novosibirsk oblast’ as a region to receive migrants demanded a huge input of resources to enable realistic resettlement – such demands have largely been unrealized (Borodkin 1996: 113). In 1998, 9,000 people were on the waiting list for housing, within the five years of the migration service’s existence, housing has been allocated to only 740 forced migrants (Trigubovich 1998). Due to a lack of sufficient resources the territorial migration service has been unable to fulfill its responsibilities for migrant provision (Kalugina 1996: 151). The policy of the regional migration service to encourage migrants to settle in rural areas, which reflects federal directives, i.e. the directing of migrants to revitalize depopulated and economically depressed rural regions, has proved unsuitable both to the needs of the region and the migrants themselves whose prior lifestyle, skills and qualifications are more suited to urban life (ibid: 156). The policy also ignores the urban concentration of industry and accompanying infrastructure in the oblast’ and the lack of significant rural development and social infrastructure to facilitate

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16 The lack of federal investment reflects the wider economic relationship between the oblast’ and the federal government. The oblast’ has not received any of the federal benefits which many other Russian regions received, did not receive financing from any federal, regional or branch programmes, did not receive the status of a free economic zone or preferential customs treatment or tax exemption. Tax deducted into the federal budget was actually set at a higher level in Novosibirsk oblast’ than in Western Siberia as a whole despite the fact that the oblast’ was included in the list of depressed regions in 1994 (Selivestrov 1996a: 8).
resettlement. The local administrations in rural areas where migrant resettlement has taken place have proved unprepared to cope with the arrival of migrants and unable to provide housing and employment (ibid: 151, 155).

Despite the ‘preferred’ status of Novosibirsk, at a federal level, for migrant resettlement, and the recognition of the socio-economic and demographic potential of migrants at the regional level, the real amount of resources made available has been strictly limited. This has impacted upon the ‘liberal’ policies of the state bodies in the region, the non-restrictive nature of migration policy, and the efforts made at devising a viable programme of regional resettlement. Rather than a policy of ‘restriction’ which characterizes the approaches in Stavropol’, Krasnodar, and Ul’ianovsk, efforts are made to encourage in-migration and accommodate migrants. In contrast to Krasnodar and Stavropol’, the issue is not part of mainstream political debate and is not constructed in such a way as to see migration predominately as a threat. The resettlement of the forced migrant population in Novosibirsk oblast’, however, is greatly problematized by the difficult economic situation existing on the territory of the region. Limited resources, and the practice of misguided resettlement policies, results in a more ‘neutral’ approach to migrant provision and resettlement.

Other regions have attempted open approaches to migration. However, in many cases the attempts at positive reception are impeded by a lack of resources and viable resettlement policy and practice. Belgorod, in the Central Black Earth zone has received consistently high levels of in-migration since 1992, a result of the attractiveness of the region for resettling migrants. The local authorities attempted to practice a positive policy of reception, identified migrants as a part of the economic development of the region, and provided assistance to migrants in resettlement – housing and employment (Kuleshov 1996). However, allocated federal government funding has not been fulfilled and the region introduced restrictions on in-migration through the use of the propiska

17 In 1996 almost three quarters of all industrial production took place in the oblast’ centre (including the cities of Berdsk and Iskitim which come within the Novosibirsk urban agglomeration). For the whole oblast’ in 1999 the urban population was 2,029,5000, and the rural population only 719,000 (http://www.gks.ru, 1 January 1999).
(Sizova 2000). Orel oblast', in the Central region of Russia, identified in-migration as a way to reverse the negative effects of the consistent out-migration of its population. The regional administration saw the demographic decline as inhibiting social and economic development and migrants as a way of reviving the rural areas. Migrants were included in regional level development plans, supported by federal, regional and local resources, that tied in with federal policies of directing migrants towards rural areas, but away from the Black Earth zone. Policies of encouragement were used including positive portrayals in the local media, and emphasis within the territorial migration service of its registration and welfare provision. However, despite the receptive policies of Orel oblast', and federal level support, the levels of in-migration have remained consistently low. One reason for this may be rooted in the composition of the potential migrant population, which is predominantly urban and does not favour rural settlement (Pilkington 1998a: 94-105; Vitkovskaia 1998a: 27).18

The examples demonstrate that even in cases where migration is encouraged and written into the wider socio-economic agendas for the development of the region, due to a lack of federal and local resources, or unsuitable resettlement policies, positive attempts at resettlement are impeded, and restrictive measures may be introduced. Both the ‘restrictive’ and ‘receptive’ cases demonstrate the importance of considering individual choice. Despite restrictive measures in certain regions, high in-migration has been consistent, whereas in regions where incentives are offered, and migration is encouraged, low levels of in-migration continue. The limitations of the state management of migration flows, and the often individual and self-supporting nature of migration and migrant resettlement which is taking place on the territory of the Russian Federation, are therefore clearly demonstrated.

18 Over the period 1998-1999, only 1,611 forced migrants and refugees were registered on the territory of Orel oblast'. For the period 1992-1999, a total of 12,477 forced migrants and refugees have been registered (Goskomstat 2000: 114). Despite the attempts to attract migrants, there has been resentment from the local community in the oblast' (Pilkington 1998a: 104).
4.4 Federal - regional relations and the development of regional migration regimes

The examples of regional responses to in-migration and migrant resettlement identify some of the factors that are integral to the shaping of regional migration regimes including: the size and nature of the arriving migrant population; the economic and political agendas of local administrations; and the wider socio-economic and political circumstances of the region. Although federal migration legislation, and accompanying implementing structures, have been established across the Russian Federation to regulate the status of forced migrants and refugees, protect their rights, control their movement, and provide for their resettlement, there is much ambiguity and leeway for regional interpretations to take place. Codagnone suggests that recognizing the importance of migration regimes and state action in regulating migration is not the same thing as assuming that state capacity to control is unconstrained, and organized according to clear goals. Across the Russian Federation migration policies and regimes at both the federal and regional levels have emerged in an often disjunctured and chaotic way and show high degrees of inconsistency and various cases of unintended and counter-intuitive results (1998a: 46). A key factor which demands further investigation is the contradictory relationship between the regional and federal, on a number of levels – legislative, institutional, financial – that allows variation in regional migration practice.

4.4.1 Legislative contradictions

Although federal legislation and practice prioritizes the restriction and control of migration flows, the actual legislation is legally balanced and does not contravene international conventions pertaining to human rights and human movement (Codagnone 1998a: 27). The introduction of regional legislation to regulate migration, and in particular, the continued use of the propiska in many subjects of the Russian Federation, contradicts not only the federal constitution and other federal legislation, but also international legislation to which Russia is subject. The use of the propiska restricts the right of forced migrants to freely choose their place of residence contained in Article 6 of the forced migrant law, and Article 27 of the Constitution of the Russian
Federation that guarantee all Russian citizens the right to freedom of movement. In addition, regional practices violate Russia's international commitments - the 1951 UN Convention and 1967 Protocol on the Status of Refugees, the 1948 UN Declaration of Human Rights, and the 1966 International Convention of Citizenship and Political Rights - through discrimination of migrants based upon their country of origin and restrictions on freedom of movement through the mechanism of the propiska (Mukomel 1998: 5). It is estimated that at least twenty regions have legislation which restricts migration (Filippova 1997: 51).

It is the complex interaction and ambiguity between different levels of migration and human rights legislation that creates the space for such contradictions. The new Russian Constitution of 1993 established the primacy of the norms contained in international agreements, ratified by Russia, over federal laws, and made the general principle of international law and international agreements a constituent part of the Russian legal system (Article 15). However, Article 72 of the Constitution places the defence of freedom and rights, such as freedom of choice of residence, under the joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and its subjects (autonomous republic, krai, oblast', federal level city). Legislation in this sphere impacts upon forced migrants. No clear guidelines exist on how the joint jurisdiction is to be exercised. Thus, the 'right' of joint jurisdiction has opened the space for a regional legislation that is not always in line with federal laws. The interaction between different legislative levels - international, CIS, federal and regional - results in a contrast between more liberal and progressive norms entailed in international human rights standards, CIS agreements, and to some extent federal legislation, and the more restrictive and, at times discriminatory behaviour, of local administrations. It is ironic that as regional legislative activity tends to conflict with federal legislation on migrants' rights, in legal terms migrants in regions in which migration law is practically non-existent fare better, as federal law,

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19 In addition to the regions already mentioned, other notable examples of the use of the propiska to regulate movement are found in Moscow city, Moscow oblast', St. Petersburg, and one of the case study regions - Samara oblast' (Grankina 1996). Moscow in particular enforces the propiska in order 'to keep people perceived as undesirable out of their communities' ( Forced Migration Monitor 1997, No. 20). The resolution of the Moscow city government of 9 November 1994 on 'Improving work with refugees and forced migrants' states that on the territory of the city of Moscow, only refugees and forced migrants with a permanent propiska may be registered. (Voronina 1997: 39). In Samara, it is impossible to register as a forced migrant without the possession of a propiska (interviews conducted by the author with representatives of the Territorial Migration Service, Samara, 24 April 1998 and 30 September 1999).
which is stricter and more balanced, is ‘effective’ in these regions (Codagnone 1998a: 25-26; Mukomel 1998: 1-8).

Other areas of policy development reflect the contradictory relationship and difficulties of joint responsibility between the regional and federal levels. In 1996 the annual migration programme Migratsiia combined a comprehensive federal wide strategy with the formulation of corresponding, but individual, regional level programmes. The aim of the FMS initiative was to fulfil the demands of the federal programme whilst taking into account the specifics of the migration situation in different regions (Shlichkova 1997: 14). The stipulation was reiterated in the Federal Migration Programme 1998-2000 (see Chapter 3). Attempts to develop regional level migration programmes were ongoing in many regions over the period 1996-2000. However, their development has been hindered by the conflict between federal level priorities and regional specifics. At the regional level, the involvement of both local administrations and the regional migration services in the development of the programmes produced contradictory results. The resulting regional programmes were of a two sided nature, independent, but at the same time a sub-programme operating within the framework of the federal migration programme. The quality of the resulting programmes reflected the lack of resources and experience at the regional level (ibid).

4.4.2 Institutional and financial considerations

The lack of implementation of federal legislation, and contradictory and autonomous regional action, indicates the complex relationship which exists between the different government structures involved in migration management. The implementation of local level migration policy is an indication of the strong role of regional authorities, over whom the former Federal Migration Service, federal legislation and territorial migration services, have little influence. The regional authorities may have the support of other federal agencies in Moscow. As was shown in Krasnodar krai, although the restrictions

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20 A corresponding ‘Department of Federal and Regional Migration Programmes’ was created in the central apparatus of the FMS for the control and coordination of the two facets of the migration programme. The numbers of territorial organs of the FMS were increased to realize the programme at a regional level (Shlichkova 1997: 15).

21 In Saratov continuous efforts have been made towards creating a comprehensive regional migration programme since 1996, this is looked at in more detail in Chapter 6.
on migrants’ rights have taken place at the regional level, this has been done with the silent agreement of Moscow (Grankina 1996). The territorial migration services were both subordinate to the FMS, and to different local administrative bodies, for example the Department of Labour and Social Security, or the head of the regional administration. This ‘dual subordination’ was one reason for the lack of a comprehensive vertical structure existing between the federal and territorial branches of the former migration service. As described in Chapter 3, investigations in 1997 by the inter-departmental commission of the Security Council revealed widespread financial mis-management and corruption at the local level, a lack of control by the FMS over its regional bodies, and toleration by the service of the distortion of state policy that led to the violation of migrants’ rights. Tat’iana Regent, former head of the FMS, attributed the situation to the strength of particular local authorities and the lack of a mechanism through which a protest could be made to the Constitutional court against the implementation of local laws, which she identified as a prerogative of the government (Kamakin 1998a).

With the abolition of the FMS, and its incorporation into the Ministry for Federation Affairs, Nationality and Migration Policy, the future status of the territorial branches is uncertain. Although the regional migration services are now formally considered as regional affiliations of the new ministry, the status and functions of the regional organs are likely to differ across the country. In some subjects of the federation, where the local authorities are ‘interested’ in migration issues, the former territorial migration services have become a part of the local administration (for instance in Moscow the migration service is now attached to the city government). In other areas where there is less interest, and available resources, the regional branches may face major cuts or changes in personnel.

22 In Saratov oblast, although the TMS claimed to be directly subordinate to the FMS, it also came under the jurisdiction of the Department of Labour and Social Protection. Dual subordination was evident in other regions, for example in Ul’yanovsk oblast the TMS was subordinate to the FMS and the head of the regional administration (Pilkington 1998a: 61). Following the accusations by the Security Council Tat’iana Regent admitted that the migration service could not always influence local administrations in the necessary way. The situation has been particularly difficult in Moscow due to the power and influence of the mayor of Moscow, Yurii Luzhkov, and in Krasnodar krai (Kamakin 1998a).
The responsibility for, and allocation of, financial resources is central to migrant provision. Migrant provision is funded from both the federal and regional budget. If a region is particularly dependent upon its regional government for resources, then this dependence can disrupt the implementation of federal legislation, and prioritize local interest (Pilkington 1998a: 61). If a region, as in the case of Novosibirsk oblast, is targeted as a receiver region, but does not receive the allocated federal resources, policy implementation is affected. As Drought suggests, the FMS has often used local authorities as the key providers of socio-economic support despite a policy that was supposed to centralize and channel resettlement assistance via the migration service (Drought 2000: 115). The result is a growing resentment in the localities at the lack of compensation from the federal budget to cover the costs of resettlement and a corresponding increase in local legislation preventing refugee and forced migrant resettlement. The lack of federal resources feeds the perception that forced migrants and refugees are a burden (ibid). As was shown in the case of Belgorod oblast, until local authorities receive compensation for the settlement of refugees and forced migrants, the introduction of restrictive legislation locally that undermines more progressive legislation federally is likely to continue.

4.5 ‘Alternative’ actors shaping regional migration regimes

The chapter has focused upon the development of regional government approaches to migration, and the central part they play in the formation of regional level migration regimes. However, the arrival of migration flows to a region, and the need for resettlement and provision, encourages and necessitates the growth of other bodies that become a part of the migration regime. These bodies are the regional level migrant organizations and collectives that have developed across the territory of the Russian Federation, and federal and international NGOs and organizations concerned with the rights of migrants and refugees, and provision for their resettlement at a regional level. The ‘alternative’ non-state actors must work within the migration environment created by the regional government actors. Nevertheless, they may acquire the power and influence to alter existing approaches. The position and activity of the non-state sector within regional migration regimes is considered in more detail in the two case study
regions (see Chapter 6). The present chapter provides some indication of the activity of regional, federal and international non-state actors. The activity varies according to the type of migration environment they are operating within: the state/non-state relationships existing in the region, and the general level of internal non-governmental activity, and external non-governmental interest in the region. The attitude of state (regional administration and territorial migration services) to non-governmental activity, especially that initiated by local migrant groups, is a key factor. A negative attitude can prevent development, whereas, a positive attitude can facilitate development.

4.5.1 Regional migrant associations

The regional migrant associations across the Russian Federation have developed in the space left by a lack of a comprehensive government system of provision and assistance to facilitate migrant resettlement at the local level. As mentioned in Chapter 3, although the regional level organizations developed at the same time as the federal level organizations, the development was originally independent of these federal structures. Levels of communication are now firmly established. The regional level migrant organizations either form in the country of origin or, more commonly, emerge in the new place of settlement. The regional level organizations have been formed by migrants themselves and provide immediate help in the processes of integration upon arrival – acquiring of forced migrant status, finding of accommodation and employment. A large number of the migrant NGOs are members of the Forum of Migrant Associations, however, the structure does not encompass all organizations. There are many ‘types’ of organizations including more informal, self-help groups and organizations attached to compact settlement sites, other sites of migrant settlement (hostels) or commercial enterprises. Migrant associations also act as a network to provide ‘bridges’ of information and support to potential migrants in the former republics.

The activity of regional level organizations requires in-depth empirical study, which should consider the origin and development of the organizations, the need or demand in the region for such organizations, outside (federal/international) support, the personalities active within the organization, the political, socio-economic and cultural environment in which they are operating, their participation in the wider migration
regime, and their impact upon individual level migrant resettlement (see Chapter 6). Organizations have developed in both ‘restrictive’ and ‘receptive’ environments to fill the gap left by a lack of state resources, both in opposition to, and sometimes upon the instigation of, and in cooperation with, state structures. Relations with local power structures are an important factor and the state/non-state relationship can prove to be vital to their later development. In ‘restrictive’ environments the development of organizations may flourish due to the intense need for alternative support structures, or their development may be impeded by local state structures.23 In more ‘receptive’ environments, the organizations may develop in closer coordination with state structures to contribute to the more open approach to migration, or may fail to develop due to the lesser need for them.24

A growing problem facing the activity of migrant associations has been the suspicion which has developed around their development, and charges of corruption and the misuse of funds.25 The problem has been connected with the uncontrolled allocation of grants by international organizations, grants applied for by organizations for ‘mythical’ projects, or by organizations intent on commercial profit rather than non-govermentnal activities (Gannushkina 1999: INT; Airapetova 1998c). However, the issue of corruption reveals the deeper problems present in attempting to create regional organizations. Firstly, the severe lack of financial assistance for the basic running of the organizations which leads to intense competition for western grants (Vitkovskaia 1999: INT). Many organizations, due to financial difficulties, have adopted a ‘dual structure’, as an NGO providing assistance and information to forced migrants and refugees, and

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23 Despite the very difficult circumstances existing in Krasnodar krai, and in Rostov oblast', where equally restrictive migration practices are practised, the presence of energetic personalities have not only succeeded in creating strong organizations, but the organizations have achieved significant results. The activity of a number of effective organizations in Krasnodar krai has succeeded in strengthening links between existing organizations, and has led to the development of new ones (interview conducted with Galina Vitkovskaia, Moscow, 13 September 1999).

24 The contrasting development of regional level organizations is explored in Chapter 6 in the two case study regions where there is a clear contrast in the development and activity of the organizations, and in relations between the regional organizations, territorial migration services and local administrations.

25 Accusations were made against the Urals Association of Refugees by the Control-Auditing Department of Sverdlovsk oblast' administration that the ex-president had appropriated 10,000 dollars given to the association in the form of a grant from UNHCR (Dobrinina 1999).
also operating as a commercial enterprise.26 These organizations have faced criticism over combining humanitarian, with commercial, activity. Secondly, the mis-use of funds has been found in some cases not to be so much a case of corruption, but a total incomprehension of western accounting practices, unsuited to the specifics of the Russian environment.27

The development of regional migrant organizations, across the territory of an individual region, has been impeded by official government policy of settling migrants in non-urban, isolated rural areas. The type of resettlement causes isolation and impedes communication. Problems of inter-regional and federal cooperation and communication, however, are equally difficult.28 Federal and international non-govermental experts have identified this as a problem in the Russian Federation and are keen to encourage both the formation of umbrella organizations to provide a focal point for smaller migrant organizations and the use of alternative means of communication (such as the Internet) to encourage cooperation and the exchange of ideas and experience (Open Society Institute 1996: 87).

4.5.2 Federal and international connections
The presence of links between regional, and with federal and international level organizations, is a significant factor in facilitating the development of regional organizations.29 The presence, or absence, of channels of information, communication, and resources are key to the growth of regional level organizations. A correlation may be drawn between the levels of federal and international interaction with regional migrant associations, and the level and stage of development of the migrant NGO sphere at the regional level. Where partnerships and contacts already exist in a region

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26 In Saratov oblast' the migrant organization ‘Saratovskii Istochnik’, has a dual structure. The organization operates as a NGO and provides legal and other consultation, and some material help to forced migrants and refugees, it also operates as a printing enterprise, ‘Tipografiia AVP Saratovskii Istochnik’, which prints information for forced migrants, but also fulfils commercial orders, see Chapter 6.

27 These points were supported by Edwin McClain, Chief of Mission, IOM, Moscow (interview conducted by the author, Moscow, 15 September 1999).

28 This issue came out in the empirical study, see Chapter 6.

29 This observation has been made by both heads of regional level organizations in the two case study regions, and by heads of federal level organizations, including Svetlana Gannushkina and Lidia Grafova. It has been partly achieved through the creation of the Forum of Migrant Associations, and the involvement of regional level organizations in the 1996 Geneva Conference and the follow up process to the conference.
the further development of the included organizations, and the creation of new organizations is facilitated. In the absence of any links, the initial beginnings of regional based organizations are problematised (see Chapter 6).

The federal level, Moscow-based organizations provide one channel of communication for the regional migrant associations. The activity of the federal level organizations, outlined in Chapter 3, demonstrated the varying levels of regional activity of the organizations, depending upon their mandates, and their operational structure. The Civic Assistance Committee operates mainly in Moscow. However, in cooperation with ‘Memorial’, and with the help of UNHCR and Tacis, the organization has extended its programme of legal assistance points to fifty regions of the Russian Federation. One of the aims of the project is to facilitate the exchange of information between the federal and regional levels concerning the situation of forced migrants and refugees, and to influence regional practice where it violates the rights of forced migrants and refugees (Gannushkina 1997: 19).\(^\text{30}\) The Forum of Migrant Associations, and its central working apparatus, the Coordinating Council for Aid to Refugees and Forced Migrants, operate specifically as an umbrella organization to connect regional level to federal level organizations.\(^\text{31}\) The organizations facilitate the activity of regional based organizations through the provision of information, resources and provide the opportunity for regional organizations to participate at the federal governmental level in debates concerning forced migrant and refugee issues. Indeed this is the purpose of the meetings of the Forum, which are held every two years. The reach of both these federally organized structures is significant, although links are more firmly established in certain regions than others.

\(^{30}\)A legal consultation point has been established in Saratov, through the regional migrant association ‘Vozvrashchение’. The legal consultation point in Stavropol’ prepared a case against the introduction of the ‘Immigration Code’, although the case proved unsuccessful. Representatives of the legal consultation points have represented individual migrants in court cases against the action of local laws restricting migrant rights, and the acquisition of status (Gaidash 1997: 70).

\(^{31}\)CCARFM was particularly active at compact settlement sites. With the support of the Open Society Institute the organization undertook in-depth research of a number of compact settlement sites during 1995 at ‘Novosel’ Kaluzhskaya oblast’, ‘Zov’ Lipetskaya oblast and ‘Khoko’, Voronezh oblast’, participated in a joint project with the Swiss red cross at ‘Novosel’, and gave legal and organizational help at a number of other compact settlements (‘Novosel’, ‘Zov’, ‘Volga’ Volgogradskaya oblast’).
Regional international involvement, and the nature of regional international activity, is determined by a number of different factors: the type of migrant situation existing in a region and the nature of the migrant population; internal, federal and international (donor) directives regarding the region; the presence or possibility of productive links with the local migration services and/or administrations, and non-governmental structures. The type of international activity varies according to the needs of the region. As a representative of UNHCR noted, the regions themselves determine the ‘type’ of action. In Stavropol’ krai, where there are large numbers of internally displaced, forced migrants from Chechnia completely different programmes exist than for those migrants who have resettled in the North West of Russia (Salova 1999: INT). In areas where provision is particularly limited, the socio-economic infrastructure is poor, and there are large populations in need of direct humanitarian assistance, international activity is high – this is the case in the whole of the North Caucasus region. The UNHCR micro-credit programme, run by the Danish Refugee Council in Stavropol’ krai, has been developed to suit the specifics of the migrant population in the krai which is composed of large number of persons displaced as a result of conflict in Chechnia. The programme only provides loans to internally displaced persons and lowers the entry requirements for receiving a loan. In other regions where UNHCR has developed micro-credit programmes, Saratov, Voronezh, Novgorod and Rostov oblasti, the entry requirements are stricter, and the programme aims for a much higher level of joint migrant-local community action. In these regions the micro-credit programmes prioritize forced migrants, but also target the local community.

The international organizations make clear that they are not acting independently of state structures, but rather supplement state provision to migrants, through, for example,

32 In the North Caucasus the organization has provided humanitarian aid to victims of the Chechen conflict and has developed programmes either to facilitate voluntary return or, in cases where return is impossible, integration in the local community. Similar help has been provided to Georgian refugees in North Ossetia including help for their voluntary repatriation to South Ossetia, and to Ingushetian refugees in the Prigorodny district. In response to the difficult migration situation in these areas UNHCR has opened offices in Dagestan (Makhachkala and Khasavyr), Ingushetia (Nazran) and North Ossetia (Vladikavkaz).

33 100 per cent of the recipients of loans in Stavropol krai are internally displaced persons (interview conducted by the author with Jean Verheyden, Self-Reliance Officer, UNHCR, Moscow, 9 November 1999).

34 Over the period 1997-1999 UNHCR had issued 1,551 microcredit loans in Saratov, Voronezh, Novgorod and Rostov oblasti. Forty per cent of these loans were issued to forced migrants (UNHCR unpublished data 1999).
material resources and legal aid to state and non-state structures. The factors influencing the choice of region varies according to the organization. UNHCR states that its choice of region is determined by the requests of the Russian government, the number of beneficiaries in a region, and the presence of established links and good connections. All activity at the regional level is coordinated through federal structures, formerly the Federal Migration Service and now Ministry of Federation Affairs, Nationality and Migration Policy. The work in the regions is highly dependent upon the knowledge of local administrations. UNHCR has avoided certain regions to develop its micro-credit programme due to problems with the regional authorities or regional migration services. The lack of knowledge of how the regional migration regime operates, and the absence of reliable and established partners is a problem when extending to new regions. UNHCR also attempts to work with regional migrant associations which have good and productive relations with the local authorities. IOM, due to the recent reduction in resources, now target just four regions, all in South Eastern Russia: Tambov, Belgorod, Voronezh and Briansk. The organization has withdrawn from activity in the other regions where it previously operated. The organization’s choice of the four regions is due to the high concentration of forced migrants, the geographical location of the regions, and access to the regions due to prior work experience, knowledge of the people and established partners in the regions, which allow the development of viable projects that can be presented to donors (McClain 1999: INT).

35 Olga Salova, representative of the UNHCR department for Cooperation with Social Organizations was keen to stress that all their regional activity went through the FMS so that the central body would know what assistance different regional structures were receiving from donors. Prior accusations aimed at international organizations, particularly IOM, suggested that the organization did not notify the FMS about their regional activity, which led to the mis-use of aid at the regional level, did not inform the Russian government about the fulfilment of particular programmes, or share information about the situation at the regional level (Forced Migration Monitor, 1998: 2) These particular accusations were made by Mikhail Lebedev, deputy director at the Department of Humanitarian Cooperation and Human Rights at Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who was involved in the Geneva Conference, and POA. The method of the UNHCR’s work, and the shift in focus of IOM, to an extent reflect these concerns.

36 Jean Verheyden, Self-Reliance Officer of UNHCR stated that the programme was not set up in Altai krai due to problems with the territorial migration service. Equally, problems had been encountered in trying to set up the programme in Samara due to the lack of reliable partners, and previous negative experiences (interview conducted by the author, Moscow, 9 November 1999).

37 This was particularly true for Briansk oblast' and Belgorod oblast', which border Ukraine, as one of the new initiatives of IOM is a border control project in cooperation with the Russian government.
Although the reasons for such international approaches are rational and understandable, and the need for federal level, governmental coordination is acknowledged, the possibility arises of regions being totally excluded from international activity. One of the case studies found that Samara, for a long period of time, was excluded from any international involvement both regarding state and non-state bodies. This has impacted to some degree upon the development of the regional migrant NGO sphere. The initiation of activity in a region is the most difficult stage of the process of international activity, and may be prevented or impeded by the perception of local administrative structures as unwilling to cooperate, or a lack of knowledge of migrant organizations attempting to work within the region. This situation is likely to occur in cases where the regional migration regime is ‘restrictive’. The extent of regional, federal, and international non-governmental activity within a region is a further means by which the ‘region’, and regional actors, i.e. local migrant associations, may be incorporated into the wider levels of the migration regime – federal and international – and may enable these actors to act at these wider levels (see Chapter 6).

Conclusion

The variable nature of regional migration regimes demonstrates the combination of factors that impact upon their development. The nature of the migration flow, its size and migrant population, is significant. Placed within a federal framework, the economic and political priorities of the regional administrations, and the wider economic, social, political and cultural environment in the region, influence the subsequent construction of the migration issue in legislative and discursive practice. It is found that regional administrations hold the power to determine the overall nature of the regime and determine other state (TMS) practices. Non-political agencies are either enabled or constrained by state attitudes, but can negotiate for additional power beyond the limits of the regional migration regime. The analyses of types of regional migration regimes is central to the present study, yet, the significance for individual migrant resettlement needs to be critically accessed. The impact of the nature of the official response, either ‘restrictive’ or ‘receptive’, is mediated by the presence of other factors. Migrant ‘satisfaction’ with resettlement has been identified as being independent, to an extent,
of the nature of the surrounding regime.\textsuperscript{38} Equally, the presence or absence of non-state help requires more critical attention. Even in the presence of migrant structures, individual migrants may use more informal strategies – family and friendship networks – to facilitate resettlement. The tendency for a reliance upon informal networks of family and friends may be a result of both the nature of the surrounding migration regime, and individual preference and circumstance. The following chapters of the thesis combine analyses of the interaction of the surrounding migration regime, the nature of individual and collective level migrant response and the subsequent experience of migrant resettlement.

\textsuperscript{38} Despite the existence of restrictive practices and difficult circumstances a survey amongst forced migrants and refugees in Stavropol’ krai revealed that they had a higher index of satisfaction, as compared to other less populated regions (Vitkovskaia 1998a: 29). In a comparative study of migrant resettlement in Ul’ianovsk oblast’ and Orel oblast’ despite the more ‘restrictive’ nature of the regime in Ul’ianovsk and the more receptive regime in Orel, the levels of individual migrant satisfaction in Ul’ianovsk were higher than that of Orel (Pilkington 1998a).
Chapter 5: Introduction to the regions of study, methodological issues and ethical concerns

Introduction

Chapter 5 discusses the process of research that led to, and enabled, the production of the final written text. Too often the procedure of ‘doing research’ is ignored and research is seen purely as a product rather than as a ‘social process’ which requires careful scrutiny (England 1994: 82). The research question, the choice of location and methods, data collection, the analysis of data, the writing up process, and the final dissemination of information, must be seen as a cumulative and interactive process. Individual parts of the research process are connected through the overall research design. In the present study, the research had to be designed bearing in mind that the uncertainty and changing nature of the topic of study demanded a high degree of flexibility. The scope of the study required attention to both the micro and the macro levels, and their interaction, and actors in both the ‘construction’ and ‘experience’ of the migration process had to be engaged. The complex and sensitive nature of the study, and its location in the Russian Federation, necessitated reflection upon the research process.

The chapter begins with a discussion of the design of the research including an introduction to the case study regions and choice of research methods. The different methods of data gathering are described with reference to their application in the field, followed by the approach taken in the analysis of the data. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the main methodological issues which emerged from the study and places them within wider debates concerning the process and practice of doing research in post-Soviet Russia.¹

¹ Due to the chapter very much representing a reflection on the research process by the researcher involved, the chapter uses the first person narrative in contrast to the other chapters of the thesis.
5.1 Research design: a critical ethnographic approach

5.1.1 ‘New’ approaches within ethnography

Recent, critical approaches to ethnography were found to be of use in the research; that share with conventional ethnography an emphasis on the use of an extensive fieldwork approach where the researcher is located ‘within’ the context of what they are studying. They stress in addition that research is an interactive and reflective process between the observer and observed; and that the micro-location of a study can inform theoretical understanding of the wider ‘whole’ (Berg 1998: 121; Burawoy et al. 1991: 1-9). The practice of ethnography is a disputed term, and sociologists differ on both its conceptual meaning and application (Berg 1998: 120). Ethnography has developed in two key ways: how the subjects of the research, and their role in the research process, are viewed; and the level of analysis the research encompasses. Conventional approaches to ethnography represented a ‘gaze looking in’. A specific case provided the sole focus of the research and the subject was ‘described’ and objectified in the written text. The approach was broadened out, under the influence of Clifford Geertz, who used his case study of the Balinese cockfight to ‘reflect’ the wider social organization of Balinese society. Geertz, however, did not place the experience of the cockfight within the historical, economic, political and cultural contexts of the wider social system (Burawoy et al. 1991: 278). Later ethnographic studies, for example Paul Willis’s ‘Learning to Labour’, used the locale of primary ethnographic fieldwork to provide a representation, and inform understanding, of the wider macro-system. The local situation was therefore opened up to, and embedded within, wider political, social, cultural and economic forces (Marcus 1991: 178-181). Later ethnographic research interrogated the process of research to a greater extent, and addressed issues such as the position of the researcher within the research process, and the unequal power relations between the researcher, and researched. One result of greater reflection on the research process was the re-positioning of the subject and the recognition that the ethnographic project was a product of the interaction between the subjects of the research and the researcher. This allows the research to be informed to a greater extent by the dialogue of the subject, and the path the research process takes to be shaped by subject response.
The present study explores the construction and experience of a migration process, taking place within a migration system that is being produced through the interaction of structure and agency. Within the migration system, the study focuses upon the development of the migration regime; how the migration regime shapes migrant experience and how migrants work both ‘through’ and ‘round’ the migration regime to facilitate their resettlement. The study understands the nature of the migration, ‘return’, and resettlement of the Russian populations from the former republics as being constructed and experienced at the individual level, but equally acknowledges the construction of the processes discursively at the state level through policy and legislation, which impacts upon migrant experience. In addition, the study recognizes that both individual and institutional practices are embedded in the wider reaches of time and space (Giddens 1986: 298); and therefore acknowledges the significance of historical, political, social and economic structural relations which impact upon state and individual action.

The spatial and temporal displacement experienced by migrants, the complex process of resettlement, the evolving nature of the migration regime in the Russian Federation, and the surrounding fluidity of Russian society, informed the choice of a qualitative, ethnographic approach. Qualitative research methods in general treat ‘social reality’ as always ‘in flux’ (Silverman 2000: 10). However, further insights from critical ethnography provided a flexible and reflective framework which I feel best allowed the research question to be managed. As the research was conducted within the context of a rapidly changing environment, this had an impact for both ‘what’ was being looked at, and ‘how’ it was looked at. An ethnographic approach ensured that I would be situated within the changing environment, that itself directed my research activity. Face-to-face interaction with the different actors involved in the migration process enabled examination of the process underway as perceived by the participants, and for different interpretations of the situation to be gained. The research focus was shaped, therefore, to an extent by the subjects of the research as interaction with one respondent, informed my dialogue with another. The extended period of fieldwork enabled reflection, and the adaptation of the research approach on a continual basis. Only by positioning myself within the changing environment, and between the key actors, could I access how the migration process was being constructed through discourse and institutional change.
and how the same process was being experienced by the individual migrant. Further to adopting a broad ethnographic approach, particular methods needed to be selected.

5.1.2 The case study approach

The extended case method

Methodology itself provides the link between technique and theory. Technique is concerned with the instruments and strategies of data collection, and methodology is concerned with the reciprocal relationship between data and theory (Burawoy et al. 1991: 271). This linkage reflects the dichotomy of ‘understanding’ and ‘explanation’ in social science. Understanding may be achieved by participation in a social situation, through a ‘real’ or ‘constructed’ dialogue between the researcher and respondent, i.e. at the fieldwork location. Explanation concerns the researcher, and the dialogue between ‘theory’ and ‘data’. The researcher is interested in learning about a specific social situation, and how that knowledge can have validity beyond the situation that has been studied. The question recent ethnographies have attempted to answer is what methods are available to best move from the data of the ethnographic study, to the level of social theory (ibid: 3).

A case study approach using ethnographic methods of investigation can facilitate the move from data to theory. Such an approach was adopted in the present study. A case study approach would enable the operation of the migration system to be observed and interrogated; specifically the way in which the process of migration, and subsequent resettlement, were constructed by certain key actors (regional governments, migration services, the migrant), and experienced and negotiated by the individual migrant. Two case study regions were chosen – Saratov and Samara oblasti. The case study regions were not chosen in order to present singular examples of distinct migration environments and migrant experiences of resettlement. Instead, the regions were chosen as ‘instrumental cases’ to provide insight to key differences in the construction, and experience, of the migration process. The case study regions would inform analysis at the wider regional and federal level, and refine theoretical explanation of the broader migration process and migration system (Berg 1998: 216). The use of a case study can explicate the links between the micro and macro, which, in the present study, is key to understanding the migration process. Within the case study region itself, the specifics of
migrant resettlement and the experience of the individual migrant could be focused upon, as could the wider regional migration regime, but with constant consideration of the implicit interaction with the regional, national and international levels of the wider migration system.

The combination of micro-level analysis, an awareness of the wider structural environment, and the use of the regional case studies to inform theoretical understanding of the whole migration process, reflects what Burawoy labels the 'extended case method' (see Burawoy et al. 1991). By focusing empirical, ethnographic research at the case study level, an exchange can continually go on between the fieldwork process and the analysis that both follows, and goes on simultaneously, during the fieldwork period. By placing the case study within the wider macro-environment, a second exchange can go on between analysis and existing theory. The method allows both a 'grounded' approach, and permits the location of the study within a broader theoretical tradition. The present study draws upon structuration theory to understand the production and operation of the migration system. Structuration theory illuminates key areas of social life which are frequently overlooked, and identifies them for empirical analysis. Nevertheless, as May suggests 'structuration is a theoretical enterprise which is still unfolding' (1996: 118). It is through empirical application that the analytic reach of the theory may be furthered. Rather than suggesting that the local case study can only generate new theories from the 'ground up' (i.e. as 'pure' grounded theory approaches suggest, see Glaser and Strauss 1967), the extended case method suggests that findings from the micro-local can allow the reconstruction of existing theories through the exploration of the gaps, silences or shortcomings of those theories (Burawoy 1991: 10-11). In addition, the approach may generate ideas and micro-theories during the empirical work, that can subsequently be used to explore the usefulness of other existing theories.

**The case study regions**

The choice of the regions of study took into consideration the broad research questions of the study, prior and acquired knowledge about the regions and the nature of their migration regimes, and practical considerations such as ease of access and presence of contacts. The research focused on migrant resettlement in two neighbouring oblasti –
Samara and Saratov – which are situated in the Volga economic region of the Russian Federation. Moscow provided a third location, but not a case study location. In Moscow the activity of federal and international actors and their interaction with the regions – in this case Saratov and Samara oblasti – were examined. The three locations of the research provided an important spatial element, allowing issues of interest at all the locations, and questions which arose during the research process across the locations, to be cross-checked and verified.

An initial visit was made to Saratov oblast’ in 1996 to attend a seminar being held on forced migrant and refugee issues in the city of Saratov, organized by the local migration service and regional migrant associations, and attended by representatives of both federal and international structures concerned with refugee and forced migrant issues in the Russian Federation. The seminar enabled initial contacts to be made with both regional (migration service, migrant association, and migrants), federal and international actors. Pilot visits were conducted to Saratov oblast’ in September 1997 and May 1998 when contacts with governmental and non-governmental structures were developed, and migrant and expert pilot interviews were conducted. The main period of fieldwork in Saratov oblast’ took place from June-September 1999. The second region of study, Samara oblast’, was chosen due to practical concerns i.e. its close geographical location to Saratov oblast’, and due to the existence of certain consistent and differing variables which provided a comparison to the situation in Saratov oblast’. A pilot visit to the oblast’ in April 1998 enabled initial contacts to be made. The main period of fieldwork in Samara oblast’ took place from September-November 1999.

The two regions were experiencing very similar levels of in-migration of ethnic Russian and Russian speaking migrants from the same departure regions. In addition, the socio-economic and political conditions in the two oblasti were of a similar nature. These similarities provided a set of consistent variables against which the experience of individual migrant resettlement could be located and the development of the regional

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2 A socio-economic profile of the two oblasti, an overview of the migration flows occurring to the regions, and an in-depth comparison of the nature of the two migration regimes in Samara and Saratov oblasti, is provided in the following chapter.
migration regimes could be placed. Initially it was not known whether the nature of the two migration regimes would significantly differ, however, the pilot visits to the two regions revealed a number of other criteria which suggested the emergence of two ‘types’ of regime. On the territory of Saratov oblast’ the migration service was ‘receptive’ and active, there was an emerging network of regional migrant associations, and high levels of international involvement. Initial expert interviews in 1998 with representatives of the migration service indicated a liberal and open attitude to immigration and migrant resettlement existing in Saratov oblast’. In Samara initial observations revealed that the general attitude of the regional migration service was ‘restrictive’ and closed, there was a lack of international involvement in the region, and at the time of the initial pilot visit in 1997 there was no visible activity of any regional migrant associations.

The regional level case study approach requires some qualifying remarks. The greater period of time spent in Saratov oblast’ allowed a more in-depth and longitudinal view of the situation to be gained. The fact that the period of fieldwork in Samara followed that which was conducted in Saratov had an impact upon the way the research was conducted in Samara, and influenced the questions asked. However, this was seen as an opportunity for earlier findings to inform later research, rather than as an impediment to the empirical process. Also, as the focus of the study was broadly the construction and experience of the migration process, and at the micro-level, the experience of individual migrant resettlement set within the context of the surrounding migration regimes, rather than a comparison of the nature of regional migration regimes, I feel that the effect of the bias in favour of Saratov oblast’ is lessened. Another point of qualification, however, is that although Saratov and Samara oblasti are described as the regions of study, due to time limitations and the difficulties of travelling out into the oblast’ the fieldwork was concentrated in the urban centres, and in urban and rural locations in the districts which bordered on the oblast’ central region. However the research was a study of migrant experiences of migration and resettlement within the context of the local, regional, federal and international migration environment, rather than the specific ‘nature’ of urban or rural resettlement.
5.1.3 The choice of methods

The methods, employed in triangulation, were: in-depth, semi-structured interviews with individual migrants; expert interviews with representatives of migrant associations, local, national and international NGOs and government bodies; and field observations at different sites within the regional migration regimes. Triangulation allows the use of different kinds of data from different sources to see whether they corroborate one another (Walsh 1998: 231). In the present study the methods chosen aimed to understand the different perceptions and priorities of the same phenomenon, at varying levels of analysis and at different points in time, and to reveal the contradictions and inconsistencies existing between them. Each method – migrant interview, expert interview, field observation – was used to verify and check the other. Points of contention and interest in one sphere, were noted and tested in another sphere (see below). The combination of methods, and different location sites of the research, enabled to an extent, the divide between the individual and wider institutional and structural environment to be bridged. The ‘grounded’ nature of the research approach, and the time period of the study, meant that the parameters of the research, and the theoretical concepts, were constantly reviewed, redefined and focused over the course of the research process.

In addition to the data gathered from interviews and observation, an ACCESS data base of socio-demographic information for each migrant was compiled by asking each migrant respondent at the end of the interview to fill in a short questionnaire (see Appendix 4 for a sample questionnaire and Appendix 7 for a summary of the data). The data collected from interviews and observation was used in combination with other secondary information and documentary materials (official legislation and policy documents, institutional documentation, newspaper articles).³

³ A press review was carried out at the national and regional levels. Four central newspapers were reviewed for the period March 1996 to the end of 2000. The central newspapers were Izvestia, Segodnia, Nezavisimaja gazeta and Literaturnaja gazeta. At the regional level a comparative press analysis was conducted for the period January 1999-August 1999. However, in both regions a general press review, depending upon the availability of the papers and the time period spent in the region, preceded and extended the comparative press analysis period. The regional papers were, in Saratov, Saratovskie vesti (daily), Saratov (daily), and Komu chto (weekly), and in Samara, Samarskie izvestija (daily), Samarskaia gazeta (daily) and Samarskoe obozrenie (weekly).
5.2 Conducting the research

5.2.1 Migrant interviews

A socio-demographic profile of the migrant respondents

A total of sixty two migrants were interviewed in the two regions of study. Respondents had arrived in the two oblasti over the period 1991-1999. Forty four respondents were interviewed in Saratov oblast and eighteen respondents in Samara oblast. Seventeen of the migrant respondents were interviewed as part of the pilot study in Saratov oblast in September 1997. The remaining respondents were interviewed during the main period of fieldwork, from June-November 1999. In both oblasti migrants were interviewed at a number of settlement type sites located in urban, semi-urban and rural areas. The number of respondents resident in urban areas totalled forty, the number of rural respondents totalled twenty two. The respondents were not sampled according to socio-demographic characteristics. However, as indicated, socio-demographic data were gathered for each respondent. Forty five female migrants were interviewed, and seventeen male migrants. Reasons for the higher incidence of female respondents were that female migrants were easier to access, they were generally more available than male migrants, especially at the rural resettlement sites, and were more willing to talk. In addition, the migrant associations used to access some respondents were predominantly run by women, who themselves had more contacts with, and found it easier to approach, other female migrants.

The majority of the respondents stated their nationality as Russian (eighty two per cent). This is slightly higher than that reflected in official Federal Migration Service data, which showed seventy eight per cent of the forced migrants registered in Saratov oblast over the period 1997-1999 (Saratov territorial migration service 1999) and seventy seven per cent in Samara oblast over the period 1996-1999 (Samara territorial migration service 1999) to be of Russian nationality. The other stated nationalities were: Ukrainian, Chechen, German, Uzbek, Tajik, Tatar, Chuvash and Moldovan. The respondents mainly came from the Central Asian republics (sixteen respondents from

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1 See Appendix 2 for a detailed overview of the migrant settlement sites in Saratov and Samara oblasti.
Tajikistan, seventeen respondents from Uzbekistan) and Kazakstan (eighteen respondents). Four respondents had arrived from Azerbaijan, two from Georgia, three from Turkmenistan and two from Chechnia. The regions of departure of respondents closely reflects the tendencies in migration service data for migration into the oblast’ as a whole (see Chapter 6).

The interview process

The migrants were accessed via the Samara and Saratov territorial migration services, the regional migrant organizations active in the two oblasti, and through the use of snowballing techniques beginning with migrant contacts. The interviews took place at the premises of the territorial migration service and the regional migrant organizations, or in the hostel rooms, flats or houses of individual migrants in urban and rural areas. The choice of interview location was determined, in the first instance, by respondent preference, and secondly by practical considerations concerning the availability of space at the premises of the TMS and migrant associations, and the time individual migrants could give to be interviewed. Visits were made out from the oblast’ centres to rural sites where migrants were resident on repeated occasions. The length of interviews varied; from shorter interviews of 15 minutes to hour long interviews. This was highly dependent upon the location of the interview; in more official surroundings the interviews tended to be shorter whilst at migrants’ homes, the respondents had more time to talk. All of the interviews were taped after gaining the respondent’s permission and assurances that that the information would be treated with the utmost confidentiality and would only be listened to by myself. In the interests of anonymity, when migrant interviews are cited in the text of the thesis, respondents are referred to only by the identification number assigned them in the database of socio-demographic details, the region of their resettlement and the year of interview.

The interviews with migrants focused on: histories of their lives in the former republics and motivations for migration; the nature of the migration movement; interaction with governmental and non-governmental structures during the process of resettlement; the

5 In instances where the time respondents could offer was very limited, it was usually agreed to conduct the interview straight away, often at the premises of the migration service or migrant associations.
experience of finding work and accommodation; and understandings of ‘home’. These themes were used as a series of key prompts rather than a strict outline. It is suggested that in qualitative interviewing the emphasis should be on allowing the speaker to have control, and so enable them to say how they see things in their own words rather than making them follow the researcher’s agenda (Seale 1998: 207). I attempted to cover all of the themes I have indicated, but the fluidity of the question structure allowed the respondent to take the conversation in the direction they wished. In contrast to more structured techniques, such as a questionnaire or survey, the interview approach did not suggest one answer but allowed the migrants to express the contradictory nature of their experiences of migration and resettlement in their own terms (ibid: 202).

A preliminary analysis of the pilot interviews conducted in Saratov oblast’ in 1997 allowed adaptation of the interview questions and the incorporation of issues and language used by the migrant respondents themselves. A key change concerned migrant understandings of ‘return’. In the pilot interviews my focus had been upon the idea of repatriation to a ‘historical homeland’ (rodina) which reflected key Russian political, academic and media discourses concerning the process. This was re-defined after listening to migrants to reflect a broader idea of understandings of ‘return’ which included that of being ‘at home’ signified by the term doma. The ‘home’ thesis, therefore, came out of the analysis of the pilot interviews and demonstrates how the original interviews served to generate meaningful themes for the later interviews, where some of the categories used were grounded in migrant narratives, rather than imposed by the researcher. The process of research, therefore, generated new ideas which could then undergo wider theoretical investigation.

**Methodological and ethical issues**

The experience of interviewing individuals, who were located in a state of ‘dislocation’, i.e. displaced from their homes and in the process of trying to re-establish themselves in a new place of residence, generated a number of methodological and ethical concerns which require some discussion and attempted resolution.

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6 See Appendix 3 for an outline of the scenario used for the migrant interviews.
An issue of concern was that by requesting an interview with migrants I was infringing upon the space and privacy of the individuals involved, taking up their valuable time, and asking them to talk about topics which were frequently distressing and which they may have wished to forget. I did not receive any refusal from migrants to be interviewed: the vast majority of respondents were very willing to answer any question I posed. When I conducted the interviews in the home environment the migrants appeared more than happy to receive me, offered me refreshments and made me feel completely at ease. Yet, this did not prevent me from feeling I was demanding time and attention which they had to make unwarranted sacrifices to give. Although Finch notes that the interview can be a `welcome experience` for respondents by providing the opportunity to talk (Finch 1984: 73) – indeed a number of my respondents themselves mentioned this – I needed to be careful in the extent I used this as a justification. My purpose as a researcher prioritized the process of data collection. Although I realized that I had to accept my role as `data collector` it was important that I reflected on how I would collect this data, my attitude to my respondents, their perception of me, and how I would use the data gathered.

My fear that I was imposing upon the respondents’ time, and raising issues which they might want to forget, were partly assuaged by the reception and personal responses which I received from my respondents. A number of the respondents expressed their gratitude that someone was thinking about them and was prepared to listen to them. This may stem from the indifference they felt they have received from both the Russian state and society (see Chapter 7).7 The interview often developed, especially after the tape recorder had been switched off, to a more general discussion where the individuals questioned me about my life, why I was here, what it was like for me to live in Russia, standards of living in the West, etc. This exchange helped to reduce the unequal position of researcher/respondent, where I was able to present myself as an individual willing and pleased to hold a normal conversation. On reflection, I should have

7 Similar responses have been found in other studies where forced migrants were interviewed. Drought notes that the forced migrants in her study (of settlement of forced migrants from Tajikistan at compact type settlements) welcomed the opportunity to express their views about resettlement, the role of state structures, and the leaders of the settlements as it was often the first time they had been asked to talk about this (2000: Appendix 1).
included time at the end of the interview to ask the respondents whether they wished to ask me any questions. However, as noted, this exchange frequently occurred naturally.

The instances where such an exchange occurred were mainly with female respondents. Although I did not face any problems when I interviewed male migrants, female respondents were more willing to talk, more eager to divulge greater personal information about their experience, and more interested in my own personal history. This issue has been widely addressed in literature looking at women interviewing other women (Oakley 1981; England 1994; Finch 1984; McRobbie 1982). However, as much as it was a welcome situation to find respondents who were willing to talk to me, made easier by me being a young woman, this presented the potential to abuse my position. I was aware of my position as ‘researcher’ and that these women were vulnerable as subjects of research both due to their gender and their position as migrants. Their availability and willingness to talk was possible evidence of this (McRobbie 1982: 57). The only resolution to the dilemma was to be aware of the power relations involved, my genuine interest in the respondents and appreciation of the warmth that they showed towards me even in the short space of the interview period, and my subsequent prioritization of them as subjects rather than objects of the research.

The interview process provided a rich source of data that was subject-defined (Dey 1993: 14). Lawson suggests that in-depth interviews best cope with questions of identity and subjectivity, and reveal the ‘empirical disjuncture’ between expectations of migration and the actual experiences of migration (2000: 174). The approach prioritized the migrant’s personal understanding and experience of the migration process, that could be contrasted with how the same process was framed by other actors. The interviews placed the migrant at the centre of the migration and resettlement process as a ‘knowledgeable agent’ and offered them the opportunity to describe their experiences, actions and reasons for their actions (Giddens 1986: 281). The interviews provided access to the past experiences and changing identities of the respondents, essential to the present study, and allowed their opinions about the wider institutional features of the surrounding migration regime, and Russian society, to be elicited. The data enabled wider critiques of dominant assumptions being made of the migration processes
underway, i.e. at the state level, by drawing on the re-interpretations of the process amongst the migrants themselves (Lawson 2000: 176).

5.2.2 Expert interviews

*Expert respondents*

Expert interviews were conducted with representatives of the territorial migration service and its district branches, the local administration – both local deputies and employees in relevant government departments – the regional migrant associations, the local media and the regional non-governmental sphere, in Samara and Saratov oblasti. The experts were selected by identifying the key structures concerned with the issue of migrant resettlement in the region. This was done both prior to the fieldwork, and during the course of the fieldwork, by following up comments by experts and migrants concerning structures they had come into contact with. The experts interviewed in Moscow included representatives of the Federal Migration Service, Russian and international NGOs concerned with migration, and Russian academics working in the field of migration. An initial base of interviewees in Moscow was extended through the use of snowballing. A number of the expert respondents were active at both the federal and regional level. This proved valuable when tracing the relationships, and making connections, between the multiple levels – international, federal, regional.8

*The interview process*

The expert interviews were structured around a number of key themes. Each expert interview was adapted to the specific respondent who was being interviewed, which meant that questions were altered, omitted, or additional questions were included.9 Interviews conducted with regional governmental and non-governmental structures covered: their activity in the field of migrant resettlement and migrant provision; their relationship with and evaluation of (other) governmental and (other) non-governmental structures concerned with migration; their evaluation of regional and federal attitudes towards the issue of migration; their evaluation of the situation of migrants in the region and their resettlement prospects; their evaluation of federal and regional legislation regarding migrants; and their opinion concerning future migration processes

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8 See Appendix 5 for a list of expert respondents.
9 See Appendix 6 for an outline of the scenario used for the expert interviews.
at the regional and national level. Interviews with migration experts and journalists concentrated on their opinions of governmental and non-governmental action in the field of migration, and perceptions of the processes of migration and resettlement taking place at the regional and federal level. The aim was to construct individual interviews suited to the respondent in question, but where relevant to try and cover the same ground and to triangulate and cross-check accounts and interpretations (Ball 1994: 97)

Accessing and building relationships with expert respondents

The possibility to make repeat visits to Samara and Saratov oblasti, and to Moscow, allowed me to conduct a large number of second and even third interviews with a number of individuals which allowed relationships of trust to build up with the individuals involved. This trust was invaluable due to the sensitivity of the issue of migration in Russia. The fact that I turned up time and time again helped to demonstrate the seriousness of my approach, my knowledge about and genuine interest in the issue. The importance and value of being fully prepared and knowledgeable about the topic of concern became very clear during the time of conducting expert interviews and facilitated the collection of useful data (Richards 1996: 201; Ball 1994: 99). The repeat visits to key institutions allowed me to trace the development of different structures and their approach to the issue of migration over time and meant that new areas of concern arising during the period of fieldwork could be followed up. All of the expert interviews provided access to documents and material not available elsewhere and helped me to establish contacts with other individuals which I may not have initially considered (Richards 1996: 200). The interviews with regional migrant officials, in particular, provided an essential supplement to my interpretation of migration legislation and its ‘adaptation’ at the regional level and the reasons and justifications for its use (see Chapter 6).

My access to government structures differed between the two regions of study, specifically with relation to the territorial migration service. Over the course of three years I developed a good relationship with a number of the employees in the Saratov migration service, which facilitated access to officials higher up in the service, and to official data. In contrast, the reception I received from the Samara territorial migration
service, although not openly hostile, was obstructive. During my pilot visit to the region in 1998 I was only allowed to interview one official, was refused access to statistics or official documentation and was informed that if I wanted further interviews or information that I would need official permission from the FMS and must be officially registered, i.e. have a propiska, on the territory of Samara oblast'.\(^{10}\) I followed this advice and received a recommendation from a Federal Migration Service employee the following year. However, the willingness to offer information remained much more limited than in Saratov oblast'. Although I interviewed the director of the Samara territorial migration service, he was very dismissive and I gained much more information and official data during interviews with other employees in the service.

The questionable reliability and consistency of statistics is discussed in Appendix 1. However, my experience of acquiring access to statistics demonstrated the additional problem of sometimes acquiring concrete ‘real’ data. In Saratov, the data were seen as fields of open information. Employees of the migration service actually photocopied the data for me. In Samara, the data were regarded as secret and sensitive information. I only gained access to the data in Samara via one employee, and had to copy the figures out by hand. The experience, like other observations of the migration services, informed my overall impressions of the operation of the services in the two regions (see Chapter 6)

Access to other governmental bodies was problematized by the fact that the government officials generally directed me back to the migration service. This reflects what many migrants experienced where the migration service is identified as the only source of possible help. Officials denied that they had any responsibility for, or dealings with, forced migrants, however, if they allowed the conversation to continue, which was predominantly the case, they would often mention a sphere where they had dealings with migrants. Nevertheless, besides the Samara TMS, I did not face significant

\(^{10}\) I learned during a second interview conducted in 1999 that the official had been warned by the director of the service about what he should answer in the interview. During the second interview he had been instructed to write down all of my questions so he could report at a later date back to the director. Regarding the propiska it is necessary for a foreign visitor to register their presence with the local authorities when in Russia. I did this in Ul’ianovsk oblast'. It is not necessary to register in every place you visit.
difficulties in accessing official, governmental structures at either the regional or federal level.

One structure where I encountered problems at the non-governmental level, both at the regional and federal branch, was with the Compatriots Fund (‘Sootechestvenniki’). Representatives of the organization in Moscow and Samara oblast were the only individuals to refuse my request to record the interview. The representative in Samara merely answered every question by saying that the migration service would be a better place to go. The representative in Moscow asked me why I was studying Russia, although I had introduced myself, my position and affiliation, and had explained the full nature of my research. The representative was suspicious about the ‘political’ purpose of my research and concerned about the future readership of the thesis. However, he agreed to continue with the interview, proceeded to answer my questions, and showed me material demonstrating what the organization had achieved. The reaction could be explained by the policy and position of the Compatriots Fund. Originally closely linked to the state, it had faced charges of misuse of federal budget allocations and possible illegal investment in commercial activities (see Chapter 3). The interview experience demonstrated to me how in ‘expert’ or ‘elite’ interviews the respondents may have particular reasons for being careful about what, and how, they say things in interviews, and may be totally resistant to the interviewer’s questions (Ball 1994: 96, 107). If the interviewer is aware of this then it can help in the later interpretation of the interview data.

My relationship with the representatives of the migrant associations was specific due to the extended periods of time I spent with a number of them. With two representatives of migrant organizations, in both Samara and Saratov oblasti, I developed a friendly relationship, which meant that I was more personally involved in both the association and the individuals’ lives. This led me to see the situation in the region, and other structures in the regional migration regime, predominantly through the eyes of one association or individual. As Walsh suggests, even facilitative relations with ‘gatekeepers’ can be problematic if they structure the fieldwork towards the ‘gatekeepers’ existing networks (1998: 225). A problem arose when I was portrayed by a number of the migrant associations to ‘official structures’ as a concerned western
onlooker in an attempt to get help for the association over a certain issue, which in fact facilitated my access to these official structures. Although I was willing to be of assistance, I wished the migrant associations to know that I had very little influence or power; as a PhD student I was situated on the outside of the operation of the involved structures in the region, and at the federal and international level. However, I feel upon reflection my close relationship with the organizations provided me with much greater insight into the issues involved and enabled me to gain access to official structures and settlement sites that would have been very problematic otherwise.

The unlimited help of the associations, despite the much larger and real concerns they were having to deal with on an everyday basis, caused me concern. However, the genuine dialogue and exchange of information which took place with the representatives helped assuage my fears that I was merely exploiting them and their associations for the purpose of my research. The representatives spoke of how the conversations helped them to see the issues more clearly, to think about questions I had raised, and to consider resolutions. The conversations provided an invaluable supplement to the other more formal interviews I had conducted with the individuals and offered the opportunity to discuss issues and questions that arose on a daily basis. Due to the more relaxed environment, and the often enforced long time periods (the conversations frequently took place on bus or train journeys out into the oblast' to visit rural migrant resettlement sites), I was able to clarify many questions and have productive conversations with the individuals involved.

5.2.3 Field observations
Field observations were carried out at different sites of migrant resettlement, the migration service, the regional migrant associations, and on an everyday basis as I came into contact with migrants and the representatives of the involved structures. All observations were recorded in a field diary which was continually updated. The field notes not only provided an essential form of data collection, but also enabled the beginnings of informal analysis to take place during the period of fieldwork (Bryman and Burgess 1994: 11; Hughes 1994: 37). The field observations meant that I could actually watch the interaction of my different key actors, and the way relationships
between them were constructed, whilst keeping in mind the personal accounts I had received from the actors themselves.

The field observations at the migration service and migrant associations enabled me to gain a detailed insight into people going about their work. Observation proved more difficult at the migration service although I was invited to observe receptions at the Saratov territorial migration service on a number of occasions, and travelled out with one employee to the Temporary Resettlement Centres. At the migrant associations I was able to sit unobtrusively at a desk in their offices and to observe the receptions for forced migrants on a regular basis. I frequently travelled with representatives of the migrant associations on their visits to official structures and sites of migrant resettlement where I could observe the interaction of the migrant associations with other structures and individual migrants. A particularly good opportunity was provided to me by the head of the migrant organization 'Vozvrashchenie' in Saratov. Through her introduction, I was able to be present at the meetings of the 'Coordinating Council on Problems of Forced Migrants and Refugees' of Saratov oblast over the period June-September 1999. I gained an in-depth view of attitudes within the regional administration and other involved structures towards migrants, migrant resettlement and policy development on the territory of the oblast, and of the relationships and interaction between the different individuals. My presence at the meetings also helped me to develop contacts with the individuals who were present.

Although I cannot claim to appreciate the reality of the everyday lives of migrants, my extended presence at the different sites of migrant settlement (hostels and rural settlement sites) were informative and useful. Conversations held prior to and after the interviews with migrants at these sites, and other informal conversations with migrants not included in my sample, provided a large amount of additional information which was immediately written up as field notes and referred to at a later date. The conversations with migrants demonstrated to me the limitations of what were informal, but still recorded, interviews in some contexts. I was conscious of the impression that, once I had got my answers, I was immediately moving away. However, by spending time talking informally to both respondents and non-respondents, without the presence of a tape recorder, I was able to build up some degree of trust with the respondents, and
also improve my own understanding of the situation. The more informal and relaxed atmosphere of these situations ensured a more productive and genuine dialogue with the individuals involved.

5.3 Approaching the data

5.3.1 Analysis in the field

Often in accounts of research practice the stage of ‘analysis’ is ignored, or assumed, and not accounted for in any rigorous way (Dey 1993: 5). However, the process of analysis is integral to the process of research and is not confined to the period after all data has been collected. Data analysis is ‘always present in the ideas and hunches of the researcher as he or she engages in the field setting and seeks to understand the data being collected’ (Walsh 1998: 229). Analysis begins ‘in the field’ where the researcher must be constantly engaging in ‘preliminary analytic strategies’ during data collection (Bogdan and Biklen 1982 cited in Bryman and Burgess 1994: 7). The beginnings of analysis reflects the grounded and reflective nature of the study where the analytic strategies employed involved narrowing the focus of the study, reviewing field notes to determine new questions, writing notes about emerging issues, trying out emergent ideas, and thinking through theoretical assumptions in situ.

After each stage of fieldwork any migrant and expert interviews that had been conducted were transcribed and analyzed prior to the next stage. Themes which came out of the analysis of pilot migrant interviews informed both the questions and the language used in later interviews. Issues which came out of migrant interviews were introduced into expert interviews, and vice versa. This possibility was particularly important for gaining a comprehensive understanding of the complex operation of forced migrant legislation, and the implications of having a propiska or Russian citizenship (see Chapter 6). The different stages and different locations of the fieldwork facilitated such an approach. Issues which arose at the different locations (regional and national) and at different points in time could be checked and followed up in the later stages of the fieldwork. Theory generation was ‘constructive’ as opposed to purely data-based (Walsh 1998: 231). As noted at the beginning of the chapter, certain theories
structured my observation and my pathways of data collection. However, the data collection was adapted as themes of interest arose during the research process, which subsequently led to further theoretical interrogation.

5.3.2 Post-fieldwork analysis

After the final period of fieldwork the main bulk of migrant and expert interviews were transcribed in full. Three sets of text based primary data now existed – migrant interviews, expert interviews, and field observations. Each of the data were afforded equal priority in the analysis and each source of data supplemented and provided the context for the other. Slightly different approaches to the analysis of the different data, however, were adopted. The texts of expert interviews and field observations were read in detail, then sorted, using a cut and paste technique, into the key categories and sub-categories which emerged from the texts. This process was completed separately for the two regions. The body of categorized data was employed in the thesis to structure Chapter 6 which maps the regional migration regimes in the two regions, and to inform Chapter 7 which maps experiences of migrant resettlement.

The analysis of the migrant interviews was conducted more ‘rigorously’ due to the greater complexity of the data, which contained, to a larger extent than the expert interviews, both factual statements but also respondents’ perceptions and feelings. The data were sorted thematically (again using a cut and paste technique) into key categories. The categories emerged naturally around the key stages and aspects of the migration and resettlement processes. Within the main categories, the information was further broken down into sub-categories which split the data into sections regarding more factual accounts and statements and more ‘subjective’ expressions of feelings and perceptions. The final stage of the analysis looked for connections between the groups of categories and sub-categories, e.g. commonalities and differences in feelings of ‘home’ in the new and former place of residence. The key category groups, sub-category groups, and the connections between the groups provided the basis for Chapter 7. The transcribed migrant interviews were not analysed individually for each region as I hoped that any difference in experience of resettlement between the two oblasti would emerge spontaneously in the process of category formation. Throughout the analysis, however, the source of the original quotation or piece of text was recorded which
enabled constant reference back to the socio-demographic data gathered for each respondent.

5.3.3 The importance of context

During the process of final data analysis, and during the employment of the data in the written text, it was important to refer back to the process and circumstances of data collection. As Burawoy suggests, ‘data are the preconstituted theories and concepts of participants, and their meaning can only be gauged in relation to the context of their production’ (1991: 4). My knowledge of context was facilitated by the presence of detailed field notes which provided information about when the interviews were conducted, and noted observations of the process. In addition, for the migrant interviews, observations from interviews were included in the ACCESS data base.

The context in which an interview takes place has an impact upon the personal comfort and behaviour of the respondent and upon the information which they give. This was particularly true for the migrant respondents. A number of the interviews with migrants took place at the premises of the migration service. These were in a minority numbering only seven of the total. At this particular site I perceived a reluctance to speak and a sense of discomfort on the side of the migrant. Although I explained fully the purpose of my research, the fact the interview was taking place in an official government building, where the migrant had just been involved in negotiating registration or assistance, may have influenced the information given. My possible association with the official structure may have encouraged migrants to offer the ‘required response’, i.e., trying to prove that their movement was forced in an attempt to receive forced migrant status and some form of assistance. Whatever the location of the interview there was a tendency for migrants to prioritize ethnic motivations when describing their reasons for leaving the former republic (see Chapter 7). However, the meagre assistance they received and the criticism the migrants expressed regarding all governmental structures for which they held little respect must be taken into consideration. The prioritization of ethnic motivations may also reflect the timing of the research. The majority of the migrant interviews took place following the crisis of August 1998. Although many of the migrants had moved prior to this date, their lack of success in
resolving the economic problems which had contributed to their decision to move may have encouraged them to prioritize other reasons for migration.

Fourteen of the migrant interviews took place at the premises of one of the regional migrant associations. Some of the migrants interviewed at this location were involved in, or had some attachment to, the migrant association. Thus, they were more likely to positively assess the activity of the migrant association. However, others had just arrived to get information or possible assistance and offered independent and sometimes critical opinions concerning the migrant associations. The conducting of interviews at the premises of both the migration service and migrant associations, although a practical necessity, was not ideal due to noise and frequent interruptions, although I was kindly given a room in all instances away from other people. A more ideal location for the interviews proved to be at the homes of migrants where migrants appeared more at ease and had more time. Another factor that may have influenced migrant response was the presence of other people at the time of the interview: other migrants; migration service workers; representatives of the migrant associations; or other family members. As the location and conditions of the interview were recorded this allowed all of these factors to be considered in later analysis.

5.3.4 The use of data in writing
The specific way I have employed the migrant data in Chapter 7, by structuring the chapter according to the themes which arose from the migrant narratives, and by using direct citations, aimed to meet one of the objectives of the study; the prioritization of the understanding of the migration and resettlement experience by the individual. Madge suggests that by using transcripts of interviews the writing up of research can create a space for the voices of the researched to be heard (1997: 107). However, such an approach only allows the voices of a small number of individuals to be represented. As McRobbie observes ‘The fact that it is uncommented on text carries particular connotations, seeming the more pure the less it is edited. In this way the intermediary processes fade into the background and fail to be recognized for what they are: activities which are as ideologically loaded and as saturated with ‘the subjective factor’ as anything else’ (McRobbie 1982: 51). I chose the quotes to be included and to an extent I had structured the conversation and posed the questions which produced these
quotes. Another limitation in my use of the interview data is that I have translated the words the respondents used, so cannot be certain I have managed to convey their exact sentiments. However, I have attempted to use the migrant data in the way that I feel most fairly represents what was told to me during the interviews.

5.4 Considerations on the ‘research space’

My experience of fieldwork, and the theoretical, practical and ethical issues and concerns which arose before, during, and after the periods of time I spent in the Russian Federation, feed into a number of wider issues and debates concerning the process of doing research. In the final section of the chapter I refer to these debates by considering my position vis à vis the research space in which I chose to place my study. That ‘space’ in this case, is the Russian Federation at the macro level, and the case study locations at the micro level.

5.4.1 The macro-level: the Russian Federation

It is useful to locate the present study within the increasing number of qualitative studies which, over the last decade, have been conducted by both Russian and western researchers in the Russian Federation. Of particular significance for this chapter is the growing literature which has given attention to the actual processes and practices of doing research in the late-Soviet and post-Soviet Russian environment (Pilkington 1994; Walker 1996; Thomson 2000; Buraway and Verdery 1999; Kay 2000) including two useful and sensitive commentaries on conducting research amongst forced migrants and refugees on the territory of the Russian Federation (Pilkington and Omel’chenko 1997; Drought 2000). The studies demonstrate the usefulness of employing qualitative methodologies in an environment that is demanding new and flexible approaches to enable understanding of the complexity of the previously ‘uncharted’ territory, but equally pay attention to the practicalities and problems of conducting such research.

The present study may also be located within the wider debate that has taken place since 1991 over the viability of ‘applying’ western social science theories and concepts to Russia, and the post-communist space (Roeder 1999; Sakwa 1996; Nikulin 2001;
Burawoy 1999). The conclusion reached by commentators that there is a need to ground approaches to Russia in ‘western’ social science theory, along with an appreciation of the specific case, i.e. Russia, in question, is perhaps obvious but requires sensitive and thoughtful application. Findings from studies of post-communist states are increasingly acknowledged for how they can challenge, and what they can contribute to, existing debates within social science disciplines (Roeder 1999: 743). Yet, as suggested, any study of contemporary Russia must take into account the ‘specifics’ of Russia and be sited within its past and the legacy of the Soviet and even Tsarist periods (Roeder 1999: 749; Sakwa 1996: 175). The experience of research in the field of migration and migrant resettlement in the Russian Federation finds resonance in these debates. Western theories provided a theoretical framework and understanding for the study. However, the thesis hopes to demonstrate the importance of placing the study within the specificities of both the Russian past and present and the ‘unique’ nature of the migrant ‘return’ and resettlement taking place in contemporary Russia. The value of the research to inform existing theory will then be enhanced.

The debate may be taken to the individual level and the position of a western researcher conducting research in Russia. It is impossible for the independent researcher to separate her/himself from the wider relationship which exists, and has existed, between the west and Russia, and the ‘power’ relations within this relationship. My position as a western researcher impacted upon the perceptions of me during the period of fieldwork. It was often the first label which respondents and other people I came into contact with applied to me. It did not obviously create any obstacle to carrying out the fieldwork, and I was rarely met with any antagonism. On the contrary, it often worked to my advantage in gaining access to and attracting the interest of those people I wished to talk to. Nevertheless reflecting upon the possible impact of my position as a western researcher can only add to an understanding of the society in which I was located and the area of study I was involved in.

11 Burawoy makes the observation that western theory was in fact ‘shaped’ by the practice and ideology of communism (1999: 301).
5.4.2 The micro-level: the case study location

The role of the researcher and perceptions of the researcher amongst respondents, beyond being ‘from the west’, need consideration. Involvement and participation at the case study location furthers the process of research becoming one of interaction between observer and observed, yet, certain issues of a personal and ethical nature remain. The researcher needs to acknowledge their human involvement in the research space, the question of the multiple roles they have and adopt within it, and how this impacts upon the research process and the information received (Madge 1993: 295). The researcher cannot completely detach themselves from the space as research is not conducted in a vacuum. The researcher is living in two worlds simultaneously, that of ‘participation’ and research (Walsh 1998: 227). My experience of conducting research in Samara and Saratov oblasti, specifically my interaction with individual migrants and migrant groups and associations, meant that for a period of time I became involved in and part of the research space. My role shifted between that of research student and, at times, friend. On occasions these multiple roles came into conflict and affected my relationship with my respondents, the process of data collection, and the later use of the data (Madge 1993: 296). The implications of the different roles I adopted and which were given to me need to be acknowledged.

The area of study and the situation of the respondents who were part of the study, posed particular issues. Prior to the fieldwork I was unaware of the reality for many of the individuals involved, and I was unprepared for how I would be affected by the narratives of migrants when they revealed the physical and mental distress they had suffered. This affected both my position as a researcher and the way that I managed to justify this role. Although I felt that my respondents were willing to talk to me, our conversations were part of the research process. It was difficult to immerse myself totally in the conversation, and not to think how the words of the respondents would fit with my ideas, or how they would provide a good quote (England 1994: 86). The

12 One example of this was my relationship with the different migrant associations in Saratov. I was on good terms with all of the heads of the migrant associations, but had developed a closer relationship and friendship with one particular head. Due to the conflictual relations that existed between the migrant associations (see Chapter 6), this problematized my position to an extent.
material received was going to be used for the purposes of research and I, as the researcher, was going to move away from the research space when the period of fieldwork was over.

Upon reflection I resolved to accept my role as a researcher and my relative powerlessness to play any other part. This did not prevent my acceptance of other, closer, contact which developed genuinely, and even apart from the research project itself. Through my approach to respondents I attempted to make central ‘that those who are researched should be treated like people and not as mere mines of information to be exploited by the researcher as a neutral collector of facts’ (England 1994: 82). I attempted to be constantly aware of the situation which these people were in which forced me at times to step back from the research itself and not prioritize my research aims above everything else. I had to accept that I could not offer any solutions or assistance to the people involved, or that I should have assumed I had anything to offer them (McRobbie 1982: 52). In accepting this I was being more honest about what my role was, and about what value my research could have for my respondents.

**Conclusion**

'A more flexible and reflexive approach to fieldwork allows the researcher to be more open to any challenges to their theoretical position that fieldwork almost inevitably raises' (England 1984: 82). Flexibility and reflexivity were essential in the current research. The ethnographic methodology ensured a flexible approach that allowed my location within an emerging migration environment, enabling me to access different perceptions and experiences of the migration process at the micro-level. At the analytic level this approach allowed me to place these findings within my wider research results, and to constantly question my theoretical hypothesis about the nature of the migration process, and operation of the migration system. Reflexivity was a naturally occurring and essential part of the empirical study, and the whole project. My reflections shaped the development of the research, allowed it to be influenced by the subject, and ensured my location within, not outside of, the research space. I hope that my methodological approach, the way I tried to conduct the research, and how I present the data I received.
resolves to an extent some of the theoretical, practical and ethical issues of concern which arose during the course of the research. Flexibility and reflection do not solve the problems involved in ethnographic fieldwork and qualitative studies; however, they are an essential part of the research process and any presentation of its results.
Introduction

Chapter 6 provides an in-depth analysis of the nature and development of the regional migration regimes in Samara and Saratov. The two migration regimes are placed within the typology provided in Chapter 4 to assess the nature of regional response to in-migration and migrant resettlement, and provide further clarification of the ‘power’ of different variables to influence regional migration regime development. Despite very similar socio-economic and political environments, and levels of in-migration, the two migration regimes operate in significantly different ways. The Saratov migration regime might be labelled as ‘receptive’, whilst the Samara migration regime as ‘restrictive’. As suggested in Chapter 4, neither regime can be strictly defined as one or the other, due to conflicting and contradictory governmental and non-governmental priorities existing both within the regions, and with federal and international level institutions and practices. Nevertheless, key differences are apparent, the main reason for which lies with the dominant approach of the regional administration. In Samara oblast’ the priority of the regional administration to maintain socio-economic stability has resulted in a ‘restrictive’ approach towards in-migration. Regional mechanisms (the propiska) are used to limit migrant resettlement, the migration service adopts a regulatory, rather than provisory role regarding migrants, and a hostile stance towards the development of migrant initiatives. In contrast in Saratov oblast’, the dominant approach of the regional administration has been to tolerate, and in some cases, encourage in-migration, in part to attract the investment of federal resources. The practice of the territorial migration service is correspondingly liberal, prioritizing the efficient use of the available resources, and encouraging the formation of regional migrant initiatives. The chapter, however, also draws attention to the minimum levels of provision that are in fact available to the individual migrant in the Russian regions, regardless of the ‘type’ of migration regime operating.
6.1 A socio-economic and political profile of the regions of study

The chapter begins with socio-economic and political profiles of the two regions that highlight a number of key issues operating at the level of the region to inform analyses of responses to migration. Such general profiles are of only limited use, however. Although there have been attempts in economic and statistical studies of the regions of the Russian Federation to define ‘winner’ and ‘loser’ regions, the approach has come under criticism for being too simplistic (Popov 1999; Bradshaw 1996: 126). Regional case studies often reveal widespread variation within a territory, particularly in terms of living standards between urban and rural areas or the major urban settlements of the oblast’. (Bradshaw and Shaw 1996 cited in Bradshaw and Hanson 1998: 290). Social, economic and political ‘transition’ is taking place not just ‘at’ a regional level, but ‘within’ a region, and impacting upon the population in different ways. The situation of the migrant population within a region provides an indication of this.

Samara and Saratov oblasti are part of the Volga Economic Region – the sixth largest economic region in the Russian Federation. In terms of industrial output the region occupies fourth place in the country, and second place in terms of agricultural production (Shaw 1999: 199). In academic studies of economic change, both oblasti have been labelled as ‘most favoured regions’ (Nefedova and Treyvish 1994 in Shaw 1999: 100), and as ‘high-tech industrial regions’ with the potential for economic revival in conditions of a market economy (Hanson 1995, Bradshaw 1996 cited in Shaw 1999: 113-114). Both of the regions are comparatively stable, politically, socially and economically, when set within the context of the Russian Federation as a whole. The population in Samara oblast’ enjoys a slightly higher standard of living than the population in Saratov oblast’, a fact which is supported by statistics for household income, average monthly salaries, employment levels and industrial development (see Table 6.1). Such economic indicators are limited, however. As stated by Bradshaw and Hanson, to understand how ‘people’ are coping with economic change a lot more is needed besides ‘numbers’ (1998: 294). Significant intra-regional differences within the two territories must be noted.
Table 6.1 Key socio-economic characteristics of Samara and Saratov oblasti

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Samara</th>
<th>Saratov</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Volga region</td>
<td>Volga region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance from Moscow</td>
<td>1,098 km</td>
<td>858 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>53,600 sq km</td>
<td>100,200 sq km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composition</td>
<td>27 raioni, 10 cities</td>
<td>38 raioni, 17 cities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Numbers of unemployed</td>
<td>137,200</td>
<td>202,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of labour force in employment (2000)</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average monthly income</td>
<td>1,163 roubles</td>
<td>646 roubles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of individuals of the oblast' population with an income lower than the subsistence minimum</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major industrial centres</td>
<td>Samara, Tol'iatti, Sizran,</td>
<td>Saratov, Engel’s, Balashovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of businesses and organizations</td>
<td>61,549</td>
<td>44,602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of industrial enterprises</td>
<td>3,765</td>
<td>1,596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of a basket of 25 basic food products</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional leadership</td>
<td>Strong. Governor: Konstantin Titov, an ambitious, ‘authoritarian’ market reformer, ‘centrist’, prominent at the federal level</td>
<td>Strong. Governor: Dmitrii Aiatskov, reputation as a ‘reformer’, prominent at the federal level</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.1.1 Samara oblast

Samara oblast lies north-east of Saratov oblast and its southernmost tip touches the border with Kazakhstan. Although the oblast is smaller than Saratov, it has a larger and more heavily concentrated population (see Table 6.2). The oblast is a major junction of rail, air, river, road and pipeline networks, and is considered an emerging commercial hub region (Hanson and Bradshaw 2000: 15). The defence related industries, previously concentrated in the region, are now in decline. However, the motor and petrochemical industries are well established, and the construction, trade and financial sectors are rapidly developing. The presence of the two large, economically powerful, cities – Samara and Tol’iatti – is significant for the oblast. The presence of the car factory AvtoVAZ in Tol’iatti has encouraged migrant settlement in the city, and has been a major source of employment for the arriving migrants (Romanov and Tartakovskaia 1998: 342).\footnote{AvtoVAZ, a Fiat owned company which produces the Lada car, accounts for nearly 50 per cent of the industrial output of the oblast' (The Territories of the Russian Federation 1999: 212).} Due to the non-interventionist, open-door economic policy pursued by the oblast administration, there has been large-scale foreign investment in the region (Thornhill 1999). The oblast was ranked fifth in terms of investment potential by Ekspert magazine in 1999 (Ekspert geografiia 1999: 28). In addition to foreign commercial investment, western development agencies, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the World Bank and USAID, have supported restructuring projects in Samara region. Such investment reflects the recognition of Samara as a region where ‘democracy’ and ‘market reform’ are progressing. The Open Society Institute and the British Know How Fund have supported NGO development in the region.

The region’s economic ‘success’ is frequently linked to the activity of its ambitious governor Konstantin Titov. Titov has headed the oblast administration since 1991, politically he occupies a ‘centrist’ position, is a moderate reformer and was a supporter of the former president of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin. Yet, despite the governor having had cordial relations with Moscow, he has been critical of federal policy concerning the regions, particularly that owing to Samara’s status as one of the few ‘donor’ regions in the Russian Federation, the region does not receive any transfers from the federal budget. Titov’s heavy involvement in the running of the regional
Table 6.2 Key demographic characteristics of
Samara and Saratov oblasti

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Samara</th>
<th>Saratov</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>3,305,300</td>
<td>2,719,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density of population</td>
<td>61.7 individuals per square metre</td>
<td>27.1 individuals per square metre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban concentration</td>
<td>2,661,000</td>
<td>1,984,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural concentration</td>
<td>644,200</td>
<td>734,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population of major cities</td>
<td>Samara: 1,170,800</td>
<td>Saratov: 878,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tol’iatti: 719,000</td>
<td>Balakovo: 208,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sizran’: 187,000</td>
<td>Engel’s: 189,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic composition of population</td>
<td>Russian: 83.4%</td>
<td>Russian: 85.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chuvash: 3.6%</td>
<td>Ukrainian: 3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mordva: 3.6%</td>
<td>Kazak: 2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tatar: 3.5%</td>
<td>Other nationalities: 7.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ukrainian: 2.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other nationalities: 3.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population trends</td>
<td>Negative natural growth of - 5.8 per 1,000 individuals</td>
<td>Negative natural growth of - 6.0 per 1,000 individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy in years</td>
<td>male: 59</td>
<td>male: 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>female: 73</td>
<td>female: 72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of refugees and forced migrants</td>
<td>69,983</td>
<td>54,625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>registered in region</td>
<td>(1 July 1992- 1 January 2000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

economy has earned him the reputation of being an ‘authoritarian’, Soviet style, market reformer. With regard to social and welfare provision Titov advocated a ‘tough structure’ where social security would be provided only to those who really need it, and a gradual reduction in state intervention and support (‘Obshchestvo dolzhno’ 1997). Yet, the Samara government’s record concerning payment of social benefits is positive. One of Titov’s most popular policies was to increase state employees’ salaries by thirty percent, and to ensure the payment of pensions on time (www.iews.org/eastwestnet, 19 November 1998). In 1998, the government succeeded in fully financing from the oblast’ budget measures for the social protection of the population which meant that all payments of social benefits were fulfilled (Burtsev 1998).

Samara oblast’ is characterized as stable with the potential for economic success and development. However, within the oblast’ significant differences exist between the urban centres and rural districts regarding size of incomes, levels of unemployment and industrial production. The differences are due to the rapidity of the development of market institutions and market relations in relation to the overall capacity of the different parts of the oblast’ to adjust to the changing environment (Bradshaw and Hanson 1998: 296; Romanov and Tartakovskaia 1998: 343). The internal differences have led to tensions between the leaders of towns and districts who are facing severe social and economic difficulties, and the central administration, over the allocation of oblast’ budget resources (Romanov and Tartakovskaia 1998: 355).

6.1.2 Saratov oblast’

Saratov oblast’ is located south-west of Samara oblast’ and shares a 551km border with Kazakstan. The region is agro-industrial and a key industrial area of the Volga region. Saratov city is one of Russia’s largest industrial centres. The governor of the oblast’, Dmitrii Aiatskov, is keen to generate the conditions for the development of a market economy on the territory of the oblast’. Aiatskov was appointed by Boris Yeltsin in April 1996, and elected in December of that year with 81.5 per cent of the popular vote despite traditional widespread Communist support in the region. During his period in office the governor has become increasingly visible and influential at the federal level,

2 The policy, however, was introduced just prior to the 1996 governor elections.
and has been keen to represent the regional interest, at both the federal and international levels. However, in the process he has attracted increasing criticism from the capital’s politicians and press. Aiatskov carried out extensive reform of the agro-industrial sector and earned himself the nationwide reputation of being a reformer following the passing of a ‘Land Law’ in December 1997 which introduced the rights to private ownership and the buying and selling of land. Although the law came under heavy criticism from politicians in Moscow, it opened up possibilities on the territory of the oblast‘ which attracted interest from foreign investors. In 1999, Saratov was ranked among the top twenty regions where joint-venture and foreign companies are active and twenty first in terms of investment potential by Ekspert magazine (Ekspert geografiia 1999: 28, 33).

In the social arena, Aiatskov gained popularity for a variety of socially oriented policies, and his interventionist approach to economic activity. In addition, the governor has introduced measures to facilitate state cooperation with the NGO sphere. In 1998 Aiatskov developed a ‘Social Partnership Agreement’ for Saratov oblast‘ which was signed by both public and private organizations. The agreement was extended and updated in November 2000. The aim of the agreement was firstly to facilitate agreement and partnership between state and society and between different social groups and political forces, and secondly, to increase the social role of the individual and encourage citizen involvement in the solution of the socio-economic and political challenges of the region. An institutional body, the Council for Cooperation with Non-Governmental organizations exists under the oblast’ Duma. The Council, and its NGO members, were central in the development of the latest ‘Social Partnership Agreement’ (www.gov.saratov.ru/gubernator/papata, 20 March 2001). The agreement, and institutional body, have encouraged the growth of non-state initiatives, and their involvement in regional development and the resolution of social issues. This is evidenced by the inclusion of the regional migrant associations in the development of regional migration policies (see below).
6.2 The nature of migration flows and migrant settlement in Samara and Saratov oblasti

The Volga region is one of the main regions for migrant settlement in the Russian Federation (see Map 4.1). By 1 January 2000 the region had received the second highest number of forced migrants and refugees – a total of 250,840 (Goskomstat 2000: 115; Goskomstat 1998: 68; Federal Migration Service 1998). The Volga region includes Astrakhan, Volgograd, Penza, Samara, Saratov and Ul’ianovsk oblasti, and the republics of Kalmikiia and Tatarstan. Samara and Saratov are ranked first and second respectively within the region in terms of receiving the highest numbers of migrants. The relative stability and prosperity of the two regions is a reason for these high levels of in-migration. High levels of in-migration are identified as one key indicator of the economic well-being and health of a region (Heleniak 1997 cited in Bradshaw and Hanson 1998: 291; Shaw 1999: 100). In addition, the geographical location of the two oblasti, the good communication and transportation networks existing across and out of the two territories, and the attractive climatic conditions existing in the regions encourage in-migration. These factors interact with the individual motivations for choice of settlement which are explored in Chapter 7.

Table 6.3 provides a snapshot profile of the nature of the migration flows arriving in the two regions. In both regions the migrant population makes up approximately two percent of the total population. However, the figures cited in the table represent only those arrivees who have received forced migrant or refugee status. In both regions the numbers of migrants arriving from the republics of the former Soviet Union are much higher. In 1998, registered forced migrants made up only a third of all migrants arriving from the republics of the former Soviet Union in Samara oblast'. The total number of arrivees registered according to place of residence by the Ministry of Internal Affairs was 13,142 (Samarskii oblastnoi komitet gosudarstvennoi statistiki 1999: 3). Even this total figure for 1998 would likely not represent the actual number of migrants, as many fail to register at either the migration service or the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In
### Table 6.3 Key characteristics of migration flows and migrant resettlement in Samara and Saratov oblasti

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Samara</th>
<th>Saratov</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Numbers of registered forced migrants and refugees (1 July 1992-1 January 2000)</td>
<td>69,983</td>
<td>54,625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main regions of departure of forced migrants and refugees (in order of intensity)</td>
<td>Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Numbers of registered forced migrants from within Russia (1 July 1992-1 January 2000)*</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>4,709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban/rural settlement</td>
<td>Urban: 68%</td>
<td>Urban: 70% (* 45% in the city of Saratov)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural: 32%</td>
<td>Rural: 30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic composition of migrant population</td>
<td>Russian: 77%</td>
<td>Russian: 78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tatar: 7%</td>
<td>Ukrainian: 6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ukrainian: 6%</td>
<td>Tatar: 5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender breakdown</td>
<td>Male: 49%</td>
<td>Male: 48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female: 51%</td>
<td>Female: 52%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Goskomstat 2000: 115; Goskomstat 1998: 68; Federal Migration Service 1998; Samara Territorial Migration Service 1998; Saratov Migration Service 1999

* This figure is taken to represent the numbers of forced migrants from Chechnia as only these internal migrants qualify for forced migrant status. The figures are from a Goskomstat statistical bulletin on migration (2000). However, the amounts contradict figures received from Saratov territorial migration service, which put the number of registered forced migrants from Chechnia at 5,526 by 1 April 1998, and figures from Goskomstat in Samara oblast' which put the number of registered forced migrants for just the period 1997-1998 at 221.
Saratov oblast, it is estimated that since 1992 the actual number of migrants from the former republics could be as high as 200,000 (Pudina 1999e).³

In both regions, the numbers of registered forced migrants have decreased from the mid 1990s. A peak was reached in Samara oblast in 1995 (of 9,531 individuals) and in Saratov oblast in 1994 (12,397 individuals). By 1999, the respective figures had decreased to 2,726 and 1,472. The decrease is representative of in-migration flows to the Russian Federation as a whole (see Chapters 1 and 4). However, restrictions within the two regions may also have impacted upon the numbers of individuals being officially ‘registered’ (see below). The predominant regions of departure reflect the geographical position of the oblasti, and their transportation links with the regions in question. The much greater number of forced migrants from Chechnia on the territory of Saratov oblast is due to the availability of emergency accommodation in the oblast in the form of temporary resettlement centres, and subsequent directives by the FMS. The urban concentration of migrant resettlement reflects the predominantly urban nature of the migrant population arriving and personal preferences of individual migrants, despite the restrictions that are placed on settlement in major cities and towns (see Maps 6.1 and 6.2).

6.3 The Saratov and Samara migration regimes - governmental structures and approaches to migration

The general profiles of the two regions, and the description of migration flows, show that the socio-economic conditions existing on the territories of the two regions are not significantly different, and that similar numbers of migrants and ‘types’ of migrants are arriving. The political environment in both regions is comparable, with the regional administration headed by a strong governor. However, the size of the migration flows, and the socio-economic and political conditions of the two oblasti, have different repercussions for approaches towards migration, and the development of the regional migration regimes. The main structures making up the migration regimes in the two regions are the territorial migration service, the oblast government and administrative

³ Appendix 1 discusses the problems with statistics concerning numbers of forced migrants and refugees.
Map 6.1 Distribution of forced migrants and refugees, Saratov Oblast’, 1999

Numbers of forced migrants and refugees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban centre</td>
<td>4,500 - 6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,000 +</td>
<td>3,000 - 4,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 - 1,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Saratov Territorial Migration Service
Map 6.2 Distribution of migrants, Samara Oblast', 1998

Numbers of migrants

- Urban centre
- 2,400 - 3,000
- 1,800 - 2,400
- 1,200 - 1,800
- 600 - 1,200
- 0 - 600

Source: Samara Oblast' Committee for State Statistics
structures, and the developing network of migrant associations on the territories of the oblast’. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 represent the different state and non-state structures which interact to create the regional migration regimes. The solid lines depict direct connections, whilst the broken lines depict in-direct connections. The diagrams, however, fail to show the very different priorities of the structures, the alternative ways in which the relations between the structures have developed, and the significantly contrasting nature of the two migration regimes.

Figure 6.3 clarifies the actual operation of the two migration regimes. In both regions the approach of the strong regional administrations are the key to directing migration policy. The Samara regional administration prioritizes the maintenance of the socio-economic stability existing in the region, and, as a result, advocates a policy which discourages migration. The Saratov regional administration identifies in-migration as beneficial for the oblast’ and does not restrict migrant resettlement. The two different interpretations of the impact of migration flows by the regional administrations have shaped the practice of the main state structure in the two regions directly concerned with migration issues – the territorial migration service. In Samara oblast’, the priority of the migration service is to restrict and control migration. In Saratov oblast’ the territorial migration service practices a predominantly liberal approach to migrant registration and resettlement. The ‘restrictive’/‘receptive’ approaches in the two regions have directly impacted upon the development of non-migrant initiatives, and upon external non-governmental activity in the regions. The receptive, cooperative environment in Saratov has facilitated both regional, federal and international non-governmental activity, whilst the ‘restrictive’ and sometimes hostile environment in Samara has hindered comparable activity. Other factors do impact upon non-governmental initiatives, however, which are explored in more detail below. The key state actors and their interaction are now explored in tandem for the two oblasti.4

4 The overview of the regional migration regimes is primarily a picture of how they existed in 1999 as the main part of the empirical study was conducted in this year. Reference is made to the earlier period.
Figure 6.1 The Saratov regional migration regime, 1999
Figure 6.2 The Samara regional migration regime, 1999
Figure 6.3 Saratov and Samara regional migration regimes: a comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Regime</th>
<th>Samara</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Size and nature of flow</strong></td>
<td>High levels of in-migration, predominantly ethnic Russian</td>
<td>High levels of in-migration, predominantly ethnic Russian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socio-economic priorities</strong></td>
<td>In-migration seen as benefit, and possible way of attracting federal resources</td>
<td>High levels seen as possible danger to ‘demographic’ and socio-economic stability of regions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political priorities</strong></td>
<td>‘Migration’ present within regional political discourse</td>
<td>‘Migration’ not present within regional political discourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operation of regional actors</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Federal-regional relations</strong></td>
<td>Violation of federal migration legislation with the ‘citizenship clause’ Lack of allocation of federal resources</td>
<td>Violation of federal, and international legislation with the use of the propiska Lack of allocation of federal resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional administration</strong></td>
<td>Move from ‘receptive’ to more ‘restrictive’ approach to in-migration High level of interest in resolving migration issues, development of regional migration programme and institutional bodies</td>
<td>‘Restrictive’ approach to in-migration Low level of interest in resolving migration issues, lack of institutional bodies and migration discourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Territorial migration services</strong></td>
<td>Move from liberal to restrictive interpretation of forced migrant law Efficient use of resources Coordination with, and tolerance, of non-state bodies</td>
<td>‘Restrictive’ interpretation of forced migrant law Role to ‘control’ migration Lack of coordination with non-state bodies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Migrant activity</strong></td>
<td>High levels of migrant activity, coordination with state structures and federal/ international organizations</td>
<td>Low levels of migrant activity and lack of coordination with state structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Activity of international actors</strong></td>
<td>High levels of activity, cooperation with regional state structures and regional migrant structures</td>
<td>Low levels of activity, lack of cooperation with state structures and limited cooperation with regional migrant structures</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.3.1 The Territorial Migration Services – provision, priorities and practice

The Saratov and Samara Territorial Migration Services (TMS) were both established in 1993. The Saratov service comprised a central oblast’ office, twelve raion branches, two centres of temporary resettlement which were able to accommodate 440 and 120 migrants, and a primary reception point which housed migrants for up to a week upon initial arrival. The structure of the Samara migration service was slightly smaller, comprising a central oblast’ office, eight raion branches and an immigration control post at Samara international airport. Although the numbers of forced migrants registered by the services has consistently been very similar, the approaches of the services were different. The approach of the Saratov TMS was receptive, although with changes in the priorities of the regional administration their migrant registration policy underwent a change in 1999. The Samara TMS consistently advocated ‘control’ over ‘provision’, an approach rooted in the concerns of the regional administration. The possibilities of both services, however, to ‘provide’ for migrants has been significantly limited by a lack of federal and regional resources, and by the restricted powers the migration service holds. on a federal wide basis, to provide for forced migrants, beyond registration, emergency assistance and limited help with accommodation.

The stated priorities of both migration services in line with federal directives were: the reception and registration of forced migrants and refugees; provision of help in their resettlement especially in the sphere of housing; the regulation and control of migrant flows to the oblast’, and participation in the development and realization of federal, regional and inter-regional migration programmes. The fulfillment of these tasks, however, differed. The director of the Samara migration service declared that although the service acknowledged its responsibility to provide help to forced migrants and refugees in their resettlement, the priorities of the service had shifted to the regulation of migration, specifically the reduction of ‘illegal migration’ and the control of the non-Russian labour force arriving to the oblast’. Registration practice, and records of

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5 Interviews conducted by the author with the director of the TMS, Saratov 16 August 1999, the deputy director of the TMS, Saratov, 28 July 1999, ‘Polozenie o migratsionnoi sluzhbe Samarskoj oblast’ 1998.
6 The priorities coincided with federal directives and reflected the nature of present migration flows where numbers of forced migrants had decreased over the last five years and labour migration and illegal migration flows had become more significant (interview conducted by the author with the director of the TMS, Samara, 12 October 1999).
provision are two indicators that demonstrate the differing approaches of the two migration services, and that reflect the influence of the regional administration in shaping response.

Registration practice

The priorities of the Samara migration service to regulate migration were rooted in the stance of the regional administration towards in-migration. It was an oblast’ level decree in 1995 that determined the approach of the TMS towards registration. The decree of the governor, Konstantin Titov, stipulated that only those migrants who were able to register with family or friends would be able to settle on the territory of the oblast’. To make an application for forced migrant status the possession of a permanent propiska was demanded. The propiska decree established the priorities of the Samara regional government over federal and regional migration practice, and the Russian constitution. The directive reflects wider regional priorities concerning in-migration. The director of the migration service acknowledged that migration was positive for the development of the oblast’ economy and that the potential of the oblast’ for receiving arriving migrants was high, yet he stressed that the oblast’ capacity to absorb migration flows was limited by the minimal levels of available provision for forced migrants with regard to accommodation and work places. This necessitated state regulation of the flows to keep the overall ‘socio-economic and demographic situation in the oblast’ under control’ (Zhirniagin 1998: 70).

In Saratov oblast’ the influence of the regional administration in migration policy, and migration service practice, was also apparent. The development of a ‘receptive’ policy was influenced by an effort to encourage migrant inflows as part of a wider regional attempt to attract external federal funds for arriving migrants (Vitkovskaia 1998a: 27; Drought 2000: 165). The ‘receptive’ policy meant that the registration practice of the migration service was ‘liberal’, and in line with federal directives. However, in 1999 there was a change in the registration requirements for those seeking forced migrant

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7 Representatives of the migration service justified the practice in logistical terms claiming the migration service was unable to offer temporary or permanent accommodation and would not register an individual who had no fixed address. However, the service offered no help to migrants who had nowhere to register, their only solution was for the migrant to travel on to another region (interview conducted by the author with an employee in the department for resettlement of the central TMS, Samara, 20 April 1998).
status. The TMS began to demand that the arriving migrant held Russian citizenship prior to arrival on the territory of Saratov oblast', that is the individual must have acquired citizenship in the former place of residence (former republic). The introduction of the ‘citizenship’ clause represented a clear change in migration policy.

The practice was not universal throughout the Russian migration service, but representatives of the Saratov TMS claimed they had confirmed it with the Federal Ministry of Justice and that it was in full accordance with the law on forced migrants. Although it was not a regional government resolution, it is unlikely that it was a result of an independent migration service decision, but rather a reflection of changing regional priorities. When federal resources were not forthcoming, a reassessment of the region’s, and migration service’s, capabilities to accept and provide for migrants resulted in the introduction of the ‘restrictive’ citizenship clause. The practice aimed to reduce those numbers of migrants eligible for forced migrant status, and for whom the service was ‘legally’ responsible, thereby reducing the burden upon the oblast’ administration to compensate for the absence of federal resources.

Resource limitations

In both regions the possibilities of the territorial migration services to provide assistance were severely limited by a lack of resources from both federal and oblast’ levels. In Saratov oblast’ the federal resources received were only sufficient for the resettlement of 8-10 per cent of the migrants who had already settled in the region, or who were arriving during 1999. In Samara oblast’ in 1998 only 11 per cent of the

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8 As migrants testified in the interviews conducted, such a demand ignored the conditions in many of the former republics where citizenship was increasingly difficult to obtain.
9 Although representatives of the migration service claim that the acquisition of Russian citizenship before arrival on the territory of the Russian Federation has been a legal requirement since the changes to the law on forced migrants in 1995, this did not appear to be the practice before 1999 in Saratov oblast’.
10 Representatives of the Saratov TMS stated that as the law on forced migrants defines who can be a forced migrant as a ‘Russian citizen’, they claimed that a person not holding citizenship at time of application is ineligible (interviews conducted by the author with the head of the department of registration, TMS, Saratov 16 August 1999, the deputy director of the TMS, Saratov, 28 July 1999 and the director of the TMS, Saratov, 16 August 1999). The forced migrant law, however, does not clearly state when or where citizenship must be acquired. No references to this practice in other regions has been found.
11 The position of the Saratov TMS was contradictory. Representatives of the service accepted that migrants arriving with citizenship required help, but claimed that those without citizenship did not require any assistance. The deputy director of the Saratov TMS denied that those migrants arriving without citizenship could be ‘forced migrants’, i.e. they could not have been forced to leave, and as ‘illegal migrants’ they were the responsibility of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the passport and visa department, rather than of the migration service (interview conducted by the author, Saratov, 28 July 1999).
required resources were received from the federal budget, whilst nothing was received from the oblast' budget (Fedorova 1999). As a result of federal directives issued in 1997, the migration services faced cutbacks in resources, and both the numbers of employees and raion branches of the service were reduced.\(^\text{12}\) In both oblasti there were irregularities in the payment of money for migrant provision and employees' salaries by the federal centre, a lack of resources to improve the premises and equipment of the service, and insufficient money and means of transport for visits to migrant settlements in the districts of the oblast' (Pudina 1999d; 1999e; Borob'eva 1998).

**Contrasting records of provision**

Although both regions lacked sufficient federal and local government resources, the way that available resources were utilized by the migration services varied. The Saratov TMS was proud of its efficient record concerning housing, loans and compensation payments. In 1998, 250 apartments were provided for forced migrants, the second highest number in the Russian Federation.\(^\text{13}\) In 1999 Saratov was the only region in the Russian Federation where there was no longer a queue for receiving a loan for the construction, renovation or acquisition of housing. However, the absence of a queue was as much a reflection of the difficulties forced migrants faced in applying and qualifying for a loan, than a sign of the efficiency of the migration service or the ease of obtaining a loan.\(^\text{14}\) If a family of four received the maximum loan - 52,000 roubles - it was only possible to acquire housing in a rural area of the oblast' rather than in the city.

\(^\text{12}\) The director of the Saratov migration service noted that in accordance with established norms an individual employee should deal with 150-200 refugees and forced migrants, in Saratov the number they are responsible for is 2,000 (Pudina 1999d). The reduction in the number of raion branches had caused difficulties for migrants wishing to visit the service in Samara oblast'. The head of a migrant initiative in Sizran related how she had to leave at three in the morning to be on time for the migration service reception in Samara city. The head of the regional migrant organization Samarskii pereselents referred to the difficulties of migrants in the regions accessing the service, and described the service as serving urban residents but forgetting those in the in the regions of the oblast'.

\(^\text{13}\) The majority of housing was received by socially disadvantaged categories of migrants in the city of Saratov and other large towns in the oblast'. Two housing lists exist - a normal and a priority one. The priority list includes socially disadvantaged categories of migrants: lone pensioners, lone invalids, single mothers, and large families. When the present director of the TMS took over in 1998, 300 families were on the priority housing list, the number was reduced to sixty by August 1999. However there is only sufficient financing for 6-8 per cent of what is required to provide housing for those on the priority housing list (interview conducted by the author with the director of the TMS, Saratov, 16 August 1999).

\(^\text{14}\) Out of the sixty two migrants interviewed during the period of research in Saratov and Samara oblasti only six individuals had received the housing loan, four of these had settled in Saratov oblast'.

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of Saratov or other large towns. Finally, the processing of claims and payment of compensation in Saratov oblast' had not faced the delays seen in other regions.

In contrast with Saratov, the Samara migration service did not ‘advertise’ a record of efficient practice. A particular difference was seen in the sphere of housing. Within the framework of the Federal Migration Programme for 1998, in Samara and Saratov oblasti respectively, the number of apartments allocated were thirty four and 181 (Migratsiia 1998, 3-4: 64). Accommodation was identified as a priority by the migration service; however, the housing that the migration service had at its disposal was insufficient to meet the demands of the numbers of forced migrants (Zhirmiagin 1998: 71). Unlike in Saratov oblast', there were no centres of temporary resettlement, the nearest centres were found in the neighbouring regions of Saratov and Tambov. In 1999, 2,645 families were on the migration service list for accommodation (Tiumentsev 1999). After the August crisis of 1998, the maximum size of a loan of 60-80,000 roubles per family was no longer sufficient to acquire accommodation in Samara city or in the other large urban centres where the predominantly urban migrant population preferred to settle. Despite the insufficient size of the loan and difficulties faced by migrants concerning application and qualification, 900 individuals were in the queue for a loan in 1999 (Fedorova 1999). Queues and delays were also being faced in the payment of compensation for forced migrants from Chechnia due to insufficient allocation of funds from the federal budget (‘Problema - Den’gi bezhentsev’ 1998).

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15 The director of the TMS spoke of the need for both an increase in the size of the loan and simplification of the process of application (interview conducted by the author with the director of the TMS, Saratov, 16 August 1999, and Pudina 1999e). The regional coefficient allocated to Saratov region is 0.5 which meant that half of the amount of the total ‘average’ cost of housing would be provided. The amount of the loan depends upon the total income of the working members of the family. To receive the maximum loan this must equal 550 roubles and the individuals must have worked on the territory of the Russian Federation for a year. As observed by V. Bobrova, head of the Committee for Social Protection under the oblast' duma, teachers only receive 180-220 roubles a month, thus even a joint salary of two teachers would not qualify them for a loan (Pudina: 1999b).

16 In Saratov in 1998 the third highest number of compensation payments in the Russian Federation were allocated - 251. Stavropol' krai allocated 655 payments, and Krasnodar krai 641 (Migratsiia 1998:64). This, however, is directly related to the high numbers of forced migrants from Chechnia resident in the three regions.

17 Within the same programme, the number of loans provided were 156 and 177, the number of compensation payments 163 and 251, in Samara and Saratov oblasti respectively.

18 As in Saratov, the director of the migration service identified the need to reconsider the size of the loans being awarded (interview conducted by the author with the director of the TMS, Samara, 12 October 1999).
6.3.2 Institutional and legislative practices of the regional administration

The 'restrictive' versus 'receptive' nature of the regional migration regimes is further evidenced by regional structural (legislative, institutional and discursive) practices. In Samara oblast' there is a lack of political interest in the issue of migration, and a corresponding absence of institutional bodies and inter-departmental or inter-sector cooperation. In Saratov oblast' there has been continued political interest within the regional government towards developing regional migration programmes, and enthusiasm for the formation of institutional bodies to foster debate and cooperation between different government agencies and with the non-governmental sector. In 1999, the director of the migration service identified a shift towards a deeper understanding of migrant issues within the regional government over recent years, and a greater willingness to work towards constructive solutions to the problems of migrant resettlement. He defined the attitude of the regional government to the migration issue as being 'informed, rational and constructive'.

A Saratov Regional Coordinating Council on Problems of Forced Migrants and Refugees was set up under the Committee on Legislation of the oblast' Duma in November 1998. The Coordinating Council was made up of Duma deputies, the director of the migration service, representatives of enterprises which employ migrants in Saratov oblast', representatives of regional migrant associations and other regional social organizations concerned with migration issues. Saratov region was the first region in Russia to form such a body. Only in May of 1999 did the FMS introduce it as a Russia-wide policy. The main aims of the council were to foster cooperation between regional and district government structures and regional non-governmental

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19 Interview conducted by the author with the director of the TMS, Saratov, 16 August 1999. The present discussion focuses on the period of the late 1990s. In 1995-6 Drought identified a more 'restrictive' attitude on the side of the Saratov regional administration, and the efforts of both the migration service and 'Saratov Istochnik', one of the migrant associations, to act to change this (2000: 183-184). Although the present study does not cover the earlier period in detail, it suggests that growing dialogue between the regional administration, the migration service, and non-governmental organizations, fostered the more receptive regional administration attitude identified in the later period. However, actions by the regional administration are still the deciding factor. This is evidenced by a decision in January 1998 by governor Aiatskov to replace the old director of the TMS with whom he had a difficult relationship, with a government official he favoured. The decision, originally opposed by the FMS, demonstrated the power the regional administration had over the TMS. Nevertheless, the subsequent increased cooperation between the regional administration and migration service facilitated the more receptive approach. It was in January 1998 that Aiatskov also announced the decision for a new regional migration policy for the oblast'.
organizations concerned with the problems of refugees and forced migrants, and to develop a concept for a regional migration policy for Saratov oblast' (Nauchno-prakticheski seminar 1999: 193). The high prioritization of the development of a regional migration policy in Saratov oblast' was evident. The initial decision for a programme was made by governor Aiatskov in January 1998.20 Numerous drafts of the programme were formulated over the period 1998/99 by working groups made up of representatives of the regional government, the TMS, and the regional migrant associations.21 In 1999 a draft migration programme was developed by the Coordinating Council, involving input from different ministries and departments in the regional administration and all of the regional migrant associations (Pudina 1999a).22 The implementation of the programme, however, was threatened by a lack of resources. In addition to federal financing, the programme needed additional input from both the regional and district level budgets that had to take into account the financial-economic conditions existing in the region.23

Migration was not a central issue of debate or concern at the level of the Samara oblast' government. The Samara regional consultation council, in contrast to Saratov, was set up on the initiative of the FMS under the migration service, rather than the oblast' Duma. The council members were limited to representatives of the TMS, regional migrant associations, other social organizations concerned with migration and businesses employing migrants. Discussion was therefore confined to this sphere, rather than extended to the wider regional governmental arena. A migration policy was developed for the period 1996-2000 but was largely unfulfilled due to a lack of both

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20 A previous regional migration programme for 1996-1998 had been severely affected by a lack of resources.
21 Lidiia Grafova, head of the Forum of Migrant Associations, commented upon the significance of the role of social organizations in Saratov oblast' in the development of the regional migration programme, which is not seen in many other regions (Materiali mezhdunarodnogo seminara 1999: 6).
22 The programme provided an analysis of the current migration situation on the territory of Saratov oblast', a breakdown of the problems which needed to be addressed, and possible solutions and strategies. Areas of concern were forced, illegal and external labour migration flows, and the improvement of financial, legal, technical, personnel and sanitary-epidemiological provision in the area of migration (Migratsionnaia programma Saratovskoi oblasti 1999).
23 Interviews conducted by the author with the director of the Saratov TMS, 16 August 1999, the deputy-director, 28 July 1999, and the head of the department for the registration of forced migrants and refugees, Saratov, 16 August 1999.
federal and regional resources. Although discussion of a new regional migration programme for the period 2000-2002 had taken place, no concrete strategy existed and there was a lack of inter-departmental cooperation regarding the issue within the regional government.

The contrasting approaches towards migration in the two regions is also indicated in the regional media. A press review for the period January 1999-August 1999 revealed a difference in both the quantity, and content, of coverage regarding migration. In Saratov there were a total of thirty one articles, compared to eight in Samara. In Samara half of the articles focused upon the lack of fulfillment of the regional migration programme due to a severe deficit of resources alongside the growing problem of ‘illegal’ migration on the territory of the oblast’. The remaining articles concerned the experience of ‘German’ compact settlements in the oblast’, decisions for compensation claims to Chechen forced migrants, the lack of resources available for migrant resettlement in Samara, and one personal migrant story about a positive experience of resettlement in Samara. In the Saratov press the articles concentrated primarily on providing information to forced migrants regarding the migration service, status acquisition, benefits, and additional help that could be received from legal advice centres and the regional migrant associations (48 per cent). Another major theme was the situation at compact settlement sites where the articles called for an improvement in state assistance. Only one article spoke of the ‘threat’ of migration and the need to improve control of the border with Kazakstan. Four of the articles discussed the organization of joint governmental/non-governmental initiatives where the issue of migration had been under discussion. Therefore the media discourse in Samara oblast’ constructed migration as a ‘problem’, and in Saratov oblast’ as a topic of debate, as well as providing a medium for the exchange of information.

24 Twenty three million roubles were required for the implementation of the programme from the oblast’ budget and nothing was received. Only ten percent of the required federal financing was received (Siprov 1999).
25 The press review covered a total of six newspapers, three in both oblasti. Two of the newspapers in both regions were dailies, the remaining newspaper was a weekly.
26 In Saratov the large numbers of articles was partly due to a joint project between the regional daily newspaper Saratovskie vesti and the regional migrant organization ‘Vozvrashchenie’, funded by UNHCR (see below) where each month a page was devoted to different migration issues. The purpose of the page was to raise awareness in the oblast’ about migration.
27 Much of the information concerning the entitlements of migrants was provided in an interview format with the director of the Saratov TMS.
constructed migration as a 'problem', and in Saratov oblast' as a topic of debate, as well as providing a medium for the exchange of information.

6.3.3 Individual government department responses

In both oblasti, government departments outside of the migration service were on the periphery as regards migrant provision and resettlement. Individual government departments at the oblast' and raion level identified the migration service as the central structure involved in forced migrant assistance and provision. If forced migrants turned to these departments they were not identified as a special case but were treated as any other Russian citizen enjoying the 'rights' of this citizenship. There were no specific departmental programmes for forced migrants. The TMS, however, in both oblasti, denied a wider provisory role. Beyond providing registration, minimal material help in the form of a one-time monetary payment, and possible assistance with acquiring accommodation, the individual was identified by the service as a citizen of the Russian Federation who could receive help – regarding employment, education or health – from the responsible government departments. The ambiguity over responsibility for specific areas of migrant provision is a reflection of the system set up at the federal level for migrant provision (see Chapters 3 and 4). The Migration Service is identified as the structure having a 'monopoly' over migrant provision and resettlement. Yet, in reality the service fulfils only a limited role as provider of 'status', limited material help, and in certain cases help with accommodation. The situation

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28 This caused problems for the resolution of local migration problems. The head of one local administration in Saratov oblast' (Novii Biian) was critical of the lack of assistance to forced migrants at a resettlement site in his district. However, he felt that he had no influence in this area with the oblast' administration and had to work through the TMS which failed to lead to the resolution of the problems at the particular settlement site (interview conducted by the author with the head of the Novii Biyan raion administration, Samara, 1 October 1999). See Appendix 2 for a description of the migrant resettlement sites included in the study.

29 Statement of the assistant head of the Saratov City 'Department of Social Protection' during a seminar on the problems of forced migrants and refugees in Saratov oblast', July 1999 (Pudina 1999b). Interviews conducted by the author with the head of the Department for Employment Assistance, the oblast' Employment Service, Samara, 28 April 1998, and with the head of the city of Samara Committee for Affairs of the Family, Samara, 4 November 1999.

30 The director of the Saratov TMS stated that the possession of citizenship by forced migrants was a positive factor which should have provided them with additional assistance in resettlement. He did note that forced migrants, although 'equal citizens', lacked the connections and networks of the local population, a factor which should have been remembered by those state employees dealing with them (interview conducted by the author with the director of the TMS, Saratov, 16 August 1999).
demonstrates the lack of a ‘comprehensive’ or ‘holistic’ state approach to migrant resettlement. Instead the individual migrant is passed between departments, who are unable or unwilling to provide any special form of assistance, and then referred back to the ‘responsible’ structure – the migration service.

Despite the ambiguity over ‘responsibility’ for migrant provision there were nascent signs of cooperation between the migration services and the other departments depicted in Figures 6.1 and 6.2.31 However, in Saratov, the migration service criticized the departments, especially at a raion level, for the lack of a specific approach towards forced migrants, the absence of coordination between different departments and the paucity of knowledge amongst employees concerning migration issues and legislation (Pudina 1999b and 1999c). Representatives of raion administrations, however, claimed that problems of migrant resettlement could be solved at the local level if there would be increased planning and cooperation between raion and oblast’ level administrations, and were in fact suspicious of regional level programmes that were never implemented.32 In Samara oblast’ the employment service held a weekly reception at the migration service and provided consultation and information concerning vacancies both in Samara oblast’ (urban and rural areas) and in other regions of Russia. However, the attitudes of the two structures were contradictory. The director of the migration service claimed that migrants were able to cope on their own and that opportunities for employment existed in the oblast’, an approach rooted in the wider ‘economic success’ of the region (Shtanov 1998; Dement’ev 1998). A representative of the oblast’ employment service, however, identified forced migrants as a special category and considered that legislation introducing a quota system which would prioritize work places for unprotected categories of citizens, including forced migrants, was essential at both a federal and oblast’ level.33

The operation of the official state structures of the two regional migration regimes

31 Interview conducted by the author with the deputy director of the TMS, Saratov, 28 July 1999.
32 Interviews conducted by the author with a member of Engel’s raion Assembly of Deputies and representative of the Committee on Legislation, Engel’s, 30 July 1999, and the head of the Saratov raion administration, Saratov, 3 August 1999.
33 Interview conducted by the author with the head of the Department for Employment Assistance, the oblast’ Employment Service, Samara, 4 October 1999.
reflects the power of the local administration to determine regional response. The situation in the two regions reflects the importance of socio-economic conditions and adequate regional resources in shaping response. Even in relatively stable conditions, migration can be seen as a ‘threat’. When expected federal resources are not forthcoming, restrictions are placed upon in-migration. Yet although both migration services were able to provide only minimal levels of assistance to forced migrants, there has been a significant difference in the extent to which these minimal levels of assistance are made available. Although the official migration regime in Saratov has moved towards limiting in-migration through the ‘citizenship’ clause, the attitude of the migration service, the interest of the regional administration, and the nature of regional media discourse, show the operation of the migration regime to be more ‘receptive’ and open, than the regime in Samara. This is further evidenced by the position of the non-state sector within the two regional migration regimes.

6.4 The non-state sector – the development of non-governmental activity in Samara and Saratov oblasti

6.4.1 Regional migrant associations

The study looked at four migrant organizations active in Saratov oblast’ and one in Samara oblast’. The main spheres of activity of the organizations, and scope for activity, differ both within and between the regions due to the origins and internal priorities of the organizations, the relationships maintained with state structures, connections with other non-state (Russian and international) bodies, and external factors such as regional attitudes to non-governmental activity. The different factors both enable and constrain the ability of the organizations within the regional migration regime to effect change. The overall picture of non-governmental migrant activity fits into the ‘restrictive’/‘receptive’ paradigm, and demonstrates the centrality of the state in

34 It is difficult to assess the relative restrictive powers of the ‘citizenship’ and ‘propiska’ clause in preventing registration, especially as citizenship has become more difficult to acquire in the former republics. It is fairer to say that they both represent restrictive tendencies, and in the case of Saratov, might reflect the direction in which official migration policy will develop.

35 Besides the five organizations listed there were no other associations in the two urban centres. In the regions of both oblasti there were a number of more commercially based organizations, or organizations centred on compact settlement sites which are referred to in the text.
determining non-governmental activity in the sphere of migration. In Saratov oblast’ the generally liberal attitude of the TMS, and regional administration, allowed and encouraged the development of regional migrant associations. In Samara oblast’ the ‘restrictive’ regional attitude towards migration, which informed migration service practice, hindered the formation of migrant initiatives. The discussion begins with a description of the main activities of the five regional migrant associations.

‘Saratovskii Istochnik’

‘Saratovskii Istochnik’ (Saratov Spring) was the first migrant association to be established in Saratov oblast’. The association was created in January 1995 on the basis of a group of twenty three families who had arrived from Uzbekistan in 1994 upon the initiative of the migrant group leader and the director of the TMS. Other groups of migrants from a number of different republics were invited to join and the association was originally financed with the help of different migrant enterprises for which the association provided support. Nine members of staff worked for ‘Saratovskii Istochnik’ including one full time lawyer. The work of ‘Saratovskii Istochnik’ centred around a daily reception at the association’s headquarters in the centre of the city of Saratov. This provided both general advice and specific legal consultation. Other activities of the association included informing migrants of their rights through the provision of literature published by the association and providing information regarding resettlement possibilities in Saratov oblast’ to potential migrants in the former republics, or to ‘scouts’ (rasvedchiki) investigating the possibility of settlement in the region.

Employment was identified by the head of ‘Saratovskii Istochnik’ as central to enabling migrants to resolve independently other aspects of their resettlement – housing,

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36 There was some cross over with the staff of the commercial enterprise ‘Tipografiya AVP Saratovskii Istochnik’ which occupies a neighbouring room in the building where the migrant association is located. ‘Saratovskii Istochnik’ received a printing press from UNHCR and created this partner organization which produced information bulletins for forced migrants and for the Forum of Migrant Associations and fulfilled commercial orders.

37 The volume of forced migrants attending the daily consultation was consistently high. This was observed during the three periods of research in Saratov (September 1997, May 1998, July-August 1999) when frequent observations were made of the migrant consultations.
education, health. In 1995, the association was involved in the implementation of an agreement between the Federal Migration Service and Federal Employment Service that provided funding for the creation of work places for forced migrants in existing enterprises and for the development of new migrant enterprises on the territory of the oblast'. The association provided a data base of job opportunities existing within Saratov oblast' to migrants arriving for consultation. A joint research project with the migration service, employment service and different local level administrations, funded by the Eurasia Foundation, looked at the potential of different regions in the oblast' for the creation of work places. However, problems were faced both in the financing of the actual research, and resources for putting the programmes into action.

'Vozvrashchenie'

'Vozvrashchenie' (Return) was formed in 1996 to provide support for migrant women and children. Although registered as an independent organization it was originally closely linked with 'Saratovskii Istochnik'. The organization employed three workers, the head, a secretary, a consultant/migration expert, plus one voluntary worker. The organization provided consultation (general advice, moral/psychological support) and material help (medicine and other material aid) for forced migrants. A qualified

38 Interview conducted by the author with the head of 'Saratovskii Istochnik', Saratov, 20 August 1999. In her study of migrant resettlement Drought noted the focus of 'Saratovskii Istochnik' on 'private income generating activities' among migrants as essential in facilitating successful resettlement (2000: 184).

39 Following an open competition organized by a commission which included representatives of 'Saratovskii Istochnik', the Saratov TMS, and city and oblast' administration, fifteen enterprises were allocated the money received from the State Fund for the Employment of the Population. Problems arose concerning the qualifications and skills of forced migrants and refugees, and with a growth of tensions with the local population over the allocation of work to forced migrants and refugees. Training was subsequently organized for the migrant population. As a result of the project 900 work places created, 70 per cent of those were allocated to forced migrants and refugees (Materialy mezhdunarodnogo seminara 1999: 26-27).

40 'Vozvrashchenie' shared the premises of 'Saratovskii Istochnik' for a period of time. After moving 'Vozvrashchenie' was located in a peripheral region of the city fairly inaccessible for migrants. Early in 1999 the association acquired new premises near to the centre of the city with excellent access to public transport. The office of 'Vozvrashchenie' was located in a former armaments factory which made access problematic as an official pass was required and individuals entering had to be accompanied by a member of the association. This posed a problem during fieldwork for the researcher, who was refused a pass and had to gain permission every time the building was entered. The accommodation was acquired through one of the businesses which had been set up in the former factory. In return for the room 'Vozvrashchenie' offered the business the use of its fax, telephone, photocopier and computer.

41 The head of the association, the secretary and the voluntary worker were all forced migrants, whilst the consultant was a former worker of the TMS in Saratov.

42 According to its registration figures 'Vozvrashchenie' had registered and provided help to 500 individuals over the period 1998-1999.
lawyer who provided free legal advice and represented individual migrants in court was employed by the organization as part of the joint UNHCR, Civic Assistance Committee and ‘Memorial’ programme of regional legal consultation points for refugees and forced migrants (see Chapters 3 and 4). One of the main objectives of the association was the creation of work places for forced migrants, via co-operation with local businesses, and through concrete programmes, which placed employment creation within a wider programme of migrant self-help and self-resettlement.

The association was particularly involved at a number of migrant ‘compact settlement’ sites, where it negotiated on behalf of the migrants to try to secure help from the TMS and district administrations to alleviate the difficult situations existing at the sites of settlement. The head of the association supported the idea of the self-settlement of migrants and saw compact living and on-site provision of housing and employment as a solution to the problems faced by migrants during resettlement. The association had close links with the local press, specifically with a journalist who worked on the local paper Saratovskii vesti and wrote a UNHCR funded page devoted to migration issues. The head of ‘Vozvrashchenie’ was involved in the work of Danko S, the implementing partner of UNHCR/ Opportunity International’s micro-credit programme in Saratov region, as one of the independent experts responsible for decisions on the granting of micro-credit loans to forced migrants and refugees.

‘The Komitet Bezhentsev iz Chechnii’

The ‘Komitet Bezhentsev iz Chechnii’ (the Committee of Refugees from Chechnia) was created in March 1997 to provide assistance to the large numbers of forced migrants and refugees from Chechnia who had arrived on the territory of Saratov oblast’. The ‘Komitet’ was closely linked with ‘Saratovskii Istochnik’ and worked at the premises of the organization until acquiring its own accommodation from the city.

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43 Interview conducted by the author with the head of ‘Vozvrashchenie’, Saratov, 24 August 1999. During 1999 the association established close links with a village/former kolkhoz ‘Lebedka’ and its director, where the majority of the inhabitants are migrants (see Appendix 2). The relationship was forged outside of official structures as the majority of the migrants were not registered. However, the outcome was very positive, ‘Vozvrashchenie’ introduced both the migrants and the director of the village to valuable information and resources, and the director helped out in the resettlement of individual migrants brought to his attention by ‘Vozvrashchenie’.

44 A monthly page was bought by UNHCR in the regional newspaper ‘Saratovskii vesti’. The project was initiated after the journalist involved attended a UNHCR seminar in Moscow.
administration in October 1998.\textsuperscript{45} The association had nine full time workers, all of whom were forced migrants from Chechnia. A daily consultation, and a weekly legal consultation with a qualified lawyer (funded by a Soros grant), were held at the headquarters of the organization. The consultations were attended by migrants from both Saratov city and the districts of the oblast.\textsuperscript{46} The association had also set up a number of ‘social councils’ at migrant settlement sites in the districts of Saratov oblast.\textsuperscript{46} Although the organization focused upon the special needs of refugees and forced migrants from Chechnia the association was open to all migrants.

‘Zov’

‘Zov’ (the call) was formed in March 1998 and officially registered in June 1998 in response to the large numbers of migrants arriving in Engel’s raion – prior to this there was no non-governmental organization for migrants in the district.\textsuperscript{47} The initiative for the formation of ‘Zov’ lay with the deputy of Engel’s raion assembly.\textsuperscript{48} ‘Saratovskii Istochnik’ was also heavily involved in the establishment of ‘Zov’ and paid the rent for the association’s accommodation. The association was located in a building in a central area of the city of Engel’s. However, the office was difficult to find and communication was impeded as there was no phone. The only equipment the association possessed was an old typewriter.\textsuperscript{49} The association had two permanent staff, a chairman and vice-chairman, together with a large number of part-time workers, all of whom worked

\textsuperscript{45} The accommodation was acquired free of charge. Although the premises were situated on a main trolley bus line it was quite a distance from the centre which was seen as a problem by representatives of the organization in terms of migrant access. However, the vice-chairman of the association saw the move as important in that it represented a break from a previous sense of dependence upon ‘Saratovskii Istochnik’ (interview conducted by the author with the vice-chairman of the ‘Komitet bezhentsev iz Chechnii’, Saratov, 19 August 1999).

\textsuperscript{46} The ‘Komitet’ particularly visited regions where there were high numbers of forced migrants and refugees from Chechnia. The migration service claimed it did not have the money for these visits (Pudina 1999d).

\textsuperscript{47} The city of Engel’s is situated across the Volga river from the city of Saratov. A bridge links the two cities. Structures concerned with migration issues (primarily the TMS, local administrations, and press) were looked at in both these urban areas.

\textsuperscript{48} The deputy stated that he saw the need for a migrant association due to the migration service not adequately fulfilling its responsibilities, and perceived his role as providing the conditions for the formation of the association, so the association could then go on to solve the problems of the forced migrant community (interview conducted by the author with the deputy of Engel’s raion assembly, Engel’s, 30 July 1999).

\textsuperscript{49} The possibility of help from the Engel’s ‘raion’ administration with a move to other accommodation and the installation of a phone was under discussion during the summer of 1999.
voluntarily and were forced migrants. The organization held a daily reception at its office, and a weekly consultation at a social reception organized by the Engel’s raion administration. The consultations provided information concerning acquisition of status and entitlement to social benefits. ‘Zov’ had links with a number of local enterprises that provided material goods for forced migrants, and was attempting to attract additional sponsors amongst the local business community. The organization hoped to extend its work out into the rural areas of the Engel’s raion where migrants lacked information and faced difficulties travelling into the district centre. ‘Zov’ had links with a local Engel’s newspaper, Novaia gazeta, which published information about the association and migrant legislation and rights.

‘Samarskii pereselenets’

‘Samarskii pereselenets’ (the Samara migrant/resettler) was officially registered in 1997, but had been active since 1995.50 The association was established independently of any state structures, in fact it was formed in reaction to problems experienced by the head of the association with the Samara migration service after she arrived from Tajikistan in 1993. The association was located in a hostel in Samara city which housed approximately twenty five forced migrant families. The staff of ‘Samarskii pereselenets’ comprised three paid staff who were forced migrants – the head, a secretary and part-time lawyer – and other volunteers who were migrants in the hostel. The association held daily consultations in the hostel room of the head of the association which effectively meant the association was there for migrants whenever they needed it. The consultations provided information, moral support and ‘someone’ for migrants to talk to. The absence of alternative premises, however, impeded the work of the association and the lack of strict consultation hours placed great pressure upon the association’s workers. Until November 1999 there was no phone line and contact with the association had to be made through the hostel warden.51 ‘Samarskii pereselenets’ had established an informal network of communication with potential migrants coming from the former republics. Information about the association was

50 Official registration of the organization was delayed until 1997 due to a lack of money.
51 Consultation usually took place in the evenings after the working day had finished. During the period of fieldwork there was the possibility of a room being acquired in a building near the centre of the city of Saratov. However, this was under negotiation and no help was being received from the migration service or city administration.
passed by word of mouth, or in the form of written information, by migrants who had come to the oblast' on exploratory trips and were returning to the former republics.52

A central role of all the five migrant associations was consultative: the provision of general information and in some cases legal advice. In addition, as evidenced by interviews with representatives of the organizations and migrants themselves, the organizations provided a vital source of moral and psychological support.53 Whilst attempting to inform migrants of their rights, the organizations also aimed to raise the level of awareness of migrant issues within state structures. The longer established associations, 'Saratovskii Istochnik' and 'Vozvrashchenie', had been able to extend the scope of their activities and provided limited 'direct' help to migrants regarding employment in an attempt to fill a gap they felt had been left by the state. The work of the organizations was clearly constrained by the resources they had available, and for the younger organizations, by the lack of adequate accommodation. All of the organizations in Saratov originated from, and with the help of, the initial organization 'Saratovskii Istochnik'. However, as the new organizations developed, they established themselves independently of the core organization.

6.4.2 Inter-sectoral relations – the migrant associations and government structures

Relations with the territorial migration services

The key factor impacting upon the development and role of the regional migrant associations was the relationship that existed with the relevant state structures of the regional migration regimes. Both within, and between, the two regions the form of the relationship differed depending both upon the individual associations and the state structure in question. The key relationship was that which existed with the TMS, however, this reflected wider attitudes at the regional administration level towards migrants, and migrant activity. A much closer and more cooperative relationship existed between the migrant association[s] and the TMS in Saratov than in Samara. This may be attributed to the desire to provide a 'solution' to the problem of migration...

52 Copies of Kompas (the book produced by the Forum of Migrant Associations containing information about migration legislation, migrants' rights, government and non-governmental structures concerned with migration) were passed to migrants by the organization to take back to the former republics.
53 The role and importance of the migrant associations for individual migrants is looked at in detail in Chapter 7.
in Saratov oblast’, leading to the inclusion of those affected within the resolution process, compared with the desire to ‘control’ and restrict migration flows in Samara oblast’, that led rather to the exclusion of those affected from any debate.

In Saratov oblast’ the relationship between the majority of the migrant associations and the territorial migration service was cooperative. The origin and early development of the first migrant association on the territory of the oblast’ – ‘Saratovskii Istochnik’ – was closely linked with the central migration service which established a tradition of cooperation. The dominant impression gained from interviews conducted with representatives of the migrant organizations was a willingness to work ‘with’, rather than in opposition to, or in isolation from, the TMS. The levels of cooperation varied across the organizations and changed over time, for example in 1997 initial visits to the oblast’ revealed a very strong working relationship between ‘Saratovskii Istochnik’ and the head of the migration service. By 1999, ‘Saratovskii Istochnik’ had been displaced as the main organization with which the migration service cooperated by ‘Vozvrashchennie’ due to a change in leadership at the migration service.

Both sectors in Saratov oblast’, to varying extents, were critical of the practices of the other. A number of the migrant associations excluded themselves from state led initiatives, and were keen to maintain independence. An example of this was seen in attitudes towards the Coordinating Council on Problems of Forced Migrants and Refugees. Although the Council aimed to aid interaction between state and non-state structures, and included migrant associations within the Duma body, the elected head of the Coordinating Council on Problems of Forced Migrants and Refugees was the director of the migration service.54 ‘Saratovskii Istochnik’, the ‘Komitet bezhentsev iz Chechnii’ and ‘Zov’ did not participate in the meetings of the council as they fundamentally disagreed with the head of the council being a ‘state’ representative.55 In

54 The vice head was the leader of the migrant association ‘Vozvrashchennie’. The election of the head of the TMS by the social organizations was seen as a positive evaluation of the work of the migration service by the deputy director of the TMS, interview by author, Saratov, 28 July 1999. However, during the election for the head and vice-head of the Coordinating Council there was disagreement amongst the migrant associations. All of them apart from ‘Vozvrashchennie’ opposed the appointment of the head of the migration service.

55 The ‘Komitet bezhentsev iz Chechnii’ felt excluded from the Council and did not recognize the body as representative of migrant interests but rather of general NGO interest. ‘Saratovskii Istochnik’ saw the council as purely consultative, rather than having any practical, implementing force.
contrast, the head of ‘Vozvrashchenie’ believed that having the director of the TMS as chairman of the council brought state and non-state structures into close cooperation, and ensured migrants an influential voice.\textsuperscript{56} However, despite their misgivings about the coordinating council, all of the migrant organizations were keen to participate in the development of the regional migration programme during 1999. ‘Vozvrashchenie’, however, was the main migrant association involved in the development of the programme due to its close relations with the migration service and position within the coordinating council.

Migrant associations in Saratov oblast' saw their role as ‘correcting’ state migration practice. The organizations were particularly critical of the lack of understanding and professionalism of the service’s employees. All of the migrant associations disagreed with the service’s practice concerning forced migrant registration and court appeals were made in a number of cases against the ‘citizenship’ clause (Pudina 1999c).\textsuperscript{57} It is important to note, nevertheless, that in Saratov oblast' the organizations were provided with the opportunity to criticize and contribute to the migration debate. Another institutional body where state and non-state actors worked in tandem in Saratov oblast' was the Commission for Compensation for Forced Migrants and Refugees from Chechnia. Although the regional migrant associations were critical of federal legislation concerning compensation, they positively assessed the work of the compensation commission. The commission was made up of representatives of the regional migration service, the oblast' administration, and two of the regional migrant associations – ‘Vozvrashchenie’ and the ‘Komitet bezhentsev iz Chechnii’. The commission worked within the framework of the regulations laid down by federal policy, but its members were keen to prioritize the needs of the migrants, which reflected the influence of non-governmental representation.\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{56} Interviews conducted by the author with the vice-chairman of the ‘Komitet bezhentsev iz Chechnii’, Saratov, 19 August 1999, the head of ‘Saratovskii Istochnik’, Saratov, 22 August 1999 and with the head of ‘Vozvrashchenie’, Saratov, 24 August 1999.

\textsuperscript{57} A representative of ‘Vozvrashchenie’ was developing a project to raise awareness and knowledge of the abuse of forced migrants’ rights through the difficulties faced in obtaining a propiska in the city of Saratov. Although a propiska was not required for an application for forced migrant status to be made, the possibilities for forced migrants to find a place of residence at which to register in an urban area such as Saratov city was very difficult and no help was received by the migrations service, who advised migrants that it would be easier to seek accommodation and a propiska in rural areas.

\textsuperscript{58} Interview conducted by the author with the vice-chairman of the ‘Komitet bezhentsev iz Chechnii’, Saratov, 19 August 1999.
The TMS occupied an ambiguous position in relation to the activity of the migrant organizations. The director of the service recognized the need to work 'in a consolidated way' with the organizations, accepted that they provided additional help to specific categories of migrants for whom the migration service could not provide, and saw the possibility for the social organizations obtaining extra resources from external sponsors, such as international organizations (Pudina 1999e). However, the service also perceived the organizations as supplementary, unprofessional and insufficiently informed, and as failing to offer concrete solutions to the housing and employment problems of forced migrants. This was an opinion very similar to that of the organizations about the migration service. This was especially the case for 'Zov'. Although the head of 'Zov' felt relations with the local branch of the TMS had improved and that there was a common acknowledgement of the need to work together, a representative of the raion branch of the migration service regarded the role of 'Zov' as disruptive and claimed that the organization was unaware of migrant legislation and practice.

The relationship between 'Samarskii pereselenets' and the Samara TMS provided a stark contrast to that in Saratov and can be defined as hostile, a definition used by representatives of 'Samarskii pereselents'. Relations with the first director of the migration service, who was replaced in June 1997 due to charges of corruption and misuse of funds, were particularly difficult. The replacement of the director was part of the federal campaign to clamp down on corruptive practices at the regional level (see Chapters 3 and 4). Despite the change in directorship the situation did not improve. In

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59 The TMS allowed the posting of information about the three main migrant organizations ‘Saratovskii Istochnik’, ‘Vozvrashchenie’ and the ‘Komitet bezhentsev iz Chechnii’ at the service’s premises. This was in marked contrast to the situation in Samara where advertising of the migrant association in the Samara TMS was forbidden.

60 Interviews conducted by the author with the director of the TMS, Saratov, 16 August 1999, and the head of the department for the registration of forced migrants and refugees, Saratov, 16 August 1999.

61 Interviews conducted by the author with the head of ‘Zov’, Engel’s, 30 July 1999, and the head of the Engel’s raion branch of the TMS, Engel’s, 18 August 1999. Amongst the future plans of the association was the signing of an agreement with the TMS leadership, greater cooperation with state organs to solve the socio-economic problems of migrants and close cooperation with the TMS particularly concerning the creation of work places (unpublished report of the activity of ‘Zov’ for the period June 1998-June 1999).

62 Drought identified instances of both bribery and corruption in migration service, local administration, and regional NGO practice regarding the allocation of resources for migrant provision at compact settlement sites in Voronezh and Kaluga oblast (2000: 199-211).
1998 although representatives of the migration service acknowledged that migrant social organizations might exist, they claimed they had no knowledge of their activity.\(^6\)

In November 1998, a round table discussion, initiated by the migration service, brought together state and non-state structures concerned with migration issues for the first time. In May 1999 the Consultation Council created a forum for discussion between representatives of the TMS and the regional migrant associations. The fact that the body was created under the migration service rather than the oblast' Duma limited its influence at the regional government level. The format of the council also impeded, rather than facilitated, an equal, cooperative relationship. The meetings were held as a question and answer session led by the head of the migration service. The aim to dispel the confusion and mis-understanding about the work of the migration service which had existed was a reflection of the federal aims of the coordinating councils.\(^4\)

Representatives of the migration service claimed the meetings had increased 'understanding' of their work amongst the migrant organizations and had facilitated contacts with the different migrant initiatives on the territory of the oblast'. The head of ‘Samarskii pereselents’, however, saw the meetings as just for ‘men in suits’.\(^5\) The initiative for the council had been due to federal directives; its limited success reflected the regional reality.

Outside of the council the relationship between ‘Samarskii pereselenets’ and the migration service continued to be difficult. The head of ‘Samarskii pereselenets’ identified the lack of cooperation and support from the migration service as one of the most serious problems the association faced.\(^6\) In contrast to Saratov oblast’ ‘Samarskii pereselenets’ was not included in the development of a regional migration programme, or in the temporary commission set up to assess compensation payments to forced

\(^6\) Interview conducted by the author with an employee of the department for resettlement of the central TMS, Samara, 20 April 1998.
\(^4\) Interview conducted by the author with the director of the TMS, Samara, 12 October 1999.
\(^5\) Interviews conducted by the author with a representative of the TMS, Samara, 30 September 1999, and the head of ‘Samarskii pereselents’, Samara, 5 November 1999. A positive outcome of the council meetings was to bring together different organizations, groups, and individual migrants from the districts of the oblast' who previously had no contact with one another.
\(^6\) Interview conducted by the author with the head of ‘Samarskii Pereselenets’, Samara, 5 November 1999.
migrants from Chechnia. The lack of effective joint-sector institutions and the exclusion from any governmental debate concerning migrant issues severely constrained the scope of the migrant association’s activity. The attitude of the migration service reduced the general legitimization of the organization’s activity within the region. However, the ‘hostile’ relationship must be partly rooted in the oppositional stance the association firmly adopted vis à vis the migration service.

Relations with individual departments and regional deputies

Relations between the migrant associations and government deputies, or individuals within governmental departments showed greater similarities across the two regions. Good relationships had been developed by all the organizations with individuals in government departments who were seen to understand the problems of forced migrants. Nevertheless, in both regions a number of departments refused to deal with the associations and claimed they would only work with the ‘official’ state structures, i.e. the TMS. ‘Samarskii pereselents’ was frequently referred back to the migration service with which it had a hostile relationship. Relations with individual Duma deputies were established by using the potential political and electoral significance of the migrant population. During the elections for the oblast’ Duma in 1998 ‘Saratovskii Istochnik’ supported four deputies for election, three of whom were elected. The support was given in return for assistance promised by the potential deputy. The head of ‘Saratovskii Istochnik’ saw the involvement as a way of ensuring that migrants had a voice in the oblast’ Duma, and to promote understanding of the problems of migrants at this level (Materiali mezhdunarodnogo seminara 1999: 24). ‘Zov’ had received assistance of a deputy in return for migrant electoral support. The head of ‘Zov’ adopted a pragmatic approach and stated that the political orientation of a candidate was irrelevant, what was important was whether they would provide concrete help to forced migrants. In Samara oblast’ ‘Samarskii pereselenets’ gained the support of the trade union

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67 The head of ‘Samarskii pereselenets’ was suspicious of the content of any future programme and did not consider that it was likely she would see any draft copy during its development.

68 The vice-head of the Engel’s raion administration helped the association with accommodation for 25 migrant families in a hostel in return for the association encouraging the migrant community to vote for him as head of the raion administration.

69 Interview conducted by the author with the head of ‘Zov’, Engel’s, 30 July 1999.
movement in return for providing electoral support for the trade union’s representatives.\textsuperscript{70}

Contacts with individual government departments and deputies were important for migrant associations, particularly ‘Samarskii pereselents’, as they provided an alternative way of representing migrants’ interests if the main ‘state’ structure, i.e. the TMS was hostile. Nevertheless, the determining factor influencing migrant activity in both oblasti was the attitude of the TMS. The tolerant and sometimes cooperative nature of this relationship in Saratov oblast facilitated the development of the regional migrant associations, and provided the associations with a voice at the level of the regional migration regime. In Samara oblast the hostile nature of the relationship impeded the development of migrant non-state, structures, and constrained their possibility to participate and effectively act at the regional level. The situation reflects the priorities of the regional administration regarding migration. In Samara oblast migration was seen as something to ‘control’, not as a ‘social issue’ requiring debate. In Saratov, the issue was identified as worthy of discussion, and as the ‘Social Partnership Agreement’ had established, any resolution should include both the state, and the individual citizen and wider society.

6.4.3 Relationships between migrant associations

In Saratov oblast' the development of migrant organizations had been facilitated by the existence of an original ‘hub’ organization ‘Saratovskii Istochnik’, that provided initial help with information, premises, and resources. The later organizations had benefited from the existence of an original strong organization, and its close relations with the Saratov TMS, that had fostered a tradition of ‘positive’ relations with the state sector. However, despite the early cooperation and interaction, by 1999, the three main organizations were working independently of each other due to competition for resources, personal conflicts, and differing opinions of, and relations with, state structures. The relationship between ‘Vozvrashchenie’ and ‘Saratovskii Istochnik’ was particularly tense and uncooperative. The hostility was connected with charges, under

\textsuperscript{70} During the period of fieldwork the association also approached the local faction of the Russian Communist Party. The head of the association stressed that she would approach any body in return for assistance to the forced migrant community.
investigation in 1999, against the head of ‘Saratovskii Istochnik’ regarding the non-payment of taxes, the mis-management of funds intended for a compact settlement site, and questions over missing equipment that the organization had received from IOM and UNHCR. The ‘Komitet bezhentsev iz Chechnii’ worked independently of the other migrant associations in the region, and was wary of getting involved in any ‘political battles’.

In Samara oblast, ‘Samarskii pereselents’ had developed links with groups of migrants at different settlement sites. The groups of migrants at two of the settlement sites (Novii Buian and Sukodol) were in the process of setting up their own migrant associations to work in conjunction with ‘Samarskii pereselents’. ‘Samarskii pereselents’ envisaged its future role as a central resource centre offering information and advice for a network of organizations developing in the regions of the oblast. This aim possibly reflects a wider attempt to make the profile of the organization as a ‘resource centre’ more attractive for international funding bodies. ‘Samarskii pereselents’ had developed a working partnership with the regional branch of the non-governmental organization the Compatriots Fund (‘Sootechestvenniki’). The ‘non-state’ status of the Samara Compatriots Fund was unclear, as is true for the federal level of the Fund (see Chapter 3). The organization was seen by some commentators as a structure which attracted funds aimed at non-governmental structures, however, the use of these funds was tightly controlled by the associated state structure. Nevertheless, the Compatriots Fund and ‘Samarskii pereselents’ had cooperated in efforts to improve conditions at migrant compact settlement sites. The Fund had independent links with other migrant initiatives based around business or agricultural enterprises in the regions of the oblast. Less productive links existed between ‘Samarskii pereselents’ and these migrant initiatives. ‘Samarskii pereselents’ saw the role of these organizations as commercial and business orientated rather than providing advice, information and

71. The development of the Samara branch of the organization, formed in 1993, was closely linked to the migration service and its office was located in the building of the central migration service until 1997.
72. Interview conducted by the author with the co-director of the historical, ecological, cultural NGO and resource centre ‘Povol’zhe’, Samara, 13 October 1999.
73. The initial relationship between the two organizations was problematic, the head of ‘Samarskii pereselents’ stated that it improved when her organization received international and federal support and funding.
74. As part of a federally directed project the Compatriots Fund were able to provide equipment for construction and production initiatives at compact settlements.
assistance. Any contact had been confined to discussions about how to acquire western grants.75

The relationship between the three migrant organizations in Saratov oblast' is indicative of wider tendencies which have been identified in the NGO sphere in Russia where intra-NGO conflict can impede joint action (Stephenson 2000: 289). Kay's study of grassroots women's organizations shows how a dependence upon western grants as the only source of available funding has generated intense direct competition between local organizations for grants. As a result, opportunities for potentially significant and fruitful cooperation between organizations are prevented, fostering resentment and division amongst the organizations (Kay 1998: 10). This was evident in the present study. A joint proposal to develop a medical rehabilitation for forced migrants and refugees to a funding body in Moscow was prevented due to hostile relations between the three applicant organizations. Individual projects were submitted but subsequently rejected. The vice-chairman of the 'Komitet bezhentsev iz Chechnii' regretted the lack of cooperative action in this case. The reluctance of 'Vozvrashchenie' and 'Saratovskii Istochnik' reflected their desire to independently acquire funding grants, but is equally a reflection of the high dependence upon external sources of funding to enable the survival of the organizations (see below).

6.4.4 The wider non-governmental sphere

The attitude towards non-governmental organizations in the two regions, and inclusion within the wider non-governmental sphere, impacted upon the development of the regional migrant associations. The Saratov regional administration consciously supported non-governmental activity, and coordination with state structures. The 'Social Partnership Agreement' and the Council of Social Organizations under the oblast' Duma were aimed at facilitating state/non-state relations. The inter-sectoral discussion of the regional migration programme can be heralded as a success of the 'Social Partnership Agreement'. The Committee of Social Organizations was less successful. Although the head of 'Vozvrashchenie' was an active member of the Committee of Social Organizations, and had excellent links with other social

75 Interview conducted with the head of 'Samarskii pereselenets', Samara, 5 November 1999.
organizations acting in the region, the involvement of the other organizations within the general non-governmental sphere was limited, and the organizations were themselves sceptical of the work of the committee. However, rather than being excluded, the organizations tended to exclude themselves, preferring to concentrate on their own particular issues, and to maintain a sense of distance and independence.

In Samara oblast' despite a wider tradition of non-governmental activity in the oblast', evidenced by the large number of non-governmental, social organizations, hostile relations between the migrant organization and the Samara TMS, had constrained the involvement of ‘Samarskii pereselenets’ in the wider non-governmental sphere. The identification by the regional administration of migration as an issue to control, rather than one of ‘social’ concern, meant that support from the regional administration for migrant initiatives was withheld. Cooperation in other spheres between the state and non-state sphere was a frequent subject for discussion at seminars involving representatives of government and non-governmental bodies. However, representatives of the NGO sector claimed that cooperation often remained at the abstract, theoretical level, and that any real cooperation depended upon individuals within the government departments. The head of ‘Samarskii pereselenets’ identified her organization as outside of these seminars, and the network of ‘official’ social organizations in the oblast’ who received support and some funding from the administration. ‘Samarskii Pereselenets’ had developed productive links with the western funded NGO resource centre ‘Povol’zhe’ from the time of the official registration of the migrant organization.

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76 The number of registered ‘social’ organizations is 2,000. However, including unregistered organizations this number could be as high as 4,500. Interview conducted by the author with a representative of the Department of Nationality Affairs and Cooperation with Social Organizations, Samara, 20 October, 1999. The large numbers are seen as an indication of the liberal attitude of administration and the lack of opposition to their registration. Interview conducted by the author with the co-director of the historical, ecological, cultural NGO and resource centre ‘Povol’zhe’, Samara, 13 October 1999.

77 Interview conducted by the author with the co-director of the historical, ecological, cultural NGO and resource centre ‘Povol’zhe’, Samara, 13 October 1999. The Department of Nationality Affairs and Cooperation with Social Organizations, created in 1994 to coordinate the interaction of the state with the non-state sector and to better inform government departments of the activities of social organizations, faced cutbacks in staff and its future was uncertain.

78 At present these ‘official’ social organizations number twenty five. They receive funding from the oblast’ budget to fulfil certain tasks.
two years ago. Help has been received with the use of technical equipment, computer training and advice, and information concerning NGO development and grant applications.

6.4.5 Federal and international connections

Although representatives of migrant associations in both Saratov and Samara oblasti noted that gaining recognition by federal and international structures was difficult and time consuming, and could detract from addressing the more immediate problems of arriving migrants, these connections had been essential for the development of organizations in both regions in two principle ways. Firstly, as a source of funding to enable the actual running of the organizations. Secondly, contacts with both federal and international structures were valued by the migrant associations in terms of information, experience and legitimization. Recognition by federal level Russian and international non-governmental structures facilitated interaction with national and regional level governmental structures.

Financing for the basic running costs of the migrant organizations was found to be a sufficiently problematic issue. No financing was available from the state at the regional level. Alternative sources of funding were local commercial or business enterprises. ‘Vozvrashchenie’ depended upon an agreement with a local enterprise to secure its accommodation in return for fax, telephone, photocopier and computer services which the organization, due to an international grant, was in a position to offer.

79 ‘Povol’zhe’ was formed in 1991, but became a registered resource centre in 1995 with the aim of facilitating the development of a strong regional NGO sector. It offers help with resources, including computers and other technical equipment, and provides opportunities for training in computer skills, legal issues, secretarial skills and fundraising. These activities are funded with the help of Western organizations, primarily US Aid, the Eurasia Foundation and the BEARR Trust (UK).

80 In a study of NGO development in contemporary Russia, Stephenson suggests that international aid, in the first instance, needs to be directed at the running costs of Russian organizations, and not just to particular projects. If organizations are unable to cover these costs, then they are likely to vanish or experience great difficulties in fulfilling their role. She adds that some donors have established small grant programmes which allow such costs to be covered (2000: 291). An example of this is the start-up grants offered by UNHCR, which had been received by ‘Komitet bezhentsev iz Chechnii’ and ‘Samarskii pereselents’.

81 ‘Zov’ and the ‘Komitet bezhentsev iz Chechnii’ had been helped with accommodation by the local administration, ‘Samarskii pereselents’ had requested similar help but had been refused. A lack of state funding is not universal across the NGO sector in Russia. For example health promotion NGOs in the area of drugs prevention are able to acquire local state sources of funding. In general, however, their work is very closely associated with the state, or they are in fact quasi-state organizations (Richardson 2001).
‘Saratovskii Istochnik’ had received financial support from certain migrant organizations in return for the organization’s support and its financial position was alleviated slightly by its ‘joint role’ as a commercial organization.82 Both ‘Zov’ and ‘Komitet bezhentsev iz Chechnii’ actively sought business sponsorship for small-scale activities. However, the extent of funding from local commercial structures was limited.

The primary source of funding was therefore identified as western organizations.83 Representatives of ‘Samaraskii pereselenets’ admitted that the continued existence of the organization would have been impossible without an international grant they had received through the Forum of Migrant Associations, and a start-up grant from UNHCR. The start-up grant received from UNHCR by the ‘Komitet bezhentsev iz Chechnii’ was seen as the key which had provided the organization with the opportunity to become independent and develop their own work and programmes.84 The involvement of ‘Vozvrashchenie’ in two UNHCR supported initiatives: the network of legal consultation points, and the project with the local newspaper Saratovskie vesti, provided essential funding. ‘Saratovskii Istochnik’ had received substantial help in the form of technical equipment from IOM and UNHCR.85 However, relations between ‘Saratovskii Istochnik’ and UNHCR were under review due to the charges of mismanagement of funds. Representatives of ‘Zov’ were keen to develop international links, however, as yet, the organization had not developed the ‘criteria’ needed to make an application for a grant.86

82 ‘Saratovskii Istochnik’, during 1999, was in the process of attempting to get a second grant from the Eurasian foundation and it was clear from interviews with the head of the association that the grant was vital. The head stated that the organization had to develop commercial activities, through its printing enterprise, to survive.
83 Kay notes in her study of grassroots women’s organizations that western grants are seen as a quick and easy solution to an organization’s financial problems. Securing such a grant becomes an absolute imperative and grant application writing an art (Kay 1998: 3).
84 Interviews conducted by the author with the chairman and vice-chairman of the ‘Komitet bezhentsev iz Chechnii’, Saratov, 19 August 1999.
85 ‘Saratovskii Istochnik’ had also received resources from IOM and UNHCR for a compact type settlement of migrants which the organization was initially involved with.
86 Contact has been made by the organization with UNHCR, but the international organization demanded greater experience and evidence of what had been achieved by the migrant association before any grant application could be made.
Links with Russian federal organizations were significant and provided information and direct access to the wider federal, and international migration regimes. All the migrant associations were national members of the ‘Forum of Migrant Associations’, however, their level of attachment varied. ‘Saratovskii Istochnik’ had been a member of the Forum’s Executive Committee, but later became a member of the alternative ‘Council of Migrant Associations’ under the state duma (see Chapter 3). The ‘Komitet bezhentsev iz Chechnii’ had excellent links with the Forum and its chairman Lidiia Grafova. Grafova was seen as central to the success and development of the organization and had been a source of advice and expertise. The head of ‘Samarskii pereselenets’ positioned the association as a regional branch within the Forum’s vertical structure.

In Saratov oblast’ international involvement had influenced the development of both state and non-state structures. The Saratov TMS had received technical equipment from IOM and UNHCR as part of their federal wide programme for the institutional development of migration structures (see Chapter 3). The assistance provided to migrant organizations had enabled them to develop their activities, and the presence of federal and international level connections had furthered recognition of the associations by the state sector. In contrast, ‘Samarskii pereselenents’ was the first migrant initiative in the oblast’ to have been targeted by UNHCR. Neither UNHCR, nor IOM, had targeted the Samara migration service for any assistance. The lack of international involvement in Samara oblast’ may be rooted in the nature of the regional migration regime, the ‘restrictive’ attitudes of the Samara migration service, and a lack of migrant initiatives. However, the lack of international attention impeded the development of relations between the state sector and alternative, migrant non-governmental structures in the region, due to the absence of ‘legitimization’ which international support and approval seems to bring to migrant associations, and the practical factor of initial, start-up funding, which enables an organization to prove it has a role to play.

87 Lidiia Grafova, who defined the Council of Migrant Associations as a communist led, political body, was critical of the head of ‘Saratovskii Istochnik’ and questioned the legitimacy of the organization (interview conducted by the author, Moscow, 22 September 1999).
The situation existing in Saratov and Samara oblasti concerning migrant, non-governmental activity, its relationship with the state-sector, and the wider federal, and international, non-governmental migration regime, is informative for what it indicates about post-Soviet NGO development, and western involvement. The two different situations reflect the practice of international organizations in the migration field when choosing the regions in which to focus their activities. The presence of cooperative, and receptive, local government structures are preferred, the absence of which discourages international interest.\textsuperscript{88} In turn, international organizations favour non-governmental organizations who have productive links with these ‘cooperative’ local government structures. This reflects the wider dominance of ‘multi-agency working’, where western bodies prefer to work in regions where well established and effective state/non-state relationships have been developed (Richardson 2001). Although it is acknowledged that a successful state/non-state relationship may generate productive results, it is suggested from the evidence of the present study, that in some cases international organizations funding NGO activity need to look beyond the ‘state’ structures in a region, and equally beyond the ‘same’ regularly funded regions, to the efforts of alternative and independent group initiatives that are not, as yet, included within the wider system. The activity of the federal level, Russian organizations, reflects such a wider approach. Yet, this is partly due to the indirect nature of the working relationship these organizations have with the Russian state.

\textbf{Conclusion}

The consequences of in-migration, and the migration process as a whole, were perceived differently by the regional administrations of Saratov and Samara oblasti. The dominant perception influenced the activity of other state structures, primarily the TMS, and the development of either a ‘restrictive’ or ‘receptive’ regional migration regime. Yet, despite the dissimilar approaches, any great disparity in the level of provision

\textsuperscript{88} Kay notes the tendency of donor organizations to allocate repeat funding to either individuals who have had experience of running projects, or to the same areas which have already been established as ‘useful’ (1998: 4). During interviews at the central headquarters in Moscow, representatives of IOM and UNHCR stressed the importance of already knowing a region, and having established connections and a positive working relationship with the regional administrations, and regional migration services.
available for the individual migrant is questionable. In both oblasti, government assistance was severely limited, a situation which reflected political priorities at the federal level, and a real lack of both federal and regional resources. Ambiguity over responsibility for forced migrant provision, which is not sufficiently clarified at the federal level, resulted in a general lack of coordination between governmental structures, and an abnegation of responsibility. Migrant associations that developed to fill the gap and meet the demands of migrants, were facilitated by the environment existing in Saratov oblast', and impeded by the environment in Samara. However, the better socio-economic conditions existing in Samara oblast', and the positive record of payment of social benefits, may have enabled higher levels of individual resolution of resettlement problems, reducing the need and demand for alternative migrant structures.

The chapter has concentrated upon the ‘construction’ of the migration process at the regional level, i.e. the construction of the environment in which the process of resettlement takes place by state and non-state bodies. As yet, the thesis has not directly addressed the migrant experience of the process of migration and resettlement. To understand the impact that the nature of both the federal and regional Russian migration regimes has upon individual migrant resettlement, and the levels of ‘dependence’ upon state and non-state structures amongst the migrant community, it is essential to take the analysis to the level of migrant agency. The following chapter explores the construction and experience of the migration process, involving the movement from the former republic, and resettlement on the territory of Saratov and Samara oblasti, at this individual migrant level.
Chapter 7: Migrant experiences of resettlement in Samara and Saratov oblasti

Introduction

The final chapter of the thesis moves to the level of individual agency and focuses upon the understanding and experience of migration, and subsequent resettlement, by the migrant. The thesis has attempted to bring in the agency of the migrant throughout the text, however it has thus far prioritized the ‘construction’ of the migration and resettlement of ‘returning’ Russians, and of the individual migrant, at the level of the state and within the federal and regional migration regimes. The dominant construction of the home/land by the Russian state occurs through a restrictive and securitized migration discourse. The ‘returnee’ is positioned as a ‘forced migrant’, rather than a welcomed ‘repatriate’ in Russian society. This chapter explores the individual’s experience of the ‘constructed’ home/land by focusing upon the real process of re-creating ‘home’ in Samara and Saratov oblasti. The chapter demonstrates how migrants are independent and rational actors in the migration and resettlement process, and how they act within the migration regime to locate themselves at the new place of residence. Although ‘victims’ of wider political and socio-economic change, and constrained by this change, they have responded and chosen to migrate. Upon ‘return’ the process of resettlement takes place via individual interaction with, response to, and effect upon, the surrounding migration regime, and wider state and society. The chapter demonstrates that despite the operation of the two different migration regimes, as discussed in Chapter 6, the experience of migrant resettlement across the two regions is very similar. Due to the ‘constraining’ aspects of state structures, an absence of state provision and concern, and distrust or lack of knowledge of other ‘alternative’

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1 As noted earlier in the thesis, the term home/land is used to depict the two levels of ‘homeland’, where it is broken down into the interrelated understandings of a wider ‘homeland’, and a more immediate ‘home’.
structures, migrants frequently distance themselves from the operation of the federal and regional migration regimes to negotiate their own resettlement, and re-creation of home, with the help of alternative structures; primarily immediate family and friendship networks.

7.1 The dichotomy of ‘home’ and ‘homeland’

Expectations of ‘return’, and the associated imaginings of ‘homeland’, vary amongst the different actors involved in the migration process; actors who hold certain degrees of power to shape the space of ‘return’ and the identities of those involved in the process (Stepputat 1994: 177). One of the key actors is the government of the ‘host’ nation. The thesis has shown how in response to the issue of the ethnic Russian and Russian speaking populations resident in the former republics of the Soviet Union and the possibility of their ‘return’ to the territory of the Russian Federation, the Russian state has followed a dual policy which accepts in-migration, but at a legislative level frames it as ‘forced migration’ rather than ‘repatriation’. At the same time, the dual policy encourages the communities to remain in the former republics where the Russian state has constructed them as a Russian ‘diaspora’. The present chapter reveals the discrepancy between state policy and discourse and the construction of the resettlement process and individual migrant, and migrants’ own expectations and understandings of what ‘return’ to the Russian Federation represents. Firstly, the movements cannot be uniformly encompassed by the label of ‘forced migration’ contained in legislative discourse, or as the ‘voluntary repatriation’ of a post-colonial ‘diaspora’ to their ‘historical homeland’, terms often utilized in political, academic and media discourse. Secondly, migrant expectations of what is required for successful resettlement are rarely satisfied through the operation of the federal and regional migration regimes.

Central to the migration movement and resettlement process at the individual level is the desire to re-create home/land. The term home/land encompasses that of ‘home’ located at ‘the site of everyday lived experience’, and that of ‘homeland’ at the level of wider ‘narratives of the nation’ (Brah 1996: 3). With the loss of one home/land comes
the desire for its re-creation at another location. The re-creation of a ‘home’ and ‘homeland’ must be seen as a ‘process’ which takes place at a number of stages, where one may be achieved before, or without, the other. A feeling of ‘being at home’ may be distinct from an actual declaration of the place as ‘home’, as ‘one’s own’. The initial priority is to ‘feel at home’, rather than a desire to be included within a distinct ‘homeland’ (ibid: 197). To further a comprehension of what the migration process represents, the chapter explores migrant understandings of ‘home’ and ‘homeland’ in the former place of residence, the disruption of these understandings at the site of departure, and their relevance at the site of resettlement. The experience of ‘return’ and resettlement amongst migrant respondents shows a tendency to depend upon the close ties of family and friends, rather than upon outside help, to achieve the immediate localized siting of home.

The use of the terms rodina (‘homeland’) and doma (‘at home’) by migrant respondents may be loosely associated with the meanings of home suggested by Brah: rodina as the wider ‘narrative of the nation’ (the former Soviet Union, or national republic, or the ‘ethnic Russian homeland), and doma as the ‘site of everyday lived experience’ (the immediate physical surroundings of the physical ‘home’ in the former republic). However, when the terms are employed in relation to the former place of residence, and the security of life there, the understandings of the concepts overlap and in many cases cannot be clearly separated from the other. The rooted existence of their ‘home’ in the former republic, allowed the wider territory to become that of their ‘homeland’. With the political, social and economic changes brought about by the collapse of the Soviet Union the security of both ‘home’ and ‘homeland’ have been disrupted and disconnected from one another. Their re-creation is then imagined before ‘return’ to Russia when the decision for migration is taken, and the reality of the process of recreation is confronted upon ‘return’.

Rodina is often employed in political, academic, media, and personal discourse, within the term ‘istoricheskaia rodina’ (the Russian ‘historical homeland’) which prioritizes the ‘ethnic’ and wider basis of belonging to a ‘homeland’. However, migrant narratives show a lack of prior identification to this ‘ethnic homeland’. Instead, empirical analyses of understandings of rodina, by uncovering the additional concept of doma, challenge
the assumption of a natural attachment to a single ‘homeland’. Both terms encompass associations with a place where ethnicity is not prioritized. Doma refers to the immediate physical and social relations within the prior locality, whilst the term rodina is used to stress a wider, and at the same time, more ‘rooted’ attachment to the locality, and surrounding territory, a place where they were born, have grown up, and have family connections. Migration provides the opportunity or possibility to transfer these associations to a new locality. However, as the process of transferral of ‘home’ and ‘homeland’ occurs in distinct stages, the ‘return’ is best understood not as the immediate ‘return’ of ethnic Russians to their ‘homeland’, but as the migration of individuals to a new locality, where they face the challenges of re-creating what constitutes ‘home’ in this new locality, and where they themselves will establish the connections for a future ‘homeland’.

7.2 Understandings of ‘home’ and ‘homeland’ amongst Russian migrants

When migrants located their ‘home’ and ‘homeland’ in the former republics, a sense of the stability and continuity that had characterized their past lives was gained. The difficult circumstances under which their past lives were being spoken, and the distance in time and space from those past lives, needs to be taken into account. In refugee or migrant narratives there is the possibility of a distortion of memory where nostalgic longings for the ‘better’ past in fact romanticize the view of this past. Yet, despite the contrast with what the migrants were experiencing upon ‘return’, the vivid recollections of what they had possessed still represented a ‘norm’ or a ‘standard’ which they hoped to re-create in their new location. It was clear that recollections of the past served as a mechanism to preserve some sense of continuity with the past, and to maintain their sense of self-identity, and self-understanding, upon arrival in the Russian Federation (Gupta and Ferguson 1992: 11; Fried 1963: 162).

2 Baudrillard observes that ‘when the real is no longer what it used to be, nostalgia assumes its full meaning. There is a proliferation of myths of origin... and authenticity’ (cited in Morley and Robins 1993: 10). Ganguly, in a study of the Indian diaspora in the USA, notes how ‘the stories that people tell us about their pasts have more to do with the continuing shoring up of self-understanding than with historical ‘truths’ (cited in Jansen 1998: 89).
Although 'rodina' and 'doma' were frequently used in tandem when migrants spoke of their lives in the former republics, the specific associations of either term need to be distinguished to demonstrate the different nature and levels of their attachment to that 'place'. Out of the sixty two migrant respondents the majority were either born, or had spent the vast majority of their lives, outside Russia. Only ten of the respondents were born on the present territory of the Russian Federation. The majority of respondents when they spoke of their rodina placed it 'there' (in the former republic). This is, in many ways, logical. Linguistically, the term rodina fixes homeland as the 'place of birth', and many respondents identified their rodina as 'there', the republic where they were born:

I consider that my rodina is where I was born, if nothing had happened, we would have lived in that place, our parents are buried there. [10, Saratov, 1997]

The importance of establishing some sense of family 'rootedness' over a period of time was demonstrated by migrants when they spoke about rodina as both where they were born, and where their parents were buried. In this sense the former republic was quite explicitly the land of their kin, their people (rod-ina). Respondents narrated how they, or their ancestors before them, were born in the former republic, they located their 'roots' as being there:

I was born in Tashkent, in Uzbekistan. My parents were also born there. It is a long story. My ancestors settled there for different reasons. My grandfather, grandmother from one side, and the other. [19, Saratov, 1999]

A number of the respondents related 'homeland' to the space of the former USSR as a whole, rather than confining it to the territory of the former republic. Chapter 2 discussed the ambiguous position the Russian communities outside of the RSFSR occupied due to their close association with the 'imperial' Soviet power, and the specific role they played in the strengthening of the Soviet state and its institutions,

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3 As noted in Chapter 5, in the interests of anonymity, when migrant interviews are cited in the text of the thesis, respondents are referred to only by the identification number assigned them in the database of socio-demographic details, the region of their resettlement and the year of interview.
rather than the expansion of a Russian nation-state. The identification of the Soviet Union, rather than the Russian republic, as their ‘national homeland’ was particular to the Russian populations in the Soviet republics, in contrast to the titular nationalities (Brubaker 1994: 68; Payin 1994: 22). Although the creation of a Soviet national identity, and the existence, or survival of a Sovietskii narod, is questioned (Castells 1997: 39), the narratives of the migrant respondents demonstrate that it was not an ‘empty ideological shell’, but a ‘lived reality’ (Pilkington 1998b: 98). An identification with the Soviet Union as a ‘homeland’, and membership of a multi-national community, was clearly expressed by a number of respondents in the present study:

My understanding of rodina is all of the Soviet Union. My mother was Belarusian, my father Ukrainian, I was born in Alma Ata, Kazakhstan, in my passport it is written I am Russian. My husband is Mordvin, we lived in Tajikistan. [1, Saratov. 1997]

However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and a change in political borders, this previous ‘homeland’, the Soviet Union, could never be returned to either temporally or spatially. The wider ‘homeland’ which had ensured their socio-economic and political identity had disappeared. The ‘homeland’ embodied in the Soviet Union was rooted in both memories of a time and experiences of a place, neither of which any longer existed.

The memories of homeland, whether perceived at the level of the multi-national state (the Soviet Union), or more often the former republic, were closely associated with the immediate locale where the individual lived and what the time spent in this place represented. When the individual spoke of this ‘time’ and ‘place’ then ‘homeland’ (rodina) and being ‘at home’ (doma) were spoken about in terms of each other. Both the physical aspects and social relations that had characterized the place were spoken about (cf. Fried 1963; Massey 1992; and see Chapter 2). Much was attributed to ‘home’ being where a person had feelings of stability and belonging, when there had been employment, housing, established friends and community. The narratives of this time were firmly grounded in a sense of the security, safeness and completeness of life, based upon well-established networks, connections and roots, which had been built up often over generations. Migrants spoke of growing up, getting married and having
children there. Their work, flats and summer houses (dachas) were located there. These articulations indicate that not only did the former republics constitute respondents ‘homeland’ (rodina), but also where they were ‘at home’ (doma).

Alongside these expressions of having lived ‘well’, of security and normality, was an absence of any remembered desires to ‘return’ home, or of feelings of being separated, at that time, from their ethnic ‘homeland’, i.e. Russia. Instead, respondents frequently suggested that until the situation altered, the thought of leaving had never been an issue:

Up until those events in the nineties in Kazakstan, we lived very well. We did not even think that we would go anywhere. I had a four roomed apartment, excellent work, my husband worked, we were well-provided for. [59, Samara, 1999]

In the migrants’ narratives, past understandings of rodina and doma were firmly rooted in the territory of the former republic, and the security of the past. The presence of family, material objects, everyday routines, social relations, and their continuity over time, had created a sense of ‘home’ in that particular spatial region, and had generated a deeper sense of belonging to a wider ‘homeland’. Russia to many of the migrants was an ‘unknown’ territory prior to 1991. The decision to ‘return’ to the Russian Federation was made by the majority of migrants in direct response to the disruption of the security of the life they had enjoyed in the former republic. Until this security was challenged, they had not imagined Russia as a lived ‘alternative’. In contrast with other ‘diasporas’, the ‘myth of homeland’, a dream of going home (Safran 1991: 91), did not exist amongst the respondents during the period of the Soviet Union. Russia had only been present as an ‘imagined community’ to which they had been attached through the Soviet Union. The actual process of return for many would be one of leaving their immediate ‘home’ and wider ‘homeland’ rather than returning to it. Once the decision

\[4\] In his study of post-Yugoslav identities, Jansen notes how individuals use narratives of everyday life in an attempt to preserve a certain continuity, a sense of spatial and temporal orientation, where, in this case, war [and displacement], are not seen as immediate when they could be kept out of the places, networks, meanings that constitute ‘home’ (1998: 103).

\[5\] An interesting comparison may be made with a study of meanings of home and homeland in Czech nationalist discourse. Czech respondents found it hard not to talk about homeland and home in terms of each other. ‘Home’ was the place where they were born, brought up, where they had established their own families, had children. ‘Homeland’ was the familiar space stretching beyond the boundaries of the immediate ‘home’, and was where they felt ‘at home’. These attachments were prioritized over those of blood and soil, or common ancestry (Holy 1998: 128).
to ‘return’ was made, Russia had to be imagined as a real possibility to provide a future ‘home’. However, as Gupta and Ferguson suggest, when places imagined at a distance become ‘lived spaces’, tensions may arise. The contrast of the image of Russia constructed after the decision to migrate had been made, with what was experienced upon ‘return’, made it difficult for expectations to be realized as the economic, social and political realities of the new location were confronted (1992: 11). The possibility of Russia, as a distant ‘imagined community’ during the period of the Soviet Union, and now imagined location for a ‘lived home’, was to be put to the test upon ‘return’.

7.3 The disruption of ‘home’ and ‘homeland’

The reasons given by migrants for moving are significant in terms of understanding how a previous ‘home’ and ‘homeland’ has been disrupted. Socio-economic securities of life – employment, education, everyday practices – had been threatened. However, the underlying reasons for the disruption were identified as ethnic, political causes. The narratives of migrants thus provide an insight into the complexity of factors which lie behind the decision to migrate, and the impossibility of trying to define the movement as either voluntary/economic or involuntary/political. This complexity reveals the limitations of current federal and regional level policy thinking and legislative frameworks which, in theory, deny forced migrant status to any individual not able to prove the forced nature of their movement. In addition, experiences at the site of departure demonstrate why Russia is imagined as the most logical and viable solution when the decision to migrate is made.

The most frequent reasons given by migrants for departure were: socio-economic and material difficulties; a concern for the safety and future of the children; the actual threat to personal safety and lives from disorder and conflict; and isolation from their ‘own’ culture and people. These were rooted in the rise of ‘nationalism’ including discrimination on the basis of language and ethnicity and everyday displays of nationalist feeling. Migrants spoke about these factors simultaneously and in relation to one another. A growing ‘ethnic discomfort’ was interwoven with other socio-economic
and material factors that influenced the decision making process. The unconscious merging of motivations demonstrates the interplay of political, social, economic and cultural/ethnic factors at the site of departure, and how the previous existence of these factors in some sort of equilibrium had been unbalanced by recent events.

7.3.1 The ‘everyday’

‘Home’ at the ‘site of everyday lived experience’ was increasingly under disruption due to the encounter of ethnic discomfort in daily socio-economic practices. Discrimination on the basis of language and ethnicity was talked about in the sphere of employment and had led to increases in levels of insecurity and uncertainty about the future. A female migrant of working age from Uzbekistan stated:

We only moved to Russia in August 1998. But such a situation had arisen that we were forced to move. All the family were affected by nationalism. We had to learn the language, and it was already impossible to learn the language....there was no work, and if there is no work then of course there is no money, and you have to exist on nothing. Therefore we left. [29, Saratov, 1999]

Socio-economic factors and material difficulties, such as lack of jobs and money, were rarely mentioned in isolation as a factor in the decision to migrate, these material difficulties were rooted in an ethnic context and the nationalist tendencies at the wider level of society. Although in most cases actual ethnic conflict or disorder were not being experienced, and it was the immediate threat to socio-economic security that forced the decision to migrate, ethnic discomfort experienced at the level of the everyday had destroyed the security and stability of previous years. The situation generated feelings of uncertainty and a lack of hope in the future. A female migrant and mother spoke of her individual experience in Tajikistan:

You cannot say that nationalism is propagandised in Tajikistan, that does not exist, but there is everyday nationalism on a juvenile level, and that is frightening because it is the prospect for the future, it is already on an unregulated level, when it flares up spontaneously, all of this together creates such premises that

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6 Ethnic discomfort has been identified in a number of studies as a key motivating factor for migration (see for example Gritsenko 1999: 41; Vitkovskaia 1999: 54; Lapshova et al. 1996: 15; Pilkington 1998a: 134-138).
firstly there is no future for your children, and secondly there is no future for you because in essence there is nowhere to work...[62. Samara, 1999]

The experience of ethnic discomfort was not confined to the work sphere. Of concern to respondents was its growing presence in everyday routines; daily activities such as shopping, using public transport, or walking down the street were no longer ‘safe’ and unproblematic. The ability to move freely within the surrounding environment, i.e. the possession of a secure spatial identity within that locality, had been disrupted (Fried 1963: 168):

....there we were restrained, our freedom, even when we went into the town, on public transport we weren’t allowed through. Even when I was pregnant no-one offered me a seat, even when I was with a small baby. [57, Samara, 1999]

The expressions of insecurity about the present socio-economic reality, the disruption of daily routines and familiar practices within the surrounding environment, and a concern about the uncertainty of the future, demonstrate how feelings of being ‘at home’ at the ‘site of everyday lived experience’ had been disrupted.

7.3.2 The family
The narratives of ‘home’ and ‘homeland’ located in the former republics demonstrated the central importance of establishing the continuity and security of a family over generations. Therefore, when the children’s security, lives, and futures were threatened, the Russian Federation was perceived as the place where a future ‘homeland’, especially for their children, might be secured. The threat to their children’s security was rooted in a combination of ethnic and socio-economic factors.7 The most predominant concern was for the short term educational prospects of children due to the decline of adequate educational facilities for Russian speaking children in the former

7 Other migration research has pointed to concern about the future of children; their education and prospects in influencing the decision to migrate (see for example Gritsenko 1999: 41; Lapshova et al. 1996: 15; Pilkington 1998a: 136; Vitkovskaia 1999: 55).
These concerns were expressed by a young female migrant and mother who had arrived from Tajikistan:

Recently there has been a large outflow of the Russian speaking population from Tajikistan. All Russian specialists have begun to leave. There are no schools left for us. And we have a child, a daughter, she is thirteen. She has to study, and on the whole the schools are without teachers... we left because of this. [27, Saratov, 1999]

Concerns were also expressed for the long-term educational and professional prospects of the children, and the growing isolation of the children from their ‘own’ culture. A female migrant and mother from Tajikistan who arrived in Samara oblast’ in 1998 articulated these fears and the part they played in making the decision to migrate:

The primary reason [for migration] was most of all the children, the fact that there was no future for them. It was impossible for them to study, impossible even to receive elementary education. Then there is the problem of the isolation of the children from their native culture, from its roots, in Tajikistan. It would be impossible for our children to receive higher education in Russia because they study according to a different programme which means they lag behind. That would mean that they are denied higher education. Then there is the problem of teachers, there has been a constant outflow of the population and this has naturally lowered the standard of teaching. [62, Samara, 1999]

Children are an essential part of a family network that can be used as a base to re-establish roots in the new place of residence. After arrival a number of individuals spoke of how Russia had provided the chance to initiate the process of securing their children’s future. The primary concern of these respondents was clearly not their own security and well being but that of their children. Thus, the purpose of migration was seen through the future of their children. A female migrant from Tajikistan stated:

They [our children] were receiving no sort of education. Basically we left for the children. Because, we, as you say have had our day. But we must get our children established, that is the most important thing. [21, Saratov, 1999]

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8 This situation was attributed to the implementation of state language policies which had made the titular language obligatory in schools, the closure of Russian speaking schools, and the departure of ethnic Russian and Russian speaking teaching staff.
7.3.3 ‘Homeland’

Although the majority of respondents located their rodina in the former republic, and did not demonstrate any prior ‘ethnic’ attachment to the ‘historical homeland’, a consciousness of ‘being Russian’ was heightened by the experiences of ethnic discomfort in the former republics. In these cases, Russia was re-discovered or uncovered as the ‘ethnic homeland’. Many respondents spoke of the verbal abuse they received on the grounds of their ethnicity and of being told to ‘return’ to ‘their Russia’:

Your homeland (rodina) is Russia - you are Russian - go back to your Russia. [42, Saratov, 1999].

Migrants received these demands from within the immediate local community and social networks they had previously felt a part of. A female migrant spoke of a particularly distressing moment when a life-long friend with whom she had grown up told her:

It is time for you to go to Russia, there is nothing for you to do here, it is our land [35, Saratov, 1999]

This ‘rejection’ was felt at the state level when migrants spoke of no longer feeling needed in the country where they had once felt valued. The role they felt they had fulfilled, that of a valuable force for change, improvement and development in the former republics, had been challenged and displaced. Both a ‘homeland’ and ‘home’ that had been created was being broken down:

..everyone started to leave, everything became so bad there, there was no work, no future for the children. Everything went into Kazak, there was already nothing for us - although our parents had gone there to open up a new land, to build everything, but we turned out to be, how to say, redundant [34, Saratov, 1999].

Hall notes how an identity can suddenly become ‘historically available’, in this case an Afro-Caribbean identity to Jamaican people, and how, subsequently Africa, and the implications of this identity, have to be confronted (1990: 231). Through their experiences in the former republics, the respondents were confronted with an ‘ethnic’ identity, many of them had previously not prioritized but were now forced to come to terms with.
Other research on the situation of ethnic Russian and Russian speaking communities in the former republics has noted the effect on individuals who have experienced a loss of meaning in life, self-confidence and self-respect due to feelings of not being needed in a country which was once considered their ‘rodina’ (homeland) (Lebedeva 1995 cited in Gritsenko 1999: 43; Gritsenko 1999: 43). Although economic and material factors are recognized as being important in the decision to migrate, the movement is seen as an important way out of a crisis of ethnic and social identity, where the new place of settlement (the Russian Federation) is perceived as the place where it is possible to recover personal self-respect and a sense of positive ethnic and social identity (ibid: 45). However, the present study shows that upon arrival the migrants’ understanding of both their Russian ethnic identity, and their socio-economic identity, is challenged, both through interaction with the state during their resettlement, and with the local community. This makes the recovery of a positive sense of either identity problematic.

7.3.4 Networks

The security of an established community, and the social networks which formed this community in the former republics, were another key component of understandings of ‘home’. The presence of an established set of social relations within a particular locality contributes to a ‘sense of belonging’, and a feeling of group identity situated at that locality (Fried 1963: 156). As the Russian population began to leave, the social networks began to break down, and Russians who remained increasingly felt the lack of a supportive community. A migrant from Uzbekistan spoke of this:

All Russians are leaving. Conditions there do not allow you to live. Everything is in Uzbek. And most of all what frightens you is that Russians are leaving. Only a few Russians are left. Living conditions of course are terrible. Even though here it is not much better, we are living amongst Russians, in Russia, all of us have Russian citizenship. [42, Saratov, 1999]

The effect of other members of their family or close friends leaving had a significant influence upon feelings of security. An elderly, male migrant from Uzbekistan stated:
we took the decision together, we spoke a lot about it, you know we started to panic, our family, all of our relatives, all the people close to us had begun to leave, it influences your psyche, so we thought it over and decided to leave. [54, Samara, 1999]

The gradual break up of a previous network of family and friends threatened one of the factors of stability that had rooted their lives in the former republics. The centrality of these networks to a sense of ‘home’, and the desire to preserve them, were apparent in the later stages of the migration process: the actual move, and at the site of settlement.

7.3.5 Russia as solution?
The migrants’ reasons for migration demonstrate the disruption of both a sense of immediate ‘home’ and wider ‘homeland’. The lived and rooted experience of ‘homeland’, and the features which made ‘home’ operate, had been lost. At this point, Russia was imagined as providing a possible return to both, as a place where they could be re-created. The experience of ‘ethnic discomfort’ had heightened the ethnic consciousness of the potential migrants. Due to the context of the movement, for some respondents migration to Russia was directly perceived, at this point, as a return to an ethnic homeland:

We are Russian (russkie), we have come to our Russian brothers, we have not just moved anywhere, we have come to our native Russia. (35, Saratov, 1999)

However, the move to Russia was not a positive response to a call from their ‘historical homeland’, in fact any mention of such a call was completely absent from the respondents’ narratives. Nevertheless the changing nature of life in the former republic meant that the adjacent ‘historical’ homeland – Russia – presented itself as the logical solution to the displacement felt. The logic of choosing Russia may be seen on two levels. The presence of historical, political, social and economic institutional links between the former republics and the Russian Federation might allow and facilitate the process of migration. Equally, due to these connections, and those at a more personal level, Russia was a place where the future might be imagined, a place which would
enable a re-creation of the securities of 'home', jobs, education for their children, social networks, which had come under threat and for many had been destroyed.10

7.4 Situating 'home' and 'homeland'

Upon arrival in the Russian Federation the distinction was made more clearly between 'homeland' and being 'at home'. The narratives of life in the former republics demonstrate the close association of rodina and doma, and their roots in the continuity and security of the past. Rodina continued to be rooted in the past for the majority of the returnees. It was not just attached to the physical space where they were born, but also to their memories of that place, and roots in that locality, which could not be relived or re-created. For many returnees, an association of Russia as their homeland had never been consciously made, their rodina would always remain in the former republic:

I consider that Uzbekistan remains and will always be my rodina. I never considered Russia, there is only one rodina, and for me it is Uzbekistan [53, Samara, 1999]

Upon arrival in the Russian Federation they had a sense of having 'no homeland'. Although 'home' was also located in the former republic and in the past, the memories of what it was associated with could be used in the re-construction of 'home' in the present place of residence. The focus shifted from the past memories of 'homeland' and 'home' in the former republic to the 'present' necessary process of reconstructing 'home'. The process would be one of 'becoming' or 'rooting', of finding their 'own place':

I plan to find permanent work here, to find my 'nook' and to live, to work further, to make friends. [22, Saratov, 1999]

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10 The fact that historical, political, social and economic institutional links are present between the former republics and the Russian Federation, and are absent between the FSU space and Western Europe, is seen as a reason for the low levels of migration from the former republics to Western European destinations (Codagnone 1998a: 48). No migrants in the present study mentioned the possibility of moving elsewhere from the former republics, however a number of migrants spoke of trying to move on to Germany or America due to the unsuccessful experience of resettlement in the Russian Federation.
I lived all my life there. Of course the nostalgia torments me. I remember all the good days there, but I have faced up to the fact that I have to live here. Do you understand, I was born there, I studied there, I have many friends, many memories, all that was good, my youth, was spent there. But I have set myself the task that I will live here, but of course there is nostalgia. [27, Saratov, 1999]

The migrant narratives describe a process of 'recreation' and transferral. There was a clear acceptance that the period of rodina being 'there' was over in a physical, lived sense. Respondents rarely envisaged return as a real possibility, although the memory of 'homeland' remained potent. The goal upon 'return' was to attempt to rebuild their 'home' - signifying the security of housing and employment, the establishment of family and friends, and a future for their children. The first step was to recreate 'home' in Russia; if they managed this successfully, it might become 'homeland' for future generations:

My rodina is there, where I was born, where my friends are. But I think Russia has to become my 'home'. If there is housing, then Russia will become homeland and home, because our children will be here. Our children will have children, and there will be grandchildren. Therefore I will consider that Russia is my home. (35, Saratov, 1999)

The fact that Russia was envisaged as a future rodina for the children is significant. It suggests that the feelings of displacement and difference which the returning migrants were experiencing would be transitory across generations. As Brah suggests, the relationship of the first generation to the place of migration is different from that of subsequent generations. The relationship of initial returnees to the new 'home' is mediated by memories of what was recently left behind, and by the experiences of disruption and displacement as they try to reorientate, to form new social networks, and learn to negotiate new economic, political, and cultural realities (1996: 194). Migrants spoke of how some of their children had already grown up on Russian territory, for them the sense of displacement from their previous 'homeland' was not felt to such an extent. The children would go through the process of growing up and establishing their own 'roots' in the Russian Federation, the place where both their 'home' and 'homeland' would be located, as their parents had done in the former republics. However, for their parents their rodina was rooted 'there' and the dislocation from their rodina could not be overcome even with the recreation of 'home'.

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I cannot say that I exactly feel at home. But, I feel calm, simply calm. It is already the children, grandchildren, this will be their rodina in time, when it has all settled down. [39. Saratov, 1999]

Although the female/male respondent ratio makes any gender analysis problematic\(^{11}\), it was female migrants alone who stressed that Russia would be a place where, above all, the security of their children might be ensured, and a future rodina created. The tendency to prioritize the establishment of family ‘roots’ in a region, was reflected in the narratives of female migrants concerning why their rodina was located in the former republics.\(^{12}\) Women formed the majority of those who stressed the importance of generations of family having been born, and having died and been buried, in a region. It would seem that female migrants articulate their prioritization of the recreation of ‘home’ and a future rodina at the very immediate level of the family.\(^{13}\) A more equal gender balance was seen when migrants spoke of the importance and experience of a normal ‘daily’ life – employment, friends, apartment – the continuity of which had generated feelings of ‘homeland’ in the former republic, and which in Russia would be central to the initial re-creation of a ‘home’.\(^{14}\)

\(^{11}\) Of the respondents interviewed, forty five were female and seventeen were male. Chapter 6 discusses the reasons for this ratio discrepancy.  
\(^{12}\) In the study of meanings of ‘home’ and ‘homeland’ in the Czech Republic, it was women in particular who stressed that their homeland was formed by where their family lives (Holy 1998: 128).  
\(^{13}\) Massey notes how women and men grow up with personalities affected by different boundary experiences, differently constructed and experienced inner and outer worlds, and pre-occupations with different relational issues (1992: 14). The fact that the female respondents were more likely to have been active at the immediate level of the home, in bringing up their children, than the male respondents may have influenced the prioritization of the recreation of ‘home’ at this level.  
\(^{14}\) The tendency to ‘prioritize’ children may be linked to wider debates. Of the twenty migrants who spoke of the concern for the future prospects of their children as a factor in the decision to migrate only one was male. It has been suggested that conditions in the former republics - fear of ethnic conflict, fear of the future, fear of discrimination against Russians - are specifically causing women to initiate migration due to their greater feelings of responsibility for their children (Vitkovskaia 1995 cited in Pilkington 1998a: 122; Gritsenko 1999: 43). Both authors prioritize ‘ethnic’ concerns amongst women, and the ‘natural’ instincts of women to think of their family, particularly their children. Yet, as Pilkington suggests motivations amongst women are not the result of ‘natural instincts’ but of their experience of the ethnopolitical, ethno-social and ethno-economic conditions existing in the country, which are often ‘expressed’ through concerns about the present and future educational and employment possibilities of their children (Pilkington 1997: 123).
7.5 Reconstructing ‘home’ at the site of resettlement via family and friendship networks

7.5.1 An absence of state concern

Although Russia was seen as the solution by migrants, the Russian state as an institution did not play a role in either their decision to migrate or their actual movement from the former republics to the Russian Federation. In addition, at the site of resettlement, state involvement was peripheral rather than central for the majority of migrants. Despite the process of ‘diasporization’ of the Russian-speaking communities in the ‘near abroad’ by the Russian state, and in political and media discourse, no references were made by migrant respondents to the Russian state protecting them whilst they were still resident in the former republic, or of encouraging or welcoming their ‘return’. A complete lack of official information and help in planning and making the move continued during the process of resettlement. The actual journeys made by migrants and the location of places for settlement were conducted primarily with the assistance of personal channels of information, family and friendship networks. The lack of the influence of state institutional support in the choice of place of settlement was striking. Only three respondents spoke of the Territorial Migration Service (in Saratov oblast’) as being an influencing factor and a possible form of assistance. The absence of any state programme or direction at this stage of the resettlement process reflects the reluctance of the state to officially frame these journeys as a repatriation movement. However, there was a lack of non-state institutional support also. Although representatives of the migrant organizations in Saratov and Samara oblasti claimed that the provision of information to potential migrants in the former republics was a role the associations fulfilled, none of the respondents in the present study mentioned the role of

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15 Amongst the sixty two respondents included in the present study there was only one case where institutional help had been received in organizing the move, this was received from the Russian embassy and military in Tajikistan, and an ethnic Russian social organization based in Tajikistan.

16 A lack of state or institutional support is reflected in other research. A survey conducted over 1997-1998 of migrants in five regions of Russia showed that seventy to eighty percent of respondents obtained information about opportunities for resettlement not from government bodies, but from friends and acquaintances who had migrated earlier to the region (Vitkovskaia 1999: 55).

17 The three migrants who mentioned the significance of the migration service had left Azerbaijan and Tajikistan due to the outbreak of conflict.
a migrant organization in influencing the choice of settlement.

Instead, family and friendship networks were central to every stage of the migration movement: in the decision to move, as the structure which ‘moved’, as an important factor in influencing the choice of settlement region, and as providing initial support upon ‘return’. Although homes and employment had been lost, networks of family and friends could more easily be sustained. Migrants usually moved from the former place of residence either as a group (made up of family and friends/acquaintances), as a family group, or as an individual. The movement was most often made with other family members – partners, children, parents and grandparents. In making the choice of the place of settlement the main reason given by respondents was the presence of family and friends in the chosen region. Thirty four respondents named family links, and nine respondents friendship links, as the deciding factor. Equally, although many of the migrants requested state assistance upon ‘return’, and received forced migrant status, the actual impact of the state upon the practical experience of resettlement of migrants was minimal. At this stage of the migration process migrants depended primarily upon the support of informal networks of family and friends.

7.5.2 Family networks

The family ties which existed in the regions took varying forms: ancestral roots in the oblast, family members who were permanently resident in the oblast, prior residence and personal contacts in the oblast, and family members who had migrated to the oblast at an earlier date. The presence of relatives resident in the region of arrival made the region attractive for resettlement as they provided one way of solving some of the

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18 Other factors were influential in the choice of the region of settlement. They included the geographical location of the oblast in relation to the region of departure (including direct transport links connecting the two regions), knowledge of possible sources of assistance in the oblast, climatic conditions in the oblast, and the socio-economic conditions existing in the region of arrival. When migrants spoke of other factors influencing the choice of region they were often mentioned in the context of the absence of family or friends in Russia; but in terms of their potential relationship to something from their past, a similar climate, environment, the possibility of employment.

19 The importance of the presence of family, friends or acquaintances in the region of settlement is reflected in other studies, both of the resettlement of ethnic Russian and Russian speaking migrants in the Russian Federation, and in other studies of migrant ‘return’, where they are identified as a key factor in the attraction to a particular region (Pilkington 1998a: 125; Vitkovskaia 1999: 55; Lapshova et al. 1996: 7; Glytsos 1995: 162; Hunt 1992: 563).

20 Only three of the respondents, however, were returning to their region of birth, in all cases this was Samara oblast.
immediate problems of resettlement; practical help in the initial process of registration, finding accommodation or employment.\(^{21}\) A young female migrant who made the movement individually and was able to register at her grandmother’s apartment stated:

I came here because I have relatives here. My grandmother lives here. That solves a lot of problems. [20, Saratov, 1999]

In migrants’ narratives, family connections were often seen as the only way out of a desperate situation, they both influenced the decision to leave to be made, and provided a basis for resettlement to begin. A female migrant from Uzbekistan spoke of the importance of these links:

I have a cousin here. She helped me at the beginning, she often used to come to see my parents. My parents died there, I was alone, she is older than me, she rang and said that I have the possibility to help you to resettle, I am very grateful; it is thanks to her I am not on the street with my family. [53, Samara, 1999]

Another important role which the presence of family connections played in the region of arrival was to facilitate the creation of feelings of familiarity, security and belonging. Migrant statements suggested that the presence of family created a sense that they were ‘returning’ to something which they had temporarily lost:

We had some distant roots here, links. When we came here it was a familiar place, familiar people. [22, Saratov, 1999]

In some cases family networks were used by migrants to allow a form of ‘staggered’ migration to take place. Respondents often moved to family members who were themselves recent migrants, having been resident in the same city or town in the former republic prior to migration, and who had established themselves in the new place of residence. Family structures were identified as a source of essential support by a female migrant who had arrived in Samara oblast from Kazakstan in 1998:

\(^{21}\)A study of migrant resettlement in Orel and Ul’ianovsk oblasti identified this tendency where the presence of family, friends and acquaintances were seen by migrants as networks which would help in the acquiring of residence rights, housing, and employment (Pilkington 1998a: 125).
I have a sister here. She left a year earlier than me and I came to her because other than her we do not have anyone. Our parents died a long time ago. And in order to somehow support one another, we came here together. She came a year ago. I came a little later. She managed to buy a little house with the money we had. Her daughter helped. [46, Samara, 1999]

In other cases members of the family acted as scouts (razvedchiki) and conducted ‘scouting’ missions to Russia to explore the possibilities for resettlement, particularly regarding accommodation and employment, after which they returned to the former place of residence to collect the rest of the family.\textsuperscript{22} The migration of different members of the same family might continue for a number of years. Migrants spoke of family members, often elderly parents, who they hoped to bring to Russia when it was financially and practically viable.\textsuperscript{23}

7.5.3 Friendship networks

The presence of friends or acquaintances was another key factor in the choice of the region of settlement, and as a source of assistance in the initial stages of resettlement.\textsuperscript{24} The contact was seen as a possible support structure, in the absence of family networks and state assistance. Friends or acquaintances often provided a place where migrants could register (acquire a propiska), even if only temporarily. This was particularly important in Samara oblast\textsuperscript{ } where resettlement was impossible if migrants did not have somewhere to register. Friends and acquaintances, who were themselves often migrants, also provided information about possibilities of employment and accommodation in the region which was essential in the absence of official information:

We moved here because we have one acquaintance who allowed us to come and register, not live, just register temporarily. In Russia we have no relatives or acquaintances. There was simply nowhere for us to go, therefore this was our only chance, and we decided to use it. [21, Saratov, 1999]

\textsuperscript{22} In a study of migrant resettlement in Samara oblast\textsuperscript{ } in 1996, the use of a scout by a family was frequently used before the migration of the whole family (Lapshova et al.1996: 9).

\textsuperscript{23} Filippova notes that the use of scouts is important for migrants who are often unwilling to give up what they have in the former place of residence, in particular their housing, and who are coming to a new place of residence where it is far from easy to immediately secure housing or employment. When it is viable the staggered movement enables greater preparations to be made in both the region of departure and at the site of arrival (Filippova 1997: 53).

\textsuperscript{24} The term ‘friend’ (drug/podruga) and the term ‘acquaintance’ (znakomii) are used distinctly by the respondents. Friend is used to describe someone who is close and with whom a personal relationship is shared, whereas acquaintance indicates a more distant, business-like relationship.
Migrants frequently moved to friends or acquaintances who originated from the same region in the former republic and had moved at an earlier date, which, like the presence of close family members, created a sense of something ‘familiar’ being returned to:

We are both from Samarkand. We are fellow countrywomen (zemliachki). We grew up on one street as friends. We grew up together. I lived with her for 2 weeks, then we were given the neighbouring room (in a hostel). [41, Saratov, 1999]

In some cases migration and resettlement was undertaken as a group, consisting of family members, friends and acquaintances, who had lived in the same region in the former place of residence. The actual migration movement was staggered, where an individual or a number of migrants (usually male) acted as scouts and came to the chosen region to explore possibilities for resettlement after which the whole group made the move. This was the case for the group of migrants from Uzbekistan who formed a compact settlement at Aleksandrovka, Saratov oblast'. This was the only case among respondents in this study of formal group migration.25 A more informal example of staggered, group migration occurred to Lebedka village in Saratov oblast' where the presence of friends or acquaintances in the region of settlement instigated a form of chain migration. The initial migration of certain individuals and the sending back of information about possibilities for resettlement, led to the migration of other individuals from the same region, (Ural’skii region) in Kazakstan. There were also migrants from different former republics resident in the village.26

The use of family and friendship networks points to how in conditions of displacement and uncertainty, where ‘home’ and ‘homeland’ have been disrupted, lives may become ‘highly localized’ (Gupta and Ferguson 1992: 11). Even in cases where sufficient government provision exists, studies of ‘return’ migration have demonstrated a tendency to depend upon immediate and familiar networks of friends and family (Glytsos 1995: 162; Hunt 1992: 563). The use of family and friendship networks

25 Although a visit was made to a compact settlement site in Saratov oblast' which was created on the basis of a group moving together from Dushanbe in 1992, no migrants were formally interviewed at this site.
26 See Appendix 2 for a description of the different sites of migrant resettlement.
reveals a desire amongst migrants to maintain or restore the framework of security which has been destroyed. In some cases connecting networks, established between the regions of departure and arrival, generate a sense of continuity with the lost community. The use of family and friendship networks may represent a psychological strategy to maintain a connection with the past and to immediately create the beginnings of family or friendship networks which had been lost with displacement.27 In some instances distant or lost family members are contacted, perhaps in an attempt to establish some essential ‘connection’ with the new territory. Yet, the use of family and friendship networks also represents a basic survival strategy where in the absence of any state assistance, personal information and assistance channels are crucial to facilitate migration and the beginnings of the reconstruction of ‘home’ at the site of resettlement. Castells notes how the post-Soviet environment of widespread socio-economic and political collapse and the weakening of the state, has forced dependence upon primary networks and individual survival strategies and has heightened identification at the family level (1997:41; 1998: 68). The dependence upon family and friendship networks points to the position in which migrants are placed by the Russian state upon ‘return’, and how they negotiate that position.

7.6 Reconstructing ‘home’ at the site of resettlement: recognition by the Russian state and inclusion within socio-economic structures

The priorities of the migrant upon ‘return’ seen as necessary for the re-creation of ‘home’ – employment, housing, education for their children – could not be assumed upon arrival as many migrants found themselves outside of the socio-economic structures which enable integration and participation in the wider society. As was discussed in Chapter 2, in the Soviet period, the territorial stratification of society had meant that the position of an individual, their standards of living and life chances, were closely linked to the place where they were located. Mobility, and access to places which would provide better ‘life chances’, such as the closed cities of the Soviet Union, 27 Fried notes how people, responding to the loss of place and people, accentuate the importance of those family and close relationships that remain (1963: 160).
were strictly regulated through the use of the internal passport and the propiska system (Zaslavsky 1994: 139, 140). As Humphrey suggests, entitlements in Soviet Russia were long represented by the possession of numerous inter-related documents: birth certificate; internal passport; trudovaia knizhka (booklet documenting the work record and giving entitlement to a pension); propiska, and order na dom (certificate of proprietary rights on a dwelling). Without any one of these documents, an individual was in danger of being excluded from the ‘operating structures’ of society and access to housing, employment, and other social services. The rigidity of the system generated a ‘dread of being outside’ that reinforced a sense of ‘rootedness’ amongst the population (Humphrey 1996: 75, 79).

The legacy of the Soviet system endures in contemporary Russia. Inclusion within the economic, social and political structures had been assumed in the former place of residence: migrants had possessed the relevant documentation, their identity had been legitimized by the state, and the resultant security had been enjoyed. Upon arrival in the Russian Federation migrants are ‘outside’ of many of the structures which allow participation and involvement in the receiving society. Once secure in their Soviet citizenship, they now have no established identity and are no longer ‘possessed’ by any framework of social structures (ibid: 70, 73). The process of resettlement therefore requires re-negotiation by migrants of inclusion within economic, social and political structures which may restore a framework of security and normality. As Humphrey states, there is a need for the ‘dispossessed’ (in this case the migrants) to establish their identity in the new place of residence if they are to be noticed (ibid: 71). In theory the acquisition of citizenship, forced migrant status, and a propiska should re-establish their identity, facilitate subsequent political and socio-economic participation in society, and enable the securing of employment and housing. However, the process is problematic, and in most cases is not aided through interaction with the state, but in fact impeded.

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28 Zaslavsky notes that the propiska was used in the Soviet period by ‘closed cities’ to pursue a consistent policy of selecting immigrants and limiting population growth. This is very similar to its use today by cities such as Samara and Moscow to restrict in-migration. Closed cities included all capitals of Soviet national republics, almost all cities with a population in excess of 500,000, and several smaller towns and regions which were especially attractive for migration (Zaslavsky 1994: 14). During the Soviet period both Samara and Saratov were closed cities.
7.6.1 Recognition as a ‘forced migrant’

Forced migrant status is an official indication of the Russian state’s acceptance of responsibility for those individuals eligible for Russian citizenship, who have been ‘forced’ to leave their former place of residence, and have chosen to settle on Russian territory. In theory, the status guarantees state assistance with resettlement. However, the migrants expressed scepticism about both what the status could provide, and the operation of the migration service itself. Although all the migrant respondents, to a greater or lesser extent, defined their movement to the Russian Federation as ‘forced’, they did not automatically apply for, or qualify for, official ‘forced migrant’ status. Out of the sixty two respondents, thirty nine individuals received forced migrant status, four individuals received refugee status, and nineteen individuals were in possession of neither. ²⁹

One reason for non-registration was a lack of information amongst respondents about the existence of the migration service and the possibility of gaining forced migrant status. A female migrant who had arrived in Saratov oblast’ from Azerbaijan in 1992 stated:

We did not turn anywhere. We did not know that we needed to go to someone. We only knew after two years, then we knew that there was a migration service, and that we needed to go there. We are considered ‘forced migrants’, we did not even know that. They said we could have received compensation, but we didn’t go there, and we still haven’t gone there. [30, Saratov, 1999]

For a male migrant from Kazakstan, receiving official forced migrant status was not seen as a priority within the context of other issues of resettlement. In addition, it was important for him that he and his family did not identify themselves either as ‘migrants’ (migranty) or as ‘refugees’ (bezhentsy). For this migrant, the fact he was a Russian citizen should have been enough to guarantee inclusion and acceptance by state and society:

²⁹ Out of the nineteen respondents who had neither forced migrant nor refugee status, six had been refused status due to their ineligibility; five considered the status unnecessary and had not made an application; four were resident at the settlement ‘Lebedka’ and had not known of the migration service; and four had made an application for status and were awaiting a decision. Some of these cases are explored in more detail below. This situation reflects what commentators suggest about the real numbers of ethnic Russian and Russian speaking migrants arriving from the former republics to the Russian Federation being up to three times higher than those actually registered.
We didn’t go (to the migration service). I am a Russian citizen (rossiianin), I am from Russia. We just found a place for ourselves, we found some solid ground. And we didn’t turn to anyone with those pretensions that we are migrants or refugees. No-one oppressed us, it simply became very difficult to live, difficult for the children. So I came to my people (narod) and everything is normal. We didn’t have time to turn to anyone, maybe it would have been worth it to apply, but you understand we had to think about work, about how to feed the family. [31, Saratov, 1999]

The migrant was resident with his family in the village of Lebedka and had received housing, permanent registration and employment upon arrival. In Lebedka migrants were immediately provided with a house, propiska and employment and so were included in the social structures at that micro-level. The director of the farm initially claimed he had no knowledge of the district migration service and did not encourage arrivees to register. Observations and interviews at the village revealed that the director preferred to have total control over the management of the village, which included the employment and housing of the migrants, and did not consider the involvement of outside state institutions necessary.

A number of the migrant respondents were ineligible for official forced migrant status. This was due either to them having housing and employment, in which case the service concluded they were not ‘in need’, or because they lacked the necessary documentation – Russian citizenship and a propiska – demanded of applicants by the migration services in Samara and Saratov oblasti. A male migrant who had fled ethnic conflict in Tajikistan, and who had arrived in Samara oblast in 1998 described the difficulties he faced:

we haven’t got it (forced migrant status) still. It is difficult to get status, how can I explain, the actual process of receiving status is very difficult. You see to get status you need a propiska, it is very difficult to get a propiska, all of that and citizenship, they are all connected, it is very hard. [52, Samara, 1999]

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30 Four of the nine respondents interviewed at the village of Lebedka had not received official migrant status. See Appendix 2 for a detailed description of the Lebedka settlement.

31 The difficulty migrants face in registering in Samara city without the presence of family or friends, and the impossibility of obtaining forced migrant status without a propiska, was noted in a study conducted in 1996 of migrant resettlement in Samara oblast (Lapshova et al. 1996: 13).
The latter statement demonstrates the complex relationship which exists between forced migrant status, citizenship and the propiska, and how the absence of one can prevent the acquisition of one of the others. The difficulties in acquiring these documents, and the effect this has upon resettlement, has been noted in other studies (Filippova 1997: 50-54). Many respondents spoke of the increasing difficulty of obtaining Russian citizenship in the former republic before departure. Large amounts of money were demanded and the process frequently took a long period of time. If citizenship was received, then it was often a problem to sell property, and obtain a vypiska (notice of departure) which is also demanded for forced migrant status.

In addition to the barriers to receiving official forced migrant status, doubts were held about the relevance of the status, particularly that it provided little concrete assistance in the process of resettlement. The opinions of what the status provided were similar for both migrants who had or had not received forced migrant status. The first statement comes from a migrant who had not received the status, the second shows that even for those who received the status, its practical significance was frequently disappointing and limited:

I did not go. I do not hope for any kind of help, and to go there and waste time. Some people go but all the same they do not get any help. I did not take the status, nothing. [28, Saratov, 1999]

We have forced migrant status, but it does not give us anything. [2, Saratov, 1999]

The dominant perception of forced migrant status amongst migrants, therefore, was negative. The majority of migrants had received no help, or just the emergency monetary payment, which they considered as completely insignificant and worthless:

32 Of the forty one respondents who had received official migrant status from the migration service (forced migrant or refugee), eighteen had received the one time payment of emergency monetary help and six respondents had received a loan for the acquisition, construction or renovation of housing.
For three of us - 245 roubles (the amount of emergency monetary help). That is all the help that there was. And what is 245 roubles. You most probably know what it is like here. What is it possible to get with that amount of money? That is all the help. nothing more. [34, Saratov, 1999]

The lack of concrete help the status provided, and the reception they met at the migration service, shaped migrants’ impressions about what the state was doing to help in their ‘return’, and had a direct impact upon resettlement. Forced migrant status was something that had to be negotiated, acquisition was not only restricted due to the requirements of the forced migrant law, but by the operation of other barriers, such as the propiska, citizenship, or a lack of information. The majority of migrants expressed a lack of faith in the state institution which was meant to provide for their ‘return’ and resettlement. Despite the apparently different approaches of the migration services in Samara and Saratov oblasti the perception amongst migrants of what the service provided was similar. The respondents’ testimonies suggest a feeling of psychological distance from the service, which was not seen as central to their resettlement. Migrants sensed that the employees of the service could not, and did not want to, understand what had happened to them and were unwilling to help or provide information about what assistance might be available:33

We received the status. It was absolutely no help. Absolutely nothing - if anything the opposite. If we had known about some laws we would have got settled quicker. They simply kept some laws from us. Not that they kept them from us, they just didn’t talk about them, they were silent. And when we asked ‘why didn’t you tell us that there was a queue or something, they said ‘you didn’t ask’. Nothing, no information, no help, in five years we have not received anything. [21, Saratov, 1999]

I haven’t received anything. I went to the migration service twice but I am not going anymore. Such people work there….if I am honest they are incompetent. As I said I have been there twice and I do not wish to go there anymore. Instead of trying to help you, they say ‘why have you come here? You should live there’. I do not want to go there again, I do not want to be humiliated, let alone, ask for any help. [41, Saratov, 1999]

33 Similar experiences of bureaucracy, indifference and lack of any concrete help from the migration service were found among migrants in the study conducted in Orel and Ul’ianovsk oblasti in 1994/95 (Pilkington 1998a: 155).
7.6.2 Recognition through registration – the propiska

A number of migrants did not see the need to register for forced migrant status because they had Russian citizenship and permanent registration at their place of residence (propiska). These documents were seen as sufficient to provide access to essential structures and services which would help in their further resettlement. Often a propiska had been gained with the help of family or friends. A young female migrant from Uzbekistan stated:

I didn’t go anywhere to register. because, simply, I have somewhere to live here. My grandmother is here, she has an apartment. We have such an institution called the ‘propiska’. I have the possibility to receive a propiska because I have relatives here. Therefore I didn’t turn to the migration service. [20, Saratov, 1999]

The possession, or lack, of a propiska had both practical and symbolic significance for the returnees. If individuals did not possess a propiska then they were not eligible for any benefits or access to social services, including medical assistance. In addition a propiska was demanded by potential employers:

I want to get citizenship here, but that is a problem, you need a propiska. It is all a kind of bureaucracy. Why? I am Russian (russkii), why do I have to do this. They put a spoke in your wheels. It is possible to find work, but first you need a propiska, you need citizenship, it is a vicious circle. As yet I am not registered here, and I cannot find work anywhere. [38, Saratov, 1999]

Gaining permanent registration was something which required negotiation, it was not a ‘right’ granted upon arrival and its absence could prevent qualification for forced migrant status, and access to other essential structures and services. Those without somewhere to register upon arrival used other strategies. For migrants who lacked family or friends one alternative was obtaining a propiska through illegal means. The individual either paid to be registered at a completely fictitious address, registered in

34 See Chapters 3, 4 and 6 for an explanation of the workings of the propiska and its use as a mechanism to restrict migrant resettlement in the Russian Federation.
35 Thirty two of the respondents held a permanent propiska, twenty four held a temporary propiska and six respondents were not registered at all.
'fresh air', or paid to be registered at a real address but rented accommodation elsewhere:

We have paid a lot of money to get registered. We registered in a hostel but with no right to any living space, I did not even try. But, thank god we are registered, because here without a propiska you cannot get work, without a propiska you cannot get anything, a loan, overall - nothing. [35. Saratov, 1999]

The lack of permanent registration and the constant pressure to re-register temporarily, which was experienced particularly by migrants living in hostels, was a restriction of rights, a cause of uncertainty and a source of humiliation. A female migrant who left Uzbekistan and had been living in a hostel for the five years since her arrival spoke of this:

we are not registered - we only have temporary registration according to place of temporary abode. We are restricted in our possibilities everywhere. I have lived here for five years in such a condition of suspense - in many ways our rights are restricted. I have had enough of these five years, my nerves have been so strained, you have to explain to everyone why you came, who you are, why you are here. [19, Saratov, 1999]

The lack of a permanent propiska prevented migrants from developing a sense of security, and underlined the fact, both to the individual migrants, and to those they came into contact with, that they were arrivees. The respondents identified the possession of a propiska as their right, and related this to the fact they were both Russian (Russkii), and Russian citizens (Rossiianin). The propiska represented proof of identity and status, and allowed participation within Russian society. Without a propiska, migrants felt, and in practical terms, were, 'on the outside' of the operating structures of society. Yet the host state, Russia, did not guarantee the acquisition of a propiska, and in fact used it to restrict acquisition of forced status and resettlement

36 A number of migrants resident in hostel accommodation formed 'action groups' made up of a number of migrant families whose central aim was to negotiate for permanent registration in the hostel where they were living. One of these groups (in Frunzenskii raion, Saratov city, see Appendix 2) had successfully won their court case, whilst the other (in Zavodskii raion, Saratov city, see Appendix 2) was involved in the process at the time of fieldwork. In both cases the groups had received advice and support from one of the regional migration associations.
possibilities. The comment of a migrant who had managed to acquire a permanent propiska demonstrates its centrality to feelings of security and stability:

I did not have any confidence when I did not have a propiska. I did not feel that I was a Russian citizen (rossianka). It was as if I was only living here temporarily when I did not have a propiska. It was only a month ago when it happened, we have lived here for four years. Only now have I calmed down. A propiska. I consider that it is the most important thing for a person. [21, Saratov, 1999]

7.6.3 Recognition through employment and housing

We have a house, and we have work. That is most important for us. Yes, if a person has a house and work, then he already feels himself a person. We will become like people again [28, Saratov, 1999]

The migrants’ narratives revealed the centrality of housing and employment in the process of re-creating ‘home’ and establishing an attachment in the new locality. The possession of a secure job, and an apartment, in the former republic was frequently expressed as a loss which they were finding hard to replace. For those migrants who had managed to secure some form of permanent accommodation and stable employment upon ‘return’, these represented the first signs of greater stability and attachment. Housing and employment were often spoken about in tandem; the attempted negotiation of both, as is demonstrated below, was closely related. Their absence in the new place of residence prevented feelings of security and of being ‘at home’ developing:

I would not say this is my home. I still do not feel myself as my own mistress here, I do not feel relaxed. There I am a stranger, and here I am still not myself. That is, I am between the sky and earth. I am not there, or here...if everything were settled, if there were housing and work, then I could say I would never leave here - it would be my ‘home’. (43, Saratov, 1999)
Securing employment

Migrants consciously identified their labour potential, and that of their children, as something positive they were bringing to Russia. The migrants wanted the opportunity to invest in Russia for both the nation's and their future:

We are Russian, we came to our Russian brother, we did not go elsewhere. Help us, and we may show our gratitude. After a year or two we will be of benefit to you, we will work. How many children will we have? All of them will work in Russia, our roots will remain here. [35, Saratov, 1999]

The difficulties migrants faced in gaining any employment and in finding suitable employment in terms of their individual skills and professional status, however, led to widespread feelings of discontent, redundancy, instability and insecurity. Although the majority of the migrants were professionals or highly skilled workers, a large number of migrant respondents were forced to change their profession and suffer a drop in professional status. Of the migrants who found employment thirteen individuals experienced professional downgrading, ten individuals made a sideways professional move, two individuals managed to find employment according to their profession and

37 Of the number of registered unemployed in the two regions forced migrants and refugees made up 0.7 per cent of the total in Samara oblast' (up to 31.8.99, Samara Federal Employment Service 1999) and 0.9 per cent of the total in Saratov oblast' (up to 1.1.99, Pravitel'stvo Saratovskoi oblasti Ministerstvo truda i sotsial'nogo razvitiia 1999: 10). Registered forced migrants and refugees made up approximately two per cent of the total population in both oblasti. It is difficult to provide any comprehensive statistics regarding actual unemployment within the forced migrant and refugee population. The TMS did not gather these figures, and the number of unemployed forced migrants and refugees registered with the Employment Service at any one time cannot be compared against the total number of forced migrants and refugees who have arrived in the oblast' over the last decade. Also a large number of forced migrants would not register with the Employment Service due to the meagre unemployment benefit and the lack of concrete help in finding a job. In a study conducted in 1999 unemployment among forced migrants was found to be nearly three times higher than among the Russian population as a whole (Vitkovskaia 1999: 19).

38 The educational and professional levels of the respondents reflect the general characteristics of the returnee population in the two regions of study and the Russian Federation as a whole where the educational levels of migrants and numbers of professional and skilled workers exceeds the average levels of the population in the receiving areas (Vitkovskaia 1998b). The majority of the respondents were either graduates (seventeen individuals) or had secondary specialist education (forty individuals), and had occupied positions in the professional, skilled sector (including teachers, doctors, engineers, technicians, accountants). Of the sixty two migrants interviewed, fifty four were of working age and eight were pensioners. The respondents were within the following age brackets: 20-29 years: eleven respondents, 30-39 years: thirteen respondents, 40-49 years: twenty five respondents, 50-59 years: five respondents, 60-69 years: seven respondents, 70+ years: one respondent.
fourteen of the respondents were unable to find any work.\textsuperscript{39}

Difficulties were faced in finding suitable employment both in urban and rural locations. In urban areas the scaling down and closure of industries, and lack of funding in state financed sectors such as education and healthcare, meant that migrants found it difficult to secure employment commensurate with their skills and experience. A number of female migrants who were technicians and chemists by profession worked as market traders. The re-location of individuals in rural regions had an even greater impact upon employment opportunities.\textsuperscript{40} Where enterprises had failed at compact settlement sites migrants both lost their jobs and were hindered in finding other employment due to the location of the settlement.\textsuperscript{41} Amongst the respondents resident in rural areas, a tendency was seen for ‘skilled’ workers (teachers, technologists) to become general farm labourers. A forty year old female migrant from Uzbekistan spoke of her experience: \textsuperscript{42}

I went to work on the kolkhoz, four kilometres from here, of course they do not give me work according to my profession [a teacher] that is not needed there. On the whole they just need manual labour. [43, Saratov, 1999]

Little help was provided by the state, either the regional migration services or employment service, to fulfil this potential. The migrant experiences demonstrate how

\textsuperscript{39}The experiences of the migrant respondents reflects those of forced migrants elsewhere. Vitkovskaia’s study shows that only forty percent of employed forced migrants were employed in the same branch as they had been before moving, there was a drop of those engaged in industry and science, especially in villages, and a rise in those employed in agriculture and trade (1999: 25). The experience of forced migrants reflects the wider characteristic of de-skilling across the post-Soviet labour market where there has been a move of professional personnel into the informal trading and service sector, and workers have been forced to accept a drop in professional status in order to secure employment (Pilkington 1998a: 144).

\textsuperscript{40}Previous urban/rural status was not included as a question when gathering socio-demographic data. However, the majority of respondents stated either the capital city of the former republic or another large city as the place they had left. There were a number of migrants who had been resident in rural areas amongst those who had arrived from Kazakhstan but they were in the minority. Migrants now resident in rural areas frequently spoke about the difficulties the re-location had caused.

\textsuperscript{41}Other studies have shown that unemployment levels are higher amongst migrants resident in rural areas than urban areas and that de-skilling is more likely due to the move from mental and industrial labour, to manual, agricultural employment (Pilkington 1998a: 144; Vitkovskaia 1999: 25; 1998b: 8).

\textsuperscript{42}The migrants resident in rural areas and without employment were all female. Other research has pointed to the gendered nature of unemployment and de-skilling in both urban and rural areas. In rural areas it is particularly difficult for women to find work commensurable with their previous professions. For a detailed discussion of the gendered nature of migrant unemployment see Vitkovskaia 1998b: 8; Pilkington 1998: 145-148.
the migration service did not accept responsibility for this sphere of resettlement, and
refutes the claims that alternative assistance was provided by the employment service.
Alternative structures, such as the regional migration associations, had not filled the gap
left by the state. Only three of the respondents received help from a regional migrant
association in finding work. Respondents frequently expressed feelings of no longer
being 'needed':

> When it turns out that we (migrants) are not needed it is a huge psychological
trauma. It is not the problem of the actual movement, because that was thought
out, we decided, we are not 'refugees' after all, it was the fruit of long thought. It
is namely a problem of adaptation and a problem of employment, of course it
would be easier if work places were created. (62, Samara, 1999)

The current state policy, or rather lack of one, ignores the labour potential the migrants
represent, and identify themselves as. This is despite the fact that Russia is facing a
huge decline in its working age population over the next fifteen years. The potential of
the migrant labour force is being destroyed due to a lack of state effort in integrating
migrants into the labour force, and unsuitable settlement which results in de-skilling
and drop in professional status (Vitkovsaia 1998b: 6, 10; Filippova 1997: 54;
Pilkington 1998a: 144). The negative experience of de-skilling and professional
downgrading has a wider impact upon the individuals’ confidence and self worth and
the likelihood of successful integration into society (Pilkington 1998: 144; Vitkovskaia
1999: 23). Employment is central as a facilitator in other areas of resettlement, both in
practical terms of material benefit, and psychological, in providing social interaction
and a sense of purpose. Those migrants who had managed to secure employment either
in the same profession, or who had made a 'sideways' professional move, expressed
feelings of fulfilment and contentment with their employment, and a sense of being 'on
an equal level' with the local population. For these migrants there is some sense of
continuity, due to the possession of suitable employment, with their previous life. A
crucial symbol of security has been restored.

**Securing housing**

The apartment or house where respondents had lived in the former republic was a
central factor when they spoke of their lives 'there', it was representative of the normal,
secure life they had enjoyed, was the focus of an extension of ‘home’ within the wider locality, and mentioned in conjunction with work, family, neighbours, summer houses, gardens. Possession, and frequently ownership, of a house or apartment had formed part of the migrants’ identity in the former republic, and was a symbol of security and attachment to the territory. The absence of housing at the new place of residence impeded the development of sense of security.\footnote{The importance of housing was very apparent in conversations with migrants, especially if these took place where migrants were resident. Migrants apologized for the conditions in which they lived, and compared them to what they had possessed. One female migrant whom the researcher met on a number of occasions in Saratov oblast’ over the three years of fieldwork had eventually acquired an apartment where all her family members were resident and declared that this represented the beginning of a new period of their life in the region.} What was stressed by the migrants was the contrast between the housing that they had possessed and their present housing situation.\footnote{In the survey conducted in 1997-1998 across five regions of Russia twenty two per cent of respondents had their own houses and seventy one per cent their own (privatized) apartments before moving, whilst in Russia only fifteen percent of respondents were able to acquire their own housing (Vitkovskaia 1999: 33).} Migrants frequently expressed a sense of loss concerning what they had ‘left behind’ in the former republic:

We left such an apartment there. We had a three-roomed apartment, we had only just decorated it. A beautiful apartment. Then we were put in this hostel, it is to be honest like a shed. All the same we have sorted it out, we have decorated, and tried to make everything as good as possible. We would like it to be bigger and better, but that is a dream. [21, Saratov, 1999]

The reality of the housing conditions of the migrant respondents demonstrates why the issue caused distress. In the hostels, migrants lived in cramped conditions, the infrastructure was poor and a number of migrants were under the constant threat of eviction and only held a temporary propiska. Housing conditions at the rural settlement sites were equally difficult. The location of the settlements and their distance from good transport facilities and urban centres proved problematic for the mainly urban migrants, especially with regard to accessing work, schools, and medical services. There was a lack of adequate infrastructure at the sites, including no running water, or communication links.\footnote{See Appendix 2 for a detailed description of the housing conditions at the different sites of settlement.} Many of the migrants had only chosen to settle in rural areas
due to the guarantee of both housing and employment.46 A female migrant from Tajikistan spoke of why her family chose to settle at one of the rural settlements:

He (the director of the village) said that he would give us a house. It was something for us then, he gave us housing, he gave us work, so we work here, it is the countryside of course, and after the city? We lived in the city...[27, Saratov, 1999]

The lack or insecurity of property ownership caused migrants concern. In the village of Lebedka, migrants were involved in long-term, ten year contracts which stipulated continued employment on the farm or village enterprise, and the purchase of housing over this time. Although migrants were reassured with the security of employment and housing, many expressed concerns about the long-term commitment they were making. In effect, the migrants involved were being denied the right to freedom of movement: if they chose to move they would lose any right to the housing they had invested in. At other compact settlement sites migrants invested a great deal in the construction of housing at some of the compact settlement sites (particularly Severianka), but the legality of their residence was uncertain and they had no legal rights to ownership.47 Out of all the migrant respondents in urban and rural areas only one individual had succeeded in buying their own apartment after arrival in Saratov oblast', the majority had been dispossessed of ownership.

The possibility of buying or building property in the future was severely restricted. This was due to both a lack of state help, and an absence of personal means. State assistance was confined to the loan provided by the migration service.48 Six of the migrants interviewed for this study had received the loan, and one individual was awaiting a decision on his application. However, for a number of respondents, the loan only provided sufficient resources necessary to build the foundations of the housing. For the

46 Other research has shown that the availability of housing is one of the prime motivations for migrants in choosing to settle in rural areas (Pilkington 1998a: 151; Vitkovskaia 1999: 36; Drought 2000: 134).
47 Similar cases have been identified in other regions. Migrants are frequently buying back housing they have built themselves, and the fact that housing is conditional upon continued employment on a farm or rural enterprise means that even if the migrants are dissatisfied with their work, they are unable to seek employment elsewhere (Vitkovskaia 1999: 29; 1998b: 8; Pilkington 1998a: 152).
48 Although a number of migrants had received housing from the migration service, this was not seen as adequate in the long-term.
majority of the migrants in both regions the loan system was not viewed as a realistic option. The employment situation of migrants had a significant impact upon opportunities for the improvement of housing conditions. The employment gained was rarely sufficient to provide the extra resources which would enable improvement of the migrants' housing circumstances. Returnees found it impossible to allocate any of their income towards improving their accommodation situation. A twenty six year old, female migrant from Tajikistan whose family had begun to build a house at a compact-type settlement, spoke of the difficulties faced:

It is very expensive to build a house. What can you do? You can build, gradually, to the extent which is possible. But it is a very long story. If everything was stable here, it would be different. But with delays in the payment of wages, and the level of wages compared to prices, it turns out that things don’t work out, what you want doesn’t happen. [19, Saratov, 1999]

Migrants’ possibilities to regain what they had lost in the former republic, both in terms of housing and employment, were constrained by the economic environment they were operating within, the lack of personal strategies they were able to draw upon, and the absence of viable help and adequate understanding from government structures. When housing was acquired in rural areas, migrants found it difficult to find suitable employment. Although the long term prospects of migrant resettlement would be more likely to be resolved in the urban areas of the oblasti, the migration service encouraged rural resettlement, and the loan system meant that if migrants wished to purchase

49 The migrants were critical of the perceived bureaucracy and length of process, the need for a large amount of documentation, for two people willing to act as guarantors in the new region of settlement, for applicants’ salaries to be of a sufficient level, and the meagre amount of the loan.  
50 Vitkovskaia suggests that there had been a shift in migrant attitudes from seeing the state as the solution to their housing problems to identifying themselves as providing the solution, primarily through the acquisition of employment. However, the low salaries prevent the strategy from working. Pay received by migrants in Russia was found to be on average more than 35 per cent less that that received by the local population. The situation was especially severe in villages (Vitkovskaia 1999: 27).  
51 The situation is exacerbated by the difficulties in selling their accommodation in the former republic. Where migrants had been able to sell, the gap in prices between the former republic and the Russian Federation meant the money they brought with them was insufficient to purchase any housing. The money was often used for the transportation of themselves and their belongings. A survey conducted late in 1998 in Tver oblast’ revealed that forty percent of respondents had used all their available resources for the payment of their fare and the transportation of their luggage. Only eight per cent of the migrants included in this survey where able to purchase housing upon arrival in Russia (Vitkovskaia 1999: 40).
accommodation in an urban area then personal resources were needed. The experience of urban living is what the majority of migrants wished to re-create in the new place of residence. 'Home' had been located in an urban environment, where there had been access to suitable employment, adequate social infrastructure, and the wider social interaction urban living may provide. This experience had not been re-created in the Russian Federation. A lack of both employment and housing clearly impeded the development of a sense of 'home':

We do not feel at home here, it is a sufficiently difficult problem. It is a problem of housing and of interaction with other people, it is a problem of what your needs are. Therefore I cannot say that we feel 'at home' here yet. To feel more comfortable here, we need to organize everything here, to organize work, to feel 'needed'. [62, Samara, 1999]

7.7 Re-constructing 'home' and 'homeland' within the Russian state and society

Upon 'return' migrants prioritize inclusion at the immediate locality of resettlement, however, there is also a desire to be included at the level of the wider 'homeland' and to gain the recognition of the Russian state. The experience of resettlement reveals the discrepancy between how migrants perceive themselves and their 'return', and how they and their 'return' are perceived, and constructed, by the Russian state, and, in some instances, the local Russian community. In their narratives, migrants often identify themselves as a source of labour potential, and cultural worth for Russia. Upon 'return' they wish to invest this potential at the level of the local community, and wider nation to help with the rebuilding of Russia. However, the possibility to do this is constrained at the level of the Russian state, the 'homeland', and at the level of the immediate

52 Of the four rural settlements considered in the study, two of them were created with the direct involvement of the migration service (Aleksandrovka and Novii Biian). However, later support was not forthcoming. In the case of Severianka, the migration service had been turned to for help, but had not provided any assistance. Lebedka was completely independent of any state involvement (see Appendix 2).
53 One female migrant previously resident in a city in Tajikistan, who had moved to the village of 'Lebedka', spoke of the loss of being able to go to the cinema and theatre, and the lack of daily social interaction she had previously enjoyed with her work collective.

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locality of ‘home’, as they interact with the local Russian community. The way migrants are positioned by both the Russian state and society, and the personal perception of their position, impedes the re-creation of ‘home’ and idea of returning to a ‘homeland’ at the individual level.

7.7.1 Being ‘at home’ in the ‘state’

I am insulted by our government, the state, for the way they have handled us [2, Saratov, 1997]

The statement of a female migrant who had fled Grozny may reflect the particular response she felt forced migrants and refugees from the conflict in Chechnia had received from the Russian government. However, it was echoed by other migrants from the former republics of the Soviet Union. There was a dominant feeling amongst migrants that they had not been treated by the Russian state as having ‘come home’. Instead they had been treated as a ‘problem’ or ‘burden’ to the state. The initial confrontation with a new ‘homeland’ occurs in the process of negotiation for official status, employment and housing. How the migrant is received by the ‘home’ society takes place in these spheres, yet, most returnees felt an overwhelming absence of state concern. This generated a feeling of hurt amongst some respondents that while they had 'done their duty' for Russia ‘there’, they were denied this role upon ‘return’ and the Russian state now considered them 'redundant' and was indifferent to their plight:

Where did the Russians in Kazakstan appear from? They came from Russia. Then it was in the interests of Russia to send them there - so they would open up a new land... But now, when we want to return, after three or four generations, because we are being driven out - they will not take us here. We are redundant (my ne nuzhni). [36, Saratov, 1999]

The indifference of the state was encountered in the first instance from the migration service, and repeated upon interaction with local government administrations in both of the regions. The returnees did not see themselves as an issue of concern at this regional level, or, equally at the federal level:
I have the feeling that they [the local administration] don’t consider us at all. I don’t know whether it is just this local administration [Samara] that has this attitude. I don’t know if other migrants live better, maybe there is somewhere, where they live worse than us. But in principle you do not wait for help from anyone, it is necessary to survive on your own. It is evident in Moscow they have forgotten that we exist. It has become almost insulting. [46, Samara, 1999]

A number of migrants felt that the federal government was not showing sufficient concern and that there was a need for the process of migration to be managed in a more ordered way. Migrants themselves saw that a resolution was needed to their situation, but did not identify such a recognition on the side of the state:

I think they relate to us in a slipshod manner, in any case they do not resolve the question. I consider that at a high level, that is at the level of the president, they could resolve this question. [50, Samara, 1999]

A lot more attention needs to be given to migrant provision - they do not need to think about laws, but to look at the position of people, from what region they have come, this is significant. Help should be given to those people who have fled conflict in the first instance. Also there must be some sort of agreement between governments. [14, Saratov, 1997]

In the face of state indifference to their plight, and/or its incapability to help, many of the individuals recognize that they must depend upon themselves and no longer look elsewhere for help. This attitude of independence is rooted in the experience of state assistance migrants have had since ‘return’. In addition it is a reflection of the secure position the majority of the migrants had previously occupied in society. Faced with finding themselves in a previously unknown condition of dependency they were keen not to be a burden on anyone and were reluctant to turn to any structure for help:

We do not ask the state for anything, we try our own path, everyone for themselves, if we waited we would die, like mammoths, we would become extinct. [51, Samara, 1999]

I have got forced migrant status, but I did not go anywhere for help, I did not want to be importunate. We have always lived basically for ourselves, and we are not used to wait for, or to ask for, help. [6, Saratov, 1997]
Although some migrants expressed an acknowledgement of the difficulty of the situation that Russia is in, and recognized that the general socio-economic and political situation within the country was a factor in the lack of state attention to their plight, the interaction of migrants with different state structures did not foster feelings of inclusion within Russian society. Migrant experiences of government departments at the regional level highlight the absence of any comprehensive federal or regional state programme of assistance in resettlement. The absence of provision, together with the indifference and lack of understanding on the side of state representatives, is likely to generate a disassociation from the Russian state and nation which is not seen as relevant to solving the everyday problems of resettlement, or as welcoming their return to a wider ‘homeland’.

7.7.2 Being ‘at home’ in the local community

The existence of established social networks had clearly fostered a sense of ‘home’ in the former republics. With displacement, not only have these networks been destroyed, but the migrants faced obstacles when attempting to recreate similar networks and feelings of community belonging upon ‘return’. The obstacles were rooted in the actual practicalities of ‘making friends’ and meeting people in the new place of residence. The process was made more difficult due to the sense of difference many migrants felt upon returning to the Russian Federation, grounded in experiences of life in the former republics, and in the shared experiences of migration and resettlement.54

Migrants were clear about the potential they felt they held for Russia and the region to which they had moved. However, in the present socio-economic conditions of the regions in which they had arrived, returnees claimed that the local population saw them as a threat and that general economic problems were blamed on increased competition generated by their arrival:

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54 The present study did not address the question of the reception of migrants by the local community in that interviews were not conducted with representatives of the local population apart from expert interviews with official representatives of mainly state institutions. The findings therefore are based upon migrants’ perceptions of the issue, and from ethnographic observation conducted by the researcher. Other studies of migrant resettlement in the Russian Federation have addressed the question of the reception of migrants amongst the receiver community in more depth (Pilkington 1998a; Filippova 1997; Kosmarskaia 1998a).
...it seems to them that we take their work, their money. When a country ‘fills up’, there are soon difficulties, therefore people already look at you in a different way. We are like competitors for life. [36, Saratov, 1999]

The lack of opportunities to fulfil their potential, and to regain the standards of housing and employment they had lost by leaving the former republics, led to a tendency amongst the migrants to contrast the superiority of their former lives, living conditions, and their personal levels of education and culture with that of the local Russian population and the locality in which they now lived:55

the cultural level in Russia is very low, relationships between people are completely different....those who have arrived, they are highly educated and highly specialized. They are very hardworking, and come with the desire to work...it is highly qualified, cultured, intellectual, well brought up people who have arrived. They want to bring their culture and their strong labour potential to the economy and culture of Russia, there is a great potential amongst these people – their cultural level is high. [53, Samara, 1999]

The migrants tended to directly compare the attributes of their ‘community’ in the former republic, with the one in which they were now located in the Russian Federation. The customs, traditions, and conditions of life which represented their lives before and had made that place ‘home’: both the nature of the physical environment (cleanliness, order, quality of buildings, the countryside) and of social relationships (the nature of social interaction, characteristics of people), were compared to what was faced upon ‘return’, where such attributes were seen to impede understanding, rather than facilitating efforts, to establish links with the local population:

Russian people there and here - they are completely different nations, completely different people. For Uzbeks it is customary to help one another, we have an Eastern upbringing. If something happens to someone then everyone helps. For Russians this is not customary, here it is everyone for themselves. Everyone survives on their own. No-one helps. [21, Saratov, 1999]

55 A study of the ‘return’ migration of ethnic Greeks to Macedonia demonstrated the generation of similar ‘reactive’ expressions of ‘superiority’ due to competition between the returnees and locals for resources (Voutira 1997: 120). Other research amongst forced migrant communities in Russia have revealed feelings of ‘superiority’ vis-à-vis the local Russian population in the spheres of education, employment and culture, related to how the returnees saw themselves as representatives of the ‘brightest and the best’ sent out on a mission to raise the cultural and economic levels of the Soviet republics. Upon ‘return’ this sense of self leads to the expressions of superiority, and disappointment with the local environment and local Russians (Pilkington 1998a: 168-171; Drought 2000: 329-333).
In Asia people are brought up according to two faiths, two cultures, it gave us something of its own. Children respect elders, our girls are more modest than those here. Our men drink but not to such an extent, everything is done for the home, cleanliness around the home, they do not understand here, it is difficult for us to get used to it here. It is bad, all of Russia drinks. It is her misfortune. There are a lot of drunkards, and do people pay any attention to around their home? I also do not like the unpaved roads, the dirt. We had everything, our roads were paved, our gardens well kept, everyone tried to make things tidy, comfortable, and here they do not understand that, it is difficult. [50, Samara, 1999]

Although migrants of common ethnicity with the host nation may assume easier acceptance in a community where origins, culture and heritage are similar, the past lives of individuals, and the development of cultural, and linguistic, differences, can impede inclusion (Voutira 1997: 119-120; Glytos 1995). For some respondents the hope that a return to Russia would dispel the ‘ethnic discomfort’ recently experienced in the former republic was problematized when they felt their Russianness to be challenged by the local population:

It is us who are strangers, we who have arrived. Yes, we are Russians (rußkie), but we are not perceived as Russians. We are strangers, and I think that our children, who have come with us, they will also be strangers. [45, Saratov, 1999]

I am Russian (rußkaia), my husband is Russian (rußkii), but everyone treats me as a Kazak (Kazashka) at work, if you are from Kazakstan [to them] it means you are a Kazak. [49, Samara, 1999]

It is likely that more successful resettlement experiences would have lessened the sense of difference of the returning Russians. Yet, despite the differences which existed with the local community, empathy was also felt due to the shared experience of the difficult socio-economic situation in Russia and a feeling of common state indifference towards them. Some migrants mentioned that in place of initially difficult relations with the local community there was growing understanding and tolerance and some of the barriers were breaking down. Individual references were made to receiving help and support from local Russians, and of building up friendship networks within the local community that showed the beginnings of the re-creation of the social networks that had been lost. In addition, some migrants expressed a feeling of a wider sense of
security' in the surrounding environment. Even in the absence of employment or housing, the sense of personal security represented the first feelings of 'home' and belonging, and hope for a future, in the new place of residence. It suggests, that over time the intensity of feelings of cultural difference may lessen as security and stability are ensured:

If you consider your home as the surrounding environment, the atmosphere, then it is here, because here I feel much better. I feel equal, a normal person, no-one is going to try to 'knock you about' because you don't speak Uzbek for example' [23, Saratov, 1999]

I feel better here....even though I live in a hostel, how can I explain. I have more confidence. I feel equal, here you can do something, you can show something, you can compete for something [41, Saratov, 1999]

7.8 Alternative migrant spaces for the recreation of 'home' and 'homeland'

A sense of state indifference, and feelings of difference and exclusion from the local Russian community, led some migrants to come together in groups, more formally organized than the family and friendship networks discussed above. The ease of developing these migrant networks was due to a shared experience of life in the former republic, and the experience of displacement and resettlement. Two primary sites existed where migrants attempted to improve their possibilities of employment and housing, and where they were able to re-create the social support networks and friendships which had been lost. These were at compact settlement sites and within migrant associations. However, as studies of migrant networks have suggested, empirical analyses of such migrant initiatives is needed to reveal the diversity which exists within the migrant population. Automatic inclusion from, or the desire to be included within, these migrant networks cannot be assumed (Snowdon 1990: 578; Goss and Lindquist 1995: 330).

56 Although the security in both quotes implies a positive identification with being a Russian in Russia, this was rarely directly articulated by respondents. Rather it was the absence of discrimination for being Russian which was implied. Only three respondents directly attributed their 'home' (but not rodina) as being in Russia, due to them being Russian. These respondents were all male.
Compact settlements

Compact type settlements were perceived by migrants as helping in the reality of resettlement with the provision of employment and housing on site, but also as a space where feelings of security and belonging might be recreated amongst ‘similar’ people, that is, other migrants. A female migrant resident in the village of Lebedka stated:

...here we are all newcomers (priezhie). We are all close to each other in spirit. Everyone is from Central Asia here. We have our own way of life, although I am Russian (russkaia), my way of life is more similar to an Eastern woman’s. Therefore we have found a common language. Newcomers, no-one loves them anywhere. Here, we are all together, we are all a group...we can communicate, we have a great deal in common, our way of life, for example. We even have the same dishes. We prepare dishes in the same way. It means a great deal. And to have left there, to have lost everything, left everything....such little things give you joy. We have common recollections, a common outlook. It is something important for us. [27. Saratov, 1999]

Despite the rural location of the settlements, the sense of community that they generated was obviously important to the migrant respondents. The settlements immediately provided some of the basic networks, and the normality of life, which had been lost. Despite the very difficult conditions which existed at the compact settlement sites, and the uncertain future of the settlements, migrants had already invested a great deal of physical and emotional energy into the settlement, and a sense of community and attachment to the physical space had developed which was strong enough to deter them from abandoning hope in its eventual success. A female migrant from Kazakhstan who lived at the Novii Biian settlement stated:

The place here is not bad, it is beautiful, we hope to achieve something here. The children like it, and we have already become accustomed, we know the place, it already seems a shame to leave. And here living on the hillside, we have our clan, we... are all newcomers (priezhie), we have our community (obshchina), we have our own outlook and views, a lot of us do not want to leave the hillside, we already want to build our settlement here. [59, Samara, 1999]

Other migrants, however, viewed the idea of compact settlements as impeding the process of re-location. Firstly, the location of the settlements lessened the likelihood of
acquiring professional employment, and secondly, they were seen as hindering integration with the local community, which might generate exclusion from wider Russian society and thus inhibit adaptation:

I think it is better to live together with the local population...it is impossible to be separate, we must integrate faster. In order to integrate it is absolutely necessary to live with the Russians (rossiiane). If we acquire citizenship, we want to take part in the affairs of Russia. We will also feel ourselves to be rossiiane. Therefore we must mix with them. Compact settlements - I do not consider they are that good an idea. [21, Saratov, 1999]

7.8.2 Migrant associations

Migrant associations provided another form of network which individuals could immediately draw upon for social interaction and support. Although the number and activity of migrant associations was greater in Saratov than Samara oblast', the opinions amongst migrants were very similar. The perception of migrant associations differed amongst those migrants who had made contact with the associations, or were actually involved in their operation, and those who had not made, or did not wish to have, such contact.57 The migrants who had been involved in the activity of the associations saw the organizations as an essential response to state indifference and lack of assistance, and as a source of real potential help:

...if the government does not care, then we must come together in a group, what other way is there? [37, Saratov, 1999]

In the face of the confusing array of state structures and legislation concerned with migrant resettlement the associations were identified as a mediating structure between the individual and the state, which could make any interaction with official departments easier. The associations provided assistance regardless of whether migrants had citizenship or forced migrant status. In other words the association was an information resource and source of help unavailable elsewhere:

57 Out of the sixty two migrants interviewed in the two oblasti thirty five had not received any help from a migrant association, a number of these had never head of the existence of any migrant association. The help received was predominantly legal consultation, moral support, and material help (clothes, food). Five migrants received help with finding accommodation, and two with finding employment.
I think that they [migrant associations] are very important. Because, after all people are coming from different places. They do not know the laws, they do not know who to turn to, they do not know how to get jobs or find housing. Many do not know because they have not had to do this before, they do not know their rights, and the laws are unclear. Here [at the migrant association] they are given everything, full information, therefore, I think they are very important. If a person knows what is going on, he is able to get him/herself sorted out more quickly. We received valuable advice from the association - after which we started to demand things from the migration service. [21, Saratov, 1999]

Although often identified as a formal structure, migrant associations were considered, unlike official government structures, to approach migrants with understanding and empathy. The reason for this was precisely that the associations were run by migrants, who, had experienced similar displacement, and may have come from the individual’s previous ‘homeland’:

She [the head of one association] always listens to you when you go there, she will always give you advice. She is our fellow countrywoman (zemliachka), also from Uzbekistan. She knows what it is like, she has gone through it herself, so it is easier for her to understand. [41, Saratov, 1999]

If people have gone through it themselves, they understand that it is very difficult. All the people try to support you with warm words, to provide help in some way, to do something. In the migration service it is more difficult, you go there and it is like a ‘deaf wall’, a wall that doesn’t understand, and people who do not understand - that a person has come with nothing, has to start again, and that adaptation is very difficult. Here [in the migrant association] it is easier, you can always run to the association with any question. [50, Samara, 1999]

Migrant associations, however, were sometimes identified as not beneficial to facilitating resettlement. Many migrants, after experiencing government indifference, identified migrant associations as yet another ‘official’ structure in which one should have little faith as a source of help. Often migrants refused to distinguish between official, state bodies, and unofficial, non-governmental bodies, claiming that the migrant organizations had to be either ‘commercial’ or linked to state structures:
I do not believe in any of these associations, or in this [migration] service, I have no faith in them. [54, Samara, 1999]

You know, I have no faith in anyone anymore, so we don’t turn to anyone, and don’t get anything from anyone. We are afraid to talk. Everywhere money is wanted, and we do not have the possibility to give any money. [40, Saratov, 1999]

For some of those migrants who were involved in the activity of the migrant associations or resident at compact settlement sites, networks were created where social interaction, facilitated by feelings of common identity and experience, could take place. The associations and compact settlements enabled the re-creation of friendships and community networks which helped in developing an immediate sense of the ‘home’ that had been lost. The actual site of the compact settlements provided an environment that was valued for its physical location, and the sense of security and familiarity it generated. Nevertheless there was great diversity of interest and identity amongst the migrant community and many returnees did not consider larger migrant networks as integral to their process of resettlement. The experience of the resettlement process, state indifference, and the characteristics of migrants themselves, had generated a strong sense of independence from outside structures and caused individuals to depend upon themselves and their immediate network of family and friends. In many cases resettlement and the reconstruction of ‘home’ remained an individual or family centred process.

I had my parents near, my relatives, they supported me here. I already feel that I am at home, I feel calm now, I know when I leave work, that I am going ‘home’ [27, Saratov, 1999]

58 Voutira has shown how migrant associations and collectives can help with integration, and facilitate the creation of a sense of self-identity and security in the new environment (1996: 120-121).
59 Although many of the migrant respondents preferred urban settlement, they had clearly developed a sense of attachment to the location of the compact settlements, and were keen to point out the beauty of the surroundings, and how they had adapted to, and had made the most of, living in a rural environment.
Conclusion

The resettlement experience of the migrants included in the present study demonstrates the importance of looking to the individual level to illuminate the gap that exists between state discourse and personal reality, when exploring understandings of migration and resettlement, and equally ‘home’ and ‘homeland’. Upon ‘return’, Russia is imagined in many different ways, but perhaps most importantly, as a site to recreate ‘home’ – the normality and security of life which had been disrupted in the former republic. A sense that the process of re-creating ‘home’ was underway, through the reality of migration and resettlement, appeared in some migrant narratives. Migrants spoke of feeling secure and confident in their new environment; they stressed the importance of having established the routines of daily life, social interaction, of finding a place to live and work. This had been achieved primarily at an individual level with families and friends, and independently of the state. The nature of the re-creation is both a reaction to state policy and a reflection of personal choices made by the migrants themselves. The experiences of individual migrant resettlement in both Saratov and Samara oblasti cannot be distinguished on a regional basis despite the different nature of the two migration regimes. This suggests that even in a more liberal migration environment, the state does not play a central role in, and may restrict, individual migrant resettlement. The activity of state structures, in fact, created a perception of governmental indifference, at both the regional and national level, amongst migrants. Certain state policies, such as the use of the propiska and encouragement of rural settlement, further impeded positive resettlement experience, and any sense that returnees had arrived to a ‘welcoming homeland’.

In an attempt to resolve both the immediate practical concerns faced upon arrival, and to foster a sense of security and belonging in the new place of residence, some migrants drew upon the support of other migrants either at the site of settlement or in the form of a regional migrant association. However, more often it was immediate family and friendship networks that provided the essential support required. For many migrants, friends, and in particular family, were the one constant which provided both a link to the past, fostered an initial sense of security and belonging in the present, and provided
a base for building a future. Whether the centrality of these close networks would be sustained would require further longer-term research. However, in the immediate and medium term, family and friends were used to re-locate a certain understanding of ‘home’. The migrants were transferring this understanding of ‘home’ to a territory which they hoped would in time become a wider ‘homeland’ for their children. This future ‘homeland’ would ‘become’ through the rooting of ‘home’, which meant their family, job, house, social networks, present memories, and future imaginings.
Conclusion

This thesis has argued that to understand the migration process – the return movement of ethnic Russian and Russian speaking migrants from the former republics to the Russian Federation, and their subsequent experience of resettlement on Russian territory – attention must be given to both how the process is constructed by key actors in the surrounding migration regime, and to the way in which the same process is perceived and experienced by the individual migrant. The thesis has shown how dominant migration discourse and practice in the Russian Federation has failed to create a ‘welcoming homeland’, and has constrained migrants’ possibilities for successful resettlement. Attention to migrant experience revealed interaction with the migration regime, but frequent withdrawal from the operation of that regime. It was personal networks of family and friends that primarily enabled the re-creation of migrants’ ‘homes’ upon arrival in the Russian Federation to begin.

The approach that was adopted in the study allowed these different levels of analysis to be addressed. It located the processes of movement and resettlement within the context of a wider migration system. A complex and fluid migration system in a state of constant transformation was revealed. The study’s findings reinforce the need to further resolve ‘structure’ and ‘agency’, and to combine, and give sufficient individual attention to, micro and macro levels of analysis, in any study of a migration process. At the point of departure, individual reasons for migration revealed the presence of personal socio-economic motivations that were rooted in a wider context of political change, new nation building and ethnic upheaval. The migration movement and choice of place of settlement were influenced by the prior existence and present formation of personal and institutional connections between the former republics of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation. The study revealed the discrepancy between the way in which the migration process was constructed by dominant state actors at the federal and regional levels, and the perception and experience of that same process at the individual migrant level. The study went further to explore the real implications of this discrepancy. The discrepancy was apparent in the negative experience of government migration and resettlement policy amongst returning migrants. Furthermore, the state
‘homeland’ created through migration discourse and policy frequently impeded the re-
creation of a locally situated ‘home’.

The case of the Russian migration regime has demonstrated how migration politics is a
contested arena where differing ideological, political and socio-economic priorities of
both state and non-state actors are played out. The constitution of the federal and
regional migration regimes – their institutions, legislation and policy directives – were
under constant negotiation by competing actors at the regional and federal levels. At the
federal level, the question of Russian nationhood, international and geopolitical
considerations, domestic socio-economic concerns and humanitarian issues, where
prioritized to varying degrees by the different political and non-political institutions
vying for control over the formulation of policy. At the regional level, federal directives
were confronted by the political and socio-economic priorities of local authorities who
shaped their migration policy accordingly. Legislation in particular was formulated out
of the complex interaction of international, federal, and regional levels of interest that
resulted in inconsistencies and ambiguities of legislative practice specifically at the
level of the regional migration regimes. A lack of consistent legislative practice had a
negative impact upon the already vulnerable position of the migrant at the regional
level.

If the complete absence of structures and legislation in the Russian Federation in 1990
to deal with any type of migration flow is compared to what exists in 2001, then over
the course of the last ten years significant headway has been made in the development
of an operating migration regime. Russian government structures are clearly working
within a difficult socio-economic environment where the resources available for any
realm of social provision is limited. In reality, the created institutions and policy
directives of the migration regime demanded resources that were beyond the
capabilities of the Russian federal and regional level budgets to meet. The study has
been critical of the lack of a comprehensive programme of resettlement for the
returning migrants, and a corresponding absence of concrete provision at the federal
and regional levels of the government migration regimes. This criticism must take into
account the socio-economic difficulties, and the scarcity of available resources.
However, the criticism of government policy is not only directed at the lack of an
allocation of funds and absence of provision. The dominant government discourse
prioritizes securitization and restriction, and relegates provision and assistance to second place. This discourse is partly rooted in socio-economic concerns, but, it equally reflects Russia’s geo-political and foreign policy interests that prefer the continued residence of the Russian communities in the former republics. The policy reflects tendencies within the wider global migration regime and the increasingly restrictive migration practices of western governments at a domestic and regional level. The restrictive practices in the west reveal how political interest can consciously shape policy to the detriment of the real needs of migrants. This has increasingly been the case at both the regional and federal levels in the Russian Federation.

The thesis traced for the first time the evolution of an alternative non-state migrant sector that became a significant actor within the migration regimes at the federal and regional levels. The non-state sector developed in response to the needs of the arriving migrants and adopted a dual role: as provider of alternative forms of assistance; and as challenger of restrictive government policies. The low levels of real assistance that these non-state structures have been able to provide is due to a lack of resources and their limited powers to act effectively. Yet, the non-state sphere at both the federal and regional levels has served another role; it has provided an alternative discourse that attempts to positively re-frame the ‘return’ of the Russian populations. Although the practical capabilities of these alternative actors are restricted, both primary and secondary empirical evidence points to the real difference that they have made to the lives of individuals and groups of migrants. The thesis has demonstrated how non-state frameworks reach across the regional, federal and international levels and allow migrant group actors, e.g. regional migrant associations, constrained by the limits of the immediate environment to access structures and resources beyond that locale. The increased power the interaction provides improves the capacity of these local initiatives to act at the regional level. The existence of these frameworks is one result of the inclusion of the Russian Federation within the operation of a wider global migration regime made up of transnational government and non-governmental structures that transgress the borders of the nation state.

A conscious attempt has been made throughout the text to prioritize the individual migrant. Yet, the difficulty of adequately and consistently articulating migrant agency is acknowledged. The structure of the thesis meant that the in-depth analysis of
individual experiences of migration and resettlement were confined to the final stage of the study. The approach did not seek to reduce the importance of understanding at the individual level, rather it hoped to reinforce the contrast between individual perceptions and experiences of migration and resettlement, and how the process is constructed for the migrant at the level of the migration regimes. Evidence from migrant narratives demonstrates that the migration movement and resettlement process are negotiated primarily through drawing upon the support of family and friendship networks. However, that negotiation takes place within a surrounding migration regime and a wider structural environment of de-colonization, new nation building and mass political, social and economic change. A central question in the study has been that of the extent to which migrants are directed or influenced by the surrounding environment; the practices of the migration regime and the discourses of de-colonization, nationhood and national identity.

To facilitate their resettlement some migrants acted within the immediate migration regime and drew upon state and non-state resources. For the majority, however, the capacity or desire to draw on resources within the regime were limited. It is specifically at the individual level of resettlement that the real implications of a lack of effective government policy and paucity of state assistance are revealed. The strategies of migrants that were uncovered through the study provided an indication of how migrants often distance themselves from the operation of the official migration regimes. The constraints that government policies placed upon migrants’ capabilities to act enforced and encouraged dependence upon personal networks for support. The thesis has hopefully demonstrated the importance of these personal networks as a positive force in facilitating resettlement. Migrants might distance themselves from the operation of both the official and non-official structures within the surrounding migration regimes, however, they are still acting within the wider migration system. The strategies that migrants adopt, i.e. the use of personal networks, shape experiences of migration and resettlement. An understanding of the relevance of personal networks provides a way to re-read the operation of the migration system, and the nature of the migration process underway.

The re-reading of the migration process through the narratives of migrants revealed the distance of migrants’ lives from the dominant and contested discourses of ‘forced
migration’, ‘repatriation’, and ‘diaspora’. This is not to dispute the relevance of exploring the origins and development of such discourses to achieve an understanding of Russian migration policy. The discourses are rooted in the historical and contemporary political, economic, and socio-cultural connections that extend between the sites of departure (the former republics) and the sites of arrival (the regions of the Russian Federation). Although the empirical reach of the study was confined to the site of settlement, attention to these connections informed an understanding of state reactions, migrant experiences, and the migration process as a whole. The way that the discourses are translated into policy shapes the context within which migration and resettlement take place. Migrants are positioned within, and influenced by, these discourses, yet, they use alternative discourses to articulate both their personal identities and their experiences of migration and resettlement. Migrants’ narratives concerning the migration movement revealed that political causes can rarely stand alone or be separated from the socio-economic realities of their lives. This problematizes the voluntary/involuntary dichotomy contained in migration legislation. Through the analysis of migrants’ discourses of movement and resettlement the dichotomy of ‘home’ and ‘homeland’ was revealed. Uncoupling the notion of home/land in this way allowed alternative understandings apart from the migration representing either a forced or voluntary ‘return’ to an ethnic ‘homeland’ to be gained. Via the narratives of individuals alternative and more grounded understandings of the migration and resettlement processes emerge, that dispute the relevancy of wider discourses, by above all prioritizing a ‘return’ to what is required for the re-creation of ‘home’ – employment, housing, social interaction, a secure environment.

By providing an insight into the reality of resettlement experience at the individual migrant level the study revealed some of the contradictions in current federal and regional migration policy including: unsuitable resettlement location; lack of information concerning minimum benefits or employment opportunities; restrictive resettlement practices (the propiska); and an ineffective loan system for housing. The gap that is apparent between individual experience and state policy reinforces the need to understand how resettlement is perceived and experienced by migrants themselves to ensure more suitable and viable policies. Other studies of migrant resettlement on the territory of the Russian Federation support the findings from the present study and stress the failure of current federal and regional migration policy to address the nature
of the migration movement taking place and the needs of the migrant returnees (Vitkovskaia 1999; Filippova 1997). For the majority of migrants in the current case of 'return' migration, emergency humanitarian assistance is not required. Instead positive policies that enable integration within the political and socio-economic structures of society are needed. Such policy initiatives could include: the removal of barriers to movement and resettlement (e.g. the propiska); the operation of an effective loan system that would allow the acquisition of housing in a suitable location; the identification of regions and labour market spheres that require and are suited to the specific professional, educational and employment skills of the migrant population; the adequate provision of information concerning employment, housing and any other social provision. The recommendations appear obvious, and some require an input of scarce resources. However, such policies and limited forms of assistance would enable the immediate inclusion of migrants within the operating structures of society, and facilitate their swifter and more successful integration and resettlement. A move away from a securitized migration discourse and restrictive migration practice would provide a more positive space of 'return' within which migrants could act more effectively.

Many areas of interest have emerged from the research project that could provide valuable and interesting starting points for further theoretical and empirical enquiry. Two of these areas may be mentioned here. They focus upon forms of migrant networks, and therefore prioritize actors' viewpoints but set within the wider migration environment, and the specific context of post-Soviet Russian society. One focus of future research could be to assess the durability of the family and friendship networks that have played a central role in the migration process, but at later stages of the resettlement process. If these networks proved to be resilient and persistent as primary supportive structures then comparisons could be made with other studies that focus upon the relevance of personal social networks in different spheres of post-Soviet Russian society (see for example Ledeneva 1998; Rose 1999; Lonkila 2000; White 2001). A second and complementary focus could be to trace the further development of regional migrant associations, their future significance for the individual migrant, their role within the migration regime[s], and wider society. The research would be located within wider debates concerning the development of the non-governmental sector, state/voluntary sector relations, state/society relations and the emergence of a 'civil society' in contemporary Russia.
This thesis sought to understand migration not only as a process of ‘dislocation’, but equally as one of ‘re-location’. The importance of the narrative of ‘home’ emerged from the research project itself in the dialogues of migrants. The contribution of this narrative to understanding migration and migrant resettlement is significant. The thesis suggests therefore that the understanding of ‘home’ requires further empirical and theoretical interrogation. Although it would appear to be a logical and unexceptional narrative, it is perhaps too often displaced in studies of migration either by narratives of ‘homelessness’, or lost within wider narratives that prioritize national identity and attachments to bounded ‘homelands’. Through their ‘home’ narratives, migrants articulate the practical and emotional priorities that they feel need to be fulfilled for successful resettlement. A further suggestion, therefore, is for the dialogues of migrants to be listened to in policy development. Migrants across the Russian Federation have made their voices heard through regional and federal level migrant associations and have achieved positive change. Nevertheless, the present study suggests that more often migrants retreat into personal networks of family and friends that allow an immediate sense of ‘home’ and security to be maintained. It is hoped that in the coming years, the energies and resources invested in migrants’ decisions to move, could be unleashed and engaged in a constructive way for post-Soviet Russian society. For this to happen the Russian government needs to prioritize the genuine needs of real citizens rather than the abstract, imaginary requirements of constructing a new Russian ‘homeland’.
Appendix 1: Limitations of statistics concerning forced migrants and refugees

Although official statistics show that between July 1992 and 1 January 2000, there were 1,388,400 ethnic Russian and Russian speaking forced migrants and refugees registered in the Russian Federation (Goskomstat Rossii 1998: 68; Federal Migration Service 1998; Goskomstat Rossii 2000: 113), these figures only include those who ‘officially’ registered with the FMS. Due to ambiguous legislation and ‘flawed’ registration practices, official statistics do not necessarily reflect the magnitude of forced migration flows (Vitkovskaia 1998a: 11). However, at the same time other figures which are proposed (such as the eight million ‘returnees’ from the former republics of the Soviet Union which is the current figure being offered both by government officials and in the media) may be exaggerated. There are a number of factors which problematize the validity and use of statistics concerning forced migrants and refugees on the territory of the Russian Federation. The present study acknowledges the likely inconsistency and unreliability of the acquired statistical data.

(i) Inconsistency of data collection

The ‘gathering’ of data concerning numbers of forced migrants and refugees has been the responsibility of a number of different government agencies, and dependent upon different criteria, over the period 1991-2001. Initially in 1991, data was gathered by both the Ministry of the Interior and the Committee on Migration within the Ministry of Labour. The Ministry of the Interior based its figures upon applications made for a propiska (registration), whilst the Committee on Migration relied upon figures from local employment services who registered ‘forced migrants’. The definition of ‘forced migrants’ or ‘refugees’ over this period was random and varied between the two agencies. From July 1992, the FMS began to gather migration statistics concerning forced migrants and refugees, again together with the Ministry of the Interior. From 1 January 1994, the FMS adopted total responsibility. The FMS received statistical information from its regional branches, and the system of data collection improved over the period of
the service’s existence. However, the FMS’s statistics from July 1992 did not include migrants who had arrived since 1989. The service tried to correct this by encouraging migrants to re-register, but this proved largely unsuccessful. The Ministry of the Interior still records numbers of ‘arrivees’ who do not apply for forced migrant status, but register with the local branch of the ministry for a propiska.

(ii) Determining between ‘forced migrants’ and ‘refugees’ in data sources
A second difficulty is that although the laws on refugees and forced migrants were introduced in February 1993, statistics continued to be collected without distinguishing between the two categories. This continued as FMS practice until 1996, and the State Committee on Statistics (Goskomstat) continued to publish ‘joint’ data until 1998.

In addition, the distinction between ‘forced migrant’ and ‘refugee’ status, and decisions about to whom each status is awarded, have been highly ambiguous. Initially both ‘categories’ were available to those entitled to Russian citizenship. Particularly in the first half of the 1990s ‘refugee’ status was often acquired by persons who had arrived in the Russian Federation without Russian citizenship. Up to October 1994 the law on citizenship required individuals who had arrived in the Russian Federation prior to February 1992 to return to their former place of residence to get Russian citizenship. However, if they gained ‘refugee’ status, they could establish their place of residence and then apply for Russian citizenship ‘by registration’ on Russian territory (Codagnone 1998a: 27). Once they had acquired Russian citizenship, they could apply for ‘forced migrant’ status, and the slightly higher level of benefits it offered. According to the amendments to the law on forced migrants in December 1995, this had to be done within a month of gaining Russian citizenship, a fact many ‘refugees’ were not aware of. With the introduction of the amendments to the law on refugees in June 1997, refugee status became much more difficult to acquire and in practice was no longer awarded to arrivees from the former republics who did not possess, but were entitled to, Russian citizenship. The exact numbers, therefore, of later ‘Russian citizens’ within the category of registered ‘refugees’, and who may have moved into the category of ‘forced migrants’, is difficult to predict over the period 1991-1997.
(iii) Regional discrepancies
The regional use of the propiska also problematizes standardized data collection across the Russian Federation. In regions where the propiska and other restrictive measures are used as a way of restricting migrant settlement, the discrepancy between the number of registered migrants and their actual number is very high, and the greater the numbers of arrivees who do not possess either forced migrant status, or even a propiska. Neither the migration service, nor the Ministry of Internal Affairs, records the arrival of such migrants. Regions themselves distort migration statistics. It is suggested that some regions overstate the numbers of registered migrants in an attempt to attract increased funding, as the level of funding received by the local administration is dependent upon the numbers of registered migrants (IOM 1999: 188; Vitkovskaia 1998a: 14).

(iv) Individual inconsistencies
Large numbers of migrants fail to register due to the lack of actual benefit they receive from the process, although they may be entitled to forced migrant status. Particularly in areas where there are restrictions on settlement, the meagre assistance, but high risk of registering as a forced migrant or refugee, has led many migrants to avoid approaching any official agencies (IOM 1999: 188). However, there are cases where migrants may register more than once in order to get benefits several times, or in response to specific legislative initiatives. In December 1992 when interest-free loans were first introduced the numbers of persons registering rose sharply (Vitkovskaia 1998a: 13). Another group of migrants not accounted for is those who return to their country of origin. There is no special registration procedure for these persons (ibid: 14).
Appendix 2: Migrant settlement sites in Saratov and Samara oblasti

The sites of settlement described below are the locations where migrant respondents were interviewed. The descriptions provide a broad overview of the different ‘types’ of migrant resettlement which are occurring in the two regions of study although they cannot claim to be representative of all the locations of migrants or types of settlement present on the territory of the two oblasti.

1. Urban/individual settlement
Migrant respondents in urban areas of the oblasti were located in the cities of Saratov and Samara, in urban settlements on the outskirts of the main urban centre (Dubki and Aleksandrovka in Saratovskii raion Saratov oblast, Dubrava in Vol’skii raion (Samara oblast’) and in other raion centres of the oblast’ (Engel’s in Engel’skii raion Saratov oblast’, Sizran in Sizranskii raion Samara oblast’, Kinel’ in Kinelskii raion Samara oblast’ - all of these raiony were situated in the central regions of the two oblasti). The majority of migrants lived in rented apartments and in hostels. One migrant respondent owned her own apartment. The hostels in this case had not been specifically allocated for migrant resettlement and only individual migrant families resided there. The hostel accommodation was acquired through work or family contacts, whilst the apartment accommodation was acquired with the help of the migration service, through work or family contacts, or purchased using personal resources.

2. Urban/group settlement

(i) Hostels
A number of respondents lived in hostels, where a part of the hostel had been allocated specifically for forced migrants. In one case the group of migrants had arrived together, in the other two cases the settlement of the migrants in the hostel took place at different times.

Zavodskii raion, city of Saratov
The hostel in Zavodskii raion (on the periphery of Saratov city) was attached to a PTU (Professional’no-tekhnicheskoe uchilishche) and housed approximately twenty three families of migrants who lived on one floor of the hostel. The group of migrants had
arrived from Uzbekistan in autumn 1994. The original leader of the migrant group was the head of the association ‘Saratovskii Istochnik’. He visited Saratov prior to the movement of the group when he acquired the hostel accommodation through an acquaintance at the PTU. However, since 1994 a number of the migrant families had acquired alternative, private accommodation. For the first three years, the hostel was free of charge, since the end of 1997 the migrants were required to pay rent. The hostel accommodation was intended as a temporary measure whilst the group of migrants constructed a compact settlement site on land acquired from the local administration of Aleksandrovka raion. However, this venture was largely unsuccessful (see below). Conditions in the hostel were adequate but basic. Migrants had been resident there for a number of years and had made their own rooms as comfortable as possible. Initially there was overcrowding, however, over the years additional rooms were acquired which improved the situation. The majority of migrants at the hostel did not have a permanent propiska and at the time of fieldwork were being threatened with eviction by the PTU administration. This had led to the formation of a migrant initiative made up of five of the families resident in the hostel, which had been supported by the migrant association ‘Vozvrashchenie’, to specifically address the issue of obtaining permanent residence permits at the hostel.

Frunzenskii raion, city of Saratov

The hostel was situated in the central Frunzenskii raion in the city of Saratov. The migrants occupied one floor of the hostel, but they had arrived individually and at different times. Accommodation was acquired in the hostel through work, family/friend connections or the local administration. Conditions were very basic. The length of time the migrants had been resident in the hostel, or whether they viewed the accommodation as permanent or temporary, had influenced the extent to which they had made their accommodation attractive and personal. Some of the more recent arrivees were still living out of suitcases. The families of migrants who were interviewed lived in fairly cramped conditions, with two to three adults, and up to two children living in one small room. Problems had been faced in the hostel with acquiring a permanent propiska as the director of the hostel refused to allow permanent registration. A group of migrants at the hostel came together to fight the issue in court, which resulted in those involved obtaining a permanent propiska.
Sovietskii raion, city of Samara

Twenty five migrant families were resident in the hostel which was situated in a central region of Samara city. The hostel was where the migrant association ‘Samarskii pereselenets’ was located. The living conditions in the hostel were very difficult. During the period of fieldwork the non-payment of gas bills and the need for essential repairs meant that there had been no gas for three months and families were using small electric cookers for all cooking purposes. Nothing was being done to improve this situation. The water supply to the hostel was frequently switched off. The migrants lived in very overcrowded conditions. In some cases up to three adults and two children lived in one small room, and due to the large number of residents unsuitable rooms were being used which were damp and had no natural light. Individual families, depending upon their possibilities and the time they had spent in the hostel, had made their rooms as habitable as possible.

The hostel was owned by a construction firm which was itself bankrupt, therefore, there were no resources to spend on repairs or renovation. Migrants had acquired accommodation in the hostel via the local administration or personal contacts. The settlement of the initial group of migrants occurred due to an agreement between the ‘Committee for Affairs of the Family and Children’ and the construction firm in 1993. At this point the local administration paid the migrants’ rent which continued for two years. The migrants then paid the rent themselves. During the period of fieldwork discussions were being held with the firm about the possibility of some of the migrant families acquiring rooms on another floor. Although ‘Samarskii pereselenets’ had been actively negotiating this issue, there had been little progress. There was no coordination between the construction firm and the migration service concerning the issue. The majority of the migrants at the hostel held a temporary propiska.

(ii) Krasnoarmeisk temporary resettlement centre

The temporary resettlement centre was located in Krasnoarmeisk raion, Saratov oblast. The town of Krasnoarmeisk was approximately 200 kilometres from the city of Saratov. The town was small with just a few shops and a market. The temporary resettlement centre was situated in an isolated area seven kilometres outside of the town. The centre
was comprised of two buildings which could house up to 440 migrants. Surrounding the centre were small plots of cultivated land on which migrants grew vegetables and fruit. Conditions inside the centre were very basic and migrants shared communal kitchen and bathroom facilities.

At the time of the initial visit in 1997 the hostel housed 311 migrants, 252 of these from Chechnia. Over the period 1997/99 the numbers of forced migrants and refugees in the centre decreased. This was mainly due to forced migrants and refugees from Chechnia receiving compensation payments and being able to obtain their own accommodation. Links had been established between the migrant community at the centre and the town of Krasnoarmeisk. Migrants visited the town to sell their grown produce and to purchase other goods. and the migrant children attended the school in the town. Despite this contact, however. the migrants were isolated and spent a great deal of time either in their hostel rooms or in their gardens.

The temporary resettlement centre was situated in a region with high levels of unemployment and a lack of housing. Opportunities for movement out of the centre was limited, especially for the socially disadvantaged migrants who formed the majority of the resident migrant community. The official period a migrant could stay in the centre was three months, however, most had been there for one to two years. Plans to implement micro-credit programmes to develop individual employment at the centre were not realized due to the poor business possibilities in the surrounding area and a lack of interest on the part of the migrants.

3. Compact type settlements
The settlement sites visited during the periods of fieldwork cannot be strictly defined as compact settlements. However, they were settlements inhabited by groups of migrants where the original plan was to create a form of self-sufficient settlement through the provision of on-site housing and employment. There had been varying levels of involvement by state structures, specifically the migration service. Three of the settlements visited during the periods of fieldwork were located in Saratov oblast and one in Samara oblast.
(i) Aleksandrovka, Saratov raion, Saratov oblast

Aleksandrovka was a planned settlement of twenty houses, situated on the edge of the village of Aleksandrovka approximately seven kilometres from the outskirts of the city of Saratov. The group of migrants from Uzbekistan, resident in the hostel in Zavodskii raion in the city of Saratov, acquired a plot of land free of charge from the Aleksandrovka raion administration. The TMS helped to finance the installation of gas and electricity. However, due to the lack of resources after the initial investment, only the foundations for the twenty houses had been completed. Work was continuing on seven of the houses, four of which have roofs. There was no water supply to the settlement.

At the time of fieldwork all of the migrant families still lived in the hostel in Zavodskii raion. The settlement was not attached to the development of any specific enterprise. Links had been established with the local community where there was individual migrant resettlement. In the village school, the director and a number of the teachers were migrants and migrant children made up approximately forty percent of the students. The compact settlement had received continued support from the head of the local administration of Aleksandrovka, however, in the absence of either personal resources or assistance from state structures, the future of the settlement was uncertain.

(ii) Severianka, Saratov raion, Saratov oblast

The settlement 'Severianka' was situated approximately twelve kilometres from the outskirts of Saratov city and four kilometres from the nearest village. The settlement was made up of individual families of migrants from different republics who, upon arrival, had found out about the possibility of work and accommodation at the settlement established by a migrant from the North of Russia in 1992. Initially the enterprise attached to the settlement had been successful. The individual migrants had received loans from the TMS and together with the investment of their own money had converted existing large farm sheds into houses. The situation had greatly deteriorated, however. The original director, unable to pay back initial bank loans, faced bankruptcy, the enterprise and houses became the property of the bank, and responsibility for the settlement had been completely transferred to the local administration.
The migrants had received little help apart from the constant support of the migrant association ‘Vozvrashchenie’. They had no legal claim to the housing, despite the fact they had been involved in its construction and had invested personal resources. Conditions at the settlement site were very difficult as there was no gas or water, and all production had come to a halt. The local administration saw no future in the settlement and was encouraging all the migrants to leave. Although the migrants wished to remain, the uncertainty of a secure future at the settlement was forcing them to look for housing and work elsewhere.

(iii) Village of Lebedka, Kalinskii raion, Saratov oblast

The settlement was located in the village of Lebedka near to the town of Kalininsk, 126 kilometres from the city of Saratov. The initiative for the settlement came from a local businessman who had been born and had grown up in the village of Lebedka. In 1994 he made the decision to invest in the restoration of the village which had been deserted in the 1970s. It was not the intention to specifically attract migrants, however, the majority of the inhabitants of Lebedka were arrivees from the former republics, along with a number of migrants from neighbouring villages. There were thirty five houses in the village and 180 residents.

Migrants from the former republics had found out about the possibilities of settlement in Lebedka either from the media (a television programme was made by the central Russian television channel ‘ORT’ about the settlement and shown in the former republics), or through personal contacts. The director of the village assessed the migrants upon arrival, but did not demand that they had either forced migrant status or Russian citizenship. Employment was provided in the village on the farm, in the dairy, shop or garage. Migrants concluded an agreement with the director of the village which stipulated the purchase of a house at a reduced rate as dependent upon continued employment in the village for a period of ten years. All of the migrants had their own plots of land where they grew vegetables and fruit. The majority kept their own pigs, chickens and goats.

Problems had arisen on the settlement as the urban migrants often saw residence there as a temporary step before trying to move to a more urban area. Due to a lack of
construction materials some of the migrants were living in unfinished houses. None of the houses had running water. The director of the settlement originally had no dealings at all with the migration service, and although there was a district service in the raion he denied any knowledge of its existence. Contact had increased during 1999 due to the work of ‘Vozvrashchenie’ and efforts were being made to encourage new arrivees to register at the migration service.

(iv) Novii Biian, Krasnoiarskii raion, Samara oblast’
The settlement was situated on the outskirts of the village of Novii Biian, located seventy three kilometres from Samara city. The initiative for the settlement originated with the migration service. In 1993 a plan was developed to construct ‘American style’ cottages for forced migrants on the piece of land and to build a saw mill to provide both construction materials and future employment. Migrants arriving to the area were directed to the site, and were employed to renovate and build barracks which were intended as temporary accommodation prior to the building of the ‘cottages’. However, the resources for further construction ran out and the saw mill ceased to operate. There were three barrack buildings, two were completed and one was under construction.

Conditions in the barracks were very poor. Although there was a cold water supply, gas and electricity, there were no showers in one of the barrack buildings and all toilet facilities were outside. All of the migrant families had their own plot of land surrounding the barracks where they grew vegetables and fruit. The settlement was situated on a hill approximately twenty minutes walk from the main settlement. In winter the path became inaccessible. The road to the settlement was in bad repair and there was no permanent bus although one was provided on a temporary basis by the local administration or the local spirits factory. Access to the settlement for old people and children, who attended school in the village, was very difficult. The migration service was planning to settle more migrants in the third barrack building. The migrants selected would likely have been on the priority housing list, and so would have been in the category of socially disadvantaged migrants. Therefore such accommodation would have been highly unsuitable.
The village administration had been very helpful towards the migrants. Many of the migrants were employed in the local spirits factory, and there was a good relationship with the local community as a whole. However, very limited help had been received from the migration service. Although the migrants held a permanent propiska, the legality of this was uncertain as there was no documentation concerning the registration of the barracks as permanent accommodation. Migrants were trying to negotiate for the division of the land to enable them to build their own houses. The migrant association ‘Samarskii pereselenets’ was involved in trying to resolve the question and it was possible that the Samara regional branch of the Compatriots Fund would provide equipment for the construction of building materials at the settlement. In the area as a whole there were few employment opportunities beyond the spirits factory and seasonal work on a nearby sovkhoz.
Appendix 3: Migrant interview scenario

The migrant scenario provided the structure for the migrant interviews. Although the interview was structured around the main questions noted, and the prompts were sometimes used, the scenario was employed in a flexible manner. Advice was received from Russian colleagues concerning the specific Russian language terms and expressions used in the interview questions.

1. To begin with could you say something about yourself?
   - Where were you born?
   - Can you tell me something about your family
   - When did you arrive in Samara/Saratov oblast’?
   - Why did you come here? (the reasons for your move)

2. How did you move here? Did you move with your family, with friends, or in a group of migrants?
   - If you moved with your family - who first had the idea to move?
   - How long did you plan the move for?
   - Why did you choose to move to Saratov/Samara oblast’?
   - Where did you get the information about the possibilities to move to Saratov/Samara oblast’?
   - If you came with a group of migrants, when and how did the group form?

3. Did you go to register at the Territorial Migration Service?
   - Did you receive forced migrant status?
   - Did you get help from the Territorial Migration Service in your resettlement? (one time emergency monetary help, loan for the acquisition, construction or renovation of housing, compensation).
   - Did you receive any information about state help for forced migrants?
   - Did you receive any help from other state organs? (e.g. the employment service) (if they received forced migrant status)
   - Was it important for you that you registered? what exactly did forced migrant status provide you with?
4. Did you receive Russian citizenship before or after your move?
- Can you describe the process of receiving citizenship?
- Is it important for you to have Russian citizenship? - has it helped in the process of moving/resettlement?

5. Do you know of any migrant associations in Saratov/Samara oblasti?
- What role has the association played in your move, and resettlement on the territory of Samara/Saratov oblast’?
- Are you a member of a migrant association/or a migrant group linked with production, building, linked to some sort of enterprise?.
- How do you evaluate the role of migrant associations in providing assistance for the resettlement of forced migrants?

6. Housing/Work
a) Where do you live now? Do you have your own apartment, rent an apartment or room, live in a hostel? With whom do you live?
- How did you find this housing? Did you receive any help?
- Are you happy with your housing conditions?
- Would you like to change your housing?

b) Where do you work at the moment?
- Did you receive any help in finding work? How did you find this work?
- Are you happy with your work?
- Would you like to change your place of work?

c) What is your opinion about the idea of compact settlements?
- Would you prefer to live in an individual settlements with other migrants, or together with the local population?

7. Have you received any help from non-governmental organizations - Russian or international?
- e.g. the Compatriots Fund, the Russian Red Cross Society, UNHCR, IOM, International Red Cross.

8. The question of ‘home’.

Where is home for you?

a) Do you feel at home here?
   - Could you say from what moment you began to feel yourself at home?
   - What has helped you to feel at home?
   - What prevents you from feeling at home?

b) Do you feel safe here?
   - What helps you to feel safe and what prevents you from feeling safe?

c) What hopes did you have when you moved here? Have these hopes been fulfilled?
   - If you could return to the past, how would you have acted? Would you have moved here as you did, or stayed, or moved to another oblast?’

d) What helps you to feel calm/comfortable here - the state, migrant association, friends, family, neighbours, new friends, colleagues at work?

e) What were your initial feelings when you had just moved here?
   - Did you feel that your move here was a return ‘home’?

f) How have you been received in the settlement, in society, in general (in Russia)?
   - How do your neighbours/the local population relate to you? Can you describe your relations with them?
   - What were relations like with your neighbours/the local community, in your former place of residence?

g) What are your thoughts about the future?
   - Do you think you will stay here, what does this depend upon?
   - Would you like to go back?
Appendix 4: Socio-demographic questionnaire

The questionnaire is translated from the Russian original. The migrants were requested to fill in the questionnaire at the end of the interview and help was given if any problems arose with comprehension. Where a Yes/No option existed, or concerning family status and education, the migrant was requested to underline the relevant alternative.

1. Date of birth: ______________  2. Nationality: ______________________
5. Family position: (not) married/ divorced/ widow/widower
Composition of family: _____________________________________________
6. Education: elementary 10 -11th class secondary specialist
                unfinished higher higher
7. When did you arrive in Saratov/Samara oblast'?________ Where from?__________
8. Did you register at the territorial migration service? Yes/No
Status received____________________________
9. Did you receive emergency monetary assistance? Yes/No
10. Did you receive a housing loan? Yes/No
11. Did you receive help from the migration service of Saratov/Samara oblast' or a
migrant association:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migration Service</th>
<th>Migrant association</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In finding work:</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In your choice of</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>place of residence:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material help:</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any other:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
12. Living conditions at the present time: _____________________________
13. Place of work and position: _______________________________________
14. Place of work and position before your move to Russia: _______________
15. What is your profession: __________________________________________
16. Registration (propiska) status: ____________________________________
Appendix 5: Expert respondents in Samara and Saratov oblasti and the city of Moscow

The following list of expert respondents are those persons interviewed in the city of Moscow, and in Samara and Saratov oblasti, over the period 1996-1999. Expert interviews are referred to throughout the text by citing the position of the individual interviewed, and the location and date of the interview. Anonymity has been given to the representatives of state structures at the federal and regional levels, and to the representatives of migrant associations. However, as the position of the respondent is cited this reduces the extent of anonymity. Anonymity was not strictly requested, but permission to state names in the written text was not consistently asked for by the researcher. Therefore, anonymity has been adopted when it is felt that the research could in any way impact (negatively) upon the respondent. The names of the representatives of international and federal organizations, and of academics, based in Moscow are provided, permission for which was received. When information from these interviews is cited directly in the text, rather than in a footnote, only the name of the interviewee is given, the year of the interview, and it is indicated with the abbreviation INT that the reference is derived from an interview data source, e.g. (Vitkovskaia 1999: INT). This can then be cross-checked with the list of expert respondents in the appendix.

Not available in the digital version of this thesis

Moscow

(i) International organizations
Appendix 6: Expert interview scenario

The scenario has been included to indicate the broad framework around which the expert interviews conducted in Samara and Saratov oblasti were based. However, each expert interview was adapted to the specific respondent who was being interviewed. The broad framework was used in Moscow and again adapted to the respondent in question.

1. To begin with, could you describe the activity of (the Territorial Migration Service, your governmental department, your migrant association etc.)?
   - What role does it play in the resettlement of forced migrants?
   - How do you conceive your role in the resettlement process of forced migrants?

2. What sort of relationship do you have with (migrant associations/the territorial migration service)? How do you cooperate with these structures at the moment?

3. What sort of relationship do you have with the local administration/oblast’ duma - which departments do you work with at the moment?
   - How do you evaluate the attitude/approach of the Samara/Saratov oblast’ administration to the problems of migrants?

4. Can you say something about the (development) and activity of the (new) regional migration programme?
   - Have any new laws been taken on the territory of Saratov/Samara oblast’ concerning migration?

5. Migrants
   - Where do the majority of migrants come from? How have they moved, with their family, with friends, in groups?
   - Do they receive information about the possibility of moving to Samara/Saratov oblast’ before moving?
   - Where do they settle in general - in cities/towns, in rural areas?
- How many migrants have already received loans/compensation in Saratov/Samara oblast’?
- How do you evaluate the situation at the temporary resettlement centres (for Saratov oblast’ only) regarding accommodation and employment? How many migrants live in the centres at the moment?
- Do you have contacts with migrants at compact settlement sites? How do you evaluate the situation there? Do you provide any help to migrants at compact settlement sites?
- How do you evaluate the situation of migrants at the present moment in Samara/Saratov oblasti regarding accommodation/employment/general resettlement?

6. Are you in contact with any international organizations? Do you receive any help from them?

7. What sort of relationship do you have with the Federal Migration Service?
- How do you evaluate the changes in the service - specifically concerning the new head of the service, Vladimir Kalamanov?
- Do you receive any funds to implement the Federal Migration Programme on the territory of Samara/Saratov oblast’?
[This question was primarily addressed to representatives of the territorial migration service]

8. In the near future, how do you perceive the development of the territorial migration service/your department/your migration association regarding migration?
- What plans do you have?
- What directions of your work would you like to develop?

9. How do you evaluate the migration situation in Saratov/Samara oblast’/Russia at the present time?
- Have there been any changes in the attitudes towards migrants/forced migrants in Russia?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code of migrant/ gender</th>
<th>Date of birth</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>Place of birth</th>
<th>Family position</th>
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<th>Republic of departure</th>
<th>Employment position in Russia</th>
<th>Profession/ Employment before move</th>
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**Appendix 7: Table of migrant socio-demographic data***

320
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<th>Code of migrant/gender</th>
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<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>Place of birth</th>
<th>Family position</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Date of arrival in Russia</th>
<th>Republic of departure</th>
<th>Employment position in Russia</th>
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* The information presented in the table represents the socio-demographic data given by migrants at the time of the interviews. Abbreviations used in the table are: Sec./Spec = Secondary Specialist Education; Un./Higher = Unfinished Higher Education; C.S. = Compact Settlement; TRC = Temporary Resettlement Centre; N/A = not applicable. Any gaps in the table indicate that this data is missing, i.e. was not filled in on the form.
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