THE INCOHERENT NEIGHBOUR:
GEORGE C. MARSHALL & US STRATEGY IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, 1947-48

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THE INCOHERENT NEIGHBOUR

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MARK A. SPOKES
Dedicated to

*Mum* – for whom I walk this path

Jo – for taking each step with me.
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INTRODUCTION
The early Cold War is often the worst chapter in any narrative of the Western Hemisphere. A rewrite is long overdue. In a historiographical essay written for *Diplomatic History* in 1992, Mark T. Gilderhus noted that the few existing studies on US relations with Latin America during the administration of Harry S. Truman have left a number of significant issues in need of examination. The integration of the Western Hemisphere into a strategy of global containment is perhaps the most important of these issues that remains neglected. Studies on US strategy in the Western Hemisphere during the Truman administration have primarily focused on either the period of democracy promotion in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War or the emergence of an anti-Communist framework later in the second term. *The Incoherent Neighbour* fills a serious gap in the academic record with a historical reconstruction of the development of strategy in the Western Hemisphere between 1947 and 1948.

The Western Hemisphere is almost always a missing chapter in the story of this key period in the Cold War. The omission is assumed to be consistent with the absence of Latin America in George F. Kennan’s original conception of containment. The region had not been completely neglected by the Truman administration however. The central role played by George C. Marshall in filling this strategic vacuum has so far been overlooked. He made a significant impact on US strategy in the Western Hemisphere during his tenure as Secretary of State between January 1947 and January 1949. Marshall assumed the primary responsibilities for translating the abstract concepts of containment into the specific context of Latin America.
The evolution of strategy in the early Cold War did not determine a self-evident and necessary approach to the Western Hemisphere. The defining feature of the strategic approach shaped and implemented by Marshall was one of incoherence. He failed to reconcile significant tensions on various levels. At the most basic level was a bureaucratic conflict that prevented a consistent pursuit of strategic objectives in the region. Only the authority and reputation of Marshall as an inspirational leader maintained an illusion of coherence. This lack of domestic consensus originated in conceptual differences over the role of the Western Hemisphere in a global strategy of containment. The Cold War made US influence in the Western Hemisphere simultaneously more important and less of a priority for limited resources increasingly redirected to meet commitments to extended strategic objectives in Western Europe. This gap between the means and ends of global strategy proved further complicated by the absence of even a coherent strategic end in the Western Hemisphere. Marshall failed to reconcile conflicting commitments to restore the cooperation between equal sovereign states in the Good Neighbour Policy and to address the demands of a rising tide of expectations in Latin America for political and economic development. The myth of coherence is revealed most clearly in the resistance across the region to the meanings defined by Marshall of the Western Hemisphere in itself.

*The Incoherent Neighbour* writes a new chapter on US strategy in the Western Hemisphere during the early Cold War. This re-examination of the development of containment strategy provides an essential revision of the established narrative on the role of George C. Marshall. The identification of failings in the Western Hemisphere that mitigated his successes in Western Europe also offers an important contribution to the wider historiography of the early Cold War. *The Incoherent Neighbour* further
demonstrates fresh insights into the effect of the Cold War on the meaning of the Western Hemisphere to US strategy that represent a major breakthrough for the academic record on US relation with Latin America.

**Securing the Peace for a New Era: A Narrative Introduction**

The appointment of George C. Marshall as Secretary of State in January 1947 presented an opportunity to address dual challenges that had inhibited the administration of Harry S. Truman for much of the previous year. President Truman looked to Marshall firstly to fill the strategic vacuum in the State Department. The resignation of James F. Byrnes just as the collapse of the wartime Grand Alliance seemed imminent left Truman regretful of this untimely loss of a ‘very good negotiator.’ But the President had already begun to consider a new strategic direction. He had warned of the escalating danger that the nation confronted in his State of the Union address only a few days earlier. The growing difficulty in finding an agreement with the Soviet Union on the terms of settlement for a ‘secure and just peace’ threatened the pursuit of a ‘collective security for all mankind.’ Truman found reassurance that he could turn to Marshall however, to lead the US into an uncertain new era and unfamiliar global setting with a more coherent and assertive approach towards the Soviet Union. He held his new Secretary of State in the highest regard as both ‘a man and a soldier.’

Truman anticipated that the appointment of the ‘greatest man of World War II’ to take the helm at the State Department would bring more authoritative leadership and end the second problem of incohesion within the US. The absence of a domestic consensus had become increasingly obstructive to the pursuit of strategic objectives. The lack of
direction actually started within the State Department itself. Even Truman had been made aware of the joke circulating Washington: the State Department fiddles while Byrnes roams. This drift towards incoherence only invited other executive departments to contest the traditional leadership of the State Department in foreign affairs.

The electoral defeats for the Democratic Party at the end of 1946 that ended their long-held stranglehold over both the House of Representatives and the Senate represented a more serious disaster for the Truman administration. A bipartisan consensus with the new Republican-led 80th Congress seemed far from assured. The seriousness of the problem had led Truman to use his State of the Union address to warn against any ‘retreat to isolationism.’ Franklin D. Roosevelt had relied on the ability of Marshall to maintain the cooperation of Congress in waging the Second World War; Truman would now depend upon him once again to maintain a broad internationalist consensus. The Senate had been swift and enthusiastic in authorising his appointment as Secretary of State. Marshall enjoyed a reputation amongst prominent legislative leaders that ‘was probably higher than that of any living American.’

Truman understood that a renewed commitment to internationalism relied on not only a bipartisan consensus but also uniting the entire country. A crisis of representation within the US public after the wearing experience of the Second World War threatened a more general rejection of further international engagement. Truman anticipated that Marshall would be well received amongst the people of the US. Despite their traditional guardedness towards military leaders, the US public liked and trusted Marshall as an individual representing both duty and work well done. The confidence in Marshall as a person supposed to know how to secure the nation from the new challenge posed by
the Soviet Union ultimately ensured the readiness of the US public to ‘back him to the limit’ in his ‘vigorous leadership’ of an internationalist foreign policy.\(^8\)

In order to address each of these challenges Truman ceded much of his authority in foreign affairs to his new Secretary of State. On taking his oath of office Marshall received the immediate gratitude of the President for assuming the burden of leadership. It appeared clear even at the time that Marshall had accepted the ‘greatest responsibilities of any US Secretary of State.’\(^9\) He later revealed that this transfer of power extended so far as to the President agreeing ‘to everything and anything I suggest or propose to him.’\(^10\) Marshall did not return to office with a prepared strategic vision to direct the US in the world however. His immediate impact lay more in his initial steps to lead the country in the absence of a coherent strategy.

Marshall focused on mobilising the country with a shared sense of purpose. In his first public address as Secretary of State at Princeton University he warned of the dangers of a relaxed attitude or indifference towards threats to long-term national security whilst peace remained to be secured.\(^11\) But Marshall also realised that his success in maintaining a broad consensus depended upon establishing a unity of command, teamwork, and coordination within the Truman administration. Marshall made clear his intention to end the strategic drift by reasserting traditional State Department authority over foreign affairs under his leadership. An unparalleled military reputation meant that the increased sensitivities towards national security provided him considerable licence to reshape the disjointed organisation of the administration on foreign affairs. He understood the need for further action to ensure the acceptance of this however. Marshall swiftly reassured all other parties that he held no plans to dictate strategy and
intended to rebuild shared institutional meanings as a basis for more effective cooperation. He also recognised that widespread approval of restored State Department leadership depended upon shaping a new organisation capable of handling the ‘intensive joint manoeuvres’ needed for global responsibilities.

Marshall made a significant impact on the State Department. In spite of his initial ‘delight with the high quality of the personnel’ that would support him in the State Department, Marshall soon bemoaned the observable ‘lack of organisation’ and internal personal conflicts. He immediately blamed this disorganisation on the traditional dominance of lawyers within the State Department. Marshall concluded that nothing short of a major shake-up would be necessary to instil more organisation and discipline in to the department than his predecessor had managed. Truman had certainly been frustrated with the ineptness of Byrnes’ leadership and expressed satisfaction that Marshall would establish a ‘real State Department now.’

Marshall used his experience to reorganise the State Department along a model of military authority. He introduced a clear line of command to end the bureaucratic tensions that had long characterised the State Department. He considered himself the “Commanding Officer” and was determined to lead from the front. Marshall also persuaded his Undersecretary, Dean G. Acheson, to delay his return to private law practice and continue as his “Chief of Staff”. Marshall instructed Acheson to vet everything unless he ‘chose to decide the matter himself.’ But after making any decision, Marshall expected immediate and resolute implementation.
The tireless individual efforts of Marshall during his first month as Secretary of State led one State Department official to declare that he had ‘met a superman.’ Acheson regarded the arrival of Marshall as an ‘act of God.’ He also noted that keeping up with his new Secretary would be no easy task however: ‘I understand already why most of Marshall’s former associates have stomach ulcers.’ Marshall spent much of his first weeks preparing for the decisive negotiations with the Soviet Union at the forthcoming Fourth Meeting of the Council on Foreign Ministers in Moscow. On handing over the reins of the State Department, Byrnes had conveyed to Marshall the importance of securing an agreement with the Soviets in Moscow – a message he reaffirmed a few days later whilst making his parting words to the nation. After the disappointment of his earlier diplomatic mission to China, Marshall seemed determined to succeed in concluding a peace settlement with the Soviet Union.

Although he had been appointed by Truman to establish a firmer line with the Soviet Union, Marshall appeared to be the last remaining top official within Washington to come to terms with the collapse of the Grand Alliance. Marshall could not control the rapid shift in the strategic climate in Washington during his absence however. Although he had ceded much authority in foreign affairs to his new Secretary of State, Truman could not resist exploiting an opportunity to arouse the country to the emerging danger posed by the Soviet Union. The President used an address to a Joint Session of Congress to demand assistance for Greece and Turkey to warn of the destabilising influence of the Soviet Union. The declaration of this Truman Doctrine realised the immediate aim of gathering support for a renewed commitment to internationalism; Life magazine described it as a ‘bolt of lightning’ that ‘cut through the confused international atmosphere.’ In defining the ‘present moment in history’ as one when ‘nearly every
nation must choose between alternative ways of life,’ Truman managed to capture established narratives of exceptional US identity as well as provide a new manageable space for the ‘meaning of America in a globalised world.’

Marshall initially protested the declaration of the Truman Doctrine. Although the President had not directly pointed at the Soviet Union, Marshall objected to the use of strong rhetoric to frame the crisis in terms of a direct threat from external aggression. Marshall had been expected to adopt a firmer stance towards the Soviet Union than his predecessor, but the new Secretary could not see the benefit of conducting negotiations in Moscow whilst ‘hit[ting] a man across the face and call[ing] him names.’ Marshall received advice from the State Department however, to postpone his reports from the Moscow Conference until he could ‘sense the change in atmosphere here which has occurred since your departure.’ Marshall’s remonstrations were ephemeral however. His own resignations on securing peace with the Soviet Union soon began to develop in convergence with the transformation in strategic climate within Washington. The encounters with the Kremlin leadership at the Moscow Conference ultimately ‘made up’ the mind of Marshall that they ‘could not be negotiated with.’

The reputation of Marshall as a military leader made him the ideal figure to assume a prominent role in shaping a response to the inevitable confrontation with the Soviet Union. He remained unsatisfied with the defensive posture that characterised the Truman Doctrine and would not look to wait to fight each fire as it broke out. It did not seem immediately clear that he had fully thought out the strategic objectives beyond this confrontation of the danger emanating from Moscow however. Acheson praised both his ‘mastery of precise information’ and vision that retained a focus on the bigger
strategic picture.\textsuperscript{27} But many of his military colleagues considered him more skilled as an organiser than a strategist. A lack of coherence soon became evident once Marshall began to shape a new strategic approach to securing the peace for a new era.

\textbf{Servant of the American Nation: A Revisionist Critique of George C. Marshall}

George C. Marshall is uniformly remembered as one of the most distinguished soldiers and statesmen in US history.\textsuperscript{28} After being named by \textit{Time} magazine as their Man of the Year for 1943 and praised for his commitment and contribution as Army Chief of Staff, Marshall came to be revered at the end of the Second World War as the greatest military leader of the Allied forces and the “Organiser of Victory”.\textsuperscript{29} The accolades continued during his tenure as the fiftieth US Secretary of State. \textit{Time} once again chose Marshall as their Man of the Year for 1947 after his first year in office.\textsuperscript{30} In what transpired as a momentous year of decision for the US on its future role in the world, Marshall was hailed once again as the ‘saviour of Europe.’ Although acknowledging the innate sense of justice guiding the US people in their commitment to the reconstruction of Western Europe, \textit{Time} identified Marshall as the symbol of this new role in offering ‘hope to those who needed it.’

The enduring recognition of this legacy could be seen in October 2009 when the Virginia Military Institute held a symposium at the new Center for Leadership and Ethics to mark the 50\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of Marshall’s death. It aimed to honour this “Servant of the American Nation” and his substantive contributions to ‘virtually every important event and issue comprising America’s rise to power in the first half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century.’\textsuperscript{31} Speakers shared insights into his major leadership roles as both a soldier and a
statesman in arenas from Europe to Korea. An examination of the important role played by Marshall in shaping US relations with Latin America during the early Cold War stood out as a notable omission however. This is perhaps no surprise; the VMI symposium only reflected a gap in the scholarly literature on Marshall.

The lack in understanding of Marshall’s part in formulating strategy in the Western Hemisphere can be explained, to some extent, by his own aversion to public attention. He even refused to keep a journal or diary for posterity in order to remain focused on the immediate business at hand.\(^3\)\(^2\) The retired Army Major General Josiah Bunting III suggested that this means whilst “Marshall” is not ‘anonymous or obscure, “George Marshall” remains for most a remote presence, an unknowable and distant entity, a noble piece of statuary.’\(^3\)\(^3\) The conscious efforts made by “George Marshall” to remain hard to know are not sufficient explanation for the gap in the academic record however. As important is an apparent reluctance to reassess the popular symbolisation of “Marshall” as an exceptional model of ethical leadership and strategic visionary.\(^3\)\(^4\) Beyond the acknowledgement of a few minor character flaws, such as poor oratory skills, Marshall has been spared revisionist critique.

*The Incoherent Neighbour* does not fit so readily within this established narrative of Marshall. Although it cannot provide a comprehensive reassessment of Marshall, a study of US strategy in the Western Hemisphere between 1947 and 1948 is able to demonstrate the limits of his leadership and ability to maintain cohesion within Washington. It can also reveal his failure to integrate a particular approach to the region into a coherent global strategy. The incoherence in the translation of his strategic vision
into effective policies in the Western Hemisphere only raises questions for the legacy of Marshall. He offered little hope to those Latin Americans who needed it.

**A New Approach to the Western Hemisphere in the Cold War**

*The Incoherent Neighbour* challenges the orthodox and later post-revisionist studies of the early Cold War that are best represented by John Lewis Gaddis and identify a neglect of the Western Hemisphere in the initial formulations of containment. Gaddis emphasised the specific focus of Kennan on securing strategic strongpoints such as Western Europe rather than overstretching US resources to contain the threat of Communism along the entire perimeter of the antagonistic frontier with the Soviet Union. Although he included a footnote that the Truman administration did not consider Latin America to be just another area on the periphery of US interests, Gaddis recognised that Kennan dismissed any review of strategy in the Western Hemisphere because of an absence of a Soviet threat.

It was then only after the combination of the NSC-68 memorandum of 1950 when the Truman administration becomes more interested in perimeter defence and the perception of a growing Communist influence across Latin America, and in Guatemala in particular, that the Western Hemisphere was considered in strategies of containment. The Truman administration would not contemplate losing an established area within the US sphere of influence to the Soviet Union. The separate accounts of US relations with both the Soviet Union and Latin America finally came together after the Cuban Revolution highlighted the region as both a prize and battleground in the Cold War. Their destinies appeared to remain interconnected after President John F. Kennedy
declared the Western Hemisphere to be the most dangerous area in the world. The focus on the initial neglect of Latin America, by Kennan in particular, means that these traditional accounts fail to recognise the integral role of George C. Marshall in translating the logic of containment into a strategy in the Western Hemisphere. Marshall identified a vital interest in the region despite the lack of a direct threat from the Soviet Union.

Revisionist interpretations of the Cold War identify some continuity in the efforts of the Truman administration to consolidate the US position in the Western Hemisphere.\textsuperscript{36} They fail to provide a complete understanding of US interests in the region however. Revisionists such as William Appleman Williams suggested that the Truman administration pursued a strategic approach that remained focused on the necessity of economic expansion. Latin America continued to be regarded as primarily a market for exports and a source of raw materials.\textsuperscript{37} Williams also insisted that the internalisation of the assumptions and principles of the Open Door Policy by Kennan meant that his strategy of containment only extended this logic to Western Europe rather than articulating a radically different program. Thomas J. McCormick argued that the Truman administration considered regions such as Latin America as dependent variables in the priority of the dollar gap crisis in Western Europe.\textsuperscript{38} Gabriel Kolko agreed that the US attempted to define its relationship with other areas in the world in the context of prioritising limited resources and attention to secure interests in Western Europe but added that the US faced specific challenges in Latin America; the emergence of nationalism posed the main threat to US economic interests in the region.\textsuperscript{39} The economic importance of the Western Hemisphere meant that US strategy continued to focus on safeguarding the interests of private enterprise.
A focus on the narrow pursuit of economic interests overlooks Marshall’s coordination of wider strategic objectives. The prime position afforded to security in his considerations of US strategy in the Western Hemisphere meant that Marshall often deferred the immediate interests of US businesses operating in the region in order to maintain the cooperation of Latin American governments. The increasing prospects for armed confrontation with the Soviet Union in Western Europe made Marshall more interested in securing access to vital strategic resources in Latin America. Such priorities did not supplant the original focus of his strategy of containment in the Western Hemisphere however. Marshall identified the region as an important arena for the demonstration of a symbolic example of the positive nature of international relations within the US sphere of influence. He considered a commitment to solidarity in the Western Hemisphere to be a significant response to the psychological struggle of the Cold War. To fully understand this symbolic element of US strategy in the Western Hemisphere necessitates engagement with new approaches to the Cold War.

*The Incoherent Neighbour* builds on the poststructuralist approaches to US strategy in the Cold War adopted by the likes of Frank Ninkovich, Anders Stephanson, Walter L. Hixson, and more importantly David Campbell. These approaches transcend the ongoing debate in the scholarship on the Cold War between the primacy of either security or economic priorities in US strategic objectives to focus primarily on a crisis of identity. Campbell identifies containment as more of a discursive strategy articulating a specific series of representations and practices of danger. The meanings articulated in this discourse actually constitute and consolidate, rather than simply describe, a dominant interpretation of US identity.
Containment must then be considered not in the context of the strictly material pursuit of strategic and economic interests, but in that of a wider psychological struggle of the Cold War to project a positive image of the US. As Frank Ninkovich explained:

‘The Cold War reversed the traditional relationship between reality and appearance. Instead of symbolism being seen as a weak form of power, power had now become a servant of symbolism. The Cold War was psychologically defined as an exercise in maintaining credibility and world opinion.... If symbol systems are constitutive of reality, then a loss of faith in these systems therefore creates a radical change in how that reality will be constituted.’

Kennan, after all, recognised that ‘what is important is not what things actually are but the shadows which are cast by those shapes upon the minds of men.’

The symbolic significance of US strategy in the Western Hemisphere during the early Cold War cast a longer shadow than these scholars give credit for. It assumes more importance within an understanding of the Cold War that denotes for the US a struggle over identity that extends beyond the specific context of rivalry with the Soviet Union. The narrative of containment is actually not a singular one that follows the genesis of a strategic approach in Western Europe to subsequent applications in different areas. As Alan Nadel explained:

‘Under the common name of containment the Truman administration generated numerous, often contradictory or mutually exclusive, stories, each grounding its authority in the
claim that it is part of the same story. Without that story, none of the narratives would have the authority to generate the actions committed in its name; at the same time the claim to a common narrative renders the narrative itself incoherent.”

US strategy in the Western Hemisphere has then its own narrative that can be claimed to play an important part of a broader story on containment whilst simultaneously revealing the incoherence within it.

The importance of the Western Hemisphere in the story of the early Cold War can be understood by building on the conceptual approach outlined by Campbell. He critiqued the essentialism of traditional state-centric analyses and insisted that the state is not finished as an entity. Campbell defended his own focus on the specific representations of US identity in the early Cold War then because ‘America is the imagined community par excellence.’ This acquires more significance within an understanding of America in the context of the Monroe Doctrine as a founding myth for a community that is imagined as not only America the nation but also America the continent. A narrative of the US is also one that is easily translated into one of the Western Hemisphere. If the narrative of a nation is always one of family then this is similarly true of a narrative of an imagined community of the Americas. The conflicting stories of the Western Hemisphere were those of either the fraternity in the evolution of the Pan-American movement or the paternalism of US imperialism in the region.

Marshall identified the importance of the Western Hemisphere not because of a genuine threat of Communism or an imperative to secure economic interests, but as an opportunity to claim the narrative of the region as part of the same story of the Cold
War. A commitment to the ongoing project of inter-American integration would provide a symbolic example of fraternal solidarity within the US sphere of influence. Rather than neglecting the Western Hemisphere as a region of strategic importance that remained beyond the threat of the Soviet Union, Marshall identified the relative strength of the US position in Latin America as an opportunity to use the space for an asymmetric response in the psychological struggle with the Soviet Union.

Kennan acknowledged this symbolic nature of the Cold War in his X article as he insisted that ‘the issue of Soviet-American relations is in essence a test of the overall worth of the US as a nation among nations.’ He designated Western Europe as the primary space for the demonstration of the credibility of US commitment and capacity to guarantee the political and economic development of countries within its orbit. Marshall simultaneously pursued in the Western Hemisphere a symbolic demonstration of the nature of international relations within the US sphere of influence. The administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt had previously considered a shining example of solidarity in the Western Hemisphere to be essential in showing the benevolent intentions of the US to the rest of the world. In his commitment to cooperation with equal and sovereign neighbouring Latin American states Marshall sought to project a positive image of the US that stood in contrast to the perceived relationship that the Soviet Union maintained with its satellites in Eastern Europe.

Marshall did not bring the Cold War to the Western Hemisphere then; rather he projected the Western Hemisphere into the Cold War. The particular demonstration of the fraternal relationship with Latin American neighbours would be used to determine a desired identity of the US. The inherent ambiguities in the logic of containment
ultimately ensured the failure in fixing this identity however. Campbell identified a significant problem facing the US as it attempted to handle different regional contexts and situations within a universal strategic approach. The tensions between the abstract universalism of the discourse of containment and the particularism of its application became increasingly evident as the Truman administration pursued divergent policies in Western Europe and the Western Hemisphere. The gap between the expanded commitments of containment and the limited capabilities to fulfil them created further strategic incoherence.

This incoherence did not simply reflect the idiosyncrasies of Kennan’s formulation of containment by Kennan; rather these contradictions were symptomatic of US strategy. The inherent inability to secure the meanings in any discourse means that ‘any apparently coherent system of thought can be shown to have underlying irresolvable antimonies, such that there are multiple and conflicting readings that must be held simultaneously.’ The unfixed nature of the meanings of containment and the nature of relations within the Western Hemisphere also allowed for alternative understandings to challenge the dominant interpretation set out by Marshall.

**A New Approach to the Cold War in the Western Hemisphere**

The *Incoherent Neighbour* provides an understanding of US relations with Latin America that extends beyond the established debates between continuity and change. Orthodox historians of inter-American relations each provide similar accounts of a change in strategy under the Truman administration. A renewed focus on security following the initial conception of containment did not determine an immediate strategic shift.
Despite the renewed focus on security, the expansion of commitments in the Cold War brought a coherent recalibration of interests that required the redirection of resources to secure Western Europe. ‘Far from the Soviet Union’s borders,’ explained Lars Schoultz, ‘Latin America was not yet threatened, and so it did not require much attention.’ The growing danger posed to US security by the rise of Communism in Latin America eventually led the Truman administration to the coherent application of containment in the Western Hemisphere.

In these traditional accounts the Truman administration abandoned previous commitments to democracy promotion as it came to regard the Western Hemisphere as both a battleground and prize in the struggle with the Soviet Union. Anti-Communism became the central feature to define the US approach towards Latin American neighbours considered only as pawns in the Cold War. Although orthodox accounts each differ on the precise timeframe of this shift in regional strategy they agree in general that a Cold War framework had been constructed by the end of 1948. The Truman administration consequently made cold-blooded calculations to support Latin American dictatorships that proved more efficient in combating Communism.

As orthodox historians dedicate no more than a few pages to the period between 1947 and 1948 they fail to provide sufficient evidence to support assumptions that the application of containment represented a coherent shift in strategic approach to address the mounting threat of Communism in Latin America. In the only detailed examination of US relations with Latin America during the Truman administration, Steven Schwartzberg refuted the idea that the primacy of security and the establishment of a Cold War framework determined the abandonment of democracy
He suggested that a group of liberal policymakers during the first term of office regarded democracy promotion as central to the Cold War. This strategic approach only shifted once a competing group of conservative policymakers became more influential in the second term. They differed in attitude towards the prospects for democracy in Latin America and favoured cooperation with dictatorships to secure US interests in the Cold War.

A narrow focus on the variable of democracy led Schwartzberg to the erroneous assumption that a change in policymakers determined a shift in strategic approach. He overlooked vast differences on a number of other issues between the earlier group of liberals that included the likes of Spruille Braden, Ellis O. Briggs, Adolf A. Berle Jr., and Nelson Rockefeller. Braden had even gone so far as to criticise the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, led by Rockefeller, as a ‘superfluous and wasteful agency’ full of ‘communist-fellow-travellers’ and ‘do-gooders and one-worlders.’ Schwartzberg was perhaps more flawed in associating the views of George F. Kennan with the likes of Louis J. Halle, Dean G. Acheson, and Edward G. Miller in the later group of conservatives. His simplistic demarcation of two competing groups provides a conceptual framework to support the argument that strategy shifted only after conservatives replaced liberals in the prominent positions within the Truman administration.

The assumption of a seamless transition from the liberal to the conservative groups of policymakers can only be maintained with the neglect of the important time period between 1947 and 1948. In identifying the end of liberal influence with the resignation of Braden in early 1947 and the rise of conservative influence in late 1948 Schwartzberg
overlooked the significant roles of several key actors in the period in between. He ignored the likes of Robert Lovett, Norman A. Armour, and Paul C. Daniels who all assumed some responsibility in the State Department for coordinating strategy in the Western Hemisphere whilst the position of Assistant Secretary remained vacant. Schwartzberg also missed the influence of actors from across the rest of the administration as well as the Republican leadership in Congress. The most significant absence is the role played by Marshall however.

Marshall did not abandon democracy promotion in favour of cooperation with dictatorships in combating Communism. The universal resonance of democratic ideals that arose during the Second World War created a rising tide of expectations across Latin America that Marshall simply could not ignore. He struggled instead to promote democracy at the same time as maintaining a commitment to cooperate with all Latin American governments as equals. Marshall did not shift between conflicting means as much as ensuring their concurrent existence in irreconcilable tension.

Revisionist interpretations of US relations with Latin America during the Truman administration shift focus from security and political issues to emphasise important continuities in economic policies. Stephen G. Rabe acknowledged the triumph of Cold War imperatives over the earlier democracy promotion by the end of 1948, but also identified a commitment to free trade and private investment as a constant in the US approach. David Green similarly pointed to economic priorities that made stability a watchword throughout the Truman administration. Neither dedicate more than a few pages to the era between 1947 and 1948 however. Green could only maintain his
argument for continuity with the erroneous identification of Braden as the architect of economic policy for the Truman administration.

The prioritisation of free trade and private enterprise was neither necessary nor determined by the pursuit of economic interests in the region. Marshall considered economic relations only as one, albeit important, element in maintaining the cooperation of Latin American neighbours. He remained ready to abandon narrow economic interests if they undermined broader strategic objectives in the region. Marshall adopted a complex role of mediation between the competing interests of US businesses and Latin American governments in order to maintain the support of both. The redirection of limited resources for containment in Western Europe left Marshall only with offers of private investment to meet the demands of Latin American leaders for assistance in economic development in return for their protection of US interests.

Bryce Wood suggested that this principle of reciprocity originated in the Good Neighbour Policy. Although Braden began to dismantle the Good Neighbour Policy, Wood highlighted a memorandum for Truman in March 1947 as a signal of another shift in approach:

‘There is a widespread feeling in Latin America that the Good Neighbour Policy is being shelved... They feel, right or wrong, that since their champion, the late President Roosevelt, past [sic] away, the Good Neighbour Policy has taken a secondary place in the scheme of international relations, and they point out that neither the President of the US nor the Secretary of State have made any
major pronouncements on Latin America, nor have they stressed the Good Neighbour Policy.'

Despite this memorandum, Wood did not identify an official reaffirmation of the Good Neighbour Policy until August 1949. But the traditions of the Good Neighbour Policy must also be recognised in the strategic approach shaped earlier by Marshall. A renewed commitment to the Good Neighbour Policy did not represent a simple continuity in inter-American relations however. Wood described the spirit of the Good Neighbour Policy as only abstract sympathies rather than specific strategic guidelines. This allowed Marshall to retroactively reflect his interpretation of containment back into the established meanings and political imaginaries of the Western Hemisphere. Rather than any continuity or change in regional strategy in the new global context of the Cold War Marshall rearticulated previous strategies to make it appear as if his approach had all the time been possible.

The Incoherent Neighbour: US Strategy in the Western Hemisphere

The first section of The Incoherent Neighbour explores different levels of incoherence within US strategy in the Western Hemisphere. Chapter one reveals the bureaucratic tensions that prevented a coherent strategic response to the new dangers of the Cold War. The reputation of Marshall as a military leader meant that his appointment as Secretary of State presented an opportunity to end bureaucratic deadlock. Despite a convergence on renewed priorities of securing the region, a lack of consensus on specific measures, such as inter-American military cooperation, showed that a focus on security would not determine a necessary strategic shift however. Marshall initially demonstrated less concern for defining a coherent strategic approach than for restoring domestic cohesion. He identified his Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic
Affairs, Spruille Braden, as the main obstacle to establishing a coordinated approach under his leadership. Although the eventual departure of Braden made it easier for Marshall to prioritise the defence of the Western Hemisphere, the institutionalisation of alternative meanings of security left bureaucratic tensions unreconciled.

Chapter two examines a further level of incoherence that emerged as Marshall struggled to integrate a distinct regional approach into a global strategy. Whilst Kennan focused primarily on a particular application of the abstract strategic concepts of containment in Western Europe, Marshall assumed the main responsibilities for translating these concepts into the context of the Western Hemisphere. Marshall did not bring the Cold War into the Western Hemisphere; he sought to project the Western Hemisphere into the Cold War. Marshall identified a strategic opportunity to use the region as a site for an asymmetric response in the psychological struggle with the Soviet Union. A demonstration of hemispheric solidarity would provide a symbolic example of international relations within the US sphere of influence and a positive image of the US. The prioritisation of limited resources and attention for containment in Western Europe undermined the pursuit of these strategic objectives in the Western Hemisphere however.

The second section reveals numerous challenges faced by Marshall in the application of his interpretation of containment in the Western Hemisphere during the inter-American conferences at Petrópolis and Bogotá. Marshall looked to restore solidarity in the Western Hemisphere with a renewed commitment to the Good Neighbour Policy. But he failed to understand that the lessons of the Good Neighbour Policy no longer applied to a region transformed by a rising tide of expectations. Serious schisms that appeared
both particular to the region and transcendent of the Cold War exposed the absence of unity in the Western Hemisphere. The inability of Marshall to resolve these tensions only invited Latin American leaders to articulate competing meanings of the Western Hemisphere and their relationship with the US.

Marshall defined a shared identity in the region primarily in terms of cooperation between equal and sovereign neighbouring countries. He struggled to reconcile this commitment to the Good Neighbour Policy to the growing demands across the region for political and economic freedoms however. Chapter three reveals the tension in simultaneous commitments to the promotion of democracy and cooperation with each Latin American government without discrimination on the basis of their internal political nature. The persistence of dictatorships across the region meant that Marshall faced growing demands to demonstrate the credibility of his rhetorical commitment to a shared democratic identity in the Western Hemisphere. Chapter four shows his failure to reconcile an adherence to the principle of non-intervention with a resolve for supporting progressive movements across Latin America.

Chapter five explores the more serious challenge that Latin American economic underdevelopment posed to the harmony of the Americas. A rising tide of expectations created mounting pressure on Marshall to deal with inequalities in living standards. Latin American leaders facing domestic unrest appealed to Marshall for economic assistance. But the prioritisation of limited resources for Western Europe prevented Marshall from pledging the funds needed to maintain the cooperation of Latin America.
Chapter six shows how these restrictions made it difficult for Marshall to mediate between the divergent economic interests of Latin American governments and of the US and its private sector. Marshall could not offer the assistance needed to persuade Latin American leaders to reject economic nationalism. But he also failed to guarantee the private investment that he offered as an alternative solution for development. Business leaders in the US remained reluctant to risk investments in Latin American countries unwilling to respect private property. Marshall struggled to reconcile this need to provide adequate protection of private economic interests with his commitment to non-intervention in the internal affairs of Latin American neighbours.

The third section examines the efforts of Marshall to address the tensions that appeared during the negotiations at the inter-American conferences. Rather than reconciling these tensions Marshall instead depended upon representations of the Western Hemisphere as a coherent imagined space. Chapter seven looks at the failure of representations of exceptionalism to persuade Latin American leaders to sacrifice their own economic agenda and support the US in the reconstruction of Western Europe. Marshall relied upon the performative nature of exceptional rhetoric to establish this symbolic mandate of the Western Hemisphere as ‘always existing.’ He soon discovered that he could not define the identity of the Western Hemisphere alone however. Latin American leaders articulated alternative meanings of hemispheric exceptionalism to rationalise their continued demands for economic assistance.

Chapter eight shows that Marshall instead came to depend upon new representations of danger to maintain the illusion of coherence in the Western Hemisphere. The riots that erupted during the Bogotá Conference led Marshall to overlook the tensions that
transcended the Cold War to identify the subversive activities of local Communists as the main threat to solidarity in the region. A growing fear of a military confrontation with the Soviet Union also shifted strategic priorities in the Western Hemisphere however. Marshall focused less on projecting a symbolic example into the psychological struggle of the Cold War and more on mobilising and securing access to the vital resources needed for a war effort. He feared that local Communists would take advantage of the root causes of social unrest to pressure Latin American leaders in to adopting autonomous efforts to address their problems of underdevelopment. Marshall attempted to maintain Latin American cooperation in securing US interests with the reinvention of the myths and narratives of revolution as a foundation of a shared history and common purpose. But it remained clear that a lack of resources to raise living standards left a fertile ground for local Communists to exploit the rising tide of revolution across the region.

The final section reveals the consequences of an inability to direct social transformation in the Western Hemisphere for the Truman administration. Chapter nine shows that a lack of resources to shape Latin American development left Marshall to seek measures to eradicate the Communist threat. The inability even to fund military assistance for the containment of subversive activities meant that the Truman administration remained a spectator as Latin American governments took matters into their own hands. Marshall did not support military dictatorships as part of a deliberate attempt to establish an anti-Communist coalition in the Western Hemisphere. As the final chapter demonstrates he could only observe the conservative reaction to the rising tide of revolution in Latin America. The failure of the Good Neighbour Policy to shape developments across the region meant that Marshall looked instead to ensure the cooperation of these
dictatorships in securing US interests. The reactionary coups at the end of 1948 also exposed the illusion of coherence in the Western Hemisphere. The most important task became the articulation of a new meaning of the Western Hemisphere that would protect a positive image of the US as a Good Neighbour.

Marshall should be remembered as an “incoherent neighbour”. The key to understanding the incoherence in his strategic approach in the Western Hemisphere is found in the tension between the particular and the universal. Strategies of containment focused on demonstrating the universality of US leadership and the American way of life through symbolic examples in particular geographical spaces. Marshall identified both Western Europe and the Western Hemisphere as the initial theatres for this psychological struggle. The prioritisation of resources for the Marshall Plan helped ensure the successful demonstration of the American way of life in Western Europe. It also brought the failure of the symbolic example of the US as Good Neighbour in the Western Hemisphere however. As a result Latin America came to be regarded more as a source of vital resources needed for the success of examples in other theatres. The priority became the stabilisation of the Western Hemisphere. The failure of Marshall to address the rising tide of revolution across the region ensured that it would break later to present a challenge to the universality of US leadership and the American way of life.
Notes for Introduction

2 The Diary of President Harry S. Truman, “Entry on Wednesday, January 8th 1947,” The Truman Library (www.trumanlibrary.org/diary/page7.htm)
5 President Roosevelt told Marshall: ‘I didn’t feel I could sleep at ease if you were out of Washington.’ See Buell, Thomas B., and John H. Bradley, *The Second World War: Europe and the Mediterranean* (New York: Square One, 2002) p. 258
6 *Time*, 10.03.1947
8 Jacques Lacan developed the concept of the “subject supposed to know” in his studies of psychoanalysis, to examine an analysand’s relationship to their analyst. It can be used in this context to describe a general transference on to Marshall to make the decisions on how to determine their role in the world. The idea of mass gratitude for the burden of leadership being removed is also covered in the extensive work of the German sociologist, Robert Michels.
9 *Time*, 27.01.1947
10 Interview with George C. Marshall, by William M. Spencer, July 7th 1947 (Marshall Foundation Library)
12 Interview with George C. Marshall, by Forrest C. Pogue, Tape 19 (Marshall Foundation Library); *Time*, 10.03.1947
13 The positive transformation was later acknowledged by the State Department in 1970.
14 The Diary of President Harry S. Truman, “Entry on Wednesday, January 8th 1947,” The Truman Library (www.trumanlibrary.org/diary/page7.htm)
15 Pogue, *George C. Marshall*, p. 146
17 *Time*, 10.03.1947
19 *Time*, 17.02.1947
20 ‘We were determined to do our part to bring peace to a war-weary world and we have not sought any excuse, however plausible, for shirking our responsibilities,’ Byrnes told 12,000 spectators in Cleveland. ‘The US will keep that covenant,’ he promised. *Time*, 20.01.1947
21 Pogue, *George C. Marshall*, p. 162; *Time*, 10.03.1947
23 Ibid. p. 28
24 Pogue, *George C. Marshall*, p. 165
26 Interview with George C. Marshall, by Forrest C. Pogue, Tape 19 (Marshall Foundation Library); Interview with George C. Marshall, by Harry B. Price and Roy E. Foulke, February 18th 1953 (Marshall Foundation Library); *Time*, 10.03.1947
27 Uuldrich, *Soldier, Statesman, Peacemaker*, p. 185
29 *Time*, 03.01.1944
30 *Time*, 05.01.1948
34 See for example Pops, Gerald, “The Ethical Leadership of George C. Marshall,” *Public Integrity* (Volume 8, No. 2) p. 177
37 Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, p. 274
38 McCormick, *America’s Half-Century*, p. 75
39 Kolko, *Confronting the Third World*, p. 75

41 Campbell, Writing Security, p. X and p. 169
42 See Ninkovich, Modernity and Power p. 193
43 Ibid., p. 174
46 Campbell, Writing Security, p. 91
47 For more see Kenworthy, Eldon, America/Américas: Myth in the Making of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995)
48 Weber, Cynthia, Imagining America at War: Morality, Politics, and Film (London: Taylor and Francis, 2006) p. 6
49 X, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs (July 1947) p. 582
50 Campbell, “Contradictions of a Lone Superpower,” p. 236
55 Schwartzberg, Steven, Democracy and US Policy in Latin America during the Truman Years (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2003)
56 Schoultz, Beneath the United States, p. 309


I. REPRESENTATIONS of the WESTERN HEMISPHERE
1. Internal Incoherence

The appointment of George C. Marshall as Secretary of State in January 1947 made an immediate impact on the strategic environment in Washington. On his arrival at the State Department he sought recommendations from his Undersecretary of State, Dean G. Acheson, on the priority issues requiring his urgent attention. Acheson advised him of a need to address growing conflict over the current approach towards Latin America. The lack of consensus could be attributed, in some part, to the continuous personnel changes within the State Department. Alongside the four Secretaries in as many years, three changes had been made in the position of regional co-ordinator. The strategic approach shaped by Spruille Braden after filling the post of Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs in October 1945 created more serious tensions however. Acheson informed Marshall of the inertia besetting US strategy in the Western Hemisphere as Braden struggled to defend his position from criticism mounting across Washington. He also warned that the clashes endangered his own authority as they spilled over into the public sphere and undermined the image of the State Department.

Marshall sought an immediate resolution of the situation. He invited Braden into his office in order to identify the magnitude of the problem. Marshall noted being particularly unimpressed by the Assistant Secretary; he considered his strategic vision for the region to be ‘not all of one piece’. Marshall did bring some of his own ideas on the strategic priorities for the Western Hemisphere. His prior experience in securing inter-American cooperation in the mobilisation of the defences of the region during the Second World War appeared a more appropriate strategic focus as relations with the
Soviet Union continued to deteriorate. Marshall shared the fears of his colleagues in the armed services and those of Congress that the intervention of Braden in the internal affairs of Latin American countries endangered this regional cooperation and diverted attention from more serious business at hand. But Marshall appeared less concerned in shaping a coherent strategic approach in the Western Hemisphere than restoring internal cohesion within Washington. The tensions caused by the failure of Braden to command a broad consensus in support of his strategic approach typified the distractions that Marshall sought to root out of the State Department and the rest of the Truman administration. He soon identified Braden as the main obstacle to his priority of restoring a coordinated strategic approach under his leadership.3

**Hemispheric Security**

The Secretaries of War and Navy, Robert P. Patterson and James V. Forrestal, as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, regarded the arrival of Marshall at the State Department as an opportunity to end the bureaucratic clashes that had ultimately led to impasse for strategy in the Western Hemisphere. The military leadership found Braden to be particularly uncooperative and obstructive to their agenda of securing the Western Hemisphere. They sought to re-establish the inter-American cooperation in preparing the defence of the region that had become the focus of strategy during the Second World War. Patterson and Forrestal, in particular, had become increasingly frustrated by the readiness of Braden and the rest of the State Department to dismiss their warnings of the potential threat that the Soviet Union posed to the security of the Western Hemisphere.4 Both had worked with Marshall in mobilising military forces in preparation for the Second World War. They anticipated that the arrival of their former
colleague represented a shift in focus within the State Department that would bring renewed collaboration on their security agenda.

Marshall certainly shared their understanding of the vital interests for the US in securing the region. He had come to identify the defence of the Western Hemisphere as synonymous with the security of the US during his time as Army Chief of Staff. Marshall had been integral at the start of the Second World War in transforming the geographical concept of security, which had already expanded through more limited spaces of an “American lake” through to a quarter-sphere, into the defence of the entire hemisphere. Marshall emphasised the value of securing the region in a memorandum presented to President Franklin D. Roosevelt in May 1940; he prioritised defence of the Western Hemisphere over other interests in Europe and the Far East. This importance of hemispheric security had only been confirmed for Marshall as he observed the German advance across Africa towards the Atlantic.

Marshall also rejected the view held by both Byrnes and Braden that the threat posed to the region by the Soviet Union lacked immediacy. He accepted their emphasis on a more pressing danger to Western Europe. In the event of an outbreak of war with the Soviet Union Marshall agreed with the assessments of General Dwight D. Eisenhower that he ‘wouldn’t expect South America to be a battleground in the strategic factors that apply in the world today.’ Although he acknowledged that regional defence no longer remained sufficient for US security after the Second World War, Marshall shared the general impatience of the armed services to ‘get this hemisphere together’ before any possible confrontation with the Soviet Union.
Marshall had already learned an important lesson in building readiness to defend the Americas in the event of a failure to meet a threat in Europe. He warned the House Appropriations Committee in February 1940, that ‘if Europe blazes in the late spring or summer, we must put our house in order before the sparks reach the Western Hemisphere.’

Substantial efforts were later necessary to divert resources into counteracting the influence of Nazi Germany in the region. Marshall identified a vital interest in preparedness for an uncertain threat during an indeterminate peace. ‘No man can predict the outcome of the tragic struggle in Europe,’ he warned graduates of the Virginia Military Institute in June 1940. ‘No American can foresee the eventual effect on the Americas.’

Marshall continued to preach these lessons in the post-war period. Shortly before his appointment as Secretary of State he testified in hearings before Congress that a program of hemispheric defence would remain necessary, even in peace, in order to avoid future repetition of previous mistakes.

The established record of Marshall encouraged Patterson and Forrestal to renew their appeals for collaboration with the State Department on securing the Western Hemisphere. They promptly solicited Marshall for his endorsement of their immediate priority of pursuing funding for a program of military assistance. Marshall had long been an advocate of inter-American military cooperation as an essential instrument for hemispheric defence. In his position as Army Chief of Staff he approved plans, promoted by both Patterson and Forrestal, to sell standardised and arms across the region. Marshall considered such a program to be ‘of first importance to the peace and safety of the Western Hemisphere.’

Shortly before the Second World War he declared that: ‘we are determined that if it should become necessary for us to use a club to defend our
democracy and our interests in the Western Hemisphere, that it shall be a club of hard wood, and not of rubber hose.’

Marshall dismissed the concerns expressed by both Byrnes and Braden that a focus on inter-American military cooperation would divert vital resources away from Europe. He agreed with Patterson and Forrestal that failure to mobilise the military power of the rest of the region would only later lead to the redirection of US resources from the European frontier. Although he had warned against assuming sole responsibility for protecting the hemisphere before entry into the Second World War, Marshall criticised the eventual program of military assistance for Latin America that only came through ‘convulsive, expensive expansion in an emergency.’ After more than 100,000 US troops had to be re-stationed to defend the Western Hemisphere, Marshall supported the recommendations of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee at the end of the war for a better planned program of military assistance for Latin American. Marshall also prioritised inter-American military cooperation to guarantee access to the strategic air bases, sea lines of communication, and raw materials that would be necessary for launching any defence of Europe. Eisenhower agreed that if Latin America was not going to be a key battleground, it would still provide ‘the main base’ of US power.

Marshall understood that his reputation amongst fellow military leaders meant that a shift to security as the strategic focus in the Western Hemisphere would allow him to reassert the authority of the State Department. Both Patterson and Forrestal acknowledged that the experience of Marshall in preparing and implementing plans for hemispheric defence during his time as Army Chief of Staff made him best suited to lead in securing the region from the emerging Soviet danger. Marshall remained in no hurry
to impose his own strategic vision however. He decided to defer his decision on inter-
American military cooperation until after his return from the Moscow Conference when
time could be found to make a comprehensive review of strategy in the Western
Hemisphere.

Marshall appeared to be more concerned with renewing cooperation between the State
Department and the armed services. He provided Patterson and Forrestal with some
encouragement that he would consider a review of the State Department opposition to
their security agenda after authorising a preliminary study of possible requests from
Latin America as part of a wider program of military assistance. As the
recommendations of this study would form the basis of the review of State Department
strategy in the Western Hemisphere, both Patterson and Forrestal welcomed the
decision by Marshall to remove the responsibility for this study from Braden and the
Office of American Republic Affairs. As General John H. Hilldring proved ‘very receptive’
to their objectives after being chosen to lead the review, Patterson and Forrestal
anticipated that this reflected Marshall’s own support for their agenda of hemispheric
security.

**Hemispheric Solidarity**

The prospects for some convergence between the State Department and the armed
services after the return of Marshall to Washington by no means assured a coherent
shift in strategy in the Western Hemisphere. A domestic consensus on a strategic
approach towards Latin America faced a more serious challenge from the new
Republican leadership in Congress. Marshall soon realised that the support of Congress
would be difficult to maintain without marginalising Braden. The strategic approach shaped by the Assistant Secretary incited animosity amongst legislators seeking to restore the earlier era of the Good Neighbour Policy. The new Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Arthur H. Vandenberg (R-MI), summarised the fears of the Republican leadership that the interventionist campaigns conducted by Braden against Latin American dictators only undermined the continental solidarity established in the Good Neighbour Policy. He warned Marshall that the US would face a “communistic upsurge” in the region if Braden continued to force the Americas apart. Vandenberg demanded an immediate shift in strategic approach from Marshall and insisted that his commitment to bipartisan cooperation with the Truman administration would not extend to ‘the policy in Latin America now operating in a vacuum created by Assistant Secretary of State Spruille Braden.’

Marshall understood the enmity that Braden provoked amongst the Republican leadership threatened his objective of domestic consensus. Only days after the House of Representatives censured Braden as a ‘muddling jug head,’ he privately assured senior Congressional members that he would deal with the Assistant Secretary in the near future. Marshall informed the House Foreign Affairs Committee that he would formulate his own approach to the region on his return from the Moscow Conference; he could however, promise them that he would not be adopting Braden’s policies.

Marshall understood as well as the military leadership that the priority for Congress of restoring the hemispheric solidarity of the Good Neighbour era could make them reluctant to support a renewed focus on securing the Western Hemisphere. The preceding 79th Congress had rejected appropriations for an earlier draft of the Inter-
American Military Cooperation Act after failing to be persuaded of the immediate need to prepare regional defences. The armed services increasingly adopted the discursive meanings of the Good Neighbour Policy to frame their own security agenda in order to satisfy the demands of Congress. ‘Hemispheric solidarity was the word [sic] we used for national security,’ later noted Major General Kenner F. Hertford, who led the War Department’s Pan-American Group.

Patterson and Forrestal recognised that the smooth passage of future legislation for an expensive program of military assistance for Latin America however, relied on gaining the support of Marshall. The outgoing Democratic Speaker of the House of Representatives, Sam Rayburn, made clear the importance of testimonial support from Marshall: ‘He laid it on the line. He would tell the truth even if it hurt his cause. Congress always respected him. They would give him things they would give no one else.’

Marshall had already joined the military leadership in efforts to persuade Congress that inter-American military cooperation provided the necessary corollary to restoring the continental solidarity of the Good Neighbour Policy:

‘I think it is fundamental that we should do everything within our power in a reasonable manner to unify the entire Western Hemisphere, so far as we can, in our thinking and in our arrangements, for our own security, for our own well-being.’

Only weeks before his appointment as Secretary of State, Marshall told the House Foreign Affairs Committee that: ‘Pan-American solidarity is a highly essential military need at the moment.’
Patterson and Forrestal hoped that the reputation of Marshall would secure success in their pursuit of legislation on inter-American military cooperation. Marshall’s departure for the Moscow Conference did not deter them from pressing the State Department to reconsider its opposition to a focus on securing the region however. The significance of hemispheric solidarity to the Good Neighbour era presented an opportunity to Patterson and Forrestal to mobilise Congress in support for a commitment to military cooperation. A short visit to Mexico had brought an impulsive promise from Truman to seek congressional authorisation for the sale of military equipment to the administration of President Miguel Alemán Valdés.26 Patterson and Forrestal insisted that the credibility of Truman’s commitment to friendly and collaborative relations with neighbouring countries relied on the smooth passage of the Inter-American Military Cooperation Act.

The strategic vision of inter-American solidarity and security shared by Marshall and the military leadership seemed to offer a chance to end the bureaucratic deadlock in the executive branch over the control and direction of hemispheric strategy. Patterson and Forrestal anticipated that a commitment to inter-American military cooperation from the popular Secretary of State would present a united front needed to convince Congress to support their strategic priorities. Even with the absence of Marshall from Washington, they hoped that the momentum continued to shift in their favour. As a result they renewed their appeals for the State Department to reverse its opposition to inter-American military cooperation.

The State Department would not overturn its established position simply because of the appointment of Marshall as Secretary of State however. The tensions between Braden
and the armed services represented more than a clash of bureaucratic interests. The promotion of divergent priorities rested on the evocation of different strategic traditions as ideological rationale. Braden dismissed outright the Soviet threat and the assurances made to Mexico by Truman as sufficient rationale to shift the State Department position in support of a return to the earlier wartime footing of the Good Neighbour Policy. The State Department had already outlined two major problems in making an association between securing the region and consolidating solidarity in the Western Hemisphere.

Firstly, the prioritisation of inter-American cooperation did not converge with an effective defence of the Americas. The need to offer comparable assistance packages to each of the Latin American governments, regardless of strategic location, in order to maintain hemispheric solidarity, wasted essential resources for regional defence. Increasing the military capacity of the smallest Republics would also bring little additional security to the hemisphere. The reluctance of many military planners in the US to depend upon a number of Latin American Republics for anything more than secondary responsibilities in hemispheric defence only demonstrated that the US would still need to assume their duties in the eventuality of an outbreak of war.27 This disinclination to trust some Latin American militaries with important roles for regional security was evident during the war; the US, for example, maintained the Inter-American Defense Board only as a symbolic channel for collective security, whilst continuing to take on the key operations.28

Secondly, a prioritisation of security objectives only created more serious problems for hemispheric unity. Braden warned of a repeat of the ‘very serious situation’ that arose
when military assistance packages had been prioritised for countries vital for regional
defence. The State Department noted during the war that Truman's directive to grant
Lend-Lease military aid only to those Latin American countries essential for continuing
the war effort caused widespread resentment and tension that undermined the
solidarity of the hemisphere.\textsuperscript{29} The directive made sense from a military perspective;
the defence of priority geographic areas, such as the northeast Brazilian ‘bulge’ at Natal
and the Panama Canal, had been identified by the War and Navy Departments during
the war.\textsuperscript{30} The limited allocation of resources and attention however, left other Latin
American allies feeling neglected by the US and increasingly cautious of the rising
military capabilities of their neighbours.

The State Department continued to highlight the inherent tensions in the simultaneous
pursuit of security and solidarity in the Western Hemisphere particularly through a
focus on inter-American military cooperation. Braden also recognised the momentum
building against him however. He persuaded Acheson not to wait for Marshall to return
from Moscow before responding to Patterson and Forrestal. The Assistant Secretary
seized the opportunity to draft a memorandum defending his opposition to inter-
American military cooperation for Acheson to authorise.

**Hemispheric Order**

The declaration of the Truman Doctrine further shifted the strategic environment days
before Braden completed his memorandum on inter-American military cooperation.
The emerging security discourse that followed the identification of a hostile enemy in
the Soviet Union articulated a new nodal point around which Patterson and Forrestal
could attempt to redefine the meaning of US strategy in the Western Hemisphere. The military leadership had long warned the State Department of the serious danger of the intrusion of Soviet influence would undermine the US position and threaten to destabilise the region. This danger appeared to provide them with a response to the limitations highlighted by the State Department of a multilateral approach to defending the region. Although he acknowledged that the rationale for an assistance program remained ‘more political than military,’ Patterson repeatedly emphasised the interest in securing a stable flank in South America and the necessity of action to avoid any ‘confusion’ and disorder caused by ‘enemy penetration – political, economic or military.’ He insisted on the need to support military institutions that dominated politics across Latin America as the only safe means to ensure the exclusion of Soviet influence over prominent positions. The failure to exclude foreign military missions and equipment from Latin America would present a ‘grave danger to the US.’

State Department officials agreed on the vital strategic interest in stabilising the region. Their fundamentally different understanding of the nature of order in the Western Hemisphere however, prevented the War and Navy Departments from fixing meanings that would determine a self-evident or necessary strategic approach towards the region. These alternative constructions simply established the strategic objective of order in the Western Hemisphere as a site for struggle. Whilst Patterson and Forrestal insisted that the cohesion of the region could be maintained through the simple exclusion of external influences, Braden identified internal dynamics that caused dysfunction in the order of the Western Hemisphere. He had drawn an antagonistic frontier within the region that isolated authoritarian leaders as the primary obstacle to the realisation of order.
Braden did not consider the context of confrontation with the Soviet Union to be just cause to shift the focus of his strategy in the Western Hemisphere. The representations of danger only provided new rationale for the alternative interpretations of US objectives in the Western Hemisphere constructed within the State Department. He sent his memorandum to Patterson and Forrestal warning of the ‘wholly undesirable consequences’ that inter-American military cooperation would invite.34

Braden highlighted foremost that military assistance would undermine individual political freedoms across the region. The State Department had long warned against strengthening Latin American militaries that would offer authoritarian leaders the legitimacy and means to turn on their own citizens.35 The popular discontent at widespread repression of democratic movements would become a source of instability across the entire region. Secretary Byrnes had even asked Patterson to curtail military visits to Latin American Republics as they could be misinterpreted in those countries facing political turmoil, particularly those with upcoming elections.36 The US Ambassador in Paraguay, Willard Beaulac, reaffirmed this message from his experience in Asunción: ‘The point that is sought to be made, is that our military cooperation with Paraguay ...tends to make democratization of Paraguay more difficult.’37

State Department officials and Foreign Service Officers agreed on the need to maintain strong relationships with Latin American leaders in order to prevent subversive influences. But Acheson had warned the War Department that cooperation with authoritarian militaries,
would lose much of the support and friendship of those people of Latin America who are devoted to the cause of peace and of stable democratic government. In the long run we must in large measure rely upon the support of those groups if our position of leadership among the American Republics is to be maintained and strengthened.’

Braden had long maintained that military cooperation would only perpetuate ‘the grip of reactionary military groups’ that actually created the conditions favourable to the spread of communism. He insisted that hemispheric order could only be secured on the foundation of continued inter-American cooperation between progressive democratic movements.

Braden also warned Patterson and Forrestal that military assistance threatened to exacerbate dependent and ‘backward’ economic conditions across the region. State Department officials repeatedly stressed the danger in encouraging Latin American governments to redirect limited resources from improving destabilising standards of living towards expenditure on military programs for hemispheric defence. Braden had previously managed to persuade Byrnes to move away from hesitant conciliation with the War and Navy Departments and harden the State Department position, by showing that even a post-war interim program of arms sales had been beyond the economic capacity of many of the Latin American Republics.

Braden adopted the rhetoric of the Truman Doctrine to warn of the destabilisation that the economic handicaps of a military assistance program would cause:
‘[It would] aggravate conditions of economic and political instability which already constitute a serious problem for this Government in Latin America, and which this Government now proposes to spend large amounts of money to overcome in other parts of the world. These conditions are the soil in which the seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured.’

Many of the progressive leaders in Latin America agreed. ‘The armaments race has been one of the bad factors in Latin America,’ stated the Chilean President, Gabriel González Videla. ‘We are too poor to bear the load and [we] need the money to raise [our] standard of living. As a Chilean and ... an American, I am, frankly, an enemy of over-arming.’ After the revised studies carried out by Hilldring revealed that a Latin American program of arms standardisation would approach a cost of $1 billion Braden took an even stronger tone. ‘Encouragement of expenditures on arms by the Latin American countries,’ Braden noted, ‘runs directly counter to our basic economic and political policies which aim to encourage an improvement in the living standards and economic welfare in those countries.’ He concluded that the military assistance program proposed by the War and Navy Departments was, in short, ‘dangerous to hemisphere security.’

Braden provoked immediate responses from both Patterson and Forrestal. As well as reasserting that their security agenda could not be neglected, the military leadership also emphasised that inter-American military cooperation did not undermine State Department objectives. The armed services had agreed during the war that regional stability required the US to ‘avoid the stimulation of political rivalries or other political developments which would prejudice our good relations with the other American
Republics.' But Patterson and Forrestal maintained a pragmatic approach to realising those objectives. The US could not afford to lose their influence over Latin American military leaders that would not relinquish their predominant position in government life. Failure to do so risked a significant danger of encouraging extra-hemispheric influences. Patterson and Forrestal still insisted that inter-American military cooperation however, would still ‘introduce and demonstrate, to individuals in key positions, US democratic principles.’

The armed services also insisted that a program of military assistance would not be so expensive as to impede shared objectives and would similarly encourage Latin American leaders to embrace American ideals and way of life. Patterson stressed that as many Latin American governments wanted to buy arms regardless, it was important to ensure that the US furnished them rather than a European – or worse – Soviet-bloc country. He reminded the State Department that the US needed to maintain Latin American military establishments that ‘they, not we, feel they require.’ Patterson felt that the increased prospects for war should not raise a question of whether the Latin Americans should receive arms, but whether they would have US or foreign arms? He asserted that the US could not afford to play into the hands of the Soviet Union by allowing them to gain influence through military missions. If crises were costly in money, time and blood, Patterson suggested, prevention was cheap and the US could ‘lock the stable door’ before the horse was stolen. He argued that inter-American military cooperation had been designed ‘to prevent the very type of crisis which has arisen in Turkey and Greece.’
Strategic Shift

The representations of danger in the Cold War did not determine a strategic approach in the Western Hemisphere and it would be necessary for Marshall to end the bureaucratic deadlock on his return to Washington. His experience at the Moscow Conference meant that he now looked to defer the comprehensive strategic review promised before his departure. The ongoing bureaucratic conflict on the issue of inter-American military cooperation undermining internal cohesion still required his immediate attention even in the absence of a coherent strategic blueprint. He decided to delegate authority to Acheson to represent the State Department at a meeting of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on the morning of 1st May however. Although Acheson had endorsed his memorandum opposing inter-American military cooperation only a few weeks earlier, Braden realised that his exclusion from the meeting likely signalled the end of his influence over shaping strategy in the region.

Acheson opened the meeting by informing Patterson and Forrestal ‘that he had overruled objections within his department against the [Inter-American Military Cooperation Act] and that the State Department would now support it.’\textsuperscript{49} This shift in position certainly did not represent a genuine change of heart or a reconciliation of the tensions identified in the strategy pursued by the armed services. The decision appeared to be a measure of political expedience – a combination of avoiding any damage to his reputation during his last days in office or those of his superiors.

Firstly, Acheson had considered it necessary to respond to the significant transformation in the strategic climate within Washington whilst Marshall remained absent in Moscow. He had already learned important lessons that convinced him of the
imprudence of waiting to persuade Marshall of the State Department opposition to inter-American military cooperation. The intervention of the President alerted Acheson to the costs of maintaining State Department opposition to the security agenda in the Western Hemisphere. He had recognised the tide moving away from his liberal views on the Soviet Union in late 1946 and shifted to a more hard-line approach. After the shift in strategic climate created by the Truman Doctrine, Acheson detected the possibility of similar changes for strategy in the Western Hemisphere. The recommendations for a comprehensive military assistance program delivered by Hilldring in his interim report only supported these trends. Acheson showed reluctant to risk maintaining a position that would likely be reversed once Marshall received recommendations in support of his own preferred approach. The new attitude that Marshall brought back from Moscow only confirmed the decision for Acheson. After a bitter experience as Roosevelt’s Acting Secretary of the Treasury early in his career, Acheson had become “quite determined” to avoid any arguments with his superiors that threatened to undermine their prestige or damage his own status.

Secondly, Acheson shaped his decision within the context of a restructuring State Department. He welcomed the effective coordination introduced by Marshall and managed to establish an effective working relationship with the new Secretary; but Acheson typified the veteran diplomats that found some difficulty in adapting to the military approach in the personal style of Marshall. He recognised the Secretary’s willingness to accept the recommendations of his advisers, but remained concerned that Marshall did not spend enough time considering alternative solutions to problems. Shortly after his arrival, the new Secretary instructed two subordinates arguing over recommendations to not ‘fight the problem,’ but ‘decide it.’ To reduce his own exposure
to personal clashes that could influence decisions, Marshall delegated responsibility for coordinating action to his Special Assistant, Colonel Marshall S. J. Carter. Acheson was not expected to promote deliberation within the State Department, but rather to ensure that everyone sang from the same hymn sheet. Acheson recognised that standing by a position promoted by Braden would be far from expedient within this new institutional context.

Braden was less willing to accept the reversal of his position however. He wrote to Marshall accusing him of deceiving the public on the problems faced with military assistance. Braden felt that the refusal of the Secretary to heed the warnings of his own department constituted a deliberate manipulation of the facts. Marshall considered Braden’s protest letter to be the final straw. As Army Chief of Staff he had proved to be a ‘merciless redliner’ and readily fired inefficient high-ranking officers. Marshall called Braden into his office, where he was ‘quietly informed that his services would not long be needed.’ Truman’s authorisation to send the Inter-American Military Cooperation Act to Congress a few weeks later only convinced Braden that he could not have continued in his post with any authority anyway.

The realignment of the State Department with the agenda of security in the Western Hemisphere did not represent the implementation of a coherent strategic vision. Although Marshall did consider the approach adopted by Braden to be damaging to both the security and solidarity of the region, his primary concern remained to re-establish a unity within Washington. Marshall could only manage to establish an “illusion of coherence” through the identification of Braden and his strategic approach as the empirical obstacle to this unity however. The isolation of Braden only objectified the
ontological impossibility of articulating a discourse that fixed all meanings for the Western Hemisphere. Marshall could not simply throw Braden out of the State Department as dirty water and expect to be left with a pure strategic vision; it was the incoherence of these strategic concepts that had soiled Braden in the first place.

The differences over hemispheric strategy during the first few months of 1947 had been based on alternative conceptualisations as well as organisational conflicts of interest. A simple commitment to inter-American military cooperation ultimately could not reconcile the tensions that emerged from a failure to represent those demanding an alternative commitment to promoting the political and economic freedoms of the region. Although security emerged as the dominant discourse to frame strategy in the Western Hemisphere, the divergent meanings used by the State Department would survive beyond Spruille Braden.
Notes for Chapter 1

3 *Time*, 03.02.1947
9 Hertford was appointed as Brigadier General. See Oral History Interview with Kenner F. Hertford, by Richard D. McKinzie, 17.06.1974 (Truman Library)
17 Ibid., p. 200
20 Pogue, *George C. Marshall*, p. 259
21 Ibid. p. 241
22 Oral History Interview with Kenner F. Hertford, by Richard D. McKinzie, 17.06.1974 (Truman Library)
Opposition to this interim program was aggravated by US pricing regulations forcing military equipment to be sold without allowance for depreciation.
“The Secretary of War to the Acting Secretary of State,” 17.04.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)
45 810.20 Defense/3-2747, Department of State, “The Secretary of War to the Acting Secretary of State,” 27.03.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)
46 810.20 Defense/3-2747, Department of State, “The Secretary of War to the Acting Secretary of State,” 27.03.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)
47 810.20 Defense/4-1747, Department of State, “The Secretary of War to the Acting Secretary of State,” 17.04.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)
48 810.20 Defense/3-2747, Department of State, “The Secretary of War to the Acting Secretary of State,” 27.03.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)
49 810.20 Defense/5-147, Department of State, “Minutes of Meeting of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy,” 01.05.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)
51 Ibid.
52 Pogue, George C. Marshall, p. 147; Interview with George C. Marshall, by Forrest C. Pogue, Tape 19 (Marshall Foundation Library)
53 Pogue, George C. Marshall, p. 147; Interview with George C. Marshall, by Forrest C. Pogue, Tape 19 (Marshall Foundation Library)
54 Braden, Spruille, Diplomats and Demagogues (New York: Arlington House, 1971) p. 364
## 2. STRATEGIC INCOHERENCE

The strategic shift in the Western Hemisphere during the first months of 1947 did not originate from a coherent framework. Marshall’s decision to rescind the long-standing State Department opposition to inter-American military cooperation emerged only partially from a concern to secure the US from the danger posed by the Soviet Union. Marshall showed more concern for restoring internal cohesion within Washington. The departure of Spruille Braden cleared an easier path for building a consensus around a strategic priority of securing the Western Hemisphere. Yet Marshall still recognised the need for a comprehensive strategic review. This was no simple task. Aware of his own limits as a geopolitical strategist, Marshall also identified a lack of capacity across the State Department to simultaneously plan and implement strategy.

Marshall continued his restructuring of the State Department in order to address this problem. He turned first to the appointment of Robert A. Lovett as a replacement for Acheson as Undersecretary of State. The two had previously worked together and found that they ‘normally reacted the same way to issues and problems.’ Lovett did not expect any difficulty in integrating their ideas into shaping a wider strategic vision. He used the brief weeks before officially relieving Acheson however, to turn to fellow members of the Council on Foreign Relations for recommendations on strategic priorities. A dinner meeting held at the New York offices of the Council brought a unanimous agreement on the need to secure both the Western Hemisphere and Western Europe within an extended US sphere of influence. The group could not offer
Lovett any suggestions on how to integrate the existing separate approaches towards these different regions into a coherent global strategy however.

Marshall had already decided to establish an autonomous group within the State Department to undertake this task. He instructed Acheson whilst he travelled to the Moscow Conference to recruit George F. Kennan to direct this Policy Planning Staff in reconceptualising US strategic objectives for a new global context. Marshall anticipated that Kennan would introduce a conceptual framework from which to integrate the unique spaces in Western Europe and the Western Hemisphere into a new global strategy. Kennan had already made a significant impact on the strategic environment with his renowned “Long Telegram” sent from Moscow in February 1946. He had been developing his ideas on the Soviet threat since his initial involvement in establishing the Riga Axioms and continued through private communications and lectures at the National War College. These ideas culminated in a memorandum prepared for Secretary Forrestal, entitled “Psychological Background of Soviet Foreign Policy”. The growing awareness in Washington of the Soviet threat ensured an enthusiastic welcome of the recommendations for the containment of the Soviet Union. Kennan’s reputation as a Soviet expert continued to grow and from his new office adjacent to Marshall in the “New State Building” on C Street, he now had the institutional support to influence strategic thought and redefine US interests in a new global role.

Marshall remained a more important figure in reshaping a strategic approach in the Western Hemisphere however. It soon became clear that Marshall would need to fill the gap left by the Policy Planning Staff as it avoided ‘any complete or global answer to the problems of US foreign policy’ in order to focus on ‘individual areas of policy.’
decision to leave the position of Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs vacant after the departure of Braden appeared myopic once Kennan’s narrow focus on Western Europe became apparent. Marshall not only struggled alone in finding a solution to integrating distinct regional approaches into a coherent global strategy; the prioritisation of Western Europe in the initial formulations of Kennan’s strategies of global containment only created further problems for both the means and ends of the US approach in the Western Hemisphere.

**Strategic Priorities**

Serious developments in Western Europe overtook plans for a comprehensive review to address the drift in strategy towards the Western Hemisphere. The State Department provided Marshall with numerous briefings that warned of an imminent economic crisis in Western Europe. He had witnessed the poverty and hunger suffered in Western Europe first hand en route to Moscow. Marshall warned the delegates at the Moscow Conference that the European patient sank whilst the doctors deliberated and insisted that there be no further delay in finding a remedy for their malady. The problem could not ‘fester any longer – the time for launching the boil was now at hand.’ Marshall deferred a broad strategic review and issued Kennan with a narrower remit of finding an immediate solution to this crisis.

Kennan did not consider this remit and the plans to shape wider strategic objectives to be mutually exclusive. Although the Truman Doctrine had implied the need to resist Soviet aggression wherever it emerged, Kennan initially focused his strategies of containment on defending specific strongpoints like Western Europe. He regarded the
security of the American way of life as dependent upon the effective integration of the
total industrial core of Western Europe into the US sphere of influence. Inertia would
only undermine the consolidation of the base of US economic power; an interdependent
economic system based upon freedom of trade, capital flow, and currency convertibility
underpinned US strength.11 State Department analysts also warned that economic
collapse in Western Europe could destabilise the economic system already secured in
the Western Hemisphere. If European nations failed to sell enough produce to raise the
dollars needed to import from the Americas, the growing dollar gap would only
generate incentives for Latin American governments to turn towards economic
autarchy.12

Kennan presented Marshall with recommendations in Policy Planning Study 1 that a
program of economic aid would be the most effective tool to stabilise and strengthen
European infrastructure. He also asserted that a successful demonstration of improved
standards of living through economic assistance would also further encourage
European integration into the American orbit. Marshall authorised these
recommendations in PPS/1 and presented the plans for a European Recovery Program
in a speech at Harvard University two weeks later.13

The leaders of Western Europe welcomed the announcement of this Marshall Plan; but
this did not represent an immediate success for the broader aim of shaping a
comprehensive strategic approach however. Senior officials within the Truman
administration acknowledged that the elevation of the economic reconstruction of
Western Europe to the highest priority even created significant problems for the pursuit
of strategic objectives by seriously limiting the resources available to fulfil existing
commitments. The armed services expressed concerns that extended financial commitments would stretch their capacity to guarantee the security of the entire US orbit. The Assistant Secretary of War, Howard C. Petersen warned that ‘our goals are out of balance with our means.’ The Chief of Staff for the Army, Dwight D. Eisenhower, also emphasised that resources were not available for ‘our great bag of commitments.’

Although the prioritisation of defending strongpoints like Western Europe over the entire perimeter of the US sphere of influence provided the benefit of matching ends to the limited means available, Kennan worried that the limits of these resources would not be sufficient even for the economic reconstruction of Europe. ‘It may be that we have undertaken too much,’ he warned an audience at the National War College. ‘There is a serious gap between the things we have set out to do and our capabilities for doing them,’ he concluded.

Staunch internationalists stepped up to argue the need to match resources to the commitments necessary to maintain US global credibility. Hamilton Fish Armstrong insisted that the ‘American way is not to ask if the US can afford to ask.’ The resolution of this serious tension between commitment and resources is credited to Marshall however. He understood that strategic initiatives, such as the prioritised program of economic assistance in Western Europe, would be short-lived if Congress could not be persuaded to authorise necessary funding. The general reluctance of Congress to extend already stretched resources did not make for an easy task however. The Republican leadership had campaigned on spending cuts and were keeping a tight hold of their “powers of the purse” to restrain any overreaching commitments. The personal credibility of Marshall became essential as he focused his attention on persuading Senator Vandenberg to help him work through legislation on the ERP through
Although he had not consulted the Republican leadership before his Harvard speech, Marshall hoped that his renouncement of any bid for the Democrat nomination to the Presidency would alleviate their fears that his accomplishments would be credited to Truman and thus make it easier for them to cooperate. Marshall held regular secret meetings with Vandenberg at the President’s official guest house in an attempt to find a solution; he noted that the two ‘couldn’t have gotten much closer together unless I sat in Vandenberg’s lap or he sat in mine.’ Marshall later suggested that ‘Vandenberg was my right hand man and at times I was his right hand man.’

Marshall was not entirely successful in his efforts however. Vandenberg could not guarantee appropriations even for the Marshall Plan. Although he emphasised his own commitment to ‘saving civilisation in Europe’ in a private letter to Marshall, Vandenberg informed the Secretary that he did ‘not take it for granted that the American public is ready for such burdens as would be involved.’ Vandenberg reaffirmed his own intentions to pursue a bipartisan approach to foreign affairs, but this would not guarantee a blank cheque for the Truman administration. ‘We are not suddenly resolved to underwrite the earth,’ Vandenberg cautioned. ‘That would be fantastic, improvident, and impossible.’

This refusal to match limited resources to extended commitments proved to have a significant impact on US strategy in the Western Hemisphere. The efforts made by Marshall to extend the responsibilities of the US to Western Europe had already established a sense of overstretching limited resources. Something would have to give. The submission of the request to fund a program of inter-American military cooperation only a few weeks after the announcement of the Marshall Plan evidently represented a
commitment too far for Congress. The House Foreign Affairs Committee raised objections to the costs of the program that Patterson promised would not exceed $10 million per year. The military leaders did their best to emphasise the urgent need for preparations for hemispheric defence. Patterson testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee that the bill was necessary for the 'planned system of collective action to safeguard the peace and security of the Continent.' A few days later, the US delegate to the Inter-American Defense Board, General Matthew B. Ridgway, informed the committee members that by strengthening the regional system, inter-American military cooperation would 'contribute to the effective maintenance of world peace and security.'

Marshall made his own appeal with similar conviction. Demonstrating the new unified approach towards strategy in the Western Hemisphere, Marshall 'urgently recommended early and favourable action.' His failure to assure the smooth passing of House Resolution 3836 revealed the limitations of not only his influence in Congress, but also the coherence of his strategic approach for the Western Hemisphere. Marshall appeared mistaken once again in his assumption that the prospects of war meant that legislation on inter-American military cooperation would 'skid through like a wet duck.' Although the Cold War provided a rationale for inter-American military cooperation, it also prioritised limited resources to be redirected to the new frontier in Western Europe. Significant opposition arose from continued doubts as to the urgency of returning the Good Neighbour Policy to a wartime footing.

Senators and House Representatives also remained unconvinced that other long-held objections to a hemispheric program of military cooperation had been resolved. The
House Foreign Affairs Committee again raised questions on the use of a military rationale for what was essentially a political program. On the one hand they expressed concerns about the fitness of a program that did not prioritise aid to those Latin American countries assuming responsibilities vital to hemispheric security. On the other hand however, they feared it would offer opportunities for specific Latin American governments and their supporters in the US to develop political reasons for more assistance. A divisive use of preponderant US power to support political allies would only undermine the Good Neighbour commitment to a regional fraternity of equal and sovereign American Republics.

Senator Robert A. Taft (R-OH) led demonstrations in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee against even putting the bill on a tight legislative agenda before adjournment. Marshall reluctantly agreed with Senator Vandenberg to postpone any further consideration of the bill until the next session of Congress. The ultimate failure of Marshall to assure legislative action from, what Truman later referred to as, the “do-nothing” 80th Congress cast a first major blow for his efforts to reshape strategy in the Western Hemisphere.

**Strategic Frontiers**

The Inter-American Military Cooperation Act did not fail simple because of a disparity between ends and means. Strategy in the Western Hemisphere vacillated in the early months of 1947 more fundamentally from the absence of clearly defined ends. The State Department only began to conceptualise a broader framework for strategic objectives at the global level in response to the struggle it faced in finding a clear path through
Congress for the Marshall Plan. The efforts to explain the meaning of US economic assistance for Western Europe first in terms of a broader self-interest and then of more universal purpose only created further problems for US strategy in the Western Hemisphere. The conceptualisation of the abstract principles guiding a broader strategic approach with a primary consideration of the specific problems of Western Europe ensured tensions in their application to the different context of the Western Hemisphere.

The need to appeal to enduring constructions of national exceptionalism to frame the new US role in the world became evident as the State Department failed to explain the meaning of economic assistance to Western Europe in more simple terms of self-interest. Acheson used an address to the Delta Council in Mississippi to provide an explanation for the American public on what the crisis in Western Europe ‘meant for the US and for US foreign policy.’ In what Truman would later describe as the ‘prologue to the Marshall Plan,’ Acheson described the substantial financial commitment to the economic reconstruction of Western Europe as ‘chiefly a matter of self-interest.’ Administration officials repeatedly emphasised that future US prosperity and security depended on consolidating European integration into an American system of free trade. Although Marshall insisted that the intention all along had been to ‘spring the plan with explosive force’ to prevent premature political debate, the ultimate failure to drum up popular support meant that the State Department actually expended more effort in limiting the exposure of the commitment to Europe in the American press.

The Council on Foreign Relations led criticisms of the ineptitude shown by the State Department in its efforts to encourage the scale of sacrifice necessary for the
reconstruction of Europe. Senator Vandenberg warned that Congressional authorisation of assistance to Western Europe remained difficult ‘until it is far more efficiently demonstrated to the American people that this is in the latitude of their own available resources and serves their intelligent self-interest.’ Marshall continued to frame the program as an ‘entirely a selfish move’ after further consultations with Vandenberg. He increased efforts to sell the ERP in areas such as the Middle West however. Marshall later described these attempts as if he ‘were running for office.’ The need for a different approach became increasingly clear however.

Kennan had already acknowledged this need to explain ‘to an informed public in our country the complexities of some of the problems which confront it and the background of some of its solutions.’ He consented for the Council on Foreign Relations to publish his memorandum drafted for Forrestal in Foreign Affairs in the hope that it would foster similar support amongst the public for action to contain the Soviet Union. The editor of the journal, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, included the memorandum as an essay entitled “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” under the pseudonym – X.

The Council on Foreign Relations later described the immediate impact that the X article made upon the national climate:

‘Perhaps no single essay of the twentieth century can match the X article for its impact upon the intellectual curiosity of a confused nation, upon the mindset of equally confused policymakers and scholars, upon national policy in at least seven presidential administrations to come.’
The influence of the X article did not emanate from Kennan presenting a comprehensive strategic vision for the US or even the prescription of specific policies; it derived precisely from the fact that it had been framed in ‘terms of principles’ rather than clear strategic objectives. The X article simply provided a timely and widespread dissemination of an intellectual framework that reaffirmed the ‘gross oversimplification of reality’ in the Truman Doctrine. The Manichaean construction of the ‘US and Soviet Union representing two opposed hostile poles in the world’ rearticulated a ‘geography of evil’ that made the international environment understandable. The identification of the new face of evil in the Soviet threat served as a negative agent to rearticulate enduring constructions of American exceptionalism. In order to meet the challenge posed by the Soviet Union, Kennan declared that the US ‘need only measure up to its own best traditions and prove itself worthy of preservation as a great nation.’ He appealed to the American people to assume ‘the responsibilities of moral and political leadership that history plainly intended them to bear.’

In these constructions of containment Kennan provided Marshall with more of a discursive strategy ‘associated with the logic of identity.’ The discourse of containment became central in defining an American identity that ‘left a sort of tidal stain’ on Marshall. In promoting the ERP as a strategic priority Marshall moved away from a narrow focus on US interests and reverted instead to similar appeals to the messianic tendency in American identity. He emphasised the duty of the US to confront the universal threat of hunger, poverty and chaos. Marshall called on the American people ‘to face up to that responsibility which history has clearly placed upon our country, the difficulties I have outlined can and will be overcome.’ He also framed the economic reconstruction of Western Europe in terms of securing the extended US
sphere against Soviet expansion. Soviet attempts to exploit political and economic instability posed a serious threat to the integration of Western Europe into the American orbit. Marshall emphasised that subversive communist movements thrived on the kind of crisis seen in Europe. He warned that the Soviets would do everything possible to stir unrest; it was a parasite or cancer feeding on European infirmity.  

Kennan feared that the use of the universal rhetoric employed in the Truman Doctrine and his X article to frame the Marshall Plan in terms of the containment of the Soviet Union would undermine the focus on defending strategic strongpoints. He warned that the Messianic rhetoric and Manichaean constructions necessary to mobilise domestic support would simultaneously rouse fears amongst leaders in Western Europe of being drawn into a crusade or confrontation with the Soviet Union. The editor of *Foreign Affairs*, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, agreed that the European preoccupation with ‘the bare essentials of existence’ meant that the US could not win their hearts and minds with the insistence that ‘everyone must now choose sides in an ideological battle.’  

Kennan became more concerned that his X article would be used to rationalise a more universal strategic commitment. He faced immediate criticism from the likes of Walter Lippmann that limited resources would be stretched further with such an indeterminate commitment. In his appeal for the US public to embrace their national purpose, Kennan had effectively asked for a ‘commitment to the idea of commitment.’ The PPS Director later acknowledged that the failure to distinguish the geographical areas of vital interest brought prompt demands for commitments comparable to the Marshall Plan in other regions of the world. The Latin Americanists within the State Department certainly felt that further resources could be useful in securing US interests
in the Western Hemisphere. Kennan realised that open-ended commitments such as 
eradicating poverty, which were not unique to the crisis in Western Europe, would only 
divert resources away from strategic priorities.45 ‘The notion should be dispelled that 
the Truman Doctrine was a blank check to be used for economic and military aid 
anywhere in the world where the Communists show signs of being successful,’ he also 
warned.

Kennan reconciled the tension between the abstract conceptual framework of 
containment found in the likes of the Truman Doctrine and the X article on the one hand 
and the limited measures pursued in the specific space of Western Europe on the other 
with the rationale that global containment had to be focused on the strategic frontier of 
Western Europe instead of wasting resources on the periphery. He considered the 
prioritisation of Western Europe to be essential not only for security and economic 
interests but also its central position along the antagonistic frontier drawn between the 
US and Soviet spheres. Western Europe provided the Cold War terrain where the 
relations of force and material interest converged with symbolic and imaginary 
representations of identity.46 This situation made Western Europe the first important 
battleground for the opposing universal claims for the future that had been outlined in 
the Truman Doctrine.

Kennan understood that European integration into the US sphere remained at stake in 
this psychological struggle. Although the experience of the Second World War and the 
subsequent economic devastation had dislocated previous European constructions of 
identity, Kennan warned that recent European identification with a shared American 
way of life in an imagined “Western” community could yet prove transient if the Soviet
Union provided an attractive alternative. The rhetoric of containment had simply redrawn established boundaries between “civilisation” and “barbarism” with the demarcation of the European frontier; Kennan understood that resistance in Western Europe to Soviet claims to the future would prove short-lived if the US showed unable to guard civilisation and its progress from the barbaric hordes at the gate. Success in his particular application of containment in the symbolic theatre of Europe was necessary to prevent widespread identification with Communism as ‘the coming thing, the movement of the future - that it is on the make and there is no stopping it.’

The boost to European confidence would provide a psychological counter-offensive to demoralise the Soviet orbit. Kennan identified an opportunity to compel change in Soviet behaviour by making those living under the Communist system question the reality constructed for them by their leaders. He was convinced that the inherent contradictions of Marxist-Leninist ideology and the fundamental weaknesses in the Soviet society and economy were only being concealed by the false “reality” established by those who had consolidated power in the higher echelons of the Communist Party. ‘Soviet power,’ he wrote in his X article, ‘like the capitalist world of its conception, bears within it the seeds of its own decay, and that the sprouting of these seeds is well advanced.’ An assistance program in Europe would demonstrate that neither the US nor the American capitalist way of life was in decline. Kennan demanded that ‘the aims of Russian Communism must appear sterile and quixotic, the hopes and enthusiasm of Moscow’s supporters must wane, and added strain must be imposed on the Kremlin’s foreign policies.’ If the strategic instrument of economic aid could encourage Europeans to identify with American universality, this particular success could, in turn, demonstrate the credibility of the American telos. The particular symbolic examples
would form a reflexive loop of power that gave the Truman administration the prestige to assign acts of liberation to its own teleological destiny. The prioritisation of strategic instruments for psychological warfare recognised the Hobbesian concept of reputation for power as power. Immediate action in Europe was necessary but the key to containment would be patience. If the US could avoid war in the short-term, it would have more opportunities to demonstrate the inalienable truth of the dismal “reality” of the Communist way of life.

Kennan dismissed the significance of the Western Hemisphere in his initial constructions of containment. The lack of vital material interests and the absence of any immediate symbolic threat of identification with the Soviet Union in the Latin American periphery only confirmed his prioritisation of attention and resources for securing success in the primary example of containment in Western Europe. "The trouble with Kennan's prescription," as one diplomatic correspondent would later suggest however, "was that different people read words differently."48 The assumption made by Kennan that the Truman administration should focus on defending the strongpoint of Western Europe did not necessarily mean that others within the US would tolerate the neglect of Latin America as a peripheral region. The established sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere made it of vital interest for many.

The failure of Kennan to rearticulate the specific approaches pursued in each region into a comprehensive strategy only left Marshall to translate the abstract concepts of containment into the context of the Western Hemisphere. The use of this conceptual framework by Kennan to rationalise the prioritisation of measures pursued in Western
Europe however, ensured that strategy in the Western Hemisphere would be framed to some extent within this context.

**Strategic Asymmetric Responses**

The development of US strategy in the Western Hemisphere suffered from the redirection of attention and resources considered necessary to reconcile the discrepancy between available ends and means. The antagonistic frontier between the US and Soviet orbits in Kennan’s articulation of containment had also established Western Europe as the primary terrain for the struggle between conflicting ideological narratives. This symbolic element made success in Western Europe essential for the broader psychological confrontation with the Soviet Union. The dismissal of the importance of the Western Hemisphere by Kennan left Marshall without necessary institutional support for reshaping a strategic approach to this specific region. In translating the abstract concepts of containment however, Marshall identified both serious threats and an opportunity to use the Western Hemisphere as an established political space in the US sphere of influence in which he could choose to apply the strengths of the US for an asymmetric response in the symbolic struggle of the Cold War.

The Western Hemisphere endured as a unique space in US foreign policy. The blurred horizon between the inside and outside of American identity that followed the expansion of the US sphere of influence in the Monroe Doctrine made the Western Hemisphere integral to the psychological battle in the Cold War for two reasons. On the one hand inter-American relations provided an important representation of the wider
relationship that the US held with its external world. On the other the need to separate
the US orbit from traditional models of imperialism had led to the internalisation of the
Western Hemisphere; the extension of American identity from nation to continent
assimilated Latin American countries into an “Empire of Liberty”.\textsuperscript{49} In the Western
Hemisphere the US faced both the internal and external challenges of containment that
had been articulated by Kennan.

Kennan had warned in his X article that ‘exhibitions of indecision, disunity and internal
disintegration within this country have an exhilarating effect on the whole Communist
movement.’ Marshall simply applied this domestic context of containment to the inter-
American community long identified in the Good Neighbour Policy. Marshall feared that
any failure to maintain the continental solidarity of the Good Neighbour Policy would
also be exploited by the Soviet leadership as demonstrative of Latin American
resistance to the American way of life and US leadership in the region. It became
important to unite not only the American people behind the commitment to confront
the Soviet Union, but also the rest of the Western Hemisphere.

Although Kennan disregarded serious Latin American identification with Communism,
Marshall recognised that even Latin American protest against “Yanqui imperialism”
would damage the US image. Kennan had, after all, expressed similar concerns that any
strategic loss in the “zero-sum” nature of the global bipolar conflict would be exploited
as a victory for the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{50} The greater fears that European resistance to the
American orbit would create a “bandwagon” effect were described by Acheson during a
meeting with Congressional leaders in the White House:
‘Like apples in a barrel infected by one rotten one, the corruption of Greece would infect Iran and all to the east. It would also carry infection to Africa through Asia Minor and Egypt, and to Europe through Italy and France, already threatened by the strongest domestic Communist parties in Western Europe. The Soviet Union was playing one of the greatest gambles in history at minimal cost. It did not need to win all the possibilities. Even one or two offered immense gains.'

Kennan focused on preventing any strategic losses that would provide encouragement for the Soviet Union in Europe. But in this immediate prioritisation of the strategic frontier he could only defer consideration of containment in other regions that would be essential in the longer-term. Kennan also recognised that the Kremlin would inevitably pursue new opportunities elsewhere if forced to retreat from Europe. He warned that the psychological battle would be no brief endeavour as the Soviet leadership believed in the teleological inevitability of their own victory and would be patient in their design. Marshall took a more far-sighted approach to containment in assuming responsibility for preventing the eventuality of engaging the Soviet Union in the established strategic settlement of the Western Hemisphere.

The partial and ambiguous nature of containment provided Marshall with neither a self-evident nor necessary response to these strategic threats in the Western Hemisphere. The Policy Planning Staff had formulated “measures short of war” as the response to the Soviet threat in Western Europe. Marshall retained faith in the assessments of the PPS that dismissed the capabilities of the Soviet Red Army stationed along the European
frontier to mount a military strike even in the face of increased references to the “lessons of Munich” amongst the leadership of the armed services. He had to assert his status and expend some political capital within the military establishment in order just to moderate their demands for the mobilisation of a “preponderance of power” and gain support for the reduction of US armed forces in Europe and a reliance on the European Recovery Program as the primary instrument of statecraft. Marshall relied on his own previous experience and observations of inter-American relations to formulate a response in the Western Hemisphere however. He had recommended the continued pursuit of preponderant power during peacetime in his final report to the Secretary of War before the end of the Second World War:

‘We must, if we are to realize the hopes we may now dare have for lasting peace, enforce our will for peace with strength. We must make it clear to the potential gangsters of the world that if they dare break our peace, they will do so at their great peril. . . . We have tried since the birth of our nation to promote our love of peace by a display of weakness. This course has failed us utterly.’

Despite rejecting the mobilisation of military force in Western Europe, Marshall drew immediately upon his wealth of experience in preparing for the defence of the Americas in formulating a response in the Western Hemisphere.

The extensive organisational clashes over inter-American military cooperation and the return of the Good Neighbour Policy to a wartime footing suggested that the response adopted by Marshall did not represent the most suitable means for integrating the Western Hemisphere into a global strategy of containment. The strategic approach formulated by Marshall demonstrated more nuanced origins than a simple reflection of
‘the growing fear of Soviet aggression in Latin America’ however. His approval of the assessment of the Soviet threat made by the PPS for Western Europe suggested that he did not consider the defence of the Americas to be the sole or even primary objective for strategy in the Western Hemisphere. Marshall recognised that support from Congress and the US public would not be guaranteed by a simple focus on hemispheric security. Although polls revealed that 72 percent of the American public supported sending US armed forces along with other American Republics to stop an attack against a South American country, the absence of an imminent threat undermined the rationale for prioritising hemispheric security. Marshall even acknowledged the lack of urgency in regional defence preparations during testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Marshall did not look to bring the Cold War to the Western Hemisphere however; he sought to project the Western Hemisphere into the Cold War. He identified the long-awaited Rio de Janeiro Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security as a particularly useful opportunity for an asymmetric response in the Cold War. The negotiation of an Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance that would make permanent the defence pact of the Act of Chapultepec continued the emphasis on security in hemispheric strategy. But Marshall considered the importance of the Rio Conference more as a ‘political rather than military agreement, establishing terms of inter-American political solidarity for the maintenance of peace and security.’ Whilst the Latin American Republics offered little additional military capacity for hemispheric defence, let alone action “out of theatre”, cooperation in providing vital resources and markets was fundamental to US strategy in Europe. The consolidation of a hemisphere united in common cause would be vital for the integration of his regional approach into
a global strategy; it would allow the US to project the entire power of the New World back into the main Cold War theatre in the Old World.

Marshall identified the pursuit of hemispheric solidarity under the banner of wartime cooperation of the Good Neighbour Policy as an integral component of containment. A shared focus on security in the region would provide the next chapter in writing hemispheric identity. The absence of an immediate Soviet threat meant that security could not constitute the basis for continental solidarity alone however. If the machinery of collective security provided a narrative of integration of the Western Hemisphere – it also narrated an inter-American family. Marshall regarded the multilateralisation of the Monroe Doctrine as essential in demonstrating the renunciation of the paternalistic interventionism under Braden. A renewed commitment to the consultation and cooperation between sovereign and equal American Republics that characterised the Good Neighbour Policy would form the basis of hemispheric fraternity.

Marshall also considered the successful demonstration of genuine inter-American fraternity to be a powerful psychological instrument in the Cold War. The administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt had already adapted the Good Neighbour Policy in pursuit of more global strategic objectives. In an article for *Foreign Affairs* in 1928 Roosevelt warned that ‘the outside world views us with less good will today than at any previous period.’ He suggested that a demonstration of good will behind its leadership would ‘regain the world’s trust and friendship.’ His formal commitment to non-intervention at the 7th Pan-American Conference held later in 1933 in Montevideo would project the benevolent use of US power as a positive ‘example to the rest of the world’ in the hope that there would be ‘some moral repercussions in Europe.’ The
further development of a shared approach to the defence of the Americas through the 1936 Buenos Aires Conference to the 1945 Chapultepec Conference would also demonstrate to the rest of the world the benefits of collective security over the established balance of power in Europe.

Marshall looked for further demonstration of a “shining example” of hemispheric solidarity at the Rio Conference. The Marshall Plan in Europe would provide a successful example of the American economic model and US commitment to assist recovery, whilst the Good Neighbour Policy would present a model of peaceful cooperation between the US and smaller neighbouring countries that stood in contrast with the Soviet interventionist domination of regional satellites. Marshall hoped that the commitment to self-determination and cooperation between regional allies would encourage Europe to renounce the self-destructive aggression and conflict of the Second World War and invite further integration into the American orbit.61

The Congressional leadership welcomed this renewed commitment to the Good Neighbour Policy. Senator Vandenberg acknowledged that the successful negotiation of the Rio Treaty would provide a ‘useful and impressive model of how big and little states can work together on a basis of absolute equality of both obligation and power in the pursuit of international peace and security.’62 The minority leader of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Thomas T. Connally (D-TX), declared that:

'The treaty will do much to the spirit of pan-American solidarity and creates substantial provisions for the preservation of peace in this Hemisphere and for the cooperation of the American states in resisting aggression from any source whatever. The treaty marks
an onward step in behalf of international cooperation and world peace.’63

The Council on Foreign Relations later noted that ‘harmony in the Americas was the watchword of the Rio Conference.’64

Marshall managed to reinvent the Good Neighbour Policy and its specific focus on continental solidarity as the anchor point for his translation of containment for a regional context. Rather than bringing the Cold War to the Western Hemisphere, he looked to use the asymmetric advantage of the US position in the Western Hemisphere to guarantee success in the primary struggle at the European frontier of the Cold War. This strategic approach left a number of significant problems however. Firstly, it remained unclear as to whether the integration of the Western Hemisphere should be considered as an end in itself or primarily as a means to defend the new frontier in Western Europe. This problem became more pronounced as Marshall applied the universal framework of containment without addressing the particular challenges that faced the region. It is the failure to reconcile enduring tensions in the Good Neighbour Policy that Marshall frequently relied on to address specific regional issues however, which ultimately guaranteed the incoherence in US strategy in the Western Hemisphere during the rest of 1947.
Notes for Chapter 2


2 Lovett left the dinner meeting held at Harold Pratt House also ‘with the firm conviction that it would be our principle task at State to awaken the nation to the dangers of Communist aggression.’ See Wala, Michael, The Council on Foreign Relations and the Early Cold War (Oxford: Berghahn, 1994) p. 163


4 For the Long Telegram: 861.00/2-2246: Telegram, “The Chargé in the Soviet Union to the Secretary of State,” 22.02.1946 (FRUS 1946, Volume VI)

5 Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950, p. 353

6 As the War Department had been unable to fit into the building, Marshall had just moved the State Department there from Pennsylvania Avenue. See Time, 12.05.1947; Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950, p. 345.


9 Interview with George C. Marshall, by Harry B. Price and Roy E. Foulke, February 18th 1953 (Marshall Foundation Library)


13 Pogue, George C. Marshall, p. 207

14 Quoted in Leffler, Melvyn P., A Preponderance of Power (Stanford University Press, 1992) p. 147


17 In an editorial piece for the New York Times, entitled “The Task-and Price-of World Leadership”, Hamilton Fish Armstrong preached the value of demonstrating American global resolve. He stressed the need for the US to show its allies and enemies alike that it is committed and competent to act effectively. See New York Times, 29.06.1947

18 Brian Shaw lauds the role of Marshall in persuading Congress to support the ERP: ‘Marshall rejected appropriations if he considered them unnecessary. If he did appear before Congress with requests he supported them with fact and justified every penny. His professional and personal credibility convinced the negative and hostile Congress to
support the European Recovery Program.’ See Shaw, Brian, “George C. Marshall: A Selfless Public Servant,” *Richmond Times-Dispatch*, 11.10.2009. Gerald Pops offers similar praise: ‘Marshall testified before committees of both houses on a regular basis and drew respect from both political parties for his no-nonsense, fact-intensive, sometimes passionately earnest, and always comprehensive yet succinctly written reports and testimony. For his part, Marshall understood the political environment and the political calculus undergirding the acquisition, and the timing of the acquisition, of military resources. Despite frequent battles with doctrinaire opponents of spending, he kept his outward calm and impressed a majority of them, regardless of their political persuasion, with the weight of his evidence and the soundness of his judgment.’ See Pops, Gerald, “The Ethical Leadership of George C. Marshall,” *Public Integrity* (Volume 8, No. 2) p. 177

19 *Time*, 03.02.1947
20 Interview with George C. Marshall, by Harry B. Price and Roy E. Foulke, February 18th 1953 (Marshall Foundation Library)
21 Interview with George C. Marshall, by Harry B. Price, October 30th 1952 (Harry S. Truman Library. Access available online at European Navigator, www.ena.lu)
22 *Time*, 12.05.1947
23 *New York Times*, 24.06.1947
26 Francis, Michael J., “Military Aid to Latin America in the US Congress,” *Journal of Inter-American Studies* (Volume 6, No. 3, July 1964) p. 392
27 Lieuwen, Edwin, *Arms and Politics in Latin America* (London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961) p. 218. Marshall had already received pleas of preferential treatment for Brazil from the administration of Eurico Gaspar Dutra, because of its considerable wartime cooperation under predecessor President Getúlio Dornelles Vargas. The possibility that Argentina, who had been less than cooperative, despite the strategic importance of its ocean passage at the Straits of Magellan, could receive equivalent military aid, left Brazilian leaders complaining of the US treating brothers-in-arms as stepchildren. See Davis, Sonny B., “Brazil-United States Military Relations in the Early Post-World War II Era,” *Dialogos* (Volume 1, No. 6)
30 Interview with George C. Marshall, by Harry B. Price and Roy E. Foulke, October 30th 1952 (Marshall Foundation Library)
On the evening of Byrnes' resignation, Kennan had presented his ideas to the thirty-two attending members of the Council on Foreign Relations' study group on United States' Relations with Russia at the elegant offices of Harold Pratt House on the corner of New York's 68th Street and Park Avenue. The study group's secretary, George S. Franklin Jr., paid a visit to Hamilton Fish Armstrong the next morning to inform the editor of the Council's popular journal, Foreign Affairs, of the memorable evening. See Grose, Peter, Continuing the Inquiry: The Council on Foreign Relations from 1921 to 1996 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996) p. 35. Armstrong had already found Kennan's work on the Soviet Union to be 'exceptionally interesting,' but Franklin's positive appraisal of the lecture on “The Soviet Way of Thought and Its Effects on Foreign Policy” persuaded him to solicit a contribution from Kennan for future publication in the Council's journal, Foreign Affairs. Kennan expressed his interest ‘in the question of whether our Government might not find some other means than it possesses today of explaining to an informed public in our country the complexities of some of the problems which confront it and the background of some of its solutions.'

See Wala, The Council on Foreign Relations and the Early Cold War, p. 81


X, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs (July 1947). The content of the X article and the concept of containment have been covered elsewhere in much detail. The main argument was to dispel the idea that there could be any cooperation with the Soviet Union. The modern Soviet leadership would be guided in an expansionist foreign policy by a traditional fear of external hostility and a Marxist-Leninist ideology that depicted a threat posed by foreign capitalists. These factors were exploited, Kennan explained, by the Soviet 'dictatorship' as a means to legitimise their regime and consolidate their power over the Russian people. This did not, however, inhibit a genuine belief in the Kremlin of the innate antagonism between capitalism and socialism, which would end only with the destruction of the former. Kennan would soon come to regret clarifying his ideas on the specific measures necessary in containment. Conflicting interpretations have been well documented elsewhere. As a select list for more information, particularly in regards to the differences between military and political counter-force and between limited and universal commitment, see Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950, p. 313; Stephanson, Anders, Kennan and the Art of Foreign Policy (London: Harvard University Press, 1989); Gati, Charles, “What Containment Meant,” Foreign Policy (No. 7, Summer 1972); Mayers, David, “Containment and the Primacy of Diplomacy: George Kennan's Views, 1947-1948,” International Security (Volume 11, No. 1, Summer 1986); Gaddis, John Lewis, “Containment: Its Past and Future,” International Security (Volume 5, No. 4, Spring 1981) pp. 74-102; Lukacs, John, George Kennan: A Study of Character (London: Yale University Press, 2007)

Campbell, David, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2nd edn., 1998) p. 169. For further details on the contingent identification of a hostile Soviet Union and alternatives to Kennan's containment, see Messer, Robert L., “Paths Not Taken: The United States
Kennan rallied the American public to ‘demonstrat[e] to the peoples of the world, that the US is a country which knows what it wants, which is coping successfully with the problems of its internal life and with the responsibilities of being a World Power, and which has a spiritual vitality capable of holding its own among the major ideological currents of the time.’

Campbell, Writing Security, p. 195


Ibid., p. 173

Armstrong, Hamilton Fish, “Europe Revisited,” Foreign Affairs (July 1947)


Interview with George C. Marshall, by Harry B. Price and Roy E. Foulke, October 30th 1952 (Marshall Foundation Library); Pogue, George C. Marshall, p. 213

Balibar, Étienne, We, the People of Europe? (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2003) p. 4

Ninkovich, Modernity and Power, p. 174

Roberts, Chalmers M., W. Averill Harriman, Arthur Krock, and Dean Acheson, “How Containment Worked,” Foreign Policy (No. 7, Summer 1972) p. 42. Looking back, Kennan would say as much in his memoirs: ‘[T]he myth of the “doctrine of containment” has never fully lost its spell…. It has been interpreted by others in a variety of ways.’ See Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950, p. 363


Acheson, Dean, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (London: W.W. Norton and Co., 1969) p. 198

Time, 05.01.1948


The National Opinion Research Center asked a cross-section of the American people in June 1947, whether they supported sending US armed forces along with other American Republics to stop an attack against a South American country. Cited in Wittkopf, Eugene R., and James M. McCormick, “The Cold War Consensus: Did it Exist?” Polity (Volume 22, No. 4, Summer 1990) p. 641

710 Consultation 4/7-347: Circular Telegram, Department of State, “The Secretary of State to the Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics except Nicaragua,”03.07.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII); Oral History Interview with J. Wesley Adams, by Richard D. McKinzie, 18.12.1972 (Truman Library)

For more on writing security, see Campbell, David, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2nd edn., 1998)

Weber, Cynthia, Imagining America at War (London: Routledge, 2006) p. 6

The demonstration of inter-American solidarity and an example of collective security had been envisaged as a central principle of global strategy by Woodrow Wilson after finding himself unable to convince Europe to abandon its model of balance of power. The Roosevelt administration had developed this strategy through active integration efforts in the inter-American conferences prior to and during the war. See Walker III, William O., “Crucible for Peace: Herbert Hoover, Modernization, and Economic Growth in Latin America,” Diplomatic History (Volume 30, No. 1, January 2006) p. 86.


II. ILLUSIONS of COHERENCE
3. POLITICAL DISCRIMINATION

Marshall identified the Rio de Janeiro Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security and the Ninth International Conference of American States at Bogotá as opportunities to renew the regional integration of the earlier Good Neighbour era. He hoped that such a commitment would demonstrate to Latin American leaders that the policies pursued under Braden could be dismissed as a brief aberration in the recent tradition of inter-American relations. Marshall also focused on the restoration of inter-American solidarity in integrating the Western Hemisphere into a strategy of containment. He looked to project a shining example of international relations within the US sphere of influence as a symbolic response in the psychological struggle of the Cold War.

The conferences at Rio de Janeiro and Bogotá revealed the incoherence in this strategic vision however. The Rio Conference had been originally scheduled for October 1945 to make permanent the temporary collective security pact agreed earlier in March at the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace held at Chapultepec in Mexico. This would be followed by the creation of a formal inter-American political system at the Bogotá Conference. Marshall publicly criticised Braden for the ‘confusing and disturbing propaganda’ that had created the ‘frustrating delays’ in convening these conferences. He feared that further postponement would cause irreparable damage to the solidarity of the Western Hemisphere and undermine the credibility of the US commitment to the Good Neighbour Policy. In conceptualising solidarity in the Western Hemisphere in terms of cooperation between equal and sovereign neighbouring...
countries however, Marshall neglected a number of significant problems particular to
the region that transcended the Cold War. The failure to reconcile serious tensions
exposed the absence of unity in an imagined community of the Western Hemisphere.
Marshall appreciated less than Braden that the lessons of the Good Neighbour Policy no
longer remained applicable to a region transformed by a rising tide of expectations.

The first lesson that Marshall failed to understand was that a commitment to the Good
Neighbour Policy did not address the growing demands for democratic freedoms across
the region. The original commitment to the Good Neighbour Policy had not precluded
the Roosevelt administration from seeking ways to discriminate between different
forms of Latin American governments in order to demonstrate a disapproval of
dictatorships. However, the architects of the Good Neighbour Policy ultimately
dismissed discrimination between Latin American governments on the basis of their
internal political nature as ineffective or even damaging to inter-American relations.

The shift in political climate during the Second World War made this understanding of
self-determination increasingly difficult to maintain however. The State Department
faced growing demands to support democratic movements from Latin American
countries fighting alongside them under the banner of freedom. The commitment to a
policy of non-discrimination only exposed the empty rhetoric of freedom and invited
criticism of the Roosevelt administration as the ‘good neighbour of tyrants.’ The State
Department soon recognised that ‘the US must embrace nations that represent
democracy.’ In the aftermath of the Second World War the Truman administration
increasingly distanced itself from Latin American dictatorships and replaced its
commitment to equal treatment with discrimination in favour of democratic allies.
Braden highlighted the inherent tension in the Good Neighbour Policy of a simultaneous commitment to democracy and toleration of dictatorship in an article for *Atlantic Monthly*. ‘Either the Hemisphere is united or it is broken. There is no room anywhere for middle ground.’ Marshall failed to understand that he could not re-establish equal treatment as the basis of cooperation with neighbouring countries without determining the meaning of solidarity and the nature of a shared identity in the Western Hemisphere.

**Hemispheric Discrimination**

The tensions inherent to this first lesson of the Good Neighbour Policy appeared foremost in US relations with Argentina. The convention of the Rio Conference would require a fundamental reassessment of the State Department position established by Braden to refuse recognition or enter a diplomatic agreement with the government of Argentina. Although the departure of Braden presented Marshall with the opportunity to reverse this position, the *New York Times* warned that it would not be a simple task to resolve an issue ‘so filled with controversy.’ After the overthrow of President Ramón Castillo in June 1943 by military leaders of the *Grupo de Oficiales Unidos*, the State Department continued to hold reservations against successive leaders in the Argentine government displaying political sympathies for the Axis nations. From his position as US Ambassador in Buenos Aires, Braden warned that tolerance of a repressive and dangerous dictatorship in Argentina would undermine the credibility of the global struggle for democracy.
Braden managed to persuade the State Department to withhold diplomatic recognition of the new regime headed by de facto President General Edelmiro Julián Farrell. He warned that several figures in the Farrell regime harboured Nazi affinities and identified General Juan Perón, who simultaneously served as Vice-President and Secretary for Labour and War, as the most serious threat. Although Perón shared neither the social base nor the brutality of comparable European fascist leaders, Braden remained concerned for his admiration of Mussolini and his broader ideas on the role of the State in directing the public sphere and controlling the masses. Despite their commitment to the Good Neighbour Policy, Congress also recognised the need to isolate the Argentine regime. The Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs at the time, Nelson Rockefeller, even faced fierce attacks from Congressional leaders for his decision to admit Argentine representatives to the United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco. The sustained criticism eventually led Rockefeller to make a public denouncement of the Farrell regime before handing in his resignation.7

Braden began to shape a more aggressive campaign for discrimination against the Farrell regime after replacing Rockefeller in the role of Assistant Secretary. He warned the US public that the priority for the region ‘is to know whether a country is moving in the direction of dictatorship and disregard for the rights of man, or whether it is moving toward government of the people, by the people, and for the people.’8 Braden led the State Department to reject framing hemispheric solidarity in the terms of non-discrimination and cooperation between equal states found in the Good Neighbour Policy. The pursuit of unity at all costs, Ellis O. Briggs warned, would ‘not infrequently result in whittling down principles to fit the lowest unanimous denominator.’9 Braden
also continued more active interference in the domestic affairs of Argentina that reached its peak as Perón campaigned in presidential elections during early 1946. Braden provided support to the activities of an opposition movement. Although he eventually submitted to the demands to jail Perón from the opposition marchers roused by Braden, Farrell released his Vice-President within the month after supporters themselves took to the streets with the claims to be the heirs of a true Argentina.\textsuperscript{10}

Braden responded by gathering Latin American diplomats at Blair House to present them with a 130-page book, entitled “Consultation among the American Republics with Respect to the Argentine Situation,” outlining Nazi infiltration in Argentina. Many officials within Washington criticised this “Blue Book” as cynical interference in the Argentine elections. As a primary architect of the principle of non-discrimination in the Good Neighbour Policy, the former Undersecretary of State, Sumner Welles, condemned the “Blue Book” as ‘an almost unbelievably crass blunder.’\textsuperscript{11} The eventual electoral victory for Perón demonstrated the ineffectiveness of Braden’s interference and represented ‘the worst diplomatic defeat...[the US] ever sustained in the Western Hemisphere.’

Welles led demands from within the US for Braden to end his campaign against Argentina and return to the key principles of equal treatment and cooperation found previously in the Good Neighbour Policy. In an article for the \textit{New York Herald Tribune}, he warned that further discrimination against Argentina would ‘arouse popular support for the military leaders and weaken [Argentina’s] liberal and democratic forces.’\textsuperscript{12} Welles also insisted that without rapprochement with the Perón regime ‘no inter-American conference can now be held without risking . . . the total destruction of Pan-
Although Braden insisted that the participation of the Farrell regime in the Rio Conference would make a ridicule of the plans to formalise hemispheric solidarity, senior figures from the Good Neighbour era, such as Adolf A. Berle, Jr., agreed that discrimination against Argentina damaged the US image across the region and argued that their commitment to regional integration had been abandoned.14

The divisions within Washington ultimately led to an incoherent strategic approach towards Argentina. Byrnes initially responded to the demands from Senate leaders to change approach by filling the vacant post of Ambassador to Buenos Aires that Braden had continued to control from Washington.15 After Braden threatened to resign Byrnes decided not to tell him that the President had granted freedom of action to the new Ambassador, George S. Messersmith, to improve relations with Argentina. Braden continued to receive the support of Truman and Byrnes however, as he sought to isolate Argentina and further postpone the Rio Conference.16 Byrnes even considered some means of signing a treaty at the Rio Conference without Argentina.17 Although publicly announcing the path open for Argentina to attend the Rio Conference, Byrnes outlined a roadmap that required ‘deeds and not merely promises’ for the fulfilment of Argentina’s ‘solemn commitments’ at Chapultepec to eliminate Axis influence.18

Byrnes also continued to defend the “Blue Book” against the criticisms of interference. ‘We are not concerned with what type of Gov[ernmen]t Argentine electorate chooses for itself,’ he explained to diplomatic representatives, ‘but rather with specified elements in whom confidence is entirely lacking.’19 Braden joined him in emphasising that confidence in Perón could not be restored without some positive action from Buenos Aires in meeting these demands.20 This inconsistent approach created an increasingly
bitter feud between Braden and Messersmith over control and direction of US relations with Argentina. The impasse ensured that, by the time Marshall arrived at the State Department to replace Byrnes, policy had drifted towards, what *Time* described as, the ‘traditional Latin pattern of mañana.’

Marshall deferred a full review of the issue until after his return from the Moscow Conference. In the meantime the Argentina Ambassador to the US, Dr. Oscar Ivanissevich, was informed that Perón was still expected to fulfil the demands made earlier by Byrnes. Messersmith sent recommendations to reinstate diplomatic relations immediately after Marshall returned to Washington. He attempted to persuade the Secretary that Perón had shown to be doing everything in his power to comply with US demands. He even appealed to the new Cold War climate that had emerged during the Moscow Conference. ‘By continuing this situation with the Argentine longer,’ he suggested, ‘we are serving the interests of only one country, and that is Soviet Russia.’ Most of the State Department remained sceptical of any Argentine assurances to meet such demands however. The Chief of the Division of River Plate Affairs found it ‘difficult to believe’ the argument that the Argentine government could perform no better in dealing with Axis influence. He noted their failure on a number of commitments and suggested their program was ‘limited.’

The responses from Marshall lacked clear consistency. At first he maintained the pressure on Perón to conform to previous State Department demands. Ivanissevich received an invitation to return to the White House only weeks later however; Truman promptly informed him that all obstacles to friendly relations had been removed. There had been no significant steps made by the Argentine government to fulfil its
commitments during that time. The growing awareness of Cold War threats may have diminished some importance in dealing with the Axis influence. The shift in approach towards Argentina emerged primarily as a reaction to domestic pressures however. The departure of Braden from the State Department brought immediate demands from Senator Vandenberg to repair relations with Argentina and renew ‘our indispensable Pan-American solidarity.’ Marshall swiftly reassured him that a new approach towards Argentina would soon be clarified ‘in clear and unmistakeable terms.’ Although the departure of Braden made it easier to undertake this task, Marshall also considered it necessary to reassign Messersmith. The Ambassador had gone too far in circumnavigating the State Department to press his case before Congress. Marshall would tolerate no one undermining his authority.

The formal recognition of Argentina opened the door to reschedule the long-delayed Rio Conference. It also presented a clear path to rescind an existing arms embargo against Argentina. The State Department had previously considered it necessary to discriminate in providing military assistance against dictatorships like the Argentine regime. The new Ambassador in Buenos Aires, James Bruce, took little time to recommend that further discrimination of Argentina would be ineffective and damaging to US interests. Marshall had already made his decision to lift restrictions on arms sales to Argentina however; inter-American military cooperation to prevent external influences remained central to his pursuit of hemispheric solidarity. Although he had repeatedly declared his preference for reducing costs and difficulties by buying standardised American arms, Perón threatened to pursue arms from Czechoslovakia if necessary. Marshall determined that arms supplied to Argentina from outside the Western Hemisphere, particularly from the Soviet bloc, would damage the prestige of the US. The importance
of restoring hemispheric solidarity on the basis of equal cooperation within the region led Marshall to dismiss the previous concerns raised in the State Department on military assistance.

This decision to lift the State Department embargo on arms sales to Argentina created immediate problems for Marshall. He faced complaints from the Ambassador for the Dominican Republic, Luis F. Thomen, that similar restrictions on the Dominican Republic were unfair.\textsuperscript{33} Marshall noted that the political factors determining the original sanctions remained 'as cogent today as ever.'\textsuperscript{34} In December 1945 the State Department considered the sale of arms to be neither reasonable nor necessary for the defence of the Dominican Republic or the Western Hemisphere. State Department officials also warned Marshall of the prospects of US arms being used by the regime of Rafael Trujillo against neighbouring Latin American countries or the people of the Dominican Republic. They still considered military assistance to Trujillo's authoritarian as adverse to the development of freedom and democracy in the region.\textsuperscript{35} Trujillo still managed to persuade Marshall to reverse the State Department embargo on arms sales to the Dominican Republic by following the earlier example of Perón in threatening to purchase arms from elsewhere if the US remained unwilling to supply them. The absence of a clear roadmap to navigate between competing principles of discrimination and equal cooperation left Marshall to make his decision 'on pragmatic grounds.'\textsuperscript{36} It also ensured that this decision would not remain unchallenged however.
Hemispheric Cooperation

Marshall regarded his renewed commitment to the Good Neighbour Policy as necessary to reassert coherence to US strategy in the Western Hemisphere. He anticipated that the recognition of Argentina would restore an image of unity in the Western Hemisphere. It could not guarantee cohesion within Washington however. The cooperation with the Argentine regime made Congress increasingly apprehensive. Despite their earlier criticism of Braden for his ‘mistaken policy’ of ‘messing in too much,’ Congressional leaders remained unenthusiastic about arming a leader castigated as a fascist dictator. State Department officials recognised the difficulty in reconciling the Good Neighbour Policy to the mounting pressure to safeguard democratic freedoms across the Western Hemisphere. The State Department representative to the State-War-Navy-Coordination Committee, John C. Dreier, warned Marshall that cooperation with dictators of the likes of Perón would remain unpopular with Congress and the public. He argued that it would be particularly difficult to petition Congress in public and recommended refrain from press or radio comments. As Congress simultaneously pressured the State Department to restore the inclusive unity of the Good Neighbour Policy and demonstrated unease in cooperation with Latin American dictators, Marshall could be forgiven for accepting the earlier conclusions made by *Time* magazine: ‘Damned if you do, damned if you don’t.’

The difficulty in reconciling the principle of equal treatment of sovereign countries established in the Good Neighbour Policy to the demand for discrimination on behalf of individual political freedoms ultimately undermined domestic cohesion as different actors favoured one over the other. The State Department under Braden had begun to realise that the lessons of the Good Neighbour Policy no longer remained completely
relevant. Although Braden had divided the region he understood better than Marshall the rising tide of expectations across the region. Braden continued to influence the strategic environment in Washington even after his departure from the State Department however, after his memorandum outlining opposition to military cooperation leaked to Representative Mike Mansfield (D-MT). Despite his insistence that full release of the memorandum would not be ‘in the interest of best relations with Latin America,’ Marshall understood that the disclosure of opposition to his decision within the State Department undercut his authority.

The departure of Braden did not mean that Marshall could reverse the commitment to democratisation entrenched within the State Department. Any support for the decision to cooperate with Argentina would remain primarily in form rather than substance. The military leadership immediately rallied in support of Marshall. General Ridgway criticised the conduct of the ‘little coterie in the State Department’ that opposed Marshall. ‘There is no such thing as loyalty in the State Department,’ he complained. ‘If a subordinate doesn’t like a decision that is handed down, he will obstruct it as far as he can delay it, take no action, but he will buck it to the end.’

Resistance to military cooperation represented more than bureaucratic inertia however; the State Department had institutionalised an entirely different strategy. This alternative had not been framed in binary opposition to the objective of hemispheric solidarity but in a different meaning of it. Rather than viewing Argentina as an equal and sovereign American Republic, the State Department under Braden identified Perón’s regime as incongruent to the inter-American community and its shared values and interests. The departure of Braden would not displace these meanings of hemispheric solidarity established in the State Department. The concepts would continue as, what Michel Foucault described
as, ‘strategies without a knowing strategist,’ or similarly as Pierre Bourdieu understood as a ‘conductorless orchestration of collective action and improvisations.’

Marshall shared concerns held within Congress that the State Department no longer remained fit to even re-establish the Good Neighbour Policy. His efforts to assert some authority threatened to undermine the capabilities of the State Department to formulate a coherent understanding of the strategic environment in the Western Hemisphere however. Marshall decided not to fill the post left vacant by the departure of Braden. But the lack of an Assistant Secretary for American Republic Affairs meant that regional expertise would be left underrepresented in the higher echelons of strategic planning. Although he had earlier acknowledged the need for a designated actor to deal with specific regional issues after supporting the establishment in the War Department of a Pan-American Group led by Kenner F. Hertford, Marshall now faced mounting criticism for the reliance on his Undersecretaries as the principal figures to assume the duties previously undertaken by Braden. Despite their reputation and ability, both Lovett and his counterpart – William Clayton, who was appointed to a new position of Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs – received criticism for their lack of regional experience either within the State Department or in the field. Neither had first-hand experience of specific conditions in Latin America that came from a background in diplomatic service.

Despite his own reputation Marshall also invited criticism for his measures taken to circumnavigate the entrenched thinking within the State Department. He faced disapproval for his efforts to break the tradition of civilian leadership with the gradual militarisation of the State Department and the increasing shift of responsibilities from
regional experts to leaders from the private sector.\textsuperscript{43} One State Department careerist writing in a letter to the \textit{New York Times} under the pseudonym A.B.C. criticised Marshall for the increasing prominence of “ins and outers” like Clayton and Lovett within the higher echelons of the State Department.\textsuperscript{44} Clayton had found his success in cotton-trading before entering government and Lovett had returned to private banking after the war. The official complained that previous appointments of expert career officials to top positions had been replaced with the selection of amateurs with little or no training and who ‘have come and gone with scene-shifting rapidity.’ The problem appeared more acute in relation to inter-American affairs, where Marshall also filled lower appointments with business leaders. The most recent appointment to the Foreign Service under Marshall, James Bruce, left his vice-presidency of the National Dairy Products Corporation to take the post of Ambassador to Argentina without any diplomatic training.\textsuperscript{45}

Marshall soon realised that the successful implementation of the Good Neighbour Policy required filling this organisational vacuum that had opened in the State Department. He decided to introduce James Harris Wright as a replacement for Ellis O. Briggs who had worked under Braden as Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs and appointed Robert Forbes Woodward as his deputy. As established Latin Americanists both would bring regional experience and expertise.\textsuperscript{46} Marshall seized an opportunity to integrate this regional office into a more centralised and hierarchical organisation however. He felt that the Office of American Republic Affairs held too narrow remit for reshaping a coherent regional approach as part of a comprehensive global strategy. The regional specialists would be more useful to him as credible officials to implement and build support for his wider strategic vision for the Western Hemisphere.
Marshall also brought Norman A. Armour out of early retirement to fill a newly created role of Assistant Secretary for Political Affairs. The return of Armour to the State Department was widely welcomed. With previous service as Acting Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs and a wealth of experience acquired during several Ambassadorships in important Latin American capitals, Armour would be the ideal candidate to oversee regional activities. One leading Congressional representative described Armour as ‘a man with profound knowledge of all Latin America.’ Referring to Armour as a ‘courteous gentleman’ and ‘staunch American,’ the *New York Times* praised his appointment: ‘We know of no one who could better exemplify for the US south of the Rio Grande the role of the Good Neighbour.’ Armour would still struggle to use this expertise to influence the formulation of regional strategy however. In extending the remit of Armour beyond the immediate concerns of the Western Hemisphere, Marshall looked to institutionalise a vision of the Good Neighbour Policy first promoted by Cordell Hull. Marshall ensured that solutions to the problems specific to the region would be situated primarily in the broader context of global strategic objectives. These organisational shifts would only create problems for Marshall once he began to be confronted with such regional challenges.

**Hemispheric Democracy**

Marshall believed that the renewed commitment to the Good Neighbour Policy would ensure a successful demonstration of hemispheric solidarity at the Rio Conference. He arrived at Petrópolis with a preliminary draft of the Rio Treaty that defined the cooperation of sovereign and equal American Republics as the basis for the ‘fulfilment
of the principles and purposes of a policy of peace.

He cast himself in the lead role for negotiations and chose to embody the Good Neighbor Policy with his own personal diplomacy. Marshall identified his first task as re-establishing personal contact with each of the smaller Latin American nations that Byrnes had typically ignored. After receiving criticism for not mixing with the other representatives at the Moscow Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Marshall made a concerted effort to visit each of the Latin American delegations staying at the new Hotel Quitandinha. His efforts were warmly welcomed; the Peruvian Foreign Minister, Dr. Enrique García-Sayán, suggested that Marshall 'had gone far beyond the needs of diplomatic good taste.'

It became immediately evident once negotiations opened that the Latin American delegates would not simply accept the basis of inter-American cooperation proposed by Marshall. The rising tide of expectations that broke across much of the region led Latin American leaders to prepare their own agendas for the Rio Conference. The US delegation lacked the direction of a regional specialist at its helm that could navigate these currents flowing through the region. Marshall did not stand against the movement towards democratic freedom but he maintained the mistaken belief that hemispheric solidarity could be guaranteed with a return to the Good Neighbor principles of non-discrimination and cooperation amongst sovereign and equal states. He failed to recognise that 'Latin America did not and could not settle down to “normalcy” after the strain of a world war.'

The pursuit of a symbolic model of solidarity at Petrópolis left Marshall with the considerable problem of shaping a coherent concept of a Western Hemisphere that included both progressive democracies and repressive dictatorships. The evidence at
the Rio Conference of an antagonistic divide between these divergent elements made his idea of equal respect and cooperation regardless of internal political makeup increasingly difficult. Marshall soon realised that he alone could not determine the meaning and role of the Western Hemisphere in the world. An alternative to his draft agreement for the maintenance of continental peace presented by the Guatemalan delegation revealed the contingency of his representation of hemispheric solidarity.

The head of the Guatemalan delegation and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Carlos Leonidas Acevedo, proposed that the Rio Treaty include the identification of any Latin American government denying their citizens the fundamental rights of man as a threat to collective security. Authoritarian elements would be identified as “foreign” to the Americas and constituting a danger to the security of individual freedoms found in a common way of life.

Although Marshall ultimately dismissed the Guatemalan draft proposal, his decision did not represent a deliberate and coherent shift away from earlier optimism within the State Department for the prospects of democracy in Latin America. Marshall did not reject the basis of shared ideals of democracy in the Western Hemisphere. He even accepted initial drafts of the Rio Treaty that formalised alongside the principle of sovereign and equal states the idea of individual freedom as an essential feature of a common hemispheric identity. The Rio Treaty also asserted hemispheric peace as founded on a justice and moral order that required the ‘recognition and protection of human rights and freedoms,’ the ‘indispensable well-being of the people,’ and the ‘effectiveness of democracy for the international realisation of justice and security.'
Marshall understood the declaration of the collective security of the Americas as ‘essentially related to their democratic ideals.’

Marshall unequivocally asserted the importance of individual freedom and democratic rights to a common American way of life in his own major address to the delegates at Petrópolis:

‘We of the American republics won our freedom in the name of democracy. We have fought for the dignity of the individual - an individual endowed with certain inalienable rights that cannot be taken from him by law or decree, an individual whose standards of moral conduct are the essence of a peaceful world.... We must reject encroachment upon the fundamental rights of the individual with the same determination that we reject any encroachment upon the fundamental rights of the state. I am confident that we all agree that the state exists for man, not man for the state-and that we abhor any limitations upon the freedom of expression of men throughout the world. For only when we have access to the thoughts of men, to the forces of public opinion free of coercion or connivance, only then can we develop a wholesome common interest while at the same time respecting separate national traditions.’

The identification of both democracy and state sovereignty as positive elements of hemispheric identity made either difficult to oppose. The prioritisation of one element rarely brought a willingness to reject the other as descriptive of a common identity. As a result the Rio Treaty would simultaneously assert both the rights of states and
individuals in an incoherent construction. Although he attempted to draw the equivalence between the both principles, in rejecting the estrangement of regional dictators Marshall became the latest to tip the balance of what *Time* magazine describes as the ‘see-saw’ of conflicting rights of states and individuals.\(^{56}\)

The incoherence of his image of the Western Hemisphere should have been clear to Marshall. The State Department had previously struggled to reconcile the rights of states and individuals in attempting to identify the ‘distinguishing ideals and beliefs which bind [the American Republics] together in contrast with other non-American powers.’\(^{57}\) Although he was not the first to identify the region with positive features that it did not fully represent, the determination of Marshall to demonstrate an example of cooperation rather than establishing a genuine hemispheric solidarity compelled him to overlook the persistence of authoritarian regimes across Latin America and the hollowness in the declaration of protection for the fundamental rights of individuals.\(^{58}\) His prioritisation of projecting the credibility of the US commitment to voluntarily restrain its own preponderant power in relations with neighbouring countries in its sphere of influence led Marshall to insist that a few governments straying from the democratic path should not encourage delegates to weaken the force of the Rio Treaty.

Marshall considered the US commitment to cooperation with sovereign and equal Latin American states to be a significant weapon in the psychological battleground of the Cold War. His approach did not represent a necessary or cohesive response to the Soviet threat however. Marshall constructed hemispheric identity in opposition to the violations of sovereignty within the Soviet orbit. The construction of a Soviet Other in the imagery and symbolic discourse of containment did not provide a single lens from
which to view the struggle for hemispheric identity however. Alternative existing constructions of hemispheric identity could be framed in opposition to different threats posed by the Soviet Union. In their initiative for the Rio Treaty the Guatemalan delegation had identified repression in Latin American dictatorships as analogous to the Soviet abuse of individual political rights. Marshall had underestimated these competing pressures and simply attempted to establish an illusion of coherence by projecting the positive elements of democracy in the US onto the identity of a region that contained repressive dictatorships in order to pursue his own strategic objective of demonstrating the solidarity of the Western Hemisphere. The Guatemalan delegation appealed to the rest of the Latin American delegates to resist this myth of democracy and demand the formalisation of the political rights of individuals as a condition of national sovereignty within the Western Hemisphere.
Notes for Chapter 3


3 Norman Armour quoted in Schoultz, Lars, *Beneath the United States: A History of US Policy toward Latin America* (London: Harvard University Press, 1998) p. 317. The commitment to individual political liberties soon became institutionalised as the basis of solidarity and cooperation alongside the concept of equal treatment. The Council on Foreign Relations noted the precedent ‘in the declarations and resolutions which marked the development of the inter-American system, the concepts of democracy and justice had stood side by side with those of peace and security. Even before the war, Franklin Roosevelt had stated at the 1936 Buenos Aires Conference for the Maintenance of Peace the need to strengthen the processes of constitutional democratic government and preserve individual liberties. The final agreement claimed the ‘existence of a solitary democracy in America.’ Three years later at the Panama Conference, delegates noted the advisability of protecting the integrity of the ‘democratic ideal’ through the ‘adoption of appropriate measures.’ Similar statements were made at Havana and Rio, but at Chapultepec in 1945, the American Republics made the plainest statement to affirm their ‘adherence to the democratic ideal’ and their recognition that ‘the dissemination of totalitarian doctrines in this Continent would endanger the American democratic ideal.’ Delegates also agreed that ‘[t]he purpose of the State is the happiness of man in society. The interests of the community should be harmonized with the rights of the individual. The American man cannot conceive of living without justice, just as he cannot conceive of living without liberty.’ They also proclaimed ‘the adherence of the American Republics to the principles established by international law for safeguarding the essential rights of man, and to declare their support of a system in international protection of these rights.’ See Campbell, *The United States in World Affairs, 1947-1948*, p. 220.


5 *New York Times*, 08.06.1947

6 On arrival in Buenos Aires, Braden announced that, ‘We are fighting throughout the whole world for the cause of democracy, and when we say fighting for democracy, we mean just that. It is our purpose to support all democracies and we would like to see democratic governments in all parts of the world.’ See *Time*, 15.10.1945. The urgency of the problem was clear to Braden. ‘[I]t is my feeling,’ he noted, ‘that democracy as we know it in this country is not merely on trial or at the crossroads but is approaching a precipice....’ Quoted in Schwartzberg, Steven, *Democracy and US Policy in Latin America during the Truman Years* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2003) p. 8. He promptly disseminated a memorandum, which argued that the US could not ‘retain un tarnished and unblemished our resolute self respect and the respect of others for us while maintaining at the same time friendly, cooperative relations’ with ‘dictatorships and disreputable governments.’ Quoted in Wood, Bryce, *The Dismantling of the Good Neighbour Policy* (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1985) p. 95
7 Address by Assistant Secretary Rockefeller, “Obligations of the Americas Toward the Peace,” State Department Bulletin (Volume XIII, No.322, August 26th 1945) p. 285; Time, 03.09.1945
9 Time, 03.12.1945
10 Plotkin, Mariano Ben, Mañana es San Perón: A Cultural History of Perón’s Argentina (Delaware: Scholarly Resources, 2003) p. 21
12 Time, 15.04.1946
13 Time, 18.03.1946; 01.04.1946; 15.04.1946
14 710. Consultation (4)/11-945, Department of State, ‘Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State,”09.11.1945 (FRUS 1945, Volume IX)
15 Acheson, Dean, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (London: W.W. Norton and Co., 1969) p. 187
17 711.35/3-3147: Telegram, Department of State, “The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Argentina,” 23.04.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII); 862.20235/5-747: Telegram, Department of State, “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Argentina,” (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII) 07.05.1947, p. 193; 862.20235/5-847: Telegram, Department of State, “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Argentina,” 09.05.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)
18 710 Consultation 4-/4-146: Circular Telegram, Department of State, “The Acting Secretary of State to Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics Except Argentina and Haiti,” 01.04.1946 (FRUS 1946, Volume XI)
19 710 Consultation 4-/3-946, Department of State, “The Secretary of State to Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics Except Argentina and Haiti,”09.03.1946 (FRUS 1946, Volume IX)
20 See for example, 710 Consultation 4-/7-1646, Department of State, ‘Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs,”16.07.1946 (FRUS 1946, Volume XI)
21 For further information see Braden, Diplomats and Demagogues; Stiller, George S. Messersmith; Trask, “Spruille Braden versus George Messersmith,” pp. 69-95
22 Time, 18.03.1946
23 Truman Library, Diary of Harry S. Truman, 31.03.1947; 711.35/4-247: Telegram, Department of State, “The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Argentina,” 02.04.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)
24 862.20235/5-747: Telegram, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Argentina to the Secretary of State,” 07.05.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII); 862.20235/5-847: Telegram, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Argentina to the Secretary of State,” 08.05.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII); 862.20235/5-947: Telegram, Department of
State, “The Ambassador in Argentina to the Secretary of State,” 09.05.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)

25 711.35/5-1347, Department of State, “Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of River Plate Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs,” 13.05.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)

26 711.35/3-3147: Telegram, Department of State, “The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Argentina,” 23.04.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII); 862.20235/5-747: Telegram, Department of State, “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Argentina,” 07.05.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII); 862.20235/5-847: Telegram, Department of State, “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Argentina,” 09.05.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)

27 “Joint Statement Following Discussions with Ambassador Ivanissevich of Argentina,” 03.06.1947, Public Papers of the Presidents. Harry S. Truman, 1947 (Washington: GPO, 1963); Braden, Diplomats and Demagogues p. 369


29 Ibid.

30 Wood, The Dismantling of the Good Neighbour Policy, p. 120

31 835.248/8-2247: Telegram, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Argentina to the Secretary of State,” 22.08.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)

32 810.24/8-447, Department of State, Policy Committee on Arms and Armaments, “Memorandum by the Secretary of the Policy Committee on Arms and Armaments,” 04.08.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)

33 839.24/7-847, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State,” 08.07.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)

34 839.24/7-1747, Department of State, “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic,” 01.08.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)

35 839.24/11-2945, Department of State, “The Department of State to the Dominican Embassy,” 28.12.1945 (FRUS 1945, Volume IX)

36 839.24/7-1747, Department of State, “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic,” 01.08.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)

37 Braden, Diplomats and Demagogues, p. 364

38 Time, 15.10.1945


41 Ibid., p. 70

42 New York Times, 11.06.1947


44 New York Times, 30.11.1947

45 Time, 16.06.1947

46 New York Times, 08.07.1947

48 New York Times, 10.06.1947
49 Woods, Randall B., The Roosevelt Foreign Policy Establishment and the “Good Neighbor” (Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1979) p. 23
51 Interview with George C. Marshall, by William M. Spencer, July 9th 1947 (Marshall Foundation Library)
52 Time, 01.09.1947
54 710 Consultation 4/9-847, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chairman of the United States Delegation,” 21.08.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)
56 Time, 15.10.1945; The State Department considered various routes between upholding the principle of non-intervention and safeguarding each individual’s rights and freedoms. One example of these approaches to the complex problem was the effort of Dana Munro in stating the difference between military intervention and the use of moral and economic influence. But this, like others, was far from a reconciliation of the tension. See Schwartzberg, Democracy and US Policy in Latin America during the Truman Years, p. 13
57 The State Department memorandum listed the positive attributes as: ‘Faith in republican institutions, loyalty to democracy as an ideal, reverence for liberty, acceptance of the dignity of the individual and his inviolable personal rights, belief in peaceable adjustment of disputes, aversion to use of force as an instrument of national or international policy, adherence to the principles of equal sovereignty of states and justice under international law and hope of the eventual coming of a lasting peace for all nations.’ Quoted in Haines, “Under the Eagle’s Wing,” p. 373
58 Amongst these numerous similar declarations, Roosevelt himself had praised hemispheric democratic government at the 1936 Buenos Aires Conference for the Maintenance of Peace: ‘First, it is our duty by every honourable means to prevent any future war among ourselves. This can best be done through the strengthening of the processes of constitutional democratic government – to make these processes conform to the modern need for unity and efficiency and, at the same time, preserve the individual liberties of our citizens. By so doing, the people of our nations, unlike the people of many nations who live under other forms of government, can and will insist on their intention to live in peace. Thus will democratic government be justified throughout the world.’
The disagreements at the Rio Conference revealed that Marshall could not operate alone in defining the meaning of the Western Hemisphere in the global context of the Cold War. The failure to reconcile the demands of Latin American delegates for recognition of a shared identity of democracy with the commitment to a principle of non-discrimination in inter-American cooperation threatened to undermine his demonstration of solidarity in the Western Hemisphere. Marshall did not deliberately stand as an obstacle to the spread of democracy however. The toleration of Latin American governments that failed to protect individual rights originated, in large part, from his inability to resolve the dilemma highlighted by the Council on Foreign Relations: ‘Granting the desirability of obligations to respect human rights, the essential problem remained one of enforcement.’ It would be particularly problematic to find a formula in the Americas where non-intervention had become a ‘sacred cow.’

Marshall once again showed unable to recognise the incoherence in the application of the lessons of the Good Neighbour Policy to an environment transformed by the Second World War. The architects of the Good Neighbour Policy had considered the renunciation of intervention as essential for demonstrating their commitment to treat Latin American governments as equal partners. The former Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles insisted that ‘neither the individual interests of the US nor the cause of Inter-American unity is served when the US Government or its representatives take action which is regarded by the peoples of the Latin American nations as derogatory to their national sovereignty.’ In his article for Foreign Affairs in 1928, Franklin D.
Roosevelt declared it neither the right nor the sacred duty of the US alone to intervene even in support of democracy across Latin America. Roosevelt insisted that such an absolute commitment to non-intervention would not only restore Latin American goodwill towards the US, but also project a positive example of US intentions to ‘regain the world’s trust and friendship.’

The principle of non-intervention sat more uncomfortably after the “lessons of Munich” however. Braden in particular regarded attempts to find accommodation with dictators like Perón as nothing short of appeasement. Despite their criticism of interference in the domestic affairs of Argentina during the confirmation hearings for the appointment of Braden to the post of Assistant Secretary, the Senate ultimately provided their unanimous support in fear of being painted as appeasers. Although the demands that the US support democratic rights created similar sentiments across much of Latin America, the subsequent interventionism under Braden engendered some fears of a return to an earlier period of “two Americas”. A question remained for Marshall and the other delegates at Petrópolis: ‘How could intervention, unilateral or collective, to force a government to grant certain rights to its own citizens be reconciled with the principle of national sovereignty, which was supposed to be the cornerstone of the inter-American system?’

**Hemispheric Intervention**

The failure of Marshall to provide a suitable answer to this question invited the other delegations to consider their own solutions. The head of the Uruguayan delegation, the Foreign Minister Dr. Mateo Marques Castro, suggested that Marshall’s
multilateralisation of the Monroe Doctrine could be extended from the defence of regional territory to the integrity of individuals. He argued that the Rio Treaty presented an opportunity to assign collective duty for the protection of individual rights within the Western Hemisphere. The proposal had already received some consideration within the US. Roosevelt himself had suggested that the internal conditions of states affecting others should become the joint concern of the entire continent.  

The State Department under Byrnes and Braden had given its unqualified support to a similar proposal made by Marques Castro’s predecessor, Dr. Alberto Rodriguez Larreta, for collective intervention against regimes violating ‘the elementary rights of man and of the citizens.’ Both recognised the inherent problem in the abandonment of the principle of non-intervention in the Larreta Doctrine however. The ongoing contestation between the rights and duties of states and individuals meant that efforts to reconcile this tension increasingly focused less on favouring one over the other and more on rearticulating the meanings in this debate. Rather than renounce non-intervention, Byrnes and Braden constantly reaffirmed their observance to this principle, whilst simultaneously adding the caveat that ‘non-intervention in internal affairs does not mean the approval of local tyranny.’

The State Department under Byrnes embarked upon a significant campaign to assuage critics of collective intervention and demonstrate that it could be safeguarded against abuse. Byrnes defended the Larreta Doctrine on the assumption that national sovereignty ‘may not be used as a shield behind which a government of force violates those very rights for which we have expended so heavily of our human and material resources.’ In a public radio broadcast, Braden stressed that, ‘our policy of non-
intervention in the affairs of the other American nations is fundamental and will continue. We have no intention of taking that kind of action of unilateral action.’

Provisos were added again however:

‘Neither do we intend to stand idly by while the Fascist ideology against which we fought a war endeavors to entrench itself in this hemisphere. But our policy is one of joint action with the other republics - group action for our mutual security.’

The Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs, Ellis O. Briggs, also used a speech to Philadelphia’s Pan American Association to emphasise that collective action in the Americas was not intervention, but the ‘legitimate exercise of collective initiative.’ It was the normal and democratic way of handling regional affairs.

Marshall refused to support the proposal outlined by Marques Castro however. He understood that, despite the aspirations for democracy across the region, many Latin American leaders remained wary that duties to protect individual rights could be used against them as a pretext for undue interference in their internal affairs. Many Latin American governments responded negatively to the Larreta Doctrine, ‘despite, or perhaps because of, the strong endorsement of it by the Unites States.’ The State Department’s John C. Dreier later identified the problems for the Latin American leaders: ‘The potential dangers inherent in permitting any kind of intervention were considered greater than the evils which intervention under the Rodriguez Larreta Doctrine were intended to correct.’ Even a number of progressive Latin American governments eventually rejected the formal proposal from the Guatemalan delegation to include in the Rio Treaty necessary measures against attacks on ‘the democratic structure of American governments,’ on the basis that the task of defining “democratic”
governments remained too subjective. Their antipathy towards the authoritarian regimes that opposed the proposal did not eradicated suspicions of previous unilateral efforts made by the US to isolate and intervene under the guise of “tutelage”.

The fear of “Yanqui imperialism” persisted in the Western Hemisphere. Marshall understood that the primacy of power ensured that the US would need to lead, or at least provide disproportionate influence, in any intervention to fulfil even a collective duty to protect individual rights. He wanted to avoid the perception of any unilateral use of US power that could draw criticism. Despite affirmations of the importance of individual rights and democracy across the region, Marshall prioritised the larger global fight against the Soviet Union for the principle of democracy. The importance of the US image in the psychological battle of the Cold War meant that Marshall remained unwilling to project any impression of imperialism in the Western Hemisphere.

Marshall appreciated the negative consequences of an absolute rejection of measures for the active promotion of democracy however. In his address to the Rio Conference he attempted to rearticulate the meaning of democratic ideals within the context of the Good Neighbour Policy. Marshall emphasised the importance of being ‘...devoted to the principle that states and nations should be bound by the same standards of moral conduct we set for the individual.’ But he shifted the basis of these standards of individual conduct from the value of freedom used by Byrnes and Braden to the principles of equality and respect:

‘Good faith and fair dealing, honesty and friendly cooperation, mutual respect and freedom of intercourse - these we expect of each other as individuals, these we should demand of each other
as states. This is the basis of our fundamental belief in the equality of individuals, of the equality of states. We stand to all the world as an example of states striving to live in harmony, determined to abide by the same principles of moral conduct we demand of the individual citizen.’

Rather than holding up Latin American governments to shared standards of individual political rights, Marshall simply attempted to shift the meaning of a common hemispheric identity to one that fit within the context of international relations in the Good Neighbour Policy. President Truman had used his first presidential trip to Mexico City just before the Rio Conference as an opportunity to prepare the path for this discourse. He not only reaffirmed the doctrine of non-intervention in the Good Neighbour Policy as the ‘keystone of the inter-American system,’ but also rearticulated the domestic values of democracy to the systemic level: ‘The Good Neighbour Policy applies to international relations the same standards of conduct that prevail among self-respecting individuals within a democratic community.’

Marshall could not replace the meaning of non-intervention in the inter-American system. His subjectivity emerged in his own ambiguous interpretation of ‘a term not easy of definition.’ The negotiations at the Rio Conference demonstrated that Latin American delegates would maintain their own divergent interpretations of the meanings of shared values in the Western Hemisphere.

**Hemispheric Clashes**

The Good Neighbour Policy established a model of international relations between the states of the Western Hemisphere, but the commitment to the principle of non-
intervention failed to provide a meaning of continental solidarity that could accommodate both the democracies and dictatorships of the region. The absence of a coherent approach from Marshall led the Argentine delegation to propose a solution. The Argentine Foreign Minister, Dr. Juan Atilio Bramuglia, recommended that ‘all other considerations’ of relations within the Western Hemisphere be subordinated to securing the region from the threat of the Soviet Union. The internal nature of the region should be overlooked in favour of maintaining a ‘completely united front’ in response to extra-hemispheric aggression. Marshall rejected this proposal as he remained less interested in securing the Western Hemisphere than projecting a successful example of inter-American cooperation. Congressional representatives on the US delegation agreed that the solidarity of the region could not dismiss intervention within the region to focus only on hemispheric defence. ‘A crime was a crime wherever the criminal came from,’ warned Vandenberg.

In his determination to demonstrate a successful model of solidarity in the Western Hemisphere on the basis of cooperation and adherence to the principle of non-intervention amongst equal and sovereign states, Marshall ignored numerous warnings that a harmonious neighbourhood simply may not be possible. Despite the cooperation shown by the Argentine delegation at the Rio Conference, the fears that Perón continued to harbour expansionist designs for an austral bloc left the likes of Vandenberg cautious of any distinction in the Rio Treaty between internal and external intervention. The Venezuelan Foreign Minister, Dr. Carlos Morales, warned Marshall against a resolute commitment to non-intervention. Although he agreed that the shared interest in securing the peace would bring unity in the face of external aggression, Morales insisted
that this did not preclude the intensification of armed struggle between the opposing forces of authoritarian and democratic countries.\(^{23}\)

In dismissing intervention against any Latin American country on the basis of its internal nature, Marshall failed to understand that relations *between* states in the Western Hemisphere would be shaped by the political relations *within* states. The open antagonism that followed the demand for democracy across the region became evident in the Caribbean and Central America in particular. The refusal of several dictatorships to protect individual rights and the adherence to the principle of non-intervention from some of the progressive governments meant that non-state actors had actively assumed the duties to promote democracy.

The organisation of exiled democrats into a “Caribbean Legion” had led to several armed attacks against the dictatorships of the region. Those authoritarian governments targeted, such as the regimes in the Dominican Republic, Honduras, and Nicaragua, often retaliated against neighbouring countries like Cuba and Guatemala that they accused of staging the bases for launched attacks. The incoherence of an absolute commitment to non-intervention had already appeared shortly before the Rio Conference. Despite his own misgivings towards the regime of Rafael Leónidas Trujillo Molina in the Dominican Republic, Marshall condemned plans made by the Caribbean Legion to launch a coup attempt from Cayo Confites in Cuba.\(^{24}\) He feared that an attack would irreversibly damage the credibility of the inter-American system just as global attention was about to converge on Petrópolis. But he had to hold the Cuban President, Dr. Ramón Grau San Martín, responsible in order to condemn the planned attacks as a violation of the principle of non-intervention.
Morales expressed his doubt that the principle of non-intervention could be framed in such terms when a state aggressor was not self-evident. The Venezuelan representative warned that situations could be further complicated if opposing governments claimed the other as aggressor and planned pre-emptive strikes to eliminate the imminent threat of attack. Morales also warned Marshall that hemispheric solidarity would be endangered if conflict drew in neighbouring countries to opposing sides. The presentation of the Guatemalan proposal for the Rio Treaty had demonstrated the potential for a regional antagonism. The progressive governments like Cuba offered their immediate support, whilst the Argentine regime swiftly joined the autocratic governments in registering opposition. Marshall could only inform Morales that he would think further on his recommendations. He did insist that the terms of the Rio Treaty would ultimately be less important than the good faith in which it was carried out. Marshall was adamant that ‘even if we allowed for two or three exceptions we could count on the good faith and influence of the vast majority of the American Republics to make our treaty work.’ He failed to see that the internal conflict within the region could undermine the symbolic example of an “indivisible Americas” however. Marshall could not reconcile this tension inherent to his construction of regional order upon a traditional state-centric approach to inter-American diplomatic relations.

The dismissal of this incoherence revealed the importance that Marshall attached to the demonstration of the US commitment to non-intervention in its relations with Latin American states over any genuine pursuit of peace and solidarity in the Western Hemisphere. He did not need to address the tensions between Latin American neighbours to project a symbolic example of US relations with them. Such an approach
ignored the increasing pressure on hemispheric solidarity exerted by the growing movement for democratic freedom and ensured that events quickly overtook US strategy in the region. The rapid proliferation of destabilising movements of revolution and reaction increasingly revealed the incoherence in Marshall’s commitment to non-intervention.

The failure to reconcile the Good Neighbour Policy with the demands for democratic transformation became clearer as the delegates at the Rio Conference turned their attention to the civil war that had raged in Paraguay since March. The assurances of non-intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states made in the Good Neighbour Policy could not deal with the antagonism between repressive dictatorships and democratic movements that emerged within state boundaries. The representatives at the Rio Conference unanimously passed a resolution urging warring parties to lay down arms and end the conflict, but Marshall’s own response to the Paraguayan civil war appeared to demonstrate a strategic shift from the promotion of democratic rights to support of conservative reactionaries.\textsuperscript{25} Braden had earlier opposed any assistance to the authoritarian President of Paraguay, General Higinio Moríñigo Martínez, as initial unrest had been instigated by the dictator’s expulsion of political opponents.\textsuperscript{26} The State Department informed Moríñigo that assistance would be determined by ‘the degree of evolution toward liberal, democratic government in Paraguay.’\textsuperscript{27} Acheson also cautioned against any subsequent support for Moríñigo that would be ‘interpreted by various unfriendly groups as intervention in Paraguay’s internal affairs aimed at propping up a “reactionary dictatorship” by the suppression with US arms of a “popular revolt.”’\textsuperscript{28} Marshall’s commitment to a neutral position and strict adherence to non-intervention in the internal affairs of Paraguay however, removed any tools to secure
peace or protect individual rights. The failure to gain any support inevitably guaranteed the failure of the considerably weaker democratic insurrection.

The renewed requests for assistance from the Morínigo regime after the defeat of the Paraguayan uprising left Marshall to confront the inconsistencies of his strategic approach during the negotiations at Petrópolis. In a meeting during a lunch break in the conference, the Paraguayan Foreign Minister, Dr. Federico Chaves, showed eager to demonstrate to Marshall the democratic nature of his ruling Partido Colorado and its opposition to all forms of dictatorship. Chaves could not demonstrate the democratic reforms that had been demanded by Braden, but he identified his country, in its ‘friendship to the US,’ with the side of democratic freedom and in opposition to the dictatorial threat of the Soviet Union and Communism. This Manichaean construction created the illusion of coherence for Marshall’s approach to democracy and non-intervention at the Rio Conference; he later agreed to the requests for assistance in reconstructing the country and reinstating US military training. Marshall could not continue to guarantee hemispheric solidarity by simply removing the spectre of US intervention however; the conflict between democratic movements and dictatorial rule threatened to persist.

Marshall continued after the Rio Conference to pursue hemispheric solidarity through the renunciation of US interventionism, but the escalation of tensions in the Caribbean exposed his misjudgement of Latin American actors’ capacity to destabilise the region. Marshall remained confident, nonetheless, that the conflict in the Caribbean could be resolved through the machinery of the Rio Treaty. He assigned responsibility for forging a solution to Paul C. Daniels, who filled the post of Director of the Office of
American Republic Affairs after the tragic death of James H. Wright. Like other State Department careerists, Daniels joined the Foreign Service after graduating from Harvard and then gained regional experience whilst serving in a number of diplomatic posts and special missions. More importantly for Marshall however, Daniels shared his belief that US intervention in the Western Hemisphere would ‘undermine confidence in the Good Neighbour Policy.’ Daniels sought to ensure that the forthcoming Ninth International Conference of American States at Bogotá would be approached with the same spirit of ‘mutual respect and voluntary cooperation for common interests’ demonstrated in Rio de Janeiro.

Daniels initially hoped that an informal evocation of this cooperative spirit would encourage some peaceful settlement of the Caribbean situation; he encouraged all conflicting parties to declare commitments to comply with the duties of states stipulated in recent inter-American agreements. But Marshall had already been warned of the limitations of these agreements, particularly the Rio Treaty, in the context of the Caribbean crisis. The provisions for restoring peace with measures of reciprocal assistance set out in the Rio Treaty’s Article 7 relied on a designation of belligerence; the conflicting accusations of aggression from Venezuela and the Dominican Republic only complicated this situation. The claims of aggression could not be based upon the definitions of armed attack or invasion by another state outlined in Article 9, but on the clandestine support of insurgent movements.

A reliance on traditional diplomatic concepts, based on the particular estrangement of states, meant that the State Department failed to address the forces transcending national borders. States may have assumed the duties of non-intervention, but dissident
exiles continued to cross borders to promote unrest. The State Department could only deal with this instability instigated by non-state actors by focusing pressure on any states providing support. The Inter-American Convention Concerning the Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife signed at the 1928 Sixth Conference of American States in Havana demanded each American Republic prevent their territory being used to launch insurgent actions. The State Department was left with the problem however, of whether belligerent states were ‘us[ing] all means at their disposal’ to prevent these insurgencies.

Marshall was initially encouraged by reassurances of the Cuban President, Dr. Ramón Grau San Martín, that he would prevent rebels from attempting to invade the Dominican Republic from their main bases within Cuban territory; but reports from various sources continued to detail ongoing plans for invasion being made from within Cuba. Even when Marshall eventually managed to pressure Grau into arresting revolutionary exiles, many were allowed to escape to safe havens in Venezuela and Guatemala. Far from restraining these remaining rebels, the Guatemalan President, Juan José Arévalo, engineered the Pacto del Caribe to bring them together and organise their efforts. The Ambassador for the Dominican Republic in Washington, Luis F. Thomen, expressed fears that Guatemala, as well as Haiti, were already providing support for actions against his country.

The Trujillo regime also faced charges of smuggling arms to Venezuelan exiled rebels. The Chargé at the Embassy in Ciudad Trujillo, Charles R. Burrows, confirmed that Trujillo sought to avoid the launch of any direct attack, but would provide support for revolutionary movements in Venezuela and Cuba. The US Ambassador, George H.
Butler, had already reported connections between the Dominican military and forces being assembled to attack Venezuela.\textsuperscript{44}

Daniels received counsel that the failure of his informal approaches brought general agreement in the State Department that the situation had become serious enough to warrant collective action through established instruments of mediation.\textsuperscript{45} From the Embassy in Caracas however, Thomas C. Mann cautioned that these processes would be unable to settle the issue; the polemical divergence on ideology meant that no settlement would be satisfactory to both parties. Indeed, neither the Venezuelan nor Dominican government showed willingness to invoke any inter-American machinery for conciliation.\textsuperscript{46} They both found legitimacy for their actions in conflicting discourses of hemispheric identity.

The persistent repression of individual rights by the dictatorships of the region certainly undermined the objective of institutionalising hemispheric solidarity at Bogotá. Those seeking to escape authoritarian regimes identified a fundamental antagonism in the region; they identified with the construction promoted by the State Department under Braden that labelled Latin American dictators, such as Trujillo, as dangerous Others to the security and liberty of the hemispheric Self. The declaration that the ‘obligation of mutual assistance and common defense of the American Republics is essentially related to their democratic ideals’ in the Rio Treaty only encouraged rising expectations. Rómulo Betancourt argued that the inter-American system could not enjoy real support until the Western Hemisphere became truly democratic; he added that Venezuela and the other Latin American Republics could not
be expected to speak out against dictatorship in the global struggle against the Soviet Union whilst tolerating it in the Western Hemisphere.\textsuperscript{47}

Betancourt claimed the remaining Latin American dictators to be the clearest danger to the unity and peace of the Americas. He had expressed unease with the initial decision made by Marshall to reverse the military embargo against the Trujillo regime. They complained that the supply of arms to the Dominican Republic also provided justification for other Latin American Republics, such as Brazil, to sell munitions for use in aggressive actions against Venezuela.\textsuperscript{48} Dreier advised Marshall to refuse the request made by Trujillo for a large quantity of US medium and large bomber aircraft and pursuit fighter planes; he should provide an example of discrimination against repressive and belligerent dictators. A settlement of the crisis would be difficult whilst the Dominican Republic was identified by the Venezuelan government as the ‘real enemy.’\textsuperscript{49}

Latin American dictators, like Trujillo, did not recognise themselves as the antagonistic obstacle to the realisation of an exceptional hemispheric identity however. They found the Manichaean constructions of containment discourse useful instead to identify their regimes with the democratic sphere of influence of the US. As Trujillo defined his goals in terms of a common response to the threat of the Soviet enemy-Other, he also marked the threat facing his ‘democratic’ nation during the Caribbean crisis as Communist-inspired.\textsuperscript{50} The State Department found itself dragged into the conflict as Trujillo expressed his great alarm at Venezuelan acquisition of arms and aircraft and further attempts to purchase airships from the US.\textsuperscript{51}
The Truman administration remained unwilling to project such Cold War constructions into their relationship with the Dominican Republic. Butler, in particular, argued that Trujillo was a ruthless dictator who did not share the democratic traditions of the US. He also advised Marshall that it was ‘extremely unlikely’ that the Dominican Republic faced any serious communist threat; Trujillo indiscriminately branded all of his opponents as “communist.” The new Central Intelligence Agency similarly found little credibility in the labelling of the Venezuelan government as Communist. Butler advised Marshall that the charges against Betancourt were part of Trujillo’s ‘devious means to obtain arms and munitions from the US.’ He also warned that claims were, in fact, ‘smokescreens’ to cover plans to use ‘defensive’ armaments against neighbouring countries. Although Marshall did not share Butler’s legitimisation of the revolutionary exiles’ targeting of dangerous regional dictatorships, he was also unready to accept anti-Communism as the primary criterion for friendly relations with the US.

Marshall supported a declaration of the Fundamental Rights and Duties of States in a chapter in the Charter of the Organization of American States at the Bogotá Conference; but he did not abandon constructions of democratic ideals as guiding principles of inter-American solidarity. A pioneering agreement at Bogotá on an American Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man would also assert the individual right to vote and participate in government. The decision to make the latter declaration separate from the main body of the Organic Pact of the Bogotá Conference and without binding force illustrated the continued prioritisation of non-intervention as the basis of inter-American cooperation. This commitment only removed effective means for the US to enforce any conditionality on the sovereignty of Latin America’s remaining dictatorships.
**Hemispheric Neutrality**

The commitment to the principle of non-intervention in the Good Neighbour Policy could not be reconciled with the need to establish cohesion within the Western Hemisphere. Marshall received numerous warnings that the ideological antagonism defining the conflict in the Caribbean made any resolution difficult without decisive US action. The State Department found resistance from the American Republics to inter-American measures for peaceful settlement and a reluctance of the Governing Board of the Pan American Union to instigate action. The machinery of the Rio Treaty could not settle the crisis in the Caribbean; stipulations requiring the restoration of the status quo ante bellum were clearly not acceptable for the progressive parties involved. From Ciudad Trujillo, Butler advised Marshall that the situation would deteriorate further without US action; it would ultimately need more time and attention in the future to prevent any disruption to the forthcoming Bogotá Conference. He warned that the unrest was symptomatic of a more basic trouble across the Western Hemisphere: ‘As long as internal political situations in many countries are such that political exiles must plot from abroad, there probably will be a continuation of these difficulties.’

Butler was amongst many State Department and Foreign Service officials to argue that the US must accept, even if reluctantly, that preponderant power conferred primary responsibility for securing individual rights within the Western Hemisphere. As the Office of American Republic Affairs’ chief of the Division of River Plate Affairs, Butler wrote an article during the Second World War arguing that, ‘[t]he US must throw its full weight to achieve democracy [in the Western Hemisphere].’ The “Butler Doctrine” emphasised that the US should not be deterred by the ‘cry of Yankee Imperialism’ from
Latin American Republics placing an undue emphasis on the sovereignty of states. ‘If we do not lead in the fight for these principles,’ he asked, ‘who will?’

The urgency of the situation in the Caribbean led Butler to restate the assertions of his earlier “doctrine” – the principle of non-intervention was at ‘variance with history and experience’ that showed not all Latin American states ‘act always in such a manner that the welfare of the American community of nations will not suffer thereby.’

Butler insisted that the roots of the crisis came from the failure of the US to hold Latin American regimes accountable to the basic principles of democracy declared in numerous inter-American agreements and promoted by the Truman administration.

He argued that the US approach should be guided by President Truman’s address before the Governing Board of the Pan American Union in April 1946. Truman had declared that lasting peace in the region required the dedication of resources to the ultimate objective of securing a democratic American way of life; such a commitment to democracy should be the positive example that the Western Hemisphere provided to the rest of the world.

Butler emphasised that Truman had recognised the need to resort to force to maintain solidarity in the Western Hemisphere and proposed US leadership of a multilateral action based on the democratic principle of majority rule. Although recognising that his recommendations created complications for the State Department, Butler insisted that the abuse of democratic principles, that all American Republics at least proclaimed to observe, legitimised US support for collective intervention against the Dominican Republic. Even Braden had remained hesitant to support the original assertion of the Butler Doctrine however. Although he agreed that multilateral action did not constitute
intervention and should actually be considered as the antithesis of intervention, Braden warned that US leadership of such actions, or even proposals for action, would ultimately ensure resistance from many Latin American governments. The enduring suspicion of US unilateral intervention under the guise of collective action must simply be accepted as their “penalty of power”.

Marshall considered this “penalty of power” to be too high to reverse his commitment to non-intervention. The use of hemispheric discourse on democracy to frame revolutionary movements in the Caribbean only increased the need to demonstrate the credibility of this rhetoric before the Bogotá Conference. The failings of the Good Neighbour approach to assume the necessary duties to protect those individual rights asserted in inter-American declarations became more apparent as others continued to assume such responsibilities.

Marshall grew concerned that the eruption of another local conflict could further undermine regional stability after the US Ambassador in San José, Nathaniel P. Davies, informed him of the unrest breaking out across Costa Rica63. The country had been destabilised by the declaration of the presidential election victory of Otilio Ulate Blanco of the National Union Party as null and void by an Electoral Board sympathetic to the ruling National Republican Party’s candidate, Rafael Ángel Calderón Guardia. Civil War broke out as the military and police loyal to Calderón and the sitting President, Teodoro Picado Michalski, responded to a strike initiated by Ulate supporters with violent reprisals that culminated in the imprisonment of Ulate and the death of his close associate, Dr. Carlos Luis Valverde.
Marshall considered this new crisis a serious and untimely threat to another symbolic example of hemispheric solidarity at the Bogotá Conference. But the Good Neighbour approach was limited by the need to refrain from any interference in a domestic conflict. The State Department strictly adhered to Marshall’s position on non-intervention; Robert Newbegin notified parties that the US would act only to prevent any outside interference that would make Costa Rica a scene of conflict between opposing external interests. Marshall faced a serious decision as such conflict became the reality of the situation in Costa Rica.

Developments in Costa Rica meant that Marshall could no longer dismiss the warnings proffered at Petrópolis that limited domestic conflicts would quickly draw in neighbouring countries to destabilise the entire region. When Costa Rican government forces confronted troops led by the exiled José María Hipólito Figueres Ferrer, the Ambassador in Washington, Francisco de P. Gutiérrez, immediately emphasised the training and support provided to Figueres by Arévalo and the Caribbean Legion. Gutiérrez expressed fears that Arévalo intended to conquer all of Central America. Maurice Bernbaum, the Chargé in Nicaragua, also advised Marshall that fears of a Guatemalan invasion to follow Figueres’ revolt caused Anastasio Somoza to consider sending support to Teodoro Picado.

As the Truman administration refused to stop Figueres and his rebels move on San José, it appeared that there was an intentional plan to undermine a government sympathetic to local Communists. The State Department made it clear to Somoza that it did not share his belief that Guatemalan support of Figueres and his ‘War of National Liberation’ provided the justification for responding to Picado’s appeals for assistance.
Somoza cancelled his plans after Robert F. Woodward informed him that any further action without inter-American agreement would be considered unilateral intervention. Daniels simply evaded a response to the appeals of the Costa Rican Ambassador, Francisco de P. Gutiérrez, that Costa Rica could legitimately request assistance to defend itself, whilst the Havana Convention obliged Guatemala not to assist insurgent groups.

State Department obstruction of Somoza’s attempts to support the Costa Rican government, whilst failing to prevent Arévalo’s assistance to rebels, were not the result of Cold War considerations however; they were illustrative of the limitations inherent to the traditional state-centric approach of inter-American diplomacy. Somoza’s declared intention to unilaterally send Nicaraguan state forces across the Costa Rican border made condemnation more straightforward as a clear violation of the principle of non-intervention in the Rio Treaty. Arévalo’s consistent denials of involvement with a non-state actor made similar censure through the Havana Convention more difficult.

The Truman administration faced Latin American criticism for maintaining the neutral position in its commitment to non-intervention. Braden had identified the price of neutrality earlier during the Second World War: ‘Whatever we refrain from saying and whatever we refrain from doing may constitute intervention, no less than what we do or say.’ He considered this price to be sound reason to embrace intervention in favour of democracy across the region:

‘The problem we face is not how to avoid using our power. We cannot possibly avoid using it, for it weighs in the balance just as much even when we do not deliberately apply it or when we
deliberately seek to avoid applying it. . . . If a nation has great power, as we have it in abundance, it cannot shun the obligation to exercise commensurate leadership . . . positively on behalf of human rights.’

Braden also later insisted that:

‘Not to use our power in the interests of peace and freedom may be misusing that power just as much as if we brought our influence to bear on the wrong side of an issue. We must lean over backwards to avoid intervention by action or inaction alike.’\(^7^3\)

In an article for *Foreign Affairs* the Colombia University academic, Professor Frank Tannenbaum, restated this argument that whatever the US *did* or *did not* do would have the effect of intervention because of its strength.\(^7^4\)

Marshall faced criticism not for his active intervention in support of pro-American regimes, but for the incoherence in his determination to avoid any appearance of interference in the internal affairs of Latin American neighbours. Ambassador Davis reported back the consequences of this tension between the penalty of power and the price of neutrality in Costa Rica: ‘[W]e are condemned for the failure to come to the rescue of which Costa Ricans themselves have not been able to resolve.’\(^7^5\)
Notes for Chapter 4

4 Time, 05.11.1945.
5 Campbell, The United States in World Affairs, 1947-1948, p. 103
7 835.00/11-2145: Telegram, Department of State, ‘The Uruguayan Foreign Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary of State,”21.11.1945 (FRUS 1945, Volume IX)
8 710.11/12-845: Telegram, Department of State, ‘The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Uruguay,”08.12.1945 (FRUS 1945, Volume IX)
9 835.00/10-8145: Telegram, Department of State, ‘The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Uruguay,”03.11.1945 (FRUS 1945, Volume IX)
11 Ibid.
12 Time, 03.12.1945
13 Marques Castro expressed his own gratitude to Marshall for his sacrifice in the defence of democracy and declared the shared values of the US and Uruguay. See 710 Consultation 4/9-847, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chairman of the United States Delegation,”28.08.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)
14 Campbell, The United States in World Affairs, 1947-1948, p. 103
16 Ibid.
17 839.00/12-2446: Telegram, Department of State, “The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Dominican Republic,” 09.02.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)
18 World Peace Foundation, “Address by the President on United States Relations with Mexico and Latin American Republics, March 3, 1947,” Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1947 (New York: Princeton University Press, Volume IX, 1949) p. 552; Braden had already conceded this point, when on his appointment to Washington, he had suggested, that ‘the ideal of the inter-American system is the application of democracy to international relations.’ See Time, 05.11.1945
20 710 Consultation 4/8-147: Telegram, Department of State, “The Chargé in Argentina to the Secretary of State,”01.08.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)
22 The new cordial relations with the US were reemphasised by the Argentine Foreign Minister, Dr. Juan Atílio Bramuglia, when he greeted Marshall and Armour in his Hotel Quitandinha apartment. He immediately pledged Argentina’s support for the US in the
global struggle against the Soviet Union and Communism. See 710 Consultation 4/9-847, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation by, the Chairman of the United States Delegation,” 20.08.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)

23 710 Consultation 4/9-847, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chairman of the United States Delegation,” 20.08.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)

24 839.00/6-1947, Department of State, “The Ambassador in the Dominican Republic to the Secretary of State,” 19.06.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)

25 710 Consultation 4/8-1647, Department of State, “The Chairman of the United States Delegation to the Acting Secretary of State,” 16.08.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)

26 834.00/4-2147, Department of State, “Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs to the Under Secretary of State,” 23.04.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)


28 Ibid; 834.00/4-2147, Department of State, “Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs,” 30.04.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)

29 Even after some of the bloodiest struggle in the civil war during the first few days of the Rio Conference, Robert Lovett could only authorise the US Ambassador, Willard L. Beaulac, to join other American Republics in an informal protest of the endangerment of lives. He was quick to add that such action had no implication of support for either side. See 834.00/8-1647, Department of State, “The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Paraguay,” 19.08.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)

30 Chaves also suggested that the President and the Colorado Party opposed the dangerous Paraguayan Communist Party. In the event of hostilities breaking out between the ‘totalitarian East and democratic West’ they would ‘unreservedly stand by the US See 710 Consultation 4/9-847, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chairman of the United States Delegation,” 27.08.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)

31 710 Consultation 4/9-847, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chairman of the United States Delegation,” 27.08.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII). A few days before Chaves’ request, the chargé in Asunción, Edward G. Trueblood, who Chaves had noted as a personal friend, had requested the resumption of US military missions in the country now that normalcy was beginning to return. See 834.20 Missions/8-2147: Telegram, Department of State, “The Chargé in Paraguay to the Secretary of State,” 21.08.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII). An agreement was signed later in the year.

32 Marshall simply asked regional diplomats to remain vigilant and continue reporting on developments. See 810.00/1-1748: Circular Telegram, Department of State, “The Secretary of State to Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics,” 17.01.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX); 731.39/2-248, Department of State, “The Secretary of State to Certain Consular Offices,” 02.02.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)


34 Wood, Bryce, The Dismantling of the Good Neighbour Policy (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1985) p. 140
133

35 710.J/11-2847, Department of State, "The Acting Secretary of State to Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics," 28.11.1947 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)
36 731.39/1-2148, Department of State, "Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles C. Hauch of the Division of Caribbean Affairs," 21.01.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX); 731.39/1-2248, Department of State, "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs," 22.01.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)
38 731.39/1-2148, Department of State, "Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles C. Hauch of the Division of Caribbean Affairs," 21.01.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX); 731.39/1-2248, Department of State, "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs," 22.01.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)
40 New York Times, 16.01.1948
41 Juan José Arévalo also managed to persuade Grau to send him arms confiscated from captured democratic exiles. See Gleijeses, Piero, "Juan Jose Arevalo and the Caribbean Legion," *Journal of Latin American Studies* (Volume 21, No. 1, February 1989) p. 137
42 731.39/1-2148: Circular Telegram, Department of State, "Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles C. Hauch of the Division of Caribbean Affairs," 17.01.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)
44 839.113/12-947: Telegram, Department of State, "The Charge in the Dominican Republic to the Secretary of State," 09.12.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)
45 839.00/6-1947: Telegram, Department of State, "The Ambassador in the Dominican Republic to the Secretary of State," 19.06.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)
46 731.39/1-248, Department of State, "Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Special Inter-American Affairs to the Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs," 29.01.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)
47 810.00/6-2348: Telegram, Department of State, "The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Venezuela," 23.06.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)
48 810.00/6-2348: Telegram, Department of State, "The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Venezuela," 23.06.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)
49 Lot 60D665, Box 15280: Telegram, Department of State, "The Ambassador in Colombia to the Acting Secretary of State," 07.04.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)
52 839.00/6-1947: Telegram, Department of State, "The Ambassador in the Dominican Republic to the Secretary of State," 19.06.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII); 731.39/3-1548, Department of State, "The Ambassador in Venezuela to the Secretary of State," 15.03.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)
53 731.39/1-848, Department of State, "Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles C. Hauch of the Division of Caribbean Affairs," 08.01.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)
52 839.00/6-1947, Department of State, “The Ambassador in the Dominican Republic to the Secretary of State,” 19.06.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII); 839.00/9-147, Department of State, “The Ambassador in the Dominican Republic to the Secretary of State,” 01.09.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)
54 810.00/6-2348: Airgram, Department of State, “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Venezuela,” 23.06.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)
55 731.39/1-248, Department of State, “The Ambassador in the Dominican Republic to the Secretary of State,” 02.01.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)
56 839.00/9-147, Department of State, “The Ambassador in the Dominican Republic to the Secretary of State,” 01.09.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)
58 Ibid.
59 839.00/5-2847, Department of State, “The Ambassador in the Dominican Republic to the Secretary of State,” 28.05.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume IX); 839.00/6-1947, Department of State, “The Ambassador in the Dominican Republic to the Secretary of State,” 19.06.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume IX)
60 Butler, “Inter-American Relations After World War II,” p. 88; 839.00/6-1947, Department of State, “The Ambassador in the Dominican Republic to the Secretary of State,” 19.06.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII); 731.39/1-248, Department of State, “The Ambassador in the Dominican Republic to the Secretary of State,” 02.01.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)
61 Address Before the Governing Board of the Pan American Union, April 15th 1946, Public Papers of the Presidents. Harry S. Truman, 1946. (Washington: GPO, 1963)
62 See for example, 839.00/12-2446, Department of State, “The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Dominican Republic,” 19.02.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII); 731.39/1-248, Department of State, “The Ambassador in the Dominican Republic to the Secretary of State,” 02.01.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)
63 818.00/3-248: Telegram, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Costa Rica to the Secretary of State,” 02.03.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)
64 818.00/3-2248: Circular Telegram, Department of State, “The Secretary of State to Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics,” 22.03.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)
65 Lot 60D665, Box 15280: Telegram, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Colombia to the Acting Secretary of State,” 07.04.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)
66 818.00/3-1948, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Central America and Panama Affairs,” 19.03.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)
67 Kyle Longley suggests that US prevention of Nicaraguan support for Picado, whilst simultaneously turning a blind eye to Guatemalan assistance to Figueres demonstrates the State Department support for a movement against Picado’s government. This, he argues, demonstrates that Costa Rica was the first Cold War battleground in Latin America. See Longley, Kyle, “Peaceful Costa Rica, the First Battleground: The United States and the Costa Rican Revolution,” The Americas (Volume 50, No. 2, October 1993) pp. 149-175
Somoza repeatedly probed to find the US position on the Costa Rican situation. Bernbaum, on instruction from Marshall, informed the Nicaraguan dictator that the US was committed to non-intervention in the hemisphere. See for example: 818.00/3-1548: Telegram, Department of State, “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Nicaragua,” 15.03.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX). The Nicaraguan Ambassador to the US, Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa, assured Daniels that Nicaragua was not supplying arms to the Costa Rican government, but he hoped that the US would recognise Nicaraguan assistance as legal under the Habana Convention of 1928 – as Guatemala were already assisting an opposition group. See 818.00/3-1948, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs,” 19.03.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX). Again, Daniels stated that the US would not take a position and intervene in Costa Rican domestic affairs. Nevertheless, Somoza decided anyway to send a thousand troops to assist the Costa Rican Government without prior inter-American consultation.

Sevilla Sacasa desperately attempted to justify Nicaraguan actions – arguing that a friendly government had requested assistance and Nicaraguan action was taken under its obligations under the Central American Anti-Communist Pact of 1947. After Office of American Republic Affairs’ Deputy Director, Robert F. Woodward, made the US position clear however, Somoza spoke to Robert Newbegin to inform him of his change of heart. See 818.00/3-2248, Department of State, “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs,” 22.03.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX). Somoza was unwilling to risk his chances of US recognition.

For more on Arévalo and Costa Rica, see Gleijeses, “Juan Jose Arévalo and the Caribbean Legion,” pp. 133-145


State Department and Embassy officials repeatedly emphasised that the US was committed to non-intervention and expected other neighbouring countries to adhere to the principle. When Gonzalez Facio and Dr. Carlos Gutiérrez met with Norman Armour and William Tapley Bennett, Jr. of the Division of Central America and Panama Affairs however, whilst the latter may have appeared fairly sympathetic, they were met only with another reverberation of the US’ commitment to non-intervention from the Assistant Secretary. See Longley, “Peaceful Costa Rica, the First Battleground,” p. 160. Ambassador Davis reported his attempts to limit the bloodshed back in Costa Rica, but he was also cautious to ensure that his actions were not construed as intervention. See Olander, Marcia, “Costa Rica in 1948: Cold War or Local War?” *The Americas* (Volume 52, No. 4, April 1996) p. 473.
Marshall prioritised a commitment to the principle of non-intervention in order to restore the solidarity of the Western Hemisphere. The coherence of this pursuit was undermined at Petrópolis by the persistence of Latin American demands for democracy however. In his adherence to non-intervention at the expense of other objectives, Marshall also demonstrated further lack of understanding of its prior relevance in inter-American relations. Although non-intervention had become the rhetorical focus of the Good Neighbour Policy, the Roosevelt administration had only considered it as a useful concession in maintaining the cooperation of Latin American governments. The Roosevelt administration would refrain from intervention in the anticipation of a reciprocal commitment from Latin American governments to secure the private property of US companies.\footnote{The Roosevelt administration used non-intervention alongside other instruments of statecraft as part of a more complex role of mediating between the competing interests of private enterprise and Latin American governments.} Economic assistance proved to be increasingly important as a strategic instrument for maintaining this relationship of reciprocity. The chief architect of the Good Neighbour Policy within the Roosevelt administration, Sumner Welles, identified the mutual interest in such assistance:

‘The US has to continue wholeheartedly its policy of economic cooperation with its American neighbours. Such bread cast upon the waters will come back to this country a hundredfold. One of

5. Economic Development
the most profitable opportunities for American investment and for American foreign trade lay with the neighbouring republics of the hemisphere.  

The use of economic incentives became even more essential during the Second World War as the State Department shifted its focus from protecting property to securing access to vital strategic resources. Marshall worked closely with Nelson Rockefeller, acting at the time as the State Department’s Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, to coordinate this evocation of reciprocity. Rockefeller pursued a “comprehensive approach” to securing the region against aggression from Nazi Germany. He maintained that inter-American military cooperation would not guarantee the security of the Western Hemisphere. The US would also need to “sell” the American way of life in order to prevent Axis exploitation of the widespread economic deprivation in the region. Rockefeller used economic assistance to raise living standards across the region and demonstrate that to Latin American leaders that the development and progress of their countries would be best achieved through capitalist modernisation that came with further integration into the US sphere of influence. A commitment to Latin American economic development would also enhance the global prestige of the US and dispel any images of it as ‘the most feared and hated country.’

Alongside these small measures of economic assistance during the Second World War, the State Department maintained the cooperation of Latin America, in large part, through promises for a larger program of assistance to develop industrial capacity at the end of hostilities. Merwin L. Bohan was amongst many economic advisers at the Chapultepec Conference that felt a demonstration of the US commitment and capability to provide Latin American leaders with a model of ‘economic salvation’ would be
essential for maintaining inter-American cooperation after the war. The stretch on US resources as the US looked to extend its commitments into Western Europe however, led William L. Clayton, then serving as Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, to recommend that Latin American leaders postpone their industrialisation plans. ‘It isn’t going to be at all as you’d like it in the post-war period,’ he warned.⁵

Latin American disappointment was immediately evident. Delegates at the Chapultepec Conference pleaded for the US to honour its pledges to provide assistance for their economic development. The Mexican President, Manuel Ávila Camacho, received a standing ovation for his demands that the security of the Western Hemisphere depended upon sound economic and social conditions established by Latin American industrialisation.⁶ ‘The Latin Americans,’ as the Commerce Department’s regional specialist, George Wythe, highlighted, ‘have gone hog-wild for industrialisation.’ Yet the Truman administration continued to stall on their wartime pledges of development assistance and returned to the idea of free market principles as ‘religion or creed.’ Once the Truman administration cancelled wartime purchases and raised tariffs on their primary exports, Latin American leaders complained that the US had fixed inter-American economic relations in its favour ‘not once, but twice.’⁷

The exacerbation of Latin American economic problems brought criticisms from a number of former State Department officials from the Good Neighbour era that the principle of reciprocity had been abandoned. Laurence Duggan, the Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs under Sumner Welles, feared that the Truman administration had relegated Latin American leaders to the status of second-class citizens in the region:
'Today we are paying a minimum of attention to New World problems and this neglect is all the more marked because only yesterday we were making an all out effort to persuade our neighbours of our friendship.'

The neglect of the economic conditions throughout much of Latin America posed as serious danger to the solidarity of the region than the rising tide of expectations for democratic freedoms. Marshall needed to address the wide differences in living standards that undermined the imaginary of solidarity in the Western Hemisphere.

**Economic Reciprocity**

The announcement of the European Recovery Program offered Latin American leaders some encouragement that Marshall would honour earlier US commitments for assistance in their economic development. He had declared his commitment to address ‘hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos.’ Although they anticipated some discussion on economic cooperation at the Rio Conference, the Latin American delegations made sure that Marshall was aware of their agenda. The Mexican Foreign Minister, Jaime Torres Bodet, received rapturous applause for his opening address to the Rio Conference after restating the importance of economic development for both hemispheric security and solidarity. Torres Bodet stressed that economic inequality posed a significant threat to the maintenance of peace in the Western Hemisphere:

‘One of the deepest yearnings of the continent is to develop the economic cooperation of our countries to the end that many of them shall not become simply armored invalids artificially ironclad in time of emergency, but rather communities that are
strong through production, sound through equitable exploitation
of their resources....Nations that are weak owing to their economy
will be unable to exercise rapid and decisive action against
aggression.'

Despite constant questions asked from Latin American delegates however, Marshall
insisted each time that economic discussions could not be added to the agenda of the
Rio Conference.

The general message offered by Marshall to the Latin American delegates appeared
clear: the US could no longer afford further commitments to economic assistance on top
of the reconstruction of Europe. Marshall realised that Latin American cooperation on
negotiations over the Rio Treaty required some commitment for later discussions on
their economic agenda. He reassured them that ‘in assuming this burden we have not
lost sight of the economic problems of the Western Hemisphere.’ After the efforts
required in selling the ERP to Congress however, Marshall anticipated little chance of
appropriations for an assistance program in a region far away from the dangers of the
Cold War. He used his address and personal visits to delegations instead to explain the
importance of European recovery to the Americas. The Marshall Plan would firstly be
in Latin American interests; the threat of European markets being closed to their
surpluses endangered future development. Marshall also highlighted the dangers of
expansive Communism, comparing it to a fire, from which the Western Hemisphere
received sparks, but should be stamped out at its source – in Western Europe.

President Truman reinforced this message back in Washington during a press
conference held to celebrate Victory in Japan Day. He dismissed any economic
assistance for Latin America: ‘There has been a Marshall Plan for the Western Hemisphere for a century and a half,’ he suggested; it was ‘known as the Monroe Doctrine.’ 17 Truman made his position clearer after flying into Rio de Janeiro in his new Presidential DC-6, Independence, to make the closing address to the conference. ‘We intend to do our best to provide economic help to those who are prepared to help themselves and each other,’ he declared. ‘But our resources are not unlimited. We must apply them where they can serve most effectively to bring production, freedom, and confidence back to the world.’ 18 In an address to a joint session of the Brazilian Congress after the conclusion of the Rio Conference, Truman reassured the region that the US remained committed to action that would secure the solidarity of the Western Hemisphere: ‘I’m here to say that we don’t forget our friends when they have been friends in need.’ 19 Latin American leaders would just have to accept that the principle of reciprocity did not extend to a commitment to economic development.

**Economic Drift**

The prioritisation of limited resources into the ERP left Marshall and the State Department without serious means to maintain the principle of reciprocity within the Western Hemisphere. Although Marshall celebrated the conclusion of the Rio Treaty as a significant victory in the psychological battle with the Soviet Union, the failure to translate the commitment to the Good Neighbour Policy into an effective solution for the economic problems faced in Latin America exposed the fragility of his symbolic example of solidarity in the Western Hemisphere. The inadequate means available to the State Department to deal with subsequent economic crises that threatened much of Latin America only undermined the authenticity of the Good Neighbour relationship.
The State Department could not respond to the systemic food and fuel crises that endangered the extended US orbit with a comprehensive solution; the prioritisation of European reconstruction had already established a division in economic planning along regional lines. The drift in planning for inter-American economic cooperation only made the integration of a global response more problematic.

Latin American leaders expected the State Department to make at least comparable efforts to address the economic crises that imperilled both Western Europe and the Western Hemisphere. The continued prioritisation of the needs of Western Europe over those of Latin America appeared evident in the divergent responses from the State Department to the critical food shortages experienced. The State Department received urgent appeals for emergency economic assistance from Latin American leaders fearing that the public reaction to food shortages threatened the survival of their governments. The US Ambassador in Lima, Prentice W. Cooper Jr., informed Marshall that the Peruvian government of José Luis Bustamante y Rivero faced particularly acute cases of starvation and reported on the ongoing riots in the capital. Peruvian officials warned the State Department that the social unrest had reached proportions dangerous enough to extend beyond their borders and destabilise the hemisphere. After failing to secure assistance during several trips to Washington, the Peruvian Foreign Minister, Enrique García-Sayán, desperately used his address to the Rio Conference to make appeals for economic aid; he likened his country ‘to a drowning man asking for immediate help.’

Although he recognised the ‘tremendous gravity’ of the crisis in Latin America, Marshall shared the view of many prominent administration officials that the economic crisis in Western Europe should take precedence over any other issue. The inter-departmental
committee on the Marshall Plan warned that the future of cooperation of Western Europe depended upon providing vital food supplies throughout the winter.\textsuperscript{22} Marshall focused resources on alleviating the acute crises confronting the US in the strategic priorities of France and Italy. He feared imminent economic collapse in Europe before Congressional authorisation of the ERP however.

Marshall recommended that Truman request an interim $600 million aid package from Congress to provide support for the independent efforts of the \textit{Friendship Train} in gathering vital food parcels for these countries. This prioritisation of the limited resources available to the State Department restricted any commitment that Marshall could offer to Latin American countries facing shortages. Despite help from former President Herbert Hoover, Marshall endured tough Congressional hearings even over this emergency assistance and feared that further financial commitments would be impossible.\textsuperscript{23}

Latin American governments appealed to the State Department for a more coherent response to the economic crisis that would also address the challenges that they faced. The economic stabilisation of the US sphere did not solely determine the approach sanctioned by Marshall however. The symbolic significance of Western Europe as a site for the demonstration of the US commitment and capability to guarantee standards of living had already been established. Latin American specialists attempted to evoke similar psychological implications in their appeals to Marshall to reconsider the provision of emergency assistance for Peru. Cooper and officials within the Office of American Republic Affairs advised Marshall of the necessity to offer aid to the Bustamante government as both reciprocal reward for historic cooperation and the
symbolic demonstration of concern and provision of moral support for a struggling friend. Although he had pursued his symbolic example of hemispheric solidarity at the Rio Conference through a commitment to non-intervention and cooperation in regional security, Marshall received advice that economic assistance had become integral to the credibility of the image of the US as Good Neighbour.

The incoherence of strategic approach towards Latin America once again became clear as Marshall rejected recommendations to offer a program of economic assistance in order to ensure the solidarity of the Western Hemisphere. The absence of a comprehensive solution to the food crisis and the prioritisation of funds to Europe meant that the Office of American Republic Affairs struggled to formulate an effective response to tackle the acute shortages in Peru. The State Department consistently denied any long-term commitment to satisfy the appeals of the Bustamante government for emergency shipments and increased monthly quotas of wheat needed to alleviate the growing hunger in Peru. Marshall notified the Embassy in Lima that declining domestic wheat crops meant that the US would struggle to meet even the increasing demand in Europe. Even the aid that the State Department promised to provide from ‘time to time’ in response to grave crises was severely inadequate. The need to consider the primary European demand for wheat meant that a request from the Peruvian government for an emergency shipment of 15,000 tons of wheat and a new monthly quota of 12,000 tons, was met only with a measure to permit the purchase of 10,000 tons of flour – a measure that the Office of American Republic Affairs had previously condemned as damaging to the sustainability of the Peruvian milling industry.
The failure to formulate a coherent economic approach to be integrated into the Good Neighbour Policy became exposed further in the State Department efforts to address a serious fuel crisis in Chile. The US Ambassador in Santiago, Claude G. Bowers, reported that the exacerbation of coal shortages in Chile by ongoing miner strikes had begun to paralyse industrial life and seriously endangered the stability of the country.\textsuperscript{28} The Chilean Foreign Minister, Germán Vergara Donoso, appealed to the State Department for emergency coal supplies that would prevent many Chilean people suffering cold and hunger.\textsuperscript{29} Bowers recommended that Marshall meet these appeals in order to lend moral support for the government of President Gabriel González Vileda and show that the US was not indifferent to the economic struggles in Chile.\textsuperscript{30} The Office of American Republic Affairs also proposed aid to Chile as the situation worsened.\textsuperscript{31} Deputy Director Robert F. Woodward complained that Europe already received the vast majority of US exports of coal and recommended redistributing some of these supplies in an emergency allocation to Chile.

The needs of Latin America lost out once again as the State Department prioritised the demands from Western Europe. Robert Lovett insisted that the failure to increase German coal production and slowing domestic output meant that meeting critical requirements in Western Europe would be difficult enough and, as a result, Chile would continue to receive only a small fraction of the stockpile.\textsuperscript{32} The State Department failed to provide an effective solution to the Chilean crisis. As the only government able to provide the coal necessary to avoid economic collapse, the Truman administration did eventually agree to increase quotas available to Chile. But Bowers swiftly warned Marshall that the provisions were not enough to end the crisis and restore stability.\textsuperscript{33} More significantly however, the Chilean Ambassador, Felix Nieto del Rio, informed
Lovett that his government would struggle to find means of payment for an emergency shipment.\textsuperscript{34} Although he recognised the need to offer direct aid to Western Europe in order to address the severe dollar gap that denied countries the means to purchase essential fuel supplies, Marshall assured Congressional leaders that appropriations would be unnecessary for Latin America.\textsuperscript{35}

The incoherence of strategy in the Western Hemisphere did not represent a simple tension between ends and means however. The solution for providing capital needed in Latin America that Marshall presented revealed a significant lack of appreciation for the unique problems that countries like Chile faced. Robert H. Patchin - the Vice-President of \textit{W. R. Grace and Co.} and honorary Vice-President of the Pan-American Society – challenged the claims that Latin American governments would be able to earn vital dollars in the European markets restored by the Marshall Plan when they were presented again in a dinner address by Norman Armour.\textsuperscript{36} Despite assurances that dollars given in aid to Europe would be spent on goods from across the Western Hemisphere, the Latin American countries most in need, like Chile, would not accrue any benefits as only Argentina possessed any significant quantity of supplies needed in Europe.\textsuperscript{37} Patchin expressed Latin American concerns that the ERP would actually have a negative effect on their economies. They feared that the prioritisation of US capital goods to Europe would allow recipient countries to build up export sectors threatening nascent Latin American industries.

Marshall suggested that credit from the Export-Import Bank would provide Latin American countries with the finance capital for purchasing vital supplies and developing domestic industries. Lovett recommended that the Chilean government seek
a loan to make payment on increased quotas of coal. The fundamental tension in this approach was evident however, in his acknowledgement of the slim chances of success for any Chilean application to the EXIM Bank for a line of credit. The State Department reliance on the likes of the EXIM Bank and the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development to provide capital foods for Latin American countries was undermined by the support for their restrictive criteria for lending. The State Department could have supported an initial Chilean application for credit that the International Bank considered as a test case of whether loans should be approved on the traditional basis of security of repayment or on the immediate needs of weak and unbalanced economies. State Department officials provided no support for Latin American specialists within the IBRD arguing against the decision of President John J. McCloy to reject the application on the grounds of significant financial risk. McCloy ignored arguments that the primary mandate of the IBRD should be to provide credit to those Latin American countries struggling to meet conditions such as foreign debt settlement.

The State Department acknowledged the vicious circle created by rejections of credit necessary for economic recovery on the basis of poor economic structure, but it provided no solution. No support was offered to Chilean representatives as they lodged complaints that European countries, such as France, would not be forced into impossible debt repayment increases of $10-15 million per year in order to secure a $40 million credit. McCloy insisted that the IBRD maintained uniform standards, but his acknowledgement that no Latin American country had managed a successful application highlighted the penalty imposed on poorer economies. The French government faced fuel strikes similar to those in Chile, but the need to secure the cooperation of President Vincent Auriol in the ERP led Marshall to guarantee adequate supplies. The Chilean
government received no such direct assistance from the State Department and was offered only suggestions to assume responsibility for breaking the vicious circle they found themselves in. The State Department even provided little help once the Chilean government attempted to settle these debt problems; officials only issued warning that actions would still not guarantee necessary credit. Similar insensitivities had been evident when State Department officials not only rejected earlier Peruvian offers to compromise on similar commercial debt problems with guarantees to repay the maximum that could be sacrificed, but also made further demands for settlement of wartime Lend-Lease aid.

The Truman administration faced a serious threat to regional stability after the EXIM Bank also rejected an application for credit from Chile. The drift in strategic planning for inter-American economic cooperation meant that the State Department had to rely on a temporary solution for finding the necessary financial capital for Chilean fuel purchases. An interim agreement for the EXIM Bank to advance funds for another development project would provide González Vileda with enough credibility to maintain provisional stability in Chile. Bowers reported that the measure had almost brought the Chilean President to tears as he pledged his loyalty to the US. But State Department reliance on such nominal assistance could guarantee no more than superficial cooperation. The Chilean government shared the fears of other Latin American leaders that the Truman administration held no interest in hemispheric development. The prioritisation of European economic problems and Marshall’s reluctance to translate Good Neighbour relations into a commitment to inter-American economic cooperation only endangered Latin American integration into a wider US sphere of influence.
After the disappointment of the Rio Conference and the ongoing drift in State Department planning for inter-American economic cooperation, Latin American governments finally found a platform to voice their frustrations at the UN Conference on Trade and Employment held in Havana. The Cuban President, Ramón Grau San Martín, used his opening address as host to appeal to the delegations to ‘not be indifferent’ to the specific needs of the underdeveloped countries in the Western Hemisphere. The US representatives soon discovered the full extent of Latin American discontent however; the Latin Americans offered the ‘most consistent and difficult opposition’ to the creation of a new International Trade Organization to accompany the International Monetary Fund and International Bank of Reconstruction and Development. Latin American delegates refused to be confined to their traditional role of supplying the industrialised core with their raw materials and accused the Truman administration of proposing measures to win Western European support for the hierarchical integration of a global economy. ‘An error has been committed in trying to solve the problems of European industrial reconstruction independently and in ignorance of the needs of Latin America’s economy,’ the Peruvian Foreign Minister, Enrique García-Sayán, complained.

The ongoing neglect of the Latin American economic agenda at the Havana Conference created an ideal stage for Perón to announce $5 billion in graduated and compensated credits for the region. The absence of a Marshall Plan for the Western Hemisphere had left a vacuum in the Good Neighbour Policy that Perón was ready to fill. The relative economic strength that Argentina emerged from the war with provided Perón with some means to shape a challenge to US leadership in the region. The State Department
remained cautious of Argentine intentions even after the restoration of diplomatic relations.52 ‘The threat which gives us the worst case of cold shivers,’ one official noted, ‘is that of a southern bloc dominated by Argentina.’53 The US delegation at Havana paid close attention to efforts made by their Argentine counterparts to direct neighbouring Latin American countries towards state-directed development as a way of ‘equalising all economies.’54 The Perón regime had long warned of the dangers of both capitalist and communist development and encouraged Latin America to adopt the tercera posición adopted by Argentina.55 Perón promised that his Instituto Argentino para la Promoción del Intercambio would prove a successful alternative to the liberal economic policies pursued by the US.56 Although the economic means available to Argentina allowed Perón to demonstrate the credibility of this model of development to the rest of Latin America, the US preoccupation with the economic reconstruction of Western Europe remained ‘the strongest force presently tending to magnify Argentina’s stature vis-à-vis the other American Republics.’57

The Truman administration struggled to find agreement on the significance and the most suitable response to the Argentine challenge to the US position in the Western Hemisphere. The US Embassy in Buenos Aires emphasised the continuing pledges from Perón to cooperate with the State Department and advised Marshall to dismiss any threat from Argentina. The CIA disagreed that Perón only promoted his tercera posición for domestic consumption in order to balance opposing factions however.58 They also warned that the cooperation of Perón remained dependent upon him maintaining a majority of support in upcoming congressional elections as the opposition rejected any collaboration with the US.59 State Department intelligence reports even questioned the assumption that all of the Perónistas were pro-American. Perhaps more importantly
however, the active promotion of the *tercera posición* could attract the attention of Latin America. Marshall received numerous warnings that mounting domestic pressure might force the neighbours of Argentina to accept the concessions demanded by Perón in return for the capital and supplies needed to alleviate their economic crises.\(^{60}\)

Marshall dismissed the need for a more effective commitment to economic assistance in response to the Argentine challenge however. He remained confident that suspicions of Perón’s designs for expansion ensured that Argentina’s neighbours would not isolate themselves from the US. Armour highlighted the resistance amongst many Latin American governments to the demands made by Perón for commercial concessions as a condition for economic assistance.\(^{61}\) The Chilean President, González Vileda, conveyed a similar alertness as the Peruvian and Uruguayan leadership to the pressure exerted by Argentina in negotiations for commercial agreements.\(^{62}\) He reassured the State Department that he would prevent his country from becoming ‘a cat’s paw of Perón.’\(^{63}\) It became evident that Marshall held no concern for the Argentine threat when he rejected Latin American appeals for assistance in exchange for guarantees to suspend any negotiations with Perón.\(^{64}\) He received warnings that Argentina would be identified as a ‘bogey man’ in order to solicit a program of economic assistance from the US.\(^{65}\)

Marshall remained more reluctant to undermine his commitment to the Good Neighbour Policy. As a democratically elected leader enjoying considerable popular support for his success in improving standards of living and renewing a sense of national pride, Perón would escape unilateral condemnation from the US.\(^{66}\) Although some State Department officials feared that this approach damaged the US image, Marshall remained content to accept the assurances from Argentina’s neighbours that
they opposed the tercera posición and would maintain their friendship with the US. A symbolic example of US assistance in economic development had been established in Western Europe and Marshall focused on the Western Hemisphere primarily as a site to demonstrate to the world the US commitment to cooperation and non-interference in the internal affairs of Latin American neighbours. He prioritised only enough action to prevent any serious alternative to US constructions of solidarity in the Western Hemisphere; a minimal amount of support would be offered to Latin American leaders to improve their bargaining position with Argentina.

Marshall only became concerned once Latin American leaders began to unite their efforts to fill the vacuum in inter-American economic planning. Regional leaders planned preliminary meetings to finalise their own details for a Marshall Plan for the Western Hemisphere. Once the Economic and Social Council of the Pan American Union presented the State Department with a draft agreement for an inter-American development organisation and demand for a program of economic assistance, Marshall acknowledged that his focus on Europe had caused a ‘serious and rapid decline in our relations with the countries of Latin America.’ He was not necessarily concerned about Latin American criticism that the US had passed them by when they called for aid; the US had already established a positive image through economic cooperation in Western Europe. Marshall feared that the US would be identified as the robber that had stripped them and left them for dead in the first place. As Latin American leaders now considered economic assistance for the litmus test for the authenticity of the Good Neighbour Policy, Marshall anticipated criticism of the US as the obstacle to solidarity in the Western Hemisphere if he arrived at the Bogotá Conference without a commitment to their development agenda.
Economic Development

Marshall arrived at the Bogotá Conference eager to demonstrate that he took the Latin American agenda of economic development seriously. The US delegation comprised a number of economic specialists – including Commerce Secretary W. Averell Harriman, Treasury Secretary John Snyder, Export-Import Bank Chairman William McChesney Martin Jr. The International Bank President, John J. McCloy, also joined the US delegation as an unofficial representative. In gathering to make their final preparations however, the US representatives undoubtedly recognised that the Latin Americans would demand more than a parade and they readied themselves for the inevitable criticism.\(^\text{72}\) The US would not be able to avoid the issue of economic development. The Colombian President Mariano Ospina Perez and his Foreign Minister Laureano Gomez raised this agenda immediately in their opening addresses to the conference.

Latin American delegates evidently ‘tense with excitement’ filled the Capitolio Building in Bogotá the next day as they awaited a speech from Marshall to open the second plenary session. The eventual speech from Marshall marked a turning point in inter-American relations. Despite a commitment to inter-American cooperation, his direct rejection of a Marshall Plan for Latin America came as a bombshell to the entire group; a stony silence met the end of Marshall’s address.\(^\text{73}\) Latin American leaders had expected difficult negotiations with the US delegation, but not such an unequivocal dismissal of their economic agenda. ‘For me,’ one Latin American delegate stated the next day, ‘the conference ended yesterday.’\(^\text{74}\)
The fate of inter-American economic relations had been sealed when Marshall requested recommendations for an approach to be pursued at the Bogotá Conference from the Office of Financial and Development Policy. In presenting the conclusions of this study, the Director of the OFP, Norman T. Ness, acknowledged the strategic importance of Latin America and emphasised the importance of solidarity in the Western Hemisphere. The OFP also recognised economic development as the foremost objective of Latin American countries and highlighted their dissatisfaction with the ‘disappointing’ performance of US assistance in realising this goal. Ness still insisted that the demands of the ERP on limited resources meant that no comparable program could be undertaken in the Western Hemisphere however.

The OFP advised Marshall of the need for some concessions to Latin American demands to ensure the successful conclusion of an agreement at Bogotá. ‘What is needed is not so much a new policy,’ Ness concluded however; rather a ‘more effective and integrated implementation of existing economic policy.’ The OFP recommended a series of measures that Marshall could announce as a “Positive Program of US Assistance for Latin America” without creating too heavy burden on already limited US resources. It would be left to Marshall to lead the State Department in a public relations campaign to promote these current development projects that had received less attention than would come from ‘a unified program presented as this country’s contribution to the development of the Latin American economy.’

Marshall anticipated that the measures in this program ‘would accomplish the objective of the US at Bogotá without laying on this country any heavy new burden’ and demonstrate that Latin America had not been abandoned. The US delegation accepted
a proposal from the Ecuadorian representatives to prevent severe fluctuations in the
differences between prices of raw materials and manufactured goods. Marshall also
guaranteed Latin America a fair allocation of US exports and technical expertise to assist
in their industrialisation efforts. Although these measures did not address the
immediate need to meet the demand for development finance capital, Marshall believed
that an increase in the lending authority of the Export-Import Bank would dampen the
disappointment in the absence of an assistance program.

As the centrepiece of the US demonstration of support for Latin American economic
development at the Bogotá Conference, a considerable effort had been made to gain
Congressional appropriations. The fact that Truman needed to convey a special message
to Congress on ‘Economic Aid to Latin America’ to even secure the additional $500
million for the EXIM Bank budget illustrated the serious tensions between US
commitments and resources. The limited nature of even these appropriations became
evident as soon as William McChesney Martin Jr. announced the conditions of the new
budget of the EXIM Bank however. Martin announced that credit would be authorised
only for applications not met by the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development. Although John J. McCloy had already announced that the IBRD was ready
to consider loans to Latin America, the limited funds left by European demands meant
that the increased budget of the EXIM Bank would not fill the gap in development
finance. The increased capacity of the EXIM Bank also provided no opportunities for
the Latin American governments that had experienced difficulties in meeting the strict
criteria for successful loan applications. Although the OFP had recommended some
liberalisation of the purpose of the lending programme, Martin made it clear that credit
would continue to be provided only for specific projects with guarantees of
repayment. Martin showed little sympathy for Latin American complaints and their alternative proposals for public funding programmes through a regional bank or technical development corporation. As the main author of Marshall’s speech he felt that Latin American delegates had simply been told that they could no longer expect ‘something for nothing’: ‘Santa Claus was dead and he didn’t intend to unbury him.’

Such revelation meant that Marshall lost the confidence of the Latin Americans at the Bogotá Conference. The New York Times highlighted the noticeable difference between receptions offered Marshall at Petrópolis and Bogotá. Latin American cooperation with the US prioritisation of European reconstruction at Petrópolis rested upon the reassurances of Marshall to honour earlier commitments to assist in economic development. Marshall insisted once again at Bogotá that his Latin American counterparts continue to show some ‘understanding and cooperation’ whilst the US shoulder the ‘heavy responsibilities’ of European economic recovery. He could no longer rely on his personal credibility to maintain Latin American patience however. The Mexican Foreign Minister, Jaime Torres Bodet, summarised Latin American frustrations: ‘Of course reconstruction is urgent, but is development less urgent when the peoples who seek it live as miserably as most of those who clamor for reconstruction?’ Marshall spent much of the rest of the conference attempting to reassure Latin American governments that their interests had received ‘careful consideration’ in the planning of the ERP. He emphasised the benefits to be shared in the Western Hemisphere from US efforts through the Marshall Plan to restore the triangular links of transatlantic trade and close the dollar gap.
Latin American leaders left the Bogotá Conference doubting the sincerity of such claims. Some officials within the State Department agreed that the Marshall Plan would not provide Latin America with enough dollars to address their economic problems. The National Foreign Trade Council later also argued that the Latin American countries most in need of dollars would not benefit from the ERP. The US Embassy in Buenos Aires warned that the Argentine regime would be amongst several Latin American governments that would blame the US if dollar purchases failed to materialise and economic conditions deteriorated.

Marshall did not expect any further financial support for the Marshall Plan from Congress however. He came to understand the difficulty of securing appropriations as he served as the point contact for the Truman administration during Congressional hearings on the Marshall Plan. Senator Taft continued to obstruct even the original $6.8 billion requested despite a demand from the President for ‘all or nothing’ of the full amount. The CIA warned that this Congressional reluctance for financial commitments meant that ‘the prospects of effective remedial attack on the basic causes of economic instability continue[d] to be poor.’

The incoherence in US strategy caused by this tension between commitment and resources only became more prominent after a 19-member Select Committee of the House of Representatives presented its final report on a study of foreign aid. Despite his acknowledgement that most Latin American countries suffered from serious difficulties in balance-of-payments and depleted gold and dollar reserves, the Select Committee Chairman, Charles Easton, declared it imperative ‘that no program for Latin America relief as such be included as a part of the European Recovery Program.’ Although
Marshall had attempted to present the measures made through the ERP as part of a comprehensive program of economic assistance for Latin America, the House Select Committee insisted that even offshore purchases should not be confused as such:

‘In other words, ECA financing in Latin America must be evaluated in terms of its contribution to European recovery; Latin America’s special needs must be considered separately on their own merits and in relation to total demands upon the financial and industrial resources of the US.’

The House Select Committee even declared that some Latin American nations actually benefited too much from the ERP already and called on the State Department to ‘correct this unequal competitive situation.’ Despite the deterioration of the economic situation in the Western Hemisphere, the House Select Committee accused the Latin American countries of failing to pull their weight in providing aid to Europe. The fates of a Marshall Plan for the Western Hemisphere and the effective working of the principle of reciprocity in the Good Neighbour Policy appeared to be sealed when the Select Committee concluded that the Truman administration should ask: ‘What more can Latin America do to assist in European recovery?’
Notes for Chapter 5

5 Oral history interview with Joseph E. Johnson, by Richard D. McKinzie, 29.06.1973 (Truman Library)
6 See 710 Conference/2-2145: Telegram, Department of State, “The American Delegation to the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace to the Acting Secretary of State,”21.02.1945 (FRUS 1945, Volume IX); Even the eminent American scholar, Arthur P. Whitaker, highlighted at the close of the war that “democracy” in Latin America meant popular mobilisation and social reform. See Rock, *Latin America in the 1940s*, p. 21
7 *Time*, 28.01.1946
8 Walter LaFeber, quoted in Cobbs, Elizabeth A., “Entrepreneurship as Diplomacy: Nelson Rockefeller and the Development of the Brazilian Capital Market,” *Entrepreneurs in Business History* (Spring 1989) p. 94. During the war, the US had guaranteed purchases of Latin American crops and strategic natural resources. This meant that Latin American Republics emerged from the war as creditors, but they did so through fixed-price commodity agreements that would ensure they focused all of their development resources into the essential strategic exports for the war effort. Post-war dollar surpluses offered Latin American leaders the ideal opportunity to cut their economic independence. The situation worsened for Latin American economies as the markets they depended on were closed when the Truman administration cancelled many of the contracts for purchasing resources. As the need for industrialisation increased, US industrial goods were also becoming increasingly expensive. For more figures on this, see DeBeers, John S., “Some Aspects of Latin America’s Trade and Balance of Payments,” *The American Economic Review* (Volume 39, No. 3, May 1949) pp. 384-395. Dollar reserves quickly disappeared across the region. Shortly before the Rio Conference the deficits faced by Mexico were so deep the government was forced to devalue its currency. See Rock, “War and Postwar Interventions: Latin America and the United States” p. 30.
10 710 Conference/2-2345: Telegram, Department of State, "The American Delegation to the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace to the Acting Secretary of State,"23.02.1945 (FRUS 1945, Volume IX); 710 Consultation 4/8-1647: Circular Telegram, Department of State, “The Chairman of the United States Delegation to the Acting Secretary of State,"16.08.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)
11 *Time*, 25.08.1947
The Secretary noted that: ‘The grave political problems confronting the world today are largely due to the complete disruptions of normal economic and social relations. The extent of this confusion is much more marked in Europe and the East than in this Hemisphere. The Government of the United States of America has assumed unusually heavy burdens in a determined effort to meet the minimum economic requirements of the areas devastated by war and now threatened with starvation and economic chaos.’ See Address by the Secretary of State, “Civil Freedom, Mutual Trust, and Cooperation are Bases for Strong Inter-American System,” State Department Bulletin (Volume XVII, No. 426. August 31, 1947) p. 414

During his speech, Marshall had emphasised that, ‘the economic rehabilitation of Europe is vital to the economy of this Hemisphere.’ In a number of personal meetings, he emphasised the tremendous strain on the US economy resulting from this priority, which prevented immediate economic assistance in the Americas. See, for example, his conversation with the Chilean Foreign Minister, 710 Consultation 4/8-847, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chairman of the United States Delegation,” 20.08.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)

These points had been made in the Council on Foreign Relations concerning the Nazi German threat, but the danger remained the same from the Soviets. See Minutes of the 2nd Meeting of the Study Group on Economic Defense of the Americas, 26.11.1940, Council on Foreign Relations Records, Fiche 90


Address by the President, "United States Relations with Brazil," State Department Bulletin (Volume XVII, No. 428. September 14, 1947) p. 519

See for example, 823.51/2-447, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Peru to the Secretary of State,” 04.02.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII); 823.51/2-2747, Department of State, “Memorandum by the Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs,” 27.02.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII); 823.51/5-2247, Department of State, “The Chargé in Peru to the Secretary of State,” 22.05.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII); 711.23/7-847, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. James Epsy of the Division of North and West Coast Affairs,” 08.07.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)

Testimony of George C. Marshall on Emergency/Interim Aid for Europe, November 10-11, 1947 (The George C. Marshall Foundation); “The issues involved are of such importance as to take precedence over all other questions...,” warned White House Counsel Clark Clifford. Similar assessments were offered across executive departments and shared by Marshall and Lovett in the State Department, as well as Kennan and the Policy Planning Staff. Quoted in Leffler, Melvyn P., A Preponderance of Power (Stanford University Press, 1992) p. 189

Leffler, The Preponderance of Power, p. 189

See for example, 823.51/2-447, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Peru to the Secretary of State,” 04.02.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)

823.61311/11-1747: Airgram, Department of State, “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Peru,” 17.11.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)

611.2331/3-2547: Telegram, Department of State, “The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Peru,” 25.03.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)

611.2331/5-947: Telegram, Department of State, “The Charge' in Peru to the Secretary of State,” 09.05.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII); 611.2331/5-947: Telegram, Department of State, “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Peru,” 19.05.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII). Briggs had earlier condemned such measures as contrary to commercial policy as it would favour American millers to the detriment of their Peruvian counterparts. See 102.78/1-1047, Department of State, “Memorandum by the Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs to the Director of the Office of International Trade,” 19.02.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)

825.5045/10-1347: Telegram, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Chile to the Secretary of State,” 13.10.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII); 825.6362/6-1147, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Chile to the Secretary of State,” 11.06.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII); Bowers, Claude G., Chile through Embassy Windows: 1939-1953 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958) p. 167

See for example, 711.23/7-847, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. James Epsy of the Division of North and West Coast Affairs,” 08.07.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII); 825.5045/10-1347: Telegram, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Chile to the Secretary of State,” 13.10.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)

825.5045/10-947: Telegram, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Chile to the Secretary of State,” 09.10.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)

825.00B/10-847: Telegram, Department of State, “Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs,” 08.10.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)

Woodward supported Villeda’s request for an emergency allocation of 100,000 tons of coal from the 3,500,000 tons available for November. Lovett wrote to Bowers that Chile would receive only 9,000 – a reduction from 18,000 in October. See 825.5045/10-647: Telegram, Department of State, “The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Chile,” 07.10.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII); 825.00B/10-847: Telegram, Department of State, “Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs,” 08.10.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)

825.5045/10-947: Telegram, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Chile to the Secretary of State,” 09.10.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)

825.5045/10-1347: Telegram, Department of State, “The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Chile,” 13.10.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII); 825.5045/10-2147: Telegram, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Chile to the Secretary of State,” 21.10.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)
825.5045/10-1347: Telegram, Department of State, “The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Chile,” 13.10.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)
37 Time, 29.12.1947
38 825.5045/10-1347: Telegram, Department of State, “The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Chile,” 13.10.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)
39 823.51/1-347, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy,” 03.01.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)
40 See for example, 825.51/2-2047: Airgram, Department of State, “The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Chile,” 19.03.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII); 825.51/4-447, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation by the Deputy Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs,” 04.04.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)
41 825.51/1-2948, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Chief of the Division of North and West Coast Affairs,” 29.01.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX); 825.51/2-448, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Edgar L. McGinnis, Division of North and West Coast Affairs,” 04.02.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX); 823.6363/2-1648, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. George H. Owen of the Division of North and West Coast Affairs,” 16.02.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX); 711.23/7-847, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. James Epsy of the Division of North and West Coast Affairs,” 08.07.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII); 825.51/8-2547, Department of State, “Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of River Plate Affairs,” 10.09.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)
42 825.00/4-1847, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation by the Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs,” 18.04.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII); 825.50/5-2247, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation by Messrs. Edgar L. McGinnis and Burr. C. Brundage of the Division of North and West Coast Affairs,” 22.05.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII); 825.51/8-2547, Department of State, “Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of River Plate Affairs,” 10.09.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)
43 825.51/10-3047, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. James H. Webb of the Division of North and West Coast Affairs,” 30.10.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)
44 The Peruvian government offered a compromise on debt repayment, but the State Department simply passed on the American Foreign Bondholders Council rejection. The Peruvian Foreign Minister, García-Sayán, warned that they offered the maximum sacrifice they could bare. See 823.51/5-2247, Department of State, “The Chargé in Peru to the Secretary of State,” 22.05.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII). The settlement of Lend-Lease was discussed later: See 711.23/7-947: Telegram, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. James Epsy of the Division of North and West Coast Affairs,” 09.07.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)
45 The State Department finally managed to guarantee an emergency shipment of coal to the Chilean government when the Export-Import Bank decided to circumvent its refusal to authorise credit by agreeing to reimburse the Chilean Development Corporation for
expenditure on a steel mill that could be forwarded to the Chilean government. See 825.5045/10-1747: Telegram, Department of State, “Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs to the Secretary of State,” 17.10.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)


47 After the failure of the Chilean Economic Mission to Washington, González Vileda expressed fears that the Truman administration held no interest in economic assistance. See 825.51/6-447, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Chile to the Secretary of State,” 04.06.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)

48 New York Times, 22.11.1947

49 Even established allies, like the senior Colombian official, Dr. Eduardo Zuleta Angel, were vociferous. See Time, 26.01.1948. Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, the leader of the Peruvian opposition, Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA), toured the region mobilising radical movements in support of alternative solutions to desperate poverty. Haya de la Torre embraced the universalistic rhetoric of Marshall’s announcement of the European Recovery Program as a measure to assist the return of economic health in the world, but he warned that the small Republics of South America could not live together with the big Republic of the US


53 Dorn, “Peron's Gambit,” p. 1

54 Latin American nations proposed resolutions opposed to liberal international trade standards, such as provisions for public enterprises of poor nations to be given special trade privileges and that commodity control and enactment of price stabilization agreements. See Rabe, “The Elusive Conference,” p. 287

55 710 Consultation 4/8-1847: Circular Telegram, Department of State, “The Chairman of the United States Delegation to the Acting Secretary of State,” 18.08.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)

56 For more on the Argentine model see Dorn, “Peron’s Gambit.”

57 New York Times, 22.02.1948

58 711.35/1-548, Department of State, “Memorandum by Mr. Henry Dearborn of the Division of River Plate Affairs,” 20.01.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX); 825.51/2-448, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Edgar L. McGinnis, Division of North and West Coast Affairs,” 04.02.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX). The US Ambassador appeared intent on personifying the improved relationship between the two countries and went so far as to identify Perón ‘a great leader of a great nation.’ See New York Times, 07.12.1947

59 Central Intelligence Agency, “Perón and the Argentine Congressional Elections,” 28.02.1948 (DDRS)

60 825.00/4-1847, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation by the Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs,” 18.04.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII); Argentina demanded that Peru supply concessions on key resources like petroleum and sugar in return for supply of wheat and other food stuffs. See 623.3531/3-2247: Telegram, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Peru to the Secretary of State,”
Argentina demanded that Peru supply concessions on key resources like petroleum and sugar in return for supply of wheat and other food stuffs. See 623.363/2-1648, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. George H. Owen of the Division of North and West Coast Affairs,” 16.02.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX).
Despite his electoral legitimacy, Perón had only created the illusion that he enjoyed the unanimous support of “the people”. The myth of unity had been constructed by redefining “the people” as those supporting Peronism and delegitimising opposition as the “anti-people”. See Plotkin, *Mañana es San Perón*, p. 21

Merwin L. Bohan stated that ‘I would say that I think our blowing hot and cold certainly didn’t do our prestige any particular good in Latin America, or elsewhere for that matter. One minute we were sending people down to Argentina to give Perón an abrazo [an abrazo is to say hello or goodbye by embracing someone with both arms and giving a pat on the back], and the next minute we were sending somebody else to give him a kick.’ See Oral History Interview with Merwin L. Bohan, by Richard D. McKinzie, 15.06.1974 (Truman Library)

For example, Marshall expressed hope that an emergency allocation of wheat to Peru would improve Bustamante’s hand in dealing with Perón. See 611.2331/5-947: Telegram, Department of State, “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Peru,” 19.05.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII).

The US seemed to resemble more of the Priest or Levite that passed by on the other side in the biblical parable of the Good Neighbour or Good Samaritan from The Gospel of St. Luke (10, 25-37): ‘A man was going down from Jerusalem to Jericho, when he fell into the hands of robbers. They stripped him of his clothes, beat him and went away, leaving him half dead with no clothes. A priest happened to be going down the same road, and when he saw the man, and he passed by on the other side. So too, a Levite, when he came to the place and saw him, he too passed by on the other side. But a Samaritan, as he travelled, came where the man was; and when he saw him, he took pity on him. He went to him and bandaged his wounds, pouring on oil and wine. Then he put the man on his own donkey, took him to an inn and looked after him. The next day he took out two silver coins and gave them to the innkeeper. ‘Look after him,’ he said, ‘and when I return, I will reimburse you for any extra expense you may have.’ “Which of these three do you think was a neighbour to the man who fell into the hands of robbers?” The expert in the law replied, “The one who had mercy on him.” Jesus told him, “Go and do likewise.”


Marshall, George C., “Interdependence of the Americas: An Address by the Secretary of State to the second plenary session in Bogotá on April 1st 1948,” *Department of State Bulletin* (Volume XVIII, No. 461, April 11th 1948) p. 469; Martin Jr., “Personal Notes on Trip to Bogotá,” (FRASER)

Time, 12.04.1948

810.50/2-1948, Department of State, “Memorandum by the Director, Office of Financial and Development Policy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs,” 19.02.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)
Lovett, Robert A., “Letter to William McChesney Martin Jr.,” 04.03.1948 (William McChesney Martin Jr. Collection, Missouri Historical Society, FRASER, http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/historical/martin/16_12_19480304.pdf). Marshall wrote to US Ambassadors in the hemisphere: ‘Such a program, it is believed, would accomplish the objective of the United States at Bogota without laying on this country any heavy new burden. Its presentation would be accompanied by an orderly recapitulation of the economic assistance already extended by the United States to Latin America since the end of the war as proof that this country had not forsaken its neighbours to the South. Behind the scenes at the Conference the advantages of the ERP off-shore procurement might be stressed in talks with those countries which stand to benefit from it, provided the ERP had sufficiently advanced in the Congress by that time to warrant such use.’ See 710.J/3-948, Department of State, ‘Memorandum by the Secretary of State to Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics,’ 09.03.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)


In the hope of persuading Congress to authorise the request, President Truman emphasised that the funds were needed ‘to further the achievement of the primary objective of our foreign policy—the establishment throughout the world of the conditions of a just and lasting peace.’ See Public Papers of President Harry S. Truman, “Special Message to the Congress on Economic Aid to Latin America,” 08.04.1948 (Truman Library, http://trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=1435&st=&st1=)

Martin announced that: ‘We in the United States recognize clearly that although private capital must play the major role in the economic development of Latin America, nevertheless, inter-governmental financial cooperation will be required.’ See Lot 60 D 665: USBog/150, Department of State, “Remarks of William McC. Martin Jr., President of the Export-Import Bank of Washington Before Committee IV of the Ninth International Conference of American States,” 09.04.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)

For Latin American proposals see for example, 710.J/4-648, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Colombia to the Acting Secretary of State,” 06.04.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX); New York Times, 06.04.1948

Martin was particularly critical of Torres Bodet, who he censured for his ability to ‘talk endlessly and say absolutely nothing.’ See Martin Jr., “Personal Notes on Trip to Bogotá,” (FRASER)

New York Times, 04.04.1948

Marshall told a Colombian delegation to Washington seeking aid after the Bogotá that the ERP would offer many trade opportunities. See 821.24/6-1848, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State,” 12.07.1948 (FRUS 1948,
Volume IX). In his meeting with the Bolivian Ambassador during the Bogotá Conference, Marshall had also expressed his faith in the trade opportunities presented by the ERP. Whilst he stated that he had economic development in Latin America ‘very much in mind,’ he stressed the heavy demands on the US and suggested that, ‘...the Department of State was the one that was in the middle and being pressed from all directions.’

87 823.50/5-2848: Telegram, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of Division of Investment and Economic Development,” 28.05.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX)
88 New York Times, 13.01.1949
89 825.00/9-1348, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Argentina to the Secretary of State,” 13.09.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)
90 New York Times, 31.01.1948
93 The report accused Argentina, in particular, of overcharging Europe on goods. Ibid.
94 The report declared: ‘The Administration estimate that the Western Hemisphere countries, outside of the United States, should be expected to finance $700 million of aid to Europe in the period April 1, 1948, to June 30, 1949, seems unduly conservative, particularly in view of the fact that it is also contemplated that of the offshore procurement program of $2.6 billion, more than $1.7 billion is to be expended in Latin American countries.’ Ibid.
Marshall sought to project a symbolic example of unity in the Western Hemisphere into the Cold War. The prioritisation of the economic reconstruction of Western Europe in the psychological struggle with the Soviet Union undermined this objective however. The expansion of commitments in Western Europe limited the resources available to Marshall to guarantee Latin American cooperation. Despite their clear demands to restore the hemispheric solidarity of the Good Neighbour era, senior Congressional leaders refused to extend Marshall the means to engage the Latin America agenda of economic development. As a result Marshall struggled to maintain the complex role for the State Department as a mediator between the divergent interests of Latin American governments and the private sector in the US. His response once more demonstrated a lack of awareness of the problems previously experienced in inter-American relations.

Marshall struggled to persuade Latin American leaders that the solution to their development problems could be found in the creation of favourable conditions to attract private investment. Their experience of US actions at the end of the Second World War made them reluctant to relinquish further autonomy over their struggling economies. This left Marshall in a catch-22 situation. He could not offer the financial assistance needed to convince Latin American leaders to eschew economic nationalism. Yet Marshall could not even deliver on his guarantees of private investment either. US businesses had showed unwilling to risk investments in countries equally unwilling to respect private property. Private sector leaders repeatedly expressed their concerns that the Good Neighbour Policy did not provide them with the adequate protection of
their interests. This left Marshall with a dilemma of whether to maintain the principle of non-intervention or provide more direct support for private enterprise in Latin America.

**Economic Interests**

It appeared that Marshall abandoned the intricate mediation of the principle of reciprocity in favour of more direct protection of the interests of US private enterprise in the Western Hemisphere. He focused on promoting the ‘self-help, cooperation and internal stabilisation measures’ that would support these interests. Acknowledgement of overstretched resources even shifted the authority for ongoing negotiations over the Marshall Plan from economic planners to economic liberals. US representatives emphasised that European leaders must accept the “American essentials” of private enterprise and self-help to assure Congressional authorisation. Within days of being sent to Paris by Marshall to conclude negotiations on the European Recovery Program, Kennan decided that it would be impossible for the US to agree to genuine cooperation with European leaders in reconstructing their economies. He wrote to Marshall informing the Secretary that ‘this would mean that we listen to all that the Europeans had to say, but in the end we would not ask them, we would just tell them what they would get.’ US investment in European stabilisation gave it the right, even the duty, to unilaterally demand internal adjustments.

The influence of economic liberals became more evident in US economic planning in the Western Hemisphere. Marshall certainly considered the only important questions left in inter-American relations to be those of business. This belief also pervaded amongst
many of the officials within the higher echelons of the State Department and Foreign Service; a faith in the role of private enterprise ensured active recruitment from the business sector. Marshall had selected William Pawley - the Ambassador in Rio de Janeiro and widely renowned as a staunch defender of narrow US private interests – to shape the State Department approach on issues of inter-American economic cooperation at Bogotá. In making his preparations for Bogotá, Pawley consulted with US companies and trade councils operating within Latin America. One Brazilian academic criticised him for not knowing ‘a single man of letters, only businessmen;’ these same business contacts regarded the Ambassador as ‘the best we’ve ever had.’ Pawley adopted a particularly tough position at the Bogotá Conference during negotiations over a new inter-American economic agreement. He pushed the Latin Americans to end restrictions and taxation on the profitable ventures of US private investors. Pawley also threatened to completely withdraw the US from negotiations if the Latin American delegates refused to include a clause in the agreement that demanded ‘any expropriation shall be accompanied by payment of fair compensation in a prompt, adequate, and effective manner.’

It is not evident that Marshall rejected a more comprehensive economic approach in the Western Hemisphere on principle alone however. The reluctance of Congress to appropriate funds for any government-sponsored assistance programs left the consolidation of private enterprise as the only solution for Marshall to support Latin American economic development. Truman had even needed to emphasise the primary role of private finance capital to secure the additional budget for the Export-Import Bank. Marshall attempted to persuade Latin American delegates at both Rio de Janeiro and Bogotá to restructure their economies in order to create more favourable climates
that could attract private investment in the knowledge that it remained the best means to fill the gap in necessary finance capital.\textsuperscript{10} ‘Foreign capital will naturally gravitate most readily to countries where it is accorded fair and equitable treatment,’ he told the delegates at the Bogotá Conference. Marshall even ventured so far as to suggest that such measures had been agreed upon as the natural path for economic development in the Economic Charter of the Americas signed at the Chapultepec Conference in 1945.

Despite these efforts to support US private interests the US representatives negotiating over a new Economic Agreement showed willing to offer concessions to their Latin American counterparts where possible. They agreed to measures that would prevent severe fluctuations in the prices of raw materials and establish restrictions on private enterprise to avoid the most flagrant abuses by US corporations.\textsuperscript{11} Latin American delegates also managed to extract guarantees that foreign private investment would be made in the objective of the development and welfare of the recipient country as well as profit. They even managed to secure assurances from the US delegation that a more comprehensive Economic Charter would be finalised in a later conference to be held in Buenos Aires.

The dissatisfaction directed against even these limited concessions from Congressional leaders demonstrated the pressure exerted on Marshall and the State Department. In his understanding that ‘[n]o policy, whether foreign or domestic, has the slightest chance of being effective unless it enjoys popular support,’ Marshall agreed to the demands made by Congress to readdress each of the concessions made at Bogotá.\textsuperscript{12} The State Department consequently filed a memorandum to the Inter-American Economic and Social Council outlining all of their reservations on the Economic Agreement.\textsuperscript{13}
Although these initial steps still failed to appease Congress, they ultimately ensured that ‘the political achievements of the Good Neighbour Policy were not matched in the economic field.’\(^{14}\) These measures caused further frustration for Latin American leaders at a time that an ongoing decline in dollar balances only threatened destabilisation of the region. The CIA warned that the deteriorating economic situation left the region teetering ever closer to the brink of revolution.\(^ {15}\)

**Economic Sovereignty**

The absence of a program of economic development undermined the principle of reciprocity and left Latin American governments critical of the US commitment to the Good Neighbour Policy. The State Department only compounded this as they struggled to make a clear distinction between promoting shared values of private enterprise and appearing to support the interests of specific businesses. The pervasive influence of foreign businesses in the political and social life of many Latin American countries that continued to suffer from dismal economic conditions led regional leaders increasingly to identify this as a clear violation of their national sovereignty. The Guatemalan government lodged complaints against the US Ambassador, Richard C. Patterson, after he began to lobby in support of the United Fruit Company almost immediately after his appointment. The Cuban government laid out more similar accusations against the new US Ambassador in Havana following his defence of US sugar companies operating in the country. At the Rio Conference the Cuban representatives of the administration of Dr. Ramón Grau San Martín had gone so far as to accuse the US of using the Good Neighbour Policy to pursue economic colonialism. In what Marshall described as ‘a very aggressive speech,’ the head of the delegation, Guillermo Belt, proposed that the Rio Treaty include
provisions against the economic intervention being practiced by the US. He argued that unilateral economic measures undermined the sovereignty of Latin American Republics and constituted a threat to the stability of the region. The Cubans continued to argue that economic intervention remained an enduring feature of the Good Neighbour Policy.

The commitment to non-intervention and sovereignty certainly appeared not to preclude the State Department from intervening on behalf of private economic interests. The long-standing refusal of the Cuban government to honour debts or protect the interests of US businesses led to escalating coercive measures from the State Department. The inclusion of Section 202(e) in the US Sugar Act of 1948 invited protests from Belt as the Cuban Ambassador in Washington that the US sought to use its economic power to undermine their national sovereignty. The section threatened to withhold vital quota allocations from Cuba if the government continued to deny ‘fair and equitable treatment to the nationals of the US, its commerce, navigation or industry.’ Belt claimed that this constituted economic intervention that violated the Act of Chapultepec and represented a new Platt Amendment. Marshall defended Section 202(e) in a letter assuring Truman that the clause represented neither a purposeful design for economic aggression undermining Cuban sovereignty nor any shift in US policy. Numerous officials across Washington did not share his conviction however. Planners for the Havana Conference regarded Section 202(e) to be in violation of the principles to be established in the International Trade Organisation. Senators Connally and Vandenberg also expressed concerns that the Sugar Act had turned Congress into a collection agency for American creditors and ushered a return to gunboat diplomacy. Senator Dionisio Chávez (D-NM), the first Hispanic in the US Senate, complained that
Section 202(e) would ‘undermine any conference, be it held in Buenos Aires, be it held in Rio.’

The lack of cohesion within Washington made it difficult to respond to Cuban accusations that economic intervention remained an endemic feature of the Good Neighbour Policy. The mounting criticism from the Latin American media could not be ignored and ultimately Marshall decided to reverse his position on the Sugar Act. Although Latin American delegations eventually decided to reject the Cuban proposal for economic sovereignty at the Rio Conference by 15 votes to 5, the shift in US position had not prevented statements of support. The Latin American delegates identified the economic threat to their sovereignty, but representatives like Jaime Torres Bodet acknowledged that ‘it was difficult enough to define political aggression’ and that ‘it would be impossible to define satisfactorily economic aggression.’ Many of the Latin American delegates also considered it necessary to reject the radicalism of the Cuban proposal in the hope that it would encourage more constructive engagement with the Truman administration. It soon became evident that their optimism had no sound foundation.

The State Department continued to push Cuba to protect US private interests operating in the country. Officials did recognise the need for a cautious approach as much of the region regarded US relations with Cuba as a barometer of the Good Neighbour Policy and economic aggression would be condemned as symbolic of a disregard for all Latin American welfare. This made it difficult for Marshall to find a suitable response as Cuba became more aggressive in asserting authority over its economy. After Butler encouraged an immediate response from the State Department to the authorisation by
the Cuban government for the seizure of the US-owned Tanamo Sugar Mill, Marshall refused to force a resolution on commercial disagreements.23 ‘This coercion would give rise to unfavourable repercussions in Cuba and the other America Republics,’ added Armour.24 A memorandum prepared in the State Department however, warned that the Grau administration sought to take advantage of principle of non-intervention in the Good Neighbour Policy in order to leave commercial commitments unfulfilled and discriminate against US businesses.25 Although Marshall continued to assert his own commitment to Cuban national sovereignty, he wasted no time in appealing to Grau to reverse the seizure decision.26

The Cuban government felt that the actions taken by Marshall represented less the promotion of the general principles of private enterprise than intervention in support of the interests of a specific US company. The State Department decision to deny any increase in quotas or support of credit applications ultimately forced the Cuban government to overturn their original position. The new Cuban President, Carlos Prío Socarrás, immediately promised security for US private investment.27 The President and Counsel of Tanamo Sugar also sent Marshall their ‘warm appreciation’ for his efforts on their behalf, which they regarded as ‘responsible in large measure for the satisfactory solution which has been reached.’28

The Foreign Policy Association warned the State Department at the start of the year against continuing this economic approach as it would push more Latin American leaders to find their own solutions to the problems in the region.29 The fears became reality after the disappointment on the issue of financial assistance at the Bogotá Conference and the persistence of US economic intervention prompted a number of
Latin American to develop their own theoretical explanation on economic development. A few months after the UN authorised a Chilean proposal to establish an agency to establish new approaches to Latin American economic problems, the Comisión Económica para América Latina (Economic Commission for Latin America - ECLA) held its first session in Santiago. The economists at the session identified the US as the major impediment to Latin American economic development. They targeted the classical US explanations of development from the likes of Talcott Parsons that argued for the penetration of US capital into primary export sectors to promote economic growth. The economist Raúl Prebisch led criticisms of the US model of stages of progress in modernisation and argued that Latin American dependency on exporting one or two principal commodities prohibited development. He advocated instead a significant increase in the role of the State in asserting authority over the economy in order to promote industrialisation that could substitute manufactured imports from the US.

Although the ECLA deferred a comprehensive solution until the second session scheduled for Havana in early 1949, it recommended further discussion of the problems at the forthcoming inter-American economic conference at Buenos Aires. The State Department could not find a coherent response to this challenge. As Latin American leaders increasingly considered assuming more authority over their economies in order to address their persistent problems, Marshall could only continue to extol the virtues of private enterprise. The State Department could only consider supporting the cancellation, or at least postponement, of the Buenos Aires Conference as economic relations continued to deteriorate.
**Economic Intervention**

Some prominent leaders from the private sector in the US felt that regaining Latin American cooperation in the principle of reciprocity required more than the ‘wearisome repetition of our goodwill intentions.’ Several progressive businessmen felt it necessary to sell the benefits of private enterprise before Latin American leaders rejected them altogether. The failure of the State Department to undertake this task led many of them to establish their own direct links with Latin American governments. Those former architects of the Good Neighbour Policy that had moved into the private sector led efforts to promote capitalism in the Western Hemisphere. Adolf A. Berle Jr. warned that the US had ‘simply forgotten about Latin America.’ He used his position on the board of directors for the American Molasses Company, which was prominent in the Caribbean sugar trade, to arrange credits from private US banks for several Latin American countries. In doing so he continued to highlight the contributions made by US corporations in Latin American social progress. As a consultant to a number of businesses dealing in Latin America, Spruille Braden also diverted his attention to promoting the free enterprise system.

Nelson Rockefeller emerged as the pioneer of private entrepreneurship in Latin American economic development however. He had recognised the importance of recruiting influential US companies for selling the American way of life during his time as the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs and then later as Assistant Secretary as Chairman of the Inter-American Development Commission and Corporation. Despite his personal ties with a number of corporate leaders through the Council on Foreign Relations, Rockefeller often failed in persuading them to set aside their narrow interests to build a deeper relationship with Latin America. But the importance of inter-American
economic cooperation meant that he continued this work begun in Washington after moving back into the private sphere. Although they questioned the motives of “Johnny Ten Cents” Rockefeller, many Latin Americans considered his proposals for an investment “experiment” to be more appealing as the Truman administration continued to neglect their economic problems. Rockefeller secured agreements with Latin American governments to establish subsidiaries of his International Basic Economy Corporation to invest in local production enterprises. He expressed confidence that the likes of his Venezuelan Basic Economy Corporation would cooperate with the State-run Corporación Venezolano de Fomento as a first of many bridges to be rebuilt between the US and Latin America.

The limited nature of these initiatives meant that the State Department faced significant criticism from the rest of the private sector dealing with the rise of economic nationalism across Latin America. Many business leaders in the US considered the pursuit of their economic interests to be seriously hindered by the commitment to non-intervention made by Marshall. Regular discussions between businessmen at the Council on Foreign Relations revealed the animosity towards State Department reluctance to intervene on behalf of the interests of private enterprise for the fear of undermining the Good Neighbour Policy. In many cases the State Department regarded the protection of specific business interests to be an internal matter for each Latin American country and left the business leaders to undertake their own negotiations.

Despite facing accusations of economic intervention from the Cuban government, the State Department also faced conflicting criticism for the failure to offer enough
protection to private enterprise from the harsh treatment mete out from the likes of the Cuban government. US businessmen considered coercive economic measures to be justifiable against governments, like Cuba, that enacted punitive policies towards private US enterprise. The recent experience of the United Fruit Company in Guatemala also highlighted the frustrations with the State Department. Although officials from the US Embassy protested against the restrictions on private enterprise in Guatemalan reforms like the new Labour Code, the State Department refused to act on the appeals of the United Fruit Company for direct intervention.\textsuperscript{42} The State Department continued in struggling to reconcile the interests of private enterprise with its wider strategic objectives in the Good Neighbour Policy.

The objections to Latin American governments demanding assistance through the principle of reciprocity whilst discriminating against US companies soon began to extend beyond the private sector however. Sol Bloom complained that US private enterprise remained vulnerable to Latin American governments exploiting the State Department commitment to non-intervention by refusing to reciprocate the Good Neighbour Policy. ‘How could we hope to build a solid structure until we had assurance that the ground itself was firm?’\textsuperscript{43} A State Department official writing in the \textit{New York Times} under the pseudonym “Americus” also criticised the Good Neighbour Policy for undermining economic interests:

'It is extremely questionable whether very many [Latin American nations] have ever believed in our sincerity and altruism in proclaiming such a policy as the keystone of our official relationship with Latin America, but they have not been backward in taking advantage of it and making it mostly a “one-way street”'}
financially and economically. It is all too easy for the Latin Americans to accuse us of violating the principles of the Good Neighbour Policy when we refuse to grant their requests, but it bears little or no weight when the US asks a favour of them. The Good Neighbour Policy should not be considered as an end itself and should be replaced by the era of “Economic Inter-Dependability”.

The State Department official considered it necessary to redefine the Good Neighbour Policy in terms of intelligent self-interest rather than philanthropy and sentiment. The US commitment to the Good Neighbour Policy should be dependent upon quid pro quo for Latin American openings to private investment and sound economic methods. A demonstration of reciprocity from Latin America would not need a commitment from the US to their agenda of economic development however.

The belief that the private sector in the US could better solve the economic problems of the Western Hemisphere than the Latin American government proved widespread. The Speaker of the House of Representatives, Joseph W. Martin Jr, encapsulated this sentiment:

'Businessmen approach their problems in a more practical way. They patch up the bad holes in the road and get traffic moving. Government programs too often abandon the old road and the people are left with no thoroughfare whatever while a new one is being debated and designed.'
The Chairman of the Electric Bond and Share Company, Curtis E. Calder, also criticised Latin American arguments that their underdevelopment required a larger amount of government intervention:

‘It is right that government should be concerned about the welfare of the citizen. It is not right for government to squander the national patrimony on uneconomic projects, or projects which can be carried on to better advantage by private enterprise.’

The private sector continued to implore the State Department to address the growing “misguided nationalism” that barriers to the flow of their capital investment in Latin America.

The lack of means available to mediate the competing interests of Latin American governments and private enterprise left the State Department as simply an observer of many developments in the Western Hemisphere. The incoherence of the strategic approach pursued by Marshall appeared in his failure to secure the cooperation of private investors in providing the capital necessary for Latin American development. Spruille Braden had previously acknowledged the importance of maintaining the cooperation of the private sector for US strategic objectives in the Western Hemisphere. Although he assured business leaders that reciprocity remained at the core of the Good Neighbour Policy, even Braden failed to convince them that the administration would protect their interests.

Braden had made it clear that the Truman administration could not return to the previous interventionism to support narrow economic interests. He hoped that the
private sector would respond to appeals for invest in Latin American development framed in terms of defending civilisation:

‘The job must be done. It should be done primarily by private enterprise with all the driving force of competitive democratic capitalism rather than by government. But if there is not a conscious, coordinated, and effective performance by private enterprise, government may be compelled to fill the breach. If we are to preserve the “American way of life,” this unhappy alternative must be avoided.’

Latin America still provided half the return on US foreign private investment after Marshall arrived at the State Department. The majority of this outlay had been made before the private sector began to perceive Latin America as a poor prospect for new ventures. Latin American enthusiasm for the principle of reciprocity faded as it became clearer that Marshall would not engage their agenda of economic development. As Latin American governments increasingly turned to simultaneously extending duties and reducing rights of foreign private investors in order to resolve their economic problems brought warnings from the National Foreign Trade Council that the emerging situation threatened to ‘weaken the business structure of the Western Hemisphere.’

Marshall could only restrain this behaviour with appeals to Latin American leaders to invite private investment. This relied on guarantees that private investment would be forthcoming however. The reaffirmation of the commitment to the principle of non-intervention in the Good Neighbour Policy from the State Department only meant that business leaders became more cautious in their investments. This abject failure of the principle of reciprocity ensured that US strategy in the Western Hemisphere under Marshall would remain incoherent.
Notes for Chapter 6

3 823.6363/2-948, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State,” 27.01.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)
5 Time, 16.02.1948
7 Time, 26.04.1948
8 See for example, 825.51/1-2948, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Chief of the Division of North and West Coast Affairs,” 29.01.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX); 825.51/2-448, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Edgar L. McGinnis, Division of North and West Coast Affairs,” 04.02.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)
9 Truman laid out the implications for private enterprise in the EXIM Bank proposal: ‘Such an increase would not, of course, be a substitute for necessary action that the other American Republics can and should take to attract private investment capital and to mobilize fully their own investment resources.’ He also stressed the importance for US interests: ‘It is of great importance to the United States, as a member of the American community, that there be continued expansion of production, increasing trade activity and rising standards of living in the other American Republics. It is in our mutual interest to help develop in the countries to the south those essential materials which are becoming less abundant in the United States, as well as others regularly imported from distant regions. Above all, it is in our mutual interest to assist the American Republics to continue their economic progress, which can contribute so much to the cooperative strength of the independent American Republics.’ See “Special Message to the Congress on Economic Aid to Latin America,” 08.04.1948, Public Papers of the Presidents. Harry S. Truman, 1948 (Washington: GPO, 1963)
10 Marshall told the delegates at the Rio Conference: ‘Our problems are long-range peacetime problems requiring more intensive economic planning for the more efficient use of the tools of production and of the abundant resources at our disposal with which to raise the general living standard of this Hemisphere. The resources and technical skill of private enterprise, the resources of our Government and of international agencies, such as the Pan American Union, the World Bank, and International Monetary Fund must be intelligently applied to the efficient and fair development of this productive capacity.’ See Address by the Secretary of State, “Civil Freedom, Mutual Trust, and Cooperation are Bases for Strong Inter-American System,” State Department Bulletin (Volume XVII, No. 426. August 31, 1947) p. 414

As there was no means for the collection of debts or protection of US enterprises, elements in the US, particularly the National Foreign Trade Council, wanted to circumvent interventionism by obtaining a new commercial treaty that would guarantee Cuban cooperation. After much delay, a draft was submitted in January 1947, but the Cubans were unwilling to accept many of the rulings. Braden noted that the Cubans would only enter the agreement with economic security through a guaranteed US market for its principal sugar export. Briggs had already warned in May 1946 that, 'until the Cubans are convinced that the United States will not collaborate, or will not grant favors, we can only expect minimum performance, reluctantly furnished.' The Sugar Act of 1937 had guaranteed Cuba 28.6% quota of the US market at above market rates. With the Sugar Act due to expire on June 30th 1947 the Cubans and Americans entered a stalemate as the former threatened to refuse the commercial treaty without an improved quota, whilst the latter warned that they would cut the quota without a signed treaty. The State Department sensed a stronger bargaining position as the expiration date neared and global consumption of sugar reduced even further. The eventual proposed Sugar Act of 1948 did not increase the Cuban quota, but instead gave it 98.64% of American demand over 5.22 million tons. On 29th March 1947 Briggs suggested that this increase be predicated on Cuban acceptance of the treaty. Braden concurred: 'I agree, but can we think of [a] way of doing same thing without our appearing to intervene?' Robert Woodward suggested that instead of continuing to push the treaty, why not include provisions in a section of the Sugar Act. For further information see: Heston, Thomas J., "Cuba, the United States, and the Sugar Act of 1948: The Failure of Economic Coercion," *Diplomatic History* (Volume 6, Issue 1, January 1982)

Section 202 (e) broadened Briggs’ concept of protecting commerce and industry, but it satisfied Braden as it was aimed at any government receiving a quota. This was transparent however, as countries other than Cuba and the Philippines receiving quotas received less than 1% of US consumption. Despite Woodward’s suggestion that Section 202 (e) allow for the suspension of the whole quota for non-compliance, the less punitive proposal of withholding quota increases from any nation denying ‘fair and equitable treatment to the nationals of the United States, its commerce, navigation or industry’ was instead included. Ibid.

On 26th June, Marshall wrote to Truman assuring him that Section 202 (e) was ‘essential to the protection of American investments in Cuba...and to the settlement of
the many long-pending problems affecting United States-Cuban relations.’ See 710 Consultation 4/8-147: Circular Telegram, Department of State, “The Secretary of State to the Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics,” 01.08.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII).


22 710 Consultation 4/9-847, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chairman of the United States Delegation,” 20.08.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)

23 837.61351/4-2848, Department of State, “Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs to the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs,” 28.04.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX); 711.37/6-1648: Telegram, Department of State, “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Cuba,” 18.06.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)

24 837.61351/9-648, Department of State, “The Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs to the Ambassador in Cuba,” 21.06.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)


26 837.61351/4-3048, Department of State, “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Cuba,” 30.04.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)


28 837.61351/5-1048, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Cuba to the Secretary of State,” 10.05.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)

29 New York Times, 21.01.1948


31 New York Times, 26.06.1948

32 810.50 Buenos Aires/11-2648: Circular Airgram, The Secretary of State to Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics, 26.11.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX)


34 839.00/6-1947, Department of State, “The Ambassador in the Dominican Republic to the Secretary of State,” 19.06.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII); Cobbs, Elizabeth Anne, The Rich Neighbour Policy: Rockefeller and Kaiser in Brazil (London: Yale University Press, 1992) p. 17


The Council on Foreign Relations had published Dollars in Latin America: An Old Problem in a New Setting before US entry into the war that highlighted the mounting conflict between US investors and the government. Business leaders and bondholders were sceptical of the Good Neighbour Policy that was failing to protect their interests. Some business leaders demanded economic, or even military, sanctions against Latin American Republics expropriating US private property. They complained that the State Department would only log complaints rather than intervening. Government officials argued however, that they would not be able to protect their interests without ‘alienating the sympathies of sovereign states’ and damaging the national interest. Intervention was a ‘clumsy instrument,’ which besides evoking Latin American hostility, also failed to resolve long-term economic problems. See Feuerlein and Hannan, Dollars in Latin America. Meetings at the Council revealed that the Good Neighbour Policy had not received the full support of US business leaders from its inception. Many argued that the US should only be a “good neighbour” when they had “good neighbours.” Latin America erection of tariffs against US exports abused the Good Neighbour Policy. See Minutes of the 1st Meeting of the Study Group on Trends in our Recent Relations with Latin America, 07.02.1935, Council on Foreign Relations Records, Fiche 56. The general consensus was that if the US was to respect self-determination then Latin American Republics ‘may do anything that suits their convenience.’ The conservative feeling of some of the business members at Council meetings led to the invitation of Sumner Welles to speak and try to make them reconsider the Good Neighbour Policy. See Minutes of the 5th Meeting of the Study Group on Trends in our Recent Relations with Latin America, 08.05.1935, Council on Foreign Relations Records, Fiche 58. Many remained unconvinced. The Council’s various Latin America groups continued to consider hemispheric economic relations in the Good Neighbour Policy in some detail. Shortly before the Council ended studies in 1947 however, members of the business community used a forum on Latin American industrialisation to complain that the Truman administration still did not support them in Latin America. See Minutes of the 5th Meeting of the Study Group on Industrialisation in Latin America, 14.04.1947, Council on Foreign Relations Records, Fiche 143. UFCo’s experience in Guatemala was not isolated. The Brazilian seizure of bonds for the Brazilian Railway Company also had a damaging effect on the American Chase National Bank that was the trustee of the securities. The Bank’s legal representative, Edward G. Miller of the law firm Sullivan and Cromwell, requested US government intervention. The State Department suggested however, that although it would support a demand for the return of securities, it could not be expected to intervene in support of the stability of US investments. See 823.51/6-1247: Telegram, Department of State, “The Chief of the Division of Brazilian Affairs to the Ambassador in Brazil,” 17.06.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)

One clear example is the decision of the State Department not to actively lobby the Uruguayan government of Luis Batlle Berres when its proposed monopolisation by the state petroleum corporation, ANCAP, threatened the position of American petroleum companies. See Division of Research for the American Republics, Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State, “Relations of the Uruguayan Government Petroleum Corporation with the Foreign Oil Companies,” 31.01.1948 (DDRS)
Eugenio Silva Peña, who Acevedo was standing in for, had been visited a month earlier by Robert Newbegin, for a discussion on the new Labor Code. Newbegin highlighted discriminatory practices in the new laws against the United Fruit Company (UFCo). He pointed out the contributions that UFCo made to the Guatemalan economy and suggested that the treatment it was receiving might not only force it to withdraw from the country, but may also make other US investors apprehensive about approaching Guatemala. See 814.504/8-447, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Central America and Panama Affairs (Newbegin),” 30.07.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII). When Arévalo refused to retract the discriminatory articles in the Labor Code, it prompted Lovett, as Acting Secretary, to order the US Embassy to remind the Guatemalan leader that they would have a general adverse effect on US business interests and could damage relations between the two countries. When Arévalo refused to retract the discriminatory articles in the Labor Code, it prompted Lovett, as Acting Secretary, to order the US Embassy to remind the Guatemalan leader that they would have a general adverse effect on US business interests and could damage relations between the two countries.

UFCo urged further intervention from the State Department, but the Office of American Republic Affairs would only formally hear their complaints as they recognised similar principles of discrimination were being used in the US. See Dosal, Paul J., Doing Business with the Dictators: A Political History of United Fruit, 1899-1944 (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 1993) p. 206.

It seemed that the charge of 40 cents for milk added to free coffee at the Rio Conference appeared to be the final straw for Bloom. 'This is too brazen,' he fumed at symbolic example of Latin American attempts to take advantage of the US. 'When I am gypped, I want to be gypped by experts, not robbers!' He recalled an old saying: 'It was fun to be a sucker if you could afford it.' The Congressman believed that the US could not afford to be misused. Time, 25.08.1947; Bloom, Sol, The Autobiography of Sol Bloom (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1948) p. 285.

Braden told the National Foreign Trade Convention that although the American economy was suffering from the large debts amassed during the war, the suffering of the Latin American economies must not be ignored. He warned against the ‘selfish interests’ that would come to the fore as the unanimity of purpose prevailing during the war disappeared. ‘Rising standards of living are a powerful bulwark to the institutions of freedom and popular government,’ he told them, ‘and these institutions, as we know too well, are stones in the arch of peace.’ Cooperation from the Latin Americans would be guaranteed with swift action in the post-war honeymoon period. ‘We start today not with a clean slate,’ Braden said, ‘but with a slate cleaner than it may be again for a long time.’ See Address by Assistant Secretary Braden, “Foreign Trade Reconstruction - The
Braden publicly announced that the US ‘should do everything in [its] power to help [its] American neighbours to increase industrialisation along sound lines and to achieve higher standards of living.’ But reassured business leaders however, that economic strategy would be based upon ‘first self-respect and then mutual respect among American Republics.’ In summary: ‘We offer our friendship and cooperation on a reciprocal basis.’ See Radio Broadcast with Assistant Secretary Braden, Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs, Ellis O. Briggs, and the Director of NBC University of the Air, Sterling Fisher, “What is Our Inter-American Policy?” State Department Bulletin (Volume XIV, No.341, January 6th 1946) p. 26

Braden’s desperation to recruit the private sector was more evident in an address to the Executives’ Club of Chicago. ‘The selective processes of society’s evolution through the ages,’ he declared, ‘have proved the institution of private property ranks with those of religion and the family as a bulwark of civilization.’ He drew economic strategy into a discourse of bipolar struggle as he told of the gross inefficiencies of totalitarian economic state management that had ‘left the single man weak and subjected to such barbaric conditions as have shocked all civilized peoples.’ He warned that if the US did not act to improve living conditions in Latin America, ‘proponents of extremist “isms” will fill the vacuum with their specious promises, which aim to create such confusion and upheaval as will destroy both private enterprise and the human rights and civil liberties we hold so dear.’ See Address by Assistant Secretary Braden, “Private Enterprise in the Development of the Americas,” State Department Bulletin (Volume XV, No.377, September 22nd 1946) p. 539

The State Department had prepared, in particular, for private investment to stimulate Latin American production of raw materials and crops. See Siekmeier, James F., Aid, Nationalism and Inter-American Relations (New York: Edwin Meller Press, 1999) p. 70

Time, 12.01.1948; New York Times, 22.03.1948
III. (Re)presentations of the Western Hemisphere
7. (RE)PRESENTATIONS OF EXCEPTIONALISM

In shaping his strategy of containment Marshall sought to project the Western Hemisphere as a unique and coherent space that demonstrated the solidarity within the US sphere of influence. In doing so he presented the Western Hemisphere as ‘a sociological organism moving calendrically through homogenous, empty time.’

Marshall identified the inter-American conferences at Petrópolis and Bogotá as integral to establishing the credibility of this symbolic representation of the Western Hemisphere. They would continue a process of integration that moved beyond the nation-state towards a conceptualisation of a sovereign space in the Western Hemisphere. Although Article 51 of the United Nations Charter guaranteed the right to construct a sovereign sphere of influence in the region, Marshall understood that this remained dependent upon the formalisation of inter-American machinery for governance. He hoped that successful agreements of the Rio Treaty and the Organic Pact of the Inter-American System would together finally establish ‘a harmonious whole guaranteeing the social, cultural, and economic progress of the Americas.’

The significant tensions that emerged during negotiations at Petrópolis and Bogotá revealed the lack of harmony in the Western Hemisphere however. As he took office Marshall received warning from George H. Butler of the magnitude of the task of building a coherent inter-American system:

‘If the American Republics wish to handle their affairs under a mutually satisfactory arrangement with the United Nations, then they must make the inter-American system a live force devoted to
the attainment of the general welfare, peace and security of the peoples of the Americas. Problems of armament and hemisphere defense, of the duties as well as the rights of states, of the protection of individual rights and civil liberties, and of real freedom of information in all countries must be faced and workable solutions found which will be genuinely supported by a substantial majority of the American nations.’

It is perhaps notable that Marshall left Braden to respond. Braden agreed that ‘the difficulty at present would be to obtain the requisite support of a substantial majority of the American nations.’ As he travelled to the inter-American conferences the problem that Marshall faced was that he could only imagine an organic and coherent Western Hemisphere. In order to project this imaginary into the minds of others in the region and outside however, Marshall depended on representations and re-presentations of the Western Hemisphere and the dangers confronting it.

Writing and Performing the Western Hemisphere

An imagined community in the Western Hemisphere united around common interests and a shared identity relied foremost on the enduring myth of a separate and sovereign geographical space. Although political leaders from Thomas Jefferson through to Marshall had claimed the Western Hemisphere to be a ‘separate division of the globe,’ a State Department cartographer, Sam Whittemore Boggs, writing at the end of the war, claimed that it is ‘inadvisably called “western” and does not deserve the appellation “hemisphere.”’ The late discovery of the Americas by the European powers and the Atlantic Ocean separating the Old and New Worlds ensured some persistence of a
distinct geographical space in the Western Hemisphere, but the frontiers were not necessary ones. He pointed out that the US could as easily redraw boundaries to find itself within the same hemisphere as Europe or even Asia. Despite the clear importance of spatial constructions in the Monroe Doctrine’s declaration of spheres of influence, Boggs noted that the concept of a Western Hemisphere had not featured. The multilateralisation of the Monroe Doctrine in the Rio Treaty identified this sphere of influence within the Western Hemisphere, but the disputed and irregular boundaries drawn up only illustrated the abstract and unstable nature of this space.

The State Department continued to acknowledge the important sense of community provided by geographic space during the development of the inter-American system; but officials also recognised the overdetermination of the borders of their “land”. The absence of a corresponding and relevant Eastern Hemisphere meant that the ideological construction of a Western Hemisphere in opposition to Europe was not sufficient condition for creating a regional organisation. A common hemispheric identity could be found however, in the development of a shared way of life. President Truman closed the Rio Conference declaring that hemispheric exceptionalism was founded not upon geographical proximity, but on the ‘common interests, common principles, and common ideals’ of the peoples of the Americas. The differences within the region that became evident during the inter-American conferences however, only revealed this representation of a clear boundary demarcating a distinct way of life and identity within the Western Hemisphere as an object of a historical “forcing”.

In the absence of a natural community, the Rio and Bogotá Conferences became essential elements in the function of the myth of an essential and shared hemispheric
identity. The written agreements continued to articulate the declaration in the Act of Chapultepec that the ‘unity of the people of the Americas is indivisible.’ The statement made by the US Ambassador to the UN, Warren R. Austin, after the signing of the Rio Treaty encapsulated this writing of hemispheric identity: Pan American solidarity is not created by this treaty,’ he noted. It was after all, ‘a living spirit that animates the peoples and governments of this Hemisphere and holds them together in bonds of interest and human aspiration.’ But the Rio Treaty was significant as ’a step forwards,’ he added. ‘It formalises the spirit.’ Senator Vandenberg similarly welcomed the inter-American agreements for their transformation of hemispheric solidarity ‘from an ideal into a reality.’ But the written declaration, in fact, remained only a symbolic representation of a myth, rather than a genuine construction of hemispheric solidarity.

The inter-American conferences not only continued to write the myth of a common hemispheric spirit, but also consolidated a shared identity through the performativity of this imagined regional community. An identification of common hemispheric interests and ideals emerged less as a representation of the inner convictions of regional leaders than their performances at the “ritual carnivals” of the regular Pan-American Conferences. In meeting together at Petrópolis and Bogotá and acting in the name of hemispheric spirit, delegates did not simply imagine the Western Hemisphere – they invented it as a perennial community. The objectification of hemispheric solidarity in the inter-American meetings replaced the need for any genuine belief from the regional leaders.

The ritual annual celebration of Pan-American Day on April 1st further performed this hemispheric commonality between the intermittent inter-American meetings. President
Hoover had issued a Proclamation in 1930 recommending American citizens to observe the day with ‘appropriate ceremonies’ that would give, 'expression to the spirit of continental solidarity and to the sentiments of cordiality and friendly feeling which the Government and people of the US entertain toward the peoples and Governments of the other republics of the American Continent.’

Whilst Marshall led the US delegation at Bogotá, the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, George V. Allen, declared Pan-American Day to be an enduring symbol of the solidarity within the Western Hemisphere. He also emphasised the “fact” of inter-American friendship self-evident in the Pan-American agreements.

The negotiations and ultimate conclusions of the inter-American conferences created an illusion of coherence in the Western Hemisphere. Rather than emerging as the result of a coherent regional identity, the conferences at Rio de Janeiro and Bogotá actually contributed in performing and writing this identity. The Rio Treaty and Organic Pact of Bogotá would stand in for an absent regional solidarity and maintain the myth of a sovereign Western Hemisphere.

Sacrificing the Western Hemisphere

Marshall attempted to persuade Latin American delegates at Bogotá once again that the US could not be expected to honour earlier commitments to economic assistance. He requested that his regional counterparts show some ‘understanding and cooperation,’ whilst the US shoulder the ‘heavy responsibilities’ of confronting the ‘determined and
open opposition’ of the Soviet Union in Western Europe. He insisted that Latin America should hold the Soviet Union responsible for the prolongation of their underdevelopment. President Truman reaffirmed this message on signing the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 a few days later – he announced the commitment of further funds for European reconstruction as ‘America’s answer to the challenge to the free world.’

The US Ambassador in Bogotá, Willard L. Beaulac, also suggested in a newspaper interview that the defence of civilisation and the free way of life in Western Europe through the Marshall Plan provided evidence of US altruism and a guarantee of future Latin American economic development. Although the evocation of this Cold War discourse intended to be served as a reminder to Latin American leaders of their shared interest in the defence of a Free World, it only fuelled expectations that the reconstruction of Western Europe could no longer receive priority over the economic needs and standards of living of the Western Hemisphere.

Marshall had also constructed his Good Neighbour Policy in inter-American relations, in large part, upon the image of the US as an equal and cooperative American Republic within the particularity of the New World. In confronting the threat of the Soviet Union however, he projected the US as the leader, defender, and liberator of the Free World.

The reference to the exceptional role of the US established a subordinate place for Latin America in its identification with both the Free World and New World. This became more problematic when the idea that the US occupied a privileged position in protecting the interests of the Western Hemisphere extended from the security sphere to the economic sphere. Some considered assistance for Latin American economic development to be less a project of inter-American cooperation than a benevolent
contribution from the US protector. After their experience at the Havana Conference, Latin American leaders only considered Marshall’s speech at Bogotá to be further evidence of the Truman administration’s economic approach that had determined their “place in the larger community of the Western world” to be one on the economic periphery. Walter Lippmann cautioned Latin America that it needed to learn to ‘take its place in the larger community of the Western world.’

Marshall considered the successful conclusions of the inter-American conferences at Petrópolis and Bogotá to be ‘the most encouraging, the most stimulating action since the close of hostilities.’ He did not simply seek the naturalisation of the Western Hemisphere however. Marshall considered the integration of the region into a coherent political space primarily as an effective measure in the broader global struggle against the Soviet Union. He sought to project the symbolic example of a coherent hemispheric community in his strategy of containment. On signing the Rio Treaty he declared:

‘Today, at Rio de Janeiro our concern is with mutual defense and security; tomorrow at Bogotá, we shall go on to reorganize and strengthen our inter-American system and to make it a more effective agency of cooperation in the pursuit of our common interests. With good will and mutual respect for one another, both of the objectives will be attained. And the world will learn, I hope, a great lesson.’

Together with the OAS Charter, the Rio Treaty ‘set an example to a distracted world in the maintenance of peace among neighbour states under an accepted system of law that assures justice and equality to all nations, large and small.’ Marshall found reassurance that unanimous agreement on a model of international cooperation would have an
important effect on the rest of the world during the psychological battle of the Cold War.\(^{20}\) A successful demonstration that ‘nations who really want peace can have peace’ assisted in the ‘projection of American political, social and cultural values as universal.’\(^{21}\)

In his efforts to project a shining example of solidarity in the Western Hemisphere, Marshall came to rely on a discourse of exceptionalism. Other members of the US delegations to Petrópolis and Bogotá shared this emphasis on an exceptional example provided in the region. Vandenberg conferred similar praise for the conclusion of a ‘tremendously significant and progressive pattern for others to follow.’\(^{22}\) He would ensure the swift ratification of agreements that provided an ‘example worthy of high emulation’ and represented ‘sunlight in a dark world.’\(^{23}\) In his address to the closing session in Petrópolis, Truman also declared the successful realisation of a symbolic model. ‘Our nations,’ he announced, ‘have provided an example of good neighbourliness and international amity to the rest of the world.’\(^{24}\)

Despite the clear differences with the US delegation that emerged at Petrópolis and Bogotá, Latin American leaders still shared the commitment to establish a symbolic example in the inter-American system.\(^{25}\) Latin American delegates at the inter-American conferences even acknowledged the duty to the rest of the civilised world that remained a central feature of the discourse of exceptionalism. Opening the Rio Conference, the Brazilian President, Eurico Gaspar Dutra, appealed to delegates to cooperate in building a universal example of solidarity.\(^{26}\) Oswaldo Aranha, the head of the Brazilian delegation and the outgoing President of the United Nations General
Assembly, identified the Bogotá Conference as an important step in formalising the region’s shining example to the rest of the world:

‘The contribution of the Americas in the field of international organization cannot be disregarded by those who aim to build a durable peace structure for the world. Indeed, the statesmen who are endeavoring to develop our present world organization have a great deal to learn from the American experience. For the Americas have anticipated the international organization of the future.’

Even the Cuban Ambassador, Guillermo Belt, described by one US official as a left-wing opponent of the Rio Conference, noted their success in providing a ‘democratic example to Europe.’

This shared identification of an exceptional community and the commitment to building a shining example for the rest of the world did not establish a coherent idea of the Western Hemisphere however. Differing interpretations between the US and Latin American delegations on the meaning of the Western Hemisphere in the world revealed a significant paradox in the discourse of exceptionalism.

Marshall and the US delegates imagined the model of the Western Hemisphere as boundless; the consolidation of solidarity in the region only provided a solid foundation from which to build bridges to Europe that could be used to spread the values of a shared American way of life. The “chosen people” of the Western Hemisphere had a responsibility to safeguard civilisation at the European frontier. ‘Crimes against peace and justice cannot be confined within latitudes and longitudes,’ Vandenberg declared;
the ‘creation of our “region” should imply no lack of interest in world peace outside that “region” nor condone war crimes against humanity wherever they occur.’

Although the Monroe Doctrine had initially declared a lack of interest in action outside the Western Hemisphere, a State Department specialist in international organisation, William Sanders, noted that the US had long discarded this self-restraining injunction to seek involvement with conflicts abroad. The multilateralisation of the Monroe Doctrine meant that the entire region had an obligation to contain extra-hemispheric threats. Both Marshall and Truman appealed to the Latin American delegates to accept this duty in securing the peace in Europe.

Although they shared the concept of the Western Hemisphere as both sovereign and exceptional imagined by Marshall, the Latin American delegates also imagined the meaning of this community and the obligations of the Monroe Doctrine as limited. Such different interpretations revealed a significant paradox in the discourse of hemispheric exceptionalism. On the one hand, the Latin American delegates recognised their duty to construct a “city upon the hill” for Europe and the rest of the world to imitate; but on the other hand, they simultaneously identified the European Other as an impediment to the universal values shared in a common American way of life. One Latin American delegate typified this attitude:

‘If all those Europeans conferences had succeeded, this one wouldn’t amount to much. Indeed, many of the delegates pinned hopes of success in developing a model of cooperation where Europeans had previously failed. Maybe you think this conference won’t be exciting, but it will be—it’s almost our last hope.’
The deterioration of the prospects for peace elsewhere in the world only galvanised identification with the affirmation in the OAS Charter of ‘the historic mission of America is to offer to man a land of liberty [emphasis added].’

The Mexican Foreign Minister, Jaime Torres Bodet, underlined their shared ‘duty to mankind to ensure that the inter-American system served as a bridge of world conciliation and hope.’ 32 The Latin American willingness to build a bridge to the Old World would be limited to those seeking the ideals of freedom to cross to the New World. The Chilean Foreign Minister, Dr. Juvenal Hernández, declared the importance of the inter-American system as a refuge for all those on the side of democracy and liberty in the bipolar conflict. 33 Their priority at Petrópolis and Bogotá was to protect universal values through the strengthening of an exceptional hemispheric particularity.

The Truman administration sought to persuade Latin Americans to defer their own economic development in order for the US to assist Europe however. Truman described Latin American problems of development as ‘small in contrast with the struggle for life itself that engrosses the people of Europe’ and even hoped that they would assist in the rehabilitation of war torn Europe. 34 He appealed to Latin American delegates to identify their exceptional hemispheric community with a sense of Messianic Duty through the evocation of themes of sacrifice and challenge common to the idea of salvation:

‘The Old World is exhausted, its civilization imperilled. Its people are suffering. They are confused and filled with fears for the future. Their hope must lie in this New World of ours. It is for us, the young and the strong, to erect the bulwarks which will protect mankind from the horrors of war-forever. The US seeks world
peace - the peace of free men. I know that you stand with us. United, we can constitute the greatest single force in the world for the good of humanity. We approach our task with resolution and courage, firm in the faith of our Lord whose will it is that there shall be Peace on Earth. We cannot be dissuaded, and we shall not be diverted, from our efforts to achieve His will.\textsuperscript{35}

The Truman administration effectively sought to inspire in the Latin Americans a similar “commitment to a commitment” that Kennan asked of the American people in his X article. Although Latin American delegates responded to appeals to hemispheric exceptionalism they continued to interpret this in terms of an exemplar region rather than accepting the US themes of sacrifice and Mission. The conflicting interpretations of hemispheric exceptionalism simply rationalised the divergent priorities of the US and Latin American delegations at Petrópolis and Bogotá.

\textbf{(Re)inventing the Western Hemisphere}

Despite the evident asymmetry of their relationship with the US, the Latin American leaders recognised the imaginary of geographic space – an exceptional land of liberty – as a shared site of struggle to shape their own agenda. The inter-American conferences at Petrópolis and Bogotá provided a forum to find not only ‘the best means for achieving [a] common goal,’ but also to struggle over certain names – the meanings of America, the New World, the Western Hemisphere and the “founding myth” of the Monroe Doctrine.\textsuperscript{36} The rearticulation of these names provided ideological legitimacy for the different agendas of the US and Latin American delegations.
The Truman administration sought to re-articulate these meanings to simultaneously project a positive image of the US relationship with its neighbours and mobilise Latin America in a commitment to action in Europe. The multilateralisation of the Monroe Doctrine would maintain the imaginary of an exceptional community in the New World. ‘This Western Hemisphere of ours is usually referred to as the New World,’ Truman announced; ‘that it is the New World is clearer today than ever before.’\(^{37}\) This would provide a demonstration of the benign intentions of the US in the world. ‘Everything we do here,’ Vandenberg declared at Petrópolis, ‘is devoid of the remotest thought of conquest or imperialism and is dedicated solely to the orderly pursuit of international justice and security.’\(^{38}\) The Truman administration also hoped that the shining example of sovereignty and cooperation would also awaken a Messianic Duty in Latin America. ‘The Western Hemisphere cannot alone assure world peace,’ Truman reminded his Latin American counterparts, ‘but without the Western Hemisphere no peace is possible.’\(^{39}\)

Such names were not devoid of established meanings and assumptions however.\(^{40}\) The use of an established discourse of the Western Hemisphere relied on an enduring dichotomy of a New World constituted in common negation to an Old World in Europe characterised by conflict, imperialism, and an inability to identify with the ideals of peace and cooperation. The integration of Europe into the US sphere of influence created the need to redefine this antagonistic relationship between the New and Old Worlds.\(^{41}\)

In order to maintain the imaginary of a separate community in the Western Hemisphere the Truman administration sought to re-articulate the dichotomous construction
between the New and Old Worlds as a new agonistic relationship rather than abandoning it altogether. The task would not be easy however. The Roosevelt administration had previously struggled to identify and unite ‘democratically oriented nations of the Western Hemisphere’ in a commitment for support for the Allied forces in the Second World War without the construction of a monolithic barbarism in Europe.\textsuperscript{42} The Truman administration took its cues instead from Spruille Braden who had managed to conceal the lack of a homogenous European identity with the use of a metaphor of sickness.\textsuperscript{43} In contrast to the “health” of the Americas, Braden suggested that all of Europe was ‘sick unto death.’\textsuperscript{44} Whilst the fascist elements in Europe ‘suffered from the gangrene of its immoral ideology and of its barbarous instruments of aggression,’ the non-fascists elements still ‘suffered from the sad ailment called “appeasement,” an ailment whose cause is none other than the lack of moral integrity, and the prevalence of scepticism and inertia.’ Although Braden adopted this metaphor of illness to maintain a separation between the Western Hemisphere and Europe the Truman administration could re-articulate it to suggest the need to help their European friends that now sought an American remedy for the terminal illness that they finally acknowledged.

Although they remained unconvinced by the appeals for assistance to Europe, the Latin Americans regarded their commitment to the inter-American system as necessary to prevent the US and even other regional adversaries from appropriating the significant meanings and names of the Western Hemisphere. Truman’s declaration that ‘the Western Hemisphere cannot alone provide world prosperity, but without the Western Hemisphere no world prosperity is possible,’ only provoked Latin American fears of a return to Atlantic colonialism and economic dependency. A pledge to sovereignty and
cooperation in the new OAS also revealed a mutual fear of a worse fate of being cast as Other in the “gaze” of the US. Despite their clear differences with the US the Latin American leaders recognised that negotiations with the Truman administration at Petrópolis and Bogotá would draw them back into an engagement with their agenda and provide them some influence through demands for the demonstration of the stated ideals of the Western Hemisphere. They could convey to Marshall the significant political, economic and cultural schisms in the region.

The projection of an imaginary of the Western Hemisphere as an established organic and stable social community remained a central feature of Marshall’s strategic vision of containment. Although the identification of the Western Hemisphere with a discourse of exceptionalism could only establish an illusion of coherence, the importance of this construction did lead Marshall to dismiss the significance of the regional tensions that became more evident between Petrópolis and Bogotá. In order to remain attached to this construction however, Marshall would ultimately come to identify the primary threat to his strategic objective of regional solidarity as coming from outside the imagined community of the Western Hemisphere.
Notes for Chapter 7

2 839.00/12-2446, Department of State, “The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Dominican Republic,” 19.02.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)
3 Connor, Walker F., “Myths of Hemispheric, Continental, Regional and State Unity,” *Political Science Quarterly* (Volume 84, No. 4, December 1969) p. 555;
4 Boggs was Chief of the Division of Geography and Cartography, office of Public Affairs, State Department. He suggested a number of reasons why the Americas “scarcely deserve to be called a "hemisphere"; ‘The northern and southern hemispheres are the only hemispheres whose common boundary has any geographic significance. The seasons on opposite sides of the equator are antipodal, since it is summer in one where it is winter in the other. The continent lies in a quarter sphere and there is twice as much water as there is land. The centre of the “Western Hemisphere” is in the Pacific Ocean about 1250 miles from the nearest point on the continental mainland. The limiting meridians have no political, historic, geographic, or economic significance. Most of these demarcating lines are Open Ocean. Geographic terms like “the Americas” are more accurate. The global relations of the United States are disclosed in a rather remarkable way by a series of hemispheres such as those shown above. When a person speaks of “this hemisphere” as the one in which the United States of America is located, one may well enquire, “Which hemisphere?”’ See Boggs, S.W., “This Hemisphere,” *State Department Bulletin* (Volume XII, No. 306, May 6th 1945) p. 845.
6 Address by the President, “United States Relations with Brazil,” *State Department Bulletin* (Volume XVII, No. 428. September 14, 1947) p. 519
7 Balibar, Étienne, *We, the People of Europe?: Reflections on Transnational Citizenship* (London: Princeton University Press, 2003) p. 4
8 Secretary Stettinius had described the Act of Chapultepec as ‘indispensable to the building, after victory, of a peaceful and democratic world order...built by all nations, large and small acting together as sovereign equals.’ See Address by Secretary of State Stettinius at the Plenary Session of the Conference, February 22nd 1945, *State Department Bulletin* (Volume XII, No. 296, February 25th 1945) p. 273. Senator Connally had described the Act not only guaranteeing ‘peace and security in the Western Hemisphere,’ but also as ‘a beacon of courage and hope to the advocates of security and peace the world over.’ See Speech made by Senator Tom Connally, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, cited in Canyes, Manuel S., “The Inter-American System and the Conference of Chapultepec,” *The American Journal of International Law* (Volume 39, No. 3, July 1945) p. 511. Senator Vandenberg had similarly described the Act to delegates at the San Francisco Conference: ‘We bring you this bulwark of our strength and we build it into the foundations of a better world.’ See Vandenberg Jr., Arthur H., *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1953) p. 365

9 Vandenberg Jr., The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, p. 365


11 The idea of myth in this sense is derived from Roland Barthes’ work on semiological systems. See Barthes, Roland, Mythologies (London: Harper Collins, 1973) p. 117; for more on imagined communities, see Anderson, Imagined Communities

12 Vandenberg assured swift Senate ratification of the Rio Treaty in time for presentation to the Pan American Union before the New Year. When Robert Lovett presented this Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance to Truman for signing a few months later, his attached report connected this ‘spirit’ and the concrete hemispheric interests: ‘The vital spirit of Pan American solidarity is implicit in the provisions of the treaty and there is every reason to believe that the treaty affords an adequate guaranty of the peace and security of this Hemisphere, thereby assuring so far as possible a necessary condition to the continued advancement of the economic, political, and social ideals of the peoples of the American States.’ See 710 Consultation 4/11-2947, Department of State, “The Acting Secretary of State to President Truman,” 01.12.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)

13 Vandenberg Jr., The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, p. 365. Vandenberg assured swift Senate ratification of the Rio Treaty in time for presentation to the Pan American Union before the New Year. When Robert Lovett presented this Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance to Truman for signing a few months later, his attached report connected this ‘spirit’ and the concrete hemispheric interests: ‘The vital spirit of Pan American solidarity is implicit in the provisions of the treaty and there is every reason to believe that the treaty affords an adequate guaranty of the peace and security of this Hemisphere, thereby assuring so far as possible a necessary condition to the continued advancement of the economic, political, and social ideals of the peoples of the American States.’ See 710 Consultation 4/11-2947, Department of State, “The Acting Secretary of State to President Truman,” 01.12.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII); President’s Message and Report of the Acting Secretary of State, “Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance Transmitted to the Senate,” State Department Bulletin (Volume XVII, No. 441. December 14th, 1947) p. 1188 Vandenberg assured swift Senate
ratification of the Rio Treaty in time for presentation to the Pan American Union before the New Year.


25 See Kenworthy, Eldon, *America/Américas: Myth in the Making of US Policy Toward Latin America* (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995) p. 12. This destiny had been declared by the Mexican President, Ávila Camacho, as the context for the Act of Chapultepec: ‘Over and above the forces of mere matter, the spirit throbs as a shining mentor. If the sword weighs heavily in the balance, still greater is the unchangeable power of virtue. And it is the virtue of the Americas which they have placed in the first rank of their offering on the altar of democracy: their innate honesty, their ardent idealism, the whole of their history, that intense history of theirs which is like a hymn etched by fire on the undying bronze of freedom....[W]e hopefully indulge in the thought of a common life worthy of the principles on whose behalf we have accepted the commitments imposed upon us by destiny, and we shall do our duty. We shall not prove ourselves equal to the loftiness of the hope that our hemisphere has held for the world since the day of its discovery, if we hesitate an instant in assuming the unavoidable responsibilities of transforming that wonderful hope into a living and magnificent reality. A free America, strong, healthy, prosperous and enlightened, will constitute an inestimable promise of well-being for the civilized world. The conference which we are inaugurating today will be able to contribute to the determination of the American destiny along the lines of permanent human service.’ See Address by the President of Mexico, Ávila Camacho, at the Opening Session of the Conference, February 21st 1945, *State Department Bulletin* (Volume XII, No. 296, February 25th 1945) p. 273. Shortly afterwards, in laying out his doctrine, the Uruguayan Foreign Minister, Eduardo Larreta, noted the ‘responsibility for leadership’ of the American Republics, ‘which has been and must continue to be their role in the task of building a free and peaceful world.’²⁵ The Americas were, he argued, ‘the hope of peoples around the world for a better life.’ See 835.00/11-2145: Telegram, Department of State, ‘The Uruguayan Foreign Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary of State,’21.11.1945 (FRUS 1945, Volume IX)

26 *New York Times*, 16.08.1947

27 He shared Hamilton Fish Armstrong’s frustration that the U.N. had not gained the confidence of countries that it could carry out its stated objectives in its incomplete form. See Aranha, Oswaldo, “Regional Systems and the Future of the U.N.,” *Foreign Affairs* (Volume 26, No. 3, April 1948) p. 415


30 This was a tension that that had already been noted by Serge Ricard of US exceptionalism, where the basic incompatibility of the exceptionalist claim with political messianism, of singularity with universalism.’ Quoted in Adas, Michael, “From Settler Colony to Global Hegemon: Integrating the Exceptionalist Narrative of the American
Experience into World History,” *The American Historical Review* (Volume 106, No. 5). The development of exceptionalist discourse in the early years of independence in the US had not guaranteed a consensus on suitable foreign policy. The Hamiltonian approach of active extension of the frontier conflicted with the early priorities of Jefferson in focusing attention inwards to build a ‘city upon the hill.’ Only through the Good Neighbour Policy had there been any common cause found between isolationists, who regarded it, along with the Monroe Doctrine, as justification for the maintenance of two separate political spheres, and internationalists, who pursued the extension of the American way of life through engagement with Latin America. For more on this subject see Murphy, Gretchen, *Hemispheric Imaginings: The Monroe Doctrine and Narratives of US Empire* (London: Duke University Press, 2005) and Ninkovich, Frank, *The Wilsonian Century: US Foreign Policy since 1900* (London: The University of Chicago Press, 1999).

After the development of exceptionalist discourse at the hemispheric level, the expansion of the US frontier resurrected these tensions. It did not necessarily, as Arthur P. Whitaker suggested, signal the end of the “Western Hemisphere idea,” but US officials were posed with the same question as their Latin American counterparts of how hemispheric exceptionalism would direct any universalising mission. Although supported by many US isolationists, Pan-Americanism had not been synonymous with such sentiment and internationalists who had accepted the hemispheric construction did not automatically abandon it in their support for engagement in Europe.

31 *Time*, 25.08.1947
32 710.J/3-3148: Telegram, Department of State, “Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State,” 31.03.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)
33 *New York Times*, 01.04.1948
34 710 Consultation 4/9-347, Department of State, “Memorandum by Mr. Edgar L. McGinnis of the Division of North and West Coast Affairs,” 03.09.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)
36 Balibar, *We, the People of Europe?*; Barthes, *Mythologies*, p. 119
38 Quoted in Finch, ‘The Inter-American Defense Treaty,’ p. 865
40 Campbell, *Writing Security*, p. 70
41 For more on the concepts of agonism/antagonism and adversary/enemy, see Mouffe, Chantal, *The Democratic Paradox* (London: Verso, 2000) and Mouffe, Chantal, “Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism,” *Dialogue* (No. 07-08, 1998)
43 For further discussion of this ‘sickness’ analogy, see Campbell, *Writing Security*, p. 75
44 See Address by Spruille Braden, “The Good Neighbour Policy,” *State Department Bulletin* (Volume XIII, No.323, September 2nd 1945) p. 327
A useful example of this was seen at the San Francisco Conference. The State Department’s Leo Pasvolsky had shown willing to negate collective responsibility for hemispheric security at the Conference and placing it solely in the hands of the US’ veto in the U.N. Security Council. The Chairman of the Pan American Union, Alberto Lleras Camargo, described to delegates the differences ‘between our inter-national democratic world and old world of alliances, balance power, zones of influence and insatiable imperialistic ambition.’ The importance of the hemispheric example of these ideals was retained by the likes of Vandenberg, who insisted that ‘we are going to keep our promise in the Act of Chapultepec.’ See Tillapaugh, J., “Closed Hemisphere and Open World? The Dispute over Regional Security at the U.N. Conference, 1945,” *Diplomatic History* (Volume 2, Issue 1, January 1978) pp. 25-42.
The representation of an exceptional Western Hemisphere could guarantee neither a
genuine inter-American solidarity nor a larger commitment from Latin America to
sacrifice its own agenda in order for the US to fight the Cold War. The performative
nature of the inter-American conferences could not even fix a stable identity of the
Western Hemisphere. This is perhaps no surprise. Representations of a danger
emanating from Europe had been a more important impetus for regional integration in
the past. The reinvention of the relationship with Europe had removed much of the
urgency for securing the region from external threats however. The imperative for
collective security could be fully invoked even with the identification of the new threat
posed by the Soviet Union. The danger to the Western Hemisphere simply did not
appear credible.

A gradual shift in the representations of danger between the inter-American
conferences allowed Marshall to re-present an imaginary of the Western Hemisphere
however. A growing realisation of the possibilities for a shift from psychological Cold
War to a militarised hot war provoked new fears of the Soviet Union. The US would
need to mobilise the resources of the Western Hemisphere for the containment of this
external threat. At the same time however the focus on securing the Western
Hemisphere moved increasingly towards the neutralisation of the internal threat of
local Communism.\footnote{Alarm at the growing presence of Communism within the region
was certainly nothing new. Even as Marshall assumed his post as Secretary of State the
\textit{New York Times} reported that ‘Communists had made more progress in Latin America}
than did the pre-war Fascists and Nazis loyal to Berlin, Rome and Madrid.\textsuperscript{2} \textit{Time} magazine similarly reported that ‘there were few Latin American countries in which Communists could not point to gains.’\textsuperscript{3} A rising tide of social unrest established new links between Communist subversion and exploitation by the Soviet Union.

\textbf{Imagining Danger in the Western Hemisphere}

The Truman administration did not perceive any serious Cold War danger in the Western Hemisphere in the aftermath of the Rio Conference. After the announcement of the Marshall Plan in Western Europe and the finalisation of the Rio Treaty in the Western Hemisphere the Policy Planning Staff reported back to Marshall the initial success of containment and the increasingly weakened position of the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{4} This success meant that the Policy Planning Staff neglected any serious calculations of Soviet objectives in the Western Hemisphere. The Kremlin demonstrated neither the intentions nor the capabilities to establish a beachhead in the Western Hemisphere. The new Central Intelligence Agency sought to fill this vacuum however. Despite sharing the general assessments of the Policy Planning Staff, it warned that the Soviet leadership still sought to undermine the solidarity of the region.\textsuperscript{5} The Chargé in Moscow, Edridge Durbrow, similarly warned that the successful containment of the Soviet Union in Western Europe could lead the Kremlin to turn its attention to the periphery.\textsuperscript{6}

Kennan felt that even if the Soviet leadership did adapt their “design” to turn their focus to the periphery their immediate priority would be Asia rather than the Western Hemisphere. The rest of the intelligence community also dismissed the idea that Latin American figured as a priority in Soviet long-term objectives. The State Department
Intelligence Organization doubted that the Soviet Union even held the capabilities to achieve such objectives. Military intelligence also forecast that the Soviets could pose no threat in the next ten years to the solidarity of the region. The State Department rejected the assessments of the CIA as simply an attempt to shape a role within the executive bureaucracy however. It insisted that the mistaken recognition of autonomous local Communist activity in Latin America had led to the exaggeration of the ‘real or latent danger’ of the Soviet Union.

The CIA still warned that the Soviet Union would benefit from unrest if it undermined the solidarity of the region. Spruille Braden had acknowledged the dangerous influence wielded by a small number of Communists that would seek to exploit nationalist or anti-American sentiment to destabilise the region:

‘Their whole program is to create chaos at every turn. They are in every potential revolution and it does not matter who is behind it. It may be started by an ultra-conservative, but nevertheless the Communists will join up with it because that is part of their system of creating chaos.’

Marshall did not see the same level of danger however. He had left been left incensed during his post-war mission to China by the propaganda efforts to mislead the world into ‘a bitter hatred of Americans.’ But speaking after the successful completion of the Rio Conference Marshall expressed his satisfaction with the absence in Latin America of the ‘confusing and disturbing propaganda’ he had seen elsewhere.

In the months following the Rio Conference however, Marshall received a growing number of reports on the widespread dissemination of anti-American propaganda by
local Communist movements across Latin America looking to undermine the image of the US as a Good Neighbour and identify “Yanqui Imperialism” as the most serious threat to Latin American development. The National Security Council feared that the Soviet Union could even provide a further source of power for these efforts to instigate unrest. In authorising a program of propaganda and subversive activities in the Soviet sphere, it warned of the possibilities of comparable efforts by the Kremlin in the Western Hemisphere.11

The spread of social unrest provoked further fears of growing Communist strength in Latin America. The rapid destabilisation of Chile towards the end of 1947 particularly added to the perception of danger. The Partido Comunista de Chile continued to gain support during the ongoing economic crisis in the region. After good election results they called for coal miners to strike in Lota and Coronel in order to place serious pressure on Gabriel González Vileda. The Chilean President emphasised the role of Communist subversion as he turned to the State Department for assistance. He highlighted his expulsion of two Yugoslavian diplomatic representatives for their part as external antagonists fomenting the strike.

The US Ambassador in Santiago, Claude G. Bowers, certainly identified the menace of Communism behind the unrest in Chile. He adopted similar terms as González Vileda to frame the unrest in his warnings to Marshall that the US faced a new battlefront in the Cold War.12 ‘It is the common belief here,’ he reported, ‘that the result of test international Communism now concentrating on here will have decisive effect throughout South America.’13 ‘The issue is clear as crystal,’ he warned: ‘Communism or democracy.’14 Bowers reinforced these Manichean constructions with the evocation of
key elements found in containment discourse such as symbolic credibility and “rotten apple theories”. He warned that the result of US inaction in Chile would signal a Communist triumph and lead to the rapid spread of unrest across the region. There was ‘no possible doubt,’ he finally added, ‘that [the] strike is ordered from outside as a major effort of Communism to take over in Chile as first toward the Continent.’ The observations of Bowers revealed an implicit link between local Communist movements and a larger ideological design for the region that assumed a monolithic nature of the threat.

Marshall dismissed the warnings from Bowers. State Department officials informed him that González Vileda attempted to amplify the Communist threat in order to gain US support and consolidate his own domestic political base. The State Department also recognised that opposition forces in Latin American countries with strong leftist governments had also begun to inflate the Communist threat. Both domestic adversaries and US businesses operating in Guatemala persisted in highlighting the role of Communists within the Arévalo government.

The CIA continued to caution against complacency however, as local Communists had not demonstrated their full potential in Chile. The New York Times also warned that the Communist movement in Chile meant that ‘there must be similar ones being put into operation elsewhere.’ It appeared evident that the State Department did not share assessments of the significance of the battle developing for the representation of the US and its role in the Western Hemisphere. They anticipated that their solid standing in the Cold War would only lead the Kremlin to recognise the ultimate futility of supporting local Communist activities in Latin America.
Kennan and the Policy Planning Staff once again neglected Latin America in its recommendations of PPS/13 to radically improve the machinery to counter anti-American propaganda and find measures to influence international opinion in favour of the US.\(^\text{16}\) The specific measures to combat anti-American propaganda outlined in the State Department ‘Information and Cultural Program in Latin America’ also proved to be inadequate in funding and slow in application. The US Embassy in Quito did not even receive enough funds necessary to receive wireless bulletins from the State Department that could be promoted within the local press.\(^\text{17}\)

The Truman administration finally managed to persuade Congress to support a global propaganda campaign when in January it signed the US Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948. The intensification of measures in Western Europe and the Soviet orbit only forced serious cutbacks in operations within the Western Hemisphere.\(^\text{18}\) Congress threatened even a minimum operating level in Voice of America activities in the region after criticising the poor quality of broadcast programmes.\(^\text{19}\) The Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, George V. Allen, admitted that the State Department only checked the priority broadcasts to Eastern Europe.\(^\text{20}\) Resources would not be diverted to check broadcasts that few in Latin America listened to.

The journalist Ruby Hart Phillips warned that the vacuum left in Latin America from the US failure to advertise the American way of life had been filled by attempts to ‘sell communism.’ She highlighted in particular the efforts of the Communist Information Bureau to spread anti-American propaganda.\(^\text{21}\) Senior members of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) also warned that local Communist movements had begun to
use this propaganda to recruit and organise labour unions across the region. The Truman administration recognised that the World Federation of Trade Unions had become a tool of Communist propaganda against the US.\textsuperscript{22} It became increasingly aware that the activities of the regional Confederation of Latin American Labor (Confederación de Trabajadores de América Latina - CTAL) established by Vicente Lombardo Toledano had also fallen under Communist control.\textsuperscript{23}

The alarms triggered did not seem to translate into a serious response however. The State Department demonstrated little enthusiasm for calls to compete with the influence of the Cominform with the creation of a Democratic Information Bureau.\textsuperscript{24} The limited ‘informal assistance’ offered to Serafino Romualdi did not make any easier his task of establishing an Inter-American Federation of Labor (Confederación Interamericana de Trabajadores – CIT) to rival the CTAL. Romualdi struggled to organise pro-American unions into the CIT at the Inter-American Labor Conference held in Lima at the start of 1948. Although the declaration from the newly elected President for the CIT, Chilean Bernardo Ibáñez, that they would be ready for ‘the commies’ who would ‘use every dirty trick in the bag’ provided some initial encouragement,’ this soon disappeared as it became evident that anti-Communist fervour did not translate into pro-American sentiment.\textsuperscript{25} The CIT executive policy committee produced a long declaration condemning the ‘imperialistic aspects of US economic policy in Latin America’ and ‘the planned intervention of the US in the industrialization of Latin America.’\textsuperscript{26} The US delegation ultimately refused to sign the declaration.\textsuperscript{27}
Evoking Reciprocity

A series of developments at the start of 1948 transformed the strategic climate in Washington. A “bloodless coup” in Czechoslovakia triggered alarms within the Truman administration and brought demands from the armed services for military preparedness. The prospect of an electoral victory for the Italian Communist Party also disturbed the likes of Kennan who feared that a symbolic success for the Soviet Union so shortly after the “quiet revolution” in Czechoslovakia would embolden the Kremlin. Observing the events in Europe whilst returning from a trip to Japan, Kennan sent urgent warnings to Marshall that the Soviets could be preparing for an armed contest.

In his preparations for the Bogotá Conference Marshall continued to make the most of the strategic opportunity in the psychological confrontation with the Soviet Union in pursuing a symbolic demonstration of solidarity in the Western Hemisphere. Strategic priorities in the region began to shift as the crises in Europe transformed the climate in the Cold War. The imminent danger of direct war with the Soviet Union meant that military preparations became the new focus in relations with Latin America. The Western Hemisphere came to be regarded evermore as a region supplying vital strategic resources than simply a unique space to demonstrate a symbolic commitment to the solidarity of the Good Neighbour Policy. The State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee identified adequate supplies in the Western Hemisphere to meet the wartime demand of strategic resources if Latin American governments matched the measures within the US to increase production.
The State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee had advised Marshall to negotiate an inter-American agreement on concrete measures to develop and secure vital resources. Marshall immediately dismissed the recommendations however; he insisted on supporting any means capable of success. Marshall worked with the military establishment in the rapid mobilisation of strategic resources needed for a war effort. He responded immediately to requests from Forrestal for his interest and cooperation in safeguarding the 'availability of all material essential for a war economy' that would be 'of vital importance to the security of the nation.' Marshall also agreed to recommendations for an inter-departmental study group on strategic materials in advance of the Bogotá Conference. He instructed Daniels to request from the International Resources Division a list of the resources that could be procured from the Western Hemisphere and any problems that could be faced in production or purchase.

Forrestal considered in necessary to pursue a specific settlement on petroleum. He warned Marshall of the danger of being closed off from Middle East oil in the event of war and recommended a refocus on the significant reserves identified in the Western Hemisphere. The State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee emphasised the magnitude of the problem:

'The US is expending its non-replaceable petroleum resources at a rate vastly greater than that of any other country or any other oil producing area in the world.'

Marshall understood that the US could not depend upon areas like the Middle East to meet increased demand and recognised the importance of securing access to the strategic resources of the Western Hemisphere in the event of war. Forrestal suggested emphasising to Latin American leaders that increased production should be
regarded not only as a moral obligation under the Rio Treaty, but also of immense commercial benefit to them.\textsuperscript{39} Although Marshall dismissed a specific agreement on petroleum, the State Department worked on a Basic Agreement on Economic Cooperation to be presented at the Bogotá Conference as the basis for access to regional resources.

A situation emerged similar to that at the start of the Second World War. The urgent need to mobilise strategic resources across the region led the State Department to shift from the anticipation of reciprocity as the focus of cooperation in the Good Neighbour Policy to a more direct evocation of reciprocity that demanded Latin American governments act to secure US economic interests.\textsuperscript{40} This created immediate problems. A number of Latin American leaders recognised these demands to develop their capabilities in production of strategic resources as an opportunity to renew their appeals for economic assistance. The prioritisation of resources for the European Recovery Program continued to limit the means available to Marshall to pursue essential strategic objectives in the Western Hemisphere however. The State Department remained unable to support Latin American loan applications to the Export-Import Bank even for the development of key strategic industries.\textsuperscript{41} The Office of International Trade Policy would eventually warn against any further demands on Latin America to increase production of strategic materials that would invite appeals for economic assistance to develop or purchase such materials.\textsuperscript{42}

Marshall had to rely instead on cooperation between private enterprise and Latin American governments to develop strategic industries; the lack of resources available to the State Department made it difficult to mediate competing interests however. Without
any guarantees of assistance for economic development a number of regional leaders turned increasingly to nationalist measures that would guarantee them the fair share of the returns from their resources that private enterprise failed to offer. This created a serious challenge for US strategic objectives as private companies showed reluctant to invest in Latin American countries without ‘adequate safeguards against excessive national action.’

The State Department led efforts across the Truman administration to encourage Latin American leaders to liberalise their economies and guarantee a sound environment for private capital investment. The Office of American Republic Affairs requested that the National Securities Resources Board work with the private sector to remove remaining obstacles to investment in Latin America. The Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy also established a sub-committee on strategic materials to work on liberalising or removing discriminatory laws against foreign capital. Lt. General Ridgway worked with military leaders to push through a resolution in the Inter-American Defense Board to find immediate measures capable of enhancing reserves of important resources. Marshall shared the concerns of Forrestal that many Latin American leaders continued to show a lack of appreciation for the importance of these demands however.

Dictators across the region warned Marshall that a number of progressive Latin American governments faced pressure from local Communist movements to reject the evocation of reciprocity in favour of economic nationalism. Perón suggested that where Communists could not gain direct influence over governments they sought direct contact with the masses instead. The evocation of the spectre of international
Communism in the Civil War in Costa Rica certainly received more sympathetic hearing within the Truman administration. State Department officials like William Tapley Bennett Jr., of the Division of Central America and Panama Affairs, identified the roots of the crisis in the connections between President Teodoro Picado Michalski and the Communist Vanguardia Popular party. The US Ambassador in San José had previously demonstrated support for Picado and considered him as a friend to the US and servant of democratic ideals and the inter-American way of life. The State Department had also accepted that Picado identified with the US and the democratic doctrine of the bloc of Western nations. Bennett now attempted to draw comparisons between the situations in Costa Rica and Czechoslovakia. He circulated a memorandum within the State Department that drew attention to an interview in the New York Times with a Costa Rican opposition leader warning that 'few foresaw the Czechoslovak crisis, but now we have the same thing in our front yard.' Bennett also highlighted the description of Costa Rica made by the Peruvian founder of the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance, Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, as ‘the Czechoslovakia of the Western Hemisphere.’

Marshall remained reluctant to draw these links between Czechoslovakia and Costa Rica however. Much of the intelligence community continued to dismiss the prospects of any Soviet opportunism in Latin America that risked antagonising the US. Marshall ultimately did not consider the threat of local Communism to be significant enough to discard his commitment to the principle of non-intervention. His primary focus for the Bogotá Conference remained a symbolic demonstration of the relationship between, rather than within, states. The shift in priorities towards the mobilisation of strategic resources did present an opportunity to realign the basis of cooperation between states.
in the Western Hemisphere however. Rafael Trujillo proposed an inter-American agreement to be considered at the Bogotá Conference for the collective defence of regional resources from Communist penetration. Marshall regarded access to strategic resources in Latin America to be essential for US capabilities to meet any direct military confrontation with the Soviet Union. Although economic nationalism represented the immediate threat to this objective in the Western Hemisphere, the danger that Communists could increase the possibilities of this outcome led Marshall to instruct the Policy Planning Staff to find a position for negotiations at the Bogotá Conference on the proposals made by Trujillo.

Kennan asked his new Deputy Director, George H. Butler, to use his regional experience to prepare recommendations for Policy Planning Study 26. Butler warned Marshall that Trujillo sought to exploit an agreement on anti-Communism in order to conflate the threat with their political opponents and justify repressive activities. As he anticipated further ‘extreme proposals that could increase international tension and give dictators legitimacy for repression,’ Butler advised Marshall to promote a more moderate resolution at the Bogotá Conference that simply made a strong declaration that Communism remained as odds with a shared inter-American way of life. Marshall agreed that the legitimisation of repressive activities could undermine the principle of reciprocity and pose a more serious danger to regional solidarity than the relatively insignificant influence of local Communism.

Marshall immediately faced divisions at the Bogotá Conference on the issue of anti-Communism as a basis for inter-American cooperation. The dictatorships of the region offered their support for the proposals made by Trujillo, but showed little resistance to
the alternative presented by Marshall. Even the Argentine delegation declared its willingness to follow the US in any declaration of war against the Soviet Union. The delegations from progressive Latin American governments continue to reject the Soviet Union and Communism as a significant threat and targeted the dictators of the region as the primary danger to their shared way of life. The conference steering committee approved proposals from the Mexican, Venezuelan, and Guatemalan representatives however, to extend their resolution to a condemnation of all totalitarian ideologies that showed ‘inconsistent with the tradition of the countries of America.’

**Inventing Enemies in the Western Hemisphere**

Further negotiations on the agreement were disrupted by the shock assassination of the Colombian Liberal Party leader, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán. Although the violent riots that broke out across the city did not deliberately target the Bogotá Conference, delegates found themselves caught in the crossfire of a confrontation between the Colombian Army that remained loyal to the sitting Conservative government and the local police that supported the Liberal Party. Although he had previously remained reluctant to link the threat of local unrest to a broader ideological design for the Western Hemisphere, Marshall shifted his position after his experience in the Bogotazo. The direct encounter with disorder in Bogotá made it difficult for him to sustain the construction of a stable and coherent Western Hemisphere.

A brief moment followed the immediate trauma of the Bogotazo before it could be symbolised and understood. The immediate reaction of Marshall revealed less concern for his personal security than the threat to the success of the Bogotá
Conference and his priority of a shining example of inter-American solidarity. As the eyes of the world scrutinised the efforts to establish a model of regional cooperation, Marshall considered it ‘not only important, but imperative that the conference continue.’ He warned that any failure to let the unrest disrupt the proceedings of the Bogotá Conference would have negative implications for the credibility of the US across the world. Marshall implored his Latin American counterparts to continue their work ‘at all costs’ and ‘not take action to give the impression of defeat.’

The State Department agreed on the significance of the implications of the uprising; Lovett informed Marshall that ‘the unanimous feeling in Washington was that the continuation of the Conference was of greatest importance.’ The Acting Secretary of State later warned Marshall that whilst Congress and the press remained sensitive to the need not to appear to fail or run away from the Bogotá Conference however, they had begun to press for the US delegation to return to Washington to deal with the increasing reports of further revolutionary movements across Latin America, particularly in Costa Rica. Although he also appeared concerned about events unfolding across the region, Marshall insisted that his presence at the conference had ‘done more in the way of “doing something about” Communist and revolutionary reported moves in Latin America than our return home would do.’

The Bogotazo provided Marshall with a harsh lesson in the shortcomings of his construction of a cohesive and stable space in the Western Hemisphere. The primary symbolisation of the Bogotazo then became the danger to order posed by international Communism. Congress and the US media immediately drew parallels with Pearl Harbor and ascribed the assassination of Gaitán to Soviet agents. Marshall also labelled the
instigators of the Bogotazo as “evil” and informed Latin American delegations that the rioting had been a well organised and deliberate attempt of local Communists to sabotage the conference and the US position in Europe.\textsuperscript{61}

Local Communists had greeted Marshall to Bogotá with posters depicting him as a Nazi.\textsuperscript{62} Although these local Communists only had a small influence in the general strike called by the Confederation of Workers of Colombia during the riots, Marshall drew attention to press reports in Yugoslavia that connected the uprising in Bogotá to the larger threat of the international Communist movement. In a later address to the conference, the US Secretary of Commerce, W. Averell Harriman, insisted that even if Communists had not initiated the unrest, they had certainly exploited the opportunity to destabilise the government.\textsuperscript{63}

A new prioritisation of anti-Communism appeared once the proceedings of the Bogotá Conference resumed. Delegates immediately agreed upon Resolution 32 that called for measures to:

‘eradicate and prevent activities directed, assisted, or instigated by foreign governments, organizations, or individuals, that tend to overthrow their institutions by violence, to foment disorder in their domestic political life, or to disturb, by means of pressure, subversive propaganda, threats or by any other means, the free and sovereign right of their peoples to govern themselves in accordance with their democratic aspirations.’

The focus of Marshall became clear once he left the Bogotá Conference early to return to Washington less than 24 hours after securing this agreement.\textsuperscript{64}
Resolution 32 of the Final Act of the Bogotá Conference signalled a re-presentation rather than a shift in strategic focus. Marshall now identified antagonism that undermined his construction of a coherent and unified space in the Western Hemisphere. Rather than abandoning this imaginary Marshall adopted an ideological strategy that treated this dysfunction as the consequence of an external intrusion rather than a necessary result of an inner dynamic within the inter-American system. In establishing links between internal subversion and “traces of the outside”, Marshall externalised the representations of danger to hemispheric order. Marshall could reinvent the space in the Western Hemisphere as ‘a social totality that is never really present’ and project an imagined community as if it ‘had always been.’

Marshall sought to demonstrate a shared identity in the Western Hemisphere that had proved elusive through the common estrangement of Communism. He simply obliterated the differences between the distinct tensions within the region through the establishment of “Communism” as a metasignifier that would re-present each danger. This new threat would assume the radicalism of the nationalists; the inadequacy of the indigenous, mestizo, mulatto, black and zambo; the ungodliness of the atheists; the repressive militarism of the caudillos; and the name of the Communists. But it was not that Communists would be considered a threat simply because they possessed such negative attributes; with the intervention of this established empty signifier, such properties would be evident because they were Communist. The identification of Communism as a new point de capiton would provide only the illusion of coherence in the meaning of a shared hemispheric identity however. Marshall focused more on anti-Communism than the reconciliation of genuine tensions within the region. The
eradication of Communism as the obstacle preventing solidarity within the Western Hemisphere became his “fetishistic” pursuit.  

(Re)inventing the Myths of Revolution

The Bogotazo introduced a new ideological competition over the representation of the Western Hemisphere. Marshall acknowledged that his failure to demonstrate the credibility of regional solidarity and the role of the US as a Good Neighbour had created a vacuum that invited different meanings. He had warned during an address earlier in the year that ‘the great mass of the ill-favoured people of the world have come to realize all that they lack in comparison with the advantages enjoyed by others.’ The rising tide of expectations in the region simply meant that a growing number of Latin Americans would no longer tolerate the ‘unfairness of this situation.’ Marshall understood then the roots of the profound social unrest spreading across Latin America to be ‘based on something more than ideology.’ He feared that local Communists could exploit rising anti-Americanism amongst the masses to undermine inter-American cooperation however.

The CIA warned that the dissemination of anti-American propaganda by local Communists from across the region exerted further pressure on Latin American leaders to reject cooperation with the US in favour of more autonomous development. This serious danger to the principle of reciprocity revealed itself in Venezuela in particular. The US Ambassador in Caracas, Walter Donnelly, reported his feared that Communist elements that had infiltrated the main labour union for the oil industries, Fedepetrol, had become powerful enough to pressure the government of Rómulo Gallegos to
renegotiate the terms for collaboration with the foreign oil companies. This posed a significant problem for Marshall. Venezuela remained the only Latin American country to allow large-scale production and exportation of oil by private US enterprises. He had highlighted the profit sharing deal between these companies and the Gallegos government as a prime example of cooperation in developing vital strategic resources for the rest of the region. The positive response to his appeals to employ all measures necessary to increase oil production had only provided further encouragement of this model. The leaders of Fedepetrol now warned that the rise of Communism could only be prevented with the oil companies submitting to all of their demands. A Special Subcommittee of the House Committee of the Armed Services, led by Dewey Short (R-MS), criticised the subsequent refusal of the Gallegos administration to offer any new concessions to US oil companies as ‘strictly and basically nationalistic.’

Social transformation gripped Latin America. Marshall recognised the danger in local Communists exploiting this unrest to undermine US interests in vital strategic industries across the region. Communist recruitment in labour unions only heightened his fear of more direct subversive activities. Reports surfaced of labour unions plans to follow the directions of the Cominform to keep the key industries in Latin American neutral in the event of war between the US and Soviet Union. The declaration that not one drop of oil would make its way to the US by the Congress of Oil Workers in Tampico, Mexico only provoked concerns of similar activities in Venezuela. The CIA identified their oil fields as one of the ‘most remunerative targets for industrial sabotage in the Western Hemisphere.’ Marshall received frequent reports from the US Embassy in Caracas of Communist plots to damage oil installations. Ambassador Donnelly further
warned that Gallegos would reject efforts to find further means to secure resources from Communist sabotage.80

Marshall realised the urgent need to shape new measures to address this threat to his strategic objectives of mobilising vital resources in the region. Butler had deferred full recommendations in Policy Planning Study 26 for specific measures to address growing anti-Americanism in Latin America until a comprehensive review could be conducted. He did warn Marshall of the serious ground lost in the propaganda war and advised that raising living standards as the most solid deterrent to Communism in Latin America however. Although he recommended that the Office of American Republic Affairs continue to develop measures to address the economic crisis in the Western Hemisphere, Butler realised that the ongoing lack in resources needed to improve Latin American economic conditions would make it difficult for the State Department to maintain the positive image of the US as a Good Neighbour. The prospects for persuading Congress to authorise the necessary funds to address the root problem of poverty remained poor.

Marshall still considered it possible to recapture the hearts and minds of the Latin American people and prevent any further growth in the influence of Communism however. He hoped that some form of symbolic commitment to Latin American development would demonstrate that the best path for social transformation still lay with the American way of life and cooperation with the US. He looked to publicise the existing health and food programmes of the Institute for Inter-American Affairs to provide some credibility to US promises to improve living conditions across the region.81 Marshall authorised Louis J. Halle to publicise these limited programmes to
strengthen the social systems of Latin American neighbours in a series of articles. In an echo of the Truman Doctrine, Halle identified ‘hunger, disease, and ignorance’ as the ‘principle allies of totalitarianism;’ he insisted that the State Department considered this a more serious danger to the Western Hemisphere that Soviet efforts to establish a military beachhead. The US remained committed to address the specific problems of Latin American countries rather than looking at the region only through the lens of conflict with the Soviet Union. The Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, George V. Allen, joined Halle in an assertion that the IIAA programs ‘provide one solid and tangible answer to the critics who contend the Good Neighbour Policy is no more.’

The rising tide of expectations across Latin America meant that Marshall would need a firmer commitment to economic development than the limited programmes of the IIAA in order to maintain the cooperation of regional leaders in combating the danger of Communist subversion in key strategic industries. The importance of securing US access to vital oil resources in Venezuela even led to the involvement of President Truman as Gallegos joined him for a tour in the US. As he did not have the resources available to him to assure the cooperation of Gallegos with promises of economic cooperation, Truman relied instead on the myth of Simón Bolívar to promote his message. As part of his whistle-stop campaign during July Truman invited President Gallegos to dedicate a statue to el Libertador in the town of Bolivar, Missouri. On his return from Missouri he told reporters that he regarded Bolívar as the George Washington of South America. He hoped that the comparisons drawn between the living myths of these two revolutionary leaders would identify the US on the side of both the historic independence movements and the future progress of their rising tide of expectations. The evocation of this shared experience would allow the US to direct social
transformation in Latin America along the ordered lines of a standard set by the American Revolution.\textsuperscript{87}

The intervention of Truman ultimately brought promises from Gallegos not to restrict the production of petroleum. The Venezuelan President insisted that he still had to reinvest revenue received from the resources into productive domestic enterprises, the diversification of industry and agriculture, and programs to improve standards of living however.\textsuperscript{88} Truman noted his pleasure that US oil companies had learned not to exploit opportunities to extract profits and that Gallegos cooperated with them on a shared profit agreement that continued to work within the free enterprise system.\textsuperscript{89} Gallegos also instructed his army to remain alert to dangerous Communist elements in the labour unions of vital strategic industries. Donnelly constantly provided Gallegos with facts and figures on Communist infiltration of labour unions and their activities around the oil fields.\textsuperscript{90} The CIA soon noted improvements in the situation as Acción Democrática demonstrated a growing awareness of the potential subversive threat.\textsuperscript{91} They would continue to monitor the activities of ‘expert saboteurs’ in the area however.\textsuperscript{92} The NSC/29 directive on the “Security of Strategically Important Industrial Operations in Foreign Countries”, requested that the CIA Director, Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, formulate a plan to secure the Venezuelan oil fields.\textsuperscript{93}

The cooperation between the Venezuelan government and US companies in developing strategic resources was once again identified as an ideal model for the region during a meeting held in Rio de Janeiro for economic officers stationed in US missions across Latin America.\textsuperscript{94} The economic specialists within the State Department warned that this Venezuelan model would be difficult to translate across the rest of the region however.
The demands on increased production of vital resources without a commitment to assist in development meant that Latin American governments showed unwilling to rush through any reforms.95

Marshall had used a similar approach to Truman a few months earlier at the Bogotá Conference.96 In acknowledging the decline in his personal credibility amongst Latin American leaders Marshall turned instead to the evocation of Bolívar to sell his strategic approach. El Libertador remained a symbolic patriarch for whom many Latin American leaders continued to look to for meaning. As the embodiment of a shared past and the promise, the authoritative figure of Bolívar had been used to legitimise diverse programs across Latin America.97 He had long stood as the embodiment of national identity in Venezuela, but had since been reconstructed as the Liberator of numerous Latin American countries.98

Speaking extemporaneously after his formal address to the Bogotá Conference, Marshall evoked this cult of Bolívar to first justify his focus on the containment of the Soviet Union in Western Europe.99 He drew attention to the mural of Bolívar that hung in the room and drew parallels with Commander Simon Bolivar Buckner, who led the US 10th Army against the Japanese at Okinawa. Buckner gave his life, Marshall told the delegates, ‘for the peace and security of the Pacific, that it would no longer carry a threat to your western shores.’ That he shared his name with el Libertador, Marshall suggested, ‘indicates something of our common purpose and much more of our common bonds.’ Marshall concluded his eulogy of Bolívar to establish a shared revolutionary history of the Americas.100
In the clear absence of the shared principles of ‘liberty, unity, and friendship’ in the Western Hemisphere, the monument of Bolívar would simply stand in as ‘an enduring symbol of these great aspirations.’ Inter-American unity would not be defined within itself, but through its relationship to the myth of Bolívar. But naturalising Bolívar in a wider regional collective memory as a monument to the development of Pan-Americanism would require the reinvention of the myth recognised in Latin America however. Although Bolívar honoured the American way of life in his infamous Angostura Address, he denounced US leaders on a number of occasions and had not even wanted US representatives at the Congress of Panama in 1826. The Truman administration appropriated the name of Bolívar as the ‘soul and symbol’ of hemispheric solidarity. But Latin American leaders would continue to see Bolívar as more of a “Pan-Latin Americanist” who believed in the existence of divergent traditions between the two Americas. Indeed they could look to the Liberator for an entirely different representation of the US. As Bolívar would tell a British diplomat in Bogotá: ‘The US ... seems destined by Providence to plague America with torments in the name of freedom.’
Notes to Chapter 8

2 Time, 13.01.1947
3 Time, 03.02.1947
4 Policy Planning Staff Files, Department of State, Policy Planning Staff, "Report by the Policy Planning Staff, PPS/13: Résumé of World Situation," 06.11.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume I)
5 Central Intelligence Agency, “Review of the World Situation as it Relates to the Security of the United States,” 14.11.1947 (DDRS); Central Intelligence Agency, “Soviet Objectives in Latin America,” DDRS, 01.11.1947. This report argued that, ‘Since for strategic reasons the Latin American Republics can be of scant use to the USSR as allies or sources of supply in any future war, the emphasis of Soviet activity in the area has recently shifted to measures that can be counted on to prevent, reduce, or place in doubt US access to the area's strategic materials or military support.’ The report also warned that in the event of an outbreak of war, the Soviets would develop propaganda to gain wide sympathy in Latin America for their position. They would also try to create an effective intelligence network that would help develop local Communist parties and further propaganda, in an attempt to gain control of organized labour, particularly in strategic industries.
7 JSPC 814/3, Department of Defense, “Note by the Secretaries of the Joint Strategic Plans Committee on Soviet Capabilities,” 11.12.1947 (DDRS)
8 The State Department claimed that the CIA had failed to distinguish between Soviet influence based upon Marxist theory and local Communist activities that were conditioned by local economic and political situations and personal ambitions. The ONI agreed that Latin American Communists were dissimilar to those of the Eastern bloc, in that they were not motivated by Marxist theory, but by economic suffering and nationalism. The State Department Office of Intelligence and Research had already reported that Communist Party membership in Latin America was only around 360,000 or less than one-quarter of one percent of the entire population. See reference to “OIR Report No. 4367: Communist Strength in the other American Republics,”16.09.1947 in Enclosure No. 2, “Paper Prepared by the Policy Planning Staff: PPS/26,” 22.03.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)
9 New York Times, 10.06.1947
11 Document 247, “Memorandum from the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers) to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter, 17.12.1947 (FRUS 1945-1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment)
12 González Vileda alleged that the strike had been intended by the Communists as a show-down and made a firm anti-Communist commitment in the hope of gaining State Department support. See Barnard, Andrew, “Chile” in Bethell and Roxburgh, Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold War, 1944-1948 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) p. 66
Bowers recommended offering moral support for the Chilean government and supplying as much coal as possible to undermine the strike. He feared that plans had already been made to reduce the coal supply because of poor US production and European needs during the winter. He argued that such action would, during this crisis, ‘inevitably create impression here we are indifferent to struggle now in decisive state.’ See 825.00B/10-847: Telegram, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Chile to the Secretary of State,” 08.10.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)

Bowers reemphasised his belief that, ‘the strike is Communistic and revolutionary and result will have inevitable effect throughout South America. See 825.5045/10-1347: Telegram, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Chile to the Secretary of State,” 13.10.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)

New York Times, 11.10.1947


811.20200 (D)/3-448, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Ecuador to the Secretary of State,” 04.03.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)

The Voice of American broadcasts behind the Iron Curtain as part of the political warfare strategy pursued by Kennan only contributed further to this redirection of resources.

One series made by the National Broadcasting Company, entitled “Know North America,” even provided erroneous descriptions of American states.

New York Times, 05.12.1948. Phillips had already appealed for the Truman administration to better understand the different kind of relationship that Latin Americans had with propaganda. Whilst the US public regarded propaganda in a negative light, most Latin Americans defined the term as simply “publicity” or “advertising”. See Phillips, R. Hart, “The Future of American Propaganda in Latin America,” The Public Opinion Quarterly (Volume 9, No. 3, Autumn 1945) p. 305

Central Intelligence Agency, “The Significance of the World Federation of Trade Unions,” 14.06.1948 (DDRS)

Department of State, “The Conflict for Leadership in Latin American Labor,” 23.08.1948 (DDRS)

New York Times, 13.11.1947

Time, 26.01.1948


New York Times, 14.01.1948

See the series on public opinion in “The Quarter’s Polls,” The Public Opinion Quarterly (Volumes in 1947 and 1948)


Even Kennan understood that the immediacy of war required the acceleration of preparations for war. Despite his previous opposition to militarisation Kennan understood the failure of his approach to the containment of the Soviet Union in Europe
would need him to shift his own priorities in order to provide political support for armed force. See Mayers, David, “Containment and the Primacy of Diplomacy: George Kennan’s Views, 1947-1948,” International Security (Volume 11, No. 1, Summer 1986) p. 150. The State Department actually moderated these recommendations from Kennan. His approach still opened up more space for the armed services to push their own agenda however. See 761.00/3-1548: Telegram, Department of State, “The Director of the Policy Planning Staff to the Secretary of State,” 15.03.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume III) 31 Department of Defense, “Letter to Secretary of State George Marshall from Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal regarding the development of petroleum products sources in secure geographical areas available to the US in the event of a major war,” 06.11.1947 (DDRS); 823.6363/2-948, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State,” 27.01.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX) 32 823.6363/2-948, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State,” 27.01.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX) 33 Letter of 01.12.1947 referenced in: 810.20 Defense/3-1748, ‘The Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State,’ 17.03.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX) 34 Daniels’ request was made on 17.02.1948. Anderson noted the delay to his response as due to the heavy demands of the IRD office. Anderson also noted that the National Securities Resources Board was cooperating with the Munitions Board and the Bureau of Mines to produce a more detailed report. See 811.20 Defense (M)/2-1748, ‘Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the International Resources Division to the Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs,’ 12.03.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX) 35 810.20 Defense/3-1748, Department of State, ‘The Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State,’ 17.03.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX) 36 Department of Defense, “Letter to Secretary of State George Marshall from Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal regarding the development of petroleum products sources in secure geographical areas available to the US in the event of a major war,” 06.11.1947 (DDRS) 37 810.6363/4-1448, “The Acting Secretary of State to Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics,” 14.04.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX) 38 Pogue, George C. Marshall, p. 387 39 810.6363/3-2648: Circular Telegram, The Secretary of State to Diplomatic Representatives in Certain American Republics, 26.03.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX) 40 Wood, Bryce, The Dismantling of the Good Neighbour Policy (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985) p. Xi 41 825.51/1-2948, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Chief of the Division of North and West Coast Affairs,” 29.01.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX). The Bolivian application for a $30 million credit extension from the Export-Import Bank for their La Paz-Beni Railway construction project was typical of Latin American requests that followed from the US decision for no regional aid. The State Department’s recommendations to the Bank were just as typical. As with a number of cases, State Department officials found no economic justification for accepting the application and advised the Bolivians to attract private investment. See 824.51/8-2147: Airgram, Department of State, “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Bolivia,” 12.09.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII). In a meeting with the president of the Export-Import Bank, William Martin, the Brazilian Ambassador summarised Latin American disappointment that the Bank was not doing enough to assist economic development and argued that it
was indicative of the US’ retreat from the Good Neighbour Policy. See 811.516 Export-Import Bank/7-2347, Export-Import Bank, “Memorandum by Mr. Richard F. Toole of the Division of Brazilian Affairs to the Chief of That Division,” 23.07.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII). The Export-Import Bank also rejected a Peruvian request for credit to develop their coal industries. See 611.2331/10-548, Department of State, “Memorandum by, Mr George H. Owen of the Division of North and West Coast Affairs to the Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs,” 05.10.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX)

42 810.50 Buenos Aires/12-148, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. H. Gerald Smith, Adviser, Office of Financial and Development Policy, 01.12.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX)

43 See for example, 824.6363/10-148: Airgram, The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Bolivia, 09.11.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX); 823.6363/3-2848: Airgram, Department of State, “The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Peru,” 13.04.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX); 810.6363/3-2648: Circular Telegram, Department of State, ‘The Secretary of State to Diplomatic Representatives in Certain American Republics,’ 26.03.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX); 811.20 Defense (M)/2-1748, Department of State, ‘Memorandum by the Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs to the Assistant Chief of the Division of River Plate Affairs,’ 17.03.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX); See notes from 810.6363/4-1448, Department of State, ‘The Acting Secretary of State to Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics,’ 14.04.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)

44 811.20 Defense (M)/3-2548, Memorandum by the Assistant Chief to the Chief of the Division of River Plate Affairs, 09.04.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX)

45 810.20 Defense/3-1748, “The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense,” 15.04.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX)

46 810.6363/4-1448, “The Acting Secretary of State to Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics,” 14.04.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX)

47 Department of Defense, “Letter to Secretary of State George Marshall from Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal regarding the development of petroleum products sources in secure geographical areas available to the US in the event of a major war,” 06.11.1947 (DDRS); 823.6363/2-948, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State,” 27.01.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)

48 711.35/4-2848, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Argentina to the Secretary of State,” 28.04.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)

49 See 731.39/3-1548, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Venezuela to the Secretary of State,” 15.03.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX). Although concerns about Costa Rican Communism were growing within the State Department, the view toward Picado and Calderón were not particularly negative. The US Ambassador until March 1947, Hallet Johnson, had tried to underline the progressive nature of the Picado administration and his reforms. He also reemphasized Picado’s support of the US and the exaggeration of the claims of Communist influence in the country. As the interim Ambassador to Costa Rica, Walter Donnelly had also made it clear to Marshall that he believed Picado had always been friendly to the US, served democratic ideals and supported the inter-American way of life. See 818.00/10-947, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Costa Rica to the Secretary of State,” 09.10.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII). Most US officials did not perceive that there would be any difference in the
transition from Picado to Calderón, who both pledged allegiance to the National Republican Party.

50 818.00/10-947, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Costa Rica to the Secretary of State,” 09.10.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)

51 New York Times, 22.03.1948

52 The State Department reported that even trade ‘would remain negligible in the foreseeable future.’ Division of Research for the American Republics, Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State, “Report No. 4368: Trade between Eastern Europe and Latin America,” 08.03.1948 (DDRS)

53 810.00B/6-2148, Department of State, “The Secretary of State to Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics,” 21.01.1948 – Enclosure No. 2, “Paper Prepared by the Policy Planning Staff: PPS/26,” 22.03.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX); or Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, “Policy Planning Study 26: A Report to the National Security Council by The Department of State on US Policy Regarding Anti-Communist Measures Which Could Be Planned and Carried out within the Inter-American System (Presented as NSC/16),” 22.03.1948 (DDRS)

54 Rómulo Betancourt made the announcement: ‘Because Communist ideas inspire aggression and violence we support the resolution, but we also want to condemn the existence of other types of dictatorships which are an equal menace.’ See Time, 03.05.1948


56 710.J/4-1048: Telegram, Department of State, “The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State,” 10.04.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)

57 710.J/4-1148: Telegram, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Colombia to the Acting Secretary of State,” 11.04.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)


59 710.J/4-2048: Telegram, Department of State, “The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State,” 10.04.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)

60 Darling, Arthur B., The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government, to 1950 (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990) p. 140. Allegations were later raised about US complicity in the assassination through a CIA operation, codenamed “Pantomime”. The US would have directly benefited from shocking the Latin Americans into support for any anti-Communist measure at the conference; however, these questions remain unanswered.


62 Gettysburg Times, 30.03.1948

63 The new coalition of Conservatives and Liberals that had taken control of the government and led by President Ospina Perez also accused the Communists of supporting the riots. The Liberal Vice President, Dr. Eduardo Santos, however, felt that the ‘only thing was the assassination of Gaitán, one of the most beloved men in
Colombia. Then there were outbursts of passion, absolutely without program.' *New York Times*, 11.04.1948

64 *New York Times*, 24.04.1948


66 Campbell, *Writing Security*, p. 70; p. 322

67 Žižek, *In Defense of Lost Causes*, p. 318

68 For more on this understanding of the fetish, see Žižek, Slavoj, *First as Tragedy, then as Farce* (London: Verso, 2009) p. 65

69 See Pogue, *George C. Marshall*, p. 253


72 The Venezuelan Finance Minister, Juan Pablo Perez Alfonso, satisfied the Truman administration that their policies resembled the ‘wise nationalism’ used in the US.

83 15.6363/3-1848: Telegram, Department of State, “The Chargé in Venezuela to the Secretary of State,” 18.03.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX)

73 810.6363/3-2648: Circular Telegram, The Secretary of State to Diplomatic Representatives in Certain American Republics, 26.03.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX)

74 Central Intelligence Agency, “Intelligence report regarding the vulnerability of the petroleum installations of Venezuela and the West Indies islands of Aruba and Curaçao to acts of sabotage,” 14.05.1948 (DDRS)

75 811.6363/4-1548, The Secretary of State to Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics 06.07.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX)


77 *New York Times*, 05.12.1948

78 Central Intelligence Agency, “Intelligence report regarding the vulnerability of the petroleum installations of Venezuela and the West Indies islands of Aruba and Curaçao to acts of sabotage,” 14.05.1948 (DDRS)

79 831.6363/4-1548: Telegram, Department of State, “The Chargé in Venezuela to the Secretary of State,” 18.04.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX)

80 813.6363/4-2248, Department of State, “The Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State,” 24.04.1948 FRUS 1948, Volume IX)

81 The popularity of the IIAA programmes had been evident in the widespread condemnation across Washington to the earlier efforts by the Republican Congress to cut funding. See *New York Times*, 21.07.1947

85 *New York Times*, 05.07.1948
86 The sentiment is perhaps not farfetched. The President had even hung a portrait of Bolívar above the fireplace in the Oval Office in between portraits of George Washington and Franklin Roosevelt. For more on the trip to Bolivar, see Hulston, John K., *An Ozark Lawyer’s Story* (excerpt contributed to Whistle-Stop Campaign Collection, Missouri State Archives, http://www.sos.mo.gov/archives/exhibits/TrumanProject/campex2.asp)
88 631.119/7-2148, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation between President Truman and the President of Venezuela,” 21.07.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX)
89 831.6363/7-2248, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Venezuela to the Secretary of State,” 22.07.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX); Ibid.
90 831.6363/9-1448, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Venezuela to the Secretary of State,” 14.09.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX)
91 Central Intelligence Agency, “Intelligence report regarding the vulnerability of the petroleum installations of Venezuela and the West Indies islands of Aruba and Curaçao to acts of sabotage,” 14.05.1948 (DDRS). The US Ambassador in Caracas, Walter Donnelly, later reported of a satisfactory meeting with President Gallegos in which the Venezuelan leader demonstrated alertness to the Communist threat. See 831.6363/9-1448, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Venezuela to the Secretary of State,” 14.09.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX)
92 Central Intelligence Agency, “Intelligence report regarding the vulnerability of the petroleum installations of Venezuela and the West Indies islands of Aruba and Curaçao to acts of sabotage,” 14.05.1948 (DDRS)
93 National Security Council, “Memorandum to CIA Director,” DDRS, 03.09.1948
94 810.50 Rio de Janeiro/10-2248, The Acting Secretary of State to Diplomatic Representatives in Certain American Republics, 13.10.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX)
95 The Peruvian government criticised their reciprocal trade agreement with the US; high US tariffs prevented them from raising enough revenue. The Peruvian Ambassador also complained to Daniels that his country had been denied a fair share of US markets in key materials. See 611.2331/10-548, Department of State, “Memorandum by, Mr George H. Owen of the Division of North and West Coast Affairs to the Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs,” 05.10.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX)
96 Marshall actually received a scrapbook on the life of Simón Bolívar at the end of the Bogotá Conference.
98 For monuments to national identity, see Anderson, Benedict, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1983)


IV. Costs of Incoherence
9. The Limitations of Incoherent Strategy

The Bogotazo provoked serious reactions from across the Western Hemisphere. Juan Perón informed the US Ambassador in Buenos Aires, James Bruce, that the graphic lessons from Bogotá should open everybody's eyes to the real danger of revolution across Latin America.¹ He suggested that raising living standards across the region remained the only genuine long-term solution for preventing fertile ground for Communism. The lack of serious resources had left Marshall without the means to improve economic conditions and direct social transformation in the Western Hemisphere however. The Argentine leader warned the State Department that if local Communists could not be bought off then it would be necessary to exterminate them. The State Department seemed to run out of ideas on combating Communism and by mid-October turned instead to neighbouring Latin American governments for suggestions on suitable measures to be carried out under the provisions of Resolution 32 of the Final Act of the Bogotá Conference.²

The State Department expressed some interest in the suggestion offered by Perón.³ Ambassador Bruce had reported the informal recommendation offered by the Argentine leader for a secret inter-American conference to reach agreement on measures to stamp out Communism from the Western Hemisphere. It is unlikely he was aware of events in Peru the previous evening of October 27th, where General Manuel Arturo Odría Amoretti had led armed forces to overthrow President Bustamante. Harold H. Tittman Jr. had only officially assumed his position as Ambassador in Lima that day. He reported
back to the State Department two days later that Bustamante had resigned and fled to avoid any bloodshed. The coup succeeded without firing a shot.

The social unrest that gripped the entire region over the next month led Marshall to reconsider important policies in inter-American cooperation. The recognition and assistance offered to Odría and other dictators provoked immediate criticism that the State Department had shifted to anti-Communism as the basis to assess relations with Latin American neighbours. The growing fears within the Truman administration after the Bogotá Conference of local Communist movements exploiting instability and engaging in subversive activities to disrupt access to vital strategic positions and resources certainly established new priorities, but the US remained largely an observer to the conservative reaction to revolutionary movements across the region. Events unfolded as a result of the earlier failures of Marshall to resolve significant tensions in his strategic approach in the Western Hemisphere. He could not reconcile the differences between his commitments to the equal treatment of Latin American governments in the Good Neighbour Policy and the protection of shared progressive ideals. The ongoing prioritisation of limited funds for strategic objectives outside of the Western Hemisphere prevented Marshall from effectively pursuing either commitment. The only decision left for Marshall as rival forces from across Latin America took the matter into their own hands was to take sides.

**Discrimination in Military Cooperation**

At the start of October Paul C. Daniels reconsidered the prospects of submitting legislation for inter-American military cooperation to the upcoming 81st Congress. The
prioritisation of military assistance for Latin American governments under Marshall had proven disastrous for hemispheric relations thus far however. Military cooperation showed ineffective as a means for a strategic approach that focused less on addressing any Cold War threats in the Western Hemisphere than projecting the psychological and material power of the Western Hemisphere into the Cold War.

The inherent tensions in the approach shaped by Marshall had emerged immediately after his decision to remove the embargos on arms sales against Argentina and the Dominican Republic and continued to plague later reconsiderations. The Policy Committee on Arms and Armament confronted the difficulty of discrimination between different Latin American governments in the Good Neighbour Policy after receiving instructions from Marshall to formulate general guidelines for arms sales. Although it initially decided to relax regulations on commercial licences and the Interim Allocations Program, the PCA ultimately determined in its PD-10 guidelines that arms sales would need to be considered ‘reasonable and necessary’ for either the maintenance of internal order, protection against external attack, or carrying out UN duties. The guidelines only invited further bureaucratic struggle to determine the meaning of such ambiguous criteria however. A common understanding of ‘reasonable and necessary’ would only be found through practical endeavours to find specific solutions to the problems in policies towards repressive regimes of the likes of the Dominican Republic and Honduras.

A few months before the Bogotá Conference the State Department’s Chief of the Division of Special Inter-American Affairs, John C. Dreier, insisted that the regime of Rafael Trujillo should not receive equal treatment in its requests for arms sales. He drafted a memorandum that highlighted the conclusions of even the armed services that military
assistance to the Dominican Republic could be considered neither reasonable nor necessary for hemispheric defence or internal stabilisation. George H. Butler continued to make similar appeals from his position at the time as US Ambassador in Ciudad Trujillo that followed his initial recommendations that there could be ‘no justification for additional armament for the Dominican Republic.’ He stressed that armaments had already proven too heavy a burden for ‘practically all of the Latin American Republics.’ But Butler also expressed concerns that arms sales would only provide a tyrant like Trujillo with further means to continue his campaign of terror against the unarmed people of the Dominican Republic.

Marshall maintained a commitment to equal treatment of all Latin American governments rather than find some means of discrimination on the basis of internal governance. The reconciliation of competing objectives continued to cause incoherent policies as Paul C. Daniels discovered on his arrival to Washington. As part of his first brief as Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs, Daniels met with Colonel Ordway and Lieutenant General Smith of the Army to discuss provision of military assistance to the Honduran armed forces as part of their broader plans to equip and train all Latin American militaries to contain internal unrest. Daniels had just left his post as Ambassador in Tegucigalpa and told his military counterparts that protecting the status quo would not serve US interests. Support for a repressive dictator like Tiburcio Carías Andino would only increase anti-American sentiment across the region. Ordway accepted the precedence of the political considerations made by the State Department over the preferences of the Army for military assistance.
Daniels did not pursue a straightforward approach however. On the one hand he facilitated the sale of aircraft that had been authorised for export to the Honduran regime during his time as Ambassador. On the other hand however, Daniels refused to act favourably on the formal requests for broader military assistance before scheduled elections.\textsuperscript{10} The Honduran Ambassador to the US, Julián R. Cáceres, expressed his frustration at these mixed signals. He stated his belief that the prohibition of military cooperation with non-democratic Latin American countries had been the policy of Spruille Braden and Ellis O. Briggs and not a continuing policy of the State Department.\textsuperscript{11} Braden had maintained a ‘tolerant and patient’ relationship with democratic governments, whilst treating dictatorships only with ‘aloof formality.’\textsuperscript{12} Robert Newbegin informed Cáceres that ‘there was perhaps a difference in approach’ evident within the State Department, but ‘our outlook remained very much the same.’

At the start of the year Marshall acknowledged that his strategic approach had failed to address the growing conflict in the region. He feared that this conflict endangered his priorities of an example of hemispheric solidarity and the projection of the US as a Good Neighbour just as the world prepared to cast their eyes upon developments at the Bogotá Conference.\textsuperscript{13} The PCA received instructions from Marshall to review their PD-10 guidelines on arms sales to Latin American governments. The review led to exceptions to military assistance in addition to the criteria of ‘reasonable and necessary.’ Arms sales, including export licences for private suppliers, would no longer be authorised if deemed to constitute ‘special circumstances involving serious political disturbances or strained international relations.’\textsuperscript{14}
Marshall authorised these amended guidelines shortly after the *Bogotazo*, but they did not determine an approach to address a growing threat of subversive activities undermining new strategic priorities in the region. Spruille Braden had earlier outlined a rationale for discriminating in favour of progressive democrats as a measure to combat Communism in Latin America. ‘If we fail to sustain and augment the enthusiasm for the practice of democratic ideals,’ Braden warned, ‘the void will be filled by pernicious “isms” imperilling our way of life.’\(^\text{15}\) He made it clear that the failure to establish democracy across Latin America only encouraged ‘the most dangerous and insidious threat of all to the American mode of life and democracy – Communism.’\(^\text{16}\)

Although Marshall rejected the interventionism of Braden, he did not shift the general attitude within the State Department that it was more favourable to collaborate with democrats rather than dictators in combating Communism. Butler and the Policy Planning Staff retained a faith in progressive Latin American democrats as the most effective deterrent to Communism. They shared CIA conclusions that the popular support won by *Acción Democrática* in Venezuela showed that ‘in the special conditions of Latin American politics, an active non-Communist progressive party constitutes one of the best guarantees against a strong Communist movement.’\(^\text{17}\)

In reflecting on his experience of the *Bogotazo* Marshall showed that even he would not realign inter-American cooperation on the basis of anti-Communism alone. He still considered it desirable to work with democrats to stabilise the region. Marshall called on Latin American leaders ‘not just to sit back and allow bad conditions to develop which played into the hands of the radical subversive communist elements but to take the initiative and themselves meet the problems facing their countries.’\(^\text{18}\) He specifically
encouraged them to educate the poor and underprivileged peoples of their countries in
democratic ways. Marshall feared that ‘if this is not done the communists will certainly
seize the chance to train and indoctrinate those future leaders in the ideologies and
ways of communism.’

This outlook did not seem to be reconciled to the ongoing efforts to maintain friendly
relations with all Latin American governments. The tension appeared most evident as
George V. Allen addressed a Pan-American dinner in Washington with a celebration of
the friendship between each of the American Republics – not as an ideal – but as
accomplished fact.¹⁹ He singled out Cáceres as the ‘personal symbol of the friendliness
and good will that animates the relations of the Good Neighbour republics.’²⁰ The
continued friendship and military cooperation with all Latin American governments
revealed the inherent danger of the Good Neighbour Policy that placed the US in
support of a repressive status quo in the likes of Honduras. It became increasingly
evident that not everyone across the region would remain as tolerant as Marshall.

A Spectator to Social Transformation

A number of Latin American governments remained aware of their isolation from the
Cold War and showed unwilling to cooperate with the US in securing strategic locations
and resources from Communist subversion.²¹ The decision made by the Panamanian
National Assembly shortly before the Bogotá Conference to reject proposals for US
troops to defend the Canal from sabotage rang alarm bells within the Truman
administration. Forrestal feared that the government of Enrique Adolfo Jiménez would
be unable to defend vital strategic access to the Panama Canal Zone; he appealed for
Marshall to present at the Bogotá Conference an inter-American treaty on reciprocal use of military bases that would secure a direct US presence.\textsuperscript{22} Although he reaffirmed his commitment to military cooperation, Marshall refused to place the issue on the agenda and insisted on prioritising political affairs.\textsuperscript{23} The State Department warned that regional support for a multilateral agreement would be difficult to secure; many Latin American governments had welcomed the evacuation of US troops from the Panama Canal Zone.\textsuperscript{24} Perhaps more importantly, Marshall acknowledged the unwillingness of Latin American leaders to allow neighbours similar access to their strategic bases.\textsuperscript{25}

Marshall shifted his view after scheduled elections in Panama provoked fears of ‘another Bogotá’ however.\textsuperscript{26} He feared that the Jiménez administration could not be relied upon to secure the Panama Canal Zone from reported plans of local Communists to destabilise the region and disrupt the elections. Marshall warned that direct US intervention could produce ‘extremely serious repercussions throughout [the] hemisphere.’\textsuperscript{27} The strategic importance of the Panama Canal led him to support directives from the US Army to defend the area if necessary however.\textsuperscript{28} The Army continued to pressure for a commitment to intervention amidst further reports of Communist subversive activities during the elections.\textsuperscript{29}

The situation deteriorated as street clashes followed the electoral victory for Domingo Díaz Arosemena. Reports that Díaz won through a falsified count of votes brought protests from supporters of the defeated candidate, Arnulfo Arias Madrid.\textsuperscript{30} Only the swift restoration of order after the inauguration of Díaz saved Marshall from the choice between maintaining his commitment to non-intervention and direct action to secure the Panama Canal Zone. The US Commander in Chief of Caribbean Command, General
Matthew B. Ridgway, requested an immediate meeting between the US Ambassador in Panama City, Monnet B. Davis, and the new government to secure a longer-term solution. Davis reported that Díaz pledged full cooperation in securing the Panama Canal from sabotage and either incarcerating or handing over into US custody ‘all persons deemed dangerous by Caribbean Command.’ The collaboration of Díaz seemed to avert the immediate need for US presence to defend vital strategic positions and resources in the Western Hemisphere. But this cooperation with an undemocratic regime only revived for the State Department the issue of discrimination in military assistance.

The equal treatment of democrats and dictators in even the limited measures of military assistance only continued to alienate established progressive allies in the region however. A number of liberal allies across South America expressed shared concerns over the level of confidence and support offered by the Truman administration to reactionary regimes of the likes of Argentina. Brazilian leaders revealed particular resentment to their established cooperation with the US receiving equal treatment to the Argentine regime despite Perón’s repeated attempts to undermine the unity of the region. They criticised the US approach to military cooperation as treating brothers-in-arms as stepchildren.

Marshall also received numerous complaints that limited arms sales from the US to Argentina undermined the security of neighbours. The Uruguayan Ambassador, Dr. Domínguez Cámpora, continued to express his fears that Perón planned to dominate the region. He warned the State Department that Perón would not use overt aggression, but rather seek to support an indigenous coup. The Paraguayan Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Dr. César A. Vasconsellos, insisted that his government would stand up for democratic ideals, but warned that it would be too weak to oppose Argentina. From his new position as US Ambassador in Montevideo, Ellis O. Briggs requested some measure of support from the State Department for Uruguay and other democratic allies in the region. Both the State Department and CIA found no reason to dismiss the appeals of the Argentine Foreign Minister to reject accusations against Perón however. Briggs received the response that Argentina's neighbours could only be provided with assurances of equal reciprocal assistance in accordance with the Rio Treaty and the negotiation of a new informal agreement of friendship.

Marshall would not reverse his commitment to non-discrimination when the heightened tensions with the Soviet Union made friendly relations with Argentina more important. The US Embassy in Buenos Aires continued to remind Marshall that whilst 'war with Russia must be considered at least as a possibility,' then 'wise policy towards Argentina would ensure that it would be on the US side in the event of war.' Marshall did not simply shift support towards reactionary regimes able to demonstrate an ability to secure US interests in the Cold War however. The State Department made it clear to the Argentine government that it would not receive any special treatment in military cooperation; the priority of the US remained to not be seen as working with one country over another.

A number of progressive leaders in Central America and the Caribbean showed less willing to tolerate US cooperation with reactionary regimes than some of their neighbours to the South. The State Department continued to monitor the activities of the Caribbean Legion in preparing revolutionary attacks against the dictatorships in the
The commitment to neutrality ensured that the State Department remained a spectator to these serious developments however. Although progressive Latin American governments in the likes of Cuba reaffirmed their commitment to prevent their territory being used by the Caribbean Legion for armed expeditions they maintained their ideological opposition to the dictators of the region. President Carlos Prío publicly criticised ‘the anachronistic presence of dictators on our continent’ and called for a democratic bloc to fight against them. His Foreign Minister added that ‘it was not right to condone dictatorships in other parts of the world and not in nearby waters.’

Serious political disturbances in the Caribbean and Central American became more frequent throughout 1948 as the dictators in the region – in particular the “Three Ts” of Nicaragua’s “Tacho” Somoza, the Dominican Republic’s Rafael Trujillo, and Honduras’ Tiburcio Carías –joined together to resist the perceived threat posed by the likes of Cuba, Costa Rica, and Guatemala. ‘Nothing unites men quicker than a threat,’ noted Somoza; ‘so it was inevitable that we dictators should get together.’ The progressive leaders of the region frequently warned of the aggressive military cooperation amongst this reactionary grouping and urged the US to provide them the necessary support to defend against them. The State Department could only offer another restatement of its commitment for equal treatment of each Latin American government.

**The Failure of US Strategy in the Western Hemisphere**

Marshall did not appear to appreciate the problems caused by the equal treatment of Latin American governments in military assistance. He remained concerned instead that the limited capacity to supply arms only undermined the natural development towards
a balance of power in the region. The effective collaboration of Latin American allies in securing US interests from the threats of instability and subversion still depended, in large part, on the provision of necessary military materiel. The refusal of Congress to authorise funding for arms sales had led Marshall to undertake a number of provisional measures to safeguard the future of inter-American military cooperation. He even authorised proposals for sending technical experts to assist in setting up military factories in Latin America making standardised US arms.48 The need for a more effective and permanent regional solution for military assistance ensured that Marshall turned his attention once again to promoting legislation within Congress.49

Marshall regarded the authorisation of funds for arms sales as essential. He had received warning from the Secretary of the Air Force, Stuart Symington, shortly before the Bogotá Conference that the Interim Allocations Program, which was being used to provide military assistance in the absence of Congressional approval of the Inter-American Military Cooperation Act, was failing to deliver the quantities and qualities of arms that Latin American leaders deemed necessary to stabilise and secure their countries.50 Symington requested that the State Department authorise unlimited commercial sales of arms requested by Latin American militaries and extend the interim program without waiting for legislation.51

Marshall sympathised with the rationale provided by Symington. Marshall had warned before the war that reneging on any pledges to provide arms to Latin America would lead to doubts of US sincerity in its larger commitment to inter-American cooperation.52 Even Acheson and Braden had accepted the arguments made by the War Department at the end of the war that the US should uphold its ‘moral commitment of sort’ to meeting
military assistance commitments in order to avoid any damage to their reputation as an ally. More importantly however, the ongoing crises across the region had led many Latin American leaders to become increasingly mindful of an arms race in the Western Hemisphere. Marshall remained alert to their warnings that if the US could not supply arms then they would be forced to seek assistance from outside the Western Hemisphere. Marshall looked once again to the Policy Committee on Arms and Armament for recommendations. The Secretary of the PCA, Earl D. Sohm, advised Marshall to pursue further legislation before extending the Interim Allocations Program as unauthorised sales would further undermine precarious executive-legislative relations. The State Department would need to renew its pursuit of Congressional authorisation for another draft of the Inter-American Military Cooperation Act.

Marshall regarded military cooperation to be vital for securing the Western Hemisphere, but he understood that obtaining Congressional authorisation for a program of arms sales to Latin America would not be an easy task. Although securing necessary funding for inter-American military cooperation had proven difficult during 1947, whilst the danger of open hostilities in the Cold War seemed more remote, the risk of armed confrontation with the Soviet Union did not dramatically improve the prospects for success; it only further shifted the focus away from the Western Hemisphere. Kennan in particular continued to warn of the serious danger of overstretching financial capabilities and stressed the importance of matching available resources to commitments in areas of vital interest. He made it clear that Latin America remained strategically unimportant.
Although a number of major developments in the Cold War throughout 1948 made securing access to the strategic resources in the Western Hemisphere more urgent, they also led to further demands to redirect limited funds elsewhere. Firstly the shock Soviet blockade of Berlin led to demands from the armed services for prioritisation of expenditure on military preparedness to counter Soviet aggression in Europe. General Lucius D. Clay reported from Berlin that war could break out with ‘dramatic suddenness.’\textsuperscript{59} Although they recognised that any defence of the blockaded US sector would be difficult and of questionable strategic interest, the Truman administration identified the symbolic significance of the first major confrontation with the Soviet Union. Many officials simply deferred to the lessons of Munich and feared that capitulation would undermine US credibility and encourage further Soviet aggression in order to occupy the whole of Germany.\textsuperscript{60} Dean Acheson made clear the significance of the situation in Berlin: ‘We couldn’t afford to have the Russians win in Berlin; otherwise Europe was down the drain.’ Although Truman had already submitted a proposal to Congress in January for an increase in military budgets for FY 1949 to $10 billion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested supplementary funding of around $9 billion for immediate military expansion.\textsuperscript{61}

The expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform a few days after the blockade transformed the strategic climate of the Cold War even further. ‘The breach between Tito and the Kremlin is the most significant development in international Communism in twenty years,’ reported the CIA.\textsuperscript{62} The refusal of Josep Broz Tito to accept the absolute leadership of the Kremlin for Yugoslavia seemed to strike a symbolic blow for the Soviet Union in its sphere of influence. The decision made by Stalin to establish an economic blockade around the country only demonstrated the contrast to the inter-
American solidarity found in the final agreement at Bogotá. Kennan regarded the Tito-Stalin split as an opportunity to shift the strategic focus from securing the US orbit in Western Europe to the active liberation of the Soviet sphere of influence. He proposed operations for mobilising resistance to Soviet control in Eastern Europe that would force the Kremlin to either open up its sphere of influence and risk losing influence over satellites or clamp down on it at considerable political and economic cost.\textsuperscript{63}

The refocus of US global strategy ‘from solely a policy of containment into a policy of coercion’ did not come without danger for the Western Hemisphere. Kennan expressed concerns that the defiance displayed by Tito would force Moscow to look for ways to reconcile nationalism with ‘monolithic Soviet unity.’ He feared that the damage to Soviet prestige caused by further US activities in their sphere of influence could antagonise the Kremlin into similar actions in the US orbit. The CIA also warned that the lack of capabilities for direct aggression in the Western Hemisphere would not prevent the Soviets from becoming ‘actively interested in the development of indecisive, diversionary situations which will cause the US to over-extend its commitments and expend its resources.’\textsuperscript{64} The prioritisation of actions in both Western and Eastern Europe only continued to redirect resources away from the pursuit of strategic objectives in the Western Hemisphere however.

The strain on US resources led Congress once again to reject a draft of the Inter-American Military Cooperation Act.\textsuperscript{65} Despite his appeals to the Chairmen of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Charles Easton and Arthur Vandenberg, Marshall failed once again to convince them of the urgency of mobilising regional defences.\textsuperscript{66} Congress actually exacerbated the problem of restricted
means to pursue strategic ends in the region. An amendment to the Surplus Property Act of 1944 effectively ended the “interim program” that the Truman administration had relied on to sell excess arms to Latin America. Daniels concluded that the State Department could only pursue yet another revised version of the IAMCA or seek broader legislation to cover appropriations for arms sales to Latin America. The Office of the Counsel advised Marshall that Congress however, would not only continue to dismiss any specific regional program of military sales, but also insist on prioritising assistance to Western Europe within any broader program. Marshall faced the difficult reality of pursuing strategic objectives in the Western Hemisphere without the necessary commitment of resources to realise them.

This had a significant impact on US relations with Latin America. Marshall ultimately had to accept the unfeasibility of the objective of regional standardisation of arms and his inability to prevent Latin American governments from purchasing arms from outside of the Western Hemisphere. The authorisation of licences for private sources to export arms remained the only option for the State Department. The limited provision of commercial licences failed to meet Latin American demand however. On the one hand, even the small interim supplies and private sales of arms provided a symbol of the US as an obstacle to democratic progress in Latin America. On the other hand however, the lack of a significant program of military assistance only removed US influence and created a space for other powerful actors to use forces to shape the destiny of the region.

The conflict in Costa Rica demonstrated the lack of US influence in developments across the region. After being ousted by the movement led by José Figueres, the Costa Rican
President, Teodoro Picado, revealed that he had been left ‘broken hearted’ by the inability of the Truman administration to provide the quantity and quality of arms needed to defend his government.\textsuperscript{71} The fact that Figueres received military assistance from neighbouring countries made it even more difficult to take. At the same time however, José Figueres criticised the Truman administration for supplying the Picado government with arms to repress his democratic movement.\textsuperscript{72} The US Ambassador in San José, Nathaniel P. Davis, simply insisted that the small quantity of materiel acquired through the Interim Allocations Program could not influence the outcome of the conflict. This tension between the symbolism and the inadequate amount of arms supplies remained evident once fighting broke out again after an armed group of reactionary exiles crossed from Nicaragua back into Costa Rica.\textsuperscript{73} The State Department could not meet the request from the Costa Rican government for arms needed to repel the invasion.\textsuperscript{74}

The disarray evident in the US approach to military assistance for Latin America left Marshall to rely on the collective agreement at the Bogotá Conference on new inter-American procedures for signatories to settle disputes by pacific means. The State Department reaffirmed a commitment to utilise this machinery in the anticipation that it would relieve the need for the US to arbitrate in regional conflicts.\textsuperscript{75} The established procedures showed to be of limited use however; they only sanctioned the recourse to armed self-defence in the face of a clear belligerent state actor.\textsuperscript{76} A neutral position in the event of revolutionary activity and civil unrest would prove difficult to maintain. Marshall essentially possessed no serious measures to influence the course of the social transformation across Latin America. State Department officials were reduced to efforts
Without the means to address the conflict, State Department officials were reduced to silence the speculation around revolutionary activity that undermined the image of solidarity in the Western Hemisphere.\textsuperscript{77}

The illusion of harmony in the Americas continued to evaporate with the rising tide of revolution however. The Truman administration could only watch from afar as a dangerous pattern unfolded across the region. The inability to demonstrate the credibility of US support for social change in Latin America only left a vacuum to be filled by those willing to take a more active role in political and economic development. Marshall remained more of an onlooker as local Communists continued to exploit the instability caused by the dynamics of social transformation. Latin American leaders facing mounting unrest within their countries took the matter into their own hands. The destabilisation of the region led a number of governments to prohibit Communist parties and instruct their police forces to round up and incarcerate any known Communists.\textsuperscript{78} Such repressive measures even appeared in countries like Chile, where President González Vileda came to power with their support. The reactionaries of the region such as Argentina adopted ever stronger measures that would essentially perpetuate the poverty of economic and political conditions across the region.\textsuperscript{79} Strategy in the Western Hemisphere drifted into incoherence as Marshall and the rest of the Truman administration were left only to observe and explain rather than shape developments across the region.
Notes for Chapter 9

1 711.35/4-2848: Telegram, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Argentina to the Secretary of State,” 28.04.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)
2 810.00B/10-1548, Department of State, “The Acting Secretary of State to Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics,” 15.10.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)
3 810.00B/10-2848: Airgram, Department of State, “The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Argentina,” 09.11.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX); 810.00B/11-2348, Department of State, “The Department of State to the Panamanian Embassy,” 15.12.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)
4 810.24/8-447, Department of State, “Memorandum by the Secretary of the Policy Committee on Arms and Armaments,” 04.08.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII); 839.24/10-647, Department of State, “The Secretary of State to the Dominican Ambassador,” 24.10.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)
5 The Dominican Republic requested 20 B-25s, 4 B-17s, and 15 B-38s. See 810.24/11-447, Department of State, “Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Special Inter-American Affairs,” 04.11.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume IX)
6 839.00/6-1947, Department of State, “The Ambassador in the Dominican Republic to the Secretary of State,” 19.06.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume IX)
7 731.39/1-248, Department of State, “The Ambassador in the Dominican Republic to the Secretary of State,” 02.01.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)
8 839.00/1-1947, Department of State, “Memorandum by Mr. Charles C. Hauch of the Division of Caribbean Affairs,” 19.11.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)
9 810.20 Missions/11-1047, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of Division of Special Inter-American Affairs,” 10.11.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)
10 815.248/0-247, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Honduras to the Secretary of State,” 02.09.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)
11 123 Daniels, Paul C., Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Central America and Panama Affairs,” 24.10.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)
13 810.00/1-1748, Department of State, “The Secretary of State to Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics,” 17.01.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)
14 810.24/4-2748, “Memorandum by the Policy Committee on Arms and Armaments: PCA PD-10 (Revised)” 27.04.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)
15 Ibid.
18 Marshall was speaking in a meeting with the Bolivian Ambassador, Ricardo Martinez Vargas. See 824.50/6-1848, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State,” 18.06.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)


22 710.J/1-2248: Telegram, Department of State, “The Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State,” 21.01.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)

23 710.J/1-2148: Telegram, Department of State, “The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense,” 03.02.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)

24 An agreement had been signed on 01.12.1947 to replace the 1942 Defense Sites Agreement for Canal security. See 711.19/1-2048, Department of State, ‘Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Central America and Panama Affairs,’ 20.01.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)

25 810.20 Defense/1-648, “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State,” 06.01.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX); 710.J/1-2148, Department of State, “Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense,” 03.02.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)

26 819.00/4-2748: Telegram, “The Chargé in Panama to the Secretary of State,” 27.04.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)

27 819.00/4-2748: Telegram, Department of State, “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Panama,” 29.04.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)

28 Ibid; US Army General Albert C. Wedemeyer passed on these directions to the Commander in the Panama Canal Zone, General Willis D. Crittenberger. See 819.00/4-3048, Department of State, “Memorandum to the Secretary of State, by the Deputy Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs,” 30.04.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)

29 811F.812 Protection/5-2548, Department of State, “The Secretary of the Army to the Secretary of State,” 25.05.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)


31 810.20 Defense/9-3048, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Panama to the Secretary of State,” 30.09.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)

32 Lot 60D665, Box 15280, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in Brazil,” 02.04.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)


34 *Time*, 31.05.1948; 835.20/5-1348: Telegram, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Chile to the Secretary of State,” 13.05.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX). Marshall reassured Bowers that Argentina received no special treatment, but Argentina could purchase arms on the same basis as any other LA Republic. See 835.20/5-1348: Telegram, Department of State, “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Chile,” 14.05.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX). See also 835.00/11-1048, Department of State, “Memorandum by Mr. Henry Dearborn of the Division of River Plate Affairs,” 11.10.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX). Also see for example, Lot 60D665, Box 15280, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in Brazil,” 02.04.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX); 711.34/5-1348, Department of State, ‘Memorandum of Conversation,
by the Ambassador in Paraguay," 13.05.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX); 835.24/6-1048: Telegram, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Chile to the Secretary of State,” 10.06.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX); 834.00/8-948, Department of State, ‘The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Brazil,” 09.08.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX); 710.35/10-2848: Telegram, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Brazil to the Secretary of State,” 28.10.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX)

733.35/12-848, Memorandum of Conversation by Mr. R. Kenneth Oakley of the Division of River Plate Affairs 08.12.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX)

See for example, 711.34/5-1348, Department of State, 'Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in Paraguay,” 13.05.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)

711.33/8-548, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Uruguay to the Secretary of State,” 05.08.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX); 711.33/8-548, Department of State, “The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Uruguay,” 30.09.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX); 710.35/10-2848: Telegram, “The Ambassador in Brazil to the Secretary of State,” 28.10.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX); 710.35/11-0348: Telegram, “The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Brazil,” 03.11.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX)

Central Intelligence Agency, “CIA report on alleged Argentine participation in recent Latin American military coups,” 30.12.1948 (DDRS); 835.00/11-1048, Department of State, “Memorandum by Mr. Henry Dearborn of the Division of River Plate Affairs,” 11.10.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX); 711.35/12-948, Department of State, "Memorandum of Conversation by the Acting Secretary of State,” 09.12.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX)

711.33/8-548, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Uruguay to the Secretary of State,” 05.08.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX); 711.33/8-548, Department of State, “The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Uruguay,” 30.09.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX); 710.35/10-2848: Telegram, “The Ambassador in Brazil to the Secretary of State,” 28.10.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX); 710.35/11-0348: Telegram, “The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Brazil,” 03.11.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX)

835.00/6-348, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Argentina to the Secretary of State,” 03.06.1948, FRUS 1948, Volume IX)

711.25/12-948, Department of State, “Memorandum by the Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs to the Acting Secretary of State,” 09.12.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX); 711.35/12-948, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation by the Acting Secretary of State,” 09.12.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX)

The State Department received a number of reports in particular of plans made by the new government of Figueres to support further attacks mounted from Costa Rica to change regimes across the region. Daniels initially dismissed the danger and insisted that Figueres demonstrated more concern for consolidating his own power within Costa Rica. See 819.00/8-948, Department of State, ‘Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Central America and Panama Affairs,” 09.08.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX). See also Gleijeses, Piero, “Juan José Arévalo and the Caribbean Legion,” Journal of Latin American Studies (Vol. 21, No. 1, Feb. 1989) p. 138

Time, 06.09.1948; New York Times, 29.01.1949

737.39/10-1948, Department of State, “The Charge in Cuba to the Secretary of State,” 19.10.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)

Time, 15.11.1948

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See for example, 818.24/7-2048, Department of State, 'Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. William Tapley Bennett, Jr., of the Division of Central America and Panama Affairs,” 20.07.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX); 818.24/8-1048, Department of State, ‘Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. William Tapley Bennett, Jr., of the Division of Central America and Panama Affairs,” 10.08.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)

810.113/10-2747, Department of State, “The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Army,” 27.10.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)

810.20 Defense/6-2248, Department of State, “The Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State,” 22.06.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)

The Ambassador from the Dominican Republic, Luis F. Thomen was amongst those complaining of the poor condition of the surplus stock available to purchase from the US. See 731.39/1-2148: Circular Telegram, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles C. Hauch of the Division of Caribbean Affairs,” 17.01.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)

810.248/10-1647, Department of State, “The Secretary of the Air Force to the Secretary of State,” 16.10.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)


810.24/12-1945, Department of State, “The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of War,” 19.12.1945 (FRUS 1945, Volume IX); 740.00119 Council/12 05.10.1948, Department of State, “The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union,” 21.12.1945 (FRUS 1945, Volume IX); 810.24/1-2246, Department of State, “Memorandum of Meeting, by the Chief of Division of American Republic Affairs,” 22.01.1946 (FRUS 1946, Volume XI)

See for example in Venezuela, 831.24/9-1548, Department of State,”Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of North and West Coast Affairs,” 15.09.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX); or in Argentina, 635.0031/7-1448: Airgram, Department of State, “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Argentina,” 05.08.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX)

810.248/10-1647, Department of State, “Memorandum by the Secretary of the Policy Committee on Arms and Armaments,” 12.12.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume IX)

820.24/10-548, Department of State, “The Director of the Office of American Republics to the Secretary of State,” 05.10.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)


The Soviets established the blockade after fears that the Truman administration’s announcement of plans to introduce currency reform within the Western zones of Berlin would lead to the creation of a separate West German state. Ninkovich, Frank, Modernity and Power: A History of the Domino Theory in the Twentieth Century (London:

60 McCauley, *The Origins of the Cold War*, p. 97


63 Kennan initially presented these plans in National Security Council Memorandum 10/2 entitled “The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare”. The authorisation of these plans in National Security Council Memorandum 10/2 would only divert further resources from the pursuit of strategic objectives in the Western Hemisphere. See RG 273, National Security Council, “NSC 10/2: National Security Council Directive on Office of Special Projects,” 18.06.1948 (FRUS 1945-1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment) Doc. 292. This led to the decision to overlook the ideological conflict with Communism and offer the assistance to Tito in Yugoslavia that would damage the credibility of Soviet strength in Eastern Europe. The refocus of US global strategy ‘from solely a policy of containment into a policy of coercion’ was presented by the Policy Planning Staff in PPS/36 in August 1948 entitled, ‘US Objectives towards Russia.’ This was later authorised by the National Security Council as NSC 20/1. See S/S NSC Files: Lot63D351: NSC 20 Series, Department of State, “Report to the National Security Council by the Department of State: Summary of Conclusions – NSC 20/1,” 18.08.1948 (FRUS Volume 1, Part II)

64 Central Intelligence Agency, “Threats to the Security of the United States,” DDRS, 28.09.1948

65 810.20 Defense/6-448, Department of State, “Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs to the Secretary of State,” 06.06.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)

66 810.20 Defense/5-2648, Department of State, “The Secretary of State to Representative Charles A. Eaton,” 26.05.1948, FRUS 1948, Volume IX

67 Armour informed Marshall that Congress’ third refusal to address the IAMCA meant that no further transfer of arms could be made to Latin America. See 810.20 Defense/6-448, Department of State, “Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs to the Secretary of State,” 04.06.1948, FRUS 1948, Volume IX)

68 820.24/10-548, Department of State, “The Director of the Office of American Republics to the Secretary of State,” 05.10.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)

69 820.24/10-1948, Department of State, “Memorandum by Mr. Carl M. Marcy, Assistant Legislative Counsel, Office of the Counselor, to the Acting Secretary of State,” 19.10.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)

70 810.24/7-3048, Department of State, “The Secretary of State to Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics,” 30.07.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX). The State Department looked to meet the request of Costa Rica and Venezuela, for example, by granting commercial export licences. See 818.00/12-11148: Telegram, “The Ambassador in Costa Rica to the Secretary of State,” 11.12.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX); 831.24/9-1548, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of North and West Coast Affairs,” 15.09.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX)

71 710.J/4-648: Telegram, Department of State, “Ambassador in Colombia to the Acting Secretary of State,” 06.04.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX); 818.00/4-1348, Department of
State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Central America and Panama Affairs,” 13.04.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)

Ulate also warned that the government had passed arms on to Communists to repress the movement. See 731.39/3-1548, Department of State, ‘The Ambassador in Venezuela to the Secretary of State,” 15.03.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)

818.00/12-1248: Telegram, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Nicaragua to the Secretary of State,” 12.12.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX)

818.00/12-11148: Telegram, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Costa Rica to the Secretary of State,” 11.12.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX); Ibid

839.00/8-648, Department of State, ‘Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs,” 26.08.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)

Following the invocation of the Rio Treaty, the Council of American States called upon both Costa Rica and Nicaragua to abstain from hostilities and respect the principle of non-intervention. It also voted to convene an emergency meeting of Foreign Ministers to resolve the tensions. 818.00/1201248, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. William Tapley Bennett, Jr., of the Division of Central and Panama Affairs (FRUS 1948 Volume IX); 818.00/12-1448, Department of State, “The Acting Secretary of State to Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics,” 14.12.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX); New York Times, 14.12.1948 and 25.12.1948. See also the text of the American Treaty of Pacific Settlement, 30.04.1948, is available at the website of the OAS. (http://www.oas.org/Juridico/english/treaties/a-42.html)

819.00/8-948, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Central America and Panama Affairs,” 09.08.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX); 810.00/9-2948, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs,” 29.09.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)

Time, 03.05.1948

See for example, 835.00/10-1148, Department of State, “Memorandum by Mr. Henry Dearborn of the Division of River Plate Affairs,” 11.10.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX); 711.35/11-448: Airgram, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Argentina to the Secretary of State,” 04.11.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX)
10. The Failure of Incoherent Strategy

Only weeks after the coup in Peru the Venezuelan Army Chief of Staff, Marcos Evangelista Pérez Jiménez, successfully led a group of army officers in overthrowing the government of Rómulo Gallegos. The Truman administration did have an indirect hand in these coups. The State Department shared the assessments of the CIA that the military leadership in both Peru and Venezuela had attempted to restore their influence after their failure to secure necessary assistance from the US had led increasingly to their exclusion from government.¹ The inability of the Truman administration to provide economic assistance meant also that the military juntas managed to enlist conservative elements from the landowning classes, business sector, and professionals who all feared the nationalist measures adopted by their governments to address the economic crises faced across the region.²

The Truman administration did not look upon the coups favourably however. The President even personally wrote to Gallegos:

'My Dear Friend. The overthrow of your Government came as a great shock to me, and I have personally concerned myself with this question from the beginning.'³

Truman informed his deposed Venezuelan counterpart that the State Department had begun to review the situation. As it did so however, the region descended into chaos. The governments in Guatemala and Chile successfully suppressed military plots. Reactionary elements also faced serious threats of upheaval. In El Salvador a group of young military officers succeeded in overthrowing the reactionary President General
Salvador Castaneda Castro. Argentina plunged into a state of instability after a failed attempt to assassinate Perón. The government of Juan Natalicio González Paredes in Paraguay managed to crush a fierce revolt from within its own Colorado Party. This government had only just come to power earlier in the year after another military coup forced out President General Higinio Morínigo.

Marshall acknowledged the urgent need to reassess the US relationship with these new undemocratic regimes. He had already recognised a serious problem after neighbouring Latin American governments refused to follow his lead in offering diplomatic recognition of the new regime in Peru. Marshall had instructed Lovett to ask each of the US Ambassadors in the region for recommendations on next steps. The responses led Lovett to the conclusion that serious tensions in the existing approach to diplomatic recognition had to be reconciled. The Rio Treaty had simultaneously affirmed the desirability of continuous relations and the inconsistency of the use of force to effect political change with the shared values of the Western Hemisphere. Gallegos blamed the agreement of Resolution 35 at the Bogotá Conference for his ousting however; the application of this agreement by the State Department had been the “mother” of the military coups towards the end of 1948. Time magazine also identified the State Department’s commitment to continuous diplomatic recognition under Resolution 35 as giving reactionary military leaders across the region a “green light” to take power through the use of force.

Marshall did not deliberately seek to establish a new anti-Communist coalition in the Western Hemisphere. He offered support to new military dictatorships primarily as a result of his failure to reconcile enduring tensions in his commitment to the Good
Neighbour Policy. The lack of measures to shape developments across the region left Marshall to ensure Latin American cooperation in securing US interests.

**Recognising Reactionaries**

Diplomatic recognition had proven a difficult and controversial issue in the Western Hemisphere. Marshall had appeared in his first few months as Secretary of State to be less interested in using diplomatic recognition as a strategic instrument to shape the development of the region than as another symbolic demonstration of the US commitment not to dominate Latin American neighbours or interfere in their domestic affairs. The State Department considered the issue of whether to withhold recognition of the interim leadership in Nicaragua of Benjamin Lacayo Sacasa after a coup initiated by Anastasio Somoza installed him as a puppet in May 1947.12 Marshall did not seek to reconcile the promotion of democracy and constitutional change with the competing objectives of non-interference in Nicaraguan affairs; he simply established the position of the US based on those of the majority of Latin American neighbours.13 After making enquiries as to their course of action towards the permanent appointment of Victor Manuel Róman y Reyes to the Nicaraguan Presidency, Marshall announced his formal decision to withhold recognition.

Initial disagreements amongst delegates to Petrópolis over whether to refuse recognition of representatives of the Román y Reyes regime in Nicaragua ensured that Marshall had to address these issues again. He hoped to keep the US from making any decisive judgement and insisted that he would respect the majority decision of the other delegations.14 Throughout proceedings he continued to observe the response of the
Latin American delegations to Nicaraguan appeals for recognition. But the tension between ambitions for political freedom in Nicaragua and the projection of the US as Good Neighbour was clear. Norman Armour informed a delegation of Nicaraguan observers that US and the other Latin American delegations would need to be convinced that the new government represented the will of the people. In a telegram to Marshall a few days earlier however, Robert Lovett restated the need for the US to ‘follow the majority’ on the issue of recognition for Nicaragua. He acknowledged the oppression of the new puppet regime, but the ‘wise’ and ‘judicious’ policy was to avoid ‘giving the impression of taking the lead in a manner which might be interpreted as pressure or tutelage.’

The shift in position of a number of Latin American governments after the Rio Conference to recognise the regime of Román y Reyes regime made it problematic for the State Department to maintain this approach of simply following the majority however. Lovett acknowledged that the Nicaraguan regime, like it or not, had the attributes and qualities of a stable de facto government; intelligence reports also showed that it would maintain control throughout the near future. He stressed that the lack of unanimity constituted an important change in environment for US policy that needed to be addressed. Both Armour and Daniels suggested in different meetings that the lack of democratic participation in Nicaragua created conditions for the continuation of non-recognition. Lovett also noted that US policy had not changed, but he emphasised that the hope to remain in harmony with a broad section of other Latin American governments meant that the State Department position would be largely influenced by their views.
An approach of conforming to regional consensus became impossible once the Guatemalan government led proposals not to extend an invitation for Nicaragua to the Bogotá Conference. Marshall sought to avoid any position that would swing the decision and set the tone for future inter-American relations. The US representative to the Credentials Committee, Walter Donnelly, received simple instructions to declare that the State Department had no opinion on recognition and would raise no objections to any majority decision. The Committee eventually reconciled the differences between the representatives after agreement on an Argentine proposal to invite states, rather than governments; the seating of a Nicaraguan delegation at the Bogotá Conference would not constitute recognition of its regime.

This solution did not provide Marshall with a more general approach to diplomatic recognition. Different initiatives presented by the delegations from Guatemala and Ecuador meant that Marshall would not be able to avoid the issue at the Bogotá Conference however. In identifying anti-democratic regimes as the primary ‘danger to the unity, solidarity, peace and defense of the continent,’ the Guatemalan government of Juan Arévalo proposed an agreement on withholding diplomatic recognition as an instrument for political change. The Carlos Julio Arosemena Tola government in Ecuador asserted that Good Neighbour relations necessitated continuous relations between all American Republics however. Inspired by the earlier Estrada Doctrine adopted in 1930 by the Mexican government, the Ecuadoran government proposed an inter-American agreement abolishing the practice of recognition altogether.

Marshall turned to the Policy Planning Staff to provide recommendations for a position on these proposals. Kennan admitted his unfamiliarity with his region and left Butler in
charge as he departed instead for Japan to shape plans for a strategy of containment in the Far East. Butler had demonstrated some support for the Guatemalan initiative during his time as Ambassador in Ciudad Trujillo. He had consistently opposed any actions to weaken the US commitment to democratic principles and at one point even recommended his own recall as protest to the Trujillo regime. Support for the Guatemalan proposal would not be considered beyond the conventions of recent US diplomacy. A focus on democratic ideals and constitutional change had existed in some form from the administration of Woodrow Wilson up to the policies of Braden under the Truman administration. Recent democratic advances across the region, in the likes of Venezuela and Paraguay, were also enthusiastically welcomed in both Washington and American popular opinion.

Once Butler and the Policy Planning Staff began soliciting advice from current and former State Department officials however, they soon found considerable opposition to the Guatemalan proposal. Dana Munro argued that non-recognition had become counter-productive and the State Department would need to gradually retreat from the non-recognition of the likes of Nicaragua. Laurence Duggan also suggested that non-recognition was useless if not supported by additional sanctions; without them he considered it imperative for the State Department to maintain a continuity of relations that would keep open official diplomatic channels. Opposition to the Guatemalan initiative was made primarily on grounds that it constituted intervention. The chief architect of the Good Neighbour Policy, Sumner Welles, had already criticised the Truman administration’s use of non-recognition as a political weapon in an article published in *Foreign Affairs* at the end of 1947. The Policy Committee established by Truman to prepare for the Bogotá Conference expressed similar opposition and insisted
that any policy of diplomatic recognition should not imply any approval of the government in question.

The Ecuadoran proposal better represented some of the sensitivities of several Latin American Republics that identified non-recognition as constituting interference in domestic affairs. Arosemena was amongst Latin American leaders recognising that their own survival depended largely upon recognition by the US. He had come to power in August 1947 after a diverse group led by Colonel Carlos Mancheno Cajas overthrew President José María Velasco Ibarra. Marshall only managed to avoid a divisive decision on recognition because the Ecuadoran Junta was able to swiftly restore constitutional government whilst he was attempting to ascertain the reaction of other Latin American Republics. The State Department Policy Committee preparing for Bogotá now recommended US support for the Ecuadoran proposal in the hope that a move towards the Estrada Doctrine would remove Latin American suspicions that the US sought to interfere in their internal affairs.

A commitment to non-interference, in order to maintain an image of the US as Good Neighbour, conflicted with Butler’s own priorities of securing shared hemispheric ideals. But his approach to inter-American relations was complicated by the need to establish a PPS position within a global context. Attitudes towards recognition were similarly divided at this level. Several participants in a study group established by the Council on Foreign Relations to examine political prerequisites for participation in the Marshall Plan insisted that recognition should be regulated by the principles of individual liberty enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. Other members however, suggested that a moral code could not always be followed; many shared
Marshall’s view that the benefits of breaking relations with the Soviet Union had not outweighed the interests in maintaining official contact with Moscow. In pulling together these divergent concepts into the final conclusions of Policy Planning Study 24, Butler identified more with the institutionalised attitudes of the PPS. Kennan had developed a broad realist framework that focused on a narrow conception of US interests and dealt with the world ‘as it is’; he had argued in PPS/23 against making foreign policy commitments for reasons of ‘altruism and world benefaction.’ Butler needed to establish a recognition policy that served US interests and ‘refrained from offering moral and ideological advice.’

Butler concluded that US interests required a flexible response. As the State Department would benefit from different approaches to specific cases, his first recommendation was to avoid any rigid formula for a policy of recognition. Butler acknowledged that Marshall’s priorities of inter-American consultation would remain important, but he advised that the US should maintain its freedom of decision. In drawing up guidelines for a general policy, Butler ultimately concluded that recognition should not be considered primarily as a political weapon. But US interests required action in specific cases. There were clear advantages to withholding recognition of regimes that were either imposed by force, lacked popular support, refused to respect international obligations, or posed a threat to neighbouring countries.

Butler still interpreted US interests in promoting political freedoms in the Western Hemisphere. He warned against reducing the criteria for de facto recognition to the effective control of the territory and administration of the State and an ability to uphold international obligations; regional stability would not be restored with assurances of
recognition that would signal a “green light” for reactionaries to impose their rule by force. He also cautioned against support for the Ecuadoran proposal that would be perceived as weakening the US commitment to democratic principles. Butler rejected the Guatemalan initiatives for recognition, but he still inserted the requirement of a ‘general acquiescence of the people of a country in the government in power.’

Butler did not rule out action to shape the region, but the flexibility of PPS/24 provided Marshall with rationale for continued adherence to the majority position in the region. Shortly after authorising the study, Marshall declared that the moment was still not opportune for granting recognition of Nicaragua. If a general resolution approved at the Bogotá Conference pointed towards the renewal of relations however, he would look favourably on recognising the Nicaraguan government.

Marshall faced a serious impasse at Bogotá. His interpretation of Good Neighbour relations as the avoidance of any unilateral decision that could be perceived as tutelage precluded any decisive action to resolve the crises in the region. Marshall would need to rely instead on the joint endeavours of the American Republics to reach agreement on a solution. The Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, George V. Allen, suggested to regional leaders that mutual compromise was the price of any good agreement. The State Department sought to follow the majority of American Republics on numerous issues, but failing a regional consensus a compromise would avoid accusations of US unilateralism. The fundamental antagonism dividing the region between progressive and authoritarian governments however, ensured that serious multilateral cooperation to find such a compromise, let alone unanimous agreement, would be difficult.
The outcome of negotiations at Bogotá on the issue of diplomatic recognition symbolised the real price of a good agreement; the compromise assured by Daniels took from divergent proposals rather than resolve the differences between them.40 The problem of *de facto* recognition was left altogether to be addressed later by the Juridical Committee. The rest of the language used remained ambiguous and open to interpretation. Resolution 35 *did* declare disapproval of non-recognition as a tool for unilateral intervention in the internal affairs of another American Republic. The delegates would not accept the Ecuadorian proposal to abolish recognition however; opposition led by the Guatemalan delegation ensured that agreement could only be found in a declaration of the *desirability* of continuous diplomatic relations. The inclusion of the ‘Exercise of the Right of Legation’ ensured that withholding recognition would not bring charges of intervention.41 But the Guatemalan initiative for collective action against anti-democratic regimes was undermined by agreement that recognition should not imply approval of any regime.

Resolution 35 ensured the flexibility of response recommended by Butler, but this also left open the possibility for further struggle over its meaning. The US delegation prioritised the conclusion of a symbolic agreement that would demonstrate the absence of US tutelage over genuine reconciliation of the tensions threatening hemispheric peace. It was more important to demonstrate an example of the US commitment to the Good Neighbour than an example of hemispheric solidarity. Marshall’s strategic approach sought to project the universality of the US rather than the Western Hemisphere; hemispheric particularity only provided a suitable geographic space for an asymmetric response in the Cold War. As a result however, Marshall simply failed to translate his strategy of containment in the Western Hemisphere into a coherent
approach to both the persistent Latin American dictatorships and the growing regional movements for democracy.

Deserting Democrats

The inherent tensions in Resolution 35 appeared almost immediately. The Costa Rican Civil War ended after Picado resigned his Presidency and Santos Leon Herrera assumed office as provisional leader. Despite the questions concerning its legitimacy, the US Ambassador in San José, Nathaniel P. Davis, recommended recognition of the new government as soon as it gained control of the machinery of the state. Only an agreement between Figueres and Ulate, which stipulated that the former would lead a revolutionary junta for 18 months before the latter became the first constitutional President of the Second Republic, diffused the unrest in Costa Rica. Marshall considered the appearance of restored constitutionality to be enough to announce that diplomatic relations would continue. In light of this however, the State Department had to consider reinstating relations with Nicaragua. The Truman administration's eventual recognition of the Nicaraguan regime did not necessarily represent an abandonment of democratic ideals; it was neither 'synonymous with approval' nor a guarantee of 'intimate cooperation.' Shortly afterwards Marshall adopted the same approach towards a new regime in Paraguay that came to power through unconstitutional use of force. The US Ambassador in Asunció, Fletcher Warren, informed him that the de facto government had been accepted by people, albeit “lethargically”.

The coups in Peru and Venezuela towards the end of the year forced closer inspection of the US approach to diplomatic recognition however. The criticism of the US
commitment to Resolution 35 was made most clearly by Gonzalo Carnevali. The Venezuelan Ambassador, who remained loyal to Gallegos, was informed by Daniels of the regret felt across the State Department at the eradication of constitutional democracy in his country. Carnevali interrupted as Daniels stressed that this regret did not alter the desirability in continuous diplomatic relations as stated in Resolution 35 however. He insisted that ‘there were many things in life that were desirable, but it was not always practical or possible to have them.’ Carnevali reminded Daniels that Gallegos was recognised as a democrat within every home throughout Latin America.

The Latin American reaction to the coups that threatened to eradicate democracy in the Western Hemisphere led Marshall to acknowledge the need for an immediate review of the US commitment to Resolution 35. A number of progressive leaders from across the region complained that this commitment had only emboldened reactionary elements to intervene without fear of interference from US. Marshall received appeals to reconsider concerted action to prevent further regimes coming to power through the use of force. The Colombian Foreign Minister, Eduardo Zuleta Angel, declared that ‘something must be done to defend the effectiveness of democracy in the Americas.’ Serafino Romualdi also warned of the threat to the free labour movement in the region and the possible tragedy of saving ‘Western Europe from the menace of totalitarian communism only to wake up one morning and find that democracy has disappeared from our backyard in Latin America.’ A sub-committee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs offered similar warnings after a 25-day fact-finding mission in Latin America. The members of the committee criticised Resolution 35 as giving a ‘green light to political adventurers’ across the region.
The process of review within the State Department brought immediate complaints from the new regimes. The State Department made it clear to them their concerns about the recent overthrows of governments and simply wanted to consider possible steps to prevent any further coups and consolidate democracy in the region. The leaders of these regimes insisted that their actions had been in defence of democracy in their countries. The new Ambassador-designate for Venezuela also appealed to the State Department to confer immediate recognition of his government with the reminder that ‘the important thing in hemispheric relations was unity.’ US diplomatic representatives in their capitals also warned Marshall against further delays in recognition that could cause offense or damage the prestige of the new regimes. Any alienation of the military juntas could endanger bilateral relations and have further unforeseeable consequences for inter-American relations.

The armed services in the US provided stronger support for the new regimes. The Secretary of the Army, Kenneth C. Royall, emphasised the desirability of maintaining relations with the new regimes that would keep US military missions in each country. He believed that many of the new leaders that attended US military schools would cooperate fully in protecting the strategic interests of the US. Both the Air and Ground Missions in El Salvador, for example, expressed their satisfaction in ‘finding many good friends in positions of importance.’ Royall similarly welcomed the promises of the new Venezuelan Minister of National Defence, Delgado Chalbaud, to use every possible measure to protect US oil interests. The leaders of the US oil companies operating in Venezuela also welcomed commitments from the regime to offer new concessions and reverse the established policy of shared profits. Although the US Ambassador in Caracas, Walter Donnelly, recognised the prospects of the reactionary government
providing ‘fertile ground for underground growth [of] Communism,’ he reported his conviction that the new regime would be pro-American.\textsuperscript{61} He warned that the refusal to recognise the regime would only risk destabilising this relationship and place US lives, property, and interests in danger.\textsuperscript{62}

This crisis in Latin America led Kennan to make his first serious assessment of the role of the Western Hemisphere in containment. Marshall had turned to him to find a solution for reconciling the tension between the objectives of securing democracy in the region and maintaining friendly relations with each of the Latin American governments. Kennan recruited the assistance of the Office of American Republic Affairs in his reassessment of the established position on diplomatic recognition. He ultimately reasserted the earlier findings in PPS/24 however; there would be no favourable course for the national interest in withholding recognition of new regimes. He advised Marshall that more guarantees of stabilisation could be offered by working with the new regimes rather than opposing them. Kennan also warned that the prospect of other Latin American governments recognising the new regimes would leave the US without enough support in maintaining a position on a ‘thorny and difficult issue’ that he did not consider to be of primary importance at this time.

Kennan concluded that it still remained important for the State Department to make sure this decision on recognition played well in global opinion. The US commitment to continuous recognition could not be interpreted as a departure from the shared principles of democracy as agreed at Petrópolis and Bogotá. Although he did not consider the need for a genuine commitment to democracy in the Western Hemisphere, Kennan expressed concerns for the image of the US projected into the psychological
struggle of the Cold War. In doing so he finally acknowledged the symbolic role for containment that Marshall shaped for US strategy in the Western Hemisphere.

Kennan could only offer two limited recommendations however. In the absence of a clear timetable for the resumption of diplomatic relations the State Department should allow some delay. He suggested that recognition should be accorded after an interval neither so short as to be undignified nor so long as to make a prestige issue of the recognition question. This would satisfy countries like Chile that had begun to feel that the delay had already made the point. For the progressive governments of Guatemala and Cuba that had indicated the possibility of indefinite withholding of recognition, Kennan suggested publicising language added to the notification of resumed diplomatic relations that condemned ‘the use of force as an instrument of political change [as] deplorable, inconsistent with the acknowledged ideals of American Republics and increasingly dangerous to all countries in this Hemisphere.’

The attachment of notes on the importance of democratic principles to the announcements made in early January of the recognition of new regimes did not save the State Department from fierce criticism however. The CIA warned that Latin Americans increasingly viewed the US position as a commitment not to demonstrate any leadership or engagement in the region. Dr. Alberto Rodriguez Larreta accused the State Department of ‘indifference’ towards the conditions found across Latin America. He stressed that a strong statement of support from the US would have constituted a ‘great point of leverage for the democracies against totalitarian tendencies.’ Kennan certainly could not reconcile the tensions in the approach shaped by Marshall to find a coherent strategy for preventing Communism in Latin America.
Marshall failed to translate containment into a coherent strategic approach for the Western Hemisphere. The US essentially remained an observer to the growing dynamic of revolution and reaction in the region. The commitments in the Good Neighbour Policy to principles such as non-discrimination and non-intervention did not leave the Truman administration neutral in these developments however. The price of power ensured that inaction placed the US on the side of the most dominant actors. President Truman concluded his first term with a private note that expressed his concerns that the commitment to non-intervention could find the US in the unfortunate position of supporting dictatorships across Latin America. The symbolic importance of positive representations of the US in the psychological struggle of the Cold War meant that the only action remaining for the Truman administration was to turn to the related constructions of Latin American inferiority and US exceptionalism as ideological rationale to explain developments in the region.

**Imagining Two Americas**

The upheaval across Latin America towards the end of 1948 exposed the illusion of coherence in US strategy in the Western Hemisphere. Alongside the persistence of Latin American underdevelopment, the reactionary coups prompted renewed scrutiny within Washington of the US relationship with the rest of the region. The imaginary of an organic and cohesive political space in the Western Hemisphere began to disappear as the Truman administration noted of their Latin American neighbours that ‘the basic trouble is that we really have much less in common with these people than we like to pretend.’ Any reservations towards a shared identity in the Western Hemisphere
represented an inherent tension within the Good Neighbour Policy rather than an abandonment of it however. The announcement of the Good Neighbour Policy by Franklin D. Roosevelt did not entirely remove the imaginary of “two Americas” established by Theodore Roosevelt shortly before the declaration of his Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.\textsuperscript{72} Despite the commitment to regional solidarity in his first direct address to Latin American leaders as President, Franklin D. Roosevelt still referred to ‘your Americanism and mine.’\textsuperscript{73}

The identification of Latin America as a neighbour rather than Self retained a distanced Otherness that should be manifest in an agonistic rather than antagonistic relationship.\textsuperscript{74} This agonistic relationship in the Good Neighbour Policy found its best representation in a metaphor of family. Roosevelt extended on behalf of the people of the US ‘a fraternal greeting to our sister American Republics.’\textsuperscript{75} Marshall continued to frame his rhetoric of the Good Neighbour Policy with the same fraternal and sororal terms. In his official addresses at both Petrópolis and Bogotá he promised to cooperate with sovereign and equal ‘sister republics.’\textsuperscript{76} At the heart of this discourse was the idea that the US recognised the equal potential of Latin American peoples to realise accepted shared ideals.\textsuperscript{77} In building flourishing democracies and economies the Good Neighbour Policy still identified obligations and responsibilities however.

Impatience with Latin American political immaturity at the end of the Second World War had led George H. Butler to rearticulate the family metaphor of the Good Neighbour Policy as justification for intervention to ensure ordered development in the region:

‘Children in spite of being weak and helpless as compared with adults are not permitted because of that fact to play with fire
before they start a conflagration nor are they permitted wantonly to destroy property or to abuse weaker playmates.\textsuperscript{78}

Butler argued that the principle of non-intervention had been erroneously based upon an ideal that every “sister” acted in a manner that would not undermine the welfare of the inter-American family. He insisted that history and experience had shown that some “sisters” were less mature and worse behaved than others. The identification of the US with this paternal role amongst the family of hemispheric nations required the Truman administration to discipline any further violations of “family values” as ‘an act of love, not power.’\textsuperscript{79}

Marshall renewed his commitment as a symbolic rejection of such paternalism. The persistence of Latin American underdevelopment did mean that recognition of the need for tutelage of immature Latin Americans appeared evident throughout his time as Secretary of State. A hierarchy of races that guided the tutelage of the 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries had become indefensible in the rhetoric of the Good Neighbour Policy, but such assumptions found more acceptable expression in a discourse of modernisation that identified the need for immature Latin Americans to reject their irrational and “backward” traditions in order to follow the example of the US.\textsuperscript{80} In his speech to the Rio Conference, Marshall encouraged Latin American delegates to follow the model that had ‘enabled the US to prosper.’ Although Latin America travelled the same development path, Marshall implied that “historical experience” and “maturity” bestowed responsibility on the US to lead their way.

Such paternalism appeared clearer in economic relations. An anonymous high-ranking State Department official writing in the \textit{New York Times} under the pseudonym...
“Americus” argued that Latin America ‘must bring its economic thinking into line with modern principles if it wishes to improve its living standards.’ Marshall and other State Department officials used language such as “uninformed” and “unwise” to criticise Latin American efforts to formulate their own solutions to economic problems. John J. McCloy even called for the Chilean government to ‘keep quiet for a while’ so the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development could work out something to repair the “messy” state of their economy. Although it appeared benign, such language betrayed the assumptions that US officials knew Latin American interests better than them. The efforts to shape an autonomous desarrollismo model of development that identified the dependent relationship on the US as the reason for Latin American backwardness certainly provoked impatience within Washington. The Truman administration could not accept the idea that Latin Americans could shape a better understanding of their underdevelopment. They felt that only when Latin Americans came to look upon the US as a Good Partner as well as their Good Neighbour would they benefit from a useful education in development.

These constructions of hierarchy received mixed welcomes amongst Latin American leaders. The reactionaries of the region identified an opportunity to use the metaphor of family to rationalise the absence of political liberties within their countries. In terms of political development Somoza compared Nicaragua to a baby: ‘Nobody gives a baby everything to eat right away. I’m giving ’em liberty—but in my style. If you give a baby a hot tamale, you’ll kill him.’ The new dictatorship in Peru also informed the State Department towards the end of 1948 that their immature people were ‘not yet ready for either the British or American type of democracy.’
Many progressive Latin American leaders remained eager to maintain the cooperation of the Truman administration in their development. An awareness of their failure to build a shining example in the Western Hemisphere provoked fears that the Truman administration increasingly regarded them as ‘a poor relation, troublesome, bothersome and unnecessary.’ The integration of Western Europe into the US sphere of influence only further removed assurances from being defined as Other by the US.\textsuperscript{88} Although one Truman administration official described the Marshall Plan as the ‘logical extension of the Good Neighbour Policy,’ Latin American leaders regarded the prioritisation of US commitments across the Atlantic as representative of a return to the old colonial divisions that would exclude from the same benefits of modernity enjoyed by the rest of the “Free World”.\textsuperscript{89}

The Truman administration had certainly identified Europe as the site to demonstrate the success of the US model of economic progress. As the battle to win the hearts and minds of the “Third World” with a comprehensive solution for their underdevelopment had yet to fully begin, there appeared to be less immediacy to demonstrate a similar example in the Western Hemisphere. It gradually became evident that Marshall considered his commitment to the Good Neighbour Policy to be more important for projecting a positive image of the US than building a genuine solidarity in the region. Marshall did not assert the superiority of the US over Latin America in so much as he ignored the differences within the Western Hemisphere entirely. This ‘prejudice of equality’ concealed the differences within the region by simply identifying each neighbouring Latin American country with an \textit{ego-ideal} of the exceptional US nation.\textsuperscript{90}
This projection of a particular identity onto the rest of the region actually remained central to the functioning of US exceptionalism. The absence of a collective historical memory in the founding of the US created the need to prioritise spatial over temporal conceptions of exceptionalism. The limited territories of the US at that point meant that both the spatial and temporal concepts of a “land of liberty” guaranteed by Divine Providence and Manifest Destiny appeared better aligned in the construct of a New World of the Americas. The reduction of Latin American “Otherness” to an American “Sameness” in this prejudice of equality meant that Marshall would always struggle to identify neighbours as truly equal without seeing them as identical or as different without seeing them as inferior however. The persistence of Latin American underdevelopment would continue to be considered a fundamental obstacle to the realisation of a universal American identity. The impact of the reactionary coups in Latin America on the psychological struggle of the Cold War meant that they would need to be rationalised as the enduring fate of “backward” countries in the periphery rather than the inevitable result of the US model of development.

Latin American leaders would not be so ready to identify themselves as the inferior Other in a construction of two Americas however. In fact they increasingly identified the US as the fundamental obstacle to building an exceptional Western Hemisphere. Since the declaration of Nuestra America by José Martí there had always been a feeling that the US remained less faithful to the ideals of the New World. One State Department official noted the enduring Latin American criticism of the prevalence of consumerism and the pursuit of materialism in US culture that betrayed their conception of the importance of spirit in universal American ideals.
The complex dynamics of identity in the Western Hemisphere suggest that these divergent constructions of material and spirit should be considered representative less of an imaginary of two Americas than being locked in a dialectical understanding of a universal America. Their own historical experience had led Latin American leaders to construct a different interpretation of American exceptionalism. Latin American resistance to the US and its model of development should be considered less as anti-Americanism than an alternative definition of Americanism. The dual signification of America as both nation and continent ensured that it stood for the Part as well as the Whole. As such it became synonymous to other universal truths such as freedom and liberty. Marshall sought to use the particular space of “America” the hemisphere to project the universality of “America” the nation. The complex constructions of this American Self made it impossible to fix a ‘sure sense of identity’ required to define clear strategic objectives. The inherent emptiness of this identity prevented Marshall from monopolising an understanding of the master signifier of America from its security to its development. America remained a site of hegemonic struggle for the numerous domestic and Latin American leaders attempting to ‘have a hand in cooking the stew.’ This complex struggle ultimately ensured the incoherence of US strategy in the Western Hemisphere.
Notes for Chapter 10

1 831.00/11-2248, Department of State, “Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of North and West Coast Affairs to the Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs,” 22.11.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX); Central Intelligence Agency, “CIA Director Hillenkoetter discusses unrest in Latin America: military seizes power 10/30/48 in Peru; military seizes power in Venezuela 11/24/48; discontent in Ecuador may lead to military takeover,” 08.12.1948 (DDRS)


4 816.00/12-1648, Department of State, “The Chargé in El Salvador to the Secretary of State,” 16.12.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)

5 835.00/10-148, Department of State, “The Chargé in Argentina to the Secretary of State,” 01.10.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX); 835.00/10-1148, Department of State, “Memorandum by Mr. Henry Dearborn of the Division of River Plate Affairs,” 11.10.1948 (FRUS 1948 Volume IX)

6 823.00/11-348: Telegram, The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Paraguay (FRUS 1948 Volume IX)

7 823.01/10-3148: Telegram, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Peru to the Secretary of State,” 31.10.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)

8 823.01/11-1248: Circular Telegram, Department of State, “The Acting Secretary of State to Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics,” 12.11.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)

9 831.01/12-1648: Circular Airgram, Department of State, “The Acting Secretary of State to Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics,” 16.12.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)

10 831.001 Gallegos, Romulo/12-648, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Chile to the Secretary of State,” 06.12.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)

11 Time, 27.12.1948

The US Embassy in Managua had proposed at the end of the war that the US' commitment to the ideals of democracy and freedom could be demonstrated by keeping Somoza from power. As Assistant Secretary, Braden had not sanctioned any US intervention, but he had informed Somoza that warmer relations would be extended with a democratic government. This did not stop Somoza, shortly before Braden's departure, from leading a successful coup d'état in Nicaragua to overthrow Leonardo Argüello Barreto. Argüello had been installed by Somoza, but had quickly demonstrated that he would not act as the puppet that had been anticipated. Somoza certainly felt that his authoritarianism was tutelage, rather than tyranny. 'These little countries are like little children,' he suggested. 'When a boy's sick you've got to force castor oil down him whether he likes it or not. After he's been to the toilet a few times he'll be all right.' See Time, 10.02.1947. To replace Argüello, Somoza appointed his wife's uncle, Benjamin Lacayo Sacasa, as interim leader. In his final days in office, Braden set a precedent for the administration by giving instructions to continue dealing with the Argüello

13 Marshall instructed the US Embassy in La Paz to discuss the imitative of the Bolivian government to withhold recognition of the new Nicaraguan regime. He wanted a consensus of the American Republics on non-recognition to be recorded regardless of the subsequent action taken. See 817.00/7-1147, Department of State, "The Department of State to the Bolivian Embassy," 07.07.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)

14 The Governing Board of the Pan American Union voted 13-5 not to invite Nicaragua to the Rio Conference. Whilst the Governing Board of the Pan American Union had to make this decision, it did not want to make a unilateral decision so it asked the governments of the American Republics to consider their views before the vote. Marshall declared that the US position was that Nicaragua had the right to be represented, but as there was no proper government to fulfil this responsibility this should not be allowed. Marshall explained that the deposed Argüello regime did not hold sovereignty and the Lacayo government was not recognised by most Latin American Republics. But the US would only act with the majority. See 710 Consultation 4-/7-2447, Department of State, 'The Secretary of State to the Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics,"24.07.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII). This was a different result from the earlier Chapultepec Conference, when the Inter-American Emergency Advisory Committee recognised Salvador Castañeda Castro as President of El Salvador, despite not satisfying the criteria of popular support. 710 Conference W and PW/2-845, Department of State, 'Memorandum Supplementary to Memorandum No. 4 by Mr. William Sanders, a Technical Officer of the Delegation,"09.02.1945 (FRUS 1945, Volume IX)

For Nelson Rockefeller’s prioritisation of hemispheric solidarity over democratic principles at Chapultepec, see also Leonard, Thomas, *Central America and the United States: The Search for Stability* (London: The University of Georgia Press, 1991) p. 122

15 The US Chargé in Nicaragua, Maurice Bernbaum, described Somoza’s preoccupation with gaining the formal recognition of the other American Republics at the Conference, particularly that of the US Without the legitimacy of recognition, the regime would be ineligible for different forms of support and would face increased domestic opposition. Bernbaum expressed Somoza’s hope that it would be granted as a reward for including cooperative clauses on anti-Communism and the sharing of military bases in a new Constitution. Somoza also convened the national Constituent Assembly to appoint a new permanent President. The selection of another uncle of Somoza, Víctor Manuel Román y Reyes, soon showed however, that the dictator was not yet willing to relinquish his grip on Nicaraguan government. See 817.00/8-747: Airgram, Department of State, “The Chargé in Nicaragua to the Secretary of State,” 07.08.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)

16 817.01/8-2447, Department of State, "Memorandum of Conversation, by Assistant Secretary of State Armour, Political Adviser, United States Delegation, Rio de Janeiro Conference," 24.08.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)

17 817.01/8-2147: Airgram, Department of State, “The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Nicaragua,” 21.08.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)

18 817.01/12-3147: Circular Airgram, Department of State, “The Acting Secretary of State to Diplomatic Representatives Except Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua,” 31.12.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)

19 817.00/10-647, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Central America and Panama Affairs,” 06.10.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume
The Mexican Foreign Secretary, Genaro Estrada, declared in 1930: 'The government of Mexico restricts itself to keep or retire, when considered appropriate, its diplomatic agents and to continue accepting, when considered appropriate as well, similar diplomatic agents whose respective nations have accredited in Mexico, without qualifying, neither hastily nor a posteriori, the right that nations have to accept, keep or replace their governments or authorities.'


Welles complained that 'there seems no longer to be any general regard for the moral values upon which the doctrine of non-intervention has been based.' He suggested that the use of non-recognition specifically went against the Good Neighbour Policy. 'Intervention,' he argued, was becoming synonymous with 'non-intervention.' He concluded that, 'until the American people realize that the principles of democracy consecrated within their own Constitution, which grant to each citizen the fullest measure of individual liberty compatible with the welfare of the majority of his fellows, are equally essential to a democratic international order, we will continue to witness a disintegration of the moral standards on which international law are founded.' See Welles, Sumner, "Intervention and Interventions," Foreign Affairs (Volume 26, No. 1, October 1947) p. 133
30 822.01/8-2847: Circular Telegram, Department of State, “Acting Secretary of State to the Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics,” 28.08.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII). The Ecuadorian military was one of the few in Latin America that had leftist sentiments and was not willing to accept Velasco’s recent swing to the right. Despite Mancheno’s declaration that there would be no conservatives in the government, the US Ambassador to Ecuador, John F. Simmons, informed Marshall that he believed Mancheno to be more pro-US than Velasco and would have no dealings with the Communists. See Time, 01.09.1947 and 711.32/8-1847: Telegram, Department of State, “Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Brazil,” 25.08.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII). In recommending that the establishment of de facto government should not affect normal diplomatic relations, Arosemena effectively reversed the Ecuadoran position established in 1907 by the Foreign Minister of the time, Dr. Carlos Tobar – commonly referred to as the Tobar Doctrine - that recognition should be refused to regimes established by unconstitutional force.

31 822.01/8-2847: Circular Telegram, Department of State, “Acting Secretary of State to the Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics,” 28.08.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII). The Ecuadorian military was one of the few in Latin America that had leftist sentiments and was not willing to accept Velasco’s recent swing to the right. Despite Mancheno’s declaration that there would be no conservatives in the government, the US Ambassador to Ecuador, John F. Simmons, informed Marshall that he believed Mancheno to be more pro-US than Velasco and would have no dealings with the Communists. See Time, 01.09.1947 and 711.32/8-1847: Telegram, Department of State, “Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Brazil,” 25.08.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII). When Mancheno himself was removed only 10 days after assuming office, Velasco’s Vice-President, Mariano Suárez Veintemilla, assumed temporary control of the country. Marshall again decided that the best course was to wait before making a decision on diplomatic recognition. See 822.01/9-747: Telegram, Department of State, “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Ecuador,” 08.09.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII). Suárez stood down a few days later, signalling the return of constitutionality and allowing Carlos Julio Arosemena Tola to be elected President. See 822.01/9-1847: Telegram, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Ecuador to the Secretary of State,” 18.09.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII). The State Department then formally recognised the constitutional regime of Arosemena. See 822.01/9-1847: Telegram, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Ecuador to the Secretary of State,” 18.09.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII)

32 The equivalent State Department Policy Committee preparing for the Chapultepec Conference had already considered the benefits of supporting the Estrada Doctrine, but did not fully endorse such measures. See 710 Conference (W and PW)/1-2245, “Memorandum of Department Policy Committee Meeting Preparatory to the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace,” 12.01.1945 (FRUS 1945, Volume IX)


34 Interview with George C. Marshall, by William M. Spencer, July 7th 1947 (Marshall Foundation Library)

35 800.01/6-848, Department of State, Policy Planning Staff, “Paper Prepared by the Policy Planning Staff: PPS/24,” 15.03.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)
36 Policy Planning Staff Files, Department of State, Policy Planning Staff, “Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff to the Secretary of State and the Undersecretary of State,” 24.02.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume I, Part II)
38 817.01/3-2248: Telegram, Department of State, “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Brazil,” 24.03.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)
40 710.J/4-848: Telegram, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Colombia to the Acting Secretary of State,” 08.04.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)
41 Dozer, “Recognition in Contemporary Inter-American Relations,” p. 328
42 818.00/4-2048: Telegram, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Costa Rica to the Secretary of State,” 20.04.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)
43 818.00/4-348: Telegram, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Costa Rica to the Secretary of State,” 03.05.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)
44 871.01/4-3048: Circular Telegram, Department of State, ‘The Secretary of State to American Diplomatic Officers in the American Republics except Nicaragua,’ 30.04.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)
46 834.00/6-748, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Paraguay to the Secretary of State,” 07.06.1948, FRUS 1948, Volume IX); 834.00/6-548, Department of State, “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Paraguay,” 08.06.1948, FRUS 1948, Volume IX)
47 831.01/12-748, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation by the Acting Secretary of State,” 07.12.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)
48 A claim supported by some of the US press and the embassy in Caracas. See for example, New York Times, 27.11.1948; Schwartzberg, Steven, Democracy and U.S. Policy in Latin America during the Truman Years (Gainesville, Florida: University Press of Florida, 2003) p. 652
49 818.24/7-2048, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. William Tapley Bennett, Jr., of the Division of Central America and Panama Affairs,” 20.07.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)
50 New York Times, 23.12.1948
51 New York Times, 29.12.1948
53 810.00/12-2348, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of North and West Coast Affairs,” 23.12.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)
54 See for example, 831.01/11-2948, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation by the Acting Assistant Chief of the Division of North and West Coast Affairs,” 22.11.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX); 831.00/11-2548, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Venezuela to the Secretary of State,” 25.11.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX); 810.00/12-2348, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of North and West Coast Affairs,” 23.12.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)
Other Diplomats also informed the State Department that the new regimes would support US interests. The Ambassador in San Salvador, Albert F. Nufer, for example reported that there was no reason to believe that the new Junta would allow communist influence. 816.00/12-2248, Department of State, “The Ambassador in El Salvador to the Secretary of State,” 18.12.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX); 816.01/12-2248, Department of State, “The Ambassador in El Salvador to the Secretary of State,” 18.12.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)

831.00/11-2448, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Venezuela to the Secretary of State,” 24.11.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX); 831.01/12-1548, Department of State, “Memorandum by George H. Butler, of the Policy Planning Staff, to the Acting Secretary of State,” 15.12.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)

831.00/12-448, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Venezuela to the Secretary of State,” 04.12.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX); 816.01/12-2848, Department of State, “The Ambassador in El Salvador to the Secretary of State,” 28.12.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)

831.01/12-1548, Department of State, “Memorandum by George H. Butler, of the Policy Planning Staff, to the Acting Secretary of State,” 15.12.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)

816.00/12-1748, Department of State, “The Chargé in El Salvador to the Secretary of State,” 17.12.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)

831.01/12-2848: Circular Telegram, Department of State, “The Acting Secretary of State to Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics,” 28.12.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)

Schwartzberg, “Romulo Betancourt: From a Communist Anti-Imperialist to a Social Democrat with US Support,” p. 191

Schwartzberg, Democracy and US Policy in Latin America during the Truman Years, p. 656

Schwartzberg, “Romulo Betancourt: From a Communist Anti-Imperialist to a Social Democrat with US Support,” p. 191

*New York Times*, 03.05.1948

Three years before Theodore Roosevelt proclaimed his Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, he made his first address to Congress in December 1901, where he described his hope that the Monroe Doctrine would become ‘the cardinal feature of the foreign policy of all the nations of the two Americas.’ Quoted in Ricard, Serge, “The Roosevelt Corollary,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* (Volume 36, No. 1, March 2006).


See the distinction between agonistic and antagonistic relations in Mouffe, Chantal, *The Democratic Paradox* (London: Verso, 2000)


This “fraternal” approach that accepted Latin Americans as equals was defined by one senior regional diplomat: ‘Every Latin American people aspire to be democratic. There is no quarrel about aims. Here again the problem is one of means. The Latin Americans think they know more about that than we do, and they may be right. I would try to hold high the banner of democracy but I would not keep mouthing the word. If Latin Americans are capable of achieving democracy they will achieve it without our preachments and without our having to exert political and economic pressure on them.’ See Beaulac, Willard L, *A Diplomat Looks at Aid to Latin America* (London: Feffer and Simons, Inc., 1970) p. 126


*New York Times*, 28.03.1948

Daniels admonished Brazilian officials that opposed the inclusion of provisions for US investors in proposed new national petroleum laws as ‘uninformed.’ See 832.6363/1-2648, Department of State, “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Brazil,” 27.01.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX). Marshall also agreed with Ambassador Walter Thurston in his assessment of the economic imprudence of the Mexican government as they clung to their faith in the role of the state in the economy and rejected private enterprise.
Thurston warned Marshall that if the US did not intervene there then the Mexican Government was likely to enact “unwise” policies to place protective tariffs on domestic industry that had been proposed by the Mexican Chamber of Manufacturing Industries. See 612.003/6-1647, Department of State, “The Ambassador in Mexico to the Secretary of State,” 16.06.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII) and 611.1231/4-2347, Department of State, “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Mexico,” 19.06.1947 (FRUS 1947, Volume VIII).

83 825.51 Bondholders/1-1548, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of North and West Coast Affairs,” 15.01.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX); 825.51/2-448, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Edgar L. McGinnis, Division of North and West Coast Affairs,” 04.02.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX); New York Times, 25.01.1948

84 Time, 28.02.1949

85 See for example the Brazilian Foreign Minister, Raúl Fernandes in Time, 04.08.1947

86 Time, 15.11.1948

87 810.00/12-2348, Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of North and West Coast Affairs,” 23.12.1948 (FRUS 1948, Volume IX)

88 See this process of Othering in Der Derian, James, On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991) p. 41

89 Discussions at the Council on Foreign Relations had already provoked the suggestion that the US actually remained closer to Europe than Latin American neighbours. See Feuerlein, Willy and Elizabeth Hannan, Dollars in Latin America: An Old Problem in a New Setting, Studies in American Foreign Relations, No. 1 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1941) p. V. Such discussions were not new however. Even before entry into the war, the constructions of racial hierarchies led many members to suggest that the US shared more with Europe. See for example, Minutes of the 1st Meeting of the Study Group on the Defense of the Western Hemisphere, 09.11.1939, Council on Foreign Relations Records, Fiche 84

90 For more on the prejudice of equality see Todorov, Tsvetan, The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other (London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999) p. 165. See also Kenworthy, America/Americas, p. 35; Campbell, Writing Security, p. 103


93 Thomas Jefferson had suggested that the United States would need to be ‘the nest from which all America, North and South is to be peopled.’ Quoted in Lind, Michael, The American Way of Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) p. 62 John Quincy Adams had similarly rejected the promotion of Latin American Republics ‘as absurd as similar plans would be to establish democracies among the birds, beasts and fishes.’ Lind, The American Way of Strategy, p. 38


95 Thomas C. Mann spoke of Latin American criticism that the most important thing in the US was how big your house was and whether it had plumbing and sanitation. See
Oral history interview with Thomas C. Mann, by Richard D. McKinzie, 12.06.1974 (Truman Library). Another State Department official had noted in the Council on Foreign Relations’ pre-war Study Group on Latin American Policy that Latin Americans thought that the US had no culture. See One State Department official noted in the Council on Foreign Relations’ pre-war Study Group on Latin American Policy that Latin Americans thought that the US had no culture.

96 Hegel had even recognised the significance of this complex relationship over a century before in his Philosophy of History: ‘America is therefore the land of the future, where, in the ages that lie before us, the burden of the World's History shall reveal itself – perhaps in a contest between North and South America. It is a land of desire for all those who are weary of the historical lumber-room of old Europe.’ See Hegel, Georg W. F., Philosophy of History (New York: Barnes and Noble, 2004) p. 95


100 Oral history interview with Merwin L. Bohan, by Richard D. McKinzie, 15.06.1974 (Truman Library)
CONCLUSIONS
A difficult recovery from a kidney operation in December 1948 eventually forced Marshall to leave the Truman administration before it began its second term in January 1949. The President announced the resignation with only praise for the important role played by his ‘indispensable’ Secretary of State. Marshall had successfully contained the Soviet Union in Western Europe. Truman insisted that the appointment of Dean G. Acheson would not signal a shift from this successful strategy. The tenure of Marshall had not been a complete triumph however. He left behind him a rising tide of revolution in the Western Hemisphere for Acheson to deal with.

A lack of coherence defined Marshall’s strategic approach in the Western Hemisphere. The key to understanding this incoherence is a tension between the particular and the universal inherent to the strategy of global containment. Kennan neglected Latin America as he focused resources and attention on ensuring the success of a particular demonstration in Western Europe of the universal appeal of US leadership and the American way of life. Marshall agreed with the prioritisation of Western Europe in the psychological struggle with the Soviet Union and did not see the need to bring the Cold War to the Western Hemisphere. But he did identify a vital role for the region as a particular space for another symbolic example to be projected into the Cold War. Marshall aimed to demonstrate the global credibility of the US as a Good Neighbour through the context of relations with Latin America.
A neglect of problems specific to the region ensured the failure of this symbolic demonstration of the Good Neighbour Policy in the Western Hemisphere. Marshall attempted to explain the persistence of Latin American underdevelopment and preserve the imaginary of a shining example of solidarity in the Americas with representations of exceptionalism and the danger of Communism. The reactionary coups at the end of 1948 ultimately forced the Truman administration to find another ideological rationalisation that would prevent blame falling on their strategic approach.

The identification of Latin American inferiority in a construction of “two Americas” not only protected the credibility of the image of the US as a Good Neighbour but also provided justification for considering the region only as a source of vital resources necessary for the success of symbolic examples in other theatres. The absence of a coherent strategic approach however, ensured ongoing struggle within the Truman administration on the most effective approach to pursue even this strategic objective. The strategic solution formulated by Marshall essentially failed to address, and even contributed to, the tide of revolution creating small currents across Latin America. This tide continued to rise after the departure of Marshall to destabilise the region to an extent that not only endangered US access to vital strategic resources, but also threatened to represent a symbolic defeat in the psychological struggle of the Cold War.

**Reconstructing the Good Neighbour Policy**

Standard narratives of US relations with Latin America discern the dismantling of the Good Neighbour Policy in the aftermath of the Second World War. A fresh insight into US relations with Latin America during the Truman administration reveals that Marshall reconstructed rather than abandoned the Good Neighbour Policy. The
marginalisation of Spruille Braden shortly after his appointment as Secretary of State made it easier for Marshall to renew the commitment of the US to the Good Neighbour Policy. Perhaps more important remained the fact that the indeterminate meanings of principles in the Good Neighbour Policy could be reframed by Marshall in terms of a global strategy of containment. The reflection of the established traditions and narratives of the Good Neighbour Policy made it appear as if the strategic approach shaped by Marshall had remained necessary all along.

This rearticulation of the Good Neighbour Policy into an interpretation of containment in Latin America also ensured its continuation after the departure of Marshall. In his first major address on hemispheric relations as Secretary of State, Acheson informed a meeting of the Pan-American Society in September 1949 of his intention to continue the inter-American cooperation needed for ‘waging peace in the Americas.’² The State Department hailed the speech as the most complete restatement of the Good Neighbour Policy under the Truman administration.³ Acheson recognised the need to rebuild bridges between the US and Latin America. Despite his reputation Marshall had failed to persuade regional leaders of the sincerity of his commitment to inter-American cooperation. The decision not to replace Braden had removed a vital link for Latin American leaders to the Truman administration and signalled to them a disregard for expertise on specific regional problems. In his appointment of Edward G. Miller Jr. to fill the long vacant regional post, renamed as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Acheson hoped to send a clear message that Latin America would no longer be neglected. Miller received warm welcome as he embarked upon a tour of each Latin American nation.
Acheson and Miller acknowledged the limitations of the renewed commitment to the Good Neighbour Policy however. Marshall had failed to restore the solidarity of the Western Hemisphere. Although the persistence of dictatorships and the reversal of earlier democratic advances towards the end of 1948 did not represent a deliberate attempt to obstruct Latin American development, Marshall showed unable to address the rising tide of expectations across the region for political and economic progress. He failed to reconcile central tenets of the Good Neighbour Policy, such as non-discrimination and non-intervention, to Latin American demands. The lack of effective strategic instruments to direct social transformation left a vacuum in inter-American relations to be filled with anti-Americanism or alternative models of development.

Acheson sought to reconcile these inherent tensions with a more coherent conceptualisation of the Good Neighbour Policy. He gave instructions in early 1950 to Louis J. Halle of the Policy Planning Staff to prepare an article that would complement Kennan’s X article with a coherent outline of an approach towards Latin America. Halle published “On a Certain Impatience with Latin America” in *Foreign Affairs* under the pseudonym “Y”. The difficulty of the task that Marshall had faced in interpreting containment became clear in the failure of Halle to identify a more coherent approach to securing the success of a symbolic example in the Western Hemisphere. A commitment to the Good Neighbour Policy left the Truman administration all but a spectator to the conservative reaction across the region. Halle focused instead on providing an explanation for the persistence of Latin American underdevelopment that protected the image of the US as a Good Neighbour.
On a Certain Impatience with Latin American Underdevelopment

Marshall did not deliberately neglect the development of Latin America. Rather he failed to reconcile the Good Neighbour Policy to the rising tide of expectations across the region. Left with a choice Marshall considered it more important to project a positive image of the US as a Good Neighbour that respected the sovereignty of Latin American states than intervening to advance democracy. He also prioritised the successful demonstration of economic development in Western Europe that denied resources for a similar example in the Western Hemisphere. Marshall relied on concealing the inequalities across the region with a prejudice of equality that identified Latin American neighbours to an exceptional ideal of development within the US sphere of influence. The reactionary coups of late 1948 represented a regression in Latin American development that demanded a new ideological rationalisation however.

Halle identified certain impatience within the US with Latin American underdevelopment that brought the fraternal relationship of the Good Neighbour Policy into question. He noted that even public opinion in the US had reacted to the coups ‘in the manner of a stern father in the privacy of his home after his children have publicly embarrassed him.’ Assumptions of Latin American inferiority pervaded much of the Truman administration. Acheson attributed the underdevelopment of Latin America simply to the ‘Hispano-Indian culture – or lack of it.’ Kennan came to similar conclusions after a tour of the region. He had finally decided to prepare a review of strategy in the region after coming to realise that if the US lost the Cold War struggle in Western Europe then ‘Latin America would be all [the US] would have to fall back on.’ Kennan acknowledged that ‘we are only gradually becoming conscious of irrelevance of our national experience to contemporary problems of other peoples.’ But his lack of
understanding of the specific problems faced in Latin America left him to depend upon simple schemata of racial categorisations for meanings of 'the tragic nature of human civilisation' in Latin America.⁹ In the report of his tour Kennan suggested that the colonial wound passed on through the indigenous peoples and the importation of black slaves hindered Latin American progress.¹⁰

Kennan regarded Latin American inferiority as significant in translating containment into the context of the Western Hemisphere. He had already warned that Communism exercised a fatal fascination over emotional and irrational Latin minds. Anglo-Saxon peoples had become ‘experienced in the practices of representative government’ and developed a ‘greater political maturity as well as a certain sobriety of social thought.’ The Latin people however, stood before Communism ‘like the bird before the cobra, seized with dread foreboding, yet unable to detach its eye or remove itself from the advance.’¹¹ Kennan considered a paternal relationship with Latin America as necessary to protect ‘our raw materials’ in the region.¹²

This blunt rejection of the traditions of the Good Neighbour Policy came as a great shock to many within the State Department. Marshall had institutionalised a commitment to fraternal relations with Latin America that ultimately led Miller to prevent the distribution of Kennan’s recommendations.¹³ The failure to address the rising tide of expectations across Latin America ultimately revealed the rhetoric of fraternal cooperation as empty however. The assumption that the rest of the region needed to follow US leadership along a historical path towards progress had been inherent in the approach pursued by Marshall. He acknowledged the benefits of inter-American
cooperation only to the extent of a shared understanding of political and economic development along the general guidelines outlined by the US.

The Truman administration maintained its commitment to the Good Neighbour Policy that incorporated these teleological assumptions of development. Halle warned against any replacement in the future of expressions of what “we” must do to realise a common purpose with demands for what “you” must do to live up to “our” ideals. He regarded the coups only as a setback in an otherwise steady progress towards political and economic maturity in Latin America. Halle noted that Latin American neighbours had not gained their independence after coming of age like the US. The origins of political and economic freedoms in the US bestowed upon it a ‘special position’ as a ‘first among equals’ within the region. Halle recommended a continuation of the approach pursued by Marshall that encouraged Latin American governments to follow the US example but remain cautious of any deviations that endangered their vital interests.

**Fighting for Freedom in the Western Hemisphere**

The Y article did not represent an attitude within the Truman administration that the Cold War had arrived in the Western Hemisphere. It did provide rationale for reconsidering the Latin American role in the Cold War however. Kennan had certainly identified a peripheral role for Latin America in his original formulations of containment. The escalation of hostilities in the Cold War and the failure to maintain an exceptional model of solidarity eventually led Marshall to identify the Western Hemisphere more with its traditional function as a source of strategic materials. To trace the path from the original conception outlined in the X article to its translation
Marshall was presented with a number of different approaches to the pursuit of interests in the Western Hemisphere. He ensured some convergence within the Truman administration after shifting the State Department position on the security agenda of the armed services. But his reputation and authoritative leadership only created an illusion of coherence that concealed bureaucratic tensions continuing to simmer below the surface appearance of consensus. An understanding of a strategy of containment in the Western Hemisphere requires a rejection of the exogenisation of the national interest as a necessary response to the threat of the Cold War. State Department officials had not disciplined themselves to the pursuit of self-evident interests. Rather they articulated for Marshall an entirely different construction of the Western Hemisphere and the role of the US within it.

These differences resurfaced without Marshall at the helm. Miller noted significant disagreements between the State and Defense Departments as they worked together as they considered how to secure access to strategic raw materials in Latin America for a war effort in Korea.\textsuperscript{15} The Defense Department continued to identify their priority in the region as inter-American military cooperation.\textsuperscript{16} They regarded a program of arms sales, provided for in the Military Defense Assistance Act and NSC-56/2, to be the most suitable approach to securing the cooperation of Latin American militaries in safeguarding US interests.\textsuperscript{17} Marshall had not stamped out the opposition to inter-American military cooperation that had been institutionalised within the State Department however. The new Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs, John
C. Dreier, wrote a memorandum for Miller restating his earlier warnings that military assistance conflicted with the objectives of Latin American political and economic development pursued by the State Department.¹⁸

The marginalisation of Braden had made it easier for Marshall to cooperate with his military colleagues on regional security. The appointment of Miller to fill his post made a noticeable difference for the representation of State Department positions on inter-American relations. Miller recommended that Acheson defend the political and economic objectives of the State Department from the focus on militarisation in the Defense Department.¹⁹ He also sought the support of the Policy Planning Staff against efforts to force an unaffordable program of militarisation on Latin American neighbours.²⁰ To stabilise the region Miller still considered it necessary to address Latin American political and economic aspirations: ‘Nowhere in the world is “the revolution of rising expectations” more in evidence that in Latin America and our own actions are directly responsible for this.’

Marshall acknowledged that the redirection of limited resources for the economic reconstruction of Western Europe reduced prospects for obtaining necessary funds to assist development in the Western Hemisphere. The escalation of hostilities in the Cold War made the cooperation of Latin America in securing US interests more important; yet it also made appropriations for regional assistance programs a lower priority. The appointment of Paul H. Nitze to replace Kennan as the Director of the Policy Planning Staff signalled a shift away from this prioritisation of strategic strongpoints however.²¹ The NSC-68 memorandum indicated a move towards a strategic perimeter approach of containment wherever threats appeared:
‘The assault on free institutions is world wide now, and in the context of the present polarization of power a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere.’

This perimeter approach did not rule out the prioritisation of symbolic examples however. The importance of Western Europe to the psychological struggle of the Cold War had simply shifted to a new danger in Korea. After the symbolic defeats in the losses of China and the atomic monopoly, Acheson had considered it necessary to ‘think of Korea as a world matter.’

Miller complained to Nitze that the detailed focus on each area in NSC-68 failed to give sufficient importance to the Western Hemisphere. Although he acknowledged that overstretched resources still made it difficult to provide direct assistance for Latin American development, Miller warned that the neglect of Latin America would have an adverse impact on inter-American relations. He considered economic cooperation necessary to ‘offset deteriorating relations with Latin America because of other programs elsewhere in the world.’

Marshall had failed to close the gap between means and ends that would enable the integration of approaches to specific regions into a coherent strategy of global containment. The difficulty of this task became evident after Miller turned to Halle for recommendations on integrating an approach to the Western Hemisphere into the global strategy outlined in NSC-68. Halle acknowledged that the strategic objectives in NSC-68 of strengthening the Free World from the Kremlin design needed to be ‘interpreted in terms of the special features that characterize the American states as a regional community sharing the hemisphere, and the special relations that the US
Marshall did not bring the Cold War into the Western Hemisphere. Rather he focused on using the US position in the region to project the Western Hemisphere into the Cold War confrontation in Western Europe. Halle similarly recognised a need to use the inter-American system as an instrument to encourage Latin American support for the US in the cause of saving freedom around the world. He recommended convening a meeting of Foreign Ministers to ‘adopt the principle that the defense of the hemisphere is not to be achieved only along its beaches but by political, economic, and psychological action overseas.’ Halle considered it important to reassure Latin American leaders of participation with the US in the ‘war for all men’s minds.’

Marshall had failed to win Latin American hearts and minds however. Halle recommended a ‘more direct, aggressive approach’ to countering Communist propaganda that exacerbated the deterioration in US relations with Latin America and called for active measures to spread pro-American sentiment across the region:

‘Men live and die for ideas. If we wish the people of Latin America to assimilate the concept of a hemisphere coalition, we must make it real to them by translating it into the terms of a coalition of the peoples.’

Halle acknowledged, like Marshall before him, that the persistence of social unrest made engagement with the Latin American economic agenda the most important action.
Halle identified the neglect of Latin American economic development as the biggest failure of the strategy shaped by Marshall. The Western Hemisphere remained the only major area without a full program of assistance for economic development. Miller could see no alternative however. The assumption of more duties in other parts of the world meant that the Good Neighbour Policy no longer remained the sole program of the US.²⁶ A limitation of resources meant that the Truman administration would need to continue to demonstrate its commitment to Latin American development through the same means pursued by Marshall. The Point IV programs of technical assistance that the President announced in his inaugural address expanded the limited programs previously pursued by Marshall through the Institute of Inter-American Affairs.²⁷ The Truman administration would also continue to depend upon promoting measures of self-reliance and private enterprise for the development of vital strategic resources. Miller and Halle had no more resources available to them than Marshall. As a result they also depended upon persuading Latin American leaders to pursue their development agenda by following the example of the US.

The incoherence caused by the failure to reconcile the complex tension between the universal and particular ultimately ensured the difficulty in integrating the Western Hemisphere into a coherent global strategic approach. Marshall confronted strategic drift on his arrival at the State Department as Braden failed to convince the rest of Washington that democratic idealism represented the best approach towards Latin America. A similar failure to find a general consensus on the renewed commitment to the Good Neighbour Policy made by Marshall and his successors became clear in late 1950 as Halle provided Miller with a ‘post-mortem’ of a meeting with the Policy Planning Staff.²⁸ He informed the Assistant Secretary that most of the members of the
PPS admitted not reading the paper they had drafted on the role of Latin America in global strategy. The entire staff had also forgotten their agreement to lead the project with the cooperation of the Office of American Republic Affairs and instead simply used the paper prepared by Halle.

Despite the apologies offered by the PPS, Halle did not consider it worthwhile to recommend a reassessment of the paper. He warned Miller that the PPS was 'so busy catching fast ones that it is not in as good a position as the operational bureaus to think in terms of long range policy.' A continued neglect for the importance of Latin America was evident in the recommendation of one member of the PPS that the administration simply retain a budget without a defined strategic approach towards the Western Hemisphere. Halle highlighted the 'complete frivolity' of the meeting in his remarks that the high-point occurred 'when almost the entire staff rushed to the window to see some fire engines.' The lack of any further consideration in the following year meant a strategic approach towards the Western Hemisphere once again began to drift.

**Legacy of the First Global Strategist**

Marshall made a significant impact on US strategy after his appointment as Secretary of State. The importance of this contribution led Truman to turn to him in late 1950 to replace Louis A. Johnson as Secretary of Defence and assume the burden of leadership once again.29 The President honoured the role that Marshall played within his administration a few months later. He sent a tribute message to be read out as the Virginia Military Institute Corps of Cadets honoured Marshall at the 50th reunion of his graduating class with the dedication of an entrance arch:
‘Once again our nation looks to him for leadership and guidance in the struggle between free men and those who would snuff out freedom.... I consider it a high privilege to pay me personal respects and my humble tribute to a truly great American, George Catlett Marshall – an inspirational leader who deserves the thanks and appreciation of all America and the nations of the free world for his life of unselfish dedication to the best interests of humanity.’

Although Marshall should certainly be remembered as a Servant of the Nation and his inspirational leadership perhaps merits the label of Saviour of Europe, Truman showed all too willing to overlook the failings of Marshall and build a legacy.

The myth surrounding Marshall appeared evident in the statements made by Bernard Baruch, who was also in attendance at the VMI ceremony. The elder statesman hailed Marshall as the author of a global strategy that saved the Free World once and could save it again. He referred to Marshall as ‘history's first global strategist.’ Baruch highlighted the specific attributes that made Marshall stand out as a strategist:

‘A great leader of troops naturally is zealous when his men become locked in battle, that every resource be marshalled which might increase the chance of their winning or of decreasing their losses. The very qualities which made him so valiant a leader of troops would make him impatient of any limitations of his action. But the organiser has to think not only of the man fighting on the one front but of all the fronts of war and defense. He must weigh
each theatre and its relative importance upon the scales of globe flung strategy.’

The lessons learned in the Korean experience clearly influenced Baruch. But Marshall had certainly demonstrated such traits beforehand. ‘We must not jeopardise our sound overall strategy to exploit local success in a generally accepted secondary theatre,’ he had insisted during wartime planning in 1943.31

Such an interpretation of global strategy neglects the complex relationship between primary and secondary theatres of action however. The initial strategic successes that Marshall managed in Western Europe were mitigated by the failures in the Western Hemisphere. The incoherent integration of particular approaches belies his reputation as a global strategist. Marshall rarely demonstrated an understanding of the strategic context specific to Latin America. His projection of US exceptionalism onto the Western Hemisphere only created an illusion of coherence. Marshall ultimately set a course for US strategy in the Western Hemisphere that failed to deal with the rising tide of expectations across Latin America.32 He left the Truman administration drifting towards a rising tide of revolution.

An understanding of the failings of the incoherent strategic approach shaped by Marshall has implications for studies of subsequent relations between the US and Latin America. The administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower had to deal with the rising tide of revolution left unaddressed by Marshall. A National Intelligence Estimate warned Eisenhower that the autonomous development pursued by the Guatemalan government of Jacobo Árbenz threatened to set a dangerous precedent for the rest of the region.33 The National Security Council expressed further fears that Guatemala represented the
leading example of Communist penetration in the American Republics.”34 Even if not under Communist control, Halle cautioned that any success of the Guatemalan government to demonstrate an alternative model of development that appealed to neighbouring governments would damage the prestige of the US in its own “backyard”.35

Eisenhower acknowledged the significance of the symbolic: ‘The only solution to a lack of credibility was more credibility; the only sense to a lack of commitment, yet more commitment.’36 Yet his Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Henry F. Holland, feared that the commitment to non-intervention at the Bogotá Conference would obstruct the US in defending the credibility of its sphere of influence. The Western Hemisphere, he complained, was ‘the only area in the world that the US has formally renounced the right to take unilateral measures against Communism.’37 Halle warned against unilateral intervention that would be perceived around the world as an act of single-mindedness and lawlessness.38 As the Eisenhower administration recognised the need to maintain, at least the pretence of, the image of a Good Neighbour they developed covert plans rather than openly violating the principle of non-intervention. Although the backlash across the region from the overthrow of Árbenz left Halle to warn that in repeating such actions ‘we may commit errors of historic significance,’ Eisenhower left office after authorising similar covert action against the new threat posed by the regime of Fidel Castro in Cuba.39

An interdepartmental group on Cuba established by John F. Kennedy identified a shift in the Cold War battleground from the core to the periphery.40 They feared that the Soviet Union would provide enough economic assistance to Cuba to demonstrate an effective
example of the Communist model of development to appeal to neighbouring Latin American governments. A Task Force on Immediate Latin American Problems had already expressed concerns about Soviet designs to guide rising discontent with poor standards of living towards support for Communism. They further warned that ‘the United States has stated no clear philosophy of its own, and has no effective machinery to disseminate such a philosophy.’ The Eisenhower administration had not remedied the failure of Marshall to present Latin America with an appealing model of development. Eisenhower’s Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, even acknowledged that economic dependency undermined the formal commitment to treat Latin Americans as political equals. At the same time he had expressed feared that the US remained ‘hopelessly far behind the Soviets in developing controls over the minds and emotions of unsophisticated peoples.’

A former architect of the Good Neighbour Policy, Adolf A. Berle Jr, advised Kennedy of the new symbolic significance of US strategy in the Western Hemisphere:

‘While the great Cold War could not be decisively won in the Latin America theatre, it obviously could be lost there, and that situation seemed to me and to most of the Committee very dangerous.’

Acheson had earlier warned that success in Western Europe, and then later Korea, held the key to the entire global strategy of containment. Berle now similarly warned that: ‘Either we build a true and brilliant community in the Western Hemisphere – or we go under.’
The Special Assistant to Kennedy, Arthur Schlesinger, recommended that the Cold War battle of image required the US to present itself as a transformative force in the political and economic development of Latin America. A commitment to this development in the Alliance for Progress aimed to recover Latin American cooperation and restrain the revolutionary fervour across the region. Latin American leaders warmly welcomed the engagement with their economic agenda they had long appealed for. The Alliance for Progress would never achieve the same success of the Marshall Plan however; the balance of payments in the deficit in the US prevented assistance on any similar scale.

On the one hand the New Frontiersmen of the Kennedy administration did not fully appreciate the limitations of their ability to shape the world. The bold ambitions for Latin American development would never be realised with the resources that they showed prepared to commit. On the other hand the Alliance for Progress had been exposed as more of an exercise to provide symbolic examples rather than a genuine commitment to Latin American development. The First Meeting of the Working Group on Problems of the Alliance for Progress noted that:

“There may be very real merit in concentrating efforts on a few cases which can become demonstrations of what we are able to do when we set our minds to it. Too much dispersion may lead to inconspicuous results; concentration of effort may make demonstrations possible.\textsuperscript{43}

Such limited commitments would not appeal to leaders across the region however.

Kennedy showed no less able than Marshall to address the rising tide of revolution in Latin America. Like Marshall before him he attempted instead to identify his program
with the enduring legacy of Simón Bolívar. In his famous *Carta de Jamaica* of 1815 Bolívar insisted that the peoples of the New World had awoken to their oppression at the hands of European colonialism: ‘The veil has been torn asunder. We have already seen the light and it is not our desire to be thrust back into the darkness.’ Kennedy referred back to this passage to claim that the Alliance for Progress addressed a new oppression of poverty, hunger, and social injustice.

Like Marshall before him Kennedy would not succeed in reframing the myth of Bolívar however. A Marshall Plan for the Western Hemisphere failed to materialise; Latin American leaders no longer expected the US to appear as the Good Neighbour. Few blamed Kennedy for this failure. But the growing number that identified the US as the source of their oppression had only to look to the next lines in the vision of Latin American liberation outlined by Bolívar in his *Carta de Jamaica*:

‘The chains have been broken; we have been freed, and now our enemies seek to enslave us anew. For this reason America fights desperately, and seldom has desperation failed to achieve victory.’

As Latin Americans continued their desperate fight to victory, Kennedy came to the realisation that ‘Latin America was the most dangerous area in the world.’ Although few had recognised it at the time, both the desperation and the danger had originated in Marshall’s earlier appropriation of the name America for his incoherent strategy of containment.
Notes for Conclusions

1 Herald Journal, 07.01.1949; St. Petersburg Times, 08.01.1949
3 Miller Files, Lot 53 D 26, “Unsigned Draft Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State: Briefing Material for Secretary,” 04.01.1950 (FRUS 1950, Volume II)
4 611.20/8-750, “Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs to the Secretary of State,” 07.08.1950 (FRUS 1950, Volume II)
7 Immerman, Richard H., The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982) p. 8
8 Memorandum by the Department of State to the Secretary of State, PPS Papers, NND 811016, RG59, Lot 64 D 563, Box 8 (Washington) January 6, 1950
9 On the Soviet Union, Kennan had earlier noted that for the American people, ‘there is nothing as dangerous or terrifying as the unknown.’ Quoted in Johnson, Robert H., Improbable Dangers: US Conceptions of Threat in the Cold War and After (London: Macmillan Press, 1984) p. 12. His own ignorance of Latin America would have been equally terrifying and he used racial categorisation as a simple explanatory model for the unknown.
10 PPS Files, Lot 64 D 563, “Memorandum by the Counselor of the Department to the Secretary of State,” 29.03.1950 (FRUS 1950, Volume II)
11 Taken from a speech in February 1947. Quoted in Stephanson, Anders, Kennan and the Art of Foreign Policy (London: Harvard University Press, 1989) p. 86
15 710.5/5-1750, “Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs to the Secretary of State,” 17.05.1950 (FRUS 1950, Volume I)
16 8/8-NSC Files: Lot 68D351: NSC 56 Series, “Memorandum by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council,” 31.08.1949 (FRUS 1950, Volume I)
17 8/8-NSC Files: Lot 68D351: NSC 56 Series, “Memorandum by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council,” 31.08.1949 (FRUS 1950, Volume I)
18 710.5/2-720, “Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Regional American Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs,” 07.02.1950 (FRUS 1950, Volume I)
19 710.5/5-1750, “Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs to the Secretary of State,” 17.05.1950 (FRUS 1950, Volume I)
20 710.5/9-250, “Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff,” 26.09.1950 (FRUS 1950, Volume I). The Policy Planning Staff had already criticised attempts in NSC-56/2 to focus on hemispheric defence without the coordination and approval of the State Department.
They warned against the definition in NSC-56/2 of the Organization of American States as primarily a collective defensive agreement and suggested that securing the region would require stabilising measures principally in the political, economic, and social fields. See PPS Files: Lot 64D563: PPS 63 Series, “Paper Prepared by the Policy Planning Staff,” 20.09.1949 (FRUS 1950, Volume I)


24 710.5/9-250, “Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff,” 26.09.1950 (FRUS 1950, Volume I)


26 611.20/11-750, “Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs to the Regional Planning Adviser,” 07.11.1950 (FRUS 1950, Volume II)

27 Truman also announced the Point IV Program in his inaugural address as progress for all humankind. This assumption that the US model of private enterprise represented the best path for Latin American economic development remained inherent to the principle of reciprocity in the Good Neighbour Policy. See Document 19, “Inaugural Address,” 20.01.1949, Public Papers of the Presidents. Harry S. Truman, 1949 (Washington: GPO, 1963)

28 611.20/12-2150, “Memorandum by the Regional Planning Adviser of the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs,” 21.12.1950 (FRUS 1950, Volume II)

29 Marshall encountered more resistance from Congress this time around as his appointment required an amendment to the National Security Act of 1947 in order to allow a recent military leader to head the Department of Defense. See Time, 25.09.1950

30 St. Petersburg Times, 16.05.1951


32 An insightful symbol of this incoherence is found just days after Marshall returned from the Moscow Conference to begin his review of global strategy. A state visit from the Mexican President provided Truman the occasion to declare: ‘We now are living in an age of friendship and unity in the Western Hemisphere.’ He then turned to Marshall. ‘General, if we could just get friendship and unity in the Eastern Hemisphere, we would have no more trouble.’ See Miami News, 30.04.1947

33 INR-NIE Files, National Intelligence Estimate [CIA, NSC, State Department], “NIE-84 ” 19.05.1953 (FRUS 1952-1954, Volume IV)


35 Policy Planning Staff, “Memorandum by Louis J. Halle, Jr.,” January 2 1954, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, NND 927313, RG 59, lot 65 D101, Box 79

36 Quoted in Ninkovich, Modernity and Power, p. 200
37 714.00/5-1454, Department of State, “Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs to the Secretary of State,” 14.05.1954 (FRUS 1952-1954, Volume IV)
44 Translated in Bertrand, Lewis, Selected Writings of Bolívar (New York: The Colonial Press, 1951)
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