

*The Utilisation of Euroscepticism in West
European Election Campaigns: A Multi-
dimensional Analysis*

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the question of how West European political parties use Euroscepticism in European elections during the time period of 1989-2004. In doing so it puts forward five core arguments surrounding the need for a dynamic and nuanced conceptualisation of the phenomenon; the need to deploy a multi-dimensional framework to position parties towards the component processes of European integration; that Europe does play a more important role in European elections than previously thought; that political party ideology is the strongest predictor of behaviour towards European integration in European elections; and finally that the quantitative study of party manifestos produces valid and reliable data for positioning political parties. Euroscepticism is defined as:

The sustained espousal of a critical or rejectionist argument towards one or more aspects of European integration: economic, supranational, legal, social, cultural and foreign policy forms of integration.

The research takes on an empirical strategy that demonstrates the importance of Europe in European elections by analysing issue saliency, compares the predicted positions between national and European elections to demonstrate that party behaviour is similar between national and European elections on the specific issue of Europe, before embarking on multivariate OLS regression analyses to investigate the predictive power of the several sets of independent variables. These include party families, national location, year of election, forms of integration, and existing alternative theories – including left-right position, new politics position, member of government or opposition, and the median voter position. It returns to reconsider ideology in terms of observed positions examining the patterns of behaviour by each party family, and whether there are further patterns of behaviour within the families in each accession group and between geographical core and peripheral member states.

The study finds that the European issue is the most important in European election manifestos and that parties do take similar positions of behaviour towards Europe in both national and European elections, despite the greater number of Eurosceptic parties identified in EP elections. Furthermore, it finds that ideology remains an important and strong predictive factor, but its explanatory power diminishes in the analyses towards the newer dimensions of integration (social, cultural, and foreign policy integration). However, the existing alternative theories also have little explanatory power, but positions towards the other forms of integration do have more impact, indicating that importantly there remains a protest element within the phenomenon of Euroscepticism. Overall, when returning to the issue of party ideology, it is possible to identify a significantly greater number of Eurosceptic parties using the new definition, that Euroscepticism is now found in all political party families, and that there remains a strong ideological component in the content of positions towards integration across all party families. However, ideology is a stronger influence for the left-wing parties, with those on the right being more fragmented and heterogeneous.

*To my parents, Maurice and Valerie, thank you for all your emotional, mental and financial inputs in helping me
to get this far.*

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS (INCLUDING LIST OF POLITICAL PARTIES)

ACP – African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States

ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations

Austrian FPÖ - Freedom Party

Austrian GA - Green Alternative

Austrian: KPO - Communist Party

Austrian: LF - Liberal Forum

Austrian: OVP - Peoples Party

Austrian SPÖ - Social Democratic Party

Belgian AGALEV - Flemish Ecologists

Belgian CD&V - Christian Democrats

Belgian CDH - Christian and Humanist Party

Belgian CVP - Christian Peoples Party

Belgian ECOLO - Francophone Ecologists

Belgian FDF - Francophone Democratic Front

Belgian FN - National Front

Belgian NVA - New Flemish Alliance

Belgian PRL - Francophone Liberals

Belgian PRL-FDF - Liberal Reformation-Democratic Front

Belgian PRL-FDF-MCC Alliance

Belgian PS - Francophone Socialist Party

Belgian PSC - Christian Social Party

Belgian PVV - Party of Liberty and Progress

Belgian SP - Flemish Socialist Party

Belgian VB - Flemish Block

Belgian VLD - Flemish Liberals and Democrats

Belgian VU - Peoples Union

Belgian VU-ID21 - Peoples Union-ID21

Belgian FDF-PRL Francophone Democratic Front-Francophone Liberals Alliance

CACA – Computer Aided Content Analysis

CAP – Common Agricultural Policy

CEECs – Central and East European Countries

CFSP – Common Foreign and Security Policy

CMP – Comparative Manifestos Project

Czech ODS – Civic Democrats

Danish FB - People’s Movement

Danish CD Centre Democrats

Danish DF Peoples Party

Danish: EL Red-Green Unity List

Danish FP Progress Party

Danish JB June Movement

Danish KF Conservative Peoples Party

Danish KrF Christian Peoples Party

Danish: RV Radical Party

Danish SD Social Democratic Party

Danish SF Socialist Peoples Party

Danish V Liberals

EC – European Community

ECJ – European Court of Justice

EDC – European Defence Community

EEA – European Economic Area

EEC – European Economic Community

EMP – Euromanifestos Project

EMU – Economic and Monetary Union

EP – European Parliament

EPC – European Policy Community

ESDI – European Security and Defence Initiative

ESDP – European Security and Defence Policy

EU – European Union

EU12 – The EU with twelve member states (1986 - 1995)

EU15 – The EU with fifteen member states (1995 - 2004)

EU25 – The EU with twenty-five member states (2004-2007)

EU27 – The EU with twenty-seven member states (2007-)

EuroMed – The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

Finnish SMP - Rural Party

Finnish: KD Christian Democrats

Finnish: KK National Coalition

Finnish: LKP Liberal Peoples Party

Finnish: NSP Progressives-Young Finns

Finnish: PS True Finns

Finnish: RKP-SFP Swedish Peoples Party

Finnish: SK Finnish Centre

Finnish: SKL Christian Union

Finnish: SSDP Social Democrats

Finnish: VL Green Union

Finnish: VL Left Wing Alliance

French: FN National Front

French: GE Ecology Generation

French: Greens

French: PCF Communist Party

French: PS Socialist Party

French: RPF Rally for France

French: RPR Rally for the Republic

French: RPR Rally for the Republic/UDF Union for French Democracy

French: UDF Union for French Democracy

French: UMP Union for Presidential Majority

GAL/TAN – the new politics dimension representing green, alternative, and libertarian values versus traditional and authoritarian values.

British Conservative Party

British DUP - Democratic Unionist Party

British Green Party

British Labour Party

British LDP - Liberal Democratic Party

British PC - Party for Wales

British SDLP - Social Democratic and Labour Party

British Sinn Fein

British SNP - Scottish National Party

British UKIP - UK Independence Party

British UUP - Ulster Unionist Party

German CDU - Christian Democrats

German CSU - Christian Democrats

German FDP - Free Democratic Party

German Greens-90 - Greens-Alliance 90

German PDS - Party of Democratic Socialism

German REP - The Republicans

German SPD - Social Democratic Party

Greek DIKKI - Democratic Social Movement

Greek KKE - Communist Party

Greek ND - New Democracy

Greek PASOK - Panhellenic Socialist Movement

Greek Pola - Political Spring

Greek SAP - Progressive Left Coalition

IGC – Intergovernmental Conference

IR – International Relations

Irish DLP - Democratic Left Party

Irish Fianna Fail
Irish Fine Gael
Irish Greens
Irish LP - Labour Party
Irish PD - Progressive Democrats
Irish: Sinn Fein – We Ourselves
Irish WP - Workers Party
Italian AD - Democratic Alliance
Italian AN - National Alliance
Italian Biancofiore - White Flower
Italian Casa delle Liberta - House of Freedom Coalition
Italian CCD - Christian Democratic Centre
Italian DC - Christian Democrats
Italian DE - European Democracy
Italian FdV - Green Federation
Italian FI Forza Italia - Go Italy
Italian Il Girasole Greens-Social Democrats
Italian List Di Pietro - List of Values
Italian Lista Sgarbi-Panella
Italian LN - Northern League
Italian LR - Network-Movement for Democracy
Italian Margherita – Daisy Coalition
Italian MSI-DN - Social Movement Right Nationalist
Italian NPSI - New Socialist Party
Italian PCI – Communist Party of Italy
Italian PDCI - Italian Communists
Italian PDS - Democratic Party of the Left
Italian PI - Pact for Italy
Italian PLI - Liberal Party

Italian PPI - Italian Popular Party

Italian PRI - Republican Party

Italian PSDI - Democratic Socialist Party

Italian PSI - Socialist Party

Italian RC – Newly/Re-founded Communists

Italian RI - Italian Renewal

Italian SVP - South Tyrol People's Party

Italian Ulivo - Olive Tree Coalition

Luxembourg ADR - Democracy and Pension Justice

Luxembourg GLEI-GAP - Ecological-Alternative

Luxembourg PCS-CSV - Christian Social Peoples Party

Luxembourg PD-DP - Democratic Party

Luxembourg POSL-LSAP - Socialist Workers Party

MEP – Member of the European Parliament

Mercosur – Southern Common Market (Regional Trade Agreement)

MP – Member of Parliament

MRG – Manifesto Research Group

N – number of cases

NATO – North American Treaty Organisation

NEI – New International Teams – a Christian Democrat initiative to establish a Christian Democrat International

Netherlands CDA - Christian Democratic Appeal

Netherlands CU - Christian Union

Netherlands D66 - Democrats 66

Netherlands GL - Green Left

Netherlands LN - Liveable Netherlands

Netherlands LPF - List Pim Fortuyn

Netherlands PvdA - Labour Party

Netherlands SP - Socialist Party

Netherlands VVD - Peoples Party Freedom Democracy

NPT – (Nuclear) Non-Proliferation treaty

OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

OLS – Ordinary Least Squares (a regression procedure)

Portuguese BE - Left Bloc

Portuguese CDS - Centre Social Democrats

Portuguese CDU - Unified Democratic Coalition

Portuguese PCP - Communist Party

Portuguese PSD - Social Democratic Party

Portuguese PSN - National Solidarity Party

Portuguese PSP - Socialist Party

QMV – Qualified Majority Voting

R^2 – refers to the amount of variance explained in the dependent variable during regression analyses.

SEA – Single European Act

Spanish AP, PP - Popular Party

Spanish BNG - Galician Nationalist Bloc

Spanish CC - Canarian Coalition

Spanish CDS - Centre Democrats

Spanish CIU - Convergence and Union

Spanish EA - Basque Solidarity

Spanish EH - Basque Euskal Herritarrok

Spanish ERC - Catalan Republican Left

Spanish IU - United Left

Spanish PA - Andalusian Party

Spanish PAR - Aragonese Regionalist Party

Spanish PNV - EAJ Basque Nationalist Party

Spanish PSOE - Socialist Workers Party

Swedish CP - Centre Party

Swedish FP - Liberal Peoples Party

Swedish Green Ecology Party

Swedish KdS - Christian Democratic Community Party

Swedish MSP - Moderate Coalition Party

Swedish NyD - New Democracy

Swedish SdaP - Social Democratic Labour Party

Swedish VP - Left Party

UN – United Nations

WEU – West European Union

WSE – Welfare State Expansion

WSL – Welfare State Limitation

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION – ASSESSING THE USE OF EUROSCEPTICISM

European integration has brought about a fundamental reorganisation in the relationship between nation states in Europe (however one defines ‘Europe’¹). As of 2010 it has seen the tying together of French and German coal and steel production; the development of a Common Market for goods, services, capital and persons; the development of a single European market; and the expansion of membership to West European neighbours, southern European countries undergoing a painful transition to democracy, and also the Central and Eastern states which until 1989 had been under the political umbrella of Soviet state socialism. The process has also seen the adoption of a European currency; the development of common policies towards security and defence, as well as the field of justice and home affairs.

This smattering of the history of European integration does not do these changes justice, but serves to highlight some of the most important events. With such an important set of transformations, a resistance to these developments taking place was predictable. National party systems of the European states, the media and public have all seen the growth in the phenomenon of Euroscepticism. Broadly speaking this has included discourses of outright rejection, calls for the exit of the member state from the European Community/European Union (EC/EU), scepticism towards the processes of integration – traditionally seen as economic and political - and criticism of the institutions and policies of the EU.

RESEARCH QUESTION

As mentioned above, Euroscepticism has grown in three specific national arenas – party systems, the news and print media, and the publics of European states. Whilst recognising the importance of all three arenas, in focusing on the phenomenon of Euroscepticism this thesis solely addresses

¹ An excellent starting point when considering the question ‘what is Europe?’ is Paasi (2001).

the arena of national political party discourse, but uniquely within the context of European Parliamentary (EP) election campaigns. The study examines the following research question:

How do parties in Western Europe utilise Eurosceptic discourse in European election campaigns over the period of 1989-2004?

Therefore the key aim of the research thesis is to identify the level and usage of Eurosceptic arguments by West European political parties in European elections and to examine causation of the party positions observed. This thesis has a much broader set of related research aims:

- To explore the number of and variety of Eurosceptic discourses used by political parties;
- To identify specific Eurosceptic parties within in each party family;
- To compare the salience of Euroscepticism in national and European elections; and finally;
- To compare Eurosceptic party behaviour in national and European elections.

While addressing the key aim, the thesis seeks to promote five fundamental aspects within its core argument. Firstly, the European integration project is a dynamic process, which is continually evolving with expanding competencies and policy areas. So in order to understand political party responses over time, we need a dynamic conceptualisation of Euroscepticism that is sufficiently broad to take account of the major developments by identifying multiple dimensions of EU decision-making, but vitally it needs to allow for the capturing of sufficient detail by disaggregating these to understand the specific positions taken by political parties in those areas of EU involvement².

²This conceptualisation is concerned with the general ideas behind integration, as there is a danger when creating a broad conceptualisation of Euroscepticism, to include almost every disagreement with the EU-level by a party actor. It identifies particular areas where integration has expanded, and allows for the identification of party positions over time by using multiple data points, but recognises that the saliency of the issue will increase or decrease with EU developments during the period.

Secondly, in order to implement a more dynamic and nuanced conceptualisation, a multi-dimensional framework should be employed. This allows for a more intricate understanding over time as parties can be identified as to the aspects they are more supportive or more sceptical towards.

Thirdly, in focusing on European elections, not only is the thesis attempting to fill the literature gap on Euroscepticism in European elections, but the research also aims to turn against the tide of prevailing academic orthodoxy. It argues that despite the second-order label, which is applied to non-national elections, i.e. regional, local and European, they remain an important element within party competition. Specifically with European elections, whilst nationally derived issues enter the election campaigns, they invariably are about Europe, and that in manifestos political parties focus far more on European rather than national issues.

The fourth fundamental element of the core argument surrounds the role of ideology in how parties respond to the dynamic multi-dimensional nature of European integration. Ideology conceptualised through party families constricts the freedom of political parties to adapt their positions. While ideology does not constitute a solid barrier to change, it creates an air of expectation amongst its party members, parliamentary party and its core voters. Put another way it becomes an opportunity cost in terms of the potential alienation of its current supporters if the party attempts to attract new voters and members through shifting their policies. This is operationalised in terms of party families. This is because they allow the capturing of and evolution of behaviour by related political parties, especially on issues, which do not necessarily easily relate to the left-right dimension – such as post-materialist values.

The fifth and final principal element of the argument surrounds the use of manifesto research, and specifically a quantitative research strategy. The thesis posits the argument that manifestos are relevant sources for deriving policy positions from the political party election campaign

discourse, as fundamentally they are one of the only comprehensive policy statements that political parties make (Budge, 1994: 455). For the analyst they offer valid positions for the time series, as it is not possible to contaminate historical positions with later party behaviour, unlike with an expert survey. Manifesto research allows the positioning of any party, even those that have received little expert attention – though they need sufficient party manifesto material in order to allow accurate analyses. The use of quantitative analyses also allows for a practical large-n study. It provides valid large-scale longitudinal language-blind data on party positions, the thorough testing of operationalised theoretical explanations in multiple settings and the possibility of retesting to allow for reliability assessments or alternative theoretical explanations.

In constructing the research question to focus on West European Euroscepticism in European elections during the period of 1989-2004, several important decisions need to be clarified surrounding the focus on national parties; the focus on Western Europe; the focus on European elections - specifically election campaigns rather than behaviour post-election; and finally the choice of time period.

Parties remain a key component in how European integration was constructed and how it has developed, and will continue to develop. Governing parties provide ministers, personnel and conceptions of how business should be performed at the supranational level. Ultimately the major steps in the integration process have been and continue to be taken at Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs), but parties still remain the major actors in the process. Opposition parties are still relevant, given that they provide critical appraisals of decisions taken (and help ratify any treaties and legislation) and increase the political costs of decision-making.

The decision to restrict the study to Western Europe was taken on both theoretical and practical reasons. In Central and Eastern Europe, during the time period, those countries were dealing with massive economic and social upheavals, and the European Union was often seen

uncritically, or at the very least less critically, and as a way in which to “return to Europe” (Grabbe & Hughes, 1998). Significantly, for those states there were precious few alternatives, and this would have tempered party discourses. Furthermore, additional variations need to be taken account of such as wealth disparities, their newer more unstable party systems, and the lack of impact of the historical cleavage structures seen in Western Europe. Practically speaking, the parties from the Central and Eastern member states have only taken part in one European election during the 1984-2004 period, meaning that important data points from 1989-1999 do not exist. Importantly one also had to consider what could be achieved in the time frame. Giving appropriate analytical time and space to the twenty-seven member states (and further numbers of potential candidate and non-member states such as Croatia, Turkey, Norway and Switzerland, would have been a massive undertaking, one which would have been beyond the scope of one researcher and one PhD.

That this study has framed the research question to focus on European elections is also important. Research on Euroscepticism in European elections has been lacking, especially given the assumption that European elections were fought on national election priorities³ as will be discussed below. Analysing European elections will provide important findings on how parties relate to multi-dimensional developments at the supranational level and how they use this in party competition.

Related to this is the decision to focus on studying election campaign behaviour rather than party policy post-election. The researcher has a choice of whether to focus on elections campaigns, to focus on behaviour during the parliamentary period, or a combination of both (see Volkens, 2007:117). Importantly, the decision to restrict the research question to the study of elections can be justified on several grounds. Elections allow the party to examine their core ideology and core

^{3 3} See Reif, 1984; Schmitt, 1990; Irwin, 1995; Van der Eijk, Franklin & Marsh, 1996; Marsh, 1998 Schmitt, 2004; Koepke & Ringe, 2006;

policies and present an appropriate course of action to the electorate in terms of a manifesto and planned election campaign. This really can provide an important insight into how each party sees European integration and how it should develop. One can of course argue that election campaigns are strategic, but the election campaign is still a clear statement of intent. During the parliamentary period, governing and opposition parties will not be free to pursue their policies freely. Governing parties will have coalition stability, institutional structures, member state partners requirements, societal and pressure group interests, and intra-party wishes to take into account when pursuing European integration policy. Opposition parties will have their coalition potential to take account of, other opposition party policy, their position in the party system – as a potential governing party or as a permanently excluded pariah party, societal and pressure group interests. What can be achieved during the parliamentary period between elections is down to a combination of the factors mentioned above, and may not be a clear indication of the party's programmatic aspirations.

Finally, the time period also needs clarification. At first glance one can ask the question of why has the entire period not been included in the study – for example 1979-2004 or even 1957-2004. Taggart (1998: 363) argued that Maastricht was the turning point in Eurosceptic party behaviour. So why not have the time period from 1992 onwards, or perhaps taking into account its precursor, the Single European Act of 1986 (enacted 1987) which laid down the foundations for the Single Market of 1992? The European integration process was born out of the post-war situation of a Europe recovering from an extraordinarily destructive war, and a continent split down the middle by a two-superpower cold war. With the removal of this geopolitical situation in 1989, transformations across Europe took place, as well as a reorientation of Communist and far left parties. Furthermore, by 1989 the EC/EU had twelve member states and later expanded to fifteen by 1995. From these arguments it makes sense to limit the time frame to 1989-2004 given the drastic geopolitical change and also given that the number of cases available was far greater.

RELEVANCE OF THE PHENOMENON OF EUROSCEPTICISM IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN POLITICS

At first glance, one may argue that Europe has not had a major impact on party competition in national politics. Europe has remained a second-order issue (Reif & Schmitt, 1980; Reif, 1984; Schmitt, 1990; 2004; Irwin, 1995; Van der Eijk et al, 1996; Marsh, 1998). Mair (2000) argued that in terms of the format and mechanics of party competition that Europe had generated new parties – particularly those who were anti-Europe. However, they have been mostly confined to the European Parliament and have had little impact on national politics. In addition, while the anti-European bloc accounted for approximately 17% of parties, they gained a low percentage of votes in national elections. Those that were stronger used Euroscepticism as a tool among many in the toolkit (Mair, 2000: 31-33). As Harmsen and Spiering (2004:24) noted there continues to be little evidence of existing parties redefining themselves and hence much of the evidence continues to confirm the limited impact of Europe. However, the study was limited to direct effects on the format and mechanics of party competition only, and while parties may not be redefining themselves in terms a new cleavage, many parties have now incorporated the issue and have developed critical positions across all party families and almost all member, candidate, and European non-member states.

In particular the phenomenon brings the triple issues of the democratic deficit⁴ of the European Union, the community deficit and the political legitimacy of the European integration process into sharp focus. Assessing the European Union's democratic deficit on the level of perceptions, the European Commission – the institution with the major right of legislative initiation – has the perception of being a technocracy. Only one institution receives directly elected representatives from the European constituencies, often on an electoral ticket that is distant in its construction

⁴ Europe's "democratic deficit" is an extremely contentious issue. Moravcsik (2002) and Menon (2008) for example have argued that to introduce party competition into the area of the running of the single market would have been a mistake. Whether or not this is the reality of the situation is not at stake, but on the level of perceptions – at least in some quarters – Europe's major institution, the European Commission, features unelected officials at its head.

from European issues. The remaining institutions receive appointed officials and ministers from the constituent member states. The deliberations taking place at the EU level appear to lack transparency with decisions being taken behind closed doors (Moravcsik, 2002: 604-605). Euroscepticism also highlights the issue of a community deficit, the notion of a lack of shared values and bonds, which is underscored when a significant minority reject the process of European integration. Indeed, Etzioni argues that Community building is necessary before the democratic deficit can be curtailed – democracy would require sacrifices by some EU citizens for the common good, both in economic terms, in legal harmonisation requisites, and perhaps even in terms of lives, in the case of hard power foreign policy actions (military and peace keeping operations) (Etzioni, 2007: 23-24 & 31-34). Euroscepticism has the potential to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the European integration project. Legitimacy is traditionally seen as the right to govern, but related to this is the issue of consent. A right, which is not seen as valid by the many, does not possess the character of a right (Coicaud, 2002: 10-11). However, as Beetham and Lord (1998: 15) noted:

Positions of authority are confirmed by the express consent or affirmation on the part of appropriate subordinates, and by recognition from other legitimate authorities.

The recognition from other legitimate authorities element has been the key mode of legitimation in the past, but key referenda results have shown this has not been enough and they constitute a delegitimation – a removal of consent by the public (Beetham, 1991: 19).

In Western Europe, what was once considered a peripheral phenomenon has seen use amongst parties of major importance in the individual party systems. From the empirical findings in this thesis it has been possible to identify that Eurosceptic discourses have appeared in the campaign manifestos of even the more ‘centrist’ party families. To present a few examples, in the Socialist and Social Democratic party family, relevant discourses emerged from major parties such as the

Luxembourg POSL/LSAP (Luxembourg Socialist Workers Party) – the second largest party and junior member of the governing coalition; the French PS (Socialist Party) – the largest left-wing party in the party system; and the Portuguese PS (Socialist Party) party – a major governing party. Amongst the Conservative party family, Eurosceptic discourse was identifiable amongst two major governing parties and one former governing party – the Italian FI (Forward Italy), French UMP (Union for a Popular Movement) and British Conservative Party. Even with the German case, often considered the *Musterknabe* or ‘model boy’ (Lees, 2002: 244), there have even been instances of Eurosceptic discourses used by the CDU (Christian Democratic Union), something which was more expected of the Christian Social Union (CSU) sister party, and also the SPD (German Social Democratic Party). While these may have been exceptions to their general pro-EU behaviour, Euroscepticism is still present in ‘centrist’ parties. In the case of the CDU, Eurosceptic discourse was used after the Commission declared a state subsidy illegal (Lees, 2002: 258). With the SPD case, they flirted with Euroscepticism in the Baden-Württemberg state elections of 1996 (Reinhardt, 1997)⁵.

Euroscepticism also became an important issue for the former accession states during their negotiations for EU membership during the 1990s and early 2000s. Across all applicant states, Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002:15) noted that the potential size of the Eurosceptic electoral constituency could be as high as 25.9% although most parties constructed their identities around other issues. However, they also underlined Eurobarometer results from the then thirteen candidate states which amounted to an average of 10% of the populations who regarded EU membership as a bad thing (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2002: 6). A cursory glance at the latest Eurobarometer (European Commission, 2009) figures reveal that by the later stages of 2009, five

⁵ This case of Euroscepticism was entirely situational. The 1996 campaign was focused on the personality of Dieter Spöri and this allowed a greater opportunity to promote his critique of EMU. While not formally endorsed by the main leadership of the SPD, it was influenced by positions taken by three major politicians within the party: Scharping, Schröder and Lafontaine. Given the reaction of other political parties, regional and national media, the later intervention of the SPD leadership after the contents of a proposed billboard campaign became public, as well as voter reactions, it remains unlikely that challenges to the prevailing consensus on Europe will emerge within election campaigns again in Germany.

years after joining, 50.31% of the public thought membership was a good thing compared with an EU27 average of 53%. Conversely, 13.54% of the population viewed EU membership as a bad thing. The EU27 average was 15%. The results among those who saw membership as a bad thing were particularly high for Cyprus, Latvia and Hungary (approximately 22%). This highlighted a significant undercurrent of negative views in those member states. While the values show that those holding more critical views are most certainly not a majority, they still suggest that a significant portion of the electorate amongst the Central and East European EU member states holds these Eurosceptic beliefs.

The European non-member states, some of which have opted to have an economic association rather than full membership, for example Norway and Switzerland, are a significant example of the importance of issue of Euroscepticism in contemporary European politics. The EU issue in these two states has been extremely divisive on both a societal and, in the case of Norway, on the level of the party system. Norway has seen several failed applications to the EC/EU including two referenda defeats (Svåsand, 2002: 329). Furthermore amongst political parties there has been a desire to compartmentalise the EU issue in Norwegian politics. The Christian People's Party, for example, made it clear that EU matters were off limits to its pro-EU Conservative coalition partners (Aylott, 2002: 455). With the Swiss case, Marquis (2004: 3) noted that the Swiss have been considerably opposed to full integration into the EU. Three referenda between 1992-2001 only resulted in support for a bilateral economic agreement rather than membership in the EEA or as a full member of the EU. In particular there has been a division in support between the French-speaking pro-EU minority and the anti-EU German-speaking population (Theiler, 2004: 646)⁶.

The impact of public criticism and unease can potentially undermine any democratic credentials that the project can claim when a sizeable section of the Union's population is sceptical. Of

⁶ Also see Church (2003) for an in-depth examination of the Swiss case.

particular public interest has been the continuing fraud at the EU-level. The fight against the practice has been hampered by fragmentation at transnational, national and legal levels; the agency combating fraud has not been provided with the required responsibilities; and new member states have been less than effective in tackling the issue. Despite the majority of the fraud taking place at the member state level (Quirke, 2010: 61), the perception is that fraud is endemic at the European level. Press reports often focus on fraud, some with the clear intention of inflicting damage to the integration process. Sieber (1998: 1-2) noted that elements of the press claimed that up to 20% of the EC budget was subject to fraud. More recently, Pop (2009) reported that the EU's Court of Auditors refused to sign off the accounts for the 15th year in a row. In addition, as was evidenced by the rejection of the European Constitution by the French and Dutch public, the Union was left in somewhat of a quandary as to how to bring about changes to the institutional structure to allow twenty-five, and later twenty-seven member states to work together more effectively. Public scepticism exercised through referenda can significantly impact on the progress of the European integration project (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2008a: 1).

WHAT IS EUROSCEPTICISM & WHAT IS IDEOLOGY

Thus far, the thesis has provided an outline of the research question, and the five fundamental aspects of the core argument: the need for a dynamic and nuanced conceptualisation of Euroscepticism; the importance of developing a multi-dimensional framework to analyse Eurosceptic parties based on that definition; the not-so second-order nature of European elections; the role and importance of ideology in structuring political party responses to European integration; and finally the importance of using a quantitative manifesto research strategy to examine Euroscepticism in election campaigns. It has also clarified aspects of the research question and underlined the relevance of Euroscepticism for member states, the (then) accession states, European non-member states, and for the European national publics.

The first and fourth aspects of the core argument will rely on clear definitions of Euroscepticism, and party ideology. This next section will provide working definitions for both concepts, though the definition of Euroscepticism will be further built upon in chapter three.

EUROSCEPTICISM

Initially, there was a lag in the scholarly treatment of Euroscepticism, due to the early dominance of the International Relations (IR) tradition in examining the processes of European integration (see Marks & Steenbergen, 2002: 883). However, from 1998 onwards two particular approaches emerged out of the comparative literature. These two approaches are perhaps best distinguished by the type of research they promoted – the broader definitions used a more qualitative approach and the dimensional analyses used quantitative analyses.

Euroscepticism was initially defined in a broad fashion that brought together discourses of outright rejection, exit from EU, scepticism towards the processes of integration, and criticism of the practice of the EU. The most dominant definitions were those by Paul Taggart and his later collaborative work with Aleks Szczerbiak. Euroscepticism was defined as:

...the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration (Taggart, 1998: 365-366).

Specifically with the Taggart (1998) definition, Euroscepticism was both an anti-system phenomenon, and also one that encompassed more specific and qualified grievances. This was later split into “hard” and “soft” aspects, which were based around whether the actor advocated outright rejection and withdrawal in the case of hard Euroscepticism, or more qualified scepticism in the case of soft Euroscepticism without the withdrawal option (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2001). The emphasis of Euroscepticism as a phenomenon that encompasses an anti-system feature is important and has been repeatedly included elsewhere. It allowed the identification of the more critical parties from those parties who have used milder negative

discourses. However it suffered from a key weakness in the lack of an analytical distinction between those critiquing the European Union, the process of European integration and whether membership was of benefit to that member state. In addition, the use of hard and soft distinctions was not particularly successful due to the broad nature of the soft Euroscepticism definition – which had the potential to include most European political parties (see Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2003: 7).

In the same vein, Flood (2002: 73 in Ray, 2004: 4) defined Euroscepticism as a phenomenon concerned with doubts and distrusts. The really important and key development offered by Flood's conceptualisation was to include those in favour of integration, and so Euroscepticism was not treated as analytically separate, but as the negative end of a range of positions from outright rejection to strongly pro-European. It was not dimensional, but based on a large typology (Flood, 2002 in Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2003: 10).

The critique of Flood was quite specific. His six categories were not mutually exclusive and required a substantial amount of information before each party could be classified: whether a party opposed membership or participation in an institution or policy area; preferred a return of competencies as a whole or in a specific policy area; whether a party accepted the status quo but resisted further integration as a whole or in a specific area; supported integration as a whole or in a specific area as long as it was gradual; took positions of constructive engagement and reform; or wished to push integration forward as a whole or in a specific policy area (see Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2003: 10). Parties could also potentially move between categories over time creating further difficulties in classifying them. With dimensional analyses, if a party does not take a position this can be recorded as such. If this is systemic across party families or party systems, then the entire dimension can be removed.

The improvement in the understanding of Euroscepticism with this definition has been significant and these party types capture important aspects of competition towards European integration/European Union, but with the exception of maximalists all other parties could be labelled Eurosceptic. Furthermore it is questionable whether parties truly elaborate on their positions enough to provide the nuanced data necessary to apply such a theoretically detailed framework.

Responding to two specific weaknesses in the existing Taggart and Szcerbiak (2001) definition – namely whether the focus of Euroscepticism was on matters of integration, EU membership or both; and also the inclusive nature of the ‘soft’ Eurosceptic category, Kopecký and Mudde (2002) treated Euroscepticism as a dual dimensional phenomenon, with diffuse support indicating a position towards the general ideas of European integration and specific support indicating a position towards how European integration was being practiced – i.e. the European Union and its development. This produced a typology of four positions: “Euroenthusiast” (support for the theory and practice of integration); “Eurosceptics” (support for the general ideas, but pessimistic about the practice); “Eurorejects” (rejection of the theory and the practice); and finally “Europragmatists” (rejection of the theory, but support for the practice – perhaps for utilitarian considerations) (Kopecký and Mudde, 2002: 300-303).

Lubbers and Scheepers (2005) development was to analytically separate political Euroscepticism from the instrumental form. The former was concerned with the transfers of policy competencies in thirteen policy areas from currency and defence to fighting unemployment and cultural policy. The latter dimension focused on whether people were sceptical about the benefits of the EU for their own country (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2005: 225-228).

What was observable was a shift from assessing all criticisms of European integration, the EU and membership, to consider Euroscepticism as a dual dimension – the first with diffuse and

specific support and the second with political and instrumental support. The two most useful aspects to utilise from this subset of the literature are the importance of treating support for the general ideas behind European integration as analytically separate from more instrumental Euroscepticism and specific support within party discourse and to include pro-European values in assessing party positions.

A second approach was taken by academics adopting a mostly quantitative research strategy. Euroscepticism here was not treated as analytically distinct from pro-European attitudes and these could be positioned on dimensions of behaviour.

The initial conceptualisation of Euroscepticism, or rather party positions towards integration using this method was Ray's (1999) single pro versus anti dimension and this was followed in a similar fashion by Tsebelis and Garrett (2000, in Marks and Steenbergen, 2002: 886) with a dimension which reflected the desire for high or low regulation. These approaches had the distinct advantage of being easy to operationalise and in the case of the latter conceptualisation narrow enough to allow the researcher to appraise the level of support for economic integration, but these were rather static understandings of the integration process, and did not allow for the identification of more nuanced attitudes towards the integration process.

Several focused on conceptualising European integration in terms of dual or multiple dimensions. Hix and Lord (1997) produced a more advanced explanation of positions being derived from two irreconcilable dimensions – the left-right dimension and an integration-independence dimension. In a similar fashion, Marks and Wilson (2000) identified that the twin process of economic and political integration could be subsumed into the left-right dimension. These frameworks began to see European integration more dynamically, though they still simplified political integration too much. However one has to remain sceptical of the relevance of the left-right dimension given that it was a simplification in the first place, and with the

unfreezing of the original cleavage structures there has been the emergence of post-materialist values that did not fit so easily within the traditional left-right dimension (see Inglehart, 1977). Yet, one has to acknowledge that some have seen the changing paradigm as the enrichment rather than a marginalisation of the left-right dimension (Ignazi, 2003: 6).

A later improvement dealt with the emergence of further European developments and the growth of post-materialist values with a conceptualisation which saw positions as derived from multiple dimensions being subsumed into the traditional patterns of party competition – pro versus anti, environmental, cohesion, asylum, fiscal, foreign policy and European Parliament (EP) powers, and an related but unfused dimension which represented new politics and traditional authoritarian values (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson, 2002). The inclusion of multiple dimensions was a tremendous advancement in the field as this allowed for a far more dynamic assessment of party positions, but where this conceptualisation faltered was the focus on policies rather than processes – it was hard to analytically separate whether a party supported the transfer of sovereignty in that field or were sceptical of a particular aspect of content. Furthermore, one has to question whether these are the only dimensions that would be appropriate to study. For example, the growths in social and cultural policies at the EU level, as well as the harmonising effect of Economic and Monetary Union have been significant enough for parties to adopt positions towards the developments.

Taking these developments on board, the thesis will proceed by extending and adapting the theoretical developments of Hooghe et al (2002) and Marks et al (2006), as well as Lubbers and Scheepers (2005) to develop a multi-dimensional framework by analysing integration not by policies, but dimensions representing forms of integration (see chapter three). This will allow the exploration of whether a party was critical or rejectionist towards transfers of sovereignty within

those processes⁷ rather than necessarily the content of the policy areas identified. The alternative dimensions identified are as follows: economic liberalisation; economic harmonisation; supranational integration; legal integration; social integration; cultural integration; and foreign policy integration. With this, Euroscepticism needs a more appropriate definition:

The sustained espousal of a critical or rejectionist argument towards one or more aspects of European integration: economic, supranational, legal, social, cultural and foreign policy forms of integration.

As will be explored later in chapter three, the definition was constructed in such a fashion to emphasise that a party could only be considered truly Eurosceptic if it presented a sustained critique of one or more aspects of European integration. Kopecký and Mudde (2002: 300) were particularly critical of Taggart and Szcerbiak's (2001) definition of soft Euroscepticism given that it was constructed in a too broad manner, which meant that almost all policy disagreements could be considered Eurosceptic. What this thesis employs is a usage scale, which classifies Eurosceptic parties on the basis of major or extreme use of a particular Eurosceptic discourse ($\geq 5\%$ for major use and $\geq 10\%$ for extreme use) in a manifesto. What this allows for is the exclusion of normal policy objections without classifying all parties as Eurosceptic.

IDEOLOGY

Prevalent in the literature has been the conviction that “ideology is the most elusive concept in the whole of the social sciences” (McLellan, 1995:1), and in order to fully explore the intricacies of this contested concept would require far more space than can unfortunately be given. However, as Eccleshall, (1984: 7) identified, there are two key characteristics of ideology: an image of society and a political programme and these are particularly relevant to this thesis. The image enables the actor to interpret the social world from a particular viewpoint and also

⁷ The use of the term process is important as it denotes that European integration has been, and continues to be a project in development. It is essentially fluid and this to be taken account of in any conceptualisation of the phenomenon.

provides normative aspects to how society should be organised. The political programme sets out how this should be achieved. An important point to note is that rival social images are constructed from a shared pool of concepts. Each ideology is adapted to the evolving social circumstances and ideas are in a constant state of amendment, with some even being abandoned and with new ones being used for a particular perspective of society (Eccleshall, 1984:30).

Eccleshall (1984: 23) argued that:

People are sustained and inspired by beliefs and ideals. They need, while in pursuit of varied social purposes, both to feel at home in the world and to act with good conscience to make sense of everyday reality, as well as to clothe their interests and aspirations in the finery of moral principle. The powerful have to reassure themselves, as well as convince others, of the rightness of their might: that power is a trust held for the common good rather than self-advantage. The powerless, on the other hand, need to believe either that they are not exploited or if they nurture a grievance and desire political change that right is on their side. Ideology is the realm in which people clarify and justify their actions as they pursue divergent interests.

Several key concepts are identifiable: beliefs; principles; social; moral; political change; and interests. These do appear to be intrinsically linked to ideology. The list was very similar to the traits identified by Donald and Hall (1986: 3):

Ideas have social roots and perform a social function. They provide ideas ‘true’ and ‘false’ – within which men and women ‘think’ about society and their place in it.

The concept of ideology was born out of the process of enlightenment. Destutt de Tracy devised the concept around the aim of formulating a rational study of ideas – ideology (i.e. the science of ideas). His motive was to establish a method for scientifically identifying correct ideas. This would enable the use of reason to govern affairs for societal progression. This was seen as a threat by Napoleon who labelled them as ‘ideologues’ producing a contrasting meaning of false, and possibly subversive ideas (MacKenzie, 2003: 3-4).

The concept of ideology was developed further by Marx and Engels who argued that it demonstrated the rationality of the existing distribution of wealth and power relations, and later by Althusser who saw it as a way to mould and socialise citizens required by society (Mackenzie, 2003:3-6). Gramsci contended that ideology should include everyday conceptions to include the fragmentary, episodic, internally contradictory and incomplete chains of thought used to understand the social and political world (Donald & Hall, 1986: x).

Later, Laclau (1977 in Donald & Hall, 1986: xviii – xix) argued that concepts such as ‘democracy’ and ‘the people’ were used within fascist discourse in a way that provided some ideological unity for different classes. As such rather than having a single unequivocal class connotation these ideological terms were ‘multi-discursive’.

However, this thesis draws most heavily from Seliger (1976: 14) who presented two conceptions of ideology, that of a restrictive concept and a more inclusive concept. The restrictive type reserves the use of ideology for extremist belief systems and parties; ideological factors are held to be present in some and absent from other belief systems; or at least, they are assumed to be more important in some than in others. The more inclusive use covers sets of ideas that men posit, explain and justify ends and means of organised social action, aims to preserve, amend, uproot or rebuild a given order. Both conceptions hold in common that ideology signifies a set of ideas that have not primarily been conceived for cognitive purposes. Furthermore he argues that four propositions are crucial to any definition of ideology. Firstly all ideologies are linked to politics - it requires it as its mode of implementation. Secondly, ideology cannot be divorced from factual knowledge, rational justification, as well as moral and other prescriptions. Thirdly, all ideologies see overlap in terms of the descriptions, analysis, prescriptions, for example. Fourthly, the way ideology functions or is intended to function has a bearing on its nature (Seliger 1976: 15-16).

Seliger (1976: 102) constructed an ideological composite which he conceived as a:

...relatively coherent and never entirely non-factual and non-empirical configuration of thought and speech used for concerted social action, the notion that politics and ideology are inextricably tied to each other does not entail the conclusion that ideologically pure politics exists. From the outset ideologies are asymmetric structures and some of their principles and assessments are advanced by more than one ideology.

To summarise the components, a party would first notice and describe a phenomena. It would then analyse, and decide according to moral norms and in view of technical possibilities what to do or not to do about them. There is always a component of ideology that rejects. However, he does admit that in reality the process is much more complex. It is these two conceptions of ideology that will be carried forward to assess the impact of party ideology on party positions towards European integration.

APPROACH

The fundamental aim of the research question is to identify the level and usage of Eurosceptic discourse by West European political parties in European elections and to examine the causal influences behind the positions taken. The thesis will establish the importance of European elections to the understanding of party conflict over European integration both theoretically and empirically. In order to carry out the fundamental aim, the theoretical underpinnings of the multi-dimensional definition and framework will be examined and *a priori* predictions of party positions will be presented in chapter three. Using a quantitative research strategy, party positions will be investigated empirically using multiple OLS regression on data provided through the Comparative and Euromanifestos Project datasets⁸ (Klingemann et al, 2006; Euromanifestos Project, 2007). OLS regression was selected as the most appropriate technique to examine causation given its use of a continuous dependent variable. Logistic, Ordinal logistic and Multinomial regression techniques rely on categorical dependent variables. Logistic regression uses a dichotomous dependent variable; Ordinal logistic regression allows for more than two

⁸ The Euromanifestos dataset can be downloaded from here: <http://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/projekte/manifestos/>

categories of response that are ordered; and finally multinomial regression allows for multiple response categories. While these would allow for the analysis of the independent variables identified, support for each aspect of integration was conceptualised as a continuum stretching from strong support to outright rejection, which is more suited to being operationalised as a continuous variable.

The research strategy provides the opportunity to conduct feasible language-blind analyses of party positions in a large-n study. Furthermore, it provides other scholars the opportunity subject the results to further empirical tests by using the publicly available datasets. The section below will provide further justification for the use of manifesto-based research.

As stated earlier the third element of the core argument of the thesis is that despite the second-order label, which is applied to non-national elections, i.e. regional, local and European, they remain an important element within party competition (Reif & Schmitt, 1980; Reif, 1984; Schmitt, 1990; 2004; Irwin, 1995; Van der Eijk et al, 1996; Marsh, 1998). Specifically with European elections, whilst nationally derived issues enter the election campaigns, in manifestos political parties focus far more on European rather than national issues. In chapter four this will be examined empirically by calculating the mean average salience for each party family towards the twelve major election issues⁹. What this provides is a general indication of the level of importance of each issue in the four European elections. The data for this will be taken from both the Comparative Manifestos Project (Klingemann et al, 2006) and the Euromanifestos dataset (Euromanifestos Project, 2007) and derived from the number of quasi sentences devoted to the relevant manifesto codes, which will be summed and divided by the total. This will then be averaged for each party within the party family. This will allow a direct comparison between national and European elections.

⁹ These are Economic Policy; Social Welfare; Foreign Policy; European Policy; Internationalism; Agricultural Policy; Performance of Government; Military; Democracy Issues; Crime Issues; Cultural issues; and Environmental Issues.

The saliency measures only tell part of the picture – the relative importance of the issue in an election manifesto. Next, the number of, as well as the specific party family of each Eurosceptic parties will be identified from the national and European election data. Furthermore, in order to ascertain whether parties behave in a similar fashion it will require a comparison of the predicted values between national and European elections. For this it will be necessary to employ a single dimension of pro versus anti-EU to facilitate this. The independent variables for this assessment are essentially as similar as possible to those used in the later multi-dimensional analyses. The expectation is not that the coefficients will be same, but it will be possible to see if parties use the discourse more or less aggressively between national and European elections.

With the new development in conceptualising European integration and the new data from the understudied European arena, the thesis aims to contribute to the debate on Eurosceptic causation. To provide a background to the literature which will be detailed in chapter two, scholars have argued that Euroscepticism is derived from ideology, strategy, and/or institutional factors. To be specific these can be broken down into a further set of themes. Of those who have argued that Euroscepticism is derived from ideology, a number have posited that party families and/or the left-right dimension are the most appropriate unit of analysis (Aspinwall, 2002; Kopecký & Mudde, 2002; Crum, 2007; Hellström, 2008); another group have argued that the left-right dimension and a further dimension – either orthogonal or related, but not fused are more appropriate prisms with which to view party positions (Hix & Lord, 1997; Hix, 1999; Hooghe, Marks & Wilson, 2002; Marks, Hooghe, Nelson & Edwards, 2006). A further group have argued that Euroscepticism is derived from cleavage structures or indeed constitutes a new cleavage (Marks & Wilson, 2000; Marks, Wilson & Ray, 2002; Kriesi, 2007). Strategic factors have been put forward as causal factor in structuring the use of Euroscepticism (Taggart, 1998; Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2001; 2002; Sitter, 2002; 2003; 2004). Finally, the impact of institutional structures has also been put forward as a restriction on the use of Euroscepticism (Lees, 2002; Lees 2008b).

Given the extent of the disagreement, there is a need to reassess these theoretical and empirical contributions to the understanding of causation. For this the thesis will apply the saliency theory of political competition in understanding how parties compete. This essentially argues that parties do not compete directly, but attempt to promote the policy areas, which they specialise in or own (Budge & Farlie, 1983: 23-24). This will be explored further in chapter four.

The dependent variables for this study are the position of each party on the individual dimensions identified above: economic integration (both liberalisation and harmonisation); supranational integration; legal integration; social integration; cultural integration; and foreign policy integration. As stated earlier, the fourth core aspect of the argument presented in the thesis is the importance of party ideology operationalised in terms of party families. This is because while cleavage structures are highly correlated with party families and share much of the variance, it is important to move away from considering them - due to the question as to whether they are still frozen (see Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Inglehart, 1977, 1981, 1990; Pedersen, 1979) given that new forms of conflict have emerged from the 1970s and beyond.

Ideology constricts the freedom of political parties to adapt their positions. While ideology does not constitute a solid barrier to change, it creates an air of expectation amongst its party members, parliamentary party and its core voters. Put another way it becomes an opportunity cost in terms of the potential alienation of its current supporters if the party attempts to attract new voters and members through shifting policy. It does bring up the question of why ideology is operationalised in terms of party families and not the left-right dimension. Both of them are contested in terms of where a party lies. However, one has to question the continued relevance of the left-right dimension (see Kitchelt & Hellemans, 1990 for an overview). This is something that has been continually debated since the 1960s especially since the emergence of post-materialist values identified by Inglehart (1977). Another issue surrounding the reliance of the left-right dimension is that the scale differs from country to country. Castles and Mair's (1984)

work on an empirical foundation for the left-right scale went some way to resolving this issue, but as the party family is somewhat broader in its nature it can account for differences in the cross-national setting.

Party families therefore are the key independent variable. They, however, will be tested alongside other independent variables such as: national location; positions towards other dimensions of integration; year of election; left-right position; position on the new politics dimension; public opinion towards membership; and finally whether the party was an office holder through the use of multiple OLS regression (see chapter three for the theoretical justification). This allows the determination of the empirical weight of the party family independent variable compared to the other theoretical and empirical arguments put forward.

Finally, the approach will return to consider party ideology in a much more in-depth fashion by examining observed individual party positions and examining potential patterns of observable behaviour in the European-wide party family, or whether there are specific patterns identifiable within two sub-categories of the accession grouping and also if the party was from a member state in the geographical core or periphery of the EU. This allows the assessment of whether there are further contextual factors at play and takes account of specific differences within the party family itself.

RESEARCHING PARTY POSITIONS: RESEARCH STRATEGIES

In recent years there has been an extensive debate surrounding the methodological approach to explore party positions towards policy and ideological dimensions. One can distinguish between survey data (elite, expert or mass surveys) and document-driven data (first or secondary source information) (Keman, 2007: 77). The quantitative approaches can be subdivided into five specific techniques: expert surveys, mass surveys, roll-call analysis, flows of public funding analyses, and

manifesto-based content analysis. The Manifesto-based content analysis can be further split into Computer Aided Content Analysis techniques and manual hand coding techniques.

Expert surveys enable the gathering of data on the policy positions of key political actors by surveying people who are expert on the countries in question (Laver & Hunt, 1992: 33) and produce usable policy locations for parties at a particular point in time (Budge 2000: 111). They have a number of distinct advantages. They are reasonably cheap and simple to conduct (Ray, 1999: 285); they draw on broad knowledge, offer direct quantification (with inter-expert reliability tests), provide flexibility in information gathering, and are also valid (given the diverse sources of information used by experts) (Marks et al, 2007: 26).

Despite considerable popularity and extensive use, the technique has been the subject of significant criticism. The major weaknesses of expert surveys concern the validity with respect to the definition of party, time scale, and cause and effect (Volkens, 2007: 117). Firstly, what is the expert judging? One may evaluate the position of the electorate; another, the position of the party leadership; or the views of party activists (Marks & Steenbergen, 2006: 348-349; Budge, 2000: 111). Secondly, the temporal issue is of key concern. Retrospective party positioning is very difficult and subject to the significant possibility of errors given the potential for judgments to be influenced by subsequent party behaviour (Marks et al, 2007: 26). While some of the concerns could be alleviated by skilled expert survey design (Marks & Steenbergen, 2006: 349), it is questionable whether one can tie experts down to a specific time period (Budge, 2000: 110). Thirdly, as experts will use a variety of sources to judge party positions, it makes it very difficult, if not impossible to separate cause and effect. Party positions may be judged on programmatic promises or resulting actions, or a combination of both (see Volkens, 2007: 117). The fourth issue concerns information taken from experts being quite vulnerable to selection bias, and this is exacerbated by low response rates. One can argue that this will be less of a problem with particular parties, which have been the subject of extensive research, but those less popular with

the research community, as well as smaller newer parties may suffer from selection bias as experts have little information to draw upon (Keman, 2007: 77). This fourth point can also be an issue for the problem, which Marks et al (2007: 26; Budge, 2000: 109) illuminate in that expert judgements will take account of both rhetoric and actions. Actions may be restricted by institutional rules and the path dependent nature of previous decisions will restrict party behaviour. Hence judging parties on observed behaviour may produce different positions compared to positioning on the basis of party preferences.

The second approach is the use of mass survey data that has specifically asked respondents where parties lie on certain positions. Unfortunately very few cross-national surveys ask about party positions on issues. One Eurobarometer survey, Eurobarometer 30 did ask respondents in each EU member state to evaluate the positions of the political parties of their nation. This survey is therefore an excellent source of data on the public perception of party positions but only for 1988 (Ray, 1999: 285)¹⁰. In addition, information drawn from individuals can suffer from selection bias (Keman, 2007: 77), it cannot address positions from previous years for the same reason as expert surveys, and can only focus on perceived behaviour rather than party preferences.

The third method of estimating policy positions is to look at what they actually do in public office. The flow of public expenditure into particular policy areas can be used as an indicator of government policy. It unfortunately is only limited to single party governments, and only those parties who take office (Laver & Hunt, 1992: 32-33). The other issue is that it completely ignores policy preferences of governmental parties, focusing on behaviour, and in addition does not take into account the path dependent nature of policy decisions made by previous governments.

¹⁰ For more up-to-date election surveys see: See <http://www.ees-homepage.net/seiten/ees.html> access to the questionnaires distributed for the European Election Survey. However, they do not have questions appropriate for extracting specific party position data.

The fourth form of data analysis is the scaling of roll-call voting¹¹ data (Hix et al, 2006: 494). This involves the coding of roll-call votes, which are published in public in the European Parliament's official minutes (Yes, No and Abstain). In the case of Hix et al (2006: 499) they grouped Members of the European Parliament (MEP) by their political grouping and positioned them on two dimensions – left-right and pro vs. anti-EU. Specifically, this deals with observed behaviour and not party preferences. It is also limited by the trichotomous nature of the three responses – Yes and No and Abstain, and suffers from similar weakness to that of expenditure flow analysis namely the path dependent nature of previous decisions and institutional rigidity. However, it does not suffer from the temporal issue that is prevalent in time series estimates from expert surveys. It provides observed publically available positions for each Member of Parliament (MP) or MEP.

The fifth process of producing empirical data for the positioning of political parties is through the analysis of manifestos. There are two relevant techniques - the traditional content analytic approach of the Manifesto Research Group/Comparative Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/EMP) that utilised a standardised coding scheme, and Computer-Assisted Content Analysis (CACA) of election programmes (Volgens, 2007: 108).

The MRG/CMP approach consisted of a quantitative textual analysis of election programmes from a large number of OECD countries (plus Israel) for the entire period since 1945 (Franzmann & Kaiser, 2006: 164). It involved the developing of its own coding scheme and utilising expert coders, fluent in the language of the manifesto, reading each sentence and allocating each sentence a category in the coding scheme. The theory behind the project was the promotion of the salience model of party competition where parties compete on the basis of salience of particular issues in the policy package they put to voters (Laver & Garry, 2000: 620).

¹¹ See Hix, Noury and Roland (2006); Mattila & Lane (2001); Heckman & Snyder (1997); Poole (1985); Clinton, Jackman & Rivers (2004) for examples of roll-call data analyses.

The categories relied on parties competing indirectly by emphasizing another issue rather than a direct negative comment. However, there were compromise codings where pro and con categories were also used (Klingemann et al, 2006: xviii).

With the Euromanifestos project, Hermann Schmitt developed the idea to apply the MRG/CMP on elections to the European Parliament. The aim of the project was to collect and code all European Parliament election programmes of all parties ever represented in that body. Furthermore it needed to be comparable with the MRG/CMP, but also tailored in such a way to allow the possibility of coding specific European policies (Wüst & Volkens, 2003: 1). It was modified in three ways – firstly 54 out of the 56 codes were kept with the remaining divided into sub-codes. Further sub-codes were inserted where suitable. Secondly, the codes were mirrored based on the level which they were addressing – national, sub-national and local level; supranational; or focus on neither Europe nor national level and below. Finally 13 codes were exclusively developed for the EC/EU political system (Wüst & Volkens, 2003: 6).

In general, in terms of strengths manifesto research allows access to objective data, produces time series data, allows the separation of preferences from behaviour, and provides direct evidence of issue salience for political parties (Marks et al, 2007: 26-27). However, manifesto data only shows the declared salience of an issue, has the added complication of election timing varying from country to country and the data also gives no indication of the level of internal party dissent. Furthermore, election manifestos vary in length, and while the number of sentences towards each issue is presented as a percentage score of the total, some manifestos can be very short which does have an impact on whether it is possible to capture the variation between parties (Marks et al, 2007: 26-27). Volkens (2007: 115-116) noted several important criticisms of conventional content analysis and the MRG/CMP data. Firstly classification schemes are very time consuming. Secondly, the MRG/CMP is confined to those relevant parties in parliament.

Thirdly, with some exceptions the MRG/CMP data is based on the coding of one expert – which does increase the potential for error. Fourthly, associated costs will rise if the datasets are updated due to the increasing number of relevant parties and the general increase in the length of the manifestos. Recently, while there were shortcomings in the underlying coding scheme surrounding the ability to update it (or lack of), it has significant strength of enabling comparisons across time and space (Pennings and Keman, 2002: 66; Benoit and Laver, 2007: 130). Fortunately, the Euromanifestos coding scheme is far younger and more relevant. Another critical issue with the MRG/CMP is the lack of an agreed method of assigning the uncertainty of the estimates. Yet not only is every number estimated in the MRG/CMP dataset generated by a single human coder, but also the manifesto texts themselves represent stochastically generated verbal deposits of party positions whose random character is not represented in MRG/CMP scores (Benoit and Laver, 2007: 130).

The relevant approach within CACA is Wordscore, which was introduced in 2003. The Wordscore approach (Laver, Benoit & Garry, 2003) can be summarised as a method of estimating policy positions when comparing two sets of political texts – the first probabilistic technique for coding political text using neither predefined coding dictionaries nor subjective judgement calls by coders. Words were treated as “data”, based on the assumption that the relative frequencies of the use of specific words by political actors would provide manifestations of underlying political positions (Klemmensen et al, 2007: 748). The method utilises a comparison between “reference” and “virgin” texts. The “reference” texts are sources where *a priori* policy dimensions are already known. These are then compared to “virgin” texts that are a set of texts whose policy positions are not known. A key strength of the approach is the improvement in reliability of the process due to the removal of the human factor from the coding process. It is technically easier, more flexible and cheaper to implement. The word scoring also provides a measure of uncertainty associated with each position score and perhaps most

interestingly non-English language texts – it is essentially language blind (Laver, Benoit & Garry, 2003: 325-328). It is able to provide valid estimates for left-right and economic policy positions, but, up to now, cannot deliver valid estimates for other policy dimensions (Volken, 2007: 109).

There were a number of other pitfalls to CACA and Wordscore in particular, such as a undermining of the validity of the scores obtained due to a lack of words. The technique is also is also dependent on the reference and virgin texts have to sharing properties, which decrease the ability of reference texts to be shared amongst a wide range of political texts available. Each one has to be tailored to the virgin text under study (Klemmensen, 2007: 748). It also suffers from several other criticisms. Firstly, pairwise comparisons seem an inadequate empirical base for generating large sets of scores. Secondly, how should reference and virgin texts be used? Should the reference texts look forwards or backwards in time, and how long are these appropriate for? As they state “the potential for cumulative error here seems very large” (Budge and Pennings, 2007: 123). Furthermore CACA shares all the problems of comprehensiveness, which are attributed to the MRG/CMP because both approaches rely on the same documents - not every party publishes an election program, secondly, not all policy areas are mentioned in all of the programmes, and many programmes are short (Volken, 2007: 109) In addition, the Wordscore approach relies on the relative frequencies of words, ignoring completing their positive or negative connotations in establishing estimates of party locations (Budge and Pennings, 2007: 123-126).

However, one should note that manifesto-based research relies in its entirety on official documentation released by the party, and hence will inevitably not be able to identify aspects of party faction based Euroscepticism, as well as more tactical aspects of the use of Euroscepticism which are not sustained over the medium to long-term. This is a weakness, which is unavoidable within this research. However, as an alternative or complimentary methodological strategy the manifesto-based research approaches can be combined with more qualitative strategies such as

the analysis of newspaper material either using the adapted content analysis schemes or more simplified but related content codes, interviews of party officials or indeed qualitative (or even quantitative) expert survey analysis.

To go into more detail, there are several directions a qualitative approach to the research questions can take. Firstly, one could utilise a qualitative content analysis approach of available manifesto material, as well as other sources – such as newspaper articles and further political speeches, which has the potential benefit of allowing the identification of specific grievances within the categories used by the comparative and European manifesto projects, for example. In this sense it is much more revealing as to how the content of specific scepticism compares over time and between parties. Fundamentally, however, it suffers from significant weaknesses surrounding the accessibility of manifesto material (though this is not necessarily the case for newspaper articles) from the earlier years of the time frame; the language barrier presents a significant problem for comparative analyses as it requires multiple language competencies in order to conduct large-n analyses; and finally, the time-scale (provided that the language barrier could be overcome through the use of translations – itself potentially problematic) is incredibly time-consuming for one researcher.

Secondly, qualitative interviews of party officials have the potential to yield extremely important content-rich data. This approach provides the promise of revealing data on party factionalism, as well as the importance of and how Euroscepticism was used in the election campaigns. However, it does have a number of shortcomings. There is the potential for data on the earliest elections to be less accurate given the amount of time that has elapsed, as well as the potential contamination from later events. Furthermore, the accessibility of some senior party officials may be limited given their seniority and busy roles, some of those involved in the earlier elections of the period may well now be deceased given that the 1989 elections were over twenty-one years ago. Finally,

the cost factor may also be prohibitive with a large-n study. These issues potentially could lead to a significant number of missing cases or a much more restrictive study.

The final appropriate approach is that of the informal qualitative expert survey approach. Specifically, this takes much of the same approach as that of the formalised quantitative survey, but without the aim of positioning each party on a specific numerical scale. In particular, it is relatively cost-effective, easy to administer, and potentially covers a large number of parties. However, it still suffers from the same weaknesses as the more formalised variety – namely validity with respect to the definition of the party, time-scale, and cause and effect (see Budge, 2000; Volkens, 2007: 117). It is the informal nature with which this thesis is specifically opposed. The criteria for judging parties are considerably more opaque, and offer little possibility of error calculations and testing.

RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY

Though alluded to above, it is helpful to review and discuss the issues in more detail. In terms of reliability the approaches being quantitative in nature allow for the testing and retesting of estimates created during the process of analysis. However, as Volkens (2007: 118) notes as CACA relies on word counts, the measurement problem of getting the same results whenever the process is repeated is no problem. Expert surveys and the MRG/CMP can have problems with this too. With expert surveys, it depends on the number of experts available, but with sufficient numbers reliability can be checked and outliers deleted. The MRG/CMP has also been subjected to many reliability tests with encouraging results.

In terms of validity, Ray (2007: 12) identified four types of validity – content, criterion, convergent, and construct. The first was concerned with whether the concept was clear and measures fully represented what the concept was focussing on. The second refers to the comparison of the measure with another generally accepted measure of the same concept. The

third involves a comparison of alternative measures of the same concept. The final refers to an assessment as to whether a measure relates to other observed variables in a way, which is consistent with pre-existing theoretical predictions. These should correlate with each other. He found between the alternative approaches some discrepancy between the directional conception of the political space for content validity; for convergent validity, strong commonality between the expert survey measure, mass perceptions, electorate self-placement and manifesto data, when relative EU references were used, the exception was the roll-call method; and finally the construct validity produced similar results between expert, mass survey and roll call scores, but markedly different results with manifesto data. Marks et al (2007: 24) concluded that despite both having flaws, expert surveys and manifesto data arrived at reasonably valid measures of party positioning on European integration, although they believed that expert survey data with the current datasets were the most accurate.

Finally, Volkens (2007: 117) identified several concerns over validity for expert surveys, MRG/CMP and CACA analyses. She argued that the major concern for expert surveys over validity were with the definition of party, time scale and cause and effect. However, with the MRG/CMP, country and time specific issues which are fitted into abstract policy positions is actually highly contextual, and the method consists of a qualitative judgement as to which category is most appropriate, though all questionable results can be checked by looking at the text base. Lastly, with CACA different methods rely on differing levels of human intervention and the approaches, which rely more heavily, come closer to conventional content analysis strengths and weaknesses. Overall one can argue that with the access to objective data, the avoidance of later events contaminating the data, the provision of reasonably valid results, and the access to pre-existing data – rather than need to commission a new expert survey all demonstrate the importance of analysing CMP/Euromanifesto data in this thesis.

STRUCTURE

The thesis will be structured as follows:

Chapter two explores the existing literature related to the research topic of party-based Euroscepticism. Academic research on this area of study is now extensive. There are four areas that are directly linked to the inquiry. These are the Eurosceptic party mapping and causation; the impact of Europe on the party system; area studies based work using single country cases studies; and finally public Euroscepticism. However, other areas of literature are also relevant. In particular, this includes the Europeanisation of political parties; National and European Election/Manifesto research; and finally first and second-order elections. Critically the main focus of this chapter will be on examining the four areas identified, which are directly linked to the research question.

Having identified the limitations of the existing literature on Euroscepticism, chapter three will first to construct the multi-dimensional definition and framework. In particular it will focus on examining the individual processes of integration: economic integration – including liberalisation and harmonisation; supranational integration; legal integration; social integration; cultural integration; and foreign policy integration. It will then proceed to examine the theoretical basis behind the party family responses towards European integration. Hypotheses will be drawn up for the individual party families using a modified version of von Beyme (1985) framework. The Liberal party family will be addressed first as it serves as the control group in the multiple-regression analyses¹². Next, the remaining party families will be analysed according to the ordering in the party family framework: Conservative; Socialist and Social Democratic; Christian Democrat; Communist; Agrarian; Ethno-regionalist; and finally the Green parties. The final part of the chapter will question the second-order nature of European elections.

¹² See chapter three for an explanation as to why the Liberal party family was chosen as a control group.

Chapter four will focus on providing an empirical justification for the relevance of European elections. It starts with providing detail on how saliency, as well as the dependent and independent variables will be operationalised. The primary aim is to explore the saliency of Europe in both national and European elections, to identify Eurosceptic political parties, and to explore whether different behaviour is observable between national and European elections. For this third task OLS regression analyses will be employed utilising similar modelling between the two datasets, and also to that employed in Chapter five, and the same dependent variable with both the Comparative and Euromanifestos dataset. The explanatory models use the following variables: Party Families; Country; Year of Election; General Ideological Variables (Foreign Special Relations: positive versus negative, Military: positive versus negative, Internationalism: positive versus negative, Decentralisation versus Centralisation, Free enterprise versus Market Regulation, Welfare: positive versus negative, National Way of Life: positive versus negative, Multiculturalism: positive versus negative; and Constitutionalism: positive versus negative); and finally Alternative Theories (Left-Right position, Gal-Tan¹³ position in 1999, 2002, and 2006, and Median Voter position).

Chapter five presents the empirical results from the quantitative testing of the multi-dimensional framework. Multiple OLS Regression is utilised to test explanatory models utilising the following variables: Party Families; Country; Year of Election; Forms of Integration (party position towards social, supranational, legal, cultural, economic and foreign policy integration); and finally Alternative Theories (Left-Right Position, GAL-TAN position in 1999, 2002, and 2006, and Median Voter position). This allows the first testing of the multi-dimensional hypotheses for party families and with that the first tentative conclusions.

¹³ This is the new politics dimension which positions a party based on whether its values and discourse are in line with green/alternative/libertarian values or traditional/authoritarian values.

Chapter six constitutes the final empirical chapter. It puts the general observations made through predictive positioning to one side and delves deeper into the patterns of behaviour. Firstly, the Eurosceptic parties are identified according to the negative discourses used towards the dimensions in each of the four elections (1989, 1994, 1999, and 2004). Secondly, by grouping parties according to their party families, behavioural trends can be identified. Thirdly alternative party groupings will be examined as subdivisions of the party families according to which accession group they belong to and whether the party is a member of a party system at the geographical core or periphery of the EU. Finally, the theoretical impact of these findings will be discussed.

Chapter seven concludes the thesis by returning to the original research question and evaluates it in light of the empirical evidence provided. The research finds parties compete on multiple dimensions of European integration, and that ideology does indeed contribute strongly to the way in which parties structure the content of their Eurosceptic responses. Furthermore it considers the application of the framework to further cases, and the opportunities for further research.

SUMMARY

This chapter argued that in light of the massive transformation in the relationship between nation states in Europe and the growing supranationality of the European integration process, it is unsurprising to see a growth in critical and concerned voices. Euroscepticism has seen growth amongst political parties, the news and print media, and the public across Europe.

The research question and key aim of the thesis were presented which highlighted that the thesis has set out to identify the level and usage of Eurosceptic discourse by West European political parties in European elections, and to examine causation of the positions observed. While addressing this, the thesis will put forward the core argument which contains five fundamental

elements: the need to develop a more dynamic and nuanced conceptualisation of Euroscepticism; the importance of developing a multidimensional framework to analyse Eurosceptic parties based on the definition; that European elections are not necessarily fought solely on national issues; the role and importance of ideology; and lastly the importance of utilising a quantitative manifesto research strategy to analyse party positions.

It was also demonstrated that on the levels of perception, Euroscepticism has brought the issues of democratic deficit, the Community deficit, and fundamentally the political legitimacy of the project into question, and the articulation of Euroscepticism has been seen at both the party and voter level in member states, the then accession states of Central and Eastern Europe, and the European non-member states.

Working definitions of Euroscepticism in a multi-dimensional setting and party ideology were developed and the approach was outlined. This will entail a quantitative empirical strategy to assess the salience of European issues in national and European elections. Furthermore it will use the single dimension of pro versus anti-EU to assess the behaviour of parties in both elections. Subsequently, the research will apply the multi-dimensional framework, treating each dimension as a separate dependent variable and examining the empirical weight behind party families and the other causation theories presented using multiple OLS regression on data derived from the European manifestos. Finally the approach will shift to consider observed values of individual parties and will apply the more nuanced definition to identify Eurosceptic parties, and to assess the behaviour within party families, and furthermore within accession groups and whether the party is from geographical core or peripheral member state. This is to capture any differences within the party family itself.

The final section of the introduction assessed the different approaches to researching party positions – noting five key techniques: expert surveys, mass survey data, expenditure flows, roll

call voting analysis and manifesto research. Manifesto research was opted for due to the access to more objective data, the avoidance of later events contaminating the data, and the provision of reasonably valid results. In addition, the section also addressed the strengths and weaknesses of qualitative-based approaches to deriving party positions towards the aspects of integration identified.

Looking forward to the literature review, as previously mentioned the fourth aspect of the core argument is the importance of ideology in explaining why political parties adopt Eurosceptic discourse in European election campaigns, hence the detailed discussion of ideology in this chapter. The question of causation is one of the most active areas within the Euroscepticism literature and through investigating the strengths and weaknesses of the existing work in that area – as well as the research in the areas of Eurosceptic party mapping; the party system perspective; single-country case studies; and public Euroscepticism – it will make clear that the issue is still open to question as to whether the phenomenon is derived from party ideology, party strategy or a combination of both. This is especially the case in light of the multi-dimensional developments that this thesis is presenting.


CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review builds on the previous chapter by contouring the existing literature base of the Euroscepticism research and explicitly identifies the relevant gaps in the research in more detail. In particular, the review of the existing research reveals two specific gaps in the literature surrounding the understanding of how parties behave Eurosceptically in elections, and particularly in European elections.

However, there are further aspects that are uncovered. Firstly, as alluded to in the introduction, there are key areas of improvements surrounding the conceptualisation of Euroscepticism which need to be made – especially with regard to its specific focus (on the ideas of integration or its practice), and its multidimensionality. The field has already moved forward with improvements, but there are still areas in which this thesis can innovate – especially surrounding the specific individual dimensions on which parties compete. The discussion of causation will reveal that there are still remaining questions, and with a new set of data, further evidence of party behaviour can be illuminated. Finally, the remaining strands of literature (which the thesis does not directly contribute to) firstly within the single country case study literature reveal the importance of several causal factors – some of which will be included in the comparative study (for example national location of the party); secondly, highlight the relevance of European issues to party competition; and finally provide an understanding of whether a party is reacting to cues from the electorate and vice versa. This final point also highlights the importance of including an assessment of the median voter position in the analysis.

The way in which the overall direction and content of the thesis is linked in with the existing academic literature is presented in figure 1 below:

Figure 1: Strands of Literature



As stated earlier, initially there was a lag in the scholarly treatment of Eurocepticism, due to the early dominance of the IR tradition in examining the processes of European integration (see Marks & Steenbergen, 2002: 883). However, from 1998 onwards, comparative politics scholars began to address the domestic contestation of European integration. Four areas in particular stand out as the most relevant to the research question: Euroceptic party mapping and ideology versus strategy (causation); party system impact; single country case studies; and public Eurocepticism. However, one strand in particular – Euroceptic party mapping and ideology versus strategy – links most strongly to the research question. This area will receive the most attention. The chapter is structured as follows. Firstly the literature on Euroceptic party mapping and causation will be addressed and the themes within the strand will be identified and the key literature critically analysed individually. The chapter will progress on to discuss the remaining strands: the party system perspective, single country case studies and public Eurocepticism by identifying overall themes and critically evaluating the contributions of each strand.

EUROSCEPTIC PARTY MAPPING AND CAUSATION: IDEOLOGY, STRATEGY OR INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS

Comparative academic research on the phenomenon of party-based Euroscepticism has extensively focused on the issue of causation and it has become the central debate within the literature. In essence, scholars have questioned whether responses to the European integration project are derived from the party's ideological predispositions; whether they are a strategic response to the competitive environment political parties operate in; or whether the structure of institutions has a role in providing incentives or indeed restricting the use of Eurosceptic arguments during the course of party competition.

As previously discussed in the introduction, several themes have developed within the causation debate. Firstly, amongst those scholars who have contended that Eurosceptic party positions are derived from ideology, a number have argued that party families, the left-right dimension or broader left/centre/right-wing ideological preferences are the strongest causal factor (Aspinwall, 2002; Kopecký & Mudde, 2002; Crum, 2007; Hellström, 2008). Another group have contended that party competition towards European integration can be understood through the prism of the left-right dimension and a further dimension – which was orthogonal (Hix & Lord, 1997; Hix, 1999). A related cluster of work have argued that multiple dimensions can be collapsed within these existing patterns of political conflict and second dimension which is related to the left-right dimension but not fused (Hooghe, Marks & Wilson, 2002; Marks, Hooghe, Nelson & Edwards, 2006). A further set has argued that party competition towards European integration derives from cleavage structures or indeed has constituted a new cleavage structure within party systems (Marks & Wilson, 2000; Marks, Wilson & Ray, 2002; Kriesi, 2007).

Secondly, strategic factors have been put forward as causal factor. Euroscepticism is a product of parties' strategic choices in terms of its position within the party system, but also in light of its survival, ideology, organisation and the pursuit of office (Taggart, 1998; Taggart & Szczerbiak,

2001; 2002; Sitter, 2002; 2003; 2004). Finally, the impact of institutional structures has also been put forward as a restriction on the use of Euroscepticism (Lees, 2002; Lees 2008b).

In discussing this strand of the literature in terms of the themes that dominate the analyses, the individual scholarly work has been assigned to the most appropriate category. However, some invariably belong to more than one area. The main analyses will be discussed individually, but the thesis will draw conclusions surrounding the key strengths and weaknesses more comparatively.

To start with however, it is useful to cast light on a research note which mapped out party attitudes towards European integration. Scholars have extensively used it as a source of data. Ray's (1999) party mapping work used a quantitative approach to expert survey data. He analysed West European parties between 1984 and 1996 and he found that on average there was increasing support for integration across the parties over the period under study. In addition, the salience of the issue increased over time, but the unanimity within the party decreased as intra-party dissent became an issue for a number of parties (Ray, 1999: 290-292). Specifically using a single dimension of support was the study's major weakness – this did not allow for those parties that varied in their support towards specific aspects of integration. However, while he was right to examine the dynamic aspects of party positioning across four points in time: 1984, 1988, 1992 and 1996, the methodological approach used increased the potential for positions to be contaminated from behaviour observed at other points in time.

EUROSCEPTICISM AS DERIVED FROM PARTY FAMILIES AND/OR THE LEFT-RIGHT DIMENSION

Four pieces of research fit within this sub-strand of literature, which is concerned with Euroscepticism being derived ideologically in the form of party family behaviour and/or policy spaces on the traditional left-right dimension. Aspinwall (2002: 82-85) examined the impact of political ideology on the preferences of member state governments towards integration. He conceived of ideology not in party family terms, but broad left-wing, centre, and right-wing tendencies. Mapping two dimensions of the conflict – the left-right and the domestic-

international, he found that ideology appeared to be a good indicator of positions towards integration. It essentially acts as a "...transmission device between voter choice and party, and between parliamentary parties and coalition government". It explained nearly 70% of both party positions on integration and governmental positions on the Amsterdam IGC (Aspinwall, 2002: 105). Aspinwall's (2002) conclusion is particularly important in highlighting the relevance of ideology to party positions. However, his decision to simplify ideology in broad left, centre and right-wing tendencies can be seen as unwise as it disguises the serious differences within each category.

Kopecký and Mudde (2002: 298-302) developed a new conceptual framework for examining support and opposition to Europe, as well as Eurosceptic attitudes in particular, focusing on the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. They distinguished between diffuse support, which was concerned about the general ideas of integration, and specific support, which was concerned with the general practice of integration. In addition, they created a fourfold typology using the two dimensions identified – Europhiles versus Europhobes for the dimension of general ideas of European integration; and EU-optimists versus EU-pessimists on the dimension of support for the EU. This led to the following categories: Euroenthusiasts (combining Europhile and EU-optimist positions), Europragmatists (combining Europhobe and EU-optimist positions), Eurosceptic (combining Europhile and EU-pessimist positions), and lastly Euroreject (combining Europhobe and EU-pessimist positions). They found that ideology was the strongest predictor of positions towards both diffuse and specific support, although party strategy had some role to play towards the latter (2002: 319). Kopecký and Mudde's (2002) utilisation of Easton's (1965) concept for diffuse and specific support for regimes was a tremendous addition to the area of research. This separation was necessary, but one has to question whether specific support should be included in the rubric of Euroscepticism as parties will always criticise the practice of a policy or a particular political development, but this criticism

does not mean a rejection of the whole process. Secondly, the research was limited by the number of case studies incorporated into the study - only four East Central European countries were included.

Crum (2007) examined party stances in the referenda on the 2005 Constitutional Treaty. He noted the literature has seen two theoretical explanations - the first argues that it is domestic politics that determines the outcomes of the referenda, and the second argues that the outcomes reflect the well-considered views of the electorate towards the issue being voted on. In identifying the ideological influences of European policy stances he made the case that a core of centre-left and centre-right parties have shown strong support for the European integration project, but a number of peripheral fringe parties on the left and right were more sceptical. In discussing the strategic responses to EU referenda, he argued that governmental parties are bound to support Treaty revisions due to their involvement in the process and potential veto. With opposition parties, those who are permanently in opposition may be tempted to use the opportunity to mobilise against the government. For those not necessarily in permanent opposition, they may be reluctant to take this approach as this may alienate potential future coalition partners. These points were drawn together into two models: the Competitive Party System model, in which governmental parties are left to campaign for the Treaty revisions, with all opposition parties campaigning against it; and the Collusive Party Systems model in which the major opposition parties join with the government to support the treaty amendments, with only fringe parties campaigning against it (Crum, 2007: 64-67).

Overall, he found that ideology predominates when parties determine their stance in referenda on the EU Constitution. In addition, the Collusive Model was found to be dominant in seven out of the ten cases. Crum (2007) makes several important contributions, notably in the behaviour of governing and the non-permanent opposition in reacting to treaties being put to referenda. One question that does arise is how long does a former governing party have to be in opposition

before it is considered a permanent state for the party. There are also cases where non-permanent opposition parties have engaged in the specific criticism of the Constitutional Treaty – i.e. the British Conservatives and the Czech ODS (Civic Democrats). Furthermore, he never makes clear whether the impact of ideology on party stances in referenda is a more generalisable finding beyond the EU Constitution.

Hellström's (2008: 189-191) article addressed the extent to which ideology influenced party stances on the EU issue. He focused on testing three sets of hypotheses focusing on ideology; strategic positioning and national context using pooled national manifesto data from the period of 1970-2003. However, it is his treatment of the dependent variable, which is analytically flawed.

He argued that:

...occasionally parties have the tendency to overemphasise or under underemphasise the issue in certain elections, when international or domestic events temporally increase or decrease the salience of issues relating to European integration. Thus, data related to manifestos published at single points in time do not necessarily accurately reflect the true positions of the parties, and data on the dependent variable that have been smoothed in an appropriate fashion are more likely to be more robust.... (Hellström, 2008: 196).

The critique of Hellström's approach is less concerned with the use of manifesto research as an appropriate source of party positioning data, but his theoretical justification for the alteration of the values of the dependent variable was weak given that his claim was somewhat irrelevant, as how can one define what the "true" position of a party is (see Laver & Garry, 2000: 620). Manifesto research has been developed purely to address how parties positioned themselves at that point in time. Furthermore his emphasis on the issue of autocorrelation and criticism of other studies (e.g. Marks et al, 2002, see page 590 – they were aware of the potential for errors given the time series nature, but argued that the relationships were robust) with this matter (see Hellström, 2008: 198 & 205) are exaggerated. Autocorrelation can be a problem to deal with, only if this approaches the critical level of ≤ 1 or ≥ 3 .

This group of literature has been broadly influential in encouraging a reassessment of ideology as a causal factor in determining the positions taken by parties towards the European integration. Aspinwall's (2002) notion of a transmission device emphasised the continued importance of ideology in that it still frames political conflict amongst political parties and between political parties and the voter level. The IGC was also a particular arena where more nuanced discussions were likely to emerge. Kopecký and Mudde's (2002) notion of diffuse and specific support has also been incredibly useful for developing the multi-dimensional definition (see chapter one and chapter three). Crum's (2007) findings of a continued ideologically supportive core and critical fringe, raised questions of whether away from the setting of a treaty referendum, the core ideological party families do remain supportive, especially as there have been instances of Eurosceptic factions identified (see Taggart, 1998) and even in the most supportive states – such as Germany, mainstream parties have had a limited but significant engagement with critical discourses towards European integration (Reinhardt, 1997; Lees, 2002: 258). Hellström's (2008) work was particularly important for its decision to examine national manifestos as a data source. He used the Comparative Manifestos Project data and applied a single dimension of EU support as the dependent variable producing comparable findings to those using expert surveys (for example, Marks & Wilson, 2000; Marks, Wilson & Ray, 2002).

Critically, however, several weaknesses stood out. In particular, Aspinwall's (2002) decision to conceptualise ideology in terms of broad left, centre and right-wing tendencies, while easier to operationalise, it underestimated the significant differences in policy position within each category. Whilst this was not the case with Hellström (2008) his conceptualisation, despite being easy to operationalise, lacked clarity given the reliance on the single dimension of pro versus anti-EU. The rationale for his smoothing exercise of the dependent variable remained unconvincing, as the nature of a party's true position was unclear.

EUROSCEPTIC POLICY SPACE AS IDEOLOGICALLY DERIVED BUT TWO-DIMENSIONAL

The research on the Eurosceptic policy space being two-dimensional, or at least reducible to two dimensions, has proven extremely influential – in particular with ideological environment being a constraint on action, as well as the identification of multiple dimensions (even if the thesis has disagreed with collapsing them into the two dimensions). Hix and Lord (1997: 26) contended that in general main parties force new movements to compete on traditional issues that result in an amalgamation into the left-right dimension. However, the division between interests that support European integration, and interests that are opposed does not fit into the left-right dimension. Furthermore, the main party families represent ideologies about who gets what under a particular institutional structure. However, the European issue is determined more by national and cultural factors.

Hix (1999: 71-80) developed this further and explored the cognitive/ideological environment or policy space of the EU, utilising a new institutional approach. He argued that the dimensionality of the policy space as well as the ideological location of actors is as much a constraint on action as institutional rules. Hix presented two main dimensions of competition – an integration-independence dimension, which he related to the centre-periphery cleavage, and the traditional left-right dimension. He separated the latter into a libertarian-authoritarian dimension that is concerned with normative aspects of democracy, and the intervention-free market, which is concerned with redistribution, employment, public ownership and welfare. Following on from this two/three-dimensional classification he located social interests within this space through considering class positions, but also combined this with considering the interests of occupational sector interests. In exploring the impact of EU policy space constraints on political parties he focused on testing whether there are two dominant dimensions in the EU policy space; the location of class and sectoral interests limits the options for party differentiation on the

integration-independence dimension; parties would only then compete on the left-right dimension; and finally the main parties could be expected to become more integrationist.

This argument on the ideological constraints posed by previous party programmes resonates strongly with this research thesis. This is why in particular it is important to return to examining the responses to European integration within party families. However, where the research falters slightly is its conception of the main dimensions of competition. With his integration-independence dimension (which is orthogonal), support for European integration is presented as a single dimension. This is a mistake, especially when integration has developed beyond a project of economic liberalisation and the potential is that parties may relate to some aspects of the process, but not to others. This is a situation, which cannot be captured by this model. Furthermore one has to question whether a EU dimension would be orthogonal if it was separated to represent the different aspects of integration. The potential is that it would relate more easily to existing domestic conflicts.

Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002: 965-967) sought to examine whether European integration issues were assimilated into the pre-existing left-right dimension and the new politics dimension. A key development was the idea of disaggregating the European integration process into multiple dimensions. This included a general pro vs. anti integration dimension, as well as dimensions representing environmental policy, cohesion policy, asylum policy, fiscal policy, foreign policy and the expansion of the powers of the European Parliament. They found that peripheral parties were the most Eurosceptic, which surrounded a more pro-integration core of parties. In addition, they found that left-right location constrained positions towards environmental policy, cohesion policy and employment policy (Hooghe, Marks & Wilson, 2002: 985). Later Marks et al (2006) further explored the positions of parties towards European integration and whether they relate to the basic conflicts inherent in domestic politics, but also introduced a new set of case study countries from Eastern Europe. Utilising a two dimensional analysis of left-right positions, and a

green/alternative/libertarian (GAL) vs. traditional/authoritarian (TAN) dimension, they found that in the West parties were clustered around the Left/GAL and Right/TAN positions. In Central and Eastern Europe, the majority of parties are positioned either as Left/TAN or Right/GAL. This is due to Communism being a Left tradition combining traditional and authoritarian positions. Reforms have been the complete opposite of these positions and parties catering for those who lost out in the transition have positioned themselves by emphasising the polar opposite of the reforms, hence Left-TAN. Those catering for transition winners wish to repudiate authoritarianism and state control and hence Right/GAL positions (Marks et al, 2006: 156-160).

Hooghe, Marks and Wilson's (2002) and the later Marks et al (2006) article were two of the standout pieces of research within the strand. The key area of improvement in disaggregating European integration was a breakthrough in understanding European integration and a significant point of focus for this research thesis. However, the choice of examining particular policies is a curious one. Being critical of a policy does not necessarily mean that the party is anti-system, so this does not make clear whether the party position is a rejection of the construction of the policy or supranational involvement in the policy area. Conceptual clarity is compromised here.

Overall with this set of research, Hix's (1999) argument on the ideological constraints posed by previous party positions resonated strongly, as did the multi-dimensionality of the policy space identified by Hooghe et al (2002). Yet with Hix and Lord (1997) and Hix (1999), the orthogonal nature of the integration-independence dimension and its relationship to the centre-periphery cleavage remained unconvincing, given that the multi-dimensionality of integration should mean that some political conflicts would relate to the traditional policy space more readily, and that where a party was located on the integration-independence dimension was likely to vary from process to process. With Hooghe et al (2002) and Marks et al (2006) the selection of dimensions

was a curious one as they did not include social policy, Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the expansion of European legal powers, and cultural policy, for example, which one can argue have become burgeoning areas of European policy.

EUROSCEPTICISM AS IDEOLOGICALLY DERIVED FROM CLEAVAGE STRUCTURES

Marks and Wilson (2000) set out to use cleavage theory to explain the variation in positions taken by national political parties over the period of 1984 to 1996 - utilising Ray's (1999) data. They argued that:

...although the influence of traditional social cleavages has diminished in shaping individual voting choice, we hypothesize that such cleavages may still be powerful in structuring the way political parties respond to new issues (Marks and Wilson, 2000: 434).

Interestingly, they posit an important argument as to why policy positions are not a response to elector incentives. They believed that a citizen's economic interest was not obvious in preferences for or against integration. They also conceived a two-dimensional space – economic and political (Marks and Wilson, 2000: 435-436). Their analyses showed that party family was a much stronger explanatory variable than individual nation-states, though this did vary among the different time periods. Marks and Wilson (2000) highlight the importance of pre-existing ties, or constraints on party behaviour when considering positions towards integration. Despite, the thawing of the original cleavage structures, there is still merit in considering those original responses as a framework or prism with which parties view developments. Again it is the conception of European integration as two-dimensional, which is where the analysis suffers. On the one hand there are both 'economic' and 'political' aspects to the project. However, one needs to be careful when using these two concepts as resource allocation, the idea of a free market, abolishment of internal tariffs, and the establishment of a tariff to trading outside the region are intensely political policies. When these two concepts merge, one is left with an analytical blur. It is far more prudent to consider European integration as a space of multi-dimensional processes.

Marks, Wilson and Ray (2002) tested cleavage theory as an explanation for party positions on European integration in Western Europe against three alternative theories: national context, response to voter issue positions, and finally mainstream parties suppressing competition on this dimension, hence extreme party uptake of the issue. Utilising Ray's (1999) data, they tested four time periods: 1984, 1988, 1992, and 1996, as well as Eurobarometer data. They argued that cleavage theory remains the strongest explanatory theory. Party family explained almost two-thirds of the variance in issue positions. The country variables only explained five percent of the variance. Interestingly, the hypothesis that political parties position themselves according to the median voter position explained sixty-two percent of the variance; however, they stated that this measure mispredicted the positions of the more Eurosceptic Conservative parties. Marks, Wilson and Ray (2002) have similar issues to those of Ray (1999) as they rely on his data, but more importantly they rely on a single dimensional conception of support for integration (though it is very loosely conceptualised). Furthermore, given the way that they operationalised cleavage structures and party families, the independent variables were likely to have shared much of the variance, but perhaps not to the levels where multi-collinearity was an issue.

Kriesi (2007: 84-91) explored the role of European integration in national elections arguing that European integration should be considered in the context of a larger set of processes under the heading of globalisation or 'denationalisation'. Interestingly, parties who most successfully appealed to the losers of the transformations, he argued, would drive the mobilisation of this issue in national politics. In essence he rejected the argument that Euroscepticism was essentially the politics of opposition, and instead conceptualised it as a new cleavage. Identifying two dimensions of competition – economic and cultural – he compared the positions of political parties towards Europe in six countries: Austria, Germany, France, Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UK. He focused on the political debates reported in newspapers and cross-validated the results with manifesto data. Kriesi found that both dimensions were polarising and that cultural

integration had been gaining importance during the 1990s and had shifted from cultural liberalism and the military to concerns about immigration in five countries with the exception of the UK. Euroscepticism was more salient where it had been articulated in cultural terms (Kriesi, 2007: 102-103). Kriesi (2007) put forward an interesting and extremely important proposition – that Euroscepticism constituted a new cleavage. This is probably stretching the concept of a social cleavage too far as we have yet to see a substantial number of parties appearing on both sides and extensive social roots to the issue, for example. His empirical work supported this scepticism. However, his exploration of the dimension of cultural integration was particularly important and an element that should be included within the multi-dimensional framework used in this thesis.

Overall within this strand, there were several important elements that the thesis needs to take account of. Marks and Wilson (2000) fundamentally underlined the importance of pre-existing ties and constraints on party positioning. This is of particular theoretical importance in considering causal factors behind Euroscepticism. Kriesi's (2007) analysis provides for the understanding of a dimension of conflict which had previously received little attention – that of cultural integration. However, Marks and Wilson (2000) and later Marks, Wilson and Ray's (2002) work suffered from their reliance on the single dimension of pro versus anti-EU, which did not take account of the dynamic nature of the integration process. Secondly, it was not clear on the level of shared variance between political party families and cleavage structures. Finally, Kriesi's (2007) argument of European integration representing a new cleavage was questionable given the lack of a substantial number of parties competing against each other and the lack of social roots to the issue.

EUROSCEPTICISM AS DERIVED FROM STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

Taggart (1998) examined Euroscepticism in West European party systems utilising an approach of positioning parties via an informal expert survey (essentially asking around amongst party

experts on the various party systems). In particular, he found that: "...even in the most pro-European countries, it is possible to see significant traces of Euroscepticism" (Taggart, 1998: 364). Taggart (1998: 384) argued that Euroscepticism is often symptomatic of the reaction by certain types of parties to their position within the party system. After applying a twelve-fold ideological party family scheme by adapting von Beyme's classification, he found that Euroscepticism did not easily relate to these party families and different parties in different countries were Eurosceptical. Furthermore he employed a four-fold categorisation of Eurosceptic parties: single-issue, protest-based parties, established parties, and Eurosceptic factions. Protest-based Euroscepticism was the most pervasive type of EU party opposition, but it varied in ideology (Taggart, 1998: 369-373). Clearly, for Taggart Euroscepticism was a combination of ideology and strategic considerations, though weighted more towards the impact of a party's position in the party system. His identification of the four-fold categorisation was particularly persuasive and his methodological approach was well suited to identify these various types. However, when he argued that Euroscepticism created strange ideological bedfellows, his definition did not allow for further nuanced analyses to be conducted, as he could not compare the arguments used by parties (as discussed in the introduction).

Taggart & Szczerbiak (2001) in their collaborative work further developed Taggart's (1998) conceptualisation of Euroscepticism and applied the typology of hard and soft Euroscepticism on cases from Central and Eastern Europe. Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002: 21-29) then provided a comparative study of cases in Western and Central and Eastern Europe. They found that while in the West it was hard to establish whether party families were more prone to Euroscepticism, in Central and Eastern Europe there was a stronger tendency for these to be found on the right of the political spectrum. In contrast to Western Europe, soft Euroscepticism could be found within governmental and opposition parties in the mainstream of the party system. However, it was still a phenomenon of the periphery. It had no clear link between public opinion and party-

based Euroscepticism, and did not relate to prospects for accession. Euroscepticism also did not relate to whether the state was newly independent or an established state. Hard Euroscepticism was much more rare than soft Euroscepticism, with high level of elite consensus towards accession to the European Union. Here the combination of ideology and strategy clearly remained, but with a slightly stronger ideological component for Central and Eastern Europe. They made an important step forward understanding the specific context of Euroscepticism within the (then) accession states, but their classificatory scheme still did not illuminate the specific areas of contestation amongst political parties.

Sitter (2002: 23-24; also see Sitter, 2003; 2004) specifically focused on the role of strategy when he examined whether Euroscepticism was a strategic response to the party environment. He argued that it was a product of parties' strategic choices in the light of its survival, ideology, organisation and the pursuit of office. In addition, that while long-term interests and ideology have more impact, the competition between governing and opposition parties can be expected to impact on party Euroscepticism in the short term. He identified three factors. The first centred on the competition between catch-all parties. Softer forms of Euroscepticism could appear during opposition, but in general Euroscepticism amongst these parties was not expected, though any examples would reduce the opportunity for 'flank' Euroscepticism. The second was based on territorial opposition. This dimension would form a foundation for Euroscepticism based on the extent to which the state was seen as the main form of protection for territorial identity, values and interests. Sitter (2002: 24) stated that:

...the non-economic aspect of opposition may be based on religious or regional identity, and/or opposition to supranational governance; the economic aspect on the economic costs or benefits of membership.

Finally, the third factor is based on the incentives for flank parties to adopt Euroscepticism as part of their protest profile.

Overall one can note several important points with the literature in this sub-section. Despite the conclusion in both Taggart (1998) and Taggart and Szczerbiak (2001; 2002) that Euroscepticism did not relate to ideological party families particularly easily, it is still an area worth exploring. Some party families are definitely more predisposed to Euroscepticism than others and fundamentally, given the broad nature of the conceptualisation, in addition to the lack of clarity with each of the three positions identified, it is an aspect worth returning to. Taggart's (1998) identification of a four-fold categorisation is particularly important, and was obviously aided by the methodological approach utilised. His analysis did suffer from a number of weaknesses. His conceptualisation was too broad and constructed in such a fashion that it was particularly difficult to apply – especially with the second and third position identified. Taggart did not provide a scale in order to determine the saliency of the Eurosceptic positions of the parties he identified (this was later added by Rovny, (2004) using Taggart & Szczerbiak's later conceptualisation). The informal expert surveys were particularly problematic as it has allowed no replication and no review of the data, as well giving little clue as to the time frame used, or the extent to which the party was Eurosceptic, or even towards which aspects. In essence it was too opaque.

Sitter's theoretical contribution has been a very important step in understanding of political party conflict being a combination of strategic choices of ideology and longer-term interests with that of its goals as an organisation. With the first and third form one can see to some extent that coalition politics and the opposition dynamic may have a role in the emphasis of Eurosceptic discourses, but party positions are surely derived from long-term assessments on the ideas of integration. Given the long-term nature of European integration it is questionable whether overall party Euroscepticism would be based on short-term decision-making. In addition, the longer-term territorial opposition could potentially be seen more of a product of the centre-periphery cleavage, and so it is not so much of a strategy, but a shift of the tension traditionally associated towards the nation-state.

Lees' (2002; 2008) contributions constitute the missing element in a theoretical understanding of Eurosceptic causation amongst political parties. Yet at first Lees' (2002) article might seem somewhat out of place in a discussion of the strands of comparative literature, as it focuses on the case of Germany. In particular, it is the emphasis on the impact of institutions on the opportunity structures available for Eurosceptic platforms to succeed which is important. He noted that on the one hand, political elites in Germany have always been seen as an example of a model state and the consensus has been stable over time. Yet, there has been the potential for Eurosceptic discourse to develop as party elites have flirted or made greater use of the issue. There have also been increases in the levels of negative public opinion (Lees, 2002: 244-245). However, German Federalism's institutional design creates patterns of constraint that limit the strategies that can be pursued by political actors. He presented two categories of constraint: polis-constraining – strategies that attempt to constrain the central polity from without – and polis-shaping – strategies which allow the modifying, slowing down or vetoing of integrationist initiatives by engaging with the pro-European majority directly at the national level. From this he presented a further two categories of agenda: sustained agendas – which are developed across time and reflect the core values of the actor – and heresthetic agendas – which are exercises in manipulation in an attempt to change the balance of political forces by introducing a new dimension of issue salience (Lees, 2002: 246-249).

Lees (2008b: 28-29) noted that party systems could in effect be causal drivers of Euroscepticism as the varying institutional settings may impact on 'political opportunity structures'. Quoting (Tarrow, 1994:18) Lees described:

...political opportunity structures as consistent...dimensions of the political environment...state structures create stable opportunities, but it is changing opportunities within states that provide the openings for political action (Lees. 2008b: 29).

He put forward arguments surrounding the impact of federal and unitary structures, the party system and also the electoral system. Lees (2008: 31) theorised that federations should provide more opportunities for Eurosceptic parties due to the importance of sub-national party systems and the constitutional checks and balances between the tiers of government. In addition, he argued that ‘in principle, majoritarian systems hold the danger of producing a tyranny of the majority whilst proportional systems hold the potential to provide a more effective ‘voice’ for minority positions, including Eurosceptic positions’, though he admits that this is over-simplified. (Lees, 2008: 38-39). In terms of findings he found that it was difficult to identify a clear causal relationship between institutions and the presence and relative strength of party-based Euroscepticism. This would be difficult to further assess empirically on a large-n study due to difficulties of operationalising electoral systems, party systems, and the impact of federations versus unitary structures. These surround the appropriate selection of the various classificatory schemes and whether the regional party actors would engage at the European level.

Clearly within the comparative literature on Eurosceptic party mapping and causation, there has already been a tremendous amount of scholarly attention. However, there have been some clear omissions, and some specific weaknesses, as well as some specific components, which can be utilised or explored further.

Firstly, in terms of focusing on specific arenas where Euroscepticism has been observed, there have been two pieces which have examined national elections (Kresi, 2007; Hellström, 2008); one which has focused on the Amsterdam IGC (Aspinwall, 2002), one on the Constitution referenda (Crum, 2007); and only one which has focused on the European arena (Hix, 1999). The remainder have examined Eurosceptic behaviour as a whole. With the exception of Hix, who examined Euro party federations, no one has examined the use of Eurosceptic discourse in European election campaigns. This is a clear gap in the literature, which the thesis has set out to plug.

Secondly, as discussed earlier in the introduction, there are various conceptual weaknesses to overcome. Taggart's (1998) and later Taggart and Szczerbiak's (2001; 2002; 2003; 2008) framework was too broad – focusing attention on party discourses which were aimed at critiquing the benefits of membership, the general ideas behind European integration, and the institutions and policies of the EU. This has been improved on by the work of Kopecký and Mudde (2002), as well as Lubbers and Scheepers (2005) who treated these as separate dimensions of contestation. However, they should be treated as separate phenomena. Euroscepticism should refer to diffuse support – support for the general ideas of European integration. In addition, any evaluation of party positions also needs to take account of pro-Europeanism as well as Eurosceptic positions. This has been taken account of by Flood (2002), as well as those engaged in dimensional analyses (for example, Ray, 1999; Marks and Wilson, 2002; Marks, Wilson, and Ray, 2002; Hooghe, Marks and Wilson, 2002). Euroscepticism is possible towards multiple elements of the integration project, and while this has been taken account of by (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002) and Marks et al (2006) these multiple dimensions do not refer to all the major areas, nor focus solely on the general ideas of integration. This is a clear area which where some of the developments can be utilised, and further progress made.

PARTY SYSTEM IMPACT

The third strand that was identified revolved around the party system perspective and considered whether European integration had changed the format or the dynamics of existing domestic conflict, and specifically whether conflicts over European integration were assimilated into pre-existing structures of party competition or whether the issue had produced a new cleavage. Mair (2000) argued that there has been almost no direct impact of Europeanization on national party systems, though there may have been stronger indirect impacts. With the format of the party system, he argued that:

Europe has clearly generated new parties, particularly within that segment of opinion that is hostile or sceptical towards (further) European integration. But while such new parties have emerged, they have tended to remain confined to the European electoral arena (Mair, 2000: 30-31).

With mechanics of party competition, Mair (2000: 31-34) stated that while amounting to 17% of parties across the party systems of member states, the anti-Europe bloc polls very few votes and hence they have little influence. Additional factors such as extreme domestic ideologies explained the remaining variation. By Mair's own admission the study was limited, and it is fair to say that in some countries it had generated what amounted to an electoral cleavage, for example United Kingdom and France (Gabel, 2000a: 57).

Sitter (2002) argued that approaching Euroscepticism as a cleavage brought the question of concept stretching into play. He stated, referring to Lipset and Rokkan's cleavage model, that in the:

...[with] more sociological interpretations of the model, new cleavages should therefore shape party system re-alignment, while mere 'issues' would have a less dramatic effect (Sitter, 2002: 7).

Euroscepticism has not provided much evidence of an effect on the social structure, nor on values and beliefs or in producing an organisational reaction within parties (Sitter, 2002: 7-9). Much of the American literature (for example, Marks and Wilson, 2000; Marks, Wilson and Ray, 2002; Marks et al, 2004), in addition to stating that ideology is strong predictor of support for European integration, argued that conflict over European integration has been amalgamated into existing patterns of conflict within national party systems, i.e. the left-right dimension.

Taggart and Szczerbiak (2008; 348-363) noted three patterns of competition, which characterise party systems over the European issue. The first is a system of limited contestation. This system entails that the major parties display a strong commitment to European integration and that integration is not a source of competition for the mainstream. However, this does not imply the

absence of Euroscepticism, but it is essentially confined to the periphery. Examples of party systems displaying this behaviour include Germany, France, Italy, Finland, Belgium, Ireland and Spain (Taggart and Szeczerbiak, 2008: 348-353). The system of open contestation had three relevant characteristics: one or more parties of government have taken a position of Euroscepticism; European integration is an important component in party competition, but this is not to say it is electorally salient; and that the European issue has played a role in either determining the make-up of government or played an important role in determining the leadership of a major party. Examples included Britain, Greece (in the early period after democratisation), Malta, Denmark, Czech Republic, Sweden, Austria, and Norway (Taggart and Szeczerbiak, 2008: 348-349, & 354-358). The third system is that of constrained contestation. This is where European issues play a role and where Euroscepticism is present, but European issues do not generally affect party competition as it is framed in the inevitability of involvement in the integration process. Here the vast bulk of the 2004 accession member states could be considered as examples.

Clearly, within this strand, there has been considerable disagreement over the impact of Europe on the party system. While Mair's (2000) argument is fairly clear over the direct impact of Europe on party systems, it tends to downplay, or underestimate the issue and despite this, the issue does remain important. Europe is not as divisive an electoral issue as the economy, for example. However, as Gabel (2000) and Taggart and Szeczerbiak (2008) have demonstrated, in some party systems Europe has had a more significant impact. What this underlines is the need to assess the overall impact of the country of origin of the political parties as a key independent variable.

SINGLE COUNTRY CASE STUDIES

The single country case study approach, while not the overall focus of this research thesis, has been particularly strong at identifying Euroscepticism amongst centralist and peripheral parties in the party system, as well as identifying national contextual factors for the use of Euroscepticism

amongst political parties and the general public. Most studies have made use of in-depth qualitative assessments, or mixed methods with a heavy qualitative bias. They have used a mixture of party documents, parliamentary and newspaper archives, interviews; and in some cases Eurobarometer data. There were roughly four categories of contextual factors identified in the literature: structure of the party system and institutional structures; ideology; geopolitical and historical traditions; and utilitarian concerns. However, through necessity these were broad categories.

With the structure of the party system factor, two articles were relevant. Grunberg (2008: 40-41) identified several variables in the French political system which help explain the take up of European issues by certain parties since 1991 - the position of the party in relation to holding office; the alternation between the moderate right and moderate left; the path dependence of previous policy choices for both Mitterand and Chirac; the tempered hostility of the Communist Party; and finally the neutralization of the issue by Mitterand and Chirac due to internal divisions within their respective parties. He found that the development and current situation of Eurosceptic parties was closely linked to the structure of the party system. The major left and moderate right could not exercise Euroscepticism due to their involvement with the integration process. Aylott (2008: 196-199) argued that the translation of those fears was influenced by the ideological predisposition of the Swedish Left and Centre Party, as well as the Christian Democrats and Greens. The Social Democrats had a similar but weaker Eurosceptic pull. However, structural factors also aided the use of Eurosceptic discourse such as the character of the party system and Swedish parliamentary democracy.

The institutional structures factor saw two relevant pieces. As addressed earlier, Lees (2002: 244-245) noted that on the one hand political elites in Germany have always been seen as example of a model state and the consensus has been stable over time. In addition, despite the potential for Eurosceptic discourse to develop as party elites have flirted or made greater use of the issue, as

well as increases in the levels of negative public opinion, Germany's federal system design creates patterns of constraint that limit the strategies, which can be pursued by political actors. As far as the national parties go, while they did exhibit positions on integration, these were secondary to their wider ideological profiles (Lees, 2008: 35-37).

Three pieces identified ideology as an important contextual factor, though Euroscepticism was part of a wider ideological profile. Quaglia's (2008: 58-59) study on Italian Euroscepticism posited the argument that with the case of Italian Euroscepticism that while the pro-European attitudes of citizens have continued, Eurosceptic positions have mostly surfaced in the centre-right parties. She noted that there was very little discussion on the direction of integration, and the critique of the EU has taken on the appearance of an extension of domestic politics (Quaglia, 2008: 73). Gilland (2008: 130-133) found evidence for both soft and hard Irish Eurosceptic parties, though most tended to be left-wing. Furthermore, Euroscepticism for these parties was only a small part of their wider ideological profile. Salience of the issue remained low and this restricted parties aiming to profile themselves on their Euroscepticism, and finally that the ideological constraints on parties in the system were quite severe. Overall, Euroscepticism has continued to be a peripheral phenomenon in the Irish political system. Fallend (2008: 201-204) found that ideology played a dominant role in the positioning of Austrian Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, and more lately the Greens who moderated their stance to campaign for EU-level environmental policy. Before the leadership of the late Jörg Haider, the position of the FPÖ could be explained by ideology and afterwards explained more by the position of the party on the periphery of the party system.

A large number of articles did identify particular geopolitical, historical and traditional factors in the use of Euroscepticism in the cases under study. This was perhaps the broadest category with other factors coming into play as well. Baker, Gamble, Randall and Seawright (2008: 115-116) were keen to point out with the British case that while there has been a powerful predisposition

to Euroscepticism due to distinctive geopolitical, economic, constitutional interests and traditions, the fluctuating usage of Euroscepticism showed political parties adapting to the opportunities and constraints provided by the supranational level. Gómez-Reino, Llamazares and Ramiro (2008: 148-149) argued that the articulation of Euroscepticism was strongly conditioned by the historical characteristics of the Spanish party system. The orientation of parties was also conditioned by the ideological views of party politicians. Soft Euroscepticism was connected with fears that integration would reduce public expenditure and damage the welfare state. Peripheral nationalities were fearful that integration would negatively affect their aims.

Hainsworth, O'Brien and Mitchell (2004) explored the Eurosceptic French right wing, noting that while it has been at the forefront of the leadership of European integration, it is still a country of strong nationalist sentiments, long history of nation-state construction and assimilationist-minded imperialism, and therefore not surprisingly does have its own Eurosceptic parties. Sunnus (2004) argued that Euroscepticism in Sweden focuses on issues of democracy and sovereignty, particularly over neutrality and the influence of smaller states; the inequality in federalism; and issues of gender inequality at the supranational level.

Spiering (2004: 137-147) posited several explanations for the existence of British Euroscepticism - the historical position of the UK in the international system; 'differentness' in terms of political structures; the British adversarial political system; psychological reasons such as different formative experiences and the 'national psyche'; and national identity. Lastly, Pelinka (2004: 207-209) argued that there was no significant fundamental Euroscepticism in Austria, but there remained significant differences in positioning between the relevant actors. He accounted for this variation by arguing that specific Austrian factors were at play – delayed EU membership, permanent neutrality, and the geopolitical situation. This was in addition to the traditional explanations put forward such as the political and ideological position of actors, left versus right and elite versus masses.

With the final category, two pieces identified utilitarian concerns behind the use of Euroscepticism. The first, Busch and Knélangen (2004: 83-88) explored German Euroscepticism both at the level of the public and political party elites. They noted that “...German public opinion, social elites, and political parties have harmoniously supported integration...” (2004: 83). Yet from the 1990s onwards the level of public support fell below the EU average. They posited explanations such as the impact of the single market, legitimacy and democratic quality, and aversion to the introduction of the Euro. With the second, Harmsen (2004: 103-120) identified Eurosceptic discourse which highlighted the importance of further liberalisation, the abandoning of Social Europe, importance of subsidiarity and particularly reductions in budget contributions.

As Lees (2006: 1096-1097) noted, with the single-country case study literature, the rationale is to explain political phenomena by relying on the rich contextual data derived from comparisons over time, while balancing the issues of breadth versus depth, micro and macro level understandings, rich description and abstraction, as well as inductive versus deductive approaches. Specifically, weaknesses can arise as the single country perspective can be prone to develop models which are more inductively grounded in a specific context, as well as misusing or leading to the hybridization of concepts. The key issue in this thesis though, is to avoid the idea that some countries are more culturally bound to be Eurosceptic and to develop a theoretical understanding, which is compatible with numerous contexts. In addition for large-n studies, the methodological approach is too time consuming and resource intensive to replicate across multiple cases. Yet, there is much that this thesis can take from this section of the existing research, specifically the importance of assessing the national context as an independent variable (though the thesis continues to underline the rejection of the notion of cultural exceptionalism) that was mentioned earlier, and the continued underlining of the importance of ideology in explaining why parties are more predisposed to the use of Euroscepticism than others – which this thesis has stated as a core argument.

PUBLIC EUROSCEPTICISM

Considerable academic attention has been directed towards examining public Euroscepticism and public attitudes towards Europe in member states, candidate-states and non-member states. A consistent theme when considering public opinion is that a permissive consensus¹⁴ existed and that this has eroded with citizens becoming more aware post-Maastricht. Eichenberg and Dalton (2007:128-134) noted that support for integration grew during the 1980s, but this began to decrease the following the ratification of Maastricht Treaty. They found it was EMU, which changed the basis on which citizens evaluate EU policy performance. In particular, the pre- and post-Maastricht periods show that the implications of EMU became apparent and that citizens feared cuts in governmental spending. The evidence also points to the possibility of citizens fearing the harmonisation of social security and other policy areas (Eichenberg & Dalton, 2007: 143-145). So while there has been academic attention towards public opinions before 1992, it has become much more relevant post-Maastricht, as well as pre- and post-EMU.

Specifically, the focus has been on attempting to establish causal relationships between individual, societal and structural variables and attitudes towards European integration. In particular, scholars have concentrated on economic reasoning and utilitarian considerations (Anderson & Shawn Reichart, 1996; Gabel, 1998a; McLaren, 2002; Hooghe and Marks, 2004; Ray, 2003a; Ray, 2003b; Luedtke, 2005; Christin, 2005; Hooghe, Huo & Marks, 2007; Liebert, 1997; Gabel, 1998b; Sørensen, 2008). Attention has also been given as to whether opinions held by citizens are nationally derived or whether they are a product of particular EU events and/or an understanding of the European integration processes (Anderson, 1998; Kritzinger, 2003; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2005; Karp & Bowler, 2006; Carruba, 2001; Ray, 2003b; Hooghe & Marks, 2005; Mattila & Raunio, 2006). In addition, an important concern within the literature has been whether public Euroscepticism is a product of elite 'cueing' or whether the public is indeed

¹⁴ See Lindberg and Scheingold, 1979

cueing Eurosceptic parties to represent their fears and concerns over the process of integration (Binzer and Hobolt, 2005; 2006; De Vries, 2007; Gabel and Scheve, 2007; Steenbergen et al, 2007; Hix, 2007; Hooghe & Marks, 2008). Finally, there have been studies focused on small-N studies (for example Haesly, 2001).

While the thesis has taken the approach of studying Euroscepticism in the arena of national political parties, the literature towards public Euroscepticism is still an important influence. In particular, the sub-section of research asks an important question on the direction of Eurosceptic cueing – whether party Euroscepticism is derived from a Eurosceptic public or whether the public becomes Eurosceptic due to the engagement of parties towards the issue within the national party system. What the thesis can take from this is the need to consider this cueing effect as an important independent variable. It essentially asks whether the party is responsive to the position of the median voter.

SUMMARY

This detailed review of the literature has highlighted several key areas of improvement, which form the main gaps in the literature. There are several improvements that need to be made to the conceptualisation of Euroscepticism, which have also been highlighted in the introduction. Firstly, with regard to the specific focus of Euroscepticism it has previously been too broad. While this aspect of the criticism has received theoretical attention, it can be taken further by focusing solely on the general ideas of integration. Secondly, there has been too much focus on European integration as a single dimension of pro versus anti-EU and as a dual dimension of economic and political integration. While the field has begun to address the multi-dimensionality of the European policy space, this is an area in need of further theoretical work – especially surrounding the inclusion of further dimensions of political competition, and the focus on processes rather than policies.

The field of causation has revealed two specific areas in which this thesis innovates. Currently, there has been little attention given to how parties behave Eurosceptically during elections, and specifically how national parties use Euroscepticism in European elections. There are still remaining questions over the strength of the existing causal factors and with a new set of data further evidence of party behaviour can be illuminated. In addition, the literature also highlighted the extensive use of expert surveys – which were less accurate in time-series analyses, and did not allow the analytical focus to be cast solely on election campaigns – be it national elections, or the far less studied European elections.

More generally, each strand of literature has provided some valid insights. In particular, the party system mapping and causation literature provided evidence that Euroscepticism was a much broader phenomenon and one that now impacted on even the most pro-European countries. It also demonstrated the fluidity of Eurosceptic opinions over the time period, and also the importance of considering the impact of the ideological party families, cleavage structures and the party's strategic environment in determining the response to the integration project.

The party system perspective literature was particularly important in highlighting the general agreement surrounding the impact of Euroscepticism on party system dynamics and patterns of party competition. Overall, to describe Euroscepticism as the embodiment of an new electoral cleavage, in most cases was to stretch the concept of a cleavage structure, but fundamentally Euroscepticism amongst some of the member states has become an important component in domestic party competition amongst countries such as Britain, Malta, Denmark, Czech Republic, Sweden, Austria and Norway.

The single country case study literature identified several causal factors in the use of Euroscepticism. In particular four themes emerged concerning the structure of the party system and institutional structure; ideology, geopolitical and historical traditions; and finally utilitarian

concerns. Two of these – ideology and geopolitical and historical traditions – will be assessed in the comparative analyses.

Finally, the public Euroscepticism research was significant in understanding the interaction between the citizen and political party on the issue of European integration. In particular, the scholarly work focused on the theme of the breakdown of the permissive consensus, establishing causal relationships between attitudes towards the EU and individual, societal and structural variables, whether citizens derived their opinions from national discourses or particular EU events, and/or a particular understanding of the process. The critical element was the study of elite versus public cueing of positions towards integration, which will be included in the comparative analysis in the form of the median voter position.

Looking forward, the literature review, as well as the contributions in the introduction provides several areas, which need substantial theoretical consideration. Clearly, the conceptualisation of Euroscepticism needs to be addressed in light of the criticisms detailed above. Two of the core elements of the argument emphasise the need for a dynamic and nuanced conceptualisation that takes account of the multi-dimensionality of the policy space. In addition, the fourth core element in the argument stressed that political parties are predisposed to react to integration in certain ways by their party ideology, operationalised in terms of party families. This will be investigated theoretically and hypotheses drawn up. Finally, as stated above, there has been a lack of research into party positions towards European integration during election campaigns, and especially in European election campaigns. This will need to be concentrated on theoretically in light of the traditional view of these elections being dominated by national issues.

CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

As stated earlier, the thesis has set out with the overall aim to identify the level and usage of Eurosceptic discourse by West European political parties in European elections and to examine Eurosceptic causation towards the multi-dimensional integration process. The introduction set out the five elements of the core argument: the need for a dynamic and nuanced conceptualisation of Euroscepticism; the importance of developing a multi-dimensional framework to analyse Eurosceptic parties based on that definition; the importance of Europe despite the second-order nature of European elections; the role and importance of ideology in structuring political party responses to European integration; and finally the importance of using a quantitative manifesto research strategy to examine Euroscepticism in election campaigns.

This chapter provides the theoretical underpinnings to four of the core arguments stated above. In addressing the first two elements, it returns to the previous discussions on the weaknesses of the existing conceptualisations of Euroscepticism examined in chapters one and two, and concentrates on adjusting the field of focus for the phenomenon to analyse the critiques of parties towards the general ideas of European integration. It opts for dimensional analyses to allow the assessment of pro-European attitudes, and addresses the multi-dimensionality of European integration by identifying areas of increased integration, which are then later explored within the chapter. In examining the third aspect of the core argument - the role of ideology in structuring party positions, it utilises the findings from the discussion of ideology in chapter one, and adapts Marks and Wilsons (2000) theoretical discussion on the impact of historical predispositions of parties, but departs from their theory by underlining the appropriateness of party families as the unit of study. With the final core element of the main argument, the chapter inserts a caveat into the second-order theory of European elections.

The chapter is structured as follows. Firstly, several theoretical developments will be utilised to identify appropriate dimensions for studying party positions towards European integration. From this, the new approach to conceptualising Euroscepticism will be presented and the forms of integration individually analysed to understand the background to these processes. The chapter will then move on to discuss causation and produce a set of hypotheses for testing, based on a modification of von Beyme's (1985) party family framework. Finally, the caveat to the second-order model of European elections will be presented.

THE MULTI-DIMENSIONAL EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS

It was Hooghe et al (2002: 966) argument surrounding the need to disaggregate European integration into its particular components that provided the theoretical impetus for the multi-dimensional approach. However, the question remains as to how this should be achieved, and what should be focused on in the analysis. Hooghe et al (2002: 967) identified seven policy areas: EU environmental policy, EU cohesion policy, EU asylum policy, EU employment policy, EU fiscal policy and expanding the EP's powers. However, this to some extent appears to be quite limited. Lubbers and Scheepers (2005: 228) identified several policy areas in their analysis: currency; defence; scientific and technological research; foreign policy towards countries external to the EU; fight against drugs; protection of the environment; immigration; asylum seekers; education; health and social welfare; fighting unemployment; basic rules for broadcasting and the press; and cultural policy. While their research was specifically focused on public Euroscepticism, they did identify several important areas such as currency, foreign policy, aspects of social policy and cultural policy.

However, the strongest influence was earlier work of Hooghe and Marks (2001: 17-18). They identified that Qualified Majority Voting had been extended to policy fields in the first pillar to such processes as the single market, competition policy, EMU, regional policy, trade, environment, research and development, transport, employment, immigration, social policy and

education. It has also been extended to some of the decision-making in the Common Foreign and Security Policy pillar and to the Justice and Home Affairs pillar. It is the identification of these pillars, which forms the theoretical basis behind considering additional aspects of integration. Clearly the move towards the single market and EMU signified economic forms of integration. The dimension of supranational integration takes account of stances towards the growing levels of governance at the supranational level. In addition, legal integration has been one of the fundamental bases behind the success of economic integration.

EUROSCEPTICISM

As discussed earlier in the introduction, within the literature there were two broad approaches to conceptualising the phenomenon, the first of which focused on a very inclusive definition of Euroscepticism and used qualitative research strategies. The inclusive definition (Taggart, 1998; Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2001; 2002; 2003; 2008) incorporated instrumental concerns (such as whether membership was of benefit to the country), diffuse support - support for the general ideas of integration (see Kopecký and Mudde, 2002), and specific support - support for the practice of integration (see Kopecký and Mudde, 2002). Furthermore initially Euroscepticism was treated as analytically separate from pro-Europeanism. While some of these issues were later addressed by separating the concerns (Kopecký and Mudde, 2002; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2005) and including pro-Europeanism (Flood, 2002), there were two further issues that were not addressed. These were the multi-dimensionality of the European integration project and the problem of typologies. Taggart and Szczerbiak's (2001; 2002; 2003; 2008) two-category classification was very strong in being applicable to multiple cases, but told the analyst very little about what the individual parties shared in terms of their more nuanced positions towards European integration. On the other end of the scale Flood's (2002) typology had so many categories that not only was it difficult to apply to more than one case study due to the extensive

qualitative and nuanced data necessary, it suffered from the perennial problem in comparative political science of too many variables and not enough cases.

On the other side of the research field, the analyses dealt with many of the issues facing those qualitative researchers mentioned above, but their approach had its own inherent problems. Initially, they also suffered from taking a too inclusive approach to studying party positions towards integration. While both pro and anti positions were included, they conceptualised the policy space as a single pro versus anti-EU dimension (Ray, 1999), and alternatively as high versus low regulation (Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000 in Marks and Steenbergen, 2002: 886). Subsequently, a dual dimensional conceptualisation was used. This included both economic and political integration – which were then subsumed within left-right dimension.

Later, the multi-dimensionality of European integration was addressed which constituted a strong step forward within the field (Hooghe, Marks & Wilson, 2002; Marks et al, 2006). However, several issues remain. These revolve around the continued highlighting of the relevance of the left-right dimension in which the multiple dimensions they identify are then subsumed, as well as whether the dimensions identified are the most relevant new areas of conflict towards integration. In addition, the separation of behaviour (whether party positions reflect criticisms towards the general ideas behind integration, or specific issues with the content of each policy area) needs to be achieved at least at the theoretical level, even if it is more difficult to accomplish empirically.

The new definition used in this research was presented in the introduction, but the theoretical rationale behind its construction will be further investigated below. Having established the multi-dimensional nature of the contemporary European integration process above, the focus needs to be turned towards the essence of the Eurosceptic phenomenon. Katz (2008: 154), in considering his own use of the concept of Euroscepticism asked several significant questions and

observations. Firstly, he asked what is the ‘scepticism’ aspect of the phenomenon of Euroscepticism. As it has been developed it generally denotes opposition to the European project, however the term ‘scepticism’ usually refers to doubts and reservations, rather than outright rejection. This is a fundamental point in developing the new definition and analytical framework. So the question is what can Euroscepticism refer to and in developing a definition of the concept what ‘should’ it refer to?

Forster’s (2002:2) argument that “Euroscepticism can be understood by taking account of its multi-faceted nature” is an important consideration when theorising what Euroscepticism consists of. Euroscepticism in its simplest form referred to negative opinions towards European integration. Potentially this can encompass a broad range of opinions on European integration – past, present and future; its nature – whether that is its economic, political, social or cultural aspects; its method of organisation – for example its institutions, the perceived lack of democratic legitimacy amongst some or all of the institutions; its policy areas – their negative externalities towards the interests of member states, and also possibly the growth or decline of these areas. It can also include the centralisation of decision-making, the potential and achieved efficiency in all areas of interest; the perceived growth of European integration, and finally where integration should finish – where should Europe’s borders lie and how many member states should the European Union encompass.

Picking up on the ‘finish line’ of European integration, Lindberg and Scheingold (1970: 24) noted when considering how to evaluate the growth and achievements of the EC that:

One obvious referent is the nation-state, but except among some federalists, a new European super-state has never been posited as the necessary end-point of the integrative process.

That a new European super-state had never been conceived - especially during the early history of the Community - as an end point is an important consideration when evaluating whether

scepticism towards a “European state” can be construed as Euroscepticism. Conversely, Euroscepticism could also include those opinions, which are critical of the slowing or the current rate of European integration.

Euroscepticism had already been considered as being limited to a more narrow conceptualisation: in terms of being pro- or anti-integration (Ray, 1999); high or low regulation (Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000 in Marks and Steenbergen, 2002: 886); and an integration-independence dimension orthogonal to the left-right (Hix, 1999: 73). However, despite this, it was Hix (1999: 69-70) that laid the groundwork necessary to move on from considering integration as uni-dimensional, but also the importance of considering its multi-faceted terms. He argued that:

...the EU is now more of a ‘political system’ than an international organisation. The EU has a trias politica: with executive, legislative and judicial functions. The amount of resources that are directly redistributed through the exercise of these functions may be marginal compared to the domestic level in Europe. However, through the convergence criteria for EMU, the rules for the Single Market and EU social policy, the regulatory and (indirect) redistributive impact of EU decision making is enormous...Moreover, through EU environment policy, equal opportunities legislation, provisions on EU citizenship, culture and media policies and the emerging policies against racism and xenophobia, the EU has an increasing impact on the allocation of values and norms in Europe.

Equally, Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002: 966) also prepared the way for reconsidering the way in which integration is viewed by disaggregating integration into multiple elements – a traditional pro vs. anti-integration dimension, environmental, cohesion, asylum, fiscal, foreign policy and EP powers dimensions. They found that conflicts on all of these dimensions could be subsumed within the traditional left-right dimension along with a new politics dimension capturing green-libertarian and traditional-authoritarian values. While this thesis disagrees that these dimensions can be subsumed within the traditional left-right scale, it is particularly illuminating, that integration is viewed in a disaggregated fashion.

What has been established is the need to approach Euroscepticism in terms of its underlying components. As was stated in the introduction, this should take the form of economic

liberalisation and economic harmonisation, supranational, legal, social, cultural and foreign policy integration. Therefore the following definition of Euroscepticism has been constructed.

Euroscepticism refers to:

...the sustained espousal of a critical or rejectionist argument towards economic, supranational, legal, social, cultural integration or foreign policy integration in Europe.

The disaggregation of integration dimensions raises an important issue of surrounding “integration policy packages”. This was raised by Katz (2008: 155) and he argued that unpacking Euroscepticism is on the one hand a good idea, but Europhiles have generally adopted the strategy of presenting varying levels and foci of scepticism as intertwined. Secondly, while they can be separated, proposals put forward for extending integration have usually been presented as packages of proposals rather than movement in one area of integration or another. For example, the Nice Treaty, set out the groundwork for expansion of the geographic reach of the Union, restricted the veto available to member states in around thirty individual policy areas, as well as altered the voting power among member states by furthering qualified majority voting. Katz has made a fair point here, but his position is open to criticism. Proposals have never been presented *fait accompli*, and parties of the member state governments will have preferences as to which points to press for, which to concede and areas under which they will absolutely reject developments. Party actors may be forced to concede in some areas, but these are far from the package deals described by Katz at the stage of negotiation. One caveat does exist here in that once they reach the member states for ratification then they are presented as package deals, however, parties will have been aware of the developments at an early stage.

Two final observations have had a significant impact on choosing to advance this project with a multi-dimensional framework. Firstly Katz (2008: 156) asked should Euroscepticism be operationalised in absolute or relative terms and secondly, given that the ‘European project’ has and continues to evolve over time, “about which one might be sceptical is in effect a moving

target”. However it is precisely due to the use of a multi-dimensional framework that this moving target is not misunderstood. Using single or dual dimensions provides comparatively little data on whether parties across EU member states are indeed focusing their criticisms or their rejectionist discourses at the same developments in integration. One can indeed envision a party being supportive of the majority of forms of integration, but one particular set of proposals in an area of integration may be too far. Less nuanced frameworks will pick this scepticism up and potentially classify a party as Eurosceptic, but will not necessarily take the supportive nature of party towards the remaining aspects of integration into account.

Critical to the development of the framework is to select dimensions of competition, which have a minimal amount of shared variance that they explain. Tests for multicollinearity using a correlation matrix confirm that none of the identified dimensions are very highly correlated with each other (≥ 0.75). The highest correlations are between economic harmonisation and foreign policy integration (.464**), and between legal integration and foreign policy integration (0.409**).

See table 1 below:


Table 1: Multicollinearity Correlation Matrix

	Social Integration	Supranational Integration	Legal Integration	Cultural Integration	Economic Harmonisation	Foreign Policy Integration	Economic Liberalisation
Social Integration	1	0.47	0.190**	0.58	0.077	0.128*	0.032
Supranational Integration	0.47	1	0.306**	0.376**	0.173**	0.150**	-0.004
Legal Integration	0.190**	0.306**	1	0.201**	0.318**	0.409**	0.261**
Cultural Integration	0.58	0.376**	0.201**	1	0.095*	0.108*	0.017
Economic Harmonisation	0.77	0.173**	0.318**	0.095*	1	0.464**	0.290**
Foreign Policy Integration	0.128*	0.150**	0.409**	0.108*	0.464**	1	0.283**
Economic Liberalisation	0.32	-0.004	0.261**	0.017	0.290**	0.283**	1

n=588; ** Correlation was significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); * Correlation was significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

In addition, by disaggregating Euroscepticism into its component elements, it is possible to place individual parties' campaigns according to specific positions on the individual dimensions of Euroscepticism (see figure 2¹⁶). This graphical representation allows a more simplified understanding of shifts in support by each Eurosceptic party. To illustrate the following example describes how this operates: Party A, for example, is very sceptical about supranational integration and economic liberalisation, but is very positive about economic harmonisation and legal integration, and has no stated preferences for social and cultural integration.... Party B, on the other hand, is negative about economic harmonisation, legal and supranational integration, but is very positive towards economic liberalisation, as well as social integration, and finally has a slight preference towards cultural integration.

Figure 2: Multi-dimensional framework



The British Conservative Party provides an accurate illustration of the need for understanding the importance of changes of time and the multi-dimensional nature of the phenomenon. Their drastic re-orientation during the late 1980s and early 1990s is a good example of the multi-dimensional nature of Euroscepticism, the changing nature of the European integration project, and the evolving nature of the party. While the party was very much in favour of the single market through the enactment of the Single European Act (1986) as it furthered the neo-liberal

¹⁶ These diagrams are provided in the appendix for all fifteen party systems over the time period. Parties with multiple missing entries for the elections were removed for the later analyses, but plotted on the diagrams.

agenda put forward under Margaret Thatcher, it resisted the enactment of the Maastricht Treaty (1992), which incorporated much further deepening of supranational integration. Another example was the attempted harmonisation of social rights for workers through the enactment of the Charter of Fundamental Social Rights, which again produced a reorientation of the British Conservative Party against European integration.

To clarify the decisions over the construction of the definition it is necessary to briefly deconstruct it and to focus on potential areas of significance. Firstly, the use of the term 'sustained' is important as the majority of parties have engaged in criticising a particular aspect of integration or European affairs, but fundamentally a parties' discourse should only be classified as Eurosceptic when used more substantially. However, this does raise difficulties in operationalisation and measurement of the concept of 'sustained'. This has been solved by introducing a threshold whereby only parties who have devoted more than five percent of their negative discourse to a particular aspect of integration should be classified as Eurosceptic. Secondly, the use of the terms critical and rejectionist have also been deliberate. Critical refers to the expression of "...adverse or disapproving comments or judgements" (Soanes & Hawker, 2005: 232-233). The reason for the inclusion of 'critical' is that it captures harmful and disapproving comments or judgements while excluding more general complaints. To reject refers "to dismiss as inadequate or faulty"; "to refuse to consider or agree to"; and finally "to fail to show due affection or concern for" (Soanes & Hawker, 2005: 866). This was included to capture the most disparaging comments.

Euro-rejectionism has been downplayed as it suggests an outright dismissal of the whole integration project. This would be an inappropriate classificatory scheme to capture those parties who have previously supported and continue to support economic liberalisation and specifically the creation of the single market, but reject aspects of further supranational integration and

economic harmonisation. This has been the position, to varying degrees, of both the British Conservative Party and the Czech ODS (Civic Democrats) under Václav Klaus.

FORMS OF INTEGRATION

Having established the need to take account of the multi-faceted nature of Euroscepticism, and having provided an alternative definition and framework, it is now crucial to develop the theoretical underpinnings of each process of integration.

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

Economic integration has been divided into two sub-dimensions of economic liberalisation and economic harmonisation. Economic liberalisation was the foundation of the European integration project. It consisted of internal trade liberalisation and underwent three major phases. The first, which started with the signing of the Treaty of Rome, was the elimination of customs duties and quantitative restrictions, giving ‘free’ movement throughout the six signatories to goods, services, capital and people. The second period lasted from around 1973 to 1986 which saw the expansion of membership, however much of the fervour for further liberalisation was lost at this time. Finally the third period, which ended in 1992 with the Maastricht Treaty, saw the completion of the single market and the reduction/elimination of non-tariff barriers to trade (Sapir, 1992: 1491).¹⁷

Harmonisation involved the removal of further barriers to trade as a result of differing product specifications; trading laws; tax regimes; regulatory systems; and currency values. Dashwood (1981: 7) argued that it:

...involves the adoption of legislation by the community institutions that is designed to bring about changes in the internal legal systems of the member states.

However, the aim of harmonisation has not been the complete removal of disparities between the member-states national legal systems. This is because the presence of further disparities in

¹⁷ The Economic and Monetary Union project was deliberately excluded from this dimension as it was not strictly necessary to adopt a single currency as part of trade liberalisation and instead has been classified as Economic harmonisation

some of the legal fields is unlikely to affect the running of the European market all. Yet, harmonisation measures may be needed even if all member states have the same rule due to the differences in the way each legal system interprets the rule (Dashwood, 1981: 7-8).

SUPRANATIONAL INTEGRATION

Supranational integration involves the transfer of competencies traditionally associated with national governments and administrations. Nugent (1999: 502) argued it:

...involves states working with one another in a manner that does not allow them to retain complete control over developments. That is, states may be obliged to do things against their preferences and their will because they do not have the power to stop decisions. Supranationalism thus takes inter-state relations beyond co-operation into integration, and involves some loss of national sovereignty.

It is perhaps the growth of supranational governance that has caused the most intense debates within national political parties. While intergovernmental decision making on a multi-lateral level has involved compromise and in some cases net losses for individual states, the key drivers of policy have remained national political leaders. However, supranationalism involves the delegation of decision-making powers, and sovereign governments take the decision:

...to address problems that cannot be dealt with effectively at the national level...jointly develop international governance structures. Increasingly, the design of such structures involves the delegation of decision-making powers to institutions that are organisationally and politically independent of the founding states, and therefore conceived of as 'supranational' (Tallberg, 2002: 23).

Essentially parties have seen this as an issue of sovereignty and their ability to continue to formulate policy based on national priorities. The reality of whether or not nationally derived policies are possible in the face of globalisation and the growth of the international economy is immaterial. In addition, Tallberg (2002: 23) identifies a further issue over the lack of democracy that supranational institutions entail:

...the evolution of international governance reflects a general development in politics: the delegation of political authority from representative organs to non-majoritarian institutions, which are neither directly elected by the people nor directly managed by elected politicians.

LEGAL INTEGRATION

Legal integration has produced large ramifications for the member states. One difficulty is to disentangle the 'legal' aspects of integration from the other dimensions of political conflict over European integration. The treaties have provided some of the means in integrating legal aspects, but for the most part it has been the proactive attitude taken by the court in applying the treaty clauses and expanding on its own powers. As Garrett argued (1995: 171) the 1957 Treaty of Rome and its subsequent amendments - the 1987 Single European Act and the 1993 Treaty on European Union – have operated as a de facto constitution. In addition, the impact of preliminary references, the doctrines of direct effect, supremacy, indirect effect and governmental liability and finally the imposition of a foreign legal culture all have had the capability to generate Eurosceptic positions. As Wincott (2000: 5) argued:

Eurosceptics see the Court as taking up a 'political', 'legislative' or 'policy-making' stance and wresting political sovereignty from the member states.

With the creation of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the European legal system was designed so that a vast majority of European cases could arise through two paths – direct actions and preliminary references. The direct actions path referred to cases brought directly to the ECJ by the Commission or a member state government. The inclusion of preliminary references was an extremely significant step in integration as the path referred to cases brought about when a national court referred a case by a private litigant to the ECJ. Once that opinion was passed back down to the national court, the national court would then make a final ruling (Carruba & Murrah, 2005: 400). Originally when it was designed there was little evidence of the potential impact of Europeanisation on national courts, indeed until 1963, the enforcement of the Rome treaty, like that of any other international treaty, depended entirely on action by the national legislatures of the member states of the community (Burley & Mattli, 1993: 42).

From the early 1960s onwards the impact of the European Court of Justice began to increase dramatically. The greatest period of development of European legal integration was during the 1962-1979 period. This saw the doctrine of supremacy emerge from the ruling in the case of *Costa* in 1964, which essentially laid down the rule that in any conflict between a Community legal rule and the rule of national law, the Community law had to be given primacy over the latter. Indeed later in the case of *Simmenthal* in 1978, the court ruled to the effect that every Community rule from the moment of entry into force would automatically render the conflicting piece of national legislation inapplicable (Stone Sweet & Brunell, 1998: 66; Carrubba & Murrah, 2005: 400-402). In addition, the *Van Gend en Loos* case in 1963 and the 1964 *Costa v. ENEL* case allowed for the emergence of the doctrine of direct effect. Direct effect declared that citizens have rights under EU law and, thus, national courts could apply EU law themselves. Furthermore, the impact of both of these doctrines on the preliminary rulings was immense as charges of non-compliance were no longer limited to direct action and individuals could bring charges of non-compliance against governments, agencies, businesses, and other private actors in their national courts (Carrubba & Murrah, 2005: 400-402).

By the 1980s saw the second wave of constitutionalisation, and with that the doctrine of indirect effect emerged. It was the 1984 case of *Von Colson* in particular saw the doctrine of indirect effect emerge which inferred the responsibility for national judges to interpret national law so that it conformed with EC law. Later in the 1990 case of *Marleasing*, the court clarified the meaning of indirect effect, ruling that when a directive has not been transposed or has been transposed incorrectly into national law, national judges were obliged to interpret national law as if it were in conformity with European law. The doctrine essentially gave national judges the power to rewrite national legislation – in processes of “principled construction” – in order to render EC law applicable in the absence of implementing measures (Stone Sweet and Brunell, 1998: 66).

The doctrine of governmental liability emerged in the 1991 case of *Francovich*. According to this rule, a national court can hold a member state liable for damages caused to individuals due to the state's failure to implement a directive properly. The national court could then require the state to compensate such individuals for their financial losses (Stone Sweet & Brunell, 1998: 66).

The integration of private law also had and continues to have the potential for friction. Caruso (1997) defined private law as:

...an integrated system of rules, standards and principles, which together form an autonomous subset, conventionally severable from the rest of the legal regime of which they are part (Caruso, 1997: 5).

In addition he argued that contemporary private law is supposedly concerned with the horizontal dimension of citizens' interaction, based on a presumption of the formal equality of individuals. While the Treaty of Rome (1957) was essentially public in its legal provisions, there has been some evidence of the impact of European legal integration on the national civil codes. This however, was limited to matters to ensure the liberalization of the market, for example in the field of consumer protection. Yet, this remains a field with potential further future integration as for example, in 1989 the European Parliament called for the drawing up of a European Code of Private Law (Legrand, 1996: 53).

Overall, legal systems have their own cultural element. They have their own cultural identity and encode national experiences. Essentially rules are "...the outward manifestation of an implicit structure of attitude and references, they are a reflection of a given legal culture" (Legrand, 1996: 57). However, rules do not constitute the entirety of law, on the contrary 'legal' cannot be separated analytically from the 'social' that underpins the legal system. In essence, the European Union's rules signify its own legal culture and have been produced by human agency through institutional structures and legal processes containing their own social component (Legrand, 1996: 57-60). There is something intrinsically national about each national legal system. Legal

culture differs state to state, and the European legal system has developed from the growth in the activity of the Community. The EU represents a body of law and rules, which have been developed from institutional structures and legal processes outside a particular nation state and hence have had the potential for a large amount of friction.

SOCIAL INTEGRATION

Social integration has been one of the least developed processes of European integration. It can generally be defined as “an attempt to correct the negative externalities from economic integration from a non-national platform”.

At the national level social policy has been seen as the use of:

...political power to supersede, supplement, or modify operations of the economic system in order to achieve results which the economic system would not achieve on its own (Marshall, 1975: 15).

For Marshall, social policy was seen in its broadest terms and included maintaining income during sickness, unemployment allowance, old age allowance (old age pension) and family allowance, as well as housing, education, community services and health care (Marshall 1975: 11-16). This has traditionally been the exclusive domain of national government, and national party platforms in deciding on the delivery method and funding for these policy areas.

In examining the supranational level for developments in the field of social integration, one is left with the impression that there had been little achieved and there is little scope for action. According to Leibfried and Pierson (1995:44) there were no welfare laws at the EU level which would grant individual entitlements from Brussels; no direct taxes or funding for a social budget; and no Brussels welfare bureaucracy to speak of. This was reiterated by Falkner (1998: 56-60) who argued that there were scarce legal competencies for the development of a social policy at the European level. The only explicit Community competence was aimed at promoting the

freedom of movement for workers by abolishing any discrimination based on nationality in regard to employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment. Yet, in the EEC Treaty there were a small number of concessions for the more 'interventionist' social policy. These revolved around equal pay for both sexes, on maintaining 'the existing equivalence between paid holiday schemes, and the establishment of a European Social Fund.

The Commission was given the task of promoting close co-operation between member states in the social field, particularly in matters relating to employment; labour law and working conditions; basic and advanced vocational training; social security; prevention of occupational accidents and diseases; occupational hygiene; the right of association; and collective bargaining between employers and workers. In other areas of EEC activity, the Commission was empowered to present legislative proposals with a view to Council deliberation of binding EC law, however with social policy the Commission could only act in close contact with member states by making studies, delivering opinions and arranging consultations both on problems arising at national level and on those of concern to international organisations in the social area (Falkner, 1998: 56-60).

Despite this, there were at least some attempts by member state governments to reconfigure Community ambitions towards an EC social policy by agreeing to adopt measures on employment policy, harmonisation of working conditions, health and safety, but these fell short of ambitions. With the Single European Act, social policy did not become a focus for action, though health and safety regulations could be issued from the European level through directives as these might be used as non-tariff barriers. In addition a social dialogue between management and labour at the European level was to be encouraged (Ross, 1995: 360-362).

The Maastricht Treaty was a turning point in supranational social policy. Here Community competencies were extended to include working conditions, the information and consultation of

workers, equality between men and women with regard to labour market opportunities and treatment at work, and the integration of persons excluded from the labour market. Issues such as pay, the right of association, the right to strike, and the right to impose lockouts were excluded from the minimum harmonisation standards that the Commission was trying to promote. The scope of potential areas of European co-operation was increased to include social security and social protection of workers as well as protection for workers made redundant, representation of worker and employer issues, for example, but these needed to be agreed unanimously (Falkner et al, 2005: 44).

Subsequently, the Amsterdam summit saw social provisions agreed at Maastricht incorporated into the Treaty after the defeat of the British Conservative Government in 1997. The only other significant innovation was the new employment policy chapter of the EC Treaty. While this excluded harmonisation of domestic laws, it enabled the regular co-ordination of national employment policies. It also outlined community action to be undertaken against any form of discrimination. The Nice Treaty of 2001 gave the option, within some fields, for the application of the co-decision procedure on worker protection with redundancy, representation of collective interests and employment of third country nationals. Finally the Union gained the ability to adopt more measures to encourage co-operation on all social issues (Falkner et al, 2005: 44-45).

Clearly, social provisions at the supranational level have not become as integrated as other areas, but there have been significant steps forwards, especially during the Maastricht Treaty. Yet it still remains a particularly important area which can and has led to political conflict as it touches upon traditional nation state competencies, and more fundamentally impacts on the particular type of economy the member state runs – i.e. the level of government intervention in the market.

CULTURAL INTEGRATION

European integration as a whole has the potential to be seen as a threat to national identity and national culture when these are conceptualised as homogenous and unique to the ‘ethnic’

community. As Banús (2002: 159) argued there has been the tendency to consider cultural unity (and linguistic unity) as an important part of political unity. Inherent to the process of nation building seems to have been cultural homogenisation, forging a “cultural identity”.

It is particularly useful to examine the work of Miller and Yúdice (2002). Culture they suggested ‘is connected to policy in two registers: the aesthetic and the anthropological’ (Miller and Yúdice, 2002: 1). The aesthetic register refers to artistic output, and culture within this context is seen as an indicator of similarities and differences in terms of taste and status within social groups of a particular community (Miller & Yúdice, 2002: 1). Their second category, the anthropological register, saw culture as an indication of how a particular group of people, a community, live their lives, the senses of place and person, which are grounded in language, religion, custom, time and space. Furthermore, it is the anthropological register that articulates differences between populations (Miller & Yúdice, 2002: 1).

Shore (2000: 22-23) suggested five broad categories of usage for the concept of culture: firstly culture has been restricted to questions of art, the entertainment industries or the acquisition of learning (similar to the aesthetic register of Miller and Yúdice, 2002); secondly, it has been construed in terms of acquired learning or ‘civilisation’; thirdly, it can refer to organisational culture in that it is seen as the informal concepts, attitudes and values of a workforce or formal organisational values and practices imposed by management; fourthly culture can be to refer to a particular way of life – of a people, period, group or humanity – informed by a common spirit (Tyler, 1971 cited in Shore, 2000: 23); and finally culture is presented as an indigenous category.

So if the European Community/European Union has been promoting a European culture in whatever form, what is a ‘cultural policy’? Adapting Miller and Yúdice’s work (2002: 1) cultural policy can be seen as a way of ‘bridging the two registers’ – institutional supports which promote and channel aesthetic creativity and understandings of collective ways of life. Essentially cultural

policy is embodied in systematic, regulatory guides to action that are adopted by organisations to achieve their goals. In addition within the European member states there have been differing national priorities and levels of involvement within cultural policy. Particularly, within countries with more liberal traditions (for example, the United Kingdom and some of the Scandinavian countries) culture has been considered as a matter of choice, determined by individual freedom, where the state should interfere as little as possible. Therefore, there is little tradition of 'Ministries of Culture' in the United Kingdom or in Scandinavian countries. Elsewhere more countries have followed the so-called 'French' model, where the state not only awards direct subsidies but also plays a role in cultural management (Banús, 2002: 159). Therefore it is necessary to utilise the somewhat loose definition posited above.

This then raises a further question of what were the goals behind the creation of a supranational cultural policy? Legitimacy has been one of the most important factors driving cultural integration and a 'cultural policy' of the EU. European integration has long been seen as an elitist project. Yet, in order for the European integration project to continue, some level of popular attachment is necessary, as Kostakopoulou (2001: 46) argued:

...as an emerging polity, the EC/EU has to foster a sense of solidarity among European peoples who would not hesitate to participate in the project of European unification and support in times of crises.

This was a point supported by (Pantel, 1999: 46) who argued that:

...the existence of an overarching European identity is essential for its legitimation. Without a common culture to bind together diverse Europeans, they argue, the European polity cannot garner the deep-rooted, long-term support it requires from its citizens.

Furthermore a theme, which has emerged out of the security literature, is that the European Union's position would be strengthened as an international actor by the creation of collective identity vis-à-vis the rest of the world (Kostakopoulou, 2001: 14). There were other goals – for

example, the protection of European cultural heritage against the impact of globalisation, and the promotion of solidarity amongst nation states.

It is acknowledged within the literature that the real shift towards the development of a cultural policy took place during the early 1970s. Pantel (1999: 48) noted that efforts to link cultural unity and support for deeper European integration could be found within the founding treaty (Treaty of Rome, 1957). Kostakopoulou (2001) acknowledged this, but argued that while the period between 1958-1972 did not see an official cultural policy, through the fleshing out and realisation of the provisions for freedom of movement of peoples within the Treaty of Rome, its restriction to nationals of the founding member states effectively prevented many third-country nationals from taking advantage of this provision. This amounted to the creation of the 'other' in the formation of a European identity.

With the establishment of the programme for political union, it became necessary to have Europeans. At the Copenhagen Summit in 1973, the nine Member States adopted a "Declaration on European Identity". This document set out a definition of a:

European identity based on the principles of the rule of law, social justice, respect for human rights and democracy, and in relation to: (i) the status and the responsibilities of the nine member states vis-à-vis the rest of the world; (ii) the dynamic nature of the process of European unification. The political definition of European identity was intertwined with Euro-centric statements invoking a common European civilisation whose survival had to be ensured (Kostakopoulou, 2001: 45).

In December 1974, the Paris Summit Conference endorsed the idea of a European identity and gave it more concrete substance by specifying policy objectives, such as elections for the European Parliament on the basis of direct universal suffrage, special rights for citizens of the nine Member States and the creation of passport union. The follow up report on European Union proposed the protection of the rights of Europeans, and identified three areas for action:

protection of fundamental rights in view of the gradual increase in the powers of European institutions; consumer rights; and the protection of the environment (Kostakopoulou, 2001).

Finally, during the last sixteen years, within the European Commission, there has been a Directorate General for Culture and a member of the Commission with special responsibilities for Culture; and, there is a specific programme with clear objectives and conditions for participating, supported by a budgetary allocation. This budgetary item is dedicated almost entirely to the new cultural instrument, the Culture 2000 Programme. This programme followed a Council resolution of September 1997, made in response to growing pressure for some initiative in this area. Culture 2000 was intended to contribute 'to the promotion of a cultural area common to the European peoples' in terms of specific innovative and/ or experimental actions, integrated actions, covered by structured, multiannual transnational cultural co-operation agreements, and special cultural events with a European or international dimension, such as the European Capital of Culture and the Cultural Month. The programme declared the objectives of 'highlighting the cultural diversity' and the 'sharing and highlighting' of 'the common cultural heritage of European significance' (Banús, 2002: 161).

FOREIGN POLICY INTEGRATION

Despite the economic character that dominated the early years of the European Community, attempts at co-ordinating and integration in the area of foreign and defence policy have indeed been important from the very beginning of European integration. Yet, European foreign policy integration is a field which has seen quite a few initiatives that didn't live up to their intended roles – in particular the European Defence Community failed to get off the ground during the 1950s, and much more recently the policy actions in the first Gulf War and those during the break-up of Yugoslavia during the early 1990s. Jørgensen (2004: 11) identified six significant areas addressed by Europe's common foreign policy – a bilateral relationship between the US and Europe; relations with Eastern Europe and pre/post-Soviet Union; relations with developing

countries, especially the ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific); a common trade policy; Europe's joint policy towards ex-Yugoslavia (though some would rightly argue it was almost a policy failure); and finally other geographical and thematic areas such as EuroMed (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership); Central America; China; dialogues with the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN); Gulf Co-operation Council; the Southern Common Market (Mercosur); negotiations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and UN policy making.

Foreign policy integration revolves around the promotion of harmonised European positions towards third party states, international organisations and in international multilateral negotiations. In addition, the promotion of a military capability is important. Fears over the potential consequences of integration have resulted in vetoes from various member states. This is perhaps best demonstrated by the institutional set up of the area. Since the early 1970s it has involved a complex fusion of several institutional forms: intergovernmental, transgovernmental, and supranational (Smith, 1998 in Smith 2004: 740). In particular questions over the role and scope of EU centric policy, loss of sovereignty, the undermining of the traditional US-European relationship and primacy of NATO. Despite the instances of stuttering progress, the developments have been important, and because of this, foreign policy integration is an area where strong Eurosceptic discourses potentially can develop. The developments of foreign and defence policy integration in the European Community and later European Union are briefly outlined below.

The early arrangements took the form of two French proposals – the European Defence Community (EDC) and the *Fouchet* Plans. The EDC was a French plan devised in 1950 to create an integrated European army, but were rejected by France's National Assembly in 1954. The *Fouchet* plans, named after French President Charles de Gaulle's advisor Christian Fouchet, were de Gaulle's attempts to create a European political-military grouping distinct from the United States. Contradictorily, the French National Assembly rejected the EDC largely because it was

too integrated and too Atlanticist, and the *Fouchet* Plans were rejected by the Belgians and Dutch in 1962 because they were not integrated and not Atlanticist enough (Gordon, 1997/98: 83-84).

The key failures during early 1950s and the solidifying of NATO's role as the key defence institution, saw Europe as a 'civilian power' emerge with the emphasis for diplomacy to be centred on the economic sphere. During the 1960s some further integration was seen - despite the failure of the French *Fouchet* plan, which had been designed to enable foreign policy co-ordination. The first significant steps from the purely economic sphere for foreign affairs were seen with the emergence of the *Davignon* plan and the European Political Community. The 1970s and early 1980s saw increasingly diplomatic co-ordination among members that were driven by factors such as the 1973 enlargement, US initiatives being perceived as risky and the politicisation of 'economic' issues. Furthermore new patterns of co-operation emerged and the period also saw the consolidation of the EPC by the London Report of 1981, the Solemn Declaration on European Union, and the Single European Act (SEA) (Smith, 2003: 559-561).

The SEA finally gave the Commission a role in both political and economic aspects of security and emphasised the need to avoid vetoing when the potential for consensus existed. However, most outcomes were declarations only, had little effect and the EPC remained limited in European foreign policy making. However, the EPC improved understanding among member-state actors and helped harmonise positions (Gordon, 1997/98: 84-85).

The Maastricht Treaty was a significant step in foreign policy integration. It established the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and allowed the possibility of merging the West European Union and EU. Furthermore, it provided a new basis for development by consolidating and embedding gains from the EPC, as well as providing joint action procedures, which allowed for the possibility of Qualified Majority Voting (Smith, 2003: 561). Yet while the Maastricht Treaty provisions had moved from 'co-operation' to common policy, CFSP was left as essentially

intergovernmental (Hoffmann, 2000: 193). So in some respects integration had been significantly deepened when compared to the reforms seen in the SEA, but despite these steps keeping foreign and security policy as a separate intergovernmental pillar diluted the potential impact. CFSP was a response to the EPC's perceived inadequacy in light of the post-Cold war world. As Gordon (1997/98: 85-86) argued:

...The CFSP created at Maastricht reflected a lowest-common-denominator compromise among competing visions and interests of the EC's member states. In this case, the compromise was between one group of states led by France and Germany, that sought significantly to strengthen the existing EPC and to give it more of an integrated and binding character, and another group, led by the United Kingdom, that was more cautious about giving up its national foreign policy prerogatives and sought to avoid any possible threat to the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance.

Towards the end of the 1990s, the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 further opened the debate on EU and WEU convergence, installed a High Representative for CFSP, advanced the possibility of QMV and promised budgetary stabilisation. However, there was a significant gap between Treaty provisions and practice. Significant progress was made later with the 1998 St Malo declaration, which was a British and French plan to build a European Security and Defence Initiative – within NATO. This proved to be a catalyst with proposals for a European Rapid Reaction force being put into place in the 1999 Cologne EU summit, which were then fleshed out at the Helsinki Council meeting. These developments certainly added meat to the EU's area of hard security (Smith, 2003: 562).

The EU has been most lacking in the area of military power, with significant concerns over the impact on national sovereignty and relationship to NATO. Progress in this area has also been seen as doubtful. Originally, increases in EC/EU military power was promoted by France who argued that Europe needed a strategic capability. Britain and others resisted any possibility of undermining NATO. At the Maastricht summit the majority of member states were reluctant to

cede sovereignty and compromised on the WEU becoming the defence institution of the EU. This was also resisted by Britain and the neutral member states later in the Amsterdam Treaty negotiations. There have been some minor instances of EU military operations, and negotiations have suggested roles for a specific EU military capability. The Petersberg Declaration listed possible operations such as humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping, and combat tasks in crisis management (Gordon, 1997/98: 89-92).

CAUSATION

In the introduction, the concept of party ideology was examined and the inclusive definition by Seliger (1976: 14) was adopted. This argued that ideology refers to a set of ideas that posit, explain, and justify through the means of social action to preserve, to amend, to uproot, or to rebuild a given social order. Party ideology essentially acts as a prism, a lens whereby an issue is identified, analysed according to a specific worldview and the technical possibilities of action (Seliger, 1976: 102). While this ideological lens is historically grounded, it is not fixed, but an evolving response to the changing world around the party. This is where it links with the theoretical work by Marks and Wilson (2000: 434). Parties do apply existing modes of understanding to new developments. While ideology is no straightjacket in tethering a party to a particular ideological response it remains a strong influence, and a party needs to weigh up considerable potential costs in alienating grass-roots members, members of the parliamentary party and elements of their core electorate.

However, where this thesis departs from Marks and Wilson (2000) is the way in which party ideology is operationalised. As stated, earlier ideology is historically grounded, but significantly it is not a fixed entity. Marks and Wilson (2000) put forward the argument that cleavage structures were powerful predictors in how parties structure their responses to developments in European integration. Yet, social cleavages are far more of a fixed historical entity, and less responsive to changes in the social world. What is more appropriate is to study party positions towards

European integration in terms of party families for two reasons. Firstly, cleavage structures and party families are likely to share much of the same variance explained. Secondly, not only do party families take account of the historical modes of political conflict, but also they allow for later patterns of behaviour to be considered amongst similar parties, as well as geographical differences between groups of parties from the same party family.

The party family independent variables will be empirically tested in multivariate analyses (see chapter five) along with a number of other theories. Previously in the literature review chapter, several alternative theories of party positioning were identified. Within the causation research, the strategic decisions of parties were put forward as a strong causal influence in how parties respond to European integration (Sitter, 2002; 2003; 2004). In particular, he identified a government-opposition dynamic in the way that Euroscepticism was used by parties arguing that considerations towards the issue of Euroscepticism would fall under short term planning (Sitter, 2002: 23-24). This thesis rejects that Euroscepticism is a short-term strategic decision, given the long-term nature of the integration project. However, the empirical strength of this theory will be assessed in the multiple regression analyses in chapter five.

With several pieces of research it was emphasised that conflicts over European integration were amalgamated into existing patterns of political conflict – in particular the classic left-right dimension and the new politics dimension¹⁸ (Hooghe, Marks & Wilson, 2002; Marks et al, 2006). As stated in the introduction, this thesis remains sceptical of the relevance of the left-right dimension, due to the ‘unfreezing’ of the original cleavage structures, the emergence of post-materialist values (though the new politics dimension captures competition towards this issue), and the cross-national variation in the meaning of the left-right scale. The explanatory value of

¹⁸ This thesis utilises the left-right variable which has been created within the Euromanifestos dataset, but in order to construct the new politics dimension, the data from three expert surveys conducted by the team at UNC (Chapel Hill) were used. These covered the following time periods: 1999 (Steenbergen & Marks, 2007); 2002 and 2006 (Hooghe et al, 2008).

the left-right dimension, and also the new politics dimension will be tested alongside the strategic issue, and party families.

Within the single-country case study literature, a theme, which became apparent, was that some countries were more Eurosceptic than others. This notion of cultural exceptionalism is rejected in the thesis given the comparative literature's emphasis that there has been some evidence of Euroscepticism in even the most pro-European countries (Taggart, 1998: 364). However, it will be tested alongside the other independent variables to assess its strength, but in particular to ascertain whether some countries are more Eurosceptic towards a particular aspect than others.

The public Euroscepticism literature focused on the cueing effect, and whether Euroscepticism was the result of signals from political parties or whether the public prompted parties to adopt Eurosceptic attitudes. This thesis argues that public attitudes towards the multi-dimensional nature of Euroscepticism are likely to be cued from elites given that it is unlikely that the public will be aware of the benefits or drawbacks of specific forms of integration. This will be tested alongside two other groups of independent variables. Firstly the year of election will be tested to assess the temporal variance, and secondly the other forms of integration will be included to assess whether a party's Eurosceptic attitude towards one aspect conditions their response to an alternative dimension of integration.

HYPOTHESES

Having established the multi-faceted reality of contemporary Euroscepticism, as well as arguing that partisan responses are derived from ideology. The thesis will now provide hypotheses for the behaviour of each party family towards the multiple dimensions of European integration. For this the research utilised the expertise of the Comparative Manifesto Project/Manifesto Research Group and Euromanifestos research team when grouping the individual parties according to their party ideology. Both research projects employed the modified framework of von Beyme

(1985) and this is how the thesis will proceed. Within each sub-section a table of parties, which fall under the particular party family label, will be provided.

Initially the expectation was that European policies of party families should have been addressed to a certain degree within the literature, which would facilitate *a priori* theorising. However, what has become fundamentally apparent is the lack of recent attention in the case of some party families, or even a lack of attention overall. Therefore the hypotheses need to come with a ‘health warning’ so to speak, and with some of the party families it is a case of theory generation rather than theory testing of party behaviour towards European policy.

LIBERALS

The Liberal party family has been selected as a control group for the later regression analyses. Control groups are necessary to allow the use of dummy variables without resorting to individual regression equations for each sub-category of party family. While the research on the two major pro-European party families – Liberal and Christian Democratic – has not been as extensive as other party families (which will be examined below), those studies, which have been conducted, have highlighted the positive engagement with supranational developments. Marks, Wilson and Ray (2002: 587) argued that the Liberal party family was strongly in favour of economic integration as it enhanced market competition and economic freedoms. They also noted that the family were strongly in favour of political integration as it moderated nationalism, increased political freedoms, though it did weaken democracy. Taggart (1998: 378) also highlighted that some party families (notably Social Democrats, Liberals and Christian Democrats) seemed to be more favourably disposed towards support. Given the existing literature specifically identifies the Liberal party family as very supportive, they are the most appropriate category to hold as a control group – despite later findings of some caveats to their behaviour (see Chapter Six).

As mentioned above, Liberal parties in general have not been the subjects of much research in recent years and little work has been directed towards the party or its European policies since the

1980s. Kirchner's (1988) volume and Von Beyme (1985) seminal book were particularly strong accounts of the liberal party family and they suggested that Liberal have parties adopted a strongly pro-European orientation (see Kirchner and Broughton, 1988: 82; Curtice, 1988: 99 and 117; Daalder and Koole, 1988: 171; Ruud, 1988: 207).

Von Beyme (1985: 38-39) noted that Liberal parties have been less eager when compared to the Christian Democrats and Socialist and Social Democratic parties in developing comprehensive programmes, perhaps with the exception of the Germany FDP, and they preferred a pragmatic approach. This potentially complicates hypothesising positions for the family. However, the Liberals' European programme stressed human and civil rights, pluralism and regionalism, and suggested practical ways of improving the institutional structure of the Community. In addition the liberals have been more emphatic than most parties in declaring their support for a united Europe.

As stated above, traditionally Liberal parties have been strong supporters of European integration, being one of the driving forces of European integration. Considered as a very broad church, and despite the wide variances within the ideology, Liberals have supported economic, supranational and legal integration from the outset. Therefore it is hypothesised that Liberal parties will use positive discourses towards all aspects of integration. The table below shows the Liberal parties that have manifestos available for the analyses in chapter five and chapter six:

Table 2: Liberal Parties from Euromanifestos Dataset

Party	Year
<i>Liberals</i>	
GER: FDP Free Democratic Party	1989, 1994, 1999, 2004
LUX: PD-DP Democratic Party	1989, 1994, 1999, 2004
NET: VVD Peoples Party Freedom Democracy	1994, 1999, 2004
Belgian FDF-PRL	1989, 1994, 1999,
ITA: Ulivo Olive Tree	1999
ITA: Margherita Daisy	2004
BEL: VLD Flemish Liberals and Democrats	1989, 1994, 1999, 2004
GB: LDP Liberal Democratic Party	1989, 1994, 1999, 2004
DEN: RV Radical Party	1989, 1994, 1999, 2004
DEN: V Liberals	1989, 1994, 1999, 2004
SWE: FP Liberal Peoples Party	1995, 1999, 2004
AUT: FPÖ Freedom Party	1996, 1999, 2004
AUT: LF Liberal Forum	1996, 1999

CONSERVATIVE

Historically, the emergence of the political right in Western Europe (as well as in North and South America) can be associated with distinct property-owning classes, the defence of social institutions such as the Catholic Church and the rise of a bourgeois civil society linked to the development of capitalism (Hanley, 2004: 10). Layton-Henry (1982: 1) argued that attempts to clarify and define Conservatism have had little success, but noted that Michels identified two major senses – the technical political and the philosophical usage. The first was a tendency to maintain the status quo, and the second described the love of authority and tradition. Girvin (1988: 2) noted that in its original form, and particularly for most of the nineteenth century, conservatism opposed the claims of ‘modernity’, that is, the radical consequences associated with nationalism, democracy, industrialisation and secularisation. Towards the end of the 19th century, a number of Conservatives began to shift away from their reactionary position. It was this ability to adapt their ideology that has meant that Conservative parties have maintained their relevance in a number of member states over a large period of time. It was precisely the issue of Conservative party environmental adaptation, which could impact on the identification of ideological traits.

Despite some scholars arguing that Conservatism is very much a national phenomenon in comparison to liberalism and socialism that are seen as more internationalist (Layton-Henry, 1982: 7), there are three varieties of Conservatism relevant to Western Europe. The first is the modern liberal Conservative form. This has been most advanced in Britain and is strongly pro-capitalist asserting the strongest possible relationship between the market economy, individual liberty and the rule of law. The second is Christian Democracy, which is addressed below. The third variety is authoritarian conservatism, which is very reluctant to give up control of state apparatus. This particular form accepts state intervention in the economy and regulation. The

French Gaullists, Irish Fianna Fáil and the German CSU have been the strongest examples of this variety of Conservatism (Girvin, 1988: 9-10).

Pridham (1982: 319) argued that while Christian Democratic parties in particular are renowned for their strong ideological commitment to European integration, with Conservative parties this European ‘vocation’ is less profound. With the liberal Conservative form being strongly pro-market any measures that improve free-market credentials are likely attract positive discourses, but any encroachments on individual liberty and the rule of law such as harmonisation measures, and supranational and legal integration are likely to be received more negatively. Given the strong market orientation, any supranational social policy is also likely to be received with hostility. The authoritarian Conservative variety however is more likely to accept moves towards regulated capitalism, as well as accepting supranational and legal integration as necessary to achieve the intervention and regulation needed in the European market. As both types have been nationally orientated, the promotion and supranational foreign policy is likely to be negatively received.

Overall, the Conservative party family is likely to be supportive of economic liberalisation, and legal integration in the earliest stages, but negative towards harmonisation, supranational integration, social integration, cultural integration and foreign policy integration throughout the time period. The table below shows the Conservative parties that have manifestos available for the analyses in chapter five and chapter six:

Table 3: Conservative Parties from Euromanifestos Dataset

Party	Year
<i>Conservatives</i>	
FRA: RPR Rally for the Republic/UDF Union for French Democracy	1989, 1994, 1999, 2004
FRA: UMP Union for Presidential Majority	1999, 2004
ITA: FI Forza Italia Go Italy	1989, 1994, 1999, 2004
GB: Conservative Party	1989, 1994, 1999, 2004
DEN: KF Conservative Peoples Party	1994, 1999
IRE: Fianna Fail	1994, 1999
SPA: AP, PP Popular Party	1989, 1994, 1999, 2004
SPA: CIU Convergence and Union	1989, 1994, 1999, 2004
SWE: MSP Moderate Coalition Party	1995, 1999, 2004
FIN: KK National Coalition	1996, 1999, 2004

SOCIALIST AND SOCIAL DEMOCRATS

Traditionally, Socialism has been seen as the product of the changing conditions for workers resulting from the birth of Capitalism and the Industrial Revolution. As Wright (1999: 83) noted

...in a basic sense Socialism defined itself as the ideological expression of the workers' movement that arose in resistance and opposition to the depredations of industrial capitalism. If 'labourism' sought to protect and defend the interests of labour in relation to this system, 'socialism' sought to change the system itself.

Later, the intellectual rupture saw a fissure grow between revolutionary Marxism and reformist Social Democracy (Wright, 1999: 85). Revolutionary Marxism sought to overthrow the system, whereas reformist Social Democracy could be summarised as the acceptance of the capitalist economy, though with extensive state intervention; the use of Keynesian steering mechanisms to achieve growth, high wages, price stability and full employment; redistributive policies; and finally a working class organised in a Social Democratic party with strong links to the trade union movement (Paterson & Thomas, 1986: 3).

Sassoon (1997:5) identified three large 'families' before 1989 – Communist parties of central and eastern Europe; the 'northern' social democratic parties – these came to power in relatively well-developed capitalist countries, with the task of the management of capitalism and proper distribution of wealth; and finally the southern European socialist parties – their main objective was the modernisation and development of welfare policies where none or few existed previously. However, as he also notes that these party groupings have converged extensively since the end of the Cold War. Essentially, Sassoon (1997: 4) argued that adopting a defensive strategy, parties on the left accepted that market forces could be regulated, but not eliminated; co-ordination should be sought multilaterally; public spending should be reduced and extensions to the welfare state avoided; privatisation is needed in many areas of state provision; policies of equality need to take into account the goal of inducing competition; and finally financial institutions and international financial markets could only be contained multilaterally.

Featherstone in a number of works examined at the position of socialist and social democratic parties towards the process of integration up to the end of the 1980s. He argued that:

...the process of integration in Western Europe since 1945 has forced the socialist parties of these countries to reconcile a contradiction between their aspirations and the reality of their situation. Socialism as an ideology professes an internationalist vocation, but the gradually-developing integration process has in reality been based on modern capitalist principles, at variance with left-wing ideals. [Yet,] ...on the Left, neither all support for, nor all opposition against the European Community can readily claim to have been 'more' socialist; to the extent that the respective strategies have been governed by different national considerations... (Featherstone, 1988: 339).

With specific regard to European integration, there are four specific strands of thought on the West European left. Firstly, the EEC/EU was seen as an agent of multinational capitalist exploitation and of German or American hegemony. The second position agreed with most of the analysis of the first position, but argued that withdrawal was unrealistic, and therefore only a root-and-branch restructure of the EU was a viable solution. The third position saw the EEC/EU as a potential agent of social and political change and the regeneration of the European left. The final position, so-called 'weak reformism' saw Europe and the pursuit of integration as a primary project of the left, and the outcome is more or less uncritical support (Dunphy, 2004: 4-6).

With economic liberalisation it is likely that there would be broad support across the party family as the majority of parties have accepted the liberalisation of the market – as Sassoon (1997: 2-3) noted that there had been the "...extraordinary ideological success of the proponents of the liberalization of market forces". However there is the likelihood that two groups of party behaviour will be observable for economic harmonisation. Anglo-Nordic social democratic parties are likely to be suspicious, for quite different reasons – in the UK, as it generally has aimed to keep its labour market as competitive as possible and therefore will generally want to avoid harmonising various aspects of economic policy; and for Sweden, Finland and perhaps

Denmark they already possessed greater levels of welfare and labour market protection and will want to avoid reducing the level of provision down to that of the UK.

For the dimension of supranational integration, it is possible to argue that most social democratic parties like with that of economic liberalisation will show at least an acceptance of the process. Featherstone (1988: 243) noted that in particular there was a gradual increase in support for the principle of supranational integration. Again, with legal integration, there will be at least an observable acceptance of the process due to their support for liberalisation of the market.

For social integration, a similar trend to that of economic harmonisation will most likely be observable as it is entirely contingent on the achievements of the welfare state and the will for labour market flexibility. Anglo-Nordic parties are likely to be suspicious, whereas continental Social Democratic parties are likely to show support. Cultural integration is likely to receive some support due to their reorientation towards more support for integration more generally, but traditionally they were grounded at the national level. Finally, with foreign policy integration the more left-wing of Socialist and Social Democratic parties are likely to engage in critical discourses, but more centre-left parties are likely to give more positive consideration of this issue.

Overall, Socialist and Social Democratic parties are likely to use positive support towards all aspects of integration. However, the only area that may break this pattern is that of social integration. During the early part of the time-series more critical discourses may be observable, but these should shift later towards more support. The table below shows the Socialist and Social Democratic parties that have manifestos available for the analyses in chapter five and chapter six:

Table 4: Socialist and Social Democratic Parties from Euromanifestos Dataset

Party	Year
Social Democrats	
FRA: PS Socialist Party	1989, 1994, 1999, 2004
GER: SPD Social Democratic Party	1989, 1994, 1999, 2004
LUX: POSL-LSAP Socialist Workers Party	1989, 1994, 1999, 2004
NET: PvdA Labour Party	1989, 1994, 1999, 2004
NET: D66 Democrats 66	1989, 1994, 1999, 2004
BEL: SP Flemish Socialist Party	1989, 1994, 1999, 2004
GB: Labour Party	1989, 1994, 1999, 2004

GB: SDLP Social Democratic and Labour Party	1989, 1994, 1999, 2004
DEN: SD Social Democracy in Denmark	1989, 1994, 1999, 2004
DEN: CD Centre Democrats	1989, 1994, 1999
IRE: LP Labour Party	1989, 1994, 1999, 2004
GRE: KKE Communist Party	1994, 1999, 2004
SPA: PSOE Socialist Workers Party	1989, 1994, 1999, 2004
POR: PSP Socialist Party	1989, 1994, 1999, 2004
POR: PSD Social Democratic Party	1989, 1994, 1999, 2004
SWE: SdaP Social Democratic Labour Party	1995, 1999, 2004
FIN: SSDP Social Democrats	1996, 1999, 2004
AUT: SPÖ Social Democratic Party	1996, 1999, 2004

CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS

Christian Democratic parties along with Liberal parties were the original proponents of integration in Europe, and have continually supported both the process of deepening and widening of the EC/EU. Despite the lack of scholarly attention given to the Christian Democratic phenomenon, it has been noted that it is clear that Christian Democratic groups have been a major force behind the push for political and monetary union (Hanley, 1994: 1-2).

In terms of the Christian Democratic ideology, Hanley (1994:3) argued that most political scientists see it as a form of moderate conservatism, perhaps with a more recognisable doctrine based on Catholic social thought and a commitment to cultural pluralism, as well as a policy style that contains a fairly generous welfare element and an attachment to European federalism, in addition to uncritical Atlanticism. Irving (1979: xviii) argued that it was not easy to define Christian Democracy, as there were considerable variations with the German Christian Democrats having many similarities to the British Conservatives, the Belgian and Italian Christian Democrats being more orientated towards the Left and the Dutch somewhere between the two positions. However, there were three distinctive principles:

“Christian principles’ (in the sense of a broad commitment to basic human rights, particularly those of the individual); ‘democracy’ (in the sense of a clear-cut commitment to liberal democracy); and ‘integration’ (in the dual sense of a commitment to class reconciliation through the concept of the broad-based *Volkspartei* and to transnational reconciliation, manifested especially through the strong Christian Democratic commitment to European integration) (Irving, 1979: xviii).

Van Kersbergen (1994: 36) provided a useful summary of some of the key concepts in the Christian Democratic movement:

The key concepts for understanding Christian Democracy are integration, (class) compromise, accommodation and pluralism. It is precisely the ceaseless attempt at integrating and reconciling a plurality of societal groups with possibly opposed interests that makes Christian Democracy distinctive. Christian Democracy voices, translates, codifies and restructures societal conflict within itself in the attempt to arbitrate and accommodate societal discord. Socialism and liberalism – at least in Christian Democratic interpretation – tend to be the political articulations of opposing poles of societal difference, disagreement and conflict.

In terms of economic integration (liberalisation and harmonisation), supranational integration and legal integration, these were frequently called for during the NEI congresses. During the period of the congresses the desire for an economic and political union were emphasised, calls to accept decreases in sovereignty were made, economic resolutions (incorporating the fundamental ideas behind the Common Market) were set and indeed during the Christian Democratic party membership of member state governments they were implemented (see Papini, 1997: 54-67). Christian Democratic parties due to their strong commitment to welfare provision are also likely to exhibit strong support for social integration. With cultural integration, they led the movement for transnational integration and furthermore called for the extension of integration to Central and Eastern Europe (see Papini, 1997: 54-67). Finally with foreign policy integration, as Buffotot (1994: 202-206) stated, Christian Democratic parties make simultaneous use of the concept of defence and security – which involves political, military, economy, ecological, technological and psychological aspects. Therefore Christian Democratic parties have made considerable efforts to emphasise the importance of freedom and respect for human rights, reductions in the socio-economic inequalities between states, as well as disarmament. These recurring themes were regularly on the agenda of the NEI congresses at the start of integration up until the early 1960s (see Papini, 1997: 54-66). In addition, the imbalance between the US and European allies in terms of military capabilities has continued to be of concern for the Christian Democratic parties,

and they have attempted to resolve this with their support of the European Defence Community (Papini, 1997: 64) and beyond to include the institutional battles of the 1980s (Buffotot, 206-210) and support for the moves towards the ESDP and CFSP during the 1990s.

Overall, it is possible to hypothesise that Christian democratic parties are likely to support all aspects of integration. This should be observable at all four data points throughout the time period. The table below shows the Christian Democratic parties that have manifestos available for the analyses in chapter five and chapter six:

Table 5: Christian Democratic Parties from Euromanifestos Dataset

Party	Year
<i>Christian Democrats</i>	
GER: CDU Christian Democrats	1989, 1994, 1999
GER: CSU Christian Democrats	1989, 1994, 1999
LUX: PCS-CSV Christian Social Peoples Party	1989, 1994, 1999
ITA: DC Christian Democrats	1989, 1994, 1999
NET: CDA Christian Democratic Appeal	1994
BEL: PSC Christian Social Party	1989, 1994
BEL: CD&V Christian Democrats	1989, 1994
IRE: Fine Gael	1989, 1994
GRE: ND New Democracy	1999, 2004
SPA: CDS Democratic and Social Centre	1989
SWE: KdS Christian Democratic Community Party	1994, 1999
AUT: OVP Peoples Party	1994, 1999
FIN: KD Christian Democrats	2004

(POST) - COMMUNIST PARTIES

Within Western Europe there was a demarcation in policy and orientation between the traditional Communist parties with their Eastern outlook and the growth of Eurocommunist parties and their acceptance of democratic structures. After 1989 some traditional Marxist parties remained, but others split, with one element moving towards the position of a more mainstream social democratic party and the other remaining as a traditional Marxist party – for example the Italian Communist Party (PCI) split to form *Rifondazioni Comunista* (RC) and *Partito della Sinistra* (PDS). Ziblatt ¹⁹(1998 in Bozoki & Ishiyama, 2002: 5) noted that there were at least two strategies utilised successfully - that of leftist-retreat and pragmatic-reform. The leftist-retreat strategy involved embracing Marxist traditions and continuing with the status of an anti-system party. The pragmatic-reform strategy on the other hand attempted to redefine the party as a left leaning

¹⁹ This was originally applied to the cases of Central and Eastern Europe, but still offers some fit with West European cases.

European social democratic party. Ishiyama (1998 in Bozoki & Ishiyama, 2002: 5-6) added a third strategy – that of national-patriotic. This entailed the continuation of Marxist-Leninist traditions but they did not wholly embrace the Marxist-Leninist legacy. There was no attempt to redefine the party as a European Social Democratic party.

Traditionally, Communist parties have opposed all aspects of European integration, as the process was dominated by policies designed to enhance the neo-liberal character of West European democracies. The European issue was little more than a distraction up until the Second World War. However, they became aggressively hostile after the founding of the *Komintern* in 1947. They saw Europe as capitalist, Atlanticist, reformist and a rampart against the revolution. This was the case amongst both traditional Marxist and those parties having adopted Euro-communist values post-1970 (Bell, 1996: 220-222). Gramsci's notion of reification perhaps summed up Communist objections. Reification referred to a process:

...whereby men and women become passive spectators of the social forces that structure their lives. The origins of this passivity lie in capitalism's dehumanization of the worker, who is reduced to a marketable commodity, a 'thing', to be bought in the market, just like any other instrument of production or consumption (Femia, 1999: 114-115).

The market-orientated reforms have done much to promote the free movement of goods, services, workers, and capital. With the free movement of workers, this can be seen as dehumanizing the worker and forcing them to market their labour like any other commodity. Traditional Communist parties, as well as post-communist parties taking the left-retreat and national-patriotic strategies are likely to reject both the processes of economic liberalisation, as well as economic harmonisation. As Bell (1996: 228-229) has remarked that with the process of the ratifying of the Maastricht Treaty, Communist parties attacked it "because it undermined the purely national forms of defence available to the worker". As Chan (2001: 157) notes 'Communist and ex-Communist parties have in recent years frequently been described as

‘conservative’ because of their scepticism towards market-oriented reforms and democratization’. Those post-Communist parties following the path of pragmatic-reform are likely to continue to support both economic liberalisation and harmonisation, as this is crucial for the continuing membership of the European Union.

The process of supranational integration provides conflicting patterns within this party family. Like the twin processes of economic liberalisation and harmonisation it should be observed that traditional Communist, as well as those taking the left-retreat and national-patriotic strategies are likely to reject supranational integration. Bell (1996: 229) in his examination of the reaction of West European Communist parties to the Maastricht Treaty found that all the parties emphasised a democratic deficit of the European Union.

Positions towards legal integration are likely to be unpronounced with the pragmatic reformists parties due to the need accept the *acquis communautaire* and the rules surrounding the running of the single market as a fundamental element of continued membership of the EU. Unsurprisingly, the remaining categories of traditional Marxist, leftist retreat and national-patriotic parties are likely to reject legal integration given their positions towards economic and supranational integration.

With social integration, three considerations need to be taken into account. Firstly, to what extent does the (post)-communist party believe that national social welfare policies have failed? Secondly does the party consider it necessary to develop policies to support those losing out the European market reforms? Finally, linking in with the second point, how do those parties intend to achieve the implementation of those policies – at the national or European level?

Finally, traditional, left-retreatist and national-patriotic post-communist parties are likely to view both NATO and European foreign policy structures with suspicion and therefore reject them outright, but the pragmatist reformist parties with their attempt to be seen as a left-leaning social

democratic party are more likely to engage in less critical discourse, but are likely to remain suspicious.

To sum up and simplify, (post)-Communist parties are likely to exhibit the following behaviour. Traditional Communist parties (those relatively unreformed since 1989) are likely to continue to reject towards all aspects of integration, with the exception of social integration to which they would show no overall position. On the other hand, the reformed (post)-Communist parties are likely to show support for all dimensions with the exception of social and foreign policy integration, where they are likely to show no overall position towards the former, and use critical discourses towards the latter. The table below shows the (post)-Communist parties that have manifestos available for the analyses in chapter five and chapter six:

Table 6: (Post)-Communist Parties from Euromanifestos Dataset

Party	Year
<i>Post-Communists</i>	
FRA: PCF Communist Party	1989, 1994, 1999, 2004
GER: PDS Party of Democratic Socialism	1994, 1999, 2004
NET: SP Socialist Party	1989, 1994, 1999, 2004
DEN: SF Socialist Peoples Party	1989, 1994, 1999, 2004
IRE: Workers Party	1989, 1994, 1999
GRE: KKE Communist Party	1989, 1994, 1999, 2004
SPA: IU United Left	1989, 1994, 1999, 2004
POR: PCP Communist Party	1989, 1994, 1999
ITA: RC Newly Founded Communists	1994, 1999, 2004
SWE: VP Left Party	1995, 1999, 2004
FIN: VL Left Wing Alliance	1996, 1999, 2004

AGRARIAN

European Agrarian party origins were found in the influence of two principal cleavage structures – that of the rural-urban and centre-periphery cleavages. Despite common roots, the interpretation of these societal cleavages into the ideological and strategic behaviour of political parties depended on the contextual situation the agrarian parties found themselves in. Wider developments in the party system and liberal democracy have led to very different outcomes across Europe. In addition with the shrinking of the agricultural sector, some significant changes were observable – the changing of party names in order to widen their appeal; the adoption of

some catch-all features; and even encroaching on the territory of the extreme right. So essentially within the party family, the factors outlined above presented the possibility for greater variance in the positions of agrarian parties towards European integration (Batory and Sitter, 2004: 523-527).

Agrarian parties have particularly critical of the process of European integration. In particular they represent peripheral communities and displayed a strong dislike of any centralising features. Hence their particular dislike of transfers of sovereignty to the supranational level. Again due to the nature of the constituency, they tend to be critical of the complete liberalisation of the market and the banning of state subsidies to particular industries. A caveat must be inserted here. As representatives of farming communities, they have and continue to benefit from the impact of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) payments hence this may sway their opinions on the liberalisation of the market.

In summary, Agrarian parties are likely to use critical and rejectionist discourses towards all aspects of economic, supranational and legal integration. They are also likely to be extremely critical of the remaining forms of integration: social, cultural and foreign policy integration. The table below shows the Agrarian parties that have manifestos available for the analyses in chapter five and chapter six:

Table 7: Agrarian Parties from Euromanifestos Dataset

Party	Year
<i>Agrarian</i>	
SWE: CP Centre Party	1995, 1999, 2004
FIN: SK Finnish Centre	1996, 1999, 2004

REGIONAL/ETHNO-REGIONAL

Regionalist parties form the peripheral opposition of the centre-periphery cleavage (see Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). Not only are they extremely diverse (Türsan, 1998: 4-7) but also difficult to study – due to a lack of a commonly shared definition (Muller-Rommel, 1998: 18). Perhaps in no small part due to this diversity, they have been prevalent in virtually all West European states (Türsan,

1998: 1). Regional party behaviour has been intensely context driven and has been entirely dependent on the position of the regions within the nation state, where some have enjoyed relative autonomy within their territorial area, while others have had very little scope to influence policy. This has made them both interesting to study especially with regards to European integration, but also has thrown up hurdles when attempting to produce broad hypotheses in order to predict their behaviour. For example, an examination of the broad objectives illuminates this lack of convergence within the party family, and for this Türsen's (1998: 6) extensive research is particularly useful. He argued that:

Much like nationalism, ethnoregionalism is a mobilisation concept. It shares with nationalist philosophy the priority of the interests of the persons within the national unit (citizens) vis-à-vis those external to it. The most prominent feature of ethnoregionalist parties is undoubtedly their demand for political reorganisation of the national power structure, or for some kind of 'self-government'. In addition to the defining characteristics of identity and territory, the centrality of the demand for empowerment of the regional group distinguishes this type of party from other party 'families' that translate sociostructural cleavages to the party competition arena.

It is the 'some kind of self-government' which is particularly relevant, in that it can encompass forms of decentralisation, from a few competencies to wholesale autonomy, or towards independence and full-independency. This was then where the EU could frustrate moves towards autonomy and independence, replacing one (national) centre with a new supranational centre, or indeed even promote it through subsidiarity, engagement with regional actors in the Committee of the Regions or a reliance on the monitoring capabilities of regional authorities.

As Lynch (1998: 198) stated with regionalist parties within the European Free Alliance though are "... largely support the principle of European integration, they are often suspicious of the practice of integration and the attitudes of the large member states". A caveat is necessary here, the European Free Alliance does not contain all regionalist parties within the EU, and so this cannot be taken as a full generalisation of the behaviour exhibited by the parties.

Economic Liberalisation is a particularly interesting issue with regionalist parties. Peripheral regions while extremely diverse can be considerably weaker economically than the centre. There are obvious exceptions – for example the Basque and Catalan regions of Spain have been considerably wealthier than the Castilian centre and historically have subsidised the poorer regions of Spain. Liberalisation opens peripheral regions to much greater competition and has allowed resources – workers, capital, services and production to enter or exit. Hence this provided the potential for negative discourses especially approaching the signing of Maastricht. Yet as Kincaid Jolly (2007: 111) points out the European Union makes smaller states more viable by diminishing the advantages of larger states, often through suitable regional policies.

Economic harmonisation is likely to cause considerable friction amongst peripheral regions. Harmonisation of fiscal policies together with the consequences of competition promotion through economic liberalisation could potentially disadvantage a peripheral region, especially as some state aid, preferential policies on tax and/or subsidies are now illegal. In addition, due to the large number of regions and small level of available EU subsidies territorial disparities have remained large (De Winter & Gomez-Reino, 2002: 488). In addition it could negatively impact inward investment – as economic integration opened the way for capital and labour to flow to other regions of the EC/EU.

Supranational integration on the one hand has been a process of transferring policy competencies away from the traditional dominant national centre to a supranational organisation. Yet on the other hand it has constituted an amplification of the “democratic deficit” defined in terms of distance between decision-makers and the beneficiaries of public policy (De Winter & Gomez-Reino, 2002: 489). Essentially, supranational integration can be seen as a mixed blessing, it has removed some of the competencies from the traditional centre, but on the other hand replaced the national centre with another centre, but further away. This potentially means that the aim of autonomy is more difficult to achieve. Yet, the promotion of a Europe of the Regions, especially

with the Commission having sought to engage regional bodies, through consultations, subsidiarity and also through regional bodies monitoring of legislation and regulations has the potential to facilitate greater autonomy.

Two potential positions exist when examining the position of regionalist parties towards aspects of Legal integration. On the one hand supranational law further distances decision-makers and their beneficiaries and reduced the potential influence of regional actors; yet supranational law may help to undermine the traditional sovereignty of the centre – the nation-state. Social integration provides the potential to correct the negative externalities of the market created by further economic liberalisation and economic harmonisation. Peripheral regions can be particularly at risk from increased competition and the potential loss of workers, capital, and the production of goods and services within the particular geographical locality. Policies, which aim to improve the position of the peripheral regions within the market, are likely to be widely supported amongst regionalist parties.

The ethnic theme is particularly salient amongst regional parties due to two developments – de-territorialisation via globalisation of market forces and the resurgence of the salience of territoriality of political forces (Türsan, 1998: 3). The defence of a unique group identity against the centralising nation state has been a recurring theme amongst the parties, but replacing the nation state with a centralising supranational state is likely to be resisted as much. However, with the promotion of individual identities within a broad European umbrella this has the potential to be seen much more positively.

Finally, with foreign policy integration, regionalist parties are likely to show a greater diversity than with other forms of integration. Traditionally, foreign and defence policy has been provided by nation-states and hence regionalist parties may not have particularly developed policies. Positions towards this aspect will depend on the level of self-government regionalist parties are

aiming for. Certainly for those aiming for independence will show more positive discourses as it reduces the expenditure needed. However, another variable is whether each region is aiming for neutrality, whereby supranational foreign policy will be viewed with suspicion.

Overall, the ethno-regionalist party family is likely to show positive discourses towards economic liberalisation, legal, social and cultural integration. Towards supranational integration the family is likely to show a heterogeneous pattern of behaviour, and towards harmonisation, the parties are likely to be negative. The table below shows the ethno-regionalist parties that have manifestos available for the analyses in chapter five and chapter six:

Table 8: Ethno-Regionalist Parties from Euromanifestos Dataset

Party	Year
<i>Ethno-regionalist</i>	
FRA: RPF Rally for France	1994, 1999, 2004
ITA: SVP South Tyrol People's Party	1999, 2004
BEL: VB Flemish Block	1989, 1994, 1999, 2004
BEL: NVA New Flemish Alliance	1989, 1994, 2004
GB: PC Party for Wales	1994, 1999, 2004
GB: SNP Scottish National Party	1989, 1994, 1999, 2004
GB: UKIP UK Independence Party	1994, 1999, 2004
GB: DUP Democratic Unionist Party	1989, 1994, 1999, 2004
GB: UUP Ulster Unionist Party	1989, 1994, 1999, 2004
DEN: FP Progress Party	1989, 1994, 1999
DEN FB: People's Movement	1989, 1994, 1999, 2004
DEN: JB June Movement	2004
SPA: PNV-EAJ Basque Nationalist Party	1989, 1994, 2004
SPA: EA Basque Solidarity	2004
SPA: ERC Catalan Republican Left	1989, 1994, 1999
SPA: EH Basque Euskal Herritarrok	1994, 1999, 2004
SPA: BNG Galician Nationalist Bloc	1994, 1999
FIN: RKP-SFP Swedish Peoples Party	1996, 1999, 2004

NATIONALIST

Nationalists and the extreme right form an uneasy party grouping given the extreme diverse nature of its members²⁰. Nationalist parties are generally found at the extremes of the party system and by their very nature extremely suspicious of the impact of European integration on the integrity of the nation state – often both sovereignty based issues, and issues of the cultural impact of integration. The party family has perhaps contained some of the harshest critics towards the EU.

²⁰ Ignazi (2003) addressed the wide variety and meanings of the right, and in particular the widening of the extreme right in the 1980s with the emergence of a new political cultural discourse fostered by neo-conservative and the new right (Nouvelle Droite). See Chapters 1 and 2.

Ramet (1999: 4) linked the concept of radical right and organised intolerance to argue that the term radical right was generally applied to twentieth-century incarnations of organised intolerance. Furthermore organised intolerance was defined as:

...that segment of the political landscape which arose, historically, as a dimension of cultural “irrationalism,” and is inspired by intolerance (of any defined as “outsider”), and hostility to notions of popular sovereignty or popular rule (Ramet, 1999:4).

This conception touches upon an important element of nationalist/extreme right parties – that of the “outsider” – this was somewhat of a floating concept in that it can refer to other member states or those outside the EU and this has varied over time and parties.

Stöss (1991 in Ramet, 1999: 6) identified four characteristics with right-wing extremism: exaggerated nationalism involving hostile attitudes towards other states or peoples; denial that all people had equal rights of life, liberty, security, conscience and religion, opinion and speech, assembly and association, and the denial of the equality of human worth; a rejection of parliamentary-pluralist systems; and finally a folk-ethnocentric ideology. With Stöss’ characteristics once again the hostile attitudes towards other states, and furthermore anti-system characteristics are apparent. Finally examining Griffin’s definition one can see interesting additions to the two previous attempts. Griffin (1999: 154) defined nationalism as:

...an ideology whose affective driving force is the sense of belonging to and serving a perceived national community. The carriers of this ideology attribute to their nation a distinctive cultural identity, which sets apart from other nations and gives it a special place in the historical process. This Community is (usually subliminally) identified with a unique set of characteristics allegedly deriving from constitutional, historical, geographical, religious, linguistic, ethnic and/or genetic realities. The sentiments aroused by the sense of being a member of this community may be confined to a keen sense of pride in national culture and traditions without being associated with political demands (“cultural nationalism”). On the other hand, when such sentiments play a major role in the dynamics of a official movement, the thrust of nationalism is generally for the national community to be assumed to form ‘naturally’ a state (whether autonomous or part of a federation or confederation of states) in which the sovereignty held to reside in the people is exercised by its elected or self-appointed representatives within territorial boundaries recognised by the international political community.

In addition to the distinctive national culture and the setting the country apart by emphasising its uniqueness/superiority; characteristics such as the historical importance of the nation state, particular linguistic and ethnic distinctiveness, and finally the importance of sovereignty is particularly important. These three definitions/examinations of the characteristics of nationalists/extreme right ideology suggested a rejection on most if not all the dimensions under investigation. However, the previous literature suggested a more complex picture of reality.

With economic integration, nationalist and extreme right parties are likely to accept the liberalisation of the market, but with continuing strict controls on imports from outside of the free trade area (Mudde, 2007: 169). As Mudde (2007: 159) noted, many West European parties were supportive of European integration during the 1980s and the turning point was the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty with parties attacking it as “neoliberal” and “socialism”.

Supranational integration is a clear process that has received strong critical and rejectionist discourses. As Mudde (2007: 168) noted most populist radical right parties denounced the current form of European co-operation and did not want further loss of independence, a European super-state, and preferred a confederalist model. Fieschi, Shields and Woods, 1996: 237) in their study of German, French and Italian extreme right parties found that the parties stated an adamant rejection of any loss of national sovereignty to a centralised European bureaucracy.

Nationalist parties are likely to view supranational law as taking away the independence of the member states and therefore likely to be critical or outright rejectionist. Social integration is also likely to be seen very critically as Maastricht has been criticised as too “socialist” as mentioned above. However, as Mudde (2007:169) has noted that a few parties have called for a ‘social Europe’ yet others feel that this is the domain of the nation state.

Consideration of the dimension of cultural integration leads to two potential predictions. On the one hand, much of the discourse of the extreme right/nationalist parties has been flavoured by the mythical visionary treatment of the continent and Europe’s pre-eminence as a civilisation. Indeed, as Fieschi et al (1996: 239) noted that during the 1984 European election the French National Front (FN) called for a “European patriotism”. Yet nationalist parties are primarily concerned with the nation state, and so while this may be found in the discourse of nationalist parties during the 1980s, during the 1990s and beyond it is likely that the parties are critical or rejectionist discourses towards this aspect of integration. Finally, with foreign policy integration, parties are likely to be supportive of some collective security arrangements, without necessarily losing any national sovereignty. Several parties have called for Europe to be independent from NATO and European co-operation in this field has been seen as a means of achieving this.

Overall, nationalist parties are likely to be critical of the majority of dimensions, but with the exception of liberalisation and foreign policy integration. With the market-orientated reforms it is likely that the data will reveal that initial support will shift towards more critical discourses later in the time series. For foreign policy integration nationalist parties are likely to exhibit support for the process. The table below shows the Nationalist parties that have manifestos available for the analyses in chapter five and chapter six:

Table 9: Nationalist Parties from Euromanifestos Dataset

Party	Year
Nationalist	
GER: REP The Republicans	1989, 1994, 1999
FRA: FN National Front	1994, 1999, 2004
ITA: AN National Alliance	1994, 1999, 2004
ITA: LN Northern League	1994, 1999
BEL: FN National Front	1999, 2004
DEN: DF Peoples Party	1999, 2004

GREEN PARTIES

The Ecological/Green/New Politics party family can be considered as an umbrella term for a diverse range of positions. As Freedman (1996: 526) noted, existing analyses position green

ideology into a number of categories. Some position it within new social movements, and others see it as exhibiting socialist and anarchist elements. In addition, it can be seen as left-ecological, neither left or right, a post-modern demand for radical democracy, a development of 19th century anti-capitalist and liberationist movement, new form of conservatism, or finally as a new protest phenomenon. Dobson (1999) has clearly differentiated between “Maximalism” and “Minimalism”, as well as “anthropocentrism” and “biocentrism” (also referred to as ecocentrism). Maximalism and Minimalism refer to how broad political-ecological thought should be defined – Maximalists define ecogism tightly, whereas minimalist’s definitions of ecogism are subject to fewer constraints. The second distinction is extremely important. The foundation of anthropocentrism is the belief that the:

...world has been made for human beings, and that human beings are not only the source but the measure of all value. Biocentrists posit the view that all life and not just human life has value (Dobson, 1999:235-239).

Green parties have been faced with a dilemma when dealing with the issue of engagement with the EU. The EU represents much that greens will instinctively oppose, such as technocratic policymaking, closed decision-making procedures, distant institutions, and the dominance of inter-governmental bargaining. Policy influence has relied on coalitions and this has meant the dilution of green principles. Yet for the Greens the EU offers a new forum in which to pursue reform and further decentralisation. Membership in the European Parliament has provided Greens with access to decision-making particularly with policy areas such as environmental, energy, regional and single market policies. Furthermore the EU’s growing global influence has meant the possibility of negotiated global action on issues such as global warming, deforestation and ozone depletion (Bomberg, 1998: 3).

Greens have rejected of unlimited and unregulated economic growth that is seen as a fundamental threat to the ecological balance (Poguntke, 1993: 36). Greens espouse the concept

of consumer society and thus the more materialist and consumer-oriented society is completely at odds with this ideology (Richardson, 1995: 9). A commitment to the liberalisation of the market and the freedom of movement is underpinned by the importance of promoting economic growth and hence green parties are deeply opposed to this process. Yet the EU also provides the opportunity for regulated capitalism and the potential structures for the promotion of policies to promote ecological balance.

Green ideology and in particular eco-socialists have emphasised the importance of Community and bottom-up participatory democracy (Freedon, 1996: 540-542; Bomberg, 1998: 2). Greens have rejected the notion of the EU developing into a new super-state and emphasise the importance of subsidiarity (Rüdig, 1996: 264), but environmental problems clearly operate across borders creating a dilemma in whether to use European structures to enable cross-border co-operation.

In a move away from focusing solely on post-materialist values Greens have adopted positions towards the traditional national areas of political competition, often adopting the approaches of left-wing parties. Despite this however, Greens emphasise the importance of a new global order to deal with cross-national concerns such as peace, social welfare and environment (Bomberg, 1998: 62). This emphasis on peace has been a strong feature of their ideology. Poguntke (1993: 10) argued that 'New Politics' demands included unilateral disarmament during the Cold War. Rüdig (1996: 261) examined the German Greens and argued that they emphasised the importance of the EU remaining a civil-economic alliance rather than developing any military capability.

With their ideological focus being global Greens have contended the EU is neither European nor a Community and argued that co-operation and solidarity shouldn't stop at the borders and therefore should include all of Eastern Europe as well as anyone else wishing to join (Bomberg,

1998: 62). Green/Ecologist parties have traditionally been opposed to military expenditure and action. Furthermore due to a strong interest in the promotion of third world issues, any exercise of hard power and diplomacy is likely to invoke strong critical discourses.

In summary, from this discussion it is possible to predict that Green parties are likely to reject both forms of economic integration, legal, cultural and foreign policy integration throughout the period. It is also likely to be the case with supranational integration but later in the period there may well be a discernible shift towards more positive positions. Finally with social integration, with the exception of “eco-socialists” this is unlikely to provoke much debate and therefore the hypothesis is that Green parties will exhibit no overall position. The table below shows the Green parties that have manifestos available for the analyses in chapter five and chapter six:

Table 10: Green Parties from Euromanifestos Dataset

Party	Year
<i>Green Parties</i>	
GER: Greens-90 Greens-Alliance 90	1989, 1994, 1999, 2004
LUX: GLEI-GAP Ecological-Alternative	1989, 1994, 1999, 2004
BEL: ECOLO Francophone Ecologists	1989, 1994, 1999, 2004
BEL: AGALEV Flemish Ecologists	1989, 1994, 1999, 2004
NET: GL Green Left	1994, 2004
GB: Green Party	1994, 1999, 2004
IRE: Greens	1999, 2004
SWE: Green Ecology Party	1995, 1999, 2004
FIN: VL Green Union	1996, 1999, 2004
AUT: GA Green Alternative	1996, 1999, 2004

The following table provides a summary of the hypothesised positions:

Table 11: Hypothesised Party Positions (* reformed versus non-reformed)

Party Family	Economic Integration	Economic Integration	Supranational Integration	Legal Integration	Social Integration	Cultural Integration	Foreign Policy Integration
	Liberalisation	Harmonisation					
Liberals	Positive	Positive	Positive	Positive	Positive	Positive	Positive
Conservative	Positive	Positive	Negative	Positive (more negative later)	Negative	Negative	Negative
Social Democrats	Positive	Minor positive	Negative (positive later)	Positive	Positive	Positive	Positive
Christian Democrats	Positive	Positive	Positive	Positive	Positive	Positive	Positive
(Post) - Communist	Negative/Positive*	Negative/Positive*	Negative/Positive*	Negative/Positive*	No overall position	Negative/Positive*	Negative
Agrarian	Negative	Negative	Negative	Negative	Negative	Negative	Negative
Nationalist	Positive (negative shift later)	Negative	Negative	Negative	Negative	Negative	Minor Positive
Regional	Positive	Negative	Positive	Positive	Positive	Positive	No overall position
Green	Negative	Negative	Negative	Negative	No overall position	Negative	Negative

EUROPEAN ELECTIONS AS SECOND ORDER

The second-order nature of European elections has been one of the more enduring theories from the field of political science. Across all non-national elections – local, regional and European, there is the tendency for issues specific to those arenas to have a less important role. The traditional view is that European Parliamentary elections are fought over national issues (Carrubba & Timpone, 2005: 260).

General elections for parliament in European countries, as well as most parliamentary democracies have been seen as first-order elections as they play a role in deciding who governs and which electoral platform should be put into practice. They are elections of great consequence for actors with the national context. Other elections which decide on regional, local, supranational, individual questions (referenda), and non-executive heads of state, play no role in deciding who governs at the national level and hence are referred to as ‘second-order’ national elections (Van der Eijk, Franklin and Marsh, 1996:150; Koepke & Ringe, 2006:324).

In investigating second-order elections, Reif and Schmitt (1980: 8-15) developed a model of electoral behaviour, in which they argued that while European elections have no institutionally binding consequences to governmental or opposition policies at the national level, there remains the perception that there is a connection with political configurations at the European and national stage. Hence frequently national issues become relevant. Consequentially, there is less at stake and there are lower levels of participation, greater successes for smaller parties, governmental parties generally lose out and there are higher levels of invalidated ballots. However, there is some importance to the specific arena – parties, platforms, candidates, policy areas and positions of control are at stake, and while at the time the arena was new, it transcended borders; has grown in power and developed a complex system of coalitions.

The Reif and Schmitt (1980) model was revisited by a number of scholars²¹ reaching similar conclusions (for Western Europe). Marsh (1998: 606) found that EP elections had a pattern of an anti-government swing; a shift of votes from bigger to smaller parties; EP elections were pointers to subsequent general elections; and finally the results were characteristic of party systems where the norm is government alternation. It is indeed the finding that EP elections are pointers to later elections as parties can treat the election as a poll on its electoral performance, which particularly underlines the focus on national electoral issues. Schmitt (2004: 668) found that in Western Europe the elections were still second-order, with participation remaining low, governmental parties still losing support and smaller parties performing more strongly. In addition, East European results suggested that participation was lower, abstentions were very high, and the elections had a Eurosceptical element. Governmental losses did not follow a cyclical pattern and small parties did not perform better in European elections. The findings towards the behaviour of voters in Central and Eastern Europe by Koepke and Ringe (2006: 341) also confirm that protest votes were not cast against the governmental parties.

The caveat²² to the model that this thesis develops, picks up on the Eurosceptical element found by Schmitt (2004). It argues that while undoubtedly the weight of empirical evidence infers that parties utilise national issues in their campaigns, the elections will still invariably and unavoidably be about Europe in some fashion for most parties and hence there should be at least some reference to Europe in the party policies. This is despite the lack of an emergence of a truly supranational party system that would allow voters to pick up voting cues (Kousser, 2004: 2) from competing electoral blocs with varying conceptions on the development of European integration (Bogdanor, 1989:214 in Van der Eijk, Franklin & Marsh, 1996; 160). While

²¹ See Reif, 1984; Schmitt, 1990; Irwin, 1995; Van der Eijk, Franklin & Marsh, 1996; Marsh, 1998 Schmitt, 2004; Koepke & Ringe, 2006;

²² Irwin, 1995's results would tend to disagree with the caveat this thesis inserts into the model (see p192). However, analysing the manifestos from the transnational groupings tells the analyst nothing about national parties' election manifestos. Furthermore, the transnational groupings are indeed wide in terms of their membership and very much heterogeneous.

discussions on Europe may not take up a large proportion of the campaign in quantitative terms, there should be at least some salience²³ to the issue. Indeed it is when one focuses on party manifestos that this should be the most obvious given that the manifesto is one of the only predetermined extensive policy statements a party makes during an electoral cycle. One can argue that with first-order elections the likelihood is that the greater weight of the policy issues addressed during the campaign will focus on national issues and not European, and hence European elections can provide a greater amount of data to analyse with regard to party positioning.

This caveat is supported by the work of Ferrara and Weishaupt (2004). They argued that the traditional theoretical position regarding the issue of Europe in European elections was essentially that Europe did not matter, it was a second-order election and that domestic concerns were paramount. However, their study suggests that European elections are, at least in part, about Europe. They noted that:

...political parties may run Euro-campaigns that utilise national policy issues to mobilize habitual supporters in order to demonstrate their strength in the national 'first-order' arena. In turn, voters may indeed largely tune out during such campaigns and then take advantage of the insignificance of European elections to vote sincerely, or to express their anger through a protest vote. Nonetheless, as we have shown, parties experiencing deep Euro-divisions suffer substantial desertions in elections to the European parliament, as voters behave in a way that is consistent with seeing through and punishing, intra-party fractionalization (Ferrara & Weishaupt, 2004: 301-302).

Both the caveat and the empirical contribution from Ferrara and Weishaupt (2004) suggest that while this does not amount to a wholesale rejection of forty years worth of empirical contributions, the role of European elections is perhaps more complex than previous research has given credit for. This caveat will be empirically assessed through analysing the salience of quasi-sentences towards European issues, which were coded across member states in the Comparative Manifestos Project (Klingemann et al, 2006) and the Euromanifestos Project

²³ Salience is discussed in detail in the fourth chapter of this thesis.

(August 2007). One issue that needed to be accounted for before any conclusions could be drawn was the potential for electoral behaviour to be different between national and European elections. Given that European elections do not impact on the distribution of seats at the national level there may be fewer constraints on party behaviour towards European integration. In order to assess this potential for party behaviour to differ substantially, this will be empirically assessed through the use of multiple OLS regression utilising comparable variables found in both studies. The dependent variable for this analysis will be the single pro versus anti-EU dimension found in both datasets.

SUMMARY

This chapter addressed the theoretical underpinnings of four core areas of the overall argument – the need for a more dynamic and nuanced definition, the need for a multi-dimensional framework to apply this conceptual evolution, that ideology is the strongest causal explanation of the use of Euroscepticism, and finally that European elections are important for understanding the way in which parties compete towards the issue of European integration. First and secondly, it addressed the issue of the conceptualisation of Euroscepticism and the development of a multi-dimensional framework. As has previously been discussed in the introduction and in chapter two, existing conceptualisations were too broad in their focus and the behavioural aspects they were attempting to capture. In addition, the way in which they conceptualised European integration did not capture the dynamic nature of the process. As an alternative, the thesis set out that Euroscepticism should be defined as:

...the sustained espousal of a critical or rejectionist argument towards economic, supranational, legal, social, cultural integration or foreign policy integration in Europe.

In doing so, it focuses on party positions towards the general ideas of integration only (which Kopecký & Mudde (2002) define as diffuse support), allows a dynamic nature of the process to

be captured by positioning on the basis of multiple dimensions, and finally captures pro-European attitudes as well.

Thirdly, the chapter examined the issue of Eurosceptic causation, and applied Seliger's (1976) definition of party ideology, as well as adapting Marks and Wilson's (2000) theory on the impact of the historical dispositions of parties. This underlined the major impact that ideology has on party positions towards European integration, and was operationalised on the basis of party families. Furthermore it discussed other existing theories of Eurosceptic causation – party strategy, the impact of the left-right dimension and the new politics dimension, the impact of national location, and the cueing effect from public attitudes towards integration. It then created a set of hypotheses for each dimension based on a modified version of von Beyme's (1985) party family framework.

Finally, the chapter tackled the issue surrounding whether European elections were appropriate sources of data for positioning parties given their second-order nature. It was argued that despite the dominance of national issues in the election campaigns, Europe is still important and in the area in which parties set out their predetermined positions – the European election manifestos – there is likely to be a greater discussion of the issue.

Looking forward to the next chapter, it will present the first element of the empirical analyses. It is focused on demonstrating that the European issue is both salient and that parties behave in a similar fashion between national and European elections towards the issue. Critically this provides the empirical justification for applying the multi-dimensional definition and framework in the subsequent analyses.

CHAPTER 4: EUROPEAN ELECTION RELEVANCY

As discussed in the introduction, the thesis has set out with the overall aim to identify the level and usage of Eurosceptic discourse by West European political parties in European elections and to examine Eurosceptic causation towards the multi-dimensional integration process. The introduction set out the five elements of the core argument: the need for a dynamic and nuanced conceptualisation of Euroscepticism; the importance of developing a multi-dimensional framework to analyse Eurosceptic parties based on that definition; the importance of Europe in European elections; the role and importance of ideology in structuring political party responses to European integration; and finally the importance of using a quantitative manifesto research strategy to examine Euroscepticism in election campaigns.

The focus of this chapter is to empirically examine the case put forward in the theoretical chapter – that in European elections, the issue of European integration is of importance to party competition and this will be investigated through a comparison of the data between national election manifestos (from the Comparative Manifestos Project) and European elections (from the Euromanifestos Project). It also provides the justification for carrying out further empirical work in chapter five and chapter six using the multi-dimensional framework by demonstrating the importance of European elections in understanding party positions towards European integration. After operationalising the saliency tests and the behavioural comparison of the two elections, the mean average saliency for each party family will be calculated towards twelve major election issues: Economic Policy; Social Welfare; Foreign Policy; European integration; Internationalism; Agricultural Policy; Performance of Government; Military; Democracy Issues; Crime Issues; Cultural Issues; and Environmental Issues. This will provide a general indication of the level of importance of each issue in the four European elections. Subsequently, Eurosceptic parties will be identified from each data source. Eurosceptic parties will be divided up by party family of origin and selected according to whether their manifestos featured five percent of

negative European discourses. Finally, using multiple OLS regression, predicted positions for parties will be analysed and constructed using similar independent variables to those selected for the later examination. However, a single pro vs. anti-EU dimension was selected for the analysis. This enables the comparison of both comparative manifesto data (where the coding structure restricts the ability to perform multi-dimensional analyses) and the Euromanifesto data.

The data indicates that Europe is the most salient issue within European election manifestos for all the party families. In addition, the Euromanifesto (Autumn 2007) data allows a greater number of Eurosceptic parties to be identified using a similar single dimension of support versus opposition to the EU when analysing the Comparative Manifesto Project data (Klingemann et al, 2006). While this initially suggests that parties are more Eurosceptic in European elections, a comparison of the predictive power of several sets of independent variables suggests that parties still behave in similar ways in both national and European elections.

OPERATIONALISING A TEST OF EUROPEAN ISSUE SALIENCY

Netjes and Binnema (2007:39-40) specifically examined the issue of the salience of European integration. As they pointed out the term is used quite impressionistically, but it is important due to two reasons – it can be used to explain how a party competes, and secondly, is relevant to understand the relationship between party positions and European voters.

Budge and Farlie (1983: 23-24) developed a theory of party saliency arguing that the tradition view of government spokesmen defending their programmes, and the opposition criticising it and presenting its own preferred policies was only supported by limited evidence. They argued instead that parties tend to ignore opponents' plans as far as possible and attempt to deflect attention to other policies. Those parties then attempt to promote their own preferred issues. They essentially do not compete directly, but try to promote the policy areas that they specialise in or own. Netjes & Binnema (2007: 40) second approach theorises saliency differently. This

concentrates on political parties heightening the importance of issues by framing them in partisan terms to attract voters; they essentially promote new issues to beat the incumbent or front running party. As such there are two definitions of saliency in these two approaches – one which is associated with the emphasis/frequency of policy areas by parties, and the other the extent to which an issue creates conflict. This thesis is focused on saliency approach, which is concerned with the emphasis a party makes towards a policy area.

Budge & Farlie (1983: 26-30) identified several policy areas which electors see issues falling into. They listed fourteen which focused on: civil order; constitutional; foreign relationships; defence; candidate reactions; government record and prospects; moral-religious; ethnic; regional; urban-rural; socio-economic redistribution; government control and planning; government regulation in favour of the individual; and finally initiative and freedom.

In order to analyse the difference in issue salience of Europe between national and European elections, variables were identified which were similar in both datasets and that fitted within the categories identified by Budge and Farlie (1983). Twelve categories were created: economic policy; social welfare; foreign policy; European integration; internationalism; agricultural policy; performance of government; military; democracy issues; crime issues; cultural issues; and environmental issues. The table below details the variables used for each category of policy. New 'sum' variables were created by combining the frequency of each individual variable and dividing the totals by the sum total of sentences in each manifesto. Means were then calculated and the results plotted for each party family of origin utilising both datasets. The Comparative Manifesto codes are shown in Table 12 and the Euromanifesto codes are shown in Table 13:

Table 12: Comparative Manifestos Project Codes

Variable	Description	National Elections Variable	Description
Economy		European Policy	
Per 401	Free Enterprise: Positive	Per 108	European Integration: Positive
Per 402	Incentives: Positive	Per 110	European Integration: Negative
Per 403	Market Regulation: Positive		
Per 404	Economic Planning: Positive	Internationalism	
Per 405	Corporatism: Positive	Per 107	Internationalism: Positive
Per 406	Protectionism: Positive	Per 109	Internationalism: Negative
Per 407	Protectionism: Negative		
Per 408	Economic Goals	Agricultural Policy	
Per 409	Keynesian Demand Management: Positive	Per 703	Farmers: Positive
Per 410	Productivity: Positive		
Per 411	Technology and Infrastructure: Positive	Performance of Government	
Per 412	Controlled Economy: Positive	Per 303	Governmental and Administrative Efficiency: Positive
Per 413	Nationalisation: Positive	Per 304	Political Corruption: Negative
Per 414	Economic Orthodoxy: Positive	Per 305	Political Authority: Positive
Per 415	Marxist Analysis: Positive		
Per 416	Anti-Growth Economy: Positive	Military	
		Per 104	Military: Positive
		Per 105	Military: Negative
Social Welfare			
Per 504	Welfare State Expansion: Positive		
Per 505	Welfare State Limitation: Positive	Democracy Issues	
Per 506	Education Expansion: Positive	Per 201	Freedom and Human Rights: Positive
Per 507	Education Limitation: Positive	Per 202	Democracy: Positive
Foreign Policy		Crime Issues	
Per 101	Foreign Special Relationships: Positive	Per 605	Law and Order: Positive
Per 102	Foreign Special Relationships: Negative	Per 606	Social Harmony: Positive
Per 103	Anti-Imperialism: Positive		
Per 104	Military: Positive	Cultural Issues	
Per 105	Military: Negative	Per 601	National Way of Life: Positive
Per 106	Peace: Positive	Per 602	National Way of Life: Negative
Per 107	Internationalism: Positive	Per 603	Traditional Morality: Positive
Per 108	European integration: Positive	Per 604	Traditional Morality: Negative
Per 109	Internationalism: Negative	Per 607	Multiculturalism: Positive
Per 110	European Integration: Negative	Per 608	Multiculturalism: Negative
		Environmental Issues	
		per 501	Environmental Protectionism: Positive

Table 13: Euromanifestos Project Codes

Variable	Description	European Elections Variable	Description
Economy		European Policy	
v1_401	Free Enterprise	v2_301	Decentralisation: Positive
v1_402	Incentives	v2_3011	Transfer of Power to the EC/EU: Negative
v1_403	Market Regulations	v2_302	Decentralisation: Negative
v1_404	Economic Planning	v2_3021	Transfer of Power to the EC/EU: Positive
v1_405	Corporatism	v2_303	Executive and Administrative Efficiency
v1_406	Protectionism: Positive	v2_304	Political Corruption
v1_407	Protectionism: Negative	v2_305	Political Authority
v1_408	Economic Goals	v2_306	Competences of the European Parliament: Positive
v1_4081	Creating Jobs	v2_307	Competences of the European Parliament: Negative
v1_4082	Labour Migration: Positive	v2_308	Competences of the European Commission: Positive
v1_4083	Labour Migration: Negative	v2_309	Competences of the European Commission: Negative
v1_409	Keynesianism Demand Management	v2_310	Competences of the European Council/Council of Ministers: Positive
v1_410	Productivity	v2_3101	Unanimity in the (European) Council
v1_411	Technology and Infrastructure	v2_311	Competences of the European Council/Council of Ministers: Negative
v1_412	Controlled Economy	v2_3111	Majority voting in the (European) Council
v1_413	Nationalisation	v2_312	Competences of the European Court of Justice: Positive
v1_414	Economic Orthodoxy	v2_313	Competences of the European Court of Justice: Negative
V1_415	Marxist Analysis	v2_314	Competences of other EC/EU Institutions: Positive
V1_416	Anti-Growth Economy	v2_3141	Positive mentions of the European Central Bank
		V2_315	Competences of other EC/EU Institutions: Negative
Social Welfare		v2_3151	Negative mentions of European Central Bank
v1_504	Welfare State Expansion	v2_316	EC/EU Enlargement: Positive
v1_5041	WSE: Job Programmes	v2_317	EC/EU Enlargement: Negative
v1_5042	WSE: Pensions	v2_318	Complexity of the EC/EU Political System
v1_5043	WSE: Health Care and Nursing Service		
v1_5044	WSE: Social Housing	Internationalism	
v1_5045	WSE: Child Care	v1_107	Internationalism: Positive
v1_505	Welfare State Limitation	v1_109	Internationalism: Negative
v1_5051	WSL: Job Programmes		
v1_5052	WSL: Pensions	Agricultural Policy	
v1_5053	WSL: Health Care and Nursing Service	v1_7031	Agriculture and Farmers: Positive
v1_5054	WSL: Social Housing	v1_7032	Agriculture and Farmers: Negative
v1_5055	WSL Child Care		
v1_506	Education Expansion	Performance of Government	
v1_507	Education Limitation	v1_303	Executive and Administrative Efficiency
		v1_304	Political Corruption
Health Policy		v1_305	Political Authority
v1_5043	WSE: Health Care and Nursing Service		
v1_5053	WSL: Health Care and Nursing Service	Military	
		v1_104	Military: Positive
Foreign Policy		v1_105	Military: Negative

v1_101 Foreign Special Relationships: Positive
v1_102 Foreign Special Relationships: Negative
v1_103 Anti-Imperialism
v1_104 Military: Positive
v1_105 Military: Negative
v1_106 Peace
v1_107 Internationalism: Positive
v1_108 Europe, European Community/Union: Positive
v1_109 Internationalism: Negative
v1_110 Europe, European Community/Union: Negative

Democracy Issues

sum2011
sum2012
sum202

Freedom
Human Rights
Democracy

Crime Issues

v1_605
v1_606

Law and Order
Social Harmony

Cultural Issues

v1_601
v1_6011
v1_602
v1_603
v1_604
V1_607
v1_608

National/European Way of Life: Positive
Immigration: Negative
National/European Way of Life: Negative
Traditional Morality: Positive
Traditional Morality: Negative
Multiculturalism: Positive
Multiculturalism: Negative

Environmental Issues

v1_501

Environmental Protection

OPERATIONALISING THE BEHAVIOURAL COMPARISON OF PARTIES IN NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN ELECTIONS

The multiple OLS regression tests were conducted using the Comparative Manifesto Project dataset from 1989-2003/5, and Euromanifesto dataset, which was artificially restricted to the time period of 1989-2004 (originally the data stretched from 1979-2004). Four models were created, which mirrored the models constructed for the multi-dimensional analysis in chapter five. The independent variable of year was included to control for any temporal effects due to the time-series nature of the panel data. National elections were at different points in time compared to other member states, while the European elections were held at specific points in time.

The first model was designed to isolate the impact of the party family by creating dummy independent variables for the following party families: Conservative, Socialist and Social Democratic, Christian Democratic, Communist, Agrarian, Ethno-regionalist, Green, and Special Issue. The Liberal party family was held as a control variable. The second model added thirteen country dummy variables: Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, Germany, Austria, Great Britain, and Ireland. Luxembourg was held as the control variable and the analysis excluded the Netherlands dummy variable. The inclusion of this additional set assessed whether some member states have a greater propensity towards Euroscepticism than others.

The third model added a selection of 'general ideological' independent variables. These were included to relate the dimension of European integration to traditional sources of conflict within national party systems. The independent variables included the following categories (which incorporated positive and negative usage): foreign special relationships, military, internationalism, decentralisation, centralisation, free enterprise, market regulation, welfare, national way of life, multiculturalism, and constitutionalism. This is where the regression analyses differed

significantly to the later multi-dimensional regression tests that instead included other elements in the multi-dimensional framework.

The fourth model took the previous selection of independent variables and added the alternative theories utilised in the later analyses – Left-Right position, GAL-TAN position and an indicator of the public position of each member state towards membership of the EU²⁵. The public's position was derived from the data provided by Eurobarometer surveys from 1989-2004 and the question of whether one considered EU membership to be a good thing.

Before moving on to discuss the results of the saliency tests, the Eurosceptic party identification, and the multiple regression results, the following table will provide information on which parties were included in the analyses from the Comparative Manifesto Project and to which party family they were assigned. The Euromanifestos party allocation tables were presented in the previous chapter.²⁶

²⁵ The three GAL-TAN position variables were calculated from various expert surveys carried out by Gary Marks and Liesbet Hooghe at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The 1999 values were from the 1999 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Steenbergen & Marks, 2007). The 2002 values were derived from the 2002 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Hooghe et al, 2008). Finally the 2006 GAL-TAN values were derived from the 2006 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Hooghe et al, 2008).

²⁶ Please note that this thesis has used the pre-existing party family allocations from the actual datasets themselves. For many academics the party family of origin for many political parties is a topic of much debate.

Table 14: Comparative Manifesto Project Parties

Party	Year
Liberal	
SWE: FP Liberal Peoples Party	1991, 1994, 1998, 2002
DEN: RV Radical Party	1990, 1994, 1998, 2001
DEN: V Liberals	1990, 1994, 1998, 2001
FIN: LKP Liberal Peoples Party	1991
FIN: NSP Progressives-Young Finns	1995
BEL: PVV Party of Liberty and Progress	1991
BEL: VLD Flemish Liberals and Democrats	1995, 1999, 2003
BEL: PRL Francophone Liberals	1991
BEL: PRL-FDF Liberal Reformation-Democratic Front	1995
BEL: PRL-FDF-MCC Alliance	1999
NET: VVD Peoples Party Freedom Democracy	1994, 1998, 2002, 2003
NET: LN Liveable Netherlands	2002, 2003
LUX: PD-DP Democratic Party	1994, 1999
ITA: PRI Republican Party	1992
ITA: PLI Liberal Party	1992
ITA: Margherita Daisy	2001
GER: FDP Free Democratic Party	1990, 1994, 1998, 2002
AUT: FPÖ Freedom Party	1990, 1994, 1995, 1999, 2002
AUT: LF Liberal Forum	1994, 1995
GB: LDP Liberal Democratic Party	1992, 1997, 2001, 2005
IRE: PD Progressive Democrats	1992, 1997, 2002
Conservative	
SWE: MSP Moderate Coalition Party	1991, 1994, 1998, 2002
DEN: KF Conservative Peoples Party	1990, 1994, 1998, 2001
FIN: KK National Coalition	1991, 1995, 1999, 2003
FRA: UDF Union for French Democracy	1993, 1997, 2002
FRA: RPR Rally for the Republic	1993, 1997
FRA: UMP Union for Presidential Majority	2002
ITA: FI Forza Italia Go Italy	1994, 1996, 2001
ITA: NPSI New Socialist Party	2001
ITA: Casa delle Liberta House of Freedom	2001
SPA: PP Popular Party	1993, 1996, 2000
SPA: CiU Convergence and Union	1993, 1996, 2000
GB: Conservative Party	1992, 1997, 2001, 2005
GB: UUP Ulster Unionist Party	1992, 1997, 2001
IRE: Fianna Fail	1992, 1997, 2002
Socialist & Social Democratic	
SWE: SdaP Social Democratic Labour Party	1991, 1994, 1998, 2002
DEN: SD Social Democratic Party	1990, 1994, 1998, 2001
DEN: CD Centre Democrats	1990, 1994, 1998
FIN: SSDP Social Democrats	1991, 1995, 1999, 2003
BEL: SP Flemish Socialist Party	1991, 1995, 1999
BEL: PS Francophone Socialist Party	1991, 1995, 1999, 2003
NET: PvdA Labour Party	1994, 1998, 2002, 2003
NET: D66 Democrats 66	1994, 1998, 2002, 2003
LUX: POSL-LSAP Socialist Workers Party	1994, 1999
FRA: PS Socialist Party	1993, 1997, 2002
ITA: Lista Sgarbi-Panella	1992, 1994, 1996
ITA: PSI Socialist Party	1992, 1994
ITA: RI Italian Renewal	1996
ITA: Ulivo Olive Tree	2001
ITA: PSDI Democratic Socialist Party	1992
GRE: PASOK Panhellenic Socialist Movement	1990, 1993, 1996, 2000
GRE: DIKKI Democratic Social Movement	1996
SPA: PSOE Socialist Workers Party	1993, 1996, 2000
POR: PSP Socialist Party	1991, 1995, 1999, 2002
POR: PSD Social Democratic Party	1991, 1995, 1999, 2002
GER: SPD Social Democratic Party	1990, 1994, 1998, 2002
AUT: SPÖ Social Democratic Party	1990, 1994, 1995, 1999, 2002
GB: Labour Party	1992, 1997, 2001, 2005
IRE: LP Labour Party	1992, 1997, 2002
Christian Democrats	
SWE: KdS Christian Democratic Community Party	1991, 1994, 1998, 2002
DEN: KrF Christian Peoples Party	1990, 1994, 1998, 2001
FIN: SKL Christian Union	1991, 1995, 1999, 2003
BEL: CVP Christian Peoples Party	1991, 1995, 1999
BEL: CD&V Christian Democrats	2003
BEL: PSC Christian Social Party	1991, 1995, 1999

BEL: CDH Christian and Humanist Party	2003
NET: CDA Christian Democratic Appeal	1994, 1998, 2002, 2003
NET: CU Christian Union	2002, 2003
LUX: PCS-CSV Christian Social Peoples Party	1994, 1999
ITA: DC Christian Democrats	1992
ITA: PPI Italian Popular Party	1994, 1996
ITA: CCD Christian Democratic Centre	1996
ITA: Biancofiore White Flower	2001
ITA: PI Pact for Italy	1994
ITA: AD Democratic Alliance	1994, 1996
SPA: CDS Centre Democrats	1993
GRE: ND New Democracy	1990, 1993, 1996, 2000
GRE: Pola Political Spring	1993, 1996
Por: CDS Centre Social Democrats	1991
POR: PP Popular Party	1995, 1999, 2002
GER: CDU-CSU Christian Democrats	1990, 1994, 1998, 2002
AUT: OVP Peoples Party	1990, 1994, 1995, 1999, 2002
IRE: Fine Gael	1992, 1997, 2002
<i>(Post)-Communist</i>	
SWE: Vp Left Party	1991, 1994, 1998, 2002
DEN: EL Red-Green Unity List	1994, 1998, 2001
DEN: SF Socialist Peoples Party	1990, 1994, 1998, 2001
FIN: VL Left Wing Alliance	1991, 1995, 1999, 2003
NET: SP Socialist Party	1994, 1998, 2002, 2003
FRA: PCF Communist Party	1993, 1997, 2002
ITA: RC Newly Founded Communists	1992, 1994, 1996, 2001
ITA: PDCI Italian Communists	2001
ITA: PDS Democratic Party of the Left	1992, 1994, 1996, 2001
SPA: IU United Left	1993, 1996, 2000
GRE: KKE Communist Party	1993, 1996, 2000
GRE: SAP Progressive Left Coalition	1990, 1996, 2000
POR: BE Left Bloc	1999, 2002
POR: PCP Communist Party	1991, 1995, 1999
POR: CDU Unified Democratic Coalition	1991, 1995, 1999, 2002
GER: PDS Party of Democratic Socialism	1990, 1994, 1998, 2002
AUT: KPO Communist Party	2002
GB: Sinn Fein	1997, 2001
IRE: DLP Democratic Left Party	1992, 1997
<i>Agrarian</i>	
SWE: CP Centre Party	1991, 1994, 1998, 2002
FIN: SK Finnish Centre	1991, 1995, 1999, 2003
FIN - SMP Rural Party	1991, 1995
FIN: PS True Finns	1999, 2003
<i>Ethno-regionalist</i>	
FIN: RKP-SFP Swedish Peoples Party	1991, 1995, 1999, 2003
BEL: FDF Francophone Democratic Front	1991
BEL: VU Peoples Union	1991, 1995,
BEL: VB Flemish Block	1991, 1995, 1999, 2003
BEL: VU-ID21 Peoples Union-ID21	1999
SPA: PNV-EAJ Basque Nationalist Party	1993, 1996, 2000
SPA: EA Basque Solidarity	1993, 1996, 2000
SPA: PAR Aragonese Regionalist Party	1993, 2000
SPA: ERC Catalan Republican Left	1993, 1996, 2000
SPA: PA Andalusian Party	1993, 2000
SPA: CC Canarian Coalition	1993, 1996, 2000
SPA: BNG Galician Nationalist Bloc	1996, 2000
GB: SNP Scottish National Party	1992, 1997, 2001
GB: DUP Democratic Unionist Party	1992, 1997, 2001
<i>Nationalist</i>	
DEN: DF Peoples Party	1998, 2001
FRA: FN National Front	1993, 1997, 2002
ITA: MSI-DN Social Movement Right Nationalist	1992
ITA: AN National Alliance	1994, 1996, 2001
ITA: LN Northern League	1992, 1994, 1996, 2001
NET: LPF List Pim Fortuyn	2002, 2003
<i>Green Parties</i>	
SWE: Green Ecology Party	1991, 1994, 1998, 2002
FIN: VL Green Union	1991, 1995, 1999, 2003
BEL: Ecolo Francophone Ecologists	1991, 1995, 1999, 2003
BEL: AGALEV Flemish Ecologists	1991, 1995, 1999


NET: GL Green Left	1994, 1998, 2002, 2003
LUX: GLEI-GAP Ecological-Alternative	1994, 1999
FRA: Greens	1993, 1997, 2002
FRA: GE Ecology Generation	1997
ITA: FdV Green Federation	1992, 1994, 1996
ITA: Il Girasole Greens-Social Democrats	2001
GER: Greens-90 Greens-Alliance 90	1990, 1994, 1998, 2002
AUT: GA Green Alternative	1990, 1994, 1995, 1999, 2002
IRE: Greens	1992, 1997, 2002
<i>Special Issue</i>	
SWE: NyD New Democracy	1991
DEN: FP Progress Party	1990, 1994, 1998
LUX: ADR Democracy and Pension Justice	1994, 1999
ITA: DE European Democracy	2001
ITA: List Di Pietro of Values	2001
ITA: LR Network-Movement for Democracy	1992, 1994
POR: PSN National Solidarity Party	1991
GB: UKIP UK Independence Party	2001
IRE: Sinn Fein Ourselves III	1997, 2002

RESULTS: SALIENCY COMPARISON

The graphs presented below show the results for the equivalent party families from each data source and demonstrate the importance of the European issue across parties in European elections, but conversely shows the disinterest of parties towards the issue in the national elections. One should note these are mean percentage values across all political parties from the EU-15 and therefore the percentages should be seen as a general indication of use:


LIBERAL PARTIES

Figure 3: Liberal European Issue Saliency Results



Source: Euromanifestos Project 1989-2004

Figure 4: Liberal National Issue Saliency Results




Source: Comparative Manifestos Project 1989-2003/5

For Liberal parties, in the European elections, European integration was clearly the most salient concern. It peaked at approximately 75-80% in 1995 and 1999. Foreign policy, democracy issues and economic policy were also important concerns. In the national elections, Liberal parties focused primarily on economic policy. However, concerns over social welfare, democracy issues, the performance of government, crime, and foreign policy were all salient. Europe had little importance, peaking at approximately 4%.


CONSERVATIVE PARTIES

Figure 5: Conservative European Issue Saliency Results



Source: Euromanifestos Project 1989-2004

Figure 6: Conservative National Issue Saliency Results




Source: Comparative Manifestos Project 1989-2003/5

Examining Conservative parties, it was possible to see that European integration was again the most salient. However, in 1994 economic policy also saw an average usage of approximately 58%. As both European policy and economic policy saw values in this region it is possible that one or two parties have outliers, which shifted the mean score much higher. European integration was clearly the most salient across the time period. Other important concerns included democracy, and foreign policy issues. In national elections, economic policy was clearly the most salient with values in the region of 12.5-28%. Other important policy foci were social welfare, foreign policy, and the performance of government. European integration only peaked at approximately 5%.


SOCIALIST AND SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTIES

Figure 7: Social-Democratic European Issue Saliency Results



Source: Euromanifestos Project 1989-2004


Figure 8: Social-Democratic National Issue Saliency Results



Source: Comparative Manifestos Project 1989-2003/5


Examining social democratic parties, in the European elections, European integration was clearly the most important issue. It saw mean scores of between 30-40% with the exception of the 1995 and 1996 elections for the 1995 accession group. Other important issues included economic policy, democracy issues, social welfare and foreign policy. Repeating the observed behaviour of the two preceding party families, social democratic parties in national elections focused their manifestos on economic policy, social welfare, foreign policy, performance of government, and democracy issues. European integration barely saw any use, peaking at approximately 2.5%.

Figure 9: Christian Democratic European Issue Saliency Results



Source: Euromanifestos Project 1989-2004


Figure 10: Christian Democratic National Issue Saliency Results



Source: Comparative Manifestos Project 1989-2003/5


For Christian Democratic parties, Europe took priority with approximately 20-48% sentences devoted to the policy area. Democracy issues, foreign policy and economic policy were also important. In national elections the use of European integration discourses was similar to the preceding party families, peaking at approximately 5% of usage. However, while prioritizing issues such as economic policy; cultural issues also saw strong saliency across the time period. In addition social welfare, performance of government, foreign policy, and crime issues were also important.

Figure 11: Post-Communist European Issue Saliency Results



Source: Euromanifestos Project 1989-2004


Figure 12: Post-Communist National Issue Saliency Results



Source: Comparative Manifestos Project 1989-2003/5


Among the (post)-Communist parties, during the European elections the most important issue was European integration, especially during the 1999 election where the parties devoted approximately 60% of their manifesto towards the issue. Other important and salient concerns were economic policy, democracy issues, social welfare and foreign policy. By complete contrast, in national elections, economic policy while it fluctuated accounted for 15% plus of the manifesto, while European integration only accounted for less than approximately 3% over the time period. Other important issues included social welfare, foreign policy, the performance of government, and democracy issues.

Figure 13: Agrarian European Issue Saliency Results



Source: Euromanifestos Project 1989-2004


Figure 14: Agrarian National Issue Saliency Results



Source: Comparative Manifestos Project 1989-2003/5


Analysing the results for Agrarian parties, it is again possible to see strong salience for European issues. Other important concerns included foreign policy, democracy issues and agricultural policy. In national elections, economic, and agricultural policy were the most salient. Europe peaked at approximately 2.5%. Other important foci included social welfare, performance of government and cultural issues.

Figure 15: Ethno-regionalist European Issue Saliency Results



Source: Euromanifestos Project 1989-2004

Figure 16: Ethno-Regionalist National Issue Saliency Results




Source: Comparative Manifestos Project 1989-2003/5

Examining the ethno-regionalist party family, it was still possible to see the pattern demonstrated by the preceding party families. European integration was clearly the most salient issue in European elections. Other concerns focused on in the manifestos included economic policy, democracy issues, foreign policy and cultural issues. With national election manifestos economic policy, cultural issues, social welfare and performance of government were the most salient. Democracy issues were also important. Europe for this party family was not very important with references only reaching approximately 2.5% of the manifesto length.


NATIONALIST PARTIES

Figure 17: Nationalist European Issue Saliency Results



Source: Euromanifestos Project 1989-2004

Figure 18: Nationalist National Issue Saliency Results




Source: Comparative Manifestos Project 1989-2003/5

With nationalist parties, in the European manifestos it was possible to observe the increasing saliency of Europe from 5% in 1989 to 35% in 1999. Interestingly cultural issues declined from 27% in 1989 to 10% in 2004. Other important concerns included economic policy and foreign policy. In national elections, economic policy, cultural issues and the performance of government were clearly the most salient. Other important policy foci were foreign policy, social welfare, democracy issues and crime. European integration references peaked at approximately 5%.


GREEN PARTIES

Figure 19: Green Party European Issue Saliency Results



Source: Euromanifestos Project 1989-2004

Figure 20: Green Party National Issue Saliency Results



Source: Comparative Manifestos Project 1989-2003/5

Finally, for the Green parties in the European election manifestos, the chief concerns across the time period were European integration issues, democracy issues, social welfare, performance of government, and foreign policy. The saliency of European integration was clearly the most important issue for the party family. One important point to note was the drop in issue saliency for the 1995/1996 elections. This result needs to be interpreted carefully read as it only applies to Green parties from the 1995 accession group. Despite saliency being <20% it was still clearly the most important issue. Amongst the remaining elections, the importance of European integration was clear with usage having a range from 37% to 78%. By contrast in national elections, Green parties focused on the environment and economic policy. The use of European related discourses only peaked at 5% in 1997. Other significant issue areas that saw a salience value of

greater than 10% during some of the elections were the performance of government, democracy issues and foreign policy issues.

RESULTS: IDENTIFYING EUROSCEPTIC PARTIES

Having established that Europe is a key policy area in European election manifestos, it is necessary to explore whether party behaviour differs substantially between national and European elections. If parties behave in a similar way towards Europe in both national and European elections, European election data from manifestos could be key to a deeper understanding of how parties position themselves towards European integration. Firstly, Eurosceptic parties will be identified using both Comparative Manifesto Project data from 1989-2003/5 utilising the dependent variable of pro vs. anti-EU, which subtracted the percentage of anti-European statements from percentage of pro-European statements. Reporting those parties that used 5% or more of their manifesto towards criticising Europe, there were only a small number of cases:

Table 15: Eurosceptic Parties Identified in National Election Manifestos

Parties	Eurosceptic in Election Year
Green Parties:	
SWE: Green Ecology Party	1991, 1994, 1998
Post-Communist Parties:	
SWE: VP Left Party	1994
DEN: EL Red-Green Unity List	1998, 2001
DEN: SF Socialist Peoples Party	1990
GRE: KKE Communist Party	1993, 1996, 2000
Nationalist Parties:	
DEN: DF Peoples Party	1998, 2001
Special Interest Parties:	
GB: UKIP UK Independence Party	2001

Source: Comparative Manifestos Project 1989-2003/5

Overall, it is possible to see that amongst West-European parties, with the few Eurosceptic cases identified, the majority are confined to the peripheries of the party system, thus confirming

previously observed positions. Furthermore all are confined to peripheral member states in the Union, and later accession groups.

Comparing the above results to the parties identified from the Euromanifestos Project data from 1989 to 2004, it is possible to identify far more cases across an almost identical timeline:

Table 16: Eurosceptic Parties Identified in European Election Manifestos

Parties	Eurosceptic in Election Year
Liberal Parties:	
AUT: FPÖ Freedom Party	1996, 1999, 2004
Conservatives:	
GB: Conservative Party	1999, 2004
Socialist and Social Democrats:	
LUX: POSL-LSAP Socialist Workers Party	1989
Christian Democrats:	
NET: CU Christian Union	1989
Post-Communist:	
SWE: VP Left Party	1995, 1999, 2004
NET: SP Socialist Party	1989, 1994, 1999
FRA: PCF Communist Party	1989, 1994
ITA: RC Newly Founded Communists	1994
GRE: KKE Communist Party	1994, 1999, 2004
POR: PCP Communist Party	1989, 1994, 1999
IRE: Workers Party	1999
Regionalist Parties:	
DEN FB: People's Movement	1989, 1994, 1999, 2004
DEN: FP Progress Party	1994
DEN: JB June Movement	1994, 1999, 2004
FRA: RPF Rally for France	1994, 1999
SPA: EH Basque Euskal Herritarrok	1999
SPA: BNG Galician Nationalist Bloc	1999
GER: REP The Republicans	1989, 1994, 1999, 2004
BEL: VB Flemish Block	1999, 2004
GB: UKIP UK Independence Party	1994, 1999, 2004
GB: DUP Democratic Unionist Party	1989, 1994, 1999, 2004
GB: UUP Ulster Unionist Party	1999
Nationalist Parties:	
DEN: DF Peoples Party	1999, 2004
FRA: FN National Front	1994, 1999, 2004
ITA: LN Northern League	2004
BEL: FN National Front	2004
Green Parties:	
SWE: Green Ecology Party	1995, 1999, 2004
LUX: GLEI-GAP Ecological-Alternative	1994
GER: Greens-90 Greens-Alliance 90	1989
AUT: GA Green Alternative	1996
GB: Green Party	1999

Source: Euromanifestos Project 1989-2004

The Euromanifestos data identifies far more Eurosceptic parties from all of the party family groupings. In addition a significant number of parties became Eurosceptic by the 1999 and 2004 European elections. What this could suggest is that it is misleading to argue that Euroscepticism is confined to the peripheries of the party system, it now could be argued that Euroscepticism is something that parties from all party families use at different points in time. However, any conclusions drawn from this data need to be qualified. Firstly, the number of party manifestos available expanded during the time period, and secondly the greater number of parties identified as Eurosceptic could be due to parties behaving in a less inhibited way given that European elections do not impact on the seat distribution at the national level. However, if one focuses again on the results, the number of Eurosceptic parties within the central core of party families: Social Democrats, Liberal Parties, Christian Democrats and Conservatives there are only a few examples when compared to the large number of Eurosceptic parties from the Greens, (post)-Communists, Nationalists and Regionalist groupings.

RESULTS: MULTIPLE OLS REGRESSION

The Comparative Manifesto data revealed that the models accounted for between 12.7 and 49.7% of the variance explained. The Durbin-Watson statistic suggests a minor case of negative autocorrelation, but this is well within acceptable standards: ≥ 1 and ≤ 3 . The Euromanifestos project (August 2007) data in comparison produced some similar results with the party family dummies, although more were statistically significant. The data did produce different coefficients for the country, general ideological and alternative theories independent variables. The data reveals that the models produced an adjusted R^2 range from 34.3% and 50% of the variance explained. In addition, there was almost no evidence of autocorrelation: 2.048.

The Comparative Manifesto Project results and Euromanifestos project regression results are presented below:

Table 17: National Election Regression Results

Variables	Standardised Coefficients			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Party Families				
Conservative	.008	-.019	-.016	.062
Socialist and Social Democratic	-.055	-.103	-.088	-.105
Christian Democrat	-.005	-.033	-.046	-.041
Communist	-.334***	-.425***	-.327***	-.309***
Agrarian	-.060	-.053	-.083	-.015
Ethnic-Regional	-.014	-.081	-.145	-.087
Nationalist	-.250***	-.335*	-.139	-.068
Green/Ecologist	-.202*	-.262***	-.218**	-.285**
Special Issue	-.118	-.090	-.066	-.013
Country				
Sweden		-.058	-.106	-.147
Denmark		-.102	-.139	-.121
Finland		-.085	-.071	-.089
Belgium		.030	.006	.080
France		.141	.086	.111
Italy		.058	-.027	.014
Spain		.081	.076	.117
Greece		-.032	-.002	.025
Portugal		.025	.020	.014
Germany		.195**	.194**	.238**
Austria		-.097	-.074	-.045
Great Britain		-.093	-.114	-.085
Ireland		-.120	-.144*	-.057
Year of Election			.056	.035
General Ideological Variables				
Foreign Special Relationship: Positive			.314***	.311***
Foreign Special Relationship: Negative			-.003	.003
Military: Positive			.092	.113
Military: Negative			-.112	-.093
Internationalism: Positive			.194**	.193**
Internationalism: Negative			-.137	-.126
Decentralisation: Positive			.063	.044
Centralisation: Positive			-.013	.009
Free Enterprise: Positive			.073	.058
Market Regulation: Positive			-.227***	-.215***
Welfare: Positive			-.026	.006
Welfare: Negative			-.136*	-.113
National Way Life: Positive			-.148*	-.111
National Way Life: Negative			.070	.064
Multiculturalism: Positive			-.082	-.060
Multiculturalism: Negative			-.161*	-.139*
Constitutionalism: Positive			-.056	-.038
Constitutionalism: Negative			.065	.047
Alternative Theories				
Left-Right Position				.021
Gal-Tan Values 2006				.520*
Gal-Tan Values 2002				-.744**
Gal-Tan Values 1999				.039

Is EU Membership a good thing? Eurobarometer data					-0.084
Adjusted R ²	0.127	0.208	0.481	0.497	
Durbin Watson			1.796		

Source: Comparative Manifestos Project 1989-2003/5
 Excluded Variables: Diverse Alliance, Northern Ireland
 P values: P < 0.5 (*), P < 0.1 (**), P < 0.01 (***)

Table 18: European Election Regression Results

Variables	Standardised Coefficients			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Party Families				
Conservative	.039	-.016	.067	.212**
Socialist and Social Democratic	.169*	.151	.108	.091
Christian Democrat	.160*	.198**	.178**	.343***
Communist	-.422***	-.474***	-.432***	-.476***
Agrarian	-.024	-.026	-.036	.071
Ethnic-Regional	-.026	-.057	-.069	-.018
Nationalist	-.251***	-.377***	-.317***	-.161
Green/Ecologist	-.201**	-.199**	-.234**	-.421***
Special Issue	-.070	-.062	-.065	-.028
Country				
Sweden		-.135*	-.149*	-.131
Denmark		.103	.078	.076
Finland		.118	.075	.103
Belgium		.004	-.025	-.085
France		.042	.043	.071
Italy		.184*	.127	.097
Spain		.035	-.013	-.046
Greece		-.062	-.030	-.052
Portugal		.022	-.007	-.032
Germany		.035	-.042	-.062
Austria		-.115	-.175**	-.130
Great Britain		-.018	.010	.002
Ireland		-.035	-.076	-.130
Year of Election			-.002	.032
General Ideological Variables				
Foreign Special Relationship: Positive			-.021	-.002
Foreign Special Relationship: Negative			.019	.032
Military: Positive			-.065	-.109
Military: Negative			.042	.044
Internationalism: Positive			.021	.001
Internationalism: Negative			-.196***	-.156**
Decentralisation: Positive			.045	.001
Centralisation: Positive			.007	.023
Free Enterprise: Positive			-.050	-.020
Market Regulation: Positive			-.012	.016
Welfare: Positive			.019	-.005
Welfare: Negative			.014	-.005
National Way Life: Positive			.061	.079
Nat Way Life: Negative			.023	.098
Multiculturalism: Positive			-.056	-.023
Multiculturalism: Negative			-.063	-.002
Constitutionalism: Positive			.203**	.152*
Constitutionalism: Negative			-.151*	-.162*
Alternative Theories				
Left-Right Position				.038
Gal-Tan Values 2006				.056
Gal-Tan Values 2002				-.147
Gal-Tan Values 1999				-.383*
Is EU Membership a good thing? Eurobarometer data				.084

Adjusted R ²	.343	.396	.457	.500
Durbin Watson			2.048	

Source: Euromanifestos Project 1989-2004
 Excluded Variables: Belgium, Northern Ireland
 P values: P < 0.5 (*), P < 0.1 (**), P < 0.01 (***)

Examining all the models within the CMP data, the party family variables significant results were confined to the Green/Ecologist, Communist and Nationalist parties. The Green/Ecologist party family saw significant negative coefficients ranging from -.202* to -.285**. Communist parties saw significant coefficients ranging from -.309*** to -.425***. Nationalist parties saw two significant negative coefficients which were confined to models 1 and 2, and ranged from -.250*** to -.335*. With the EMP data, amongst the party family variables, the significant coefficients were spread across the Green/Ecologist, Communist, Socialist and Social Democratic, Christian Democratic, Conservative, and Nationalist party family dummies. The Green/Ecologist party family had four significant negative coefficients ranging in strength from -.199** to -.421***. The Communist party family had four significant negative coefficients ranging in strength from -.422*** to -.476***. By contrast to the CMP, the EMP data produced one significant result for the Socialist and Social Democrats (.169* in model 1), four significant coefficients for the Christian Democrats ranging from .160* to .343***, and one significant coefficient for Conservative parties (.212** in model 4). Nationalist parties saw three significant coefficients ranging in strength from -.251*** to -.377***. While the CMP data did produce fewer significant coefficients, the negative coefficients produced for Green/Ecologist, Communist and Nationalist party families were comparable with those produced by the EMP data. Interestingly the data from the EMP continued to demonstrate the applicability of the inverted u-curve of support for European integration mentioned above. With regard to the party

family independent dummy variables, the behaviour observed appears to be broadly inline with the Comparative Manifesto data, as well as previous studies²⁷.

Examining the country dummy variables for the CMP data, only two significant coefficients were produced – for Germany and Ireland. Germany saw three positive coefficients ranging from .194** to .238**. For Ireland there was only one significant coefficient in model 3, which was of minor strength: -.144*. For the EMP, the country dummy variables only produced significant coefficients for three countries. Sweden saw negative coefficients in model 2 (-.135*) and model 3(-.175**). Austria saw a single significant negative coefficient: -.175** (model 3), while Italy saw a minor positive coefficient: .184*. Across both sets of data the coefficients were different, but the pattern suggests that for most parties, national contextual factors within each individual member state have little impact on party behaviour towards European integration²⁸.

In terms of the general ideological variables (in the CMP data), several produced significant coefficients. Foreign special relationship: positive saw two significant positive coefficients ranging from .311*** to .314***. Military: negative produced two similar coefficients at the value of .193** and .194**. Market Regulation: positive produced two significant negative coefficients ranging from -.215*** to -.227***. National way of life: positive and welfare: negative produced one significant negative coefficient each: -.148 and -.136 respectively. Finally, multi-culturalism:

²⁷ Marks and Wilson (2000: 441) demonstrated that party family had a powerful impact on party positioning towards European integration, explaining 63% of the variance. Marks, Wilson & Ray (2002: 590) identified the most favourably oriented parties were the Liberals and Christian Democrats, followed by the Social Democratic, and regionalist parties. They then listed the Agrarian, Conservative and Green party families. Finally, they noted that the Protestant, Extreme Right and Communist/Extreme Left were the most Eurosceptic. Kresi (2007: 98) noted that the radical left and greens, as well as the national conservatives and populist right were predominantly Eurosceptic. Hellström (2008: 199) noted the same with regard to party families, identifying the Greens, former Communists and nationalists as the most Eurosceptic – this is not surprising given the use of the same dataset, though he did alter the dependent variable through a smoothing exercise.

²⁸ This contradicts findings by Hellström (2008: 203) who argued that national contextual factors were important sources of variation, but conforms to findings by Marks, Wilson and Ray (2002: 591) whose data suggested while several country variables were highly significant their explanatory power was very weak. They concluded that national location and political cleavages did not appear to be contending sources of sources of party positioning with national location account for just 5% of the total explained variance. This was mirrored by Aspinwall (2002: 91) who found that despite the predictions of most mainstream theories of national preference formation, there was little evidence of a correlation between nationality of a party and its views and position towards European integration.

negative produced two significant negative correlations ranging from -.139 to -.161. For the EMP data, the general ideological variables only three produced significant coefficients. Internationalism: negative saw two negative coefficients ranging from -.156** to -.196***. Constitutionalism: positive produced two significant positive correlations ranging from .152* to .203**. Constitutionalism: negative produced two significant coefficients: -.151* to -.162*. These results are somewhat surprising as the general ideological variables were included to ascertain whether positions towards the traditional sources of conflict in domestic politics had a constraining effect on position taken towards the EU and the European integration. With the CMP data one can see evidence of this taking place. Those parties advocating market regulation were likely to view integration quite sceptically as the initial drive of the Community and later the Union was for market liberalisation, and not supranational market regulation. Those supporting national way of life (National way of life: positive, and multi-culturalism: negative) were also inline with expectations for those advocating national autonomy and national culture to be critical. This pattern was not replicated in the European election data. The predicted values for internationalism: negative were of little surprise, and in line with expectations, but with the exception of Constitutionalism: positive and negative, no other independent variables were significant. This may suggest that traditional sources of conflict are less constraining in European elections, but this is difficult to tally up with the common regarded status of European elections being second-order.

The alternative theories variables produced contradictory values. The variable utilising values from the 2006 Marks and Hooghe survey for GAL-TAN position (Green-Alternative-Libertarian vs. Traditional-Authoritarian) produced a coefficient which was strongly positive, and statistically significant: .520*. However, examining the variable utilising values from the 2002 Marks and Hooghe survey for GAL-TAN position produced a very strongly negative and significant coefficient: -.744**. This is a very strange result and does focus questions on whether one can

accept the results from these two independent variables. The result may well be spurious or driven by the fact that some of party positions were not available for all expert surveys, but this seems unlikely as this did not apply to all parties. It is also doubtful that shifts in position on this dimension could have driven such a change, as they would have been drastic reorientations. One can conclude that while the result cannot dismiss the relevancy of the GAL-TAN dimension to party positioning, it does call for further research²⁹. For the Euromanifestos, among the alternative theories variables only the GAL-TAN values from 1999 produced a significant coefficient (-.383*). This is a strong negative coefficient, but is overall weaker than some of coefficient results among the party family dummies and in addition for one to accept the strength of the GAL-TAN continuum it would be expected that all three GAL-TAN coefficients would be significant. In addition, in neither the Comparative Manifesto Project data nor the Euromanifesto data produced significant coefficients for left-right position³⁰ or the median voter position independent variables.

Two points to note are that the R² values for the model peak at approximately 50% of the variance for both the Comparative Manifesto Project and Euromanifesto Project data. This is a reasonably strong result, but this also considerably lower than values seen in the previous academic literature. However, the previous work has relied on expert survey data in which the

²⁹ Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002: 973) ran a Multiple Ordinary Least Squares regression for party positioning and found for the dimension of General EU Integration that GAL-TAN produced a coefficient of -.53 which was significant to the value of $p < .01$. In fact across the multiple dimensions GAL-TAN produced only negative coefficients, with only employment policy and cohesion policy producing coefficients, which were not statistically significant (2002: 976). Marks, Hooghe, Nelson and Edwards (2006: 164)'s statement that the GAL/TAN divide is considerably powerful than the Left-Right dimension in predicting party positioning does seem to be confirmed by the results including the EMP on the single dimension of pro vs. anti integration, but the contradictory CMP results do cast some doubt.

³⁰ Marks, Wilson & Ray (2002: 592) found that left-right extremism competed directly with the political cleavage hypothesis and was significant. Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002: 970) did note that Left-Right extremism did have a powerful effect on the dependent variable of support for European integration. Furthermore, after testing three models of behaviour they found that in general Left/Right contestation shapes positioning only on European policies that are concerned with redistribution and regulating capitalism. Once controls were put in place for GAL/TAN and Left/Right extremism the results suggested that integration and Left/Right contestation were independent of each other. Hellström (2008: 199) noted that the effect sizes of a party's left/right position were medium to large (0.25-0.35).

range of values and standard deviation in the mean of the dependent variable will be much lower. Secondly, year of election had no effect in either dataset.

SUMMARY

In the previous chapter and introduction the thesis emphasised that the focus of European elections was not only national issues, but included European issues as well. Essentially this means that while national issues invariably form part of European election campaigns, Europe is still an important component; and the most significant aspect of the campaign where Europe will be a part is in the election manifesto as it is a document that can contain the most extensive predetermined policy statements made by parties (Budge, 1994: 455).

From the graph data, one can see there is consistently greater use of European policy discourses in the European elections. In fact, with all four elections and most party families it is the case that European integration is the most politically salient issue in European elections, despite the complete lack of attention given to it in other parts of the campaign (see Lodge 1989; 1996; 2001; 2005). By contrast, in national elections it is a minor issue compared to the remaining dimensions. In particular, national elections focused on the economy, social welfare, performance of government, democracy issues and foreign policy. In particular, Kresi (2007: 94) examined the salience of European integration in national elections between the 1970s and 1990s. He found that on average issues relating to European integration made up only 2.5% of all issue related statements in the 1970s campaigns, but close to 7.0% in the campaigns of the 1990s. European integration then has remained a rather unimportant issue in national elections. Although the study by Kriesi only overlaps slightly in terms of the period under study, the results are broadly similar, despite the different methodological strategy utilized (newspaper analyses), different time period, and only using six West European case studies. In addition, he also found that the three most salient issue categories remained the same as in the 1970s: welfare (16.4% share), cultural liberalism (12.4% share) and economic liberalism (12% share).

Given that much of the second-order election literature (Reif & Schmitt, 1980; Reif, 1984; Schmitt, 1990; 2004; Irwin, 1995; Van der Eijk et al, 1996; Marsh, 1998) has emphasised the importance of national issues and national priorities for political parties in European elections, this is a very significant finding which suggests at least with the case of the manifestos, that European policy priorities are important to some degree, even if they focus their campaign priorities on more national issues.

With the identification of Eurosceptic party results, clearly they suggest a greater number of parties are Eurosceptic in European elections. In the national elections only seven parties could be identified as Eurosceptic, whereas in the European elections forty-two parties were Eurosceptic. One of the first conclusions could be that parties exhibit greater Eurosceptic behaviour in European elections than in national elections. Here one could posit that the reason for this is that parties feel less inhibited by the results, as this would not necessarily bar them from joining government coalitions, for example. However, this conclusion should be regarded as premature. Already identified above is the lack of discourses devoted to European issues in national elections is on average incredibly small at around 5% across the time period and party families. One would expect a greater number to be identifiable when parties can more easily discuss European issues. Secondly, in both sets of data, the inverted u-curve pattern (see Hooghe, Marks & Wilson, 2002: 970; Aspinwall, 2002: 85; Kresi, 2007: 98; Hellström, 2008: 203) is clearly identifiable from the results. There are greater numbers of parties who are Eurosceptic at the peripheries of the party systems, whereas in the centre the majority of parties are more positive towards integration, with only a few identifiable outliers. A more valid tentative conclusion from this is that in both elections Euroscepticism it is a peripheral minority protest against a largely pro-European centre, but Euroscepticism has now become a phenomenon that has seeped into the potential toolkits of all party families. Next, this needs to be further investigated by comparing the predicted positions of parties between national and European

elections. Attention should be paid to the coefficients for party families, as this will provide an empirically derived understanding of the differences in the use of Euroscepticism in national and European elections.

With the regressions results, in terms of predicted behaviour between the two elections one can see similar behaviour for the families of Green/Ecologist, Post-Communist, and Nationalist parties, though the Euromanifestos data produced stronger coefficients. The Euromanifestos data differed because it also produced positive significant coefficients for Social Democratic and Christian Democratic Parties. While this differed from the Comparative Manifesto data this has not predicted behaviour, which is contradictory for results derived in previous studies. However, this does point out that while the Eurosceptic parties identified with the Euromanifestos data suggests Euroscepticism to be spread across the party families it is still most likely to be found in the periphery of the party system. One further point to note is that few of the remaining independent variables produced similar coefficients.

So what can be concluded? Firstly, there does appear to be similar behaviour predicted between national and European elections by the party families, though this is not conclusive. It is important to note that there is no evidence of parties being outrageously critical of European integration despite the lack of consequences on the national level. However, the ability to work in the transnational federations post-election must surely act as a constraining factor should the parties be inclined to behave more critically. This comparability should allow for meaningful conclusions to be drawn from the multi-dimensional analyses.

Secondly, while the Euromanifestos data has thrown new light on the Eurosceptic behaviour of parties from all party families, the trend is still very much to see Eurosceptic behaviour at the peripheries of the party system. However, this is the conclusion to be drawn from examining a single dimension of party positions towards European integration, rather than necessarily from

multi-dimensional analyses. The results also do indicate while some parties are more ideologically predisposed to Euroscepticism, the results also do give some weight to Taggart's (1998: 379) assertion that:

...it is clear that knowing a party's ideology is not necessarily a guide to its position on the EU. There is too much variance for us to reliably focus on particular party families. In addition it is also clear that Euroscepticism can come from opposite parts and from across the range of the political spectrum. Nevertheless, ideology clearly is a component in explaining EU opposition. Parties do not place themselves in positions which simply maximize their electoral support because they are constrained by ideological position.

Given that this chapter demonstrates the importance of Europe in European elections, that it is the most salient issue within party manifestos across the party families and that parties do not differ too significantly between elections to draw out wider generalisations on how they behave towards the issue of European integration. However, in order to move the study of Eurosceptic parties and party positioning, the theoretical framework presented in chapter three will need to be operationalised and party behaviour investigated. Looking forwards the next chapter will use the Euromanifesto data (August, 2007) and will address each dimension from the multi-dimensional framework separately to understand causation in a more nuanced setting.

CHAPTER FIVE: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS ASSESSING THE BEHAVIOUR OF WEST EUROPEAN PARTIES IN EUROPEAN ELECTIONS

The research question set out the aim to investigate the level and nature of party-based Euroscepticism in Western Europe, and to fundamentally reassess causation. The introduction highlighted several core aspects to the argument of the thesis: the need for a dynamic and nuanced conceptualisation of Euroscepticism; the importance of developing a multi-dimensional framework to analyse Eurosceptic parties based on that definition; the importance of Europe in European elections; the role and importance of ideology in structuring political party responses to European integration; and finally the importance of using a quantitative manifesto research strategy to examine Euroscepticism in election campaigns.

This chapter pushes the study forward by testing Eurosceptic causation within a multi-dimensional setting. The theoretical framework presented in chapter three will be operationalised and each dimension analysed individually as a dependent variable. These will then be used in seven multiple regression analyses and tested using six models. The first model will focus on the explanatory power of party families. The second model will add the national location independent variables. The third model will include the independent variable of year of the election to control for impact of the temporal element of time series studies. It will also insert another group – the other forms of integration identified in the multi-dimensional framework. Model four adds the left-right dimension variable, while model five includes the three variables representing GAL-TAN values from 1999, 2002 and 2006. The final model, model six will add the two remaining variables from the alternative theories group – the first examines the government-opposition dynamic, and the second examines the impact of the median voter position - calculated from Eurobarometer data between 1989-2004 (Eurobarometer, 31-62).

Importantly, for all seven of the regression analyses the variables selected have been weighted equally. The chapter is organised as follows: the first section presents how the multi-dimensional framework theorised earlier was operationalised for empirical analyses. The following sections then look at the following dimensions separately: liberalisation, harmonisation, supranational integration, legal integration, social integration, cultural integration and foreign policy integration.

The results indicate that party ideology remains a strong causal factor in determining the way parties respond to developments in European integration. When considered on its own the amount of variance explained declines when considering the newer dimensions of social, cultural and foreign policy integration, but in combination with the other factors produces a number of strong coefficients. With the majority of the dimensions the existing alternative theories produce few statistically significant coefficients. The set of variables, which have the greatest impact are the forms of integration variables increasing the amount of variance explained dramatically, and producing a number of strong statistically significant coefficients.

OPERATIONALISING THE MULTI-DIMENSIONAL FRAMEWORK

The Euromanifestos Dataset categories are organised into three levels – national, European, no-level/world. Utilising the definitions in the theoretical framework chapter a number of appropriate variables were selected. Most were from level 2 which indicated that the quasi-sentences addressed the level of the European Union.

In order to analyse each form of integration a number of appropriate variables for each form were summed to give an appropriate value for each election manifesto. Initially positive and negative mentions were treated separately. The negative variables were then subtracted from the positive variables to give an overall position on each aspect of European integration identified in the theoretical framework. This is what Ray (2007: 16) refers to as additive scaling.

Creating a dimension for Economic Liberalisation, the party responses for the following variables were summed: Labour migration: positive; Single-Market: positive; Protectionism: negative; Incentives; and finally Free Enterprise. The following negative variables were also summed and subtracted from the pro-liberalisation values: Labour Migration: negative; Single Market: negative; Corporatism; Protectionism: Positive; Controlled Economy; Economic Orthodoxy; and Marxist Analysis. Both the positive and negative variables were all from level two – reporting quasi-sentences, which referred to the EU-level.

Creating a dimension for Economic Harmonisation was more difficult given the limited number of appropriate variables. Unfortunately, in operationalising this dimension, party positions towards the harmonization of standards were not present within the framework and this dimension has had to focus solely on Economic and Monetary Union. The following two positive variables were summed: Economic Monetary Union/European Currency: Positive; and Positive Mentions of the European Central Bank. Two negative variables were summed and subtracted: Economic Monetary Union/European Currency: Negative; and negative Mentions of the European Central Bank. All four individual variables were from level two.

Fortunately, the dataset had a strong number of variables to construct an appropriate dimension for supranational integration. The statements which were positive towards the process were first summed: Competences of the European Parliament: Positive; Competences of the European Commission: Positive; Competences of the European Council/Council of Ministers: Negative; Majority voting in the European Council; Competences of Other EC/EU Institutions: Positive; Transfer of Power to the EC/EU: Positive; and Decentralisation: Negative. Next the negative statements and subtracted from the sum of the positive statements: Transfer of Power to the EC/EU: Negative; Decentralisation: Positive; Competences of the European Parliament: Negative; Competences of the European Commission: Negative; Competences of the European Council/Council of Ministers: Positive; Unanimity in the (European) Council; Competences of

other EC/EU Institutions: Negative; and Complexity of the EC/EU. All individual variables were from level two.

Like Economic Harmonisation, Legal integration was also restricted in terms of the number of appropriate variables to construct an appropriate dimension. The dataset had two pairs of appropriate variables, which focused on constitutionalism and the ECJ. Firstly the pro-legal statements were summed. These included: Constitutionalism: Positive; and Competences of the European Court of Justice: Positive. The anti-legal statements were then summed and subtracted from the positive references: Constitutionalism: Negative; and Competences of the European Court of Justice: Negative. Both pairs were from level two.

The positive and negative statements relevant to creating an appropriate dimension for social integration centred around two pairs of categories – welfare state expansion (WSE) and welfare state limitation (WSL), each containing five individual variables. Firstly, the following pro-Social integration variables were summed: Welfare State Expansion (WSE); WSE: Job Programs; WSE: Pensions; WSE: Health Care and Nursing Service; WSE: Social Housing; and WSE: Child Care. The negative statements were then summed and subtracted from the positive summed variables: Welfare State Limitation (WSL); WSL: Job Programs; WSL: Pensions; WSL: Health Care and Nursing Service; WSL: Social Housing; and WSL: Child Care. All variables were from level two.

The appropriate variables for Cultural integration came from both level one and two (national and European sentences) and consisted of three pairs focused on national, European ways of life, and immigration. The pro-cultural statements were first summed: National way of life: Negative; Immigration: Positive; and European Way of Life: Positive. The negative statements were then summed and subtracted: National Way of Life: Positive; Immigration: Negative; and European Way of Life: Negative.

Finally with foreign policy integration, the appropriate themes identified in the dataset related to foreign special relations, the military, peace, imperialism and internationalism. The construct of this dimension also makes use of both national and European level statements. Firstly the pro-foreign policy related statements were summed: Foreign Special Relationships: Positive (European-level); Military: Positive (European-level); Peace (European-level); Anti-Imperialism (European-level); and Internationalism: Positive (European-level). The negative statements were then summed and subtracted from the summed positive statements: Foreign Special Relationships: Negative (European Level); Foreign Special Relationships (National Level); Military: Negative (European Level); Military: Positive (National Level); Internationalism: Negative (European Level); and Internationalism: Positive (National Level).

Table 19: Variables used for the Construction of Quantitative Dimensions

Variable	Description
Pro-Economic Liberalisation	
v2_4082	Labour Migration: Positive
v2_4084	Single Market: Positive
v2_407	Protectionism: Negative
v2_402	Incentives
v2_401	Free Enterprise
Anti-Economic Liberalisation	
v2_4083	Labour Migration: Negative
v2_4085	Single Market: Negative
v2_405	Corporatism
v2_406	Protectionism: Positive
v2_412	Controlled Economy
v2_413	Nationalisation
v2_414	Economic Orthodoxy
v2_415	Marxist Analysis
Pro-Economic Harmonisation	
V2_4086	European Monetary Union/European Currency: Positive
V2_3141	Positive Mentions of the European Central Bank
Anti-Economic Harmonisation	
V2_4087	European Monetary Union/European Currency: Negative
V2_3151	Negative Mentions of the European Central Bank
Pro-Supranational Integration	
v2_306	Competences of the European Parliament: Positive
v2_308	Competences of the European Commission: Positive
v2_311	Competences of the European Council/Council of Ministers: Negative
v2_3111	Majority voting in European Council
v2_314	Competences of the Other EC/EU Institutions: Positive
v2_3021	Transfer of Power to the EC/EU: Positive
v2_302	Decentralisation: Negative
Anti-Supranational Integration	

v2_3011	Transfer of Power to the EC/EU: Negative
v2_301	Decentralisation: Positive
v2_307	Competences of the European Parliament: Negative
v2_309	Competences of the European Commission: Negative
v2_310	Competences of the European Council/Council of Ministers: Positive
v2_3101	Unanimity in the (European) Council
v2_315	Competences of other EC/EU Institutions: Negative
v2_318	Complexity of the EC/EU
Pro-Legal Integration	
v2_203	Constitutionalism: Positive
v2_312	Competences of the European Court of Justice: Positive
Anti-Legal Integration	
v2_204	Constitutionalism: Negative
v2_313	Competences of the European Court of Justice: Negative
Pro-Social Integration	
v2_504	Welfare State Expansion
v2_5041	WSE: Job Programs
v2_5042	WSE: Pensions
v2_5043	WSE: Health Care and Nursing Service
v2_5044	WSE: Social Housing
v2_5045	WSE: Child Care
Anti-Social Integration	
v2_505	Welfare State Limitation
v2_5051	WSL: Job Programs
v2_5052	WSL: Pensions
v2_5053	WSL: Health Care and Nursing Service
v2_5054	WSL: Social Housing
v2_5055	WSL: Child Care
Pro-Cultural Integration	
v1_602	National way of life: Negative
v2_6011	Immigration: Positive
v2_601	European Way of Life: Positive
Anti-Cultural Integration	
v1_601	National Way of Life: Positive
v2_6021	Immigration: Negative
V2_602	European Way of Life: Negative
Pro-Foreign Policy Integration	
v2_101	Foreign Special Relationships: Positive (European-level)
v2_104	Military: Positive (European-level)
v2_106	Peace (European-level)
v2_103	Anti-Imperialism (European-level)
v2_107	Internationalism: Positive (European-level)
Anti-Foreign Policy Integration	
v2_102	Foreign Special Relationships: Negative (European Level)
v1_101	Foreign Special Relationships: Positive (National Level)
v2_105	Military: Negative (European Level)
v1_104	Military: Positive (National Level)
v2_109	Internationalism: Negative (European Level)
v1_107	Internationalism: Positive (National Level)

Source: Euromanifestos Project Dataset

As briefly mentioned above, Ray (2007: 16) pointed out that there are several techniques to reduce a number of themes to a single dimension. The simplest technique utilised examined pro-

EU references and anti-EU references in isolation. The second technique used by Carruba (2001 in Ray, 2007) was to subtract anti-EU from pro-EU references in order to calculate the net support for the EU from each party. However, the main issue with this is that, as Ray (2007: 16) points out is that ‘this approach does not distinguish between a political party whose manifesto contains five positive references to the EU with no offsetting negative references, and another party which may have 25 positive references to the EU, but also 20 offsetting negative references. It would seem that the latter party is more ambivalent about the EU than the first party, and that the net measure should be divided by the sum of positive and negative mentions to produce a relative, rather than absolute count of references to the EU’. This is the third technique. For this thesis it was vital to have a dimension, which reflected the overall position of a party rather than a scale that would indicate the amount of references. Having an overall position was a key element in the research question and to understanding the impact of ideology on party positions. The reason why the third technique was less appropriate to use was that in some of the dimensions, a party’s preference for a national solution was also utilised and hence dividing by the sum of all EU related sentences would have been misleading. Finally a point to note about the very important criticism levelled at the second method. Ray is absolutely right that by subtracting the negative references from the positive score will tend to mask any ambivalent behaviour a party may adopt towards European integration and present a party which may be more supportive or more critical than is actually the case. However, this applies mostly to single-dimensional studies. When a multi-dimensional model is used, it is highly unlikely that a party’s ambivalence will be hidden given that each dimension looks at a particular process of integration which is much more specific.

MULTIPLE OLS REGRESSION: THE RESULTS

LIBERALISATION

Table 20: Multiple Regression results – DV (Liberalisation)

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Standardised Coefficients			
			Model 3 ³¹	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Party Families						
Conservative	-.149	-.147	-.063	-.071	-.073	-.071
Socialist and Social Democratic	-.408**	-.407***	-.326**	-.313**	-.295*	-.288*
Christian Democrat	-.171	-.230*	-.210*	-.217*	-.226*	-.226*
(Post)-Communist	-.611***	-.632***	-.327**	-.315**	-.302*	-.280*
Agrarian	-.147	-.218*	-.093	-.089	-.095	-.098
Ethnic-Regional	-1.39	-.178*	-.152*	-.153*	-.153	-.153
Nationalist	-.206*	-.072	-.013	-.021	-.039	-.038
Green/Ecologist	-0.411***	-.462***	-.303**	-.294**	-.273*	-.258*
Country						
Sweden		.021	.059	-.067	.058	-.010
Denmark		-.228*	-.181	-.169	-.177	-.225
Finland		-.034	-.012	.002	-.003	-.063
France		-.433***	-.385***	-.379***	-.392***	-.436**
Italy		-.203*	-.166	-.159	-.164	-.181
Greece		-.071	-.093	-.102	-.120	-.146
Portugal		-.069	-.031	-.031	-.034	-.048
Germany		.041	.008	-.004	-.022	-.074
Austria		-.251**	-.198*	-.194*	-.209*	-.276
Ireland		-.086	-.067	-.058	-.074	-.077
Year of Election			-.041	-.047	-.052	-.063
Forms of Integration						
Economic Harmonisation			.205*	.203*	.197*	.204*
Supranational Integration			.179	-.181	.182	.173
Legal Integration			.159	.152	.160	.168
Social integration			-.185*	-.174	-.178	-.181
Cultural Integration			.033	.034	.035	.031
Foreign policy integration			.101	.105	.110	.108
Alternative Theories						
Left-Right Position				.038	.045	.049
Gal-Tan Values 2006					-.079	-.082
Gal-Tan Values 2002					.130	.147
Gal-Tan Values 1999					-.017	-.024
In Government when manifesto published						-.028
Is EU Membership a good thing? Eurobarometer data ³²						-.080
Adjusted R ²	0.285	0.495	0.636	0.636	0.637	0.638
Durbin Watson			1.897 ³³			

Source: Euromanifestos Project

Excluded Variables: Belgium, Luxembourg, UK, Northern Ireland, Belgium-Wallonia, Belgium-Flanders, Netherlands, Cleavage Theory

P values: P < 0.5 (*), P < 0.1 (**), P < 0.01 (***)

If we first focus on the impact of the models, we can see that on its own the party family dummies accounted for 28.5% of the variance. The two substantial increases in the adjusted R²

³¹ Please note that from Model 3 onwards both the unstandardised beta value and the standard error for the Constant increased dramatically. In addition the standard error was larger than the Constant. The tables for these can be found in the appendix.

³² The independent variable representing the median voter was calculated using the data supplied by the Eurobarometer surveys over the period 1989-2004 (European Opinion Research Group Eurobarometer 31-62). It focused on the question of whether the respondent thought EU membership was a good thing.

³³ Importantly the Durbin-Watson statistic shows that while there is some evidence of positive autocorrelation, this is not critical. Any value <1 would indicate a need for a lagged dependent variable. This can mean that some of the statistical significance is underestimated.

value came from the addition of the country dummy variables (to 49.5%) and the forms of integration (to 63.6%). The later models did not account for more of the variance.

Incredibly with the dependent variable of liberalisation, almost all party families produced significant negative coefficients. The exception was the Conservative party family, which had no significant coefficients. The three party families with the strong coefficients were the Green/Ecologists (-.462 *** in model 2), (post)-Communists (-.632*** in model 2) and the Socialist and Social Democrats (-.408**). Also noteworthy was a set of slightly weaker negative coefficients for Christian Democratic parties with the strongest value being found in Model 2 (-0.230*). Further weaker significant coefficients were visible with Agrarian (-0.218* in model 2) and eEthnic-Regional parties (-0.178* in model 2, -0.152* in model 3, and -0.153* in model 4). In addition nationalist parties also had a significant negative coefficient in model 1 (-0.206*). Most party family independent variables have produced significant coefficients. The data suggests that for a one-unit change in the independent variable for the Green/Ecologist, (Post)-Communist, Social Democrat, and Christian Democratic, Nationalist, Agrarian and Ethno-regional dummies should all produce a negative shift in the dependent variable (liberalisation). This confirms three of the hypotheses, but suggests liberalisation does attract a much more negative stance across the party system than expected. One should note that the coefficients for Christian Democrats, Nationalist, Agrarian and Ethno-Regional are quite weak suggesting a very small negative shift. The results are also surprising for (post)-Communist parties as it suggests that the general trend is towards negative discourse suggesting that a number of the cases remain unreformed Communist parties and continue to be critical. In addition the inverted u-curve, which was so apparent with the single dimensional analysis of pro vs. anti-EU in both national and European election analyses earlier, was not visible. This is a considerably different finding from previous research (for example see Hellström, 2008).

The Country dummy variables produced some surprising results. Amongst the country dummy variables, two countries produced significant negative coefficients that stood out in multiple models. France registered negative coefficients from Model 2-6 with the strongest value being in Model 6 (-0.436**). Austria saw negative coefficients from Models 2-5 with the strongest coefficient in Model 2 (-0.251**). There was some evidence of a geographical peripheral trend in potential critical positioning with both Sweden and Austria producing significant but weak coefficients with a range of -.194 to -.251. However there was some indication of critical behaviour amongst the traditional core parties with the coefficients of France as described above, but also Italy in Model 2 produced a coefficient of -.203 *.

In terms of the other significant predictors, Model 3 saw a negative coefficient for social integration (-0.185*) and positive coefficients for economic harmonisation in models 3-6. Model 3 produced the strongest positive coefficient (0.205*). No other independent variables produced significant coefficients. These results are less surprising as those that would potentially support social integration, could be more fearful of increased liberalisation, which can be at the detriment of welfare policies. Those that support harmonisation are likely to also support liberalisation, given that the two integration processes are fundamentally linked. Importantly, however, within the European election data neither the left-right dimension nor the alternative theories have produced significant coefficients, despite this being the case in data from previous studies.

HARMONISATION

Table 21: Multiple Regression results – DV (Harmonisation)

Variables	Standardised Coefficients					
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Party Families						
Conservative	-.100	-.132	-.059	-.084	.047	.033
Socialist and Social Democratic	-.101	-.097	.015	.056	.109	.082
Christian Democrat	-.060	-.076	-.038	-.059	.084	.087
Communist	-.551***	-.585***	-.312	-.272	-.283	-.348*
Agrarian	-.183*	-.216	-0.93	-.080	-.017	-.007
Ethnic-Regional	-.005	-.032	.017	.016	-.001	-.002
Nationalist	-.142	-.156	-.106	-.129	.016	.014
Green/Ecologist	-.316**	-.350**	-.183	-.154	-.200	-.244
Country						
Sweden		.132	.203	.227	.138	.448
Denmark		.052	.180	.216	.114	.334
Finland		.139	.200	.243	.208	.478*
France		.073	.267*	.284*	.193	.392*
Italy		.096	.137	.158	.089	.167
Greece		.116	.165	.134	.033	.144
Portugal		-.021	.056	.057	.005	.071
Germany		.250*	.234*	.246*	.107	0.339
Austria		.019	.167	.180	.092	.403
Ireland		.062	.173	.197	.053	.069
Year of Election			-.094	-.111	-.140	-.091
Forms of Integration						
Economic Liberalisation			.296*	.291*	.252*	.254*
Supranational Integration			.146	.151	.086	.117
Legal Integration			-.043	-.063	-.083	-.119
Social integration			.022	.053	.030	.045
Cultural Integration			.145	.148	.105	.115
Foreign policy integration			.197*	.210	.223*	.221*
Alternative Theories						
Left-Right Position				.119	.181	.171
Gal-Tan Values 2006					-.617	-.590
Gal-Tan Values 2002					.649	.571
Gal-Tan Values 1999					-.353	.324
In Government when manifesto published						.085
Is EU Membership a good thing? Eurobarometer data						.371
Adjusted R ²	0.213	0.196	0.331	0.328	0.38	0.386
Durbin Watson			1.735			

Source: Euromanifestos Project

Excluded Variables: Belgium, Luxembourg, UK, Northern Ireland, Belgium-Wallonia, Belgium-Flanders, Netherlands, Cleavage Theory, EU Accession Year

P values: P < 0.5 (*), P < 0.1 (**), P < 0.01 (***)

Examining the amount of variance explained by the six models, it is possible to see that initially party families only explained approximately 21.3%. With Model 2's country dummy variables, the variance explained decreased to 19.6%. The introduction of Model 3 saw the largest increase

variance explained to 33.1%. Finally with Model 6 the amount of variance explained increased to 38.6%.

The regression for the dependent variable of economic harmonisation produced only a few significant coefficients. With the party family dummy variables, the Green/Ecologist parties saw significant coefficients in Model 1 (-0.316**) and Model 2 (-0.350**). The (post)-Communist parties saw three instances of significant negative coefficients in Model 1 (-0.551***), Model 2(-0.585***)) and Model 6 (-0.348*). The Agrarian party family also produced one significant negative coefficient in Model 1 (-0.183*). Importantly it appears that only the peripheral parties produced significant coefficients, but from a hypotheses testing standpoint it is possible to confirm the hypotheses for Green parties, Agrarian parties and (Post)-Communist parties – though with one caveat. (Post)-Communist parties include both the reformed and unreformed examples. However, the predicted behaviour is strongly critical across both. The coefficient was -.348 (model 6) to -.585 (model 2).

A key observation amongst the country dummy variables is that the significant coefficients were all positive. In addition there is a clear identifiable group of countries producing weak to strong significant positive coefficients with a range of .234 to .478. Finland saw one significant coefficient in Model 6 (0.478*). France saw three significant coefficients in Models 3 (0.267*), Model 4 (0.284*) and Model 6(0.392*). Germany saw three significant coefficients in Model 2 (0.250*), Model 3 (0.234*) and Model 4 (0.246*).

Finally, the ‘forms of integration’ variables also produced significant positive coefficients. Liberalisation saw four significant coefficients in Model 3 (0.296*), Model 4 (0.291*), Model 5(0.252*), and Model 6 (0.254*). Foreign policy integration saw three significant coefficients in Model 3 (0,197*), Model 5 (0.223*) and Model 6 (0.221*). The results from this group of independent variables are not particularly surprising given that those particularly supportive of

economic liberalisation are likely to see economic harmonisation as a natural progression and the realisation of a fully functioning single market. In addition those that supported foreign policy integration are likely to be strongly supportive of most integration processes. Furthermore, when examining the impact of the alternative theories, it is surprising that none have produced significant coefficients, especially as aspects of this dimension would have been covered by the economic integration dimension used in previous studies (for example, see Marks, Wilson and Ray, 2002). However, in the case of European election manifestos this has not proven to be the case.

SUPRANATIONAL INTEGRATION

Table 22: Multiple Regression results – DV (Supranational Integration)

Variables	Standardised Coefficients					
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Party Families						
Conservative	-.015	-.012	.119	.140	.226*	.225*
Socialist and Social Democratic	.221	.163	.345**	.308*	.268	.284*
Christian Democrat	.071	.042	.157	.174	.302*	.286*
Communist	-.170	-.213	.191	.158	.070	.153
Agrarian	-.243**	-.234*	-.148	-.157	-.076	-.085
Ethnic-Regional	.044	.038	.108	.108	.108	.101
Nationalist	-.072	-.064	.075	.094	.220	.218
Green/Ecologist	.032	.028	.303**	.278*	.149	.201
Country						
Sweden		-.292*	-.322**	-.342***	-.327**	-.558*
Denmark		-.239*	-.138	-.168	-.156	-.326
Finland		-.217	-.206*	-.242*	-.217	-.428*
France		-.228*	-.181	-.196	-.142	-.305
Italy		-.207	-.080	-.098	-.087	-.149
Greece		-.099	-.070	-.044	-.038	-.137
Portugal		-.127	-.126	-.126	-.149	-.198
Germany		-.349**	-.432***	-.440***	-.434***	-.610***
Austria		-.264*	-.237*	-.248*	-.231*	-.471*
Ireland		-.153	-.194	-.215*	-.233	-.235*
Year of Election			-.009	.007	.009	-.032
Forms of Integration						
Economic Liberalisation			.220	.221	.214	.196
Economic Harmonisation			.125	.129	.078	.106
Legal Integration			.404***	.419***	.361**	.379***
Social integration			-.081	-.107	-.097	-.107
Cultural Integration			-.404***	-.405***	-.424***	-.424***
Foreign policy integration			.067	.054	.051	.041
Alternative Theories						
Left-Right Position				-.100	-.111	-.083
Gal-Tan Values 2006					.098	.077
Gal-Tan Values 2002					-.064	.008
Gal-Tan Values 1999					-.350	-.364
In Government when manifesto published						-.121
Is EU Membership a good thing? Eurobarometer data						-.290
Adjusted R ²	0.113	0.134	0.428	0.425	0.433	0.441
Durbin Watson			1.017			

Source: Euromanifestos Project

Excluded Variables: Belgium, Luxembourg, UK, Northern Ireland, Belgium-Wallonia, Belgium-Flanders, Netherlands, Cleavage Theory, EU Accession Year

P values: P < 0.5 (*), P < 0.1 (**), P < 0.01 (***)

With the dependent variable of supranational integration, the adjusted R² variable showed that the amount of variance explained by Model 6 was a more modest 44.1%. The party family

dummy variables explained only 11.3%, and the largest increase in variance explained was seen with Model 3 with the forms of integration independent variables that jumped to 42.8%.

In terms of significant coefficients, the party family dummies saw a significant spread. The Green/Ecologist parties had two significant coefficients in Model 3 (0.303**) and Model 4 (0.278*). Social Democratic parties had three significant coefficients in Model 3 (0.345**), Model 4 (0.308*) and Model 6 (0.284*). Conservative parties had two significant coefficients in Model 5 (0.302*) and Model 6 (0.225*). Finally Agrarian parties produced two instances of significant coefficients in Model 1 (-0.243**) and Model 2 (-0.234*). The results did produce some extremely interesting findings regarding the hypotheses. Firstly the positive coefficients for the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats confirmed the hypotheses. Secondly, the negative coefficients for Agrarian parties also confirmed the hypotheses. It was the positive coefficients for Green/ecologist parties and Conservative parties contradicted the original hypotheses. For both party families the coefficients were weak, but suggest that for the Green parties' further transfers of sovereignty will be seen as more of an opportunity to achieve Green goals at the European level. The values for Conservative parties also suggest that any scepticism is limited to a small number of cases and that the family is supportive of transfers of sovereignty to the supranational level.

The country dummies saw a number of significant coefficients. Sweden saw five in Model 2 (-0.292*), Model 3 (-0.322**), Model 4 (-0.342***), Model 5 (-0.327**) and Model 6 (-0.558*). Denmark saw one significant coefficient in Model 2 (-0.239*). Finland saw three significant coefficients in Model 3 (-0.206*), Model 4 (-0.242*) and Model 6 (-0.428*). France had one significant coefficient in Model 2(-0.228*). Germany saw significant negative coefficients across Model 2 (-0.349***), Model 3 (-0.432***), Model 4 (-0.440***), Model 5 (-0.434***) and Model 6 (-0.610***). Austria saw significant coefficients in Model 2 (-0.264*), Model 3 (-0.237*), Model 4 (-0.248*), Model 5 (-0.231*) and Model 6 (-0.471*). Lastly, Ireland had one instance of a

significant coefficient in Model 6 (-0.235*). Importantly with the country dummy variables is that all significant coefficients are negative. The coefficients are spread across the member states, giving the impression that some scepticism is present in almost all member states, with the only exceptions in the results being Italy, Greece and Portugal.

Furthermore the 'forms of integration' variables suggest that those parties who support legal integration will also support supranational integration, but those cases who support cultural integration will be critical of further transfers of sovereignty. Legal integration had four positive coefficients – model 3 (0.404***), Model 4 (0.419***), Model 5 (0.361***), and Model 6 (0.379***). Cultural integration also had four significant negative coefficients – Model 3 (-0.404***), Model 4 (-0.405***), Model 5 (-0.424***), and Model 6 (-0.424***).

LEGAL INTEGRATION

Table 23: Multiple Regression results – DV (Legal Integration)

Variables	Standardised Coefficients					
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Party Families						
Conservative	-.226*	-.178	-.150	-.199	-.122	-.135
Socialist and Social Democrats	-.076	-.043	-.141	-.045	-.103	-.118
Christian Democrat	-.005	-.045	-.078	-.121	-.009	-.005
Communist	-.416***	-.366**	-.230	-.136	-.209	-.245
Agrarian	-.042	.033	.104	.126	.173*	.171*
Ethnic-Regional	-.082	-.033	-.049	-.051	-.054	-.058
Nationalist	-.127	-.109	-.051	-.099	.069	.069
Green/Ecologist	.020	-.020	-.068	-.005	-.143	-.171
Country						
Sweden		-.169	-.003	.053	.068	.438*
Denmark		-.210	.009	.089	.086	.343*
Finland		-.133	-.027	.073	.095	.410*
France		-.047	.127	.163	.187	.408**
Italy		-.002	-.018	.030	.027	.115
Greece		-.078	.040	-.028	.030	.142
Portugal		-.114	.012	.014	.009	.084
Germany		.234*	.302**	.316***	.348***	.597***
Austria		.106	.215*	.237**	.278***	.630**
Ireland		-.001	.171	.220*	.239*	.256**
Year of Election			.083	.039	.042	.085
Forms of Integration						
Economic Liberalisation			.167	.153	.152	.153
Economic Harmonisation			-.031	-.044	-.061	-.087
Supranational Integration			.345***	.344***	.292*	.305***
Social Integration			.353***	.406***	.393***	.394***
Cultural Integration			.179*	.181*	.158	.160
Foreign policy integration			.162	.186*	.170*	.160
Alternative Theories						
Left-Right Position				.261*	.255	.266*
Gal-Tan Values 2006					.076	.064
Gal-Tan Values 2002					-.394	-.409
Gal-Tan Values 1999					-.007	-.002
In Government when manifesto published						.021
Is EU Membership a good thing? Eurobarometer data						.435*
Adjusted R ²	0.113	0.222	0.512	0.529	0.54	0.551
Durbin Watson			1.55			

Source: Euromanifestos Project

Excluded Variables: Belgium, Luxembourg, UK, Northern Ireland, Belgium-Wallonia, Belgium-Flanders, Netherlands, Cleavage Theory, EU Accession Year

P values: P < 0.5 (*), P < 0.1 (**), P < 0.01 (***)

The dependent variable of legal integration saw 55.1% of the variance explained by Model 6. Initially, the party family dummy variables accounted for only 11.3% of the variance. With the addition of country variables this was pushed up to 22.2%. The largest jump in variance

explained was due to the addition of the 'forms of integration independent variables where the variance accounted for was 51.2%.

The party family dummies produced few significant coefficients that could be utilised for the purpose of hypotheses testing. The Conservative and (post)-Communist party hypotheses were confirmed, though with one caveat for the Communist group. The overall prediction is for weak to strong negative behaviour (with coefficients ranging from -.366 and -.416) for the party family despite a number of parties being of the reformed variety. The Agrarian coefficients while very weak were positive and this contradicted the original prediction of the hypotheses. (Post)-Communist parties saw two significant negative coefficients in Model 1 (-0.416***) and Model 2 (-0.366**). Conservative parties saw one instance of a significant coefficient in Model 1 (-0.226*). Agrarian parties had two significant coefficients in Model 5 (0.173*) and Model 6 (0.171*).

As noted there were an extensive number of significant positive correlations amongst the country dummy variables. These were spread across the accession groups and ranged from weak coefficients of .215 to strong coefficients of .630. Overall for this dimension, the country dummies were a more accurate predictor of positions than party family dummy variables. There were a large number of coefficients, which were statistically significant especially with Model 6. Sweden, Denmark, Finland and France saw one significant coefficient each in Model 6 (0.438*; 0.343*; 0.410*; and 0.408** respectively). Germany saw five significant coefficients in Models 2-6 (0.234*; 0.302**; 0.316***; 0.348*; and 0.597* respectively). Austria saw significant coefficients in Models 3-6 (0.215*; 0.237**; 0.278***; and 0.630** respectively). Finally, Ireland saw significant coefficients in Models 4-6 (0.220*; 0.239*; and 0.256** respectively).

The 'forms of integration' saw a number of significant coefficients. Supranational integration saw four positive coefficients in Models 3-6 (0.345***; 0.344***; 0.292*; and 0.305*** respectively). Social integration had four significant positive coefficients in Models 3-6 (0.353***; 0.406***;

0.393***; 0.394*** respectively). Interestingly given how much the process of legal integration is bound up with the processes of economic integration one would have expected a relationship. However, legal integration also includes the moves towards creating a European Constitution and hence those parties who support social, cultural and foreign policy integration were likely to (and it was predicted) support the process.

Lastly, two of the alternative theories also had examples of positive significant coefficients. Left-Right position in Models 4 and 6 had the following weak coefficients: 0.264* and 0.266* respectively. The Median Voter Position in Model 6 produced a reasonably strong coefficient of 0.435*.

SOCIAL INTEGRATION

Table 24: Multiple Regression results – DV (Social Integration)

Variables	Standardised Coefficients					
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Party Families						
Conservative	.064	.049	.111	.208*	.204	.213
Socialist and Social Democrats	.348**	.368**	.302*	.076	.118	.128
Christian Democrat	.056	.059	.031	.120	.098	.095
Communist	.270*	.270*	.286*	.075	.104	.132
Agrarian	.136	.167	.074	.009	-.008	-.012
Ethnic-Regional	.085	.098	.071	.068	.061	.065
Nationalist	.035	-.097	-.041	.068	.036	.034
Green/Ecologist	.358**	.327**	.247*	.090	.135	.155
Country						
Sweden		-.140	-.083	-.186	-.210	-.430
Denmark		-.177	-.159	-.301**	-.327**	-.479*
Finland		-.089	-.050	-.245*	-.256	-.444
France		.021	-.111	-.180	-.221	-.357
Italy		.185	.119	.005	-.015	-.068
Greece		-.189	-.175	-.016	-.058	-.126
Portugal		-.116	-.093	-.084	-.089	-.133
Germany		.012	-.139	-.176	-.219	-.375
Austria		.059	-.082	-.134	-.169	-.386
Ireland		-.114	-.158	-.251*	-.288	-.301*
Year of Election			-.053	.036	.019	-.008
Forms of Integration						
Economic Liberalisation			-.287	-.234	-.237	-.239
Economic Harmonisation			.024	.050	.031	.048
Supranational Integration			-.102	-.117	-.110	-.125
Legal Integration			.523***	.541***	.551***	.572***
Cultural Integration			-.076	-.086	-.080	-.084
Foreign Policy Integration			.042	-.028	-.014	-.013
Alternative Theories						
Left-Right Position				-.533***	-.499***	-.505**
Gal-Tan Values 2006					-.263	-.256
Gal-Tan Values 2002					.329	.346
Gal-Tan Values 1999					-.004	-.007
In Government when manifesto published						-.017
Is EU Membership a good thing? Eurobarometer data						-.260
Adjusted R ²	0.079	0.134	0.277	0.371	0.356	0.348
Durbin Watson				2.269		

Source: Euromanifestos Project

Excluded Variables: Belgium, Luxembourg, UK, Northern Ireland, Belgium-Wallonia, Belgium-Flanders, Netherlands, Cleavage Theory, EU Accession Year

P values: P < 0.5 (*), P < 0.1 (**), P < 0.01 (***)

Social integration saw a low R^2 value for all six models peaking at model 4 with 37.1% of the variance explained. The party family dummies only explained 7.9% and the addition of country dummy variables only increased this to 13.4%.

Examining the party family dummies that there are clearly significant positive coefficients amongst the Green/Ecological, (post)-Communist and Social Democratic parties in Models 1-3. Green parties saw 0.358*** in model 1, 0.327** in model 2, and 0.247** in model 3. (Post)-Communist parties produced 0.270* in model 1, 0.270* in model 2, and 0.286* in model 3. Lastly, Socialist and Social Democratic parties produced 0.348** in model 1, 0.368** in model 2, and 0.302* in model 3.

In terms of the hypotheses testing the results were important for the Green/Ecologist parties as originally it was argued that they would most likely have no overall position towards social integration. However, the results suggest that Green parties will adopt positive positions and this leads to an argument that the parties have broadened their ideological appeal to include social welfare elements and that this can be achieved at the supranational level. In addition it was also argued that (post)-Communist parties would also have no overall position towards social integration. However, despite the critical positions towards many of the other dimensions, (post)-Communist parties favoured improving social welfare at the EU-level. The Conservative dummy variables also contradicted the hypotheses as it was expected that they would be negative towards the process. However, the behaviour for the majority of the cases is actually positive, giving the impression that the negative behaviour may only be confined to one or two cases. This will be explored later in the next chapter. Finally, the hypothesis for Socialist and Social Democratic parties was confirmed.

The country dummy variables produced few significant coefficients with the exception of Denmark, Finland and Ireland. Denmark produced significant coefficients in model 4 (-0.301**),

in model 5 (-0.327**) and model 6 (-0.479*). Finland produced one significant coefficient in model 4 (-0.245*). Ireland produced two significant coefficients in model 4 (-0.251*) and model 6 (-0.301*). Interestingly, all the significant coefficients were negative, and were also confined to the peripheries – Denmark, Finland and Ireland, potentially suggesting a geographical peripheral scepticism towards the process.

The final two independent variables of legal integration and left-right position produced strong coefficients. Legal integration produced positive coefficients varying in size between 0.523*** and 0.572*** in models 3-6. Left-right position produced negative coefficients varying in size between -0.499*** and -0.533*** in models 4-6. The fact that the Left-Right coefficient has produced a very strong negative coefficient is of little surprise given that social welfare is a traditional element of the dimension and source of conflict in national party politics. It is important to note this conflict has continued on to the supranational level.

CULTURAL INTEGRATION

Table 25: Multiple Regression results – DV (Cultural Integration)

Variables	Standardised Coefficients					
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Party Families						
Conservative	-.026	-.011	.084	.104	.180	.180
Socialist and Social Democrats	-.018	.052	.240	.207	.175	.187
Christian Democrat	.071	.092	.142	.157	.278*	.273*
Communist	-.003	-.010	.186	.155	.072	.122
Agrarian	-.051	.006	-.045	-.054	.027	.020
Ethnic-Regional	-.013	.008	.062	.063	.079	.075
Nationalist	.220*	.137	.179	.197	.260	.261
Green/Ecologist	.175	.183	.353**	.330*	.222	.254
Country						
Sweden		-.167	-.307**	-.325**	-.302*	-.400
Denmark		-.053	-.109	-.137	-.096	-.170
Finland		-.063	-.172	-.206	-.187	-.279
France		-.156	-.243	-.257*	-.164	-.237
Italy		.210	.097	.080	.107	.078
Greece		.019	-.032	-.008	-.015	-.064
Portugal		-.145	-.173*	-.173*	-.198	-.221*
Germany		.157	-.150	-.159	-.179	-.262
Austria		.011	-.127	-.137	-.140	-.245
Ireland		-.144	-.202	-.221*	-.246*	-.246
Year of Election			.010	.024	.039	.018
Forms of Integration						
Economic Liberalisation			.051	.053	.052	.046
Economic Harmonisation			.157	.162	.122	.136
Supranational Integration			-.513***	-.516***	-.537***	-.552***
Legal Integration			.266*	.281*	.247	.259
Social integration			-.077	-.100	-.089	-.094
Foreign Policy Integration			.154	.143	.126	.119
Alternative Theories						
Left-Right Position				-.092	-.150	-.128
Gal-Tan Values 2006					.343	.327
Gal-Tan Values 2002					-.039	.003
Gal-Tan Values 1999					-.535*	-.547*
In Government when manifesto published						-.078
Is EU Membership a good thing? Eurobarometer data						-.431
Adjusted R ²	0.016	0.106	0.274	0.268	0.283	0.272
Durbin Watson				1.572		

Source: Euromanifestos Project

Excluded Variables: Belgium, Luxembourg, UK, Northern Ireland, Belgium-Wallonia, Belgium-Flanders, Netherlands, Cleavage Theory, EU Accession Year

P values: P < 0.5 (*), P < 0.1 (**), P < 0.01 (***)

Cultural integration had very little of the variance explained by the six models peaking at 28.5% in model 5. The party family dummy variables only explained 1.6% of the variance. The country dummy variables pushed this up to 10.6%.

In terms of the coefficients there were only a few independent variables, which produced significant results. Among the party family dummy variables the Green/ecologist parties produced two significant coefficients in model 3 (0.353**) and model 4 (0.330*). Christian Democrat parties produced two significant coefficients in model 5 (0.278*) and model 6 (0.273*). Nationalist parties produced one significant coefficient in model 1 (0.220*). Despite the lack of significant coefficients there still important results and conclusions to draw from the party family dummies in regard to hypotheses testing. The Green parties contradicted the original hypotheses in having a positive coefficient. Nationalist parties were also predicted to position positively and this was in contradiction of the original hypotheses. This does suggest that their cultural discourse may not be as 'national' as expected. Finally the Christian Democrat positive coefficients supported the original hypotheses.

With the dummy country independent variables, Sweden produced three significant coefficients ranging in strength between -0.302* and -0.325** in models 3-5. France had one significant coefficient in model 4 (-0.257*). Portugal had three instances of significant coefficients varying in strength between -0.173* and -0.221* in models 3-6. Ireland had two instances of significant coefficients in models 4 and 5 (-0.221* and -0.246*). It is important to note that all of the significant coefficients are negative and with the exception of France the countries can be described as the more peripheral members of the European Union – perhaps indicating a geographical peripheral scepticism towards the process.

The 'forms of integration' independent variables produced two interesting results. Supranational integration produced four negative and strongly significant results varying in strength between -

0.513*** and -0.552*** in models 3-6. Legal integration also produced two significant positive coefficients in models 3 (0.266*) and model 4 (0.281*). Finally the GAL-TAN values from 1999 produced two strongly significant negative coefficients in model 5 (-0.535* and -0.547*). The GAL-TAN dimension does relate quite significantly to cultural and the extreme TAN aspect (Traditional/Authoritarian) was likely to conflict significantly with any promotion of a supranational European cultural identity and hence this is not a surprise to observe a pair of large negative coefficients.

FOREIGN POLICY INTEGRATION

Table 26: Multiple Regression results – DV (Foreign Policy Integration)

Variables	Standardised Coefficients					
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Party Families						
Conservative	-.123	-.148	-.051	.009	-.008	-.014
Socialist and Social Democrats	-.179	-.183	-.126	-.217	-.269	-.260
Christian Democrat	.066	.072	.117	.161	.162	.159
Communist	-.347**	-.402**	-.083	-.169	-.193	-.155
Agrarian	-.092	-.131	-.047	-.074	-.056	-.061
Ethnic-Regional	.004	-.029	.005	.009	.023	.016
Nationalist	-.096	-.168	-.107	-.050	-.048	-.042
Green/Ecologist	-.250*	-.307**	-.197	-.254	-.286	-.262
Country						
Sweden		.006	.075	.013	.055	.096
Denmark		-.136	-.026	-.110	-.050	-.026
Finland		.030	.074	-.033	-.017	.010
France		-.033	.075	.029	.102	.113
Italy		.105	.095	.042	.081	.085
Greece		-.055	-.035	.036	.094	.086
Portugal		-.064	.018	.015	.025	.029
Germany		.169	.057	.025	.088	.103
Austria		-.084	-.052	-.083	-.033	.000
Ireland		-.217	-.177	-.230*	-.163	-.153
Year of Election			-.023	.020	.050	.045
Forms of Integration						
Economic Liberalisation			.158	.159	.162	.158
Economic Harmonisation			.213*	.221*	.257*	.261*
Supranational Integration			.084	.067	.065	.053
Legal Integration			.240	.279	.264*	.259
Social integration			.042	-.032	-.015	-.014
Cultural Integration			.154	.138	.125	.118
Alternative Theories						
Left-Right Position				-.276	-.333*	-.299
Gal-Tan Values 2006					.494	.472
Gal-Tan Values 2002					-.475	-.439
Gal-Tan Values 1999					-.021	-.038
In Government when manifesto published						-.077
Is EU Membership a good thing? Eurobarometer data						.043
Adjusted R ²	0.067	0.114	0.276	0.292	0.286	0.275
Durbin Watson				1.803		

Source: Euromanifestos Project

Excluded Variables: Belgium, Luxembourg, UK, Northern Ireland, Belgium-Wallonia, Belgium-Flanders, Netherlands, Cleavage Theory, EU Accession Year

P values: P < 0.5 (*), P < 0.1 (**), P < 0.01 (***)

Lastly the dependent variable of foreign policy integration, like the previous two regression results only had a small amount of the variance explained (27.5% by Model 4). The party family

dummy variables only explained 6.7% of the variance. The country dummy variables increased this to 11.4% and forms of integration to 27.6%.

The party family dummy variables saw Green/ecologist parties produced -0.250^* in model 1 and -0.307^{**} in model 2. (Post)-Communist parties also produced two significant coefficients in model 1 (-0.347^{**}) and model 2 (-0.402^{**}). In terms of hypotheses testing, with very few coefficients to allow conclusions to be drawn, this is inevitably limited. The negative coefficients for Green/Ecologist and (Post)-Communist party families both support the original hypotheses.

The country dummy variables had only one significant coefficient – Ireland in Model 3 (-0.230^*). With the ‘forms of integration’ independent variables, economic harmonisation produced four significant coefficients between 0.213^* and 0.261^* in models 3-6. Ireland’s negative coefficient can be explained by the country’s traditional neutrality in matters of military action.

In terms of the forms of integration group of variables, economic harmonisation produced coefficients in the range of $.213^*$ and $.261^*$ in models 3 to 6. Legal integration produced a coefficient of 0.264^* in model 5. The left-right position produced a significant coefficient -0.333^* in model 5. The positive coefficients for economic harmonisation and legal integration indicate those cases that exhibit support for these two processes will support further integration for foreign policy and defence. Finally, the negative coefficient for the variable of Left-Right position suggests that further unit increases (i.e. shift towards the right) will result in increases in the use of negative discourses. This was the only independent variable from the alternative theories group to produce a significant coefficient.

SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS

To summarise the findings in terms of predicted positions, the explanatory power of party families declined with the newer dimensions of European integration. Yet the existing theories struggled to explain the variance in party positions across the dimensions. With the process of

liberalisation, there were very surprising results with the party family coefficients in that almost all were negative towards the unconstrained single market. The country dummy variables added significantly to the amount of variance explained. There was a strong relationship between social integration and liberalisation, as well as harmonisation and liberalisation. There was also no impact from the alternative theories and no evidence of an inverted u-curve with support for liberalisation.

For the process of harmonisation, the findings showed that existing theoretical explanations were less successful at predicting positions than liberalisation. Party families were shown to still be one of the comparatively stronger explanatory variables. The forms of integration variables demonstrated that support for harmonisation was related to support for economic liberalisation, but also foreign policy integration. Again, the alternative theories had little explanatory value.

With supranational integration, the party family variables accounted for a smaller proportion of the variance, but identified core supporters amongst the Conservative, Socialist and Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, and also the Greens. The Agrarian party family were identified as critical. All country dummy variables producing significant coefficients were negative – with both geographical core and peripheral member states. The forms of integration of integration demonstrated a strong positive relationship between supranational integration and legal integration, as well as a strong negative relationship with cultural integration. The alternative theories offered no significant coefficients.

Legal integration showed that the party family dummy variables explained a small amount of the variance. However, the country dummies showed support from both geographical core and peripheral member states. There was a positive relationship between legal integration and supranational, social, cultural, and foreign policy integration. The left-right dimension

demonstrated right-wing support, and the process linked strongly (positively) with the median voter theory.

For the process of social integration, the amount of variance explained by party families was weak, but the coefficients showed strong left-wing support from Socialist and Social Democratic, (post)-Communist and the Green/Ecologist parties. There was evidence of negative relationships with the country dummy variables of the geographical peripheral member states. The forms of integration variables showed a strong positive relationship between social and legal integration. The left-right dimension demonstrated a strong right-wing critique and finally there was no evidence of a relationship with the existing theories.

With cultural integration, the data showed that party families only explained a small portion of the variance, but demonstrated support amongst the Nationalist, Green/Ecologists and Christian Democrats. The country dummy variables also showed negative relationships from Sweden, France, Portugal, and Ireland. There was a strong negative relationship between cultural integration and supranational integration, but a positive relationship with legal integration. Finally, the GAL-TAN dimension showed a negative position from the Traditional/Authoritarian aspect of the scale.

Lastly, with the dimension of foreign policy integration, the amount of variance explained by party families was very weak, but it still identified negative relationships for the (post)-Communists and the Green/Ecologists. There was a positive relationship identified between foreign policy integration and harmonisation, as well as legal integration. The left-right dimension variable highlighted a right-wing critique of the dimension.

COMPARATIVE OBSERVATIONS³⁴

If one takes a broad comparative view of what the regression analyses reveal, the data provides a number of empirically significant findings. Starting with the major theme of the thesis that party ideology is the strongest predictor of party positions towards the dimensions of European integration, the results are somewhat mixed. Focusing on the R^2 value – i.e. the amount of variance explained by each model we see a general decline, across the dimensions, in the variance explained by the party family model alone (model 1). For liberalisation, almost 30% was explained by party family dummy variables. However, by cultural integration the variance explained was approximately 1.6%. This suggests that the newer dimensions of integration are perhaps independent of traditional party family stances, and that parties have not subsumed these issues into their existing ideology or developed common responses. Interestingly when this is compared to the findings in the literature party family had a much larger impact on the variance – in Marks, Wilson and Ray (2002: 590-591) the variable explained two-thirds of the variance. Marks and Wilson (2000: 441) also reported similar results. Interestingly when looking at the regression results from Hellström (2008: 200-201) the models containing party families only saw R^2 values of approximately .30. There does appear to be some disparity here between the results derived from manifesto and expert survey data. Furthermore when examining the literature using multiple dimension analyses the R^2 values were much weaker, though they did not decline in similar areas (Hooghe et al, 2002: 973, Table 2)

Continuing with examining the variance explained by each model, the results reveal that with the exception of the dimension of liberalisation, model 2 –national location – explains only a small proportion of the variance with each dimension. Despite some examples of moderate to strong coefficients, the low R^2 weakens the explanatory power of Country variables and suggests that

³⁴ Given the lack of multi-dimensional analyses it restricts the comparisons that can be made with the findings of existing research. Two exceptions were produced by academics at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (Hooghe et al, 2002; and Marks et al, 2006). With the remainder of the comparative literature the only comparisons can be made with party positions towards the dimensions of liberalisation and supranational integration.

some member states are not necessarily more Eurosceptic towards some or all of the aspects of European integration. This finding was supported by previous results in Marks, Wilson and Ray (2002: 590-591) who reported that country dummies only had a small amount of influence and explained only around 5% of the variance. This was also the conclusion in Marks and Wilson (2000: 441). However, Hellström (2008: 199) noted that national and party strategic factors were also found to be important. This was a result that was not mirrored here.

A group of variables, which have had a strong influence, were the 'forms of integration' independent variables. Across the majority of dimensions, this group has substantially increased the variance explained. For example, with liberalisation the variance explained increased by 21%. For supranational integration the increase in variance explained was 29.4%. The relevance of these variables does suggest that being Eurosceptic towards one dimension increases the likelihood of being Eurosceptic towards another aspect of European integration. In this sense it emphasises the protest nature of the phenomenon. Lastly, the final three models added the alternative theories variables. What was evident was that these variables only added a few percentage points to the variance explained across the dimensions. This does weaken the explanatory power of those variables that were significant.

Moving on to focus on the values of coefficients. There was no evidence of the inverted u-curve (see Hooghe, Marks & Wilson, 2002: 970; Aspinwall, 2002: 85; Kresi, 2007: 98; Hellström, 2008: 203). This was a result that was similarly reported by Hooghe et al (2002: 973) for the dimension of employment policy (as well as cohesion and environmental policy). They found that there was a highly significant downward sloping line from a pro-integrationist left to a less integrationist right. This was not completely replicated amongst the dimensions.

Liberalisation saw a pattern for the party family variables, which consisted of moderately to strongly negative values amongst the left-wing parties, but the strength of those coefficients

declined towards the party families located in the centre and right-wing of the party system. As all significant coefficients were negative only three of the hypotheses were confirmed (Greens, non-reformed Communists, and Agrarian parties). Despite this, ideology does appear to be a driver of positions towards Liberalisation, especially when constructed as a more inclusive concept (as by Seliger, 1997: 14). This is not particularly surprising that the left-wing parties produced the strongest predicted negative coefficients given the relationship of economic liberalisation to conflicts at the national level surrounding the construction of the national economy as more *laissez faire* versus regulated capitalism in Western Europe during this time period.

Economic Harmonisation did not see a similar pattern. There were significant coefficients only amongst the Green/Ecologist, (post)-Communist, and Agrarian party families. Again only three hypotheses were confirmed amongst the same three party families. For the Greens and (post)-Communists the coefficients were moderately to strongly negative, while for the Agrarian parties the coefficient was relatively weak. Without significant coefficients for the remaining party families it is difficult to conclude that a Eurosceptic periphery exists with this dimension, though the first tentative evidence at least suggests the possibility. If one considers Seliger's (1976) dual conception of ideology, only the restrictive concept seems to apply to this, where ideology is restricted to the peripheral parties. Here this would suggest that ideology is a strong predictor of positions, but this is unsatisfactory and when the inclusive concept is used, ideology appears weaker.

For supranational integration, the previous elements of patterns, which were extractable from the results for liberalisation and harmonisation, did not continue with the new dimension. Moderately strong positive coefficients were found amongst the Green/Ecologists, Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, and Conservatives. The Agrarian party family produced moderately strong negative coefficients. Three of the hypotheses were confirmed by the results (Social Democrats (later), Christian Democrats, and Agrarian party families). The results suggest

a right-wing critique, although this is difficult to conclude conclusively given the lack of a significant coefficient for nationalist parties, as well as the lack of an inverted u-curve. The most surprising results were for the Conservative parties, and in particular the Green/Ecologists positive coefficients in models 3 and 4, suggesting a complete reorientation towards working within EU structures to further Green policies. This possibility was noted in chapter three. Using Seliger's (1976) inclusive concept, ideology does appear to be a strong predictor of party positions, but this conclusion is significantly weakened R² value as reported above.

If one moves on to consider Social integration, the results report a significant left-wing bias in the identification of significant coefficients. For Green/Ecologists, (post)-Communist, Social Democrats, and Christian Democrats all the results were moderately positive. No other significant coefficients were produced. Furthermore only two hypotheses were confirmed. However, for the Green/ecologists and (post)-Communists it was hypothesised that the parties would have no overall position, given the likelihood that while they could possibly support the process it would conflict with their overall critique of European integration. Being confined to the left wing with the exception of the Christian Democrats does not sit well when considering whether ideology is a strong predictor using either of Seliger's (1976: 14) two concepts, especially with the R² value being so low.

With the dimensions of legal, cultural and foreign policy integration, the strength of ideology as a predictor declines dramatically. Legal integration saw three party families with significant coefficients, and with only two hypotheses confirmed. Cultural integration saw three party families with significant coefficients (all positive), but with only one hypothesis confirmed. Finally for foreign policy, only two party families had significant coefficients (both were negative), and two confirmed hypotheses. These results, using either of Seliger's (1976: 14) concepts suggest that ideology is a weak causal factor for these three dimensions. This conclusion was supported by the weak R² values reported above.

If ideology's strength as a causal variable towards party positioning is to be questioned at least on the latter dimensions, how do some of the alternative theories fared which have previously been developed in the existing academic literature?

The national location variables were generally a weak explanatory factor. The exceptions were for the dimensions of supranational integration and legal integration. For the former, despite the minor 1.9% increase in the R^2 between model 1 and model 2, the regression saw six countries register moderately to strongly negative coefficients, though there does not appear to be a clear pattern as both old and new member states have produced significant coefficients. It is important, however, that there were a large number of negative values, which emphasises a Eurosceptic undercurrent towards supranational integration. With the latter the majority of significant coefficients only appeared in model six. Again, a pattern was difficult to discern as national-locations included member states from the majority of accession groups, but there appears to be widespread support for legal integration, and that it is a stronger predictor of party positions than ideology for this dimension.

The group of variables, which have had the most impact, has been the 'forms of integration' independent variables. Not only have they increased the variance explained dramatically, with the majority dimensions they have produced some of the strongest statistically significant coefficients. For liberalisation, the economic harmonisation independent variable produced a positive coefficient of .205* (model 3). For supranational integration, the legal integration independent variable produced a coefficient of .419*** (model 4) and the cultural integration independent variable produced a negative coefficient of -.424*** (models 5 and 6). The impact of these variables emphasises that parties supporting one dimension of integration are likely to support further dimensions. However, it also highlights the protest element of Euroscepticism.

Finally, in a comparative sense the impact of the alternative theories was rather small. They had no significant impact on the dimensions of liberalisation, harmonisation, and supranational integration. However, they did have an impact on the later dimensions. Legal integration saw moderate to strong positive coefficients towards left-right position and median voter position. This suggested that right-wing parties were more likely to support legal integration developments, and those countries with greater support amongst the public was likely to translate into greater support for legal integration. Social integration and foreign policy integration saw strong negative coefficients indicating a right-wing critique of these developments. These results were very surprising. Marks et al (2006: 162-165) found that the left-right dimension constrained positions towards integration on policies, which were concerned about the regulation of the market. This finding was not repeated with this dataset. Governmental participation seemed to have no statistically significant impact, in contrast to the findings of Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002: 968), Hellström (2008: 199) and the theoretical work of Sitter (2003). However, the results similar to Kresi (2007: 98) who found that while the opposition hypothesis was not entirely wrong, its explanatory power was very weak. Finally, cultural integration produced the only instance where the GAL-TAN dimensions produced significant coefficients (-.547* in model six). This suggests a rejection by the traditional-authoritarian parties of European cultural integration, which is not surprising given the relationship of GAL-TAN to 'new politics'. Hooghe et al (2002) as well as Marks et al (2006) were keen to stress that the new politics dimension related best to EU issues which engaged with lifestyle, gender, environment, participatory decision making and national culture (Marks et al, 2006: 164). However, GAL-TAN did not have the same impact on the other dimensions with this dataset as it did in the Hooghe et al (2002: 973 Table 2) dataset results.

SUMMARY

The European election data demonstrated that again ideology continues to remain an important element in structuring party responses to European integration. Importantly however, the study has unearthed some important caveats to consider. Party family alone does not explain a large proportion of the variance. In addition its explanatory power is limited to the original processes of integration – for example economic liberalisation, harmonisation, and supranational. For newer developments in European integration, ideology has less influence in structuring party positions, though with social integration it clearly correctly predicts the position of left-wing parties. Only a proportion of the hypotheses were confirmed for party families and this decreased when the newer dimensions were examined. This is broadly in line when Taggart (1998: 3979) argued that it “it is clear that knowing a party’s ideology is not necessarily a guide to its position on the EU.” Essentially positions cannot be read off from a party family, but it still does structure responses on the original processes.

National location was found to have little impact on whether a party is Eurosceptic or not. Comparatively, for each dimension country returned a low R^2 value and produced a few weak coefficients, with few exceptions. These were for supranational and legal integration where a number of strong coefficients were produced (negative for supranational and positive for legal integration), but an examination of these proved difficult to identify particular patterns to the strength of these results. However, again the variance explained remained low even for these exceptions.

The major influence was found to be the platform taken by each individual party on the other dimensions of integration. Those parties more supportive of one aspect of integration were likely to be supportive towards other dimensions. Critically, it highlighted the protest aspect of integration and emphasised its peripheral nature. Finally, the alternative theories simply did not have a significant impact across the dimensions. There were some exceptions – legal social and

foreign policy integration saw significant coefficients with the Left-right dimension independent variable, and GAL-TAN for cultural integration. However their impact on the amount of variance explained was very weak. With this new data, they were mostly inadequate at explaining party behaviour.

The findings clearly demonstrate the need for a multi-dimensional understanding of party positioning towards European integration, as well as the importance of understanding European party platforms in the EP elections. It does demonstrate that party discourse is influenced by ideological predispositions. There are a large number of statistically significant coefficients from the party family dummy variables across the majority of dimensions. There are also other indicators. The forms of integration variables show that positive support is repeated towards other dimensions demonstrating the peripheral and protest nature of the phenomenon. The left-right dimension is a strong predictor in the case of social and foreign policy integration. However, caveats need to be inserted in the overall argument surrounding the predictive power of ideology. Party families are certainly the strongest predictor amongst the existing causal theories previously put forward, but their explanatory power weakens towards the newer dimensions, indicating that these emerging areas of competition have yet to be interpreted by parties in traditional terms. So in some respects the picture is much more complicated and while ideology remains a very strong causal factor, it is not the case that one can read off positions on the basis of the party family. Furthermore it suggests that there still continues to be a number of hidden causal factors, which explain more of the remaining variance.

The subsequent chapter will move on to focus more heavily on the ideological element with a specific heavy focus on Eurosceptic party behaviour. In particular it focuses on the observed behaviour from the Euromanifestos data. The previous chapter demonstrated that ideology remains an important causal factor, and one of the strongest when compared to the existing causal theories, but this is not wholly conclusive towards all aspects of integration. The final

empirical chapter aims to subject the theory of ideological causation to a stronger analytical spotlight and introduces two further analytical distinctions within the party family – as to whether there are further ideological patterns when one groups those parties according to their accession group, and whether their member state is in the geographical core or periphery of the EU.

CHAPTER SIX: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS: IDEOLOGY AS AN ACCURATE PREDICTOR?

As stated earlier, this research has aimed to investigate the level and nature of party-based Euroscepticism in Western Europe, and to fundamentally reassess causation. In so doing has presented five core aspects to the overall argument revolving around: the need for a dynamic and nuanced conceptualisation of Euroscepticism; the importance of developing a multi-dimensional framework to analyse Eurosceptic parties based on that definition; the importance of Europe in European elections; the role and importance of ideology in structuring political party responses to European integration; and finally the importance of using a quantitative manifesto research strategy to examine Euroscepticism in election campaigns.

This final empirical chapter examines ideology in isolation from other causal factors. As such it utilises the new definition presented earlier, to identify Eurosceptic parties in each party family from the raw data used to generate the previous analyses. Firstly these are compared to those identified through the use of the single dimension of support and opposition for European integration. The Eurosceptic parties on the multiple dimensions are identified by assessing whether a party dedicates $\geq 5\%$ of its manifesto towards criticising or rejecting a particular dimension of integration³⁵ Secondly, a more nuanced approach is taken and individual parties within the party families will be tested as to whether they conform to the hypotheses. In order to assess whether there are further patterns of support within the party families, parties will be analysed according to accession group, as well as whether the party was from a central or peripheral member state.

³⁵ Minor support or criticism was $\leq 5\%$; strong support or criticism was $\geq 5\%$ and $\leq 10\%$; and finally extreme support or criticism was $\geq 10\%$.

The chapter finds that a far greater number of Eurosceptic parties are identifiable through the use of the multi-dimensional definition and framework. Secondly, with only a few exceptions it accurately identifies Eurosceptic parties, which were previously identified using the more common single dimension of support versus opposition to the EU. The findings clearly underline the impact of ideology, as with all party families the data suggests that there is an ideological component to the Eurosceptic positions of the identified parties, and even with the more general behaviour of the entire party family. However, the results indicate that the hypotheses and groupings within the party families are most accurate in predicting positions towards those parties who are more left wing. With those on the right patterns are harder to discern indicate a much more fragmented and heterogeneous response among party families of the right.

EUROSCEPTIC PARTY COMPARISON

The table below presents the parties identified by the single dimension of integration on the left hand side to those identified through the multiple dimensions on the right hand side. Further details on which aspects the parties are Eurosceptic towards are available later in the chapter.

Table 27: Comparison of Eurosceptic Parties from the European elections

Eurosceptic Parties Identified (Single-dimensional analysis)	Eurosceptic Parties Identified (Multi-dimensional analysis)
Liberal Parties: AUT: FPÖ Freedom Party	<i>Liberals</i> LUX: PD-DP Democratic Party
Conservatives: GB: Conservative Party	BEL: VLD Flemish Liberals and Democrats DEN: V Liberals
Socialist and Social Democrats: LUX: POSL-LSAP Socialist Workers Party	GB: LDP Liberal Democratic Party AUT: FPÖ Freedom Party
Christian Democrats: NET: CU Christian Union	<i>Conservatives</i> ITA: FI Forza Italia Go Italy
Post-Communist: SWE: VP Left Party NET: SP Socialist Party FRA: PCF Communist Party ITA: RC Newly Founded Communists GRE: KKE Communist Party POR: PCP Communist Party	FRA: UMP Union for Presidential Majority GB: Conservative Party DEN: KF Conservative Peoples Party SPA: CiU Convergence and Union <i>Socialist and Social Democratic</i> LUX: POSL-LSAP Socialist Workers Party FRA: PS Socialist Party

IRE: Workers Party

Regionalist Parties:

DEN FB: People's Movement

DEN: FP Progress Party

DEN: JB June Movement

FRA: RPF Rally for France

SPA: EH Basque Euskal Herritarrok

SPA: BNG Galician Nationalist Bloc

GER: REP The Republicans

BEL: VB Flemish Block

GB: UKIP UK Independence Party

GB: DUP Democratic Unionist Party

GB: UUP Ulster Unionist Party

Nationalist Parties:

DEN: DF Peoples Party

FRA: FN National Front

ITA: LN Northern League

BEL: FN National Front

Green Parties:

SWE: Green Ecology Party

LUX: GLEI-GAP Ecological-Alternative

GER: Greens-90 Greens-Alliance 90

AUT: GA Green Alternative

GB: Green Party

BEL: PS Francophone Socialist Party

POR: PSP Socialist Party

GRE: PASOK Panhellenic Socialist Movement

FIN: SSDP Social Democrats

Christian Democrats

GER: CSU Christian Democrats

NET: CU Christian Union

LUX: PCS-CSV Christian Social Peoples Party

IRE: Fine Gael

SWE: KdS Christian Democratic Community Party

FIN: KD Christian Democrats

(Post)-Communist

FRA: PCF Communist Party

NET: SP Socialist Party

ITA: RC Newly Founded Communists

DEN: SF Socialist Peoples Party

IRE: Workers Party

GRE: KKE Communist Party

POR: PCP Communist Party

SWE: Vp Left Party

FIN: VL Left Wing Alliance

Agrarian

SWE: CP Centre Party

FIN: SK Finnish Centre

Ethno-regionalist

FRA: RPF Rally for France

BEL: VB Flemish Block

BEL: NVA New Flemish Alliance

ITA: SVP South Tyrol People's Party

GB: SNP Scottish National Party

GB: PC Party for Wales

GB: UKIP UK Independence Party

GB: DUP Democratic Unionist Party

GB: UUP Ulster Unionist Party

DEN: FP Progress Party

DEN FB: People's Movement

DEN: JB June Movement

SPA: PNV-EAJ Basque Nationalist Party

SPA: ERC Catalan Republican Left

SPA: EH Basque Euskal Herritarrok

SPA: BNG Galician Nationalist Bloc

SPA: EA Basque Solidarity

Nationalists

GER: REP The Republicans

FRA: FN National Front

ITA: AN National Alliance

ITA: LN Northern League

BEL: FN National Front
DEN: DF Peoples Party

Greens

BEL: AGALEV Flemish Ecologists

GER: Greens-90 Greens-Alliance 90

GB: Green Party

SWE: Green Ecology Party

As is made clear by the table, the multi-dimensional definition and framework identify a greater number of Eurosceptic parties than the single dimension. In addition, with only one or two exceptions (for example the Luxembourg Green party), the more nuanced definition includes all the Eurosceptic parties previously identified.

EUROSCEPTIC LIBERAL PARTIES:

The analysis of the results was able to identify that the following parties could be classified as Eurosceptic:

- Luxembourg PD DP – towards foreign policy integration in 1989; towards supranational integration in 1994; and towards supranational integration and foreign policy integration in 1999;
- Belgian VLD – towards cultural integration in 2004;
- Danish V – towards supranational integration in 1994;
- British Liberal Democrats – towards supranational integration in 2004;
- Austrian FPÖ – towards harmonisation and supranational integration in 1996; and towards supranational integration and foreign policy integration in 1999;

The Liberal party family saw almost all accession groups saw the use of Eurosceptic arguments, with the exception being that of the southern enlargement of 1981 and 1986. Importantly, it is clear that these Eurosceptic Liberal parties did share some of the same strong criticisms of European integration. In particular, the Luxembourg PD DP, Danish V, British Liberal Democrats and Austrian FPÖ were all sceptical towards supranational integration, with the PD DP, V and FPÖ being critical in the 1994 election campaign (though the Austrian election was two years later – 1996 – after accession in 1995). Critically this points to a strong critique of the Maastricht provisions of 1992. The Luxembourg PD DP and Austrian FPÖ also were both critical of foreign policy integration in 1999. The 1999 election took place just before the Nice European Council where new military structures brought in to the Council of the European Union. Furthermore QMV was

extended to aspects of CFSP. With this party family much of the observed Eurosceptic behaviour appears to have been a reaction to the same developments.

COMPARATIVE OBSERVATIONS

This thesis hypothesised that Liberal parties would be positive towards all dimensions of European integration: liberalisation, harmonisation, supranational, legal, social, cultural and foreign policy integration. There were clearly many of the parties which were supportive towards many of the dimensions, but the initial examination of the liberal party responses also revealed subtle differences suggesting that at least in some respects it is a heterogeneous party family grouping.

In the 1989 elections (see table 28) the German FDP conformed to the predicted positions. In addition four other parties matched the majority of the predicted positions: the Belgian FDF-PRL (except supranational integration – no overall position); Belgian VLD (except social and cultural integration – no overall position); the British Liberal Democrats (except cultural integration – no overall position); and finally the Danish V (except three no overall positions – harmonisation, legal and foreign policy integration).

The two parties that did not conform to the hypotheses accurately were the Luxembourg PD DP and the Danish RV. The Luxembourg PD DP was extremely negative towards supranational integration and foreign policy integration. It also demonstrated no overall position towards legal, social and cultural integration. The Danish RV were less critical – using minor negative discourse towards legal integration and demonstrating no overall position towards harmonisation, supranational integration, social integration and cultural integration.

The 1994 elections (see table 28) saw a similar pattern to the 1989 elections with only one party completely conforming to the predictions – the Belgian VLD. There were only four other parties

who fitted the hypotheses with reasonable accuracy: the Dutch WD (except for cultural integration – minor negative); British Liberal Democrats (except for cultural integration – no overall position); Danish V (except for supranational integration – strong negative and legal integration – no overall position); and finally the Austrian LF (except for social integration – no overall position).

There were six parties that did not fit the hypotheses – the German FDP, Luxembourg PD DP, Belgian FDF-PRL, Danish RV, Swedish FP, and finally Austrian FPÖ. The German FDP had become more negative since the 1989 elections and had focused minor criticism on supranational and social integration indicating some concern over the increasing transfers of sovereignty and creation of a social Europe. The Luxembourg PD DP continued to be extremely negative towards supranational integration, but did not develop their manifesto to examine other dimensions. The Belgian FDF-PRL became more negative by 1994 using minor negative discourse towards liberalisation and supranational integration, but the party remained supportive of the other dimensions. The Danish RV continued with its minor criticisms towards legal integration, but did not develop its manifesto particularly beyond that – three no overall positions toward liberalisation, harmonisation and cultural integration. The Swedish FP was strongly supportive of the free market element of integration, but it was clear that they had minor reservations towards supranational and cultural integration. Finally the Austrian FPÖ was critical towards liberalisation, harmonisation, supranational and legal integration. This is not surprising given that the party developed a much more nationalistic stance under the control of Jörg Haider.

Table 28 – Liberal Party Positions and Confirmation/Rejection of Hypotheses 1989 to 1994-1996:

Year	Party	Forms of Integration							
		Economic Liberalisation	Economic Harmonisation	Supranational Integration	Legal Integration	Social Integration	Cultural Integration	Foreign Policy Integration	
1989	German FDP	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Extreme Positive Yes
	Luxembourg PD DP	Extreme Positive Yes	Extreme Positive Yes	Extreme Negative No	No Overall No	No overall No	No Overall No	No Overall No	Extreme Negative No
	Belgian FDF-PRL	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	Minor Positive Yes	Extreme Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes
	Belgian VLD	Extreme Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Extreme Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	No Overall No	No Overall No	Minor Positive Yes
	British Liberal Democrats	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	No Overall No	Strong Positive Yes
	Danish RV	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	No Overall No	Minor Negative No	No Overall No	No Overall No	No Overall No	Extreme Positive Yes
	Danish V	Strong Positive Yes	No Overall No	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No
	1994	German FDP	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Negative No	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Negative No	Minor Positive Yes	Extreme Positive Yes
Luxembourg PD DP	No Overall No	No Overall No	Extreme Negative No	No Overall No	No Overall No	No Overall No	No Overall No	No Overall No	
Dutch WD	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Negative No	Strong Positive Yes	
Belgian FDF-PRL	Minor Negative No	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Negative No	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Strong Positive Yes	Strong Positive Yes	Extreme Positive Yes	
Belgian VLD	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Extreme Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	
British Liberal Democrats	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	Strong Positive Yes	
Danish RV	No Overall No	No Overall No	Extreme Positive Yes	Minor Negative No	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	No Overall No	Extreme Positive Yes	
Danish V	Extreme Positive Yes	Strong Positive Yes	Strong Negative No	No Overall No	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Strong Positive Yes	
(1995)	Swedish FP	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Negative No	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Negative No	Extreme Positive Yes	
(1996)	Austrian FPO	Minor Negative No	Strong Negative No	Extreme Negative No	Minor Negative No	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	
(1996)	Austrian LF	Minor Positive Yes	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	Minor Positive Yes	Extreme Positive Yes	

Source: Euromanifestos Dataset 1979-2004

The 1999 European elections continued the trend of non-conformity. The Austrian LF was the only party to confirm the hypothesised positions. Five other parties exhibited behaviour similar to the original predictions – the Italian Ulivo electoral alliance (two no overall positions – liberalisation and social integration); Belgian FDF-PRL (two no overall positions – liberalisation and social integration); British Liberal Democrats (one no overall position – cultural integration); Danish V (one no overall position – cultural integration); and finally the Swedish FP (one minor negative – cultural integration).

Focusing on the non-conforming cases, the German FDP continued the behaviour observed in 1994, but also did not formulate a position towards cultural integration. The Luxembourg PD DP continued with the behaviour observed over the two previous elections. It rejected supranational and foreign policy integration (strong and extreme negative use respectively). The Dutch WD only focused their manifesto on supporting harmonisation and supranational integration. Surprisingly, the Belgian VLD shifted from its position of conformity in 1994 to using minor criticism towards social and cultural integration. Finally, the Danish RV continued with a similar manifesto to that of 1989 and 1994. It remained critical of legal integration, was positive towards supranational and foreign policy integration, but had no overall position towards the remaining dimensions.

By the 2004 election, the party family still remained heterogeneous. Eleven parties exhibited behaviour which was mostly conformist. However fourteen parties did not fit the hypotheses accurately at all. The German FDP became more conformist by 2004, but it was strongly critical of supranational integration. The Luxembourg PD DP changed dramatically from previous elections being supportive of all processes, but with one no overall position (cultural integration). The Dutch WD was supportive, though like the PD DP had one no overall position (cultural integration). The Italian electoral alliances – Ulivo and La Margherita behaved in a similar fashion with support for all

but cultural integration (minor negative). The Danish RV developed its manifesto far more extensively supporting liberalisation, harmonisation, supranational and social integration. It also remained critical of legal integration.

Table 29 – Liberal Party Positions and Confirmation/Rejection of Hypotheses 1999-2004:

Year	Party	Forms of Integration							Foreign Policy Integration
		Economic Liberalisation	Economic Harmonisation	Supranational Integration	Legal Integration	Social Integration	Cultural Integration		
1999	German FDP	Minor Positive Yes	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Negative No	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Negative No	No Overall No	Strong Positive Yes	
	Luxembourg PD DP	No Overall No	No Overall No	Strong Negative No	No Overall No	No Overall No	No Overall No	Extreme Negative No	
	Dutch WD	No Overall No	Minor Positive Yes	Strong Positive Yes	No Overall No	No Overall No	No Overall No	No Overall No	
	Italian Ulivo	No Overall No	Strong Positive Yes	Extreme Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	Minor Positive Yes	Extreme Positive Yes	
	Belgian FDF-PRL	No Overall No	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Strong Positive Yes	No Overall No	Strong Positive Yes	
	Belgian VLD	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Negative No	Minor Negative No	Minor Positive Yes	
	British Liberal Democrats	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	Minor Positive Yes	
	Danish RV	No Overall No	No Overall No	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Negative No	No Overall No	No Overall No	Extreme Positive Yes	
	Danish V	Minor Positive Yes	Strong Positive Yes	Extreme Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	Minor Positive Yes	
	Swedish FP	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Negative No	Strong Positive Yes	
	Austrian FPO	No Overall No	Minor Negative No	Extreme Negative No	No Overall No	No Overall No	No Overall No	Strong Negative No	
	Austrian LF	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	
	2004	German FDP	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Strong Negative No	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	- -
		Luxembourg PD DP	Strong Positive Yes	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	- -
		Dutch WD	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	- -
		Italian Ulivo	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Negative No	- -
		Italian DS/SDI/ La Margherita	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Negative No	- -
		Belgian VLD	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Strong Positive Yes	No Overall No	Minor Negative No	Strong Negative No	- -
		British Liberal Democrats	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Strong Negative No	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	- -
		Danish RV	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Negative No	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	- -
Danish V		Strong Positive Yes	No Overall No	Minor Negative No	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	No Overall No	- -	
Swedish FP		Strong Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Negative No	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Negative No	- -	
Austrian FPO		Minor Negative No	No Overall No	No Overall No	No Overall No	Minor Negative No	Minor Positive Yes	- -	

Source: Euromanifestos Project 1989-2004

In terms of the non-conforming liberal parties, the Belgian VLD continued its critique of social integration, but also became strongly critical of cultural integration. The Danish V became slightly critical of supranational integration, but also did not develop positions towards harmonisation, social and cultural integration. The Swedish FP behaved in a similar fashion to the 1995 and 1999 elections with minor negative discourse directed at supranational and cultural integration. The Austrian FPÖ did not develop their manifesto in a particularly detailed fashion towards the issues represented by the dimensions, but used minor negative discourse towards liberalisation and social integration.

LIBERAL PARTY BEHAVIOURAL PATTERNS IN THE ACCESSION GROUPS

Within the original six member states Liberal parties during the 1989 elections as a group were coherent with their positive positions towards liberalisation, harmonisation, legal integration (Luxembourg's PD DP was the exception with no overall position), cultural integration (except Luxembourg's PD DP – no overall position), and foreign policy integration (except Luxembourg's PD DP – extreme negative). The major exception did prove to be the Luxembourg PD DP, which was negative towards supranational and foreign policy integration, but supportive towards the economic aspects – liberalisation and harmonisation. This does suggest that the party may well have been more inclined to espouse economic liberalism. In the 1973 accession group the three Liberal parties were all supportive towards liberalisation. However, with the remaining dimensions two of the parties – the Danish RV, and Danish V did not develop as many positions as the British Liberal Democrats. There was still a pattern to discern for supranational integration, social integration and foreign policy integration, where two of the parties indicated support and the remaining party had no overall position.

The 1994 election saw a decrease in the consistency within which Liberal parties in the original six member states adopted similar positions. Only three parties (the German FDP, the Dutch WD, and

Belgian VLD) adopted positive positions towards liberalisation. The FDF-PRL adopted a negative stance and the PD DP had no overall position. The majority supported harmonisation, legal, and foreign policy integration. The exception to all of them was the PD DP, which failed to develop a position towards the dimensions. In addition, three parties developed negative positions towards supranational integration – the German FDP, Luxembourg PD DP and Belgian FDF-PRL. In the 1973 accession group it continued to be difficult to extract patterns of behaviour. The Danish RV's manifesto remained less developed. However, the three parties were consistent in their support towards social integration and foreign policy integration. In addition the British Liberal Democrats and Danish V supported liberalisation and harmonisation. Furthermore, both the Liberal Democrats and Danish RV supported supranational integration, but the Danish V rejected this. The 1995 accession group was altogether much more negative. This is partly due to the membership FPÖ, which may have been nominally liberal at the outset, but had developed far right tendencies. Within the group two of the parties (Swedish FP and Austrian LF) supported liberalisation, harmonisation, and legal integration. In addition, both the Swedish FP and Austrian FPÖ supported social integration; the FPÖ and LF supported cultural integration; and all three supported foreign policy integration.

By the 1999 elections, the Liberal parties of the original six had surprisingly developed manifestos without much if any emphasis on the process of liberalisation. They focused more on harmonisation – which all, but the Luxembourg PD DP supported (no overall position), supranational integration – which all but the Luxembourg PD DP supported, and foreign policy integration – which was supported by the German FDP, Italian Ulivo, Belgian FDF-PRL, and Belgian VLD. The Luxembourg PD DP rejected it, and the Dutch WD had no overall position. The 1973 accession group saw a similar pattern of inconsistency amongst the member parties as was observable in 1989

and 1994. The only consistent behaviour was found to be towards supranational and foreign policy integration (all parties were positive); and finally cultural integration (all parties had no overall position). The 1995 accession group was again split by the behaviour of the Austrian FPÖ. The Swedish FP and Austria LF exhibited similar support towards all, but cultural integration. Here the Swedish FP was critical and the Austrian LF offered minor support.

Finally, the 2004 elections saw a remarkable change in the pattern of support and an increase in the consistency of the behaviour of Liberal parties in the 'original six'. All parties supported liberalisation and harmonisation. All parties supported the processes, with the exception of the German FDP (strong negative) towards supranational integration, and the Belgian VLD (no overall position) with legal integration and social integration (minor negative). Only with cultural integration was it possible to see less consistent behaviour with the German FDP, Luxembourg PD DP, Dutch WD having no overall position, and the Italian Ulivo, Italian La Margherita, and Belgian VLD using negative discourse. The 1973 accession group did not see a similar change in their consistency in terms of their behaviour towards the dimensions. All three supported liberalisation. The British Liberal Democrats and Danish RV supported both harmonisation and social integration with the Danish V having no overall position. All three parties adopted no overall position towards cultural integration. Interestingly both the British Liberal Democrats and Danish V were critical towards supranational integration. In the 1995 accession group, only two parties – the Swedish FP and Austrian FPÖ remained, and they took opposite positions on liberalisation, social integration, and cultural integration. For the remaining dimensions the FPÖ had no overall position. This makes it impossible to extract meaningful patterns of behaviour within this sub-grouping.

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

When attempting to derive theoretical implications for the Liberal party family, one is struck by the broad ideological traditions within the Liberal party family. Yet if one first focuses on the identified Eurosceptic parties, it is clear that there is an ideological component identifiable with their behaviour. There were clear patterns of opposition towards the Maastricht provisions and their criticism of supranational integration. Furthermore, there was also a clear pattern of opposition towards the Nice provisions and the growth of competences within the foreign policy integration dimension.

However, when the party family is taken as a whole at first there appears to be some heterogeneity amongst the member parties. Yet, it is clear that many of the parties supported many of the dimensions, indicating that the differences were subtle. There was an increase in conformity when split into accession groups especially during the 1989 and 2004 elections for the parties of original six member states.

Looking at particular variations within the broad Liberal ideological tradition, Marks and Wilson (2000: 448-449) identified three variations in Liberal party ideology: liberal radicalism; liberal-conservatism; and the agrarian/centre variety (dealt with separately here). The Liberal-radical variety is left of centre on economic issues and supports a broad interpretation of democratic rights. They also favour substantial state intervention. There were clearly parties, which supported liberalisation, but significantly also supported social integration at the EU-level and these appear to fit several of the parties (for example the Swedish FP, Danish RV, and British Liberal Democrats). The Liberal-Conservatives emphasise economic freedom, are more right-of-centre and advocate a minimal role for the state. They have opposed any project to introduce regulated capitalism. At times this did appear to fit the behaviour of the Danish V and Belgian VLD, though these distinctions were not

completely obvious from the positions taken towards the various aspects of integration where the parties appeared to waiver between the two types. Despite this however, there were five parties who were identified as Eurosceptic, with supranational integration being the most feared – which did fit somewhat with the argument by Marks and Wilson (2000: 449) that Liberal-Conservatives would reject ‘political’ integration. It was only the British Liberal Democrats who were critical towards supranational integration by 2004, the remainder were critical up to 1994, which may have been more a product of the discomfort towards Maastricht.

Overall, when one looks at the results ideologically inspired Euroscepticism has clearly been used by a significant number of Liberal parties. However, the party family does remain broadly pro-European, but a closer inspections reveals significant, but subtle differences between the parties. There appears to be a number of parties that fit the Liberal-radical grouping who espouse support for a form of regulated capitalism, and some instances of the Liberal-Conservative variety, though this is less conclusive.

EUROSCEPTIC CONSERVATIVE PARTIES:

The analysis of the results was able that the following parties could be classified as Eurosceptic:

- Italian FI – towards supranational integration in 1994;
- French UMP – towards supranational integration in 1999;
- British Conservatives – towards supranational integration in 1994; towards supranational integration in 1999; towards supranational integration in 2004;
- Danish KF – towards supranational integration in 1999;
- Spanish CIU – towards supranational integration in 1989; towards supranational integration in 1994; and towards supranational integration in 1999;

With the Eurosceptic Conservative parties it is quite clear that there is a significant ideological component to their use of Euroscepticism as all were hostile towards supranational integration with instances of its use in all four elections. The Italian FI, British Conservatives and Spanish CIU were critical in 1994. This can potentially be attributed to the Maastricht Treaty provisions. The French UMP, British Conservatives, Danish KF and the Spanish CIU were all hostile in 1999.

COMPARATIVE OBSERVATIONS

This thesis argued that Conservative parties would be positive towards the key economic aspects of European integration – liberalisation and harmonisation, as well as being positive towards legal integration at first (up to 1994), but would be negative towards supranational, social, cultural and foreign policy integration. The initial analyses suggest the depth of scepticism towards the later processes of integration – social, cultural and foreign policy was ill founded, and general scepticism in this area was mostly a British phenomenon. However, Conservative party responses were broadly

in line with expectations for economic liberalisation and harmonisation, as well as supranational integration.

In 1989 (see table 30) only one party demonstrated a reasonable level of fit with the hypotheses – the French RPR/UDF, though it had one no overall position towards social integration and one strongly positive position towards foreign policy integration. The three remaining parties – the British Conservatives, Spanish AP PP, and Spanish CIU met most of the hypotheses for the dimensions of harmonisation (except British Conservatives – no overall position), supranational integration (except Spanish AP PP – minor positive) and legal integration (except British Conservatives – no overall position). However, interestingly enough instead of the parties indicating negative support for the remaining dimensions of social, cultural and foreign policy integration all three parties indicated minor to strong positive positions.

In the 1994 European elections (see table 30) there was only one party that demonstrated a reasonable level of fit with the hypotheses – the Irish Fianna Fáil (confirmed all hypotheses except for legal integration – no overall position and social integration – minor positive). With the remaining parties it was possible to see a very similar pattern to the one in 1989. With the exception of the following observations, the parties all met the predictions for liberalisation, harmonisation, and supranational integration (legal integration had six out of nine parties adopting no overall position): French RPR UDF – liberalisation (minor negative); British Conservatives – harmonisation (minor negative); Danish KF – harmonisation (no overall position) and supranational integration (minor positive); and finally Spanish AP PP – harmonisation (no overall position). Six out of the nine parties used minor positive discourse towards social integration (the three remaining – no overall position). A similar pattern was observable with cultural integration – five parties used positive discourses, one party minor negative discourses and the remaining had no overall position. Finally

with foreign policy integration, only the Irish Fianna Fáil used negative discourse with the remaining demonstrated minor to extreme levels of positive support.

Table 30 – Conservative Party Positions and Confirmation/Rejection of Hypotheses 1989-1994:

Year	Party	Forms of Integration						
		Economic Liberalisation	Economic Harmonisation	Supranational Integration	Legal Integration	Social Integration	Cultural Integration	Foreign Policy Integration
1989	French RPR/UDF	Strong Positive Yes	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Negative Yes	Strong Positive Yes	No Overall No	Minor Negative Yes	Strong Positive No
	British Conservatives	Extreme Positive Yes	No Overall No	Minor Negative Yes	No Overall No	Minor Positive No	Minor Positive No	Minor Positive No
	Spanish AP,PP	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive No	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive No	Minor Positive No	Strong Positive No
	Spanish CIU	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Strong Negative Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Strong Positive No	Minor Positive No	Minor Positive No
1994	French RPR/UDF	Minor Negative No	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Negative Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive No	No Overall No	Extreme Positive No
	Italian FI	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Extreme Negative Yes	No Overall No	Strong Positive No	Strong Positive No	Extreme Positive No
	British Conservatives	Extreme Positive Yes	Minor Negative No	Strong Negative Yes	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	Minor Positive No	Minor Positive No
	Danish KF	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	Minor Positive No	No Overall No	No Overall No	No Overall No	Minor Positive No
	Irish Fianna Fail	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Negative Yes	No Overall No	Minor Positive No	Minor Negative Yes	Minor Negative Yes
	Spanish AP,PP	Strong Positive Yes	No Overall No	Minor Negative Yes	No Overall No	Strong Positive No	Minor Positive No	Strong Positive No
	Spanish CIU	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Strong Negative Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Strong Positive No	Minor Positive No	Strong Positive No
	(1995) Swedish MSP	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Negative Yes	No Overall No	No Overall No	No Overall No	Strong Positive No
(1996) Finnish KK	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Negative Yes	No Overall No	Minor Positive No	Minor Positive No	Minor Positive No	

Source: Euromanifestos Dataset 1979-2004

The pattern established in the 1989 and 1994 European elections continued with Conservative parties in the 1999 elections (see table 31). Firstly there were no parties that accurately fitted all of the hypothesised positions. However, there were only a few parties which did not fit the hypotheses for the first three dimensions – liberalisation, harmonisation and supranational integration – the French RPR/UDF (liberalisation – minor negative); French UMP (liberalisation); Italian FI (harmonisation – no overall position); British Conservatives (harmonisation – minor negative); Danish KF (harmonisation – no overall position); and finally the Irish Fianna Fail, Spanish AP PP, and Finnish KK (supranational integration – no overall position). Also important to note was that there was no perceivable shift from support for legal integration to negative support. Indeed only one party used minor negative discourse, with seven parties using minor positive discourse and two having no overall position. With the remaining dimensions, for social and foreign policy integration the majority of parties used minor to extreme positive discourse – social integration saw seven out of ten parties showing positive support. Foreign policy integration was not criticised at all. Lastly, cultural integration showed mixed results – four parties supported the process, three parties used minor criticism and three had no overall position.

By the 2004 European elections (see table 31) the pattern had not altered much. The British Conservatives were the only party that offered a reasonable fit to the hypotheses (with the exception of harmonisation – minor negative and social integration – no overall position). Overall the behaviour remained constant with liberalisation – there was one exception of no overall position out of ten parties (French UMP). There were more exceptions for harmonisation, but over half the parties did still conform to the predicted positions. For supranational integration there were only four parties that behaved in a manner that did not conform to the hypothesis (French RPR/UDF, Italian FI, Danish KF, Irish Fianna Fail). The results remained similar for the final three dimensions

of legal, social and cultural integration. The majority of parties were supportive of the processes, indicating that a revision of the understanding of how Conservative parties behave towards Europe is most definitely needed.

Table 31 – Conservative Party Positions and Confirmation/Rejection of Hypotheses 1999-2004:

Year	Party	Forms of Integration						
		Economic Liberalisation	Economic Harmonisation	Supranational Integration	Legal Integration	Social Integration	Cultural Integration	Foreign Policy Integration
1999	French RPR/UDF	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Strong Positive
		No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
	French UMP	No Overall	Minor Positive	Strong Negative	Minor Positive	Extreme Positive	Extreme Positive	Strong Positive
		No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
	Italian FI	Strong Positive	No Overall	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Strong Positive	Strong Positive	Extreme Positive
		Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
	British Conservative	Extreme Positive	Minor Negative	Extreme Negative	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Minor Negative	Minor Positive
		Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
	Danish KF	Extreme Positive	No Overall	Strong Negative	No Overall	No Overall	No Overall	Extreme Positive
		Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
	Irish Fianna Fail	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	No Overall	No Overall	No Overall	Minor Negative	Minor Positive
		Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
	Spanish AP,PP	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	No Overall	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Negative	Strong Positive
		Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No
	Spanish CIU	Strong Positive	Minor Positive	Strong Negative	Minor Positive	Strong Positive	Minor Positive	Strong Positive
		Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
	Swedish MSP	Strong Positive	Strong Positive	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	No Overall	No Overall	Strong Positive
		Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Finnish KK	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	No Overall	Minor Positive	Strong Positive	No Overall	Strong Positive	
	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	
2004	French RPR/UDF	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Strong Positive	-
		Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	-
	French UMP	No Overall	Minor Positive	Minor Negative	Extreme Positive	Strong Positive	No Overall	-
		No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	-
	Italian FI	Strong Positive	No Overall	Strong Positive	Minor Positive	No Overall	Minor Positive	-
		Yes	No	No	No	No	No	-
	British Conservatives	Strong Positive	Minor Negative	Extreme Negative	Strong Negative	No Overall	Minor Negative	-
		Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	-
	Danish KF	Strong Positive	Minor Positive	No Overall	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	No Overall	-
		Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	-
	Irish Fianna Fail	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Strong Positive	Minor Positive	-
		Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	-
	Spanish AP,PP	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	-
		Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	-
	Spanish CIU	Strong Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Strong Positive	No Overall	-
		Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	-
	Swedish M	Extreme Positive	No Overall	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	No Overall	Minor Negative	-
		Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	-
Finnish KOK	Minor Positive	No Overall	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Strong Positive	No Overall	-	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	-	

Source: Euromanifestos Dataset 1979-2004

CONSERVATIVE PARTIES BEHAVIOURAL PATTERNS IN THE ACCESSION GROUPS

Within the 'original six' member states there were only a few cases across the time period. In the 1989 election, only the manifesto of the French RPR/UDF was available. The key patterns identifiable were the support for economic, legal and foreign policy integration and the criticisms directed at supranational and cultural integration. Examining the responses from the 1973 accession group, the parties in the 1989 election adopted a generally positive set of positions, with the exception of supranational integration. The 1981-1986 accession group was similar in the positions it adopted. The Spanish AP PP and Spanish CIU positioned themselves positively on all dimensions, with the exception of supranational integration where the Spanish CIU used strong negative discourse.

In the 1994 election, the two parties from the 'original six' did stay reasonably consistent with the previous behaviour. While the parties were positive towards harmonisation, foreign policy integration, and negative towards supranational integration, they were split on the issue of liberalisation. In addition, a new trend of positive support for social integration emerged. The 1973 accession group did not display much consistency in their behaviour. All parties supported liberalisation; two of the parties (British Conservatives and Irish Fianna Fail) were negative towards supranational integration, and two parties (British Conservatives and Danish KF) supported foreign policy integration. With the remainder of the dimensions the party positions towards the dimensions were split. The 1981-1986 accession group by contrast remained consistent in its behaviour. It was supportive of liberalisation, social integration, cultural and foreign policy integration. It was also critical towards supranational integration. With the remainder, only the Spanish CIU positioned itself (minor positive). In the 1995 accession group, the two parties were consistent in their behaviour towards liberalisation, harmonisation and foreign policy integration, which they supported, and

supranational integration that they both criticised. With the remaining dimensions, one or both had no overall position.

In the 1999 election, the three Conservative parties of the 'original six' still remained split over liberalisation, and the two parties (French RPR/UDF and UMP) were positive towards harmonisation, and the Italian FI had no overall position. With supranational integration all were negative. Finally, the three parties positioned themselves positively towards the remainder of the dimensions. In the 1973 accession group, during the 1999 election the parties lacked consistency in their group behaviour. While all were positive towards liberalisation and foreign policy integration, one or more parties either had no overall position or adopted the opposite view. Supranational and cultural integration still had the majority of parties adopting critical discourses. The 1981-1986 accession group was by contrast much more consistent. Both parties supported liberalisation, harmonisation, legal integration, social integration and foreign policy integration. Towards supranational integration only the Spanish CIU took a position (a strong negative one). Cultural integration saw a split. With the 1995 accession group, both parties used similar positions towards liberalisation, harmonisation, legal integration, cultural integration (no overall position) and foreign policy integration. With the remainder one party took a position towards supranational integration (Swedish MSP – negative) and one took a position towards social integration (Finnish KK – positive). The other party of the pair with both dimensions had no overall position.

Finally with the 2004 elections, the three Conservative parties of the 'original six' remained supportive towards legal integration. With the dimensions of liberalisation, economic harmonisation, social and cultural integration, two of the three parties were supportive of the process with one party adopting no overall position. Supranational integration saw the French UMP's criticism split the positive support from the French RPR/UDF and Italian FI. The 1973 accession group still remained

a fairly unpredictable group of parties, with the only consistent behaviour being towards liberalisation. Both the Danish KF and Irish Fianna Fail supported both harmonisation and social integration, whilst both the British Conservatives and Danish KF criticised legal integration, the remainder of parties were split. The 1981-1986 group was a complete contrast again, with both parties being supportive of liberalisation, harmonisation, legal integration, and social integration. They were both critical of supranational integration. The only exception was cultural integration where the CIU did not have a position. The 1995 accession group was very similar with consistent behaviour towards liberalisation (positive), harmonisation (no overall position), supranational integration (negative), and legal integration (positive). The remainder saw one party position itself (Finnish KK – positive towards supranational integration and Swedish MSP – negative towards cultural integration). The other party of the pair had no overall position with both dimensions.

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

The Eurosceptic Conservative parties focused their attention and hostility towards supranational integration. For all other dimensions, any criticism levelled was less than 5% of the manifesto. Theoretically this is extremely significant as it suggests that the party family's biggest fear is further loss of national sovereignty. European integration on the other dimensions identified is strongly supported by almost all Conservative parties. The British Conservative party appears to be the outlying case, and perhaps can best be described as the 'British exception'.

The most surprising results were the positive utilisation of discourse towards legal, social, cultural and foreign policy integration. Conservative parties have always been nationally orientated and Girvin's (1988:9-10) three type Conservative typology identified that the first and third remained nationally orientated. With the exception of the British Conservative party meeting the general criteria for the modern liberal Conservative form, there appears to have been a convergence of the

remaining parties towards the behaviour, at least in regards to the issue of European integration, expected of Christian Democratic parties. This is evidenced by the observation that Conservative parties have generally shown a strong level of support towards liberalisation of the market – economic liberalisation, harmonisation and legal integration (to tie partner states to the agreements). However, the convergence is most obvious when considering the level of support for a social policy at the supranational level. Theoretically this is extremely significant as one can posit the argument that the British Conservative party is the exception rather than the rule, and in line with previous findings in the comparative literature (see for example, Taggart, 1998; Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2002) that Euroscepticism is still very much a peripheral phenomenon, and is not to be found in the centre-right, despite the visually dominating case of the British Conservative party.

EUROSCEPTIC SOCIALIST AND SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTIES:

The analysis of the results was able to identify that the following parties could be classified as Eurosceptic:

- Luxembourg POSL LSAP – towards supranational integration and cultural integration in 1989; towards cultural integration in 1994; and towards supranational integration in 1999;
- French PS – towards liberalisation in 1994;
- Belgian PS – towards liberalisation and social integration in 1999;
- Portuguese PSP – towards cultural integration in 1994; and towards supranational integration and legal integration in 2004;
- Greek PASOK – towards foreign policy integration in 1994;
- Finnish SSDP – towards liberalisation in 1999;

Socialist and Social Democratic parties have become one of the most pro-European party families, and the use of Eurosceptic discourse by Socialist and Social Democratic parties was sporadic, with only six parties using it at different points in the period of study. It was identifiable in most of the accession group parties, with the exception of the 1973 accession member states. Some of the parties did share similar criticisms of the integration processes. The Luxembourg POSL LSAP and Portuguese PSP shared criticisms towards supranational integration, though in different elections. The Luxembourg POSL LSAP shared Eurosceptic behaviour towards cultural integration with the Portuguese PSP in the same election year. Finally, the Belgian PS and Finnish SSDP were both critical of liberalisation during the same election. There is some evidence of shared Eurosceptic

behaviour between parties at the same election suggesting that they were reacting to the same political stimuli, but there were a significant number of instances where this was not the case.

COMPARATIVE OBSERVATIONS

This thesis hypothesised that Socialist and Social Democratic parties would be positive towards liberalisation, harmonisation, legal, social, cultural and foreign policy integration. With supranational integration, party behaviour was expected to demonstrate negative discourses in the 1989 and 1994 elections. From the 1999 election onwards it was expected that there would be a reorientation with Socialist and Social Democratic parties being positive in the 1999 and 2004 European elections. A general observation to note for all four elections is the level of conformity amongst the parties. Across the majority of parties there is a high level of conformity and a number of cases with complete conformity. The expected shift towards support and engagement with the supranational level took place before the 1989 elections with the majority of Socialist and Social Democratic parties

In the 1989 elections (see table 32), the German SPD and Irish LP conformed to all the hypotheses without exception. A large number of the other cases had positions which mostly conformed to previously predicted positions: the French PS (except supranational integration; Luxembourg POSL LSAP (except cultural integration and two no overall positions); Dutch PvdA (except supranational integration); Dutch D66 (except supranational integration and one no overall position); Belgian SP (except supranational integration and one no overall position); Northern Irish SDLP (except supranational integration and one no overall position); Spanish PSOE (except supranational integration and one no overall position); and finally the Portuguese PSD (except supranational integration). As one can see a large number of the parties were supportive of the process of supranational integration, suggesting that if they had been previously suspicious of a supranational authority, they had certainly shifted their position towards minor positive support.

The British Labour party, Danish SD and Portuguese PSP were the three cases that did not fit the hypotheses. They share a minor suspicious attitude towards supranational integration, as well as poorly developed positions to a number of dimensions in the case of the Danish SD and PSP, but have little else in common. The British Labour party were the most critical with minor negative positions towards the three key processes of liberalisation, harmonisation and supranational integration.

In the 1994 elections (see table 32) it was possible to observe that once again the German SPD conformed to all of the hypotheses. Significantly, a similar pattern to the one analysed above appeared. Twelve parties showed strong conformity to the hypotheses, but supported the process of supranational integration: Luxembourg POSL LSAP (though with one strong negative – cultural integration and one no overall position) Dutch PvdA, Dutch D66, Belgian SP, British Labour (though with one no overall position), Northern Irish SDLP (very positive apart from three no overall positions), Danish SD (though with one no overall position), Irish LP (though with one minor negative – cultural integration), Greek PASOK (though with one minor negative – liberalisation), Portuguese PSD (though with two no overall positions), the Finnish SDP (with one minor negative – liberalisation and two no overall positions), and finally the Austrian SPÖ (with one minor negative – liberalisation). Clearly the majority of cases within the 1989 and 1994 election periods support supranational integration indicating as stated earlier that a revision of the theoretical background informing the hypotheses needs some qualification.

There were five cases that did not fit the predictions as accurately. Firstly the French PS had seen quite a change from its 1989 manifesto. It had become strongly negative towards liberalisation, and demonstrated minor criticisms towards supranational integration, cultural integration and foreign policy integration. The Danish CD had not developed their manifesto to address the issues

surrounding the seven forms of integration – they had three no overall positions and one minor negative position towards cultural integration. The Spanish PSOE like the French PS had become more negative towards liberalisation and supranational integration, but remained positive towards four of the remaining dimensions. The Portuguese PSP demonstrated minor negative criticisms towards liberalisation and was extremely negative towards cultural integration, but also did not address three of the dimensions at all in their manifesto – harmonisation, supranational and legal integration. Finally, the Swedish S demonstrated minor criticisms of harmonisation, supranational and cultural integration, as well as two no overall positions towards liberalisation and legal integration. As one can note from the observations above, with the exception of the French PS and Spanish PSOE it is again difficult to establish any overlap in the behaviour of these five cases, which separate the parties from the party family norm.

Table 32 – Social Democratic Party Positions and Confirmation/Rejection of Hypotheses 1989-1994:

Year	Party	Forms of Integration							
		Economic Liberalisation	Economic Harmonisation	Supranational Integration	Legal Integration	Social Integration	Cultural Integration	Foreign Policy Integration	
1989	French PS	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Strong Positive	Minor Positive	Extreme Positive	
		Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
	German SPD	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Strong Positive
		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Luxembourg POSL LSAP	Strong Positive	No Overall	Extreme Negative	No Overall	No Overall	No Overall	Extreme Negative	Extreme Positive
		Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes
	Dutch PvdA	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Strong Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive
		Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Dutch D66	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	No Overall	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Extreme Positive
		Yes	yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Belgian SP	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	No Overall	Strong Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Strong Positive
		Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	British Labour	Minor Negative	Minor Negative	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Strong Positive	No Overall	Extreme Positive	
		No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	
	Northern Irish SDLP	Strong Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	No Overall	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive
		Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Danish SD	No Overall	Minor Positive	Minor Negative	No Overall	No Overall	No Overall	No Overall	Minor Negative
		No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
	Danish CD	No Overall	No Overall	Extreme Positive	No Overall	No Overall	No Overall	No Overall	No Overall
		No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Irish LP	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Strong Positive	
	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Spanish PSOE	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	No Overall	Strong Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	
	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Portuguese PSP	No Overall	No Overall	Minor Negative	No Overall	Minor Positive	No Overall	No Overall	No Overall	
	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	
Portuguese PSD	Extreme Positive	Minor Positive	Strong Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	
	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
1994	French PS	Strong Negative	Minor Positive	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Strong Positive	Minor Negative	Minor Negative	
		No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	
	German SPD	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Strong Positive
		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Luxembourg POSL LSAP	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	No Overall	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Strong Negative	Minor Positive	
		Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	
	Dutch PvdA	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Strong Positive
		Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Dutch D66	Strong Positive	Minor Positive	Strong Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Extreme Positive
		Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Belgian SP	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Strong Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Strong Positive
		Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	British Labour	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Strong Positive	No Overall	Strong Positive	
		Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	
	Northern Irish SDLP	Minor Positive	No Overall	Minor Positive	No Overall	Minor Positive	No Overall	Strong Positive	
		Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	
	Danish SD	Minor Positive	No Overall	Strong Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive

		Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Danish CD	No Overall	No Overall	Extreme Positive	No Overall	Minor Positive	Minor Negative	Extreme Positive
		No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
	Irish LP	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Strong Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Negative	Minor Positive
		Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
	Greek PASOK	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Strong Positive
		No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Spanish PSOE	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Minor Negative	No Overall	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Extreme Positive
		No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Portuguese PSP	Minor Negative	No Overall	No Overall	No Overall	Minor Positive	Extreme Negative	Minor Positive
		No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
	Portuguese PSD	No Overall	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	No Overall	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive
		No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
(1995)	Swedish S	No Overall	Minor Negative	Minor Negative	No Overall	Strong Positive	Minor Negative	Strong Positive
		No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
(1996)	Finnish SSDP	Minor Negative	Strong Positive	Strong Positive	No Overall	Extreme Positive	No Overall	Strong Positive
		No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
(1996)	Austrian SPÖ	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Strong Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive
		No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Source: Euromanifestos Dataset: 1979-2004

In the 1999 European election (see table 33) the Belgian SP conformed to the hypothesised positions accurately. Eight parties met the majority of the hypotheses: the French PS (except for liberalisation – no overall position and harmonisation – minor negative); the German SPD (except for liberalisation – no overall position and supranational integration – minor negative); Dutch PvdA (except for liberalisation – minor negative and legal integration – no overall position); Dutch D66 (except for cultural integration – no overall position); British Labour (except for liberalisation – no overall position and supranational integration – minor negative); Danish CD – (except for cultural integration – no overall position); Spanish PSOE (except for supranational integration – minor negative and legal integration – no overall position); and finally the Finnish SSDP (except for liberalisation – strong negative and legal integration – no overall position). Furthermore, both the Portuguese cases (PSP and PSD) were positive towards the aspects of European integration, however their manifestos were not so developed towards some of the dimensions – with three no overall positions each.

Focusing on the non-conforming cases, amongst the eight cases, five of the parties demonstrated minor-strong levels of negative discourse towards liberalisation (Luxembourg POSL LSAP, Belgian PS, Northern Irish SDLP, Danish SD, and Austrian SPÖ). Six cases demonstrated minor-strong levels of negative discourse towards supranational integration (Luxembourg POSL LSAP, Northern Irish SDLP, Danish SD, Irish LP, Swedish S and Austrian SPÖ). With the remaining instances of negative discourses among the non-conforming cases no obvious pattern emerges – one party showed minor negative discourse towards harmonisation (Danish SD), one party showed strong negative discourse towards social integration (Belgian PS), two parties showed minor negative discourse towards cultural integration (Luxembourg POSL LSAP and Irish LP), and two parties

showed minor-extreme positive levels of discourse towards foreign policy integration (Northern Irish SDLP and Greek PASOK).

In addition a large number of the cases had become critical of liberalisation – Luxembourg POSL LSAP, Dutch PvdA, Belgian PS, Northern Irish SDLP, Danish SD, Finnish SDP, and Austrian SPÖ. Furthermore, seven parties used minor negative discourse towards supranational integration – German SPD, Luxembourg POSL LSAP, British Labour, Northern Irish SDLP, Danish SD, Irish LP, Spanish PSOE, Swedish S, and Austrian SPÖ. There was wide acceptance of social and foreign policy integration (with one case of strong negative discourse towards social integration – Belgian PS; and two cases – one minor negative by Northern Irish SDLP and one extreme negative by the Greek PASOK).

Finally, the 2004 European elections (see table 33) saw the Greek PASOK conform to the predicted electoral behaviour, supporting all dimensions with minor positive levels of discourse. Across all political parties one can note that harmonisation had little impact on Socialist and Social Democratic parties in 2004 and positioning towards cultural integration was also limited. The following parties fulfilled most predicted party positions: French PS (except liberalisation – minor negative and harmonisation – no overall position); Luxembourg POSL LSAP (except three no overall positions – harmonisation, social and cultural integration); Dutch PvdA (except harmonisation – no overall position); Dutch D66 (except harmonisation – no overall position); Belgian SP (except harmonisation – no overall position); British Labour (except supranational integration – minor negative and social integration – no overall position); Northern Irish SDLP (except supranational integration – minor negative); Irish LP (except liberalisation – minor negative and harmonisation – no overall position); and Finnish SSDP (except harmonisation – no overall position).

With this election there were eleven cases where the predictions proved fairly inaccurate. Two key observations to note here were that eight of the eleven cases demonstrated minor negative discourse towards economic liberalisation (French PS, Belgian PS, Danish SD, Irish LP, Spanish PSOE, Portuguese PSP, and Austrian SPÖ). For supranational integration four of the cases demonstrated minor to strong levels of negative discourse (British Labour, Northern Irish SDLP, and Portuguese PSP). With the remaining dimensions there were no discernible patterns with only one extremely negative case (Portuguese PSP) towards legal integration.

Table 33 - Social Democratic Party Positions and Confirmation/Rejection of Hypotheses 1999-2004:

Year	Party	Forms of Integration							
		Economic Liberalisation	Economic Harmonisation	Supranational Integration	Legal Integration	Social Integration	Cultural Integration	Foreign Policy Integration	
1999	French PS	No Overall Position	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Strong Positive
		No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	German SPD	No Overall	Minor Positive	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Strong Positive
		No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Luxembourg POSL LSAP	Minor Negative	Strong Positive	Strong Negative	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Negative	Strong Positive
		No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
	Dutch PvdA	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Strong Positive	No Overall	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive
		No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Dutch D66	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Strong Positive	Minor Positive	Strong Positive	Strong Positive	No Overall	Strong Positive
		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
	Belgian SP	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Strong Positive	Minor Positive	Strong Positive	Strong Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive
		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Belgian PS	Strong Negative	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Strong Positive	Strong Positive	Strong Negative	No Overall	Strong Positive
		No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
	British Labour	No Overall	Minor Positive	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Strong Positive
		No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Northern Irish SDLP	Minor Negative	Strong Positive	Minor Negative	No Overall	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Negative
		No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
	Danish SD	Minor Negative	Minor Negative	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	No Overall	Strong Positive
		No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
	Danish CD	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Strong Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	No Overall	Minor Positive
		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
	Irish LP	No Overall	Minor Positive	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Negative	Strong Positive
		No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
	Greek PASOK	Extreme Positive	No Overall	No Overall	No Overall	No Overall	Minor Positive	No Overall	Extreme Negative
		Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
	Spanish PSOE	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Negative	No Overall	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Extreme Positive
		Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Portuguese PSP	Minor Positive	No Overall	Minor Positive	No Overall	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	No Overall	Minor Positive
		Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
	Portuguese PSD	No Overall	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	No Overall	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	No Overall	Extreme Positive
		No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Swedish S	Minor Positive	No Overall	Minor Negative	No Overall	Strong Positive	No Overall	Extreme Positive		
	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes		
Finnish SSDP	Strong Negative	Strong Positive	Minor Positive	No Overall	Strong Positive	Minor Positive	Strong Positive		
	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Austrian SPÖ	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Strong Positive	Minor Positive	Strong Positive		
	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
2004	French PS	Minor Negative	No Overall Position	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	-	
		No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-	
	German SPD	No Overall	No Overall	No Overall	Minor Positive	No Overall	Strong Positive	-	
		No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	-	
	Luxembourg POSL LSAP	Minor Positive	No Overall	Minor Positive	Strong Positive	No Overall	No Overall	-	
		Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	-	
	Dutch PvdA	Minor Positive	No Overall	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	-	

	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Dutch D66	Minor Positive	No Overall	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	-
	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Belgian SP	Minor Positive	No Overall	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Strong Positive	Minor Positive	-
	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Belgian PS	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Strong Positive	No Overall	-
	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	-
British Labour	Strong Positive	Strong Positive	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	No Overall	Minor Positive	-
	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	-
Northern Irish SDLP	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	-
	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Danish SD	Minor Negative	No Overall	Strong Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	No Overall	-
	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	-
Irish LP	Minor Negative	No Overall	Minor Positive	Strong Positive	Strong Positive	Minor Positive	-
	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Greek PASOK	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	-
	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Spanish PSOE	Minor Negative	No Overall	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Strong Positive	No Overall	-
	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	-
Portuguese PSP	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Strong Negative	Extreme Negative	Minor Positive	No Overall	-
	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	-
Swedish S	Minor Positive	No Overall	No Overall	No Overall	Strong Positive	No Overall	-
	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	-
Finnish SSDP	Minor Positive	No Overall	Minor Positive	Strong Positive	Strong Positive	Minor Positive	-
	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Austrian SPÖ	Minor Negative	No Overall	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Extreme Positive	No Overall	-
	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	-

Source: Euromanifestos Dataset 1979-2004

SOCIALIST AND SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY BEHAVIOURAL PATTERNS IN THE ACCESSION GROUPS

Amongst the Socialist and Social Democratic Parties of the 'original six' member states during the 1989 elections, there was a very high degree of conformity in the behaviour of the parties towards almost all of the dimensions. All parties were supportive of liberalisation and foreign policy integration. All but one party (Luxembourg POSL LSAP – no overall position) were supportive towards harmonisation and social integration. The pattern was similar with cultural integration, but the Luxembourg POSL LSAP was extremely negative while the remainder supported the process. With the process of supranational integration two parties were negative (German SPD and Luxembourg POSL LSAP), while the remainder were supportive. This suggests that the Luxembourg party has remained orientated towards a national solution to its socialist aims. Legal integration saw three positive parties – the French PS, German SPD and Dutch PvdA, while the rest had no overall position. The 1973 accession group behaved in a much less predictable manner than the original six Socialist and Social Democratic parties. The results were very mixed towards liberalisation, harmonisation, supranational integration and foreign policy integration. The responses were mostly positive towards legal, social and cultural integration, but there were many of the parties had no overall position to one or more of those dimensions. The 1981 to 1986 accession group demonstrated strong similarity in the behaviour of the Spanish PSOE and Portuguese PSD, but the exception to the group was the Portuguese PSP who did not develop positions towards the dimensions, but positioned themselves negatively towards supranational integration and positively towards social integration.

In the 1994 elections, the behavioural pattern of the original six continued with a large degree of conformity amongst the parties across the dimensions. Harmonisation, legal integration and social integration all saw the parties in complete support. Liberalisation and foreign policy integration saw

all but the French PS in support. Cultural integration had two parties position negatively towards it (the French PS and Luxembourg POSL LSAP), while the remainder were supportive. Finally supranational integration saw a split in support with two parties being critical (French PS and German SPD), one with no overall position (Luxembourg POSL LSAP) and the remainder were supportive.

By 1994, the 1973 accession group did demonstrate some conformity in their positions. Four out of the five parties (the exception was the Danish CD – no overall position) were positive towards liberalisation, all were positive towards supranational integration and social integration and foreign policy integration. With the remaining dimensions some of the parties did not position themselves. With harmonisation only the British Labour Party and Irish LP positioned themselves (both using minor positive discourse) with the remainder having no overall position. With legal integration three of the parties used minor positive discourse (British Labour, Danish SD and Irish LP) with the remaining two having no overall position. Lastly the positions towards cultural integration were mixed with the Danish CD and Irish LP being critical, the Danish SD using minor positive discourse, and the remaining two parties having no overall position.

The 1981 to 1986 accession group by 1994 demonstrated some consistency in their positions. The majority were now critical of liberalisation, as well as positive towards harmonisation and cultural integration, and all were positive towards social and foreign policy integration. For the remaining dimensions of supranational integration and legal integration, the former saw a mix of two positive positions (Greek PASOK and Portuguese PSD), one negative position (Spanish PSOE) and one no overall position. For the latter, only the Greek PASOK positioned itself on this dimension (minor positive). The 1995 accession group saw some similarities in the behaviour of the parties, especially between Finnish SSDP and Austrian SPÖ towards liberalisation, harmonisation and supranational

integration. All three parties (Swedish S is the additional member of the group) used similar discourses towards social integration and foreign policy integration.

By the 1999 elections the consensus, which had existed in the previous two elections amongst the Socialist and Social Democratic parties of the original six began to show some cracks. Liberalisation saw the French PS and German SPD take no overall position, saw the Luxembourg POSL LSAP and Belgian PS adopting critical positions with the remainder showing support. Harmonisation did remain supported by the majority, though the French PS began to use some critical discourses. Supranational integration saw mostly positive responses, though the German SPD and Luxembourg POSL LSAP were negative towards the process. Legal integration saw all but the Dutch PvdA (no overall position) using positive discourse. The Belgian PS also used negative discourse towards social integration, but the remainder of the group positioned themselves positively. Cultural integration saw a split in the behaviour of the parties, with one party being critical (Luxembourg POSL LSAP), two with no overall position (Dutch D66 and Belgian PS) and the remainder were positive. Finally all parties supported foreign policy integration.

The 1973 accession group showed reasonable consistency with their positions towards the dimensions, though there are two major exceptions – liberalisation and cultural integration. With liberalisation both the Northern Irish SDLP and Danish SD used minor negative discourse, the Danish CD used minor positive discourse, and British Labour and Irish LP had no overall position. With cultural integration, both the British Labour Party and Northern Irish SDLP used minor positive discourse, the Irish LP used minor negative discourse and the remaining two parties had no overall position. In addition, four of the five parties used minor negative discourse towards supranational integration (the Danish CD was the exception). Within the 1981 and 1986 accession group there were some similarities identifiable amongst the parties. The majority of parties supported

liberalisation (the exception was the Portuguese PSD – no overall position). The majority also supported foreign policy integration (the exception was the Greek PASOK – extreme negative discourse). Social integration saw all parties in support and legal integration saw all parties having no overall position. Cultural integration only saw one party position itself (Spanish PSOE- minor positive). The final two dimensions of harmonisation and supranational integration saw a mix of positions. For the former the Spanish PSOE and Portuguese PSD both positioned themselves positively, while the remaining two had no overall position. For the latter, the Portuguese parties used minor positive discourse, the Spanish PSOE used minor negative discourse and the Greek PASOK had no overall position. The 1995 accession group behaved in a similar way to the previous election with the Finnish SSDP and Austrian SPÖ adopting similar positions towards liberalisation, harmonisation, and cultural integration. All three parties adopted similar positions towards social integration and foreign policy integration. In addition both the Swedish S and Austrian SPÖ were negative towards supranational integration.

In the 2004 election, it was possible to observe a more consistent set of positions between the parties of the original six member states. All parties supported the process of legal integration. The majority supported supranational integration (the exception was the German SPD – no overall position), social integration (the exceptions were the German SPD and Luxembourg POSL LSAP – no overall position), and cultural integration (the exceptions were Luxembourg POSL LSAP and Belgian PS – no overall position). Finally, all but the Belgian PS (minor positive) had no overall position towards harmonisation. In the 1973 accession group there was a real observable split in the behaviour of the four parties. With liberalisation both the British Labour Party and Northern Irish SDLP supported the process, but the Danish SD and Irish LP positioned negatively towards it. With supranational integration the British Labour Party and Northern Irish SDLP were negative towards the process,

while the Danish SD and Irish LP were positive towards the process. With the remaining dimensions all parties were supportive towards legal integration, the majority of the parties were supportive towards social integration (the exception was British Labour – no overall position) and cultural integration (the exception was the Danish SD – no overall position). Lastly, with harmonisation only two parties positioned themselves towards it (British Labour and Northern Irish SDLP – strong-minor positive). The 1981 to 1986 accession group saw some similarities between the parties in terms of their positions, but this was not particularly strong. The Greek PASOK adopted similar positions to the Spanish PSOE towards supranational, legal and social integration. The Portuguese PSP was the most critical using negative discourse towards liberalisation, supranational and legal integration. Again the 1995 accession group showed reasonable similarities in the positions adopted by the parties. All three parties used positive discourse towards social integration and no overall position towards harmonisation. In addition, both the Swedish S and Finnish SDP adopted positive positions towards liberalisation (with the SPÖ against). Supranational and legal integration saw the both the Finnish SSDP and Austrian SPÖ adopting positive positions. Lastly, the 2004 accession group saw strong consistent behaviour towards liberalisation, legal integration, and social integration with almost all adopting positive positions (with the remainder having no overall position). Notable was the lack of positions towards harmonisation, supranational integration and cultural integration by some of the parties.

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

The examination of the positions taken by the identified Eurosceptic Socialist and Social Democratic parties reveal that there is a strong ideological influence in taking up those positions. Amongst two of the Socialist parties, as well as the Finnish Social Democratic party there is a clear discomfort with the liberalisation of the market. With the Luxembourg Workers party, as well as the Portuguese

Socialist party there is a clear discomfort with cultural integration, indicating that the preference for member state solution and a general orientation towards the national still remains very salient.

Beyond those Eurosceptic parties, the general trends from the entire party family showed that in most cases the hypotheses were clearly supported and that Socialist and Social Democratic parties are in general supportive of the individual processes of European integration. There was very little evidence of any sustained critical discourses used against any of the dimensions, indicating that the major shift in support identified by Featherstone (1988) had already made its mark. Other academics have picked up on this and posited explanations for this change. Bailey (2005: 14) for example, argued that:

From the 1980s onwards, the European Union has been presented as an institutional opportunity for the re-intervention in, and re-regulation of an increasingly integrated socio-economic space...support for the European Union has been used by social democratic parties to compensate for failure and retrenchment at the national level.

This explanation is borne out by the results, especially the evidently strong support for the process of social integration. If one returns to the discussion in the hypotheses section, and focuses on the four strands identified by Dunphy (2004: 4-6) - the EEC/EU as an agent of multinational capitalist exploitation and to be withdrawn from immediately; as before, but withdrawal as unrealistic; the EEC/EU as a potential agent for social and political change; and finally Europe as the primary project of the left. Clearly the evidence fits the third strand strongly. Socialist and Social Democratic parties in general, have adapted their ideology to overcome restrictions at the national level and the potential for major national reforms to be derailed by the exit and reduction in foreign direct investment, by seeking to introduce and expand on a social element at the supranational level. Socialist and Social Democratic parties have sought to underline their pro-European credentials in

the election and hence the party family is mostly supportive across accession groups and in central as well as peripheral member states.

EUROSCEPTIC CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTIES:

The analysis of the results was able to identify that the following parties could be classified as Eurosceptic:

- German CSU – towards cultural integration in 1989; towards supranational integration in 1994; towards supranational integration in 1999; and towards supranational integration in 2004;
- Dutch CU/SGP – towards supranational integration in 1989; towards supranational integration and cultural integration in 1994; and towards supranational integration in 1999;
- Luxembourg PCS CSV – towards supranational integration and cultural integration in 1994;
- Irish Fine Gael – towards foreign policy integration in 1999;
- Swedish KD – towards supranational integration in 1999;
- Finnish KD – towards supranational integration in 1999 and 2004;

Interestingly among the Eurosceptic Christian Democratic parties many shared a specific hostility towards supranational integration – the German CSU, Dutch CU/SGP, Luxembourg PCS CSV, Swedish KD and Finnish KD. In addition, the German CSU, Dutch CU/SGP and Luxembourg PCS CSV were all critical in the 1994 election. In the 1999 election, the German CSU, Dutch CU/SGP, Swedish KD and Finnish KD were all Eurosceptic towards supranational integration. The other dimensions, which received critical discourses from these Eurosceptic parties, were cultural integration (German CSU in 1989; Dutch CU/SGP and Luxembourg PCS CSV in 1994) and foreign policy integration (Irish Fine Gael in 1999). What this may suggest is that these parties, though Christian Democratic in terms of the party family they have been assigned to, these perhaps occupy

the more conservative end of the group, and share some ideological components with the broader Conservative party family tradition. Given their consistent criticism of supranational integration, there clearly is an identifiable ideological component to the use of this Eurosceptic discourse.

COMPARATIVE OBSERVATIONS

This thesis hypothesised that Christian Democratic parties, as one of the driving forces behind the whole process of European integration, would espouse positive discourses towards all processes of integration: liberalisation, harmonisation, supranational, legal, social, cultural and foreign policy integration. In addition this would stay consistent throughout the period of 1989 to 2004. The initial analyses confirmed the accuracy of the hypotheses for 1989 only. Support for the individual processes decreased over the time period – and hence the accuracy of the fit between the predictions and party positions. However, there is a danger of overplaying this. Yes, there was a decrease in the fit, but overall the party family was still very pro-European. The main issues of non-conformity surrounded the dimension of supranational and cultural integration.

In 1989 (see table 34) eight cases were Christian Democratic parties and out of those three parties matched the hypotheses exactly: Luxembourg PCS CSV, Belgian CD&V and finally the Spanish CDS. A further four parties behaved in a reasonably consistent manner vis-à-vis the hypotheses: German CDU (except two no overall positions: social and cultural integration); Italian DC (three no overall positions: legal, social and cultural integration); Belgian PSC (one minor negative – supranational integration and one no overall position – legal integration); and finally Irish Fine Gael (except for three no overall positions – legal, social and cultural integration). The German CSU was the only party to deviate from the norm – it used minor negative discourse towards supranational integration and strong negative discourse towards cultural integration. This can be explained by the unique situation the Bavarian CSU finds itself in given the particularly strong regional identity of the

Bavarian state. The party also had no overall position towards harmonisation, legal, and social integration.

By 1994 (see table 34) only one case out of ten fitted the hypotheses exactly- the German CDU. There were four other parties which fitted the majority of hypotheses: the Belgian PSC (except for supranational integration – minor negative); Belgian CD&V (except for cultural integration – no overall position; Irish Fine Gael (except for cultural integration – no overall position); and finally in 1996 the Austrian OVP (except for legal and cultural integration – no overall position).

There were five non-conforming parties – the German CSU, Luxembourg PCS CSV, Dutch CDA, Italian DC, and Swedish KD. Interestingly four out of five were negative towards supranational integration with the CSU and PCS CSV being strong and extremely negative respectively. Additionally the only two remaining instances (the rest were no overall positions) were a minor and a strong negative position towards cultural integration by the CSU and PCS CSV.

Table 34 – Christian Democratic Party Positions and Confirmation/Rejection of Hypotheses 1989 to 1994-1996:

Year	Party	Economic Liberalisation	Economic Harmonisation	Forms of Integration			Social Integration	Cultural Integration	Foreign Policy Integration
				Supranational Integration	Legal Integration				
1989	German CDU	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	No Overall No	Extreme Positive Yes	
	German CSU	Strong Positive Yes	No Overall No	Minor Negative No	No Overall No	No Overall No	Strong Negative No	Extreme Positive Yes	
	Luxembourg PCS CSV	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	
	Italian DC	Extreme Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	No overall No	No Overall No	Strong Positive Yes	
	Belgian PSC	Extreme Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Negative No	No Overall No	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	
	Belgian CD&V	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	
	Irish Fine Gael	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	Extreme Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	No Overall No	Minor Positive Yes	
	Spanish CDS	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Extreme Positive Yes	
	German CDU	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Extreme Positive Yes	
	German CSU	Minor Positive Yes	Strong Positive Yes	Strong Negative No	No Overall No	No Overall No	Minor Negative No	Extreme Positive Yes	
1994	Luxembourg PCS CSV	Extreme Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Extreme Negative No	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	Strong Negative No	Minor Positive Yes	
	Dutch CDA	No Overall No	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Negative No	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	Strong Positive Yes	Extreme Positive Yes	
	Italian DC	No Overall No	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	No Overall No	No Overall No	Minor Positive Yes	
	Belgian PSC	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Negative No	Minor Positive Yes	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Extreme Positive Yes	
	Belgian CD&V	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	Minor Positive Yes	
	Irish Fine Gael	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	Minor Positive Yes	
	(1995) Swedish KD	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	Minor Negative No	No Overall No	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Strong Positive Yes	
	(1996) Austrian OVP	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	Strong Positive Yes	

Source: Euromanifestos Dataset 1979-2004

In the 1999 elections, (see table 35) there were no parties that fitted the predictions exactly. However, six parties behaved in a consistent manner with the hypotheses, though with a couple of exceptions per case: the Dutch CDA (cultural integration – no overall position); Irish DC (liberalisation – no overall position); Belgian PSC (harmonisation – no overall position); Belgian CD&V (except social integration – no overall position); Irish Fine Gael (except cultural integration – no overall position and foreign policy integration – extreme negative); and finally the Austrian OVP (liberalisation – no overall position).

In this election, there were six non-conforming parties – German CDU, German CSU, Luxembourg PCS CSV, Greek ND, Swedish KD, and Finnish KD. The Greek ND is excluded from this element of the analysis, as it was included amongst the non-conforming parties due to having no overall position six times. One can again observe that the pattern of non-conformity is greatest surrounding the issue of supranational integration. All five remaining parties used minor to extreme levels of negative discourse. In addition, further negative discourse could be found with the CSU – minor negative discourse towards social and cultural integration – and the PCS CSV – minor negative discourse towards cultural integration.

Finally, with the 2004 elections (see table 35) one party conformed to the hypotheses exactly – the Greek ND. This time only three parties behaved in a manner consistent with the predictions, but with exceptions. These were the Belgian CD&V (harmonisation - no overall position); Irish Fine Gael (harmonisation – no overall position); and Greek ND.

Interestingly, amongst the seven non-conforming parties, the pattern that emerges is a consistent use of negative discourse towards supranational integration – with only two exceptions. In addition, a four parties engaged in minor criticisms towards cultural integration Furthermore, three parties used

minor negative discourse towards liberalisation for the first time – German CSU, Luxembourg PCS
CSV, and Austrian OVP.

Table 35 – Christian Democratic Party Positions and Confirmation/Rejection of Hypotheses 1999-2004:

Year	Party	Forms of Integration							
		Economic Liberalisation	Economic Harmonisation	Supranational Integration	Legal Integration	Social Integration	Cultural Integration	Foreign Policy Integration	
1999	German CDU	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Negative No	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	No Overall No	Strong Positive Yes	
	German CSU	Extreme Positive Yes	Strong Positive Yes	Strong Negative No	No Overall No	Minor Negative No	Minor Negative No	Strong Positive Yes	
	PCS CSV	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Negative No	No Overall No	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Negative No	Strong Positive Yes	
	Dutch CDA	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	Extreme Positive Yes	
	Italian DC	No Overall No	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Extreme Positive Yes	Strong Positive Yes	
	Belgian PSC	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Extreme Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Strong Positive Yes	
	Belgian CD&V	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Extreme Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	
	Irish Fine Gael	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	Extreme Negative No	
	Greek ND	No Overall No	No Overall No	No Overall No	No Overall No	No Overall No	Extreme Positive Yes	No Overall No	
	Swedish KD	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	Strong Negative No	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	Extreme Positive Yes	
	Austrian OVP	No Overall No	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Strong Positive Yes	
	Finnish KD	Strong Positive Yes	No Overall No	Extreme Negative No	No Overall No	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	Strong Positive Yes	
	2004	German CDU	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Negative No	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	Minor Negative No	- -
		German CSU	Minor Negative No	Minor Positive Yes	Extreme Negative No	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	Minor Negative No	- -
		Luxembourg PCS CSV	Minor Negative No	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Strong Positive Yes	No Overall No	Minor Negative No	- -
		Dutch CDA	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Negative No	No Overall No	Strong Positive Yes	No Overall No	- -
Belgian CD&V		Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	- -	
Irish Fine Gael		Strong Positive Yes	No Overall No	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	- -	
Greek ND		Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	- -	
Swedish KD		Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	Minor Negative No	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	- -	
Finnish KD		No Overall No	No Overall No	Extreme Negative No	Minor Positive Yes	Strong Positive Yes	No Overall No	- -	
Austrian OVP		Minor Negative No	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	Minor Negative No	- -	

Source: Euromanifestos Dataset 1979-2004

CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC BEHAVIOURAL PATTERNS IN THE ACCESSION GROUPS

In the 1989 elections, the Christian Democratic parties from the original six did adopt similar patterns of behaviour towards liberalisation, harmonisation and foreign policy integration. All parties were supportive towards liberalisation and foreign policy integration and the majority were supportive towards harmonisation. Supranational integration saw a divided set of positions, with little indication of a pattern of support amongst the six countries. Of those parties who positioned themselves towards legal integration and social integration all were supportive. Cultural integration saw a real mix of positions, with the German CSU and Dutch CU/SGP being critical, the Luxembourg PCS CSV, Belgian PSC and CD&V making positive statements and the remainder having no overall position. Within the 1973 accession states there was only one Christian Democratic Party – the Irish Fine Gael. This party was positive towards liberalisation, supranational integration, legal integration and foreign policy integration. It had no overall position towards the remaining dimensions. In this election it did not behave in a particularly different manner to those parties from the original six member states.

In the 1994 election, the parties from the original six were still consistent in their support for liberalisation, harmonisation and foreign policy integration. However, there was a majority of the parties who were critical of supranational integration – German CSU, Luxembourg PCS CSV, Dutch CU/SGP, Dutch CDA, and Belgian PSC. For legal and social integration, it was possible to see the same pattern as in 1989 – of those who took positions, all were positive. With cultural integration, there was a group of three parties – the German CSU, Luxembourg PCS CSV and Dutch CU/SGP who were negative, three parties who were positive – German CDU, Dutch CDA and Belgian PSC, and the remaining parties had no overall position. In the 1973 accession group, the Irish Fine Gael remained supportive with a consistent pattern of behaviour similar to the more supportive parties

from the original six. Amongst the 1995 accession group parties, both the Swedish KD and Austrian OVP were supportive towards liberalisation, and the Austrian OVP supportive towards harmonisation. Both were supportive social integration and foreign policy integration.

In the 1999 election, there was much greater uniformity amongst the Christian Democratic parties of the 'original six'. All, with the exception of the Italian DC (for liberalisation) and Belgian PSC (for harmonisation), supported both processes of economic integration. All parties also supported foreign policy integration. In addition, with legal integration there were only two parties that did not position themselves positively (the German CSU and Luxembourg PCS CSV – no overall position). Social integration saw most parties positioning themselves positively (the exceptions were the German CDU and Belgian CD&V – no overall position, and German CSU – minor negative). The two interesting dimensions were supranational and cultural integration. Here it was possible to see two groups of responses. With supranational integration, the German CDU and CSU, Luxembourg PCS CSV and Dutch CU/SGP all positioned themselves negatively towards the process. However, the Dutch CDA, Italian DC, Belgian PSC and Belgian CD&V all positioned themselves positively. The same pattern was repeated with cultural integration. Here the German CSU, Luxembourg PCS CSV and Dutch CU/SGP all used minor negative discourse. The Italian DC, Belgian PSC and Belgian CD&V used minor to extreme levels of positive discourse. In the 1973 accession group, the Irish Fine Gael only differed from the most positive examples of the previous accession group in that it was extremely negative towards foreign policy integration. In the 1981 and 1986 accession group, the results for the Greek ND provide little comparative material as it only had one position – being extremely positive towards cultural integration. In the 1995 accession group, there were only a couple of examples of uniformity in the behaviour of the parties. All were positive towards social and foreign policy integration. In addition, the Swedish KD and Finnish KD took similar positive

positions towards liberalisation and similar negative positions towards supranational integration. Finally, both the Swedish KD and Austrian OVP shared similar positions towards legal integration.

In the 2004 elections for the original six, there was a key trend of support for liberalisation, harmonisation, and legal integration. However, there were two exceptions with the dimension of liberalisation (German CSU and Luxembourg PCS – minor negative). There was also a key trend of criticism towards supranational integration (with the exception of the Luxembourg PCS CSV – minor positive and Belgian CD&V – strong positive). This was also the case with cultural integration where four of the parties using minor negative discourse (the two exceptions were Dutch CDA – no overall and Belgian CD&V – minor positive). Finally, social integration was only salient with the Dutch and Belgian parties (minor to strong positive).

In the 1973 and 1981-1986 accession groups, the behaviour was very positive towards the dimensions by the Irish Fine Gael and Greek ND and overall these parties were very similar to the behaviour exhibited by the Belgian CD&V. In the 1995 accession group, the patterns of behaviour were more difficult to decipher with liberalisation, harmonisation and cultural integration. Legal integration saw all three parties being supportive, and two of the three (the Austrian OVP being the exception – no overall position) were supportive of social integration. Finally, two of the parties were also critical towards supranational integration (again the Austrian OVP was the exception – minor positive).

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

The results from the Christian Democratic analyses have theoretical significance. Traditionally Christian Democratic Parties have been the driving force behind European integration, and it was specifically hypothesised that the party family would espouse positive discourses towards all dimensions throughout the time period. The pattern of behaviour, in fact, suggests that Christian

Democratic support for the processes of European integration has been on the decline from 1994 onwards and this may be explained by the developments instigated by Maastricht and beyond. However, it is important to underline that Christian Democratic parties remain supportive despite the identification of more critical discourses being used. Six parties were identifiable as Eurosceptic with all, but the Irish Fine Gale being critical of supranational integration – this was very surprising given the support for a federal Europe, though federal structures obviously do not necessarily mean greatly increasing the power of the supranational centre. Johansson (2002: 880) noted the preference for subsidiarity as well as a federal Europe. Half of the parties were critical of cultural integration, which may reflect the party family's general distaste for nationalist discourses and a general discomfort of European identity and culture being promoted in the same or a similar manner. Supranational and cultural integration were the two dimensions to see the increase in minor, as well as critical discourses. These results highlight the relevance of an observation made by Irving (1976: 405) in the context of the Italian DC. He noted that some Christian Democrats had doubts about the way in which European integration developed, though the DC was fundamentally united in a commitment to the developing a closely integrated Europe.

EUROSCEPTIC (POST)-COMMUNIST PARTIES:

The analysis of the results was able to identify a significant number of parties that could be classified as Eurosceptic:

- French PCF – towards liberalisation, harmonisation and foreign policy integration in 1989; towards liberalisation, harmonisation, supranational integration, and legal integration in 1994; and towards liberalisation in 2004.
- Dutch SP – towards liberalisation, harmonisation, and supranational integration in 1994; towards harmonisation and supranational integration in 1999; and liberalisation in 2004;
- Italian RC³⁶ – towards liberalisation, harmonisation, and supranational integration in 1994; towards liberalisation in 1999; and towards harmonisation in 2004;
- Danish SF – towards supranational integration in 1994;
- Irish WP – towards liberalisation in 1989; towards liberalisation in 1994; and towards liberalisation and harmonisation in 1999;
- Greek KKE – towards liberalisation in 1989 and 1994; towards liberalisation and legal integration in 1999; and towards liberalisation, supranational integration, and legal integration in 2004;
- Portuguese PCP – towards liberalisation in 1989; towards supranational integration in 1994; and towards harmonisation in 1999;

³⁶ The Italian RC's behaviour is roughly in line with Conti's (2003: 25) observations that they consider the EU as "an instrument for the globalisation of capitalism and market-economies against the interests of the masses".

- Swedish V – towards harmonisation in 1995; towards harmonisation, supranational integration, and foreign policy integration in 1999; and towards supranational and legal integration in 2004;
- Finnish VL Left Wing – towards harmonisation and supranational integration in 1996; towards supranational integration in 1999; and towards liberalisation in 2004;

As one can observe that there are Eurosceptic (post)-Communist parties spread across the accession groups and amongst both core and peripheral members. The majority appear to consist of the remaining unreformed Communist Party type. Consistently, the majority of the Eurosceptic parties rejected the processes of liberalisation, harmonisation and supranational integration. This clearly is influenced by the ideological predispositions of the parties. Interestingly, this scepticism rarely extended to the other dimensions. The French PCF and Swedish V were critical of legal integration and foreign policy integration, but no other parties joined them with this critique and furthermore, no parties exhibited critical discourses at the level to be considered Eurosceptic. Importantly, and unlike some of the Eurosceptic behaviour exhibited by the Green parties, a number of the dimensions showed Eurosceptic behaviour during the same election suggesting that in these cases it was a response to the same integration development stimuli.

COMPARATIVE OBSERVATIONS

This thesis had hypothesised that there would be divergence of behaviour amongst (post)-Communist parties. Those that were unreformed were likely to exhibit negative discourse towards all but social integration where the parties were likely to have no overall position. The reformed post-Communist parties were likely to be positive towards all dimensions with the exceptions of social integration (where the parties were likely to have no overall position) and foreign policy integration where the parties were likely to be negative. Overall, it was possible to observe examples of parties

across the elections conforming to the behaviour predicted by the hypotheses. However, much of the data points to a more complex picture. An observation of strong significance is the almost universal support for social integration, leading to the conclusion that (post)-Communist parties on the whole do not see the EU's expansion into social policy as a threat to the achievements of national welfare state policies. In addition, another important observation to note was the strong homogeneity of party responses towards foreign policy integration. The majority of the parties supported the process strongly. One can argue that this response was due to the traditional American bias in western security structures and that a EU foreign and defence policy would allow European independence.

During the 1989 elections (see table 36), four parties were critical of economic liberalisation – French PCF, Irish WP, Spanish IU and Portuguese PCP. The Irish WP was extremely negative towards liberalisation – suggesting a rejection of the common market and moves towards the single market - and demonstrated minor negative discourse towards foreign policy integration, but the remaining dimensions saw minor positive support – which would be the expected behaviour of a reformed Communist party. The Spanish IU demonstrated minor negative support for liberalisation, and no overall position towards harmonisation, legal and cultural integration, but the remaining dimensions saw minor to strong levels of positive discourse.

By the 1994 European elections (see table 36) it was possible to see many more parties conforming to the predictions on the majority of the integration dimensions. In terms of the behaviour of unreformed Communist parties, almost all rejected liberalisation, harmonisation and supranational integration (French PCF, Dutch SP, Danish SF, Spanish IU, Portuguese PCP, Finnish VL Left Wing and Italian RC). The Irish WP party also did not fit the predictions accurately. While it was extremely negative towards the liberalisation of the market in was positive towards harmonisation and

supranational integration. The final party, which did not completely fit the pattern, was the Swedish V party. It had no overall position towards liberalisation, was strongly negative towards harmonisation, but showed minor positive towards supranational integration.

The two remaining dimensions – legal and cultural integration saw some interesting results. Legal integration saw the majority of unreformed parties reject with minor negative discourse (the Spanish IU being an exception). However, with Cultural integration, the majority of parties show minor/strong positive positions (the exceptions being the Dutch SP and Portuguese PCP – no overall position, and Danish SF – Minor negative position).

Table 36 - Post-Communist Party Positions and Confirmation/Rejection of Hypotheses 1989-1994:

Year	Party	Economic Liberalisation	Economic Harmonisation	Forms of Integration			Social Integration	Cultural Integration	Foreign Policy Integration
				Supranational Integration	Legal Integration				
1989	French PCF	Extreme Negative	Strong Negative	Minor Negative	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Minor Negative	Strong Negative	
		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	
	Dutch SP	No Overall	No Overall	Minor Negative	No Overall	Minor Positive	No Overall	Minor Positive	
		No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	
	Danish SF	No Overall	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Minor Negative	No Overall	No Overall	Minor Positive	
		No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	
	Irish WP	Extreme Negative	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Negative	
		Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	
	Greek KKE	No Overall	No Overall	No Overall	No Overall	No Overall	No Overall	Extreme Positive	
		No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	
Spanish IU	Minor Negative	No Overall	Strong Positive	No Overall	Strong Positive	No Overall	Minor Positive		
	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No		
Portuguese PCP	Extreme Negative	Minor Negative	No Overall	No Overall	No Overall	Minor Negative	Extreme Positive		
	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No		
1994	French PCF	Extreme Negative	Strong Negative	Extreme Negative	Strong Negative	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Negative	
		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	
	German PDS	Minor Positive	Minor Negative	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	
		Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	
	Dutch SP	Strong Negative	Strong Negative	Extreme Negative	No Overall	Extreme Positive	No Overall	No Overall	
		Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	
	Italian PDS	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Strong Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Extreme Positive	
		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	
	Danish SF	Minor Negative	Minor Negative	Strong Negative	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	
		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	
	Irish WP	Extreme Negative	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	No Overall	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Strong Positive	
		Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	
	Greek KKE	Strong Negative	No Overall	Minor Negative	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Extreme Positive	
		Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	
	Spanish IU	Minor Negative	Minor Negative	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Strong Positive	Minor Positive	Extreme Positive	
		Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	
	Portuguese PCP	Minor Negative	Minor Negative	Extreme Negative	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	No Overall	Extreme Positive	
		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	
Italian RC	Extreme Negative	Strong Negative	Extreme Negative	No Overall	Extreme Positive	Strong Positive	Minor Negative		
	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes		
(1995)	Swedish V	No Overall	Strong Negative	Minor Positive	No Overall	Minor Positive	Minor Negative	Minor Negative	
		No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	
(1996)	Finnish VL Left Wing	No Overall	Strong Negative	Strong Negative	Minor Positive	Strong Positive	Minor Positive	Strong Positive	
		No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	

Source: Euromanifestos Dataset 1979-2004

In the 1999 European election (see table 37), the majority of the parties conformed to the predictions with reasonable accuracy. If the results from social and foreign policy integration are ignored – which have already been addressed, we find the following. The French PCF, Dutch SP, Danish SF, Greek KKE, Swedish V and Italian RC all conformed to the predictions. With the Irish WP, Portuguese PCP and Finnish VL left Wing, all demonstrated strong conformity with the exceptions of minor positive positions towards legal integration (Irish WP and Finnish VL Left Wing) and cultural integration (Portuguese PCP).

With the remaining reformed Communist parties the German PDS demonstrated some conformity towards the predictions. The PDS utilised discourses indicating minor positive towards liberalisation, legal, social, cultural and foreign policy integration. The party showed minor criticisms towards harmonisation and supranational integration. The Italian PDS on the other hand showed conformity to all but social and foreign policy integration. It used minor to extremely positive discourse towards all the dimensions.

Finally with the 2004 European elections (see table 37) only three parties conformed to the set predictions for unreformed Communist parties towards the dimensions liberalisation, harmonisation, supranational and legal integration. These were the French PCF, Greek KKE and Swedish V. However, there were many more that conformed to the predictions on some of the dimensions. The Dutch SP used minor to strong positive discourse towards supranational, social and cultural integration. The Italian RC followed the same pattern. The Danish SF exhibited minor levels of positive discourse towards liberalisation, legal and social integration, and minor negative discourse towards harmonisation and supranational integration. Finally, the Finnish VL Left Wing party used strong levels of negative discourse towards liberalisation and minor to strong levels of positive discourse towards legal and social integration.

The reformed Communist parties behaved quite differently to previous elections. The German PDS had become negative towards liberalisation, harmonisation and supranational integration (minor levels); the Spanish IU was negative towards liberalisation and legal integration (minor levels). Surprisingly the Dutch CU/SGP exhibited behaviour towards European integration akin to that of a reformed Communist party – showing minor positive support towards liberalisation, harmonisation, legal and social integration.

Table 37 – Post-Communist Party Positions and Confirmation/Rejection of Hypotheses 1999-2004:

Year	Party	Forms of Integration							
		Economic Liberalisation	Economic Harmonisation	Supranational Integration	Legal Integration	Social Integration	Cultural Integration	Foreign Policy Integration	
1999	French PCF	Minor Negative Yes	Minor Negative Yes	No Overall Position No	Minor Negative Yes	Strong Positive No	Minor Negative Yes	Minor Positive No	
	German PDS	No Overall No	Minor Negative No	Minor Negative No	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive No	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive No	
	Dutch SP	Minor Negative Yes	Extreme Negative Yes	Strong Negative Yes	No Overall No	Strong Positive No	Minor Negative Yes	Minor Negative Yes	
	Italian PDS	Minor Negative No	Extreme Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive No	No Overall No	Strong Positive No	
	Danish SF	Minor Negative Yes	Minor Negative Yes	Minor Negative Yes	Minor Negative Yes	Minor Positive No	Minor Negative Yes	Minor Negative Yes	
	Irish WP	Extreme Negative Yes	Strong Negative Yes	Minor Negative Yes	Minor Positive No	Minor Positive No	Minor Negative Yes	Minor Positive No	
	Greek KKE	Strong Negative Yes	No Overall No	No Overall No	Strong Negative Yes	Minor Positive No	No Overall No	Minor Positive No	
	Spanish IU	Minor Positive No	Minor Negative Yes	Minor Positive No	Minor Positive No	Extreme Positive No	Minor Positive No	Strong Positive No	
	Portuguese PCP	Minor Negative Yes	Extreme Negative Yes	Minor Negative Yes	No Overall No	Minor Positive No	Minor Positive No	Minor Positive No	
	Swedish V	No Overall No	Strong Negative Yes	Extreme Negative Yes	No Overall No	Minor Positive No	No Overall No	Strong Negative Yes	
	Finnish VL Left Wing	No Overall No	Minor Negative Yes	Strong Negative Yes	Minor Positive No	Extreme Positive No	No Overall No	Strong Positive No	
	Italian RC	Strong Negative Yes	Minor Negative Yes	Minor Negative Yes	No Overall No	Extreme Positive No	Minor Negative Yes	Strong Positive No	
	2004	French PCF	Extreme Negative Yes	Minor Negative Yes	Minor Negative Yes	Minor Negative Yes	Extreme Positive No	No Overall Position No	-
		German PDS	Minor Negative No	Minor Negative No	Minor Negative No	Minor Positive Yes	Strong Positive No	Minor Positive Yes	-
		Dutch SP	Strong Negative Yes	Minor Negative Yes	Minor Positive No	Minor Negative Yes	Strong Positive No	Minor Positive No	-
Italian RC		Minor Negative Yes	Strong Negative Yes	Minor Positive No	Minor Negative Yes	Minor Positive No	Strong Positive No	-	
Danish SF		Minor Positive No	Minor Negative Yes	Minor Negative Yes	Minor Positive No	Minor Positive No	No Overall No	-	
Greek KKE		Extreme Negative Yes	Minor Negative Yes	Strong Negative Yes	Strong Negative Yes	Minor Positive No	No Overall No	-	
Spanish IU		Minor Negative Yes	Minor Positive No	Minor Positive No	Minor Negative Yes	Extreme Positive No	Minor Positive No	-	
Swedish V		Minor Negative Yes	Minor Negative Yes	Extreme Negative Yes	Strong Negative Yes	Minor Positive No	No Overall No	-	
Finnish VL Left Wing		Strong Negative Yes	No Overall No	No Overall No	Minor Positive No	Strong Positive No	No Overall No	-	

Source: Euromanifestos Dataset 1979-2004

(POST)-COMMUNIST PARTY BEHAVIOURAL PATTERNS IN ACCESSION GROUPS

When comparing (post)-Communist parties within each accession group, the task is somewhat complicated by two behavioural patterns identified vis-à-vis the number of cases. In the 1989 elections, within the 'original six' accession group, while French PCF adopted extreme negative discourse towards liberalisation and the Dutch SP having no overall position) it is possible to identify homogenous patterns of behaviour towards supranational integration where both parties adopted negative discourses, and social integration where both parties adopted minor positive discourses. Within the 1973 accession group, there were only two cases – the Danish SF and Irish WP, both of which behaved in an unreformed manner (the Danish SF appeared to re-orientate its position in 2004). The only dimension where the parties behaved consistently was towards supranational integration - utilising minor positive discourse. In the 1981 and 1986 accession group, the lack of development towards the manifestos is apparent with the Greek KKE and Spanish IU. Within this group the majority of parties were critical towards liberalisation and all were positive towards foreign policy integration.

By 1994, among the original six, there were two reformed (the German PDS and Italian PDS) and three unreformed parties (the French PCF, Dutch SP and Italian RC). The behaviour of the reformed parties was consistent to establish identifiable patterns of behaviour. The parties adopted similar positions towards liberalisation, legal, social, cultural and foreign policy integration. They differed in their attitude towards harmonisation and supranational integration with the German PDS using minor negative arguments towards both and the Italian PDS using minor positive arguments towards both. The unreformed parties were consistent in the behaviour towards liberalisation, harmonisation, supranational integration, and social integration, though the level of usage did vary on two of the dimensions. In addition, both the French PCF and Italian RC adopted similar positions

with cultural and foreign policy integration, while the Dutch SP had no overall position. In the 1973 accession group, the parties did not behave consistently to establish patterns of behaviour. The two exceptions were liberalisation and social integration. The Danish SF used minor negative discourses and the Irish WP used extreme negative discourse towards liberalisation. Both utilised minor positive discourse towards social integration. Within the 1981 and 1986 accession group there was strong conformity across the dimensions. For the following processes all three parties took comparable positions: liberalisation (minor to strong negative discourses), supranational integration (minor to extreme negative discourses), social integration (minor to strong positive) and foreign policy integration (extreme positive discourses). However, the level of usage did vary amongst the three parties. In addition, with the remaining three dimensions, two of the parties used similar discourses – harmonisation (minor negative, except Greek KKE – no overall position), legal integration (minor negative, except Spanish IU), and cultural integration (minor positive, except for Portuguese PCP – no overall position). The behavioural pattern amongst the two parties of the 1995 accession group was much harder to discern. The Swedish V and Finnish VL Left Wing both used strong negative discourse towards harmonisation, and had no overall position towards liberalisation, but with the remaining dimensions they took opposite positions.

In the 1999 elections, the pattern remained similar between the unreformed Communist parties of the ‘original six’ member states. The French PCF, Dutch SP and Italian RC adopted similar positions towards liberalisation, harmonisation, social and cultural integration. They were negative to all, with the exception of social integration. On the remaining dimensions, supranational integration saw both the Dutch SP and Italian RC adopt negative positions (French PCF – no overall position). Similarities in the behaviour of reformed Communist parties were harder to identify. The German and Italian PDS were only similar with their positions toward legal, social and foreign policy

integration. In the 1973 accession group, the Danish SF and Irish WP similarly adopted negative stances towards liberalisation, harmonisation, supranational integration and cultural integration, though their level of usage varied. They also both adopted minor positive positions towards social integration. The 1981 and 1986 accession group did not match this pattern. They only adopted similar behaviour towards social and foreign policy integration, though they differed in the intensity of the usage. The 1995 accession group behaviour was similar to that observed for the 1973 parties. The Swedish V and Finnish VL Left Wing were both negative towards harmonisation, supranational integration, positive towards social integration, and finally both offered no overall position towards liberalisation and cultural integration.

Lastly in the 2004 elections, the original six member states saw very similar behaviour exhibited across the dimensions by the parties. Towards liberalisation, all parties were negative though the level of use of the discourse did vary. The negative behaviour was evident towards harmonisation where all parties used minor to strong levels of negative discourse. Supranational integration saw a split in the behaviour of the parties with the French PCF and German PDS using minor negative discourse, but the Dutch SP and Italian RC using minor positive discourse. The split was less pronounced for legal integration with three of the parties using minor negative discourse, and only the German PDS using minor positive discourse. Finally both social and cultural integration saw extensive use of positive discourse. Within the 1973 accession group, there was only one party – the Danish SF. This party did behave in a similar fashion to those parties of the original six member states in that it was negative towards harmonisation and supranational integration, and took positive positions towards legal and social integration. It did take a minor positive position towards liberalisation. In the 1981 and 1986 accession group, the Greek KKE and Spanish IU did take similar positions towards liberalisation (though the level of negative discourse did vary considerably), legal integration (again

the level of negative discourse did vary) and social integration (the level of positive discourse did vary). They both took opposing positions towards harmonisation and supranational integration. Within the 1995 accession group, there were few examples of similar patterns of behaviour between the Swedish V and Finnish VL Left Wing. Both were negative towards liberalisation, both positive towards social integration and both had no overall position towards cultural integration.

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

The research was able to identify a significant number of Eurosceptic parties within the party family, which was expected. Amongst the identified Eurosceptic (post)-Communist political parties there is a clear ideological component to their use of Euroscepticism towards the three traditional aspects of integration – economic liberalisation, economic harmonisation and supranational integration. This is in regards to their deep rejection of any process that leads to unrestrained capitalist economies.

Delving further into the extensive party positioning data, theoretically one can extrapolate several behavioural traits for (post)-Communist parties towards European integration. Firstly, there were very few reformed post-Communist parties and in general they were very positive towards the majority of the processes of integration – for example, the Italian PDS and the Spanish IU.

Secondly unreformed Communist Parties have remained Eurosceptic throughout the period focusing their rejectionist discourse on the fundamental elements of integration – liberalisation, harmonisation and supranational integration. One can therefore argue that the phenomenon of Euroscepticism has maintained an element of extreme left rejectionism throughout the period and should continue to do so.

Thirdly, the really significant finding is that there appears to have been a tremendous ideological shift. The literature and the hypotheses pointed to the argument that the majority of parties within

the party family amongst the unreformed type would attempt to avoid engaging with Europe, given its strong free-market roots. However, amongst the majority of (post)-Communist parties there was a strong will to engage with European structures to correct the negative externalities of the market through social integration. It amounted to almost universal support. There was also a strong homogenous response towards foreign policy integration. Communist parties re-orientated themselves towards western structures with the Euro-Communism reforms during the 1970s and 1980s, but it is still surprising that they supported European common policies on foreign and defence matters. However, this may well be a response to the continued American bias in western defence structures – i.e. NATO – despite evidence of a diminishing importance post-Cold war and its search for a new role.

EUROSCEPTIC AGRARIAN PARTIES:

The analysis of the results was able to identify that the following parties could be classified as Eurosceptic:

- Swedish Centre – towards supranational integration in 1995; and towards supranational integration in 1999;
- Finnish SK – towards harmonisation and supranational integration in 1996; and towards supranational integration in 1999;

Of the two West European Agrarian parties both shared Eurosceptic positions towards supranational integration in 1995/6 and 1999. In addition, the Finnish SK differed by also being Eurosceptic towards harmonisation in 1996. Unfortunately, given the number of cases within the party family (i.e. two cases across multiple years) it is difficult to generalise beyond this.

COMPARATIVE OBSERVATIONS

This thesis argued that Agrarian parties would mostly likely position themselves negatively towards all dimensions towards European integration. From the results, an important issue has arisen in that the number of Agrarian parties within Europe that had European manifestos available was extremely limited. There were only two individual parties – the Swedish Centre and Finnish SK. This obviously makes hypotheses testing and generalisations difficult as it is based on a small sample size.

If one takes all three elections as a whole for the purpose of the analysis one can see that there were very few instances of negative discourse towards liberalisation. This potentially can be explained by the fact that within the farming constituencies they represent, the liberalisation of the markets has not been so damaging to these peripheral communities given the impact of the Common Agricultural Policy. In addition two parties – the Swedish Centre and Finnish SK supported legal,

social, and foreign policy integration. The parties were clearly suspicious towards supranational integration with minor to extreme negative discourse being used. Lastly the Swedish and Finnish Centre were negative towards harmonisation in 1995/1996 and one was in 1999 (Swedish Centre).

AGRARIAN PARTIES BEHAVIOURAL PATTERNS IN THE ACCESSION GROUPS

By their very nature they are peripheral parties within Europe, being mostly found amongst Northern and Scandinavian member states. What one can note is that within the 1995 accession group the two parties – the Swedish Centre and Finnish SK are much more positive – especially towards liberalisation, legal and social integration – across three elections.

Table 38 – Agrarian Party Positions and Confirmation/Rejection of Hypotheses 1994/95-2004:

Year	Party	Forms of Integration						
		Economic Liberalisation	Economic Harmonisation	Supranational Integration	Legal Integration	Social Integration	Cultural Integration	Foreign Policy Integration
(1995)	Swedish Centre	Minor Positive	Minor Negative	Strong Negative	Minor Positive	Strong Positive	Minor Negative	Strong Positive
		No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
(1996)	Finnish SK	Minor Negative	Strong Negative	Strong Negative	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	No Overall	No Overall
		Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
1999	Swedish Centre	Minor Positive	Minor Negative	Strong Negative	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Strong Positive
		No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
	Finnish SK	Strong Positive	Minor Positive	Extreme Negative	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	No Overall	Extreme Positive
		No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
2004	Swedish Centre	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	No Overall	-
		No	No	Yes	No	No	No	-
	Finnish SK	Minor Positive	No Overall	Extreme Positive	Minor Positive	Strong Positive	No Overall	-
		No	No	No	No	No	No	-

Source: Euromanifestos Dataset 1979-2004

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

The results of the hypotheses testing indicate a lack of success, with only harmonisation (1995/1996) and supranational integration (1995/1996 and 1999) returning confirmations. Clearly the theoretical implications are unfortunately very limited for party family generalisations. However from this limited sample one can reject the assumption that Agrarian parties are very critical of the process of integration. Their hostility is much more nuanced. Indeed the clear instances of rejectionist discourse are confined to the dimension of supranational integration. This is in line with the peripheral roots of the party family and indeed the location of these two parties' constituencies being on the edge of Europe. The surprising results are the general support for liberalisation given the potential detrimental effects of opening up the markets of these traditional farming constituencies that support agrarian parties to competition and the reorientation to supporting harmonisation for both the Swedish Centre and Finnish SK. One can conclude that harmonisation measurements have allowed the improvement in the possibility of trading for the constituencies who support agrarian parties. This is especially the case as the Common Agricultural Policy remains paramount to artificially raising the income of farmers and improving the competitiveness vis-à-vis third world imports due to the impact of subsidies. The results for social integration do have an impact on the theoretical understanding of Agrarian party behaviour. Both parties have been supportive throughout the time period. Given that they are both from member states with strong state welfare support this is surprising. Whether the parties support this as it will increase welfare provision or will lead to a reduction in support is unclear. This is an area that will need further research in the future.

EUROSCEPTIC ETHNO-REGIONALIST PARTIES:

The analysis of the results was able to identify that the following parties could be classified as Eurosceptic:

- French RPF – towards liberalisation and supranational integration in 1994; towards liberalisation, harmonisation, and supranational integration in 1999; towards supranational integration, legal integration and cultural integration in 2004;
- Belgian VB – towards supranational integration in 1994; towards supranational integration and cultural integration in 2004;
- Belgian NVA – towards supranational integration in 2004;
- Italian SVP – towards supranational integration in 1999;
- British SNP – towards cultural integration in 1989; towards cultural integration in 1994; and towards supranational integration and cultural integration in 2004;
- British PC – towards supranational integration in 1994; towards supranational integration in 1999; and towards supranational integration in 2004;
- British UKIP – towards supranational integration in 1994; towards harmonisation, supranational integration and foreign policy integration in 1999; and supranational integration and legal integration in 2004;
- Northern Irish DUP – towards liberalisation, supranational integration and cultural integration in 1989; towards supranational integration and cultural integration in 1994;

towards supranational and cultural integration in 1999; and towards harmonisation, supranational integration and legal integration in 2004;

- Northern Irish UUP – towards harmonisation and supranational integration in 1989; towards supranational integration in 1994; towards liberalisation in 1999; and towards harmonisation, supranational integration, and legal integration in 2004;
- Danish FrP – towards supranational integration and foreign policy integration in 1989; and towards supranational integration and legal integration in 1994;
- Danish FB – towards liberalisation, supranational integration, legal integration, and foreign policy integration in 1989; towards liberalisation, harmonisation, supranational integration, legal integration and foreign policy integration in 1994; towards harmonisation, supranational integration, legal integration, cultural integration and foreign policy integration in 1999; towards harmonisation, supranational integration, and legal integration in 2004;
- Danish JB – towards harmonisation, supranational integration, and legal integration in 1994; and supranational integration and legal integration in 2004;
- Spanish PNV – towards supranational integration in 1989;
- Spanish ERC – towards supranational integration in 1989; towards supranational integration in 1994; and towards supranational integration in 1999;
- Spanish EH – towards supranational integration in 1994; towards liberalisation and cultural integration in 1999; and towards supranational integration in 2004;
- Spanish BNG – towards liberalisation in 1994; and towards liberalisation in 1999;

- Spanish EA – towards liberalisation in 2004;

Examining the regionalist Eurosceptic parties, one can immediately observe that the parties are critical of multiple dimensions. This is a very Eurosceptic party family. The majority are hostile towards supranational integration and cultural integration, and this demonstrates a clear ideological component to their Eurosceptic discourse. Only a small number of parties have criticised liberalisation (French RPF in 1994 and 1999; Northern Irish DUP in 1989; Danish FB in 1989 and 1994; Spanish BNG in 1994 and 1999; and finally the Spanish EA in 2004). It is interesting that few of these parties remained Eurosceptic towards liberalisation beyond 1999. Harmonisation, like liberalisation saw critical discourses from a small number of regionalist parties (French RPF in 1999; British UKIP; Northern Irish DUP in 2004; Northern Irish UUP in 1989 and 2004; Danish FB in 1994, 1999 and 2004; and finally the Danish JB in 1994). Legal integration also saw criticism from only seven out of the seventeen Eurosceptic regionalist parties (French RPF in 2004; British UKIP in 2004; Northern Irish DUP in 2004; Northern Irish UUP in 2004; Danish FrP in 1994; Danish FB in 1989, 1994, 1999 and 2004; and finally the Danish JB in 1994 and 2004). Lastly, only one regionalist party – the Danish FB was Eurosceptic towards foreign policy integration in 1994 and 1999. As one can see there is significant evidence of parties using similar discourses in each European election suggesting this is a reaction to similar political developments and stimuli.

COMPARATIVE OBSERVATIONS

The thesis argued that Regionalist parties would position themselves positively towards liberalisation, supranational, legal, social and cultural integration. The parties would see harmonisation negatively, but have no overall position towards foreign policy integration.

From the results it is possible to observe that none of the parties accurately conformed to the predicted positions. However, while it is easy to conclude that regional parties are difficult to group

together given the rather heterogeneous makeup of regions in the EU, under close analysis it is possible to extract patterns of behaviour across all four elections.

In 1989 (see table 39), there was clear support across all the regionalist parties under analysis for liberalisation as seven parties supported the process and only two were negative – Northern Irish DUP (extreme negative) and Danish FB (Strong Negative). For harmonisation, a pattern is more difficult to establish as three parties were in support and two parties who were opposed. Supranational integration was much clearer, only one party supported the process, while eight were negative – Belgian NVA (minor negative); British SNP (minor negative); Northern Irish DUP (extreme negative); Northern Irish UUP (extreme negative); Danish FrP (strong negative); Danish FB (extreme negative); Spanish PNV (strong negative); and Spanish ERC (extreme negative). Positions towards legal and social integration were much more positive. Legal integration saw five parties in support and two opposed – Danish FrP (minor negative) and Danish FB (strong negative). Social integration saw six parties in support and none opposed. Cultural integration saw similar results to harmonisation. It was difficult to see a discernable pattern of behaviour with three parties in support and two opposed – British SNP (strong negative); and Northern Irish DUP (extreme negative). Finally with foreign policy integration saw five parties in support and only two parties opposed – the Danish FrP (extreme negative) and Danish FB (extreme negative).

By 1994 (see table 39), there was an increasing number of parties who were opposed to liberalisation, however nine parties still supported the process, compared to five parties against – French RPF (extreme negative); Northern Irish DUP (minor negative); Danish FB (strong negative); Spanish EH (minor negative); and finally the Spanish BNG (strong negative). Support for harmonisation increased slightly with five parties in support, however three parties were still negative - Northern Irish DUP (minor negative); Danish FB (strong negative); and finally Danish JB (strong negative).

Supranational integration continued to be seen negatively with two parties in support, but thirteen opposed – French RPF (extreme negative); Belgian VB (strong negative); British PC (extreme negative); British UKIP (extreme negative), Northern Irish DUP (strong negative); Northern Irish UUP (extreme negative); Danish FrP (extreme negative); Danish FB (extreme negative); Danish JB (extreme negative); Spanish PNV (minor negative); Spanish ERC (strong negative); Spanish EH (strong negative); and Spanish BNG (minor negative). The pattern of support changed considerably for legal integration. By 1994, there were five parties in support and eight opposed – French RPF (strong negative); Belgian VB (minor negative); British UKIP (minor negative); Northern Irish DUP (minor negative); Danish FrP (extreme negative); Danish FB (extreme negative); Danish JB (strong negative); and finally Spanish EH (minor negative). Social integration saw the same pattern as in 1989 – twelve parties in support and none opposed. Cultural integration saw a similar shift in support as legal integration, with five parties in support and eight in opposition – Belgian NVA (minor negative); British PC (minor negative); British SNP (strong negative); Northern Irish DUP (strong negative); Northern Irish UUP (minor negative) Danish FB (minor negative); Danish JB (minor negative); and finally Spanish EH (minor negative). The pattern of support became clearer for foreign policy integration. Twelve parties were positive, while only two were negative towards the process – Danish FB (extreme negative); and finally Danish JB (minor negative).

Table 39 – Regional Party Positions and Confirmation/Rejection of Hypotheses 1989-1994:

Year	Party	Forms of Integration						
		Economic Liberalisation	Economic Harmonisation	Supranational Integration	Legal Integration	Social Integration	Cultural Integration	Foreign Policy Integration
1989	Belgian VB	Minor Positive	No Overall	Minor Positive	No overall	Strong Positive	Extreme Positive	Minor Positive
		Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
	Belgian NVA	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Extreme Positive	Minor Positive	Extreme Positive
		Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
	British SNP	Minor Positive	No Overall	Minor Negative	No Overall	Strong Positive	Strong Negative	Minor Positive
		Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
	Northern Irish DUP	Extreme Negative	No Overall	Extreme Negative	Strong Positive	No Overall	Extreme Negative	No Overall
		No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
	Northern Irish UUP	Minor Positive	Strong Negative	Extreme Negative	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	No Overall	No Overall
		Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
	Danish FrP	Extreme Positive	Extreme Positive	Strong Negative	Minor Negative	No Overall	No Overall	Extreme Negative
		Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
	Danish FB	Strong Negative	Minor Negative	Extreme Negative	Strong Negative	No Overall	No Overall	Extreme Negative
		No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Spanish PNV	Strong Positive	Minor Positive	Strong Negative	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Strong Positive	
	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	
Spanish ERC	Strong Positive	No Overall	Extreme Negative	Strong Positive	Strong Positive	No Overall	Strong Positive	
	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	
1994	French RPF	Extreme Negative	No Overall	Extreme Negative	Strong Negative	No Overall	Extreme Positive	Minor Positive
		No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
	Belgian VB	Minor Positive	No Overall	Strong Negative	Minor Negative	Strong Positive	Extreme Positive	Minor Positive
		Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
	Belgian NVA	No Overall	No Overall	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Extreme Positive	Minor Negative	Minor Positive
		No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
	British PC	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Extreme Negative	Minor Positive	Strong Positive	Minor Negative	Minor Positive
		Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
	British SNP	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	No Overall	No Overall	Minor Positive	Strong Negative	Strong Positive
		Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
	British UKIP	Strong Positive	Strong Positive	Extreme Negative	Minor Negative	No Overall	No Overall	No Overall
		Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
	Northern Irish DUP	Minor Negative	Minor Negative	Strong Negative	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Strong Negative	Minor Positive
		No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
	Northern Irish UUP	Strong Positive	No Overall	Extreme Negative	No Overall	Minor Positive	Minor Negative	Minor Positive
		Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
	Danish FrP	Extreme Positive	No Overall	Extreme Negative	Extreme Negative	No Overall	No Overall	No Overall
		Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
	Danish FB	Strong Negative	Strong Negative	Extreme Negative	Extreme Negative	Minor Positive	Minor Negative	Extreme Negative
		No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
	Danish JB	No Overall	Strong Negative	Extreme Negative	Strong Negative	Minor Positive	Minor Negative	Minor Negative
		No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
	Spanish PNV	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Strong Positive	Strong Positive	Minor Positive
		Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
	Spanish ERC	Minor Positive	No Overall	Strong Negative	No Overall	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Strong Positive
		Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
	Spanish EH	Minor Negative	No Overall	Strong Negative	Minor Negative	Strong Positive	Minor Negative	Minor Positive

	Spanish BNG	No Strong Negative	No No Overall	No Minor Negative	No Minor Positive	Yes No Overall	No Strong Positive	No Minor Positive
(1996)	Finnish RKP SFP	No Minor Positive Yes	No Minor Positive No	No Minor Positive Yes	Yes Minor Positive Yes	No Strong Positive Yes	Yes No Overall No	Yes Strong Positive No

Source: Euromanifestos Dataset 1979-2004

By the 1999 election (see table 40), the party family became increasingly unclear in terms of its adopted patterns of behaviour. Support for liberalisation dropped to five parties with seven parties opposed – French RPF (extreme negative); Italian SVP (minor negative); Belgian VB (minor negative); Northern Irish UUP (strong negative); Spanish EH (strong negative); Spanish BNG (extreme negative); and finally the Finnish RKP SFP (minor negative). The responses to harmonisation were equal with five in support and five in opposition – French RPF (strong negative); British UKIP (extreme negative); Northern Irish DUP (minor negative); Northern Irish UUP (minor negative) and finally the Danish FB (extreme negative). Supranational integration remained stable with two parties in support and eleven in opposition – French RPF (strong negative); Italian SVP (extreme negative); British PC (extreme negative); British SNP (minor negative); British UKIP (extreme negative); Northern Irish UUP (minor negative); Danish FB (extreme negative); Danish JB (minor negative); Spanish ERC (extreme negative); and Spanish BNG (minor negative). Legal integration was inconclusive as four parties took positions of support and four took positions of opposition – British UKIP (minor negative); Danish FB (extreme negative); Danish JB (minor negative); and finally Spanish ERC (minor negative). Social integration remained stable with seven parties in support and none against the process. Cultural integration saw support decrease and negative discourse amongst parties increase – eight parties were now in opposition compared to three for the process. The following parties used negative discourse – Belgian VB (minor negative); British SNP (minor negative); British UKIP (minor negative); Northern Irish DUP (extreme negative); Northern Irish UUP (minor negative); Danish FB (strong negative); and finally Spanish EH (extreme negative). Finally foreign policy integration remained stable in its pattern of behaviour with seven parties using positive discourse and only three parties using negative discourse – British UKIP (strong negative); Danish FB (extreme negative); and finally Spanish EH (minor negative).

Lastly, in the 2004 election (see table 40) only three dimensions offered definitive patterns of behaviour for the regionalist party family – liberalisation, supranational integration and social integration. Liberalisation saw seven parties in support and two against – Belgian VB (minor negative); and Spanish EH (minor negative). Harmonisation saw four parties using positive discourse and six using negative discourse – French RPF (minor negative); Belgian VB (minor negative); Northern Irish DUP (extreme negative); Northern Irish UUP (strong negative); Danish FB (strong negative); and Danish JB (minor negative). Supranational saw fifteen parties against and none for the process – French PRF (extreme negative); Italian SVP (minor negative); Belgian VB (extreme negative); Belgian NVA (strong negative); British PC (strong negative); British SNP (extreme negative); British UKIP (extreme negative); Northern Irish DUP (strong negative); Northern Irish UUP (extreme negative); Danish FB (extreme negative); Danish JB (extreme negative); Spanish PNV (minor negative); Spanish EA (extreme negative); Spanish EH (strong negative); and finally Finnish RKP SFP (minor negative). Legal integration was inconclusive with six parties in support and six parties against – French RPF (extreme negative); Belgian VB (extreme negative); British UKIP (extreme negative); Northern Irish DUP (Strong negative); Danish FB (strong negative); and Danish JB (strong negative). Social integration saw seven parties in support and none in opposition. Lastly cultural integration was inconclusive with five parties using positive discourse and six using negative discourses – French RPF (strong negative); Belgian VB (extreme negative); British PC (minor negative); British SNP (strong negative); Northern Irish DUP (minor negative); Danish FB (minor negative); and finally Danish JB (minor negative).

Table 40 – Regional Party Positions and Confirmation/Rejection of Hypotheses 1999-2004:

Year	Party	Forms of Integration							Foreign Policy Integration
		Economic Liberalisation	Economic Harmonisation	Supranational Integration	Legal Integration	Social Integration	Cultural Integration		
1999	French RPF	Extreme Negative No	Strong Negative Yes	Strong Negative No	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	No Overall No	Strong Positive No	
	Italian SVP	Minor Negative No	Minor Positive No	Extreme Negative No	No Overall No	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Strong Positive No	
	Belgian VB	Minor Negative No	No Overall No	Minor Positive Yes	No overall No	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Negative No	Strong Positive No	
	British PC	No Overall No	Extreme Positive No	Extreme Negative No	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	No Overall No	Minor Positive No	
	British SNP	Minor Positive Yes	Strong Positive No	Minor Negative No	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Negative No	No Overall Yes	
	British UKIP	Extreme Positive Yes	Extreme Negative Yes	Extreme Negative No	Minor Negative No	No Overall No	Minor Negative No	Strong Negative No	
	Northern Irish DUP	No Overall No	Minor Negative Yes	Extreme Negative No	No Overall No	No Overall No	Extreme Negative No	No Overall Yes	
	Northern Irish UUP	Strong Negative No	Minor Negative Yes	Minor Negative No	No Overall No	No Overall No	Minor Negative No	No Overall Yes	
	Danish FrP	Extreme Positive Yes	Extreme Positive No	Strong Positive Yes	No Overall No	Strong Positive Yes	No Overall No	No Overall Yes	
	Danish FB	No Overall No	Extreme Negative Yes	Extreme Negative No	Extreme Negative No	No Overall No	Strong Negative No	Extreme Negative No	
	Danish JB	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	Minor Negative No	Minor Negative No	No Overall No	No Overall No	Minor Positive No	
	Spanish ERC	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	Extreme Negative No	Minor Negative No	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	- -	
	Spanish EH	Strong Negative No	No Overall no	No Overall No	No Overall No	No Overall No	Extreme Negative No	Minor Negative No	
	Spanish BNG	Extreme Negative No	No Overall No	Minor Negative No	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive No	
	Finnish RKP SFP	Minor Negative No	Minor Positive No	No Overall No	No Overall No	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	Extreme Positive No	
	2004	French RPF	No Overall No	Minor negative Yes	Extreme Negative No	Extreme Negative No	No Overall No	Strong Negative No	- -
		Italian SVP	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	Minor Negative No	No Overall No	Strong Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	- -
		Belgian VB	Minor Negative No	Minor Negative Yes	Extreme Negative No	Minor Negative No	Minor Positive Yes	Extreme Negative No	- -
		Belgian NVA	No Overall No	No Overall No	Strong Negative No	Minor Positive Yes	No Overall No	Minor Positive Yes	- -
		British PC	No Overall No	Minor Positive No	Strong Negative No	No Overall No	No Overall No	Minor Negative No	- -
British SNP		Minor Positive Yes	Strong Positive No	Extreme Negative No	Minor Positive Yes	Minor Positive Yes	Strong Negative No	- -	
British UKIP		No Overall No	No Overall No	Extreme Negative No	Extreme Negative No	No Overall No	No Overall No	- -	
Northern Irish DUP		Minor Positive	Extreme Negative	Strong Negative	Strong Negative	No Overall	Minor Negative	-	

	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	-
Northern Irish UUP	Extreme Positive	Strong Negative	Extreme Negative	No Overall	No Overall	Minor Positive	-
	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	-
Danish FB	Minor Positive	Strong Negative	Extreme Negative	Strong Negative	No Overall	Minor Negative	-
	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	-
Danish JB	No Overall	Minor Negative	Extreme Negative	Strong Negative	No Overall	Minor Negative	-
	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	-
Spanish PNV	Strong Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Strong Positive	Minor Positive	-
	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Spanish EA	No Overall	No Overall	Extreme Negative	Minor Positive	Strong Positive	No Overall	-
	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	-
Spanish EH	Minor Negative	No Overall	Strong Negative	Minor Positive	Strong Positive	No Overall	-
	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	-
Finnish RKP SFP	Strong Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	-
	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	-

Source: Euromanifestos Dataset 1979-2004

ETHNO-REGIONALIST BEHAVIOURAL PATTERNS IN THE ACCESSION GROUPS

The 'original six' parties in the 1989 election only consisted of two cases. However, both were positive towards liberalisation, social integration, cultural integration and foreign policy integration. The only remaining dimension where the parties took opposing positions was supranational integration where the Belgian VB took a minor positive position and the Belgian NVA took a minor negative position. With the 1973 accession group, parties differed significantly from the previous category. All were critical of supranational integration. The dimensions of liberalisation, harmonisation, legal, and foreign policy integration saw splits in the positions taken across five parties. For social, and cultural integration two of the parties took positions – social integration was positive (SNP and UUP) and cultural integration was negative (SNP and DUP). The rest of the parties had no overall position. The 1981-1986 accession group was more similar in its behaviour to the 'original six'. There was a strong degree of consistency amongst the two cases. Both supported liberalisation, legal, social and foreign policy integration. They both criticised supranational integration. With the remaining dimensions of harmonisation and cultural integration the Spanish PNV took a positive position, while the Spanish ERC had no overall position.

In the 1994 elections, the 'original six' parties were less consistent in their behaviour than previously observed. All were still supportive of foreign policy integration, and all had no overall position towards harmonisation. No pattern of behaviour was observable with liberalisation. With the remaining dimensions, two of the parties took similar positions while the other took an opposing view on supranational integration and legal integration (French RPF and Belgian VB – negative); social integration (Belgian VB and Belgian NVA – positive); and cultural integration (French RPF and Belgian VB – positive). In the 1973 accession group, there was some consistency amongst a number of the parties on each dimension, but this was limited. All, but the British SNP (no overall

position), took negative stances towards supranational integration. The majority of parties took a positive position towards social integration and a negative position towards cultural integration, with the exceptions of the British UKIP and Danish FrP (no overall position). For liberalisation, there were three exceptions to the positive discourse used by the group (Northern Irish DUP and Danish FB- negative, and Danish JB – no overall position). For the dimension of harmonisation the parties were divided with the British PC, British SNP and British UKIP using positive discourse; the Northern Irish DUP, Danish FB and Danish JB using negative discourses; and the remainder having no overall position. Foreign policy integration saw the British PC, British SNP, Northern Irish DUP and Northern Irish UUP take positive positions; the Danish FB and Danish JB take negative positions; and the remainder having no overall position. In the 1981-1986 accession group, there was some evidence of consistent behaviour amongst the parties. Supranational integration saw all parties use negative discourse and for foreign policy integration all parties used positive discourse. There was a split with the positions towards liberalisation with the Spanish PNV and Spanish ERC using positive discourse, and the Spanish EH and Spanish BG using negative discourse. Legal integration was also split. Lastly with social integration, the majority of the parties used positive discourse, with the exception of the Spanish BNG who had no overall position. The 1995 accession group response differed remarkably. There was only one case – the Finnish RKP SFP. The party was positive towards all dimensions with the exception of cultural integration (no overall position).

In the 1999 election, the regional parties of the ‘original six’ continued the previously observed behaviour. The three parties were critical of liberalisation and supportive of foreign policy integration. There were two instances where the majority of parties took a similar position – supranational integration and social integration. Supranational integration saw the French RPF and Italian SVP take negative positions, and social integration saw the Italian SVP and Belgian VB take

positive positions. The 1973 accession group saw a real mix of positions with a lack of real consistency in the group behaviour towards the dimensions. Supranational integration saw the most similar behaviour between the parties where seven out of the eight parties were critical towards supranational integration. The Danish FrP was the exception (strong positive). The 1981-1986 accession group's parties also lacked consistent behaviour. Towards liberalisation both the Spanish EH and Spanish BNG were critical. Harmonisation saw all three parties have no overall position. The Spanish ERC and Spanish BNG took similar positions towards supranational integration (negative), social integration (positive) and cultural integration (positive). Lastly, the Finnish RKP SFP case in the 1995 accession group saw the party differ considerably from the previous election and did not behave in a similar way to parties in other accession groups. It was negative towards liberalisation, positive towards harmonisation, social integration and foreign policy integration, but had no overall position towards the remaining dimensions.

Finally in the 2004 elections, the regionalist parties of the 'original six' showed little consistency in behaviour with only supranational integration seeing all parties position themselves negatively. In the 1973 accession group, all parties criticised supranational integration. The majority of parties supported liberalisation, and criticised harmonisation, legal, and cultural integration. In the 1981-1986 accession group there was more consistent behaviour between the three Spanish cases. All parties criticised supranational integration and supported legal and social integration. Finally, the single case from the 1995 accession group was more positive than any of the other parties from the various accession groups, supporting all, but supranational integration.

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

Theoretically, the ethno-regionalist party family has produced some extremely significant behaviour. As a whole it is extremely Eurosceptic especially towards the processes of supranational integration

and cultural integration. This clearly relates to Ethno-regionalist party ideology. More specifically, as theorised by De Winter and Gomez-Reino (2002: 489) the weight of empirical evidence shows that regionalist parties are hostile to supranational integration throughout the time period, suggesting that the party family does indeed see transfers of sovereignty as an amplification of the democratic deficit in the EU. However, the weight of empirical evidence also points to the strong support for social integration and foreign policy at the EU-level, which indicates the willingness and support EU efforts to improve social welfare in the peripheral regions, and in the case foreign policy integration – completely contradicting the hypotheses - that this may indicate that for a public good such as defence and foreign policy it gives smaller regions the opportunity to contribute and to have a standing above their population size and economic might, but fundamentally reduces the costs associated with this.

One must note that the empirical data produced here generally supported much of the theoretical work of De Winter and Gomez-Reino (2002: 485-489), but significantly the data contradicted most of their findings from the examination of Ray's (1999) survey data. They found that on average that the regionalist party family was the most pro-European of all party families; when taking all EU countries together regionalists were the most homogenous party family; and that the regionalist party family had become more pro-European. These findings were not replicated here and have little support once the more nuanced data was used (De Winter & Gomez-Reino, 2002: 491). However, with their distinction of more nationalist regionalist parties they found that they were less pro-European than other traditional party families in Belgium, Spain, Italy, UK and Finland. Returning to their theoretical work – they put forward the argument that the political space for these parties had been growing; that the party family was becoming less homogenous; that the ideological cohesiveness was low; and that the transfers of competencies from the national level to a higher level

constitutes an amplification of the democratic deficit and distance between decisions and the public. In addition, they argued that European integration posed both political and constitutional challenges due to the erosion of competencies in policy domains of regional federal states and that member states do act as gatekeepers on European policies creating new grievances (De Winter & Gomez-Reino, 2002: 489). These theoretical concerns of regionalist parties seem to be strongly supported by the Euromanifesto data, where the majority of parties were against supranational transfers of sovereignty and legal integration. Kincaid Jolly's (2007: 124) empirical work was also contradicted by the Euromanifesto data. He argued that:

Unlike other fringe parties in Western Europe, regionalist parties are Europhile. They are pro-EU across time and issue area. The existence of this Europhile fringe contradicts the expectations of the mainstream versus fringe party theories on support for European integration.

Given the number of Eurosceptic regionalist parties identified their assertions are clearly not the case and that the regionalist party family does produce a substantial number of Eurosceptic parties.

Between 1989 and 1999, the pattern of behaviour on the dimension of liberalisation was intriguing. As noted above the majority of regionalist parties were supportive towards the process, as had been previously hypothesised. However, by 1994 the number of parties against the process had increased to five (although the majority were still in support). One can explain this change by the enactment of the Maastricht Treaty, which finally removed all tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade (with the exception of currency exchange) and exposed the regions to the full extent of the internal market. This continued in 1999 with support for liberalisation dropping to five parties, with seven opposed. However, by 2004 the data suggested that this trend might be reversing. There were still five parties against the process and six parties with no overall position, but those parties in support had grown to seven. This suggests that regionalist parties may slowly be coming to terms with at least the reality of

the single market. Legal integration followed a similar pattern during the 1989 and 1994 elections at first the majority of parties were supportive, but post-Maastricht the number of parties against the process had increased dramatically – to five parties in support and eight opposed. For the two remaining elections of the time period the parties remained divided over the process, though at least some of the parties had no overall position. This is unsurprising as while it created a level playing field in terms enforcing set standards and the running of the single market, but it increased the democratic deficit even further as it was enforcing laws made in the supranational centre rather than laws made by peripheral regions.

The process of harmonisation has proven to be a dimension that has split the party family. Throughout the time period the parties were split fairly evenly. However, there remained a significant number of parties in each election suggesting for that member state, harmonisation failed to become a significant electoral issue. This was especially the case with the Spanish regionalist parties. The bulk of the criticism is confined to Northern Irish and Danish regionalist parties, two member states in northern Europe and peripheral to the core member states.

During the period, the hostility towards cultural integration increased dramatically. The European election of 1989 was inconclusive for identifying a general pattern amongst the parties, however during the 1994 and 1999 elections the hostility towards the process increased dramatically suggesting that amongst a large number of regionalist parties were fearful of replacing the nation state with a centralising supranational entity and impact of integration on their unique sub-national identity.

Theoretically, the impact of considering whether accession groups saw similar behaviour did not illuminate any further patterns of behaviour. In addition, given the peripheral nature of regionalist

parties in general it is difficult to derive theoretically significant behaviour from core versus peripheral regionalist parties.

EUROSCEPTIC NATIONALIST PARTIES:

The analysis of the results was able to identify that the following parties could be classified as Eurosceptic:

- German REP – towards harmonisation, supranational integration, and cultural integration in 1989; towards harmonisation and foreign policy integration in 1994; and towards harmonisation, supranational integration, cultural integration and foreign policy integration in 1999;
- French FN – towards liberalisation and supranational integration in 1994; towards liberalisation and cultural integration in 1999; and towards liberalisation, harmonisation and supranational integration in 2004;
- Italian AN – towards supranational integration in 2004;
- Italian LN – towards supranational integration in 1999; and towards supranational integration in 2004;
- Belgian FN – towards supranational integration and cultural integration in 2004;
- Danish DF – towards supranational integration in 1999; and towards supranational integration in 2004;

Analysing nationalist parties, one can see that all parties were hostile towards supranational integration, with most being critical in the 1999 and 2004 European elections. This again clearly relates to the national orientation of their ideology. The German REP and French FN extended their critique to present Eurosceptic arguments towards economic integration, cultural integration and foreign policy integration.

COMPARATIVE OBSERVATIONS

This thesis originally hypothesised that Nationalist parties would initially support liberalisation, but become increasingly sceptical over time. They would also be likely to be quite critical of harmonisation, supranational, legal, social, and cultural integration. Nationalist parties would also be likely to be positive to foreign policy integration.

Taking the 1989 and 1994 elections (see table 41) together (due to a lack of cases, i.e. one case for the 1989 elections) the first thing to note is the lack of development in the manifestos. A large number of responses showed no overall position towards the individual dimensions. Furthermore some of the parties were much more positive than expected – the Italian AN, and also the LN. The German REP was negative towards liberalisation, harmonisation, supranational and cultural integration. In 1994 they focused their manifesto being extremely critical of harmonisation and foreign policy integration. The French FN focused on different dimensions being strongly negative towards liberalisation, extremely negative towards supranational integration and offered minor criticisms of cultural integration. The two more positive cases were as follows. The Italian AN strongly supported liberalisation, social and foreign policy integration, while offering minor support to cultural integration. It was slightly critical of supranational integration. The LN used minor negative discourse towards liberalisation, but was positive towards harmonisation and cultural integration. It was strongly positive towards supranational, legal and foreign policy integration.

Table 41 – Nationalist Party Positions and Confirmation/Rejection of Hypotheses 1989-1994:

Year	Party	Forms of Integration						
		Economic Liberalisation	Economic Harmonisation	Supranational Integration	Legal Integration	Social Integration	Cultural Integration	Foreign Policy Integration
1989	German REP	Minor Negative	Extreme Negative	Extreme Negative	No Overall	No Overall	Extreme Negative	No Overall
		No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
1994	French FN	Strong Negative	No Overall	Extreme Negative	No Overall	No Overall	Minor Negative	No Overall
		No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
	German REP	No Overall	Extreme Negative	No Overall	No Overall	No Overall	-	Extreme Negative
		No	Yes	No	No	No	-	No
	Italian AN	Strong Positive	No Overall	Minor Negative	No Overall	Extreme Positive	Minor Positive	Strong Positive
		Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
	Italian LN	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Strong Positive	Strong Positive	No Overall	Minor Positive	Strong Positive
		No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes

Source: Euromanifestos Dataset 1979-200

In the 1999 elections (see table 42), there was a mix of positions amongst the parties on the majority of the dimensions. Liberalisation saw two parties using negative discourse and three using positive discourse, cultural integration saw three parties using positive discourse and two using negative discourse. The exception was supranational integration. Four out of the six parties used negative discourses with two using extremely negative arguments – the German REP and Danish DF. The trend of narrow focused manifestos continued with a large number of instances of no overall position. The French FN used extreme negative discourse towards liberalisation and strong negative discourse towards foreign policy integration. In addition, it used minor negative criticism towards harmonisation, but minor positive discourses towards social and cultural integration.

The German REP was clearly negative towards more dimensions. The party was extremely negative towards harmonisation and supranational integration, strongly negative towards cultural and foreign policy integration. Finally they used minor negative criticism towards liberalisation. The Italian AN became slightly more critical, though it still used strong positive discourse towards liberalisation and minor positive discourse towards social integration. It also used minor criticism towards supranational and cultural integration. The Italian LN was still mostly positive with minor positive discourse being used towards liberalisation, harmonisation, legal and social integration. It also used strong positive discourse towards foreign policy integration, and extremely positive discourse towards cultural integration. The Belgian FN only positioned itself on two dimensions – supranational and cultural integration – where it used extreme levels of positive discourse. Lastly, the Danish DF only positioned itself on three dimensions using strong positive levels of discourse towards liberalisation, minor negative levels of discourse towards cultural integration, and extreme levels of negative discourse towards supranational integration.

Table 42 - Nationalist Party Positions and Confirmation/Rejection of Hypotheses 1999-2004:

Year	Party	Forms of Integration						
		Economic Liberalisation	Economic Harmonisation	Supranational Integration	Legal Integration	Social Integration	Cultural Integration	Foreign Policy Integration
1999	French FN	Extreme Negative Yes	Minor Negative Yes	No Overall No	No Overall No	Minor Positive No	Minor Positive No	Strong Negative No
	German REP	Minor Negative Yes	Extreme Negative Yes	Extreme Negative Yes	No Overall No	No Overall No	Strong Negative Yes	Strong Negative No
	Italian AN	Strong Positive No	No Overall No	Minor Negative Yes	No Overall No	Minor Positive No	Minor Negative Yes	No Overall No
	Italian LN	Minor Positive No	Minor Positive No	Strong Negative Yes	Minor Positive No	Minor Positive No	Extreme Positive No	Strong Positive No
	Belgian FN	No Overall No	No Overall No	Extreme Positive No	No Overall No	No Overall No	Extreme Positive No	No Overall No
	Danish DF	Strong Positive Yes	No Overall No	Extreme Negative Yes	No Overall No	No Overall No	No Overall No	Minor Negative No
	French FN	Extreme Negative Yes	Strong Negative Yes	Extreme Negative Yes	Minor Negative Yes	No Overall No	Strong Positive No	-
	Italian AN	No Overall No	No Overall No	Extreme Negative Yes	Strong Positive No	No Overall No	Extreme Positive No	-
2004	Italian LN	Minor Negative Yes	Minor Negative Yes	Strong Negative Yes	Minor Negative Yes	Minor Positive No	Minor Positive No	-
	Belgian FN	Minor Positive No	No Overall No	Strong Negative Yes	No Overall No	No Overall No	Extreme Negative Yes	-
	Danish DF	Minor Negative Yes	No Overall No	Extreme Negative Yes	Minor Negative Yes	No Overall No	No Overall No	-
	French FN	Extreme Negative Yes	Strong Negative Yes	Extreme Negative Yes	Minor Negative Yes	No Overall No	Strong Positive No	-
	Italian AN	No Overall No	No Overall No	Extreme Negative Yes	Strong Positive No	No Overall No	Extreme Positive No	-
	Italian LN	Minor Negative Yes	Minor Negative Yes	Strong Negative Yes	Minor Negative Yes	Minor Positive No	Minor Positive No	-

Source: Euromanifestos Dataset 1989-2004

In the 2004 European elections (see table 42), the same pattern was identifiable from previous elections. On a number of dimensions there was a mix of positive and negative positions on liberalisation, legal and cultural integration. Social integration only saw those parties that positioned themselves on this dimension did so positively. The party responses towards supranational integration were similar to the 1999 election results and were mostly strong to extremely negative. The French FN used minor negative discourse towards legal integration, strong negative discourse towards harmonisation, and extremely negative discourse towards liberalisation and supranational integration. In addition, it used strong positive discourse towards cultural integration. The Italian AN used extreme negative discourse towards supranational integration, strong positive discourse towards legal integration and extreme positive discourse towards cultural integration. The Italian LN's positions shifted completely with minor negative discourse being used towards liberalisation, harmonisation and legal integration. Strong negative discourse was used towards supranational integration, but minor positive discourse was used social and cultural integration. The Belgian FN was strongly to extremely critical of supranational and cultural integration, but was shown to offer minor support to liberalisation. The Danish DF used minor negative discourse towards liberalisation and legal integration, but was extremely critical towards supranational integration.

NATIONALIST PARTIES BEHAVIOURAL PATTERNS IN THE ACCESSION GROUPS

In the 1989 election across all accession groups only one manifesto was available for analysis. The German REP was negative towards liberalisation, harmonisation, supranational and cultural integration. In particular it was extremely negative towards harmonisation, supranational and cultural integration. With the remaining dimensions of legal, social and foreign policy integration the party took no overall position.

In the 1994 elections, the ‘original six’ accession group showed very little uniformity in its behaviour. Liberalisation saw both the French FN and Italian LN take negative positions. The Italian AN took a strong positive position and the German REP had no overall position. This behaviour was very similar to that observed for supranational integration. Across all the dimensions there is at least one case of a party taking no overall position – with legal integration (Italian LN – strong positive) and social integration (Italian AN – extreme positive) only one party took a position with the remainder having no overall position.

In the 1999 elections, the ‘original six’ accession group again saw very little uniformity in the behaviour of parties across the dimensions. The only possible exception to this was the three parties who positioned themselves negatively towards supranational integration, although all used the discourse to massively varying degrees. With the dimensions of liberalisation, harmonisation, cultural integration and foreign policy integration support is ‘fairly’ evenly divided between negative support, no overall position and positive support. The 1973 accession group only had one nationalist party with manifestos available – the Danish DF. In this election it did not develop many positions towards the dimensions – being strongly positive towards liberalisation, extremely negative towards supranational integration and using minor negative discourse towards foreign policy integration. It had no overall position towards the remaining dimensions.

In the 2004 elections, the “original six” accession group saw a slight increase in the uniformity of the behaviour of nationalist parties. All parties were negative towards supranational integration, and three out of four parties (the Belgian FN was the exception) were positive towards cultural integration. Social integration only saw the Italian LN take a position (minor positive); with liberalisation, harmonisation and legal integration seeing the parties ‘fairly’ evenly divided between negative support, no overall position and positive support. The 1973 accession group party – the

Danish DF still had a manifesto lacking development towards the dimensions of harmonisation, social and cultural integration. It shifted its support towards liberalisation using minor negative discourse, and was extremely negative towards supranational and legal integration, taking similar positions to the French FN and Italian LN on the relevant dimensions.

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

The results show that only liberalisation and supranational integration had significant number of confirmed positive returns, with most dimensions seeing a partial confirmation. Although the positions did not completely conform to the predictions for all parties, the behaviour of parties in the 1989 and 1994 European elections was broadly in line with existing theoretical understandings of nationalist party behaviour. Focusing on the behaviour of the Italian AN, at first one could argue that its strongly positive support for liberalisation, social and foreign policy integration and minor support for cultural integration suggests an exception, an outlier or a case which could question previously held assumptions. However, Mudde (2007: 168-169) has already noted that parties have accepted a free trade area, though with strict controls on imports from outside, as well as a few parties calling a social Europe, and some calling for a Europe to be independent of NATO. Even the minor support for cultural integration, has previously been observed in that parties have treated Europe in an almost mythical fashion. Neither can the Italian LN's behaviour be taken as another outlier between 1994 and 1999 when it was supportive of most processes of European integration and in 2004 became much more sceptic towards most processes of integration – with the exception of social and cultural integration. This has been explored elsewhere (see Quaglia, 2003) and can be explained by the LN secessionist claims for the north of Italy first being helped by regional policies being developed in the EU, and then post-EMU hampering its aims.

Examining the remaining results one can note the extreme heterogeneity of the family and that with the possible exceptions of liberalisation (as of 2004), supranational integration and cultural integration, party positions towards aspects of integration remain grounded in national contextual factors. This is evidenced by the lack of uniformity across the parties and over the time period. However, theoretically one can support the conclusion that parties remain wedded to the concept of national sovereignty and are extremely hostile to transfers of sovereignty to the European Union. Yet they remain taken with the vision of Europe in a cultural sense and this is somewhat surprising given how nationalist parties are grounded in the nation state.

EUROSCEPTIC GREEN PARTIES:

The analysis of the results was able to identify that the following parties could be classified as Eurosceptic:

- Belgian AGALEV – towards liberalisation and foreign policy integration in 1989;
- German Greens – towards supranational integration in 1994;
- British Green Party – towards supranational integration in 1989; towards liberalisation and supranational integration in 1994; and finally towards harmonisation, supranational integration and social integration in 1999.
- Swedish Greens – towards harmonisation, supranational integration and foreign policy integration in 1995; and towards supranational integration in 2004;

As one can observe that there are Eurosceptic Green parties across the accession groups and amongst both core and peripheral members. However, post-1994 it is only those peripheral member states that have continued to see Eurosceptic behaviour. Interestingly, the few Green parties, which could be considered Eurosceptic, did not necessarily share similar criticisms. Three of the parties – the German Greens, the British Greens and the Swedish Greens were critical towards supranational integration. Two of the parties were critical towards liberalisation – the Belgian AGALEV and British Green party. In addition, the Belgian AGALEV and Swedish Greens were critical of foreign policy. However, these were not necessarily during the same election campaign and hence would almost certainly been reactions to different political stimuli.

COMPARATIVE OBSERVATIONS

This thesis had hypothesized that the Green parties would exhibit negative discourse towards all dimensions, with the exception of social integration (where the Greens would have no overall position). During the 1989 European elections (see table 43), the Green parties that took part did not fit the predictions particularly well. Indeed they adopted much more positive discourse in addressing the underlying issues represented by the integration dimensions.

There was still a pattern of negative discourse towards liberalization across all but the Belgian E.F. Ecologists (who adopted a minor positive position). None of the parties engaged with the issue of harmonisation. The surprising results were the positions towards supranational integration (the Luxembourg Greens saw supranational integration extremely positively and the Belgian AGALEV who used minor positive discourse); towards social integration (all but the Luxembourg Greens adopted a position – demonstrating minor to strong positive support); and foreign policy integration – where three parties adopted minor positive support (German Greens, Belgian E.F. Ecologists and the British Greens).

Table 43 - Green Party Positions and Confirmation/Rejection of Hypotheses 1989-1994:

Year	Party	Forms of Integration						
		Economic Liberalisation	Economic Harmonisation	Supranational Integration	Legal Integration	Social Integration	Cultural Integration	Foreign Policy Integration
1989	German Greens	Minor Negative	No Overall	Minor Negative	No overall	Strong Positive	Minor Negative	Minor Positive
		Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
	Luxembourg Greens	Minor Negative	No Overall	Extreme Positive	No Overall	No Overall	No Overall	No Overall
		Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
	Belgian E.F. Ecologists	Minor Positive	No Overall	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Negative	Minor Positive
		No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
	Belgian AGALEV	Strong Negative	No Overall	Minor Positive	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	No Overall	Strong Negative
		Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
1994	German Greens	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Strong Negative	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Strong Positive
		Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
	Luxembourg Greens	Minor Negative	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	No Overall	Minor Positive
		Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
	Dutch GL	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Negative	Strong Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive
		Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
	Belgian E.F. Ecologists	Minor Negative	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Extreme Positive	Minor Negative	Minor Positive
		Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No
	Belgian AGALEV	Minor Negative	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Negative
		Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
	British Greens	Strong Negative	Minor Negative	Extreme Negative	No Overall	Minor Positive	No Overall	Minor Positive
		Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
	(1995) Swedish Greens	Minor Negative	Extreme Negative	Extreme Negative	No Overall	No Overall	Minor Negative	Strong Negative
		Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
	(1996) Finnish VL Greens	No Overall	Minor Negative	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Strong Positive	No Overall	Strong Positive
		No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
(1996) Austrian GA	Minor Negative	Minor Negative	Minor Negative	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	Minor Positive	
	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	

Source: Euromanifestos Dataset 1979-2004

The results were surprising as certainly during the 1980s the EC was seen as promoting a neo-liberal agenda – it was moving quickly towards the realization of the single market project and a key architect of this was the European Commission. In addition for Greens to show support towards social and foreign policy integration was also interesting as many of the parties were still very much single issue (hence the surprise of developing a discourse towards social policy) and very much peace promoting.

During the 1994³⁷ European elections (see table 43), the only party to closely follow the pattern of behaviour established in the theoretical chapter and hypotheses was the Swedish Greens. The party showed minor to extreme negative discourse towards liberalisation, harmonisation, supranational, cultural and foreign policy integration.¹ The Swedish Green party has previously been identified as a protest based Eurosceptic party (see Taggart, 1998: 368) so the fact that it met all the hypothesised positions is of little surprise. Interestingly, Bomberg (2002: 33) noted that Swedish Greens, were wary of supranational integration in the form of a “superstate”, but were supportive of co-operation traditional green issue areas. It was possible to observe developing patterns across all of the Green parties – the continued rejection of economic liberalisation, the developing support for social integration and the growing support for foreign policy integration. The parties were mostly negative towards economic harmonisation and for supranational integration there was a cluster of minor support by the Luxembourg, Dutch and Belgian Green parties. Finally, with legal integration support fluctuated and a pattern of behaviour is difficult to identify. However support could be found amongst the German Greens, Luxembourg Greens, Belgian E.F. Ecologists, the Finnish VL Greens and Austrian GA.

³⁷ It was acknowledged that the new member states had elections later in the electoral term, but for the purpose of the study they were included in with the positions towards the 1994 European elections.

In the 1999 European election (see table 44) none of the Green parties fitted the pattern of behaviour established in the theoretical chapter. Indeed, 1999 saw substantial changes to the observable positions across the party family. There was the start of a visible reorientation with the dimension of economic liberalisation. While there is an obvious continuation of criticism towards the dimension, the Luxembourg Greens, Dutch GL and the Swedish Greens have shifted towards espousing minor to strong levels of positive discourse. Patterns of support towards legal, social and foreign policy integration have become established. With the exception of two parties who adopted no overall position (the Belgian AGALEV and Finnish VL Greens) all of the parties demonstrated minor positive support. The British Greens were the only party to strongly critique social integration, the remainder offered minor to strong positive support (the Swedish Greens had no overall position).

With the exception of three parties – the Belgian AGALEV, Irish Greens and Swedish Greens (who demonstrated minor negative criticism) – the remaining parties showed minor to strong positive support towards foreign policy integration. Supranational integration saw four parties support the process, however the only continuity from the previous election was by the Luxembourg Greens and Dutch GL and therefore a pattern is difficult to discern. This is very similar to economic harmonisation. Two parties supported the processes – the German Greens, and Belgian E.F. Ecologists, three parties adopted no overall position and five parties showed minor to strong negative discourse (Dutch GL, Belgian AGALEV, British Greens, Irish Greens, and Austrian GA).

Finally in 2004 (see table 44), it was possible to observe the continuation of the reorientation in positions towards liberalisation. Seven parties now supported the process – German Greens, Luxembourg Greens, GL, E.F. Ecologists, Belgian AGALEV, and the Swedish Greens. There was clear support amongst the original members by this stage, and a clear rejection by parties from the

1973 entrants, but this pattern of behaviour amongst other accession groups did not continue. Neither was it possible to observe behavioural patterns consistent with core and peripheral members. Economic harmonisation remained a dimension of less importance to Green parties – seven parties demonstrated no overall position. One party supported the process (Dutch GL) and three parties criticised it (Swedish Greens, Finnish VL Greens and Austrian GA. Like with liberalisation, supranational integration has seen support grow, though there was not a discernable reorientation of the entire party family. Seven parties demonstrated minor to extreme positive positions (Dutch GL, Belgian E.F. Ecologists, Belgian AGALEV, Irish Greens, Finnish VL Greens, and the Austrian GA). Support for legal and social integration continued in a similar pattern to that of previous elections. Finally, with cultural integration sporadic support amongst Green parties continued in a similar fashion to previous elections. The German Greens, the Luxembourg Greens, Dutch GL, Finnish VL Greens and Austrian GA all demonstrated minor support, whereas the two Belgian Green parties, and the British Greens all demonstrated minor to strong levels of negative discourse.

Table 44: Green Party Positions and Confirmation/Rejection of Hypotheses 1999-2004:

Year	Party	Forms of Integration							
		Economic Liberalisation	Economic Harmonisation	Supranational Integration	Legal Integration	Social Integration	Cultural Integration	Foreign Policy Integration	
1999	German Greens	Minor Negative Yes	Minor Positive No	Minor Negative Yes	Minor Positive No	Minor Positive No	Minor Positive No	Strong Positive No	
	Luxembourg Greens	Minor Positive No	No overall No	Strong Positive No	Minor Positive No	Strong Positive No	No Overall No	Strong Positive No	
	Dutch GL	Minor Positive No	Minor Negative Yes	Strong Positive No	Minor Positive No	Minor Positive No	Minor Positive No	Minor Positive No	
	Belgian E.F. Ecologists	Minor Negative Yes	Minor Positive No	No Overall No	Minor Positive No	Strong Positive No	Minor Negative Yes	Minor Positive No	
	Belgian AGALEV	Minor Negative Yes	Minor Negative Yes	Strong Positive No	No Overall No	Minor Positive No	Minor Positive No	Minor Negative Yes	
	British Greens	Minor Negative Yes	Strong Negative Yes	Strong Negative Yes	Minor Positive No	Strong Negative No	No Overall No	Minor Positive No	
	Irish Greens	Minor Negative Yes	Minor Negative Yes	Minor Negative Yes	Minor Positive No	Minor Positive No	No Overall No	Minor Negative Yes	
	Swedish Greens	Strong Positive No	No Overall No	Minor Negative Yes	Minor Positive No	No Overall Yes	Minor Negative Yes	Minor Negative Yes	
	Finnish VL Greens	Minor Negative Yes	No Overall No	No Overall No	No Overall No	Strong Positive No	No Overall No	Strong Positive No	
	Austrian GA	Minor Negative Yes	Minor Negative Yes	Minor Positive No	Minor Positive No	Minor Positive No	Minor Positive No	Strong Positive No	
	2004	German Greens	Minor Positive No	No overall No	Minor Negative Yes	Minor Positive No	Minor Positive No	Minor Positive No	-
		Luxembourg Greens	Minor Positive No	No overall No	Minor Negative Yes	Minor Positive No	Minor Positive No	Minor Positive No	-
		Dutch GL	Minor Positive No	Minor Positive No	Extreme Positive No	Minor Positive No	Minor Positive No	Minor Positive No	-
		Belgian E.F. Ecologists	Minor Positive No	No Overall No	Minor Positive No	Minor Positive No	Minor Positive No	Minor Negative Yes	-
		Belgian AGALEV	Minor Positive No	No Overall No	Minor Positive No	Minor Positive No	Minor Positive No	Minor Negative Yes	-
		British Greens	Minor Negative Yes	Minor Negative Yes	Minor Negative Yes	No Overall No	Minor Positive No	Minor Negative Yes	-
		Irish Greens	Minor Negative Yes	No Overall No	Strong Positive No	Minor Positive No	Minor Positive No	No Overall No	-
		Swedish Greens	Minor Positive No	Minor Negative Yes	Strong Negative Yes	Minor Negative Yes	No Overall Yes	No Overall No	-
Finnish VL Greens		Minor Negative Yes	Minor Negative Yes	Minor Positive No	Minor Positive No	Minor Positive No	Minor Positive No	-	
Austrian GA		Minor Negative Yes	Minor Negative Yes	Strong Positive No	Strong Positive No	Minor Positive No	Minor Positive No	-	

Source: Euromanifestos Dataset 1979-2004

GREEN PARTY BEHAVIOURAL PATTERNS IN ACCESSION GROUPS

Separating Green parties into their accession groups does not immediately throw up clear identifiable patterns of behaviour. No parties fulfilled the hypotheses in the group of 'original six'. In 1989, three out of the four parties used negative liberalisation (the Belgian E.F. Ecologists were the exception). All the parties had no overall position towards harmonisation with the remainder of dimensions seeing very fragmented and heterogeneous positions – supranational integration saw two parties supportive of the process (Luxembourg Greens and Belgian AGALEV) and two against (German Greens and E.F. Ecologists). Amongst the 1973 entrants, the analysis suffers from too few cases – the only party was the British Greens in 1989. At this point in the time series, the behaviour was extremely similar to that of the previous group; however the party was much more negative towards supranational integration.

In 1994, there were clearer patterns of behaviour towards four dimensions. All parties used minor negative discourse towards liberalisation. Four out of five parties used minor positive discourse towards supranational integration (the exception was the German Greens). All parties supported social integration and finally four out of five parties supported foreign policy integration (the exception was Belgian AGALEV). The 1973 group still had only one Green party during the 1994 elections and again its behaviour was fairly consistent with that of the original six, but was altogether more negative towards the first three dimensions – liberalisation, harmonisation and supranational integration. In the 1995 accession group, the three parties – Swedish Greens, Finnish VL Greens, and Austrian GA – were, like the 1973 accession group, strongly negative towards liberalisation, harmonisation and supranational integration (the exception was the Finnish VL Greens towards liberalisation – no overall position). Two of three parties were positive towards legal, social and foreign policy integration.

By 1999, the behaviour was fragmented towards liberalisation, harmonisation and supranational integration. The majority of parties were supportive of legal and foreign policy integration, and all

parties supported social integration. In the 1973 accession group, the behaviour by the British and Irish Greens was more homogenous and more negative. Both were negative towards liberalisation, harmonisation and supranational integration. Both were positive towards legal integration and both demonstrated no overall position towards cultural integration. The remaining dimensions showed no clear pattern. In the 1995 accession group, the positions were much more fragmented. Two of the parties clearly remained negative towards liberalisation, but positive towards social and foreign policy integration (Finnish VL Greens and Austrian GA). In addition, the Swedish Greens and Austrian GA also supported legal integration.

Finally, in 2004 the results for the original six were more homogenous. All parties supported liberalisation, legal, and social integration. The majority of parties from the group also supported supranational and cultural integration. The British and Irish Greens from the 1973 accession group remained negative towards liberalisation, but were positive towards social integration. On the remaining dimensions no clear pattern of behaviour emerged. The 1995 group clearly remained sceptical of some of the dimensions, unlike the original six. Two of the parties were critical of liberalisation and all were critical of harmonisation. With the remainder of the dimensions the majority of parties were supportive.

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

The results demonstrate important theoretical implications for the understanding of Green party behaviour towards the processes of European integration. It was clear at first that the process of liberalisation did indeed represent the potential for the promotion of market structuring which would allow uncontrollable growth and unchecked this could endanger political movements that aimed to ensure environmental negative externalities of industrial development and activity be taken into account. Between 1989 and 1994 there was a continuous pattern of criticism towards the process. This continued amongst Green parties in the 1973, 1995 and 2004 accession groups. However, amongst the original six member states, their Green parties, by 2004, had accepted the

process and all used minor positive discourse in their manifestos. As noted in the hypotheses chapter, there was the potential for integration to allow for capitalism to be regulated and the market to be governed at a much greater scale than a purely national level would allow. Greens also would have seen the potential to provide structures to promote ecological balance as key policy goal.

While there was a discernible shift in behaviour with the dimension of liberalisation, Green parties did not significantly alter their behaviour towards economic harmonisation. In 1989, it was of little interest, but by 1994, with the exception of two parties, the remainder rejected the process. This remained the case during the 1999 and 2004 elections, though for some it was of little significance. Theoretically one can posit that EMU and more generally harmonisation policies have done little, if anything, to encourage the use of local produce, local goods and services, and what harmonisation makes easier is the transport of goods across Europe which is so at odds with the aims to decrease carbon emissions. This can bring the question that if this is the case, then why has there been an observable shift towards minor support towards liberalisation? EMU and its one-size fit all monetary policy will generally be altered on the basis of core economies, with a detrimental effect towards the peripheries. If the businesses of the peripheral regions cannot compete, then surely it will become a net importer – totally at odds with encouraging an ecological balance.

The observations noted a general increase in the support for supranational integration, though a few parties did remain critical throughout the period. Initially however, the majority of the Green parties did not support the process of further transfers of sovereignty to Brussels. This behaviour initially does seem to fit with the argument in the hypotheses chapter that are fearful of both a ‘super-state’ developing and a further distancing from the citizens of the Union (see Freedon, 1996:540-542; Bomberg, 1998:2). Furthermore, with the observable shift it supports the second argument in the hypotheses chapter that Green parties may well see supranational integration as a

potential source of directives and legislation, which may allow the overcoming of the collective action problem.

A clear line of behaviour was observable with legal integration and this did contradict the arguments posited by the hypotheses chapter. Initially it was theorized that legal integration would be seen as a threat as it is essentially imposed from the supranational body to national political structures, as well as regional bodies. However, legal integration also provides opportunities for Green action as EU law constructed in the first pillar regulates the single market and this provides opportunities for laws and directives that can force or encourage member states to take account of the environmental impact of the economy.

Also noted in the comparative observations was the large-scale support towards social integration across all the elections. The hypotheses chapter noted that Green movements could indeed contain socialist elements (Freedon, 1996: 526). This in one respect can be interpreted as Green parties attempting to broaden their appeal by espousing elements of socialist ideology, and on the other supporting attempts to mitigate the externalities which will clearly exist between regions of the EU despite the move towards more regulated capitalism. As stated in the hypotheses, it was expected that due to social policies being mostly directed at the populations of Europe, rather than having a wider scope which would help alleviate poverty in the third-world, this would lead to critical discourses. This has not been the case. However, the EU is a large donor of aid to the third-world, though this was not reflected in the content analysis.

Cultural integration was difficult to analyse, as the pattern is not completely homogenous amongst the party family, the accession groups within the party family, and also the core/peripheral relationship within the party family. Initially it was hypothesised that Greens may well view the EU as neither European nor a Community and should not be exclusive (Bomberg, 1998:62). Yet there are a clear number of parties, which have supported cultural integration. Pro-

cultural integration was constructed on the basis of the following variables: National way of life: Negative; Immigration: Positive (European level); and European Way of Life: Positive. Therefore, the extensive use of minor positive discourse is somewhat of a surprise and needs further research. One can put forward an explanation that any policy which promotes a view beyond the national, which fosters a spirit of co-operation, and distances citizens from nationalist rivalries, can further help the cause of Green and Ecological movements.

Finally, foreign policy integration saw extensive use of positive discourse across all Green political parties and across the three elections³⁸. This has significant implications for the theoretical understanding of the behaviour of Green parties. Previously this thesis argued that traditionally Green/ecological parties have been opposed to military expenditure and action (Poguntke, 1993:10). However, this result could be seen as surprising. However, returning to how the positive aspects of the dimension were constructed using the following variables: Foreign Special Relationships: Positive (European-level), Military: Positive (European-level), Peace (European-level), Anti-Imperialism (European-level), Internationalism: Positive (European-level), one can see that the Green parties may well support all of these variables, bar the creation of a military level at the EU-level. Certainly build up of the EU as a soft power and distancing of the EU from the Cold War institutions of NATO could be seen as positive in the eyes of Green parties. This is something, which needs further research.

³⁸ Unfortunately, this was not coded as part of the 2004 set of data for the Euromanifestos Project and hence has had to be treated as missing.

SUMMARY

The overall argument of the thesis has been that in order to understand party positions towards European integration, a much more dynamic, as well as nuanced definition and framework was needed in order to fully understand the way in which the process has developed and how parties compete towards the issue. Furthermore, on the issue of how parties compete towards European integration, it is strongly influenced by the ideological predispositions of political parties, seen through the party family lens. As stated earlier ideology is historically grounded, but significantly it is not a fixed entity. Essentially party ideology is not a tether, and not a straightjacket in forcing political parties to take certain policy decisions, but provides a framework for how to parties should respond to developments.

The results in this chapter strongly highlighted the impact of ideology on party positions towards European integration, and especially with respect to the positions taken by Eurosceptic political parties. As such there were aspects of ideological impact in the positions of all party families. The framework underlined the argument that parties interpret Euroscepticism in terms of multiple processes and structure their responses based on a nuanced understanding of European integration. The definition identified a much larger set of Eurosceptic parties within each party family. However, when generalising about the entire party family, rather than a Eurosceptic subset, patterns of behaviour seem to be more easily discernible amongst the left wing parties than right wing. This is not say that the individual party families on the left were homogeneous, but the right appeared more fragmented, and the Agrarian party family suffered from a lack of available cases.

Beyond this, the chapter has pulled out important behavioural aspects that were previously under-researched. With the Liberals, despite being generally seen as fairly pro-European as a party family, the evidence gathered does suggest that this is not necessarily always the case. With such a broad nature to its party ideology, integration developments were undoubtedly going to

impinge on traditional Liberal positions to issues – hence the identification of five Eurosceptic Liberal parties during the time-scale. The economic-liberal element remained strong throughout the period, with harmonisation also becoming strongly supported. Despite the existence of Liberal-Conservative parties, most parties became broadly supportive towards social integration, as well as supranational integration. Interestingly cultural integration never really became a salient issue for the Liberals. Foreign policy was popular for all Liberal parties (with only a small number of exceptions). Importantly the Liberal-Radical and Liberal-Conservative distinctions became less obvious over time and by 2004 the majority were supportive of all but cultural integration.

The results for Conservative parties demonstrate the scepticism predicted towards the newer dimensions of integration – social, cultural and foreign policy was ill-founded. On the whole Conservative parties were supportive of the process. However, the party family clearly views the national arena as the most appropriate policy domain given the levels of negative discourse towards supranational integration, and one can therefore extrapolate that while they are broadly supportive of other measures, these should be achieved through intergovernmental co-operation rather than supranational policy transfers to the European Union. The one case that stands out, of course, is the British Conservatives who have become very sceptical towards integration beyond the economic sphere despite earlier support. However, this party is very much the case of British exceptionalism and is an example of the exception rather than the rule when considering broad party family trends.

Given the size of the Socialist and Social Democratic party family, to have only six Eurosceptic parties identified during the fifteen year period indicates the decreasing salience of Eurosceptic discourses for the party family. The results found a high level of conformity between the observed positions and the hypotheses providing very strong indication that ideology does have predictive power in this case. However, the expected shift in the positions of Socialist and Social Democratic party support for European integration took place much earlier and hence there was

little evidence of this from 1989 onwards. It was for the most part a supportive party family, hence the provisos in the hypotheses turned out to be unnecessary and incorrect. Theoretically, the results confirm previous academic explanations indicating that the shift in support has seen Socialist and Social Democratic parties make use of Europe as an agent of change in their own countries. Given the lack of opportunity to achieve social democratic goals at the national level, given the impact of domestic pressure groups, business organisations and the potential for the exit of foreign direct investment, straying too far from the path of a liberalised market/lightly mixed economy, social democratic parties have shifted their work to the supranational level in an attempt to soften the impact of the market. This is clearly supported by the evidence of the positive discourses used towards social integration and for the most part liberalisation and supranational integration.

One cannot discount the pro-European nature of the Christian Democrats, given that they have been a driving force behind the European integration project. Johansson (2002: 880-887) identified several ideological traits, which were present in the European People's Party (the EP group which mainly consists of Centre-Right parties – especially the Christian Democrats). They emphasised integration along federal lines, as well as the Christian vision of man. This formed the basis for concepts such as subsidiarity, personalism, and the social market. He also noted that before the Maastricht Treaty the EPP called for a federal constitution, commitments to a strong single currency, institutional adaptation – including the power of co-decision, the reinforcement of executive power and the political role for the Commission. In addition, social policy was seen as the most important for the heads of the EPP. None of the results contradict these ideological traits, but one can argue that developments in supranational and cultural integration have seen critical reactions from some of the most pro-European parties.

Fundamentally, the results showed that (post)-Communists in general have rejected the major processes of European integration, with only a handful that have reacted more positively –

though the use of positive discourse amongst these has been extremely limited to the very few post-Communist parties which were identifiable (the Italian PDS and Spanish IU). There appears to be a consistent left-wing critique to the classic dimensions of integration – liberalisation, harmonisation and supranational integration. However, the really significant findings to come out of the study is that the far left have not completely rejected the utilisation of European structures, and hence Eurosceptic discourse does not extend to the dimensions of social policy integration and foreign policy integration, though very different explanations can be posited for this – the mitigation of negative externalities of the internal market, which cannot necessarily be achieved at the national level; and the latter to promote defence structures away from American domination.

The number of Western Europe Agrarian parties, which have had available European manifestos, was incredibly small, but on a whole the party family has few members. Both parties were Eurosceptic during the period and this appears to be as a result of ideological responses derived from the centre-periphery cleavage – for both harmonisation and supranational integration. There appeared to be considerable discomfort for the transfers of sovereignty away from nation states, this is despite the growth in the involvement of regions in policy-making – the growth in the Committee of the Regions and subsidiarity rules. However, the levels did reduce and indeed the SK re-orientated itself. The two surprising results were the lack of engagement with cultural discourses, as one would have expected rural parties to be critical of any impact on their cultural distinctiveness, and also the level of acceptance of economic liberalisation, which has exposed their constituencies to further competition and potential erosion of success in certain markets, though it also opens up access to new markets. This may have been because of the need to widen their appeal, as Batory and Sitter, 2004: 523-527) suggested, but there appeared to be no encroachment on the ideological territory of the extreme nationalist right.

Ethno-regionalist party ideology has been impacted on by two historical cleavage structures – the centre-periphery cleavage and urban-rural cleavage. Despite parties being derived from these two social conflicts, they have produced a wide variety of ideological responses and hence the party family is quite heterogeneous. As such the hypotheses proved to be ineffective in predicting party responses to the various processes of European integration. However, the study has illuminated the way in which regionalist parties respond to the supranational level, and it is clear that despite previous academic findings, it is a highly Eurosceptic party family, with a particular fear of transfers of sovereignty as well as legal provisions. What this tells the observer is that despite an increase in the potential for these parties to engage in policy making and subverting the traditional national barriers, it is still seen critically. However, regionalist parties as a group appear to be somewhat pragmatic and have demonstrated that social and foreign policy integration does appeal, suggesting that these peripheral regions see the opportunity that these integration areas provide. The fascinating result however was the clear debate surrounding the impact of liberalisation on these peripheral regions. Support fell over the period from post-Maastricht until this was reversed in the 2004 election, indicating the removal of non-tariff barriers was feared due to the potential to open up these more fragile regional economies to a more extensive free-market regime, though it appears that many came to accept this process later on.

One can see that the results were derived from a small sample of Western European nationalist parties. However, all nationalist parties during the period were Eurosceptic during the period, with all being critical of supranational integration. However, only the German REP and French FN extended this to further dimensions such as economic, cultural and foreign policy integration. The treatment of European integration by nationalist parties remains quite heterogeneous despite the more nuanced examination of the integration process. However, one can clearly see that nationalist parties remain wedded to the superiority of the nation state in terms of sovereignty as well as legally when this was threatened by the Constitutional debates during the early 2000s and

towards the run up to the 2004 European elections. The traditional toolkit of the nationalist party appeared to be used less. Two of Stöss's (1991 in Ramet, 1999: 6) four characteristics – that of exaggerated nationalism with hostile attitudes towards other states and/or peoples; and folk-ethnocentric element appeared less obvious in the majority of nationalist parties. The potential for Europe to be treated in an almost mythical fashion appeared plausible from its treatment by the Belgian FN, Italian AN, and Italian LN³⁹, but nonetheless the results have been very surprising. Furthermore, across the time period, the number of no overall positions suggested the focus of the election campaign concentrated on other issues to a greater extent than other parties (see chapter four for the mean average utilisation of various policy discourses).

Finally, the results and theoretical discussion have shown that the Green party family underwent considerable discussion and reorientation towards European integration. However, the patterns of policy shift did differ from dimension to dimension. There was only limited evidence of behaviour in European elections conforming to previously established and hypothesised positions. Essentially, far from embracing European integration, the party family has taken a pragmatic approach to the integration process and have adapted their positions in order to maximise the opportunities available at the European level. This has been particularly evident with the economic integration process. Liberalisation for the Green parties of the original six was seen more positively by the 2004 elections; however the pattern of behaviour across the accession groups for economic harmonisation did not significantly change across the time period. In addition the Greens shifted from viewing supranational developments critically to seeing the potential for Green directives and legislation beyond the nation state. The support for Legal integration was also understandable as it provided for the enforcement of Green standards and legislation.

³⁹ Although one can justifiably argue that the Lega Nord can be seen as a regionalist party.

CONCLUSION

In addressing the research question of how do parties use Eurosceptic arguments in European election campaigns, the thesis contributed to the existing literature, by arguing that the Euroscepticism and indeed the entire European integration process needed to be understood as a more dynamic and nuanced. In addition, in order to understand the way in which parties compete on the issue of integration, a multi-dimensional framework was needed which would allow the subtle, and also the more obvious variations in party positions to be understood.

It argued that ideology remained the strongest causal factor in structuring party responses. However, party ideology was not to be seen as a straightjacket, or historically fixed, but more of an evolving entity which allowed parties to adapt their positions towards the individual processes. The unit of analysis put forward here was that of the party family. This was due to their broader nature and their ability to take account of party evolution. This was a more appropriate choice than that of cleavage structures, which were seen as much more of fixed historical entity, and the left-right dimension to which the thesis questioned the continued relevance, and the difficulties in applying cross-nationally.

A clear area where the understanding of party competition towards the issue of European integration was lacking was in European elections. The research put forward the argument that despite the second-order nature of non-national elections, the issue of Europe in European elections was still important, and in the context of election manifestos was likely to have greater salience than previously thought. This linked in with the chosen methodological approach of the thesis which focused on a quantitative strategy of examining political party manifestos which allowed a large-scale large-n comparison of multiple parties from fifteen member state countries, and importantly enough data to analyse the nuanced policy positions taken by political parties during election campaigns. The improvement in the way that Euroscepticism was conceptualised

was demonstrated by the results generated from its application. As chapter six showed, the multi-dimensional conception of Euroscepticism identified a significantly greater number of Eurosceptic parties overall, as well as in each party family. With only a few exceptions, the definition correctly identified all Eurosceptic parties, which had been identified through the use of the single dimension of support and opposition towards the EU.

The importance of the use of the multi-dimensional framework was underlined by the data analysed. The multicollinearity tests revealed that the individual dimensions did not share much of the variance in party positions, but the analyses confirmed that parties do take positions on those issues, and secondly that they compete on those issues as well. The analyses from chapter five did suggest that the more traditional patterns of competition related better to those dimensions which related to long-established processes, but as chapter six confirmed, Eurosceptic behaviour, as well as more supportive pro-European behaviour from various party families were captured on the newer processes – such as social, cultural and foreign policy integration.

The research found that not only are European issues more important than previously thought, but they constitute the most salient issue within the European election party manifestos of parties from all nine party families included in the analyses: Liberal, Conservative, Socialist and Social Democratic, Christian Democratic, (post)-Communist, Agrarian, Ethno-regionalist, Nationalist and final Green/Ecologist parties. However, what was critical to being able to generalise out from how parties compete on the issue of European elections was to analyse whether the predicted behaviour of parties differed substantially from national to European elections. Initially it was identified that there were far more Eurosceptic parties identifiable through the use of the European manifesto data compared to the national manifesto data when utilising the same single dimension of support versus opposition to the EU. This suggested that parties might interpret the arena as a potential area where they could behave more Eurosceptically than in the national

elections. However, the multiple regression analyses confirmed that while not conclusive, the behaviour between elections was similar in terms of the strength and direction of relevant coefficients under test – party family and country dummies, general ideological variables, and the alternative theories which had been posited for Eurosceptic causation. This was an extremely important finding in illuminating the way in which parties compete in different elections on the issue of European integration.

The results from the thesis again underlined the importance of ideology as a strong causal factor in determining the way in which parties respond to the processes of European integration. It produced a number of strong and statistically significant coefficients. When taken on its own, its explanatory power declined when analysing the newer dimensions, but taken with the other causal factors under investigation in the later models it still produced some of the stronger coefficients. Overall, the explanatory power of the other causal factors were generally much weaker than party families. In the alternative theories set, the left-right dimension was only significant towards legal, social and foreign policy integration. The new politics dimension could only offer explanatory weight for the dimension of cultural integration, and finally the median voter position offered explanatory weight only for the dimension of legal integration. The country dummy variables fared better, though rarely added much to the R^2 value much.

Furthermore there were few patterns to the strength of the coefficients or their direction of support. One of the critical findings was the relationship between support for one aspect of integration and support for another dimension. It suggests that while there is clear evidence of parties taking more nuanced positions, parties supporting one particular aspect are more likely to be tied in to support another aspect, and therefore less likely to adopt Eurosceptic positions on related dimensions. It underlines the peripheral nature of the phenomenon.

The final chapter reveals that as stated above, the multi-dimensional definition and framework identified a greater number of Eurosceptic parties. The examination of their behaviour, as well as

the more general observations of party family position revealed that there remains a strong ideological component to Eurosceptic arguments, and the positioning of parties towards individual dimensions. Furthermore it has revealed important behavioural aspects of the party families.

The analyses revealed that that with the Liberals, despite their rather pro-European reputation, generated five Eurosceptic parties. The economic-liberal element of the ideology remained strong and economic integration was widely supported, and despite the existence of Liberal-Conservative parties, most of the family became supportive of social and supranational integration. With the (post)-Communist party family there appeared to be a consistent left-wing critique of the more classic dimensions of integration, but the far left did not put forward the complete rejection of European structures – they remained supportive of social and foreign policy integration. The Social Democratic family was mostly supportive and the results indicated a real shift towards seeing Europe as an opportunity to enact change within their own countries.

The Christian Democrats again were somewhat of a surprise. They have remained the driving force behind the process of integration, but have developed some critical reactions towards some of the developments in supranational and cultural integration. Yet in comparison, the Conservative party were on the whole supportive of the process, but deeply sceptical on the transfer of sovereignty, and one was left with the conclusion that they would prefer intergovernmental cooperation in most of the newer integration fields.

The Agrarian parties lacked a significant number of cases, but they were clearly uncomfortable with the transfers of sovereignty to the supranational level, but surprisingly they did not engage in criticising cultural integration, and seemed to accept economic liberalisation. With the ethno-regionalist party family, despite being derived from the centre-periphery and urban-rural cleavage,

the parties produced a wide variety of ideological responses. They were clearly Eurosceptic with particular fears of supranational and legal integration, but the party remained heterogeneous.

All nationalist parties were Eurosceptic during the period especially towards supranational integration, but surprisingly the traditional toolkit of nationalist parties - that of cultural superiority – appeared to be utilised less when considering cultural integration in Europe. Lastly, for the Greens it was found that the party family had taken a pragmatic approach to the integration process and has adapted its position to maximise opportunities for Green policies to succeed at the supranational level.

KEY IMPACTS OF THE RESEARCH

The thesis has shown several key areas of impact for both scholars of the discipline, as well as a wider audience such as policy practitioners. For scholars of the discipline, the thesis has made important contributions to the understanding of the phenomenon surrounding the issue of conceptualisation and operationalisation, an understanding of how parties compete in European elections on the issue of Europe, and specifically how individual party families have behaved individually and as party families over the time period towards the individual aspects of integration.

With the contribution to the literature from the improved conceptualisation of Euroscepticism, the narrowing of the field of focus to the general ideas of integration and allowing the nuanced positions political parties adopt to be fully captured by further developing the multi-dimensional approach previously used by Hooghe et al (2002) and to some extent, Lubbers and Scheepers (2005). In addition, the use of a Eurosceptic measure allows a distinction to be made between those parties that espouse isolated criticisms of particular aspects of integration and those that are more regularly Eurosceptic in their behaviour.

The findings of the examination of the issue saliency measurements in chapter four have made a significant step forward in understanding how parties campaign in both national and European elections. Significantly, the results highlighted the importance of Europe in European election manifestos, which has not been previously acknowledged. Furthermore, while the regression results did not suggest that parties behaved in exactly the same way on the issue of Europe between elections, it was very significant that the behaviour was reasonably similar and that no evidence was found which would suggest that parties made significantly higher usage of Eurosceptic discourse in European elections to that of national elections. Crucially, despite the lack of evidence of a clear party system developing at the EU level, parties have scrutinized aspects of integration to a much more substantial degree in elections and specifically European elections than previously thought.

The key findings surrounding the behaviour of party families towards the individual dimensions of European integration have been mentioned above, however, particularly with the cases of some Liberal parties, Christian Democratic parties, (post)-Communist and Green parties their positions towards aspects of integration are much more nuanced than previously thought.

For policy practitioners, the findings demonstrate that political parties indicate particularly varied positions towards individual dimensions of integration. The research also allows the reader to fully appreciate how parties have developed their positions over time and where they specifically stand on a particular development.

THE APPLICABILITY OF THE MULTI-DIMENSIONAL FRAMEWORK TO OTHER CASES

A brief examination of cases in Central and Eastern Europe revealed that despite a significant number of cases where parties had not developed positions, there were clear findings to be drawn from the application of the multi-dimensional framework, though economic harmonisation and legal integration saw fewer parties take on specific positions. Focusing on the

general trends within the member states, the data revealed that across most parties there was a pattern of support for the dimension of economic liberalisation, which indicated a high level of acceptance for pro-market reforms across the new member states. There were a few exceptions where the parties in Poland, Cyprus and Malta had not developed clear positions.

Economic harmonisation across most of the new member states saw little saliency in the party manifestos. Three of the new member states (Estonia, Slovenia, and Cyprus) registered minor levels of support and critical discourses, but these formed a very minor role within the party manifestos. This was a fairly predictable result given that none of the new states were in a position to actively consider accession to the Euro-zone. A very interesting finding with the process of supranational was that strong criticisms were clearly evident, with the only two exceptions being that of parties in Hungary and Slovenia. There was a visible pattern of polarization amongst most of the party systems in the new member states.

For the dimension of legal integration, it was possible to identify a centripetal tendency in party positions being clustered around minor support and minor criticisms. This was of little surprise given the prerequisite for joining the EU was the acceptance of the extensive body of European law. A more interesting pattern emerged with the consideration of social integration. The majority of the new member states had extensive welfare provision. Therefore it was of little surprise to see the indications of the use of positive discourses. The exceptions were Poland, Slovakia and Cyprus where the parties took very minor positions. Finally with cultural integration, while there was evidence of considerable variation in party positions, there were clear patterns of negative discourse, revealing a particular critique of the promotion of more European identities.

Clearly within these states parties have begun to engage with a more multidimensional understanding of the European integration process, but there were still limits to this. The focus

on European issues was much less within the manifestos when compared to West European parties. However, with further elections, there may well be a shift by parties to consider the aspects of European integration in more detail within the Central and East European states, and hence will become an important set of cases to include in further analyses within the future. A particularly important research topic could focus on whether after four or eight years (by 2013) more specific nuanced critiques are emerging, especially as the argument was made that during the pre-accession most discourse focused on criticising issues surround the membership process (see Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2002: 27 where this was discussed).

FUTURE RESEARCH AVENUES

During the course of the thesis a number of future research avenues became apparent. In particular, when the construction of hypotheses was being considered it became clear of the lack of research towards the behaviour of Liberal, Christian Democratic, Conservative and Agrarian party families towards Europe, and indeed beyond the confines of European policy. Furthermore with a number of party families, the existing research appeared dated, especially with such a time sensitive issue such as party responses towards Europe and European policy in general. This was particularly the case with Green, (post)-Communist and Ethno-regionalist party families.

Secondly, with the time-series analyses being confined to a fifteen-year period, the opportunity to extend is also a possibility. Data is available from 1979 onwards so extending back and reviewing the developments over twenty-five years would be feasible with the EU-12. A recent development has been the commitment by the Euromanifestos team to extend the data to include 2009 European elections. This highlights the possibility of future research into a number of new cases with the 2004 and 2007 entrants in the future, as hitherto the lack of cases previous to the 2004 elections has made this impossible.

The final way in which further research could be conducted (related to the original research presented here) would be to focus more in-depth on campaign material beyond that of election

manifestos. Manifestos do indeed constitute only one aspect of an election campaign. Depending on the campaign budget of each party and the institutional rules governing election campaigns, there will be politician speeches, specific campaign literature and policy launches, newspaper reports, as well as TV and radio broadcasts, magazines and billboard adverts etc. These all are legitimate sources of party positioning data, as well as being potentially rich in revealing policy nuances. This would be potentially be a much more qualitative content analytical approach, would be much wider in scope, and would most likely require a team of researchers with specific foreign language expertise.

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APPENDIX

UNSTANDARDISED REGRESSION RESULTS

The following tables will show the unstandardised coefficients along with their standard errors in parentheses from the regression analyses in chapter four and chapter five.

SINGLE DIMENSION OF SUPPORT FOR THE EU

Table 45: National Election Regression Results

Variables	Unstandardised Coefficients (Standard Error in parenthesis)			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Constant	3.257 (.623)	3.879 (.930)	-107.338 (113.186)	-63.655 (118.856)
Party Families				
Green/Ecologist	-2.346 (.910)*	-3.053(.911)***	-2.537(.904)**	-3.321(1.044)**
Communist	-3.696 (.882)***	-4.700(.928)***	-3.618(.953)***	-3.424(1.032)***
Socialist & Social Democrats	-.543 (.827)	-1.027(.823)	-.877(.801)	-1.045(0.811)
Christian Democrat	-.066(.945)	-.410(.944)	-.572(.827)	.505(.986)
Conservative	.102(.990)	-.247(1.011)	-.208(.861)	.820(1.026)
Nationalist	-4.477 (1.234)***	-5.997(1.438)*	-2.480(1.553)	-1.225(1.726)
Agrarian	-2.091(2.219)	-1.851(2.296)	-2.901(2.008)	-.540(2.175)
Ethnic-Regional	-.187 (1.018)	-1.116(1.192)	-1.999(1.181)	-1.196(1.309)
Special Issue	-5.077(2.682)	-3.877(2.705)	-2.850(2.313)	-.541(2.476)
Country				
Sweden		-.862(1.183)	-1.570(1.063)	-2.173(1.612)
Denmark		-1.411(1.098)	-1.924(1.080)	-1.674(1.280)
Finland		-1.370(1.182)	-1.147(1.096)	-1.439(1.499)
Belgium		.385(1.037)	.082(.976)	1.045(1.150)
France		2.268(1.218)	1.379(1.083)	1.793(1.465)
Italy		.972(1.412)	-.441(1.314)	.237(1.359)
Spain		1.230(1.334)	1.151(1.296)	1.780(1.510)
Greece		-.592(1.305)	-.033(1.453)	.467(1.556)
Portugal		.613(1.634)	.488(1.424)	.349(1.486)
Germany		2.756(1.067)**	2.739(.986)**	3.363(1.186)**
Austria		-1.436(1.110)	-1.096(1.018)	-.666(1.621)
Great Britain		-1.497(1.216)	-1.829(1.108)	-1.372(1.808)
Ireland		-1.822(1.175)	-2.195(1.059)*	-.870(1.159)
Year of Election			.056(.057)	.035(.059)
General Ideological Variables				
Foreign Special Relationship: Positive			1.318(.282)***	1.304(.283)***
Foreign Special Relationship: Negative			-.043(1.235)	.040(1.243)
Military: Positive			.250(.188)	.307(.192)
Military: Negative			-.292(.165)	-.244(.167)
Internationalism: Positive			.346(.106)**	.344(.111)**
Internationalism: Negative			-.402(.179)	-.370(.185)
Decentralisation: Positive			.062(0.89)	.044(0.89)
Centralisation: Positive			-.163(.684)	.109(.685)
Free Enterprise: Positive			.096(.093)	.075(.103)
Market Regulation: Positive			-.453(.112)***	-.429(.117)***

Table 46: European Election Regression Results

Variables	Unstandardised Coefficients (Standard Error in parenthesis)			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Constant	10.76(1.93)	11.13(2.84)	24.45	-174.788
Party Families				
Conservative	1.58(2.78)	-0.65(2.89)	2.72(2.90)	8.54(3.17)**
Socialist & Social Democrats	5.22(2.40)*	4.67(2.45)	3.34(2.61)	2.81(2.58)
Christian Democrat	6.90(2.90)*	8.54(2.95)**	7.68(2.91)**	14.82(3.23)***
Communist	-16.53(2.74)***	-18.59(2.83)***	-16.93(3.13)***	-18.67(3.15)***
Agrarian	-1.98(4.74)	-2.16(4.93)	-3.01(4.90)	5.87(5.12)
Ethnic-Regional	-1.12(2.90)	-2.48(3.16)	-2.96(3.52)	-0.78(3.42)
Nationalist	-15.55(3.73)***	-23.34(4.29)***	-19.66(4.40)***	-9.99(5.19)
Green/Ecologist	-8.14 (2.78)**	-8.06(2.83)**	-9.45(3.12)**	-17.01(3.55)***
Special Issue	-14.05(10.77)	-12.54(10.71)	-12.99(14.77)	-5.55(14.36)
Country				
Sweden		-6.19(3.10)*	-6.86(3.30)*	-5.99(3.96)
Denmark		4.73(3.21)	3.59(3.44)	3.47(3.52)
Finland		5.83(3.26)	3.71(3.46)	5.09(3.93)
Belgium		0.16(3.03)	-1.14(3.06)	-3.90(3.83)
France		2.20(3.43)	2.24(3.61)	3.69(3.75)
Italy		10.95(4.26)*	7.53(4.36)	5.76(4.40)
Spain		1.59(3.16)	-0.58(3.53)	-2.12(3.45)
Greece		-4.23(4.08)	-2.03(4.46)	-3.53(4.41)
Portugal		2.58(6.34)	-0.86(6.30)	-3.76(6.23)
Germany		1.69(3.10)	-2.01(3.42)	-2.97(3.55)
Austria		-6.38(3.42)	-9.66(3.56)**	-7.18(4.59)
Great Britain		-0.88(3.19)	0.49(3.64)	0.08(4.25)
Ireland		-1.87(3.40)	-4.07(3.53)	-6.95(3.83)
Year of Election			-0.01(0.16)	0.10(0.16)
General Ideological Variables				
Foreign Special Relationship: Positive			-0.06(0.19)	-0.01(0.18)
Foreign Special Relationship: Negative			0.16(0.46)	0.27(0.44)
Military: Positive			-0.12(0.13)	-0.19(0.13)
Military: Negative			0.04(0.09)	0.04(0.09)
Internationalism: Positive			0.01(0.05)	0.00(0.5)
Internationalism: Negative			-0.46(0.13)***	-0.37(0.13)**
Decentralisation: Positive			0.38(0.13)	0.29(0.13)
Centralisation: Positive			-0.41(0.19)	-0.44(0.19)
Free Enterprise: Positive			0.02(0.05)	0.00(0.05)
Market Regulation: Positive			0.02(0.14)	0.06(0.14)
Welfare: Positive			-0.06(0.07)	-0.02(0.08)
Welfare: Negative			-0.01(0.06)	0.01(0.06)
National Way Life: Positive			0.02(0.07)	0.00(0.07)
Nat Way Life: Negative			0.11(0.43)	-0.04(0.43)
Multiculturalism: Positive			0.05(0.10)	0.07(0.09)
Multiculturalism: Negative			0.05(0.14)	0.23(0.140)
Constitutionalism: Positive			-0.04(0.06)**	-0.02(0.06)*
Constitutionalism: Negative			-0.21(0.31)*	-0.01(0.31)*
Alternative Theories				
Left-Right Position				0.03(0.07)
Gal-Tan Values 2006				0.32(1.08)
Gal-Tan Values 2002				-0.88(1.33)
Gal-Tan Values 1999				-2.53(0.99)*

Is EU Membership a good thing? Eurobarometer data				0.08(0.12)
Adjusted R ²	0.343	0.396	0.457	0.5
Durbin Watson			2.048	

Source: Euromanifestos Project 1989-2004

Excluded Variables: Belgium, Northern Ireland

MULTI-DIMENSIONAL SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

LIBERALISATION

Table 47: Multiple Regression results – DV (Liberalisation)

Variables	Unstandardised Coefficients (Standard Error in parenthesis)					
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Constant	10.407 (2.13)	14.671 (2.85)	256.969 (412.39)	291.022 (430.70)	320.212 (449.26)	388.473 (481.24)
Party Families						
Conservative Socialist & Social Democrats	-5.040 (3.37)	-4.994(3.20)	-2.14(2.92)	-2.41(3.08)	-2.49(3.46)	-2.41(3.51)
Christian Democrat	-9.705 (2.71)**	-9.674 (2.58)***	-7.76(2.50)**	-7.44(2.74)**	-7.02(2.95)*	-6.85(3.00)*
Communist	-5.78 (3.37)	-7.77 (3.12)*	-7.13(2.83)*	-7.34(2.94)*	-7.64(3.66)*	-7.66(3.70)*
Agrarian	-17.572 (2.94)***	(2.837)***	-8.93(3.01)**	-8.59(3.24)**	-8.23(3.50)*	-7.64(3.78)*
Ethnic-Regional	-8.33 (5.00)	-12.346(4.85)*	-5.26(4.55)	-5.04(4.63)	-5.40(5.10)	-5.54(5.16)
Nationalist	-11.026 (6.74)	-14.131(6.64)*	-12.07(5.93)*	-12.09(5.96)*	-12.13(6.12)	-12.15(6.21)
Green/Ecologist	-8.944 (4.03)*	-3.134(4.325)	-5.82(3.93)	-0.90(4.10)	-1.70(5.32)	-1.64(5.38)
	-13.450(3.29)***	-15.106 (3.05)***	-9.92(3.15)**	-9.62(3.33)**	-8.92(4.03)*	-8.43(4.21)*
Country						
Sweden		0.673(3.08)	1.87(3.00)	-2.12(3.14)	1.82(3.29)	-0.31(7.18)
Denmark		-6.99(3.05)*	-5.55(2.81)	-5.19(3.08)	-5.43(3.28)	-6.91(5.42)
Finland		-1.16(3.47)	-0.40(3.24)	0.08(3.65)	-0.11(3.74)	-2.15(6.92)
France		-15.24(3.3)***	-13.56(3.09)***	-13.34(3.20)***	-13.78(3.62)***	-15.35(5.63)**
Italy		-8.26(4.16)*	-6.77(3.82)	-6.48(3.97)	-6.68(4.15)	-7.39(4.61)
Greece		-3.33(3.92)	-4.32(3.58)	-4.76(3.91)	-5.58(4.42)	-6.80(5.33)
Portugal		-5.50(6.11)	-2.49(5.61)	-2.46(5.64)	-2.66(5.88)	-3.83(6.74)
Germany		1.31(3.00)	-0.25(3.07)	-0.13(3.12)	-0.71(3.49)	-2.35(5.72)
Austria		-9.23(3.35)**	-7.28(3.18)*	-7.11(3.25)*	-7.68(3.57)	-10.16(8.02)
Ireland		-3.15(3.34)	-2.45(3.16)	-2.15(3.34)	-2.73(3.76)	-2.84(3.84)
Year of Election			-0.12(0.21)	-0.14(0.22)	-0.16(0.23)	-0.19(0.24)
Forms of Integration						
Social integration			-0.15(0.06)*	-0.14(0.07)	-0.14(0.07)	-0.14(0.07)
Supranational Integration			0.13(0.07)	0.13(0.07)	0.13(0.07)	0.12(0.07)
Legal Integration			0.28(0.18)	0.27(0.18)	0.28(0.19)	0.30(0.20)
Cultural Integration			0.07(0.17)	0.07(0.18)	0.07(0.18)	0.06(0.19)
Economic Harmonisation			0.19(0.08)*	0.19(0.08)*	0.19(0.09)*	0.19(0.09)*
Foreign policy integration			0.07(0.06)	0.08(0.06)	0.08(0.06)	0.08(0.07)
Alternative Theories						
Left-Right Position				0.02(0.07)	0.02(0.07)	0.03(0.08)
Gal-Tan Values 2006					-0.37(1.34)	-0.39(1.36)
Gal-Tan Values 2002					0.63(1.51)	0.71(1.54)
Gal-Tan Values 1999					-0.09(1.17)	-0.13(1.19)
In Government when manifesto published						-0.59(1.70)

Is EU Membership a good thing?
Eurobarometer data -0.05(0.16)

Adjusted R² 0.285 0.495 0.636 0.636 0.637 0.638

Durbin Watson 1.897

Source:
Euromanifestos
Project

Excluded Variables: Belgium, Luxembourg, UK, Northern Ireland, Belgium-Wallonia, Belgium-Flanders, Netherlands, Cleavage Theory

HARMONISATION

Table 48: Multiple Regression results – DV (Harmonisation)

Variables	Unstandardised Coefficients (Standard Error in parentheses)					
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Constant	6.90(2.28)	4.17(3.49)	584.24(519.71)	694.64(540.29)	888.84(529.15)	553.78(564.77)
Party Families						
Conservative	-3.58(3.60)	-4.70(3.92)	-2.10(3.70)	-2.99(3.88)	1.69(4.13)	1.19(4.14)
Socialist & Social Democrats	-2.53(2.90)	-2.43(3.16)	0.37(3.33)	1.40(3.59)	2.75(3.62)	2.05(3.63)
Christian Democrat	-2.13(3.60)	-2.72(3.83)	-1.36(3.70)	-2.09(3.83)	3.01(4.46)	3.09(4.44)
Communist	-15.87(3.14)***	-16.83(3.47)***	-8.97(3.88)	-7.82(4.17)	-8.16(4.22)	-10.02(4.42)*
Agrarian	-10.90(5.34)*	-12.86(5.93)	-5.54(5.77)	-4.77(5.87)	-1.01(6.12)	-0.41(6.11)
Ethnic-Regional	-0.40(7.20)	-2.64(8.12)	1.46(7.67)	1.32(7.69)	-0.07(7.47)	-0.13(7.46)
Nationalist	-6.47(4.30)	-7.11(5.29)	-4.85(4.95)	-5.88(5.14)	0.75(6.35)	0.62(6.33)
Green/Ecologist	-10.91(3.51)**	-12.05(3.73)**	-6.31(4.15)	-5.32(4.35)	-6.88(4.89)	-8.42(4.98)
Country						
Sweden		4.42(3.77)	6.77(3.74)	7.59(3.90)	4.61(3.90)	14.96(8.28)
Denmark		1.67(3.73)	5.84(3.58)	6.99(3.88)	3.71(3.96)	10.84(6.32)
Finland		4.98(4.24)	7.13(4.03)	8.69(4.52)	7.44(4.39)	17.07(7.93)*
France		2.72(4.04)	9.90(4.18)*	10.54(4.27)*	7.15(4.60)	14.56(6.72)*
Italy		4.13(5.09)	5.88(4.89)	6.78(5.03)	3.84(5.01)	7.15(5.45)
Greece		5.68(4.80)	8.12(4.49)	6.59(4.92)	1.62(5.32)	7.09(6.27)
Portugal		-1.74(7.47)	4.69(7.10)	4.74(7.11)	0.38(7.02)	5.97(7.92)
Germany		8.33(3.67)*	7.83(3.80)*	8.20(3.84)*	3.57(4.15)	11.33(6.62)
Austria		0.73(4.10)	6.47(4.09)	6.97(4.15)	3.56(4.36)	15.61(9.36)
Ireland		2.40(4.09)	6.69(3.95)	7.64(4.15)	2.04(4.49)	2.68(4.52)
Year of Election			-0.29(0.26)	-0.35(0.27)	-0.44(0.27)	-0.29(0.28)
Forms of Integration						
Social integration			0.02(0.08)	0.04(0.09)	0.02(0.09)	0.04(0.09)
Supranational Integration			0.11(0.08)	0.11(0.08)	0.06(0.08)	0.09(0.08)
Legal Integration			-0.08(0.23)	-0.12(0.23)	-0.15(0.23)	-0.22(0.23)
Cultural Integration			0.32(0.22)	0.33(0.22)	0.23(0.22)	0.25(0.22)
Economic Liberalisation			0.32(0.22)*	0.31(0.13)*	0.27(0.12)*	0.27(0.12)*
Foreign policy integration			0.15(0.08)*	0.16(0.08)	0.17(0.08)*	0.17(0.08)*
Alternative Theories						
Left-Right Position				0.07(0.09)	0.10(0.09)	0.09(0.09)
Gal-Tan Values 2006					-3.06(1.57)	-2.93(1.57)
Gal-Tan Values 2002					3.32(1.77)	2.92(1.78)
Gal-Tan Values 1999					-2.03(1.38)	-1.85(1.38)
In Government when manifesto published						1.89(1.98)
Is EU Membership a good thing? Eurobarometer data						0.26(0.18)
Adjusted R ²	0.213	0.196	0.331	0.328	0.38	0.386
Durbin Watson				1.735		

Source: Euromanifestos Project

Excluded Variables: Belgium, Luxembourg, UK, Northern Ireland, Belgium-Wallonia, Belgium-Flanders, Netherlands, Cleavage Theory, EU Accession Year

SUPRANATIONAL INTEGRATION

Table 49: Multiple Regression results – DV (Supranational Integration)

Variables	Unstandardised Coefficients (Standard Error in parentheses)					
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Constant	1.70(3.22)	9.24(4.83)	71.04(644.46)	-56.65(671.89)	-67.84(685.08)	305.40(721.37)
Party Families						
Conservative	-0.74(5.09)	-0.55(5.42)	5.67(4.53)	6.64(4.75)	10.75(5.15)*	10.70(5.14)*
Socialist & Social Democrats	7.38(4.10)	5.46(4.37)	11.53(3.92)**	10.32(4.30)*	8.97(4.53)	9.50(4.51)*
Christian Democrat	3.39(5.09)	1.98(5.29)	7.49(4.49)	8.28(4.65)	14.39(5.49)*	13.63(5.47)*
Communist	-6.50(4.44)	-8.17(4.80)	7.33(4.86)	6.07(5.20)	2.68(5.48)	5.88(5.75)
Agrarian	-19.30(7.55)**	-18.59(8.20)*	-11.74(7.03)	-12.50(7.14)	-6.07(7.77)	-6.76(7.73)
Ethnic-Regional	4.85(10.18)	4.23(11.23)	11.98(9.37)	12.06(9.39)	12.06(9.42)	11.23(9.41)
Nationalist	-4.38(6.08)	-3.87(7.32)	4.59(6.11)	5.75(6.35)	13.40(7.96)	13.25(7.92)
Green/Ecologist	1.48(4.97)	1.28(5.15)	13.90(4.97)**	12.77(5.24)*	6.82(6.25)	9.22(6.36)
Country						
Sweden		-12.98(5.22)*	-14.33(4.44)**	-15.21(4.63)***	-14.54(4.76)**	-24.82(10.38)*
Denmark		-10.34(5.15)*	-5.96(4.43)	-7.25(4.81)	-6.73(5.02)	-14.08(8.03)
Finland		-10.33(5.86)	-9.79(4.94)*	-11.54(5.55)*	-10.33(5.58)	-20.39(10.12)*
France		-11.26(5.58)*	-8.95(5.22)	-9.69(5.34)	-7.01(5.90)	-15.08(8.63)
Italy		-11.26(5.58)	-4.59(6.05)	-5.61(6.24)	-4.96(6.38)	-8.52(6.94)
Greece		-6.48(6.63)	-4.55(5.61)	-2.88(6.12)	-2.51(6.78)	-8.99(7.98)
Portugal		-14.20(10.34)	-14.08(8.64)	-14.09(8.66)	-16.59(8.77)	-22.07(9.81)
Germany		-15.53(5.07)**	-19.20(4.34)***	-19.57(4.39)***	-19.29(4.89)***	-27.14(8.04)***
Austria		-13.63(5.67)*	-12.25(4.94)*	-12.80(5.02)*	-11.94(5.43)*	-24.32(11.81)*
Ireland		-7.89(5.66)	-10.03(4.83)	-11.09(5.08)*	-12.04(5.58)	-12.13(5.61)*
Year of Election			-0.04(0.32)	0.03(0.34)	0.04(0.34)	-0.14(0.36)
Forms of Integration						
Social integration			-0.09(0.10)	-0.12(0.11)	-0.11(0.11)	-0.12(0.11)
Liberalisation			0.31(0.16)	0.31(0.16)	0.30(0.16)	0.28(0.16)
Economic Harmonisation			0.17(0.13)	0.17(0.13)	0.10(0.14)	0.14(0.14)
Legal Integration			1.00(0.26)***	1.04(0.27)***	0.89(0.28)**	0.94(0.28)***
Cultural Integration			-1.18(0.24)***	-1.19(0.24)***	-1.24(0.25)***	-1.24(0.24)***
Foreign policy integration			0.07(0.10)	0.06(0.10)	0.05(0.10)	0.04(0.10)
Alternative Theories						
Left-Right Position				-0.07(0.11)	-0.08(0.11)	-0.06(0.11)
Gal-Tan Values 2006					0.65(2.04)	0.51(2.03)
Gal-Tan Values 2002					-0.44(2.30)	0.05(2.30)
Gal-Tan Values 1999					-2.67(1.76)	-2.78(1.75)
In Government when manifesto published						-3.56(2.51)
Is EU Membership a good thing? Eurobarometer data						-0.27(0.23)
Adjusted R ²	0.113	0.134	0.428	0.425	0.433	0.441
Durbin Watson				1.017		

Source: Euromanifestos Project

Excluded Variables: Belgium, Luxembourg, UK, Northern Ireland, Belgium-Wallonia, Belgium-Flanders, Netherlands, Cleavage Theory, EU Accession Year

LEGAL INTEGRATION

Table 50: Multiple Regression results – DV (Legal Integration)

Variables	Unstandardised Coefficients (Standard Error in parenthesis)					
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Constant	5.36(1.30)	5.73(1.85)	279.26(239.10)	-132.03(245.73)	-137.32(249.12)	-294.87(259.87)
Party Families						
Conservative	-4.34(2.06)*	-3.43(2.08)	-2.89(1.68)	-3.83(1.71)	-2.34(1.90)	-2.60(1.89)
Socialist & Social Democrats	-1.02(1.66)	-0.59(1.84)	-1.91(1.52)	-0.60(1.62)	-1.40(1.68)	-1.60(1.67)
Christian Democrat	-0.10(2.06)	-0.86(2.03)	-1.51(1.70)	-2.32(1.71)	-0.17(2.08)	-0.09(2.05)
Communist	-6.45(1.79)***	-5.68(1.84)**	-3.56(1.80)	-2.11(1.91)	-3.23(1.97)	-3.80(2.06)
Agrarian	-1.36(3.05)	1.07(3.14)	3.34(2.65)	4.06(2.62)	5.56(2.78)	5.49(2.75)*
Ethnic-Regional	-3.69(4.12)	-1.50(4.30)	-2.22(3.52)	-2.28(3.46)	-2.42(3.46)	-2.62(3.43)
Nationalist	-3.14(2.46)	-2.69(2.80)	-1.24(2.29)	-2.44(2.32)	1.70(2.94)	1.70(2.91)
Green/Ecologist	0.38(2.01)	-0.36(1.97)	-1.27(1.93)	-0.10(1.98)	-2.66(2.28)	-3.17(2.31)
Country						
Sweden		-3.04(2.00)	-0.06(1.75)	0.96(1.79)	1.23(1.82)	7.88(3.79)*
Denmark		-3.67(1.97)	0.16(1.67)	1.56(1.78)	1.51(1.84)	5.99(2.89)*
Finland		-2.56(2.25)	-0.52(1.89)	1.41(2.08)	1.83(2.06)	7.89(3.66)*
France		-0.94(2.14)	2.54(1.97)	3.26(1.96)	3.74(2.13)	8.17(3.06)**
Italy		-0.04(2.70)	-0.42(2.27)	0.70(2.29)	0.63(2.33)	2.67(2.52)
Greece		-2.06(2.54)	1.05(2.10)	-0.75(2.24)	0.79(2.47)	3.75(2.89)
Portugal		-5.15(3.96)	0.54(3.27)	0.61(3.22)	0.40(3.26)	3.78(3.64)
Germany		4.21(1.94)*	5.44(1.70)**	5.69(1.67)	6.26(1.81)	10.75(2.88)***
Austria		2.21(2.17)	4.49(1.85)*	4.94(1.83)**	5.81(1.93)***	13.16(4.15)**
Ireland		-0.02(2.17)	3.58(1.81)	4.59(1.85)*	5.00(2.02)*	5.35(2.01)**
Year of Election			0.14(0.12)	0.07(0.12)	0.07(0.12)	0.14(0.13)
Forms of Integration						
Supranational Integration			0.14(0.04)***	0.14(0.04)***	0.12(0.04)*	0.12(0.04)***
Economic Harmonisation			-0.02(0.05)	-0.02(0.05)	-0.03(0.05)	-0.05(0.05)
Social Integration			0.16(0.03)***	0.18(0.04)***	0.18(0.04)***	0.18(0.04)***
Cultural Integration			0.21(0.10)*	0.21(0.10)*	0.19(0.10)	0.19(0.10)
Economic Liberalisation			0.09(0.06)	0.09(0.06)	0.09(0.06)	0.09(0.06)
Foreign policy integration			0.07(0.04)	0.08(0.03)*	0.07(0.04)*	0.07(0.03)
Alternative Theories						
Left-Right Position				0.08(0.04)*	0.08(0.04)	0.08(0.04)*
Gal-Tan Values 2006					0.20(0.74)	0.17(0.74)
Gal-Tan Values 2002					-1.09(0.83)	-1.13(0.83)
Gal-Tan Values 1999					-0.02(0.65)	-0.01(0.64)
In Government when manifesto published						0.25(0.92)
Is EU Membership a good thing? Eurobarometer data						0.17(0.08)*
Adjusted R ²	0.113	0.222	0.512	0.529	0.54	0.551
Durbin Watson				1.55		

Source: Euromanifestos Project

Excluded Variables: Belgium, Luxembourg, UK, Northern Ireland, Belgium-Wallonia, Belgium-Flanders, Netherlands, Cleavage Theory, EU Accession Year

SOCIAL INTEGRATION

Table 51: Multiple Regression results – DV (Social Integration)

Variables	Unstandardised Coefficients (Standard Error in parentheses)					
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Constant	1.50(2.96)	4.02(4.35)	403.85(651.78)	-265.29(632.80)	-139.94(658.12)	83.21(702.69)
Party Families						
Conservative	2.75(4.67)	2.12(4.88)	4.75(4.60)	8.93(4.43)*	8.74(4.98)	9.12(5.03)
Socialist & Social Democrats	10.50(3.76)**	11.09(3.94)**	9.11(4.04)*	2.30(4.17)	3.55(4.43)	3.87(4.48)
Christian Democrat	2.42(4.67)	2.54(4.77)	1.31(4.62)	5.14(4.42)	4.22(5.46)	4.08(5.50)
Communist	9.35(4.07)*	9.33(4.32)*	9.87(4.88)*	3.60(4.93)	3.59(5.26)	4.56(5.61)
Agrarian	9.75(6.93)	11.94(7.39)	5.33(7.21)	0.62(6.84)	-0.61(7.49)	-0.85(7.56)
Ethnic-Regional	8.50(9.35)	9.80(10.12)	7.09(9.55)	6.80(8.91)	6.17(9.12)	6.49(9.21)
Nationalist	1.93(5.59)	-5.32(6.59)	-2.26(6.21)	3.73(6.00)	1.96(7.77)	1.85(7.83)
Green/Ecologist	14.81(4.56)**	13.53(4.64)**	10.22(5.13)*	3.71(5.08)	5.58(6.02)	6.42(6.23)
Country						
Sweden		-5.60(4.70)	-3.31(4.74)	-7.45(4.55)	-8.41(4.73)	-17.25(10.27)
Denmark		-6.90(4.64)	-6.18(4.48)	-11.70(4.42)**	-12.71(4.68)**	-18.64(7.69)*
Finland		-3.83(5.28)	-2.16(5.11)	-10.51(5.24)*	-10.96(5.34)	-19.04(9.87)
France		0.94(5.03)	-4.96(5.35)	-8.02(5.06)	-9.86(5.61)	-15.90(8.37)
Italy		9.52(6.35)	6.11(6.11)	0.26(5.91)	-0.76(6.15)	-3.53(6.80)
Greece		-11.14(5.98)	-10.32(5.60)	-0.92(5.78)	-3.45(6.51)	-7.45(7.78)
Portugal		-11.61(9.31)	-9.34(8.83)	-8.46(8.24)	-8.94(8.54)	-13.38(9.72)
Germany		0.50(4.57)	-5.59(4.82)	-7.07(4.51)	-8.77(5.02)	-15.05(8.17)
Austria		2.75(5.11)	-3.82(5.16)	-6.23(4.85)	-7.88(5.29)	-17.94(11.61)
Ireland		-5.29(5.10)	-7.37(4.95)	-11.67(4.75)*	-13.40(5.32)	-14.01(5.40)*
Year of Election			-0.20(0.33)	0.14(0.32)	0.07(0.33)	-0.03(0.35)
Forms of Integration						
Supranational Integration			-0.09(0.11)	-0.11(0.10)	-0.10(0.10)	-0.11(0.10)
Economic Harmonisation			0.03(0.13)	0.06(0.12)	0.04(0.13)	0.06(0.13)
Legal Integration			1.16(0.26)***	1.21(0.24)***	1.23(0.25)***	1.27(0.26)***
Cultural Integration			-0.20(0.28)	-0.23(0.26)	-0.21(0.27)	-0.22(0.27)
Economic Liberalisation			-0.36(0.16)	-0.30(0.15)	-0.30(0.15)	-0.30(0.15)
Foreign Policy Integration			0.04(0.10)	-0.03(0.09)	-0.01(0.09)	-0.01(0.10)
Alternative Theories						
Left-Right Position				-0.36(0.09)***	-0.33(0.10)***	-0.34(0.10)**
Gal-Tan Values 2006					-1.57(1.95)	-1.53(1.97)
Gal-Tan Values 2002					2.02(2.20)	2.12(2.23)
Gal-Tan Values 1999					-0.03(1.71)	-0.05(1.73)
In Government when manifesto published						-0.44(2.47)
Is EU Membership a good thing? Eurobarometer data						-0.22(0.23)
Adjusted R ²	0.079	0.134	0.277	0.371	0.356	0.348
Durbin Watson				2.269		

Source: Euromanifestos
Project

Excluded Variables: Belgium, Luxembourg, UK, Northern Ireland, Belgium-Wallonia, Belgium-Flanders, Netherlands, Cleavage Theory, EU
Accession Year

CULTURAL INTEGRATION

Table 52: Multiple Regression results – DV (Cultural Integration)

Variables	Unstandardised Coefficients (Standard Error in parentheses)					
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Constant	0.43(1.16)	0.68(1.68)	-28.00(248.21)	-67.95(258.92)	-107.70(263.12)	-44.41(281.42)
Party Families						
Conservative	-0.42(1.83)	-0.18(1.88)	1.37(1.75)	1.68(1.84)	2.93(2.00)	2.93(2.03)
Socialist & Social Democrats	-0.21(1.47)	0.59(1.52)	2.74(1.55)	2.37(1.69)	2.00(1.77)	2.14(1.79)
Christian Democrat	1.15(1.83)	1.50(1.84)	2.30(1.74)	2.56(1.80)	4.52(2.14)*	4.44(2.16)*
Communist	-0.04(1.60)	-0.13(1.67)	2.43(1.88)	2.04(2.01)	0.94(2.11)	1.59(2.25)
Agrarian	-1.38(2.72)	0.16(2.85)	-1.22(2.75)	-1.48(2.79)	0.72(3.00)	0.53(3.03)
Ethnic-Regional	-0.49(3.66)	0.29(3.90)	2.35(3.63)	2.39(3.65)	3.01(3.64)	2.85(3.69)
Nationalist	4.58(2.19)*	2.85(2.54)	3.73(2.33)	4.09(2.42)	5.40(3.06)	5.44(3.08)
Green/Ecologist	2.75(1.79)	2.87(1.79)	5.54(1.91)**	5.18(2.01)*	3.49(2.39)	3.98(2.47)
Country						
Sweden		-2.54(1.81)	-4.66(1.74)**	-4.95(1.82)**	-4.59(1.86)*	-6.09(4.13)
Denmark		-0.79(1.79)	-1.61(1.71)	-2.02(1.87)	-1.42(1.94)	-2.51(3.17)
Finland		-1.02(2.03)	-2.80(1.92)	-3.35(2.16)	-3.03(2.16)	-4.54(4.01)
France		-2.64(1.94)	-4.11(2.00)	-4.35(2.05)*	-2.77(2.27)	-4.01(3.40)
Italy		4.11(2.45)	1.90(2.33)	1.56(2.41)	2.10(2.45)	1.51(2.72)
Greece		0.43(2.30)	-0.71(2.17)	-0.19(2.36)	-0.34(2.61)	-1.43(3.13)
Portugal		-5.51(3.59)	-6.57(3.30)*	-6.57(3.32)*	-7.55(3.34)	-8.41(3.83)*
Germany		2.38(1.76)	-2.28(1.83)	-2.42(1.85)	-2.72(2.02)	-3.99(3.31)
Austria		0.20(1.97)	-2.24(1.95)	-2.42(1.99)	-2.48(2.13)	-4.32(4.69)
Ireland		-2.54(1.96)	-3.57(1.87)	-3.90(1.96)*	-4.35(2.15)*	-4.35(2.20)
Year of Election			0.01(0.12)	0.03(0.13)	0.06(0.13)	0.03(0.14)
Forms of Integration						
Supranational Integration			-0.18(0.04)***	-0.18(0.04)***	-0.18(0.04)***	-0.19(0.04)***
Economic Harmonisation			0.07(0.05)	0.07(0.05)	0.06(0.05)	0.06(0.05)
Social integration			-0.03(0.04)	-0.04(0.04)	-0.03(0.04)	-0.04(0.04)
Legal Integration			0.22(0.11)*	0.24(0.11)*	0.21(0.11)	0.22(0.11)
Economic Liberalisation			0.02(0.06)	0.03(0.06)	0.02(0.06)	0.02(0.06)
Foreign Policy Integration			0.05(0.04)	0.05(0.04)	0.04(0.04)	0.04(0.04)
Alternative Theories						
Left-Right Position				-0.02(0.04)	-0.04(0.04)	-0.03(0.04)
Gal-Tan Values 2006					0.77(0.78)	0.74(0.79)
Gal-Tan Values 2002					-0.09(0.88)	0.01(0.90)
Gal-Tan Values 1999					-1.40(0.67)*	-1.43(0.68)*
In Government when manifesto published						-0.79(0.98)
Is EU Membership a good thing? Eurobarometer data						-0.04(0.09)
Adjusted R2	0.016	0.106	0.274	0.268	0.283	0.272
Durbin Watson				1.572		

Source: Euromanifestos
Project

Excluded Variables: Belgium, Luxembourg, UK, Northern Ireland, Belgium-Wallonia, Belgium-Flanders, Netherlands, Cleavage Theory, EU
Accession Year

FOREIGN POLICY INTEGRATION

Table 53: Multiple Regression results – DV (Foreign Policy Integration)

Variables	Unstandardised Coefficients (Standard Error in parentheses)					
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Constant	11.92(3.20)	14.11(4.73)	194.22(701.89)	-153.04(721.55)	-396.45(743.26)	-360.49(795.14)
Party Families						
Conservative	-5.65(5.05)	-6.80(5.30)	-2.37(4.97)	0.40(5.16)	-0.38(5.73)	-0.65(5.81)
Socialist & Social Democrats	-5.80(4.07)	-5.92(4.28)	-4.08(4.45)	-7.02(4.70)	-8.71(4.95)	-8.41(5.02)
Christian Democrat	3.06(5.05)	3.31(5.18)	5.38(4.94)	7.42(5.02)	7.44(6.14)	7.31(6.20)*
Agrarian	-7.11(7.49)	-10.10(8.03)	-3.60(7.77)	-5.69(7.77)	-4.33(8.46)	-4.71(8.55)
Communist	-12.90(4.40)	-14.94(4.70)	-3.09(5.35)	-6.26(5.59)	-7.17(5.91)	-5.77(6.35)
Ethnic-Regional	0.41(10.10)	-3.14(11.00)	0.59(10.30)	0.95(10.18)	2.48(10.33)	1.74(10.46)
Nationalist	-5.66(6.04)*	-9.90(7.16)	-6.29(6.65)	-2.92(6.85)	-2.82(8.79)	-2.46(8.87)
Green/Ecologist	-11.12(4.93)	-13.64(5.04)	8.76(5.56)**	-11.29(5.69)*	-12.73(6.71)	-11.64(6.99)
Country						
Sweden		0.24(5.11)	3.22(5.10)**	0.55(5.27)**	2.37(5.44)*	4.13(11.82)
Denmark		-5.68(5.05)	-1.07(4.87)	-4.58(5.21)	-2.11(5.51)	-1.07(9.01)
Finland		1.36(5.74)	3.40(5.49)	-1.53(6.11)	-0.78(6.18)	0.47(11.42)
France		-1.56(5.46)	3.59(5.77)	1.38(5.84)*	4.87(6.44)	5.39(9.66)
Italy		5.79(6.90)	5.28(6.59)	2.32(6.72)	4.48(6.94)	4.72(7.70)
Greece		-3.51(6.49)	-2.25(6.13)	2.25(6.58)	5.96(7.35)	5.46(8.84)
Portugal		-6.95(10.12)	-1.93(9.54)*	1.63(9.44)*	2.70(9.72)	3.14(11.13)*
Germany		7.30(4.96)	2.44(5.21)	1.10(5.21)	3.79(5.76)	4.41(9.42)
Austria		-4.21(5.55)	-2.58(5.55)	-4.13(5.56)	-1.63(6.06)	0.02(13.34)
Ireland		-10.83(5.54)	-8.84(5.31)	-11.51(5.46)*	-8.16(6.17)*	-7.65(6.30)
Year of Election			-0.09(0.35)	0.08(0.36)	0.20(0.37)	0.18(0.40)
Forms of Integration						
Supranational Integration			0.08(0.11)***	0.06(0.11)***	0.06(0.12)***	0.05(0.12)***
Economic Harmonisation			0.27(0.14)	0.29(0.14)	0.33(0.14)	0.34(0.15)
Social integration			0.05(0.11)	-0.03(0.12)	-0.02(0.12)	-0.02(0.12)
Legal Integration			0.57(0.30)*	0.67(0.30)*	0.63(0.31)	0.62(0.32)
Economic Liberalisation			0.21(0.18)	0.22(0.17)	0.22(0.18)	0.21(0.18)
Foreign Policy Integration			0.44(0.29)	0.39(0.29)	0.36(0.30)	0.33(0.30)
Alternative Theories						
Left-Right Position				-0.20(0.11)	-0.24(0.12)	-0.21(0.12)
Gal-Tan Values 2006					3.16(2.19)	3.02(2.22)
Gal-Tan Values 2002					-3.13(2.47)	-2.89(2.52)
Gal-Tan Values 1999					-0.16(1.94)*	-0.28(1.96)*
In Government when manifesto published						-2.18(2.79)
Is EU Membership a good thing? Eurobarometer data						0.04(0.26)
Adjusted R2	0.016	0.106	0.274	0.268	0.283	0.272
Durbin Watson				1.572		

Source: Euromanifestos Project

Excluded Variables: Belgium, Luxembourg, UK, Northern Ireland, Belgium-Wallonia, Belgium-Flanders, Netherlands, Cleavage Theory, EU Accession Year

PARTY POSITIONING DIAGRAMS

Figure 21: French Political Party Positions in the 1989 European Elections




Figure 22: French Political Party Positions in the 1994 European Elections




Figure 23: French Political Party Positions in the 1999 European Elections





Figure 24: French Political Party Positions in the 2004 European Elections



Notes: Greens (Green Parties), La terre sinion rien (Green Parties), PCF Communists (Post-Communist), LO Workers Fight (Post-Communist), LCR Revolutionary Communist League (Post-Communist), Parti des travailleurs (Post-Communist), PS Socialist (Social Democratic), ER-Radical Energy (Regionalist), PRG- Radical Left Party (Social Democratic), MDC – The Citizen’s Movement (Social Democratic), UDF (Conservative), RPR (Conservative), MPF – Mouvement for France (Conservative), RPR/UDF (Conservative), RPR/DL now UMP (Conservative), FN National Front (Nationalist), UFCN (Nationalist), RPF –Rally for France and an Independent Europe (Regionalist/Special Interest), CPNT Hunting Fishing Nature Traditions (Regionalist/Special interest), L’ouest au Coeur (Special Interest), Nouvelle solidarite (Special Interest), HZ (Special interest), EDE Europe – Democratie – Esperanto (Special Interest), Parti des socioprofessionels (special interest).

Figure 25: German Political Party Positions in the 1989 European Elections




Figure 26: German Political Party Positions in the 1994 European Elections




Figure 27: German Political Party Positions in the 1999 European Elections





Figure 28: German Political Party Positions in the 2004 European Elections



Notes: Greens (Green Parties), PDS – Party for Democratic Socialism (Post-Communist), SPD – Social Democratic Party (Social Democratic), FDP – Free Democrats (Liberal), CDU –Christian Democratic Union (Christian Democratic), CSU – Christian Social Union (Christian Democratic), REP – Republikaner (Nationalist)

Figure 29: Luxembourg Political Party Positions in the 1989 European Elections




Figure 30: Luxembourg Political Party Positions in the 1994 European Elections




Figure 31: Luxembourg Political Party Positions in the 1999 European Elections





Figure 32: Luxembourg Political Party Positions in the 2004 European Elections



Notes: Greens (Green Parties), POSL LSAP Social Democrats (Social Democratic), PD DP Democrats (Liberal) PCS CSV – Christian Social Party (Christian Democratic), ADR Pension Justice (Special Interest)

Figure 33: Dutch Political Party Positions in the 1989 European Elections




Figure 34: Dutch Political Party Positions in the 1994 European Elections




Figure 35: Dutch Political Party Positions in the 1999 European Elections





Figure 36: Dutch Political Party Positions in the 2004 European Elections



Notes: GL Green Left (Green Parties), Regenboog (Green parties), SP Socialist Party (Post-Communist), CU/SGP: former RPF/SGP/GPV until 2004 (Christian Democrat), PPR Radical Political Party (Social Democratic), CPN (Social Democratic), PvdA Labour (Social Democratic), VVD Liberals (Liberal), CDA Christian Democrats (Christian Democratic), RPF Reformatorian Political Federation (Christian Democratic), SGP Political Reformed Party (Christian Democratic), GPV Reformed Political League (Christian Democratic), Lijst Pim Fortuyn (Nationalist), EuroTrans (Special Interest).

Figure 37: Italian Political Party Positions in the 1989 European Elections




Figure 38: Italian Political Party Positions in the 1994 European Elections




Figure 39: Italian Political Party Positions in the 1999 European Elections





Figure 40: Italian Political Party Positions in the 2004 European Elections



Notes: Fed. V: Federazione dei Verdi (Green Parties), LV Green List (Green Party), RC New Communists (Post-Communist), PdCI Communisti Italiano (Post-Communist), PCI-PDS Communists (Post-Communist), PDS Italian Communists (Post-Communist), PR Radicals/Lista Emma Bonino (Social Democratic), PSI Socialists (Social Democratic), Lista pri Liberal (Liberals), S.C.D.P. (IDV) Lista di Pietro (Liberals), Dem: The Democrats (Liberals), UD.EUR Democrats Union for Europe (Liberals), FLI/PRI (Liberals), Ulivo (Liberals), DS/SDI/La Margherita (Liberals), Patto Segni (Christian Democratic) PPI-DC Christian Democrats (Christian Democratic), CCD Christian Democratic Centre (Christian Democratic), UDC (Christian Democratic), FI Forza Italia (Conservative), AN National Alliance (Nationalist), LN Northern League (Nationalist), SVP –South Tyrol Peoples Party (Regionalist)

Figure 41: Belgian Political Party Positions in the 1989 European Elections




Figure 42: Belgian Political Party Positions in the 1994 European Elections




Figure 43: Belgian Political Party Positions in the 1999 European Elections





Figure 44: Belgian Political Party Positions in the 2004 European Elections



Notes: Ecolo Francophone Ecologists (Green Parties), PS Francophone Socialists (Social Democratic), PRL-FDF-MCC (Liberal), FDF-PRL (Liberal), MR Mouvement Reformateur (Liberal), PSC Francophone Christian Social Party (Christian Democratic), FN National Front (Nationalist), CDH (Regional), FDF – French Speaking Front (Regional), FDF-RW (Regional), Groen!: former Agalev Flemish Greens – Until 2004 (Green parties), SP Flemish Socialists (Social Democratic), Spirit (Regional), VLD: former PVV Flemish Liberals (Liberal), CD&V: former CVP Flemish Christian Peoples Party (Christian Democratic), NVA: former VU Flemish Peoples Union – until 2004 (Regional), VB Flemish Bloc (Regional), Spirit: former VU-ID21 –until 2004 (Regional).

Figure 45: British Political Party Positions in the 1989 European Elections




Figure 46: British Political Party Positions in the 1994 European Elections




Figure 47: British Political Party Positions in the 1999 European Elections





Figure 48: British Political Party Positions in the 2004 European Elections



Notes: Greens (Green Parties), Labour (Social Democrat), LP/SDP – Liberal Party/Social Democratic Party (Liberal), LDP – Liberal Democrats (Liberal), Conservatives (Conservative, PC – Plaid Cymru (Regional), SNP – Scottish National Party (Regional), UK Independence Party (Regional/Special Interest), Respect (Special Interest), SDLP – Northern Ireland Social Democratic and Labour Party, DUP – Northern Ireland Democratic Unionist Party, UUP – Northern Ireland Ulster Unionist Party, SF – Northern Ireland Sinn Fein.

Figure 49: Danish Political Party Positions in the 1989 European Elections




Figure 50: Danish Political Party Positions in the 1994 European Elections




Figure 51: Danish Political Party Positions in the 1999 European Elections





Figure 52: Danish Political Party Positions in the 2004 European Elections



Notes: SF – Socialist Peoples Party (Post-Communist), SD – Social Democrats (Social Democratic), CD Centre Democrats (Social Democratic), RV Radicals (Liberal), V Liberals (Liberal), KF Conservatives (Conservative), DF Danish Peoples Party (Nationalist), Siumut Greenland

(Regionalist) FP Progress Party (Regionalist), FB Peoples Movement against EC (Special Interest), JB June Movement against EC (Special Interest).

Figure 53: Irish Political Party Positions in the 1989 European Elections




Figure 54: Irish Political Party Positions in the 1994 European Elections




Figure 55: Irish Political Party Positions in the 1999 European Elections





Figure 56: Irish Political Party Positions in the 2004 European Elections



Notes: Greens (Green Parties), WP Workers Party (Post-Communist), LP Labour Party (Social Democratic), PD Progressive Democratic Party (Liberal), Fine Gael (Christian Democratic), Fianna Fail (Conservative), Sinn Fein (Special Interest).

Figure 57: Greek Political Party Positions in the 1989 European Elections




Figure 58: Greek Political Party Positions in the 1994 European Elections




Figure 59: Greek Political Party Positions in the 1999 European Elections





Figure 60: Greek Political Party Positions in the 2004 European Elections



Notes: KKE Communist (Post-Communist), SYN Coalition Left and Progress (Post-Communist), PASOK Socialists (Social Democratic), DIKKI Democratic Social Movement (Social Democratic), ND New Democracy (Christian Democratic), POLA Political Spring (Christian Democratic), LAOS: Laos Orthodoxos Synagermos (Nationalist), DPE Demokratiki Perifereiaki Enosi (Agrarian).

Figure 61: Spanish Political Party Positions in the 1989 European Elections




Figure 62: Spanish Political Party Positions in the 1994 European Elections




Figure 63: Spanish Political Party Positions in the 1999 European Elections





Figure 64: Spanish Political Party Positions in the 2004 European Elections



Notes: Los Verde (Green), IU – former PCE-IU Communists until 2004 (Post-Communist), PSOE Socialists (Social Democratic), CDS – Centre Democrats (Christian Democratic) AP/PP – Popular Party (Conservative), CiU Convergence and Unity (Conservative), PNV EAJ – Basque National Party (Regional) , EA Basque Solidarity (Regional), ERC - Catalan Republican Left (Regional), EH Euskal Herritarrok former HB – Herri Batasuna (Regional), BNG - Galician Nationalist Bloc (Regionalist), Agrupacion Ruiz Mateo (Regionalist), CC – Canarian Coalition (Regionalist), Coalicion “Europa de los Pueblos” – EA, ERC and PNG (Regionalist/Special Interest), Por la Europe de los Pueblos (Regionalist), GALEUSCA (Regionalist), Coalicion Europea (Regionalist).

Figure 65: Portuguese Political Party Positions in the 1989 European Elections




Figure 66: Portuguese Political Party Positions in the 1994 European Elections




Figure 67: Portuguese Political Party Positions in the 1999 European Elections





Figure 68: Portuguese Political Party Positions in the 2004 European Elections



Notes: PEV Greens (Green), PCP Communists (Communist), B.E. Bloco de Esquerda (Communist), CDU – Coligacao Democratica Unitaria (Communist), PSP Socialists (Social Democrat), PSD Social Democrats (Social Democrat), PP – Popular Party, former: CDS (Social Democrat), PSD- PP – Coligacao Forca Portugal (Social Democrat).

Figure 69: Swedish Political Party Positions in the 1995 European Elections




Figure 70: Swedish Political Party Positions in the 1999 European Elections





Figure 71: Swedish Political Party Positions in the 2004 European Elections



Notes: Greens (Green Parties), VP - Communists (Post-Communist), Sdap – Social Democrats (Social Democrat), FP – Liberals (Liberal), KdS – Christian Democrats (Christian Democratic), MSP Conservatives (Conservative), Centre Party (Agrarian), Junilistan (Special Interest).

Figure 72: Finnish Political Party Positions in the 1996 European Elections




Figure 73: Finnish Political Party Positions in the 1999 European Elections





Figure 74: Finnish Political Party Positions in the 2004 European Elections



Notes: VL Greens (Green parties), VL Left Wing Alliance (Post-Communist), SSDP - Social Democrats (Social Democrat), KD (former: SKL) – Christian Union (Christian Democrat), KK National Coalition (Conservative), SK - Finnish Centre (Agrarian), RKP SFP – Swedish Peoples Party (Regional).

Figure 75: Austrian Political Party Positions in the 1996 European Elections




Figure 76: Austrian Political Party Positions in the 1999 European Elections





Figure 77: Austrian Political Party Positions in the 2004 European Elections



Notes: GA Greens (Green), LINKE (Post-Communist), SPO Socialists (Social Democrat), FPO – Freedom Movement (Liberal), LF –Liberal Forum (Liberal), OVP – Christian Democrats (Christian Democratic), HPM – Liste Hans-Peter Martin (Special Interest)