UN CENTRISM IN JAPAN

Understanding the Background of the Political and Social Movements Supporting the United Nations

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Abstract

Although academic literature predominantly discusses UN centrism as Japan’s foreign policy, this thesis stipulates it as a popular norm supported by the Japanese public. The thesis employs the constructivist approach in understanding UN centrism as a domestic norm. Following the analytical methods employed in existing studies on norm diffusion, it identifies UN centrism is Japan’s interpretation of the international UN norms seen through the lens of its post-war domestic pacifist norm. Building on existing literature on civil society and Japanese studies, it analyses how civil movements supporting UNESCO and UNICEF have worked their way through Japanese society, traditional social behaviours and customs to diffuse the norm. The success of the civil movements has not been in spite of Japan’s weak civil society but because its characteristics have worked in their favour. The UN centrism norm at its core urges individuals to construct peace and international cooperation through the UN. The norm continues to develop, and today it has become a norm which not only urges ordinary Japanese to think about creating and maintaining peace through the UN, but also to make personal financial contributions to support UN humanitarian activities and even dictates where they should visit for their next holiday.
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On the Civil UNESCO movements, I have interviewed Professor Yuji Suzuki (the former President, World Federation of UNESCO Clubs, Centers and Associations), Professor Noboru Noguchi (Executive Secretary, The National Federation of UNESCO Associations in Japan), Professor Noriaki Sagara (the Vice Chairperson, UNESCO Asia-Pacific Centre of Education for International Understanding), Mr Goro Fujiwara (the Chairman of Sendai UNESCO association), Mr Iku Ito (the Chairman of Kobe UNESCO association) and Ms Yoshiko Nagato (the Chairman of Utsunomiya UNESCO association). On the civil UNICEF movements, I interviewed Mr Hiromasa Nakai (the Chief of Information & Public Affairs, Japan Committee for UNICEF). I would like to thank them for their important and useful information.

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### Abbreviation

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHQ/SCAP</td>
<td>General Headquarters/Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>gross national product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITU</td>
<td>International Telecommunication Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IYC</td>
<td>International Year of the Child</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCP</td>
<td>Japanese Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JDF</td>
<td>Japan Defense Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSDF</td>
<td>Japan Self-Defense Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSP</td>
<td>Japan Socialist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LARA</td>
<td>Licensed Agencies for Relief of Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party (of Japan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAFF</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (of Japan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs (of Japan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDL</td>
<td>National Diet Library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPO</td>
<td>non-profit (-making) organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>official development assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDPJ</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party of Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAIDS</td>
<td>Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States (of America)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD</td>
<td>United States Dollars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YEN</td>
<td>Japanese Yen</td>
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CHAPTER 1  THESIS INTRODUCTION

1.1  The United Nations and UN centred foreign policy

The thesis seeks to contribute to our understanding of the domestic roots of a norm, the UN centrism norm, that has worked in a bottom-up fashion to influence state behaviour despite the traditional weakness of civil society in Japan. Existing academic research on UN centrism predominantly refers to Japanese foreign policy towards the UN. However this thesis stipulates a normative tendency towards UN centrism amongst the general public in Japan urging individuals to construct peace and international cooperation through the UN, and that the said foreign policy is in fact pulled by the UN centrism norm.

The name the ‘United Nations’ (UN) was devised by United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt and was first used in the Declaration by United Nations of 1 January 1942, during the Second World War, when 26 nations pledged their governments to continue fighting together against the Axis Power. The UN Charter was drawn up by representatives of 50 countries at the UN Conference on International Organisation, which met in San Francisco from 25 April to 26 June 1945 (United Nations 1987: 1). The Charter claims four main objectives of the UN:
to maintain international peace and security; to develop friendly relations among nations; to co-operate internationally in solving international economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems and in promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; and lastly, to be the centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in attaining these common ends (United Nations 1987: 2).

‘UN centrism’, or ‘UN-centred diplomacy’ as it is sometimes translated, has been one of the main post-war foreign policies in Japan. UN centrism has consistently, albeit not continuously, appeared as an element of Japan’s foreign policy but what it means has never been clearly defined (Matsumoto et al. 1962: 180; Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai 1964: i; Tsuruoka 1986: 89; Ueki 1993: 348). The concept was first officially endorsed as a diplomatic term by Nobusuke Kishi, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs during an administrative policy speech in the Diet on 4 February 1957. Kishi declared ‘from now on, our country should as our basic diplomatic policy contribute to global peace and prosperity through the United Nations’ (Shūgiin Jimu Kyoku 1957: 1-3). Following this, in the 1957 Waga Gaikō no Kinkyō (Diplomatic Blue Book) issued by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the principle of assigning a central role to the UN was proclaimed as one of the three pillars of Japan’s foreign policy, the two other pillars being
‘cooperation with the democratic states of the world’ and ‘alignment with the states of Asia’ (Gaimushō 1957: 7). While the term largely faded out of Japan’s foreign policy documents by the 1960s (Ogata 1983: 34; Kawabe 1994: 56-57; Shinyo 1995: 265-266; Usui 2004: 208-209) until its revival in the 1990s, the Japanese public have consistently held high regard towards the UN. For example, a public opinion conducted in the 1970s revealed that 51 per cent agreed that Japan should actively pursue a ‘UN centred diplomacy’ and only eight per cent disagreed (Naikaku Sōri Daijin Kanbō Kōhōshitsu 1970: online). The thesis argues that UN centrism is in fact developed from the grass roots and that without proper recognition as such there is a risk that the UN centrism as a foreign policy will be misinterpreted in international relations.

1.2 UN centrism as a domestic norm in Japan

The thesis employs the constructivist approach in understanding UN centrism as a domestic norm. It follows the earlier studies on norm diffusion, identifying that new norms need to be compatible with existing norms and the support from political and social structures are essential. It aims to show the dynamic relationships between norms as they converge and divide as new meanings are added and emphasis change. It identifies that UN centrism, which encourages Japanese individuals to
construct peace and international cooperation through the UN, is Japan’s interpretation of the international UN norms seen through the lens of its post-war domestic pacifist norm. The UN’s role as a promoter of peace and the Japanese attitude towards pacifism is therefore thought to be the backbone of the UN centrism norm. Indeed the general public’s trust towards the UN as a peace organisation is high in Japan. For example when asked about the role of the UN in a poll conducted in 1970 by the Naikaku Sori Daijin Kanbō Kōhōshitsu (The Cabinet Public Relations Office within the Prime Minister’s Cabinet), the most popular response was that the UN was an organisation which offered peaceful solutions to conflicts and protected the peace at 54 per cent (Naikaku Sori Daijin Kanbō Kōhōshitsu 1970). Most, nearly 46 per cent, identified the UN’s biggest achievement to be preventing the spread of wars and offering peaceful solution to international conflicts. Further, the vast majority, 78 per cent, agreed to some degree that the UN was overall contributing towards world peace and improvement in human welfare. Most, nearly 59 per cent, thought there was a need to further build the UN’s capacity to protect the peace.

But how did the UN build its trust amongst the Japanese people? The thesis puts forward Japan’s civil UN movements, in particular the UNICEF and UNESCO
movements, as the key norm entrepreneurs to the UN centrism norm and that their respective successes have led to the norm development. The successes of the civil UN movements is interesting from a civil society studies perspective as Japan is considered to be traditionally weak in this area (see below). The thesis, through the analysis of the UN centrism norm, will therefore also seek to answer whether the development was ‘in spite of’ Japan’s weak civil society. It is hoped that the examinations of the civil UN movements will also contribute towards civil society studies.

Before examining the UN centrism norm however, the rest of this chapter outlines its key backgrounds which will act as reference points: Namely a short literature review of the UN centrism norm, UN centrism as a foreign policy and the civil UN associations in Japan.

1.3 UN centrism norm in academic literature

There are not many studies that directly examine UN centrism as a norm. In Hook et al. ‘internationalism’ is put forward as an international norm that expresses the ‘cooperation with and support for the ideals of international society constructed by the early-starters of the West’, including cooperation towards the UN. In the case of
Japan, they point out that the internationalism norm, which includes providing militarily contributions for international security, has become significant since the 1990-1991 Gulf War (Hook et al. 2001: 67). More specifically, Dobson identifies UN centrist norm, or ‘UN internationalism’, as a norm relevant to Japanese foreign policy by defining UN centrist norm to be a norm that ‘promotes the resolution of global human problems on a multilateral basis through international organisations such as the UN’ (2003: 39). In comparing the norms of UN centrist norm and peacekeeping against other norms identified as significant to Japan’s foreign policy --anti-militarism, US bilateralism and East Asianism-- he concludes that the norm of UN centrist norm is growing in importance at the expense of the domestic norm of anti-militarism, and shows that Japan’s post-war foreign policy changed from reactive to proactive in the late 1980s:

There has been a clash of international and domestic norms in Japan for the past half-century over the role of the UN in relation to domestic anti-militarism and the dominant normative influence of US bilateralism. (Dobson 2003: 160)

While UN centrist norm and anti-militarism has, at times, been seen as contesting norms, more often the former is described as a domestic compromise between
international, namely the US administration, pressure for the Japanese government to contribute towards international security, and the domestic norm of anti-militarism (see, for example, Green 1995: 26; Berger 1996; Katzenstein 1996a). The growing power of the norm of UN internationalism has been described as ‘a palliative that appeased all of these other norms [anti-militarism, US bilateralism and East Asianism]’ and which ‘could transcend all other norms in importance’ (Dobson 2003: 93). Similarly, in Hook et al. the ‘internationalism’ norm is identified to be in tension with the domestically embedded norm of anti-militarism.

In explaining Japan’s bilateral policy with the US during the early 1950s, Green points out:

[The Yoshida Doctrine] was in fact, not a ‘doctrine’ but a ‘compromise’ among the advocates of unarmed neutrality, unilateral rearmament, and disarmed economic (and technological) alliance with the United States – all of whom had to fit under the conservatives’ ideological tent in order to achieve the political stability necessary for economic reconstruction. (Green 1995: 26)

In existing literature, it appears the UN centrism norm has been mostly discussed at the state level and therefore focuses on UN centrism as a foreign policy. On the
other hand, the thesis considers UN centrism foreign policy to be the state level response to the general public’s UN centrism norm. None the less, the foreign policy aspect is an important part of the UN centrism norm and is considered in detail in the next section.

1.4 UN centrism as a foreign policy

1.4.1 UN as a source of Japan’s security

As above, a key norm identified as affecting the Japanese government’s security and foreign policies is pacifism, at times also referred as anti-militarism (e.g. Ishibashi 1980; Hook 1986; 1996; Berger 1996; Katzenstein 1996a; Hook, et al. 2001: 67-68). As Katzenstein and Okawara point out, although Japan’s social and legal norms are largely consensual on economic security, it has been deeply contested on military security (1993: 97). Berger assesses the anti-militarist beliefs and values as issuing from Japan’s historical experience of the Second World War. The government’s interpretation of this norm and the way it came to be institutionalised in the political system in the immediate post-war period constitutes a unique political-military culture, which leads the decision makers to respond to international environments in a different way to other states in an identical situation (Berger 1996: 318). As a result, UN centrism as a foreign policy has been largely
about security policy.

Japan joined the UN in 1956. Immediately after the war, Japanese policy makers were initially looking for Japan’s security to be guaranteed by the UN but quickly realised this was not possible. Weinstein believes that as early as 1947, the government had decided that neutrality or reliance on the UN for military security was ‘impractical’ and that Japan should continue to ‘cast its lot with the United States’ after the end of the Allied Power occupation of Japan headed by the US (1971: 105). Ogata, in contrast, demonstrated that the ‘UN occupied a focal point in the thinking of foreign policy makers’ at the time the UN centrum policy was proclaimed, but that expectations quickly eroded and by 1960 when the US-Japan Security Treaty was being amended the policy makers were ‘aware of the UN’s limitations as an effective collective security system’ (1983: 34). Indeed the 1961 Waga Gaikō no Kinkyō (Diplomatic Blue Book) criticised the UN as not satisfactorily fulfilling its role as a world peace organisation and warned the public against excessive hopes (Gaimushō 1961: 8-10). Contrary to initial ambitions held by some UN advocates, the above reflect the failure of the UN and other international organisations to control states as a world government; rather, the UN has become merely a tool for state policies (Pentland 1976). Such an explanation
is also consistent with Drifte’s observation of Japan-UN relations during the 1950s and 1960s that:

> [G]iven the UN’s paralysis due to the East-West confrontation, as well as Japan’s firm implantation in the alliance with the US, there was not much room for an UN-centred policy beyond the incantation of the principle.

(2000: 16)

On the use of UN centrism as a diplomatic term, once the Japanese government had reinforced its security treaty with the US in 1960, the term faded out of its foreign policy documents (Ogata 1983: 34; Kawabe 1994: 56-57; Shinyo 1995: 265-266; Usui 2004: 208-209). This removal of the term implies that at the time UN centrism had only limited relevance in terms of Japan’s security. For Japan, its security revolved around its ties with the US and not the UN.

1.4.2 Role of UN centrism as a camouflage for US-Japan alliance

Security relations between the US and Japanese governments lie at the heart of their post-war bilateral relations (see, for example, Gallicchio 2001: 136; Irie and Wampler 2001: 8). This is because Japan’s security reliance on the US, built
around the US-Japan security treaty, has seen the country highly vulnerable to US pressure not only in security issues, but also over political and economic matters in general (Hook et al. 2001: 124). Realist approaches would therefore regard Japan’s UN policy to be a subset of the US-Japan alliance, rather than an independent foreign policy. Ogata claims that ‘the principle of ‘UN-centred’ diplomacy both assured cooperation with the United States in a US-dominated arena and satisfied domestic aspirations to contribute to world peace’ (1983: 34).

The Japanese government employed UN centrism as a foreign policy tool in 1957 at a time when the UN was under the predominant control of the US administration, and so such a policy position did not conflict with its US interests (Ogata 1983: 29). Initially, the US government was very much committed to the UN and played a key role in setting up the organisation. The US also had great powers over the UN in its early days. Of the 51 original member nations, 39 were thought to be under the influence of the US (Ogata 1986: 172). Hence, during the 1950s and 1960s, the Japanese government could claim to follow a UN centred foreign policy and still more or less accept and follow the UN foreign policy of the US (Satô, Imai and Kohno 1995: 172).

At the same time, the UN has been used as a public relations camouflage for
politicians wanting to pursue US-Japan bilateral relations (Saitō 1977: 58; Kawabe 1994: 65; Soeya 2003). Iokibe explains:

One gets the feeling that those principles given in the *Diplomatic Blue Book* were laid down for the express purpose of improving the government's image by declaring to domestic critics of Japan's US-oriented foreign policy that the country's leaders are truly engaged in efforts outside this framework. (Iokibe 1999b)

The first post-war US-Japan bilateral treaty, the ‘Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan’, was signed in 1951 and came into force simultaneously with the ‘Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and Japan’, which ended the Allied Power’s occupation of Japan. During the treaty negotiations, the Japanese government’s prognosis was that:

[T]he planned security treaty with the United States would never gain the popularity of the old Anglo-Japanese alliance. At best, it would be accepted as the unavoidable *quid pro quo* for the nonpunitive peace settlement – a concession to irresistible American pressure. (Weinstein 1971: 55)
Drifte illustrates how the government felt under pressure to respond to the public’s high expectations towards the UN and to make the Treaty more palatable to the Japanese public; so much so, that it ‘had to resort to an array of alleviating policies, subterfuges, lies and ‘spin-doctoring’” (2000: 13). The outcome was that the government explained to the public that ‘the Japan-US security treaty is a supplementary treaty until Japan’s admission to the UN’ (Shūgiin Jimu Kyoku 1951: 15) and to assist the government’s statement, Article IV of the Treaty stated that:

This Treaty shall expire whenever in the opinion of the Governments of Japan and the United States of America there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements or such alternative individual or collective security dispositions as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance by the United Nations or otherwise of international peace and security in the Japan Area. (Article IV, Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan 1951)

Article IV provided hope that the Japanese government could abort the US-Japan Security Treaty once it was admitted to the UN and rely on the collective security provided by the organisation (Kawabe 1996: 33). Thus, the government was
looking to amend the Security Treaty as soon as it was signed in 1951. One of the main aims was to place the security arrangement within the framework of the UN Charter (Weinstein 1971: 64; Hosoya 2001: 72). The inclusion of the UN Charter into the Treaty had two meanings for the Japanese government. First, it was to make the Treaty more acceptable to those who opposed the bilateral nature of security treaty, as the UN Charter introduces the concept of collective security into the Treaty. In the words of Shigeru Yoshida, the Japanese prime minister who negotiated the first Security Treaty, who attempted but failed to bring the Treaty within the UN Charter framework, the Charter was a ‘silk hat’ to dress up the unattractive reality (Weinstein 1971: 57). Additionally through the UN Charter, the Japanese government could require the US to protect Japan under the collective security clause. Under the first Treaty, although Japan was required to provide US military bases in Japan, the US was not required to protect Japan. Therefore, many Japanese felt that the UN Charter framework provided a more equal partnership (Hosoya 2001: 37).

With the escalation of the Cold War, the US administration was concerned that their Japanese counterpart may move away from the US alliance and towards neutralism, and so by the late 1950s it was ready to negotiate with Japanese policy
makers on amending the Treaty (Hosoya 2001: 73-74; Schaller 2001: 52). As a result, in the 1960 ‘Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America’, the Preamble and Articles I, V and VII make reference to the UN Charter. For example, Article I endorses the UN Charter as a means of settling international disputes and its basis for the right for collective self-defence. Despite the UN inclusion in the Treaty to ‘please the voters’, the Treaty was widely opposed by the public and its relevance was played down by successive governments (Weinstein 1971: 102-103; Green 2001: 162). Nevertheless, the government did get the result it wanted; namely, the US protection of Japan. The political meaning of UN centrism during the early post-war years in Japan, then, may be summarised as a means of reconciling Japanese government interests and Japanese public opposition to the military alliance with the US (Kawabe 1994: 64-65).

1.4.3 UN centrism as proactive diplomacy

However, alongside its commitment to bilateralism with the US, the Japanese government also actively pursued UN multilateralism. During the honeymoon period between the US and the UN, Japan, with the assistance of the US, was elected as a non-permanent Security Council member for the first time in 1958. It
also gained membership to most of the important committees in the UN and was on the board of directors of several UN agencies until the late 1960s (Satō, Imai and Kohno 1995: 173). The government’s quest for a permanent Security Council seat, a policy that was in place from the start of the country’s UN membership according to Drifte but officially announced in 1968, is a significant example of its UN activism. It incorporates the key objectives of the Japanese government vis-à-vis the UN, notably: improving Japan’s international standing; strengthening Japan’s multilateral diplomacy; and improving the peace-making capabilities of the UN (2000: 18-19). Although UN centrism as a diplomatic term had once faded away in the 1960s, by the late 1980s it was starting to make a revival. Drifte attributes the resurgent interest of policy makers towards the UN with Japan’s bid for a permanent Security Council membership (Drifte 2000: 61). In 1989, the then Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama in his speech to the UN General Assembly stated ‘since joining the UN, Japan has taken the stance of attaching great importance to the UN’, paying great importance to the UN being a variation of UN centrism. In the 1990s, it further stepped up its campaign for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and openly declared its candidature in 1994 (Gaimushō 1995: 27-28; Hatano 2008: 201-203). In 1990, the term UN centrism was included in the foreign minister’s speech to the General Assembly.³ In the Diet, Prime Minister Kiichi
Miyazawa spoke of Japan’s UN centrism (Shūgiin Jimu Kyoku 1992: 2). During this period, MOFA observed the rise of the UN, and a lessening role of US leadership in the organisation (Matsumoto 1988).

Despite its general foreign policy approach being ‘defensive and risk minimizing’, Japan’s UN policy showed a degree of independence from the US policy on the UN during the period when relationship between the UN and the US was at its low point (Satō, Imai and Kohno, 1995: 173). The US-UN relationship started to sour from around the late 1960s when, with the entry of large numbers of new states from Africa and Asia to the UN, the US lost control over the UN General Assembly’s majority-vote resolutions (Ogata 1986: 173-187). In 1974 the then UN Ambassador John Scali claimed that the UN’s perceived bias against the US was a ‘tyranny of the majority’ (Fasulo 1984: 142). The US’s hostility towards the UN continued into the 1980s under the Reagan administration. Japanese political behaviour was pushed by the changes in the structure of the international system with the decline in the power of the US symbolised by events in August 1971, notably the normalisation of US-Sino relations and the end of the gold-standard which had been assuring the strong US dollar (see Kusano 1985: 303-305; Ogata 1992: 184-188; Hook et al. 2001: 96; Schaller 2001). Especially after the 1973 oil crisis,
the government realised that it was no longer able to rely on its military alliance with
the US for its economic security (Satō, Imai and Kohno, 1995: 173). Japan, whose
industrial structure relied on natural resource imports from all over the world, felt
the need to be ‘friendly with everybody’, and this became the catchphrase of
Japanese diplomacy in the wake of the oil crisis (Ogata 1983: 36). During this
crisis period, its diplomacy became more proactive, by going against US policy in
support of the Arab nations (Ishikawa 1983: i-ix, 144-208). In the UN, voting
patterns at the General Assembly showed the government attempting to maintain a
delicate balance between showing support to the Arab and Asian nations
independent of US policy but at the same time reaffirming its relationship with the
US as the cornerstone of its foreign policy and asserting its position as a member of
the industrialised democracies (Ogata 1983: 34-38; Satō, Imai and Kohno, 1995:
172-176). Amau points out that although Japan’s UN representative sided with the
US on important issues, the claim that it blindly followed the US is inaccurate. His
analysis of the voting patterns in the 41st Assembly in 1986 shows that 99 per cent
of Israel’s votes were in accordance with the US, followed by 90 per cent in the
case of the United Kingdom, while Japan was at 60 per cent. In the 42nd Assembly
Japan sided with the US only 32 per cent of the time, but with Russia, China,
Western Europe and the Non Aligned Movement countries 46 per cent, 48 per cent,
75 per cent and 49 per cent of the time respectively (Amou 1990: 223). What is more, Japan did not follow the US in its withdrawal from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1984 when UK and Singapore followed the US’s lead (Kawabe 1995; Noguchi 1996; Obana 1999).

As Japan attained economic power⁵, rather than actively seek to develop its military capabilities (see, for example, Friedman and Lebard 1992: 259-263; Waltz 1993: 44-79), it removed itself from the power struggles amongst the superpowers and instead targeted its efforts in niche areas of diplomacy such as multilateralism (Soeya 2005: 6). Some commentators noted a more active role by the Japanese government in global institutions including the UN from the 1980s (see, for example, Yasutomo 1995; Dobson 1998; Owada 1998: 23; Gilson 2000). It significantly stepped up its multilateral involvement, primarily in economic arenas, such as in Official Development Assistance (ODA). Within the UN it moved into the vacuum left by the US to some extent, by increasing its financial and personnel contributions and becoming the second largest UN budget contributor in 1986 (Ishihara 2008: 155-157). In addition, for the first time, it provided military contribution by participating in UN peacekeeping operations from 1992 in Cambodia.
1.4.4 Military contributions to the UN peacekeeping operations

In the late 1980s, with the end of the Cold War, the bipolarity in the international system collapsed. With the end of many communist regimes and increased economic interdependence around the world, there was greater support for the ‘revival’ of the UN, which had been battered by financial crisis and a declining reputation in the 1980s (see, for example, Mortimer 2003; Mogami 2005: 179-180) and UN peacekeeping operations increased significantly. In the 48 years between 1948 and 1996, the UN mounted 41 peacekeeping operations of which 26, or over 60 per cent, were set up after 1989 (United Nations 1996: 3). Kawabe blames the former Cold War superpowers for this sudden surge in demand for UN peacekeeping. He criticises the superpowers for having intervened, enlarged and complicated the regional conflicts during the Cold War, and for walking away from these conflicts without taking proper responsibly for them and leaving the UN to pick up the pieces (1994: 120-121). Japan’s record in UN peacekeeping operations is that of growing involvement. Initially in the 1950s it refused to participate but from the 1980s it was despatching non-military personnel and making significant financial contributions. Finally, from 1992, it sent its de facto military, the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDFs)\(^6\) on UN peacekeeping missions to Cambodia and
thereafter has continued to participate in operations such as in Mozambique, Rwanda, the Golan Heights and East Timor.

Berger explains Japan’s military contribution in the UN reflects a proactiveness to take on new opportunities to increase its military capabilities after the Cold War (1996: 322). Indeed, to some extent, its new activities in the UN can be seen as an active attempt at self-promotion in the international system. A MOFA official acknowledged Japan’s participation in UN peacekeeping as a ‘good opportunity to gain a higher profile in the world political scene’ (Yomiuri Shimbun, 17 July 1991: 3) and George similarly suggests that some Japanese politicians wanted to use it as a vehicle to raise the country’s international status with the ultimate goal of converting the JSDFs into fully fledged armed forces (1993: 568, 573-574).

Nevertheless, the foundations of the Japanese government’s foreign policy remained unchanged at the end of the Cold War; it was still firmly aligned with the US (Inoguchi 1988; Islam 1993: 326-331). Increased multilateralism and contribution towards international peacekeeping in the 1990s was a response to increased US pressure for burden sharing the cost of maintaining a US led world system (Joseph 1991: 136-139; Kawabe 1994: 65; Sotooka 1994: 194; Watanabe
By the early 1990s many observers regarded the US, the sole remaining economic and military super power, as establishing a new unipolar and hegemonic world order (see, for example, Krauthammer 1990/1991). In addition, Japan-UN relations were to be affected by new developments in the US-UN relations. From the late 1980s, developments such as the reversal of Soviet Union’s behaviour towards cooperation with the UN were transforming ‘the UN into a more congenial place for US interests and values’ (Gregg 1993: 94), enabling the US as it were to subcontract its foreign policy to the international organisation (Bennis 2000). The close cooperation between the UN and the US during the 1990-1991 crisis over Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait suggested that the US had once again become supportive of the international organisation. President George Bush Senior claimed ‘My vision of a new world order foresees a United Nations with a revitalized peacekeeping function’ (Bush 1991: online).

In principle, the Japanese government has kept a low profile in military matters even as the country’s economic power was growing. One reason stems from the many mechanisms put in place to keep JSDF activities low-key, one of which was the House of Representatives’ resolution prohibiting the JSDF from operating overseas (Sangiin Jimu Kyoku 1954: 34-38). With the start of the Gulf War in 1990,
the US administration urged its Japanese counterpart to make military contributions to the war by deploying the JSDFs to the Gulf to provide logistical support to the US-lead multinational forces (Asahi Shimbun, 22 August 1990: 2). The then prime minister, Toshiki Kaifu, was initially reluctant to deploy the JSDFs overseas, but eventually responded to repeated US demands (Sasaki 1992: 33-34). As was the case in the two US-Japan security treaties of 1951 and 1960, the government looked to the UN as a justification for change in 1990 when it attempted to amend the law preventing overseas deployment of the JSDF. On 16 October 1990 the government submitted the Bill Concerning Cooperation to the UN Peace Effort (UN Peace Cooperation Bill) to the Diet. The name of the bill infers an association between JSDFs’ overseas deployment and a contribution to UN peacekeeping efforts. In fact however, although the bill required UN Assembly or UN Security Council authorisation for the use of force, the JSDF did not necessarily have to be deployed under UN command (Mori 1991: 18; Sasaki 1992: 37). It was clear that the aim of the bill was to deploy the JSDFs under a US-led multinational force, and so it was criticised as a bill to cooperate with the US rather than the UN (Asahi Shimbun on 28 September, 1990: 4; Asai 1991: 213-215). Because Japan has often been accused of ‘free riding’ on the back of the established world order maintained by the US and other industrialised powers (Prestowitz 1988: 249,
Berger points out the political importance of deploying a small force in the Gulf to avoid an isolationist backlash as a worthwhile investment for a rational free rider (Berger 1996). However, an opinion poll conducted in November 1990 revealed strong public opinion against the overseas deployment of the JSDFs with 78 per cent of the public opposed to the idea (Asahi Shimbun, 6 November 1990: 1). Together with legal confusion surrounding the bill (Furukawa 1991: 13-14; Mori 1991: 18), the bill was eventually abandoned.

When the UN Peace Cooperation Bill failed, the Japanese government compensated the lack of physical presence by adding USD 9 billion to the USD 4 billion financial contribution it was already making towards the Gulf War (Sasaki 1992: 70-73), a significant contribution considering the total UN peacekeeping operations budget at the time was about USD 0.4 billion (United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2001). However, the US administration was no longer satisfied with just financial contributions and stepped up its pressure on the Japanese government to assume greater military responsibilities. The then US Secretary of State James Baker commented:

We recognize that Japan’s leaders and its people, are now grappling with a
difficult adjustment in Japan’s world role. … Your ‘checkbook diplomacy,’ like our ‘dollar diplomacy’ of an earlier era, is clearly too narrow. (*Los Angeles Times*, on 11 November 1991)

Despite the eagerness by policy makers to respond to US demand, the overseas deployment of the JSDFs was only realised as a result of extensive persuasion by the government and by adapting conditions in light of what was acceptable by the public. In a desperate response, in 1992 the Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations (International Peace Cooperation Law) was passed through the Diet. The single most significant difference with the earlier bill was that the latter restricted JSDF deployment to participation in UN peacekeeping operations and humanitarian assistance. This time, the bill was more palatable to the Japanese public. For example, according to an opinion poll conducted in June 1991, 45 per cent supported peacekeeping under the UN, 13 per cent were against and 36 per cent expressed no strong view (*Mainichi Shimbun*, 7 June 1991). The bill was also supported by the major opposition parties, the Kōmei Party and the Democratic Socialist Party, *Minshatō* (Kōmeitō 1991; Minshatō 1994).
1.4.5 Public opinion in favour of the UN

The significance of public opinion is hidden in traditional international relations theories that assume state actors to be unitary and national interests of all states to be rational and therefore similar. However, some observers point out that policy-making agents can be influenced to a significant extent by public opinion. Emmerson claims that ‘the voice of public opinion being louder in Japan than in most democracies, the Japanese leadership was never insensitive to the effects on the public of its decisions and actions’ (Emmerson 1971: 114). Watanabe points out that especially since the fall of the Kishi Cabinet in the wake of huge demonstrations over the US-Japan treaty revision of 1960, ‘Japanese leaders have become more cautious (or even timid) about offending the vox populi’ (1977: 144). It is observed that politicians heed to their own support groups and public opinion sometimes against the advice of MOFA on foreign policy matters (Hellmann 1969). Indeed, within MOFA itself, Shunichi Kase, the first Ambassador to the UN, admits he was greatly motivated by public enthusiasm towards the UN (1986: 37).

As seen in the section above, public opinion played a significant role in key foreign policies such as the US-Japan treaty and the overseas deployment of JSDFs. In both cases, the government used the public’s positive image of the UN as a ‘useful
tool’ to persuade the public and get the result they needed. For example in the case of the latter, to some extent public opinion was also influenced by international, mainly US, criticism over the non-dispatch of its forces to the Gulf despite its significant USD 13 billion financial contribution which lead to the growing acceptance that the international community was no longer satisfied with just financial contributions (Nakamura 2005: 209; Fujishige 2008: 101). However a more effective means of convincing a sceptical public was the government’s change in strategy to emphasise the deployment as making a contribution towards the UN (Mori 1991: 20-21; Kenmochi 1992: 25-26, 242-243; Asai 1993: 12-18, Kawabe 1994: 131-152). Military contribution was ‘justified as long as it was sanctioned by the UN’ (Dobson 2003: 70) and states that ‘the UN had become an arena in which Japan’s military contribution could be justified and coexist with the concordance and specificity accorded to the traditional norm of anti-militarism’ (2003: 74).

But why was the overseas deployment of JSDFs acceptable to the public under the UN flag and why was it contested under other conditions? And why was UN centrisim regarded as a viable tool for politicians in justifying the US-Japan alliance? In short, why was UN centred diplomacy a ‘useful tool’ (Drifte 2000:60) to
manage public relations for the Japanese government? In order to understand
Japan’s international behaviour, not only towards the UN, but also in a wider
context, this thesis examines the general public’s attitude towards the UN. The
hypothesis is that the Japanese hold UN centrism as a norm which is separate to
the ‘UN centrism’ referred to in foreign policy and that this norm has been led by the
civil UN movements that operated in Japan after the war.

1.5 Civil UN associations

There are many civil UN associations in Japan (see Table 1). In particular, those
civil associations which support UNESCO, UNICEF, and ILO, are all the world’s
first civil associations set up to specifically support the respective UN agencies.
Today UN agencies recognise numerous non-governmental and private support
groups, but the three Japanese associations remain some of the most successful in
terms of size for their respective agencies. Another characteristic of these three
civil associations is that they originated as civil voluntary groups, ‘unincorporated
associations’ (nin’i dantai), but later became incorporated non-profit organisations
(NPOs) called ‘public-interest corporations’ (kōeki hōjin). In contrast, some of the
newer UN associations — Japan FAO Association, Japan WHO association, ITU
Association of Japan and Japan Foundation for UNU — have been ‘public-interest
corporations’ from the beginning. This thesis identifies that, in particular, the civil UNESCO and UNICEF movements played a special role in developing UN centrism in Japan and so examines them in detail.

Table 1: Associations of UN organisations in Japan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>UN association</th>
<th>Original objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 1947 (Sendai)</td>
<td>Sendai UNESCO Co-operative Association (<a href="http://www.unesco.jp/sendai">www.unesco.jp/sendai</a>)</td>
<td>• To urge the government to join United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1948 (National Federations)</td>
<td>National Federation of UNESCO Associations in Japan* (<a href="http://www.unesco.jp">www.unesco.jp</a>)</td>
<td>• The association originally started as the UNESCO Co-operative Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1947</td>
<td>United Nations Association of Japan</td>
<td>• To promote the understanding of and cooperation towards the UN amongst the public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• To contribute towards world peace and human welfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1949</td>
<td>ILO Association of Japan (<a href="http://www.jilo.or.jp">www.jilo.or.jp</a>)</td>
<td>• To urge the government to rejoin the International Labour Organisation (ILO) which Japan left in 1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1950</td>
<td>The Japan Committee for UNICEF (<a href="http://www.unicef.or.jp">www.unicef.or.jp</a>)</td>
<td>• To assist in the smooth operations of United Nations’ Children Fund (UNICEF) activities in Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1952</td>
<td>Japan FAO Association (<a href="http://www.fao-kyokai.or.jp">www.fao-kyokai.or.jp</a>)</td>
<td>Formed on Japan joining the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• To assist in the operations of FAO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1965</td>
<td>Japan WHO Association (<a href="http://www.japan-who.or.jp">www.japan-who.or.jp</a>)</td>
<td>Formed on Japan joining World Health Organization (WHO).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• To disseminate the spirit of the WHO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Charter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| September 1971 | The ITU Association of Japan (www.ituaj.jp) | • To communicate objectives of the WHO  
• Networking and cooperation with health related organisations overseas. |
| August 1985 | The Japan Foundation for UNU (www.unu.edu/hq/japanese/funu) | • To cooperate with the activities of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and other international organisations.  
• To collect and disseminate information regarding activities of international organisations  
• Provide technical cooperation to developing countries |
| November 1992 | UNIFEM National Committee Japan (www.unifem.nihon.jp) | • To cooperate with the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) in assisting women in developing countries to improve their standards of living, to empower and obtain gender equality  
• To contribute to the international community and for a gender equal society. |
| January 1999 | The Japan Association for the World Food Programme (www.jawfp.org) | • To communicate to the Japanese public the food assistance programmes  
• To offer opportunities for the understanding of world food situations and food assistance  
• To raise both physical and psychological contribution from Japan |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| September 1999 | Foundation for the Support of the United Nations (www.fsun.org) | • To assist in UN activities on the global solutions for peace, welfare, environment, human rights etc  
• To contribute towards international understanding |
| May 2000   | Japan for UNHCR (www.japanforunhcr.org) | • To appeal to the Japanese public the issues of refugees                     |
| March 2001 | Japan HABITAT Association (www.habitat.or.jp) | • To communicate widely the importance of habitat issues with the UN Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT)  
• To promote the international cooperation in the field of habitation in the Asia region |

Information collated by the author

1.5.1 Civil UNESCO movement

It is not widely known that there is at least one area, in addition to economics and technology, in which Japan can be proud to the rest of world. That is the civil UNESCO movement. (Yoshida 1991: 37-38)

In November 1946 Kōichi Ueda, an officer at a regional Liaison Office for the occupation forces in Tohoku, read a small article in the Asahi Shimbun newspaper about the first session of the General Conference of UNESCO being held in Paris. Intrigued, together with others he formed the Sendai UNESCO Co-operative Association (Ueda 1993: 9), now called Sendai UNESCO Association. Its inaugural
address on 19 July 1947 pronounced:

The spirit of the UNESCO Constitution … is strongly shared by the Japanese people who have experienced the Great War. It is especially in Japan that a movement to reject wars and promote peace must start immediately from the minds of every person and not left to state leaders and politicians. In order to prepare for this mind, the UNESCO Co-operative Association is set up ahead of Japan’s official admittance to UNESCO.

(Ueda 1983: 9)

Ueda explains that the starting point of the civil UNESCO movement was linking ‘peace in the minds of men’ of the UNESCO Constitution to pacifist thinking (Ueda 1951: 256). ‘It is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed’ (UNESCO 1953: 5) is identified to be the basis of the ‘UNESCO spirit’ which was created and embedded in post-war Japanese society (Hook et al. 2001: 306). This phrase from the UNESCO Constitution originates from the words of the then UK prime minister Clement Attlee (Sagara 1964: 9; Ueda 1986: 73). The origin of the phrase is traced back to Attlee’s welcoming address at the Conference for the Establishment of the UNESCO held in London on 16 November 1945 in which
he questioned ‘do not war, after all, begin in the minds of men?’ and followed with ‘educate so that the minds of the people shall be attuned to peace’ (Attlee 1946: 22). Based on this tenet, the purpose of the organisation is ‘to contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among nations through education, science and culture’ (UNESCO 1953: 5).

Ueda found that the civil UNESCO movement developed with particular enthusiasm in Japan because its activities were based on four pacifist spirits: self-recrimination towards the war; establishing a peace state; absolute pacifism based on the Constitution; and world peace based on the ideals of UNESCO (Sendai Yunesko Kyōkai 1983: 20). Within a few months, in September 1947, the second UNESCO Co-operative Association was set up in Kyoto. On this occasion, the Kyoto UNESCO Co-operative Association announced a ‘message to our comrades around the world’ as follows:

We actively adopted democracy and formulated a constitution which is committed to human right and renunciation of war. We have taken the leadership to reject war and totally abolish military capability entrusting the security of this pacifist nation to the sense of justice of the world. … Therefore
international understanding and cooperation are the keys to peace. This is the reason why we, the citizen of Kyoto, in establishing the UNESCO Association, send this message to the UNESCO headquarter to be disseminated widely to gain the understanding and cooperation amongst our friends around the world. (Ueda 1951: 212)

The civil movement quickly spread all over Japan and by 1949 there were nearly 70 associations (Nihon Yunesuko Kyōkai Renmei 2007: 8-10). The UNESCO civil movement claims its promotion of Japan’s membership to UNESCO became a ‘national movement’ (Nihon Yunesuko Kyōkai Renmei 1999: 24). Further, the civil UNESCO movement acted to raise not only the profile of UNESCO but also the UN system as a whole in Japan. As shown in Figure 1, the civil UNESCO association was launched four years before Japan was admitted to UNESCO in June 1951, and nine years before becoming a UN member state. Hence the civil movement, before the state, was Japan’s first linkage with the UN. The Sendai UNESCO Association stated its objective as ‘raising awareness of United Nations, UNESCO and other international organisations and the promotion of the spirit of the UNESCO Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ (Sendai Yunesuko Kyōkai 1983: 69).
In this way, this thesis determines that the civil UNESCO movement was not just an advocate of the UNESCO spirit. It was spreading the idea that Japan ought to pursue absolute pacifism under the leadership of the UN, and successfully captured the support of the pacifists.

### 1.5.2 Civil UNICEF movement

The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) was established in 1946 with the aim of providing assistance to children and mothers affected by the aftermath of the Second World War and the civil wars that continued or started. The ‘founding fathers’ of UNICEF can be identified as the former president of the United States of America Herbert Hoover, the last president of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) Fiorello La Guardia and the Polish diplomat
Ludwik Rajchman who together demanded that the residual resources of the UNRRA be directed towards a new organisation to help children (Stenersen 1996; Inoue 2004).

In Japan, hunger continued to be acute after the war. Akiyuki Nosaka in his semi-autobiography ‘Grave of the Fireflies’ (Hotaru no Haka) illustrates the struggle against hunger amongst children, not only during the war but also after the war (1968). In order to relieve this food shortage, in 1949 UNICEF set up an office in Japan to provide aid to children mostly in the form of milk powder for school lunches. UNICEF’s relief activities in Japan ran for 15 years until 1964. The milk program ran for 13 years to 1962 (Inoue 2004: 87; Nihon Yunisefu Kyōkai Shashi Kankōkai 2005: 74). The aid was worth about USD 18 million and benefited approximately 1.5 million children (UNICEF Office in Japan and Japan Committee for UNICEF 1986: 3; Yunisefu Chūnichi Jimusho and Nihon Yunisefu Kyōkai 1999: 9).

The civil UNICEF movement started from volunteers supporting UNICEF’s activities in Japan. In 1950 the volunteer group became an unincorporated association (nin’i dantai) called the UNICEF Association, and in 1955 became an
incorporated foundation (*zaidan hōjin*) called the Japan UNICEF Association. It is also called the Japan Committee for UNICEF from 1977 and is part of the 36 National Committees for UNICEF around the world today.¹⁰ Note that the civil association is separate to the UNICEF Office in Japan, which reports to the UNICEF headquarters in New York, that remained after the end of UNICEF’s humanitarian activities in Japan and today resides in the UN House in Tokyo together with other UN agencies. The Association was established five years before UNICEF itself initiated the establishment of National Committees around the world in 1955 (Bellamy 2005: 12), and so it could be said that the civil UNICEF movement in Japan was a genuinely spontaneous initiative by the Japanese people. This thesis claims that the civil UNICEF movement added a new dimension to the UN centrism norm in Japan by advocating individuals, not just the state, to contribute to the UN.

### 1.5.3 Civil society

This thesis takes as its point of departure the fact that the civil UN movement has been extremely successful in Japan. However, many academics claim that civil society *per se* in Japan is laggard or weak (Van Wolfren 1989; Yamamoto 1995; 1998; Carothers 1999: 23). In a recent comparative study on citizen participation,
Japan ranks low amongst developed countries. Howard compared citizen participation in voluntary associations amongst ‘old democratic states’ of Australia, East Germany, Finland, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the US, and found Japan’s participation of 0.92 associations per person to be the lowest amongst this group, whose average was 2.39 associations. Japan comes last even when compared against ‘post authoritarian states’ such as Argentina and the Philippines and only just above the average of ‘post communist states’ (Howard 2003: 69). Similarly, studies conducted by Salamon and Anheier, which compared the level of employment in the non-profit sector in US, Germany, France, UK, Japan, Italy, and Hungary in the 1990s found that the US came top at 6.9 per cent whilst Japan came third from the bottom at 2.5 per cent whilst the average was 3.4 per cent (1996: 34, 92; 1998: 218). Yamamoto claims Japan has lagged behind not only other developed countries but also some of Japan’s neighbouring states in Asia whose civil society has seen dynamic growth in recent times (Yamamoto et al. 1998: 132). For example in 1993 the Japan Center for International Exchange researched the civil societies of 15 countries/regions in the Asia Pacific and reported a rise of non-profit and non-governmental organisations (NPOs and NGOs) in the region (Yamamoto 1995). In Japan, however, it noted the red tape faced by NPOs obstruct the growth of their activities (Yamamoto 1995: 27, 37).
This thesis therefore examines the basis of the civil UN movement’s success against the background of an apparently weak civil society in Japan.

1.6 Structure of the thesis

The thesis examines UN centrism in two parts. Part I (Chapters 2 to 4) deals with the theories and methodologies of the thesis. It outlines all the main theories and ideas used. Chapter 2 outlines the whole theoretical framework with emphasis on the underlining constructivist approach of the thesis, while Chapters 3 and 4 details the key theories and ideas that support the UN centrism norm. Chapter 3 explains the development of Japan’s pacifist norm which is determined as the backbone of the UN centrism norm, and Chapter 4 outlines the social structures and customs which the thesis finds are important in explaining the UN centrism norm: strong authority and weak individualism creating a society (‘seken’) with weak civil society in which norms and behaviours are dictated by the need to conform and avoid being shamed. In particular, the gift giving culture based on the idea of receiving and returning favours (‘on’ and ‘giri’) is examined carefully as it is used to explain the development of UN centism norm under the civil UNICEF movement in Chapter 6.
Employing the constructivist framework, theories and social behaviours examined in Part I, Part II (Chapters 5 to 7) reviews the civil UNESCO and UNICEF movements and the UNESCO World Heritage listing to explain the UN centrism norm. The biggest feature of the UN centrism norm is that it considers the UN to be part of the ‘authority’ of post-war Japan and as such the UN commands the power to mobilise the Japanese. This feature together with the examination of how the international UN norms and the domestic pacifist norm have shaped UN centrism is considered through the examination of the civil UN movements in general with a special focus on the civil UNESCO movement (Chapter 5). In reviewing the civil UNICEF movement in Chapter 6, the main purposes shifts to explaining first, the expansion of UN centrism norm to fully incorporate the aspect of international cooperation and second, the confirmation that Japan’s pacifist norm is based on the shared experience of the war and hence strongest amongst the generation affected by it. Lastly, Chapter 7 examines the UNESCO World Heritage system as part of the international UN norm, to illustrate how Japan’s UN centrism norm is today interacting with the international UN norms. UN centrism under civil UNESCO and UNICEF movements have been domestic norms consumed solely within Japan but through international tourism, the Japanese are now becoming conscious of how their UN centrism norm is being seen by foreigners.
Lastly, as the concluding chapter, Chapter 8 provides an analytical review of how empirical material and theoretical approach relates to each other within the thesis. This will be done through revisiting the research questions put forward in the thesis. Namely, it assesses whether the thesis successfully contributed to the understanding of the domestic roots of a norm – UN Centrism-. It also considers the contribution towards Japan’s international relations and civil society discussions. Finally, as a further research question it discusses the applicability of Japan’s UN centrism norm in other countries and its possibility in assisting the democratisation of the UN.
PART 1 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

CHAPTER 2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:
CONSTRUCTIVISM, NORMS, PACIFISM,
CIVIL SOCIETY AND JAPANESE STUDIES

Part 1 focuses on examining the theories and ideas employed in this thesis to explain how UN centrism is a domestically embedded post-war norm that formed part of the national identity of post-war Japan.

2.1 Introduction: Alternative approaches in analysing UN centrism

This chapter begins by reviewing how UN centrism may be understood at the state level as a foreign policy tool / concept / idea in international relations. The first purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the potential utility of a constructivist approach for examining UN centrism as a socio-cultural norm. Through the examination of the theory on norms, the second purpose of this chapter is to set the scene for the rest of the thesis by examining the key theories that support the explanation of the UN centrism norm which are identified as pacifism and civil society and to come to an understanding that the use of Japanese Studies is
valuable in examining the political and social structures and customs behind the norm. First, UN centrism at the state level is examined according to three main theoretical approaches of international relations: realism, liberalism and constructivism.

2.1.1 Realism

Realism approaches explain how international relations are shaped by state capabilities and by the structure of the international system. They are based on the key assumptions that: the international systems are anarchic, with no authority above states; the state is the primary and unitary actor in the decision making process; \(^{12}\) that states are rational actors in pursuit of self-interest, whose primary goal is security; that the behaviour of states is determined by the balance of power between states based on military and economic state capabilities; and that states are inherently aggressive (Carr 1946; Morgenthau 1973; Waltz 1979; Keohane 1986).

In international relations, the US has been the most influential country for Japan: victor in the Second World War; occupier after the war; and the world’s super power even today (see Hosoya and Honma 1982; Igarashi 1995: 153-180; Ilkura
2001). In a post-war international system dominated by the US therefore, the basic characteristic of Japan’s foreign policy is ‘all-out pro-US policy’ (Asai 1989: 8-10) and that it ‘should not resist against hegemony’ (Tosa 2005: 113). This means, according to realist theory, the only effective foreign policy in Japan’s three pillars of diplomacy will be its ‘cooperation with the democratic states of the world’, which essentially means ‘cooperation with the US’ as confirmed by the Diet (Shūgiin Jimu Kyoku 1957: 3-4). In order to confirm this position, Kishi in his prime ministerial administrative policy speech stated in 1958: ‘cooperation with the democratic states of the world, especially with the United States’ (Shūgiin Jimu Kyoku 1958: 1).

Makoto Iokibe, an academic specialising in Japanese diplomatic history and US-Japan relations, goes as far as to state that:

[A]ctual postwar Japanese foreign policy, however, casts some doubt on Japan's adherence to these principles [the three pillars of foreign policy], which perhaps speak more to hope than reality. The truth is that most --- say, around 60 per cent--- of Japan's postwar foreign policy has centred on the US. (Iokibe 1999b: online)

After the signing of the 1960 US-Japan Security Treaty, realist academics such as
Masataka Kōsaka and Yōnosuke Nagai called on the Japanese government to pursue a ‘balance of power’ policy in which US-Japan security system and nuclear deterrence counteract the ‘expanding power’ of communist states (Shindō 2001: 68).

In examining UN centrism, what is the explanatory power of realism? Firstly, the theory would predict the UN and other international organisations as unable to build the authority to control states as a world government but rather regard them merely as tools of state policies for accumulating power (Pentland 1976: 632). Therefore, this aspect of realism would not recognise UN centrism as a viable foreign policy and strictly speaking would have no explanatory power. Secondly, based on the theory’s assumption that state behaviours are determined by the balance of power between states, the theory indirectly assesses all Japanese foreign policies, including the UN centred foreign policy, to be a subset of the US-Japan alliance rather than an independent policy. From this perspective, one could assume the UN-Japan relationship to be affected by the relationship between the US and the UN. Thus, if the US is seen not to be in favour of the UN, it follows that Japan’s UN policy will be adversely influenced. Lastly, the theory’s assumption that states pursue self-interest may explain Japan’s UN centrism as a foreign policy aimed at
promoting itself in the international system. The theory predicts that as Japan accumulates economic power, it seeks to increase its political-military power (Yamamoto 1976: 15-16; Berger 1996: 317-325; Hook, et al. 2001: 19), which may be reflected in Japan’s self-promotion in the UN Security Council.

2.1.2 Liberalism

In contrast to realism, which is interested in the power struggle between states, liberalism attempts to explain why and how states co-operate (Mitrany 1946; Allison 1971; Halperin 1974; Keohane and Nye 1977; Nye 1988). On the question of why states co-operate, the theory looks towards the decline of state sovereignty and the increased interdependencies and interconnectedness amongst states created by international business and trade. The theory explains the role of international organisations, which act as venues for the increasing transnational governmental policy co-ordination, as well as the role of other non-state actors such as NGOs and transnational corporations. Liberalism may also recognise the role of international regulatory norms such as ‘identifiable social conventions’ created through states’ co-operation within institutions (Young 1986) and through advanced forms in international treaties and the conversion of national legislation. As with realism, the actors are assumed to be rational in pursuit of self-interests but
liberalism acknowledges objectives other than security issues as being relevant.

Liberalism therefore provides an explanatory power for multilateral diplomacy as transcending straightforward security issues. The theory backs observations that despite US dominance over Japan’s foreign policy, many state actors in Japan believed in, or wanted to create, an international community in which Japan could pursue multilateral diplomacy (Saitō 1986: 223; Tsuruoka 1986: 89-90; Amou 1990). Hence, liberalism theory is able to explain Japan’s UN centred foreign policy from a multilateralist perspective. Indeed some writers have noted UN centred foreign policy to be the main source of Japan’s multilateral diplomatic activities (Saitō 1991).

There is an extensive literature analysing Japan’s diplomacy as reactive or passive, and assessing whether its foreign policy is subservient to external pressures, namely the US (for example, see Hellman 1972: 135 and 137-138; Calder 1988: 520; Funabashi 1991-1992: 62; Hook et al. 2005; Iokibe 2008; Soeya 2009). According to Kohno, those who regard Japan’s diplomacy as reactive tend to classify it as ‘external pressure-driven’ (thus not changing course unless it is criticised by foreign countries); as ‘a blind follower of the US’; or ‘faceless’ (lacking
any leading personalities) (Kohno 1999: online). In contrast, some observers acknowledge a limited activism in: crisis situations (Hook, et al. 2001: 70-71); areas of international cooperation, such as in the field of foreign aid (Orr 1990; Yasutomo 1995); and a higher standing in the international community, such as its quest for a seat at the UN Security Council (Takahara 1996: 64; Drifte 2000). Pharr, on the other hand, determines the style of Japan’s diplomacy to be defensive rather than reactive. She explains that the government minimises its security risks by associating itself with the US, but at the same time takes proactive and independent actions in its calculated self-interest (Pharr 1993: 246). Similarly, Hook et al. explain that the reactive and proactive models would only provide caricatures of Japanese foreign policy, and in fact its international behaviour may be best expressed as a ‘quiet diplomacy’, whose approach is low-risk and low-profiled (Hook, et al. 2001: 71).

2.1.3 Constructivism

Mainstream constructivist approaches take collective identities, norms, cultures and values as important factors in explaining the behaviour of state actors (Wendt 1987; 1992; Onuf 1989; Katzenstein 1996a)\(^\text{13}\). Whereas both realist and liberal theories assume identities and interests of states to be structurally determined,
constructivist approaches argue that process, and not structure, determines international behaviour (Wendt 1992). Nye explains that ‘structure’ refers principally to the distribution of capabilities of actors while ‘processes’ refers to the ways in which the actors relate to each other (Nye 1988: 249). Constructivists therefore regard norms as exerting an important influence upon state behaviour, in contrast to realist and liberal theories, for which the explanatory power of norms are dependent upon a state’s material capabilities (Hook et al. 2001: 65). Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein define norms as being either constitutive of identities (‘generating expectations about the proper portfolio of identities for a given context’); as prescribing or proscribing (thus regulating) behaviour (‘generating expectations about how those identities will shape behaviour in varying circumstances’) (1996: 54).

While in realist and liberal theories actors are assumed to be basically rational, meaning that the ‘national interests of all states are fundamentally similar and are rooted in universal human needs and desires’, under constructivist approaches ‘national interest is a construct emerging out of contingent historical, social and rational processes that can vary considerably across different states at different point in time’ (Berger 1998: 16). Although realist and liberalist approaches explain
the ‘what’ (nature) and, to some extent, the ‘how’ (process) of Japan’s UN centred foreign policy it provides insufficient explanations as to its ‘why’ (motives). Why UN centrism became a state policy is better understood by examining the rise of UN centrism as a domestic norm supported by the general public. Through the examination of UN centrism as a domestic norm which worked in a bottom-up fashion, this thesis argues that the norm offers more than just the UN centrism foreign policy but that it has contributed, in its unique way, to the development of Japan’s civil society and the rise of grassroots activities. To understand these aspects of UN centrism, the next section reviews the theory on norms as the analytical approach of this thesis.

2.2 Theory on norms

2.2.1 Definitions and typology of norms

Norms are defined by Karsner as ‘standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations’ (1983: 2). Further it can be explained as shared expectations about appropriate behaviour with a given collective identity (Katzenstein 1996a: 5; Checkel 1999: 83). In other situations, norms operate as standards that specify the proper enactment of an already defined identity. Norms thus either define (or constitute) identities or prescribe (or regulate) behaviour, or they do both
This thesis is concerned in explaining UN centrism as a domestic norm in Japan. However as identified by Finnemore and Sikkink that ‘There is a two level norm game occurring in which the domestic and international norm tables are increasingly linked’ (1998: 893), in understanding the domestic UN centrism norm it is important to consider its relationship with international norms. For this purpose, the international and domestic norms are defined respectively as those norms which ‘set standards for the appropriate behaviour of states’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 893) and those norms which set standards for the appropriate behaviour of citizens in a particular state. The typology of norms considered in this thesis are the domestic ‘UN centrism norm’, the domestic ‘pacifist norm’ as the key political culture which supported the development of the UN centrism norm and the international norms of the UN and its agencies - ‘UN norm’, ‘UNESCO norm’ and ‘UNICEF norm’. Taking the missions of the agencies, this thesis understands the international ‘UNESCO norm’ and ‘UNICEF norm’ to mean states ought to support the two UN agencies which respectively ‘contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture’ (UNESCO 1953) and ‘helps build a world where the rights of every child are
realized’ (UNICEF 2008a: online). The international ‘UN norm’, based on the UN Charter, is the norm which encourages states to build and maintain international peace through the multilateralism platform of the UN and its System including UNESCO and UNICEF. Finally, in addition to the singular ‘international UN norm’, this thesis also uses the plural, ‘international UN norms’, as a collective term which incorporates the international norms of the UN and its agencies - ‘UN norm’, ‘UNESCO norm’ and ‘UNICEF norm’ and is defined as equivalent to Dobson’s definition of ‘UN centrist’ or ‘UN internationalism’ which ‘promotes the resolution of global human problems on a multilateral basis through international organisations such as the UN’ (2003: 39).

The relationships between these norms are illustrated in Figure 2. As shown in the Figure, the thesis stipulates that the domestic ‘UN centrist’ is Japan’s unique interpretation of the international ‘UN norm’ and is developed mainly through the act of the ‘civil UNESCO movement’ and the ‘civil UNICEF movement’ who are identified as the norm entrepreneurs below. The two civil UN movements are in turn influenced by the international norms of the UN agencies they support, i.e. the international ‘UNESCO norm’ and ‘UNICEF norm’. The domestic ‘pacifist norm’ which is reviewed in detail in Chapter 3 is another key norm motivating both norm
entrepreneurs and so act as the base of the UN centrism norm. Further as shown in Part II of the thesis, as the two civil UN movements matured, they have been able to export back its values and counter-influence the international norms of the UN agencies they support. The concluding chapter, Chapter 8, suggests as a further research question, the potential utility of Japan’s UN centrism norm in international society.

Figure 2: International and domestic norms surrounding the UN centrism norm
2.2.2 Norm development: Diffusion and the norm life cycle

The section above explained the typology of the norms used in the thesis and their relationships. This section examines the existing literature surrounding the development and diffusion of norms starting with Wendt’s (1999) theory on development of a collective identity.

Explaining at the systemic level, Wendt explains that the identity amongst states can be collective rather than egoistic (1996: 52; 1999: 229). Here, the thesis generalises Wendt’s theory by replacing his analysis of the development of collective identity amongst states to amongst a group of actors in general. When an actor is seen to take a self-sacrificing and altruistic action, it creates a signal for other actors to take similar action. If the other actors respond and take up the action proposed, it sends a signal back to the first actor confirming the provisional collective identity which it set. As this mutually enforcing process is repeated, the actors start to gain a shared understanding of their mutual social roles and a ‘collective identity’ is internalised.

There exist broadly three different ideas on the way norms diffuse: Principles of coercion, consequences, and appropriateness. The ‘principle of coercion’ is mainly
supported by the realists who see the hegemon as diffusing norms. International norms emerge and diffuse when it is promoted by the hegemon. Conformance to the norm is determined by the strength of the coercion of the hegemon (Morgenthau 1954: 205-209; Gilpin 1981; Krasner 1983; Mearsheimer 1994-1995: 5-49). In the case of the UN centrism norm whilst the hegemon does play a role, the realist principle does not sufficiently explain its development. As seen in Part II of the thesis, Japan’s defeat in the War and the subsequent US hegemony over Japan is an important background in the birth of the civil UN movements. At the same time whilst the US have been a central actor in the establishment of the UN, it has not coerced the Japanese to actively support UNESCO but the support came voluntarily from the citizens (Bunce 1949a: 6).

Another idea, the ‘principle of consequences’, is mainly associated with liberalist thinking. Here, the norm conformance is thought to be voluntary. The actor voluntarily accepts the norm if he deems this to be in his favour (March and Olson 1999: 308-314; Keohane 2002: 126-128). In international society many nations conform to international norms even when it results in a loss of interest in the short run if it sees the benefit in the long run (Keohane 1984). If one sees Japan’s UN centrism as a choice made by the state, the liberalist approach will explain the UN
centrism as a foreign policy. However the main theme of this thesis is to explain UN centrism as a bottom-up norm led not by bureaucrats and politicians but by provincial civil associations who voluntarily and without any influence pioneered civil movements supporting the UN and its agencies. They did not do so because others were doing it nor were they calculating their interests.

Finally, the ‘principle of appropriateness’ is supported by the constructivists who see the international networks of non-governmental organisations as the main actor in the development of norms. These networks diffuse the norm by gathering information, utilising physical incentives and putting pressure such as lobbying politicians to make the state conform to an international standard. For example, Martha Finnemore studied how UNESCO diffused its science policy around the world under this approach (1993). John Boli, George Thomas and Frank Lechner reviewed the diffusion of universalism and rational thinking into a global norm by international non-governmental organisations since the 19th century, tying it to the development of corporate philosophies of multinational corporations of today (Boli and Thomas 1997; 1999; Lechner and Boli 2005).

In the case of the UN centrism norm, the ‘international networks of non-
governmental organisations’ would be the UN and its System promoting the UN norms. However this thesis stipulates that the role played by the UN and its System as actors in the norm development was relatively small and indirect and that the main actors were the domestic civil UN movements.

The thesis considers the norm diffusion of UN centrism in Japan using the norm life-cycle by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998). They explain the development of the norm, also at the systemic level, in a form of a life-cycle which is divided into three stages. Stage one is determined as ‘norm emergence’. Norm entrepreneurs, committed to the ideals and values embodied in the norm or idea, frame a new norm and attempt to persuade a critical mass to embrace it. Norm entrepreneurs are identified with organisational platforms from which they attempt to promote their norms. Stage two is ‘norm cascade’. The norm reaches a tipping point when adopted by a critical mass, and the norm building process enters its second stage. State actors endorse and institutionalise the norm. The norm is socialised as it captures sufficient legitimacy that citizens conform to it voluntarily out of self esteem and peer pressure. The final stage is the internalisation. This stage is an extreme point of norm cascade when the norm is so widely accepted that it is taken for granted and conformance to it is not questioned.
It has often been questioned as to at what point one can consider a norm to have ‘cascaded’ (Schmitz and Sikkink 2002: 533)? In response, based on evidence gathered from empirical studies, Finnemore and Sikkink suggests the tipping point to be when one third of the states which form international society conform to the norm. Further when the norm is a treaty, they suggest the tipping point to be at the point when it enters into force with the signature and ratification of sufficient number of states (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 901). This thesis however questions whether one should consider norm diffusion merely based on ratifications. For example, the UN has 192 member states as at June 2010 (United Nations 2010) but never the less the UN has been subjected to a growing number of terrorist attacks in recent years and between 2004 and 2009, over 173 UN personnel have been killed (UN News Centre 2006; 2007; 2008; 2009; 2010) mostly in member state territories. It is clear that state membership does not automatically mean the acceptance of the UN by its citizens. In states where democracy is effective, technically it may be possible to assume a norm to be conformed by the nation when their elected politicians ratify a treaty, but it does not guarantee that the norm has in fact been communicated to all. *Vice versa*, there may be a case when the norm is accepted by the nation before the state. This thesis argues Japan’s UN
centrism is just such a case. In understanding the dynamism of a norm therefore, it is important to consider not just the diffusion of the international norm at the state level but also the match with the values of its people embedded in its political culture. Hence the significance of the relationship between international and domestic norms.

2.2.3 Acceptance of an international norm by a nation

The UN centrism in Japan, a domestic norm, originates from the acceptance of the international norm of the UN as a multilateral organisation. This section determines that the successful diffusion of an international norm at the national level is dependent on the match with the domestic political culture and support from its political and social structures. Without these, the new international norm would find it difficult to compete with the existing domestic norms. Hence, the degree of penetration of an international norm in a particular country is unrelated to the maturity of the norm internationally (Goertz and Diehl 1992: 646). Even when the norm is internationally widely accepted, if its legitimacy is rejected at the national level, its diffusion within the country will remain low. On the other hand, when there is a good match between the international norm and the national political culture and structure, the norm diffusion is very smooth (Hirata 2004: 181).
Checkel defined that the compatibility of international norms with national norms depends on the match with the national culture: the degree the international norm is ‘reflected in discourse, the legal system (constitutions, judicial codes, laws), and bureaucratic agencies (organizational ethos and administrative procedures)’ of the country (1999: 87). When the two are incompatible, the national actors feel the international norm threatens their state sovereignty (Cortell and Davis 2000: 65-87). Although Cortell and Davis (2000) indicated that this cultural match was difficult to measure, Checkel uses a horizontal continuum scale to measure the congruence between a particular international norm and the domestic culture: a positive match leading to complete congruence, a negative match leading to no congruence and a null match at the centre where there are no obvious normative barriers (1999: 87). This thesis would suggest a variation to the continuum scale suggested by Checkel (1999: 87) examined above. Outside of the scale between complete and no congruence, the thesis puts forward an additional outcome that is ‘over’ acceptance of the international norm by the domestic audience. In such a case, international norms are ‘internalised’ through the nation and the societies which form the nation and a new domestic norm is created which over emphasise the international norm. This thesis argues that UN centrism in Japan is such a domestic
norm. Although originally based on the international UN norm, it has converged with the domestic pacifist norm and filtered through the domestic structures to become a powerful ‘UN centrism’ norm in post-war Japan.

In addition to the cultural match, the national (domestic) diffusion of the international norms also relies on the political structure of the country (Cortell and Davis 1996: 454). For each international norm however, Cortell and Davis (1996) stipulate that both the actors who have influence over national policy and the state-society relations are varied. In short, the domestic political structure must be analysed each time a diffusion of an international norm is discussed.

2.2.4 UN centrism norm as Japan’s interpretation of the international UN norms

In principle, the constructivist norm theories reviewed above have been developed to explain international norms and states system. Their approach therefore assumes a state to be one integrated actor (Katzenstein 1996a; Wendt 1999). For example, Wendt explains ‘I want to show that states are ontologically prior to the states system’ (1999: 198) and the states are determined as primary actors which are more autonomous from the social system than the individuals (1999: 2). The
states as ‘individuals’ (1999: 3) are therefore actors that construct, accept or reject various international norms, and society is overlooked as a ‘state-society complex’ (1993: 210). In international politics, the state-society may be a single actor, but when one examines at the level of the communities and societies that construct a state and influences its policies, the ‘state’ is a collection of numerous actors and norm entrepreneurs. Collective identities, which are the basis of norms, exist in various societies both domestically and internationally. Indeed all norms are group norms (Sherif and Sherif 1969) and are numerous. Different norms generate different degrees of agreement. Some norms are international, whereas others are regional, domestic, or local (Legro 1997). Whether a particular behaviour is a norm depends on the group in question which could be a state, a region or a community which has its own cultural identity (Dohrenwend and Chin-Shong 1969; Cohen 1996). Further, new norms do not develop out of the blue but, in most cases, compete with existing regional/national/international norms, some successfully becoming a norm but others disappearing before becoming one (Öyane 2005b: 131-132). Norms are situation-relevant (Secord and Backman 1974) and changes over time and with the groups that form the norm (Kitaori 2000: 157). As Katzenstein explains, ‘norm are not static; they are contested and contingent’ (1996b: 3). From this perspective, the norm life-cycle also becomes multi-layered
and complex. It would not be simple to generalise when a critical mass or a tipping point is attained (Mitsutsuji and Kageyama 2009: 22). Within this anarchic norm development, the dynamic relationships within and between norms, actors and the underlying political and social structures need to be examined to follow the creation of a norm.

The thesis asserts that whilst the international UN norms are undoubtedly the origins of Japan’s UN centrism norm, in the process of introduction to the country the norm was re-developed into a different and separate norm. As Finnemore and Sikkink states ‘International norms must always work their influence through the filter of domestic structures and domestic norms, which can produce important variations in compliance and interpretation of these norms’ (1998: 893). One important reason the international UN norms were ‘interpreted’ into a different norm is because the UN and its agencies only played a minor role in the norm’s diffusion in Japan. Rather the domestic UN centrism norm was developed by the civil UN movement’s own interpretation of the UN norms.

Alastair Johnston puts forward that norms are accepted by persuasion. He explains that there are three ways in which an actor is persuaded into accepting a norm:
'First, s/he can engage in a high intensity process of cognition, reflection, and argument about the content of new information'; 'An actor is persuaded because of her/his affect relationship to the persuader'; 'Third the persuasiveness of a message may be a function of characteristics of the persuadee her/himself' (Johnston 2003: 116-117). Thomas Risse on the other hand explains norms diffuse through the communicative action between the actors (2000: 1-39) through discussions and arguments in the form suggest by Jurgen Habermas (2000: 8-11). However in the case of the UN centrum norm, the first civil UN association, the Sendai UNESCO Association, was established voluntarily without persuasion by or communication with UNESCO. The Sendai UNESCO Association was established just based on what the founders learned about the international organisation through the media. UNESCO only heard about the movement for the first time when the Sendai UNESCO Association sent a letter to the first Director-General of UNESCO, Julian Huxley, after its foundation (Sendai Yunesko Kyōkai 1983: 13-14).

UNESCO was therefore not a direct norm entrepreneur in Japan and did not ‘persuade’ the norm diffusion in Japan. UNESCO only started ‘communicative action’ with the UNESCO associations after they were contacted by the Japanese
actors and were notified of their existence. Kuo Yu-Shou, an advisor of the UNESCO Director General in the Far East, commented in 1948 that it is surprising that so many organisations related to UNESCO have voluntarily sprang up amongst the Japanese (Ueda 1951: 233). As seen in Part II, similarly the civil UNICEF movement also started voluntarily and without the involvement of UNICEF itself. Instead the thesis asserts that the norm entrepreneurs were the Japanese civil UN activists based on their own interpretations of the international UN norms. As shown in Part II, their movements have been closely intertwined with the internationalisation of Japan and have led to the commitment of the Japanese towards the UN and its System as a whole. Hence, regardless of whether they were self conscious of this or not, rather than develop a UNESCO or UNICEF specific norm these norm entrepreneurs developed a ‘UN centrism norm’ in which the ‘UN’ in the ‘UN centrism norm’ refers broadly to the UN and its System.

2.2.5 Domestic norms in Japan: Case studies

Before going further, this section reviews existing literature that focus on the relationship between international norms and domestic norms in Japan. From the few studies that are available, this section examines this relationship taking the examples from the studies by: Keiko Hirata (2004) on the whaling issue; Satoshi
Öyane (2005b) on the World Trade Organization (WTO) demand to liberalise the import of apples; and Hiromi Fujishige (2008) on the domestic debate over the overseas dispatch of the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDFs).

First, Hirata's study (2004) examines Japan's rejection of the international anti-whaling norm which spread from the 1970s. Despite pressure from influential countries such as the US, the Japanese government has not let go of its whaling policy. Japan gains little political and economical benefits from whaling and its stubborn attitude cannot be explained by the rational calculation of material benefits the state is predicted to make in the realism and liberalism theories. Hirata explains that government policy is based on two key domestic structures: First, the cultural mismatch with the international norm as a country with a tradition of eating whales (2004: 186-187, 194); and second, the rejection by the decision making authorities of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF), more specifically, the Whaling Division at the Fisheries Agency to protect its own divisional interests (Hirata 2004: 194). Hirata therefore argues that one must consider the Japanese culture and its bureaucratic structures to understand why Japan rejects the international anti-whaling norm.
Second, the clash with the international trade liberalisation norm led by the WTO and the process of acceptance are studied by Ōyane (2005b) in the case of MAFF’s protectionist policy of inspection and quarantining of imported apples. Import liberalisation of apples started from 1971 in Japan but in practice, the volume of imported apples was low. One key reason was the existence of a domestic law, the Plant Protection Act, which required the inspection and quarantine of imported agriculture. The Act, supported by the Japanese apple producer groups, was claimed by the US to be in violation of the WTO agreement. In 1998, Japan lost the case at the WTO panel and at the subsequent Appellate Body. Despite the stubborn attitude by the government and the producers’ group until then, once the final WTO decision was made in March 1999, by the following month the government announced it would observe the decision and reached an agreement with the US by June. Shōichi Nakagawa, the then minister of MAFF stated that ‘a rule is a rule’ and the producers’ groups also accepted the WTO decision on the grounds that there was ‘no other choice’. Ōyane observes this sudden change in attitude with surprise as the Japanese readily cooperated with the WTO and US as soon as it decided to give up its resistance and accept the current conditions as reality (2005a: 153). He points out that neither the stubborn protest at the start nor the sudden obedience at the end are based on any rational
calculation of material benefits as the latter cannot explain the former behaviour. Rather, he determines that the Japanese policy was based on group psychology influenced by the Japanese mentality.

Finally, Fujishige (2008) studied how the international collective security norm was contested in Japan in the 1990s when the country was under foreign pressure to despatch its JSDF troops overseas. As seen in Chapter 1, the end of the Cold War and the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait shifted the international security norms from passive to active. However domestic security norm remained passive even after the end of the Cold War and the new international norm was initially rejected. In the following year, with the start of the Gulf War and further request from the US, a revised bill was finally passed in June 1992, making the overseas deployment a reality. However the bill did not allow the use of force of the JSDFs overseas, and so the domestic norm was still not in favour of activism. Fujishige believes the turning point of the domestic norm was in fact caused by two major domestic incidents which both happened in 1995: the Great Hanshin Earthquake on 17 January and the sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway system on 20 March. Fujishige argues that the two incidents changed the outlook towards crisis management and preparedness. In addition other factors such as the declaration of
the Japan Socialist Party in 1994 that the JSDFs were constitutional\textsuperscript{15} and the launching of a ballistic missile by the People’s Republic of China to Taiwan in 1996 also helped push the domestic security norm towards activism (Fujishige 2008: 105-106). Hence, Fujishige’s argument is that one needs to understand the psychological impact of these incidents to understand the change in Japan’s norm over the overseas deployment of the JSDFs.

The three studies show that research in international norms need to address the linkages with domestic norms and structures. In understanding domestic norms and structures, one cannot ignore the research on Japanese Studies that examines the culture and collective identities formed by what Wendt (1999: 349) calls ‘common fate’ experiences. Wendt explains that ‘Actors face a common fate when their individual survival, fitness, or welfare depends on what happens to the group as a whole’ (1999: 349). Although the three cases compare one international against one domestic norm, one must also remember that the domestic norm is a dynamic outcome of various other norms not least smaller regional and community norms. Domestic norms do not exist in \textit{a priori} and, as seen earlier, norms are ‘contested and contingent’ (Katzenstein 1996b: 3).
2.3 Theories on pacifism: A norm supporting the UN centrim

The transformation of the international UN norms to a domestic UN centrim norm was not a direct process. As seen above, compatibility with the existing domestic norms is required for a successful diffusion of the international norm. This thesis identifies that the domestic pacifist norm plays a significant role in the take up of the international UN norms, specifically the aspect of the ‘promotion of peace’ through the UN (United Nations 1987: 16), and the domestic norm on UN centrim builds upon the domestic pacifism norm. The development of this domestic norm is examined in detail in Chapter 2 but first, this section provides an overview of the theories surrounding pacifism and the theoretical positioning of Japan’s pacifism.

2.3.1 Definitions on pacifism: Absolute pacifism and pacific-ism

The broad definition of pacifism is opposing war and working to create or maintain peace between nations (Ostergaard 1981: 172). A narrower definition by Ceadel is an ‘absolute theory that participation in and support for war is always impermissible’ (Ceadel 1987: 5). To differentiate between the broad meanings of pacifism, some of the Japanese literature refers to this thinking as ‘absolute pacifism’ (zetttai heiwa shugi) (see, for example, Odaka and Yokota 1956: 9; Kuno 1972: 78; Nishibe 1991; Shimada 1991: 242-247; Okamoto 1999: 116-118; Mogami 2001: vii-x; Michiba
2005: 246-252). Kuno defines absolute pacifism as ‘to deny war absolutely, reject
the taking up of arms and participating in conflict whatever the circumstance and to
renounce all countermeasures except non-violent resistances’ (Kuno 1972: 78).

As seen above although Ceadel defined pacifism as an absolute theory, he also
puts forward varieties of pacifism, one of which is the ‘mainstream’ version of
pacifism:

A mainstream version, which does not believe that pacifism is yet practical
politics although it will fairly soon be so. In the meantime pacifists should, so
far as their consciences allow, support pacifism as a step in the right
direction. This assumes the international system to be already a society and
one capable of evolving into a community. (Ceadel 1987: 5)

‘Pacifism’ was a term coined in 1957 by A. J. P. Taylor in which he means ‘the
advocacy of a peaceful policy’ (Taylor 1957: 51). Wittner describes pacifists as
‘peace-oriented non-pacifists [who] have considered warfare a conceivable, if
distasteful possibility’ (Wittner 1969: ix). Further, Ceadel explains ‘pacifism rules
out all aggressive wars and even some defensive ones … but accepts the need for
military force to defend its political achievements against aggression’ (Ceadel 1987: 5). Hence, Ostergaard explains ‘pacifists may support the use of military force in ‘peace-keeping’ operations’ (Ostergaard 1981: 172).

In this thesis the ‘pacifist norm’ refers to pacifism in the broad sense and encompassing both absolute pacifism and pacific-ism.

2.3.2 Positive and negative peace

Johan Galtung broadened the definition of peace by defining peace as the absence of violence and identified two kinds of peace: ‘negative peace’ and ‘positive peace’. Negative peace is a situation where ‘personal violence’, direct physical, verbal or psychological violence, such as war, terrorism and crime are absent (1969: 183). Realist theorist Hans Morgenthau stated that, ‘in the life of nations peace is only respite from trouble’ (1952: 92). Another type of peace, positive peace, is the absence of structural violence. Galtung points out that social injustice such as hunger, poverty, human rights abuses and environmental destruction could be called ‘structural violence’ (1969: 183).

In following Galtung’s distinction of peace, one would consider the ‘war’ within
society as well as physical warfare. This understanding shifts peace studies to a normative science researching ‘Not merely with peace and war, or even violence, but with all the ills that afflict the human race (Boulding 1977: 85). In order to understand positive peace therefore, one would need to consider the ‘structural violence’ which had been overlooked by previous peace studies literature before Galtung. However not all academics agree with Galtung’s approach to peace. For example, Kenneth Boulding does not support Galtung’s idea that positive peace should be part of the peace research as ‘Threshold phenomena like violence are difficult to study because they represent ‘breaks’ in the system rather than uniformities’ (1977:83). In other words, positive peace could be endlessly pursued as, in Boulding’s words, it is like observing boiling water in a pot (1977: 83) and so it would be difficult to determine the point at which a positive peace is attained.

2.3.3 Theoretical analysis of the pacifism in Japan

This thesis argues that since the early 1950s Japan has been a pacifist supporting pacif-ism. Although the terms ‘mainstream pacifism’ and ‘pacifism’ are not used in Japanese literature, some have introduced terms with similar meanings such as ‘realistic pacifism’ (genjitsu-teki heiwa-shugi) (Morito 1951; Miyamoto 1967; Inoki 1985: 242-245; Sankei Shimbun 24 October 2001; Vogel 2003) and ‘responsible
peace’ (*sekinin aru heiwa*) (Okamoto 1991: 190-191; Shimada 1991: 246-247). In this thesis absolute pacifism in Japan is understood as the position of supporting the literal interpretation of the post-war Japanese Constitution of unarmed neutralism. As will be seen in detail in Chapter 3, Japan’s pacifism started from ‘absolute pacifism’ during the period of Japan’s occupation but gradually shifted to pacifism with the start of the Korea War in 1950 and the set up of the National Police Reserve and its reorganisation into the JSDF in 1954. Thereon, Yasushi Akashi sums up the general thinking of mainstream pacifism in Japan as follows:

Many of us have come to feel that absolute pacifism is not realistic at this time.

It is too utopian. Any country must have a minimum of self-defence. Maybe Japan has gone too far in the direction of idealism and pacifism and neutrality, and so we are trying to find a happy medium. (*The Age*, on 28 February 2004)

The thesis also argues that this realistic pacifism supported much of Japan’s post-war economic policy, and indirectly its foreign policy as pursuit of economic wealth and protecting the *status quo* are highlighted as the key motivation to Japan’s approach to peace. Although Galtung pointed out that the Japanese word for peace, *heiwa*, holds a broad notion of non-violence (1981: 193), in addition to
negative peace, Japan’s concern was in fact concentrated in gaining and maintaining one aspect of positive peace, freedom from hunger, at the cost of other positive peace. For example, the Peace Studies Association of Japan (PSAJ) in 1985 determined that structural violence exists in education, (for example in its over-management of children), gender (in prostitution), labour (labour rights), information (right-wing tendencies of the media), authority (structural problem over the same party continuing to hold power) (Nihon Heiwa Gakkai 1988). The concluding message to all the above is that while Japan has pursued the ‘wealth’ to ‘liberate itself from the hunger’ and as a result successfully became one of the richest countries in the world, it still has not attained ‘(positive) peace’ (Shindō 1988: iii). The key cause of the structural violence is often pointed to the ‘backwardness’ of Japan’s society. For example, the authoritarian structure of corporate society is deemed to have created weak labour unions and stressful work environments in Japanese corporations (see for example, Fujita: 1987; Katō 1988: 42; Watanabe: 1988). By making pax economica the priority therefore, social restructurings were neglected (Sakamoto 1982; Katō 1988: 41).

2.4 Civil society theory: Political and social structures

Katzenstein claims the sustained pacifist norm in post-war Japan should be
explained in its history and institutions.

Actors attribute far deeper meanings to the historical battles that define collective identities than to the transient conflicts of daily politics. Collective identities are not easily changed .... Second, the taken-for-grantedness of institutionalized norms limits the range of choice at any given time. ...

History and institutions thus give norms both importance and endurance.

(Katzenstein 1996b: 3)

This thesis identifies that in addition to its strong pacifism base, the weakness in Japan’s political and social structures, namely its civil society, is another key factor supporting the UN centrism norm. Chapter 5 reveals how the UN became a powerful authoritative figure alongside the state and emperor in post-war Japan within an authoritarian society and shows how the successes of the civil UN movements, the entrepreneurs of the norm, were in fact due to the weakness, not strengths, in Japan’s civil society. In a strange way, the weak civil society worked in favour for the civil UN movements. But before this aspect of UN centrism is considered in the second part of the thesis, this section reviews the theories on civil society.
2.4.1 Civil society and the state in early modern Europe

Although there is much controversy and disagreement about what should be included or not be included within the boundaries of civil society, much of the thinking on civil society assumes autonomy from bureaucratic authorities. Gellner defines civil society as:

[T]hat set of diverse non-governmental institutions, which is strong enough to counterbalance the state, and, while not preventing the state from fulfilling its role of keeper of the peace and arbitrator between major interests, can nevertheless prevent the state from dominating and atomising the rest of society. (Gellner 1995: 32)

It is therefore difficult to analyse civil society in isolation, ignoring the role of the state. This is especially true when examining the civil society in Japan where state influence is strong. But before looking into Japan’s civil society-state relationship, this sub-section briefly reviews historical developments in the thinking about civil society that originated in Europe.
‘Civil society’ and the ‘state’ were interchangeable terms until the middle of the eighteenth century (Keane 1988b: 35-36). The origin of this classical concept of civil society can be traced back to the ancient Greek and Roman political theory. Here ‘civil society (societas civilis)’ is a civilised political community, a separate sphere from the family (namely, the private, domestic society), in which men fulfil their public and social roles serving the community’s interests. It is synonymous with the ‘state’ as the political collective (polis) (Keane 1988b: 35, Bobbio 1989; Riedel 1990: 11-12; Black 2001; Kaldor 2003:23). It was in the eighteenth century Scottish and Continental Enlightenment that the modern idea of civil society began to be discussed (Carothers 1999: 18; Baker 2002: 4). Until then, the focus was on the relationship between ‘society’ and the ‘state of nature’ rather than between ‘state’ and ‘society’. However, the classical idea of the unity between civil society and the state remained amongst philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment (Baker 2002: 4-5). For example, it was Adam Ferguson who first used the term ‘civil society’ in the English speaking world in 1767, in his work An Essay on the History of Civil Society. However, although he too did not see civil society to be a separate sphere from the state (Keane 1988b: 40), nevertheless Ferguson is the starting point in the modernisation of the concept of civil society. He saw that economic modernisation was leading to the loss of public spirit, which in turn was paving the
way for authoritarianism. Ferguson cautioned society to guard against state
despoticism through the development of independent ‘societies’ within civil society –
what we may consider as associationalism today (Keane 1988b: 39-44; Baker
2002: 4-5).

Many academics identify the German philosopher Hegel’s work, the *Elements of
the Philosophy of Right* (1821) as the bifurcation between modern and pre-modern
concept of civil society (see Riedel 1984). The Hegelian concept identified civil
society and the state as separate spheres, placing the state over civil society.
Hegel believed that modern economic interactions between individuals pursuing
their self interests, what he calls the ‘system of needs’, creates a civil society filled
with injustices and inequalities through the economic and/or political dominance of
one social class or group over another. The state is seen as the supreme public
power that must police civil society and protect ‘public interests’, themselves
identified by the state (Keane 1988: 50-55; Hegel 1991). John Keane claims that
Hegel was in fact not the first to make the thematic distinction between civil society
and the state but that it ‘first appeared in the ‘American and French revolution
controversies’ in Britain and France’ (1988b: 38). Unlike Hegel, the revolutionists
called for state power to be restricted in favour of civil society (Keane 1988b: 44).
Through his illustration of Thomas Paine’s *Rights of Man* (1791-92), Keane describes the concept of civil society here as built upon individual citizens exercising their natural rights to freedom and happiness, living harmoniously with one another with the understanding that they need to cooperate in order to fulfil their own needs. Here the proper role of the state is therefore seen as minimal, merely assisting the smooth running of civil society. But contrary to his hypothesis, in reality Paine saw the state as obstructing the self-government of its citizens and therefore he called on citizens to resist this excess state power (Paine 1969; Keane 1988b: 44-50).

Marx and Engels developed the civil society-state antithesis based on Hegel’s works (Bobbio 1988: 81). Their understanding of the civil society-state relationship ‘stands Hegel on his Head’ as they placed civil society over the state. Marx states that ‘(civil society) transcends the State and the nation, though, …, it must assert itself on its foreign relations as nationality and inwardly must organize itself as state’ (Marx 1959: 76). In turn, Engels states that ‘it is not the State which conditions and regulates civil society, but it is civil society which conditions and regulates the State’ (1970: 178). At the same time, however, they were also critical of civil society as an egoistic ‘bourgeois society’, which alienated and exploited the working class (Marx
Civil society was a popular theme in early modern Europe but fell into obscurity by
the mid-nineteenth century (see Keane 1988: 1; Carothers 1999: 18; Schwartz
2003: 1). The topic enjoyed a renaissance in the 1970s and by the 1990s it had
become ‘the motherhood-and-apple pie of the 1990s’ (McElvoy 1997) and a
‘mantra for everyone from presidents to political scientists’ (Carothers 1999: 19).
The revived civil society discussions revolve around a pluralist self-organised civil
society in which voluntary associations are at the centre. The next sections
continue to review the state-civil society relationship, focusing on voluntary
associations and their relationship with the state.

2.4.2 Civil society and the state: Beyond the oppositional relationship

All associations should be communities of choice and not of fate. The right to be a
‘voluntary’ member is identified as the most basic right in associative society (Hirst
1994: 51). Today, associations are at the core of the definition of civil society. For
example, Waltzer sees them as the ‘the space of uncoerced human association
and also the set of relational networks’ (1995: 7). Carothers defines civil society as
a broad concept ‘encompassing all the organizations and associations that exist
outside of the state (including political parities) and the market' (1999: 19).

Habermas claims that non-state and non-economic voluntary associations form the
core of civil society (1990: vorwort; 1994: xxxviii), while Mark Warren conceptualises civil society as ‘the domain of social organization within which voluntary associative relations are dominant' (2001: 57).

De Tocqueville was one of the first philosophers to discuss civil society in which associations played a central role. To ensure that the state does not monopolise political power and rob civil society of its freedoms, de Tocqueville called for political power to be distributed into many and various hands within civil society in the form of voluntary associations. In De la démocratie en Amérique (1835-1840), de Tocqueville stressed the importance of ‘the independent eye of society’ (1864 vol.1: 236) – an eye comprising a ‘plurality of interacting, self-organized and constantly vigilant civil associations’ (Keane 1988b: 61). Voluntary associations therefore posed a threat to political institutions (Whittington: 2001: 23). At the same time however, de Tocqueville saw that an active and strong state was both necessary and desirable for democracy (Keane 1988b: 59).

The tension between the state and civil society articulated by various philosophers
is further strengthened when civil society is described as a means of resisting the encroachment of society by the state. The neo-Marxist Antonio Gramsci articulated in the 1930s that civil society itself could be the source of resistance to state despotism. While the philosophers of the Enlightenment identified civil society as a sphere between state and family, mainly the market economy, Gramsci saw it as an associational realm (Baker 2002: 6). In terms of civil society-state relations, Gramsci conceives the ‘reabsorption of political society in civil society’ (1971: 253). He predicts the growth of civil society into the space occupied by political society, leading to what he terms a ‘regulated society’, a society without the state (Bobbio 1988: 94). Gramsci’s idea of civil society was influential in the political struggles in Eastern Europe and Latin America during the 1970s and 1980s. This concept of civil society in opposition to the state has also been popular in contemporary literature (see Arato 1981: 24; Keane 1988a, 1988b, 1998: 79; Kumar 1993: 386-388; White 1994: 376-377). It must be noted, however, as Adam Seligman points out, that in Eastern and Central Europe, ‘civil society’ in some cases was merely a prop to oppose communism and provide a justification for the new post-socialist regimes (1992: 7).

As suggested above, civil society has proved to be an effective counter power to
state despotism. Michael Mann argues that historically states are rarely able to hold on to despotic power, but that there is another type of state power, namely infrastructural power (1986: 113). While the despotic power of a state allows it to act free from constitutional constraints, many academics believe that the real strength of a state depends on such infrastructural power, which is the capacity of a state to penetrate civil society and its ability to organise social relations (Mann 1986; Hall and Ikenberry 1989; Altvater 1995: 157-158). At the same time, state intervention in society could lead to commitments and obligations that may subsequently bind the state to these commitments, and which may lead ‘strong’ states to look ‘weak’ (Suleiman 1987; Ikenberry 1988). Alfred Stepan (1985: 318), however, stresses that the interaction between civil society and the state need not be a zero-sum game, but that it can be positively as well as negatively reciprocal. Likewise, Hall and Ikenberry state that ‘working through the independent civil society groups can in fact assist in supporting a state’s autonomy’ (1989: 14). These discussions have led academics today to look beyond oppositional relationships and to understand how the authorities might shape civil society (see Carapico 1998; Skocpol 1999; Levy 1999; Pekkanen 2003: 116).

Michael Walzer, for example, claims that the relationship between civil society and
the state must be reciprocal for both to flourish (1992: 104-105; 1995: 24).

Observing the collapse of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, Walzer concludes that ‘no state can survive for long if it is wholly alienated from civil society’ and that ‘only a democratic civil society can sustain a democratic state’ (1995: 21 and 24). Despite these claims, Walzer insists that the existence of the state, which he deems as a special type of association and part of civil society, is essential for the survival of a healthy civil society. Waltzer postulates a Hegelian state in which the state should have a supreme role, which he terms as ‘the paradox of the civil society argument’ (1995: 23). The state is to govern other associations by framing civil society and fixing the ‘boundary conditions and basic rules of all associational activity (including political activity)’. In addition, the state acts as the moral authority by compelling association members to think about ‘a common good beyond their own conceptions of the good life’. In short, then, the state has greater say about the quality and vitality of associations (Walzer 1995: 23).

2.4.3 Associationalism

Like Walzer, the conventional idea of the relationship between the state and associations is that associations play a secondary role to the state.
Associationalism or associative democracy is a theory developed in the late 1980s that calls for associations to have a more prominent role in social and economic governance within the framework of representative democracy (Perczynski 2001). Associationalists claim that associations change the role of the state. However unlike the more revolutionary Gramscian idea in which associations take over the state, the association democracy theorists do not see the two in opposition. Rather associations and the state are thought to complement each other. The theory can be largely divided into two streams according to the association-state relationship: the ‘bottom-up’ or ‘societal approach’ and the ‘top-down’ or ‘state approach’ (Perczynski 2001: 76).

The first stream is represented by Hirst (see 1997; 2001) who modernised the idea of the Guild Socialism of the late nineteenth to early 20th century, developed by British socialists such as Harold Laski and GDH Cole. According to Hirst, association democracy seeks the state to voluntarily transfer many of its functions to associations, but requires public authority to maintain laws that regulate associational activities. He sees the role of the state as supplementary but essential, to ensure peace between associations, provide public finance to fund associations and to protect individual rights (1997: 18). The state is to be pluralised
and federalised and its authority to be disseminated to the regions and by functions as much as possible, so that its governance is minimised while maintaining high quality public services with the help of associations. Although Hirst calls for state power to be restricted, he does not see associations as being in opposition or in competition with the state. Rather, for associationalism to be successful he sees state cooperation, or at minimum lack of active hostility towards associations, as an important condition and calls on associations to seek to win over state support (Hirst 1994: 40). Hirst argues that associationalism can even strengthen state institutions by allowing it to concentrate on the legislative and judicial functions that they do best (Perczynski 2001: 77-78).

The second stream is represented by academics such as Cohen and Roger (1995) and Schmitter (1995). Here, the state is given a greater role than envisioned by Hirst and is similar to Walzer’s civil society-state relationship above. The state is actively involved in the organising of the associations as well as managing relations between them. Associations support the state by assisting in the formulation and execution of public policies. This chapter determines that the civil society-state relationship in Japan has taken this ‘top-down’ form. To summarise so far, civil society does not only act as a restraint on state power, but may also support, or
even take over, the role of the state.

Although one of the main themes of this thesis is to explain the UN associations in Japan, the traditional view is that the UN itself as an intergovernmental institution is a ‘club of states’ (Traub 2006), an ‘association’ of sovereign states (e.g. Shikama 2001: 15). However the UN also has a long history of working with civil society going back to its foundation in 1945. Roosevelt called on NGO leaders to take part in the drafting of the UN Charter (Robins 1971). As a result, civil society participation arrangement at the UN is formalised in Article 71 of the Charter in which it states the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) may consult with NGOs (United Nations Conference on International Organization 1945: 23). Based on this Article, other UN agencies and intergovernmental organisations such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific & Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (Article XI, paragraph 4), United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) (Article 2 (p)) and World Health Organization (WHO) (Article 71) have incorporated the consultation and cooperation with NGOs within their constitutions. However it is not until the 1990s that the partnership with NGOs became more prominent. The participation of large numbers of NGOs (not necessarily with UN consultative status) in UN world conferences such as the 1992 Rio Earth Summit was followed
by ECOSOC’s adoption of Resolution 1996/31 which established wider accreditation rules for NGOs and a greater commitment to work with them. More recently, UN advisors put forward a report in which they stipulate ‘multilateralism to mean multiple constituencies’ in which the UN act as the facilitator between governments and civil society (Chair of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations – Civil Society Relations 2004: online). The conclusion to the thesis will consider whether the UN centrism in Japan can contribute to this discussion.

2.4.4 Civil society theories in Japan

This sub-section looks at how theories of civil society have been understood, debated and developed in Japan. Ferguson’s 1767 work was not translated into Japanese until after the Second World War in 1946, and civil society was not particularly discussed before the war. At the time, terms to describe civil society were left largely to individual academics’ own translations of the Western literature. Even after the Meiji Restoration of 1868-69 when Japan was modernising itself, there was little discussion of terms such as ‘civil’ and ‘citizen’. The Meiji government was attempting to modernise under imperialism, and so rather than civil society it was the bushido (the frame of mind of the samurai) that became the opposing force to the state. For example, the author and political theorist Yukichi
Fukuzawa who in 1875 introduced the term ‘citizen’ into Japan by translating it as ‘shimin’ and who urged individuals to become independent, said that the ethos of the samurai was needed to criticise the government. Similarly, the philosopher Chomin Nakae, known for translating Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s ‘The Social Contract, Or Principles of Political Right’ translated those persons holding the ‘social contract’ as samurai.

After the Second World War interest in civil society grew, but as theories of it were based on Western models, the debate inevitably centred on Japan’s inability to develop such a civil society of its own. However, as stated above, civil society first became a central theme in Western European politics and social theory between 1750 and 1850 (Keane 1988: 36) and by the start of the 20th century it had gone out of fashion in the West until its revival from the 1970s. It could therefore be said that Japan was in fact taking the lead in the renewed interest in civil society theory in the 20th century.

The starting point of discussions on civil society in post-war Japan was based on pre-war debates by academics of the Koza-ha (Lecture Group) Marxists, who had been cracked down on in 1936 (Tsuzuki 1995: 16). These Marxists saw Japan’s
capitalism as taking the form of “militaristic semi-serfdom” (Yamada 1977: 7, 23), indicating that Japan’s ‘backward’ society was hopelessly removed from Western civil society (Yamaguchi 2004: 41). Post-war civil society discussions were, however, not led by mainstream Marxists. Marxists saw the ‘bourgeois society’ as ‘capitalist society’, and therefore civil society was considered a bourgeois society which needed to be overcome. Further, class and class struggle were the central and supreme themes, and ideas about citizens and civil society were peripheral (Katō 2006).

Hence with the fade out of Marxists’ inputs, post-war civil society discussions were taken up by liberal modernists who followed the models of Western modernism. When they analysed modern Japan, they saw a country that had led itself to a militarist state and, like the pre-war Marxists, they too concluded that Japanese society was ‘backward’ and behind the West. The difference between the Marxists and the modernists was that for the latter, the ultimate goal was the building of civil society, created by a people’s revolution; the former saw civil society as a bourgeois society based on a bourgeois-democratic revolution, which was a step towards a proletarian socialist revolution that would ultimately build a socialist/communist society (Hidaka 1964: 28-29; Gotō 1996: 535; Watanabe
As the Marxist revolution is a drawn out process, the Marxists were able to share the idea of civil society with the liberal modernists. Further, the Marxists’ negative attitude towards civil society influenced some liberal modernists such as Masao Maruyama, who avoided using the term ‘civil society’ to deter criticism of being bourgeois.

As stated earlier, when the liberal modernists studied civil society based on the modern Western model they found Japan’s situation to be a bad fit. Therefore as a starting point, with the premise that post-war Japan was on its way to modernisation, they stressed the importance of the independence of individuals and for citizens to take the lead in building society. For example Hisao Ōtsuka, known for his works on Max Weber, criticised the ‘backwardness’ of Japanese society in his 1948 thesis, stating that it ‘lacked the inner spontaneity unique to modern individuals, the equity unique to civil society, the rationality that forms the basis of modern science, the love and respect for the masses which characterizes the root of the modern spirit, and the social interest towards the daily economic livelihood of the common people’ (1948: 7-8; 1967: 171). Legal sociologist Takeyoshi Kawashima, in his essay *The Laws and Ethics of Civil Society* written in 1950, defined a typical civil society as a ‘society of modern citizens who have
claimed their rights and won their liberty against totalitarian authority’ (1982: 55).

He observed that in the case of Japan, its citizens are generally less assertive about their rights, do not have well established economic rights and therefore have a weak civil society.

Masao Maruyama, who placed more importance on democracy than on civil society, was appalled to see that social associations in Japan were being taken over by the state. He wrote:

> When it becomes a tradition for non-political voluntary associations to, based on their interest, uninterruptedly criticise on important themes of the time, including those on political issues, the binary theoretical practice of politicism or culturalism will be broken for the first time it is hoped that the common moral of modern citizens to make political statements from non-political quarters will develop. (Maruyama 1992: 194)

Maruyama did not idealise Western society but saw the underdeveloped modern citizen as the reason for Japanese society’s inability to form association. Keiichi Matsushita categorised the social configuration of modern states in the 19th
century as civil society but by the 20th century it had become a mass society (1956: 31; 1994: 13). However, in the case of Japan, Matsushita concluded that it bypassed the formation of civil society and that post-war economic growth precipitated the creation of a mass society based on private interests (1994: 191). Therefore, the modernisation of Japanese society was incomplete and it was necessary to understand the unique mixture of mass society and pre-modern village society for the emergence of a ‘civic person’ (Matsushita 1966: 16, 25; 1994: 171, 191).

These studies on citizens by liberal modernism theorists continued after the 1950s and reached its peak in the 1960s and 1970s during the student demonstrations. 300,000 people participated in demonstrations against the Japan-US Security Treaty, the setting up of consumer cooperatives, and other civil movements such as Vietnam War protests. The interest in civil movements also spread into academia, where it grew as a popular topic for research. However, these demonstrations did not appear to lead to the further development of Japan’s civil society. The growth in civil movements was limited to students and workers in urban areas and did not lead to a change in government. Shinohara, who studied citizen participation in social and political groups commented, ‘It cannot be avoided
that the struggle of citizen participation against the walls of authority and bureaucracy is a long and drawn out battle’ (1977: 78). Applying the three categories of political culture set out by the American political scientists Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba in *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (1963), Shinohara classified Japan as being in between ‘subject’ and ‘participant’ political cultures and concluded that the passivity of the masses was hindering the development of civic culture. Ichiro Miyake, however, criticised Shinohara’s assessment for being overly optimistic. His own assessment was that whilst political participation grew in the 1960s and 1970s, it fell back to its original level with a decline in enthusiasm for participatory democracy (Miyake 1985: 315).

Liberal modernists called for the establishment of civic people who would participate in political society. They did not envisage citizens creating a society that would replace the state. Maruyama said that ‘citizens have both a citoyen aspect in which they participate in the process of democratic determination and an aspect of protecting civil liberty to against public power and other social pressures’ (Maruyama 1998a: 150). Unlike these liberal modernists, Kiyoaki Hirata called for the supremacy of the civic society. Hirata, a neo-Marxist, following Gramsci’s idea of civil society absorbing political society (namely the state), saw civil society as
playing a key role in the Marxist historical transformation (Hirata 1987: 6). Hirata argued against the traditional Marxist theory of the state as the superstructure and civic society as the bourgeois society by stating that civil society includes, ‘elements which are socially collective’ (Hirata 1987: 9). Hirata concluded that socialism without civil society is state socialism (Hirata 1994: 3).

This civil society theory developed by Hirata in the 1960s has been identified by Keane as the first step in the renaissance of studies of civil society study, ahead of its major revival in central and eastern Europe in the 1970s (Keane 1998: 13). In Japan, Hirata’s works were not considered any more special than those of the liberal modernists, but it attracted more interest globally with his analysis of corporate Japan. Hirata analysed that the formation of civil society that initially developed with the rise of post-war democracy became restrained with the rise of the capitalist society that came with the country’s economic development. He explains society became geared towards *kaisha-shugi* (company-ism) and instead of civil society maturing, it was steadily absorbed into a corporate society. Hirata refers to this as the arrival of the ‘age of corporate citizens’ under which private citizens are critically discussed (Hirata 1994: 36). Hirata criticised Japanese society for allowing it to create a corporate society negligent of individuals by sacrificing
civil society for industrialisation. This confirms the examination made on Japan’s pacifism above which determined the country’s concern to be concentrated on one aspect of positive peace, freedom from hunger, at the cost of other positive peace.

In summarising the direct and indirect discussions surrounding civil society in post-war Japan, what are common are the criticisms against the general public. Even after the liberation of the people with the end of the war, individualism did not flower as the masses relied on the state and bureaucracy. This lack of interest by the Japanese people to become ‘citizens’ and establish a civil society was the main source of criticism. The underlining presumption behind the critique for both the liberal modernists and the neo-Marxists was that civil society is an opposite of the state. Their differences were whether civil society should subsume the state or be its opposition. Activities that are in alignment with or in cooperation with the state were not considered part of civil society.

The 20th century saw a rediscovery of civil society and citizenship in Japan. But this represented only an early form of discussions; the general population remained passive about the nature of citizenship. Against this background, however, a focus on the civil UN movements will question whether the Japanese people were indeed
passive and whether movements that do not stand in opposition of the state can be simply dismissed as not qualifying as independent activities by citizens.

2.5 Socio-cultural background: Japanese Studies

The weak civil society in Japan has given way to the continued presence of the traditional authoritarian society, examined in Chapter 4. Authoritarian personalities are not unique to Japan but what drives it has a strong socio-cultural basis. Erich Seligmann Fromm’s *Escape from Freedom (The Fear of Freedom)* (1942) and works of Theodor W. Adorno (1950) have revealed the authoritarian personality of the masses under Nazi Germany. Studies on authoritarian personality developed in the US after the war. Psychological experiments such as Solomon Asch’s ‘conformity experiments’ (1955), Stanley Milgram’s ‘Milgram experiment’ (1962), Philip G. Zimbardo’s ‘Stanford prison experiment’ (1971) have proven that authoritarian personalities also exist in the US. The Japanese authoritarian personality has not been studied as much but some notable examples are Kido and Sugi (1954), Kido (1970), Saitō (1981, 1982), Naoi (1986), Todoroki (1995). The characteristic of social identity of contemporary Japanese is the co-existence of traditional and modern values but the Japanese authoritarian personality relies more on the systems of traditional values (Kido and Sugi 1954: 76-77; Saitō 1981: 111)
Such authoritarian personality places paternalistic values of the samurai class as its basis which became the characteristic of society through modernisation from the Meiji era. For example, blind submission to authority expanded to various authorities and ‘when submission to authority becomes common practice, ‘Japanese masochism’ is established in which life becomes robotic lacking voluntary action without orders from authority’ (Kido 1970: 11).

Okamoto sees that, as in the case of Germany, the Japanese tendency towards an authoritarian personality is based on ancient animism worship. For example in Japanese mythology the sun goddess, Amaterasu, is identified as creating Japan, and the emperor is considered to be her direct descendent (Okamoto 2005: 211). In modern Japan, Okamoto identifies the conditions for the infestation of authoritarianism as the existence of people or groups who benefit from authoritarianism; and a lack of ability by the masses to identify authoritarianism (Okamoto 2005: 220). Kinya Abe explains that the reasons ordinary Japanese so willingly accept authority are because they place importance on authority taking it as an absolute value. Their actions and thinking are thus based on authoritative values and are blindly submissive to authority (Abe 1995: 24). While acknowledging that authoritarian personalities are not unique to Japan, many
Japanese academics consider the trait to be stronger than in other countries (Watanabe 1987: 182; Okamoto 2005:211).

The thesis therefore relies much on the prior-work undertaken within Japanese Studies to understand the political and social structures surrounding the development of the UN centrism norm and its dynamics with other norms and values. In particular, the thesis looks towards Japan’s village-like society (seken) as a powerful basis for Japanese socio-cultural behaviour. Although pacifism is the backbone of the UN centrism norm, this thesis argues that other norms and behaviours such as the culture of shame (haji) and customs surrounding gift giving, (on) and (giri) have also attached itself to create an independent norm.

2.6 Conclusion

The thesis stipulates the UN centrism is an example where a new domestic norm emerged initially as a result of accepting an international norm but that its interpretation and development through the domestic political and social structures and convergence with the political culture and norms have created a new domestic norm separate to the international norm. Through the analysis of the process of the norm development, the thesis aims to show the dynamic relationships between
international and domestic norms as they converge and divide and the new meanings are added to the UN centrism and emphasis change. The next chapter examines the domestic norm which the UN centrism norm bases itself, the pacifist norm in post-war Japan.
CHAPTER 3  PEACE FOR STATUS QUO:

THE DOMESTIC PACIFIST NORM

3.1  Introduction

This chapter considers the pacifist norm in Japan, the key domestic norm supporting the UN centrism norm. Academics studying post-war Japanese anti-militarism such as Berger (1996), Dobson (2003: 36) and Katzenstein (1996a), all identify anti-militarism to have a norm meaning in Japanese society. By the 1990s, the New York Times described, ‘postwar military restraints have become the core of the country’s self-image’ (New York Times 5 May 1992). In Japan, pacifism can be identified as one of the prominent post-war identity (Bamba and Howes 1978: 1; Hidaka 1995: 103; Michiba 2005: 230).

This chapter illustrates that the one of the most prominent characteristics of Japan’s pacifist norm is that peace is seen as a pre-condition to economic prosperity. Peace includes not just what Galtung (1996) calls ‘negative peace’, the absence of physical wars, but also ‘positive peace’ which was originally the freedom from starvation but today has shifted to the desire to maintain the country’s wealth. Hence it is a peace for maintaining the status quo. The norm is
motivated by the personal tragedies as victims of the war, little on the remorse as the perpetrators of the war, and the understanding that the current peace and the economic prosperity stand on the sacrifice of the war victims. Its pacifism is self-centred as it is primary concern is the maintenance of peace in Japan and not the resolution of global conflict. Peace should be maintained to avoid the repeat of the misery and hardship caused by the war. Pacifism in Japan as a norm supported by the general public is not linked to peace movements and is non-ideological and non-political. The norm is associated closely with the community (seken), a collective identity ranging from the village as the smallest unit to the country, rather than to individuals.

3.2 The post-war pacifists: the ‘community of remorse’ (kaikon kyōdōtai)

First, the chapter begins by confirming that the pacifist norm stems from the common experiences of the Second World War. There were some pacifists during the pre-war period as but pacifism takes on a norm meaning after the war. This section examines the profiles of some of the pacifists to understand the background and origin of the post-war pacifist norm.

Bamba and Howe identifies that modern anti-war sentiments first flourished in the
period preceding the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War as a result of experiencing the horrors of modern warfare for the first time in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 (Bamba and Howe 1978). For example, the Christian writer Kanzô Uchimura in 1903 proclaimed:

I am not only against the start of the Japanese-Russo War. I am an advocate of the absolute ban on wars. War kills people, and to kill someone is a huge sin. Individuals and states cannot forever gain profit out of committing such sins. (Uchimura 1990: 50)

Pacifism became an acceptable philosophical position, particularly amongst Christians and socialists, for three decades in the early 20th century until Japan’s militarism accelerated after the country’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931 (Bamba and Howes 1978). After the 1930s until the end of the war in 1945, pacifists in Japan became virtually non-existent with the exception of the Japanese Communist Party.

After the Second World War, wartime leaders denied their responsibilities towards the war. The complete denial by military officers, politicians and bureaucrats
towards both the international and domestic war responsibilities at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East is described by Maruyama as the ‘system of irresponsibilities’ (Maruyama 1956: 123; 1963: 128; 1964: 129). A national newspaper, the *Asahi Shimbun*, called for the ‘repentance of a hundred million people’ to be directed to turn the Japanese people from ‘losers of war’ into ‘winners of peace’ (27 August 1945: 1; also see Dower 1999: 493-494).

Left-wing intellectuals especially were remorseful over their failure to take sufficient action to stop the war (see, for example, Maruyama 1982: 114-115; Tsuzuki 1995: 93-115). Maruyama called these the ‘community of remorse’ (*kaikon kyōdōtai*) (Maruyama 1982: 114; 1996: 254; Dower 1999: 590). For example, both the President of the University of Tokyo Shigeru Nambara and Professor Akira Honda at Hosei University were self-critical of their cowardice to criticise the war policies and stop the students from being conscripted into the army (Honda 1955: 40-42; Nambara 1973: 229). Similarly, Hook also notes that in stark contrast to the group of Western social scientists who studied the causes of the Second World War for UNESCO and did not condemn the scientists who produced the atomic bomb, the Japanese intellectual group, the *Heiwa Mondai Danwakai* (Peace Issues Discussion Group), felt a sense of guilt and self-recrimination at failing to stop the
war (Hook 1986: 146; 1996: 30). Thus scholars such as Masato Ara called for peace from the feeling of guilt over Japan as the defeated aggressor (1947: 18). These intellectuals who personally regretted the war joined the post-war peace movement to clear their humiliating past and to demonstrate their courage and conscience (Kuno, Tsurumi and Fujita 1959: 95; 1995: 134-135; Maruyama, Takeuchi and Kaikō 1960: 36).

Many war veterans also felt a sense of redemption as they felt guilty over leaving injured comrades behind in their retreat (Hanzawa 1962: 101) or guilty that they survived when many of their comrades fell (Kamishima 1961: 364, Watanabe 1983). Utusmi even noticed that many of the former military personnel convicted of class-B or C war crimes turned into peace activists after the war (Utsumi 2004). On the other hand there are those who became involved in peace movements based on their experiences as the victims of the war, for example through losing their loved ones in the conflict (see, for example, Okabe 1997). Especially, the experiences and memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have become the basis for the anti-nuclear discourse which many writers have identified as playing an important role in the formation of the anti-militarism or pacifist norm in Japan (Harries and Harries 1987: 287; Hook 1996; Sakamoto 1997: 65-67; Dower 1999:
What has been crucial to the evolution of the anti-nuclear discourse in Japan has been the centrality of the atom-bomb experience as the starting point to oppose nuclear weapons as the core of this [anti-nuclear] identity. (Hook 1996: 159)

Hence individual war experiences have been essential in shaping Japan’s post-war thoughts on peace (Tsurumi 1968: 6; Yamamoto 2004: 10) and the attitude towards peace is therefore varied because of its basis on individual experiences. Hook however points out that Japanese ‘peace thoughts and ideas’ (heiwa shisō) are made up not only from subjective and emotional ‘thoughts’ but also from objectifiable ‘ideas’ such as the pacifist Constitution (Hook 1981: 60-61; 1996: 28-29). The next section examines the Constitution of Japan as the backbone of the pacifist norm.

3.3 The Pacifist Constitution: Backbone of the pacifist norm

The Constitution has severely placed constraints on Japanese rearmament throughout the post-war period (see, for example, Hook 1996: 23). This ‘revolution
from above’, as described by Dower, was well received by the public and left a permanent mark on post-war Japan (Dower 1999: 65-84). Hook points out that the pacifist Constitution reflected the apathy of the public and ‘in a mutually reinforcing way, the Constitution came to symbolize the quintessence of anti-militarism and anti-nuclearism as the core of a new identity for the state and society’ (Hook 1996: 2).

The post-war Constitution of Japan (Nihonkoku Kenpō), mainly drafted by the occupying Allied Powers (GHQ/SCAP)\textsuperscript{17}, was promulgated in 1946 (see, for example, National Diet Library 1997: online). The renunciation of war, together with the principle of the sovereignty of the people and respect for fundamental human rights, is regarded as one of the central themes of the Constitution (see, for example, Ashibe 1993) as seen below:

We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship, and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world. We desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the
banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want. (Preamble, The Constitution of Japan 1946)

1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

(Chapter II Renunciation of War, Article 9, The Constitution of Japan 1946)

The draft constitution, which included the ban on the use of force to settle international disputes and the ban on maintaining military forces, was presented to the 90th session of the Imperial Diet and passed through the House of Representatives on 24 August 1946 (Teikoku Gikai Shugiin 1985a: 495-526). All parties except the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) supported the renunciation of
war and the abandonment of right to self-defence based on the literal interpretation of the new Constitution of Japan. Even many of the Marxist politicians from the Japan Socialist Party claimed they were pacifists (Stockwin 1968: 133). In 1946, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida stated that although Article 9 does not renounce self-defence, as it forbids Japan from holding any forces and does not recognise the right of belligerency, Article 9 in effect means the renunciation of self defence wars and the right of belligerency (Shimizu 1962: 15-16). However, legal interpretations over Article 9 have been fiercely disputed to the present day. For example, there are those who interpret Article 9 to mean total renouncement of all wars including self defence wars while others interpret it as meaning renouncing aggressive wars but allowing self defence wars.

From its inception, there have also been heated debates over whether to amend or maintain the Constitution. One long-standing argument for amendment is based on the fundamental problem that it was imposed by the USA (Koyama 2002: 103-112). From the 1990s after the Gulf War, with the overseas deployment of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDFs), the amendment has also been discussed from the aspect of national security (Saitō 2006: 94-95). The September Eleven 2001 Attacks furthered pushed this debate and both the Keidanren (Japan Federation of
Economic Organizations) and the LDP have started reviewing the Constitution including Article 9 (Saitō 2006: 81-82). On the other hand, there are two main arguments supporting the current Constitution: the idea of a social contract that although it was drafted by the occupiers it was taken up by the will of the Japanese people; and the idea of universalism which stress that the Constitution embodies the universal values for human kind and therefore there is no need for change (Sugita 2004: 52-54).

The reality is that the Constitution was drafted by twenty-four Americans at the Constitution Convention, Government Section within the GHQ/SCAP lead by General Douglas MacArthur. The Constitution whose key aspects includes the renunciation of war, popular sovereignty, the emperor as a symbol and the abolishment of the House of Peers was indeed a ‘revolution from above’ (see Johnson 1992: 730; Dower 1999: 203-204) and a ‘revolution we have been given’ as described by Etsurō Katō (Katō Etsurō Manga Shu Kankō Kai 1961: 44). It is also debatable whether the Japanese people proactively accepted this Constitution from above. An opinion survey published on 27 May 1946 in the Mainichi Shimbun newspaper showed 85 per cent supporting the emperor to be a symbol in the new Constitution and only 13 per cent against. Using this data, the Asahi Shimbun
newspaper in 2000 analyses that ‘at the time, the nation overall supported the framework philosophy and articles of the current Constitution and were placing it as a guiding principle in the new nation building’ (3 May 2000, editorial). Tsunemi Koyama however claims that opinion polls at the time are unreliable as freedom of speech was restricted by the GHQ/SCAP and negative opinions towards the Constitution were censored as seen by the banning of the book Kenpō Kaisei to Potsudamu Sengen (Amendment of the Constitution and Potsdam Declaration) by Takamaro Inoue (1979: 337) which claimed a new constitution was unnecessary (Koyama 2006: 73). Another opinion is that at the time the nation was too occupied with basic survival to have had an opinion on the Constitution. Yuzuru Kai who censored letters for the GHQ/SCAP stated ‘the biggest concern for everyone was survival. For a commoner at the time, the establishment of a new constitution was a development in a different world’ (Kai 1995: 162). While 30,000 people gathered for the ceremony of the enforcement of the Constitution on 3 May 1947 at the Imperial Palace Square, 400,000 people gathered at the same place two days earlier on May Day calling for an increase in food rations and raise in wages (Gein 1998: 536-537). At the same time, if one argues that the post-war constitution was imposed upon, for the masses the earlier Meiji Constitution was no different as it was ‘granted’ by the Emperor. While the Constitution remained the backbone of
Japan’s security policy, its political interpretation has shifted from absolute pacifism to pacific-ism as reviewed in the section below.

3.4 Shift from absolute pacifism to pacific-ism

3.4.1 Absolute pacifism

In the post-war period, all politicians and bureaucrats have praised ‘peace’ but its definition has not been consistent. At the normative level there was a clear shift from a short-lived but firm position on absolute pacifism, based on the literal interpretation of the pacifist Constitution, to pacific-ism.

In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, the defeat in the war together with the pacifist constitution brought a period in which absolute pacifism dominated Japanese political thinking and social norms. As at 1946, the government’s policy was not to rearm (see, for example, Oguma 2002: 159) and taught absolute pacifism in the classroom. In 1947 the Ministry of Education published a text book for junior high schools called ‘The Story of the New Constitution’ (Atarashii Kenpō no Hanashi) which reflects on the tragedies, horrors and dis-benefits of the war and persuades the reader never to go through this again, warning that the next state to start a war will have to bear heavy responsibilities (Monbushō 1948: 19). This is a
big turnaround as the previous government only in 1941 published ‘The way of the subject’ (*Shinmin no Michi*) which called on the virtues of serving the Emperor.

Absolute pacifism was endorsed not only by traditional pacifist such as Christians and socialists but also by traditionalists such as Yojūrō Yasuda who reflecting on the defeat of the modern war called for the return to the oriental way of life and for the passive spirit to be the basis of peace after the war (Yasuda 1987: 12-146). Traditionalists accepted absolute pacifism indirectly by accepting the new Constitution. The Constitution had made itself palatable to them by including nationalist sentiments in the preamble stating ‘We, the Japanese people, desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace’ and do so by ‘pledging our national honor’ (Katō 2007: 111). Despite downgrading the emperor as a symbol, conservative academics such as Sōkichi Tsuda and Tetsurō Watsuji welcomed the Constitution by self-justifying this change as a ‘traditional Japanese system’ (Michiba 2005: 174-190) and ‘adjusting’ oneself in a very short period of time to the US rule (Oguma 2002: 163). Finally, even the realists were able to accept Article 9 on the renunciation of war alongside the pacifists as it simply reflected the reality of disarmed post-war Japan with no possibility of rearmament in the near future and also that the pacifist declaration
was merely a politically beneficial move to show allegiance to the Allied countries (Satō 1951: 99-100).

Ironically the Japanese Communist Party, the sole pacifist before the war, was one of the few groups to reject absolute pacifism. The Party declared it would seek to establish an army once the communist revolution succeeded and called for rearmament for self-defence (Teikoku Gikai Shūgiin 1985b: 126; Takabatake, Yamaguchi and Wada 1994: 234) thereby opposing the pacifist Japanese constitution. Absolute pacifism had therefore been supported largely by the pre-war militarists.

3.4.2 Shift to pacific-ism

Japan as a state restored negative peace with its surrender to the Allied Powers and its acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration on 15 August 1945. However as in Morgenthau’s model, maintaining negative peace was soon becoming precarious with the start of the Cold War. In the region, the Korean War started in June 1950. With the change in the international environment, the content of Japan’s pacifist norm also shifted from absolute pacifism to pacific-ism.
Some scholars claim that the Allied occupiers actively fostered pacifism with the initial intention of turning Japan into an unarmed peaceful nation (see, for example, Weinstein 1971: 8; Bamba and Howes 1978; Dower 1999: 361) while others point out that imposing permanent demilitarisation was never amongst the American intentions (see, for example, Harries and Harries 1987: 213; Iokibe 2001: 268). Either way, the US was soon urging the Japanese government to rearm against communist threats. With the start of the Korean War, US policy changed from total demobilisation of Japan’s military capabilities to securing a military ally in the Far East thereby prompting the set up an ‘embryonic military’, the Police Reserve Corps, in August 1950 (Katzenstein 1996b: 58). In 1953, Vice-President Richard Nixon is said to have admitted that the Article 9 was an ‘honest mistake’ (Harries and Harries 1987: 213).

Amongst the Japanese politicians, as seen above although Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida was supportive of absolute pacifism in 1946, by 1950 his policy had changed as he stated ‘to devote to the intent of the renunciation of war does not mean the rejection of the right to self defence’ (Shūgiin Jimu Kyoku 1950: 131). In 2004 Takako Doi from the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) reminded the former prime minister Yasuhiro Nakasone about the statement he made in 1949 at
the House of Representatives in which he said ‘absolute pacifism and adherence to neutrality is the determination of the 80 million people and the symbolic emperor also clearly voice the nation’s will’ and questioned the reason for his turn around to become the strong advocate of the US-Japan Security Treaty and the JSDFs to which Nakasone replied that his initial statement was made under the special circumstances of the occupation and that after the recovery of Japan’s independence in 1953 he abandoned this position (Shūgiin Jimu Kyoku 2004: 29). In 1952 government lines had shifted from unarmed neutralist position to claiming that Article 9’s renunciation of use of force do not include equipment and organisations that is insufficient to operate a modern war (Cabinet Legislation Bureau and Yoshida Cabinet November on 25 November 1952) (Asahi Shimbun on 26 November 1952: 1; Maeda and Iijima 2003: 22; Samuels 2004: 3). Further in 1954, Prime Minister Hatoyama declared the JSDFs as constitutional, thereby introducing the concept of ‘self-defence capabilities’ as separate from ‘war capabilities’ (Cabinet Legislation Bureau and Hatoyama Cabinet 1954) (Shūgiin Jimu Kyoku 1954: 1). Therefore the establishment of the JSDFs under legal and political controversies was in itself a political victory by the government in the 1950s. Since its birth however, the JSDFs’ right to operate has continued to be constrained by the Constitution, or rather the controversies surrounding its interpretations.
Mirroring these political developments, the Ministry of Education ended the use of its absolute pacifist text book, ‘The Story of the New Constitution (Atarashii Kenpō no Hanashi)’, in March 1952 (Atarasii Kenpō no Hanashi Minshushugi Kikaku Henshū linkai 2004: 5).

By the early 1990s with the collapse of the Cold War international structure, some politicians and intellectuals, most notably Ichirō Ozawa, were starting to advocate for Japan to be a ‘normal country’ which can provide military contribution in maintaining international security (Ozawa 1993: 102-105). As an extension to this argument, there was also renewed criticism towards the idea of absolute pacifism (see, for example, Nishibe 1991; Shimada, Okamoto, Ijiri and Kimura 1991). It appears these critics have received public support as the political parties advocating the line of absolute pacifism have been losing seats since the early 1990s. Although Ozawa and other advocates of “Japan as a normal country” are not generally regarded as pacifists within Japan, this thesis observes that under Ceadel’s definition, his statement which limits military use for peace-keeping operations can still fall under pacific-ism.

As examined below, the government abandoned its position on absolute pacifism
in the early 1950s but absolute pacifists had not completely disappeared. According to the Diet minutes, absolute pacifism has been consistently advocated by the opposition parties of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) until 1994 when they joined the coalition government and until 1975 in the case of the Kōmei Party (Kōmeitō) formed in the 1964.22 Today, the JSP tradition has been picked up by the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ), formed in 1996 by some of the former members of the JSP (Shakai Minshutō 2010: online). The JCP, which in 1946 was calling for the right of self-defence, abandoned the policy of a violent revolution with the end of the Cold War and today advocates for the scrapping of the US-Japan security treaty and the disbanding of the JSDFs (Japanese Communist Party 2004: online; Shim bun Akahata on 26 December 2007: 12). The positions of the SDPJ and the JCP are however labelled ‘one state pacifism’ by the critics because of their refusal to contribute militarily to international peace (see, for example, Yomiuri Shimbun, 17 August 1994: 3; Mainichi Shimbun, 2 May 1995: 3).

3.5 FREEDOM FROM HUNGER: CORE OF JAPAN’S PACIFISM

Despite the political shift from absolute pacifism to pacific-ism, ‘pacifism’ in a generalised and non-politicised form has been strongly supported by the Japanese throughout the post-war period. The section argues that Japan’s pacifist norm is
greatly influenced by the Yoshida Doctrine and therefore, although still placing the absence of war as the most important pre-condition, devotes a large part of its concern to the attainment and maintenance of one particular ‘positive peace’ (Galtung 1969), freedom from hunger. It reflects Japan’s experience of hunger in the immediate aftermath of the war which was nearly as tragic and difficult as the Second World War, and the experience left a permanent mark on the ordinary citizen’s outlook on peace.

The Second World War proved to be disastrous for the Japanese economy. With the war, Japan lost 43 per cent of its pre-war territory, 25 per cent loss in national wealth and the gross national product (GNP) was 66 per cent of what it was between 1934 and 1936 (Kōshiro and Rengō Sogō Seikatsu Kaihatsu Kenkyūjo 1995: 3). The war left 300 million dead and those who survived were starving. Securing enough food continued to be a problem even after the war. According to the Ministry of Health and Welfare in 1941 the standard daily nutritional requirement for a Japanese adult was 2,000 calories per day but the average intake fell as the war progressed and while it was 1,971 calories in 1942, by 1945 it was only 1,793 calories (Ōhara Shakai Mondai Kenkyūjo 1964: 148). Rations were extremely limited so most people relied on additional sources of nutrition. For
example, the nutritional value of rations in July 1945 in Tokyo was equivalent to only 1,437 calories per day (Asahi Shimbunsha 1946: 156-157). Rice rations at 300 grams per day for adults were at bear subsistence level but worse, its deliveries were often late or missed. On 11 October 1947, Yoshitada Yamaguchi a Tokyo district court judge in charge of offences relating to black market food trading shocked the Japanese public when he died from starvation by strictly adhering to the rations.

As seen above already early in the post-war period, Japan’s negative peace was already under threat with the start of the Korean War and it was still struggling to attain some of the most basic positive peace. Under these circumstances, Japan concentrated on maintaining the negative peace and recovering and developing its economy. This section identifies Japan’s two-staged approach towards peace which were developed by Shigeru Yoshida, twice prime minister between May 1946 to May 1947 and October 1948 and December 1954. The first stage was ‘peace for status quo ante’ which was a vehicle for the so-called ‘Yoshida Doctrine’ that led to the post-war economic recovery. The second stage is ‘peace for status quo’ whose objectives have changed with the times as examined below.
3.5.1 Pacific-ism and the Yoshida Doctrine: Peace for status quo ante

Yoshida’s ultimate political objective according to Inoue was the revival of the Empire of Japan based on a liberalist state (Inoue 2009: 133). Yoshida commented immediately after the war on 27 August 1945 that Japan’s defeat would not have been a bad thing if the military, the cancer of politics, was eliminated, the nations spirits were revived, foreign policy was renewed, science was advanced, American capital was received, the finances was rebuilt and the best aspects of the Empire of Japan was revived (Yoshida Shigeru Kinen Jigyō Zaidan 1994: 553-554). Despite Yoshida’s abandonment of the absolute pacifist position by the early 1950s, this thesis categorises him and many of the LDP politicians as pacific-ists. One of his main motives for pacific-ism was his priority for economic revival. The ex-prime minister Kiichi Miyazawa explains Yoshida’s true intention for resisting American call for rearmament as follows:

We cannot afford rearmament and there is no support for this from the people. It will happen when the economy recovers but until then, it may be sneaky but, we should let the Americans protect us. It is fortunate that our Constitution forbids armament as it will be a proper excuse to the Americans if they complain. Those politicians who call for the revision of
the Constitution are plain stupid. (Miyazawa 1975: 160)

Reflecting the above, Yoshida played a significant role in slowing the pace of rearmament (Hook 1996: 23-24). As Berger explains, ‘Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru provided his countrymen with a vision of Japan as a ‘merchant nation’ (shōnin kokka), a country that concentrated on economic development while eschewing the pursuit of military power’ (Berger 1996: 336-337). Yoshida Doctrine, as this is generally called, has been followed by policy makers after Yoshida as is reflected in the tight budgetary constraint placed on defence expenditures since the birth of the JSDF in 1954. Defence expenditures which had started just under two per cent of gross national product (GNP) in 1954 declined to 0.79 per cent by 1970 (Bōeichō 1970: 46, 92-93). The budget restriction became an official government policy in 1976 under the Miki Cabinet with the so-called ‘one per cent ceiling’ under which the percentage of the GNP to be spent on defence was to be limited to one per cent (The decision at a Cabinet meeting kakugi kettei on 5 November 1976) (Naikaku Kanbō Naikaku Sanjikan Shitsu 1976: 44).

The Yoshida Doctrine in other words is an economic policy based on pacific-ism. Its original motive for peace is the status quo ante which is the economic recovery and
so is slightly different to the peace for status quo which is discussed below.
Yoshida used the peace Constitution as a tool for economic recovery by not rejecting American demand but to minimise Japan’s response. Overall however Yoshida’s pacific-ism lay within the framework of ‘adjusting’ to the US ‘rule’. Okazaki points out that although Yoshida has a reputation for resisting American demand to protect the peace and concentrate on the economic recovery, upon closer examination of his actions and words, one can see that he faithfully followed General MacArthur’s wishes (2003: 372-373). Regardless, it is still a fact that Yoshida repeatedly spoke on peace within and outside of the Diet. But as his peace was a tool for other objectives, Yoshida did not see Article 9 as holy sacrament and thought it would face revision in the future but that unarmed neutrality was merely the most effective political policy at the time (1963: 99-100). Hence Yoshida thought Japan should not continue to rely on the power of other states but that it should strive to build its defences within its available capacity (1963: 103). The misreading of Yoshida was that as Japan recovered its economy and further developed it using pacific-ist policy, the nation now wanted to maintain the ‘peace’ to protect the status quo.
3.5.2 Peace for status quo under Shigeru Yoshida

Before examining peace as a vehicle for maintaining the status quo, this section first examines the original ‘peace for status quo’ developed by Shigeru Yoshida. Yoshida used ‘peace’ against two things he wanted to maintain the status quo: the emperor system, and liberal-capitalism meaning fighting off communism and the revival of militarism.

One of the main motives for Yoshida to accept the pacifist Constitution was the protection of the emperor system. As far as Yoshida was concerned, the key objective of the new Constitution was to save the state and ensure the protection of the imperial household (Teikoku Gikai Kizokuin 1985:17). He therefore welcomed the Article 1 of the Constitution on the basis that it would protect the emperor and excuse him from war responsibilities (Ōtake 1991: 107). Historian Yoshihisa Hara claims Yoshida has consistently vowed absolute devotion towards the emperor before and after the war (Hara 2005: 233). Towards the end of war on 14 February 1945, Yoshida had written to the emperor suggesting the emperor to end the war by turning against the military which has led to his arrest and imprisonment by the Military Police between April and June 1945 (Okazaki 2003: 188-189). Yoshida was concerned about the emperor being taken advantage of by the military (Hara...
2005: 233). His view towards the imperial household was that it was inseparable to
the nation (Yoshida 1958: 72), that it was the ancestral root of the nation, and
respect towards it was the basis for social order (Yoshida 1958: 80). An Allied
Power officer Bonner Fellers before the International Military Tribunal for the Far
East predicted that the Japanese would tolerate any humiliation to avoid the
prosecution of the emperor’ (Dower 1999: 299; Okazaki 2003: 67-68). Whether all
the Japanese would have agreed to this statement, those politicians such as
Yoshida who wanted to protect the emperor system knew that the only way was to
agree to the new Constitution and accept the unarmed neutrality clause (Ōtake
1991: 77). Indeed, as stated above, Yoshida was initially supportive of absolute
peace. In his administrative policy speech to the Diet on 8 November 1949 he
stated:

As is solemnly declared in the new constitution, our country stands before
other countries as an unarmed nation, having voluntarily renounced war
and abandoned armaments. Backed by world opinion devoted to peace, let
us increasingly strengthen the resolve of our people to contribute to the
civilization and peace and prosperity of the world, so that the civilized world
more and more will understand and appreciate our country. This, I believe,
is the only way to expedite a peace treaty. (Dower 1979: 381; also see
Yoshida: 1958)

Having stated the above, earlier at the Privy Council meetings during March to May
1946 Yoshida stated that while he understood that revising the Article 9 was not
easy as it was a restriction placed by the Allied Powers who were concerned about
Japan’s rearmament (Ōtake 1991: 107), his views were that upon Japan regaining
its independence it would need to have some military strength as a state in some
form or another (Ōtake 1991: 108). Yoshida’s inconsistent attitude towards peace
and rearmament is a sign of his ‘conformity’ towards peace under occupation. In
short, he accepted absolute pacifism as part of the condition of being under an
occupation and therefore understood this to be a temporary condition.

Further, in addition to the maintenance of the emperor, the pacifist position was an
effective breakwater against the Communist forces. As seen above, the
Communist Party rejected the new Constitution on the basis of its pro-emperor and
pro-capitalist position and instead produced its own draft (Nihon Kyōsantō 1971:
136-142). The Asahi Shimbun newspaper on 10 March 1946 reported the business
community welcoming the draft Constitution commenting that it would lock in the
emperor system and capitalism providing the much needed stability as well as reducing the pressure from the extreme forces such as the Communist Party. Yoshida was an anti-communist. His anti-war movement which lead to his arrest was triggered by his fear towards the communist threat leading him to call for peace with the West to unite in the fight against communism (Okazaki 2003: 188-189). In the post-war period, Yoshida continued to fight with the Communist Party over labour unions and protecting the pro-emperor Constitution and called on the occupying Allied Powers to illegalise the JCP (Gaimushō 2002b: 605). When Yoshida was initially approached by the Americans on Japan's rearmament in 1951, one of the reasons Yoshida gave for resisting this demand was that the cost of rearmament will further worsen the economic recession leading to social instability (Yoshida 1963: 101; Gaimushō 2002b: 15) that will further strengthen the JCP. For Yoshida therefore, pacifism was a vehicle for stopping communism in Japan via an economic recovery and the pacifist Constitution was his biggest weapon.

As well as fighting the Communists, Yoshida was staving off the revival of the militarists. Japan's involvement in the Second World War was widely blamed as resulting from totalitarianism which gave uncontrolled powers to the irresponsible military (Maruyama 1956: 83-124; 1963: 84-131). Regardless of their political
orientation, pre-war non-military elites such as Yoshida were suspicious of the military which had hijacked party politics from the 1930s until the end of the war (Berger 1993: 134). Initially when negotiating with Dulles over rearmament in the Korea War, the other explanation Yoshida gave against rearmament was that this may revive the militarists, who were currently hiding underground, leading to the military once again taking over the state (Ōtake 1992: 37). Indeed a group of ex-military men lead by a former general, Takushiro Hattori, were in contact with Charles Willoughby of the GHQ/SCAP discussing on Japan’s rearmament. Although Yoshida eventually agreed to the American demand for rearmament, in his discussions with General MacArthur in February 1951 he stressed the need to prevent the revival of militarism (Gaimushō 2002a: 109; 2002b: 12, 16) by building a democratic military without relying on the old boys from the Imperial Army (Ōtake 1992: 46; Gaimushō 2002b: 82). Therefore in the post-war period Katzenstein describes how the Japanese Defence Agency (JDA), which is the agency to the JSDFs, has been under the control of the civilian administration since its birth and how on security policy, the JDA is subordinate to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Katzenstein 1996b: 104-108). For this purpose also, the pacifist norm contributed towards pushing back on the revival of militarism and maintaining a cautious approach towards rearmament.
Therefore Yoshida’s approach to peace has centred around the idea that rearmament should be minimised as much as possible to protect the status quo which is based on his priority over economic recovery and a deep distrust towards the military. The basic idea has been shared by the Japanese in general and has developed into a norm as below.

### 3.5.3 Peace for status quo today

This thesis believes the status quo that the Japanese want to protect is the ‘happiness’ brought by the post-war rapid economic growth. While economic growth brought some negative impacts such as environmental problems, the positive economic aspects were the priority for the ordinary person. Liberated from the post-war hunger, they are keen to maintain their economic wealth. Peace has been an important component to the economic prosperity.

By the 1980s Japan had enjoyed an ‘economic miracle’ and as a result US accusation of ‘free riding’ on US defences was getting stronger (see, for example, Hosoya 1986: iii; Harries and Harries 1987: 249,). With increasing US pressure to contribute more towards the US-Japan military relations, the Nakasone Cabinet
abandoned the ‘one per cent ceiling’ in January 1987 and the 1987 defence budget was 1.004 per cent of GNP (Böeichō 1987: 178, 336). Despite Nakasone’s actions, economic constraint towards defence spending remains strong with a *de facto* one per cent ceiling. The defence budget continues to hover around one per cent and in the last twenty years has remained under this ceiling (Böeichō 1995: 331; Böeishō 2009: 344). Hook identifies, ‘the ‘1 per cent ceiling’ was a symbol of the ideal, demilitarized state as Japan’s identity’ (Hook 1996: 55). On analysing the recurrent opinion polls, he summarises the public attitude which supports pacifism as:

> [T]hese surveys have brought into stark relief the underlying structure of mass attitudes, with a persistent anti-militaristic core at their base. At the most fundamental level this is rooted in an inveterate opposition to participate in any form of aggressive wars. (Hook 1996: 122)

At the same time, Hook acknowledges that ‘mass attitudes are not ‘pacifist’ in a western sense … and are prepared to accept a role for the SDF under constraint’ (Hook 1996: 125). Similarly, Sakamoto confirms that while Japan’s pacifism absolutely rejects militarism, war of aggression and nuclear war, it does not necessarily support unarmed neutralism (Sakamoto 1997: 142). Yamamoto
assessed the public attitude to be ‘torn or oscillates between pacifism and pacifism’ (Yamamoto 2004: 10).

Per the opinion poll conducted by the NHK on whether one accepts or rejects wars, as at 1953 when many intellectuals were calling for absolute pacifism, surprisingly 75 per cent accepted wars in general. But by 1968, the latter part of Vietnam War, the situation reversed and 74 per cent rejected wars (NHK Hōsō Seron Chōsa Jo 1982: 164). At the same time, more people supported than opposed the Japan-US Security Treaty with the exception of 1955 and 1971 and the gap widened in the 1970s and 1980s. To the question on whether a military was necessary for Japan, those in favour consistently outnumbered those against. Therefore those in favour JSDF was a clear majority and since 1963, has gained over 70 per cent support (NHK Hōsō Seron Chōsa Jo 1982: 167-173). This ambivalence in public opinion continues into the 2000. The NHK opinion poll revealed that the Japanese wanted to maintain the Japan-US Security Treaty (50 per cent in favour), cherish the love for their country (93 per cent in favour), acknowledge that the Second World War was Japan’s war of aggression (51 per cent in agreement), recognise wars to be tragic (77 per cent holding this image) and want to protect the peace (89 per cent in agreement). Tetsuo Makita of the NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute
analyses this poll result as ‘While the details and recognition of the past war is gradually weathering away, people still maintain a strong sense of wanting to avoid wars and maintain the peace’ (2000: 15).

A report revealed that these vague attitudes towards peace are in fact motivated by the desire to maintain the status quo. According to the report ‘Attitude towards peace in post-war Japan’ published by the Institute for Sociology (Shakaigaku Kenkyū Jo), Tōyō University (Tōyō Daigaku 1987: 102), the public is static towards changes in politics, prefer the status quo except if it causes severe disbenefit and there is an ethical inconsistency in their attitude towards peace. The report analyses that the Japanese public opinion tends to support anything that the governments has continued for some time and therefore it is an act of confirming rather than affirming the reality. The only exception, as also seen in the NHK poll above, has been around the time of the signing in 1960 and the amendment in 1970 of the Japan-US Security Treaty when critical opinions increased due to the severe disbenefit the public felt towards the Treaty. This was however a temporary exception and as the Vietnam War concluded and the Treaty repeated its automatic renewals, critical opinion subsided and the majority shifted to confirming the reality. At the same time, discussions over constitutional revision died down.
from around 1955 and the pacifist Constitution was accepted simply because it has continued to exist. 80 per cent said they supported the expanding role of the self-defence force while still claiming acceptance of Article 9 (Tōyō Daigaku 1987: 102). This contradiction can be understood if the pacifism is understood not within the definitions of absolute pacifism and pacific-ism but as a norm that Japan ought to avoid wars to maintain the status quo, namely its economic prosperity.

Therefore Japan’s approach to peace has been very self-centred. Shindō, a Peace Studies academic, laments if Japan’s wealth ‘creates friction with the developed countries and is at the cost of starvation and conflict in the third world, what is ‘peace’ for us?’ (1988: iii). Indeed, Fujiwara claims that for pacifism to become a universal behavioural principle, it needs to be based on the happiness of not just oneself but also of others (Fujiwara 2004: 224).

3.5.4 Challenges facing peace for status quo in economic recession

The thesis believes the collapse of the bubble economy in the 1990s has had an effect on the ‘peace for status quo’. The ‘employment ice age’ started from 1993 as the number of job seekers exceeded employment vacancy numbers, and by 1999 this ratio of job offers to job seekers fell below 0.5. The number of ‘furītā’, who are
defined as either permanent part-time workers or job seekers, steadily increased from 1,830,000 persons in 1990 to 4,170,000 persons in 2001 (Naikakufu 2003: 78). As at 2001 one in nine persons (but excluding housewife part-time workers, the genuine number is one in five) between the ages of 15 and 34 is said to be belong to this group (Naikakufu 2003: 78). The conditions worsened and today, the numbers of those in irregular employment have jumped from 6,730,000 (which represent 16.6 per cent of the employed excluding executives) in 1986 to 11,520,000 or 23.2 per cent in 1997 (Sōmushō Tōkeikyoku 1997: 210) and to 17,320,000 or 33.5 per cent in 2007 (Sōmushō Tōkeikyoku 2009: online). Obtaining regular employment has become extremely difficult especially amongst the youth population and 43.3 per cent of the male and 49.6 per cent of the female population between the ages of 15 and 24 are in irregular employment (Sōmushō Tōkeikyoku 2009).

This economic recession placed the existence of peace, which until then was considered given, into question. The comic writer Yoshinori Kobayashi published Sensōron (‘On War’) in 1998 in which he criticised the post-war democracy and the leftist peace as a fantasy in an era of economic hardship (1998: 7-9). Further, Amamiya claims that this ‘drooling peace’ does not exist amongst the youth today
as they fight for survival under an environment of unstable employment conditions (2007: 46). Tomohiro Akagi, a young ‘furītā’ overnight came under the lime light as his provocatively entitled essay ‘Would like to Slap Masao Maruyama: A 31 year old furītā. Longing for War’ was published in a leftist weekly journal Ronza published by the Asahi Shimbun newspaper in which he defined peace as the ‘present continuing as unchanged’ (2007: 53). For him peace was locking in the present society of disparity (kakusa shakai) and rather naively considers war to be the break through (2007: 58). As an example, Akagi refers to Masao Maruyama’s experience during the Second World War in which the then rising researcher of the University of Tokyo but as a second class soldier, was slapped by an uneducated first class soldier (2007: 59). The danger in Akagi’s assertion is that in a society of disparity during a recession individuals may look towards the military as a solution.

The above is a reaffirmation that for many Japanese ‘peace’ includes not just what Galtung (1996) calls ‘negative peace’, the absence of physical wars, but also ‘positive peace’ which is the economic stability. Hence for the younger generation especially, it could be said that Japan’s peace is under threat.
3.6 Pacifist norm independent of peace movements in Japan

This thesis argues that another key characteristic of the Japanese pacifist norm is that it is not linked to any ‘peace’ movements but as seen in Chapters 5 and 6, has linked itself to the civil UN movements. This section examines two prominent peace movements in Japan to show that they lacked the support of the general public and have, to a large degree, been independent of the development of the pacifist norm.

3.6.1 Anti-hydrogen bomb movement: A political movement

Absolute pacifist Osamu Kuno in 1954 recommended that peace movements should not become a political movement to avoid belonging under any specific political party’s power grab activities (Kuno 1954: 50). The anti-hydrogen bomb movement however suffered from a long history of political infractions and break up leading to the alienation of the general public.

In March 1945, a Japanese tuna fishing boat, the *Daigo Fukuryū Maru (Lucky Dragon 5)*, was caught up in the US hydrogen bomb test at the Bikini Atoll and the fishermen were exposed to large amounts of radiation. This accident started a massive anti-nuclear signature campaign all over Japan and by January 1955 it gathered 22 million signatures (Yoshikawa 1995: 110) and by August it collected
over 30 million (Gensuibaku Kinshi Nihon Kokumin Kaigi and 21 Seiki no Gensuikin undō o Kangaeru Kai 2002: 64). Within a decade of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the nuclear issue reappeared as a national concern leading to many local assemblies and the national Diet to pass through motions banning hydrogen bombs.

Initially the anti-hydrogen bomb movement declared itself to be non-partisan (see, for example, Gensuibaku Kinshi Nihon Kokumin Kaigi and 21 Seiki no Gensuikin undō o Kangaeru Kai 2002: 63). For example, Professor Kaoru Yasui of the Hosei University who later became a leader of this movement commented in May 1954 that the signature campaign united the nation from all walks of life (Yoshikawa 1995: 113), and the movement was largely unrelated to political parties but instead were locally based and led by the initiatives of individuals (Fujiwara 1991: 26). In fact however at the time ‘the soil was too poor for grassroots democracy to take root’ (Ikeyama 1977: 178) and the movement reflected Japan’s traditional society. Critic Jūrō Ikeyama noticed that with an immature civil society the main vehicles that drove the signatures were the more conservative locally based mutual support groups such as the neighbourhood associations, women’s associations and youth associations backed up by the ultra conservative local authorities (Ikeyama 1977:}
The success of the signature movement led to the First World Conference against Atomic & Hydrogen Bombs in August 1955 in Hiroshima and the Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (Gensuikyō) was established. The First World Council was attended by a wide range of people such as businesses, scientists, doctors, unionists, women’s associations, students and politicians from the conservatives to the radicals, and the messages from the then prime minister Ichirō Hatoyama (Japanese Democratic Party) and the former prime minister and former imperial family member, Naruhiko Higashikuni were read out at the conference (Gensuibaku Kinshi Nihon Kokumin Kaigi and 21 Seiki no Gensuikin undō o Kangaeru Kai 2002: 60-61). But while the coming together of citizens was an aspect of the conference, Fujiwara noticed that already the Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (Gensuikyō) were in contact with the pro-soviet The World Peace Council and relying on professional activists and pressure groups to support the large conference (1991: 46, 65). The anti-hydrogen bomb movement shifted out of its initial period of local community based activity and moved towards a movement led by political parties and labour groups. As a result various political and labour issues have been brought into the Council which
was a federation of different pacifists.

In 1959 the Council opposed the government backed amendment to the US-Japan Security Treaty leading the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to criticise the Council as ‘deceptive peace movement’ and banned its regional offices from participation (Yasuda 1997: 257). In the following year the Democratic Socialist Party also left the Council and together with the LDP established a separate anti-nuclear association called the Kakuheiki Kinshi Heiwa Kensetsu Kokumin Kaigi, abbreviated Kakukin Kaigi, (National Council for Peace and Against Nuclear Weapons) in 1961 (Imahori 1974: 117-118).

The ultimate split of the anti-hydrogen bomb movement was caused by the Soviet Union’s nuclear bomb experiment on 1 September 1961. On the same day, Akahata, the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) newspaper, declared ‘what is most important for the Japanese people is to correctly understand the intentions of the Soviet government from the view point of aligning the objective of peace protection and the fundamental benefit of a nation’ (1961 on 1 September: 1). Immediately following this statement, the JCP made various statements supporting the Soviets’ claiming overall that ‘the Soviet bombs were good bombs’ (Ishida 1966: 80-81).
The then chair of JCP Sanzō Nosaka in the Akahata stated ‘Even if there is the risk of death ash, the resumption of nuclear experiments as an emergency action is unavoidable’ (Akahata on 9 September: 1). Satomi Hakamada of the JCP declared:

The (risk of) suffering through the rain of radiation caused by the experiment is important. However the immediate danger is not the rain of radiation but that a hydrogen bomb war is about to be initiated by American Imperialism. In such times, to protest just against the resumption of Soviet experiment is in effect to ride on the back of American Imperialism. (Rōdōsho 1963: 1313)

Gensuikyō as an anti-nuclear movement was expected to take a stand on the Soviet nuclear experiment. To appease the many JCP participants to the Gensuikyō, its Secretarial General Kaoru Yasui tried to compromise by not protesting directly against the Soviets but ‘protesting against the production, storage, experiment, use and proliferation of nuclear weapons by any country’ (Imahori 1974: 206). The communist members however opposed this as it placed the US and Soviet actions on the same level and also prevented China from undertaking future experiments (Imahori 1974: 206).
On the other hand the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and its supporting labour unions, *Nihon Rōdō Kumiai Sō Hyōgikai* (Sōhyō) (General Council of Trade Unions), took the position of equally opposing both the US and Soviet experiments and criticised the JCP support to the Soviet experiment (*Nihon Shakaitō* 1961: 2). The Socialists were however outnumbered by the Communists and left the Gensuikyō to create a new body called *Gensui Baku Kinshi Nihon Kokumin Gikai* (Gensuikin) (the Japan Congress Against Atomic and Hydrogen) in February 1965. Ironically the JSP themselves soon fail to keep its absolute pacifist policy of opposing any country on the nuclear issue. As a coincidence, senior members of the JSP were visiting China when the country undertook its first nuclear experiment on 16 October 1964. The Japanese socialists initially protested against the experiment but in the end issued a joint statement without publicly criticising the Chinese experiment. The head of the delegation and chair of the JSP, Tomoi Narita conveyed his opposition in his meetings with Zhou Enlai but offered a degree of understanding by stating ‘But we must understand the circumstances of why the nuclear experiment was inevitable. There is the threat of the US nuclear strategy and deployment of nuclear armaments as background to China’s nuclear experiment’ (*Nihon Shakaitō* 1965: 177). Surprisingly, this fundamental u-turn by the leaders of the JSP was accepted
by their members without protest. Stockwin explains:

Yet at the level of the local party and trade union organization a leader’s pronouncements on foreign policy serve only an incantational purpose, if any purpose at all. Here the real business is that of personality and patronage. (Stockwin 1968: 157-158)

Gensuikyō and Gensuikin despite a temporary period of reconciliation remains separate groups today but their level of activities are far short of the early period of this movement.

Berger claims the reason Japan still does not hold nuclear weapons even after becoming an economically developed nation is because the experience of the atomic bomb has embedded an anti-militarist identity in Japan (Berger 1998). Largely independent to the above movements, results of opinion polls throughout the post-war period show a popular consensus has been built around opposing nuclear weapons on the ground that they are a threat to peace (Hook 1996: 122). Although Prime Minister Eisaku Satō attempted to resist against the popular anti-nuclear opinion by criticising it as a ‘nuclear allergy’ (Hook 1996: 146),
government policy succumbed to it and in 1967, the Satō government introduced the ‘Three Non-Nuclear Principles’ of not possessing, not producing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan (Shūgiin Jimu Kyoku 1967: 8). Successive governments including, most recently, the former Aso Cabinet (2008-2009) have repeatedly confirmed to uphold these principles (Asahi Shimbun on 6 August 2009, evening edition: 10; Yomiuri Shimbun 2009 on 10 August; 9).

3.6.2 Beheiren: Citizen's League for Peace in Vietnam

Kuno prescribed the Japanese to self-remorse the past and take active action. He states ‘Even if one does not actively take part in the institution of war and violence, as long as one adapts to the situation and remained subservient, the peace philosophy cannot overcome the war philosophy’ (Kuno 1949: 28) and urged individuals to show non-cooperation and non-subservience towards war tendencies (Kuno 1949: 28-29). In practice however, it was difficult for individuals to accept war responsibilities as his own. Masao Maruyama in a discussion with the Heiwa Mondai Danwakai (Peace Issues Discussion Group), which played a key role in the philosophical direction of Japan’s peace movement, assessed that although the Japanese intellectuals remorse that they could not unite to fight against fascism
before the war, ‘they did not think they were responsible as an individual human
being in committing to the war’ (Maruyama et al. 1985: 37). Rather, Maruyama
thought those intellectuals who participated in the discussion generally felt they got
cought up in the war as part of society and were ‘freed from the war’ with Japan’s
surrender (Maruyama et al. 1985: 37). The remorse of a group when transferred
into a peace movement results in viewing oneself as a victim rather than
perpetrator of the war. Hence the origin of the peace movement in Japan focuses
on ‘us’ as the victim whose lives were destroyed by the war rather than remorse as

The first peace movement in Japan which focused on individualism and civil society
was the Betonam ni Heiwa o Shimin Rengo (Beheiren) (Citizen's League for
Peace in Vietnam). As the US started launching air strikes in North Vietnam in
February 1952 and the Vietnam War intensified, in April in Tokyo twenty one young
intellectuals including the writer Makoto Oda called for a protest demonstration and
as a result ten peace groups gathered calling for ‘peace in Vietnam’ attracting
1,500 participants (Oda 1995: 636-637). These groups collectively became known
as Betonam ni Heiwa o Shimin Rengo (Beheiren) placed emphasis on the
participation by individuals on an individual basis and limited its activities to the
single issue of ‘Peace for Vietnam’. The loosely determined representative of the movement Makoto Oda participated in the first Beheiren demonstration raising a placard with a message ‘an individual who does not belong to any group’ (Oda 1974: 11). Beheiren was not an organisation but a movement (Tsurumi 1974: 259). Those involved were encouraged to act on voluntary will and individual beliefs. As a result, various people with different opinions participated in the demonstrations (Oda 1995: 5). Further, to encourage individual participation and gather a wide range of people, the movement took the policy of minimising its objectives (Oda 1974: 12). Oda was critical of the post-war peace movements claiming that they were no different to pre-war movements whose objectives such as the emancipation of the proletariat disrespected the individuals (Oda 1974: 10-11).

Beheiren gained popularity and at its peak in 1969 had around 380 groups around the country which claimed themselves as part of the movement: ‘every week a new Beheiren was being set up in a town somewhere in Japan’ (Tsurumi 1997: 98). As was the case with the anti-hydrogen bomb movement, Beheiren also attracted students from the extreme left but the movement did not exclude them and let them freely involved. In any case, as it was not an organisation although one could chose to leave the movement, one could not be excluded and the movement could not be
occupied or split (Yoshikawa 1999: 57).

The main theme of *Beheiren* was to call for individuals to stand up against the state. Oda explains the movement’s philosophy towards the state as ‘Unless one clearly establishes one’s own individual principles, one would be firing the gun if ordered by the state (in a state of war)’ (Oda 1966: 186). He calls for ‘insubordination as a citizen’ and the ‘principle of rejection’ as the attitudes one should take towards the state:

> I will reject the production and experiment of nuclear weapons. I will never press that (nuclear) button whatever happens. Regardless of the actions of others, as long as I sign (against nuclear weapons), I will not press that button. To make such clear attitudes within one’s own personal territory is the starting point in creating peace. (Oda 1966: 191)

Similarly, the anthropologist, Yoshiyuki Tsurumi who was involved in *Beheiren* from its beginning called for the ‘breakaway from the state’ of individuals in undertaking a peace movement. Tsurumi argues that this anti-establishment movement must be based on strong individualism (Tsurumi 1967: 91). Although *Beheiren* called for
‘ordinary citizen’ participation, it was unlikely that those who committed to the movement were ‘average’ Japanese. Despite the movement’s open door policy, according to Tsurumi, it attracted certain types of people and the vast majority of the supporters were students and workers in cities (Tsurumi 1976: 54-55). As the word ‘citizens’ popularised in Japan, the police policing Beheiren’s demonstrations would call on onlookers as ‘normal citizens’ and distinguishing them against the demonstrators who protested they were also citizens (Oda 1995: 572).

The reason the movement did not spread to ‘normal citizens’ is because such peace movement that does not rely on political parties and other organisations imposes a heavy burden on the individual participants. As a result, while Oda was initially loosely defined the ‘representative’ of Beheiren, according to his memoirs he and other leaders of the movement became sanctified by the participants (Oda 1995: 537). Without intending to, the successes of the movement created a ruler-subject relationship between the participants and ‘Emperor Oda’ as he was known at the peak of its movement (Oda 1995: 537).

The examination of the two peace movements highlights Japan’s weakness of its social structures, namely civil society and preference to authoritarianism which are
examined in Chapter 4. Although short lived, the initial anti-hydrogen bomb movement became a national movement at its beginning because it limited itself on non-partisanship. Michiba explains that this could not be sustained as ‘enthusiastic activists do not appear out of the blue but that they are active communist party, socialist party, or neo-Marxist party member’ (2005: 430). The ideal would have been for civil society to come between individuals and party politics but the movement relied on institutional bodies to take charge. In the case of Beheiren, the lack of individualism in Japan limited its growth out of a niche movement. Chapter 5 and 6 however show that the success of the civil UN movements was in fact based on the effective use of these weaknesses in Japan’s civil society.

3.7 ‘The Grave of the Fireflies’ (*Hotaru no Haka*)

Before concluding this chapter, this section illustrates Japan’s pacifist norm through a review of a popular ‘anti-war’ literature. ‘The Grave of the Fireflies’ (*Hotaru no Haka*), a semi-autobiography by Akiyuki Nosaka published in 1967, is a best-seller selling over 1 million copies to date (*Sutajio Jiburi* 1996: 61). The story was first adapted into an animation film in 1988 and became a ‘national film’ (*Dan’no* 2003: 152). The animation has been aired on television bi-annually around 15 August, the anniversary of the end of the Second World War by the Nippon Television network
(Echizenya 2005: 46-47). In 2005, a new dramatisation was made by the same network to mark the 60th anniversary of the end of the war and received a high viewer rating. In the Kantō area the average rating was 21.2 per cent (Bideo Resāchi 2005: 57). The ‘Grave of the Fireflies’ has also been adapted on screen in 2008 and in a musical theatre in 2009.

Although the setting of the story was during and the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, due to the success of an animation film adaptation in the late 1980s, it has continued to increase its readership even after the 1980s (Echizenya 2005: 44-46). The story is based on the real life experience of the author and is about Seita, a fourteen-year-old boy and his four-year-old sister, Setsuko, who lost their parents during the war and died from starvation immediately after the end of the war. In the story, after the death of their parents the two children stay with their relatives, a widow and her family. As it was a time of severe food shortage the children were unwelcome and the two were eventually forced to leave the family. Without the help from the community, the children become homeless and eventually meet a tragic end shortly after the war (Nosaka 1968: 55-85). The story highlights that for the Japanese, the Second World War was not just about physical warfare but a big part was the battle against starvation which did not end as soon
as the war was over.

The story itself is not directly about war but about Japanese society during the war. The death of the children was not caused by any direct military activities such as the bombings but because they left the protection of the community (seken). The children who starved to death actually had some cash in hand but as food was rationed and they were outside any community they could not have access to it and what they could get from the black market was limited (Nosaka 1968: 79-80). The harshness of being outside the community is expressed repeatedly in the story as the children are picked on by the widow, the boy is beaten by the farmer as he tries to steal some potatoes, the doctor simply recommending the boy that her sister needs to take more food when she was suffering from malnutrition, and the station staff quickly clearing away the dead boy’s body as he died in the station concourse (Kikuchi 1974 : 60). Contrary to the story, in real life Nosaka actually survived and saw the arrival of peace as the lights returned in the village in the distance. He recalls: ‘I felt I survived but at the same time I was very fearful’ (Takahata 1991 : 425). Nosaka’s fears were related to his realisation that with the end of the war his ‘freedom’, although extremely harsh, was lost and he now had to return to society to take part in the peace. The above highlights not only the ‘structural violence’
(Galtung 1996) which exists in the domination of the community over individuals but also that peace is enjoyed at the level of the community.

Further the Japanese view on life and death is important in giving the story the relevance today. Takahata's understanding of why his work is popular as an anti-war film is because the Japanese traditionally have a feeling that they are being watched over by the dead as per the words on the Hiroshima atomic bomb monument ‘Sleep in peace as we shall never repeat this mistake’. Takahata explains that the Japanese view towards shame (haji) in which their actions are determined by what ‘others’ would think includes the dead as amongst the ‘others’ (Takahata 1991: 444-445). Indeed the animation film starts with the boy’s monologue ‘On 21 September 1945, I died’. The war dead are also emphasised during the anniversary of the end of Second World War as it falls during the annual Buddhist Bon period, a period when the dead come back to earth. This explains the pacifist norm that the peace that the Japanese enjoy today is based on the sacrifices of the war victims and that it should be maintained to avoid the repeat of the misery and hardship caused by the war. Its emphasis is therefore on the personal tragedies as victims of the war.
3.8 Conclusion

This chapter examined how pacifism as a norm has followed the political developments but its nature is more deeply connected to emotions and experiences and the desire to maintain the status quo. As a vague and flexible norm, it is not easily analysable just by looking at Japan’s security policy and peace movements. Rather, one requires understanding of Japan’s history, social structures and behaviours. The same is said for the analysis of the UN centrism norm and so this is examined in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 4  JAPAN’S SOCIAL STRUCTURES AND BEHAVIOURS

4.1  Introduction

As stated throughout the thesis so far, Japan’s social structures and behaviours are considered to be important in understanding UN centrist norm as a bottom up domestic norm. For this purpose, this chapter provides a literature review of Japanese Studies in the areas which the thesis employs as analytical tools. Namely, the Japanese relationship between state and civil society and how individual behaviours are determined by social norms are considered as key factors in explaining the development and evolvement of UN centrism amongst the Japanese public.

The chapter examines the selective nature of Japan’s modernisation and its ‘backward’ approach as being symbolic of how Japan’s village-like society (seken) and socio-cultural behaviours have influenced and co-existed with economic and, to some extent, political modernisation. As a result, as seen in Chapter 2, post-war Japan has been criticised as having a weak civil society. The chapter also considers how exactly the civil society is weak and why. It argues that the weak civil society demonstrates important Japanese phenomena which will assist the
understanding of the success of the post-war private initiative called the civil UN movements. The type of relationship that exists between the state and civil society in Japan today is often said to take the form of a ‘patron-client relationship’. Today’s relationship stems from a long history between authorities and the people, which has determined the role of the authorities as guardians of public interest. Finally, the chapter also examines how norms and social behaviours are spread within Japan’s community-like society (seken) and observe the social behaviours such as the receiving and returning of favours (on and giri) which the thesis employs in explaining how the civil UNICEF movement mobilised individuals into its movement in Chapter 6.

But before looking into the specific literature on the above, the chapter begins by reviewing the debate over Japan’s ‘uniqueness’ in order to frame the Japanese Studies as an analytical tool for the UN centrism norm.

4.2 Debate over Japan’s ‘uniqueness’

It has often been discussed that the Japanese are ‘unique’. First, many Japanese hold a strong self image that they are different to other nations (Reischauer 1986: 378; 2001: 457; Sugimoto and Mouer 1982: 62). In addition, many foreigners have
also evaluated the Japanese in this way. One of the most influential literature on Japan’s uniqueness is Ruth Benedict’s *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (1946) which first discussed the uniqueness of the Japanese from the outside. As discussed in detail in Section 4.6, Benedict described the Japanese social customs such as the act of receiving and returning favours (*on* and *giri*) as ‘specially Japanese’ (1946: 133). Benedict’s work has opened a big debate (Ikeda and Ramisu 1985) and since then the discussion over whether Japan is unique or not has been a major research theme in Japanese Studies (Dale 1986; Aoki 1990: 29).

Not a few academics, Japanese and foreigners, disagree with Benedict and argue that Japan is not unique (Sugimoto and Mouer 1982: 12). Indeed it could be said that all nations, and for that matter any social group with established identities, are essentially ‘unique’. In fact for its uniqueness to be recognised, internally and externally, requires a certain level of common ground between the other party or parties. They tend to overlook that ‘the difference which do exist tend to be of degree, rather than kind’ (Oppenheim 1991: 391). Paradoxically, Japan’s ‘uniqueness’ has been identified because it has many commonalities with the US. In the debate over Japan’s uniqueness, modernisation has often been the common ground between the West. It maybe argued therefore that its ‘uniqueness’ merely
becomes politicised as ‘unique’ when the political and/or economic presence of the particular social group rises.

Amongst those academics who claim Japan’s uniqueness, the camp is split between those who mean it in a positive way and those who mean it in a negative way. For example Japan’s uniqueness has been used, on the one hand, to explain the laggardness of Japanese society and on the other, to explain Japan’s post war economic success until the 1990s. To the former, Japan is not fully modernised whilst for the latter, modernisation has been a success (Reischauer 1964: 92-93; 1965: 45). The former finds the problem in the residuals of feudalism dating back from the Edo period and earlier but the latter argue that these traditions have worked in favour of the development of modernisation (Bellah 1957; Smith 1959; Dore 1965; Hall 1965). In both cases, the focus on Japan’s history and traditions are retroactive to explain Japan’s post war society and economy. Japan’s uniqueness has therefore been the explanation for both the success and failure of the country’s modernisation and industrialisation depending on the user.

There are trends in the debate over Japan’s uniqueness. During certain periods there is an upsurge of assessments which find the country’s uniqueness from a
positive angle and vice versa. Tamotsu Aoki labelled the various post war
literature on Japanese uniqueness as *Nihonjin-Tokushu-ron* (Arguments of
Japanese uniqueness) and grouped them in chronological order as Period 1:
period of negative uniqueness (1945 to 1954); Period 2: period of historical
relativism (1955 to 1963); Period 3: period of positive uniqueness (1964 to 1983);
and Period 4: from uniqueness into universal (1984 onwards) (Aoki 1990). Aoki’s
fourth period overlaps with the activities in the 1980s of the ‘revisionists’ mainly in
the US, who have attacked Japan’s uniqueness as being a source of the country’s
protectionism. With this in mind, the Japanese ‘uniqueness’ debate in the post war
period is reviewed below using Aoki’s timelines.

4.2.1 Period 1 (1945-1954): Self-criticism of its uniqueness as Japan loses
the War

Sociologist Minoru Kida in 1948 called for the Japanese to reject and throw away
their Japanese-ness stating ‘If the Japanese do not have anything before they
became Japanese, what hope do we have today? It [the elements that are not
Japanese] is the only strength to revive a new lease of life beneath what is
presently falling to pieces’ (Kida 1948: 279). Similarly, sociologist Takeyoshi
Kawashima claims the feudal Japanese family system has led to the subordination
to authority, lack of individualism, denial of positive criticism and reflection and the "boss and his henchmen"-like adhesion. He states ‘The Japanese society and family are based on family-like ties. The family principle which prevails is confrontational to the principles of democracy. … They are precisely what strongly obstruct the democratisation of our social life today, and without rejecting it we cannot accomplish our democratisation (Kawashima 1948: 22). Takeo Kuwabara, a leading experts on French literature, stated that in order to overcome modernity, one needs to immerse oneself in it. He questions whether Japan-unique literature such as those by Kiyōka Izumi, Kōsaku Takii and Kafū Nagai can respond to these needs and concludes that one must read western modern literatures (Kuwabara 1947: 9-10).

These discussions made early in the post war period are not influenced by Benedict’s works but their assessment of Japan’s uniqueness and its negative interpretations have many similarities. As explained by social psychologist Hiroshi Minami, ‘What is not modernised in Japanese social relationships is, to put it broadly, that the people are socially tied in pre-modern giri’ (Minami 1948: 186).
4.2.2 Period 2 (1955-1963): Historical relativism

As Japan’s economy started to recover in the 1950s, the new trend was to explain Japan as a hybrid culture. On comparing with Western developed countries, Shūichi Katō suggested the Japanese culture to be a mix between East and West and stated ‘It is not that the focus has moved from traditional to westernised Japan but that the country’s character lies in the fact that the two aspects are intertwined deep down and that they are inseparable’ Katō 1955: 7). Anthropologist Tadao Umesao in 1957 claimed, from the perspective of comparative civilization studies, that Japan's modern development path is different to that of other Asian countries and closer to the western model (1957). Hence compared to the first period, in this period Japanese researchers started to assess Japan's characteristics in a more favourable way (Aoki 1990: 69-70).

For western researchers studying Japan, it was in this period that the research themes explaining Japan’s modernisation as a success started (e.g. Bellah 1957; Smith 1959; Dore 1965). Bellah evaluates the Japanese characteristics and its industrialisation as, ‘Of all the major non-western societies Japan stands out as unique in its possession of a strong polity and central political values, and it is this above all, in my opinion, which accounts for the differential acceptance of
industrialization’ (Bellah 1957, 1985: 193). Hence in this period, the broad trend in discussing Japan’s uniqueness is taken from a relatively positive position by both the Japanese and foreign researchers.

4.2.3 Period 3 (1964-1983): Favourable assessment

From the 1960s as Japan experiences rapid economic growth and political stability, it once again reviews its identity. In this period the country’s uniqueness is used increasingly to explain its economic success, as Japan became the second largest economy in the world. Leading academics in this period were the anthropologist Chie Nakane, social psychologist Eshun Hamaguchi, sociologist Keiichi Sakuta and psychoanalysts Takeo Doi and Bin Kimura. Nakane argued that Japan’s social structure was vertically structured (1964; 1967; 1970). He explained that society was structured in a quasi family like manner and that groups and organisations, such as companies and schools, follow the family (jie) system whereby the parent-child-like relationships form the basis of human relationships. Nakane recognises the exclusivity of such vertical social structure as its weakness, but does not see it as feudalistic. Rather Nakane value it positively as contributing to the country’s modernisation by creating a sense of unity within organisations (1964: 81: 1967; 127-129; 1970:63). Although Benedict negatively expressed Japanese
society’s reputation-conscious characteristic as a ‘culture of shame (haji)’, Sakuta assessed ‘shame’ as having the mechanisms to act as a strong motive for accomplishing objectives. In addition, Sakuta saw it as suppressing excess competition that usually comes with it and thereby enabling solidarity (Sakuta 1964: 10). Then there are the works of the two psychoanalysts, Takeo Doi’s Amae no kōzō (The Anatomy of Dependence) (1971; 1973) and Bin Kimura’s Hito to hito no aida (Between Men) (Kimura 1972). Doi notices that the Japanese are characteristically strongly dependent on the mother in child rearing. He claims this maternal dependency has extended into a quasi maternal ‘dependence’ in social relationships both at home and within society in their adulthood (1971: 80-83; 1973: 74-75). Doi explains that through this dependence the Japanese respect non-discrimination and equality, and are very tolerant (1971: 84; 1973: 77) and as such, it is a driving force behind a large number of cultural values (1971: 93; 1973: 84). Bin Kimura’s analysis is that, unlike the English meaning of ‘self’, the Japanese ‘self (jibun)’ is not an entity which could be found within its inner self but rather, it is between the social relationships with others (1972: 154). Kimura finds that this idea of ‘self’ have lead the Japanese to uniquely identify oneself with nature, and forms the basis of the Japanese identity (1972: 17-19). The affirmative view on Japanese identity is also held by the social psychologist Eshun Hamaguchi. His statement is
that the Japanese are neither lacking in self-assertiveness nor have an immature self identity but is merely not expressed openly like the westerners. 'In living a modern lifestyle the Japanese, whose independence is traditionally linked to uniformity, do not need to set the western individualism as its ideal (Hamaguchi 1977: 226-227).

As above, the economic success has influenced the ‘uniqueness’ discussion by turning the argument from negative to positive assessments. This wave of positive assessment reaches its peak between the late 1970s and the 1980s with publications such as Ezra Vogel's *Japan As Number One: Lessons for America* (1979).

4.2.4 Period 4 (1984-): Revisionism

In the late 1980s, as Japan’s bubble economy reached its peak, there was an upsurge of Japanese investments to the US and its trade surplus with the country was becoming a political issue. Reflecting this economic environment, some Americans were calling for countries to ‘revise’ its relationship with Japan (Neff, Magnusson and Holstein 1989: 12-20). Their argument being that Japan’s unique bureaucracy and social political structures (Johnson 1982; Prestowitz 1988) put the
country at an unfair advantage on the international stage. In the US there were calls to ‘contain Japan’, as in the case with the Soviet Union (Fallows 1989). Whilst the call for the ‘revision’ with Japan started from criticism of its political economic structure, discussions soon expanded into criticism of its uniquely ‘different’ social system (Van Wolferen 1989).

In the 1990s, with the burst of Japan’s bubble economy and the subsequent weakening of its economic presence, the revisionist discussions subsided. But as the country’s depression prolonged in the 2000s, there appeared new but less intensive revisionist arguments which offered to explain the economic demise as resulting from the country’s unique characteristics (Kikuchi 2007: 42-43; Miyao 2002: 42-43).

In response to revisionist discussions, some Japanese such as Shintaro Ishihara counter argued against them. Ishihara together with Akio Morita, the co-founder of Sony Corporation, co-authored the ‘No to ieru Nippon (The Japan that can say No)’ (1989). Ishihara’s arguments were an emotional response to the political backlash rather than a denial of Japan’s uniqueness put forward by the revisionists. In fact, Ishihara actively supported the uniqueness idea. He states ‘Toynbee and others
want to place Japan’s miraculous development on the country’s emulation of the white man’s culture. But this is rather a conceited view as Japan has merely arrived where it is today as a result of developing its cultural potentials derived from its long history’ (Ishihara 1990: 132). To prove his point, he quoted a Portuguese missionary’s comment who came to Japan during the age of provincial wars (15th to 17th century) as stating, ‘This country is totally different’ (Ishihara 1990: 133).

Similarly, Kazuhsa Ogawa, a military commentator who co-authored the sequence to ‘No to ieru Nippon’, admitted he agreed with James Fallows’ arguments 90 per cent of the time, agreeing for example that Japan was not an ordinary country and its modern nation is immature (Ogawa 1990: 34). Similarly, another co-author and a scholar of English, Shōichi Watanabe, criticised the revisionist arguments as ‘These are no new discovery at all. The fact that we are different is known from the beginning’ (Watanabe 1990: 126).

4.2.5 Japanese Studies as analytical tools

The ‘uniqueness’ discussions have been plagued by ideology (Befu 1987: 24-25). In principle, the revisionists developed their ‘uniqueness’ discussions with the motive to protect the interests of the US (Akita 1993: v). Their views have been popular amongst the US media and the public as they were most vocal when Japan
was seen as a ‘threat’ to the Americans. The revisionists were however often criticised by American academics in Japanese Studies as being too political and their approach unacademic (Baerwald 1992: 47; Akita 1993).

In explaining the development of Japan’s UN centrism, this thesis finds Japan’s unique social structures and behaviours to have had a role. For example, in explaining why the civil UNICEF movement can raise Yen 17.7 billion of donations (Nihon Yunisefu Kyōkai 2010: 25) under today’s difficult economic environment, the Japanese tradition of receiving and returning of favours (on and giri) has a strong explanatory power. Japan’s unique features should therefore be considered for its functions in how it has contributed to the development of the UN centrism norm and not whether the uniqueness is good or bad.

4.3 Selective modernisation of Japan

J.A.A. Stockwin proposed that Japan’s modernisation was not so much about a conflict between tradition and modernity but rather about how the values of the traditional family-like group have been transferred into modern political organizations and the workplace (1975: 273). Similarly, Bellah stipulated that ‘we may say that the central value system which was found to be present in the
Tokugawa Period remained determining in the modern period, in perhaps even more intense and rationalized form’ (1957: 188). Many academics in Japanese Studies acknowledge the role of traditional Japanese values in Japan’s economic development (Jansen 1965: 93-97; Hall and Jansen 1968). The word ‘international’ was first introduced into Japanese as a new word ‘kokusai’ at the beginning of the Meiji period (see Itō 1990: 10; Miyazaki 2005: vi). For example, in translating the *Introduction to the study of International Law* by Theodore Dwight Woolsey, Rinshō Mitsukuri in 1873 translated ‘international law’ as kokusai hō (Osatake 1932: 41).

The actual internationalisation of modern Japan started in 1853 with the arrival of the American Black Ships, which ended Japan’s 200 years of national seclusion. The Meiji Period started in 1868 was ‘the height of the craze for foreign things’ (Sanson 1950: 404). Internationalisation at the time was closely linked to democratisation (Passin 1983: 15-30). As seen by the Meiji slogans ‘Out of Asia, into Europe’ (*datsua nyūō*) and ‘de-Asianisation’ (*datsua-ron*) (*Jiji Shimpō* on 16 March 1885; Fukuzawa 1933: 40-42), internationalisation was, in effect, Westernisation led by intellectuals (Lu 1997: 345-353). At the same time, internationalisation was partial, as expressed in the slogan ‘Japanese spirit combined with Western learning’ (*Wakon Yōsai*), which calls for the Japanese to obtain knowledge from the West but to keep their Japanese spirit (Hirakawa 1971;
Takeda 1988: 70). However since internationalisation became associated with the Great Asia Empire concept, after the War the word disappeared until the 1960s.

The word internationalisation was revived at the beginning of the 1960s as an economic term, and started being used by the media (Kitamura 1990: 28). By the late 1960s the word was being used in government official documents (Shindō 1988: 60). At the same time, the slogan ‘Japanese spirit combined with Western learning’ saw a revival during the economic boom of the 1970s (Sasaki 1988: 70).

For some Japanese, there was a reluctance to become fully international. For others, from the 1980s the ‘backwardness’ of Japan’s social structure, even despite economic success, needed to be debated, leading to calls for an ‘internal’ internationalisation (Hatsuse 1985: iii; Shindō 1988; Ōnuma 1990; Toida 2005). Japanese people have traditionally preferred uniformity and have a tendency to reject people alien to them (Amanuma 1989: 41-47). Nishikawa claims that the reason true internationalisation has not developed in Japan is because the Japanese society has maintained a village society in which decisions are based on consensus of the majority and little regard for the minority (Nishikawa 1988: 74).

The details of the village society will be reviewed below in this chapter.
4.4 Japan’s authority: ‘public’ (ōyake) and ‘private’ (watakushi)

In Chapter 5 it is explained that one of the key factors explaining the rapid development of UN centrism is that the UN came to be accepted as an authority by the Japanese after the war. Chapters 5 and 6 also determine that the patron-client relationship between authority and civil movements has acted in the favour of the UN centrism norm. For the use in these assessments, this section considers existing studies on how authorities have been established historically in Japan and their relationships with the people.

The concepts of ‘public’ (ōyake) and ‘private’ (watakushi) were imported from China between the seventh and eighth century during the Yamato Dynasty (Shiga 1967; 1984; Yoshida 1983; Mizoguchi 1995). It was in the Meiji Period that ōyake was translated in English as ‘public’ and watakushi as ‘private’ (Mito 1976: 79; Higashijima 2002: 65). Historically in Japan, power and authority belongs to the ‘public’, which contrasts with the ‘private’, which it dominates. Ōyake therefore has different characteristics to the equivalent modern English word of ‘public’ (see Hirata 1969: 130-145; Williams 1994: 111; Minamoto 1996: 19; McVeigh 1998: 52; Watanabe 2001: 153; Higashijima 2002: 65-69). In English, the word ‘public’ means ‘of or pertaining to the people as a whole; that belongs to, affects, or
concerns the community or nation; common, national, popular’ (Simpson and Weiner 1989: 778), but as examined below ōyake refers to power and authority. Further, ‘public' and ‘private’ together express the societal subservient relationship between authority and the people in a hierarchical society.

4.4.1 ‘Public' (ōyake): Power, authority and the state

Originally, ōyake refers to imperial or governmental power and authority (Doi 1988: 40-41; McVeigh 1998: 52; Deguchi 1999: 15, 19; Yoshida 1999: 26; Schwartz 2003: 4). In the Seventeen Article Constitution, Japan’s earliest moral and law code written by Prince Shōtoku in A.D. 604, Article 15 states:

To turn away from that which is private, and to set our faces towards that which is public that is the path of a minister. (Aston (trans.) 1997: 132)

It has been pointed out by academics, such as Mito and Yoshida, that the ‘public’ in this Article refers to the imperial court (Mito 1976: 76; Yoshida 1998: 29). Therefore although the ‘public’ originally referred to the institution of power, by the Middle Ages the emperor himself was seen as the supreme power of the ‘public’ (Mito 1976: 75; Mizubayasui 1996: 108; Mizoguchi 2002: 21-22). Hence the ‘public’ can
mean both the institution and the individual symbolising the institution.

Another characteristic of the ‘public’ is that it refers to the power of the time and so is not affiliated to one institution or individual. Political power gradually transferred from the emperor and the imperial court to the shōgun and the samurai warriors. Since the system of centralised administration was first established under the ritsuryo legal codes in A.D.645, the emperor as a political power has largely disappeared from political space (Asao 1987: 3). Kuroda points out that an aristocratic society was established by the 12th century where a few clans executed power using the authority of the emperor (Kuroda 1975).²⁷ By the beginning of the Edo Period (early 17th century) it was the Edo Shogunate who was called the ‘public’, indicating that shōgun was acknowledged as the supreme power and authority (Watanabe 2001: 151). The emperor, in contrast, although still part of the authority structures, was hidden in the background. During the Edo period, even the word ‘imperial court’ (chōtei) referred to the Shogunate (see, for example, Rai 1972: 11, 13; Muro 1974: 343; Hiraishi 1985: 111), which illustrates how the institutional power and authority originally enjoyed by the emperor was taken over by the shōgun. Under the Meiji restoration of imperial power in 1868, the emperor re-established himself as the supreme ‘public’ authority. In the following
year, under *hanseki hōkan*, land (*han*) and people (*seki*) were notionally returned from the *shōgun* and *samurai* to the emperor (*hōkan*) (Nishio et al. 2001: 192). However, although the emperor regained his authority, the institutional power did not in fact return to the imperial court but to the modern bureaucratic state.

Mizubayashi on describing the ‘public’ in the eighth century pointed out that it is a ‘word that refers to the state or the ruling class which assumes that role’ (Mizubayashi 2002: 10). The significance of the state as the ‘public’ increased as Japan entered into the Meiji Period. The Meiji government was creating a modern bureaucratic state with the emperor as its figurehead. Iokibe explains that Japan, as a late-comer to modernisation, resorted to radical westernisation, made possible through ‘modernisation from above’ led by bureaucrats. The reason for the regeneration of imperial power was a measure to counter-balance these radical changes (Iokibe 1998: 80-83). The bureaucratisation of the state and the securing of supreme authority by the emperor was made undertaken by positioning the modern bureaucratic system as the ‘emperor’s agent’ (Yoshida 1998: 29-30). Therefore, the Meiji ‘public’ referred to the modern state, the emperor and the bureaucrats as the emperor’s agents. Even today, government documents are called ‘public documents’, even if not necessarily publicly accessible; vehicles used
by bureaucrats are ‘public vehicles’; and ‘national interests’ and ‘public interests’
are determined within the bureaucratic hierarchy of state and regional governments
(Yoshida 1998: 30).

Before the Meiji Period, the emperor or the shogun as figureheads of the ‘public’
generally had little exposure to the lives of the masses or non-samurais. The
centralised government under the Meiji Period changed this (Taki 1988: 3-36;
Fujitani 1996: 159-161). Under the bureaucratic system, the people were set up to
serve the ‘public’ that was the emperor and the state. The Imperial Rescript on
Education (Kyōiku ni Kansuru Chokugo) was promulgated in 1890 and distributed
to every school in the Japanese empire. It provided the structure for national
morality until end of the Second World War and was abolished in 1948. The
Rescript, although largely based on Confucian moral principles, includes an
instruction that has been criticised as the basis of Emperor worship and
legitimisation of Japanese fascism (Khan 1997: 94-95). The controversial
instruction states that ‘should emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to
the State; and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne
coeval with heaven and earth’ (Monbushō 1909). The original Japanese text for the
official English translation ‘offer yourselves courageously to the State’, is giyū-kō,
‘kō’ (公), being the same Chinese characters (kanji) as ‘public’ (ōyake, 公). Hence Komori suggests that the text in fact means to ‘offer yourselves to the emperor’ because the emperor was the State (Komori, Yōichi 2004). By the 1930s, the military rather than the bureaucracy controlled the government and so the link between ‘public’ service and military service was strengthened. The military was often called the ‘emperor’s army’, bringing the army closer to the emperor who was the central ‘public’ authority (Yoshida 2002).28 As the military moved to the forefront of society through growing militarism, laws such as the Armed Forces Education Order (guntai kyōiku rei) officially pronounced the military’s dominating position within the ‘public’ authority, stating that ‘the military is the essence of the nation and occupies the principal position therein’ (Maruyama 1963: 14). Therefore under militarism the ‘public’ was the emperor and the emperor’s army was the essence of the state (Inoue 1953; Ōe 1982).

4.4.2 ‘Public’ (ōyake), ‘private’ (watakushi), state and the people

This section now examines the relationship between the ‘public’ and the people. As seen above although the Japanese words of ‘public’ and ‘private’ originated from China, it developed a different meaning. Mizubayashi points out that in China, from the fourth to third century BC, there was a distinction between ‘society’, which was
considered the domain of the people, and ‘state’, which was considered to belong to bureaucrats, but that the ‘public’ sphere existed in both society and the state. ‘Public opinion’ belonged under society, and ‘public office’ belonged to the state. In Japan however, as there was no established public sphere within society at the time, the ‘public’ was only associated with the state (Mizubayashi 1996: 97; 2002: 7-12). Mizoguchi claims that at the time in China, people were guaranteed their existence from the heavens where justice belonged and in that light actions of the emperor, dynasty and the state could be seen as belonging to the ‘private’ sphere. In contrast, the emperor was considered to represent the ‘public’ sphere and not to have a ‘private’ side to his existence (Mizoguchi 2001: 41-42). Compared to China, the Japanese emperor held dominant authority as a ruler. This explains the basis of the emperor as the ‘idealised source and symbol of moral virtue’ (Large 1992: 133), which led to mass emperor worship under militarism.

As stated above, originally the ‘public’ only referred to the emperor and the aristocracy but that soon it referred to those in power and its sphere of control. This sphere of control has gradually enlarged in the course of history as Japan established itself as a state. By the middle of the eighth century under the establishment of a law-governed state (ritsuryo kokka), every registered person in
the country of Yamato was leased a plot of public land to harvest (kubunden) and had to return a percentage of the harvest as a form of tax (Imamiya 1944: 82-86; Torao 1961). With this development, the ‘public’ also came to mean the sphere of control of the Yamato imperial court and so included the peasants managed by the authorities (Mizubayashi 2002: 13). According to Mizubayashi, by the Edo Period the hierarchy of the ‘public’ sphere was headed by the shōgun at the top of the hierarchical pyramid as the ōkōgi (big kōgi), followed by the other feudal lords as the kogi and below incorporating the shōgun’s other subjects such as bureaucrats, tradesman and peasants (Mizubayashi 1996: 106). The shōgun had united Japan as a state and its geographical coverage of the ‘public’ sphere is close to today’s Japanese territory. Mizubayashi explains that the reason why the ‘public’ was synonymous with the state was because individuals have been unable to form wide alliances across society outside of the state power system (Mizubayashi 2002: 13-18). This is due to the dominating nature of the ‘public’ sphere over ‘private’ space. Watanabe states that the ‘public’ -‘private’ relationship is not an ethical relationship, such as good and evil or right and wrong, but that it is a control-controlled relationship (Watanabe 2001: 153). This was true even in the liberal Taisho Period (1912-1926) when much of the pre-war western democratic initiatives were implemented (Nish 2000: 63). The following case study illustrates
the control-controlled relationship. In 1923 a large landowner Zenemon Saitō set up an incorporated foundation (*zaidan hōjin*), Saito Hōonkai, with the following objective:

One is urged by a divine power, such as god or Buddha, to work for a world cultural factory. What one gains from that are gifts from the heavens. It should not turn into one’s private possessions but should be offered for the happiness of the human race. (Hayashi 1997: 53)

But when the Foundation was approved by the Ministry of Education, its mission had changed to below:

The objective of this Foundation is to set up and assist activities which are recognised as, psychologically or materially, assisting in the advancement of the country. It is to be an establishment to facilitate and raise awareness of national consciousness, foster national ideologies and the enhancement of other social welfare. (Hayashi 1997: 54)

Although this Foundation was initially a private initiative aimed at creating a
common good extending beyond national boundaries, the ‘public’ authorities made sure that it was incorporated into their sphere of control and in line with the public interest set by them (Nakamura 2003: 76). Therefore opportunities for success for movements to form the ‘public’ from the bottom-up, such as a civil society movement, were limited (Kim 2002: 22; Kojita 2002: 59).

It must be noted, however, that although the Meiji Restoration was a ‘revolution from above’ (Moore 1969: 228; Trimberger 1978) or an ‘Aristocratic Revolution’ (Smith 1966), compared to earlier history, Meiji was a period when the ‘private’ sphere was encouraged to develop under western influences (Iokibe 1998: 83-89). For example there was a flurry of new newspaper and magazine publications within the private sector. By 1889 there were 647 newspapers and magazines in print, and on the eve of the First World War, there were over 1,500 to 2,000 different magazines in Japan (Garon 2003: 46). In addition, the number of books published was double that of the US (Gluck 1985: 12). There were those such as Yukichi Fukuzawa, the iconic liberal intellectual of the Meiji Period and the founder of the first private university in Japan, who called for the separation of state and ‘public’. He emphasised that the construction of the state should be based on watakushi and not on ōyake (Fukuzawa 1901: 1) and sought to strengthen the ‘private’
Despite these developments in the ‘private’ sphere, the traditional characteristic of Japan’s state structure in which the ‘public’ control the ‘private’ remained unchanged and even strengthened under a centralised government. This could be seen for example in the case of the Police Law (Chian Keisatsu Hō) of 1900, by which the police were given the power to disband popular political parties and to outlaw much of the labour union activities (Kawamura and Arimitsu 1923; Garon 1987: 30). Similarly, under the Peace Preservation Law (Chian Iji Hō) of 1925, the state was able to disband associations and censor publications (Minobe 1965: 311-317; Okudaira 1973: ix-xxx; Mitchell 1976: 56-103;). Most significant was when, as stated earlier, under militarism the state, emperor and the emperor’s army became the ‘public’ controlling the ‘private’. To this end, national conscription turned civilians into soldiers of the state (Ôe 1981). Under the Meiji government’s policy of ‘enriching the country and strengthening the military’ (Fukoku Kyōhei), the introduction of universal conscription incorporated all male adults into the military as the ‘emperor’s army’. In 1873 conscription was introduced to males over 20 years of age, and started on a lottery basis with exemption to heirs and high-income tax payers. In 1889 it became universal conscription, but with military
service periods differentiated according to levels of educational qualification. The Military Service Law (Heieki Hö) was adopted in 1927 making conscription health examinations mandatory for all males over 20 years old. This completed the ‘emperor’s army’ (Katō 1992: 215). Maruyama explains that the control of the ‘private’ by the ‘public’ has been a traditional characteristic of Japan’s state structure, but that in the growing period of militarism leading up to the war the ‘private’ became totally subsumed by the ‘public’ (Maruyama 1956: 9-12; 1963: 3-7; 1964: 13-16). A 1941 publication by the Ministry of Education entitled The Way of the Subject (Shinmin no Michi) states as follows (Monbushō 1941: 70-71):

What we normally refer to as ‘private life’ is, in the final analysis, the way of the subject. As such, it has a public significance, in that each so-called private action is carried out by the subject as part of his humble efforts to assist the Throne---. Thus we must never forget that even in our personal lives we are joined to the Emperor and must be moved by the desire to serve our country.

(Maruyama 1963 I. Morris (trans.): 7)

The general trend after the war was to replace pre-war military authority by new authorities in various forms (Nada 1983: 183; Soranaka 1983: 357). Despite the
temporary loss of state control during the Allied Occupation, many intellectuals have concluded that a strong bureaucratic system remained and continued to represent the ‘public’ (Maruyama 1998b: 172; Yamaguchi 2004: 262) and that the attitude of ‘sacrifice self in service to the public’ remained but with the subject matter moving from country to company (see, for example, Mito 1991; Katō 1994). Through the post-war economic recovery, businesses established authoritative rule over their workers. This authoritarianism spread from large corporations to small and medium size companies, establishing a system whereby workers would voluntarily submit themselves to their company (Watanabe 1987: 186).

Before the war, the Japanese enthusiasm towards the League of Nations, the predecessor of the UN, was not high. This is despite Japan being one of the original Council members when the League was set up in 1920 in Geneva. In 1933 Japan withdrew from the League in protest to the Assembly’s adoption on 24 February 1933 of the Lytton Report which condemned the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and refused to recognise Manchukuo as an independent state (e.g. Nish 1977: 188-193; 1993; Satō 1972; Unno 1972). This move which isolated Japan from the international community has been seen as one of the key steps to Japan’s build up to the Second World War. At the time however, Japan’s
newspapers were reporting positively on the country’s decision to leave the League and even after discounting the censorship at the time, the general public mood in Japan was that of approval. For example the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun in February 1933 wrote ‘Goodbye the League of Nations! The cooperation approach finally comes to an end. The Assembly adopts recommendation and our representative walk out boldly’ and highly evaluates the government’s decision (Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 25 February 1933 extra edition). From this it can be deduced that in by the 1930s the League of Nations was no longer considered of importance in Japan’s foreign policy and the Japanese public were not supportive of the League. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs officer responsible for the League of Nations, Naotake Satō, commented ‘Even within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the League of Nations was neither well known nor considered important. It was even less expected that the Japanese public would take interested in the institution far-away” (Satō 1963: 222). Maesaka argues however that the Japanese public individually were not necessarily against the League of Nations but that they were manipulated by the military and the media (Maesaka 1989: 123-150).32 Even taking into consideration this possibility, the reason for the 180-degree turn around of public enthusiasm towards the UN in the post-War needs to be explained in understanding UN centrism. The explanation adopted in this thesis is that, unlike
the League of Nations, the UN came to be accepted as a super authority above the state after the war. How this has happened is examined in Chapter 5.

4.4.3 Current analysis of Japan’s Civil Society: Patron-client relationship with the state

As examined above, the authorities in Japan have historically acted as the guardian of public interests. After the war, however, there was a period when the authorities’ monopoly to ‘publicness’ was loosening, but as ‘civil publicness’ was immature and could not replace the authorities and the interest in finding ‘publicness’ was lost from the political, social and economic domains (Yamaguchi et al. 2003: i). Post-war economic growth, rather than leading to a growth of civil society, instead created mass society based on private interests (Matsushita 1994: 191). The state therefore continued to represent public interests. This itself is not necessarily a bad thing: Many argue that a particular civic group may have a narrow agenda and thus not serve the general public good (Carothers 1999: 21). In such a case, it could be argued that the state can act as a referee, balancing different visions of the public good. In Japan, however, as seen below, the relationship between state and the non-profit sector is more extreme and expressed as a ‘patron-client relationship that casts the non-profit sector in a ‘junior’
role under close supervision of the relevant ministries' (Yamamoto et al. 1998: 120).

Tsujinaka compared the resources of civil society organisations (membership numbers of both individuals and groups, financial size and staff numbers) in Japan, the US, South Korea and Germany and concluded that Japan’s civil society organisations were not especially weak (2002: 299). However, Tsujinaka’s finding showed that one characteristic of Japanese civil society organisations was that economic, administrative and labour organisations formed a larger share of civil society organisations than in other countries. In the case of economic organisations, its share was 19 per cent within Japan’s civil society organisations while in the other three countries it was 17 per cent in the US, 11 per cent in South Korea and six per cent in Germany. Similarly, the statistics for administrative organisation was ten per cent in Japan, five per cent in South Korea and two per cent in the US, and for labour organisations it was eight per cent in Japan, four per cent in South Korea and the US and one per cent in Germany. Further, the shares of economic, labour and agricultural organisations were higher in rural parts of Japan (Tsujinaka 2002: 289-299). Yamaguchi reads these outcomes as evidence of Japan’s bureaucratic influence over civil society (Yamaguchi 2004: 195). To back this view, Japanese
NPOs rely heavily on the public purse. The world average share of donations income for NPOs is about ten per cent, but in Japan it is merely one per cent (Salamon and Anheier 1996: 66, 94). Instead, Japanese NPOs place greater reliance on grants and commission income from central and/or local governments (Yamaguchi 2004: 196) which suggests the leverage authorities have over what NPOs should do or should not do.

Indeed, the regulation of NGOs and NPOs in Japan is often said to be the most severe in the developed world (Schwartz 2003: 10). Until the introduction of the NPO Law in 1998, traditionally for an NPO to obtain legal status, they had to be incorporated as a ‘public-interest corporation’ (kōeki hōjin) under Article 34 of the Civil Code of 1896 which states:

Any association or foundation relating to any academic activities, art, charity, worship, religion, or other public interest which is not for profit may be established as a juridical person with the permission of the competent government agency. (Ministry of Justice, Japan 2010: online)

Out of 24,648 Public Interest Corporations (kōeki-hōjin) in 2007, 1,287 existed
before 1945 (Sōmushō Daijin Kanbō Kanrishitsu 2008: 15). Pekkanen summarises the legal problem of this law as:

This begs the question of who decides what is in the public interest. In Japan, the bureaucracy has a legal monopoly on this decision. And it cannot (legally) err in making this determination. Furthermore, Japanese law stipulates that public-interest legal persons can acquire legal status only through the explicit permission of the competent bureaucratic authority, and it grants this authority continuing powers of supervision and administrative guidance. (Pekkanen 2003: 121)

Having a retired government official on their board therefore helps the NPO to form ties with government agencies. As a result, these public interest corporations have become hot beds for parachuting retired government officials, with 31 per cent of directors of public interest corporations being former government officials (Yamauchi 1999: 42). This practice, however, has also led to criticisms that NPOs are merely a subject of bureaucrats’ interests (see Kitazawa 2001; Iriyama 2003). For the majority of NPOs, the heavy administrative burden in becoming Public Interest Corporations has meant that many remain as unincorporated associations.
nin’i dantai), which have little legal protection. Without legal status they encounter administrative difficulties as they are barred from undertaking economic transactions, which prevents them from opening bank accounts, owning property, signing a lease, and so on. What is more significant for the NPOs is the legitimacy that comes with obtaining the legal status (Pekkanen 2003: 119). The tendency of the Japanese to trust the authorities and follow their ‘endorsement’ is a feature observed in Section II of this thesis, especially under Chapter 7.

As above, the popular explanation given to Japan’s weak civil society has been the strong intervention from the bureaucratic authorities (Van Wolferen 1989). At the same time, there are some academics who provide a different explanation. They explain that the slow growth of the public sphere is a result of citizens’ over reliance on those powerful authorities (Iokibe 1999a: 67-68). Traditionally one of the main objectives of the vibrant local mutual-help associations, such as neighbourhood associations (chōnai-kai) whose membership consists of all households within the neighbourhood, was to maintain close ties with local authorities to ensure that their community do not lose out on public services (Dore 1958: 233).

Similarly, Hajime Shinohara in 1971 observed civil activities in Japan against the
model set out by Almond and Verba (1963) and concluded that it was halfway between ‘subjects type’ and ‘participants type’, and that the passivity of the people was hindering the blooming of a civic culture (Shinohara 1971: 103). These observations have led Garon to conclude that ‘the twentieth-century Japanese state’s formidable capacity to manage society rests on the active participation of groups in civil society’ (Garon 2003: 61). Since the 1980s, the old state actors have also gradually realised the need for, and utility of, citizen-led voluntary organisations (Yamamoto et al. 1998) due to the combined pressures of globalisation, liberalisation and deregulation (Pempel 1998). In the 1990s, the media and academia praised the rise of NPO activities in Japan calling it the ‘NGO-NPO boom’ and the ‘volunteer revolution’ (Honma and Deguchi 1995; Kawakami 1999; Tsujinaka 2002: 30-34). These developments resulted in the introduction of the 1998 Law to Promote Specified Nonprofit Activities (Tokutei hieiri katsudō sokushinhō), commonly known as the NPO Law. Changes such as moving the incorporation assessment from national ministries to the prefectural authorities, setting a four month time limit on the application assessment and placing the onus on the authorities to provide a clear explanation in the event that they decline certification have lightened the administrative burden for the NPOs (Schwartz 2003: 16).
The weak civil society identified by the existing literature above is not contested in this thesis even though the thesis explains the successes of the civil movements for UNESCO and UNICEF are a key driving force in the development of UN centrism. As discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, the civil UN movements’ successes were in fact not in spite of the weak civil society but rather, as a result of its weakness by effectively utilised the patron-client relationship with the state in their favour.

4.5 Japan’s ‘society’ (seken): Collective of the ‘private’ (watakushi)

Despite the recent legal change in improving the operating environment of the NGOs see above, it is the fundamentals, the social structures, which make up Japan’s society. While in Europe the ‘public’ is the society and ‘private’ are the individuals that make up society, as seen above, in the case of Japan the ‘public’ is the authority and ‘private’ are not clearly individualised. This leaves ‘society’ to take a different meaning to the Western definition. Although many intellectuals preferred to discuss the new concept of ‘society’, for the public many aspect of Japan’s community could not be expressed within ‘society’ and hence continued to use a more traditional concept called ‘seken’ (Yanabu 1977: 26; Abe 1995: 27-29). The
following section examines Japan’s ‘society’ (*seken*) to understand the spread of norms and social behaviours.

As norms and social behaviours are shaped by society, this section examines the characteristics of Japan’s society before introducing specific social behaviours used as analytical tools in the thesis. As seen below, with its selective modernisation seen in Section 4.3, the thesis determines Japan’s collective of individuals to differ from the western concept of ‘society’ and instead refer to it as a community-like society (*seken*).

### 4.5.1 The etymology of *seken*

The origin of the word ‘*seken*’ is a Buddhist terminology imported from China in the sixth century and is a Japanese translation of the Sanskrit word ‘Loka’ which originally means ‘a site of a steady transition through destruction and negation into another form’ (Watsuji 1934: 23-29; Inoue 1976: 123-124; 1977: 15-16; Abe 1995: 50). *Seken*, in Chinese characters (*kanji*) is written 「間」 and can be literally translated as ‘in between the world’. In Buddhism, the first character 「世」, meaning the ‘world’, refers to ‘time’ and the second character 「間」, meaning ‘in between’, refers to the ‘spatial area between physical and metaphysical’ (Watsuji 1934:
Man is born into this world (*seken*) and his life is about travelling through this *seken* until he departs to the next world (Inoue 1977: 19; 2007: 35). However, by the time *seken* appeared in the oldest existing Japanese poetry *Man'yōshū* (*Collection of Ten Thousand Leaves*), written around 795 A.D., the word referred to the transformation not so much about time but about space and deviating out of the Buddhist term to mean one’s life with respect to one’s relationships with others in this world (Inoue 1977: 17-18; 2007: 33-35; Abe 1995: 32-56).

It was from the late medieval to early modern ages and starting from the *samurai* class that *seken* started to take the form of its present meaning as a social space with social norms that bind personal relationships (Yamamoto 2003: v). This meaning of *seken* further spread to the masses from the late Edo period. *Sekens* has played an important role in the ethical education and collective awareness of the Japanese (Kishida 1952: 84-85) but the topic has not often been taken up within academic discussions (eg. Inoue 1977: 3; 2007: 17; Abe 1995: 27; 1999: 7-8; Satō 2001: 10; 2004: 3-5). For many Japanese, *seken* is a given (see. Setagawa 2002: 110; Satō 2008: 11-12; Okamoto 2009: 163).
4.5.2 Assumed development of *seken* into society

Since the Meiji era, many Japanese have preferred to discuss the imported concept of ‘society’, translated as *shakai*, and disregard the more traditional and familiar concept of *seken* (Yanabu 1977: 24; Tanaka 2001: 75-76). The writer Kunio Kishida stated in the early 1950s that *seken* was a concept not equivalent to Western society but:

[A] social space restricted in space and time which places emphasis on ethics, customs and in particular opinions dictated by mass psychology, whose only ideal is its self preservation, basing itself on almost ruthless rituals, and whose instinct to attack all alien existence is prominent.

(Kishida 1952: 84)

Kishida explains that this is because, unlike in the West, individuals in Japan lack self-awareness and its society is under development (1952: 84). It was thought that the old feudal societal space, which was the *seken*, would be replaced by the modern society (*shakai*) through the processes of modernisation. For example, Iwaya wrote in 1908 that Japan was ‘backward’ and that it must create a new ‘society’ (*shakai*) like the West (Iwaya 1908).
Academic research on *seken* received attention in the 1990s with the works by the established historical sociologist Kinya Abe, who started off his career in medieval European history. In his 1992 thesis and again in his 1995 publication, Abe claims that *seken* is a Japanese characteristic stemming from the failure of the development of individualism and that the Japanese even today live within their *seken* rather than within society (*shakai*), which is the collective of individuals (Abe 1992: 72-82; 1999: 6-7). Abe defines *seken* as a powerful bond that ties people together, but which is not constructed by the actions of individuals; rather, it is built automatically, without rules, through a relatively small circle of personal relationships, most of whose members are already acquainted with one another (Abe 1995: 16; 2004: 7). Within its *seken*, Abe claims individuals are restricted because their worst fear is exclusion. They avoid standing out, ensure they are considerate to others and seek conformity (Abe 1999: 7; 2004: 6). Comparing Western Europe and Japan, Abe found that such *seken* had also existed in the West, but with the spread of Christianity since the 12th century, individualism developed gradually dismantling the *seken* and creating ‘society’ (*shakai*) (Abe 1999: 77-93; 2001: 9-13; 2004: 1-5; 2005: 12-14; 2006: 18). In the case of Japan, as the Buddhist theme places emphasis on the afterlife and therefore the current
life (seken) is a secondary matter, the spread of Buddhism to the masses in the 15-16th centuries did not affect the seinen in Japan (Abe 1995: 50; 2006: 155). Hence Abe discredits the seinen for its lack of individualism.

Although the academic trend has been largely to ignore seinen or regard it as something that will disappear with modernization, seinen continued to exist past the 1960s’ sharp economic growth and continues to exist as a powerful basis of Japan’s social norms today. For example even in the cities uniformity has been a powerful phenomenon especially within closed communities such as corporate apartments. Anthropologist Tsuneichi Miyamoto noticed that when one household within a corporate apartment purchased a television set, the whole apartment block would be equipped with one within a short period. While rural villages and corporate apartments differ in that the former are connected through blood relations and relationships built over long periods and the latter form a group of people from varying geographic backgrounds, fundamentally there is little difference between them in terms of their ability to conform individuals within its seinen (Miyamoto 1964: 232). In recent years, Naoki Sato observed that seinen ballooned from around the late 1990s (Satō 2001: 103-113; 2004; 2008: 6). Sato’s idea is that sendo is influenced by the economic environment and that it is hidden.
or shrunk during economic growth but expands during a recession. His conclusion is that *seken* has been expanding since the end of the 1990s economic bubble (Satō 2001: 103-113; 2004; 2008: 6). Similarly, Shirō Tanaka sees economic growth as an opportunity for Japan’s ‘socialisation’ and so the end of high-speed economic growth and the oil shock are identified as factors that maintain the *seken* in Japan (Tanaka 2001: 74-77). In contrast, Kaoru Okamoto regards the social system as being an influential factor, and believes that democracy and liberalism in post-war Japan contributed to the gradual dissolution of *seken* and its homogeneity (Okamoto 2009: 163-165). Satō, Tanaka and Okamoto all predict that further economic development and democratisation in Japan will create individualism, which will eventually lead to the dismantling of the *seken*. However, despite experiencing several economic downturns, Japan has continued to be the second largest economy since the 1970s and Japan’s modernisation has progressed with its traditional societal mentality intact. Hence, this thesis does not see economic growth and the growth of individualism as being connected. Rather, it believes that ‘backwardness’ in forming individualism and social development (namely, the existence of *seken*) led to nationalism before the Second World War and corporatism after the war, thereby contributing to a style of modernisation unique to Japan.
4.5.3 Changes to *seken* over space and time

In order to maintain their reputation, according to Abe, the actions of the people within *seken* are based on the three principles of ‘gift giving and its reciprocity’, ‘honouring the elders’, ‘shared consciousness towards time’ (Abe 2004: 7). The ‘shared consciousness towards time’ refers to an understanding that people within the same *seken* share a common time between them but that *seken* does not change over time (Abe 2004: 10; 2006: 101). As above, the characteristic of Abe’s theory of *seken* is its temporal and spatial static-ness compared to Western society. As opposed to Abe’s, and as a rare piece of pre-war research, Tetsurō Watsuji in his 1934 publication expressed his understanding of *seken* to be an ever transiting space (Watsuji 1934). Watsuji describes *seken* as a spatial area formed by people’s activities, which incorporates society and the public sphere but is not a space where society and individuals clash (Hoshino 2007: 262). Watsuji’s position is supported by the social psychologist Tadashi Inoue who focuses on the dynamism of *seken* by analysing its historical and spatial change (Inoue 1976; 1977; 2007). Quoting Watsuji, Inoue claims that as a spatial area formed by people’s activities, *seken* must move with the times (Inoue, 1976: 125). Inoue sees the driving force of that change to be in the movement of people. As the masses
start to travel thanks to economic stability and a sustained period of peace, their *seken* (their social space) changes and expands. While taking into account of Abe’s works, this thesis bases its analysis of *seken* on the interpretation put forward by Watsuji and Inoue, which emphasises changes of *seken* over space and time. This is because the idea fits well with the assumption of the thesis that norms are dynamic (as seen in Chapter 2). It is hoped that examination of the changes in *seken*, the basis of Japan’s social norms, will help explain the changes in the norms.

When *seken* is analysed on the basis that it changes over space and time, it can be seen that, it has followed a process of stratification as it expanded its spatial coverage. Originally in the agricultural villages, until the late Edo period, *seken* referred to the world outside of its village (Yanagita 1962: 394). During the time when urbanisation was limited and one’s life was almost fully contained within the village, the external world (*seken*) was not significant for the peasant masses. In those times, the villages had its own independent social norms (Inoue 1977: 47; 2007: 67-70) that were based on an internal criterion of whether ‘our lot will accept it’, and what others outside their village would think was not taken into consideration (Yanagita 1958: 3). Through the popularisation of travel amongst the
masses which began in the early 19th century, people discovered the world outside of their villages (seken) and marvelled at how large it was (Kanamori 2002: 225). At the same time, small pieces of the world outside started to make their way into these previously self-contained villages. Ethnologist Kunio Yanagita explained:

> When one moves out from their usual surroundings and looks back to compare themselves before and after the travel, for the first time and little by little, one starts to understand the relationship between themselves and their surroundings, of things that one has taken for granted when one has been with people they have known all their lives. (Yanagita 1976: 62)

Building on this analysis, Inoue adds that to know the world outside (seken) is at the same time an act of acknowledging one’s own surroundings. The villagers started to worry about what outsiders would think of their village, and their traditional norm of ‘our lot will not accept it’ was replaced to a new norm ‘we will be laughed at by the outsiders’ (Yanagita 1976: 62). Hence the tourist boom in the Edo period contributed towards the alignment of village values to the values of seken (Inoue 1977: 49; 2007: 71). When seken is introduced to the village, the village adopts much of the seken’s norms prevailing at the time. However the convergence
is neither complete nor continuous and so when the *seken* subsumes the village a new stratified layer is created within the *seken* which distinguishes the broad *seken* from the miniature *seken* (inner *seken*) of the village (Inoue 1977: 55; 2007: 80). In the Edo agricultural villages, the introduction of the small *seken* eroded the earlier microcosmic world and weakened the solidarity amongst the villagers. To strengthen this again, a village sanctioning system was established. Known as ‘*mura hachi-bu*’, it excludes families who have strayed out of the village *seken*. By the Meiji era this sanction system was firmly established amongst villages all over Japan (Miyamoto 1964: 217), highlighting not only the closed nature of these small *seken* but also that these numerous villages were no longer isolated as before but were now connected to each other via the larger *seken*.

The divergence between the small and large *seken* is much clearer over time. The writer, Ryo Ōmura travelled through the post-war villages of the Tohoku region as a travelling merchant from 1947. He found these rural villages to still hold strong notions of *seken* which looked old fashioned for him. Ōmura explains village life as bound by ‘*seken-tei*’, reputation within one’s *seken* (Ōmura 1953: 72-101). For example he claims that for almost all the decisions the villagers make, from choosing what to wear to the choice of spouse, they take into account what his/her
seken (i.e. community) would think (Ōmura 1958: 69-75). Importance was placed on not straying away from their village customs, which was expressed as being ‘satisfactory’ towards one’s reputation (‘seken-tei’) (Ōmura 1958: 75). Ōmura’s description closely resembles that of Yanagita when he was explaining about the villages isolated from the world outside (seken) in the Edo period before seken was introduced into the villages. However the isolation of the village which Ōmura saw in 1947 was the result of the different paths taken by the small and large seken since the two converged at the end of the Edo period.

As modernisation further progressed in the Meiji era, the large seken became the ‘State’ which was the aggregation of the rural seken of agricultural villages and the urban seken of the warriors and townsman that existed from pre-Edo period. The Meiji government placed the ‘family’, a concept shared by all the population from the warriors, townsman to the peasants, as its governing principle (Isono 1960: 100). In Japan where absolute deity is absent, the family is the smallest common denominator representing the perpetual continuation of life and which can subjugate individuals (Inoue 1977; 60-62, 2007: 86-88). Drawing upon this characteristic, the Meiji government portrayed the state as a family. ‘State familism’ was introduced through policies and laws, such as the Imperial Rescript on
Education (kyōiku chokugo) and the Meiji Civil Law, and by placing loyalty as the highest virtue within the ethics used by the feudal warriors, it now set ‘loyalty to the Emperor’ as the virtue of the state (Kawashima 1957). By the time this largest seken of state familism was established, seken had experienced numerous convergences and stratified into many layers. At the core is the family and this is wrapped around by multiple layers of seken which becomes more ‘authoritative’ as it moves away from the core with the ‘state’ being the ultimate authority (Inoue 1977: 62, 2007: 89).

4.6 The culture of shame (haji)

Although academics have generally discredited seken as a sign of the ‘backwardness’ of Japanese society, some affirm it as a Japanese characteristic. There is a story of a kimono merchant in the Edo period, who during a fire that started in his shop, took active steps for his warehouse to be burned down and as a result lost all his assets. The merchant professed that he could not face his seken (his community or society) if he was left with assets when his neighbours were being affected by the fire started in his shop. In the 1970s, historian Yūji Aida praised the merchant in this story for his virtue and affirmed the ‘seken-tei’, reputation within one’s seken, as an effective behavioural principle for the

The Japanese are careful not to bring shame (haji) to their reputation within their 
Although the feeling of shame is universal as a human being (Scheler 1978: 13), 
Ruth Benedict's works on the culture of shame (haji) in Japan has been influential 
in the development of post-war academic discussions on some of the unique 
characteristics of the Japanese shame (haji). Benedict points out that the culture of 
shame in Japan is a counterpart to the culture of sin in the West (Benedict 1946: 
222). She defines the idea of shame (haji) in Japan:

True shame cultures rely on external sanctions for good behaviour, not, as 
true guilt cultures do, on an internalized conviction of sin. Shame is a 
reaction to other people's criticism. A man is shamed either by being 
openly ridiculed and rejected or by fantasizing to himself that he has been 
made ridiculous. In either case it is a potent sanction. But it requires an 
audience or at least a man's fantasy of an audience. (Benedict 1946: 223)

The primary significance of shame amongst the Japanese is that any man must be
mindful of the judgment of the public upon his deeds (Benedict 1946: 224).

Some academics have proposed alternative views to Benedict’s ideas above. Keiji Nishitani is representative of those academics who argue that shame (haji) is the autonomy of the inner self. Nishitani argues that simply worrying about one’s reputation within one’s seken is not a sufficient condition of shame (haji), but that ‘being self-conscious of others means that there is an underlying aspect that one is shamed by oneself at the same time’ (Nihon Bunka Fōram 1964: 79-80). Similarly Mikizaburō Mori, an academic specialising in Chinese philosophy, claimed that the Japanese, who have been influenced by Chinese culture, feel that, like the Chinese, shame (haji) is thought of as threatening their inner virtue, and that shame (haji) is about losing face and being disgraced (Mori 1971: 132-133; 2005:160-161). To avoid this shame (haji), the Japanese must have self-restraint (Tatara 1998: 5).

Another argument against Benedict focused on her idea of a dichotomy between shame and sin. Keiichi Sakuda claims that the shame described by Benedict is one form of shame, ‘public shame’, which is not unique to Japan. ‘Public shame’ is where an individual’s inferiority is revealed through competition and receives attention. In the West, individuals are also highly exposed to both self-assessment
and assessments by others, and emotions such as honour and shame are charged (Sakuda 1967: 12). What is unique about *haji* is that this type of shame, labelled as ‘private shame’ by Sakuda, can be felt by an individual even if the act itself is not subject to ridicule. For example, the Socialist Takeo Arishima (1878-1923) was ‘ashamed’ of his privileged bourgeoisie background and gave away his agricultural land (Sakuda 1967:12). In the West, some of the bourgeoisie Socialists may have also left their wealth but not from a feeling of shame. Although Benedict explained guilt as an internalised sanction, other academics have suggested that when the sin is externalised the guilt turns into an externalised sanction such as punitive legal measures. Although Benedict describes shame as an externalised sanction by the public (*seken*), at the same time it is a strong internalised sanction of shame for the individual in question (Piers and Singer 1953; Sakuda 1967: 23; Inoue 1977; 2007: 161).

Then there are academics who support Benedict’s dichotomy between shame and guilt but offer an alternative perspective in its explanation. One such academic, Mikizaburō Mori claims that as put forward by Confucius, man tries to escape from punishment but they are shameful of their bad deeds and therefore, in contrast to Benedict’s idea, sin is the fear towards externalised sanctions, and shame is the
internalised ethical awareness (Mori 1971: 153; 2005: 186). Also Toshiyuki Masamura puts forward that while sin is fundamentally a conscious choice, shame arises when the expectations of both others and one self are disappointed (Masamura 1995: 58). While receiving these criticisms, Benedict’s explanation of shame (haji) has been generally supported by academics both in Japan and abroad (Nihon Bunka Fōram 1964: 80; Doi 1971: 48; 1973: 48) because ‘We cannot deny that the behaviour of the Japanese, as Benedict points out, often takes into account other people’s judgements’ (Sakisaka 1982: 50). Indeed the culture of shame (haji) reaffirms the existence of seken (Hoshino 2008: 34). Sakuda explains this relationship as follows. According to him, the Japanese are generally cautious about being under the spotlight. Since the Edo period the groups which lie in between individuals and society have lacked autonomy and their function as intermediary groups to protect individuals from society has been ineffective. Even the ‘family’ as such an intermediate group is weak, and public opinion and authority can freely control the family. Not only that, within such a social structure, if an individual is criticised by society (seken) these weak intermediary groups will seek to protect themselves by cutting off the individual to conform with seken. Hence the Japanese do not obtain security from belonging to their groups, and they need to worry about the views of the outside world, making
them afraid of being shamed (haji) (Sakuda 1967: 18). In short, Sakuda explains that ‘before a pluralistic civil society made up of autonomous intermediary groups could mature, a mass socialisation of the folk society with strong tendency towards centralisation was created (in Japan)’ (Sakuda 1967: 20). Under such society, the Japanese are careful to maintain their reputation within one’s 

\textit{seken} (seken-tei) and not stray away from the social norms of the 

\textit{seken} to avoid being ridiculed and shamed (haji) (Inoue 1977: 106; 2007: 141-142).

The culture of shame provides a strong behavioural constraint within one’s \textit{seken}.

The next section examines Japan’s gift giving culture which has developed out of Japan’s community-like society (\textit{seken}) as it is employed in Chapter 6 to explain the motives of individuals in participating in the civil UNICEF movement.

4.7 Concepts of receiving and returning favours: \textit{on} and \textit{giri}

The Japanese dictionary \textit{Kōjien} explains \textit{on} as a compassion or gift received from one’s social superiors such as parents and rulers (Shinmura 1965: 327), but the terms is used here as a general translation of a ‘favour’ for \textit{on}. It is important to note that not all gifts or favours create an obligation to make some sort of repayment.

Favours (\textit{on}) which create an obligation (\textit{giri}) to repay are sometimes specified as
ongi (Shinmura 1965: 566).

Academic studies on this Japanese value of obligation originate back to before the Second World War. The word *giri* itself originated in China to mean 'anything that one is obliged to do in society' and was introduced to Japan by the ninth century (Minamoto 1996: 29, 38). While today *on* and *giri* are seen as a set of Japanese values on gift giving, initially academics did not specifically connect obligations to the receipt of favours. Instead obligation was seen as a general pragmatic consideration for others. It was considered to stem from one’s pride (*iji*) (Tsuda 1963-66: 327) and the desire to maintain one’s face (*haji*) (Fukuba 1927: 33-50). Similarly, Junkichi Shimoide in his 1925 thesis analysed obligation as a consciousness that is established beyond the parties involved and which takes into consideration the third party; namely, society to which one belongs (1932: 168-173).

4.7.1 Academic studies on receiving and returning favours: *on* and *giri*

The first scholars to associate obligation to an act of repayment were Shōtarō Sakurai and Tsutomu Himeoka. The two academics stipulated that a feeling of obligation towards another developed through the receipt of gifts or favours
(Sakurai 1939; Himeoka 1944). However they did not connect obligation to the word on. Sakurai’s idea was that on was a specific favour only born offered the benefactor is clearly superior in terms of his social status (Sakurai 1939: 86-95). According to Sakurai, the obligation to repay as a result of the receipt of a favour was limited to those from the same social status, pointing out that obligation was an important social value in the townsmen culture of the Edo period (Sakurai 1939: 43). Similarly, Himeoka also observed that the practice of ‘repayments to favours received’ is between equal parties in a feudal society (1944: 170-182).

In contrast to Sakurai and Himeoka, who mainly focused on analysing one’s obligation towards another, it was Ruth Benedict who first made the link between the two words: obligation to repay favours received. In her well-known book The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, first published in 1946, Benedict put forward separate meanings to two similar Japanese words, gimu and giri, which are both translatable as ‘obligation’, and positioned them to be the antonyms of favours (Benedict 1946: 116). As with Sakurai’s analysis above, she stipulated that a favour that creates a giri-type of obligation to repay emerges between equal partners. Under this type of obligation, she saw that often the favour is perceived by the benefactor as a loan, even a contractual relationship. As such, there are limits in
both time and the scale of the repayment. Benedict also noted that when such favours are perceived as informal loans, the motive for honouring a *giri*-obligation is to maintain one’s face and avoid criticism from others (Benedict 1946: 116).

Where Benedict and Sakurai differ is in their definition of favours. Benedict labelled the favours between equals as *on*, while Sakurai’s understanding of *on* was limited to favours between two parties with a wide gap in their social status. Further, for Sakurai, such favours did not need repayment. Contrary to Sakurai, Benedict explained that the favours in hierarchical relationships also needed to be repaid and called this a *gimu*-type of obligation to do so (Benedict 1946: 116). Benedict considered the repayment of such hierarchical favour to be limitless and un-repayable in full, and that the beneficiary feels the urge to return at least ‘one-ten-thousandth’ of the received sum through total, and often life-long, devotion to the benefactor (Benedict 1946: 115).

Table 2 below provides a summary of the different views between Benedict and Sakurai and Himeoka on the receipt of favours and its repayment.

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<td><strong>Table 2:</strong> Benedict, Sakurai and Himeoka on the receipt of favours and its repayment</td>
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### 4.7.2 Effects of social change to the acts of receiving and returning favours: *on* and *giri*

Sakurai and Himeoka perceived the tradition of *giri* to be based on the feudal and/or ‘backward’ society, and did not consider how it may be affected by social change. Chie Nakane stipulated that favours from the have to the have-not, such as between a parent to a minor, or between a higher to a lower caste member in India, do not create obligations for repayment by the beneficiary (Nakane 1968: 3).

But how would the growth of the child or social change affect the relationship? Benedict thought that when the child eventually becomes socially and financially independent, a *gimu*-type obligation towards the ‘repayment of favours’ (*on gaeshi*) emerges (1946: 102). Interesting fieldwork by Takeyoshi Kawashima in 1951 offers some conditions to Benedict’s ideas. Through his observation of agricultural

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<tr>
<td><strong>Between equals</strong></td>
<td><em>On</em></td>
<td>Within limited time and scale. To maintain one’s face in society (<em>giri</em>)</td>
<td>not <em>on</em></td>
<td>Important social value in federal Japan (<em>giri</em>)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Under hierarchical relationships</strong></td>
<td><em>On</em></td>
<td>No amount of repayment is enough (<em>gimu</em>)</td>
<td><em>On</em></td>
<td>No repayment required</td>
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communities within Tokyo, Kawashima concluded that even after the child grows up, he/she do not feel obliged to make repayments to his/her parents. However, he found that amongst the wealthy families in the cities a sense of obligation to repay did emerge amongst the grown children. It is thought that life in poor agricultural communities is about survival and that parents have not been able to provide their children ‘favours’. At the same time, the likelihood is that the grown children have not escaped the poverty trap, and so are not in a position to ‘repay’ their parents anyway. To summarise, it appears ‘repayment of favours’ neither exists when the status of the parties is too far apart -- as in the case between upper and lower castes -- nor when it is too close -- as in the case between families living on subsistence --.

In that case, when are relationships appropriate for ‘repaying a favour’? To consider this question, one must first understand that this judgement lies with the party making the repayment and that, in principle, the benefactor cannot call on the ‘repayment’ (Benedict 1946: 116). Secondly, Nakane defined an ‘obligatory’ (giri) relationship between two people as arising only when the following conditions are met: Person A has no responsibility to provide for person B and person B has no right to expect to receive anything from person A, but what person A provides is
extremely beneficial to person B and its importance is clearly recognisable to a third party (Nakane 1968: 2). This view echoes Shimoide’s analysis that the eye of the third party, namely society, is a motivating factor. Taking the above ideas together, it seems that whether a favour is repaid or not depends on whether the beneficiary of the favour perceives that society expects him to make the repayment. Indeed, as seen earlier, Tsuda thought that the emotional motive behind the obligation to repay stemmed from one’s pride. Benedict in contrast thought that it stemmed from a feeling of shame (Hoshino 2008). Both agree that the desire to maintain one’s face is an important driver in the act of repayment.

When repayments are made from a grown child to his parents, as seen earlier, Benedict believed that these favours are never completely repayable (1946: 114-115). Hence, she observed that the grown child perceived the incomplete act of repayment towards the parent to be compensated by providing favours to his own children as he became a parent himself (1946: 102). This ‘repayment’ is provided through a substitute relationship, in which the subject mirrors the past relationship between the original benefactor and the subject. This time therefore the subject becomes the benefactor and the return the favour is made in an indirect manner. This is an interesting characteristic which this thesis determines has acted
in favour of the civil UNICEF movement in persuading the public to make donations towards helping the most vulnerable people in the world today as an act of repayment to the humanitarian aid Japan received in the aftermath of the Second World War (See Chapter 6).

4.7.3 Are on and giri unique and lasting Japanese values?

Following the discussions in Section 4.2 on the debate over Japan’s uniqueness, this section will examine whether the values of on and giri are considered to be unique to Japan. Benedict claims that translating giri into ‘obligation’ is not quite accurate as giri is an idea unique to Japan (1946: 133). She stated:

There is no possible English equivalent and of all the strange categories of moral obligations which anthropologists find in the culture of the world, it is one of the most curious. It is specifically Japanese. (Benedict 1946: 133)

At the same time, Benedict was sceptical that these values and practices were ever lasting. Her analysis was that they were imbedded in the class system and order, and therefore after the Second World War with the collapse of the pre-war social system, the associated values and practices would not be maintained (Hoshino
There are however, those who consider *on* and *giri* to be unique and lasting Japanese values. Although Bellah pointed out that the return of a favour was a general obligation in the Edo period (Bellah 1957: 21), Kizaemon Aruga stipulated that *giri* was not limited to the modern feudal society, but had become a norm of Japan within various social structures through the ages, fromanciently to the present day, not just within the traditional family system and communities, but also within the present state system and corporate society (1967: 187-211).

Then there are those who do not see the gift giving traditions of *on* and *giri* as being unique to Japan in the first place. Dore claims that a similar concept exist amongst the English (Dore 1958: 254) and some academics refer to Marcel Mauss’s work in 1955 on the Nordic myths and American Indians (Kawashima 1951b: 27; Aruga 1967: 309; Minamoto 1969: 61-62; Yasuda 1974: 179) as evidence of its existence in other cultures. For example, Sakurai determines the American Indian tradition of gift giving called *potlatch* as being identical to the Japanese concept of *giri* (Sakurai 1961: 96-101). Based on Sakurai’s studies, Minamoto argues that not only the American Indians, but also the Chinese hold concepts similar to *giri* (Minamoto
1996: 63) and Kawashima stipulates that while obligation through gift giving is not seen in Western Europe and North America, it may exist in other societies in Asia (Kawashima 1951b: 22).

Many of those who do not find on and *giri* to be unique to Japan explain societal ‘backwardness’ to be the cause of these practices. For example, Dore in 1958 predicted that the importance of *giri* would diminish as Japan’s economy developed. He thought the premature social security system and low household income were the reasons for the greater importance of *giri* in Japan than in the UK (1958: 258-259). Similarly, Sakurai, who determined the American Indian’s *potlatch* to be equivalent to *giri*, stated that it was just a gift giving tradition widely practised in an undeveloped society (1961: 99). Under these hypotheses, relationships that create on and *giri* were predicted to fade out as the country developed (Himeoka 1944: 163; Kawashima 1951b). In the 1950s and 1960s ‘obligation’ was a social norm that regulated Japan’s social relationships (Kawashima 1951b: 759; Aruga 1967; Sakurai 1968), but according to Dore and Sakurai’s hypotheses, this relationship ought to have declined after the 1970s as Japan fully developed (Kanaya 1988: 619-620).
Indeed, not a few scholars point to a decline in on and giri practices as the traditional community disappeared (see Mori 2000; Kō: 2003). In contrast, others still view giri to be a strong norm even in an economically developed Japanese society (see Ginzburg 1986: 88; Hamaguchi 1988: 181; Masamura 1995: 70-71). For example, a comparative study on gift giving in Japan and the Philippines concluded that the Japanese felt stronger towards the obligation to return a favour (Kodama and Inoue 1977). Similarly a study in 1983 conducted in Japan, Hawaii and Guam questioned the respondents about how much obligation they would feel in returning a favour received within different relationships such as parent and child, and employer and employee. The survey found that in five out of seven situations, the Japanese felt more strongly about the act of repayment (Ishii 1986: 55). Inoue found that while Western values and norms came to be accepted by the Japanese after the Second World War, at the same time some Japanese values such as on and giri were maintained at a stable level (1992: 51-55).

The survival of these Japanese values may be taken positively or negatively. For example, it is often pointed out that some Japanese workers today feel they have received a favour from their company and are obligated to make a repayment through loyalty and dedication towards the company. While these values have
supported the country’s economic growth, it has also being the source of overwork, which in turn has created physical and psychological health problems including, in extreme cases, suicides and deaths (Ôno 2003: 104-111).

4.8 Conclusion

This chapter has seen how Japan’s social structures and behaviours form Japan’s weak civil society. These features are employed in Part II of this thesis to explain the emergence and development of the domestic UN centrism norm which has worked in a bottom-up fashion to influence state behaviour. Although much of the literature reviewed is critical of these social structures and behaviours, such as the subservience of individuals to authorities and willingness to conform, as discussed in Part II, in the case of the UN centrism norm they have acted in its favour. Hence, while the success of the civil UN movements may not have contributed much to Japan’s advancement of a Western style civil society which comes hand in hand with the development of individualism, its observation may shed light to acknowledging utilities of other forms of civil societies.
Employing the constructivist framework, theories and social behaviours examined in Part I, Part II of this thesis reviews the development of the UN centrism as a domestic norm in Japan. Applying the norm life-cycle model by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) reviewed in Chapter 2, Part II examines how the civil UNESCO and UNICEF movements, according to their own interpretations of the international UNESCO and UNICEF norms, have acted as norm entrepreneurs to mobilise not only the general public but also the domestic authorities in supporting the civil movements and to work their way through Japan’s weak civil society and traditional social behaviours and customs to develop the UN centrism norm. Further, it reviews that as the Japanese civil UN movements matured, it has come to influence their original international norms and bring change to the respective international organisations. Finally, the latest developments to the UN centrism norm is reviewed to confirm that the UN continues to be an authority today to the ordinary Japanese and that the UN centrism norm is still evolving as it is influenced
by changes and developments in norms, actors and the underlying political and social structures both internationally and domestically.

5.1 Introduction

Chapter 5 focuses mainly on the role of the civil UNESCO movement in framing the UN centrism norm in Japan. According to the norm life-cycle model by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) the first stage is 'norm emergence' when norm entrepreneurs, committed to the ideals and values embodied in the norm or idea, frame a new norm and attempt to persuade a critical mass to embrace it. New norms do not develop out of the blue (Öyane 2005b: 131-132). In the case of the civil UNESCO movement, the first norm entrepreneur of UN centrism, it has framed the norm based on two pre-existing norms: The international UNESCO norm and the domestic pacifist norm.

The civil UNESCO movement was set up by groups of people who only got to know of UNESCO through the newspaper but were so impressed by its constitution that they voluntarily founded an association to support the international organisation and its spirit (Nihon Yunesuko Kyōkai Renmei 2007: 5). The chapter examines that while the international UNESCO norm has been the source of motivation for the
civil movement, with no direct involvement by UNESCO, the international UNESCO norm was interpreted and developed into a different and separate norm in the process of introduction by the civil movement.

5.1.1 A spontaneous voluntary initiative from the regions

Local intellectuals and ordinary citizens, many of whom only had limited understanding of the UN and UNESCO, were the main norm entrepreneurs of the UN centrism in Japan. In a society whose civil society is said to be weak, it is significant that it did not start with the initiative of the government or any of the ministries, such as education or foreign affairs (Ueda 1951: 257).  

In fact, one of the key characteristics of the civil UNESCO movement in the context of civil society theory is that it genuinely started voluntarily by citizens. The same is said to be of the civil UNICEF movement reviewed in the next chapter. Although the weak civil society and the strong bureaucratic system and corporate culture controlling the people are characteristics of post-war Japan (as seen in Section 4.3.3 above), the ‘private’ sphere that had been suppressed during militarism revived and, to some extent, was encouraged to expand. Pre-Second World War laws enabling state repression of the ‘private’ (such as the Peace Preservation
Law) were abolished. These were replaced by the Constitution of Japan of 1947 and new laws such as the Trade Union Law of 1945 which ensured the freedom of association, speech, publication, and so on.

Ironically, some used this new found freedom to actively show support for the new ‘public’. MacArthur received approximately 500,000 letters of support and appreciation from the general public during his occupation (Sodei 1985: 10). Until then, the ‘private’ had existed at the periphery of the ‘public’ and as such was considered to be dependent upon it (Tahara 1995). Both the civil UNESCO and UNICEF movements were established during these periods of change in perception of the ‘public’. As seen in the next section, many of the early supporters of the civil UN movements in Japan saw the UN as an authority above state governments. The UNESCO association was originally a private gathering of those who empathised with the UNESCO’s spirit ‘peace in the minds of men’ (UNESCO 1953: 5). It held that it was the responsibility of the individuals rather than the state to defend the peace.

These civil UN movements were not set up by the encouragement of, nor with financial support from, the government or the occupying allied forces. The Chief of
Religious and Cultural Resources, General Headquarters Supreme Commander for the Allied Power, William Kenneth Bunce provides testimony to the voluntary nature stating ‘The UNESCO movement in Japan, …, has not been through the GHQ nor the Japanese political bureau but from private groups and individuals. Concerning UNESCO, it is something that the Japanese in general hold deep interest.’ (Bunce 1949a: 6). The fact that the civil UN movements were all voluntary associations is significant in Japanese society whose traditional characteristic has been the ‘family-system tendency’ (kazoku shugi) with its innate and family-like community (Maruyama 1956: 38; 1993: 36; 1964: 42).

In addition, regionality and social periphery, were prominent in the early civil UNESCO movement. The civil UNESCO association started from Sendai, a regional city in northern Japan, in 1947. But by pure coincidence, it was quickly followed by the setting up of another civil UNESCO association in Kyoto, in western Japan, completely independent of the development in Sendai. More than one group of people from different parts of Japan had the same idea of supporting UNESCO as a voluntary association. In addition, the idea received instant empathy and various civil UNESCO associations popped up all over Japan until there was no prefecture without at least one UNESCO association. In the case of the civil
UNICEF association, it was started by women, a social peripheral who before the war did not even have voting rights. In both cases, they were civil society organisations acting on the current popular NGO term ‘think globally, act locally’ as early as 1947.

5.2 Backgrounds of Japan’s UN centrism

The civil UN movement is part of the traditional trend in which the people look up to the ‘authorities’ for guidance and legitimacy. The thesis asserts that a key social background of the UN centrism norm is that the Japanese considers UN as part of the ‘authority’ of post-war Japan and as such the UN commands the power to mobilise the Japanese. At the same time the thesis stipulates, it was the civil UNESCO and UNICEF movements and not a ‘civil UN movement’ which became the norm entrepreneurs of UN centrism. Hence this section further reviews the incompatibility of the international UN norm with Japan’s domestic norm before examining the civil UNESCO movement.

5.2.1 Social background: UN as a new post-war authority

In the aftermath of the war, the devastating defeat and the occupation temporarily disrupted the state from operating effectively as the ‘public’ (Hidaka 1980). This
section examines how, for the first time, ‘public’ authorities beyond the state emerged. Though bewildered, the people generally welcomed these new authorities with enthusiasm which encouraged the ‘private’ sphere to expand beyond the control of the state. Fundamentally, as will be demonstrated, the origins of the civil UN movements can be found in this change.

The strongest basis for many to abandon the ‘sacrifice of self in service to the public’ (messhi hōkō) attitude was the terrible human and economic losses of the war. On the human loss for example, Dore interviewed a woman who said that before the war they had been taught that to serve the country, but that she would never again ‘sacrifice self in service to the public’. She admitted that she was even resentful towards the emperor about her son’s death (Dore 1958: 224). Dore also found only three out of 100 people he surveyed in Tokyo said that they feel a moral indebtedness to the emperor, compared to 53 people who felt so towards their parents (Dore 1958: 452). In a conservative farming village near Tokyo, a similar study still only found 30 per cent who felt moral indebtedness to the emperor (Kawashima 1951a: 122-123). On the economic loss, as examined in the Chapter 3, the people were struggling with hunger and poverty that was created as a result of the defeat.
At the same time, the defeat in the war led to the liberalisation of the ‘private’ from state-‘public’ control (Katō 1997: 82). The liberation however did not lead to a sudden rise in civil society. Maruyama explains that when the myth of the maxim ‘sacrifice self in service to the public’ (messhi hōkō) fell apart with the defeat in the war, civil movements were not sufficiently well established to transfer the public sphere to the citizens (Maruyama 1998b: 172). Historically the civic or ‘private’ sphere was prevented from establishing a ‘public-ness’ and so there was no strong demand from the people (Yamaguchi 2004: 264-267). This can be seen from Dore’s research in Tokyo in 1951, which revealed that although positive opinion towards the emperor and the state had declined, people’s willingness to be ruled and directed by a ‘public’ had changed little from before the war (Dore 1958: 225; 1997b: 208). Similarly, people showed signs of discomfort to the post-war liberty and of wanting to be controlled (Hidaka 1980: 132).

The war defeat and the collapse of militarism substantially weakened the authority of the emperor, but the authoritarian society itself did not disappear (Yasuda 1987: 146). Instead, the individuals and the institution representing the ‘public’ were replaced. On Japan’s surrender, the General Headquarters/ Supreme Commander
for the Allied Powers (‘Allied Powers’) was set up as a shadow government with the objective of ‘uprooting militarism and bringing to the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government’ (Harries and Harries 1987: xvi). The Allied Powers occupied the country between 1945 and 1952. During this period, they were considered to be the ‘new super-government’ (Cohen 1987: 101) as they worked through the existing Japanese government structure rather than disband it. Dower claims the ‘emperor’s subjects’ simply became the ‘Allied Powers’ subjects’ under the occupation (Dower 1999: 207-208). General Douglas MacArthur who headed the occupation became the supreme power in the country, as even the emperor came under his control (Large 1992: 127). MacArthur had little contact with the general public in a way similar to traditional Japanese rulers, emperors or shōguns, and he implemented a ‘revolution from above’ (Johnson 1992: 730; Dower 1999: 203-204) or a ‘controlled revolution’ (Schaller 1989: 128). Schaller describes how MacArthur’s ‘haughty style mirrored the authoritarian cultural traditions he had been sent to change’ (Schaller 1989: 128). The occupation of the Allied Powers as the new ‘public’ therefore remained militaristic, albeit less so than the Japanese totalitarian military in the Second World War (Dower 1999: 211-212). However, the most important difference under the occupation was that the ‘public’ was for the first time represented by a power surpassing the state, a super-state
which was General MacArthur and the Allied Powers.

While the authority of the Allied Powers was temporary, it was in this period that the UN became a more permanent super-state ‘public’ authority in post-war Japan. Although in effect the occupation was undertaken by the US, by name it was the ‘Allied Powers’ (Dower 1999: 73; IIkura 2001: 2; Iokibe 2001: 202). In the same way, it is not difficult to imagine that many Japanese believed the UN, which was established by the Allied Powers, had a similar authority in Japan as the occupying forces. The appointment of MacArthur as the Allied Commander of UN forces in the Far East when the Korean War started in 1950 may have further assisted in associating the UN with the Allied Powers. The significance of the UN in Japan has been analysed at length. Many scholars confirm that the Japanese people hold an idealised image of the UN as an international institution with authority above state governments (see Asai 1991: 5; Yoshida 1995:12; Akashi 1998: 10-11; Komori, Yoshihisa 2004: 222). The general perception of the UN as a high authority can be observed from a reference made by the former UN ambassador, Shizuo Saitō who stated that in the 1960s Japan’s attitude was not to blindly follow the US but ‘to hide behind the sleeve of the Konryō’ of the UN (Saitō 1991: 206). Konryō means the ceremonial robe of the emperor and hence ‘to hide behind the sleeve of the Konryō'
is originally an expression meaning to manipulate the grandeur of the emperor for one’s own cause. In Saitō’s statement it means to manipulate the grandeur of the UN. Evidence that the UN was becoming an authority in the eyes of the Japanese public.

As seen above, although the emperor has been an ultimate authority for most of Japanese history, this has not necessarily meant that he was in possession of ‘power’. Mizubayashi states that this separation of authority and power increased the mysticism of the emperor:

In the case of the emperor, as he is unrelated to power, his abilities which establishes his personality, i.e. his social natural attributions, must be sought from something other than power. Historically, the ability which can create an order was his ability as a holy priest, and therefore his ability as a religious charisma is sought for in the survival of the emperor system. Hence the emperor system is inescapably mystified. (Mizubayashi 1987: 150)

Because of this traditional divide between ‘authority’ and ‘power’ in Japan, when the UN became one of the new ‘authorities’ in post-war Japanese society, it did not
need to be in possession of actual power to be accepted as an authority. Indeed
the development of the UN as an authority in Japan started very early in the
post-war period even before the realities of the UN were still unknown. For example,
the civil UNESCO movement started in Japan in 1947 ahead of any other country
in the world and way before Japan joined UNESCO in 1951 and the UN in 1956.
From Mizubayashi’s observation of the emperor system, it could even be assumed
that the UN enjoys a mystic status due to its lack of power.

But what was the nature of the UN’s authority? What role was the UN expected to
fill? The section below argues that as an authority above the state, the expected
role of the UN has been foremost to protect Japan’s peace as a peace organisation
and is closely linked to Japan’s pacifist norm (examined in Chapter 3). How the
Japanese perceived the UN as a world peace institution is therefore examined in
the next section.

5.2.2 Compatibility between UN and Japan’s pacifist norm

In the aftermath of the Second World War, the international community led by the
Allied Powers, created the UN to act as a multilateral peace organisation based on
mistakes they learned from the League of Nations, which failed to prevent the
outbreak of the Second World War. An important characteristic of the UN at its foundation was that Japan was not included within the collective identity which was expected to share the international UN norm. As part of the Axis Power, Japan was not part of the international community which agreed to set up the UN as a multilateral organisation and therefore they did not originally intend to share its collective identity with the Japanese. On the contrary, the pacifist element within the international UN norm was based on the need to protect the peace against the ‘aggressors’ who are defined as the Axis Power in the UN Charter’s Enemy Clauses (Article 53, 77, 107) (Asai 1993: 58; Kawabe 1996: 31).

Despite this fundamental but not well-known alienation of Japan, the Japanese public associate the UN as a peace organisation that would protect Japan’s peace. As seen in Chapter 3, in the early years of the post-war period, with its imposed pacifist Constitution, the Japanese government was seriously preparing for unarmed neutralism. To provide their security, many were looking to the UN. Indeed, the American occupiers who imposed the pacifist Constitution also assumed that the initial security of the region would be attained by Japan’s demilitarisation and further security would be provided by the UN (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, 1949: 765; Dunn, 1963: 55). An editorial article
in a national newspaper in 1945 urged the Japanese people to ensure the prevention of future conflicts through the UN, which the newspaper identified as the world’s peace organisation (Asahi Shimbun, 14 December 1945: 1). Similarly, in the early years after the war, many intellectuals had high hopes of a world federal government to secure and maintain world peace, and they anticipated that the UN would develop into such a world government (Odaka and Yokota 1956; Tanigawa 1972: 240). For example, Odaka and Yokota stated as below:

Since the ending of the Pacific War with the Japanese acceptance to the terms of the Potsdam Declaration on 15 August 1956, it is undeniable that many Japanese have identified with the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations and pinned high hopes on this new international peace organisation which is greatly improved from the League of Nations. As a nation which experienced at first hand the horrors of war, in particular the first nation in the world to face the suffering of the atomic bomb as a reality, the Japanese sincerely wish for the extinction of wars. Further, Japan not only threw away what vast arms it had left under the occupation of the Allied Forces but also in Article 9 of the new Constitution enacted on 3 November 1946, it declared to renounce war and forbid itself to maintain armed forces. Japan which
transformed from extreme militarism to outright pacifist constitution, unprecedented in human history, identifies with the spirit of the United Nations as an ideal, and in practical terms wished to depend on the UN organisation for Japan's security. (Odaka and Yokota 1956: 2-3)\(^38\)

This expectation is reflected in the public opinion survey conducted in 1949, in which 39 per cent wanted Japan to become a permanent neutral country, 36 per cent to join the UN and establish collective security through the UN, and only eight per cent supported a military alliance with a particular country (Study Group by the Japanese Association of International Law 1958: 50). Many pacifists in Japan were sympathetic towards the UN because they saw the UN Charter as complementary to the pacifist Japanese Constitution. For example, Maeda claims the two are similar, pointing out that Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan is supported by the Charter of the UN's Article 2 (3) of the UN Charter, ‘All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means…’ and Article 2 (4), ‘All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force …’. (Maeda 1991: 43-44). At the same time, acknowledging the lack of military leverage as one of the weaknesses of the earlier League of Nations, the UN includes a military collective self-defence mechanism (Ryan 2000: 8) which does not fit well with the
Constitution of Japan.

It is clear that there is a prescriptive difference between the UN security structure and the fundamental principles of the Japanese Constitution. To give a schematic picture, one paints a world of uncompromising non-violence while the other is a world of uncompromising violence based on justice. With these prescriptive differences, it is in fact fundamentally impossible to pursue UN centrism under the Japanese Constitution if the issue is based on the narrow definition of military-based security. (Mogami 1999: 44)

Depending on the legal interpretation, Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan and parts of the Charter of the UN on collective self-defence have a problem of incompatibility. Article 51 of the Charter acknowledges individual or collective self-defence against armed attack as an inherent right, while Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan does not recognise the right of the belligerency of the state. More controversial to the absolute pacifists however is Article 43 of the UN Charter. It calls on member states to contribute to international peace and security through various means, including military contributions. The Mainichi Shimbun, a national newspaper, questioned: ‘would Japan have the ability to share responsibility in
maintaining international peace if it joins the UN?’ (4 September 1949). Indeed, when in 1950 UN troops led by the US went to fight the Korean War it became apparent that UN’s definition of peace was not absolute pacifism (Hook 1986: 103; Mogami 2001: i-x). Some pacifists therefore feared that membership of the UN would commit Japan in making military contributions. The concern amongst not only those who were against UN membership but also those in agreement was that the pacifist Constitution would be undermined by the UN Charter (Odaka and Yokota 1956: 42-44). Satoko Tokano of the Japan Socialist Party warned ‘if anyone would attempt to make undesirable amendments to the constitution in order to join the UN, this would in fact be a set back in international politics and would not in anyway be an advancement’ (Shūgiin Jimu Kyoku 1949b: 5). What happened in practice was, as examined in Chapter 3, after the start of the Korean War, led by government’s change of its interpretation of the Constitution, Japan’s pacifist norm shifted from absolute pacifism to pacific-ism which narrowed the gap with the UN Charter.

As above, the international UN norm was not a complete fit with Japanese pacifism. The section below now examines how the civil UNESCO movement interpreted the international UNESCO norm to create, not a ‘UNESCO centrism norm’ but a UN
centrism norm.

5.3 Norm emergence: Civil UNESCO movement's interpretation of the international UNESCO norm

This section examines the role of the civil UNESCO movement in the development of the UN centrism norm by comparing it to the international UNESCO norm. While still strongly influenced by the international UNESCO norm, it finds the UN centrism norm to be independent of it. As seen in Chapter 2, much of the studies that consider the relationship between international and domestic norms are cases where the international community tries to impose an international norm onto a country which resists it. In the case of the international UNESCO norm, as seen in Chapter 2, UNESCO only played a minor role in the diffusion of its norms in Japan. Japan was not part of UNESCO when the civil UNESCO movement started in July 1947 and so were not initiated by the international organisations. It had no contact with UNESCO prior to its set up and had only come to learn of the international organisation through the media (Sendai Yunesko Kyōkai 1983: 49, 53; Ueda 1993: 9). Their first contact was via a letter the civil movement sent to UNESCO upon the formation of the UNESCO association (Sendai Yunesko Kyōkai 1983: 13, 50-51). Although the civil movement had some understanding of the international norm of
UNESCO, it would be difficult to say that they formed a collective identity with the founders of UNESCO and so cannot be regarded as norm actors of the international UNESCO norm. Instead, the thesis stipulates that influenced by the UNESCO norm, the civil movement activists became norm entrepreneurs to a separate norm, the UN centrism norm.

In the following sections two main divergences by the civil UNESCO movement to the international UNESCO norm have been identified which has made them norm entrepreneurs of a new norm rather than an actor to the international norm. First it reviews how the ‘UNESCO spirit’, the Japanese interpretation of the international UNESCO norm, made an extremely good fit with the domestic pacifist norm. Second, it examines the civil movement’s adaptation of a state level international norm at the grass roots through its idealism that UNESCO is ‘an organisation of the people’. Lastly, another section is included to understand why a UN centrism norm and not a ‘UNESCO centrism’ norm emerged out of the civil UNESCO movement.

### 5.3.1 UNESCO constitution and Japan's pacifist norm

This section reviews how the civil movement focused the Japanese on one aspect of the international UNESCO norm, the UNESCO spirit, which was compatible
with the domestic pacifist norm to create an empathy with UNESCO.

This thesis asserts that the first norm entrepreneur of UN centrism in Japan was the civil UNESCO movement. The fact that the civil movement was for UNESCO and not the UN is possibly not unrelated to the fact that the Constitution of UNESCO was a better fit to Japan’s pacifist norm. The Constitution, adopted on 16 November 1945, was influenced by the devastation of atomic bombing in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and its contents is more pacifist and less political compared to the Charter of the United Nations. For example, it talks about peace in a more idealised manner as follows:

That a peace based exclusively upon the political and economic arrangements of governments would not be a peace which could secure the unanimous, lasting and sincere support of the peoples of the world, and that the peace must therefore be founded, if it is not to fail, upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind. (Constitution of UNESCO, Preamble)

The success of the civil UNESCO movement was its ability to connect the
UNESCO spirit of ‘peace in the minds of men’ with the people’s pacifism stemming from personal experiences of the war (*Sendai Yunesko Kyōkai* 1983: 20). As examined in Chapter 3, many pacifists by the early 1950s were no longer unarmed neutralists but they were still able to relate to the UNESCO spirit. For example, Morio Sasaki of the Democratic Liberal Party was opposed to Japan’s membership to the UN on the grounds that the pacifist Constitution of Japan was incompatible with the UN Charter, but became one of the promoters of UNESCO membership (*Shūgiin Jimu Kyoku* 1949a: 3). The academic Isaku Yanaihara agreed with UNESCO that the best defence for peace was in the minds of men rather than in militarisation (*Nihon Yunesuko Kyōkai Renmei* 1972: 292). Tsugimaro Imanaka stressed the importance of ‘positive peace’ in maintaining ‘negative peace’ and called for the end of human rights violations and racial inequality to prevent conflict of states. He urged UNESCO and its civil movement to take action on these matters (Imanaka 1986). Tatsuo Morito, former Minister of Education and former Chairperson of the Japanese National Commission for UNESCO did not rule out Japan’s rearmament but urged conservatives to support UNESCO. He stated:

I believe that the key criteria for a pacifist state are in its pacifist spirit. A demilitarised state can have a weak pacifist spirit if infested with violence.
Such a state cannot qualify as a pacifist state. On the other hand, a militarised state in which the pacifist spirit is prevalent could be said to be a pacifist state. The basis for peace hence does not lie with its exterior but in its interior.

(Morito 1972: 241)

Morito goes on to say that ‘peace in the minds of men’ must be maintained by the actions of every Japanese person in their daily lives (Morito 1972: 243-244). Indeed, the civil UNESCO movement successfully dodged the political and ideological issues of pacifism by connecting peace in the minds of the individual with the peace organisation which is the UN. At a joint seminar between UNESCO and the civil UNESCO movement held in 1951 during the Korean War, speakers stressed that ‘UNESCO is not about one ideology but is based on cooperation between various people with different ideas on peace’ (Ueda 1986: 75), ‘UNESCO must overcome specific assertions’ (Imaoka 1986: 78) and the ‘UNESCO spirit is different to that of the Quakers’ in that it is not about whether one ought to resist against foreign attack’ (Tanigawa 1986: 101). Hence as seen in Chapter 3, while many peace movements split up on ideological lines, such as the split in the anti-nuclear movement between the Communist and Socialist Party groups in the 1960s, the civil UNESCO movement managed to stay unified by incorporating ‘pacifists’
while retaining the absolute pacifists, albeit undergoing vigorous internal debates, thus enabling the movement to continue its growth.

In politics also, although absolute pacifism was short lived within post-war Japanese politics, the support for the UNESCO spirit was universal and sustained reflecting the continued support for UNESCO and its civil movement by all corners of political parties. In the Diet, after 1950 absolute pacifism has been mentioned by only two opposition parties, the Japan Socialist Party and the Kōmei Party. On the other hand, ‘peace in the minds of men’ has been mentioned at least once across the whole spectrum of political parties between 1947 and the 1990s. On the political left, even the Japanese Communist Party, which initially criticised the UNESCO spirit as too idealistic, spoke favourably of it in 1985 (Sanguine Jimu Kyoku 1985: 27). On the political right, the then prime minister Yasuhiro Nakasone claimed that the Constitution of UNESCO was a ‘norm’ (khan) for mankind (Shūgiin Jimu Kyoku 1983: 3) and confirmed that he had no intention of Japan leaving UNESCO following the departures of the US from the organisation in 1984 and of the UK and Singapore in 1985 (Shūgiin Jimu Kyoku 1985: 4).40

Support for UNESCO by Nakasone is especially symbolic. On the one-hand, he is
seen as a symbol of Japan's renewed militarism in the mid-1980s. On 15 August 1985, the anniversary commemorating the end of the Second World War, Nakasone became the first prime minister to make an official visit to the Yasukuni Shintō Shrine of the war dead (including the wartime prime minister and Class A war criminal, Hideki Tōjō), provoking protests from China and East Asian countries (see Hardacre 1989: 150-151; Liu 2004: 280-282; Takahashi 2005: 14-18, 64-69). Nakasone later explains the reason for his visit to the Yasukuni Shrine as being a private matter in that during wartime when he was in the navy he made a promise with his fellow soldiers to ‘meet again at the Yasukuni Shrine’ meaning that as a war survivor he was visiting to ‘meet’ his dead comrades (Nakasone 1996). It appears Nakasone therefore claims to visit the Yasukuni Shrine from his private experience of the war and not necessarily to express support for remilitarisation. It is from this standpoint that he has not found it inconsistent to also claim support for peace and the UNESCO spirits of ‘peace in the minds of men’. Nakasone’s support towards UNESCO reflects the broad and non-political nature of Japan’s pacifist norm based on the collective emotional identity of the tragedies of the Second World War. While Nakasone is not regarded as a pacifist from a policy perspective, he can still be considered to share the pacifist norm. His support towards UNESCO is a sign that the civil UNESCO movement was successful in getting the Japanese
to empathise with UNESCO by associating it with the domestic pacifist norm. However why does the support for UNESCO automatically lead to the support for UN in Japan? This question is examined in the Section 5.3.3.

5.3.2 Bringing the international UNESCO norm to the people

This section examines another difference between the international UNESCO norm and the interpretation by the Japanese civil movement during the early years of their foundations. The international UNESCO norm was formed by governments for governments and so by nature takes a top down approach when considered at the state level. The civil UNESCO movement on the other hand considers ‘UNESCO to be an organisation of the people’ (Ueda 1951: 53).

Indeed, ‘the people’ is the principal agent in the UNESCO Constitution. It states that war was enacted between states and so in order to maintain peace, the sincere support of the people of the world was required. This, it claims needs to be based on the ‘intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind’ which requires the ‘full and equal opportunities for education for all’ (UNESCO 1953: 5). It could therefore be said that the grass roots approach taken by the civil UNESCO movement is more faithful to the UNESCO Constitution.
In a leaflet published in May 1948 entitled Minasan no Yunesuko (Your UNESCO) it states the ‘UNESCO movement is a very accessible movement that anyone can participate’ (Sekai Nipōsha 1948: 7). Further, it claims the movement is not up to the state or government but individuals and that ‘Each citizen should individually sign up to UNESCO and become its member’ which could be done through thinking about the world in their daily lives (Sekai Nipōsha 1948: 13-14). This approach has been welcomed but with surprise by UNESCO. Kuo Yu-Shou, an advisor of the UNESCO Director General in the Far East, who travelled around Asia on a UNESCO mission states ‘I was surprised to see the UNESCO movement in Japan was not limited to the intellectuals but taken up generally. … I think UNESCO also should not be confined in Paris. There is a need to consider creating organisations which reaches out to the nation generally by observing the conditions of each country’ (Tokuzawa 1950:198-199).

Japan’s UNESCO movement therefore interpreted the international UNESCO norm as encouraging peace amongst individuals and to do so by deepening their understanding of international cultures. The civil UNESCO movement’s main area of activity was therefore ‘peace education’, which promoted international
understanding. Hook categorised two types of peace education: one based on reflecting the war experiences and emphasising unarmed neutralism; the other, based on the promotion of international understanding and cooperation, which Hook claims is a ‘conservative’ and non-ideological approach, and that supported by the civil UNESCO movement (1986: 104-108). Nevertheless, UNESCO’s peace education was welcomed by pacifists who believed pacifist measures could be strengthened by preventing wars through greater understanding of peace (Kuno 1972: 77). From around 1953 the UNESCO Association has been involved in running classes on ‘international understanding’ at schools whose purpose is to promote peace through increased understanding of foreign cultures and the UN (Hook 1986: 104-108).

The civil UNESCO movement’s activities were not limited to peace movements but expanded into education, science and culture, through which they believed would contribute towards peace (Ueda 1951: 256; Tanigawa 1986: 96). During the 1950s and 1960s its activities were directed at supporting local community developments, not necessarily related to UNESCO activities, but which assisted the civil UNESCO movement to attain a broad base of support. For example, in the case of the Sendai UNESCO Co-operative Association, while organising UNESCO seminars
its newsletter included a wide range of issues, from human and women’s rights to local culture and issues (Nagano 1973: 32). Further, it stipulated that in order to establish good relationships with other countries, children must first make friends within their local community and so organised exchange events for local school children such as the ‘UNESCO children’s school’ (Ono: 1973: 67). Other activities included UNESCO English schools for young people in the name of promoting international goodwill, cultural activities such as art classes and children’s choirs, and even driving instruction classes to assist the shortage of local driving schools (Sendai Yunesko Kyōkai 1973: 80-82; 1996: 16-17).

5.3.3 UNESCO representing the UN

Finally, this section explains why a movement supporting one UN agency, UNESCO, developed a norm relating to the whole UN system.

The first civil UNESCO association was set up in July 1947 and in no time the movement had spread all over Japan. By 1949 there were nearly 70 associations (Nihon Yunesuko Kyōkai Renmei 2007: 10). In addition, schools and universities all over Japan set up UNESCO Clubs with over 100 clubs already in existence on 4 November 1949 (UNESCO 2009: 9). According to the Ministry of Education, as at
April 1951 there were 111 UNESCO associations and 42 university UNESCO clubs

(Monbushō Daijin Kanbō Shōgai Yunesukoka 1951: 44-46).

The development of the UNESCO civil movement raised not only the profile of UNESCO but more importantly the UN and its System as a whole in Japan -- The basis that the civil UNESCO movement was a norm entrepreneur of the UN norm rather than of a UNESCO norm. The biggest reason for this is that the Japanese actively saw UNESCO as representing the UN. Politically, UNESCO represented the UN and international society in the early years after the war for the Japanese. Japan was not admitted membership to the UN until 1956, 11 years after the end of the Second World War, but gained membership to UNESCO five years earlier in June 1951, not in small part by the success of the civil UNESCO movement. Especially during this period, the Organisation provided a sense of linkage to the world (Hook, et al. 2001: 306). Many scholars point out that one of the reasons for Japan’s involvement in the Second World War was the result of its isolation from the international community as represented by its withdrawal from the League of Nations (Inoue 1998: 2). Hence re-admittance to the international community, symbolised by membership of the UN, was seen as a fundamental requirement for Japan’s peace after the war (Ogata 1983: 34). Membership to the UN was
considered conditional to the signing of peace treaties with the Allied Powers, and so was unachievable for Japan during the occupation. At the time it was virtually impossible for the Japanese government to conduct its own independent diplomacy and so the political movement to gain membership to UNESCO represented its biggest ‘official diplomacy’ efforts (Shūgiin Jimu Kyoku 1948b: 3). Further, even after the signing of the peace treaty, its membership into the UN was opposed by some of its former enemy states, most influential of which was the Soviet Union, a UN Security Council member (Kase 1986: 16-31). For Japan therefore, UNESCO and a few other UN agencies open to non-UN members were the first window of opportunity to return to the international society (Noguchi 1996; Matsuura 2004: 82).

At the first meeting of the House of Representatives Committee on Culture held in August 1947, there was a debate about Japan’s participation in UNESCO. At this meeting, Morio Sasaki of the Liberal Party (Jiyūtō) urged Tatsuo Morito, Japan Socialist Party (Shakaitō), Minister for Education, Culture and Sports to prepare for application for membership to UNESCO at the earliest possible date. Sasaki argued that UNESCO and the UN were inextricably related and that while immediate membership into the UN may be difficult under the prevailing
international situation, membership to UNESCO was possible. Minister Morito agreed that in advance of receiving the honour to be admitted into the UN by the international community, Japan would be delighted to first be accepted into UNESCO and that this would be important for world peace (Shūgiin Jimu Kyoku 1947a: 37). Although Sasaki did not explain why he thought UNESCO and the UN were inextricably linked, at the meeting held in April 1948, the Committee Chair Shigeyoshi Fukuda of the Democratic Party (Minshutō) put forward his view that the UN and UNESCO were like two sides of a coin: the former organisation seeks to find universal truths in political philosophy and to construct a unified world; and the latter organisation aims for cultural democracy and individual cultural maturation that can lead to the unification of individuals around the world. Fukuda continued, since the Japanese government was strongly committed to its membership in the UN, it ought to be equally committed to UNESCO membership (Shūgiin Jimu Kyoku 1948b). Hence it could be said that the Japanese politicians understood the spirit of UNESCO to represent the UN spirit.

Pacifist intellectuals also looked towards UNESCO as an entry point for the UN to strengthen its capacity as a peace organisation. Tetsuzo Tanigawa, former Director of the National Federation of UNESCO Associations in Japan, believed that
UNESCO would act as the spiritual stimulant for the UN General Assembly to be transformed into a world federal government. Tanigawa identified six ‘systems’ to maintain peace: bilateral security treaty system; Security Council under the UN system; world federal government system, in which part of national sovereignty is compromised; spiritual system with absolute pacifist civil movements; American dominated system; and Soviet Union dominated system. In his view the UNESCO civil movement connects the spiritual system and the world federal government system in the spirit of UNESCO and the UN (Tanigawa 1972: 236-239). Similarly, Iwao Ayusawa, the advisor of the UNESCO office in Japan, believed that world peace would remain a dream unless steps towards a world federal government were made. For him, one of the steps was the UNESCO civil movement (Ayusawa 1951). Scientists such as Yoshio Nishina, the first President of the National Federation of UNESCO Associations in Japan, supported Einstein’s call for a world federal government, believing that scientists have an obligation to prevent wars. He supported UNESCO and its civil movement from the perspective of UNESCO being the UN organisation for science (Nishina 1952).
5.4 Norm cascade: Cooperative relationships with the domestic authorities

According to the norm life-cycle by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), a norm reaches a tipping point when the state actors endorse and institutionalise the norm. The tipping point for the norm led by the civil UNESCO movement within Japan could be identified as the point when the regional movement was accepted by the elites in Tokyo.

As seen above, the civil UN movements are examples of the revival of the ‘private’ and of the ‘private’ development outside of the sphere of control of the Japanese authorities. At the same time, they are examples of ‘private’ initiatives that still looked up toward a ‘public’ authority (i.e. UNESCO in the case of the civil UNESCO movement) for legitimisation and guidance. While rejecting the pre-war government, the civil movements built a co-operative relationship with the post-war government and local authorities. The success of the civil UNESCO movement in Japan could not have been attained without the backing of the national and regional governments.

One of the strengths of the civil UN movements was that the ‘public’ authority they
supported did not stand in the way of the domestic ‘public’ authorities. The post-war bureaucrats readily accepted the Allied Powers and the UN as authorities because they were not in direct competition with their own authority (Iokibe 1998: 99). Further, in general, the bureaucracy themselves actively supported the UN and the civil UN movements.

In the case of the civil UNESCO movement, as seen above, politicians were also debating in the Diet about how to respond to UNESCO’s first session in Paris at the same time the movement started in Sendai. Soon, politicians and bureaucrats were cooperating with the movement. The UNESCO civil movement claims that its relationship with the government and Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Education was extremely good. Although the characteristic of a patron-client relationship still remains, the government was prepared to allow the civil UN movement to take the initiative and for themselves to act as its supporter. Ueda, one of the founders of the Sendai UNESCO Association, assessed the role of the government in the movement:

Amongst the governments, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Education and the Diet were from early on researching on the UNESCO issue and were
assisting the civil movement. … Towards the civil movement in Japan, the government avoided taking the lead and directing it but rather assisting the civil goodwill movement by taking up the role of a clearinghouse. (Ueda 1951: 218)

Interest towards the UNESCO civil movement amongst politicians and bureaucrats heightened after the UNESCO Association’s inaugural address was introduced at the Second General Conference of UNESCO in 1947 (Nihon Yunesuko Kyōkai Renmei 1999: 24). A UNESCO office in Japan was opened following the Third General Conference of UNESCO in November 1948. In response, the Japanese government set up a UNESCO affairs section within the Ministry of Education, whose main activities were to facilitate coordination between the Ministries of Education and Foreign Affairs, the Allied occupiers (GHQ/SCAP) and the UNESCO Japan office (Nihon Yunesuko Kokunai linkai 1962: 8).

By the end of 1949, Diet members also started to take action. A Diet Members League for UNESCO was formed, chaired by the Tokugawa shogun’s descendant, Yorisada Tokugawa, from the Democratic Liberal Party (Minshu jiyūtō). On 29
November 1949, Tokugawa, together with 24 Diet members, put forward a motion in the House of Councillors to support the UNESCO civil movement and for Japan to apply for membership to UNESCO. It was passed with a clear majority. Similarly, in the House of Representatives the same motion was passed on 1 December 1949 with the approval of all the political parties except the Japanese Communist Party.\textsuperscript{44} The resolution from the House of Councillors states:

The Japanese people who have renounced war under Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan, have the responsibility to be most concerned with the UNESCO spirit and activities whose objective is to establish everlasting peace through the minds of men. We are grateful for the kindness of UNESCO in seconding a representative to our country and greatly supporting our country’s pacifist movement. At the same time we hope to be allowed to officially participate in UNESCO as soon as possible. To respond to the growing momentum of the UNESCO civil movement, the government should quickly take measures to further facilitate it. \textit{(Sangiin Jimu Kyoku 1949: 269)}

Even the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), the only party to vote against the resolution, was in fact in support of Japan joining UNESCO, but objected on the
grounds that they did not support the Yoshida Cabinet (*Shūgiin Jimu Kyoku* 1949d: 414). The JCP’s decision may also have been affected by the fact that Communist states such as the Soviet Union and Eastern European states were not members of UNESCO at the time (*Shūgiin Jimu Kyoku* 1949d: 415). Despite this fact, it was evident that many JCP members empathised with the UNESCO ideals and indeed participated in various UNESCO Association activities around the country (*Shūgiin Jimu Kyoku* 1949d: 415). Hence by 1949 all the main parties were in support of UNESCO and the civil UNESCO movement in Japan. It was in 1951 at the Sixth General Conference of UNESCO that UNESCO members passed a resolution admitting Japan as a member nation. At the signing ceremony, Tamon Maeda, former Minister for Education and the chief Japanese delegate to the Conference, made a speech in which he referred to the civil UNESCO movement in Japan stating:

> At this happy day in which Japan has joined UNESCO, I on behalf of the Japanese government proclaim to accomplish all responsibilities laid out in the Constitution of Japan and to promote the UNESCO civil movement and to actively support and cooperate in achieving its aims. (*Monbushō* 1951: 5)
On joining UNESCO, Yunesuko katsudō ni kansuru hōritsu (the Law Concerning UNESCO Activities) was promulgated in 1952. Under this Law, the National Commission for UNESCO was set up as an organ of the Ministry of Education and acted as the liaison agency, via local authority education commissions, to the civil UNESCO movement (Yoshioka 1997: 50-51). Teiyu Amano, the then Minister for Education, Culture and Sports commented on 9 December 1951 at the First General Meeting of the set up of the National Commission for UNESCO pledged:

It is my belief that it is not sufficient for the spirit of UNESCO to be only understood by the government and a handful of people, but that it ought to be widely spread to the masses. Therefore for the UNESCO movement to fulfil its goals, dedicated support and cooperation from all that resonate with the noble ideals of UNESCO are important. And it is the National Commission for UNESCO which will be the strong force in disseminating the spirit of UNESCO to the public and tie together UNESCO and the Japanese citizens. (Monbushō 1952: 1-2)

In 1948, the Ministry of Education published a high school text book entitled ‘Democracy’ (minshu shugi), in which it promoted UNESCO and its spirit of ‘peace
in the minds of men’ (Monbushō 1949: 344-353). Suzuki comments that the cooperation between the UNESCO associations and the national government represented an ideal NGO-government relationship and regards the associations as a ‘pioneering NGO’ (2000: 45).

In some ways, then, it may be said that one of the factors of the continued success of the civil UN movements long after the occupation and return of bureaucratic power was that these ‘private’ activities voluntarily placed themselves into the sphere of control of the Japanese authorities. The civil movements of both UNESCO and UNICEF started as voluntary associations but soon became incorporated as ‘public-interest corporations’ (kōeki hōjin), which are under the supervision of the bureaucracy (Nihon Yunesuko Kokunai Iinkai 1962: 36; Nihon Yunisefu Kyōkai Shashi Kankōkai 2005: 50-51). The benefits of this are the increased legitimacy of the movement in Japanese society and the cooperation received from bureaucrats. For example under the Law Concerning UNESCO Activities, local public authorities are encouraged to offer advice and financial support to the UNESCO associations (Nihon Yunesuko Kokunai Iinkai 1962: 261-262). This Law helped the larger UNESCO associations to become ‘public-interest corporations’ (kōeki hōjin) which requires prefectural approval
Also the close relationship between the civil UN movements and the bureaucracy tightened through the appointment of many former bureaucrats as executives and board members of UN associations. For example today UN associations such as the National Federation of UNESCO Associations in Japan, the Japan Committee for UNICEF, Japan FAO Association, the ITU Association of Japan, the Japan Foundation for UNU all include former bureaucrats from their supervisory ministries on their board. With the blessing of the traditionally powerful actor in the ‘public’ sphere, the civil UN movement established itself firmly in post-war Japan.

‘UN centrisn’ became a foreign policy in 1957. As stated in Chapter 1, it was first officially introduced as a diplomatic term by Nobusuke Kishi in the Diet in 1957 and was included as one of the three pillars of Japan’s foreign policy in the 1957 Waga Gaikō no Kinkyō (Diplomatic Blue Book). However this section has shown that the civil UNESCO movement had led the state actors in accepting and institutionalising the domestic UN centrisn norm at a much earlier stage. This thesis asserts that the tipping point came in 1949 when both Houses of the Diet passed the resolution to apply for UNESCO membership as the first step in gaining membership to the UN. The UN centrisn foreign policy is therefore an outcome of the norm cascade of UN
centrism amongst the Japanese.

According to the norm life-cycle, the final stage is the internalisation. This stage is an extreme point of norm cascade when the norm is so widely accepted that it is taken for granted and conformance to it is not questioned. In the 1970s, public opinion revealed that 51 per cent agreed that Japan should actively pursue a ‘UN centred diplomacy’ and only eight per cent disagreed (Naikaku Sōri Daijin Kanbō Kōhōshitu 1970). Whether this amounts to an internalisation of the UN centrism norm is questionable but the norm has undoubtedly cascaded widely amongst the Japanese.

5.5 Evolution of UN centrism and the international UN norm

As stated in Chapter 2, ‘norm are not static; they are contested and contingent’ (Katzenstein 1996b: 3). Norms are situation-relevant (Secord and Backman 1974) and changes over time and with the groups that form the norm (Kitaori 2000: 157). Chapter 5 so far has seen how the early success of the civil movement has embedded the belief that Japanese individuals ought to construct peace through UNESCO and the UN in general. However, neither the UN centrism norm nor the international UN norms which influence the domestic norm are static. This section
first examines how the international norms of UNESCO and UNICEF have been influences by Japan’s civil movements. Secondly, it sets the scene for Chapters 6 and 7, which review the expansion of the UN centrism norm under the civil UNESCO norm over time.

5.5.1 Changes to international UN norms made by the civil UN movements

While the civil UNESCO movement was motivated by the international UNESCO norm, as the movement matured, it was able to influence back the international norm and mark a change to it. As seen in Section 5.3.2, the civil UNESCO movement considered ‘UNESCO to be an organisation of the people’ (Ueda 1951: 53) and led the international organisation to take up its bottom up approach.

It would be most desirable if democratic organisations such as the UNESCO associations and UNESCO clubs seen in Japan were to be founded all over the world and a global alliance of UNESCO movements was to be voluntarily set up. National Committees do exist but there are few where the UNESCO movement is voluntarily run by the people as in the case of Japan. … One of our biggest aims for the future is to move towards
the development of a global UNESCO movement with the involvement of both men and women young and old from all parts of society. (Ueda 1951: 268-269; 1972: 287)

In July 1947, with the backing of UNESCO, Japan’s civil UNESCO movement founded the Asian Pacific Federation of UNESCO Clubs and Associations in Kyoto with 32 countries (Nihon Yunesuko Kyōkai Renmei 2007: 62). This organisation later developed into the World Federation of UNESCO Clubs and Associations in June 1981 (Nihon Yunesuko Kyōkai Renmei 2007: 79) with the first conference held in Sendai in 1984. As at 2008, the movement includes some 3,700 associations, centres and UNESCO clubs in more than 100 countries throughout the world (UNESCO 2009: 10).

Similarly, Japan’s civil UNICEF norm today has influence over the UNICEF norm. For example, in 2002 UNICEF decided to abandon its long standing ‘mother and child’ emblem and to replace it with just the alphabet letters ‘UNICEF’. However the Japan UNICEF Association strongly opposed this change as being English-centric (Nihon Yunisefu Kyōkai Shashi Kankōkai 2005: 186-188). It placed and won a resolution on this issue at the general assembly of National Committees in
September 2002, making its opposition the position of all the UNICEF National Committees around the world. Approximately 30 per cent of UNICEF’s funding is from private contributions, most of which are from the National Committees (UNICEF 2008b: online). Met with opposition from such significant group of stakeholders, UNICEF retracted and has kept its emblem. Executive Director of the Japan Committee, Yoshihisa Togo criticised UNICEF stating, ‘As seen in its move to abandon its logo, UNICEF at times enters into a developing country from a position that the western norm and culture are always right’ and that ‘It is the mission of the Japan UNICEF Association to act as a neutraliser to enable developing countries to accept UNICEF (Nihon Yunisefu Kyōkai Shashi Kankōkai 2005: 189).

5.5.2 Contextual expansion of the UN centrism norm under the civil UNICEF movement

While the pacifist norm is the back bone of UN centrism, the other element advocated by the civil UNESCO movement was the idea that Japan ought to make contributions towards the UN and the international community to help achieve world peace. From the 1980s as Japan became an economic power, the activities of the UNESCO civil movement started to focus on international cooperation
This is a clear distinction with Japan’s inward looking pacifist norm which is primary concerned with the preservation of peace in Japan and not the resolution of global conflicts.

For example, in connection with the 1990 UN International Literacy Year, in parallel to UNESCO’s own programmes, Japan’s Federation of UNESCO Associations started its own literacy movement to support community learning projects in developing countries (Nihon Yunesuko Kyōkai Renmei 2004: 13). Between 1989 and 2008 the ‘terakoya movement’, named after terakoya, Japan’s community learning centres of the 14th to 18th centuries, supported 442 literacy projects in 44 countries educating approximately 1,240,000 people (Nihon Yunesuko Kyōkai Renmei 2009). The value of the project between 1989 and 2005 was approximately Yen 1.8 billion (roughly USD 1.8 million) (Nihon Yunesuko Kyōkai Renmei 2007: 217). In 1992, to mark Japan’s signature of the UNESCO’s Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, the Japanese Federation started a world heritage fund to protect and conserve Asian cultures. Notable was its campaign to support the preservation of the Bamiyan Buddhas in Afghanistan started in 1997, ahead of UNESCO itself which recognised it as a World Heritage site in 2003 (Nihon Yunesuko Kyōkai Renmei 2006: online).
The civil UNESCO association’s position towards international peace keeping operations is more complex. As examined in Chapter 1, in 1991 the revised peace-keeping operations bill was put to the Diet. The Chairman of the Sendai UNESCO Association, Goro Fujiwara, publicly supported the bill, stating that support of the UN by the public in the form of the civil UNESCO movement had been successful but that Japan as an economic superpower must offer political co-operation, namely peace-keeping operations, in line with the cooperative spirit of UNESCO (Shūgiin Jimu Kyoku 1991: 21). At the same time, the UNESCO spirit, together with the ideals of the Constitution, formed the grounds for opposing the bill by a speaker from the Japan Socialist Party (Shūgiin Jimu Kyoku 1991: 21). The position of the civil UNESCO movement as a whole on the overseas deployment of JSDF for UN peace-keeping operations is unclear. What is more clear is that the pacifism of the civil UNESCO movement is less associated with Japan’s security policy but linked more strongly to the domestic pacifist norm, a non-political emotional general agreement that peace must be protected but its method not specified.
Table 3: Enlargement of the norm of UN centrism under civil UNESCO movement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timeline</th>
<th>Pacifism</th>
<th>International Cooperation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>Absolute Pacifism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950s</td>
<td>Pacificism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960s &amp; 70s</td>
<td></td>
<td>International Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
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<td>Peace-Keeping?</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
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<td>2000s</td>
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The expansion of the UN centrism norm discussed above is summarised in Table 3. The UN centrism norm under the lead of the civil UNESCO movement has shifted with the changes in Japan’s pacifism. It’s initial position was to attain absolute pacifism through the UN but has changed to mean supporting the UN on a more generalised position of peace, loosely incorporating absolute pacifism and pacific-ism, as well as international understanding promoting peace. After the 1970s, the civil UNESCO movement extended its mandate to international cooperation. However, this thesis argues that another civil UN movement, the civil
UNICEF movement, played a more central role in the task of advocating the idea that individuals ought to make international contribution through the UN which is considered in the following chapter.

5.6 Conclusion

In the early 1950s, the association claims the promotion of Japan’s membership to UNESCO became a ‘national movement’ (Nihon Yunesuko Kyōkai Renmei 1999: 24). Through its activities, the civil UNESCO movement successfully raised the profile of UNESCO as a symbol of the UN. In 1966, the government conducted an opinion poll specifically on the public awareness of UNESCO. In the poll, 85 per cent recognised the UN and when asked about which UN agencies they knew, 62 per cent recognised UNESCO, making it the best known UN agency in Japan (Naikaku Sōri Daijin Kanbō Kōhōshitu 1966). Subsequently in 1970, the government conducted an opinion poll on the public awareness of the UN. On this occasion, the recognition rate for the UN remained static at 85.8 per cent but awareness of UNESCO grew slightly to 65.6 per cent and retained the status of the most recognised UN agency (Naikaku Sōri Daijin Kanbō Kōhōshitu 1970).

This chapter illustrated that the civil UNESCO movement played an important role
in framing UN centrism and disseminating it with the backing of the government and politicians from all sides. This was made possible by the fact that the UN became accepted as a new post-war authority which enabled the mobilisation of not just the general public but also the domestic authorities in supporting the civil movement. The civil movement was so supported because it acted as the gateway not only to Japan’s membership to UNESCO but the UN itself. The UN centrism that developed out of the civil UNESCO movement was its own interpretation of the international norms of the UN and UNESCO as a peace organisations through the lens of Japan’s pacifist norm. The resulting norm of UN centrism is a pacifism, in the broad and sense, which places trust in the UN as a peace organisation. The norm however has been under constant evolution and enlargement as it incorporates new ideas on peace and international cooperation (See Table 3). The aspect of international cooperation was not such a strong point under the civil UNESCO movement and its full development has been passed onto the civil UNICEF movement which is examined in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 6  THE CIVIL UNICEF MOVEMENT AND

THE ACT OF ‘RETURNING A FAVOUR’

6.1 Introduction

The contribution the civil UNICEF movement made towards the contextual
enlargement of the UN centrism norm was in two ways: First, it enlarged the norm
to fully include international cooperation at the level of individuals and second,
added a new expectation to the UN as a humanitarian organisation, to create a
world not only free from negative peace (wars and conflicts) but also ‘positive
peace’ of freedom from hunger. The gradual build up of the success of the civil
UNICEF movement itself over the post-war period but especially from the 1990s
and onwards is also a good indicator of the continued and further growth of the UN
centrism norm passed on from the civil UNESCO movement.

This chapter asserts that specifically the civil UNICEF movement added to the UN
centrism norm that the ‘Japanese individually, and not just the state, ought to repay
a favour to UNICEF’. The development stems from the success of the Japan
UNICEF Association to tap into the traditional Japanese cultural mind frame of the
'receipt of a favour' and 'returning of a favour' which was reviewed in Chapter 4: the original ‘favour’ being the humanitarian aid Japan received in the aftermath of the Second World War.

Indeed, the origin of the civil UNICEF movement itself was motivated by the appreciation of the assistance received from UNICEF immediately after the war (Nihon Yunisefu Kyōkai Shashi Kankōkai 2005: 52). One of the first activities it organised when the civil UNICEF movement became an Association was the ‘gathering to thank UNICEF’ (Yunisefu Kansha no Tsudoi) in October 1950, repeated in 1952 and 1953, to raise money for UNICEF. Since its inception, this civil movement's activities have been focused on ‘returning the favour (on gaeshi)’ to UNICEF (Nihon Yunisefu Kyōkai Shashi Kankōkai 2005: 52). The chapter argues that the success of the civil UNICEF movement was its ability to convince the Japanese public to agree that they ought to return a favour to UNICEF.

First, before moving onto this discussion, some objective measures of the movement's 'success' are briefly examined below. Since the main aim of the civil UNICEF movement is to support UNICEF through fundraising for UNICEF, its success may be measured by the amount of funds it sends to the UNICEF
headquarters in New York. As shown in Figure 3, this has grown at an amazing pace especially in the 1990s, and since 1999 it has become the largest private sector contributor for UNICEF—exceptions in 2005 when it was fourth and in 2007 when it was the second largest contributor (UNICEF 2000: 28; 2001: 28; 2002: 37; 2003: 41; 2004: 43; 2005: 47; 2006: 33; 2007: 38; 2008b: 34; 2009b: 36). In 2001 the contribution surpassed the Yen 10 billion mark for the first time, and since then the annual contribution continues to top Yen 10 billion with the latest 2009 record standing over Yen 15.2 billion (Nihon Yunisefu Kyōkai 2010: 25). According to UNICEF’s records the contribution from the Japan UNICEF Association in 2008 at USD 156 million representing 4.6 per cent of total UNICEF and was nearly double the amount of the second largest private sector contributor (UNICEF 2009b: 34-36). The success of the civil UNICEF movement in Japan is therefore comparable at a global scale.

Figure 3: Japan UNICEF Association’s annual contribution towards UNICEF

Shown in YEN in millions with selected amounts converted to USD in millions
6.2 UNICEF as a symbol of all aid to Japan

The chapter’s first proposition is that UNICEF became a symbol of the all post-war humanitarian aid (the original ‘favour’) Japan received from different sources such as NGOs, governments and UNICEF itself. In addition to the most obvious reason, which is that UNICEF is one of the most prominent international relief agencies today, this section examines other possible reasons why this may have been the case.

Very few Japanese today remember or know about an NGO whose post-war
humanitarian activities in Japan were worth approximately six times more than UNICEF. A shipment containing food, such as milk powder, clothes and shoes, medical supplies and others arrived in Japan in November 1946 from an American-based NGO called the Licensed Agencies for Relief in Asia (LARA), backed up by religious organisations, Japanese-American groups and Japanese refugee support groups (Kōseishō Shakai Kyoku 1951: 7). Their activities, which continued until June 1952, provided supplies worth approximately Yen 40 billion and have been estimated to have benefited about 14 million people, equivalent to 15 per cent of the country’s population (Iino 2000: 143-148; Zenkoku Shakai Fukushi Kyōgikai Shuppanbu 2003: 167). In response to its efforts, LARA received many letters of appreciation from the Japanese public (Nagae 1987: 143-144). Also in the Diet on 31 July 1947 the House of Representatives passed a resolution thanking LARA (Shūgiin Jimu Kyoku 1947b: 232-236), and on 28 April 1949 passed another resolution with unanimity thanking the Japanese in Hawaii and Americas who were the main activists of LARA (Shūgiin Jimu Kyoku 1949c: 288).

In trying to explain why LARA could not sustain itself as a subject for ‘returning the favour’ for the Japanese, the theories surrounding receipt and returning of favours (on and giri) examined in Chapter 4 is applied to reason that LARA’s aid did not
fully meet the conditions of a ‘favour’. LARA’s lack of recognition today may be partly due to the fact that its aid activities were, to some extent, already a ‘repayment’ of an earlier favour. LARA’s main affiliated bodies included the Japan Refugee Relief Association (*Nihon Nanmin Kyūsaikai*) and a Japanese American group, and 20 per cent of LARA’s funding came from donations from people of Japanese ancestry in the Americas (Iino 2000: 152). The charter of the Japan Refugee Relief Association stated that it is the obligation of the Japanese decedents to support the Japanese nationals because they had earlier supported the Japanese Americans held in the Japanese internment camps in the US during the war (Iino 2000: 154). Hence the argument here is that as LARA’s aid was an act of repayment, and because it was not a favour, the Japanese public were not obliged to make a repayment. This however may be a weak argument because in Japan it was not well-known that LARA was a ‘gift to the motherland from the Japanese Americans’, but rather the more popular but vague recognition was that it was ‘a kind gift from the Americans’ (Nagae 1987: 165-166).

In fact, this vague recognition of the identity of the benefactor is a more plausible reason for UNICEF coming to represent *all* the post-war aid providers and even the wider international community. The US government also provided food assistance
to Japan worth about USD 1.05 billion in the form of aid and loans (Fuji Bank 1967: 209). Today many of those who remember receiving the milk powder are uncertain as to the source of the milk, namely whether it was from ‘UNICEF’ or ‘America’, including American NGOs (Mainichi Shimbun, 24 October 2005: 29). From the 1990s, when the Japan UNICEF Association succeeded in widely receiving donations from the general public, they started to capture those who recalled receiving assistance from abroad. The Association sent directly mailed letters appealing on the basis that UNICEF had helped Japanese children after the war with milk powder and suggesting that it was now the turn of the Japanese to help children in need in other countries. Some donors remembered the assistance to have been from the ‘United States of America’, but on receiving the UNICEF Association’s letter they have accepted that these must have been from UNICEF. In some cases, the milk powder was in fact from UNICEF (Mainichi Shimbun Niigata edition, 7 November, 2005: 23) but many were indeed from the US. Other donors, while convinced that in their own case they had received assistance from the Americans, were willing to indirectly repay the favour by helping UNICEF. For example, a 56 year old (as at 2002) housewife recalls receiving buttons and pencils from the Americans but was unsure of where her school milk came from. When she received the letter from the UNICEF Association, thinking that she may have been
one of the former recipients, she decided to donate to the Association as a gesture of repaying the favour (Asahi Shimbun, Nagoya edition, on 27 June 2002).

The above illustrates the theory that the act of returning the favour is independent of whether the provider expects the favour to be repaid or not (Benedict 1946: 116).

For many donors to UNICEF it is clear that they are not bothered whether they actually return the favour to original benefactor. Rather importance is placed on the feeling that a favour is being ‘returned’, as examined within the rest of this chapter.

6.3  Actors channelling the return of a favour to UNICEF

Even if the public was not so concerned as to whom they return the favour, the success of the civil UNICEF movement in channelling it to UNICEF is an achievement. This section identifies three types of actors as playing a key role in channelling the return of the favour to UNICEF and examines their contributions and motives.

6.3.1  Activists of the civil UNICEF movement

The first actor is the activists of the civil UNICEF movement. As mentioned at the start of this chapter, the origin of the civil UNICEF movement was motivated by the
appreciation of the assistance received from UNICEF (Nihon Yunisefu Kyōkai Shashi Kankōkai 2005: 52). Soon after the UNICEF office in Japan started its activities, it received a flood of letters of appreciation from the public from all over Japan. In response, the UNICEF office set up a group of Japanese female volunteers from August 1949 who would translate these letters so that the appreciation was communicated to UNICEF. It was this volunteer group that originally set up the UNICEF Association as an unincorporated association (nin’i dantai) on 1 February 1950.

Asami Matsuoka, the first Executive Director of the UNICEF Association recalls her own commitment towards the establishment of the Association. When Matsuoka, then a member of the volunteer group, expressed her gratitude to UNICEF’s assistance in Japan, Strehier, the UNICEF office representative in Japan, responded saying there was no need to thank them as those who suffered the most from the war were the children and their mothers. Matsuoka was deeply touched by this and increased her resolve to support UNICEF (Nihon Yunisefu Kyōkai Shashi Kankōkai 2005: 51-52). Here the relationship between UNICEF and the civil UNICEF movement is hierarchical, and according to Benedict's theory (seen in Section 4.6), under such relationships no amount of repayment would be enough
for the activists of the civil UNICEF movement. Indeed, the determination by the UNICEF volunteers to continue to sustain the ‘repayment of UNICEF’s favour’ is reflected in the movement’s development from a volunteer group to an unincorporated association and finally an incorporated foundation (*zaidan hōjin*).

### 6.3.2 Political actors acting on personal favours

The second type of actor is the politicians. As was the case with the civil UNESCO movement (seen in Section 5.4), one of the key reasons for success of the civil UNICEF movement has been its close ties with the politicians which has provided legitimacy to the NGO.

Towards the end of UNICEF’s aid activities in Japan in 1962, Masa Hashimoto, wife of the former cabinet minister, Ryōgo Hashimoto, became a director at the Japan UNICEF Association and in 1966 became its executive director. Following the death of Masa’s husband in 1962 her first son, Ryūtarō Hashimoto, entered politics in 1963 as an elected member of the House of Representatives. He experienced three cabinet ministerial positions from the late 1970s and became the prime minister in 1996. For nearly 20 years until Masa retired in 1991, she devoted herself to promoting UNICEF and the Japan UNICEF Association, and utilised her
personal contacts, starting with her son, for the benefit of UNICEF activities. For example, Ryūtarō Hashimoto recalls accompanying his mother to the Ministry of Finance during state budget planning process to petition for more budget towards UNICEF (Hashimoto 1999: 10). As a result, the Japan UNICEF Association built ties with politicians especially from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, the party both Masa’s husband and son were members of.

Political support towards UNICEF and the civil UNICEF movement became more apparent and organised with the establishment of the Japanese Diet Members League for UNICEF in August 1988 (Yunisefu Kyōkai Shashi Kankōkai 2005: 127). The League started as a result of a visit by James Grant, Executive Director for UNICEF, to Japan in December 1987. Grant was introduced to Ryūtarō Hashimoto by his mother. At the time Hashimoto was already an established politician with ministerial experiences and Grant asked him to set up a UNICEF support group amongst Diet members (Nihon Yunisefu Kyōkai Shashi Kankōkai 2005: 125). The motive for Hashimoto for assisting UNICEF was personal and he explains that he organised the setting up of the diet members league to make his mother ‘happy’ (Hashimoto 1999: 10-11), a repayment of a private favour (on) by a grown child using his public power.
The inception of the League attracted 121 members from both Houses from nearly all the main parties, and well-known and influential politicians acted as its first chairman, Masayoshi Itō from the LDP, and co-chairmen, Makoto Tanabe from the Socialist Party, Chikara Sakaguchi from the Kōmei Party, and Eiichi Nagasue from the Democratic Socialist Party (YCY and NYK 1999: 15). Similar to Ryūtarō Hashimoto, the motives of Sadakazu Tanigaki, who became the first Secretary General of the League, was also personal, as he recalls that he wanted to lend a hand to Masayoshi Itō whom he had received ‘favours’ as a young politician and to show goodwill towards the personal connection he had with Ryūtarō Hashimoto (Tanigaki 1999: 16). Hashimoto’s personal relationship with Tanigaki was used effectively especially when Hashimoto became the chairman of the Japanese Diet Members League for UNICEF from 2000 and Tanigaki became the Minister for Finance in 2003. Hashimoto was able to lobby him not to reduce the UNICEF budget (Tanimoto 2004).

6.3.3 Mobilising the public: UNICEF Goodwill Ambassador Tetsuko Kuroyanagi

UNICEF Goodwill Ambassador Tetsuko Kuroyanagi, is identified as the final actor.
UNICEF was the first UN agency to appoint goodwill ambassadors, who have been enormously successful in getting the organisation’s message across to the public and helping to raise funds (UNICEF 2010a). In 1954 UNICEF appointed the song-and-dance star Danny Kaye as their first goodwill ambassador and since then has appointed various people including actresses Audrey Hepburn in 1988 and Mia Farrow in 2000, the actor Jackie Chan in 2004 and most recently, footballer Leo Messi in 2010 (UNICEF 2010a). The appointment of goodwill ambassadors has since been widely emulated by other UN agencies. The former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan stated that the goodwill ambassadors ‘had the personality to capture the imagination of people and policy makers, the passion to inspire faith in the Organization’s fundamental principles and the power to convince people of the Organization’s importance in their lives’ (United Nations 2000: online). In 1984 UNICEF appointed a Japanese writer and television personality Tetsuko Kuroyanagi as their fourth goodwill ambassador and the first non-westerner. Kuroyanagi is the author of the popular autobiography ‘Totto-chan: the little girl at the window’ which sold seven million copies worldwide and has hosted a popular daily television talk show, Tetsuko’s Room (Tetsuko no Heya), since 1976 (Kuroyanagi 2005). Since visiting Tanzania in 1984 as a UNICEF Goodwill Ambassador, Kuroyanagi has been visiting UNICEF camps on an annual basis
taking with her, a television crew and journalists from newspapers and news agencies. She publicises the trips in detail on her talk show (Kuroyanagi 2005). Her activities have raised awareness in Japan of the plight of children in the least developed countries (YCJ and NYK 1999: 11-14), which have led to the rise in profile of UNICEF’s works and to the success of the Japan UNICEF Association in collecting donations. Like many of the civil UNICEF movement actors, Kuroyanagi is a strong advocate of the ‘returning the favour’ towards UNICEF’s assistance after the war, and includes this as one of her own reasons for accepting the role of a goodwill ambassador for UNICEF (Kuroyanagi 1990-91: 6-7; 1997). Also, as one of the influential voices protesting over the planned ODA and UNICEF budget cuts in 1997, she formed her argument around the issue of favours, posting a newspaper article entitled ‘Don’t forget the favour received from UNICEF’ (Kuroyanagi 1997).

In addition, one of the characteristics of Kuroyanagi’s work for UNICEF is that as a person born in 1933, she relates her own childhood experiences during the war to the plight of children in some of the poorest developing countries. For example, she deeply sympathises with the starving children as she relates it to the poor nutritional condition of Japanese children after the war when infant mortality rate was 76.2 persons compared to four persons in 1999 (Kuroyanagi 1997). At a
lecture at the Hosei Peace University on 11 August 1990, she stated:

You may feel pity when you see pictures of the plight of African children today, but we were not so different after the war. We were all but bones and skin, our bellies were popping out because of malnutrition and we were barefooted because we had nothing to wear. I myself had only one set of clothes. Today’s African children are our Japanese children 45 years ago. It is under these circumstances that the United Nations sent lots of food to children around the world (after the Second World War). (Kuroyanagi 1990-91: 6)

Her approach has possibly helped many Japanese who can also remember the war to empathise and relate to these foreign children. She has promoted the idea that individuals must ‘return the favour’. Her direct achievements are not so quantifiable because Kuroyanagi is a goodwill ambassador to UNICEF and not to the Japan UNICEF Association. Hence although Kuroyanagi herself collects donations directly on behalf of UNICEF through her TV programme on a periodic basis, she does not have a systematically organised fundraising team like the Association and therefore their fundraising achievements are not directly comparable. With this caveat, in April 2009 Kuroyanagi had in total sent Yen
4,537,501,950 representing 337,362 donations to UNICEF (Kuroyanagi 2009: online). Her direct fundraising record in itself is impressive but more importantly her activity raised the profile of UNICEF amongst the Japanese public, which immensely helped the fundraising activities of the Japan UNICEF Association. To the general public, UNICEF and the Japan UNICEF Association are the same organisation. As a result, the fundraising activity of the latter has been able to reap the benefits of the increased UNICEF profile.

6.4 Returning the favour at the state level

The norm that each Japanese individually ought to return the favour to UNICEF did not develop overnight. This section examines that it was the state which first felt the need to do so. Again the gift giving theories are utilised to examine Japan’s motives as a state: its desire to win trust from the international community and to maintain Japan’s pride on the world stage. All the studies (as seen in Chapter 4), agree that when the beneficiary considers the favour to have been made between equals, the repayment of a favour is obligatory. Further, according to Benedict, the repayment is an act to ‘maintain one’s face in society’. Therefore the process of the returning of the favour at the state level reflects Japan’s growing desire and confidence in portraying itself as an ‘equal’ to the victors of the war.
On 30 May 1955, the civil UNICEF movement changed its NGO status from an unincorporated association (nin’i dantai) to an incorporated foundation (zaidan hōjin) called the Japan UNICEF Association. The first Executive Director under the new organisation was Naotake Satō, who was a former diplomat, foreign minister and president of the House of Councillors. As an incorporated foundation, the Association came under the supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These changes in personnel and legal status signalled the Association’s closer ties with the government compared to its days as an unincorporated association. It does not seem to be a coincidence that the timing of the transfer into an incorporated foundation came when Japan was on the verge of obtaining membership of the UN.

To mark its return to the international community, Japan was attempting to turn itself round from an aid receiver to an aid provider to developing countries, namely in Asia and Africa (Nihon Yunisefu Kyōkai Shashi Kankōkai 2005: 45). The Japan UNICEF Association acknowledged that one of its roles was ‘to secure the trust towards Japan in the United Nations’ (Nihon Yunisefu Kyōkai Shashi Kankōkai 2005: 52-53). Indeed, the objectives of the Japan UNICEF Association fitted well with the new Japanese policy on international cooperation. In the first edition of its newsletter issued in 1957, Satō states:
Vast expenditure has been made towards helping children and mothers in Japan by UNICEF since its inception. Milk powder sent to Japan by UNICEF reached 5 million pounds and this has been consumed by the Japanese mothers and children supplementing their nourishment. Also, at the time after the war when supplies were extremely scarce, UNICEF provided food and materials for clothes to overcome hunger and cold. … We the Japanese ought to further cooperate with the important activities of UNICEF. As well as helping to improve the welfare of our domestic children, the Japan UNICEF Association would like to cooperate for the children of the world. (Nihon Yunisefu Kyōkai 1957: 3)

In short, as Satō mentioned to his close friends, ‘Japan must return the goodwill received’ (Nihon Yunisefu Kyōkai Shashi Kankōkai 2005: 56), and the motivating factor for the new organisation remained the ‘returning [of] a favour’. In practice, the support that the Japan UNICEF Association provided for Asia and Africa was to raise donations for UNICEF. The first UNICEF Support Donation was initiated on 5 May 1956, which marked the formal start of the Association’s independent fund raising activities. Donation activities were mainly undertaken in primary, junior high
and high schools through a top-down approach where the Ministry of Education instructed the prefectural education committees, headmaster societies and teachers’ unions to undertake the campaign (Nihon Yunisefu Kyōkai Shashi Kankōkai 2005: 54). 3,976 schools participated in the first campaign, raising Yen 12,510,746 (Nihon Yunisefu Kyōkai Shashi Kankōkai 2005: 63), half of which was sent to the UNICEF Head Quarters and the other half was kept in Japan to support UNICEF’s activities in the country and other domestic child welfare activities, such as aiding school lunch fees in regions affected by natural disasters (Nihon Yunisefu Kyōkai 1957a: 3). Hence the UNICEF Association’s donations to the UNICEF headquarters started while Japan was still receiving aid from UNICEF. For example, in 1957 UNICEF was distributing milk powder to 70,000 people in the islands of Amami Oshima and Toshima Mura (Nihon Yunisefu Kyōkai 1957b: 3). Even in 1959, the Japanese government was requesting UNICEF to continue its aid supplies of milk powder and medical equipment (Nihon Yunisefu Kyōkai 1959: 3). Although Japan was experiencing high-speed economic growth, the country was still a receiver of foreign aid and until 1964 received aid from UNICEF (Nihon Yunisefu Kyōkai 2009: 23). How should one analyse this seemingly paradoxical situation of repayment of a favour while the benefactor continues to provide the favour?
One sees that in addition to its desire to win trust from the international community, the other motivating factor was Japan’s pride on the world stage. When Naotake Satō was serving in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he was part of the Imperial Japan delegation to the League of Nations that left the League in 1933. When Japan was accepted into the UN he was overjoyed stating:

But it was not a dream but a reality. I gazed up at the flag of Japan and received strong direction. … With the utmost feeling of gratitude, I bowed to the flag that was equally raised with the other nations, as the precious flag clearly pointing our people the direction they should go. (Satō 1963: 536-537)

As Japan was now ‘equal’ with other nations, some of the elite felt the urge to at least attempt at repaying the favour out of pride. The feeling was however not widely shared by the public at the time, and donation collection activities were undertaken with direction from ‘above’ and as part of an educational activity. Analysing this difference in the attitude between the elite and the general public using the findings on gift giving, one can see that the public generally thought of
themselves as still the have-nots who did not yet have any obligation for repayment towards the beneficiary, while the elite wanted to portray Japan as a more developed country that must already start to repay the favours it received. It is interesting to note that amongst the public, repayments of favours between the Japanese through this donation exercise had already started, even though many felt it was too early to aid people overseas. The student committee of the Mitsutomo Junior High school in Yame County, Fukuoka Prefecture, wrote to the Japan UNICEF Association stating that its reason to participate in the Second UNICEF Donation Collection was to remember the ‘feeling of thankfulness’ when they received aid supplies in the aftermath of a flood in 1953 (Nihon Yunisefu Kyōkai 1957b: 4).

Hence although the intent of both the Association members and the government may have been to start the activities of ‘returning the favour’ as early as from 1955, it seems the idea had not caught on amongst the general public at large. By the late 1960s however, Japan had become an economic power and started becoming the provider of foreign aid (Yasutomo 1986). At the 1970 World Exposition in Osaka, the Japan UNICEF Association organised a UNICEF World Expo Special Donation Campaign and successfully raised over Yen 100 million (Nihon Yunisefu Kyōkai
Shashi Kankōkai 2005: 94). In 1974, the Association together with Fuji Television, one of the major commercial television networks in Japan, started the annual UNICEF Charity Campaign that continues today. The use of the media brought instant success from the first year raising over Yen 55 million. Yet, there were still some complaints from the public about why the UNICEF Association was raising money for children abroad when there were plenty of domestic children suffering from poverty (Hieda 2005: 75). From this it is clear that there was a significant time lag between when Japan as a state wanted to think of itself as a developed country and when the idea was widely accepted by the public.

The first tipping point which brought the public closer to the state was in 1979, the UN’s International Year of the Child (IYC). The UN nominated UNICEF to be the responsible agency for the IYC which is said to be one of the most successful UN International Years. In Japan it undertook various local activities making the campaign a success (UNICEF Office in Japan and Japan Committee for UNICEF 1986: 7). As well as increasing state contributions to UNICEF by 80 per cent (YCJ and NYK 1999: 11), the government turned the IYC into a national campaign (Sōrifu Seishōnen Taisaku Honbu 1980). The IYC Secretariat was set up within the Prime Minister’s Office and wide range of people from Diet members, civil servants,
business leaders, labour union members, doctors and nursery teachers were
mobilised to campaign under the slogan ‘extend the love to our own children to the
children of the world’ (waga kodomo e no ai o sekai no kodomo e) (UNICEF Office
in Japan and Japan Committee for UNICEF 1986: 7). During the IYC, major
activities in Japan were fund raising charity events such as photograph exhibitions,
film shows and music concerts as well as street fundraising such as the UNICEF
Hand in Hand campaign in which well-known figures such as yokozuna ranked
sumo wrestlers, politicians including the future prime ministers Yasuhiro Nakasone
and Keizō Obuchi, and business leaders also participated in facilitating for
Obuchi participated in the 1979 UNICEF Hand in Hand street fundraising campaign
as the then Director of the Prime Minister’s Office and Director of the Okinawa
Development Agency. He later made the following statement.

For our country to thank the support we have received from UNICEF and at the
same time to repay the favour to the international society by undertaking
humanitarian and developmental assistances through UNICEF will significantly
contribute to the peace and prosperity of the world and therefore I find this to be
of high importance (Obuchi 1999: 4).
6.5 The act of ‘repaying a favour’ by politicians of the ‘UNICEF milk powder generation’

Benedict predicted that repayment of favours between equals are limited in both time and scale. Hence assuming the Japanese state considered its repayment as such, theory would predict that they would not feel obliged to continue the repayment. Indeed, the act of repayment of the favour as a state was made on the premise of a growing economy. The contribution towards UNICEF comes out of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) budget. After the bursting of the bubble economy in the early 1990s when fiscal austerity became an issue, the ODA budget was amongst those targeted for cuts. In 1997, the government announced a cabinet decision to reduce the ODA budget by ten per cent for the next fiscal year. In response, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted a budget proposal with large cuts in voluntary contributions towards UN agencies with a 41 per cent reduction to UNICEF (Hironaka 1997). The final contribution to international organisations for 1998 in USD terms was 24.7 per cent lower than the previous year, but the reduction in contribution to UNICEF was limited to 8.8 per cent (Gaimushō 1999: 193, 275). In Yen terms, the ODA related budgets have been in decline since then (Gaimushō 2009: 47) and today it is about 40 per cent less compared to ten years
ago although contributions towards UNICEF have declined less at 20 per cent (Nihon Yunisefu Kyōkai Shashi Kankōkai 2005: 129). The privileged position of UNICEF shows the special political support the organisation enjoys in Japan. This section explains the reason for this as the success by UNICEF, or rather the civil UNICEF movement, to win over the politicians at a personal level.

As seen in the inter-party membership to the Japanese Diet Members League for UNICEF, the UNICEF civil movement attracted broad political support. It is interesting to add that within the ruling LDP although the UNICEF advocates Hashimoto, Obuchi and Tanigaki all belong to the left-wing factions (hato-ha) of the LDP, many of those on the LDP right-wing factions (taka-ha), such as the former prime minister Yasuhiro Nakasone and Shinzō Abe, also supported UNICEF. As stated earlier, Nakasone had participated in the 1979 UNICEF Hand in Hand street fundraising campaign as the then prime minister. But the most significant supporters of UNICEF are those politicians from the ‘UNICEF milk generation’. Tanigaki who was born in 1945 called for Japan as a state to return the favour at the budgetary committee of the House of Representatives on 17 October 1989 as follows.
When Japan was faced with post-war food shortages, we received milk powder from UNICEF from 1949 to 1962, and I am from the generation who grew up drinking the milk powder. … Now that our country has today become an economic super power and a big donor country, we should, through UNICEF, contribute significantly towards saving children of developing countries. (Shūgiin Jimu Kyoku 1989: 11)

Milk powder distribution in school lunches was UNICEF’s hallmark activity in Japan. Its contribution is highlighted in a study conducted by the Ministry of Education in 1952, in which it was found that children at primary schools supplied with milk powder tended to be physically stronger than those at schools that were not supplied with it (Monbushō Shotō Chūtō Kyōiku Kyoku 1952). In response to UNICEF’s campaign efforts, in April 1952 milk powder was introduced in all primary school lunches (Nihon Yunisefu Kyōkai Shashi Kankōkai 2005: 30-45). As a result, the former Executive Director for UNICEF, Carol Bellamy recalls with surprise that during her visit to Japan that many people introduced themselves to her as from the ‘UNICEF milk generation’ and that this generation had become the core support of UNICEF (Bellamy 1999: 5). The recognition that one is from the ‘UNICEF milk generation’ is significant as the relationship between UNICEF and the beneficiary
takes on a parent-child like relationship whose repayment becomes unlimited. Hence even if at the state level Japan may have felt satisfied that they have repaid their favour to UNICEF, the ‘UNICEF milk generation’ politicians would place pressure on policy makers to continue repaying.

In fact, the ultimate success of the civil UNICEF movement rested on the Japanese population as a whole, from politicians, celebrities, the media and the general public, sharing the identity that they are part of the ‘UNICEF milk generation’ regardless of their age group and the feeling of obligation to repay the favour. The planned budget cut caused popular protest amongst politicians, media and the NGOs (see Asahi Shimbun, 5 November 1997; Hironaka 1997; Yomiuri Shimbun 14 August 1997: 3; Chiba 1998). A public opinion survey in 1997 also revealed that only 16 per cent supported a reduction in financial assistance towards developing countries (Sōrifu Kōhōshitu 1997: online). In response to these outcries, Keizō Obuchi, at the time the Minister for Foreign Affairs, stated, ‘I am eager to make the best of the budget provided by discussing thoroughly with the finance officials during the budget drafting process’ (Shūgiin Jimu Kyoku 1997: 2) and renegotiated the ODA budget cut to be smaller, and especially for UNICEF. It was while the repayment of a favour at the state level was being toned down that repayment at
the individual level was gradually becoming a national movement as examined in the next section.

6.6  Returning of the favour by the public

6.6.1  Other NGOs supporting the civil UNICEF movement

As seen above, the 1979 International Year of the Child (IYC) was an important year for the civil UNICEF movement in gaining political support. At the same time, it was also the starting point of popularising the idea to the public to ‘returning the favour’ to UNICEF on an individual basis. In an opinion poll conduct on IYC, approximately 60 per cent said that they would respond to calls for donations by UNICEF (Naikakufu Seifu Kōhōshitsu 1979: online). Through various programmes and the media, the civil UNICEF movement was successful in capturing the attention of the public by emphasising the tragic lack of opportunities for children in developing countries compared to those in Japan (UNICEF Office in Japan and Japan Committee for UNICEF 1986: 7). This is reflected in the IYC opinion poll in which nearly 80 per cent agreed or strongly agreed that Japanese children were better off internationally (Naikakufu Seifu Kōhōshitu 1979: online). This showed that many Japanese were starting to recognise Japan’s economic wealth and to feel empathy towards the objectives of the UNICEF civil movement. The effect can
be seen by the six-fold increase in donations raised by the UNICEF civil movement in 1979 (YCJ and NYK 1999: 11). A significant part of the donation however came from other NGOs. The Japan UNICEF Association records that the IYC created an NGO boom in Japan and that many of these NGOs participated in the UNICEF civil movement. Notable NGOs included a major Buddhist organisation, Risshō Kōsei-kai, the Japanese Consumers’ Co-operative Union, the Japanese Confederation of Labor and the Confederation of Japan Automobile Workers’ Unions (Nihon Yunisefu Kyōkai Shashi Kankōkai 2005: 116-117). For example, the Risshō Kōsei-kai has been running a Donate a Meal Campaign since 1974, in which campaign participants forgo a meal on the first and fifteenth of every month and contribute the money saved to the Risshō Kōsei-kai Peace Fund (Risshō Kōsei-kai 2010: online). From this fund the Japan UNICEF Association received over Yen 100 million and Yen 200 million in 1979 and 1980 respectively, the latter worth over a quarter of total donations received at the Association in that year (Nihon Yunisefu Kyōkai Shashi Kankōkai 2005: 116-117). The motive for these NGOs’ support towards the civil UNICEF movement according to the Kobe Consumers’ Co-operative Union is to ‘return the favour’ for the Yen 6.5 billion aid received (Coop Kōbe 2005: 5). During this period, civil UNICEF movement’s personal donations were still small compared to the group donations and it was not
until the late 1980s that the movement was able to directly mobilise individuals to ‘return the favour’.

6.6.2 Growing importance of individual donations

As a continuation of the IYC, during the 1980s the Japan UNICEF Association grew further with the support of both the public and the government and stipulated that it was becoming a ‘national movement’ (Nihon Yunisefu Kyōkai Shashi Kankōkai 2005: 122). With the public, the civil movement continued the UNICEF Hand in Hand street fundraising campaigns and also started new initiatives such as the UNICEF Love Walk, a charity walk, from 1983 with 2,000 participants but which by 2003 recorded 354,000 participants raising over Yen 104 million (Nihon Yunisefu Kyōkai Shashi Kankōkai 2005: 123-124).

However it was in the 1990s that the increase in public recognition of UNICEF really started to bear fruit in the form of individual donations. Today Yen 13.4 billion or 79 per cent of funds raised by the Association are from individuals (Nihon Yunisefu Kyōkai 2009: 14). It is more impressive to note that this was achieved under an environment of economic downturn. As shown in Figure 4, in 1996 Japan’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was Yen 504,262 billion but by 2002 when
the Association’s contribution to UNICEF surpassed a record breaking Yen 10 billion mark, Japan’s GDP had fallen to Yen 491,312 billion (Naikakufu Keizai Shakai Sōgō Kenkyū Jo 2008: 130-131). The National Income also fell from Yen 412,327 billion (1996) to 396,212 billion (2002) (Naikakufu Keizai Shakai Sōgō Kenkyū Jo 2008: 154-155). According to a survey in 2005, the average donation received per individual for the Association was Yen 3,314, which is not especially large compared to other NGOs’ donations (Chūō Kyōdō Bokin Kai 2006: 41). This means that the Association’s key factor for its success was capturing mass support. A 2005 government research found that 70.5 per cent of the general public have made at least one donation in the past, and by age group those in the 50s were the highest at 78 per cent followed by the 60s age group at 74 per cent, and 72 per cent for both over 70 year olds and 40s age groups (Naikakufu Daijin Kanbō Seifu Kōhōshitsu 2005: online). Hence capturing the attention of the middle aged and upwards especially was important in collecting donations.
Yoshihisa Tōgō, the Executive Director of the Japan UNICEF Association from 1991, undertook a complete overhaul of the organisation. Tōgō, who came from the private sector, introduced private sector management skills into the NGO. The most important outcome of the restructuring was the increase in funds raised. As stated earlier, the funds raised by Japan UNICEF Association to UNICEF increased from Yen 350 million in 1992 to Yen 1,210 million by 2000. Tōgō identifies the increase in funds as largely coming from personal donations due to the success of their direct mailing campaign (2000: 80).

The direct mailing campaign works as follows: donation request letters are
prepared in Japanese by the Association and sent to UNICEF headquarters in New York where an appeal from the Executive Director of UNICEF is added and posted to addresses in Japan (Nihon Yunisefu Kyōkai Shashi Kankōkai 2005: 148). The method of direct mailing itself is not unique, but the Japan UNICEF Association is the only association of UNICEF to include a letter from the UNICEF Executive Director (Yunisefu Kyōkai Shashi Kankōkai 2005: 148). This letter has the effect of formalising the appeal, which is after all from an NGO, and has blurred the distinction between the NGO and the international organisation that is UNICEF. Indeed, many Japanese today remain unaware that the Japan UNICEF Association is an NGO (Shūkan Shinchō 24. 5. 2001: 50; Themis 11. 2002: 88).

The content of the UNICEF Executive Director’s letter includes the history of how UNICEF aided Japan after the war with milk powder and other goods and a message that today they need the help of Japan (Asahi Shimbun, Nagoya edition, on 27 June 2002). Despite the internationalisation of Japan, receipt of international mail is still a novel experience for ordinary Japanese households. It is thought that for many Japanese above a certain generation, the letter from UNICEF in New York convinced them of the fulfilment of what Nakane determines as a condition for the formation of an ‘obligatory’ relationship for repayment of a favour (Nakane
1968: 2): That UNICEF had no responsibility to provide for the Japanese and the Japanese had no right to expect to receive anything from UNICEF, but what UNICEF did provide was extremely beneficial for the Japanese. For example, a 64 year old man stated that on receipt of the direct mail from New York he recalled the milk powder they received at school as a child and decided to ‘return the favour’ by responding to the request for a donation (Eburi 2002: online). As with the case of politicians, one of the Japan UNICEF Association’s core groups of donors is from the ‘UNICEF milk powder generation’. According to a small survey undertaken in 2005, those in their 50s were the third largest donors for the Japan UNICEF Association at 24 per cent and following this were those in their 40s and 60s at 29 per cent respectively (Chūō Kyōdō Bokin Kai 2006: 54). The Association’s successful direct mailing campaign was however not completely free from criticism. Some thought it was shameful that a respectful organisation such as UNICEF should bow so low as to ask for donations through direct mailing, and others complained to UNICEF for sending these direct mails (Nihon Yunisefu Kyōkai Shashi Kankōkai 2005: 143-144). However, the result proves that it has been a very effective campaign. Today, nearly all of the income of the Japan UNICEF Association comes from donations and in 2008 this accounted for 93 per cent (Nihon Yunisefu Kyōkai 2009: 24).
6.6.3 Comparing to the Community Chest of Japan (Kyōdo Bokin)

The Japan UNICEF Association has become one of the most successful fund raising NGOs in Japan. Its growth occurred when the overall donation per household in the 1990s was static with the exception of 1995 when the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake occurred (Keizai Kikaku Chō 2000: 196). The Community Chest of Japan (Kyōdo Bokin) has been the largest beneficiary of donations in the post-war era, but since its peak in 1995 at Yen 26.6 billion, its intake has been falling, and in 2007 it was limited to Yen 21.3 billion (Chūō Kyōdo Bokin 1998: 136; Chūō Kyōdō Bokin Kai 2008: 16). The Community Chest of Japan is a quasi-public organisation entrusted by the central and local governments to raise private donations to supplement incomes for private social welfare institutions (Amenomori 1997: 210). Like the Japan UNICEF Association, the most important source of funding for the Community Chest of Japan is private individuals which make up 70 per cent of total donations collected (Kyōdo Bokin 2009: online). Similar to the Japan UNICEF Association, the Community Chest of Japan also relies on the on-giri culture but in a very different way. By comparing this difference, this section aims to obtain a better understanding of the exact nature of the ‘repayment of the favour’ surrounding UNICEF.
Firstly, one of the major characteristics of the Community Chest of Japan is that it has a community collection system that is organised around the traditional community-based mutual help organisations (jichi-kai and chōnai-kai). These traditional organisations are places full of personal and organisational on-giri relationships and so small donations are readily offered either to provide a small favour or to repay a past favour or even just to save face within the community. The importance of the on-giri relationship in the fundraising for the Community Chest is confirmed by looking at the motives of some of the donors. 38 per cent said the donation was made because ‘a neighbour came for collection’, which was a close second following 40 per cent who replied that it was part of ‘an annual activity’ (Chūō Kyōdō Bokin Kai 2006: 54). At the same time, while the largest group of donors at 39 per cent stated they were ‘satisfied that they did a good thing’, 11 per cent said that they ‘felt the donation was imposed on them’, of whom 80 per cent referred to the door to door collection (Chūō Kyōdō Bokin Kai 2006: 89). This shows that a significant minority are passive donors, who donate because their community demands it. However, with the increase in single person households and double income families, there has been a fall in the activity of these community organisations, and as a result, lower participation to the Community Chest’s
fundraising campaigns. For example in 1968, 70 per cent and 49 per cent of those in rural and urban areas respectively said that they often participate in community meetings, but in 2007 only 13 per cent said that they participate in these meetings at least once a month (Naikakufu 2007: 80).

Secondly, another important fundraising method of the Community Chest is the door to door collections undertaken by volunteers. The research by the Central Community Chest found that 48 per cent of the volunteers indicated that they were involved because the volunteer’s own organisation receives funding from the Community Chest and 26 per cent said it was because they had been asked to help out by someone they knew (Chūō Kyōdo Bokin Kai 2001: 7), which is most likely to be someone from the first 48 per cent. Both motives are heavily based on the on-giri relationship: in the case of the former, it could be argued that the volunteer is repaying a favour to the Community Chest as the benefactor of the funds raised, although one could also say that it is simply in their own interest to help fundraise what would be partly their source of income; in the case of the latter, the volunteer is either creating a favour to the person he/she is helping or is trying to repay an old favour.
The Community Chest is also facing a rapid problem of aging volunteers. 55 per cent of the volunteers are over 60 years old, of whom 23 per cent are over 70 (Chūō Kyōdo Bokin Kai 2001: 7). This issue casts doubt on the sustainability of this fundraising method. It seems that younger NGO activists do not or cannot rely on this kind of community based on-giri relationship for their fundraising. The key success of the Japan UNICEF Association therefore has been not to rely on the local communities for on-giri relationship for fundraising but to ensure that many Japanese starting from the ‘UNICEF milk generation’ shared the idea of an almost virtual on-giri relationship with UNICEF. In addition, the use of indirect means of communication ensures a method that is independent from the traditional community relationships.

6.7 Conclusion

The chapter showed how the fundraising activities of the Japan UNICEF Association may be largely explained using Japan’s gift giving culture of favour (on) and the obligation to repay a favour (giri). It illustrates how, in the early 1950s, the idea of repayment of a favour to UNICEF was largely limited amongst Association members. At the time, although many people felt gratitude towards UNICEF and other providers of foreign aid, the Japanese public on the whole did not feel that
this created an obligatory relationship. This is because two important conditions for the ‘obligation’ (giri) were not met in the eyes of the general public: first, Japan was still a receiver of aid and so did not feel obliged to return the favour; second, they could not feel the presence of a third party, in the face of which they would lose face if a repayment was not made. The chapter saw that the supporters of the civil UNICEF movement and UNICEF first spread at the state level in the mid 1950s when it was preparing for Japan’s entry into the UN. It showed how the government felt Japan needed to win the respect of the international community and felt obliged to return the favour for humanitarian aid received, so as not to lose face. This was even as the country was still economically very poor and a receiver of the aid. It was the politicians in general, particularly those from the ‘UNICEF milk generations’, who became the next active supporters from the late 1970s. The setting up of the Japanese Diet Members League for UNICEF and other activities reflected their recognition of Japan as a major economic power. The motive for the support may be explained along the lines of Ruth Benedict’s observations of favour (on) between equal partners (1946: 133-144). In such relationships, the benefactor perceives the favour as a loan or even a contractual loan and as such must honour the obligation (giri) to repay, in order to maintain one’s face within one’s own community. In this case, the ‘community’ for the Japanese politicians would have
been the ‘club’ of developed nations. It is therefore assumed that the politicians perceived the loan repayment to be between developed nations: UNICEF was mainly funded by such developed nations and Japan portrayed itself as such a nation. Benedict also pointed out that for contractual favours between equal partners, the corresponding repayments also have limits in both time and scale (1946: 116). This may explain why, as the economy went into recession from the late 1990s, the government contribution towards UNICEF also declined.

This chapter also examined the roles of the UNICEF Goodwill Ambassador and the Japan UNICEF Association’s direct mailing campaigns, which have helped many to (re-)discover themselves as the ‘UNICEF milk generation’. Benedict and Nakane observed that favours amongst hierarchical relationships need not be repaid until the weaker party becomes sufficiently strong to do so (Benedict 1946: 102; Nakane 1968: 3). It is therefore not surprising that politicians were earlier than the public in supporting the Japan UNICEF Association. The time lag reflects the slower spread of consciousness towards the international community amongst the Japanese public, which could be referred to as its internationalisation (kokusai-ka) (Hook and Weiner 1992). The process of how the Japanese society (seken) enlarged into incorporating the views of the international community is considered in the next
In addition, Benedict observed that if the benefactor cannot receive the repayment, this can be compensated by providing favours to a substitute (1946: 102). This may explain why UNICEF was successful in symbolising all the providers of post-war humanitarian aid to Japan. The UNICEF Goodwill Ambassador and the Japan UNICEF Association both organise sophisticated and wide-reaching fundraising campaigns which stress on the post-war humanitarian aid provided to the Japanese by UNICEF. As seen in Chapter 4, the strength of repayments for favours stemming from hierarchical relationships is that they are never completely repayable according to Benedict: The favour is so kind that the gratitude is forever. Unlike the loan-like repayment of the favour between developed nations, which was shown to be the perception of politicians, it is argued that the perception of the general public, especially of the ‘UNICEF milk powder generation’, of its relationship with UNICEF resembles the guardian-child relationship. The grown child therefore does not stop donating in economic recession and for this reason the Japan UNICEF Association’s has been able to grow during the 1990s and 2000s, while government contributions fell. It can be concluded that the donation culture of Japan today is still strongly based on personal relationships of favours.
and obligations to repay them. The biggest challenge the Japan UNICEF Association will face in the near future is whether it can persuade the younger generations to share the gratitude of the post-war generation or create a new donation culture.

For the UN centrism norm as a whole, the success of the civil UNICEF movement has evolved the norm to consider the UN as a provider of not only peace but also humanitarian welfare and move individuals to actively contributing towards it through donations.
CHAPTER 7  UNESCO’S WORLD HERITAGE AND SEKEN

7.1  Introduction

As seen in Chapter 2, norms are situation-relevant (Secord and Backman 1974) and changes over time (Kitaori 2000: 157). As Katzenstein explains, ‘norm are not static; they are contested and contingent’ (1996b: 3). The previous chapters have seen the rise and development of the UN centrism norm in Japan. It has also seen how, as the movements matured, the Japanese civil UN movements bringing change to their original international norms. This chapter confirms the UN’s continued authority today amongst the Japanese public and reviews the change, or rather further expansion, of the UN centrism norm. The chapter also examines the process of how Japan’s ‘society’ (seken) is today expanding outside its national boarders, and as a result how Japan’s norms and values, including the UN centrism norm, are being subjected to objective assessment.

The UNESCO World Heritage system, part of UNESCO’s programme, is based on a 1972 international treaty which ‘encourage countries to sign the World Heritage Convention and to ensure the protection of their natural and cultural heritage’ (UNESCO World Heritage Centre 2010: online). As soon as the Japanese
government ratified the treaty in 1992, it has been enthusiastically adopted by the public who refer to the UNESCO World Heritage list as a global standard in authorising what and where they should go and visit for their holidays. ‘Once a site has been listed (as a World Heritage), there is a rush to visit not only to sites in Japan but to all corners of the world’ (Mainichi Shimbun evening edition 20 June 2005: 2). This trend is not limited to Japan but is observed in other countries such as in South Korea and China (Asahi Shimbun evening edition 3 December 2007: 2; Mōri 2008: 15-16). But the Japanese without doubt have a strong interest towards the World Heritage system.

7.2 Expansion of seken through tourism

As seen in Chapter 4, although the state was the ultimate authority in the Meiji era, Inoue suggested that seken could continuously expand as modernisation progressed through the introduction of external values, and pointed out the possibility of an emergence of a larger seken beyond the State as a social norm. ‘Seken expanded and subdivided as the world opened up. … The (value) basis extended further to the outside and expanded out from the state to ultimately overseas (i.e. the West)’ (Inoue 1977: 55-56; 2007: 81). In other words, Inoue predicted there will come a time when the Japanese general public would start to
worry about what the foreigners would think of them and that their behaviours would be influenced by this concern. This section explains that the realisation of this prediction came in the form of overseas travel.

7.2.1 Popularisation of tourism in the Edo period

As referred briefly in Chapter 4, the first seken developed with the popularisation of tourism in the Edo period. Traditionally travelling was for a living and an act of ‘melancoliness and hardship’ (Yanagita 1976: 60). However the Edo period brought stability to people’s lives in both urban and rural areas through factors such as: the arrival of a sustained period of peace that came with the completion of the feudal system; the development of the money economy and distribution of goods; the advancement of agricultural techniques; and the increase in productivity and the improvement in the transit environment which led to emancipation of the masses. For the first time the Japanese could enjoy travelling for leisure (Shinjō 1971: 48-67). Even so, not everyone was freely allowed to travel at the time and the movements of peasants were especially restricted. Once visits to temples and shrines and balneal visits to hot springs were permitted as exceptions, the age of mass travel arrived with people using these visits as an excuse to travel. As a result, three million people per year travelled to temples and shrines in the latter half of the
Edo period (Yamamoto 1976: 19-21). There had always been many visitors to these religious places, but with this endorsement (osumi-tsuki) of the feudal government to accept it as an excuse for peasants to travel, these became popular tourist sites (Kanzaki 2004: 86-109). Especially the Ise Shrine became an iconic tourist site in the Edo period with ‘once in a lifetime visit to Ise’ being a popular catch phrase. According to the Ise Shrine’s records, there were 427,500 visitors during just the four months between January and April 1718 (Kanzaki 2004: 5-6). This was out of approximately 600,000 people travelling overall in Japan in that year, and estimating from the population at the time, every one person in twenty were visiting Ise that year (Kanzaki 2004: 5-6). Engelbert Kaempfer, a doctor from Holland, the only country which Japan had diplomatic relations at the time, witnessed this travel boom and wrote in 1691:

> Visits to the Ise Shrine are undertaken all year but they are especially popular in the spring. In this season, the main roads (kaidō) are full of people. Both men and women, young and old, rich and poor attempt to travel on foot as much as possible with the aim of renewing their religious faith and having their prayers answered. (Kaempfer 1977: 53)
The vast majority of these tourists were not travelling alone but were members of tourist groups called ‘kō’.

Originally ‘kō’ referred to groups of monks reading and studying the Buddhist script in the Heian period (794-1185), but the meaning deviated to refer to groups formed for various purposes. In the Edo period, groups (kō) with the objective to travel became very popular. The members of the group contributed towards a travel fund and each year a few from the group took turns to make the voyage so that everyone in the group could eventually get to travel with only a small but regular financial contribution (Kanzaki 2004: 145-148). Although the Ise tour groups were the most common, other tour groups also existed for numerous other tour destinations. For example there were several dozen tour groups, each whose membership ranged from 50 to 100 persons, for climbing the sacred Mount Fuji each summer with three to seven guides per tour group (Kikuchi 1965:71). When they travelled, the group was led by an ‘onshi’ (or sometimes referred to as ‘oshi’), who would be the equivalent of a tour operator today (Kanzaki 1991: 176). Onshi were originally priests engaged in missionary work in medieval times but became involved in the travel business as they assisted samurai families in their shrine visits. As the shrine and temple visits became popular in the Edo period, the ‘onshi’ priests became independent from the shrines to become specialized tour operators systemising the kō system (Kanzaki 2004:
The onshi as former priests, now tour operators, were therefore the ‘marginal men’ who made a living out of taking the villagers to the world outside their villages and at the same time bringing the gods to the masses.

7.2.2 Popularisation of overseas travel

Fast forwarding to the present, overseas travel for the Japanese had been severely restricted from the start of the Second World War and continued well after the end of the war until 1964, the year Japan hosted the Tokyo Olympics. Even in 1964 there were only approximately 130,000 travellers to overseas destinations. The first boom in overseas travel started in 1966 when over 200,000 people travelled abroad (Naikaku Sōri Daijin Kanbō Shingi Shitsu 1967: 85). At the time however, overseas travel was still a luxury for most Japanese. When a new university graduate’s salary was about Yen 20,000, the first package tour to Europe after the travel liberalisation was offered at Yen 7,150,000 and the first tour package to Hawaii had a price tag of Yen 3,640,000 (Akiyama 1995: 90; Shirahata 1996: 233). In 1968 Japan became the second largest economy by Gross National Product, boosting overseas travel. In 1970 jumbo jet aircrafts were introduced to Japan and in the following year overseas travellers exceeded one million for the first time, surpassing the number of foreigners entering Japan and marking the start of the
second wave of boom in overseas travel (Kokudo Kōtsūsho 2008: 31). This boom continued until the 1974 oil crisis with a staggering growth in travellers: 44.9 per cent growth in 1971, 44.8 per cent in 1972 and 64.4 per cent in 1973 (Tsūrizumu Mēkettengū Kenkyūjo 2006: 1). The Japanese Yen strengthened with the 1985 Plaza Accord leading to over ten million Japanese travelling abroad per year by 1990, marking the start of the third boom in overseas travels. Since then overseas travel has continued to grow rapidly. In 1995 traveller numbers were 15 million and by 2005 it was 17 million, meaning more than one in ten Japanese were travelling abroad, of which 67.1 per cent were tourists (Tsūrizumu Mēkettengū Kenkyūjo 2006: 1, 19). At the end of 2005, one in four Japanese or 35 million held a valid passport (Gaimushō Ryōji Kyoku Ryokenka 2006: online). In a 2006 survey, 53.3 per cent said they had experience travelling abroad (Tsūrizumu Mēkettengū Kenkyūjo 2006: 51).

The characteristics of the popularisation of overseas travel, especially from 1985, resemble the travel boom in the Edo period (Kanzaki 2004: 6-7). The peace brought by the Cold War, the innovation in the mode of transport through the arrival of jumbo jet travel and favourable economic factors such as economic growth and the strengthening of the Yen all contributed to the improvement of travel conditions.
As stated above, the Edo period also enjoyed the coming together of favourable conditions. In the Edo period, the Japanese for the first time saw the ‘world’ outside of their village, which were represented by the prestigious religious sites in Japan and the people and places along the way. For many Japanese, the third overseas travel boom provided them with the opportunity to see the ‘world’ outside of Japan for the first time. The overseas travel boom was therefore a ‘revolutionary incident’ that freed the Japanese from their earlier ideas about the ‘world’ (Katō 1968: 327-328).

In the age of overseas travels, package tours became the modern equivalent of the Edo tour groups (kō) (Kanzaki 1991: 176; Sawaki 1999: 12-15). From the Meiji era commercial travel agencies were replacing the Edo tour groups. Group travel continued in the form of school excursions and company retreats. School excursions, whose destinations were often visits to shrines and temples, was part of the standard school curriculum and so became a shared experience amongst the Japanese across generations (Shirahata 1996). With this background, group tours also became popular for private travel overseas. In 1965 with the end of restrictions on foreign travel, the national carrier Japan Airlines started offering its tour package, JAL Pack, which combined air ticket and hotel stay. Other travel
agents followed suit offering various package tours, many of them very successful. Inexperienced overseas travellers were given the peace of mind by being led by a tour conductor. Takayuki Hashizume, a Japan Airlines employee, explained the success of its JAL Pack was because the Japanese were familiar with group tours through experiences such as school excursions (Hashizume 1977: 42). Overseas tour packages continue to be popular today, 40 years after its introduction. In 2005 66.2 per cent of tourists to overseas were through these group tours and an additional 3.5 per cent travelled in institutional groups such as corporations and schools. Hence approximately 70 per cent of the Japanese tourists were travelling in organised groups (Tsūrizumu Mākettengu Kenkyūjo 2006: 45).

7.2.3 Continuation of seken and its social norms: Japan’s souvenir culture

When one compares the behaviour of travellers today and the Edo period, one can see many similarities. This section argues that the underlying reason for this stems from the continuation of the seken and its social norms and that while the seken expanded and stratified it has been a continuous process with many of its roots directly traceable back to the Edo period.
Illustrator Minoru Nagao, who participated in a group tour to Paris in 1978, observed that at the gift shops in Paris ‘the tour groups that are herded into the shop, for some reason, purchase similar items and not items of their liking but items that everyone else is buying’ (Nagao 1978: 174). Purchasing large quantities of souvenirs is an act in preparation for the tourist’s imminent return to his society. This culture of bringing back souvenirs dates back to the Edo period when society first expanded through the travel boom (Kanzaki 1997: 141).

Through the popularisation of tours to Ise, the onshi tour operators created a national clientele network. By the mid Edo period there were 600 to 700 onshi families with a clientele of nearly 4.4 million households which totalled to approximately 17.6 million individuals (Miyamoto 1987: 74; Kanzaki 2004: 54-55). As an additional service to their core business the onshi tour operators made annual visits to clients who were unable to participate in the Ise tour that year. They would deliver to their clients an annual talisman issued by the Ise Shrine as proof that the onshi made the pilgrimage on their behalf. When making the visit to his clients, the onshi would take a small gift bought at the Ise Shrine. This custom was emulated by the pilgrims who would bring back souvenirs to their fellow villagers (Kanzaki 1997; 2004:57). One reason for the souvenirs was that the travellers were
sent off by their fellow villagers through the village mutual travel fund (kō) and could not go home empty handed (Kanzaki 1997: 139-141). Also, after seeing the big *seken* travellers wanted to bring a little of that back to their own small *seken*. For these reasons the souvenirs they bring back do not consider the preferences of the recipient, but the priority is placed upon gifts that symbolise the destination and which can distributed to most members of their small *seken* (Kanzaki 1997: 146-147). What is interesting is that this souvenir culture is still very much alive today.

In a survey called ‘Attitudes and practices towards souvenirs’ undertaken in 1996 with 200 people, 84.5 per cent supported this gift giving practice (Yoka Rejā Sangyo Jōhō Sentā 1997: 585-586). There were little generational differences in the survey results and for all age groups surveyed, from people in their twenties to forties, over 80 per cent were in favour of souvenirs with the exception of forties males, at 78.8 per cent. To the question ‘who is the souvenir for?’, the most popular responses were ‘close friends’ at 93 per cent, ‘family members’ at 88 per cent, ‘work colleagues’ at 62 per cent, which far exceeded the 38 per cent to ‘dating partners’. In particular, 77.6 per cent of those in their twenties said that they would bring back souvenirs to people at their work place. The most popular reason for
bringing back souvenirs to the work is ‘social obligation’ (giri), which applied to more than twice the number of respondents for the second popular reason which was ‘to show one’s continuing gratitude’ at 23.4 per cent and the motive ‘to make the recipient happy’ was only at 11.3 per cent. 84.7 per cent said that they would buy ‘local specialities of the destination’ for their work place and that their budget for this was the second highest at Yen 1,722. The lowest budget was for neighbours at Yen 1,323. Taking into account that this survey did not limit itself to souvenirs from overseas trips, the budget for each person is not so high. The survey results support the idea that the main motive for this act of gift giving is symbolic and based on the ‘returning of a favour’ (giri) relationship seen in Chapter 4. The continuation of this tourist behaviour is one proof that seken continues to dictate the patterns of behaviour amongst the Japanese to the present day.

7.2.4 Gap between the norms of the Japanese seken and those abroad

As was the case in the Edo period, the popularisation of overseas travel has led the Japanese at the mass level to become self-conscious about how they are viewed from abroad (Naikaku Sōri Daijin Kanbō Kōhō Shitsu 1978: 17). As pointed out by Kinya Abe, individuals within tour groups, which itself is a miniature society (seken), make it their priority not to stand out. However this norm of the Japanese seken is
subjected to witnesses abroad when it is in the form of overseas tour groups. According to a 1976 survey undertaken in the UK, Switzerland, Italy, West Germany and France, the impressions of Japanese tourists was that they ‘always travelled in groups’ and ‘had similar suit cases’ and that the men were often in ‘dark suits with tie’ (*Kokusai Kankō Shinkōkai* [Japan National Tourist Organization] 1976: 3). Illustrator Minoru Nagao in 1978 wrote ‘the reason Japanese tour groups stand out is because everything is uniform. We wear similar clothes and bring similar things to avoid becoming the odd man out’ (Nagao 1978: 174). Therefore, although the idea of each tourist in the group is to avoid standing out within the group, they end up standing out as a group.

In receiving these criticisms from abroad, the Japanese realised that the norms of their *seken* is not necessarily shared by people abroad. In a 1978 survey, 46.3 per cent of the Japanese agreed to the statement ‘the current trend of everyone and anyone travelling abroad is not desirable when the reputation of Japanese tourists is not favourable’ (*Naikaku Sōri Daijin Kanbō Kōhō Shitsu* 1987: 11). In a different survey undertaken in the same year, the most popular answer to the questions ‘what are you careful of when travelling abroad?’ was ‘to study the manners and etiquette of the foreign country’ at 39 per cent.
This change in attitude signals that the Japanese were adding a new layer of *seken* on top of the ‘state’ which was formerly the external layer of the stratified *seken*. Since the third wave of overseas travel boom from 1985, the Japanese *seken* has ‘internationalised’ in the sense that it has started to take into account the ‘eyes of the foreigners’. However the ‘eyes of the foreigner’ is in fact the Japanese imagination of what the foreigners would think about the Japanese and their action. This was also the case for when the Edo villages first internalised the outside world -- it was the outside world as the villagers saw it.

7.3 The UNESCO World Heritage system as the authority on Japanese tourism

The above section has considered how Japanese communities have developed and changed through their travel experiences. This section considers the role of the UNESCO World Heritage sites in the expanding *seken* caused by the overseas travel boom that started around the 1990s.

7.3.1 World Heritage system at the state level

Although today sightseeing to World Heritage sites has become an established
form of travel amongst the Japanese, it was not so long ago that they first heard of
the World Heritage. The World Heritage system is based on the treaty called the
‘Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage’
adopted by UNESCO in 1972. It could be said that the treaty is an expansion of the
international UNESCO norm holding states to protect their natural and cultural
heritage. However the Japanese government was not keen to accept this new
norm and only ratified the treaty 20 years later and was the 125th ratifying country
(as at 2008 there are 185 ratifying countries). Koichiro Matsuura, the Director
General of UNESCO, recalls that Japan was initially not particularly enthusiastic
about the World Heritage system and there was little political support to rush the
ratification (2008: 93). Whilst the international treaty was directed at the states, in
Japan the World Heritage system has gained wide public support as a form of
endorsement on where the public should travel.

7.3.2 World Heritage listing as a form of ‘endorsement (osumi-tsuki)’

Japan’s ratification came at a right time during the overseas travel boom when the
Japanese public was increasingly looking for guidance on where to go and what to
see. According to a survey undertaken in 1967 when overseas travel was still
limited to the wealthy, the second most popular travel motive was ‘to learn more
about the lives, custom and national characteristics’ of people in a foreign country (21 per cent). This was not so far behind the most popular reason, which was to see the ‘landscapes, historical sites and historic cities’ (36 per cent) (Naikaku Sōri Daijin Kanbō Kōhō Shitsu 1967: 7). In a similar survey undertaken in 1978, the gap between the first and second popular motives widened with 64 per cent wanting to see the ‘cities, beautiful landscapes and the historical sites’ and only 12 per cent interested in the way people live abroad (Naikaku Sōri Daijin Kanbō Kōhō Shitsu 1978: 12). In a follow up survey of 1987, the most popular reason in the earlier surveys was supported by 58.7 per cent of the respondents and including 12.7 per cent who chose this as their second motive, 71.4 per cent agreed that sightseeing was their main purpose in overseas travel (Naikaku Sōri Daijin Kanbō Kōhō Shitsu: 1987: 24). Hence through the popularisation of overseas travel in the 1970s and 1980s, the emphasis shifted towards sightseeing. This may be a reflection that the overseas travel boom represented an extension of the group tours of the Edo period.

The Edo travel boom and the 1970s and 1980s overseas travel booms differ greatly on one point. In the Edo period, travellers visited famous temples and shrines because the authorities gave ‘endorsement’ to visit these places, when
travel for other purposes were restricted. They were recognised to be important sacred sites by the authority and the traveller’s own seken was constructed around this norm.

In addition, the Edo travel boom and the overseas travel boom from 1964 differ in that for the latter there is no exact equivalent existence of the onshi, the ex-priest tour operator. It is true the modern group tours had many similarities with the Edo travel groups. The modern tour conductors and the onshi also shared some common roles. However the onshi as former priests were close to the gods and guided the travellers not just on their physical journey but also on their spiritual journey. In contrast, the role of the modern tour guide is limited to a functional role offering language expertise and know-how about travelling abroad (Hashimoto 2000: 77-80). The modern tour guide therefore do not have the absolute ‘authority’ that the onshi enjoyed. Instead modern tourists are left to make their own judgements.

In the 1990s when mass overseas travel really took off, the UNESCO World Heritage list was the answer to the demand for an authority telling travellers where to go. The onshi guide was substituted by the media and travel agents, which split
the roles between them. In this modern era, it is not possible to impose an endorsement. There must be a need from the recipient for such endorsement and the supplier and the recipient must share some common values. The accreditation authority of the World Heritage sites, UNESCO, has since 1947 developed a brand in Japan through the civil UNESCO movement. Today there are 279 regional UNESCO associations across Japan (Minkan Yunesuko Undō Rokujū Nenshi Hensyū linkai 2007) that act like local agents of UNESCO, as seen in Chapter 5. Based on the foundation of UN centrism discussed throughout this thesis, the World Heritage list established itself very quickly as part of the UN centrism norm.

This ‘World Heritage boom’ was originally initiated by the media. The origin can be traced back to a popular documentary television programme series ‘The World Heritage’ by the Tokyo Broadcasting Station (TBS) which started in April 1996 (Yahagi 2007: 24). Following the programme’s success, the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK, Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai) also started its own programme ‘Tanken Roman Sekai Isan (Exploration Roman, The World Heritage)’ featuring World Heritage sites from April 2005 and revised to ‘Sekai Isan eno Shōtaijō (Invitation to the World Heritage)’ from April 2009. Both programmes continue to be very popular to date. In a well established annual television programme survey, the 2007 result
showed that the TBS and NHK World Heritage programmes came first and second in the ‘viewer satisfaction ranking’, while in the ranking of ‘viewer’s intention to continue watching the programme’, the TBS programme came first and the NHK ranked in at sixth place (Bideo Resāchi 2007: 85). These viewings translated directly in tourist activities as, according to a 2007 survey of 2,172 valid respondents undertaken by the Japan Travel Bureau Foundation, 74 per cent visited and/or knew of a World Heritage site abroad and 68.4 per cent said they would like to visit one in the future (Nihon Kōtsūkōsha 2008: 45).

The popularity of the World Heritage status in Japan is explained by some as a ‘national characteristic of the Japanese to prefer those that are selected by others’ (Nishimura 2005: 13; Ogino 2008: 4). The Japanese have traditionally supported the branding of places and sites (Inaba 2008: 130-137). From the Edo period there has been a selection of Japan’s best mountains, but the 100 mountains featured in Kyūya Fukada’s essay published in 1964 ‘Japan’s 100 great mountains’ (Nihon Hyaku Meizan) (Fukada 1964) have become a brand of their own. Other notable selections include ‘Japan’s Eight Views (Nihon Hakkei,)’, whose selection was conducted by two newspaper houses in 1927. First, the top ten views were short listed through a popular vote that captured so much public interest that it gathered
over 93 million (9,320,3085) votes, far exceeding the actual population of the country at the time (Ōsaka Mainichi Shimbun 5 June 1927: 1). The final eight views were selected by a panellist of notable persons from politics, academia, writers and artists (Tetsudōshō 1928; Kōda et al. 2005: 274-275). The selected Eight Views have become a normative list today. As an extension to this, many Japanese appreciate the ‘endorsement’ of places and sites from a UN agency (Akasegawa 2008: 17), a sign that the public continue respect the UN as an authority today.

The literal translation of osumi-tsuki is ‘sealed in ink’ and originally refers to documents guaranteeing or acknowledging the granting of land by the shōgun or feudal lord (daimyō) to his subjects, a custom dating back from the Muromachi period (1336-1573). These documents were authenticated by a seal (kaō) of the warlord stamped in ink (Satō 1988: 214-222). From here, osumi-tsuki has developed into a generic term referring to a ‘guarantee, endorsement or permission from authority’ (Kenbō 1992: 136; Shinmura 2008: 397). In short, osumi-tsuki relies on the standard of value of the ‘authority’ and cannot be detached from authoritarianism. Historian Kinya Abe names this authoritarian social space as ‘seken’ and states below:
Authoritarianism is not about swaggering (by the person with authority). It is about (the person without authority) relying on another person’s authority. That authority is the ‘seken’. For example, when one is with others one tries to adapt his behaviour to others. In this respect it is a concerted move but at times this can seem to be de-individualisation and authoritarian. (Abe 1995: 24)

Seken’s enthusiastic submission to the authority of the World Heritage listing can be observed in that it is today used as an analogy to express world class values. For example it has been used in the following context: The ‘Article 9 (of the Japanese constitution) should become a World Heritage’ (Ōta and Nakazawa 2006) or the ‘Japanese imperial family should be a World Heritage’ (Watanabe 2007: 238-247). Another example is a statement that ‘gastronomic culture is a cultural heritage which needs to be passed onto the future generation as World Heritage’ (Koizumi 2004: 9-11).

It must be noted that post-war Japanese have become susceptible to international ‘authorities’ in general, not just the UN. ‘The Japanese are appreciative of international authority and these are highly valued. The ultimate representatives of
such international authorities are the Olympic medals, the United Nations and the Nobel Prize’ (Yoshida 2003: 34). Hence while the UN may not be the sole international authority, amongst the above three authorities it is one which influences public behaviour on a day to day basis as they can make donations via the civil UNICEF association, make travel plans referring to the World Heritage list and at times think about peace. It is also wrong to assume that the Japanese blindly accept all international authorities. In 2007 the Michelin Guide published its guide for Tokyo, ‘Michelin Guide 2008 Tokyo: Restaurants & Hotels’ (Rollier 2008). The Tokyo version of this internationally authoritative restaurant guide book was an instant hit in Japan. The first edition of 120,000 copies was sold out within three days of sales (Nikkei Trendy Net: 2007). At the same time the Guide caused much controversy (see Itô and Kobayashi 2007: 23-26; Inaba 2008: 130-137; Tomosato 2008: 202-207) and it is difficult to say that it was fully accepted as an ‘endorsement’ within the Japanese seken. In fact, the Michelin Guide is an example where the foreign social-culture was rejected.

7.3.3 Reactions of Japan’s natural and cultural sites

This section now considers how the UNESCO World Heritage system has affected the natural and cultural sites within Japan. As the World Heritage is a global listing,
it naturally covers Japanese sites as well. Today the Japanese actively embrace the ‘endorsement’ from UNESCO for their own cultural and natural landscapes, arguably more enthusiastically than previous lists such as the ‘Japan’s 100 great mountains’. The Japanese are over delighted when they receive an ‘endorsement’ from the UN over their cultural assets. On the listing of the ‘Historic Monuments of Ancient Kyoto’ in 1993, the Agency for Cultural Affairs commented that ‘the accreditation does not bring direct benefits but there is significance in obtaining an endorsement as a world class heritage’ (Asahi Shimbun 21 September 1993: 29). Newspapers have also followed this tone in their reporting. The Yomiuri Shimbun, a leading national newspaper, at the listing of the Shrines and Temples of Nikko predicted that ‘receiving the endorsement (osumi-tsuki) of the World Heritage will intensify the limelight on Nikko’ (Yomiuri Shimbun 3 December 1999: 32). At the same time, as above, through overseas travel, the Japanese have expanded their world (seken) and felt unease when their smaller world (domestic seken) does not match with the new larger world (global seken) as their instinct is to conform with the larger seken.

It is therefore a matter of fact that, in Japan, enlisting as a World Heritage site brings a sharp rise in tourist numbers. A 2008 survey undertaken by a leading
Japanese travel agency, the JTB Corporation, revealed that approximately 60 per cent of 2,538 valid respondents said that they have ‘experience in visiting a World Heritage site in Japan’ (Japan Travel Bureau Corporation 2008: 1). Similarly a 2004 survey undertaken by the quasi-public body, the Japan Productivity Center for Socio-Economic Development, showed that 63.3 per cent of 2,450 valid respondents said that they would like to visit both domestic and overseas World Heritage sites, and that this positive response increases to 82.9 per cent for the top 15.8 per cent most frequent travellers (Shakai Keizai Seisansei Honbu 2004: 101-117). The historic villages of Shirakawa-go and Gokayama were listed in 1995. Their annual tourist numbers in the few years before becoming a World Heritage site was around 600,000 but by 2001 it had more than doubled to 1.4 million and continued to grow to 1.8 million visitors by 2008 (Pedersen 2008: 42; Shirakawa-mura 2010: online). More recently, the Iwami Ginzan Silver Mine was designated in July 2007 and its tourist numbers have jumped from approximately 400,000 to 713,700 per year (Chihō Gyösei 2008: 2-4). As a result, there are endless candidacies for the World Heritage list in Japan. To be recognised as a World Heritage site first requires the nomination from its national government and then to be selected by the UNESCO World Heritage Committee. Currently Japan has 14 World Heritage sites, of which 11 are cultural sites and three are natural
sites, while a further nine sites nominated by the government are on the Tentative List. In addition to this, there are today over 50 sites all over Japan that are actively seeking to make it to the Tentative List (Sekai Isan Sōgō Kenkyūjo 2005: 9). It is therefore clear that there is a big financial motive for such movements. However, the activists at the centre of these movements emphasise on a more spiritual motive. The movement for Fujisan (Mount Fuji), at present on the Tentative List, to become a World Heritage site is supported by an NPO called the ‘National Council on Mt. Fuji World Heritage’ that strongly believes the highest mountain in Japan should be part of the World Heritage. The NPO’s Chairman, former prime minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, claims that:

Mount Fuji has not merely been a natural object, but has been a spiritual home and a source of courage for all the Japanese people throughout Japan’s history. I believe that it is a mission for us Japanese people living today to make Mount Fuji the world’s treasure. (Nakasone 2009: online)

Therefore the fact that Mount Fuji has not yet been enlisted as a World Heritage site, which for many Japanese symbolises the country, is a great shame for many Japanese. Similarly, on reporting on the decision by the World Heritage Committee
to postpone *(de facto reject)* the listing of Hiraizumi in 2008, another Japanese broadsheet, *the Asahi Shimbun*, consolingly commented ‘Hiraizumi is attractive even without the endorsement *(osumi-tsuki)* of the World Heritage’ *(Asahi Shimbun 9 July 2008: 1)*. There is a feeling of insecurity to know that what they value is not equally valued by the ‘outside world’ (global *seken*).

At the same time, some activists have tried to leverage the authority of the UN to meet domestic objectives such as to boost the status of their local treasure into a national asset by applying to the World Heritage listing. The ‘Shikoku Henro Route Culture’ World Heritage Listing Association established in 2000 heads the movement to place the ‘Henro’, the pilgrimage route of 88 temples on the Island of Shikoku, onto the World Heritage List. Its Chairman Kenshō Oyamada, the head priest at a temple called Senyūji, states that the pilgrimage prompts the rebirth of the lives of pilgrims through their interactions with the nature on the Island and the kindness of people they meet on the way. Therefore for the Henro to become a World Heritage site is ‘a reflection of our feelings towards nature and our hope towards the kindness in people’ *(Oyamada 2009: online)*. In 2004 the ‘Sacred Sites and Pilgrimage Routes in the Kii Mountain Range’ was enlisted as a World Heritage site. During the lobbying activities, Riten Tanaka, Chief Executive at the Kinpusen
Temple, found that the Westernisation and modernisation policies put in place since the Meiji era have resulted in the Japanese neglecting their unique religious culture, and that the World Heritage listing of these sacred sites and pilgrimage routes would ‘revive the Japanese identity’ (Tanaka 2003: 34-35).

As above, natural and cultural sites within Japan have also been affected by the UNESCO World Heritage system. Some sites have been ‘rediscovered’ by the Japanese public through the World Heritage listing bringing large growth in tourist numbers. Others are desperately seeking for the endorsement to prove that their ‘home of our soul’ is in fact a ‘treasure of the World’. Either way, the UNESCO World Heritage system has become an endorsement for the Japanese traveller both at home and abroad.

7.4 The different layers of seken: The graffiti at the Basilica di Santa Maria del Fiore in Florence

One of the main objectives of this thesis was to show the dynamism of norms and its social structure, seken in the case of Japan. This section offers a case study on how different layers of the Japanese seken interpreted the world’s seken and how they interacted with it and with each other over a particular incident. It aims to
illustrate how the smaller seken is eager to align itself to larger seken.

7.4.1 The background

In June 2008 the Japanese media reported a significant amount of Japanese graffiti on the walls of the Basilica di Santa Maria del Fiore, part of the World Heritage site of the Historical Centre of Florence in Italy. Several examples of individual graffiti came under the media spotlight. Two elements of the graffiti included both individual and institutional names. Although the exact identities of the individuals were withheld, the media revealed the institutional names of a junior college in Gifu where six of their students were involved and another of a university in Kyoto where three students were similarly involved. Further, graffiti of a baseball coach and his wife from a high school in Ibaraki well-known for baseball was exposed just through their full names.

This string of media fiasco all started from 36 students at the junior college in Gifu visiting Florence as part of a college study tour. When the group visited the cathedral, six of the students wrote together their names, their college name, date and heart icons on the marble wall (Asahi Shimbun 25 June 2008: 34). One Japanese tourist who visited the cathedral subsequently saw the graffiti and
thinking this was disgraceful, took a photograph of it and made a complaint to the college and to the media on his return. Following the initial media report of the graffiti of the junior college students, other graffiti at the cathedral was scrutinised and two more cases were exposed. The three university students from Kyoto were travelling together on a private trip independent of the university but had included their university name in the graffiti (Asahi Shimbun evening edition 26 June 2008: 14). In the case of the high school baseball coach, he and his wife had visited Florence for their honeymoon in a tour group and had written their full names on one of the pillars of the cathedral.

7.4.2 Reactions of the various layers of seken

As described earlier, the Japanese regard the UNESCO World Heritage as a ‘global’ cultural authority. At a national level of seken, to desecrate a World Heritage site therefore brings disgrace to the Japanese in the face of the foreigners, who the Japanese imagine are angered and upset by such actions. Although these graffitists were far from hardcore vandals, the tone of the media was high handed, stating that they ‘lack awareness that they are damaging a precious World Heritage site’ (Asahi Shimbun 7 July 2008: 27).
Japanese *seken* is multi-layered and sub-divided. There are multiple *seken* with differing values and norms and the people belong to several different *seken*. A good example is how the smaller *seken* at the institutional level of the junior college did not initially share the same values and norms as the media (national *seken*) above. As represented by the apologies of the three university students, ‘there was already a lot of graffiti and we did not think deeply about our actions’ (*Asahi Shimbun* evening edition 26 June 2008: 14) and it appears that the junior college students also failed to take the matter so seriously. The Japanese tourist who first took the photograph of the graffiti by the junior college students initially made a complaint to the junior college, but on failing to receive a proper response, he took the story to the media. Following the media reporting, the junior college in Gifu received over 500 complaints from the public via phone calls and emails (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, chūbu edition 26 June 2008: 31) and subsequently officially cautioned the six students. The president of the university in Kyoto apologised in front of the media stating ‘It is extremely regrettable that our students were involved in the graffiti of a sacred cathedral and a World Heritage building’. The three students were suspended for 14 days (*Yomiuri Shimbun* 28 June 2008: 37; *Asahi Shimbun* 28 June 2008: 33). The baseball coach at the high school in Ibaraki was dismissed from the school. It is clear from the initial lack of action by the junior college that at
first the college did not think the graffiti was a big problem. However through the media they were suddenly exposed to a very critical ‘public opinion’ and had to make it up with the public (seken).

In addition to the harsh sanctions placed on the graffiti artists, all three educational institutions associated with this incident sent a letter of apology to the cathedral. The students made donations to the cathedral towards the cost of repairs. In the case of the junior college students, one of them represented their group by revisiting Florence together with the college president to deliver their apologies in person. The Italian society however was taken aback by the whole incident. They were first surprised by the idea that a Japanese tourist would consider the act so shameful. They were even more surprised by the harsh punishments imposed on the perpetrators and by the official apologies from the respective institutions (Sakamoto 2008). Hence although the apology was directed at the Cathedral, it could be read that the foremost concern of the small seken of these educational institutions was to be forgiven by the larger national seken and that their actions were motivated by what they thought would satisfy the public back in Japan.50
7.5 Conclusion

The Japanese have today enthusiastically embraced the UNESCO World Heritage list as a global standard in authorising what and where the Japanese should go and visit. While this is one practical example of the UN centrism in Japan, this chapter has also analysed the UNESCO World Heritage boom in Japan as part of the transformation of Japanese society. It explained that through the several waves of travel booms since the Edo period, the Japanese have continued to reconstruct their world views, their own small world and the larger world outside of their own surroundings. Each travel boom pushed the boundaries of the Japanese seken. Even after the Western concept of ‘society’ was introduced in Japan in the Meiji period, seken continued to function in Japan. Regardless of the answer to the question posed by Kinya Abe as to whether the Western notion of ‘society’ actually exists in Japan (see Chapter 4), some of the actions taken by groups of Japanese, such as tour groups, still hold strong characteristics of the Japanese seken. But through the popularisation of overseas travel the general public have started to take into account the eyes of the international community in deciding how they should behave within their seken. The result is that Japan’s norms and values, including the UN centrism norm, are now subjected to comparison with international norms and values and domestic norms and values of other countries.
For example, the case study surrounding the graffiti at the Basilica di Santa Maria del Fiore in Florence showed a tendency of the Japanese *seken* to over-value UNESCO World Heritage sites when compared with the local Italian community. The chapter examined the first signs of the UN centrism norm’s encounter with how other countries value the UN and its norms. With the expansion of the *seken* out of its national borders however, the UN centrism norm is increasingly likely to be affected by international discussions on the UN. The future of this constantly evolving UN centrism norm is considered in the next chapter which is the thesis conclusion.
8.1 Summary

The starting point of the thesis was that Japan’s UN centric foreign policy could not be correctly understood without first understanding that UN centrism is a powerful domestic norm supported by the public. Contrary to conventional international relations theory where the state is the principal actor, the thesis asserts that the UN centrism foreign policy is in fact formed in response to domestic pressures by the nation who is UN centric.

In Chapter 2, the thesis outlined that it will follow a constructivist approach in examining UN centrism as a socio-cultural norm. Through the examination of the theory on norms, it set the scene for the rest of the thesis by examining the key theories that support the explanation of the UN centrism norm, pacifism and civil society, as well as explaining that Japanese Studies will be used to examining the political and social structures and customs behind the norm. It offered a hypothesis that the UN centrism is an example where a new domestic norm emerged initially as a result of accepting international norms but that its interpretation and development through the domestic political and social structures and convergence
with domestic norms have created a new domestic norm separate to the original international norms.

While the development of the UN centrism norm is examined in Part II (Chapter 5 onwards) of the thesis, in Chapter 4 Japan’s civil society and how social behaviours are determined were examined. It was identified that the type of relationship that exists between the state and civil society in Japan today takes a form of a ‘patron-client relationship’ which stems from a long history where authorities determined the public interest. The chapter also considered how norms and social behaviours are spread within Japan’s community-like society (‘seken’) and observes the social behaviours such as the receiving and returning of favours (‘on’ and ‘giri’) which would be especially useful in explaining how the civil UNICEF movement mobilised individuals into its movement in Chapter 6.

The thesis argued that UN centrism norm in Japan has been less about how Japan should conduct its foreign and security policies and more about individual attitudes towards peace and contributing to international cooperation through the UN and its System. As discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, Japan’s civil UN movements, in particular the civil UNICEF and UNESCO movements, have been identified as the
key norm entrepreneurs of the UN centrism norm and that the respective successes of their movements have led to the norm development. As a result, by the 1970s, the civil UNESCO movement established UN centrism to mean that peace ought to be in the minds of every individual and should reflected in their support towards peace activities undertaken by the UN and its agencies. This UN centrism norm gained broad support by successfully dodging the political and ideological issues of pacifism by placing the peace within the minds of individuals.

Although Japan’s pacifist norm (examined in detail in Chapter 3) was identified as the back bone of the UN centrism norm, the two norms have some clear differences. The pacifist norm stems from the emotions and experiences of the personal tragedies as victims of the war. There is a shared understanding that peace and the economic prosperity come hand in hand, and so maintaining the economic status quo is seen as part of the pacifist norm. The pacifism is therefore self-centred as its primary concern is the maintenance of peace in Japan and not the resolution of global conflict. The norm is not linked to peace movements and is non-ideological and non-political and hence the norm requires understanding of Japan’s history, social structures and behaviours rather than of Japan’s security policy and peace movements. The biggest points of departure between the UN
centrism and pacifist norm is twofold: First, while the latter is just concerned about ‘one state pacifism’, UN centrism is more open towards attaining world peace; Second, while the pacifist norm could not associate itself with any peace movements, the UN centrism norm was developed by the civil UN movements.

By the 1990s, the civil UNICEF movement added a new understanding to the UN centrism norm, which was that not only the state but also individuals ought to assist in international poverty reduction by making donations towards the humanitarian works of the UN and its agencies. Compared to the norm advocated under the civil UNESCO movement, UN is now considered a provider of not only peace but also humanitarian welfare. In Chapter 6 it was explained that the civil UNICEF movement’s fundraising activities become especially successful after the 1990s and that this was explainable with Japan’s traditional gift giving culture of favour (on) and the obligation to repay a favour (giri). It analysed that the Japanese experience of receiving international aid from the international community in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War led to a feeling of obligation to repay the favour as Japan became an economic power through making donations to the civil UNICEF movement.
Lastly, Chapter 7 examined the UNESCO World Heritage system. The popularisation of overseas travel since 1985 have led the masses to show strong interest and trust towards UNESCO’s World Heritage as a global standard in authorising what and where the Japanese should go and visit (Chapter 7). UN centrism under the civil UNESCO and UNICEF movements have been domestic norms for use between the Japanese with little consideration of how this norm may be seen from a non-Japanese. Chapter 7 argued that with the expansion of Japan’s society (seken) beyond the national boarders through the popularisation of overseas travel in the 1990s, the Japanese are now becoming conscious of how their UN centrism norm may be seen by foreigners.

8.2 Review of the contributions made by the thesis

8.2.1 UN centrism as a bottom-up foreign policy

This section reviews the contributions the thesis hopes to have made. It begins by suggesting that UN centrism as a foreign policy is in fact driven by a bottom up populist demand. In other words, it suggests domestic norms and public opinions have an explanatory power in the formation of foreign policy. It offers a different dynamic to that assumed in traditional international relations theories in which state actors are assumed to be unitary and national interests of all states to be rational.
and therefore similar.

As reviewed in Chapters 1 and 2, when Japan’s security and foreign policies are considered in the context of rationalist ideas of international relations theories, it is not the UN but the US which dominates Japanese government’s attention. Beyond the aspirations of some politicians and bureaucrats and the rhetoric of others, in practice it is difficult to say that, compared with other states, Japan followed a particularly UN centric foreign policy. Never the less, the term ‘UN centrism’ has been used in many occasions by state actors, in the Diet and in official policy documents, especially surrounding Japan’s security issues. The reason offered is that the UN centrism foreign policy is in fact directed at Japanese voters.

Public opinion has played a significant role in key security issues such as the US-Japan treaty and the overseas deployment of JSDFs. In both cases, the government used the public’s positive image of the UN as a ‘useful tool’ (Drifte 2000:60) to persuade the public and get the result they needed. As Dobson observed, ‘the UN had become an arena in which Japan’s military contribution could be justified and coexist with the concordance and specificity accorded to the traditional norm of anti-militarism’ (2003: 74).
8.2.2 UN centrism norm’s contribution towards norm development theories

The emergence of the UN centrism norm as a case study to norm development theories may offer two interesting observations.

First, as seen in Chapters 2 and 5, in much of the studies that consider the diffusion of an international norm, the focus has been on whether and how the norm can be successfully accepted by countries. Often it is the case that the domestic norms and political culture resist the pressures from the international community which tries to impose an international norm. In this thesis however, the international norm is not imposed upon. In fact, the norm entrepreneurs of the international norm are hardly involved in the norm diffusion. Rather, UN centrism is a case where domestic actors have voluntarily attempted to diffuse the international norms they empathise because it is close to a domestic norm they value. The thesis explains that under such conditions however, the international norm in its original form was not imported into the country. While the international norm has motivated and influenced the norm entrepreneurs, it is their own interpretation of the norm which is diffused in the country. A new domestic norm is therefore created as a result rather
than the diffusion of the international norm.

Secondly, the UN centrism norm is portrayed as a dynamic norm. It has been shown to be under constant evolution in terms of contextual enlargement as norm entrepreneurs change and new ideas from developments in international UN norms are adopted. The UN centrism initially developed by the civil UNESCO movement was its own interpretation of the international norms of the UN and UNESCO as a peace organisations through the lens of Japan’s pacifist norm. The civil UNESCO movement was the most influential civil UN movement until around the 1970s and this position was replaced by the civil UNICEF movement. Under the civil UNICEF movement, it enlarged the norm by placing emphasis on international cooperation at the level of individuals. The case of the World Heritage system is introduced in Chapter 7 as an example of the continuing changes of the UN centrism norm. At the same time, the thesis has also shown that the direction of influence and norm diffusion is not a one way process from international to domestic. While the civil UN movements were motivated by the international UN norms, as the movements matured, they were able to influence back the international norm.
8.2.3 UN centrism norm’s contribution towards civil society discussions

The active role of the civil UN movements in the development of the UN centrism norm has posed a research question on how this fits in with the general thinking that Japan has a ‘weak’ civil society in which individuals are subsumed by the authorities and show reference to conform with society (seken) rather than seek individualism (examined in Chapters 1 and 4).

The civil UN movement was first started in Japan and is still the country’s leading non-profit organisation today. However, the movement has gone largely unnoticed by academics studying civil society, as they do not regard it as forming part of Japan’s civil society. The civil UN movements have not been taken up in the post-war civil society theory discussions because in both liberalist and neo-Marxist understandings, civil society must be in opposition to the state as citizens secure their freedom by scrutinising state and government authorities. Hence the civil UN movements have not been regarded as fitting into the traditional definitions of civil society.

As analysed in Chapter 5, the success of UN centrism in Japan is strongly tied to the fact that the UN commands high authority from the Japanese people and that
the state authorities also assisted in legitimising the civil UN movements. One of the characteristics of the hierarchical and stratified Japanese society (seken) is its willingness or even its need to accept ‘authority’. Chapter 4 explained how Japan’s ‘backward’ civil society was a key underlying factor for the successful integration of the UN into the indigenous Japanese system of ‘authority’. In the immediate aftermath of the war, Japanese civil society was especially weak due to a decade of militarism. In this context the people were receptive to an authority that transcended the state. This ‘feudalism’ was one of the most important factors in the development of UN centrism, creating an environment supportive of civil UN movements. As a result, soon after the war, the UN was recognised as an authority (öyake) in Japan at the highest level by becoming associated with the Allied Powers and the US and placed alongside General Douglas MacArthur and the Emperor of Japan. The civil UN movement also managed cooperative relationship with the post-war governments and authorities which was probably a necessary condition for the NGO’s success in a bureaucratically controlled civil society. In short, the civil UN movements were successful because they utilised the features of the weak civil society to act in their favour. This success questions whether movements that do not stand in opposition of the state can be simply dismissed as not qualifying as independent activities by citizens.
Hence, while the success of civil UN movements may not have contributed much to
the advancement of a Western style civil society which comes hand in hand with
the development of individualism, its observation may shed light to acknowledging
other forms of civil societies as successfully adding value to society. Today as the
Western-centric definition of civil society is being redefined, it is worth engaging in a
re-evaluation of the civil UN movements by understanding why they became some
of the most successful civil movements in post-war Japan.

8.3 Further research areas
As above UN centrism has not been static and its meaning has been constantly
evolved as it incorporates new ideas. For Japan, until now the environment in
which UN centrism rests its success has largely been based on personal
experiences of the Second World War and its immediate aftermath. It remains to be
seen whether UN centrism is limited to a few generations. Understanding the
transferability of Japan’s UN centrism norm would be another significant future
research area which will enable the assessment of how the Japanese experience
can contribute towards increased civil activity in other countries. For example,
Chapter 7 saw how the UN centrism norm has started to interact with domestic
norms and cultures of other countries. Can this dynamic norm diffuse itself in other
countries or even convert itself into an international norm? To answer all these
questions, more studies on the dynamic movement of norms would need to be
undertaken.

The author hopes that Japan continues to sustain its UN centrism norm and at the
same time develop its civil society. So far, this thesis has shown that they have not
coeexisted. If support towards the UN can be secured in a more mature civil society
in which individualism prevails we would see the true realisation of idealism, ‘We,
the People of the United Nations’.
Notes

1 The National Diet Library, Japan, has a full-text database of the Diet session proceedings since the 1st session in May 1947 on their website (http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp).

2 Article 51 of the UN Charter includes collective self-defence as part of collective security. In Japan however, the traditional government position had been not to include collective self-defence for fear it may violate Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution (Toyoshita 2007: iii). However during the Gulf War in order to enable the overseas deployment of the JSDFs under UN resolutions, the government has explained that they were sending troops under the UN’s ‘collective security’ deliberately ignoring its collective self-defence element (Asahi Shimbun on 15 October 1990 evening edition: 1; Sasaki 1992: 35-36).

3 Note that there is a slight variation in Foreign Minister Nakayama’s speech between MOFA’s Japanese and English versions. ‘Kokuren chūshin shugi’ (UN centrism) in the Japanese version has become ‘the United Nations as a central focus of its foreign policy’ in English. Statement by His Excellency Mr Taro Nakayama, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, at the 45th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 25 September 1990 (Drifte 2000: 61).

4 The 1973 oil crisis was caused by the oil embargo placed by Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) against the US and other western states supporting Israel in the Arab-Israeli conflict and resulted in the quadrupling of world oil prices (British Petroleum Company 2004: 14).

5 Japan attained high-speed economic growth between the mid-1950s and early 1970s, becoming the second largest economic power in the world in terms of gross national product (GNP) in 1968. Japan’s GNP per capita outstripped that of the US for the first time in 1987 (Keizai Shingikai 2000).

6 To give a brief background on the JSDF, it was established in 1954 as forces of ‘self-defense’ as the Japanese constitution prohibits the country from holding ‘military forces’. In fact however the JSDFs’ military resources today are significant with a defence budget of approximately USD 43 billion in 1999, the third largest in the world (United States, Department of State: 2003).

7 According to the Ministry of Education’s 1951 records, at the time there were 153 associations and student clubs (Monbushō Dijin Kanbō Shōgai Yunesuko Ka 1951: 37-46).

8 The United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund was set up in 1946 and renamed as the United Nations Children’s Fund in 1953. The acronym has always been UNICEF.

9 According to Nihon to Yunisefu: Japan and UNICEF and Kodomonotameno pātonāshippū jointly published by the UNICEF Office in Japan and Japan Committee in 1986 and 1999 respectively, UNICEF’s humanitarian activities in Japan was until 1962 (UNICEF Office in Japan and Japan

10 National Committees for UNICEF are independent local non-governmental organisations (NGOs). They serve as the public face and dedicated voice of UNICEF, the National Committees work tirelessly to raise funds from the private sector, but they are not directly involved in the activities of neither UNICEF nor the national governments (UNICEF 2009a).

11 As will be shown later, the introduction of the NPO Law in 1998 has made it easier for NPOs to become incorporated. However, it is still not easy for NPOs to obtain a status for their donors’ to receive tax credits for donations made (Yamamoto 1998: 282).

12 It is noted that in more sophisticated realism literatures, state actors are not unitary and domestic policy process are given explanatory powers to international behaviours (Carr 1946).

13 Constructivism is not a theory, but a body of ideas.

14 Political culture is defined as ‘those worldviews and principled ideas values and norms that are stable over long periods of time and taken for granted by the vast majority of the population’ (Risse-kappen 1994: 209).

15 The JSP had been an adamant supporter of absolute pacifism and did not recognise the JSDF since its inception as it claimed its existence violated the Constitution. However the JSP changed its position when it formed a coalition government with the LDP and the New Party Sakigake in 1994.

16 Keane also acknowledged Yoshihiko Uchida as leading the renaissance in civil society study in Japan. Uchida grouped intellectuals from the Meiji period onwards into various types and identified that there were some intellectuals in the pre-War period who were influenced by civil society (Uchida and Shioda 1959; Uchida 1965; Uchida 1988).

17 Although the popular understanding is that the pacifist Japanese constitution was imposed by the American occupiers, there are those who suggest some activism from the Japanese. The Asahi Shimbun reports that before the Americans put this forward, on 10 December 1945 Toshio Shiratori, the Ambassador to Italy during the war and a convicted class-A war criminal after the war, advised the then Prime Minister Kijūrō Shidehara to include the renunciation of war in the new constitution (14 August 2005).

18 The JCP, although in favour of renunciation of wars of aggression, however argued Japan should maintain arms for self-defence (*Teikoku Gikai Shūgiin* 1985b: 126).

19 It is said that 100,000 people gathered to celebrate the promulgation of the Constitution of Japan organised for citizens of the Tokyo metropolitan district (Kōdansha 1989: 312).
The Japan Socialist Party subsequently placed preservation of the post-war constitution as the Party’s central agenda and as a result the Constitution is often seen as a left-wing philosophy but one must remember that the Constitution’s roots are not so much associated with left-wing thinking and the nationalist elements remain at the core of the Constitution (Stockwin 1968: 14-15).

In the 1993 general election, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) lost 70 seats of the 136 seats gained in the 1990 general election. After the JSP split into the Democratic Party of Japan and the Socialist Democratic Party, the latter which held to the tradition of absolute pacifism have been struggling to gain public support and have only gained 15 seats in the 1996 election, 19 seats in the 2000 election, 6 seats in the 2003 election and most recently 7 seats in 2005 election.


As an exception, when the intellectual Yoshio Nakano was asked by a newspaper to give names of who he thought were responsible for the war, he wrote his own name (Nakayama 1988: 20).

As a reportage of the Japanese as perpetrator of the war, an Asahi Shimbun newspaper series entitled ‘Travel in China’ by the journalist Katsuichi Honda (1972) is well-known.

The original Chinese words were kong for public and sī for private. Some intellectuals claim that the English words public and private, the Chinese words kong and sī and the Japanese words ōyake and watakushi all have different meanings and are not strictly direct translations (see, for example, Mizubayashi 2002: 4-5; Watanabe 1997: 5). However some such as Katō claim that compared to the Japanese word ōyake, the Chinese kong is closer to the English public (Katō 1992: 200).

Therefore ōyake is also synonymous to the word that describes the social superiors, okami, meaning ‘above’.

Kuroda assumes that by the Middle Ages Japan was a unified country. However there are academics who determine that until the early Kamakura period (1185-1333), Eastern Japan was strongly independent from the central government. Hence according to this theory, the emperor’s authority was geographically limited.

Shichihei Yamamoto who was enlisted in the army from October 1942 to September 1945 found that the older the soldier tended to call the army the ‘state army’ while the younger ones called it the ‘emperor’s army (Yamamoto 1997), which shows the strengthening of militarism over
bureaucracy in the ‘public’ (ōyake) sphere.

29 Fukuzawa recognised establishment of a government state and nation to be separate issues and lamented that although Japan became a modern state the Japanese people lacked consciousness of being a nation (Maruyama 1986: 108-111). He urges individuals to create a public wisdom and virtue (Fukuzawa 1962: 105) but Yamaguchi points out that Fukuzawa’s idea is about creating a publicness for state creation and not about establishing a civil society independent of the state (Yamaguchi 2004: 66).

30 When the state, the ‘public’ (ōyake) and the ‘private’ (watakushi) were all rolled into one under militarism, ironically this created an environment of the personalisation of the state (Maruyama 1964: 16). Shichihei Yamamoto, a Christian writer, recalling his own experience as a soldier during the war states superior officers were issuing ‘private orders’ in the name of the emperor. Some private orders were the simply the privatisation of one’s position to meet one’s greed such as ordering lower ranking soldiers to get hold of some scarcely available upmarket cigarettes (Yamamoto 1997: 383-384). Other private orders were more problematic in the sense that it blurred the chain of responsibility in a highly hierarchical regime such as the military and the state. Yamamoto gives an example of a prisoner of war, Manuel A. Roxas who later became the president of the Philippines, whose execution was ordered under the name of the Chief of Staff in Manila but had actually been ordered without his knowledge or intention by someone below him (Yamamoto 1997: 383-390). As well as revealing the inflow of ‘private’ (watakushi) in a ‘public’ (ōyake) situation, the existence of the word ‘private order’ shows that some people at the time acknowledged these as unofficial orders. Even under sever restriction on liberty and individuality, some people were trying to maintain their ‘private’ (watakushi) sphere (Hidaka 1995: 53-75). In the case of Roxas, his execution order went to the lieutenant colonel Nobuhiko Jimbo who realised it as a private order and saved the prisoner (Jimbo 1950). Jimbo was demoted as a result because although the authorities were aware of private orders, once an order was issued under their name they were not prepared to withdraw it but rather punish those who disobeyed it. Therefore in wartime Japan, the absolute control of the ‘private’ (watakushi) by the state and ‘public’ (ōyake) in fact lead to the destruction of the ‘public’ (ōyake) itself as it was allowed to be manipulated.

31 Dore points out that the privatisation of the ‘public’ (ōyake) existing amongst the bureaucracy (Dore 1997b: 112-115).

32 Some literatures claim the media were controlled by the military (eg. Matsuoka Yōsuke Dennki Kankōkai 1974: 485), but the media and the military were not always at one. For example, although the Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun, the present Mainichi Shimbun, was consistently in favour of the withdrawal from the League of Nations, the Asahi Shimbun was at first sceptical but later in favour of the idea whilst exceptionally the Jiji Shinpō was consistently against the withdrawal (Maesaka 1989: 138-148). This shows that the media had maintained a degree of
independence and so it can be deduced that the overwhelming approval of the media to the withdrawal was their voluntary position (eg. Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbunsya 1941: 240-241).

Public interest corporations once set up do not generally disband. For example, in 2007 only 361 corporations which is less than two per cent of the total disbanded (Sōmushō Daijin Kanbō Kanrishitsu 2008: 13). Hence one can infer that there has been a sharp rise in the number of public interest corporations after the Second World War. Also see Hayashi and Iriyama on the increase of public interest corporations after the war (1997: 96,125).

Shichihei Yamamoto refers to the ‘air’ (kūki) as dictating the social space of the Japanese (Yamamoto 1977), describing it in a similar manner to how seken is described in this chapter.

For example, at the at the 6 February 1948 meeting of the House of Representatives Committee on Culture, an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Shigeru Yosano, when asked about the UNESCO civil movement in Japan responded ‘we are not officially informed of the details of this activity such as its structure’ (Shūgiin Jimu Kyoku 1948a: 3).

However the people were not necessarily rejecting the emperor. In the same survey, when asked what they thought of him, 44 people responded favourably.

Even for the founding countries of the UN, it was not certain how much the international UN norm would be able to compete with existing domestic norms.

The English edition is the Study Group by the Japanese Association of International Law (1958)

Theoretical discussions on positive and negative peace, first put forward by Gultang (1969), is discussed in Chapter 3.

Subsequently, all three states have rejoined UNESCO: United Kingdom in 1997 and US and Singapore in 2007 respectively.

Japan was under the occupation of the Allied Forces between 15 August 1945, the date of Japan’s surrender, and 28 April 1952 the date of the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.

The government was especially excited by the warm welcome the Japanese association received at the UNESCO conference which included some of the member states expressing support for Japan’s early admittance (Ueda 1993: 17, 55).

The Communist Party were not opposed to the UNESCO Constitution but were opposed to the motion on the grounds that the Yoshida Cabinet was acting against the UNESCO Constitution.

In fact, by 1951 there were over 100 UNESCO associations and so there were probably already one association in every prefecture. However the Law has established a clear mandate for regional governments to offer financial support these associations.

UNICEF’s financial year ends 31 December and so have slightly different figures to that of the Japan UNICEF Association whose year end is 31 March.

On 20 November 1946, 450 tons of humanitarian aid such as milk powder and clothes from
LARA arrived at the port of Yokohama (Kôdansha 1989: 324-326).

48 At the time, letters that UNICEF’s office in Japan received included appreciation for items that UNICEF did not distribute in Japan (Mainichi Shimbun, 24 October 2005: 25).

49 The sample of this survey only consisted of 165 people which was eight per cent of an overall survey population of 2,052 people surveyed by the Central Community Chest who had made a donation to the Japan UNICEF Association in the past year.

50 The global outbreak of a new strain of influenza, known as the ‘swine flu’, in May 2009 gave another opportunity for the Japanese to discuss about ‘seken’ (Kamisato 2009: 35). The first confirmed case of the swine flu within Tokyo was of two high school students who were infected through their visit to New York between 14 to 16 May to attend the annual Model United Nations Conference. The school principal of the two girls apologised in tears through the media stating ‘I am very sorry to caused a stir amongst the seken’ and that he ‘feels socially responsible’ (Yomiuri Shimbun on 22 May 2009: 2). The schoolgirls similarly through their parents have apologised stating ‘I am very sorry to caused a stir’ but the school received numerous complaints from the public, some denouncing the school for allowing the students to travel to the United States, which was one of the countries with the highest cases of the flu, and another was ‘My child uses the same rail line as the infected girls. What if my child gets it from her?’ Also, some of the students at the school have said they do not want to wear their school uniform because of the stigma (Asahi Shimbun on 22 May 2009: 35). The school has temporarily closed taking into account these opinions of the seken. The school allowed the girls to travel to New York on consultation with the conference organiser, the United Nations Associations of the United States of America, but so far there has been no criticism over this case towards the Association or the United Nations in Japan.
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