Executive ownership, CEO over-confidence and firm policies

Bian, Huan (2018). Executive ownership, CEO over-confidence and firm policies. University of Birmingham. Ph.D.

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Abstract

Executive ownership and CEO over-confidence can affect the issue of firm policies. The thesis examines the influence of executive ownership on the firm accounting strategy and the dividend payout policy in China. The thesis also examines the influence of CEO over-confidence on the cash policy and the cash adjustment speed in the U.S. Firstly, I investigate the relationship between the executive ownership and accounting conservatism in China. The results show that accounting conservatism has a U shape relationship with the executive ownership. I further find that any deviations from the optimal executive ownership can increase accounting conservatism level in the firms. Secondly, I examine the relationship between executive ownership and dividend tunnelling behaviour in China. The results show that the increase of executive ownership can increase the dividend tunnelling behaviour. Thirdly, I investigate the relationship between CEO over-confidence and cash adjustment speed to make the cash reverse to the target cash level. The results show that the over-confident CEOs have the intentions to store more cash. Therefore, they reduce the cash adjustment speed when there is excess cash in the firm.

Type of Work:

Thesis (Doctorates > Ph.D.)

Award Type:

Doctorates > Ph.D.

Supervisor(s):