

NEGOTIATING FAITH: OBSERVANT CATHOLICS, CONSERVATISM AND THE
2000 BUSH CAMPAIGN

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the religious/political relationship between George W. Bush (the 43rd President of the United States) and conservative Catholics. Served by the over-lapping ideology of conservatism it presents a unique insight into the pragmatic, strategic and functionary role each played in the political service of the other. Unlike other studies this work argues that conservative Catholics, not Evangelicals, were at the vanguard of Bush's political drive. Although a transitory arrangement - centred around a select set of characters - the religious, ideological and political dynamic surrounding Bush was purposefully informed by careful, empirical analysis. Apprised by decades of examples: of challenges and changes, mistakes and opportunities, we see certain individuals move beyond ideas and analysis into coordinated organisation. The narrative of this transition, its players and outcomes argues that faith and politics deliberately negotiated with one another to strategically gain a moment for political traction. This negotiation was not, as has been frequently argued, a negotiation with religion or theology singularly in mind; but politics and policy. Mutual ideology, political affiliation and core aspects of their particular religious creeds facilitated this.

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CHAPTER ONE

The Virtues of the Catholic Vote - A Historical perspective.

In January 1999, Karl Rove, George W. Bush's chief political strategist, was clear: "The Catholic vote was going to be the key to winning the presidency in 2000."¹ This sentiment was echoed in preparation for the 2004 election when Bush's Catholic outreach and campaign advisor Deal Hudson stated: "If we lose any of the Catholic Vote we'll lose the election. Catholics," he added "Are key."² These statements were established on research and empirical data. Beginning in the mid-nineties certain events, circumstances, individuals and groupings combined to inform first Deal Hudson, then Karl Rove that a distinctive Catholic identity not only existed, but could – with the right strategy - significantly proffer both Catholic values and the political aspirations of George W. Bush. As a consequence, a Catholic strategy was positioned at the hub of the Bush campaign. Distinct in detail and character it represented one of the most important - if not inconspicuous - elements to the Office of Public Liaison within the administration. In due course this hopeful, predictive analysis had - they argued - been realised. following their labours, Catholics *had* delivered and any faith they once held in the virtue of a Catholic vote, redeemed.

Karl Rove's first objective was to establish George W. Bush in the White House. His second was to cement a dominant and lasting legacy for Republican Party hegemony. Religion, an indispensable component. As Allen D. Hertzke pointed out in *The Bible and the Ballot Box*, historically "From William Jennings Bryan's Evangelical crusade in 1896 to Catholic John F. Kennedy's quest in 1960, religious cross-currents have profoundly influenced past campaigns."³ The Bush campaign in 2000

was no exception. In fact, the religious ‘cross-currents’ were often unconcealed; the tone, character and influence of Bush’s personal and political quests deeply coloured by religion. To many, however, the display was overt and troublesome; but to those concerned it was a natural, functioning asset to their chosen political course. Ecumenical as well as practical, neither Rove or Bush eschewed the virtues of any constituency able to advance their cause. As a result, it is not surprising to discover a Catholic component early on in their development.

In detailing the formative years of Karl Rove’s growth as a political strategist, James Moore and Wayne Slater alluded to his meetings in the 1980s with Southern Evangelical Seminary’s Professor Richard Land. Land discovered he and Rove had “something in common.” Both emerging in their respective fields Land was attempting to “apply matters of religious faith, especially the limits on abortion, in public policy. Land was looking for ways to make good on Christian values by bonding them with the world of politics and policy. Rove, however, was looking for assets, resources he needed to build his machine for a Republican America. Land had a bloc of voters who wanted politicians to reflect their values: Rove had the politicians who needed the votes.”²⁴ Long before Bush’s political aspirations for a potential nexus between the two, a trade off, a *negotiation in faith and politics* that went beyond the general offering of religion for “emotional sustenance”²⁵ for the people was taking shape. Both were probing the other for serviceable groups. It was strategic. For Rove it was a model, a template to be overlaid on to a group of political value.

What Rove attempted to do in those early days and what he would continue to do, was tap into an ongoing, complex and burgeoning mobilisation decades in the making. While as we shall see later, the Evangelical component was arguably the *de facto* constituency for Bush, it was the engagement and installation of Catholics who made up the surprising and yet decisive elements to Bush’s

political agenda. It was not simply one dimensional. Both sides found succour in the virtues of one another. For the Bush campaign, however, the virtues of looking to Catholics for support added an array of benefits and advantages that moved beyond a comparable faith, into organisation, structure and therefore electoral scope. While Evangelicals possessed great organisation skill; media and political savvy, Catholics had deeper layers of cohesion and organisation to their history and socio-political presence. Collectively both formed a comprehensive, activist constituency whose members had structure and influence enough to affect elections. The primary difference, however, was one group (Evangelicals) were arguably onboard, the other (Catholics) required development and convincing.

Catholic political engagement, on which the Church itself purposefully developed an extensive 'Social Teaching,' providing principles for guiding Catholic thought and action in political, social and economic matters, were key to these advantages. Benefiting from a rich history of community-based and intellectual participation, was the added vigour by its institutional strength, organised hierarchy and clear Church teachings. Structurally it was, in theory, tailor-made. Another virtue - vital to our work - was the participatory involvement of that other layer of the Catholic Church the laity; who, post-war continued to emerge as a greater source of leadership and autonomy in numerous aspects of the Church's life and the community, its developments and activism. This, particularly in the intellectual community, led to greater recognition of the American Catholic, their place and role, not only in the Church, but within secular society, culture and politics too. Hence, a dynamic number of streams endeavoured to strike a strategic balance with one another. Rove was keen to intercept this.

Whilst we speak of a Catholic primacy within the religious amalgamation around Bush it is, momentarily, worth noting the Evangelical⁶ who were an indispensable and defining feature of the narrative. Interpreting Bush as being Evangelical centric was wholly understandable. Residing in Texas - informally known as part of the 'Bible Belt;' with its strong, socially conservative, Evangelical Protestant culture, both his personal life and political career were deeply intertwined with this culture. Like Ulysses Grant and William McKinley before him Bush was a Methodist, one of the largest mainline Protestant Church's in the United States. His parents were Episcopalian - which Methodists deemed to be too liberal and a much-too-tolerant off-shoot of his own Church. At ease with the Wesleyan tradition he naturally found some commonality with the more Evangelical aspects of the Protestant movement; that is: those who embrace salvation by faith in the atoning death of Jesus Christ through personal conversion - often referred to as 'born-again.' The connection often made to a spiritual adviser, like Evangelical Christian and Evangelist Billy Graham, helped prop-up the idea that Bush was easier to define this way; that is, as someone under the guidance and influence of a spiritual leader like Graham. In reality we discover a man able to engage numerous shades of Christian denominations. Either personally or professionally Bush was not short-sighted enough in his faith or career to act unwisely. Sufficient works exist detailing Bush's spiritual journey, his ideals and background and help, objectively establish the roots of his political career.⁷ They do not, however, mention a formative Catholic connection.

Nevertheless, what we witness early in George W. Bush's political biography was, amidst his ability to blend and manoeuvre, a Catholic element. Governor Bush's religious character and ecumenical approach meant that politically he did not have to strive too hard to sell his credentials. A convert to Christianity in 1985 (Bush has never referred to himself as 'born again,') he naturally made inroads into the heart of the Christian community. Ethically there is no reason to suggest duplicity in

his actions. As a consequence of his religious familiarity he was charged with helping his father (George H. W. Bush) navigate Evangelical circles, acting as Evangelical liaison to the campaign in 1988.⁸ Karl Rove - then a young strategist - was quick to see the connection. As Wayne Slater's interview with Rove revealed, long before Bush "was a candidate for Governor, Rove was taking him around to different people in Austin and elsewhere in Texas to peddle him as a potential candidate for the Texas gubernatorial election position in 1994."⁹ Among those they encountered, "religious leaders in Houston and elsewhere," they "saw in Bush the potential of someone who talked religiously and was a person of religious faith." As Wayne Slater points out: "Karl saw the mechanics of religion. If Bush was a candidate who had religion inside him, Karl was a person who understood that the externals of religion, the machinery of religion, and the constituents could be important in electing you, if only you could appeal to them on their terms."¹⁰ Bush was perfect.

Ordinarily, the appearance of Catholics would not feature so early in the narrative. Nonetheless, Texas was denominationally a strong Catholic base. In advance of any attention there is evidence of an attachment and relationship with Catholics. This can be explained by the large Hispanic population; which, in 1985 - the year Bush converted - stood at 3.7 million.¹¹ This equated to 602,000 Hispanics. Rove and Bush were cognoscent scent of this. Robert Draper's political account of Bush and Rove in Texas highlights their keen understanding of the Texas demographic. The "future of Texas," he noted and "indeed most of America, was not a tale of red or blue, black or white. It was brown. The countries population was surging with Latinos, and conservatives ignored this at their peril." Attempting to put a "new face on conservatism,"¹² Draper continued, Bush expressed to a Texas reporter in 1998 the importance of inclusive language and how Hispanics had "enriched [his] state."¹³ Although Bush was a Methodist; David Aikman, one of Bush's biographers, noted several points that made an early and positive connection to the Catholic base. For example,

the United Methodist Church (UMC) to whom Bush belonged was, “In no way part of the Religious Right;” but a “mainstream Protestant Denomination” and while this goes some way to putting distance between Bush and the fervour for linking him to the Religious Right, it may perhaps explain a more conciliatory approach to others, namely Hispanic Catholics. Strongly committed to social work programmes within the UMC Bush and his wife were, between 1989 and 1995 “active in various Church committees, in particular a program aimed at low-income, largely Hispanic families,”¹⁴ at the Wesley-Rankin Community Centre in Dallas.

Through out this period a Catholic connection continued. Notably former board director for Catholic Charities of Houston from 1989–1993, Alberto R. Gonzales was appointed Bush’s General Counsel during his governorship of Texas.¹⁵ In fact, Bush’s policy as Governor - which undoubtedly won him support - was one of inclusion. The notion of the *Lion and the Lamb*, of Evangelicals and Catholics together, was something Evangelical Christians - that is: Bush’s base community, were not prone to consider. Even so, side-stepping the pivotal issue of immigration reform and focusing on policies of health, jobs and education, stressing the idea that essentially Hispanics were good, hard working, family orientated and conservative at heart, helped Bush erode these Christian barriers. To assist, Bush’s network included Lionel Sosa, Hispanic-American advertising and marketing executive and political consultant. In 1998 Sosa helped Bush win support for his reelection bid from Hispanic voters by linking his “compassionate conservative” philosophy to the traditional Hispanic values of family, faith and the work ethic. It worked. When he won a landslide victory for a second term as Governor of Texas in 1998, Bush set a political precedent, Hispanic’s voting for him by “49% when he ran for a second term.”¹⁶ This was more than any previous Republican. His approach and relationship with Hispanics was not harmed by his brother’s conversion to Catholicism in 1995 and his marriage to a Mexican Catholic.

These examples, although slight, offer the first illustration of a Catholic connection, something of an awareness of various religious layers other than Evangelical Protestantism. The political value of faith, negotiation and an introduction to Catholicism through the demographic of Hispanics. This provided a valuable template for both Rove and Bush. On the basis that nearly all presidential campaigns have historically chosen to construct some form of 'one-size-fits-all' Catholic strategy, the introduction Rove and Bush received allowed them to see Catholics through a different lens.

Ordinarily, evaluation of the Catholic and the Catholic vote raised the question: is there such a thing as a distinct Catholic vote? - that is: a Catholic bloc who vote according to what the Church or their Bishops tell them and as complete adherents with the tenets of their religion? Early examples of Bush's relationship with Catholics would tend to imply Bush had an idea they were not so easy to define. Nevertheless, the answer - based upon past campaigns, suggests the belief in a distinct bloc was affirmative. If Catholics could be interpreted in this manner then the assumption was it could be targeted, appealed to and brought into the campaign. This, however, is a myth. To the modern campaign the notion of 'one Catholic bloc,' or a 'monolithic Catholic voting bloc,' found its way into common acceptance, largely because of the Kennedy campaign in 1960, when Catholics of all stripes coalesced - *en masse* - around a Catholic presidential candidate. As we shall see, this image was misleading. In reality, however, the political, social and economic driving forces that influence and connect Catholics are no different than for other Americans. As a particular denomination (a subgroup within the Christian religion), operating under a common name; tradition, and identity; it is understandable why they may be thought of as a homogenous unit. Past campaigns have been replete with this notion. As a result, a more forensic approach to their make-up and character was often lacking.

The formulation of Bush's Catholic out-reach went somewhat to changing this. Instead of focusing on the aggregate they focused on the particular as well. This did not mean, however, that developmentally, they discounted a cohesive approach. On the contrary, it just meant a greater recognition of the various layers and dynamics were added too. Either way there has always been a belief that this bloc was both prized and worthy of attention. There are three areas to help explain the possible virtues of looking to the Catholic vote in this way. First, demographic; second, geographic and lastly their wide ranging institutional presence and activity. It is these that have largely underpinned most campaigns.

In the first instance, Catholics due to the size of their community, have - at least in theory - the potential to dwarf other voting blocs. Gallup estimated Catholics as a whole represent 25%¹⁷ of the American population, making the tradition one of the larger demographic subgroups in the electorate. This figure is corroborated by CARA (Centre for Applied Research in the Apostolate) who states the Catholic share of the U.S. adult population has "held fairly steady in recent decades, at around a similar 25%."¹⁸ In short, Catholics represent the largest single religious denomination within the United States. At a glance these figures suggest coherence, that Catholics are, by virtue of their name or label a unified, uniform bloc. Commonly it is this that advocates the notion Catholics are monolith and can therefore be targeted. Even Deal Hudson - a man far more familiar with the variety of subtle distinctions and differences of American Catholics noted their number; a number that if stimulated, can still make a difference. Conscious of their potential power, he referred to it as a "slumbering giant."¹⁹ Of course, there is the possibility that Catholics - like others - can be brought together, but this is highly unlikely. E. J. Dionne was more analytical.

"There is no Catholic vote in the sense of a bloc that moves predictably toward one Party. Despite a

certain convergence of views among Catholics—a concern for social justice, a collective dedication to the value of the family—Catholics haven’t voted as a bloc since the early 1960s when they solidly backed America’s one and only Catholic president, John F. Kennedy and his successor, Lyndon B. Johnson.” And yet - concluded Dionne: “it matters.”²⁰

On detail; on doctrine for example, it could be argued that examples such as abortion do indeed make the Church arguably homogenous. William Prendergast’s *The Catholic Voter in American Politics: The Passing of the Democratic Monolith* hints at a time when Catholics were indeed cohesive and arguably indivisible. For example: The New Deal Democratic coalition that put Franklin D. Roosevelt in the White House and the Democratic Party in control of Congress combined support from the working class and various ethnic and minority groups. Patrick Allitt used the metaphor “Catholic Ghetto” to describe the “set of institutions” and their “distinctive way of life, shared needs and requirements”²¹ that fed into and supported such political achievements. This does not, however, capture the view Catholics had of themselves as a particular group; segregated and often at variance with the rest of America. Before the Second World War the “ghetto infrastructure of school, convent and rectory” was a “mixed blessing.” On the one hand it demonstrated pride, individualism, a type of cohesion and strength. On the other, it was a “claustrophobic, vacuum; aloof”²² from America. In this respect argued Martin Marty, Catholics were not alone, the “American population consist[ing] entirely of competing ethnic, religious and political minorities, each one laying claim to ‘ghetto status.’”²³ The Democratic Party’s appeal to blue-collar workers, low-income individuals, and recent immigrant groups located firmly in the East or Mid-West was a call to *all* Catholics. But monolithic?

For the most part, however, the expression ‘ghetto’ was used pejoratively, particularly by Protestants, their anti-Catholic stance suggesting that Catholics - in any bloc form - was here to throw a shadow over *their* domain. It was erroneous. John F. Kennedy’s election in 1960 remains perhaps the only example of Catholics forming collectively. This includes nationally. Indeed, we have to question if any, one group can ever be categorised completely as one. Despite their number they are not and nor do they act like a monolith. One element assisting in this view is polling and survey data. This puts forward the idea that descriptions are straightforward. Based on their request for a person’s religious affiliation (Catholic, Evangelical or Jewish), over simplifies their identity, the straightforwardness of the polling unable to expose its complexity. Like other groups this fails to identify the influential aspects associated with age, opinion, history, heritage, region, ideology or gender. For example, as a primarily immigrant population from Europe, their ways, mores and customs differ greatly from the growing wave of Catholics from, say, Hispanic descent in Texas.

While Ed Kilgore writing for the *American Prospect* argued there is no Catholic vote, only a voter who votes like everyone else,²⁴ to which Bishop John F. Noll, founder of National Catholic newspaper *Our Sunday Visitor* concurred with: “There was no distinct Catholic vote - Catholics voted just like any other Americans;”²⁵ the case for viewing Catholics as something of a singular body remain. Perhaps more accurately, David C. Leege and Paul D. Mueller argued Catholics were “a mosaic difficult to capture.”²⁶ This analogy was more appropriate, at least going some way to explaining why, without dismissing the idea, Catholics as a conceptual body had their allure. They may indeed vote as other Americans; however, their religion is the tie that binds them; putting them into religious congregations, organised together in an established institutional structure. Mutual commitment, accountability, a common sense of mission and history, a core set of beliefs and a

particular creed, make the case for Catholics being interpreted as - but not necessarily acting as, a singular body.

To stimulate this belief or interpretation, it was believed that this body had a locale, an actual set of bearings in which they could be found. This brings us to the second aspect considered valuable in the political pursuit of the Catholic vote: geography. The potential numerical value of Catholics mentioned above was for some time considered to reside in large population states; states that possessed a high number of Electoral College votes. The theory, put simply, was if these large percentages of Catholics could be gained they logically they would be reflected in the voting outcome of those states and subsequently in the election. Although the Bush strategy would bring this theory into some question the idea - historically at least - was reasonable. If we look at the States that offer the most Electoral College votes (see Table 1.) and then place Catholic percentages (see Table 2.) next to them the idea appears plausible.

TABLE 1.²⁷

Rank	State	Electoral Votes
1.	California	55
3.	Texas	38
2.	New York	29
4.	Florida	29
5.	Pennsylvania	20
6.	Illinois	20
7.	Ohio	18
8.	Michigan	16
9.	Georgia	16
9.	North Carolina	15
9.	New Jersey	14

TABLE 2.28

Rank	State	%
1.	California	32.0
3.	Texas	28.0
2.	New York	38.0
4.	Florida	26.0
5.	Pennsylvania	27.4
6.	Illinois	29.0
7.	Ohio	23.0
8.	Michigan	23.0
9.	Georgia	8.9
9.	North Carolina	11.0
9.	New Jersey	37.0

As we can see, the percentages across all high value states are - given their Catholic populations - significant. This value can be increased if we add other states with similar if not higher values of Catholic percentages. The picture then looks even more promising. For example: the heavily Catholic populated states of Massachusetts with (44%) of Catholics, Rhode Island (51%), Connecticut (45%), New Hampshire (35%), Vermont (38%), Wisconsin (31%) Louisiana (28%) and New Mexico (40%) add significant prospect if - the vote can be captured. Other dimensions can be added. For example: more than half (55%) of the U.S. Hispanic population resides in three, key electoral states: California, Texas, and Florida. California has the nation's largest Hispanic population. On this bases alone the virtue in seeking to lock-in the Catholic vote appears well reasoned.

Of course, this configuration is relatively modern. It also works on the notion that all Catholics contained within these percentages were the same and easily determinable. Qualitatively, however, this is not the case. Like everyone other American, the natural distribution and influence of culture and society modified them. For example: Catholics, once anchored to the inner-city "Rust Belt" - also known as the Manufacturing Belt - of the economic Northeastern, Midwest States had by the

1990s moved on. The old fashioned boundaries, once precise, have, post-war been eroded, the demarcation of the American Catholic now open to different interpretations. In short, Catholic geographic distribution across the country had changed. While this movement is not unique to Catholics, but other faiths too, it has seen their demographic move from the inner-city and 'Rust Belt' to the 'Sun Belt' and beyond. This transition is not to be underestimated. The effects of their mobility not just limited to geography but cultural and intellectual too. Re-shaped and re-invigorated the post-war Catholic was presented with new advantages and assets that ultimately transcended into their political character. This was a particularly pertinent for Deal Hudson in his later analysis of Catholics - who - like himself, could not be fitted into a neat, geographical slot. The question he would later pose was how to find and approach these new locations and communities.

Lastly, and perhaps the most important of Catholic virtues, was their institutional presence and activity. Moving beyond Patrick Allitt's metaphor of the 'Catholic Ghetto' the American Catholic Rove and Hudson looked to was a far more dynamic, spirited and changed creature. This was due to the war. World War Two demonstrated one thing to American Catholics: American beliefs and ideals were consistent with Catholicism. The strong, moral framework of Catholics rooted in family, country and faith were exposed by conflict to be one and the same. Following decades of relative isolation and suspicion Catholics ventured to question their role and position, not just as Catholics, but Americans. Through shared fears, loss and desires, American Catholics were beginning to feel an integral part of American society. More specifically, America found it increasingly difficult to view Catholics with suspicion and as outsiders. As with the rest of America, World War Two forced Catholics to look beyond the fringes of their own parish and community. The evils abroad were a threat to Christianity and democratic freedom at home and could not be ignored. For the first time it was not Catholics who were the enemy but others. To demonstrate this the administrative board of

the National Catholic Welfare Conference wrote a letter to Roosevelt proclaiming: “We place at your disposal our institutions and their consecrated personnel.”²⁹

Deal Hudson, described how Catholics, “disproportionately represented in the Armed services during World War Two were determined to pursue their piece of the American dream.” Having endured the same hardships they were not, he argued, “going to countenance anti-Catholic habits of an earlier generation.”³⁰ To date, little attention has been paid to the American Catholic and their relationship or involvement in the war but one thing is clear: if American Catholics could once be described as one, tightly cohesive subculture then World War Two began to pull them out from what was effectively isolationism. This was important. Not only was this the period that underpinned all of our main protagonists generationally, but, it was these changes that opened up spaces into which they and new generations of Catholics could move into and prosper. Hudson was one of them. Ironically, politics was slow to recognise this. In fact, it would be down to Deal Hudson to identify and utilise the new developments.

As the United States entered a period of unprecedented economic prosperity coupled with significant political influence abroad it stimulated a deliverance from years of economic depression to which Catholics took significant advantage. Following the end of the war American Catholicism accomplished unprecedented growth. Analysis carried out by Patrick W. Carey detailed the Catholic population “increased by 90 percent, from 23.9 million to 45.6 million. The number of Bishops and Archbishops increased by 58 percent, Clergy by 52 percent and seminaries by 127 percent. One hundred and twenty three new hospitals, 3,005 new catholic elementary and secondary schools increased by 3.1 million - more than 120 percent and Catholic colleges and Universities from 92,4226 to 384,526.”³¹ As these figures suggest it was not possible for Catholic proliferation to not

filter into broader scheme of American life and society and of course, politics. Catholic historian Michael Perko expressed the view that post-war, in particular the 1950's, was a "golden age." The Church, he wrote, "exercised a role in American life previously unknown; becoming a significant force in American society."³²

Other factors contributed. In addition to a sense of belonging the United States entered a period of unmatched economic prosperity. Catholics - like the rest of America - flourished. Between 1945 and 1965 Catholic population increased 90 percent.³³ To accommodate new churches, schools, seminaries and hospitals evolved. To assist the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, known as the G.I. Bill, consolidated Catholics and American society further. Designed to avert a post-war depression the G.I. Bill provided returning veterans with funds for college education, unemployment insurance and assistance purchase housing, farms and businesses. This provided an invaluable gateway that up-until then was not possible.

A once tight subculture, ostensibly set in a type of religious, cultural and social isolationism, had become unencumbered. Now active and participatory post-war Catholics were - like others - in a new relationship with America. Slowly the psychology as well as the practicality of being an inner-city, union belonging descendent of an immigrant under-class was both breaking up and spreading out. For the first time in modern American history Catholics were becoming socially mobile. Better educated, attaining higher professions and migration created a situation in which, with greater autonomy, Catholics were now able to shape and define their own environment. Reflecting on this, professor David J. O'Brian optimistically noted: the "American experience tests our faith quite as properly as our faith tests our American culture." The "Catholic experience in the United States," he argued, "has been a story of success, not failure, a story of liberation from poverty and

marginalisation;” which gave “birth to rich, diverse subcultures,”³⁴ pulling Catholics from their ethnic, ghetto conclaves.

More to the point, the psychology as well as the practicality of these changes began to see changes cut across into the political. More to the point, the Democratic Party, long considered the political home of Catholics, began to fracture. David R. Carlin argued they were the “clear party of choice for American Catholics.” The motivation for support and alignment were based upon a Party who had shown “special concern for the urban working classes and for the children and grandchildren of immigrants; its social justice ideas were often very similar to the social justice ideas outlined in Papal encyclicals (such as *Rerum Novarum* and *Quadragesimo Anno*); it was emphatically patriotic and, like the Vatican, emphatically anti-Communist; it was strong on military defence; and it did almost nothing to defy or to undermine Catholic moral values.”³⁵ As Henry C. Kenski and William Lockwood note: “New Deal” Catholics had been historically and solidly “at the very heart of the Democratic Party; providing one-third of the Democratic presidential vote despite constituting only one quarter of the population.”³⁶ With such a broad range of seemingly solid and favourable appeal it is important to understand why Catholics looked to leave their political home and in turn open up their vote to others.

Generally, two reasons are cited for a Catholic split. First, economic; second, culture. Economically it is thought that because of their immigrant past Catholics were confined to the Democratic Party because of its position on social welfare. What is more, the Church has been a strong advocate for labor unions. In fact, during the Great Depression in the 1930’s, many Catholic priests worked to support the rights of workers, including the right to join unions. For the Democratic Party, union members were the foot soldiers of their cause. Catholic social mobility post-war changed this. In

simple terms there was a shift from blue collar to white collar occupation. Catholics, like other Americans became upwardly mobile, their choices, opinions and values changing accordingly. Culturally, post-war Catholics were besieged on a number of sides. This was also true of matters within the Church. Matters of social morality, community and personal norms were probing and shaping the growth, development and reforms of the new, post-war Catholic. The Civil Rights movement, the sexual revolution, Korea and Vietnam, Women's Liberation, new alternative religions, school prayer, abortion, same-sex marriage as well as growing ideological divisions with the Church, were all contributive. It was, however, the liberal nature of these transformations that made the Republican Party appealing as an alternative to the removal or loosening of orthodox ideas. This, as we shall see later, was the opening needed for conservatism to begin to establish itself.

Overall, these cleavages of Catholics and the Catholic vote meant that because there was not a complete realignment to any one Party, Catholics became known as a 'swing vote;' that is: a vote that is seen as potentially going to either of the two dominant political parties. In reality, as Kristin E. Heyer points out, "neither political party is fully consistent with the teachings of the Catholic Church."³⁷ Nevertheless, the contest was now opening for both Catholics to be appealed to and the political made appealing. Perhaps one of the more surprising details in this new era of mutual concessions was the Church itself. In every election since 1976 the Church presented its own request for the political; the "United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) releasing a statement encouraging Catholics to vote; outlining Church teachings that are important to the political issues being debated." This is noteworthy because in their 1999 statement the USCCB recognised the limited choices of the U.S. political system and its value to them as a source for reflecting their issues. It read: "Sometimes it seems few candidates and no Party fully reflect our

values.”³⁸ It was not, however, a call for a withdraw but to advance. The greatest marker for this advance into the political arena was Vatican II in the early 1960s. This was an international council of bishops called by Pope John XXIII to Rome between 1962 and 1965 for the purpose of ‘updating’ the Church—making its traditional doctrines and rituals relevant for the modern world, was a seminal moment for American Catholics. It was arguably one of the most important events in modern religious history, generating significant latitude for the political to take interest in a more dimensional American Catholic, a Catholic discovering numerous changes and challenges to their social, cultural and political environment.

This brings us to our last point. One appeal for the political - often taken for granted - is structure. In the case of Catholics their institutional presence possess traits others do not. The Church - itself an operational and constitutional system, is constructed around an elaborate infrastructure, based on diocese run by bishops appointed by the pope. Each diocese set up a network of parishes, schools, colleges, hospitals, orphanages and other charitable institutions. In 2000, for example, CARA reported 45,699 priests; 19,236 parishes; 8,090 primary and secondary schools.³⁹ In addition to this there are 221 Catholic Colleges and Universities; 615 Catholic Hospitals; 404 health centres and a charities network with 1,600 agencies and institutions.⁴⁰ This does not include other structures like the USCCB or Catholic conferences, (the public policy arm of America’s Catholic bishops at the state level) and lay Catholics like Deal Hudson and their media networks, who represented other forms of Catholic interaction and dissemination. It is somewhat unique, however, that the ‘top-down’ authority structure of the Church; that is: from Pope to Bishop, actually see a more ‘congregational’ style of agency take place. Whilst recognising the Church and its authority it has nevertheless allowed individuals like Hudson to rise and make significant impact on the faith. Mark Chaves, specialising in the sociology of religion, suitably theorised that denominations - within the

state - are composed of two parallel structures. These comprise of a religious authority structure and an agency structure. Uniquely, Chaves argues that contrary to how the organisational order within denominations are commonly perceived, it is the horizontal, rather than vertical nature of that either guides or delivers the corporeal. These may also be divided into the 'internal' and 'external.' So, agency structures (lay Catholics, unions, staff, academics) work with and engage the real and/or secular world; whereas, the organisational or hierarchy (Rome, clergy, bishops and conferences) focus on Church doctrine and control.

What this represented for the political was a grass-tops, grass-roots organisation, ready made to be tapped into and mobilised. In theory it was a complete, functioning agency, so broad in scope that that rationally it had to some virtue or potential. To add great scope for Catholics to interact the political inadvertently opened up fresh spaces in which Catholics found them selves free to act away from the national, hierarchical conversation. If the move of the Catholic Church closer to the centre of American society and politics was not enough, then the future devolution of responsibility for policy making from the Federal governments to the state, made a significant difference too. As the move towards devolution grew it became clear that this was the battle ground for issues of most concern to religious advocacy. Catholics were no different to anyone else in the citizenry for being adaptive to their provincial concerns. Doctrinally, however, it played straight into Catholic hands by appealing to their idea of Subsidiarity; that is: social and political issues should be dealt with at the most immediate (or local) level. As former Speaker of the United States House of Representatives and Catholic Tip O'Neill once stated: "all politics is local."⁴¹

This breakdown or deconstruction of the American Catholic would be advantageous to Bush, advantageous because it went beyond attempting to view or understand Catholics as definable in

broader and often simplistic terms. In short, it opened up new areas for political targeting and engagement. Religion rather than denomination was a dividing line in American politics Bush understood. Even without the later input by individuals like Deal Hudson, Bush was aware that the best predictor of the religious, their issues, concerns and vote choice is their religiosity, *not* necessarily their religious affiliation. The family, for example, is a central concern, regardless of denomination. This insight into the workings and nuances of religion and that religions function at a ground level, gave individuals like Bush and Rove the knowledge that you had to be cautious when attempting to define religion as either exclusively left or right, progressive or conservative, Catholic or Evangelical. This kind of awareness allowed for a more conscious and detailed crafting of religion and politics.

By the time Bush began to turn his attention to the presidency the political and religious landscape had then changed profusely. By the mid-1990s the potential virtues advanced by Catholics for political gain had grown exponentially. Actively encouraged to become political, the new, post-war American Catholic, better educated and better financed had gained with these changes a sense of autonomy that in part meant they were no longer the sole property of the Democratic Party. The Parties stand on social and cultural issues, such as abortion, the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) and homosexuality, unwittingly helped Catholics - once its core constituency - drift away. In addition, significant changes within the Church saw the moral compass move. With no conflict on the part of Republicans in utilising moral issues or moral stances, Catholics, in particular conservative Catholics - troubled by these and other transformations, were not to be bypassed. Following Alexis de Tocqueville's maxim for political pragmatism: 'if it works, we don't really care why,' both Rove and Bush were calculating enough to add 'whatever works' into their blueprint.

The constitutive effect of what value Catholics potentially possessed had to be advantaged and to do this required a far more complex set of ingredients.

¹ Deal Hudson. *Onward Christian Soldiers. The Growing Political Power of Catholics and Evangelicals in the United States*. (New York: Threshold Editions, 2008) p.182

² Deborah Caldwell, "Bush's Catholic Courtship Strategy" Beliefnet, 2006
<http://www.beliefnet.com/News/2004/06/Bushs-Catholic-Courtship-Strategy.aspx?p=1> (09/05/07)

³ Allen D. Hertzke, "Harvest of Discontent: Religion and Populism in the 1988 Presidential Campaign," in *The Bible and the Ballot box, Religion and Politics in the 1988 Election*, Ed., James L. Guth & John C. Green, (Westview Press, 1991) p.3

⁴ James Moore & Wayne Slater, *The architect*. (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2007), p.21-22

⁵ Sara Diamond, *Not by Politics Alone, The Enduring Influence of the Christian Right*, (Guilford Press, 1998) p.9

⁶ We refer here to Evangelical as denoting a tradition within Protestant Christianity which emphasises the authority of the Bible, personal conversion, and the doctrine of salvation by faith in the Atonement. Evangelicals can be described as traditionalist, centrist or modernist. It is a trans-denominational movement within Protestant Christianity including numerous historically related denominations.

⁷ See: *The Faith of George W. Bush* By Stephen Mansfield & *A Man of Faith: The Spiritual Journey of George W. Bush* By David Aikman

⁸ Uncertain and uncomfortable about how to act and speak to the burgeoning conservative religious movement George H. W. Bush looked to his newly reformed and connected son to bridge the gap. Bush Jr. was supported in this by Doug Wead, an Assembly of God preacher who helped make the connection between the Bush family and many prominent conservative Christians. *Time* magazine called Wead an "insider in the Bush family orbit." Wead was one of a circle of advisers who played crucial part building, shaping and directing the Bush political and religious trajectory for Evangelicals.

Time Magazine, November 6, 2000, p. 63.

- ⁹ Wayne Slater, “Karl Rove The Architect, Frontline, PBS April 12 2005
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/architect/interviews/slater.html> (26/03/13)
- ¹⁰ Ibid.
- ¹¹ David L. Word, Population Estimates by Race and Hispanic Origin for ..., Volume 3, p. 65
<https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=De4jUGUqjtIC&pg=PA65&lpg=PA65&dq=1985+texas+hispanics&source=bl&ots=J6KI8tTLL1&sig=W1vprNRW7NFCe1IPdoVLiTI2JtM&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKewjc9pWfiteKAhUIG5oKHeHyCs0Q6AEIHDA#v=onepage&q=1985%20%20texas%20hispanics&f=false>
 (26/03/13)
- ¹² A feature of his compassionate conservative model.
- ¹³ Robert Draper, *Dead Certain, the Presidency of George W. Bush*, (Free Press, 2007) p.373-4
- ¹⁴ David Aikman, *A man of Faith, The Spiritual Journey of George W. Bush*, (W Publishing Group, 2004) p.88
- ¹⁵ Later, in February 2005 he was rewarded by becoming the highest-ranking Hispanic in executive government when he was made the first Hispanic United States Attorney General 2005 - 2007.
- ¹⁶ Ibid. p.108
- ¹⁷ Jeffrey M. Jones, Catholic Vote Still Up for Grabs. Gallup. October 26, 2004
<http://www.gallup.com/poll/13789/catholic-vote-still-grabs.aspx> (7/06/10)
- ¹⁸ CARA (Centre for Applied Research in the Apostolate) is a national, non-profit, Georgetown University affiliated research centre that conducts social scientific studies about the Catholic Church.
<http://cara.georgetown.edu/Winter%202008.pdf> (7/06/10)
- ¹⁹ Deal Hudson, *Onward Christian Soldiers, the growing Political power of Catholics and Evangelicals in the united States*, (Threshold Editions, 2008) p.221
- ²⁰ E.J. Dionne, Jr., “There Is No 'Catholic Vote.' And Yet, It Matters,” *The Washington Post*, June 18, 2000
<http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2000/06/18elections-jr> (5/02/16)
- ²¹ Patrick Allitt, *Catholic Intellectuals and the Conservative politics in America 1950-1985*, (Cornell University, 1993) p.13
- ²² Michael W. Cuneo, *The Smoke of Satan, Conservative and Traditionalist Dissent in Contemporary American Catholicism*, (Oxford University Press, 1997) p.9
- ²³ Martin Marty, “The Catholic Ghetto and all Other ghettos,” *Catholic Historical Review*, 68 (April 1982) p. 185-205
- ²⁴ See Jamelle Bouie “There is No Catholic Vote, Catholics vote like just about everyone else,” *The American Prospect*, February 21, 2012
<http://prospect.org/article/there-no-catholic-vote> (7/06/10)
- ²⁵ Robert P. Lockwood, “The (Not-So-Mindless) American Catholic Voter,” *The Catholic Answers Magazine*.
<http://www.catholic.com/magazine/articles/the-not-so-mindless-american-catholic-voter> (16/7/13)
- ²⁶ David C. Leege and Paul D. Mueller, “How Catholic is the Catholic Vote?” *American Catholics and Civil Engagement*, p.214
- ²⁷ Electoral votes for each state
<http://state.1keydata.com/state-electoral-votes.php> (16/7/13)
- ²⁸ BeliefNet. State-by-State Percentage of White Evangelicals, Catholics, and Black Protestants.
 Sources: 2004 National Surveys of Religion and Politics, 2001 American Religious Identification Survey, 2000 Glenmary Religious Congregations and Membership in the U.S., United States Census, 2002 Gallup Polls.
<http://www.beliefnet.com/Faiths/2004/11/State-By-State-Percentage-Of-White-Evangelicals-Catholics-And-Black-Protestants.aspx> (10/02/16)
- ²⁹ Pastoral letter quoted in Kenneth J. Heineman, *Catholic New Deal: Religion and Reform in Depression Pittsburgh*, (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999) p.201

- ³⁰ Deal Hudson, *Onward Christian Soldiers, the growing Political power of Catholics and Evangelicals in the united States*, (Threshold Editions, 2008) p.247
- ³¹ Patrick W. Carey, *Catholics in America, A History*, (Praeger Publishers, 1993) p.93
- ³² Michael F. Perko, *Catholic and American*, (Our Sunday Publishing, 1989) p.237
- ³³ Official Catholic Directory for 1945 and 1965, Pl, 2:1
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- ³⁷ Kristin E. Heyer, Mark J. Rozell, Michael A. Genovese, *Catholics and Politics: The Dynamic Tension Between Faith and Power*, (George Town University Press, 2008) p.96
- ³⁸ Ibid. p.76
- ³⁹ CARA. U.S. Data.
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CHAPTER TWO

Conservatism congruent with faith: The development of conservative Catholic Politics

In relation to those complex ingredients, one of the most important and intriguing aspects of the Catholic character was its ideology, an important part of our dialogue between faith and politics. As conservative Richard Weaver wrote: “Ideas have consequences.”¹ It was a mantra post-war American conservatives were intent on bringing about. Thanks to a small body of intellectual Catholic laity, the central pillars of conservative ideology (liberty, tradition, rule of law, moral realism, marriage, family and the sanctity of life and belief in Godhead) were formulated. Composed out of concerns that post-war their values were being eroded by a surge in liberalism, a liberalism willing to subordinate theology for morality and frame its own beliefs with secular notions akin to the European enlightenment, were anathema. Liberal notions of openness, diversity, pluralism and tolerance, forced conservatives to look to and promote their own principles. What followed was essentially a ‘values war’ a conflict in advance of the ‘culture wars’ to follow. If, however, these Catholic orientated intellectual conservatives had the desire to remain fixed, anchored to an unchangeable or ‘conservative’ environment in which it was possible to simply take an opposing position and soberly comment or pass judgement on liberal developments, they were mistaken. The development or transition of these Catholic conservatives from passive to assertive is integral to understanding our chief protagonists, their approaches and world view as well as giving the Republican Party a discernibly conservative agenda and philosophy.

Post-war, liberals could see the fruits of their ideas and desires. Irving Kristol, unofficially named the “Godfather of Neo-conservatism,”² (the political movement born in the 1960s among

conservative-leaning Democrats who became disenchanted with the Party), alluded to this: “it was when the Great Society programs were launched that we began to distance our selves from the newest versions of liberalism.”³ Welfare, one of its cornerstones, was robbing the basic unit of American society; the family, of its function. In addition: Permissiveness, drugs, pornography, homosexuality and - crucially - abortion, the very sanctity of life itself - were not only loathsome, but dangerous. As a result, there was a growing call to rally and help slow or stop this modern, American age of post-war decline. As David Riesman noted as early as 1950 in his work: *The Lonely Crowd* the character of America was changing, its citizens substituting conformity for individualism and structure for freedom. With faith (Catholicism) integral to their ideology with its long established, stabilising features (as mentioned above), conservatives did not find it necessary to explain the certitude between ideology and faith. To them it was enough that the back-bone to their ideology was strong enough to buttress their stance against liberalism.

Despite evidence to the contrary, the Catholic Church was most often considered to be a liberal institution. This, in part, from a political perspective, was due to its unofficial support for the Democratic Party and its programmes. Although there is no official line connecting either the Church or Catholics to any particular ideology or political party, the ties, nevertheless, did exist. As we shall see, part of the task for conservatives and the Republican Party, was to break these ties. Even so, the connection between conservatism and Catholicism was much closer than realised. It is open to debate whether the connection was *inherent* or *coherent* in nature? In short, was there something inherent in the way orthodox Catholicism developed post-1945 that made it convergent with conservatism and the way Catholics acted, participated and/or voted after 1945? Or, were we seeing a coherent connection: a carefully considered or organised relationship that was mutual along the lines of a particular argument, theory, party or policy? Our contention is the latter, the idea

that there was something deliberative in their construction and actions. While originally seeking to preserve a notion of American society and culture in their image against the changes brought about by the New Deal and the Fair Deal, we can also see further activity as the decades progressed and the challenges grew more pressing. It is, however, worth mentioning these early events because not only were they the catalyst for conservative Catholic development which fed so strongly into the Bush campaign and presidency, but they set a number of questions for American Catholics that arguably remains to this day.

In response to the Great Depression, President Franklin D. Roosevelt's series of domestic programs, known as the New Deal and sometimes referred to as the 'Three Rs:' Relief, Recovery and Reform, sat comfortable with mainstream American Catholics. No in-depth research had been undertaken into the full extent of the relationship between Catholics and Roosevelt; however, his campaign and administration was arguably the first to mount a planned appeal to Catholics. Advantageously Roosevelt was not shackled by any notion of anti-Catholicism and as a result of New Deal "Catholics began to emerge in significant numbers as officeholders in the federal government, cabinet posts and [presidential] advisors."⁴ Overall it seemed New Deal meshed with the social doctrine of the Church and in the main Catholics appeared content. Relying heavily on the ethnic Catholic constituencies in the industrial, urban political machines as well as the labour movements for its support of the New Deal. This may account for Millions of Catholic voters who helped bring Roosevelt his landslide victory in 1936. Estimates of the number of Catholics voting for FDR range from 70% - 81%. FDR supporter Fr. John A. Ryan estimated that 70% of the Catholic clergy voted for the President. Father Maurice Sheehy, another pro-Roosevelt priest, estimated that 76% of Catholics voted for the incumbent.⁵

Others, however, were less enthused. A small band of Catholic laypeople interpreted the liberal reforms and policies of the New Deal as a socialist threat, contrary to the American way, nannyng the individual, robbing them of their self determination. It also offered a process under which an expansive, interfering government could be rolled out further. To them, the New Deal was not benign. It remained, however, a paradox. On the one hand American Catholics were attempting to join-in and contribute after decades of suspicion and ostracism. Principle, however, must have inclined its head in favour of pragmatics, because Catholics continued to adjust and as the new movement of conservatives was about to protest, move further to the left. At first the response was sedate. As Alan Brinkley indicates, American conservatism was “late in developing.”⁶ George Nash conferred. In 1945 he notes there was “no articulate, coordinated, self-consciously conservative intellectual force [in existence] in the United States. There were, at most, scattered voices of protest, profoundly pessimistic about the future of their country.”⁷ In the absence of any discernible body the one common feature to this ‘scattered’ minority was its faith. Historians Ross J. S. Hoffman and political scientist Francis Graham Wilson - both converts to Catholicism - whose work in the 1930/40s, helped “set the ground work for the movement” argued in: *The Case for Conservatism, 1951*, that the “post-World War years afford[ed] Catholics a special opportunity to lead a conservative revival.” They believed this ‘revival’ necessary to the United States with Catholics as the “chief vanguard.”⁸ This is a rare example of expressing American conservatism as being Catholic. There was, perhaps reason for this early, subdued attitude and a reticence in wishing to present oneself as Catholic, rather than conservative. The further we go back, those forces that we may now refer to as ‘conservative,’ - only in the sense that they opposed the New Deal - were distinctly the opposite of our later incarnation. For example: the Know-Nothing Party, The American Liberty League, the Ku Klux Klan and the Conservative coalition *et al*, were all anti-Catholic.

Ultimately it would be Catholic desertion from the New Deal coalition (a group of voting blocs and interest groups, that supported Franklin Delano Roosevelt's New Deal) that would change the political landscape. As a consequence it opened up a space for a new political realignment, one that diminished the Democratic Parties majority which held the White House for seven out of nine Presidential terms from 1933 to 1969. More importantly it saw cracks appear within its base of liberal ideas. As a result, Catholics were beginning to define themselves along ideological as well as political lines. For a moment the changes also presented the idea that the Church was ceasing to be influential. It was, after all, a body that took orders from a hierarchy far away; its status on women, sex, life and morals in theory, clear and un-movable. It was, however, a part of America's congenital make-up, an often polarised nation, where Americans have readily sorted themselves into partisan tribes of opposing ideals, ideologies, or concepts. Catholics have historically been at the helm.

But if the conservative Catholic experience was in part driven by an opposition to certain social and cultural developments then it was also compelled by historical prejudice, preconceived ideas not just reserved for black or native Americans in the American historical narrative. While Al Smith, for example, may have been the first Catholic to be nominated for president his journey through machine politics in New York and Chicago, which, at state level was highly successful, could not, however, translate into national politics or the national psyche that Catholics were not monsters. Smith, notes Deal Hudson, was, despite his success, nevertheless a victim of "anti-Catholic prejudice in American politics and culture," receiving a "barrage of relentless anti-Catholic vitriol."⁹ While some, like William Prendergast would argue that Catholic suspicions remain, the American conservative movement was in some measure able to answer Hoffman and Wilson's call for *The*

Case for Conservatism a repost that allowed Catholics, without preconceived opinion, to coalesce and promote their values. As a tradition these values would play a major role in American politics and culture. The fusion was vital. As George Nash points out, one of the conservative movements “most remarkable features,” was that it was predominantly “Catholic in composition.” In a country still substantially Protestant, its leadership was heavily Roman Catholic, anglo-Catholic or critical of Protestant Christianity.”¹⁰ Although the movement did not set out to be specifically ‘religious,’ it was, particularly in the “early years marked by tension between Catholics and religious groups.” As Nash reminds us, initially both Catholics and conservatives (in all their forms) “were outsiders,”¹¹ another feature relevant to how they negotiated one another.

As a vehicle, moored in the basic concepts of their faith, conservatism offered the opportunity for cultural, social, intellectual and eventually political relevance. This new movement, rooted in one form or another to academia, was, suggests Nash the “cutting edge of the postwar coming of age of America’s Catholic minority.”¹² The intellectual gathering of individuals like journalists: William F. Buckley Jr., L. Brent Bozell, James McFadden, Erik von Kuehnelt and Gary Potter; political scientists: Willmoore Kendall, Francis Graham Wilson and Anthony Bouscaren; philosophers: Frederick Wilhelmsen and Thomas Molnar and historians Ross Hoffman, John Lukacs, Stephen Tonsor, Russell Kirk and Garry Wills, formed the mainstay to the movement. Though nascent, these protagonists found a “receptive audience among many Catholics, particularly the most orthodox and traditionalist.”¹³ This “strong Catholic flavour”¹⁴ was a distinctiveness, argued William F. Buckley completely “compatible with the basic tenets of conservatism.”¹⁵ Hierarchical, traditional and containing a faith in *natural law* gave a distinctive character conducive to the new movement. Above all, this group was a “decidedly activist force whose thrust was outward,” and whose “objectives was not simply to understand the world but to change it, restore it, preserve it.”¹⁶ It was

an intellectual sedition. By virtue of this small group a “revolution took place soon to shift American politics to the right, challenge the New Deal order, transformed the Republican Party into a voice of conservatism, and set the terms of debate in American politics as the country entered the new millennium.”¹⁷ It was, added Nash, the most influential synthesis; “bringing together three powerful and partially contradictory intellectual currents that previously had largely been independent of each other: libertarianism, traditionalism, and anticommunism.” These morphed into a “coherent modern Right.”¹⁸

It is little wonder that our future protagonist, Deal Hudson, should look back and view this renaissance period of modern Catholic intellectualism, benignly. It was, after all, a rich influx of circumstances ideas and changes. In addition to a heightened awareness of the Left and their liberal rational, a growing secular society with a dissolution of values as well as the threat of an atheist post-war enemy in Communism provided a more than adequate platform against which to rally. Other post-war changes helped form the basis for conservative coherence too. Changes in organisation, communication and media as well as technological structures for the first time raised the possibility of a structured coherence to the conservative drive that could transcend the local. These were not now simply ideas, fixed or rooted to the confines of establishment academia, but ideas in action propagated to a wider audience. Hence forth there was not only a determination but the machinery to “institutionalise their political ideas”¹⁹ in a constructive, organised and purposeful manner. Through journals and other “related transmission belts for conservative discourse,”²⁰ such as think-tanks, institutes and foundations and T.V. shows and radio, did these networks of scholars and contributors form a viable infrastructure for the new conservative movement. One particular means stands out.

National Review

Primary amongst the mechanisms for playing a decisive role in defining the boundaries of conservatism as well as shaping the new movement was Catholic, William Buckley's journal *National Review* (1955).²¹ For conservatism, notes Martin Durham, its launch in 1955 was the defining, "key moment."²² The role and importance of the journal can not be underestimated. Almost singlehandedly William Buckley and *National Review* (*NR*) helped not only forge, but sustain the conservative movement, *NR* standing at the vanguard of the new conservative movement. From its inception William Buckley, aided by James Burnham, Frank Meyer and William Rusher "functioned as the general staff of the conservative movement," *NR* taking up the role of "clearinghouse of news and ideas." It became, noted Nash, the self appointed "gatekeeper and arbiter of respectability"²³ for the movement.

Through *NR* a strong, purposeful sense of clarity and meaning for conservatives and the conservative voice was made; bridging the gap between academia and the public; between politics and religion, philosophy, art and culture. For our purposes, no where was the impact of *NR* more pressing than on Deal Hudson; *NR* strongly influencing his own biographical trajectory. In fact, it was through his own attempts at attempting to generate a similar, conservative Catholic media (*Crisis Magazine*) that Hudson came into direct contact with the two pillars of Catholic outreach then under early construction: namely Evangelicals and the Republican Party. This in-turn led to the Bush campaign. If we are to understand Key figures like Hudson, who, as a student, found *NR* in his "mailbox, because of a fear of liberal, socialist or even communist teachers?" then we have to examine *NR*.

As its title suggests, Buckley wanted a ‘national’ - not local or regional - review of conservatism. The New Deal, noted Buckley had been aided in its cause by liberal magazines. A lesser noted detail of the conservative movement and *NR* in particular was its survey of its liberal opposition for influence. Buckley looked to examples set by his opposition in liberal minded journals like *Harper's Magazine* (1850), *The Nation* (1865), *The Progressive* (1909) and the *New Republic* (1914) which had seriously championed and promoted their causes and philosophy. As a result, Buckley suggested the fractured regional doctrines of conservatism, often isolated on campus, be brought together in a similar fashion, and so: *NR* was born. Why not then “fund a magazine that did something for conservatism?”²⁴ The emphasis, note, was on conservatism, not Catholicism. Writing to *NR* in 1963, conservative Catholic Neil McCaffrey lamented the lack of a journal dedicated to Catholic conservatism. Founder of the ‘Conservative Book Club’ and close friend of Buckley McCaffrey wrote about the desperate need for a journal devoted to Catholic conservatism. “The times cry out for a Catholic journal of opinion that draws its inspiration from the lessons of the past, the dangers of the present, and the hard reality of original sin.”²⁵ His aim was unclear. Was he suggesting *NR* become this? Or, was he suggesting the creation of a *NR* sibling? Either way the connection was arguably strong enough for him to write to *NR*. In truth there was nowhere else to protest. William Buckley confirmed this. When Buckley conversely complained the conservative cause was getting ignored in the Catholic press, he stated: “I seldom feel so discouraged as when I receive letters from Catholic students who ask me to recommend to them the name of a good conservative Catholic magazine. There is no way to answer that query, because no such thing exists. It is truly appalling, especially since you consider that Catholics are really the ultimately conservative force in America and in the world.”²⁶

Buckley, as did those around him “saw themselves as writing from their Catholic tradition [and] for the deification of all who would listen and learn.”²⁷ In other words it was the convention and conversation with Catholicism that underpinned *NR*. There were those, however, uncomfortable with Catholicism having to take a back-seat. In conversation with Deal Hudson historian and conservative Catholic Lee Edwards was adamant, *NR*’s statement of beliefs and aims were religious and vigorously Catholic. William Buckley he believed designed and wrote from a Catholic tradition, providing a synthesis between the religious and the political, the conservative and the Catholic.²⁸ Even so, after open debate amongst its contributors, the journal came to embrace conservative as its label, rather than libertarian, individualist or Catholic. From then on *NR*’s mission statement declared it to be a ‘conservative journal of opinion.’ *NR* was, noted Professor Niels Bjerre-Poulsen “conservative before it was Catholic.”²⁹ There was, he argued, a greater emphasis on ideas than theology.

NR stood by its conservative label and was not afraid to defend its position. For example: deference to the Church or more specifically the Pope was acceptable if, as Bjerre-Poulsen noted, “its political implications did not conflict with basic conservative principles.”³⁰ An example of this occurred in July 1961, when Pope John XXIII released encyclical *Mater et Magistra* (mother and teacher). The encyclical called for social justice and aid to foreign countries as well as domestically the intermittent need for state intervention on social matters. In response, Buckley wrote an editorial entitled “A Venture in Triviality.” For Buckley there were more pressing concerns, most notably: communism. Buckley disputed the encyclical as too critical of American-style capitalism and was inconsequential at that particular time in history. *National Catholic Reporter* Michael Sean Winters wrote, this was the “first instance of notable public dissent from Church teaching by a prominent layman.”³¹ As a result, a dispute broke out between the Catholic, liberal-leaning *America* (1901)

magazine's editors and Buckley over the issue. In the eyes of *America* Buckley should have been more respectful of Papal doctrine.

Disagreement over the importance of these Catholic principles are particularly relevant, this small but neglected aspect of the narrative creating some of the movements most important directions and characteristics. Barely a decade old, *NR* co-founder Brent Bozell felt compelled to leave the magazine in 1963 due to the question of the magazines identity. Patricia Bozell – his wife and Buckley's sister - later said that the split between her husband and her brother was a matter of whether her husband was going to be a, “Catholic conservative or a conservative Catholic.”³² Overall, Bozell had been dissatisfied with insufficient respect *NR*'s largely Catholic editorial board paid to Catholic social teaching. Three years later and in reaction to the dispute Bozell founded *Triumph* magazine. *Triumph* often goes un-noticed, yet its brief existence represented an important marker in the relationship between conservatism and Catholicism. Under Bozell *Triumph* commented on religious, philosophical, and cultural issues from a traditionalist Catholic perspective. It ceased publication in 1975. By then a majority of its editors had defected to create another Catholic journal *Rough Beast* (1970), already underway. Nevertheless, the inspiration remained theological. In Mark D. Popowski's, *The Rise and Fall of Triumph: The History of a Radical Roman Catholic Magazine, 1966-1976*, Popowski writes, “The editors sought to lead an exodus of American Catholics from the American state and society and to establish a Catholic tribe—not for isolation but for confrontation—in order to fortify and order their ranks from which they could lead sallies into American society to convert it to the Roman Catholic faith.”³³ Of course it never came to fruition, and Popowski's fundamentalist vision difficult to agree with. Nevertheless, Bozell's determination to put orthodox Catholicism first emphasises the cleavage within the conservative Catholic environment.

Although *NR* usurped *Triumph* and its significance Hudson in particular was mindful of its value. At the dawn of a burgeoning conservative Christian movement, particularly that part of the movement that would come to be known as the Christian Right with its strong, socially conservative message, *Triumph* was at the cutting edge. It was Bozell who would make the first excursion into pro-life activism. If communism had been the theme that initiated the ‘marriage between Catholicism and conservatism’ then abortion, soon to be the one issue at the hub of stimulating decades of conservative Christian activism, was initiated through *Triumph* and Bozell. Hudson noted this to be Bozell’s “Catholic moment,” that “would define the rest of his career;”³⁴ defining because from within the dispute over Catholic principles in relation to the conservative movement arose the pro-life issue, central to the sanctity of life. It also represents a little recognised genesis for concerns that are only ever interpreted or defined as being Evangelical.

In June 1970, three years before *Roe v. Wade* (the Supreme Court’s decision legalising abortion) and when abortion was illegal in most of the United States, Brent and Patricia Bozell led the first “Operation Rescue” mission at George Washington University Hospital in Washington D.C. This was far in advance of Buckley, who would later become a staunch ally of the anti-abortionist cause. To start with, however, Buckley took a narrow view of the issue arguing that for non-Catholics it was permitted; a view Bozell universally rejected. The sexual revolution of the 1960’s was just as much a challenge to the morality of America as it was to official Church teachings. Artificial contraception, pre-marital sex, homosexuality and abortion were by the same token as pressing as Vietnam and the Cold War. Deal Hudson acknowledged Bozell’s importance, pointing to several of his contributions. These included his speech writing for Senator Joseph McCarthy and his job of ghost writing *The Conscience of a Conservative* in 1960 for conservative and presidential candidate

Barry Goldwater. Bozell proceeded all others in “taking up the pro-life cause well in advance of Evangelicals.” In 1962, addressing an 18,500 strong conservative rally in New York City’s Madison Square Garden, Bozell issued a rhetorical order to the Berlin commander to, “Tear down the Berlin Wall.” This would be echoed more famously 25 years later by conservative Ronald Reagan, who exhorted Mikhail Gorbachev to “Tear down this wall.”³⁵

Problematically, however, the capacity of Bozell to be ‘out-of-sync’ with events was one of a number of reasons for the demise of *Triumph*. In spite of the fact Bozell was there first and it appeared few took his lead, the objectives of the journal were lost when it began to treat the United States as a force of evil comparable to the Soviet Union because of its position and attitude to abortion and contraception. In addition, the Catholic Church undergoing its own radical transformations which arguably saw it shift away from orthodoxy and to the left, robbed *Triumph* of its chief argument: that the Catholic Church was inherently orthodox. Making the mistake of turning its audience away, the journal shrank from a 24-page glossy format into nothing more than a newsletter. A farewell edition of the magazine went out in January 1976. Initially, *NR* was less abrasive.

Buckley’s ‘man for all seasons’ approach gave *NR* enough breadth and depth to create a space in which the conservative, the laity, the Church, the academic and the political could come together; its blend of constituents gaining a sense of legitimacy as well as a platform to intermingle and speak. In *NR* there existed the possibility - as with other disciplines - that conservatism was congruent with others but specifically, faith. It was this positioning and attitude that both influenced and persuaded Deal Hudson to follow suit. Deal Hudson touched on this when he praised William Buckley for making it “respectable to be a Catholic and a conservative,” but that “Catholics could read *NR* and

take solace in its ‘fusionism’ of traditional conservatism.”³⁶ Fusionism, as Hudson had pointed out, was the key to defining *NR*’s success. In actuality ‘fusionism’ was the strategy advocated by Frank Meyer (libertarian political philosopher and co-founding editor of *National Review*). Meyer, like Buckley, believed that holders of various disparate conservative and libertarian beliefs should and could work together, creating a forum against liberal orthodoxy and becoming what John Micklethwait and Adrain Wooldridge later referred to as the “Right’s debating chamber.”³⁷

In so much as *NR* came to help define the boundaries of conservatism it should be noted that it was not, for some time fixed, and whilst it had, for example demonstrated that Rome was not beyond reproach, party politics was open to question too. A prominent feature of *NR*’s early individualism was arguably its lack of proclivity towards a particular party. Any notion that Catholics were monolithically Democrats did nothing to influence the magazine in appeasing or consolidating its audience. Not until the Catholic-Democrat connection began to fall apart of its own accord did this begin to change. Despite Catholic interests in presidential hopeful in 1960, did *NR* modify its apparent indifference to him. In truth, *NR* refused to endorse either Richard Nixon or John F. Kennedy in 1960. *NR* appeared non-partisan. It did not last, however. Barely a decade after its inception *NR*’s political un-affiliation ended. This occurred with the arrival - post-Kennedy - of conservative Barry Goldwater (R-AZ); whom Buckley would later refer to as the modern Conservative movement’s first standard-bearer. As noted below, Buckley and others played a major role in the ‘Draft Goldwater’ movement in 1960 and the 1964 presidential campaign, the magazine taking an active role. From this point onward *NR* whole heartedly championed both his conservative philosophy and political aspirations, overnight pulling their movement deeper into the arms of the Republican Party.

Individual personality aside, it was the body of topics under discussion that engaged and shaped the environment. Of these, it was the threat of communism that united and drove *NR*, its advocates and audience. Historian Patrick Allitt remarked, “Communism” was for *NR* an “intense pre-occupation from the start.” Fellow historian Lee Edwards likewise pointed to the theme of communism as having “launched the marriage between Catholicism and conservatism.” Propagated through *NR* it was a “simple notion of good versus evil.³⁸ After all, communism not only represented a threat to the individual with its doctrine of absolute submission to the state but it was above all atheist. Decades later morality wedge issues such as abortion would supplant the Cold War threat of Communism. The link in both cases was the same: a threat to the political, social and cultural *status quo* and the absence of God. Later to be replaced by the family; more specifically: family values, whose structure, function, roles, beliefs, attitudes, and ideals were seen as the bedrock of conservative ideology. Communism, however, was the catalyst.

To steer the magazine Buckley assembled an eclectic group of editors and contributors, in particular intellectuals who were political and/or religious converts. The value of this approach was that those who transferred had an explicit, subjective understanding of their area. This included ex-Communists or those who had once worked on the far Left, including Whittaker Chambers (writer), William Schlam (journalist), John Dos Passos (novelist), James Burnham (political theorist) and Frank Meyer. It may not have been by design but as: 2 Corinthians 2:10–11, states: the more you know about your enemy and his ways, the more you are able to counter-act his offensives. James Burnham is notable because as one of the original senior editors of *NR*, it was he who urged the magazine adopt a more pragmatic, less extremist editorial position, extending the influence of the magazine toward the political centre. A point in case was in 1957 when the magazine editorialised in favour of white supremacy in the South. In 1960 a *NR* editorial also supported South Africa’s

white minority rule. Buckley once referred to Burnham as “the number one intellectual influence on *NR* since the day of its founding.”³⁹

As its stature grew, *NR* built up circulation between 1957 and 1964 from 16,000 to 125,000.⁴⁰ Its popularity carved out a footing within the American media, its message now finding voice in radio, television and currently on-line. As an illustration it presented a blueprint for figures like Deal Hudson on which to model. Despite its stature it was, of course, part of a mosaic of conservative influence. Around *NR* a ground swell of new or Neo-conservative debate and opinion blossomed. For example: *American Conservative Union* (ACU), founded in 1964 and *The Fund for American Studies*, founded in 1966 also by William Buckley; *The American Spectator* (1967); *Conservative Victory Fund* (1969); *Young Americas Foundation* (1969); *The Libertarian Party of America* (1971); *The American Legislative Exchange Council*, founded in 1973; *The Conservative Political Action Conference*, started in 1974; *The Conservative Caucus*, founded in 1974; *The Second Amendment Foundation*, founded in 1974; *The National Journalism Center*, founded in 1977; the Cato Institute, founded in 1977; *Reason Foundation*, founded in 1978; *The Lincoln Institute for Research and Education* founded in 1978 and *The Leadership Institute*, founded in 1979; demonstrate what flourished from *NR*.

For Deal Hudson there was a wave of influence and motivation on which to build. Above all, added Hudson, “there is no doubt *NR* gave the early conservative movement a strong Catholic flavour.” Hudson referenced Buckley for “recognising the importance of religion to the conservative account,” in addition to citing historian Lee Edwards for explaining to him how the “Catholic character of *NR* in the beginning was very apparent and attractive to young [Catholic] conservatives like himself.”⁴¹ The “Catholic underpinning” in *NR* was clear wrote Hudson. Although not the first

conservative journal of ideas, which were characteristically scholarly, narrowly in focus and often obscure; *NR* was, in addition to its broad-based intellectual appeal, a platform a vehicle for the personal flair, wit and editorial touch of William Buckley himself. As well as *NR*'s powerful, forthright and often cutting ideas was Buckley's personality and engagement - which for better or worse undoubtedly helped drive the magazine. It was a combination not lost on Deal Hudson whose future transition from scholar to publisher to political strategist was heavily influenced by the two. Within either the conservative, political or Republican Party sphere's *NR* was, and remains, not too far away. For Hudson it offered the consummate illustration, which, once followed led eventually to the White House.

The New Right

If *NR* was important in crafting the ideological trajectory of those above, then another aspect of conservative Catholics and their political evolution was the movement described as the New Right. Sometimes referred to as the "conservative ascendancy" or "Republican ascendancy" the movement known as the New Right is generally recognised as having two phases or waves. The first (1955–1964) we have already accounted for. This is considered to be centred on the traditionalist, conservative orbit around William F. Buckley's *National Review*. The Second wave (1964 to 2000); formed in the wake of the Barry Goldwater campaign, centred around Catholic figures such as Paul Weyrich, Phylis Schlafly, Terry Dolan and Richard Viguerie. As an overlapping extension of the 'first wave,' the New Right can best be defined an organised, ideological trend within conservatism. Richard J. Meagher described the movement as a "force that is both smaller and of greater scope than conservatism as a whole." The New Right he went on, "demarcated a handful of conservative operatives," who, "not only helped bring conservatives to national power in the late 1970s, but

changed the nature of the Republican Party and partisan politics in Washington for decades to follow.”⁴²

It is worth mentioning that although the movement *is* more readily associated with the 1970s, Deal Hudson draws attention to the valuable work of Lisa McGirr; whose work in *Suburban Warriors, The Origins of the New American Right* introduces us to the small but powerful emergence of social conservative activism in Orange County, California in the mid- to late 60s. Scarcely referenced McGirr valuably contributes to the notion of grass-roots power. In advance of Brent and Patricia Bozell’s ‘Operation Rescue,’ Hudson notes how conservative Catholic activism in its local, early forms and again championed by the individual, have often been missed, overlooked in the sprint to discuss and focus on the major players and organisations within the New Right. McGirr, he recalls, wrote about an early abortion organisation: “The Citizens Action Committee, founded in 1969 by Cathy Sullivan, a Catholic who, at the request of two local Catholic priests” responded to the growing call on behalf of women’s organisations for legalised abortion.⁴³ It was symbolic. It was also far in advance of this becoming the primary defining issue to galvanise conservative Christians and the Republican Party.

Just as locating the movement in the 1970s was misleading, other misnomers are present too.

Despite often being interpreted as “nominally secular and presenting itself organisationally in non-religious terms;” the New Right was in fact, “highly religious.”⁴⁴ Once again, the preference was to jump to the Christian Right for religious value and interest. Instead the New Right is frequently discussed as being ideological or political. Also, when thought of in religious terms it is erroneously considered Evangelical. Although Evangelicals would eventually capture the movement the New

Right was ostensibly Catholic. For this reason, we should pull back and momentarily take into account the conservative Catholic dimension.⁴⁵

If we have to draw a distinction between first and second wave it would be the latter's organisation and activism. As noted, commentary as a form of dissent was powerful, but it was not sufficient on its own. While conservative instruments like *NR* pursued this, others, like Sullivan were taking a different approach. What was required, however, was a bridge between them; a situation that would begin to elevate a more structured and concerted connection and participation with politics. It was only through politics that change or policy could work. This was brought to bear by the Barry Goldwater campaign in 1964. William A. Rusher, former publisher at *NR*, considered it "the most important event of 1964." It was not just "Johnson's landslide victory...rather it was the fact that the Goldwater campaign introduced the conservatives of America to one another."⁴⁶ New Rightist Morton Blackwell added, "All of us had something to do with the Goldwater campaign. We weren't high enough in the campaign to know each other, but our involvement with Goldwater credentialed us for each other."⁴⁷ Cathy Sullivan was affirmative in her statement that it was Goldwater who "lit a fire here in the county."⁴⁸ The Goldwater connection was vital for helping to stimulate and link up this still forming movement.

Politically, however, it is prudent to highlight that initially the 'New Right' did not start out in alignment with or as a creature of the Republican Party. On the contrary, the movement was originally "unconvinced that the Party was capable of becoming a force for conservatism."⁴⁹ In fact, in 1976, three leading figures of the New Right – all Catholic - Richard Viguerie (pioneer of political direct mail and writer on American politics), Paul Weyrich (conservative political activist, commentator and co-founder the Heritage Foundation) and Howard Phillips (founder of the

Conservative Caucus) made an effort to take over the American Independent Party (AIP). Originally formed as a vehicle for the George Wallace campaign in 1968, a coalition which included elements of the Ku Klux Klan, the John Birch Society and the Liberty Lobby. It was thought the established network may provide an appealing and appropriate vehicle for their movement. All three - Weyrich, Phillips, and Viguerie - attended the AIP convention of 1976 in the hope the party would look to include Viguerie on the ticket. However, the AIP turned to Lester Maddox, a white supremacist, to head the ticket rather than Viguerie. Only then did they turn to a Republican Party. The conservative weekly magazine *Human Events*, confirmed this. It reported that the long-range plan of Viguerie, Weyrich, and Phillips at the time was to use the AIP to form the backbone for a new party in the 1980 elections.⁵⁰ Despite the lack of success the Goldwater campaign sign-posted the notion that a political medium for conservative Catholics and a suitable home, was out there. What the Republican Party offered, however, was both long term stability, structure and above all, respectability.

Lessons gained from the Goldwater campaign as well as efforts by Viguerie, Weyrich and Phillips identified the need to establish new, well thought-out methods to promote their cause and fight liberal Democrats as well as moderate Republicans. According to John Micklethwait and Adrain Wooldridge, “the logic,” according to Paul Weyrich “was simple. Liberals had managed to dominate Washington by out organising the conservatives; now the conservatives must return the compliment.”⁵¹ Henceforth a more effective, intransigent conservative force began to take shape.

Building on those elements contained within the first-wave of conservative Catholics the New Right looked to expand and move beyond their intellectual presence into a more causative form. As a result there came into existence the consultative committee or policy institute - better known as the

think-tank. Prompted by Buckley what conservatives did was effectively look to see what approaches their enemy had made, an enemy that had arguably found success. Instead of condemning them out-of-hand, they noted the strengths of the liberal organisation/s and applied their model as a framework on which to underpin their own ideas. The Brookings Institute, with ample budget, location (Washington D.C.) and a mix of academia, policy ideas and ties to the political establishment was, the New Right recognised, a primary example of this idea in motion. As a result establishments such as the Heritage Foundation (copying the Brookings Institute) came into existence in 1973. Others followed. Paul Weyrich's Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress created in 1974 and the Conservative Caucus 1974 along with The Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, The Hoover Institute, The Heartland Institute, Discovery Institute and the Acton Institute followed. In truth the New Right already possessed such an establishment. Described by Lobby Watch as the "Godfather of Washington Neo-conservative lobby groups - America's richest, largest and most influential think tank"⁵² was the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (AEI).⁵³ The AEI is considered to be "a leading member of the conservative advocacy community and is one of the more prominent U.S. policy institutions" whose "advocacy agenda extends from free-market economics to militarist security policies."⁵⁴ Formed in 1943 it was initially devised to promote big business, both domestically and globally. It did this by convening an economic advisory board. Their work, which developed its relationship within a political sphere in Washington, involved the commissioning and distribution of legislative analyses to Congress.

Under the guidance of Catholic William J. Baroody Sr (as executive vice president from 1954 to 1962 and as president from 1962 to 1978), the AEI began to change shape and structure. By publicising and distributing the institutes publications effectively he also raised money, considerably expanding its financial base during the 1950s and 1960s. Though influential it

remained a marginal operation with little practical influence in political advocacy until the 1970s. This was due to the controversy that arose over Baroody and several other AEI staff working as policy advisors on the Goldwater campaign. Partisan affiliation like this was a threat to AEI's tax exempt status. Cautiously the AEI had to distance itself from party politics. However, by virtue of its conservative ideology, corporate and foundation funding sources (Scaife Foundation, Philip Morris are examples) the AEI was clearly partisan in its political – Republican – positioning. The AEI is now linked to the Catholic University of America as well as providing significant sources for Republican political campaigns and administrations. The links to the Bush administration and AEI, for example, were strong, something Bush admitted during a speech he gave there in 2007. “I admire AEI a lot,” Bush said. “After all, I have been consistently borrowing some of your best people. More than 20 AEI scholars have worked in my administration.”⁵⁵

Slowly the conservative constellation was coming together. Building upon platforms like *NR*, becoming more vocal and organised the dissemination of conservative ideas and opinion continued to grow. Richard Viguerie, following suit, presented the New Right with its own magazine, *Conservative Digest*. Deeply religious, Viguerie was one of those who did push the boundaries between religion, ideology and politics. Rarely commented upon, particularly in the shadow of *NR*, Viguerie used *Conservative Digest* to share his faith and his belief that this was the best way to forge ahead with Christian values and take back a country whose moral and spiritual roots were eroding. This value based agenda to save the traditional family and the nations morals was something the Christian Right or Evangelicals would later claim as their own. Unlike the high-brow character associated with *NR*, there was a sense of the populist with *Conservative Digest*; nevertheless, it was a key feature in helping to join with the political with the faithful; that is: the Catholic faith. This was in addition to the think tank and the institute as instruments helping to

push, develop and promote the conservative cause. Despite the fact that these were not set up as tools to directly promote Catholic theology the faith was, nevertheless, structurally innate. What really bonded the New Right was its spiritual doctrine, its moral, behavioural framework that in turn underpinned the conservative movement. Issue based it was these elements that helped solidify the partnership with the political. According to Sara Diamond this was the “genius of New Right leaders such as Paul Weyrich and Richard Viguerie,” who had envisaged “that a focus on issues of morality was the ticket to creating an expanded activist movement, and one that could not be ignored by the Republican Party.”⁵⁶

As the post-war decades progressed a confluence of conservative Catholics were slowly beginning to form and conservatives of all stripes were finding elements around which they could cluster. Drawn in by agreeable voices the intellectual, the academic, the political and the faithful were now beginning to see hope as well as a home on which they too could unite. What anchored them was, as noted, their faith, which underpinned the moral climate for most Americans, regardless of its denomination. Nevertheless, Catholicism was in the process of helping to shape American political culture, guiding attitudes, values and culture. But what of the faith itself, the very element that despite their label (intellectual, academic or politician) reconciled them all?

- ¹ Richard M. Weaver, *Ideas Have Consequences*, (University of Chicago, 2013)
- ² Barry Gewen (September 18, 2009). "Irving Kristol, Godfather of Modern Conservatism, Dies at 89." *The New York Times*. Retrieved 14 October 2010.
- ³ Irving Kristol, "American Conservatism: 1945-1995." *The Public Interest*, Fall 1995, 85
- ⁴ William B. Prendergast, *The Catholic Voter in American Politics: The Passing of the Democratic Monolith*, (Georgetown University Press, Washington D.C., 1999) p.112
- ⁵ George Flynn, *American Catholics and the Roosevelt Presidency, 1932-1936* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1968), 231-233
- ⁶ Alan Brinkley, *Liberalism and Its Discontents*, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London England, 1998) p.281
- ⁷ George H. Nash, *The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America Since 1945*, (Wilmington, Del.: Studies institute, 2006) p.xiii
- ⁸ Patrick Allitt, *Catholic Intellectuals and Conservative Politics in America 1950-1985*, (Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1993) p.49
- ⁹ Deal Hudson, *Onward Christian Soldiers. The Growing Political Power of Catholics and Evangelicals in the United States*. (New York: Threshold Editions, 2008) p.221
- ¹⁰ George H. Nash, *The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America Since 1945*, (Wilmington, Del.: Studies institute, 2006) p.119-20
- ¹¹ George Nash, *The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America Since 1945*, (Basic Books, New York, 1976) p.80
- ¹² Ibid. p.80-81
- ¹³ William B. Prendergast, *The Catholic Voter in American Politics: The Passing of the Democratic Monolith*, (Georgetown University Press, Washington DC, 1999) p.28
- ¹⁴ Patrick Allitt, *Catholic Intellectuals and Conservative Politics in America, 1950-1985*, (Cornell University Press, 1993) p.1
- ¹⁵ Deal Hudson, *Onward Christian Soldiers. The Growing Political Power of Catholics and Evangelicals in the United States*. (New York: Threshold Editions, 2008) p.132
- ¹⁶ Ibid. p.xi
- ¹⁷ Donald T. Critchlow, Nancy MacLean *Debating the American Conservative Movement: 1945 - present*, (Rowman & Littlefield, 2009)
- ¹⁸ Kim Phillips-Fein, "Conservatism: A State of the Field," *Journal of American History*, (Dec. 2011) 98#3 pp. 723-43, quote p. 729
- ¹⁹ Professor Niels Bjerre-Poulsen quoted in George Nash, *The American Intellectual Movement in American Since 1945*, (Basic Books, 1976) p.154
- ²⁰ George Nash, *The American Intellectual Movement in American Since 1945*, (Basic Books, 1976) p.154
- ²¹ While *National Review* remained central there began a ground swell of new or Neo-conservative debate and opinion. Joining the strength of conservative organisations like *American Conservative Union* ACU, founded in 1964 and *The Fund for American Studies*, founded in 1966 by William Buckley; *The American Spectator*, founded in 1967; *Conservative Victory Fund*, founded in 1969; *Young Americas Foundation*, founded in 1969; came: *The Libertarian Party of America*, founded in 1971 by David Nolan; *The American Legislative Exchange Council*, founded in 1973; *The Conservative Political Action Conference*, started in 1974; *The Conservative Caucus*, founded in 1974; *The Second Amendment Foundation*, founded in 1974; *The National Journalism Centre*, founded in 1977; Cato Institute, founded in 1977; *Reason Foundation*, founded in 1978; *The Lincoln Institute for Research and Education* founded in 1978; *The Leadership Institute*, founded in 1979.
- ²² Martin Durham, *The Christian Right, the far right and the boundaries of American conservatism*. (Manchester University Press, 2000) p.1

- ²³ George H. Nash, *Reappraising the Right, The Past & Future of American Conservatism*, (Wilmington Delaware, 2009) p.154
- ²⁴ Rick Perlstein, *Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American Consensus*, (New York: Hill and Wang, 2001) p.73
- ²⁵ Neil McCaffrey, Letter to *National Review*, August 26, 1963, 134 - William F. Buckley, Jr. Papers, Yale University, Sterling Memorial Library, New Haven, CT.
- ²⁶ William F. Buckley to Patrick Frawley, February 1, 1965, box 35, Patrick Frawley, William F. Buckley, Jr. Papers, Yale University, Sterling Memorial Library, New Haven, CT.
- ²⁷ Patrick Allitt, *Catholic Intellectuals and Conservative Politics in America, 1950-1985*, (Cornell University Press, 1993) p.293
- ²⁸ Lee Edwards quoted in Deal Hudson. *Onward Christian Soldiers. The Growing Political Power of Catholics and Evangelicals in the United States*. (Threshold Editions. 2008). p.132-3
- ²⁹ Niels Bjerre-Poulsen, *Right face: Organising the American conservative movement 1945-65*, (Museum Tusulanum Press, 2002), p.128
- ³⁰ Ibid. p.128
- ³¹ Michael Sean Winters, "Mater et Magistra Conference," *The National Catholic Reporter*, May 16, 2011 <http://ncronline.org/blogs/distinctly-catholic/mater-et-magistra-conference> (27/2/12)
- ³² Paul Kengor, "Buckley, Rehabilitated: William F. Buckley Shaped America's Political Dialogue. The Catholic Faith Shaped William F. Buckley," *National Catholic Register*, Friday, Oct 2010 <http://www.ncregister.com/site/article/buckley-rehabilitated/> (30/01/12)
- ³³ Mark D. Popowski, *The Rise and Fall of Triumph: The History of a Radical Roman Catholic Magazine, 1966-1976*, (Lexington Books, 2012) p.231
- ³⁴ Deal Hudson. *Onward Christian Soldiers. The Growing Political Power of Catholics and Evangelicals in the United States*. (Threshold Editions. 2008). p.129
- ³⁵ Lee Edwards, "A Modern Don Quixote Fought the Good Fight," *Insight on the News*, June 9, 1997
- ³⁶ Deal Hudson. *Onward Christian Soldiers. The Growing Political Power of Catholics and Evangelicals in the United States*. (Threshold Editions. 2008). p.134
- ³⁷ John Micklethwait & Adrian Wooldridge, *The Right Nation, Why America is Different*, (Penguin Books, 2005) p.51
- ³⁸ Lee Edwards quoted in Deal Hudson. *Onward Christian Soldiers. The Growing Political Power of Catholics and Evangelicals in the United States*. (Threshold Editions. 2008). p.137
- ³⁹ Roger Kimball, "The power of James Burnham," *The New Criterion*, September 2002 <http://www.newcriterion.com/articles.cfm/burnham-kimball-1911> (27/01/12)
- ⁴⁰ Associated Press, "Conservative Writer, Commentator William F. Buckley Jr. Dies at 82," February 27, 2008 <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,333055,00.html> (23/3/12)
- ⁴¹ Deal Hudson. *Onward Christian Soldiers. The Growing Political Power of Catholics and Evangelicals in the United States*. (Threshold Editions. 2008). p.132-3
- ⁴² Richard J. Meagher, "Remembering the New Right, Political Strategy and the Building of the GOP Coalition," *The Public Eye*, Summer 2009 <http://www.publiceye.org/magazine/v24n2/remembering-new-right.html> (19/06/12)
- ⁴³ Lisa McGirr, *Suburban Warriors, The Origins of the New American Right*, (Princeton, N.J.,: Princeton University press, 2001) p.233
- ⁴⁴ Sara Diamond, *Not by politics Alone, The Enduring Influence of the Christian Right*. (The Guilford Press, 1998) p.58

⁴⁵ The formation of groups like Third Century Publishers (1974), Christian Voice (1978) and the Moral Majority (1979), though short lived, would set the foundation for the Christian Right movement, whose overall attention would supplant Catholic aspects of the New Right.

⁴⁶ Jonathan Mozzochi, Gillian Leichtling & Steven Gardiner, "The New Right and the Christian Right," <http://www.qrd.org/qrd/www/FTR/newright.html> (6/7/12)

⁴⁷ Richard J. Meagher, "Remembering the New Right, Political Strategy and the Building of the GOP Coalition," *The Public Eye*, Summer 2009
<http://www.publiceye.org/magazine/v24n2/remembering-new-right.html> (19/06/12)

⁴⁸ Lisa McGirr, *Suburban Warriors, The Origins of the New American Right*, (Princeton, N.J.,: Princeton University press, 2001) p.125

⁴⁹ Martin Durham, *The Christian Right, the far right and the boundaries of American conservatism*. (Manchester University Press, 2000) p.9

⁵⁰ *Human Events*, September 11, 1976, pgs. 3-4

⁵¹ John Micklethwait & Adrian Wooldridge, *The Right Nation, Why America is Different*, (Penguin Books, 2004) p. 82

⁵² Lobby Watch organisation. The American Enterprise Institute.
<http://www.lobbywatch.org/profile1.asp?PrId=256> (24/06/12)

⁵³ The AEI would see numerous key figures join the Bush administration. More than any other research institute the AEI would place twenty individuals into senior positions. These include:

Dick Cheney (Vice President), Lynne Cheney, his wife, is a senior fellow at the AEI.

John Snow (Treasury Secretary),

Paul O'Neil (ex-AEI board member, is also a secretary of the Treasury)

John Bolton (AEI's ex-Vice President, is the Under-secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs),

Lawrence B. Lindsey, (Assistant to the President for Economic Policy),

Richard Perle (Director, National Economic Council., considered one of AEI's top stars - a hawk's hawk - is yet another PNAC signatory is an AEI scholar and was Chairman of the Defence Policy Board at the Pentagon until he resigned in March 2003),

David Frum, (President Bush's ex-speech-writer)

R. Glenn Hubbard, (Served for two years as chairman of Bush's Council of Economic Advisers),

Leon Kass (President's Council on Bioethics),

Michael Ledeen and Arthur Waldron (U.S.-China Security Review Commission),

Allan Meltzer, Eric Engen, and Kevin Hassett (Advise congressional committees on economic policy),

Dave Wursmer, Vice-President Dick Cheney's Middle Eastern Advisor at the Vice President's office)

⁵⁴ The Right Web, American Enterprise Institute, January 20, 2009
http://rightweb.irc-online.org/profile/american_enterprise_institute (24/06/12)

⁵⁵ Payson Schwin, "AEI: The Root of Bush's Right-Wing Ideology," *Think Progress*, Feb 15, 2000
<https://thinkprogress.org/aei-the-root-of-bushs-right-wing-ideology-4de6dde00994>

⁵⁶ Sara Diamond, *Not by politics Alone, The Enduring Influence of the Christian Right*. (The Guilford Press, 1998) p.59

CHAPTER THREE

Stresses within the Catholic Church

Few modern events change wholesale the thinking, attitudes, place and function of a religion. Nevertheless, amidst the numerous developments helping to re-shape post-war American Catholics, none was arguably more influential than those changes facilitated by the Catholic Church's own introspection, known as The Second Vatican Council (1962–65). Tangential to the growing post-war challenges of American Catholics, Vatican II (as it became known) represented a seismic shift, a collective transformation that ran to the very core of the Church and its teaching. Announced by Pope John XXIII on January 25, 1959 an international council of Bishops were called to Rome with the purpose of modernising the Church making its traditional doctrines and rituals relevant for the modern world. It was an audacious step attempting to push the faith away from its fortress mentality; opening up a new, modern dialogue both amongst themselves and the world around them. No where was this more closely felt than amongst conservative Catholics, to whom Vatican II was all but hearsay. The Church's attempt at brave, optimistic and modern renewal was to others an accommodation to the free, liberal spirit of the 1960s. It was divisive. For conservative Catholics, however, it was also transformative.

Overall, The Second Vatican Council's sixteen page document legitimised change itself - anathema to most conservatives, whose traditionalist, often unprogressive stance feared Vatican II would dismantle their age old orthodoxy. William Buckley was quick, however, to turn Vatican II in on itself and proclaim: "surely the principle meaning of the religious liberty pronouncements of

Vatican II is that other men must be left free to practice the dictates of their own conscience.”¹ In other words, conservatives should remain conservative. Initially there were numerous responses. *National Review* was cautious, looking for a more harmonised approach, similar to how anti-Communism had helped bind its followers. Others, like Brent Bozell had been more theocratic in their approach, calling for Vatican II and its ideas to be brought under control. Deal Hudson, with a foot in both camps, argued for organised and structured answers to those changes effecting the faith and their environment. Ultimately, the question was how to negotiate this crisis of identity, move forward and develop?

When Pope John XXIII opened the Second Vatican Council he attempted to set the tone when he said it was time to “open the windows and let in the fresh air.” It was, recalled Maureen Fiedler a “marvellous metaphor” and for her “an exhilarating time to be a Catholic. New modes of liturgy, ecumenical and interfaith initiatives, the reform of religious life, a fresh look at social teaching in the *Church in Modern World* -- it was all part of the landscape. And central to it all was what I believe to be the council’s most important utterance: ‘the Church is the People of God.’”² Many Catholics must have felt like this but for those of a conservative disposition it was not the case. Pope John attempted to speak for Catholics in his assessment that “For many Catholics, [Vatican II] came in at gale force,”³ followed by a “period of prolonged disorientation and disorder, which at certain times and regarding certain matters, was quite severe.”⁴ Deal Hudson thought Vatican II gave way to division and a “growing split between John Paul II Catholics and those who fashion themselves as the true heirs of Vatican II and the Papacy of Pope John XXIII” - in other words: liberals. In a similar tone to Buckley, Hudson thought neither side should be obliged to “justify the kind of open dissent from Church teaching that [post-Vatican II] pours out from Catholic institutions.”⁵

Nevertheless, Vatican II became the icon of the modern, post-war Catholic Church, a Church in transition, a Church in flux. Its effects can not be over stated. Until Vatican II the Catholic Church had proclaimed itself to be religion of un-changing truth. Orthodox and traditionalist - not liberal. Vatican II, however, called for the Church to now be a progressive force for social change, an ecumenical out-reach and communication to others. For the Church, a turn away from being a non-receptive, inward looking force to modify itself into a preemptive body instead of reacting once events had occurred, had to start with basics.

The tools to achieve this included priests celebrating Mass in the vernacular, that is: the language of the countries in which they lived. In addition they would face the congregation, signalling to worshippers that they *were* included, not excluded from components of the service as well as the faith. Music and singing were advocated to help diminish the austere atmosphere. Women would be allowed into more advanced, prominent roles such as readers, lectors, and Eucharistic ministers. There also occurred the removal of symbols such as meatless Fridays. It was, noted historian Alberto Melloni, (leader of the Bologna School of Vatican II interpretation), a “dramatic rupture with the Catholic past.”⁶ To the liberal or progressive minded it was good news. Vatican II enhanced their belief that the Catholic Church *was* inclusive and democratic, forward thinking, modern and progressive.

The problem, however, was Catholics were not, as we know, a centralised harmonious body. Some, like those of a more conservative nature, received and interpreted the Councils teachings and its implications differently. While liberal perspectives like Harvey Cox’s *The Secular City: Secularisation and Urbanisation in Theological Perspective* (1965), coming at the end of Vatican II,

championed the news and its thesis; arguing that in a growing, developing society hierarchical, institutional religion would decline, placing the theological in a new perspective within the secular society. The church, Cox argued, is a people of faith and undertaking, rather than an institution. In short, the world around them had its own agenda and they - without diminishing their importance - should acclimatise. For conservative Catholic activists like cleric and writer John Neuhaus, theologian and author Michael Novak, Brent Bozell and Deal Hudson, it was too much. It was an erosion not an emancipation of the Catholic Church, disfiguring the boundaries of a long established tradition. Sacred Tradition, they argued, came from God, from Christ, from the Apostles and was faithfully handed down through generation after generation. It was not theirs to amend.

To their mind the critique was simple. The highest echelons of Catholic power had yielded to a left-wing worldview. It was, noted Hudson, that as a result of Vatican II there occurred “an amazing alienation that took place as the Catholic Conference turned hard left;”⁷ a move Hudson perceived to be orchestrated by progressives like Rev. Bryan Hehir.⁸ A particular characteristic to their interpretation, however, was political, not just theological. Because Church leaders had actively chosen to take a stand on social issues; such as: welfare, poverty, immigration and the death penalty they had opened up the Church more overtly to the political.

The most suitable political partner for this was - as history had already outlined - the Democratic Party. It was, conservatives like Hudson believed, explicit. The official Catholic hierarchy in the United States - that is: United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB),⁹ had joined hands with the Democratic Party in pursuit of its new theological revolution. It led Neuhaus and Novak to write in the *New York Times*, the “National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB) had become the Democratic Party of prayer.”¹⁰ For Democrats, although there is no reference to this from

Democratic strategists or commentators it afforded the Party the one element Republican strategists were interested in: structure. As alluded to earlier, it was one of the virtues of the Catholic vote.

Within each dioceses of the United States - grouped into fifteen regions - bishops organised parish councils, senates and pastoral councils to attempt to take into account the voices and concerns of priests and laity. Within the USCCB is a vast organisational and bureaucratic body. Programme committees and subcommittees, executive level and management committees, departments for programs, Pastoral Ministry, policy and advocacy, department of justice, peace and human development, department of migration and refugee services and communications are just a few.

What mattered, however, was that these structures were at the heart of a new politicisation of the Catholic hierarchy., of that desire, post Vatican II, to explicitly become active, involved and engage it faith and resources. This included the political. As Msgr. William P. Fay (General Secretary, USCCB) noted in a news letter for Catholic issues: “The separation of church and state does not require division between belief and public action, between moral principles and political choices, but protects the right of believers and religious groups to practice their faith and act on their values in public life.”¹¹ The message was not hidden. Catholics, despite decades of political interaction, now had licence to do so.

To Deal Hudson it was clear, however, that the “so-called spirit of Vatican II was blowing through the creation of the Catholic Conference” with “liberal policy prescriptions.” These ‘prescriptions’ he noted, filtered from the top-down. For example, the “NCCBs first elected president in 1966 was

Archbishop John F. Dearden of Detroit” a “leader of the so-called progressive wing of Roman Catholicism.” In 1968, he in-turn appointed as general secretary, Joseph Bernardin whose principal assignment was the “stream-lining of the old National Catholic Welfare Conference (NCWC) staff structure.”¹² Bernardin, soon to be the undisputed leader of a strong network of Bishops that dominated the affairs of the American hierarchy for more than two decades, during the 1970s and 1980s had his tenure referred to as the ‘Bernardin Machine.’ The Bernardin Machine’s approach to governance within the Church has frequently been described as collegial. More than this Hudson dissented, it made the Conference more “closely aligned with the Democratic Party.”¹³ For Hudson it was not only a question of suggesting the Conferences were deconstructing the orthodoxy of the Church, but doing so by cementing their relationship further with the political and the political Party thought most accommodating to their causes. Hudson argued that leading staffers and Bishops within the Conferences saw the restructuring of society - thanks to Vatican II - through egalitarian and social harmony programs. They were a bridge to the Party, a Party whose record was arguably one of social engineering. This witnessed the Church’s declaration by Bishops united in confronting issues like Civil Rights, Vietnam, the Middle East, the death penalty, sexuality, birth control and welfare, draw the Church and/or Catholics deeper into politics, specifically: Democratic politics.

Momentarily it must have appeared fixed. The Church, rooted to a familiar Party with a new, vibrant, expressive type of liberalism and transformed the theological world. After all, what were conservative, orthodox Catholics to do? Transgress perhaps, against Rome and their own faith? What ever conservatives may have thought they were nevertheless compelled on some level to defend or at least shelter their opinion of Vatican II. In theory, questioning the out-right legitimacy of Vatican II, equated to questioning the authority of the Church. Worse still, it questioned Gods purpose - even if it was through Rome, Vatican II and the American Catholic hierarchy. There were

three options: decline, agree or exploit. Conservative Catholics chose the latter. In a subtle and arguably clever move - taken from Buckley's advice - the conservative laity exercised its own distinct right to decide, to be autonomous, active; defending and upholding Church orthodoxy. Ironically, the rationale of Vatican II to change, was not an exclusively liberal decision. No longer restricted by clerical and/or hierarchical domination they were free, free to employ their own approach. Conservative Catholics had another feature in their favour. Inadvertently Vatican II had tipped the power in their direction. Below the traditionally accepted authority of Rome in all matters, the mandate of the Second Vatican Council was that every country has a national bishop's conference. Under Vatican II decision making power was therefore delegated to local bishops, clergy and councils. It was, as we have highlighted, in reality a local level functioning apparatus anyway. It was also the home of the laity. Here, amidst the media, universities, seminaries and colleges the fledgling conservative Catholic movement was not only in waiting but, as we saw with *National Review*, *The Wanderer* and *The Remnant*, progressing comfortably.

These elements were nourished by organisations such as Catholics United for the Faith (CUF). CUF is briefly worth mentioning because it arose in 1968 for the express purpose of defending the papal encyclical *Humanae Vitae*, which declares the orthodox teaching of the Catholic Church regarding marriage, love, responsible parenthood, and more specifically the continued rejection of birth control. *Humanae Vitae* was a beacon of light in a dark passage for conservative Catholics following Vatican II. Founder of CUF, H. Lyman Stebbins, mindful of respecting but still challenging the Church wrote: "When the faith at that time was starting to be attacked, distorted, and watered down from all sides, and the Second Vatican Council was misinterpreted, misapplied, and hijacked almost from the beginning of the Council, it was felt that we ought to do something about it."¹⁴ Although the CUF was very explicit in its mission statement that it 'has never and will

never be part of a political cause,' its very existence in defence *Humanae Vitae* was enough for conservative Catholics to attempt to keep a foot hold in tradition in the face of Vatican II. Historical convention on matters such as contraception, homosexuality, masturbation, pre-marital sex, abortion and euthanasia were crucial features of the church's authoritative, non-infallible teaching and had to be shielded from any dissent.

With this in mind, nothing, it seemed, was left un-questioned. The nations moral compass was out; authority and basic institutions like the family and marriage open to either change or dismissal. Feminism, homosexuality, war, civil rights, race and gender were all in flux. On almost every level for the conservative Christian model was under attack. Following on from Cox's view in *The Secular City*, that "organised religion was in retreat before the onslaught of "unbelief,"¹⁵ came another dilution of the faith with Joseph Fletcher's *Situation Ethics: The New Morality* (1966). This was the notion that some moral codes *can* be placed aside if the basic, overriding principle is one of love. While Deal Hudson remarked that 'situational ethics,' has nothing to do with Catholic moral theology, it was, nevertheless a series of dialogues to join the conversation; embraced by liberal Christians and abhorred by conservatives. It was, lamented Hudson, a new chapter in the struggles conservative Catholics faced post-Kennedy; whose "treatment of religion in his campaign greatly accelerated the trend towards secularisation and the privatisation of religious faith." It was also the precursor for "academic writers to begin making headlines with the announcement of the death of God, the creation of the secular city and situation ethics."¹⁶

The issue, was not, however, one sided. While Vatican II is our priority, it should not be forgotten that the lesser known and lesser discussed aspect of what was essentially the Protestant Church's own version of Vatican II had taken place earlier. The Fundamentalist–Modernist Controversy

within the main-line Protestant denominations in the 1920s and 30s saw the major American Christian denominations conflicted over the issues of theology and ecclesiology. Here too was a debate essentially over the liberalisation of the church and how it was to interact with the culture and society around them. Although a long way off developing into the conservative Christian bodies that would find themselves reaching out to conservative Catholics, it was, nevertheless a series of events and tensions that led to new areas of discussions and connections. As a result of these fractures, the various break-away groups attempting to find their own identities would eventually result in contact with Catholics, the reaction of which would prove invaluable to the Bush campaign almost seventy years later.

These ecumenical developments were a vital feature of the trajectory the faith-base would take in its collision course with politics. From the Catholic perspective a major feature of post-Vatican II self analysis was its position towards other Christians. The Church's previous stance cautioned against associating with non-Catholics; now, Catholics were called upon to build bridges towards common Christian goals. This emerged from the 1965 encyclical *Gaudium et Spes* (Joy and Hope). This document was an overview of the Catholic Church's teachings, specifically its relationship to society, with reference to economics, poverty, social justice, culture, science, technology and crucially: ecumenism. Following decades of being isolated, defensive and where Evangelicals were concerned a history of unbridled enmity, it was time to change, develop and annex. As a result of Vatican II the notion of the 'landscape of quarrel' – as Professor William Shea phrased it -between Evangelicals and Catholics was open to be reconciled. Nevertheless it was a start. In reality it would take thirty years before Evangelicals and Catholics would even attempt to join;¹⁷ the implication of these shared stresses, however, was that it changed their attitudes and created spaces in which future parties could develop.

From within this milieu arose the one issue upon which the future of American politics and its relationship with the conservative faith-base would hinge: abortion. Overall, the political activity of American Catholics and the Catholic hierarchy followed the words and wisdom of John Carroll, the first bishop of America. Although he requested Catholics avoid political involvement and partisan politics unless the interests and concerns of the Church were under attack. Abortion changed this. Overnight the landmark decision by the United States Supreme Court in 1973 on the issue of abortion in the case of *Roe v. Wade*, transported what Hudson referred to as “kitchen table”¹⁸ groups of Catholics to a very calculated and structured strategy. Viewed by the Church as gravely inappropriate, it considered it a duty to reduce its acceptance by the public and in civil legislation. Logically it was not their only concern but the time, effort and finances steered into the issue surpassed other business. What it did exhibit, however, was cohesion, an ability to organise and strategise for political involvement. Through this issue Catholics were not just involved locally at community or parish level, but nationally. It was both a blessing and a curse. Through the abortion issue the Church found purpose and cohesion against the stresses with the Church post-Vatican II. It also facilitated their relationship with Evangelicals.

Interestingly, abortion had not been highlighted by Vatican II as a key issue; neither was this the case for the Fundamentalist–Modernist Controversy. The Catholic Church simply reaffirmed the issue as an element of its traditional teaching and was therefore prohibitive against it. The forces that changed this came from outside the Church. In the 1960s, concurrent with Vatican II, Civil Rights and antiwar movements managed to engage women who, empowered, began to fight more actively for their rights. The expanding women’s movement managed to elevate the taboo subject of abortion to a public level. Albeit tentatively and in tandem with sexual freedom and women’s

liberation, the campaign to extend women rights and legalise abortion was gaining momentum. Drawn in by these events the Church and American bishops were compelled to defend the premise of their own morals. As Deal Hudson points out: “it was not abortion” - so central to the notion of the sanctity of life for Catholics - “that launched the Religious Right. It was the realisation by conservative Christians that government was no longer on their side. Critics who accuse the movement of being ‘obsessed with sex’ miss this.”¹⁹ Other influences included: a preoccupation - during the 1960s - concerns about a population explosion, the emphasis being on ‘population control’ rather than ‘birth control’ or even women rights. Another feature conservatives picked upon was the role of the government. When the government got involved in the issue it took away the unalienable rights of the child by one, questioning when the child actually becomes a person and two, by recognising the rights of the mother over the rights of the child. Also, the early positions on abortion were concerned with life-and-death issues and not a liberation issue.

Hudson’s central point, however, was twofold. Firstly, the pull into politics was to add a vital voice missing from the conversation and secondly, the notion of a single issue was misleading. Because Catholic bishops “responded so quickly to *Roe v. Wade* abortion was considered a Catholic issue.” Interestingly, however, Evangelicals, initially seeing this in this light “stayed away.” Although conservative Catholics and Evangelicals can and frequently are seen as being ‘single issue’ movements, it was in truth the family with its multiple layers that concerned them. Nevertheless, abortion became the most prominent and consequential of issues - soon to be fundamental to the concerns of both the faith-base and the Republican Party. At first it was not possible to anticipate this one issue would be pivotal to American liberalism, eventually transforming the character of Democratic Party. All of a sudden the Catholic presence within the party was under scrutiny. Ironically the Democratic Party, usually conservative in relation to sexual ethics, was now at odds

with its own liberal tones and overtures. In response, American bishops reacted, while liberals questioned religions place in the public, secular and political sphere. Whilst the bishops attempt to defend Catholicism's moral credentials they were overtaken by more concerted efforts. Groups consisting of lawyers, academics, politicians and lay-persons came together to form the first State's right-to-life groups, almost all of whom were Catholic. These eventually joined forces to create the National Right to Life Committee (NRLC) in 1967 - formalised in 1968. It was the Family Life Division of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB) who encouraged and oversaw its creation. Asked to observe trends in abortion reform the Committee was set up to inform on the legislation forging its way through the States legal and policy chambers. As a result of their interest and efforts the abortion issue was continually being pushed to the front. "The only reason that we have a pro-life movement in this country is because of the Catholic people and the Catholic Church,"²⁰ said the Executive director of the NRLC in 1973. It is accurate to state that Catholics were the only coordinated opposition to abortion during the early 1970s.

In November 1975, the drive to put Catholics firmly into the political frame came when the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB) and the United States Catholic Conference (USCC) published a document titled *A Pastoral Plan for Pro-Life Activities*. In it the document outlined a strategic plan for anti-abortion activities by members of the Catholic clergy and laity. Professor Laurence Tribe described the document as "an extraordinary organisational blueprint for political action." In an unprecedented move into the secular realm of politics the plan called for a "comprehensive pro-life legislative program" to push for "passage of a constitutional amendment providing protection of the unborn child to the maximum degree possible."²¹ Strategically it was petitioned that committees at the state level should both form and coordinate political efforts in both the dioceses and congressional districts of that state. The idea called for the formation of an

“identifiable, tightly-knit, well-organised pro-life unit” in each congressional district. In each case they were to “track voting records of elected officials vis-a-vis abortion and to mobilise resources for political action.”²² Had Vatican II and the sixties counter-culture not collided it is difficult to estimate what - if any - impact would have had on the American conservative Catholic.

Retrospectively John Lukacs lamented in 1970 the “Americanization” of his Church and in particular the changes produced by Vatican II “reflected an astonishing extent of psychological ineptitude on the part of its churchmen. They did not realise that by opening the windows they were letting in neon light rather than sunlight, gasoline fumes rather than fresh air, the din of publicity rather than the harmonies of nature.”²³ New issues symbolised new developments. Surely, even conservative Catholics could see the irony that from out of change and liberal growth came their own fortunes. Amidst the internal changes and stresses within the Church there was now room for manoeuvre and space for conservative Catholics to evolve.

Taken together, the stresses within the Catholic Church exacerbated by changes in their environment presented the modern American Catholic with a double edged sword. Progressive liberals, broad minded and expressive saw these stresses and changes as tantamount to freedom which in-turn brought confidence and hope. As Vatican II settled, Catholics shifted into more inclusive and active political and social roles. No longer encumbered by as much external hostility, the Church - once distant from political involvement - was now invigorated.

Perhaps inevitably Catholics connected as never before with the political. For the orthodox, conservative wing of the Church these stresses were negotiated with not vanquished by. But if these parties were busy defining and mediating with themselves so to was the political. As concerns and issues arose we should be mindful that they were not the only ones searching. Karl Rove would

express this forty years later in his quest to re-enforce the Bush campaign and the Republican majority. Opportunity then arose for a new political home, one to match the traditional character which some Catholics felt they were losing or had lost. Consequently, conservatism; that is, orthodox or more observant Catholicism and the Republican Party²⁴ emerged as the best benefactors for their shared anxieties. Added to a slow but developing ecumenical approach which saw Evangelicals, already beginning to tie themselves more closely to the Republican Party, came a more appealing and likeminded grouping. This new, emerging matrix required structure; a strategy forged out of the stresses, examples, circumstances and desires that both preceded and lay before them.

¹ John B. Judis, *William F. Buckley, Jr.: Patron Saint of the Conservatives* (Simon & Schuster, 1988) p.270

² Maureen Fiedler, "Vatican II: It's about that 'fresh air'" National Catholic Reporter Oct. 8, 2012 <https://www.ncronline.org/blogs/ncr-today/vatican-ii-its-about-fresh-air> (17/4/12)

³ John Pope "Vatican II Changed The Catholic Church -- And The World," *Huffington Post*, 10/11/2012 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/11/vatican-ii-catholic-church-changes_n_1956641.html (17/4/12)

⁴ D.Q. McNerny, "The Rise & Fall of the Thomistic Renewal - Part II, The Revivification of Sound Christian Philosophy," *Philosophia Perennis*, Tuesday, July 07, 2015 http://perennis.blogspot.co.uk/2015/07/the-rise-fall-of-thomistic-renewal-part_7.html (5/4/12)

⁵ Deal Hudson, *Onward, Christian Soldiers: The Growing Political Power of Catholics and Evangelicals in the United States*, (Threshold, 2008) p.289

⁶ George Weigel, "Vatican Time Warp, The newsmagazine launches a snide attack on the Pope," National Review online, June 4, 2010 <http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/229889/vatican-i-time-i-warp/george-weigel> (17/4/12)

⁷ Lawrence J. McAndrews, *What They Wished For: American Catholics and American Presidents, 1960-2004*, (University of Georgia, 2014), p.380

⁸ Father J. Bryan Hehir (a priest of the Archdiocese of Boston) is best known as the man who wrote the "seamless garment" speech for Archbishop Bernandin in 1983.

⁹ Note: The USCCB (the official assembly of the bishops of the Catholic Church in the United States) adopted its current name in July 2001 when the NCCB and the USCC merged. Preceding this the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB), created to deal with canonical, internal ecclesiastical concerns; and the United States Catholic Conference (USCC), its secular arm was created to deal with public policy and work in society at large. The USCC was also responsible for collaborating with lay Catholics and priests to address social and political issues both at home and abroad. In July 2001, both were combined, becoming the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB).

¹⁰ Richard John Neuhaus, "Letter to the Editor," *New York Times*, February 12, 1979, A16; Novak, "A Closed Church, Again," *Commonweal*, February 5, 1982, 113

- ¹¹ William P. Fay, "Catholics In Political Life," United States Conference of Catholic Bishops. <http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/faithful-citizenship/church-teaching/catholics-in-political-life.cfm> (17/4/12)
- ¹² Deal Hudson, *Onward, Christian Soldiers: The Growing Political Power of Catholics and Evangelicals in the United States*, (Threshold, 2008) p.16
- ¹³ Ibid. p.16
- ¹⁴ Catholics United for the Faith, "History of Catholics United for Faith," <http://www.cuf.org/history-of-catholics-united-for-faith/> (17/4/12)
- ¹⁵ Harvey Cox, *The Secular City: Secularisation and the Urbanisation in Theological Perspective*, (New York, 2013)
- ¹⁶ Deal Hudson, *Onward, Christian Soldiers: The Growing Political Power of Catholics and Evangelicals in the United States*, (Threshold, 2008) p.226
- ¹⁷ *Evangelicals and Catholics Together: The Christian Mission in the Third Millennium* (ECT) was the 1993 ecumenical document signed by leading Evangelical and Roman Catholic scholars. The co-signers of the document were Charles Colson and Richard John Neuhaus, representing each side of the discussions.
- ¹⁸ Deal Hudson, *Onward, Christian Soldiers: The Growing Political Power of Catholics and Evangelicals in the United States*, (Threshold, 2008) p.139
- ¹⁹ Ibid. p.53
- ²⁰ Daniel K. Williams, *God's Own Party The Making of the Religious Right*,(Oxford University Press, 2010). p.116.
- ²¹ Sibyl A, Schwarzenbach; Patricia Smith, *Women and the United States Constitution: history, interpretation, and practice*. (Columbia University Press, 2003) p. 233.
- ²² Laurence H. Tribe, *Abortion: the clash of absolutes*, (W. W. Norton & Company, 1992) p. 147
- ²³ John Lukacs, *The Passing of the Modern Age*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1970) p.159
- ²⁴ Two examples demonstrate this. First, in 1964 the strong Catholic enclave of New York witnessed Barry Goldwater win a majority of the cities white, blue-collar Catholics. Through-out the boroughs of Queens, Staten Island, Brooklyn and the Bronx Catholics chose to opt for a conservatively principled candidate. Secondly, the 1965 New York mayoral race saw *National Review's* William Buckley enter the campaign. Like Goldwater, Buckley lost; however, the trend was the same. White, ethnic Catholics voted overwhelmingly in his favour. Gradually there were signs of a run on the Democratic ticket. This was not confined to New York but other cities with a strong Catholic presence too. In Boston, Chicago and Philadelphia conservatism was trumping the notion that monolithically Catholics were no longer a secure component of the Democratic voting bloc.

CHAPTER FOUR

Constructing a Catholic Strategy: a Narrative of strategic organisation.

Outside of the Catholic Church with its hierarchy of bishops, priests and deacons, it was once difficult to locate any organised body or movement of Catholics. Post-Vatican II and post-Kennedy, however, the locus of religious authority and structure started to shift with new Catholic cultures emerging. Beneath the established structure of the Church it was the laity; that is: the populous of the Catholic Church within society not ordained, that began to engage, network and organise. For conservative Catholics the post-war intellectual movement was “a movement of ideas in action.” Maintaining America as a nation of religious practice, keeping secularism from taking over and maintaining traditional family values as the frame work for a moral society, however, required a strategy. It was not about “conventional power or prestige,” argued Nash, rather the “implementation of [these] ideas”¹ and the execution of their beliefs.

Taking lead from the success of their liberal opposition the best way for conservative Catholics to find expression, advocacy and lasting effect for their issues was through politics. At the summit of this approach was Deal Hudson. Hudson, as we shall see, was the primary driver for the Bush campaign’s Catholic out-reach and foremost in a desire to see a form of conservative cultural hegemony. To arrive at this point, however, required the deliberation of a rich constellation of elements and circumstances, currents and dynamics. It was, a deliberative, empirical analysis by Hudson, spanning five decades of numerous political attempts to reach-out and appeal to Catholics in the hope of harnessing what virtues they possessed and thus garnering their vote, that Hudson employed. From this, Hudson believed there was enough of a strategic narrative to be absorbed and

use as a template in the hope of proffering a conservative Catholic position contemporary to him. Beginning with the election of John F. Kennedy in 1960, when Catholic participation was arguably at its height, to the Bob Dole campaign in 1996, when Hudson made his own transition from commentator to strategic political activist, this history attempts to survey the landscape that informed Hudson and ultimately filtered into shaping the Bush campaign its own Catholic out-reach and strategy.

Kennedy: the Catholic problem and the Catholic strategy

For conservative Catholics the election in 1960 of America's first Catholic president was not a success story. Whilst Catholics generally may have felt a growing sense of accomplishment, the conservative Catholic was less than assured. For them there was little they could engage with in relation to Kennedy. While having to defend in principle the notion of a Catholic president, conservative Catholics were opposed to his liberal policies and world view. Mindful of Kennedy's record as Senator, there was no reason to expect him to modify his enthusiasm for the New Deal tradition and the idea of coexistence with the Soviet Union. For conservatives it was a painful catharsis.

However, for the more observant the Kennedy model offered a far more instructive and unexpected set of examples on which the political strategist could take note. To begin with, Kennedy's appointment broke conventional wisdom that a Catholic could ever be elected president and was viewed as a "mile stone" for "overcoming Protestant bias."² Kennedy won 78%³ of the Catholic vote. Post-election analysis of the Kennedy-Nixon contest carried out by scholars at the University of Michigan concluded: "There can be little doubt that the religious issue was the strongest single

factor overlaid on basic loyalties in the 1960 election.”⁴ Religion was pivotal; John F. Kennedy’s election seen as a breakthrough for their faith, giving further credence to them as Americans. It also opened up greater freedom for Catholics - all Catholics - to politically engage. What Hudson realised, however, was this was not a political fairytale. There were serious lessons to be learnt from the Kennedy narrative.

Despite strong post-election figures and the assumption that Kennedy had a seemingly natural allure to the Catholic faith-base his success was not - ironically - because he utilised his Catholic credentials. On the contrary, Kennedy’s strategy had been to distance himself from his faith.

Relying on coreligionist support within what was still arguably a monolithic vote amongst Catholics within the Democratic Party; Kennedy anticipated that Catholics would – without prompting – support a Catholic. It was a logical notion that left a great deal to chance. As it happened, however, the assumption was correct. It was non-Catholics that required reassurance and restraining. This was particularly the case in the South. Although largely Democratic it was their Protestant sensibility and anti-Catholic bias that was to be treated with caution and where possible eased. One thing Kennedy could not afford, had he chosen to run as a Catholic, was a retaliatory reason for Protestants to organise against him. Catholicism and Kennedy *were not* to be explicitly connected.

Going into the presidential race Kennedy was all too aware of possible faith-based acrimony.

There were two examples Kennedy had to follow. One was awareness of his own faith and attitudes towards it. Second was his own personal, politics experience. Viewed in early American history as a “foreign evil,” Catholicism was easy to portray as anti-American. The “denial of personal liberties” a “dire threat to the Anglo-American notions of national identity and independence;” in addition to which Catholicism was seen as, “actively anti-Christian.”⁵ Catholics were still largely perceived as

a sect, like Jehovah's Witnesses or Mormons. In addition, they were distinguishable from other sub-cultural groups in their structure, motivation and number; factors that as noted would later be coveted. While the political may have viewed this differently, Protestant America did not.

Then there was Kennedy the Catholic politician. In 1956 when Kennedy was under consideration for the position of vice president to Adlai Stevenson (D: IL) it was initially thought Kennedy's religion would lend weight to the Stevenson ticket. An early sign perhaps of political recognition as to the virtue of the Catholic vote. Republican accusations that Stevenson was soft on Communism and with questions looming over his divorce it was hoped the young Catholic would help purify and stimulate his nomination. In truth, religion was only one amongst many factors for Kennedy's consideration. Kennedy's "youthful, clean-cut demeanour, his candid, low-key approach and his heroic war record gave him special appeal." Still, it was the religious factor that in the end diminished any hope of Kennedy joining the ticket. As Special Counsel to Kennedy and biographer, Theodore C. Sorensen points out; Stevenson's office was receiving "heavily anti-Catholic mail, in opposition to a Catholic for vice president." In addition, "Mayor David Lawrence of Pittsburgh (Catholic), Speaker Sam Rayburn, Harry Truman and former National Chairman Frank Mckinnery (Catholic),"⁶ advised they oppose the idea. Senator Estes Kefauver of Tennessee was eventually chosen.

Nonetheless, Kennedy's consent to the position created a significant event. The Kennedy organisation (family, aids, peers) created a strategy aimed at convincing delegates to nominate Kennedy from a Catholic perspective. To attempt to achieve this Sorensen circulated a sixteen page memorandum that, in short, attempted to show that Stevenson's 1952 defeat for the presidency was

due to the defection of Catholics. The document was well researched. Full of statistics, quotations, analysis and argument it was designed to answer fear concerning the 'anti-Catholic' vote.

The memorandum highlighted where the Catholic vote mattered for electoral success. This, according to the memo, was the north-eastern states. Each state was broken down into Catholic population per state. In addition, margins between the two parties were calculated as were the electoral values for each state. There was also an analysis of voting patterns conducted within the major cities for each state. Interestingly it also suggested that it was amongst conservatives in these urban areas - who had voted for Eisenhower in 1952 - that could be re-captured. To distance themselves from the memo Sorensen persuaded Connecticut state party chairman and Catholic John M. Bailey circulate the memo under his name. From then on it became known as the 'Bailey Memorandum' (See Appendix A). Building on the work of election analysts Samuel Lubell and Luis Bean as well as data compiled by Gallup and Michigan University the memorandum was a succinct but detailed work highlighting not only the value of the Catholic vote but where to locate it and why Democrats had lost out to Republican defection by Catholics. For example, on page 281 of Appendix A, point 1., the Memorandum informed Kennedy of the true dynamics of the Catholic vote, its make-up: age, residency, population and so forth. Despite its size its content was both informative and comprehensive, something Hudson acknowledged.

The only work to ever mirror this was Deal Hudson's Catholic Voter Project three decades later. It was strategically unique. This was the first time detailed attention had been given to cracks appearing in the notion of the Democrat/Catholic (monolithic) voting relationship. Sorensen was keen to play down the analysis stating that the study "made no pretence at being a comprehensive and objective study" but a "political answer to sweeping questions."⁷ Unfortunately, whatever the memorandum had to offer it was not utilised. By the time of the convention Stevenson decide to

have them choose. Stevenson believed that to have a Catholic running mate “is only to be considered if the boldest steps are necessary.”⁸ Although unsuccessful, noted Deal Hudson, the memorandum did “help lay the ground work for a run in 1960.”⁹

Those who surrounded Kennedy, specifically his father and Sorensen, viewed his failure to join Stevenson as a blessing. Sceptical about Stevenson’s chances there was the possibility of blaming the ‘Catholic’ for a Stevenson loss. Following Kennedy’s defeat to Senator Kefauver, who had managed to convince fellow southerners to switch vote in his favour, the path was now clear to focus on the 1960 presidency. After his defeat to join Stevenson on the ticket and as a valuable stimulus, Kennedy’s father pointed out to his son that contrary to belief, [America] was “not a private preserve for Protestants.” With diligence, a “new generation”¹⁰ was out there. In 1960 the Catholic population was estimated to be numbering 40 million. This capacity could – if coalesced - impose its interests upon America. The real fear was accountability. Catholics were after all answerable to Rome and a global Church and not the United States, or so it was perceived.

The idea of double allegiance was raised in the presidential campaign of New York Governor and Catholic Alfred E. Smith in 1928. In 1927, Episcopal layman and constitutional lawyer Charles C. Marshal expressed in an open letter to Al Smith the question: “Can a Catholic be loyal to his Church and, as president, to his country?” Marshal also questioned if the election of a Catholic to the office of president would “precipitate an inevitable conflict between the American Catholic Church and the American State irreconcilable with domestic peace.”¹¹ This notion persisted. In 1959, Harry Truman also repeated Marshal’s sentiment. He asserted Catholics could not be trusted in the highest office because, “Catholics have a loyalty to a Church hierarchy that I don’t believe in... You don’t want to have anyone in control of the government of the United States who has

another loyalty, religious or otherwise.”¹² Kennedy replied, “I recognise no power in the institutions of my Church to interfere with the operations of the Constitution of the United States or the enforcement of the law of the land. I believe in absolute freedom of conscience, in the absolute separation of church and state. I believe that no tribunal of any church has any power to make any decree of any force in the law of the land, other than to establish the status of its own communicants within its own church.”¹³ Sorensen gave detail surrounding this particular question in his biography of Kennedy in 1965. As a result, we are aware that Kennedy was cognisant with what Sorensen termed the ‘persistent religious issue,’ and in particular the Catholic issues surrounding Al Smith.

To navigate this, Kennedy chose a strategy of disassociation. In March 1959, *Look* magazine commissioned Fletcher Knebel to write an article: ‘A Catholic in 1960.’ It was hoped this would distance him from prejudicial positions, stem any potential loss of votes and allow him to articulate his position on the religious issue. According to Sorensen this provided the opportunity for Kennedy to “[meet] the religious issue head on.”¹⁴ Kennedy was quoted as saying: “Whatever one’s religion in private life may be, for the office-holder, nothing takes precedence over his oath to uphold the Constitution and all its parts – including the First Amendment and the strict separation of church and state.”¹⁵ Kennedy then highlighted his opposition to federal aid for parochial schools and the appointment of an ambassador to the Vatican. Retrospectively Sorensen concluded the interview a failure. In Knebel’s article Sorensen thought Kennedy came over as “a poor Catholic, a poor politician, a poor moralist and a poor wordsmith.”¹⁶ Fortunately, only a small amount of Catholic concern was raised in relation to Kennedy distancing himself from his own faith. Biographer Thomas Maier cited the *Indiana Catholic and Record* for cautioning Kennedy, saying, the “young Senator had better watch his language.”¹⁷ Attempting to determine if Kennedy’s address was a success is difficult, although generally the consensus appeared positive. Still, organisations

like the Citizens for Religious Freedom, headed by *The Power of Positive Thought* author Reverend Norman Vincent Peale, continued attacking him. Overall the reaction was muted.

Attempts to further deal with the religious issue took a bold step, when, on September 12, 1960, Kennedy gave a speech to the Greater Houston Ministerial Association, a group of Protestant ministers, on the subject of his religion. In an effort to continue to allay non-Catholic fears this was his most staged and arguably successful attempt. “I am the Democratic Party’s candidate for president, who happens also to be a Catholic. I do not speak for my church on public matters, and the church does not speak for me.”¹⁸ Kennedy’s central theme was to focus on the separation of church and state. “I believe in an America where the separation of church and state is absolute, where no Catholic prelate would tell the president (should he be Catholic) how to act, and no Protestant minister would tell his parishioners for whom to vote; where no church or church school is granted any public funds or political preference; and where no man is denied public office merely because his religion differs from the president who might appoint him or the people who might elect him.” He continued: “I believe in an America that is officially neither Catholic, Protestant nor Jewish; where no public official either requests or accepts instructions on public policy from the Pope, the National Council of Churches or any other ecclesiastical source; where no religious body seeks to impose its will directly or indirectly upon the general populace or the public acts of its officials; and where religious liberty is so indivisible that an act against one church is treated as an act against all.”¹⁹

There is no real method for assessing if Kennedy’s address was a success; however, we can state that no concerted attempt on the part of Protestants purposefully coalesced against him. Not unexpectedly the Protestant vote, registered as 38% for Kennedy and 62%²⁰ for Nixon, accounted

for a clear religious gap. Even so, Kennedy's command of nearly 40% of the Protestant vote was not un-convincing. Interestingly, the Republican Party refrained from using the religious issue against him. In sharp contrast to its religious approach when Al Smith was the candidate Richard Nixon chose not to exploit the situation. He did not have to. The issue was the elephant in the room. Also, it looked favourably on the Republican campaign if they appeared to abstain. Had Nixon chose to use the Catholic issue against Kennedy he could be charged with bigotry and returning to old allegations, strategies Nixon did not wish the American electorate to see. Nixon's campaign managers were given strict guidelines in relation to the non-use of religious strategy. In a sense, Nixon and Kennedy both had their hands tied by religion, neither candidate willing or able to use it. Ultimately Kennedy was redeemed by a faithful Catholic turnout that gave him 80%.

For the American Catholic and the American public, Kennedy's election in 1960 helped deconstruct the belief that someone's religious persuasion could be a malevolent force influencing their position. In truth, there was no show of overt religiosity, no instruction from Rome and no preferential treatment of Catholics or their cause/s. American Catholics may have joined to vote for Kennedy and they may have rejoiced in the symbolic nature of his success, but, symbolic it was. As a Catholic leader he did not and neither could he deliver on Catholic concerns. There was, however, one important and surprising strategic lesson to be drawn from this. The idea that Kennedy was a Catholic in name only, gave rise to the idea that Catholics - who had clearly demonstrated their collective will at the pollingbooth -, were free agents. In the absence of any clear, definable strategy to appeal to Catholics, they had managed to show a form of political self- determination *en-mass*. In the most unexpected manner, Catholics had been granted a greater sense of political freedom and self determination by a Catholic president who chose to distance himself from his own faith.

Whereas the 1960 election is seen in terms of a victory for both Kennedy and Catholics; it was, in fact a veiled victory for Republicans. Thanks to Catholics showing political autonomy in their choice to vote for Kennedy it demonstrated they were perhaps no longer unsympathetic or unappealing to the Republican Party. For the first time in modern, post-war history, a space appeared in which the Republican Party had the opportunity to attract Catholics in the future if their concerns could be met. The question, was how to achieve this? Deal Hudson was aware of these nuances, those subtle but powerful elements that had helped transform the American Catholic into a far more dynamic political creature. Kennedy was arguably a turning point, but it required other events to continue its transformation.

Barry Goldwater, a fusion of Catholics?

Whilst arguably the conservative Catholic cause had been rendered almost passive up to and including Kennedy's presidency, there was, post-Kennedy one event that gave significant traction to the movement and its political orientation. This was the candidacy in 1964 of conservative and a five-term U.S. senator from Arizona Barry Goldwater (R-Az). Recognised as the "founder of a conservative movement that [became] a vital element in mainstream Republican thinking,"²¹ it was Goldwater who shaped the Republican Party and its position on limited government, welfare, and defence, traits that would remain with the Party until the present day. Although the Goldwater campaign ended in a resounding defeat; it was, noted George Nash "an educational experience."²² Lee Edwards of the *Heritage Foundation*, called him the "most consequential loser in American politics."²³ More importantly it provided a legacy on which others could and indeed would follow.

What Goldwater bequeathed was fusion. The “burst to prominence” of conservatism through the Goldwater campaign helped cement the conservative Catholic intellectual movement - so strong a feature of the campaign and its psyche - the burgeoning conservative movement finding a home and voice within the political. Goldwater, like Buckley wrote George Nash, “galvanised the rumbling popular conservative movement and helped the Right (who, in every variety endorsed Goldwater) to capture the Republican Party”²⁴ and help “find its American home.”²⁵ Most of all, Barry Goldwater was an individualist, particularly so in the face of Kennedy and who, through compromise was able to crystallise the movement. “He probably believed,” wrote Adam Clymer of the *New York Times* “that Edmund Burke was correct when he said there were no good new ideas. His notion was to revitalise what he considered to be the operating principles of this nation before it was seduced by the idea of the state as a substitute for the individual in the area of social investment.”²⁶ Thanks Goldwater the distance between conservative Catholic intellectuals, conservatives in general and politics had grown shorter.

One of the primary beneficiaries of this contraction was *National Review (NR)*. Although a decade ahead of Goldwater and as noted the owner of its own charismatic personality the links between them are strong. Before Goldwater *NR* “was conservatism,” but following the end of Kennedy’s presidential reign *NR*, having found little or no further influence during his tenure, went on to act as a forum for the Goldwater campaign. William Buckley, a friend and councillor of Goldwater’s had always been ill-at-ease over the rise and formation of various Rightist groups in the early 1960s, particularly if they were associated with conservatism in general and *NR* in particular. The rise and modelling of Goldwater, however, was one of his indulgences. As John B. Judis details: “Goldwater, Buckley and *NR* had grown up together politically, the one adding prominence to the other.” While *NR* pushed and promoted Goldwater, touting him openly as the “leader of the

conservative movement” as well as “encouraging his presidential ambitions;”²⁷ *NR* publisher, Bill Rusher, was a key architect in the Draft Goldwater Committee: the organisation responsible for engineering his nomination for President of the United States on the 1964 Republican Party ticket. Goldwater’s popularity and his image helped circulation for *NR* as well as sharpen its image for conservatives.

In Republican Barry Goldwater, himself an Episcopalian, many first wave conservative Catholics and their conservative siblings began to find the prospect of a political location on which to centre. Supported by other conservative organisations like the highly active Young Americans for Freedom (YAF) ignited the conservative cause. In actual fact, the links between conservative Catholics and Goldwater were in place before Kennedy’s election and his own presidential aspirations. Goldwater’s successful book, *The Conscience of a Conservative* (1960), was ghost written by conservative activist and Catholic Brent Bozell, William F. Buckley’s brother-in-law. In conversation with Catholic scholar Patrick Allitt, Brent Bozell, suggested his influence was crucial, saying: “Goldwater didn’t know much about conservatism until he read *The Conscience of a Conservative*.”²⁸ Through the Catholic lens of Bozell; then senior editor at *National Review*, Bozell took the ideas from his circle of conservative intellectuals and presented them in *The Conscience of a Conservative* in a way that made the ideology accessible to a general audience.

The Conscience of a Conservative became, “quite simply, the conservatives new bible, the underground book of the times.” It created a focus, a manifesto on conservative positions such as limited government, civil rights, government regulation, taxes and spending, the welfare state, education and the Soviet threat. More importantly, Goldwater “brought the three conservative branches into a coordinated and seamless tract — a “fusion” that ended the three-way debate over

reconciling conservative ideals and practical politics that had raged for 15 years. As Goldwater said: he hoped “to bridge the gap between theory and practice.” He took the ideas that established the roots of conservatism — economics, anti-communism, limited government, the Constitution — and explained how they could be applied to practical politics and government policy. The “challenge to conservatives today,” he said, “is quite simply to demonstrate the bearing of a proven philosophy on the problems of our own time.”²⁹ At its core, the architects of this were Catholic, Catholics who had managed to seat Catholic orthodox creeds into his political convictions.

In 1964, Goldwater lost, in part due to a ground sweep of sympathy for the assassinated Kennedy and if candid: fearful of this conservative unknown. Nevertheless, his legacy was highly significant. Goldwater’s achievement was to create a political and ideological shift that would forever alter the conservative-Republican and conservative Christian landscape. Goldwater’s capture of the nomination not only moved the Party to the right but towards a Southern base; making states rights one of the central issues to his campaign, capturing Southern attentions. Goldwater’s candidacy attracted politically conservative Christians who, in-turn, became active for the Republican Party because here they believed they had shared values, values missing in the Democratic Party. The Republican political machine that coalesced in his favour - stimulated by Journal’s like *National Review* - won party caucuses and some primaries but did so with such zealous enthusiasm that it left a residual mark. “Nineteen sixty-four was the year when grass-roots conservative Republicans took control of the Republican Party, and they have had it, more or less, ever since,”³⁰ said Phyllis Schlafly (Catholic political activist and founder of Eagle Forum).

Goldwater’s political aspirations saw influential conservative Catholics – like Phyllis Schlafly, establish themselves, cementing the footings for future conservative Catholic activism and political

orientation. For example: in 1964, Phyllis Schlafly, supporting Goldwater's candidacy delegated for Goldwater at the Republican National Convention that year. Her book, *A Choice Not an Echo* - Goldwater's campaign slogan - was seen as helping Goldwater win the nomination. One other notable feature to emerge at this time was Ronald Reagan's televised speech, 'A Time for Choosing,' in support of Goldwater's campaign on October 27, 1964. Not only did this strike a chord with conservatives it also spotlighted Ronald Reagan as a possible successor for the movement. Reagan's impassioned speech is considered to be the defining moment for launching his own political career.

A trend was emerging. Slowly, conservative Catholic political involvement was increasing. Post Kennedy the belief that Lyndon Johnson was his heir allowed mainstream Catholics to follow suit while conservative Catholics continued to rally against growing discord not only from within, but from American society around them. More specifically they now had numerous vehicles to rally around. What the appearance of individuals like Goldwater achieved was multi-layered. In addition to presenting a Catholic orientated conservative programme he had managed to help pull away from the fixation with the Red Threat of Communism, so often defining within the movement. Post-Goldwater there was now a broader platform on which to work both at home and abroad. Notably, however, the beginnings to a re-alignment of Catholics to the Republican Party were underway. Equally, the Republican Party was searching for new constituencies.

Richard Nixon, the working class, white ethnic strategy

The relationship between Richard Nixon and Catholics has escaped attention. Like Kennedy, preference for other aspects of his political history have take precedence. As a result, a vacuum

exists in the narrative between Kennedy and what appeared to be a resurgence of Catholic involvement around the presidency of Ronald Reagan in 1981/4. Hudson was aware of this and expressed in interview³¹ his cognisance of the fact that the little understood relationship between Nixon and the Christian base provided one of the most important periods of the strategic coalition between a president, the party and conservative Christians following Goldwater.

What little historical work does exist has not unexpectedly focused on the Evangelical detail of the relationship. Illustrating the relationship is of importance, however, because the two dovetail in a significant way. Nixon purposefully brought Evangelicals into the Republican Party by deliberately focusing his campaign on cultural issues. With assistance from high profile Evangelist, Billy Graham as a liaison to conservative Christians, Nixon attempted to cut into the heavily populated Evangelical suburban Sunbelt with special appeal to their vote. By utilising church services and Evangelical events to win their support. Evangelicals who were themselves opposed to the burgeoning cultural liberalism and secularism around them were encouraged by Nixon's socially conservative rhetoric and his public friendship with one of Bush's early influences, Billy Graham. As an Informal advisor, Billy Graham was central to Nixon's evangelical networking, Graham responsible for bringing together Nixon and leading Evangelical figures like Bill Bright founder of Campus Crusade for Christ. In addition Nixon's aides Charles Colson and H. R. Halderman networked the faith-base for Nixon through key events like Explo72 (an Evangelistic conference sponsored by Campus Crusade for Christ. It is short for: spiritual Explosion.). Although Watergate diminished Nixon's estimation in the eyes of Evangelicals, he had done enough to help secure a strong Republican/Evangelical coalition. One detail corresponding to the Bush campaign in 2000, was that Nixon's Catholic out-reach came from an Evangelical feature. Special Counsel to Nixon Chuck Colson - pejoratively known as Nixon's 'hatchet man,'³² - was the link. On the surface

Colson was firmly Evangelical, yet, despite his Southern Baptist credentials, he attended Catholic mass with his wife (a Roman Catholic) and was also a strong supporter of 'Evangelical Catholicism,' a 'born-again' movement within the Catholic Church. Colson was one of several who developed networks, ultimately helping to pilot Catholics to the GOP and Nixon.

According to Jonathan Aitken's account of Colson's life - detailed by Hudson - the strength of affinity for Catholics and Catholicism can be seen in a conversation between Nixon and Colson when Nixon said he was personally considering a conversion to Catholicism. "What I like about Catholicism is that it is unswerving, stable and solid in its teachings of traditional morality. Catholics don't go off preaching all these half-cocked social issues. They stay with the fundamentals of man's obedience to God." However, politics out-weighed conviction. According to Colson, Nixon told him he was tempted to convert to Catholicism but was worried it would be misinterpreted: "They would say there goes Tricky Dick Nixon trying to win the Catholic vote."³³ The point, however, is Nixon was mindful of the Catholic and in particular the Catholic vote and its value. Nixon, after all, had been in the unenviable position of having witnessed their collective power for Kennedy. The question was how to disfigure their vote from a seemingly unbreakable Democratic/Catholic alliance that in 1960 was arguably at its pinnacle.

As Lawrence J. McAndrews noted, while "attention to the Catholic vote was not new in 1969, the degree to which a president courted it was."³⁴ The response came in the form of three young strategists: Kevin Phillips, Richard Scammon and Ben Wattenberg whose lines of argument had a bearing on Nixon's Catholic approach. In his analysis of the 1968 election, Kevin Phillips - a conservative strategist on voting patterns for Richard Nixon - put forward a theory entitled *The Emerging republican Majority* (1968). Although Phillips' analysis began in 1966 his findings were

not published until 1969. Deal Hudson acknowledged Phillips as being “perhaps the first political strategist who recognised how the influence of religious conservatives - Evangelicals and Catholics - was going to re-shape American politics in favour of the GOP.³⁵ Incidentally, Phillips would go on to be one of the harshest critics of George W. Bush and one of the chief proponents in warning of a theocracy under his watch.

Phillips argued, however, a new era had begun; one that could be characterised as being both conservative and Republican. Furthermore, it was, he noted, religious conservatives who were migrating to the GOP and Catholics were once more at its core. In his interpretation, 1968 marked “the beginning of a new Republican cycle comparable in magnitude to the New Deal era which began in 1932.”³⁶ According to Phillips this Republican majority was fashioned by a “populist revolt of the American masses....elevated by prosperity to the middle-class status and conservatism....against the caste, policies and taxation of the mandarins of Establishment liberalism.”³⁷ More specifically, it was Catholics, Phillips argued, that fitted this description and a feature of this transformation was, he noted, a gravitation towards the Republican Party.³⁸

Phillip’s analysis was largely accurate. Compared to the overwhelming show of support for Kennedy and Johnson, 1968 did show something of a swing but it was not as comprehensive as Phillips first suggests. In fact, in 1968 Nixon only received 11% more of the Catholic vote comparable to 1960. In 1960 he still managed to receive 22%³⁹ against Kennedy. The key word, however, was ‘emerging.’ Although slight, the movement away from the Democratic hold for Catholics was in sight. Concurrent to the release of Phillips analysis came the work of journalists and Democratic strategists Richard Scammon and Ben Wattenberg. As key beneficiaries of the new, post-war elevated American (both economically and educationally) the American Catholic was

hitherto adding ideology and political transformation to its matrix and Wittenberg and Scammon had hit upon the key ingredient: values. In *The Real Majority: An Extraordinary Examination of the American Electorate* (1970) they too determined the existence a “new electoral realignment of working-class, white ethnics.” This electorate was, they argued, “centrist” and that parties or candidates were viable to attract this “real majority”⁴⁰ if they could reach-out to them. Taking note, John Ehrlichman (counsel and Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs) advised Nixon to pay careful attention to Scammon and Wattenberg’s thesis.⁴¹ He noted with some caution that it was with moderation and not with extremes (the emphasis being on conservative) these elements should be approached.

Their analysis was interesting. They argued that while the Democratic Party “owned” the Economic Issue” (a broad category encompassing issues such as Social Security and employment), the Republicans “owned” the “Social Issue[s]” (crime, drugs, and morality). They proposed which ever party could exploit this and “neutralise their opponent’s strength, would prevail.”⁴² While Scammon and Wattenberg characterised each party’s constituent base they, like Phillips were beginning to draw the battle lines for the next election. Strategically they advised the Democratic Party address these points. Wittenberg and Scammon warned Democrats to “pay attention to what was bothering the lady in Dayton.” Hudson would echo this thirty years later with: ‘who is talking to Catholics like me in Texas?’ The lady stood for the “suburban Catholic housewife married to the blue-collar worker who almost surely opposed affirmative action and sympathised with those who bloodied the antiwar marches on Wall Street in 1970.”⁴³ Note worthy is the fact that they discerned early the social conservative socio-issue based values. In future their analysis would be the one to play out.

According to McAndrews Nixon was “fascinated” by the idea that “an electoral realignment of working-class, white ethnics from Democrats to Republicans,” and eminent amongst those potential Republicans were Catholics. This, he suggested “could occur if only the new president transmitted the proper political signals.”⁴⁴ Guided by Phillips, Scammon and Wattenberg Nixon confronted the New Deal, Democratically aligned Catholic with a mixture of Federal aid to public schools, opposition to abortion and welfare. The motion towards these came from a variety of sources. Unlike Bush, whose management and orchestration can be reduced primarily to Hudson, several Catholics (and Democrats) informed Nixon. For example. Between 1940 and 1960 Reverend John F. Cronin wrote his speeches. In office, Nixon appointed Jesuit priest, the Reverend John McLaughlin as speech writer and special assistant. Further additions included professor Daniel Patrick Moynihan, urban affairs advisor and a progressive Catholic social thinker responsible for highlighting the probable advantage welfare and welfare reform may offer.⁴⁵ To help placate Catholic opinion – both at home and abroad –on March 2, 1969 and September 29, 1970 Nixon had an audience with Pope Paul in the Vatican City. To help cement and maintain these ties Nixon appointed Henry Cabot Lodge as Personal Representative of the President (1970-77) and U.S ambassador to the Vatican.

As William Prendergast noted: “throughout his political career [Nixon] sought to include Catholics in building a base support” and he argued Catholics were a “major source of recruits for the silent majority.”⁴⁶ The phrase - first used during Nixon’s November 3, 1969 television broadcast - was intended to aid support for the war in Vietnam. Closing his speech he requested the support of the ‘great silent majority.’ With this Nixon “attempted to obscure the differences between working-class and affluent voters by portraying the silent majority as both heroes and victims of this tumultuous period.” Nixon “praised the ‘forgotten Americans, the non-shouters, the non-demonstrators. The

hard-working, tax-paying Americans whose values were under siege by antiwar protesters, urban rioters, criminals and antipoverty liberals.”⁴⁷ The guiding source to this type of rhetoric can be attributed to orthodox Catholic, conservative journalist and senior advisor to Nixon, Pat Buchanan. Buchanan, a future stalwart of the Religious Right, who, in the early 90s would proclaim the existence of a ‘religious war taking place with the country for the sake of America,’⁴⁸ was responsible for fashioning the strategy that according to Buchanan had won the election in 68. Having joined the Nixon campaign as a speech writer and advisor in 1966/74, Buchanan believed the ‘silent majority’ at home was also a “source of salvation from 1960’s liberalism.”⁴⁹ Nixon, argued George Packer, was “Appalled by the chaos of the cities, the moral heedlessness of the young, and the insults to national pride in Vietnam, were ready to blame it all on the liberalism of President Lyndon B. Johnson. Right-wing populism was bubbling up from below; it needed to be guided by a leader who understood its resentments because he felt them, too.”⁵⁰ Buchanan recalled: “From Day One, Nixon and I talked about creating a new majority. What we talked about, basically, was shearing off huge segments of F.D.R.’s New Deal coalition, which L.B.J. had held together: Northern Catholic ethnics and Southern Protestant conservatives - what we called the Daley-Rizzo Democrats in the North and, frankly, the Wallace Democrats in the South.”⁵¹

Interviewed in 2014 by Sean Salai for *America, The National Catholic Review*, Nixon was asked “Why did American Catholics in the post-Kennedy era go for Nixon?” He replied: “What happened was that the Catholic community, which had voted 78 percent for Jack Kennedy and I believe 75 percent for Lyndon Johnson, in 1966 after Johnson’s great victory voted only 65 percent for the Democratic Party. They began to move to the Republican Party for reasons of morality and patriotism.” He continued: “The Democratic Party, particularly the dominant liberal intellectual wing, was becoming increasingly anti-war and almost anti-patriotic in the minds of many American

Catholics. It was calling for cutting and running in Vietnam, almost calling for a victory for the Viet Cong. You know, Ho, Ho, Ho Chi Minh, the NLF is going to win.” Domestically Buchanan spelled out what would continue to be the foundation for future Republican support, detailing the “moral end, cultural and social issues,” that stimulated Catholics to “move away from the Democratic Party of FDR and Truman.” It was, he noted “compatible with the social conservatism of [his] father’s generation, moving away on issues of morality like sexual morality, drugs, divorce and even abortion.”⁵²

Buchanan went into more detail as to why Catholics gravitated toward Nixon. Included was inner city unrest. According to Buchanan’s thesis “Northern Catholics and ethnics, along with the southern Protestants,” saw President Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society” (domestic programs to eliminate poverty and racial injustice) as a failure. “All these programs were supposed to benefit the poor, the working class and African-Americans. They saw that these programs had not brought peace to the cities, but the very opposite. So they sort of saw the country coming apart.” In contrast, argued Buchanan “Nixon, even though he had been the scourge of Truman and Kennedy—and of the liberals in the early 1940s and 1950s—suddenly emerged with Spiro Agnew as a symbol of stability.” More specifically, this security was rooted in a “return to traditional values, and as something that was resisting the (Great Society) revolution.” Pressed on what was the “central issue that helped rally Catholic voters to Nixon, Buchanan was clear; it was the “cultural, moral and social issues [that] brought postwar Catholics into the Nixon new majority.”⁵³ This theme would continue up to and including Bush in 2000.

On this point Laura Gifford and Daniel Williams concurred. Nixon they suggested had not only reached out to Catholics but had “shrewdly positioned himself as an ecumenical defender of the

nations morals, so that both Evangelicals and Catholics could view him as their own.”⁵⁴ Positioned this way Nixon managed to throw out a broad net to attract the burgeoning conservative religious base who were equally searching for a political home. There were, say compared to Kennedy - less restrictions on Nixon, restrictions that managed to open up the voting field and remove previous boundaries. Only a short time earlier the strategy had been so different. When, for example, New York banker and Catholic advisor to Nixon, Peter Flanigan, had advocated certain strategies designed to appeal to Catholics he was halted. Flanigan, who worked hard behind the scenes to either advise or connect Nixon to Catholics, suggested running specifically targeted adds to Catholics in the hope of attracting their vote. As noted, Nixon was adamant the religious card must not be played. The adds - against Kennedy - did not run.

In 1972, Richard Nixon was the first Republican to gain a majority of the Catholic vote with 52%.⁵⁵ It sent out a message. Targeted and negotiated correctly Republicans could draw upon their vote. On his own Nixon cannot be attributed with breaking the Catholic/Democratic alliance but what he had achieved was a sign-post encouraging a new way for both conservative Catholics and Republicans alike. Nixon negotiated a competent - faith-based campaign that should be give greater attention in the future. Three decades later the strategy of the Bush campaign’s out-reach to Catholics under Deal Hudson had been given a significant sign post by these transitions.

The faith interlude of Jimmy Carter

Although a Democrat Jimmy Carter’s contribution to the conservative Catholic cause and its trajectory are worthy of consideration. As we have pointed out on numerous occasions, borrowing from the examples of the opposition was justifiable, A point Hudson, acknowledged.⁵⁶ Similar John.

F. Kennedy and George W. Bush, Carter was distinguishable for his religiosity but not for the strategies of relationship that under-pinned him politically. Not untypical, the relationship between Carter and Catholics has been given little note. Nevertheless, Jimmy Carter, the first post-Vietnam president, represents a useful link in the progression of Catholic political development as well as offering another unique insight into Catholic political negotiation.

In 1977 the America Carter came into was a post-Nixon, jaded America. Disheartened and disappointed by Vietnam, alarmed at Watergate the despondency grew with the erosion of the American economy by competition from the East. Added to this the growth in Soviet military strength and her ambitions were depleting national confidence and pride combined with a sense of moral drift. Nixon, in addition to corruption at the highest level was revealed to the American public as a profane individual. To anyone of faith, decency, it appeared, was under attack. Abortion, removal of school prayer, the blurring of traditional gender roles, Equal Rights Amendment and rights for gays were - some thought - an extension of the 1960s, deconstructing a once proud, moral America. At what period within American history this was supposed to have existed is not noted; it did not, however, hide the genuine feeling of uncertainty and unease.

In Jimmy Carter, however, an unassuming, Southern Baptist who was open about his faith gave grounds for optimism to a disillusioned country. The antithesis of Nixon, Carter, whose faith was biblical, personal, homely and honest, naturally presented an image the nation sought. Thanks to Nixon and Kennedy politics had become about character. In sharp contrast to the negative details exposed through Watergate and the expletive profanity revealed in the Nixon Tapes any form of morality and decency was - it was thought - preferential. Religion, it would seem, was the answer. Carter's campaign slogan was: 'A Leader, For A Change.'

The atmosphere appeared conducive. *Newsweek* and George Gallup famously declared 1976 to be the ‘year of the Evangelical.’ The redemptive biography “Born Again” by Charles Colson added to the mood. Others were more specific. As a regular contributor to *Worldview*, a journal published by the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, prominent Catholic priest and writer Richard John Neuhaus, was, like his fellow intellectual columnists, arguing for more religion to be injected into the discourse over America. In Carter, Neuhaus saw a man who could bridge the gap. Writing in September 1976 Neuhaus thought a “Carter presidency would be a watershed.” In a hopeful, endorsing essay Neuhaus wrote with enthusiasm for the possibility that Carter would assume the presidency and in doing so there would be a “remarriage” between the “sacred and the secular.” According to Neuhaus, Americans were “ready to believe again” and in Jimmy Carter [fell] the “responsibility to articulate the national faith through a lively union of public reason and biblical hope.”⁵⁷ Neuhaus had always cautioned not to place too much trust in politicians or “princes” as his most quoted psalm (146) would read. Yet, Neuhaus did, with successive presidents, exactly this. In particular, Carter, Neuhaus believed he could reaffirm something good in a nation blighted by Vietnam and Watergate.

At the same time academia contributed to the discourse. For example: debates concerning Civic Religion⁵⁸ began to develop, pressing home the notion that sociologist Robert N. Bellah had formulated nearly a decade earlier (1967) that America - symbolically at least - *was* a religious country. Studies later undertaken by Ronald Wimberley (1976) build upon this, his analysis of language and practices demonstrating reflecting the depth to which religion is both present and utilised. He noted: “America is God’s chosen nation today; holidays like the Fourth of July are religious as well as patriotic; a president’s authority is from God; social justice cannot only be based

on laws; it must also come from religion and God can be known through the experiences of the American people.” This, Wimberley suggested gave “empirical credence” to Bellah’s argument that “civil religion is a distinct cultural component within American society.” Arguably the most important element was that Civic Religion - though integral to the American way - is not “captured either by American politics or by denominational religiosity.”⁵⁹

The relevance of civic religion is its capacity to demonstrate one of the most curious aspects of the relationship between religion and politics in America in the 1970s. In a period Erling Jorsta described as a “vivid expression of irony and paradox,” American in the 1970s was becoming “both more religious and more secular.”⁶⁰ As the counter culture of the 1960s continued to embolden itself into the next decade so did religious antipathy. Over the next few decades this disconnect made for a polemical interpretation of the period; a trenchant divide that would only grow as conservative Christian forces developed and became more indignant. As we shall see, these forces were not without their own divides, divides that would eventually cost Carter. Initially, however, Carter managed to bring religion and politics into popular, public conjunction. Religion, as a force, was in favour.

As a consequence, America and the media were awash with faith, politics and Christianity. It is worth noting that public interest in Carter was being looked upon by a new auspicious media. Following Watergate the My Lai massacre and the Pentagon Papers the press was no longer a passive receptor of the news but a functioning, powerful energy that could affect serious change and opinion. Something *NR* well knew. The live T.V debates between Nixon and Kennedy had given early indication of the pitfalls of either not being prepared or appearance. Following these dark, controversial years the press was looking for executive change. Carter, a relatively unknown, out-

side candidacy, removed and therefore untarnished by Washington appeared to offer a new starting point and fresh attention for the media.

Utilising this, Carter moved faith front and centre. What better example to present than a moral figure compared to the dishonour and distrust that preceded him. It was not, however, a cynical ploy. In this respect Carter - like George W. Bush later - was genuine. Carter was a Christian. At first there was some confusion. Terms like 'Evangelical' and 'born again' were not yet in the popular lexicon. Thanks to Carter this would change and subsequent polling data would contain such terms. Even so, there were those who were aware of the differences and more critically of the space that this environment was opening up for them and their particular kind of Christianity. For example: televangelist Pat Robertson's 'The 700 Club,' (flagship television program of the Christian Broadcasting Network) drew new attention. Established in 1961 the program achieved national syndication in 1974 and by 1976 was reaching a 100 markets and a wide audience. Another, significant development in 1976 was Southern Baptist and televangelist Jerry Falwell's 'I love America' rallies.⁶¹ A blend of patriotism, pro-family, morality and politics these events were underpinned with Falwell's brand of conservative Christianity. Falwell warned America that she was - since her inception - a religious nation and had prospered as a result. Falwell gave notice: "If God lifts his hand from America, it's all over, and if America loses her freedom, the free world is gone. America should bless the world."⁶²

Interestingly, similar to George H. W. Bush's campaign in 1988, Jimmy Carter attempted to fasten on to this 'new media' and attempted to reach-out to his audience through biographical commentary. The commonality was Religion and faith but their raison d'être was different. Carter's *Why Not The Best?* (1975) presented an image George W. Bush would echo in 2000 as a Southern State politician

and a reformer. It was also a frank depiction of a religious man. Dissimilar to Bush senior, Carter’s openness about his faith and piety were not political game plan but an honest account of the man and the politician. Conversely, Bush’s *Man of Integrity* (1988)⁶³ was a deliberate, orchestrated attempt to appeal to a new breed of post-Carter Evangelical.

Naturally, Carter brought a strong, Evangelical feel to his campaign, striking a chord with religious voters. The key, however, was Carter attracted a plurality and not a monolithic, Evangelical voting bloc. Taking one term (born again)⁶⁴ as an example then Figure 2 shows how close the vote was. If we isolate another term ‘Protestant,’ we can see how Carter, the Southern Baptist, did better amongst Catholics than Protestants (See Fig 3). It depended on how the question was framed. The key had been to tap into the one nucleus that bound them all: the family; which, in August 1979 leading New Rightist Paul Weyrich argued “would be to the 1980s what Vietnam had been to the 1960s.”⁶⁵ In the mid- to -late 70s, however, it was just as important.

Fig 2.

The White Born-Again Vote, 1976 – 2004⁶⁶

	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996	2000	2004
Republican	50%	61%	78%	81%	59%	49%	57%	62%
Democratic	50%	34%	22%	18%	21%	43%	42%	38%

Analysis undertaken by Albert J. Menendez on *Evangelicals at the Ballot box*, demonstrated how Carters success came from a swathe of religious denominations and categories. It was the breadth of Carters religious base that helped elevate him into power. This is a valuable distinction. Carter left a signpost for political campaigning - stating Christians - just as Catholics had for Kennedy - could unite and make an impact. In 1976 Carter managed to “galvanise a diverse constituency.”⁶⁷ However, if Protestants in general favoured Carter then one aspect of the faith base did invariably back Carter was Catholics. As Figure 2. shows, it was Catholics not Protestants who helped catapult Carter to power. Despite articles like *Catholics Should be Careful of Carter*⁶⁸ - which attempting to remind the public that Evangelicals and Catholics were not compatible, American Catholics - it would appear - were not listening.

Fig 3.

Religion	Carter	Ford ⁶⁹
Protestants	46	53
Catholics	57	41

Conscious of the fact that four years earlier Catholics had gone against the grain and switched to the Republican Party, Carter was aware of the need to reach out to Catholics. In fairness to Carter he did not assume the Catholic vote a fore-gone-conclusion for either himself or the Party. In the

summer of '76 Carter dispatched his representative Andrew Young to meet with Bishop James S. Rausch, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB) and the United States Catholic Conference (USCC) general secretary. Young's goal was simple: how was Carter to reach out and connect with the Catholic hierarchy? What transpired was a meeting in late summer at Washington's Mayflower Hotel between Carter and the executive committee of America's leading Bishops. Present were Archbishop Joseph L. Bernardin of Cincinnati, then president of NCCB/USCC; Bishop James Malone of Youngstown and Cardinal Terence Cooke of New York. The Catholic hierarchy had a single issue in mind: abortion. It was a monumental turning point. This was just three years after the Supreme Court's decision in *Roe v. Wade*. Carter was pushed - some thought harassed - to support a pro-life amendment to the Constitution. Carter had, after all, stated he was opposed to abortion. In spite of this Carter refused to make such a promise. In response Archbishop Bernardin publicly berated Carter before the media. Bernardin declared the Bishops were "disappointed" by Carter's position but "encouraged"⁷⁰ by president Gerald Ford.

Consequently, Carter's attempts to build a relationship with the Catholic hierarchy, though small, were initially unsuccessful. It did not, however, leave the hierarchy unblemished. Politically Bernardin had aligned the hierarchy with the Republican ticket based upon a single issue. It created, noted *The Catholic World Report*, a "firestorm of criticism for the bishops" for "interference in politics." It was also "accompanied by strong internal dissent by some bishops and NCCB/USCC staff," forcing Archbishop Bernardin to "beat a humiliating retreat."⁷¹ The issue became so heated that on September 16 Bernardin was forced to hold a news conference in which he issued a document showing conference support for a number of Democratic policies and to deny that the bishops harboured any partisan preferences towards the Republicans or for that matter a single issue. Given the support Carter did receive in 1976 from grassroots Catholics⁷² it would appear that

Deal Hudson was - in part - correct in his estimation that discontinuity existed between the Catholic hierarchy of Bishops and Catholics. Although Hudson frames this disconnect in terms of a liberal or leftward leaning hierarchy of Bishops and a disaffected and right leaning congregation the fact remains that grassroots Catholics were seemingly autonomous, indifferent and more open to the best candidate, rather than blind, partisan affiliation. Fortuitously for Carter the American Catholic was thinking differently.

According to Amy Sullivan, Carter was saved from Catholic desertion by his opponent, following a significant political blunder on the part of Ford. In a televised debate Ford “declared Poland was not under Soviet domination.” To add insult Ford appeared “unconcerned with the Soviet threat.”⁷³ Hudson too thought this reason for Carter’s Catholic support. Hudson noted that regardless of Gerald Ford “leading in the polls among Catholics during the campaign,” Ford’s “no Soviet domination gaffe - was comparable to Carter’s speech at Notre Dame in 1977,” where he appeared soft and vague. changing opinion. This may be true, but the most probable explanation was a combination of reasons for disaffected Catholics who - like other Americans - were still reeling from Nixon and Vietnam and more critically were apt to making their own mind up about both the individual, the issue and the party. A sign of this autonomy is presented by Catholic action post-Carter. Voting patterns advocated William B. Prendergast had been correct to suggest that Catholic “reaction to Watergate was relatively short-lived,”⁷⁴ given their support for Reagan four years later. This suggests Catholics were not cemented to the party or issue but their own contemporary concerns. The problem was, the appeal for Carter was short lived.

George J. Marlin noted, “Carter’s re-election campaign was in shambles.” Platforms that “burdened” Carter: “pro-abortion and pro-gay rights,” for example, were “costing him Catholic and

Southern votes.”⁷⁵ Sara Diamond thought differently. She concluded that despite the religious overtones, Carter’s 1980 defeat “actually had little to do with his religion,” but was in fact, “the victim of rising interest rates and his failure to rescue U.S. hostages in Iran.”⁷⁶ W. B. Hixson concurred. Carter’s failure to win re-election owed far more to dissatisfaction with the country’s economic situation than his alienation of social conservatives.⁷⁷ E.J. Dionne added, the white Evangelical turn away from Carter was a symptom of his stance on civil rights. “Authorisation of federal agencies to investigate racially segregated private schools, on grounds that they were ineligible for tax-exempt status, had angered white conservatives.”⁷⁸ Added to this Deal Hudson concluded that “Carter’s genuine piety made him a man of the left not the right,” which “led him toward agreeing with the left’s critique of American culture as decadent and the U.S. government as an imperial power.”⁷⁹ If Christians - including Catholics - wished to see a president deliver on his Christian values, values conforming with their way of interpreting a moral and just society, they were wrong. By supporting the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA); failing to stop funding for abortions; failure to support amendments restoring religion to the class room and his controversial interview with Robert Sheer for *Playboy* magazine in his very first term, changed the religious base’s perception of him. Ultimately, Carter failed; presenting opportunity for Reagan; who, conservative and conservative Christians alike believed to be more suited to recalibrating America’s moral compass. As a consequence Reagan was able to portray Carter as a weak leader. Militarily, economically and morally Republicans had opportunity to promise to restore American pride, patriotism and morality. During the election, Reagan continually asked: “Are you better off now than you were four years ago?”⁸⁰

Historical analysis of Carter by Hudson acknowledged the momentum conservative Christians gained from his failures. Ralph Reed, (former head of the Christian Coalition and future strategic

advisor for Evangelicals to George W. Bush) for example, looked to Carter as a sign post for his own Evangelical vision, one soon to be shared with Hudson. What Carter represented to Reed was paradoxically success. What Reed requested was that we look at where Carter came from. We have mentioned this previously, but what Reed was referring to was the ‘local.’ Carter, he reminded us was a wonderful example of where real politics matters. From the school board to the community the power house of American politics lies here. Quoting Tip O’Neill, Reed advocated: “all politics is local.” Carter’s biography, Reed noted, was from parish to President. Carter went from “pea-nut farmer to School Board to legislator to governor to president. - Of course it matters.”⁸¹ It was within this environment, at grass-roots level that Reed - through the Christian Coalition - would come to excel. Carter’s contribution, though strategically small and arguably blighted was nevertheless deeply informing. Hudson, Reed and Ronald Reagan prospered as much from Carter’s symbolism as the qualitative effects of his campaign and presidency. Although the Carter example is Evangelical centric with only slight attention to Catholics, the examples he afforded conservative Christians was highly important.

Ronald Reagan: Opportunities

Ronald Reagan’s political negotiation with Catholics is arguably one of the most distinct. Unlike those that went before him Reagan had the advantage of being able to tap into a more accumulative set of changes and developments that had built up over four decades. So, for example, the rise of the New Right, the growth of intellectual, conservative, lay Catholics, the rise of the Evangelical and the growing political connection between them all, all contributed. By harnessing, or, taking advantage of these new waves Reagan was greatly assisted to broker power. Conservative adulation for Reagan, however, is such that any remembrance of disappointment felt with Ronald Reagan are

assessments usually sidelined. There can be no doubt, however, that under Reagan the boundaries of American conservatism and American conservative religion, shifted, leaving a platform on which future networks could build. Unlike Carter the Catholic connection was strong and the examples given enlightening.

To begin, there was a personal element to the Catholic connection for Reagan. Despite being raised a member of the Mainline Protestant denomination the Disciples of Christ and a Presbyterian, Reagan's father, Jack Reagan was a Catholic and his oldest brother, Neil Reagan baptised a Catholic. Not since Kennedy had a presidential candidate had these kind of ties. Arguably Reagan had an affinity as well as an understanding of the Catholic faith. This, suggested Mary Beth Brown, was advantageous. "Growing up in a family of both Catholic and Evangelicals he [Reagan] understood the common purpose these two groups shared. He understood the orthodoxy of both and he understood the language of both American Protestant and Catholic Churches." Brown continued, this made him "just the man to bridge the divide."⁸² Brown suggests symmetry between the faiths; however, Paul Kengor, thought differently. Kengor argued Reagan demonstrated a stronger leaning towards Catholics, pointing to Reagan's most trusted advisor William P. Clark (National Security advisor). Clark - "devout in his faith and a dedicated Catholic was Reagan's closest spiritual partner. The two men frequently prayed together." The fact he "was surrounded by serious Catholics"⁸³ who had serious strategic input into his policies demonstrated the inclination.

In truth, the partisan embrace of Catholics went deeper. For example: CIA Director William J. Casey and national security adviser Richard V. Allen were Catholics. So too were Secretary of State Alexander Haig and Ambassador Vernon Walters. Reagan's moniker 'the Great Communicator,' was the contribution of Catholic speechwriters. These included: Peter Robinson (who wrote the

Brandenburg Gate address), Peggy Noonan, author of the Challenger disaster address; and chief speechwriter Tony Dolan. Special Assistant Constantine Menges, Pat Buchanan was Communications Director, and Carl Anderson, Office of Public Liaison. William Wilson, the first ambassador of the United States to the Holy See. Then there were Reagan's relationships with high-profile Catholics such as Terence Cardinal Cooke, Mother Teresa and Pope John Paul II. We can not state that these appointments were based solely on the principle that they were Catholic; but it was evident that Catholic ascendancy was not a problem.

Neil Young noted how Evangelicals were cognisant of this fact. Reagan, they pointed out had "appointed too few of them to positions in government, despite his campaign promise that Evangelicals in his administration would mirror their proportional representation in the American population – about forty percent at the time."⁸⁴ Given Reagan's early solicitation of Christians - particularly Evangelicals - it was understandable they should feel aggrieved. After all, Evangelics had actively supported him. For instance: one of a growing number of influential organisations that came into existence in 1978-9 was the California based Christian Voice. It was Christian Voice that first formed 'Christians for Reagan,' a subsidiary of the Moral Government Fund (the Voice's PAC) set up to aid Reagan in the primaries. In Sara Diamonds words the "Christian Voice went all out for Reagan."⁸⁵ With now familiar tactics it was the Christian Voice who pioneered the use of 'moral report cards,' rating congressional and presidential candidates as well as direct mail campaigning. As one of the main organisations leading the politicised side of Protestants into what would become known as the Christian Right (the Moral Majority, Religious Roundtable⁸⁶ and the National Christian Action Coalition being the others) it was a body that politically mattered. Robert G. Grant, Chairman of Christian Voice and the American Freedom Coalition, involved national conservative leaders including Gary Jarmin, Howard Phillips, Terry Dolan, and Richard Viguerie in the

movement in favour of Reagan. Both Dolan and Viguerie demonstrating once more the presence of a strong Catholic contingent.

In what Duane Oldfield referred to as Reagan's "most dramatic effort to reach out to the Religious Right, in August 21, 1980 Reagan attended a "national affairs briefing sponsored by Ed McAteer's Religious Roundtable." This was a caucus founded to specifically involve Evangelicals in mainstream politics. It was, noted Hrafnkell Haraldsson, "nothing less than, the marriage ceremony between Southern Baptists and the Republican Party." Speaking before a crowd of "more than 10,000 conservative Christians" Reagan said:

Religious America is awakening, perhaps just in time for our country's sake. If we believe God has blessed America with liberty, then we have not just a right to vote but a duty to vote. We have not just the freedom to work in campaigns and run for office and comment on public affairs. We have a responsibility to do so. ... If you do not speak your mind and cast your ballot, then who will speak and work for the ideals we cherish? Who will vote to protect the American family and respect its interests in the formulation of public policy? I know you can't endorse me because this is a nonpartisan crowd, but I ... want you to know that I endorse you and what you are doing.⁸⁷

Reagan's: "I endorse you" was persuasive. In addition to expressing his belief America needed to return to God, recognition that answers lay in the Bible as well as endorsing the teaching of creationism in public schools Reagan's speech convinced many Southern Baptists, Evangelicals and indeed Catholics to join the Republican cause. Delivered before a who's who of conservative Christians - including: W. A. Criswell, Adrian Rogers, Southern Baptist Convention President Bailey Smith, Charles Stanley, James Robison and Ed McAteer, Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson,

Phyllis Schlafly, D. James Kennedy and Richard Land it is understandable why Reagan made such an impact. Richard Land, president of the Southern Baptist Convention's Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission, called the event "a transformative moment" and where Land added: the "Evangelical involvement in public policy reached critical mass."⁸⁸

In general, this was an ecumenical tone and one not lost on those present or observing. Gary Jarmin, for example, despite being a Southern Baptist, was aware of the ecumenical value in including Catholics in their fight. As a result, detailed Daniel Williams, the Christian Voice "welcomed three hundred priests into the organisation."⁸⁹ These early connections between Protestants and Catholics demonstrate a much earlier negotiation of faith along political lines than usually profiled.

Politically, Reagan was "eager to catch a cresting wave when he could, continuing to draw the Religious Right into politics." The fact that Evangelicals were on-board was highly beneficial and not uncomfortable for Reagan to accommodate. Strategically, however, he made deliberate in-roads into strong Catholic constituencies, still thought of as being traditionally Democratic voters in the 1980 election. The goal - as expressed inside the campaign, was the BCEC, or: blue collar ethnic, Catholic, especially in the northeast. In his approach to the election Reagan spent a considerable amount of time in the Democratic heartland with Polish voters in Milwaukee, among Lithuanians in Chicago, Italians in Washington and Mexican-Americans in Texas. Reagan's political Coordinator, Roger Stone, a Catholic, said: "Our demographic material shows that the second, third generation ethnic Catholics, Polish, Italian, Irish, are the largest part of the hard-pressed middle class in the country today."⁹⁰

The point was that Reagan had a strategy. Beyond rhetoric there was a calculated approach to the Catholic vote. Reagan's political consultant and pollster, Richard Wirthlin (a Mormon) crafted a

strategy for Reagan based on data collected from his polling analysis on public opinion research. Beginning in 1978, Wirthlin developed a 'Political Information System (PINS) based on experience of Reagan's unsuccessful 1976 presidential bid. The PINS system incorporated polling data, historical vote data and demographic data and "used modelling and simulation to pre-assess strategic positioning." Wirthlin identified that the "most serious shortcoming of the campaign was providing relevant, timely and actionable data."⁹¹ What Wirthlin's study during the summer of 1979 did confirm was Reagan's crossover appeal to "blue collar" voters and Catholic ethnics. This was the result of the "value dimensions inherent in his public messages."⁹² Wirthlin recognised rhetorical references with 'value implications' to assist closing the gap between PINS data and the desired target. Using PINS, Wirthlin specifically acknowledged the Catholic element. More specifically, Wirthlin recognised Reagan was politically in tune with them. Based on this Wirthlin constructed a theme that would be used in both 1980 and 1984 elections. To shape his political message Wirthlin "told Reagan that four themes resonated most powerfully among voters, especially Catholics in the big electoral states." By matching the Catholic experience, argued Wirthlin, Reagan's themes would resonate strongly with them. These themes were, 'work, family, neighbourhood and peace through strength.'⁹³ Wirthlin explained that these "critical" themes were chosen to appeal to the "swing voters that Reagan needed to court in order to win the general election."⁹⁴

Accepting the data from Wirthlin's thesis Reagan began to implement the themes into his discourse and campaign. To demonstrate this Reagan embarked upon his campaign by appealing directly to ethnic-Catholic voters.⁹⁵ In his labour day speech, on Liberty Island, New York, his speech was peppered with Wirthlin's themes. Reagan applauded the determination of immigrants; the value of family, neighbourhood and work. To end, Reagan reminded his audience that the ideals and values

to which he alluded were invoked under the name of God. The speech was openly Christian, pointedly Catholic. To an increasingly active Christian base - whether Evangelical, Jewish or Catholic such an approach was equally accommodating. Research undertaken by David Domke and Kevin Coe into the calculated and politically partisan ‘invocation of God’ in presidential address showed Reagan exceeded all other presidents - including George W. Bush. Reagan scored 96%.⁹⁶ Retrospectively it is arguable that Wirthlin’s strategy was - in part - a success. Reagan’s post election results would suggest these themes found resonance amongst their target based on post-election results. See Fig 4.

Fig 4.

Religious vote 1980 Presidential Election⁹⁷

	Carter	Reagan	Anderson
Protestants	39	54	6
Catholics	46	47	6

Some, however, questioned Reagan’s appeal to the Christian base. G. H. Bennett pointed out, why should Reagan, “a divorcee who rarely attended church,” be preferred by the Religious Right; particularly as President Jimmy Carter – a devout Southern Baptist - was a born-again Christian and a “man of sincere and pious beliefs.”⁹⁸ Not only this, Reagan had been Governor of one of America’s most liberal states, presiding over some of its most liberal bills. Despite this small interrogation Reagan was able to override any concerns. Mindful of Wirthlin’s counsel Reagan gave a spirited defence of the conservative Christian’s most devoted political issues, including promises

to restore school prayer, to work against the Equal Rights Amendment and to attack federal abortion rights.⁹⁹

Reagan did not carry the liberalism of his state forward from his time as governor. The problem, however, is that he is steeped in conservative adulation, although retrospectively conservatives remain cautious as to whether he went far enough. A complex figure, the simplified version for those critical of Reagan argued he was a serial tax raiser, gave amnesty to significant numbers of immigrants and grew the size of the federal government. For Catholics, however, there had always been a favourable, if not, fictitious view of him. As Hudson recalls, his “appeal to Catholics was more natural than it had been with Evangelicals - after all, one of his most famous roles had been that of the “Gipper” in a film about Notre Dame football coach Knute Rockne” the result of which meant “many Catholic voters just assumed he was Catholic or Irish or both.” What ever the truth Reagan did “accelerate the migration of Catholics to the GOP.” He certainly did no harm. It was, noted Hudson a “tipping point.”¹⁰⁰ Reagan had been successful, through his use of a patriotic, traditional family value message, to help break the Democratic hold on Catholics. What this created for Hudson was the foundation for a new generation of Catholic voters known as ‘Reagan Democrats.’ It was another chapter in the allure of Catholics towards the Republican Party.

Reagan’s Catholic connection was definable in three ways. Firstly, Reagan’s approach was based upon ethnicity; that is: belonging to a definable, social group that has a common national or cultural tradition, for example, Irish or Italian Catholic. This was also strongly linked to geography. So in the case of the Irish and Italian Catholic the focus would have been New York. Secondly, the appeal to the ethnic was not necessarily religious as moral. Religiously his close relationship with Pope John Paul II and their fight against Communism - particularly in South America - was enough to

solidify his Catholic credentials. Thirdly, on which there should be more research, was Director of the Office of Public Liaison and Catholic, Faith Ryan Whittlesey. Her role, far in advance of the same arrangement for George W. Bush, was to communicate Reagan's policy agenda to various opinion leaders and groups. For Hudson, the calculated and organised connect with religious conservatives was a strong signpost, an organised indicator of how a campaign or administration should connect with both the grass roots and grass-tops. The considered creation of a Catholic portfolio by Reagan was a meaningful action Hudson saw as highly illustrative. It was, however, following Reagan that Hudson's survey of the relationship and landscape between his faith and the political moved from observing the patterns and process's to becoming a feature of it. This came through the Bob Dole campaign.

Bob Dole, A Failure

The Bob Dole example is pivotal. It was not just a representative case but the juncture at which Deal Hudson intersected with the political himself. The specifics of this will be outlined in the next chapter. However, a basic understanding of Dole's Catholic strategy completes the narrative of Catholic out-reach until Hudson's involvement.

In a decade that tended to look inward because threats from outside to America were minimal; the 1990s allowed the relationship between religion and politics to become more defined. Religion or religionists, it seemed, were framing the issues. Patrick J. Buchanan, for example, unsettled the Republican convention in Houston in 1992 by declaring there was a "cultural war" taking place and it was for the soul of America, denouncing the Democratic Party as one that supported abortion, radical feminism and homosexual rights. The expression actually came from sociologist James D.

Hunter in his 1991 publication, *Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America*. Hunter described what he saw as a dramatic realignment, a polarisation that had transformed American politics and culture. Buchanan continued the trend. James Dobson's Christian conservative organisation 'Focus on the Family' began the 1990s with its special January edition of *Citizen* magazine, which was exclusively devoted to cultural and public policy issues. It proclaimed the 1990s would be a 'Civil War Decade,' in which 'values' were key. The Christian Coalition - about to reach its peak in this early period - added to the notion that the 90s was for conflict and cooperation and they too continued with strong rhetoric of warfare, foot-soldiers as tools for stimulating political advocacy. Ralph Reed, soon to be primary driver for activating Deal Hudson into politics and the helmsman for the conservative Evangelical movement in America, gave perhaps the best example of this militant approach when, in 1991 he said: "I want to be invisible. I do guerrilla warfare. I paint my face and travel at night. You don't know it's over until you're in a body bag. You don't know until election night."¹⁰¹

Into this belligerent, aggressive environment, encapsulated with a renewed vigour to act by standard-bearers for the Christian Right, like Ralph Reed, Pat Buchanan, Jerry Falwell and James Dobson did Bob Dole's political aspirations emerge. Although our concern is with the Catholic element, the Evangelical aspect was once more responsible for framing the period. Despite this, Catholics were near at hand; just as active and strident - though less visible. But despite the apparent relegation of Catholic values, political input and action was accounted for by Dole. It was, however, not so much his adaption to including Catholics, but his manner and approach that would prove so important.

Described by Donald R. McClarey as the “avatar of Establishment Republicanism,”¹⁰² Bob Dole continued the narrative of recognising and appealing to the Catholic vote. As the 1980s came to a close and Evangelicals - through a narrow channel of individuals - sought to stir the nation, and as Falwell requested: ‘bring it back to God,’ Dole could have been forgiven for ignoring all others. Instead he *was* cognisant of Catholics. In truth, Bob Dole’s attention to the Catholic vote was more comprehensive than Deal Hudson would later suggest. John Swomley¹⁰³ detailed some of Bob Dole’s activity in the summer of 1996, demonstrating his attention to the grouping. Swomley suggested that the 1996 election was “between a religiously led party, the Republicans, and a traditionally secular party, the Democrats.” The character of the election, according to Swomley, was firmly orientated along religious lines. More specifically, he suggested, it was Catholic in orientation. “Although the religious outlook appears to be that of the Christian Coalition,” wrote Swomley, “it is actually the Vatican’s program that dominates the Republican platform and presidential candidate Robert Dole’s speaking. Dole knows this.”¹⁰⁴ How Dole “knows this” Swomley does not make clear. However, Dole’s actions indicate it to be true.

Like Evangelicals, Catholics too began the decade with their own protestations. In 1990, for example, John Cardinal O’Connor of New York suggested that, by supporting abortion rights, Catholic politicians who were pro-choice risked excommunication. This was an attitude that as we shall see, continued up until John Kerry in 2004. In the 1990’s ‘school choice’ became one of the most debated aspects of educational reform. This was the “funding of parochial schools through tuition tax vouchers.”¹⁰⁵ It was popular among families within poorly performing public school systems and seen by Republicans in particular as a way to increase support among minorities and religious conservatives (especially Catholics). This meant taking money from the public school system and giving it to the largest private-school system. This equated mostly to Catholic schools.

Religious conservatives, critical the public school system, viewed the policy of School choice through school vouchers as a solution to educating their children parochially. In their view the public school system was a “religion free zone” that would indoctrinate [their] children with the tenets of secular humanism; they are unsafe; they are hostile to family values.”¹⁰⁶ Bob Dole became the first major-party candidate to endorse school vouchers. On May 23, 1996, Bob Dole gave a speech at the annual convention of the Catholic Press Association in Philadelphia. Dole “endorsed ‘school choice.’” Dole also “attacked President Clinton’s late term or ‘partial birth’ abortion veto and, in the context of abortion said, ‘Though not a Catholic, I would listen to Pope John Paul II.’ Immediately following that speech, Dole had a 20-minute meeting with Cardinal Anthony Bevilacqua of Philadelphia.”

On June 25, “Dole had an hour-long private meeting with Cardinal John O’Connor of New York City in which they discussed Dole’s commitment to the papal position on abortion as well as his strategy to persuade moderate pro-choice Republicans to accept an anti-abortion platform.”

On July 18, Dole once again promoted the policy of school choice. “Dole spoke to a Catholic audience at Cardinal Stritch College in Milwaukee where the *New York Times* [reported] he emphasized his proposal for ‘vouchers paying \$1,000 a year in tuition for pupils in grades one through eight and \$1,500 a year for high school students. States that had adopted voucher programs would apply for federal assistance’ and the ‘federal government would provide \$2.5 billion a year to be matched’ by the state.”¹⁰⁷

For political positioning and resonance amongst Catholics, Bob Dole chose Catholic and Rep. Henry Hyde as head of the Republican platform committee. Hyde, Republican representative for

Illinois, an area of Chicago's northwestern suburbs which included O'Hare International Airport, was a solid choice. According to John Swomly, "Hyde [was] generally regarded as the Catholic bishop's spokesperson in Congress. Swomly cites the *National Catholic Reporter*, for stating that "Hyde invited Catholics to help him develop the party's 1996 platform. In an open letter to Catholics, he wrote: "Catholics are a powerful voice for moral authority and fulfil a growing leadership role in the Republican Party," noting that "there are nine U.S. senators, 55 members of the House, and nine governors who are both Republican and Catholic." His letter also said, "As a Catholic, I believe the basic principles of Catholic teaching are philosophically and morally aligned with those of the Republican Party."¹⁰⁸

Clearly there was a broader concern within the Republican Party, the Dole campaign and the media for the Catholic question. When the media, for example, speculated that Governor George Voinovich (R-Ohio) and Attorney General Daniel Lungren (R-California) were potential running mates for Dole, they made clear the value of their inclusion in relation to the Catholic Vote. The candidate's assessment was made on the bases of their individual faith; both were Catholic. Interviewed as a part of the "Veepstakes Interviews" for *Hotline*, Dole's senior campaign adviser Don Devine said the "argument for Dan Lungren" in particular was a "strategists dream." He cited two reasons: firstly, geographic value: which in Attorney General Dan Lungren case was California; and secondly, constituency. "Picture the day after the convention is over Dan Lungren and Bob Dole fly out to Notre Dame University. Lungren is a graduate. They talk about values and issues in terms tat Catholics can understand."¹⁰⁹ On May 25, 1996 the New York *Daily News* ran an editorial entitled "Hopefuls in Holy War for Catholic Vote." It detailed Doles "recruitment of Governor Voinovich to try to win back Catholic support"¹¹⁰ following Clinton's capture of the vote in 1992.

Bob Dole evidently attempted to do more than what Deal Hudson would later comment upon as simply “attend[ing] ethnic feast days” with Catholics. Equally, analysis of this period brings into question Swomely’s notion of a Catholic centric election in 1996 with a Papal programme. On balance the role and activism of Evangelicals prevailed, if not without some difficulty. Given that the general analysis views Evangelicals and Catholics as separate entities, it is important to briefly note the Evangelical dynamic; not least because as the next chapter will show, it was their efforts that helped draw in Catholics; specifically Deal Hudson. Despite being highly visible throughout the decade Evangelicals were not completely pro-Dole. Rank and file members of the Christian Right were actually drawn towards conservative journalist, and Dole’s opponent Pat Buchanan. It was the Coalition’s hierarchy who favoured Dole. Dole was conciliatory. Because a Dole win was seen as “inevitable,” it was Buchanan’s solid support “amongst Christian Right activists, [that] threatened the Christian Coalition’s position as a dominant force for social conservatism.” It had also been expressed that because “Dole was seen as someone who needed the Coalitions support [he] would thus be amenable to its demands.”¹¹¹ As a result, Pat Robertson (founder of the Christian Coalition) and Ralph Reed (political activist and executive director of the Coalition) worked hard to endorse the Dole ticket. In September, 1996, Robertson and Reed had to “convince Dole’s handlers that a speech to the Christian Coalitions September Road to Victory Conference “would boost Dole’s campaign.” As Sara Diamond has pointed out, this was a potentially hazardous decision. By “making an appearance Dole risked looking like a pawn in the Christian Coalitions drive for mainstream respectability.” However, “by declining the invitation, Dole would have thumbed his nose at a constituency the Republicans could not afford to alienate. Support from the Christian Coalition was vital to the Republicans goal of keeping their majority in Congress.”¹¹²

Bob Dole was tactical in his approach to the religious base. If anything the appeal to Catholics was not as perilous as not appealing to the Christian Right. Evangelical influence; principally at local and state level, were becoming indispensable to the Party. This was not the case, however, at national level where the “movement [was] a public relations liability.”¹¹³ Arguably this is where the Catholic vote could fill a religion gap in the religious base of Republican Party politics. If, as Hudson had suggested, the Dole campaign or the Republican National Committee (RNC) was wanting in its approach to the Catholic vote, then elements within the religious base were not. A concerted effort on the part of the Christian Coalition to organise and include Catholics into their number was already underway. It was not, as we shall see, without serious problems, but attempts by the Coalition at forging a relationship with Catholics is notable for a number of reasons. To begin with it was their understanding of politics as numbers that allowed them to drop many of the barriers that had historically existed between them. In addition to this, their system of ideas and ideals were very much aligned with Catholics, a body they saw as integral not supplemental. It was a view or a virtue we do not come to hear about. Nevertheless, wrapped around the Dole campaign was the attempt at a highly important denominational formation between the two.

Strategic Friends: The Warming of Relations

As a consequence, in 1995, the Christian Coalition estimated that of its “1.7 million members, 16%”¹¹⁴ were Catholics. Almost a decade earlier Jerry Falwell, Christian Evangelical Baptist pastor, conservative commentator and co-founder of the Moral Majority made similar claims. In *Christianity Today*, 1986, Falwell stated that “Catholics made up the largest constituency (30%) in the Moral Majority. The Moral Majority had 500,000 active contributors and a mailing list of six million people.”¹¹⁵ Declarations of numbers for public shows of strength and self-confidence were

understandable, but to help “reach beyond the evangelical vote”¹¹⁶ Reed, in particular, sought to actively engage Catholics. In September, 1995 Reed formed the Catholic Alliance. The “purpose of the new group was to forge a stronger bond between conservative Evangelicals and Catholics who, though perhaps unable to agree on theology, could work together in politics to promote common issues.”¹¹⁷ In 1994 Reed had already summarise understanding that the “common issue” that “propelled Catholics into the political arena” was “abortion.”¹¹⁸ Tactically this was the main selling point, the anchor that could hold together any evangelical/Catholic alliance. What “you have,” said Reed are a “lot of citizens who are consumers of a niche-driven message. If you just take the abortion issue: Evangelicals are more likely to appeal to scripture whereas Catholics are more likely to adopt a broader or more comprehensive ethic.”¹¹⁹

Reed’s words are telling. The notion that Catholics were “consumers,” clients for the promotion of the Evangelical and Republican political machine summed up the attitude. Unmistakably strategic, the evolution of the Catholic-Evangelical alliance was a considered approach. The Alliance tried to address concerns over differences on certain issues by taking a “carefully nuanced stance against”, for example: “capital punishment and by insisting that its other policy positions [were] not at variance with the teachings of the Catholic Church.”¹²⁰ It was pragmatism. It was not long, however, before the Coalition’s Catholic Alliance was at variance with the Church. Ultimately, several elements served to cut short the life of the Catholic Alliance. One crucial point, relevant for future strategists to take into account, was that the Coalition mistakenly “purported to represent the position of the Catholic Church.”¹²¹ This angered numerous bishops who “objected to a lay-run organisation using the name ‘Catholic’ for political purposes.”¹²² The distribution of mailing by the Alliance in its attempts to draw in Catholic support contained congressional voter scorecards that

claimed that the Catholic Alliance “represents Catholics before the US. Congress, state legislatures, and local governing bodies.”¹²³ This attracted strong criticism.

In November, 1996 Bishop Howard Hubbard of Albany, N.Y., who addressed a closed executive session of the U.S. bishops said: “the Alliance will create massive confusion among politicians and the Catholic faithful because it purports[s] to represent the position of the Catholic Church. At a minimum it must be made clear that the Catholic Alliance does not speak for the bishops, who are the official teachers in the Church. The bishop’s political agenda cuts across political and ideological lines. I believe a separate, purportedly Catholic organisation which does not adhere to this agenda will undermine our heretofore unified efforts.”¹²⁴

The

difficulty was, the creation of the Alliance omitted to engage the United States Catholic Conference (USCC). As the official organisation of the Catholic hierarchy in the United States and the governing body of the Church and its public policy arm its exclusion fuelled resentment. Hubbard was not alone in his criticism. Three months later a January statement signed by Archbishop J. Francis Stafford of Denver, Bishop Arthur Tafoya of Pueblo, and Bishop Richard Hanifen of Colorado Springs “cautioned parishes to keep an arm’s length from the organisation that claims to represent the Catholic position without any communication with the bishop’s conference. We must say as strongly as possible: the Catholic Alliance of the Christian Coalition does not represent the Catholic Church.”¹²⁵ Writing for *Crisis Magazine* in March, 1996, Maureen Roselli, executive director of Catholic Alliance, said: “The Catholic Alliance does not pretend to represent all Catholics. Our goal is to galvanise like-minded Catholics, as outlined in our mission statement, and to work with all people of goodwill in the promotion of pro-life and pro-family legislation.” The Catholic Alliance is, she continued, “an outreach to encourage Catholic Americans to participate

with other concerned citizens in a successful grass-roots organisation for the promotion and advancement of legislation that protects life and the family.”¹²⁶

Reed’s statement at the launch of the Alliance that the Alliance was a “fully owned subsidiary”¹²⁷ of the Christian Coalition had not gone unnoticed. The notion that the Alliance was nothing more than a creature of the Coalition under the control of Pat Robertson was an impasse destined to dissolve the attempted union. As Deal Hudson pointed out, “the bishops were not going to countenance a Catholic organisation being founded and funded by Republican Evangelicals Ralph Reed and Pat Robertson.”¹²⁸ In September 1996, only one year following its formation the Christian Coalition announced that its outreach organisation for American Catholics, the Catholic Alliance, was to become a separate corporation. Maureen Roselli, maintained the “group’s agenda would be protection of life, primacy of the family, religious liberty and care for the poor.”¹²⁹ It was hoped by appointing a Catholic Board of Directors and a Catholic Advisory Board the Alliance would regain ground lost in the clashes with the bishops, less allied to the Coalition and more specifically: Pat Robertson.

Political history had shown that whichever candidate appealed successfully to the largest proportion of Catholic voters has gone on to win the presidency. In the 1994 presidential election, the majority of Catholics favoured Clinton over incumbent George H. Bush; however, the majority of Catholics favoured Republican candidates and helped the GOP take Congress. There was, nevertheless, an unmistakable trend for Catholics to move towards the Republican voting. It was not, as we have already stated, a fixed pattern. The candidates dilemma in 1996 was that while Catholic voting patterns had shifted away from Democratic candidates, it was arguably a time of weak party allegiance; many Catholic just as likely to describe themselves as independent as identify

themselves as Republican. It was therefore open to all candidates to press hard on the Catholic voter; something all parties arguably failed to do.

The problem for Dole was he seemed uncomfortable with the opportunities that were presented to him. Whilst Clinton had already diminished some of his appeal to Catholics with his refusal to legislate against partial-birth-abortions, Dole did not capitalise. Dole, often seen as uneasy on the issue and therefore disingenuous in his rhetoric, led the mainstream Catholic press, not least the pro-life movement, to question his pro-life stance. There is no way to ascertain if this was the case for his eventual lack of appeal to Catholics at the ballot box, but Hudson, amidst other problems deemed it was. What did appear to save Clinton in his appeal to Catholics was what the Clinton White House referred to as M2E2. This was short hand for: Medicare, Medicaid, Education and the Environment. These were arguably default Democratic issues. Nevertheless they did appear to chime with Catholics.

Ultimately, Hudson's examination of the Dole campaign - backed by a rich, historical tapestry of conservative Catholic political involvement, guided him to the supposition that there were enough lessons to be learned to yield Catholics a dividend. Allowing for the moment, Catholics, assiduously targeted in a different manner with lessons an nuances taken into account, was possible. What was required was impetus, (the reason for Hudson to get politically involved) and research; hence, the soon to be conceived 'Catholic Voter Project.' Hudson's "principle aim was to start a public conversation about 'who is the Catholic voter?'" Looking back over the historical landscape before him that "conversation," he reasoned, "might then cause the political parties to focus more on what Catholics believe rather than what kind of last names they have."¹³⁰ It was hopeful. It was also

determined. With the right constituents Hudson's aspirations for a new period of conservative Catholic political involvement was about to dawn.

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³ Jeffrey M. Jones, "The Protestant and Catholic Vote," Gallup, June 8, 2004
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¹⁰ George J. Marlin, *The American Catholic Voter, 2000 years of Political Impact*, (St. Augustine's Press, South Bend, Indiana, 2006) p.247

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¹⁷ Ibid. p.139

¹⁸ National Public Radio, Transcript: JFK's Speech on His Religion
<http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=16920600> (3/2/12)

¹⁹ John F. Kennedy. Address to the Greater Houston Ministerial Association. Delivered 12 September 1960 at the Rice Hotel in Houston, Texas
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- ⁶² Daniel K. Williams, "Jerry Falwell's Sunbelt Politics: The Regional Origins of the Moral Majority," *Journal of Policy History* 22 (April 2010): p.138
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CHAPTER FIVE

Coalescence & success: The 1990s: A Decade of Religious and Political Progress.

With the broad contours of the post-war relationship between Catholics and politics in place the critical conjunction came in the 1990s. The development and implications of the religious and political relationship, now more active, cohesive and defined experienced an unprecedented, never-to-be repeated moment of convergence. Uniquely, this came through an extremely narrow group of people. Undoubtedly, one of the more surprising aspects to emerge from this work was ‘the narrowness of power’ which can be seen in previous examples but permeated the Bush administration. Despite the frequency with which we willingly accept individual actors of Political influence as the norm, it has received minimal research attention. Nevertheless, at the apex of this particular relationship Deal Hudson, Karl Rove and Ralph Reed possessed the unusual traits of both Political influence and political authority. From this position they were astute enough to look beyond the confines of their own religion, party and ideology with a view to discover the resources and commonality of other like-minded individuals that could bind and thus strengthen their own aims. This chapter examines the narrative behind this fusion as well as the issues, concerns and goals they wished to appropriate. For the Bush campaign and conservative Catholics this was a decade of progress in which arguably they began to realise their aims.

Catholics in Crisis

In the fall of 1994, conservative Catholic and Republican Deal Hudson became senior editor of *Catholics in Crisis*, a small conservative lay Catholic magazine located in Washington D.C..

Introduced through academic circles¹ the position was offered to him by the magazine's founders, Michael Novak (Catholic philosopher, theologian and author), and Professor Ralph McInerny (Director of the Jacques Maritain Center at the University of Notre Dame). It was out of the University, under the banner of the Brownson Institute² in 1982 that the magazine was first formed. Described as, "a profoundly partisan voice for conservative critics," *Catholics in Crisis* provided a "voice for conservative critics of the American hierarchy at a time when the U.S. Bishops conference was preparing pastoral letters on war and the economy"³ and was perceived by conservatives to be moving politically to the left, away from a more traditionalist, orthodox stance. With Brent Bozell's traditionalist Catholic perspective *Triumph Magazine* long gone, it was arguably unique – no other like-minded publication existing. The magazine was, however, under pressure; never evolving "beyond a small but dedicated readership,"⁴ the magazine was poorly structured and continually in financial difficulty. Determined to see its survival Novak and McInerny employed Hudson.

To begin with, *Catholics in Crisis* was shortened to *Crisis*. Catholics, Hudson believed, were not in crisis, they faced crisis. Subtle meaning expressed through nuanced changes helped re-launch the magazine. It was a feature of Hudson's approach. Image was important. To support this Hudson emphasised its Washington location. Positioning *Crisis* within the Washington beltway was both pragmatic and symbolic. To properly engage and push the movement's traditional, conservative, pro-life, pro-family message forward was ultimately best placed for networking and lobbying at the

heart of the Capital. Removed from the magazine's home in Joseph County, Indiana Washington added a sense of importance and legitimacy to its voice. Location, Hudson surmised, helped "pay greater attention to practical politics" and "provided a unique platform from which to address the world of policy and politics from a Catholic perspective."⁵ It was not alone. Washington's value for prestige, advocacy and influence was also recognised by other, key elements, not least the Church. For example: the two-part structure of the official Catholic Church⁶ in the United States as then expressed through the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB) and the United States Catholic Conference (USCC) resided in Washington. This was also the case for the Washington State Catholic Conference and the Catholic University of America (CUA).

From the lay, conservative Catholic perspective Washington was also notable for the gathering and formation in 1989 of the activist Catholic Campaign for America (CCA). Often neglected - if not completely overlooked - the CCA is worthy of attention because if there was an attempt to form a purposeful and cohesive organisation between conservative Catholics and politics then formatively this was the closest it came.⁷ Despite its short comings it was valuable for Hudson to note the existence of a strong, politically orientated and like minded body located within the capital. In addition, the CCA set down a kind of doctrine, a code never before referenced. It also provided a valuable network of likeminded individuals on which Hudson could both model and later connect. For example: the leadership of the CCA included: New York Cardinal John J. O'Connor (CCA's National Ecclesiastical Advisor); Mary Ellen Bork, a former nun and wife of failed Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork; former Vatican ambassadors William A. Wilson and Frank Shakespeare; former Reagan National Security Advisor Richard V. Allen; former governor of New York Hugh Carey; Congressman Robert K. Dornan; Phyllis Schlafly of Eagle Forum; Russel Shaw of the Knights of Columbus; Domino's Pizza magnate Thomas Monaghan; Bishop Rene Gracida of

Corpus Christi; Wall Street executive Frank Lynch; Philadelphia business executive Rocco L. Martino; former Pat Robertson presidential campaign coordinator Marlene Elwell; Pat Robertson's American Center for Law and Justice head Keith Fournier; secretive Opus Dei staff members Joseph J. Astarita and Patrick M. Hanretty; Steven Schmieder of the Society for Tradition, Family and Property; director of the Institute of Religion and Public Life Richard J. Neuhaus, and Legatus's Tom Wykes. Several of these would feature strongly in Hudson's own lay, conservative Catholic structuring. What it demonstrates, however, was a determined, cohesive structure. Though largely unknown it gave a strong agency structure that underpinned and helped legitimise the conservative Catholic cause.

The intention of the CCA was explicit. Its mission statement read: *'The Gospel of Jesus Christ is not a private opinion, a remote spiritual ideal, or a mere program for spiritual growth. The Gospel is the power to transform the world.'* This was tempered somewhat, with less-fundamentalist tones by Executive Director Wykes who told the *National Catholic Reporter*: "It's not a Catholic campaign to take over America. It's a Catholic campaign for America. We believe that Catholic values are a generative base for the values that all Americans share."⁸ He continued: "Imagine thousands of Catholic political leaders, business leaders, and sports and entertainment personalities bolstered by an emerging Catholic constituency who are no longer afraid to integrate their faith into public life. Leaders who see their faith as the foundational element of everything they do."⁹ This vision to bring Catholic social doctrine into American public policy was, noted Joseph A. Varacalli, a unique, serious attempt to "propagate the Catholic perspective in a public domain" and one that "sociologically, stands above the Church."¹⁰

To enhance this, the First Annual National Convention (of the CCA), held in Washington, D.C., November 17, 18, 1995, stated in its brochure: “The Catholic Campaign for America was founded with the mission to activate Catholic citizens, increase the Catholic electorate’s influence in formulating policy, and focus the public’s attention on the richness and beauty of Catholic teaching. The National Convention is one more step on the road to achieving our mission. Our goal is to attract 1,500 Catholics from across America to join together in this unique Catholic experience.” The brochure concluded: “Catholic Americans are uniquely positioned to bring their influence to bear on society. We are the largest denomination in America. We believe it is time that we give a voice to countless Catholic Americans like you who yearn for a more moral America.”¹¹ Here, the notion of denominational size, as discussed in Chapter One, *The Virtues of the Catholic Vote*, are repeated; expressing the archetypal theory that *en-masse* Catholics can make a political difference.

The Convention brochure encapsulated the lay, conservative Catholic aspirations. For the first and last time the manifesto spoke about their ambitions and reasons to connect and intersect with politics. What the CCA represented was an un-abashed attempt to fuse the theological with the political. It also represented something as close to a coherent form of deliberative organisation that had ever existed. In short, the CCA provided a template, invaluable for Hudson. One lesson Hudson did acquire from the CCA was from its demise. Despite valiant efforts to network and organise - “hosting dinners and conferences” - it was an external lack of interest that saw the CCA fold. When, notes Hudson, the CCA attempted to “mount a major rally,” the financial setback from an “embarrassingly small turn out, forced them out of business.”¹² In the end, there was a fine line between an establishment or body and their supporter or voter. What was required was a ‘hook-up’ a link or bridge between the philosophy and rhetoric and the organisation to its grass-roots.

Conversely, Evangelicals had, through the Moral Majority and the Christian Coalition, arguably been more successful. Although, as we have seen the internal structure and driving force to much of the modern Christian movement was Catholic, they were not operating from a purely Catholic location. The fact remained that the target audience was Evangelical and through hard work Christians responded accordingly. A subtle and arguably contentious aspect to this was identity. Put simply, Evangelicals can be located within the big-tent, their issues and concerns more alike and less fractured. On these issues, issues that essentially politicised the conservative Christian, Evangelicals are or were - more uniform. So, for example, the death penalty, gun control and crucially abortion had no grade or disagreement - unlike Catholics. Furthermore, lay Catholics are mindful that in the back-ground is the Church itself. By taking a stance and appealing to the people always risked infringement with the Church. For the establishment of bodies like the Christian Coalition this was not the case. They were only answerable to themselves.

The arrangement to re-locate *Catholics in Crisis* to Washington was not, neither could it be, a direct challenge to the Church. Criticism, no matter how vociferous, had to be carefully modulated; confrontation and alienation un-advisable. Deal Hudson, conscious of this was also cognisant that much of the Catholic power-base lay externally, beyond the boundaries of Washington. Washington was functionary. What was required was a connection, a means to unite the capital and the national, the organisation and the individual. While the lay, conservative Catholic remains outside of the Catholic hierarchy, the two are connected. For example: State Catholic Conferences, although more limited than the NCCB and USCC, were nevertheless highly efficient and comparable bodies. Composed of one or more dioceses within the state, these Church agencies coordinated, communicated and actively participated with state government, non-Catholic churches and other secular agencies across America. In addition, various departments within the conference worked

with Catholic Schools, charitable institutions, hospitals, public information and civil legal affairs. What is more, the State Catholic Conferences had their own procedures and styles in keeping with the particular character, their own state or parish. This transcended further into the county, community and neighbourhoods. Robert J. Schreiter referred to this in-part as “local theologies.” Schreiter’s *Constructing Local Theologies* (2004) evaluated and mapped both the relationship and the interaction between gospel, church and culture demonstrating the Catholic communities “need to adapt theological reflection to local circumstances.”¹³ As an assembly Schreiter argued it was the “community, professionals, prophets and poets, outsiders and insiders all [playing] a role in forming a local theology.”¹⁴ It was, therefore, the local that was the target.

To cast a broader net Hudson was drawn to the cultural as well as the theological, turning *Crisis* into the style of an Arts and Humanities publication in the hope of broadening its appeal.

Image and marketing refined and elevated the magazine to a new audience. Presenting itself professionally *Crisis* developed from a once “drably designed monthly” to “[become] a four-colour glossy.”¹⁵ *National Review* publisher Edward A. Capano helped navigate Hudson through the essentials of publishing. To raise profile further Hudson used his television show *Church and Culture Today*. This was broadcast on the increasingly influential Catholic Television Network, Eternal World Television Network (EWTN). Under Hudson’s guidance *Crisis* ceased to be a blunt tool for attacking the left and instead sought to debate, comment and argue judiciously amidst articles on art and philosophy, music and culture. Another major achievement of Hudson’s was to secure further funding. “Last-ditch solicitations to stave off financial disaster” - which had always plagued the magazine - were to change. The primary source for *Crisis* provided by Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation out of the University of Notre Dame remained the same. Between 1994 and 2000 data collected by the Media Transparency organisation shows *Crisis* received \$990,000.¹⁶

With funding protected Hudson implemented a “series of well-planned and well-attended partnership dinners, golf outings,” as well as hosting the “annual *Crisis* cruise” to raise extra funds. These events managed to draw in lucrative donors and raise the magazines profile. For example: conservative Catholic activist and Domino’s Pizza owner Tom Monahan ordered “1,000 subscriptions.”¹⁷ Those who attended these events were either contributing editors or on the publication committee of *Crisis*. Included were Michael Novak, Fr. Frank Pavone of Priests for Life, Bill Donohue president of the Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights, former baseball commissioner and Ave Maria Mutual Funds Bowie Kuhn and Franciscan University of Steubenville chancellor Fr. Michael Scanlan. In addition were member and contributors: Papal biographer George Weigel, Nurturing Network president Mary Cunningham Agee, former drug czar William Bennett, former National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, industrialist CEO, J. Peter Grace, former Secretary of State Alexander Haig, former U.S. Ambassador to the Vatican Thomas Melady, Reagan speechwriter Peggy Noonan, novelist Walker Percy, former Treasury Secretary William Simon, and political activist Paul Weyrich. Many were a cross over from the CCA. Either way, a small but solid network of key, influential figures were beginning to form around Hudson and *Crisis*.

Under the stewardship of Deal Hudson *Crisis* Magazine had been reinvigorated. Professional in appearance, *Crisis* now offered a broad spectrum of interests, from art to politics and sat at the centre of a small but diligent and serious cohort of Catholic magazines such as *Commonweal* (a liberal journal of Religion, Politics, Culture and opinion aimed at lay Catholics, 1924), *America* (a Jesuit magazine of opinion about Roman Catholicism, and how it relates to American politics and cultural life, 1909) and the ecumenical publication *First Things* (a conservative, religious journal on

religious history, culture, education, society and politics, 1990), are the most prominent. *First Things*, but for its ecumenicalism, came the closest in style to *Crisis*; although Hudson would prefer a comparison to *National review*.

In a relatively short period of time, *Crisis* had established itself as a standard bearer, a credible structure under which a nucleus of key conservative Catholics were able to gravitate towards. Increased circulation through “improved professional direct mail solicitations”¹⁸ saw circulation of the eleven issues per annum magazine rise from 6,500 - when Hudson took over - to around 27,000.¹⁹ In 1995 Hudson was made editor, his accomplishments at *Crisis* elevating him to one of the conservative Catholic movement’s primary, can-do, go-to figures. More importantly, these accomplishments brought Hudson into direct contact with the two primary pillars of Catholic outreach, namely Evangelicals and the Republican Party. In 1995 Hudson moved beyond editorials debating social policy, doctrine and Catholic humanities into actual political involvement. If, as Hudson had originally stated, they were to ‘address the world of policy and politics from a Catholic perspective,’ then it was at this point the modern, conservative Catholic – steered by Hudson - can be charted. Similarly, it was also the point at which the Bush campaign and Evangelicals were equally fused.

In the November, 1995 issue of *Crisis* there appeared the article: “Ralph Reed on Catholics: an interview with Deal W. Hudson.” Interviewed at the Capital Building in Washington, D.C., Hudson discussed the history of American Catholicism and his vision of Evangelical-Catholic cooperation in public policy. The introduction read: “*Crisis* wanted to talk to Ralph Reed, president of the Christian Coalition, about his plans to create a Catholic Alliance within the Christian Coalition.”²⁰ This meeting had a profound impact. Conversation with Hudson revealed this to be the catalyst for

Hudson's progression into politics. Hudson disclosed that he was first "urged" to become "politically involved" by his now friend and associate Ralph Reed. Hudson stated: "I was a philosopher. I had come to *Crisis Magazine* defending Church teaching and helping people to re-discover the great Catholic writers, painters, musicians and poets; but to be specifically involved in politics had never been on my mind."²¹ It was as a direct result of Hudson's interview with Reed this changed. Once this engagement had been established the balance between the ideological, the theologic and the political would change irrevocably.

The Ralph Reed Factor

The relevance of Ralph Reed can not be over stated. Having already alluded to his role earlier in helping to forge a bond between Evangelicals and Catholics, one of the most significant findings to emerge from this work was Reed's bringing this fusion to bear on the Bush campaign. Although we can interpret Catholic out-reach for George W. Bush as eventually being a separate, autonomous entity, the initial closeness and influence of Evangelicals through the conduit of Reed adds a vital dimension to our understanding of its development.

Fundamentally, Ralph Reed was the powerhouse to conservative Christian success. Reed was not simply a religious figure but one who could move between the religious, political and the corporate. Often seen as a contradiction in terms, it has been questioned whether he was a preacher, politician, strategist or businessman? In short, he was all of these: "a committed Christian and a committed politician."²² Certainly, Reed's real attributes are best described as that of an activist, a campaigner who could advocate either. Engaged in broadening the Christian message to appeal to a wider audience Reed was cautious of the 'hell and damnation' approach that both preceded and

surrounded him. What was needed was a more subtle initiative, one that would cast a broader net. The one dimensional, abrasive figures of Pat Robertson or Jerry Falwell were outshone by the more dynamic Reed. It was, in truth, why they employed him. Sentient of Reed's proclivity for organisation, Pat Robertson judiciously brought Reed into the fledgling Christian Coalition in 1989 to give it fresh drive and impetus. As Clyde Wicox and Mark Rozell have pointed out, the "Christian Right of the late 1970's and 80's was a social movement characterised by disorganisation, decentralisation, and a lack of fully developed institutional structures." Under Reed, however, this changed and by the 1990's the "Christian Right [had] built far more effective organisational structures, far larger and more inclusive coalitions, and began to adapt more pragmatic strategies."²³ As Jon Shields has noted, "there has been no greater pragmatist in the Christian Right than Ralph Reed."²⁴ He built the Christian Coalition from the bottom up. To influence grass-tops and public policy, Reed established chapters and re-organised the already established – but fragmented – churches. Within a year the Christian Coalition had 125 chapters and an estimated 57,000 members.²⁵ If a coherent, organisational template existed for conservative Christians then the Christian Coalition under the tutelage of Reed was it.

To some extent the common interpretation of the Christian Right has been myopic, apt to miss the fact that - as mentioned - Catholics were central to its composition and this composition was far more virtuous and deliberating than accounted for. The architect of this was Reed.

Attempting to turn ideas into practice Reed showed an early understanding of 'inclusion.' As Hudson and Reed formed their association in 1995, Reed's success with the Christian Coalition was, as noted, estimating that of its "1.7 million members, 16%"²⁶ were indeed Catholics. If correct this equated to 272,000 Catholics - a significant number. By 1997 there were 2000 chapters and an estimated 1.9 million members.²⁷ While it is often interpreted that these figures - gained from

‘internal and clearly partisan polling’ were exaggerated it was not unjustified or inconceivable that conservative Catholics were - do a greater degree - nevertheless a significant part of the movement; the question was to what degree? It was as a result of attempting to bolster these numbers - regardless of their true figure - that Reed witnessed potential in Deal Hudson; who, like Reed, was forged in a similar fashion.

Whereas Hudson initially attempted cohesion through humanities, through the connective of art and discourse, Reed was more political and aggressive, seeking a different action to connect and bring continuity as well as numbers into the ranks. In comparison to Hudson who sought to transcend boundaries with his eventual idea of approaching Catholics through faith, rather than ethnicity; Reed spoke of ‘family values’ in place of an overtly religious message. For conservative Christians these were innovative approaches. Reed concluded that, “what religious conservatives want is to make the restoration of the two-parent, intact family with children the central and paramount public policy priority of the nation.”²⁸ The pro-family platform was and remains the core platform on which conservative Christians expound their faith. The theory is logical. The common connective - regardless of denomination, faith or ethnicity - is the nucleus of the family. Strategically Reed’s vision was not then exclusively Evangelical but open to all - in particular Catholics. It was also something far more difficult for the secular to dismiss.

As early as 1989 it had been pointed out to Reed that it was Evangelicals and Catholics together who could change American politics. At Ralph Reed and Pat Robertson’s first meeting, at the inaugural of George H. W. Bush in January 1989, Robertson indicated that while these two groupings had the most grass-root support and numerical power to succeed they also lacked leadership. It was the design and desire of Robertson to see a coalition of Christians – namely

Evangelicals and Catholics - that brought Reed into the position of spearheading some form of inclusive, ecumenical strategy. In 1994, Reed reaffirmed Robertson's primary sentiment that a "union of Roman Catholics and conservative Protestants, could have a greater impact on American politics than any coalition since African-Americans and Jews came together during the civil rights movement." He called it a "New Ecumenism."²⁹ Reed continued, "The future of American Politics lies in the growing strength of Evangelicals and their Roman Catholic allies. If the two core constituencies – evangelicals comprising the swing vote in the South, Catholics holding sway in the North – can cooperate on issues and support like-minded candidates, they can determine the outcome of almost any election in the nation."³⁰

This notion of an alignment between Evangelicals and Catholics was aided in March 1994 when a group of "Catholic and Protestant leaders signed a historic declaration called: 'Evangelicals and Catholics together.'³¹ Chuck Colson (founder of Prison Fellowship Ministries in 1976, author, broadcaster and former Watergate co-conspirator) and Father Richard John Neuhaus were its founders. The resulting twenty eight page document, titled *Evangelicals and Catholics working together: The Christian mission in the Third Millennium* (ECT). Though "largely theological in context" did make "specific pledges to work together in politics on such issues as abortion and government aid in religious schools."³² This was ample for those exploring the political angle. As Hudson would later note the ETC was a "tough sell in the fundamentalist wing of the Evangelical movement" its exposure of differences equally exposed points of contact; in fact, Hudson recalls that "in both of George W. Bush's presidential campaigns and terms in the White House, lobbying for the Federal marriage amendment and the furore over Bush's nomination of the Supreme Court Justices, there were levels of cooperation between Catholics and Evangelicals that were far more deliberate than in the past." It was, argued Hudson, a "combined influence to bear on the same

goal.” For Hudson this ecumenical bond climaxed under Bush. “Having a religious conservative in the White House,” he said, “took religious coalition building to an entirely new level.”³³ ECT was a strong constituent in this drive.

Reed was aware that religious coalition building required someone at the helm; individuals similar to himself; individuals like Hudson. Reed’s inference was clear: conservative Evangelicals and Catholics may be unable to agree on key, theological grounds but this could be muted if common cause could be established. However, theology was not the only barrier. For example: welfare reform, gun control, capital punishment, civil rights, medicare and immigration. From a policy point of view these issues alone were seemingly intractable. Nevertheless, an undeterred Reed convinced in a possible union with the emulation of a Catholic version of the Christian Coalition, pressed for unification. The aim, wrote Laurie Goodstein of *The Washington Post* was to “expand its Catholic membership by 25 to 30 percent.”³⁴ Declarations of numbers for public shows of strength and self-confidence as expressed above were understandable, but to help “reach beyond the evangelical vote”³⁵ Reed sought to actively engage Catholics in an alliance to redress the secularity around them and the best way to do this was not from the floor of a mega Church or pulpit: but politics. Potentially, politics equates to policy.

Catholics and Evangelicals Together

The attempt to forge this bond came with the Christian Coalitions launch of a Catholic arm of its organisation. One month after Hudson interviewed Ralph Reed for *Crisis* the Christian Coalition officially launched the Catholic Alliance. The “purpose of the new group was to forge a stronger bond between conservative evangelicals and Catholics who, though perhaps unable to agree on

theology, could work together in politics to promote common issues.”³⁶ There was a note of caution. “Ten years ago, this would have been considered utterly quixotic because of the level of suspicion and hostility between these communities,” said the Rev. Richard John Neuhaus in 1996, a Catholic priest who has sought theological common ground between conservative Protestants and Catholics. “It’s a big job they’ve cut out for themselves. This kind of thing has never been done before.”³⁷

Nevertheless, in the Catholic stronghold of Boston on December 9, 600 people attended the opening regional meeting to hear carefully constructed pro-life, pro-family messages. References to the principles of Catholic social teaching, as well as praise for John Paul II were joined by Reed’s emphasis on life, liberty and family. Among others, Ralph Reed, then still executive director of the Christian Coalition, was joined by Maureen Roselli, appointed executive director of the Catholic Alliance; Congressman Henry Hyde (R-Ill), and Keith Fournier of the American Centre for Law and justice. Before long Roselli and Fournier would play their role in Hudson’s own political narrative and Catholic out-reach for Bush.

The Catholic Alliance mission statement, wrote Roselli, “clearly asserts that we are animated by the call of the Second Vatican Council, enlightened by our faith, and motivated by our citizenship to promote, through action, a free and truly just society.” She added: “the Catholic Alliance does not pretend to represent all Catholics. Our goal is to galvanise like-minded Catholics, as outlined in our mission statement, and to work with all people of goodwill in the promotion of pro-life and pro-family legislation. As Catholic Americans, our religious beliefs and social attitudes are formed by scripture, tradition, and the magisterium of the Church. The Catholic Alliance is an outreach to encourage Catholic Americans to participate with other concerned citizens in a successful grass-

roots organisation for the promotion and advancement of legislation that protects life and the family.”³⁸

Roselli’s pro-life, pro-family stance was key. In 1994 Reed had already summarised that the “common issue” that “propelled Catholics into the political arena” was “abortion.”³⁹ Tactically this was the main selling point, the anchor that could hold together the evangelical/Catholic alliance. What “you have,” said Reed are a “lot of citizens who are consumers of a niche-driven message. If you just take the abortion issue: Evangelicals are more likely to appeal to scripture whereas Catholics are more likely to adopt a broader or more comprehensive ethic.”⁴⁰ Reed’s words are telling. The notion that Catholics were “consumers,” clients for the promotion of the evangelical and Republican political machine summed up the attitude. Unmistakably strategic, the evolution of the Catholic-evangelical alliance was a considered approach that did attempted to trade on other issues that might be considered to reflect one another. The Alliance tried to address concerns over differences on certain issues by taking a “carefully nuanced stance against”, for example: “capital punishment and by insisting that its other policy positions [were] not at variance with the teachings of the Catholic Church.”⁴¹

Deal Hudson was more open-minded, perhaps more philosophical about the union. Speaking in 1995 in an article in *Crisis* entitled: ‘Together Again,’ Hudson wrote: “We can revisit the controversies of the Reformation in the classroom, around the dinner table, and over the phone, but in the public arena we should thank God that Catholics and evangelicals have found one another. If some people find that scary, it’s because they realise that the tide is turning.”⁴² Not everyone, however, was so enthusiastic. In a common pattern between the official Church and the laity;

neither was fond of being represented or spoken for by the other. This was made worse by what the Catholic Church saw as a purely political and cynical move by the Christian Coalition.

It was not long before the Coalition's Catholic Alliance was at variance with the Church. Several elements served to cutting short the life of the Alliance. One crucial point, relevant for future strategists to take into account, was that the Coalition mistakenly "purported to represent the position of the Catholic Church."⁴³ This angered numerous bishops who "objected to a lay-run organisation using the name 'Catholic' for political purposes."⁴⁴ The distribution of mailing by the Alliance in its attempts to draw in Catholic support contained congressional voter scorecards that claimed that the Catholic Alliance "represents Catholics before the US. Congress, state legislatures, and local governing bodies."⁴⁵ This attracted strong criticism.

Less than convinced was Bishop Howard Hubbard of Albany New York, who referred to the Coalition's initiative as "startling and offensive." He viewed it as an attempt to "split Catholics from their Bishops." Hubbard's most valuable point, however, was to indicate that the Catholic Alliance "did not speak for the Hierarchy of Bishops," who, Hubbard indicated, "were the official Church."⁴⁶ In November, 1996 Bishop Hubbard addressed a closed executive session of the U.S. Bishops saying: "the Alliance will create massive confusion among politicians and the Catholic faithful because it purports[s] to represent the position of the Catholic Church. At a minimum it must be made clear that the Catholic Alliance does not speak for the bishops. The bishop's political agenda cuts across political and ideological lines. I believe a separate, purportedly Catholic organisation which does not adhere to this agenda will undermine our heretofore unified efforts."⁴⁷

To add further difficulty the creation of the Alliance omitted to engage the United States Catholic Conference (USCC). As the governing body of the Church and its public policy arm its exclusion fuelled resentment. Bishop Hubbard was not alone in his criticism. Three months later a January statement signed by Archbishop J. Francis Stafford of Denver, Bishop Arthur Tafoya of Pueblo, and Bishop Richard Hanifen of Colorado Springs “cautioned parishes to keep an arm’s length from the organisation that claims to represent the Catholic position without any communication with the Bishop’s conference. We must say as strongly as possible: the Catholic Alliance of the Christian Coalition does not represent the Catholic Church.”⁴⁸

At the launch of the Alliance Reed stated that the Alliance was a “fully owned subsidiary”⁴⁹ of the Christian Coalition, a statement that had not gone unnoticed. The notion that the Alliance was nothing more than a creature of the Coalition under the control of Pat Robertson was an impasse destined to dissolve the attempted union. As Deal Hudson pointed out, “the Bishops were not going to countenance a Catholic organisation being founded and funded by Republican Evangelicals Ralph Reed and Pat Robertson.”⁵⁰ In September 1996, only one year following its formation the Christian Coalition announced that its outreach organisation for American Catholics, the Catholic Alliance, was to become a separate corporation. Maureen Roselli, executive director of Catholic Alliance, maintained the “group’s agenda would be protection of life, primacy of the family, religious liberty and care for the poor.”⁵¹ It was hoped by appointing a Catholic Board of Directors and a Catholic Advisory Board the Alliance would regain ground lost in the clashes with the bishops and less allied to the Coalition and Pat Robertson it would gain some traction.

It is worth noting that during interviews with Deal Hudson he divulged that Ralph Reed - post-*Crisis* interview - asked Hudson to serve on the Catholic Alliance Advisory Board and in particular

the “search Committee” looking for the next Director after Maureen Roselli, the Catholic Alliance’s first director to step down. Hudson speculated that this was as a result of Reed’s consistent “pressing for growth,” that is: “fundraising,” that took its toll on Roselli. As a consequence Reed suggested Deacon Keith Fournier take up the role. Keith Fournier, executive director of the American Centre for Law and Justice, was the ‘religious liberty’ arm and legal aid branch of the Christian Coalition. Fournier was a strong proponent and champion of the notion of a union between Catholics and Evangelicals.⁵² Although Hudson was initially in agreement to Fournier as the one chosen, he soon became doubtful. To begin with Hudson was highly surprised at Fournier’s salary; which, in 1998 stood at \$200,000. In 1997 this was a substantial amount. To add further prestige Fournier opened up offices on Pennsylvania Avenue in the Heritage Foundation Building. In addition to the “one man band of Maureen Roselli, Fournier had six staff,” a point Hudson found both unusual and unfair. In short, Hudson reflected “where is the money coming from and what is being done for it?”⁵³

Still on the board Hudson stated that there was a sense of no control. On the one hand more and more people -all unknown to him - kept joining the board. Pivotaly, the question of finance would not go away. It was he said: “not off putting - just odd.” At board meetings Hudson continued to “press for financials.” On one occasion Fournier attempted to bring Catholic entrepreneur Thomas Monaghan on-board. Although Monaghan - former Domino’s Pizza CEO was a close friend and confidant of Hudson’s, a man dedicated in his time and fortune to numerous Catholic causes and a champion of the pro-life movement and other conservative causes. Despite the friendship he was not easily accepted by Hudson. In fact, Hudson “scuppered the move” to bring him into the Alliance - much to Fournier’s annoyance. Hudson gave no explanation as to why.

Interestingly the financials Hudson kept on demanding where with-held for a reason. When Ralph Reed stepped down from the Christian Coalition he left the Catholic Alliance as well. Hudson remarked upon the situation that there was a “little Ralph Reed thing going on over there - now.” His observation that the Catholic Alliance was one dimensional came true when Reed stepped down the financial pipe-line to Fournier and the Alliance dried up. The figure was, Hudson quoted, a “sizeable, five figure/monthly donation in the 50 to 60 range.” This striking because it tells us that to all intense and purpose the active, Catholic political dimension was essentially Evangelical. In response, Fournier contacted Hudson (who at the time was playing golf) and asked for help in plugging the gap of finances. Hudson had “no sympathy.” According to Hudson “Fournier had been living off the fat of the land with the Christian Coalition.” His point was that no real ground had been made in either attracting Catholics or promoting policy. Given the staggering sums involved it appeared as though despite all the rhetoric everything had been kept in-house with no substance.

The Catholic Alliance and Ralph Reed had been very much “out of sync,” said Hudson. When, for example, Reed and Fournier decided to go to see Cardinal Bernard Law in Boston to help endorse their cause, Hudson advised against this. It was, Hudson noted a case of ethnicity once more. “A little Catholic Alliance event up-there was a really bad idea. To go,” he said, “to one of the most Irish, Catholic, traditional enclaves in the country with one of the most powerful Cardinals in the country and do the Evangelical inspired Catholic show with Ralph Reed and a convert from Virginia Beach - they are going to think you are from outer-space.” Hudson added: “They are not going to believe it - you are not from their tribe.” Indirectly, Law backed up Hudson’s point of view when he told them they had no right even having the word Catholic in there.” Hudson warned them: “Law will shut you down!” He did not have to. Ultimately, the Catholic Alliance failed to attract enough of a significant Catholic following. Despite Reed’s prediction of 2 million followers by

2000, Michael J. Chrasta cites “30,000 in the first year alone,”⁵⁴ with figures dropping off there after. More specifically Hudson detailed that once Reed left the Christian Coalition in 1996/7 the funding ceased and the Alliance faded. Either way, as a predication of things to come the Catholic Alliance disintegrated as soon as its leading protagonist walked away.

Nevertheless, as a result of the Christian Coalition’s Catholic Alliance the Reed/Hudson connection had been made. While Hudson came at this from an academic, journalistic point of view, eager to bolster the credentials of *Crisis* Magazine with arguably America’s leading Christian activist, Reed was on another trajectory. In its path, Hudson encountered first hand a type of strategic, political pragmatism coloured by religion. Following Reeds interview for *Crisis* it was clear Hudson stood-out as someone with a similar presence within the conservative Catholic community and someone who - were they to step-up - could actively engage with conservative Catholics. With one eye on cementing his own vision for Catholic involvement in the Christian Coalition, Reed advocated Hudson move into a new type of dialogue and activism in relation to his own growing Catholic audience and profile. It may be highly speculative, but perhaps in Deal Hudson, Ralph Reed saw himself or certainly someone who - un-like others - could get the job done. Either way, key figures were beginning to align, their raison d’être arguably ‘strategic not scriptural.’ Despite their failings Hudson was now in place to step up and enter the political arena.

A Call to Politics

Looking to procure Hudson, Reed intensified his pursuit. Following the *Crisis* interview Reed became - in the words of Hudson: “persistent;”⁵⁵ frequently informing Hudson by way of fax of numerous events, meetings and functions with a view to further cementing their relationships and

draw Hudson into political activism. It worked. Amidst the bulk of information Reed sent over to Hudson in late 1996 Hudson was drawn to an invite by former U.S. Ambassador to the Vatican Thomas Melady. The request was to attend a panel meeting at the RNC for Catholic outreach. As we have noted, Melady was already associated with Hudson as a contributor to *Crisis*. Appointed to the Vatican post by George H. W. Bush - following his defeat in 1992 – Melady had been persuaded to generate a continuation within the RNC to court the Catholic voter. As a result and at the time of the request to Hudson, Melady was then chairman of the Committee’s Catholic Task Force (CTF).⁵⁶

The specific purpose of the panel, Hudson explained, was to focus on the Catholic vote in relation to the Robert Dole presidential campaign. Hudson’s account of the briefing was disparaging. “Sparsely attended” Hudson also declared his “dissatisfaction at what he heard.”⁵⁷ Those in attendance included future RNC chairman Ed Gillespie, current RNC chairman Haley Barbour, philosopher and founding member of Institute on Religion and Democracy (IRD) Michael Novak and *National Review* writer Kate O’Beirne. The meeting stated that the “central focus of Dole’s outreach to Catholics was to be the candidate’s attendance at Catholic ethnic events such as St. Patrick’s Day and Columbus Day.”⁵⁸ Another aspect of their strategy the panellists conferred was that it was “Reagan Democrats,⁵⁹ who were ripe for the GOP picking because of the Clinton scandals and his veto of the ban on partial-birth abortion. The key to bringing the Reagan Democrats back to the GOP was the candidate connecting with them through their various ethnic identities.”⁶⁰

The “ethnic” approach concerned Hudson. It was flawed. As Hudson explained, “Novak,” for example, “had never lived beyond the East Coast;” as a result the notion of “ethnicity did not extend into – for example – Texas.”⁶¹ He viewed this particular strategy as “limited in its usefulness” and

questioned it for giving “oblique reasons [why] Catholics should support certain kinds of candidates.” The “idea of courting Catholics at these feast days made sense,” argued Hudson; but, “only limited Sense.” The RNC’s Catholic outreach “understood what should attract Catholics to the Bob Dole campaign but didn’t understand where to find them.”⁶² If lessons were to be learnt and the next election should contain a better strategy, then the Dole campaign should sign-post better reasoning than this.

The concept of ethnicity compatible with distinct, geographical locations was no longer so definable. As noted, post-war prosperity amongst Catholics - to which Hudson belonged - saw a migration away from the cities into the suburbs. It was true that large Catholic populations still resided in Boston, New York and Chicago and were pivotal to being targeted for electoral success; however, outside of these historically strong Catholic enclaves were other, significant groupings too. For example: “who,” asked Hudson, “was speaking to him, Deal Hudson a Catholic in Texas.” In short: no one. Hudson’s reaction to his experiences at the RNC was emphatic: “Get Catholics Right!”⁶³ The widely held and fixed approach to Catholics may well have worked in part for past campaigns but now it was missing its mark. Hudson identified this.

This was distinctive. As a model there had never been any equivalent. Thanks to his participation in the RNC out-reach and an awareness of past campaigns and their strategic out-reach’s, he was able to determine the possibility of another, valuable dimension for future exploitation. Organisationally it was true, the Church operated far beyond the constrictive nature seen in other religions. An illustration of this restrictiveness would be the Southern orientation of Evangelical Protestants whose culture and message struggles in other locations, for example, the North East. It was only because Evangelicals were actively pushing out, engaging and not particularly waiting for the

political to approach them that they found greater success. This type of restriction did not apply to Catholics. Also, the sphere of activity for the Catholic Church is or can be a global concern, the Church not inattentive at looking to international issues, a feature Reagan knew all too well and utilised. These were subtle aspects. Nevertheless, Hudson was acquainted with them and the fact they were not being applied.

The Church and its community are, Hudson understood, asymmetric. Looking beyond the customary process of approaching Catholics in an often concise manner, usually interpreted by their ethnicity; such as: Hispanic Catholics in California or Irish Catholics in New York, or as one monolithic voting bloc, led Hudson to recognise the presence of these other layers within the fabric. For Hudson, these shades of character were vitally important. Having taught at the Jesuit Fordham University (1989–1994) in New York, he was alert to the role ethnicity played amongst, for example Irish and Italian Catholics. Equally, Hudson was also sensitive to those Catholics whom this type of attention missed. Going below the radar were converts, conservatives, moderates and independents, lay or ordained, private or practicing.

Taking this into account Hudson was alarmed - given all their past history - that the RNC had, “no inkling that there was an Evangelical movement in the Catholic Church under John Paul II.”⁶⁴ This Evangelical body, though representing a “small percentage” was nevertheless an “increasingly potent” movement of writers, academics and priests and converts. Hudson was referring to a trinity of influential conservative Catholics, leading lights in the conservative Catholic sphere who, like him, were also converts.⁶⁵ At the top was priest and scholar Richard John Neuhaus (Editor of *First Things*).⁶⁶ Damon Linker, not inaccurately described Neuhaus as the “*de facto* leader and inspiration”⁶⁷ of theocratic conservatism. Originally a Lutheran Minister Neuhaus, like Hudson was

a convert to Catholicism. Vocal and energetic it was Neuhaus's book *The Naked Public Square: Religion and Democracy in America* (1984) that served as a programme for the conservative Christian movement. Neuhaus would go on to be a key advisor to George W. Bush in 2000.

Together with Neuhaus was writer, theologian and social theorist Michael Novak. Novak's contribution - predating the work of Neuhaus - was the exploration and promotion of capitalism from a theological perspective. In *The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism* (1982) Novak argued against socialism by examining Capitalism at the level of principles, values and ideas, which, he argued were completely compatible with Christianity, or, more specifically Catholicism. This said, Novak was present on the Catholic out-reach panel and it remains uncertain why his influence and/or outlook were not brought to bear on the Dole strategy.

Next was author, political activist and Papal biographer George Weigel. George Weigel became active for disseminating a conservative Catholic world view both at home and abroad. Whilst conferring with Neuhaus and Novak to attune a theologically conservative ideology at home, Weigel was also keen to discuss these same ideas and influences on America's role in the world. Most notably was his argument for the 'Just war tradition (or doctrine) of Catholic reasoning.' Weigel's contribution was to add a theological aspect legitimising American actions abroad.⁶⁸

Although only a vignette of Hudson's influences and connections it gives some insight into those who helped frame his own understanding and his particular world view of religion and politics.

Evaluative of the past and the contemporary situation around him Hudson was able to appropriate that a space existed, room for latitude to make a new approach to Catholics, Catholics like him. The existing paradigm and the historical pattern for a dialogue between Catholics and the political he

observed were not to be dismissed but added to. Using his own identity as a marker, coupled with his RNC observations and Evangelical prompting and support, Hudson expressed the notion of targeting like-minded Catholics, Catholics who were conservative, more observant and evangelical. By staking out a particular, defined objective towards a more targeted audience previous boundaries and barriers could be crossed or moved. While continuing with his stewardship of *Crisis*, Hudson's attention shifted to the mechanics of connecting these ideas together. The requisite now was a strategy.

¹ Hudson taught philosophy, firstly at Mercer University, Atlanta (1980-89) and at Fordham University, New York (1989-94).

² The publishing and educational funding arm of the University. The funding for *Crisis* (through this arm of the University) came by two foundations with a history of funding conservative movements and causes. The Milwaukee based Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation and the New York John M. Olin Foundation. Under Hudson the Brownson banner was disbanded in 1995 and replaced by the Morley Publishing Group. The funding source of The Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, Inc. which comes under the Scaife Group remained the same.

³ Joe Feuerherd, "The Real Deal. How a philosophy professor with a checkered past became the most influential Catholic layman in George W. Bush's Washington," National Catholic Reporter, August 27, 2004
http://natcath.org/NCR_Online/archives2/2004c/082704/082704i.php (3/10/11)

⁴ Deal Hudson. *Onward Christian Soldiers. The Growing Political Power of Catholics and Evangelicals in the United States*. (Threshold Editions. 2008). p.xxi-xxii

⁵Ibid.

⁶ Unlike Evangelicals for example, the Catholic Church, beginning in the progressive era, had a strong desire to create a national Episcopal body whose purpose was to organise and direct the Church; not only for its own institutional coherence but for social reform purposes too. As a result, Bishops united and began to attract isolated Catholic societies into a national force. Originally developed out of the necessities of war, the National Catholic War Council (NCWC; 1917) was born. In 1966, meeting at the Catholic University of America, the NCWC was reorganised by Bishops into two separately incorporated institutions: the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB) and the United States Catholic Conference (USCC). The NCCB was an Episcopal organisation focusing primarily on internal ecclesiastical issues and the USCC was an Episcopal organisation that collaborated with lay Catholics and priests to address social and political issues both at a national and international level. These would remain until 2001 when, unable to maintain clear distinction between the two bodies they were merged into a single United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB).

⁷ In 1991, Thomas V. Wykes, Jr. gathered together numerous notable Catholic leaders in Washington, D.C.,. These constituted the CCA's first Board. Included were: William Bennett, Mary Ellen Bork, Bishop René Henry Gracida, and Hugh Carey (former Governor of New York). The CCA was initiated to help bring a politically powerful and distinctively Catholic voice to U.S. politics.

⁸ Conn JL. Unholy Matrimony. Church & State, April 1993.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Joseph A. Varacalli, *Bright Promise, Failed Community: Catholics and the American Public Order*, (Lexington Books, 2000) p.95

¹¹ The Rise of the American Papist (Part 2), The Observer, Sunday, June 27, 2010. <http://observanda.blogspot.co.uk/2010/06/rise-of-american-papist-part-2.html> (30/04/16)

¹² Deal Hudson. *Onward Christian Soldiers. The Growing Political Power of Catholics and Evangelicals in the United States*. (Threshold Editions. 2008). p.146

¹³ Robert J. Schreiter, *Constructing Local Theologies* (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis, 1999) p.2

¹⁴ Ibid. p.21

¹⁵ Joe Feuerherd, "The Real Deal. How a philosophy professor with a checkered past became the most influential Catholic layman in George W. Bush's Washington," National Catholic Reporter, August 27, 2004
http://natcath.org/NCR_Online/archives2/2004c/082704/082704i.php (3/10/11)

¹⁶ Media Transparency.org, The Money Behind Conservative Media, Crisis Magazine.
<http://old.mediatransparency.org/grantsearchresults.php?searchString=Crisis+Magazine> (5/10/11)

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- ²¹ Deal Hudson, personal interview, Via Skype, May 19, 2011.
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- ⁴⁸ Heidi Schlumpf, "How Catholic Is the Catholic Alliance"? *Christianity Today* (May 20, 1996)
<http://www.ctlibrary.com/ct/1996/may20/6t6076.html> (22/7/10)
- ⁴⁹ Ibid.
- ⁵⁰ Deal Hudson. *Onward Christian Soldiers. The Growing Political Power of Catholics and Evangelicals in the United States*. (Threshold Editions. 2008) p.146
- ⁵¹ Tony Wharton, "Catholic Alliance is Separating from Coalition," *The Virginian-Pilot*, (Norfolk, VA), September 12, 1996, Thursday, Final Edition
http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/nexis/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T10173273518&format=GNBFI&sort=BOOLEAN&startDocNo=51&resultsUrlKey=29_T10173273521&cisb=22_T10173273520&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=144571&docNo=61 (26/03/13)
- ⁵² see: *Evangelical Catholics*, 1990 and *A House United? Evangelicals and Catholics Together : A Winning Alliance for the 21st Century*, 1995; by Fournier
- ⁵³ Deal Hudson, personal interview, Via Skype, May 19, 2011.
- ⁵⁴ Michael J. Chrasta in Dane S. Claussen, *The Promise Keepers: Essays on Masculinity and Christianity*, (McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2000) p.14
- ⁵⁵ Deal Hudson, personal interview, Via Skype, May 19, 2011.
- ⁵⁶ The CTF would be re-established a few years later in preparation for the Bush campaign in 2000.
- ⁵⁷ Deal Hudson. *Onward Christian Soldiers. The Growing Political Power of Catholics and Evangelicals in the United States*. (Threshold Editions. 2008), p. xxii
- ⁵⁸ Ibid. p.175
- ⁵⁹ Traditionally Democratic voters, especially white working-class Northerners, who defected from their party to support Republican President Ronald Reagan in both the 1980 and 1984 elections.
- ⁶⁰ Deal Hudson, *Onward Christian Soldiers. The Growing Political Power of Catholics and Evangelicals in the United States*. (Threshold Editions. 2008), p.175
- ⁶¹ Deal Hudson, personal interview, Via Skype, May 19, 2011.
- ⁶² Deal Hudson. *Onward Christian Soldiers. The Growing Political Power of Catholics and Evangelicals in the United States*. (Threshold Editions. 2008). 176-7
- ⁶³ Deal Hudson, personal interview, Via Skype, May 19, 2011.
- ⁶⁴ Ibid p. 176-7
- ⁶⁵ The idea and importance of the 'convert' is discussed in chapter six.
- ⁶⁶ *First Things*: an ecumenical journal focused on creating a 'religiously informed public philosophy for the ordering of society.'-The journal is both inter-denominational and inter-religious, representing a broad intellectual tradition of Christian and Jewish critiques of contemporary society.

⁶⁷ Damon Linker, *The Theocons, Secular America Under siege*, (DoubleDay, 2006), p.7

⁶⁸ In addition, Hudson named Scott Hahn (author, theologian, and Catholic apologist), Jeff Cavins (author and speaker), Pat Madrid (author, radio host and apologist) and Father George Rutler as other leading figures influential in the conservative Catholic cause.

CHAPTER SIX

The Catholic Voter Project

The strategy Hudson sought came in the form of a study called The Catholic Voter Project (CVP)- (See Appendix B). Unlike the initiatives which preceded it,¹ it was distinctive, not least because it came from Catholics. The project, ostensibly carried out to get a measure of conservative Catholic opinion, became the founding work for not only developing Deal Hudson's objectives but for a direct connect with the political, specifically the George W. Bush campaign. Whereas political expediency saw the Bailey Memorandum effectively shelved, the CVP *was* utilised; the CVP happening to chime perfectly with the fledgling Bush operations campaign mantra of 'compassionate conservatism.' It also provided what Bush's chief strategist Karl Rove was looking for: a qualitative piece of work; a specific, organised package of data with potential. Ultimately, the CVP provided a suitable mediating structure for both conservative Catholics and the political through Bush. Without the CVP there was no Catholic out-reach or Catholic strategy.

Timing was key. Amidst a mood of optimism following Republican success in taking Congress in 94, came a period of reflection. This was particularly so, following Bob Dole's loss in 96. It was as a result of this reflective mood that Hudson was initially invited to add input into the RNC. Despite their faults the Party was at least attempting to explore its shortcomings. While most campaigns have a short period of strategic preparation, the CVP was therefore under construction four years before the general election in 2000. In truth, as the previous chapters suggest, Hudson was actually working upon decades of strategic guidance. This offered unusual scope to survey the religious,

political and social environment; net-work and establish the foundations for the Bush campaigns eventual Catholic out-reach.

This allowed a targeted and considered work to be hewed out. The results of the CVP, to be published in *Crisis*, actually spoke to the moderate of faith, ideology and politics. It did not - neither was it designed to appeal - to the fringe or fundamentalist. These elements were free to join - *if* they were willing to interpret candidate Bush as a thorough-bred Evangelical; a conservative with a capital C or a rightist whose world view mirrored theirs. Such affiliations, however, were - if detected, detached. They were certainly not a feature of the Bush strategy, a campaign and president that was essentially a moderate. Neither did the CVP necessarily appeal to that new breed -labeled in 1996 by Jacob Heilbrunn, the Theo-Con, a portmanteau of 'theology' and 'conservatism,' equally misinterpreted as right-wing, extremist and *ergo* a threat; but instead, a more balanced medium.

Deal Hudson's analysis was simple: failings within the Robert Dole campaign in the mid-90s in its approach to Catholics led him to surmise that 'ethnicity,' though integral and important, was not enough of a strategy to attract Catholics. Empirically Hudson knew the dynamic contained far more variables and dimensions than those proposed by either Dole or previous campaigns. Neither did the fact that millions of Catholics who vote equate to the existence of a distinctive Catholic or monolithic vote. Instead it presented the idea that there existed enough of a particular characteristic amongst Catholics to be able to attempt some form of political unification.

Despite some historical examples of a general Catholic confederacy, the political setting Hudson looked upon in 1996 was different. The Catholic affiliation to the Democratic Party was under erosion and the singular coalescence of Catholics behind Kennedy in 1960 had long passed. What

Hudson noticed, crucially, was like other demographics: social, economic, ideological, cultural and political, changes that had shifted American Catholic attitudes had made them not so much prone to another party, but rather, increasingly independent. Hudson recognised that as a result they were potentially open to be moved into the Republican Party base. The process for drawing Catholics into the party should, Hudson recognised, be a combination, an amalgam of elements. Catholics - like himself - were layered. Often, the notion of a 'Catholic vote' as opposed to a 'Catholic voter' or 'ethnicity' rather than 'individuality' concealed potential hooks for political strategists to gain a footing. Strategically, Catholics had to be decipherable by other means. Widely held and fixed interpretations were no longer applicable on their own.

Hudson argued, then, for the existence of an additional element that bound them, a variable that transcended station, location, gender, education, ideology, tribe and culture but at the same time bound them. It was, he hypothesised, a matter of religious conviction; or, as the findings of the CVP would state: active Catholics. As Appendix B, page 1., clearly details: 'active Catholics constitute a coherent political constituency, inactive Catholics do not.' As with other faiths there are those who call themselves Catholic, Evangelical or Jew and there are those who move beyond the claim to act, observe their calling and practice their faith. While Hudson disputed the general notion of a Catholic vote as part-way to meaningless, he instead proposed the only relevant Catholic voter - relevant in the sense that they could be actually reached politically - was an individual whose vote *was* influenced by their faith, by their Catholicism. It was, the CVP claimed: a question of observance and piety. Beyond a generic label, Hudson focused on a breakdown of the Catholic composition; that is: the practicing, observant, conservative Catholic who attended mass at least once a week.

Pejoratively Hudson would often use the term *cafeteria Catholic* to describe those who assert their faith yet dissent from either doctrine or actual appearance. It was also a term used by conservative

Catholics critical of progressive or liberal Catholics. These were open to be drawn in, but they were not the target.

Hudson proposed that if observant, pious and/or orthodox Catholics could be identified through their voting patterns then a correlation or link would be shown to exist between this type of Catholic and the Party Hudson believed offered the most suitable home to their traditions and practices.

Conversely, Hudson argued these Catholics - who had the “strongest beliefs in the teaching of the Church would be the most likely to feel attracted to a pro-life Republican candidate.”² This, he believed did not omit the ethnic approach undertaken by numerous campaigns, but supplemented it. Appealing to Catholics through their faith and not their label; for example, Irish or Italian Catholics in Chicago or New York, not only extended the boundaries for Catholic out-reach but introduced the possibility of a distinctive advance on one of America’s strongest constituencies. While it may appear self-evident to approach the faithful through their belief, this had not previously been motioned. After all, a practicing, observant Catholic in New York was - in theory - the same as a practicing, observant Catholic in Anchorage, Alaska.

The notion of connecting through “belief” had the advantage of moving beyond the “ethnic group” and its geographical restrictions. Hudson’s post-election analysis of the Dole campaign led him to identify that despite Dole’s poor results amongst some Catholics, valuable data could still be extracted from the outcome. Only “thirty-seven percent of self-identified Catholics voted for Dole.” However: Dole’s percentage of “mass attending Catholics” saw him capture “forty-five percent.” The key figure, however, came from those voters who attended mass regularly. Dole won these by “fifty-seven percent.”³ It was logical to assume that more observant, regular mass attending

Catholics were those who could be reached through their belief. This appeared to bear out Hudson's hypothesis.

Based upon Hudson's own experience and practice of being a 'convert;' with, as he put it: "a fairly explicit understanding of Church teaching," in addition to his first hand experience and instruction from Evangelicals on "principled convictions about life, the family and moral values," Hudson asked: "Why should Catholics be any different. Why not," thought Hudson, "reach out to Catholics because of what they believe, what they hear at mass, what the Holy Father teaches them and what they read in the *Catechism*."⁴ Hudson placed great store in the concept of the convert adding to the common perception that individuals who change religions or become religious are more impassioned about their new faith. Analysis by the Pew Research Centre's Forum on Religion & Public Life provided quantitative support for this accepted wisdom, sometimes referred to as the 'zeal of the convert.'⁵ In a sense Hudson was putting himself up as the new model for the new Catholic approaching the new millennium.

However, Hudson's suppositions required data, statistical information and analysis to endorse his thinking. Until then, only a small amount of information giving support to his ideas existed.

Following the 1996 election available polling data informed him that more observant Catholics had – only narrowly – voted for Dole over Clinton with 47% to 44%⁶ respectively. Beyond this no constructive analysis of this particular constituency - with a view to discovering a Republican bias - had been undertaken. Following his attendance at the RNC panel meeting Hudson discussed his ideas and observations with Steve Wagner (pollster and *Crisis* contributor of QEV Analytics),⁷ Dan Casey (Writer) and Ann Corkery (*Crisis* Development Officer). Unsurprisingly this was a partisan assembly who happened to concur with Hudson's observations. They informed Hudson the idea had

occurred to them but (without detailing who) they told him that ‘leadership’ (again not detailed) within the RNC were nervous. The reason was connected to the RNC’s relationship with Evangelicals. According to them the RNC were irritated and concerned that “another group of religious conservatives” were narrowly “insisting on opposition to abortion.”⁸ It was, they suggested, the last thing they - the RNC - wanted. However, from within these conversations came the notion of the Catholic Voter Project (CVP), a venture whose task would be to help establish Hudson’s supposition and determine if there was indeed a feasible connect to Catholics, other than that which went before. Although Hudson suggests his “principle aim was to start a public conversation about ‘who is the Catholic voter?’” it is clear the rationale *was* political. It was not a socio-theological experiment. In fact, Hudson was hopeful it would be a conversation that “might cause political parties to focus more.”⁹ We also have to conclude that the protagonist who initiated this journey for Hudson- Ralph Reed - was a thoroughbred politico whose aims and objectives were and remain political. In addition, Hudson’s initial calling, the request for his observations on the Dole campaign, were framed by the RNC.

The first hurdle was to finance the project. This came in the form of Catholic entrepreneur and philanthropist Frank Hanna. Hanna provided the \$50,000 required for polling and with a donor in place Hudson handed the project over to Steve Wagner at the Washington public opinion firm QEV Analytics to undertake the project. Hudson instructed Wagner with a directive as to the nature of the research. As outlined above, its premise was to focus on more observant Catholics, defining and distinguishing them from less or none-observant Catholics. This analysis was to be treated in a historical context with an examination of Catholic voting in campaigns going back to 1960, with primary attention to the 1996 campaign. The further aim of the CVP was to demonstrate that not only had there been a steady migration of Catholics away from the Democrat Party towards the

Republican Party, but this had consistently happened amongst a certain type of Catholic. If identified, this represented a solid target within the border constituency of Catholics that had the potential to lead or add to electoral success.

Polling took place between February 26th and March 10th, 1998. The survey, composed of telephone interviews, targeted 1,001 self-identified Catholics. In addition, QEV used data collected by the 1996 Elections Study, The Times Mirror Centre (now the Pew Research Centre), The University of Michigan National Election Study and ABC Voter News Service polling. The first set of survey results were published in *Crisis* in November 1998. The lead article by Steve Wagner was accompanied with commentary by Robert Novak entitled: Phase One: *The Mind of the Catholic Voter* (See Appendix C). To begin, the article started by outlining all those elements previously mentioned; that “Catholics may be the most maddening electoral group in American politics,” because of their composite make-up. It acknowledges their size; “50 million strong and growing.” It also acknowledges that their number is the “Holy Grail of coalition politics,” because they have the “distinction of clustering in states rich in electoral votes, like Florida, Texas, California, New York, Ohio, and Illinois.” More importantly it recognises that Catholic “political allegiance is now up for grabs after decades of being a lock for the Democrats.”¹⁰

The article went on to state that post-analysis: “What it found verifies what many politically active Catholics have long suspected: Stripping away inactive Catholics who retain the label as a cultural identification, the real swing voters are active Catholics.” To press the legitimacy of the findings further it states that for the research these ‘active Catholics’ were “drawn from a variety of different demographic groups—young, old, wealthy, poor, urban, rural, Western, Eastern, or in-between—yet they display certain political characteristics and possess a distinctive political history.” It is these

who “drive elections in the Industrial Midwest, the ethnic Northeast, and populous Sunbelt states like California and Texas. They are a must-win for any coalition.”¹¹

Having been identified, the key or hook to reaching out to them was, according to the results of Phase One because “they are the most disaffected voters” and not “solidly in either camp.”

Pointedly, Phase One suggested these ‘disaffected Catholics’ were “increasingly self-described conservatives,” the conclusion being that a conservative candidate or a conservative Party was the answer. The rather short article concluded on this point, suggesting that to “attract these voters to policies that reflect Church teaching” was the best course. Drawing to a close, Phase One states that this is the ‘focus of the upcoming Phase II of the Catholic Voter Project.’¹² (See Appendix C)

In the June, 1999 issue of *Crisis*, the second set of results were reported. Under the heading Phase Two: The Catholic Vote in America, it was accompanied by the lead article: “The Heart of the Catholic Voter” by William McGurn (*Wall Street* journalist & White House speech writer). It also incorporated Phase Three: The Catholic Vote in America, by Steve Wagner. (See Appendix C)

As Deal Hudson notes the central findings were as follows:

* “There are - as Bob Novak puts it, two Catholic votes—just as there are two kinds of Catholics in America, active and inactive religiously.

* Active Catholics constitute most of the Catholics who have left the Democratic Party after the election of John F. Kennedy in 1960. Why? Active Catholics accept the existence of an absolute moral standard, a standard that was challenged by the Democrats’ embrace of the anti- American,

feminist and homosexual ideology. As Wagner explains: “this is, perhaps, the most profound, yet subtle, of all their characteristics, leading to a certain moral confidence, less confusion about the difference between pluralism and tolerance and a greater reluctance to the claim of a moral right to do wrong, a central tenet of contemporary liberalism.”

* Active Catholic issue priorities can be summed up under what Wagner called the ‘Social renewal’¹³ agenda of the GOP as opposed to the ‘social justice’¹⁴ agenda of the Democrats. Wagner determined that the reason for that migration is the preference of a majority of Catholic voters for a ‘social renewal’ agenda as opposed to the ‘social-justice’ agenda. These ‘social-renewal’ Catholics care about the moral decline of American culture, caused in part by an intrusive federal government and a decline in popular culture. As Appendix D, page 372 shows: “Catholics are changing their political orientation because they perceive a nation in a moral crisis that has been fuelled by popular culture and exacerbated by government and education. Catholics are moving away from their traditional social-justice orientation and adopting what can be termed a “social renewal” conservatism.”

* Perhaps the most unexpected finding: At the time of the survey, what Wagner saw as as reliable Republicans among Catholics outnumbered dependable Democrats, 23 percent to 21 percent. This strongly confirmed the exodus from the Democratic Party, with 38 percent of Independent and Republican Catholics reporting they were former Democrats.

* Of the Catholics in Wagner’s survey, 62 percent supported bishops and priests who express their views on political issues, while only 27 percent opposed. This showed a clear reversal in the findings of the Weyrich survey of 1979,¹⁵ which showed that Catholics, along with mainstream

Protestants, wanted to stay on the political sidelines. Social-renewal Catholics were more supportive of this involvement than ‘social justice’ Catholics. Sixty-two percent of all Catholics reported “taking to heart” what the Pope had to say.

* Catholic opposition to abortion was confirmed, with 55 percent saying it is always immoral and 26 percent saying it was usually, but not always immoral.

* Catholic issue priorities were not strictly conservative. Catholics are unusually patriotic, strongly in favour of welfare reform, hostile to affirmative action and social conservative. But Catholics sensitive to the conditions of the poor, distinctly tolerant and not particularly anti-government. They also favoured raising the minimum wage, protecting personal privacy, enforcing television standards, protecting religious expression and opposing gay marriage. Surprisingly, Catholics were ambivalent on support for school vouchers (once the central Catholic issue), restrictions on gambling and ending no-fault divorce.”¹⁶

With this apparently new discovery of a way in which Catholics could be both identified and therefore targeted; backed by data, it was time to make the data work and step up into the political. Despite Hudson’s protestations as an inquisitive academic and publisher the real rationale was - as already suggested: political. Although the initial suggestion was that the CVP was designed to create a discussion in the public square as to the identity of the Catholic voter, it was, from the outset an unmistakably politicised and partisan survey designed to bridge the gap between faith and politics. More specifically it was a bridge between conservative Catholics and the GOP with a desire to make observant Catholics politically relevant.

If successful, the CVP manoeuvred Hudson further towards the direction of active politics. Theoretically it also moved conservative Catholics closer to active politics too. Once complete the project was distributed to all campaigns and all presidential candidates. Nothing corroborates this, however, according to an account written by conservative activist Grover Norquist for the *American Spectator*, Hudson [did] send the *Crisis* survey to all the presidential candidates, but Karl Rove was the only one to show interest and respond.¹⁷ Up until this point and unlike all previously mentioned campaigns, the Bush campaign had not included a Catholic aspect to its strategic armoury. Until presented with the notion of a particular Catholic ingredient - as well as the perceived import of American Catholics more broadly - there is no evidence that a cohesive Catholic strategy would ever have arisen for the Bush campaign. The CVP changed this. The explanation lies perhaps in the strong and personal connection the campaign and Bush had with Evangelicals. This was the religious base deemed both secure and adequate in its support. It was not an unreasonable idea. Nonetheless, the connection had been made. As Peter J. Boyer of *The New Yorker* suggested, the CVP “Posed a thrilling prospect,” for Karl Rove; “Akin to the framing of a new constituency, to be courted and drawn into the Republican base, as Protestant Evangelicals had been, two decades earlier.”¹⁸ Commenting on his reading of the project Rove stated: “What I saw was a group that were searching.”¹⁹ As Gastón Espinosa further detailed, the CVP was highly appealing because it “complete[d] the process of building a permanent majority for the Republican Party,” as envisioned by Karl Rove, a vision to “fashion a conservative and visibly Christian Republican candidate who spoke Catholic.”²⁰ As a result, in December 1998, only one month after publication, Rove contacted Deal Hudson directly requesting he and Governor Bush meet in Austin Texas. This was the moment conservatism, conservative Catholics, conservative Evangelicals and the political fused. The focus was now the 2000 campaign and the aspiration of putting George W. Bush in the White House.

¹ Bailey Memorandum, (1956/60), for Kennedy; Kevin Phillips *The Emerging republican Majority* (1968), Richard Scammon and Ben Wattenberg *The Real Majority: An Extraordinary Examination of the American Electorate* (1970), for Nixon.

² Hudson does not reveal the source for this. Deal Hudson, *Onward Christian Soldiers, The Growing Political Power of Catholics and Evangelicals in the United States*, (Threshold Editions, 2008) p.177

³ Ibid. p.178

⁴ Ibid. p.177

⁵ The analysis finds that people who have switched faiths (or joined a faith after being raised unaffiliated with a religion) are indeed slightly more religious than those who have remained in their childhood faith, as measured by the importance of religion in their lives, frequency with which they attend religious services and other measures of religious commitment. See: The “Zeal of the Convert,” Is It the Real Deal? report was written by Allison Pond, Research Associate, and Greg Smith, Senior Researcher, Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life. OCTOBER 28, 2009

<http://www.pewforum.org/2009/10/28/the-zeal-of-the-convert-is-it-the-real-deal/> (12/2/12)

⁶ Summary: Report to *Crisis Magazine* on the American Catholic Vote, p.16

⁷ QEV: public opinion research and communications strategy firm founded by Wagner in 1996. Wagner previously worked with Republican pollster Frank Luntz during the 1994 “Contract with America” campaign. Wagner was vice president of Luntz Research & strategic facilities.

⁸ Deal Hudson, *Onward Christian Soldiers, The Growing Political Power of Catholics and Evangelicals in the United States*, (Threshold Editions, 2008) p.178

⁹ Ibid. p.179

¹⁰ The Catholic Vote—A Special Report: The Mind of the Catholic Voter, NOVEMBER 1, 1998, *Crisis Magazine* <http://www.crisismagazine.com/1998/the-catholic-vote-a-special-report-the-mind-of-the-catholic-voter> (12/2/12) See Appendix

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Social-Renewal Catholics, argued Wagner, were those Catholics who vividly register their perception that the United States is in the throes of a moral crisis. It is unlikely that this constituency would have been discernible back in 1960, because the critique of American society upon which it rests would have been virtually unknown. Social-renewal Catholics are characterised by

perceive a crisis of declining individual morality in America today;
believe the federal government is exacerbating this decline;
affirm an absolute standard of morality;
perceive the popular culture as undermining the character and values of our youth;
do not identify themselves as liberal;
reject the social-justice agenda, as defined above.

¹⁴ Social-Justice Catholics: Liberal self-identification has been waning among active Catholics since at least 1960. Wagner argued that: CVP shows that social-justice Catholics now constitute a minority of all Catholics. For our purposes, social-justice Catholics are characterised by:

criticism of America’s efforts to provide opportunities to minorities;
criticism of America’s efforts to aid the poor;
support for an activist government that does more to help people;
support for hiring preferences based on race and gender;
the perception that America is more in need of tolerance than courage;
the rejection of subsidiarity (preferring to provide aid to the needy via national government);
support for multiculturalism, or at least an indifference to the cultural assimilation of immigrants; self-identification as liberal.

¹⁵ Dan Gilgoff, "How Paul Weyrich Founded the Christian Right, The man responsible for bringing evangelicals back into politics died today." U.S. News and World Report, Dec. 18, 2008
<http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/god-and-country/2008/12/18/how-paul-weyrich-founded-the-christian-right> 27/06/16

¹⁶ Deal Hudson, *Onward Christian Soldiers, The Growing Political Power of Catholics and Evangelicals in the United States*, (Threshold Editions, 2008) p.179-80

¹⁷ Grover Norquist, "The Catholic Vote," *The American Spectator*, October 2000.

¹⁸ Peter J. Boyer, *The Daily Democrat*, "Party Faithful, Can the Democrats get a foothold on the religious vote?"
http://www.thedailydemocrat.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=229&Itemid=2 (25/11/12)

¹⁹ Peter J. Boyer, "Party Faithful, Can the Democrats get a foothold on the religious vote?" *The Political Scene*, *The New Yorker*, September 8th, 2008 Issue
<http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2008/09/08/party-faithful> (12/22/13)

²⁰ Gastón Espinosa, *Religion, Race, and Barack Obama's New Democratic Pluralism*, (Routledge, New York) p.84

CHAPTER SEVEN

Campaign 2000 From Perception to Process

By 1998 a particular type of Catholic and electoral politics converged. Because of Deal Hudson a desire to energise the conservative Catholic intersected with the political process. Had Karl Rove, Bush's Senior Advisor and chief strategist had a different conception of what was required to help Bush succeed, this would not have happened. Conversely, if the agency of Ralph Reed had not provoked Hudson into becoming pro-active, it equally fails to materialise. Together, these forces looked to the possibility of a mutual, pragmatic and strategic fusion. It was the product of a dynamic set of conceptions that momentarily turned upon the individual. Historically, we do not see this or at least we do not see this brought to fruition. On the one hand, Deal Hudson had been building a conservative Catholic base through *Crisis* for five years; his vision to revive not just a religious movement but a politically activist grouping. Karl Rove, on the other hand, had equally been planning early, "plotting Bush's path to the presidency as early as 1995."¹ As each one made claims as to the style, character and purpose, a distinct strategy emerged for a distinctly religiously orientated campaign.

Seated at the hub of this, Karl Rove had been eager to attract and take advantage of numerous interest groups capable of garnering success. Rove was a politico, a strategist coloured only by those elements that could fashion his political aspirations. Whereas most strategists entered a campaign with the basic assumption of partisanship (which included religion), Rove did not. Driven by data and analytics, Rove was also astute enough to remain open and accessible. When

interviewed, Hudson was cognisant of Rove's use of data and the idea that he - or Catholics - fitted into this scheme. "Professional political operatives - like Rove," noted Hudson, "are always looking which voters can be moved from column A to column B. There was a state by state understanding of numbers and the votability of those numbers;"² and so the Catholic Voter Project (CVP) proved the perfect catalyst for their convergence. What Hudson presented Rove with was ideal; a new, potentially valuable prospect that appealed to a political strategist who had for decades meticulously observed a political landscape driven by big data. Rove had built an elaborate system, identifying the Republican vote by gathering sizeable statistics on all aspects of the vote and its voters. This was followed by implementing a 'get-out-the-vote' strategy. Constantly monitoring, measuring and testing the process and its data his methodology was known by the Bush campaign as 'metrics.' Hudson added another dimension: the Catholic.

After reading the CVP Rove contacted Deal Hudson in December of 1998; moving quickly to cement their relationship. "What I saw," said Rove, "was a group that was searching;"³ the premise of Hudson's thesis too tempting for Rove to pass. Political expediency was, whether secular or religious their shared goal. Without the CVP, however, Rove did not necessarily see the advantages of working with Catholics in a specific way. Below the generics of previous campaigns, that is: the accepted wisdom that Catholics were perhaps numerically superior and geographically important, therefore relevant to a campaign, it was unlikely Rove would have singled out a specific strategy to reach out to the Catholic voter. Conversely, without CVP Hudson does not have the blueprint for going forward in terms of connecting and organisation with others. Hudson's initial claim that the CVP was to start a dialogue would have remained rhetorical had Karl Rove not extended his services.

The CVP thesis for the existence of a significant bloc of conservative, church-going, committed or observant Catholics; who, it was theorised, were open to the Republican vote, was for Rove and the campaign a perfect fit. The Bush campaign, running as openly moderate, conservative and Christian found it easy to accommodate Hudson's strategy, a strategy easily aligned with the GOP's general conservative ticket. Karl Rove expressed this natural fit when he told *U.S. News & World Report*, the campaign prevailed [in 2000] amongst Catholics who "go to Mass every week and link this to Bush's positions on abortion, lower taxes and the moral direction of the country. Catholics," he noted "are socially and politically conservative."⁴ Andrew Card, soon to become White House Chief of Staff, concurred, aligning Catholics and the campaign by suggesting that Catholic "core values are consistent with and reflected by the values of the president."⁵ This compatibility, forged through CVP allowed the religious and the political to co-opt with one another. Hudson recognised that direct action over, for example: abortion, was reaching, but at least there was now the prospect of injecting some conservative Catholic themes into a political campaign; perhaps change the social atmosphere and buttress the lines regarding conservative Catholic issues. It was also possible that this relationship may result in policy. Arguably, for the first time ever, Catholics were actively fabricating a political position, rather than simply being appealed to by the political for their vote.

Following Rove's initial call to Hudson, Rove invited Hudson to Austin, Texas where Rove would - following a formative meeting between the two of them - introduce Hudson to Governor Bush at a second meeting. The first meeting took place in January 1999. Here, Rove expressed both his interest and belief in the value of the CVP. Hudson recalled how he "pressed Rove to see if he *really* had grasped the central ideas behind CVP and what it meant." Rove assured Hudson he had. On the specifics of CVP and its political value Hudson told Rove "you have to go with a socially conservative message. A message of language and style. You reach out to 'active Catholics and you

don't worry about self-identified Catholics. Go to *them* where you can find them. Do not go to priests and Bishops.”⁶ Hudson informed Rove that Catholics ought to be approached on the broader basis of ‘moral decline.’ “Push this into the Bush message,”⁷ he suggested. Straight away Hudson moved abortion to the front. Rove suggested that the best way forward was for Hudson to meet Governor Bush and ask him. This, suggested Rove would answer any doubts Hudson harboured.

In conversation with Hudson, he told how a meeting for lunch at the Governors mansion was arranged and Hudson, Rove and Bush met briefly. Much of the particulars of this first meeting were not - Hudson requested - to be repeated, but the outline of events were that Hudson was invited to stay and sit down with South Carolina legislators who had been scheduled to hear Bush talk about his position on his key, campaign issues. Bush's speech helped confirm for Hudson his position on abortion; his support for a ‘Faith-based Initiative,’ because government, Bush stated: ‘cannot love.’ What Hudson did identify, however, was “the absence of the ‘family.’”⁸ This is surprising. Taking into account the Evangelical aspect of the Bush campaign, which was already established, the family was their mantra and the foundation of Ralph Reed's particular approach. This suggests either a lack of communication or Hudson was indeed the first to present the campaign with the idea. The latter seems unlikely given the relationship (formed early) between Evangelicals and Bush. Either way, the religious factor - a vital component to their political strategy - now had a theme, a goal and a target.

At the close of this initial set of meetings Hudson advocated the use of these themes. To assist, Hudson pointed Rove to Pope John Paul II's *Familiaris Consortio* (Latin: ‘The fellowship of the family;’ On the Role of the Christian Family in the Modern World) 1981. It was, suggested Hudson, elements like this that should be “introduced into Bush's political vocabulary.”⁹ There can be little

doubt, these introductory meetings were productive. Even at this early stage Hudson was having a significant impact on the Bush campaign strategy and demonstrating not only his own worth but the worth of the Catholic voter. Joe Feuerherd of the *National Catholic Reporter* opined that Bush and Rove liked both the message and the messenger.¹⁰ Ultimately, Hudson was able to interpose this message with their developing philosophy, making suggestions to tailor and change not only each ones outlook but their approach. Hudson wrote: “These Catholics are attracted to the ideas of compassionate conservatism: work permits for immigrants, protection of the unborn and tuition vouchers for schoolchildren. What they want is government out of Catholic institutions and evidence that the president is fighting the general moral decay they see in society. The answer is not to vacillate on these issues in the hopes of attracting greater numbers but to demonstrate that he [Bush] will be a champion for life and those policies he already supports.”¹¹ The proposal that Catholics wanted government out of Catholic institutions was difficult to understand. The Catholic Church in America has the deepest reach into government spending of all religions. In contracts and grants, State and Federal spending on the Church and its works surpasses everyone, making the Church a *de facto* arm of the welfare state. Although subtle, this kind of overlapping vagueness would be common.

This idea of detachment is worthy of note. Despite being interpreted as an overtly religious campaign, there were carefully orchestrated distances between the two. If we think back, most of what has taken place has been contained, in private. Despite some religious references in some of Bush’s political rhetoric - which was either personal, civic or symbolic - there was no open call to arms. It was implicit. This is important. The vehicle for these appeals came as we shall see in the forms of those blanket terms: compassionate conservatism and Faith-based Initiatives, ideas that served to appeal and attract numerous beneficiaries. If we move beyond the actual meetings, there

was something distinctly cloudy about these terms. On the one hand Bush's rhetoric bound the campaign, Catholics, Evangelicals and conservatives together, but at the same time freed them from the burden of specifics.

At the top of each one's platform was a transferable, multi-purpose set of statements that sounded definitive but were actually vague and cleverly indefinite. For example: Bush's Faith-based Initiative speaks to a multitude of faiths and ideas allowing it to fit a variety of shared conceptions by numerous peoples. It was an elastic term. Inclusive to the Catholic, the Evangelical and the Jew the 'initiative of faith' was nebulous enough to not discriminate against or exclude anyone. The Bush campaign may say 'we are going to do something, but is not making a commitment to a specific policy or judicial decision.' If, however, this was a precise policy or law based statement it would be entirely different. Strategically it also appeared to have a benign ring to it because it was expanded on the 'Charitable Choice' provision, passed as part of President Clinton's 1996 welfare reform bill, that allowed smaller and more overtly religious groups to receive government funding for providing social services. Initially, this created an air of justification for Bush's policies on faith based giving. It is also something critics of Bush do not refer to.

This was also the case for 'Compassionate Conservatism.' Splits within the Party on social policy and for example economic approaches, were negated with the notion of Compassionate Conservatism, because like the 'Faith-based Initiative,' it is an open, wide reaching term. As we shall see below, in the 2000 campaign we can also add other, indeterminate terms of Bush's: 'Reformer With Results, Leave no Child Behind and Real Plans for Real People.' In some respects the CVP fits into this scheme, mapping out what appears to be recognisable and specific terms or data while at the same time distributing broad notions of identification; for example: observant,

conservative, mass attending, family, pro-life and morality *et cetera*. Only in the back-ground were specifics and details firmly discussed. Up front it presented something of a ‘sorites paradox’ for faith and politics.

Shortly after their first set of meetings Rove asked Hudson if he “would consider being the ‘principle advisor’ on Catholic out-reach for the campaign.” Hudson was “affirmative.” There were, however, “conditions. First, Bush would remain ‘pro-life;’ second, Bush’s choice for vice-president, would also follow suit.”¹² According to Hudson Rove replied that he should have “no worries.”¹³ Accepting the role Rove requested Hudson select various Catholic leaders for meetings with Bush in Austin. From this point onwards, Hudson became the ‘gate-keeper’ to the campaign and subsequently the administration for Catholics. In discussion, Hudson detailed that this was “the establishment of the initial network of conservative Catholic leaders, donors, grass-tops, organisations and journalists between the campaign and the movement.”¹⁴ The idea was for this image to reach grass-roots Catholics; who, it was believed, would view the body and stature of a strong Catholic presence as favourable in supporting the Bush campaign. Amongst those who attended were: Helen Alvare (head of pro-life at the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (which would later become the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops)),¹⁵ Raymond Arroyo (EWTN), Father Robert Sirico of the Action Institute, Father Frank Pavone of Priests for Life, Dr Robert George of Princeton University; Carl Anderson of the Knights Of Columbus, Bill Donohue of the Catholic League N.Y. and Vatican diplomat John Klink.

Subsequently, these individuals organised by Hudson met with Bush and a tick-list in the form of a draft memo of goals and expectations was drawn up between Hudson and Klink. The meeting with Bush commenced with Hudson reading the following:

1. Sign the partial-birth abortion ban.
2. Encourage the States to demand parental-notification bills be passed.
3. Support Federal legislation banning abortion in the third trimester.
4. End abortions conducted at Federal facilities here and abroad.
5. Disallow Federal funding for including abortion as an option in family-planning initiatives both domestically and under UN auspices.

Hudson remembers that Bush's response to this list was "it is a no-brainer."¹⁶ On all accounts the two were, it appeared, in harmony; the campaign having no difficulty accommodating the requests. Nothing on the list, it seemed, could cause concern or stretch the relationship. What is perhaps surprising is the narrowness of demands. One could be forgiven for thinking that this was all their relationship represented, that the shade and detail to conservative Catholics and their eventual relationship with politics following decades of interaction was a single, wedge issue. Surely there was more to the virtues and dynamics than this?

Certainly, the whole tone was geared to being pro-life. When discussing the role of John Klink, who had, according to Hudson, "distinguished himself in the pro-life community" and was a strong proponent in the fight against an international right to abortion, Hudson compared Klink's attitude to being "representative of all of the Catholics who joined the Bush effort."¹⁷ They were, however, not alone. The National Right to Life Committee (NRLC) were, as Hudson pointed out, already "connected to Rove." Despite being formed as a creature of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB) in 1967, to observing trends in abortion reform, the NRLC would eventually break away in 1973 to appeal to a more broad-based, nonsectarian groupings. When, in February, 2000 the NRLC, America's largest pro-life organisation with 50 state affiliates and 3000 local

chapters, officially endorsed George W. Bush for President, it was not surprising the campaign accepted their support. Hudson noted: We worked with [them] side-by-side.”¹⁸ Hudson, however, was convinced of both the campaign and Bush’s personal sincerity on the matter of being pro-life. This was made apparent at Hudson’s initial meeting with Bush and his audience of South Carolina legislators. It was, he said: “a comfortable fit.”¹⁹ It was, nevertheless, a very narrow set of concerns. In spite of this, this was the foundation upon which they built.

According to Hudson these meetings “created a buzz in the Catholic network, a network they had tapped into.” As a result, Hudson began to connect Bush and his surrogates up to Catholic radio, television, publications, Knight of Columbus and universities. “We plugged the Bush message (compassionate conservatism) to all these networks;” the “Hub” as Hudson called it. But, in addition to the above, Hudson then had to make in-roads into the Church. This was more difficult. While his emphasis was primarily the lay community, the Church, as mentioned previously, could not and should not be omitted. Bishops, Cardinals and Clergy had to be reached. Although lay Catholics like Hudson were cautious of a liberal minded Church, the Church itself (unwilling to define itself in these terms), still professed to speak to the broader America, Catholic community. As a result, it too required an audience.

In the Spring, 2001 issue of Political Research Associates: *The Public Eye*, Fred Clarkson wrote retrospectively that despite the fact that historically the Church was careful about its relationship with politics, the 2000 election *was* different. Whereas caution had been given because the Church had, first, “sought to avoid arousing nativist anti-Catholic bigotry and secondly it had sought to avoid the appearance of serving as a monolithic and authoritarian voting bloc in a pluralist society;” Clarkson suggested the divide in 2000 was bridged as the “Catholic Right [was] developing and

promoting a long-term, fundamental approach to the practice of faith that links political involvement with faith itself.” In other words the barriers to partisan politics and involvement had disappeared. Clarkson continued, “Conservative appointees of Pope John Paul II, now dominate the American Catholic leadership.” This, he argues, “was clear in 1998, when the National Conference of Catholic Bishops urged Catholics to make decisions on which candidate to vote for based on a politician’s stances on abortion and euthanasia over the many other, sometimes progressive public policy views of the church.”²⁰ Hudson disagreed. The hierarchy was on the Left of the political spectrum. Only occasionally did it feign to a different position.

Hudson stood at the vanguard of this particular approach. It was not, in any way, dominated by rightist appointees of John Paul II; hence his own crusade to manoeuvre conservative Catholics in a pro-John Paul mould into a position of opposition, activism and strength - even if this did require a careful navigation around the Church. Clarkson does, however, note that externally “conservative Catholics are building effective right-wing interest groups, such as the Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights, Opus Dei, Legionnaires of Christ and Priests for Life;”²¹ each one a vehicle the Bush campaign would eventually tap into. Nevertheless, the Church had to be considered. As a consequence, Hudson made contact for Bush with Cardinal John O’Connor, Cardinal Maida, Cardinal Bernard Law and Cardinal Hickey and Bishops Charles Chaput of Denver, Robert Baker of Charleston, John Donoghue of Atlanta and Donald Wuerl of Pittsburgh. Despite these meetings being kept in private they served two purposes. First, grass-roots Catholics could see - through their own medias - the Church (in an official capacity) had been reached out to by the Bush campaign and conversely, the Church had acknowledged him. Despite the fact these particular Cardinals and bishops emphasised they would not be campaigning for Bush, it was important they hear what Bush had to say, what his stance on key issues closest to the church were.

It would have been equally naive had the Church - so often involved in the political process did not make convivial advances to a possible future president whose policy decisions may effect them.

There were exceptions. For example: Archbishop Edward Egan of New York issued a pastoral letter to his flock, urging them to vote for candidates “who share our commitment to the fundamental rights of the unborn.”²² This was unconcealed appeal to support Bush. Another was Cardinal John O’Connor. Hudson recollected his early meeting in New York in which he was endeavouring to link Cardinal O’Connor with Bush. Having submitted the CVP for the Cardinal to read and comment, Hudson was “stunned” at the Cardinal opinion when Hudson asked about his “getting involved in the Bush political campaign.” He quotes Cardinal O’Connor as saying “you not only have to get involved; you have to win.” It was, noted Hudson, more of a surprise coming from a man with a “Democratic background.”²³ Hudson added, the “significance of these meetings in 2000 was to introduce Bush and his message to active Catholics so that their familiarity with one another would make them more likely to vote for Bush and not Al Gore. “If the Gore campaign had a Catholic vote effort, we never noticed it,”²⁴ said Hudson. As Amy Sullivan points out: “by contrast the Democratic Nation Committee would not hire anyone whose job was to work with Catholics until 2007.”²⁵ This is an important point. In what did appear to be the complete absence of a Gore/Democratic Party Catholic strategy in 2000, Gore would go on to claim the general or overall Catholic vote. As we shall see, the target vote of ‘observant/conservative/orthodox Catholics as specified by Hudson was, nevertheless, achieved.

Even so, the Bush campaign ventured to make the best possible impression on the Church. These links, noted Peter J. Boyer of the *New Yorker* made some impact, but it was down to the individual as much as the campaign to press home its cause. Boyer quotes William Donohue, the president of

the conservative Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights, as saying Hudson's circle of conservative Catholics "diminished the authority of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops as the conduit between the Church and the government. If you wanted to get something to the top inner circles of the White House from a Catholic perspective, you could contact Deal Hudson and it was delivered." It was not lost on Hudson who would declare himself to be the "self-confessed Catholic gatekeeper of the Bush administration."²⁶ But gatekeeper to what, what organisational medium was Hudson foremost of?

In practice, a number of overlapping organisational elements both coexisting and competing with one another represented the landscape before Hudson. It was not one dimensional. These elements may not have constituted the same power or dynamic as Hudson, but they were consequential. Take for example the Republican National Committee (RNC); equally pro-active and committed in its goals. The RNC did not, having helped bring Hudson on board, cease to exist. Functioning to provide national leadership for the Party as well as developing and promoting the Republican political platform; coordinating fundraising and election strategy the RNC was equally aware and focused on the Catholic vote. Hudson was testimony to this. Chaired by Catholic Jim Nicholson the RNC revitalised its 'Catholic Task Force,' (CTF) as a part of its Catholic Outreach, a program under the umbrella Grassroots Development Division of the RNC. First formed in relation to the Dole campaign in 1996 the CTF was fully functioning by February, 1999. Headed by CTF Chairman and founder Thomas Melady (former U.S. Ambassador to the Vatican) the CTF roster contained a strong number of political conservative Catholic policymakers, legislators and businesspeople. Other members included Mary Cunningham Agee, founder of the Nurturing Network; William Barr, former Attorney General under the first President Bush; Peter Flanigan, a trustee of the conservative John M. Olin Foundation; Alexander Haig, former Secretary of State in the Reagan administration;

and John Klink, an adviser to the Holy See's UN Mission. Essentially, the mission of the Task Force was to identify, reach out and connect with Catholics in Rust Belt states, hoping to lure Reagan Democrats back into the party. The CTF would, it was hoped, with the help of 'team leaders,' encourage the move. It was, however, more specific than this. By focusing on the Rust Belt states the CTF could be criticised for going backwards, focusing on ethnicity - the very thing Hudson had cautioned against. All the same, it demonstrates a multi-approach to the Catholic vote.

It was not, however, without controversy. Contained within these approaches were numerous dynamics and tensions. In April 2000, for example, Catholic Bishops were called on to repudiate Republican claims that GOP Positions are "Closest" to Catholic Church's. Frances Kissling, president of Catholics for a Free Choice (CFFC), requested Bishop Joseph A. Fiorenza, president of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops/United States Catholic Conference, to reject a claim made by the Republican National Committee's CTF. Citing the CTF's mission statement which says: "We have studied the political record of all major political parties and we believe that the Republican Party *is* closest to the teachings of the Catholic Church." We call upon the bishops of the United States to correct the view held by the RNC's Catholic Task Force," wrote Kissling in a letter to Fiorenza, adding that the U.S. Bishops themselves noted in "Faithful Citizenship," their statement on political responsibility, that "no party fully reflects our values." Kissling continued "The task force is dangerously close to claiming that God is a Republican."²⁷

Nevertheless, in spite of this kind of defiance from individuals like Kissling, the CTF was requisite to the Bush effort to court Catholics and with Thomas Melady at its head the Bush campaign would go on to "budget \$400,000, one full-time staff member and a college intern,"²⁸ in its cause. Perhaps the most noteworthy member, however, was QEV Analytics researcher and author of Hudson's CVP

Steve Wagner, who was appointed as Task Force Executive Director in June 2000. Taking the lead from Evangelicals and their own plan of action to use direct-mail and cold calling the CTF followed suit. Guidance for this came from Chair of CTF Brian Tierney (head of Tierney Communications, the largest communications agency in Philadelphia). Tierney was installed as Chairman at the same time as Wagner. Having identified their target audience of ‘Church going Catholics’ through the sample and demographic analysis of the CVP, Tierney brought into service his tools of marketing and communication. Tierney built up a 2.5-million-person mailing list, crossing the names gleaned from the Census Bureau demographic data and voting records, with special emphasis on ‘independents’ or ‘soft’ Democrats. Through targeted mailing and phone calls the CVP teams carefully picked the themes: Moral crisis, compassionate conservatism, anti-abortion and family values; themes linked with key Catholic shaded words including: caring, hope and renewal. Other tactics were less implicit, for example: symbolism. Hudson gave an account of how the Catholic strategy was put front and centre at the Republican National Convention in Philadelphia in July 2000. As a statement on their position the ‘Catholic contingent’ were assigned a prime, luxury Skybox; a feature generally reserved for big-ticket corporate donors. It was Brian Tierney who welcomed guests. As an ongoing feature it was decided “nuns, fully habited just walk around the convention.” It was hoped the image would show Catholics were openly present and out for Bush. This was given greater emphasis by a hand made-banner that hung from the skybox with the words: ‘Catholics for Bush.’²⁹

If these tactics, however, appeared exaggerated then the Bush campaign and Bush in particular was engaging in a different Catholic message. Along with Deal Hudson, Christian cleric and writer Richard Neuhaus privately tutored Bush with a deliberate adaptation of a conservative Catholic worldview, via strategic language choices and communication approaches. As a result, Hudson and

Neuhaus made sure Bush incorporated references to Catholic social teaching in his speeches, memos and interviews. Bush learned this early when he served as his father's liaison to conservative Christians in 1988. Here he was counselled to 'signal early and signal often.' Neither was it a question of a religious subtext that had been carefully crafted to go beneath the radar; instead, it was often unmasked and open. Bush could often find to use terms like 'hills to climb' and 'the valley below.' Bush often used the term "a culture of life," which he borrowed from Pope John Paul II as a more targeted religious invocation to Catholics. The idea was geared to chime with Catholic concerns and the doctrines of conservative Catholics. Neuhaus, we should remember, was at the core of that growing 'Evangelical movement' underway in the Catholic Church that Hudson referred to in relation to Dole and his own stimulus for becoming political active. In contrast to the Dole campaign, where the 'RNC strategy understood what should attract Catholics to Bob Dole but did not know where to find them,' Hudson built upon this gap as an asset for Bush.

However, Neuhaus's contribution was more sophisticated than simply informing Bush on key 'Catholic' buzz words and deeper than tutoring him on the semantics of Catholic doctrine.

Neuhaus's strongest and least known offering to the campaign was to help frame Bush's 'Faith-based Initiative' programme in Catholic principles, namely: Subsidiarity and Mediating Structures.

"Subsidiarity," wrote Michele R. Pistone, John J. Hoeffne, "was one of the primary tools of the Bush 2000 presidential campaign."³⁰ In essence, the principle of 'subsidiary' is that a central authority (the state, large economic and enterprise conglomerates, labor unions and the growing bureaucracies that administer wide sectors of the society) should only have a subsidiary function, performing only those tasks which cannot be performed at a more local level. This should incur solving problems at the local level; empowering individuals, families and voluntary associations to act more efficaciously in their own lives and communities. In short, local problems are best solved

by local actors or agents. Deal Hudson wrote on the subject: “I think of what Pope Benedict XVI wrote in his eloquent passage about subsidiarity in his 2009 encyclical, *Caritas in Veritate*:

‘Subsidiarity is first and foremost a form of assistance to the human person via the autonomy of intermediate bodies. Such assistance is offered when individuals or groups are unable to accomplish something on their own, and it is always designed to achieve their emancipation, because it fosters freedom and participation through assumption of responsibility. Subsidiarity respects personal dignity by recognising in the person a subject who is always capable of giving something to others. By considering reciprocity as the heart of what it is to be a human being, subsidiarity is the most effective antidote against any form of all-encompassing welfare state.’³¹

‘Mediating structures’ refers to the social groups and associations that lie between the individual and the state—the family, parish, guild, village, voluntary associations, and all other such local and parochial communities and how they mediate between them. Richard John Neuhaus and Peter Berger, coined the terms in the 1970s.³² These principles are the “centre-piece of Bush’s embrace of the work of Catholic conservatives like Richard John Neuhaus and Michael Novak,” and the ideas course through his ‘compassionate conservatism’ and faith-based programme.³³ As scholar Robert Vischer points out, “Even where unspoken, subsidiarity underlies many of Bush’s policy proposals. In his “Duty of Hope” campaign speech outlining the compassionate conservative vision the word ‘subsidiarity,’” he notes, “never passed Bush’s lips, [but the] speech reads like a blueprint for applied subsidiarity.”³⁴ Others were more direct. Speaking at the 21st Annual John M. Ashbrook Memorial Dinner at Ashland University in 2005, Karl Rove said: “Conservatives have long known that political liberty depends upon a healthy social and moral order. And so the President and conservatives are committed to strengthening society’s key institutions: families, schools, and communities, and protecting those ‘mediating’ structures that are so important to our freedom like

our churches, neighbourhoods, and private groups. The institutions that inculcate values, shape character, and provide the young with moral education.”³⁵ In the run up to the campaign both Bush and Rove took special note of the Neuhaus pamphlet on Mediating structures and both purposefully implemented its principles and ideas into their political model.

Of course, such ideas as these established along religious lines and so central to the Bush political model were the primary reason that it was thought Bush *et al* were moving towards theocracy. The very idea that a ‘faith-based programme’ could be so central was anathema. Neuhaus, who had long advocated that the strict separation by the First Amendment in relation to religion and state leaves the ‘public square’ - ‘naked,’ stripping it of morality. This was the premise for his earlier and influential book of the same name: *The Naked Public Square* (1984). When Neuhaus died in January 2009, Bush said: “Father Neuhaus helped me craft what is still the integral part of my position on abortion, which is: every child welcomed to life and protected by law.”³⁶ The relationship was such that looking back on a 1998 breakfast meeting, “in which Bush assured Neuhaus of the strength and quality of his pro-life commitments, Neuhaus called it a decision that would ‘define the relationship of your Administration and of the Republican Party to the Catholics of America or at least to the great majority of those who are observant Catholics.’”³⁷ This reverberated perfectly with Hudson and his belief and the furtherance of the CVP.

This said, despite Hudson injecting a small, but strong, influential team into the campaign it was his understanding that Catholics were still relative newcomers to the RNC that mattered. Evangelicals, already within the coalition, he observed, were “better funded and better staffed.” Although conservative Catholics had come a long way in a relatively short period of time the parallels are important. As Hudson noted, in 2000 we had “no field staff” so all efforts were coming through a

“comparatively small port.” In addition to Neuhaus, Hudson drew in a cluster of individuals such as strategist and lobbyist and Catholic Edward ‘Ed’ Gillespie. Gillespie served as senior communications advisor for the Bush presidential campaign and was responsible for arranging the party convention program in Philadelphia for Bush’s nomination and inauguration. In 2000, Gillespie co-founded a bipartisan public affairs group called Quinn Gillespie and Associates, which is one of Washington, D.C.’s premier government relations firms. As Quinn Gillespie & Associates was taking off, Gillespie began to work for the Bush campaign, building support in Washington circles for the Texas governor; eventually moving to Austin, Texas, where he helped the campaign’s media and communications operations. During the campaign Gillespie helped convince Americans that Bush’s ‘compassionate conservatism’ represents a break from the radicalism seen in the Gingrich era. Ryan Lizza of the liberal *New Republic* magazine “call[ed] him “the most important operative you've never heard of in the Bush presidency.”³⁸

Piece by piece this small, but active cabal were orchestrating a drive to inform Catholics, specifically conservative, observant Catholics that George W. Bush was their man. This was also true for Deal Hudson. William Donohue of the Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights, told the *New York Times* that Hudson had become “the point man”³⁹ for conservative Catholics to communicate with the Bush administration. Neither Buckley or Bozell were able to infiltrate government as Hudson had managed to achieve. This was also true for Evangelicals, important because we should recall that it was they who were supposed to be at the forefront of the Christian drive and Christian orientation of the Bush campaign and presidency. This was not the case. The *de facto* head of the Evangelical movement Ralph Reed was never made an official of government or the Bush campaign for that matter. Whilst it was no secret of Reed’s involvement in both cases he was not given the same position or arguably the same access and freedoms as Hudson. It is unclear

why, having been so close in the interim, the two appeared detached. Hudson describes “relations with the Evangelical effort,” as being ‘friendly,’ although their connection was not, he stated “coordinated.” Even so, Reed kept him “abreast”⁴⁰ of the Evangelical efforts for the campaign. Post-election both Catholic and Evangelical strategies fell under the auspice Office of Public Liaison⁴¹ headed by conservative and Evangelical Timothy Goeglein. Goeglein, as we shall see, was the link man for the two.

To reach this point, however, it was not enough that Hudson; busy pushing, promoting and peddling the Bush campaign and the conservative Catholic cause, stand alone. Bush himself had to extend the strategy, making himself amenable and appealing to his audiences. Interestingly, and as alluded to earlier, we discover something of a vagueness, not usually detected or referred to. Clearly a deeply religious infused state of affairs existed, influencing, channeling and shaping them all, but in sharp contrast to the image given to us by individuals like David Domke, who asked: “Is President George W. Bush a Dangerous Theocrat?”⁴² need tempering. Biographically we see an openly religious man; a daily Bible reader; often speaking - if questioned - of how Jesus changed his heart and his call to run for the presidency as well as his belief in the power of prayer and his own view of himself as a lowly sinner. Still, this only reveals the barest outlines. Even after the first term of Bush’s presidency was over, Alan Cooperman of the *Washington Post* wrote an article entitled: “Openly Religious, to a point. Bush Leaves the Specifics of his Faith to Speculation.” Cooperman reasoned that a ‘generic’ Christian description of Bush was perhaps more apt.” Aides close to Bush within the White House said “they do not know whether the president believes that: the Bible is without error; the theory of evolution is true; homosexuality is a sinful choice; only Christians will go to heaven; support for Israel is a biblical imperative; or the war in Iraq is part of God’s plan.”⁴³

The question of equivocation gives us a different cross-section on Bush and perhaps a new way to view him.

Throughout office, clarity on these and other positions was difficult to pin down. The leading question in relation to Catholics and in particular Hudson's initial requests and proposed strategy was abortion; but "when asked by reporters during the 2000 presidential campaign and once more in the fall whether abortion should be banned, Bush said the nation was not ready for that step, without [specifically] indicating his position." Was, as Cooperman suggests, this part of a "shrewd calculation behind these ambiguities"? Contrary to the positive, affirmative answers Bush initially gave to Hudson in private, his public persona was more vague. Steering clear of the explicit and the precise left it unfastened for his audience. *Washington Post* journalist Dan Balz conferred. "For all the gravitational pull around his candidacy, there is something missing from the Bush campaign: the real substance of a presidential platform. Even as many Republicans rush to embrace him, the candidate remains in no hurry to fill in the blanks of what a Bush presidency would do. The broad themes of his candidacy, embodied in his notion of 'Compassionate Conservatism,' may be appealing to voters. But there is much more to know about him."⁴⁴ In a report carried out by the *Chicago Tribune* in early 2000, when, as *Time Magazine's* David Aikman noted, Bush was well under way in his campaign for the presidency, the report highlighted "Bush [was] not easy to pigeonhole on many major issues and at times his efforts to straddle issues can appear tortuous." In particular, it notes, "he did impose tighter restrictions on access to abortion, especially for minors, but he did not come out in favour of a constitutional amendment to ban abortions all together."⁴⁵ Given the meeting Bush had held in Texas with Hudson and the consort of Catholics who attended them it seems at odds with their discussions and promises. Perhaps one of the greatest contradictions surrounding abortion for Bush was that for all the discussions and religious doctrines

concerning morality, the protection and sanctity of life, was a man who - during his six years as Governor of Texas, presided over 152 executions, more than any other governor in the recent history of the United States. Given his record this was something that should have caused serious concern for his ensuing relationship with Catholics; after all, on this issue the Catholic position *was* clear. This did not mean Bush was not aware of border issues.

As discussed earlier, Bush's foundational religious and political experiences arose from his time as Governor of Texas where his knowledge of political management came by focusing on not one but a handful of issues; for example: education reform, welfare, tort law, and the juvenile-justice system. Known as a bi-partisan Governor, Bush was also well positioned to endear and engage himself with the Catholic electorate through issues like immigration. As Governor of Southern, border state, he had first-hand knowledge of the benefits legal immigrants bring to America as well as being strongly ingratiated to the Hispanic community. While opposed to illegal immigration he was not against a more structured approach. More, he argued, should be done to welcome legal immigrants and his plans for processing immigration applications as well as encouraging family reunification and a restructuring of immigration services along helpful lines were greeted favourably. More importantly, these aspects sat comfortably with the Catholic ethos of immigration, welfare for the family and the poor. The point was that Bush was experienced enough to know the value of several issues with several dynamics and not just one, single, wedge issue. Nevertheless, it was predominantly the one issue (abortion) that became the *sine qua non* for the coming together and focus of conservative Catholics and Bush. Describe by Robert Drapper as a "political dilemma" for Bush abortion was not his "pet issue." As Drapper noted, Bush was "firmly on record as an opponent of abortion," but his "mother and his wife were pro-choice" and as a Governor he gave "indications to moderate aides that he would never be a right-to-life firebrand."⁴⁶

The problem then, is trying to decipher whether this was a substantive or symbolic relationship. In short, was Bush genuinely acting on his personal and political views or was it carefully crafted symbolism. As Murray Edelman noted, by “utilising symbolic politics, presidents [and campaigners] identify and frame issues to their advantage and portray their administration [or campaign] as responsive and in control.”⁴⁷ Symbolic gestures: slogans, badges, banners, sound-bites, ritual acts and political staging are indispensable. However, they can backfire. Empirically, Bush knew the dangers of a symbolic and substantive position. Bush seniors pledge “Read my lips: no new taxes,”⁴⁸ for example, not only helped defeat him but left a lasting satirical legacy. In the campaign, however, the only representative cases of something substantive for Bush was his history as Governor of Texas; which was - if only measurable by popularity - arguably successful. It was confidence in this belief that initially led to the assumption that this could be elevated into a national campaign. Ultimately - and this trend would continue - substance was largely avoided. The campaign does not talk overtly of prayer in school, they do not talk on gay and lesbian rights and the poor as primary concerns. These - outside of closed and discrete meetings - are delivered in those broader terms listed above.

Bob Jones University, Symbolism put to the Test

The strength of this symbolism made an unexpected and potentially threatening appearance in Bush’s fledgling campaign. On February 2nd and only two states into the primaries (Iowa and New Hampshire), Bush’s appearance at Bob Jones University, in Greenville, South Carolina, caused controversy. Viewed as a bastion of ultra-conservative views the Universities notoriety came largely from its separatist policies, stringent adherence to scripture and an open denigration of other faiths. Not until 1971, for example, did Bob Jones University enrol black students and between 1971 and 1975 this was for married couples only. When Gov. George Wallace infamously stood in the

doorway of the University of Alabama to prevent a black student from registering, he was awarded an honorary doctorate by the Bob Jones University. The Universities stance and outlook has led to fierce criticism and where possible various attempts at reproach have been made. In 1983, following a Federal Justice Department legal challenge, the United States Supreme Court voted 8 to 1⁴⁹ in favour of the IRS to the Universities tax-exemption status,⁵⁰ a ruling that simultaneously saw the removal of the same status from North Carolina's Goldsboro Christian School. It was, however, religion that caused consternation. When Pope John Paul II visited Bob Jones University in 1987, Bob Jones Jr. said he would rather "speak to the devil himself" than meet with the Pope. If, in the twentieth century there was one last, open stage for anti-Catholic bigotry - it was here.

Ordinarily GOP candidates regularly attracted to the University due to its strong Evangelical character; then a feature of the modern Republican Party, its make-up and dynamic. Ronald Reagan spoke there in 1980; Dan Quayle, Pat Buchanan, Phil Gramm, Bob Dole, and Alan Keyes all made appearances in the 1990s. Karl Rove and Bush's campaign manager Karen Hughes - taking the appointment at face value, agreed. The "socially conservative youth vote of which Bob Jones was patron saint," was a bloc Bush "had to have." Strategically Rove forecast that "there will be five thousand Republican students packed in a convention hall for their convocation. They're there! Tell me how we're gonna get that many people to leave work and school on a Wednesday afternoon?"⁵¹ Following the shock defeat in New Hampshire for Bush, it was pressing he secure a victory, particularly in such a conservative state. Robert Draper's portrait of the Bush campaign muted the idea that Rove's 'fifty state campaign' had - following New Hampshire - been effectively reduced to one: South Carolina.

But Bush's visit turned out to be different. This was largely due to his opponent John McCain although Democrats and some conservatives were equally dismayed. For example: Conservative editor of *The Weekly Standard*, Bill Kristol commented that: "It's one thing to lurch to the right; it's another thing to lurch back 60 years. You could make the case that compassionate conservatism died on February 2nd when Bush appeared at Bob Jones University."⁵² It was, however, John McCain - Bush's opponent - who attempted to gain political impetus and in some respects fight back against a particularly personal and derogatory attack on his character, family and reputation. McCain quickly picked up on the Universities anti-Catholic sentiment and sanctioned a phone banking tactic aimed at Catholic voters in Michigan whose primary was due on the 22nd of February. To make matters worse, the McCain campaign started what it dubbed a "Catholic voter alert."⁵³ The fire storm grew. Eventually Bush was forced into making more pronounced statements and actions to resolve the issue. The initial question was could it be contained? Although Bush never apologised for visiting the University he did openly state that he regretted not having distanced himself from many of the Universities policies. To help curb the negative attention the visit was gaining Deal Hudson suggested Bush wrote a letter to Cardinal John O'Connor, Roman Catholic Archbishop of New York. The letter expressed Bush's regret and his disappointment at not having seized the opportunity at the time to detach himself from University policy. Bush also pointed out in his defence the conversion to Catholicism of his brother, Florida Governor Jeb Bush. The Catholic vote mattered and it cannot be discounted that Bush's relationship with Catholics was not to be tarnished further especially in the impending New York primary on March 7th. "On reflection, I should have been more clear in disassociating myself from anti-Catholic sentiments and racial prejudice," Bush said in his letter to Cardinal O'Connor. "It was a missed opportunity, causing needless offence, which I deeply regret." At a news conference on 28th February, Bush reiterated the letter's sentiments. "I make no excuses," Bush said. "I had an opportunity and I

missed it. I regret that. I wish I had gotten up then and seized the moment to set a tone, a tone that I had set in Texas, a positive and inclusive tone.” Officials with the Bush campaign said that the letter to Cardinal O'Connor, the spiritual leader of about 2.4 million Catholics in the New York metropolitan area, was inspired in part by the Bush family's longstanding friendship with the cardinal.⁵⁴ This may well be true, however, the campaign would have also anticipated the potential importance of Catholics in the Republican primary in New York on March 7. Catholics make up an estimated 46 percent of the registered Republicans in the state and they dominate key leadership positions in statewide and local offices. The New York contest could be pivotal in determining whether Bush can put an end to the early McCain challenge and future damage to the Catholic vote. During interview, Hudson told how Rove had informed him that “Bush's visits were wholly investigated for ‘endorsement.’ Advance people,” said Rove to Hudson, “were not sensitive to the Universities anti-Catholicism - it just did not register.” At the Governors mansion, just after the event, Hudson was told that Rove - who looked at one of the staff in the room - said: “Yes, some of my staff responsible for the visit missed that one.” Rove, Hudson expressed, “was angry.”⁵⁵

McCain made numerous errors against Bush in the primary campaign that cost him; but his greatest miscalculation was to go-broad with his attack on social conservatives. With a focus on religion as a potential weakness against Bush; McCain, possibly believing he had scored a point against his opponent with the Bob Jones University visit, embarked on wider attack. On the 29th February, in a speech in Virginia Beach, Va., McCain described Pat Robertson and Jerry Falwell as “on the outer reaches of American politics and the agents of intolerance.” He compared them to Nation of Islam leader Louis Farrakhan and liberal New York activist Al Sharpton. In their back yard this was unwise. “They were,” he continued, an “evil influence.” Both Catholics and Evangelicals responded. “Hitler, Stalin, Mao and Pol Pot were evil. But to say that Pat Robertson and Jerry

Falwell are evil is to trivialise the term and thereby make light of what truly is worthy of that name,”⁵⁶ said William Donohue, president of the Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights, in a March 1 statement. Deal Hudson was keen to assist in bringing the Catholic question back on line for Bush. “The backlash already is beginning,” said Hudson. “McCain has made himself a demagogue in implying Bush associated with anti-Catholic bias. He is creating a division among traditional allies, including religiously active Catholics and Evangelical Christians,”⁵⁷ Hudson told *The Washington Times*. “There was a sad irony,” Hudson continued, to the Bob Jones affair in that “Bush has done his best to reach out to Catholics that no other presidential candidate has done.”⁵⁸ Some, like Evangelical Charles Colson believed that whilst the Bob Jones visit was “ill advised,” this was a “divisive tactic, a calculated effort (on the part of McCain) to undermine the ‘growing alliance’ between conservative Roman Catholics and Evangelical Protestants.”⁵⁹ This broader take on the issue was indicative of how, generally, the whole affair was interpreted.

The key, however, was specifics. Hudson’s emphasis in his statement above, for example, was on ‘active,’ or observant Catholics. The notion that the broader American Catholic could be effected by the allegations does not appear to figure in his analysis. In fact, the ‘guilt by association’ that McCain attempted to portray fell short, a point Catholics themselves picked up on. Diana Jean Schemomarch of the *New York Times* noted that in advance of the New York primary, Roman Catholic leaders and laymen are “playing down the importance of the recent strife within the party over anti-Catholic fundamentalism,” expressing that they will “likely vote on the basis of substantive issues that touch their day-to-day lives and beliefs.” Citing leading Catholics like William Donohue and Bishop Thomas V. Daily of Brooklyn, “spiritual leader of 1.7 million Catholics in Brooklyn and Queens,” Bush’s visit to Bob Jones “was not, the make-or-break issue of the election.” Bishop Daily, while clear the Universities rhetoric was offensive and positions were

unacceptable was more concerned with the “Texas governor’s record on capital punishment.” This he found more questionable. Despite a clear, Catholic position to the death penalty Bush’s tenure as governor witnessed the record execution of convicts. this, said Bishop Daily, was a “more fundamental issue.” Voters in the New York boroughs of Brooklyn and Queens had, Bishop Daily noted, “more immediate problems than debating whether Mr. Bush should have spoken at the university. Concerns about immigrants and poor people trying to survive, living two, three families to an apartment to share the rent. Adding that health care and education were also critical issues he hoped to hear the candidates take on.”⁶⁰ The support continued. In the absence of what appears to be no clear strategy from the Bush campaign to combat the affair - other than Bush’s letter to Cardinal O’Connor - Catholic seemed to exhibit common sense. “I think Catholics would have preferred that [Mr. Bush] stayed away from a place like that, but I don’t think that’s going to determine how Catholics vote in New York,” said the Rev. Thomas J. Reese, editor of the Jesuit magazine America. “I think there are other issues that they are more concerned about-economic issues, political issues. I don’t think Catholics feel that they’re being hounded. Now that [Mr. Bush] has apologised, it’s a non-issue.”⁶¹

Enough information and data exists and existed to inform of the dangers of negative campaigning. While McCain attempt to bring religion into the campaign in a negative light the Bush campaign was equally complicit in its negative approach. For example: Bush’s “compassionate” mantra and rhetoric did not necessarily square with some of its other practices; for instance, Bush’s Louisiana state campaign chairman, Gov. Mike Foster, who was fined \$20,000 for purchasing mailing lists from former Ku Klux Klan wizard David Duke. In addition to this the vicious and personal campaign mounted against McCain in South Carolina - unofficially by the Bush campaign and the Christian Right, led McCain’s campaign manager, John Weaver, to congratulate Ralph Reed, Pat

Robertson and Jerry Falwell on the job they had done against McCain. Given the way in which the Christian Right had coalesced for Bush - particularly in South Carolina - it seemed ironic when one of Bush's most prominent political allies, Gov. George E. Pataki of New York, suggested that in relation to McCain and Bob Jones: "No one should inject religion in a campaign - It's just abhorrent."⁶² In fact, a number of studies⁶³ point clearly to how voters attitudes towards 'positive' and 'negative' elections and campaigns are viewed as being disapproved of, with the majority of Americans believing that "negative, attack-oriented campaigning is undermining and damaging our democracy" (82%), that unethical practices in campaigns occur "very" or "fairly" often (58%), and that "in terms of ethics and values, election campaigns in this country have gotten worse in the last 20 years" (53%).⁶⁴ The voting public, it suggests, are not necessarily duped into this type of campaigning.

Politics, however, appears blind to the data. Catholics, however, appear to have once more demonstrated a type of autonomy in the face of negative campaigning. There is no evidence to indicate McCain or for that matter anyone else in opposition was aware of the Bush/Catholic connection, its depth and concentration or of the presence and function of individuals like Hudson. What we can state is that McCain did not, nor had he ever attempted to forge a Catholic relationship for himself. Fortuitously perhaps, the Bush campaign saw emphasis on the Evangelical aspect of Bush's religious connections as a distraction away from the Catholic element. Momentarily the Bob Jones incident exposed Bush's relationship to a wider public gaze, but because his Catholic support was either partisan or politically independent enough to make-up its own mind, Bush was able to ride out the storm.

Ultimately, it was to the public sphere Bush had to turn their attentions. Having quelled the one, potentially negative Catholic issue to arise in the campaign it was the nations turn to cast its vote. The question is whether overarching terms like ‘compassionate conservatism’ or ‘faith-based Initiatives’ were refined enough to actually tap into the concerns of the American Catholic. This raises that question: what do we mean by Catholics in politics? Naturally, Catholics like any other American citizen look for an electable political candidate to attain the more important policy goals which reflect their religious convictions and concerns. As to whether Catholic voters are allowing political expediency, rather than religious convictions, to dictate their decisions can only ever be answered by the individual. If we look at Bush’s campaign themes and those elements that cut across Catholic concerns, their faith and practices, it is possible to see how Catholics of all stripes *could* - given Bush’s vagueness and breadth - associate themselves with his brand of religious, conservative candidacy. For example:

Bush’s Campaign Slogans

Prosperity with a purpose: Peaceful & prosperous future. (Mar 1999)

“Compassionate conservatism” allows individual potential. (Mar 1999)

Government if necessary, not necessarily government. (Dec 1999)

Bush’s conservatism: local solutions within limited govt. (Dec 1999)

Theme: change how Washington works & restore moral purpose. (Jun 2000)

My generation tested limits; now we’re coming home. (Aug 2000)

Now is the time to do the hard things. (Aug 2000)

Real Plans for Real People: Bush promises honest talking. (Sep 2000)

Blueprint for the Middle Class: from birth through retirement. (Sep 2000)

Barnstorm for Reform: End D.C. cynicism & zero-sum politics. (Oct 2000)

They have not led. We will. (Nov 2000)

President should be a role model and uniter. (Nov 2000)

End season of cynicism and politics of anger. (Nov 2000)

Commitment to civility, courage, compassion and character. (Jan 2001)

Abortion:

Encourage fewer abortions via adoption & abstinence. (Jul 1998)

Ban partial-birth; ban taxpayer funding. (Mar 1999)

Supports Parental Notification Law for minor girls. (Jun 1999)

Ideal: Value every life; but many steps to get there. (Jun 1999)

No Republican will allow partial-birth abortion. (Feb 2000)

Welcome all children; supports adoption tax credits. (Apr 2000)

Every child born and unborn ought to be protected. (Jun 2000)

Good people can disagree; but let's value life. (Aug 2000)

Ban partial-birth abortions, and reduce abortions overall. (Oct 2000)

Accepts FDA approval of RU-486 but concerned about overuse. (Oct 2000)

No funds to international groups that offer abortion. (Jan 2001)

Faith-based organisations and the notion the faith does have an active, participatory role:

Religious charities deserve government support. (Dec 1999)

“No-strings” vouchers for religious groups to do charity. (Jan 2000)

Church-based solutions for drugs, daycare, & crime. (Apr 2000)

Fund faith-based private programs that promote independence. (Jun 2000)

Devolve welfare to both state and private charities. (Sep 2000)

Supported church-based poverty program in Rio Grande Valley. (Oct 2000)

Government solving social problems crowds out compassion. (Oct 2000)

Establish federal & state “offices of faith-based action”. (Jan 2001)

Religious groups must be part of solution to society’s ills. (Jan 2001)

Gay Rights:

Against gay marriage, but leave it to the states. (Feb 2000)

No gay adoptions; but listens to gay GOP group. (Apr 2000)

Tolerance & equal rights, not gay marriage & special rights. (Oct 2000)

Death Penalty:

134 Texas executions are “fair and just”. (Jun 2000)

Uphold law on death penalty; and think of the victims. (Jun 2000)

Death penalty for hate crimes like any other murder. (Oct 2000)

Death penalty decisions are profound, but made in 15 minutes. (Oct 2000)

Death penalty for deterrence, not revenge. (Oct 2000)

Not proud that Texas has most executions. (Oct 2000)

On Immigration:

More border guards to compassionately turn away Mexicans. (Dec 1999)

Latinos enrich us; family values go past Rio Grande. (Feb 2000)

Farm policy: Open markets abroad; more H-2A worker visas. (Apr 2000)

High tech: More H-1B worker visas; less export controls. (Apr 2000)

Make Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) more “immigrant friendly”. (Jun 2000)

Welcome Latinos; immigration is not a problem to be solved. (Jun 2000)

\$500M to cut INS application time to 6 months. (Jul 2000)

Respect other languages, but teach all children English. (Nov 2000)

As we can see, Bush’s positions fit agreeably. What they do not do is off-set or repulse the faith-base and their concerns. Strategically, Bush Governorship helped him to distribute what Fred Greenstein called “his thematic campaign lines.”⁶⁵ In the first instance, Bush’s campaign slogans build beyond the notion of a ‘single base,’ as most commentators would have us believe. This type of rhetoric or positioning, as noted earlier, opens up a number of spaces in which *other* groups or groupings both religious and secular can feel at home. In the absence of specifics a type of freedom occurs in which all interested parties can move around. To narrow or specialised the ‘message’ targeted at one particular subculture was ill-advised. What transpired was a subtle, sophisticated tailoring of language and approaches that each group picked up on. For example, Catholics hear: ‘social renewal’ and ‘sanctity of life,’ mixed with strong, resonant themes like abortion. Evangelicals hear ‘scripture, morals, marriage’ and ‘the family.’ Conservatives hear ‘government’ and the ‘individual.’ Another distinctiveness was that to help narrow and target the Bush message

was the individual work, effort and networking of characters like Hudson and Reed. In each case both spoke to their designated network of conservative Catholics and conservative Christians respectively. Steve Wagner, who undertook the CVP research was unambiguous when he noted that “Compassionate conservatism is perfectly designed to appeal to Catholics,”⁶⁶ in this way.

On abortion we see one of the strongest links to connect both the campaign, Catholics and Evangelicals equally. However, it is worth noting that formatively Governor Bush was initially a moderate on the issue, influenced perhaps by his pro-life wife and mother. In fact, as Governor, Bush tightened laws for juveniles but voiced opposition to an out-right ban or change in law. Political expediency changed this, however, once Bush left the confines of the state and was required to address a much broader, complex audience. At one of the first meetings in Austin between Bush and Hudson, Hudson was delighted to hear Bush tell a “female legislator” that “abortion was bad for America.”⁶⁷ As mentioned previously, at their first meeting abortion was the first thing Hudson pressed Rove and Bush on and was singularly one sided in relation to all other possible issues. Nevertheless, abortion remained pivotal to both the bond and the legacy between Catholic and Bush. In: “An Interview with Deal Hudson, Part I: The Pro-Life Legacy of George W. Bush,” John Jalsevac asked Deal Hudson: ‘What is your general impression of the last 8 years, particularly in regards to President Bush’s contributions to the pro-life and pro-family cause?’” Hudson responded: “No president has accomplished more for the pro-life cause than George W. Bush. He kept all his promises that he made in the 2000 campaign, specifically to Catholics who supported him and worked for him. He declared himself a pro-life, culture of life president in his first televised message to the nation when he addressed the stem cell debate. His decision on stem-cells wasn’t perfect but he did use the opportunity of that televised speech to tell the nation that he was a pro-life president, which was to his credit.” He continued: “What a lot of people don’t

realise about the two terms of the Bush administration is that his pro-life initiatives were not just legislative, not just policy-driven, they were personnel driven. And when you look at the staff that was put in place in crucial departments like Health and Human Services and the Justice Department, the people that were put in these positions transformed the culture of the government that was left them by the Clintons. And so you had appointees with pro-life convictions who were found throughout the administration, and made a huge difference in our government and in the impact of the presidency on the culture.”⁶⁸ Defending Bush’s record on abortion Hudson remarked: “Look at the fact that there was a marked drop in abortions in between 2000 and 2006, to a level of 1974 in this country. And that’s a tribute not only to President Bush, but to a great extent to him, because when a leader of a nation says that life is precious and that life should be protected, that gives heart to a lot of people who are in the middle and who aren’t sure which way to go. That kind of leadership helps those people go in the direction of life.” The source of Hudson’s analysis for statistical data on abortion is not noted; however, the National Right To Life Committee (NRLC), did present figures backing-up his analysis. Although the NRLC was un-happy at 58,586,256 abortions in America as a “Consequence of Roe V. Wade, since 1973,”⁶⁹ data, gathered from independent sources (the government’s Centres for Disease Control (CDC) and the Guttmacher Institute (GI),) showed a steady, down-ward trend beginning in the 1990s. Bush - rather than setting this trend, merely fits into it. Nevertheless, the data was sufficient to credit Bush with continuing the descent. IT was, after all, results driven.

Concerning Faith-based organisations and the notion the faith does have an active, participatory role, Hudson is quoted as saying: “the Faith-based Initiative was important because it made Church-related social services – not just the big national networks, but local regional networks – it made them more powerful because they received funding which before had only gone to institutions like

Catholic Charities, or some Washington-based charity. So actually bringing in apostolates from cities and regions around the country and showing them how to write grants and how to receive more support. I think that was very important in pursuing his fundamental respect for the role of religion and culture of life.”⁷⁰ Hudson was a strong proponent of the Faith-based Initiative, arguing on several fronts that government should adhere to the doctrine of subsidiarity - that is: (in politics) the concept that a central authority should have a subsidiary function, performing only those tasks which cannot be performed at a more local level. We have already touched upon the subject, but it is key. In an article for *Catholic City*, entitled: *Government can not Love*, Hudson wrote “Bush [was] clearly influenced by the Catholic principle of subsidiarity.” Naturally, the implication is that this was the place Catholics could step-up, contribute and thus have real, practical value. In the light of this belief, “the program of the faith-based initiative,” wrote Hudson, “answers the question” What’s the government going to do about it? the answer being “providing resources to people motivated by the earnestness of faith.”⁷¹ Strategically, Bush, aided by individuals like Hudson were tapping into the Catholic vocabulary. It was, however, costly. As the centre piece of the Bush administration it came immediately under fire as the prime example of what Kevin Phillips *et al*, referred to as a slouch towards theocracy; a nation run by a Christian majority on purely Christian mores. The faith-based Initiative was, after all, not just rhetoric but an undertaking. Understandably this raised concern about religions role and place in what some preferred to see as a secular society. Hudson alluded to the idea that during Bush’s first term “theocracy replaced Religious Right as the label of choice to assail the political activism of religious conservatism.” In turn, he noted, “members of the Religious Right,” were then called “theocrats,” the “newest pejorative employed to demonise religious conservatives.”⁷² For Hudson the Faith-based Initiative was crucial. Writing for *Catholic City* in 2006, Hudson proposed “Ten Things Republicans Must Do To Keep the Religious Vote,” amongst which was the Faith-based Initiative. “Remind Religious Conservatives of

the Record,” he wrote. “In its first six years, the administration of President George W. Bush did more for religious conservatives than any other president, including Ronald Reagan. Bush went well beyond signing bills and defining policy that protected life and the traditional family; he created a partnership with the religious community, a ‘Faith-based Initiative,’ that invested in the ongoing work of churches to address our nation’s social problems. Nothing, I repeat nothing, has infuriated the political left more than the funding of church-related social services.”⁷³ Once in office, thirty Catholic leaders met with Bush to discuss his Faith-based Initiatives. During the 30-minute meeting, Bush applauded the Catholic Church’s long history of serving the poor and disadvantaged, stating, “There is no way that government can create love. Love comes from a higher calling. Love is inspirational. But what government can do is fund and welcome programs whose sole intent is to change lives in a positive way.” In attendance was Archbishop Egan, Archbishop Charles J. Chaput of Denver, Colo., Archbishop John C. Favalora of Miami, Fla., and Bishop Paul S. Loverde of Arlington, Va. there was also representatives from a wide range of Catholic charitable organisations including Kenneth Hackett, director of Catholic Relief Services; John Carr, head of the Department of Social Development for the National Conference of Catholic Bishops; Carl Anderson, supreme knight of the Knights of Columbus, and heads of the St. Vincent de Paul Society, Catholic Big Brothers, Boys Town and a Catholic inner-city school in Milwaukee. From New York were Father Robert Lombardo, C.F.R., director of St. Anthony's Residence in the South Bronx, which houses formerly homeless men; Mother Agnes Mary Donovan, S.V., superior general of the Sisters of Life; Christopher Bell, executive director of Good Counsel Inc., which runs homes for single mothers and their children, and Mario J. Paredes, executive director of the Northeast Hispanic Catholic Center in Manhattan. John J. DiIulio, professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia, head of the new White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, who is Catholic, Stephen Goldsmith, former mayor of Indianapolis,

Ind., who was Bush's special adviser on faith-based programs. Deal Hudson was also present. "It's a natural fit between what President Bush is proposing and what we do in many of our Catholic organisations,"⁷⁴ said Archbishop Egan. Despite the controversy it was clear the Bush administration had not merely attempted to solicit votes with the Faith-based Initiative, but was attempting to carry out its mission beyond the election.

On gay rights a similar pattern emerges. When, in April 2000, Bush met with a dozen gay Republicans, he responded that the meeting had made him a "better person."⁷⁵ But had this changed his mind. On the surface Bush was indifferent to gay marriage. As far as he was concerned it was a private matter and as Robert Draper's portrait of Bush details, he was quite uncomfortable discussing the issue. As far as Bush was concerned "it was none of his business" and he was "nervous when it [became] an agenda" and "part of the public discourse."⁷⁶ To navigate around this he employed a now familiar tactic. Post-meeting Mr. Bush said he "welcomed gays into his campaign," adding, "I want the Republicans, conservative Republicans, to understand we judge people based upon their heart and soul; that's what this campaign is about."⁷⁷ Once more, it fell under the umbrella of 'compassionate conservatism.' On such issues as this Bush's platform of being a 'uniter, not a divider,' should have been put to the test; however, the 2000 campaign was notable for its lack of anti-gay rhetoric which helped Bush navigate around the issue. To bolster his cause Log Cabin Republicans (an organisation that works within the Republican Party to advocate equal rights for LGBT) endorsed Governor Bush. Strategically, Log Cabin Republicans spent \$500,000 on get-out-the-vote radio and print advertising in battleground states. *The Washington Blade* newspaper conducted a poll of "gay voters taken by the before the Log Cabin Republicans ad campaign showed Bush winning 2% of the gay vote nationally." However, an exit poll by Voter News Service on Election Day "showed that gay support for Bush had jumped to 25%, resulting in

over one million gay votes for the Republican President-elect.”⁷⁸ Crucially, however, the conservative Christian movement deployed a similar weapon to the Bush campaign. Whereas Bush had ‘compassionate conservatism’ as a plaster for all ills, answers and issues, conservative Christians had the banner of being a ‘single issue’ movement. This single issue was: the family. Under the auspice of this title they could either challenge or avoid. Overall, they had a broad set of elements to focus upon: marriage, education, children, gender, parental roles, government and society, culture and so on. In the case of gay marriage, for example, Bush was once more aided by the fact that as Ralph Reed pointed out: “the gay marriage issue was not on anybody’s radar screen until eight members of the Massachusetts Supreme Court decided to redefine marriage.”⁷⁹ Reed was referring to Massachusetts becoming the first state to legalise same-sex marriage following a ruling by the state’s highest court in 2003. As a result: the issue was not of prime concern until Bush faced re-election. In 2000 it was sufficient that each side mitigate the issue. It was dangerous, divisive. As Hudson revealed “there [were] many in the GOP who [didn’t] want to engage issues such as gay-marriage, just as they did not want to take on feminists over the ERA in the 70s.” This was Hudson the political strategist, not the conservative Catholic whose doctrine is arguably clear. While the Church is sympathetic to same-sex couples who wish to seal their commitment to one another, same-sex couples would, they argue, break down both the public and the personal institutions of marriage that have - according to Catholics - stood throughout time. Indeed, marriage - if changed - would lose its meaning. Marriage, in keeping with catholic teaching - is a formal public institution and as such provides the state with a sound and reliable structure for more practically procreation. It is of course, flawed, but it was nevertheless their stance. As a result, Catholics in theory did not have the potential of being indistinct. To re-enforce the CVPs findings and make allowances for their stance Deal Hudson said: “These [views] are not merely my personal recommendations but represent a consensus of Catholics who have been active in leading political, grassroots efforts on

behalf of worthy candidates.” All exit polling “since the late ’50s,” he continued, “shows that Mass-attending Catholics, not self-identified Catholics, are most likely to vote for socially conservative candidates who oppose gay marriage.” This was in addition to “abortion, opposition to euthanasia, support the military, espouse traditional values, support fiscal responsibility, oppose the growth of federal power. If mass attendance continues to drop, Catholic voters will have less and less impact at the ballot box.”⁸⁰ The key was identifying those issues that when they arose - fit into the notion that ‘we agree, we concur’ and for political appearance ‘are one.’

The Death penalty cuts right across the notions of the “Culture of life,” interpreted by Catholics as the opposition to abortion, capital punishment and war, as well as support for social and economic policies that help the poor. It also gives a good example of political incrementalism in relation to the Bush campaign and Catholics. On such an important issue as the death penalty the connection between Hudson and Bush shows the lengths they were willing to go, to cement a relationship, regardless of fundamental differences. On this one issue there should have been a significant disconnect between Catholics and Bush. Where as in the case of abortion, no unanimity in science, medicine, law or even Catholic theology states when a foetus becomes a person, the death penalty is clear cut. Catholics and others may disagree on whether or not abortion constitutes the taking of a person’s life leaves little or no room for manoeuvre. Scripture,, despite notions of mercy and forgiveness, is clear. The Old Testament law commanded the death penalty for various acts: murder (Exodus 21:12), kidnapping (Exodus 21:16), bestiality (Exodus 22:19), adultery (Leviticus 20:10), homosexuality (Leviticus 20:13), being a false prophet (Deuteronomy 13:5), prostitution and rape (Deuteronomy 22:24), and several other crimes. However, in 2010, Hudson demonstrated how compromise had been possible when he wrote: “As most Catholics know, Church teaching on the death penalty developed under the leadership of Pope John Paul II. His encyclical *Evangelium Vitae*

did not rule out use of the death penalty altogether, as some people think, but stated it should be used only “in cases of absolute necessity,” adding “such cases are rare, if practically non-existent.” For John Paul, the dignity of the human person demanded that Catholics look for “bloodless means” to protect the common good from the threat of those who are guilty of taking innocent human life.”⁸¹ ‘Absolute necessity’ covers a multitude of interpretations that ultimately left room for Hudson, Bush and the Campaign to negotiate. To achieve this they almost completely omitted the issue from debate. Interestingly, however, this particular issue raises a very important example of not only the relationship between religion and politics and the campaign but Bush himself.

Although Bush’s tenure as governor can be viewed as a success the one uncomfortable issue to cause disquiet was the death penalty. David Corn of the left-wing *Nation Magazine* and Maureen Dowd, columnist of the *New York Times* were both quick to draw attention to how the openly Christian governor Bush had presided over the “execution of more felons than any other site in the union.” Dowd in particular was keen to cite John F. Kennedy as saying, “I believe in a president whose views on religion are his own private affair.”⁸² Bush’s record, she thought, contradicted his actions as a governor. As noted: Kennedy could not have exhibited his religion; the Catholic issue too strong for his own political survival. Bush was not restrained. There is, however, a more telling episode surrounding the death penalty that details for us the idea that Bush was primarily a pragmatic politician strengthened but not entirely influenced by his faith. In early February 1998 and whilst Bush’s presidential ambitions were already under construction, controversy arose regarding the execution of Karl Faye Tucker, a convicted murderess who was to be the first woman to be put to death in the United States since 1984, and the first in Texas since 1863. Her conviction was not in doubt but attitudes changed when, in October 1983, Karla Faye became a Christian. Until her execution in February 3, 1998 several prominent groups and individuals took up her cause, arguing for her redemption. These included: the World Council of Churches; Pope John Paul

II; Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi; Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Newt Gingrich and televangelist Pat Robertson. Bush was unmoved. Regardless of the pressure he received Bush gave explanation for not granting her clemency. In his biography: *A Charge to Keep*, he wrote: “If I accept that Karla Faye Tucker was a changed person because of her faith, how should Texas respond when a Muslim or a Jew made the same argument.”⁸³ Under the law Bush reasoned no one should have an advantage of faith. In a similar manner Bush added: “When I was sworn in as the governor of Texas I took an oath of office to uphold the laws of our state, including the death penalty. My responsibility is to ensure our laws are enforced fairly and evenly without preference or special treatment.”⁸⁴ This raised the question few have been willing to address: was Bush a Preacher or politician? If Bush is examined more closely it is the pragmatist that often comes through. Like so many other issues the death penalty was dealt with expediency. Writing in Mary E. Williams *Capital Punishment* (2000) Hudson followed a similar, pragmatic path by stating: “Neither does a reconsideration of the death penalty lead to the faulty reasoning of the ‘seamless garment.’ [The “seamless garment” refers to a 1983 proposal by Cardinal Joseph Bernardin for the Catholic Church to promote a consistent, life-defending philosophy in its approach to abortion, euthanasia, capital punishment, and similar issues.] The American bishops recently threw out those tattered rags and replaced them with the image of a ‘house of life.’ This house contains many rooms: All of them are devoted to issues of life and death; none of them are tied together by the false logic of moral equivalency. Catholics can safely revisit the room of the death penalty without feeling they are aiding and abetting those in the Church who see no difference between killing an innocent life and executing those who kill in cold blood.”⁸⁵ Repeatedly a loop hole appears. There is no evidence to suggest Bush was thinking this way but if strategists and advisers like Hudson were then it stands to reason that on issues such as this, Bush to could ‘safely revisit the room’ of his choosing when needed.

Immigration, particularly amongst Hispanics, potentially rated higher on Bush's radar than did other issues. The propensity, however, to remain fixed on single, wedge issues like abortion have led to the political value of these other issues being decreased. This was and remains a mistake. Bush and Hudson were not rooted so narrowly. As governor of a key, border state Bush knew too well the dynamics, virtues and iniquity of the immigration issue. To his credit he was an early advocate within the GOP for increasing the party's outreach to the Hispanic community, a feature that has almost singularly failed since. The value in this particular demographic was, as Robert Draper's account of Bush's presidency detailed, not just about the future of Texas, but America. It was not a "tale of red or blue, black or white. It was about brown."⁸⁶ Data provided by the U.S. Census Bureau shows that the Hispanic population increased by more than 50 percent since 1990 and 2000. The Hispanic population increased by 57.9 percent, from 22.4 million in 1990 to 35.3 million in 2000, compared with an increase of 13.2 percent for the total U.S. population. In 2000 the Hispanic population in Texas accounted for 6.7 million (18.9 percent). In 2000, 27.1 million, or 76.8 percent, of Hispanics lived in the seven states with Hispanic populations of 1.0 million or more (California, Texas, New York, Florida, Illinois, Arizona, and New Jersey). Hispanics in California accounted for 11.0 million (31.1 percent) of the total Hispanic population, while the Hispanic population in Texas accounted for 6.7 million (18.9 percent).⁸⁷ Even viewed cynically it was a strategy of numbers. When Bush came into politics in Texas Hispanics were transforming the state, its demographic and its electorate.

The facts were simple. Both locally and nationally this was - and remains - the fastest growing group and as a result its political power was not to be disregarded. This still holds true. The key or link that homogenises the Hispanic set is, however, Catholicism. When Spain and Portugal

conquered the new world, determined to spread the Catholic faith no matter what the religious practices were in the new territories, their religious transculturation⁸⁸ indelibly fixed Catholicism into Hispanic culture. As research carried out for *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* notes: while the “proportion of Hispanics who are Catholic remains unclear, partly because of varying survey methods and limited understanding of how these variations affect estimates of Hispanic religious identification,” they were, by comparing “12 national surveys conducted since 1990,” to draw an estimate. It was concluded that “70 percent or slightly more is a reasonable estimate of the proportion of adult Hispanics who are Catholic, and 20 percent a reasonable estimate of the proportion who are Protestant or other Christian.”⁸⁹ This equates to an estimated 24.500 million Catholics. More specifically, however, it was the character of this Catholicism that mattered. Orthodox and conservative Catholic Hispanics tend to agree with traditional church teachings and despite having a long history of being Democratically aligned, they were, in theory, in tune with CVP and Bush’s compassionate conservatism. Both Bush and Hudson were aware of this. When Hudson took over as Chairman of the RNC Catholic Outreach, the ‘problem was simple,” he stated. “There was no established network of conservative Hispanic Catholics through which we could reach that audience.” Expressing disapproval, Hudson was keen to note that what did exist were controlled by the left. Hudson sent a cautionary warning that because of the “explosion in the size of Hispanic Catholic communities across America made it clear that if the GOP did not find a way of attracting a significant portion of Hispanic voters, it would be destined to become a minority party.”⁹⁰ Steve Wagner, author of the CVP, told Hudson that in his opinion, the immigration issue - like abortion - was pivotal. Catholics were, after all, immigrants what ever their grouping. If, cautioned CVP’s author Steve Wagner, the GOP was not careful over the immigration issue, they risked not only alienating Hispanics but Catholics more generally. Michael Janofsky of the *New York Times* suggested that “many Hispanics complain that Democratic candidates, recognising the

historic gap between Hispanics and Republicans, take the Hispanic vote for granted.” Janofsky was quoting Michael Madrid, a Republican political consultant as saying “Bush is uniquely positioned with a proven record of winning Hispanic votes; Bush’s attractiveness to Hispanic voters is as much the messenger as the message.”⁹¹ This was a crucial feature of the Bush-Hispanic out-reach. The strategy was far broader than Hudson. In addition to Hudson, whose target was the Catholic element of their character, there was a significant effort on the part of senior campaign staff who were charged with developing the Hispanic out-reach strategy. The trinity of Lionel Sosa, Frank Guerra and Lance Terrance were brought into the campaign to assist. Republican consultant Lance Tarrance, a chief architect of the GOP’s 1960s and ’70s ‘Southern strategy,’ and Latino media gurus Lionel Sosa and Frank Guerra who led Bush to victory in Texas. Sosa was responsible for Hispanic-targeted ads for the Bush campaigns in 1994 and 1998 while Guerra handled ‘soft money ads,’ targeting Hispanics for the Texas Republican Party. The idea was to replicate the formula on a national level. At state level they helped Governor Bush win strong support for his reelection bid from Hispanic voters by linking his “compassionate conservative” philosophy to the traditional Hispanic values of family, faith, and the work ethic. Sosa, Guerra and Terrance proposed a ‘five-step’ process to win their vote. Key amongst these steps was Bush should be promoted and presented as an individual candidate and not Bush the Republican Party nominee. Another worthy feature was that this was a twenty year initiative and not some short term, short sighted plan. This early recognition for the imperative to create an opening with Hispanics began early, when, in October 26, 1999, Bush did the first ever Spanish radio advertisements beginning in Iowa. This was followed up on February 7, 2000 in Arizona. Other strategies put forward by Hudson would include getting Bush to visit shrines important to Hispanic Catholics. The valuable dynamic Sosa, Guerra and Terrance added to the campaign was different to the conventional political wisdom about Latinos and one that Hudson shared; that: the party should appeal to them on conservative social

issues and the standard Republican idea that Latinos - since they are predominantly Catholic and pro-family - would be attracted by the Republican message on issues like abortion. Sosa, Tarrance and Guerra said something different: the new Republican strategy for targeting Hispanics was not just a case of immigration or being a Catholic, but economic issues.

These samples go some way to uncovering the dynamics of the Bush campaign's Catholic strategy. Bush's Catholic courtship strategy was an expanding, escalating attention to capturing the American Catholic voter. Underpinned by the CVP the Republican National Committee, headed by Catholic Jim Nicholson⁹² stated openly in June 2000: "We're shifting into high gear in our efforts to engage Catholic voters. We believe, based on solid research, that Catholic voters are especially inclined this year to support Republican candidates, and we intend to do everything we can to realise this potential."⁹³ From multiple angles the Bush campaign's Catholic out-reach under the instruction of Hudson was operating on several fronts to close in on the final months of the campaign. In addition to meeting - both public and closed - visible visits and photoshoots of Bush with leading Catholics individuals like advertising executive Brian P. Tierney was brought in to bolster the Bush/Catholic message and image. As a strong advocate for the Catholic religion in general and the Philadelphia archdiocese in particular, Tierney's close links to the Archdiocese of Philadelphia made him ideal to message and stimulate Roman Catholics votes in the Rust Belt and Mid-Atlantic states that historically witnessed swing national elections. Tierney as noted above, was the choreographer behind behind the direct mailing strategy and as the campaign came to a close "each Catholic on the list received at least two phone calls and two pieces of direct mail, highlighting issues such as violence, sex on television, gay leaders in the Boy Scouts, same-sex marriage, and abortion."⁹⁴ Requests for Parish directories to strengthen this drive came from grass-roots development as a

feature of the RNC Catholic out-reach. The first of these mailings featured a priest on the cover; it read: “American Catholics ask: Which presidential candidate represents our values?”⁹⁵

This question, for Catholics was justifiable. As the Clinton years came to a close the 2000 campaign and election presented the opportunity to be virtuous. Under Clinton Democrats overcame their reputation on moralistic issues or values with a far less conciliatory stand than was regularly associated with the Party. Two examples of this were support for the death penalty and certain aspects of welfare reform⁹⁶ as well as maintaining popularity even after revelations of his sexual immorality. This did not mean Republican, conservative or conservative Christians were any less disparaging to what Clinton or Democrats represented, but the reaction was surprising. Instead of the Bush campaign entering the race as a belligerent antithesis to Clinton; Bush instead, added a softer, albeit, different and moderated approach. This approach was Bush centric. Rather than using Clinton as a spring-board against which to contrast himself, Bush just focused on his own character, position, issues and direction. His Catholic appeal was a feature to this. In reality Clinton had unsold himself with Catholics, when, according to Hudson: “the Vatican had lost the United States as an ally, upon his election.”⁹⁷ The reason appeared to be his support of abortion which led to a haemorrhage of Catholics from the party.

Clinton did, however, influence the Bush campaign in another vital aspect: the economy. Usually the strongest influence on voters, Clinton had evidenced the longest period of prosperity in American history. On the advice of Hudson Bush had to shore-up his campaign in a different way. There was no point attempting to rally Catholic support on this issue. Catholics, just as other Americans had equally prospered under a buoyant Clinton economy. More specifically, Hudson, was clear that there was certainly no traction from conservative Catholics on this. At their initial

meeting, when Hudson had been asked to assemble leading Catholics to meet Bush in Austin, the economy was the one point where difference of opinion surfaced. “It was,” noted Hudson, “only when the conversation turned to economics, specifically capital gains tax and marginal tax rates, that disagreements arose.”⁹⁸ Hudson did not detail the specifics as to why those conservative Catholics he had amassed should be in such opposition, but the inference to be drawn from Catholic social teaching may indicate why. In 1986 the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops emphasised in its pastoral letter: *Economic Justice for All*, that set against libertarian policies of laissez-faire capitalism the pastoral letter called for clear and conscious morality in all economic matters - particularly: taxes. Catholic Social Teaching through *Economic Justice for All* articulated three principles: First, the tax system should raise adequate revenues to pay for the public needs of society, especially to meet the basic needs of the poor. Secondly, the tax system should be structured according to the principle of progress, so that those with relatively greater financial resources pay a higher rate of taxation. The inclusion of such a principle in tax policies is an important means of reducing the severe inequalities of income and wealth in the nation. Thirdly, families below the official poverty line should not be required to pay income taxes. Such families are, by definition, without sufficient resources to purchase the basic necessities of life. They should not be forced to bear the additional burden of paying income taxes. Tax cuts - as promised by Bush do not fit into this. Whilst Fiscal conservatives and libertarians may favour small government and low taxes, we should recall that those present in Austin to meet Bush were primarily men of the Church, like William Donohue (president of the conservative Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights) were conservative in character. Unlike Hudson, there were those who had to be more cautious in their approach. The Catholic Church’s critique - through *Economic Justice for All* - of the inequalities of American style capitalism could not be ignored; neither was a historic suspicion towards Republicans on economic issues. Catholics, even conservative Catholics had regarded

Republicans as too materialistic; un-concerned about the less fortunate and poor in society and self-serving (through taxes) in their economic goals. It was not nor will it ever be a comfortable fit.

In the end, this was something they appeared willing to forgo. It was not, Hudson remarked either a “barrier or hindrance.” Following those early encounters, stated Hudson, Bush had made a “good impression, on those present and this was his primary concern.”⁹⁹ It was, as noted: the idea, the notion, the symbolism above the substantive that counted. If, as Hudson posited, “Catholics were uncomfortable with stridency,” preferring instead the “softer edges of compassionate conservatism,” rather than the “morally spiked rhetoric from their political leaders,”¹⁰⁰ favoured by Evangelicals, then it is easier to understand conservative Catholic acceptance of Bush. Writing in defence of Bush, Hudson was quick to point out how those on the left are critical of economic threats, like tax cuts that favour the rich over the poor, but see “no threat in abortion, homosexual marriage, or morality in education.”¹⁰¹ As the campaign geared up to go to the polls it was clear there was no moving away from that which had provided a natural affinity between conservative Christians, the Republican Party and Bush, specifically: the family. To this end the one-size-fits-all phrase compassionate conservatism, made to make traditional conservatism sound more appealing to moderate voters without completely alienating those on the right was ideal. While the importance of economy can not be denied there was no reason to fear it. During the campaign things were still blithe, with only signs of a slowing economy. It slipped into decline just weeks after Bush was sworn in.

The evaluative assessment, however, was that Catholics were now engaged; involved, consultative and in dialogue both with themselves and the campaign. Even to this point - in advance of the election and/or administration proper - conservative Catholics had transcended anything had gone

before. Whatever the limits of this narrow band of individuals they had managed to organise and articulate some form of moral counter to the political environment. Without the brashness associated with Evangelicals, conservative Catholics had no need to link-up to *all* aspects of the Bush campaign because, through an array of involvement (strategists, pastoral letters, encyclicals, journals, schools, parish, diocesan, bodies and programmes) there was, somewhere, an intersection, a connection between their faith, their ideology and the political. Away from the rancour associated with Evangelicals, conservative Catholic participation and deliberation was arguably more subtle. Beneath the perceived umbrella of virtues we saw in Chapter One Deal Hudson entered the campaign and the election with a conviction that the premise of Steve Wagner's work, instigated by Hudson, could deliver. With seemingly little or no anxieties the first, cohesive, modern Catholic strategy engineered into a political campaign moved forward. But was it a success?

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CHAPTER EIGHT

Election 2000, success or failure?

To assess the success or failure of the Bush campaign's Catholic strategy can only be drawn from the election itself; from exit poll data taken at the time. This is also true for the Evangelical and ideological (conservative) aspects of the campaign and election. At first glance, the single most striking observation to emerge from the polling shows that George W. Bush lost the Catholic vote in 2000 by three points, losing 47% to Al Gore's 50%. Despite the campaign's endeavour to 'reach-out' and attract Catholic's it would appear to have failed. This was also the case in relation to the Hispanic and Jewish vote. The Hispanic vote was lost 33% to Gore's 65% and the Jewish vote was lost 19% to Gore's 79%.¹ The exceptions to this was the Protestant vote, which Bush won 56% to Gore's 42% and ideologically (conservative) vote which Bush won 82% to Gore's 17%.² It would not be until the 2004 election that Bush would reverse the Catholic vote as a whole. (See Fig.1)

Figure 1.

2000	George W. Bush / Dick Cheney (R)	47%-50%	Al Gore / Joe Lieberman (D)
2004	George W. Bush / Dick Cheney (R)	52%-47%	John Kerry / John Edwards (D) ³

However, in relation to Deal Hudson and the CVPs analysis for a targeted approach to specific Catholics; namely: conservative, more observant or orthodox, the exit poll data redeemed their theory. According to Voter News Service polling Bush won 53% compared to Gore's 44% were Catholics attending church weekly. Whereas, 'more than once a week' was recorded at 63%

compared to Gore with 36%.⁴ Those who were described as orthodox/more observant did indeed choose to vote for Bush. Retrospectively, Hudson wrote, the “results of the 2000 election were a clear vindication of the *Crisis* Catholic Voter Report, as well as Rove’s decision to make it the blueprint for Bush’s Catholic effort.” With emphasis still on the Dole campaign in 1996 - rather than referring to previous presidents - Hudson was eager to stress an overall 10% increase of the Catholic vote for Bush over Dole and a 7% rise in “active Catholics.” It made Bush “competitive,”⁵ he argued.

There were, however, other ways to view the results. Had Hudson chose to look at previous presidential campaigns then yes, Bush did fare better than Dole, but equally Bush had increased his Catholic vote over his father in 1992, by nearly ten points - dependent upon the poll (Clinton/Bush: 44%-37%).⁶ See Fig 2. (Below is a list, a sample of three sets of data as to ‘How Catholics Voted in Presidential Elections, 1960-2008.’) Another statistic to be drawn from this data is that beginning in 1960 seven of the twelve elections were given to a Democratic victory in polling more Catholic votes. There are two ways of looking at this. One, Catholics were not the sole property of the Democrats and two, Catholics were a ‘swing vote’ and were therefore open to being attracted. The CVPs attempt to formulate a specific, not a universal approach, appeared to have worked by tapping into Catholics who, post-war, had demonstrated that - as these results show - they were willing and able to operate independently and where necessary migrate to the Party, or candidate of their choice. This was the view of Adam Reilly of the *Boston Phoenix* who saw the result in more simpler terms. Thanks to Hudson’s assistance in the 2000 election, “Bush almost matched Gore among Catholic voters, garnering 47 percent of the Catholic vote to Gore’s 50 percent and winning a clear majority among Catholics who attend church at least once a week.”⁷ Reilly’s implication

being that the closeness of the vote was nevertheless a shift in Catholic voting. Granted, these particular results bear out the CVPs hypothesis; however, the data does not go into enough detail to discover what/if any influence the CVP genuinely had. Nevertheless, those who advocated the CVPs theory were content with the result, not least the overall election result which meant they were now able to move forward from election to administration. There can be little doubt that to every agency and individual involved viewed this as a favourable outcome; not least because they were in a position of power.

This success led Hudson to quote Rove as saying the “relationship between Bush and Catholics was fabulous.” It was, however, a “success,” a “relationship,” said Hudson, that “made the Catholic left so angry. Looking back on it I underestimated and didn’t see clearly the level of anger that success bred; in a group of people who thought they thought they *owned* the Catholic, political world. It always belonged to Democrats. The Catholic establishment was not Republican or Republican leaning. What we succeeded in doing was giving a larger impression, that there was sympathy within the Catholic establishment for Bush. There was,” said Hudson, “a sense that we (Catholic out-reach and the Bush campaign) had got beyond this automatic, default identification with the Democratic Party. Because I was reporting on this or that meeting I had no idea - at the time - the animosity that was building up towards me personally on the out-side.”⁸ While others may lay claim to breaking the Democratic/Catholic coalition, Hudson saw legitimacy in placing himself along side them. His tone, a mixture of bitterness and vindication, nevertheless rang with success.

Rove in particular was not critical of the general Catholic turn out; a criticism Rove did level at Evangelicals; even though their voting numbers were significant. In December, 2001, Karl Rove,

speaking the American Enterprise Institute in Washington claimed that “19 million self-identified evangelical, fundamentalist, and Pentecostal Christians should have been expected to go to the polls in 2000,” he noted that “only 15 million did so. ‘Just over 4 million of them,’ he told his audience ‘failed to turn out and vote. And yet they are obviously part of our base.’”⁹ It was an early, unprecedented swipe at one of the Presidents primary bases. It was a comment never be repeated by Rove. The reason, according to Mark Stricherz of the *Weekly Standard*, was because Rove believed in what appeared to be the growing demise of Evangelical political activity and engagement. Ironically, the proclivity of the media to write up the obituary of the Christian Right had been - in part - pre-empted by Rove. The troubles of its flagship body, the Christian Coalition, had been much publicised, its captain, Ralph Reed, standing down at the same time as he became the unofficial advisor to Evangelicals for Bush. Even so, they were still a force; a powerful grouping that required motivation for political action and a “primary demographic objective of [the Bush-Cheney 2004 campaign] to increase turnout among families that consider themselves evangelical.”¹⁰

Overall this was part of a quick turn around. No sooner had Bush won the election than attention turned immediately to 2004. No one was quicker to understand and effect this than Rove. The emphasis, however, was still very much pointed to Catholics. Immediately attention was given to them. At the inaugural night party on January 20, 2001, Hudson, Reed and their wives observed Rove who had been asked to make remarks about the election. To those assembled Rove said: “I would like to introduce you to Deal Hudson whose Catholic out-reach is responsible for us being here tonight.” Ralph Reed “leaned over” and said: “It does not get better than that; does it?” Although anecdotal it was, nevertheless, their belief that the CVP had worked. Post-election, Hudson remarked: “We had made history. For the first time a Catholic lay body was officially

within the White House.”¹¹ Writing for the Heritage Foundation’s conservative magazine *Townhall*, in 2008, Manuel Miranda summed up Hudson’s Catholic achievements. “In leading Catholic

Fig 2.¹²

Gallup			National Election Studies			Media Exit Polls		
Year	Democrat	Republican	Year	Democrat	Republican	Year	Democrat	Republican
1960	(Kennedy/Nixon)	D-78%, R- 22%	1960	(Kennedy/Nixon)	D-82%, R-18%	1972	(McGovern/Nixon)	D-44%, R-54%
1964	(Johnson/Goldwater)	D- 76, R- 24	1964	(Johnson/Goldwater)	D-79, R-21	1976	(Carter/Ford)	D-54, R-44
1968	(Humphrey/Nixon)	D-9, R-33	1968	(Humphrey/Nixon)	D- 56, R-37	1980	(Carter/Reagan)	D-42, R-49
1972	(McGovern/Nixon)	D-48, R-52	1972	(McGovern/Nixon)	D-39, R-59	1984	(Mondale/Reagan)	D-45, R-54
1976	(Carter/Ford)	D-57, R-41	1976	(Carter/Ford)	D-57, R-41	1988	(Dukakis/Bush)	D-47, R-52
1980	(Carter/Reagan)	D- 46, R-47	1980	(Carter/Reagan)	D-41, R-50	1992	(Clinton/Bush)	D-44, R-36
1984	(Mondale/Reagan)	D- 39, R-61	1984	(Mondale/Reagan)	D-46, R-54	1996	(Clinton/Dole)	D-53, R-37
1988	(Dukakis/Bush)	D- 51, R- 49	1988	(Dukakis/Bush)	D-52, R-47	2000	(Gore/Bush)	D-50, R-47
1992	(Clinton/Bush)	D-47, R-35	1992	(Clinton/Bush)	D-50, R-30	2004	(Kerry/Bush)	D-47, R-52
1996	(Clinton/Dole)	D-55, R-35	1996	(Clinton/Dole)	D-55, R-37			
2000	(Gore/Bush)	D-52, R-46	2000	(Gore/Bush)	D-50, R-49			
2004	(Kerry/Bush)	D-52, R-48	2004	(Kerry/Bush)	D-51, R-48			

outreach before and after the 2000 election, Hudson accomplished two long-needed things. He wrested the Catholic voice from two groups of Catholics who had stunted Catholic political activism. First, Hudson replaced the myopic leadership within the Republican Party of country-club Catholics, mostly lace curtain Irishmen, who treated Catholic outreach as little more than an opportunity to socialise with people much like themselves, without offering any heavy lifting of intellect. Hudson then accomplished something else.” Lay Catholic leaders Miranda continued, “had allowed themselves to be overly concerned with our bishops’ sanction over our activities. Deal Hudson ended that. His Catholic Working Group, formed after the 2000 election, and his efforts to mobilise Catholics to advise the Bush administration, including like-minded bishops, ended the monopoly of the liberal United States Conference of Catholic Bishops and their Washington lobbying staff as the political voice of Catholics. Notably, the Conference wrote letters to President Bush objecting to the very existence of Hudson’s group.”¹³

Miranda’s observations - though partisan - highlight some of the changes Hudson managed to achieve. These changes were historical, Hudson managing to take on and win a form of victory for conservative, lay elements. Hudson tested the notion that historically the affiliation for Catholics as a particular ethnic, labour orientated ‘social-justice’ side of the Democratic Party, was not fixed. Ostensibly the 2000 election result appeared to qualify his belief that there was a bloc of ‘social-renewal’ voters whose package of issues (abortion, family, sexuality, moral decline) fitted under the umbrella of compassionate conservatism. It is correct, “bishops have the canonical right to control the use of the word ‘Catholic,’”¹⁴ explained Hudson; but the positions, interests and activism of *all* Catholics they do not. As a basis for optimism, Hudson opined that as a result of Bush’s Catholic success, 2000 marked the point the “Democratic Party saw the Catholic vote slipping away.”¹⁵

Historically, this may not be entirely accurate, but one thing remains absolute: Catholics were now in the White House.

A Place at the Table

“Power in Washington,” noted Joe Feuerherd, “is directly related to access - the ability to get phone calls taken by influential senators, key cabinet officers, top name journalists, well-wired lobbyists and most important, access to that disembodied entity known as the White House.” Hudson, he continued, “has got A-list access.”¹⁶ Because electioneering, politicking and governance are different, those networks developed, have to evolve and re-negotiate. Following Bush’s election victory on January 20, 2001, Catholics - under the stewardship of Hudson; were, for the first time in history - officially part of the machinery; a function of the administrations apparatus; the process of government as well as a feature of the administrative state and the Bureaucracy. But did this offer a plenary fulfilment for politics and policy and ultimately, what did conservative Catholics achieve?

Ralph Reed’s appeal in 1994 for religious conservatives to achieve a ‘place at the table,’ looked for Catholics to have been accomplished. Convinced of their success the Catholic component - formulated around Hudson - was almost immediately elevated into a position of consequence. Once in office they received primary attention. When Karl Rove moved into his new office in the West Wing, formerly occupied by Hillary Clinton, “three Catholic priests were called to conduct a ceremony” to “purge the room of evil spirits.” It was, noted its chief participant: Deal Hudson, “an actual liturgical ceremony. We sat at the table, we prayed. A priest said a series of prayers, including a blessing.”¹⁷ It was not just emblematic. Catholics were here to stay and a primacy to the new, re-

elect Bush strategy. The effort to connect with Catholics, post-election, was instantly doubled.

Firstly, the Bush people set up a “Transition Team office,” located in “rented office space in Tyson Square Corner in McLean, Virginia,” in which they had “two or three floors.” Hudson was called to attend the Transition Office. “It was clear,” said Hudson, that there was a “temporary feel to the set-up. There were banks of copiers, computers, desks and paper, all geared to assist in the transition process of appointing or nominating hundreds of people to various positions within the administration.” Hudson and his group were an intrinsic part of this process. Hudson would make-up “lists of various people to nominate, individuals to crucial positions who had specific things to do with their issues. They would send documents to and fro with lists of who to appoint or prioritise; for example: the U.N. assistant ambassador. This produced about a twenty-page document,”¹⁸ submitted from Hudson to Rove. Although “none-Catholic groups were involved; it was predominantly Catholic.” This document was “requested by Rove who in turn handed it off to presidential personnel. It was not his [Rove’s] job to vet but pass along recommendations,”¹⁹ added Hudson.

At the same time, Rove asked Hudson to set-up the ‘Catholic Working Group.’ During interview Hudson related the non-scientific method in which this was undertaken. On a “paper napkin Rove made a box with a line leading to the image of the White House. He also made up another box for Evangelicals.” Rove said: “you pick them, what ever size you think is good.” Rove’s inference was clear. Hudson remarked he had “complete freedom in the orchestration of the group.”²⁰ Rove also added that he wanted a weekly conference phone call. This was the main congregation or meeting point for Catholics. “This took place every Thursday morning. In four years Hudson only ever missed one call.” Interestingly, Evangelicals had their own weekly call to which Hudson was “asked

to listen in on.”²¹ This was a privilege that did not run the other way. The most consistent people on call were Robert George (Director of the James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions at Princeton University), John Klink (adviser to the Holy See’s UN Mission), Kathryn Jean Lopez (associate editor of *National Review*) and Frank Hanna (Catholic philanthropist & founder of the Solidarity Foundation). Numerous other individuals attended - all at Hudson’s request. These ‘other’ names were not detailed.

However, in discussion with Hudson another gatekeeper to these calls, one of some significance, did arise. This was Conservative Evangelical Timothy Goeglein. Goeglein, who became Special Assistant to President Bush and Deputy Director of the White House Office of Public Liaison from 2001 to 2008 was especially important, revealing further dispositions to the relationship and the way in which it was negotiated. In fact, it was under the auspice of the Office of Public Liaison, the Catholic Working Group - despite its apparent autonomy - fell. Goeglein, had been brought into the Bush campaign following his original role as spokesman for Presidential candidate, Rightist and social conservative Gary Bauer on the Gary Bauer campaign in April 1999. In conversation with Goeglein he specified, some what surprisingly - given its breadth - that his “responsibility was to the whole of American conservatism;” or, as he termed it: “The Base.” He noted, it was to “traditional conservatives,” to the “values voters” he was charged with concentrating. Goeglein’s folio, given to him by Rove, “was for him to be the ‘man in the middle’ (later to be the title of his memoirs); the liaison to the religious, social and economic wings of the conservative movement.”²² Goeglein’s role within the Office of Public Liaison, “was not policy formation or policy making,” He was, he noted, “a conduit for the ‘stake-holders.’” This was a Washington term for people focused in particular interests, such as: Hudson. The whole tone and character was, un-surprisingly,

conservative. This may be expected given that the Office of Public Liaison was originally formed under the Republican Nixon and Ford presidencies. Under Nixon it was Charles ‘Chuck’ Colson who took the lead. In fact, Goeglein revealed it was “Colson who advised him, giving counsel to reach out and link with former Office of Public Liaison Directors, deputy Directors and Associates of former presidents in other administrations, with a view to forming a more coherent and consistent feel to the Office for then, and the future.”²³

Revealing something of its attitude and outlook, the Office of Public Liaison was referred to by Goeglein as the “retail part of the White House.” According to Goeglein the Office of Public Liaison acted as a “*modus vivendi*” for, in this case, the political, religious and ideological aspects of the new administration. The job was to link them; help them fit and function together. Like Hudson, Goeglein was instructed - by Rove - to filter those who he deemed pertinent for each position or function. In each case both Hudson and Goeglein had a simple philosophy. “To communicate Bush’s agenda to key groups [individuals] and networks of influencers and opinion shapers.” Accomplishing these goals, noted Goeglein, “took a wide variety of formats, forums and venues.”²⁴ The Catholic dynamic was central to this ecumenical approach and the two moved along in collaboration. Although confessing to been “aware’ of a conservative Catholic strategy, as early as the Gary Bauer campaign; “prominent Catholics like Deal Hudson and Leonard Leo of the Federalist Society,”²⁵ were, he noted, “very active and busy in the world of ideas in an informal sense to the Bush campaign.” It was not, however, until after the campaign and the inaugural that Goeglein first met Hudson and after Goeglein had been offered the position at the Office of Public Liaison. At their introduction, between the first Director of the Office of Public Liaison, Lezlee Westine,²⁶ and Deputy Goeglein, a discussion took place as to how they would divide the portfolio.

At that point it was agreed that Goeglein would not just be the point man for his fellow conservatives and faith-based groups, but the key, outreach person to American Catholics. This was the case until he left the White House in 2008.²⁷

Post-election a close relationship with Hudson was formed; but, like Hudson the network Goeglein worked was quite expansive. Goeglein divulged during interview that “throughout his tenure he became friendly with all nine American Cardinals as well as various Bishops and Clergy with whom he liaised as a functionary of the Catholic out-reach.” His detailing how and in what form this ‘friendliness’ happened was off-record. However, From Goeglein’s perspective the non-sectarian aspect of his role was paramount. When asked if he thought the relationship between Evangelicals and Catholics in the administration was both close and positive, he replied in the affirmative. “Very,” he stated. The reason? “Because of the issue base. George W. Bush - it is fair to say - was probably the most social conservative individual in the contemporary American presidency.”²⁸ To drive home his point of view he made reference to the *Manhattan Declaration: A Call of Christian Conscience is a manifesto issued by Orthodox, Catholic, and Evangelical Christian leaders (2009)*, endorsed by Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox leaders, united in defending life and the family. It was a “very foundational document,” quoted Goeglein; arguing that “even before this document was drafted it was around Bush that these issues were congealing and that he was the one reliable advocate for these issues on life, family and liberty.”²⁹ What Goeglein was keen to express was “the parity that existed around Bush in both his office and amongst the whole faith-base.”³⁰ Encouraged by this bond the emphasis, as noted, was forward, the Catholic out-reach switching promptly to the next election.

This effort, noted Hudson, was a “Quantum leap beyond 2000.” Under the impetus of Hudson, phone calls, meetings and attempts to keep visible the administration and its conservative Catholic message went “into a canter,” continuing to “tap into the conservative, pro-life networks,” networks further proliferated now by Goeglein and Reed. Hudson’s out-reach team “peppered parishes in key cities and battle ground states with fliers, voter guides and e-mails from parish registers and lists to get the Catholic/Bush message out.” Added to this were “radio broad casts and T. V. adds.”³¹ Rove, cognisant of what was taking place stood back, confident that those steering were able enough to deliver. In the event, the RNC - eager to add its own voice - employed more than thirty field staff and “3000 volunteer Catholic team leaders and 50,000 field volunteers.” Also, the RNC “collected [Parish] directories from Catholic Churches,” for mailing lists. In addition, Catholic Ed Gillespie (Chairman of the RNC) helped coordinate a “swing-state speaking tour for Catholic Republicans.”³² There were two tasks, said Hudson: “One, concentrate on the governmental tasks at hand; two stay in power by getting re-elected.”³³

Projecting ahead, RNC chairman, Jim Gilmore said that “there would be a new National Catholic Leadership Forum to begin strategic planning for the next Congressional elections in 2002 and the Presidential election in 2004.” Speaking via satellite to the newly formed National Catholic Leadership Forum in Washington (NCLF), he continued: “In order to grow as a party, we must continually reach out.”³⁴ The NCLF, launched in late-April, in Washington, DC, was typical of the administrations new strategy. It aimed to “encourage ‘team leaders’ to introduce Mass-attending Catholics to the Republican Party.” At its inaugural meeting, Hudson told those assembled the “time for talk is over. The time to organise Catholics behind the party of life ... that time has begun.”³⁵ This, ‘reach-out’ continued on multiple levels. For example: when Bush appointed Catholic John

Klink - one of Hudson's initial invites to the Austin meetings - to head the State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration it sent out a strong message on the central concerns of Catholics. Klink, of dual Irish and American citizenship represented the Vatican on the executive board of Unicef from 1988 to 1999 and worked for Catholic Relief Services from 1976 to 1986. John Swomley, both critical and fearful of such appointments because "Vatican dogma" would "always trump a woman's right to control her own body" described Klink as a "Vatican loyalist."³⁶ A loyalist he may have been, but he was precisely the type of symbol Bush needed. Whilst Bush was on his travels over the coming months, meeting key Catholic Bishops, like Justin Rigali of St. Louis and Bishop Donald W. Wuerl of Pittsburgh (appointed Archbishop of Washington on May 16, 2006), it pressed home a seemingly solid, Catholic connection.

Klink was not alone. In a series of appointments that far outshone the commission of Evangelicals into the administration, Bush added: Anthony Principi, appointed by President Bush on January 23, 2001 to United States Secretary of Veterans Affairs; along with John Negroponte as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations in February 2001. Bush also added: Mel Martinez to United States Secretary of Housing and Urban Development on January 23, 2001. Another individual attributed by Swomley, in his article "Another Theocracy: The Ties That Bind," as belonging to the ring of Catholics set-up around Bush was Peter Wehner. Peter Wehner, initially deputy director of speechwriting to Bush in 2001, became head of the White House Office of Strategic Initiatives (OSI) in 2002. In conjunction with the Office of Public Liaison and the Office of Political Affairs the White House Office OSI, located on the fourth floor of the Eisenhower Executive Office Building, reported directly to Karl Rove. The OSI was Rove's idea. Described by the *Washington*

Post as the “smallest unit in the Rove empire, with six employees,” it “represents the closest thing the White House has to an in-house think tank.”³⁷ There are several points of note.

In this little known or mentioned department Wehner - like Hudson - helped generate policy ideas, reached out to intellectuals, published op-eds and essays and provided counsel on a range of domestic and international issues. Werner, like Hudson, Goeglein and Reed had what Hudson referred to as “unilateral autonomy.” Once more the details were ‘off-record.’ Like the Office of Public Liaison under Goeglein, it fed straight into Rove and encompassed Catholics as a principle feature of its portfolio. Wehner, as did Hudson, looked to historians as well as intellectuals for influence and guidance. Perhaps the most significant point, however, was the fusion of religion and politics once more came under the control and steering of one individual. Curiously, when Wehner, along with Michael Gerson wrote: *City of Man: Religion and Politics in a New Era* post-Bush, in 2010; their arguments, concerns and discussion had no mention of Catholics. Instead, we see a return to the focus of the Evangelical. It was as though, despite all their power and position, their relationship was confidential? As for the notion of the ‘individual’ they were both critical of the approach and “apocalyptic language” of, for example, Pat Robertson and Jerry Falwell. In *City of Man: Religion and Politics in a New Era*, they called for “a new kind of political engagement - a kind that is better both for the church and the country, a kind that cannot be co-opted by either political party, a kind that avoids the historic mistakes of both the Religious Left and the Religious Right.”³⁸ The description to their book continues: “An era has ended. The political expression that most galvanised Evangelicals during the past quarter-century, the Religious Right, is fading. What’s ahead is unclear. Millions of faith-based voters still exist, and they continue to care deeply about hot-button issues like abortion and gay marriage, but the shape of their future political engagement

remains to be formed.”³⁹ Wehner and Gerson’s work is a work of note; correct in its analysis that Christianity *was* subordinate to a political party. For those who espoused the threat of Theocracy, particularly under Bush, this is problematic. As we shall see, the impetus came from the campaign and/or administration and not necessarily the faith-base. In this respect the faith-base was appeased, consulted and included in the process and policy. Although those above had large amounts of freedom it was checked, contained with the structure of their office or portfolio. When interviewed, this autonomy within the White House, Hudson repeated numerous times: “I simply never asked for enough; I could have pushed the envelope further, much further.”⁴⁰ Having achieved substantial things in 2000/1, there appeared to be contentment, a reticence to acting beyond their situation. Whereas others, like Rove, were driven further, the faith-base were fixated on the present.

Whether short or long term, whether for the Mid-terms or the 2004 election, what is irrefutable is that the Catholic contingent remained a key aspect to the Bush strategy. We know this because in June 2002, a White House backup computer disk containing data from a White House presentation on GOP mid-term election strategies was found in Lafayette Park in Washington D C., revealing that Catholic outreach remained a pivotal priority for Republican strategists. The disk was a two person powerpoint between Rove and Ken Mehlman, White House political director. Ken Meelman’s presentation was called ‘The 2002 Challenge.’ Rove’s was called ‘The Strategic Landscape.’ The ‘Lafayette Park PowerPoint’ presentation - as it became known - notes that the GOP planed to grow its outreach to Catholics in order to make gains in November 2002. Bush’s strategy across the country was simple: target Christian evangelicals who did not vote in 2000 and conservative Catholics who responded to a family-values message. Building on the results in 2000, the target, while still hopeful of attracting all Catholics remained focused on Hudson’s initial

recommendations. Using this as a platform, another feature of Rove's post-2000 Catholic focus was the '72-Hour Task Force.' The project paid attention to using grassroots efforts to win a campaign in its last three days. Rove believed that by expanding the Republican base into the "exurbs" (a prosperous area beyond a city's suburbs) and rural areas could aid in mobilising the base on Election Day. Micro-targeting and discrete spending programs to target unsafe Democratic constituencies among Catholics, Hispanics, African Americans and Jews were employed. For the 2002 midterm contests, the Bush campaign assigned '72-Hour' directors to all 50 states. The strategy was in-part based on Hudson's analysis to cast a wider net. It was an extension of the idea that demography favoured the Republicans as voters had migrated away from the stereo typical locations and were now to be included in the Sunbelt, the exurbs, suburbs and rural areas. As Hudson identified, it was misguided and out of date to see Catholics - and other constituencies - as only located in ethnic enclaves. As a result, the Bush administration remained Catholic absorbed.

Acting as an umbrella to their various enterprises; something to tie in and harness the various strands of the faith factor within the Bush Administration, came the Controversial Office of faith-based and Community Initiative (OFBCI). It was controversial because it was seen not only as an overt religious enterprise that had no place in government, but one that would lead to the entanglement of the church and the state. Before external events re-steered and re-shaped the Bush administration (9/11) the OFBCI was central to Bush's political programme. The question, however, was did the creation of such strident bodies as the OFBCI and other elements central to Bush's religious based paradigm translate into practice or policy? If we are willing to accept that Catholics and indeed Evangelicals had a function - beyond merely serving as an electoral tool, it is important we examine these points.

Four areas were identified.

- * White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives (OFBCI).
- * Mexico City Ruling.
- * Stem Cell research.
- * Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act.

The fundamental importance of the OFBCI is that it established a culture, a religious framework around which all interested parties could build. Established by President Bush through his first executive order 13199 on January 29, 2001 - the OFBCI represented his key domestic policy, central to his political philosophy: compassionate conservatism. Equally, however, it provided the central foundation for criticism. To many there was the sweeping argument that the OFBCI was the primary example of theocracy at work; the transformation from Secular to Religious Government. Others, like Rev. Dr. C. Welton Daddy (President, The Interfaith Alliance) were more specific. Under the OFBCI, he argued, “Houses of worship - pervasively sectarian institutions in this nation - [would] become the recipients of federal funds and the employees of the federal government to do social services. That is a violation of the establishment of religion clause [in the Constitution.]”⁴¹

The concerns were understandable. This was unfamiliar territory. After decades of seeing conservative Christians achieve some success at the polls, religion was now front and centre. In contrast to their argument the OFBCI proposed social issues were best solved through private companies, charities, and faith-based organisations, rather than large government-funded programs. There was, religionists argued, no conflict of interest. Concern, however, was understandable.

What the OFBCI reflects was the meeting point between theory and practice. Throughout Bush's presidential campaign in 2000, he not only spoke openly about his religious beliefs, but connected these beliefs to public policy positions. Chief amongst his campaign messages was greater government support for faith-based initiatives. We have no reason to think Bush's approach was not authentic. Bush believed religion a force for good for both the individual and society. Despite being a Methodist Bush's attitude usually spoke to all Christian denominations; although, it was Catholics who came to head the initiative. Like so many aspects of his presidency, the concept was rooted in his governorship of Texas. Two dimensions from this period informed the future Faith-based initiative. The first was the successful Texas organisation Teen Challenge (it did account for adults too); the second, the Prison Fellowship Reform programme. Each programme gave a representative case for the idea that government can cooperate with faith-based organisations. This was aided by 'Charitable Choice,' a name for several laws signed by President Clinton's welfare reform bill in 1996. This was the first time Congress gave explicit legislative direction to federal agencies to provide institutions with grants and contracts. These were to be undertaken on an equal basis with all groups - which included religious bodies. More importantly it did not require religious groups separate out their religious agendas. Although there were rules clarifying both the rights and responsibilities of none-profit, faith-based organisations that received Federal funds the concept of Charitable Choice nevertheless gave example on which Bush could build. Marshalled together these were the origins of Bush's signature social issue the Faith-based Initiative.

A Catholic edge was given to the programme almost straight away with the appointment of the OFBCI's first Catholic director John J. DiIulio Jr., from early 2001 to August 18, 2001.

Interestingly, John J. DiIulio, a Roman Catholic in the Jesuit tradition, was a Democratic social scientist. After a gap of six months, Catholic and Knights of Columbus Jim Towey took over from Dilulio on February 1, 2002.⁴² As Deal Hudson observed, “Many expected the White House to quickly find a replacement for DiIulio for an initiative that the president considers the centrepiece of his domestic policy. But things seem to be moving forward very smoothly without a department head, under the watchful eyes of Karl Rove and John Bridgeland in the White House political office.”⁴³ Known as the ‘Faith Czar,’ Towey was protective of this rubric and cornerstone of Bush’s compassionate conservatism. Writing for the American Bar Association, Towey argued: “When President George W. Bush launched his OFBCI’s in 2001, the outcry from critics was immediate. ‘It’s political!’ ‘He’s paying back the Religious Right!’ ‘He’s instituting a theocracy!’ ‘He’s tearing down the wall between church and state!’” But, he noted, “Five years later, none of those dire predictions has turned out to be true.”⁴⁴ Later a critic of the failure of the Faith-Based Initiatives under Obama, Towey said: “under President George W. Bush, [I] saw firsthand the coordination between government and the free exercise of religion.”⁴⁵ In defence of the faith-based initiative not being part of a theocratic agenda under President Barak Obama the Initiative was not - to the surprise Democrats (who, in the main, had been critical of the Bush initiative), repealed. Instead, he promised, in 2008, he would preserve, even expand the Initiative. Upon taking office, Obama renamed the Bush faith-based office the Office of Faith-Based and Neighbourhood Partnerships, appointing Methodist Joshua DuBois as its executive director. In addition, he maintained the existing 12 faith-based centres in 12 federal agencies set-up by Bush.

Post-Bush it may be difficult to argue that this was a self serving programme for conservative Christian causes. After all, as Frank Lambert, noted, “under the Democratic Party’s control, Federal

funds had flowed primarily to liberal religious groups and social services; Democrats [sending] millions to Planned Parenthood to promote birth control.” Amongst the recipients, noted Lambert, and “for decades, mainline organisations such as Catholic Charities, the Salvation Army and Lutheran Social Services received most of the billion dollars a year granted to social service agencies.”⁴⁶ However, once the notion of using Federal funds from a conservative orientated aspect entered the arena - namely President Bush - attitudes shifted. In conservative hands it was seen as a ‘special interest,’ furthering ideological and/or theocratic causes. This was how the - pro-choice - Catholic advocacy group *Catholics for Choice* (CFC) saw the faith-based initiative; an endeavour favouring the “conservative agenda” of the Catholic hierarchy; who, as we shall see: favoured the Initiative. It was, they opined, the “Bishops’ Big Break.” In contrast to the hierarchy that Deal Hudson had viewed as Leftward leaning, CFC believed the election of George W. Bush was “fortuitous for the nation’s Catholic Bishops,” whose “policy priorities - as expressed by their national organisation, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) - neatly dovetail[ed] with those of the conservative Bush administration.”⁴⁷ Such opinions demonstrate the misconceptions towards those involved.

To push these ideas forward the administrations reach into making a Catholic connection was both deep and determined from the outset. Marshalled by Deal Hudson, one of Bush’s first social engagements in January 2001 was dinner at the residence of Washington Archbishop Theodore McCarrick. This was only one week into Bush taking office. Present were Apostolic Nuncio Archbishop Gabriel Montalvo, outgoing Washington Archbishop James Hickey, and Galveston-Houston Bishop Joseph Fiorenza, president of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops. The faith-based initiative was discussed. On January 31, six days later, at a private luncheon at the

White House Bush met with 30 Catholic leaders with a view to further solicit support for the faith-based programme. Present at this second meeting were Cardinal Francis George of Chicago; Cardinal Edward Egan of New York; Bishop Fiorenza; former Domino's Pizza magnate Thomas Monaghan; Ken Hackett, executive director of Catholic Relief Services; Mother Agnes Mary Donovan, superior general of the Sisters of Life, a small order of anti-abortion nuns; and Father David O'Connell of the Catholic University of America, Virginia Bishop Paul Loverde, Denver Archbishop Charles Chaput, Miami Archbishop Joseph Favalora, Deal Hudson and Karl Rove. Patricia Miller, writing for *Catholics for Choice* in Autumn 2001 was more cynical as to the reason for the meetings. "Despite his public pronouncements that the faith-based program is not about pushing the views of any particular religion on recipients of social services, when he spoke to the bishops, Bush explicitly linked his faith-based initiative to efforts to change attitudes about abortion rights." Miller argued that the meetings pushed a "heavily anti-abortion message." Because an "audio feed from the closed-door meeting was mistakenly delivered to the White House press room," Miller was concerned with the rhetoric and its focus. She quotes Bush as saying: "Take the life issue. This issue requires a president and an administration leading our nation to understand the importance of life. This whole faith-based initiative really ties into a larger cultural issue that we're working on...because when you're talking about welcoming people of faith to help people who are disadvantaged and are unable to defend themselves, the logical step is also those babies."⁴⁸

In addition to the above, representatives from a range of Catholic charitable organisations took part. These included Kenneth Hackett; John Carr, head of the Department of Social Development for the National Conference of Catholic Bishops; Carl Anderson, supreme knight of the Knights of Columbus, and heads of the St. Vincent de Paul Society, Catholic Big Brothers, Boys Town and a

Catholic inner-city school in Milwaukee. From New York was Father Robert Lombardo, C.F.R., director of St. Anthony's Residence in the South Bronx, which houses formerly homeless men; Mother Agnes Mary Donovan, S.V., superior general of the Sisters of Life; Christopher Bell, executive director of Good Counsel Inc., which runs homes for single mothers and their children, and Mario J. Paredes, executive director of the Northeast Hispanic Catholic Centre in Manhattan. Subsequent to the meeting Archbishop Chaput explained: the "pillars of Catholic social teaching-- respect for the human person and commitment to the common good--mesh well with the purposes of government. It's a natural fit between what President Bush is proposing and what we do in many of our Catholic organisations," he said. Archbishop Egan added he was "'delighted' with the discussion and looked forward to working with a new White House office in helping those in our community most in need." He said he saw "no legal obstacles to churches and other faith-based groups accepting government funds to serve society's needy, and he added that he is confident that the groups receiving funds will be careful not to let government infringe on their religious character."⁴⁹ On the surface, it appeared that generally those assembled were in harmony, agreeable to the notion of a Faith-based Initiative.

Seal of approval, however, came a month later in a statement by "His Eminence Cardinal Roger Mahony Archbishop of Los Angeles and Chairman of the Domestic Policy Committee on February 12, 2001. En-titled: "On Faith-Based And Community Initiatives," Under the banner of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, it read: "The United States Catholic Conference welcomes President Bush's priority on overcoming poverty as he begins to lead our nation. In his Inaugural Address, he insisted that "America, at its best, is compassionate. In the quiet of American conscience, we know that deep, persistent poverty is unworthy of our nation's promise. And

whatever our views of its cause, we can agree that children at risk are not at fault. Abandonment and abuse are not acts of God, they are failures of love.” Our bishops conference also welcomes his initiative to recognise and assist the role of “faith-based and community groups’ in the struggle against poverty in our land. We look forward to a fuller dialogue on the specifics of this initiative. We will seek opportunities to share our experience, concerns and hopes in an effort to help the Administration create a workable program.”⁵⁰ It was not the single issue used programme Patricia Miller and warned of.

Strategically, the Faith-based Initiative was a perfect vehicle around which Bush and religious coalitions could negotiate; a framework on which to build, move forward and go beyond rhetoric and into something tangible. The OFBCI linked organisation to action, ideas to individuals and did so with a very strong Catholic tone. Whereas Kennedy sought to politically separate his religion from his office, Bush openly welcomed Catholic doctrine, teachings and traditions into the White House and achieved this by utilising the Initiative - amongst other elements - as a platform. Richard John Neuhaus - who openly tutored Bush in the church’s social doctrines - were assured enough to state that “there *is* an awareness in the White House that the rich Catholic intellectual tradition is a resource for making the links between Christian faith, religiously grounded moral judgments and public policy,”⁵¹ and nowhere was there a better example for this to express itself than the Faith-based Initiative.

So, with religious consensus behind them the Catholic contingent in particular had an Initiative against which to advance their ideas. Whereas Axel Schäfer argued “conservative Protestantism,” was not determinable as being a “monolithic player in a culture war but a disparate movement

whose political allegiances are tentative and negotiable,”⁵² so too can we attribute this to conservative Catholics; the difference, however, is that while some may propose Evangelicals did, under Bush, achieve status; it was Catholics who, as an equally ‘disparate’ group managed to ‘negotiate’ greater prominence and ascendancy. Individuals like Deal Hudson; who had been given a laissez-faire role in the orchestration and participation of the Catholic Working Group, found the Faith-based Initiative a perfect back-drop against which to forge inroads into the social and political fabric. In this sense the Faith-based Initiative offered another broad canvas on which to work. For the American Catholic, of course, the idea of Charitable services taking an active and participatory role in society was not new; the proxy networks of Catholic charities, Churches, schools and hospitals geared perfectly to align with the program. More importantly this gave impetus for faith and politics to connect, to pinion grass-roots to grass-tops; which, in theory would result in votes. An example of this can be seen in Timothy Matovina’s work: *Latino Catholics and American Public Life*. Although focused on Latino Catholic political activism, it nevertheless details how, from the ground up, the Faith-based Initiative swelled interest. Quoting Sociologist Richard Wood, who contended that faith-based community organisations, that is, “organisations whose membership is comprised primarily of local congregations, represent the most widespread movement for social justice in America.” Their study revealed that there were “133 such organisations in the United States with an office and at least one full time staff person. Collectively, these organisations link 3,500 congregations plus 500 other institutions like public schools and labor union locals; congregations engaged in faith-based community organisations encompass between 1.5 and 2.5 million members and are in nearly all major urban areas and many secondary cities across the nation.”⁵³ The point, noted Formicola, Segers and Weber, is Faith-based programs work because they emphasise personalism of projects and social services.” As a result, “local groups, often in

parishes, have meaning to religious activism by incorporating a larger commitment to family, church and neighbourhood” and therefore they “engage in politics by playing critical roles after elections - planning the priorities of their communities and working for infrastructure improvements in their neighbourhoods.”⁵⁴ Ultimately the notion of faith in action at a local level had the supportive effect of trickling-up, not down, to the political.

The statecraft was lost on those who were too busy trying to frame Bush in religious terms instead of thinking of Political pragmatism that values reality over ideology. Was, therefore, Bush’s Faith-based Initiative “political patronage in the guise of charity,” as Betty Clermont argued?⁵⁵ Or was it a politician using well defined, well strutted and motivated individuals and bodies as a political instrument or tool? While David Kuo (former deputy director of White House faith-based initiatives), thought collaboration between the federal government and religious organisations as “political seduction” and a “sad charade to provide political cover to the White House that needed compassion and religion as political tools;”⁵⁶ Clermont’s argument is that this was nothing other than a ploy to bolster both Republican and in particular Bush’s vote. No one refuted this. It did, however, run a risk. When Bush held up the idea of Faith-based Initiative it may well have evidenced his ‘compassionate conservatism;’ it may well have strengthened the resolve of his own faith and those of faith who looked towards him; it may also have added to the idea that Democrats - not Republicans were hostile towards religion. There is no evidence to suggest that these were deliberate tactics; but the Faith-based Initiative did help widen the God gap between Republicans and Democrats. Ironically, the work already being carried out by Catholics; who, post war, had strived to implement their social justice philosophy, did so under the umbrella of their belonging to a Democratic coalition. There was, however, no attempt to check this or turn Bush’s strategy against

him. In stead, Democrat and Democratic Catholics alike remained silent. Dan Gilgoff argued that eight years later Barack Obama was not co-opting one of Bush's primary programs; but reclaiming it.⁵⁷ While Timothy Goeglein, one of Bush staunchest defenders, is apt to remind us the Faith-based Initiative had numerous sources; like Sociologist Robert Nisbet's classic work *The Quest for Community* (1953), in which he attributed much of America's social ills to the collapse of 'mediating institutions – village, church, and family – that traditionally stood between the individual and the state; it was the Church that actually met its philanthropic obligations towards the poor and needy and that remained the greatest medium for Bush's initiative. Goeglein was also keen to state that he (Bush) "favoured religious freedom at every level of American life, including the ability of those charities to apply for government funding," but he did not want "government funding religion."⁵⁸ Furthermore Bush did not want "religious groups seeking entrée to federal funding to have to check their principles at the front door."⁵⁹ In addition, Goeglein evoked Nesbit's aphorism for reminding us that "fads start from the top down but movements begin from the bottom up."⁶⁰ Catholic engagement through the themes of Community and Participation represented the most suitable model possible for Bush's Faith-based Initiative. In this sense they served both masters: the faithful and the political.

Perhaps the most overlooked of Bush's initial policies was the Mexico City Ruling; named because the U.S. government first announced the restrictions at the 1984 United Nations International Conference on Population held in Mexico. On Bush's first working day in office, on January 22nd, 2001, Bush issued a memorandum addressed to the administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), instructing the Mexico City Policy be reinstated. Although little or no work was required other than to simply 'reinstate' the policy, it did, symbolically go

some distance in further conciliating Bush's faith and pro-life base. The policy, originally orchestrated by Ronald Reagan stated that any nongovernmental organisation (NGO) receiving funding from the USAID could not perform or promote abortion as a method of family planning. There were exceptions, for example: rape, incest, and the threat-to-life of the mother. Deal Hudson saw the Mexico City Ruling as a second phase or as an extension to the more important Hyde amendment. Passed on September 30, 1976 by the House of Representatives, by a 207-167 vote, it was named for its chief sponsor and Catholic, Republican Congressman Henry Hyde of Illinois. The amendment represented a new tactic. Instead of attempting to ban abortion outright and keep attempting to challenge *Roe V. Wade* head on, the amendment sought to chip away at access. Originally the amendment stood at the forefront of the first wave of the pro-life movement, headed by the National Committee for a Human Life Amendment (NCHLA). Created in 1974 by the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops after it lost control of the National Right to Life Committee - which it also created - it was propelled forward by its chief lobbyist and Catholic Mark Gallagher. Gallagher, mainly responsible for lobbying Congress on abortion and programs for the poor, worked with the Government Liaison Office of the Catholic Bishops Conference in Washington from 1974 to 2007. The Mexico City Ruling was an expansion of its ideas by Reagan into foreign policy. The rule has gone back and forth between each Administration since the policy was first introduced in 1984. Politically the speed with which Bush acted helped shift Catholics slowly into his corner. Coming on the day which marked the 28th anniversary of *Roe v. Wade* Bush's action gave Republican conservatives, anti-abortion campaigners, conservative Catholics and Evangelicals alike the impression of a promise kept. It appeared to represent progress on their core issue. In fact, there were numerous instances to buttress the notion that Bush was, without question a champion of the pro-life issue. In addition to the Mexico City Policy Bush also restricted the use of the abortion

pill RU-486 as well as the Born-Alive Infants Protection Act (signed the act in August 2002).

Hudson, pleased at the outcomes, reported that on the following Thursday, Bush and his wife Laura had have dinner with Archbishop Theodore McCarrick, Cardinal James Hickey, and Auxiliary Bishop William Lori at the chancery of the Washington Archdiocese. Catholic news agency *Zenit*, reported Hudson as saying: “For the president to have dinner with a cardinal of the Church only five days after his inauguration is truly historic,” Hudson said in a press statement. “It demonstrates his commitment to understanding Catholics, working with them, and addressing their concerns. This visit combined with the president’s statement to the March for Life and his de-funding of international organisations promoting abortions is very good news for Catholics everywhere.”⁶¹ Even so, a delicate balance exists between foreign and domestic policy. It was one thing to stop the United States funding of abortion in Mexico and Latin America it was another to challenge abortion domestically. While Democrats vowed to challenge the Mexico policy, which they described as a ‘global gag rule,’ Bush was attempting to be far more conciliatory than either pro-life or pro-choice groupings would concede. Hudson agreed. “One thing we learned through the Catholic Voter Project at *Crisis* is that Catholics don’t like a lot of confrontational and aggressive speechmaking in politics. They like messages like ‘common ground’ and ‘partial agreement’ and ‘working together and ‘nonpartisan.’ They don’t like the old evangelical, more stringent-type message. Actually, common ground has its own resonance with the official Catholic community.”⁶² While some, like Robert Wuthnow,⁶³ argued such policies were part of the growing international reach of conservative Christians it was as a foundation to inspire and enthuse the domestic base that the Mexico City ruling was appropriated. Though small compared to the Faith-based Initiative it was nevertheless a worthy symbolic gesture that like so much of what Bush did could not fail to strike a chord with his base support.

In relation to stem cell research Bush said: “My position on these issues is shaped by deeply held beliefs.” I also believe human life is a sacred gift from our creator.” It was enough. Abortion did not have to be mentioned; it was still a question concerning the ‘sanctity of life’ which was still sufficient to pacify his base. When, on August 9, 2001, Bush restricted federal funding for research on stem cells obtained from human embryos because the technology required the destruction of human life, it was tantamount to the same as abortion. The decision was delayed post- Bush’s meeting with the Pope John Paul II in July in Italy, so not to appear to have been “swayed”⁶⁴ in his decision by his visit. Bush pressed ahead. “At its core,” Bush said: “this issue forces us to confront fundamental questions about the beginnings of life and the ends of science.”⁶⁵ In short, the argument ran: Bush’s ban on government funding for research on embryonic stem cells was limited to existing stem cell lines. No new cell lines or research on any new cell lines was to be undertaken. Federal money was to only work with what existed. Bush reasoned: the decisions on these had already been taken, removing the burden of guilt or principle. Brendan Foht for *National Review* called Bush’s plan for stem-cell research “an elegant compromise.”⁶⁶ Elegant or not a relatively new science with seemingly new potential was a political football. Even Deal Hudson - though for different reasons - wrote in September 2001 in *The National Catholic Register*; “President Bush’s decision to provide federal funds for research on embryonic stem cells is disappointing.” Hudson believed that while the president had “kept his campaign promise not to use federal funds to destroy embryos, the research on existing cells lines remains linked — materially — to the original destruction of the embryos.” Hudson’s position was rooted in the Catholic Church’s belief in the protection of *all* innocent human life, as Pope Paul VI’s landmark encyclical, *Humanae vitae*

(1968), made clear to Catholics. He did, however, raise some valuable points of view. “It will be interesting,” he continued “to compare the Catholic reaction of Bush’s stem-cell decision to Bill Clinton’s on partial-birth abortion. There will be some who will want to use the Bush decision as a wedge issue to divide him from his Catholic constituents; others will simply express disappointment in a man they believe is a pro-life president.” Going to Bush’s defence, however, Hudson stated: “it should be obvious that Bush, from a pro-life perspective, is doing many things right - the Mexico City Policy, Attorney General John Ashcroft’s appointment, and judicial nominations.”⁶⁷ Writing in “Reaction To President Bush’s Decision On Embryonic Stem-Cell Research” for *Catholic-Culture* a strong list of Catholics came out to state the same case. On the one hand, they conferred, Bush could have gone further, a ban preferred in relation to their Catholic doctrine on the sanctity of life. However, he was commended for his balanced and moral approach. Bishop Joseph Fiorenza of Galveston-Houston, Texas, president of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops said Bush had made a “principled stand against treating some human lives as nothing more than objects to be manipulated and destroyed for research purposes.” Cardinal William Keeler of Baltimore, chairman of the U.S. bishops Committee on Pro-Life Activities, said: although we can be “grateful that Bush pointed to the basic moral problem, we note that his solution will continue to present its own moral problems.” Archbishop Justin Rigali of St. Louis noted: “We are very grateful to the president for acknowledging, that research on embryonic stem cells raises profound ethical questions. Rigali said. However, the president’s position is not without moral difficulties. We are convinced that the creation and destruction of human embryos for scientific research cannot be facilitated or favoured in any way without threatening the whole cause of other human life and dignity.” Bishop John D’Arcy of Fort Wayne-South Bend, Ind., said: “I am relieved that the president has refused to place our government on the side of research.” Less conciliatory was Cardinal Bernard Law of Boston

who said: “It is because maintaining his position will be so difficult in today’s cultural climate that I regret the president's decision to allow federal funding for experimentation on existing embryonic stem-cell lines.” Similarly, Bishop Sean O’Malley of Fall River, Mass., said that “while the president’s decision allowing federal funding of research only on existing stem-cell lines might be regarded by some as ‘an example of morally acceptable material cooperation in evil, serious ethical questions remain.” Archbishop Harry Flynn of St. Paul and Minneapolis went further. He said, “while President Bush’s announcement ‘appropriately restricts funding for certain forms of embryonic research and the president reaffirmed his support for a ban on human cloning, the church is gravely disturbed that the human rights of these tiniest unborn were not unilaterally respected. Any form of ‘compromise’ in the arena of human life is completely unacceptable.” Cardinal Anthony Bevilacqua of Philadelphia said Bush’s decision does not eliminate all concerns, especially moral ones, regarding stem-cell research;” but while “commend[ing] the president’s proposal to name a presidential council to monitor and examine further questions relating to stem-cell research,” it must be remembered, “that the Church teaches that a human embryo is a human being.”⁶⁸

So pressing was concern over the issue, Cardinal Theodore McCarrick of Washington, Cardinal Edward Egan of New York, Cardinal Adam Maida of Detroit, Father Michael Place, president of the Catholic Health Association, Msgr. John Strykowski, executive director of the U.S. bishops Secretariat for Doctrine and Pastoral Practices, commented similarly; as did the Pontifical Academy For Life, the Diocese Of Pittsburgh, Knights Of Columbus and the National Right To Life Committee. What is clear, however, is that while the Church - or those who spoke for the Church - stuck to their core principles their tone was cautious. Bush, after all, had gone some way conciliate

the issue. The *Los Angeles Times* detailed, how, to help Bush navigate one of the “thorniest issues of his administration, several leading conservative Catholic intellectuals [were] open to a plan that would allow the government to fund certain medical experiments that use stem cells from human embryos.”⁶⁹ In other words it was the Catholic working group, assembled around Hudson, that they referred. While Gov. Thomas J. Ridge (R-Pa.) said that “choosing between medical needs of patients and abortion opponents put Bush in a no-win situation,” those “conservative Catholics who advise the White House” suggest a “compromise may be possible.” These “opinion leaders” may offer arguments for why some funding of embryo experiments is morally acceptable and help Bush win support for the policy among Catholic leaders and voters.” One of the advisors, who participated in the weekly telephone conference of Catholics, was Robert P. George. “I can imagine circumstances in which this would not only be politically acceptable but could be a morally justified policy,” he said. Another contributor was Rev. Robert A. Sirico. He told the White House the “compromise might be regarded as acceptable and consistent with church teachings if it ensures that the government never pays for the destruction of another embryo.” Hudson added that the compromise would be “a victory for those who want to use embryonic stem cells, it can also be seen as a victory for the pro-life side because it ensures, for the time being, that there is no more government support for the destruction of embryos for their stem cells.”⁷⁰

The negotiation between faith and politics continued in the form of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act; signed into law by Bush on November 5, 2003. This was the prohibiting of late-term abortion. The decision, which did not effect the legal status of abortion, made it unlawful for doctors to take action to abort a late-term foetus; that is: one in its second or third trimester. Since *Roe v. Wade* (1973) decision of the Supreme Court, abortion throughout the duration of a woman pregnancy was

legally permissible and was allowed even during the final three months of pregnancy. The Partial-Birth Abortion idea was not, we should note, Bush's creation, but a bill originating in 1995 when the House of Representatives introduced it.⁷¹ Deal Hudson was vociferous in his attitude to the issue, referring to the Church as being in the "grip of a culture of death."⁷² According to Hudson the battle over issues like partial-birth had no universal backing the Church now "less religious; liberal and frightened of losing its tax status."⁷³ In conversation with Father Benedict Groeschel, Hudson was told the problem lay in "assimilation." Conservative Lay Catholics were effectively alone because of the descent within the Church. "1960," Groeschel informed Hudson, "multiplied the problem." The coming of age for modern American Catholics with the election of Kennedy saw Catholics "[leave] the ghetto and move up into cultural mainstream too quickly." The move away from the conservative, traditionalist, often unquestioned values, "made it possible for the Bishops to make their turn to the political left."⁷⁴ Hudson would maintain the cause was taken up by them. It is true, long before Bush signed the act, Hudson helped maintain focus on the issue. In June 2000, Hudson was a key-note speaker at the NRLC Convention. Already introduced to Governor Bush and by this time familiar with Bush's assurances and commitment to protecting innocent life, Hudson said: "Governor Bush sees the child, and he will protect this child from the Herod's of this world." The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act will, continued Hudson, "expose the soul of our legislators."⁷⁵

What it did expose was further recognition that the Democratic alliance was not impervious to change and the Church, if pushed, could be autonomous, critical of anyone tampering with its fundamental doctrines. Even though this was not fundamental enough for Hudson. Whatever criticisms may have been levelled at the Church it was nevertheless, they who were at the vanguard

of the pro-life movement following *Roe V. Wade*. This created an opening for conservative Catholics like Deal Hudson to attempt to re-affirm the Church's traditional dynamic and perhaps seize the initiative and hopefully create policy. The problem, however, was that ultimately the impetus for these policies and instructions originated not in the faith-base but the administration. The flow of power was from Washington out. While remaining ethical towards Bush's genuine interest and concern for matters of faith and the religious institutions supporting him, it was their politicisation that turned into gains for Hudson. Pointedly, Deal Hudson alluded to this sense of unbalance by drawing our attention to those Christians less convinced about achieving a 'place at the table.' Prominent Evangelical and conservative columnist Cal Thomas, Deal Hudson noted, warned that "religious outreach in politics is fraught with temptations and social renewal⁷⁶ will not be accomplished by the mere fact of having a 'place at the table.'"⁷⁷ Thomas wrote: "fundraisers and TV evangelists were happy to promote this "kingdom of the world" mentality because it brought them the illusion of influence, money and a place at the table, but these politicised pulpits are doing America no good."⁷⁸ Thomas continued: "Conservative Christians wanted to be liked and respected by the world. Republican politicians saw them as a reliable voting bloc and were happy to have them in the party, but party leaders and elected officials did little to advance their agenda."⁷⁹ Hudson would disagree. Whilst openly acknowledging his cognisance of the warnings given by individuals like Cal Thomas, Hudson conformed to the biblical idea: "Render unto Caesar." The consolidation of religion and politics was, Hudson believed, justified so long as Catholics were not compromising their religious duties. If, as he and his fellow Catholics thought, they had a likeminded politician in George W. Bush, then they should not torment themselves over being engaged for surrogate political purpose. Asked to "stay out of politics," Cardinal Timothy Dolan

replied: “this is impossible for a Christian, since Jesus of Nazareth’s execution — a crucial moment in human history for us — was blatantly political.”⁸⁰ In truth, the two are reciprocal.

Hudson provides example of what happens when religion finds its way into power. Conversely, Bush provides example of what happens when politics and political power let religion in. Both argue success. What we can state is that neither did the other harm. In scholar John Eidsmore’s work on how Christianity and politics relate (*God and Caesar: Biblical Faith and Political Action*, 1984) opined that “politics is the art of the possible and sometimes this requires compromise.”⁸¹ Compromise may be the best term. In Jon Shields disparate work on the Christian Right (*The Democratic Virtues of the Religious Right*, 2009) he shows that there was integrity to the relationship and the religious was not an aggressive, one dimensional creature bent on theocracy, but instead a balanced and thoughtful body that added depth and dimension to political and social debate. Conversely, White House out-reach to Catholics was a timely, strategic appeal that like all campaigns and administrations sought capital. It arguably paid off. Because there was little or no effort for Bush to align with Pope John Paul II’s positions on life, coupled with knowledge of Catholics beyond the ‘ethnic’ he was able to add a coherent voting bloc to his arsenal. As an electoral consideration it has to be concluded that campaign 2000 and the first term administration was a success. While the parameters for gauging this success are extremely narrow, electorally they were affirmative; fulfilling Hudson’s initial projection that ‘mass attending, orthodox or conservative’ Catholics would vote for Bush; but in addition, would provide a coherent body of Catholics to kickstart support for the next election. Certainly, as a platform for the 2004 election the return figures declare even more success. In 2004, as opposed to 2001 Bush captured all of the

Catholic vote. This is especially noteworthy as the Candidate (John Kerry) was a Catholic. (See Fig. 3).

Fig. 3⁸²

	Bush	Kerry
Catholic	52%	47%
Evangelical	59%	49%
Church Attendance (Weekly)	56%	44%
Ideology	84%	15%

Reflecting on the relationship between Catholics and Bush, Deal Hudson observed: “politics exists in a flux of ever-changing contingencies. Engaging that flux with the people of faith requires both political savvy and commitment to the first principles that faith provides. The Catholics and Evangelicals of the Religious Right gained political power because they were numerous enough to force the GOP to take a stand on life and the family. Their continued power will depend on both the vitality of their religious communities and the principled translation of that vitality into political action.”⁸³

There are lessons to be learnt here. For all the success Hudson, Rove, Reed and Goeglein may argue they had, the limitations and boundaries of this success suggest the right people and circumstances, pressing extremely hard on shared, core values will register. This ‘narrowness of power’ continued. Following the midterms in 2002, another Catholic, pollster Matthew Dowd presented Rove with a report in April that suggested in relation to “agenda setting, meeting scheduling and memo dispersing,” it should be undertaken with as little “meddling” as possible. The “best re-election

campaign,” noted Dowd, (referring Reagan’s 1984 re-election campaign managed by James Baker) “had a strictly defined pipeline from White house to campaign.” It was decided. “Rove would be at the one end of the pipeline and at the other end, as the presidents campaign manager was [Ken] Mehlman.” What Mehlman “insisted on and got it was this: ‘I am in charge of who works in the campaign, and any major decision in the campaign needs my authorisation.’”⁸⁴ Fortunately, noted Hudson, Mehlman “supported the Catholic effort completely”⁸⁵ and allowing success to prosper continued unhindered and unabated. Underneath Bush and Rove the strategic franchise continued. Individuals exercising extreme power, position and duties proceeded in the same vein as before. Ultimately, having achieved their goal for reelection, the political held court. Once the election passed the relationship between religion and politics would never be the same.

Business as Usual and the Religious, Political Divorce

On August 18, 2004 Deal Hudson re-visited the source of his early influences when he chose *National Review* (NR) to announce his resignation. It came in anticipation of a forthcoming biographical article; to be published the next day, in what Hudson referred to as a liberal Catholic publication. Hudson chose NR for damage limitation. The ‘liberal’ publication to which he referred was the *National Catholic Reporter: The Independent Newsweekly* (NCR). The article, titled: The Real Deal: How a Philosophy Professor With a Checkered Past Became the Most Influential Catholic Layman in George W. Bush’s Washington, by Washington correspondent Joe Feuerherd, spelled political disaster for Hudson. How could a man guiding moral strategy from within the White House have a dubious history?

In short, the NCR's story concerned Hudson's departure from Fordham University in 1994 following allegations of an inappropriate sexual relationship with an 18 year old, female student. As a result, Hudson surrendered his tenure with the University and paid a settlement of \$30,000 to bring to a close a lawsuit that the student had brought against him. Hudson responded in *NR* with: *The Price of Politics, Getting ahead of political Distraction*. As the *de Facto* representative of conservative Catholics for the administration he was vulnerable to anyone in opposition. To compound the ignominy of his demise one month later the board of *Crisis Magazine* were approached with the argument that Hudson go. The primary complainants to approach the board included founding editors of the magazine: Michael Novak and Ralph McInerny. McInerny concluded that because he [Hudson] "withdrew from being an adviser to the White House, one could conclude he should leave *Crisis*," McInerny said, "If his presence had a negative effect on a Catholic campaign effort, certainly it would affect a Catholic magazine?"⁸⁶ Other columnists to join in the call for his step-down were Claremont University political science professor Michael Uhlmann; Faith & Reason Institute President Robert Royal; and Russell Hittinger, professor of Catholic studies at the University of Tulsa. Symbolically this was a blow for Hudson. To be ousted by his own foundational magazine and figures from academia was undignified. Despite having detailed the events earlier in 2003, his book *An American Conversion* the affair and its implications were too demanding and potentially too damaging.

Crisis board members, concerned about the situation, asked other leading Catholic scholars whether the magazine could survive with Hudson no longer steering. These included: Rev. Richard John Neuhaus, editor of *First Things* magazine; papal biographer George Weigel and Princeton University professor Robert George. The consensus, according to Julia Duin of the *Washington*

Times, was “No.” Despite Hudson’s achievements, having saved and elevated the magazine’s circulation in 2004 from “27,000 to 32,000 paid subscribers.” In an August 28 letter to supporters, Hudson not only expressed regret for “a serious sin with an undergraduate student of mine,” but he also attempted to steer blame away the magazine. Duin wrote, “the simple fact is, *Crisis Magazine* is far more than Deal Hudson.” As a result of his resignation from the Bush-Cheney campaign in August, “support for him and *Crisis* among Catholic intellectuals evaporate.”⁸⁷

Despite this, the Catholic strategy, created by Hudson - that is, the political relationship between the Bush administration and Catholics remained unmoved and unchanged. Unofficially still onboard and valuing his advice Deal Hudson suggested to Rove the nomination of a lawyer, Leonard Leo (Executive vice president The Federalist Society for Law & Public Policy Studies, Washington) - (one of America’s most influential legal organisations) as his replacement. As of August/September 2004 Leo was now the Campaign/administrations Catholic Strategist in addition to national Co-Chairman of Catholic Outreach for the Republican National Committee. Leo, a networker whose normal role was to cultivate influential Republican lawyers and judges was a surprising or unconventional choice. Specific detail as to why Leo was the choice was not forthcoming. Described by Jeffrey Toobin of the *New York Times* as a man whose life has “been shaped as much by Catholicism as by conservatism,”⁸⁸ this devout Catholic was nevertheless a networker in a different mould. Leo himself was equally vague. When interviewed by Dr. Brian Franklin (Associate Director, Centre for Presidential History, at the Southern Methodist University) Leo said: “I was asked if I would come in and chair the working group, and I did that. And I think part of that was that the White House knew me from a judicial context, and the outside world knew me from what I do with the Federalist Society, and for the conservative movement. So I think everybody was

comfortable having me step in late in the game to sort of do Catholic outreach and try to foster a coalition of Catholic leaders around the country.”⁸⁹ What we can state is that Leo, regardless of his skill and/or proficiency in legal circles, was not the same as Hudson. It is difficult to see how Leo could connect to the ‘base’ in the same way Hudson had? Conversely, it is difficult to imagine how the ‘base’ could connect with him. After all, Hudson had a prominent presence amongst conservative Catholics and had worked hard to furnish both his appearance and networks. The answer may sit with the idea that at this stage Hudson *et al* had done enough. For example: Speaking at Park Avenue’s Waldorf Astoria in September, 2004 Leo delivered a recognisable speech. The rhetoric and detail were familiar. Leo told NCR: “There are two key elements to the Catholic vote. There are faithful Catholics, by which I mean Catholics who attend Mass at least once a week and who believe in the magisterium of the church and the fundamental doctrines of the church. Secondly, there are swing Catholics, who may be less devout but remain sympathetic to church teaching on a range of social issues. Swing Catholics and faithful Catholics are often in accord on a number of the ‘culture of life’ issues and I suspect that it is this combination of voters which will be pivotal in deciding who controls the Catholic vote in this election.”

At the Waldorf Astoria, Leo: continued:

“It is important to communicate to Catholic voters where this president has been on issues of interest and concern to Catholics issues involving the ‘culture of life’ for example.

I think it’s important that we inspire and motivate Catholics to go out and support our president, who has been a very faithful advocate for nonnegotiable issues in the church [such as] abortion, marriage, cloning, and other culture of life issues like that.”⁹⁰

On the surface, it was business as usual. The blue print was identical. In essence, this was still Deal Hudson speaking. The strategy, created by Hudson, accepted by Rove and linked into the Evangelical and conservative base, continued. The foundations built by Hudson were such that there was little or nothing to adjust. Having demonstrated themselves to be Catholic friendly and agreeable with Catholic stances the Bush White House continued to build and re-enforce its standing amongst Catholics, both strategically and symbolically from a position of power and not the hope of attaining power. In short, Catholics knew they were on solid ground with the Bush administration and that another term would not damage either their standing or ideas. In a relatively short time Bush had, without too much effort, fulfilled and honoured his commitments.

However, our contention is that henceforth the moment had gone. This unique connection between faith and politics had ended. With the loss of Hudson the impetus for Catholic influence as part of structured, organised politics would not be repeated. As detailed: historically Catholics have always been active, but in terms of a systematic, organised approach - at the highest level - as we saw beginning to surface in 1996, the episode had peaked. Beyond the 2004 election, there is - and continues to be - a very limited if at all noticeable display of religion and politics. The implications suggest that without individuals like Deal Hudson this will continue to be the case. In the short term, Hudson's resignation was not damaging. Individuals like him do not entirely evaporate. It was one thing for him to officially stand down, but it was another for him to remain in proximity with the administration, the provision of his ideas and networks still in place. Focused on re-election in 2004, Hudson's political patrimony mattered. It is difficult to gauge the impact Hudson's actions had on Catholic opinion. However, within a short period of time Catholics were back at the polls

and unlike the first election Catholics came out strongly in favour of Bush. This would suggest that the Catholic public were not as effected or influenced by Hudson's departure as some of his peers. In each category: moderate, conservative and orthodox Catholics, all voted in favour of Bush. As the only existing indicator of the relationship between the Catholic public and the administration the data is agreeable. It would appear Bush's open, friendly and sympathetic approach to Catholics and their concerns, *was* rewarded. Perhaps one of the most telling aspects of the Catholic connection in 2004 was the fact the Bush's opponent, Senator John Kerry; a Massachusetts Democrat was a Catholic; who, in theory, had the same attributes as John F. Kennedy. Like Kennedy, Kerry was a war hero and the first Roman Catholic to run for president in 44 years. Nevertheless, despite raising the profile of the religion amongst the media, John Kerry did not and arguably could not, use his faith as a political tool. In fact, John Kerry's support for abortion rights, stem cell research and gay marriage, established by Hudson and Bush beforehand, led the Catholic public, Roman Catholic bishops and Vatican officials to question his qualifications as a Catholic candidate. Some conservative Catholic's urged bishops to penalise Catholic politicians who did not vote with the church and its core concerns. The Rev. John McCloskey, director of the Catholic Information Centre in Washington and a member of the conservative organisation Opus Dei, said: "Senator Kerry considers himself a Catholic, but on issues that are fundamental in terms of Catholic morality, he appears to be off the reservation."⁹¹ Crucially, however, Deal Hudson was one of the main protagonists helping to strip Kerry of his Catholic identity. In some respects it was one of his last actions. In May, 2004 Hudson told the *Washington Post* that Democratic presidential nominee John Kerry should be denounced from the pulpit "whenever and wherever he campaigns as a Catholic."⁹² When Archbishop Raymond Burke of St. Louis warned Kerry "not to present himself for communion," while Kerry's own archbishop, Sean O'Malley of Boston, endorsed the principle.

Once the pro-choice label was attached it was easy for people like Hudson to vilify Kerry. This extended to pro-lifers and Evangelicals. Hudson was clever, however, in getting others, namely Bishops and clergy to further condemn and help isolate him as a surrogacy to the Bush reelection cause.

Ultimately, the Bush administration remained focused on the election, on votes and on numbers. Republican politicians saw conservative Christians and Catholics in particular as a reliable bloc and were happy to have them in the party. Hudson's residual presence was such, the administration had little to adjust or concern themselves with once he had resigned. For Leo the components were in place and underway. Fortuitously, Catholics once more exhibited autonomy. They were not distracted by the political demise of Hudson but rather their own concerns. Where it mattered, at the polls, Catholics turned out for Bush. In sum of his own political career, Deal Hudson declared and questioned several important things. "The Republican Party," he noted "will only do what it is demanded of it." That demand is for the short term; the next election or the next candidate and the question as to whether "religious conservatives are indispensable," is, suggests Hudson only something "future campaigns will reveal." As for those "Catholics who found their way into the Republican Party," Hudson was correct in noting that they "have not been there long enough to feel deep loyalty."⁹³ The devotion to one another was pragmatic and momentary. Both ideologically and religiously each embraced one another's agency for their own purposes. Republicans - or more specifically Rove - saw through the monolithic notion of a Catholic bloc and instead chose to target and work another area, facilitated by the titular head of this timely, marriage of convenience, Deal Hudson. Without him, there was no negotiation of faith, no structural convergence. In addition there was no subjugation of politics by faith as some had feared. What all concerned may claim, however,

was success. George W. Bush served two terms and whether one accepts the argument that the faith-base was responsible for this, Catholics were undeniably an essential ingredient of the Bush campaign and presidency.

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⁴ Pew Research Centre U.S. Politics & Policy
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⁵ Deal W. Hudson, Onward, Christian Soldiers: The Growing Political Power of Catholics and Evangelicals in the United States, (Threshold Editions, 2008) p.189

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⁸ Skype interview with Deal Hudson, Thursday, 19 May 2011 at 17.00 hrs

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- ¹⁵ Deal W. Hudson, *Onward, Christian Soldiers: The Growing Political Power of Catholics and Evangelicals in the United States*, (Threshold Editions, 2008) p.192
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- ¹⁷ Wayne Slater and James Moore, *The Architect: Karl Rove and the End of the Democratic Party*, (Crown Publishing, Random House, New York, 2006) quoted in *The Truth Seeker*, 'The Rove Less Travelled,' September 9, 2006
- ¹⁸ Skype with Deal Hudson, Thursday, 19 May 2011 at 17.00 hrs
- ¹⁹ Skype interview with Deal Hudson, Tuesday, 13 March 2012 at 15:32 hrs
- ²⁰ Ibid.
- ²¹ Ibid.
- ²² Skype Interview with Timothy Goeglein, Monday, 10 December 2012. 16.00hrs
- ²³ Ibid.
- ²⁴ Goeglein, T.S. *The man in the middle: An inside account of faith and politics in the George W. Bush era*. (Nashville, TN: Broadman & Holman Publishers, 2011), p.82
- ²⁵ Leonard Leo serves as Executive Vice President of the Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies, an organisation of 46,000 individuals that is premised on advancing limited, constitutional government. He was appointed by President George W. Bush as well as the United States Senate to three terms to the US Commission on International Religious Freedom.
- ²⁶ Goeglein and Westine were the two first people to be commissioned officers for the Office of Public Liaison by Rove.
- ²⁷ In January 2009, Goeglein became the Vice President of External Relations for the Christian Organisation Focus on the Family
- ²⁸ Skype Interview with Timothy Goeglein, Monday, 10 December 2012. 16.00hrs
- ²⁹ Ibid.
- ³⁰ ibid.
- ³¹ Skype interview with Deal Hudson, Tuesday, 13 March 2012 at 15:32 hrs
- ³² Patricia Miller, *Good Catholics: The Battle over Abortion in the Catholic Church*, (University of California Press, 2014) p.227
- ³³ Skype interview with Deal Hudson, Tuesday, 13 March 2012 at 15:32 hrs
- ³⁴ Joshua Mercer, "GOP Starts Initiative to Court Catholic Voters," *National Catholic Register*, 6/5/2001
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Overwhelmingly approved by both the House and the Senate it was vetoed by President Clinton on 10 April 1996. Over the next seven years the bill would attempt to re-surface and gain its two-thirds majority in both houses of Congress to override the veto. For the Catholic hierarchy this was the dominant issue in 1996 and it witnessed the Church - ordinarily seated within the Democratic camp - oppose President Clinton. So strong was the feeling in 1996 Clinton was snubbed for the Alfred E. Smith Memorial Foundation Dinner when organisers decided not to invite President Clinton after Cardinal John O'Connor criticised him for vetoing the bill. From a Catholic perspective it was important. On the road to the White House, along with Notre Dame and the Bob Jones University (Democrats went to), it had almost always included a visit at the Al Smith Memorial Dinner, a charity roast at the Waldorf-Astoria named for the country's first Roman Catholic to be a major party's presidential nominee. In addition to this, the hierarchy sent mailings to those in Congress in an attempt to over-ride the veto. Perhaps more telling was the actual activism of the hierarchy.

On the Capitol steps on September 12, 1996 was the largest gathering of Catholic hierarchy ever assembled. Eight American Cardinals, joined by many other religious and secular leaders, held a news conference and prayer service. The attention did not stop here. In a rare declaration that spoke directly to the political the USCCBs pointedly singled out those Catholic officials who either abstained or refused to over-ride the veto saying: "Catholics who are privileged to serve in public leadership positions have an obligation to place their faith at the heart of their public service, particularly on issues regarding the sanctity and dignity of human life." They were referring to Catholic Senators "Christopher Dodd, Tom Harkin, Ted Kennedy, John Kerry, Barbara Mikulski, Carol Moseley-Braun, Susan Collins, Richard Durbin and Jack Reed."

See: United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, "A Statement by the Catholic Bishops of the United States, Living The Gospel Of Life: A Challenge To American Catholics," Cited in: William E. May, "Partial-birth abortion and Catholics, What is it all about? What are the legislative efforts to ban it? What have the U.S. Bishops done?" <http://www.catholiceducation.org/en/controversy/abortion/partial-birth-abortion-and-catholics.html> (3/7/15)

Only two Catholic Democrats voted in favour of the ban: Joseph Biden and John Breaux. This gave valuable impetus to arguably one of the most important pro-life policies post-*Roe V. Wade*. It is worth noting that the Partial-birth title was not a medical but political term coined by the by the Catholic orientated National Right to Life Committee (NRLC) in 1995.

According to Keri Folmar, the lawyer responsible for the language of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, the term was developed in early 1995, in a meeting between herself, Charles T. Canady, and NRLC lobbyist Douglas Johnson. Cynthia Gorney, "Gambling With Abortion," *Harper's Magazine*, November 2004

The NRLC's focus managed to continually push the abortion issue into the political spotlight - where it would remain. In the relationship between religion and politics this was one of the most vigorous expressions of dissatisfaction ever mounted by the Church. Joanne Sadler, writing for *Crisis*, referred to Clinton's February 28 veto announcement as "a wake-up call" to all Catholics concerned with pro-life, pro-family issues."

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Social-Renewal Catholics

That dynamic appears to be rooted in the emergence of a "social-renewal" constituency. These Catholics vividly register their perception that the United States is in the throes of a moral crisis. It is unlikely that this constituency would have been discernible back in 1960, because the critique of American society upon which it rests would have been virtually unknown.

As we understand them, social-renewal Catholics:

- perceive a crisis of declining individual morality in America today;
- believe the federal government is exacerbating this decline;
- affirm an absolute standard of morality;
- perceive the popular culture as undermining the character and values of our youth;
- do not identify themselves as liberal;
- reject the social-justice agenda, as defined above.

As opposed to:

Social-Justice Catholics:

Liberal self-identification has been waning among active Catholics since at least 1960. Our survey shows that social-justice Catholics now constitute a minority of all Catholics. For our purposes, social-justice Catholics are characterised by:

- criticism of America's efforts to provide opportunities to minorities;
- criticism of America's efforts to aid the poor;
- support for an activist government that does more to help people [like me];
- support for hiring preferences based on race and gender;
- the perception that America is more in need of tolerance than courage;
- the rejection of subsidiarity (preferring to provide aid to the needy via national government);
- support for multiculturalism, or at least an indifference to the cultural assimilation of immigrants; self-identification as liberal.

⁷⁷ Ibid. p.311

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CONCLUSION

Our purpose has been to detail a very specific relationship in the narrative of American religion and politics; a closeness between conservative Catholics, the campaign and U.S. administration of George W. Bush. It was, we argued, a special institutional moment for Catholics, that is Catholic organisation at the forefront of the relationship with the Bush group. It was arguably unique. In a modern political sense, religion has never come so close and so comprehensively to the seat of U.S. power as it did with the inauguration of George W. Bush. It was not, however, one dimensional. Contrary to current thinking this was not an Evangelical centric relationship. Evangelicals had, as we saw, a highly important role, as they had since the late 70s, their presence, networks and experience having a deep reach into both campaign and administration; as well as a crucial role to play in connecting Catholics with the campaign; but arguably, this was the first time the Catholic position was privileged in importance.

Beyond relying on a dividend of faith this work has tried to show these Catholics had, they argued: a strategy, a specific idea underpinned with networks and structures as well as decades of experience that could help steer the Catholic vote in Bush's favour. As the primary source interviews detailed, this prompted the Bush campaign into recognising their potential virtues, the campaign embracing the Catholic element, rewarding it with a place at the heart of its assembly. It was a fusion, a coming together not just of the political and the religious but equally the ideological. Conservatism, - the shared ideology that overlapped, informed and bound them all - was itself searching, examining its own responses to the great social, cultural and political rifts of the 60s, 70s,

still relevant in 2000. The domestic turmoil over the ‘values and culture wars’, framed or driven by - as they saw it - Liberalism, had not been resolved and the idea of how to react or respond to many of these elements was still in existence. In each case the traditionalist aspect tethered conservative Catholics, surrounded and supported by conservative Evangelicals and conservatives alike, each one willing and able to contribute to the dialogue and respond accordingly. Conversely, politics responded too. For the political - that is: the party and the politician, they were both adroit enough to find their compatibility a comfortable and suitable fit to help fuse the groups. Ultimately the aim was mutual, to seek the acquisition of position to proffer each one's agenda.

More specifically, what we have endeavoured to detail was that the driving force behind these developments were answered by the individual. As the campaign and Bush administration dawned, it was the power of the ‘individual link,’ a surprising ‘narrowness of power,’ that held jurisdiction over events. If we talk about a ‘privileging,’ what we are really talking about is the privileging of individuals like Deal Hudson and his ability to get into and work with the Bush campaign and administration, something no other Evangelical activist has been able to do. Despite broad, historical notions of Catholics and politics, if Deal Hudson is not there, then there was no ascendance of the Catholic position. This does not mean the group would not have communicated important information or influence; it would; a point all our protagonists openly acknowledged; the provision for the eventual construction of a conservative Catholic strategy having a long history that had been understood from 1945. But this was different. With no evidence that the Bush campaign had any idea of producing a Catholic strategy or any form of outreach to Catholics, it would appear that until the Catholic Voter Project (CVP), the reliance *was* solely on the Evangelical contingent. Even then, there was no overt plan of action. After almost fifty years we had in 2000 an entry point

of conservative Catholics into politics at a level not seen before. Once these individuals drop-off, however, as they did indeed do in 2004, the moment of 'individual agency' disappears.

Another salient feature we presented in this work was the idea that this was about symbolic representation. Whereas historically many had taken refuge in conservatism against for example, liberalism, communism or changes within the Church the approach to the 2000 campaign offered no such great upheavals. What Hudson wanted to primarily achieve was to make Catholics, specifically conservative Catholics, relevant. It was not, to begin with about Catholic dominance or policy. He wanted, based on his journalistic back-ground - to 'start a conversation;' to make conservative Catholic concerns just as discernible as the voices on the left of the ideological spectrum. Once in power and having recognised the role they played in helping to get Bush elected - or certainly stay in power - it was a goal he arguably achieved. In the short term this was about message. Below blanket terms like Catholic, Evangelical and conservative, peppered with slogans like: the 'sanctity of life, the 'family' and 'compassionate conservatism' was a symbolic resonance, rather than a substantive body of ideas, approaches and activities. This type symbolism allowed both the political and the religious to never really move too far off message. Politically it too was arguably unique. As a result, the campaign and its support were at no time in danger of either hitting or missing the mark; their 'mass appeal' to conservative, moderate, faithful and secular Americans alike, always appealing. Once in-play they did not have to strong arm Catholicism, Evangelicalism or conservatism into the political process, merely join the conversation, garner support and re-enforce sets of likeminded beliefs amongst like minded individuals.

Long term, there were no roots. Deal Hudson, as a pragmatist; focused on short-terminism, about getting a 'place at the table' - rather than receiving no place at all. Primarily, however, he was

successful in being able to get a political link between conservatism and Catholicism. Karl Rove, equally pragmatic and opportunistic and looking to the advocacy of any group or body with shared motives for political action to enhance Bush's political cause, connected to these aspirations. Added to this, key individuals like Ralph Reed and Timothy Goeglein helped square the religious/ideological and political circle. This type of limited, momentary approach may be indicative of other campaigns and their strategies, but our concern was with an agency that were aware of the bigger picture, for example: a lasting Republican majority or implementation of policy favourable to the religious, but were instead focused on the interim. There was no grand re-thinking, no re-drawing or recalibrating of political or religious boundaries. In fact, this work has hopefully demonstrated that the Bush years and the religious connection were far more nuanced, careful and conciliatory than the body of literature on a religiously orientated Bush was ever willing to concede. It was not the fear factor of a theocratic threat that was interesting but those other spaces that opened up new parameters to our understanding of a religions and political relationship whose intricately tied issues and concerns allowed them to work.

For example, observant Catholicism exists within a wider space - a largely secular space - in which key issues; for example: LGBT rights or abortion, exist and have to be navigated around. Therefore the fervent defence of an idea or ideas is neither sustainable or practical. Evangelicals demonstrated this in their overt, 'fire and brimstone' stance against their core concerns; a stance that served to label them as intolerant and bellicose and to which the political was less eager to join hands with. When individuals like Hudson arrived a different type of agency was available for the political. Wedge issues may well have been at the front and centre of their concerns, but it can not be defined by this alone. Therefore, a space for negotiation, a dialogue that only in-part attempted to shape

U.S. politics - as proposed in the notion of a theocracy - fed instead into more sensible questions of influence and contribution.

In this work, we have attempted to detail this, its history, its influences and its achievements or failures, with the suggestion that given the opportunity, individual agency - even within the confines of the elaborate and extensive body that is the U.S. Government - can make significant inroads. We have not made bold claims about any new definition about observant Catholics, or bold shifts in American politics in 2000; our claim has been to recognise both the moment and the well - or timely - placed individuals who drove important aspects of the campaign. The validity of this notion is that once they recede - as was the case with Hudson in 2004, so do the specific strategies, ideas and their particular prescription for rule and government. What remains are core ideas, conceptions or labels for others to try to guide or implement. As we have suggested this may not always be the case. Historically, each campaign and each administration works in its own fashion, tailoring its environment, constituency and philosophy to suit. Hopefully, these findings enhance our understanding of the boundaries and not the excesses of these relationships, their complexity and layers. Although we argue that this was primarily about securing votes, we have not ethically debunked the legitimacy of either conservative Catholics or Evangelicals and their desire to see change, change that fits in with *their* moral compass.

It leaves a larger question. If this was a relationship based on timely and coordinated pragmatism, rather than a platform of deeply religious ideas attempting to change the political, social and cultural landscape of America - what is left? In the future, one will have to grapple with this question and do so in the knowledge that once key individuals like Hudson and Rove fall away, we do not discern the same distinct, and consequential consolidation between these groups. This is not

to suggest it will never happen again; but in the future it may hint at what to look for. Agency, organisation and the interaction with the secular space by the individual is a possible template. What critics can take comfort in is that politics - that is: secular politics wins out. Even when religionists like Hudson and Reed gain their 'place at the table,' and are given free licence, it is ultimately the political, with discretion - albeit partisan or because of convenience - that both guides and shapes the overall trajectory. 'Negotiating Faith' has endeavoured to show that this is what it is, a negotiation, a parleying of complex ideas and beliefs that all jostle for the same thing: influence.

As America now sits astride new and significant social, cultural and political changes in a post-Bush era, an era that does not appear to include religion as it once did; this is: overtly, further work will have to be undertaken to help establish where religion and politics now reside and interact with one another. The religious would contest this. However, without a type of religious praxis; that is: practice over theory and strong individual agency then other constituencies and/or concerns will naturally move into the mind of the American people, the political campaign and the presidency. If the stridency of religion is not as visible as it was under Bush then it may be possible that any future success of religious interests lies in ideology, the factor that bound them all, as well as the role of the individual. Republican appointments to the Supreme Court have arguably moved the Court further to the right over the last forty years. For example: Ronald Reagan's appointment of William Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia and Anthony Kennedy; President George H. W. Bush's appointment of Clarence Thomas; George W. Bush's appointment of John Roberts and Samuel Alito and President Trump's appointment of Neil Gorsuch are factors far more favourable to the implementation of religious concerns. Potentially this gives a strong Catholic and Evangelical sense of theology as a contributing factor on the influence to law (Five of the nine Supreme Court justices

(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Roberts, and Alito) are/were Catholic. As this work has pointed out, the road to religious influence is layered and not always explicit.

'Negotiating Faith: Observant Catholics, Conservatism and the 2000 Bush Campaign' has been about dialogue, about a coming together of faith and politics through a variety of strands. It has tried to fill a small but nevertheless important gap in the narrative of an American presidents transition from campaign to White House a transition that has historically and more-often-than-not contained religious elements and influences. It has also attempted to show that religion and politics in the public square are as much about adaption or 'negotiation' as any other aspect of the political process; a key feature of which is timing. With neither one having to corrupt themselves in pursuit of their interests this 'negotiation of faith' or appropriate suitability, played its role in helping to shape their identity. Future research should consider these histories and look for the role of individual agency within the political process. Each one may be a proxy to something else: Rove to Bush or the Republican Party; Hudson to conservatism or Catholicism but as the Bush campaign demonstrated in 2000, they are, nevertheless, the architects of their own Church, whether religious or political. It will always remain an ethical question as to who these characters and their true motivations are. Are these individuals religious men pursuing religious means and ends, or are they political and/or ideological characters who just happen to be religious? On this evidence it would appear the latter, although this, they would arguably contest.

Often these subtleties are concealed, an over-simplistic approach masking the intricacies involved.

'Negotiating Faith: Observant Catholics, Conservatism and the 2000 Bush Campaign' has attempted to open a door on these divergent and often subtle aspects, and show - through personal testimony - how individual agents do influence and shape their respective interests. If successful -

which arguably they were - these interests do have a bearing on the political and social process. Although the role and involvement of lay Catholic activity within both the campaign and presidency of George W. Bush has been shown to have some effect, it was arguably controlled and conciliatory. Claims by those like Hudson of a lurch to the left on the part of the Church and an immoral America were not met with over enthusiastic reforms or action. In fact, the Catholic connection - despite its deep reach, strong presence and free-reign within the White House were kept in check by the political. Overall, the political mechanism and machine, whether of office or policy, happened to control the religious constituency within. In short, it was Rove who told Hudson *et al*, what to do. Largely undetected, the presence of a Catholic identity was masked by a desire to view and interpret Bush through a narrow, Evangelical lens. Such findings as this work has attempted to detail only serve to reiterate the need to develop a more multilayered perspective concerning identity politics.

Negotiating Faith has shown that when we attempt to minimise politics or religion it should be done so cautiously. Despite the breadth of lay Catholic involvement in both campaign and presidency, that arguably afforded one of the most comprehensive accommodations of one particular faith within a modern political circle, it was preference for the populist, excitable and arguably controversial aspects of religions displays (Evangelicals) that won out. In truth and albeit momentarily, we have argued that the shaping of this particular president was the product of conservative Catholics, who happened to *negotiate* better and who, through this negotiation as well as fortuitousness found both favour and influence. Looking forward, this particular conjunction is unlikely to happen again. However, as an example of individual agency this work can serve as a model, a guide that given the correct set of circumstances and desires the huge mechanism and complexity that is American politics can come down to the micro.

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
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
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
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
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
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


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


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
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
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
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
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



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















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
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
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
















The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that every entry, no matter how small, should be recorded to ensure the integrity of the financial data. This includes not only sales and purchases but also expenses and income. The text explains that proper record-keeping is essential for identifying trends, managing cash flow, and preparing for tax obligations. It also notes that clear records can help in resolving any disputes or discrepancies that may arise.


The second section focuses on the role of the accounting system in providing a clear and concise overview of the company's financial health. It describes how a well-designed system can automate many of the routine tasks, reducing the risk of human error and saving valuable time. The text highlights the importance of regular reviews and reconciliations to ensure that the books are balanced and that all transactions are properly accounted for. It also discusses the benefits of using modern accounting software, which can provide real-time insights into the company's performance and help in making informed decisions.


The final part of the document addresses the challenges of managing financial data in a complex and ever-changing business environment. It acknowledges that there are many factors that can affect the accuracy and reliability of the financial records, such as changes in accounting standards, new regulations, and technological advancements. The text offers practical advice on how to stay up-to-date with the latest developments and how to implement effective controls to mitigate the risks. It concludes by emphasizing that a strong financial foundation is crucial for the long-term success and sustainability of any business.











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
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
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


The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that every entry, no matter how small, should be recorded to ensure the integrity of the financial data. This includes not only sales and purchases but also expenses and income. The text suggests that a consistent and thorough record-keeping system is essential for identifying trends and making informed decisions.

Next, the document addresses the issue of budgeting. It explains that a well-defined budget helps in controlling costs and maximizing resources. By setting clear financial goals and limits, individuals and organizations can avoid overspending and ensure that their financial plans are realistic and achievable. The text provides practical tips on how to create a budget that works for your specific needs and circumstances.

The third section focuses on the importance of regular financial reviews. It states that periodic assessments of financial performance allow for the identification of areas that need improvement. By analyzing the data collected in the records, one can spot inefficiencies, adjust the budget as needed, and take corrective actions to stay on track. This process is described as a continuous cycle of planning, monitoring, and adjusting.

Finally, the document concludes by highlighting the long-term benefits of sound financial management. It notes that consistent record-keeping and budgeting lead to greater financial stability and growth. By staying organized and proactive, individuals can build a secure financial future and achieve their goals more effectively. The text encourages readers to adopt these practices as a habit to ensure long-term success.





the 1990s, the number of people in the UK who are aged 65 and over has increased from 10.5 million to 13.5 million, and the number of people aged 75 and over has increased from 5.5 million to 7.5 million (Office for National Statistics 2002).

There is a growing awareness of the need to address the needs of older people, and the UK Government has set out a strategy for the 21st century (Department of Health 2001). The strategy is based on the principle of 'active ageing', which is defined as 'the process of optimising opportunities for health, participation in society, and security in old age' (Department of Health 2001, p. 1).

The strategy is based on three pillars: health, participation and security. The Department of Health has set out a number of objectives for each pillar, and has identified a number of key areas for action. The key areas for action are: health, participation, security, and the environment. The Department of Health has set out a number of objectives for each pillar, and has identified a number of key areas for action.


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
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
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
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
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



























APPENDIX C

THE CATHOLIC VOTER PROJECT

QEV ANALYTICS

[HTTP://WWW.QEV.COM/REPORTS.POLITICAL.CATHOLIC.HTM](http://www.qev.com/reports/political/catholic.htm)

APPENDIX D





<https://www.catholicculture.org/culture/library/view.cfm?recnum=1412>