An extension of transaction cost economics with political governance; for the execution of major international projects

David, Paul Rajasingham (2017). An extension of transaction cost economics with political governance; for the execution of major international projects. University of Birmingham. Ph.D.

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Abstract

The objective of this research was to resolve an academic challenge to extend the predictive capabilities of the transaction cost economics (TCE) model to address the theoretical issues of governing high value, complex industrial projects executed across international borders. This extension of TCE has been achieved by political governance and indirect vertical integration to complement governance mechanisms for international transactions. The propositions for an extension of the TCE model and its applicability were explored by field investigation using three case studies complemented by interviews of industry professionals.

The comparative institutional analysis of the three case studies examined the outcome of transactions which were subject to varying levels of political hazards and property rights safeguards. The empirical evidence demonstrated that the relative hazards created by the behaviour of the host country government and institutional regimes will have an overriding impact on transactions for major international projects. In this case, compelling political requirements may require firms to select governance mechanisms in a non-transaction costs economising way.

The contribution made to knowledge by this research is to demonstrate support for the potential of an extension to the basic TCE model developed for predicting optimum governance mechanisms for transactions of major international projects.

Type of Work:

Thesis (Doctorates > Ph.D.)

Award Type:

Doctorates > Ph.D.

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