

**RELIGIONIZING POLITICS:
SALAFIS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN EGYPT**

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ABSTRACT

Egypt's 2011 revolution led to debates about Salafis' entry into politics for the first time. The socio-political vision and character of Salafi groups were relatively understudied. As such, the primary question of this thesis is what is the Salafis' vision for social and political change in post-revolution Egypt? The vision is traced through Salafis' discourse concerning change. The texts analyzed were collected from Al-Da'awa Al-Salafyya (DS), and its political arm the Al-Nor party: the latter is the only surviving Islamist party, following the toppling of the Muslim Brotherhood regime in 2013. The texts were gathered through field research, and analyzed using Critical Discourse Analysis. This analysis enabled what is the first mapping of DS' vision for change. Based on this, the thesis argues that following its entry into politics, DS reproduced its long-held discourse of social and political change. It achieved this by introducing changes to the *form* of its discourse, while preserving its *core* content. The thesis demonstrates that "continuity and consistency" of DS' key discourse for change (Manhaj), was central to its framing processes towards mobilizing political participation. More broadly, the thesis concludes that the wider movement and the specific political party are both intellectually and structurally connected.

DEDICATION

I dedicate the outcome of this long journey to my parents, Zeinab Monir and Nazy Selim; elder brother, Gamal; husband, Hisham; and my precious son, Farid. I was not to be able to make it were not for all their support.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AS: Ansar Al-Sunna Al-Mohammadyya

DS: Al-Da'awa Al-Salafyya

GI: Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiyya

JI: Al-Jama'a Al-Islamiyya

MB: Muslim Brotherhood

MS: Al-Madrasa Al-Salafyya

NP: Al-Nor Party

INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of January 2011 Revolution¹ in Egypt, debates emerged about Egyptian Salafis' official entry to politics for the first time in their history. Such debates do not only stem from the ambiguous nature of such groups that were understudied before the January Revolution, but also from the fact that Salafism had been always a problematic concept. Thus, questions arose as concerns Salafi thought and its impact on society. In this regard, various social and political groups in Egypt, such as Christians, women, and seculars, felt much concern over the Salafis entering politics. In addition, there were assumptions that Salafi discourse was transformed or should be transformed to cope with the new developments and to serve their political goals, even if this involved compromising the main tenets of Salafism. Thus, in the midst of such concerns and debates about the emergence of that new ambiguous political actor, it became important to scrutinize the Salafis' vision for change after the Revolution.

Since the main interest in Egyptian Salafis came after they became political actors, this study attempts to deal with the question of what is the Salafis' vision for social and political change in Post-revolution Egypt? The study focuses on the Salafi movement that uses political means to attain its goals, and which is the only Islamist party that survived and entered 2015 parliament, that is Al-Da'awa Al-Salafyya (DS), and its political arm, Al-Nor party (NP). Accordingly, this study is neither interested in militant nor in apolitical Salafis.

¹ The term revolution is used in this thesis to describe the uprisings that took place in January 2011 and June 2013, in line with the current Egyptian constitution. This is to stay atop of the ongoing debate on the political, popular and academic levels on the term to use to describe such transformative events and whether they are revolutions, coups or uprising, since such debate does not speak directly to the topic of discussion in this thesis.

This thesis assumes that the Egyptian Salafis' discourse is the product of interaction with the Egyptian social structure, as well as the various regional and global influences (e.g.: Egyptian Sufism, leftist discourse, interaction with the rest of Egyptian Islamists, and liberals, and the Egyptian culture and tradition, Wahhabism, and global Salafism). Moreover, as regards DS, the texts collected reflect its clear stance against both Takfir (claiming society or persons as infidel) and the use of violence, in addition to the movement's adoption of a bottom-up approach to social change. Thus, it works from within the Egyptian society and could not be considered isolated, which demarcates a clear difference between Egyptian Salafis and other groups within global Salafism. In addition, a closer look at DS' approach proves it distinct from other Islamists, as well as other Salafis in Egypt. In this regard, other Salafi groups that adopt an isolationist top-down approach for change and embrace Takfir and violence could not survive on the political scene, nor integrate in the society. In addition, due to the lack of a clear independent political vision, other Egyptian politicized Salafi groups dissolved in the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and adopted its policy choices. Therefore, all the Salafi political parties that were established post January 2011 Revolution, disappeared from the Egyptian political scene post June 2013 Revolution, except for NP, which explains why the study focuses on DS and NP.

However, despite the peculiarity of DS' vision for change among Salafis, its striking contradiction with the mainstream discourse for change in Egypt, the Egyptian legal framework, and Egyptians' perception of religion and identity and culture was manifest during the January 2011 Revolution and in the post-revolution period, when they turned such vision into action. Yet, despite the challenges that DS and NP faced in view of their problematic discourse and policy choices, within a transitional Egyptian context

they managed to be the only surviving Islamist political party after toppling the MB regime in June 2013. Such survival raised questions, again about DS' and NP's vision for change, their intentions, and what kind of compromises or transformations they undertook to stay in the political scene.

Since DS and NP, the case study of this dissertation, are newcomers to politics, such vision would be traced through critically analyzing their discourse about change.

The reason why the researcher focuses on the discourse is not only because the in-depth study of the ideological and discursive aspects of DS, particularly as concerns the concept of social change, are absent in the literature, but also for the fact that this project started just a few months after the establishment of NP. This means that NP is a new political actor that did not have a history of policy choices or tactics. Therefore, an in-depth understanding of their discourse on social change, that developed over forty years, and starting with the movement rather than the party, is a more practical and accessible approach to studying this political actor. In addition, the fact that ideology is central to CDA was another reason why this framework was convenient in studying this case (Herzog, 2016). Also, given that CDA is a "problem oriented commitment" to deal with daily social problems such as subordination, exclusion, and discrimination (Sjölander, 2011), which are traits attributed to Islamist movements, it is appropriate to the study in light of the fears and suspicions about Salafis' official entry to Egyptian politics, as will be discussed in the following chapters. Such fears were, for instance, connected to their commitment to democracy, and the possible exclusion and discrimination against Christians and women. Thus, operationalizing CDA on DS' discourse is one way of deconstructing such discourse to uncover aspects of exclusion and discrimination, if any, and to assess the level of such aspects and to what extent

they could be reflected in NP's policies. The literature on DS/NP generally describes them as pragmatists, lacking political experience, and not in possession of a clear political model. It also questions their intentions in view of the fears discussed above and projects MB experience onto them, as will be shown in the section on the existing literature. Such conclusions were derived from what DS/NP's members say, and from analysing their actions.

However, this dissertation's in-depth analysis of how DS' discourse was constructed within its operating context and over an extended period made it possible to explore whether and how they reproduced or transformed such discourse once they entered politics, and how it was reflected in their few policy choices. Thus, this project deals with a religious social movement that presents a discourse which primarily draws upon holy texts and claims to own the pure version of Islam and of the interpretations of Quran and Sunna as delivered by the pious predecessors (see chapter 2 for characteristics of the salafi discourse). On one hand, this implies that they claim that what they say are facts rather than one version of the interpretation of Islam. On the other hand, the self-reinforcing literature on Islamists and Salafis, as will be discussed later, provides a narrative and an understanding of Salafi movements and of Islamist movements in general that is taken for granted. Therefore, operationalizing CDA is one way of deconstructing DS' ideology or discourse on social change, and of what they want to do through their involvement in social and political actions. Meanwhile, it helps in taking a critical position on the dominant understanding of Islamists in the literature. Such an in-depth analysis of these groups contributes to studies of extremism and de-radicalization through scrutinizing the movement itself rather than expressing what it ought to be or

projecting other Islamist models on it, thus adopting an analytical rather than a judgemental position.

In this regard, the dialectical nature of discourse as “socially constitutive” (Egan Sjölander, 2011: 23) implies that, on the one hand, it influences how power, identities and relationships within DS and in interaction with the other are formed, and on the other hand, is influenced by its context. This also made an “ethnographically driven CDA” (Richardson et al., 2014) the frame that can help in deconstructing and contextualizing DS/NP’s discourse. Such a discourse, when contextualized within the Egyptian social and political contexts and in relation to other Islamist discourses, led to highlighting several aspects that were relatively absent in the literature. Moreover, locating the discourse of such a religious social movement within the movement’s dynamics and characteristics, through a focus on its discursive aspect, namely framing, provided a different perspective.

As this project developed it argued that DS reproduced its discourse and that, given the movement’s history (emergence, resource mobilization, organization, and framing processes), the reproduction of Manhaj and the reassurance of the continuity and consistency of the discourse was the main tool of framing aiming at mobilizing the members of the movement to politically participate. This can be attributed to the fact that the members of both DS and NP at the different levels and age and gender categories expressed clearly in the field that they give priority to religious propagation over political participation and that they see religious influences to have wider and more sustainable effects when it comes to changing society as opposed to political participation. Such an approach applies to other cases in the literature of Islamist movements who had indirect political effect but were giving priority to a wider religious

and societal influence (Mahmood, 2001). Nevertheless, the fact that DS elected to enter politics with such an understanding is one of the puzzles that this study attempts to solve, while trying to avoid the projection of other Islamists' experience onto DS.

Therefore, through providing an overview of DS as a social movement which presents both the cultural and the materialistic aspects of the movement, and through operationalizing CDA to the movement's texts on social change and comparing them to the results of CDA of the interviews carried out in the field, this thesis argues that the weight of the intellectual and the cultural resources of the movement override its materialistic aspects and direct them. If the strength of MB is in its organization and centralized structure, the point of strength of DS lies in its Manhaj, which is the core of the framing processes and the cement of the movement, and which was resorted to in order to make up for the lack of discipline and the decentralized, loose nature and intellectual independence of the members of DS, and later NP. In this respect, framing of actions is necessarily used to market choices and to mobilize members. Therefore, exploring such a process (the discursive aspect of the movement) and how it is performed within DS is one of the main contributions of this thesis. This makes focusing on the ideational aspect of DS and its discourse crucial, so as to provide a solid starting point and a reference, in future studies, to understanding its policies and choices after it became a political actor.

The texts analyzed in this study were collected from both DS and NP, through archival and ethnographic research held in four Egyptian governorates over six months (July 3rd 2013 - January 7th 2014). Such texts include articles, books, papers, statements, lectures, and semi-structured and conversational interviews. These texts will be analyzed through operationalizing Norman Fairclough's three-dimensional CDA. Such a framework

allows for understanding the mutual influences between the social structure, discursive practices (social practice), and texts (events or moments of social practice) (Fairclough, 1992, 2010). On one hand, this framework is useful in highlighting the contradictions within discourse in a changing social structure, and in explaining whether such change leads to discourse transformation or reproduction. On the other, the CDA of Fairclough matches ethnographic research, since it is not confined to textual analysis but rather includes intonation, facial expressions, and body language. The combination of Ethnography and CDA allows for a comprehensive analysis of understudied social groups and movements (Fairclough, 1992, 2010).

The methodology employed is ethnographic research, rather than just depending only on interviews. This methodology provided a triangulated data collection based on observation, archival research, and semi-structured and conversational interviews. Such a methodology was useful on different grounds. It allowed for long term interaction with a large number of members of NP and DS, sometimes in informal contexts. This helped the researcher to derive useful observations and notes on DS and NP, and to gain members' confidence. Moreover, this methodology allowed for accessing a large number of DS' and NP's followers: not only on the leaders' level, but also middle level and rank and file members, with different age and gender categories and in different governorates, and various political positions.

On the one hand holding conversations with members who are not leaders or spokesmen or used to talking to media allowed for more spontaneous reactions, with uncalculated and sometimes emotional responses. This minimized the likelihood of packaged, ready-made answers and messages, while also facilitating re-checking and testing of the content of the interviews in different situations, and on different levels. Such cross-

checking was especially important given that some of the contacts were unplanned. In addition, the moment when the field work was held was an emergency and a transitional stage when the party was still new on the political scene and was encountering sweeping changes in Egypt. As such, the members were not prepared with packaged answers and preset positions as compared to periods of stability and normal conditions, and as the party gets more experience. The moment of the field work also lent itself to close scrutiny of internal divisions and differences.

The content of the interviews was corroborated using thorough archival research to trace the roots of the movement's discourse on social change over its history (late 1970s-2015). This enabled understanding and testing what DS/NP's members were saying in the field, and allowed the researcher the opportunity to provide her own historical narrative of DS' discourse on social change that was developed over almost forty years. The thesis also traces how such discourse influenced DS' members approach and contribution to the debate on social change during the political mobilization in Egypt leading to 2011 revolution, their position on the revolution, and their approach to social change upon their entry into politics. The results of the analysis of the archival material were compared to the results of the analysis of the interviews carried out in the field. This was to test whether the discourse of DS was transformed or reproduced during this transitional stage, both in Egypt and over the movement's history. The comparison was also used to test the influence of DS' foundational texts and how it was reflected in the content of what leaders, middle level and rank and file members say, and in some of the few choices they were able to make in this relatively short period of political involvement. Such a historical narrative of the discourse on social change is one of the main contributions this dissertation offers.

The main hypothesis of this thesis was that DS' vision for social and political change is in the stage of transformation due to their official involvement in politics. However, as mentioned above, the developments of this project proved this hypothesis to be inaccurate. For according to the main findings of the fieldwork and data analysis, this study argues that DS' vision for change was not transformed, but rather underwent an apparent change in the discourse. Thus, DS' representation of reality, doctrine of change, and view of the various social groups and political powers remained unchanged. In other words, DS managed to reproduce its discourse with the same content, yet in a different form in order to adapt to the change in the social structure caused by the January 2011 revolution.

Accordingly, the *main argument* of this study is that DS managed to reproduce its discourse for change, and that the reassurance of preserving the “*consistency and continuity*” of the movement's discourse on social change, constituted the core of the movement's framing process, for the sake of mobilizing its followers to participate in politics. In contrast with the initial hypothesis, reproduction of the discourse represents a point of strength for NP after entering into political interactions. The apparent changes to the discourse were introduced, rather, to facilitate the party's communication with the rest of political and social groups as a political actor.

This argument has a number of implications, among them is the fact that DS has a clear guiding line for its political actions, and that NP's policy choices conform to its original vision. In addition, this study highlights that NP, thus far, represents a model of an Islamist political party that conforms to Shura rather than to the traditional competitive power-seeking model, a position that NP is expected to uphold as long as it remains intellectually and structurally connected to DS. Thus, the social movement and its

political embodiment, despite their controversial output and lack of political experience, proved to be self-conscious of their choices that are rooted in their thought, as well as of the political model they want to establish. Under these conditions, they maneuver for the sake of keeping a foothold in the Egyptian political scene, in view of the political and the societal challenges to both their model and discourse. Such a model is distinct in the Egyptian context, and among other Islamists.

The main findings of the CDA proves that on the textual level, DS and its political arm NP, preserved the same argumentation, and word meaning, with slight changes in the wording used, where some words either disappeared or were replaced by mild words that still fall in line with the same original definitions of the movement. On the discursive level, they increasingly drew upon the political and legal discourses, yet, still secondary to the religious discourse that remained dominant. That is, DS continued to give priority to Shari'a and their policy choices are based on religious cost-benefit calculations, in reaction to the various political developments and challenges. In addition, they started to use new genres such as appearing in various talk shows, even with unveiled female TV anchors, and they tried to adopt an informal daily conversation style to be closer to the public. The combination of a strict religious discourse especially on the level of leaders, and appearing on mainstream talk shows reflected contradiction in their combination of discursive orders. Also, the fact that they drew upon the religious discourse of the movement, and express commitment to the legal framework and social conventions of Egypt, represented another contradiction. This is because, on the one hand, the religious discourse of DS defies the Egyptian legal framework and social conventions in various aspects, particularly as concerns women's rights, Christians' citizenship, art, culture and identity. On the other hand, preserving religious

calculations resulted in what seems to be costly political choices at some stages, which was hard to reason, especially coming from the party. These contradictions in the combination of orders of discourse (genre, style, and discourses) and between discourse and action can be claimed to be misleading to outsiders, who would criticize DS and NP as sacrificing their religious tenets for the sake of political gains, while they are actually sustaining their doctrine through apparent changes and compromises. In addition, these contradictions give an impression that DS and NP have a hidden agenda and that if they have the choice they would not follow the law, and would rather turn against all the foundations of the Egyptian state and society. So, the public and other social and political groups suspected both DS and NP, as after two revolutions, they were acting within a transforming social structure. Such transitional stage constituted a challenge to the movement and its political front. Owing to the fact that they attempted to hold the equation of handling sweeping political changes while preserving their religious tenets, both DS and NP have undertaken controversial policy choices.

Existing Literature on Salafism and Politics

The literature on Salafism reflects both a consensus on the problematic nature of its very concept and on the fact that Salafi groups are understudied in general. However, before January 2011 revolution, there were a number of useful conceptual and theoretical contributions that helped lay the foundation for this study, as regards definitions, concepts, history, classification and mapping the divisions among Salafis, as well as tracing their intellectual references and the employment of such references in various contexts (Haykel, 2009, Lacroix, 2009, Lauzière, 2010, Wiktorowicz, 2006). However,

most of these contributions did not focus on Egyptian Salafis, and particularly DS, as much as the development of Salafism in Saudi Arabia, gulf countries, and Jordan, except for Lauzi'ere's (2010) conceptual history approach that gave insights on publishing as a catalyst for the development of the concept of Salafism and how this development took place within the Egyptian case. Also, there is a contribution on Egyptian Salafism in (Meijer, 2009) where the study of Egyptian Salafism, and Islamism in general, focused primarily on radicals and militants especially in the wake of September 11th 2001, and on MB as the example for moderate Egyptian Islamists. In line with this comes (Heffelfinger, 2007) study on the trends in Egyptian Salafi Activism, which geared towards studying Jihadi Salafism while briefly pointing to the activism of University Islamists' in the 1970s, and the centrality of social change to their activism and thought.

Egyptian Salafis can be studied in light of the contributions on Nassir El Din Al-Albani, one of their main contemporary intellectual references (Lacroix, 2009), classifying them as quietists (Haykel, 2009, Lacroix, 2009).² Such contributions constitute a useful source for the conceptual and historical background in this thesis. Yet, this thesis shows how DS, while presenting one version of Salafism influenced by Al-Albani, is not fitting fully in the suggested categories by these contributions. This is because the nature of DS as a Salafi movement diverged from that of the other movements and groups founded on Al-Albani's thought within the Saudi, or non-Egyptian contexts in general. This, in fact, underlines another theme in the literature on the study of Islamist movements that emphasizes the importance of contextualizing such movements. While not directly engaging Salafist movements, a number of studies were useful as regards

² In the same category also falls the more recent article by (OLIDORT, J. 2015b. The Politics of "Quietist" Salafism. *The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World* [Online], 18.

clarifying the context in which the Salafi movement and discourse developed in Egypt, and to how essentialist approaches and generalizations derived from western ideologies might not be helpful in studying these movements (Mahmood, 2001, Ismail, 2003). One study actually analyzed Islamist movements as social movements (Ismail, 2004), that discussed the activities of the organized religious charity groups in Cairo, and among them Ansar Al-Sunna Al-Mohammadyya (AS) and Al-Gami'yya Al-Sahari'yya, the traditional Salafi organizations in Egypt, however, without addressing them as Salafis.

After January revolution 2011, one major study (Gauvain, 2013) focused on Egyptian Salafis in Cairo from an anthropological perspective, going back before the revolution, with insights on the relationship between Salafism and the Egyptian tradition and culture, Al-Azhar position on Salafis, Salafi enclave discourse, and how the concept of purity influenced their relationship with non-Muslims particularly Christians, and the consequences of such notions after January 2011, and when Salafis entered politics. Despite the minimal reference to DS and NP, the aforementioned issues are of interest to this study which focuses on the development of DS' discourse as an Egyptian Salafi movement, and how it relates to the country's culture, mainstream discourse, social groups and the other Islamists.

Another post-revolution contribution came to speak more directly about political Salafism in Egypt (Hamming, 2013), which applied Bourdieu's framework to explore the Egyptian Salafis' shift from a religious movement to a politically-involved one, and how such shift affected its role in both the religious and the political fields. The study argued that Salafis' discourse turned populist, as they started to draw upon political discourses that even overshadowed the religious, thus constituting a risk to Salafis' credibility and their capability of sustaining their position in the two separate fields, the

religious and the political. Hamming suggests that homogenising the political and the religious would be the way out, yet this became difficult in view of the public's dissatisfaction with the experience of MB rule. He also expected that the internal challenge for Salafis would come in the form of inter-generational conflicts, drawing parallels to other non-Egyptian Salafi groups, which is an issue to be further investigated in this thesis. The conclusion that Salafis' discourse is changing due to political interactions, despite matching the initial hypothesis of this thesis, goes in the opposite direction of what this study concludes about DS discourse upon entering politics.

Finally, a number of policy and analysis papers, and opinion articles came out trying to offer quick answers about Egyptian Salafis, who became political actors and to answer who they are and what are the prospects and the implications of their entry into politics, and the future of such actors (Lacroix, 2012, El-Sherif, 2012b, Davis-Packard, 2014, Awad, 2014, Brown, 2013, Linn, 2015, El-Sherif, 2015, Olidort, 2015a). Some of these contributions came early in 2012 when the Egyptian Salafi political engagement was still at its very beginning and before the sweeping developments that took place afterwards. Almost all these articles and papers had consensus on the fact that Salafis are highly diversified, yet studied them as one trend or one movement. Therefore, making general conclusions drawing upon inputs from different, and sometimes contradicting, Salafi groups, led to quite blurred understanding of Salafi political actors in Egypt. In addition, trying to study all Salafis at once might lead to unrepresentative samples or interviews, where some conclusions about NP for instance were derived from interviews with those who split from the party, or through focusing on its leaders rather than rank and file, and without understanding the affiliations and the relationship

of the Salafi interviewed with the party he or she represents, or separated from. Adding to this, there was a minimal representation of female Salafis in the literature reviewed. Furthermore, sometimes for policy purposes there were pre-set lists of concepts projected on Egyptian Salafi movements, seeking answers to questions that might be interesting or of concern for the West. However, through interviews, particularly if held by foreigners, Salafis' answers seemed to be more of directed messages rather than a true expression of their thought (Davis-Packard, 2014).

One problem with this last category of works on Egyptian Salafis is that they presented one line of analysis that became self-reinforcing, possibly leading to a cycle of misunderstanding, especially with the dearth of academic literature highlighted earlier. More generally, the various contributions reviewed raise questions such as what is the appropriate methodology and approach to the study of such groups; so that, for example, the views and terminology of the Salafis can be better captured? And how could the selection of the interviewees be made as objective and representative of the phenomenon under investigation? There remains also a concern with the accurate translation of the Arabic texts produced by Salafis and the understanding of Islamic legal rulings and concepts.

While this thesis was in progress, different narratives about the history of Salafis and of DS in particular started to emerge, a different situation from where finding secondary historical references was a challenge at the beginning of the project. Back then, there were no references but the primary sources of the narratives of DS' members themselves. One of the comprehensive contributions that became available is that of (Awad, 2014), which despite being closer to a detailed biography of DS, tried to operationalize social movement literature concepts, particularly structure, organization,

finances, and decision making, which lie mostly within the resource mobilization theory approach, without much focus on the Manhaj and historical evolution of the discourse of the movement. Accordingly, despite the usefulness of these contributions as regards historical narrative, and mapping of Egyptian Salafis, they did not provide in-depth undertakings on the discourse and Manhaj, and without necessarily using history to inform present actions and policy choices. This made it seem as if the movement's political participation marked a historical break or rupture with the religious movement, and shifted the movement into the political Islamists or activists' category. This opened the door for drawing parallels between DS and the MB. Moreover, due to the domination of the study of MB and radicals in the studies of Islamists in Egypt, there was a projection of the structure, strategies and *raison d'être* of the MB and other Islamist groups and factions, on Egyptian Salafis, and particularly DS and NP. As a result, to cite one example, DS in its evolution was thought to "be mimicking the MB" structure (El-Sherif, 2015), and organization, but failed to reproduce the MB model, and while trying to do this, DS was distracted from its scholarly production. Similarly, DS as a political actor, in the footsteps of MB, faces a gap between its Islamist propaganda and its political actions that come to contradict it (El-Sherif, 2015).

Another aspect of the influence of studying MB and radicals is manifested in focusing on the actions and the strategies of the Salafi parties, particularly of NP. Entering politics DS and NP are characterized as traditional power-seeking Islamist, "politicos" or activists, who would or should react to political challenges pragmatically and with no regard to their intellectual reference, where their references will or should be revised and adapted to fit in the political field and to deal with the different economic, social and political problems (El-Sherif, 2015, Brown, 2013, Lacroix, 2012). There is also a

tendency to project some types of divisions on DS and NP, ranging from inter-generational conflict (Hamming, 2013), religious versus politicians divisions (Lacroix, 2012), or divisions as concerns the management, organization and the structure within the party (El-Sherif, 2012b), through analysing the party's actions, media statements, and NP members' interviews. Some of the studies also pointed out that Salafis did not develop a political vision and model and that they need to work on this, and to be responsive to their constituency (El-Sherif, 2015); lacking political experience, they also give the impression that they are "benign" (Hamming, 2013), or do not know what they want to do, or that they are projected to fail in politics (Linn, 2015, Brown, 2013). This study questions many of these conclusions.

As a project that started in early 2012, and witnessed all the following developments on the political scene in Egypt, and of the Salafis' political experience until the 2015 parliamentary elections, this thesis focuses on one Egyptian Salafi movement, that is DS, and its political arm, NP, and on one concept or intellectual issue, that is "social change". This makes the starting point for analysis, not the political party, but rather the social movement, and particularly how its discourse on social change developed within the Egyptian context, and how this influenced, if at all, its policy choices when it entered politics. The following section will provide an overview of how this project will be presented and how the thesis developed.

What makes this dissertation different from the rest of the literature is that it focuses on the ideational aspect of DS as a social movement and how its ideology might have influenced the policy choices of its political party. Thus, the starting point is the ideology and the ideational aspects of the movement, rather than the strategies and the policies of the party, and this is the main contribution of this dissertation. Focusing on

the tactics without grounding them in the ideology or trying at least to trace the nature and the direction of the relationship between such tactics and policies and the original ideology, and between the party and the overarching movement, can prove misleading. This dissertation argues that understanding the ideational part is crucial for explaining many of the controversial policy choices.

Thesis Outline

Chapter 1: Analytical Framework and Methodology

This chapter will present the analytical framework adopted in this thesis, which is divided into two parts: social movement concepts, particularly as concerns framing; and discourse analysis as an approach to understanding the movement's ideology, or Manhaj, and framing processes. On discourse analysis, there will be an explanation of why this study adopts CDA, and why it operationalizes Fairclough's framework in particular. Then, there will be a discussion of the methodology and data collection, which is ethnographic research, as regards its utility in studying the case of DS and NP on the one hand, and how it could be combined with CDA on the other. Finally, this chapter will present an account of how the methodology was carried out in the field, and how Fairclough's framework was adapted to the case study.

Chapter 2: DS on the Map of Global and Egyptian Salafism

This chapter presents the main concepts and mapping of Salafi groups, and provides a historical overview of Salafism in Egypt, for the sake of situating DS among other Islamists and Salafis.

Chapter Three: DS' Development as a Social Movement

This chapter studies the history of the movement that goes back to late 1970s through combining the concepts of both resource mobilization theory and the cultural approach to social movements, particularly as concerns framing and meaning making, with the aim of highlighting the internal mechanisms, the survival strategies, the pattern of the state-movement relationship, the accessibility to discourse and the discursive conflicts, the intellectual references, the opportunity structures, socio-economic and political context, and the interactions that all contributed to the emergence and the survival of the movement. In this regard, a historical account of DS is not presented for its own sake, but rather for the purpose of tracing the roots of the movement's discourse within the Egyptian context. It will serve as an introduction to an in-depth analysis of the features and the components of DS' discourse on social change. Discourse, in this thesis, is not what DS says, but rather what is DS' representation of reality as a result of continuous interaction with its Egyptian context. Thus, this chapter sheds light on the nature of the movement in relation to the Egyptian state and society, and sets the stage for discussing the movement's discourse on social change and its Manhaj and methodology in view of this history.

Chapter 4: DS' Framing and the Construction of Manhaj for Social Change

In this chapter, the CDA of DS' foundational texts on social change is an attempt to understand the movement's Manhaj (methodology), or ideology, and to situate it within the Egyptian Islamist discourse. In addition, there will be a close look at the elements of their framing processes and self-identification (discursive practices) carried out within a changing social structure, thus leading to the reproduction or the transformation of the

movement's discourse for social change. Establishing a point of reference through a close look at the foundational texts for social change is done for the sake of comparing the movement's discourse, before and after they entered politics, since this study deals with DS' discourse in view of the change that took place in Egypt after January 2011, and the question of whether this led to change in DS' discourse for social change.

Chapter 5: DS' Manhaj of Gradual Reform within a Revolutionary Context

In view of the general features of DS' discourse, this chapter discusses the movement's position on revolution as a means of change, and the implication of such a position on DS' contribution in the debate on social change that took place in Egypt, particularly from 2004 and until 2011 revolution. This is accomplished through a survey and analysis of DS' texts in this period. Finally, this chapter will examine how DS put its vision for social change into action during and in the aftermath of January 2011 Revolution. In particular, the chapter will examine whether the movement's position constituted a 'vision,' or was simply a number of instantaneous reactions, in view of the movement's discourse on revolutions and protest, as well as the movement's participation in protest after January 2011.

This chapter also applies CDA to DS' texts on social change, and surveys its members' media contributions after January 2011, when DS established NP and started political interaction. This is an attempt to trace the possible transformation in DS' discourse for social change and its relationship with the various social and political groups in Egypt. The CDA results will help in understanding the framing processes that the movement carried out during the January 2011 revolution, and then to mobilize its members to participate in politics in the post-revolution period. In addition, these CDA results shed

light on processes of self-identification that became essential after entering politics and interacting with various actors. Finally, this chapter will compare the features of DS' discourse on social change post-January 2011 revolution to those of the movement's foundational discourse on change, in order to see to what extent this discourse was transformed or reproduced. In other words, whether DS' framing processes departed from, or acted as an extension to its ideology.

Chapter 6: DS' Vision for Change as a Political Actor

This chapter applies CDA to the texts collected in the field from the party (NP), and presents the ethnographic research notes, in order to compare the discourse of the party to that of the movement. Then, there is a discussion of the structural relationship between the party and the movement. Accordingly, in view of the discursive and structural relationship between the movement and the party, the nature and the policy choices and strategies of the party will be discussed, to examine how DS' Manhaj or vision was put into action when it became a political actor, and how this influences the relationship of the party with the rest of the political and social groups in Egypt. Thus, the party's actions and strategies in themselves are not the main interest, but rather how they departed from or conformed to the original discourse of the movement, or its Manhaj.

This chapter also offers examples of the aspects in which DS' and NP's discourse diverted from the mainstream discourse and legal framework in Egypt, specifically with regards to women's status and role, Christians' citizenship, and Egyptian culture. This will be done through CDA of texts collected in the field as well as the presentation of ethnographic observations, and media contributions.

Conclusion

The thesis will conclude by summarizing how DS' and NP's discourse developed within the turbulent Egyptian social and political context, and how they represent a distinct Islamist model that does not fall into the traditional categories of Islamists or Salafis. The conclusion also considers the future prospects for NP within the Egyptian political scene, particularly in view of the party's contested discourse and controversial policy choices.

CHAPTER 1: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

Introduction

In view of the literature reviewed, the features of Salafism, and of Salafi groups, presented a number of challenges to this study. Among such challenges and features is the fact that Salafis are generally understudied, particularly Egyptian Salafis. Moreover, the study is taking place in a transitional stage in Egyptian history and in the history of Egyptian Salafis in particular. Under such major political transformations, focusing on immediate political reactions and tactics might not be useful, since such policies and decisions might reflect temporary or exceptional actions that do not accurately explain the groups' true nature and orientations. In addition, Salafi groups as described by the literature are highly diversified (Gauvain, 2013), which means that studying the whole Salafi trend in Egypt might give only snapshots on each group without much in-depth understanding, something that in turn makes generalizations about the whole trend misleading. In addition, there is the fact that Salafis give priority to the text over the human agent. However, the Salafi trend gives space for applying individual reason within the limits of the holy texts, thus, individuals can self-educate themselves, without necessarily being dependent on scholars (Lacroix, 2009, Abu El-Fadl, 2005, Haykel, 2009). Such intellectual independence gives the individual and group levels of analysis relatively equal weight. Furthermore, Egyptian Salafis at the time when this project started were newcomers to politics,³ and this made the understanding of their ideologies or Manhaj (methodology) and their discourse, the only possible source for studying their political thought and orientations. Finally, the religious nature of Salafis makes their ideational and cultural component central in studying them. As a result of such

³ 'Politics' in this study denotes official involvement in the political process, establishing parties, and entering governmental institutions.

general aspects of Salafism, the question in this chapter is what is the most appropriate analytical framework, and methodology, for the study of Salafis?

In order to deal with the abovementioned challenges, this project selected one group from among Egyptian Salafis to be the focus of the study, which is DS⁴. In line with the previous literature studying Islamists using social movement theories (Wiktorowicz, 2004, Bayat, 2007, 2005, Clark, 2004, Ismail, 2004), the approach to studying DS will be also through employing social movement concepts. Therefore, the starting point in this thesis is neither the political party nor the NGO which DS members established after January 2011, but rather DS as a religious movement that entered politics and governmental institutions.

Therefore, the focus here is on how the movement emerged within the Egyptian context, and how its discourse developed in relationship to other discourses, resulting in a Manhaj (methodology and world view) and in shaping DS' relationship to other social and political groups. In this regard, the study will discuss the framing processes and dynamics this movement carried out in order to survive under an authoritarian regime, a revolution, and after entering politics.

Approaching DS through studying its discourse on social change over its history, its framing processes, and internal dynamics within the Egyptian context, is an attempt to understand DS' vision for change, which is the main question of this study. This is also to examine the hypothesis through exploring to what extent the framing processes (as a discursive practice) led to the reproduction or departure from the movements' original Manhaj (ideology), in view of political interactions, and the implications of this on the movement and, if at all, on the party.

⁴ The case study selection will be discussed in the methodology and fieldwork sections.

To answer these questions this study will employ concepts from social movement theory, particularly in discussing DS' history, then there will be a focus on DS' framing processes through the critical discourse analysis of the movement's texts on social change, which were collected through ethnographic research. Such an analytical framework and methodology will be discussed in the following sections. Then, there will be a presentation of how the methodology was carried out in the field and how the analytical framework was applied to the texts collected.

Section One: Social Movement Theory and the Study of Religious Actors

One of the significant contributions to the study of religious movements, was that of Kniss (2007). In this study, there are three levels of analysis; the cultural ideological level and how religious values and ideas may shape collective action, the organizational level and internal rules of the religious movement, and the national and global political economies, and the institutionalized relations between state and religion. It stated that it is not helpful to separate religion from movement studies, and that this was a general feature of some of the literature on religious movements. For instance, Oberschall's early study of the New Christian Right (NCR) in the USA (Oberschall, 1993a), focused on the means of organization of the NCR, rather than on the process of meaning making itself. Therefore, Kniss suggested a historical case-based hybrid of religion and social movement studies, in view of their history and without reducing one of them to the other in order to avoid questions like; does political involvement leads to religious decline. Yet, the question of how religion affects the emergence of social movements or how social movements appear within religious fields is not sufficiently studied and this

requires more comprehensive studies across different religious traditions places and times (Kniss, 2007).

Another contribution in studying religious movements was that of Snow and Byrd (Snow, 2010) where they applied framing processes on Islamic terrorist groups. The authors highlighted the fact that the west tends to generalize, and consider these terrorist groups as homogenous, which gives a distorted image of such groups. They studied some terrorist Islamic groups in the Middle East and Central Asia through examining their ideological dimension by focusing on their framing process as the key discursive mechanism. Such framing processes link ideas, values, ideology, and events in order to guarantee the support of adherents and bystanders, and to facilitate mobilization. This not only includes a call for Jihad, but also a call for violence, and to spread this message. Due to the fact that ideology is not homogenous, tight, or directly linked to behavior, there is high diversity among Islamic movements whether within global movements or inside each particular movement (Snow, 2010).

What is common in these studies is that they combined material and cultural approaches in explaining religious social movements. In this respect, dealing with DS in the way specified above would constitute a contribution to the field of religious social movements through providing an empirical study. In view of the main question and hypothesis, the study will relatively develop along these levels of analysis, and will employ framing as a key concept. In the following part of this section there will be a presentation of the main concepts of social movement theory that will be employed in this study.

Resource Mobilization Theory and the Culturalist Institutional Approach

Social movement theories mainly investigated movements' *emergence, dynamics, and outcomes* (Jenkins, 1983). Such theories were dominated by two main influences: the *materialistic rationalist approach* represented in the *Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT)*, and the *culturalist institutionalist approach* that was associated with the development of the *political process approach*, and the concepts of *framing* and *opportunity* (McAdam, 1996). Whereas traditional social movement analysis was focused on the '*breakdown theory*' or the '*strains theory*' that attributes the formation of social movements, religious sects, and extremist groups to the occurrence of social changes that lead to dissatisfaction and *grievances*. However, systematic research proved that grievances are not sufficient to understand the formation of sustainable social movements (Oberschall, 1993b). Yet, this concept remains relevant to the case of DS and particularly as concerns its emergence.

Regarding the sustainability of a movement the two main issues that prevailed in the discussion of the various RMT theorists were the resources controlled by the group before the beginning of the mobilization efforts, and the mobilization and organizational processes by which the movements direct such resources towards social change, and how outsiders may contribute to the increase of these resources (Jenkins, 1983). Despite the fact that in the case of DS the ideational part has more weight than these materialistic components, they will be studied in order to understand the dynamics and the survival strategies of the movement at different stages, and how this was later reflected on the party. However, these materialistic factors will be connected to the ideational ones, e.g. the resources of the movement and whether they come from voluntary local sources or foreign ones, and how they influence the intellectual

background and agenda of the movement. In addition, among the resources in religious movements there are social relations, that are for instance faith sisterhood/brotherhood connections in the case of DS, as a source of keeping organization and mobilization within a large group (Oberschall, 1973). Moreover, RMT also gives a perspective on the conditions favorable to the initiation of mobilization, which include, for instance the loosening of social control due to a division among the ruling class, or long or unsuccessful wars, as these factors will exhaust the regime resources; hence, it will be difficult to control and suppress opponents, which are conditions that might have contributed to the Islamic resurgence movement, and could explain the emergence of DS in Egypt as part of this wider movement (Oberschall, 1973). While the main obstacles to mobilization are for instance the problem of counter-movements and organized opposition that will resist the goals of the movement, such as the MB, other Islamist movements, and leftists in the case of DS. Another obstacle is the participation cost and negative sanctions under an authoritarian regime and how this factor influenced DS-state relationship and whether it influenced DS' position on protest and revolution. Finally, whether the limited resources were an obstacle to the movement's mobilization (Oberschall, 1993b).

In this respect, mobilization is defined as the potential of a movement depending on its pre-existing group organization (Jenkins, 1983). According to Oberschall "*organization provides a mechanism for resources commitment to some central group or agency that then allocates these resources to the pursuit of collective goals and organization maintenance*" (Oberschall, 1993b). Such organization can be easily attained if a group already has a strong identity so that its members can be easily mobilized (Jenkins, 1983, McCarthy, 1988). Nevertheless, there has been a debate among RMT theorists on the

means and structures of organization as regards to their efficiency in promoting mobilization. For instance, there were discussions on whether a centralized tight structure or de-centralized loose structure can help in reducing conflicts within the movement, and whether a central leadership and maximization of division of labor can promote integration, or that this should be substituted by informal networks and an over-arching ideology (McCarthy, 1988, Jenkins, 1983). Such debate on organization will be examined in the case of DS, in order to highlight the dynamics of the movement and how this affected its mobilization when the movement entered politics.

In this study, discussing DS' resources, mobilization and organization will be combined with studying the relationship between the movement and its *political context*, *political opportunity structures*, and the *processes of interpretation and framing*. In this regard, Tarrow (1998) warned that contention is not all about struggles over meaning, and excess focus on this side of contention diverts attention from social networks, and connective structures and away from the links of imagined and lived experiences. For him, culture is in fact embedded in structural changes and in how political opportunity triggers discursive responses on what people choose to do when they act collectively. Thus, there should be a middle space between the ungrounded formulations of rational choice theory, and the all too grounded interpretations of culturalism, hence there should be focus on *opportunities* and constraints, repertoires and *framing*, *mobilizing structures*, as well as cycles and *institutional response* (Tarrow, 1998).

Political Opportunity and Political Opportunity Structure

As one of the prominent theorists in the political process approach put it, the interaction of organization with opportunities produces a repertoire, that in turn limits the actions of

contending parties (Tilly, 1988). In this regard, political opportunities are defined as the consistent, albeit neither fixed nor permanent, dimensions of the political environment. Such dimensions stimulate collective action by influencing people's prospects of success or failure (Tarrow, 1998). Adopting a partially rationalist approach, Tarrow emphasized that people's choice to take action or to remain inactive, might depend to a great extent on the changes in the available opportunities. However, political opportunities cannot make up for the long-term weaknesses in cultural, ideological, and organizational resources (Tarrow, 1998). In the light of such definitions the concept of opportunity is essential in understanding DS' decisions to abstain from political participation under Mubarak, to establish a political party in 2011, and to be the only surviving Islamist party after 2013 revolution.

The main dimensions of opportunity are; first, increasing access, for instance due to the adoption of some reform policies, second, shifting alignments, third, divided elites, fourth, influential allies, and finally, repression and facilitation. Opportunities also depend on state strength and strategies (McAdam, 1996, Tarrow, 1998). In this regard, Kriesi (2007) introduced a framework that links political opportunity to the whole political context. He suggested that the *political context* is formed of a number of components that are interlinked. First, *structures*, which encompass the *international context*, *political institutions*, *cultural models*, and *cleavages structures*, second, the *configuration of political actors* which determines the forms of *alliances* and *conflict* structures, and third, the *interaction context* that links both structure and configuration. This third level of analysis includes the *strategies* of public authorities and policy makers, and the *opportunities* that influence the choice of the strategies of collective political actors. These collective actors' strategies, in turn, influence strategies of public

authorities and political actors (Kriesi, 2007). However, Kriesi admits that this framework is west-centric, and is mainly applicable to democracies, and he recommended that it should be subject to modifications in order to be useful in studying cases in non-democracies, as well as on cases of inter-, supra-, and transnational levels, and that the role of media should be also integrated in this approach (Kriesi, 2007). Despite the fact that the political context framework in its relation to political opportunity is more relevant to democratic systems, it remains useful in understanding how DS reacted to the political opportunities available in the system, in view of DS-state relationship, its ideology (Manhaj), alliances and conflicts. Yet, to act upon an opportunity, the movement should frame it using its own terms.

Framing

An attractive message and a just cause are not sufficient for mobilization, unless they are efficiently framed and communicated to the movement's constituency, and to the public on a wider scope, in the field of symbols and issues (Oberschall, 1993b). In this regard, Zald (1996) attributed political and mobilization opportunities to the reframing of grievances and injustices in a way that leads to action, and that such process usually reflects cultural contradiction.

Contrary to RMT, framing concepts imply that social movements are not defending preconfigured ideas but are developing and producing meanings, organizing experience, and guiding action, through simplifying the events and realities with the intention of mobilization for their 'protagonists,' 'antagonists,' and 'bystanders.' And that this *meaning production* process is dynamic, where framing is a continuing process in which

frames are constantly articulated and elaborated, to generate meanings that are not only different from the existing frames but are challenging them (Snow, 2000, Snow, 2007).

Framing processes involve discursive processes that include talk and conversations, speech acts and written communications of movement members that are developed through two processes. First, *frame articulation* which means linking events and experiences, leading to a new vision or interpretation. The second process is *frame amplification* which involves highlighting some issues, events, or beliefs as being more important than others (Snow, 2000). In fact, frames understanding depend on these two processes rather than the topics or issues that such frames deal with, and this requires field work overtime and access to discourse (Snow, 2000). Discursive processes are also linked to ideology; however, are rarely determined by them. They are rather considered elaborate articulations of the existing ideologies or ideas and beliefs, hence they act as *extensions* to ideologies (Snow, 2007). There is also the Strategic Processes that is the goal directed framing meant to attain certain purposes, for instance, to obtain resources or mobilize members and this involves bridging, extension, amplification, and transformation. Framing also involves contested processes where frames are contested from within the movement itself and from counter-movements and media (Snow, 2000).

However, such framing processes do not exist in vacuum but are embedded in political opportunity structures, affect and are affected by cultural opportunities and constraints, and are influenced by the type of their targeted audience. Accordingly, framing cannot be sufficiently understood unless it is contextualized in its discursive field or discursive opportunity structures, which suggest that the shape and history of discursive framing processes and the fields that they are embedded in are not only a result of the stream of

events, cultural resources, and interactants, but also of the political context in which they exist (Snow, 2000, Snow, 2007).

In line with this, the political opportunity structure, by itself, is incapable of explaining why there are variations in the degree of facilitation and constraints of social movements. This is due to the absence of the study of the ideational aspects of movements. Also, the framing approach that focuses on the cultural and discursive sides of social movements, cannot explain why some frames succeeded and others failed (Koopmans, 1999). Therefore, in order to make up for that they linked up both the political opportunity structure, and the framing model. As a result, in their analysis, they adopted the concept of discursive opportunity structures that determines which ideas are sensible, constructions of reality are realistic, and claims of the legitimate⁵ could be accepted in a certain polity and at a specific time. In this regard, they developed a model that assesses the different reactions of the elite to the actions of the challengers in view of the opened-closed discursive and institutional opportunities (Koopmans, 1999). This model states that if the discursive and institutional opportunities are closed, the movement will collapse or at least be marginalized. In case the two opportunities are opened, then the movement will get access to and concessions from the elite. However, if the discursive opportunity is available while the institutional opportunity is closed, the movement will be able to influence the public but not as an official political actor. This was partially the case of some Salafis before the revolution, where Salafis had access to media, mosques, and schools, but were not officially involved in politics. Also, in this case the elite will accommodate some of the movement's ideas that do not contradict the

⁵ On cultural environment and boundaries of the legitimate see also (WILLIAMS, R. H. 2007. The Cultural Contexts of Collective Action: Constraints, Opportunities, and the Symbolic Life of Social Movements. *In*: DAVID A SNOW, S. A. S., HANSPETER KRIESI (ed.) *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*. UK Blackwell Publishing.

dominant interests and cultural codes. Meanwhile, the movement's collective action will be subject to repression (pre-emption). Finally, if the discursive opportunities are closed but the institutional opportunities are opened, then the elite will allow some elements of the movement to become official political actors, and to enter institutions. Nevertheless, these institutional opportunities are dependent on the movement's adherence to the dominant rules (co-optation) (Koopmans, 1999). While this classification is relatively rigid, it helps in understanding DS-state relationship pattern, as well as its prospects after it entered politics.

In view of the relationship between the political context and its facilitation to processes of framing, Snow (2007) mentions that framing and ideological work can still proceed even within a repressive political structure in private hidden contexts and this means that whether the structure helps or not, these processes will take place but in different ways and degrees. This can be useful in studying DS' activities under the successive authoritarian regimes, and to investigate to what extent their framing activities were hidden, or took place in public. Also, whether DS had ambitions to enter politics officially, or that their framing processes in this regard started only after the revolution, given that the available opportunities do not influence the movement until the leaders define them as opportunities (Snow, 2000).

Another aspect of framing is that it is responsible for identity construction, yet is not the only mechanism to explain the relationship between personal and collective identity (Snow, 2000). In this respect, Miethe adopts the concept of keying processes as a level of analysis to study social movements, which is the analysis of the reasons of frames formation and their function for the actors (Miethe, 2009). This concept relates the 'biographical disposition' of single actors in a movement to the understanding of the

fluctuations of participants in the social movements, where the reframing processes that take place in association with the changes of the social movement can be related to the individual actor. So, this actor might be acting according to her own primary frame and her choices might not correspond to those of other participants within the group. In this keying process, there are processes of up-keying, and down-keying, that may be adding or removing layers of the frame, hence, in some cases, leading to a fit between the individual and the collective frame, rather than the withdrawal of the individual from the group (Miethe, 2009). This concept is interesting as concerns DS case particularly with the individual reason and intellectual independence of Salafis in general. Thus, the keying concept will be adapted to the study of DS in the light of the importance of the individual level in this type of movements. This would help in understanding to what extent there were divisions within DS at the different stages of its political engagement, and how individuals within the movement reacted to its framing processes.

Given that framing is central in this study, the primary focus will be on DS' discourse, therefore, the abovementioned questions and concepts will be discussed through the application of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to texts collected from DS and NP. The following section will discuss why this study is adopting CDA, particularly Fairclough's framework.

Section Two: Critical Discourse Analysis

This study uses CDA which is not an analysis of discourse in itself, but rather of the dialectical relations between discourse and other objects, elements, or moments, as well as an analysis of the internal relations of discourse (Fairclough, 2010: 4). Such

definition goes in line with aspects of the above mentioned definition of framing. In this regard, CDA, from among other approaches to discourse analysis, is more appropriate to the study of framing processes of a social movement within a certain context. This is because this critical realist approach recognizes the social world as constructed, yet distinguishes between construals (interpretations) and construction, and in order for construals to have a socially constructive effect, certain conditions should exist, such as power relations. This means that CDA is a moderate form of social constructivism (Fairclough, 2010: 4). Thus, CDA is not just an analysis of discourse (texts) but “a systematic transdisciplinary analysis of relations between discourse and other elements of social process” (Fairclough, 2010: 10). In this regard, CDA shows the origins of discourse and how it is formed through articulating together existing discourses in an attempt to answer “why and how certain strategies and discourses emerge in particular social circumstances?” (Fairclough, 2010: 19). In addition, CDA helps to explore the relations of dialogue, contestation, and dominance between discourses such as the debate between different strategies through rhetorically oriented analysis, why certain strategies succeed and others fail and what strategies might be better. Moreover, CDA looks at recontextualization of discourses which means how particular discourses become dominant and hegemonic across structural boundaries (social fields; such as education and politics) or scalar boundaries (local, national, and regional) (Fairclough, 2010: 20). This understanding of discourse speaks to the combination of political context, opportunities and framing processes discussed earlier, and helps in understanding the relationship between the religious and the political in DS’ discourse, before and after extending its activities from the religious field to politics. In addition, it

gives an insight into how DS' discourse relates to the Egyptian local discourses, and to Global Salafism by far and large.

CDA also is mainly interested in questions of why and how particular strategies and discourses appeared at specific social circumstances? It also tries providing an answer to what extent these discourses changed, and how they were legitimized? How the past was narrated and how the future is imagined? (Fairclough, 2010: 19). This makes CDA closer to the main research question of this study, helping to answer the question of whether DS' discourse has changed after the structural changes brought about by January 2011 revolution, and how did DS narrate the past in order to justify the change? and how do DS' followers imagine the future?

Upon surveying the various trends in CDA, this study will apply Fairclough's three dimensional framework, which investigates language in relation to power and ideology, and is unveiling the discursive nature of the contemporary social and cultural changes (Wodak, 2009: 6-7). This framework states that there are three levels of social life: social structure, social practices, and social events. The social structure influences and is influenced by practices. Such practices take place through institutions, organizations, and networks of practices, and are constituted of certain elements: actions, representations, and identification. Such elements have semiotic aspects, which are the orders of the discourse. In this regard, '*genre*' is the discursive aspect of action, '*discourses*' are the semiotic aspect of representation, and '*style*' is the semiotic part of identification. These social practices (actions, representations, and identifications) and their respective discursive aspects (genres, discourses, and styles) lead to the occurrence of events, where texts are the discursive aspect of the events (Fairclough, 2010). Texts here are not confined to written texts, but also conversations and interviews, as well as

multimodal texts, such as visual images. All this means that social and discursive practices are the link between the structure (the social and political context in this study) and the events (texts) (Fairclough, 2010: 232-233, 163).

The researcher operationalized Norman Fairclough's CDA framework as a means of keeping a distance between herself and the texts collected through applying a three-level framework. This firstly investigates textual features (wording, word meaning, metaphors, theme...), and secondly discursive practices (genre, style, discourses) which are seen as semiotic aspects of social practices (actions, identification, and representation). Thirdly, the societal level or contextualization of DS' discourse within the Egyptian context (international influences, political institutions, alliances and conflicts, cultural models, and interactions) was examined drawing on the literature and on the field observations (Kriesi, 2007; Richardson, 2014; Sjölander, 2011).

CDA also offers a robust safeguard against the risks of a researcher taking the content of interviews at face value. According to the above explanation of CDA, such an approach is useful in highlighting contradictions within the texts, in the discursive combinations, and between the texts and the Egyptian context. It also allows for understanding the relationship between the religious and the political in DS' discourse, and how they identify themselves within the texts, thus in understanding the nature of DS/NP's role and identity as a religious actor within a political context, in departure from the rest of the literature. It also allows for answering the question of whether the contradictions that took place in times of transition led to the transformation or the reproduction of DS' discourse. This is while taking into consideration that discourse here is not just what DS/NP's members say as such, but rather how they represent reality. Thus, what is presented in this dissertation is the results of the CDA of the

interviews and of the archival material in the light of the observations, but not the content of the interviews. The researcher examined how DS/NP's ideology (Manhaj of social change) was constructed through looking at textual features, interdiscursivity and intertextuality, and how it was sustained through a dynamic process of framing that proved to be an extension of their ideology, within the different political contexts throughout their history. Using this framework, the study will analyze the texts that are produced by DS and NP concerning social and political change pre- and post-revolution Egypt. This analysis is not primarily concerned with what a particular sheikh or DS member says, but rather with the "social sources" and the "social effects" of the texts' production (Herzog, 2016: 69).

In this concern, following Fairclough's framework, the textual analysis is of dual character: interdiscursive analysis and multimodal analysis. Interdiscursive analysis is an analysis of which discourses, genres, and styles are drawn upon in a text, and how they are articulated together, where texts can draw upon and articulate together multiple discourses, genres, and styles. Thus, the interdiscursive level links the micro level of the texts to social analysis of practices, organizations, and institutions. This is while the multimodal analysis deals with the different semiotic modes (language, visual images, body language, music and sound effects), and their articulation (Fairclough, 2010: 7). In view of the proposed analytical framework for this study and the definition of texts that are the unit of analysis, the methodology suggested for this study is ethnographic research. The next section discusses how ethnographic research can be combined with CDA.

Ethnography and Discourse Analysis

The main reason for why CDA and ethnography can be combined is the multimodal nature of texts within CDA. Since discourse is both semiotic and non-semiotic, the definition of texts in CDA puts aside the primacy of language, and gives attention to other semiotic systems as well, such as bodily semiotics (gesture, touch, and proximity), visual semiotics (static and moving), semiotics of sound and music (Chouliaraki, 1999, Hart and Cap, 2014). In this respect, ethnography would complement CDA, in order to provide a deeper understanding of texts and to present more details.

In addition, in order “to establish mediating links between text and context: one really needs to engage in social and ethnographic research over significant periods of time in particular institutional settings, and gatherings and in analyzing textual samples and information on social and cognitive aspects, of their production and interpretation, as a part of this more broadly defined research” (Jaworski, 1999: 208). In fact, Fairclough’s definition of text as including linguistic analysis, visual images analysis, and body language analysis shows how the multimodal nature of texts in CDA can be served most by the use of ethnography (Fairclough, 2010: 234). “Discourse analysis here works together with ethnographic research that locates discourse as a part of wider set of social practices” (Chouliaraki, 1999: 45). In order for CDA to link the findings to its “text producers and institutions, it has to empirically involve the social world engaged in the production and reception of the text,” and here lies “the importance of an ethnographically driven CDA” (Richardson et. al., 2014: 234).

Section Three: Ethnographic Research

Ethnographic research is suitable to study DS as a religious movement that entered politics officially and for the first time in 2011, since ethnographic methods are of particular use in situations “in which the social issues or behaviors are not yet clearly understood” (Angrosino, 2007: 26). In addition, it is also useful in “accounting for unpredicted outcomes,” “identifying participants in a social setting,” “and documenting a social process” (Angrosino, 2007: 26). In addition, despite the rare use of ethnographic research on the side of political scientists, it is an appropriate research strategy in situations of studying small groups that are marginalized in the political system, and that might also be secret groups (Burnham, 2008: 249), and Salafis were always marginalized politically and now are a new political actor that needs to be explored, while being understudied over their history. Also, ethnography proved to be useful in providing more precise results than confining research to semi-structured interviews in cases of studying far right groups, revolutionary groups, and small social movements (Burnham, 2008). Moreover, “interviews should wherever possible be used in conjunction with other methods, for example the examination of primary archive material or participant observation,” (Stedward, 1997: 152) both are techniques of ethnographic research.

Thus, ethnography is the most convenient method to study DS for a number of reasons. First, Salafis have been subject to generalizations, since most of the previous literature and the media dealt with Salafis as one bloc. That is why there was a motivation for this study to focus on only one group, and to go beyond the packaged answers in interviews, through adopting ethnography that gives the chance to grasp more details and allows for a deeper understanding as a result of a long term, closer interaction with the

movement's members. Second, they are newcomers to the Egyptian political scene. Third, ethnography provides details about the settings, the symbols, clothing, gestures, and all the issues that might help in understanding these groups, particularly with the importance of the cultural dimension in this movement (Hart, 2014; Richardson et al, 2014). Finally, it is also interesting to see how these groups will interact with a female researcher, coming from a British university, affiliated with Cairo University, and having a different political and religious attitude. Accordingly, a closer look at the interaction within DS and NP can lead to interesting conclusions, and might take the researcher to new areas and topics. Such expected results stemmed out of the characteristics of ethnography, as field-based, personalized, multi-factorial (involving two or more data collection techniques), long-term connection, inductive, dialogic (subjects can comment on the researcher's findings), and holistic (an attempt to cover the fullest details as possible of the group studied) (Angrosino, 2007: 15).

Data Collection

Concerning data collection in ethnography, it is done through *observing* and *recording* the behavior of the people in a *natural social setting*, and this might be supported by formal or informal *interviews*, and the collection of *documentary materials* (Burnham, 2008: 265). Angrosino believes that "good ethnography is usually the result of triangulation- the use of multiple data collection techniques to reinforce conclusions" (Angrosino, 2007: 33), and that there are three key skill areas that should be part of the repertoire of all fieldworkers: *observation*, *interviewing*, and *archival research* (Angrosino, 2007: 37).

a- Observation:

“Observation is the act of perceiving the activities and interrelationships of people in the field setting through the five senses of the researcher,” (Angrosino, 2007: 37), while keeping professional distance that allows the researcher to observe and record data (Fatterman, 2010).

Types of participant observation:

Participant observation varies between passive and active participants, and between the complete participant (covert method), and complete observer (Burnham, 2008, Burgess, 1982).

Concerns about Participant Observation

In case of adopting a covert method there might be ethical problems, such as being concealed, the researcher cannot pose questions to subjects, and it puts the researcher in the position of a spy (Burgess, 1982). As for the participant observer “personal characteristics” might influence “roles, relationships, and data” (Burgess, 1982: 46). For instance, how the factors of gender, age, and ethnicity of the researcher can influence the fieldwork. There is also the risk that the participant observer might be driven towards the involvement in situations in which “his values are being questioned or attacked” (Burgess, 1982: 47). Nevertheless, a non-participant observant may be alienated in a Salafi context, where people are skeptic of outsiders due to long history of marginalization, negative social images, state repression, and security prosecution. Hence, a minimum participation or silence might hinder a successful rapport, and the researcher may not be able to gain the subjects’ confidence. For, in cases of successful integration in the community, the “subjects of the study will learn to take the researcher

for granted and will thus behave almost as though he or she were not there, and the researcher will get ‘under the skin’ of the subjects and learn to think almost as they think” (Burnham, 2008: 267-268).

In the light of these concerns, the researcher assumed a participant observant role, where she was open about her identity.

b- Interviewing:

Types of interviews:

Interviews cannot be confined to structured or unstructured typologies. They would rather fall onto a continuum. At one end of this continuum is the free interview, where the respondent is allowed to lead the discussion within broad lines set by the interviewer; while at the other end is the tightly structured interview, in which the interviewer cannot deviate from the questionnaire (Stedward, 1997). In case of elite interviews, deciding the type of interview depends on a number of factors, such as the time available for the interview and the level of rapport between interviewer and interviewee (Stedward, 1997). However, political research mostly uses semi-structured interviews, particularly in cases of elite interviews, where there is a schedule of a “limited number of topic-related questions and pre-determined, alternative supplementary questions” (Pierce, 2008: 118, Burnham, 2008: 231).

According to Burnham (2008) in semi-structured interviews, first, interviewers will have to prepare a list of topics or questions, but unlike questionnaires the “interview guide is used as a check-list of topics to be covered, although the order in which they are discussed is not-preordained” (Burnham, 2008: 240). Second, interviewers should prioritize the topics. Third, the interviewer must not impose a rigid framework in order

to allow the opening of new topics and areas that can lead to new questions. Generally, interviews differ according to the cultural contexts that they are held in and it is useful to take notes of the context of the interview as regards to the location and the impressions of the interviewee (Stedward, 1997: 161).

Interviews in Ethnography

As regards to interviews in ethnographic research, Angrosino (2007) sees that the ethnographic interview is an open ended interview by nature, however, it might be also a semi-structured interview. Yet in ethnography, semi-structured interviews should develop out of open-ended interviews in order to clarify issues that were discussed, and this gives the interview a more conversational format. This study tried to apply this type of interviews whether with elite, whenever possible, or with rank and file members of DS and NP. Otherwise, the researcher carried out semi-structured interviews, depending on the time that the interviewee was willing to spend. Sometimes also the interviews developed from the situations such as a meeting in the party discussing a certain agenda, or in a visit in one of the homes where the researcher gets introduced to family members of the interviewee.

Archival research:

“Archival research is the analysis of materials that have been stored for research, service, and other purposes both official and unofficial” (Angrosino, 2007: 49). In this study archival research was carried out in order to be able to retrieve the foundational texts of DS on social change, the main concept of this study, and to follow up the variations on such texts over the movement’s history, through following the movement’s and the party’s statements, articles, lessons, religious rulings, and Friday

speeches in this regard. This archival research also would complement the interviews in putting a narrative of the movement's history within the framework discussed above.

Sampling and Case Study

Concerning sampling “the research questions shape the selection of a place and a people or program to study” (Fatterman, 2010: 35). First, the researcher can choose who and what not to study, second, to select who and what to study. In view of ethnography, judgmental sampling is mostly used where ethnographers depend on their judgment to select the most appropriate members of the group studied according to the research question (Fatterman, 2010, Burgess, 1982). Using this approach of sampling, the researcher simply collects information about the individuals and what they do (Fatterman, 2010). In this study, the researcher decided on the field upon following up the situation, and collecting information about the various Salafi political parties from media, officials, the public, and previous experience. There is also snowball sampling whereby researchers use informants to introduce them to other members of their groups. Such an approach is found in studying groups that are difficult to contact (Burgess, 1982), which was the case in this study as will be discussed in the next section.

In addition, the rigorous randomized strategy can be used if the researcher already knows a great deal about the culture or unit they are studying (Fatterman, 2010). However, if the people were under-studied, the use of highly structured randomized design might lead to narrowing the focus of the study, hence will lead to losing important details, and the chance of talking to relevant people. Therefore, in order to carry out efficient sampling besides studying the previous literature, it is crucial to go in the field and to explore the people (Fatterman, 2010: 35-36), therefore, in the case of

understudied Salafis, the case study was decided upon arrival in the field, through judgmental sampling.

The Case study:

The case study in this thesis is Al-Da'awa Al-Salafyya (Salafi Call) in Alexandria, that established Al-Nor (Light) party, the first Salafi political party.

Section Four: The Fieldwork and Analysis

The Fieldwork

The researcher passed the University of Birmingham ethics committee review process and was prepared and authorized to start the field work in July 2013. The arrival of the researcher in Egypt was on July 3rd: this transpired to be the day when President Mohammed Morsi was officially removed from power, General Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi's speech was delivered and the political powers' meeting was held with NP's obvious presence. After one day of celebrations, unrest and violent reactions started from the side of Morsi's supporters,⁶ where gunshots were heard in the neighborhood of the researcher in the middle of Cairo. Under such conditions and due to ethics committee instructions, the researcher could not move around, especially given that there was a curfew in place. When security conditions relatively improved, the researcher had to select one of the politicized Salafi groups and to start to contact them. As mentioned above this study focused on the Salafis who adopt political means, rather than militants or apolitical Salafis. At this stage of the fieldwork one would see Salafis on the Raba'a sit-in that was organized by Morsi's supporters, threatening the use of violence if Morsi

⁶ According to media sources.

does not get back to the palace, and their sit-in was broadcasted live on TV. There were talks in media that it is an armed sit-in, in addition the researcher was advised not to approach this sit-in or to contact their leaders who might be targeted by the police due to claims about their involvement in violence or at least violence incitement, in addition there was popular outrage against them. Thus, avoiding such contacts was not only because of security reasons but also so as not to look suspicious in front of the security institutions in the country.

However, with the development of the situation excluding the Salafi supporters of Morsi (Al-Asala, Al-Fadila, Al-Raya, Construction and Development, and Al-Watan parties) was not only for practical and security reasons, but also because events proved them to be first, an extension to MB,⁷ and this study is not interested in analyzing MB political thought and strategies. Second, as mentioned above many of the ex-Jihadi elements threatened the use of violence. Finally, none of these parties survived in politics, and they disappeared from the political scene. Also, this comes in the light of the researcher's experience of Salafis from previous research, and the fact that she was able to meet a number of their leaders before her PhD program, for research purposes, e.g. Mohammed Abdel Maqsoud (March 2011), Mohamed Hassan (March 2011), Tarek Al-Zumur after a protest (September 2011), and members of AS, besides attending lessons in one of the Salafi schools in 2010 as part of an ethnographic research, as a research assistant. The understanding of their general orientations and classifying them in view of the events that took place starting January 2011 provided the researcher with some guiding lines to decide the case study.

⁷ This will be discussed in chapter 2.

Such givens made the most suitable case for this study DS and NP which through the field work and the analysis proved to be presenting a new Islamist model that diverted from the thought of MB and the rest of Salafis on the local and the global levels. Thus, the selection of the case study was for both practical reasons, as well as for fitting into the scope of this study.

As for NP being part of the July 3rd, 2013 Road Map, this made them under threat from their fellow Islamists on one hand, and adhering to their appearance as bearded men or women wearing Niqab made them targeted by the public who might think that they are Morsi supporters on the other hand. Under such conditions, it was difficult to reach the party's headquarters or to find any contacts. The researcher used the telephone guide and headed to three available addresses but no one of them was right. In one of the three places, it was a cupping centre in Al-Zawya Al-Hamra,⁸ in Cairo, where the owner of the centre was known to his neighbours as "Al-Nor member who goes every day to Raba'a," which was contradicting in the light of his party's official position. The researcher was able to reach him over the phone while he was in the sit-in, and he was angry, and promising that "Morsi will come back," he criticized NP and said that he is now a member of Al-Raya party, who might be classified as revolutionary Salafis (Lacroix, 2016). The researcher was then able to reach the number of a DS' office in Alexandria, and was guided to the NP's secretariat general in Imbaba, Giza, where there were no banners or any signs that shows that this is NP headquarter. The place was new and not fully furnished, and there through the help of an office boy, the researcher was put in contact with Mr. Mahmood Shaltoot one of the party's youth members, the head of NP's Al-Tablyya office, Giza, and who carried some administrative work in the

⁸ Visited on July 11th 2013.

secretariat general of the party. The first meeting⁹ was on July 20th, 2013, and was more of an introduction to the researcher and the project, and general chat about the history of the movement and the party, besides discussing the events taking place in Egypt. The researcher then started to have extended meetings with middle level members and young leaders, since the activities of the party was almost frozen except for the supreme committee meetings that the researcher was not allowed to attend and she was told that their timing and place are not known except in the last minute for security reasons. By August 25th the researcher started to see young members of the supreme committee of NP, and to have various visits to see her contact in the secretariat general and exchange talks with whoever present there. However, some of the members were still cautious and had security concerns, as the researcher was once told “why would we let you in and make you meet the leaders, even if we trust you and you have good intentions you might be used and exploited by anybody, research is also a sensitive area.” However, by time the researcher gained more of the members’ and young leaders’ confidence especially with developing personal contacts, acting informally, being open about her project and identity, and even directly asking them for help and cooperation with the project. On August 28th, the researcher attended a press conference in the party secretariat general where she was introduced to some of the leaders as a researcher writing the first PhD thesis on NP and DS. In September, the researcher managed to meet more young leaders, visited the party’s secretariat in Giza, and attended a youth meeting in Al-Talbiyya. Despite spending time in the headquarters, seeing members of the party in their offices and work places, having phone calls to exchange conversations, and attending a youth meeting, under such conditions in Egypt, the researcher needed an

⁹ The researcher was able to meet over 56 members from both DS and NP in different situations and places.

extension of the field work, especially that she was able to make herself familiar and present in the party, which would widen the scope of the field findings and observations.

The first three months of field work came to an end in September 2013, and the researcher had to go to the UK for a short visit in October 2013 to meet her supervisor and report back, consult on some issues, and ask for an extension of the field work, particularly when there were concerns over the security situation in Egypt due to an attempt to assassinate the minister of interior at the time. However, the researcher as per ethics committee, and supervisor's instructions put her security first and moved only when it was safe to go around, respected curfew timings, and avoided places of unrest, while accompanied by family members or a driver, and by making herself accessible all the time through the phone. By time the researcher's contact in NP was also accompanying her in many meetings. Being accompanied was also a religious requirement to meet some of the members. Besides, while knowing that the researcher is unveiled they asked her to wear the veil in some meetings.

After three more months, in the field the researcher had already gained confidence, contacts and made her network in NP. The second part of the field work was intensive, it witnessed visits to Alexandria, two cities in Al-Buhayra, and Al-Fayyom. In this part of the field work, the researcher had access to the female community not only on the leaders' level but also among the young female members, where the total number of female members met was thirty-three women. Beside home visits, the researcher attended one of their meetings in Alexandria NP's secretariat general. The researcher also was able to meet two of the founders of DS; Sheikh Yasser Borhami in a ministry of health clinic, and then on a highway drive to a religious lesson. Sheikh Ahmed Farid,

also exceptionally agreed to meet a researcher, and the meeting was in a mosque, where being spontaneous and non-politicized sheikh Farid meeting was representative of the religious side of DS, and gave account of the history and development of the movement and the decision to participate in politics. However, Sheikh Abu Edris, the head of DS, does not like to talk to media or researchers, and Sheikh Al-Moqaddem also exceptionally expressed willingness to meet the researcher yet when he could not, he sent his secretary with a book about the foundations of Salafism, and promised to meet later, which did not happen for time limitation of the field work. The researcher in this part of the field also met a number of second generation sheikhs who became party leaders, among them the chairman of NP in his home in Abu Hummus, and this meeting helped in opening other meetings with second DS' generation sheikhs and party leaders, middle level leaders, females and young members of DS and NP. The researcher was welcomed to spend a day in some of their homes seeing their families, chatting and sharing them meals, where the presence of the researcher's mother at times gave them a sense of comfort and familiarity. The researcher also visited a DS' kindergarten and had some notes and observations on the educational system and the activities of DS at an early age. As a typical ethnographic research, the researcher established informal relationship with some of the members of DS and NP, while being open about her identity as an independent researcher who has no political affiliations, who is not an Islamist, unveiled, belong to mainstream Muslims, has intellectual and religious differences with them, who is going to write a critical analysis about the party and the movement, and while keeping a distance since in all cases she is around only for research. As long as the researcher did not touch upon any of the security concerns of the members, they welcomed her, even if she is different, particularly when they show

respect to academia and many of them are post-graduate students or planning to be, or are researchers or already have masters and PhD degrees. On the field also the researcher went with her husband in outings in public places in Cairo with an NP contact, and he visited them for farewell. Where none of the researcher's family members are Salafis or have any Islamist orientations, however they were also welcomed in the different settings.

The fact that the researcher had a prolonged and close contact with the members of NP and DS, and was able to attend and watch various situations, and to be present in various places was treated at times not only as a researcher but also as a fellow citizen at a time of fear and unrest in the country, where the special historical moment when the field work started gave a different perspective, and highlighted many aspects of the movement and the party. Sometimes the researcher was treated as a student taking them serious through this methodology that they praised as they say no one can know them except through interaction, and this might explain their success in their close neighbourhoods where the main tool of their call for God was through face to face interactions as the researcher was told, and that they are not as successful in their media contributions. The researcher was sometimes treated as a friend or as a 'sister', and there was some sympathy especially on the side of women that she is seeking a degree on a topic they see as "controversial" in the west. The researcher was also at some occasions a subject of da'awa (call for God), especially among female members. Another observation was that they were not always politically correct, sometimes they asked to stop recording, and allowed the researcher to derive conclusions but not mention what they said exactly, and sometimes not to mention their names. Getting the same set of ideas and messages all the time sometimes in unplanned meetings and

conversations, and the fact that they have always been apolitical made them more spontaneous, thus, helped the researcher to go beyond the packaged, well prepared answers that one can get in interviews, and limited formal interactions. Long hours of talking, where meetings sometimes passed three hours helped in breaking the ice, particularly when participants were invited to go beyond the clichés of media and traditional research questions. The researcher was also keen on getting brief biographies from individuals on how and when they joined DS and when they were aware of their belonging to the movement and on what basis, and how they perceived things after political engagement, particularly post-July 3rd, 2013. Finally, there were a number of conversational interviews with random individuals who do not belong to DS or NP, about how they perceive NP and how they feel about their religious discourse, in attempt to have a more complete picture.¹⁰

The observations that the researcher took as concerns the places, the behaviour, the male-female relationships, and the way they treated the researcher at the different stages of the field work, all complemented the texts collected through conversational and semi-structured interviews. In addition, the researcher was directed to Darb Al-Atrak to collect DS' sheikhs' books, some of the members of DS also gave her books and documents. Also, rare copies of the 1980's Sawt Al-Da'awa (The Voice of Da'awa), the DS' periodical, and a soft-copy of NP's Al-Fath newspaper archive were collected. The researcher was also directed to archival material on YouTube and DS' websites.

Analysis

The data collected was analyzed using Fairclough's three levels model of analysis (Fairclough, 2010, Fairclough, 1992). In the following there will be an adaptation of this

¹⁰ This included individuals from different professions and classes, as well as both Christians and Muslims.

framework to the study of texts collected from DS and NP, both in standard Arabic and the Egyptian accent, besides, ethnographic research notes.

Analysis looks at, first, the discourse production through exploring the features of the texts, interdiscursivity, and intertextuality, second, the discourse distribution through investigating intertextual chains, and third, the consumption of the discourse through looking at the coherence as the interpretative implications of the intertextual and interdiscursive properties of the discourse sample. Finally, this analysis will link these discourse practices to the conditions of discourse that are the social and institutional aspects of discourse, for instance what sort of non-discursive effects the sample has? All these levels of analysis will be contextualized within the social context in the social level of analysis.

Textual Analysis

The text

The analysis of texts is divided into two levels. First, the construction of social relations and self, for instance, the ethos within the texts is discussed in order to explore the social identity of DS' and NP's members and leaders (self-identification, the we and the other). Texts collected in meetings and visits will be analyzed as concerns turn taking and topic control, that will be mainly derived from ethnographic research notes, where these factors can reveal the hierarchy, the type of organization, and the framing processes within both NP and DS, the female-male, and sheikhs-members relationships. The second level is connectives and argumentations, where the argumentation within the texts is discussed. In addition, there will be occasional presentation of the strategies used. Moreover, some grammatical aspects were analysed such as modality, transitivity,

theme, and cohesive markers. However, word meaning, wording and metaphors were of primary importance to this study (what are the new terms, their meanings, which meanings and words disappeared and which survived).

Intertextuality

This part of analysis explores the construction of subjects and social groups through texts, and the contribution of changing discursive practices to changes of social identity. This is done through specifying which texts are overtly drawn upon within the text or influenced the texts analysed, such as Quran, Sunna, and certain Muslim scholars. Intertextual chains also are studied in this part through following the distribution of a type of discourse sample, and the series of types it is transformed into or out, to answer questions about the sort of transformation, and the expected audience.

Discursive Practices

At this level, interdiscursivity will be analyzed in order to explore which discourses, genres, and styles do NP and DS mainly draw upon, and how the combination of these factors can help in addressing the research question, and the hypothesis, for instance, the relationship between the religious and the political in DS' discourse.

Social Practices

This level aims at exploring certain issues in view of the main questions of the study:

First, *the social matrix of discourse* as whether the context is conventional, innovative, or oppositional, to see how DS and NP's discourse interacted with other discourses within their context and the implications of this on their relationship with political and social groups. Second, *the reproduction or transformation of orders of discourse*, where

this part will take place through comparing the orders of discourse, and textual features of DS' and NP's texts, with the foundational texts on change, within the changing social and political context in Egypt, and how such context influenced the interdiscursivity and intertextuality within the sample. Third, *the ideological and political effects of discourse*, as to what extent NP was influenced by DS' ideology and original discourse, and the consequences of this on the party's policy choices, and future prospects. Where there are two visions on ideology and discourse, a *one-sided imposition* and reproduction of dominant ideology in which ideology constitutes an universal social cement, and a *site stake* in which there is constant struggle, contradiction, and transformation.

This three level framework of analysis aims at providing a deep analysis of the construction of DS' ideology and its framing processes, while contextualizing them in their social and political context, in the various stages, through focusing on the concept of "social change" for the movement, and its implications on the political party.

CHAPTER 2: DS ON THE MAP OF GLOBAL AND EGYPTIAN SALAFISM

Introduction

This study is interested in DS' vision for social change in the sense of how it was constructed and how it evolved with the development of the movement and its framing processes in the Egyptian context. In order to provide a thorough understanding for the history of DS as a social movement and the history of its discourse on social change, in relationship with other discourses, it is important to situate DS on the map of Egyptian Salafism, and to explore the foundations that shaped the movement.

Accordingly, this chapter begins with a presentation of the main tenets of Salafism, and how these are connected to the concept of social and political change. Then, the second section discusses how the aspects and different definitions of change contributed to the classification of Salafi movements and to the development of the main trends within global Salafism. Finally, section three will present DS' intellectual background, in view of the trends of global Salafism, and DS' narrative of the history of Egyptian Salafism and of how they perceive other Salafis. This is not only for the sake of providing a historical account, but rather to explore DS' self-identification, how they see other Salafis, and how they situate themselves on the Salafi map as concerns the concept of social change. Doing this, it will be possible to connect DS to its roots in global Salafism, and to understand its position within the Egyptian context, as an introduction to a focused historical chapter on the emergence and development of DS, as a social movement, and until it entered politics. The chapter concludes that DS does not fully conform to any of the Egyptian Salafi groups, nor to any of the categories of global Salafism.

Section One: Salafism and Social Change:

Salafism a Contested Concept:

Salafism is used to signify the ‘purist concept of Islam.’ Despite the medieval origins of the concept, meaning “doctrine of the forefathers” (*Madhab Al-Salaf*), it cannot be held synonymous to the present connotation which did not exist until the 20th century. The contemporary concept of Salafism is much broader and includes theology, law, morals, and etiquette (Lauzi`ere, 2010). The Salafi narrative, however, rejects this differentiation and insists on the continuity of Salafism, which can be traced back to the second Hijri century and although it witnessed several fluctuations and challenges, it did not completely disappear at any point. Such challenges, sometimes repression and discursive conflicts with other Islamic groups (*Feraq*), encouraged Salafi scholars to use the word “Ahl Al-Salaf” or “Salafis” to distinguish themselves from the deviating groups (Tawfiq, 2012b). However, according to a Salafi scholar, “Salafis cannot be considered a sub-sect or group within Islam. On the contrary, Salafism denotes the right approach to understanding Islam” (Abdel Hamid, 2013). It can be concluded from this Salafi narrative that discursive conflicts contributed to the development and the crystallization of the Salafi methodology and concepts, where scholars had to produce a wide literature in order to survive debates and arguments, and to stand in the face of rulers and opponents or “deviant groups” (Tawfiq, 2012b, Abdel Hamid, 2013). Such a legacy helped contemporary Salafis in the process of identifying themselves, deciding their Manhaj (methodology), and in choosing their curriculum, in different regions and periods.

The starting date of Salafism and the issue of continuity versus separation between the medieval Madhab Al-Salaf and contemporary Salafis is not the only problem in tracing the history of Salafism. There is also the problem of who is a Salafi and who is not? And what are the intellectual contours of Salafism?

The lack of precision in the secondary references resulted in a loose concept which was used to describe contradicting meanings and different groups. For instance, at a certain point the literature confused Salafism with Modernist Islam of Mohamed Abdou and Gamal Eddin Al-Afghani¹¹ (Lauzi`ere, 2010, Abdel Hamid, 2013). There was a tendency to trace Salafism back to Abdou and Al-Afghani, yet assume that rational reformist Salafism transformed over history into puritanism, and later Wahhabism (Abu El-Fadl, 2005). This definition not only considers Modernist Islam as a starting point to Salafism, but also reduces Salafism to Wahhabism, which is only one part of the wider Salafi movement, or could be considered one of the intellectual waves that shaped the movement. Such assumptions can be refuted through Salafis' narrative of the history of the concept, which gives much weight to Muhammed ibn Abdel Wahhab, and considers him one of their main references. Yet, Salafis do not call themselves Wahhabis. Moreover, they emphasize the distinction between Salafism, and Modernist or Rationalist Islam, which is based on the use of human reason, rationality and observation, while Salafis give priority to the texts (Tawfiq, 2012b).

¹¹ Abdou and Al-Afghani did not adopt the anti-rationalist literalist theology of Ibn Taymiyya, yet shared with him the importance of *Ijtihad* (individual interpretation), and they were focused on the renaissance of the Muslim society. Accordingly, they neither dwelled much into theological issues nor did they give much attention to the study of Hadith (quotes and sayings of Prophet Muhammad) but rather fought superstitions. Thus, they differed from traditional Salafism. However, their anti-Sufis' superstitions position put them in the same camp with traditional Salafism. Later on, one of Abdou's students, Rashid Reda was inclined to traditional Salafism and focused on the works of Ibn Taymiyya. Thus, according to Salafis' narrative, Reda is considered the father of "Egyptian Salafism" (Tawfiq, 2012, Haykel, 2009). Yet, despite Reda's intellectual inclination, the literature mentions that there is not enough evidence of his full affiliation to traditional Salafism (Lauzi`ere, 2010, Haykel, 2009).

The Definition and Main Aspects of Salafism:

Salafis consider that Quran and Sunna (words and acts of Prophet Muhammad) should only be understood through the interpretations of the ‘good precedent Muslims’ (*Al-Salaf Al-Saleh*), who are the first three generations of Islam (companions of Prophet Muhammad and companions of the companions). Salafis believe that by confining themselves to these sources of Islam, they would evade any human biases or deviations and will be confident that they abide by God’s orders, and by the purist version of Islam (Wiktorowicz, 2006, Meijer, 2009, Conv. int. Shaltoot, 2013, Abdel Hamid, 2013). Nevertheless, according to a Salafi scholar “any Muslim group can assume that their main references are Quran and Sunna regardless of their source of understanding, whether it is through logic, philosophy and rational thinking, revelations, or emotional preferences, but the fact remains that the only true understanding is the one provided by the Prophet and his companions (Abdel Hamid, 2013).”

This statement implies that the difference between Salafis and any other Muslim groups is the adoption and observance of the interpretation of *Al-Salaf Al-Saleh*. In this regard, *Al-Salaf Al-Saleh* should be the ideal for all Muslims since there is a tendency to consider the “temporal proximity to Prophet Muhammad” as an indication of the purity of Islam, for the fact that they learned directly from him (Haykel, 2009). Besides the *Salaf’s* ability to seek clarification from the Prophet on the various issues of Islam, Quran and Prophet’s teachings came in *Salafs’* version of Arabic language, and this makes them the most capable of interpretation (Abdel Hamid, 2013).

Moreover, texts are central to Salafis and they warn against the use of human reason to speculate beyond the text (Conv. int. Shaltoot, 2013, Abdel Hamid, 2013). According to

Wiktorowicz (2006), Salafis perceive the application of “human intellect” or “rationalism” to the original sources of Islam as the most threatening danger to its purity. Thus, through avoiding the use of human logic and metaphorical interpretation of the holy texts, they guarantee that they do not suspend the connotation and the authority of the texts, where human reason should only be employed within the limits of the text (Abdel Hamid, 2013, Conv. int. Shaltoot, 2013). Doing this, Salafis are “literalists not only scripturalists” (Meijer, 2009). This literal approach was connected to the issue of *Tawhid*, or the oneness of God and his names and attributes that is the core of Salafis’ theology. In this respect, Salafis, unlike other Islamic groups, insist that God’s names and attributes should be literally understood and that any deviation from this puts one at risk of unbelief (Haykel, 2009). Salafis also, by limiting themselves to Quran and Sunna with the understanding of Salaf rather than any other sources, avoid the dangers of innovations (*Bid’a*) in the moral and ritual spheres (Wiktorowicz, 2006, Gauvain, 2013).

Accordingly, Salafis would not rely on the Four Law Schools of Islam (*Madhahib*), since such schools derive their rulings from the ‘opinion’ of their founders and their disciples. Thus, blind imitation of such schools (Taqlid) is rejected by Salafis, who consider legal imitation as the reason for Muslims’ decline. Therefore, Ijtihad (individual interpretation) is much encouraged; however, it should follow certain rules (Lacroix, 2009, Meijer, 2009, Haykel, 2009). In this regard, Salafis see Quran and Sunna as ‘self-explanatory.’ Thus, if the necessary training and religious knowledge are acquired, the majority of religious rulings can be directly derived from the holy texts, and will be clear and incontrovertible. Salafis go through this process as if it is a “scientific enterprise governed by hard laws of nature (in this case divinity),” where

they make sure that the methodology is sound and that the conclusions are based on strong evidence from the holy texts and the consensus of the Salaf (Wiktorowicz, 2006: 214). That is why they see that it is not impossible to become a scholar, and religious self-learning is encouraged as a duty for every Muslim (Haykel, 2009).

This focus on *ijtihad*, the priority of the text over the human agent, and self-learning, are factors that can explain the intellectual independence among Salafis, and the “shallow and limited hierarchy of scholarly authorities” (Haykel, 2009: 36). Such aspects give weight to the individual level of analysis in studying Salafis, and the organization of the Salafi movements and their political mobilization and performance if they happen to enter politics.

To sum up the main aspects of Salafism, as regards Salafis’ theology, the key concept is *Tawhid*¹² (God’s oneness). As for Law (*Fiqh*) and how religious rulings are derived, they prefer individual interpretation (*Ijtihad*) over imitation (*Taqlid*) or adherence to the teachings of a particular school of law (*Madhabyya*) (Haykel, 2009). In addition, it is common among Salafis in general that they propagate ideas of the obligation of Jihad, the necessity of “purification of the heart” through prayers, the dangers of innovation in ritual issues (*Bid’a*), the “fragility of the human condition”, the “threat of westernization” and “the ethical and spiritual weakness of modern Muslims”. While such aspects and definition of Salafism are global, they tend to apply to Salafis in Egypt as well (Gauvain, 2013).

¹² The oneness of Lordship, the oneness of Godship, the oneness of names and attributes of God, and the literal interpretation of names and attributes without any metaphorical explanations, fighting unbelief and association of God with anyone or anything (Shirk/polytheism) (Haykel, 2009)

Waves of Salafism and the Salafi Literature:

As mentioned above, Salafism is sometimes confused with *Wahhabism*, a religious tradition established by and named after Muhammed ibn Abdel Wahhab, the co-founder of the first Saudi state (in 1744). For Ibn Abdel Wahhab, who was deeply influenced by Ibn Taymiyya, the purification of Islam solely meant pure *Tawhid* that should be both recognized and practised by a true Muslim. He stressed that religious judgement can only be based on Quran, Sunna, and consensus of the pious ancestors as the only sources of Islam. While he recognized *Ijtihad*, he himself followed the Hanbali school of law¹³ (Lacroix, 2009). The centrality of creed (*'aqida*) and the adoption of Hanbalism were two main characteristics of Wahhabism, until recently, and can be used to distinguish Wahhabism from the rest of Salafi waves that followed (Gauvain, 2013). Among these, for instance, there was *Ahl Al-Hadith* (partisans of Hadith), established in India in the 1860s, which focused on Law (*Fiqh*) rather than creed, and advocated *Ijtihad* and complete rejection to the imitation of the four law schools, where Quran and Sunna are the main sources of religious rulings without intermediaries. Accordingly, it focused on the study of Hadith (words and quotes of the Prophet) that can provide answers to all legal and interpretation questions (Lacroix, 2009). Some Wahhabi scholars went to study in India and were influenced by Ahl Al-Hadith, among them Abdel Aziz ibn Baz the prominent Saudi and Salafi figure. This paved the way for change, however challenging and politically loaded it was, in the Wahhabi stance towards the Hanbali school of law (Lacroix, 2009). Ahl Al-Hadith also influenced Muhammed Nasir El Din Al-Albani who became the most important contemporary Hadith scholar and authority, whose efforts in studying and authenticating Hadith, and

¹³ Which meant a strict literal reading of the holy texts (Lacroix, 2009).

his purification and education strategy had a profound influence on modern Salafism (Lacroix, 2009). Al-Albani disciples founded the Neo Ahl Al-Hadith, whose presence was clear in Al-Madina, Saudi Arabia in the 1960s. However, with the increasing number of Al-Albani disciples who initially emphasized an apolitical stance, they were divided into two groups as regards their position from the regime; Al-Jama'a Al-Salafiyya Al-Muhtasiba (apolitical, yet anti-royal family in Saudi Arabia), and the Madkhalis (pro-regime) (Lacroix, 2009). The latter was the reason behind the Saudi regime's encouragement of Al-Albani's approach, despite of the fact that his thought was previously restricted in Saudi Arabia for opposing Wahhabi Hanbalism, promoting Ijtihad and questioning Ibn Abdel Wahhab's Hadith understanding and capabilities. However, for political reasons, Al-Albani disciples were empowered in Saudi universities and institutions. Neo Ahl Al-Hadith, as the most recent intellectual wave in Salafism, was exported through the personal influence of Al-Albani, and through the institutions and universities in which this trend was empowered, which can explain its outreach in Europe and the Middle East (Lacroix, 2009).

To sum up, Salafism took place in three intellectual waves. It derives its theological background from Ibn Taymiyya, and his student Mohammed ibn Abdel Wahhab, who for long were marginal sources for the Sunni community. Salafis then emphasized hadith scholarship through the efforts of Ahl Al-Hadith that led to the writings of Al-Albani. Finally, the third wave could be the obvious political phase for Salafis, where Al-Albani thought was used to face the revolutionary tendencies and political aspirations of Al-Salafiyya Al-Muhtasiba, and Al-Sahwa, movements in Saudi Arabia. In fact, Al-Albani was supported by the influential figures in Saudi Arabia, Ibn

‘Uthaymin and Ibn Baz, who are also among the main Salafi references (Gauvain, 2013, Lacroix, 2009).

The presentation of the waves of Salafism and the development of the concept through the interaction among these waves, is an attempt to determine the intellectual contours of this movement in its entirety, and to trace the main figures and writings that constitute the literature of the Salafi groups from which they derive their ideologies and on which they base their framing processes. In addition, this historical and conceptual presentation will help in understanding the political implications of Salafism, even of the most apolitical groups within the movement. In this regard, Salafism is viewed as a “social and religious movement whose activities have long term political effects that are not obvious at first glance” (Haykel, 2009: 34). They have a certain dress code, social and religious habits, prayers postures, and content and form of speech. Thus, focusing on the political aspects only leads to missing the ideational, theological and legal aspects, which results in misunderstanding of the fact that, politically, Salafis are usually divided between the Jihadis, and the politically submissive. Thus, the term Salafi loses its value and the variations in between these two categories are not presented (Haykel, 2009). For these reasons, this thesis puts equal emphasis on the ideational and political aspects of the Salafi movements, and attempts to root their political aspects in the Salafi intellectual background that was shaped through discursive and political interactions.

In the following part of this section there will be a discussion of how the main intellectual issues and tensions in Salafism contributed to the contemporary divisions of the Salafi movement, and the political implications of such Salafi divisions, particularly as concerns the concept of *social change*.

The Religio-political Questions Splitting the Salafi Movement:

In view of the historical overview of Salafism, contemporary Salafism was influenced by Wahhabism as regards the literalist tendency, doctrinal purity and internal splits (Meijer, 2009). Salafism also inherited the tensions that started within Wahhabism, such as the doctrine regulating the relationship with non-believers “loyalty and enmity” (*Al-Walaa wal Baraa*), the issue of “*ijtihad*” which had political implications, the condemnation of “*Shi’ism*” as heresy, and the politicization of this issue, “*Al-Hisba*” or commanding virtue and preventing vice (*Al-amr bel m’arouf wel nahy ‘an al-Monkar*) that was propagated by Ibn Taymiyya and in its extremist interpretation led to the use of violence (Meijer, 2009). In this respect, “Salafis spend a considerable amount of time and energy on doctrinal disputes” (Meijer, 2009: 12), which are in this thesis the discursive conflicts that led to the formation of the ideology and identity of the various groups within the Salafi movement. Such discursive conflicts are mostly along the four main issues mentioned above, which all signify a difference in what is the right method to apply the religious beliefs to contemporary issues and contexts. Since there is only one legitimate religious interpretation, pluralism does not exist in Islam. However, the application of religion to the various issues depends on the subjective understanding of the context. Therefore, Salafis are divided into factions over “contextual interpretation and analysis.” Each faction considered itself the only one that practises and implements *Tawhid*, while all other factions may share the same creed and beliefs but are unable to apply them to their behaviour and contexts in the right way, thus are not “real Salafis”¹⁴ (Wiktorowicz, 2006).

¹⁴ This mindset leads to “exclusivist understanding of Islam” (Wiktorowicz, 2006: 217).

Accordingly, Salafis are united on matters of theology (*'aqida*), and as regards Law (*Fiqh*) most Salafis adopt *ijtihad*, however the difference is as concerns *Manhaj* by which Salafis mean “the path or method they live and implement their beliefs and call (da’awa)” (Haykel, 2009: 47). The split among Salafis as concerns *Manhaj*, or on how to “engage the world” and “how to make Salafi teaching pertinent to political life and questions of power,” makes *Manhaj* the relevant concept for questions on Salafis and politics (Haykel, 2009: 51).

Salafism and the Concept of Social Change:

One of the dilemmas for Salafis in which the difference in *Manhaj* is obvious is social and political change. Such an issue can be linked to the concept of *Tawhid* in Salafis’ theology, for if a Muslim should abide by *Tawhid*, would he follow the ruler even if he is not Islamic, and when he does not apply the rulings of Islam and orders of God? Would a Muslim face this by education and da’awa to purify and change the society, or by changing the ruler through verbally opposing him, or even through rising against him? (Meijer, 2009)

This dilemma is also connected to the debate on *Takfir* (declaring a person, society, or an act as infidel). Despite the fact that there are conditions and strict rulings for practising *Takfir*, the difference among Salafis is not whether to use *Takfir*, or over its conditions, but rather whether to declare the ruler as *Kafir* (non-believer/infidel) or not. This difference emanates from their different evaluations of the ruler’s behaviour and

beliefs, in the light of the nature of faith, which requires both belief in God, and living according to His orders¹⁵ (Wiktorowicz, 2006)

Another concept that is of relevance to social change is *Al-Hisba* or commanding virtue and preventing vice, which in its development started as a socially conservative principle, then an instrument for social activism (through persuasion and da'awa or by hand), and which in its ultimate form was connected to Jihad, or the use of violence (Meijer, 2009).

Such differences¹⁶ among Salafis on *Manhaj*, particularly as regards *social and political change* led to the formation of the Salafi main political trends.

Section Two: Salafi Political Trends

Salafism, in its political dimension, can be divided into “*quietist and discrete Salafis*” or “*purists*” who are apolitical but might advise rulers behind the scenes (Meijer, 2009, Wiktorowicz, 2006). The quietists, or purists, prefer proselytization and advising leaders over rebellion and overt opposition or any political organization or actions. For them, political opposition or organization might lead to civil strife among Muslims, and might provoke the regime, thus might be leading to the destruction of the movement. This is while change is aimed at attaining better conditions for Muslims, and not the

¹⁵ For mainstream Muslims requires both belief in Islam, and acting according to God's orders. However, as long as one believes in Islam, he remains a Muslim, and when he fails to abide by God's orders in his life he is just sinner, not a non-believer (Wiktorowicz, 2006).

¹⁶ Such differences were obvious in the third wave of Salafism, which is the political phase 1960s-1970s and onwards, which Lacroix called the “the birth of Salafism”, and by that he meant the intellectual contributions that came out due to the Islamic solidarity policy in Saudi Arabia against the progressive leftist regime of Nasser in Egypt. In this period, Saudi Arabia was a meeting point of Islamist activists and religious figures who were persecuted by Nasser's regime, and in the case of Al-Albani, he was fleeing Assad's regime in Syria. Thus, the interaction between Wahhabism, Ahl Al-Hadith influence represented in Al-Albani, Ibn Baz and others, and MB, who influenced Al-Sahwa movement in Saudi Arabia, as political Islamists (Lacroix, 2009), played a decisive role in shaping the current political map of Salafism.

opposite. Therefore, they advocated that actions should not lead to greater evil, defined as “weakening of propagation (*Al-Da’awa*).” Accordingly, it was understandable that they do not declare the regime or the ruler as *Kafir* (infidel). Moreover, obedience to the Muslim ruler is a religious obligation, even if the ruler is unjust (Wiktorowicz, 2006, Haykel, 2009). The quietists who are connected to Al-Albani, and groups such as Jamis and Madkhalis, are sometimes called ‘scholastic Salafis’ or ‘al-Salafyya al-‘ilmiyya’, since they focus on educating individuals and correcting them with almost no interest in current political issues, particularly, international ones. They believe that Islamic revival would only happen through adopting Al-Albani’s purification and education strategy (Haykel, 2009) or “*Al-Tasfya wal Tarbiya*”. This strategy should occur in two parts, first, the purification (*Al-Tasfya*) of Islam from everything that is alien to it, through the elimination of all forged or weak Hadiths and the interpretation of Quran along this authenticated Sunna and the concepts of Al-Salaf Al-Saleh. Second, *Al-Tarbiyya*, or education, is teaching “authentic Islamic creed” derived from Quran and Sunna to Muslim youth. This strategy gives priority, again, to the individual over the state (Lacroix, 2009).

The second trend is the “Covert Salafis” who advocate quietism, yet, act politically without open or full political participation for the fact that they condemn *hizbyya* (partisanship/political parties) on the basis that it leads to *fitna* (factionalism) (Meijer, 2009). Finally, there are the “openly activists” who call for political reform, are also known as *Harakis* (activists), and they advocate non-violent political activism both in Muslim and non-Muslim countries. These politicized Salafi groups usually fall in the orbit of Islamism (political Islam) of MB, such as in the case of Al-Sahwa movement in

Saudi Arabia or Al-Jama'a Al-Islamiyya in Egypt¹⁷ (Meijer, 2009). Since they usually adopt some of the teachings, the political consciousness and the political organization of MB in seeking political reform and aspiring to power (Haykel, 2009), they are usually "labelled as Ikhwanis (Muslim Brothers) or Bannawites (followers of Hassan al-Banna, the founder of MB) (Wiktorowicz, 2006, Haykel, 2009, Meijer, 2009). Such politicized groups' weakest aspect is their "underdeveloped political vocabulary." In addition, on some occasions, their political activism goes beyond politics to the use of violence and Jihad (Meijer, 2009). Jihadis, like political activists, have been influenced by MB's organizational teachings and political concepts especially those of Sayyid Qutb (Haykel, 2009). Nevertheless, their Manhaj of change is the use of violence against the current political systems in order to establish a unitary Islamic state in the form of a caliphate. Al-Qaeda is the most obvious example of this trend, yet their Salafi training distinguishes them from Sayyid Qutb's followers as concerns sticking to conditions of Takfir, whereas Qutbis denounce the entire society as infidel without necessarily applying Takfir's strict conditions (Haykel, 2009, Wiktorowicz, 2006).

Contra the political activists and Jihadis, the quietists were highly critical of MB, as shallow and deviant (Meijer, 2009). This is because quietist Salafis see that MB are putting politics over creed and religious knowledge. Since they are pragmatic, they adopt a political approach and are more in harmony with local cultures, and national causes. In contrast with MB, quietist Salafis were de-territorialized, de-culturized, and are apolitical (Meijer, 2009). Accordingly, MB was seen as one of the sources of Salafis' divisions, and as causing political tensions among them. Therefore, MB is seen as an external enemy, and as a competitor for resources and influence. However, such a

¹⁷ Or as the Shubra School in Cairo, as will be discussed later.

problematic relationship with MB pushed the apolitical Salafis to eventually form political views (Meijer, 2009). Al-Albani was known for criticizing Al-Banna and Qutb (Lacroix, 2009), and provided a counter-discourse to that of the Brotherhood. Such relationship between Salafis and the MB was manifested in Egypt post-January 2011 revolution, and can help in understanding the relationship between the Salafi political parties and MB before and after June 30th revolution.

It remains to be said, however, according to Meijer (2009), that these trends and divisions among Salafis should not be taken as rigid, but rather to be seen on a sliding scale from quietist ‘minimalists,’ who put doctrinal purity first, to political and violent ‘maximalists.’ However, Salafis’ variations are not only concerning Manhaj and methods of change, but also along geographical areas where Salafis adapt to their local circumstances.

In this regard the following section will discuss Egyptian Salafism, with a focus on DS, in order to see how it can be connected to this global Salafi scale and political trends, particularly as concerns methods of social change.

Section Three: Salafism in Egypt

Despite the long history of Salafism in Egypt, there is almost no systemic academic contribution within western academia that deeply and clearly studies the workings of Egyptian Salafism (Gauvain, 2013). This can be attributed to the fact that usually there is no distinction among Egyptian Islamists, and that for instance, Salafis, MB, and Al-Tabligh wal Da’awa tend to be studied in the same way (Gauvain, 2013).

The literature reviewed on Egyptian Salafis divides them into four major categories. Traditional Salafi organizations, which are AS (founded in 1926) and Al-Gami'yya Al-Shar'yya,¹⁸ that is not typically a Salafi organization. In addition, the recently established schools; the Salafi School in Alexandria (DS) and Salafis in Shubra, Cairo; that started in 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, there are the independent Salafis, or Al-Albani disciples and their followers. Finally, there is a number of Azhari sheikhs influenced by Saudi Wahhabism (Gauvain, 2013).

This chapter aims at situating DS both intellectually and ideologically on this Salafi map in Egypt. Thus in the following section, there will be a discussion of the intellectual references of DS, in order to determine both the global and the Egyptian Salafi intellectual influences on the movement. Then, DS ideological position will be discussed through examining its position on the Qutbi-Madkhali conflict in Egypt and how this position situates DS on the map of global Salafism.

The Intellectual Background of DS:

DS' narrative of the history of Salafism reflects a connection between the medieval and the contemporary connotations of the concept, rooted in the Wahhabis' attempts to penetrate Egypt back in 1818¹⁹, and highlighted a historical rivalry with the embedded mystical Sufism in Egypt. Such Sufi-Salafi rivalry, besides having a political dimension, constituted a challenge against Salafism throughout its history in Egypt, since Sufism is connected to cultural heritage and is supported by Al-Azhar (Abdel

¹⁸ According to DS' narrative that conformed to the literature, Al-Gami'yya Al-Shari'yya is human reason based Asha'ari, organization and represented the official Al-Azhar religious discourse. Thus, there were theological differences between AS and Al-Gami'yya Al-Shari'yya (Tawfiq, 2012a).

¹⁹ When the Egyptian army defeated Wahhabis and the Wahhabi captives according to the Salafi narrative took the opportunity and tried to spread their thought in Al-Azhar through attending sessions and participating in discussions. Wahhabi captives also tried to counter-Sufism and mystics. Among these captives were Al-Zubaidi and Al-Jabarty (Tawfiq, 2012b). However, there is no evidence on the precision of this narrative.

Hamid, 2013, Tawfiq, 2012b). Despite of the fact that according to DS' narrative the real beginning of Salafism in Egypt goes back to Rashid Reda²⁰, there is not much evidence on the Salafism of Reda in the literature (Lauzi`ere, 2010). Nevertheless, according to the literature and as per Salafis' narrative it was indisputable that AS that was established by Mohammed Hamid Al-Fiqqi²¹ in 1926 for the purpose of spreading the understanding of Tawhid, fighting heresy, and Sufism, and which referred to Ibn Taymiyya as its intellectual reference, is the first Salafi organization in Egypt, and the main source of Salafism, particularly for DS (Abdel Hamid, 2013, int. Al-Shahhat, 2013, Gauvain, 2013). In this regard, AS libraries provided "huge stockpiles of Salafi books, available for DS' young sheikhs, starting from Ibn El Qayyem, Ibn Taymyya, Ibn Abdel Wahhab and Rashid Reda" (int. Al Shahhat). They were active in Moharram Bey in Alexandria²² (Abdel Hamid, 2013), and provided a space for the young people who had religious inclinations especially after the 1967 defeat (int. Al Shahhat). However, AS, from DS' founders and followers' point of view, was just a simple organization responsible for the management of some mosques and its leaders were against a more sophisticated collective action, especially given the state restrictions during Nasser's era (1954-1970). In addition, most of AS' sheikhs and leaders were elderly and unsuited for activism, which paved the way for the foundation of the younger DS movement. Moreover, young DS' members had a number of religious reservations against AS, particularly as concerns Hadith, in addition to some minor

²⁰ Through his Salafi contributions in Al-Manar magazine, the formation of a Salafi front with other intellectuals, among them Mohammed Hamid Al-Fiqqi. In 1912, Reda established the school of Dar Al-Da'awa Wl Ershad le Tadrib al-A'emma (School for Training and Guiding Imams) and he kept spreading Salafism until he died in 1935 (Abdel Hamid, 2013)

²¹ According to Abdel Hamid (2013), Al-Fiqqi graduated in Al-Azhar in 1917, and learned about Salafism from an average farmer in his village, so he got back to Cairo and started his research, and was highly influenced by Moheb Eddin Khatib and Rashid Reda. El-Feqqi started to spread Salafism among small groups of workers and farmers, since Salafism was not much welcomed in Egypt. As a role model for DS' followers, it seems that they adopted his method of working with small groups, later in their propagation activities. Al-Feqqi then taught Quran interpretation in Saudi Arabia (Abdel Hamid, 2013).

²² One of the main leaders of AS, Abdel Razzak Afifi, was responsible for Alexandria.

intellectual differences. These reasons might explain why despite sharing the same references and Salafi background, young DS' sheikhs did not join AS, yet preserved a "cooperative relationship" with the organization (int. Borhami, 2013, Abdel Hamid, 2013). It is worth saying here that DS shared Al-Albani's criticism of AS, as focusing on theology rather than on Hadith (Lacroix, 2009). This directs the attention to the influence of Al-Albani on DS, where they consider him one of the main sources of Egyptian Salafism. In addition, DS members saw the evolution and institutionalization of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia through the establishment of the Saudi Fatwa Committee, and the Da'awa Council, as a strong source of Salafism in the region, and recognized this influence in Egypt and as one of their sources (Tawfiq, 2012b).

To sum up, DS' narrative supports the "continuity of Salafism" rather than a separation between the medieval and the contemporary, and insists on the deep roots of the concept in Egypt, and that they are an extension for it. They share the same references of modern global Salafism; mainly Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn El Qayyem, and Ibn Abdel Wahhab, in addition to the influence of Rashid Reda, and AS, the first Egyptian Salafi organization, particularly the contributions of Hamid Al-Fiqqi and Abdel Razzak Afifi. However, they are also highly influenced by Al-Albani, and recognize the influence of Saudi Wahhabism. Yet, it can be concluded from their narrative that, like AS' followers,²³ DS believes in the mutual influence between Wahhabism and Egyptian Salafism (Gauvain, 2013, Abdel Hamid, 2013).

That said, surveying the intellectual contours of DS does not answer the question of what is their political position on the map of global and Egyptian Salafism. As mentioned above, Salafis share the same creed and adopt Ijtihad as the method of

²³ Many AS' members believe that Wahhabism was influenced by their sheikhs such as Abdel Razzaq Afifi who became the vice chairman of the prestigious fatwa committee (Gauvain, 2013).

deriving religious rulings. However, they differ among themselves as concerns Manhaj, or as to how they engage with the world, and how they deal with the question of change, and its relevant concepts. Therefore, to situate DS on the map of Egyptian Salafism and to connect it to the categories of global Salafism discussed above, the following section will discuss how DS perceives the various Salafi and Islamist groups, and how DS' followers situate themselves on the ideological spectrum of Islamists in Egypt. This will be done through focusing on the method of social change, and the relevant concepts of Takfir, and Al-Hisba.

DS on the Egyptian and Global Salafi Map:

According to the Salafi narrative, after years of restricting religious activities during Nasser's era (1954-1970), despite signs of a more religious inclination among Egyptians after the 1967 defeat, the "real religious resurgence" was during the Sadat era (1970-1981), when he wanted to get rid of Nasser's legacy and leftist followers, through facilitating the activities of Islamists (Abdel Hamid, 2013, Tawfiq, 2012a, int. Al-Shahhat, 2013). Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiyya (GI)²⁴, as a religious student organization, was thus established in Egyptian universities to counterbalance the leftist dominated student unions. Yet, this religious university activity was focused on religion, and there were no political orientations or divisions within the group, which was an independent body, supported and supervised by the university, and constituted the early beginning of systematic da'awa (Tawfiq, 2012a, Al-Naquib, 2011).

However, according to DS' narrative, such religious da'awa activities were not problematic until MB came out of prisons later during Sadat's era and wanted to take control of this university activity (Tawfiq, 2012a). According to a Salafi Scholar, "MB

²⁴ This is different from Al-Jama'a Al-Islamiyya, the violent Islamist group that used the same name later.

prefers to dominate rather than cooperate or work side by side with any Islamist group on the ground. Thus, they wanted to transform GI, that was an umbrella for all religious Muslim students, into a sub-section within MB, and intended to call it the university wing of MB” (Tawfiq, 2012b). In this regard, the six founders of the Salafi school in Alexandria (*Al-Madrasa Al-Salafyya* -MS) studied MB’s thought, and reached the conclusion that it deviates from Salafi methods and approach to Islam. Accordingly, they left GI, and founded their own school, thus, were subject to pressures from MB²⁵ (Tawfiq, 2012b, Abdel Hamid, 2013).

In the light of this historical narrative and of the interviews held in the field, my research has found that DS’ founders and followers accuse MB of being responsible for the restrictions on Islamic activities during the Nasser’s era, and for hindering da’awa, because of their political aspirations (Abdel Hamid, 2013). In addition, DS classifies MB as an Asha’ari, thus, combined Salafi and liberal rational Islam (int. Al Shahhat), which led to many theological confrontations with DS, who also criticized MB for diluting and manipulating Islamic rulings (int. Shaltoot, 2013). Such criticism can be rooted not only in Al-Albani’s harsh criticism to the MB’s founder Hassan Al-Banna, and to Sayyid Qutb, but also in Al-Fiqqi’s position on MB since its emergence in the 1920s. In this regard, Al-Fiqqi condemned MB as a highly politicized group, one that gives priority to power-seeking and makes use of Islam for this purpose. Al-Feqqi also said that MB is not a da’awa group and its members are “Muslim traitors rather than Muslim brothers” (Abdel Hamid, 2013). Thus, it can be concluded that the current

²⁵ According to the biography of Sheikh Ahmed Farid, one of DS’ founders, MS was faced with threats, antagonistic actions, and defamation from MB, since it was fighting all those who refused to join its ranks, and they argued that all Islamists should be united within one group. However, in Farid’s words “Al-Madrasa Al-Salafyya favoured the right theological methodology and thought, over the unity of an Islamic group” (Farid, 2012).

conflict between DS and MB had its intellectual and ideological roots back in the 1920s, 1960s and the 1970s.

The way DS perceives MB not only reflects the historical rivalry between the two, but also constitutes a reproduction of the global and regional Salafi quietists' discourse on MB discussed earlier, where the presence of MB represented for them a threat to da'awa activity, and brought about the unwelcome politicization of the religious movement.

However, there was also a strong confrontation between MB and GI in upper-Egypt universities, and the latter resisted MB's domination, yet was transformed later to Al-Jama'a Al-Islamiyya (JI), the Jihadi group (Tawfiq, 2012a). Thus, DS' leaders and followers see that the 1970s witnessed the formation of the Islamist groups and of the structure of their map and areas of influence in Egypt. The three major groups that came out during this period were; MB in all lower-Egypt universities (int. Farid, 2013, int. Shaltoot, 2013), JI in upper-Egypt universities, and the independent Salafi school in Alexandria, which refused to join any of the large Islamist groups (int. Shaltoot, 2013). These three streams had varying influences on the formation of the Islamist groups that appeared over the following two decades, as will be shown in the following part of this section, with a focus on DS' narrative and position on such groups.

The Criminalization of Militant Islamist groups:

For DS' followers, "There is nothing called Jihadi Salafism, and adding the word Salafism to Jihad is a decoration to attract more followers" (Abdel Hamid, 2013), for "not every bombing or crime is considered Jihad" (int. Borhami, 2013).

Thus, DS' sheikhs refuse to use the words Jihadism or Jihadi Salafism, but rather use the expression the "military confrontation groups"²⁶ to describe groups that believe in change through violent confrontations with the society and the governments, believe in toppling rulers, and adopt the idea of coups. Among these groups were those who considered themselves Sayyid Qutb's disciples, and organized themselves while in prison, prior to their release during the 1970s and the beginning of their interaction and strong intellectual confrontations with Salafis (Abdel Hamid, 2013, int. Borhami, 2013).

One of the founders of DS, Yasser Borhami said "I first heard the concept of Jihadi Salafism in 2002 in the official state security interrogations" (int. Borhami, 2013). For Borhami, such coinage is a conspiracy against Salafism in order to limit their resources and to make them vulnerable to security persecution. However, there are major differences between Salafis and militants as concerns Takfir, the use of violence, cost-benefit analysis, or evils versus benefits calculations (*Masaleh and Mafased*). This is in addition to differences as concerns all the concepts militants get from the Qutbi framework, which Salafis never adopted (int. Borhami, 2013).

Besides the difference with such groups on issues of declaring societies and rulers as infidel thus permits the use of violence as means of social change, DS' sheikhs and followers have differences with such militant groups on the concept of *Al-Hisba*. For instance, JI in Upper Egypt, adopted the principle of preventing vice through direct action, or "by one's hand" (*Enkar Al-Munkar bel Yad*). On the contrary, DS said that this leads to corruption, bloodshed, and chaos, and that the state and the police are the

²⁶ Among the violent groups that emerged in this period was Al-Jihad, which was also condemned by DS as seeking change through violent confrontations following a fatwa of *Takfir* (int. Shaltoot, 2013). In addition to Jihad and JI, some Qutbi and Takfiri groups were formed inside prison. DS sees that Qutb's writings were mostly literary, and were full of general expressions that may have contradicting meanings and connotations. This led to the creation of various groups, generally Takfiri (inclined to declare society or certain figures as infidel), such as Al-Tawaqqof wl Tabayyon, and Al-Takfir wl Hijra (Abdel Hamid, 2013).

only institutions responsible for fighting crimes and illegal actions, while Hisba should be carried out through persuasion and propagation (int. Shaltoot, 2013).

As concerns cost-benefit analysis, and in line with the quietists' logic and with Al-Albani argument discussed above, DS' followers saw that the highest cost of such violent method of change is the weakening of da'awa. This is because violence against civilians and assassination of politicians in Egypt led to defamation of Islamists, and made them lose "people's sympathy" (Abdel Hamid, 2013). In addition, according to a female leader "adoption of violence, not only hinders da'awa, but also destroys the families of the followers of violent Takfiri groups and exposes them to torture, humiliation, and prison. Therefore, because such methods deviate from true Islam they do not even deserve this sacrifice (int. F. leader, 2013)."

Thus, DS' position and arguments against all the militant Islamist groups particularly those with a Salafi background, voiced Al-Albani's arguments, which might put DS in the category of purists or quietists, especially, with regard to their position on MB discussed earlier.

In view of the above, DS decisively criminalizes militants, and refutes the revolutionary ideas and infidelity of the society, both on religious and practical levels. In addition, it rejects the political nature of MB, in line with Al-Albani's and Al-Fiqqi's arguments. Nevertheless, such conclusions do not put DS within the pro-regime or politically submissive Madkhali trend that is connected to global Salafi quietism as discussed above. Put differently, such position does not put DS among the pro-Mubarak "Madkhali" Salafis in Egypt, who appeared to counterbalance the effect of Qutbism (Gauvain, 2013). Where, Qutbism, as an ideological Salafi trend in Egypt, does not

necessarily mean full affiliation to Sayyid Qutb (Gauvain, 2013), since the development of the connotation of Qutbism moved beyond the area of Takfir and violence discussed above, to signify the broader meaning of the legitimacy to rebel against the established political authority (Meijer, 2009). Thus, as concerns Salafis' approach to politics the real question then was to what extent a Salafi should consider Mubarak's regime as legitimate? Those who considered the regime as illegitimate and announced this were punished by the regime that managed also to penetrate their groups, so that even questioning the legitimacy of the regime privately had a high cost. Therefore, those who believed that the regime was illegitimate had to wait patiently, spread da'awa and teach cautiously until they build the strength of the Egyptian Muslim community until it eventually changes itself: whether this change was to occur through revolution or through peaceful means differed among individuals and groups within Salafism (Gauvain, 2013).

The Qutbi-Madkhali confrontation in Egypt will be discussed in the following part of this section, with focus on how DS reacted to these two major political trends within the Salafi movement in Egypt, and how this connects DS to the global Salafi map.

DS on the Qutbi-Madkhali Spectrum:

The Pro-regime Madkhalis:

Madkhalis are Salafis who were highly critical of Sayyid Qutb and MB and employed the doctrine of "*la khuruj 'ala al-hakim*" (full obedience to the ruler) to denounce anyone who voiced criticism against the regime or considered alternatives to it. The Shubra Salafis called this trend, the Madkhalis. However, Egyptian Madkhalis who shared the thought of Rab'i Al-Madkhali, did not have direct connection with him, and

despite being mild Madkhalis, the word was used as an accusation to anyone who seems to be ‘in the pocket of the regime’ (Gauvain, 2013). The book *Al-Hakimyya wal Syassa al-Shar’iyya* (Governance and Legitimate politics) was written by one of the prominent sheikhs in AS to advocate loyalty to authority even if it does not live according to Shari’a, and was directed against Qutbi revolutionary ideas (Gauvain, 2013). In this regard, DS criticised Madkhalis for not giving priority to the rule of God issue, which for DS was a central issue and was connected to issues of faith and Tawhid. DS’ followers mentioned that for Madkhalis the rule of God is irrelevant to true belief, thus, the ruler who replaces God’s rules by others and obliges people to follow such non-divine rulings commits *minor infidelity (Kufr Asghar)*. Consequently, he is just a sinner and he is left to God to judge whether to punish or forgive him. This trend is represented in Egypt by Sheikh Muhammed Raslan and Mahmoud Amer, and such figures considered that revolution is prohibited by religion. Currently, this trend is present in AS (int. Shaltoot, 2013, Gauvain, 2013, int. Borhami, 2013). Nevertheless, despite sharing the same intellectual background with AS, DS did not approve of such Madkhali ideas and positions, which implies that DS adopted a rather revolutionary or at least oppositional political approach. Thus, the question here is to what extent DS’ approach conformed to Qutbism with its revolutionary connotation? The following part of this section will try to answer this question through discussing Qutbism as represented by Shubra School, and its relationship with DS.

Qutbism and non-Violent Salafis:

From the 1970s to the 1990s, Shubra, Cairo, was known to be a hub for JI and Al-Jihad political revolutionaries, yet their influence declined and they disappeared, and local Salafi scholars filled the vacuum that they left behind. In view of the interaction with

these earlier revolutionary or violent movements, the forms of Salafism in Shubra become highly politicized and rejected the regime repression of the people. Pro-government sheikhs were present in Shubra as well, but without much significant Madkhali influence (Gauvain, 2013).

As mentioned above, activists and violent Salafis who might be classified also as revolutionaries were influenced by Sayyid Qutb. Therefore, due to the influence of the earlier revolutionary groups in Shubra, “within many Shubra circles Sayyid Qutb is still regarded as a hero” (Gauvain, 2013), however they see that his mistake was his willingness to pronounce Takfir on other Muslims. So in Shubra it was not wrong to speak positively about Sayyid Qutb as long as one makes sure that he does not use excessive Takfir. Therefore, being a moderate Qutbi is considered the right way to approach politics among the Shubra Salafis, without necessarily transforming this approach into revolutionary or violent actions (Gauvain, 2013). Accordingly, Salafis in Shubra can be classified as non-violent political activist Salafis, who oppose the regime, and are influenced by MB political thought, yet they are neither organized nor harmonious, and are divided into circles around individual sheikhs (Gauvain, 2013).

DS and the Shubra School:

The lack of coordination and organization among Shubra Salafis was supported by DS’ narrative about the Shubra School, which according to Borhami emerged in the mid-1980s (int. Borhami, 2013). Generally, DS’ followers perceive Shubra School as Salafi scholars who came late to da’awa²⁷ post-DS, and, unlike DS, were unable to create a comprehensive social movement with organized disciplined collective action and

²⁷ They admit that they joined da’awa and contributed to it, years after the Alexandria school, and Mohamed Abdel Maqsood the most prominent figure among them used to ironically tell DS sheikhs, “we were in the café when you were already established sheikhs” (int. Borhami, 2013).

networks in the Egyptian governorates. Accordingly, Shubra School did not have a real popular base or a strong constituency. Nevertheless, DS shared the same theological background, Ijtihad method, and the same intellectual references with Shubra Salafis (int. Borhami, 2013, int. Shaltoot, 2013). Yet, the differences between Shubra and Alexandria Salafi schools were concerning collective action, Takfir and Qutbism.

According to Borhami, DS and Shubra School differed as concerns collective action as means of social change, where a number of Shubra scholars considered organized collective action an innovation in religion (Bida'a). Despite the fact that some Shubra scholars respected collective action, they preferred to be independent and to work as individuals. Therefore, the Shubra School developed around individual sheikhs and followers who were not disciplined or organized. Thus, when they established political parties and even the Salafi Front as an organization post-January 2011, such entities evolved around individuals and disappeared with them after July 3rd 2013 (int. Shaltoot, 2013, int. Borhami, 2013). That is why DS' sheikhs see that the term '*Harakyya*' or activism, that was used to describe the Shubra School, does not apply to a group that does not believe in collective action in the first place. Whereas DS' founders see their movement as the only representative of Salafi organized scholarship and activism, and to a lesser extent AS that focuses on scholarship rather than activism. In fact, Borhami sees DS as the modern young version of AS (int. Borhami, 2013).

Accordingly, in a departure from the quietists, DS approves of organized action and it classifies itself as an activist in the field of da'awa. Nevertheless, unlike the general categories of global Salafism discussed above, being activist does not mean that DS approves of the revolutionary connotation of Qutbism, since, for DS, Qutbism has a

different definition. Thus, despite DS' oppositional position to Mubarak's regime, Qutbism was one of the differences between them and fellow Salafis in Shubra.

Despite the Shubra Salafis' cautious approach to Takfir discussed in the literature, Borhami mentioned that Qutbi thought generally provides a frame for Takfir and the use of violence and that Qutbis are usually closer to MB when it comes to political alliances, which is not the case with DS (int. Borhami, 2013). Sheikh Ahmed Farid one of the founders of DS also sees Shubra school as more inclined to Takfir (int. Farid, 2013). This is because they used to declare as infidel Muslims who do not pray (int. Borhami, 2013). In addition, as concerns the issue of the rule of God and applying God's rules, which is connected to Tawhid and Takfir of the ruler, DS see that most Islamist groups are inclined to describe ruling against God's orders as Major infidelity (*Kufr Akbar*). However, Shubra School declares specific persons (*Kufr Ayn*) as infidel. Such Takfir practice directed towards persons was criticized by DS, which despite considering ruling against God's law a Major infidelity, would declare actions rather than persons as infidel (*Kufr Mo'ayyan*). That is why Shubra School proved by evidence that Mubarak is Kafir (infidel), while DS says that the actions of replacing God's rulings by others, and obliging people to follow them is an infidel action, or act of Kufr. This is because DS' scholars are pro the opinion that Takfir should be subject to strict conditions, particularly when it comes to individuals (int. Shaltoot, 2013).

DS' members also criticised Shubra Sheikhs' discourse on Raba'a sit-in platform, and said that it implicated Takfir and an antagonistic approach towards the society. Thus, even if they do not adopt violence they weaken da'awa through losing people's sympathy and acceptance, which makes it more difficult to approach sinners (int. Al Shahhat). Thus, according to the literature and to DS' narrative, Shubra School's

independent sheikhs adopted a Qutbi approach and were influenced by MB thought and policy choices as concerns politics. Such an attitude did not conform with DS' political preferences, and clear differences appeared when both DS and Shubra school entered politics (int. Borhami, 2013, int. Farid, 2013). This can explain why the Salafi political parties that joined the MB's alliance, after June 30th revolution, were left out of the scope of this study²⁸.

To sum up, the main differences between DS and Shubra School concern collective action as a method of social change and propagation or da'awa, and the Qutbi and Takfir attitude in Shubra circles. More recently, DS' followers said that the difference with Shubra Scholars' was due to their inclination towards MB political approach.




Figure (1) Types of Takfir

Conclusion

This chapter presented the main concepts and references of global Salafism as an introduction to the study of Egyptian Salafism, in order to situate DS on the Egyptian

²⁸ To understand these parties better, the starting point of study should be with MB, and then Salafi thought.

Salafis ideological spectrum, to determine its intellectual contours, and to connect the movement to the broader global Salafism map.

This was done through exploring DS' narrative of the Islamist resurgence, and the consequences of the main trends within the Islamist movement, particularly on issues of social change, and the relevant issues of Takfir, and Hisba, in order to determine DS' position that developed through the interaction with the other Salafis and Islamists in general. In addition, DS' position on these issues and its arguments help in locating it among global categories of Salafism.

It can be concluded that DS' position on the various Islamist and Salafi groups, and their choices as concerns social change, Takfir, and Hisba, does not fully conform to the attitude of the quietists who forbid organized action as an innovation, even if DS meant by activism a religious one. Such departure from the quietists' thought is reinforced by DS' opposition to the regime, and by calling the regime's actions Kufr or infidel, due to the fact that DS' followers do not compromise the issue of God's rule, in addition to adhering to the issue of loyalty and enmity as core issues of belief. Such major issues made DS a target for state persecution. However, DS did not suffer the same level of restrictions and state repression as other Islamist groups during the Mubarak Era (int. Borhami, 2013).

Accordingly, DS neither fully belongs to the quietists nor to the covert Salafis who preach quietism while being politically activists. This is because DS neither propagated a typical quietist approach, despite the clear influence of Al-Albani on DS' political views, nor carried out political activism. Thus, DS also does not fall in the political activists category which, as per the literature, falls in the orbit of MB political thought

(Haykel, 2009, Meijer, 2009). Nevertheless, DS, while abstaining from political activism, still held an oppositional position against Mubarak's regime. Yet, on the Egyptian Salafi ideological spectrum they cannot be considered mild Qutbis as suggested in the literature (Gauvain, 2013) since they consider Qutbism as a negative label.

Therefore, while adopting an oppositional position that matches the objectives of January 2011 revolution, they did not participate in the protests (int. Shaltoot, 2013), which clearly makes them an openly opposition movement, that verbally criticizes the ruler, yet, abstains from political activism, or actual participation. However, this anti-protest attitude made the public confuse them with Madkhalis, and they were situated in the quietists category.

Even more, in contrast with both the quietists' and the covert Salafis' ban on Hizbiyya (partisanship), DS established a political party. Thus, confusion about situating DS and its references might be responsible for the misunderstanding of the movement and the expectations about it. Therefore, the fact that DS does not fully conform to any of the Egyptian Salafi groups, or global Salafism categories, makes it an interesting case study. This makes an in-depth study of the ideational side of DS crucial not only for understanding its distinct nature among other Salafis', but more importantly to make sense of its policy choices as a political actor on one side and the nature of its role in the political scene on the other. However, to investigate DS' ideology and its formation, it is crucial to study DS' as a social movement within the Egyptian context and to explore both its cultural and materialistic aspects in order to clarify the internal dynamics of the movement, its decision-making mechanisms, and intellectual formation, and which of these aspects have more weight through the movement's development.

CHAPTER THREE: DS' DEVELOPMENT AS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT

Introduction

In view of the discussion of DS' location on the Salafi map, the previous chapter concluded that DS does not belong fully to any of the standing categories of global and Egyptian Salafism. This raises questions about DS' formation and development as a distinct movement. Such a distinct position on the Salafi spectrum requires a closer look at the conditions within which DS as a social movement emerged, and developed its method and vision for social change. In this regard, this chapter finds that DS emerged as a social movement with the aim of protecting its Manhaj, and that the grievance that accompanied the movement was from a fellow Islamist counter-movement, not from the state. In addition, DS' Manhaj developed through interactions and discursive conflicts with fellow Islamists and the dominant conservative discourse. However, DS-state relationship witnessed fluctuations which required that DS' leaders and followers had to sacrifice parts of their organizational structure, but did not offer any intellectual concessions as concerns their Manhaj that is the cement of the movement. Therefore, Manhaj was always central in the movement's mobilization, decision making, and framing processes of the opportunities and constraints that results from its context.

Therefore, this chapter aims at understanding the socio-economic and political context in which DS emerged. This analysis of the context will discuss the institutionalized relations between the state and religion in general (Kniss, 2007), and DS-state relationship in particular. Moreover, DS' interaction with counter-movements, seculars or fellow Islamists alike, will be explored, in the sense of how DS' discourse developed due to interaction with the competitors' discourses as well as with the dominant

discourse. Such contextualization of DS is an attempt to clarify the political configuration and the opportunity structures (Snow, 2000) in which the movement was formed, which contributed to the construction of its identity and Manhaj (ideology), and the resulting method and strategies of propagation (da'awa) and social change. Consequently, the concern is with how this Manhaj influenced the movement's framing of the opportunities and the constraints within this context. This understanding of DS' context also helps in understanding the dynamics of the movement in the sense of its resources, mobilization, and organization, and how they were shaped by the Egyptian conditions, as well as the movement's Manhaj, and how they contributed to the movement's survival under an authoritarian regime.

Accordingly, this chapter sets the scene for a focus on DS' ideological dimension in the following chapters, through explaining the conditions within which DS' discourse (Manhaj) or vision for social change was constructed and how it was crystallized. This ideological dimension will be examined through discussing the means and processes of framing that DS carried out in the different periods in view of its Manhaj or original discourse, and in reaction to the different issues and sometimes challenges or new developments. Such a focus on framing comes as it is the key discursive mechanism that links ideas, values, ideology, and events in order to guarantee the support of adherents and bystanders, and to facilitate mobilization (Snow, 2010).

This chapter begins with a presentation of the Egyptian context in which DS' emerged and developed as part of a wider Islamist resurgence movement. In this regard, there will be a discussion of the structure and political configurations within which DS' emerged, and how the consequent opportunities and constraints influenced DS' development, selection of its Manhaj and the formation of its identity, in view of its

interaction with the rest of the Islamist movements and the dominant discourse. In addition, there will be a discussion of DS-state relationship pattern. The second section will discuss DS' internal dynamics and strategies in light of its socio-economic context and relationship pattern with the state. This will be done through discussing the movement's resources, mobilization, and organization, which all served in its survival, and were connected to its Manhaj.

Section One: DS' Emergence and Development in the Egyptian Context:

The political context is formed of a number of components that are interlinked, first, structures, which encompass the international context, political institutions, cultural models, and cleavage structures, second, the configuration of political actors which determines the forms of alliances and conflict structures, and third, the interaction context that links both structure and configuration. This third level of analysis includes the strategies of public authorities and policy makers, and the opportunities that influence the choice of the strategies of collective political actors. These collective actors' strategies, in turn, influence strategies of public authorities and political actors (Kriesi, 2007). Therefore, this section will discuss the socio-economic and the political context in which DS emerged, in order to understand how its ideology was constructed or how its Manhaj was formed, through the interaction with the various components and actors within this context, and what were DS' opportunities and constraints, and consequently, what were the strategies that DS employed to deal with them. Finally, there will be a discussion of DS-state relationship pattern.

The Transitional Stage and Setting the Structure:

The historical moment when DS emerged signified a transitional stage in Egyptian history from Nasser's socialist to Sadat's rightist semi-authoritarian regime that sponsored a religious conservative discourse to eradicate Nasser's legacy. Nasser's regime represented a post-colonial state and society that emphasized modernization, populism, and nationalism, and in which there were corporatist arrangements where the state was the sole welfare provider (Ismail, 2004: 388). According to DS' narrative, such an atmosphere was challenging to the founders of DS, since they grew up in a socialist state that imposed its discourse through all institutions of socialization. Thus, young sheikhs, particularly Mohamed Ismail Al-Moqaddem²⁹, who came from religious families and were sent to AS' mosques to memorize Quran during their early intellectual formation, developed a negative position towards socialism and secularism and a belief that Islam is the answer for all their questions in resistance to the dominant discourse (Tawfiq, 2012b).

However, by the mid-1960s there were signs of change in the structure, that were manifested in a decline in the nationalist narrative (Ismail, 2004), which for DS' followers constituted the collapse of Nasser's Arab nationalist and socialist project after the defeat of 1967. Such a demise from DS' perspective resulted in a "religious inclination in Egyptian society, which found its references in the Salafi books and contributions that were available in AS libraries" (int. Al-Shahhat). Thus, the 1967-1973 war constituted a favorable condition for the initiation of Islamist mobilization.

²⁹ Al-Moqaddem is the founder of DS and studied in AS mosque in Alexandria, and had access to its library. He was challenged by his leftist teacher, who saw that Islam defies science and women's rights. As a result, Al-Moqaddem carried out a research in AS library to prepare a counter-argument that defends Islam in an academic way. This confrontation escalated; however, with the support of his father, it was settled in favour of Al-Moqaddem. Such a tough experience resulted in his convictions that Quran has answers for all questions and criticisms and that non-Islamist ideologies hate Islam. Therefore, Al-Moqaddem developed a tendency to fight the leftist hegemonic discourse, particularly because of the suppression of his religious beliefs (Tawfiq, 2012b).

Not only that such a long war had negative implications on the Arab nationalist project, it might have also contributed to the exhaustion of the regime's resources; and its capability to suppress the opponents (Oberschall, 1973). This might explain the decline of the statist and corporatist arrangements, particularly in the beginning of the 1970s where the state was no longer the sole provider for economic resources and was not the main employer: this resulted in rising autonomy in the society, both on the cultural and economic levels. This situation continued in the 1980s where the state capacity of exerting control over the people through coercion and providing services weakened, thus giving space for the informal economy, and for the social activities and services and informal employment provided by Islamists and centered around mosques (and churches for Christians) (Ismail, 2004: 388).

On the political level, in the 1970s Sadat's shift from leftist to rightist orientation, the adoption of the economic open-door policy and a multiparty system constituted a transformation of the Egyptian political system from an authoritarian system with rigid state control to a semi-authoritarian one (Brown, 2012). This shift was also seen as part of a wider shift of alliance away from the communist USSR towards the USA, which was applauded by Islamists. Meanwhile, on the regional level, the Egyptian-Saudi relationship witnessed significant improvement, particularly during the 1973 war (the Oil Embargo), and until signing the peace treaty with Israel in 1978. Such Egyptian-Saudi rapprochement paved the way for a flow of Muslim scholars, ideas and resources between the two countries and, thus, the support of Islamists in general³⁰ (Tawfiq, 2012b, int. Farid, 2013).

³⁰ Despite the fact that DS leaders stressed their financial and intellectual independence from Saudi Arabia over their history. However, they mentioned that one aspect of the Saudi support to the Salafi thought in Egypt was through funding AS organization (int. Farid).

Sadat's rightist orientation and manipulation of religious symbols, due to his tendency to get rid of Nasser's legacy and of his leftist opponents (Ismail, 2004), signified a shift in the alignments, which constituted an opportunity for Islamists (McAdam, 1996, Tarrow, 1998) during that transitional stage. In this context, state-religion relations developed in two main directions: the establishment of state-controlled religious institutions, which eventually developed as relatively autonomous bodies, yet under direct presidential control. This is in addition to religious social actors who were allowed to express their religious views yet within the limits defined by the state (Brown, 2012). In this respect, the state sponsored a conservative religious discourse, in which religious figures such as Sheikh Sha'rawy appeared to be independent from the state apparatus yet were responsible for the production of state ideology (Ismail, 2003).

As a result of such new arrangements, Sadat established Al-Gama'a Al-Dinyya in schools³¹ and GI in universities, in addition to releasing MB from prison (Tawfiq, 2012b). Besides turning a blind eye on the Leftist-Islamist clashes in university, the state relatively supported the rise of GI that was considered a university student association parallel to the students' union, thus, it benefited from the financial allocations that were available at state universities to support their camps and activities (Tawfiq, 2012a, Farid, 2012, Al-Naquib, 2011).

Thus, it can be said that the employment of "Islamist articulations in the constitution of political forces" started in the 1970s with GI, the return of the MB to the political scene,

³¹ Sheikh Yasser Borhami and Sheikh Ahmed Hotayba, two of DS founders, were the products of Al-Gama'a Al-Dinyya. They were availed the opportunity to write and to deliver religious speeches in their school, and they became the religious references for their colleagues. At the university level, sheikh Al-Moqaddem joined GI when he became a student in the school of medicine in Alexandria University. Al-Moqaddem had a clash with the leftist students' union over tearing Quran posters hung on the walls by GI. This clash escalated when Al-Moqaddem was violently beaten, and it turned into a battle between the leftists and the Islamists in the university. The result of this fight was that Al-Moqaddem became the main leader in GI (Tawfiq, 2012)

Sadat's use of Islamic slogans and symbols, and the rise of Jihad (Ismail, 2003: 55, int. Shaltoot, 2013).

The 1980s and 1990s witnessed the confrontation between the radical Islamists and the state, and in order to control radicals, particularly after Sadat's assassination in 1981, the state used both repression and dialogue, and propagated its own version of Islam. Thus, the state sponsored the conservative religious discourse that served in the construction of the Muslim identity, or the "Muslim subject in ethical and cultural terms," in which conservative figures particularly Al-Azhar sheikhs introduced an "alternative frame of ordering the world as guardians of moderate Islam" (Ismail, 2003: 32). Eventually such a version of Islam, identity, culture, and morality constituted the ideology of the state. This discourse evolved around the narrative of the confrontation between the correct or moderate Islam and the mistaken or radical Islam (Ismail, 2003).

Political Configurations and Strategies of the State and Islamists:

Such conservative discourse was represented mainly by Al-Azhar sheikhs, and the moderate opposition, mainly Al-Ahrar party and elements of MB (Ismail, 2003). Also, the number of thinkers who called themselves moderate or "wasati" was large and encompassed, besides MB's figures, liberal intellectuals who had religious inclinations as well as television preachers, and since this category is wide many Salafis would fit in it as well (Brown, 2012). The dominant bloc which was not homogenous included several fractions that were connected to the rentier economy and parasitic economic activities (petite bourgeoisie, parasitic bourgeoisie, transformed labor aristocracy and professionals), who, for tactical reasons, also supported this conservative discourse. Thus, the conservative figures served as the link between the bourgeoisie and the state

(Ismail, 2003: 51, 57), and were emphasizing the status-quo (Ismail, 2004). In the meantime, the moderate Islamist opposition or MB served as the guardian of the pious youth, condemned violence, and criticized state transgressions against shari'a. In this regard, MB chose to function from within the system, through its "formal structures such as party organizations, professional syndicates and the Parliament." And to overcome state restrictions on them, they made alliances with other parties who were not necessarily Islamists (Ismail, 2004: 396-397). Such conservative ideology was also reflected in state institutions. For instance, the parliament and courts were responsible for legislations and rulings that conform to shari'a as per article 2 of the constitution. In addition, the Ministry of Education had to ensure the instruction of Islamic practice and content to Muslim students (Brown, 2012).

In view of such political configurations, the state's strategy was to sponsor the conservative discourse and its convergence with the moderate Islamist opposition aimed at "neutralizing radicals," "containing Islamic left," "circumventing secularists," "displacing social and national struggles" and "producing a religious identity," which in turn led to the reproduction of power relations (Ismail, 2003: 32). Accordingly, Muslims' activities became bounded by the limits of the teachings of some Islamic authority (Ismail, 2003: 81), and it was under the control of the state except for the revolutionaries or the violent groups, who were subject to state repression.

Within this context, Islamists represent wide loose networks that have common references and positions as regards morals, yet they might differ as concerns the state and method of activism as mentioned in the previous chapter. Thus, they used various strategies ranging from direct confrontation with the state and violent attacks, to

propagating tension in the public sphere, to penetration of societal spaces (Ismail, 2003: 176).

This structure and political configuration resulted in a number of opportunities and constraints that were responsible for DS' emergence, the formation of its Manhaj, or ideology, its identity, its transformation into a social movement, and its strategies and choices. In the following part of this section, there will be a presentation of DS' opportunities and constraints and how they influenced DS' Manhaj, and its interaction with fellow Islamists and the rest of the components of its context. Then, there will be a discussion of the state-DS relationship pattern.

DS' Opportunities and Constraints:

According to DS' narrative, the young sheikhs³² who later established DS, considered the shift of alignment in the regime, the consequent support of Islamists against the leftists, and the establishment of GI, as the opportunity that made Islamists' revival possible. Nevertheless, most Islamists did not realize it at the beginning, thus they were cautious and fearful of state repression if they were open about their religious orientations.³³ On the contrary, the later DS' founders who were then enrolled in GI, were able to understand the opportunity, and to make timely use of it. Thus, within this vibrant Islamist atmosphere, GI sheikhs established committees and groups, divided up work, and participated in students' unions and in all kinds of university activities. This gave them sufficient experience of how organized work is carried out and they became

³² Mohammad Ismail Al-Moqaddem, Ahmed Farid, Mohamed Abu Edris, Yasser Borhami, Ahmed Hotayeba, and Sa'id Abdel A'zim, are the six founders of DS.

³³ Arresting Sayed Qutb (MB prominent figure), and his group, then his execution during Nasser's era was always present in Islamists' memory (Tawfiq, 2012b).

familiar with administrative structures³⁴ (Tawfiq, 2012b). Such access to institutions through working within the university, and freedom of expression, constituted open institutional and discursive opportunities for Islamists that meant access and concessions according to Koopmans' (1999) model.

This success and the impartial nature of GI continued until MB came out of prisons starting 1974 (Tawfiq, 2012b, int. Al-Shahhat, 2013) and found out that a new generation continued Islamic da'awa, and were active and dynamic (int. Farid, 2013). At the beginning, MB's members started to practice da'awa on an individual basis through GI without revealing their identity or trying to recruit any student in their organization. This policy continued until they got a green light from President Sadat to resume their activism. Such state tolerance with MB made the political opportunity more obvious for the rest of Islamists, and they decided to step up their activities (Tawfiq, 2012b).

Forming an alliance with an influential ally is considered one of the dimensions of political opportunity (McAdam, 1996, Tarrow, 1998). This makes MB's return to the political scene, while being supported by the regime and part of the dominant discourse, an influential ally for fellow Islamists. Nevertheless, DS' founders did not see this as an opportunity and refused to turn GI into a sub-section of MB organization, while the majority of GI members agreed to join MB. Therefore, GI was split between those pro the formation of an umbrella Islamist front, and those who did not support unconditional alliance with no regard to theological and methodological differences among the various groups. The latter was the minority. In fact, eleven members left GI

³⁴ At that time, GI main influence was in schools of Medicine and Engineering, and then spread to other schools and GI's members were elected for the cultural and the student services committees in the students' unions. Moreover, GI's influence availed them the opportunity to win a number of seats in the national students' union (int. Farid, 2013, Farid, 2012).

in 1977 and established MS (Tawfiq, 2012b). It can be inferred then that instead of considering MB an opportunity, it became a constraint since it turned into a counter-movement (Oberschall, 1993b), that worked on defaming MS' members and managed to make them lose their main platform, and to be ejected from several mosques. This was done through employing the moderate versus radical dominant narrative, where MB spread the image that MS' sheikhs are young, inexperienced, and radicals (Tawfiq, 2012b), while MB constituted part of the dominant conservative discourse that acted as the guardian of moderate Islam (Ismail, 2003), and conformed to the common understanding of religion in Egypt at that time as went earlier. Moreover, MB was seen by the rest of Islamists as heroes who were imprisoned for the sake of Islam, while MS' sheikhs lacked such a legacy (Tawfiq, 2012a). Therefore, fellow Islamists, rather than the ministry of Endowments or the police, fought MS (Tawfiq, 2012b).

Yet, since 1977 MS focused its efforts in two directions. First, the preparation of preachers using references to Quran and Sunna, and finding evidence. Second, publishing Salafi books to spread their methodology in a series titled "Salafis talk"³⁵ (Abdel Hamid, 2013). They also pursued three strategies to counter MB's pressures. First, they insisted on delivering their speeches and preached even in means of transportation and on the streets.³⁶ Second, they worked on reinforcing and deepening the friendship among the founding sheikhs of the school and the people who come to the mosque in what they called enhancing unity, fraternity, and faith meanings (*ma'ani*

³⁵ Among the books published were 37 volumes of Ibn Taymiyya, each volume was sold for one Egyptian pound. Each week students read a volume, and would buy another in the following week, which was one of MS educational methods (Abdel Hamid, 2013).

³⁶ For instance, Sheikh Ahmed Hotayba used to give two lessons for a large number of people in the tram on his way back and forth from university (Tawfiq, 2012b).

Imanyya)³⁷, and from DS' point of view, this was one of the ways in which MS' sheikhs made their ways back to the mosques. Finally, according to their narrative, they used the "Bonaparte strategy," attack is the best means of defence. Thus, sheikh Al-Moqaddem decided that he would face MB's defamation campaign through a series of lectures in which he objectively criticized the twenty principles of Hassan Al-Banna, founder of MB, using evidence from Quran and Sunna. At this time, since criticizing Al-Banna was a taboo even on the official level, this decision attracted people's attention to MS, and they gradually started to accept Al-Moqaddem's arguments. Later on, they adopted his opinions, and some of them became Salafis. Afterwards, people came to his lectures in order to learn how to counter-argue the MB, and this series of lectures, from DS' point of view, was one of the main reasons for the spread of Salafism in Alexandria (Tawfiq, 2012b). This has also helped with the return of MS', later DS', sheikhs to mosques, as they were largely seen as adhering primarily to religious, rather than political discourse, and that their focus is on 'ilm (legal sciences). Thus, people seeking answers to religious questions would prefer DS' mosques over those of MB, who were more involved in politics than in preaching and religious lessons (Gawwad, 2013).

Such clashes between DS and MB were mainly ideological and mirrored the regional clash between Salafis, particularly Al-Albani's followers, and MB and the movements of politicized Salafis that evolved in MB's orbit, as mentioned in chapter 2. This sheds light on the importance of DS' Manhaj that the founders were not willing to sacrifice for the sake of the formation of a unified Islamist front under the leadership of MB as an influential ally. In contrast, they turned MB into an enemy for the sake of preserving

³⁷ sheikh Yasser Borhami (one of the six founders, known for having high communication skills), always stressed the necessity of "taking care of those who enter the mosque, know their names and addresses, give them perfume, and be there for them in times of need" (Tawfiq, 2012b).

their thought. Nevertheless, the conflict was not solely with MB since in its early beginning as MS, DS entered into discursive conflicts with fellow Islamists as well as with the dominant conservative discourse.

Discursive Conflicts among Islamist Groups and the Dominant Discourse:

According to DS' narrative, there were major differences with Al-Azhar, the official Islamic institution that led the dominant conservative discourse and was responsible for the production of the state ideology (Ismail, 2003). These differences were about issues of interpretation, Sunna, the issues of the rule of God, and the principle of loyalty and enmity (Tawfiq, 2012b). Such differences were highlighted in the interviews as a concern about the Ash'ari approach (rationalism) of Al-Azhar and the encouragement of Sufism (mysticism), in addition to reservations on the choices and statements of some of Al-Azhar figures (int. Makhyon, 2013, Talibbya, 2013). Thus, such differences can explain why DS did not join the conservatives' alliance. However, the dominance of the conservative discourse, particularly when sponsored by the state, and the re-islamization of the society, has served DS in its propagation activities, where the society was ready for the acceptance of a religious discourse. Yet, this state led conservatism was seen by DS' followers as a state of nature, since they always repeated that "the Egyptian society is conservative by nature" (Int. Mekki, 2013, int. Makhyon, 2013, Ismail, 2003). This means that they did not recognize the construction of this conservative Islamic identity that was sponsored by the dominant bloc, and which facilitated DS' mission. One of the reasons was that DS' followers see that they adopt a comprehensive definition of Islam, one that does not differentiate between "core and crust" (int. Shoukri, 2013). Thus, they pay attention to all aspects of Islam including appearance, emphasizing purity, priority of the texts, and avoiding any concessions or deviations from the right path of Al-Salaf

Al-Saleh (int. Nasr, 2013, int. Al-Shahhat, 2013). Such claims to purity and comprehensiveness were DS' reason for entering into discursive conflicts, not only with the dominant conservative discourse that was not up to their standards, but also with the rest of the Islamist groups that for them misunderstood some Islamic concepts and rulings, thus, deviating from the right path. This falls in line with Wiktorowicz' understanding that each faction among Salafis considers itself the real Salafi and the most capable of applying the Islamic rulings to contemporary contexts (Wiktorowicz, 2006).

In this respect, the differences among Islamists were generally on the priorities of da'awa and the sources of Islam and of Sunna (Tawfiq, 2012b). Such differences revolved around the method of social change (*Manhaj Al-Taghyeer*), and the position on the state. Since its early days, DS had three main intellectual distinctions that set it apart from the rest of Islamists, and such positions were mainly drawn from its Manhaj. First, unlike the rest of Islamists, particularly MB, DS criticized the Iranian Revolution for being a Shiite sectarian revolution rather than an Islamic one; thus, DS was accused of serving Sadat's regime and it suffered a negative image for a long time, until it became known that the Iranian regime is suppressing Sunnis. Second, DS had a clear position against Jihad and Takfir groups, thus, due to harsh criticism of such groups, DS was accused of dividing Islamists' unity, while it made it clear that priority goes first to its Manhaj. Third, DS' approach to social change, unlike other Islamists was a bottom-up approach rather than imposing change through parliaments or coups. DS was also subject to Islamists' suspicions for adopting this approach to social change and its loyalty to Islamists was questioned. This is because such an approach implied a mild position against the state, which was for other Islamists the main obstacle in the face of

their efforts to establish an Islamic state, and that changing it should be Islamists' main target (Tawfiq, 2012b). However, again this moderate position on the state did not mean that DS joined the dominant bloc or the conservatives' alliance, as mentioned above. Yet, in view of the dominant narrative of radical versus moderate Islam (Ismail, 2003), DS' non-violent position made it relatively evade state repression, and facilitated its survival, as will be discussed in the following part of this section.

Finally, in view of the structure and political configurations of DS' context, there is no evidence that they benefited from the opportunity of the bourgeoisie support to the conservative discourse. For although the alliance between the bourgeoisie and conservative figures (Ismail, 2003), and the changing composition of JI to encompass tradesmen and benefit from their resources on the radicals side (Ismail, 2004), DS suffered from limited resources over their history (Women's committee, 2014, int. Makhyon, 2013, int. Farid, 2013). Moreover, based on field work meetings and ethnographic notes, the information available on DS composition is that it was composed of students like other Islamist movements, and continued to draw upon middle and lower middle class professionals, and even the businessmen in the movement were originally professionals rather than tradesmen, at least as concerns the leaders and the core members of DS (Field notes, 2013-2014). However, with DS' limited resources they were able to carry out social activities and charity work in their neighbourhoods through mosques, where, like other Islamists, the social disengagement and the limitation of the role of the state as economic provider gave space to such activities (Ismail, 2004).

To sum up, DS' Manhaj formation evolved in interaction with its context, i.e. with alternative Islamic discourses whether that of the dominant bloc, the moderate or radical

opposition. Such interaction shaped DS' framing of the opportunities and constraints, as well as its strategies and alliances or cleavages with the various components and actors. Accordingly, DS did not join the conservative dominant discourse, thus did not benefit from the resources and the support of the state, Al-Azhar, and the bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, it benefited indirectly from the state conservative ideology and the re-islamization of the society, where DS mission was facilitated, through the creation of a fertile space for its propagation and through giving it access to discourse, particularly given it was non-violent. In addition, DS did not join the Islamist front and rather entered into discursive conflicts with fellow Islamists, and considered MB's return to the scene as a constraint and an obstacle to propagation. Thus, it is necessary to look at DS' methodology that makes it distinct among other Islamists, and that is responsible for DS strategies and is core to its framing of opportunities and constraints.

The Formation of DS' Manhaj and Identity:

DS' founders invested heavily in selecting their methodology and intellectual approach. This process of approach formation took place within a context characterized by profound discursive conflicts among Islamists, and in a transitional period, that allowed Islamists unprecedented freedom of expression and action. Thus, new Islamist trends and ideas emerged and interacted (Tawfiq, 2012b).

In this context, DS founders were able to develop a narrative of Islamic history and decided on the references for the interpretation of its main sources. So the Salafi methodology to interpret and to form positions on the various issues was based on finding evidence from the main sources of legislation in Islam; Quran, Sunna, consensus of scholars, analogy (qiyas), convention, considerations of public Interests,

and Madhhab Al-Sahaba (The doctrine of the companions), which come in an ordered ranking (int. Al-Shahhat, 2013). They focused on literal study of the texts of Ibn El Qayyem, Ibn Taymiyya, and Mohamed Ibn Abdel-Wahhab, and used to revise and check their understanding of such texts with senior sheikhs³⁸ (Tawfiq, 2012b). In addition, they adopted Al-Albani's purification and education strategy (Omar, 2013). Accordingly, they defined the contours of their thought within the Salafi references. In addition, they were keen on producing a simple clear religious discourse, based on trusted references that could be easily communicated to the public through simplifying events and realities (Snow, 2000, 2007). According to Sheikh Adel Nasr, "their main message was that they call for a path that conforms to human instinct, which would normally lead to God's way, and since He created humans, He knows what grants them internal peace. Such an objective can be attained through going back to Quran and Sunna with the understanding of Al-Salaf Al-Saleh (pious predecessors) away from Bida'a and moral anomalies" (int. Nasr, 2013).

DS' followers and leaders mentioned that people of different backgrounds could understand such simple and straightforward call and religious discourse. Moreover, linking it to human instinct does not make Salafism exclusive to a certain superior group but rather normalizes this approach and makes it more feasible, and does not assume superiority over their society which contradicts ideas of Takfir, and isolation. Therefore, the main objective was to work from within the society in order to introduce

³⁸ In order to guarantee precision, the founding sheikhs, besides copying the texts in their exact wordings, they used to revise their understanding with the students of Mohamed ibn Abdel Wahhab in the world and in Saudi Arabia, in particular. In this concern, they referred to "AL-Fatwa committee" in Saudi Arabia, which was for them a trusted authority, and was respected by AS, Al-Gami'yya Al-Shar'yya, and Al-Azhar. For that reason, sheikh Al-Moqaddem visited Saudi Arabia five times, and the rest of the founding sheikhs used to go for Umra (Mecca, and Medina) in Ramadan and to stay there until pilgrimage (two months) during their summer vacation when they were still students. In this period, they interacted with the most famous Saudi scholars, and discussed their understanding of their main texts. Among them was Sheikh Ibn U'thaymin, the prominent Saudi religious reference, who used to spend long hours with the youth, to discuss the various religious topics, and answer controversial questions (Tawfiq, 2012b).

a gradual bottom-up social change (int. Nasr, 2013). Thus, their appeal comes from the clarity of their doctrine and claim to purity, like fellow Salafis on the global level (Meijer, 2009). Accordingly, religious sciences dissemination through public lectures, and specific curriculums in their kindergartens, Quran schools, and Al-Forqan institute became the main tool of spreading DS' Manhaj and such educational programs start at the age of three, and continues in the different stages of DS follower's life (kindergarden, 2013, int. F. leader, 2013). Eventually, they developed a full vision of reform that started to be applied gradually (int. Al-Shahhat). The sheikhs started by teaching U'lum Shari'yya (Islamic religious sciences) for non-specialists. Accordingly, DS was distinguished by a school that provided academic Shari'a studies, through a curriculum equivalent to that of standing Universities with the same speciality, thus, was able to provide civil university graduates with a solid religious background (int. Al-Shahhat).

As for identity construction, DS' leaders and members defined themselves as those who follow the comprehensive and disciplined approach to Islam (int. Shoukri, 2013). In addition, they were keen on defining themselves against the "Other," in order to set the limits between them and all groups that defy Manhaj Al-Salaf such as Shiites, MB, liberals, or Takfir and violence groups (Tawfiq, 2012b, int. Al-Shahhat, 2013). DS' decisions were all attributed to its leaders' and members' strict abidance by Manhaj Al-Salaf, whatever the losses can be, since sacrificing Al-Manhaj for them is an existential threat, as was emphasized in all the interviews held in the field. Thus, all the framing processes of DS' choices evolved around this explanation, as will be explained further in the analysis of DS' and NP's framing processes in the following chapters.

DS' narrative of the process of methodology selection, meaning making, and the formation of the intellectual approach of the young Salafi sheikhs results in a number of observations. First, the founders' exposure to AS' libraries determined their selection of their approach and intellectual contours. Second, the improvement in the Egyptian-Saudi relations, besides availing resources for AS the main Salafi institution then, allowed for the flow of ideas and thought from Saudi prominent Salafi figures. Third, encircled by leftist secular discourse where the discussion of science, research, and the importance of concrete evidence was at its peak in the Egyptian society, the young sheikhs were keen on adopting scientific thinking, and on proving that being religious does not contradict being systematic. This was reinforced by the nature of their educational disciplines, which were mostly in medicine and engineering (Tawfiq, 2012b). Therefore, they decided that there were a number of problems within Islamists' discourse and their understanding of Islam. They undertook expansive research of their own and produced a list of references and a methodology to study and interpret Islam. Thus, their scholastic approach was not only a result of their adoption of Al-Salafyya Al-'ilmiyya school of Al-Albani that was flourishing in Saudi Arabia, but also due to the cultural and political context during Nasser's era that might have influenced their intellectual formation. Finally, the crystallization of DS' Manhaj took place due to interaction with other Islamists, and particularly, in opposition to that of MB.

In conclusion, DS' sheikhs exerted serious efforts in selecting and forming the intellectual approach and methodology. However, this school, in order to survive, and to resume and widen its activities, had to turn into a complete social movement. This transformation was a form of resistance to the counter-movements' pressures that

threatened the outreach and even the existence of MS' Manhaj; therefore, organized collective action became necessary.

The Transformation of MS into a Social Movement:

In view of the importance of Manhaj, MS as a school of thought was transformed into a social movement through the adoption of collective action, according to DS' narrative, just for the sake of immunizing their Manhaj against counter-movements' campaigns, particularly that of MB (Tawfiq, 2012b). This is because when MS tried to resume university activities, MB challenged them. Such confrontations did not stop at defamation, but escalated into a violent clash in which MS members were brutally beaten, and emerged from this fight determined to start an organized collective action for the sake of protecting the existence of their Manhaj, to resume da'awa, and to prove that they are not powerless. However, the decision to pursue organized collective action caused polarization among sheikhs. In this regard, a group preferred to stick to academic work within the school and to avoid any confrontation with MB. The other group insisted on establishing organized collective action and a complete da'awa movement, with wider activities that bypass academic ones, and are more systematic and structured. Accordingly, they turned MS into DS movement (Tawfiq, 2012b, Tawfiq, 2012a, Abdel Hamid, 2013).

Thus, the main reason for the establishment of the social movement was confrontation with the main counter-movement, MB, and the adoption of collective action, which relatively departed from the purely scholastic approach of Al-Albani, was framed by the existential threat to da'awa and Manhaj, which required collective action to confront it.

Accordingly, the grievances that accompanied the emergence of the movement came from a counter-Islamist movement rather than from the state (Oberschall, 1993b).

Awareness of the Social Movement:

There were variations in the timing of the awareness of the existence of DS as a complete social movement among the sheikhs of the various generations, and among male and female members of the movement. The female DS' narrative³⁹ tends to avoid exaggeration or making up facts as concerns their role at the emergence stage, because they had no awareness of the existence of DS since all their activities were carried out through GI, which encompassed all Islamists except for Al-Takfir wl Hijra. In addition, female students' activities were religious and impartial⁴⁰. However, women were not aware of the differences among Islamists, discussed in the previous chapter, and nobody explained these divisions to them (int. F. leader, 2013). Yet, they were attracted to DS' simple, apolitical religious discourse, but, were not aware that there is a specific Salafi entity, at the beginning (Gawwad, 2013).

Accordingly, women did not develop an independent position during the DS' emergence stage, and each one adopted her husband's affiliation and views, shared his books, and believed in them, be they MB, JI, or Salafi. There were no other sources available, until all the Islamist groups were activated, and among them, DS, and each got its own mosques and produced its books and ideas. Subsequently, members of the various Islamist groups started to exchange books and ideas, and to argue against each other (int. F. leader, 2013). This was the way DS benefited in its emergence as a social

³⁹ Due to the low profile of DS' women, their narrative of DS' history and their contribution in the movement was not studied, which led to misconceptions about women of DS as will be discussed in the following chapters.

⁴⁰ For instance, they were not studying certain religious subjects, but were only learning how to read Quran, used to fast on Mondays and Thursdays (Sunna), maintain the morning and evening prayers (Azkar), visit patients, and support the newly married. Moreover, they wore Hijab, and those who wanted wore Niqab (int. F. Leader, 2013).

movement from the conservative atmosphere and social re-islamization, discussed above, which was signified by the employment of religious cultural products such as religious speeches, and publications, cassette tapes, the appearance of religious actors who claim “religious authority” and contributed to the construction of “identity frames” that were based on religious elements. Such frames and products were also used by Islamists (Ismail, 2004: 401), thus promoting DS’ members’ awareness of their belonging to the movements.

According to DS’ women, the various intellectual approaches developed when each expressed and exchanged their views, and presented their principles and books through public lectures. Thus, by the end of the 1980s, the ideas of the different groups were fully crystallized, and the new generations came out with the legacy of their groups represented in books, principles and responses to suspicions (int. F. leader, 2013). By the turn of the 1990s religious sciences students started to seek knowledge in DS’ mosques, among them females’ lessons, leaving behind the politicized MB’s discourse. In addition, fully convinced with the Salafi discourse, women in Alexandria University formed a group without any political intentions by 1986. They highlighted also that their awareness of their affiliation to DS was motivated by religious differences and clashes with MB in university (Gawwad, 2013, Women's committee, 2014). Therefore, based on DS’ historical narrative, the two main components in DS’ framing starting from the adoption of collective action and members’ awareness of the movement and of their identity, were connected to Manhaj, and to the threat from MB.

There were also variations in the awareness of DS’ emergence as a social movement among the elite. However, most of them dated it back to the late 1970s/early 1980s (int. Al-Shahhat, 2013, Abdel Hamid, 2013, Tawfiq, 2012a, int. Borhami, 2013, int. Farid,

2013). Moreover, there were differences among them as concerns DS' definition and nature, and whether it is a social movement, or it resembles Islam as a whole. For some of them, there was a significant rejection of the western concept of "social movement," which is seen as limited relative to the comprehensive nature of Islam. This is because they perceived DS' main aim as the application of Islamic shari'a to all dimensions of one's life (int. Al-Shahhat, 2013), or the operationalization of Manhaj Al-Salaf to reality (int. Nasr, 2013), which led to the diversification of DS activities, and broadened its scope (int. Al-Shahhat, 2013). This implicates their inclination to stress the all-inclusive nature of Islam in the face of the western understanding, which for them tends to marginalize religion and limit DS' areas of specialization. Despite the fact that their description of DS (int. Al-Shahhat, 2013, int. Nasr, 2013) conforms to a typical social movement, they were defensive against this western concept. This is while some of them would give priority to DS' structure, collective organized action, and networking, over its scientific production, and religious reference. The latter narrative highlights DS' activism as a movement in order to distinguish it from the rest of Salafis, who share the same references but differ in nature (int. Borhami, 2013).

In conclusion, the above-mentioned narratives about DS' emergence conform to the definitions of a social movement. Despite their sensitivity towards the concept, they constituted a collective challenge to existing social, political, and even religious definitions and arrangements in the Egyptian context. They developed a common approach to Islam, with the purpose of applying it to society. Accordingly, they invested in creating solidarities and networks, and interacted with their secular and Islamist opponents, as well as with the state (Jenkins, 2005). As a group struggling over the definition of meanings, concepts, and the approach to Islam, they give special attention

to building Muslim identity and lifestyle that matches their Manhaj, on reforming society, and consequently state arrangements and institutions (Nash, 2010).

Nevertheless, when the movement became more formal, it attracted state attention, where according to Brown (2012) the state gave Islamists, except for MB, the choice between either organization or political participation, i.e. Islamists who carry out organizational work should not participate, and who participate are not allowed to organize. Thus, in the following section there will be a discussion of DS-state relationship pattern upon becoming a social movement.

State-DS Relationship, 1984-2011:

According to DS' followers' narrative, DS-state relationship witnessed fluctuations that varied from restriction to facilitation; however, facilitation did not mean supporting the movement at any level, but rather turning a blind eye on its activities and members (int. Borhami, 2013). Yet, even the periods of facilitation were not problem-free, since the early 1980s, which was considered the golden age of the movement, witnessed detentions of young members and leaders to keep DS under control. DS' activity was stalled due to Jihadis' assassination of Sadat in 1981. As a result, Islamists were generally detained, and among them DS sheikhs, who were imprisoned from 1981 until 1984, despite being proven innocent. Such activism was subject to restrictions again in 1994, and their open organizational work was banned. This meant the state allowed them to exist without any official cover or licence which made DS vulnerable to security prosecution. The second largest attack came in 2002 when DS University activities were prohibited. Therefore, there were periodical limitations to DS but without complete eradication of the movement, so the state left the mosques under the

DS' influence, on condition that security personnel are fully aware of the details of its actions (int. Borhami, 2013). Thus, State Security had reports about DS' preachers, occasionally prohibited DS' educational hand-outs and entertainment trips, and put restrictions on the topics preachers can discuss. As concerns charity work and social services, DS' members had to carry them on individual basis not under the banner of DS, and could not use any slogans. However, in all cases, they had their Salafi appearance, that distinguishes them. Meanwhile, to limit their influence, Salafis were subject to media defamation and accusations of being sectarian (Gawwad, 2013).

Such DS' narrative interprets the fluctuating state position by its desire to maintain a balance among Islamists, since a full abolition of DS may drive many individuals to join the violent and Takfir groups. In addition, the state was resisting Shi'ite thought through Salafis. That said, it remains also obvious that DS was not a pro-government group, whose sheikhs had clear political positions as concerns loyalty and enmity, and the rule of God, and were keen on discussing these issues in all cases, which made it impossible that state would grant them freedom to expand (int. Borhami, int. Makhyon, int. Nasr, 2013). Such security approach resulted in denying sheikhs access to media, despite of the fact that many non-DS independent Salafi sheikhs had access to TV programs and newspapers (int. Borhami, 2013). However, there is some evidence that access to media was not absolutely denied (Farid, 2012; 67); but the presence of DS sheikhs on TV was rare.⁴¹ However, in view of the above-mentioned policy towards DS and Islamists, the state would allow media access to individual sheikhs rather than leaders of a large organized Salafi movement, which openly opposes the government.

⁴¹ Overview of archival material online 2002-2011, confirms that there is no TV participation except for Sheikh Farid.

In addition to DS' tense relationship with state security entities, its relationship with Al-Azhar and the Ministry of Endowments, the official religious bodies, was also subject to fluctuations. In view of the dominant narrative of correct versus mistaken Islam, in which Al-Azhar was the moderate authority, in 1984 the state announced that Al-Azhar would evaluate the Islamist groups' thought through public intellectual debates, and would recognize those who prove to be abiding by the true Islamic teachings and they would be allowed to practice da'awa, whereas extremist violent groups would be excluded from preaching. Thus, DS was recognized as moderate by Al-Azhar (Tawfiq, 2012a, Ismail, 2003), and some of DS' sheikhs became official preachers (Nasr, 2013). Consequently, in order to gain credibility and to acquire legitimacy, sheikh Borhami and sheikh Al-Moqaddem studied in Al-Azhar. After that, other Salafis started to apply to Al-Azhar, but later on a number of DS applicants were rejected with the argument that Salafis were trying to infiltrate Al-Azhar (int. F. leader, 2013).

In this regard, DS in its relationship with the state diverted from the Koopmans and Statham model that assesses the different reactions of the elite to the actions of the movements and the opponents, in the various opened-closed discursive and institutional opportunities (Koopmans, 1999). First, because access to both institutional and discursive opportunities during the 1970s-1980s neither led to any concessions from the side of the government, nor to DS full empowerment, because it did not constitute a stable facilitation pattern within an authoritarian regime. Second, the combination of restricting institutional opportunity while allowing access to discourse in the 1990s did not lead to any intellectual concessions from the side of DS. Despite the fact that young preachers abided by state security rules in their public lectures (Gawwad, 2013), DS maintained organized collective action, through private actions and discourse (conv. int.

Rashwan). Nevertheless, these private activities remained not secretive or underground (int. Thabet, 2013), yet only on a scale that did not incite security intervention, particularly because they are not interested in being a political actor in the first place (Brown, 2011). Thus, unlike Koopman's model, despite setting red lines for DS' discourse, the state failed to repress the ideas that did not conform to its interests. In this regard, Snow (2007) mentions that framing and ideological work can still proceed even within a repressive political structure in private contexts. This means that whether the structure helps or not, these processes will take place but in different ways and degrees. Therefore, when both the institutional and the discursive opportunities were blocked in 2002, organized work continued at a smaller scale, and even during detention, sheikhs started schools in prison. In addition, there were no concessions as concerns DS' main tenets, whereas other Islamist groups carried out revisions to their thoughts. Fourth, DS-state relationship did not witness the combination of open institutional opportunity and closed discursive opportunity in which the state selects some figures of the movement to enter polity as long as they adhere to the prevailing rules, since DS was not ready to exchange intellectual concessions for political gains.

Accordingly, the nature of the role of the state in the emergence and development of a social movement in an authoritarian system, and DS religious apolitical targets, made the facilitation-restriction mechanisms produce different results. Thus, DS provides an interesting model of movements' survival strategies within an authoritarian regime, where state restrictions indirectly empowered the movement.

In the following section there will be a presentation of the internal dynamics of DS over its history, in view of such DS-state relationship.

Section Two: The Internal Dynamics of DS

Resources, Mobilization and Decision-making

DS' financial resources draw mainly on members' donations. At the beginning of the movement, all members were students and were generally on an equal footing in terms of their limited financial capabilities. But as they graduated and worked, then several generations joined, making larger internal donations became possible (int. Al-Shahhat). DS' policy assigns such internal donations, e.g. membership subscriptions, in-kind donations and free services, and relatively large donations of some members, to funding the da'awa activities (preaching). Funds collected in mosques' charity boxes are directed towards the poor and social services. According to DS' narrative, such policy contributed to DS' credibility, since the community felt that DS would not exploit them, but rather sufficed by the role of the mediator between them and the poor (int. Al-Shahhat). In addition, this awareness of the limited resources as one of the main obstacles to da'awa, made DS' members more motivated to think of creative ways to be self-sufficient, and to achieve tasks with the least cost (int. Al-Shahhat). Moreover, DS' regulations confine speeches, preaching, teaching, and working as Imams (leading people in prayers) to volunteers, and never allows such tasks turn into a source of living (int. Al-Shahhat).

Generally, DS prefers self-sufficiency through physical-efforts, and members' donations (int. Al-Shahhat, int. Makhyon, int. Borhami), and decisively denied receiving any Saudi funds, considering this a form of defamation (int. Makhyon). Even though sheikhs used to visit senior sheikhs of Saudi Arabia, their relationship was friendly, and was confined to exchanging books, and religious discussions. However, there was no

coordination or funding of any sort. This was because DS' leaders saw that whoever funds them would direct their agenda, and they were keen on keeping their independence, and distinctive intellectual approach (int. Farid, 2013). In this regard, Haykel finds it simplistic to consider that Wahhabism was spread because of Saudi funding, since Salafism appeared before the establishment of Saudi Arabia, and because not all Salafi groups accept or benefit from Saudi funds (Haykel, 2009).

Despite there being no concrete evidence that DS did not receive any foreign funds, their activities, headquarters, and lack of facilities prove their limited financial resources (int. Makhyon, 2013). For instance, because of the cost, DS did not open a headquarters in Cairo⁴² (int. Borhami, 2013). In addition, they have been always under police supervision and restrictions, thus, the fact that they might have received foreign fund, could have been a good chance for their detention and for the media and counter-movements to defame them. Finally, DS' leaders do appreciate the Saudi senior sheikhs, yet they are keen on stressing the independence of their school of thought, and that they do not ascribe, neither politically nor religiously, to Saudi Wahhabism. On the contrary, there are points of disagreement between them as concerns Takfir (int. Borhami, 2013), balance among the various Islamic sources, interpretations, practices, and priorities of da'wa activities (int. Farid, 2013).

To sum up, DS managed to free itself from the domination of any of the other Salafi schools that might have stronger financial capabilities, being keen on preserving their

⁴² Even when the political party was established, most of its headquarters were hired from DS' members who contributed the rent and in cases where there were no volunteers; they did not open one (int. Al-Shahhat, 2013). In addition, due to lack of resources, the party could not have a media platform in order to defend itself against the MB's defamation campaign, especially after the June 30th Revolution (int. Makhyon, 2013). Also the field observations show that the general secretariat of the party in Cairo, is in a relatively popular area, and is very simple and was gradually furnished since July 2013 and until the end of the field work in January 2014, yet, was not luxurious. The party headquarter in Alexandria is in a relatively strategic area, still was not luxurious either. The party headquarter in Giza was significantly poor and simple.

distinct Manhaj. In addition, it was obvious that the quality of its human resources was making up for the lack of financial resources. However, the intellectual connection with Saudi Arabia and the influence of its prominent sheikhs on the intellectual formation of DS sheikhs were highlighted in the interviews, which is something DS' members are clear about. Nevertheless, as concerns the issue of financial backing, the literature discussed earlier did not provide a definite answer and this issue tends to be a matter of speculation not supported with evidence. In line with this, this dissertation also adopted a sceptical position in this regard. Nonetheless, the tight restrictions on foreign funding, particularly to islamists in Egypt and the security limitations on DS, besides the field observations through which the researcher discovered that they have few offices that are poorly and gradually furnished, in cheap rental areas, in addition to the researcher's observation of their cars, clothing and homes, all might imply that they are not a rich organization if compared to other Saudi-funded Salafis in Egypt. Moreover, the researcher knew informally from her sources outside DS and NP, after the field work, that NP, despite their fears of MB defamation, were not able to pay for launching a TV channel or taking a media strategy offer that was presented to them by a media agency in August 2014, and they are still unable to do that; yet, they later launched a YouTube channel instead, and the party does not have a website, but rather a Facebook page. In addition, NP experienced pressures during 2015 elections especially with vote buying, (Nabil, 2015a, Al-Shahhat, 2015), which might imply that if they were supported by any actor in the region they might have been funded and pushed to gain more seats in the 2015 elections. Finally, in view of the recent fluctuations in the Egyptian-Saudi relations (Ali, 2016; Habboush, 2016), NP is still active on the Egyptian political scene and present in presidential conferences and events, which can say something about their

relationship with Saudi Arabia, and with other regional rivals of Egypt, namely Qatar and Turkey who embrace MB (Ghitis, 2014, Tol, 2016), DS' historical rival. However, nothing can be inferred about their relationship with UAE and Kuwait for instance. Therefore, so far there is no credible and clear information available in this regard and the researcher suggests that such information might only be available to a security institution with potential access to private data, but not to an individual researcher. However, in view of the observations collected in the field and of following up the case in Egypt, the researcher is still more inclined to think that DS is not foreign funded and is a financially poor organization that makes up for this through its human resources and in-kind donations from its members (including some successful businessmen). Nevertheless, this is an issue that remains undecided.

As for human resources mobilization, DS does not depend on the recruitment approach. This is because recruitment contradicts DS' belief that it should be a social reform movement rather than a "cocoon" within this society. Thus, DS directs its discourse towards building intellectual convictions and educational preparations (int. Al-Shahhat, 2013). Accordingly, the irregular audience for the lectures of DS would gradually turn into a permanent audience and subsequently into actors within the movement once they ask or get asked to express their opinions, and then participate in the activities. Nonetheless there were no intentional organized recruitment processes to urge the youth to join (int. Al-Shahhat, 2013). As for decision making mechanisms, according to its leaders, DS has always applied "Shura" mechanisms (int. Borhami, 2013). And in case the resulting decisions are not popular, leaders gave special attention to feedback from DS' popular base. In fact, communicating decisions to the different levels of the movement takes place through various types of interactions that range from public

lectures, to one-on-one friendly communications (Women's committee, 2014). Therefore, leaders were keen on keeping a bottom-up decision-making process, not only for the reason that Islam requires Shura, but also because the movement's human resources are its main asset, and their intellectual mode would not tolerate blind obedience (int. Farid, 2013).

In conclusion, DS' discourse is mainly directed towards the public, for the sake of building convictions and not mobilizing people or recruiting them to join its ranks, and those who become fully convinced with its religious discourse would ask to join, which reflects again the centrality of DS' Manhaj as the cement of the movement (Gawwad, 2013, Shams, 2013, int. Al-Shahhat, 2013). Moreover, the decision-making process takes into consideration the opinion of the followers, who adopt the individual reason approach of Salafism, leading to shallow hierarchies, and empowering followers vis-a-vis leaders, as mentioned in Chapter 2. Such intellectual decentralization requires that leaders' framing processes be connected to DS' followers Manhaj and intellectual approach in order to keep the connectedness of the movement.

The Two Phases of Organized Collective Action:

Phase One (Pre-1994):

Once activated as a social movement, similar to other Islamists at this period (Ismail, 2004), DS started to expand its activities. It established social and media committees to contact public figures, started Islamic investment (Tawzif Al-Amwal), and Zakat (levy on the property of Muslims) committees. Gradually, regional committees were established, and there was a central council to manage them (Tawfiq, 2012a). Accordingly, activities such as commanding virtue and prevention of vice, and Shari'a

courts to settle and resolve conflicts among people (not to apply Islamic penal laws “Hudud”), were organized, yet were not official. In addition, Sot Al-Da’awa magazine was published to spread the main DS’ intellectual issues and convictions (Tawfiq, 2012a). Moreover, in 1984 Al-Forqan institute for preparing and educating preachers was established, where the founding sheikhs taught and trained the first class that included almost 300 students and later various classes graduated⁴³ (Abdel Hamid, 2013).

Moreover, students who studied in Alexandria University transferred DS’ thought, thus, it became strong in most of the important governorates in the north coast and delta, then Suez Canal governorates, while having a weak presence in Cairo and Giza. Despite Sheikh Sayyed Al-Afani efforts in 1970’s, it was difficult to move within JI dominated Upper Egypt, particularly in the presence of armed clashes with the police. There was also no presence for DS in Sinai and the Red Sea areas (Abdel Hamid, 2013). However, DS started to spread its activities abroad as well, and had visits and centres in Europe and USA (Abdel Hamid, 2013, Farid, 2012).

As for women’s activism⁴⁴ and collective action, each region had its female preacher that was famous in her area, and this local activism could be explained by shari’a restriction on women’s travelling as well as state pressures on all DS’ members (int. F. leader, 2013).

⁴³ DS also managed to take charge of mosques all over Alexandria, and opened up in the various governorates through lectures delivered by DS sheikhs and envoys (int. Farid, Abdel Hamid, 2013).

⁴⁴ Women’s’ narrative shows that they suffered discrimination in jobs, their children’s opportunities were limited, and they were exposed to verbal harassment in the streets because of their outfit (Niqab). In addition, they experienced other types of pressure when their husbands were detained, and they had to take the responsibility of their families, to raise new generations, and to support their imprisoned husbands. This means that women, despite being latecomers to DS, proved to be dynamic actors within the movement, particularly in studying and teaching religious sciences, and in social services activities, and through providing a back-up to male members when they were arrested. Thus, DS’ women contributed to the survival of the movement despite social and state pressures (Gawwad, 2013, int. F. leader, 2013).

Thus, DS had high access and outreach before its open collective action was restricted in 1994 (Abdel Hamid, 2013). In addition, DS' activities were frozen, except for the university and the youth ones that remained until 2002 (Tawfiq, 2012b). However, after dissolving the social committee, charity continued and this promoted people's loyalty to the movement and increased its popularity (int. Farid, 2013).

Therefore, the year 1994 marked a new phase of activism, where the leaders and members managed to maintain their movement and to survive all the restrictions until January 2011 Revolution.

Phase Two (Post-1994):

DS sheikhs saw that it was not wise to be intransigent with the state, or to insist on keeping all their gains. Therefore, they decided to keep what guaranteed DS' survival and continuity, which was the university activities that helped in the development of the movement (Abdel Hamid, 2013). Moreover, in order to minimize risk and cost of activism, DS sheikhs were making use of social events such as weddings, and funerals, and of other religious organizations to deliver their lectures and speeches (Abdel Hamid, 2013, Nasr 2013), as well as establishing their own small licensed charity organizations (Nasr, 2013). They also held private sessions, and sometimes youth had to disguise to attend them (conv. Int. Rashwan). In addition, the board of directors that included seven members used to hold bi- and tri-lateral meetings to avoid the state pressures (int. Borhami, 2013).

In order to make up for the shutdown of Al-Forqan institute, the courses were divided into a larger number of mosques, thus, lessons took place quietly without irritating the police (Abdel Hamid, 2013). However, this alternative plan benefited DS more than the

existence of the institute itself, because it increased DS' outreach in new areas. In addition, Salafi books were published, and intensive courses, as well as four-year ones were held, then post-graduate studies were introduced, with a thesis and a supervisor (Abdel Hamid, 2013).

Within such restrictions, it seemed that sheikhs and organizations that were banned by the government were more attractive and credible to people than official ones. In addition, the strategy of targeting smaller numbers of students, in larger numbers of mosques, spread in different areas, and without attracting attention of the authorities, was one of the main reasons of DS' outreach. Moreover, keeping the university activity contributed significantly to this success. For despite the fact that authorities restricted the movement of senior sheikhs, Alexandria University students spread DS' Manhaj all over the country. This was in addition to the continuous publishing of Salafi books that assisted in spreading the word (Abdel Hamid, 2013).

Thus, when DS' sheikhs were imprisoned in 2002, which constituted the second attack in DS history, they discovered that they have many followers, whom they were not aware of, and who recited DS' lessons and books. Therefore, the sheikhs started a school inside the prison. In addition, they had the chance to communicate with Jihadis, and influenced some of them. Later, DS' sheikhs were released on condition that they give up on university activity as well as their administrative structure, and the result was the relative weakening of DS (Abdel Hamid, 2013).

This situation remained without significant changes until there was an unprecedented escalation in 2010 after the bombing of Al-Qiddissin (Saints') Church in Alexandria on December 31st (Abdel Hamid, 2013), when the state security investigation service

arrested Sayyed Bilal, the young Salafi who was suspected to be responsible for the bombing, and was tortured until death (AhramOnline, 2012), despite being innocent. Such torture incident took place three weeks before January 2011 revolution.

Thus, such tight conditions continued until DS experienced both open institutional and discursive opportunities after January 2011 revolution, which constituted the second major opportunity in DS' history. However, within a different political context that was subject to radical structural changes, and again during this transitional stage, DS established an NGO, a political party, and expansively participated in all TV channels. Due to its previous experience in organized action, the shift to institutionalization was smooth, and it already had a clear methodology that predated the January revolution, influence on the ground, and a wide popular base (int. Al-Shahhat, int. Borhami, int. Nasr, Nasr, 2013).

Conclusion

This chapter presented the structure of the Egyptian socio-economic and political context during the transitional stage from Nasser's era to Sadat's era, which constituted an opportunity for the rise of Islamist movements and among them DS. The following period was signified by the dominance of religious conservative discourse, sponsored by the state, and propagated by Al-Azhar sheikhs and the moderate Islamist opposition represented by the MB. The bourgeoisie's interests converged with that of conservative figures (Ismail, 2003). Such atmosphere created favourable conditions for DS' proselytization. However, DS did not join the dominant conservative alliance since it had differences with Al-Azhar, and adopted an oppositional position on the state, even

though this position was non-violent and non-Takfiri. The return of MB to the political scene constituted a constraint to DS, however, encouraged its leaders to crystallize their Manhaj and identity, in opposition to MB and the rest of fellow Islamists, and to adopt collective action, where the main difference with the rest of Islamists was on the position on state, and the methodology or Manhaj of change.

The adoption of collective action, which was relatively alien to the Salafi quietist references of DS, was framed as a defence of DS' Manhaj against the existential threat of MB. Thus, MS turned into a social movement for the sake of Manhaj and to withstand MB pressures. These two components of DS' framing processes were employed by DS' members in different instances through their narrative of the movement's history, and of their awareness of their affiliation to it (Gawwad, 2013, int. Shoukri, 2013, int. Shams, 2013).

Nevertheless, despite being apolitical and non-violent, DS' organized collective action provoked occasional state repression (Brown, 2012). Yet, this did not lead to the full abolition of the movement since according to DS' narrative, the state used DS to keep the balance among Islamists, and to contain radicals, however without letting it grow and expand. In this regard, DS' leaders and followers were ready to give up parts of their organizational structure, but did not offer any intellectual concessions as concerns Manhaj that is the *raison d'être* of the movement and its cement. Thus, even with the limitation of collective action, and breaking the link between Alexandria and the rest of the governorates, sheikhs and their followers in the various governorates continued to teach a specific curriculum, that included certain intellectual issues and to prepare and educate cadres according to it, even in private sessions and through informal networks. Yet, their activities were not secret, so as not to raise security suspicions (int. Thabet,

2013, int. Makhyon, 2013, conv. int. Rashwan, 2013). This is how DS managed to survive within an authoritarian regime and through the fluctuations of DS-state relationship.

To sum up, DS' differences with the dominant discourse as well as fellow Islamists, particularly MB, were because of its Manhaj. Thus, DS neither framed state-sponsored conservatism as an opportunity, nor joined the Islamists' front under MB's leadership. Accordingly, DS preferred limited resources over sacrificing the independence of their intellectual agenda if, for instance, they receive Saudi funding. Finally, Manhaj was always central in the movement's mobilization, decision making, and framing processes.

Such conclusions give more weight to the intellectual aspect of the movement over the materialistic one since studying DS as a social movement showed that its main point of strength is its Manhaj or ideology, rather than its structure or organization. This was especially the case when members of the movement gave up parts of its structure and institutionalized work for the sake of survival at the different stages of the movement's development, and the movement survived through the continuous education of its curriculum and literature in informal and private rather than secret means to the different generations. This makes it necessary to carry out an in-depth investigation of DS' Manhaj and how it is employed in the various framing processes that DS carried out when it entered politics, in order to test whether the new arrangements after January 2011 transformed DS' Manhaj, how the movement carried out its framing processes in the various occasions and how DS' Manhaj eventually influenced NP's policy choices.

Thus, as mentioned in chapter one, the definition of framing adopted in this thesis and contextualizing the framing processes within the Egyptian context can best be understood through operationalizing Norman Fairclough's framework. Norman Fairclough's CDA framework is a means of keeping a distance between the researcher and the texts collected through applying a three-level framework that investigates the textual features, the discursive practices as semiotic aspects of social practices and the societal level or contextualizing of DS' discourse within the Egyptian context.

The following chapter aims at highlighting the main concepts and characteristics of DS' discourse or Manhaj on social change as the main concept that can explain their political plans or intentions, and how this discourse developed alongside the development of DS in the Egyptian context. This will be done through applying CDA to the texts produced by the two ideologues of DS who are the main references on social change, Yasser Borhami and Abdel Moneim Al-Shahhat. This will provide an overview on how the concept was framed and how the ideology of the movement was developed through a continuous process of framing over the movement's history. This chapter constitutes a point of reference to which the discourse of the movement on social change will be compared in the various stages of its history, on the different levels of the movement (elite, middle level, and rank and file), and age and gender categories, especially when the movement entered politics as will be shown in chapters 5 and 6.

CHAPTER 4: DS' FRAMING AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF MANHAJ FOR SOCIAL CHANGE

Introduction

In light of the conclusions of chapter 3, the protection of DS' Manhaj proves to be key in the framing process of MS' decision to adopt collective action. In addition, Manhaj was present in the movement's subsequent framing processes, resource mobilization, and decision making and organization. However, the founders' initial articulation of their Manhaj as simply the belief in the comprehensive nature of Islam, and judging all issues depending on evidence from Quran and Sunna with the interpretation of the pious predecessors, makes DS closer to the quietist Salafis, particularly with their adoption of Al-Albani's purification and education theory (Lacroix, 2009, Haykel, 2009). Although DS' initial activities were purely scholastic, this initial articulation is not reflective of the movement's Manhaj for social change that represents DS' plan of action or ideology, which has in fact developed and crystallized through the movement's evolution.

One of the main contributions of this thesis is that it argues that DS has an established vision for social and political change, which was formed in interaction with other Islamists approaches to change, and was elaborated as the movement developed within the Egyptian context. In this regard, DS presents its approach as primarily religious, gradual, and is based on cost-benefit analysis and weighing consequences of actions, and reality requirements. This social change project is based on da'awa as sole means of change, and takes place in three levels the individual, the social, and the state, where the latter is fatalistic and should not be imposed on society. This makes it a bottom-up, non-Takfiri, thus non-violent approach to change. Also the framing of such an approach, in

comparison to other Islamist approaches, involves a self-identification process of DS' followers as scholastic, realists, rationalists, non-violent, and non-Takfiri. However, DS' discourse shared the features of the Islamists' discourse as regards the Other (the West, Christians, and seculars), and the tendency to adopt conspiracy.

Therefore, in departure from some existing literature that deals with DS in view of MB's experience, this thesis argues that DS has a clear distinct ideology. Thus, this chapter is providing a narrative of DS' vision and the main features of its pre-revolution discourse for social change, a vision that gives priority to the religious over the political and to the individual and the social over the state. This chapter also provides a spectrum of Islamists based on their approach for social change.

Accordingly, this chapter focuses on the construction of DS' Manhaj for social change, which constitutes the movement's ideology, as well as the framing processes that were carried out towards the crystallization of this Manhaj. Such ideology does not exist in vacuum, and is not a set of abstract ideas, values, and beliefs, but is rather a result of interaction (Ismail, 2004, Wiktorowicz, 2006) between DS' discourse and the rest of Islamists, seculars, and the dominant conservative discourse within the Egyptian context discussed in the previous chapter.

Thus, this chapter operationalizes the *framing* concept, which implies that social movements are not defending "preconfigured" ideas but are developing and producing meanings, organizing experience, and guiding action, through simplifying the events and realities with the intention of mobilization. Thus, the framing process is dynamic, and is a continuing process in which frames are constantly articulated and elaborated, to generate meanings that are not only different from the existing frames but are resisting

them as well (Snow, 2000, 2007). Such framing processes involve discursive processes that include talk and conversations, speech acts and written communications of movement members that are developed through linking events and experiences, leading to a new vision or interpretation and highlighting some issues, events, or beliefs as being more important than others. Another aspect of framing is that it is responsible for identity construction (Snow, 2000). Therefore, framing processes of DS, being the movement's discursive practices, will be studied through the CDA of DS' foundational texts on Manhaj of social change.

Looking at the construction of DS' Manhaj for social change through the operationalization of CDA to its key texts on the subject is fruitful. This approach not only highlights the broad lines of DS' vision for change, its argumentation and the aspects of its plan of action, but also shows how the foundational texts of the movement - published almost ten years after its transformation into a social movement - contributed to the construction of the social reality, social relations, and the self or identity of DS. Attention is also drawn to DS' social context (Fairclough, 2010, 1992); the late 1980s and early 1990s was a period of increasing distinction between the various Islamist movements and groups.

This analysis aims at setting a point of reference to which DS' discourse for social change in post-January 2011 revolution Egypt will be compared. Understanding the main features of DS' discourse and clarifying its ideology or Manhaj, is the first step to examining how the Manhaj was employed in the movement's framing processes of the opportunities and constraints that resulted from the structural changes of both January 2011 and June 2013 revolutions. This examination will be informative as to what extent the framing or discursive processes of DS and its political arm, NP, are linked to this

Manhaj, and whether the discursive practices of the movement and the party functioned as extensions to or departed from it due to political interactions and calculations (Snow, 2007).

Accordingly, tracing the construction of DS' Manhaj, and its framing processes through applying CDA to its foundational texts, this chapter starts with an overview of DS' foundational texts on Manhaj of social change. The second section will discuss how DS' foundational texts framed the different Islamist approaches to social change, through discussing how DS reacted to the main concepts and intellectual issues that were subject to tensions among Islamists, as mentioned in chapters 2 and 3, resulting in the crystallization of DS' Manhaj of social change. The third section will discuss how DS' discursive interactions and framing processes contributed to the formation of DS' identity, and of its relationship with the other political powers, social groups, the state, the dominant conservative discourse, and various more specific concepts, such as democracy and citizenship.

Section One: DS' Foundational Texts on Social Change

The main foundational text of DS' concept and methodology of change is an article entitled, "Salafism and approaches to change," (Borhami, 1992) written by Sheikh Yasser Borhami, and was initially published in DS' non-regular magazine, Sawt Al-Da'awa in 1992. This article constitutes a comprehensive and a clear statement of DS' position on the Islamist controversial concepts and intellectual issues and defines DS' Manhaj for social change. It came out after nearly decade on DS transformation from a school into a social movement, in view of debates with other Islamists. In fact, the

author's name was not mentioned despite the fact that the article was highlighted on the cover. The article was republished online, and in handouts exchanged among DS' followers, on Salafi online forums and websites from 2001- present with its original wording, eventually identifying the author, who became the main authority in the topic of change. The version analyzed in this chapter is the one published by Al-Baraha forum, and was collected in the field and compared to all other versions, where all proved to be identical.

The author re-introduced the foundational text in a lecture delivered in 2009 and then in a book in 2010 (Borhami, 2009a, 2010a). CDA⁴⁵ (see appendix 1) applied to such texts shows that the new versions evolved around the same broad lines and argumentation, but there were some differences as concerns the textual features⁴⁶, strategies, interdiscursivity⁴⁷, and intertextuality⁴⁸. The lecture: 'Salafism and Approaches to Change: Political Participations,' focused on the approach to political participation in light of MB's success in winning seats in the people's assembly in 2005. It also addressed that preparations for the 2010 parliamentary elections aroused various questions among DS' followers about the subject. Such spoken text, that was directed to a mostly Salafi audience, proved to be different from Borhami's written texts, since he was more open about his beliefs, and less politically cautious in choosing his wording.

⁴⁵ For the details of CDA of DS' foundational texts on Manhaj of Social change, see appendix (1).

⁴⁶ The textual analysis explores the argumentation, the strategies and the grammatical aspects such as modality (high or low affinity), transitivity (who is the main subject), theme (priorities, and common sense), and cohesive markers (coherence, type of text). However, word meaning, wording and metaphors were of primary importance to this study in the sense of what are the new terms, their meanings, which meanings and words disappeared and which survived, since framing processes of articulation and amplification are directly connected to the choice of wording, linking concepts and words, definitions, and metaphors that serve in the construction of reality (Fairclough, 2010, 1992, Snow, 2000).

⁴⁷ Interdiscursivity means here what combinations of discourses, genres, and styles were employed and whether they changed over time. Discursive combinations are reflective of the movement's identity, relation to the other, and representation of reality (Fairclough, 2010, 1992).

⁴⁸ Intertextuality explores the construction of subjects and social groups through texts, and the contribution of changing discursive practices to changes of social identity. This is done through specifying which texts are overtly drawn upon within the text or influenced the texts analysed (Fairclough, 2010, 1992).

In his book: "The Prerequisites of Calling for God," Borhami reintroduced the article in a book, whose two editions were published in 2010 (1st edition in February, 2nd edition in July), a few months before the January 2011 Revolution. The new version of the article lies within the first part of the book, Pp. 40-119. The book as a written text was much closer to the article, yet it was more technical and depended on a wider range of quotes from Quran, Hadith, contributions of Salafi and prominent scholars, in addition to classical Islamic books. It was also loaded with implicit criticisms of the state and MB, but without making direct reference.

Moreover, Sheikh Abdul Moneim Al-Shahhat delivered 22 lectures about reform in 2010, and DS followers transcribed them and made them available online in 240 pages. Al-Shahhat was actually reproducing the foundational article of Borhami in his own way and was contextualizing DS' methodology of change within DS thought, where his contribution constituted the most important second to Borhami's. This chapter will focus on the last four lectures, 19, 20, 21, and 22, of Al-Shahhat's contribution since they are the ones that directly dealt with DS' methodology of change, while also summarizing the main tenets of the rest of the series.

A survey of "Ana Al-Salafi" DS' website, under the section entitled "The complete collection of explanations of the intellectual issues of the Salafi methodology," shows that there is a sub-section for the contributions about the issue of 'change.' The content of this section further confirmed the findings of the fieldwork and the results of the archival research, where Borhami is the main reference for Manhaj on social change, followed by Al-Shahhat, who uses the concept "reform" instead.

Thus, the texts discussed above constitute the main reference to social change for DS' followers, and covers all that was produced in this regard over the period from 1992 to 2010. The following section will discuss how DS perceives other Islamists' approaches to social change and, accordingly, how such critical views and evaluations paved the way for the formation and the development of an alternative definition and methodology of change.

Section Two: Inter-Islamists Discourses on Social Change and DS' Manhaj

This section discusses how DS' foundational texts framed and interacted with the tensions among Islamists: primarily their position on the state, and methods or Manhaj of social change. These two issues were connected to the concepts of Tawhid, Takfir and Hisba, as mentioned in chapter 2. Thus, in the following, there will be a discussion of how DS' texts frame political participation, Jihad and how both are connected to Tawhid and Takfir, and whether they are the right approach to Hisba. There will also be a discussion of collective action versus da'awa and persuasion on the individual level. Finally, DS' Manhaj for social change will be presented in view of such frames and interactions.

Dilemmas of Social Change:

DS' Contextualization of Political Participation:

Political participation and involvement in legislative bodies is connected to the concept of Tawhid or oneness of God. Thus, Borhami's article (1992) states a number of facts that emphasize this concept: legislation is the absolute right of God, man-made laws are against shari'a, and ruling by such human laws would by necessity stir God's wrath.

However, there was a differentiation between the administrative and the legal religious systems, where administrative systems should be allowed as long as they respond to the general good of the people. Similarly, there exists a difference between secular rule, where the nation is the source of power, and Islamic rule, where both the Quran and Sunna represent the main terms of reference. Accordingly, Islamic rule does not allow any separation between state and religion. Instead of Democracy, Islam applies Shura, which is based on consulting regarding earthly issues. Yet, Shura never discusses whether to apply Shari'a laws or not. Therefore, such legislative councils that impose on the people anti-Shari'a laws are considered infidel ones, notwithstanding the fact that they are based on majority rule. Accordingly, those who abide by the decisions of such councils are judged as committing polytheism (*Shirk*), since they obey someone else other than God.

Despite the fact that Borhami (2009) based his criticism of parliamentary participation on the same argumentation in the foundational article (1992), mainly based on Tawhid or monotheism, he gave in the new version special attention to the absence of the so-called "Ahl Al-Hal Wl-A'qd" (the elite, formed of experts and specialists who can elect the ruler, and whom he should consult) in Shura, versus the public in Democracy. In addition, he discussed in an extensive way the issues of Shura and consultation, stressing that Shura should never be made through majority rule of unqualified parliament members, particularly when the criteria of such candidates is not based on education, experience, specialization or piety. In this concern, he is closer to Plato's ideas of the virtuous city where elites only can rule.

One of the repercussions of framing political participation in connection with Tawhid is the fact that anti-shari'a rule involves defying the principle of loyalty and enmity. In this

respect, such rule leads to the rise of political parties that are based on secular, democratic, socialist, or communist man-made principles, which are adversarial to Islam and are thus considered as being against belief. Such parties promote the separation of the social system and the state from religion. Meanwhile, they advocate equality among all religions and would show respect to infidelity under the false claim that the "difference in opinion does not mar the ties of friendship." In Borhami's (1992) opinion, such political parties are considered as possessing a "degree of ignorance (Jahelyya), fanaticism, and loyalty to infidels and hypocrites, a situation that by necessity every Muslim must abandon, fight, and repudiate." Meanwhile, commanding virtue and preventing vice (*Hisba*) constitute an obligation, which is dependent on the believers' capacity and capability, and should be carried out in a legitimate way that maximizes benefits and minimizes both loss and corruption. Accordingly, parliaments might not always be the most suitable means for undertaking this task, in view of the above mentioned violations of Tawhid, and the principle of loyalty and enmity.

Going a step further, Al-Shahhat (2010) associated the parliamentary approach with "lubricity," "compromises," "concessions," and "transforming fixed religious constants into relative issues subject to difference in opinion," such as indulgence with loyalty and enmity, governance of God, and artistic production (songs and literature). Thus, the parliamentary approach is linked to concessions either because Islamists might recognize sins but promise that they would not use their power to ban them once in parliament, or through redefining sins, in order to gain votes. For the first time, Al-Shahhat mentioned the concept of "double standard discourse," and linked it to the parliamentary approach, which is clearly represented in MB. He said that proponents of such discourse deliver a certain message to their followers and another to the public and

since technology made it impossible to keep two contradicting discourses, followers of the parliamentary trend started to unify their discourse through using the mildest and softest religious discourses even with their followers. For him, this harms Da'awa and dilutes it (Al Shahhat, 2010).

In view of such contradictions between Tawhid, loyalty and enmity, and even Hisba, they did not result in declaring those who participate as Kafir (infidel) since DS' leaders and followers perceive Takfir of individuals as a long, complicated process that should be subject to scholars' meticulous religious judgement, and divine argument (Borhami, 1992, int. Shaltoot, 2013). Thus, they conform to the purists' position on Takfir that tends to discuss this issue "in terms of categories of actions, rather than specific individuals" (Wiktorowicz, 2006: 231) or the infidelity of actions (Kufr Mo'ayyan), rather than infidelity as the belief of a certain and a particular person (Kufr A'yn) (Borhami, 1992).

The framing of DS' position as regards political participation came as a religious ruling, where Borhami (1992) stated that the evaluation of parliamentary participation usually depends on the intentions of participants. If the intention behind participation is achieving democracy through allowing legislation for humans not God, drawing on majority rule, participants are then committing polytheism, unless they are ignorant, and thus they cannot be judged as infidels unless a scholar deals with their case and provides adequate evidence. Whereas in the case of participants who join the parliament with the intention of calling for God and establishing shari'a therein, depending on them voicing loyalty and enmity, they might be subject to one of two legal evaluations. The first is that parliamentary participation is absolutely forbidden by religion, since participants' belief remains in their hearts, and is not applied in reality. Second, in case joining the

parliament would achieve the interests of Islam, such membership shall be considered an indication of obedience to God.

In view of such aforementioned evaluations, DS elected to abstain from political participation in the “so called legislative councils,” either by casting votes or through supporting candidates, since intention is not the sole criterion, but also the context that might make of political participation a path to evils, rather than benefits. In this respect, the articulation of events, past experience and real practices of Islamists proved that “the most probable scenario” is that more corruption would occur instead of securing Islam's interests. This is because seculars will never allow Islamists to achieve any progress or achieve interests. On the contrary, seculars would drag them into a series of extreme concessions without any reward. Borhami referred to the Turkish and the Algerian cases where military coups took place to abolish Islamists’ success. However, the author asserts that despite the option to which it resorted, DS still pays respect to all opinions that are pro and against parliamentary participation, since they share good intentions and have consensus, as regards the aforementioned postulates and facts (Borhami, 1992). DS’ position on political participation conforms to that of Al-Albani who saw that under certain circumstances “the good policy is to stay away from politics” (Lacroix, 2009: 70).

Thus, Borhami argues that in the Egyptian context Shari’a is not applied to all laws, and that there is a gap between theory and practice. He even said that Egyptian law still facilitates adultery. However, he asserted that, in theory, members of parliaments that announce respect to Islamic Sharia’ cannot be considered infidels. Yet, he still criticized the parliament at that time for a number of reasons. First, because the functions of parliamentary oversight of the executive branch, and fixing the budget might be

acceptable as a human task, but the legislative task is exclusively for God. Second, the 1981 amendment of article 2 of the 1971 Constitution, which listed Shari'a as the main source of legislation, was only applied to laws issued after 1981. Third, 'majority rule is against Shari'a,' especially in view of the quality of parliament members. Fourth, he had reservations on the parliament oath that does not mention respect to Shari'a. Fifth, he considers the capacity of parliament membership as one aspect of guardianship; and since Christians and women should never be legal guardians and are not among Ahl Al-Hal wl-A'qd, they should not be allowed membership to parliament⁴⁹. Thus, he refused allowing parliament membership to some groups on sectarian, gender, and education grounds. Finally, he thinks that contesting in elections with an Islamist profile and agenda with others, would put Islam in comparison with other ideologies, and this harms its sacred nature and makes it void of its meaning. So, in his opinion, this contradicts monotheism since people are never in a position to judge Islam and Shari'a' in the first place, let alone voting for it once and against it the following time⁵⁰. Such arguments are usually supported by a narrative about previous Islamists' experiences in politics, with a hint about Egypt, without going into specifics (Borhami, 2009a).

In line with the general Islamists' tools of validation, Borhami used the argumentative discourse that defines secularism as foreign and alien (Ismail, 2003: 43). He framed parliamentary elections as "seasons" that distract Muslims from their real priorities, while election slogans and principles of secularism were never mentioned in Quran, but are rather imported to Muslims from the West. However, there has been a division among Islamists as concerns principles of participation between groups which think that

⁴⁹ Guardianship of women and Christians, and denying them full citizenship rights was not mentioned in the foundational article (1992) or in Borhami's book (2010), and was only discussed in his lecture (2009).

⁵⁰ Such argument in particular raises questions about how DS managed to frame political participation in post-revolution Egypt in view of this fatal violation of Tawhid.

participation in elections is a necessary positive action, and others who believe that the balance of power already determines the results of the elections against Islamists. Therefore, participation would not make any difference, but would instead lead to Islamists' concessions without serving the main purposes of da'awa in return. Given the timing of the lecture, it is reasonable to think Borhami was referring to the experience of MB in Egypt, where their success in 2005 elections seemed attractive at that time to DS' youth, however, he neither openly named nor attacked MB (Borhami, 2009a).

Therefore, political participation is not forbidden in principle and is not allowed based on the "intentions of the participants," but is dependent rather on context. Such emphasis on context came out clearly in Borhami's (2010) reaction to criticism directed to DS as passive and isolated group because of its choice to abstain from political participation. In response, he asserted that DS' apolitical position could never be attributed to what he calls secular claims about the religion-politics separation, but rather to the inconvenient balance of power on the international, regional and local levels, which would not allow their political participation, except with a sacrifice of their beliefs and principles, in return for temporary benefits or political positions. In this regard, he stressed that DS would not trade values for seats in parliament, or for presence on the international scene, since this would not serve DS targeted reform. Thus, being positive for him is possible through being able to preserve their tenets through "taking no action." This argument reflects the context-based, rational thinking and cost-benefit analysis based on religious calculations, that proved to prevail in DS' framing processes and decision making as will be shown in the following chapters. This also implies a realist approach, even though the main DS' motivation stays religious (Borhami, 2010a).

In sum, DS' texts framed political participation as a contradiction to concepts of Tawhid, the rule of God, loyalty and enmity, as inefficient means of holding Hisba, and are associated in their discourse with concessions and indulgence in religious issues, thus leading to more losses (evils) than benefits to Islam. Nevertheless, they have been clear that such evaluation is dependent on the context, not only the intentions of participants; and that the fact that political participation implies polytheism does not necessarily mean that participants are infidels. Thus, unlike quietists and covertists, DS did not absolutely ban political participation in the pre-revolution texts, yet, did not adopt it as means of social change.

Disengagement of Military Confrontation from Jihad:

In the midst of militant Islamists attacks in the 1990s in their confrontation with the state, came the first foundational text on DS' social change Manhaj. It provided an account of such an approach that mainly aimed at disengaging the concepts of Jihad and Military confrontation as means of change, discharging military confrontation as religiously invalid and as associated with fatal losses. This came also in reaction to Islamists criticisms of DS' followers as opponents of Jihad and as dividing the Islamist front as mentioned in chapter 3. In this regard, DS' adopted a scientific approach through providing a genealogy of the concept of Jihad, rooting it in Islamic history and comparing it to the concept and the consequences of Islamist militants' violent confrontation.

This framing not only discredited militants, but also serves in framing DS' leaders and followers as Muslim scholars who would never compromise the definitions of Quran and Sunna. This, as well as the previously discussed framing of political participation,

goes in line with purists' framing of both Jihadis and politicians as rationalists, who tend to bring about social and religious change through the adoption of human reason-based strategies and "then selectively misappropriate religious evidence to support their decision." Thus for them, "strategy drives religious evidence rather than the other way around" (Wiktorowicz, 2006: 220).

In this regard, Borhami's (1992) argumentation was based on two points. First, stressing the "love of Jihad" as a religious obligation connected to faith, in order to prove that he is not against "Jihad" in principle, and to find a common ground with such trends, prior to subjecting them to criticism. Meanwhile, emphasizing the pre-requisites of Jihad as a duty imposed upon the Muslim nation, in as much as it has potential. This is dictated by the fact that Jihad depends on the estimation of capability and calculation of potential benefits (Borhami, 1992). In this regard, he explained the various stages⁵¹ of Jihad legislation in Islamic history, where reference to history is one of Islamists' discourse's tools of validation (Ismail, 2003: 41). Second, he mentioned that the definition of Jihad in the last stage, which meant launching an offensive against infidels, is irrelevant to contemporary Islamist military confrontations in view of scholars' opinions on managing relationships with infidels in times of weakness. This indicates that Jihad depends on cost-benefit analysis, reality requirements, comes in stages and is limited to infidels, in order to avoid inter-Muslim conflicts that lead to defeats and spread of vice and corruption, without achieving the main aim of Muslims, which is spreading God's

⁵¹ Jihad passed by various stages of legislation, starting by resorting to patience, while continuing da'awa, then allowing for voluntary fighting, up to compulsory call to Muslims to fight in defense of their life and religion against those who attack them. In a final stage, Muslims are obliged to launch offensive attacks against infidels until they are converted to Islam, and against people of the book (Ahl Al-Kitab, or Christians and Jews and Magi) until they either convert or pay taxes (Jizyah), in "submission" and "humiliation." This last stage constituted the definition of Jihad. According, however, to the Salaf, Muslims should never carry out Jihad if they are weak, since the Realities dictate the rules applicable. In this regard, Borhami discussed a technical issue about abrogation "Al-Naskh" in the Quran. Such issue was further elaborated later on in other versions of the text (Borhami, 1992).

word. Therefore, the reckless rushing to militarized Jihad might lead to more evil and corruption, instead of safeguarding Islamic interests.

In sum, a military confrontation approach to social change is framed in terms of cost-benefit analysis, capability and balance of power. As such, the approach is framed as not conforming to the right definition of Jihad, but rather is an invalid top-down approach to social change that would lead to the loss of lives and money, and the violation of religious teachings (Borhami, 2009b). To emphasize this position on Jihadis, Borhami over time expanded his evidence and references, and elaborated on technical issues, reflecting the development of his experience and the interaction with DS' followers and counter-movements (Borhami, 2010a).

Revolution, Takfir, and Ousting the Ruler:

Relevant to Jihad or military confrontation is the dilemma of abiding by Tawhid under a non-Islamic rule, which is one of the main controversial issues among Islamists, and one that is closely connected with approaches to social change (Meijer, 2009). This dilemma aroused debates on the issue of declaring the ruler as Kafir if he fails to apply shari'aa which implies the duty to take action against him, thus is one of the main reasons of the rise of militants (Ismail, 2004). This in turn also gives rise to discussions on the legitimacy of revolt and ousting the ruler, which are raised by revolutionaries or Qutbis, and militant and politicized Salafis in general, as opposed to the propagation of the obligation of the Muslim subject's obedience to the legal guardian advocated by Madkhalis (Gauvain, 2013).

In this regard, DS' foundational texts on social change Manhaj took a position in the middle between these two extremes. Thus, DS' texts do not absolutely dismiss ousting

the tyrant ruler; however, they mention that there are certain restrictions on such an act. First, there is the evaluation of motives for ousting the ruler. In the event the justifications prove to be valid, Muslims must then make sure that they can possess the capability of confronting such a ruler. They should also calculate the gains and losses involved in taking such action. Such calculations must assess whether action would lead to reform, or would pave the way to gross harm, corruption and chaos. Again, dealing with an authoritarian ruler depends on realistic calculations (Borhami, 1992). This intersects with the purists' tendency to weigh the consequences of ousting rulers on the well-being of Muslims (Wiktorowicz, 2006). As previously mentioned, DS departs from quietists or purists as regards declaring the state's actions openly as infidel, and not just sufficing by considering the rule that defies shari'a as a sin. However, DS does not declare the ruler himself as a Kafir. By this distinct position on issues of Takfir and the position on the state, DS detaches itself from both revolutionaries as well as quietists. Despite the fact that framing this position comes in the form of precise religious definitions, it might be also explained in light of DS-state relationship discussed in chapter 3. However, to decide whether this position is an ideological and religious one or is the result of the repression of the authoritarian regime, the next chapter will trace DS' framing of January 2011 revolution, and its position on June 2013 revolution after it entered politics, in order to examine how such framing processes departed or conformed to this ideological stance.

Da'awa and Persuasion:

In contrast with militants who see that violence is the only way to promote religious and social change, and to defend DS against criticism that it abandons Jihad which is a religious obligation, Borhami refers to Ibn El Qayyem's types of Jihad that starts by

“Jihad of the self”⁵². Thus, Jihad should not be undertaken unless certain stages are fulfilled, and the first stage is that of Al-Da’awa, based on spiritual and physical preparation, establishing beliefs, self-purification, in addition to filtering religious teachings from Bida’a and systematic education for the promotion of Tawhid (monotheism) (Borhami, 1992). This was the extension of DS’ adoption of Al-Albani’s purification and education Da’awa theory (Lacroix, 2009). Borhami’s argumentation for Da’awa was based on the obligation to observe priorities and appropriate preparations in order to materialize the rules and restrictions of Jihad. Thus, da’awa, being the means of spreading the word of God and his religion through persuasion, could be considered one type of Jihad (Borhami, 1992). However, the adoption of da’awa and persuasion as the means of social change brings about the debate on whether to carry out da’awa individually or to adopt collective action.

Individual Da’awa Approach to Change:

This approach to change takes place through Individual work in da'awa and education which sees that the main role of scholars and sheikhs is to reform individuals. Proponents of this approach have differences among themselves as concerns the priorities of reform and whether it should be belief reform and spread of legal sciences on a theoretical level, or education of rituals, and good deeds on a practical level. They also see that the spread of pious individuals in a society would spontaneously lead to its reform. Among supporters of the approach are those who ban or put limits to collective action, under the pretext that it involves partisan and fanatic tendencies, which might easily render it targeted by secular governments. Hence, the potential harm of collective action might exceed its expected benefits. DS’ texts give credit to such an approach for

⁵² Ibn El Qayyem mentioned various types and priorities of Jihad that starts first and above all by “Jihad of the self,” “Jihad of the Satan,” then “Jihad of infidels,” and finally “Jihad against the hypocrites” (Borhami, 1992).

focusing on education and following up small groups, yet, they criticize them for avoiding any political involvement, even by giving comments. Thus, DS sees this individual level as limited in scope, failing to undertake sufficiency duties,⁵³ (*fard al-kifāyah*), or religious obligations that if are not fulfilled within a Muslim community even by only one person, the whole community collectively sins. Nevertheless, Islamists tend to link this concept to collective action (Reinhart, 2009). For DS, such duties are not confined to education and should be carried out at all social levels, which requires organized work and coordination. Moreover, DS sees this approach disregarding issues of the rule of God, and loyalty and enmity due to their reluctance to assume the duty of denouncing the vices of contemporary governments, due to fear of the government repression. Such reluctance renders da'awa as void of its real content (Borhami, 1992). In Borhami's book (2010), he elaborated expansively on the concept of Gama'a (group) and collective action, both on the linguistic and on the Islamic legal levels. He defended collective action as a means of coordination to fulfil sufficiency duties. However, he also introduced another type of extremism as concerns collective action where a certain group of Islamists considers itself the representative of Islam, the all-inclusive group, despite the fact that it is just one among numerous Islamist groups that all try to accomplish the extensive sufficiency duties, until the unity of the community is achieved. He stressed that when loyalty is given to groups and names rather than to Islam, this will give rise to fanaticism and extremism. He also used strong literary

⁵³ "In Muslim legal doctrine the *fard al-kifāyah* (lit., "duty of the sufficiency") defines a communal responsibility. According to this doctrine, within a community of Muslims, if some religious obligation belonging to the category of *fard al-kifāyah* is not fulfilled, the whole have collectively sinned. If a sufficient number of the community undertakes the duty, however, the responsibility on the community is discharged. For example, it is necessary that at least one Muslim recite the funeral prayers. If no one does, the entire community is at fault." "*Fard al-kifāyah* was one of the major vehicles used by jurists to talk about society in the aggregate, as a collective entity." "In recent Muslim literature, there is some evidence of a reconsideration of this doctrine as a way to discuss social responsibility." (REINHART, A. K. 2009. *Fard al-Kifāyah*. *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

expressions, analogies, and exaggerations that reflected his bias for collective action, which he considered the core of DS method (Borhami, 2010a).

Da'awa through Collective Action: DS' Manhaj for Social Change

According to Borhami, DS' Manhaj is a call for the understanding of and response to a “comprehensive” meaning of “belief”⁵⁴, requires fighting polytheism and superstitions in all their aspects, polytheism of cemeteries (belief in powers of dead pious figures), and of governance (obeying laws and regulations which are adversary to Shari'a). This understanding of the main objective of DS is again based on Tawhid, however, it goes beyond the traditional confrontation with mystic Sufism, that DS shares with AS for instance, to the issue of the rule of God and denying state religious transgressions.

DS' approach to change through da'awa is framed as the one adopted by prophets, and this should be the very first priority of Islamic actions and duties that should be attained by all means. In addition, in all the foundational texts from 1992 to 2010, da'awa is linked to “the superiority of the Ahl Al-Sunna,” or superiority of Muslims, since such superiority comes from their duty in combating social deviations (Borhami, 1992), or duty of commanding virtue and prevention of vice. Thus, the only way out would be ‘change’ through da'awa (Borhami, 2010a). Accordingly, da'awa should be carried out by all means, both in public, through speeches, lessons and lectures, books, brochures, in addition to Da'awa envoys, or through private lessons, educational institutes, and educational groups. This implies that DS' Manhaj is connected to education, learning and legal sciences, which again highlights DS' adoption of Al-Albani's purification and education theory (Borhami, 2009a, Lacroix, 2009).

⁵⁴ Which involves belief in God, his angels, holy books, prophets, Doomsday, the fate and destiny. In addition, belief means following Sunna, approval of inference methods, in addition to self-purification (as concerns rituals, morals, together with behavior and human interaction).

However, as mentioned above DS departs from this theory as it advocates collective action for the sake of achieving higher coordination in order to cover a wider scope of sufficiency duties on all social levels. DS' Manhaj of da'awa and persuasion through collective action is operationalized along three levels that begin with education of the individual, which resonate with the idea of starting by the stage of Jihad of the self, and of Al-Albani emphasis on the individual level, and on education (Lacroix, 2009). This level is followed by the social or community level, which means finding and founding the community of believers who will cooperate and coordinate to promote rendering sufficiency duties. Among other things, such duties must observe cost-benefit analysis based on shari'a, including the performance of social duties, formation of an Islamic financial system, inculcation of team work and collective action concepts, the prevention and resolution of conflicts by applying shari'a rather than resorting to man-made laws. Furthermore, Jihad must be established as long as the conditions thereof are availed. Eventually, empowerment and triumph will be attained in the third level as a result of the stages of educating individuals and founding the community of believers. However, DS does not think of the Islamic state in a deterministic way. On the contrary, DS' members focus on the incontestable accomplishment of such duties, in view of their belief that empowerment is a grant from God that they should just wait for to materialize, and that the Islamist state is a fatalistic issue that cannot be imposed on a certain society, but should rather emanate from the society, albeit depending on God's will (Borhami, 1992).

The features of DS' Manhaj for social change are highlighted as the movement developed within its context. For instance, framing *da'awa as an aspect of Jihad* and one of its essential stages appeared since the first foundational text was published in the

early 1990's at the peak of Jihadi activities, as mentioned. Still, such connection between da'awa and Jihad was again brought up in Borhami's 2009 lecture. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the emphasis on education and the priority of the individual level, despite being a fundamental part of DS' Manhaj, was highlighted in reaction to seculars' criticism of Islamists, particularly those who were not part of the dominant conservative or "moderate" discourse, in view of the radicals versus moderates narrative that dominated the 1990s (Ismail, 2003). In this regard, the secular nationalist discourse associated Islamists with fundamentalism, hypocrisy and corruption, and religious extremism that goes against mainstream Islam, and was sometimes taken to the media and cinema movies as a way to manage their personal psychological disorders (Khatib, 2006, Ahmed, 2011). In reaction to such discourse, Borhami (2009) admitted that Islamists do have problems, and that the solution is through a more in-depth religious education and the infiltration of the aspects of the Muslim personality in Muslim individuals, as a first step towards a more comprehensive reform. Borhami's (2009) recognition of the problems of "emotional superficial religiosity" or "pseudo-religion" that characterized some of the Islamic resurgence followers, led to highlighting the focus of DS on *education* and the priority of the *individual level*.

In addition, in the 2000s and particularly since MB's success in the parliamentary elections of 2005, DS started to clarify "the *gradual* and the *bottom-up*" nature of their approach to social change. For despite the fact that, on the state level, they saw that each nation should apply its systems that shape the individuals, and in Muslim countries it should be Islamic systems⁵⁵ as part of worshiping God and of submissiveness to Him. However, the change of the current system to an Islamic one should be "*gradual and*

⁵⁵ For instance, there are the Islamic judiciary, social (gender, class, and power relations), political (choosing the leader and deciding the targets), and war and peace systems.

bottom-up,” rather than through struggling to get positions in order to impose it from above, since it has been proven that top-down approaches would lead to illusionary empowerment that would soon disappear (Borhami, 2009).

Finally, Borhami’s book in 2010, provides a more elaborate explanation of “*collective action*,” and its conditions, and the concept of Al-Gama’a (an organization, or organized group), while providing references and evidence from Quran, Sunna and many scholars in order to approve such a method, since this is one of the controversial issues among proponents of da’awa as a means of social change.

In this sense, da’awa as a means of social change is a *long-term project* and is no easy task, as the Do’aa (preachers) might be exposed to harm, or, at least met with a reluctant audience. Since da’awa is associated with “lenience, patience and forbearance” as its main conditions, it can never work if it involves *Takfir, violence* or *top-down imposition of Islamic values*. Thus, da’awa is a means for social change based on Quran, which states that God does not change people’s conditions until they exert effort on changing themselves, and that no matter the degree of piety, a Muslim should denounce vice (Borhami, 2010a).

Thus, the presentation of DS’ methodology of change in the 2010 book was more detailed and technical than was the article, and less confrontational than the lecture. Yet, despite the fact that DS’ Manhaj throughout its development in the foundational texts became more crystallized and elaborate, with well-defined concepts, priorities and a value system, it still revolves around the same broad lines and main argumentation of the original foundational text published in 1992. Based on this DS’ perspective, a spectrum of Islamists can be drawn using their approach to social change, whereas at

one end there are those that adopt da'awa and persuasion and on the other those that undertake violence, while in the middle the political participation approach exists. The main criteria for social change on this spectrum is a bottom-up approach, position on Takfir, and undertaking violence, where the more a group engages in a bottom-up approach, the lesser its tendency for exclusion, Takfir, and violence.




Figure (2)

As for Al-Shahhat's series on reform lectures, he followed the same argumentation, titles and broad lines as in Borhami's foundational article. However, in his lectures, he elaborated expansively on each point, through giving examples, analogies, and linking the ideas to reality, especially as regards well known cases and incidents that attracted public opinion. This was intended to get the audience engaged, and to reflect DS' Manhaj on their daily life. Al-Shahhat clearly focused on a practical articulation of DS' methodology of change rather than the theoretical approach of Borhami. However, besides Al-Shahhat's straightforward explanation of DS' Manhaj of change, his lectures were characterized by the use of a confrontational tone when it comes to other social

groups such as Christians, Sufis, and seculars. Moreover, he criticized Al-Azhar, and the West. Thus, Al-Shahhat's lectures were useful in understanding DS' identification, perception of the Other and representation of reality, in the period that preceded January 2011.

To sum up, this section has argued that DS' framing processes that took place in interaction mainly with Islamists led to the formation of DS' Manhaj for social change, and such dynamic processes continued to carve out and elaborate the main features of this Manhaj. Framing of the Islamist approaches took place through connecting each approach with certain concepts and providing certain definitions and narratives of events. Therefore, political participation was connected to religious concessions within their context, thus, Islamists' experience in parliaments, as per DS' narrative, are necessarily a failure. Moreover, military confrontation is not Jihad, is associated with bloodshed and evils, and is proved religiously irrelevant. While discrediting the other approaches, da'awa is framed as the only accepted approach to social change, and is an aspect of Jihad. However, for the sake of carrying out a comprehensive da'awa, and to fulfill sufficiency duties, da'awa should be done through collective action. Thus, da'awa is introduced as a long-term gradual project of social change that focuses on the education of individuals, thus, founding the community of believers. Accordingly, change on the state level will eventually come as a divine grant. However, DS' Manhaj is not deterministic as concerns the Islamic state. *As a result, they give priority to the individual and the society over the state and to religion over politics.*

As part of the movement's framing processes and in view of the abovementioned representation of DS' methodology and definition of social change, the following section will discuss aspects of DS self-identification and views of the 'Other,' and

consequently the nature of DS' relationship with the various social groups within the Egyptian society. This will be done through discussion of CDA findings as concerns these issues.

Section Three: The “We” and the “Other”: DS' Identity and Representation of Reality

The DS' Manhaj for social change conforms to the understanding of Salafis' reform project as primarily religious, and is based on creed, or as mentioned above, and connected to Tawhid. Such a reform project aims at forming a Muslim “subjectivity,” which has deep social and political influences. Thus, while being “religious and social reformers,” they are engaged in producing and reproducing certain “authority and identity both personal and communal” (Haykel, 2009: 34-35).

The results of CDA of the foundational texts reflect the *religious nature* of their project through the central position of shari'a, the stress on the comprehensiveness of Islam and that the superiority of Muslims comes from their duty to spread da'awa, command virtue and prevent vice, since God does not change people until they change themselves. This makes ‘Change’ the core concept of DS' foundational texts, since, in DS' narrative, Muslims' reality is characterised by weakness and humiliation and the only way to change this situation is through da'awa or religious propagation rather than political participation or military confrontations.

Moreover, the gradual nature of DS' discourse for social change is based on the evaluation of the consequences of Muslims' actions, the cost-benefit analysis guided by religious values and principles, and consequently weighing the benefits and the evils of

the change methods adopted. All these foundations reflect the *rationalist identity* that DS' sheikhs emphasize all the time through the texts in comparison to the reckless militants, or the indulgent politicians who end up offering religious concessions for no significant reward. In addition to the cost-benefit analysis that is always present in the choices and framing of DS' method of change, there is also the awareness of the context or the "*reality requirements*." Thus, the texts reflected awareness of the opportunity structure where the movement exists and of the possible opportunities and constraints, however without necessarily using this wording and where the definition of constraints and opportunities depends on religious evaluation. This, for instance, explains their decision to be apolitical. In addition, they were keen on *avoiding confrontation* with the state or other Islamists. Thus, the critical view of other Islamist approaches to change emphasized the fact that DS does not fully reject all their principles, or language. On the contrary, the texts' strategy was to state the common facts, and share the same fundamental principles, wording, and even metaphors. Nevertheless, there were differences in the definitions of the concepts, objectives and methods. This might have helped in avoiding confrontation through creating a common ground. Moreover, the texts did not mention MB, their historical rival, but was rather highly critical of their trend, approach to social change, and their actions. The focus on actions rather than particular individuals or entities, applies to the state where they repeated issues of the rule of God and loyalty and enmity, and denounced state religious transgressions, but never mentioned the name of the president for instance. Such a *non-confrontational approach* might be one of their survival strategies; however it reflects that *survival* for them was meant for propagation activities which take precedence over entering into political confrontations.

Moreover, it can be understood from the texts that they were keen on emphasizing the *scholastic or scientific identity* of DS; for instance through the presentation of the article as an academic paper (genre) in the form of its cover, using the title (Dr.), rather than sheikh, for Borhami. The texts also present an overview of all other approaches in a neutral tone and then criticize each of them before presenting DS' Manhaj of social change. Thus, they wanted to present themselves as *neutral and impartial*. In addition, they defined concepts, used technical words or religious jargon, numbering, and clear cohesive markers and nominalization which all give a sense of a scientific exposition. This emphasis on the scholastic nature is supported by excessive referencing from Quran, Sunna, and Salaf and prominent Muslim scholars. Moreover, in the spoken texts, for instance Al-Shahhat's lectures were systematic and pedagogic⁵⁶ as if he is writing rather than speaking. This reflects that the scientific discourse seemed to colonize the religious, thus resulting in a *scientific religious discourse*. In this regard, Al-Shahhat introduced self-criticism to DS concerning their focus on legal sciences, that takes more space to the detriment of actual training, follow-up and education of individuals, and that they give more attention to complex scientific issues over simple daily life issues.

Besides being scholastic, such findings also emphasize the intellectual contours of the movement that are mainly Salafi, and their Manhaj that is based on providing evidence from texts and religious authorities. In this regard, it was clear that the *hierarchy and authority is in the text*⁵⁷, where quotes from Quran and Hadith as a proof, are enough as a tool of validation of their opinion. Nevertheless, next in importance comes a continuous stress on the authority of prominent Salafi scholars as the references to

⁵⁶ In each lecture, he provided an overview of the previous one, and in the concluding part, he summed up the main points, and gave a hint about what is going to be discussed in the next lecture.

⁵⁷ For instance, Quran as a source comes before the rest of sources.

Islam. For instance, quotations of Ibn Taymiyya or Ibn El Qayyim are taken for granted and are a proof by themselves to the author's arguments. This is what Haykel calls "hypertextuality" (Haykel, 2009: 45). Thus, there is a clear hierarchy and asymmetry within the texts or among the Islamic main sources (Quran, Hadith, and Salafi scholars), where the *text is the main source of authority*. Nevertheless, there is also a clear distinction between Muslim scholars and the public.

However, this has two implications. First, heavy referencing to holy texts and religious authorities or scholars gives high assertiveness to what they say. The views of the authors were stated as facts, rather than their own understanding or opinions about various issues and concepts⁵⁸. Second, there is an elitist approach that confines full rights and governance to educated pious Muslim men, or Ahl Al-Hal wal-A'qd while considering the public incapable of choosing or ruling, thus there is *discrimination on the basis of gender, education, and belief*.

However, the questions and answers in the spoken texts (lectures) did not reflect a strict hierarchy within the movement where the relationship between the sheikh and his audience was more of a mentor-student relationship in a classroom setting. However, the pedagogic style, that was another indication of the scholastic nature and focus on education, was maintained⁵⁹, yet, goes side by side with an argumentative style that might be addressing the intellectual mode of the Salafi audience (individual reason). Also, the foundational texts varied ranging from the simple article that is reproduced and taught as part of the movement's educational curriculum to the book that is more of

⁵⁸ Assertiveness and high affinity are clear in modality (see appendix (1)).

⁵⁹ Through explanation, asking questions to attract attention and to make the audience think of the answer until the scholar gives them the way out. There were also negative questions directing the audience to reject and disrespect some aspects and ideas, or to show wonder and sarcasm.

a specialists' text⁶⁰. In addition, there are the informal lectures that adopted a daily conversation informal style.⁶¹ This reflects the features of DS' pedagogy and leaders' endeavours to keep their followers connected to DS' Manhaj, through repeating the same ideas in multiple ways until they are normalized (Borhami, 2010a).

From the above representation, DS' discourse included almost all *features*⁶² of the *general Islamist and conservative discourse*, particularly as concerns the comprehensiveness of Islam as the only religion capable of leading humanity as well as their sense of superiority discussed above that was expressed directly as "Muslims' superiority" or "Ahl Al-Sunna superiority". In addition, there is the elitist approach that discriminates on gender and belief basis (Ismail, 2003).

Such features of the Islamist discourse led to a number of implications as concerns women, Christians, and seculars. One of these is the *reproduction of the relations of domination based on gender* (Ismail, 2003), and the *traditional division of labour between men and women*, which was clear as regards the arguments for the rejection of women's right to guardianship. In this regard, Borhami criticized the participation of women in parliaments, since "women should not become guardiansm," and are not supposed to enjoy full political rights. He based his argument on the fact that women could not go anywhere without permission, and that their first priority should be childcare, thus, they could not become judges or parliament members. He referred to the

⁶⁰ which might explain why the article is preferred as a main reference, particularly in training and educational courses.

⁶¹ That was sometimes ironic, where sheikhs were always keen on engaging the audience and eventually they moved from the use of formal Arabic, to Egyptian accent and to including texts from media and public opinion issues.

⁶² For instance, the comprehensiveness and the superiority of Islam, confrontation with the other, corrupting effects of interaction with the other, conspiracy against Islam (infiltration, distortion, misinterpretation), danger of annihilation, the multi-faceted other: the other is (secularists, crusaders, proselytisers (Christian west), Zionism, Marxist, communists, atheists). Arab Marxist nationalist secularists are associated with the west and have a foreign character. And tools of validation: History, argumentative discourse secularism as foreign and alien, Islam contradiction with the other, Islamic identity and the discourse. Framing in terms of the permissible and the forbidden (legal ruling), and reproducing patriarchal and hierarchical relationships (Ismail, 2003: 35-46).

hadith that says “No people would thrive if they ordain a woman as their Sovereign”. However, Borhami was not as open about such wording in his written texts.

Such features, which put Islam as superior and as the only source for people’s good and interests, calls in also the *conspiracy against Islam* plotted by the multi-faceted other, especially the West, Christians and Jews (Ismail, 2003). At some point, this led DS’ sheikhs to considering that Al-Azhar unknowingly is used as a tool by the West to weaken Salafis who bring strength to Muslims, while empowering Sufis who are associated in DS’ discourse with “mysticism and superstitions,” “hysteria” and “polytheism of cemeteries,” thus resulting in the weakening of Muslims (Al-Shahhat, 2010). Despite the conformation of DS’ discourse to the dominant conservative discourse in almost all the aspects and tools of validation, the tension with Al-Azhar was articulated in the foundational texts particularly that of Al-Shahhat (2010), who rejects the dominant narrative of moderates versus radicals, and of describing Islamic resurgence as an extremist Wahhabi thought, versus the moderate Asha’ari thought of Al-Azhar. In this respect, he used “Islamic resurgence” instead of Salafis or Islamists. This framing reflected a sense of *victimization*. However, Borhami appreciated the court rulings that imposed censorship of conservatives on seculars (Brown, 2012, Ismail, 2003). In this respect, he esteemed the Egyptian judiciary system that acknowledged Shari’a as the main source of all legislations, and issued a series of rulings against authors who were considered infidel, such as Nasr Abu Zayd, saying that such rulings pleased the Islamists in general at that time (Borhami, 2009a).

As concerns other religious groups, one of the striking features of Borhami’s lecture, when it comes to wording and metaphors relevant to these groups, was that he characterised Jews, polytheists and even Christians as 'enemies of humanity,' who ‘try

to shut off the light of God, live in aberration, delusion, sins', saying that by so doing, they do not promote virtue or prevent vice (for him this duty is only forborne to Muslims). Even more to reinforce this frame, there was an incident of contradiction with the meaning of the holy text.⁶³ For Al-Shahhat (2010), as concerns Christians, he provided his narrative of Christian laws and regulations, stressing that they contradict human nature. His argument was that for instance forbidding divorce, second marriage, and polygamy must lead to the complication of marriage, thus facilitating adultery. In addition, he adopted media narratives about conflicts within the Egyptian church, particularly as concerns divorce and second marriage.⁶⁴ Thus, he concluded that when problems arise people realize that Islam provides the most suitable solutions to humans' lives. It is obvious that his main sources as concerns the church were mainly based on media, rather than checking Christian legal regulations, or undertaking a dialogue with Christians. In addition, for him "People of the book," or Christians and Jews, are "polytheists" and that Islamic Shari'a is the one from God and is the one that achieves people's interests. Thus, he framed the Egyptian church as weak and its actions as defying human instinct, and focused on all media narratives that support this.⁶⁵

Regarding seculars, it is expected that they are belittled in the Salafi discourse that considers them their main enemy, and a danger to Islam. For instance, Al-Shahhat

⁶³ In this incident where DS' texts contradicted the content of holy texts, Borhami's comment on non-believers in the 2009 lecture, which was mainly influenced by the wording and style of verse 82 in suret Al-Ma'edah in the Quran (implicit intertextuality), explained the antagonism between the dominant polytheists and Jews on one side and pioneer Muslims at that time. Despite that such verse excluded Christians from this category; and spoke positively about their friendliness and support, and the modesty of Christian priests and monks, Borhami said that Christians also belong to the enemies' category, which defied the content of the verse. In this regard, the researcher contacted a DS' member to clarify this contradiction, and to ask about the generalizations and judgments in that part of the text, however, there was no answer (conversation, October 15th 2014), which was uncommon, since this contact has been responsive all the time.

⁶⁴ He gave the example of a famous divorce case raised by an Egyptian Christian actress.

⁶⁵ Such attitude to frame Christians as enemies might have been augmented due to concerns about missionary activities, seculars' discourse that equates Muslims and Christians, or may be within the Egyptian Muslim-Christian discursive conflicts that were at their peak in 2010, in view of the crisis of Christian women who converted to Islam as will be discussed in chapter 5.

(2010) said that seculars say that Quran was written by humans, and that this is the way that seculars variously think about such a claim.⁶⁶ From the above, in rejection to seculars' discourse, *Christians and women should never be legal guardians* and are not among Ahl Al-Hal wl-A'qd. Therefore, they should not be allowed membership to parliament,⁶⁷ thus do not enjoy full citizenship.

Such a definition of citizenship raises questions about *democracy in DS' pre-revolution texts*. In DS' discourse for change before January revolution, democracy was absolutely rejected by the movement's scholars, and they believed that Shura is the most suitable political system. However, since democratic institutions constituted the current political framework, they can only be valid if amended to follow Shari'a and to abide by Shura conditions. Yet, in all cases, DS decision was to boycott such a system, because real experience proved that the losses bypass the gains it could bring to Islam (Borhami, 1992, 2009, 2010, Al-Shahhat, 2010). In this regard, Borhami always compares democracy to a 'fetish' made of 'Ajwa' (dates) that the infidels in Jahilyya, before Islam, used to worship and sanctify, but when they are hungry, they just eat it. This metaphor reflects his view of democracy as contradictory and fake. Whenever, democratic mechanisms go against the interests of the more powerful, they easily sacrifice it. This simile aims at discrediting democratic claims, and is highly ironic. It also brought about expressions such as 'abortion of democracy by the military,' and 'the democracy that they invented.' More on rejection of Democracy came in a whole lecture in Al-Shahhat's series on reform. In addition, in his series, he defines Muslims' reference as only Quran and Sunna with the understanding of the pious predecessors of

⁶⁶ This generalization implies a contradiction as it defies the scientific identity of DS.

⁶⁷ which is something Borhami stated in his 2009 lecture, yet did not mention anywhere else in his article, or book (written texts)

the nation, rather than the United Nations documents and agreements or the secular thought of human rights. In the following chapter, this will be discussed in detail, as well as compared to DS' post-revolution framing of democracy and entering politics.

Despite expressing objectivity regarding other groups, in both the lectures of Borhami and Al-Shahhat⁶⁸ there were certain generalizations, imprecisions, as well as some apparent mistakes in giving figures, dates, and in stating principles and regulations, specifically in definitions of concepts relevant to other social, political or religious groups, which came as part of their efforts to push for and stress certain frames for the other. However, this also indicates either that their scientific profile might be limited to legal sciences and to their professional specializations, or might be a sign of high self-regard and taking opponent groups lightly. The later explanation might be more probable in view of the intertextuality, in the sense of the sarcastic representation of texts and quotes of counter-movements, seculars and MB. In addition, reference to MB's actions, as mentioned above, came always under the title of the parliamentary approach, which was associated with religious concessions, and fake success.

Moreover, there seems to be incidents of contradiction within the texts as concerns Jihad that were mainly connected to intertextuality, wording and word meaning. For instance, events in Afghanistan were mentioned positively in Borhami's foundational

⁶⁸ Regarding Christians, for instance, where the researcher held conversational interviews with two Egyptian Christians belonging to two different churches to double check Al-Shahhat narrative about divorce regulations, and the controversial stories of divorce within the Egyptian Christian community. In this regard, their reaction was that what he mentioned is not precise, and that they themselves do not have much detail about the different cases that he explained, since the church prefers to keep quiet about divorce regulations and issues. This implies that Al-Shahhat (2010) adopted media narratives rather than a scientific approach to understand this issue.

In addition, Borhami's lecture reflected a sense of superiority over the rest of intellectual systems. This is clear in his sarcastic tone, and in the mistakes he made in reporting certain historical facts, ideas, numbers, and dates relevant to opponent groups or systems. This could be attributed primarily to his rejection of such groups. Hence, being precise in his narrative about them is not important. For instance, slogans of the French Revolution included democracy and left out fraternity, and the number of the first Turkish Islamists who entered parliament was different from the one he mentioned later in his book. Furthermore, there are mistakes in some dates related to historical developments and constitutions (Borhami, 2009).

article in 1992, which might be understandable because it was at a time when Mujahidin were fighting Russian occupiers. However, again he positively mentioned military confrontations in Afghanistan and Iraq in his book in 2010, which was a clear contradiction of his rejection of violent groups, especially those who do not understand or study Islam. However, Al-Shahhat seemed to be answering this question in particular in his 2010 lectures. He said that mentioning Afghanistan as an example is confined to combating and fighting the occupier. In this regard, both the Russian and American occupiers are equal, yet, each situation and time period will always have its special evaluation and legal religious positions and judgments. Thus, for instance, Al-Shahhat (2010) mentioned the concept of “Safety visa”⁶⁹ in countries of infidels, as an argument against those who permit executing terrorist attacks in Western countries. The researcher held a conversation with one of DS’ followers (anonymous, 2014), in this regard, and he directly repeated the same argument of Al-Shahhat.⁷⁰ Thus, Al-Shahhat’s argument on how each situation requires a different ruling might relatively justify such contradiction, in addition, it gives an example of DS’ *practical and flexible attitude* in dealing with reality. This attitude is crucial in understanding DS’ political choices in the post-revolution period as will be discussed in the following chapters.

In addition, from the conversation the researcher held with the young DS’ member, it was noticed that he spontaneously repeats Al-Shahhat’s and, in probability, other DS’ scholars’ exact argument, and wording. Such an observation might imply the efficiency of DS’ education and framing processes, and to the way they infiltrate their arguments

⁶⁹ which means that once such countries grant a visa, then it is a safety and security agreement that a Muslim should respect upon arrival in these countries.

⁷⁰ Moreover, this anonymous interviewee, besides considering fighting Americans in Afghanistan as Jihad, he said that there is no evidence that Taliban is involved in drug trafficking or any crimes, and that these are media narratives. However, he did not comment on the reports about human rights, and particularly the violation of women’s rights, and the destruction of Budha statutes, which so far goes against the studied DS’ discourse.

among their youth members, which can serve in their mobilization. However, in view of the Salafi intellectual mode discussed earlier, this does not imply full obedience or acceptance⁷¹ of all the ideas of leaders. Moreover, framing processes are not the sole means of connecting the individual member to the movement. This leads to variations among DS' individuals as regards receiving and adopting DS' leaders' frames and arguments. Accordingly, DS' members might not necessarily equally share the same arguments or frames as this interviewee (Miethe, 2009). Thus, the efficiency of DS' framing processes and how individuals within the movement react to them, and are consequently mobilized or de-mobilized will be discussed in the following chapters through discussing DS' management during January 2011 and June 2013 revolutions.

Finally, in view of the CDA results, it is clear that DS was not an isolated group, but was rather the result of the interactions and dynamics of the Egyptian context. For instance, the foundational texts started to draw upon legal⁷² and political discourses, which reflect DS' scholars' awareness of their political context, and the fact that abstaining from political participation did not mean isolation from the legal and the political system in the country. In addition, referring to media narratives⁷³ as concerns incidents, events, and social issues, in order to engage the audience, shows DS' close connection to their social context, and that DS was not directing its call solely to Salafis but also to the Egyptian public. Besides conforming to aspects of the conservative discourse while refusing to join the conservative alliance as mentioned in chapter 3, DS' narrative of recruitment and education in the militarized confrontation groups presented

⁷¹ For instance, in Borhami's lecture in 2009, (that was relatively open to non-DS followers), his opinions about women's political rights, among other issues, aroused many questions from the audience who seemed to be arguing back and resisting some of the ideas discussed in the lecture. Thus, it gave an impression that there is a space for arguments and discussion.

⁷² For instance, refer to articles from the constitution, and discuss elections (see appendix (1)).

⁷³ Even if they were obviously imprecise or contradictory, which, sometimes defies their scientific profile, and to their critical approach to the current system, through giving credibility to the media they see as corrupting.

the same dominant discourse that is even shared by seculars, the media, and Egyptian cinema in this regard (Khatib, 2006, Adil, 2007). Such points reflect DS' connection to their cultural and social context, and the possibility of having common ground with their opponents, rather than being an isolated fundamentalist group. This could also explain their smooth entry to politics later on. Nevertheless, it was observed that Egyptian nationalist expressions and patriotic ones are absent in these texts, where the expression "interests of Muslims" prevailed even over the Islamist expression of Umma Islamiyya (Islamic nation).

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that DS' Manhaj for social change developed due to interactions with other Islamists and within the dynamics of the Egyptian context, where the various influences over DS contributed to refining and elaborating DS' Manhaj features, its identity construction, and representation of reality.

In this regard, the chapter offered a presentation of how DS' foundational texts framed the alternative Islamist approaches to change, through connecting them to certain wording, word meanings, and metaphors, and where narratives of the consequences of such approaches focused on negative aspects and events. Accordingly, the texts associated political participation with religious concessions, and presented narratives of Islamists' participation in parliaments as necessarily a failure and leading to contradictions with and dilution of religious rulings. In addition, DS' foundational texts disengaged the concepts of Jihad and militarized confrontation, where militants are associated with bloodshed, destruction, and losses, while such confrontations are non-

Islamic and irrelevant to Jihad in the first place. By so doing, DS' foundational texts frame da'awa as one real aspect of Jihad and as the sole means of change for the time being. However, da'awa is also connected to sufficiency duties that Muslims should cooperate to carry out on a broad scale, across all social levels, which requires the employment of collective action. Thus, DS' Manhaj for social change is da'awa through collective action, and it takes place on three levels: the individual level, finding and founding the community of believers or the social level, and thirdly the state level. The first two levels would spontaneously be conducive to the empowerment of Islam, to facilitate the adoption of its laws and teachings on the third, i.e. state, level. Yet, DS will not induce this state level stage, since it is a grant from God and a reward for their industrious work on the other two levels. Such Manhaj is characterized by the focus on education at the individual level, and by giving priority to the individual and the social over the state levels. It is signified by a non-Takfiri, non-violent and bottom-up nature. Such frames of Islamists' approaches to change and the interaction with them, not only clarified DS' Manhaj for social change, but also provided a spectrum of Egyptian Islamists based on their social change methods.

Based on tracing DS' framing processes within the Egyptian context, this chapter also discussed DS' self-identification and representation of reality in the sense of how it perceives the Other, and how it understands the various concepts. This was done through the presentation of the results of the CDA of DS' foundational texts, which showed that they mainly draw upon the religious scientific discourse, and that they emphasize an identity that is primarily religious, scholastic, rationalist, and realist. Furthermore, there is no strict hierarchy within the movement, but rather a mentorship. CDA results also reflect that DS' discourse conforms to the main features of the general

conservative and Islamist discourses, while criticizing both. In this respect, DS is keen on distinguishing itself from the rest of Islamists, and criticizes Al-Azhar. In addition, they showed an anti-democratic attitude and rejection of full citizenship for women and Christians. Moreover, there is a confrontation with the seculars, and a belief in a western conspiracy that uses all means to weaken Islam. Finally, it is observed that DS is closely connected to the Egyptian context and is a product of interactions with its components.

This presentation provides the main features of DS' pre-2011 revolution discourse and its positions as a point of reference to which the features of DS' post-revolution discourse and framing processes will be compared in the following chapters. This is in order to understand DS' vision for social change in post-revolution Egypt, and to what extent it conformed to or departed from its original discourse, and the implications of this on NP.

CHAPTER 5: DS' MANHAJ OF GRADUAL REFORM WITHIN A REVOLUTIONARY CONTEXT

Introduction

As was explained in previous chapters, DS' interaction with the rest of the Islamists, seculars, the dominant conservative discourse, and the state, contributed to the formation of its Manhaj for social change. Such Manhaj was crystallized and its features were refined due to the dynamic processes of framing associated with interactions with other groups and events within the Egyptian context. This resulted in DS' *gradual reform, primarily religious, context-based* Manhaj that takes place on three levels, the *individual, the society, and the state*, where empowerment on the state level is a matter of fate and a divine grant. However, DS Manhaj prescribes unconditional commitment to the first two levels, where change is feasible. Thus, CDA of DS' foundational texts on social change reflected that they give priority to the individual and society over the state and *to the religious over the political*. This made religious *propagation and education* the sole means of change, rather than political participation, or any radical means of change be it military confrontation, or revolutions⁷⁴ and ousting the ruler on basis of declaring him Kafir. In this regard, DS stressed the importance of the conditions and the context of political participation, and disengaged the concepts of Jihad and military confrontation while legitimizing ousting the ruler, but on the condition that this action conforms to the religious rulings in this regard, particularly considering the consequences of, the capabilities to, and the cost-benefit analysis of undertaking such a step. This way DS is closer to the purists' Manhaj, yet while

⁷⁴ As mentioned in chapter 3, one of the main differences between DS and the rest of Islamists was DS' rejection to the Iranian revolution not only because it was Shi'ite, but also because they did not approve of the method, which implies conspiracy as well (Tawfiq, 2012).

condemning vices and state transgressions, especially with regard to the issues of the rule of God and loyalty and enmity.

In view of these main features of DS' Manhaj for social change, this chapter argues that DS' framing processes (discursive practices), in the pre- and post-revolution contexts, constituted an extension to this Manhaj or ideology, and reinforced the basis of self-identification and perception of the Other that were established in the foundational texts (Snow, 2000). This is done through tracing DS' framing processes in the years leading to January 2011 revolution, during the revolution, and when DS decided to enter politics later in 2011, comparing these processes to the findings of the foundational texts discussed in chapter 4.

The first section discusses DS' framing of a number of issues and major events in the 2000s: DS' position and religious ruling on the rising protests and the wave of social mobilization that started in Egypt from 2003 until January 2011 revolution; DS' framing of assumptions about Mubarak's plans to pass power to his son Gamal (inheritance); their position on the political opposition alliance and their main differences with them; the discursive conflicts with Christians and the Kamillia Shehata issue; and finally the two interlinked issues of the church bombing in Alexandria and the arrest and torture to death of Sayed Bilal, the young DS' member who was accused of undertaking the bombing. Within the pre-revolution context, DS' positions and frames reflected the relationship between the religious and the political in DS' discourse, and their perception of the Other (Christians, seculars, and MB). This overview paves the way to understand how DS dealt with January 2011 revolution within this discursive field, and how it decided to enter politics afterwards.

Thus, the second section will provide a CDA of DS' texts (articles, statements, religious rulings, Friday speeches and conference recommendations)⁷⁵ produced in the period from January 21st, five days before the outbreak of protests, until February 17th, six days after the toppling of Mubarak and ending the eighteen days Tahrir square sit-in. This analysis reflects the relationship between DS' Manhaj for social change and their framing processes during and immediately after January 2011 revolution, through shedding the light on the main features of the movement's discourse, definition of concepts, and narrative of events, and how such events were linked (articulation process), then which concepts and events were given priority as being more important than others (the amplification processes) (Snow, 2000). Finally, we shall see how DS' self-identification process and perception of the other took place. This section also deals with the question of whether DS' position on protest reflects a vision on means of change, or was the result of state repression. To answer these questions, the focus will be on the texts DS produced at the specific historical moment of January 2011 revolution, in order to understand DS' position on revolution as a means of social change in view of its wider discourse on change, and amidst a revolutionary context.

Among the consequences of the revolution was what DS framed as an existential threat to shari'a and to the Islamic identity of Egypt. However, due to the structural changes

⁷⁵ The list compiled by the researcher includes:

- Ruling on participation to January 25th, Revolution to Support a Number of Activists on the Internet, in Imitation of the Tunisian Revolution (21-01-2011);
- Borhami, Sages of the nation, Save the Country before it is late (26-01-2011);
- First Statement by Alexandria-based DS on Current Incidents (29-1-2011);
- Second DS Statement on Treatment of Current Situation (31-1-2011);
- Third DS' Statement on Treating Current Situation (01-02-2011);
- A Statement by Al-Hay'a Al-Shari'ya on Rights & Liberties (05-02-2011);
- The Salafi Rally Conference in Alexandria (08-02-2011);
- A.R. Alaa El Din, Advice about January 25 incidents-Friday prayers' speech (11-02-2011);
- M. Sarhan, Attitudes towards January 25 events, Friday prayers' speech (11-02-2011);
- Al-Shahhat, Al-Salafiyon w Kashf Hesab Al-Azma (17-02-2011); and
- Al-Shahhat, Youth and Revolution (17-02-2011).

brought about by toppling Mubarak's regime, DS' framed the revolution as an opportunity to enter politics without the need of providing religious concessions. Thus, January 2011 is the second opportunity in DS' history, after the one that permitted the beginning of their collective action, and is the turning point of the movement to become an official political actor. Nevertheless, such developments represented a challenge to the movement's Manhaj of social change, and raised a number of questions: have they changed their means of change? How have they framed political participation after years of abstaining from politics and of criticizing political participation as a means of change? Have the framing processes that were associated with political participation departed from the movement's Manhaj for social change, or acted as an extension to it? To deal with these questions, the third section traces DS' discourse on social change after January 2011 in an attempt to understand the movement's vision for social and political change after it established its political party, NP, and engaged in political interactions. The focus will be on Borhami's and Al-Shahhat's texts, as well as a number of DS members' media contributions. This is because Borhami and Al-Shahhat are the ones who put the foundational texts on the issue of social change, previously analyzed. Moreover, as mentioned in chapter 4, and through archival research, and the field observations, both can be considered the ideologues of the movement, whose major contributions to DS' meaning production processes and discourse on social change are reproduced by the rest of DS' members.⁷⁶

In the same way that chapter 4 presents a point of reference through providing the main features of the foundational texts, this chapter again constitutes a point of reference,

⁷⁶ In the field, young leaders and members saw Al-Shahhat as systematic and is able to link issues and to explain concepts in an organized way. They all referred the researcher to his contributions on reform as one that comes second to that of Borhami on that main issue on DS' curriculum and understanding of Al-Syasa Al-Shar'iyya.

providing the features of DS' Manhaj and framing processes after January 2011. This aim is to assess the influence of DS' Manhaj on NP's policy choices, the relationship between the movement and the party, and the nature of NP as a political party established by a religious movement, to be tackled in chapter 6.

Section One: DS' Pre-Revolution Context and the National Debate on Political Change:

DS' Discursive Field:

The framing process cannot be understood except through contextualizing it in its discursive field or discursive opportunity structures, in which meaning contests happen (Snow, 2000, 2007). In this regard, DS' framing processes in the period between 2004 and 2011 took place within a period of significant political mobilization and protests. Such protests were divided into, firstly, pro-democracy protests that were led by the opposition alliance (encompassing seculars, mainly leftists, Marxists, Nationalists and Nasserites, in addition to MB). And secondly, labour protests resulting from the Mubarak regime's neoliberal policies, and the wave of privatizations that led to deterioration of the conditions of labour and the rise of poverty, spurring also basic citizenship rights protests (Abdelrahman, 2009, 2013, Shehata, 2010, Aoudé, 2013). Such movements were initiated by a wide popular rejection of any Egyptian involvement in the war in Iraq in 2003. This foreign policy issue expanded to a wider demand for comprehensive reforms at the national level, seeking to pave the way for the rise of an alternative regime, to propagate for new policies, together with a leadership that could respond to the nation's choices and demands. In addition, there was a wide

concern about the state of economic injustice, the spread of corruption, and the prevalence of emergency law. That is why the amendment of article (76) of the 1971 Constitution came to provoke anger, as the move was seen by the opposition groups as a mechanism to allow Mubarak to stay in power for a longer period (Al-Agaty, 2011, Ismail, 2010, Badran, 2014, Hafez, 2013).⁷⁷

In this context, a survey of ‘Ana Al-Salafi’ and ‘Tariq Al-Salaf’ websites, the official online media outlet of DS, shows that DS distanced itself from the social and political mobilization process that was taking place in Egypt at that time. Nevertheless, it rigorously followed developments, commented on events and calls for protest in a number of speeches and articles⁷⁸ (see appendix 2) and criticized the activists’ ideas and demands. This, in a sense, makes DS a contributor to the national debate on social change. Such a survey reflects an ongoing contestation of meanings and an indirect dialogue between DS and other political powers, in which DS was keen on clarifying its position on change, and to respond to the continuous misunderstanding, or accusations alleged against the movement. In this regard, they framed the national debate as polarized, with them being portrayed as either joining the opposition alliance unconditionally, or being in Mubarak’s camp, whereas in reality they belonged to neither bloc. Alternatively, they emphasized that they provide an alternative approach and are insisting on resisting the dominant secular discourse for change, through propagating their gradual, primarily religious, discourse on social change instead. At

⁷⁷ In this regard, a number of movements were formed such as, Kefaya (Enough) and the "April 6th Movement", which was established parallel to the labor protests which were triggered in Mahalla industrial city in the spring of 2008. Moreover, there was also "The Popular Movement for Change" that embraced diverse political actors belonging to various ideological backgrounds, calling for democracy and freedom. In addition, there were factional economic and social demands, particularly of labor. Such demands were related to the daily needs of life, rather than direct political demands and protests. In such case, protestors had no affiliation to political parties, organizations, or social movements. Protests in the Egyptian street in general took an upward curve, escalating from 202 protests in 2005 to around 650 protests in 2009. Such protests involved demonstrations, sit-ins, strikes, hunger strikes, collecting signatures, and even detaining factory owners (Ismail, 2010, Al-Agaty, 2011, Hafez, 2013, Badran, 2014)

⁷⁸ See Appendix (2) for details of the survey and the analysis of the selected pre-revolution texts.

that time, DS' texts also reflected the fear of the secular threat to article (2) of the constitution, and to shari'a and Islamic identity. Accordingly, the movement was not silent before the revolution, and was keen on expressing its views (Abdel A'zim, 2008, 2009, 2010b, 2010a, Abd El-A'al, 2010).

In the light of DS' reservations on the "concept of change" introduced by the secular movements, for the lack of a religious component, and DS' opposition to the rising number of protests, DS' position on protest as a means of change and of expression was framed as a religious ruling, or fatwa, expressed in Al-Shahhat's comprehensive article titled "Waqfa Ma'a Al-Mozaharat (A Pause to Discuss Protests)" (Al-Shahhat, 2009). This ruling, while legitimizing protest on religious basis, proves it to be an inefficient method, and one that defies shari'a in practice. Such a religious ruling, besides being based on *shari'aa restrictions* and *cost-benefit analysis*, is also *context-based*; thus reflecting DS' primarily religious nature, rationality and realism. In line with this, Borhami answered a question concerning protest and its religious ruling, where he emphasized the same position, and clearly mentioned that DS chose not to participate in demonstrations and protests (Borhami, 2010b).

Nevertheless, DS supported and participated in the protests against what Salafis called the church's pressures on Christian women who convert to Islam, where the most famous case was that of Kamilia Shehata in 2010 (Spencer, 2011). However, it is obvious that the main reason that drove followers of DS to protest was purely religious (The captive sister Kamilia Shehata, 2010b, 2010a, AnaAlsalafi, 2010).⁷⁹ Such angry reaction went on for around three months before the bombing of the Two Saints Church

⁷⁹ One of the occasions in which DS' leaders expressed their opinions in Kamilia Shehata issue was in Sheikh Mahmoud Abdel Hamid's daughter's wedding, for weddings and funerals were among occasions that DS' sheikhs use to deliver their speeches away from permissions and state restrictions (int. Nasr, 2013).

in Alexandria took place on new year's eve prayers of 2011 (AhramOnline, 2012). Following the bombing, and in line with their anti-violence approach, DS' leaders issued a statement in which they condemned the attack, on the basis that such attacks defy the Islamic approach based on da'awa and advice, would lead to the spread of evils in the whole society, open the door for accusing Islam of violence and bloodshed, and would only serve enemies of Islam⁸⁰ (statements, 2011). Nevertheless, despite their non-violent history, Sayed Bilal, one of DS' young members, was arrested as a suspect, and was tortured to death (AhramOnline, 2012).

As mentioned in chapter 3, the state-DS relationship was characterized by fluctuations and periodical attacks on the movement in order to limit its capabilities and influence. In view of the sequence of events and speeches that preceded the bombings, it was easy for the state to take DS as a scapegoat, on one side to absorb the anger of public opinion, and on the other to restrict DS. Despite the consistency of the pattern of the DS-state relationship, the death of Sayed Bilal seemed to be an unprecedented escalation that constituted a shock to DS' followers, particularly the youth, who considered it an incident requiring prompt reaction from senior sheikhs. However, DS' leaders framed it as mere act of injustice that should not distract the movement from its much wider objective of da'awa and social change (Borhami, 2011g, Al-Moqaddem, 2011b). Thus, DS did not call for protests or any confrontational action against the regime in the light of Bilal's death. On the contrary, the rest of the political powers, focused their activism on the case of Khaled Said's torture to death in June 2010, where

⁸⁰ DS' statement reminded of the centuries long Egyptian Muslims and Christians coexistence, and the tolerance and security that prevailed, despite of the different beliefs, except for rare incidents of violence, that could be easily understood using a "scientific objective and fair treatment" to each crisis. DS also condemned calls for foreign intervention in Egyptian affairs and considered it a justification to attack Muslims' lives, money, and mosques. In addition, they prayed that God protects Egypt from all conspiracies that aim at spreading fitna (sedition), and threatens its stability

they made use of this shocking incident to mobilize people to protest against Mubarak's regime, and made him the icon of January 2011 revolution (BBC, 2014, Online, 2011).

To sum up, this overview shows that DS' position in its pre-revolution context was that it did not remain silent but rather did participate in the national debate on political and social change, where DS adhered to the features of its discourse and to its framing tools. Thus, it gave priority to the religious over the political and human rights concerns and basic material needs. In addition, the pre-revolution texts reproduced DS' Manhaj for social change as in the foundational texts, criticized both seculars and MB, as well as the state. The sense of victimization was also present due to state restrictions as well as misconceptions by opposition powers and the media. In this regard, DS' leaders used the tools of cost-benefit analysis and emphasized reality requirements in framing protest as religiously legitimate while practically resulting in defying shari'aa, and thus it is dismissed as a means of change. However, they would participate in protest if it is for a religious cause, such as in the case of Kamilia Shehata. Furthermore, their opposition to the state and church practices and their first participation in protest led to an escalation with security, as in the torture and killing of Bilal, which was framed by leaders as a mere act of injustice, with their own objectives being much wider. Moreover, the dominant religious discourse that always lists rituals among solutions to major crises and calamities was also observed.

With regard to the type of DS-State relationship, particularly under the Mubarak regime and in view of DS' cost-benefit analysis approach, refraining from protest and the exclusion of revolutions as a means of change for DS might not reflect a consistent approach for the movement. In other words, the high cost of participation in public action under Mubarak regime may still be the reason for such a choice. Therefore, DS'

position on confrontational or radical means of change could be better understood when put into action, during and after January 2011 Revolution.

In the following section, there will be a discussion of the results of CDA of DS' texts during January 2011 revolution, to see how the revolution was framed, and how concepts and events were defined, narrated and linked, as the situation developed. This will be in order to see to what extent DS' framing was an extension to its Manhaj, and thus to what extent refraining from protest as a means of change represented a vision, rather than a more pragmatic fear of oppression.

Section 2: DS' Discourse in a Revolutionary Context

The analysis of DS' texts during January 2011 Revolution reflected the fact that DS' leaders maintained their reservations over protest (AnaAlsalaḥi, 2011c). On January 26th, following the outbreak of protests, Borhami (2011e) in an article warned against bloodshed as a major sin, which triggers rage and disruption, especially in absence of an aware leadership. DS' statements that followed adhered to the same position, and focused on security, particularly after January 28th violent clashes between the police and protesters, withdrawal of the police from the streets and the occurrence of looting (Reuters, 2012).

DS' Narrative of January 2011 Events

DS' statements on January 29th and 31st (AnaAlsalaḥi, 2011b, AnaAlsalaḥi, 2011e) addressed protesters as a separate group, expressing its concern about the consequences of the protesters' actions. Such a stance on protest was maintained through the 18 days of sit-in in Tahrir Square. In an article by Al-Shahhat (Al-Shahhat, 2011), five days

after toppling Mubarak, he repeated that “DS has a principled position that does not consider protest as an illegitimate action. However, in most cases, protests in practice lead to religious concessions, and to breaching shari’a in return for no gains, or for slight gains and interests.” For him, corrupt actions which are associated with protest were, for instance, flawed slogans, finery, singing, and the high risk of bloodshed, and arbitrary detentions. Meanwhile, for Al-Shahhat, the experience over decades before January 25th was that protest never achieved even its minimum demands, while most of the time it led to bloody clashes. In the meantime, he stressed that Islamic groups’ main duty is to protect religion and to manage everyday life in accordance with religious rules. In view of such a position, Al-Shahhat (2011) justified DS’ absence in January 2011 protests, while praising Kamilia Shehata protests. He did this through comparing the givens of the two cases, as concerns weighing the consequences of the action, and the religious objective where they had to balance “extremist Christians” in the media. Thus, the risk was low and the objective was crucial for the Shehata case. Also, DS did not adopt protest as means of change, since protest does not conform to the nature of DS’ role and methods. On the contrary, DS’ main tools are conferences, lectures, and writings: this was not to the satisfaction of DS’ youth enthusiasm, yet they achieved most of the gains that could have been achieved through protest (Al-Shahhat, 2011).

Al-Shahhat’s framing of January 25th protests was that they did not come up with anything new to the pattern of protests that took place over a decade with no reward, and that they were organized by the “internet activists” who do not care about the opinion of the traditional powers, among them the Islamists. However, the turnout this time (January 25th 2011) was more than expected by both the organizers and the regime. Al-Shahhat added that in the meantime the fellow Islamists, MB, initially decided not to

participate in the protests. Later on, they decided to contribute a symbolic number of their followers. However, they claimed, after the acceleration of incidents, that it was a tactical maneuver, which Al-Shahhat does not believe was their real position. In this part of Al-Shahhat narrative of January 2011, it appears that he was responding to DS' youth, who seem to have blamed the leaders for non-participation in January 2011 Revolution, which implied that they were comparing themselves to MB and other Islamists. In addition, Al-Shahhat seemed critical about MB's attempt to hijack the revolution, particularly given that MB were their historical rival (Al-Shahhat, 2011). Another point in Al-Shahhat's narrative of the revolution events, or justification of their choice of abstaining from protest, was that after the obvious turnout of protesters, there were clear signs that the regime would resort to violence, and clashes actually erupted between the police and the "internet activists," with slight MB participation. He made it clear that MB participation was confined to the organizational level, and under the condition that they never present Islamic slogans, or reveal any Islamist identity. For Al-Shahhat (2011) "what was worse, were the slogans that represented deviation from faith, such as "The crescent hand in hand with the cross". In fact, equating Islam to Christianity was among the deviations that DS can never tolerate. Such DS' reservations on protesters' practices were also highlighted in the February 11th 2011 Alaa El Din's Friday speech (Alaa El-Din, 2011).

According to Al-Shahhat (2011), such developments made DS direct its followers to refrain from participation in protests, since *they would not accept any religious concessions, nor would they be willing to give up their Islamic identity and outlook*, which indirectly served the protests since it did not make them vulnerable to the state's oppression of Islamists. In addition, DS was mainly occupied with guarding the internal

front through securing homes, people, and properties (AnaAlsalaḥi, 2011b, AnaAlsalaḥi, 2011e) which, for him, was in itself an indirect contribution from DS' point of view⁸¹ (Al-Shahhat, 2011). He added that DS also decided not to warn or praise any party, since it was too late for such actions, when each has already chosen their position. However, with the development of the situation, DS praised those who went out to fight corruption and to demand justice, and considered those who died for this purpose as "martyrs" (AnaAlsalaḥi, 2011a, Al-Shahhat, 2011).

In addition, DS' fears of the secular threats manifested in demands to isolate religion, together with discussions about the annulment of article (2) of the Constitution were highlighted in the movement's framing of the situation (AnaAlsalaḥi, 2011d, Alaa El-Din, 2011, AnaAlsalaḥi, 2011a, Sarhan, 2011, Al-Shahhat, 2011). As mentioned above, such fears have characterized DS' comments on the definition of the concept of change and the nature of the political demands that have been dominating the scene since 2004. Therefore, as per Al-Shahhat (2011), such secular intentions, besides the rest of reservations on protest and revolution, were the reasons why DS did not actually participate in the January protests. However, "such secular targets, in fact, served DS and its followers to come out of the revolution with the least losses and the maximum gains," according to the recommendations of the Alexandria rally conference (AnaAlsalaḥi, 2011d) that proclaimed DS' position and demands as concerns shari'a and the reforms generally recommended to the regime.

DS' statements and articles during the Revolution days reflected that the "cost-benefit analysis approach," that signified DS' choices throughout their history, continued to

⁸¹ For DS, the protection of the internal front (DS' statements 1 and 2), and containing people's rage, through providing them with their basic needs (food, goods, and fuel), helped in evading the country a possible civil war since the pressures of the situation could have provoked some people to fight the protesters in order to end their sit-in and bring back life to normal.

direct their attitudes. So, DS' narrative of the events of January 2011 revolution focused on the security threats and disruption brought about by protests. This narrative reflected that DS was committed to and guided by the cost-benefit rules, as defined by shari'a.⁸² Compared to other Salafis, such as Madkhalis, DS did not have reservations in principle on toppling the president, or the legal guardian. Yet, they see that, in Islam, toppling the governor should follow specific regulations that the protestors obviously ignored. Therefore, according to DS' argumentation through the texts, despite the fact that DS does not rule out toppling governors or opposing them, and that DS also recognizes the injustices of the regime and rejects them, its calculations of gains and losses and the nature of DS' religious role resulted in the exclusion of protest.

Thus, DS' narrative of the revolution leads to the conclusion that DS represented a third path on the map of social and political change in Egypt. This is owing to the fact that they do not reject protest as a means of expression but, simultaneously, do not adopt it as one of DS' means of change. In addition, while they accepted protest in principle, and gave support to the protesters' targets, they refused the protesters' practices, which for them constituted deviation from Islam. Meanwhile, they were against Mubarak's regime, but did not offer absolute support to the protesters' demands, since for them a certain part of such demands was in defiance of shari'a. Moreover, they were worried about chaos and fitna, but did not find this an excuse to accept injustice and oppression. Finally, as part of their unique position, they did not approve of the position of their fellow Islamists, MB and some Salafis, who agreed to put aside their Islamic identity, demands and slogans just for the sake of being part of the revolutionary alliance.

⁸² This was clear in the argumentation of the religious judgment issued by DS calling its followers not to participate in January 2011 protests before the beginning of the revolution, and in Al-Shahhat's article, after toppling Mubarak, where cost-benefit analysis was the key argumentation.

However, DS' adherence to the position of defending a shari'a-guided change, to be enhanced through campaigns, statements, conferences, and lectures, seemed unwelcome amidst the polarization that characterized the revolutionary climate of the time.⁸³

CDA Results:

With the breakout of January 2011 Revolution, CDA of the texts (see appendix 3) that the movement produced during the 18 days of protest reveals a detachment from the revolution during the first 12 days. In these days, DS focused on dealing with the "*disastrous consequences of wide protest*," without discrediting or approving of the protesters, or their demands. On day 12 of the protests, DS' texts started to discuss the demands of the protesters, and their direction, and connotations. Such a turning-point occurred when DS realized the dominance of secular powers, and their comments on Article (2) of the Constitution, which represented an existential threat to Islam in Egypt from DS point of view.

The *religious rather than the political motives* of DS' actions were obvious in their discourse. Moreover, in the middle of the overwhelming situation of the revolution, DS' leaders were keen on attracting the attention of followers and focusing their efforts on the main issue for the movement: Islam and the future of religion in the Egyptian society. Thus, DS' activism during the days of the revolution used the movement's usual means such as conferences, lectures, statements, and Friday speeches, which focused on sticking to *shari'a*, the importance of Article (2) of the Constitution, and projecting the defects of secular demands. This was the case before the revolution, in

⁸³ According to Al-Shahhat (2011), "supporters of protest asked us not to prohibit protest as long as we are not participating, and we complied, and even more... So we hope that our brothers would accommodate our conferences and lectures, which explain the issue of the rule of God, clarify the benefits of Shari'a, to overcome the flaws blemishing secularism, and the prevention of any retreat (in Shari'a application) in order to secure the minimum of people's demands. Even if our brothers see such conferences as waste of time and effort, these events would not lead to any expected evil. If they do so, they would be maintaining the spirit of brotherhood based on faith".

Al-Moqaddem's speech in the wake of the shocking incident of Sayed Bilal's torture, where he wanted to draw followers' attention to the core of their struggle rather than being dragged into issues which he considered as secondary. It could be understood that their take on that human rights issue was that it was a fatal incident, and a sign of suppression. In other words, as can be deduced from their texts, DS' main mission was defined as one that goes beyond resisting one aspect of injustice, to the wider cause of "applying Shari'a, maintaining Islamic identity, and achieving social reform" (Al-Moqaddem, 2011b).

The CDA of DS' discourse at the specific historical moment of January 2011 Revolution, in view of the wider DS' discourse about change over its history, led to the conclusion that DS' discourse on change, as concerns its meaning and methods, and DS' position on revolution and protest, was maintained even within a revolutionary context. This signifies that DS has a vision on the means of change, and that their position might not be attributed only to fear of Mubarak's regime, or was formed as a momentary reaction to events. Actually, with all the dynamism and the changes that took place in Egypt in the wake of January 2011 protests, DS preserved a counter-discourse, one that resisted the mainstream. Therefore, they continued their pre-revolution reservations on seculars' definition, direction, and means of change, and resisted the polarization that prevailed on the political scene since 2004, which divided the society into revolutionaries and regime supporters, with no regard to different change methods and movements.

Within this context of polarization, as framed by DS, and after the fall of the Mubarak regime, the absence of a leader for the revolutionary movement and the lack of a clear ideological orientation, political life suffered from a vacuum, and conflicts started

between Islamists and seculars over who was to lay the foundation of the post-revolution regime. Such a situation, while framed as a threat to shari'a, was also framed as an opportunity for DS to politically participate, and to introduce the application of shari'aa as the "project that guarantees the unity of the nation," especially in the light of DS perception of revolutionaries' lack of a "vision or an ideology" (Al-Shahhat, 2011).⁸⁴ Consequently, while rejecting protest as a means of change, DS' members cautiously⁸⁵ participated in protests after January 2011 (Borhami, 2012a); yet, this was religiously motivated and came as part of DS coordination with the Islamists' coalition (AnaAlsalaḥi, 2013b) for the sake of emphasizing the Islamists' demands vis-à-vis those of the seculars. Underlining their appreciation of "institutionalism," DS eventually saw protest as meaningless, especially given the presence of an executive institution (AnaAlsalaḥi, 2013b) and reaffirmed their belief that protest is inefficient and unsustainable. Rejecting participation in June 2013 protests and describing them as *fitna*, even though they agreed with their cause (AnaAlsalaḥi, 2013a, Party, 2013), shows that DS maintained its position in this regard.

If DS rejects revolution as means of change, then the question is what does DS offer as an alternative within such a revolutionary atmosphere? The next section attempts to answer the question of what is DS' vision for change post-revolution, and how they perceive their position on this issue relative to other powers. In particular, this question is examined from when DS became a political actor: this enables examination of whether their discourse on change has been transformed due to political interaction, in comparison to their foundational texts and historical discourse discussed in previously.

⁸⁴ In this respect, the revolutionary alliance was seen as fragmented and unorganized in DS' texts (Alaa El-Din, 2011), which might be understandable in view of the loose nature and heterogeneity of the Egyptian social change movements (Abdelrahman, 2013).

⁸⁵ See details on this in Appendix (3).

Section Three: Framing of Political Participation and Post-Revolution Self-Identification:

The consequences of the revolution represented a challenge to DS' core values⁸⁶, yet also constituted a political opportunity to institutionalize the movement, and to officially enter politics. However, such a decision was not taken immediately after the revolution. On the contrary, the leaders were cautious and preferred to follow the same decision-making mechanisms discussed in chapter 3. Borhami, in a lecture on February 26th, 2011, spoke about claims that they would change their foundations, and he denied that they could compromise any of their core beliefs. But when the balance of power changes, as a new regime emerges, then political participation "might become a matter of discussion, depending on the changes that might happen, and in view of the overall image of the political scene (Borhami, 2011f)." In this regard, Sheikh Borhami compared the ambiguous situation in Egypt after the revolution to a "foggy road," to be navigated slowly and cautiously, and requiring consultation with each other before taking any step forward. He added that senior sheikhs would share opinion with the rest of DS' followers, once they reach a final decision. Thus, the leaders were keen on communicating their intentions about political participation to the rank and file of the movement. On March 22 2011, DS released a statement announcing that after consultation and discussion, in view of current developments, they had decided to participate "positively" in political activity, despite the fact that DS was still considering the convenient form of political participation it would take (AnaAlsalaft, 2011).

However, such decision seemed to contradict DS' means of change, and raised questions about possible transformation in DS' Manhaj, and the nature of its role and

⁸⁶ Particularly as concerns rejecting radical change, besides what the movement saw as deviant practices associated with protest, and above all the movement's rising fear of seculars' threat to Islam.

targets. Therefore, at this turning-point towards a new phase for the movement, and to answer such questions, DS' leaders were keen on framing their political participation decision in order to secure the interconnectedness of the movement, and win the support of its followers and sympathizers.

Accordingly, in order to understand DS' post-Revolution vision for change, it is useful to explore the main features of the framing process of their decision to participate in politics, and the self-identification that the movement had to undertake, as a new political actor, within such a polarized and transitional political context. The tracing of transformations in DS' discourse and methodology of change, in the light of their new role, will be placed in comparison to DS' pre-revolution foundational texts about change analyzed in chapter 4. This comparison will help in tackling the questions of: whether DS, as a movement, has a vision for change; what the contours of such a vision are; and whether such a vision was influenced by DS' political interactions.

CDA Results:

The CDA results⁸⁷ of DS' post-revolution texts⁸⁸ (see appendix 4) revealed that they preserved their core argumentation and word meaning, and the religious and spiritual wording was obviously present in all texts. They maintained the movement's social

⁸⁷ See appendix (4) for the details of CDA of DS' texts on Social change and reform in the post-revolution period. As will be discussed in chapter 6, it is difficult to separate the movement from the party. Thus, at parts of the analysis of DS' contributions in media, there is an overlap between DS and NP membership at some points.

⁸⁸ Al-Shahhat reform series: (27-9-2013) «An Introduction to Reform; (08-10-2013) Religion includes the goodness of Individual, Society; (21-10-2013) Individual Goodness; (02-11-2013) Change Milestones; (09-11-2013) State Reform Milestones; (15-11-2013) State Reform under New Systems; (23-11-2013) A full review of total reform ways and other reform ways.

Borhami, (26-2-2011) Salafyyon and Politics.. have attitudes changed?; BORHAMI (20-04-2011) Interview by Islamyyon.Net with Sheikh Yasser Borhami on Salafyyin from Political boycott to Participation; (22-03-2011) Statement by DS regarding political participation; (07-12-2011) Manhaj of Change in the light of first round of elections .

AL-Moqaddem, (9-12-2011) Comment on results of the first round of parliamentary elections.
Besides a number of other media contributions.

change methodology at least on the discursive level. However, the fact that they entered politics made them look at the order of the social change levels as parallel, rather than consecutive. Thus, they would continue da'awa and instead of waiting until social reforms reached the state level, after entering politics they said that they would work on reflecting whatever reforms already achieved on such a level. Such variation in the order of change levels might indicate change in the importance of the components of their change methodology. However, they continued to give priority to da'awa and to put more weight on religious and social reform over the political in their discourse. Nonetheless, the possibility of achieving this combination in practice within their political reality remains questionable. This is particularly so when they stress that they adopt a normative perception of politics, and would never offer any religious concessions in search for political gains. Such statements could not explain their acceptance of female participation in parliament, despite declaring their rejection to women's guardianship in principle. However, it was obvious that the religious cost-benefit analysis approach, that has been the common factor in DS' discourse, seemed to be the way out for bridging the gap between their fixed religious discourse and their actual actions and reality requirements. Adopting such an approach, they stressed that the application of shari'a is context based, and takes into account benefits versus evils calculations, together with the conditions of the people. Nevertheless, if this approach proved to be efficient for them as a movement, its effectiveness, when they became political actors, became questionable. In particular, they faced the challenge of having to convince the whole society, not only their followers, and at a time when the scale of challenges to their thought and enduring discourse would definitely increase.

In this regard, while maintaining the core principles of the movement, there was, however, a slight change in their discursive combination, mainly in the genre, since they had more access to media and enjoyed an obvious presence in talk shows in the post-Revolution period. They also used an everyday conversational style rather than a tutorial or preaching one, and were trying to embrace components of the popular culture, yet this was confined to an inclination to the use of Egyptian accent, metaphors, and proverbs, in addition to the sense of humor. However, they maintained a religious-political discourse where the proportion of the political increased, yet, the priority was given to the religious, where the reality was represented through Islam, and all their arguments were based on Islamic logic and references. In sum, the observed changes in DS' discourse as concerns change were apparent or superficial, and did not go deeper to the core of their methodology (Manhaj).

Such findings indicate that they have a vision for change that continued with the movement even after its institutionalization, and after it had established a political party. Despite the fact that maintaining a consistent discourse reflects having a project and a vision, it was also a double-edged sword, since adhering to all the movement's definitions and principles led to issuing several statements that were shocking to Egyptian society. Moreover, other general features of DS' discourse continued, such as victimization, criticizing media, the fear of conspiracy, an anti-west and anti-secular approach, and their understanding of Christians and other social groups that for them represented the "Other", even if they were Muslims or Islamists. Accordingly, the relationship between DS and the other political powers and social groups did not change, in spite of the increased interaction and forming alliances or mutual

understanding at some points, and the tireless effort on part of DS' leaders and members to integrate into the society.

The fact that DS' social change discourse is non-violent, non-Takfiri, and is a bottom-up approach, makes it a promising platform for political participation. In addition, according to their media statements, their openness and willingness to interact and cooperate with various actors indicate that they are a tolerant, non-exclusive Islamist group. However, being able to maintain consistency in their discourse, and adherence to their methodology of change could be better tested through exploring the discourse of DS as a political actor, since the essence and the nature of DS' vision becomes clearer when implemented under political pressures and public opinion challenges.

In sum, following up the discourse of DS' post-revolution texts, it is observed that they constituted a reproduction of the movement's discourse on social change. It also proved that, despite the apparent changes represented by taking part in talk shows and building upon political discourses, they did not change their argumentation and word meaning. In addition, the religious discourse, or the religious representation of reality, prevailed over the political and legal discourses. Thus, change was confined to the genre, style, a relative increase in the political component depending on the position of the person.

Framing and Self-Identification:

DS' Framing of Political Participation

The CDA results reflected DS' definitions of concepts, the representation of reality and of the self and the other. In addition, DS' narratives of the revolution and the post-revolution period, proved that religion is the centre of DS' framing processes, and that these processes are closely connected to the movement's Manhaj of social change, both

on the level of reproducing its components and on taking actions and decisions to protect its survival. The main tools employed in this regard were the cost-benefit analysis guided by religion, weighing consequences, and employing the reality requirements law (Fiqh Al-Waqi'), in addition to changing the wording, while preserving the word meanings and argumentation.

Therefore, the framing of political participation was based on framing the revolution led by seculars as an existential threat to shari'a and the Islamic identity of Egypt, which at the same time came to represent an opportunity to politically participate without necessarily providing any religious concessions. Thus, the decision of political participation was framed as a change in Fatwa (religious ruling), based on the Changing of Fatwa with the Change of the Eras, Places, Conditions, Intentions, and Habits section in Ibn El Qayyem's book *E'lam Al-Mowaqq'*in⁸⁹ (int. Nasr, 2013). On his February 26th 2011 lecture, sheikh Borhami said that as concerns political participation, DS boycotted politics and abstained from participation, originally as a "Fatwa" issued due to a certain political reality, and for specific reasons. As a continuation of the approach on cost-benefit analysis, guided by shari'aa, Borhami mentioned that in this issue, DS based its calculations on the assessment of expected evils and interests, DS' capacity and the possibility of achieving a true influence, and the cost they had to pay for having such political influence (Borhami, 2011f). In addition, Borhami in his justification of this historical decision based his argument on linking political participation to DS' methodology of change as well as the foundational text. Meanwhile, he maintained the same features of DS' discourse. By so doing, he aimed at assuring DS' followers that

⁸⁹ see (EL JAWZIYYA, I.-E. Q. 2006. Changing of Fatwa with the change of the Eras, Places, Conditions, Intentions, and Habits *In*: EL-SABAYTI, E. E.-D. (ed.) *E'lam El Mowaqqi'n*. Cairo: Dar-El-Hadith.

they are not facing a radical change in the movements' orientations and methods, and are not going to sacrifice their core beliefs.

Accordingly, when Sheikhs pursue the same calculations, under the new conditions, and within a different balance of power, their decision to participate would not be a deviation from DS' original path. This also highlights their practical approach that considers fatwa to be context specific, conditioned by maximizing interests and minimizing evils. This underlines their realist approach, which might have facilitated their framing processes afterwards when they were involved in politics, and might comply with their strategy of survival as political actors.

In line with asserting consistency of DS' methodology of change, Sheikh Borhami, in an interview (Borhami, 2011c), mentioned that DS' apolitical nature was due to its sheikhs' rejection to offer any faith or Manhaj concessions. DS refused to enter politics due to the fact that political participation was just a formality to decorate the regime, despite its corrupt actions of forging elections, in addition to the full domination of the ruling party. Yet, the change brought about by the revolution eliminated such fears, consequently, large numbers of DS' followers participated in the post-revolution constitution referendum. In addition, taking part in politics was not completely new to DS, since according to Borhami, DS was not politically isolated, and their political participation was through expressing their views concerning public opinion issues, such as the Gulf war, and the wars on Iraq and Afghanistan (Borhami, 2011c). However, he did not mention DS' senior sheikhs' contribution in the societal debate on change, and their discursive conflict with the seculars as an example of their pre-revolution political involvement.

Thus, Borhami aimed at maintaining the *consistency, and the continuity* of DS' discourse on change through mentioning the same argumentation of the foundational texts to justify boycotting parliamentary elections before the revolution. In addition, he said that DS already had precedents in political participation, through issuing comments and advice on certain occasions. By so doing, he wanted to assure the followers that the nature of the movement's role did not change, but it was just subject to limited adjustment, to keep up with the developments that occurred in the post-revolution context.

Accordingly, it was necessary to emphasize full commitment to the movement's original levels, direction, and objectives of social change. Thus, Borhami stressed that political participation does not mean that DS is replacing its bottom-up method to social change with a parliamentary approach. On the contrary, running for parliament and seeking existence in governmental institutions is, in itself, a means, not an end. Thus, such representation in parliament and presence in institutions avail one of the tools that facilitate da'awa. Therefore, failure to achieve political success does not mean the end of DS, since elections and entering politics would not replace DS' original methodology, and vision for social change. Accordingly, DS' members should never offer any religious concessions to attract the public and gain votes. They are, in fact, required to adhere to the morals and values of the movement, even if they would lose (Borhami, 2011d). This was obvious on the occasion of MB's domination of the first round of the parliamentary elections in December 2011. At their first exposure to politics, Borhami had to deal with the frustration DS' followers suffered due to the results of their first experience in elections. In this regard, he laid emphasis on the *continuation and the consistency* of DS' methodology for change, where he clarified

that *political participation is merely a tool of change*, but *would never replace the core of their methodology of change, which is da'awa*. Thus, he stressed the methodological differences between DS and MB, stressing that any sacrifice of DS' principles would render its social reform efforts as devoid of meaning, particularly considering the parliament a means, not an end. He told his followers that by adhering to the movement's values, they have the "upper hand" like Moses and those who followed him, compared to those "who won over" in this round, like "Qaron and the Pharoah" who apparently seemed victorious, but were destroyed as a result of disobeying God. Accordingly, he wanted to assure DS' followers that political failure does not mean the collapse of the movement, since *da'awa and call for God will continue*, and the "real victory is the presence of "Manhaj Al-Haq" (the path of truth) in the society, and the existence of committed Muslims, rather than securing seats in parliament and presence in government institutions" (Borhami, 2011d).

Al-Moqaddem, in his comment on the first round of the parliamentary elections, supported Borhami's argument as concerns *the priority of da'awa over political participation*, where he considered *da'awa as resembling a river, while politics are no more than a stream*. He assured that despite of Al-Shahhat's loss in the parliamentary elections, he would be able to continue his da'awa activity. Nevertheless, he warned against divisions among Muslims, saying sowing discord among Islamists, under current developments, would cause much delight for their anti-Islamist rivals. Accordingly, he focused his lecture on clarifying the issue of "*loyalty and enmity*". In this context, while avoiding criticism to any group, he defined the criteria of loyalty and support to any of the actors involved in the political process. He stated that loyalty is faith-based, rather than political party- or alliance-based. He urged DS' followers to

support whoever follows the teachings of Prophet Mohammed, and to denounce whoever and whatever that goes against it (Al-Moqaddem, 2011a).

In addition to prioritizing da'awa as a means of change, DS' interest in the individual, as the first level of social change, is clear, and demonstrates adherence to the original order of social change levels, even after they became political actors. This is observed in Borhami's emphasis on the importance of investing in individuals to avoid having weak personalities that could be easily manipulated and misguided through media and education. In this regard, he holds media and education responsible for frightening people of Islamists. For him, in absence of a sound religious background, media and education make people believe that Islamists would cut people's tongues and legs (Borhami, 2011d). In addition, Al-Shahhat, in his reform lectures after two years of practicing in politics, was committed to the original levels of social change, even if they would be carried out simultaneously, rather than consecutively as could be understood from the foundational texts (Al-Shahhat, 2013f).

Such commitment to social change signifies that DS gave priority to the religious and the social over the political components, at least on the discursive level. However, this leads to the question of to what extent they successfully acted according to this order of priorities in reality, particularly in the light of their involvement in state institutions.

The Formulation of the Relationship between Social and State Levels in DS' Manhaj:

Al-Shahhat (2013f) managed to introduce a formulation of the relationship between the level of social reform and the level of state reform, where the latter was in DS' discourse absolutely fatalistic and left to God, especially when the foundational texts

indicate that they would not aim at establishing an Islamic state. While recognizing the difficulty of reaching the idealistic state founded after Islamic standards and values, Al-Shahhat said that one of the targets of reform is that the state must be a true reflection of its society. For instance, if 60% to 70% of the women are veiled then their rights should be respected, and legislations should protect them (Al-Shahhat, 2013f). He added: “Therefore, we could participate in state institutions in order to bridge the gap between the belief and the values of both the society and the state, just to make the state as a reflection of the society, as it is. However, imagining that dominating the state can help in bringing about further reform and to change society is nothing but an illusion.” For, according to Al-Shahhat, those who believe in top-down reform think that participation could bring about reform, however, DS do not see a necessary link between “reform” and “participation”, since social reform is the ultimate target, and politics is just one of the tools that might be of help. In this context, he repeated the same religious judgment about political participation that was first presented in the foundational article (Al-Shahhat, 2013f). Within this framing of political participation, he laid emphasis on the cost-benefit analysis approach, the rejection of any religious concessions, together with the aspiration to maximize the movement’s benefits from the post-revolution political situation.

In sum, from DS’ point of view, the relationship between reform and political participation is that participation is the sole means of transferring social reforms to government bodies, which was not welcome before January 2011 Revolution. Therefore, adopting this approach, they were keen on stressing their rejection of top-down change, and to make it clear that maximizing DS’ social reform achievements through transferring them to the state (a bottom up reform) is the motive behind their

involvement in politics. In addition, they attributed their participation in politics, after the revolution, as motivated by the apparent tendencies of some political powers to marginalize shari'a, even more than it was under Mubarak's regime (Al-Shahhat, 2013h). Thus, for DS' sheikhs, such a decision was fruitful since a positive role in politics allowed the movement to carry out its main mission of defending shari'a. In addition, they were able to express their vision that rejects western democracy, meanwhile, they were able to defend Article 2 of the Constitution and to introduce articles 4, 81, and 219, and to maintain both article 2 and 11 in 2012 Constitution⁹⁰ (Al-Shahhat, 2013h). Moreover, it gave them an opportunity to interact with various sectors of the society, thus widened their scope of da'awa (Ramadan, 2012, Ramzi, 2013).

Therefore, besides stressing that DS' participation conforms to its Manhaj of change, and to its previous actions and practices, they highlighted the religious motive behind participation, through expressing concern over the seculars' intentions. In this regard, Borhami discussed the secular calls for the annulment - or at least the amendment - of article 2 of the Constitution, and named the opponents of this article. Therefore, he said that when the constitution draft came out with article 2 "untouched", DS' sheikhs and

⁹⁰ "Article 2: Islam is the state's religion, and Arabic is its official language. The principles of Islamic law (sharia) form the main source of legislation.

Article 4: The noble Azhar is an independent Islamic institution of higher learning. It handles all its affairs without outside interference. It leads the call into Islam and assumes responsibility for religious studies and the Arabic language in Egypt and the world. The Azhar's Body of Senior Scholars is to be consulted in matters pertaining to Islamic law (shari'a).

The state guarantees the financial means needed to fulfil these tasks.

The Sheikh of Al-Azhar is independent and cannot be dismissed from his position. The law determines the process by which he is selected from among the members of the Body of Senior Scholars.

All this will proceed as stipulated by law.

Article 11: The state promotes morality, decency, and public order, as well as a high level of education and religious and patriotic values, scientific truths, the Arab culture, and the historical and civilizational patrimony of the People.

All this as specified by law.

Article 81: The rights and freedoms that attach to the citizen must not be impaired. No law regulating the practice of these rights and freedoms may narrow their intent and essence.

The rights and freedoms are to be practiced in such a way that they do not conflict with the provisions of Part One of this Constitution, which covers the elements of state and society.

Article 219: The principles of Islamic law (sharia) include general evidence, the foundational principles of Islamic jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh), the reliable sources from among the Sunni schools of thought (madhahib)."

followers decided to vote yes in the referendum (Borhami, 2011c). Moreover, he said that the issue of the rule of God was suppressed for years and they were not allowed to express it, but after the revolution, it is no longer banned, and they have the opportunity to defend it in absence of the restrictions that characterized Mubarak's regime (Borhami, 2011c). Borhami added that his earlier criticism and reservation on Islamists' political participation, were general, and were confined to Islamists' participation in secular regimes, such as in Turkey and Tunisia, as well as Egypt before 1996. However, in the Egyptian case shari'a became the main source of legislation by virtue of a constitutional court ruling in 1996 (Borhami, 2011c). Thus, Borhami clarified that he was not against participation in principle, on the contrary, he approves of political participation as long as shari'aa is the ceiling. Projecting the religious motive, discussing the rule of God issue, and considering shari'a as DS' condition for political participation, all constituted another justification for the argument that there is no contradiction with the foundational text.

In an attempt to include and frame the concepts associated with political participation, DS' leaders provided definitions and links that made democracy and state connected to DS' Manhaj. This was done through *re-wording, while preserving the same word meaning and argumentation as in the pre-revolution texts*.

Democracy and Shari'a in DS' Post-Revolution Discourse

In an attempt to find a common ground between shari'a and democracy, Borhami mentioned that in the past, Islamists' loyalty to democracy, liberalism, and all what contradicts Shari'a, was tested, whereas democracy has taken many of its principles

from Islam (Borhami, 2011c). In this regard, Borhami called in the ‘comprehensiveness of Islam,’⁹¹ making democracy one, even partial, derivative of Islam rather than tracing the common ground between both. However, the difference between Islam and Democracy is that the latter gave the right of legislation to the people with no regard to shari’aa, which is considered ‘polytheism’. Such a definition of democracy also conforms to Borhami’s pre-revolution definitions and reservations on democracy in the foundational text, particularly linking it to polytheism. Preserving this firm position on the concept, Borhami clarified that DS’ political participation in a democratic system is only possible if democracy is limited by shari’a (Borhami, 2011c). After two years of political participation, Al-Shahhat (2013h) also introduced an adaptation to the concept of democracy, through saying that some of its mechanisms exist in Islam. Unlike Borhami, he refuses slogans of “our goods are back.” Thus, for Al-Shahhat, democracy is irrelevant to an Islamic context. For despite the fact that it prevailed in contemporary states as a governance system that all nations pursue, being the dominant system does not make democracy the only possible option for good governance. For him, Shura remains an alternative to democracy, and is not one of its versions or adaptations, but is rather a distinct one. Meanwhile, the way democracy is applied in the Muslim world deprives the nations of any benefits of democracy, bearing in mind that some Islamists do not even see any positive sides to democracy (Al-Shahhat, 2013h). This conforms to his pre-revolution text (Al-Shahhat, 2010).

⁹¹ As one of the main features of the movement’s discourse and Manhaj.

Deconstruction of Democracy:

At this point, to face the reality of the domination of democracy, Al-Shahhat dealt with the question of the religious legitimacy of “applying *partial reform* to the state using modern constitutional systems, and the possibility of *deconstructing the concept of democracy*,” and accepting some of its components. However, he asked whether Islamists would approve of “the deconstruction of democracy” as a way out to deal with their political reality (Al-Shahhat, 2013h). In this regard, he mentioned that there are two Islamist approaches towards democracy, one that absolutely rejects it, and another that treats it as a *complex concept*, which could be deconstructed, thus, could be partially accepted through approving some of its mechanisms. However, those who strictly reject a partial acceptance of democracy, base their argument on fears of religious confusion and fitna, particularly if media misrepresented this as an absolute approval of all aspects of democracy, on the part of the Islamists. Accordingly, such misrepresentation might put pressure on Islamists who have to provide religious concessions and reform compromises in this case (Al-Shahhat, 2013h).

Nevertheless, while recognizing that democracy includes “infidelity components,” Al-Shahhat sees that democracy is a complex concept, and one should be selective about its components, depending on the *benefits versus evils* calculations. He argues that it does not matter if Muslims refer to “people of the book” in some issues. In addition, Ibn Taymiyya redefined and clarified some Sufi concepts since not all of them defy shari’a and faith. Thus, Al-Shahhat believes that *the problem with democracy is conceptual and lies in the misuse of some concepts and the intention of the user*. Moreover, Ibn U’taymin and Ibn Baz, while aware of the existence of constitutions and the uses of the concept of democracy, accepted political practices on condition that they promote

virtue and prevent corruption and immorality. He concludes from such evidences that those who participate in politics should be fully aware of the definitions of the concepts and their real connotations, and to be selective in a way that serves the religious purposes (Al-Shahhat, 2013h). Thus, he says that DS allowed participation after the revolution, while being keen on denying vice, and without praising democracy in its abstract meaning, particularly its philosophy of the “sovereignty lies in the nation”. Even for the mechanisms of democracy, DS’ sheikhs believe that there is no religious consensus about the fact that such mechanisms conform to shari’a, and DS never claimed that they are. However, participation with such democratic mechanisms is based on the benefits versus evils calculations, since they are the lesser of two evils. Al-Shahhat explained that accepting democratic mechanisms is like accepting excess salt in the food, which is inconvenient, but is still a better option than poison for example. This is why DS accepted parliamentary elections as a mechanism, instead of selecting the group of Ahl Al-Hal Wl-A’qd, which for him represented excess salt, but refused the democratic philosophy that is for him like poison (Al-Shahhat, 2013h).

Such flexibility and willingness to be selective about democracy, conforms to Al-Shahhat’s pre-revolution stand on democracy and participation⁹² (Al-Shahhat, 2010),

⁹² Despite of the emphasis on rejecting democracy, he showed flexibility in dealing with the concept in his pre-Revolution lecture about democracy, through linking the acceptance of democracy to a number of conditions. In this regard, Al-Shahhat stated that accepting, or prohibiting democracy could be conditioned by violations expected or associated with it. Among such violations is the formation of alliances with secular parties, and the acceptance or the silence on their falsehood. What is worse for him is the recognition of issues that defies Shari’aa, such as allowing the guardianship of the infidel, or of women, or the acceptance of the freedom of expression and opinion, without any restrictions. Thus, if there are any of such violations, democracy should be prohibited, however, such prohibition is not absolute in all times and places, for he stated a number of conditions under which Islamists can participate in a democratic system. For instance, if the electoral system is a single member district system, or if the country allows the formation of an Islamic political party, where participants are not pressured to support issues that defy Shari’a. If such conditions existed then participation would be subject to evils versus benefits calculations. Therefore, in the pre-Revolution period, Al-Shahhat said that DS’ evaluation of the situation is that the expected corruption and evils overruns the possible benefits of participation in a democratic system, thus, they would probably tend to prohibit democracy. However, there are occasions when those who participate in a democratic system commit clear sins and violations that require condemnation as in the case of breaching the religious foundations, and sometimes there are cases when an action could be subject to discussion to decide if it is really a fatal violation (Al-Shahhat, 2010). Thus, their strict position on democracy was not absolute as it availed some space for context based flexibility and

where Islamists could never adopt democracy in principle, and all Islamists should abide by this attitude. Thus, DS' pre-revolution general position on democracy; gives the impression that they contradict DS' current position. In addition, in the pre-revolution texts, there is an intersection between their perception of democracy, political participation, and religious concessions, since they have been dealing with them as counterparts. Nevertheless, the comparison of the post and pre-Revolution texts, as concerns democracy, reflected a consistent approach towards the concept, and this was clear in the continuity of the core argumentation, and the word meaning. However, there was a slight difference in the wording used, which implied that the inevitable connection between democracy, political participation and religious concessions, was adjourned in their post-revolution texts, particularly, through the introduction of the concept of "deconstruction of democracy". Such a concept, despite conforming to their core argumentations, helped in providing an elaborate articulation of them through dividing the concept of democracy into "mechanisms", which could be, temporarily, and conditionally adopted, and a "philosophy" that they have been always open about its rejection, being an act of polytheism.

In sum, DS' leaders maintained their core argumentation, yet, with a new formulation through breaking down the concept of democracy. Thus, they are dealing with the decision of participation as an act that would be practiced within a democratic structure. Yet, reservations over such a structure were muted since, after the revolution, the features of the political context started to conform to their initial conditions for a legitimate, or at least an acceptable, political participation.

The Religious and the Civic State in DS' Post-Revolution Discourse:

understanding, depending on specific conditions. Such roots of the concept in DS' thought might have paved the way for their involvement in politics after the Revolution, and that was clear in DS' post-Revolution discourse.

As for the definition of the state and its nature, Al-Shahhat (2010) mentioned that the Muslim state is faith based. However, he rejects the religious state in its western definition, that is connected to the transgressions of the Catholic Church historically, which makes it irrelevant to Islamic culture. The state in Islam, for him, is neither an autocracy nor a theocracy, but one where the whole nation and the ruler are subject to shari'a and no one can speak in the name of God. After the revolution, the refusal of using the term "civic state" in the Constitution was obvious in DS' comment on Al-Azhar document that supported such approach. In this concern, DS' statement mentioned that the word civic is the Arabic translation of the English concept of "secular" or "non-religious," and DS strictly rejected that the Constitution includes the word civic, for it contradicts Islamic shari'a reference⁹³ (AnaAlsalaft, 2011g)⁹⁴. Moreover, in TV interviews during MB rule, Borhami stressed that DS does not aim at a religious state in the European or western sense, and that secularism is irrelevant to Islam (Al-Laithy, 2012). This is because da'awa, which can be launched everywhere using lenient and kind words, is the only means of change that DS recognizes and they hold the state responsible for it. In fact, all socialization means should serve this da'awa purpose. In addition, he clarified in few words what he means by the application of shari'a, that is, determining the permissible and the forbidden, assuring that such application takes into account the cost-benefit analysis, the capabilities and weaknesses, and is context base, thus, it pays attention to people's conditions (Ramadan, 2012).

⁹³ Al-Shahhat was DS' representative in this discussion.

⁹⁴ In a debate with the liberal figure Amr Hamzawy, Al-Shahhat adhered to the same definition of democracy and to his position and arguments on secularism. He further insisted on a constitution that gives Shari'a as the upper hand in legislation, since that under Islam freedom is restricted by Shari'a, while under liberalism liberty is restricted by public interest. He also mentioned that he is open to all ideas, and methods, if they guarantee that legislation is for God (AL SHAHHAT, A. M., HAMZAWY, AMR Jul 9, 2011. في إطار مقاييس الشريعة بعد الإفراج للصحاحات و عمرو حمزاوى).

Thus, in line with DS' gradual reform approach, despite its continued rejection to what the sheikhs call the "philosophy of democracy," and all its relevant concepts, they expressed clear commitment to the democratic mechanisms, although they consider such mechanisms as non-Islamic. Also, against the history of DS-state relationship, DS sheikhs were keen on *institutionalism and constitutional procedures*; thus, were against any radical steps against MB, but were pro changing the regime through the constitution and elections (Al-Laithy, 2012 , Ramzi, 2013).

In addition to employing the same *argumentation* and *word meaning*, *prioritizing the religious* concerns and mission, and the *commitment to the movement's social change Manhaj*, the post-revolution texts shared other aspects with the pre-revolution ones, for instance, the aspects of victimization, considering media an enemy, as well as the conspiracy and plots against Islam and the religious people. Such insistence on their original position on democracy, social change, and the priority of the religious and the normative components over the political, which consequently led to issuing controversial statements, all raise questions about the nature of the relationship between DS, and NP, and the rest of political powers and social groups in their new political context after the revolution.

The "We" and the "Other":

Being open about anti-Western democracy, the conspiracy of the West, Christians, Jews, and the liberals against Islam, and the priority of keeping Islamic identity, Borhami said that members of DS, who are not directly involved in da'awa, can contribute through political participation on condition that they do not become members in secular or liberal political parties (Borhami, 2011c). In his reform lectures, Al-

Shahhat's criticism to the secular powers was analyzed on basis of making secularism as devoid of meaning, and denying its feasibility in an Islamic context (Al-Shahhat, 2013d, Al-Shahhat, 2013h, Al-Shahhat, 2013f). Al-Shahhat also criticized leftists indirectly, for instance, when he rejected their slogans of "the revolution continues"⁹⁵ (Abdelrahman, 2013), saying that "the possible violent confrontations that might result from such an approach could be accepted by believers in class conflict (meaning leftists), but never from owners of a da'awa methodology whose project is mainly educational, focused on individual reform and solidarity of the society" (Al-Shahhat, 2013c). He criticized those who consider themselves revolutionary, and who put much weight on protest, strikes, and seem to be proud of getting detained, without being clear about the demands, agenda, or long-term objectives. In this regard, he said: "it is not about protest, strikes or detentions, it is rather about what is meant by them." Moreover, he admitted that there was an accumulation of reform efforts, and limited protests against Gamal Mubarak's intended power inheritance, and even if such accumulative reform work turned into a revolution, it can never continue forever (Al-Shahhat, 2013c).

The fact that Al-Shahhat was criticizing the dominant revolutionary discourse and the activists' slogan, was largely swimming against the tide, and implies an adherence to their counter-discourse, that rejects all types of radical change, irrespective of the political and the social contexts. It also indicates that the relationship between DS and seculars did not change after political interactions, especially when DS' post-revolution discursive field remained almost the same as the pre-revolution one, with more or less

⁹⁵ Such slogan was raised by leftist revolutionaries who were desperate due to the dominance of the organized and established entities (the military, MB, and the remnant of Mubarak's regime) who hijacked the political scene after the revolution, leaving the revolutionaries out since they were under-organized movements with no leadership or clear structure (Abdlerahman, 2013).

the same actors and meaning contestation, despite the structural changes in the Egyptian context.

In addition, according to the post-revolution reform texts analyzed, unlike the pre-revolution ones, Al-Shahhat declined to mention controversial issues as concerns women and social groups, for instance, Christians' and the women's guardianship. However, with female candidacy in the 2011 parliamentary election, DS' leaders insisted that it is not accepted with regard to shari'a, and their justification to this DS' women participation step was centered on cost-benefit analysis and context based choices⁹⁶ (Abu El-Enin, 2011 , Borhami, 2011a). Nevertheless, Borhami was all the way clear about the rejection of non-Muslim guardianship, and said that DS would not change its position on the right to guardianship in order to please the public or to politically market themselves (Borhami, 2011d). Borhami also mentioned several times that Muslims should not greet Christians in their feasts (Borhami, 2013b), and DS' sheikhs supported this opinion.⁹⁷ The fact that NP's electoral lists included Christian candidates running for parliamentary elections in 2015, and that they have already allowed women candidates in 2011, made questionable NP's and DS' framing processes, and the relationship between the party and the movement.

As for Sufis, Borhami recognized the belief differences which Salafis have with the various Sufi trends, yet, he stressed that such differences would not escalate to the use

⁹⁶ As will be discussed in detail in chapter 6.

⁹⁷ As concerns Christians, Al-Shahhat said that Muslims are not supposed to attend Christian ceremonial prayers or to greet Christians in their feasts, since they have no evidence on this from the Prophet's biography on this issue. He argues that, out of their own beliefs and sectarian divisions, the followers of Protestant or Catholic churches will not attend the prayers at the Orthodox Church, so why would a Muslim attend to a Christian church? Christians are partners in homeland and their feast would survive even if we do not greet them, and, from his point of view, this constitutes no harm to them. Borhami also supported this argument (AL-DEMERDASH, M. 2012. Interview between Sheikh Abdel Mone'm el Shehat and Mo'itaz ad-Demerdash, BORHAMI, Y. 2013b. Opinion by Sheikh Yasser Borhami on according greetings to Christians on their feasts. Referring to Field Notes, in reaction to such fatwa, average men on the street were resistant and said they have never been that divided on belief basis. Furthermore, they assure that they would not think twice before greeting Christians (Field Notes August 2013).

of violence, and all deputy attorney (magistrate) investigations proved the innocence of Salafis in cases of dismantling Sufi shrines after the Revolution (Borhami, 2011c). Borhami also clearly stated that there could be a Sufi with correct faith (Al-Laithy, 2012). A mild take on Sufis was also clear in Al-Shahhat's example about Ibn Taymyya's redefinition and clarification of some Sufi concepts that do not necessarily defy shari'a and belief, if defined in the right way (Al-Shahhat, 2013h). However, as concerns Shiites, extreme rivalry with that Islamic sect expressed itself in DS' historical position against the Iranian Revolution and the Shiites⁹⁸, and such antagonism continued after January 2011 revolution. In this regard, Borhami said that Shiites have clear faith deviation in the foundations of Islamic belief and the relationship with the companions and family of Prophet Mohamed. Thus, he does not welcome any reconciliation and is not interested in a dialogue with them. Also, Borhami mentioned that the main difference with MB in the 1970s was on the Iranian Revolution, that MB praised, and DS criticized (Ramadan, 2012).

Borhami also highlighted the diversified nature of Salafis, and was keen on distinguishing DS from the rest of Salafis, since they do not necessarily represent the same set of ideas adopted by other Salafi groups. He said that AS⁹⁹ was one stage in Salafis' da'awa, but was later dominated by the Madkhali¹⁰⁰ trend, who considered Mubarak the Emir of the believers (Borhami, 2011c). In this regard, Borhami was keen on defending DS against claims that they share AS' argument against the revolution, that was based on the religious illegitimacy of protesting against and toppling the legal guardian. He mentioned that DS' members were subject to suppression and prison

⁹⁸ See Chapter 3.

⁹⁹ See Chapter 2.

¹⁰⁰ See Chapter 2.

because they refused to support that argument. On the contrary, they were rather fighting for the issues of God's governance, and loyalty and enmity. Such issues constituted the political position of DS and were unwelcome by Mubarak's regime (Al-Laithy, 2012). He even mentioned that DS was closer to non-Islamists than to Madkhalis on the issue of denouncing oppression, and in rejecting calling oppressors the emirs of the believers (Al-Laithy, 2012). He also added that Madkhalis had access to media and that their views were widespread, giving the wrong impression about Salafis (Al-Laithy, 2012).

As concerns MB, Borhami said that DS does care to avoid conflict with MB, and that each works on his own to reach to its Islamic form of society (Borhami, 2011c). Al-Shahhat also emphasized the distinct nature of DS and NP, through speaking about the diversity within the Salafi trend, and through saying "we are not MB" (Al-Warwary, 2012). Such an approach to fellow Islamists emphasizes the historical pattern of DS-Islamists' relationship, and DS' keenness to express their distinct position within Islamist activism¹⁰¹.

As concerns the relationship with the state and society, Borhami said that, after the revolution, there was a breakthrough in the relationship with the state and the Ministry of Endowments. He also described Al-Azhar as the guardian of Islam, and that they hoped that Al-Azhar continues tackling his mission, in spite of some intellectual differences with its sheikhs (Borhami, 2011c). It is to be said also that Salafis, and particularly DS, were understudied and were not known to non-specialists. Even in media, there was a difficulty in accepting the concept "Salafi," as compared to Sunni or Muslim, since it was perceived as an unnecessary fractionalization of Muslims

¹⁰¹ See chapters 2 and 3.

(Ramadan, 2012). This is especially true given that the connotation of Salafi and the nature of Salafi groups was ambiguous and loaded with various impressions, mostly linked to “extremism,” “radicalism,” “non-Egyptian Wahhabism,” and “rigidity” versus the “Egyptian moderate” and “popular Islam” connected to a mix of “Sufi mystical,” “spontaneous,” “simple” and “rationalist” practices, that is basically related to Al-Azhar, the official and the main religious authority in Egypt (Al-Malyka, 2012, Field notes, 2013-2014) .¹⁰² Among the factors that augmented this position came Al-Shahhat’s culturally shocking comments that added to DS’ cultural exclusion (Al-Qarmoty, 2011, Al-Warwary, 2012, Al-Demerdash, 2012)¹⁰³.

In view of this DS’ relationship to the various actors within their new political context, a process of self-identification and conceptual clarifications was required at this transitional stage. First, the sheikhs had to keep the integrity and the identity of the movement within such political momentum. Second, they had to introduce themselves and their approach to the society and the actors that they interact with. After June 30th Revolution, which brought an end to MB rule, Al-Shahhat wrote a series of seven articles about reform, starting in September 2013. Marking two years of DS’ involvement in politics, such a series represented an emphasis on the movement’s

¹⁰² See also chapters 3 and 4 on this.

¹⁰³ He criticised the writings of the Nobel Prize-winner, Naguib Mahfouz, saying that his novels are full of violations to religion, and that he propagates “prostitution and drugs”. When faced with people’s reservations, he insisted on his view and argued that no one would dare to read Naguib’s novels on air. Naguib was not the only national and cultural figure that Al-Shahhat criticized, as he also criticized Om Kolthoum, and other prominent artists. He also mentioned that music is banned by religion, except for chanting accompanied by tambourine. Al-Shahhat was also accused of propagating the idea of effacing ancient Egyptian statues, and his comment on this accusation was that, despite the religious evidence in this regard, he would not call for destroying such monuments if they bring about benefits and are a source of income to the country. However, he would suggest covering the faces of such statues with a “wax mask”, and that would be a practical way out. Nevertheless, he denied that he was defaming the ancient Egyptian civilization; however, there is a difference between being proud of ancestors’ achievements and civilization, and of boasting about their infidelity. Thus, he is selective as concerns the Egyptian history (Al-Demerdash, 2012, Al-Warwary, 2012). In addition, Al-Shahhat, refused to be interviewed by any unveiled female TV anchors, and when he was invited to present his platform during the elections, in Alexandria local channel, he asked the anchor to wear a veil. Such situation exposed him to wide criticism, in addition to rumours that he refused to appear with a Coptic figure, which the anchor denied (Qarmoty, 2011).

reform methodology. Meanwhile, it constituted a self-identification process through defining the “We” in opposition, and in comparison, to the “Other.”

In this process, unlike other Islamists, DS identified itself as the group that accepts gradual change, while recognizing the faults and shortcomings of the existing system, and rejecting any religious concessions (Al-Shahhat, 2013d). This description of DS’ position was in view of its participation in politics, within a democratic structure, while openly rejecting democracy for being non-Islamic. Accordingly, they had to comply with election laws and regulations, while stating that such laws and regulations are not Islamic. Meanwhile, they were keen on reproducing DS’ Manhaj (as in the foundational text), with a focus on the bottom-up approach and the consequent non-Takfiri, non-violent nature of its members, besides emphasizing DS willingness to cooperate with other powers. This was meant to compare themselves to or to distance themselves from MB’s exclusionary behavior and the tendency to Takfir that dominated Islamist media under MB’s rule (Borhami, 2013c, Abdulla, 2014, Ramzi, 2013). DS’ sheikhs also stressed the catastrophic consequences of a sudden application of shari’aa, emphasizing instead the gradual nature of their approach, and the *rationality and realism* of their members (Al-Demerdash, 2012). In addition, they would not impose their own religious concepts, but rather the interpretations issued by the Al-Azhar-based Islamic Research Complex, as a neutral and trusted religious authority (Al-Demerdash, 2012).

Thus, despite entrenching this image of having a tolerant nature and openness to other political powers, and of being a distinct Islamist model, there was an obvious social resentment to DS’ discourse, and the relationship between the religious and the political in such discourse was questionable. In fact, the DS-NP separation that DS’ members always emphasized was not convincing. Thus, there were questions on the relationship

between the party and the movement, and between DS' vision for social change and NP' policy choices, particularly with the party's controversial decisions during and after June 2013 revolution, as will be discussed in the following chapter.

Conclusion

The main argument in this chapter is that DS' framing processes constituted an extension of DS' ideology or Manhaj for social change. Such framing processes center around religious argumentations, and mostly take the form of a religious ruling, based on evidence from Quran and Sunna, with the interpretation of Salafi scholars. Thus, framing came to follow DS' Manhaj, aiming at its preservation along with the protection of shari'a and Egyptian Islamic identity. The main tools of framing were cost-benefit analysis guided by religious rulings, evaluating reality requirements (Feqh Al-Waqi'), and the re-wording of the movement's definitions which preserved the core argumentations, and word meanings, while using different wording such as the introduction of the concept 'deconstruction of democracy', and the formulation of the relationship between the social and state levels of change in DS' Manhaj.

In this respect, DS' framing processes were traced through a survey of its texts on social and political change pre-January 2011, and applying CDA to DS' texts during the January 2011 revolution, and texts on reform and means of social change in the post-2011 revolution. Such framing processes were contextualized in DS' discursive field that was shaped through contestation on political and social change meanings, and the relevant concepts and means among the various actors in the 2000s, the decade that witnessed the rise of protests and social mobilization in Egypt, and paved the way for the revolution.

Thus, this chapter explored DS' framing of protests as a means of social change, the framing of the Christian-Muslim discursive conflict and the protest for "liberating Christian converts" and the framing of Bilal's torture in 2011, which was connected to DS' position on Alexandria Church bombings, and the state and media reactions to it. Such framing processes within the Egyptian context at this period showed DS' self-identification and relationship with the Other. The givens of the framing processes analysis reflected a *consistency and continuity* in DS' relationship with the other, self-identification, and discourse. This could be understood in the light of the fact that the main features of DS' discursive field persisted through the revolution and post-revolution periods, with the same actors and meaning contestations largely intact.

The focus was on DS' framing of the revolution as constituting an existential threat to shari'a, while in the meantime an opportunity to politically participate. Thus, DS' framing of the adoption of collective action in the early 1980s and its decision to participate in politics were both framed as attempts to protect da'awa, Manhaj and shari'aa against an existential threat. In view of cost-benefit analysis and context based evaluation, political participation was introduced as one of DS tools to preserve da'awa and Manhaj under the new conditions. Yet, it does not replace its Manhaj of Social change that is based on education and propagation and stays bottom-up. In this regard, DS' members were assured that DS' Manhaj will never be sacrificed, a message that can be said to come at the core of DS' framing of political participation. Thus, DS' original Manhaj was reproduced in all the movement's post-revolution texts analyzed, however, with an adaptation to explain the parallel rather than the consecutive order of the levels of social change, which again was an elaborate articulation to the necessity of carrying out da'awa at all levels of the society. There was also the re-wording of the

definition of democracy and the nature of the state, as the structures in which DS will participate. Moreover, adopting democratic mechanisms, with a background of a gradual change ideology, DS aligned itself more with the constitutional procedures of regime change rather than protest or revolution. Accordingly, they refused all the arrangements of June 2013 revolution and did not participate in the protest.

As part of the post-revolution framing processes, DS' leaders' self-identification was that they are the group that adopts gradual long-term social change and, while participating in the current structure, denounce vice and religious transgressions. They also highlight the flexible and rationalist, limited by shari'a, nature of DS' members. Moreover, they stress that they are anti-violent, anti-Takfiri, anti-exclusionary and are open to all political and social groups. This openness and tolerance emphasized by DS' leaders was also associated with an emphasis on the distinct nature of DS among other Islamists, where they are highly critical of MB, their historical rival. This also explains why their alliance with MB did not last for long. While being open, they would not enter into alliances with seculars, whom they preserved their hostile discourse on and, while interacting, they kept a distance. In addition, while allowing women to participate in politics, they stressed that it is banned by religion. Moreover, they kept the same discourse about Christians, Shi'ites, and a rather mild discourse about Sufis. Finally, DS' discourse was received with caution, and sometimes resentment, from the media and society. Such givens raise questions about the relationship between DS and NP and the influence of DS' Manhaj on NP's policy choices, relationship with the various actors, and framing processes. The CDA framework adopted in this dissertation helped in revealing the textual features of DS' texts in the various stages: this was particularly as concerns wording, word meaning and argumentation, in addition to tracing its ethos

and relationship with the other in comparison to the results of chapter four. It also showed the change in the discursive combinations of DS within a changing Egyptian context, where the structure of the Egyptian system was transformed, yet while preserving the same discursive field so DS seemed to be sticking to its discourse on social change, its self-identification as a religious actor, and its relationship with the other or the various social and political groups within the Egyptian context. This conclusion was not to be reached without applying CDA to DS' texts on social change over its history. In the following chapter, such conclusions will be tested through CDA of the content of the interviews carried out in the field with DS/NP's members on the various levels (elite, middle level, and rank and file), and age and gender categories. This will investigate to what extent the characteristics of DS' discourse survived when it entered politics, and how the various members relate to such discourse and reacted to the movement's framing processes for political mobilization within the sweeping changes in the Egyptian context particularly from 2011 to 2013. Testing the results of CDA through applying a comparison of DS' texts throughout its history until its entry to politics along the CDA textual, discursive and societal levels allows not only for an understanding of the main question of this thesis on what is DS' vision for social change, but also answers the sub-question of whether DS' discourse was transformed or reproduced during a period of change for both Egypt and the movement. Such discussion brings about three issues, first, the intellectual and structural relationship between DS and NP. Second, the nature of NP's role, and finally how NP's few policy choices, since its establishment in 2011-2013, could be understood in light of the ideology of the overarching social movement.

CHAPTER 6: DS' VISION FOR CHANGE AS A POLITICAL ACTOR

Introduction:

The CDA of post-revolution texts on social change produced by DS' prominent sheikhs, namely Borhami and Al-Shahhat, in addition to media contributions by DS' members, proved to be consistent with the pre-revolution texts. Thus, they constitute a reproduction of DS' foundational texts on the Manhaj of social change. Moreover, they shared the same features of DS' discourse throughout its history, with seeming changes, while maintaining a religious representation of reality, as demonstrated in the domination of the religious discourse over the political and legal discourses, which they have increasingly drawn on after the revolution. This indicates that DS' framing processes are an extension of its ideology, and that the influence of political interaction and media access has been upon the form, rather than the core content, of the movement's discourse. Such a persistent religious inclination raises questions about the nature of NP, the political front of DS, particularly in the light of the party's, and DS', figures' contestable position within Egyptian society, and among other political powers after June 2013 revolution.

As mentioned in chapter 5, the analysis of DS' discourse concerning social change has shed light on DS' vision for gradual reform, and the positive indications of its non-Takfiri, non-violent and bottom-up nature. However, the relationship between NP's conduct in various situations and such a religious vision, became questioned in the literature, in the media, by various political powers, and even lay citizens, particularly as concerns NP attitudes during June 2013 revolution. On the one hand, Islamists criticized the party as having a pragmatic tendency, letting down its fellow Islamists and

abandoning shari'a: the claim was that it became partner to the new regime that killed Islamists in the Raba'a sit-in (Al-Affani, 2013, Brown, 2013). On the other hand, non-Islamists considered the NP as a fifth column trying to support MB through hindering the road map (notes, 2013-2014, Talibbya, 2013). This adds to the current impressions about NP, as one that does not respect citizenship, due to DS' previously discussed views about the political rights of Christians and women. Moreover, there is the widespread perception of Salafism as a strict understanding of Islam, which departs from the moderate, or rather mild interpretations of Al-Azhar, in addition to DS' open rejection of the elements and figures of Egyptian popular culture. All of the above has augmented the ambiguity of DS' vision and NP's political choices. However, such social resentment is quite puzzling in view of DS' historically non-violent, non-Takfiri, and gradual social change vision.

This chapter attempts to explore the vision of DS as a political actor through a deeper look at the discourse of NP's members, to understand the relationship between the overarching ideology of the religious movement (Manhaj for social change) and the vision of NP members and their policy choices. This will be done through presenting the CDA of the discourse of NP's members at the various levels of the party, according to age and gender, in a number of governorates with varying levels of DS' presence in Egypt, in addition to ethnographic research observations. The objective is to address the question of whether the party conforms to, or departs from, the original vision of the religious movement, and to explore the extent to which political interactions influenced the relationship between DS' discourse and that of the political party. This will draw attention to DS' vision when put into action in a political context, and to any changes to its discourse as a political actor. Such analysis will also help in understanding the

relationship between DS and NP, as one model of a religious social movement that entered politics. In addition, this analysis will contribute to understanding the party's controversial policy choices within the Egyptian context, given their vision for social change and the structural relationship between the party and the movement. Finally, the analysis can also help to solve the puzzle of social resentment towards DS' vision.

Therefore, this chapter will start with a discussion of the relationship between DS' and NP's discourses. The discussion will provide an understanding of the features of the relationship between the political party and the religious movement, helping to clarify the nature of NP. In view of such a vision and the structural relationship between the party and the movement, the social resentment to DS' discourse and NP's presence on the political scene will then be discussed. This will be done through presenting the CDA results of DS' and NP's discourse as concerns three controversial issues in Egyptian society, namely, the status of women, Christians, and art and culture. The chapter argues that DS and NP are intellectually and structurally connected, thus NP is a religious actor within a political context and is a shura model party, rather than a power seeking one. This primarily religious identity led to contradictions and controversial policy choices that were negatively received by the public and fellow political actors, in view of the Egyptian context discussed in previous chapters. Such public resentment and the problematic positioning of DS/NP constitute a challenge to their political future.

Section 1: The Relationship between NP's and DS' Discourses

This section presents the analysis of spoken texts collected through conversational and semi-structured interviews, carried out in four Egyptian governorates (Alexandria, Al-Buhayra, Giza and Al-Fayyom), during the period from July 3rd 2013 to January 8th

2014. Moreover, it discusses ethnographic research observations from NP's meetings, visits to NP's headquarters, and the homes and offices of NP's and DS' members, in the same areas and time-period.

The Intellectual Connection Between NP and DS:

The Vision for Social Change, and Self-Identification

An overview of NP's members' discourse has revealed a number of features. First, a *dominant religious component* through stressing the importance of *shari'aa*,¹⁰⁴ the *Islamic identity* (Talibbya, 2013),¹⁰⁵ and the *religious motive*¹⁰⁶ and *objectives* of their involvement in politics (Women's committee, 2014).¹⁰⁷ When met in the field, one of the young NP leaders stated that DS and NP are against politicizing religion, even calling for criminalizing this act, while they aim at *religionizing politics*, where the general policy of the state should conform to shari'a¹⁰⁸ (Shams, 2013, Talibbya, 2013, Shokry, 2013),¹⁰⁹ (Int. Mekki, 2013),¹¹⁰ (Gawwad, 2013). Second, DS' Manhaj of social change was central in NP's members' discourse, particularly as concerns focus on the *individual level*, the importance of *religious education*, and the *priority of the social*

¹⁰⁴ In all the interviews, shari'a was considered the main condition and reason for political participation.

¹⁰⁵ One of the main topics on the Talibyya young NP's members' meeting agenda was the preparation for Islamic identity campaign in which the leader of the group said that he will send them files on shari'a rules and identity conflict, the article of Al-Moqaddem on Islamic identity, among others, for them to study before they attend a "training camp" with their leaders, in order to them for the campaign, before the constitutional referendum (TALIBBYA 2013. meeting).

¹⁰⁶ One of the female members said "since the 2011 constitutional modifications, we all came out of our homes to participate, even before founding the party, for the sake of God, and even if DS des not mobilize us, we do this with for reward, except from God." Another female member added that they contribute financially to sustain the party's activities, and they do not get any personal rewards or benefits (WOMEN'S COMMITTEE, N. 5-01-2014 2014. *RE: NP Women's committee meeting*).

¹⁰⁷ A young female member said, "we needed a party for DS"

¹⁰⁸ "There should be a framework for organizing the relationship between the governor and the governed, and there should be a superior reference, other than the human one. This should be shari'a." He summarized the same argumentation, and explanation of Al-Shahhat's articles on reform, analyzed in chapter 5 (SHAMS, I. 2013. Interview with Secretary General of NP in Badrasheen center).

¹⁰⁹ During discussions in a young NP' leaders meeting, they showed keenness on the conformity of NP's positions with shari'a, and they were concerned over article 219 of the constitution that interprets the principles of shari'a in article 2, to the extent that some of them insisted on the withdrawal of NP's representative in the Fifty's constitutional committee, if the committee insists on cancelling this article (TALIBBYA 2013. meeting).

¹¹⁰ Amr Mekki, the Chariman's adviser on foreign affairs, said that NP's ideology is Salafi (INT. MEKKI, A. 2013. *RE: int. Mekki*).

over state reform (Talibbya, 2013, Shams, 2013), ¹¹¹ (Women's committee, 2014), ¹¹²(Bakkar, 2013), (int. Thabet, 2013, Shokry, 2013)¹¹³. This was obvious in their preference for a *bottom-up* method of social change, while maintaining factors of *containment and accommodation* of individuals which reflected a *non-Takfiri* ¹¹⁴ *approach to society* (Gawwad, 2013), ¹¹⁵(Int. Mekki, 2013, Women's committee, 2014, Gawwad, 2013, int. Nasr, 2013, Omar, 2013). In view of this approach, they stressed that the purpose of entering politics was reaching out to more social classes and sectors, and accessing national figures. Thus, with political interactions, they were widening their scope of *da'awa*, which conformed to DS' framing of political participation discussed in chapter 5 (Shams, 2013, Women's committee, 2014) ¹¹⁶. They also mentioned that their approach to other political powers was based on *da'awa* rather than conflict or political competition, and it was for the sake of coordination with the rest of the powers (Shokry, 2013, Bakkar, 2013). Thus, *da'awa*, as the sole means of change in DS' Manhaj for social change, was a key concept in NP's members' approach to

¹¹¹ While reorganizing the administrative structure of the party's office in Talibbiyya after the June 30 crisis, Mahmoud Shaloot, the head of the office, said that he would differentiate between true affiliates of the party and other non-reliable sympathizers, based on their understanding and affiliation to Al-Manhaj. Moreover, he mentioned that, away from the difference in opinions on what happened after June 30 and the definitions of the concepts, he sees that the positive side was that NP preserved Al-Manhaj and protected it, and this would make them forgive any pitfalls or wrong management that NP did, as long as the foundations are maintained. No one of the audience opposed him on this point, despite that they were arguing all the time about other issues (TALIBBYA 2013. meeting.

¹¹²The Women's affairs committee meeting was held at the general secretariat of the party in Alexandria, and was attended by 27 female members.

¹¹³ Ahraf Thabet said that, in DS, they teach people religion not politics. Thus, they are investing in good personalities who would automatically judge things from the perspective of interests versus evils, and Shari'a, as a balanced personality that can deal with whatever situation or issue (INT. THABET, A. 29.12.2013, 9.33-10.44 pm 2013.

¹¹⁴ This was stressed in all interviews and conversations, besides the interaction with the researcher, who herself became subject to *da'awa*. At the time of the field work, they were working in a campaign against Takfir, where leaders, young NP and DS members, and DS' women were actively involved (CONV. INT. RASHWAN, A. 7.11.2013

2013, DOCTOR, N.-V. O. A. F. F. 2013.

¹¹⁵ Hanan Allam said "no laws should be imposed on people since they would not respect them, society should be changed first, awareness should be spread and people should be prepared before laws are enjoined."

¹¹⁶ An NP female member said "In *Da'wa*, I was a candle lightening up for others. After entering politics, I became huge lamp lighting up for more people." She based her political participation and work in the party on the Hadith: 'Who introduces a good custom shall be recompensed by its reward, and the reward of anyone who adopts it until the Day of Resurrection.' In addition, NP female members told the researcher that during the June 30 crisis, Allam advised women to recite a prayer in order to decide their political position in the middle of the confusing crisis (WOMEN'S COMMITTEE, N. 5-01-2014 2014. RE: NP Women's committee meeting.

politics. They drew also upon a religious political discourse in which *they linked the main intellectual issues they studied in DS' educational curriculum* with their political acts and choices, such as the Manhaj of social change, Islamic laws on managing opinion difference (Fiqh Al-Ekhtelaf), and rules of commanding virtue and preventing vice (int. Thabet, 2013, Shams, 2013). This was called by one of the female members, *Al-Siyasa Al-Shar'yya*, or Islamic politics (Women's committee, 2014).¹¹⁷

Moreover, in line with the scholastic identity of DS, and the tendency to root their ideas and principles in social sciences in the post-revolution period¹¹⁸, the narratives and definitions of the concepts of the political situation during NP's crisis after June 30 revolution were mainly guided by the academic literature on revolutions¹¹⁹ and coups. However, some of them decided to go beyond debates on definitions to “*realistically deal with the status-quo*” (Talibbya, 2013). This *realistic tendency* of NP's members was expressed in various occasions where they always weighed *interests versus evils*, which is a significant feature in DS' Manhaj as was discussed in chapters 4 and 5. One of the young NP's leaders said that the governor might exceptionally, and temporarily, freeze a right granted by religion, or a legal act, if he sees some public interest in doing so (Shams, 2013). They also spoke about the wide range of alternatives in Islam, that allows coping with practical issues, and the variations of individual cases¹²⁰ in reality

¹¹⁷ This young female NP member was a new affiliate to DS and NP, and she joined the party after the 2011 Revolution, after party-shopping in different secular parties, and is enthusiastic about what she called the Islamic unique model of politics that NP represents. Thus, she was one of the cases that was not prepared in DS but still adopted a religious discourse.

¹¹⁸ See Appendix (4) for Al-Shahhat's articles on reform.

¹¹⁹ What happened on July 3rd 2013 was a coup for most of the young men who attended the meeting in Talibbya, despite their recognition of a wide popular opposition to Morsi. However, for Shaltout, he thought it is a popular revolution, but comparative studies have shown that a revolution cannot succeed unless one of the repressive tools joins the popular protests, and according to Shaltout, this is what the Egyptian military did both in 2011, and in 2013 (TALIBBYA 2013. meeting).

¹²⁰ This might explain the exceptional actions taken by NP, which depart from clear religious rulings particularly as concerns guardianship, as will be discussed later in this chapter.

where each case has its evaluation and separate assessment (Gawwad, 2013).¹²¹ However, the *flexibility and practicality* of the party and the movement are limited by the Manhaj. This is supported through an overview of the *intertextuality* within the texts analyzed, which revealed their reference to Quran,¹²² Sunna, Prophet's biography, and quotes from prominent Muslim Scholars. Nevertheless, as mentioned in chapter 2, all Salafis share the same references, but differ as concerns how they engage with the world and how they apply religious rulings on their contemporary contexts (Wiktorowicz, 2006, Haykel, 2009). Thus, what makes DS distinct among other Salafis is its Manhaj of social change. In this regard, a follow up of the intertextual chains also reflected that they reproduced Borhami's (1992) foundational text on DS' Manhaj for social change, where discussions included a manifest representation of that key text, in addition to reproducing Al-Shahhat's texts as concerns democracy and the details and definitions of the concepts relevant to DS' social change methodology. However, this went side by side with awareness of non-Islamists' contributions in opinion articles and media messages (Shams, 2013, Shokry, 2013).

The Other in NP's Discourse:

There was a tendency to hold comparisons with the *West* whenever asked about women, Christians, or democracy and human rights issues (Shokry, 2013, Int. Mekki, 2013, int. Makhyon, 2013, int. Nasr, 2013). Such comparisons were in favour of Islam and of DS understanding, while being highly critical of the West. Accordingly, it was obvious from the discourse of NP's members that it had common features with DS' discourse, as

¹²¹ Such attitude goes in line with the previously analyzed DS' framing processes, for instance Al-Shahhat's explanation to DS' position on the militant groups in chapter 4.

¹²² particularly Quaranic verses relevant to change and Da'awa. A young man in the Talibyya meeting said that he agrees on staying in the constitutional committee on the basis of a religious ruling that one should spread da'awa and speaks the truth, and is not to be held responsible for what comes after.

well as with the features of the Islamist discourse in general. NP's members also showed adherence to *democratic mechanisms*, despite adopting the same definition of democracy (all interviews) in the foundational texts. Thus, they refuse the philosophy of democracy, but are against any *radical changes* as well (Talibbya, 2013).¹²³ According to NP members' definition of democracy, they believe that *freedom is never absolute*, even in the West, where the limit is others' freedoms, the public interest, or may be national security concerns. However, for them, freedom should be *restricted by shari'a* (Shams, 2013, Shokry, 2013, Int. Mekki, 2013). They believe that on basis of *majority rule*, they should apply shari'aa and maintain Islamic identity in Egypt, which implies limitation of the political rights of some groups such as Christians (int. Makhyon, 2013), particularly as concerns the presidency, and the restriction of some trends such as Shi'ism and Baha'ism (Int. Mekki, 2013). This tendency to adopt *exclusionary* views was seen normal since there is no absolute democracy in practice even in the West.¹²⁴

The discourse of NP members also included features of *victimization* due to state repression, social discrimination, and media defamation (Shokry, 2013, int. Makhyon, 2013, int. Nasr, 2013, conv. int. Rashwan, 2013, Gawwad, 2013, Bakkar, 2013). They also shared grievances and historical rivalry with the MB among the leaders and the elder generations of the party. Among youths, there was evidence of resentment towards and fear of MB's violent attacks, or harassment, especially after June 30 revolution (Gawwad, 2013, Shams, 2013, int. Makhyon, 2013, Shokry, 2013, Women's committee, 2014, Talibbya, 2013). NP's members also reproduced the same perception on other Islamist approaches to change discussed in DS' foundational texts. Thus, their view of

¹²³ Young men in the Talibyya meeting insisted that a constitutional democratic way out in June 30 was the best management, and they talked about early presidential elections, or at least about holding parliamentary elections to counter balance the powers of Morsi. This conformed to the abovementioned position of DS' leaders before June 30. However, the young members had reservations on DS' and NP's management following June 30.

¹²⁴ This point will be discussed in further details in the following sections.

other Islamists, as well as their relationship with them, and with other political powers, followed the same pattern as DS (Shokry, 2013, Shams, 2013, Women's committee, 2014, Gawwad, 2013, int. Thabet, 2013).

Institutionalism in a Revolutionary Context:

In line with their choice of adopting democratic mechanisms, and their gradual reform approach, NP puts much stress on *institutionalism*, which conforms to DS' position and choices. This is in contrast with calls for protest or the revolutionary tendencies that were propagated by leftists and fellow Islamists as mentioned in chapter 5. The implication of this on their perception and relationship with the state is that, while having reservations about state institutions and despite denouncing their transgressions, NP is keen on protecting them to prevent chaos and instability. In this regard, the Egyptian military was praised as one of the state foundations (int. Thabet, 2013). Moreover, there is an emphasis on considering Al-Azhar the main religious reference and on respecting the institution, while having intellectual differences with a number of Azhari figures (int. Makhyon, 2013, Talibbya, 2013). Their argumentation for institutionalism is that they are keen on countering the *personalization of politics and authority* through promoting institutional decisions, both within the state and within the party (int. Thabet, 2013, int. Makhyon, 2013, leader, 2013). Meanwhile, in view of DS-state pattern, institutionality and respect for the constitution, law and court rulings and legal procedures is not only a reflection of their conservative approach to change, but might also be a way of protecting themselves against state transgressions. For instance, suspecting a connection between MB and terrorist groups in Sinai, they prefer that declaring MB as a terrorist group be made through the judiciary rather than the executive branch. They are also against arbitrary detentions, that the party itself suffered

from, and emergency policies for the fact that they spread a feeling of insecurity and popular outrage (int. Thabet, 2013).

On both DS and NP levels, the importance of institutionalization and organizational structures,¹²⁵ besides preventing personalization and individualistic decisions, is that they engender an efficient *division of labour*. Thus, they are needed for functional and practical reasons of *coordination*, and not as a source of practising authority over each other. This was their experience as an organized movement over time, and is also the same way they framed the benefits of collective action in the foundational texts, as discussed in chapter 4 (Women's committee, 2014, int. Makhyon, 2013).¹²⁶ Such an understanding of organization within DS and NP matches the intellectual nature of the movement, since the rank and file do not take leaders' opinions at face-value, but are always critical and would not necessarily follow. Yet, they remain loyal to the general methodology and guiding principles, derived from Quran and Sunna (Talibbya, 2013, Meeting Female leaders, 2014, int. Thabet, 2013). Thus, individuals and leaders are not sacred (int. Makhyon, 2013),¹²⁷ despite their spiritual influence, but their opinions are considered mere *Ijtihad*, that is not flawless, whereas the cement of the party and the movement is the Manhaj (Talibbya, 2013). Thus, it was clear that the members who were educated in DS seemed to have assimilated the methodology; however, they differentiate between that *methodology and its application*. Therefore, the wrong

¹²⁵ This point will be discussed in detail in section 2.

¹²⁶ Female leaders and young female members confirmed that their work in the party is not different at any level from their work in DS, and that what was added is a political component to their message where they spread awareness about women's political rights and mobilizing people and spreading their political ideas. In meetings with the public, representatives of both the party and DS are present. They added they organize courses on human development, illiteracy classes and handicrafts training courses for women; however they never give out money. The nature of their work reflected the spirit of a religious social movement more than of a political party.

¹²⁷ Makhyon said decisively we do not have individuals. The female members also said that they argue against Borhami, and that he tries to answer all their questions, and sometimes they show anger at him, and while being a spiritual leader, he still owes them an explanation to whatever decisions taken by the party or DS. They also said that they might not follow his opinion and that this does not affect their affiliation to DS or NP. This same opinion was repeated in the young members meeting, who seemed to argue against each and every point, and the meeting actually was held to transfer their opinion to the leaders.

application is not enough of a reason to quit the movement, but members can reject it, and might not react positively towards DS/NP framing to it (Talibbya, 2013, Women's committee, 2014).

Keying and Individual Reason in Response to DS' and NP's Framing:

An example individual members' reaction to DS' and NP's framing, is the contest over defining the events of June 30th 2013. The majority of the youth met in the field defined it as a coup, few others as a revolution, while DS and NP official position is that, while preferring constitutional procedures over radical ones, they cannot do anything about the escalation on the ground. Thus, both entities chose to disregard this whole debate, to distance themselves from June 2013 revolution alliance mobilization and Islamists counter-mobilization, and to deal with reality as mentioned above. In addition, they drew upon their historical differences with Islamists and their criticism of MB's political approach and intransigence, which led to this escalation (Al-Affani, 2013). It was clear that DS and NP individual members varied in their acceptance of such framing; however, this does not necessarily suggest a division within the movement. What connect individuals to the collective entity is not only the framing processes, but rather how the individual actor reacts to the processes of reframing, associated with changes to the social movement. Thus, the individual actor might be acting according to her own primary frame and her choices might not correspond to those of other participants within the group. In this keying process, there are processes of up-keying and down-keying that may be adding or removing layers of the frame. Hence, in some cases, keying may lead to a fit between the individual and the collective frame, rather than the withdrawal of the individual from the group (Miethe, 2009).

In this regard, it was understood from the interviews and interactions with DS' and NP's members that they have carried out a keying process. This involved focusing their affiliation on the Manhaj, that is for them the Salafi Manhaj or the Manhaj of prophets, and the right way of understanding Islam, which could be understood as their primary frame. This made them closer to the collective frame that justifies decisions as being dictated by Manhaj, and as being taken for the sake of protecting it. In this way, *ijtihad* of leaders, although not binding on individual members, is accepted by them as an attempt to apply Manhaj, yet one that can be questioned by individuals without necessarily leading to their departure from the movement (Women's committee, 2014, Talibbya, 2013). A young member of NP said "I am against the decisions of the leaders but my differences with them are so far not enough for me to quit NP, and even if I leave the party I will never leave DS because I do believe in DS' Manhaj" (Talibbya, 2013).

Such an understanding of the reaction of individual actors or participants to framing processes is important in two respects. Firstly, in view of the general Salafi intellectual mode that promotes independence from scholars (Brown, 2014). Secondly, it is important in view of DS' resource mobilization discussed in chapter 3, to recall that they do not recruit members and do not offer any benefits, and affiliation to the movement is based solely on individuals' conviction of the Manhaj. This intellectual nature of DS' members and the internal dynamics and affiliation criteria lead to a number of implications. First is the central position of Manhaj, being the cement of the movement, as well as the tool of political mobilization. Second, there is a positive relationship between the conviction and adherence to Manhaj as explained throughout, and the belonging and mobilization of DS' and NP's members. This conclusion helps in

explaining the implications of DS' and NP's framing processes and mobilization within the changing political context in Egypt, during and after June 2013 revolution, on their followers and sympathizers, and on the party's future as will be discussed in the following section.

To sum up, NP's members shared with DS the same wording and word meaning as concerns social change, democracy, political participation, Islamic identity and shari'aa. They adopted the same argumentation and drew upon the same discourses that were dominated by the religious discourse, in which they provided a religious representation of reality, and even the use of political and legal discourses came from a religious perspective. Their technocratic approach to the various political and social topics from security to tourism, education, and health (Al-Sayyed, 2013, int. Bakkar, 2013, Int. Mekki, 2013, int. Thabet, 2013) seemed to be based on research and consultation with experts, and on their expertise as businessmen, doctors, and engineers. However, the religious component was present, particularly at points of intersection with religious issues. For instance, in the case of "conservative tourism," NP presented a wide range of alternatives to beach tourism, without demanding a ban to it (Int. Mekki, 2013, int. Bakkar, 2013). This reflects what Roy (2012) suggests about Islamists successful balanced combination of technocratic and conservative values, except that in the case of NP, the religious component overrides all other values.

The genre of the texts was close to conversations and discussions, at a time of a revolution and instability. Many of NP's members started their talk with a formal style closer to tutoring, but gradually opened up when provoked by arguments about Islam and Salafism in the literature, or when the researcher discussed impressions about them among the Egyptian public and media. At this point, the style turns into an informal

Egyptian accent, a daily conversational style, which is sometimes friendly, and sometimes full of joking, sarcasm,¹²⁸ enthusiasm, and emotionality. They were exchanging ideas and expressing themselves smoothly with a fellow citizen in a time of uncertainty and instability in the country. Nevertheless, they would take the researcher as rather serious, the more the researcher uses academic terms, and departs from journalistic language, since they obviously appreciate academia and research, and they are suspicious of and look down at the media. Also, keeping the spirit of approachable activists in a religious social movement and accommodating da'awa people was obvious in most of the encounters with NP members, where the researcher herself was sometimes subject to da'awa.

The result of the analysis leads to the conclusion that NP shared the same discourse with DS, and that such a unified discourse was observed on various levels of the party and across varied categories of age and gender, and in different areas, even when DS' presence was not as strong. This means that NP and DS are intellectually connected. However, this does not mean that there were no opinion differences within the movement and the party on various issues. However, such differences were confined to *the application of DS' methodology (Manhaj)*, as they might have reservations on its projection upon their political reality. Thus, the internal differences were on how Manhaj is applied to NP's political context. Such differences were not dividing the party into leaders and rank and file, or elders and youth, but were rather spread across

¹²⁸ For example: When discussing the impression taken about Salafis' rigidity and rejection to all aspects of modernity and culture, Mr. Shams was laughing and said "ohhh do such Salafis still exist?! Of course not" and he was sarcastic about such claims. In the Talibyya meeting, they were quoting a secular figure and joking about his coinage about June 2013 revolution. They were also open about their sadness and family problems due to divisions among Islamists into supporters of NP and MB's affiliates. One of the young men said "my aunt and her husband told us you are kafir!"

Women also were emotional and were worried that the researcher might face challenges during her studies in the west. They also repeated jokes from the movies, and were joking about their struggle to quit listening to music. Such impressions also were clear in the field observations due to interaction on a long period of time, and from notes about their body language and facial expressions and voice tone.

all the levels of NP. Yet, they were all defined by the members as “Ijtihad” and attempts that might be right or wrong but are subject to discussion in order to prevent deviation from the Manhaj. Thus, despite differences, there is no polarization between two camps or visions, but various packages of opinions across all levels, while maintaining consensus on Manhaj. These findings raise questions about the structural relationship between the party and the social movement, and about the nature of NP as a political actor. These will now be explored.

Section 2: The Structural Relationship between DS and NP:

There are two explanations of the relationship between DS and NP. The first, emerging from initial analysis in the wake of DS’ political involvement, saw a conflict between the religious movement and the political party (Lacroix, 2012). The second explanation presented the relationship between the party and the movement as the beginning of a split into two visions: senior sheikhs’ insisting on preserving the distinct nature of DS among the Salafis, versus the more politically oriented leaders of the party who support a horizontal expansion among Salafis in order to widen NP’s constituency (El-Sherif, 2012a). This section will present the two explanations, and will conclude with an alternative reading of NP-DS relationship. This alternative reading suggests a structural and an intellectual connection between the movement and the party, in addition to a clear Shura mechanism of managing both DS and NP. Moreover, both experience decentralization on the intellectual level, while on the structural level, and as concerns decision-making, power lies in the middle tier, neither in the elite nor in the rank and file.

The Explanation of Political-Religious Conflict:

In contrast to the results of the CDA of NP members' interviews discussed in section one, the initial reading of the relationship between DS and NP was that the party is trying to develop a separate political discourse and strategy from that of DS' religious one, which might eventually lead to a confrontation between DS' sheikhs and NP politicians (Lacroix, 2012). This was during the period of Emad Abdel Ghaffour's leadership of NP. This reading was reinforced by a statement by Nader Bakkar, (seen as one of sheikh Borhami's closest followers), that Abdel Ghaffour could no longer serve as the head of NP while serving as President Morsi's close advisor. This statement was understood as evidence of a personal clash between Abdel Ghaffour, the politician, and Yasser Borhami, who was accused of disregarding the distinction between religion and politics and of giving direct orders to party members, bypassing party leadership. Abdel Ghaffour's approach to politics and close ties with MB, seeing that it is "the time for Islamists to leap fully into politics," went against Borhami's cautious stand on MB's initiatives (Brown, 2013). Observers started to see such clashes as religious versus political, starting fall 2011, particularly when Abdel Ghaffour expressed his desire to have Christians run on party lists in the next elections. Meanwhile, Borhami issued a statement on his website, as a religious leader in DS, that "only Muslims should occupy positions linked to the objectives (maqasid) of the Muslim state" (Lacroix, 2012). Nevertheless, the fact that there was a political discourse from NP, and a religious discourse coming out from DS, could reflect the division of labour that the movement and the party were trying to establish, and not necessarily an internal conflict. Borhami's comment, according to the CDA of DS' texts, conformed to the religious movement's discourse regarding non-Muslims' guardianship discussed in previous

chapters. Thus, whether NP was going to run Christian candidates or not, it was DS sheikhs' role to explicitly state and confirm the relevant shari'a rule, even if this meant the alienation of the electorate.¹²⁹ Similarly, listing women candidates, in contrast with DS' interpretation on women's guardianship, came as a result of cost-benefit analysis, which DS' members take as an exception, not the norm. As mentioned in chapter 5, they follow the laws and regulations, while condemning vice and rejecting them as non-Islamic.

However, the perceived confrontation was considered clearest with Abdel Ghaffour's announcement that he has an intention to form an electoral alliance with non-Islamist political parties,¹³⁰ which was met again with opposition by Borhami who mentioned that "any alliance with groups that oppose God's Law is absolutely forbidden" (Lacroix, 2012). This is because, while coordination and cooperation are welcomed, no alliance with non-Islamists is to be accepted under any condition, particularly when NP had other options, and is not compelled to (Sabe'e, 2013, Sultan, 2013). Finally, among incidents that fed into the perception of NP-DS clash, was the NP's then-spokesman, Mohammed Nour (seen as an Abdel Ghaffour follower), accepting an invitation to attend the anniversary of the Iranian revolution in the Iranian embassy in February 2012, disregarding Salafi hostility to Shi'ism (Lacroix, 2012). The fact that the contradiction between NP and DS statements became more frequent reflected a rising internal clash at that point, however questions remained regarding the nature of the clash and its scope.

¹²⁹ Ahmed Farid said: "The one covered by the public is naked" (Farid int, 2013).

¹³⁰ Even with the Free Egyptians party, headed by the Coptic businessman Naguib Sawiris (LACROIX, S. 2012. *Sheikhs and Politicians: Inside the New Egyptian Salafism. Brookings Doha Center Publications* Brookings Doha Center.

In view of this initial reading of NP-DS relationship, these incidents were perceived as evidence on NP's tendency to separate away from DS, and to develop a political logic distinct from the religious one, i.e. "political Salafism may be quietly separating from religious Salafism," with NP aiming at "pro-political autonomy" (Lacroix, 2012). The first general congress of NP and the election of the party's president in 2012 were seen as the battlefield, where it will be decided which group will dominate (Lacroix, 2012).

The Explanation on Divisions over the Direction of Expansion and Relationship with Other Salafis:

Obviously, DS' sheikhs saw in Abdel Ghaffour's decisions a departure from DS' Manhaj. Nevertheless, others viewed understanding the relationship between NP and DS as simply a clash between sheikhs and politicians as not precise: the imprecision concerned defining the parties to, and the reasons for and context of, such a clash (El-Sherif, 2012a). This second explanation tends to see the conflict, which was clear to the public at that time, as one that has to do with deeper intellectual, institutional, and organizational visions, in light of the transformations brought about by January 2011 revolution. In fact, the rapid pace of Salafis' entry to politics hindered their ability to undertake the necessary intellectual and organizational revisions (El-Sherif, 2012a). In addition, beyond the need for arranging the relationship between the party and the social movement, or the political and the religious, there was a need to develop a crystallized, unique Islamic model of political participation (El-Sherif, 2012a). According to this explanation, the conflict was seen as one between two main distinct trends within the party, as concerns the nature of a Salafi party, and the relationship of this party with the rest of the highly diversified Salafi movement (El-Sherif, 2012a). The first trend viewed NP's success as lying in a horizontal expansion that accommodates all the different

trends, groups and orientations within the general Salafi movement. Thus, the party needs to be based on democratic management, opening the door for political and organizational mobilization of all its popular base, whatever their views (El-Sherif, 2012a). The second trend saw that NP should preserve its distinct belief and intellectual identity, and to protect its methodology (Manhaj). Such a vision implies that there should be a process of *selection and filtration* based on the criteria of believing in DS' thought (El-Sherif, 2012a). This trend implied a vertical hierarchy and a strict management mechanism, centred around DS' elites for decision making, through a particular group of loyal members - the same as in MB (El-Sherif, 2012a). The abovementioned explanation, of the nature of DS-NP clash, suggests that the clash is between competing visions over the internal structure and management of NP; the vertical versus horizontal expansion with regard to relationship with other Salafis, and the democratic versus elitist centralized structures as concerns party management (El-Sherif, 2012a), projecting to an extent MB's experience on NP.

This view also implies that DS had undergone changes after becoming a political actor, and that it had to introduce intellectual and organizational revisions, which implies the need for *fundamental changes* if NP wants to achieve political success or to maintain its unity. This suggestion goes against the "*continuity and the consistency*" of DS' vision and social change discourse throughout its history. According to previous analysis in this and previous chapters, one of DS' main tenets and the corner stone of their framing process of "*political participation*," and of mobilizing followers to participate, was leaders' reassurance that DS and its political arm would not give up on the foundational principles, and that the religious prevails over the political. Thus, according to their discourse, the objective was to conform to their foundational texts, and to maintain their

Manhaj, and not to introduce any revisions for the sake of political gains. Previous chapters also showed that DS has a crystallized vision about social change and a means of promoting this change, and that such a vision was sustained, even at times of crises, and even when defying the dominant discourse. Moreover, DS' Manhaj constituted the *cement of the social movement*, and that DS' emergence and development were not the result of demands or interests, or confined to grievances, but rather were built around religious guiding principles, and sacred texts, and for carrying out a religious mission.¹³¹ Therefore, the interconnectedness of the movement is tied to preserving its foundational principles, which it is inconceivable that they would sacrifice, especially for politics, which is according to their methodology nothing but one tool that serves da'awa.¹³² Moreover, in view of DS' discourse, and the history of discursive conflicts with other Islamists, which contributed to the crystallization of DS' Manhaj, DS is always keen on clarifying its distinct position on the map of Islamist activism. From DS' texts discussed in chapters 4 and 5, and interviews with NP's and DS' members, the Islamic *reference* is the common factor between them and the rest of the Islamists. However, they have obvious fundamental differences with the rest of fellow Islamists as regards the application of such a reference, especially against the dominant top-down approach and the possible consequent components of Takfir and violence. Therefore, it is unexpected that DS' Manhaj would be sacrificed for the sake of expanding horizontally, and gaining the support of fellow Salafis and Islamists, in return for securing votes, or to widen its popular base for political purposes: this is particularly so if political participation is framed as a means not an end. This implies that such explanations of

¹³¹ "DS' followers also recognize leader's spiritual value, but their affiliation is to the idea not individuals... Leaders are not sacred" (INT. MAKHYON, Y. 2013. interview, LEADER, Y. B. 2013).

¹³² This was stated in all interviews and encounters in the field, "the party speaks with the tongue of DS in politics" (WOMEN'S COMMITTEE, N. 5-01-2014 2014. *RE: NP Women's committee meeting*, 2014). They all used the word "the political arm of DS," to describe NP and "politics is just means or a tool".

divisions between two distinct trends do not reflect the reality of the relationship between the party and the movement.

In this regard, this thesis recognizes the internal divisions of the movement and party particularly in view of the earlier discussion of the characteristics of Salafis as intellectually independent, and as having shallow hierarchies, in addition to the discussion of the concept of keying processes. As mentioned above keying is a way of understanding individual reactions to framing and how this was reflected in the divisions over NP's position on June 30th revolution. The critique of the literature's understanding of such divisions and how it describes them does not mean that this dissertation claims by any means that the movement is homogenous, but rather suggests a different description and explanation of such internal divisions, and of the nature of the relationship between the party and the social movement both on the intellectual and structural levels, which is indeed one of the main contributions of the dissertation. This thesis, as will be shown in the next section, argues that by tracing the ideology and the framing processes over the movement's history through operationalizing CDA of the archival texts and interviews held with members on various levels, particularly the youth and the rank and file, Manhaj emerges clearly as the primary frame for the members around which mobilization processes are held and which makes up for the lack of discipline within the party. Thus, with the special nature of NP, members are divided among themselves on the leaders' choices and application of Manhaj, yet despite being allowed to express this, are not punished or excluded, and the core members of the movement are still united around the Manhaj despite divisions on the application, and this was expressed in interviews across all levels. Thus, divisions are not intergenerational or between leaders and rank and file, since even on the level of

founders there was a division, yet so far, such divisions do not result in excluding members from the movement. Al-Shahhat, during 2015 elections, said that he does not deny the internal divisions, particularly due to the influence of Said Abdel Azeim, one of the founders of DS, who joined the MB legitimacy alliance. Abdel Azeim was demotivating his students who remained in Alexandria, asking them to boycott elections and political participation (Al-Shahhat, 2015). Despite the fact that the 2015 elections were reflective of the internal divisions, the media attack accusing DS and NP of being a failed political actor and the assassination of one of NP's leaders in North Sinai were framed by DS' leaders as reasons for unity and for defending the movement and its Manhaj. According to party leaders, such factors might have positively influenced the political mobilization of DS/NP's members. In other words, it can be seen that leaders' framing of such events had positive influence on members' mobilization during the elections. This was seen as evidenced in the winning of 12 seats despite of the fierce competition with all secular political parties, while NP was the only Islamist party. NP's leaders also claimed that many of the members who lost interest in politics and left the party re-joined NP during the elections (al Shahhat, 2015, Al Shalma, 2015). Yet, the analysis in the next section is mainly based on the material collected in the field work in 2013, and questions about 2015 developments might be answered through a second round of field work in the future, since media and leaders' statements are not enough for forming a complete picture.

The following section elaborates on the relationship of DS and NP through tracing the *structural* relationship between both after proving an intellectual connection through the results of CDA.

Explaining DS and NP Relationship as Structurally and Intellectually Connected:

In a novel reading on how we understand the party-movement relation, this thesis argues that DS and NP are both structurally and intellectually connected, rather than split between two trends or between the religious and the political.

Structurally, DS is more of a social movement than an organized group. Based on analysis of DS' discourse and organization over its history, and through interviews and interaction in the field,¹³³ it is clear that DS represents a loose decentralized social movement - unified by an overarching ideology - that uses organizational structures functionally, and only for coordination purposes (Women's committee, 2014). However, there was also an elitist tendency, based on the legacy of Shura, which is preferred over democracy, in managing the organization, as discussed in the previous chapter, particularly with the concept of Ahl Al-Hal Wl-A'aqd. Such a tendency was illustrated by how Borhami, on the occasion of choosing a candidate for the presidency, was against the involvement of what he regarded as the choices of emotional youth (Al-Laithy, 2012).¹³⁴ However, DS and NP members stressed that Sheikhs or elite opinion is for consultation and is not obligatory, despite the spiritual value of the religious leaders. They added that members of DS and NP are free in their choices and that this does not affect their affiliation to DS, in contrast with MB's members who pledge full obedience to the leaders and are expelled or blamed if they act otherwise (Women's committee, 2014). Thus, there was not much discipline within the party or the movement as concerns political issues¹³⁵ and on the intellectual level power seems to be

¹³³ where the researcher attended meetings and observed work within the headquarters.

¹³⁴ He clearly mentioned that the knowledgeable and experienced people should be those who undertake selection of the presidential candidate (AL-LAITHY, A. 2012 90 - Minutes program, Interview with Yasser Borhami 90 - *Minutes program*.).

¹³⁵ NP's and DS' members met in the field said that they share the same guiding principles and mindset with the leaders and by following this way of thinking, they eventually arrive at the same conclusions. They added that even if

equally distributed among leaders' levels, and the rank and file who might choose not to support the leaders. This conforms to the bottom-up approach of the movement, and reflects a flow of power among all those who adopt the Manhaj and possess religious knowledge.

In sum, there was obvious decentralization¹³⁶ on the intellectual level where the reference is the Manhaj, as derived from divine texts, not the individual leaders or their interpretations, since, as mentioned in section one, application of Manhaj is a matter of Ijtihad. This means that it is subject to the judgment of those who share knowledge, where power flows among all those who study and understand the Manhaj. Despite their recognition of the variation in the level of knowledge, this does not take away their right to argue against leaders, and even to oppose them, if not fully convinced. In addition, it seems that there is no authority for individuals, even the leaders, who are respected but

they have different opinions they argue and ask, and if are not convinced, and this rarely happens due to their common strong intellectual background, they do not face any blame and are not expelled from either DS or NP, and they were proud that the pattern of their social movement is the opposite of the strict centralized structure of MB, that is based on absolute obedience to the leaders, or being expelled. In addition, they all stressed that persons are not sacred and that sheikhs owe them an explanation of whatever decisions they take or intend to take. NB: Some of the interviewees were members in MB but left and joined DS due to intellectual differences, and some of them came from mixed families where some of their relatives are MBs (WOMEN'S COMMITTEE, N. 5-01-2014 2014. *RE: NP Women's committee meeting*, SHAMSI, I. 2013. Interview with Secretary General of NP in Badrasheen center, TALIBBYA 2013. meeting.

¹³⁶A famous example on decentralization in DS and NP was the case of choosing Abdul Moneim Abu El Fotouh as a presidential candidate. The researcher was told on the field that the opinion of DS was just advisory, and that DS and NP members were free to vote for whomever they choose. Yet, most of them said that few opposed the choice of Abu El Fotouh, discrediting media claims. They said that Salafis in general may be did not, but NP supported Abu El Fotouh and even worked with his campaign (WOMEN'S COMMITTEE, N. 5-01-2014 2014. *RE: NP Women's committee meeting*, SHOKRY, A. 2013. Secretary General of NP in Giza Governorate, LACROIX, S. 2012. *Sheikhs and Politicians: Inside the New Egyptian Salafism. Brookings Doha Center Publications* Brookings Doha Center, LEADER, Y. B. 2013.. One of NP female members said that they did not want an Islamist president, and that they wanted someone who appeals to all political powers in order to achieve stability. In addition, they believed that while Abu El Fotouh belongs to the same school of thought of Muhammed Morsi, the difference between both for them was that Morsi is supported by MB, whereas Abu El Fotouh was an individual candidate. Thus, NP could be more influential with the individual candidate, not backed with a strong organization like MB (WOMEN'S COMMITTEE, N. 5-01-2014 2014. *RE: NP Women's committee meeting*.). Nobody denied that some NP members did not support this choice; however, their size cannot be determined. Moreover, this narrative conforms to their Manhaj, which perceives the society as incapable of accepting an Islamist president, and that they should work on the societal level first to prepare the people before imposing an Islamist president, according to their bottom-up approach and where state reform comes eventually as a result of societal reform. Therefore, those who held this position did not see that Shari'a would be applied after 2012 presidential elections (LEADER, Y. B. 2013.). Thus, assuming a division between the leaders and NP's rank and file in this regard would not be precise. Nevertheless, speaking about divisions might be possible as regards the whole Salafi movement, particularly with the defeat of Abu El Fotouh in the first round of the 2012 presidential election (LACROIX, S. 2012. *Sheikhs and Politicians: Inside the New Egyptian Salafism. Brookings Doha Center Publications* Brookings Doha Center.

not taken as sacred, or are blindly followed. This goes in line with the general characteristics of Salafis, previously discussed, as having ‘shallow hierarchies’ and are applying individual reason (Haykel, 2009). However, the 2011 revolution provided a chance for the institutionalization of DS and for the development of the functional structures, particularly when DS became an NGO and NP was established, as mentioned in Chapter 3.

As for NP, it was structurally a separate entity with its president, presidential council, supreme committee, general congress, conflict resolution senate (int. Makhyon, 2013), parliamentarians, and gubernatorial secretaries, and chieftains levels (leader, 2013).¹³⁷ Such a structure is parallel to that of DS in which the board of trustees is limited to the six founders of the movement, the administrative or the executive council, which includes the second and third generation of DS’ sheikhs in governorates, who act as the decision makers. There is also the general Shura council of DS that is highly diversified since it includes DS’ representatives from all Egyptian governorates, and who are in direct contact with the rank and file. DS General Shura council is parallel to NP’s general congress, and both of them are the ones that elect the executive bodies (leader, 2013, Shokry, 2013). Thus, on the structural level and decision making, power does not lie either in the movement nor with the party’s top councils or leaders, nor at the bottom with the rank and file, but resides rather in the middle, where the Shura council and the general congress are the link between the elite and the rank and file.

Therefore, power in view of structure does not lie with the rank and file despite their intellectual independence, since they contribute to decision-making through two-step, or

¹³⁷The supreme committee is elected by the general congress, which in turn elects the president. The supreme committee also elects the presidential committee, to take faster decisions since this committee meets weekly, while the supreme committee meets every two months unless there is an emergency.

indirect, voting. Thus, their views on DS' and NP's decisions go through the Shura council, and the general congress. Nevertheless, *hierarchy* remains loose within the party's committees and offices (Women's committee, 2014, Talibbya, 2013), preserving the nature of a social movement's management, voluntary work, and informal faith-based brotherhood/sisterhood, where mentorship dominates (Meeting Female leaders, 2014, Women's committee, 2014, Talibbya, 2013).¹³⁸ *Therefore, the structure and mechanisms discussed above imply a shura model applied in both DS and NP, rather than a democratic model. Yet, it remains not an elitist approach, since spiritual leaders, for instance, do not have absolute power. Despite the flexible hierarchies, power is not with the rank and file either, but decision-making and electing leaders depends on the votes of the middle level.*

In all interviews held in the field, interviewees stressed the structural separation between DS and NP, however, they emphasized the intellectual connection and sharing of the same Manhaj¹³⁹ (leader, 2013, int. Shaltoot, 2013, Shokry, 2013, Int. Mekki, 2013). Thus, despite the fact that theoretically speaking NP can take decisions different from DS, the fact that they share the same Manhaj would lead to taking the same decisions (leader, 2013, Shokry, 2013). In addition, this might not only be due to the common Manhaj, but also owing to the fact that when "DS' General Shura Council established NP, they mainly chose the professional and well educated youth among DS cadres, who were trained and religiously educated in the movement and assigned them the responsibility of the Party" (leader, 2013, int. Makhyon, 2013, Shokry, 2013, conv. int. Rashwan, 2013). In addition to sharing the same cadres, there is sometimes an

¹³⁸ This was understood from analysing turn taking and setting meeting agendas, and in interviews where leaders and rank and file were interviewed together, besides notes on discussions and interactions.

¹³⁹ "Al-Manhaj," the thought, the guiding principles, the mind-set, and the social change methodology, were brought up in almost all interviews held during the field work.

overlap in membership, since, for instance, Makhyon, the president of NP, is a member of the administrative committee of DS (leader, 2013); Ahmed Shokry,¹⁴⁰ the secretary general of NP in Giza and a member of NP's supreme committee, is the vice-president of DS in Giza and a member of DS executive office in Giza (Shokry, 2013). The researcher also learnt from Ahmed Rashawn, NP's supreme committee secretary, that he would deliver a Friday speech and that he works in the anti-Takfir campaign, yet, he makes sure that he does not discuss anything that has to do with NP while carrying out *da'awa* (conv. int. Rashwan, 2013).¹⁴¹ In this regard, it is also worth mentioning that DS' Manhaj was even demonstrated in the structure and interactions within the party, particularly as concerns the women's affairs committee, which has a sub-structure echoing that of NP; for instance education and health sub-committees for women. Yet, NP's women said that they coordinate and work with their parallel male committees in NP, while following the rules of seclusion and male-female interactions in Islam. They said men in the party believe that women are more capable of determining fellow women's needs, and that they are asked by NP's leaders to provide their visions as concerns women's affairs in various party committees (Women's committee, 2014).

In view of the centrality of the Manhaj, both in DS' and in NP's organization, framing and mobilization, describing the conflict within NP during 2011-2012 as a polarization between two distinct trends as concerns party management and expansion (El-Sherif, 2012a) becomes questionable. Particularly, when Abdel Ghaffour had to defect from NP, along with a hundred members only, and formed Al-Watan (homeland) Party in

¹⁴⁰Ahmed Shokry joined DS as a child when he was in grade 2, to recite the Quran and he continued to attend the classes and courses at various levels of education, and attending to all the activities. When he joined the university, he became DS' representative in Cairo University, and was once arrested in 2002 because of his university activism.

¹⁴¹ Rashawn, who is a young medical doctor studying for MA in medicine and has an MBA degree, feels it is awkward when people liked his religious speeches and told him that they will vote for NP. It seems that he was having difficulty in moving around with the two hats.

December 2012 (Brown, 2013). According to NP's members' narrative, Abdel Ghaffour lived outside Egypt and was away from DS for years, and only came back a few months before the 2011 revolution (Shokry, 2013). It was said that he was exposed to various intellectual influences that made him depart from DS' Manhaj, and got inclined to MB's policy choices, something that went against DS position that MB, while a fellow Islamist group, commits clear religious violations that DS should openly deny and distance itself from (Shokry, 2013). Makhyon also had doubts that Abdel Ghaffour might have been manipulated by MB (int. Makhyon, 2013).¹⁴² This might explain DS' opposition to him and his followers in the incidents of Christian guardianship, alliance with seculars, and rapprochement with Shiites, that were all MB's choices that DS' used to criticize, according to its historical discourse analyzed in previous chapters. In addition, according to the current NP president Makhyon, as well as young NP leader in a city in Al-Buhayra Governorate (leader, 2013, int. Makhyon, 2013), Abdel Ghaffour tended to impose his opinion on the supreme committee, and if they disagree, he would react with rage. Later on, Abdel Ghaffour started to take decisions on his own without consulting with the supreme committee of NP, and ceased to attend the meetings: members relied on getting the news of the party from the media (int. Makhyon, 2013). The young leader said that one of the affairs that irritated NP's members was that Abdel Ghaffour ignored the *institutionality* that they appreciate, and that he was acting on his own. In Makhyon's wording "it was a party without a president." Thus, according to NP members, it seemed that the whole party was on one side (Shokry, 2013),¹⁴³ while Abdel Ghaffour and his hundred followers were on the other. Accordingly, Abdel

¹⁴² A female leader said that Said Abdel Azim, one of the six founders left DS and join Raba'a sit-in, and now he and his wife, who worked in Da'awa as well, left to Qatar. The female leader was extremely shocked. She justified their separation from DS on basis of MB's penetration to DS. However, this implies that whoever defies Al-Manhaj, even a founder, leaves the movement, and there was no evidence that any defectors left with Abdel A'zim.

¹⁴³ Shokry said "the majority of NP cadres who are brought up on DS' Manhaj rejected Abdel Ghaffour's inclination towards MB", Shaltoot confirmed saying "yeah... he is dissolving in MB."

Ghaffour did not belong to the same Manhaj, and this position, together with his followers, was closer to MB and was not representative of DS or the NP mainstream. Thus, this approach could not be considered a distinct trend in NP facing that of DS' founders, but rather an exceptional one on the margins. What makes this narrative more probable is that Al-Watan joined the "legitimacy alliance" of MB after June 2013 revolution, and joined the Raba'a sit-in (Brown, 2013).

It is to be said also that, according to Sheikh Ahmed Farid, Sheikh Abu Edris, after being arrested, preferred to stay away from activism in DS. At this point, Sheikh Yasser Borhami, instead, became the one who took the responsibility for DS' organizational and administrative issues, and was travelling around in all governorates, keeping in close contact with the youth (int. Farid, 2013). Furthermore, Borhami was the one who appointed almost all the cadres and thus, according to Farid, it was logical that they liked Borhami and that they had mutual understanding to the extent that some DS' followers were called Borhamists (int. Farid, 2013). But he sees no problem in this, since it is logical and normal and happened for necessity. Adding this piece of information to the fact that Borhami was the one who instituted the foundational text of social change, which is approved by the rest of the founders, could explain why DS' board of trustees thought dominated, especially with the common cadres and such structural and intellectual links, reinforcing the fact that DS and NP had a unified discourse.

Accordingly, due to the importance of Al-Manhaj, filtration of members based on affiliation to Manhaj and the entity of NP, is sometimes functional. As Mahmoud Shaloot (Talibbya, 2013) said, a filtration process on the executive level, was carried out in all regions through local leaders to differentiate active members from

sympathizers. The criterion is that an active member is the one who understands and believes in Al-Manhaj; thus, would be reliable and would not distort the work of the executive structure. This comes in comparison to the sympathizers, who might defect according to emotional reasons or because of lack of knowledge and understanding of the situation. This process took place after many NP members, who did not abide by DS' Manhaj, either boycotted the party meetings or joined Raba'a sit-in¹⁴⁴ (Talibbya, 2013). According to NP members, understanding and belief in Manhaj applies to those who joined DS on a *rational basis* and upon a scholarship foundation. For them, this is the criteria of being active members, who constitute the core of the movement, as compared to bystanders or sympathizers who build their affiliation on an emotional basis, and have not acquired enough religious knowledge (Talibbya, 2013, Gawwad, 2013, Women's committee, 2014, Bakkar, 2013).

In this regard, as mentioned in previous chapters, differences among Salafis remain on the understanding of the contemporary context and the method of applying religious rulings to it. Thus, it is a contextual rather than belief difference, and has to do with Manhaj, or the way they engage with the world (Wiktorowicz, 2006, Haykel, 2009). Therefore, what DS and NP members called “sympathizers” or “emotional,” could be describing the general Islamist popular base, which do not have a particular affiliation, but have a strong religious inclination. They might be also understood as the “volatile or the moving block” (El-Sherif, 2012a),¹⁴⁵ which could support and sympathize with DS

¹⁴⁴ The first encounter with NP's members on the field, was with an NP's member who defected and joined Hazemon, and talked to the researcher on the phone while attending Raba'a sit-in. However, he seemed to be an enthusiastic Islamist of those who were unable to express themselves in the same eloquent way of the rest of NP's and DS' members she met later. He kept repeating with anger that he wants Morsi back, and that he is now with Al-Raya political party.

¹⁴⁵ For El Sherif what he considered NP's failure in the 2015 elections was attributed to the absence of this popular base, or sympathizers and bystanders, and it was not only state restrictions, which was one of the main complaints of NP (LINN, E. C., LINN, NICHOLAS. 2015. The Nour Party Goes Dim, Egypt's last Islamist party is clinging to life. But how much longer?).

and NP without necessarily sharing the same Manhaj. Thus, they might leave and join another Islamist group as their understanding of the context, and of applying religious rulings to it, differ from that of DS. That is why formal and informal DS and NP framing processes were in operation immediately after June 2013, to maintain the interconnectedness of the movement and the party during the crisis. In this respect, the Talibyya meeting attended by the researcher was one among others¹⁴⁶ held on the levels of governorates, centres, and chieftains; the objective being that leaders at each level could convey rank and file opinions to party leaders, and communicate the leaders' points of views as well (Talibyya, 2013). There were also conferences, lectures delivered by sheikhs, where the floor was open for questions and answers, training camps and informal encounters¹⁴⁷ through friends and family visits and phone calls to regain DS and NP members who were angry at the party's management after June 30. These informal encounters were carried out by core or active members, where their argumentation centred around reminders of DS' Manhaj and mind-set (Women's committee, 2014, notes, 2013-2014).

To sum up, DS and NP are intellectually and structurally connected, where the internal management of both takes place through a Shura model, rather than a democratic one. Thus, decision-making is neither confined to the religious leaders' nor the founders' level, nor lies with the rank and file but is rather dependent on the vote of the middle level. However, DS and NP are characterized by loose hierarchies, and intellectual

¹⁴⁶ The researcher was not allowed to attend the supreme committee meeting, whose place, and timing was not announced for security reasons, and the rest of the meetings on the rest of NP's levels were halted for security reasons right after June 30, and when the meeting started they were less frequent. The Talibyya meeting was held in a lawyers' office member in the executive office, not at a party headquarter. However, towards January, the researcher attended a meeting in the secretariat general of the party in Alexandria.

¹⁴⁷ One of the female members said that it was easy for her to talk to fellow DS' members after the crisis, since they knew she is talking to them out of advice because she cares about them out of their faith based and friendly relationship, and she said that they knew that her motive was to gain God's satisfaction, and that she is not aiming at imposing her opinion but is giving them the choice. Her colleagues in the party said that this approach started to work when they were allowed to explain and when people were in a mood to listen.

independence. This would mean low discipline and mobilization; however, the interconnectedness of the movement and mobilization is maintained through dynamic framing processes that gravitate around DS' Manhaj, the cement of the movement and the main tool of political mobilization. Again, in view of members' biographies and their relationship to the movement, the earlier they joined the movement and the more they are trained within its educational structure and curriculum, the more they are inclined to DS' Manhaj and choices. Thus, they tend to fit with the collective framing (Miethe, 2009), and help in infiltrating such frames, even after joining the party and after the political interactions and challenges that came about to DS' concepts and Manhaj. This can explain that bystanders and sympathizers, who are not connected to the party or the movement on a Manhaj conviction basis, but rather on general emotional Islamist inclinations, tend to fluctuate in their relationship with the party and the movement. Thus, their affiliation is volatile and their intellectual formation might be influenced by various Islamist sources, particularly in view of the fluidity among Salafi groups (Gauvain, 2013, Miethe, 2009).

The Nature of NP:

In view, of NP's obvious religious reference, which they put forward, they stress that they are a political party that follows the Egyptian constitution, laws and social conventions, besides the vision of the party. This is because, with their decision to enter politics, they cannot breach such frameworks. Therefore, their membership is open to all Egyptians willing to adopt their Salafi ideology (Int. Mekki, 2013, Women's committee, 2014). In this regard, Al-Shahhat (2013) drew parallels of the relationship between the party and the movement to the one between the British trade unions and the Labour party, making it normal that they share a Salafi ideology.

Nevertheless, the point to be made here is that NP was not established as a power-seeking party, according to what NP members described in the field (Gawwad, 2013),¹⁴⁸ (Omar, 2013),¹⁴⁹ (leader, 2013),¹⁵⁰ (Shokry, 2013).¹⁵¹ In view of Al-Manhaj, da'awa comes first and social change is the strategic objective. Thus, a political party is merely a tool in the hands of DS, to expand their scope of activism (Women's committee, 2014, int. Makhyon, 2013),¹⁵² particularly on the level of the state, where they could advise leaders (Shams, 2013, Women's committee, 2014). Another side of participation was protecting da'awa (int. Farid, 2013),¹⁵³ and working on a wider scope with a legal framework (Gawwad, 2013). This again conforms to DS' framing of political participation discussed in chapter 5, and the framing of adopting collective action discussed in chapters 3 and 4. In addition, it reflects DS-state relationship pattern, particularly after the 2011 escalation of torturing to death of Bilal, by making the party and the NGO a legal cover for da'awa, and a way of protecting their propagation activism and members against state repression and restrictions. They also stressed the fact that their approach in dealing with political powers was not based on conflict or competition but rather on a da'awa approach (Shokry, 2013, Bakkar, 2013). This conforms to Al-Shahhat's (2010) understanding of the role of political parties, as they should not be competitors, but would rather cooperate with the governor and

¹⁴⁸ "NP's main position when it participated in the road map, and then the 5O-committee, and in the constitutional committee before that, was for protecting the articles of identity. Our participation was mainly for these articles, not for holding portfolios. We refused portfolios now and before. The focus is on society, not authority... I will not stand and fight for authority. Those who want authority, let them take it. I can talk to people, and explain to them."

¹⁴⁹ "we do not care who comes to power but rather how he governs"

¹⁵⁰ "The party is something marginal to Da'awa, because for us Da'awa is more important... This makes the easiest thing for the party is to freeze its activities if this was in the public interest... we are not aiming at positions or authority".

¹⁵¹ "we are not entering politics on conflictual or competition basis. This would negatively affect Da'awa. We avoided this, and entered politics with the intention of interaction and participation, and this is clear."

¹⁵² "Among our activities was the establishment of a political party to express DS' point of view on reform."

¹⁵³ Farid said after the Revolution, we knew that if MB participated and DS did not, they would withdraw the mosques from DS, and this already happened during MB's rule. MB replaced all Salafi managers and Imams in the Ministry of Endowments to be occupied by an MB's affiliate.

complement his role, as in the case of *shura model of governance* (see chapter 5 and appendix 4).

Therefore, it could be understood from the definitions and reasons for establishing a political party mentioned in the interviews, that the party wanted to represent a “*Shura model*” within a democratic framework and a competitive party system. It was obvious that all that they are aiming at is a foothold in politics, and presence even with 1% representation¹⁵⁴ (Talibbya, 2013), to be inside the political process (int. Farid, 2013).¹⁵⁵ Additionally, if they are able to advise or to prevent corruption they will, since it is their duty. In this respect, they do not regard themselves as responsible for political outcomes. Rather, they convey the message but they are not aiming to controlling the state. This is because controlling the state would not help in establishing the Muslim state they aim for, since in any case top-down state-led changes are ineffective (leader, 2013, int. Nasr, 2013),¹⁵⁶ (Shams, 2013, Shokry, 2013).¹⁵⁷ Again this conforms to Al-Shahhat’s formulation of the relationship between the social and state levels of DS’ Manhaj of social change discussed in chapter 5.

In sum, NP could not be judged as a typical political party according to western standards, or as an Islamist power-seeking political party. Thus, NP does not fully lie in the *politicos*, or the politicized Salafis category (Haykel, 2009, Lacroix, 2009), since it

¹⁵⁴ A young member in the Talibyya meeting said that he agrees on staying in the constitutional committee, even with a single person representation based on the Quranic verses 164-165 of Surat Al-A’raf: “A group of them said to another that used to deny their actions and warn them against the punishment of Allah: Why do you forbid those disobedient while they deserved the destruction from their Lord or a painful torment, so there is no need to remind them. When they did not pay attention to the advice and turned away from what they have been reminded, we saved the group which used to remind them and forbid them from their bad actions, then we took their aggressors to a severe torment because of their continuous lewdness.” He perceived contribution to the constitution as part of *da’awa*.

¹⁵⁵ As Farid mentioned, they wanted to be in elections and in constitutional committee to be present in the kitchen, when recipes are being cooked.

¹⁵⁶ All interviews gave a summary of DS’ foundational text on social change and the bottom-up approach versus the top-down one.

¹⁵⁷ Among others since all mentioned this in various ways.

is a party based on a religious social movement where the party is just a tool that serves the religious purpose of this movement, and is a legal cover for its religious propagation and social activities. Such a social movement does not aim at “politicizing religion; but rather at religionizing politics” (Shams, 2013), as they condemn the use of religion to serve politics, and consider it a serious violation (Shams, 2013). Thus, NP would be simply a tool of religious da’awa and is closer in its structure, management and the nature of its cadres to a religious social movement than to a political party. This makes *NP a religious actor in a political context* trying to colour the political with the religious, rather than the opposite. In other words, they are trying to make the religious discourse colonize the political, rather than assimilating the dominant political discourse. This conclusion finds support in their controversial choices during June 30 revolution.

DS’ Political Vision in Action:

The findings discussed above might explain that although NP refused MB’s practices, it did not fully approve of Al-Sisi and the June 2013 revolution alliance,¹⁵⁸ and was critical of both. For observers, NP did not only decline to support MB when Morsi was overthrown, but Makhyon appeared in the road map meeting just after Al-Sisi’s speech, and criticised members of NP’s rank and file who joined the Raba’a sit-in.¹⁵⁹ The situation became complicated after the clearing of Raba’a and the gap widened between DS/NP and the rest of Islamists (Brown, 2013). NP was perceived as the supporter of a regime that killed Islamists, and as having been used by the regime to legitimize its actions (Talibbya, 2013); whereas this could threaten the very existence of the party

¹⁵⁸ Which incorporated secular and remnants of Mubarak’s regime elements, besides common apolitical individuals who were just angry at MB’s rule.

¹⁵⁹ Nader Bakkar, NP’s spokesman offered to resign for going against the line of his party and saying that Raba’a sit-in was peaceful

itself (Brown, 2013). However, for DS' leaders, the cost of this action is still tolerable since the political party and political participation itself are only an experiment and are separate from da'awa. Yet, in reaction to this, observers saw that such a policy choice would in fact threaten da'awa and the religious activism of DS (Brown, 2013). NP and DS were aware of such a risk however, and they tried to clarify their position through a campaign that started during the fieldwork. Thus, DS and NP distanced themselves from other Islamists' choices, which conform to the DS-Islamists relationship pattern, particularly as concerns MB. In this regard, as mentioned in previous chapters, on the occasions that DS was criticized by other Islamists as splitting their front and for being clients of the regime, DS would respond by insisting upon its discourse and position, rather than resorting to intellectual compromises and rapprochement with Islamists.¹⁶⁰ Therefore, what happened between DS/NP and other Islamists after June 2013 revolution was not new, in view of their relationship pattern.

As noted earlier, whereas some of the youth the researcher met considered what happened a coup, others considered it a revolution in which the military sided with an angry nation (Talibbya, 2013). This is while others conformed to the official position of the party that NP and DS did not really care about the concepts of coup or revolution and the debates about them, and preferred to move beyond this discussion as it is of no practical use.¹⁶¹ For them, "the problem is in how to deal with reality" (Al-Affani, 2013: 10). They also justified their choice through saying that the strong presence of an Islamist faction would allow for influencing those in power, and that they managed, for

¹⁶⁰ See chapter 3 on the crisis of the Iranian Revolution.

¹⁶¹ They simplified this position saying that "If milk is spilt, would it make any difference to discuss if it is cow or buffalo milk?"

example, to prevent Al-Baradie¹⁶² from assuming power as a prime minister, besides preventing the complete annulment of the constitution. Thus, they believe that they have protected article 2 in the constitutional declaration which protects Islamic identity, and that the lack of political understanding made Islamists unable to appreciate the presence of an Islamist faction to secure balance with the seculars in the new power arrangement. They believe that they were the only Islamist faction to undertake this duty, and that some Islamists do realize this but are insisting on weakening NP (Al-Affani, 2013: 10-11).

Besides DS and NP framing of secular dominated revolutions as an existential threat to shari'aa and Islamic identity, in the case of June 2013 revolution they had fears that under such conditions state security practices might return.¹⁶³ Therefore, there is no guarantee that either negotiations or mobilization and protest would work; thus, they have chosen the option with the least risk of bloodshed, whereas the only way to keep the maximum volume of gains was *their presence* as a united entity while hiding any differences or divisions in front of the parties they negotiate with (Al-Affani, 2013). This is, again, a reproduction of DS' framing tools of cost-benefit analysis and weighing the consequences of their actions in view of the context. Such framing processes and mobilization target the protection of da'awa and shari'aa and Islamic identity. Thus, on one hand, this reflects the primarily religious and realist identity of DS/NP members. On the other hand, it indicates the *continuity and consistency* of their discourse and the *reproduction of their Manhaj* or ideology.

¹⁶² The icon of the political change movement in Egypt, and one of DS' secular rivals, who has been openly criticized in the texts analyzed in chapter 5.

¹⁶³ NP's members, despite supporting the road map, expressed in various interviews their fear of the return of the state security oppression against Islamists.

Meanwhile, according to NP members and statements (Al-Affani, 2013), after the “massacre of the Republican Guards’ club,” NP withdrew from the road map because both the government and MB did not abide by it, and continued their intransigence and agitation.¹⁶⁴ Mr. Galal Morra, the secretary general of the party, warned against injustice in dealing with the situation in Raba’a, and that this might cause popular outrage. NP issued various official statements warning against forming a popular delegation to deal with the situation in Raba’a with exceptional standards, and that state institutions should respect the law or else this would threaten the very existence of the state. In addition, DS announced before God that it does not hold responsibility for all those who practised, ordered, instigated, or resolved upon shedding blood (party, 2013a, Al-Affani, 2013). Younis Makhyon and Ahmed Khalil Khairalla,¹⁶⁵ members of the supreme committee of NP, among others, held Al-Sisi, Adly Mansour¹⁶⁶ and all their supporters responsible for any killings or bloodshed (Al-Affani, 2013: 12-13). After clearing the Raba’a sit-in, NP and DS issued a statement (party, 2013b) in which they condemned excess use of force and demanded the resignation of the government. In addition, Borhami held responsible for the bloodshed all those who ordered a haphazard dismantling of the sit-in (Al-Affani, 2013: 13-14). In the middle of the congested post-June 2013 political context, NP mentioned that their strategic target is the society, whereas the state does not represent anything “except a mere hat on a huge body” (Al-Affani, 2013:16). NP published a booklet in which it re-stated DS’ Manhaj of social

¹⁶⁴ For instance, according to NP’s booklet, MB said that terrorist attacks in Sinai will continue until Morsi is back in power, and they claimed that there were divisions within the army. NP also asked the Grand Sheikh of Al-Azhar to mediate but he was considered a traitor by MB, which rejected all means and attempts of reconciliation, until Morsi gets back in power, which was, from NP’s point of view, an unreasonable demand. In addition, Al-Beltagi said on July 26th 2013 that the army offered that all MB’s leaders can go out of the sit-in and that they would be pardoned and that their money would not be confiscated, but MB refused this offer and insisted on the return of Morsi (AL-AFFANI, S. E. 2013. Who is responsible? suspicions and replies. *In*: AL NOR PARTY, A. D. A. A. S. (ed.). Dar Al Hoda

¹⁶⁵ The head of NP’s parliamentary bloc in 2015.

¹⁶⁶ The then-provisional president.

change, as in the foundational texts of the movement, as an explanation for their actions (Al-Affani, 2013). NP's post-June 2013 revolution framing and justifications conform to the conclusions of CDA in chapter 5 as concerns DS' rejection of protest, and the fact that, even if they cautiously participated in protests after January 2011 (see appendix 3), they never participated in sit-ins, and this participation was for a religious reason rather than due to power conflict. In addition, it was obvious that DS' Manhaj of social change is central in their justification, particularly as regards rejecting Takfir and distinguishing themselves from the rest of Islamists' discourse (Al-Shahhat, 2013e).¹⁶⁷ Therefore, in view of their Manhaj and history, they did not frame the Raba'a sit-in as a fight for legitimacy or shari'a, and they had reservations on the content of the speeches delivered in the sit-in that at least implied Takfir (int. Al-Shahhat, 2013).

To sum up, NP's primarily religious approach, guided by its Manhaj, made it distance itself from both the Islamists and the regime with its June 2013 alliance, since it criticized both of them, boycotted all protests, and refused to take any ministerial positions (Gawwad, 2013, Al-Affani, 2013). Yet, it remained committed to the road map, and accepted a single member representation in the constitutional committee, to protect article 2 that has been their initial target for involvement in politics (Talibbya, 2013). Revising DS' objectives of having a political party, references and commitments discussed at the beginning of this section would make such actions understandable. However, such choices could be read as inconsistent, if the concept of a power-seeking party or a pragmatic political Islamist movement that uses religion as a tool is projected on them. In the case of NP, founded on DS' Manhaj, the party resembled a tool that serves the religious reference, which led to its apolitical policy choices. This led to

¹⁶⁷ See chapters 3, 4, and 5.

alienating NP from the rest of political powers, cost them state support and a large part of their popular base, and gave a controversial image about them.

The development of NP's critical situation was clear in the 2015 parliamentary elections. However, the party chose to participate in the elections with only two lists instead of four, and with 165 candidates instead of 220, to emphasize their intention and approach of a cooperative rather than a competitive political power and, according to Al-Shahhat (2015), in order to contain the public's fear that they are repeating MB's experience. He added that one of their electoral lists was in upper Egypt where DS has a weak presence, and they wanted to take the opportunity of elections to introduce themselves in this area (Al-Shahhat, 2015). Such policy choices conform to the party's nature as non-power seeking, entering politics to interact and to widen the scope and outreach of da'awa and Manhaj. However, such intentions convinced neither the public, fellow political parties, nor the media.

As a result, NP did not form any alliances with secular powers during the 2015 parliamentary elections (Al-Shahhat, 2015), despite the fact that it knew it lost the votes of the rest of Islamists. Within this context, NP choices during elections were framed around the fact that they are the only Islamist party that aims at securing a foothold in the system. Thus, in order to protect the religious foundations, and by using DS' interests versus evils calculations, it became possible to form a temporary alliance with non-Islamists for electoral purposes. Although this was true, NP was not welcome by seculars at this point. Al-Shahhat mentioned they tried to join any front in the elections, but no political power wanted to cooperate with them, and they were basically left with one option, that is to run against all other parties and fronts on their own (Al-Shahhat, 2015). In this respect, while insisting on preserving their religious identity, and through

operationalizing Manhaj and framing the situation as an existential threat to shari'aa, NP accepted temporarily to have women and Christian candidates and was willing to join a secular electoral front in the run for parliament. These policy choices came to satisfy electoral laws, while denouncing all three and rejecting them on religious basis.¹⁶⁸ The gap between their actions and convictions and discourse created a distance, not only between NP and other political actors, but also with the public, who perceive DS/NP's flexibility and realism as an abuse of religion (Field notes, 2013-2014).

Meanwhile, as a result of NP's choices, after June 30 state-DS relationship largely returned to its historic pattern. However, state limitations this time came through the Ministry of Religious Endowments, which put restrictions on DS' sheikhs, and made their access to lectures and religious speeches subject to its licensing and supervision (Mostafa, 2015). Moreover, NP and DS leaders complained of security pressures, and state bias against them during elections, which added to the reasons for their minimal electoral achievement (Nabil, 2015b), that came way below their modest expectations. However, under such conditions and with media defamation campaigns against the party, NP decided to continue with the elections, whatever their representation in the parliament would eventually become (Nabil, 2015b).

To conclude, NP's political isolation might be a result of their policy choices that did not conform to political compromises as much as to DS' Manhaj, and the pattern and legacy of their historical relationships with other political powers (including fellow Islamists) discussed in previous chapters. In addition, through their engagement in debates on political reform, and social change, DS/NP expressed their rejection of what they called *polarization*, since they were keen on affirming that they are not biased

¹⁶⁸ Since women and Christians should not be allowed full political rights, and secularism is associated with polytheism in their discourse.

towards one group to the detriment of the other, but are offering an independent discourse, that might be seen as a third path.¹⁶⁹ Despite the *consistency* in applying their Manhaj, their choices remained confusing to the public who, in addition to observing what they considered as being contradictions in NP's political positions, were not satisfied with DS' and NP's adherence to their shocking discourse as regards the national culture, and issues of citizenship. What added to the confusion was NP's choice to run Christian candidates on their lists for the 2015 parliamentary elections; thus reinforcing the image of a pragmatic political party. All these choices were not understandable from the viewpoint of both specialists and the public.

In view of the main findings that NP is part and parcel of DS, and that both the movement and the party abide by DS original Manhaj, it is useful to explore this religious party's position on the most controversial issues they were faced with in view of such Manhaj and the nature of the party. These issues are namely the issue of women, and the citizenship of the Christians, in addition to NP's stance on art and culture.

Controversial Issues in DS/NP Discourse:

Women:

The results of CDA (see appendix 5) applied to DS' and NP's texts on women reveals that, for DS/NP, women are not submissive figures shrouded in black, but nor they do resemble a fully liberated model: instead they appear as between these extremes. The gap between DS/NP women's feeling of over-confidence and success expressed in

¹⁶⁹ Such rejection to polarization was discussed in the interviews, especially, in the female leaders' meeting when they said, people in politics now want us to be with them or else we are their enemies. Mekki also expressed his fears of the possibility of having a police state after June 30, and of the return to the pre-January 2011 revolution. He said that NP shares with the rest of political powers (despite ideological and political differences) the fear of the scenario of who is not with us is our enemy, and who does not approve of all state's decisions would be oppressed.

interviews, and through ethnographic research observations, and the image of a submissive woman (Ahmed, 2011, Khatib, 2006), could be mainly attributed to society's attempts to impose liberal, feminist, and nationalist discourses upon them. This is while they actually provide a new model of female politicians and activists who might be more empowered and fulfilled by their Salafi Manhaj than many unveiled and westernized women, while not matching the feminist and liberal discourses on women's liberation and on what successful women look like (Meijer, 2009, Mahmood, 2001). Thus, they are a different model, yet not necessarily in a negative or a positive sense. From another angle, there is an obvious gap between DS' strict religious discourse on women and women's actual moderate practices in reality. Finally, what augmented DS' women's societal crisis was their personal choice to keep a low profile, and to adhere to their traditional role as prescribed by the religious interpretations they adopt.

Christians:

As regards Christians in DS' discourse, putting aside the reasons behind running Christians candidates on NP's electoral lists, CDA results (see appendix 5) highlighted the fact that there is a gap between NP's discourse and their political action in this regard. NP and DS see their shocking discourse about Christians as logical, and that they have all the right to adhere to it out of belief concerns.¹⁷⁰ In view of DS members' vision, the words and terms they use to describe Christians have a largely positive, or at least a neutral, connotation. However, Christians believe that their connotation is extremely offensive. Moreover, everyday Muslims met on the field see that for instance calling Christians 'Kafir' is alien to the mainstream discourse that "Christians worship God in a different way, and that they have fatal belief and faith violations and

¹⁷⁰ Loyalty and enmity

misunderstanding, yet it is none of Muslims' business" (Field notes, 2013-2014). Such tolerant or indifferent discourse of everyday Muslims might also reflect an inherent national security fear of sectarian conflict, or of discussing such a sensitive issue, even if some Muslims do not fully respect Christians (Dalacoura, 2014).¹⁷¹ In addition, the arguments used in the interviews imply that accumulations of discursive conflicts between Muslim and Christian extremists (in reference to the Bishop Bishoy crisis discussed earlier), left DS' members with hard feelings. However, DS' members believe that in all cases they should strictly abide by shari'a and grant Christians their social and protection rights, for the sake of respecting divine orders and for purposes of peaceful co-existence. This suggests that they are against the mistreatment of Christians or using violence against them. In this regard, Nasr explained that in view of DS' understanding, "DS is the only Islamist group that never used violence against Christians" (int. Nasr, 2013).

Yet, "full citizenship rights and status of Christians," remains the point of contradiction between DS Manhaj and religious discourse, and the Egyptian legal framework which NP says it respects and follows. This gap between belief and the law, and NP's attempts to combine both in a very delicate equation, may be held responsible for the inconsistent behaviour of NP. Therefore, according to its discourse, NP seems to choose such controversial acts purposefully, even if they lead to a high political cost, or put the party's image at stake.

In this regard, despite enrolling Christians on NP's electoral lists, the party or DS' figures never mentioned that this is out of tolerance and acceptance of full Christian citizenship, but rather because of the elections law that imposes this on them, and in

¹⁷¹ Dalacoura says "Let us be honest: for the majority of Egyptians, women and the Copts must be kept firmly in their place." However, people do not want to be politically incorrect.

view of the practical considerations where no electoral front accepted to form an alliance with NP: they thus had to enrol Christians of their own (Morsy, 2015, al Shahhat, 2015). Nevertheless, according to the elections law the Christian quota is only obligatory in case of forming lists not for the individual candidates (Morsy, 2015, ElectoralCommission), which raises questions about the motivation of NP to enrol Christians if they could have just competed for individual seats. One of the possible justifications would be that NP wanted to assure the state, and other political powers, that they are a political party that conforms to the Constitution, particularly, when there was a legal case against them in the supreme administrative court demanding their dissolution on the basis of being a religious party in contradiction with the Egyptian Constitution (Kamel, 2016). This is while NP insists that it is a political party open to all Egyptians but with a Salafi ideology, and like any political party, they have an intellectual reference (Int. Mekki, 2013). Thus, in view of NP's belief and self-identification, it could be true that Christians' presence was a formality to complete the image of the party, and using DS' cost-benefit analysis and logic, such policy choice might maximize interests and minimize the losses, since for them absence from the political scene is a loss, and presence even with insignificant representation is a success (Talibbya, 2013). Yet, despite of the negative image that NP acquired, it seems that they achieved their target, since the court ruling rejected the party dissolution (Kamel, 2016).

Despite the enrollment of Christians on their electoral lists, none of them were represented in the parliament which might be attributed to the general deterioration in NP's political position, as well as the possibility that DS and NP's members might have chosen to vote for individual candidates rather than the lists that included Christians. However, in view of a closed absolute lists system and low turnout in the elections

especially in its first round, NP still got 30% of the votes, and while none of NP's lists won even in Alexandria, DS' capital and strong hold, 12 individual candidates won (al Shahhat, 2015, ElectoralCommission). Nevertheless, putting aside the political weakness of NP at this period, which this thesis attributes to the dominance of the religious discourse and Manhaj over political considerations, it seemed also that NP was trying to keep the balance between Manhaj and legal commitments through manipulating the elections law. This can be seen from the position and order of Christians on the electoral lists where in all the lists Christians came in the middle or towards the end of the lists, sometimes after NP's women candidates, and despite putting Nader Al-Serafi, their prominent Christian figure, as number six on the Alexandria list, he came after Hanan Allam the women's leader in the party, in a 15-candidate list (SupportNPFront, 2015). Moreover, the Alexandria list was competing in a constituency of high Christian concentration where the counter-electoral front "In love of Egypt" included, among others, Suzi Nashed, a church-supported candidate; meanwhile, the Christian anti-church candidate on NP's list was considered a traitor (Al-Hadidi, 2015, al Shahhat, 2015). So, the order of the Christian candidates and the nature of the constituency might void this enrollment of its meaning, even if NP was powerful at this period. Thus, if this explanation was true, it would mean that NP follows the law but can always maneuver in order to simultaneously adhere to Manhaj.

Art and Culture:

Such detachment from the mainstream discourse in Egypt is not separate from DS/NP's equally debateable position on art and culture. In this regard, as a Salafi movement and party, while proving to be responsive to local traditions, they practise de-culturation in view of their rejection of aspects of popular culture (music, dancing, movies, and TV

series), as banned by religion and leading to immorality and deviation (Roy, 2004, Bonnefoy, 2009, Gauvain, 2013). In this regard, CDA results (see appendix 5) of NP's and DS' texts show that they do not ban all kinds of art. They only accept the art that abides by religious rules and restrictions. Thus, they accept cinema and acting, as long as it conforms to shari'a, particularly when it is modest, and does not include insults (Gawwad, 2013, Shams, 2013). However, they say that there are clear texts in the Quran and Sunna which ban music, according to their interpretation (Women's committee, 2014). Nevertheless, they respect chanting, and members of DS compose their chanting songs and practise poetry recitation, Arabic handwriting and painting, and female respondents reported that they had their women's magazine (Women's committee, 2014). They were also aware of the popular culture, and were not isolated. However, they have chosen to detach themselves from it and to make their own sort of sub-culture in which they give up many of the popular cultural aspects (Women's committee, 2014). Yet, they said that it is not wise to attack all aspects of culture in a shocking way, but rather to apply a more sustainable solution through social change and spreading da'awa, which conforms to DS' long term, gradual bottom-up social change approach, so that a Muslim committed society would present more Islamic choices, and give up on sources of vice (Shams, 2013).

Moreover, in interviews, the common point of view among the interviewed was the acceptance of traditions, habits and convention. Thus, the way people celebrate, and all aspects of modern life are acceptable as long as they are not connected to infidelity or pagan practices (Shams, 2013, int. Nasr, 2013). Moreover, convention and customary law is highly respected by DS' members and "is considered one of the references in Islamic shari'a, and could be a source of legislation in the absence of a clear religious

text dealing with a given issue” (int. Nasr, 2013). Therefore, people’s customs and culture¹⁷² are highly respected, and DS’ members think that imposing a law that defies them would be considered a top-down change that people would undermine and find ways to secretly evade. So, if there are harmful habits, they should be countered by education and spreading awareness (Gawwad, 2013). Such a stance supports the bottom-up approach in DS’ discourse. They also believe that Islam gives a wide range of options and alternatives to fit the conditions of people who are diversified as regards culture, social class, education, and even weather and regional conditions (int. F. leader, 2013). This conforms to DS’ discourse that Islam is comprehensive and all inclusive, as well as their flexibility and context-based religious rulings.

The Implications of DS’ Discourse on its Approach to Society, and on Society’s Perception of DS:

From the above, DS discourse reflects a tendency to adhere to a bottom-up reform approach to society’s violations, and a non-Takfiri approach to the society, where people definitely commit sins and pitfalls (Omar, 2013). On the contrary, they see the society as mostly conservative (Int. Mekki, 2013), with no recognition for the role of the state in constructing this Islamic identity and in promoting conservative discourse (Ismail, 2003), as mentioned in chapter 3. This shows that they do not see themselves as the “chosen people” or the “saviours,” but are just people who study, and who have extra information that they want to share (Omar, 2013, Gawwad, 2013), and that each Muslim should share whatever religious information he learns with others, even if he or

¹⁷² For instance, female genital mutilation is not Islamic and is dependent on specific medical diagnosis. However, since it is a tradition, DS’ members prefer to spread awareness and use persuasion to fight this phenomenon rather than impose laws on the society that defy their traditions. Moreover, underage-marriage, common in rural areas, cannot be condemned for DS since Islam does not ban it. However, they do not prefer it and see the only way to fight it is through education and awareness as well (Gawwad, 2013).

she is not a scholar (Shokry, 2013, Meeting Female leaders, 2014, Gawwad, 2013, Omar, 2013). This conforms to the importance of education, and the focus on the individual and social levels in DS' methodology, through means of sharing information, direct interaction, and building upon emotional informal and faith-based relationships with individuals and groups within their communities (Omar, 2013, Women's committee, 2014, Gawwad, 2013).

The features of their propagation or da'awa discourse, besides being non-Takfiri and non-violent, does not assume the role of guardians, as in the case of top-down approaches. However, this positive aspect of their social change approach contradicts the image of the sectarian, religiously strict Salafis. This could be explained in view of their obvious detachment from the popular culture, rejecting most types of art, which is perceived as a tendency of de-culturation, and departing from the mainstream discourse of Egyptian Islam (discussed in chapters 3 and 5), in addition to their perception of women's political rights and restrictions,¹⁷³ and the status of Christians and their right to full citizenship. Moreover, the fact that Salafis tend to have a special outfit, such as Niqab, and dressing in dark colours through which DS' women are distinguished (Gawwad, 2013), as well as letting men's beards grow (Shokry, 2013),¹⁷⁴ make them differentiated among other Egyptians, with all the negative and positive reactions to this look (Field notes, 2013-2014).

In view of the abovementioned factors to DS' discourse, despite being non-Takfiri, non-violent, promoting a bottom-up approach to social change and accommodating

¹⁷³ Salafi women follow such rules willingly, and are not giving priority to political rights, but still see that they are empowered.

¹⁷⁴ They insist on their look even if it causes social resentment, or problems with security. Shokry said that, in Islam, there is no difference between core and crust. All religious rules and practices should be followed even as concerns appearance and whatever the challenges are. This was in a researcher's comment on why DS' members do not shave to hide their identity, since, after June 30, they were subject to security threats from MB, and generally from common people in the street who were mad at Islamists.

conventions and traditions, it remains resisted by the public. In this regard, the public might read NP's actions as contradictory, and alien. This is because the bridge between NP's policy choices and its rigid adherence to DS' discourse - through evils-benefits calculations and context-based religious rulings - might be unfamiliar to the public. Moreover, a religious actor that enters politics and does not shift from the quietists or coverts, to the politicos category or the MB model, but rather tries to religionize politics, might also be atypical, not falling completely into one or the other of the established categories of Salafis or Islamists in the literature. However, as Meijer (2009) suggests, such Salafi categories should be seen as a sliding scale. Thus, DS/NP sit at a distinct point among these categories. Considering the distinct nature of DS among Islamists, and the novelty of NP's experience, particularly in the Egyptian context and within the current discursive field that is dominated by anti-Islamist discourse after the MB experience, it is very probable that DS/NP will at least be perceived as a different group, if not a dangerous one. These challenges raise questions about the future prospects of NP on the Egyptian political scene.

Conclusion

This chapter presented DS' vision for social and political change as a political actor, through analysing the discourse of NP, DS' political front, to find out whether NP's discourse departs from that of DS. The relationship between DS and NP, both on the intellectual and structural levels, was discussed in order to highlight the implications of DS' vision on the nature of NP, and its policy choices.

The findings indicate that DS and NP have a unified discourse, with both adhering to DS' Manhaj of change and general guiding principles. The analysis also suggested a structural connection between the movement and the party in addition to a clear Shura mechanism of managing both DS and NP, and an obvious intellectual decentralization. This results in low levels of party discipline, which might be compensated by taking adherence to Manhaj as the core framing and mobilization tool of the movement. Thus, DS/NP's strength lies not in the organizational aspect, but rather in their Manhaj. Accordingly, NP's policy choices refer to DS' Manhaj, and its members are open about the religious reference of the political party and its Salafi ideology. This is while stressing that it is not a religious party, and with emphasis on its conformity to the Constitution.

In this regard, DS/NP framed the post-revolution situation as representing an existential threat to shari'a. Therefore, they operationalized the framing tools of cost-benefit analysis based on religious rulings, weighing consequences of actions, and of context-based choices, that are historically the main tools of DS' framing. Accordingly, DS/NP framed decisions to enter politics, and then to allow women and Christian candidates in parliamentary elections, as bringing more benefits than evils. Such actions were taken while announcing that they defy Islam and condemning them as a vice that they are temporarily compelled to undertake. Thus, in spite of commitment to the Egyptian legal framework and social conventions, both DS and NP are open about their beliefs that might contradict such frameworks (i.e. the belief in incomplete citizenship rights for women and Christians). Such an attitude, which they do not hide, implies a tendency for exclusionary practices. These account for the drop in the party's popularity, and arouse

suspicious about NP's actions that would seem contradictory to the public, even if they were resorted to for the sake of abiding by law.

In addition, DS and NP members are also critical about the aspects of national culture, and about secular parties' thought and choices. Thus, besides their historical distinction from fellow Islamists, DS' and NP's discourse departs from the mainstream political discourse and national culture. Moreover, they created a sub-culture of their own that made them different, and despite being aware of their sub-culture, they believe it should be spread through da'awa, because it is, in their opinion, the ideal model, being derived from Islam. Holding firm to their interpretations, and to a different outlook and appearance, is understood by the public as a tendency of either oppressive views, or a superior attitude. Such a national impression contradicts DS' containment approach for da'awa, which is at work on limited local areas, and within close circles. This could be attributed to the weakness of DS' communication skills and presentation on a wider social scope. Thus, state restrictions and media defamation might not be the only reasons for the negative Salafi image in the society. This was particularly noticeable when access to the media and wider interactions, in the absence of state restrictions immediately after January 2011 revolution, did not help much in changing this image. However, this can also be explained in light of the nature of DS' discursive field that is dominated by the Al-Azhar discourse on the religious level and secular's discourse on the political level.

In addition, such a gap between the party's actions, belief and the legal framework and mainstream discourse, both on the cultural and political levels, made the party's discourse and choices controversial, and led to political losses, and even to political isolation. Yet, their mostly apolitical choices could be understood, in view of the party's

nature as non-power seeking, just aiming at securing a political foothold. This is for the sake of bringing about DS' vision on the table and to defend Shari'a, on basis of cooperation, rather than political competition, as a shura model of politics. They also participate politically in order to widen the scope of da'awa outreach within new social classes and sectors, including the elite and governors. Thus, if they are present and have access to new places, this is a success for them, albeit more on a religious than on political basis. Finally, NP sets a model of a party religionizing politics rather than politicizing religion; thus constituting a political entity restricted in its policy choices by religious rulings and calculations, rather than adapting its Manhaj to politics. This is arguably a new phenomenon in Egyptian politics, where religion traditionally serves politics, not the opposite. Therefore, being a new and different model, one that works against its context, adds to suspicions about NP actions and intentions, and makes its policy choices unclear, if not controversial.

CONCLUSION

Al-Da'awa Al-Salafyya (DS) and Social and Political Change

This thesis has argued that Al-Da'awa Al-Salafyya's (DS) Manhaj of social and political change, which is a primarily religious project, did not alter following the movement's entry into politics and the establishment of its political front, Al-Nor Party (NP), in 2011. It has further been argued that the wider movement and the political party are intellectually and structurally connected. Thus, DS' approach to change represents a vision that was sustained throughout the movement's history including, crucially, the period following the structural changes in the Egyptian political context brought about by the January 2011 revolution. Thus, DS' Manhaj for change is a long-term, gradual project founded on propagation and education as its sole means. This ideology was formed through the movement's interaction with its Egyptian context, and was maintained and extended through a dynamic framing process, which was explored through CDA operationalized in this thesis.

DS' Manhaj of social change is a project that occurs over three levels: the individual, the social, and the state. The final, state level is treated fatalistically, as a divine grant which should thus emanate from a reformed society, not imposed on it. Consequently, this Manhaj gives priority to the individual and the social levels over the state level and to the religious over the political. Accordingly, it is a bottom-up approach that focuses on the education of the individual and finding and founding a community of believers that carries out sufficiency duties, among them da'awa. Eventually, empowerment will be accomplished and the reformed society will make Islamic righteous choices, which will be reflected on the state level. Thus, DS does not aim at establishing an Islamic

state as such. Instead, it focuses its efforts on the first two levels of the individual and the social, leaving the state to divine will.

This approach to social and political change, besides being gradual and bottom up, is also non-Takfiri. This is because DS does not consider a society departing from Islamic teachings as infidel; but rather as committing sins and vices that can only be changed through da'awa and advice. This implies that DS do not advocate confronting vice through violence. Such an attitude can also be attributed to the movement's rationalist nature, where it weighs the consequences of its actions, assesses reality requirements, and applies a cost-benefit analysis guided by religion. In this respect, the Manhaj is based on the movement's Salafi methodology of deriving religious rulings from the Quran and Sunna with reference to pious predecessors (Salaf). Thus, DS, as a Salafi movement, shares with other Salafis the literalist interpretations of Quran and Sunna; gives priority to the text over human reason (Al-Naql qabl Al-A'ql). It also emphasizes the issue of Tawhid (oneness of God) as its main creed issue and adopts ijtihaḍ (individual reason within texts and with guidance of Salaf interpretations) rather than Taqlid (imitation) and Madhabyya (following the four Islamic law schools). It follows that DS' intellectual mode is characterised by self-learning and independence from scholars, with only shallow scholastic hierarchies (Haykel, 2009), which were reflected on the structure and internal dynamics of DS as a social movement.

DS and the Political Map of Salafism

However, since Salafis differ among themselves as concerns Manhaj, or the way they engage with the world, while sharing the same creed, references, and their relative agreement on Ijtihaḍ and Fiqh issues, they also differ as concerns understanding their

contexts, and how to apply religious rulings to them (Haykel, 2009, Wiktorowicz, 2006). Accordingly, DS, despite being a Salafi movement, does not sit neatly in any of the standing global or Egyptian Salafi categories in the literature. On the global level, DS neither fully belongs to the quietists nor to the covert Salafis, who preach quietism while being political activists. This is because DS neither propagated a typical quietist approach, despite the clear influence of Al-Albani on DS' political views, nor carried out political activism. Thus, DS does not fall into the political activists' category which, as per the literature, falls within the orbit of MB political thought (Meijer, 2009, Lacroix, 2009, Haykel, 2009). Nevertheless, DS, while abstaining from political activism, still held an oppositional position against Mubarak's regime. Meanwhile, on the Egyptian Salafi ideological spectrum, DS cannot be considered mild Qutbis as suggested in the literature (Gauvain, 2013), since it considers Qutbism as a negative label. Moreover, despite its close connections with AS, DS denounces the Madkhali trend that preaches full obedience to the ruler.

In this regard, DS neither approved of the regime, nor declared Mubarak as Kafir, and did not adopt the revolutionary approach. Its position was rather that ruling by laws that defy shari'a is kufr. Thus, DS applied Takfir on action and did not announce the ruler himself as Kafir. This can be connected to DS' tendency to restrict and limit Takfir of individuals, which for DS should be subject to a long complicated process, to be carried out only by scholars. Moreover, DS does not see that ousting the ruler through revolution is the way out of non-Islamic rule. Thus, while opposing Mubarak, they propagated their Manhaj of social change that is based on da'awa and persuasion rather than revolution or violence.

Studying DS as a Social Movement

Being one version of Al-Albani's theory of education and purification (Lacroix, 2009), DS saw that, under Mubarak's regime, political participation is necessarily associated with religious concessions. That is why it opted to stay apolitical, and was highly critical of MB for giving priority to politics over religion. This way, DS, while being the product of socio-economic, political and cultural conditions and interactions within the Egyptian context (Gauvain, 2013), remained distinct on the map of Islamist activism. Accordingly, DS' entry to politics raised questions about its plans and intentions and the nature of the role it wants to play on the Egyptian political scene, especially as DS was understudied before January 2011 revolution. That is why this thesis sees that the starting point in studying DS should not be the political party established by DS but rather the religious movement and its vision for change. This is to be able to evaluate to what extent the movement influenced the ideology, and, thus, the policy choices, of the party, and how its vision was put into action. In fact, confining analysis to the party's policy choices and strategies, or even its discourse, means a focus on the political aspect which leads to missing the ideational, theological and legal aspects of the religious movement and the party. This usually results in a dichotomous depiction of Salafi activism, between Jihadis and the politically submissive, while ignoring the variations in between (Haykel, 2009). Therefore, this thesis deals with the religious social movement and its vision, as the foundations for the political moves and policy choices of the party. It also engages the question of to what extent the framing processes of the movement and of its political party, upon entering politics, departed from or conformed to the movement's foundations and original discourse or ideology.

Thus, this thesis provided a narrative of the history of DS as a social movement that constituted a collective challenge to existing social, political, and even religious definitions and arrangements in the Egyptian context. DS developed a common approach to social change represented by its Manhaj, with the purpose of applying it to society, and propagated it through a specific educational curriculum that has been taught in its institutes, mosques, and even in private, to the different generations of the movement. In addition, it invested in creating solidarities and networks, based on faith sister/brotherhood, and interacted with their secular and Islamist opponents, as well as with the state (Jenkins, 2005). As a group struggling over the definition of meanings, concepts, and the approach to change, they give special attention to building Muslim identity and lifestyle that matches their Manhaj, and to reforming society, and consequently state arrangements and institutions (Nash, 2010).

To better understand DS' vision for social change, its emergence and development as a social movement was studied in view of its Egyptian context, to understand how the interactions and the features of this context influenced DS' framing processes that eventually resulted in the formation of its ideology or vision for social change. Such a vision was refined through dynamic framing processes in reaction to the developments and events within the Egyptian context. Within this context, for example, DS entered into discussion and conflicts with MB, and violent and Takfiri groups, through which DS developed its distinct vision among other Islamists, despite being accused of splitting the Islamist front, and sometimes of being clients of the regime.

The Discursive Basis of DS' Method for Social Change (Manhaj)

The continuous interactions and discursive conflicts that carved the features of DS' Manhaj were mainly on the issues of its social change methodology - or Manhaj - and its position on the state, Hisba (commanding virtue and preventing vice), Takfir and violence, and the Iranian revolution or the Shi'ite issue. In addition, they did not join the dominant conservative alliance that prevailed in Egypt during their emergence, thus departed from the mainstream Islam as propagated by Al-Azhar sheikhs, sponsored by the state and supported by the bourgeoisie, and with an understanding with the moderate Islamist opposition (Ismail, 2003). This might be because the Salafi approach of DS went against the Asha'ari (reason-based) approach of Al-Azhar that also builds on the popular segments of Egyptian culture and Sufism. Such creedal and intellectual differences with the official religious institution resulted in the marginalization of DS. Even within the duality of radicals-moderates that prevailed in the 1980s-1990s, due to the rising terrorist attacks, DS, despite being anti-Takfir, anti-violence, was not placed on the moderate camp either. This came with DS sharing almost all the features of the dominant conservative discourse, however, while keeping a distance and independence from the conservative alliance (Ismail, 2003). This can also be explained by Al-Azhar's view of DS, and of Salafis in general, as Wahhabi and non-Egyptian (Gauvain, 2013). As discussed earlier in the thesis, DS, despite the high esteem it accords to Mohammed ibn Abdel Wahhab and to the Saudi prominent sheikhs, Ibn Baz and Ibn U'thaymin, and considering them among their references, was keen on establishing its independence from them and on emphasizing the distinct nature and agenda of their Salafi School.

Nevertheless, DS' conservative discursive field that aimed at neutralizing radicals and besieging seculars through censorship of their intellectual production, while

marginalizing DS, indirectly served its survival. In fact, DS propagation mission became easier in a context of re-islamization, where the society became fertile for accepting DS' da'awa activities, that was facilitated by the spread of Islamic products, mosques, speeches, booklets, and audio-tapes (Ismail, 2003). Moreover, within the radicals-moderates' narrative, being non-Takfiri, anti-violence and due to the apolitical nature of DS, it evaded much of state's repression to Islamists. However, DS-state relationship was fluctuating where the state undertook occasional attacks on the movement to limit its expansion, while keeping its presence within the state designated lines. This could be explained by the fact that, while not put on the moderates' camp, DS was used by the state, though informally, to de-radicalize and contain youth by providing a religious alternative to radicals, which might be credible because it distances itself from the state.

DS leaders were also clear that collective action is means to protect and spread da'awa and is not an end in itself. Thus, they were willing to give up parts of their structure and organizational entities as part of an understanding with the state, in return for allowing them to continue da'awa. DS undertook its activities on a wider geographical scale but in smaller groups so as not to provoke security concerns, and they carried da'awa in private but not in secrecy, and thus were able to teach their curriculum in the various governorates, and to infiltrate their Manhaj. This way, DS managed to survive under the authoritarian regime, and through the fluctuations of DS-state relationship.

From the above, DS' differences with the dominant discourse as well as with fellow Islamists, particularly MB, were because of its Manhaj. Thus, DS neither framed state-sponsored conservatism as an opportunity, nor joined the Islamists' front, led by MB. Accordingly, DS preferred to live with limited resources and to sacrifice parts of its

organizational structures, than to sacrifice the independence of its intellectual agenda, or to provide concessions as concerns Manhaj. Thus, Manhaj was always central in the movement's mobilization, decision making, and framing processes.

The Dynamic Production of DS' Ideology

In this respect, DS as social movement does not defend "preconfigured" ideas but was rather developing and producing meanings, organizing experience, and guiding action, through simplifying events and realities with the intention of mobilization, where framing, i.e. the *meaning production* process, is dynamic (Snow, 2007, 2000). Thus, DS' Manhaj or ideology was formed through interaction with other Islamists, and the components of the Egyptian context, through a dynamic process of framing. After establishing its ideology, its main features were refined through interactions and framing processes which constituted an extension to the movement's Manhaj. In this thesis, the formation of the DS' ideology and the dynamic framing processes as the discursive practices of the movement were studied through critical discourse analysis (CDA).

The result of applying CDA to DS' foundational texts on social change shows that its distinct Manhaj developed as a result of dynamic framing of other Islamist approaches to change. In this respect, DS emphasized the importance of the context and conditions to politically participate, and dismissed political participation as a means of change in cases it would necessarily lead to religious concessions. They also disengaged the concepts of Jihad and the Islamist military confrontation groups, where these were held to not conform to the conditions of Jihad in Islam. Moreover, they argued that Jihad has various stages, of which da'awa should be the first. However, they criticized the

individual da'awa approach, on the basis that collective action and organized da'awa allow them to carry out sufficiency duties on a wider scope and in a more comprehensive manner across all social levels. Thus, DS sees that da'awa and education of the individual and finding and founding the community of believers requires a collective action to carry out sufficiency duties, which will eventually lead to changing of the whole society, and consequently the state.

As a result, DS identified itself as primarily Salafi, rationalist, prudent, anti-Takfiri and anti-violent. It was also stressing its scholastic identity as a group that chose its method as a result of expansive research, studies and precise definition of Islamic concepts and legal issues. Thus, it is not willing to offer any compromises in order to achieve a rapprochement with neither fellow Islamists, particularly MB and Jihadis, nor with the conservative dominant discourse. DS was also keen on keeping the consistency of their discourse against state repression. It also preserved a hostile discourse against seculars, Christians, and the West, which is normal for a Salafi movement. However, this perception of the Other and the religious self-identification became problematic when DS entered politics. Moreover, the fact that it dismissed political participation as a means of social change, and then established a political party after the January 2011 revolution, raised questions about whether DS changed its Manhaj of social change and transformed its discourse, or whether NP would depart from the movement's ideology.

To answer these questions this study offered an overview of DS' texts as concerns the various issues in the national debate on social change in the pre- January 2011 revolution period. Then, CDA was applied to the movement's texts, during the days of protest and Tahrir square sit-in, which reflected their assessment of revolution as means of change, within a revolutionary context. CDA was also applied to texts on social

change and reform in the post-January 2011 revolution period. This was significant as it tracked DS' discourse upon involvement in political interactions in order to explore how the movement's Manhaj of social change fared in the post-revolutionary context. The results of the analysis were compared to the results of CDA of DS' foundational texts on social change. This enabled understanding of the main features and tools of DS' framing processes in its interaction with the different situations and contexts, and whether they constituted an extension to or departure from its Manhaj. Then, such findings were compared to NP's discourse, and policy choices, to test whether NP's ideology and framing processes departed or conformed to DS' original discourse, and to the main features and tools of the movement's framing processes.

Thus, the main argument of this thesis is based on CDA which indicates that in the transitional stage of 2011 revolution and the official entry of DS into politics, DS' discourse did not change except in the form (style, genre, and wording), while keeping the core of the discourse (argumentation, word meaning, religious representation of reality or priority of the religious discourse over the political). The rest of the implications and conclusions about the movement and the party's relationship, nature, and policy choices were based on this main argument that was not to be possible if CDA was not foregrounded.

To sum up, the nature of the methodology, and the CDA as the analytical framework applied, in addition to the exceptional moment of carrying out the field work, were the means the researcher employed to maintain a distance with the case, and to re-check and test the content of the interviews. Accordingly, on the societal level of CDA, the researcher contextualized the case study within the global, regional, and local contexts over its history while focusing on the intellectual connections, and as far as was availed

by the literature, media, and data available from the field to her capacity as an individual researcher.

The Persistence of DS' Core Religious Discourse

The CDA results - and comparisons between them in the various historical stages and different empirical contexts - revealed that DS' discourse did not change, since the main argumentation, word meaning, and the religious representation of reality were all maintained in all the texts in the different periods, and they conform to the foundational texts. However, there were apparent changes on the level of genre (access to media), style, besides drawing upon political and legal discourses and introducing technocratic values; yet all remained dominated by a religious discourse. Thus, the religious took priority over the political in DS' discourse before and after entering politics. In addition, the result of CDA of NP's discourse proved that it conforms to DS' discourse. This means that DS' ideology was reproduced over its history where framing processes of the movement were an extension of its ideology, and its political arm, NP, adopted the same ideology and framing tools. Such framing tools are religious justifications, quoting Quran and Sunna, framing around religious rulings, re-wording and elaboration of DS' Manhaj and its concepts while preserving its original definitions, and applying Feqh Al-Waqi', or weighing consequences and assessing context and reality requirements. Consequently, the application of cost-benefit analysis is one of the main tools of framing of the decisions that seems to defy the legal Islamic tenets, for instance as concerns guardianship. In this respect, actions are to be taken if the benefits to Muslims and Islam are expected to weigh more than evils. This is because, in view of the constraints of their context and for the sake of making use of the opportunities it provides, DS are sometimes compelled to take religiously controversial actions in the

name of serving their wider objectives, protecting da'awa and Manhaj, shari'a and Islamic identity. Thus, opportunities and constraints are framed around religious values and through reassurance of conformity with DS' Manhaj of social change, that is the core of the framing processes of the movement, and the cement that maintains its interconnectedness.

In this respect, in line with the foundational texts, not only was revolution dismissed as a means of change, it also represented, in 2011, an existential threat to shari'a and to Islamic identity. Yet, the structural changes brought about by the revolution were framed as an opportunity to politically participate without religious concessions, making the January 2011 revolution the movement's second opportunity in its history after the one that allowed it to initiate collective action. However, political participation is not a means of social change for DS, but rather a tool that serves and protects da'awa, while also expanding its scope. Thus, in conformity with DS' Manhaj of change, da'awa remains the sole means of social change, with political participation being just a tool. DS participation in that sense is on condition of achieving more benefits than evils to Islam and Muslims. *Consequently, participation at the state level comes to reflect whatever reforms first achieved at the social level, but not to impose change.* This implies that DS/NP will not offer any Manhaj or religious compromises for the sake of political gains. Using the same tools of framing, DS/NP mentioned that they will participate through democratic mechanisms while rejecting democratic philosophy, thus adopting a partial definition of democracy. Accordingly, they will participate while denouncing democracy as infidel.

Consequently, once DS decided to participate and mobilized their followers on such basis, while vowing to respect the legal framework and conventions in Egypt, they

declared the non-Islamic components of them as vice. Thus, they identified themselves as the group that takes part in politics while denouncing vice, and without sacrificing religious foundations. This was applied to women's and Christians' participation in parliament, since they justified them by cost-benefit analysis, while condemning them as vice since both groups should not enjoy guardianship. The gap between the legal framework that DS/NP follow and their belief and discourse on one hand, and the flexibility that their Manhaj provides on the other, made the assessment of their actions a complicated process. However, in view of the analysis in this thesis, the *consistency and continuity* of DS' discourse reflected their adherence to their ideology and the employment of the same traditional framing tools of the movement even after they entered politics. Thus, their flexibility and practicality is limited by Manhaj, and does not reflect absolute pragmatism. As sheikh Borhami said: "yes I am pragmatic as far as shari'a allows me to; and I am strict when it comes to religious foundations" (int. Borhami, 2013).

The Intellectual and Structural Interconnection between DS and NP

Besides demonstrating the *consistency and continuity* of DS' discourse on social and political change in different political contexts and throughout its history, this thesis also argued that NP is both intellectually and structurally connected to the wider movement. This makes NP a religious actor in a political context. In addition, their insistence on their religious discourse and adherence to their Manhaj, while abiding by the law, results in controversial policy choices. Such controversy reflects the inherent tension of being a religious actor in a political context: such a context demands *primarily* office-seeking and political and policy decisions, rather than entering into prolonged religious calculations, justifications, and bargains. The common ideology and its reproduction

implied also that DS/NP relationship with the other did not change. Thus, their hostile relationship with seculars continued, their rivalry with MB, distancing themselves from other Islamists, as well as the fluctuating relationship pattern with the state that allowed them to exist but within limits. DS/NP also reproduced their discourse concerning Christian and female citizenship, and Shi'ites, thus, expressing exclusionary views.

Accordingly, this thesis concluded that when the movement established a political party, it did so to serve its primarily religious social change Manhaj. Thus, the party represents DS in politics and reproduces its discourse. Therefore, NP constitutes a shura model, where it acts as "Ahl Al-shura," who advise the ruler and complement his efforts, rather than compete for power. This model - of a religious political actor under a Shura system - has a number of features. First, being a model of a non-power seeking, non-competitive party - within a competitive political context - puts them at odds with their political environment. Second, their understanding of religion and their discourse, besides being distinct from other Islamist powers in Egypt, significantly departs in some aspects from the legal framework and the mainstream of political and cultural discourses. Third, their discourse remains relatively open to exclusionary practices.

Prospects for DS, NP and the Study of Islamist Movements

The fact that NP insists on preserving its religious Salafi identity and Manhaj and on adhering to DS discourse, while being keen on securing a foothold in politics, constitutes a challenge to the party and the movement. This is especially so considering that their objective is to religionize politics, rather than to become politicized themselves. Despite adhering to their Manhaj, the Manhaj's flexibility gives the

impression of pragmatism, abuse of religion, and contradiction. However, for better or worse, NP decisions did not defy DS' Manhaj of social change.

Nevertheless, in view of the relative stability of DS' discursive field, the reaction to its persistent discourse is likely to be resistance and marginalization. This is despite DS being non-violent, non-Takfiri, and adopting a bottom-up approach to social change. There are several reasons for this likelihood. Firstly, because DS/NP are alien to mainstream Muslims in Egypt, and are distinct among Islamists as well, their Manhaj and calculations might be uncommon to the public, or may be unpopular among Islamists. Moreover, they represent a religious discourse amidst a political context, dominated by a secular discourse representing the June 2013 alliance and in the absence of any other Islamist political party. Thus, religiously, culturally, and politically DS/NP resist the dominant discourse. This is because in spite of sharing almost all of the features of Al-Azhar discourse, differences on the Ash'aari approach and Sufism put DS in a different camp. This is while NP and DS emphasize the importance of the Al-Azhar institution and are keen on maintaining dialogue with its figures. Their relationship with the official religious institutions, the Ministry of Endowments and Al-Azhar remains complicated since they are allowed to preach, however are subject to criticism and restrictions from both.

In terms of relationship to the state, toppling the MB regime was a new phase that renewed the pattern of DS-state relationship, where NP members complained of security restrictions during the elections, and DS sheikhs became subject to the Ministry of Endowment authority and restrictions regarding licenses and the content of Friday speeches. Thus, DS' access to discourse is still there, but is legally and officially administered and put under control. Also a long history of media defamation of

Islamists, and of Salafis among them, as part of the radicals-moderates narrative that prevailed in 1980s-1990s and continued into the 2000s, favouring Al-Azhar as the guardian of orthodoxy (Ismail, 2003), adds to NP's challenge. Such duality was revived after the MB experience and prevailed after the June 2013 revolution.

Finally, DS/NP's discourse on women, Christians, and art and culture, is another reason for the movement's and the party's alienation. In this respect, relatively refining the wording used, besides finding ways to communicate their views to a wider scope of society through media, did not serve DS/NP, but rather might have harmed them. This is because delivering a shocking discourse that is alien to the mainstream, and purposefully insisting on it, does not reflect DS/NP's daily life and real practices that are more moderate and less strict than the religious rules that they feel they are committed to explain theoretically. This could explain their relative success in their closer circles where they are identified as different, and may be as having a sub-culture, but not as radicals or as dangerous. Whereas on the discursive level and in view of the connotations of the radicals (non-Azhari) and moderate (Azhari thought), they could be classified as radicals, or at least as different or rigid. However, DS' and NP's discourse never reflected their moderate application of religious rulings, and is seen for the previously mentioned reasons as a dogmatic, religiously strict discourse. This implies, among other problems, a point of weakness in DS' interaction, and communication of their ideas to the public. In sum, they do not work on explaining the non-Takfiri, non-violent, and bottom-up nature of their discourse to the public: instead it remains hidden behind shockingly strict statements, and a different definition of democracy and citizenship and model of political participation. In this regard, DS recognized their exclusionary discourse as concerns Christians, Shiites, and Baha'is, and justified such

views as exclusion within the normal levels practised even in ancient democracies in the west.

In view of the analysis of DS' discourse, and the history of the social movement, NP's policy choices were consistent with DS' position of giving priority to Manhaj over pleasing fellow Islamists, even if the cost was their marginalization. Thus, the pattern of the DS-Islamists relationship did not change. Consequently, it will be challenging for NP to regain its 2011-2012 levels of confidence and support among Islamists, if not impossible. Due to the hard choice between Al-Manhaj and maintaining their popular base, they have chosen decisively to adhere to their foundational principles (Al-Shahhat, 2013e), which have historically departed from those of other Islamists. Thus, it can be said that NP intentionally lost other Islamist votes. In the near future, it is expected that NP will remain isolated among Islamists, particularly after they have chosen to support Al-Sisi in the presidential elections (Linn, 2015). However, with the demise of the MB alliance, if, in the long-run, NP manages to convince Islamist sympathizers that it is a reliable leadership, other Islamists, for practical reasons, might support NP as the only remaining Islamist political party. Thus, it is at least conceivable that NP might regain its Islamist popular base, without offering Manhaj concessions.

The most recent parliamentary elections in 2015 resulted in NP gaining 12 seats. However, a small number of seats that is, it was compensated for by NP parliamentarians gaining membership in almost all the specialized committees in the Egyptian parliament. Therefore, on the quantitative level their presence is not influential, but on the qualitative level, they are present, even with only one member in the committees, conforming to their approach of aiming at presence and at securing just a foothold in the system. In the foreseen future, this pattern is expected to continue.

From another perspective, the 2015 election, despite being relatively reflective of low political mobilization and internal divisions on political participation at this stage in the party and the movement, again proved that the main source of mobilization and reuniting the party was through referring to Manhaj and defending the existence of da'awa and of DS' objectives. There was also no sign of disintegration of the religious social movement, but rather a weakness in the political side that might have changed over time since the election in 2015. However, this can only be decided in the light of a future round of field work. This present work is meant to focus on ideology rather than on tactics and policies and is mainly based on materials collected from the field in 2013-2014, and media follow-up from 2014-2016. This makes a more comprehensive analysis of the policies and tactics of DS and NP the focus of further studies based on the results of this dissertation, after carrying out a second round of field work, as NP develops and becomes active in a different stage of Egyptian politics. Nevertheless, policies and tactics were also discussed in this dissertation (chapters 3, 5, and 6) as far as possible for a new political actor that only appeared in the last six years, in view of the overarching ideology investigated in this dissertation.

This study departs from and questions the existing literature on Salafis and on DS/NP, not only through the combination of CDA and ethnography, but also due to using such a framework to practice what might be considered an *immanent* social critique of the case study. Adopting an immanent critique means that norms that we measure against "are not taken from outside or from a specific procedure but directly from the object of critique" (Herzog, 2016). Accordingly, this study is not assuming an *external* critique that focuses on the contradiction between some external criteria and the case study and its practices. The study is also not a *procedural* critique that looks at the contradiction

between reality and the aspects of a desired and a fair procedure. Finally, this study, despite of the fact that it provides an in-depth analysis of DS' discourse on social change and lets the actors speak for themselves then analyzes what they say, it does not represent an *internal social* critique either, one that suffices by revealing the inconsistencies between what the movement says and its ideals, and its reality. For instance, an internal critique of a racist discourse might not be condemned if it is consistent. Thus, the main standard in the *internal* critique is primarily consistency and coherence, which are criteria not derived from the case itself (Herzog, 2016). In other words, in the immanent critique, adopted in this thesis, the functional (to criticize something for being dysfunctional), ethical (to what extent the social order studied brings good and completes life to individuals), and moral (revealing aspects of inequality and justice) strategies of critique (Herzog, 2016: 29), are about how the studied entity defines functions, norms and values.

Thus, there was a need for understanding DS as an entity using a systematic approach to derive its norms and to understand its meaning making while locating it within context. For instance, due to the characteristics of the movement and the nature of its members, and based on CDA of DS' texts on social change over its history, DS attributes a religious function to its political party that is defined as one of da'awa tools. In that sense, the political party is a means of providing the movement with a legal framework in view of the nature of DS-state relationship that is signified by fluctuations. In addition, according to DS' members, political participation offers them access to wider sectors, classes, and areas to spread da'awa. Accordingly, being present in the process of law making, for instance, they are always keen on expressing the religious point of view even if it seems controversial and politically costly (e.g. female genital mutilation

(Tareq, 2016)). Finally, for them, political participation is a means not an end and can never be the only tool for social change, and that is why through participation they so far aimed at presenting a religious voice in the political process. Thus, they aim at religionizing politics rather than politicizing their religious movement or using religion to serve politics but rather the opposite.

Ethnographic observations and CDA results proved that such a framing of political participation is one of the main tools of members' political mobilization. Due to the lack of discipline and to the intellectual independence within the movement, the party seeks to abide by such an understanding of a political party that conforms to DS' Manhaj of social change which represents the primary frame for the movement's individual members (see chapter 6). At the same time, NP does follow the Egyptian law and constitution that bans religious parties. Sticking to DS' religious discourse while abiding by the Egyptian law, NP consciously opts for controversial policy choices and costly political actions that cannot be simply minimized to pragmatism since they are tied to their Manhaj, or to a lack of experience because they are aware of their actions and of the political model they want to convey and they do that intentionally. This can be proved for instance through a look at DS relationship to Islamists over its history which did not change when they entered politics. Thus, DS/NP's actions were an extension of their historical choices (see chapters 3 and 5).

Therefore, DS/NP, in an attempt to secure a foothold in the system and to protect the movement's existence and unity while mobilizing its members politically, they gave contradictory impressions that were not to be understood without an ethnographically driven CDA while adopting an immanent social critique. As such, this study is neither projecting external standards of how a political actor ought to be, nor of how an islamist

group is, but it focuses rather on understanding the movement itself and scrutinizing its ideology to see how, if ever, it is reflected in its policies as a new political actor within its context. This way the present work not only lays the ground for future studies of NP as a political actor, but also questions the definitions of moderation and radicalization, and contributes to criticism of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis (Willis, 2006, Schwedler, 2011, 2007, Jenkins, 2014).

On the broader theoretical and applied levels, this thesis's contribution to testing the roots and the durability of a non-takfiri, non-violent and bottom up approach for change in an Islamist movement discourse over its history - and in different contexts - might be helpful in studying moderation and radicalization. In particular, this thesis indicates that in determining if an Islamist group is moderate, it might not be sufficient to observe that it has claimed to have revised its tenets, or that it accommodates democracy, the West and Christians, for instance. Rather, it is important to test the longer-term trajectory of the vision for social change, whether it is bottom-up or top-down, and if it is exclusionary and/or authoritarian. The question of Takfir should be also factored in: examining the scale, frequency and type of Takfir in the foundational texts of a movement enables an appraisal of its potential to legitimise and use violence. Consequently, this study proposes a different approach to the study of Islamism and radicalization as one of the main global security challenges.

EXPLANATION OF THE APPENDICES

This section on appendices includes the details of the CDA of DS' and NP's texts collected through archival and ethnographic research. This section shows the way Norman Fairclough's CDA framework was operationalized and applied in this thesis. Thus, the appendices include the details and evidence that supports the arguments and the conclusions made in the thesis.

Appendix (1) presents the details of the CDA of DS' foundational texts on social change.

Appendix (2) presents the analysis of DS' texts on the debate on social and political change in pre-revolution Egypt.

Appendices (3) and (4) present the CDA of DS' texts on the means of social change during and after the January 2011 revolution periods, respectively.

Finally, appendix (5) presents a complete analysis of the concepts of women, Christians, and art and culture in the discourse of DS/NP.

APPENDIX 1: CDA OF DS' FOUNDATIONAL TEXTS ON SOCIAL CHANGE

Text 1: Salafism and Approaches to Change, Borhami Article (1992)

Textual Analysis

First: Construction of Social Relations and the Self:

Modality: The text was characterized by *high affinity* as regards opinions and suppositions mentioned by the author. High affinity was also reflected in verbs such as “to impose” “must”, and “should” when it comes to holy orders from God, before religious obligations, and before and within the quotes of pioneer Salafi scholars. There was also the verb ‘to state’ when it comes to listing the author’s arguments, understanding, or opinions as universal facts. In addition to the use of expressions such as ‘no doubt’, absolute negation, questions to attract attention or for negation, and depending on the present tense to stress that what follows is a fact or is continuous. Thus, modality in this text was characterized by both high affinity and the use of objective rather than subjective modality, which aimed at giving credibility to the content of the text and to send the message that the facts mentioned are universal. In cases of subjective modality the pronoun used is ‘We’, whether connected or separated from the verbs, which gives the sense of a united Salafi position as regards to certain issues.

Ethos: The cover page of the text adopts the format of an academic paper where the title is in the middle then the author, the source and the publisher. The title: “Salafism and methods of change”, uses the general concept of ‘Salafism’ without reference to DS in particular which gives authority to DS as the representative of Salafism. In addition, it shows a tendency to present the various Islamist methods of change as a sort of a literature review, that provides a critical and an objective reading to all these trends, and then present the Salafi stance on such trends. Despite being a medical doctor rather than a Shari’a PhD holder, the title ‘Dr.’ was used before the author’s name. Such outlook aims at stressing a prestigious scientific aspect for the text, and a tendency to present DS’ scholar and co-founder Dr. Yasser Borhami, as one who provides precise academic texts and arguments. This identity was stressed all over the text through the use of religious jargon, the structure and the strategy used through objectively presenting the narratives of each group, then criticizing such narratives and providing a detailed explanation of the DS’ definition of ‘Change’ that avoids their points of weaknesses. In addition, there was clear citation to quotes of Salafi prominent scholars and main references all over the text, which aimed at giving credibility and an academic outlook to the text.

The reference to Quran, Sunna and Hadith, and to certain prominent Salafi scholars such as Ahmed Ibn Hambal, Ibn Taymiyya, and Al-Albani, confirms the DS narrative about the definition and contours of Salafism, and their Salafi identity.

Second: Construction of Social Reality:

Connectives and Argumentation:

Cohesion reflects the rationality and the argumentation of the text, and in this text the cohesive makers are explicit on the surface of the text, such as reference (pronouns, demonstrative, or definite articles), ellipsis (referring to other parts in the text), conjunction (since, and, if, therefore), or lexical (synonyms, hyponym, collocate (same domain, pipe and tobacco). Thus, the link between clauses was obvious and the

functions of cohesion are mostly for providing definitions, descriptions and classification of groups, opinions and trends or concepts. In addition, there were elaboration, extension and enhancement to clarify legal Islamic rules, which gave a sense of tutorial and preaching approach. There were also causal relations to explain certain positions, phenomenon or to state justifications on the side of the author or the opposing parties. In addition, there was the conditional relation that aims at providing precise specific religious rules away from superficial understandings or generalizations. There were also various comparison relations, especially to compare the worse and the better choices, which can be referred to DS principle of calculating interest versus corruptions and losses, and comparisons between different scenarios, mentioning the situation and its opposite, or the word and its antonym, for the sake of clarifying the meaning in a tutorial approach. Finally, there was deduction through stating a group of facts or conditions and coming up with a logical conclusion.

Transitivity and Theme:

Transitivity (action, event, relational, mental): God and his rule are the main agents in all the processes and actions. In addition, there are parts where Ahl Al-E'lm (scholars) and Salaf (predecessors) are the main agents, which gives them authority, credibility, and a special position. There were also parts when average Muslims were highlighted as agents to stress their obligations, duties, with focus on the relationship between God and the self on one hand, and the importance of their dynamic and positive role in society. There is the use of the pronoun 'We' as mentioned above to give a sense of unity and solidarity among Muslims in the face of their reality, challenges, and the religious rules and obligations that they have to understand then to abide by, it also helps in engaging the reader. In addition, there is a general tendency to state events (event and goal), and relational processes more than the use of passive voice when mentioning a general rule. This could be because events and relational processes are not as obscure as passive voice, and their use is not to hide the agent, but are used where explaining the process itself is more important than mentioning the agent. Moreover, using events and relational processes might be for the sake of generalization without addressing specific persons or groups (to avoid confrontations), while sustaining the clarity and confidence adopted by the author through the text, with low use of mental processes to stress the objectivity of the text.

Despite of the fact that passive voice is preferred in scientific texts and in mentioning general rules, the author preferred to depend mainly on nominalization.

Nominalization:

The use of nominalization is obvious in this text that aims at defining concepts and explaining trends and schools of thought, thus the majority of sentences are nominal not verbal, which gives the sense that it is a scientific paper that deals with specific concepts, and terms. Thus, each sentence constitutes a fact, and a definition rather than an opinion. The use of nominalization also goes with the tendency to avoiding personalization or mentioning particular agents, or groups, which adds to the objectivity and abstraction of a scientific text that does not aim at entering into confrontations or conflicts but rather help in understanding general trends and attitudes. Thus, each sentence started by a noun or clear concept from the Islamic heritage and terminology, or one of the author's coinages. Such concepts constituted the theme of the sentences.

Theme:

The theme of the sentences reflects the supremacy of God and the obligation to follow His rules. Themes shed the light on the main concepts that constitute the priorities and principles of DS, especially as concerns change, such as governance/rule of God, legislation, the Islamic legal system and the administrative system. Moreover, there was a tendency to put religious prohibitions and orders forward at the beginning of the sentence, such as, promoting virtue and preventing vice, the position of DS, Jihad, Methodology (Manhaj), and Da'awa. The fact that such concepts are given priority in the text reflects their importance and central position in DS vision of 'change'. It means also that they are considered common sense, and basic principles, and are represented to the audience, or interpreter in this way.

Word meaning reflected the wider social and cultural process discussed in the history chapters, where DS sustained a unique approach among other Islamists that rejected radical social change, violence or exclusion of Muslims. Such definitions implied political and ideological investment and formed the general perspective of DS for 'change' and its identity and relationship with the society and the counter-movements. The persistence in sticking to such definitions and reproducing them all over DS' history aimed at inculcating them in the minds of its followers as well as normalizing them among the rest of Islamist trends on the long run.

Within this text, there was a detailed definition of 'Takfir' and 'Kufr' (considering someone as infidel, and infidelity) and a definition and history of Jihad from DS' point of view. As mentioned above such definitions and chronology were mainly directed against the violent and exclusive Islamist trends, which based their action for 'change' on extremist imprecise definitions and conditions for Takfir and Jihad in Islam due to the lack of academic religious background. There were also definitions of comprehensive da'awa and change, and the conditions of 'ousting governors' as a last resort for 'change'. Borhami also stressed that DS does not adopt a Machiavellian approach, on the contrary, both means and ends should be legitimate and allowed by Islam. Moreover, this text presented the religious debate among Islamists regarding collective action, as well as DS' definition of 'Democracy' versus 'Shura', and the distinctions between administrative worldly systems and the legal religious ones. Finally, there were the non-deterministic definitions of 'empowerment', and 'The Islamic state'.

The tendency to give the impression that it is a scientific text that provides tight definitions, and clarifies concepts, rules, and regulations, depending on trusted references, was associated by an obvious religious wording and metaphors inspired from Islam and Arab heritage, which in the final product gives an "academic religious text". Both wording and word meaning contributed to describing reality from DS perspective, and constructed groups, facts, concepts, and distinctions.

Wording: The types of words that were used were words such as, Caliphate, Ahl Al-Sunna, the distinguished sect, the community of believers to signify superiority. Al-Kufr (infidelity), Kufr Al-Fe'l (the infidel action) as a complicated restricted filtration process. There were also a set of dualities, Islamic rule versus Secular Rule, Shura versus Democracy, and 'Omor Al-Donya' and 'Omor Al-Din' (worldly versus religious issues), to compare the opinions of the "self" and the "other". The use of words such as 'Ijtihadi (individual reason), 'contemporary issues' that shows dynamism. He also used 'Military confrontation', rather than violence or Jihad to avoid positive or negative judgments.

Within Jihad, the author discussed “the situation of weakness” associated with patience and tolerance with non-believers, who harm Muslims. The relevant concepts to such situation were ‘Appease of the infidels’ (Mohadanat Al-Kuffar) used to show the possibility of reaching a compromise with non-Muslims in case of Muslims’ weakness. In addition, there is also ‘Al-Farar’ (escaping and withdrawing) in case of an eminent threat where cost-benefit calculations show that confrontation would not be possible (DS are not against Jihad but think that it should be done rationally). The author then discussed “the situation of strength” associated with fighting ‘Imams of disbelief’ (enemies of Islam), and making Ashab Al-Ketab (Christians, and Jews) pay ‘Al-Jizyah’ (tax imposed on non-believers) willingly, where words such as ‘humiliation and submissiveness’ were associated with non-believers.

There is also stress on the word “gradual” that reflects the main method of change for DS. Al-Naskh (Abrogation of religious rulings) includes Al-Taqqyod, Al-Bayan, Al-Takhsis, which meant that applying the rule depends on the situation itself and reality determines which stage of Jihad are they (jargons here address specialists and Islamists in particular), and they show the flexibility and responsiveness to reality requirements.

The author also used words such as ‘recklessness’, ‘rush’ leading to ‘corruption’ and ‘evil’, to describe the attitude of those who adopt a violent militant approach to change. He defined Da’awa as Jihad, and provided variations on Jihad, such as Jihad of the self, Jihad of the Satan, Jihad of infidels, and Jihad of the hypocrites. Thus, DS is against confining Jihad to military confrontation, to ousting rulers, or fighting infidels, especially that their definitions of infidelity are very restricted. There is also the use of the superlatives ‘most important’, the ‘more important’ and the ‘important’, to show that there are priorities in Islamic action, and to stress DS’ gradual approach.

Finally, education and science were the keywords linking Salafi identity to legal science (O’lom Shar’yya), and stressing their ethos as scholars.

Metaphors are meant to construct reality, and the metaphor is then reflected on the use of words and concepts. In this text, there are a number of metaphors, for instance, ‘Living as a Muslim in a society that does not abide by Islam is like living while “catching a burning ember”. This simile is inspired from the Hadith that says; “There shall come upon the people a time in which the one who is steadfast upon his religion will be like the one holding onto a burning ember.”

The author also compared democracy to a ‘fetish’ made of Ajwa (dates) that infidels in Jahilyyya before Islam used to worship and sanctify, but when they are hungry, they just eat it. This reflects his view of democracy as contradictory and the fake. Whenever, democratic mechanisms go against the interests of the more powerful they easily sacrifice it. This simile aims at discrediting democratic claims, and is highly ironic. It also brought about expressions such as ‘abortion of democracy by the military’, and ‘the democracy that they invented’.

Another metaphor is ‘Pulling people out of darkness to light’ where deviation from Islam is the darkness and Islam is the light. This metaphor is inspired from the first verse of Surah Ibrahim in Quran which says; “Alif, Lam, Ra. [This is] a Book which We have revealed to you, that you might bring mankind out of darkneses into the light by permission of their Lord - to the path of the Exalted in Might, the Praiseworthy”.

‘The straight path to Allah’ is also a common metaphor, which speaks about a straight road to God inspired from verse six in Al-Fatiha the first Surah in Quran; “Guide us to the straight path”.

The author also warned from the consequences of inter-Muslim conflicts in the metaphor “So that our homes are not transformed into a battlefield” and all the resulting wording of Blind Fitna (blind conflict and distress), Nakba (defeat) Masayeb (calamities). As well as, the metaphor ‘We do not want to be bitten from the pit thousand times’ that was inspired from the Hadith that says; “A believer is not bitten from the same pit twice”. This means that Muslims should learn from history, and avoid rashness in military confrontations.

The author also presented an image of the Muslim nation as a body whose heart beats are the Islamic resurgence groups. He said that such groups are the aspects of life at the time when the Islamic body lost all such aspects. Thus, the extreme criticism to such groups and the desire to stop them is like curing the sick person by killing him, or stopping his heart.

Interdiscursivity

Genre: Journal paper in DS magazine, Sawt Al-Da’awa.

This paper was reproduced by Barahet Al-Dawarat Al-Shar’yya wal Bohoth Al-Elmyya (spacious legal courses and scientific research), Montada Al-Baraha (Al-Baraha forum). The fact that it is presented as an academic paper reflects the scientific approach of DS, and gives the image of a precise rooting to the definition of ‘change’ that is not limited to the DS perspective

Discourse: The text reflects mainly the Islamists’ discourse for change that asserts that the society has deviated and that Islam should be revived in order to reform it. Such religious discourse is colonized by a scientific discourse through adopting the same textual features (grammar, narrative, metaphor, and organization), structure argumentation, and strategies of scientific academic texts.

The combination of scientific and religious is the innovative aspect of DS discursive practice and this could be attributed to the fact that the movement since its early beginnings was challenged by the leftist discourse that criticized religion as contradicting science, progress, and human rights. In addition, the six founders were five doctors and an engineer and their influence was mostly in natural science schools, so their scientific background influenced their understanding and representation of reality. Moreover, DS sheikhs were always accused of being ignorant non-Azharis, where Al-Azhar is the official religious institution in Egypt, however, DS sheikhs were keen on joining Al-Azhar and on studying and educating themselves, thus, they consider themselves U’lama (scholars), or experts in Islamic teachings, who provide precise ideas and concepts.

Style: of this text is, written formal, and mostly argumentative.

Activity type: This text is for the sake of preaching, tutoring, and setting the frame for the movement. It is also part of defining DS identity, and approach, and to distinguish it from the rest of Islamist movements, through rooting the meaning of ‘change’.

(This applies to all the following texts).

Intertextuality

There is manifest intertextuality within this text in the form of discourse representation through referring to Quran, Sunna, Sira, and quotes from the books of the main Salafi references such as Ibn Taymyya, and Al-Albani. This manifest intertextuality

confirms DS' identity, and narrative. There is also an implicit intertextuality reflected in the strong influence of such sources on the author's language, and metaphors.

Text 2: The Pre-requisites of Calling for God, Borhami Book (2010)

Textual Analysis

Ethos was exactly like in the article where the author was sending the message of a neutral, objective scholar whose main references are Quran and Sunna with the understanding of Salaf. In addition, *modality* used in the book was generally the same as in the article, however, the author sometimes used low affinity to stress his neutrality as concerns other trends.

Wording: it was almost the same as in the article except that the author's voice disappeared when it comes to controversial concepts such as 'submissiveness and humiliation' associated with non-Muslims, and about jezyah. In general, he did not focus on confrontational concepts. He also used classical Arabic expressions and words that are not familiar to average readers. *Word meaning*: the book that came almost 18 years after the article kept the same content and definitions without any changes, yet the number of academic definitions increased, and they covered both linguistic, and shari'a legal definitions. Using excessive technical definitions and jargon, gives the text a scientific nature, and makes it more of a specialists' text if compared to the simple concise foundational article, which might explain why the article is a main reference, particularly in training and educational courses.

Like in the article, cohesive makers were clear and they showed causal, explanatory, extension, and conditional functions. In addition, there was the numbering that gave it a scientific outlook.

Theme and transitivity: it was almost the same as in the foundational article in the sense of the dominance of *nominalization* associated with definitions and stating facts. As regards metaphor, the author again used the image of comparing democracy to the fetish made of dates that infidels eat when hungry, which sums up his perception of the democratic system. Yet, metaphor was not significant at this version.

Interdiscursivity

Genre: this version came in sections of a chapter in a book published in 2010.

Discourse that the book built upon was again the main Islamist discourse about change colonized by the scientific discourse. However, due to interactions and discursive conflicts, this version could also be considered a counter-discourse to that of Muslim Brotherhood, militants, and seculars, since its argumentation is mainly directed towards specific parts of such discourses. This makes this new version of the article a product of the historical development of DS within the Egyptian context.

Style in this version is a mix of formal written style, using classical Arabic, and informal conversational style using Egyptian accent and joking in order to clarify some points, engage the reader, and link the text to the Egyptian reality. It is also generally argumentative, and many parts were sarcastic when it comes to counter-movements and political opponents.

Intertextuality

This version depended heavily on quotes from Quran, Sunna, classical Islamic books of Salaf and prominent scholars, and poetry, especially when the author tried to avoid confrontation, where his voice disappears and is replaced by a quote from a strong Islamic reference about controversial issues or concepts. There was also ironic representation of MB and seculars' discourse.

Text 3: Salafism and Approaches to Change-Political Participations, Borhami Lecture (2009)

Textual Analysis

Ethos: in the 2009 lecture again reflected the identity of scholars, keen on legal sciences, where the lecture took place in a class setting, in which the sheikh is the tutor, and the audience are more of students learning from him, in an asymmetrical relationship, despite that it did not seem actually to be a class or a training course. Borhami acted as the mentor who educates his followers and this was even clearer in the questions and answers part when the floor was opened. However, the audience was not entirely Salafis, since at a point, a phone rang with female singer ringtone, and sheikh Borhami just stopped talking and said "God forbids", but he did not get out of his way to comment on this, since denying such act is the common sense. It is highly expected that in view of the movement state relationship discussed in chapter 3, there could be security persons among the audience as well.

There is also a sense of superiority through associating the "We" with noble duties and righteous understanding and the "other" by sarcasm and wonder. In this lecture, sarcasm came through his voice tone, laughing and making the audience laugh, giving funny examples, and exaggeration. He also showed wonder and sometimes shock through opening the letters and raising his voice. However, he was not shouting or acting dramatically like other sheikhs, but kept a regular voice tone, yet was not monotonous, which reflected his capability of addressing the public.

Modality: was characterized by general high affinity, like the previous versions of the article. Especially, when it is based on facts from Quran Sunna or Salaf and prominent scholars, and this was through the use of assertive verbs, strong negation or emphasis tools, and the use of present tense that implies continuity and gives an impression that what was mentioned is a fact, in addition to issuing clear assertive statements. In this lecture, there was also the use of questions to attract attention and to make the audience think of the answer until the scholar gives them the way out. There were also negative questions directing the audience to reject and disrespect some aspects and ideas, or to show wonder and sarcasm. In addition, there were parts where the lecturer associated low affinity verbs with the opponents' understanding of reality, and their definitions of concepts, to show scepticism about their intentions and visions.

Wording: One of the striking aspects of the lecture when it comes to wording was that Borhami associated Jews, polytheists and even Christians to the expressions enemies of humanity, shutting off the light of God, aberration, delusion, sins, and said that they do not promote virtue or prevent vice (for him this duty is only linked to Muslims). However, he was not as open about such wording in his written texts.

Moreover, he maintained the concept “military confrontation approach”, instead of violence, terrorism, or even the concept of Jihadis, despite of the dominant use of such terms in media and academia. This means he avoided normative judgments about this trend whether negative or positive, despite of the fact that after the discussion, he rejected that militant approach and its arguments. Military confrontation as a trend is later associated with loss of lives, money, and violation of religious teachings. In addition, true Jihad is limited by restrictions and regulations.

There were also keywords and expressions that signified DS’ approach, such as; the path of prophets, the full Muslim personality, worshiping God as if we see him, charity is the fruit of charity, the formation of the Muslim personality is the first priority of all priorities in Islamic action, the community of believers, sufficiency duties, the Islamic approach, cooperation for goodness and piety, Change of the self, change of the family, friends, relatives, and neighbors, that come first, Cooperation to spread God’s religion (he uses God’s religion to signify that Islam is the only religion of God), the balances of benefit versus corruption (cost-benefit analysis), capability and balance of power, and shari’a’ rules as concerns blood and money.

He also rejected a set of aspects such as, Pseudo-religion associated with slogans, banners, appearances, and deviation. In addition to “Elections” that he described as “seasons”, in order to show how the processes of elections and democracy are temporary, and sometimes become fashionable, but are not as authentic and constant as the religious priorities. He associated such processes with the imposition of “alien concepts and processes” on Muslims, to rob them of their will, and to spread a certain discourse, or discipline to which they become subject to and preoccupied with. Moreover, he linked elections to the increase of calamity, violations, and concessions as concerns Islamic commitments, and linked democracy and western slogans to malignance.

Moreover, he rejected words such as Individual religiosity (in private sphere), and defining religion as rituals. For him concessions are linked to inferiority and submission of those who mainly target the parliament.

The lecture also presented a set of dualities, such as secular versus Islamic, democracy versus shura, shari’a as the main source of all legislation versus the nation/people as the source of authorities.

He also linked the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice to capability, education and learning legal sciences, and cost-benefit analysis.

Secularism and equality of religions were associated with ignorance (Jahelyya).

In his criticism to some practices in Egypt, he said “in some countries”, but the content of his comment implied that it is Egypt; however, he is avoiding a direct criticism. Also, when he criticized MB, he said “Those who say” and he did not say whom exactly, but it could be understood that it is MB, since it was the only group that managed to enter the parliament, and was known for a soft discourse about Christians to gain their votes, or at least to maintain a positive profile.

He also used the expression ‘God forbids’ as a comment on those who say that they would vote for non-Muslims in some constituencies.

In a technical definition parliament membership was linked to the concept of guardianship, rather than agency.

He was also straightforward about putting women, commoners or the average man of the street, and non-Muslims or infidel in the same category as concerns parliament membership and political rights.

Also reasons for rejecting women participation were linked to the fact that they might constitute a majority, they might become a “point of focus”, and the possibility of “their visibility”, “interacting with foreign men”, and “putting their photos on banners”.

Word meaning:

This lecture provided a number of definitions from Borhami and DS’ point of view to various concepts within both the Islamists, as well as, the secular western thought.

In this regard, Borhami’s definition of the military confrontation approach stated that such trend neither differentiates between Muslim majority and infidel majority societies, nor take into account treaties and peace agreements or covenants with non-believers in some societies (this might explain the DS’ smooth relationship with Christians, for example, despite classifying them as infidels). In addition, such trend see military confrontation as the only means of change which is rejected by DS as false, and contradicting with Prophet Mohamed’s teachings, behavior, and policy choices. In this regard, he also defined Jihad by negation: ‘it is not disrespect of the sanctity of blood and wealth, or any other sanctities’.

As concerns democracy and elections, Borhami said that they are all imported from the west and are irrelevant to the Islamic thought. He rooted them back to the French revolution slogans that were for him: Freedom, democracy and equality. He ignored fraternity that is more relevant in his mindset to Islam, and to the way he manages relationships with fellow Muslims. He also wanted to inject the word democracy among western alien slogans to prove his point.

In this regards he presented the definitions of these three western slogans as follows:

Freedom: is that people are free to do whatever they want.

Democracy: is the system where the nation is the source of all authorities legislative, executive, and judiciary, and that men of religion and religion itself have no say. Those who want to be religious should do that in their private life, but the social system and the life of people are formed according to their own will and to the majority rule.

Equality should be among all people in everything and that referred originally to equality of religions. However, Borhami sees that the west never applied equality, and there is always discrimination based on race, color, and religion. He said, “God knows the degree of fanaticism in such societies that influences all people”.

On the contrary to Military or parliamentary approaches, DS focuses on developing the Muslim personality whose aspects are belief in God, his angels, prophets holy books, the dooms day, and fate and destiny. Thus, DS’ approach matches the prophets’ educational methods.

He defined the prophets’ method of education as delivering religious teachings in details and gradually away from apparent commitment, formalities and emotional attachments to certain outfits or appearances. In this definition, he is warning of emotional followers who study religion superficially and stick to appearance of Salafis without real in-depth understanding of Islam.

In this lecture, he also discussed Islamic systems and defined them as:

- 1- Promoting virtue and preventing vice system that decides what is right and what is wrong.
- 2- War and peace systems that decides agreements, treaties, war, targets of war, who is the enemy? When do agreements take place? Moreover, what to negotiate and issue agreements about?
- 3- Conflict resolution and judiciary system that provides rules and penalties.

- 4- The social system that manages gender and class relationships, the relationship between the ruled and the ruling elite.
- 5- The political system puts the rules for choosing the leader, and his criteria, and the targets of the society that should be fulfilled.
- 6- The Islamic economic and the financial system specified in Quran and Sunna to avoid usury and all other financial violations.

Transitivity:

God is generally the main actor/agent. He moves between nominalization, actions, and cognitive processes where the main agents are the “We” referring to Muslims or DS, “you” referring to the audience, and ‘prophets’ who are the ideal that should be followed. Despite of the fact that there was significant use of nominalization associated with definitions in this text, it is not as much as in the written texts.

Cohesion:

The order of Jews then polytheists and Christians reflected linguistic influence of Quran despite that it did not give the same meaning as the Quarnic text.

There are also clear cohesive markers for comparison, causality, emphasis, elaboration, extension, order of priorities.

To move from an idea to the other he uses the verb “we say” to engage the audience.

Metaphor:

- Comparing the process of learning religion details to the preparation for exams that cannot be passed by reciting titles, or by a book that cannot be understood only through its table of contents. Such metaphors go with the academic nature of DS and its followers, and with Borhami who was responsible for the university and students’ activities within the movement.
- Comparing the process of da’awa and change to cultivating a seed that grows and is cared for and purified continuously until it flourishes and becomes a tree that people enjoy its shadows. This metaphor is to stress the importance of gradual change and of persistence and patience while spreading da’awa and changing the society.
- Comparing politics to a game with well known limitations and ends. In this he takes politics lightly and says that the results of elections and of the whole process is pre-decided and is not transparent or fair, and this is followed up with metaphors such as: “Limitations put a ceiling on Islamists’ ambitions”, and “the wrestling or conflict arena of politics”.
- Comparing the legitimacy of the political systems, and their image by a painting where elections are complementary touches, or frills, which signifies how he thinks that elections are marginal and are just a formality.
- Finally, he used the simile of the “date fetish” again to describe democracy, and how it could be easily sacrificed to get rid of Islamists.

Interdiscursivity

Genre: this is a public lecture delivered in 2009.

Discourse: this text again built upon the Islamic discourse for change, the scientific religious discourse, as well as responding to discourses of Muslim Brotherhood, militants, and seculars.

The style: is spoken, mix of formal classical Arabic and a conversational style using Egyptian accent and joking, besides mentioning examples from reality. The style of the lecture is also more of tutoring through repetition, questions and answers form, and analogies. The lecturer's voice becomes sarcastic when he quotes western values and ideas, or those of Islamists in counter-movements, especially when he speaks about MB without mentioning them. He opens the letters and raises his voice slightly to stress or exaggerate.

Intertextuality

There was explicit representation of quotes from Quran verses, Sunna, Salaf and prominent scholars' contributions. However, the quotes from holy texts were not as oftenly used as in the written texts, yet the influence of the language and wording of Quran and Sunna were clear throughout the lecture. In addition to religious texts, in this lecture and for the first time, Borhami quoted articles from the Egyptian 1971 constitution, and its amendments in 1980, from articles 86, 17, 99, and 2.

Text 4: Series of lectures on Reform: No. 19, 20, 21, and 22, Al-Shahhat (2010)

Textual Analysis

In Al-Shahhat lectures, *ethos* and *modality* were the same as in the previous versions of the text.

Transitivity:

Relational processes and actions, dominated the lectures where the main agent is mostly the "We" that refers to the lecturer and the audience, and this is to engage them, create solidarity, to assure them that there is mutual understanding, and to avoid subjectivity.

There is also a balance between *nominalization* and verbal sentences. This use of verbal sentences and actions signifies a positive mood of being active and in control, and matches Al-Shahhat straightforward expression of ideas and positions.

Connectives:

Beside comparisons and elaborations, the lecture mostly used numbering and listing which added to the systematic nature of Al-Shahhat lectures.

Metaphor:

Defending collective action and describing it as a cosmic law, Al-Shahhat compared the individual effort to a pond, while collective action and the formation of a group as the water of the river in its strength and usefulness. Meanwhile, he referred to the Egyptian-African Nile river problems, which were discussed in media at that time, which added to the lively mood of his lectures.

Word Meaning:

- Al-Shahhat linked da'awa to being public, open and peaceful, rather than secret or underground.
- Empowerment for him is a stage in social change but not at step in the DS' methodology, since it cannot be brought about through planning and milestones, it is a grant from God who decides when and how, and da'awa is not a commercial or administrative process that depends on plans and time frames.
- He associated the parliamentary trend with lubricity, compromises, concessions, and transforming fixed religious constants into relative issues subject to difference in opinion. For instance, flexibility with loyalty and enmity, governance of God, and artistic production (songs and literature).

- The parliamentary approach is linked to concessions through either recognizing sins but promising they would not use their power to ban them once in parliament, or through redefining sins, in order to gain votes.
- For the first time, Al-Shahhat mentioned the concept of “Double standard discourse”, and linked it to the parliamentary approach that is clearly represented in MB. He said that proponents of such discourse deliver a certain message to their followers and another to the public, and since technology made it impossible to keep two contradicting discourses, followers of the parliamentary trend started to unify their discourse through using the most mild and softest religious discourses even with their followers. For him this harms da’awa and dilutes it. Whereas DS absolutely refuses double standard discourse, and is rather associated with precise religious rules, transparency, and openness.
- Al-Shahhat provided a definition of the education of the individual in the various approaches to change:

For the Military confrontation approach: they select aggressive violent individuals who are used to arms, crimes, sins, and who are alienated. Such type of persons might be injected with a religious emotion, and could be easily influenced if shown some respect. Consequently, they become apparently religious without understanding or studying Islam, and are used in military confrontations under an Islamic banner. This leads to dramatic repercussions, whereas Jihad actually requires balanced Muslim personalities. For the individual da’awa approach it does not invest in dialogue and negotiation skills of its individual followers, or carry out da’awa activities, thus, the aspects of the Muslim individual for them are not complete, and they focus on belief, rituals, morals, or Fiqh.

The parliamentary approach selects individuals based on their capabilities to gain power, and practice politics, and prepares them mainly to be able to enter the parliament.

Unlike the abovementioned approaches, DS works on finding the individual that becomes the nucleus of the Muslim community, thus, the DS individual Islamic education, and preparation process should be precise and comprehensive. Again, there is a sense of superiority in perceiving DS and its methodology in comparison to other approaches even though the starting point was to show respect and neutral stance as concerns all trends.

Wording:

Al-Shahhat choice of wording reflected a more confident and straightforward tone:

- He rejects describing Islamic resurgence as an extremist Wahhabi thought, versus the moderate Asha’ari thought of Al-Azhar, and he used “Islamic resurgence” instead of Salafis or Islamists.
- People of the book, or Christians and Jews are polytheists.
- Monotheism is the base on which everything in da’awa is built.
- Islamic shari’a’ is the one from God and is the one that achieves people’s interests.
- Linking Sufism to hysteria, superstitions, and polytheism of cemeteries.
- Linking seculars to claims, that Quran is made by humans.
- Defining Muslims’ reference as only Quran and Sunna with the understanding of the pious predecessors of the nation, and not the United Nations documents and agreements or the secular thought or human rights.
- He highlighted the process of the Self- purification, ritual and moral wise.

- He said that all Islamic trends share the same concepts, but with different definitions and targets.
- He also mentioned the concept of “Safety visa in countries of infidels”, which means that once such countries grant a visa, then it is a safety and security agreement that a Muslim should respect once they arrive in these countries. This concept is an argument against those who allow terrorist attacks in western countries since they are infidel.

Interdiscursivity

Genre: the texts analyzed are part of a series of lectures delivered on weekly basis to DS’ followers, with no details about whether they are open to outsiders.

Discourse: these lectures drew upon the scientific religious discourse, as well as responding to discourses of counter-movements and other social groups.

Style: formal spoken but is very similar in structure, wording and organization to written texts, and there is no joking or sarcasm, but rather a serious tone confined to formal Arabic. It is also mostly argumentative, and tutorial, however, the floor was not open for discussion, or at least that was not recorded in any of the 22 lectures.

Intertextuality

Al-Shahhat is closer to application and operationalization of the DS’ method of change and of linking DS’ thought to reality, rather than rooting and establishing the idea like Borhami.

Thus, Al-Shahhat did not focus on using quotes from Quran, Sunna, and Salaf and prominent scholars’ texts to prove each and every point and definition as in Borhami’s texts, but rather depended on the use of logic, examples from daily life, and adopted media narratives about the various issues.

APPENDIX (2): PRE-REVOLUTION TEXTS ON SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CHANGE

Among DS' contributions as regards the 2000s rising wave of protest was Sheikh Said Abdel A'zim's¹⁷⁵ lecture (2008) on April 6th, where he insisted on delivering a lecture on that day in opposition to the call for the first general civil strike under Mubarak's regime. Abdel A'zim's argumentation against striking was based on DS' Salafi Manhaj of providing evidence from Quran and Sunna, which he said they both should be the bottom line in assessing the situation. The fact that he frames strikes of April 6th 2008 around DS' Manhaj result in a number of observations. First, he dismisses strikes as a means of expression, since hunger strikes are suicidal, and because, weighing the consequences of civil strikes, it would lead to more harm and evils, than to benefits, and are thus not accepted by Islam. Second, he indicated that there is a problem in the society's value system and priorities, since people would strike and protest for materialistic basic needs while they never think of protesting for condemning vice, sins and religious transgressions, which he gives priority over economic basic needs. Third, in extension to weighing consequences of strikes, he suggested that an alternative method based on spiritual method, and charity and social solidarity would be more efficient than protest and without the risks associated with them. He also discredited the general coordinator of Kefaya movement George Isaac; however while emphasizing that his criticism is not on sectarian basis but basically because he does not approve of Kefaya's method for social change. For him, opinion leaders should be aware of Shari'a and Islamic rule to be able to direct people in the right path.

In fact, the religious representation of reality, of defining concepts, and of judging events and priorities, prevailed in the event of April 6th strike, in addition to DS' tools of cost-benefit analysis, and calling in conspiracy, which all constituted the main features of DS' discourse and continued to guide its framing processes at this stage. In contrast to the MB-seculars rapprochement that took place in different cycles (Shehata, 2010), Abdel A'zim discredited the secular movements, and said that 'communists' (the leftists) could exploit protesters and raise slogans that defy people's faith and which are not representative of them. Uncommonly, this text included personalization, as Abdel A'zim named a certain politician and movement, whereas in DS' foundational texts the focus typically was on actions not on persons.

According to DS' narrative (Abd El-A'al, 2010), such anti-protest position made secular movements and media accuse them of supporting Mubarak's regime and his power inheritance project, particularly in view of Abdel A'zim's (2009) article, titled "The Religious Ruling on Power Inheritance." Sheikh Abdel A'zim's position on the doubts about Mubarak's intentions to pass on power to his son was that all secular powers, whom he treated as one bloc, use democratic slogans and concepts in their take on the power inheritance issue, and are concerned about the constitutional amendments, while disregarding the Islamic teachings and Shari'a rulings as concerns the governor and his criteria. In his argumentation, he thinks that such secular opposition movements are

¹⁷⁵ Sheikh Abdel A'zim is one of DS' six founders.

fighting the wrong battle because of the absence of the religious component in their calls for social and political change. However, this general comment on seculars' activism became more specific when Abdel A'zim (2010a) criticized the "The National Association for Change", and its prominent leader Mohamed Al-Baradei for the absence of the religious content in their definition of social and political change and objectives, whereas shari'a should guide any foreseen change, otherwise the change would be to the worst. Thus, for him, democracy and liberal values cannot replace Quran and Sunna. In this article, DS' concern about the seculars' calls to cancel article (2) of the Constitution became clearest. In addition, DS' indirect criticism to MB continued on basis of departing from da'awa, and MB's choice to keep silent as concerns *shari'a* in order to gain *popularity*, whereas "what is right should be accepted and who defies it should be counter-argued whoever he is" (Abdel Azim, 2010a). Thus, the difference between DS and seculars and MB opposition alliance was mainly on the absence of the religious component, not on change in principle.

According to Abdel A'zim (2010b), despite his repeated message that his reservation on the secular movements for change is on the definition and methods of "change", his comments were represented in media as a Salafi approval of passing on power to the Mubarak's son. In reaction to media misinterpretation of DS' position, Abdel A'zim criticized the secular media in a lecture (2010b) and stressed that he never endorsed power inheritance, and that the main issue that he defends is the *rule of God, respect for Shari'a, and the Islamic identity*, against the secular calls for an *ancient Egyptian identity* and an *Egyptian Islam*. In fact, Shari'a and the Islamic identity of Egypt were the key concepts of DS that continued to guide their framing processes in the following situations, particularly during the revolution as will be discussed in the next section.

According to DS' narrative (Abd El-A'al, 2010), this media imposition of DS' discourse reflected the *polarization* of the society at that time, when DS had to take sides, so either they join the opposition alliance unconditionally, or else are considered part of Mubarak's camp. Such problematic situation continued to shape DS' image and relationship with the other political powers during and after the Revolution, as will be shown in the coming sections. In this regard, an article on Tariq Al-Salaf website questioned whether Salafis are an obstacle to reform (Abd El-A'al, 2010) and emphasized that the main difference between Salafis and the rest of the political powers demanding change, is that such groups call for a change void of any religious rulings or content. Moreover, they are not against Mohammed Al-Baradei, the icon of the Egyptian movement for change, on personal grounds, but because of particular ideological and religious differences and issues. Such differences have to do with his secular orientation, the willingness to compromise and rethink article (2) of the Constitution, his visits to the church to attend the Christian ceremonial prayers, the support immigrant Copts accord to him, and his relationship with the USA and the West (Abd El A'al, 2010). However, it is impossible that DS opts to side with the secular project of Mubarak against him. In addition, this article revealed a sense of *victimization* that is manifested in stating the exclusionary policies of Mubarak's regime that discriminate against Salafis and marginalize them, and even oppress them. Framing the national debate on social and political change as *polarized* suggests again that DS is

subject to misunderstanding and judgments on one hand, and on the other it indicates that it provides a counter-discourse or an alternative path for social change. In this respect, this article (Abd El-A'al, 2010) reproduced DS' three levels Manhaj for social change, as in the foundational texts.

In the light of DS' reservations on the "concept of change" introduced by the secular movements, and the rising number of protests in the period from 2004 to 2010, DS' position on protest as means of change and of expression was framed as a religious ruling, or fatwa, expressed in Al-Shahhat's comprehensive article titled "Waqfa Ma'a Al-Mozaharat (A Pause to Discuss Protests)" (Al-Shahhat, 2009). This article starts off with a presentation of the various religious approaches to this issue, and then expresses DS' position, which considers protest as legitimate as long as it meets the religious standards, and are for legitimate purposes. Therefore, since protest is neither clearly prohibited, nor allowed, the decision to protest should be subject to respect of shari'a, in addition to cost-benefit analysis. But, in reality, protests are full of violations, even if unintentional. Meanwhile, there are alternatives to protests for the purposes of spreading the word. In addition, applying pressures on the government through protest is neither feasible nor acceptable in the third world. Such religious ruling, is based on *shari'a restrictions* and *cost-benefit analysis*, it is also *context-based*, thus, reflecting DS' primarily religious nature, rationality and realism. In addition, Borhami answered a question concerning protest and its religious ruling, where he emphasized the same position, and clearly mentioned that DS has chosen the position of non-participation in demonstrations and protests (Borhami, 2010b).

Nevertheless, DS supported and participated in the protests against the church's pressures on Christian women who convert to Islam, where the most famous case was that of Kamilia Shehata in 2010 (Spencer, 2011). As mentioned in the previous chapter, Christians were associated with polytheism, and conspiracy, and were framed as part of the enemies of humanity in the DS' texts analyzed. Also, the issue of loyalty and enmity that implies loyalty to God and enmity or denouncement of polytheism and kufr had its implications on the relationship with Christians (Meijer, 2009). In line with such view of the other and of this major issue in DS' discourse, it is expected that in Kamilia Shehata crisis, DS adopts a confrontational discourse, saying that "every bishop makes up part of the bible, and that Muslims are generous in dealing with their opponents to the extent that they made such opponents attack Muslims... Thus, taking Muslims lightly requires a strong position and reaction to show that they are capable of defending their religion." This was not only because of Christian converts, but also according to the Salafi narrative in reaction to Bishop Bishoy's harsh criticism to Islam and Quran, and his statement that "Muslims are guests in Egypt"¹⁷⁶. DS' leaders expressed opposition to the church practices, and to the perceived government support for them. In this occasion, they announced that they are determined to what they called "rescuing, and backing" the Christian women who converted to Islam but were under pressures from the church to return to Christianity (The captive sister Kamilia Shehata, 2010a). Therefore, DS' senior sheikhs supported peaceful protests as a means of expression for

¹⁷⁶ Which was an unprecedented escalation on part of the Christian figures against Muslims.

the first time. However, sheikhs stressed that participants in the protests should abide by the religious rulings (The captive sister Kamilia Shehata, 2010b). They were also critical of the fellow Muslim sheikhs who did not take a firm position on the issue of converts to Islam, and who were afraid to express Muslims' anger (The captive sister Kamilia Shehata, 2010b, AnaAlsalaft, 2010)¹⁷⁷. Such angry reaction went on for around three months before the bombing of the Two Saints Church in Alexandria on the new year's eve prayers of 2011 (AhramOnline, 2012). Following the bombing, and in line with their anti-violence approach, DS' leaders issued a statement in which they condemned the attack, on the basis that such attacks defy the Islamic approach based on *da'awa* and advice, would also lead to the spread of evils in the whole society, open the door for accusing Islam of violence and bloodshed, and would only serve enemies of Islam¹⁷⁸ (statements, 2011). Nevertheless, despite their non-violent history, Sayed Bilal, one of DS' young members, was arrested as a suspect, and was tortured to death (AhramOnline, 2012).

Nevertheless, the torture of Bilal was framed as a mere incident of injustice (Borhami, 2011g), that requires caution in dealing with, since losing one person does not justify the sacrifice of more DS' members for revenge. Thus, members were asked to be patient like "Moses and his followers," and that the action that will be taken is going to be through legal channels, for "courage does not mean taking uncalculated steps," and that actions should be based on "capability and strength." Also among the actions that should be taken are prayers, patience and *zikr* (prayers), since abandoning many of God's orders is the reason behind calamities (Borhami, 2011g).

Al-Moqaddem's (2011b) analysis of the situation after the church bombings aimed at calling the attention of DS' members to the threats jeopardizing the *Islamic identity* and the rights of the Muslim majority in Egypt. In this case, DS' senior sheikh adhered to DS' religious cause, and was keen on focusing their discourse and efforts to serve their religious concerns, rather than being dragged to other issues, which are secondary from DS' leaders' point of view. Meanwhile, he referred to Christian public figures in order to emphasize the conspiracy explanation of the church bombing. He also stressed that "it was a tragic event and that any rational person should sympathize with the victims, however, there is much exaggeration in people's reaction to the bombings, as if it is the Holocaust, for which we should all atone, while we are not responsible" (Al-Moqaddem, 2011b). He hinted on the positive discrimination to Christians and to the imbalance in dealing with the Muslim majority. In this regard, he believes that there is positive discrimination towards minorities, and that they are being "spoiled" while ignoring the demands of the majority under Western pressures, and because of the

¹⁷⁷ One of the occasions in which DS' leaders expressed their opinions in Kamilia Shehata issue in Sheikh Mahmoud Abdel Hamid's daughter's wedding, for weddings and funerals were among occasions that DS' sheikhs use to deliver their speeches away from permissions and state restrictions (int. Nasr, 2013).

¹⁷⁸ DS' statement reminded of the centuries long Egyptian Muslims and Christians coexistence, and the tolerance and security that prevailed, despite of the different beliefs, except for rare incidents of violence, that could be easily understood using a "scientific objective and fair treatment" to each crisis. DS also condemned calls for foreign intervention in Egyptian affairs and considered it a justification to attack Muslims' lives, money, and mosques. In addition, they prayed that God protects Egypt from all conspiracies that aim at spreading *fitna* (sedition), and threatens its stability

“rumors that the Copts in diaspora spread about the sufferings of Christians in Egypt, while this totally defies the Egyptian reality”. Due to such state choices and minority policy, Al-Moqaddem expressed concern about “Egyptian Islamic identity”. In this regard, he mentioned that Western countries defend their identities through, for instance, banning of Azan, and through unjustifiable intervention in designing the architecture of mosques. Such acts are acceptable for Al-Moqaddem, since they protect the belief of the majority in Western nations; however, he demands the same understanding to be applied in Egypt, which has the right to protect the identity of its majority as well. Similarly, he questioned the protection of Muslims in Germany, for instance, when Marwa Al-Sherbiny, an Egyptian Muslim citizen was stabbed, and then her husband was stabbed in the court while following up her case. He also asked about whether the US as a colonizer was capable of protecting Churches in Iraq (Al-Moqaddem, 2011a).

Meanwhile, he clarified that exaggerated reactions to the church bombings only lead to fanaticism. Moreover, he said that “calculated reactions and thinking of the consequences of their choices is not cowardice”, and that “tolerance with people of the book is out of question and it is a strategy not a tactic” (Al-Moqaddem, 2011b).

APPENDIX 3: THE CONCEPT OF REVOLUTION IN DS' DISCOURSE: CDA OF JANUARY 2011 REVOLUTION TEXTS

The analysis of DS' texts during January 2011 Revolution reflected that DS' leaders maintained their reservations on protest. On January 21st, 2011, when there was a direct question on Ana Al-Salafi site about the religious judgement of participation in the planned January 25th protests, the reply indicated that DS' senior sheikhs see that DS' members should not participate in January 25th protests. According to the sheikhs, this decision came out of their feeling of responsibility and out of keen commitment to the prerequisites of Egypt's security in such tough period, and in order to thwart the plots of enemies propagating the spread of "fitna" (AnaAlsalaft, 2011c). On January 26th, following the break of protests, Borhami (2011e), in an article, warned against bloodshed as a major sin, which triggers rage and sets things out of order, especially in absence of an aware leadership. In addition, he addressed the decision-makers, requiring them to take prompt and effective actions to contain people's growing anger, rather than focusing on media propaganda, or resorting to violence. He advised the nation to avoid bloodshed, and to safeguard lives and property.

DS' statements that followed adhered to the movement's position of addressing security concerns, particularly after January 28th violent clashes between the police and protesters (AnaAlsalaft, 2011h, AnaAlsalaft, 2011j). Such clashes ended up by the withdrawal of the police from the streets, which witnessed the spread of looting and plunder, while protesters sat fire to the headquarters of the ruling party. Then, military troops were deployed to keep security, and a curfew was announced (Reuters, 2012).

CDA of January 2011 Revolution DS' Texts:

Textual analysis:

Amidst the ambiguous situation that prevailed in the Egyptian scene, before, and after 2011 Revolution, DS' texts reflected a sense of *high affinity*, and decisiveness as regards their choices and evaluation of the situation. Such decisiveness suggests that, DS had a developed position on such situations. In addition, all DS' texts stated the same reservations on protest as introduced in the foundational texts on change, they used the same decision making approach, and they insisted on their position even after the success of protests in toppling Mubarak. Such observations might imply that their decision of nonparticipation was not extemporaneous, but could reflect their vision on means of change formed over the movement's history. Such high affinity was revealed in clear commands, modal verbs, and absolute prohibition. For instance, "do not take individual actions," "the Muslims should all carry out their duty," "you are required to...", "you must," "it is not possible," "we see that we should not participate in January 25th protests, sheikhs' take on protest is clear-cut, and the situation in Egypt is different from that in Tunisia." Thus, the decision to abstain was not optional or left to followers' choices, but was one of the definite issues.

In addition, DS' ethos throughout the texts showed that they feel victimized, and oppressed, and revealed their grievances under Mubarak's regime. Their feeling of victimization under Mubarak was clear in expressions such as "defamation campaigns," "injustice," "being subject to accusations," and the "absence of the rule of God (applying Shari'a)." Yet, with all these grievances, they justify boycotting protests by their "patriotism" and "responsibility towards the country." Thus, such grievances did not change their position on protest, that was in their wording and word meaning, linked to "Fitna," "threatening security," the "greatest harm," the "targets of the enemies (conspiracy)," "looting and plunder," "chaos," "destruction of properties," and "attacking people". On the contrary, they expressed their method of change clearly, that is "Da'awa in the best manner," as the religious judgment states "God ordered believers to call for Him peacefully and patiently without harming anybody or causing more losses." This was directed to DS' members abroad as well, since some of them have shown support to the protests. Therefore, the religious judgement advised them to follow the consensus of the sheikhs, particularly, when they are away from the reality in Egypt.

Borhami also in his article stressed that change should start by the "individual," and that "each should start by changing himself," since this would be the way out of people's problems and complaints. In this respect, he mentioned the verse 96 of surat Al-A'raaf *"And if only the people of the cities had believed and feared Allah, We would have opened upon them blessings from the heaven and the earth; but they denied [the messengers], so We seized them for what they were earning."* In DS' Alexandria conference on February 8th 2011, there was a manifest representation of Quranic verses that calls for change that starts by reforming "individual manners" and by "repentance," as the revolution for them signified distress. For instance, the verse 43 of Surat Al-Ana'am: *"Why then did they not entreat when Our distress came to them? But their hearts were hard, and Satan made all that they used to do seem fair unto them,"* and verse 11 of Surat Al-Ra'ad: *"For each one are successive [angels] before and behind him who protect him by the decree of Allah. Indeed, Allah will not change the condition of a people until they change what is in themselves. And when Allah intends for a people ill, there is no repelling it. And there is not for them besides Him any patron."*

In this regard, DS' first statements after the breakout of protests revealed special interest in the *individual* whether his security, or basic needs. This could be understood in the light of the abovementioned DS' adherence to its means of change, and the fact that the *individual* represents the first level in DS' methodology of change. Since, according to DS method discussed in Chapter 4, reforming individuals should be the starting point of a wider social change, and this cannot be achieved without maintaining the appropriate climate for propagating da'awa. Such concerns contradicted the calls for protests from a DS point of view. Therefore, statement (1) on January 29th, and statement (2) on January 31st, did not discuss the demands of the protesters or their legitimacy, but rather focused on the fear of "fitna" leading to bloodshed and chaos; thus, threatening people's security. These statements suggested an action plan based on forming groups to fight against looting and plunder, to organize traffic and to support the army in securing the country. They also called for avoiding the discussion of controversial issues that might

stir conflict among people. Moreover, they advised people to check whether their neighbors need help. They also called retailers to refrain from monopoly and pleaded them to reduce prices and asked private hospitals to open their doors for any persons.

Despite of the high affinity as concerns issues of DS' foundations and position, there was low affinity as regards the details of the events, or the narratives of media sources, such as; "It was said that there is a clash between Mubarak and the minister of interior." In addition, the use of passive voice, and the description of incidents, rather than specifying certain actors, particularly at the breakout of the protests, were all indications that showed that, under such crisis, they did not acquire adequate information, especially that they were not part of such events, and thus adopted a cautious approach, and avoided running into any confrontations. Therefore, in the first texts, they present media narrative with a neutral tone without supporting or disapproving. Meanwhile, DS' observations and action plans were based on the givens, which they observe in reality. Thus, they kept a distance from the events and the protesters, yet they were not isolated from their social context.

Argumentation, Wording and Word Meaning and Metaphors:

Accordingly, in view of DS' resistance to the idea of protest and revolution, and because of their cautious approach to the situation, DS' leaders did not use the concept "Revolution" in the movements' statements. They rather used "protests," "crisis," or "current events," until Alaa El Din's Friday speech on February 11th 2011. Despite of the apparent appreciation of the Revolution in such speech, the concept was still linked to chaos, fitna, bloodshed, and the possibility of losing the foundations of the country, which conforms to DS' foundational texts, their position on the Iranian revolution discussed in chapter 3, and their initial stance as concerns revolution as means of change.

Moreover, senior sheikhs' narratives as concerns the 2011 Revolution, and the actors involved in it seemed to be reserved, or unenthusiastic. For instance, Borhami's evaluation of January 25th protests was that such protests were beyond the capacity of the traditional opposition parties, or change movements, who, for him, have a limited influence on the public. However, January 25th protest revealed that the youth and the ordinary people on the street are in rage, and would not retreat unless there are real steps taken towards reform, to fight corruption and remove injustice. Sheikh Alaa El Din in the Friday speech, discussed the ambiguity of the regime's official statements, and said that this might provoke the outrageous people, leading them to confrontations with the army, which he perceives as the most dangerous stage, since unless people control themselves, the very foundation of the state would be under threat. He added that "the youth of the internet, seen before as the video games youth, were the ones who triggered the largest and unprecedented popular revolution in world's history. Even in the most populous countries, even in China, no revolution came out with 8 million protesters, and no nation came out in this way in the contemporary history to topple a regime. However, control is required, which means that there should be a vision, and prudence, since Prophet Mohammed said, 'You must be compassionate. Whenever there is compassion in something, it adorns it, and whenever it is removed from something, it

disgraces it.” Thus, he calls people to protect state foundations, despite all the demands, since avoiding internal clashes, especially with the army, was one of the main warnings of Sheikh Alaa El Din, who seemed to be worried about the attitude of the protesters.

Calling the activists involved in January 2011 Revolution, “the youth of the internet” in both Al-Shahhat and Alaa El Din’s texts, might reflect a perception of them as cyber activists, who were not present on the ground before, and are new comers to real activism. Moreover, using expressions such as the “largest revolution in world’s history” and “contemporary history,” were representative of the local and international media narratives that Sheikh Alaa used to pave the way for his criticism and advice with, so as not to alienate the audience on that day that constituted the peak of protests, and witnessed the toppling Mubarak later. After toppling Mubarak, Al-Shahhat in his article “To the Youth of the Revolution,” differentiated between the revolutionary alliance, and the average youth of the revolution who had no definite ideological affiliations from his point of view. It seemed from the content of his article that he considered the latter as the real makers of the revolution. He made the point that he respects the efforts the youth exerted, and argued that DS and other movements might have come late to the revolution, since DS was restricted by the regime, whereas youth with no affiliations were more capable to act spontaneously and escape regime suppression. However, again, he sees that their lack of an ideology or a vision was considered a defect.

From the above, such texts emphasize DS’ perception of the situation as a chaotic one that lacks vision. It also reflected that DS did not give much credit to the opposition powers, or the revolutionary alliance.

Sheikh Alaa El Din seemed to be praising the Revolution while he was actually reiterating the same fears and concerns of revolutions as means of change that were stated in Borhami’s foundational text. Thus, in a direct response to questions about whether to participate in protests or not, he said that participation to support just demands is only accepted if governed by religious rulings. However, under the conditions mentioned above, things have been getting out of control, and the DS feared bloodshed. Thus, it was clear that he discouraged people from participation. Yet, he said that he could not claim that he owns the truth, and is not sticking to one opinion and rejecting others. “Only God owns the truth, and He guides whoever He wants to it.” “Nobody should stick to his opinion and deny others to, at a moment where we are united to improve and change our conditions.” Such attitude might imply again an attempt to embrace the audience, and to be close to the society, even though DS continues to adhere to its alternative path, and to promote a counter-discourse to the revolutionary discourse which was dominant at that stage.

In his narrative of the Revolution, Al-Shahhat said that as DS expected and warned, bloodshed left 300 killed and thousands injured. Police disappeared or withdrew from the streets, and the army went out to keep security, a curfew was enforced, looting, destruction, and bullying spread all over the country, and the US was present through holding meetings with the political powers in the embassy, and the situation ended by announcing an open sit-in in Tahrir Square. Such narrative came after the end of the sit-

in and its success in toppling Mubarak, which signifies a constant DS' position, from the beginning until the end of protests.

Al-Shahhat defined the concept of Revolution in this case as a crisis exposing lives, properties, and means of earning living to eminent danger, while vague regime management dominated. Thus, the situation only turned from a "limited youth protest movement" against corruption and power inheritance led by youth, into a real revolution, escalating to the level of a societal crisis threatening the rest of sectors and people within the society. Thus, he might be making a point that DS' evaluation of the situation was realistic at the beginning, and that they did not deal with it as a revolution except after certain developments.

Al-Shahhat also doubted that the protesters were aware that it was a revolution, or had specific demands. According to Al-Shahhat, despite of the regime's slow reactions to the protests, it provided unprecedented concessions that "protesters never dreamed of." However, at this stage protesters rejected the suggested reforms of the regime, and insisted that Mubarak should step down. The demands of protesters were general, and were not clear, and it seemed that they are dictated by the media or international statements. The Revolution was associated with the slogan "people want to get rid of the regime." Therefore, such absence of clear targets or demands, from DS' point of view might explain their lack of enthusiasm about the situation and talking about international dictation might imply a conspiracy, since they even warned "there are some attempts to push the country in the direction of absolute chaos."

Accordingly, DS detached its followers from the protests, and focused on dealing with its consequences. Thus, DS' texts during the first days of protest and sit-in, tackled everyday problems, summarized the situation in points, and put an action plan, where, numbering was the main connective in the statements (1, 2, and recommendations of the Rally conference) (AnaAlsalafi, 2011h, AnaAlsalafi, 2011j, AnaAlsalafi, 2011d). Such concise and action-oriented texts reflected DS' experience and focus on social activism. Meanwhile, the political component and *wording* was almost nonexistent at the beginning of the Revolution, they even considered political debates, and ideological arguments, as "controversial issues," and as "nonsense leading to conflict", and thus should be avoided.

Nevertheless, besides the pragmatic and rational approach in DS' texts, they included a strong religious component. Their *Islamic identity* dominated the texts, as well, and was represented through linking the definitions and explanation of all issues to Islam, as well as referring to Quran and Sunna to prove their point. Their *religious identity* was also clear in considering God the main and the only actor to whom they surrender and follow (God ordered us, we are submissive to God and his orders, we follow the orders of God). They also spoke in plural reflecting a sense of community and solidarity (our acceptance, keeping the spirit of the community, acting as a group). Their focus on "sins" as a leading to "disasters," and "repentance" as a way out from the "crisis and the calamities," and that prayers and Quran are the means to survive, as part of the action plans, all signifies a pure religious discourse. For instance, Borhami, in his January 26th article, said that "nationwide repentance is a must to protect the country against

calamities.” In the first and second statements, among the actions suggested were nationwide repentance, prayers and asking God to end the crisis. In all the texts analyzed, there was a manifest representation of Quran and Hadith.

However, with the development of the situation, in addition to stressing security concerns and using religious expressions such as the “belief of the nation,” and “the rule of God,” and considering those who oppose Islamic demands among seculars, as “climbers on the shoulders of the nation,” DS’ texts started to include political and human rights wording. For instance, unlike the case of Bilal’s torture, texts after the breakout of the revolution included expressions such as “the social contract,” “the constitution,” “oppression,” “torture,” “arbitrary detention,” “the urge of reforming security institutions,” “good treatment of the people,” “the prompt annulment of the emergency law,” “freeing those who were imprisoned without trial” and “fighting regime directed media.” Moreover, in Alaa El Din Friday speech, Mubarak was highly criticized and described as “a psychopath,” and that “Mubarak’s men are protecting him because their survival was tied to his presence in office,” which is a significant development in DS’ speeches, since criticizing the president and naming him was not observed in any of their pre-Revolution texts examined.

Such change in the *wording* of the texts started in DS’ third statement (AnaAlsalaft, 2011i), and the statement from the Legal (religious) committee for protecting rights and freedoms on February 5th and was signed by all DS’ senior sheikhs. Such statements brought up the concerns about Article (2) of the Constitution that they were worried that seculars, who seemed to be dominating the scene, might ask for getting rid of it. They also demanded to end emergency law. In addition, for the first time since the breakout of the Revolution, they gave legitimacy to the protests saying that their demands conform to Shari’a, the international conventions, and the nation’s consensus, thus, those who were killed while fighting for justice, development, and the reform of the political system and its institutions are “God willing, considered martyrs.” Such statement came after the bloody escalation in Tahrir Square that the media called the “Battle of the Camel,” which erupted right after an emotional speech delivered by Mubarak to contain people’s anger (Fathi, 2012). As a result, DS stressed that protests should remain peaceful and conforming to Islamic rules, and to avoid any misguiding slogans and deviations.

Being religiously driven, the texts produced with the development of protests focused mainly on “the Egyptian Islamic identity” threatened by seculars, and this was obviously the main motivation of DS’ actions at this stage, especially with the third statement on February 1st 2011, and the Legal committee statement on February 5th, 2011 (AnaAlsalaft, 2011f). On February 8th 2011, in DS’ rally conference in Alexandria (AnaAlsalaft, 2011d), which was held 12 days following the breakout of protests, they showed a rising concern about the scale and the influence of the protests, particularly as regards the annulment of “Article (2) of the Constitution,” the “Egyptian Islamic identity,” and the “role of Islam in Egypt.” The texts that followed stressed that Egypt should be a state where all decisions and issues conform to Islamic Shari’a, and that

anything that defies this is “untruthful,” especially that, according to DS, the masses of people approve of Islam as their reference.

In the February 11th Friday speech, sheikh Alaa El Din (2011) said in his narrative of the situation that the demands of protesters are legitimate; however, they are not one group, but are divided, and have various demands whether economic, political, or social. Thus, such groups must have a common factor that unifies them, and this should be something that “no one can deny” or that enjoys national consensus. For him, in reality, the identity of all these groups is Islamic; therefore, the highest ceiling of their demands should be the application of Shari’a. This is because being a Muslim implies that one should observe Islam privately and apply the rulings of God to daily life management, because Islam is a religion and a state, and every Muslim should believe in this, as a condition for his sound faith. However, such belief goes against the secular claims that call for separating state and religion and reconsidering Article (2) of the Constitution. He said that the demand of the protests now is just to get rid of a corrupt ruler, but a worse one could replace him if people disregard the application of Islamic Shari’a. Alaa El Din stressed that Islam could not be minimized to rituals or inflicting “Hadd punishment,” since it is rather a comprehensive religion, and those who do not believe in this, are “sinners and are on the way to polytheism.”

In this regard, Alaa El Din (2011) explained “the basis of a state of Islam” as the one in which sovereignty is in Shari’a, and powers are with the people, who should be ruled by a governor that acts as their deputy and is responsible before them for applying Shari’a. In addition, there should be a Shura council in such state, whose members should be experts and religious people. This council is responsible for choosing the governor. Finally, the system in the state of Islam is a complementary not a competitive one, and the governor is not supposed to monopolize everything. Such system helps to attain stability and security, and to gain God’s satisfaction in the other world. For Alaa El Din, such state is the ideal and what ought to be, but what is possible from his point of view is at least to apply Shari’a to Muslims’ life.

Such speech conformed to the argumentation in Borhami’s foundational text (Borhami, 1992), thus, revealing *consistency in DS’ discourse* as regards issues of change, governance, and Shari’a. Moreover, DS’ texts in this stage brought back one of their main issues that is protecting Article (2) of the Constitution, and the definition of the concept of “change,” which was one of the key differences between DS and the secular activists and politicians before the Revolution, as mentioned in previous sections.

In Al-Shahhat article (2011), he said that they realized the danger of secular demands to isolate religion, accordingly they launched a campaign against attempts to annul Article (2) of the Constitution. As per Al-Shahhat (2011), DS focused on the target of having a constitution with an Islamic reference, and this was criticized by “some Islamists,” who saw that DS’ campaign was not in the right timing, when the whole nation should be united behind national targets. The rest of DS’ fellow Islamists said that they were not certain that fears of isolating religion were realistic, especially that, the committee formed to revise the constitution included Islamist figures. However, Al-Shahhat (2011) provided evidence that these fears were true, first because DS’ campaign was launched

before the formation of the constitution committee. Second, that it was not only Copts in diasporas that called for the annulment of Article (2), but also the liberal figure Ayman Nor who called for returning to the 1923 Constitution, which did not include this article, and Al Baradei, in addition to the “so called group of intellectuals” who called for reconsidering this article, which provoked Al-Azhar itself. Third, the constitutional committee requires a popular support to protect Shari’a. Al-Shahhat also warned of calls to form a new constitution through an appointed committee rather than a referendum, which he sees as a preemptive action on part of secular intellectuals. This could be understood, from his point of view, as a way to evade people’s desire to protect Shari’a, which would express itself any way in a referendum.

Thus, the recurrence of the confrontation between DS and secular powers was in fact an extension of the debate on the definition, direction, and references of “change” in the discourse of both sides.

In this regard, DS repeated that they are not against change in principle, but are against the secular approach, and the means of social reform that they adopt. Therefore, DS refused the polarization that the society has undergone before and during the Revolution. In the Friday speech, Sheikh Alaa El Din (2011) said that they reject polarization and are not willing to accept extremes and dualities that brought up by various actors during the Revolution, such as choosing between either chaos or oppression. He also mentioned that they are also faced with the choice of either sacrificing Shari’a, or else being classified as Mubarak’s followers and the corrupt system supporters. He stressed that DS is in the middle, supports all legitimate demands of the protesters, but only if they conform to Shari’a, and if protests are expressed in a way that does not deviate from Islamic rulings. Sheikh Mohammed Sarhan (2011), in February 11th Friday speech, mentioned that having a different approach does not mean that they are “traitors,” or “agents of the regime.” It is only that they have a different point of view, and are meanwhile guarding the internal front. He said that one of the calamities and the tests that they live through over the days of the revolution is the extreme polarization that divides friends and families, “you are either my advocate, or my opponent.”

Ethos:

Such ethos/position leads to the idea that DS’ references and motives are both religious, rather than political, for the fact that they did not provide any religious concessions, even on the level of political maneuvering. In addition, their neutral texts based on safety, security, and religious discourses at the beginning of the revolution were only transformed to include political, legal, and human rights discourses, when they expected that the religious reference in the Egyptian constitution is threatened by seculars.

Interdiscursivity:

Reproduction of DS' Discourse on Social Change:

However, DS' adherence to the position of defending a Shari'a-guided change, to be enhanced through campaigns, statements, conferences, and lectures, seemed unwelcome amidst the polarization that characterized the then dominating revolutionary climates. According to Al-Shahhat, "supporters of protest asked us not to prohibit protest as long as we are not participating, and we complied and even more... So we hope that our brothers would accommodate our conferences and lectures, which explain the issue of the rule of God, clarify the benefits of Shari'a, to overcome the flaws blemishing secularism, and the prevention of any retreat (in Shari'a application) in order to secure the minimum of people's demands. Even if our brothers see such conferences as waste of time and effort, they would not be leading to any expected evil. If they do so, they would be maintaining the spirit of brotherhood based on faith." Al-Shahhat added that DS did not move after they missed the "train of the revolution," but rather when Mubarak was still in power and the situation was still awaiting either success in toppling him, or the abolition of the revolution. He stressed that the main motive for DS' actions was the secular threats; particularly that DS defines things precisely without exaggeration or complications. Nevertheless, when they came out with a different point of view, they "acted under the slogan of abstaining from blaming or criticizing any power, but rather under the feeling of collective responsibility." So they "hoped that this would be the dominant spirit." Therefore, it is obvious that DS demanded equal treatment and acceptance on part of the revolutionary alliance. This was not the case at that time, as it seems that DS that started to express its demands, while it was not part of the revolutionary alliance and even refrained from taking part in protest, was not welcome at such stage.

Genre, Style, and Discourses:

Nevertheless, they maintained the same religious *genre* since the texts were mainly religious judgments, official statements issued from DS, Friday speeches, and articles on Al-Salafi website. Such a religious genre was directed to DS' members in particular. At the beginning, the *style* of texts did not depart from DS' usual argumentative, formal written or spoken Arabic, with few vernacular Egyptian terms in the Friday speeches, especially, when the sheikh gets emotional or enthusiastic about a certain idea that he wants to elaborate on. However, the quotes mentioned above show that the style turned from advisory, warning, and tutoring, as well as descriptive providing a narrative of the situation, to being critical, defensive, and even confrontational as they started to defend Article (2) of the Constitution, and to face what they see as a secular threat. Such changes in DS' discursive combination, in which the discourse and the style built upon were both transformed, only occurred when one of the movements' foundations were threatened. It was not a reaction to any of the other radical developments that took place on the ground during the revolution.

DS' religious discourse was maintained, however, after almost 12 days of protests, the widening audience, building upon political and human rights discourses, and adopting a

more confrontational style, all reflected their deeper involvement in their political and social context at this stage of the revolution. Despite the fact that such attitude marked a change in DS' discursive combination; it reinforced their discourse on change, in the sense of how change is represented in their texts, at the levels of both the means and the ends, which they refer to as "change methodology."

Nevertheless, the observed change in DS' discursive combination at such historical moment of the revolution, particularly after around 12 days of protest, in comparison with the texts produced during the early days of the revolution does not express a significant change in DS' discourse, if viewed on a wider scope. This is because the CDA of the pre-revolution foundational texts about "change" in chapter 5, and the texts discussed above as concerns DS' relationship to the social and political mobilization process that occurred in Egypt between 2004 and 2011, show that such texts occasionally used both a relatively confrontational style, and religious political and legal discourses. Such discursive combination was observed in reaction to threats to the movements' core foundations particularly as concerns "change methodology" and the pure religious issues; however, was not detected in cases of political and human rights issues, within both the analyzed and discussed texts. For instance, Sheikh Abdel Azim's texts as concerns seculars' definition of change, as well as the texts produced during Kamilia Shehata case, in addition to a number of spoken texts among the foundational ones analyzed in chapter 4, if compared to texts produced in reaction to Sayed Bilal's torture, and the beginning of protests in January 2011, would support this observation.

Intertextuality:

Moreover, DS' statements also showed that DS' targeted audience widened. At the beginning, they addressed DS members, the believers and the good people, then all Muslims, and then other people in the society, such as the government, hospitals, retailers, and protesters, in addition to their usual rivals among fellow Islamists, seculars, and certain politicians. Thus, under the pressure of the revolution, DS started to interact and to direct its call to more actors. They praised the "chivalry of the Egyptian youth" and "their heroism" in securing their country through the popular committees, the "role of the Egyptian military," and finally, the "youth of the revolution" and hopes for a fruitful interaction with them.

However, despite the observed changes in the textual features, the discourses and the style built upon in DS' statements and articles, there remained a manifest representation of Quran, Sunna, and Islamic heritage in such texts, as well as the media narrative. This means that DS' revolution texts, if compared to the whole texts analyzed and discussed, adhered to DS' main references and acted within the contours that defined their identity as Salafis, and reflected a religious discourse, which is open to media sources. In addition, in Al-Shahhat report to DS' followers about the leaders' management, there was a manifest representation of DS' first, second, and third statements, in addition to Borhami's article on January 26th, which evidenced that DS warned of bloodshed and clashes and asked all parties to avoid such consequences. Thus, following up their intertextual chain reflects consistency in DS' positions as concerns the events, and protest in general.

DS' Participation in Protests after 2011:

Nonetheless, despite of the anti-protest position, DS' participation in protests and marches after January 2011, was again religiously motivated, and was part of its coordination with the Islamists' coalition (AnaAlsalaḥī, 2013b) for the sake of emphasizing Islamists' demands vis-à-vis those of the seculars. On such occasions, DS' statements were committed to the movement's discourse about protest, and reflected a reproduction of Senior Sheikhs' texts as concerns avoiding chaos, and abiding by Shari'a rulings (Party, 2013). Accordingly, it was clear that their participations would be confined to protest, but would not be extended to sit-ins, or radical actions, especially, if protest challenges the institutions of the state, particularly the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF), the Constitution, or the landmarks agreed upon as concerns the political process. They also would never participate in protests which are carried out under the slogan of a "second revolution." For DS, this participation in protests was mainly when protest in Tahrir square served as an alternative means of expression in absence of institutions. However, DS was pushing for elections and for reaching the road map milestones agreed upon, to put an end to the then continuing protests (party, 2013a, party, 2013b, Net, 2013, Borhami, 2012a). In this respect, they did not see that pressure through protest is "understandable" after the formation of legislative, and executive institutions (AnaAlsalaḥī, 2013b).

Moreover, Borhami's January 26th 2011 article was republished on June 28th 2013, two days before June 2013 Revolution which toppled the MB regime. This article was reproduced in DS' statement under the title "Never fall for Fitna" (AnaAlsalaḥī, 2013a), which warned of the preparations for protests against the MB on June 30th 2013. Such statement repeated the same discourse about revolutions, and framed it as Fitna that both the nation and the regime should avoid, and they mentioned that they exerted much effort to help all parties get out of the crisis peacefully. Thus, even if they give legitimacy to protesters' demands, they criticized the methods and the practices. Moreover, they suggested solutions for the regime to avoid an escalation of the situation, despite of the deterioration of the relationship between NP and the MB regime (Al-Watan, 2013).

Therefore, the intertextual chains of DS' texts on protest as means of expression, and revolution as means of change, proved to be coherent until 2013. The reproduction of Borhami's text, two years later in a revolutionary situation, and DS' statement a few days before the June 2013 protests, in addition to NP statement on June 30th 2013 (Party, 2013), show that they insisted on their position in this regard. However, as mentioned above, when such texts are represented in media, or in the other political powers' discourse, they are reproduced in a way that shows that DS is against change, especially in a polarized context. Yet, both NP and DS continued to reject the mobilization of the June 30th Revolution alliance and the counter-mobilization of Islamists. Nevertheless, NP was the only Islamist party which participated in the 'road map' after June 30th Revolution (party, 2013a, party, 2013b, Net, 2013).

Such observations should lead to a number of deductions. First, in the light of comparing texts produced during the revolution to the pre-revolution texts, it is

understood that there was no significant change in DS' argumentation, text features, interdiscursivity and intertextuality, during the revolution, even within a changing societal context. Second, that the consistency in DS' discourse on change and revolution, and the priority of the religious over the political, persisted during January 2011 Revolution, even though, the revolution constituted a "crisis" for DS, and a challenge to their discourse. In addition, it is obvious that DS' different approach, which was on the sidelines of the mainstream discourse of change at this moment, might be responsible for the ambiguity of DS' intentions, and might justify the fears and questions raised about DS' later involvement in politics, particularly among the public and the outsiders, who were only introduced to DS when it started to express itself on a wider scale during the 2011 revolution, with such discursive combination of religious genre, religious and political discourses, both with a confrontational style. Thus, they represented a religious actor within a political context, where religion was confined to being a tool of political maneuvering; therefore, DS was more exposed to doubts about the credibility of their religious demands. Moreover, they were presenting a counter-discourse in resistance to that of the revolutionary alliance, when such an alliance assumed the image of the victorious, and the righteous, especially, after their success in toppling Mubarak. Such doubts increased with DS' intention to enter politics, and the question of whether they are a religious or a political actor, and if a religious actor, whether their unique position hides an "extremist" or "violent" thought?, which was unwelcome in the Egyptian society, as per the public and other social and political groups at that time.

APPENDIX 4: CDA OF DS' POST-REVOLUTION TEXTS ON REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE

After June 30th Revolution, which put an end to MB rule, Al-Shahhat wrote a series of seven articles about reform, starting from September 2013. Marking two years of DS' involvement in politics, such series represented an emphasis on the movement's reform methodology. Meanwhile, it constituted a self-identification process through defining the "We" in opposition and in comparison to the "Other".

In rejection to the calls to adopt an absolute application of western concepts and methods of reform in Islamic countries, Al-Shahhat views that reform rules are absolute, while reform methods are context based. Therefore, the situation should be precisely assessed, while being aware of the hoped-for targets, or the idealistic situation, then to decide the suitable handling of each case. He said, "There is no one prescription that fits all patients, thus, we cannot apply to Muslim societies the reform methods developed by non-believers and non-Muslims" (Al-Shahhat, 2013d).

In this regard, according to Al-Shahhat, Muslim societies should adopt gradual change. Then, he provided a classification of Islamists' approaches to change, which seemed to be influenced by the post-Revolution developments. For him, there usually exists three Islamist approaches to gradual reform, "first, the group that strictly rejects any gradual solutions for social deviations" in reference to the military confrontation approach. "Second, a group that accepts compromises and are willing to adapt Islamic interpretations to fit such compromises," and it seems that this represented the MB or the parliamentary approach, in the light of DS' criticism to MB's obvious religious concessions. "Third, the group that accepts gradual change, while recognizing the faults and shortcomings of the existing system, and rejecting any religious concessions, which represented DS' approach" (Al-Shahhat, 2013d). This description of DS' position was in view of its participation in politics, within a democratic structure, while openly rejecting democracy for being non-Islamic. Such involvement in politics required selecting DS' women to be candidates for parliamentary elections, something that touched on one of DS' core beliefs, that there is no guardianship for women. However, as mentioned above, doing this, they were clear that they still believe in women's religious ineligibility to hold a legal guardian position. However, cost-benefit analysis calculations dictated that at such moment, for the sake of defending the Islamic identity and the application of Shari'a, they needed to enter the parliament. Accordingly, they had to comply with election laws and regulations, meanwhile, stating that such laws and regulations are unethical.

From a wider perspective, Al-Shahhat specified some criteria to compare the various approaches to reform, including the non-Islamist ones. He mentioned that the differences among approaches might be emanating from their reference, the understanding of such reference, or the methods of treating deviations, and the earlier difference arises among such three stages, the deeper it becomes. For instance, the difference between seculars and Islamists is a fundamental one, since it is in the reference. According to seculars human experience is the reference, thus, they would legitimize usury, whereas for Islamists "Shari'a has the upper hand." As for Islamists,

their approach is composed of the belief system which means applying deduction methods on issues of belief, and the practical methods of fiqh, or reform methods. In the past, the difference among Islamists revolved around deduction methods, and consequently around the remainder of belief issues. However, the contemporary difference among Islamists mostly concerns the reform method, “for instance, whether all methods of reform are legitimate, including lying.” In this example, he seemed to be projecting on MB political methods that they have criticized earlier (Al-Shahhat, 2013d).

Al-Shahhat highlighted the main approaches to change that were discussed in the foundational article. However, under the top-down approach, he added to the parliamentary approach the revolutionary one, and the actions of militants. The revolutionary approach is a new category that was not mentioned in the foundational text. He stated clearly that DS calls for a comprehensive reform to the individual, society, and the state. However, he says that in political science, change approaches vary among those who call for a radical prompt change, and those who call for an accumulative gradual change, and that DS belongs to the gradual reform approach. In this regard, they view that both approaches cannot claim credit for a revolution, and that the main difference between reformers and revolutionaries lies in mechanisms. Followers of reform approach work to achieve the possible level of reform, while the revolutionary approach supporters endeavor to escalate the situation until it ends into a crisis (Al-Shahhat, 2013c).

Al-Shahhat then traced the roots of DS’ reform in human sciences, particularly sociology, where he stressed that the human being is a social creature, and that individualism remains a philosophical idea. Therefore, individuals have a sense of belonging to their communities, to which they abide by certain commitments. He also discussed the concept of the state and authority, saying that reformers were preoccupied with the idealistic form of individuals, the social relationship among them and the idealistic system of governance (individual liberties, justice and distribution of resources). Thus, without reforming individual, society, and the state, there will be a gap that allows the spread of corruption, stressing that this is the comprehensive reform that Islam calls for, due to its comprehensive nature “that could not be denied.” Therefore, he rejects the claims attempting to confine religion, to be limited into a private sphere, as a personal relationship between man and God. He stresses that there is no separation of Islam and state and society, thus criticizing seculars for the claims they propagate, such as “no religion in politics and no politics in religion.” His argument against seculars was that separation of state and religion depends on which religion it is. For instance, the history of secularism is a result of the alliance between feudalism and the Catholic Church in Europe, and for him, this was the reason why religion was associated with autocracy (Al-Shahhat, 2013f). In this regard, he mentioned that the Greek system of democracy was replaced by a combination of autocracy and theocracy, until people got rid of both through revolutions. For Al-Shahhat, such historical developments are irrelevant to Islam, whereas secularism remains relevant to Christianity in its most recent version, and to other religions as well (Al-Shahhat, 2013f, Al-Shahhat, 2013h). Finally, despite the fact that Islam does not discuss certain issues

such as presidential elections, accountability, and public and private sectors, it does put a framework and a value system for various fields based on Shari'a. In that sense, an Islamic system means the application of such framework by whatever means and mechanisms, as long as they do not defy the framework (Al-Shahhat, 2013f).

He then discussed the three levels of DS' social change methodology, starting by depicting the characteristics of the good Muslim individual, who has to be "aware of the truth and the right way" and to be "merciful." He discussed the reform of the "mind, self, spirit, and body," and the reform of the "belief, rituals, morals, and behavior." He stressed that "self-control" is more important than fear of the law and the state, particularly if one is aware and is well educated. Other characteristics include "satisfaction, being moderate, pursuing religious knowledge and education," and making use of other people's experience as long as it doesn't defy Shari'a (Al-Shahhat, 2013a). Having specified such characteristics, Al-Shahhat, however, clarified that those who do not strictly adhere to such idealistic model cannot be described as infidel or non-believers, since there is always a midway in between the two extremes of announcing that someone is infidel (kafir), and being tolerant with sins and evils (Al-Shahhat, 2013a). This was in view of the overwhelming trend accusing some people as being kafir, which Islamists' media propagated, especially during the MB rule (Abdulla, 2014).

Furthermore, Al-Shahhat gave details of the characteristics of solidarity in the Muslim society, which should be based on *faith connection*, while rejecting fanaticism. For him, the virtuous society can be built on "calling for virtue, preventing vice, teaching mercifulness and supporting solidarity." For him, freedom, justice and equality, are areas where the state can play its role. However, the family must maintain its status as the corner-stone of the Muslim society. In this regard, the mosque remains the main incumbent for education, and the social system can go forward through achieving the sufficiency duties of Islam (Al-Shahhat, 2013b).

On the level of the state, governance should not suppress individuals and must observe establishing justice, both social and judicial. It has to be said that there is ample evidence on the obligation of creating a governance system, as in Islam there should be a governor, who must be obeyed. In addition to having a governor, the characteristics of the Muslim state should prevail under the supremacy of Shari'a, entrusting experts and specialists (Ahl Al-Hal Wl-A'qd) to hold the Shura system, and keeping a social contract. Such a social contract constitutes an authorization from the people to the governor in order to govern on their behalf. This Islamic system should be based on justice, equality, and freedom as long as people do not defy Shari'a, where they have the freedom to choose the governor, whose behaviors are to be checked directly or indirectly by Ahl Al-Hal Wl-A'qd (Al-Shahhat, 2013g).

For Al-Shahhat, reforming the individual is the easiest part since human instinct helps in discriminating the good and the evil. However, reform of the society, where the family is the building unit, is rather difficult, despite the presence of the traces of solidarity, cooperation, and promotion of virtue and prevention of vice, as all these

values are shaken and confused due to the presence of multiple cultural sources to which the society is exposed (Al-Shahhat, 2013h).

Nevertheless, the reform of the state remains the most difficult of all due to the huge gap between the existing state and what it ought to be in a Muslim state. The existing state is a territorial one, based on citizenship, and the role of the government is to manage the resources, and to keep order. Some add to the government's functions the task of guarding the values of society. In addition, democracy has prevailed in contemporary states as a governance system that all nations pursue. On the contrary, the Muslim state is based on faith and belief, and the role of the state is to guard religion and to manage the country according to religious rules, where Shura is the system that could be applied through various mechanisms, accumulated over generations. Such take on the modern state raises questions about the understanding of DS' sheikhs of the citizenship concept (Al-Shahhat, 2013h).

Moreover, he discusses the concept of sovereignty, with the connotation of the "will" as part of the democratic concept. He asked where sovereignty lies in the various types of states and systems, mentioning that in Islam sovereignty is neither in the governor for it is not an autocracy, nor in the imams and men of religion, since it is not a theocracy. Moreover, it is neither in the law, nor in the nation as in western democracies. In Islam, it is both in Shari'a as well as in the nation, and it is impossible to establish an Islamic state without both of them. In view of this definition, democracy should be limited by Shari'a, which does not make it a typical democratic system or a pure Islamic system, but, it would be the convenient way to apply democracy in a Muslim context. Thus, for Al-Shahhat, a Muslim state has a unique nature, specific to Islam, however, there is no concept that describes it yet, but it is generally described as the Islamic system (Al-Shahhat, 2013h).

He also discussed the concept of the religious state both in the western and in the Islamic literature. The fact that DS does not approve of the western definition of the religious state or a theocracy, conformed to Al-Shahhat pre-revolution text about democracy, where he said that for the West, the church historically claimed a connection with God, so whatever priests said was God's word, and the ruler is God's shadow on earth, and that his rule is the rule of God. However, DS does want a religious state, at least not in the western sense, but one that rules by God's Shari'a to which both the governor and the governed should be subjected. In this case, the law of God has clear foundations, and "Ijtihad" is subject to certain rules and methodology, therefore, nobody can claim to be speaking in the name of God, or dare to monopolize God's words (Al-Shahhat, 2010). However, he says that when Islamists enter politics, they have no option but to say that they do not want a religious state, but rather a civic one with religious reference. For him, "civic" means a state that is not based on any religious foundations, but rather on ethnic, or geographic basis. This contradicts with him saying that "Islam does not recognize national affiliations, partisanship, and fanaticism" (Al-Shahhat, 2010).

After the Revolution, the refusal of using the term of "civic state" in the Constitution was obvious in DS' comment on Al-Azhar document that supported such approach. In

this concern, DS statement mentioned that the word civic is the Arabic translation of the English concept of “secular” or “non-religious” state and DS strictly rejected that the Constitution includes the word civic, which contradicts Islamic Shari’a reference¹⁷⁹ (AnaAlsalaḥi, 2011g)¹⁸⁰. Moreover, in TV interviews during MB rule, Borhami stressed that DS does not aim at a religious state in the European or the western sense, however, they find secularism irrelevant to Islam (Al-Laithy, 2012), and that Da’awa launched everywhere, through using lenient and kind words, is the only means of change that DS recognizes, where they hold the state responsible for Da’awa, thus, all socialization means should serve this purpose. In addition, he clarified in a few words what he means by the application of Shari’a, determining the allowed and the forbidden, assuring that such application takes into account the cost-benefit analysis, the capabilities and weaknesses, and is context base, thus, it pays attention to people’s conditions (Ramadan, 2012).

Meanwhile, in reaction to the fears and the controversy about DS and Salafis, Al-Shahhat said that they would like to calm people down by assuring that they would not be hasty in introducing prompt or sudden application of Shari’a. In the mean time, they would apply a specifically rational concept of Shari’a, on understanding that a sudden application of Shari’a would result in a catastrophe, similar to that which would happen in case of a applying a sudden change of the existing banking system into an Islamic one. Salafis would introduce the changes required gradually. In addition, they would not impose their own religious concepts, but rather the interpretations issued by the Al-Azhar-based Islamic Research Complex, as a neutral and trusted religious authority (Al-Demerdash, 2012). Along the same lines went Borhami, who supported the application of Islamic penal law since this will deter criminals, saying that 90% of the crimes would disappear, thus, he did not shirk from this controversial concept, yet, he said it is not easy to apply and it needs preparing people through media and education (Ramadan, 2012).

In view of such strict position on Shari’a, DS and NP did not feel that they are isolated from society. On the contrary, they saw that they are fighting for national demands. For instance, their insistence on maintaining article 2 of the Constitution reflects, from their viewpoint, the demand of the whole nation, based on the results of referenda. Thus, assuring media that all talk against Salafis was unjustifiable due to the fact that they were not only representing themselves but also the whole society (Ramadan, 2012). Borhami also said that besides working on the application of Shari’a, entering politics availed DS the opportunity to have access to various media channels, and by so doing they added to their platforms, widened their audience, and made them closer to their society. This way, he views that entering politics has neither distracted them nor negatively impacted Da’awa, but rather made them closer to sectors of the society they

¹⁷⁹Al-Shahhat was DS’ representative in this discussion.

¹⁸⁰ In a debate with the liberal figure, Amr Hamzawy, Al-Shahhat, adhered to the same definition of democracy and to his position and arguments on secularism. He further insisted on a constitution that gives Shari’a the upper hand in legislation, and that under Islam freedom is restricted by Shari’a, while under liberalism liberty is restricted by public interest. He also mentioned that he is open to all ideas, and methods, if he guarantees that legislation is for God (AL SHAHHAT, A. M., HAMZAWY, AMR Jul 9, 2011. في إطار قتيبي للشيخ بعد لفهم للتحركات و عمرو حمزاوي).

were not familiar with before (Ramadan, 2012, Ramzi, 2013). This was the way DS members saw themselves, despite of their shocking statements and strict positions in some situations. Nevertheless, such shocking statements over a long period, and in the light of the post-Revolution developments, have left a relatively positive impression about DS. So, despite people's reservations on DS' arguments and perceptions, they praised their consistency (field notes, August 2013). As an indication of such positive impression about DS, a Christian comedian movie star, who hosted Borhami in a TV talk show, voiced his belief that Salafis are generally known as straightforward, and are not double faced. Even if they have shocking statements (Ramzi, 2013, Sarhan, 2013), they would not hide them. Feeling proud of such impression, Borhami said that many people share this opinion, even though they sometimes get angry with DS' comments on certain issues, and they begin to think that Salafis are strict or extremist. In further clarification, he said that Salafis are strict in matters enjoined by Shari'a, but they are more flexible about things that do not defy it. Borhami saw that an example of such flexibility is that people watch him on the TV saying to his host, "we are partners in one homeland" (Ramzi, 2013). However, he would never offer compliments or give any concessions as concerns the issues of faith (Sarhan, 2013). One of the issues that Borhami might be hinting at in this situation is the description of Christians as non-believers, and refusing to greet them at their religious feasts.

This brings up the issue of Takfir, declaring individuals or groups as Kafir. In this regard, Borhami had to clarify that both DS and NP do not resort, in a haphazard or indiscriminate way, to the judgement of Takfir. They should know first if the person judged is aware of his choices and practices, and that they should advise him before declaring him kafir. Thus, he was keen on emphasizing this meaning, in addition to denying the idea of changing vice by hand, or using violence to fight sins in society. For instance, DS followers would never destroy a pub, since it will be built and maintained again. On the contrary, DS method is rather to use Da'awa and advice to change the society, which serves as a deeper and a more sustainable way of changing vice¹⁸¹ (Ramzi, 2013). He also showed willingness for cooperation to reach to mutual understanding with the rest of the powers in society, for the sake of achieving Egyptian national interests. He said "if Egypt is a bucket with two handles so that two can carry it together, NP aims at creating seven handles so that everyone can share and participate." In this example, he was using the Egyptian proverb equivalent to "takes two to tango." Sending such a message was a kind of projection on the situation under MB rule, where leaders of MB excluded the rest of political powers and aimed at dominating all institutions. The anchor comment was sarcastic when he said seven not one in a hint at MB (Ramzi, 2013).

This emphasizes the non-Takfiri, non-violent nature of DS and NP, assuming the image of an open and cooperative political actor, expressing willingness for working with

¹⁸¹ Al-Shahhat highlighted that changing vice by hand should be confined to institutions, particularly the police, who is authorized to carry out that duty, and that all what he can do is to call people through Da'awa to leave vice and hold on to virtue. However, since he is well aware of the society, he would not dare to call a drug addict to leave vice since he knows very well that such an addict might use violence against him. For Al-Shahhat, change requires certain ability, provided it should not involve violence, either to the one who preaches or to the wrongdoer (AL-WARWARY, M. 2012. Interview of Sheikh Abdel Mone'em el Shehat on Al Arabiyya Channel Al Arabiyya..

others, with no exclusion to any power or any group in another attempt to distinguish themselves from the rest of Salafis, and Islamists, and particularly the MB. In addition, DS as being subject to cultural exclusion wanted to show its nationalist aspect with sharing the same homeland, where Egypt is the common ground for them, and where the achievement of the national interest is the main target. Borhami showed that through accepting the invitation of a Christian anchor, and an actor, with all the reservations of Salafis on cinema and art, he has stressed the meanings aforementioned. Moreover, he went into the TV studio, hoisting a big Egyptian flag, acting in a friendly way with the anchor. Throughout the interview, Borhami was keen to dispel the stereotypes about Salafis as grim radicals, who have no sense of humour. Thus, he was laughing and joking, and interacted with the caricatures and the comments of the comedian actor, however, cautiously, in order not to fall in religious or political mistakes. He was also keen on being objective in his comments on MB despite being open about NP clash and difference with them (Ramzi, 2013).

As concerns NP visits to the US and Europe, he said that Al-Nor does not want to replace MB in such countries, and that he does not perceive the West as the powers deciding the leaders of the Egyptian people. In clarification, he said that they travel to introduce themselves and clarify their views, and propagate their Da'awa to people who do not know them, in addition to explaining their attitude towards Christians and women (Ramzi, 2013). In another talk show, a young NP MP, Hassan Abu Al-Azayem, also showed that he was impressed by his experience in the US, particularly, as concerns the fact that when Obama won over Romney, the Republicans respected election results, and, unlike Egyptians, they were truly committed to the democratic mechanisms. He also seemed to be proud that he was lucky enough to have a baby born in the US, and that Jewish doctors cared for his wife, and that a Muslim sheikh was called in to whisper Azan in his baby's ears, which he defined as reflecting true social justice and tolerance (Ramadan, 2013).

From the above, despite the ideas of western conspiracy that remained in their discourse, after entering politics, DS and NP followers seemed open to learn about and to give credit to the west, initiate dialogue, and to interact with westerners. In addition, the presence of Abu Al-Azayem in a talk show with poets, cinema director, a musician, a lady singer, with an outfit that is considered finery for Salafis, a Christian politician, and the head of the Famers Union, was an expression of taking the nation's side and readiness to deal with all social sectors, and that they tolerate diversity. Such figures also constituted the alliance of June 30th Revolution against MB regime (Ramadan, 2013). However, despite all attempts to resist the stereotypes about Salafis, Borhami in the comedy talk show, maintained DS' discourse, and asked the producers that they do not put on music. While he accepted that there were unveiled women, he called them to wearing the veil (as part of da'awa) (Sarhan, 2013), and did not have a problem watching and even commenting on caricature (Ramzi, 2013). Also amidst a group of intellectuals and within this context, Abu Al-Azayem maintained DS' discourse, defended Islamists, and focused on criticizing media bias in dealing with them, and the seculars' lack of commitment to democratic mechanisms (Ramadan, 2013).

Accordingly, they achieved presence in new contexts, and tried to be part of the political scene, while preserving their approach and discourse.

Thus, despite of entrenching this image of having a tolerant nature and openness to other political powers, and of being a distinct Islamism model, DS continued to reject what they call the “philosophy of democracy,” and all its relevant concepts. However, they expressed clear commitment to the democratic mechanisms, despite of the fact that they consider such mechanisms as non-Islamic. As mentioned in the previous chapter, they were keen on holding elections and sticking to post-January Revolution road map, instead of protests and sit-ins. When asked about whether an Islamist parliament represents the nation, Borhami answered that election is the only mechanism used in all countries to measure the popularity of political parties and the representation of the nations. He also mentioned that in 104 countries around the world, parliaments draft constitutions, and the percentage of participation might not exceed 40%. In addition, when he was asked about the appeals on the constitutionality of the parliament, Borhami clearly answered that until the supreme court takes a decision in this regard, the parliament will continue to work on the constitution, without excluding any political power (Al-Laithy, 2012). Accordingly, it was clear that he respects elections, institutions, and court decisions¹⁸². In this regard, NP presented an initiative to the Salvation Front, providing a political resolution to the escalation of the confrontation between MB and the rest of the non-Islamist powers, and the exclusion of NP itself. The initiative included a number of articles. First, the formation of a coalition government, second, forming a committee to amend the debatable constitutional articles, third, the independence and neutrality of governmental institutions, fourth, appointing a new General Prosecutor, fifth, investigating the violent incidents which occurred during the MB rule, sixth, a point agreed upon by all the parties involved in the initiative, that no one faction is capable of governing the whole country and excluding all the others, and that all political powers should cooperate and work together for serving the country, seventh condemning all aspects of violence or attacking public property while preserving the right to peaceful protest, eighth, setting a code of conduct to put an end to the diatribes among the various political powers (Sabe'e, 2013, Al-Sabbagh, 2013). In a press conference, Makhyon said that Egypt is for all Egyptians, and is not exclusive for one faction, where he meant clearly the MB (Sabe'e, 2013). MB criticized NP after this initiative, for being an Islamist party providing support to what the MB called the destruction front, while MB themselves signed a new initiative with the salvation front later (Sultan, 2013). In this regard, DS and NP clarified that this initiative is for realizing national rapprochement and unity, and was not meant to be against MB or any other Islamist faction, and is not meant to divide Islamists. In addition, there is a difference between issuing an initiative to start negotiations based on constitutional rights, and alliance formation. In this concern, they said that they did not join any alliance that contained secular parties during the elections, while MB did. Moreover, they said that MB who criticized them for supporting the salvation front against the

¹⁸² Al-Shahhat was also committed to the road map agreed upon with SCAF, and was keen on following the democratic mechanisms, and the political means AL-LAITHY, A. 2012 90 - Minutes program, Interview with Yasser Borhami 90 - *Minutes program*.

Islamists, did the same a few days later, and that during the national dialogue President Morsi refused to discuss NP initiative. Borhami viewed such attitude on the part of MB as monopolizing power and institutions, dominating all aspects of political life in Egypt and adopting an exclusionary discourse, which was called in media the “Brotherhoodness” and which Borhami said that the DS insists on resisting it (Abdulla, 2014, Borhami, 2013a, Borhami, 2013c)

In same line with adhering to a political management of the situation, and despite the deterioration of DS-MB relationship, Borhami also stressed that if people were angry at Morsi, there should be a constitutional mechanism to change the president, and did not give much weight to Tamarrud (HUSSEIN, 2015), that was collecting signatures to topple the president, for any way they might not bypass the number of votes that Morsi got, and there would be suspicions about the authenticity of the people’s signatures collected. Thus, as he only recognizes legal and constitutional methods, Borhami said that the only way out, days before June 30, was that Morsi had to resign. In case Morsi refused to resign, Borhami suggested that parliamentary election should be held as soon as possible to counterbalance Morsi’s power and to introduce the necessary reforms, through a constitutional solution (Ramzi, 2013).

Such respect of institutions and democratic mechanisms was also applied within the organization and the political party. In view of the fact that the choice of a presidential candidate to be supported must be taken institutionally, Borhami mentioned that they formed a committee which has to hold meetings with various presidential candidates and ask them various questions. When they receive answers they submit them to the administrative boards of both DS and NP, which take the decision (Al-Laithy, 2012). There was also an emphasis on the separation of DS and NP, when Borhami said that the political party has an official position that does not interfere with the religious organization. However, he said that at the same time DS followers can act as cadres of the political party, yet the party has its own mechanisms (Al-Laithy, 2012). Nonetheless, his emphasis on the separation of the party and the organization, while sharing the same cadres, and referring to the advice and guidance of the six founders of DS, made it difficult to secure the party’s independence. Furthermore, the institutionalism that they take pride in, both in the movement and the party, did not mean that they fully embraced democratic mechanisms inside DS’ entities, or that the decisions taken by the administrative boards were necessarily representative of the followers, or the rank and file of DS, particularly the youth. For instance, the issue of selecting the presidential candidate was subject to four criteria decided by the senior sheikhs. First, the media performance of the candidate and to what extent he adopts the Islamic project. Second, the capabilities, the personal traits, and the skills of the candidate, and that he should not be calming down the fears of the west to the detriment of Egypt’s interests, or the defection of his faith. Third, the quality of the candidate’s program and to what extent the program is realistic and feasible, and whether he has experts involved in putting his plan. Fourth, is the group of assistants and consultants of the candidate. In this concern, Borhami objected to the tendency that the youth of DS and NP should choose the candidate, since their choice is emotional, if they are not aware of the required qualifications and traits of a candidate. He criticized the youth

who would go to an extreme, saying that if you do not support their choice then you deserve the worst. Thus, he clearly mentioned that the knowledgeable and experienced people should be those who undertake selection of the presidential candidate (Al-Laithy, 2012). This makes their management closer to Shura than to democracy.

As a result of such approach, Al-Shahhat said that the Shura council of DS voted by 80% in support of the presidential candidate Abu El Fotouh, and that their votes were based on what the Islamist candidates have said to the administrative board, in addition to opinion polls for DS' followers, voters, and listening directly to the candidates (Al-Shahhat, 2012). Borhami also said that the youth are well represented in the movement and the party and that the shura council comprised a majority of youth. However, the votes for Abou El Fotouh in the Salafi constituencies were very low (Ramadan, 2012). The gap between the choice of the leaders and that of the youth and rank and file of DS¹⁸³ and NP was obvious through the actual votes of the followers of the movement to that candidate (Rahim, 2012), (Nagi, 2012).

Also, leaders' openness to media was not well received by DS' followers who, according to the Christian anchor, did not accept Borhami's participation in such a comedy program. According to the anchor, in reaction to the anger of DS' followers, Borhami directed them to objectively revise the issue of loyalty and enmity, where they would know that accepting to sit with non-believers, kafir, or with those who are accused of hypocrisy, without saying anything that contradicts faith, is not banned by Shari'a. He added that sitting with such people does not mean that they do not have deep faith differences with them, assuring that he is willing to sit with anyone, since he would express his same views. Such reaction bothered Salafis as well as the rest of the audience. However, the anchor saw the interview as a fruitful one, saying that it helped to dissolve lots of misunderstanding and differences (Sarhan, 2013). In addition, Sheikh Fawzi Al-Said, a Shubra Salafi sheikh, also harshly criticized Borhami for this program (Al-Said, 2013). Thus, this media contribution was neither welcome among the Salafis in general, nor was favourably received by the rest of the audience.

In sum, despite of the obvious pragmatic/rationalist attitude of DS and NP, their cautious attempts to open up for media and society, were restricted by their religious discourse, and the core principles of the movement, in addition to the censorship of the popular base.

According to the CDA of DS' texts at this transitional stage, it was obvious that there was high affinity about their beliefs and their religious teachings, yet, they were uncertain about the political scene, or their chances to succeed in politics. Thus, DS' senior sheikhs were cautious, and had to follow up with DS' followers, as part of their framing process, in order to contain frustrations. At this transitional stage of transformation from a non-political to an active political actor, they were keen on maintaining the confidence in their methods and thought, as well as the interconnectedness of the movement.

¹⁸³ For more details about the internal debate as concerns the presidential candidate, and rank and file reservations on Abu El Fotouh, see (BORHAMI, Y. 2012b. Why Abdel Mone'em Abul Foutouh was chosen ? .

Borhami's contribution as concerns DS' social change methods and political participation in the wake of January 2011 Revolution was through an interview to Islamyon.net, which was published in Al-Salafi website, in addition, to two lectures. Thus, there was no change in the genre of DS' texts at this point. However, besides dealing with questions by the DS' followers, and focusing on the framing process, the interview presented above, tackled questions of the media, the political powers, and the ordinary man in the street. This was a sign that DS started to be transformed from an observer of the society, whose texts are confined to addressing the movement's followers, into an active actors all over the Egyptian society. The first lecture was based on religious discourse, while both the second lecture and the interview were built upon a religious-political one. However, the broad lines of DS' discourse were maintained through all three texts. Thus, the representation of reality was through Islam, in addition to cost-benefit analysis, based on Islamic definitions, and rules. In addition, there was a manifest representation of Quran, Sunna, Ibn Taymyya, Al-Goweni, and clear influence of these texts on the written and spoken styles of Borhami, in addition to referring to media narrative. However, in a significant change in DS' texts and particularly Borhami's texts, he named and quoted specific politicians such as Al-Baradei, Ayman Nor, and Sawires, and considered them representatives of the secular anti-Islam powers. Before the Revolution, DS' sheikhs rarely resorted to personalization according to previously analyzed texts, but were rather keen on indirect criticism of their opponents. However, these indirect hints continued in the case of MB, until DS became no longer part of the MB alliance, and started to openly criticize MB's exclusionary policies.

Similar to Al-Shahhat's pre-Revolution lectures on reform, analyzed in chapter 4, the texts reflected a religious scientific and rationalist identity, where Islam is the motive and the objective, and all argumentations are proved by a manifest representation of religious quotes, from Quran, Sunna, and Islamic scholars such as, Ibn Taymyya, Ibn Baz, Ibn Othaymin, Al-Albani, Mohamed Omara, and Said Abdel Azim. However, in the post-Revolution texts, he did not confine his references to religious texts and concepts only, but rather introduced and discussed concepts of sociology and political science (Al-Shahhat, 2013d, Al-Shahhat, 2013c), such as the "social nature of humans," "individualism," "rotation of power," the "definition of the state," and of the various approaches to reform. He also resorted to a tutoring and preaching style through using metaphors to clarify his views, such as dealing with social deviation as a disease that needs treatment, and that each society is a patient that needs a specific prescription, thus western perspectives are not necessarily helpful in an Islamic context (Al-Shahhat, 2013d). Unlike the pre-Revolution lectures, this was a series of formal Arabic, argumentative articles, in which Al-Shahhat was able to control his temper, and to choose his wording and expressions, trying to be politically correct. In addition, he maintained a religious, scientific discourse more than a political one. While the pre-Revolution spoken texts included shocking expressions, and were relatively confrontational, in the post-Revolution lectures, he preserved an academic form, where it seemed that he carried out a research, defined concepts, presented the various views, then provided his argumentation for criticizing them, rather than merely depending on impressions or media narratives. Al-Shahhat's articles were all published on Ana Al-

Salafi, DS' website, and the researcher was directed to them by NP member before deciding to have an appointment with Al-Shahhat. According to a young party member that the researcher met in the field, these reform articles are one of the main references for members of the party as concerns DS' vision for change. The importance of such texts within the new context emanates from their systematic explanation of the reasons which motivated DS' to participate in politics, where Al-Shahhat rooted such choice in DS' methodology and foundational texts. In addition, he linked DS' approach to the wider reform literature, as an attempt to convey the message that DS' approach is not exceptional or alien to the society, on the contrary, it builds upon human accumulations. However, while connecting their approach to society and humanity, he stressed the Islamic identity of their project in light of the comprehensiveness nature of Islam. Moreover, the post-Revolution period availed Al-Shahhat a wider audience, to include all those who want to understand DS' thought and intentions, not only the Salafis. Thus, these lectures aimed at providing answers to questions about the nature of DS and its perceptions.

Thus, in light of the CDA of the post-Revolution texts about reform and social change, DS sheikhs did not change their core argumentation, wording or the meaning of terms. Yet, there was a change in their discursive combinations. The main change was in the genre, since they were open to new channels of expression other than publishing, lectures and lessons in mosques and at social events, and the movement's official websites. After the Revolution, they became guests to famous talk shows and had significant and unprecedented media presence. Even more, they appeared in shows with certain controversial TV anchors. In addition, it was obvious that the proportion of political and legal discourses relatively increased in their post-Revolution texts, and they started to include legal texts and to quote politicians, more than they used to do in pre-Revolution period, as they became even closer to the language of the people and were trying to show connection to national and cultural components of the Egyptians. However, all such changes did not touch upon the movement's core beliefs, methods and definitions. They stressed their position of not offering any religious concessions. Meanwhile, they justified the exceptional decisions they had taken, as to women participation in politics and elections, as being taken only when they were compelled and after interest-evils calculations, while announcing the religious judgment and mentioning that such arrangements and regulations are religiously wrong. This emphasized the priority of the religious component in their discourse, and might explain people's impressions about their rigidity, despite of their obviously pragmatic approach.

In an attempt to address that wider audience, Borhami participated, in his capacity as one of the six founders of DS, where he was interviewed by secular anchors. According to observations made on a selected sample of such talk shows, Borhami used a spoken conversational style, and a simple Egyptian accent, sometimes humorous and sarcastic, and was also friendly and open about family life, yet, built upon religious political discourse. His argumentation and word meaning conformed to the texts previously analyzed; yet, his answers seemed to be ready-made, and well prepared for expected questions that seemed to have been asked several times in media and society.

It is observed that the restrictions were eased when dealing with NP members' media contributions, if compared to the founders and high rank members of DS. For instance, the party members appeared on TV with unveiled female anchors (Kharsa, 2012, Sarhan, 2012, Nabil, 2015a, Abdel Azim, 2012), and they were adopting a political rather than a religious discourse, however, the religious component and insistence on DS core values were present in all their contributions. Moreover, the movement's younger generations, who joined the party, used a mild language in the sense that it used familiar wording closer to everyday language, and was dominated by political discourse, however, they did not depart from the main arguments of their movement.¹⁸⁴

For instance, Nader Bakkar, the then spokesman of the party, had a calm attitude in dealing with media attacks; his discourse was mainly political and focused on procedural issues and party decisions. In view of the nature of his role as a spokesman of the party, he had a clear understanding of DS and NP views and had argumentative skills, which allowed him to withstand long discussions. Unlike the leaders, Bakkar avoided any criticism to any political actor or group, and was keen on keeping a neutral tone. In addition, he was not challenging to the dominant revolutionary discourse as concerns the Revolution's slogans; "the revolution would continue until all demands are met," and that "it is the Revolution of the people." As a way to introduce political mechanisms without provocation of the protesters, he said that, while Egyptians continue their revolution, they should be keeping their gains from it, in a hint to the parliament. Moreover, he spoke about the complementary relationship between the parliament and Tahrir Square, where people should correct all the authorities if they deviate from the right path, and that without Tahrir Square the parliament could have not existed. However, the parliament is working on getting people's rights from SCAF (the executive branch) (Youtube, 2012, 2012b) (Youtube, 2012, 2012b) (Youtube, 2012, 2012b) (Youtube, 2012, 2012b) (Youtube, 2012, 2012b) (Youtube, 2012, 2012b) (Youtube, 2012, 2012b) (Youtube, 2012, 2012b) (Youtube, 2012, 2012b) (2012c, 2012). Thus, according to the party policy line, he was adhering to the road map, and said that people should give the parliament a chance to work and to fulfil their demands (Youtube, 2012, 2012b)(Youtube, 2012, 2012b)(Youtube, 2012, 2012b)(Youtube, 2012, 2012b)(Youtube, 2012, 2012b)(Youtube, 2012, 2012b)(Youtube, 2012, 2012b)(Youtube, 2012, 2012b)(Youtube, 2012, 2012b)(Youtube, 2012, 2012b)(2012c, 2012). However, religious discourse represented a significant part in his discourse when he was faced with religious questions or situations that require a religious opinion. Nevertheless, he insisted that he is not a sheikh but rather a student of Oulum Shar'ia (Al-Ebrashy, 2011), and that he does not present his own personal views, but rather the policy of the party (Kharsa, 2012). In addition, he works hard to divert media attention from religious controversial issues to economic and political ones, since by the passage of time, DS and NP members would

¹⁸⁴ Nader Bakkar, NP spokesman, is known for being closer to his generation on the level of outfit and language, except for the Salafi beard, and with his appearance and management, he constituted a role model, or at least was similar to almost all the youth that the researcher met on the field. They were friendly approachable and would even act as family, especially when they trusted and got used to the researcher. Whereas leaders were not as approachable, and the researcher had to be very strict when it comes to wearing veil, time and length of the meeting, and the reactions and behaviour.

realize that they should resist “media tricks” and avoid getting dragged to controversial issues. In his media contributions, victimization remained a feature of his discourse, demonstrated in complaints about exclusion, media discrimination and intentional misrepresentation, and fear of pressures from the minority, however, the western conspiracy was replaced in party and DS’ members’ discourse by a desire to introduce themselves to the west and to enter into debates with westerners (Mosallam, 2011, Al-Rahma, 2011, Al-Arabiyya, 2011, Al-Hadidi, 2011b, Ramadan, 2013, Ramzi, 2013).

While preserving a cautious approach to media and political and social groups, there were incidents where political interaction generated some exceptional situations, such as the attendance of Bakkar to the wedding of Amr Hamzawy, the liberal figure who got married to an Egyptian actress. It was an unfamiliar scene to find a Salafi in such context that he perceives as full of finery aspects. Bakkar had to justify his position and was on the defensive when fellow Islamists and seculars launched a harsh attack against him (Al-Ebrashy, 2012, 2012a). Such a situation was repeated when Bakkar said that he does not see that forbidding music and cinema is absolute. This rather progressive comment was shocking to the DS popular base, and required a decisive reply from Borhami to correct Nader (Borhami, 2014). Thus, despite of the fact that the youth and the party members seem to be more open, and closer to the people, they do adhere to DS’ principles and to the agreed upon policy for the party, and are well disciplined in this regard, particularly when it comes to religious issues, or when there is conflict between what is religious and what is political.

In the months leading to June 30th Revolution, seculars’ TV talk shows dealt with reservations on MB’ exclusive policies, and the deterioration of living conditions under their rule. An example of such talk shows was one that came in a series of episodes, under the title of “What makes us angry in Egypt,” in which various political and cultural figures took part, and it even welcomed a member of NP, whereas MB’ representatives were absent. In such an example, besides the presence of NP and the absence of MB, there were a number of observations. First, it was not common to see a female singer wearing a revealing dress and singing in the presence of a Salafi. Second, the young NP member, while present, seemed not to be part of the scene, despite the fact that he was building mainly on a political rather than a religious discourse. This is because he was critical to media imbalance, and obviously defended all Islamists all the time, giving hints about seculars’ disrespect of democratic mechanisms, and was not on the same page of the rest of the participants who were critical of the exclusionary nature and the confrontational means of MB and its Islamist alliance, which Al-Nor was no longer part thereof. Third, such attitude alienated him and gave an impression that he is pro-MB, while the official position of his party was against them. Such scene could be taken representative of DS and NP position in society in general, after June 30th, 2013, when they were judged by rival powers and social groups to be serving as a fifth column, or as another version of MB (field notes August-October 2013). This marked the beginning of another phase of social isolation for DS.

In sum, following up the discourse of DS and NP texts after 2011 Revolution, it is observed that they constituted a reproduction of their discourse. It also proved that,

despite the apparent changes represented in attending talk shows and building upon political discourses, they did not change their argumentation, and wording, or changed their religious or change discourses. Thus, change was confined to the genre, style, a relative increase in the political component depending on the position of the person, and a change in the outfit and look, while preserving the beard, which is a distinguishing Islamic feature.

APPENDIX 5: WOMEN, CHRISTIANS, AND CULTURE

Women in the Discourse and Reality of DS and NP:

Unlike the image of weak, submissive women shrouded in black, field observations¹⁸⁵ and findings have unexpectedly revealed that the majority of female members of DS and NP are well educated, occupying major positions in both the organization and party, while practicing very important professions in society. In addition, they have been active at various stages over the progress of DS, as an organized social movement. They, however, do not deny that the movement was joined by average uneducated women, for instance, simple peasants, whom they think understand the simple message of DS but are not capable of expressing it, and that outsiders intend to make generalizations about the movement through focusing on these women (int. F. leader, 2013).

Such findings were quite puzzling in the light of the strict teachings and opinions of DS' founders on the one hand, and the deeply-rooted negative beliefs of non-Salafis about such women on the other.

The Social and State Perceptions of Salafi Women

The social isolation of religious or veiled women in general, let alone the ones wearing Niqab, was attributed to the fact that such women perceived their Islam as being different from that of the mainstream of community and of Al-Azhar (Ahmed, 2011: 80), to the extent that "some people were not only baffled but also were offended and angered by the dress" (Ahmed, 2011: 84). However, Salafi women interviewed in DS, believed that what they abide by is "the Islam" not a version different from that of the society, and they believed that people are good by nature, and that they just lack the knowledge as concerns some religious issues (Gawwad, 2013, int. F. leader, 2013). They also stressed the fact that they try to study in Al-Azhar (int. F. leader, 2013)¹⁸⁶, and some of them graduated in the institutions of Endowment Ministry (Gawwad, 2013). Nevertheless, the literature on women who were influenced by the Islamic resurgence movement in Egypt, showed for instance, that professors began in the 1970s to dismiss girls wearing veil from their classes, and some people perceived such girls as backwards, who were being paid by Saudi Arabia to encourage them wear such veil (Ahmed, 2011): 84-86). In this regard, Dr. Allam¹⁸⁷ mentioned that cars might chase girls to call them bad names and ridicule them for their Niqab, "despite the fact that some of them are medical doctors, enjoying strong patriotic feeling", but, are severely criticised by fellow Egyptians (Int. Allam, 2013). Meanwhile, she mentioned that medical doctors wearing Niqab are generally deprived from enjoying scholarships for higher medical studies, and that their bosses bluntly tell them that such deprivation is

¹⁸⁵ The researcher managed to meet 33 DS' and NP's female members.

¹⁸⁶ Kafr El Dawwar leader's daughter is a graduate of one of Al-Azhar institute and was top of her class, thus, was aiming to teaching at the same institute.

¹⁸⁷ Allam is a political and religious leader, while her husband decided not to work in politics, and he is just a medical doctor dedicating his time to scientific research.

intentional because they wear Niqab, and that their outfit should not be normalized. Furthermore, Allam mentioned that her son who suffers deaf mutism, was also deprived of an educational scholarship in USA or Japan, which was secured by the Library of Alexandria, because his mother was found to be wearing Niqab (Int. Allam, 2013). Niqab was connected to extremism, terrorism, and security concerns, at least, unnecessary religious exaggeration, especially if it is not legalized or encouraged by official religious institutions (Hackensberger, 2009, Salama, 2007)¹⁸⁸.

Such attitude assumed by both the State and society was reinforced by media and cinema that affirmed the negative conceptual images about Islamists in general, and among them Salafis, linking Niqab and veil to women commodification, which were in such movies an indication of fundamentalists' corruption (Khatib, 2006): 89-90), besides, attributing all what is not Egyptian to Islamists (Khatib, 2006): 90-91). Egyptian movies generally excluded the different meanings behind the veil, while focusing on one perspective that associates veil with backwardness and repression. Even if veiled women were allowed to speak their passivity reflected their silence, whereas unveiling and liberation were represented as factors that give women a say in society. In addition, veil was used to signify difference and to distinguish Egyptian from the "Other", where the Egyptian identity is constructed and based on modern and secular notions, which are seeking to destroy alternative bases of identity (Khatib, 2006: 91).

Despite of all obstacles and harassment, the number of women wearing that outfit is in the rise (Ahmed, 2011: 145). This poses questions about the extent of such women's conviction, and of the intellectual references that form their strong belief and will to challenge all the pressures of state and society.

Women in DS' discourse and literature:

It was observed in the field, and through CDA, that the founders' contributions constituted the main intellectual source for DS' affiliates. In one of the meetings with a female leader¹⁸⁹ in Al-Buhayra governorate, the researcher was referred to the main intellectual reference of DS' women that is A'wdet El Hijab (The Return of the Veil), a book written by Sheikh Mohamed Ismail Al-Moqaddem (int. F. leader). That woman offered the researcher the second part of the book that includes the rights, duties, and all the rules and regulations that has to do with women's lives. In addition, almost all male and female members when they discuss women's issues and position, they would mention proudly Al-Moqaddem's introductory quote: "You are half of the nation and you give birth to the other half, then you are the whole nation" (Al-Moqaddem, 1999).

¹⁸⁸ Then-Grand Imam of Al-Azhar, Sheikh Mohammad Sayed Tantawi, stated that full-face veil "is not religiously permissible" and that it is only a tradition that has nothing to do with Islam. He then issued a decision preventing girl students in religious institutes from wearing Niqab. The Supreme Council, as the highest seat of religious learning in Sunni Islam approved of the decision and it was enforced. Later on, the Ministry of Higher Education approved the decision and stated that it should apply to all Egyptian Universities.

¹⁸⁹ Kafr El Dawwar leader is just a religious leader, and despite that her husband is a political and a religious leader and ex-parliament member, she has chosen not to work in politics, and saw that she prefers not to take any unnecessary religious exceptions as regards women's travel, and interaction, and not to be identified in this dissertation.

In this book, Al-Moqaddem defends the full veil, as prescribed by Islamic Shari'a, and the traditional role of women as mothers and wives at the first place, according to Salafi interpretation. Al-Moqaddem attributed calls for women's liberation to a western conspiracy that aims at ruining the Muslim society through corrupting women. For him, women are a double edged sword, as they are the corner stone of Muslim renaissance since they are responsible for education and the bringing up of Muslim generations. He believes that without women's role prosperity and Muslim Caliphate cannot be revived. Accordingly, since women are the key for success, their deviation and corruption would be the easiest way to destroy any society (Al-Moqaddem, 1999: 7-14). He discussed legal guardians' responsibility for women's straightforwardness, and held progressive fathers and contemporary husbands responsible for women's misconceptions and departure from God's teachings (Al-Moqaddem, 1999). He says that women were manipulated and pushed to leave their homes for education and work under a non-Muslim system that exposes them to men in coeducation institutes and workplaces, where they are associated with men, let alone the social events that combine both sexes. He condemned those who call for women's liberation describing them as the real enemies of women, since they overload them with issues that are beyond women's nature and capabilities, and then they manipulate them (Al-Moqaddem, 1999: 32-34). Al-Moqaddem sees that women have been taught that such liberation would save them from the enthrallment and that it is their right that they should never give up (Al-Moqaddem, 1999: 25, 34). Women for Al-Moqaddem are defined through their relationship to men, since she is the mother, sister, wife, and daughter of Mujahidin, or of men generally. Thus, Al-Moqaddem views women's duties and contributions as dependent on men's role (Al-Moqaddem, 1999: 25). He provided a comparative study to show the difference in women's status under various civilizations, whether Greek, Roman, Chinese, Indian, and Iraqi civilizations, extending the comparison to consider women's status under both Judaism and Christianity on one hand, and their status under Islam on the other. According to his narrative women were humiliated under all such civilizations and were deprived of their basic rights, to the extent that their human nature was questioned (Al-Moqaddem, 1999: 45-56)¹⁹⁰. In addition, he provided an overview of women in pre-Islam Society (Jahilyya) and concluded by describing women's status in contemporary, non-Muslim societies as being humiliated, full of deviation and exploitation (Al-Moqaddem, 1999)¹⁹¹. Islam then came to honour women who are men's partners, and they became equally responsible for work and for life. He mentioned examples of mercy and honouring of women in Islam (Al-Moqaddem, 1999: 75-96). For him, complete woman-man equality is impossible, due to the difference in their nature. He then stated a number of differences between men and women. For instance, women cannot go to Jihad, they cannot become prophets, in most cases they get less inheritance, they cannot divorce, compensation for women's murder is half that

¹⁹⁰ Such tendency to compare the "honoured, precious, and protected Muslim women" to the "humiliated and suffering women" in the west and in other cultures and civilizations throughout history was the attitude of all the interviewees whether males or females, when women's rights issue is raised.

¹⁹¹ He sees that girls in the west are kicked out of their homes at the age of 18, and if they stay at their homes, they would pay the rent of their room and their living expenses to their parents. All this led to a number of consequences among them that marriage became rare, "adultery" increased and single mothers multiplied (Al-Moqaddem, 1999: 57-73).

of men, she cannot become a president, and they cannot enjoy polygamy. In addition, women are generally, emotional and passionate, and the fact that in court two female witnesses are equivalent to one male witness, is an evidence for him, that women's normal place is her home. Thus, women are not fully aware of legal and financial issues and need to remind each other. Women should have a legal guardian and a mahram¹⁹² to accompany her when she travels (Al-Moqaddem, 1999: 134-135, 145-146, 147-152). He also discussed mother's rights and duties, the mutual rights and duties of married couples. Again, he mentioned biographies of strong believers and women scholars (Al-Moqaddem, 1999: 209-475, 539-561, 600-627). Such book, which was written by the founder of DS, constituted the foundational book, or guide on women and women's role and rights for DS' followers.

This explains the fact that before January Revolution, and in a lecture in 2009, Sheikh Yasser Borhami (Borhami, 2009a) said that women should not become guardians and that they should not become parliament members. Salafis generally depend in this regard on the Hadith saying: "No people would thrive if they ordain a woman as their sovereign".

After the 2011 Revolution, women of DS were encouraged to undergo political participation. Accordingly, they joined the membership of Nor Party, the political wing of DS, and Sheikh Borhami issued an advisory opinion (Fatwa) allowing women to run for parliamentary elections. In his counsel, he said that the basic rule is that women should not be parliament members. However, he added, Islam encourages Muslims to maximize benefits and minimize losses. Hence, based on cost benefit analysis women can exceptionally run for elections, as the harm of violating the basic religious rule is less than the harm of leaving the parliament exclusively to secularists, who might issue a constitution that violates Islam and restricts Da'awa. He also said that if DS had banned political participation under a corrupt regime, the Revolution now secures a better political climate, where their participation would be meaningful (Borhami, 2011a).

Using the same logic, Borhami, in another counsel, allowed veiled women to uncover their faces while voting. He said that besides the fact that uncovering face is allowed by religion in case of necessity, the harm of a foreigner looking into a woman's face is much lesser than quitting political participation at this critical point, when Muslims are required to support the agenda of Islam and safeguard national identity. Thus, all women are encouraged to vote and to mobilize others to promote the true Islamic approach (Borhami, 2011b).

At the first Salafi women's conference in Alexandria in October 2011, Borhami stressed again that women's participation in parliament is a corrupt act which is not allowed by religion but the NP is obliged to accept such condition for political participation, instead of leaving the whole political scene to those who might fight Islam and the call for God (Abu El-Enin, 2011).

¹⁹² Someone of her relatives to chaperon her, i.e. a husband, a father, a son, or a brother.

Salafi women candidates then raised lots of questions and cast doubt on the NP's perceptions of women's rights and their agenda in this regard, when they put the pictures of flowers and sometimes the photos of their husbands¹⁹³, instead of their photos, on their electoral banners. At such time, members of the NP defended such attitude as a free personal choice of full-face veiled women candidates, who would not in any way show their faces in pictures, especially, that showing a picture is not enjoined by law. So, the party can never force these women to show their faces to the public against their own will (Hassanen, 2011).

At a meeting with women of NP leaders in Alexandria in January 2014, they confirmed to the researcher that such attitude came out of their own choice, and that they are irritated by the exaggerations and prejudgements of such matter in the media. They also mentioned that their faces do not make any difference, as the more important is their capabilities and skills, which enable them to come up with creative ideas that would serve their country's people (Meeting Female leaders). Such arguments were again confirmed during the preparations for 2015 parliamentary elections, where women are given the right to use the logo of the party instead of their faces (Mahmoud, 2015). In this concern, Dr. Allam asserted that the main criteria of choosing the women candidates are the same applied for men, and that Niqab is not an obligation, but rather the capability of acting in the parliament, together with the critical analytical mind. Meanwhile, women must have the will to give priority to public interests over personal or party interests (Kamal, 2014).

To sum up, the founders of DS and its leaders are clear about the religious restrictions on women's public guardianship and the priorities of women's duties in Islam. Obviously their discourse, as concerns women, contradicts the feminist and liberal discourses. However, unlike the general impression that Salafis are dogmatically reserved as concerns women's rights, they proved to be adaptive and flexible in one of the most critical issues in their thought. In view of a feminist or liberal thought, this flexibility could be read by some outsiders as a tactic, in contradiction to Salafi thought, while for others it constituted a religious concession for the sake of gaining power. This added to the aforementioned negative conceptual image about Salafis as hypocritical or corrupt, and that when they would actually assume power they would ruin all the achievements, which women made over the past years. On contrary to the suspicions which the non-Salafis made, and which the researcher observed in the field, NP's members confirmed on various occasions that they strictly abide by the established rules of the Salafi thought, which implied the necessity of judging each case separately, and of applying cost-benefit analysis, where they should maximize gains and minimize losses without committing fatal violations to Shari'a (int. F. leader, 2013). Accordingly, DS' women do not deny that women's public guardianship is a corrupt act, and that they did not give any concessions during the electoral process itself, as regards women's veil, and the appropriate Islamic conduct.

¹⁹³ However, in the case of putting husband's name or picture instead of the woman candidate's, the NP's spokesman mentioned several times that it was a plot against NP, and that the party filed a process verbal at the police in this regard, yet, such information was not corrected in any of the Egyptian or western media sources (AL-AL-HADIDI, L. 2011a. Nadder Bakkar Interview with Lamees El-Hadidi).

Field Observations and CDA Results:

The researcher met a number of DS' and NP's women, who were visited at their homes, NP's headquarters, and work place, in Alexandria, Al-Buhayra, and Al-Fayyom (Women's committee, 2014, Gawwad, 2013, kindergarden, 2013, int. F. leader, 2013, doctor, 2013). However, the access to Salafi women was not easy and required a long time to gain confidence and understanding to the project from the side of male leaders and members first, who then allowed the researcher to spend long time in their homes with women members and to meet their families. On the one hand, years of state oppression and fear from the state security, counter-Islamist movements, particularly, the MB, and intruders might explain the high standards of women protection. On the other hand, this matches the over-protective Salafi teachings as concerns men's duties towards women, and women's precautions and restrictions on movement and interaction with the society. As a result of the abovementioned conditions, women's activism and fame were confined to their city or village, and may be to their neighbourhood. Thus, there were many local female leaders and preachers, yet they were not known to the public in the same degree like their male counterparts (int. F. leader). This meant that DS' women worked in the public domain, yet only on the social level, over the last four decades. However, their recent active role in politics was based on their contributions and reputation in their districts. Dr. Allam confirmed this in her narrative of how she was chosen to become the NP Secretary-General of Women and of her clashes with MB, since she said that they have always known her as a rival (Int. Allam, 2013).

Unexpectedly, all the ladies that the researcher met were well educated even if they did not enjoy a high social status, but they stressed that education, research and knowledge are in the core of the movements' thought. For instance, the researcher met with medical doctors, PhD holders, scientists, and a lawyer, who wears Niqab, education specialists and a school headmistress, who wore coloured head covers, and having average make-up. Even those who did not work, or belonged to lower social classes still had an active role in charity work and in Da'awa. This could be explained by the fact that DS started in universities, and that most of them joined the movement when they were undergraduates.

Moreover, the women interviewed by the researcher, seemed to be generally enthusiastic and confident. Out of their daily life stories, it was clear that they are empowered at both the DS and NP, and they attributed this to the fact that Islam stresses husband and wife partnership¹⁹⁴. However, for them, men and women are never equal, yet, through their various contributions in life, they complement one another. For instance, a female leader said that husbands and wives developed their ideological tendencies and religious knowledge through this partnership. Since they were studying together, discussing, and even arguing until they formed an understanding that their choices might not be the same as their husbands' choices (int. F. leader). Another female member said that she was conservative since she was a child but she only

¹⁹⁴ Women can join DS even if their brothers or husbands are MB or belong to any other Islamist group. A young lady mentioned that she is facing pressures from her MB brother to leave DS, especially after June 30, but she insists on her position, and is highly critical of her brother's attitude.

became a Salafi once she joined DS' Al-Furqan Institute with her husband (Int. Allam, 2013). Actually, women's memories and narratives showed that Salafi thought and code of conduct were never imposed on them by their husbands, but was a personal choice that developed through research and education, and was sometimes associated with a certain turning point in their lives.

At one of the meetings with an ex-Shura Council member at his home in Al-Buhayra Governorate his wife, who was one of the interviewees as well, had been interrupting him, she had a loud voice, self-confidence, and her husband respected her and even relied on her to remind him of some points. This same lady, who asked the researcher not to mention her name, said that she was responsible for her home, and that she has taken care of her husband when he was imprisoned during Mubarak's rule, and that this is what women of the movement would normally do. She said that since she was in a critical situation, she moved on her own without a mahram. Yet, this was an exceptional case, and that normally she would prefer not to break the rules of women's travel and movement (int. F. leader). This was not the only case since similar visits in Alexandria, and Al-Fayyom proved that women were neither silent nor suppressed at their homes. They know that DS' men never practice polygamy, which can never be tolerated by women of DS. Moreover, it is clear that women's observation of Salafi teachings and acceptance of the restrictions, identity, social role, and duties that such teachings dictate, is a matter of personal choice.

Out of the aforementioned observations, women are actually the backbone of the movement, and might be one of the reasons of its survival and its hidden point of strength, since they were responsible for the bringing up of the new generations, educating them and spreading DS' thought in homes, kindergartens, institutes and mosques, as well as being socially active through socializing and charity work (int. F. leader, 2013, kindergarden, 2013)¹⁹⁵. They also managed to protect their homes and families when their husbands faced oppression and arrest by the State Security.

Thus, it was not surprising, that they stressed that their strong affiliation to DS and then to NP was based on critical thinking, interaction and research, and sometimes through comparing DS to other Islamist groups and even secular entities (Meeting Female leaders). In addition, they were keen on clarifying that they can pose to their sheikhs certain controversial questions, and can argue against their sheikhs' opinions and decisions. They even mentioned that Sheikh Borhami held conferences and lectures to discuss women's political concerns, and that their female leaders do not take their opinions for granted (Meeting Female leaders).

Such general findings added to the puzzle, which required a deeper look at the texts collected in the field, in view of the intellectual references of the interviewees, and of their social and political context. In this regard, the researcher operationalized CDA to the texts, in order to take account of the contradictions and to contextualize such texts.

¹⁹⁵Notes from a visit to a DS' kindergarden in Alexandria.

CDA results:

This part presents a brief overview of the results of CDA of texts collected in the field.

The texts were characterized by high affinity as regards opinions and suppositions mentioned by the women in reaction to both religious and political questions, reflected in assertive verbs and expressions, and the modality was generally subjective where the pronoun used is 'We', which gives the sense of high awareness of their identity, and a unified attitude towards certain issues.

As concerns the ethos (self-identification); the postures, frequent laughs and joking, firm language, strong voices, and facial expressions, were ways women wanted to say that they are happy, liberated, and empowered, and to send a clear message that conceptual images about them are not true. They were also keen to look presentable within their homes to prove that women can fully enjoy their lives in their private sphere, and that Niqab does not deprive them of their femininity and self-esteem¹⁹⁶. Regarding cohesion within the texts, the cohesive makers are explicit on the surface of the text, which at some point gave a sense of tutorial and preaching approach, and reflected an organized stream of thought. For instance, cohesive makers were used for deduction through stating a group of facts or conditions and coming up with a logical conclusion. As for transitivity, God and his rule are the main agents in all the processes and actions. In addition, there is a general tendency to state events (event and goal), and relational processes, especially when they mention MB, who were their historical rivals. However, unlike men, women interviewees were more open about their criticism to MB, and Mubarak's regime and would use clear sentences in that regard.

The ladies' wording: "God's love", "obedience of God", to reflect that their motives and authority all come from God. They mentioned "Egypt", "the country and love of the country", "serving the country", "I love the soil of Egypt", "we are highly patriotic", rather than the Muslim Umma or the nation, which implied a nationalist patriotic attitude, unlike fellow Islamists who might not respect borders among Muslim countries. They also used jargons and technical language when they discussed religious issues, in addition to the English scientific terms that were used particularly by the medical doctors, in addition to words such as the "triangle of poverty, ignorance, and illness", the "social context", and "respect of traditions". This implied their level of education and their awareness of their social and political context. There was also the use of the words, "our dear sisters" and similar emotional wording even when they talk about their rivals, which reflected both their nature as women and as activists in a religious movement rather than political party members. Words like exclusion, we were

¹⁹⁶ In the Party meeting, female leaders, and young NP's members acted spontaneously, and stressed a feminine identity, as wives, mothers, and ladies who go out of their homes mainly for religious reasons, and for God's reward, thus, they did not conform to the professional look and style of working women, and politicians. Besides sticking to a traditional feminine identity, and being passionate when they express their views, babies and children came with their mothers; however, this might be because of the special nature of this meeting that was more of a focus group to discuss the work of women in NP with the researcher. Many of them besides being mothers, they carry out social work, spread Da'awa, and might be also studying in post-graduate programs. They were proud with their activities and hard work, and repeated that despite being what they are, they have various contributions.

excluded, fear, obliged, all reflected their grievances under the pre-Revolution regimes and the MB counter-movement that aimed at dominating Islamist groups.

As regards turn taking, it occurred smoothly and did not reflect a strict hierarchy, except in the party meeting when the Secretary-General of women in the party tried to control the discussion and women responses to the researcher. She did that clearly in a mentor like attitude, and it seemed that they accepted her directions willingly, may be because she is their mentor as they said, or because the researcher was present and they wanted to keep a good image and a unified attitude towards the various issues discussed. However, Dr. Allam was not able to keep control most of the time, since women were keen on telling the new comer everything about the activities they are proud of and to share their political views, and the explanation of their righteous religious approach. For instance, by the end of the women party meeting, after each one took her turn to speak, voices overlapped and they all interrupted each other.

On the discursive level, the discourses they built upon were scientific religious and political ones, despite of the fact that the genre of the texts collected are semi-structured, and conversational interviews, besides a focus group, encounters with female DS' and NP's members were closer to women's everyday talk. However, sometimes women seemed well prepared for the meetings and there were clear messages sent to the society through the researcher. The style is an informal spoken text, that is conducted in Egyptian accent, and that it is both critical and argumentative. They would listen to the issues and claims that the researcher discusses, refutes them, and provides a counter-argument.

As regards Intertextuality, the texts quoted and used were from Quran, Sunna, and the contributions of the DS' founders, mainly Al-Moqaddem's book. They also joked and were ironic about the criticisms and the prejudgements against Salafis. However, except for the women's party meeting that was attended by several young ladies, and fresh graduates, it was obvious that they do not usually quote expressions or passages from popular culture, whether movies, theatre, drama, songs, or even proverbs, which are texts Egyptians generally use in their daily conversations. Moreover, they expressed in all cases their disrespect of some arts and considered them banned by religion, which might have contributed to their relative isolation from the society on the cultural level¹⁹⁷.

As for intertextual chains, as mentioned above, the texts included an adaptation to Al-Moqaddem's book and to Islamic teachings from women's point of view.

In almost all the interactions with the Salafi women their strategy was to accommodate the researcher, and express appreciation to her personally and towards her project. They treated her as a "We" not the "Other" despite of the fact that the researcher is unveiled and had a western look, for instance they told her "You are a Salafi by nature". They also used their knowledge, education and professions to assume authority over the researcher, for example as preachers, or medical doctors, in order to convince her that

¹⁹⁷ Further details will be discussed in the section on culture and de-culturation in DS' discourse.

what they say are facts not just opinions. As for the content of the texts, women were defending the Salafi thought and rules as concerns women, with all possible arguments, for instance, as concerns legal guardian, inheritance, and the role of women and their political rights. Their main argumentation was that none of the rules influence negatively their independence and free will, and that they consider them to their advantage and protection, rather than means of suppression.

To assess how such texts are consumed by the public, the researcher shared the content of the texts with people in her community and in this regard, people had mixed feelings of relief that there might be some hope in such ultra-conservative parties, yet, they generally do not believe them and have doubts that they are pretending to be tolerant, and open minded to gain votes and assume power.

In order to explain the gap between the findings about Salafi women in the field and the doubts and conceptual images that the public has about them, the textual and discursive analysis above should be contextualized.

Among the negative images that Egyptians have about Salafis, is their oppressive nature or, at least, the fact that they believe that they own the only right explanation of religion. Such image seemed to be closer to reality through the discourse analysis of DS' ladies. For despite of all the efforts to prove their tolerance and acceptance of the Other, Salafi women's assertive tone and firm language about all what they believe in religiously and politically, implies that they might feel that they knew the truth, and that they want to inform people with their right understanding, and share it with them. Thus, even if as per the interviewees, they do not assume superiority over the society, and they tend to adopt a containment approach¹⁹⁸, their determinism, and firm holding to their beliefs might have created a distance between them and their society. However, the researcher was told that young non-Salafi girls are never obliged to wear the veil in the Quran and religious schools of DS (kindergarten, 2013)¹⁹⁹, and that forcing them to cover would be useless, for the reason that if the girls are not convinced with the veil, they would throw it away once they leave the school (kindergarten, 2013). This attitude implies a bottom-up approach based on persuasion, and conforms to DS' general methodology. However, despite of the relatively mild practices, the discourse produced gives the opposite impression.

Nevertheless, Salafi women would not be as liberated and empowered as they try to show, since they actually try to convince themselves and the others with all the explanations of DS' sheikhs as concerns perspective on women, and despite their

¹⁹⁸ According to the researcher's experience, DS' women do not criticize the subject of da'awa, but rather build upon any positive side in him or her according to their point of view.

¹⁹⁹ The head of the Alexandria kindergarten is the wife of a prominent figure in NP; yet, she preferred not to be identified and refused to record the conversational interview. She mentioned that she has chosen to keep a low profile, not to work in politics and is not interested in political discussions, and she confined her contribution to taking care of babies and children, while focusing as well on her home and her own children. According to her the kindergarten serves non-Salafis in the district, as well, and they find it a clean and a reliable place to leave their children in, especially when they get some religious education and recite Quran, starting at the age of three, through using the "Norany method". The lady and her husband showed interest in human development courses and events, and in education. She was wearing Niqab, and spoke in a low voice, and despite of her social work, she was a shy person, not outspoken like the rest of DS' ladies met in other contexts.

personal free choice to be Salafis, they are subject to such explanations and confine their understanding to Islam to them, even if these interpretations might be challenging or intolerable when applied in everyday life. However, they stress that each case has its own conditions, since there is no generalization in Islam, thus, exceptions are always possible depending on the situation. For instance, they said that they approve of all God's rules and orders, and among them polygamy, yet they do not tolerate that their husband marries another one. In the case of the Kafr El Dawwar leader she said that in her situation, she moved around without a mahram to visit her husband in prison and provide him with necessary medicine. "Thus, in case of necessity there is always flexibility" (int. F. leader, 2013). They all stressed that their life is not as tough as others might see (Women's committee, 2014). Beyond the precision of such statements, this is another evidence of the gap between DS' strict discourse, and their rather mild practices.

Besides being perceived as strict, Salafi women are sometimes not considered fully Egyptian, which is not only attributed to their appearance, but also as aforementioned, because of the fact that they are culturally isolated, despite of their active role on ground between charity and call for God.

In addition, DS' Salafi women kept a low profile due to the fears they had; the harassment, exclusion, and pressures, on part of their counter-movement the MB and the state security (all interviews), thus their reality was not revealed to the public. In addition, the simplicity of the DS' discourse that refers Muslims to Quran and Sunna through Salaf understanding attracted a large number of women from different backgrounds and among them poor women who might not be educated like the leaders and active members of the organization and NP. Such women who are unable to explain and argue contributed to the negative image of manipulated women Salafis, "even if they are not and are only unable to express themselves" (int. F. leader).

To sum up Salafi women provide a new model of women politicians and activists who might be more powerful than many unveiled and westernized women, yet they do not match the feminist and liberal discourses of women's liberation and of how a successful women should look like, in addition to the obvious gap between DS' strict religious discourse, and their mild practices.

Moreover, Salafi women might be culturally isolated, thus, are judged as non Egyptians especially those who wear Niqab among them. However, these women always stress that they are Egyptians; yet, they do not match the dominant nationalist discourses, where such nationalist discourses also assume that they own the truth about the Egyptian national identity.

In conclusion, Salafi women are not the submissive women shrouded in black, meanwhile, they do not fully resemble a liberated model but a pattern in between. The gap between their feeling of over-confidence and success and the image of a submissive woman could be mainly attributed to society's attempts to impose liberal, feminist, and nationalist discourses on them, while they actually represent a different model, yet not necessarily in a negative or a positive sense. What augmented DS' women's societal

crisis was their personal choice to keep a low profile, and to adhere to their role prescribed by the religious interpretations they adopt.

Christians in DS' and NP's Discourse:

One of the most controversial issues about DS and NP was their discourse about Christians generally, and particularly as regards their citizenship and full political rights. This section discusses the results of CDA of texts collected in the field, through interviews with NP's and DS' leaders, their youth and women.

The wording of the texts analyzed revealed that Christians were linked to concepts of "Nasara"²⁰⁰ with the positive connotation of those who supported the religion or the order of God. By this word the Quran describes them (Women's committee, 2014). However, an NP's female member said that Christians do not like the word despite that it is an honour for them to be supporters of God's orders, yet they prefer to be named after Christ, thus, Salafis go around this and call them by their own names in everyday life (Women's committee, 2014). In nearly all the interviews that discussed Christians' affairs there was a strong reference to their history under Muslim rule, and in one of the interviews the word Ahl Al-Dhimma/Zimma was linked to Christians (int. Nasr, 2013). The "Dhimmi" according to Oxford Encyclopaedia of Islam and law is "a non-Muslim who is in the covenant of protection (*dhimmah*) with the Muslim ruling authority. The *dhimmah* accorded hospitality and protection to Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians, and in some cases other non-Muslims, on condition that they paid the *jizyah* (a poll tax) and acknowledged the domination of Islam (Scott, 2016)."

According to the American Heritage Dictionary a Zimmi is "a non –Muslim subject of a state governed under Shari'a laws. Under such state they are granted the freedom to worship, and they entitled to the protection of life and property by the state, although they were constrained to pay a special tax. However, they were not granted full legal status accorded to Muslim subjects (Dictionary, 2011).

Even if the exact word of Dhimmis was not used, its definition prevailed in describing Christians' rights in Islam. Makhyon said that "Islam prescribes that Muslims should protect non-Muslims, which means that a Muslim might sacrifice his life for the sake of defending a Christian", and that Christians enjoy respect and all the rights, particularly the right to hold their prayers and rituals, and they carry out their duties as well (int. Makhyon, 2013). In reference to Christians' status, Ahmed Rashwan said that in Muslim countries we have a different contract (conv. int. Rashwan, 2013). Adel Nasr stressed that Shari'a prevented causing any harm to Christians (int. Nasr, 2013).

They tended to provide historical evidence from the Islamic history on how non-Muslims enjoyed dignity and peace under the Islamic rule²⁰¹ (int. Nasr, 2013). In modern history they refer to the fact that Pope Shenouda III had resorted to article 2 of

²⁰⁰ Most interviewees used this word.

²⁰¹ To the extent that Jews fled oppression in Andalusia to the Ottoman empire in order to gain more rights under Islamic rule, in addition to the favourable conditions Christians live under the Islamic rule in Egypt, after being suppressed and tortured by fellow Christian Romans (INT. NASR, A. 7.11.2013, 2.15-5.30. 2013. RE: interview.

the constitution in order to defend the church's right to manage Christian personal affairs, according to Christian religious verdicts, as Islamic Shari'a prescribes (int. Nasr, 2013, int. Makhyon, 2013). Thus, NP's members and DS' sheikhs see that Islam and Shari'a, if applied in the right way would be the guarantee for the rights of the Christian minority (int. Nasr, 2013, int. Makhyon, 2013). However, such definition of Christians' rights implies an incomplete citizenship, and despite that they recognize all social and protection rights, according to Makhyon Christians' rights are "not absolute, since we are a country with a Muslim majority, and minority and majority could never be equal in everything" (int. Makhyon, 2013). Nasr said that Islam has a comprehensive Shari'a and is based on preserving religion and ruling the earthly life according to the divine rules. "This Shari'a is complete and free of any alterations, I am not like that of Christians, that is based on some values and moral rulings" (int. Nasr, 2013). Therefore, Nasr asked "would it be logical that the governor who rules Muslims with their religion, Shari'a, and Manhaj be a non-Muslim?" (int. Nasr, 2013). For Nasr, and Makhyon, according to the modern democratic system it is a majority rule. Consequently, as a Muslim majority, will be ruled by Shari'a, and in Islam this who can accomplish the objectives, should be a Muslim, since a non-Muslim can never maintain Shari'a (int. Nasr, 2013). In addition, the president is a role model (int. Nasr, 2013, int. Makhyon, 2013).

Moreover, they believe that, based on human instinct any social group should be ruled by someone who shares its belief (int. Nasr, 2013). DS' and NP's members do not see any discrimination in this regard, (int. Makhyon, 2013) but it is the human nature, and logic that in any human group, majority will take more rights, and their belief will prevail, and they would prefer a leader who shares this belief (int. Nasr, 2013).

Nevertheless, they confirmed that the Egyptian law, which is the legal framework under which they work and follow, guarantees for Christians full citizenship rights. However, "DS' religious belief and their logic dictates that they must oppose that a Christian becomes a presidential candidate, since in Islam there are rules and conditions for guardianship that should not be violated, and if it happened they would clearly judge it as defying Shari'a, despite the fact that they would still follow the law" (conv. int. Rashwan, 2013). Yet, they say that if this is the law, and if the constitution gives the right for any non-Muslim or non-Sunni to be a presidential candidate, they bet that due to conventions and culture, the Muslim general atmosphere would tend to choose a Muslim-Sunni president, and would not accept any other options (int. Makhyon, 2013, Int. Mekki, 2013). Meanwhile, Makhyon does not see any problem that Christians hold whatever positions in the state, other than the presidency, as long as they proved to be experienced and loyal Egyptians. As an evidence to this idea, he mentioned the fact that prophet Muhammad used a "kafir guide" in his trip through the desert between Mecca and Al-Madina (int. Makhyon, 2013). Moreover, he said that NP believes in "administration" rather than "governance" or "ruling" of the country, and that a good management of the country requires dependence on all efficient factors (int. Makhyon, 2013).

Besides arguments of “human instinct”, “minority-majority” justification, the practical concerns of “convention and culture”, and the “Islamic Shari’a”, that all support an incomplete citizenship for Christians, they believe that western practices go beyond empowering the majority over the minority, to the extent practising discrimination against Muslims, whose conditions are terrible in the west²⁰². Thus, in reality, freedoms in the west has a ceiling that protects the foundations of the state (int. Nasr, 2013). Whereas Christians in Egypt can refer to their religious verdict in personal affairs, Muslims in the west cannot refer to their Shari’a in personal affairs, and should abide by the laws of the countries where they live, such as in France, or in the US where for instance polygamy is criminalized (int. Nasr, 2013). Therefore, Makhyon sees that Christians in Egypt are “the happiest minority in the world, however, they do not appreciate the blessing that they enjoy” (int. Makhyon, 2013).

In this regard, they all tended to compare the Christian minority to Muslim minorities in the west. The first question that is asked is “why Muslims who pay taxes and carry out all their duties in western countries are still treated as second class citizen?” They also mention that Muslims are denied the right to specify the religion of the president, while, western constitutions sometimes determine the religion and the sect of the president which could be for instance, catholic (int. Makhyon, 2013, int. Nasr, 2013). In this regard, they criticize the western countries for claiming that they maintain human rights, and they blame Muslim countries for discrimination, while they do empower the majority over the minority, and even suppress Muslim minorities (int. Nasr, 2013, int. Makhyon, 2013).

During the period when the field work was conducted had coincided with the work of the Fifty’s constitutional committee, after June 30 2013, where the Egyptian church representatives opposed the article 219 that interprets the word “principles of Islamic Shari’a” under article 2 of the Constitution, such opposition bothered NP’s members who believe that it is “none of the Christians’ business”, and that what Christians call the MB’s constitution included article 3 that guarantees rights of Christians to refer to their religious verdicts in personal affairs, and to appoint their spiritual leaders. Such article was issued for the first time in Egypt’s history, thanks to Islamists where NP’s members and among them Makhyon were members in the committee that approved such article, at the time when Muslims’ rights are never mentioned in any western constitution (int. Makhyon, 2013). Such Christian²⁰³ opposition to article 219, was understood by NP’s members as a “conspiracy or a plot” against Islam to turn it into wide vague principles that can never be applied in reality, through voiding article 2 of its meaning (int. Makhyon, 2013, int. Nasr, 2013). Such explanation is based on DS’ and NP’s narratives about the church’s discourse. Accordingly, they supported their fears by evidence from “stories told” about the separatist tendency of late Pope Shenouda in the 1950’s who according to their narrative led a Copts’ independence movement, besides what they believe is the church’s literature, and their reading of the content of the Christian newspaper Watani, in addition to the most recent discursive

²⁰² Some governments refuse to allow minarets or Hijab.

²⁰³ Seculars opposed as well, besides some Azhari figures (INT. MAKHYON, Y. 2013. interview, TALIBBYA 2013. meeting).

conflict, discussed in chapter 5, with Bishop Bishoy who considered “Muslims as temporary guests in Egypt, and are going to leave” (int. Makhyon, 2013, int. Nasr, 2013). Such things besides reflecting bad intentions towards Muslims, are perceived by DS’ members as “seeds for sectarian sedition,” which “undermines Egyptian national unity”, and “leads to the destruction of the country” (int. Nasr, 2013).

However, as concerns sectarian sedition incidents, Nasr believed that Muslims and Christians are equally responsible for them and that sometimes Christians violate Muslims’ rights. For Nasr, article 219 is one example for “how a minority is trying to impose its opinion on the majority”, from his point of view (int. Nasr, 2013). ”

Thus, they argued that the Christians are a “positively discriminated at minority”, while Muslims are the “oppressed majority subject to discrimination”. Such argument was mentioned earlier during the crisis of the church bombings discussed in chapter 5. While Sheikh Ahmed Farid avoided to discuss the topic of Christians in the interview he said “I swear to God Christians are taking all their rights and even more, Muslims are the discriminated at majority”. They seemed to be responding to pressures from the west in this regard, which from their point of view completely defies reality of Christians in Egypt (int. Nasr, 2013, int. Makhyon, 2013).

Thus, as concerns citizenship, DS’ and NP’s members do believe in an incomplete citizenship for Christians. Despite of their background that is influenced by the concept of Dhimmis, which was obvious in their argumentation, however, they preferred to base their opinion on the definition of democracy as the majority rule, and on the actual application of democracy in western countries. Saying that this indicates that there is no absolute democracy or rights, thus, Christians being a minority could never be equated to the Muslim majority, from their point of view. Their justification to this exclusionary view, is that in practice Muslims in the west are not full citizens, and it is inconceivable that at any time, there could be a Muslim presidential candidate in a western country for instance (Int. Mekki, 2013). This change in the wording, and the discourses they draw upon, where they tended to use definitions of democracy, human rights issues, and legal references, did not mean a change in their word meaning where the definition of Christians’ status, and the obvious presence of the definition of a Dhimmi, without using the word though, reflected consistency in their discourse about Christians’ citizenship. They were mainly saying the same thing in a different way, which leads to the same conclusion and reflects insistence on adhering to their original DS’ discourse, despite becoming political actors. Therefore, in view of the Egyptian constitution, their position in this regard, remains politically controversial or incorrect within the Egyptian context.

Nevertheless, they say that when Christians listen to NP’s viewpoint from NP’s members, they react positively (Int. Mekki, 2013). In addition, NP despite having a Salafi ideology, is a political party that is open for every Egyptian citizen, even for Christians, as long as they believe in the party’s ideology and objectives (Int. Mekki, 2013, Women's committee, 2014).

Nevertheless, DS' members also linked Christians to the word "Kafir," or infidel in the sense that they are non-Muslims, which is a fact, however, for Christians this word means that they are atheists, or may be evil, since infidelity in the Egyptian accent is used as an exaggeration sometimes to deny evil or lack of mercy. Such word was not mentioned in any of the interviews or conversations held in the field with DS' or NP's members, yet there is evidence from media (Al-Hadidi, 2015, Al-Ibrashi, 2015)²⁰⁴, and in comments in talk shows and interviews in the field, with average Egyptians whether Muslims or Christians (field notes), indicating that DS' members use the word.

What led to more resentment is the repeated fatwa DS' sheikhs, particularly Borhami that it is prohibited in Islam, to greet Christians in their feasts since the Christmas and Easter are connected to beliefs that defy Islamic faith. Thus, since in Islam feasts are part of religion, then Muslims can only celebrate Edul Fetr and Edul-Audha. Meanwhile, Christians are free to enjoy their feasts and are never obliged to greet Muslims in theirs, or to do anything against their faith (int. Nasr, 2013). In addition, Muslims are free to share Christians all other social occasions, weddings, funerals, birth, and they are ordered by religion to support Christians in calamities and visit them in case they are ill, or in need for help (int. Nasr, 2013). However, such fatwa irritated Christians, and astonished Muslims (Al-Hadidi, 2015, Al-Ibrashi, 2015). Moreover, it was not a matter of consensus among Muslim sheikhs (field notes) (Al-Ibrashi, 2015). Nevertheless, at the NP's female members meeting, they insisted on stressing that this did not negatively affect their relationship with their Christian friends and neighbours, as media says, since they share everything with them, and life is full of occasions that is far more important than feasts, in addition to offering charity and services to Christians (Women's committee, 2014, Gawwad, 2013). On the contrary, "because of DS' popularity on different levels some Christians joined the party (Women's committee, 2014)." Some interviewees in the female leaders' meeting, said that it is a personal freedom, and that their Christian friends and colleagues get used to this fatwa, and they do not care (Women's committee, 2014). They supported their point by saying that their relationship with their Christian neighbours was much better after DS' efforts in protecting them during the 2011 Revolution (Women's committee, 2014). However, despite insisting that their relationship is not affected, a lady said that "they used to exchange feast cookies with their Christian neighbours and that they used to attend their weddings in churches, but after "religious commitment" both stopped doing this" (Women's committee, 2014). However, despite the change in the pattern of their relationship they still exchange visits (Women's committee, 2014). The wording they used was friendly such as "we have Christian neighbours who brought us up", "they care for my 68 years old mum who wears Niqab", "our Christian neighbour trusts my husband and consults him when goes to buy assets" (Women's committee, 2014).

²⁰⁴ Nader Al-Serafi, the founder of 38 Copts against the church personal affairs law, and NP's Christian candidate for 2015 parliamentary elections, said that he understands DS' use of Kafir, as a non-believer, and that he appreciates NP's positions on combating sectarian conflicts, and is equally treated in the party based on the Egyptian Constitution, whereas he thinks that NP' members' religious belief is goes against the law, religion is not part of his relationship with the party. On the contrary, his competitor in the same constituency Suzy Nashed, who is Christian as well yet a candidate of the nationalist front "In love of Egypt", said that she finds the word kafir very offensive and that even if it is a fact she does not dare to use the word, and would rather use the word non-believer. Mrs. Nashed, believes that NP's views would harm the Egyptian identity.

Such positive language about Christians, their stories about providing their services, and support for everybody with no regard to his religion, and that they protected Christian properties and churches during 2011 Revolution (int. Nasr, 2013), came against all the impressions about Salafis' perceptions of Christians, despite of conforming to the definition of Dhimmi in Islam. Accordingly, such input was focused on issues of social rights, and religious obligations and duties of Muslims towards non-Muslims, for purposes of peaceful and healthy co-existence similar to that of Al-Madina during the days of Prophet Mohammad (Women's committee, 2014, int. Nasr, 2013). "Therefore, sticking to their Islamic faith and rulings, does not contradict with being friendly with Christians" (int. Nasr, 2013). It is obvious that NP's members interviewed could not understand why they have a good experience of coexistence on the personal and neighbourhood levels, while they have an extremely negative image as concerns Christians on the national level (Women's committee, 2014).

From the abovementioned analysis, such national resentment might be explained by the fact that DS' members ignore the irritation to Christians due to the fatwa of greeting in feasts, and to the use of offensive or belittling terms on describing Christians from the public viewpoint. However, beyond the wording and the cultural issues, the most critical part is that Christians' rights in Islam for DS' members are confined to the social side, thus Christians' full citizenship and political rights were the point of concern for Christians (Al-Youm, 2015).

Nonetheless, DS' discourse on Christians, discussed above, contradicted the party's choice to run Christians on their lists for the 2015²⁰⁵parliamentary elections²⁰⁶, which put NP's Christian candidates under pressures from the Christian community, to the extent that NP did not announce their names (Al-Youm, 2015, Masr, 2015, Fouad, 2015). Such step, did not only infuriate Christians (Fouad, 2015), but also reinforced the image of a pragmatic and inconsistent political party (Al-Hadidi, 2015). The Christians who joined the party in the elections were accused of treason, and of being part of a plot against the church (Al-Hadidi, 2015, Al-Ibrashi, 2015). Among such debate on the contradiction between DS' discourse about Christians and running Christian candidates, Makhyon mentioned that NP are running Christian candidates only because the law obliged them to do so, and if it were not for abiding by law, NP would not have thought of running Christians for parliamentary elections (Kamel, 2015), yet, Nader Al-Serafy, who is not only a Christian NP's candidate, but also member of the NP legal committee, commented on this saying that this is the Salafi thought and the party is abiding by law, and the main criteria for judging it is "our performance in the parliament, and the legislations we intend to push for" (Kamel, 2015). This conforms to NP's position in adopting DS' discourse, while abiding by the Egyptian law, despite the fact of denying the religious violations under such law.

However, in all cases no one of the Christians, won any of the seats in the parliament (Ali, 2015). The Christian candidate, who turned against NP after the elections, said that

²⁰⁵ The field work did not cover the 2015 elections.

²⁰⁶ The elections law, stated that a quota of 24 Christians should run on the lists of each party or front all over the country (FOUAD, A. 2015. Who are the Christians of the Salafi NP? *Al Monitor*.

the party did not support her and that they stopped to contact their Christian candidates after the elections. She also said that there are divisions within the party regarding Christian candidates (Hegazy, 2015). However, Nader Al-Serafy, the Christian candidate of NP in West Delta, said that he will continue with NP and will follow its decisions, and support candidates in the second round of the elections (United, 2015). He also said earlier that the party was committed to the guardianship rules, but discussions were made, and due to their calculations they agreed upon running Christian candidates (Kamel, 2015). However, neither DS nor NP stated that they believe in such step or consider it conforming to Shari'a. Thus, DS and NP maintained their beliefs about Christians, while running Christian candidates, in contrast to their rules about Christian's guardianship.

Nonetheless, in the interviews carried out in the field, they mainly talked about presidency not the parliament. However, in view of their previous religious adaptation as concerns women guardianship, they probably used the same cost-benefit analysis from a religious perspective as shown in other chapters, regarding this issue of Christians' guardianship. One of the possible justifications, in view of the analysis in this dissertation, would be that NP wanted to assure the state, and other political powers that they are a political party that conforms to the Constitution, particularly, when there was a case against them in the supreme administrative court demanding their dissolution on basis of being a religious party, in contradiction with the Egyptian Constitution (Kamel, 2016). Where NP insist that they are a political party open to all Egyptians but with a Salafi ideology, and like any political party they have an intellectual reference (Int. Mekki, 2013). Thus, in view of NP's belief and self-identification, it could be true that Christians' presence was a formality to complete the image of the party, and using DS' cost-benefit analysis and logic, such policy choice might maximize interests and minimize the losses, since absence from the political scene is a loss, and presence even with insignificant representation is for them a success (Talibbya, 2013). Yet, despite of the negative image that NP acquired, it seems that they achieved their target, since the court ruling rejected the party dissolution (Kamel, 2016).

As mentioned above, they are keen on a political presence, however without sacrificing their foundations. Nevertheless, in view of the fact that NP is the only remaining Islamist party, they had to consider cooperation with other non-Islamist fronts, despite of their religious reservations on alliances with non-Islamists, however, nobody allowed them in and they had to run alone in the elections (Al-Shahhat, 2015). Thus, the only condition for them to continue was to run Christian candidates, which makes a case for an interests-evils argument.

To sum up, putting aside the reasons behind running Christians candidates on NP's electoral lists, the obvious fact is that there is a gap between NP's discourse, and their political action in this regard. NP and DS see their shocking discourse as logical, and that they have all the right to adhere to it out of belief concerns. In view of the DS' members vision the words and terms they use to describe Christians really have a good or at least a neutral connotation. However, Christians believe that their connotation is extremely offensive. Moreover, average Muslims met on the field see that such

discourse is alien to the mainstream discourse that “Christians worship God in a different way, and that they have fatal belief and faith violations and misunderstanding, yet it is none of Muslims’ business” (field notes), the researcher was also told “since when we think twice before greeting Christians, and since when we say Muslims and Christians” (field notes). Such tolerant or indifferent discourse of average Muslims, might also reflect an inherent national security fear of sectarian conflict, or of discussing such sensitive issue, even if some Muslims do not fully respect Christians (Dalacoura, 2014),²⁰⁷ field notes). In addition, the arguments used in the interviews imply that accumulations of discursive conflicts between Muslim and Christian extremists (in reference to Bishop Bishoy crisis discussed earlier), left DS’ members with hard feelings. However, DS’ members believe that in all cases they should strictly abide by Shari’a and grant Christians their social and protection rights, just for the sake of respecting divine orders, and for purposes of peaceful co-existence. This suggests that they are against the mistreatment of Christians or using violence against them. In this regard, Nasr mentioned that in view of DS’ understanding, which he explained, “DS is the only Islamist group that never used violence against Christians” (int. Nasr, 2013), and Thabet, said that “in the case of Kamilia Shehata, rank and file of the movement joined protests, but DS refused to initiate any action or to take the lead in this, since despite their clear position, they avoid confrontation” (int. Thabet, 2013).

Yet, “full citizenship rights and status of Christians,” remains the point of contradiction between Al Manhaj or DS’ religious discourse, and the Egyptian legal framework which NP respects and follows, as they say. This gap between the belief and the law, and NP’s attempts to combine both in a very delicate equation, might lead to the inconsistent behaviour of NP. Therefore, according to their discourse, they seem to choose such controversial acts intentionally, even if they lead to a high political cost, or puts the party’s image at stake.

Such detachment from the mainstream discourse in Egypt is not separate from their equally debateable position on art and culture.

Culture and De-culturation:

The issue of NP’s rejection to art and culture, which was seen by Egyptian artists as reactionary and taking Egypt backward, was brought up mainly when NP’s Shura council member demanded that ballet be prohibited in Egypt (Al-Youm, 2013)²⁰⁸.

²⁰⁷ Dalacoura says “Let us be honest: for the majority of Egyptians, women and the Copts must be kept firmly in their place.”

²⁰⁸ In a meeting of the Shura Council's Culture, Information and Tourism Committee, to decide on the budget for the Opera House for the new fiscal year, Gamal Hamed, NP’s member, linked Ballet to nudity and said that it spreads immorality and obscenity to the people. Hamed said that “he is not against the arts in general, but that he opposes "nudity" in the name of art or under the banner of cultural slogans.” (AL-YOUM, A.-M. 2013. Salafis demand end to women's rights body, ballet. *Egypt Independent*).

In this regard, NP's and DS' members interviewed, said that they do not ban all kinds of art. However, they accept the art that abides by religious rules and restrictions. Thus, they accept cinema and acting, as long as it conforms to Shari'a, particularly when it is modest, and does not include insults (Gawwad, 2013, Shams, 2013). However, they say that there are clear texts in the Quran and in Sunna, which, according to their interpretations ban music (Women's committee, 2014). Whereas they respect chanting, and members of DS compose their chanting songs, they practise poetry recitation, Arabic handwriting, painting, and women said they had a women's magazine (Women's committee, 2014). They also saw that the researchers' interest in art is a type of psychological tricks, called "displacement", however, by time the researcher would draw her attention to other things (Women's committee, 2014). Nevertheless, the ladies were aware of the popular culture, and were not isolated, but rather, knew the jokes and the expressions used in the movies. However, they have chosen to detach themselves from it and to make their own sort of sub-culture in which they gave up many of the popular cultural aspects (Women's committee, 2014). Nevertheless, they spoke everyday Egyptian accent, and one of them admitted that she has difficulty in resisting listening to music particularly the classical Egyptian songs, but she is trying hard to get rid of this habit, since she knew that it is wrong (Women's committee, 2014). The same impression was taken from young men who were aware of the Egyptian artistic production, yet boycotted it and had reservations on the defamation of religious people and the dualities presented in cinema that shows secular westernized as good people and religious people as evil and ignorant terrorists (Bakkar, 2013)²⁰⁹. Another young man in the party affirmed the distinction between the religiously accepted art, that is subject to religious rules, and the banned art that violates them, and said that our job is to advise people, and they are free to follow or to ignore our message (Shams, 2013). When discussing art and culture, he mentioned that unfortunately, "the Egyptian culture is now associated with the public places in tourist areas such "the Pyramids street Cabarets", which implies, in his understanding, a connection between arts and night life (Shams, 2013). However, he said that it is not wise to shut down all places, but rather to apply a more sustainable solution through social change and spreading Da'awa (Shams, 2013), which conforms to DS' long term, gradual bottom-up social change approach, in which they rely on a reforming individuals and society, so that a Muslim committed society would make more Islamic choices, and give up sources of vice. He said that he will never say that folkloric dancing and ballet are accepted just to please people. In this regard, and according to his viewpoint ballet requires a certain outfit that is not allowed in Islam, and, in his opinion, women should never perform such dancing (Shams, 2013). This bottom-up approach was approved by an NP's leader who stressed that a more sustainable change should come from the bottom, and from changing society, rather than shutting down night-clubs (Mekki). This goes in line with rejecting violence or changing vice by hand, as one of the main rules of promoting virtue and preventing vice, in DS' discourse, earlier discussed.

²⁰⁹ Mahmoud Shaltoot attended the discussion and showed awareness of what Bakkar pointed at, he confirmed his point and was ironic about the stereotypes, and suppositions of Egyptian cinema.

In interviews, the common point of view among persons interviewed was the acceptance of traditions, habits, and convention. Thus, the way people celebrate, and all aspects of modern life are acceptable as long as they are not connected to infidelity or pagan practices (Shams, 2013, int. Nasr, 2013). Moreover, convention and customary law is highly respected by DS' members and "it is considered one of the references in Islamic Shari'a, and could be a source of legislation, if there is no clear religious texts dealing with certain issues" (int. Nasr, 2013). Therefore, people's customs and culture are highly respected, and DS' members think that imposing a law that defies them would be considered a top-down change that people would undermine and find ways to secretly evade. So if there are harmful habits, they should be countered by education and spreading awareness (Gawwad, 2013). Such stance supports the bottom-up approach in DS' discourse. They also believe that Islam gave a wide range of options and alternatives to fit the conditions of people who are diversified as regards culture, social class, education, and even weather and regional conditions (int. F. leader, 2013). This conforms to DS' discourse that Islam is comprehensive and all inclusive.

Therefore, their discourse reflects a tendency to adhere to a bottom-up reform approach to society's violations, and a non-Takfiri approach to the society, where people definitely commit sins and pitfalls (Omar, 2013). On the contrary, they see the society as mostly conservative (Int. Mekki, 2013). In spite of the fact that such generalization might not be necessarily true. However, it shows that they do not see themselves as the "chosen people" or the "saviour", but are just people who study, and who have extra information that they want to share (Omar, 2013, Gawwad, 2013), and that each Muslim should share whatever religious information he learns with others, even if he or she is not a scholar (Shokry, 2013, Meeting Female leaders, 2014, Gawwad, 2013, Omar, 2013). This conforms to the importance of education, and focus on the individual and social levels in DS' methodology, through means of sharing information, direct interaction, and building upon emotional informal and faith based relationship with individuals and groups within their communities (Omar, 2013, Women's committee, 2014, Gawwad, 2013).

The features of their missionary or Da'awa discourse, besides being non-Takfiri, and non-violent, it does not depict society or assume the role of the guardians such as the case of top-down approaches. However, this positive aspect of their social change approach, contradicts the image of the sectarian, strict, Salafis. This could be explained in view of their obvious detachment from the popular culture, rejecting most types of art, which is perceived as a tendency of de-culturation, and departing from the mainstream discourse as regards Egyptian Islam (discussed in chapter 5), in addition to their perception of women's political rights and restrictions²¹⁰, and the status of Christians, and their right to full citizenship. Moreover, the fact that Salafis tend to have a special outfit, such as Niqab, and dark colours through which DS' women are distinguished (Gawwad, 2013), as well as letting men's beards (Shokry, 2013)²¹¹, make

²¹⁰ Even with the fact that Salafi women follow such rules willingly, are not giving priority to political rights, and see that they are empowered.

²¹¹ They insist on their look even if it causes social resentment, or problems with security. Shokry said that in Islam there is no difference between core and crust, all religious rules and practices should be followed even as concerns

them differentiated among other Egyptians, with all the negative and positive reactions to this look (field notes). Such factors constitute a challenge to DS' discourse, and to NP's political acceptance, where at least they would be perceived as a different group, if not a dangerous one.

appearance and whatever the challenges are. This was in a researcher's comment on why DS' members do not shave to hide their identity, since after June 30 they were subject to security threats from MB, and mainly from common people in the street who were angry at Islamists.

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